

**“Institutional Change of the Senior Civil Service:
A comparative analysis of
the United Kingdom and South Korea”**

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Abstract

This thesis provides a comparative analysis of the process of Senior Civil Service (SCS) reform to improve understanding of changes in the United Kingdom and South Korea. A SCS system is a distinctive personnel management arrangement for high-ranking officials. It is not only composed of various sub-systems about their reward, competency and loyalty, but is also influenced by dynamic politico-administrative relations. Moreover, this civil service reforms vary depending on the different places and eras. The thesis attempts to examine the characteristics and causal factors behind the SCS change from the perspective of historical institutionalism, as well as to assess the changed results in multi-dimensional framework.

The comparative case study explores the development of the British and Korean SCS systems in the period from before their launch to after the turnover of government (Mr. Blair and Mr. Lee) based on the concepts of public service bargains (PSB) and politicisation. Both countries can be comparable cases methodologically because of their contrasting backgrounds, and measuring both countries' SCS types before and after the alternations in government allows to recognise the pattern of the institutional changes over time. Then the comparison of their processes and results facilitates to analyse the key causal factor(s) of the dynamics.

The findings reveal not only the diverse types of SCS, which varies across time and space, but also the different patterns of its change process by means of its institutional properties. Also, this research demonstrates empirically that the shift toward managerialism in the core of PSB, reward and loyalty, drove the changes to the SCSs in Britain and Korea. This relation may be comprehended fully by establishing the change mechanism in which the bargains over power, as well as the institutional resources shaping or delimiting the strategies of change-agents are reflected. The assessment of these changes can differ according to which method or perspective is adopted. Furthermore, it is discovered that the gradual transformation of the British SCS, which is founded on the 'agency' bargains, contrasts with the institutional change of SCS in Korea where the 'tutelary' bargains has been deep-rooted. Consequently, this thesis contributes to the development of literature on the SCS systems, civil service reform and PSBs by providing insights into the SCS concept and the institutional dynamics.

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List of Abbreviation

ABC	Anything But Clinton
ABR	Anything But Roh Moo-hyun
AC	Assessment Centre
APS	Australian Public Service
BH	Blue House (Office of the President)
BSC	Balanced Score Card
CSC	Civil Service Commission
CSD	Civil Service Department
CSRA	Civil Service Reform Act
EL	Executive Level
ERBs	Executive Resources Boards
Ex Group	Canada Executive Group
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FMI	Financial Management Initiative
GS	General Schedule
HR	Human Resource
IMF	International Monetary Fund
JESP	Job Evaluation for Senior Posts
JPS	Job Posting System
KCSC	Korea Civil Service Commission
MDSD	Most Different Systems Designs
MMA	Mill's Method of Agreement
MMD	Mill's Method of Difference
MOFAT	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
MOGAHA	Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs
MOPAS	Ministry of Public Administration and Security
MPs	Members of Parliament

MPB	Ministry of Planning and Budget
MPM	Ministry of Personnel Management
MSSD	Most Similar Systems Designs
NPM	New Public Management
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OMCS	Office of Minister for the Civil Service
OPS	Open position system
OPSS	Office of Public Service and Science
OPM	Office of Personnel Management
PM	Prime Minister
PRP	Performance-Related Pay
PSB	Public Service Bargains
PSE	Public Service Ethos
QRB	Qualifications Review Board
SASC	Senior Appointments Selection Committee
SCS	Senior Civil Service
SES	Senior Executive Service
SLC	Senior Leadership Committee
SPOA	State Public Officials Act
SSRB	Review Body on Senior Salaries

Chapter 1 . Introduction

1-1. The Senior Civil Service as an institution

Introduction of the research

Most governments seek to reform themselves in order to improve their institutions and procedures despite their diversity across space and time. For contemporary states, various factors, such as financial crises or just imitation of other countries, may have triggered a new reform termed the New Public Management (NPM) in the last three decades. This NPM, which introduced such concepts as managerial performance¹; competition; marketisation; and customer choice, has been the goal of many countries for more efficient government (Hood, 1991, pp. 4-6; Peters & Pierre, 2007, pp. 8-9; Rhodes, 1997, pp. 48-49, 93-95). It is noteworthy that there has been an effort to restructure the senior officials in a different way from the old civil service system as a part of this managerial reform (Mukherjee, 2004; OECD, 2004). This civil service transformation, which was initially developed from the American Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA) of 1978, varies from country to country (Buchanan, 1981; P.-s. Kim, 2007; Mukherjee, 2004). This thesis analyses the change process of this reform, namely the Senior Civil Service (SCS) system, through the comparative study on the cases in the United Kingdom (U.K.) and South Korea (Korea). From this research, it is supposed that not only are the distinctive patterns and causal factors behind the institutional dynamics revealed, but also the instructions on how to manage and evaluate the government reform can be given. This chapter begins with the terminology of topic, and then it attempts to build the conceptual and logical foundation of the analysis, including the theoretical approach and research scope.

Different interpretations of the Senior Civil Service

The SCS can be interpreted differently depending on the intention of the researcher. What the SCS notion is defined as is critical in this study because the definition of a term reflects the purpose and design of the research. There can be

¹ Private sector management skill, value for money, and the '3Es' (economy, efficiency and effectiveness), are the examples of this.

two inquiries from the description of SCS: ‘who are the high-ranking officials?’ and ‘what are their different points?’. The SCS concept implies a new personnel system, as well as a group of people, and both have diverse meanings respectively. For example in Richards’ research (1996) on the appointment process of the British high-ranking officials, the SCS meant a group of civil servants in Whitehall. On the other hand, Dargie and Locke (1999, p. 182) redefined the SCS as not just a group of senior staff in a government but also “a managerialist tool for leading the civil service”. Obviously, top bureaucrats, who are located at a pivotal junction between policy making and delivery execution (OECD, 2011, p. 92; 2017, p. 142), already existed before the managerial reform. However, such terms as senior or civil service, are used so commonly that it is hard to understand what this compound name, the SCS, really means in political science and the real world. There seems to be no broadly agreed definition about what the SCS is even though this notion was introduced as a new personnel initiative in various nations, as shown Table 1-1.

< Table 1-1. Comparison of the SCS system across nations >

	America	Britain	Canada	Netherlands	Australia	Korea
Name	SES (Senior Executive Service)	SCS (Senior Civil Service)	Ex Group (The Executive Group)	SPS (Senior Public Service)	SES (Senior Executive Service)	SCS (Senior Civil Service)
Number (of total civil service)	About 7,000 (0.5%)	5,162 (2.5%)	4,923 (0.9%)	About 800 (0.7%)	2,683 (1.7%)	1,594 (0.3%)
position	Director General and above	Deputy Director and above	Deputy Director and above	Director and above	Director and above	Director General and above

Source: adjusted from Ketelaar, Manning, and Turkisch (2007) and Lafuente, Manning, and Watkins (2012, p. 2)

Meanwhile, it seems that the OECD report, one of the major publications on the SCS, regards this new personnel system as an innovative initiative managing elite officials when compared internationally. According to the report in 2008 (OECD, p. 70), this is characterised as “a structured system of staff arrangements for the highest non-political positions” in the central government, and its purpose is the provision of professionalism and flexibility to match the various and

changing challenges surrounding the nation. The aims of this management would be to utilise their core talents in the right place, as well as to strengthen their competition and leadership (CSC, 2004; P.-s. Kim, 2007; MOPAS, 2010). Consequently, this new scheme for reforming the civil service system, namely the SCS, indicates separate rules and practices for senior officials who are located at a critical junction between public strategy making and delivery (OECD, 2008, p. 6; 2017, p. 142).

Institutional complexity and relationship of the SCS

In this thesis, the SCS can be regarded as an institution considering Hall's definition (1986, p. 19) of institution, which refers to "the formal rules, compliance procedures, and standard operating practices that structure the relationship between individuals in various units of the polity and economy". There are two significant properties of institutions from his explanation: "complexity"² (Boas, 2007, p. 44; Y.-s. Ha, 2006, p. 219) or "disaggregation" (Lowndes, 2002, p. 100) and "relationship"³ (Y.-k. Kim, 2005, p. 303; Y.-j. Kwon, 2008, p. 35). An institution is perceived as not a holistic entity but a relatively enduring combination consisting of various sub-elements. Particularly, Orren and Skowronek (1994) paid attention to how the complex components of institutions bind together or conflict with each other inside. The "relationship" as the nature of another institutional feature means that an institution in a specific area has an interaction with institutions which can be in a different area or institutional level (Y.-s. Ha, 2006, p. 220), and that political institutions cannot exist alone out of their spatial and temporal environment (Lowndes, 2002, p. 101).

In terms of complexity, the SCS system has two prominent characteristics. One is that much attention has been given to "separate" rules and practices, in which several sub-elements of personnel institutions which are independent from each other and show their own initiatives exist (e.g., OECD, 2011, p. 92; 2017, p. 142). The other is that this separation would primarily originate from the objectives of

² The concept of complexity could be also elicited from such arguments of Steinmo and Thelen (1992, p. 2), or North (1991, p. 97) that political institutions can encompass many kinds of forms and procedures which can constrain or shape the political life in themselves.

³ Hall's definition is often interpreted to emphasise the relationship between institutions and individual behaviours (Y.-k. Kim, 2005, p. 303; Y.-j. Kwon, 2008, p. 35).

efficient governance and political consideration (Buchanan, 1981, p. 350; Hahn, 2010, pp. 76-77; Huddleston, 1988, pp. 407-410; OECD, 2008, p. 68). The heterogeneous SCS sub-elements, linking and sometimes conflicting with other components, are designed on the principle of efficiency and/or democracy. Therefore, the SCS system would be illustrated as *a separate set of collections of various personnel management systems* for achieving the key goals of the government of the day effectively. According to this description, it is possible to devise a conceptual matrix which contains five characteristics of sub-elements as well as two underlying principles coming from the political affairs in a modern bureaucracy. Each of the specific criteria and their examples are shown in Table 1-2: classification and appointment differentiated from ordinary civil servants, performance-based payment and appraisal, competency enhancement; competitiveness and political responsiveness.


< Table 1-2. Sub-elements and examples of the SCS concept >

<i>Sub-elements</i>	<i>Principles</i>	
	Competitiveness	Responsiveness
Classification (structure)	Job-oriented system / Central control / Mobility	
Appointment	Open recruitment (expert)	Political appointment
Pay for performance	Increased Incentives	Performance Agreement (Accountable for performance / Dismiss low performer)
Measurable appraisal	Performance Evaluation	
Competency management	Competency Assessment	Emphasis on delivery

In addition, the SCS is related with various institutional factors such as other personnel systems, political partners and environments. Also, it connects to its goals of improving government performance and public confidence, as shown in Figure 1-1. This relationship can be analysed with Mahoney and Snyder (1999)'s multiple dimensions: inspection of *the political surroundings macroscopically*; exploration of *reciprocal interaction with political actors microscopically*. Since this personnel strategy is regarded as a managerial reform, it needs to note the debate on the NPM. Despite the doubt about the effectiveness of this managerial reform in both efficiency and democracy aspects (Lewis, 2008; Peters & Savoie, 1994; Suleiman, 2003), the emergence of NPM seems to be considered to produce the environmental changes, including government structure and public

ethos, as well as to accelerate the desire for the democratic control over bureaucracy against government failure (Peters & Pierre, 2004, pp. 4-5; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011, p. 9). Moreover, the perspective focusing on the SCS member, who is a political agent, is interested in the influence of historical and cultural backgrounds, informal convention and interaction with other actors. That is, the relation of the SCS is not only under the network of its main turf, the government affairs, but also under the intervention of its political principals, the elected officials. Thus, there appear to be few aspects of the SCS which are not associated with politico-administrative relationship whether it be at a macro or micro level.

< Figure 1-1. The design logic of the Senior Executive Service programme >



Source: Buchanan (1981, p. 351)

In conclusion, putting together main publications and institutional natures, this research defines the SCS as “a new personnel system, which is loosely coupled by various sub-elements, for managing separately high-ranking civil servants who are under the politico-administrative relationship.” The main sub-elements of this initiative are managerialism systems connected with the rewards, competencies, and loyalty or responsibility of senior officials, such as an incentive structure and

performance contract, competency framework and competitive (open) employment. Additionally, the key aspect of the politico-administrative relationship is the increasing political involvement in the career service, namely politicisation. This definition has profound significance in this thesis because it can provide the basis of the theoretical approach and concepts, including the bargain theory, as well as the framework for an analysis of research questions.

1-2. Questions of the Research

The elite career officials filling key positions in each department (Huddleston, 1988, p. 407) play a pivotal role in government, and at the same time, this cadre as a political actor has a deep connection with the democracy of the modern bureaucracy. On the one hand, the personnel scheme for this cadre, inspired by the NPM, has swept across the globe as a new trend for solving the inefficient and lethargic bureaucracy. Nevertheless, there is a doubt about its effectiveness. Moreover, this reform is also regarded to have brought about a political tension between politicians and top civil servants who seek their own interests (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004, p. 75; 2011, p. 89). On the other hand, as shown in Table 1-1, there would be few governments which have an identical configuration of it, just as there are different names and definitions for this system in each country (P.-s. Kim & Lee, 1998, p. 131). Besides the heterogeneity across countries, the separate rule for senior staff could be different over time even in the same country. In other words, this would be an issue of institutional change: the important feature of institutions, like the SCS, is that they are not static because of their interaction with society and individuals, notwithstanding their stability which offers predictability or shared values among the members of the polity (March & Olsen, 2006, pp. 6-7; Peters, 2005, pp. 18-19, 35). In this regard, the research into the SCS, especially with regard to its difference over time and the characteristics of its institution change, is worthy of analysis from the perspective of political science.

In addition, there seems to be a misunderstanding over the institutional change. For example, the SCS in Korea, where this system was launched later than that of Anglo-American countries, has received criticism for the failure to accomplish its original aims (J.-g. Kim, 2013; Y.-I. Kim, 2014; C.-o. Park & Cho, 2013). Some

commentators denounced that the regression of this system is mainly derived from the change of its institutional reconfiguration by President Lee's new administration (Y.-j. Kwon, 2008, p. 58; Y.-j. Kwon & Kwon, 2010, p. 27; C.-o. Park & Cho, 2013, p. 165). Accordingly, the arguments that such political shocks as the inauguration of new government impacted the change of the SCS's political character (e.g., Hood & Lodge, 2006a; Meyer-Sahling & Veen, 2012), appear to require additional scrutiny. Meanwhile, the civil service reform in the U.K. is also noteworthy owing to its contrasting background to the Korean one. On the face of it, it might seem that both SCS systems are in line with managerial reform to overcome an economic and bureaucratic crisis. Additionally, considering the contemporary results after the institutional change of the SCS, both systems might be classified in the same category using Huddleston's SCS model (1992): the European elite type which blends with political machine type (Youn-soo Kim & Kim, 2007, pp. 49, 58). However, their historical paths and the establishment processes of the new institutions, can be distinguished between the two countries, which will be demonstrated later.

As a result, it is worth throwing a spotlight on the question of 'how we can understand changes to the SCS system' in these two contrasting countries, that is 'how and why' this institutional change took place, or whether the changed SCS means really a failure. Therefore, the thesis poses the following research questions:

'How can we understand changes to the SCS systems in the United Kingdom and South Korea?'

This question needs to be addressed by concentrating on more concrete sub-questions in order to explore this subject systematically. (1) Understanding the SCS change would start with being aware of the diversity of this system across countries and time, despite the global convergence of the NPM. Since this diversity over time could emerge differently depending on nations, it is needed to investigate the difference or distinctiveness of the process, which may be able to be divided into the specific patterns of new institutionalism. (2) Furthermore, comprehending the essence of institutional changes would include the analysis on its change mechanism, such as the dynamics of its reproduction and

transformation (Bezes & Lodge, 2007, 2015; Y.-s. Ha, 2006; Thelen, 1999). In this regard, it is expected that the common factors which affected the SCS dynamics in the U.K. and Korea can be identified through comparing their diverse results of the changes. (3) Lastly, the changed results of the SCS raise debatable issues, particularly in the practical perspectives. Considering that the aftermath of institutions is likely to influence the matter of follow-up policies and political responsibilities (Cairney, 2012; Y.-j. Kwon, 2008; Mahoney, 2000a), the assessment issue can be one of the inquiries in this thesis. Consequently, the sub-questions of this thesis are addressed as followings:

- (1) What the characteristics of the SCS change process are;
- (2) What the causal factors of the SCS change are;
- (3) How the result of this change is assessed and were the changes successful.

With this in mind, this thesis explores the SCS change processes, during the before-and-after advent of new government, by applying a comparative analysis in two different cases. Thus, the present study traces and compares the trajectories of the SCS establishment in Britain and Korea, then investigates the relevant factors impacting their changes. In particular, it is notable that the meaning of the SCS, which became unambiguous through the definition of the above section, gives clues for the two sub-questions about institutional change (questions (1) and (2)). That is, the ideas will be examined that the SCS exists as an institutional complexity in the political network, and that its change is the result of the macro- and micro- interaction with institutional variables of the network. Not only will the historical and cultural legacies surrounding it in each country, such as the path-dependency, be investigated from the perspective of new institutionalism, but also will the relationship between the SCS members and politicians be analysed through using the notion of bargaining which may arouse the institutional change directly.

Since there still is limited literature analysing the dynamics of the civil service reform (Bezes & Lodge, 2015, p. 137), this thesis about countries which have

undergone differential changes across different governments affords the opportunity to analyse various types of institutional change and its causal mechanism simultaneously. Moreover, the research into the differences over time, even in the same country, and the characteristics of its institutional change can be helpful to comprehend the variation and convergency of this managerial reform. The introduction of new assessment framework, like Marsh and McConnell (2010), would be conducive to managing and evaluating public policies or institutions as well. In conclusion, finding the pattern, dynamic and result of the SCS change process can make a far-reaching contribution to understanding the nature of institutions or path-dependency academically, and also to implementing the civil service reform practically.

1-3. The Research Design and Scope

1-3-1. Theoretical approach of the research

In order to understand the diversity and dynamics of the SCS change across time and space, this thesis is primarily based on the perspective of historical institutionalism. Its three major characteristics, suggested by Pierson and Skocpol (2002), seem to match the questions of this research well: according to their argument, (1) big and important substantive agenda in the real world attracts interest; (2) historical institutionalists pay much attention to the processes over time; and (3) the contextual meaning of institutions matters (Pierson & Skocpol, 2002, pp. 695-699). The SCS system, not only has significant effects on the government policies (critical agenda), but also exists under the influence of various social and historical situations of each country (contextual meanings). Additionally, this personnel scheme does not always, as will be described later, have the same configuration in space and time (process and changeability). Accordingly, this historical institutionalism highlighting the asymmetries of power, path dependence, and intermediate-level analysis (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 938), lays a theoretical foundation for this study which deals with spatial difference and temporal change in each case. Particularly, the theoretical advancement of institutional change in this approach, such as the “gradual institutional change” of Streeck and Thelen (2005) or Mahoney and Thelen (2010), offers considerable

insights for understanding the pattern and dynamics of the change process in the British and Korean SCS.

In practice, historical institutionalism seems to have been suitable for comparative studies on civil service systems. This analysis, as Van der Meer (2011, p. 6) points out, contributed to a sense of the civil service development, and it gave a deep insight about 'how and why' questions. The investigation of Meyer-Sahling and Yesilkagit (2011) into the legacies of civil service systems in reforming government can be an illustration of this, and Bezes and Lodge (2007, 2015) also applied the historical approach to the variation of civil service change patterns. Since the political institutions, including the SCS, are conceptualised as disaggregative blocks which properties are characterised as complexity and relationship, the change and stability of this personnel system can be understood by a historical probe into the political and asymmetrical power-relation surrounding it, as well as by a narrative of its context and background. In brief, the approach of historical institutionalism is assessed to have enhanced a new and better understanding about institutional variation across countries and the institutional persistence (Steinmo & Thelen, 1992, p. 13). Consequently, the reason why a historical approach is emphasised would be that the civil service reforms 'have not taken place in a vacuum' (Bovaird & Russell, 2007, pp. 306-307). Without the theoretical basis of this historical institutionalism, it would be very challenging both analysing the process of the SCS change and exploring its causality. In addition, methodologically there is a junction between historical institutionalism and the small-N comparisons of this case study, especially "how and why" research (Rhodes, 1997, pp. 82-83; Yin, 2014, pp. 8-14)⁴.

Public Service Bargains and Politicisation in SCS change

Based on historical institutionalism, this research pays attention to the concept of Public Service Bargains (PSB) and politicisation as major concepts for analysing the SCS change.

Considering the change process of a new NPM-type management is under the

⁴ It is taken for granted that fundamentally, methodology is logically interrelated with research question and design (Grix, 2002, p. 180; Hay, 2002, p. 64; Mason, 2002, p. 30).

politico-administrative relation, it is expected that the nature of the SCS change will be unravelled through the interaction or bargain between politician and bureaucrat. The PSB theory is considered to deepen understanding of this relationship in an integrative approach encompassing both the micro and macro level, as well as to offer a convincing explanation for institutional diversities and changes across countries. This theory can be used not only to explain the interdependent relationship between politicians and bureaucrats by using the resource model, but also to analyse the strategic interaction on the basis of their institutional and historical contexts (Bezes & Lodge, 2015, p. 137; Bourgault, 2013, p. 154; Hood, 2000, p. 8; Page, 2012, p. 4). To be specific, the key idea of PSB is the mutual exchanging bargains in which the politicians and bureaucrats expect to “gain” and “give up” their own resources, namely the reward, competency, loyalty and responsibility, from each other (Hood & Lodge, 2006b, p. 8). This approach appears to be based on the rationality which could be applied to the even cooperative/exchange game (McCain, 2015, p. 154) because each political actor is assumed to pursue his/her own interest. On the other hand, the interactive relationship can vary in patterns as many as the various governments across time and places. That is, this illustrates the varieties of bargaining patterns, which depends on the historical and cultural backdrops, the legacies (Bezes & Lodge, 2015, p. 138; Hood & Lodge, 2006b, pp. 7-11). According to Hood and Lodge (2006b, pp. 153-160), there are reasons why the bargain breaks down or changes into another, such as habitat change and cheating, and the PSB is not fixed but unstable and changeable over time. Since the formal and informal legacies, which are the source of the divergences of PSB, lead to forming the institutional condition in a given country, an institutional change is naturally liable to be affected by this path-dependency. The pre-existing PSB pattern not only offers a different starting point and acceptability of managerial reform, but also is able to turn into a different one by the effect of internal political adjustment (Bezes & Lodge, 2015, p. 142; Hood, 2000, p. 18; Hood & Lodge, 2006b, p. 11). Therefore, this viewpoint, which associates the strategic and micro analysis with the idiographic approach using cases or legacies, can provide a considerable insight into exploring the patterns and reasons of the institutional divergence and dynamics.

In fact, the discussion on the politico-administrative relationship has a long

history, which ranges from W. Wilson's (1887) dichotomy to the New Deal era, and even to bureaucracy failure (Hood, James, Peters, & Scott, 2004; Lowi, 1979). Recently, there is a repeated controversy over the dichotomy of this relationship in the NPM era. Although the NPM, which is perceived as politically neutral, has no direct linkage with the bureaucratic politicisation, it is argued that paradoxically this managerial reform has stimulated the political process (Hood, 2000, p. 6; Rouban, 2015, pp. 317-318; Suleiman, 2003, pp. 212-213). Since the historical event of NPM reform prompted the launch of the SCS system, the politicisation of the civil service is not just an academic argument but a real-world matter of power relationship. This issue of politicisation, which implies the change of politico-administrative relationship, should be taken account of significantly in the study of SCS change, in that the interaction between politicians and civil servants is reflected in the matter of democratic control over the bureaucracy.

The discussion on the democratic control over bureaucracy may be referred to as politicisation, which means basically "*the substitution of political criteria for merit-based criteria in the selection, retention, promotion, rewards, and disciplining of members of the public service*" (Peters & Pierre, 2004, p. 2 emphasis in original). This issue can be grouped under three themes⁵: strategy of individuals; institutional measures; and cultural impact of managerial reform. The first dimension encompasses the appointment of faithful servants politically and the pressure imposed over the bureaucracy for political interests. This micro-level pursuit, which might be related with the underlying premise of PSB, would be the loyalty-based personnel strategy of Page (2012) and J. Yang (2003). The political leaders are eager to use the authority of giving and withholding jobs, which is conceived as one of the powerful bargaining resources (Lewis, 2008, pp. 7-8), in order to make the civil service comply with their will. This politicisation may come from the interaction with the other partners (W.-j. Kim, 2005, p. 28), as well as from the influence of institutions (Steinmo & Thelen, 1992, p. 7). Both the structural solution and changing policy would be the second strategy. According to Peters & Pierre's (2004), such attempts as changing the decision-making

⁵ Similarly, Rouban (2003, p. 311; 2015, pp. 322-323) summarises politicisation into three dimensions and argues that the implication of politicisation has been enlarged: (1) appointment to top position; (2) involvement in policy making; and (3) classical restraint of civil service partisanship.

arenas⁶ or procedures, and re-building the existing alliance among political actors, mean reconstructing the political relationship. The reorganisation strategy, including strengthening the leader's office and the consultative committee with the ruling party (J.-j. Yang, 2003), appears to be an exploration of this context as well. Lastly, as Peters and Pierre (2004, pp. 4-5) described, the pursuit for political control based on the NPM, even if it may be discounted as just ideological rhetoric, is connected with changing the culture and behaviour of the civil service. Page's (2012, p. 2) approach that the "politics decides, administration implements", could be interpreted as this kind of NPM-type influence because the 'can-doers' officials were considered as an ideal type under this reform rather than the 'thinkers' or 'but- sayers' (Rhodes, 2000, p. 158; Richards, 1997; Rouban, 2015, p. 323). This managerial reform would be the most prominent ideology and historical element, which has exerted an impact on the civil service change recently.

1-3-2. Scope of the research

The thesis began from the pragmatic curiosity from author's personal experience about the Korean SCS change, and this led to the academic inquiry of how and why the SCS changes. The present study uses comparison, which is regarded as the laboratory as well as the heart of political science, for scientific validity (M. C. Mills, 2008, p. 100; D.-s. Park, 1967, pp. 59-60; Peters, 1998, p. 3; Wilson, 1887, pp. 218-219). Such queries as how the SCS change proceeded and which factors impacted this change need to compare their institutional types and analyse the commonalities and differences vis-à-vis their change processes, based on the empirical evidence of the plural SCSs. This research adopts a comparative method so as to explore institutional diversity and dynamics behind the SCS change process in the U.K. and Korea. Considering that the underlying goal of comparative research is to investigate in order to find similarity and reveal variation (M. C. Mills, 2008, pp. 100-101), the methods of John Stuart Mill have provided a logic of comparison. His three conditions for demonstrating the causal mechanism between 'variables' (the 'method of agreement', 'method of difference' and 'method of concomitant variations') could be considered as useful research plans for comparative explanation (Hopkin, 2010, p. 291; Peters, 1998, pp. 28-

⁶ The *quangocratisation* in Britain could be an example of this.

29). Moreover, since the small-N analysis, like this study, adopts a qualitative research, the comparative methods to explain the outcomes (the SCS change) would be 'necessary and/or sufficient' causation or the 'Boolean algebra' model (Mahoney & Goertz, 2006, p. 232). Thus, it is essential to recognise and compare the commonalities and differences of the comparison targets in Britain and Korea, not only in designing the research, including the research scope, but also in the inferring the causality. Since the reason for case selection will be discussed in Chapter 3, this section overviews the spatial and temporal scope of this study.

< Table 1-3. Comparison between Anglo-American and classic East Asian >

		Anglo-American (e.g., the U.K.)	East Asian (e.g., Korea)
Administ-rative Tradition	Geo	Western	Eastern
	History	Colonizer	Colonist
	Culture	Pluralist	Confucian
Legal basis for state		No (common law)	Yes (<i>Rechtsstaat</i>)
Organization of government		Limited and unitary government (Westminster model)	Highly centralized government (Presidential system)
Civil service		Quite high status, unified, neutral, generalist, permanent	Career civil service system ⁷

Source: adjusted from Painter and Peters (2010)

In term of spatial scope, this research classifies the U.K. and Korea into different groups by adopting the types of 'administrative traditions⁸' presented by Painter and Peters (2010). In accordance with the administrative traditions which reflect such multi-categories as geography, history (including colonisation) and culture, the U.K. is the member of the 'Anglo-American' type, and Korea belongs to the 'East Asian' type, particularly the mixed form of Confucian tradition and Continental Europe transplant (Painter & Peters, 2010, pp. 20, 26). Additionally, by using the sub-criteria which assort other European or Asian countries, it could provide a sharper contrast between Britain and Korea with respect to the politico-

⁷ The career civil service system is one of the merit systems. This pursues the internal labour orientation and assigning a rank to a person, selects and promotes young talents for longer development as well as makes them think of their job as a worthwhile lifetime work by ensuring their proper remuneration and pension (Mosher, 1968, pp. 138-150; Ridley, 1983, pp. 179-180).

⁸ The nine groups of countries are Anglo-American, Napoleonic, Germanic, Scandinavian, Latin American, Postcolonial South Asian and African, East Asian, Soviet and Islamic tradition.

administrative relationship, namely the ‘turf’ surrounding the SCS change, as shown in Table 1-3.

Meanwhile, the time boundary is the period of “alternation in government⁹” in relation to the establishment of both countries' SCS systems. Since the purpose of this study is to investigate the process of SCS change, including its creation, reinforcing and transformation, how to set the temporal scope especially in the aspect of historical institutionalism is critical. Scholars interested in the historical analysis of political change have paid attention to the trajectories of the regime or government (e.g., R. B. Collier & Collier, 1991; Hall, 1992; Mahoney, 2001; Meyer-Sahling, 2008). Such periods as new government inauguration, reform and crisis are decisive times because they offer a “critical juncture” of the path-dependence (Boas, 2007, p. 46; Thelen, 1999, pp. 387-390) or “choice opportunity” (Cohen, March, & Olsen, 1972; Kingdon, 1984).

To put it concretely, the research focuses on the period of the advent of a new government in around 1997 for Tony Blair’s government, and around 2008 for President Lee’s government, owing to their high potentialities for the institutional change. The SCSs in Britain and Korea were launched by PM Major, who was a successor to Mrs. Thatcher, in 1996 and by President Roh in 2006 respectively. Then, not long after this launch, there was an alternation in government which led to the change of political power in both countries: from the Conservative Party to the Labour Party, in May 1997; from the ‘U-Ri’ Party which is left-wing to the ‘Grand National Party’ which is right-wing, in February 2008. This coincidence of time parameter in the progress of the SCS establishment can be given much interest in the comparative study because it may show how those critical points have an effect on each case which has different legacies.

⁹ The term of “*alternation*”, which is supposed to be distinguished from the “regime change” (Appendix B), seems to be more attractive to describe this change which swings between the right and left than Calvert’s (1987) “political succession” expressing the change of political leadership in a democratic regime. Moreover, this can implicate, as in Aron’s (1982) paper, the advent of a new government such as a reshuffle after an election

1-4. Structure of the Research

This thesis is composed of nine chapters including this introductory chapter. The remaining chapters are set out below.

Chapter 2 reviews previous literature about the SCS. This exploration will lead to the discussion on the main concept and theory, such as the NPM reform, politicisation and the PSB, on which the thesis is based. In addition, the chapter sets up the prerequisites of the analysis on the SCS by suggesting a category for measuring it and introducing a perspective for investigating the causality of its change. Its aim is to understand the overall hypothetical ideas and empirical evidence through the viewpoints with which to approach the research subject.

Chapter 3 deals with the theoretical foundation as well as the methodological strategy in this research. The types of institutional change, which are established basically from the perspective of historical institutionalists, could provide the solution to perceive the pattern of the SCS changes. Also, their analytic framework gives an insight about its causal mechanism. Furthermore, there is considerable discussion of the comparative case study. It involves how the British and Korean SCS cases are selected, and how to collect the evidence for the study. Particularly, the case selection with respect to Levi-Faur's strategy and the document analysis as a way of data collection will be described.

Chapters 4 to 7 are empirical case studies that seek the answers for each research question. Specifically, Chapter 4 begins with the overview concerning the SCS reform in the U.K. and Korea. This will contribute to understanding the outline, history and politico-administrative relationship in terms of the civil service system in two countries.

Chapters 5 and 6 examine and compare the transformations of the SCS system before and after the alternation in government by applying the analytic frameworks discussed in Chapter 3 in order to find the characteristics of their change processes as well as the causal factors of it. The diversity of the institutional change process, along with various SCS types, would be disclosed in Chapter 5. It is expected to reveal the causal factors affecting the SCS change

through a stepwise comparison of these different processes in Britain and Korea. Chapter 7 introduces a new perspective for assessing the changed SCSs, Marsh and McConnell's multi-dimensional assessment tool. The chapter attempts to evaluate the results of the changed SCS in each case, which is the answer for the last sub-question in this study.

Chapter 8 not only summarises the key findings from Chapters 5 to 7, but also looks to the broader consequences of them. It is expected this will provide an insight into how to understand the change to the SCS system, the ultimate goal of the thesis.

Lastly, Chapter 9 recapitulates this comparative case study. This final chapter also presents some suggestion for further inquiry.

Chapter 2 . Literature Review

2-1. Introduction

Chapter 1 started with defining the meaning of the SCS in this case study. Based on this terminology and the research question, it set out the research design, including its main concept as well as the spatial and temporal scope briefly. In this chapter, the previous studies related to the SCS will be reviewed, which would lead to the discussion on the NPM and politicisation, with regard to the civil service reform. Those issues find the need of introducing the PSB theory because they imply the interaction between politicians and public officials under the new managerial reform. Then, the prerequisite for the analysis of the SCS change, such as how to measure the SCS and what the causal factors are, will be examined: it is suggested that establishing the typology of the SCS enables to ascertain the characteristics of its change; and it is regarded that the causality of its change process can be proved by using the PSB approach. The specific investigation into the British and Korean SCS cases will be explored in Chapters 5 and 6 on the basis of these preconditions.

2-2. Trajectory of Senior Civil Service Research

In retrospect, there had already been a trend of research on investigating the political aspects of the high-ranking officials before the launch of the SCS system (Aberbach & Rockman, 1976; Putnam, 1973). Even subsequent to the establishment of this scheme, many political scientists have concentrated on the political relationship of senior public servants regardless of this new personnel reform (e.g., Aberbach, Putnam, & Rockman, 1981; Barker & Wilson, 1997; C. Campbell, 1988; Cole & Caputo, 1979; Dolan, 2000; Peters, 1987). Meanwhile, another distinguishing research trend is about probing into the SCS itself in the middle of the recent government reform. Some researchers have spotlighted the SCS characteristics as a personnel system (e.g., Buchanan, 1981; Dargie & Locke, 1999; Dror, 1997; Huddleston, 1988; Mukherjee, 2004; OECD, 2008), others tried to look at a bigger picture like government reform based on NPM

doctrine (e.g., Bovaird & Russell, 2007; Nigro, 1979; Parry, 2011; Rhodes, 2000; Richards, 2003). The work of tracing for the SCS research trajectory could enable researchers to lead to a path of new development of this system. The present study divides the SCS related literature into two main trajectories, with the conceptual criteria of *locus* and *focus*.

Generally, every academic discipline has both its specialised research target/topic (focus) and its own study area (locus), which help to identify the change of paradigm as well as to signpost the direction of academic development (Y.-c. Choi & Park, 2011; Henry, 1975; D.-g. Kim & Oh, 2007; J.-s. Lee, 2010; Y.-g. Lee, 1994). The main theoretical premise behind using the notion of focus and locus is that these frames are deeply connected to the academic originality of public field research. Whenever public administration as an academic discipline faced an examination of its academic identity, these two notions, the locus and focus, have been used often in order to prove it (Golembiewski, 1974; D.-g. Kim & Oh, 2007). Thus, it would be plausible to apply this criterion in the SCS research including the present study because these can also be encompassed by the subject of public administration or political science. In this regard, it can be said that the 'locus' is the areas where the SCS is studied, while the 'focus' is the main topic of research in which the SCS is analysed.

The focus of SCS studies

It seems that there are two distinctive foci in the discussion on the SCS study. This may be related to the two kinds of meanings in the SCS terminology because the terminology not only has the purpose of communication in a special discipline field, but also depends on its theoretical foundation (Castellví, 1999, pp. 9-11). Accordingly, the SCS can be interpreted in two contexts: as a political actor and a governmental system.

Above all, many traditional studies which analysed the political role of the bureaucrats, have paid much attention to the political relationship between politicians and senior officials who can also exert an influence on policy making. For example, Putnam (1973) was interested in the political responsiveness of the bureaucrats when comparing the British, German and Italian governments. In

addition, there was some remarkable studies on the political role of the high-ranking public officials and on their interactions with politicians, which research would be based on the perspectives of behaviouralism (e.g., Aberbach et al., 1981; Aberbach & Rockman, 1976; C. Campbell, 1988; Peters, 1987; Putnam, 1973). Conversely, some researchers, like Cole & Caputo (1979), Ingraham (1987), and Aberbach & Rockman (1990), tried to investigate the president's political effect over the American senior civil servants. When it comes to the U.K., C. Campbell & Wilson (1995), as well as Barker & Wilson (1997) analysed the interactive relationship between the senior bureaucrats in Whitehall and the British politicians. There are also more developed studies which concentrated on the role of the SCS in politically changing environments (e.g. Dolan, 2000; Johnson & Libecap, 1994; Marsh, Richards, & Smith, 2001; Rhodes, 2000; Richards, 2008; Sausman & Locke, 2007). It would be notable that the debate on this dynamic interaction between the administration and parliament actors converges into the politicisation issue of the SCS. As illustrations of this, the studies of Peters & Pierre (2004), P. Kim (2004), Meyer-Sahling (2008) and Meyer-Sahling & Veen (2012) could be addressed.

The next focus of the SCS study is associated with the emergence of the managerial reform. The addition of new senses may mean that the SCS have evolved over time. Some studies on the characteristics and typologies also show that the related research has been derived from this development of the SCS concept. Huddleston's studies are an illustration of this: he had tried to define the SES of U.S. federal government through dividing the characteristics of this new corps in his early research (Huddleston, 1988). Later in 1992, he suggested four ideal types: congeries of agency specialists, European-style elite corps, political machine and corporate managers, after exploring the establishment process of this SES (Huddleston, 1992). Moreover, there have been many efforts to put the SCS into an explicit category especially with reference to the politico-administrative relation, only to fail to make an agreed single classification of it (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011, p. 60). Instead, Bourgault (2013), who reviewed the SCS models reflecting some of its facets, distinguished seven characteristics through a set of classification¹⁰. He claims that these typological features are

¹⁰ Relations with the state; Politicisation; Roles in relation to civil society or politicians; Roles within a department; Career management; Relations with reforms (Bourgault, 2013, pp. 168-169).

stratified hierarchically within themselves, and associated with societal, historical and political aspects (Bourgault, 2013, p. 165). This implies the complex evolution of the SCS notion in political science. In addition, the studies focusing on how to manage the senior staff efficiently have increased prominently since launching the SCS system. For instance, Dullea (1979), Ingraham and Barrilleaux (1983) examined the American SES system in the training policy and in the incentive motivation system respectively. In regard to the performance management, scholars such as Pearce & Perry (1983), and Perry, Petrakis, & Miller (1989) applied longitudinal research to the merit pay system of the top federal officials. Others, including Yeager (1987), and Perry & Miller (1991), analysed the impact of this personnel reform on performance improvement. In terms of Korea, which introduced the SCS system later, many Korean researchers paid attention to this new managerial personnel system, particularly with regard to its successful implementation and the evaluation of its performance (J.-g. Kim, 2013, pp. 18-22). Nevertheless, it should not be overlooked that there are academic works from a critical viewpoint about the NPM-type civil service reform as well, such as Peters & Savoie (1994), and Rhodes (2000).

The locus of SCS studies

The more an administrative phenomenon becomes complicated, the wider the 'locus' of public administrative research expands (D.-g. Kim & Oh, 2007, p. 232). Similarly, it seems that the area of the SCS study triggered by the CSRA in 1978 has also expanded as each government has committed to reform. After Nigro (1979) had introduced the progress of Carter's reform, the characteristics of the SCS as a system itself have been spotlighted at the beginning of the study. The investigation with the survey method was used to explain what this new American personnel policy looked like (e.g., Ingraham & Colby, 1982; Rosen, 1981), and Richards (1996) explored the appointment process for the top Whitehall officials in the Thatcher era. Meanwhile, it was natural that evaluating how well this new institution was implemented or how it settled down became the next study step. Buchanan (1981) assessed the fulfilment of this managerial scheme in accordance with its original purposes, and Perry & Miller (1991) revised his model afterward. The articles of Colby and Ingraham (1981), Ring and Perry (1983) are also appreciated as the research to assess the outcome of the SES too (Lah &

Perry, 2008, p. 286). The suggestion of Haraway and Haraway (2004) is another example of this assessment. They argued that using the French elite-corps model can help to evaluate this new American personnel system.

In addition, as the SCS reform spread out across the world, each country began to research this newly launched personnel system for the purpose of its successful establishment. For example, Dargie and Locke (1999) described the evolutionary progress and characteristics of the British SCS system. In the case of Korea, some researchers designed the Korean-styled SCS system (C.-h. Cho, 2005; P.-s. Kim & Lee, 1998), as well as identified the outline and process of this system (C.-s. Kang, 2006; P.-s. Kim, 2007). Then, there were also the studies to evaluate its implementation by using the concept of performance-based assessment (K.-h. Cho, Jin, & Lee, 2008; J.-h. Lee, Choi, Hwang, & Hwang, 2008). Recently, the research on the SCS of Eastern Europe, such as Estonia and Lithuania are conducted as well (Civinskas, Kaselis, & Pivoras, 2016; Randma-Liiv, Uudelepp, & Sarapuu, 2015). Those studies on the implementation of the SCS are considered to have not only an academic purpose but also the practical goal of successful government reform. Furthermore, according to Lah and Perry (2008, p. 293), many OECD countries adopted the principle of the CSRA including the SES system despite not using all of its components. Correspondingly, there seems to be growing literature on the comparisons with other SCS systems. Hood (1998) conducted the comparative investigation of the SCS performance agreements in the U.K. and New Zealand. The OECD (2008) articulated the outline and features of its members' SCS such as who they are, how they are managed, and what the politics related with them is. Moreover, there are other papers which compared the SCS of OECD countries from a specific viewpoint. For instance, Ketelaar et al. (2007) emphasised the SCS performance management, including performance-related salary and contract, while Matheson, Weber, Manning, and Arnould (2007) depicted the institutional arrangement to balance political neutrality and responsiveness. Therefore, it can be argued from a larger perspective that the locus of the SCS research has been expanded from giving just an overview of this new system to conducting a cross-national comparison.

Review and Discussion

To sum up, the focus of the literature about the SCS may be divided into two parts which are related with its terminology. While some who view the SCS as a group of high-ranking bureaucrats explored their political role and responsiveness, currently many researchers who regard this as a new human resource (HR) initiative have associated it with the civil service reform. Especially, when it comes to the perspective of exploring the aspect of a management system, its locus has continuously expanded: the studies range from the introduction of this new personnel scheme to the evaluation of it and even to the cross-nation comparison. In addition, it seems that the research into the managerial efficiency of this system would be related to the NPM issue, while the studies paying attention to political role could lead to the discussion on politicisation.

However, the previous literature has the imperfection. For instance, there seems to be still no single convincing agreed typology about the SCS, whether it is considered as a new system or as a kind of elite corps. Most of all, the former comparative studies were close to merely showing their counterpoints between countries, as well as the earlier work having evaluated the SCS system seemed to be no more than a simple policy assessment. In other words, there appears to be neither the analysis on the variability or change processes of the SCS over time, nor the materials evaluating the results of the SCS reform in multi-aspects. Much of traditional comparative research has put more emphasis on the spatial difference, but there was a limitation to grasping the changing nature of political phenomena over time¹¹ because the previous studies, as Yeom (2005, p. 431) pointed out, focused on the status quo in a given space and time. Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that it has begun to study the matter which incorporates timing, temporality, and sequence of time into the analysis in the institutionalism perspective (Orren & Skowronek, 1994, p. 312; Pierson, 2000, p. 264; Thelen, 1999, p. 388).

¹¹ Even though Kingdon (1984, 2003) would be one of the initial studies which emphasises the importance of time, yet this research dealt with the policy making not the institutional comparison.

2-3. New Public Management and Politicisation

The bureaucratic reform in the NPM era

NPM is commonly defined as “*deliberate changes to the structures and processes of public sector organisations with the objective of getting them to run better*” (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004, p. 8, emphasis in original). This reform, in which managers manage under political officials, has swept across the globe as a new panacean trend, particularly in industrialised countries. The new managerial idea inspired by Osborne and Gaebler (1992), NPM, was also pursued in the public personnel administration. According to Bovaird and Russell (2007, p. 325), civil service reform programme is considered as one of the main pathfinders in both the rhetoric and practice in the public sector reforms. It is also argued that innovating the civil service has become more important and inevitable as government reform progresses, especially since the global economic crisis of 2008 (J.-h. Hong, 1999, p. 94; Peters & Pierre, 2004, p. 8; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011, p. 89). This entrepreneurial solution, including the launch of SCS, aimed at the inefficient and selfish inertia of civil service, and opened a new debate on the relation between politicians and bureaucrats, namely, the re-visiting of the politics-administration dichotomy (Peters & Savoie, 1994, p. 421; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011, p. 280; Rouban, 2015, p. 317; Svara, 2006, p. 958). Not only because the senior officials are the object of the managerial reform, but also because this remedy is believed to influence the change of politico-administrative relationship, it is important to investigate the NPM’s impact on the SCS.

The reform toward productivity seeks the goals of a more flexible, performance-related and decentralised personnel system (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004, 2011; Rhodes, 1994, 1997, 2000). With respect to the SCS, the new distinguishing rules applied to high-ranking officials, such as entrepreneurial skill and performance-based pay, have a lot in common with the NPM doctrine which emphasises the productivity, competition and value for money. Moreover, the empirical evidence of the recent British and Korean government reforms, supports the fact that the NPM-type prescriptions are the foundation of creating the SCS system (NamKoong, 2007, pp. 27-28; C.-o. Park & Joo, 2010, pp. 193-201; Rhodes, 1994, pp. 144-145; 1997, pp. 88-100). Hence, the SCS system as a new personnel

management seems to be derived mainly from principles of the managerial reform. This discussion has already taken place in the preceding section, the focus of the SCS research trajectory.

The results that the NPM reform affected the change of the SCS system, on the other hand, left some critical questions about the political dynamics of bureaucracy. According to Hood (2000), there are important study themes about following three contradictory situations vis-à-vis this issue: (1) the coexistence of diversity and commonality caused by the NPM-type doctrine; (2) the difference of reform speed in the countries which adopted the same remedy; and (3) the politicisation of civil service which has resulted from de-politicisation reform. The first two paradoxical questions can be condensed into the matter of why different results have occurred in the countries which have adopted similar managerial reform. Although the NPM-type doctrine was considered as an internationally convergent remedy, its practical reality has shown divergent directions and susceptibilities depending on the path of each nation's backdrop (Hood, 2000, pp. 3-5). As Rouban (2003, p. 310) argued, the political relationship of the civil service is not only a cultural and historical outcome depending on its nation, but also a changeable one over time. There is new idea for analysing this inquiry in relation to senior officials. In other words, PSB seems to be estimated as a theoretical framework which can give a valuable clue to reveal the black-box explaining the diversity relying on spatial and temporal difference, particularly since the managerial reform (Hood, 2000, p. 2; Hood & Lodge, 2006b, p. 13). A detailed review of this material will be introduced in the next section. The last contradiction is about how the modern managerial reform resulted in a politicisation. Why the NPM reform received widespread support is that it was considered as a politically neutral device which uses private sector skills to achieve efficiency. However, despite the intention of increasing the manager's freedom and neutrality, many scholars point out that this entrepreneurial instrument has resulted in the subordination of the senior bureaucrats to the politicians, namely the politicisation of SCS (Maor, 1999; Peters & Pierre, 2004; Peters & Savoie, 1994; Rouban, 2015; Sausman & Locke, 2007; Suleiman, 2003). In fact, there has been sweeping reassertion about the political control over the bureaucracy in Western governments including during the Thatcher, Reagan and Mulroney era (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004; Savoie, 1994). Even, Page (2012, p. 3) alleged that the focus

of the political literature has moved toward the issue of politicisation such as the development of ‘special advisers’ and ‘political craft’ of the career officials. Consequently, the principles of NPM-type government can be associated with the programmes of political control over bureaucracy, as shown in Table 2-1. The following paragraph will focus a discussion on this increased politicisation of civil service even under the political neutral reform.

< Table 2-1. Reinventing Government and Dual control over bureaucracy >

Reinventing Government		Dual approach to control bureaucracy	
Catalytic gov't		Representative bureau	Internal regulation (allow the bureaucratic discretion)
Customer-Driven gov't	→	Citizen participation	
Results-Oriented gov't	→	Performance-related reward	
Competitive gov't	↗ ↘	Spoil/ patronage system	External regulation (allow the bureaucratic discretion)
Enterprising gov't	→	Outsourcing (agencification)	
Mission-Driven gov't	→	Contract (elaborative legislation)	

Source: adjusted from Osborne (1993) and C.-o. Park and Joo (2007)

Hunger for stronger politicisation in the NPM era

The debate on the political-administrative relationship has become more complicated and sometimes even conflicting than before due to the newly added NPM variable and the pessimistic view of the bureaucratic state experience. This discussion seems to have evolved and enlarged into how to establish a democratic control over bureaucracy in modern complex society beyond a mere theoretical controversy about the political-administrative relationship (Page, 2012; C.-o. Park & Joo, 2007; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004, 2011; Svara, 1998, 2001; J.-j. Yang, 2003). The generally accepted characteristics of bureaucracy appear to be contradictory to its original goals, in that it has been considered not only as a leviathan invading liberty and democracy, but also as a set of inefficient red tape (Peters, 1984, p. 238; 2001, p. 302). According to Suleiman (2003, p. 211), the fear that the overwhelming autonomy of bureaucracy would threaten democracy, has made democratic governments devise how to exert political influence on this implementation apparatus. That is, democratic control over the civil service would

be somewhat inevitable considering the instrumental nature of bureaucracy. The beginning of the democratic control over bureaucracy starts from investigating the reason for a government failure. Two theoretical premises may be applied to this matter (J.-j. Yang, 2003, pp. 267-268). First, the administrative executives who pursue their own interests, as Aberbach et al. (1981) mentioned, also take part in the political decision-making together with politicians. In other words, the traditional “Weberian-Wilsonian” model was denied. In this regard, the desire for coordination and engagement by the elected representatives is gradually increased especially after the advent of new government (C. Campbell, 1988, pp. 271-272). The second reason can be seen from a principal-agent approach. The administrative agents with more professional knowledge and experience can use the information asymmetry when goal conflict exists, that is called “shirking” (Waterman & Meier, 1998). The probability of this shirking in a political situation could bring politicians to control the bureaucratic discretion. This issue would be inevitably connected to the question how to make the public executives implement properly the programmes and goals which political leaders set up, which is the basis of the NPM reform.

