Democracy and Democratic Language in Isocrates

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I certify that all material in this thesis which is not my own work has been identified and that any material that has previously been submitted and approved for the award of a degree by this or any other University has been acknowledged.

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Abstract

The Athenian orator Isocrates (436-338 BC) is frequently branded as an insincere supporter of democracy who was promoting an oligarchic agenda in disguise. Within this framework, his use of the δημ- family of words and closely related terms has usually been either neglected or interpreted as corroborating his alleged anti-democratic stance. By challenging these trends, I explore how a re-examination of Isocrates' usages of democratic vocabulary throws light on his political views and, more generally, on the role of his political thought within the development of Greek political thought.

The opening chapter provides some preliminary remarks on the issues at stake and the methodological approach. The thesis then analyses the Isocratean usages of two notions inextricably related to democracy: Chapter 2 focuses on speaking freely by examining the occurrences of παρρησία, Chapter 3 explores his use of the idea and language of equality. Both chapters show that, rather than distorting their alleged true meaning, Isocrates problematises these terms and notions on the basis of their deeply-rooted flexibility. Chapter 4 investigates the usages of δημαγωγός highlighting the relevance of his interest in political leadership. This chapter also analyses the Isocratean depictions of Alcibiades to elucidate further his views on leadership. The final chapter develops these insights by examining the occurrences of δημοτικός and showing that Isocrates redefines what it means to be in favour of the δῆμος in light of his ideas on leadership.

Overall, by means of a semantic approach, this thesis argues against the view of Isocrates as an anti-democratic thinker and suggests a more sophisticated approach that takes into account two essential elements. On the one hand, the fact that Isocrates exploits, and stretches, the ductility already embedded in these terms in order to tackle contemporary historical and political issues. On the other hand, his interest in what makes a good leader in both internal and external politics and the crucial role that this profound interest in leadership plays in shaping his views on what democracy should look like.

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Abbreviations

DK	H. Diels and W. Kranz, *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*[6]
FGrHist	Jacoby, *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker*
Fr.West	M.L. West, *Iambi et Elegi Graeci*, vol. II
IG	*Inscriptiones Graecae*, 14 vols.
PMG	D.L. Page, *Poetae Melici Graeci*
TLG	*Thesaurus Linguae Graecae*

A Note on Editions and Translations

All translations are my own, unless otherwise noted. The translations of Isocrates are based on the Budé text. All other translations are based on the relevant edition of the Loeb Classical Library, with the exception of the following:

Archytas of Tarentum	Huffman (2005)
[Aristotle]	Rhodes (2017)
[Xenophon]	Marr and Rhodes (2008)

Chapter 1
Introduction

The present thesis aims to investigate and reappraise the political thought of the Athenian orator and teacher of rhetoric Isocrates (436-338)[1] through the lens of an examination of the political vocabulary that he employs in his vast corpus of works. More specifically, my focus will be on the use of the δημ- family of words and of closely related terms.[2] Isocrates has often been labelled as an insincere supporter of democracy, whose main goal actually consists in promoting an oligarchic agenda in disguise.[3] In this respect, his use of political language has generally been either overlooked or dismissed as supporting evidence for the charge of an inveterate and ill-concealed anti-democratic stance. In response to these widespread and long-standing assumptions, I intend to show, by means of a semantic investigation contextualised in the broader historical and literary framework, that it is possible to draw a significantly more nuanced picture in which both the ductility entrenched in the δημ- family of words and in some key related terms as well as Isocrates' profound interest in political leadership play a crucial, yet often neglected, role.

In this introductory chapter, which is composed of three sections, I shall begin by focusing on the pivotal elements that characterise Isocrates' self-representation throughout the corpus, with specific reference to his self-portrait as ἀπράγμων ('free from business'). Indeed, as we will see, far from pointing to a lack of interest in contemporary political issues or an anti-democratic stance, ἀπραγμοσύνη ('love of a quiet life') represents the cornerstone on which Isocrates builds his claim of being a political counsellor *par excellence*. The second section provides a survey of the main studies devoted to Isocrates' political thought in order to position the overall argument within the wider picture of the key scholarly debates. Finally, I shall conclude this opening chapter with some methodological considerations, which lay down the specific lexical approach that I intend to adopt throughout this dissertation, along with a detailed illustration of the content and aim of each chapter.

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[1] All dates are BC unless otherwise noted.
[2] For a more detailed discussion of the key political terms which will be analysed in the present study see the final section of this introductory chapter.
[3] See, for instance, Bearzot (1980).

1. Isocrates and the τόπος of ἀπραγμοσύνη

In his own self-characterisation Isocrates underlines his decision to withdraw from Athens' public life opting for ἀπραγμοσύνη. This emphasis on the concept of quietism has contributed to the image of a teacher of rhetoric positioning himself outside Athens' political community and withdrawing into the ivory towers of his school. Moreover, his remarks that his retreat from public life has been caused, as we shall see below, by his weak voice and lack of courage have been interpreted as part of his alleged anti-democratic stance.[4] Within this context, his deliberate choice of ἀπραγμοσύνη has generally been regarded as stemming from his 'dissatisfaction with Athens'.[5] In this respect, ἀπραγμοσύνη, according to Mirhady and Too, 'marks out the aristocratic and oligarchical members of the democratic community to each other and to their fellow citizens'.[6] Nonetheless, the Isocratean use of this commonplace is more multifaceted than it might appear at first sight. Indeed, in the present section we shall see how Isocrates problematises and reinvents this τόπος in order to show that he is very much capable of benefiting his own πόλις while being, or rather precisely because he is, ἀπράγμων.

Isocrates' self-portrait as ἀπράγμων

To begin with, let us look more closely at the autobiographical details that Isocrates himself provides throughout his corpus. Special attention has to be devoted, in this respect, to the self-portrait that he paints in *To Philip*, written in 346, shortly after Athens and Macedon had concluded the Peace of Philocrates. Here Isocrates urges Philip not to be surprised by the fact that, despite being neither a 'general' (στρατηγός) nor a 'public speaker' (ῥήτωρ) nor a 'ruler in any particular way' (ἄλλως δυνάστης), he has addressed the king of Macedon 'more boldly' (θρασύτερον) than others do. Indeed, Isocrates continues, he is 'the most naturally unsuited' (ἀφυέστατος) among his fellow citizens to take part in political activity (πρὸς τὸ πολιτεύεσθαι) since his voice is weak (οὔτε γὰρ φωνὴν ἔσχον ἱκανήν) and he does not possess the 'courage' (τόλμα) necessary 'to deal with the mob' (ὄχλῳ χρῆσθαι) and 'to rail at those who wallow on the

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[4] See Heilbrunn (1975) 157 (cf. Too (1995) 103).
[5] Heilbrunn (1975) 164.
[6] Mirhady and Too (2000) 203.

platform' (λοιδορεῖσθαι τοῖς ἐπὶ τοῦ βήματος κυλινδουμένοις).[7] Nonetheless, Isocrates concurrently claims, he is most prominent in terms of both sound understanding and good education (τὸ φρονεῖν εὖ καὶ πεπαιδεῦσθαι καλῶς)[8] and thus endeavours 'to give advice' (συμβουλεύειν), according to his nature and his ability, to his fellow citizens and to the other Greeks in general as well as to 'those of the highest repute among men' (τῶν ἀνδρῶν οἱ ἐνδοξότατοι).[9]

As Isocrates himself highlights at the beginning of this passage from *To Philip*, he has already made similar remarks in his letter to the tyrant of Syracuse Dionysius the Elder, which was most probably written either in 368 or early in 367.[10] Indeed, in the *incipit* of section 81 of *To Philip* Isocrates echoes section 9 of the epistle addressed to Dionysius where he invites the tyrant of Syracuse not to wonder at the fact that, even though he is neither a 'popular orator' (δημηγορός) nor a 'general' (στρατηγός) nor a 'ruler in any particular way' (ἄλλως δυνάστης), he is taking up such a 'burdensome matter' (ἐμβριθὲς (...) πρᾶγμα) attempting both 'to speak for the safety of Greece' (ὑπέρ τε τῆς Ἑλλάδος λέγειν) and 'to give advice' (συμβουλεύειν) to Dionysius himself; then Isocrates also stresses that from the beginning of his career he has 'straightway' (εὐθύς) made the decision to stand aloof (ἐξέστην) from engaging in public affairs. Yet, in this same section of the letter, unlike in the passage from *To Philip*, he does not offer any specific reason for his choice limiting himself to saying that providing an explanation would be too much work and that he has, nonetheless, taken part in 'the education which despises small things and which attempts to reach the important ones' (ἡ παίδευσις ἡ τῶν μικρῶν καταφρονοῦσα τῶν μεγάλων ἐφικνεῖσθαι πειρωμένη).

