

## Baudelairean Empathy and the Limits of Transcendence

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The posthumous survival of traces of lived experience is a persistent theme in Baudelaire's writing. Sometimes it is an uncorked perfume bottle or a chest of drawers that holds ghosts of the past, while at other times art and poetry promise a form of immortality. At other times again, the dead are afforded a kind of enduring half-life, even as they lie in their graves. The poet himself has enjoyed an unusually prolonged afterlife in the banal sense that applies to many famous authors whose work survives them. In an only slightly less banal sense, Baudelaire's *survivance* can be related to the fact that so much of his writing, whether in the form of lyric poetry or prose poetry, describes an affective response to a real or imagined sight, situation, or event, so that his poems become virtual, time-travelling vehicles for intensely lived experience. The phenomenological critic Georges Poulet was particularly interested in the emotional afterlife of Baudelaire's verse, claiming that, for the poet himself, 'Lire un poème, c'est se mettre dans des conditions telles que revivent dans la pensée lectrice des sentiments analogues à ceux qui ont inspiré le poème.'<sup>1</sup> What makes the affective afterlife of Baudelaire's poetry unusual is that, quite often, the 'je' is represented as a participant in a more or less emotionally communicative encounter with a perceived or imagined other person or persona.<sup>2</sup> The feelings that the 'je' experiences in emotionally identifying with others find expression in poems that themselves elicit, at least potentially, analogous affective responses from the reader. This means that it is not just the emotional experience of the poet's alter ego that is conveyed by *Les Fleurs du Mal*, but also, at least potentially, the communicated feelings of multiple real or imagined human others. Baudelaire's poems, which so often give thematic prominence to the idea of an afterlife, can thus communicate an affective experience that has outlived both the poet and its originator. Indeed, it will be suggested in what follows that inscriptions of empathy for other human beings, in Baudelaire's poetry, tend to gesture towards both the possibility and the impossibility of the transcendence of physical limitations.

This article will begin with a brief discussion of both the history and meaning of empathy, in order to work out how the poet's presentation of the phenomenon both relates to and goes beyond the thinking of his contemporaries. The article will suggest that Baudelaire can be understood not only as an early theorist of empathy, but also as a very early theorist of an ethical form of empathy.

Baudelaire died a few years before the concept of empathy was formally named, though the idea had been in development for some time. The English word 'empathy', from which its French cognate would be derived, was coined in the early twentieth century, by analogy with the older concept of 'sympathy', which was known to the Ancient Greeks and theorised by David Hume and Adam Smith in the eighteenth century.<sup>3</sup> Empathy, by contrast with sympathy,

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<sup>1</sup> Georges Poulet, *La Poésie éclatée. Baudelaire– Rimbaud* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1980), p. 80.

<sup>2</sup> On the preponderance of dialogic address in *Les Fleurs du Mal*, see Jennifer Yee, "'La Beauté': Art and Dialogism in the Poetry of Baudelaire", *Neophilologus*, 102 (2018), 1–14 (p. 3).

<sup>3</sup> Sympathy tends now to be understood as a feeling for, while empathy is understood instead primarily as a feeling with. The literary scholar Suzanne Keen defines empathy as 'the spontaneous, responsive sharing of an appropriate feeling', and sympathy as 'the more complex, differentiated feeling for another'. Suzanne Keen, *Empathy and the Novel* (Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 4.

is generally defined by a perception of similarity between the affective states of subject and object.<sup>4</sup> The Oxford English dictionary accordingly defines empathy in terms of identification, while also supposing a certain separateness: it is the ‘power of mentally identifying oneself with (and so fully comprehending) a person or object of contemplation’.

The word ‘empathy’ was introduced into English as a translation of the German term *Einfühlung*, first used by the aesthetic philosopher Robert Vischer, in his 1873 doctoral thesis, to designate the role of emotional projection in aesthetic contemplation. For Vischer, *Einfühlung*, which literally means ‘in-feeling’ or ‘feeling into’, described an affective self-projection into the visual object. At its origins, *Einfühlung* was experienced primarily in relation to objects of contemplation rather than people. It was essentially, for Vischer, a ‘symbolizing activity’, linked to a perception of similarity between subject and object, whereby the object effectively becomes a symbol of the subject.<sup>5</sup> Crucially, however, for Vischer, *Einfühlung* involved not just an emotional projection into the object, on the part of the perceiving subject, but also a kind of imaginary adaptation to, and even fusion with, the object on the part of the subject:

It does not matter whether the object is imagined or actually perceived; as soon as our idea of the self is projected into it, it always becomes an imagined object: an appearance. The way in which the phenomenon is constructed also becomes an analogy for my own structure. I wrap myself within its contours as in a garment. [...] We move in and with the forms.<sup>6</sup>

In the experience of *Einfühlung*, a kind of reciprocal dynamic is established between subject and object. For Vischer, according to his translators, empathy is more than a ‘simple projection of emotions or the emotional response we may feel toward an object’, denoting instead a ‘more radical and thoroughgoing transference of our personal ego, one in which our whole personality (consciously or unconsciously) merges with the object’, as part of a ‘transcendental process’.<sup>7</sup> Vischer writes:

We [...] have the wonderful ability to project and incorporate our own physical form into an objective form [...] I project my own life into the lifeless form, just as I quite justifiably do with another living person. Only ostensibly do I keep my own identity although the object remains distinct. I seem merely to adapt and attach myself to it as

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<sup>4</sup> The following definition has found wide acceptance among psychologists: ‘There is empathy if: (i) one is in an affective state; (ii) this state is isomorphic to another person’s affective state; (iii) this state is elicited by the observation or imagination of another person’s affective state; (iv) one knows that the other person is the source of one’s own affective state.’ Frédérique de Vignemont and Tania Singer, ‘The Empathic Brain’, *Trends in Cognitive Sciences*, 10.10 (2006), 435–41 (p. 435).

<sup>5</sup> Robert Vischer, ‘On the Optical Sense of Form: A Contribution to Aesthetics’, in *Empathy, Form, and Space: Problems in German Aesthetics, 1873–1893*, Introduction and Translation by Harry Francis Mallgrave and Eleftherios Ikonomou (Santa Monica, CA: Getty Center for the History of Art and the Humanities, 1994), pp. 89–123 (p. 109).

<sup>6</sup> Vischer, ‘On the Optical Sense of Form’, p. 101.