Nevertheless, there are arguments that the recent boosting of politicisation is greater than ever even if the desire to control the government through the political officials, such as ministers, is not a basically unwelcoming theme in democracy (Lewis, 2008; Maor, 1999; Peters & Pierre, 2004; Suleiman, 2003). In particular, the pursuit for this kind of control, as already mentioned, has been spurred on even more after the NPM-type managerial remedy for the economic crisis in western countries. In terms of the drawbacks of this politicisation caused by NPM reform, some research indicates that there is a trade-off between the political control and policy professionalism. For example, Suleiman (2003) made the claim that the politicisation over bureaucracy undermines the instrumental ability of a government as a professional state apparatus. Lewis (2008) also warned that the political appointment can damage government performance after examining the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) case in America. This compensation-based relationship may be caused by either the inadequate supply of good technical officials with political loyalty (Peters & Pierre, 2004, p. 8), by the short-term tangible accomplishment preferred by politicians (Suleiman, 2003, pp. 218, 243) or by both. Moreover, critics also point out the flaw of politicisation in a

democratic aspect. According to Suleiman (2003), historically a competent bureaucracy can contribute to the development of democracy, in that effective administration is inevitable for the fair and responsive government to the constituents. Also, it is claimed that since the neutral bureaucracy pursues the public interest with long-term planning, the overly politicisation serving of the government of the day can frustrate the democracy such as in selective responsiveness (Lewis, 2008; C.-o. Park & Joo, 2007; Suleiman, 2003). As a result, Peters and Savoie (1994, p. 424) described, the misdiagnosing prescription of NPM does “not remove administrative shackles but leave(s) intact policy shackles”. Some scholars even came to allege that the civil service reform based on the NPM doctrine is nothing more than a little bit of political rhetoric to attract support or legitimacy for the political grasp of the government (Im, 2007, p. 43).

There is an interesting discussion about what has produced this paradox. This boosting of politicisation can be analysed with two aspects: the exogenous and endogenous ones of bureaucratic apparatus. On the one hand, Osborne (1993) presented the more complicated and paradoxical demands from the voting constituents, and Peters and Pierre (2004, p. 7) point out the enlarged accountability of ministers who are expected to carry out the jobs of even affiliated organisation. Furthermore, it is claimed that the top leader is under the pressure of responsibility for the whole range of national matters, such as foreign affairs and economic crisis, regardless of the real accountability (Lewis, 2008; Moe & Wilson, 1994). On the other hand, as Maor (1999, p. 5) argues, while the burden to the political executives was increasing, they were losing the political tools for implementation of their policy, particularly with the advent of NPM, which reform gave greater freedom to managers and had nothing to do with politicisation. As a result, according to Peters & Pierre (2004), and Maor (1999), this loss of the policy methods has made the politicians feel hunger for more control paradoxically. In sum, the modern political leaders have been under the situation in which the external demands for responsiveness were getting stronger while the political equipment and resource inside the government were leaking. This circumstance seems to have been the impetus toward a new politico-administration relationship.

In particular, the Lewis' (2008) hypothesis is remarkable with respect to the explanation of this process. He insists that policy disagreement between the political leader and the bureaucracy increases politicisation, the rapid and frequent alternation in government of the modern democracy could have impacted the intervention of politicians who are eager for the victory in elections. In other words, the reasserting of political control was stimulated not only by the fear of bureaucratic autonomy which can cause democratic crisis (Kaufman, 1981; C.-o. Park & Joo, 2007), but also by the political need for redirecting the policy after the advent of a new government which is moving between the right and left (C. Campbell & Wilson, 1995; J.-j. Yang, 2003). In regard to this causality, there is supporting research, which examined the politicisation of senior bureaucrats in Central and Eastern Europe after democracy (Meyer-Sahling & Veen, 2012; Meyer-Sahling, 2008). They argue that the patterns of government change exert an impact on the extent of politicisation. Consequently, the argument seems to arise that the reason behind stronger politicisation, especially in the democratic government of the NPM era, can be understood as an attempt to re-gain control over the bureaucracy for compensating this inner and outer gap.

Review and Discussion

The literature on the civil service reform based on the NPM implies this new external shock of managerialism may have influenced the institution and identity of the SCS. In addition, the review showed the deep relationship between the entrepreneurial reform and politicisation, as well as the causation of stronger politicisation even under this political neutral reform. However, there seems to be still a shortage of studies which show in what kind of factors and processes the politicisation of the civil service takes place concretely. For instance, although Meyer-Sahling and Veen (2012) and Meyer-Sahling (2008) attempted to categorise the type of politicisation and to demonstrate the government alternation which lead to high turnover as the major cause of politicisation, those studies which were limited to some scope need to be scrutinised with more empirical evidence and specific mechanism model.

2-4. Public Service Bargains and Civil Service Reform

Study on the variation and dynamics of PSB

As reviewed above, it is argued that the NPM-type initiative has affected both the bureaucratic reforms, which differ in their style and speed depending on countries, and the nature of the SCS members, like their increased politicisation. These were also addressed as the contradictory questions of the NPM. In order to investigate these two inquiries, which are about a variety of outcomes caused by an identical reform, as well as about a hunger for stronger politicisation, the idea of PSB is significant because it casts a new light of analysing framework on this subject. Actually, the research tendency for the politico-administrative relation may be largely divided into two academic schools: a cultural perspective; and a rational one. The former perspective, such as in Hood, Peters, and Lee (2003), highlights cultural and historical variables in the comparison of this relationship, while the latter adopts the economic analysis, such a concept as 'transaction costs' or 'pareto optimal status', which puts an emphasis on the behaviour of individuals like in Horn (1995) (Nam, 2016, p. 14). However, both perspectives seem to lack the integrated viewpoint which links the external macro-aspect explaining the historical or cultural differences and the internal micro-analysis of dynamic interaction between actors. Recently, new studies emphasised the influence of national legacies even in the micro viewpoint (e.g., Bezes & Lodge, 2007; Bezes & Lodge, 2015; Meyer-Sahling & Yesilkagit, 2011), and particularly the PSB theory could be one of the latest solutions for this integration. This access intends to combine a comparative and historical analysis with a strategical and rational perspective in the politico-administrative relationship¹² (Barzelay & Gallego, 2006, p. 534; Hood, 2000, p. 2; Hood & Lodge, 2006b, p. 14; Nam, 2016, pp. 14-15). Consequently, as mentioned in section 1-3-1, the theoretical approach based on the PSB not only emphasises the strategical interplay of actors over resource or power both in rational and microscopic aspects, but also improves understanding of their diverse bargaining

¹² Although Barzelay and Gallego (2006) classified the PSB approach of Hood (2000) as a kind of rational choice institutional research, there is no doubt that the theory is estimated to be an integration of historical and rational approaches. The present research considers the PSB to be closer to historical institutionalism because the author thinks that the later research of Hood and Lodge (2006b), put more weight on the explanation for the diversity of bargaining.

by adopting the macro-concept of historical and structural legacies. By virtue of this integrative approach, the framework of PSB provides a compelling explanation about the patterns of the interactions between politicians and public officials across cultures and nations, as well as even their dynamics.

In terms of bargaining theory which is about the interactive relation between politicians and career officials, the research of Hood and Lodge (2006b) can be evaluated to make a synthesis of the PSB theory. Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011, pp. 59-61) also advocated Hood and Lodge (2006b)'s approach because diverse patterns of the interaction across countries can be analysed and understood through it. Particularly, it can be argued that 'public servants' in the PSB theory primarily means the members of SCS because the main actors who interact with political leaders are commonly high-rank bureaucrats (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011, p. 95). Additionally, one of the main issues in which politicians tend to intervene is the personnel matter of the senior staff (Hood, 2000, p. 15). In fact, most studies based on the PSB approach postulate senior officials of the executive branch as the bargaining partner.

The study of PSB can be divided into two parts like two kinds of paradoxes which the NPM-type civil service reform left behind, or like this thesis' main inquires of diversities and dynamics of the SCS change: the divergence of PSBs across nations; and its variation or the changeability of PSB types. First, the explanation as to why the PSBs are diverse would be basically related with its typology. Although the typical patterns of PSB are already arranged by Hood (2002, pp. 320-321) and Hood and Lodge (2006b, pp. 20-21), those empirical studies demonstrated the real bargaining types can vary in different forms and number corresponding to the distinguishing features of each country. For example, Hood (2000, p. 9) differentiates the American 'spoils-type' bargain from the British 'Schafferian-type' bargain, and Bezes and Lodge (2015, p. 141) makes a distinction between loyalist of the U.S. and that of the U.K. as well. Additionally, there are empirical studies about the PSB of each country. For instance, Balle Hansen and Houlberg Salomonsen (2011), analysed Danish Permanent Secretaries with the PSB components, and De Visscher, Hondeghe, Montuelle, and Van Dorpe (2011) also did similar job in the federal administration of Belgium. Van Dorpe and Horton (2011) investigated the change of the British

PSB type. Hondeghe and Dorpe (2013) developed understanding of the PSB by comparing five countries (Canada, the UK, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Belgium).

The next research step in this theory would be the examination of the PSB change. Hood and Lodge (2006b) argued that not only outer factors, including a short regime change and long-term cumulated dissatisfaction, but also inner factors, such as cheating behaviour of the actors of the bilateral relation, can be the reasons for the PSB change. Then they analysed the remaking of PSBs with respect to NPM reform. In practice, researchers, like Hood (2000, 2002) and Horton (2006a), usually investigated the NPM's impact on the PSB type and its components. Then, there were also attempts to compare one country with other ones about the influence of this managerial reform. Lodge and Hood (2012) explored the change of the PSB, which might occur through the recent financial crisis, through analysing the OECD countries. Bourgault and Van Dorpe (2013) also investigated the changes that have occurred in top officials' identity (personal, role and social) by the managerial reforms, within a sample of countries such as Belgium, Canada, Denmark, and the Netherlands. In addition, another studies paid attention to the other potential factors which can affect the dynamics or variability of PSB over time. Hood and Lodge (2006a) looked through the future possibility of a new stable British PSB with the advent of New Labour government, while Nam (2016) demonstrated the unstable or rebounding PSB type even during a single term of the Korean president due to the lame-duck phenomenon. In terms of causal mechanism, Elston (2017) suggested two kinds of PSB, the explicit and tacit ones, the trading-off relation of which could explain the source of its change. Moreover, as Nam (2016) suggested a Korean own model of the civil service reform with the PSB framework, so did Bezes and Lodge (2015) apply the PSB theory and its components to the analysis on the diversity as well as resilience of the civil service reform.

Review and Discussion

In summary, the PSB approach can be considered as a combination of micro- and macro-level analysis through using both strategic game behaviour and national legacies. This integrated viewpoint would be helpful to explore the

pattern and reason vis-à-vis the institutional divergence and dynamics, which is the main research question of the thesis. The bifocal angle of PSB, which enables the investigation of individual interactions within a polity as well, may provide a more sophisticated tool to throw a light on the changing process of the SCS system. In other words, the research based on PSB has been interested and seems to be persuasive in explaining its diverse type across nations as well as in analysing its changeability by external shock, such as the NPM reform. Especially, with reference to the relation between PSB and NPM, Hood's (2002, p. 323) argument that the transformation to the thermostatic control model of NPM-type PSB is more smoothly attainable from a certain PSB pattern than other pattern, is quite remarkable. This is because it can give the clues as to the various change processes between the countries of different administrative tradition. As a result, considering that the NPM affected the identity of SCS and that the PSB provides a framework for comprehension of the politico-administrative relation, it seems to be very adequate to apply the concepts of PSB to the analysis on the SCS change and its causality. Accordingly, contrary to such assertions that the change of civil service is caused directly by the environmental change surrounding its relationships, as Meyer-Sahling and Veen (2012) and Meyer-Sahling (2008), there could be other endogenous mechanism in the SCS change.

In this context, it would be convincing that the pre-existing PSB, which is constituted by formal and informal components, maybe including the capacity of reform, responds differently to such the external stimuli as political motive or opportunity, could result in the stickiness or gradual changes of the civil service system (Bezes & Lodge, 2015, p. 143; Hood, 2000, pp. 12, 18). Most of all, the research of Bezes and Lodge (2007, 2015), who investigated the dynamics of the civil service reform by using this PSB concept from the perspective of historical institutionalism, has great implication for the present thesis. These two scholars set out the advantage of PSB notion in exploring the various change process of the civil service system, and they also recommended the research on the politicisation with this framework along with on that on the diversification of reforms. Based on their arguments, this research will explore how the SCS changes in the U.K. and Korea can be understood.

2-5. Prerequisites for the change analysis

2-5-1. Categorisation of the senior civil service for measurement

Necessity for the SCS typology

As pointed out at the previous literature review on the SCS, it is difficult to arrive at consensus about the SCS typology. Though there have been many attempts to make a single classification for senior officials, researchers had to be satisfied with just suggesting a diverse 'model', 'image' and 'configuration' of the SCS (Bourgault, 2013, pp. 140, 165-170) because of its ambiguous and complex meaning. Nonetheless, since categorising the SCS type is vitally important to discern its changes over time, this section attempts to classify this new personnel system based on the discussion of preceding research results.

When it comes to the first research sub-questions, the inquiry which is about the characteristics of the SCS change process, basically needs to reply to what the SCS is like as well as how the process of its change can be measured. This is because the distinctive feature (pattern or mode) of the SCS change process can be seen through by measuring the degree of the SCS transformation. The analysis of the SCS change over time would mean identifying the differences between the SCS types before and after the government alternation in each case. In other words, the definition of SCS contributes to improving the comprehension of its properties, and the classification of this new personnel institution enables the measurement of degree of its change for discerning the change patterns. Additionally, in terms of methodological aspect, the reason why this comparison requires not only to define the SCS concept with clear criteria, but also to classify its types in a nominal way, is this research is non-quantitative study. As Geddes (2003), and Mahoney and Goertz (2006) confirmed, the precise definition and nominal category about the research subject are significant to enhance the validity of measurement in non-quantitative approach. According to them, while statistical indicators and ordinal levels are adopted as the 'operationalisation' and 'measurement' respectively in quantitative studies, defining the concepts clearly and categorising observations unambiguously are used in the qualitative strategies (Geddes, 2003, pp. 144-145; Mahoney & Goertz, 2006, pp. 244-245). In this regard, since the SCS is already conceptualised as a separate personnel

institution consisting of various sub-element for managing senior officials who are the politico-administrative relationship, the following paragraph creates the SCS category in accordance with this definition.

Two-dimensional Category of the SCS

Considering the SCS definition as well as its properties as a political institution, it can be reminded that its nature of 'complexity' was related with the personnel management based on the NPM reform. Also, another institutional nature of the SCS, as discussed in the section of the SCS definition (chapter 1-1), would be connected to the changing relationship between politicians and bureaucrats, namely politicisation. Correspondingly, it is reasonable that the dimension of the SCS types would be arrayed in accordance with these two conceptual features. Moreover, the fact that the focus of the typology of senior career servants has moved from the politicisation issue of them, to eventually their managerial role (Bourgault, 2013, pp. 170-171), carries overarching implications for creating categories of this study. In this context, the present study comes up with a matrix of the SCS classification by using earlier categories, which are already applied to the analysis of its types for each dimension respectively.

The first dimension, the managerial approach, is analogous to the perspective which regards the SCS as a personnel system because it normally deals with the senior officials' role within their department or executive apparatus. Since Huddleston's research is known as a model of the high-ranking public officials' roles on the foundation of over twenty years' experience of this system (Youn-soo Kim & Kim, 2007, p. 33), the present study adopts his models for this analysis study. He provides four dominant images, and elucidates key features of the SCS by examining those images in contrast. The first image ('congeries of agency specialists') based on the traditional position classification system, assumes that senior officials are specialists. The next type ('European-style elite corps') based on the elitism perspective regards the SCS as 'guardians of the broad public interest' (Huddleston, 1992, p. 180). He believes that business management skills can be hardly applied to that kind of top bureaucrats distinguished from aforementioned technicians, in that administrative generalists are cultivated through their whole career in the public sector. The third image ('political machine')

is considered to emphasize the political responsiveness. From this point of view, it is argued that the senior career officials who seek to preserve their own administrative authority should be permeable to the will of elected officials (Huddleston, 1992, p. 182). Even reform programmes such as the accountability for the performance and the open recruitment to outsiders, could be perceived as the strategies aiming for this type (Youn-soo Kim & Kim, 2007, pp. 35-36). Lastly, it is supposed that the image of 'corporate managers' puts an emphasis on the performance-oriented and flexible management like in business men. Huddleston (1992, p. 184) describes that this viewpoint tries to keep aloof from political issues due to the presumption that politics is the obstacle of efficiency.

< Table 2-2. Relation between the features of the SCS and its types >

SCS Feature	Supporting	Contradictory
Government-wide personnel system	Elite, P·M	Specialist
Rank-in-person	Elite	Specialist
Decentralisation of recruitment and training	Specialist, Manager	Elite
Relaxed tenure, managerial flexibility	P·M, Manager	Specialist, Elite
Responsiveness through political appointment to career jobs	P·M	Specialist, Elite, Manager
Careerist opportunities through career appointment to political jobs	Elite	P·M
Pay for performance	P·M, Manager	Elite
Emphasis on general management	Elite	Specialist
Mobility	Elite	Specialist
Accountability through measurable performance goals and appraisals	P·M, Manager	Elite

- *Specialist: Image 1 (the perspective of 'agency specialists')*
- *Elite: Image 2 (the perspective of 'European-style elite corps')*
- *P·M: Image 3 (the perspective of 'political machine')*
- *Manager: Image 4 (the perspective of 'corporate managers')*

Source: adjusted from Huddleston (1992, p. 191)

According to his typology, these four images of the prevailing roles of senior bureaucrats can be linked to ten features of the SCS system as shown in Table

2-2. One thing to note here is that each type does not always include all those SCS characteristics and some features may conflict with certain types. Youn-soo Kim and Kim (2007) counted the number of how many features a country has in its personnel system, and then they classified each country by the dominant SCS image¹³. If a case meets a certain characteristic of the table, it could be classified as a supporting model, and if not, as a contradictory model (Youn-soo Kim & Kim, 2007, p. 48). For example, a hypothetical country equipped with the rank-in-person system gets one point of elite corps image. Or if it has a rank-in-position system, the country earns one point of agency specialists image. This thesis follows their process so as to classify the British and Korean cases. However, the present study will count the pair of features marked by yellow bars in Table 2-2 just once because of the redundancy. The availability of moving an employee from one position to another, namely 'mobility', implies that the personnel management is based on a person-oriented system (rank-in-person), not on a job-oriented system allocating jobs according to the speciality. Lafuente et al. (2012, p. 8) also argues that the distinction between career-based system and position-based one is becoming less important due to their convergence tendency.

Those four images are perceived as typical examples or idea types for construing the various reform proposals in the development of the higher civil service, particularly with respect to the post-war history in the U.S. federal government (Huddleston, 1992, pp. 178, 187). Although where the SCS system initially came from is America, its classification ought to be founded not on the background of a specific country but on the acceptable universal criterion such as a definition or concept. Since Huddleston's category reflects only the aspect viewing the SCS as a collection of personnel management systems, the key features of Table 2-2 appear to represent the institutional complexity as one of the new reform initiatives in which its sub-elements are exemplified in Table 1-2. Thus, there needs to be supplemented with the 'relationship', which is the other institutional property of the SCS in grouping this new personnel system. That is, the weakness of Huddleston's framework would be that he overlooked the interactive and dynamic relation between high-ranking career officials and

¹³ Those Korean researchers made use of this table in analysing and comparing the SCS systems of five countries: the U.S.; the U.K.; Australia; New Zealand; and South Korea

politically elected servants. For instance, the image of 'political machine' just dealt with the policies for greater political responsiveness of public officials like the fifth indicator in Table 2-2 (marked by a blue bar). However, it cannot distinguish the degree of political intervention, nor does it take into account the influence from the opposite side (career administrators) in the politico-administrative relation. Furthermore, considering that any single one from above images, as he admitted, does not fully underlies the SCS, and that the image of this system is depicted as a kaleidoscope (Huddleston, 1992, p. 185), it might be contended that which part of the four types would achieve dominance may be deeply associated with the political power in politico-administrative relation. Accordingly, this research's category for measuring different SCSs over time or across countries require a synthesized typology by adding another dimension of political relationship.

The other dimension of categorisation is the extent of politicisation of the SCS. Although the issues of politicisation can be academically classified into more than three aspects, like Rouban (2003, 2015), and Peters and Pierre (2004)¹⁴, yet in practice, it seems to be common to measure this notion in two ways: the political influence on the civil service and the political approach of bureaucrats (e.g., Ketelaar et al., 2007; Matheson et al., 2007; OECD, 2011). For example, Page and Wright (1999, pp. 270-271) also differentiates political appointment from the party affiliation. Their study attempted to synthesise those tools to establish the standard of political involvement in the SCS. They measure the intensity of partisanship in dual ways, which are the political influence on the high-ranking civil servants and the political neutrality of them. The results of these two measurements can be obtained by political neutrality and opportunism of civil servants, as well as by political appointment or dismissal respectively. Firstly, the political impartiality of public employees, which would be analogous to Rouban's classical restraint of civil service partisanship, is usually guaranteed by the regulation forms in most democratic countries. This research will investigate legal restrictions such as laws, codes or customs, on the political actions of civil service by adopting the criteria of OECD survey.

Then, in terms of the influence of politicians, the politicisation modes used by

¹⁴ They classify the target of politicisation as five objectives: employee; behaviour; culture; structure; and policy (Peters & Pierre, 2004, pp. 4-6)

Meyer-Sahling (2008) is helpful for categorising the various SCSs in this investigation. He divides the degree of politicisation into four modes with two criteria in a legal viewpoint: turnover of inherited senior officials and recruitment route for new appointees. Even these criteria have been developed into five more specific indicators encompassing the range and intensity of the politicisation of senior officials, such as the scope of political appointment, the turnover among senior officials after elections and the importance of political contact for career progression (Meyer-Sahling & Veen, 2012, p. 9). Among those typologies about politicisation, it appears that the two simple standards of Table 2-3, would be appropriate for measuring the intensity of politicisation in this research. This is because both the turnover or appointment of public officials by newly elected government, and career investigation of the appointees are more available in consideration of the access to formal data. The judgement on these measurements will be displayed in the unit of high and low level. Nevertheless, the present study will also make an endeavour to find the movement of bureaucratic culture or atmosphere behind the above explicit data through the historical narratives of each case. This would contribute to sense the cultural impact of managerial reform or political involvement in policy making.

< Table 2-3. Four modes of politicisation >

	Non-politicisation	Bounded politicisation	Open politicisation	Partisan politicisation
<i>The approach of new governments towards inherited senior officials</i>	Do not replace	Replace	Replace	Replace
<i>The career path of new appointees</i>	Recruit career officials from the ministerial bureaucracy	Recruit career officials from the ministerial bureaucracy	Recruit outsiders from non-political settings	Recruit outsiders from political settings

Source: Meyer-Sahling (2008, p. 8)

In summary, the re-devised SCS category in this thesis is not only designed to measure the SCS nominally in the comparative study, but also compatible with the conceptual criteria of the SCS definition. Fundamentally, nine features derived from the model of Huddleston (1992), which characterise each of the SCS images, could match with the sub-elements of the SCS concept, as shown in

Table 1-2, as a NPM-type system. In addition, the fact that the SCS exists in the network of the political arena and interacts with political actors, is connected to the second dimension of partisanship or politicisation of the category. Consequently, this research suggests a new way of classifying SCS types as a prerequisite for identifying the degree of the SCS change. The composition of this two-dimensional category is synthesized from the row of Huddleston images (agency specialist-elite corps-political machine-corporate manager) and the column of politicisation (high-medium-low).

2-5-2. Principal components for analysis

Integrative perspective of PSB for cause analysis

When it comes to the second sub-question, the analysis on the determinants causing the SCS change requires the illustration of the whole potential factors, including political structures, which can have an impact on this personnel system. That is, since the nature of SCS is regarded as an institution of complex combination not as a single entity (J. L. Campbell, 2005; Lowndes, 2002; Pierson, 2004; Thelen, 2009), it demands to probe the relevant institutional elements and their political network, which may affect the change of SCS or sometimes which compose its system itself. Then, the interactive dynamics concerning the SCS, including the relationships over power and the resource between political actors, will need to be examined in order to unravel the specific operation of the change process. As a result, an understanding of the strategic bargaining between elected politicians and top-ranking bureaucrats, namely the PSB, ought to be required prior to beginning the investigation into SCS change (Bezes & Lodge, 2015; Hood, 2000; Hood & Lodge, 2006b; Peters & Pierre, 2001).

As revealed in the previous review, the PSB framework has a considerable advantage to the explanation of institutional diversities across nations, as well as even of its changes over time, especially in terms of the NPM reform under the politico-administrative relation. Moreover, according to Hood (2002, p. 2), the perspective of this theory “enables the combined strength of historical institutionalist and strategic-interaction approaches to be brought to bear on public service reform experience”. In particular, it is thought that Bezes and Lodge


(2007, 2015), whose research also applied this integrative framework to the process of civil service reform from the standpoint of historical institutionalism, could serve as a representative example of advanced studies. This thesis adopts the Bezes and Lodge's (2015) assumption, in that the bureaucratic reform including the SCS is under the influence of the pre-conditioned relationship between politicians and bureaucrats, and that its outcome and process can be shown diversely across time and countries through their complex bargaining despite even the same exogenous forces. In this regard, the present study, of course, can be regarded as a theory-confirming of theirs because of similar theoretical basis, such as the PSB-based analysis and the historical institutionalism viewpoint. However, there are differences from those when considering this research will not only scrutinise the various mode of institutional change contrary to Bezes and Lodge's (2015) conclusion of the resilience of the civil service systems, but also place a more emphasis on the change process through comparative case study.

The constituent parts of PSB and its type

The interactive relationship between actors of the PSB can be analysed with the three key elements, and each of them or their combination has been interpreted in a political way. 'Reward' as the first PSB component could be defined as the gain of civil servants in the politico-administrative relationship. This dimension, which includes not only material rewards like salaries but also immaterial expectations, including career advancement and promotion, is considered essential in the politics of PSB because public servants can be controlled and motivated by how to manage this resource (Bezes & Lodge, 2015, p. 138; Hood & Lodge, 2006b, p. 64). On the other hand, 'competency', the second element of the bargaining, would be the gains of politicians. This is the return that high-ranking public officials are supposed to show the public management abilities, such as policy advice, executive knowledge and skills, as an exchange for their rewards. The competency seems to be considered an important part to maintain or pursue the will of the ruling political group, as well as to assess the administrative executives (Bezes & Lodge, 2015, p. 140; Hood & Lodge, 2006b, p. 88). Lastly, 'loyalty and responsibility', which are believed to relate to the second component, are also regarded as an exchange package of mutual reward

or gain. For instance, while the competency is about a technical or managerial capability, the loyalty can be described as a source of honesty, passion and affection which are required by civil servants (Hood & Lodge, 2006b, pp. 109-110). With reference to this element, the issue of whom public officials are loyal to, whether to the specific politicians or the whole state, as well as the matter of how to secure their loyalties is critical. This is because those are deeply connected with the politicisation of civil servants in the modern democratic countries, especially when the alternation in government or regime change happens (Bezes & Lodge, 2015, p. 141; Hood & Lodge, 2006a, pp. 361-362; 2006b, p. 110).

< Figure 2-1. Some types of public service bargains >



Source: Hood (2002, p. 320) and Hood and Lodge (2006b, p. 21)

Those PSB components comprise the main conceptual dimensions of the bargaining, and they could be differentiated variously by their historical and cultural varieties or be interpreted depending on their institutional and political context. According to Hood & Lodge (2006b), the PSB types are shaped by putting together those three elements. There are two general types consisting of 'Trustee' and 'Agency' bargains in large, and then these two can be re-divided into eight sub-types as variation as shown in Figure 2-1. Although these typical patterns of the PSB in this Figure are arranged, the real bargains can vary again in different forms and number corresponding to the distinguishing features of each country, such as legal orders and informal conventions of the civil service (Bezes & Lodge, 2015, pp. 142-143). The comparative study by Bourgault and Van Dorpe (2013), in which the four cases of Belgium, Canada, Denmark and Netherlands were classified into the pragmatic and systemic bargain type, would be an instances of this. Even such notion as reward can be accepted differently depending on the bureaucratic rank or situation. For instance, some top officials put emphasis on the recognition or self-restraint as a 'quid pro quo' (i.e. equal exchange) of their services, 'Noblesse Oblige' (Hood & Lodge, 2006b, p. 71).

Components for analysing the process of civil service reform

The PSB model integrating individual strategies and political environments provides a perspective for explaining the institutional changes as well. Within this framework, the bargaining results which come from the interaction between political actors influenced by pre-existing institutional arrangements, response differently to the external shock. Hence, a PSB-based approach would be useful for making an inference and enhancing understanding of the NPM reform experience, including the shift of senior career officials' role (Hood, 2000, p. 20; 2002, pp. 322-323). For example, Hood (2000, p. 12) claims that there are two kinds of conflicting forces, like 'tortoise-like' and 'hare-like' over changing processes, where the motive and opportunity, or capacity for reform would activate on the historical legacies. Particularly, in terms of the analysis on the institutional change of civil service reform, Bezes and Lodge (2007) insisted that civil service systems, in which five elements (legal entrenchment, pervasiveness, political-administrative nexus, career and reward) are embedded, have responded in various ways to the exogenous challenge so-called in 'critical

conjuncture'. In their following paper of 2015, they still put an emphasis on the influence of the institutional components of civil service systems in the reform trajectories, yet they develop the causal mechanism especially by mean of the concepts of PSB (Bezes & Lodge, 2015, p. 137). In accordance with their argument, the civil service system, which is characterised by three PSB components, including reward, competency and loyalty or responsibility, has its own national distinctiveness not only because of the historical and legal entrenchment but also because of the pervasiveness of administration. In addition, these two scholars argue that the institutional complexity of the bureaucratic system, along with the interaction of PSB, results in the variation of change patterns during the reform processes. They also introduce four modes of evolutionary change of the civil service reform based on historical institutionalism, and then suggests the two functions ('absorbing' and 'shaping') of institutional arrangements which differentiate the change process.

Considering that understanding the change to the SCS through exploring its causal factors is one of this research purposes, the second sub-question to be exact, there needs to set potential explanatory factors behind its transformation in designing research model. In other words, it essentially requires to develop a set of conceptual tools to analyse the process of institutional change (Thelen, 2003, p. 232). In this regard, the present study, as Bezes and Lodge (2015) recommended, takes basically their five key components, which are three PSB elements ('*reward*', '*competency*' and '*loyalty*') and two variation modes ('*entrenchment*' and '*pervasiveness*'), as the potential causes of the changes to the SCS systems in the U.K. and Korea. In addition, if those two modes which function like the inheritance of a nation, can be considered as the features of 'institutional arrangements' (Bezes & Lodge, 2015, pp. 137, 149) or 'legacy of concrete historical processes' (Thelen, 1999, p. 382), then such '*opportunity structures*' as 'political motives' or 'veto possibilities' should be also considered as possible causal factors (Bezes & Lodge, 2015, pp. 151, 156). Adding these external or environmental challenges in the variables of research is important as well because this thesis also aims at verifying the impact of government alternation on the politicisation of SCS, which is claimed by Meyer-Sahling and Veen (2012) and Meyer-Sahling (2008). In consequence, this comparative case study use the principal components of Bezes and Lodge (2007, 2015), where the

PSB concepts are adopted for analysing the civil service reform as the explanatory factors of the SCS changes in Britain and Korea.

2-6. Conclusion

The literature review shows that the SCS terminology and SCS-related research have been developed in the politico-administrative relationship, particularly with the respect to the NPM. However, there still requires the in-depth analysis on the varieties of the SCS change across time and space as well as its causal mechanism. It is expected that the PSB approach, which is regarded as an integrative perspective ranging from structure (macro-level) to individual (micro-level), would provide a useful analytic framework for this institutional divergence and dynamics. In this regard, the analysis of the SCS change in this research mainly depends on this bargaining theory; particularly it adopted the conceptual elements and tool which are suggested by Bezes and Lodge (2007, 2015) about the civil service reform. Furthermore, it is also remarkable that the present study set up the criteria for a new SCS category combining Huddleston's (1992) four complex images with politicisation degree of Meyer-Sahling's (2008). This categorisation may not only represent the institutional properties of complexity and relationship, but also contribute to measuring the targets of this qualitative research, which means identifying the degree of the SCS change. In terms of what the features of the SCS change in Britain and Korea and what the specific potential causes affecting the institutional transformation are, they will be established on the basis of theoretical and methodological foundations which will be discussed in next chapter.

Chapter 3 . Theoretical and Methodological foundation

3-1. Introduction

Before launching out into the exploration for the SCS changes, there needs to be explicit reasons why historical institutionalism, the theoretical foundation of the research, is valuable to this research as well as it suitable to deal with the variables of time and space. With respect to the theoretical approach of historical institutionalists, this chapter introduces their analytic model for the institutional change, particularly its types and causal mechanism, such as Mahoney and Thelen (2010), after brief descriptions of the institutionalism and the behaviouralism (e.g., Lowndes, 2002; March & Olsen, 1984; Peters, 2005). As Peters (1998, pp. 78, 109) pointed out, the importance of the political theory cannot be too highly emphasised, especially in both the issue of the methodological solution and the research design, including case selection. In this context, Chapter 3 goes on with the review about comparative analysis and case studies as a methodological strategy. This understanding of qualitative study underlies the typology of the SCS change patterns, as well as its causal mechanism. Since selecting cases systematically and collecting sources appropriately would be directly connected to providing validity to the research as well as a vital clue to the research questions, there will be an examination about the reasonable grounds for those methods and sources in this chapter.

3-2. Theoretical foundation for Senior Civil Service Change

3-2-1. Historical institutionalism as a theoretical basis

The development of New Institutionalism

This 'old institutionalism', which can be traditionally characterised as legalism, structure-determination, holistic description as well as historical and normative analysis (Peters, 2005, pp. 1, 6-11; Rhodes, 1997, p. 79), has been used for the comparative studies because it pays attention to the institutional differences across countries. However, Steinmo and Thelen (1992, pp. 3-4) criticise that this

old approach provided the description of just institutional configurations with normative perspectives rather than the comparative analysis, and that its emphasis on the formal-legal aspects hardly explain real political issues. Moreover, as March and Olsen (1984, p. 738) argued that political institutions affect society as well as being influenced by it, it would be difficult to research the various aspects of institutions and to analyse the difference of the SCS changes if the present study simply uses the classical institution approach. The next wave in political science, the 'behavioural revolution', which emphasises the individual's attitude and behaviour beyond the formal structures, is evaluated to have established not only the scientific method but also the theory-building in political science (Peters, 2005, pp. 12-13). Despite those contributions, this theoretical way does not seem to be suitable for this research because of limitations such as reductionism, utilitarianism and functionalism, which are presented by March and Olsen (1984, p. 735). First, behaviouralism seeking for grand theorising tends to obscure the difference and divergence across nations in the intermediate institution analysis (Steinmo & Thelen, 1992, p. 5). Second, this approach regards institutions as an aggregation of individual behaviour which makes it challenging to explore the macro issue, including the governmental structure and culture. Thirdly, since the behaviouralists assume the rationality of individuals and think of the institutional development as an efficient process toward some equilibrium (March & Olsen, 1984, p. 737; Peters, 2005, p. 17), it would be hard to explain the path-dependence or historical unintended results.

As a result, the theoretical foundation for the SCS change should be not only based on an institutional approach to illustrate phenomena in the public sector, but also be required to elucidate diversities and dynamics across countries and over time. In this respect, the 'new institutionalism' labelled by March and Olsen (1984) can be estimated to overcome the 'old' approach through highlighting the autonomy of political institutions, instead of treating them as just dependent variables affected by society. Instead of legalism, static structuralism and holism, this new theoretical paradigm considers institutions as variable processes, such as informal procedure, and focuses on the disaggregation and embeddedness of institutions (Lowndes, 2002, pp. 97-101). The new idea about institutions allows advances in the discussion of institutional difference, complexity and dynamics across space and time. This approach underlines the interactive relation between

institutions and individuals (Lowndes, 2002, pp. 91, 102; March & Olsen, 2006), which can be used to explain the formation and change of institutions (Orren & Skowronek, 1994, p. 323; Peters, 2005, pp. 36, 157).

In large, there are two subfields in this neo institutionalism: the rational choice and the historical institutionalism (Hall & Taylor, 1996; Steinmo & Thelen, 1992; Thelen, 1999). The former concentrates on the formal rules and self-interested behaviour in a calculative perspective, while the latter lays stress on the institutional role of shaping individual behaviour in a broader context (Schmidt, 2008, p. 314; Steinmo & Thelen, 1992, p. 7). The approach of rational choice presumes that the political actors maximise their gain, like reducing 'transaction costs', whereas the historical institutionalism has much interest in the power asymmetry by expanding the meaning of institutions to amorphous procedures (Dodds, 2018, pp. 109-114; Steinmo & Thelen, 1992, pp. 2, 7; Thelen, 1999, p. 379). These two schools can be also distinguished by how to analyse the institutional (trans)formation. Rationalists explain the persistence and change of institutions depending on the bargains or contracts of strategic individuals, and they regard the life of institutions as the equilibrated results of intentional creation or design (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 952; North, 1990, pp. 86-87; Peters, 2005, pp. 59-60). On the other hand, historical institutionalists accept the conceptions of path-dependency, which illuminates the space and time variables in the institutional continuity and change (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 954; Peters, 2005, pp. 76-77; Thelen, 1999, p. 384). Particularly, they pay much attention to the power-oriented historical view and the unintended contingency (Y.-s. Ha, 2002, p. 341; Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 938; Pierson, 2000, pp. 263-264). Furthermore, these two approaches contrast with each other in the methodology. The rationalism method, which is often referred to as 'methodological individualism', explains in a deductive way, while the historical approach starts with empirical evidence from observed events or comparisons (Cairney, 2012, p. 79; Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 954; Thelen, 1999, p. 373).

The appropriateness of historical Institutionalism

However, the rational choice has the weakness of simplification along with the difficulty in applying to real cases due to its endeavour to make universal theories

and restrictive assumptions of a deductive approach (Green & Shapiro, 1994; Peters, 2005; Steinmo & Thelen, 1992). Additionally, as Hall and Taylor (1996, pp. 952-953) describe, this approach is not enough to explain the unintended consequences of the political world and the historical inefficiency. For these reasons the theoretical foundation based on rationalism alone provides little plausible account of the institutional change. Subsequently, it would be a challenge to analyse the target of this research, the differences of each country's civil service change, with this rational choice theory.

< Table 3-1. Pros and cons of the two new Institutionalism >

	Strength	Weakness
<i>Rational Choice</i>	Theory-building with micro foundation	Simplification of human motivation
	Reasonable explanation for the emergence of institutions	Difficulty of explaining the historical inefficiency
<i>Historical Institutionalism</i>	Linking between institutions and individuals	Insufficient micro foundations of the causal mechanism
	Synthesized perspective on institutional change	Impossibility of what the institutional change will be

Source: Green and Shapiro (1994, p. 3); Y.-s. Ha (2002, pp. 341-342); Hall and Taylor (1996, p. 950); Lowndes (2002, pp. 105-106); Peters (2005, pp. 80, 85)

On the contrary, historical institutionalists not only re-defined the institution including 'regular patterns of behaviours' (Cairney, 2012, p. 74), but also refurbished the relationship between structures and agents by re-valuing an institution which had been regarded as a subordinate before. Some of them took a profound interest in the long-term or cumulative process, particularly, to the historic event which might influence subsequent events (e.g., R. B. Collier & Collier, 1991; Hall, 1986, 1992; Mahoney, 2001). The approach of historical institutionalists frequently chooses the comparative-historical analysis as a methodological tool for analysing the so-called path-dependency, and describes the level of middle range (Immergut & Anderson, 2008, p. 346; Mahoney, 2004, p. 81). This theoretical viewpoint is attractive, in that the establishment of political phenomenon and its context could be illustrated more visibly and understandably (Pierson & Skocpol, 2002, p. 693). Additionally, as Steinmo and Thelen (1992, p. 10) argued, the historical institutionalism has the advantage of supplying a

'theoretical leverage' to understand policy continuity over time within nations and policy difference across nations. The merits and demerits of these two approaches of new institutionalism can be compared as shown in Table 3-1.

In terms of the civil service reform, historical analysis has been applied to many studies (e.g., Bovaird & Russell, 2007; Massey, 2005; Parry, 2001, 2011; Rhodes, 2000; Richards, 2003, 2008; Sausman & Locke, 2007). This approach, as Van der Meer (2011, p. 6) asserts, can give deeper insights into what forces shape institutional development about this issue. Accordingly, as discussed in section 1-3-1, historical institutionalism would be an appropriate foundation for exploring the SCS change processes. The following section sets up the theoretical foundation for building up the SCS (trans)formation model, which contains the patterns and causal mechanism of institutional change, based on the recent findings of historical institutionalists.

3-2-2. Pattern of institutional change

Understanding what the characteristics of the SCS change are, the first inquiry of this thesis, could be facilitated by classifying the features of its institutional transformation into some patterns. Accordingly, there needs to develop a theoretical design about the various types of institutional change. In practice, the work of identifying or measuring the specific types of each research case will be carried out in accordance with the SCS categorisation established in section 2-5-1. Based on the above classification model, it can be possible to discern the degree of its SCS change, including its creation, continuity and transformation. In this regard, the present study uses a mixed form of the institutional change modes, which combines Mahoney and Thelen (2010) with Streeck and Thelen (2005).

Streeck and Thelen (2005) criticised the dichotomous theories which simply divide between stability and change, and then developed the classification of institutional changes systematically (Y.-s. Ha, 2006, p. 226). Their category is distinguished by two criteria as shown in Table 3-2: one is 'processes of change', which take two forms of the incremental and abrupt change; the other is 'results of change', which amount to either continuity or discontinuity (Streeck & Thelen, 2005, p. 8). When applying the 2X2 matrix of Streeck and Thelen (2005),

Mahoney (2000a)'s 'reactive sequence' consisting of the chains of historical events may fall under the '*Reproduction by adaptation*', which brings about a change incrementally yet results in little breakdown of present institutions. The 'punctuated equilibrium' accepting the notion of critical juncture, would match with the transition to new institutional equilibria by an abrupt change. In terms of the '*Incremental change with transformative results*' which may be the main focus of the categorisation of Streeck and Thelen, they argue that the crawling and accumulative change causes the '*Gradual transformation*' of institutions, and this mechanism can eventually lead to discontinuous outcomes which are completely distinguished (Streeck & Thelen, 2005, p. 9, emphasis in original). Lastly, the '*Survival and return*' means that the existing institutions still persist despite dramatic historical shakings, that is institutional stability.

< Table 3-2. Types of institutional change >

		Result of Change	
		Continuity	Discontinuity
Process of Change	Abrupt	Survival and return (→ <i>Institutional Persistence</i>)	Breakdown and replacement (→ <i>"Punctuated Equilibrium"</i>)
	Incremental	Reproduction by adaptation (→ <i>"Reactive sequence"</i>)	Gradual transformation (→ <i>"Incremental change"</i>)

Source: adjusted from Streeck and Thelen (2005, p. 9)

< Table 3-3. Types of gradual change >

	Displacement	Layering	Drift	Convention
<i>Removal of old rules</i>	Yes	No	No	No
<i>Neglect of old rules</i>	-	No	Yes	No
<i>Changed enactment of old rules</i>	-	No	Yes	Yes
<i>Introduction of new rules</i>	Yes	Yes	No	No

Source: Mahoney and Thelen (2010, p. 16)

When it comes to the '*gradual transformation*', which means incremental change with transformative result, Mahoney and Thelen (2010, p. 15) argue that this kind

of institutional change has four modes¹⁵, which are differentiated by the ‘locus of institutional transformation’, as shown in Table 3-3. They addressed each of these four types as ‘displacement’, ‘layering’, ‘drift’ and ‘conversion’ respectively. The outlines and features of them are delineated as follows:

Firstly, the *displacement* could be defined as the replacement of the old institutions by new ones through rediscovery or reactivation, which alternatives used to be often in a latent or subordinate position. The advance of market-oriented institutions in China and Cuba (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010, p. 16) or the shift from Keynesianism to monetarism in Britain (Y.-s. Ha, 2006, p. 227), can be an illustration of this. Secondly, the attachment or addition of newly introduced institutions to the existing ones would be the definition of the *layering*. This can be distinguished from the *displacement* in the sense that it is not a substitution of a whole system nor removal of old rules (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010, p. 16). The amendment of the old rules, which is caused by the ‘differential growth’, that is faster growth of the new rules, can eat into the core of original ones over time, and Pierson’s case of a voluntary private pension system added to an existing public system, would be a good example (T.-s. Ha, 2017, p. 356; Streeck & Thelen, 2005, pp. 23-24). Thirdly, the *drift* occurs when the maintenance of old institutions is neglected despite environmental changes. This inaction or *non-decisions* can result in the changed impact of the old institutions, including erosion, atrophy and slippage of the status quo (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010, p. 17; Streeck & Thelen, 2005, pp. 24-25, emphasis in original). For instance, Hacker (2004, 2005) analysed the welfare system of the U.S., particularly the Medicare programme, as one of the drift cases. Lastly, the *conversion* is a strategic “redeployment of old institutions to new purpose” (Streeck & Thelen, 2005, p. 31) through the reinterpretation or redirection of ambiguous institutions and enactments. One example is the development of the German vocational training system presented by Thelen (2004). This case shows that the actors who had not been involved in the design of an original system but later gained power, have turned the institution to new ends or goals through so-called ‘redirection’ (Boas, 2007, p. 47; T.-s. Ha, 2017, p. 357; Y.-s. Ha, 2006, p. 228).

¹⁵ Streeck and Thelen (2005) suggested five types of gradual transformation at first, yet the mode of ‘exhaustion’ may be excluded from these types because it means collapse or demise of rules rather than change. Later, Mahoney and Thelen (2010) also describe only four types.

In conclusion, the classification of the SCS change processes can be designed by connecting the large category of Table 3-2 to the small category of gradual institutional change of Table 3-3. Not only since the case in which the continuity maintains considerably despite of historical shocks (upper left cell in Table 3-2), receives less attention (Streeck & Thelen, 2005, pp. 8-9), but also since such situation seems to be difficult to discern the differences from the institutional reproduction, this type will be out of consideration in the change types. Therefore, the logical flow of identifying the change pattern would be to confirm whether the shift is substantial or not, and if then (change happens) to investigate the range or speed of the reform. This model could be distinguished from Bezes & Lodge's (2015) feature of the civil service reform, which was described as 'resilience' or 'institutional stickiness' with four change modes exemplified in Table 3-3, because it embraces the abrupt transformation in the SCS change.

3-2-3. Mechanism of institutional change

It seems to be encouraged that categorising the patterns of the civil service reform through the perspective of historical institutionalism is deeply associated with exploring the causations of its shift (Bezes & Lodge, 2015, pp. 146-147; Mahoney & Thelen, 2010; Streeck & Thelen, 2005). Correspondingly, the mechanism of causal inference in this research is founded on the recent achievements of historical institutionalists who have developed the institutional change models. In other words, the present study primarily applies Mahoney and Thelen's (2010) framework for explaining the modes and process of the SCS change, in addition to the ideas or perspectives of other historical institutionalism viewpoints.

Recently, historical institutionalists are interested in the link between the renewed concept of an institution and the institutional change process. This is because the arguments which mostly rely on exogenous factors in the explanation of abrupt shifts (e.g., upper right cell in Table 3-2) or institutional stability (e.g., lower left cell in Table 3-2), have been criticised not only for underestimating the endogenous sources of the change and the incremental process, but also for disentangling the logic of the institutional change from that


of its stability (Cairney, 2012, p. 177; March & Olsen, 2006; Thelen, 1999, p. 396). Along with acknowledging those limits of path-dependency theory, research on the internal dynamics and gradual transformation (e.g., lower right cell in Table 3-2) began to attract attention in the new institutionalism (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010, pp. 4-7; Streeck & Thelen, 2005, pp. 1-4). Historical institutionalism seemed to solve these issues by re-defining an institution with its own properties of complexity and relationship, and pays attention to the conflicting interactions among its elements. According to this, those institutional components hardly coexist without any incongruity, nor respond to a stimulus in the same way (Y.-s. Ha, 2006, p. 223; Scott, 2014, p. 266; Thelen, 1999, p. 397). In this context, it is conceived that the internal contradiction, conflict and gap of the components could twist the configuration within a block of institution, as well as requiring the re-arrangement of them. Moreover, Orren and Skowronek (1994) is valued to have added the notion of “time” to this institutional contradiction situation (Y.-s. Ha, 2002, p. 351; Thelen, 1999, pp. 382-383). The institutional sub-elements constructed in various temporal and historical backgrounds may have their own distinctive logics, and even small changes or frictions can affect a whole system, often in the form of gradualism¹⁶ by interacting with each other (Orren & Skowronek, 1994, pp. 320-321).

In real politics, the conflictive relationship for seizing power between political actors has been taken account of significantly in the ‘incremental change with transformative result’. For instance, Streeck and Thelen (2005, p. 16) emphasise interplay ‘between the rule makers and rule takers’, while Mahoney and Thelen (2010, pp. 10, 14) who, using the concept of ‘compliance’, highlight the ‘power-distributional implication of institutions’, especially the gap or tension in this aspect. To be specific, Mahoney and Thelen (2010) offer a new framework with three levels, as shown in Figure 3-1. They argue that the characteristics of the ‘political context’ as well as those of the ‘targeted institution’ could influence the transformation modes, and that the type of ‘change-agent’ affected by both above variables exerts an impact on the institutional change again at the same time. The two levels of political context and institution are represented by the possibility

¹⁶ This could be named as ‘(re)combination’ (Lieberman, 2002; Scott, 2014), or ‘bricolage’ (J. L. Campbell, 1997, 2005).

of the 'political veto' and the 'discretion' of the targeted institution respectively. According to Mahoney and Thelen (2010)'s model, if the veto possibilities were strong, such as the adverse political conditions, it would be hard for the change-agent to abolish the institution formally. Instead, political actors may neglect the existing institution or exploit it privately, otherwise they disguise their preference for a change like adding another rule to existing one. In terms of the other level, the features of an institution, it is claimed that the discretion of rules in the implementation can be a measurement for compliance with institutions. If institutions allow different interpretation, which may be derived from the ambiguity of rules, or if administrators have the capabilities to change its enforcement, then an altered (*conversion*) or slacked (*drift*) application might happen. Furthermore, although the change-agents who drive the institutional transformation, might obtain their own benefits, the advantages could be not only ambiguous or complicated but also different depending on the perspectives of long and short term. Consequently, the institutional change would emerge from the *distributional struggles* in which the pursuit of political actors are engaged and through which the unintended results are produced (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010, pp. 22-23).

< Figure 3-1. Framework of explaining modes of institutional change >



Source: adjusted from Mahoney and Thelen (2010, pp. 15, 19)

With this in mind, a hypothetical mechanism for inferring the causation of the SCS change during the alternations in government, can be presented. Considering that the SCS, which is definitely recognised as a sort of the civil service system/reform, is a complex and loosely-coupled institution for managing senior bureaucrats in a new political condition (Bezes & Lodge, 2015, p. 156), its

change can be explored through this power-distributional approach of historical institutionalism. The SCS is composed of various personnel systems founded on somewhat contradictory principles of efficiency and responsiveness, as shown Table 1-2, along with its members interacting with their political principals under the contexts of its own legacies, including 'administrative traditions'. In addition, the dynamics surrounding this new institutional reform could be understood by the PSB-based analysis, as discussed in section 2-5-2.