Further autobiographical details can be found in another letter, namely Epistle VIII *To the Rulers of Mytilene*, dating most likely to 350[11] and addressed to the members of the oligarchic government of Mytilene, where democracy had

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[7] Isoc., *To Philip* 81.
[8] On Isocrates presenting himself as belonging to οἱ εὖ φρονοῦντες and the key role played by this specific phrase throughout his corpus see, in particular, Chapter 5 section 3.3.2.
[9] Isoc., *To Philip* 82.
[10] See Papillon (2004) 247 who suggests that the letter is incomplete as a result of the transmission process, whereas Mathieu (1962) 168 points out that Isocrates left the letter unfinished at the news of Dionysius' death. On the contrary, Too (1995) 199 believes that this letter was truncated by Isocrates on purpose as in the case of Epistle VI *To the Children of Jason*, Epistle IX *To Archidamus* and the speech *Against the Sophists*.
[11] The date of this letter is usually determined from the content of section 8, where we find references to both Conon and Timotheus being dead as well as to Diophantus serving the king of Egypt in Asia against Artaxerxes Ochus.

recently been replaced precisely by an oligarchy. This letter was written, as Isocrates himself specifies, at the insistence of his own grandsons who had asked him to urge the Mytilenean oligarchs to restore from exile their former teacher Agenor together with his father and brothers, considering also that the oligarchs had already shown a clement attitude allowing some of the other exiled democrats to return home.[12] Here Isocrates points out that he has held back from politics and public oratory (ἐγὼ τοῦ μὲν πολιτεύεσθαι καὶ ῥητορεύειν ἀπέστην) because of his inadequate voice and his lack of courage (οὔτε γὰρ φωνὴν ἔσχον ἱκανὴν οὔτε τόλμαν). However, Isocrates goes on to argue, he has not been 'altogether useless' (παντάπασιν ἄχρηστος) or 'disreputable' (ἀδόκιμος) since he has played the key role of 'counsellor' (σύμβουλος) and 'fellow combattant' (συναγωνιστής) of 'those who have chosen to say something good' (οἱ λέγειν προηρημένοι ἀγαθόν τι) about the Mytilenean oligarchs and about the other Athenian allies, while at the same time composing more speeches 'in defence of the freedom and independence of the Greeks' (ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐλευθερίας καὶ τῆς αὐτονομίας τῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων) than those who spend their whole time on the platform (σύμπαντες οἱ τὰ βήματα κατατετριφότες).[13] Furthermore, Isocrates concludes this letter by remarking that his main aim has consisted in showing his grandsons (at whose insistence, as we saw, he claims to have written to the oligarchic rulers of Mytilene) that even if they do not speak in the assembly and do not become generals but, instead, confine themselves to imitate his life (κἂν μὴ δημηγορῶσι μηδὲ στρατηγῶσιν ἀλλὰ μόνον μιμῶνται τὸν τρόπον τὸν ἐμόν), 'they will not live in a state of neglect among the Greeks' (οὐκ ἠμελημένως διάξουσιν ἐν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν).[14]

Similarly, in his last major work, *Panathenaicus*, which he began to write in 342 and completed in 339, Isocrates states that his 'nature' (φύσις) is 'weaker' (ἀρρωστοτέρα) and 'softer' (μαλακωτέρα) than it should be for practical matters, adding that it is neither 'perfect' (τελεία) nor 'in all respects useful' (πανταχῇ χρησίμη) when it comes to debates.[15] In this regard, Isocrates acknowledges that he lacks the two key elements which have 'the greatest power' (μεγίστη δύναμις) in Athens, namely an 'adequate voice' (φωνὴ ἱκανή) and 'courage' (τόλμα), and highlights that men who, like him, do not possess

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[12] See Isoc., *To the Rulers of Mytilene* 1-3.
[13] Isoc., *To the Rulers of Mytilene* 7.
[14] Isoc., *To the Rulers of Mytilene* 10. On this passage see Too (1995) 188.
[15] Isoc., *Panathenaicus* 9.

these qualities are 'more dishonoured' (ἀτιμότεροι) than debtors to the πόλις, since the latter can still hope to pay off the money which they owe, while the former are unable to change their nature (οἱ δ᾽ οὐδέ ποτ᾽ ἂν τὴν φύσιν μεταβάλοιεν).[16] Nevertheless, Isocrates stresses that, far from being discouraged by this fact, he did not allow himself to become 'disreputable' (ἄδοξος) or 'unseen' (ἀφανής); instead, after having gone astray from civic life, he has devoted himself to φιλοσοφία,[17] to hard work and to writing down his thoughts (ἐπὶ τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ πονεῖν καὶ γράφειν ἃ διανοηθείην) choosing to treat neither trivial topics, nor private contracts, nor the subjects dealt with by the other orators (οὐ περὶ μικρῶν τὴν προαίρεσιν ποιούμενος οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἰδίων συμβολαίων οὐδὲ περὶ ὧν ἄλλοι τινὲς ληροῦσιν), but rather matters concerning Greece, kingship and the πόλις (περὶ τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν καὶ βασιλικῶν καὶ πολιτικῶν πραγμάτων), although he has not received the honour that he was expecting his choice of such higher themes would entail.[18]

In addition to the autobiographical references in these passages, Isocrates' self-representation is a crucial aspect in *Antidosis* (353), the fictional legal defence which he himself describes as the way that he has devised to reveal not only to his fellow citizens but also to the future generations his 'character' (τρόπος), his 'life' (βίος) and the 'education' (παιδεία) promoted in his school.[19] Indeed, Isocrates defines this speech as an 'image' (εἰκών) of his 'thought' (διάνοια) and of his whole life with the twofold aim of making known the truth about himself and, at the same time, of leaving behind a 'monument' (μνημεῖον), which he characterises as 'much finer than bronze statues' (πολὺ κάλλιον τῶν χαλκῶν ἀνθημάτων).[20]

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[16] Isoc., *Panathenaicus* 10.
[17] On the complex meaning of φιλοσοφία in the Isocratean corpus see, for instance, Levi (1959) 85-89, Mirhady and Too (2000) 202 and 267, Livingstone (2007), Timmerman and Schiappa (2010) 43-66, and Janik (2012) 15-33.
[18] Isoc., *Panathenaicus* 11.
[19] Isoc., *Antidosis* 6.
[20] Isoc., *Antidosis* 7. See Too (1995) 188-189 who points out that the reference to the memorial calls to mind *Evagoras* 75 and *To Nicocles* 1. On this passage from *Antidosis* see also Giovannelli-Jouanna (2015) 84 and 92 (where a comparison is made with a similar use of the term εἰκών in *To Nicocles* 36). See also Giovannelli-Jouanna (2015) 94-95 on the *proemium* of *Antidosis*, where Isocrates not only acknowledges the 'newness' (δεινότης) and 'difference' (διαφορά) of this speech compared to standard discourses composed for the lawcourts or for display, but also demonstrates his awareness that the choice of such a literary form to convey his self-representation and his self-defence needs to be justified, otherwise the speech could be regarded as 'out of place' (ἄτοπος).

And it is precisely in *Antidosis* that Isocrates' decision to opt for ἀπραγμοσύνη emerges most clearly. Indeed, the student who takes the floor during the interlude in the middle portion of the speech lists among the features which distinguish Isocrates from his fellow citizens the fact that he has led a well-ordained and lawful life like no other Athenian citizen, has never been involved in a trial (except in the present case of the exchange of property), and does not engage in the activities in which all those who meddle with politics take part (ἀποφαίνεις γὰρ (...) τά τε καθ᾽ ἡμέραν οὕτω κοσμίως καὶ τεταγμένως βεβιωκότα σαυτὸν ὡς οὐκ οἶδ᾽ εἴ τις ἄλλος τῶν πολιτῶν, ἔτι δὲ μήτε δεδικασμένον μηδενὶ μήτε πεφευγότα πλὴν περὶ ἀντιδόσεως, μήθ᾽ ἑτέροις συνηγωνισμένον μήτε μεμαρτυρηκότα, μήτ᾽ ἄλλο πεποιηκότα μηδέν, ἐν οἷς ἅπαντες πολιτευόμενοι τυγχάνουσι).[21] Furthermore, his associate points out that Isocrates has stood aloof not only from public offices and the benefits deriving from holding such positions, but also from all other common matters (πρὸς δὲ τούτοις οὕτως ἰδίοις οὖσι καὶ περιττοῖς κἀκεῖνο λέγεις, ὡς τῶν μὲν ἀρχῶν καὶ τῶν ὠφελιῶν τῶν ἐντεῦθεν γιγνομένων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων τῶν κοινῶν ἐξέστηκας).[22] Then, in replying to the speech of his associate and in order to justify his lifestyle, Isocrates specifies that he has chosen this way of life not because he is rich or arrogant (ταῦτα γὰρ συνεταξάμην οὐ διὰ πλοῦτον οὐδὲ δι᾽ ὑπερηφανίαν), but because he loves 'tranquillity' (ἡσυχία) and 'quiet' (ἀπραγμοσύνη).[23]