<sup>7</sup> Harry Francis Mallgrave and Eleftherios Ikonomou, Introduction to *Empathy, Form, and Space: Problems in German Aesthetics, 1873–1893* (Santa Monica, CA: Getty Center for the History of Art and the Humanities, 1994), pp. 1–85 (pp. 25–26).

one hand clasps another, and yet I am mysteriously transplanted and magically transformed into this Other.<sup>8</sup>

While *Einfühlung* was conceived primarily as an aesthetic emotion stimulated by the subject's perception of an object, it could also be applied to people, as the above passage suggests. Indeed, the process was understood by Vischer to be fundamentally interpersonal in character. Vischer observes, for example, that the human, interpersonal dimension of empathy is the very condition of self-projection, even where the latter involves inanimate objects only: 'This natural love for my species is the only thing that makes it possible for me to project myself mentally.'<sup>9</sup> In other words, according to Vischer, we anthropomorphise the world around us, finding our own reflections in it, because of our love for humanity. The interpersonal dimension of *Einfühlung* is particularly operative in the contemplation of artistic creations. Vischer notes that 'every work of art reveals itself to us as a person harmoniously feeling himself into a kindred object, or as humanity objectifying itself in harmonious form'.<sup>10</sup> For Theodor Lipps, too, who developed Vischer's conception of *Einfühlung*, empathy with natural objects or artefacts is inseparable from the 'experience of another human'.<sup>11</sup>

However, empathy for another living person is more complicated than empathy with a non-human object, insofar as human beings are invested with consciousness while objects are not (even where those objects are the products of human consciousness).<sup>12</sup> It is not clear, in the work of the early theorists of *Einfühlung*, whether emotional self-projection into another human being can lead to any genuine understanding of that other person's inner life. Vischer observes that where empathy has a tendency to animate plants and anthropomorphise animals, in the case of other human beings it produces a 'doubling of self', a recognition of oneself in the other.<sup>13</sup> As commentators have pointed out, to recognise oneself in the other is not necessarily the same as to understand the other, and may indeed amount to a misunderstanding of the other, whose inner life and experience may be entirely different from one's own.<sup>14</sup> Nevertheless, empathy came to be understood increasingly, in the twentieth century, as a way of gaining access to other people's minds.

The idea of empathy has often been invoked in critical work on Baudelaire, particularly in recent years, with the surge of academic empathy studies and of public interest in the theme, partly as a result of developments in neuroscience. In the 1930s, for example, Walter Benjamin finds in Baudelaire's work a form of empathy with objects. He refers to the poet's unusual

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<sup>8</sup> Vischer, 'On the Optical Sense of Form', p. 104.

<sup>9</sup> Vischer, 'On the Optical Sense of Form', p. 103.

<sup>10</sup> Vischer, 'On the Optical Sense of Form', p. 117.

<sup>11</sup> See Theodor Lipps, *Ästhetik II* (Hamburg: Voss Verlag, 1905), p. 49. The translated quotation is from <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/empathy/> [last consulted 26 September 2019].

<sup>12</sup> Admittedly, there is an increasing philosophical tendency to question the possibility of distinguishing in any absolute way between human consciousness and the world of things. This article will itself complicate this distinction, while also maintaining it. For a consideration of this question in relation to nineteenth-century French literature, see for example Corry Cropper, 'Réintroduction à la littérature fantastique: Enlightenment Philosophy, Object-Oriented Ontology and the French Fantastic', *Nineteenth-Century French Studies*, 44.1–2 (2015–16), 25–45.

<sup>13</sup> Vischer, 'On the Optical Sense of Form', p. 106.

<sup>14</sup> See for example, on the thinking of Lipps, Dan Zahavi, *Self and Other: Exploring Subjectivity, Empathy, and Shame* (Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 103–105.

identificatory empathy with ‘the material’ and with ‘inorganic things’.<sup>15</sup> In Benjamin’s understanding of the term, empathy is a kind of self-object fusion without any particular moral value. An amoral, self-projective type of empathy is also discerned in Baudelaire’s work by some critics who are interested in the poet’s representation of interpersonal relations. For Edward Kaplan, accordingly, the variant of empathy at work in Baudelaire’s prose poems lacks any ethical value, being entirely ‘narcissistic’; it is ‘not a *transitive* empathy with separate persons who possess subjective depth but a *reflexive* mental drama’.<sup>16</sup> For Gérard Gasarian, Baudelaire does succeed in incorporating something of the lives of other people, but does so as part of an essentially hedonistic project, in pursuit of vicarious feeling: ‘La poésie s’offre ainsi comme un réservoir d’affects imaginaires où puiser des frissons nouveaux. Pour être ressentis sur une scène artificielle, ces frissons étrangers n’en sont pas moins réels, permettant ainsi au sujet d’épouser à distance d’autres sensibilités que la sienne.’<sup>17</sup>

Many critics, however, invest Baudelairean empathy with ethical force. Poulet, who argues for the centrality of identification to Baudelaire’s work as both poet and critic, associates this phenomenon with a ‘pitié’ that is also ‘une espèce d’amour’.<sup>18</sup> Ross Chambers suggests that the poet demonstrates a non-objectifying and therefore superior form of compassion for others: ‘Baudelairean *empathy* for marginal and socially-abandoned people contrasts with Hugo’s brand of “humanitarian” liberalism’.<sup>19</sup> Beibei Guan and Wayne Cristaudo, similarly, remark that the poet chooses to express solidarity with rag-pickers rather than ‘simply *objectify* them with his pity’: ‘While Baudelaire is, in many important respects, hostile to any kind of moralism, he is deeply empathetic to human suffering wherever it occurs.’<sup>20</sup> For Marielle Macé and Mathieu Vernet, Baudelaire’s receptiveness to other people (‘il ouvre son âme à d’autres âmes’), his willingness to go ‘hors de lui’ in all senses, reveal a fundamentally ethical attitude, associated with ‘[la] cette promesse d’une hospitalité’.<sup>21</sup> However, Vernet elsewhere suggests that the poet’s empathy, while generous in its impulse, is also deeply ambivalent: he notes that Baudelaire’s ‘disposition empathique qui partage les souffrances et rassemble les cœurs’ is always accompanied by an objectification of the other that can take the form of cruelty, impassivity, or disgust.<sup>22</sup> Indeed, taking ‘À une mendicante rousse’ as his starting point, Peter Nicholls has argued that the poet deploys irony and objectification as a defence against ‘the full recognition of identity with other people’.<sup>23</sup> Similarly, while John E. Jackson gives the idea of compassion a central role in Baudelaire’s poetics, he too acknowledges that compassion and cruelty can be close bedfellows in his work.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> Walter Benjamin, *The Writer of Modern Life: Essays on Baudelaire* (Harvard University Press), pp. 245, 85–86.