In this respect, it would be plausible to apply the conceptual tool of Bezes and Lodge (2015) to the causal model for comprehending this SCS change, and to connect their components to each level of Mahoney and Thelen (2010)'s framework. Firstly, the Bezes and Lodge (2015)'s opportunity structures of can be interpreted to mean broad- or macro-level variables, as exemplified as the 'political context'. This level is compatible with political motives, such as alternation in government (inauguration of new administration) and veto points including the opposition party's objection. Particularly, these variables would be empirically associated with the relative strength of the ruling party or the presidential-legislative relationship concerning election systems. Next, since the *institutional arrangements*, which makes national distinctiveness through legal *entrenchments* and administrative *pervasiveness*, have the absorbing or at times shaping influence over reforms (Bezes & Lodge, 2015, pp. 142, 149), this could be conceived as the characteristics of the 'targeted institution', including the extent of the 'discretion' of rules. This dimension may depend on how the executive apparatus including the civil service system operate, or what the governance philosophy in a state is. For example, the analysis on the Westminster model and the NPM reform could be involved. Lastly, the types of 'change-agents' in the Mahoney and Thelen's (2010) are the individuals' behaviours under the certain situation shaped by contexts and institutions, and the patterns of PSBs are also influenced by legacies, both can be thought to be conceptually linked each other. That is, the characteristics of political actors might be regarded the results of politico-administrative bargaining where the components of reward, competency and loyalty are exchanged. Correspondingly, it is expected that after selecting cases for comparative analysis, these potential explanatory variables will be more clearly identified.

3-3. Methodological foundation for Senior Civil Service Change

3-3-1. Comparative analysis and Case studies

The pros and cons of comparative analysis

The methodology and theory cannot be isolated from each other when carrying out actual research, not to mention designing the research. According to Lijphart (1975, p. 159), the aim of scientific method is “establishing general empirical propositions”, that is scientific explanation. Similarly, Yin (2009, pp. 35, 38; 2014, pp. 44-45) argues that theory is essential in the research design of case study, and simultaneously the research methodology is conducive to the analytic generation of theory. In this regard, there seems to be a junction between the perspective of historical analysis and the method of comparative case study. For a long history, many political scientists, including Montesquieu and Aristotle, have used the comparison (Dodds, 2018, p. 4): particular, with relation to the study of institutions, it ranges from Wilson (1918) to Lijphart (1971). As classical institutionalists adopted the way of this historical comparison, neither do new institutionalists neglect this method entirely. New institutionalism, dressed in the revived comparative and historical approach, is assessed to have provided a new and better understanding of the institutional varieties across countries as well as the institutional persistence (Steinmo & Thelen, 1992, p. 13). This would be why the comparative analysis, which examines the similarities and variations between different entities, is considered as a central part of most social sciences research (M. C. Mills, 2008, p. 100).

To be more concrete, there appear to be three kinds of advantages in the comparative analysis in large. First, identifying the similarities and differences in the entities, such as individuals, nations and even time periods, allows researcher to reach a universal model or to form a typology because the comparison can encompass the entities across time, space and context (M. C. Mills, 2008, p. 101; Peters, 1998, p. 93). That is, the comparative analysis of multiple cases through replication serves generalisation (Creswell, 2007, p. 74; George & Bennett, 2005, pp. 109-110; Yin, 2009, pp. 54-55). For example, Hofstede’s study (2001), which explored the disparate cultures of fifty countries through comparison and

simplification, gave a useful insight even in political science research. Particularly, it is evaluated that the comparative analysis as a method is conducive to reviving the value of historical and institutional studies against the criticism over its insufficient scientific basis (Rhodes, 1997, pp. 80-81). Secondly, the relationship between research objects, or the causality of research variables (when taking into account of their sequence or time), can be proven through comparative analysis. Mill's logic of comparison is one of the representative illustrations which explore the ways of investigating causal relationship. As a result, by using this tool of comparing variables researchers can test hypotheses and eliminate rival explanations about specific events, actors, structures (Landman, 2008, p. 4). Lastly, as Peters (1998) points out, since it is rarely possible to conduct experiments, through which political scientists are eager to control variables and manage the large research scope, in the real world, the comparative study is a good approach in investigating political phenomena. This approach is especially preferred when the number of research subjects is limited and when the cases focus on the processes across time and countries (Peters, 1998, pp. 4, 13). In practical aspect, since comparisons is useful to disclose the unique aspects of an entity, this method could facilitate describing the political phenomena more sharply (Landman, 2008, p. 5; M. C. Mills, 2008, p. 101).

On the contrary, the comparative analysis has some methodological pitfalls. Firstly, the bias of case selection is one of the most critical problems, which might undermine the internal validity, in comparative analysis (M. C. Mills, 2008, p. 101; Peters, 1998, pp. 46-48). The pitfall can arise from the intentional selection rather than the sampling (random selection) of statistical method (Landman, 2008, p. 36). As Geddes (2003, p. 92) exemplifies, there could be two potential mistakes in drawing inferences: concluding hastily that any characteristic that the selected cases share is a cause would be the one; inferring that a relationship (or absence of relationship) between variables within limited cluster reflects the relationship in the entire population of cases may be the other. Secondly, reaching the goal of comparative analysis requires the establishment of equivalent instrument or definitions to measure constructs (M. C. Mills, 2008, p. 102). As Landman (2008, p. 33) pointed out, if the analytic concept used in the same research is understood differently, the validity of comparison can be threatened due to the different measures being developed for that concept. M. C. Mills (2008) who cited the term

of 'race' which means differently in North America and Latin America, would be an illustration of this. Lastly, there could be the weakness of data availability, particularly in the case of comparing many entities (Landman, 2008, p. 47). This situation can force researcher to replicate and perform secondary analysis. However, it is argued the heavy reliance on it might pose a threat to research reliability (C.-s. Jung, 2014, p. 310), despite its potentiality of providing incremental advancement in knowledge.

The pros and cons of case studies

In terms of defining case study, Eckstein ([1975] 1992, pp. 123-124) starts from the clear point that case study is the investigation of individuals which can be reported and analysed with a single measurement. In addition, Yin (2014, pp. 16-17) explains it as an empirical investigation on the 'contemporary phenomenon in depth', in which its 'context' can be researched with various evidence and method techniques. This definition seems to reflect the merits of case studies. First of all, this research method has the strength of providing an in-depth understanding of the focused individual phenomenon. Because of this strength of description in detail, case studies can find out such contextual factors as minor but significant clues, which statistical studies might skip or leave out (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 21). Secondly, the method of case study has its own characteristics contrary to the experiment which tends to be in the absence of the context because of its control over the phenomenon (Yin, 2014, pp. 12, 16). Since there would be multiple conjunctural causations in social phenomena, the case study which can offer their context or holistic understanding, would be suitable for dealing with this causal complexity (C.-s. Jung, 2014, p. 310; Ragin, 2014, pp. 20, 23). In this regard, qualitative research like case study, is more favourable than quantitative one when researcher is uncertain about which variables should be examined or when they probe into a new topic (Creswell, 2003, p. 22). Lastly, since it is difficult that a single source has absolute advantage over others, using multiple sources which are complementary each other is the advantage of case studies (Yin, 2009, p. 114). This is why the approach of case study is distinguished from the specific method for data collection, such as observations, fieldwork and ethnographies, and it is recognised as a methodological strategy of research which is deeply associated with non-quantitative research (Yin, 2009,

pp. 16-17). Similarly, Creswell (2003, p. 15; 2007, p. 89) argues that a case study is the research in which academic investigator explores one or more individuals through detailed, in-depth data collection involving multiple sources of information (e.g., observations, interviews, and documents).

Although the belief that the work researched in a qualitative way is not an empirical study, would be nothing but a scientific superstition (Im, 2009, p. 156), there still seems to have been some critical or even misguided views about this methodology. Flyvbjerg (2006) enumerated five misunderstandings¹⁷ about case studies, and Yin (2009) refuted traditional prejudices¹⁸ about them. Those concerns about the case study method would be condensed into the 'small-N problem'. It can be argued that this problem may consist of two issues relating to generalisation and hypothesis testing. These might be understood as the "threats to validity in non-experimental research": the former would be external validity and the latter would concern internal validity (Peters, 1998, pp. 46, 48).

The first aspect of the small-N problem, generalising from small numbers of cases, is not the only problem of case studies. As the single experiments of quantitative research also face the same methodological difficulty, the essence is not the matter of how many cases or experiments are selected, but of how carefully they are chosen and carried out. Through a strategic choice, case studies pursue the 'analytic generalisation' (Yin, 2014, p. 21) or the 'force of example' (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 228) rather than the statistical or formal generalisation of the probability world. In this regard, quantitative researchers view their scope more broadly than qualitative ones, and then make an attempt at generalisation about many samples, whereas the investigators of qualitative research including case study, narrow the scope of their theories down to only a limited range of cases (Mahoney & Goertz, 2006, p. 27). When it comes to the other aspect, there appears to be distrust in the internal validity, particularly its

¹⁷ (a) practical or context-dependent knowledge is less valuable than theoretical or rule-based knowledge; (b) since generalising from a single case is unattainable, case studies provide little basis for scientific development; (c) the case study method has limitations on hypothesis testing and theory building; (d) the case study allows a subjective bias toward verification; (e) summarising case studies is difficult (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 221).

¹⁸ (1) deficiency of rigor in doing case studies; (2) difficulty of generalisation from a single case; (3) the sheer volume of the case study research; (4) weakness in establishing causal relationships, such as the effectiveness of treatments (Yin, 2014, pp. 19-22).

causal mechanism, which is similar to the criticism of comparative research. However, qualitative analysts contend that the causal relationship of the statistical approach cannot apply to case studies because the causation mechanism of qualitative research is quite different from that of quantitative one. Mahoney and Goertz (2006) distinguish these two with the ideas which are the Boolean equation and the correlational approach¹⁹. The former explains the cause through the logic of necessary/ sufficient condition or its combination, while the latter contains the probabilistic view using numerical coefficients (D. Collier & Mahoney, 1996, pp. 65, 90; Mahoney, 2000b, p. 397; Mahoney & Goertz, 2006, pp. 232-234). Besides those points, it would be needed to disprove the other denunciations against the case study method. In terms of the dispute over the less rigorous research and the thick narratives, Flyvbjerg (2006) and Yin (2009) refute these criticisms by claiming the more systematic training of researchers and the possibility of summarisation or inevitability of narratives respectively. Moreover, it was alleged that “concrete, context-dependent knowledge is [...] more valuable than the vain search for predictive theories and universals” (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 224).

Discussion: Strategies for comparative case studies

Despite the distinction between comparative analysis and case study, Lijphart (1975, pp. 163-164) simplified that when the number of cases is too small to apply a statistical method and the cases are comparable for the analysis, the comparative method would be suitable. Furthermore, Yin (2009, p. 54) claimed that comparison can be included with multiple-cases studies, in that both of them use the same methodological framework. Even, if the uniqueness of comparative analysis might be acknowledged, its good combination with case study could improve the research validity by making up for other's weakness (C.-s. Jung, 2014, p. 15). Therefore, with this in mind, this thesis applies the combined methodology of those two ways, the comparative case study, to the analysis of the changes to the British and Korean SCS.

¹⁹ The example of the Boolean algebra model:

Outcome Y = (Factor A AND Factor B AND Factor C) OR (Factor A AND Factor C AND Factor D)

The example of the Correlation model with numerical coefficients:

*Outcome Y = $\beta_0 X_0 + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 + \beta_3 X_3 + \dots + \beta_{12} X_1 * X_2 + \epsilon$.* (β : coefficient, X: Factor)

Source: adjusted from (Mahoney & Goertz, 2006, p. 234)

Above all, since the purpose of this research is to improve understanding of the SCS change by investigating the similarities and differences between its processes in the U.K. and those in Korea, the analysis is fundamentally based on the comparison. The present study also attempts to test the hypotheses or theories related with the PSB or politicisation. Hence, comparative analysis would be suitable for making a typology of the SCS change as well as for forming its causal mechanism. Moreover, the approach of historical institutionalism on which this thesis is grounded can be also compatible with the comparative case study. In this regard, Rhodes (1997) also advocates this methodology because of its advantage of linking historical description and causal analysis, as to this research (pp. 82-83). In addition, the method strategies depend on the topics and circumstances of the research question and its characteristics (Bryman, 2012, pp. xxxii, 4; Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 226; Lune & Berg, 2016, p. 14). In particular, according to Yin (2009, pp. 8-13), when the research explores the 'how' and 'why' questions (especially over time), which not only deal with contemporary events but also are usually out of the researcher's control, then, the case study has more methodological advantage than other methodological approaches. Consequently, the topic of "contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-world context" (Yin, 2014, p. 16) in this research, can harmonise well with the subject and scope of case studies.

When it comes to conducting the comparative case study in practice, it is important how to avoid the potential pitfalls of the small-N problem: the need of countermeasure against the matters of generalisation (external validity) and hypothesis testing (internal validity). With respect to this issue, Lijphart (1971, pp. 686-691; 1975, p. 159) offered four ways: (1) increase the number of cases as much as possible; (2) reduce the property-space of analysis by combining variables and/or categories; (3) focus the comparative analysis on 'comparable' cases; (4) restrict the analysis to the 'key' variables. These strategies for minimising the problem of 'many variables, small N' seem to converge into the 'strategies for the selection cases' (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 230) because the two aspects of generalisation and causal inference, as Blatter (2008, p. 69) pointed out, are connected to corresponding selection criteria. In other words, as the selection bias resulting from 'inadvertent selection' induces a critical failure in small-N analysis, thereby cases should be selected with deliberation (D. Collier

& Mahoney, 1996, pp. 88-89; Geddes, 2003, pp. 117-118, 129; Mahoney & Goertz, 2006, pp. 239-240). Flyvbjerg (2006) suggests the information-oriented selection, through which method the cases are believed to reflect the investigators' expectations or to correlate strongly with the research variables. Also, Gerring (2008) argues that the case(s) is chosen because of the situation within its (their) population and researcher's intention (2008, p. 646). As a result, it is desirable that selecting "comparable" cases carefully in reference to such comparative inferential strategies, as Mill's 'method of agreement (difference)' or Przeworski and Teune's 'most similar (different) systems design' (Blatter, 2008, p. 70; Brans, 2007, p. 270). How to select the research case(s) has an impact not only on overcoming the criticism of the small-N analysis, but also increasing the validities of comparative research (Blatter, 2008; Ebbinghaus, 2005; M. Mills, Van de Bunt, & De Bruijn, 2006). In the next section, why and how the present study selects the cases, especially with regard to the idea of Levi-Faur (2006), will be deliberated.

3-3-2. Case selection

Basis of selecting cases: Levi-Faur's four strategies


a set of 'comparable cases' can be defined as a unit of observation or analysis which contains one measurable value relating to the research questions (Geddes, 2003, p. 137; Yin, 2009, p. 30). Usually, the meaning of *comparable* might be perceived on the basis of the similarity or difference among cases (Lijphart, 1971). However, the cases in the small-N analysis should not be sampled randomly, but screened in accordance with a specific purpose derived from the theoretical foundation (M. Mills et al., 2006, p. 622). In addition, since this study targets more than two cases, it is crucial that the screening procedure takes into account the logic of 'replication', in which the theoretical framework, like multiple experiments, plays an important part in the generalisation (Yin, 2014, pp. 57-58, 95). Thus, it can be argued that the cases in comparative research can be juxtaposed in the analysis area owing to their commonalities or dissimilarities, yet they should have the reason which emanates from plausible inference and theoretical intention.

On this basis, in order to reduce case selection bias as well as to test/generate hypotheses, this research adopts the advice of Levi-Faur (2006), which separates Mill's methods inferring the causal relationship from the designs of Przeworski and Teune (1970) dealing with the unknown variables of diverse aspects. Commonly, it would be true that those methodological models of Mill, Przeworski and Teune appear to look like an analogous logic and to be intimately related with each other, in the nominal comparison of causal assessment (Landman, 2008, p. 70; Mahoney, 2003, p. 342; Peters, 1998, pp. 28-29, 37-41; Skocpol & Somers, 1980, pp. 183-184). However, if both approaches would utilise the same reasoning process, the 'Most Different Systems Designs' (MDSD) of Przeworski and Teune (1970), in which most of the plausible factors are dissimilar, might have a logical difficulty in extracting the cause(s) when the results of those selected cases are different each other. Despite the contrast between 'Mill's Method of Difference' (MMD) focusing on the variation of outcomes and 'Mill's Method of Agreement' (MMA) targeting the similarities, these two methods compare the similar aspects of different cases, while it is argued that the 'Most Similar Systems Designs' (MSSD) can contribute to enhance the internal validity by isolating the intervening factors, and that the comparison of MDSD aims to increase external validity as well as to establish the robust relationship of causal mechanism (Levi-Faur, 2006, pp. 45, 57-58). In fact, Przeworski and Teune analysed the relationship between variables of the hypotheses with the focus of similarities and differences among cases (Brans, 2007, p. 270; Gerring, 2008, p. 648; Landman, 2008, p. 73). Therefore, since the interests of Przeworski and Teune's designs would be about how to deal with the unknown variable of diverse aspects for generating/testing hypothesis, yet Mill's two methods seem to be about the logical process of inferring the causal relationship, these two distinct approaches can be synthesised.

Levi-Faur's four strategies of the comparative small-N analysis, as shown in Figure 3-2, which are combined with the x-axis of dependent variables using Mill's logic and the y-axis of control variables using Przeworski and Teune's models. In accordance with his four techniques, the idea of MSSD+ MMD' hopes to detect the factor which can explain the outcomes (e.g., factor 'd' on the upper left of Figure 3-2). Meanwhile, other strategies expect to be able to eliminate the following variables which are less likely to effect on the outcomes: the factors

found in one of the cases in similar outcomes (e.g., factors 'd·e' of the MSSD+ MMA); the factors found in both of the different cases (e.g., factors 'd·e' of the MDSD+MMD); a set of the different variables in the similar outcomes (e.g., factors 'a·b·c, f·g·h' of the MDSD+MMA). In practice, this scholar recommends to uphold the internal validity with the primary cases based on the MSSD at first, and then to enlarge the research through diverse cases as a second stage to increase the external validity by relying on the MDSD+MMD or MDSD+MMA strategy (Levi-Faur, 2006, p. 63). As a result, this combination of methods is not only based on the similarities and differences of the cases, but also reflects the nominal strategy in which the causal relationship is conceived as necessary/sufficient or the Boolean equation, not as statistical or probabilistic views (Mahoney, 2000b; Mahoney & Goertz, 2006). Consequently, it can be argued that his strategies advanced from the previous two nominal ways (MSSD/MDSD, and MMD/MMA), will provide more precise and systematic methodological tools for analysing diverse cases to which those dichotomous models have not applied easily.

< Figure 3-2. Four inferential strategies >



Source: adjusted from Levi-Faur (2006, p. 59)

Selecting comparable cases

The number of the SCS system which could be a candidate of 'cases' in this comparative research, is limited because there are not so many countries adopting this new government reform programme. It is argued that this personnel management has been introduced usually in the OECD countries (Lafuente et al., 2012, p. 4), and an OECD surveys show that only about 20 countries replied that they have a separate group of SCS (OECD, 2009, p. 83; 2011, p. 93). Moreover, it is known that the research on this system, particularly the classification of the OECD countries in a comparative viewpoint, appears to have been becoming active (Brans, 2007, p. 272). After all, the studies on the SCS can be included in the small-N analysis. The procedure of screening which cases are comparable with respect to this research, as discussed already in the previous section, is deeply related with the theories or information of the present study. Thus, the Levi-Faur's (2006) strategies for selection cases is used in this stage, based on such the above-discussed theoretical foundations, as PSB model, politicisation and historical approach. For starters, in order to apply his methods, it needs to identify the commonalities and diversities of multivariate factors among the candidate countries.

In some countries, the specific group of senior staff is defined or designated as a separate cadre by law or formal arrangement, while there are other countries where the group of high-ranking officials might be able to be recognised but not defined formally (Lafuente et al., 2012, pp. 7-8; OECD, 2008, p. 72). With regard to this, the OECD index and reports seem to offer proper criteria of the senior public officials, such as their formalised status, performance-related management for them. Above all, the countries equipped explicitly with the formal personnel system for special management of elite cadre, are chosen as candidate cases for this comparative analysis. However, considering the SCS is regarded as an institution which includes informal procedure and convention as well, the countries where senior staff is treated differently according to the managerialism doctrine, could be also on the list of the present study. Therefore, 13 OECD countries, including France and Spain, can be considered as potential comparable cases, as shown Table 3-4 (except the nations with grey bar).

< Table 3-4. Candidate countries of the comparative research of the SCS >

	Formalisation (Formal: ● / Informal: ○ / none: -)	Performance management	
		More emphasis on the performance (Yes: ● / No: ○)	High performance-related remuneration (Yes: ● / No: ○)
Australia	●	●	○
Belgium	●	●	○
Canada	●	●	●
Czech R.	●	●	●
France	○	●	●
Germany	-	●	○
Italy	●	●	●
Japan	○	●	○
Korea	●	●	●
Mexico	○	●	○
Netherlands	●	●	○
Poland	●	●	○
Portugal	●	●	○
Spain	-	●	●
Sweden	-	○	○
United Kingdom	●	●	●
United States	●	●	●

Source: adjusted from Lafuente et al. (2012, p. 8), OECD (2011, p. 93)

On the other hand, it is essential to identify the systemic characteristics of the potential intervening factors in those countries, in that the similarities and variations among a variety of variables could be the independent variables or sometimes the control variables within a system depending on the MSSD and MDSD (Levi-Faur, 2006, p. 57; Przeworski & Teune, 1970, pp. 32-35). Since the types of 'administrative traditions' (Painter & Peters, 2010; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2017, p. 63), as mentioned in the section of research scope, would be a valuable tool in grouping nations, this yardstick is used to classify the above 13 countries in the beginning of case selection. Furthermore, this research suggests more detailed descriptions about Painter and Peters' multidimensional criterion by adding relevant academic achievements, which may strengthen the persuasive power. To be specific, firstly, geographical division would not an unacceptable way to display the national trait. This phase also compares the countries which having the SCS by applying the cultural classification of Hofstede (2001). Table 3-5 is the results of categorising those nations. It shows that Anglo-Saxon

countries and Iberian countries have much in common with each other, whereas it is noticeable that Korea contrasts with U.K. and U.S.

< Table 3-5. Geographic, cultural and administrative difference of candidates >


	Geography	Five dimensions of Hofstede (* red is top 20 ranks, whereas blue is bottom 40 ranks)					Administrative traditions
		power distance	uncertainty avoidance	Individualism	Masculinity	long-term orientation	
Australia	Oceania	36	51	90	61	31	Anglo-American
Belgium	Western Europe	65	94	75	54	38	-
Canada	Northern America	39	48	80	52	23	Anglo-American
Czech Rep.	Eastern Europe	-	-	-	-	-	Post-communist
France	Western Europe	68	86	71	43	39	Napoleonic
Germany	Western Europe	35	65	67	66	31	Germanic
Italy	Southern Europe	50	75	76	70	34	Napoleonic
Japan	Eastern Asia	54	92	46	95	80	East Asian
Korea	Eastern Asia	60	85	18	39	75	East Asian
Mexico	central America	81	82	30	69	-	Latin America
Netherlands	Western Europe	38	53	80	14	44	Germanic
Poland	Eastern Europe	-	-	-	-	-	Post-communist
Portugal	Southern Europe	63	104	27	31	30	Napoleonic
Spain	Southern Europe	57	86	51	42	19	Napoleonic
Sweden	Northern Europe	31	29	71	5	33	Scandinavian
United Kingdom	Northern Europe	35	35	89	66	25	Anglo-American
United States	Northern America	40	46	91	62	29	Anglo-American

Source: <https://unstats.un.org/unsd/methodology/m49>, Painter and Peters (2010), and Hofstede (2001, p. 500)

Then, now that this examination was intended to scan which cases are comparable, the next stage is to screen these countries on the foundation of the theoretical understanding of this study. Generally, the logic of replication needs to be considered. Such reasonable predicting of the similar results (literal replication) or the contrasting results (theoretical replication) underlies selecting multiple cases on the basis of theoretical comprehension (Yin, 2009, p. 54; 2014, p. 57). The replication in case study means that the contextual condition of one case can be duplicated or applied to that of another case. For instance, the fact that most of the OECD nations share the value of “like-mindedness”, such as a market-based economy and democratic principles (Noboru, 2004, pp. 16-17), gains advantage in replicating cases. In this regard, it would be a little hard to

compare the post-communist states with others directly²⁰, apart from the comparison within them like Meyer-Sahling and Veen (2012). Thus, when putting together the outcomes, it would be persuasive to put the Britain, U.S., and Korea on the research candidate list.

< Figure 3-3. Historical trajectory of the U.S., U.K. and Korea >



Furthermore, for the sake of screening those sets of cases in detail, it needs additional investigation into the historical background of each country and the institutional arrangement surrounding those SCSs, which may be associated with the theoretical interests of this research. Firstly, coincidentally all the three countries experienced the alternation in government, not long after the launch of the SCS system, but the historical trajectory of the U.K. and Korea is slightly different from that of the U.S., as shown in Figure 3-3. The American system was derived from the constant suspicions against Washington bureaucracy since the Nixon administration, while both the British and Korean SCS seem to be triggered

²⁰ The reform law regulating the SCS officially was not fixed until 2015 in the Czech Republic (Plaček & Ochrana, 2018, p. 880), although the Czech government replied to the OECD inquiries that it has a separate and performance-oriented system for senior officials.

by a financial crisis and subsequently the NPM reform (Aberbach & Rockman, 1990, p. 36; Bae, Ham, Na, Moon, & Choi, 2005, pp. 23, 47; Huddleston, 1992, pp. 166-178; Massey, 1993, pp. 21, 87-88; M.-j. Moon & Kim, 2006, pp. 239-240).

Secondly, despite the analogous legal basis, the two Anglo-Saxon countries have made their own typical diffusion patterns about their government system: centralised Westminster-model; federalism and presidential system (Halligan, 2015, p. 59; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2017, pp. 6, 49-50). Meanwhile, the overall governing systems of Korea seem to resemble those of the U.S. because of the political and economic leverage of the America in the national construction after the Korean war (J.-h. Kim, 2018, p. 2; S.-w. Yoon, 2006, pp. 75-79). In terms of the civil service system, the U.S. model, which is assessed as an open and position-based system, contrasts with the closed model of the traditional British civil service (G. A. Campbell, 1965, pp. 56-63; Halligan, 2007, p. 51; Richards, 2003, p. 39). In this regard, the Korean civil service, essentially based on the (person-oriented) rank system, would be more similar to the British one (S.-y. Kim, 1967, pp. 150-151).

Thirdly, the British elite executives were commonly supposed to be an instrumental support for the political minister since the Northcote-Trevelyan report of 1854, while the past authoritarian Korean state are regarded to be captured by the elite bureaucrats, who were raised by the developmentalism model (Amsden, 1989; J.-j. Choi, 2002; Marsh et al., 2001; Richards, 2003). According to Painter and Peters (2010, p. 27) and Horton (2011), Korean civil servants appear to belong to the style mixed with Continental European and Confucian 'virtuous men', rather than that of Anglo-American.

In brief, it would be relatively awkward to compare the cases of the U.S. with those of the U.K. or even with those of Korea in this study. The similarity between the U.S. and the U.K. is too equivocal to use the MSSD. Even though admitting the commonalities of Anglo-American countries, as Peters (1998, p. 38) pointed out, the inability to insulate extraneous variance completely is the major drawback of MSSD. Consequently, the present study is mainly founded on the MDSD perspective by selecting the British and Korean SCSs. Since the assumption of the MDSD usually looks at sub-systemic levels and attempts to interpret the

relationship among variables (Peters, 1998, pp. 28-29, 37-41; Przeworski & Teune, 1970, pp. 34-39; Skocpol & Somers, 1980, pp. 183-184), it will be a good approach to analyse the SCS change of this research.

Disaggregation of cases by time dimension

According to Levi-Faur (2006, pp. 60-62), the stepwise comparative analysis consists of at least two inference steps, in which analysing the co-variation of variables within the primary cases (MSSD for internal validity) is the first stage and comparing the results across different cases (MDSD for external validity) is the second. One of the most interesting pieces of his advice is to “add a temporal dimension to the analysis to compare sectors and nations before and after a critical event or a turning point” (Levi-Faur, 2006, p. 64). This would be also an effective way to deal with the problem of “many variables, few cases” in the small-N analysis, particularly with respect to Lijphart (1971, 1975)’s increasing the number of cases as much as possible. This suggestion corresponds with Geddes (2003)’s model, which disaggregates cases into multiple observations of analysis unit, as well. Considering this disaggregation strategy comes from the path-dependence perspective (Geddes, 2003, pp. 139-140), obviously the ‘time’ dimension is an important determinant not only for the theoretical basis of research on the institutional change but also its methodological design.

When applying this temporal dimension to the selected cases of this study, it would be possible to divide the time series by the juncture which may influence the arrangement of the SCS. In other words, two more observations or cases can be respectively, because each country as an analysis unit is composed of two nodes: the point of the launch of SCS system and the point of the alternation in government. It is supposed that these two historical nodes have the potentiality of a critical juncture in the institutional change. Therefore, four cases in two countries will be analysed in this research: before and after April 1996, as well as before and after May 1997 (U.K.); before and after July 2006, as well as before and after February 2008 (Korea). In accordance with Levi-Faur’s stepwise inference, the investigation over time within a country, the first stage could be analysed on the basis of the approach of MSSD. From this, it is expected that tracing for the historical development of the SCS establishment in the U.K. and

Korea will allow how different the institutional change patterns are. Then, the next step is the comparison across those two countries based on the MDSD strategy. For example, if the historical processes of the SCS change have taken place differently in the U.K., and Korea, the research design of the methodological strategies would be the method set of MSDS+MMD. Consequently, it would be reasonable to apply the four inferential strategies of Levi-Faur (2006) to this comparative analysis by disaggregating the cases of Britain and Korea.

< Table 3-6. Differences between the U.K. and Korea concerning the SCS >

<div>Research Cases</div> <div>Potential variables</div>			United Kingdom		Korea	
			(Before and After)		(Before and After)	
			April 1996	May 1997	July 2006	Feb 2008
opportunity structures	Geography		Northern Europe		Eastern Asia	
	History / Culture		Colonizer/ Pluralist (individualism, risk-preference)		Colonist / Confucian (collectivism, uncertainty-avoidance)	
	Administrative tradition		Anglo-American		East Asian	
	Political motive or opportunity		Major (Tory)	Blair admin (Tory → Labour)	Mr.t Roh (Left)	Lee admin (Left → Right)
Institutional Arrangement	Entrenchment	Law	Common Law		Codified law	
		Govern-ment system	Limited and unitary gov't (Parliamentary Sovereignty)		Highly centralized gov't (Presidential system)	
	Pervasi-veness	Execu-tives	Westminster Model		'Rechtsstaat' Model	
			Career civil service system (rank in person)			
		Civil service	Anglo-American (unified, neutral, generalist, permanent)		Fusion of Continental European and Confucian	
Components of PSB	Reward		Northcote-Trevelyan → NPM-type management of the SCS system (To be examined more closely)		Elite bureaucrats raised by the developmentalism model → NPM-type management of the SCS system (To be examined more closely)	
	Competency					
	Loyalty					


To sum up, it could be possible to contrast the research cases, which are associated with the four changes to the SCS systems in the U.K. and Korea during the two alternations in government respectively through the above discussions, as shown in Table 3-6. This structure of comparison is grounded on such conceptual tools as the analytic components of Bezes and Lodge (2015),

which are already proposed in section 2-5-2, and the causation model for institutional change of Mahoney and Thelen (2010).

3-4. Frameworks for Analysis

The theoretical and methodological foundations examined in this chapter, allow to establish the framework for analysing the patterns of each SCS change process as well as the causal factors of its institutional changes. The analytic structures would not only contribute seeking the answers for the main questions of this research, but also enhance understanding the narratives of the reform processes in the U.K. and Korea with ease.

< Figure 3-4. Framework for analysis on patterns of the SCS change >



First, the key characteristics of the SCS change over time, the answer to sub-question (1), can be revealed in the specific forms of the institutional change. In other words, each of the transformation processes will be recognised as one of the modes of Streeck and Thelen (2005) (Table 3-2) largely, and then if the change would be incremental, it can be classified by the typology of Mahoney and Thelen (2010) (Table 3-3) again. The degree of SCS change is identified by means of comparing a pair of the SCS types in each observation which includes the timing of before and after alternation in government. As a result, a total of 6 types in Britain and Korea will form a contrast with each other. From this

comparison, four modes of the SCS change in the U.K. and Korea can be acquired, as shown in Figure 3-4. Second, with regard to discovering the causal factor of the SCS changes, the exploration of sub-question (2), it is expected that the method of Levi-Faur's (2006) comparative analysis facilitates extracting the determinants and at the same time eliminating the irrelevant ones among potential explanatory variables through. In accordance with his stepwise heuristics, four pairs of the SCS change patterns, which are drawn from the previous stage (a total of 4 modes of institutional change in Figure 3-4) will be compared to one another. In practice, two pair of cases grounded in the MSSD, that is the observations within a country over time, are compared each other for achieving internal validity. The next analysis moves to the issue of external validity through the way of MDSD, in which two couple of contrasting cases from different nations are compared. The focus of these analyses to find out which factors were decisive in the SCS change through investigating whether the SCS was changed or not, and if so, what form the transformation was. In fact, the resulted patterns of the SCS change process would be the outcomes which this case analysis is mainly interested in. Accordingly, the dynamics of the SCS change can be inferred from those verified determinants on the basis of the above causal model derived from historical institutionalism.

< Table 3-7. Framework for analysis on causal factors of the SCS change >

	Mill's Method of Difference	Mill's Method of Agreement
Most Similar System Design	Comparison between ' mode A ' and ' mode B ' (<i>within the U.K.</i>)	Comparison between ' mode C ' and ' mode D ' (<i>within Korea</i>)
Most Different System Design	Comparison between ' mode B ' and ' mode C '	Comparison between ' mode A ' and ' mode D '

When it comes to the last sub-question, how to evaluate the changed SCSs signifies to examine the distinctive outcomes and their aftermath in the cases. Like the previous two questions, this assessment not only can be given diverse interpretations by the perspectives of historical institutionalism, but also should be undertaken through the consideration of its politico-administrative relation. The fact that the concepts of success and evaluation in the public sector can be discussed in various aspects (Marsh & McConnell, 2010, pp. 565, 569), has an

important implication in assessing the changes of this new institution. In consequence, the four changed SCSs in the U.K. and Korea will be reviewed in the three-dimensional tool of policy success according to the suggestion of Marsh and McConnell (2010): programmatic, process and political aspects, as exemplified in Table 3-8.

< Table 3-8. Framework for assessment of the changed SCSs >


	United Kingdom		Korea	
	SCS (Major)	SCS (Blair)	SCS (Roh)	SCS (Lee)
Programmatic	<i>(The discussion of comparative framework for evaluating the outcome of SCS reform is postponed until Chapter seven.)</i>			
Process				
Political				

Source: adjust from Marsh and McConnell (2010, p. 571)

3-5. Data Collection

3-5-1. The process and principle of collecting data

< Figure 3-5. Data collection activities >



Source: Creswell (2007, p. 118)

The subsequent phase of setting up methodology and framework would be how to gather the data or source relevant to the answers to the research questions (Bryman, 2012, pp. 14, 24; Grix, 2002, p. 180). According to Creswell (2007, p.

118), collecting the research data progresses in a series of interrelated activities for pursuing the inquiry into the main subject of study. He claims that finding the right people (sites) who (which) can provide good data for the study, and getting access to them, would be the prominent procedure as well as the first step of the data collection. Then, the continuous sequences of data collecting activities are followed as shown in Figure 3-5.

In order to identify and access the key individuals or sites, it must be known that the evidence which is to be collected for research can be derived from various data. As reviewed earlier, one of the strengths of case study is that it can be underpinned by diverse source, such as Yin's (2009, p. 99) six sources: documents, archival records, interviews, direct observation, participant-observation, and physical artifacts. In particular, considering that the data in qualitative research are for describing and clarifying the experiences or phenomena into which the study is investigating, and that often this evidence take the form of written language texts, it can be claimed that the *document*, *interview* and *observation* are considered as the three major sources of this comparative case study in large (Creswell, 2007, pp. 129, 132; Polkinghorne, 2005, pp. 137-138, 141).

With regard to this gathered data especially in a case study, according to Polkinghorne (2005, p. 138), researcher seeks to discover the meaning and ideas of the textual evidence, not the marked words on the paper. There seems to be three principles for the improvement of the quality of data collection, which are advised as followings (King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994, pp. 23-27; Yin, 2014, pp. 118-129). First, it is recommended to collect as much data as from as many diverse sources as possible. This 'triangulation'²¹ by using multiple and different sources is an advantage as well as a requirement in the data collection of case study, when compared to other methods despite the additional burden (Yin, 2014, pp. 119-122). Second, it is important to ensure the reliability or replicability of the collected data. Reliability involves the same result being secured if the same procedure is applied, and replicability means the possibility of duplicating the data or conclusions when tracing the research logic (King et al., 1994, pp. 25-26). Yin

²¹ Denzin (1970, p. 291) describes this as 'the combination of methodologies in the study of the same phenomenon'

(2014, pp. 127-128) argues that these could be obtained by reporting sufficient detail and following the method protocol. Thirdly, it is necessary to record the collecting process and to store the data in a separate database. The thesis tried to collect data in compliance with these principles.

3-5-2. The sources of evidence for this research

Fundamentally, this qualitative research triangulates reliable data from the three main sources: document; interview; and observation. The triangulation can, as Eisner (1991, p. 110) and Bowen (2009, p. 28) believed, enhance the credibility of research by a confluence of evidence, and offer the corroboration of findings through diverse methods. In particular, document analysis, the methodologically systematic procedure of interpreting documents to acquire meaning or understanding on the subject (Bowen, 2009, p. 27), will be the major source of evidence in this thesis. Those documents encompass official government report, brochure, journal, newspaper, internet material and even the interview in a secondary source. According to Bowen (2009, pp. 28-29), document analysis has been proved to be useful to triangulating data, and notably to be appropriate to qualitative case studies because it can provide rich descriptions as well as large contexts about the research objects. Besides the complementary role, it is argued that the value of document analysis lies in conducting historical and cross-cultural research, in which there is no choice but to depend on the in-depth analysis of previous literature. In other words, various documentary materials can serve not only to understand the historical background and context, but also to track the change of the target over time by comparing them (Bowen, 2009, p. 30). These functions may result from the methodological advantages of document analysis, such as its exactness providing details of events and the broadness covering a long span of time or many events (Yin, 2014, p. 106). However, now that the collection process of documents has the weakness of 'biased selectivity', and that the original intention of producing them may not be directly related with the research questions, it is advised to refrain from overreliance on these materials through digging below the surface of them (Polkinghorne, 2005, p. 141; Yin, 2014, p. 108).

Therefore, one of the most dominant methods to collect data in this case study, which is based on the comparison and historical institutionalism, is document analysis. Nonetheless, as Bowen (2009, pp. 29, 38) points out, this should not be the only stand-alone way to obtain empirical data for evidence if there would be other appropriate collection source, including interview, because of its methodological nature as supplementary provider. Since not only the terminology of the SCS was ambiguous and disparate but also understanding the historical backgrounds of its emergence was needed, a wide literature review with various academic texts, journals and reports is required. Notwithstanding the abundant documentary materials, it is recommended to utilise them with a critical and cautious attitude due to the limitations of document analysis (Bowen, 2009, p. 33; Yin, 2014, p. 106). The sources in this study, particularly in connection with document analysis, will be assessed in reference to their quality and reliability as research evidence. Additionally, the procedure of evaluating document means that the selection of data-collection should be based on the research purpose and the conceptual framework (Owen, 2014, p. 7). In consequence, data for this qualitative research is collected in accordance with the analysis framework of the thesis, that is Bezes and Lodge's three-dimensional aspects of PSB (opportunity structures, institutional arrangements and bargaining components), as well as with the civil service reform from the viewpoint of historical institutionalism. With this in mind, the following unfolds not only what source/document were selected, but also why and how they are analysed in each case of the U.K. and Korea.

Official documents

Considering that the SCS can be defined as one of the distinctive personnel system, and that this political institution was launched through a formal procedure in each country, the investigation should start at finding and appraising official documents. This kind of materials would let qualitative researchers to access the evidence for what intension or expectancy effect the SCS has and for how it was designed, with high efficiency and easy availability (Bowen, 2009, p. 31; Yin, 2014, p. 106). Above all, white papers about the civil service reform are outstandingly advantageous in comprehending this new system. For example, '*The Civil Service: Continuity and Change*' (Cm 2627, 1994) as well as '*The Civil Service: Taking Forward Continuity and Change*' (Cm 2748, 1995), is widely regarded to

have been the basis which formally established the British SCS. The 'Modernising government' (Cm 4310, 1999) indicates the direction and mission of the Blair administration's reform. In terms of the Korea, the white paper reported by the 'Board of Policy Plan for President consulting' (BPP, 2008) details the whole process of the SCS policy from the beginning of its creation by President Roh. The data about the public reform of Lee's administration, the next government of Mr. Roh, can be found in 'Whitepaper on the advancement of public institutions during 2008-2010' (MoSF, 2011). Besides these white papers, annual reports with statistical data, including 'Civil service statistics, UK' in Britain and 'National Civil Service Personnel Statistics' in Korea, are foundations for researching the events going on government. The official websites, which are one of the invaluable evidence providers (Yin, 2009, p. 103), are treated as a sort of documentation as well. Also, such documents as the report of task force team ('Efficiency Unit'), namely 'The Next Steps', and the brochure for introducing the Korean SCS system (e.g., MOPAS, 2009a, 2009b; MOPAS, 2010), help to understand the backgrounds and contexts at the time. In addition, the international surveys like OECD are also beneficial when comparing these new NPM-type managements of the U.K. and Korea. Those data involves both the managerial aspect of the SCS (e.g., OECD, 2003; OECD, 2004, 2017) and the politicisation of its members (e.g., Matheson et al., 2007), which are the two dimensions of categorising the SCS in this research. As a result, the credible evidence about the characteristics of the SCS system (institutional arrangements) as well as about its sub-elements as a personnel system (bargaining components), can be obtained through analysing official documents.

Journal and practical reports

The above-discussed documents published by government commonly presents only the factual data or the blueprints of the policy, while academic ones evaluate its result/performance or indicate its problems, and practical reports attempt to analyse its actual operation or implementation. As Bowen (2009, pp. 33, 35) pointed out, since not only each document was written to serve its own target, but also the data mined in a study is bound to be fragmentary and selective, it is important to assess the material by considering its author and original intension. In this respect, a variety of critical literature, such as journal and memorandum

related with the civil service reform, are needed as well to this case study. When it comes to the British case, the pragmatic research from 'the Institute for government', which think tank is an independent charity, were helpful to comprehend Whitehall realistically and impartially. It is expected that the books combining the historical stories with the civil service reform in Britain, such as Richards (1996, 1997, 2003, 2008) and Dowding (1995, 2003), also offer the empirical evidence for this research. Meanwhile, many of papers researching the personnel administration were conducted by the 'Korean Society for Public Personnel Administration', and they are the representative examples of academical materials in Korea. Particularly, it is remarkable that Sun-woo Lee, Kim, Lee, and Lee (2011) providing comprehensive data on the Korean SCS system, is referred to in full swing at this study. Prior to this thesis, it has been difficult to introduce their study in other research because their work sponsored by the Korean government has been un-published so far²². Those sources, along with official materials, allow researcher to penetrate the institutional changes of SCS and its opportunity structures in the view of the PSB variables.

Other materials as secondary source

Although the analysis through documents would be efficient way to collect data, this literature may not be convincing evidence enough to ascertain an argument due to the potential disadvantage of their 'insufficient detail' and 'biased selectivity'. As Yin (2014, p. 106) claims, there might be a critical document which could be difficult to find or even be deliberately withheld. This is why the data triangulation is methodologically needed by taking supplementary sources even if document analysis can be recognised as a stand-alone method. This study attempted to locate the interviewees who can elucidate the process of the SCS establishment through the course of the alternation in government, and the method of interview would be one of the alternatives for complementing the document analysis. However, the historical events in the U.K., notably the affairs during the period from Margaret Thatcher to John Major, are relatively distant in time. Subsequently, it would be realistically inevitable to depend on analysing documentary materials again because of the nature of historical research. Nevertheless, it was a luck in the midst of a misfortune, in that there are plenty of

²² Since author was involved in this study as a project manager, it was possible to access to this.

published materials, where the interviews of incumbents in Britain at that time are contained. According to Bryman (2012, pp. 312-313), these secondary sources, which can offer high-quality data and opportunities for longitudinal analysis, are also worthwhile for collecting evidence of the research. The newspapers and publications, including biographies, in which the interview or speech script of such central figures as Richard Wilson²³, Robin Butler²⁴ and Gus O'Donnell²⁵, were gathered as a secondary source of this research. Furthermore, the present study attempted to disclose the difference or distinguishment from those materials through reinterpretation them or combining the sources.

Interview

In terms of the U.K., even though the already published comments of top-ranking officials are abundant, the interview method is still useful in conducting a qualitative research. In this regard, there was a brief e-mail interview with former minister who had worked during the John Major era. Unlike the British case, it seems to have been to some degree a taboo for the Korean career officials, as long as they do not run for election, to publish memoir about the state affairs, especially in a critical perspective. Accordingly, it would be true that this culture has led to the shortage of such research or documents depicting the actual situation or story within the Korean government. Generally, interview enables to focus on a targeted topic straight and to offer the insight of causality (Yin, 2014, pp. 106, 110), yet nonetheless it demands the specific skills and procedures as well as the key informants for in-depth inquiries (Creswell, 2007, p. 132; Polkinghorne, 2005, p. 142; Yin, 2009, p. 107). Correspondingly, face-to-face interviews with four interviewees who had witnessed/experienced the beginning of the Korean SCS in Roh's administration and its change of Lee's (Appendix A), were conducted with semi-structured open questions. Three of them (with the participant's consent) were recorded and stored under the principles of data collection. As a result, one of the contributions of this thesis is that in-depth and integrative investigations into the former and current bureaucrats, who held key

²³ He was then Cabinet Secretary and Head of the Home Civil Service in 1998-2002.

²⁴ This retired British civil servant, who was Secretary of the Cabinet from 1988 to 1998, is regarded as the last "apolitical mandarin" (Jago, 2017, p. 204).

²⁵ He served as Cabinet Secretary as well as Head of the Home Civil Service under Tony Blair, Gordon Brown and even David Cameron during 2005 and 2011.

positions concerning the Korean SCS system, were successfully carried out. Considering the insufficiency of government-related materials, these interviews would be able to provide compelling and empirical evidence for this research in accordance with the PSB theory. Furthermore, it is expected that those sources will not only be associated with the assessment of the SCS results, but also be valuable for revealing the distinctiveness of the Korean civil service reform.

Observation

In addition, the special position of the author, which may have both positive and negative effects on this research, should be evaluated. On the one hand, the 7 years working experience as a civil servant of the author, who was in charge of drafting the SCS policy and judging the promotion and recruitment of senior staff, could have given the obvious advantages of observing the SCS system directly as well as of building a good rapport with key informants. On the other hand, the potential biases of the author could hinder the objective description of the Korean SCS situation. Accordingly, the efforts to eliminate the possible bias were pursued in two ways. Setting bounds to the temporal scope of the research was one thing: the main events of the SCS change is antecedent to the period when the author was on duty (ranging from 2010 to 2017) in the SCS job. Maintaining an independent stance in the research process through relying not on personal experience but on collected evidence was another effort: the preceding academic experience of the author, who analysed the Korean MOFAT (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade) by using the method of participant observation, helped to reduce the potential bias for this research.

3-6. Conclusion

From this chapter, it is learned that the historical approach can contribute to examining the various SCS change over time through offering the nature of an institution as well as the institutional continuity and change. In particular, the various types of the SCS transformation can be classified by virtue of the achievements of historical institutionalists, as shown in Tables 3-2 and 3-3. This category will be applied to finding the features of the SCS change in Chapter 5.

Moreover, the framework for analysing the causality of the SCS change, the PSB, can be one of the representative models of historical institutionalism as Bezes and Lodge (2015) insisted. In addition, based on the pros and cons of the comparative case studies, this thesis pursues the qualitative research, which inferential process and logic differ from the statistical method. This chapter demonstrated that the research cases, the British and Korean SCS systems, are comparable, and that Levi-Faur's comparison strategy can be used not only selecting cases but also deducing the causal factors of the SCS change, as discussed in Chapter 6. Then, it is provided how to answer the three research questions presented in Chapter 1 specifically through building the analytic framework respectively, as shown Tables from 3-4 to 3-6. Each analysis will be supported by collecting empirical evidence, especially by using multiple sources for triangulation. It would be notable that the thesis heavily relies on the method of document analysis including secondary interview source. Before scrutinising the SCS cases substantively (Chapters 5, 6 and 7), the next chapter explores the historical and political situation concerning the SCS systems. It would be believed that this narrative will provide a deep understanding of the context of the research subject, particularly in this qualitative strategy.

Chapter 4 . Emergence of Senior Civil Service system in the U.K. and Korea

4-1. Introduction

Chapter 4 provides not only the comprehension of the British and Korean civil service systems overall, but also the historical and political background to the SCS establishment. As discussed in the SCS definition and literature review, the matter of the politico-administrative relationship, especially the democratic control over bureaucracy, which was based on the managerial reform, can be considered as one of the principal driving forces for this new personnel system. Accordingly, the empirical examination of this subject in this chapter begins by exploring the historical narratives of its activity area, the government²⁶, in which politicians and bureaucrats interact with each other. This exploration may allow better understanding of the contexts of the SCS dynamics. Then, it seeks to keep track of the development of the civil service systems, including the SCS launch, as well as of the political relations of them before the specific SCS forms and their change processes in Britain and Korea are investigated in the next chapters. Through uncovering the institutional legacies and circumstances in the U.K. and Korea, this chapter is expected to present evidence for identifying the characteristics of each SCS change and evidence for finding out the causal factors of its change.

4-2. Managerialism and the Civil Service in the U.K.

4-2-1. Development of the civil service system in Britain

Understanding of the British governing system

The rule of law is the foundation of democracy (O'donnell, 2004, p. 32), and the U.K. is founded on the common law, which has been accumulated over its long


²⁶ While the "government" in the U.K. tends to indicate the administrative branch or the cabinet narrowly, this term in the U.S. implies legislatures and courts as well as executive organisations (C.-w. Park, 1996, p. 473). This research will use it as a broad meaning including parliament because this chapter deals with an overall politico-administration relationship.

history. This 'indeterminate, indistinct and un-entrenched' characteristic could be an advantage of flexibility in management of state (Finer, Bogdanor, & Rudden, 1995, pp. 41-43; Lijphart, 1999, p. 19), however it is difficult to grasp the British government system fully at a glance. Fundamentally, Britain is a constitutional monarchy, but the sovereign as head of state reigns rather than rules. That is to say, even though Britain is governed in the name of the Queen, the British government is dominated by the principle of parliamentary sovereignty bestowed by the electoral process (Elgie, 1995, p. 28; Goldsworthy, 1999, p. 1; Judge, 1993, pp. 66-67; Massey, 2005, p. 14). The practical principle for operating the constitutional power in Britain is the overlap of the executive and legislature branches, namely "collaboration of powers" (Y.-h. Jung, 2013, p. 145) based on the Westminster model. Despite the British bicameral legislature of the House of Commons and the House of Lords, in reality the chamber is operated asymmetrically like unicameralism in reality since the Parliament Act of 1911: the House of Commons has most of the legislative powers asymmetrically (Childs, 2001, p. 303; Elgie, 1995, p. 29; Lijphart, 2012, p. 18). Considering the scrutiny of parliament, through opportunities such as Prime Minister's question time in plenary sessions or supervision through departmental select committees (Leyland & Anthony, 2016, pp. 25-28; Rush & Giddings, 2011, pp. 18-22), the British parliament, as Polsby (1975, pp. 281-283) exemplified, could be characterised as "arena" legislatures. In other words, its salient feature is a 'talking shop' or 'forum' rather than an active and policymaking body (Norton, 1998, p. 197; Peters, 1998, p. 14; Russell & Cowley, 2016, p. 122).