So, in his corpus Isocrates, as shown by these passages, alludes to his physical limitations underscoring his weak voice and his lack of courage and portrays himself as ἀπράγμων.[24] These key aspects of his self-representation, especially his μικροφωνία, are highlighted also in the biographical tradition. Indeed, the ancient biographers refer to him as having a frail voice and appear to regard this detail as the main reason why he stood apart from public life.[25] As a result of this corroboration, most scholars have taken Isocrates' remarks at face value and as accurate from a historical point of view.[26] However, Too has

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[21] Isoc., *Antidosis* 144.
[22] Isoc., *Antidosis* 145.
[23] Isoc., *Antidosis* 151.
[24] On Isocrates' self-representation as having a weak voice and lacking courage as well as on the link between these two aspects and his consequent choice of ἀπραγμοσύνη see Giovannelli-Jouanna (2015) 88-89.
[25] Dion. Hal., *The Ancient Orators* 2, [Plut.], *Moralia* 837a, Philostr., *Lives of the Sophists* 505, [Zos.], *Life of Isocrates* 35-37, Phot., cod. 260 p. 486b6, *Suda* 652 13-14.
[26] See, for instance, Mikkola (1954) 143 and Kennedy (1963) 205.

pointed out two key aspects concerning Isocrates' ancient biographers: on the one hand, they engaged in literary fiction recording episodes for which we do not have any other evidence in order to illustrate his inability to speak in public (such as the anecdote in [Plutarch]'s life about his failed attempt to defend Theramenes, to which I will return below);[27] on the other hand, most importantly, they even challenged Isocrates' own self-description by creating stories which report that he did give some speeches in public.[28] Moreover, Too has highlighted how by claiming μικροφωνία Isocrates articulates a rejection of public oratory and depicts himself as having authority and respectability precisely because of his ἀπραγμοσύνη, thus deliberately differentiating himself from the 'new politicians' with their 'loud voice'.[29] Yet, Too's study appears to share the commonly-held interpretation of the Isocratean corpus as bearing witness to an oligarchic stance as she assumes that Isocrates 'invokes a democratic language while actually putting forward an ideology of conservative elitism'.[30]

Nevertheless, while ἀπραγμοσύνη is generally considered as a non-democratic τόπος as we briefly saw earlier, a closer look at its crucial role in the Isocratean self-representation, suggests that his use of this τόπος, should not be regarded as part of an oligarchic agenda. Rather, by depicting himself as a reliable political adviser due to his withdrawal from public life, Isocrates goes beyond the traditional notion of ἀπραγμοσύνη by reshaping it and offering his own original and innovative version of this commonplace.[31] Thus, while complaining of μικροφωνία and appearing to retreat into the ivory towers of his school, Isocrates, as we shall see more in depth below, does intend his voice to be heard loud and clear first and foremost in, and for the benefit of, contemporary Athenian democracy.

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[27] See Too (1995) 77-78.
[28] See Too (1995) 79-81 who enumerates the three main instances: the anecdote reported by [Plut.], *Moralia* 838b according to which Isocrates delivered a speech at the funeral games of Mausolus of Halicarnassus, the passage in Philostr., *Lives of the Sophists* 505 where Isocrates is said to have delivered *Panegyricus* at Olympia, and the biographical detail present in both [Plut.], *Moralia* 837a and Phot., cod. 260 p. 487b28 according to which *Antidosis* was presented by Isocrates in person.
[29] Too (1995) 98-99. The τόπος of ἀπραγμοσύνη has been the focus of Carter (1986) who, however, refers to Isocrates only in passing.
[30] Too (1995) 6; see also Too (1995) 104.
[31] See Blank (2017) 286; more on Blank's viewpoint will be said towards the end of the present section.

Isocrates' ἀπραγμοσύνη and his παιδεία

Isocrates' withdrawal from political activity could be interpreted as taking the form of remaining relegated, so to speak, to his school and his role as teacher of rhetoric, for which he is best known. Indeed, after his activity as a logographer between the very end of the fifth and the first decade of the fourth century, Isocrates made the decision to turn to education. In this respect, in his biography [Plutarch] appears to suggest that Isocrates established three schools, namely a first one in Athens before moving to Chios, a second one on the island and finally a third one, the most well-known, once again in Athens when he returned from his Chian sojourn.[32] The actual date when Isocrates opened this school in Athens, which was located near the Lyceum as reported by [Zosimus],[33] is debated: some scholars believe that it was founded in around 388,[34] whereas the prevailing scholarly opinion holds that he established it in the late 390s, more precisely between 393 and 392.[35]

Moreover, some key aspects of Isocrates' pedagogical programme are still *sub iudice* and have thus offered scope for further investigation,[36] yet such investigation cannot be disentangled from his interest in, and reflection on, contemporary political issues. In this regard, it is worth noting that the close interaction between his political thought and his pedagogy has been hinted at by some scholars through, for instance, a description of his παιδεία as 'political', a reference which we can already find in the third volume of Jaeger's landmark study devoted to education in Ancient Greece.[37] This association has been employed also by Lombard[38] and by Livingstone who, more specifically, has additionally defined the Isocratean pedagogical programme as 'an education which fits pupils for leadership within their city or state'.[39]

One of the main goals of Isocrates' teaching consisted indeed in forming leaders.[40] Isocrates had among his students, for example, the Athenian general

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[32] See [Plut.], *Moralia* 837a-c. On Isocrates' alleged sojourn at Chios see Appendix II.
[33] See [Zos.], *Life of Isocrates* 116-117; on this passage and the location of Isocrates' school see Pinto (2015) 323. See also Jebb (1876) 8 n. 4.
[34] See, for instance, Edwards (1994) 7 and 25; see also Usher (1999) 296.
[35] See, for example, Benoit (1984) 111 and Pinto (2015) 322.
[36] See Pinto (2015) 321.
[37] Jaeger (1944) 86; see also Jaeger (1944) 138 on the relevance to Isocrates of the link between his teaching and politics.
[38] Lombard (1990) 63.
[39] Livingstone (1998) 264.
[40] See, for instance, Johnson (1959) 25 and Clark (1996) 120-121.
The pupils referred to in this passage are: Eunomus, Lysitheides, Callippus (Isocrates specifies that they were among his first students), then Onetor, Anticles, Philonides, Philomelus and

Timotheus, son of Conon, and the Cyprian king Nicocles, son of Evagoras. Although neither Timotheus nor Nicocles are referred to in *Antidosis* 93-94 where he mentions explicitly the names of eight of his pupils, Isocrates appears to have a particular preference for them. More specifically, Timotheus is the protagonist of the well-known *excursus* in *Antidosis* 101-139, while Nicocles is not only the addressee of *To Nicocles* (where Isocrates offers him his advice on how to rule his subjects) but also the *persona loquens* in *Nicocles or the Cyprians*, in which by instructing his citizens in their duties Isocrates' former student takes on 'the role of political teacher', thus witnessing 'the success of a pedagogical method that aspires to teach the student to be like his teacher'.[41] However, Livingstone, as we shall see more clearly below, highlights that neither Nicocles nor Timotheus manages to imitate fully his master and thus to acquire his pedagogy.[42]

Moreover, the ultimate aim of Isocrates' παιδεία is even broader and more ambitious than training leaders. His educational programme is closely related to, and at the same time goes beyond, the Panhellenic scope marking out his speeches (which I shall discuss more in depth in Chapter 3 section 4), since it is presented as having the potential not only to identify, but also to expand the boundaries of the idea itself of Greekness, as suggested by a straightforward reading of *Panegyricus* 50.[43] In this passage Isocrates states that due to Athens' superiority in thought and speech (περὶ τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ λέγειν) its 'pupils' (μαθηταί) have become the 'teachers' (διδάσκαλοι) of the rest of mankind and it is those who share that education who are called Greeks rather than those who share 'the common nature' (ἡ κοινὴ φύσις). In this respect, Livingstone points out that:

> What the pupils learn, if they imitate the pedagogue well and acquire his
> voice, is a way of speaking with authority for Greece as a whole –

Charmantides, with Isocrates adding that all of them received gold crowns by Athens due to the fact that they were 'good men' (ἄνδρες ἀγαθοί) who had spent much of their own wealth for the benefit of the πόλις. For biographical details on the eight pupils mentioned here see Too (2008) 140-141.