<sup>16</sup> Edward K. Kaplan, *Baudelaire’s Prose Poems: The Esthetic, the Ethical, and the Religious in The Parisian Prowler* (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2009 [1990]), p. 62.

<sup>17</sup> Gérard Gasarian, *De loin tendrement: étude sur Baudelaire* (Paris: Champion, 1996), p. 229.

<sup>18</sup> Poulet, *La Poésie éclatée*, p. 70.

<sup>19</sup> Ross Chambers, ‘Baudelaire’s Dedicatory Practice’, *SubStance*, 17.2 (1988), 5–17 (p. 8).

<sup>20</sup> Beibei Guan and Wayne Cristaudo, *Baudelaire Contra Benjamin* (Lanham: Lexington, 2019), p. xiii–xiv.

<sup>21</sup> Marielle Macé and Mathieu Vernet, ‘Présentation. Baudelaire hors de lui’, *Baudelaire hors de lui* (special issue) *Littérature*, 177 (2015), 1–6 (pp. 5, 6).

<sup>22</sup> Matthieu Vernet, ‘Baudelaire, “le plus peuple des poètes”’, *Littérature*, 177 (2015), 61–72 (p. 72).

<sup>23</sup> Peter Nicholls, *Modernisms: A Literary Guide* (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1995), p. 4.

<sup>24</sup> John E. Jackson, *Baudelaire et la sacralité de la poésie* (Geneva: Droz, 2018).

Sometimes, criticism of Baudelaire invokes a quasi-magical identificatory empathy which is reminiscent of elements of the thinking of Vischer and Lipps. Judith Wulf, for example, refers to the ‘empathie collective’ that arises from ‘les métamorphoses du moi’, in Baudelaire.<sup>25</sup> Michele Hannoosh, in a similar vein, discusses the trope of self-doubling in Baudelaire’s work: the ‘observateur passionné’ is capable of maintaining the self-contained ‘impassivity of the dandy’ while also escaping from the self and identifying with the other.<sup>26</sup> Implicitly present in much of what has been written about Baudelairean empathy is the idea of transcendence: the notion that a poet can almost magically slip under the skin of others and inhabit their lives. This is not surprising, given that the narrator of the prose poem ‘Les Foules’ states that the poet ‘entre, quand il veut, dans le personnage de chacun’, and the narrator of the prose poem ‘Les Fenêtres’ claims to be ‘fier d’avoir vécu et souffert dans d’autres que [lui]-même’.<sup>27</sup> However, given the now widely acknowledged unreliability of the narrator of *Le Spleen de Paris*, and competing statements in that collection such as ‘tant la pensée est incommunicable, même entre gens qui s’aiment’ (*Oc* I 319), this article will focus instead upon depictions of empathy in the verse poetry. How magical and fusional are depictions of empathy in Baudelaire’s verse?

Timothy C. Vincent has argued that *Les Fleurs du Mal* exemplifies the turn, on the part of French modernism, away from the fusional identification that he associates with the realist style, towards a self-projective form of ‘empathetic identification’ that the critic associates with Vischer’s thinking and which crucially rejects any notion of a ‘transference of meaning from object to subject’ that would idealise the object world as intrinsically meaningful.<sup>28</sup> In Vincent’s reading of Baudelaire, the role of the poet or artist is to transform the object, bringing a kind of coherence and stability to it that it otherwise lacks; the poem or artwork is the result of this transformative self-projection. Vincent bases his reading upon the humanisation of the city of Paris in the poet’s ‘Projets d’un épilogue pour l’édition de 1861’. This article will show that Baudelaire’s anticipation of *Einfühlung* theory goes beyond Vincent’s account of the self-projective humanisation of external objects. This is because, it will be argued, empathetic (or ‘empathic’ — the less morally connoted term often used in recent work on the subject) identification, in the poet’s work, also involves the kind of merging or binding that is an important component of Vischer’s thinking. This is not to say that Baudelaire idealises the external world, but rather to suggest that his verse inscribes a kind of becoming-other of the self. I will argue, furthermore, that Baudelaire’s inscriptions of empathy in relation to observed human beings go beyond self-projective self-doubling, taking the form instead of a recognition of shared limitations.

This article has noted that empathy was, for its early theorists, inseparable from the human tendency to anthropomorphise the physical universe. This tendency, often associated with Romanticism, is certainly present in the work of Baudelaire. Indeed, the poet claimed to subscribe to the idea, which he associated with the eighteenth-century theologian and mystic Emanuel Swedenborg, that a network of analogies or correspondences connects the human

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<sup>25</sup> Judith Wulf, ‘“A travers l’espace”: Ici ou là dans *Le Spleen de Paris*’, in *Lectures du Spleen de Paris*, ed. Steve Murphy (Rennes: Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2014), pp. 335–48 (p. 346).

<sup>26</sup> Michele Hannoosh, *Baudelaire and Caricature: From the Comic to an Art of Modernity* (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992), p. 292.

<sup>27</sup> Charles Baudelaire, *Œuvres complètes*, ed. Claude Pichois, Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, 2 vols (Paris: Gallimard, 1975–76), I, 291, 339. Henceforth *Oc* followed by volume number.