It is commonly recognised that under the Westminster system, parliamentary sovereignty is the most essential doctrine underpinning the constitutional system and all other legislation (Goldsworthy, 1999, p. 236; Leyland & Anthony, 2016, p. 20). Constituting principles, such as a strong cabinet government, the responsibility of ministers to parliament and accountability through elections, would have been derived from this sovereignty, although there may be modification or distortion in actual application. According to Lijphart (1999, pp. 10-12), the power tends to be concentrated in a single place under this model: Cabinet taken up by the party which has a majority of seats in the Commons is the most powerful organ in the real political world despite its reliance on the confidence of Parliament. The British political terrain, which is favourable to form

a majority through both the election system of the plurality method and the disciplined two-party system (Lijphart, 1999, pp. 13-15), seems to be compatible with, and even more so, to be contributing considerably to the strong cabinet leadership or the executive dominance.

< Figure 4-1. The format of the executive and its relationship to the legislature >



Source: adjusted from Hood and James (1997, p. 179) and Norton (1994, p. 177)

Initially, the Westminster model intended to achieve a 'representative and responsible' government through the parliament elected by people and the executive apparatus called to account in parliament (Leyland & Anthony, 2016, p. 22). However, the transition of the limited government in the *laissez-faire* era into executive dominance in the Keynesian welfare state was triggered by both the domestic demands and crisis from outside, from the mid-19th century industrialisation to the two World Wars. In accordance with those pressures, it was needed to combine the principle of parliamentary sovereignty with the necessity of active government, and the solution required the Westminster model to be equipped with 'ministerial responsibility' and a 'meritocratic and neutral civil service' (Richards & Smith, 2002, p. 53). As a result, the British government has been geared towards increasing the core executive's power through developing departmentalism and bureaucratic hierarchy (Richards & Smith, 2002, p. 54). The centre of this executive domination is the Cabinet in the British parliament system,

and in particular the Prime Minister (PM), who practically takes over all national affairs as the head of the ruling party and Cabinet (Drewry & Butcher, 1991, p. 87; Dynes & Walker, 1995, p. 10). The ‘core executive’ aiming to coordinate and arbitrate national decisions, refers to a complex network of central government, which consists of the PM, Cabinet, cabinet committees and some major departments like the Treasury, as shown in Figure 4-1 (Dunleavy & Rhodes, 1990, p. 3; Hood & James, 1997, p. 178).

In conclusion, the traditional nature of this British government system is unitariness, collegiality and responsibility: the political system is perceived as a unitary and centralised state, and the cabinet members are responsible for Parliament in a collective way under the parliamentary sovereignty (Elgie, 1995, pp. 26, 41; Y.-h. Jung, 2013, p. 146; Marsh et al., 2001, p. 247; Smith, 1999, pp. 9-10). Also, the career officials in Whitehall could be assured of their separate place in the government, in that the British ministers²⁷ are conventionally members of parliament (MP) of the ruling party and that they have political responsibility. Table 4-1 shows the distinctive characteristics of this British model in the dimension of politics and administration.

< Table 4-1. Characteristics of the Westminster model >

Westminster	Whitehall
Parliamentary sovereignty	Permanence
Governing party with a majority in the House of Commons	Anonymity
Cabinet ministers have collective responsibility	Neutrality
Party discipline maintained	Expertise/knowledge
Voters offered choice between disciplined parties	Informal ‘village-like’ networks
Accountability through free and fair elections	Accountability to political masters
Delivers strong Cabinet government	Ensures defence of the public interest


Source: Richards and Smith (2002, p. 48)

²⁷ The ministers are divided into three categories: cabinet ministers, the ‘Secretaries of State’, are appointed usually as the head of department; ministers of state who are allocated a department’s functions; parliamentary secretaries who have duties of passing legislation of their department (J.-w. Jang, Kim, & Seo, 2007, pp. 47-18; Massey, 2005, pp. 15-16).

The civil service system in the U.K.

Under this governing system, the bureaucracy of Britain is not the creation of a constitutional 'big bang', but the result of centuries of evolution up to the present day, experiencing various revisions, twists and reforms (Pyper, 1995, p. 4). As Drewry and Butcher (1991, pp. 13-15) pointed out, the meaning of the British civil service has continued to change even since the Victorian-era. Despite the definition of the 'Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010', the precise meaning of the British civil service is still debatable. Generally, it can be argued that the civil service in the U.K. is a group of servants of the Crown who are: selected on the merit system recruitment; aligned by the principle of political non-partisanship; and who support the government of the day in developing and implementing its policies and in delivering public services (Cabinet Office, 2011, p. 57; Massey, 2005, p. 9). Particularly, with regard to the top leader group in a department, there are two representative types under ministers, as shown in Figure 4-2: special adviser and permanent secretary. The special adviser, who is appointed politically, occupies a crucial role in assisting ministers in the issues ranging from specific policy to media and public relations (Pyper, 1995, pp. 94-95; Richards, 2003, p. 56; Richards & Smith, 2002, p. 219). On the other hand, permanent secretaries, who are appointed apolitically and symbolised as 'Sir. Humphrey', hold the highest level of career civil service. Customarily, their jobs are the administration of policy or departmental management and the provision of policy advice to ministers (Judge, 1993, p. 145; Pyper, 1995, p. 79).

< Figure 4-2. The structure of minister appointment in the U.K. >



Source: Drewry and Butcher (1991, p. 138) and JINJI (2004, p. 23)

Basically, it seems that the modernised concept of the British civil service began from the Northcote-Trevelyan reform in 1854 and the Tomlin Commission²⁸ in 1931. The Northcote-Trevelyan Report is considered not only to have underpinned the establishment of the British Westminster government, but also to have contributed to building a modern typical model of Whitehall. In other words, it is acknowledged that the key precepts of the British civil service, which are often referred to as permanency, neutrality and anonymity, have been maintained since the Northcote-Trevelyan reform (G. A. Campbell, 1965, p. 25; Parry, 2011, p. 348; Pyper, 1991, p. 28; 1995, pp. 12-13; Richards, 2003, pp. 39-40). This report of the mid-19th century recommended the arrangement of proper competitive examination, and the establishment of civil servant class and merit system (Northcote & Trevelyan, [1854] 1954, pp. 15-16). To be specific, ministers in the U.K. are individually responsible to Parliament in return for their monopolistic control over policy, while public officials acquire anonymity and neutrality by implementing ministers' will with professionalism and loyalty (Beattie, 1995, p. 159; Richards, 2003, p. 32). The anonymity means that while officials confidentially advise ministers, they can remain 'faceless' by the ministerial responsibility in Parliament (Greenwood, Pyper, & Wilson, 2002, p. 74; Pyper, 1995, p. 13). The meaning of neutrality in Britain, which has been developed along with the 'permanence' concept since 1780 (Drewry & Butcher, 1991, p. 38), seems to be traditionally accepted as serving ministers with differing views, not to mention avoiding any partisanship (Greenwood et al., 2002, p. 74; Pyper, 1995, p. 12). The Westminster model, in which the robust state apparatus, Whitehall, is underpinned by the disciplined party and harmonised with the democratic control through election, is assessed as the political source of Britain's success in the 20th century (Gamble, 1990, p. 407; Smith, 1999, p. 10). This unified, professional and non-partisan system of the British civil service, which was considered an ideal fit in the nightwatchman state (Hennessey, 1989, p. 50), was maintained with the underpinning of the public service ethos of Britain, such as integrity, impartiality and objectivity until the 1980s (Horton, 2006b; Parry, 2011, p. 348; Richards & Smith, 2002, p. 54).

²⁸ This defined the British civil servants as non-military servants of the Crown who are employed in a civil capacity, excluding the holders of political or judicial office, and whose remuneration is paid wholly and directly by money voted by Parliament (Drewry & Butcher, 1991, p. 13).

The Fulton Report is one of the most significant influences upon the modern civil service reform in Britain recently. This reform in 1968 was brought about by the increased doubts on the capability of the British generalists after the experience of the growth of government. The Fulton committee consisting of 12 members from academic, bureaucratic, business, and labour backgrounds, tried to make modern civil servants who could handle the complex problems of those times (Cmnd 3638, 1968, pp. 10-11). According to Dowding (2003, pp. 182-183), the main concept of this committee was to encourage more flexible and specialised public management, not amateurism. This report insisted on merging classes for a common path to the higher level for 'relevant' applicants, as well as launching a new department for better administration and trained civil servants. The Civil Service Department (CSD) and Civil Service College are illustrations of this. In spite of its radical expression, such as the "amateur", this report definitely aroused new discussion on the diagnoses and resolutions in the civil service reform (Drewry & Butcher, 1991, p. 51). Moreover, though there also has been considerable struggling and wriggling under the 'giantism' of a welfare state, most of the innovative ideas and insights in this report have been in the direction of British government reform for last 40 years (Dowding, 2003, pp. 182-183; Parry, 2011, p. 355; Pyper, 1991, p. 26; Richards, 2003, p. 38). As Ridley (1983, p. 179) claims, the civil service in the U.K. seems to have been thought to resemble the ideal of a career service over any other western country, until doubt was raised by the Fulton committee. However, this centralised and unified system has been eroded or broken up into the looser federation of decentralised and various groups since the changes of the 1980s (Dowding, 1995, p. 71; Pyper, 1995, p. 181).

Civil service reform in Britain since 1980s

The economic crisis of 1976 and the 'winter of discontent' of 1978-1979 triggered the coming of the Thatcherite reform which is assessed as progress towards smaller and more efficient government on the principle of free markets. Margaret Thatcher, the Conservative party leader, concentrated on how to raise the value of taxpayers' money in government, and her dominant theme was eliminating waste and improving efficiency through new initiatives for the civil service (Pollitt, 2013, p. 906; Randma, 1999, p. 126). Besides the reduction of

civil servant numbers, it is noticeable that her reform was related to creating an atmosphere of efficient implementation rather than of decision making (Pyper, 1995, pp. 84-85; Richards, 2003, p. 47). Thatcher did not put her faith in the British mandarins, who were often depicted as 'budget maximisers' (Richards, 2003, p. 36) or 'privileged elites' (Reitan, 2003, p. 97). Instead, she appointed successful businessmen, including Sir Derek Rayner²⁹ and Sir Robin Ibbs, as her advisers on efficiency in government, in order to draw up her reform programmes inspired by the liberalism of Sir Keith Joseph and F.A. Hayek (Reitan, 2003, pp. 17, 98; Zifcak, 1994, pp. 9, 15-16), which might have implied her distrust of Whitehall as well as her intention towards the NPM-type reform. After the Financial Management Initiative (FMI) advised by Sir Rayner in 1982, the Next-Steps programme, which is considered to have transformed the face of Whitehall (Greer, 1994, p. 23), was launched in 1988 under the supervision of Sir Ibbs. This 'Next-Steps' reform, in which the executive agencies for delivering public services efficiently, namely 'agencification', were initiated, is regarded as a key part of Thatcherite NPM reform (James, 2003, pp. 2-3; Parry, 2011, pp. 355-356; Rhodes, 1997, p. 95). The chief executives of those agencies created by this reform programme were allowed to obtain more flexibility and independence in the management, yet they were responsible for the contract with the Ministers (Jenkins, Caines, & Jackson, 1988, p. para. 21).

Despite these reforms of the budget (FMI) and of structural hiving-off (Next-Steps), it is argued that a series of these Thatcher initiatives particularly pursued a change in the culture and attitude of high-ranking officials through institutional change, along with her pro-active intervention in senior level personnel (Dowding, 1995, p. 63; Richards, 2003, pp. 43-44, 47). As Dowding (1995, p. 64) pointed out, the reforms by this first female British PM can be condensed into the attempt to "make civil servants more manageable by making them more managerial". That is, while the quantitative changes in the Thatcher government, such as downsizing the civil service and creating executive units, took place in practice, the fundamental point of her reform would be the qualitative changes like the crack of the traditional official's role. The shift to "management by contract" (Greer, 1994, p. 59) embodied in the Next-Steps, would mean the change toward

²⁹ He was chairman of the major retailer company of 'Marks & Spencer'

the managerialism of the British civil service, no matter whether this neo-liberalism movement broke down the Public Service Ethos (PSE) in Britain (e.g., C. Campbell & Wilson, 1995) or if it was just an evolution of Whitehall (e.g., Richards & Smith, 2002). Eventually, the British civil service was split into two tiers: civil servants in the policy making core departments; those in the policy implementing executive agencies, for example, the chief executives (Dowding, 1995, p. 70; Greer, 1994, pp. 96-97; Rhodes, 1997, p. 96; Zifcak, 1994, pp. 78-80). According to Greer (1994, pp. 97, 103), as the distinction between the two types of public officials became entrenched, it is likely that this change would exert influence on the future of the mandarin class in core departments.

It is estimated that the Thatcherite reforms persisted continuously with some supplements under the leadership of J. Major. The establishment of Citizen's Charter in 1991, which features saliently include the value of public services and the right of users' choice (Pollitt, 2013, p. 908), can be exemplified. Considering Major's core idea, which was well echoed in the initiative of 1991, had aimed to improve the quality of public service delivery and to assign managers the responsibility for the customers, the reforms of Thatcher's successor were also founded on market-based managerialism ((Dowding, 1995, p. 171; Garnett & Lynch, 2009, p. 84; Reitan, 2003, p. 119; Rhodes, 1997, pp. 97, 129-130). In this regard, each minister or chief executive in government has been delegated more authorities by wide-spread decentralisation within administrative running cost. With respect to the civil service reform, as Richards (2003, pp. 48-49) argues, the cultural change of the British senior bureaucrats was highlighted during the 1980s, while Major's government appears to have underlined an institutional arrangement for the establishment of a "business-like" official. His emphasis was specified in his two representative documents of 1994 and 1995: '*The Civil Service: Continuity and Change*' (Cm 2627, 1994); and '*The Civil Service: Taking Forward Continuity and Change*' (Cm 2748, 1995). According to both white papers, the neo-liberal administration enforced the SCS system, which intended to pursue a more open and centralised elite group in the shrunken role of a state. Therefore, it could be argued that a series of the civil service reforms based on the Thatcherite managerialism provided the political and institutional environment for creating the SCS system in the Major period.

4-2-2. Emergence of the British Senior Civil Service

New landmark in the civil service system in Britain

As reviewed above, the historical background of the British civil service reform was the long-term seizure of power by the Conservative government of 1979-1997. Hence it is plausible that the target of this study, the SCS, can be explored in detail within the context of a series of reform programmes of Thatcherism³⁰. When it comes to the changes of the personnel system in the U.K., although the British civil service system was famous for its impartiality, permanency and competence, the high-ranking officials have been criticised for their lack of demographic diversity as well as for the need for professional expertise (Parry, 2011, p. 378; Reitan, 2003, p. 97). It was even described that Whitehall, being mostly composed of generalists who were Oxbridge-educated gentlemen with little training of technical fields, was nothing more than the closed system of a self-perpetuating 'fraternal club' (Dargie & Locke, 1999, pp. 192-194; Richards, 1996, pp. 674-675; 2003, p. 45). In this context, the British SCS system was created officially in 1996 under the Major's premiership. However, considering its main ideas originated from the previous government's reform package, this institution would not be entirely new. The white paper in 1994 triggering this managerial system can be traced back to the 1968 Fulton Report, the concept of which was also adopted in the civil service reform of the antecedent Thatcherism (Chapman, 1994, p. 599; Parry, 2011, p. 355; Richards, 2003, p. 38; Sausman & Locke, 2007, p. 191). Moreover, it seems to be thought that John Major, who had been raised as a political successor to Thatcher, followed the principles of his former PM, and that his public reforms could be a further wave or extended version of her remedy programmes (Parry, 2011, p. 357; Reitan, 2003, pp. 117-119, 135; Richards, 2003, pp. 41-51; 2008, pp. 32-44). In other words, the institutional and political background of the SCS establishment in the U.K. could be understood in the trajectory of the Thatcherite legacies.

As Randma (1999, p. 129) appraised, the closed civil service system in Britain has changed into an open and job-oriented system since the Thatcher era. The

³⁰ The strategies of Thatcher were comprised of four features: monetarism; privatisation; trade union reform; and hiving off (Garnett & Lynch, 2009, pp. 55-57).

British civil service system was divided largely into two parts in 1986: the ‘open structure’ ranging from grade 1 to 7, which had been established by merging the previous ‘classes’³¹; and the ‘administration’ (non-management) group (Drewry & Butcher, 1991, p. 21; J.-m. Jung et al., 2006, p. 262). Then, with the accelerated personnel delegation (Dowding, 2003, p. 190), this was transformed again into new structure in 1996, as shown in Table 4-2. The white papers in 1994 and 1995, which contributed to creating the British SCS, not only eliminated the bureaucratic tiers over grade 5, but also integrated the service-wide elite group, about 1% of officials in Whitehall. On the other hand, it would be difficult to grasp collectively the detailed systems of the full non-senior civil service, in that the control of each department, except the fast stream system, has been decentralised. Table 4-3 shows both the structural varieties of these non-management groups in each public organisation, and the commonality of the SCS construction across departments. Also, this table in 2009 indicates that the newly established civil service system maintains its institutional persistency until recently.

< Table 4-2. Change of civil service structure in 1996: Cabinet Office case >

<i>Before</i>		⇒ 1996	AFTER		
<i>Grade</i>	<i>Job title</i>		<i>PAY BAND</i>		<i>JOB TITLE</i>
Grade 1	Permanent Secretary		Senior Civil Service	3	Permanent Secretary
Grade 2	Deputy Secretary				SCS TOP 200
Grade 3	Under Secretary			2	Director (General)
Grade 4	Executive directing bands / Assistant Secretary			1A	
Grade 5			1	(Deputy) Director	
Grade 6	Senior Principal		A		(Assistant Director)
Grade 7	Principal		B2		Fast stream Recruitment
SEO	Senior Executive Officer		B1		
HEO	Higher Executive Officer		C (1, 2)		
EO	Executive Officer				
AO	Administrative Officer				
AA	Administrative Assistant				

Source: adjusted from Drewry and Butcher (1991, p. 64), M.-h. Lee, Kim, Yoon, and Park (2012, pp. 61-63) and Seo (2005, p. 164)

³¹ The ‘classes’ were originally derived from the Northcote-Trevelyan Report.

< Table 4-3. Departmental grade structures in 2019 >

Rank	Short name	Full name	Other depts	CO	DCMS	DfID	DWP	FCO	HMRC	HMT	MoD	Moj
Most senior	SCS	Senior Civil Service	SCS4	Permanent Secretary								
			SCS3	Second Permanent Secretary, Director General								
			SCS2	Director								
			SCS1	Deputy Director								
	G6&7	Grades 6 and 7	G6	Band A	AU	A1	G	D7	G6	E2	B1	A
			G7	Band A	A	A2	F	D6	G7	E	B2	A
	SEO/ HEO	Senior Executive Officer, Higher Executive Officer	SEO	B2	B	A2L	E	C5	SO	D	C1	B
			HEO	B2	C	B1	D	C4	HO	D	C2	C
	EO	Executive Officer	EO	B1	D	B2	C	B3	Officer	C	D	D
Most junior	AO/	Administrative Officer,	AO	C2		C1	B	A2	AO	B	E1	E
	AA	Administrative Assistant	AA	C1			A	A1			E2	F

Source: www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/explainers/grade-structures-civil-service
(26/ November/ 2019)

To be specific, the documents of 1994 and 1995, which allowed more flexibility to departments and executive agencies on the management of pay, recruitment and budget, sought to improve public service by exploiting competition as well as by delegating responsibility (Chapman, 1994, p. 600; Cm 2627, 1994, p. 2; Cm 2748, 1995). The decentralisation was applied to the staff below senior level, and it was proposed to create a new senior professional group which encompassed the agency chief executives and the grade 5 level and above (broadening the existing '*senior open structure*') by April 1996. The new managerial management was introduced to the staff who were about 1% (3,920 persons) of the total civil service (458,370 staff members). In this regard, it is claimed that the requirement of counterbalancing this devolved personnel administration and promoting the cooperation of decentralised public bodies was one of the reasons for the SCS launch (J.-h. Lee et al., 2008, p. 163; Parry, 2011, pp. 348, 357; Richards, 2003, p. 48). Also, this newly-revised HR system, for high-ranking officials, aimed at enhancing the performance through the effective leadership of those cohesive groups (Cm 2627, 1994, p. 35; Cm 2748, 1995, p. 15). Its scheme addressed the issues of coverage, appointment, appraisal, mobility and training of senior officials: in terms of its designing, this senior group was intended not only to be centrally managed by performance-based appraisal and explicit contracts, but also to be appointed through fair and open competition (Cm 2627, 1994, pp. 3-4). In addition, it seems that Thatcherite civil service reforms in the Major administration were continuously engaged in the pursuit of recruiting outsiders

from the private sector not the inner labour market of Whitehall, and in increasing diversity in the senior level (Garnett & Lynch, 2009, p. 167).

This civil service reform in the Major era could be summed up in three changes: (1) a heightened managerial role rather than policy advice; (2) a removal of Whitehall's hierarchy through de-layering (eliminating layers); (3) a bigger function for executive agencies rather than policy departments (Richards & Smith, 2002, pp. 221-223). This transformation of Whitehall from policy-makers to policy-implementors appears to be institutionalised through the establishment of the SCS system. On the one hand, this new strategy forced the previous homogenous generalists, who had been nurtured within a closed 'old-boy' network, to change to more professionalised and opened specialists. But on the other hand, they were expected to provide leadership in public service, as well as cohesion among themselves (Cm 2627, 1994, p. 37; Dargie & Locke, 1999, p. 182; J.-h. Lee et al., 2008, p. 163; Reitan, 2003, p. 97). According to Dargie & Locke (1999, pp. 179-181), this new initiative can be described with four analytic aspects of managerialism, marketisation, agencification and politicisation: (a) private-sector managements are introduced in the SCS; (b) the government adopts the idea of choice, competition and prices; (c) the SCS's role of policy-implementation is separated from that of policy-making, and considered to be valued highly; (d) the politics-administration dichotomy is revisited and the decision power of the politician is stronger than that of the bureaucrat.

The continuity of managerial reform

After the 1997 general election, many of the Conservative projects about Whitehall, seemed to have survived, the same as ever, under the 'Third Way', which advocated the effective coordination between public and private sectors (Richards, 2003, p. 54). This continuity can be identified in three aims of the white paper, 'Modernising government' (Cm 4310, 1999), which were the initial innovations of the New Labour government. To be concrete, the delivery issue, like the 'Service First', which had been derived in earnest from the Next-Steps, exercised considerable influence over both the performance target and the policy principle in the Blair government, because delivering services properly was in need of top-down control through the performance management and external

audit (Fawcett & Rhodes, 2008, p. 91; Jung-yul Kim, 2001, pp. 90-92; Reitan, 2003, p. 222).

- Ensuring that policy making is more **joined up and strategic**.
- Making sure that **public service users**, not providers, are the focus, by matching services more closely to people's lives.
- Delivering public services that are **high quality and efficient**.

Source: Cm 4310 (1999, p. 6, emphasis in original)

Additionally, Blair faced the demand of balancing between decentralisation and integrative modernisation, due to the hollowing-out of the state, such as the devolution of political authorities to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, the delegation of decision-making, the privatisation inspired by the managerialism, and the rapid Europeanisation (Massey, 2005, pp. 40-41; Parry, 2001, pp. 53-55; Rhodes, 1997, pp. 53-54). In this regard, the new Labour PM could not abandon the Thatcherite strategies for strong leadership and enhanced coordination, rather it seems that he strengthened them even more (Richards, 2003, pp. 60-61). His 'joined-up government' programmes can be viewed as solutions for the fragmentation caused by the marketisation, agencification, devolution, and regionalisation (Butcher & Massey, 2003, p. 9; Massey, 2005, p. 54).

As a result, despite the different titles of Blair's reforms ("Joined-Up Government" and "Delivery"), it would be apparent that the idea of efficiency (value for money) and effectiveness (performance-based evaluation) would have consistently underlain those agendas. Particularly, in terms of the concern of how to deal with the executive apparatus which had long served the Conservative administrations, this young PM was evaluated to have retained such managerial schemes as the SCS system through a continuous injection of the principle of business management into Whitehall (Butcher, 1998, p. 1; Reitan, 2003, p. 222). Consequently, the New Labour government wanted modernisation of the British bureaucracy through accepting the legacy of the consecutive Conservative governments (Richards, 2003, pp. 54-55; 2008, p. 156). Therefore, it can be argued that despite some supplementary or amendatory measures, the Blair government's tendency towards a better Whitehall overall did not deviate from the direction of Thatcherite initiatives, including the personnel managements for

changing the attitude of British bureaucrats. For this reason, Reitan (2003, p. 175) described his project as “Thatcherism with a smiling face”, and Gray (2004, pp. 39-40) considered it as a renewed lease of Thatcherism as well.

4-2-3. Politics of the senior civil service reform in the U.K.


Personalisation vs. politicisation in the civil service reform

Thatcher, the ‘Iron Lady’, seemed to be pro-active rather than passive in the politico-administrative relations, especially, in the appointment of top officials³² (Richards, 1996, p. 669). However, not only because the centre appointing them was the ‘Senior Appointments Selection Committee (SASC)’ which advises and recommends this process neutrally, but also because her main interest was to change the culture of mandarinism and bureaucratic elitism, Thatcher’s effect on the personnel reshuffle of Downing Street would have been indirect. Nevertheless, what is notable in the appointments, as Sausman and Locke (2004, p. 103) pointed out, was that her choices were made for personal or political reasons. Many researchers appear to agree that Thatcher is considered to have personalised the personnel system, even though they do not reach a consensus that her behaviour was the politicisation of civil service (Rhodes, 1997, p. 90; 2000, p. 158; Sausman & Locke, 2004, p. 102). For example, she did not attempt to appoint Conservative Party sympathisers to major posts (Richards, 2008, p. 152). Instead, she preferred the type of ‘can-doers’ who were managerially oriented, to that of ‘wait a minute’ mandarins during the longevity of her power (Dargie & Locke, 1999, p. 199; Drewry & Butcher, 1991, pp. 169-170; Richards, 2003, p. 44). It seems that this preference for managers began to be institutionalised into the Next-Steps initiatives which intended to specialise the policy implementation. As a result, it would be of little doubt that Thatcher’s pro-active and informal intervention in the appointment procedure of the highest-rank bureaucrats, made a crack in the solid iron-veil of Whitehall, regardless of what this might be called, be it a personalisation or a politicisation (Marsh et al., 2001, pp. 275-276; Richards, 1996, pp. 666-669).

³² The power to appoint permanent secretaries has been given to the PM in the U.K. since 1919, but this hardly means that PM can check their work individually (Elgie, 1995, pp. 37-38).

In addition to the change of appointment style, it seems that Thatcher tried to make a clutch at the civil service through strengthening her direct rule. The PM's Office to support her/his leadership is commonly considered a personal creation (Elgie, 1995, p. 38), and recently the Office has reinforced its staff constantly by increasing the number of politically selected members for boosting the power of No. 10, similar to the political appointees of the U.S. (Massey, 2005, p. 26; Reitan, 2003, p. 221). Thatcher who was top of the political and administrative machine in Britain, made use of personalised organisations, such as the 'Efficiency Unit', as a centre of the core executive under the continuing situation of departmentalism and devolution. As Gray (2004, p. 43) pointed out, centralisation was the inner logic of Thatcherism, which emphasised the free market through the interference of a strong state. For instance, the process to accomplish the Next-Steps initiative, as shown in Figure 4-3, demonstrates not only how the PM controlled the public reforms, but also which actors outside the hierarchy were involved or contributed to those programmes.

< Figure 4-3. Institutions and actors for the launch of Next-Steps 1986-92 >



Source: James (2003, p. 44)

Furthermore, there generally seemed to not be a big difference between the political view, including reform initiative, of the Thatcher administration and that of her successive government after her resignation in November 1990 (E. J. Evans, 2004, pp. 123-136; Gamble, 1994, pp. 254-256; S.-m. Hong, 2016, pp. 327-332; Reitan, 2003, pp. 221-240), though there were some political conflicts

between M. Thatcher and J. Major, such as the ‘Exchange Rate Mechanism’ which later caused “Black Wednesday” (Gamble, 1994, p. 213; Reitan, 2003, pp. 126-131). According to Reitan (2003, pp. 167, 243), such Thatcherite attitudes about the civil service reforms and privatisations were still in effect as the core doctrine of British public policy under the period of John Major, and even Tony Blair. For instance, the Major government, as Richards (2003, p. 49) argues, not only increased the pace of the Thatcherite institutional reform, like the expansion of Next-Steps agencies as shown in Table 4-4, but also complemented or elaborated the reform programmes through the Citizen’s Charter (1991) and Market Testing (1992).

< Table 4-4. Growth in executive agencies and total civil servants, U.K. >

Year	Total number of executive agencies.	Civil servants in executive agencies (thousands)	All civil servants (thousands)	Percentage of civil servants in executive agencies (%)
1988	3	6	580	>1
1990	35	114	562	20
1992	76	210	565	37
1994	102	268	540	50
1996	133	275	495	56
1998	138	277	463	60
2000	126	279	475	59

Source: adjusted from James (2003, p. 57)

The continuous political influence over senior staff in the Blair era

The Labour Party’s sweeping victory in May 1997 seemed to be attributable to the new left’s modernisation, which is symbolised by Blair’s historic decision of abandoning “the old clause IV”³³ to gain the support of middle-class English voters (Gray, 2004, p. 42; S.-m. Hong, 2016, p. 330; Richards, 2008, p. 106; Riddell, 1997, p. 24). The new young leader pursued a “Third Way” which is thought of as an alternative strategy between neo-liberalism (individualism) and

³³ It was regarded as a straightforward commitment to nationalisation or the common ownership, and the specific phase is as follows: “To secure for the workers by hand or by brain the full fruits of their industry and the most equitable distribution thereof that may be possible upon the basis of the common ownership of the means of production, distribution, and exchange, and the best obtainable system of popular administration and control of each industry or service” (Gani, 2015).

state socialism (collectivism) by combining the free market with social justice (Garnett & Lynch, 2009, p. 542; Gray, 2004, p. 39; Richards, 2008, p. 49). Blair's reforms appeared to be based on the concept of 'governance' in which the importance of partnership across the network was emphasised, against the moving up, moving down, and moving out phenomenon of the government. Thus, it might be argued that this new PM of the Labour Party controlled Whitehall less overtly. However, he not only continued the process of de-privileging the traditional British civil service as Conservative PMs had done since the 1980s, but also did not abandon the implicit influence over top appointments (Richards, 2008, pp. 166-172; Sausman & Locke, 2007, pp. 191-192). Even though it is hard to say that the civil service under Blair's leadership was replaced with a spoil or patronage system because of no large-scale reshuffle or dismissal of senior officials after the inauguration of May 1997, it would be very difficult to concur that there was no political consideration in appointing the senior posts when taking into consideration the strategic role of the transformed 'Senior Leadership Committee (SLC)'³⁴. In addition, Thatcherite logic of centralisation was also applied to Blair, who emphasised the strengthening of No. 10, as illustrated by his Napoleonic leadership style and the catchphrase of 'joined-up government'.

For instance, with respect to staffing the highest posts (grade 1/1a), there was little significant change, as shown in Table 4-5, from the Thatcher years to the Blair period in the number of outsiders and the nature of insiders. This invariable trend appears to mean that the Labour ministries denied going back to the old monopoly of bureaucracy, and that the government sought for high-profile leaders from non-Whitehall sources by using open recruitment such as the SCS system as well (Richards, 2008, pp. 168-169; Sausman & Locke, 2004, p. 106; 2007, p. 201). Moreover, it became harder to curb the increasing inclination for political and personal appointments, taking as an example the dramatic growth of political appointees from the Major era to the Blair administration (Sausman & Locke, 2004, pp. 103-104; 2007, p. 193). The expansion of special advisers was one of the essential characteristics of the Blair administration. The use of them was conspicuous in the case of the PM's Office; an increase from 6 before the inauguration of Labour to 25 in December 1999 (Fawcett & Rhodes, 2008, p. 80).

³⁴ The SLC was similar to the SASC, but it is considered to have strengthened the strategic and cross-departmental roles in staffing the top 200 positions (Richards, 2008, pp. 158-159).

Whereas the can-doers, who were high-flyers with experience of the centre, including the Cabinet Office, were picked out and utilised in the Thatcher years, the special advisers who were appointed as alternative consulting providers had greater effect on the policies in the Blair government than before.

< Table 4-5. Number of appointment (proportion) to grade 1/1a in Britain >

	1980-90	1991-96	1997-2004
With centre Experience <i>(excluding outside appointment)</i>	16 (58.6%)	12 (44.4%)	16 (43.2%)
Outside promotion	9 (10.7%)	8 (29.7%)	8 (17%)

* Centre: Cabinet Office, Treasury and Prime Minister Office

Source: Richards (2008, pp. 167-168)

Accordingly, the perspective regarding civil servants as just policy implementors, not as main policy advisors, would still have been active in the Labour years. The decreased role of senior career officials in decision making was caused by a structural and cultural change, which had proceeded through a relatively long and continuous historical process from the NPM era to the Third Way days (Bovaird & Russell, 2007, p. 301; Garnett & Lynch, 2009, p. 169; Richards, 2008, p. 179). As Richards (2008, p. 179) exemplified, consecutive initiatives such as creation of executive agencies (after 1988), introduction of the SCS (1994-96) and the impact of devolution (after 1998) have led high-ranking officials to devote themselves chiefly to the managerial function rather than to the policy making. According to him, the Conservatives introduced the principal-agent model, which is based on contracts and markets, for controlling Whitehall, and even after the 1990s, this contractual model has been made more sophisticated by the delivery of public service, the situation of which is more complex and interdependent than a market (Richards, 2008, pp. 101-103). Consequently, it is thought that this Labour successor to Thatcher and Major relied on outsiders in developing policy, and he believed in the performance-oriented management in implementing policy. Therefore, it can be argued that the conventional politico-administration relationship derived from the Westminster model has been challenged by the NPM reform, and that a new interaction between principal and agent has begun to evolve through treating the bureaucrat as an economic being.

4-3. Description of the Civil Service Reform in Korea

4-3-1. Development of the civil service system in Korea

The Korean Presidency as elected monarch

Korea differs from Britain in having a written Constitution, which declares the “separation of powers” (Finer et al., 1995, p. 57) in governing and puts the president as a head of state. How to allocate powers of a state fundamentally and how to organise the government is codified in the written constitution. Also, its government structures, as Ko (2008, p. 24) describes, are clearly specified by laws which should be reviewed and agreed by the legislature, the Korean National Assembly, before putting those rules into practice. The presidential government characterised as ‘dual democratic legitimacy’ by Linz (1994), has been retained formally in Korea since the first constitution of 1948 except during the period of 1960-1961. Although the duality of the presidential system was able to contribute to establishing democracy through the principle of ‘check and balance’, the Korean presidency, which is believed to have more power in reality than the constitution regulations, has been criticised for hindering the development of democracy in Korea (Hahm, 2009; Jeong, 2002; H.-y. Kim, 2011; H. Kwon, 2018; K.-d. Park, 2007; D.-h. Yang, 1999). Since the current constitution in Korea is the result of many amendments caused by dramatic political upheavals in a relatively short time, it is unstable and inexperienced until now. In particular, General Park Chung-hee replaced the embryo of democratic system with an authoritarian presidential government again in 1961 when opening the Third Republic after his military coup. Even though he might be glorified as a hero for developing the Korean economy, his dictatorship has been criticised for having damaged democracy and civil rights. The Fourth Korean Republic, created by the so-called “Yushin” system (7th revision of the constitution), pursued a hyper-presidentialism³⁵ without any check and balance for the purpose of a prolonged seizure of President Park’s power. The next republic, which was established by another military coup by General Chun, could not escape from this authoritarian dictatorship either. After the mass democratisation

³⁵ This hyper- presidentialism with super-constitutional power over other state institutions is compared to “Sovereign Dictatorship”(Carl Schmitt) or “Neo-Presidentialism”(Karl Loewenstein), such as Perón in Argentina or De Gaulle (H.-i. Choi, 2008, p ; Jeong, 2002; Lijphart, 1992).

protest in June of 1987, the democracy in Korea returned through a final-amended (9th) constitution, which was the result of unrestrained cooperation and bargaining between the ruling party and the opposition party for the first time (Cumings, 2005, pp. 391-392; Roh, 2003, p. 190).

The presidency is the core of the nation as well as the core of the executive apparatus in Korea. Article 66 of the constitution stipulates this dual status of the president: the head of state, such as defence and diplomacy; the head of government including authority on civil service appointments. Formally, the Korean presidency of a single five-year term is not considered to have more power than other presidential systems, yet it is uniquely distinguished for a mixture of parliamentary features within (Hahm, 2009, pp. 204-205; H.-y. Kim, 2011, pp. 133-134). The existence of a PM and the inspection of the National Assembly are illustrations of that mixture. These features seem to be caused not only by bargaining among the presidential candidates who were less sure about winning the election of 1987 (Ginsburg, 2003, p. 215), but also by being alert to dictatorship which might have come from the historical experience. Nonetheless, Korean commentators complain about the concentration of power in the Presidency system in reality, by describing the occupant of the 'Blue House'³⁶ as an "imperial presidency" or an "elected monarch" (Jeong, 2002, p. 265). There may be an argument that the parliamentary features of the Korean government can strengthen asymmetrically the check functions of the Assembly in principle, but it would be generally accepted that, by contrast, those have hindered the separation of powers and rather led to a more dominant president in practice (Hahm, 2009, p. 205; Jeong, 2002, p. 294; H.-y. Kim, 2011, p. 136; K.-d. Park, 2007, p. 128). Actually, in the Korean National Assembly, this unicameral legislature has hardly been considered to have strong functions in governing through Korean modern history in comparison with the administrative branches (Hahm, 2009; Jeong, 2002; C.-s. Kim & Jung, 2006; C.-p. Park, 1997). According to C.-p. Park (1997, p. 332), under the rapid industrialisation led by the authoritarian government of imperial presidency, the meaning of the legislature branches was that they played a role of an arena of political confrontation and

³⁶ The Blue House ('Cheongwadae' in Korean) is the executive office and official residence of the President of the Republic of Korea, similar to the White House' which the official workplace of the U.S. president.

competition over democracy and anti-democracy. Thus, its type is estimated to be closer to the “arena” legislatures of Polsby (1975), rather than “transformative” ones such as the U.S. congress (Sung-hun Jang & Ko, 2005, p. 182; Kwak, 2003, p. 176; K.-t. Lee, 2006, p. 25).

Understanding of the Korean governing system and civil service

It can be argued that the terms of the ‘party-government council’ and the ‘divided government’ represent the practical situation in Korea concerning the relationship between politics and administration.


Above all, as W.-t. Kang (2018, pp. 15-18) demonstrates, whilst the birth of the mass party system in Korea is attributable to General Park’s military government, its development led by the presidency, has resulted in the weakness of party or parliamentary politics. The party-government council was launched in 1963 of the 3rd Republic with the purpose of being ruling party-centred and efficient governing, but gradually the executives within the halo of the president came to spearhead the coordination (H.-s. Choi, 2007, pp. 285-291; Ka & An, 2012, pp. 91-92; C.-p. Park, 1997, p. 333). The subordination of the ruling party to the president appears to be due to the incomplete presidential system caused by historical legacies, such as the Korean elected monarchs and the unsettled political operation/culture. Even after the 1987 democratisation, the presidents in Korea have retained not only the practical power of nominating the candidates of his party for the Assembly, but also the legitimate right to appoint cabinet members among parliamentary members³⁷ (Chung, 2008, pp. 89-90; K.-d. Park, 2007, pp. 121-122, 128). Moreover, though the administrative departments, which were the driving force of the ‘Miracle on the Han River’, are equipped with the elite-bureaucrats who are cultivated after passing the so-called ‘go-si’³⁸ (a

³⁷ Most of the former presidents before Mr. Roh Moo-hyun still held the president of their own party, and they exerted a considerable partisan influence despite their resignation from the official leader of the party (H.-s. Choi, 2007, p. 298; K.-w. Choi, 2015). It has been criticised that the mixed presidency system in Korea, such as appointing MPs to the ministerial position and using the PM as a political shield from the opposing party’s offensive (Jeong, 2002, p. 276; H.-y. Kim, 2011, pp. 150, 153).

³⁸ The ‘go-si’ (or ‘goduing-gosi’) is the open-competitive examination to select qualified and outstanding officials and to appoint them in the rank of middle manager (currently, the grade 5). Those young officials who pass the exam are not only motivated by the organised career system, but also cultivated by the centralised training and the objective promotion system.

fast-stream exam) in their youth and possess enough information and expertise, the parliament disciplined strongly by the party leaders has gone through struggles of insufficient support (K.-m. Jung, 2007, pp. 192-193, 198-200; C.-s. Kim & Jung, 2006, pp. 115-123; C.-p. Park, 1997, pp. 332-336). Under this strong presidency, the Blue House attempts to be a control tower of every state issue. This situation can be described as the existence of the 'party-government council' which is a substantial coordination system/organisation for the prior consultation of policy decisions between the ruling party and the administration, as shown in Figure 4-4. This system is estimated to have bred the government frame of executive superiority as well as to have reduced the autonomy of the party and parliament (Ka & An, 2012, pp. 105-106; W.-t. Kang, 2018, p. 17; C.-p. Park, 1997, p. 333).

< Figure 4-4. The relation among the president, executives and party in Korea >



Source: adjusted from Ka and An (2012, pp. 94, 96, 100, 102)

On the other hand, the presidential system has faced a serious conflict and contradiction, since parliament politics triggered by the 1987 democratisation became substantially engaged in governing (Chung, 2008, pp. 80-83; Kwak, 2003, pp. 171-172). Notwithstanding the growth of parliamentary power, the attitude of the presidents elected through the democratic constitution was not changed. The former Korean presidents with an authoritative leadership looked

forward to an immediate result within their five-year term, yet the unilateral pushing of the president's policies had to often face a severe confrontation with the opposition parties. The confrontation between the president's alliance and the opposition party usually tended to be taken to the extreme when the 'divided government' happened. That is, the dual legitimacy might cause an inefficiency of a whole state in case of the condition of 'stalemate' or 'gridlock' created by the severe conflicts between legislature and administration (Sung-hun Jang & Ko, 2005, p. 178; Linz, 1994, pp. 8-10; Suleiman, 1994, pp. 149-150; J.-j. Yang, 2002, p. 170; 2017, pp. 41-42). As Jaung (2002) pointed out, the strained relations between these two constitutional branches, especially the frequent emergence of divided government, is regarded as one of critical sources for the problematic instability of the governing system in Korea.

There could be two probable explanations about this repeated occurrence in Korea. Structurally, even though the party system in this new-born democracy adopts the principle of a plural party system, which is usually based on the fragmented regional cleavage, the election system relies on the simple plurality voting method. According to Jaung (2002, pp. 112-117) and Hahm (2009, pp. 212-213), this multilateral structure makes it difficult for the current president as well as the ruling party to win a majority of votes, and the Korean non-synchronous cycle of presidential and parliamentary election is likely to make a multiparty trend even stronger. Furthermore, it is hard to solve this gridlock in practice, not only because the "coalition avoidance" in a presidential election, but also the lack of compromise or persuasion which is caused by the arena legislature of centralised parties (Chung, 2008, pp. 80-84; Sung-hun Jang & Ko, 2005, p. 182; Jaung, 2002, p. 118). As a result, most presidents in Korea showed strong authoritative leadership, and on top of that, the Korean electoral system, with a fixed and non-synchronous cycle of president and parliament, worsened the conflict or stalemate, such as the problem of divided government³⁹, as shown in Table 4-6 (Chung, 2008, p. 84; Hahm, 2009, pp. 210-211; Jaung, 2002, pp. 116-117).

³⁹ The situation of divided government happens when one party (the ruling party) holds the presidency of executive branch and simultaneously the other party has a majority in legislative branch, the congress or assembly (Alesina & Rosenthal, 1995, p. 2).

< Table 4-6. The divided government in Korea since democratisation >


Time	President		Assembly		Cause of occurrence	
	section	rate	section	ruling party	starting	ending
1988.5-1990.1	Roh, Tae-woo (1988.2)	36.6%	The 13 th (1988.5)	41.8%	Ruling party's election defeat	Merger with other parties
1992.3-1992.5			The 14 th (1992.5)	49.8%	defeat in the MP election	bringing in opposition MPs
1996.4-1996.5	Kim, Young-sam (1993.2)	42.0%	The 15 th (1996.5)	46.4%	defeat in the MP election	bringing in opposition MPs
1998.2-1998.8	Kim, Dae-jung (1998.2)	40.3%		26.4%	alternation in government	by-elections & coalition gov't
2000.5-2001.2			The 16 th (2000.5)	42.1%	defeat of the coalition party	forming a union of policy
2001.9-2003.9				43.5%	Breaking the policy alliance	-
2003.9-2004.5	Roh, Moo-hyun (2003.2)	48.9%	The 17 th (2004.5)	17.2%	creating a new ruling party	Victory of the MP election
2005.5-2008.2				48.8%	defeat in the by-elections	The election of 17 th president
2008.2-2008.5	Lee, Myung-bak (2008.2)	48.7%		43.9%	alternation in government	Victory of the MP election

Source: adjusted from Jaung (2002, pp. 110-111), C.-s. Kim and Jung (2006, p. 114), <http://www.assembly.go.kr/> and <http://theme.archives.go.kr/> (07/January/2020)

The governing system in Korea seems to come from the 'developmental state' strategy which requires two preconditions of the autonomy over society and the state capacity to implement policies (H.-w. Koo, 2009, p. 148; J.-j. Yang, 2005, p. 3). To be specific, the Korean presidents of the authoritarian regime succeeded in controlling the bureaucrats through seizing core executives such as the Blue House (BH), and the high-fliers who had sought the upper echelon or dominant power and authority needed the experience of the BH or the political resource of the president (S.-c. Cho, 1991, pp. 47-50; H.-r. Kim & Ahn, 2004, pp. 314, 324). (Y.-d. Jung, 2008, pp. 137-138). In other words, the Korean elite bureaucrats have increased their influence by obeying the ruling power, or sometimes by exploiting their large discretion in policy making. Contrary to Britain, they could even become the head of department because the ministers are legally civil servants and appointed by the president. As shown in Figure 4-5, the proportion of ex-bureaucrats (if ex-military men are included, the amount is bigger) in the appointment of ministers has increased until recently. Meanwhile, the president's direct control over bureaucracy, particularly through the BH, seems to have been

taken for granted in Korea, notwithstanding the increased parliamentary power after democratisation (e.g., W.-t. Kang, 2014; J.-j. Yang, 2003). Although the presidents in the democratic era attempted to reform without these administrative elites, they realized that it would not be easy without them because of the incapacity and immaturity in governing (J.-j. Choi, 2002, p. 128). After all, the ruling leader's reliance on the elites continued in every civilian regime, and the bureaucratic autonomy in Korea seemed to be maintained by taking advantage of the blind spot caused by the five-year, single-term presidency. Therefore, it appears that the bargaining connection between the imperial president and elite bureaucrats, which contributed to the efficient and state-led industrialisation, has still been abused for bureaucracy rent-seeking even through the historical process of democratisation.

< Figure 4-5. Analysis of the career of past government ministers in Korea >




Source: adjusted from Shim (2019), Kwak (2017, p. 204), C.-s. Kim and Jung (2006, p. 111) and See-won Lee and Min (2005, p. 17)

Modernisation of the Korean civil service system

The definition and scope of the Korean civil service, contrary to the British one, is stipulated in the Constitution and the State Public Officials Act (SPOA). Also, the closed career system, in which young talents are picked, cultivated, and

employed according to ranks in the hierarchy (Mosher, 1968, pp. 138-150), is considered to be well entrenched today in Korea. The Korean civil service has been frequently classified by its way of appointment and its legal status (career/non-career). The public officials in career service are appointed based on their performance and qualification requirements, and they are expected to be committed to their services in a legally guaranteed status⁴⁰. There are two sub-categories in this type: the general service, and the special service like the police, teachers and judges. Meanwhile, the civil servants in non-career service are not subject to strict performance or qualifications, and their job stability as civil servants is not assured by law either (P.-s. Kim, 2010, p. 454). Non-career service also has two sub-categories: the officials who are appointed by election (MPs) or by the approval from parliament, and the incumbents above the vice-ministerial level who deal with political decision-making; the officials in extraordinary service are employed because of their specialised duties like assistant secretary. The number and ration of the total civil servants are shown in Figure 4-6.

< Figure 4-6. The numbers and component ration of civil servants in Korea >



Source: MPM (2019)

The establishment of the Korean bureaucracy was settled after many twists and turns. According to Y.-d. Jung (2008), its development can be divided into three periods, which are associated with its political watershed, like the industrialisation and democratisation: the immature stage (1948-1960); the developmental stage (1961-1987); the transitional stage to post-bureaucracy (1988-the present).

⁴⁰ Article 2 of the SPOA

Firstly, the new regime independent from Japanese colonialism had difficulty in establishing the rationalism and impersonality of the Weberian bureaucracy, due to such disruptive legacies as patriarchal collectivism or hierarchical harmonisation (“*kwan-jon-min-bi*”) (C.-o. Park & Joo, 2010, p. 194). Even worse, the reemployment of pro-Japanese traitors under the Rhee’s spoils system aggravated the political turmoil (Y.-d. Jung, 2008, pp. 131-132; H.-k. Kang, 1998, p. 252), and those ex-colonial officials made an opportunistic grab for power of government for their survival.

Secondly, the modernised civil service system, which had been suspended during the Dr Rhee era, has been built up by the military dictatorship which replaced the political democracy with economic growth. This military-originated regime adopted the ‘developmental state’ strategies, which intervene in private sectors by using centralised apparatus composed of competent bureaucrats (Amsden, 1989, p. 81; P.-s. Kim, 2017, p. 227; S.-y. Lee & Lee, 2014, p. 52). It is notable that the Korean government underlined the recruitment of talented human resources in the process of building up the civil service system. Park’s authoritarian government picked and utilised “the best and the brightest” talent through the so-called ‘*go-si*’ (P. Evans, 1998, p. 71), and the elite bureaucrats were guaranteed a lifetime job with high prestige, and were permitted to exercise enormous power and autonomy over society (J.-j. Choi, 2002, p. 78; S.-y. Lee & Lee, 2014, p. 54). Along with the Confucian culture, in which the public official earns the honour, this merit system and the high prestige of elite bureaucrats firmly contributed to the establishment of the Korean civil service system (S.-o. Choi & Park, 2013, pp. 24-26; S.-y. Lee & Lee, 2014, p. 54).

Lastly, the Korean bureaucracy has experienced a change since the era of post-democratisation. The merit system for ensuring the non-partisanship of the civil service was reinforced because of the historical events in the 1980s⁴¹ failing to secure the status of a public servant (Y.-d. Jung, 2008, p. 145). This is why the personnel system became even more inflexible, and why the reform in the public sector was delayed before the movement of post-bureaucracy in Korea. Since the democratisation of the 1990s, every president has sounded the clarion call to

⁴¹ The purge movement in 1980, when a group of military coups expelled the opposite higher public officials, could be an illustration of this history.

reform bureaucracy by adopting the political rhetoric on the inefficient and incompetent government, like Table 4-7, and subsequently tried to exercise strict control over the executive branch (Im, 2007, pp. 47, 49). In particular, after the financial crisis in 1997, the reform targeted to convert the unilateral and state-led administration, which had achieved industrialisation but provoked a national default, into a flexible and performance-based system (Y.-d. Jung, 2008, p. 149; P.-s. Kim, 2010, p. 468; Nam, 2016, p. 47). Subsequently, the managerial paradigm was newly adopted in the post-democratisation era, especially from the period under the presidency of Kim Dae-jung (1998-2003).