[41] Mirhady and Too (2000) 169. See below for more details on this key aspect of Isocrates' pedagogy as well as on his teacher-pupil relation with both Timotheus and Nicocles.

[42] See Livingstone (1998) 277-280.

[43] Livingstone (1998) 274-275 whose interpretation of Isoc., *Panegyricus* 50 appears to entail that, while being used in the context of a manifest praise of Athens, the phrase ἡ παίδευσις ἡμέτερα should be interpreted as referring specifically to the pedagogical programme offered by Isocrates' school.

adopting a central position within the field of 'Greekness'; by becoming the mouthpiece for this Panhellenic discourse, the pupil becomes identified with the power to define and extend the civilised world.[44]

Thus, as Livingstone notes, 'Isocrates' pedagogy of Panhellenic *logoi*' should not only be interpreted as reflecting 'his political ideal of a Panhellenic crusade', but can even lead to regard 'producing Panhellenic speeches' as 'more important than realising concrete Panhellenic aims'.[45] This conflicting aspect is illustrated by the two different groups of Isocratean students that Livingstone identifies: the first category is represented by 'the pupil who is a king or general, a prime mover in political events', like Nicocles or Timotheus, who, although being 'idealised' in various instances in the corpus, turns out to be 'ultimately unable to appropriate Isocratean *paideia*, and remains in a state of interdependence with the pedagogue'; the second category, which is exemplified by the unnamed student taking the floor in *Panathenaicus* and which is 'never identified with a specific individual', is embodied by 'the inheritor of Isocratean discourse', namely 'the pupil who is like his master, who can speak with Isocrates' voice (which is a textual voice, a voice that exists in writing), and who can continue where Isocrates left off'.[46]

This distinction between two different categories of pupils suggested by Livingstone can be connected with Isocrates' self-depiction as ideal political counsellor capable of offering better advice than Athenian politicians due to his ἀπραγμοσύνη, which as we saw earlier represents an essential aspect of his self-portrait throughout the corpus. Indeed, Blank has recently pointed out that in *Panathenaicus* 229-232 Isocrates' self-reflection and subsequent doubts concerning the rhetorical strategy adopted in the contest with his pro-Spartan former student (with both Isocrates and his pupil embodying 'Isocratean education') show how the 'entanglement in a live contest on the rhetorical stage, the influence of the audience as well as the personal interest of the speakers' have had a negative effect on both Isocrates' and his former student's

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[44] Livingstone (1998) 276.
[45] Livingstone (1998) 280.
[46] Livingstone (1998) 280-281, who describes the first category of pupils as 'a self-contained, binary relationship of exchange mutually beneficial (...) but essentially static', thus differing from the second category which embodies a 'more authentically pedagogical relationship' characterised by being 'reproductive in character: the pupil is his master's true successor, he acquires mastery of Isocrates' *logoi*, and will go on speaking – or rather writing – in Isocrates' voice'.

'power of judgment'.[47] Thus, although throughout the present study I shall challenge the widespread assumption, shared by Blank, according to which Isocrates' speeches are characterised by 'radically antidemocratic undertones',[48] I agree with Blank's following conclusion regarding the Isocratean use of the τόπος of ἀπραγμοσύνη:

> If getting involved in a (bad) state has a negative influence on one's intellect, then no active politician of a defective state can ever be a good -and at the same time successful- political adviser. In order to maintain sound judgement and intelligence -and personal wellbeing-, the counsellor has to step back from involvement in politics, unless he happens to live in his preferred ideal state. Only by being a private teacher in poltical morlaty [*sic*] can he promote good counsel and thus contribute to the success of the state.[49]

Indeed, Isocrates' pedagogy ultimately aims at imparting the ability to give the most sound and reliable political advice, first and foremost, to leaders (with a predominantly Athenocentric perspective) and ἀπραγμοσύνη represents the *conditio sine qua non* in order to reach such a goal. While ἀπραγμοσύνη was generally regarded as an anti-democratic τόπος, Isocrates rethinks this commonplace by presenting stepping outside of Athens' public life as the best way to step into it, that is, to influence it through his role as political counsellor. In this regard, the implication of the present analysis is precisely that Isocrates was intending his works for a wide audience, not exclusively for the students whom he was teaching in his school.[50]

 In other words, by withdrawing from public oratory and devoting himself to education, Isocrates, rather than rejecting the possibility of benefiting contemporary Athenian democracy and making his voice heard, is actually enhancing his capability, and maximising his chances, to do so. In this respect, it is worth noting that ἀπραγμοσύνη as an Isocratean virtue differs significantly

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[47] Blank (2017) 285.
[48] Blank (2017) 280.
[49] Blank (2017) 285.
[50] On Isocrates' intended audience see, for instance, Hudson-Williams (1949) and, more recently, Usener (1994).

from the viewpoint on this commonplace expressed by Thucydides' Pericles.[51] In particular, in the Funeral Oration, Pericles notoriously states that the Athenians regard anyone who does not take part in public life not as 'free from business' (ἀπράγμων) but as 'useless' (ἀχρεῖος).[52] Conversely, Isocrates presents himself as political counsellor *par excellence*, and thus as being useful to his πόλις, precisely on the basis of his being ἀπράγμων.

Therefore, through his choice of ἀπραγμοσύνη and his educational programme, he intends primarily not only to train leaders but also, even more importantly, to teach those pupils who can imitate him well the crucial skill of giving reliable and much needed practical advice to political leaders. His attempt to deal with, and have an impact on, contemporary political issues not only in close connection to, but even by means of, his teaching activity goes hand in hand with his own version of the τόπος of ἀπραγμοσύνη. So, his pedagogy and his political views, rather than being watertight compartments, are inextricably related to one another. This is why a thorough analysis of Isocrates' political thought has to take into account and underline the crucial role played by the intersection of these two aspects throughout his corpus.

2. Isocrates' political thought

As we briefly mentioned at the beginning of this introductory chapter, Isocrates has generally been underestimated as a political thinker and is often dismissed as a sympathiser of oligarchy whose claim to support democracy is mere window-dressing as part of a cunning attempt to promote an anti-democratic agenda. In response to these trends, the present study aims to provide an in-depth discussion and reappraisal of Isocrates' political thought by means of a semantic analysis of a selection of key instances of democratic vocabulary. Nonetheless, before doing so, in this section I shall offer a snapshot of some of the main studies on Isocrates' political thought in order to highlight the key

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[51] See Too (1995) 98. On the broader issue of the relationship between Thucydides and Isocrates see, for instance, Mathieu (1918), Hudson-Williams (1948) and, more recently, Brunello (2015) 29-30 and 176-179.
[52] Thuc., II 40, 2. For a discussion of the τόπος of ἀπραγμοσύνη in Thucydides see Carter (1986) 26-51.

scholarly viewpoints around which the debate has been revolving and thus to position the overall argument of this dissertation within its wider context.

Previous studies on Isocrates' political thought

Despite the rather widespread tendency to regard Isocrates as attempting to promote an anti-democratic programme misleadingly presented under the name of δημοκρατία, it is worth underlining that Mathieu, one of the first scholars to focus on Isocrates' political thought, did try to position Isocrates within democratic discourse. The French scholar encapsulates his position as follows:

> Cependant, malgré toutes ces critiques souvent acerbes contre la démocratie, Isocrate se dèfend d'en être un adversaire. Au contraire, il attaque violemment les Trente et critique en général l'oligarchie. Il se considère donc comme démocrate. (…) Isocrate n'est donc partisan ni de la monarchie ni de l'oligarchie; mais d'autre part il ne croit pas qu'une seule forme de démocratie soit possible, et en cela il se sépare de la majorité des hommes politiques de son temps qui semblent nous traduire l'état de l'opinion publique d'Athènes. C'est un démocrate modéré, de l'école d'Anytos ou de Phormisios, qui ne compte que sur des réformes partielles, plus morales que constitutionnelles, mais qui veut les faire porter sur plus d'un point de la vie politique athénienne.[53]

Therefore, Mathieu not only highlights the moral value which Isocrates placed on the reforms he promoted, but he also argues that, in spite of the harsh criticism constantly directed at contemporary democracy, Isocrates was a supporter of democracy. Norlin seems to share this conclusion and to go even further when he states that Isocrates was, 'unlike many of the intellectuals of his age, a pronounced believer in democracy'; yet, he adds that 'while he reaffirms his faith in a democratic ideal (…) it seems clear that he considers the Athenian state as it then was in practice (…) to be a caricature of what a democracy should be'.[54]

The interest in Isocrates' political views was taken up again at the beginning of the 1960s by Cloché in his study entitled *Isocrate et son temps*.