<sup>28</sup> Timothy C. Vincent, ‘From Sympathy to Empathy: Baudelaire, Vischer, and Early Modernism’, *Mosaic: a journal for the interdisciplinary study of literature*, 45.1 (2012), 1–15 (p. 5).

mind to the material world.<sup>29</sup> It is not surprising, then, that Baudelaire's verse poetry regularly confers human traits upon inanimate reality. What is striking, though, for our argument, is the manner in which Baudelaire's verse poetry also regularly stages an imaginative merging of self and non-human object, whereby not only is the external object liable to take on human characteristics, but the subject takes on something of the quality of the object. The blurring of boundaries between the self and a non-human object is regularly portrayed, in Baudelaire's verse, by means of a kind of metaphorical contagion. 'Le Flacon' (*Oc* 1 47–48) describes the release of the memory of a past love from an oddly humanised perfume bottle ('un vieux flacon qui se souvient'), and the troubling effects it has on the perceiving subject. In the final two stanzas, the lyric subject imagines himself as, and metaphorically becomes, the perfume bottle — 'on m'aura jeté, vieux flacon désolé' — container of a 'poison préparé par les anges'. Similarly, in 'La Cloche fêlée' (*Oc* 1 71–72) we find the lyric subject metaphorically taking on the attributes of a church bell that the sonnet has previously humanised as, for example, 'alerte et bien portante'. In 'La Musique' (*Oc* 1 68), the lyric subject, carried away as if by a sea of music, takes on the characteristics of a boat: 'Je sens vibrer en moi toutes les passions/ D'un vaisseau qui souffre'. As this quotation make clear, the traffic is two-way, the imagined boat becoming imbued with the affective life of the lyric subject even as the latter imagines himself as a boat.<sup>30</sup> The poem 'L'Albatros' (*Oc* 1 9–10) humanises the sea birds in its second quatrain, describing them as 'ces rois de l'azur', goes on to establish an analogy between the poet and a now singularised bird ('Le Poète est semblable au prince des nuées'), and concludes with a metaphorical identification of 'Poète' and bird: 'Exilé sur le sol au milieu des huées,/ Ses ailes de géant l'empêchent de marcher.' Interestingly, the cruel sailors described in this poem, who taunt the albatross, engage in anthropomorphising and mimetic activities that mirror the processes underpinning the lyric subject's empathic identification with the bird: they humanise it by inserting a clay pipe into its beak and they mimic the albatross's awkward gait. In 'Le Cygne', too, the lyric subject identifies with a bird that he simultaneously humanises, even comparing it to 'l'homme d'Ovide'. The self-projection is more extreme than in 'L'Albatros', as the lyric subject goes as far as to ventriloquise the swan's thoughts. The poem states that a swan, escaped from its cage, says: "'Eau, quand donc pleuvras-tu? quand tonneras-tu, foudre?'" (*Oc* 1 86). While the humanisation of the swan is pronounced, the lyric subject's own identification with it is more subtle, being implied by the analogy between the swan's imagined yearning for its lake and the sense of displacement that is at the very core of this poem. It should be noted that there is no sense in any of these poems that the empathic event is anything other than an effect of imaginative processes: while Baudelaire does associate artistic creativity, in his aesthetic criticism, with a magic that binds subjects to objects, it is a magic that has its origins in the evocations and suggestions of the human mind: it is 'une espèce de sorcellerie évocatoire' (*Oc* 2 118) or 'une magie suggestive contenant à la fois l'objet et le sujet, le monde extérieur à l'artiste et l'artiste lui-même' (*Oc* 2 599).

As in the case of empathy with objects, in Baudelaire's poetry, the practice of feeling oneself into the lives of other people, as long as they are represented as virtual people only, involves an imaginative merging. To begin with, there are various poems, such as 'La Beauté' and 'Le Vin de l'assassin', in which the lyric subject adopts a virtual human persona, just as

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<sup>29</sup> For example, Baudelaire paraphrases Swedenborg as teaching that 'le ciel est un très grand homme' (*Oc* 2 133).

<sup>30</sup> For a more detailed analysis of the operation of empathy with objects in these poems, see my article 'Baudelaire, Vischer, and Self-Transforming Empathy', *Nineteenth-Century French Studies*, 50.1–2 (2021), 84–102.

there are poems in which the lyric subject speaks from the perspective of an object (for example, 'La Pipe' and 'L'Âme du vin'). In texts such as these, there is no clear-cut division established between lyric subject and adopted persona. In other poems, however, there is a clear subject-other division, which permits an analysis of the workings of empathy as it relates to a virtual human. In 'Le Masque' (*Oc* 1 23–24), for example, a statue depicting a beautiful woman is described by the lyric subject, to an interlocutor, as an object in the third person ('ce trésor de graces florentines', 'Cette femme, morceau vraiment miraculeux'). Her imagined thoughts are ventriloquised by the lyric subject, who imagines her to say "'La Volupté m'appelle et l'Amour me couronne!'"'. When the subject realises that the statue's serenely smiling face is actually a mask hiding a second, suffering face, the quality of his relationship to the virtual woman shifts: he addresses the statue in the second person, and is virtually soaked in its imagined feelings:

Pauvre grande beauté! le magnifique fleuve  
De tes pleurs aboutit dans mon cœur soucieux;  
Ton mensonge m'enivre, et mon âme s'abreuve  
Aux flots que la Douleur fait jaillir de tes yeux! (*Oc* 1 24)

In the final part of the poem the lyric subject again addresses his initial interlocutor, and refers to the statue in the third person once again. However, not only is the statue highly humanised now, and even endowed with a life that it/ she is apparently condemned to live, but the subject clearly identifies with the imagined woman, claiming to know and share her inner feelings:

Elle pleure, insensé, parce qu'elle a vécu!  
Et parce qu'elle vit! Mais ce qu'elle déplore  
Surtout, ce qui la fait frémir jusqu'aux genoux,  
C'est que demain, hélas! Il faudra vivre encore!  
Demain, après-demain et toujours! — comme nous! (*Oc* 1 24)

What is interesting about this poem, from the perspective of our analysis of empathic processes, is the fact that the lyric subject ventriloquises the object's imagined thoughts very differently before and after the discovery of the mask. His projection of thoughts onto the statue is initially dispassionate, and accompanies an attitude of aesthetic and sensual admiration which seems to echo the statue's own air of self-admiring complacency. Subsequent to the 'surprise fatale', however, the lyric subject becomes impassioned and melancholic, and appears to feel a strong identificatory connection with the now far more humanised statue. Identification with a humanised object is the key feature of the empathic event that is described in 'Le Masque', as of Baudelaire's verse poems that evoke empathy with more obviously non-human objects.