< Table 4-7. Public personnel administration in Korea since the 1990s >

Phase	National Goal	Primary Value in PPA	Major Actions
Kim Young-sam (1993-1998)	Reform of undemocratic vestige	Efficiency and Competition for Globalisation	Introduction of preliminary pay for performance (1995)
Kim Dae-jung (1998-2003)	Co-growth of democracy & economy	Efficiency, Competition and Professionalism by Civil Service Commission	Open-competition position system (1999) Expansion of pay for performance (1999)
Roh Moo-hyun (2003-2008)	Participation & Decentralisation	PPA Innovation for Fairness, Professionalism and Participation	Positive discrimination for disabled & local talents (2004, 2005) Senior Civil Service (2006)
Lee Myung-bak (2008-2013)	Toward advanced nation	minor reform (toward Equity and Professionalism)	Abolition of age ceiling for civil service exam (2009)

Source: adjusted from S.-y. Lee and Lee (2014, p. 49)

4-3-2. Emergence of the Korean senior civil service

Fragile and unstable basis for establishing the Korean SCS system

The SCS system failed to be introduced during the period of Kim Dae-jung, even though it was thought one of the necessary reform initiatives in the IMF crisis for enhancing the competitiveness of government (BPP, 2008, p. 14; P.-s. Kim & Lee, 1998, p. 150). The full-scale implementation of this strategic system was delayed due to considerable resistance concerned about the unrest of public employees and the incongruity of the existing administration system (BPP, 2008, p. 14; T.-k. Ha, Park, Lee, Lee, & Jin, 2007, p. 23; J.-h. Lee et al., 2008, p. 61). Instead, some

reformatory personnel policies, which later constituted the SCS system, were introduced in his period. Thus, characterising the SCS of Roh's government in the aspect of institutional change needs understanding before and after its creation in 2006.

As P. Kim & Lee (1998, p. 150) pointed out, the performance contracting system launched in the Kim era was a key prerequisite for successful implementation of the new personnel management, but it seemed to be premature of the Kim government to even introduce performance managements such as *Performance-Related Pay* (PRP) and *Open-Position system* (OPS). To be concrete, not only because the collectivism in Korea was incompatible with the individual-based reward system, but also because the evaluation of performance is still questionable in the public sector, there has been sceptical views on the feasibility of these performance systems (Y.-j. Choi, 2017, p. 99; J.-g. Kim, 2013, pp. 63-64; C.-o. Park & Joo, 2010, pp. 197-198). In practice, the OPS intended to make civil servants compete with the private sector, but the effectiveness of this new recruiting system was disputed due to its poor appointment rate of outsiders⁴², as shown in Table 4-8.

< Table 4-8. The OPS appointees between the Kim and Roh era >

	Total OPS Positions appointed	Within the Ministry	Outside of the Ministry		
			Sub-total	Civilian	Other Ministry
Kim administration (Jul.2000- Feb.2003)	180 (100%)	151 (83.9%)	29 (16.1%)	22 (12.2%)	7 (3.9%)
Roh administration (Feb.2003-May.2007)	348 (100%)	190 (56.6%)	158 (43.4%)	132 (34.3%)	26 (9.1%)


Source: NamKoong (2007, p. 32) and BPP (2008, p. 120)

Besides, another one of Kim's managerial initiatives, the agencification, appeared to not be implemented properly either. Since the chief executives were seldom empowered to manage their agencies in personnel and financial aspects

⁴² There would be three reasons for the poor number of external appointments to an open position: (1) the qualified candidates from outside are insufficient due to the inflexible labour market in Korea as well as the dissimilar business character between public and private sectors; (2) the contract terms is relatively short and the payment is not enough to attract talent; (3) the exclusive and elitism culture of the Korean bureaucracy hinders the outsiders' adaptation to the workplace (J.-g. Kim, 2013, p. 54; NamKoong, 2000, p. 269; C.-o. Park & Joo, 2010, p. 195).

(B.-s. Kim, Jeong, & Im, 2001, pp. 73-79), and since powerless units were usually chosen for this agencification not by rational analysis but by political consideration (T.-s. Ha, 2019, pp. 42-46; M.-j. Moon & Kim, 2006, p. 244), the impact of this programme was unpopular or limited as shown in Figure 4-7. As a result, although Kim's government promoted many revolutionary NPM initiatives so as to reform the civil service system, the majority of them had difficulty in maintaining their sustainability until the next government (M.-j. Moon & Kim, 2006, pp. 247-250). Thus, it appears that the Korean government was not ready to meet the prerequisites for the SCS system, even when President Roh decided to create this new personnel strategy for senior officials in 2003.

< Figure 4-7. Number of units and staff in Korean executive agencies >



Source: C.-s. Jung (2014, p. 125)

Mr. Roh Moo-hyun may have thought that the aim of a 'good and participatory' government could be achieved through the innovation in which the cooperation of civil servants, symbolised as the "hyuk-sin" mind (devotion for innovation or the will of participation), was inevitably needed (K.-h. Jung, 2005, p. 321; S.-y. Lee & Lee, 2014, p. 60; S.-k. Park, 2005, p. 420). This new president wanted to ensure an effective way of allowing the right person, who can realise his ideal, to be used in the right place regardless of his/her department. His intention seems to have been reflected in designing the SCS system in Korea. This personnel strategy based on job and performance management has three essential characteristics in large: (1) performance and accountability; (2) openness and competition; (3) competency development and verification (BPP, 2008, pp. 17-19; T.-k. Ha et al., 2007, p. 37; MOPAS, 2009b, 2010).

The Korean bureaucratic hierarchy, which has over a thousand-year history ranging from the 18 grades in the Goryeo and Joseon Dynasties to the 9 grades of career public officials in the modern period, has changed dramatically at last. The overview of the modern Korean civil service is shown in Table 4-9, and particularly the reform in 2006, the launch of the SCS system, could be regarded as the first substantial step toward a job-oriented system. Also, the Korea Civil Service Commission (KCSC), which was the first central personnel organisation exclusively responsible for the public personnel policy (C.-s. Kang, Kim, Lee, Choi, & Ha, 2008, p. 136), is considered to have played a leading part in the course of the SCS establishment.

< Table 4-9. History of the civil service system and personnel agency in Korea >

<i>The previous ranking system</i>		<i>The present civil service system</i>		
Time	Number of Grades or ranks	Position	Grade	
1945-1948	15 Grades * <i>job classification</i> (from grade 1 to 15)	Deputy Minister`	Senior Civil Service	A ('Ga')
1949-1950	7 grades (Grade 1, 2, 3A, 3B, 4A, 4B, 5)	Director General		B ('Na')
1950-1961	6 grades (Grade 1, 2, 3A, 3B, 4, 5)	Director (of Division)		C ('da')
1961-1981	9 grades (Grade 1, 2A, 2B, 3A, 3B, 4A, 4B, 5A, 5B)	Head of Team		D ('Ra')
1981-2006	9 grades (from 'Grade 1' to 'Grade 9')	Staff		E ('Ma')
				Grade 3 or 4
				Grade 4 or 5
				Grade 6 - 9

→ 2006

<i>History of the central personnel agency of the Korean government</i>			
1948	Dualized system: The <i>Higher Civil Service Examination Commission</i> & The <i>Ministry of Government Administration</i>	1955	Downsized to an <i>Administrative Bureau</i> under the <i>State Council</i>
1963	Personnel Bureau under the <i>Ministry of Government Administration</i>	1998	Personnel function is moved to the <i>MOGAHA</i> (Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs)
1999	Dualized system: The <i>KCSC</i> (planning), and The <i>MOGAHA</i> (implementation and pension)	2004	Public personnel management is completely integrated into the <i>KCSC</i> .
2008	The <i>KCSC</i> is abolished, and its function is downsized to the <i>Office of Personnel</i> under the newly created <i>MOPAS</i>	2014	The new <i>Ministry of Personnel Management</i> (MPM) is in charge of the public personnel affair exclusively.

Source: adjusted from C.-s. Kang et al. (2008, p. 242) and S.-y. Lee and Lee (2014, p. 56), as well as extracted from <http://www.mpm.go.kr>

The SCS system on the verge of collapse in Korea

President Lee Myung-bak, who ended a ten-year Democratic administration, not only downsized the departments through organisational mergers, but also promoted the privatisation of public enterprises and agencies, as shown in Tables 4-10 and 4-11 (H.-s. Hwang, 2013, p. 349; Shin, 2009, pp. 213-214; Yun, 2009, pp. 296-300). Looking at the difference between Lee's reform and his predecessor's, the former focused on quantitative targets such as restructuring and downsizing while the latter emphasised the change of culture and system (H.-s. Hwang, 2013, pp. 354-355).

< Table 4-10. Downsizing the central government of the Lee administration >

	Structural Organisation	Personnel organisation		
		Minister	Vice-minister	SCS
President Roh (Dec. 2007)	22 Ministry (including 3 vice-ministerial administration) 17 Agency 2 Commission	38	90	1,592
President Lee (Dec.2008)	17 Ministry (including 2 vice-ministerial administration) 18 Agency 3 Commission	27 (▼11)	84 (▼6)	1,472 (▼120)

Source: adjusted from H.-s. Hwang (2013, p. 350) and www.mpm.go.kr

< Table 4-11. Lee's projects on reforming the public enterprise & agency >

	Privatisation		Merger	Abolition	Competition	Restructuring	Downsizing (Staff)	Subsidiary Reorganisation
		Partial						
Number of Bodies	24	5	36 → 16	5	2	20	▼22 (thousand)	131

Source: adjusted from MoSF (2011, p. 307)

In terms of the civil service reform towards the 'small but efficient government', the new administration focused on revising or adjusting the existing programmes in compliance with the demands of pragmatism and performance principles, like the extension of PRP (S.-y. Lee & Lee, 2014, pp. 62-63; C.-o. Park & Joo, 2010, p. 204; J.-b. Yoon, 2010, pp. 32-33). Particularly, Mr. Lee blamed the era of the two former presidents by borrowing the term of "the lost decade". Some commentators characterised the direction of his policy as the "Anything But Roh

Moo-hyun" (ABR)⁴³, which were movements to reverse the accomplishment of the previous government (D.-c. Kim, 2018; E.-j. Kim, 2018; Yon-se Kim, 2008; J.-s. Lee, 2008). With regard to his ABR policies, it is remarkable that the SCS system was in danger of elimination. Since this HR system was not only considered one of the most self-admiring triumphs from the Roh era, but also accused of being operated in a perfunctory manner (K.-s. Choi, 2008; Se-hoon Jang, 2008; Joo, 2008), it might have been inevitable that it faced a crisis of survival. This controversy over the maintenance or abolition of the SCS system could be interpreted as a kind of political "big bath", which discloses the hidden problems of the previous leader. Notwithstanding disapproval of this reform, there was a burden to abolish what was less than two years old, as well as advice that the new management for high-ranking officials could give the president the advantage of controlling the bureaucracy. Consequently, the Korean SCS system survived from the crisis of potential removal, and it was merely altered or adjusted in Lee's period. If taking a closer look inside its revision, it can be argued that only the theme about performance and accountability was highlighted, whereas other issues, such as openness and competence development, seemed to be neglected, whether it was intended or not. As shown in the interviews below, it would have been untenable to abolish this brand-new system of which the drawbacks or effects had not yet been verified at that time.

"It is true that President Lee ordered a review of abolishing the SCS system, and that the public opinion against this policy was strong. Nevertheless, when working groups, including the president secretary for personnel affairs, persuaded Mr. president with the benefits and purpose of this system, he changed his mind even under the political situation when everything about Roh's policy was denied at that time."

Source: Interviewee IK2

"It is not right to completely abolish the system less than three years old. Since this [the SCS system] is an advanced system, we will supplement the problems so that it can take root in officialdom."

Source: Interview with Mr. Choi Min-Ho, the head of personnel bureau of the MOPAS (Se-hoon Jang, 2009)


⁴³ It is claimed that this may have benchmarked the 'Anything But Clinton (ABC)' policies of the Bush administration in the U.S.

4-3-3. Politics of the senior civil service reform in Korea

Between bashing bureaucrats and taming them

Although the previous Korean leaders also had used the so-called “bureaucrat-bashing” as their political rhetoric, Kim’s administration was the first time the government used mainly outside forces like businessmen, rather than bureaucratic self-treatment, in the 1997 financial crisis (Y.-d. Jung, 2008, pp. 117-118). However, it is claimed that many of his unsustainable and inconsistent programmes indicate that the political leaders did not have enough political capital, such as information, expertise, network and policy experience, to overcome the bureaucratic resistance (W.-t. Kang, 2001; M.-j. Moon & Kim, 2006). A series of Kim Dae-jung’s managerial initiatives, including downsizing and marketisation, may have decreased the bureaucratic influence, but there was still a question mark over whether the dominance of public officials had changed. The surge of civil servants in the last year of his term eventually resulted in a more enlarged government (889,993 persons) than that of his inauguration year (888,334 person) (Youn-soo Kim & Lee, 2007, p. 56). As Im (2007, p. 49) pointed out, the NPM-type reform would have been not only a policy experiment imitating American cases, but also a microscopic modification in operation rather than a fundamental transition.

< Figure 4-8. Increase of public corporations & agencies in the Roh era >



Source: www.index.go.kr and MoSF (2011, p. 128)

Meanwhile, there was a relatively distinct difference between Mr. Kim and President Roh in reform philosophy despite their shared identity of the Democratic Party⁴⁴. While Kim's administration patiently tried to follow the NPM doctrine, Mr. Roh refused to accept the principles of his former president as they were (Youn-soo Kim & Lee, 2007, p. 54; S.-k. Park, 2005, pp. 418-419). The new administration, which named itself as "Participatory government", pursued the 'governance' regardless of its size. As shown in Figure 4-8, this new left-wing administration increased the volume and role of the public sector, including the number of civil servants. President Roh pushed through reform with the new governance, with philosophy different from his former administration. Since he wanted bureaucrats to be the advocates of his reform, not the reformation objects, he attempted to control them by encouraging their participation and taming his own supporters within government (K.-h. Jung, 2005, pp. 308, 321; Oh, 2007, p. 22; S.-k. Park, 2005, pp. 420-421). His aim seemed to change the attitude and culture of civil servants by breaking the uniformity of the traditional bureaucracy as well as by promoting heterogeneity or diversity (Im, 2007, p. 50). For instance, unprecedented appointments, like ministers from a fringe group⁴⁵ and promotions to break conventions⁴⁶, were held, and even the SCS system was regarded as one of these shaking strategies for taming bureaucrats (Y.-h. Choi, Gong, & Kim, 2004). On the other hand, Roh balanced the public-private pay and increased the number of senior positions to attract career servants into participating in his reform. In brief, a bundle of initiatives containing a carrot and stick were undertaken in order to change the un-progressive and irresponsible bureaucracy.

Moreover, not only was the size of the President's Office (Blue House: BH) enlarged, such as the rise of the top-ranking officials, as shown in Table 4-12, but also its authority and function were more empowered in both planning and implementation (J.-b. Yoon, 2010, pp. 32-33). The unnecessary and inefficient intervention of this bloated control tower, including personnel issues, was

⁴⁴ Later, Mr. Roh not only formed his own new party, 'U-Ri' party, in 2003, but also approved the investigation into the political scandal of the former president Kim.

⁴⁵ For example, Lee Chang-dong (film director) as Culture Minister, Kang Geum-sil (young female lawyer) as Justice Minister, and Kim Doo-kwan (small county governor) as Home Minister.

⁴⁶ It was customary to promote the elite officials according to the order of passing the "go-si", but President ignored this and gave preferential treatment to woman and graduates of local university.

criticised for worsening the Korean bureaucracy under the situation in which the huge gap in power between the BH and other departments lasted through the Roh administration (Im, 2007, pp. 51-52). A screening procedure in which the candidates for key positions, including SCS members, are scrutinised for moral and ethical inadequacies, would be an illustration of this. This scrutiny had been conducted by the secretariat for official discipline in the BH before President Roh's period, yet it has been developed since the creation of the personnel secretariat in 2003 (P.-s. Kim, 2004, p. 239; P.-s. Kim, Jeong, & Hong, 2008, pp. 117-118). It seems that this structural and functional separation between recommendation and verification would have provided a preliminary foundation of government-wide and cohesive talent pool, because the enlarged and enriched personnel power, controlled directly by the BH, made it easier for the president to dominate the bureaucratic apparatus.

< Table 4-12. Size comparison of the Korean President's Office (BH) >

Term of President Organisation		Kim Young-sam		Kim Dae-jung		Roh Moo-hyun		Lee Myung-bak	
		Inauguration (1993.3)	Retirement (1998.2)	Inauguration (1998.2)	Retirement (2003.2)	Inauguration (2003.2)	Retirement (2008.2)	Inauguration (2008.2)	Retirement (2013.12)
System	H.O	1	1	1	1	2	3	1	1
	S.S	8	11 1 Advisor	6	8	5 6 Advisor	8 2 Advisor	7 1 Rep.	9 1 Director
Ministers	M	1	3	1	1	3	3	1	1
	V.M	8	10	6	8	10	10	8	10
Secretary		51	48	35	41	37	53	41	46
Total Size		377	375	380	405	498	531	456	456

* **H.O**: Head of Office, **S.S**: Senior Secretary, **M**: Minister, and **V.M**: Vice Minister

Source: adjusted from J.-b. Yoon (2010, p. 32) and www.law.go.kr

The issue on the "civil servants without spirit" in Korea

It is recognised that one of the main footholds of Mr. Lee Myung-bak's victory in next presidential election would be attributable to his entrepreneurial career under the then continued economic recession (H.-s. Hwang, 2013; Onishi, 2007). His goal of "Small Government, Big Market" seemed to impact the voters who

were tired of Roh's fruitless changes; this former business CEO prioritised the government reorganisation and de-regulatory reform as the most urgent tasks. This conservative administration did not treat public officials as main agents or comrades of reform, but as the "meo-seum"⁴⁷, and its reformation method was a top-down and one-off approach (H.-s. Hwang, 2013, p. 348; Yun, 2009, p. 303).

The controversy over the politico-administrative relationship attracted media and public attention, particularly during the transition period from President Roh to Mr. Lee. This issue was triggered by the comment of one top-ranking official who made an excuse for politically disputable activities during the previous government: the statement being "because we are civil servants without spirit"⁴⁸. Some criticised the irresponsibility and uncritical loyalty of bureaucrats, while others denounced Lee's rash bashing of them (C.-o. Park, 2011b, pp. 33-35). It appeared as if the new conservative administration pursued exercising strict control over the bureaucracy in order to recover their "lost decade". In addition, a rumour that the highest officials in some departments and the chief executives in public enterprises were demanded to resign by the BH, namely '*en masse resignation*', was in the air (J.-b. Hwang, 2008; Jong-yoon Kim & Son, 2008). Although all of their resignations were not accepted, this scene would have been enough to put pressure on the whole executive branch. This could be why almost every new Korean president used this kind of strategy whenever he/she needed to refresh the atmosphere of the government. Apart from this operational aspect, there was an institutional or legal movement for dominating the bureaucracy; the dismissal against his/her will for the top officials has been revived⁴⁹.

The strategy of bashing bureaucrats had to be changed in 2008 when Lee's government had enormous difficulty in handling state affairs such as the financial mire caused by the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, and the violent mass rally about mad cow disease. Accordingly, a new tactic in which the supporters within government were tamed and utilised, appeared to have been adopted since the

⁴⁷ Which literally means a farmhand or footman, but Mr. Lee intended to tighten discipline among public officials by emphasising their salaries come from people's taxes.

⁴⁸ The official said that he just quoted this comment from Marx Weber's bureaucratisation theory, and that the real intention was that bureaucrats have no choice but to work in accordance with the government's philosophy (H.-h. Cho, 2008; Huh, 2008).

⁴⁹ The Article 68 of the SPOA, which clause had disappeared by the introduction of the SCS system, was revised again in March 2010 (originally proposed in early 2009).

middle of Lee's term. For instance, President Lee began to appoint current and former bureaucrats, who had been from the *go-si*, to the majority of the senior secretary posts of the BH⁵⁰, and the scrutinisation of the screening of candidates for key posts still lasted despite his downsized office. It was later discovered that during this time, Lee's administration inspected the loyalty of the highest officials due to the suspicion that their non-cooperative attitude was the cause of the lethargic government (E.-j. Kim, 2018). Nevertheless, Mr. Lee could not avoid the lame-duck phenomenon in the latter stage of his term, and the passive resistance of bureaucrats, like delaying or slowing-down tactics and flattering potential presidents, appeared to mount (e.g., B.-k. Moon, 2011). Since his reforms like the organisational restructuring were carried out on a relatively one-off basis (H.-s. Hwang, 2013, p. 355), it would not have been easy to maintain his political leverage to the last stage of the term despite the existence of the SCS system.

4-4. Conclusion

The overview of the civil service system, including the reform of the SCS system in the U.K. and Korea, particularly with respect to the politico-administrative relationship, was described in this chapter. These historical narratives derived from a comparative point of view, we can uncover the sharp differences between the British and Korean civil service reform. Although both countries launched an analogous personnel system based on the NPM, the stories not only about their contrasting process of the civil service development, but also about the distinctive relationship between legislative and executive branches, have enriched the comprehension of this research subject. The empirical results from this chapter's exploration provide the foundation of the case study, in terms of setting the MDSD approach in Britain and Korea methodologically, and even of identifying potential causal factors/inputs in the analysis on the SCS change. In particular, the document analysis of the official materials concerning each country's SCS can contribute to understanding the characteristics of this new institution, which will be later associated with categorising the SCS and analysing its components in

⁵⁰ Six of nine senior secretaries in the BH were of bureaucratic origin in late 2008, whereas most of those positions were staffed by professors at Lee's inauguration (K.-w. Cho, 2008).

relation to the PSB theory. Additionally, the dynamic politics surrounding the creation and transformation of the SCS system would be enough to figure out the 'opportunity structure' or 'institutional arrangements' by virtue of re-organising various literature in chronological order despite their limitation as secondary sources. With this in mind, the next chapters (Chapters 5 and 6) will examine the process of the SCS changes in detail over four historic nodes: from Mrs. Thatcher to PM Blair, and from President Kim to Mr. Lee. Each of the observations will be classified by the SCS category (the synthesis of Tables 2-2 and 2-3) and the type of institutional change (Tables 3-2 and 3-3), and they will also be researched according to the analytical frameworks, such as Figure 3-4 and Table 3-7, which would be the key for analysing the process and cause of the SCS change.

Chapter 5 . Characteristics of the Senior Civil Service

Change process

5-1. Introduction

As reviewed in the earlier discussion, a series of the civil service reforms derived from managerialism seems to have continued until recently both in the U.K. and Korea despite several alternations of government. This chapter attempts to answer the first sub-question of the thesis with empirical evidence. This analytic exploration is on the foundations of the narratives constructed in the previous chapter, in which the historical and institutional features of the contemporary civil service system as well as the political relations concerning its reform in those two countries were dealt with. To figure out the characteristics of the SCS change process, as illustrated in Figure 3-4, first it requires to identify the features of three SCS observations by country respectively. The distinction between the SCSs would be available after classifying each of them according to the SCS category, which is the synthesis of Huddleston's types and the four politicisation modes. With regard to Britain cases, three different SCS forms will be compared with each other in two periods from M. Thatcher to T. Blair, and then two kinds of SCS change processes, the modes A and B, can be drawn from after this comparison. Also, the modes C and D of the Korean cases can be led to in the same way. Accordingly, it is expected to discern the salient characteristics of each change process to the SCS by analysing those procedures by means of four patterns of institutional change (Streeck & Thelen, 2005, p. 9) and furthermore by more detailed modes concerning the gradual change (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010, p. 16), as introduced in Tables 3-2 and 3-3.

5-2. Findings for the British Senior Civil Service system

The British SCS system in the Conservative governments

Above all, admitting that the Thatcherite 'Next-Steps' programme stirred up the birth of new types of staff, it seems that they were distinguished from the

traditional senior civil servants in Whitehall because they belonged to executive agencies which were specially designed for operational effectiveness. In this respect, it would be plausible to compare the features of the British SCS and that of the conventional mandarin. These two classes will be classified according to this research's category which was deduced from the main concepts of its definition: managerialism and politicisation. This categorisation is composed of the column of managerial approach, in which the four ideal images of Huddleston (1992) is used, and the row of politicisation degree.

Which type of four Huddleston's (1992) images would be suitable for the civil service in each period can be judged by making use of the relationship between the features of SCS and its types, as exemplified in Table 2-2. If the analysis target involves an element which is listed among Huddleston's nine features, it will be counted for the supporting image (check "O"). On the contrary, if the system does not have the listed traits, it will be counted for the contradictory image (check "X"). Then, the result calculated with the most frequency is determined as its SCS type. Table 5-1 shows the matching results of the SCS features and the Major's new personnel model in comparison with traditional Whitehall officials. The checklists on this table are filled out in accordance with the descriptions of the previous chapter (section 4-2-2), as well as with the empirical data from existing document materials. In particular, the survey from OECD facilitates to identify the features of this British civil service system for senior officials. Moreover, the research of Youn-soo Kim and Kim (2007, p. 48) was referred for verifying those results because they already had investigated and classified the cases of the U.K. by Huddleston's model.

When it comes to the SCS established in the Major period, the judgement about its typical features are mainly derived from the three managerial characteristics of managerialism, marketisation and agencification (Dargie & Locke, 1999, pp. 179-181). To be more specific, it can be found that from the major literatures explaining the SCS creation in the U.K. that most of their forepart introduction commonly begins with such concepts as "professionalism", "wide(overall) vision", and "cooperation and cohesion between(across) departments" or "mobility" (Cm 2748, 1995, pp. 15-16; Ingraham, Murlis, & Peters, 1999, p. 8; OECD, 2003, p. 25). This means that one of the primary purposes of this new strategy launched

in April 1996 can correspond with the SCS features ① and ⑧ or ⑦ in Table 5-1. In addition, another fundamental and important concept of the SCS in Britain is the term of "performance", which is the most frequently mentioned word in explaining the differentiating feature from the rest of the old personnel systems. According to two elemental white papers concerning the establishment of SCS in 1994 and 1995, not only the "sustained improvement in performance" was the chief target point of the scheme, but also the items related to the performance-based management, including salary, flexible contract and appraisal system, were emphasised (Cm 2627, 1994, pp. 3-4, 35; Cm 2748, 1995, p. 15). These present a sharp contrast between the SCS and the traditional mandarin (e.g., the features of ③, ⑥ and ⑨ in Table 5-1). In terms of the items checked "X", such as the Huddleston's features of ②, ④ and ⑤), considering that this new NPM-type management was considered as a centralised system for counterbalancing the fragmentation or decentralisation in the U.K. (Butcher & Massey, 2003, p. 9; Massey, 2005, p. 54; Parry, 2001, pp. 348, 357), and that it planned to provide coherent development programmes for senior officials (Cm 2627, 1994, pp. 38-39; Cm 2748, 1995, p. 16), feature ② does not apply to this case. Actually, the results of the international survey, which measures the level of the SCS institutionalisation regularly, also show that the U.K. answered 'no' to the inquiry about the centralised recruitment process of the SCS (OECD, 2009, p. 83; 2011, p. 93). Additionally, the Whitehall staff seemed to be still disconnected from political appointment of their MP minister under the Westminster model (Richards, 2003, 2008). The SASC⁵¹, former advising organisation for the fair process of the appointment to the top-level posts, would be an instance of this centralised and non-political personnel management in Britain.

On the other hand, it is believed that the traits of traditional Whitehall generalists have been formed by the Northcote-Trevelyan report, as introduced in section 4-2-1. The civil service system being inspired this reform can be thought to have supported the merit system, and this 'Permanent Civil Service' put an emphasis on the notions of permanency, neutrality and anonymity (or ministerial responsibility) (Northcote & Trevelyan, [1854] 1954, pp. 1-2, 15-16; Pyper, 1995,

⁵¹ This was transformed into the Senior Leadership Committee (SLC) during the Blair era. The SCS recruitment of the U.K. is known to have central guidance and criteria in spite of its decentralised processes (OECD, 2003, p. 11).

pp. 12-15). To sum up, it could be argued that the traditional mandarins in Britain, who have been often characterised as a typical image of ‘Sir Humphrey’⁵², are close to the exclusive elite corps, while the Thatcherite reform affected them to become a politically responding can-doers. As a result, this work of matching Huddleston's yardsticks about the SCS feature to the real characteristics of British SCS through document analysis, could make useful contribution to understanding the nature of SCS and to recognising the differences between those cases.

< Table 5-1. Features of the Major's SCS and traditional one in the U.K. >

SCS Feature	SCS in the Major era		Traditional Mandarin	
	Matching	Image	Matching	Image
① Government-wide personnel system	O	E, P	O	E, P
② Decentralisation of recruitment and training	X	E	- **	-
③ Relaxed tenure, managerial flexibility	O	P, M	X	S, E
④ Responsiveness through political appointment to career jobs	X	S, E, M	X	S, E, M
⑤ Careerist opportunities through career appointment to political jobs	X	P	X	P
⑥ Pay for performance	O	P, M	X	E
⑦ Emphasis on general management	O	E	O	E
⑧ Mobility	O	E	X	S
⑨ Accountability through measurable performance goals and appraisals	O	P, M	X	E
Total results (S, E, P, M)*	S (1), E (5), P (5), M (4)		S (3), E (6), P (2), M (1)	

* **S:** agency Specialists, **E:** (European-style) Elite corps, **P:** Political machine, **M:** corporate Managers

** judgment postponement: Before the launch of the SCS system, the unified civil service had already been weakened and the personnel authority has also been delegated.

The other dimension of the SCS category, namely the extent of politicisation, is measured in two directions: the political approach from civil servants; and the

⁵² Sir Humphrey Appleby is one of the characters in the old BBC television series, “Yes, Minister”, which exposed the workings of Whitehall sarcastically.

political involvement in the careers of senior officials. The former, as briefed earlier, means a formal regulation on the partisanship of the public employees, which can be confirmed by the OECD publications. The latter is primarily obtained through the results of OECD survey, as well as judged by the two criteria of Meyer-Sahling (2008), as shown in Table 2-3. However, it is needed to be wary of not to be dependent totally on those visible or published data in measuring the degree of politicisation because this work is about the relationship between political actors whose attitude or real intentions are hard to be gauged.

< Table 5-2. OECD survey results of the politicisation in the U.K. >

Restriction on political approach of SCS	Standing for public office?	High profile party activity?	Other party political activity?	Trade union activity?
	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Political involvement in staffing SCS	Public servants change with change of gov't	Political involvement in appointment	Political involvement in dismissal	Political involvement in promotion
	No	None	None	-

Source: Matheson et al. (2007, pp. 19, 25)

Traditionally, the public officials of Whitehall were considered separate from the Westminster politicians despite the principle of parliamentary sovereignty. That is, the civil service under the strong British PSE which is characterised as permanency, anonymity and political neutrality, would be far away from politicisation, and the intensity of political impact on staff was low, as shown in Table 5-2. Generally, as the OECD reports delivered (Ingraham et al., 1999, p. 14; OECD, 2003, p. 26), such conventional management values in Britain as impartiality and neutrality appeared to remained even after the SCS launch. Nonetheless, it seems to be generally agreed that there has been certainly an increased challenge to those Northcote-Trevelyan principles of senior permanent officials in Britain (Dargie & Locke, 1999, pp. 181, 199).

Meanwhile, the turnover of civil servants following elections, the first criterion of Meyer-Sahling, does not occur in the U.K., except for the special advisors who are not actually career officials. According to the OECD survey of Table 5-2 (Matheson et al., 2007, p. 25), there is no political involvement in staffing for the post of level 5 and higher. However, as reviewed earlier, it is believed that

Thatcher's distrust in those 'privileged elites' (Reitan, 2003, p. 97) has led to Whitehall becoming more accountable or responsible for the performance, particularly with relation to the policy-delivery like being a 'can-doer', regardless of whether or not her appointments were based on personality trait (Bae et al., 2005, pp. 47-48; Dargie & Locke, 1999, p. 181; Page & Wright, 1999, p. 275; Richards, 2003, p. 47). This trend would have been solidified in Major's government with the introduction of the managerial reform, the launch of SCS, which can be considered to have reflected the controversial issue of the "hunger for stronger politicisation in the NPM era", as examined in section 2-3. Therefore, considering Parry's (2011, pp. 365-366) conclusion that political impartiality for the British civil service is regarded not as a being apolitical, but as a being "able to offer the same commitment to another party at a moment's notice", the politicisation of the civil service in the U.K. has moved from non-politicisation toward a bounded- or open-one in the degree of Meyer-Sahling's politicisation.

The SCS system and special advisors in the Blair era

The SCS type of Blair's government can be categorised in the same way like that of his predecessor's. Although the 'third way' was oriented toward somewhat different ideological goals, most of the managerial features in the initial SCS system appear to have been still valid because Major's main idea about the civil service reform continued in the era of New Labour, as probed in the preceding chapter. In particular, the emphasis on the 'joined-up government' and 'service delivery' in the Blair administration (Cm 4310, 1999) seems to have resulted in the centralised performance management of the SCS. He needed to deal with the 'pathologies' (Richards, 2008) or 'unintended problems' (Rhodes, 2000) resulted from a package of neo-liberalistic measures. The institutional fragmentation and obscure accountability, which are caused by agencification and worsened by devolution, were representative instances of those disputes (Dargie & Locke, 1999, p. 199; Rhodes, 1997, pp. 101-102; 2000, pp. 157, 159). Thus, now that the joined-up government meant the steering networks involving markets and civil societies, the government officials were required to be equipped with the abilities of partnership, to say nothing of manager skills. As a result, it looked like the basic arrangement of the SCS system has persisted as well in the Blair's premiership, with a small addition of setting a target for women, ethnic

minorities and disabled people in the SCS members (Cm 4310, 1999, pp. 59-60).

With respect to categorising the SCS in this period according to the politicisation criteria, the Blair government did not get out of the habit of politicisation trend despite its outward appearance of remaining neutral Whitehall (Rhodes, 2000; Sausman & Locke, 2004, 2007). In fact, it appears that the political influence over senior staff, or the intensity of politicisation, could have escalated continuously during the Labour years, as described in section 4-2-3. Most of all, it is noticeable that Blair, the Napoleonic PM made giant strides in the use of the 'special advisers'. *Special adviser* is commonly referred to as a 'temporary political appointment made by a minister,' and is allowed to 'convey instructions and commission work' from public officials on the behalf of ministers, especially in the field of media and public relations (Garnett & Lynch, 2009, p. 168). Both the number and role of special advisers have proliferated since the victory of New Labour in 1997.

< Table 5-3. Numbers of the British government special advisers >

Financial Year	Numbers of Special Adviser			Special Adviser Pay
	Total	No. 10	Department	
1979/80	7	<i>n.a.</i>	<i>n.a.</i>	-
1989/90	35	<i>n.a.</i>	<i>n.a.</i>	-
1994/95	34	6	28	£1.5 million
1996/97	38	8	30	£1.8 million
1998/99	74	25	49	£3.5 million
2000/01	79	25	54	£4.4 million
2002/03	81	27	54	£5.4 million
2004/05	84	28	56	£5.5 million
2005/06	78	24	54	£5.9 million

Source: [http:// publications.parliament.uk](http://publications.parliament.uk), Cm 5775 (2003, p. 50) and Richards (2008, p. 180)

In terms of the quantitative aspect, as shown in the yellow bars of Table 5-3, not only has the recruitment of them more than doubled in comparison with the Conservative era, but also has personnel expenditure increased dramatically to £4 million per annum, more than twice the cost of the Major era (Richards, 2008: 180). This increase was attributed to the strengthening of the core executives

such as 10 Downing Street and the Cabinet Office, as well as the revised payment system for giving high salaries to senior advisers (Sausman & Locke, 2004, pp. 104-105). On the other hand, from the qualitative perspective, special advisers played an important part in policy deliberations of Blair's departments. These politically appointed advisers reflected the interests or demands of politicians faithfully, unlike permanent officials, but simultaneously they got heavily involved in the policy-making process, like typical public officials through interaction with ministers. As the Labour's reliance on the advisors deepened, these political officials were able to hold a lead over bureaucrats in their area like being a gatekeeper (Horton, 2006b, p. 42; Sausman & Locke, 2007, p. 193). There were even such influential special advisers as Jonathan Powell and Alastair Campbell who had control over Whitehall with special trust from the PM. Hence, this might be interpreted that the Blair government sought an approach to the presidential system. Consequently, the overall SCS configuration has not been changed significantly since the 1990s Thatcherite reform, and rather it is supposed that the degree or density of each dimension has got higher. This two-way measurement about the bureaucrats' politicisation, which uses both empirical results of survey and non-quantitative evidence, can add persuasive power when judging the degree of politicisation in the case.

Comparison of the SCS of Major and Blair

It can be learned that both SCSs in the Major and Blair eras originated from the Thatcherite managerial reform. This personnel scheme designed for improving the performance, especially policy implementation and service delivery, seems to have strengthened control over Whitehall in both periods. In fact, it can be found that the continuous pursuit of business-like civil servants has resulted in the change from the 'Sir Humphrey' to the 'can-doer' in the U.K., which may be connected with the replacement for the thermostatic control over bureaucracy. As a result, as the former MP (1992-2015) and J. Major's minister acknowledged, it would be difficult to distinguish keenly the SCS change during the 1990s.

"I was not able to be aware of how the SCS scheme changed before and after the Blair administration because of no big and abrupt or significant transformation of it."

Source: Interviewee IB1

In summary, the comparison of the SCSs before-and-after two alternations of government can be made through putting those three sub-types (SCS_T , SCS_M and SCS_B) together, as illustrated in Table 5-4. Within a matrix of the SCS categorisation, the initial point of the British mandarins would be placed in the intersection (SCS_T) in which the elite-corps type meets with low intensity of politicisation. Then, the SCS system launched by the Major administration would be located at the space of SCS_M , where the column is the point between the elite-corps and political-machine, the row of the matrix is the intensity of bounded politicisation. Furthermore, during the Blair era, it could be argued that the previous area hardly moves around, or that the new mark (SCS_B) crawls within the range between bounded- and open-politicisation. As a result, for the British cases, those three lattice points in this classification are not dispersed within a certain scope, regardless of inauguration of the new government.

< Table 5-4. The change of the SCS category over time in the U.K. >

	Agency Specialist	Elite corps	Political Machine	Corporate Managers
Non-politicisation		SCS_T		
Bounded-Politicisation			SCS_M SCS_B	
Open-Politicisation				
Partisan-politicisation				

* SCS_T : traditional mandarin in Britain, SCS_M : SCS in the Major era, SCS_B : SCS in the Blair era

Consequently, if it is postulated that the change from SCS_T to SCS_M would be the 'mode A', and that from SCS_M to SCS_B is the 'mode B', what these consequences of modes indicate can be understood by means of the patterns of institutional change. This will be discussed through comparing the results of the Korean SCS cases in the next section.

5-3. Findings for the Korean Senior Civil Service system

This section is also linked with the measurement of the SCSs for identifying their institutional changes for answering the first sub-question of the thesis, like the previous British cases. This investigation, which covers the period before the establishment of this personnel management system in Roh's administration, to after the alternation of government by Mr. Lee, would enable to categorise three types of the Korean SCS systems, as did it in Table 5-4. Based on the classification of those three observations, it is expected to characterise the two SCS change processes, which are divided into 'mode C' (before-and-after July 2006) and 'mode D' (the historic node of February 2008).

Typical feature of the SCS system in the Roh era

The analysis for categorising the Korean SCS cases will employ the same method as the way discussed in the British SCSs: mixing the managerial approach derived from Huddleston (1992) model, and the degree of politicisation founded on Meyer-Sahling (2008) and OECD survey.

When it comes to the first dimension of this category, whether each system of the cases involves the nine SCS features Huddleston suggested or not (checking "O" or "X"), is judged through the historical narratives mainly in section 4-3, and the analysis of Youn-soo Kim and Kim (2007, pp. 57-58) is used as auxiliary or re-validation data. Applying those results to the criteria of the initial Korean SCS in the Roh administration, as well as the ideal elite bureaucrat who led the industrialisation in Korea, the results are shown in Table 5-5. In terms of the features ① and ② in Table 5-5, one of the clear objectives of the Korean SCS was "selecting and developing senior officials from an expanded government-wide pool of talents" (CSC, 2006, pp. 4, 7), and such personnel systems, as Open-Position system (OPS) and government-wide Job Posting System (JPS), would be examples of this. Meanwhile, contrary to the "O" mark given by Youn-soo Kim and Kim (2007), the item of decentralisation on the checklist (feature ②) is marked "X" in this study because the important process of key public posts, including the SCS positions, in Korea are still controlled by the BH, as described in section 4-3-3. In fact, it would be true that the conventionally modern civil

service before those systems, had been also operated across departments by a centralised management form including the President's Office or the Ministry of Government Administration (H.-r. Kim & Ahn, 2004, pp. 307, 324; NamKoong, 2007, p. 26). With respect to the differences from the British SCS system (features ③, ④, ⑤), the career civil servants not only have been often appointed as political ministers in Korea since the establishment of the Korean constitution, as illustrated in Figure 4-5, but also the political appointment to career jobs has been officially possible by the newly established the 'Regulations on the Establishment and Operation of Policy Advisors' in 2003. In particular, as Youn-soo Kim and Kim (2007, p. 57) acknowledged, the Korean SCS system has its own distinctiveness compared to other countries' system, in that this reform initiative kept such strong merit systems, as retirement age and pension system, intact (e.g., the feature ③ in Table 5-5). This adherence was the outcome of the consideration of the bureaucratic resistance against the reform and the protection of career system (BPP, 2008, pp. 25, 32).

In addition, according to explicit statements in the whitepaper (e.g., BPP (2008)) and the official brochure, which were published around the time of the SCS launch, the distinctive traits this new system possesses would be that it is a performance-related and competition-oriented strategy designed by the job-based competency framework (BPP, 2008, pp. 17-19; CSC, 2006, p. 4). Considering personnel exchange programmes, especially for above the level of director, were actively promoted after the inauguration of President Roh, the Korean SCS can correspond with the feature ⑧, as shown in Table 5-5. On the contrary, the system in the 'developmental state', which is mentioned in section 4-3-1, is known to have the follows: (1) closed career system; (2) generalist; (3) rank-in-person; (4) status-guaranteeing system (S.-o. Choi & Park, 2013, p. 22; C.-s. Kang et al., 2008, p. 43; Mosher, 1968, pp. 151-156). That is, the SCS system created in the Roh administration contrasts with the traditional Korean career system in the aspect of managerialism, similar to the comparison between the NPM-type SCS and the traditional mandarin in the U.K. as shown in the features ⑥, ⑧ and ⑨ of Table 5-1. In consequence, Table 5-5 implies that the typical elitism in Korean bureaucracy has been altered to some extent by adding political and managerial factors, which change pattern appears to be analogous to the transformation from the Northcote-Trevelyan system to the Thatcherite

SCS system in Britain.

< Table 5-5. Features of the Roh's SCS and traditional one in Korea >

SCS Feature	SCS in the Roh era		Traditional Bureaucrat	
	Matching	Image	Matching	Image
① Government-wide personnel system	O	E, P	O	E, P
② Decentralisation of recruitment and training	X	E	X	E
③ Relaxed tenure, managerial flexibility	X	S, E	X	S, E
④ Responsiveness through political appointment to career jobs	O	P	- **	-
⑤ Careerist opportunities through career appointment to political jobs	O	E	O	E
⑥ Pay for performance	O	P, M	X	E
⑦ Emphasis on general management	O	E	O	E
⑧ Mobility	O	E	X	S
⑨ Accountability through measurable performance goals and appraisals	O	P, M	X	E
Total results (S, E, P, M)*	S (1), E (6), P (4), M (2)		S (2), E (7), P (1), M (0)	

* **S**: agency Specialists, **E**: (European-style) Elite corps, **P**: Political machine, **M**: corporate Managers

** judgment postponement: Although many politicians have been appointed to the secretaries of the BH, the organisation regulation were not clear and developed before 1998.

As for the measurement of the intensity of politicisation, not only the political influence of the politicians like MPs, but also the political activity of the public officials is strictly restricted in Korea, as shown in Table 5-6. For example, the SPOA (Article 65), the 'Public Official Election Act' and the 'Public Service Ethics Act' are legal devices for ensuring the neutrality of the civil service, which is the first dimension of measuring politicisation, following the declaration of the Article 7 of the Korean Constitution. According to the article 68 of the SPOA, no Korean civil servants, except the highest rank administrator ('grade 1', usually the position of vice ministers), are suspended from service, demoted or dismissed against his/her will unless he/she commits violation of law. In addition, Bourgault (2013, p. 160) argued that Korea belonged to an OECD group where the politicians'

intervention in such senior official HR issues, as appointment, revocation and promotion is weak, on a 2006 basis.

< Table 5-6. OECD survey results of the politicisation in Korea >

Restriction on political approach of SCS	Standing for public office?	High profile party activity?	Other party political activity?	Trade union activity?
	Yes	Yes	Yes	<i>Only lower grades</i>
Political involvement in staffing SCS	Public servants change with change of gov't	Political involvement in appointment	Political involvement in dismissal	Political involvement in promotion
	<i>Yes (only level 1)</i>	<i>Low</i>	<i>Low</i>	<i>Low</i>


Source: Matheson et al. (2007, pp. 19, 25)

Paradoxically, a chain of those statutory sanctions against violating political neutrality, could be interpreted into a historical reflection or counter-evidence of the symbiotic relationship between the presidents and the executive elites in the past authoritarian governments, as reviewed in Korean modern history. It would be tough to conclude that even the administration of Mr. Roh was far from the politicisation, as long as the old-fashioned *Party-Government Council* was still valid in his and his predecessors' democratic governments, and the bureaucrats seemed to consistently be absorbed in the opportunistic pursuit of power. In this regard, it may be said that Korea is not in the non-politicisation mode, nor is it in the partisan or open politicisation mode, until the launch of the SCS system. Even it is admitted that increasing the objectivity through competitive recruitment as well as incapacitating the clause 68 of the SPOA by the abolishment of rank system, might be perceived to enhance the neutrality of civil service. Nevertheless, the existence of the Korean OPS which enables positions to be filled with outsiders from non-public sector and even political territory, would correspond with the 'open politicisation' mode of Meyer-Sahling (2008). Moreover, considering the enlarged President's office, like Table 4-12, and its enhanced personnel power, such as scrutinisation of candidates for public posts, it would be hard to argue that the intensity of politicisation has not increased substantially during the Roh period by comparison with the previous periods.

The SCS system under the Lee's ABR policy

Overall, the Lee government did not change much of the underlying configuration items of the SCS system from the previous administration despite the ABR policies which had jeopardized the continuity of the SCS, yet some of its components have been amended from the perspective of emphasising the efficiency, performance and accountability. For instance, the index indicating the degree of the leniency tendency of SCS evaluation, has declined since the introduction of the stronger performance management, as shown in Figure 5-1.

< Figure 5-1. Trajectory of the leniency index of the SCS evaluation >



Source: J.-g. Kim (2013, p. 60)

Besides, the narrative in the Lee period shows that the revised Article 68 of the SPOA made the top official's tenure flexible, and the penalty for his/her poor performance was increased through strengthening the requirement of the SCS re-certification (from lowest performers for a total of 3 years, to a total of 2 years). These measures intended to reinforce the accountability and performance of the SCS, which leads to the Huddleston's (1992) images of political machine and corporate managers. In addition, the pragmatism of President Lee in personnel management, such as the merger of OPS and JPS, or the expanded exemption of the Assessment Centre (AC), may be considered to have ruined the original systems because the streamlined process or relaxation of regulation made it difficult to achieve the aim of screening talent through competition. As a result, for the purpose of identifying sharply the distinctiveness of the SCS under the

presidency of Mr. Lee, the amendments of Table 5-7 can be applied. In summary, the results of the typical SCS features in Korea would change from the total of 'S (1), E (6), P (4), M (2)' to the sum of 'S (2), E (5), P (5), M (3)', which would mean more a politicised and business-like SCS image.

< Table 5-7. Amendment of the Lee government and the SCS features >

SCS Feature \ Amendment	Increase of PRP ratio	Relative evaluation	Revision of OPS & JPS	Article 68, Re-certification
Relaxed tenure, managerial flexibility				▲ (P, M)
Pay for performance	▲ (P, M)			
Mobility			▼ (S)	
Accountability through measurable performance goals and appraisals		▲ (P, M)		

* **S**: agency Specialists, **E**: (European-style) Elite corps, **P**: Political machine, **M**: corporate Managers

** ▲: Supporting (strengthening the feature), ▼: Contradictory (weakening the feature)

In terms of the next dimension in the SCS category, the intensity of politicisation in the Lee administration appeared to be still controversial. The two episodes in his early days of the term, the 'civil servants without spirit and 'en masse resignation', were associated with the issue of the turnover of high-ranking officials. These issues may have been enough to create a strong impression on the attempt of politicisation by his administration, but they were not fresh new, in that every new Korean president uses this oppressive strategy whenever he/she needed to refresh the atmosphere of the government. Instead, it seems that Lee's downsizing reform as well as his strict personnel management, which might link to his negative prejudice like the perception of '*meo-suem*', seemed to be used as political rhetoric for bashing and taming the bureaucracy. In fact, the civil servants grew in number slightly and gradually during the Lee era, and that his re-structuring was only one-time. Meanwhile, the opportunistic rent-seeking behaviour of the Korean bureaucrats appeared to also get no better. As Kang (2014, p. 86) contends, the Korean bureaucracy tends to strengthen its own autonomy and to pursue its own interests whenever the political control is loosened under the condition of the presidency's single five-year term after the

democratisation of 1988. Even, the frequent situation of the *divided government* which could increase the political instability, might have reinforced this tendency in Korea. To sum up, the political principals became more and more involved in the personnel affairs of senior officials in order to control the long-standing autonomy of the bureaucracy. At the same time, the elite bureaucrats seem to have desired to interact politically with the powers all the harder by taking advantage of the conditions in which the presidency term was limited, and the policy capacities of parliament were underdeveloped. Therefore, it can be argued that the intensity of politicisation was still not low in the Lee era, even if it did not reach the degree of partisanship.

Comparison of the SCS of Roh and Lee

This section depicts that there were slight differences among each government of the 2000s in Korea, though the administrations from President Kim to Mr. Lee, were under the influence of the global NPM. The SCS scheme launched in Roh's administration was based on the context of this managerial reform. However, the later model of this personnel system in the Lee era can be distinguished carefully from the original one, particularly in terms of the configuration of its sub-elements. Meanwhile, these two governments did have similarity in the view of the politico-administrative relationship, especially politicisation. That is, as Y.-d. Jung (2008) and Nam (2016) claim, the pattern of control over the bureaucracy being sought but ending unsuccessfully, seemed to be repeated during the two eras.

This difference or change over time in the Korean SCS can be pictorialized in the three cross points (SCS_K , SCS_R and SCS_L) in the multi-dimensional SCS categorisation of Table 5-8. The equilibrium of the Korean traditional ranking system (SCS_K) would be the cross point where the elite-corps style meets with the row of a relatively bounded politicisation. After the launch of the SCS system in the Roh era, the intersection point moves to the right across the previous boundary, and its row within this matrix seems to go into the higher intensity of politicisation (SCS_R). Outwardly, the new balance area of the Lee administration (SCS_L) is placed beside the last field where the SCS_R was located. Nonetheless, the colour of those two SCSs (SCS_R and SCS_L) may not be the same because of their different institutional emphasis and political background. In consequence,

the area where the Korean SCS system would be located is considerably separated from the prior point of the conventional civil service system, which is the 'mode C'. On the other hand, the new lattice points, which undergo the transition from SCSR to SCSL (the 'mode D'), in the matrix of SCS category, seem to be partially overlapped, despite of their clear heterogeneity.