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[53] Mathieu (1925) 138-139.
[54] Norlin (1928) XXXVIII.

From a methodological point of view, Cloché employs an approach which is quite similar to the one adopted by Mathieu as they both make use mainly of a work-by-work examination which follows a chronological order. However, Cloché reaches a different conclusion from Mathieu's. More specifically, Cloché summarises his view as follows:

> En résumé, s'il est impossible de ranger Isocrate dans un parti nettement déterminé et de lui attribuer une doctrine politique bien définie, nous sommes du moins autorisés ou même invités par les textes à ne pas faire de lui un partisan de l'oligarchie brutale et tyrannique, pas plus que de la démocratie «extrême» (*eschatè dèmocratia*) ou même, sauf pour un temps, de la démocratie pure et simple, fondée sur l'égalité des citoyens et la souveraineté des assemblées politiques et judiciaires. (…) Le mieux est donc, selon nous, de se borner à signaler les analogies, peu douteuses, qui règnent entre les tendances politiques de l'auteur du *Panathénaïque* et celles des partisans de Théramène sans essayer de préciser davantage et sans le qualifier de «démocrate», même modéré.[55]

Indeed, here Cloché explicitly refers to Mathieu's conclusion in order to distance himself from it. In this respect, Cloché fittingly stresses the complexity of Isocrates' political thought and the resulting difficulty in classing his political views. Nevertheless, his observations appear to result in an impasse, he merely acknowledges the impossibility of overcoming it and suspends judgment while concurrently casting doubts upon the genuineness of Isocrates' attestations of allegiance to democracy,[56] an accusation frequently made also by subsequent scholars, as we have seen.

Furthermore, Cloché bears witness to the widespread view according to which Isocrates shared Theramenes' ideas.[57] This assumption has been

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[55] Cloché (1963) 94-95.
[56] See Cloché (1963) 83-84, who states that in *On the Peace* and *Areopagiticus* Isocrates, 'sincèrement ou par tactique, ne s'attaque pas au principe même de la «démocratie»'. See also Cloché (1963) 93 who claims that 'selon toute probabilité, l'adhésion apportée par Isocrate à la constitution démocratique de sa patrie manque d'ardeur et n'est même pas exempte de réserves'.
[57] See also, for instance, Bearzot (1980) 123 n. 41 and 131. On the issue of the relationship between Isocrates' political views and Theramenes' programme see also Cloché (1936) and Canfora (1990).

substantiated by the fact that among the names of Isocrates' teachers enumerated by the ancient biographers that of Theramenes comes to the fore. For instance, [Plutarch], after mentioning him as one of Isocrates' tutors, relates two anecdotes in order to stress the alleged relation existing between the two.[58] According to the first story, when Theramenes was arrested by the Thirty Tyrants, while everyone else was terrified, Isocrates was the only one who stood up attempting to speak in his aid and, although he was not able to utter a word for a long time, he was then urged to keep silent by Theramenes himself, who did not want any of his 'friends' (φίλοι) to share his misfortune. The second anecdote refers to a collaboration between the two men in developing some of Theramenes' τέχναι.[59] As noted by Roisman and Worthington, 'the primary sources for Theramenes' life never mentions his teaching of rhetoric',[60] so it does not seem plausible that Isocrates learnt rhetoric from him. It is also unlikely that Isocrates was present when Theramenes was arrested by the Thirty since he was most probably attending Gorgias' lectures in Thessaly at that time.[61] Therefore, these anecdotes about Theramenes which we find in [Plutarch]'s biography do not appear to be very credible. Yet, even some of the scholars who cast doubts on the reliability of the stories narrated by [Plutarch] and, more broadly, on the tradition which makes Isocrates a pupil of Theramenes refer to 'une affinité politique manifeste' between the two men.[62]

It is worth pointing out that shortly after Cloché's study, additional attention to Isocratean political thought was paid by Bringmann in his volume entitled *Studien zu den politischen Ideen des Isokrates* in which however, while focusing in depth on the historical context of Isocrates' major political speeches, the German scholar ultimately regards him as being negligible in terms of originality of thought and political influence.[63] From Bringmann's study up until recently this view on an alleged lack of originality and novelty in Isocrates'

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[58] See [Plut.], *Moralia* 836f-837a.
[59] See Lopez Cruces and Fuentes Gonzalez (2000) 894 who point out that such τέχναι should be regarded 'non pas comme des traités rhétoriques, mais comme des discours-modèles' and that, even if they ever existed, they were certainly lost very early, already in the third century. On the tradition according to which Theramenes was one of Isocrates' teachers see also Rhodes (2005) 282 and Giovannelli-Jouanna (2015) 87-88.
[60] Roisman and Worthington (2015) 144.
[61] See Lopez Cruces and Fuentes Gonzalez (2000) 894.
[62] Lopez Cruces and Fuentes Gonzalez (2000) 894. See also Lombard (1990) 83 for a similar theory.
[63] Bringmann (1965).

works has persisted among scholars.[64] A resurgence of interest in Isocrates in the noughties has led to the 'portrait of a democratic Isocrates'.[65] Nevertheless, the opposite image of an undemocratic Isocrates still pervades modern scholarship, suffice it to say that not so long ago his appeal for a return to the Athenian ancestral constitution (which I shall discuss in Chapter 5 section 3.3.1) has been labelled as 'a mask for more basic anti-democratic leanings and yearnings'.[66]

Isocrates, Xenophon and leadership

The renewed interest in Isocrates' works and his political thought over the last decades has occurred in parallel, if not in conjunction, with similar trends in Xenophontic scholarship. For instance, Blank has lately associated Clark's description of Isocrates as 'critical servant'[67] to Kroeker's use of the notion of 'internal criticism' in relation to Xenophon,[68] suggesting, although tentatively, that the latter concept could be applied to Isocrates as well.[69] Likewise, a recent attempt to understand Xenophon's writings as addressed primarily to the Athenian élite to which he belongs and as endeavouring to redefine this élite citizenry instructing them on how to become effective civic leaders[70] can be compared with a study on the same wavelength by Azoulay analysing how Isocrates interacts with, and aims to redefine, the Athenian élite.[71] While these points of contact do not necessarily entail that Isocrates and Xenophon are talking to one another, they suggest that both authors take part in a common discussion going on at the time.

Thus, much of recent scholarship on Isocrates has been going in the same direction as Xenophontic studies. However, even though these studies have cast some much needed light on significant features of the Isocratean corpus, they tend not to tackle a relevant facet of it, that is, Isocrates' prominent and enduring interest in political leadership, especially within and by Athens, and the crucial implications that this key aspect has for our understanding of his political views. Even those works devoted specifically to the parallel treatment of

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[64] See, for instance, Rhodes (2005) 281.
[65] Poulakos and Depew (2004) 8.
[66] Cartledge (2009) 98.
[67] See Clark (1996).
[68] See Kroeker (2009).
[69] See Blank (2017) 286.
[70] See Christ (2020).
[71] See Azoulay (2010).

Isocrates and Xenophon have either not addressed their common interest in leadership (with the specific similarities and differences in their respective discussions)[72] or dealt with it only tangentially.[73]

A notable exception in this respect is represented by Wallace's monograph on the Areopagus.[74] Indeed, in the chapter of his study devoted to Isocrates, with particular focus on the constitutional reform promoted in *Areopagiticus*, Wallace stresses two key aspects: Isocrates' original stance in the speech (despite some parallels with Theramenes' plausible involvement in promoting the reform of the Areopagus)[75] and the fact that his programme in *Areopagiticus* is motivated by his attempt to improve Athens' internal leadership with the ultimate aim of consolidating its leading position abroad.[76] Additionally, Wallace acknowledges that Isocrates' main concern throughout the corpus lies in 'strong, principled leadership, willingly followed by the people', which could be achieved under any kind of constitution,[77] and that in *Areopagiticus* his views on Athenian leadership in foreign politics overlap with the reshaping of leadership in domestic politics that he upholds.[78]

Nonetheless, within the specific context of his study, Wallace focuses, first and foremost, on *Areopagiticus* and regards it as being in contraposition with *On the Peace*, whereas the interaction between these two speeches is more complex, as we shall see.[79] Moreover, in addition to the questionable judgment on Isocrates as 'neither brilliant nor incisive',[80] Wallace does not dwell upon the key features that, in Isocrates' view, characterise a good and effective leader and the broader implications that the examination of his ideas on leadership has for our understanding of his political thought. Overall, there is thus still scope for conducting a further investigation of Isocrates' views on this topic and the crucial relevance that they acquire within his corpus.