There are various other virtual people in *Les Fleurs du Mal* with whom an at least initially distinct lyric subject expresses identificatory empathy. Sometimes, the virtual person is presented in the third person, and then addressed directly, before the lyric subject acknowledges his similarity to him or her. The first part of 'Le Squelette laboureur' (*Oc* 1 93–94) sets the scene with a third-person description of anatomical drawings, while the second part directly addresses the skeletal labourers depicted therein, and finishes upon the idea that this hellish afterlife will also be visited upon 'nous', a pronoun that takes in both lyric subject and reader; indeed, the final quatrain puts the spade under 'notre pied sanglant et nu', the 'nous' having assumed the physical posture of the addressees, even perhaps having become the singularised skeleton named in the title. The hanged and partially devoured man of 'Un voyage à Cythère' (*Oc* 1 117–19), a poem that has its origins in a textual source, is similarly described in the third person before being apostrophised. The lyric subject feels himself into the

presumably dead body of this man, sharing not only his suffering in the abstract sense ('Ridicule pendu, tes douleurs sont les miennes!') but also, after initial revulsion, feeling a strong physical identification with his dead or dying body, even going so far as to refer to the man's flesh as his own:

Devant toi, pauvre diable au souvenir si cher,  
J'ai senti tous les becs et toutes les mâchoires  
Des corbeaux lancinants et des panthères noires  
Qui jadis aimaient tant à triturer ma chair.

In the final quatrain, the lyric subject refers to the hanged man as 'mon image', and begs for the courage to look upon his own heart and body 'sans dégoût'. Here, the lyric subject appears to identify with the hanged man while preserving his own separate identity.

The movement of the poem 'Une martyre' (*Oc* 1 111–13) is somewhat different, though it again takes a virtual person as its object. The object is twice removed from being a living human being, firstly in that it is a drawing of a human being and secondly in that the human being is dead, her decapitated corpse lying semi-naked on a bed and her head sitting on a bedside table. As in some of the other texts just discussed, the poem moves from third-person description to direct address; the corpse is exhorted to respond to the speaker and is thereby imaginatively endowed with a kind of inner life. However, the lyric subject does not explicitly identify with the virtual person by taking on any of her characteristics or assumed feelings, as he does in 'Le Masque' and 'Un voyage à Cythère'. Nor does he attempt to imagine the dead woman's thoughts, though he does speculate that the woman loved the man who killed her, and even suggests that her 'forme immortelle' continues to watch over her assassin as he sleeps. In this poem, the lyric subject asks questions of the corpse that remain unanswered, and he begins to do so precisely at the point where the perspective shifts from the third person to the second person:

Elle est bien jeune encor! — Son âme exaspérée  
Et ses sens par l'ennui mordus  
S'étaient-ils entrouverts à la meute altérée  
Des désirs errants et perdus ?

L'homme vindicatif que tu n'as pu, vivante  
Malgré tant d'amour, assouvir,  
Combla-t-il sur ta chair inerte et complaisante  
L'immensité de son désir ?

Réponds, cadavre impur! et par tes tresses roides  
Te soulevant d'un bras fiévreux,  
Dis-moi, tête effrayante, a-t-il sur tes dents froides  
Collé les suprêmes adieux?

The lyric subject imagines elements of the woman's inner life, above, and will later appear to sympathise with her, but the three questions that are asked here, and left without an answer, suggest that there is a limit to his willingness or ability to feel himself into, and thereby comprehend, her situation. He stops short, in other words, of identifying with her. Certainly, the 'je' speculates, in the above quatrains, about the scene of the woman's death, but this speculation is framed as a series of questions, as if the lyric subject were unwilling to expose this once-human other any more than she has already been exposed. It may also be the case



that the speaker's empathy is obstructed by what appears to be a simultaneous identification with the woman's lover (the lyric subject's gaze is voyeuristic and even sadistic, and in the final lines he vouches for the lover's faithfulness to the woman), and an intuition that to expose her inner life further would be to repeat the act of violence that has already been visited upon her.

A similar suggestion of *pudeur* is present in some of Baudelaire's verse poems that evoke an identificatory or empathic relation with apparently observed, living human others, as distinct from virtual or imagined human beings. In the sonnet 'Les Aveugles' (*Oc* 1 92) there is no switch from a third-person to a second-person perspective. There is, however, an increasing sense of identification, on the part of the lyric subject, first with the situation, secondly with the physical attitude, and finally with the inner life of the blind people. The poem begins by dehumanising the observed blind people, describing them as zombie-like, soulless figures:

Contemple-les, mon âme; ils sont vraiment affreux!  
Pareils aux mannequins; vaguement ridicules;  
Terribles, singuliers comme les somnambules;  
Dardant on ne sait où leurs globes ténébreux.

Leurs yeux, d'où la divine étincelle est partie,  
Comme s'ils regardaient au loin, restent levés  
Au ciel; on ne les voit jamais vers les pavés  
Pencher rêveusement leur tête appesantie.

Any 'divine étincelle' that these beings may once have had in their eyes has long departed, leaving only dark globes in heavy heads. By contrast, the lyric subject can see perfectly well, as suggested by the first word of the poem: 'Contemple-les', by his visual description, and by the first word of the penultimate line: 'Vois!'. And whereas these sleep-walking zombies seem to lack any soul, the lyric subject gives a leading mention to his own 'âme', in the first syllables of the poem. It is, then, the difference between the 'je' and the blind people that is highlighted in the first part of the poem. Something shifts, however, in the first tercet:

Ils traversent ainsi le noir illimité,  
Ce frère du silence éternel. Ô cité!  
Pendant qu'autour de nous tu chantes, ris et beugles,

Éprise du plaisir jusqu'à l'atrocité,  
Vois! je me traîne aussi! mais, plus qu'eux hébété,  
Je dis: Que cherchent-ils au Ciel, tous ces aveugles?

In the final line of the first tercet we find a reference to 'nous', suggesting a kind of fraternity between the lyric subject and the blind men. The idea of fraternity is even more explicitly invoked in the previous line: the infinite darkness that the blind people inhabit is described as brother to the eternal silence for which the lyric subject implicitly yearns. The noisy, pleasure-seeking city — singing, laughing, and bellowing — may be all around, 'autour de', both the blind people and the speaker, but both seem also to be separate from the city, distinct from it. The blind people are removed from the city insofar as they appear to inhabit unlimited darkness, while the lyric subject is situated outside of the raucous, hedonistic city, 'Éprise du plaisir jusqu'à l'atrocité', on account of his contemplative attitude: contemplation is evoked in the very first word of the poem. The lyric subject and the blind men are brothers, it turns out,

because they are outsiders within the city. They fixate on something other than pleasure. In the final stanza, above, the lyric subject declares his own physical similarity to the blind people: he drags his feet as they do, and is as dazed-looking as are they. The last line suggests that he also participates in their inability to see: he wonders what they are looking for in the skies, and by asking the question suggests his own blindness. He cannot see what it is that the blind men appear to be straining to see, and therefore shares their searching attitude. It is notable that, recalling the three unanswered questions of 'Une martyre', the poem ends with a question, as if to suggest not just the lyric subject's fraternal participation in the blindness of those he contemplates but also the impossibility of feeling oneself fully into the experience of another human being.