< Table 5-8. The change of the SCS category over time in Korea >

	agency Specialist	Elite corps	Political machine	Corporate Managers
Non-politicisation				
Bounded-Politicisation		SCS_K		
Open-Politicisation			SCS_R	SCS_L
Partisan-politicisation				

* **SCS_K**: traditional Korean official, **SCS_R**: SCS in the Roh era, **SCS_L**: SCS in the Lee era

The following section will compare these two results in the Roh and Lee administrations, along with the other British cases of the Major and Blair eras for the purpose of finding out the characteristics of the SCS change process by virtue of the various patterns of institutional change.

5-4. Comparative findings of the Change Processes

This stage examines the four modes of the SCS change processes (from the mode A to the mode D), which are derived from six SCS types in the U.K. and Korea. Then, it is expected to accomplish the main purpose of this chapter by classifying the characteristics of those modes in accordance with the mixed form of institutional change modes, which combines Mahoney and Thelen (2010) with Streeck and Thelen (2005), as introduced in Tables 3-2 and 3-3.

Mode A ($SCS_T \rightarrow SCS_M$): gradual transformation - layering

Above all, with regard to the SCS change in the Major era (mode A), the narrative of Britain shows that the typical image of the traditional senior mandarin is distinguished from that of the modern SCS after the reform of the 'Iron Lady', particularly from the aspect of managerial approach. This transition could be verified through the movement on the map of Table 5-4 ($SCS_T \rightarrow SCS_M$) and through the contrast of Table 5-1. However, it is also known that the fundamental basis of the SCS system had originated from Thatcherism, especially the Next-Steps initiative. Not only was the main idea of the civil service reform during the two Conservative PMs of the 1980s and 1990s almost identical, but also many of Thatcher's policies were completed in the period of her successor. In some way, it may look like a contradiction that the SCS system in the premiership of Major was quite different from the previous one and, at the same time, it was derived from the former days. As a result, it would be plausible to interpret that a chain of Thatcherite civil service reforms were stepping-stones for establishing this new managerial system for senior officials. This analysis provides an insight about institutional change from the perspective of Streeck & Thelen's (2005) model. It means that although there might have been a lack of continuity between the results of Thatcher's initiatives and those of the next prime minister's, the process of their reforms could continuously advance toward the same direction. Accordingly, it can be argued that the incremental change of the SCS belongs to the type of '*gradual transformation*'.

Moreover, this gradual change is in large part classified again into four types: *displacement*, *layering*, *drift* and *conversion*. According to Bezes & Lodge (2007, p. 132; 2015, p. 147), Thatcher's Next-Steps reform, which is exemplified as the 'layering' process, is considered to have changed the bargaining relationship of the chief executives by introducing such performance management systems as the PRP and explicit contracts. Likewise, it is believed that the managerialism framework of the SCS system was infused into the core group playing a pivotal role in Whitehall during the period of her successor, for the sake of changing the old government culture, as well as of improving the professionalism and cohesion of the civil service. Actually, the centralised and NPM-type system was a separate rule for only about the top 2% officials, which policy might be similar to the way

of dividing the 'open structure' in 1986, but contrasted with the minister's entrusted power over managing ordinary civil servants, as discussed already in section 4-2-2. These revisions and additions in the personnel operation of high-ranking officials can lead to a 'different growth' (Streeck & Thelen, 2005, p. 23) by rank (or grade) in the whole civil service system. Therefore, the claim can be put forward that the SCS system may have been accepted as a kind of neo-liberalistic initiative which had been already applied to the staff of executive agencies or quangos, and that its advent may be understood as one of a series of Thatcherite reforms. In other words, the layering strategy would have been extended in the British civil service by stages.

Furthermore, in order to decide the mode of the *gradual but transformative* change on the basis of the theoretical approach, it needs to analyse both characteristics of the political context and the Thatcherite initiatives in the Major era, in accordance with the classification of Mahoney and Thelen (2010, pp. 18-19) displayed in Table 3-3. The executive branch with cabinet collegiality seemed not to have a high level of discretion at that time in enforcing the SCS system which was regarded as one of a series of the Conservative's civil service reforms, under the British Westminster system and the condition of the long-accumulated and common law. Also, now that Thatcherism was still an effective and valid reform project and that the majority ruling party was Tory, there were not many veto points in introducing this new HR scheme. Hence, the SCS change in the Major era can be regarded as one of the examples of an institutional change through 'layering' (low discretion in interpretation & strong veto possibilities). This change pattern appears to have brought such substantial transition as the altered expectation of high-ranking officials from policy adviser to policy implementer, and the increasing politicisation of Whitehall in the U.K.

Mode B (SCS_M → SCS_B): reproduction by adaptation

The previous discussion in section 5-2 indicates that the SCS system in the Blair government was not so different from that in the previous one. As depicted in Table 5-4, the new intersection point in the Labour era does not deviate much from the place of the former era. Although some elements of each sub-category might be highlighted more because of the emphasis on the joined-up government

and delivery of public service, it can be argued that PM Blair seems to have developed the SCS system overall in a similar direction to which he inherited it. This consistency might be understood from the perspectives of path-dependency, such as a stable equilibrium or period of stasis of punctuated equilibrium (Krasner, 1984). In accordance with this view, the Thatcherite reforms could be the 'critical juncture' from the perspective of historical institutionalism (R. B. Collier & Collier, 1991; Pierson & Skocpol, 2002) or the 'alternative of reactive sequence' of Mahoney (2000a). Then, in this regard, Blair's SCS system may be able to be interpreted as increasing returns (Pierson, 2000) or self-reinforcing sequences (Mahoney, 2000a). However, not only since those arguments relying on contingent historical events have a limitation in explaining the endogenous causes and the political relationship, as analysed earlier, but also since the comparison with other change patterns and processes in this study needs a synthesised framework, it would be more reasonable to comprehend Blair's SCS with the institutional change types of Streeck & Thelen (2005). Therefore, with respect to the SCS change in the *mode B*, considering the continuous result of its change as well as the incremental progress process, this sort of institutional transformation in the Blair era could be conceived of as the type of 'reproduction by adaptation' in Table 3-2. This reactive and adaptive change serves to keep institutional continuity at the time, even though there might be a dynamic of collision and incongruity, which has the potentiality of change, beneath the stable surface of the SCS institutional complexity (Streeck & Thelen, 2005, p. 8; Thelen, 1999, pp. 396-399).

Mode C (SCS_K SCS C_R): breakdown and replacement

While the intersections of the British cases transferred to a similar place and gathered in a relatively confined space, the movement during the period of President Roh in Table 5-8 (SCS_K → SCS_R), which crosses the frontiers, is much larger and more dynamic. The illustration of this model can be applied to the reality in Korea. The rapid economic growth was attributable to the career civil service system (SCS_K) on the one hand, but on the other, this closed rank-in-person bureaucracy raised such problems as government failure. The first Democratic government which faced with the financial crisis of 1997, struggled to solve these deep-rooted troubles, but the sporadic and dispersed measures of

President Kim were not enough to resolve them. However, according to Y. Kwon (2008, pp. 37-38), the Kim era might have been the period of foetal movement for the institutional cleavage because his administration not only supported the advent of political power with new ideology like Mr. Roh, but also established friendly troops within government, like the KCSC, in practice. He also argues that the Participatory government, which initiated an entirely distinctive personnel management, the SCS system, was a *critical juncture* in the history of Korean civil service arrangement (Y.-j. Kwon, 2008, pp. 46-57). Thus, the point of SCS_R could be titled as the period of innovation in Krasner's (1984) punctuated equilibrium. Meanwhile, from the perspective of Streeck & Thelen's (2005) model, which provides the equal analysis framework of this case study, it is needed to investigate the process and result of the SCS change. Not only did Kim's political ideology and stance fail to maintain consistency until his political heir, but also were Kim's NPM-type initiatives too deficient and fragile to provide the institutional foundation or legacy for the SCS system. From this aspect, it can be argued that the result of institutional change in 2006 was discontinuous with the previous government. Moreover, considering that the time from selecting the SCS system as a policy agenda to legislating and implementing the scheme took just about three years, during which there was even political turmoil due to the issue of president's impeachment, the introduction process of this personnel reform was an abrupt transformation. Accordingly, it can be claimed that this new managerial reform for enhancing the flexibility and professionalism of high-ranking officials, which was promoted by new political leaders, would be included in the type of 'breakdown and replacement' of institutional change in Table 3-2.

Mode D (SCS_R SCS_{DL}): gradual transformation – drift & conversion

The shift in the Lee government (SCS_R → SCS_L) in Table 5-8 demonstrates a slight change of the SCS system at a glance. With regard to its change process, it is commonly recognised that there were few major changes in the laws, programmes and even operating rules of the civil service, except some adjustment under the presidency of Lee Myung-bak (S.-y. Lee & Lee, 2014, p. 63; C.-o. Park & Joo, 2010, p. 204). From those facts, it can be argued that the process of the SCS change from Roh's administration to Lee's was incremental. Then, whether the result of this institutional change was discontinuous or not,

could be induced by comparing the political ideology and personnel policy before and after the new conservative government of 2008. As already mentioned, whereas President Roh was interested in the personnel issues and systemised HR schemes, which are the foundation for the governance and participation, President Lee pursued structural and de-regulatory reform based on neo-liberalism. Additionally, as for the civil service reform, this new conservative leader seemed to be absorbed in taking control of the bureaucrats, like the ABR policy, rather than in enhancing their capabilities. Despite such minor revisions to the SCS configuration as reducing the portion of JPS and the classes of duty, there would have been an implicitly significant difference in the main focus of the SCS system between Roh and Lee. In fact, it seemed that this new personnel system was just an effective and convenient tool for President Lee to manage the executives. Some of the SCS sub-institutions appeared to be regarded as detached systems from the SCS per se: the implementation of the AC and OPS was extended to the positions of middle managers (grades 3~4) in 2009 and 2011 respectively. Thus, a series of amendments during Lee's administration makes it doubtful that the Korean SCS system exists as one strongly unified institution, as interviewee IK1 stated. As a result, it can be argued that the SCS change in the Lee era was a *gradual transformation*.

“Lee’s government appeared to have not the incentive nor interest to promote the development of the SCS system. Except for some programmes which were deemed useful and available for their control over bureaucracy, they left this system unattended. That would be why only the shell of the SCS system remains.”

Source: Interviewee IK1

Furthermore, this change mode can be classified into sub-categories again, as in the mode A. The legal structure of the Korean SCS is the Continental law which is organised by different hierarchical statutes of the legislative system including acts, orders (presidential decree), and administrative rules. Although the basic qualification and dismissal of the SCS are the matters prescribed by some articles of law, the amendment of which needs the agreement of the Assembly, many other codes and processes for operating this system are reserved for sub-regulations, in which its revision depends on the administration legislation. Thus, the bureaucratic apparatus can exercise great discretion in implementing and interpreting this HR programme. Similarly, it would be reasonable that the veto

possibilities, as the political context, should be also considered by separating the legal basis of this institutional complexity. Under the political gridlock situation in Korea, as exemplified in Table 4-5, the full-scale replacement of the SCS might have provoked serious conflict from opposition parties. However, considering the favourable condition at the beginning of the presidential term, as referred to in the arguments of Y.-d. Jung (2008) and Nam (2016), the new political leader can afford a considerable modification of the process or sub-programmes of the SCS system. As a result, on the one hand, the SCS system managed to survive, yet with left nothing but its skeleton, which means it has been vulnerable to '*erosion and atrophy through drift*' (Streeck & Thelen, 2005, p. 24, emphasis in original) despite its formal remaining. On the other hand, the revision of some SCS components, particularly such as the SCS hierarchy, JPS and OPS, may be included in the '*conversion*' form of the incremental institution change. This is because the new political group, who had not been involved in the SCS design of the Democratic governments, made use of those tools for their own purpose through re-deployment, which corresponds with the explanation of the fourth mode of change by Streeck & Thelen (2005, p. 26) and Mahoney & Thelen (2010, pp. 17-18). Furthermore, the expansion of AC and OPS to the level below senior officials (section chief positions) in 2009 and 2011 respectively would imply the growing independence of those sub-systems, and this might indicate the separation or disassembly of the SCS scheme which had been bounded together as an institutional complexity. Eventually, contrary to the provisional projections as to the continuity of the Korean SCS system (Y.-j. Kwon, 2008, p. 58; Y.-j. Kwon & Kwon, 2010, p. 28), this *conversion* of sub-institutions can aggravate the *drift* of the SCS system change as a whole.

5-5. Conclusion

In this chapter, it could be substantial contribution of the present case study that the analysis on the cases of the SCS change in Britain and Korea demonstrated the different institutional transformation processes respectively, as shown in Table 5-9. This outcome would imply the diversity of the institutional change process, not to mention the variation of the SCS system per se (e.g., Tables 5-4 and 5-8). Furthermore, it also provides the lesson that there could be other routes

in the course of the civil service reform, such as an abrupt shift by critical juncture in the Roh era, besides the gradual transformation of institution. This SCS transition during the period of President Roh illustrated in Chapter 5, can embark on a new debate, in that it is inconsistent with the conclusion of Bezes and Lodge (2015) in which the civil service systems have the nature of institutional stickiness. Then, which factors make these different processes with respect to the change of this new personnel management, will be followed in the next chapter. In other words, when setting the patterns of the SCS change process in this chapter as the output value of interest, the inputs affecting those various SCS changes would be the causes of explanation, which will be investigated in Chapter 6.

< Table 5-9. Type of institutional change in each SCS change mode >

		Result of Change	
		Continuity	Discontinuity
Process of Change	Abrupt	-	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Roh years (<i>Mode C</i>: $SCS_K \rightarrow SCS_R$) : <i>Replacement</i>
	Incremental	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Blair years (<i>Mode B</i>: $SCS_M \rightarrow SCS_B$) : <i>Institutional continuity</i> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Major years (<i>Mode A</i>: $SCS_T \rightarrow SCS_M$) : <i>Layering</i> (Gradual change) • Lee years (<i>Mode D</i>: $SCS_R \rightarrow SCS_L$) : <i>Drift</i> (Gradual change)

Chapter 6 . Analysis of the Causal Factors for Senior Civil Service Change

6-1. Introduction of the causal analysis

Overview of the chapter

In the previous chapter, it was investigated which characteristics are displayed in different aspects of SCS change, by categorising their patterns of institutional transformation. This chapter, answering the second sub-question of the thesis, requires finding out the determinants which affected the SCS change process, as well as analysing the dynamic mechanism of this institutional change, based on the diverse SCS configurations across countries and time, as well as the distinctiveness of their change processes. Since the present study is grounded on the small-N case comparison, the concept of causality in this non-quantitative research is distinguished from that found in probabilistic models like regression analysis (Mahoney & Goertz, 2006, pp. 232-233). Thus, Chapter 6 will pursue a 'Boolean equation'; to analyse 'necessary and/or sufficient' causes in relation to the explanation of outcomes in the four observations of the SCS change process. The present stage attempts to uncover the reasons behind the different change processes of the four observations in Britain and Korea. In practice, for the sake of exploring the cause of different SCS changes, four kinds of processes of the SCS transformation (modes A to D), which are identified in the previous chapter, will be compared to each other through the framework shown in Table 3-7. Then, the commonalities and differences between them will be discovered through Levi-Faur (2006)'s method. It is expected that the analysis on the factors extracted from those comparison procedures, may provide the causal mechanism of the SCS change, and this examination is based on this research's theoretical foundation for the institutional change framework as illustrated in Figure 3-1. Most importantly, it is notable that care should be taken in finding out which factors exerted influence on the SCS change per se or on the patterns of institutional change, not in determining which elements caused specific SCS types.

Setting up the causality of the SCS change: Boolean logic

When it comes to establishing a 'causes-of-effects' approach towards the SCS change, the outcome of the Boolean algebra, which could be juxtaposed with the dependent variables of quantitative research, means whether the SCS type changed before and after the alternation in government would be the pattern of the SCS change process. They could be denoted by the logic values of ' Y_1 ' (a change happened regardless of the degree of transformation)⁵³ or ' Y_0 ' (no change; institutional continuity) in large. For example, while the mode B, in which the British SCS before and after the Blair government had little changed, corresponds with the logic value of Y_0 , the SCS transformation toward enhancing performance during the Lee administration in Korea, the mode D, would be that of Y_1 . Meanwhile, a series of factors for analysing the civil service reform, which are suggested by Bezes and Lodge (2015), will be adopted in this inference model based on the nominal comparison as well. It is supposed that they have the potentiality to be the causally relevant determinants with respect to the evolution of the civil service system, particularly from the viewpoint of historical institutionalism (Bezes & Lodge, 2015, p. 156). That is, these multivariate factors, which might be conceived as independent variables, but have a different implication within a non-quantitative approach, include principal conceptual components discussed in section 2-5-2: PSB elements such as 'reward', 'competency' and 'loyalty'; the variation modes of the civil service system including 'entrenchment' and 'pervasiveness'; and the 'opportunity structures'. The example of the potential causal factors in the U.K. and Korea, which comes from the preceding literature, was presented roughly in Table 3-6, and the values of these prime implicants can be expressed as integer '1' (a change happens) and '0' (no change).

After setting up the input and output values, which is the operationalisation and measurement in this qualitative study, the next journey to make a causation model of the SCS change would be establishing a truth table corresponding to each case by using the above variables/factors. It is expected that the respective

⁵³ For now, Y_1 means any kinds of institutional change regardless of its process, including incremental change. In case of necessity, Y_1^G indicates a *gradual /incremental* institution change while Y_1^A would be an *abrupt* one.

comparisons between the four truth tables of the modes, which result from six SCS cases, can allow one to not only to infer the key determinant(s) but also to assemble a Boolean equation about the SCS change process. The causal mechanism or dynamics of the institutional transformation with respect to the civil service reform could also build on this causes-of-effects equation.

< Figure 6-1. Comparison between MSSD and MDSD in the truth tables >

Mode	Outcome (Y)	Variables Controlled					Potential causal Factors				
		X ₁	X ₂	X _k	O	E	...	C	L
MDSD	A	1	1	0	0	0	...	1	1
	B	1	1	0	1	0	...	0	0
	C	0	0	1	0	0	...	1	1
	D	0	0	1	1	0	...	0	1

To be concrete, the inference procedure comparing the four change modes follows the logical structure of Levi-Faur (2006), that is the synthesis of Mill's method and the design of Przeworski and Teune (1970), as introduced in section 3-3-2. His inferential strategy using a nominal way has the advantage of maximising internal validity as well as of achieving generalisation by means of a stepwise comparative heuristic: the first step rests on the combination of the MSSD comparison with the logic of MMA or MMD; and the second stage for external validity rests is grounded on the comparative analysis of the cases with MDSD characteristics (Levi-Faur, 2006, pp. 61-63). Actually, there could be four Boolean algebra truth tables which are equivalent to the modes from A to D, as shown in Figure 6-1, which is the application of the design of Przeworski and Teune (1970, p. 37). This design for comparison reflects the consideration that the SCS change cases within a single country are increased by a temporal dimension, and that the case selection of the U.K. and Korea is based on their distinctly different or even contrasting aspects. According to this Figure, the values of their outcomes vary depending on type of institutional change (e.g., Tables 3-2 and 5-9), and are marked as '0' (Y₀) or '1' (Y₁). The other variables, except the prime implicant factors, could be controlled as the above exemplified

table. As a result, the arrangement of MSSD, which is the first stage of Levi-Faur's heuristic, consist of the set of modes A and B (MMD) and that of modes C and D (MMA) in this research. Likewise, the set of modes A and C (MMA) as well as that of modes B and D (MMD) are grounded on the MDSD approach.

In conclusion, the following section pursues to clarify in detail what the potential causal factors were in each SCS case in Britain and Korea, on the basis of the empirical evidence of the historical narratives and institutional features of the SCS. Then, the stepwise inferential strategies of Levi-Faur (2006) are followed so as to eliminate irrelevant factors and to identify main determinant(s) in the creation and transformation of the SCS system. Therefore, it will be revealed in this chapter that the analytic components and framework of this study, which are deeply associated with the concepts of the PSB and politicisation, not only constitute the dynamics of the civil service reform, but also contribute to comparative study across countries and time.

6-2. Findings for the institutional changes

6-2-1. Analytic components of the SCS change in the U.K

Opportunities, entrenchment and pervasiveness in Britain

The alternation of government, especially an advent of new leadership equipped with different political philosophy, might be a political opportunity for the change-agents, because the change of the environments surrounding the SCS could influence institutional configurations. This is based on the arguments of Meyer-Sahling (2008) or Meyer-Sahling and Veen (2012), in which large-scale political change can lead to a high turnover of public officials or re-structuring of power. Accordingly, the general election of the new 10 Downing Street with the replacement of the ruling party would be one of the *opportunity structures* in Britain. Thus, the launch of the Blair administration is counted as the only exogenous opportunity for the civil service reform since the Thatcher era in this study, as shown in Table 6-1.

< Table 6-1. Party strength of the Commons and PM in the U.K. >

Year \ Seats	Conservative	Labour	Liberal	Others	Prime Minister
1970	330	287	6	7	E.Heath (1970-74)
1974 (Feb)	296	301	14	24	H.Wilson (1974-76)
1974 (Oct)	276	319	13	27	J.Callaghan (1976-79)
1979	339	268	11	17	M.Thatcher (1979-90)
1983	397	209	23	21	
1987	375	229	22	24	
1992	336	271	20	24	J.Major (1990-97)
1997	165	418	46	30	T.Blair (1997-2007) G.Brown (2007-2010)
2001	166	412	52	29	
2005	198	355	62	31	
2010	306	258	57	29	D.Cameron (2010-2016)

Source: adjusted from Audickas, Loft, and Cracknell (2020, pp. 11, 13) and from Childs (2001, pp. 331-332)

On the other hand, as Mahoney and Thelen (2010, pp. 18-19) pointed out, the *veto possibilities* can involve the political context too. In terms of the SCS establishment, as reviewed in the trajectory of NPM-type reforms in Britain, the Thatcherite civil service reforms, which might have begun with Thatcher's distrust of bureaucrats, extended to the Major administration and even to the Blair's 'joined-up' government. In other words, the new managerial initiatives of Thatcherism, including the Next-Steps programme, brought about a new type of civil service such as a business-like chief executive, and eventually this led to the situation of the nature of other types of civil servants in the core departments breaking down: transformation from advisory mandarins to efficient managers. In this regard, the SCS system is understood as a system that reflected this change structurally and institutionally. British history reveals that the Blair government, though based on different governance theories, did not deviate from this Thatcherite track in the civil service reform either. It seemed that the new Labour government accepted the inevitability of the SCS, and put an emphasis on it for solving the problem of the hollowing-out of the state. As a result, it might be depicted that "Thatcherism with a smiling face" (Reitan, 2003, p. 175) was embedded in the civil service reform of the 'Third Way'. Therefore, it would be

difficult to find effective *veto powers* against the SCS system in Britain during the time range of this study.

When it comes to the *institutional arrangements*, as introduced in section 4-2-1, the parliamentary sovereignty over the bureaucracy seems to have been firmly *entrenched* in the U.K. based on the common law and constitutional convention. The evolutionary development of the Westminster system through historical compromise and adjustment, is generally evaluated to have contributed to ensuring political stability (P.-s. Kim, 2005, pp. 19-20). Despite the hardship of formulating the concept of the civil service system, such characteristics as permanent, neutral and instrumental properties, which were derived from the Northcote-Trevelyan reform, seem to achieve wide recognition. This Westminster model appears to have been reinforced with the prominence of executive apparatus, such as ‘core executive’, especially during the period of two world wars (Richards & Smith, 2002, pp. 55-56; Smith, 1999, p. 10).

However, recently the more flexible, efficient and responsive public service, which resulted in the SCS reform, has been required strongly and continuously in Britain, regardless of the changes of the political leaders of the majority party and Cabinet. Subsequently, wide-spread decentralisation, such as delegation, devolution and Europeanisation, or even privatisation, has challenged the capabilities of traditional Whitehall (Dowding, 1995, p. 71; Massey, 2005, pp. 40-41; Pyper, 1995, p. 181; Rhodes, 1997, pp. 53-54). Although there may be controversy around the “death of the Whitehall paradigm” (C. Campbell & Wilson, 1995) versus the “robustness of the Westminster model” (Richards, 2003, 2008) in the U.K, the civil service system seems to have adjusted and responded incrementally to those demands. The emphasis on ‘joined-up’ government in the Blair era might be thought of as an attempt for another pervasive government against those challenges (Butcher & Massey, 2003, p. 9; Massey, 2005, p. 54). Nevertheless, it is remarkable that the attack of the ‘Iron Lady’ against the inefficient bureaucracy worked so well because of the unique traits of the British government (*pervasiveness*), in which the PM is underpinned by the majority party and the dominant executives have flexibility⁵⁴ under Parliamentary

⁵⁴ The political conflict in Britain is solved in a relatively easy and flexible way by negotiation or re-election because of its longstanding and indeterminate constitutional conventions.

sovereignty (Rhodes, 1997, p. 88). Consequently, this advantage of the Westminster model with a long history seems to have continued until Blair's premiership.

Characteristics of the British SCS system: reward, competency, loyalty

In spite of various analytical concepts for investigating the British SCS (e.g., Dargie & Locke, 1999, pp. 179-181; Richards & Smith, 2002, pp. 221-223), this new managerial system, as already discussed, can be divided into three sub-elements inspired by the PSB concepts (e.g., Bezes & Lodge, 2015, pp. 138-141; Hood & Lodge, 2006a, p. 361). These analytic components are fundamentally under the consideration of the SCS definition of institutional complexity and relationship.

First of all, the British SCS including a *reward system* was created through introducing private-sector management so as to achieve value for money in public service (Massey, 2005, p. 56), and each of the SCS member was supposed to be responsible for the performance under the individually written contracts (Cm 2627, 1994, pp. 3-4, 35; Cm 2748, 1995, p. 15). The performance management system was probably one of the most remarkable and far-reaching landmarks among other managerial skills originated from private sectors. It seems that the SCS reward system has been changed to be a more flexible and performance-based compensation. As listed in Table 6-2, the base salary of the SCS is given between the ranges of the relevant pay-band, which were decided in accordance with three or four types of JESP and recommended by the 'Review Body on Senior Salaries' (SSRB) (JINJI, 2010, pp. 8-9; NamKoong, Ha, Park, & Kim, 2005, pp. 72-73). Moreover, each SCS member is evaluated by the performance agreement (contract), and the rate or amount of one's increase remuneration, including a bonus, is dependent on their evaluation. At present, the results of evaluation are divided into three or four categories: the guided top tranche is 25% of performers, and the lowest cannot get any money (Review Body on Senior Salaries, 2017, p. 57). In addition, as the titles of the training projects suggest, such as the "top management programme" for the current senior staff and the "performance improvement plan" for low performers, the result of a performance

contract affects not only the individual's salary but also the competency development of the SCS members.

< Table 6-2. Example of the SCS salaries according to pay band in 2016 >

Pay band	Pay range (£)	Median salary (£)	Number in band
Permanent Secretaries	142,000 – 200,000	160,000 – 164,999	39
3	106,000 – 208,100	135,900	135
2	87,000 – 162,500	98,800	762
1A	67,600 – 128,900	78,700	97
1	64,000 – 117,800	75,500	2,970
Total		79,400	4,003

Source: Review Body on Senior Salaries (2017, p. 52)

Secondly, the competencies for the SCS are deeply related with the concept of 'agencification', which was the core idea of the Next-Steps reform as well as the background of the British SCS system. It could be thought that this would mean an inclination for separating the functions of senior servants from policy advice in order to improve efficiency and performance. Accordingly, the main focus of the senior staff's task in departments has also changed to taking on the achievement of the given targets (Dargie & Locke, 1999, pp. 179, 181). It is believed that the new mission of officials was focused on the delivery of public service with efficient leadership, namely the responsibility for management, and this was supposed to be related effectively to the government's strategic goals (Parry, 2011, pp. 357-360; Richards, 2003, p. 47). Ironically, as Rhodes (1994, 1997) pointed out, the matter of how to provide a cohesive service became important after this managerial initiative, because hollowing-out of the state, such as delegation, devolution, and separation of the civil service's role, led to institutional fragmentation. Thus, it was needed to re-structure high-ranking officials in departments and agencies and to promote their integration and connection. This would be why another goal of Major's civil service reform was to build a cohesion of government managers with a strategic government-wide system, despite their heterogeneous composition (Cm 2627, 1994, pp. 36-37; Parry, 2011, pp. 348, 357; Richards, 2003, p. 48). Since the mobility among senior civil servants was regarded as an encouragement for them to take a broader perspective, as well

as to increase their sense of community (Cm 2748, 1995, p. 16; Dargie & Locke, 1999, p. 189; James, 2003, p. 140), this issue could be understood as a counterbalancing method against the fragmentation of the British civil service. Consequently, what was required of the SCS in the managerialism age changed from the role of policy advisor to like that of project manager in the private sector. This could be found in the following speech delivered by Sir Richard Wilson.


"We now require people in public service to be good managers and good leaders of their organisations and to know how to achieve results through the people who are working for them and through the application of project management skills. They also need to have good presentational skills: to be prepared to appear in public, on television, before select committees [...] and to be prepared to give interviews to the media and to understand the needs of modern news management."

Source: Richard Wilson in 1999 (Sausman & Locke, 2004, p. 115)

Thirdly, the principle emphasising competition and customer service in the SCS system, could have impacted the *loyalty* of the British senior officials. It is impressive that the open competition in SCS recruitment has been considered as a principle since the employment of the chief executives in agencies publicly, and that the employment through internal competition or even without competition has been exceptional (Dargie & Locke, 1999, pp. 183, 186; J.-m. Jung et al., 2006, pp. 274-279; NamKoong et al., 2005, p. 47). In practice, the senior posts of the U.K. government, for which outside candidates were able to compete with insiders, have been increased when comparing before and after the launch of the SCS system (from one-sixth in 1992 to one-third in 1995), despite its expensiveness and the unwillingness in the field (Dargie & Locke, 1999, p. 187; Hood & James, 1997, p. 195). In addition, in order to attract outstanding external talents for the diverse and special expertise required, departments may be able to offer more money than an ordinary salary under the acceptance of the Office of Prime Minister, and even preferential treatment such as 'Shadow Target Rates' can be provided for open competition positions (Sun-woo Lee et al., 2011, pp. 103-104; NamKoong et al., 2005, p. 74). This attempt to upgrade professionalism intended to make the high-ranking officials of Whitehall more heterogeneous in composition, by infusing the new blood of specialists, and they indeed succeeded in accomplishing this objective, along with the endeavour for strengthening the representativeness of the civil service. Also, the process of '*de-Sir Humphreyfying*' (Dargie & Locke, 1999, p. 194; Hood, 1990), referring to the break from the

demographic and sociological image of 'Sir. Humphrey', could be comprehended as one of the efforts for marketisation. In fact, there was a gradual but significant increase of diverse recruitment, escaping demographically from the monopoly of white Oxbridge men (Bovaird & Russell, 2007, p. 323; Rhodes, 2000, p. 162), as shown in Figure 6-2 and Table 6-3. Therefore, it can be said that the introduction of the marketisation into the government was embodied in the SCS system, which increased the competition of bureaucrats (agents) as well as extended the choice of their political masters (principals).

< Figure 6-2. Trajectory of the diversity in the British civil service since 1996 >



Source: adjusted from Panchamia and Thomas (2014, p. 45)

< Table 6-3. Diversity of staff: senior civil service in UK, 1995 to 2000 >

	All staff	Gender (women)		Ethnic minority		Disability	
		number	%	number	%	number	%
April 1995	4200	480	11.4	60	1.4	40	1.0
April 1999	3600	620	17.2	55	1.7	58	1.6
April 2000	3730	730	19.5	70	2.1	60	1.7

Source: Richards (2003, p. 56)

In summary, the new NPM-type initiatives rewarded senior staff with market-like mechanism, such as performance-based pay and an incentive system. However, considering the meaning of reward is wider reaching, including material salary and career advancement, the conditional payment appeared to have undermined the privileged compensation of traditional mandarins, along with the emphasis on recruitment from outside (Bezes & Lodge, 2007, p. 126). Moreover, the preference for the 'can-doer' in the managerialism years, demanded the SCS to be business-like managers with new skills and leadership, which might result in the shift of the civil service's nature. In terms of loyalty, which normally means political loyalty (Hood & Lodge, 2006b, p. 7), although no one was forced to be sacked with the birth of a new government under the British SCS system, the influx of more politicised or policy-delivery talents could have served as an opportunity to change the culture of the monopolist Whitehall. Subsequently, the atmosphere of the civil service in Britain seemed to be obliged to be loyal to the government of the day by the performance contract and the given goals which were determined by political ministers. As a result, it is argued that the SCS system emphasising contracts and competition has weakened the unified civil service in the U.K, as well as challenged the properties of the traditional British civil service, such as permanence, anonymity and even impartiality (Dargie & Locke, 1999, p. 179; Dowding, 2003, p. 190; Garnett & Lynch, 2009, p. 167; Richards, 2003, p. 49).

6-2-2. Analytic components of the SCS change in Korea

Opportunities, entrenchment and pervasiveness in Korea

Commonly, Korea is introduced as the country which has had the experience of Japanese colonial exploitation and the Korean civil war, or the country with the military dictatorship caused by coups (Cumings, 2005, p. 11). At the same time, this late-industrialising country is also famous for the 'Miracle on the Han River' (Amsden, 1989, pp. 7-14; Woo-Cumings, 2001, pp. 353-358). More recently, Korea was not an exception from the world economic crisis, encountering the IMF bailout of 1997, as well as the convergence of the NPM reform. In brief, Korea has experienced many dramatic upheavals in a relatively short time, which may mean that ample opportunities of the *change* have been afforded.

< Table 6-4. The history of the Korean constitution amendments >

Amendment	Date	Main Contents
First	1952.07.07	A direct popular vote for presidency
Second	1954.11.29	Abolition of the re-election limit of presidency
Third (2 nd Rep.)	1960.06.15	Parliament system, creation of Constitutional court
Fifth (3 rd Rep.)	1962.12.26	Presidential and unicameral system
Sixth	1969.10.21	Extending the number of the president's term
Seventh (4 th Rep.)	1972.12.27	Hyper-presidentialism (indirect election)
Eighth (5 th Rep.)	1980.10.27	Limiting presidency to one, seven-year term
Ninth (6 th Rep.)	1987.10.29	Presidency of one, five-year term by a direct popular vote

Source: extract from <http://www.archives.go.kr> (18/December/2019)

In particular, the trajectory of constitutional amendment implies that one of the momentous *political opportunities* in Korea would be the launch of new president, which is especially after democratisation more significant under the single-term presidency. With regard to this research, Not only Mr. Roh and Mr. Kim were rooted on the same side, the Democracy party, but also, the former was assumed as the political successor of the latter though, Mr. Roh, the new next president politically divorced for a while from his political mentor after the election (S.-j. Choi, 2009; Goh, 2005; I.-s. Moon, 2008). Thus, it is not certain exactly that the advent of the Roh administration would be taken for granted as an alternation of government, on the other hand the election of Mr. Lee would be surely considered a classical transfer of power from left to right.

Meanwhile, the ‘divided government’ situation of a presidential system, which has been often replicated through a modern Korean political history appears to reflect the high *veto possibilities* as well as the characteristics of *entrenchment* in Korea. As narrated in chapter 4, before the democratisation of 1987 the absolute dominant presidents, “elected monarch” (Jeong, 2002, p. 265), were allowed to take control of the political situations with the ‘party-government council’ which was guided by the President’s office. However, the presidents under the era of the sixth Republic had difficulty in promoting the policies, if they faced with the opposition party’s objection, under the ‘gridlock’ situation in which the ruling party for the president fails to have a majority. As exemplified in Table 4-6, both

president of Roh and Lee was under this politically challenging circumstance of divided government at the beginning of their term.

In addition, the story of the Korean civil service development reveals that the Korean bureaucrats have been permitted privileges and strong autonomy through mutual interdependency with president⁵⁵. Additionally, some high-flyers of bureaucracy gained their promotion and influence by leaning on political power parasitically or symbiotically, as well as at the other side the authoritarian government used them for its victory of election (C.-o. Park, 2011b, p. 32). Such environment which had been favourable to the arbitrary use of the state-led power, has been changed since the demand for democracy in the late 1980s and the emergence of NPM reform in the 1990s (H.-y. Cho, 2002, pp. 309-317; J.-j. Choi, 2002, pp. 90-92; J.-j. Yang, 2005, pp. 4-5). However, notwithstanding the frequent use of the bashing on bureaucracy as political rhetoric, the opportunism and politicisation, particularly of the senior bureaucrats, is considered to have increased recently (Im, 2007, pp. 52-54). This would be why J.-j. Choi (2002, p. 129) argues that there is little difference between the bureaucratic discretion of the Korean democratic regime and that of the military authoritarian one. Therefore, the civil service reform against their interests might encounter the backlash from them (*veto players*), and the experience of stiff resistance during the Kim's NPM-type reform would be an instance of this.

In terms of the *pervasiveness* aspect of the reform, it is notable that the elite bureaucrats were prominent in the Korean socio-economic development. The elites who passed the '*go-si*' could be *veto players* as above on the one hand, yet on the other hand, the history of modernisation shows that the Korean executives led by them has faithfully fulfilled the president's purpose, such as nation-building and industrialisation, through dominating the underdeveloped legislative branch. Besides, the President's office (Blue House: BH), which has been the control tower of every state issue, as well as the main character to allocate political

⁵⁵ The reason for this can be analysed in three perspectives: First, the bureaucratic dominance over society attributed to the Confucianism, which accentuate the elitism of and moral obligation in governing; Secondly, the bureaucracy in Korea was intentionally designed to have mighty policy discretion in the nation-building process; Thirdly, there has been a longstanding stereotype about the elite official, like "Sa-dae-boo", who leads a country rightly, which would have been strengthened through the Korean industrialisation (P.-s. Kim, 2017, pp. 227-229).

resources, advocated and still underpins this apparatus of policy enforcement in order to realise the agendas of the government of the day. Furthermore, when comparing the agendas of the three Korean presidents in this research, Table 6-5 shows that the Kim and Lee administrations would have been primarily inspired by the NPM-type prescription, and that the partnership of the governance network was sought in the Roh period. Moreover, according to C.-k. Lee (2010), it is notable that the priority values in the Lee government contrasted with those of President Roh: Mr. Lee emphasised the pragmatism, performance, economy and business; whereas the frequent statement made by Roh were participation, politics and public administration.

< Table 6-5. Comparison of the government reform agendas in the 2000s >

Kim Dae-jung (1998-2003)	Roh Moo-hyun (2003-2008)	Lee Myung-bak (2008-2013)
1. Privatization of public bodies	1. Reforming the software of government	1. Reorganisation of the government departments
2. Regulatory reform	2. Delegation and Decentralization	2. Regulatory reform
3. Reforming governmental agencies and funds	3. Reforming governmental agencies and funds	3. Privatization of public enterprise and agency


Source: summarised from Shin (2009, pp. 207-216)

Characteristics of the Korean SCS system: reward, competency, loyalty

The Korean SCS system can be also analysed according to the components of PSB, likewise the British one. When it comes to the *reward* issue, the Korean SCS officially attempted to manage its members in accordance with their ability and performance (BPP, 2008; CSC, 2006 and Table 5-5). Above all, the primary step of appointment not by seniority but by expertise and competency, was to abolish the ranking system in senior levels and to transform the structure into the job classification system through job analysis. The progress of this structural shift is shown in detail in Figure 6-3. Originally, the earlier structure of the grade 3 and above of general service and the class 9 and above of foreign service, had been merged into one SCS group with 5 pay-bands. Then, this reward scheme was integrated again into just two levels (the bands of *Ga* and *Na* → a new band of *Ga*, and those from *Da* to *Ma* → a new band of *Na*) in the Lee government of 2009. This was because the previous 9-level-ranking system before 2006 had

been criticised for its difficulty to reflect “the equal pay for equal work”, as well as because the excessively fragmented wage-band of the initial SCS design was suffered from the drawback of the aggravated rigidity of personnel management (Sun-woo Lee et al., 2011, p. 49; C.-o. Park & Cho, 2013, p. 159). The structural simplification of Lee's SCS system, which sought for the HR flexibility, have the advantage of matching the hierarchy of senior groups (Deputy Minister and Director General) in government organisation.

< Figure 6-3. The relation among the president, executives and party in Korea >




In addition, based on the job analysis, SCS member should make an individual performance agreement with his/her direct supervisor about the performance objects and measures (CSC, 2006; P.-s. Kim, 2007, p. 136), and then they are paid differentiated remuneration by means of their job difficulty and performance. The performance-based system became stronger over time: the performance awards ratio to the total salary has gradually grown particularly in the SCS, as shown in Figure 6-4. Later, the SCS appraisal system has become stricter since the Lee administration in which the relative evaluation compelling a fixed ratio of the total appraisees into being rated in a certain grade⁵⁶, as well as the index (\mathcal{L})

⁵⁶ Within one department, the ratio of highest rating should be limited under 20%, and more than 10% of senior members had to be given the “Insufficient” or “Poor” (the lowest) rating.

measuring the degree of the leniency tendency⁵⁷, was introduced (S.-y. Lee & Lee, 2014, p. 63; C.-o. Park & Cho, 2013, pp. 161-162).

< Figure 6-4. Proportion of performance-related pay to total salary >



Source: adjusted from J. Kim (2013, p. 63) and H.-r. Koo (2008, p. 15)

Secondly, the Korean government adopted a series of *competency* models for SCS candidates, such as the competency assessment and training programmes for screening the qualified applicants and developing their potential capabilities. In terms of the AC, which is considered as one of the most successful institutions among various SCS sub-systems (Sun-woo Lee et al., 2011, p. 46), every candidate is required to pass this mandatory examination. Considering that the appropriate and stable drop-out rate of this test, as shown in Figure 6-5, means that the evaluation works well not only as a tool of verifying qualities but also as a motivation for self-development, the Korean AC deserves a credit (J.-g. Kim, 2013, pp. 66-67). At the beginning, the methods for measuring behavioural simulation, including group discussion, role-playing and presentation (in-basket), were used to assess their competencies consisted initially of nine competency qualities⁵⁸, which are associated with the strategic thinking, effective performing

⁵⁷ The index $\mathcal{L} = (\text{average of total SCS scores})^2 - (\text{variance of those scores})$

$$= \left(\frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n X_i \right)^2 - \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n \left(X_i - \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n X_i \right)^2$$


X_i = the score of performance evaluation ('Excellent': 5, 'Good': 4, 'Fair': 3, 'Insufficient': 2, 'Poor': 1)
if the index $\mathcal{L} \geq 16$, then there is a tendency of generosity.

Source: MOPAS (2012, p. 95)

⁵⁸ (1) communication ability (2) customer-oriented service (3) presentation of vision (4) coordination and integration (5) goal and result orientation (6) innovative leadership (7)

and coordination skills (MOPAS, 2009a). Later during the Lee administration, the competency framework and assessment methods for the SCS candidates were simplified: the number of assessment items decreased (from 9 to 6 qualities), and the testing methods were also consolidated (from 6 to 4 methods) for greater efficiency.

< Figure 6-5. Drop-out number and rate of the SCS Assessment Centre >




Source: Park & Cho (2013, p. 162)

Thirdly, with respect to the *loyalty*, the Korean SCS system set its sights on enhancing the influx of talents from outside through the quota stressing openness and competition in the staffing procedure. On the basis of the OPS (20% of the entire SCS positions), Roh's administration added the Job Posting System (JPS), which forced ministries to open up to 30 percentage of the whole senior posts, to which candidates from other departments could apply (BPP, 2008, p. 18; MOPAS, 2010, p. 84). The proportion of the JPS was reduced to 15% of the total SCS positions in 2008 under the presidency of Mr. Lee, as illustrated in Figure 6-6, and the unified operation of JPS and OPS was allowed within the purview of 30% of the total from 2010. The purposes of those two schemes were to appoint the qualified candidate by an expanded competition, as well as to promote to organise a cohesive group in the executive through a government-wide talents pool (BPP, 2008, pp. 12, 27). However, these newly introduced projects confronted challenges not only because the external appointment rate of them

remained low⁵⁹, but also because even the political minister who was reluctant to lose the discretionary appointment power, opposed them (P.-s. Kim, 2007, p. 134), particularly after the lame-duck of presidency.

< Figure 6-6. Positions of external appointment and their ratio in Korea >



Source: S.-h. Cho, Lee, and Jun (2009, p. 18) and Park & Cho (2013, p. 160)

Furthermore, the SPOA stipulates ‘re-certification process’ of the Korean SCS, in which all members should be under the review by the special committee examining their performance and competency every five years. If he/she were to fail to pass this procedure, even top-level official can be dismissed. Since this measure for strengthening the accountability of senior official was considered as a kind of expulsion system, it was controversial (BPP, 2008, pp. 24-25). Nonetheless, some commentators throw doubt on the effectiveness of this performance system because most of members received better than a “good” rating even after the implementation of relative evaluation (Nam, 2016, p. 181; C.-o. Park & Joo, 2010, pp. 200-201).

In conclusion, the performance-based initiatives on the SCS system had an impact on the reward system of high-ranking officials. Also, the abolition of rank

⁵⁹ There are three reasons for the poor external appointments: (1) the qualified candidates from outside are insufficient due to the inflexible labour market in Korea; (2) the contract terms is relatively short and the payment is not enough to attract talent; (3) the exclusive and elitism culture of the Korean bureaucracy hinders the outsiders’ adaptation to the workplace (J.-g. Kim, 2013, p. 54; NamKoong, 2000, p. 269; C.-o. Park & Joo, 2010, p. 195).

as well as the introduction of OPS and JPS, might have made the elite officials depressed due to their dim future career path. Additionally, considering the reinforcement of the performance-related elements like the PRP was prioritised in the Lee administration, this changed reward would have been solidified. Meanwhile, the new personnel policies, such as the AC and the OPS, appeared to emphasise overall the improvement of the professional capability of high-ranking civil servants than other qualities. Although whether the SCS competency framework influenced the behaviours of those officials is uncertain, the newly launched procedures of the AC and 'Re-certification' placed extra burdens on them. Accordingly, on the basis of the increased criticism and burden on the Korean bureaucrats, it might be hard for them to depend solely on the president because the political head in Korea has no more a long-term seizure of power but to adopt the rhetoric of bashing them. Eventually, it is argued that this coalition between the president and bureaucracy might have been confronted with a crack in government, occurring in the democratic era, because of the diminished rewards which headquarters offer for civil servants, such as promotion, bureaucratic power and high reputation, and thus the weakening officials' loyalty (Nam, 2016, p. 49).

6-3. Comparative Analysis for Causal Factors of the change

Analysis through the Most Similar System Design

Based on the above-identified components suggested for analysing the civil service reform by Bezes and Lodge (2015), this stage attempts to extract the determinants affecting the SCS change through sorting out the commonalities and eliminating dissimilarities from the observations of the U.K. and Korea. There can be two pairs of the SCS change modes which are selected on the basis of the MSSD in this research: the set of modes A and B in Britain; that of modes C and D in Korea. When it comes to the cases of the U.K., there was a clear change in the mode A because the gradual transformation from SCS_T to SCS_M was a discontinuous result of institutional change (Y_1). Meanwhile, it may not be appropriate to claim that there has been a distinct transformation in the process from SCS_M to SCS_B , which means the *reproduction by adaptation* or the *reactive*

sequence (Y_0). Therefore, it is appropriate that the logic of MMD is supposed to be used as a logic of comparison between these British cases which are contrasting in their outcomes.

< Table 6-6. Comparing the outcome and factors in the British SCS change >

Outcome (SCS change) Inputs (potential variables)			The U.K.			
			Mode A	value	Mode B	value
			$SCS_T \rightarrow SCS_M$	1 (Y_1)	$SCS_M \rightarrow SCS_B$	0 (Y_0)
Political opportunity	Alternation in government		Tory (Thatcher) → Tory (Major)	0	Tory (Thatcher) → Labour (Blair)	1
	Veto players		Low (Continuity of Thatcherism)	0	Low ("Thatcherism with a smiling face")	0
Institutional Arrangements	Entrenchment	Law	Common Law	0	Common Law	0
		System	Parliamentary Sovereignty	0	Parliamentary Sovereignty	0
	Pervasive-ness	Reform power	Decentralisation (e.g., delegation & agencification)	0	Decentralisation, yet 'Joined-Up' gov't under the 'Third Way'	-
		Executive discretion	Westminster model	0	Westminster model	0
Components of PSB (Public Service Bargains)	Reward		Privilege → Performance-based Pay	1	Performance-based pay	0
	Competency		Policy advisor → implementation (can-doer)	1	Delivery (can-doer)	0
	Loyalty		Monopoly of Whitehall → "De-Humphreyfying", open recruitment	1	Open recruitment (with strengthen 'Special Advisor'	0

* **Output / outcome** : If a change to the SCS happen, then Y_1 is marked (value '1'), meanwhile in case of no change, it is expressed as Y_0 (value '0').

Input / (potential) causal factor: If a factor changes during the period of each mode, the displayed value is '1', whereas the value of '0' means no change in that variable.

* SCS_T : traditional mandarin in Britain, SCS_M : SCS in the Major era, SCS_B : SCS in the Blair era

Table 6-6, which is based on the section 6-2-1, would be the comparison truth table summarising the commonalities and differences between Major's government and Blair's. By means of this table, the causal factors in the SCS change can be induced. According to the combinational strategy of MSSD+MMD, if the prime implicant(s) on which the cases of similar backdrops differ, can be identified, that (those) factor(s) would be the explanatory variable(s) which accounts for the difference in the SCS change result (Levi-Faur, 2006, p. 59;

Skocpol & Somers, 1980, p. 184). The elements in this table, which are marked by green-coloured cell because of having different values each other ('0' versus '1'), would be potentially the determinants for explaining their disparate outcomes (Y_1 and Y_0) between the two administrations. Thus, this table shows that the different outcomes of the institutional change may have been caused by the following factor(s) or some combination of them: *the alternation of government* (an advent of new government); the change of PSB components such as *reward*, *competency* and *loyalty*; and maybe the different *pervasiveness* of central government.

< Table 6-7. Comparing the outcome and factors in the Korean SCS change >

Outcome (SCS change) Inputs (potential variables)			Korea			
			Mode C	value	Mode D	value
			$SCS_K \rightarrow SCS_R$	1 (Y_1^A)	$SCS_R \rightarrow SCS_L$	1 (Y_1^G)
Political opportunity	Alternation in government		Left wing (Kim) → Left wing (Roh)	0	Left wing (Roh) → Right wing (Lee)	1
	Veto players		High (Divided gov't & elite bureaucrats)	0	High (Divided gov't & elite bureaucrats)	0
Institutional Arrangements	Entrenchment	Law	Statute (SPOA)	0	Statute (SPOA)	0
		System	Presidentialism	0	Presidentialism	0
	Pervasiveness	Reform power	Managerialism → New Governance based on NPM	-	Governance → Managerialism and ABR policies	1
		Executive discretion	Strong 'Blue House'	0	Strong 'Blue House'	0
Components of PSB (Public Service Bargains)	Reward		Privilege → Performance-related Pay	1	5 pay-bands → 2 pay-bands & Relative appraisal	1
	Competency		Seniority → Competency assessment (AC)	1	Simplification of AC method	0 (-)
	Loyalty		Closed system → OPS, JPS and Re-certification	1	JPS → Merger of OPS & JPS, revived Article 68	1

* **Output:** Y_1 (value '1') means a change happens; Y_0 (value '0') is no SCS change.

Input: If a factor changes, its value is expressed as '1'; whereas the value of no change is '0'.