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[72] See Tamiolaki (2018).
[73] See Wilms (1995), Gray (2000) 146-151, Azoulay (2006) and Pontier (2016).
[74] Wallace (1989).
[75] See Wallace (1989) 149-158; see also Wallace (1989) 144.
[76] See Wallace (1989) 164-158.
[77] Wallace (1989) 163.
[78] See Wallace (1989) 166-168.
[79] See Chapter 5 section 3.3.1.
[80] Wallace (1989) 158.

The Isocratean maze and coherency

Lastly, it is worth pointing out that, in addition to the charge of being insincere in his support to democracy while attempting in reality to promote an oligarchic constitution disguised under the name of δημοκρατία, the Isocratean writings have often been dismissed as incoherent. Baynes, for instance, has put significant emphasis on Isocrates' alleged inconsistencies, and this excessively critical attitude has led him to the pessimistic conclusion that 'even when one has tried to read his work with some care, Isocrates remains a puzzle–just a bundle of contradictions'[81] to the point that 'contradiction is piled on contradiction and one is left in a maze'.[82] Although I do not entirely reject the existence of such a maze, I shall argue that it is less intricate than Baynes believes, and, most importantly, that we are not trapped inside it. In this respect, I suggest that it is indeed possible to find a way out of the Isocratean maze, and in the present study, as we shall see in the next section, I intend to unroll an Ariadne's thread which, in my view, can enable us to do so.

3. Methodology and overview of the thesis

The Ariadne's thread consists, as I briefly mentioned at the beginning of this introductory chapter, in a detailed analysis of some key occurrences of his political vocabulary with specific reference to his use of democratic language. By the phrase 'democratic language' I intend to refer not only to terms originating from the δημ- root, but also, more broadly, to some words (and thus the notions that they convey) closely related to democracy such as παρρησία and the vocabulary expressing the idea of equality.[83]

Isocrates' multifaceted use of political vocabulary, especially democratic language, has generally been neglected by scholars. Indeed, despite the

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[81] Baynes (1955) 160.
[82] Baynes (1955) 163. Baynes (1955) 166 claims that one possible explanation for the alleged contradictions may lie in the fact that Isocrates was writing *encomia* on Athens, and so could alter history according to his goals. Isocrates' supposed incongruity is highlighted also, for instance, by Kennedy (1963) 197, who tries to justify it by arguing that '[h]is political influence, if it existed was slight', and thus denying his importance as a political thinker. However, as Too (1995) 62 points out, both Baynes' and Kennedy's explanations are not convincing.
[83] As part of the semantic approach adopted in the present study I have made systematic use of the TLG for the identification of the literary occurrences of the key terms of democratic vocabulary discussed in each chapter.

increased interest in Isocrates' writings in the 1990s and, even more clearly, at the beginning of the twenty-first century,[84] scant attention has been paid to his usage of democratic language and its complexity. Thus, in the present study I intend to address this gap that hampers our understanding of Isocrates' political views.

The ductility embedded in the word δῆμος and, consequently, in δημοκρατία has long been acknowledged.[85] In this respect, the latter term, as Brock has noted, 'did not mean the same everywhere or to everyone and could be legitimately applied to a variety of constitutional schemes'.[86] Nonetheless, this intrinsic fluidity does not appear to be taken into account in the case of Isocrates' usages of democratic vocabulary. Moreover, Isocrates, who in *Panegyricus* 8 stresses how it is possible 'to recount old things in a new manner and to speak in an old style about events that have taken place recently' (τά τε παλαιὰ καινῶς διελθεῖν καὶ περὶ τῶν νεωστὶ γεγενημένων ἀρχαίως εἰπεῖν), can be regarded as manipulating political language in a way similar to how he experiments with literary genres with his 'resolute effort to keep the lines between rhetoric, politics, and philosophy as open and flexible as possible'.[87]

By making use of, and concurrently expanding the boundaries of, the inherent malleability characterising democratic language Isocrates proves himself to be a man of his time. Indeed, this lexical ductility was deeply needed in a real political world that was dramatically changing. The Athenian democracy in the fourth century was not the same compared to the previous century, although the actual extent and nature of such a divergence is still debated among scholars. Moreover, even in the course of the fourth century itself there were shifts in the power relations between the Areopagus and the δῆμος.[88] So, Isocrates' use of democratic vocabulary should be interpreted within this broader framework, rather than being dismissed as part of an

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[84] See, for instance, Too (1995) and Poulakos (1997) as well as Haskins (2004), Nicolai (2004), Poulakos and Depew (2004), who all focus on Isocrates' rhetoric rather than on his political thought (even though most of them explicitly recognise his importance as a political thinker). See also Orth (2003), Classen (2010), Janik (2012), Bouchet and Giovanelli-Jouanna (2015) and Brunello (2015). For a reappraisal of various aspects of Isocrates' manuscript tradition see Andorlini (2003) and Pinto (2003).
[85] See, for instance, Cartledge (2009) 74.
[86] Brock (2009) 149.
[87] Poulakos and Depew (2004) 18.
[88] For a discussion of the main scholarly viewpoints on the difference between fifth- and fourth-century democracy see Rhodes (2015) 59-61.

arbitrary and deceptive manoeuvre designed to implement an anti-democratic programme.

Previous studies on Isocrates' political language

Indeed, when it is not overlooked *in toto*, Isocrates' political, especially democratic, vocabulary is usually considered as corroborating the portrait of Isocrates as supporter of an anti-democratic programme in disguise. The prime example of this trend is represented by Bearzot's study that by focusing predominantly on the occurrences of δημοκρατία and its cognates throughout Isocrates' corpus argues that his use of the term was a mere façade to promote what in reality was an oligarchic agenda.[89] While Bearzot has certainly had the merit of drawing the attention to the issue of Isocrates' manifold usages of the δημ- family of words, I disagree with, and shall thus challenge, her interpretation of the democratic language in the Isocratean corpus as *flatus vocis* within the framework of a cunning but clumsy attempt to conceal an undemocratic standpoint. Moreover, Bearzot's study assumes a fixed and monolithic meaning for the label δημοκρατία.[90] Nevertheless, as we have briefly seen above, that was not the case. Indeed, the intrinsic malleability of the term, and thus of the notion, should suggest a more sophisticated interpretation of Isocrates' instances of democratic language rather than dismissing, as Bearzot does, his use of δημοκρατία and cognates as opportunistic and thus insincere.[91]

Prior to Bearzot's study, one of the few attempts to provide an analysis of Isocrates' political terminology was made by Levi in two short articles published toward the end of the 1950s.[92] However, despite some interesting insights, Levi fails to bring together the threads of his examination of the single terms (which are listed in alphabetical order) to answer much wider questions about Isocrates' use of democratic vocabulary and to engage with broader issues related to the complexity of his political thought and language. So, Levi's

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[89] See Bearzot (1980).
[90] See Bearzot (1980) 113.
[91] See Bearzot (1980) 120.
[92] See Levi (1957) and Levi (1958). See also Labriola (1978) who focuses exclusively on three terms: δημοκρατία, ὀλιγαρχία, ἀριστοκρατία, and whose aim is to highlight the ambiguity of Isocrates' professed support of democracy. See also Ghirga and Romussi (1997) 58-63 for a helpful, though very concise, analysis of the Isocratean usage of a few political terms (including δημοκρατία and ὀλιγαρχία).

analysis is not (and most probably does not aim to be) exhaustive, and calls for a much deeper investigation of this topic.

It is only more recently that, in conjunction with the above-mentioned growing interest in Isocrates' writings, further attention has been paid to his political lexicon, as exemplified, first and foremost, by Bouchet's study.[93] Indeed, Bouchet underlines the relevance of Isocrates as a political thinker and his general consistency by focusing principally on a chronothematic examination of the topic of hegemony in his corpus. More specifically, by means of a meticulous linguistic analysis of ἡγεμονία, its cognates and related terms throughout Isocrates' works, Bouchet identifies a shift in the meaning of ἡγεμονία from designating Athens' military domination to indicating a cultural pre-eminence. Bouchet's study has indeed shown the fruitfulness of a lexical methodology in attempting to cast light on Isocrates' political thought. However, in focusing predominantly on ἡγεμονία and the terminology related to it, the French scholar does not address the issue of the manifold usages of democratic language in the corpus.

Structure and argument of the thesis

I shall, therefore, build on these insights to explore how Isocrates employs political language, particularly democratic vocabulary, what this can tell us about his political views, and how his use of democratic terminology can be contextualised within the wider contemporary historical, political and literary framework. Regarding the structure of the present dissertation, my study will comprise four chapters, in addition to this introductory chapter. I will indeed begin my investigation with the analysis of the Isocratean usages of the vocabulary related to two key notions inextricably connected with democracy, namely freedom of speech and equality, before devoting my attention, in the last two chapters, to the examination of some crucial, yet often overlooked, instances of democratic terminology stemming from the actual δημ-root.