Nevertheless, something has happened: the ridiculous-looking objects of the lyric subject's derision have become his brothers. They are, like him, outsiders and seekers. It is as if the singing, laughing, bellowing city has, like an encircling coven of witches, cast a transformative spell: 'Vois! Je me traîne aussi!', the 'je' tells the screeching city. Like most of the other poems already discussed, 'Les Aveugles' suggests a partial identification of the lyric subject with the object of empathy. However, where many of those other texts humanise their objects, the blind people are represented as only partially human, at least until the moment that the lyric subject acknowledges his similarity to them. The implied thing-ness of the observed blind people arguably renders the recognition of shared humanity more dramatic, their transformation from objects to brothers seeming vaguely magical.

A similar trajectory is described in 'Les Petites Vieilles' (*Oc* 1 89–91), the poem that directly precedes 'Les Aveugles' in *Les Fleurs du Mal*. It too dramatises an empathic transformation of its puppet-like human objects into virtual family members. That this transformation has something magical about it is suggested by its first lines: 'tout, même l'horreur, tourne aux enchantements'. The poem begins by evoking the little old ladies who frequent the streets of Paris as grotesque, thing-like creatures: they are '[d]es monstres disloqués'; their movement is reminiscent of puppets, bells, and animals; their eyes are compared to gimlets and dark pools of water; and the lyric subject speculates about the dimensions of their coffins. Although the poem's metaphors, similes, and mathematical reflections operate to dehumanise and objectify the old ladies, the latter are also described sympathetically: they are 'décrépits et charmants', and 'ce sont encor des âmes'; they are compared to 'les animaux blessés' and the bells they resemble are 'pauvres'; the lyric subject recognises in their strangely inhuman eyes 'les yeux divins de la petite fille'. The speaker goes on to apostrophise the women, as if to further counteract his dehumanisation of them with a recognition of their humanity.

By contrast with 'Les Aveugles', the lyric subject takes the liberty of feeling himself into the imagined lives of the women he observes, speculating about the nature of the suffering they have endured: one is the victim of her country, another of her husband, another of her child. The 'je' even claims to be able to experience — and draw pleasure from — the past lives of the women, simply by watching them:

Je goûte à votre insu des plaisirs clandestins:

Je vois s'épanouir vos passions novices;  
Sombres ou lumineux, je vis vos jours perdus;  
Mon cœur multiplié jouit de tous vos vices!  
Mon âme resplendit de toutes vos vertus!

Marcel Proust noted that there is something both cruel and tender about this depiction of old ladies.<sup>31</sup> There is a voyeuristic, even vampiristic quality to the pleasure that is in play here. None of this, however, means that the poem is lacking in empathy. As various commentators have pointed out, empathy can be entirely compatible with a self-serving and even sadistic kind of pleasure.<sup>32</sup>

However, there is also a certain *pudeur* in evidence in ‘Les Petites Vieilles’, as in ‘Une martyre’ and ‘Les Aveugles’. This reticence is most marked in the third part of the poem, which describes one particular old woman as she sits on a bench listening to a brass band. The lyric subject refrains from speculating about her thoughts, feelings, and motivations, suggesting her inner heroism only by a kind of metaphorical contiguity: the sky behind her is blood red, the music she listens to so ‘avidement’ is evocative of battle, her eye resembles that of an (imperial) eagle, and her marble brow recalls the sculpted heads of laurel-crowned war heroes: ‘Son front de marbre avait l’air fait pour le laurier’. Any suggestion of ‘feeling into’, here, is muted and tentative. The lyric subject of *Les Petites Vieilles* goes on to suggest, in the poem’s fourth and final part, that he maintains a respectful distance from the old ladies he observes, watching them ‘de loin tendrement’, as if he were their anxious father: ‘Tout comme si j’étais votre père’.

As this reference to fatherhood suggests, a kinship between old ladies and lyric subject is insinuated in the text. It is initially implied by the hint of a shared legacy of suffering:

— Ces yeux sont des puits faits d’un million de larmes,  
Des creusets qu’un métal refroidi pailleta...  
Ces yeux mystérieux ont d’invincibles charmes  
Pour celui que l’austère Infortune allaita !

The poem’s final quatrain explicitly confirms this recognition of kinship, in its first line, and suggests that the resemblance between the lyric subject and the old ladies is related to their shared status as ‘ruines’:

Ruines! Ma famille! ô cerveaux congénères!  
Je vous fais chaque soir un solennel adieu!  
Où serez-vous demain, Èves octogénaires,  
Sur qui pèse la griffe effroyable de Dieu?

It is noteworthy that the poem should end, like ‘Les Aveugles’, upon an unanswered question. Here, as in ‘Les Aveugles’, it is intimated that the point at which the lyric subject most closely merges with other human beings, most closely recognises his kinship with them, has something to do with an encounter with the limits of human knowledge. It is also suggested, in ‘Les Petites Vieilles’, as perhaps in ‘Les Aveugles’, that the point of contact between self and other involves a recognition of mortal limits: ‘Ruines!’. Mortality is, of course, the dominant theme of ‘Les Petites Vieilles’: it is crucially the old ladies’ closeness to death that fascinates the lyric subject. It is only at the end of the poem, however, that the ‘je’ appears to acknowledge his own participation in that mortality, as if his identification with the old women has brought him to this recognition.

A similar intimation of mortal limits, and a similarly unanswered question, suggestive of the limits of human knowledge, feature in the verse poem ‘À une passante’ (*Oc* 1 93). In

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<sup>31</sup> Marcel Proust, *Contre Sainte-Beuve* ([Paris], 1954), p. 170.