* **SCS_K :** traditional Korean official, **SCS_R :** SCS in the Roh era, **SCS_L :** SCS in the Lee era

In addition to the above MMD method, it can also be possible to eliminate the variables which may not have influenced the SCS transformation by applying the approach of MMA. Table 6-7 shows the comparison between Korean

observations, in which the set of modes C and D is involved in the MSSD. The former (mode C) was categorised as the type of abrupt change (*'breakdown and replacement'*) in section 5-4, and the process of the latter was incremental but surely its outcome was not persistent, which indicates the *'gradual transformation'*. Nevertheless, considering the patterns of SCS change in both modes (Y_1^A and Y_1^G) share a common result of discontinuity, it could be claimed that the outcomes of the institutional change were the same in substance despite their minute difference. Accordingly, when the outputs in Korea during two alternations in government would be similar, which means minimizing variance of the control variables as well as of the dependent ones, the comparison in Table 6-7 can be regarded as the inferential strategy of MSSD+MMA (Levi-Faur, 2006, p. 60).

In terms of identifying the causal factor(s), it might be thought that most of the PBS components and the way of public service deliver had been replaced with new elements of the managerial paradigm (value '1'). However, it would be difficult to associate the advent of the Roh administration with a kind of regime change or the power shift from previous Kim's government, as discussed in section 4-3-3 (value '0'). Additionally, it is ambiguous to conclude that inputs such as the type of public reform and the competency of the PSB, were switched in both SCS change processes, not only because Roh's administration added the philosophy of 'partnership (governance)' to existing managerial reform, but also because the revision of AC in the Lee era was too minor to regard it as a change⁶⁰. Under the comparative analysis grounded on the MSSD+MMA, the factor(s) which appear(s) in one case but not in the other would be eliminated from the cause(s) accounting for this institutional change (Levi-Faur, 2006, pp. 60, 62). Thus, those three variables marked by blue cell, which are dissimilar from each other, may not be the determinants of the SCS change.

Putting those two MSSD comparisons together, the probable impetuses bringing about the SCS change could be identified. Though five potential determinants including *alternation of government*, *reform power* and the *three PSB components*, were induced by analysing Table 6-6 (MSSD+MMD), those factors which are revealed to be dissimilar in the similar cases with similar results, as

⁶⁰ Because of this reason, the cell of reform power in the mode C and that of competency in the mode D were marked '-', which means judgement reservation, and '0 (-)' respectively.

Levi-Faur (2006, pp. 59-60) demonstrated, should be eliminated from the list of causes. Hence, since the value of mode C ('0': no change) is not equivalent to that of mode D ('1': change happen), it would be irrational to decide that *the alternation of government*, which is the dissimilar factor in the MSSD+MMA inference, is one of the key factors affecting the SCS change. Meanwhile, it is admitted that the factor of *reform power* (or pervasiveness) and the *competency* element of the PSB may require further examination. As a result, considering that the arguments of Meyer-Sahling (2008) and Meyer-Sahling and Veen (2012), which revealed the political influence of government alternation, were founded on post-communist states, it can be argued that at least just a launch of the new administration in a democratic state might not be the critical juncture of path-dependency. To sum up, this analysis based on Levi-Faur's first step implies that the components of PSB concept, especially the *reward* and *loyalty* can be substantial and direct inputs in explaining the causation of the SCS change.

Analysis through the Most Different System Design

The second step of Levi-Faur's heuristic is to carry out the comparative analysis across a diverse set of cases, the MDSD of Przeworski and Teune (1970), for achieving external validity, namely generalisation (Levi-Faur, 2006, p. 63). As Levi-Faur (2006) claims, the logic of comparing "cases as different as possible" allows to establish the rigorous causal association (2006, p. 57). In particular, under the strategy which reveals a maximised variance or striking difference of the control variables, as well as that of the dependent ones vis-à-vis the targets of analysis, this MDSD+MMD seeks to distil the factors in common from the cases, because they are not the critical similarities (Skocpol & Somers, 1980, p. 184), nor the key explanatory factors (Landman, 2008, pp. 70-71). In this regard, as shown in Table 6-8, it is available to compare the pair of modes B and C, in which the values of their outputs (Y_0 and Y_1) contrast sharply each other in those distinctly dissimilar nations: the U.K. and Korea. From this table, there can be found several factors/inputs which have the equal value each other in terms of the SCS change process. It may be inferred that these prime implicants (or potential variables) which have in common in this MDSD+MMD condition, would not have exerted a causal effect on the institutional changes fundamentally. Consequently, not only *veto players* but also institutional arrangements such as

legal entrenchments (law and system) and *executive pervasiveness* (reform power and executive discretion), would not be able to be included in the main causal determinants of the SCS change.

< Table 6-8. MDSD+MMD analysis on the British and Korean SCS change >

Outcome (SCS change) Inputs (potential variables)			The U.K.		Korea	
			Mode B	value	Mode C	value
			$SCS_M \rightarrow SCS_B$	0 (Y_0)	$SCS_K \rightarrow SCS_R$	1 (Y_1)
Political opportunity	Alternation in government		Tory (Thatcher) → Labour (Blair)	1	Left wing (Kim) → Left wing (Roh)	0
	Veto players		Low ("Thatcherism with a smiling face")	0	High (Divided gov't & elite bureaucrats)	0
Institutional Arrangements	Entrenchment	Law	Common Law	0	Statute (SPOA)	0
		System	Parliamentary Sovereignty	0	Presidentialism	0
	Pervasive-ness	Reform power	Decentralisation, yet 'Joined-Up' gov't under the 'Third Way'	-	Managerialism → New Governance based on NPM	-
		Executive discretion	Westminster model	0	Strong 'Blue House'	0
Components of PSB (Public Service Bargains)	Reward		Performance-based pay	0	Privilege → Performance-related Pay	1
	Competency		Delivery (can-doer)	0	Seniority → Competency assessment (AC)	1
	Loyalty		Open recruitment (with strengthen 'Special Advisor')	0	Closed system → OPS, JPS and Re-certification	1

* **Output:** Y_1 (value '1') means a change happens; Y_0 (value '0') is no SCS change.

Input: If a factor changes, its value is expressed as '1'; whereas the value of no change is '0'.

* SCS_M : Major's SCS, SCS_B : Blair's SCS, SCS_K : traditional Korean official, SCS_R : Roh's SCS

Meanwhile, the last inferential strategy of comparison, the MDSD+MMA of Levi-Faur, could be applied to the set of modes A and D with regard to establishing the Boolean equation about the SCS change. As outlined in Chapter 4, the U.K. stands in sharp contrast to Korea in terms of the historical narratives of the SCS development, including its political environments and institutional contexts. Nonetheless, both modes are quite analogous, in that the re-configuration of the SCS system progressed through an identical pattern of institutional change, gradual transformation (Y_1^G), despite their different sub-types of incremental

change of Mahoney and Thelen (2010), as discussed in section 5-4⁶¹. According to Levi-Faur (2006, pp. 60, 63), the aspects regarded to be valid internally through the MSSD can be re-examined and corroborated clearly by eliminating the mutually dissimilar factors in the different cases which brought about the same outcome (MDSD+MMA). It may be reasonable to rule out the inputs which are located at the blue-coloured cells in Table 6-9, such as *alternation in government* and *competency of the PSB*, from the potential causal determinants of the SCS change. Therefore, it can be argued again that among the provisional causes derived from the first step, a horizontal shift of political power, which occurs periodically in democracy, does not always elicit an institutional change.

< Table 6-9. MDSD+MMA analysis on the British and Korean SCS change >

Outcome (SCS change) Inputs (potential variables)			The U.K.		Korea	
			Mode A	value	Mode D	value
			$SCS_T \rightarrow SCS_M$	$1 (Y_1^G)$	$SCS_R \rightarrow SCS_L$	$1 (Y_1^G)$
Political opportunity	Alternation in government		Tory (Thatcher) → Tory (Major)	0	Left wing (Roh) → Right wing (Lee)	1
	Veto players		Low (Continuity of Thatcherism)	0	High (Divided gov't & elite bureaucrats)	0
Institutional Arrangements	Entrenchment	Law	Common Law	0	Statute (SPOA)	0
		System	Parliamentary Sovereignty	0	Presidentialism	0
	Pervasive-ness	Reform power	Decentralisation (e.g., delegation & agencification)	0	Governance → Managerialism and ABR policies	1
		Executive discretion	Westminster model	0	Strong 'Blue House'	0
Components of PSB (Public Service Bargains)	Reward		Privilege → Performance-based Pay	1	5 pay-bands → 2 pay-bands & Relative appraisal	1
	Competency		Policy advisor → implementation (can-doer)	1	Simplification of AC method	0 (-)
	Loyalty		Monopoly of Whitehall → "De-Humphreyfying", open recruitment	1	JPS → Merger of OPS & JPS, revived Article 68	1

* **Output:** Y_1 (value '1') means a change happens; Y_0 (value '0') is no SCS change.

Input: If a factor changes, its value is expressed as '1'; whereas the value of no change is '0'.

* **SCS_T:** traditional British mandarin, **SCS_M:** Major's SCS, **SCS_R:** Roh's SCS, **SCS_L:** Lee's SCS

⁶¹ The mode A and D correspond to the type of 'layering' and 'drift' respectively.

In consequence, the result analysed by using those four inferential strategies of Levi-Faur (2006) can be shown as Table 6-10 (the application of Table 3-7). The factors derived from the MDSD+MMD stage (Table 6-6), which could be put on the list of potential inputs having affected the transformation of the SCS system, are written in bold type. On the other hand, not only the elements from the MDSD+MMD stage (Table 6-8) checked with deleted mark, but also the those through the logic of MMA in the red-coloured cell, as illustrated in Tables 6-7 and 6-9, are irrelevant variables for explaining this institutional change. Then, in common, only two factors, the aspects of *reward* and *loyalty*, remain in accordance with this matrix of the comparative analysis. Therefore, this stepwise heuristic may allow to put forward the claim that the two PSB components or their combinational operation, would be prime causal determinants bringing about the changes of the SCS systems in the U.K. and Korea. In other words, the research findings about the SCS dynamics mechanism, which is based on a qualitative approach, can be expressed through Boolean equations such as '*Outcome Y = Factor R AND/OR Factor L*'⁶².

< Table 6-10. Results of the analysis on causal factors of the SCS change >

	Mill's Method of Difference		Mill's Method of Agreement
Most Similar System Design	<i>Alternation in government</i>	<i>Veto players</i>	<i>Reform power</i>
	<i>Law</i>	<i>System</i>	<i>Executive discretion</i>
	Reward	Competency	Loyalty
Most Different System Design	<i>Alternation in government</i>	<i>Veto players</i>	<i>Reform power</i>
	<i>Law</i>	<i>System</i>	<i>Executive discretion</i>
	<i>Reward</i>	<i>Competency</i>	<i>Loyalty</i>

Interpretation of the mechanism of the SCS change

This paragraph analyses the causal determinants derived as above based on the theoretical perspective of historical institutionalism. The two prime implicants of *reward* and *loyalty*, or their combination exercised influence directly on the SCS

⁶² This equation is a possible example of the relation between 'Y' representing the output of SCS change and the causal factor 'R' and 'L' which represent the reward and loyalty respectively.

change process in the U.K. and Korea, and coincidentally, both components are, as Hood and Lodge (2006b, pp. 7, 64) pointed out, the most critical factors in the PSB as well, especially in respect of the civil service reform. They argue that those who aim to reform bureaucracy pursue to control the reward system, and that the political loyalty is usually the main exchange for that benefit. For example, Bezes and Lodge (2015, p. 137) claims that the Next-Steps initiatives was the reform having intended to change these two dimensions of reward and loyalty of the executive agencies, for the introduction of managerialism. As analysed earlier, like the SCS types and of its change patterns are diverse across space and time, the PSB components of reward and loyalty may also have a variety of forms under the different cultures (Hood & Lodge, 2006b, pp. 69, 111). As a result, the shift of the bargaining between public officials and their political principals over resources, which can be represented as the change of the PSB, seems to have been also reflected in this new civil service system, the SCS.

Furthermore, this transition of reward and loyalty in the politico-administrative relationship would imply that the intention and ideas of conscious actors would have been echoed in the institutional change. According to Streeck and Thelen (2005, pp. 13-14), an institution can be conceived as continuous interaction between 'rule makers' designing an institution and 'rule takers' feedbacking to them. After all, it can be claimed that the SCS (trans)formation, which can be depicted as the reconfiguration of various personnel sub-systems, is led to by the interaction between political actors, or that this re-arrangement is driven by or dependent on the type of 'change-agents' (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010, pp. 22-23; Streeck & Thelen, 2005, p. 16). As reviewed earlier, President Roh appeared to attempt to control over the bureaucracy not under the old-fashioned symbiotic relationship, but through a performance-based partnership by changing the existing civil service system (K.-h. Jung, 2005, pp. 320-321, 328). This would be one of the reasons that he was enthusiastic about the personnel reforms in comparison with his predecessor, and actually it was the field with distinctively successful results like the implementation of SCS (K.-h. Jung, 2005, p. 307; S.-k. Park, 2005, p. 426). Meanwhile, considering that the civil service reform in the period of Major would be an expansion of the changed politico-administrative relationship sparked by Thatcherism (layering of incremental change), the SCS establishment in Britain would be attributable to the replacement of 'Schafferian-

type' bargain with the NPM-type one during the 'Iron Lady' era. Thus, it could be argued that the enlarged measures founded on the managerialism for controlling the British officials by Westminster politicians, influenced the revision of institutional change in the Downing Street.

However, not all attempts to change a system by those actors with power may cause the institutional (trans)formation successfully. For instance, unless the impact upon an institution is a critical juncture, the path-dependency makes it tough for their transition to another (R. B. Collier & Collier, 1991, p. 30; Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 942). Also, even the incremental change by internal dynamics can be stimulated only if there is a collision, conflict and contradiction within the institutional elements (Orren & Skowronek, 1994, p. 321; Thelen, 1999, p. 396). That is, the political actors, including institutional designers and rule-takers, do not exist independently. Their behaviour is not only expected within the institutional legitimacy or context, which might be embedded in the societal, historical and cultural backgrounds, but also shaped in the interactive relation with other actors vis-à-vis 'the rules and their implementation' (M. C. Mills, 2008, p. 101; Peters, 2005, p. 10; Streeck & Thelen, 2005, pp. 12-13). In this regard, as Mahoney and Snyder (1999, p. 25) argued, the 'structure' is a resource environment which delimits available tools for action rather than limits or determines the action, while the 'agency' is a self-conscious actor who can arrange their resources and adapt their strategies.

Accordingly, each SCS change in this case study, would be the outcome for which change-agents have maximised strategically the chance of institutional change under the given conditions and resources. In fact, although the accelerated decentralisation drove to the corner of 'the end of Whitehall', there may not have been many opportunities for the Major governments as well as the Blair's to shift the relationship with the civil service thoroughly under the evolutionarily accumulated Westminster system. Also, the reason why Blair's SCS progressed in an adaptive way would be that the reproduction strategy was the best option among other finite alternatives for providing the cohesive service in the hollowing-out situation. On the other hand, the drastic movements, such as the beginning of the Korean SCS system in a short time, seemed to be able to be taken by the emergence of the new left equipped with fresh ideas (Y.-j. Kwon,

2008, p. 46), as well as by the upheaval condition of the Korean politics. This trendy reform was also underpinned by the forceful apparatus, like the 'party-government council' and the strong but single-term presidency, which had been developed from the state-led industrialisation legacies. Later, after the inauguration of Lee's government, not only since there seemed to be a political burden to the restoration of the old ranking-system, but also since this brand-new management scheme was compatible with the goals of the Lee government, the full-scale abolition of the SCS appeared to have been excluded from the action list of the new administration. Consequently, the institutional transformation seems to rely on the capacity of actors or their behavioural type under the given structures, not just a substitution of actors (e.g., advent of a new government).

6-4. Conclusion

In this chapter, the causality of the SCS change in this study on the British and Korean cases was examined by setting up a Boolean equation. The values of the input and output in that algebra can be expressed as '1' signifying there happens a change and '0' meaning no change, and a total of four truth-tables were made as for the mode from A to D. The potential inputs which might have affected the institutional change in the civil service reform, the analytic components of the SCS, were found and specified based on the PSB from each case in the U.K. and Korea, as described in section 6-2. Then, according to Levi-Faur's (2006) stepwise inferential strategies, the analysis on the causation of the SCS change was carried out by comparing those four true tables each other, which pair up into four groups, through extracting the explanatory factors and eliminating irrelevant ones in these pairs. As a result, it is learned that the institutional re-configuration of the key PSB elements, such as the change of reward and loyalty, are found to be valid as the direct determinants of the SCS transformation. This finding would form the foundation of establishing the causal mechanism for explaining an institutional change along with the model of historical institutionalists, as described in Figure 3-1. The further interpretation on this mechanism is scheduled to be discussed in Chapter 8.

Chapter 7 . Assessment of the result of Senior Civil Service Change

7-1. Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to find the answer to the third sub-question of the research following the journey to comprehend the characteristics and causal factors of the SCS transformation. When admitting there was a certain change to the SCS in the U.K and Korea, the subsequent matter would be to discuss how to assess the results of this change in order to judge the success or aftermath of this new personnel system. As introduced in Chapter 1, the inquiry of how to evaluate the changed SCS, especially in Korea, was one of the motivations for this study. Some jumped to a conclusion that the Korean SCS system overall had regressed to the old one or deteriorated from its original design since the Lee government, and others anticipated that this managerial system would maintain its institutional continuity notwithstanding its revision (Y.-I. Kim, 2014; Y.-j. Kwon & Kwon, 2010, pp. 27-28; J.-h. Lee et al., 2008, p. 227; C.-o. Park & Cho, 2013, pp. 165-167). Moreover, there has been the debate on the impact of the Thatcherite civil service reform in Britain, such as the evolution or collapse of the traditional Westminster model (e.g., Richards, 2003, 2008), and the politicisation (e.g., Sausman & Locke, 2004; Sausman & Locke, 2007). With respect to these discussions, the investigation conducted in previous chapters uncovered that not only the SCS in the Roh era but also that in the presidency of Mr. Lee has obviously changed on account of political interaction, even if the transformation of the latter was relatively slight and incremental. It was also confirmed that the launch of the British SCS can be understood as a form of gradual institutional change. Subsequently, it requires how to assess these changed results. This assessment would be important because even a contingent occurrence may influence the process of follow-up events through reactive sequence (Mahoney, 2000a, p. 529) or feedback effects (Thelen, 1999, pp. 392-395). In addition, pragmatically the post management or evaluation of a policy, which could trigger another genesis or conjuncture of an institution, would be as valuable as the design and launch of the initiatives.

7-2. Framework for assessing the changed SCS

Needs for the multi-dimensional assessment tool

Based on the importance of this assessment, it would be needed to be made clear which viewpoint the institutional transformation of the SCS is supposed to be judged from. As analysed in the beginning of this thesis, because of the multi-faceted nature of the terminology and typology of SCS, the evaluation of its change may be different depending on how its success can be defined as well as from which perspective. It can even vary depending on when it is assessed. In other words, the SCS is composed of various personnel sub-systems under the politico-administrative relationship, and its types vary across time and countries. However, it seems that the SCS change has been evaluated only from the perspective of how successfully it had operated and been implemented as the NPM-type management so far. For instance, Hood (1998) compared one of the SCS key elements, including performance-contracting, across countries. J.-h. Lee et al. (2008) used the Balanced Score Card (BSC) model for the assessment framework of it. In fact, interviewee IK1 thought some of its original goals, including competency management, had failed to be met, while interviewee IK4 evaluated its transformation during the Lee era as a successful adaptation.

“BH wanted to abolish the system, but the new government was obliged to keep this alive because it was already implemented. Thus, such amendment as reducing classes was made rather than a full-scale change or revocation. Nevertheless, I think the revision has helped the adjustment of the system for better operation ultimately.”

Source: Interviewee IK4

Nonetheless, considering that the SCS concept has the institutional properties of political relationship, evaluating the transformation of this managerial system in the aspect of politico-administrative relation would be required thereafter. Although there may be literatures which are about the politicisation issue of the civil service in both Britain and Korea, those studies usually focus on a group of people, not on an institution or a reform policy. Additionally, little research appears to have assessed the change results of the SCS reform according to the time flow or historical sequence. In this regard, the conceptual tools of historical institutionalism, such as path-dependency, power relations and even unintended

consequence, may be required in consideration of the political characteristics of the SCS. Considering not only that historical institutionalists emphasise the asymmetries of power or political relationship (e.g., Hall & Taylor, 1996; Pierson, 2000), but also that they concede the artificial intervention to the path dependence as indicated in the reactive sequences (e.g., R. B. Collier & Collier, 1991; Mahoney, 2000a), application of the historical approach to assessing the SCS policies, inevitable reflecting the intentions of institutional designers or rule-makers, would be plausible. Also, the prism of the historical approach allows you to explore the historical contingency and inefficiency, which could occur in the institutional change.

As a result, the fundamental criteria of evaluating the changed SCS are supposed to involve both the (managerial) efficiency and (political) democracy, which are the two prominent values of the public policy, because of the diverse meaning of the SCS concept. Besides, for this reason, it also requires a systematic framework of assessment which can deal with the temporal parameter in which the historicity and complexity are embedded. That is, there would be a necessity to add the view of the power relationship, which is revealed to be intimately connected with the causal mechanism of the SCS change, to this evaluation tool.

Marsh and McConnell's framework for assessing success

With respect to the complicated and political nature of evaluation itself as well as its reflection of power relations, the model of Marsh and McConnell (2010) would be notable. Their assessment framework implies which way through which the issue of policy success should be analysed. They accept that the evaluation of policy is socially and politically constructed, and that the result of its evaluation can be different as a result of the power relations in society (Marsh & McConnell, 2010, pp. 566-567). Then, they present a multi-dimensional assessment tool in this context. Their framework consists of political, process and programmatic dimensions, and each aspect could be interpreted to encompass the potential variables of this research such as opportunity structures (political contexts), institutional arrangements and sub-systems of the SCS (reward, competency and loyalty aspect). In addition, admitting that their model allows for recognition of the

facets of time, space and culture (Marsh & McConnell, 2010, pp. 576-577), this would be a very appropriate method to evaluate the changes of the SCS systems in the U.K. and Korea.

According to this model, the first dimension, the success of the 'process' in policy formation can be measured in relation to the legitimate procedure or constitutional stage in which policy was produced. Measuring the item of innovation, which might be linked with the policy transfer, can also be included in this dimension (Marsh & McConnell, 2010, p. 573). Indicators of the next dimension commonly perceived as the evidence-based evaluation of policy success, are the outcomes and operational implementation by means of assessing what the policy has achieved. Efficient use of resources would also be an illustration of the measures in this 'programmatic' dimension. Lastly, assessing the 'political' success is the third dimension of Marsh & McConnell's framework. The aid to the electoral prospect and reputation of the government or governing party could be the criteria of this dimension.

< Table 7-1. Three dimensions of policy success >

Dimensions	Indicators
Process	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Legitimacy in the formation: is it produced through due processes? • Passage of legislation: was the legislation passed with no/amendments? • Political sustainability: did it have the support of a sufficient coalition? • Innovation and influence: was it based on new ideas (or policy transfer)?
Programmatic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Operational: was it implemented as per objectives? • Outcomes: did it achieve the intended outcomes? • Resource: was it an efficient use of resources? • Actor/interest: did it benefit a particular class, interest group, etc?
Political	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Government popularity: is it politically popular or helpful for re-election?

Source: adjust from Marsh and McConnell (2010, p. 571)

The consequences of evaluating the changed SCS can be classified as 'success', 'failure' or a third label which is designated as 'non-failure', owing to the difficulty of dichotomising a success clearly. The evaluation results might be

different or even contradict each other according to the dimensions of the assessment framework (Marsh & McConnell, 2010, p. 578). The following sections will examine four changed SCSs in the U.K. and Korea, which are SCS_M, SCS_B, SCS_R and SCS_L, according to the above Marsh and McConnell (2010)'s three dimensions of assessing framework.

7-3. Assessing the Changed Senior Civil Service in the U.K.

With this fact in mind that the concept of success and evaluation in the public sector can be discussed in various aspects because of the complexity of policy and its variability over time, two cases of the British SCS will be assessed in accordance with the indicators of Marsh and McConnell (2010), as shown in Table 7-1. To be specific, the evidence of the *process* dimension would be supported by the change patterns which are analysed already and the historical and legislative records, or statement of participants. The *programme* objectives in Britain were found in each government's white paper for establishing the SCS(e.g., Cm 2627, 1994; Cm 2748, 1995; Cm 4310, 1999), and their outcomes could be identified from statistical or historical data. In terms of the *political* dimension, Marsh and McConnell suggest the election results and media or academic commentary as evidence.

Assessment of the SCS system in the Major era

First of all, when it comes to the process dimension, the SCS launched in the Major government, as reviewed in section 4-2-2 it can be regarded an institutional crystallisation of the aftermath of Thatcherite reforms including the 'Next-Steps' agencification and of the 'Open structure'. Hence, it seems that this personnel management for senior staff is based on new ideas of the first female PM in Britain, which were about the cultural change of Whitehall. According to Marsh et al. (2001, pp. 28-30), Whitehall's traditional culture affected by the political evolution of the British representative system, was close to the elitism, reaching the conclusion that ministers and civil servants know best. This nature might have fed into PSE⁶³ values in the British civil service, such as integrity, honesty and

⁶³ Since this ethical framework has guided public officials and shaped the public's expectations

neutrality. However, those British PSE values were challenged by the Thatcherite managerialism reforms, emphasising openness and competition, as well as by the inflow of fresh blood from the private sector. Because of this new wave, it is argued that there were two competing cultural frameworks during the period of PM Thatcher, as shown in Table 7-2: one was the newly introduced managerialism highlighting the efficiency and accountability of civil servants as managers; and the other was the fading traditional PSE based on the trust between ministers and mandarins (Horton, 2006b, pp. 38-41; Marsh et al., 2001, pp. 36-41). In this respect, the introduction of the SCS system can be evaluated as an innovative and influential policy in the civil service reform in the U.K.

< Table 7-2. Two competing cultural frameworks of Whitehall >

	<i>Values</i>	<i>Actions</i>	<i>Institutions</i>
Managerialism	Efficiency Effectiveness Economy	Can-doer Policy implementer	Flexible / and Fragmented
Traditional Whitehall Culture	Integrity Neutrality Elitism	Policy adviser Fact imparter	Hierarchical / and United

Source: Marsh et al. (2001, p. 38)

Despite the innovative characteristics of this new system, the SCS in the U.K. was initially established through a gradual change process, which is demonstrated in the discussion on the patterns of institutional change (section 5-4). That is, the creation of the British SCS can be classified as a type of 'layering'. Additionally, this may be against the backdrop of the fact that the lead of the managerial reforms in the U.K. has been taken by the political impetus of the Conservatives, which have been the majority of parliament over twenty years as shown in Table 6-1, rather than the power of bureaucrats since Thatcher's triumph of 1979 (James, 2003, pp. 43-44). Thus, considering that the political compromise of the Westminster system is grounded in a democratic course, the SCS establishment can be assessed as having gone through a due and legitimate process.

of their behaviour (Horton, 2006b, p. 32), this could be considered as one of the Whitehall cultures.

Nonetheless, evaluating the political sustainability of the SCS system could be controversial. On the one hand, since this system has been developed through *reproduction by adaptation* or self-reinforcement in the Blair period and is still effective until now, it could be considered to have sustainability. On the other hand, when defining this indicator as sufficient coalition and support from stakeholders or interest groups (Marsh & McConnell, 2010, p. 571), it is hard to say that this managerial reform gained enough support from the bureaucrats who are subject to the policy. It is thought that a series of civil service reforms based on the NPM doctrine have weakened the unified civil service in the U.K., as well as challenged the values of the traditional British civil service, such as permanence, anonymity and even maybe impartiality (C. Campbell & Wilson, 1995, p. 60; Dargie & Locke, 1999, p. 179; Dowding, 2003, p. 190; Richards, 2003, pp. 49-50). The emergence of the performance-based and objectives-oriented officials with a limited term, has undermined the permanency of the civil service. The fact that until recently chief executives could be named and questioned by Parliament because of their responsibility for mistakes or management failure (Dowding, 1995, p. 74; Garnett & Lynch, 2009, p. 167), also means a threat against the aspect of anonymity. Moreover, the organisational fragmentation or institutional complexity caused by the creation of the Next-Steps agencies and of the SCS, obscured the accountability (Dargie & Locke, 1999, p. 199; Rhodes, 1997, pp. 101-102; 2000, pp. 157, 159). For example, the dismissal of Derek Lewis as director of the Prison Service by the Home Secretary, Michael Howard, in 1995 gave a strong impression of the issues of ambiguous accountability and unprotected anonymity (Polidano, 1999).

"[the] escapes of three dangerous men from Parkhurst prison on the Isle of Wight, [brings up] the thorny question about whether ministers, who decide prison policy, or civil servants, responsible for day-to-day operations, were to blame for the failures that led to the debacle. Mr. Lewis, [...] said: 'The attempt to distinguish between policy and operations was no more than a political fig leaf - such a small fig leaf that it was grossly indecent.'"


Source: Mills (1996)

In this respect, this might have brought about a measure to ensure fairness or brought about a backlash against the erosion of PSE. In 1996 when the SCS system was launched, the amendment of the 'Armstrong Memorandum', in which the duties and responsibilities of civil servants in relation to Ministers were noted,

could be a part of this effort. In addition, the independent recruitment operation of the Civil Service Commission (CSC), the members of which were not public officers but experienced persons from various backgrounds, might also be an illustration of the endeavour to sustain the British civil service values. As a result, assessment of the political sustainability of the Major's SCS would conclude that it was neither a success nor a failure.

Secondly, in terms of the programmatic dimension, particularly the operational indicator, the British SCS system emphasising contracts and performance headed toward a managerial, competition-oriented and implementation-focused management, as described in previous chapters⁶⁴. This characteristics contrasts the primary features of the conventional servants of the Crown (Dargie & Locke, 1999, pp. 179-181; Richards & Smith, 2002, pp. 221-223). Encouraging the open recruitment of outsiders and specialists in order to improve performance, led to the increase of the number of top officials who were out of Whitehall: in fact, the rate of external employment increased from about 10% between the 1980s and the mid-1990s to about 30% during the Major government (Richards, 2003, p. 46). For example, the results of chief executives' appointments in 1998, Figure 7-1, shows that over two-thirds were recruited through open competition and about one-fourth of the vacancies were supplemented from outside Whitehall.

< Figure 7-1. Appointment of chief executives in post in 1998 >



Source: James (2003, p. 73)

⁶⁴ As stated in section 4-2-2, Richards and Smith (2002) summed up the SCS with three changes: (1) heightening managerial role rather than policy advice; (2) a removal of hierarchy through eliminating layers; (3) a bigger function for executive agencies. Dargie and Locke (1999) suggested four aspects: (1) private-sector managements; (2) the idea of choice and competition; (3) the high value of policy-implementation role; (4) the stronger decision power of the politicians.

Apart from the above rise in ratio, most importantly, the Thatcherite civil service reform is evaluated to have transformed the nature of senior officials fundamentally in the U.K. The launch of this new personnel system seemed to have brought about a new type of civil servant such as a business-like official in the core departments: transformation from advisory mandarins to efficient managers. In other words, the managerial initiatives during the Major era, which might be accepted as the extension of the Next-Steps programmes (Reitan, 2003, p. 120), reduced most of the elite bureaucrats to just policy implementors rather than policy initiators. This growth of managerially oriented 'can-doers' in Whitehall has also changed the politico-administrative relationship, particularly between ministers and civil servants. Although the inter-dependence of the minister-civil servant relationship has been still alive and important, as Marsh et al. (2001, pp. 167-170) argue, their pattern or balance of dependency has been surely shifted from the world of bilateral monopoly to that of competition with alternatives, the outsiders in the private sector, because of the managerial reforms. Actually, commentators assess that a some of the managerial schemes for senior officials got rid of their monopolistic role on policy advice and analysis (Dargie & Locke, 1999, pp. 194-195; Richards, 2003, pp. 49-50). Therefore, it can be assessed that the initial SCS system, which had been transformed from the traditional British civil service system, implemented and has operated successfully in accordance with these programmatic aims.

In addition, with respect to the outcome aspect of the programmatic dimension, the ultimate purposes which this new system intended for would be the competitiveness and responsiveness, that is the efficiency and democracy, as shown in Table 1-2. However, even though indexes such as the IMD's world competitiveness and the World Bank's estimate might produce some evidence, as Pollitt and Bouckaert (2017, p. 143) pointed out, it would be too early to judge government efficiency and effectiveness relying only on those limited and indirect sources. Moreover, since PM Major was replaced shortly after the system was launched, it would be difficult to evaluate its effectiveness within such a short period. Meanwhile, the issue of politicisation of the civil service began to creep in from the managerial reforms of Thatcher, and it lasted during the Conservative era. As discussed earlier, it is known that the NPM reform, in which managerial remedies facilitated control over bureaucracy with goals set externally by the

political leader, paradoxically aroused politicisation and that they are associated with each other. Consequently, there could be the ironic result that the more distinct the division of the roles between decision and fulfilment, the higher the potentiality of a politicisation crisis in the civil service. Accordingly, the impartiality of the civil service would have hardly been preserved and maintained intact under the influence of ministers, who set objectives and evaluated performance, because Whitehall had found it difficult to escape from the politicised area of Westminster since the Thatcherism reform (Dowding, 1995, pp. 106-107; Garnett & Lynch, 2009, p. 167). Therefore, it seems that more time was needed to assess the outcomes of the SCS system in the Major era.

Lastly, it may be challenging to determine the SCS system as a failure considering the point of the political dimension of Marsh and McConnell (2010) because there was little time (at most about a year) to judge the influence of this bureaucratic reform. The repercussions of the managerial initiatives would be another big theme of debate, yet nevertheless it may be certain that the erosion of PSE has led a controversial and confusing issue, as briefed above. In this regard, it could be inadmissible to dismiss the crystallisation of the Thatcherite civil service reforms during the premiership of Major, namely the launch of SCS in the U.K., as a 'non-failure' in measuring government popularity. In consequence, although there were numerous reasons for the Conservatives' defeat of the general election in 1997, the alternation of the ruling party by the new Labour might have meant that the validity of the Thatcherite remedies had expired.

Assessment of the SCS system in the Blair era

First, in terms of the assessment from the process dimension of Marsh and McConnell (2010), despite the change of the ruling party, assessing the SCS system in the Blair administration could be considered similar to the evaluation of Major's SCS because of the same legitimate procedure of the Westminster model. The judgement as to this similarity would also be inferred from the reproduction pattern of the SCS change, the institutional continuity, in the era of PM Blair. As Horton (2006b, pp. 42-43) pointed out, there must have been a change continuously in the PSE, the erosion of the traditional ethos, during his


government. It is claimed that afterward this resulted in the publication of the 'civil service code' (Rhodes, 2000, p. 159). As the institution stabilised over time, the political sustainability of this managerial system was strengthened, whilst the innovation or influence of it appeared to have subsided. Consequently, there appeared to not be much substantial progression nor detailed opposition to the style of this Thatcherite Whitehall during the Blair era (Gray, 2004; Hennessy, 2005). In other words, the British SCS system has been self-reinforced stably and successfully, as analysed in the previous chapters.

Secondly, in regard to the operational indicator of programmatic dimension, namely the managerialism in the British civil service, not to mention the development of the SCS system, the enlargement and enrichment of *special advisers* seems to have impacted the status of the traditional senior staff considerably. This is not only because those political officials have gradually replaced the positions in which top career officials were used to being deployed to (Butcher, 1998, p. 5), but also because they have a great influence on the minister's policy view by working closely with them. The ministers in the Blair government seemed to put a high value on advice from external experts rather than that of senior bureaucrats (Sausman & Locke, 2007, pp. 200-201). Owing to this additional or alternative resource by the special advisor, a crack in the bilateral monopoly between political leaders and administrative executives, at least in terms of policy advice, spread wider. Then, the increased intervention of special advisers in policy advice as well as in the management of the department generated tension with the career servants. Though the number and salary cost of those advisers were limited, their powerful influence on the executives, which may have come from their personal trust or political position, has created the concern for the politically biased outcomes of the government (Fawcett & Rhodes, 2008, pp. 81-82; Sausman & Locke, 2004, p. 106; 2007, p. 193). Putting the discussion together, it can be argued that the impact of the escalating number of special advisers and their far-reaching power has played a part in the consolidation of the changing relationship between ministers and the SCS especially. In other words, the policy advice role of the British mandarins has been shrinking since the Next-Steps programme and especially the SCS scheme. Furthermore, the replacement by political advisers has made this trajectory upward, in which policy implementation is highlighted more as a role of civil

servants. Besides the flexible and business-like management for senior career officials in Britain, the Blair administration put an emphasis on the cohesion of the SCS within the ‘joined-up’ government due to decentralisation. However, there was not enough evidence to measure or determine a success or failure.

Concerning another indicator of the programmatic dimension, the anticipated outcomes through Blair’s SCS would be the improvement of government efficiency and responsiveness, which are just like the purposes of the previous government’s SCS. The accumulated evidence provided by international comparison might enable measurement of the outcomes of the SCS system roughly in the Blair era. Nonetheless, neither do the quantitative indexes of government competitiveness, shown in Figures 7-2, indicate a certain improving trend after the SCS launch in 1996, nor do the measurement items in this figure represent the quality or capabilities of senior officials. Thus, it is still difficult to conclude the assessment results from the perspective of efficiency.

< Figure 7-2. Evaluation of government efficiency and effectiveness in Britain >



Source: <https://worldcompetitiveness.imd.org/> (15/June/2020) and <https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/> (11/July/2019)

On the contrary to the uncertain judgement of the efficiency enhancement, there has been a gradual but clear change in the relationship between ministers and

senior civil servants in the U.K. from the aspect of politicisation. As a result, it can be argued that the change triggered by the continuous NPM-type civil service reform would have tipped the balance between ministers and bureaucrats until the Blair era and beyond. The new equilibrium of this relationship, as Garnett & Lynch (2009, p. 169) argue, may be in favour of the former, the political officials. Even though the following statements of two ex-officials may look contradictory, both seem to signify the increasing tendency of political control over bureaucracy.

"I think the Civil Service is in danger of politicisation, not because they will act politically, but because they are being badgered into acting in a way that appears to be political. [...] move from a Civil Service, which was relatively fearless in offering unwelcome advice and telling people about options that might not be palatable but were necessary to describe, to one where people just deliver what they think ministers want to hear [...]"

Source: Interview with Mike Granatt in 2007 (Richards, 2008, p. 178)

"It is a longstanding convention that governments must not use the resources of the State improperly to gain Party political advantage. [...] I do not believe the Civil Service is being politicised. But for many years the conditions in which we operate have been slowly changing, not least because of the pressure on all political parties to maintain a permanent level of campaigning between elections."

Source: Retirement speech of Richard Wilson in 2002 (Richards, 2008, p. 179)

Lastly, it is remarkable that the Labour government won their subsequent elections consecutively, as charted in Table 6-1, in the political dimension of the assessment. Even if the implementation of the SCS cannot have influenced the election directly, the continuous change of the SCS toward 'can-doer' might have contributed to the achievements of the agendas of the Blair administration, such as the 'Joined-up Government' and the 'Delivery' under the philosophy of the 'Third way'. On the other hand, this managerial system might have also been useful to shift the responsibility of a 'political' failure to the accountability of a 'operational' mistake (Hood & Lodge, 2006a, p. 360), as seen in the case of the dismissal of Derek Lewis. The assessment results of two SCS systems in the Major and Blair government by applying Marsh and McConnell (2010) 's three-dimensional tool is shown in Table 7-3.

< Table 7-3. Application of three-dimensional assessment to the British SCSs >

Case		<i>SCS of the Major era</i>		<i>SCS of the Blair era</i>	
Dimension / Indicator					
Process	Legitimacy (due process)	Gradual change under the Westminster system	▲	Reproduction under the Westminster system	▲
	Political sustainability	Risk of accountability and anonymity, but Backlash	■	Institutional continuity	▲
	Innovation & influence	Managerialism and erosion of PSE	▲	Erosion of PSE & Civil service code	■
Program-matic	Operational	Business-like, competition-oriented implementation-focused management	▲	Emphasis on the cohesion	■
				Business-like official with advent of special advisor	▲
	Outcomes (resource / interest)	Competitiveness: limitation of evidence	■	Government efficiency: limitation of evidence	■
		Responsiveness: political control	▲	Increased political control	▲
Political	Gov't popularity	Election: defeat in the general election in 1997	▼	Election: long-term rule of the Labour party	▲

* ▲: Judging 'Success', ▼: Judging 'Failure', ■: Judging 'Non-failure'

7-4. Assessing the Changed Senior Civil Service in Korea

Assessment of the SCS system in the Roh era

First of all, since the Korean SCS system, in which the existing ranking system was abolished and new management skills were introduced, was quite a drastic reform, the attempt itself can be considered to have been innovative and influential in the public sector of Korea. There would have been particular value of the SCS system in the respect that this strategic personnel instrument had been imported from advanced governments. In other words, this might be regarded as a policy transfer or the diffusion of NPM reform. However, the introduction of any new personnel management needs the revision of the SPOA which requires the agreement of National Assembly owing to the written constitution system in Korea. The SCS system managed to be launched despite being delayed for half a year longer than originally planned; the passage of legislation was not easy, especially due to concern over politicisation of the civil

service, as well as doubt around destruction of the merit system (BPP, 2008, pp. 31-35). Accordingly, although the creation of this scheme was so revolutionary that its process pattern, as analysed in section 5-4, can be categorised as ‘breakdown and replacement’, its legitimacy was able to be secured by the legal basis for the SCS.

On the other hand, the active resistance of bureaucrats was also found in the process of the SCS establishment. Particularly, the separation of the SCS for foreign service may be a representative illustration of this resistance. Because of the opposition of diplomats who argued for their uniqueness of overseas duties and were fatigued with Roh’s political pressure on them, the Senior Foreign Service system was implemented one and a half years later than the general SCS system (J.-g. Kim, 2013, pp. 34-39). Moreover, the presidency of a single five-year term appears to have aggravated the sustainability of policies. Since an administration, which once had powerful authority, experiencing the lame duck would become vulnerable to the resistance of bureaucrats who would look forward to greeting a new government, the dominance relation between politicians and senior officials may be bound to change. As a consequence, the upshot of Roh’s civil service reforms seemed to have returned to a situation analogous to his predecessor’s failure in the end.

< Table 7-4. Results of internal survey on the SCS competency in Korea >


The need for competency development	Year	Total	Negative			Positive	
			1	2	3	4	5
	2007	105 (100%)	3.8%	10.5%	18.1%	59.0%	8.6%
	2011	314 (100%)	0.6%	6.4%	35.7%	54.8%	2.5%
The validity of competency assessment	Year	Negative			Positive		
	2007	17.2%			82.8%		
	2011	10.6%			89.4%		

Source: Sun-woo Lee et al. (2011) and K.-h. Cho et al. (2008, p. 20)

Secondly, when it comes to the programmatic dimension, it is remarkable that the competency management was successfully implemented in Korea. As discussed in the description of the Korean civil service, the foundations for the

recruitment from outside or performance management were weak, whereas the operation of the SCS Assessment Centre seemed to have settled down as Figure 6-5 shows. In fact, according to an internal survey of government, as shown in Table 7-4, the incumbent senior officials responded positively to this competency assessment in the aspect of motivation and test validity. However, despite the growth of OPS numbers and the temporarily increased ratio of its external appointment (Table 4-8), not only the recruitment system but also the PRP system, as shown in Figure 5-1, appeared to be operated in a perfunctory fashion. Moreover, the reform initiatives promoted by President Roh appeared to fail to send a consistent message about what their real direction was because they were too radical and different from his previous presidents. Some critics even characterised his programmes as nothing more than idealistic and imitative policy experiments (e.g., Im, 2007, p. 50; Oh, 2007, p. 35). Accordingly, it would be hard to determine whether those new schemes except the AC were successful or not.

< Figure 7-3. Evaluation of government efficiency and effectiveness in Korea >



Source: <https://worldcompetitiveness.imd.org/> (15/June/2020) and <https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/> (11/July/2019)

With respect to the indicator of outcome aspect, it would be difficult to evaluate its efficiency or the competitiveness of government because of a shortage of time. That is, the assessment of the Korea SCS in the Roh period seems to be similar to that of the previous British case of the Major administration. Even as shown in

Figure 7-3, indexes such as the IMD's world competitiveness and the World Bank's one, indicate the improvement of relative rankings after the introduction of the SCS in the Korean government, but it is still ambiguous as to whether this new managerial system had led those moving up the list.

On the contrary, there could be some evidence to look at the side of responsiveness, which may be another reason of the launch of SCS, political control over bureaucracy. As Im (2007, pp. 52-53) argued, the attempts to directly control the executives through the introduction of new HR initiatives, as well as through the pro-active intervention in SCS appointments, resulted in strengthening the opportunism inclination of high-ranking officials, susceptible to promotion. Although the politicisation, which had resulted from the de-politicisation reform of the NPM (Hood, 2000), was intensified, the Korean bureaucrats seemed to have two different counter-strategies: active or passive resistance. With regard to the latter, those who lost or gave up hope of promotion in a specific president's term, began to have an apathetic attitude toward reform or used a delaying tactic (Im, 2007, p. 54). Some commentators attributed the failure of Roh's reform to the bureaucrats' non-cooperation or even their sabotage as follows:

***“Kim, Kwang-woong** (former minister of the KCSC): Bureaucrats showed a treacherous obedience (‘Judas kiss’). They merely followed their own bureaucratic custom, regardless of the demands of their political master, even the heavyweights of the ruling party.*

***Jung, Chan-yong** (former senior secretary for the president personnel affairs): The inertia of civil servants was the problem rather than the quality of minister. The ministers were not sufficiently supported due to the high-handed attitude of bureaucrats”*

Source: T.-w. Kim (2007)

Thus, it could be argued that the strategy for democratic control through the SCS system did not eradicate entirely the opportunistic or parasitic attributes of the Korean bureaucracy. Furthermore, in terms of assessment in the political dimension of Marsh and McConnell (2010), because of the Korean governing system of the single-term presidency, it would be quite hard to evaluate the results of the SCS system.

Assessment of the SCS system in the Lee era

First, the process of revising the Korean SCS system in the Lee administration can be also considered to have been done through a due and democratic course. As analysed in section 5-4, since the change pattern during his era was an overall gradual transformation of drift, which amendment was within the administrative discretions, there would have been little problem in securing the procedural legitimacy. The fact that Mr. Lee did not make excessive and conflicting choices, like abolishing the existing SCS system, per se, give adequacy to the change process in some ways. However, the reforms in the Lee administration could not be regarded as an innovative initiative. As revealed in the following interviews, it seemed that the systems that survived or were reinforced in the period of President Lee, were only those which could be conducive to his control over governing.

“Securing the civil servants’ adaptation as well as changing their attitudes was the focus of Lee’s government. Improving the policy capacities of bureaucrats was out of the politicians’ interest. Accordingly, personnel tools such as managing the low performers and tightening the discipline, seemed to be preferred in that era.”

Source: Interviewee IK1

Besides, considering the top-down governing style of Mr. Lee and his one-off reform approach, along with the discussion of the ‘*meo-seum*’, it was difficult to expect the coalition of civil servants. In other words, the SCS under the presidency of President Lee cannot be assessed successfully, rather, it may be evaluated as a failure when considering the aspect of political sustainability.

Secondly, it seemed that each of the personnel sub-systems this managerial public reform consisted of were detached from the SCS as a whole system, and they evolved separately in another way during the Lee era. According to the survey on public officials' awareness of the SCS as shown in Table 7-5, most sub-elements, except performance management, especially the PRP, were less necessary and less effective than before. These results might be explained by the connection to the major concern of the government of the day, the performance improvement. Hence, Lee’s SCS system would be far from many of

its original goals, such as the OPS and JPS, from the perspective of the operational indicator. This would be the reason that the Korean SCS system has been criticised for its changes and been regarded as a failure.

< Table 7-5. Ranking of the SCS necessity and effectiveness in 2005 & 2011 >

(ranking: total 25)	Necessity of the system			Effectiveness of the system		
	2005	2011	comparison	2005	2011	comparison
SCS system	19	20	(▼1)	18	16	(▼2)
OPS	12	13	(▼1)	15	20	(▼5)
JPS	7	14	(▼7)	14	14	(-)
AC	-	5		-	4	
PRP	15	11	(△4)	19	17	(△2)

* The 'Assessment Centre' was not included in the survey of 2005.

** Questionnaire survey target: the personnel officials in each department (total 47 persons)

*** Survey method: rank each personnel policy including affirmative action & 360° feedback (total 25)

Source: adjusted from C.-o. Park (2011a, pp. 17-18)

Then, in terms of the indicator of outcomes in the programmatic dimension, it is still challenging to assess whether the changed SCS of the Lee administration succeeded in achieving efficiency of government in Korea. The quantitative data indicating the upgrade of rankings in the Figure 7-3 still does not resolve the issue of measurements. Meanwhile, the Lee administration also pursued control over bureaucracy based on the dominance of the president, and the obedience of public servants seemed to work to some extent in his early days of the term. However, it would still be hard to determine whether his reforms have exerted an impact on the change of existing politico-administrative relationships, in that a relatively strong autonomy and opportunism of the elite bureaucrats, such as resistance and slowdown tactics, could be found saliently in the latter stage of the presidency term.

Lastly, in Korea where a President cannot serve more than one term of office, this single-term system, without a mid-term election, is an obstacle to politically assessing the results of a president's governing or rule. Although the tactic of bashing bureaucrats was a useful and popular rhetoric for Korean politicians, there appears to be no clear evidence that the new conservative government, which had inherited the SCS system, benefited from this managerial scheme.

Accordingly, it would be unacceptable to dismiss the changes to the SCS as just a failure in regard to the political dimension. The integration of those assessments in two SCS systems in Korea is described in Table 7-6.

< Table 7-6. Application of three-dimensional assessment to the Korean SCS >

Case		<i>SCS of the Roh era</i>		<i>SCS of the Lee era</i>	
Dimension / Indicator					
Process	Legitimacy (due process)	Based on the law (SPOA) agreed by parliament	▲	Gradual change within the administrative discretion	▲
	Political sustainability	Resistance of bureaucrats & Lam-duck	▼	Insufficient supports due to the top-down governing	▼
	Innovation & influence	Policy transfer from advanced countries	▲	Selective development of sub-system of the SCS	▼
Program-matic	Operational	Competency management	▲	Emphasis on PRP	▲
		OPS, JPS and PRP	▼	OPS, JPS & Rank system	▼
	Outcomes (resource / interest)	Competitiveness: limitation of evidence	■	Government efficiency: limitation of evidence	■
		Responsiveness: fail to eradicate opportunism	■	Still alive opportunism of elite bureaucrats	■
Political	Gov't popularity	The limitation of single-term presidency	■	Useful bureaucrat-bashing tactic, yet single-term presidency	■

* ▲: Judging 'Success', ▼: Judging 'Failure', ■: Judging 'Non-failure'

7-5. Conclusion: comparative findings of the assessment

As defined at the start of this research, the SCS concept is not a simple and a holistic entity, but it is regarded as a loosely-coupled complexity which has various personnel systems and interacts with political actors and structures. Moreover, from the perspective of historical institutionalism, not only can the values that the inner sub-systems of the SCS pursue be collisional or even contradictory, but also its political interaction involves power-relationship and conflict. Just as the unintended consequences of the political world have been explored in various ways by historical institutionalists (Hall & Taylor, 1996), the evaluation of those outcomes that the SCS may have produced, should be

approached delicately from various angles. This is because the unintentional event, as Marsh and McConnell (2010, p. 579) argue, may result in not only historical inefficiency but also a positive spin-off.