More precisely, I shall focus, first of all, on the concept of freedom of speech by means of a detailed examination of the occurrences of παρρησία and its cognate verb παρρησιάζομαι throughout the Isocratean corpus. The following chapter will then be devoted to the idea of equality in Isocrates' works with

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[93] See Bouchet (2014), who, in the final part of his volume, provides a much needed French translation of (though not a commentary on) *On the Peace*.

specific attention being given to three main aspects: ἰσονομία, the theory of the two kinds of equality, and ἰσομοιρία. Moving to the investigation of some key occurrences of democratic vocabulary directly belonging to the δημ- family of words, the fourth chapter aims to illuminate Isocrates' interest in, and views on, political leadership through an analysis of the instances of the term δημαγωγός and its cognate verb δημαγωγέω in his writings. This chapter will also include an investigation of the Isocratean depiction of Alcibiades as a case study to identify the key pillars on which Isocrates' more general ideas on leadership are based. Finally, the last chapter will provide an examination of the occurrences of the adjective δημοτικός throughout the corpus with the main purpose of showing how Isocrates' deep-rooted and predominantly Athenocentric interest in political leadership shapes his views on what democracy and being democratic should look like.

Ultimately, I shall suggest that asking whether Isocrates was a democrat or an oligarch is too simplistic and runs the risk of flattening the complexity of his political thought and his use of political, especially democratic, language. Rather, the boundaries of the debate need to be shifted and broadened so that we can look instead at two crucial points. On the one hand, how he exploits, and at the same time expands, the ductility that is embedded in democratic vocabulary within the wider context of, and in the attempt to address, contemporary historical and political issues. On the other hand, how Isocrates' views on democracy are inextricably related to, and profoundly influenced by, his ideas on what it means to be a good political leader in both internal and international politics.

Chapter 2

Παρρησία **in Isocrates' Political Thought**[1]

1. Introduction

The idea of speaking freely is inextricably linked to the Athenian democracy.[2] From a linguistic point of view, this notion was primarily expressed by two keywords: ἰσηγορία and παρρησία.[3] While ἰσηγορία occurs only once in Isocrates' works,[4] we can find several instances of the noun παρρησία and its cognate verb παρρησιάζομαι throughout the corpus. Therefore, the primary aim of this chapter is to explore how Isocrates employs and develops the concept of παρρησία in his political thought. I shall thus identify three different usages within the Isocratean corpus: a positive sense, the awareness of its drawbacks that leads at times to temporary hesitation in using it, and a negative connotation, which is highly innovative. So, I will look carefully at each of the three meanings that παρρησία takes on in Isocrates' political vocabulary with the purpose of bringing out the complexity of his use of this notion.

However, in order to do so, we need to consider, more broadly, how the idea of speaking freely was intrinsic to Greek political thought. This is the reason why I shall start, first of all, with a more general discussion of the role of ἰσηγορία and παρρησία in fifth- and fourth-century discourse before returning to a more in-depth examination of the Isocratean instances of παρρησία and παρρησιάζομαι. Finally, I will also show how this detailed analysis of the role of παρρησία within Isocrates' works can provide us with some preliminary indications about the wider issue of his use of democratic vocabulary.

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[1] This chapter represents a revised and expanded version of an article published as a result of a paper that I delivered at 'XV Encuentro de Jóvenes Investigadores en Historia Antigua', Universidad Complutense de Madrid, 4th-6th May 2016; see Giannone (2017).

[2] See, for instance, Momigliano (1973) 256-257, 258-259.

[3] There were also other terms that could indicate freedom of speech, such as the verb ἐλευθεροστομέω and the cognate adjective ἐλευθερόστομος, as well as the phrase ἐλευθέρως λέγειν. However, Spina (1986) 27 highlights that their use was very limited and not comparable to that of ἰσηγορία and παρρησία. On the use of such terms in Greek tragedy see Spina (1986) 80-82.

[4] See section 3.3.1 of the present chapter.

2. Ἰσηγορία and παρρησία in Greek political thought

In order to understand more fully how Isocrates deals with the concept of speaking freely as well as the issues that it could pose, we need to begin our investigation by looking at the origin and development of this notion in Greek political thought. The two terms that best expressed it, namely, ἰσηγορία and παρρησία, at least to a certain extent, 'clearly slide into one another', though the latter 'captures the willingness to exhume the truth without concern about whom the truth may offend', whereas the former 'captures the equality of opportunity to practice *parrhêsia*'.[5] There are thus fundamental semantic differences between the two notions, since ἰσηγορία focuses mainly on the idea of '*equality* of speech, usually in a political context', whereas παρρησία appears to be 'more closely connected with ideas of freedom, that can be used equally of social and political discourse'.[6] So, even though ἰσηγορία and παρρησία are closely related to one another, they are not 'always interchangeable', as Carter points out.[7] Moreover, they differ not only in their meaning, but also in their origin, as ἰσηγορία seems to precede παρρησία. This suggests that the notion of equality was given greater importance than that of openness until the last decades of the fifth century, when, as we shall see, the term παρρησία progressively began to take root in Greek political vocabulary.[8]

Ἰσηγορία

Interestingly, ἰσηγορία ('equal right of speech') initially originated as an aristocratic notion, not a democratic one. Indeed, as Momigliano suggests, 'it meant equality of rights in the matter of freedom of speech and could easily apply to a restricted number of aristocrats', as the name of Cleisthenes' opponent 'Isagoras' clearly shows.[9] As Raaflaub highlights, Isagoras represented 'a "political name", significantly given to a member of one of the most important aristocratic families in Athens precisely around the time when

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[5] Saxonhouse (2006) 94.
[6] Carter (2004) 201 [his italics].
[7] Carter (2004) 199.
[8] According to Carter (2004) 200 the fact that '*isêgoria* had more to do with equality of speech than with free speech' does not exclude the possibility to 'describe it as a freedom', as Theseus does in Eur., *Suppliants* 438-439.
[9] Momigliano (1973) 259. On the contrary, Griffith (1967) 115 believes that 'the word makes sense only when it is used of a democracy, for freedom of speech among an *élite* can be taken for granted'.

the value it expressed had assumed new importance'. Indeed, Raaflaub argues that, after the Pisistratid tyranny had deprived the aristocrats of their 'equality in the sense of participation in power, rule, and leadership–and thus also in the right of speaking among the leaders and in front of the community', they felt compelled to reaffirm such a prerogative and coin a specific term to define it.[10]

Nevertheless, the idea of open and free speech first appears in Aeschylus' *Persians* (472) when the Chorus make reference to Xerxes' defeat:

> τοὶ δ᾽ ἀνὰ γᾶν Ἀσίαν δὴν
> οὐκέτι περσονομοῦνται,
> οὐδ᾽ ἔτι δασμοφοροῦσι
> δεσποσύνοισιν ἀνάγκαις,
> οὐδ᾽ εἰς γᾶν προπίτνοντες
> ἅζονται· βασιλεία
> γὰρ διόλωλεν ἰσχύς.
>
> οὐδ᾽ ἔτι γλῶσσα βροτοῖσιν
> ἐν φυλακαῖς· λέλυται γὰρ
> λαὸς ἐλεύθερα βάζειν,
> ὡς ἐλύθη ζυγὸν ἀλκᾶς.
> αἱμαχθεῖσα δ᾽ ἄρουραν
> Αἴαντος περικλύστα
> νᾶσος ἔχει τὰ Περσᾶν.[11]

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[10] Raaflaub (1996) 144; see also Raaflaub (2004a) 45. Nevertheless, the fact that in [Arist.], *Constitution of the Athenians* XVI 6 Pisistratus appreciates and rewards the παρρησία employed by the peasant might indicate that the Athenian tyrant was not, after all, so keen to restrict the possibility of speaking freely and openly; see, in this respect, Monoson (1994) 177. However, Saxonhouse (2006) 90 points out that 'this story tells us very little about the actions of Athens' tyrant, but a great deal about what will elicit praise in the mid-fourth century: the appreciation of honest speech, of *parrhêsia*'.

[11] Aesch., *Persians* 584-596.

Not long now will those in the land of Asia

remain under Persian rule,

nor continue to pay tribute

under the compulsion of their lords,

nor fall on their faces to the ground

in awed obeisance; for the strength of the monarchy

has utterly vanished.

Nor do men any longer keep their tongue

under guard; for people

have been let loose to speak with freedom,

now the yoke of military force no longer binds them.