<sup>32</sup> See for example Fritz Breithaupt, *The Dark Sides of Empathy*, trans. Andrew B. B. Hamilton (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2019), and particularly the chapter on ‘Vampiristic Empathy’.

this sonnet, placed just after ‘Les Petites Vieilles’ and ‘Les Aveugles’ in the ‘Tableaux parisiens’ section of *Les Fleurs du Mal*, the lyric subject famously locks eyes with a passing woman in mourning dress, and senses, in that fleeting instant, not only that he could have loved her, but also that, in that precious moment, she too knew this. This apparent meeting of souls is, crucially, a non-meeting, riven by absence and loss:

Un éclair... puis la nuit! — Fugitive beauté  
Dont le regard m’a fait soudainement renaître,  
Ne te verrai-je plus que dans l’éternité?

Ailleurs, bien loin d’ici ! trop tard! *jamais* peut-être!  
Car j’ignore où tu fuis, tu ne sais où je vais,  
Ô toi que j’eusse aimée, ô toi qui le savais!

So keen is the sense of loss in the above lines that their tone calls to mind a grieving spouse, as if the lyric subject has somehow assumed the widowed woman’s grief. Chambers writes in 1986 about the ‘empathetic’ connection established in this meeting of eyes.<sup>33</sup> However, Sarah Gubbins notes the dubious status of the lyric subject’s ocular reading of the woman, understanding the poem to suggest that ‘even apparently genuine attempts to isolate a person’s uniqueness and establish a “true” connection are doomed to failure’.<sup>34</sup> Chambers himself, in a more recent study, writes of this poem as descriptive of ‘a missed encounter with actual knowledge’, and as an exploration of ‘the epistemological dilemma—both the wondering and the wonderment—that is entailed by knowing only that one doesn’t know’.<sup>35</sup> To the extent that this poem describes a genuinely empathic encounter, a meeting of souls, it suggests, as do its two immediate predecessors in the collection, that such encounters are marked by absence, loss, and a recognition of mortality, or the limits of human transcendence: ‘Ne te verrai-je plus que dans l’éternité?/ Ailleurs, bien loin d’ici! trop tard! *jamais* peut-être?’

There are other texts in *Les Fleurs du Mal* where the lyric subject speculates about the inner lives of apparently observed other people, and they too suggest a shared consciousness of absence, loss, and human limitation. ‘Bohédiens en voyage’ (*Oc* 1 18), for example, imagines the gypsies’ ‘morne regret des chimères absentes’, as they face into an uncertain future. The black woman of ‘Le Cygne’ (*Oc* 1 85–87) cuts an even more harrowing figure:

Je pense à la négresse, amaigrie et phtisique,  
Piétinant dans la boue, et cherchant, l’œil hagard,  
Les cocotiers absents de la superbe Afrique  
Derrière la muraille immense du brouillard

What is striking about these instances of empathic ‘mind-reading’, like some others examined in this article, is that they centre upon absence, as if the shared experience of absence, loss, or emptiness is what crucially unites self and other. Empathy with other human beings can be presented, in Baudelaire’s work, as a quasi-magical communication of souls but it can also be understood as a shared experience of the limits of the possible. These two different

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<sup>33</sup> Ross Chambers, “The Storm in the Eye of the Poem: Baudelaire’s ‘À une passante,’” in *Textual Analysis: Some Readers Reading*, ed. Mary Ann Caws (New York: Modern Language Association of America, 1986), pp. 156–66 (pp. 159, 162)

<sup>34</sup> Sarah Gubbins, ‘Generic Baggage. Encountering Other People in “À une passante” and “Les veuves”’, *Esprit Créateur*, 58.1 (2018), 8–16 (p. 15).

<sup>35</sup> Chambers, *Atmospherics*, pp. 17, 98–99.

understandings of interpersonal empathy — one of which is magical or transcendental, involving a meeting of souls unshackled by bodies, and the other of which centres upon a recognition of the irreducibility of human limitation — co-exist in the poet's work, nowhere more clearly than in 'À une passante', where both the possibility of a meeting in the afterlife and the possibility of this meeting never happening are equally explicitly evoked.<sup>36</sup>

In fact, access to the inner lives of real, living people, whether represented as observed or remembered, is rarely imagined, in Baudelaire's verse poems. There are exceptions, such as the ocular reading performed in 'Sonnet d'automne', but generally descriptions of the apparently real other person, in texts such as 'Ciel brouillé', 'Sed non satiata' and 'Le Beau Navire', make little or no pretence of insight into the other person's inner life: there is little sense in these texts that the lyric subject imagines himself to be experiencing the world from the observed other's point of view. In numerous verse poems, the lyric subject apostrophises a potentially observed living person, but where these poems assume any knowledge at all of the other's thoughts, feelings, or motivations, this knowledge tends to be accompanied by an acknowledgement of a certain limit to understanding. This sense of a limit to interpersonal knowledge is explicit in 'Les Aveugles', but it is also intimated by the unanswered questions of 'Les Petites Vieilles' and 'À une passante'. This limit becomes a central theme in prose poems such as 'Les Yeux des pauvres', 'Mademoiselle Bistouri', and 'La Fausse Monnaie'.<sup>37</sup>

What our analysis has suggested is that an at least partial imaginative merging of self and object, a recurrent motif in *Les Fleurs du Mal*, does occur in the case of apparently observed human beings: the lyric subject presents himself as a fellow blind man at the end of 'Les Aveugles', as a fellow mortal ruin in 'Les Petites Vieilles', and as a fellow grieving lover, in 'À une passante'. There is, however, a striking restraint in evidence in these texts, a sense that the other is somehow out of reach, despite the evidence of empathic identification. Certainly, the idea of a magical union of souls is present in 'Les Petites Vieilles' and 'À une passante', but there is also a recognition of the limits of human transcendence as of the limits of knowledge. There is, furthermore, a suggestion in all three of these *Tableaux parisiens* poems that the lyric subject has undergone a shift in his relation to the other, a shift that is accompanied by a recognition of kinship.