Considering the properties of SCS as an institution and its variability over time, as investigated in this study, the assessment of the SCS systems in the U.K. and Korea ought to encompass the concepts of temporality, complexity and relationship. In this context, Marsh and McConnell (2010)'s multi-dimensional framework composed of the process, programmatic and political aspects, seems to be appropriate for this purpose. Table 7-7 is the synthesis of the evaluation of four changed SCSs, based on Tables 7-3 and 7-6. The SCS systems have been judged according to diverse standards, especially in regard to the criteria reflecting the political, qualitative and long-term characteristics, and the assessment of each dimension resulted from the number of frequencies of its indicator consequences. This table shows that the claim of those two scholars, that each of the assessment results in the three-dimensional framework might be contradictory (Marsh & McConnell, 2010, p. 578), is demonstrated through this research on the British and Korean SCS change. For example, the SCS in the Major era would be a successful initiative when putting together each of the indicators in the programmatic dimension, whereas this system might be thought of as a failure from the political viewpoint of government popularity. There were even cases which were difficult to evaluate clearly as a success or failure, and those were titled as 'non-failure'. Accordingly, unlike the negative anticipation or judgement about President Lee's SCS (e.g., Y.-j. Kwon & Kwon, 2010), it would be challenging to conclude that the results caused by his institutional change had failed, particularly in the process and political angles.

< Table 7-7. Results of assessing the changed SCSs in four cases >

	United Kingdom				Korea			
	SCS (Major)		SCS (Blair)		SCS (Roh)		SCS (Lee)	
Process	▲■▲	success	▲▲■	success	▲▼▲	success	▲▼▼	failure
Programmatic	▲■▲	success	■▲■▲	success	▲■■■	success	▲▼■■■	non-fail
Political	▼	failure	▲	success	■	non-fail	■	non-fail

Furthermore, the evaluation of the SCS system can vary depending on which method is used, when it is assessed, and by whom it is judged. That is, it can be learned, not only that the institutional change of the SCS may be judged differently depending on which of the assessment dimensions is adopted (the evaluation standard or measurement method), but also that the political and long-term effects of the system are tough to assess immediately, or at the time when it was implemented. Moreover, the judgement of decision as well as the meaning of evidence could be interpreted diversely according to who evaluated it (the individual perspectives), because the evaluation itself is a ontological and epistemological matter (Boyne, 2003, pp. 222-223; Marsh & McConnell, 2010, p. 567), especially in terms of the political aspect which reflects the power relationship. Consequently, as the results of applying Marsh and McConnell's assessment tool demonstrated, rushing to a hasty conclusion should be rejected in assessing the civil service reform, including the SCS system. Thus, the criticism against the Korean SCS change after Lee's government or the argument over the collapse of the Westminster model, may need to be reconsidered and to be analysed based on the above discussion. In particular, this consequence will be a good lesson for the Korean decision-makers who have already experienced innumerable policy transfers and introductions in every government, and who will try to prepare new civil service reform again.

Chapter 8 . Discussion: understanding the Senior Civil Service Reform

8-1. Introduction

This research sought to understand the changes to the SCS systems in Britain and Korea through ascertaining the typical features and causes of their institutional (trans)formations, as well as assessing the results of them. When it comes to three main research sub-questions posed at the beginning of the thesis, the works of previous chapters 5 to 7, in which not only the traits of SCSs in the U.K. and Korea were compared but also their change processes over time were analysed, would be useful to provide each of the answers respectively. This chapter set out the review of the primary findings about the SCS system, including its terminology, typology, and change patterns. Then, it attempts to synthesize the key discoveries concerning the dynamics of the SCS change based on the historical institutionalism. Its next phase broadens the discussion of the SCS changes in Britain and Korea by addressing the wider issues related with the main research findings in this thesis. Such topics as the PSBs of managerialism and the establishment of SCS change mechanism, could enhance the understanding of the SCS systems and their development. In addition, the present chapter lastly displays a series of this thesis' contributions to literature on the civil service systems, particularly in terms of the SCS systems, public service reform and the PSB theories.

8-2. Summary of key findings

Characteristics, diversities and dynamics of the SCS

First of all, it is notable that the ambiguous meaning of the SCS has become fairly clear in this thesis. Not only this relatively new concept has evolved with the development of the study on it, but also it can be interpreted variously across nations depending on the scopes and subjects of its application. It appears that political scientists, as Bourgault (2013, p. 140) claims, were unable to reach

agreement on the category of the SCS. In this regard, the present study divided the SCS into two aspects in accordance with the trajectory of the research focus: a group of elite bureaucrats as political actors; a new managerial system for public personnel management. As a result, the definition and feature of the SCS can be comprehended as an institution having the attributes of complexes and relationship by virtue of associating this terminology with the theoretical basis of this thesis, new institutionalism. That is, the SCS is a new separate scheme, consisting of various reward, competency and loyalty system based on the NPM, for the purpose of managing high-ranking officials who have interactive relationship with politicians. This stereoscopic definition seems to be deeply related with the SCS typology. This research proposed a new integrative SCS category in section 2-5-1, which classifies the SCS according to two criteria: managerial approach (four images of Huddleston); and politicisation (two ways between politician and civil servant). Furthermore, the most important thing is that this definition is the grounds for understanding the characteristics and causality of the SCS dynamics in the U.K. and Korea, which is the starting point of answering the research question.

Secondly, it can be learned from the analysis founded on the historical and political narratives in Britain and Korea and on the above two-dimensional typology that the SCS changes showed an institutional diversity depending on spatial difference despite the global convergence of the NPM, which doctrine triggered this personnel reform. The civil service reform through the introduction of managerial HR initiatives was the pursuit for innovating the government in both countries, and the subsequent image of the Korean SCS system might look similar to the British one, not to mention their likeness of traditional types. However, the specific sub-components of their SCS types are distinguished from each other; a manager-like image is more noticed in the British SCS than the Korean one, as exemplified in Tables 5-1 and 5-5, while the politicisation intensity in Korea appeared to be higher than that in the U.K. in both way of bureaucrats and politicians. These dissimilarities seem to represent the differences of political and historical backgrounds, including the civil service system, in each country, as discussed in the process of selecting these two contrasting cases (e.g., Tables 1-3 and 3-6). Moreover, like the divergence of the governing system in those two countries, the evolutionary progress of the modern British government stands in

stark contrast to the revolutionary upheaval in the Korean development. This may mean the historical legacies or institutional environments would have impacted or shaped this new personnel system (Bezès & Lodge, 2007, 2015). Thus, the path-dependence, which accounts for the institutional distinctiveness as well as its historical process, could be identified through comprehending the British and Korean SCSs comparatively.

Thirdly, the comparison between various types of the SCS, particularly over time, revealed that the diverse patterns of its institutional change were distinguished even in the same country. As shown in Tables 5-4 and 5-8, three SCS types in each nation, which are disaggregated from each case by applying a temporal parameter (Geddes, 2003, p. 136), can be classified according to this research's own category. Then, after four process modes of the before-and-after SCS transformation were drawn on the basis of the alternation in government, four different kinds of institutional change types could be identified as followings. The creation of the SCS system in Korea, as Y.-j. Kwon (2008), and Y.-j. Kwon and Kwon (2010) already pointed out, is regarded a *critical juncture*, in which the change led to a discontinuous result through abrupt process (*'breakdown and replacement'*). Meanwhile, the gradual transformation or incremental change with transformative result is found not only in the beginning of the British SCS in the Major era but also in the SCS change in Lee's administration. Both could be re-classified into the type of *'layering'* and that of *'drift'* or *'conversion'* respectively in accordance with the gradual change of Mahoney and Thelen (2010). This is because the former can be interpreted as an extension version of the Thatcherite Next-Steps initiative, and the latter might be considered to be poles apart from the previous SCS of President Roh. It is remarkable that this institutional drift of the SCS during the period of President Lee is at odd with the conclusion of Y.-j. Kwon (2008, p. 58) who predicted the continuity of the Korean SCS based on the theory of punctuated equilibrium. On the contrary to the above shifts, the SCS type in the Blair era seemed to maintain the institutional continuity, which may be given the title of *reproduction by adaptation*.

Analysis on the causation of the SCS change, and assessment of it

Based on the diverse institutional change patterns uncovered in this case study,

it could make a Boolean equation about what caused the transformation of the SCS system. If whether the SCS was changed or not can be established as the output of causes-of-effects approach, then the potential causal factors would be estimated from the Bezes (2015)'s PSB conceptual tool which is found to be empirically relevant to the civil service system, including the SCS definition. This research identified such inputs/explanatory variables, as political opportunities (e.g., government change or veto players), institutional arrangements (legal entrenchments and executive pervasiveness), and three PSB elements (reward, competency and loyalty), in each case. Then, it was expected that the key determinants of the institutional change can be inferred by applying the stepwise comparison strategy of Levi-Faur (2006), which consists of two-stage heuristic of the MSSD and MDSD, to the four pairs of the changing modes (Tables 6-6, 6-7, 6-8 and 6-9). In conclusion, this analysis disclosed that the transition of the system related with the *reward* and *loyalty* of PSB would have been the causal factors of the SCS change, as synthesised in Table 6-10.

With respect to the causal mechanism, in which the change of those two determinants affected the (trans)formation of the SCS system, this inquiry can be deduced from the discussion of historical institutionalism. Above all, it can be regarded that the transitions of the incentive system as well as of the bureaucrat's political feedback to it, that is the core components of PSB, may have reflected the ideas of institutional designer, considering the modern history of civil service reform in both countries. The politics or interactive struggles of conscious actors are echoed in the institutional change, where rule-makers (institutional designer) and rule-takers interact each other (Streeck & Thelen, 2005, pp. 16, 23). In addition, since the SCS as an institution can be comprehended as a loosely coupled 'building-block' (Streeck & Thelen, 2005, p. 9), in which various and incongruous sub-systems standing on different ideas and interests, a shake-up or reformulation of some of their combination, as Orren and Skowronek (1994, p. 321) and Thelen (1999, p. 396) argue, could result in an institutional discontinuity. In this regard, both of the SCS changes in Korea appeared to be provoked by the emergence of the fresh power with a new governing philosophy following the alternation in government. On the other hand, the Conservatives, who were still the main characters in Westminster, introduced a new managerial ethos or attributes into the executive agencies in the U.K., through the layering change

(Bezes & Lodge, 2015, pp. 145, 147), and their paradigm seemed to have continued likewise in the establishment of the SCS system. Therefore, regardless of whether the political action of individuals is intended or not, and of the change impetus is endogenous or exogenous, the bargaining or the interplay over power in the politico-administrative relation, in which reward and loyalty would be the fundamental element, would be the key impetus in the reproduction and transformation mechanism of the SCS system (Giddens, 1979, p. 112; Orren & Skowronek, 1994, p. 323).

Nonetheless, it is believed that the *change-agents* do not exist independently of their structure and environment. Although such inputs/variables as political opportunities and institutional arrangements were come up with not the direct causes of the SCS change, it would be implausible to rule them out completely from the causal mechanism of this institutional change because the PSB components are under the influence of historical and cultural legacies as well. (Bezes & Lodge, 2007, 2015; Hood, 2002; Hood & Lodge, 2006b). Additionally, since the SCS definition also involves the interaction with other elements and surroundings, in particular a dynamic relationship with politics, the actors engaged in this SCS issue, despite the assumption of viewing them as rational and strategic beings, should be embedded in the macro factor of politico-administrative relationship. For instance, the external shocks on the institutional dynamics, such as the abortive attempts to abolish the SCS in the Lee government, are the matter of timing and interaction in the political process of agents. Likewise, the internal factors, including the collisions or gaps of the institutional components, are dependent on the characteristic of politics where the political actors exist (Thelen, 1999, pp. 392, 397). In consequence, the exploration for the causal mechanism of the SCS change may be the understanding of the political processes and power asymmetry surrounding the SCS. This thesis pays attention to this point, particularly focusing on the politico-administrative relationship, and then the exogenous and endogenous aspects relevant to the SCS are thought to have been revealed through this research's narratives of the U.K. and Korea.

Meanwhile, it is learned from the assessment of the changed SCS that purely objective evaluation would be almost impossible to exist, and that policies, like

the SCS system, may be appraised differently depending on which perspectives would be taken. The framework of Marsh and McConnell (2010), which demonstrates these varied criteria of evaluation, showed that not only the assessment of a policy can be divided into several detailed judgment indicators according to each dimension, but also the results of each judgment may be even contradictory to one another, as shown in Tables 7-7. As a result, since the institution which was modified or intervened by rule-makers cannot be free from the political surroundings, including power relations, as well as from the delimitation of time, space and culture (Marsh & McConnell, 2010, pp. 576-577), the evaluation of the SCS is supposed to vary depending on which method is used, when it is assessed, and by whom it is judged. Particularly, in terms of President Lee's SCS, which has been criticised for being transformed from its original scheme (Y.-I. Kim, 2014; J.-h. Lee et al., 2008, p. 227), it would be hard to judge this changed system as a simply 'failure' overall, when assessing its outcomes through the three-dimensional framework, as shown Table 7-6.

Understanding changes to the SCS systems in the U.K. and Korea

Returning to the main question of this case study, there has been a recent convergent tendency, namely the NPM, in reforming the bureaucracy for improving efficiency as well as for establishing democracy, yet as Hood (2000) pointed out, the reality manifested its diverse forms in different ways. In fact, the civil service reform derived from similar principles of managerialism, including the SCS initiative, varies across time and space, as explored in the British and Korean cases. This paradoxical results may have attracted an academic attention and it had a practical significance, because it means the decline of 'grand theorizing' (Steinmo & Thelen, 1992, p. 5) and the matter of policy effectiveness. Accordingly, understanding the changes to the SCS systems would be acquired by perceiving how and why the diversity of the civil service system across countries and over time happens in different nations. Besides the differences of institutional configuration, this research reveals that the gradual establishment of the SCS system and its continuous reproduction in the U.K. contrasted to the rapid SCS transformation process and its instability in Korea. Furthermore, it is inferred that there was the distinctiveness of the bargaining relationship, especially the aspects of reward and loyalty, between politicians and public

officials over resource and power behind the dynamic mechanism of those changes. In consequence, the changes toward new managerial system can be understood in the context that a transition of the politico-administrative relationship was pursued for the purpose of seizing the opportunity or dealing with challenges in a new environment (e.g., economic crisis, regime change). Considering how to manage the high-ranking talents of the executive apparatus plays a critical part for the new class in power to govern the state, it could be comprehensible that the existing structures regarding to their give-and-take relation over the political resource both sides had, have been reconsidered by new rule-makers.

As a result, it is uncovered that the changes to the SCS system in the U.K and Korea can be understood by analysing the characteristics and variations of each country's PSB type centred around the reward and loyalty. From this perspective, the same exogenous impetus might lead to different political products, and even the force triggered by endogenous frictions can cause transformative results without the impact of environments. Therefore, the consequences of this research are not only supportive of the argument of Bezes and Lodge (2015), but also compatible with the explanation for institutional dynamics of historical institutionalists, including Mahoney and Thelen (2010) or Streeck and Thelen (2005). Additionally, the results of those changed SCSs may be differently interpreted depending on the perspectives of assessment. In this respect, misunderstandings over the institutional change, such as the argument that merely external political shock changes the nature of bureaucrats (e.g., Meyer-Sahling & Veen, 2012), could be refuted through a further careful investigation. Also, the immediate and one-dimensional assessment particularly in public sector is easy to have a blind spot, and thus it ought to be re-examined through taking account of complex and political aspects surrounding the policies.

8-3. Broader Consequences of the Research Findings

We witnessed that the managerial reform for high-ranking officials was accompanied with the change of the PSB, particularly the elements of reward and loyalty, through four types of change processes in the U.K. and Korea. This may

suggest that the outcomes and processes of the SCS changes can be shown variously across countries and over time because of the diversity and variability of the PSB despite even the same exogenous impetuses. With this in mind, the explanation about the SCS changes, which is founded on the PSB, implies that there could be two further discussions. First, if admitting that the different SCSs were derived from their distinctive sub-systems concerning the reward and loyalty, it may be possible to present the typical traits of politico-administrative relationship, namely the specific types of PSB in Figure 2-1, for each SCS form respectively. The next discussion is about making an integrative model of the SCS dynamics based on the findings of this research including the PSB components, and theoretical foundations of historical institutionalism, which would be the synthesising the analytic tool of Bezes and Lodge (2015) and the framework of Mahoney and Thelen (2010).

PSB types in the U.K. and Korea, and their changes

Like the categorisation of each SCS type and its transformation process in Chapter 5, the PSB type of each case could be classified as well, given the intimate relation between the SCS and the core elements of PSB. It has been commonly recognised that the traditional Whitehall model is grounded on the 'agency' bargains, particularly the serial loyalist type, or the 'Schafferian' PSB (Bezes & Lodge, 2007, p. 130; Bourgault, 2013, p. 155; Hood, 2002, p. 321; Hood & Lodge, 2006b, p. 54). However, as described in section 4-2, it is believed that this British long-standing relationship pattern of the Westminster system may have been changed after Thatcher's attempts to control the bureaucracy. Some might speculate that her personalisation of appointment to senior posts as well as Blair's expansion of outside recruitment, could be understood as a change from the traditional bargain to the type of 'personal loyalism' (Hood & Lodge, 2006b, p. 55). However, on the other hand, it seems to be a general view that the 'delegated' form of agency-type bargains reflects the contemporary features of politician-bureaucrat bargaining in the recent NPM era (Hood, 2002, p. 322; Hood & Lodge, 2006b, pp. 56-57). As Hood (2002, p. 322) argues, the thermostatic control approach of NPM, in which political principals steer the civil servants by using an arms-length model such as a performance management system, is deeply related with the 'simple-delegated' bargains. Thus, even if both of the PSB

types before and after Thatcherism may be included in the same 'agency' bargains, their sub-categories appear to have been slightly swapped for new a PSB type owing to the managerial reform (from B2b1 to B2a2 in Figure 2-1). In consequence, considering that the development of SCS in the Major era was a crystallisation process of a series of Thatcherite managerialism, it would be convincing that the PSB type in this period can be also categorised according to the NPM doctrine. Similarly, there seems to be little difference between the time of the Major administration and that of the Blair premiership in the politico-administrative relation because Blair succeeded the Thatcherite managerial programmes in reforming the civil service. Thus, the NPM-type thermostatic control over senior officials continued to have a far-reaching effect on the Westminster system in the U.K., where the simple-delegated agency bargains started to be established in the late 20th century.

While the agency-type was the salient PSB form in Britain, the PSB of traditional Confucian-style technocrats (Painter & Peters, 2010, p. 27) in Korea could be titled as the trustee-type. When taking into account the examples of Hood and Lodge (2006b, pp. 38-39)⁶⁵, the Korean elite officials who passed the *go-si* and cultivated their own expertise on the basis of the Confucian culture, would be enough to be regarded as a classical tutelary PSB. However, the series of market-oriented and managerial reforms that followed democratisation might have undermined this entrenched PSB type in Korea since the late 1990s. The SCS system, which is strongly related with the thermostatic approach, namely the simple-delegated PSB type, was explicitly aimed at changing the civil servants' attitude based on performance and competency. Nonetheless, it is true that considering the still existing opportunistic attributes of the Korean bureaucrats, particularly in terms of their politicisation or responsiveness, the historical narratives in Korea does not prove the shift of the politico-administrative relation notwithstanding the stronger demand for managerialism of the public sector. The pendulum movement between conflict and friendship in politico-administrative relation (Y.-d. Jung, 2008), or that between the agency-type and trustee-type PSB (Nam, 2016), happened repeatedly within the period of a presidential term. This could have been caused by the political structure in Korea,

⁶⁵ The Samurai-like Japanese bureaucrat is included in the 'moralistic' tutelary, and the German Hegelian ideal is associated with the 'legal or technocratic' tutelary.

like the lame-duck usually at the final year of the president, or it may be also explained by Hood (2002)'s argument about different PSB starting points. He claims that Westminster countries with an agency-type PSB are more likely to move readily to the NPM-type bargains than the countries with a trustee-type PSB, except in the case of major systemic crisis (Hood, 2002, pp. 323-325). Thus, this evidence seems to indicate that the Korean PSB was still under a period of instability or transition even after the launch of the SCS system. In particular, after the advent of the Lee government, it would be complicated to determine the eventual result of the politico-administrative relation, as well as ambiguous to define the PSB type of the time, in that the SCS system in his presidency, as analysed in Chapter 5, is regarded to be eroded through 'drift' change. There was certainly a continuous political motivation and impetus in Korea for moving towards the 'agency-type' bargains which could make politicians hold a dominant position, in the beginning stage of President Lee. However, the Korean bureaucrats' behavioural strategy vis-à-vis the political leader, seemed not to change regardless of the alternation of government. As mentioned in the above, the shift of PSB from agency-type to trustee-type, which had been repeated before, appears to have occurred again even in the period of President Lee despite his coercive attempt to control the executive branch. In other words, the opportunistic or parasitic attribute of the elite bureaucrats has still survived just as it reflects that the SCS system has not been entrenched.

In summary, the bargaining between Westminster and Whitehall can be classified traditionally as the agency-type of PSB, particularly *serial-loyalist* bargains, whereas the relationship between politicians and senior officials in Korea would be the *tutelary* style of the trustee bargaining until recent introduction of managerialism. Later, the change of the civil service systems seemed to be provoked by the emergence of the political power following the alternation in government, who pursued a new relationship between them and their executive agents on the basis of the principle of contract, competition and performance. Accordingly, since this new relationship was associated with indirect steering system, it can be claimed that the shift toward the PSB-type based on the logic of thermostatic control, namely the 'simple-delegated' bargains, caused the launch of the SCS systems. In this regard, the repeated attempts and failures for controlling the moralistic but opportunistic bureaucrats by the Korean presidents

since democratisation of 1988, could be analysed as the 'trustee'-type which was rebounded from the 'agency' bargains. In other words, it seems that this bounce-back of the PSB may have been reflected in the instability of the SCS implementation. Consequently, the characteristics of the SCS and its dynamics could be understood through the traits and changes of the resources which political principal and bureaucratic agent, the two key actors in public sector, exchange each other.


Integrative approach to the SCS dynamics

This understanding of the SCS nature along with the findings of the causal factors in Chapter 6 may allow to propose an integrative causal model about the institutional change of the SCS system. Basically, the approach of this dynamic mechanism is based on the research achievements of historical institutionalists like Mahoney and Snyder (1999, p. 25), and Mahoney and Thelen (2010, p. 15) which is illustrated in Figure 3-1. As shown in Figure 8-1, the black box of the SCS change contains not only the reward and loyalty as the core elements of PSB, which are the internal impetuses derived from Levi-Faur's (2006) stepwise analysis, but also other explanatory components which are believed to involve the civil service systems by Bezes and Lodge (2015). This is because the civil service reforms get affected by the institutional influence of 'absorption' as well as 'shaping', combined with new ideas (Bezes & Lodge, 2015, p. 149), and because the institutional transformation, as discussed in section 6-3, relies on the capacities or resources of actors under the given structures, rather than on their mere interventions.

With respect the actual process in Figure 8-1, the SCS as an institution is described as a personnel system interacting upward and downward, not to mention the internal sideward movement, in this model. To begin with, it is important to take into account the role of the change-agents within the institutional dynamics. The behaviours of these conscious actors, that is politicians and public officials, can build up or re-deploy directly their bargaining configurations, including the reward and loyalty systems. In this respect, it can be argued that the dynamics of institutional change comes from the political process which emphasising the struggles for the asymmetric power (e.g., Mahoney & Snyder,

1999; Steinmo & Thelen, 1992). On the other hand, the range of those change-agents' behaviours and strategies, particularly rule-makers, is bound by institutional resource, like legal basis, political context (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010, p. 28) or 'ideas' (Schmidt, 2008). According to Bezes and Lodge (2015, pp. 142, 149), those institutional arrangements with two aspects (entrenchment and pervasiveness) not only generate the distinctiveness of each country, but also offer institutional capacities through absorbing or shaping reforms which may be triggered from exogenous impetuses. As a result, the change-agent serves as a parameter which brings about the institutional results, as well as on which the other inputs/explanatory factors including institutions and political contexts, have an effect (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010, pp. 22, 28). In other words, the actors' behaviours emanate through institutions in which their political tools would be afforded or bounded rather than be determined. After all, it demonstrates that institutions are not only the “product of political conflict and choice”, but also “constrain and shape” the individuals' political choices simultaneously (Steinmo & Thelen, 1992, p. 28).

< Figure 8-1. Model for the dynamics of the SCS system >



Consequently, considering the conception of the institutional complexity and relationship, like the 'building-blocks' of Streeck and Thelen (2005, p. 9), the internally originated or incremental change can be also the major impetus for the SCS transformation as well, apart from such exogenous factors as the critical juncture which might lead to the abrupt and discontinuity change (breakdown and replacement in Table 3-2). As defined in this research, the SCS sub-systems with different foundations are combined to construct a specific institution relatively loosely in a certain time and area. Simultaneously, those subsidiaries abrade against or sometimes collide with each other inside the institution because of its nature of complexity (Lieberman, 2002; Orren & Skowronek, 1994; Thelen, 1999). Additionally, as Pierson (2000, p. 257) points out, the inter-connection and conflict within polities would be stronger and more complicated in the real-world issue, in that politics has the features of collective action, asymmetries of power and intrinsic complexity. Hence, it can be argued that the mechanism of institutional (trans)formation may be revealed by taking a close look at the internal and external dynamics over its power or political resources.

In conclusion, this model illustrates the meso-level analysis of new institutionalism as well as the function of the institution as a parameter in the institutional dynamics. Furthermore, this explanation about the causal mechanism of the SCS change also implies that the endogenous factors, such as the PSB elements or the influence of existing institutions, can be conducive to comprehending the nature of institutional change.

8-4. Contribution of the research to literature

Contribution to the knowledge of the SCS system

First of all, the comprehensive discussion on the SCS concept is the primary contribution of this research to literature on the SCS system. Considering that there has been neither single interpretation about the definition of SCS nor agreed terminology of it, the thesis is meaningful that this new concept was able to be grasped as a political institution, not just an elite group or a management skill, by using the institutional properties of complexity and relationship. This effort

to establish the SCS terminology would imply two kinds of contributions. On the one hand, the present study may be evaluated to enlarge the knowledge about the SCS through organising the scattered description about senior officials' roles and images from the viewpoints of 'locus' and 'focus' (Golembiewski, 1974; Henry, 1975). Additionally, the terminology and typology are the prerequisites of the comparative study (M. C. Mills, 2008, p. 102; Peters, 1998, p. 80) as well as of the foundation for analytical precision, particularly the measurement in qualitative research (Geddes, 2003, pp. 144-145; Mahoney & Goertz, 2006, p. 244). Thus, the enlarged understanding on the SCS terminology will be an asset for another comparative case studies. On the other hand, the complexes and relationship as institutional characteristics, were demonstrated in detail by this case studies on the British and Korean SCS systems. This exploration provided not only deep understanding of the properties of an institution, but also a new research area in the SCS study, especially by adopting the definition of institution from the perspective of historical institutionalism. Moreover, the theme of 'change' in this research is supposed to deal with the temporal scope, which has made 'time' to be included in the meaning of an institution (Y.-s. Ha, 2006, p. 219; Yeom, 2005, p. 431). This enriched definition allows to access to the institution study in various ways, and it also contributes to analyse the institutional continuity and change thanks to its acceptance of the flexibility and variability over time.

Secondly, the attempt of categorising the SCS synthetically in this study presented a multi-dimensional and useful tool for analysing it. With regard to the multiple natures of this new personnel system as an institution, the SCS typology was established according to two main criteria of managerialism and politicisation. This would be another achievement to add or broaden the various SCS typologies which was earlier compiled by Bourgault (2013). In this regard, each of the British and Korean SCSs was measured and sorted actually on the basis of empirical evidence in accordance with the above-mentioned definition and categorisation. Not only the information and application procedure of this research can be conducive to the accumulation of the SCS studies, but also those data drawn from the investigation into the case of the Korean SCS would be the first English language material to be introduced to Britain. In fact, it is demonstrated that the SCS cases in the U.K. and Korea were dissimilar, or even contradicted each other in their introduction backgrounds, operation system and political structures in

spite of the identical managerial doctrine which has promoted this civil service reform. Based on this, the classification of each of the SCS cases in both governments, as well as the comparison between them has empirically revealed that the SCS types vary across time and countries, despite the global convergence of the NPM or even in the same country. Consequently, this new SCS typology and the actual application of it in this case study could be a representative example of the institutional diversity.

Thirdly, just as the thesis used this temporal and spatial diversities (6 SCS types) in classifying the SCS system, the analysis of the various patterns of the institutional change was helpful to further comprehension of the dynamics of SCS. It is newly learned that the change processes of those SCSs were distinctive as well depending on the spatial and temporal differences. In other words, the third lesson of this case study is that this investigation deepened the understanding on the fluidity or variability of the SCS system over time. Although some studies on the change in the civil service system (e.g., Bezes & Lodge, 2007; Bezes & Lodge, 2015) are encouraging, yet as discussed in the literature review (section 2-2), there seems to be little analysis on the process and dynamics of its transformation through a comparative way. This dissertation may be estimated to be one of the pioneering works which carried out research into the progress of the SCS development with the most different, even contrasting cases in the U.K. and Korea. Also, it disclosed that the reward and loyalty systems are the essential parts of the SCS system because their changes caused the transition of the civil service's nature. As a result, the conclusion that the dynamics or shift of bargains in the politico-administrative relation can make a difference to the patterns of the SCS change, which were depicted in the four modes of change process, could offer an insight into the development of the SCS system.

Furthermore, with respect to the causal mechanism of the SCS dynamics, the pattern and causation of this institutional change discussed in this thesis can promote another relevant study, such as hypothesis testing and theory-confirming, away from the simple idea of relying on the existing increasing returns or path-dependency. In particular, although many of these kinds of arguments are grounded on just a historic chronicle, the three-dimensional and PSB-based framework of this research, as illustrated in Figures 8-1, shows why an integrative

and systematic analysis is needed to explain the complicated change mechanism. The model could be in line with the recent theoretical convergence, in which the two wheels of new institutionalism, as Thelen (1999, p. 370) claims, historical approach and rational choice, have crossed each other's borders for solving empirical matters notwithstanding their distinctions. Hence, this would be valuable because the comparison of cases by using the theoretical model about the institutional change process or type, is a new and good attempt to verify the validity of the research.

Contribution to the studies on the public service reform

Since the introduction of the SCS system can be understood in the context of the civil service reform based on the managerialism, this research into the SCS change enriched the discussion on the NPM which reignited the debate over the dichotomy of the politico-administrative relationship. The significance of the interactive relationship between politician and bureaucrat, on which this thesis is founded, may attract a renewed attention, in that the debate on the dichotomy of the politico-administrative relation, which had a long history, seems to have been revived recently with the advent of the NPM-type reform. This new approach has been considered as a remedy for government failure in the managerial perspectives, but it is intimately related to the issue of politicisation, the democratic control over bureaucracy, as well. Particularly, the politicisation, which is believed to have increased with the emergence of NPM, raised doubts about the neutrality of this managerial reform. One of the contributions of the present thesis is that this paradox of public service reform was demonstrated empirically by measuring the politicisation level of each study case in the U.K. and Korea as well as by comparing the results over time.

Furthermore, this research showed that it would be important to understand the meaning of politicisation or political interaction in the civil service reform. Since the interaction between rule-makers and rule-takers under the societal context is valued as an essential source of institutional change (Streeck & Thelen, 2005, pp. 13-14), the civil servants are also political actors, and their action cannot not be politically neutral completely, particularly with respect to personnel policy. Likewise, the launch of the SCS system is considered as a strategy of business-

like management, which might represent the thermostatic approach based on a new PSB relationship between politicians and public officials. In this respect, the thesis disclosed that political bargaining over power is also the factor of consideration in reforming the civil service system, which means that the public service reform is not simply the top-down pressure, but the result of bilateral bargaining related with political power. This could provide a practical wisdom to reformers who seek to improve their government through the strategies of personnel innovation. In other words, the lesson that the civil service reform is constantly changeable by interactive dynamics between actors who are under the influence of environments, gives implications about the importance of managing the process of the reform implementation.

On the other hand, the present study not only presented the needs to rethink the appropriateness of the same NPM-type remedies, but also brought about the scepticism about its effectiveness. Particularly, the Korean government reform including its SCS establishment, shows how difficult the policy transfer or diffusion is due to the different legacies or surroundings. As analysed already, the SCS system is composed of the diverse and disparate components in terms of the personnel policy, this nature of complexity can cause the system to become susceptible to the internal conflict which is one of the driving forces of gradual institutional change. For instance, a minor endogenous abrasion or modification, like re-interpretation (conversion) or negligence of the rule (drift), in the Lee government may have led to transformative consequences or unintended results. Accordingly, the thesis may indicate that the policy transfer without consideration of the contexts and conditions in the country, like the simple imitation of the advanced countries' policy, could be problematic later. In addition, the coexistence of diversity and commonality in reforming the personnel management and the different process or speed of it, can be an empirical example of the NPM contradiction that is brought up by Hood (2000). In consequence, the outcome of this research implies that the NPM reform which has spread out globally and converged into similar managerial remedies would be worthwhile rethinking regarding its appropriateness, as well as that the strategy tailored to each country would be required for handling the change process for successful policy implementation.

Furthermore, the narratives about the reform processes in those two distinct governments, can substantially coach the policy makers or implementors who seek lessons from other's success or mistakes. This research provided a detailed description on the reform progress and its aftermath in each nation from the historical-comparative perspective. Historical institutionalists might not predict change nor suggest normative contents (Peters, 2005, pp. 82-85), yet their "historical explanation" would be helpful by providing a longer time viewpoint (Thelen, 2004, p. 294), which is demanded by recent decision-makers. Also, the comparative analysis can be useful to comprehend "the political behaviour within one's own country" by drawing the similarities and differences (Peters, 1998, p. 4), contrary to the fragmentary survey or statistical result which are not always influential to practitioners in the public sector.

Finally, the assessment method of Marsh and McConnell (2010), which was introduced in this research, not only allows policy evaluators to view a fresh angle on the issues, but also proposes more choices or targets to be aimed at to policy designers. In this regard, although some criticised the transformed SCS system in Korea on the grounds that it had deviated from its initially intended goals, the implication of this multifaceted approach will let them re-think what they judged about this matter.

Contribution to the literature on the PSB theory

Above all, this research, which started with the institutional complexity and relationship as the properties of SCS, revealed that the PSB theory is not a matter of abstract conceptualization or model, but a valuable framework to demonstrate the diversities and dynamics of the politico-administrative relationship. That is, it has been proven that the concept of bargaining concerning political interaction in the public sector is an overarching factor which would reflect the asymmetry of power in the real world, as well as influence the institutional re-configuration in the bureaucratic reform. Moreover, besides the increasing comparative research based on the PSB, like Bourgault and Van Dorpe (2013), applying the perspective of new institutionalism to the PSB-related analysis could make the studies more profound and enriched. Particularly with regard to the investigation of process over time, it has been confirmed that historical institutionalism is appropriate for

examining the substantive agenda, including the political relationship, like this study (Pierson & Skocpol, 2002, pp. 696-698). As a result, it can be argued the theoretical assumptions and analyses of Bezes and Lodge (2015) are fairly convincing through this comparative case study in the U.K. and Korea: Bezes and Lodge (2007, 2015) investigated the stickiness of civil service reform, whereas this thesis explored the variety and dynamics of the SCS system.

Secondly, considering that the *competency* component among the PSB constituents was eliminated from the major causal factors of the SCS change in the stepwise inference of Levi-Faur (2006), it can be estimated that the reward and loyalty might make up relatively more essential part of the bargains between politician and public servants. This result can support the argument of Hood and Lodge (2006b, p. 7) empirically, because the political loyalty which politicians gain from public servants may be usually the principal element in the PSB. In other words, from this research, whatever the content of the 'gain' and 'give up' between them may be, what determines their bargaining type would be the way of how the principals design the incentive structure, and of how their agents respond to it without cheating. In this regard, the comparison of role or superiority between these PSB components can be another research subject, and the thesis might be considered a beginning step for extending the range of PSB study. Furthermore, it can be concluded that the stability or variability of the bargaining over power in the public arena, rather than the political power fluctuation itself, affects the reproduction or transformation of the SCS. This consequence may imply that the external shocks would not be enough to impact on the identity of SCS. Therefore, the claim that the sweeping alternation of government mainly influences the political relationship of bureaucrats (e.g., Meyer-Sahling & Veen, 2012) might require an overall re-examination of its process, maybe particularly by using the variables of PSB.

Thirdly, the historical narratives about the establishment of the British and Korean SCS during the NPM era, can provide cumulative and empirical evidence for the research into the relation between NPM and PSB. That qualitative study with contrasting cases would be conducive to prove those studies which paid attention to the compatibility between a PSB type based on specific administrative culture and the NPM-type thermostatic control. That is, if the unstable Korean

SCS system can be attributed to the difficult shift to the PSB type of 'simple delegated agency', the arguments that the managerial approach in civil service reform is closely associated with the 'Anglo-Saxon' countries (Hood, 2000, p. 324; Hood & Lodge, 2006b, p. 179), may be more persuasive. This study is also useful to demonstrate the validity of recent PSB researcher who pointed out the sustainability or transplantability of the NPM-type PSB (e.g., Nam, 2016), and who argued the conflict between explicit and tacit PSB (e.g., Elston, 2017) at the same time.

Lastly, like the association between PSB and NPM, the analysis of this thesis displayed empirically another possible correlation, such as the linkage between the types of change-agents and the patterns of institutional change (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010, pp. 28-29). Particularly, the parasitic or opportunistic attitude of the Korean bureaucrats, which characteristics had been rooted in a modern Korean history including the compressively industrialisation (Im, 2007, pp. 52-54), can have been verified scientifically in this case study. For example, according to the categorisation of Mahoney and Thelen (2010, pp. 23-27), the change-agents in the situation of *drift* or *conversion*, as shown in the case of the Lee administration, could be classified into the type of parasitic symbionts and opportunists respectively. Meanwhile, it might be deemed that the SCS development in the U.K., where the mode of 'layering' happened, is related with the subversive reformers, who follow the rules of the institution yet pursue the replacement of the existing institution. In consequence, this thesis which compared various variables by selecting contrasting cases, seems to allow many potentialities to develop relevant research.

Chapter 9 . Conclusions

9-1. Review of the Research

The last chapter briefly reviews the main discussions and summarised findings of this study, and then it presents suggestions or alternatives for future accumulation of research. The SCS system, which distinctive institution was intended to manage high-ranking officials with efficiency and accountability, has spread to many countries along with the NPM doctrines. However, the configurations of this new HR management as well as the processes of its development, vary with the country and especially over time. Understanding the change to the SCS system which means revealing how and why their differences across time and space occurred is important, in that these dissimilarities are academically the matter of institutional diversities and changes. Moreover, since the senior civil servants play a practical, pivotal role in governing a nation, administering them effectively is significant for both the improvement of public service and the democratic control over the bureaucracy. In particular, the SCS establishment in the U.K. and Korea would be comparable cases, which can uphold the validity of a qualitative method, owing to their contrasting backgrounds. Besides this MDSD setting, it was expected that disaggregating each case into four observations, according to the before-and-after alternation in government facilitates the comparison of the dynamics over those periods through setting the MSSD.

Accordingly, the present study sought to understand the research question through the following sub-questions: (1) what the characteristics of the SCS change process are; (2) what the causal factors of it are; (3) how the result of this change is assessed. In consideration of Pierson and Skocpol (2002)'s argument that the substantive and temporal topics can be compatible with historical institutionalism, the patterns and dynamics of the SCS- this research's subject- was explored from the perspective of this new institutionalism. In addition, this research paid attention to the PSB concept and politicisation for examining the change process of each SCS system, not only because this civil service reform can be defined as a new managerial scheme consisting of various sub-institutions,

such as the reward, competency and loyalty systems, but also because it manages the interactive relationship between politicians and high-ranking bureaucrats.

Based on this overview, Chapter 2 reviewed the preceding literature concerning the key concepts of the thesis, including the NPM, politicisation and PSB, in order to establish the prerequisites to approaching the SCS change. Through this, it was available to create a two-dimensional category of the SCS for discerning its transformation over time, as well as to deduce assumptive explanatory components from the PSB theory, particularly from the conceptual tool of Bezes and Lodge (2015). Then, two theoretical frameworks for both understanding the characteristics of the SCS change and inferring its causal mechanism were introduced in Chapter 3 based on such historical institutionalists' achievements over institutional change as Mahoney and Thelen (2010) and Streeck and Thelen (2005). Also, this chapter explained the methodological issues including case selection and data collection, especially document analysis, of this comparative small-N case study. The narratives in Chapter 4, in which the developments of the SCS system in the U.K. and Korea were described, not only provided the background of comprehending the features of both countries' civil service reform, but also produced the empirical evidence for answering the research questions.

With regard to Chapters 5 to 7, each chapter attempted to answer the three sub-questions of this thesis respectively. First, a total of six SCS types in Britain and Korea were measured by this research's own classification composed of two aspects of managerialism and politicisation. This categorisation would be helpful to recognise whether the institutional change occurred and if so, to what extent by comparing the SCSs before and after the alternation in government. Subsequently, the characteristics of the observations of the SCS change processes in Britain and Korea were perceived as four different patterns of institutional (trans)formation: *layering* (gradual change), *reproduction* (continuity), *breakdown and replacement* (abrupt change) and *drift* (gradual change).

Next, As for the second inquiry into finding the main factors affecting the SCS change, this qualitative case study followed the 'Boolean logic' for causality, not a regression formula of quantitative analysis (Mahoney & Goertz, 2006, p. 232)

as analysed in Chapter 6. On the one hand, the output value of the equation is set up as a Y_1 and Y_0 , which denote the outcome whether the SCS type changed during the given period (modes A through D). On the other hand, the potential causal factors, derived from Bezes and Lodge (2015) in which six components related with the PSB are recommended for comparative research on the civil service system, were confirmed in each case. Then, the comparative analysis of Levi-Faur (2006) allowed the direct determinants of the SCS dynamics to be turned out as the changes of reward and loyalty systems, the core of PSB (e.g., *Outcome Y = Factor R AND/OR Factor L*). Furthermore, this implies that the conscious behaviours which strategies are shaped or delimited by political resources, like the advent of the thermostatic control over bureaucracy, would be deeply associated with the launch of the SCS system.

The last sub-question, which is about assessing the changed SCS, was solved by reviewing the argument of Marsh and McConnell (2010), which might be related not only with the diversity of the SCS but also with the axis of the time. According to their three-dimensional assessment tool, the evaluation of policy can be different depending on which perspectives or methods are taken because it is bound to be subjective and political. As a result, it can be learned from the assessment of the four SCSs of this case study that it is not easy to conclude the outcomes of institutions, including Mr. Lee's changed SCS which has been considered a flop, as a clear success or failure.

Chapter 8 dealt with the main findings vis-à-vis the three key inquiries of the thesis, and it involved the broader arguments over the SCS change, especially in relation to the PSB. The discussions about the explanation of PSB types in the U.K. and Korea during the four historical time nodes of this research, as well as about the suggestion of the dynamic mechanism of the SCS, are expected to contribute to understanding the SCS systems and their development. That is, this qualitative analysis on the dynamics of the SCS system can be illustrated in Figure 8-1, which might reflect the above Boolean equation of the institutional change based on the explanation of historical institutionalism. Finally, this dissertation's contributions to the knowledge were presented in three aspects: SCS systems; public service reform; and PSBs.

9-2. Avenues for future inquiry

Despite the improved understanding of the SCS and its change mechanism, there are some limitations as well as still many fields to be examined further. This section puts forward some suggestions with regard to the key findings of the present study. First, there could be other kinds of SCS terminology or typology. Terminology may be used variously depending on the theoretical foundation (Castellví, 1999, pp. 9-11). As Bourgault (2013, pp. 166, 167-168) introduced, the classification of SCS can also differ according to the purpose, focus and interest of research. Even if the intentions were similar, the category would be dissimilar in accordance with the research subject or the SCS definition. For instance, in terms of the SCS role in relations with politicians, there are several typologies, such as Peters (1987), C. Campbell (1988) and Hood and Lodge (2006b). Moreover, practically the result of applying the typology can vary depending not only on which empirical evidence is adopted, but also on who judges or interprets the materials, as this study did in deciding the decentralisation level of the Korean SCS system (e.g., ② part in Table 5-5).

Second, contrary to the conclusion of Bezes and Lodge's (2015, p. 143) gradualism, the change patterns demonstrated in this study show that even contemporary civil service systems can be transformed radically by an abrupt or revolutionary reform, like the SCS launch in the President Roh era. Hence, in future research, it would be worth examining the reason behind the dissimilar outcomes between this study and Bezes and Lodge (2015). Moreover, it might be possible to categorise the SCS change processes differently, especially its pattern in the Lee administration (e.g., drift) because the classification is grounded on the matter of ontological constructivism and epistemological interpretivism.

Third, no one can rule out the potentiality that there could be other explanatory factors in the causal mechanism of the SCS change due to the difficulty of managing control variables in non-experimental research. This study has set the list of possible inputs impacting the SCS changes, which were mainly derived from Bezes and Lodge (2015) from the viewpoint of the politico-administrative relation. However, potential factors relevant to the SCS can be set differently

depending on where the interest of the study is, as shown in Meyer-Sahling and Veen (2012, pp. 14-15), in which the government changes were subdivided into six patterns for exploring the relationship between them and the politicisation of the bureaucracy.

In addition, it seems that the model for the SCS dynamics can be refined further by investigating in detail the interaction between the PSB components and their structural resources, including legal entrenchments or political opportunities. Particularly, although the present study revealed the direct determinants of the SCS change process, the deduced Boolean equation in Chapter 6 would still require specific truth-tables about how those two factors (reward and loyalty) operate and combine other institutional elements. Thus, more empirical evidence is needed about the SCS changes even in the same countries of this thesis, which will be also conducive to the assessment of them in addition to the discussions in Chapter 7.

Fifth, increasing more cases could be helpful to improve the external validity, 'generalising', in this small-N analysis. The careful case selection of the present study has minimised error variance, but there might be a criticism of not overcoming thoroughly the potential weakness of the qualitative method in proving the causation. Also, it would be almost impossible to control extraneous variance outside the laboratory, notwithstanding the logical defence for comparative research, such as the existing theories and the time-series analysis within a country (Peters, 1998, pp. 33-34). Thus, if there can be more cases available to be examined, not only the issue of 'many variables, few cases' but also testing the hypothesised relationship will become less problematic.

In this regard, it would be interesting to compare the present study and Meyer-Sahling and Veen (2012). To begin with, the facts that there was little change to the British SCS system in the New Labour era despite a wholesale transfer of power, and that the dramatic creation of the SCS in Korea during the consecutive left-wing presidencies are contradictory to their argument emphasising extraneous shocks, such as the sweeping alternation of government. Next, since this discrepancy may be caused not only by the absence of a specific variable (PSB) or the lack of integrative comprehension of the institutional dynamics

(Figure 8-1), but also by the differences in measuring the SCS politicisation, it would be meaningful to apply these aspects to their research. Moreover, the post-communist states they investigated allow the selection of more 'comparable cases' now because more countries among them have recently adopted the SCS system (OECD, 2011, p. 93; 2017, p. 143).

In conclusion, cumulative qualitative research with more empirical evidence will offer more convincing explanations about the pattern and dynamic of this institutional change. Furthermore, through this effort, the deeper understanding of the politico-administration relationship as well as of the civil service system will be beneficial to reform government in practice.

Appendices

List of interviewees

For the sake of ensuring the anonymity, the interviewees' comments are not attributed to them by name.

Interviewee code	Position and Career	Date of interview
<i>Korean case</i>		
IK1	Current SCS member, former director of the SCS division of the MOPAS (Lee's era)	19 August 2019
IK2	Former deputy minister of the personnel bureau of the MOPAS (Lee's government)	19 August 2019
IK3	Former director of the MOPAS and deputy director of the KCSC	20 August 2019
IK4	Former minister of the MPM, and deputy Secretary of the President Office (Roh's era)	26 August 2019
<i>British case</i>		
IB1	Former minister of the Cabinet Office in the John Major government	13 August 2020

* The KCSC, which had been charged with the civil service reform, merged into MOPAS in 2008. Then the MPM separated from MOPAS, was set up for managing the government personnel affairs exclusively in 2014.

The Sheet of ‘Questions guide of Interview’

Outline of the Interview	
Research Title	<i>Change in the Senior Civil Service as Evolution: - A comparative Analysis of the U.K and South Korea</i>
Research Question	<i>How and why was the SCS (Senior Civil Service) institution changed in the United Kingdom and the Republic of Korea (South Korea)?</i>
Interviewees	<i>People who were engaged in the SCS change in each government, as well as who are involved in the SCS policy academically or practically</i>
Interview Method	<i>Semi-structured and face-to-face interview: small number (5 more or less) of people will be interviewed in depth with open questions to understand their ideas or insight about the research (Flick, 2006; Gillham, 2000; Oppenheim, 1992)</i>
Time & Place (TAP)	<i>XX. Aug. 20XX at the office of XXXX</i>

Introduction

- I am very glad to meet you, and I appreciate your accepting and cooperating with this interview.
(Offer refreshment)
- You, who are considered as one of the key participants or acknowledged experts in the Korean (*British*) SCS policy, will have a conversation about the difference of the SCS system between the period of President Roh’s government and that of President Lee’s government (*the period of Conservative governments ... of PM Blair’s government*).
- This conversation to explore the processes and reasons of the SCS change is going to last in thirty minutes to one hour.

Opening

- The purpose of this interview is to talk about how and why the SCS system, which is designed for a new personnel management for higher government officials, has been changed after President Lee Myung-bak's government of 2008. (*After Prime Minister Tony Blair’s government of 1997*).
- Furthermore, this research aims to explore the mechanism of SCS change in a historical and institutional approach by applying a comparative analysis in the two different cases of the U.K. and S. Korea.
- Do you have any questions about this interview or research?
- Would you mind agreeing to the recording of this interview on digital voice file? Recording is very important for a detailed analysis afterward. Also, all your recording-files will be held in strict confidence and be used on an anonymous basis only.

Schedule of the open questions

- I have list of questions here to just remind me.

(Open these sheets in full view)
(Allow them to lead the conversation)

Key Questions & Prompts (chronological sequence)	
1) Can I start by asking the question ‘what do you think of the main purpose and characteristics of the Korean (<i>British</i>) SCS when it initially launched in 2006 (<i>1996</i>)?’	Features, intention of the original SCS
2) Could you describe how the scene of government alternation, that is to say the regime change of 2008 (<i>1997</i>), was?	Anything but Roh (<i>the third way</i>)
3) Do you think there has been a difference of the SCS rules/operation or any personnel management since the new government was inaugurated? 3-1) If yes, what do you think the difference from past SCS was? Also, was the difference/change huge or not so big? 3-2) If no, was there any attempt or effort to reform the civil service system at that time?	Statute revision, Amendment of law / white paper for gov’t reform
4) Could you explain ‘how the change process of the statute relevant to the SCS system went on?’ 4-1) What was the Blue House (<i>PM</i>)’s position on that matter? 4-2) How did the bureaucrats respond to the new leader’s policy? 4-2) What was the attitude of other ministries’ officials?	Interaction with minister, politician / Top-down, Resistance, Bargaining
5) The last thing I want to ask you about is ‘what are your views on this progress of the SCS policy?’	Bureaucratic culture in Korea (<i>the UK</i>) / NPM

Closure

- To sum up, you mean that the Korean (*British*) SCS system has been (*little*) changed since the inauguration of new leader 2008 (*1997*), because ...
According to your memory, the change process was...., and ...
- You have given me a lot of useful material and considerable insight.
- I am really grateful to your interview today. If you request, a copy of your interview transcript will be supplied for commenting on and editing.

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