The critic John E. Jackson suggests that a presentiment of similarity or 'parenté' is necessary in order for the Baudelairean 'je' to experience identification with an object or other.<sup>38</sup> This may be so, but this article's analysis of the operation of identificatory empathy in the verse poems has suggested that the conscious recognition of 'parenté' or kinship is an endpoint rather than a point of departure, and also that the recognition of similarity, rather than simply grounding the identificatory experience of the 'je', can un-ground the subject's sense of self, whether the object of empathy is non-human, a human persona, or an apparently observed human. In the case of poems that stage empathy with observed, living human others, in particular, the recognition of similarity seems to bring the lyric subject to an unsettling confrontation with the limits of human possibilities. The moment of kinship-recognition takes

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<sup>36</sup> Edward Kaplan refers to Baudelaire's 'hard-won truce with human limits', involving a new post-religious understanding of transcendence, and a poetry that 'sanctifies the finite'. The marks of this truce are most evident, he argues, in the *Tableaux parisiens* poems added for the 1861 edition of *Les Fleurs du Mal* from which 'À une passante' is drawn. Edward Kaplan, 'Modern French Poetry and Sanctification: Charles Baudelaire and Yves Bonnefoy', *Dalhousie French Studies*, 8 (1985), 103–25 (pp. 115, 121).

<sup>37</sup> Elsewhere, I intend to explore the implications of this analysis for our understanding of Baudelaire's prose poems, which present (occasionally within the same text) interpersonal empathy as entirely unproblematic, on the one hand, and as highly problematic, on the other.

<sup>38</sup> Jackson, *Baudelaire et la sacralité de la poésie*, p. 111.

the form of a confrontation with a shared human predicament, an awareness of the limits imposed by existence. ‘Que cherchent-ils au Ciel, tous ces aveugles?’, concludes ‘Les Aveugles’. If the blind have access to the heavenly transcendence of which the sky is so often an image, then the lyric subject cannot share their insight, just as they cannot participate in his vision of the physical sky. We cannot see what others see, or know what they seek. ‘Où serez-vous demain, Èves octogénaires,/ Sur qui pèse la griffe effroyable de Dieu?’, asks the subject of ‘Les Petites Vieilles’. In the grave, it seems safe to assume; but if ‘Dieu’ exists, might they be elsewhere? The lyric subject of ‘A une passante’ confronts the limits of his knowledge: ‘Un éclair... puis la nuit! [...] j’ignore où tu fuis, tu ne sais où je vais’. This article has argued that it is this confrontation with the limits of what it is possible to know that appears to characterise empathy for other human beings as it is most profoundly expressed in *Les Fleurs du Mal*.

It is arguably in the representation of intersubjective empathy that Baudelaire’s poetry most dramatically confronts non-knowledge, revealing what David Scott calls the ‘essential impenetrability of experience’ and staging what Chambers calls ‘disalienation’, namely ‘the recognition of human alienation’, where alienation is defined as ‘the baffling proximity of familiar fellow citizens whom one can know/ read no more successfully than one can read/ know oneself’.<sup>39</sup> This recognition of alienation and impenetrability is at the heart of ‘Les Sept Vieillards’, where a dismayed, horrified lyric subject watches old man after apparently identical old man emerge from the mist of the street: the ‘je’ is ‘épouvané,/ Malade et morfondu, l’esprit fiévreux et trouble,/ Blessé par le mystère et par l’absurdité’ (*Oc* 1 87–88). The lyric subject knows that the wicked expression on the face of the man will militate against other people feeling sympathy for him, and yet he himself feels ‘un frisson fraternel’ towards him. The kind of empathy being described here is threatening for the integrity of the self. As Gasarian notes of Baudelaire’s apparent habit of self-identification with others, ‘Si le poète est un héros moderne, c’est qu’il se risque et même se prostitue dans des figures où l’intégrité de son moi est compromise.’<sup>40</sup> I would argue that Baudelaire’s verse invites the reader to engage in precisely this kind of uncomfortable empathy. An unsettling empathic connection would certainly seem to be invited by the collection’s opening address to the ‘— Hypocrite lecteur, — mon semblable, — mon frère!’ (*Oc* 1 6) as well as by the ‘Épigraphe pour un livre condamné’ (*Oc* 1 137), intended as a preface for an edition of *Les Fleurs du Mal*, which exhorts the ‘Lecteur paisible et bucolique’ to cast aside a book that is liable to be understood and loved only by a restless reader who ‘sait plonger dans les gouffres’.

In conclusion, it would appear that Baudelaire anticipated the thinking of the first empathy theorists insofar as, like them, he conceived of an at least partial imaginary merging of self and object. However, he also went beyond these thinkers to the extent that at least some of his poetry describes an unsettling recognition of kinship with other human beings that anticipates far more recent thinking about empathy, which tends to focus on the ethical importance of responsiveness, or what Dominick LaCapra calls ‘empathic unsettlement’, rather than self-projection.<sup>41</sup> Baudelairean empathy has little to do with the idea of a shared human nature, espoused by Romantics like Victor Hugo, but rather with a more recognisably modern

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<sup>39</sup> David Scott, *La Fanfarlo and Le Spleen de Paris*, (London: Grant & Cutler, 1984), p. 69. Chambers, *Atmospherics*, pp. 17, 117. It has been argued, however, that interpersonal misunderstanding can play a creative role in Baudelaire’s work. See Helen Abbott, “‘I turned to look at you to read my thought upon your face’: Baudelaire’s Readers Transposed”, in *Poets as Readers*, pp. 131–47.

<sup>40</sup> Gasarian, *De loin tendrement*, p. 236.

<sup>41</sup> See Dominick LaCapra, *Writing History, Writing Trauma* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001).

awareness of a shared human predicament. The poet's most dramatic evocations of empathy with other human beings foreground the idea of human mortality and limitation even as they hint at the possibility of the magical removal of limits. His inscriptions of empathic experience may even help us to notice the acknowledgement of human limitations that coexists, in Vischer's 1873 discussion of *Einfühlung*, with apparent claims to magical transcendence. It is striking, indeed, that in a rare passage where Vischer explicitly writes about empathy for another human being, he suggests that the sight of a wounded soldier may lead us not only to 'repeat' and 'relive' the realities of human conflict but also to become aware of 'mortality' and of 'our own dependence'.<sup>42</sup> While the notion of an ideal communication of souls is certainly present in *Les Fleurs du Mal*, the most explicit representations of interpersonal empathy in the verse poems tend to involve a recognition of both the possibility and the impossibility of human transcendence of physical limitations. This is the recognition communicated by faded roses in an old boudoir, by a fleeting glimpse of a would-be kindred spirit, or by words of poetry on a page. It is a union of souls that is also a missed meeting, in an afterlife that may, after all, exist only in the mind.

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<sup>42</sup> Vischer, 'On the Optical Sense of Form', p. 110.