In its blood-soaked soil

the sea-washed isle of Ajax

holds the power of Persia.[12]

The Chorus of Persian elders mourn for Xerxes' defeat at Salamis, regarding it as the end of the Persian empire. In particular, the elders lament that this downfall will entail free speech because people will be no more compelled to speak guardedly. Indeed, the ability to speak frankly and openly is portrayed as a crucial feature, or, more specifically, a consequence, of freedom from slavery of tyranny. As Rosenbloom highlights, even though 'the root of the word appears only three times' (one of such occurrences is precisely in the lines quoted above), ἐλευθερία constitutes 'a keyword of the play', as the tragedy stresses the Greeks' fight against Xerxes' attempt 'to unite Europe and Asia physically and politically under a yoke of slavery',[13] which is also a 'yoke of silence'.[14] The implicit contrast is represented, of course, by the Athenians, who

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[12] Trans. Sommerstein (2008) 78-79.

[13] Rosenbloom (2006) 70.

[14] Rosenbloom (2006) 81. On the image of the yoke representing Persian domination see also Garvie (2009) 248 and especially Brock (2013) 108. Concerning the Chorus' emphasis on the political consequences of Xerxes' defeat see Podlecki (1991) 87 and 89. On the character of Xerxes as 'the fully developed prototype of a tyrant' see Raaflaub (2004a) 90, according to whom the fact that the Chorus consider free speech as one of the main drawbacks resulting from the fall of the Persian empire provides us with 'the earliest extant indication that the opposite of the unfree condition imposed by tyranny includes elements of freedom'. Carter (2004) 213-214 underlines that the passage is 'full of the language of freedom: λέλυται … ἐλεύθερα … ἐλύθη', but he believes that 'the restriction of free speech under tyranny' was not regarded as 'conceptually similar to the denial of *eleutheria* under tyranny. Such denial of

in the play are chief in the resistance to Xerxes' attack. Although it is perhaps too early to talk of democratic discourse and an explicit democratic language probably only belongs to the period after Ephialtes' reforms, when the term δημοκρατία was apparently coined,[15] the Chorus' lamentation shows that speaking freely, as opposed to speaking with caution, is considered as antithetical to Athenian political ideology since it characterises a tyrannical regime like Persia.

Then, in the late fifth century the term ἰσηγορία came to be closely related to democratic vocabulary. Indeed, Herodotus, who is the first author known to us to employ both ἰσηγορία and δημοκρατία, makes an inextricable link between ἰσηγορία and democracy. After recounting the victory of the Athenians against the Chalcidians and the Boeotians in 506/5 (that is, just after Cleisthenes' reforms),[16] Herodotus describes ἰσηγορία as 'a good thing in all respects' (πανταχῇ χρῆμα σπουδαῖον). In order to support his statement he underlines the close relationship existing between foreign policy and internal political situation, arguing that when the Athenians were ruled by tyrants (τυραννευόμενοι) they were not better in war than their neighbours, but after they got rid of tyranny, they became by far the best. Such a transformation, Herodotus concludes, demonstrates that when they were oppressed the Athenians played the coward deliberately, while 'once they were set free' (ἐλευθερωθέντων), everyone was eager to achieve for himself.[17] So, in this passage, where Herodotus couples it with ἐλευθερία suggesting a contrast with tyranny as well as making the connection between equality of speech and freedom, ἰσηγορία appears to be a synonym or, more precisely, a synecdoche for δημοκρατία.[18]

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eleutheria could be considered an injustice, but no such idea is attached to the denial of *parrhêsia*', because, Carter argues, '*parrhêsia* was not considered anyone's right' in tyrannies.
[15] See, for instance, Raaflaub (1995) 1-54.
[16] Hdt., V 77.
[17] Hdt., V 78.
[18] See Griffith (1967) 115. See also Monoson (1994) 178-179 and Nenci (1994) 274. Carter (2004) 199-200 highlights that ἰσηγορία 'could be political in meaning as well as context, in that it could be used synonymously with democracy', as it is the case in the Herodotean passage, while παρρησία represents 'the word writers in a non-political context are more likely to choose', since it constitutes 'more a by-product of democracy than democracy itself'. On the contrary, Asheri (1988) LVI-LVII does not believe that in Hdt., V 78 ἰσηγορία corresponds to democracy. On different possible explanations for the use of ἰσηγορία instead of δημοκρατία (or ἰσονομία, on which we will focus in the next chapter) see Griffith (1967) 116 and, more recently, Vannicelli (2014) 130.

Moreover, the Herodotean passage has raised questions among scholars about the date when ἰσηγορία was officially introduced in Athens as the right of every citizen to address the Assembly. The issue was discussed firstly by Griffith, who, by assuming that ἰσηγορία is not 'necessarily one of the first and earliest of the political innovations that contributed to the development of a democracy', argues that we cannot take for granted that 'from the reforms of Solon onwards any citizen who could attend the Assembly could also speak in it'.[19] Griffith believes, instead, that ἰσηγορία was most probably introduced in Athens immediately after 462, since, in his view, it seems 'to fit best into the period when pay was first introduced for state service, the period inaugurated by the attack led by Ephialtes on the Areopagus', when it was 'an anachronism (even an absurdity) to restrict the right of speech in the Assembly to *any* privileged category'.[20] Griffith thus suggests that 'Athens became a democracy without it', and that 'even supposing it was introduced as early as Solon or before, it is not apparent that it played a decisive part'.[21] In an article published a few months after Griffith's essay, Woodhead stresses that if Ephialtes' reforms represent the *terminus ante quem* for the development of ἰσηγορία, 'those of Cleisthenes must be regarded as the *terminus post quem*, for it is only in the light of the working of Cleisthenes' system that the need and demand for free speech on the Pnyx can be effectively envisaged'.[22]

While both Griffith and Woodhead appear to share the common understanding that ἰσηγορία for all citizens was not in place during the time of Solon, Lewis not only maintains that there was ἰσηγορία in the assembly after Cleisthenes' reforms, but he also suggests, albeit quite cautiously, that it existed even earlier.[23] More specifically, he considers it plausible to assume that 'Solon made it law that no citizen should be debarred from having his say in the assembly', thus giving 'legal sanction to a privilege which had never been expressly restricted. The improvement was that 'discouragement' was no longer legal', so, Lewis continues, 'it was only the 'best people' and the elders who

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[19] Griffith (1967) 119.
[20] Griffith (1967) 124-125 [his italics].
[21] Griffith (1967) 128. On the contrary, Henderson (1998) 256 emphasises that '*isēgoria* came into its own with full *dēmokratia*, to which it was essential. By giving every citizen the opportunity to demonstrate, and to be rewarded for, his excellence in counsel, *isēgoria* promoted a politically vigilant and active citizenry, broadened the range of classes and groups from which leaders could emerge, and put all leaders more firmly under the demos' control'.
[22] Woodhead (1967) 134.
[23] Lewis (1971).

spoke on most occasions – but the opportunity was there for all'.[24] However, as Lewis himself admits, the arguments in support of the origin of ἰσηγορία in Solon's time are quite weak. Thus, even though he suggests that ἰσηγορία was presumably reintroduced by Cleisthenes after having being 'restricted' by Pisistratus, the more general and soundly based conclusion which Lewis ultimately believes can be reached, and with which it seems opportune to agree, is that 'there was ἰσηγορία at Athens before the time of Pericles'.[25]

In addition to Herodotus' use of the term in the above-mentioned passage, the other fifth-century occurrences of ἰσηγορία worthy of mention are the two instances that we find in [Xenophon]'s *Constitution of the Athenians*, written most probably towards the end of the century.[26] Indeed, after having complained about the 'licentiousness' (ἀκολασία) that allegedly characterises slaves and metics at Athens, [Xenophon] claims that the Athenians have allowed ἰσηγορία between slaves and free men as well as between metics and citizens due to the economic needs connected with their sea empire.[27] Here, as noted by Marr and Rhodes, rather than conveying 'a constitutional sense' as in the Herodotean passage, the term is employed 'in its more specific and literal sense'.[28] Nevertheless, the usages of the word in both Herodotus and [Xenophon] bear witness to the crucial role played by ἰσηγορία in fifth-century political terminology. In the following century, as we shall see below, it ends up coexisting with παρρησία, with the latter becoming increasingly more prominent.

Παρρησία

Παρρησία, the other term that, together with ἰσηγορία, expresses speaking freely and frankly, derives from πᾶν and ῥῆσις (or ῥῆμα), and thus denotes the possibility of 'saying all'.[29] While the most widespread English translations are

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[24] Lewis (1971) 133.
[25] Lewis (1971) 140.
[26] On the debated question regarding the exact date on which [Xenophon] wrote his work see, for instance, Forrest (1970), Sealey (1973) 257-260, Canfora (1980) 63-78, Canfora (1991) 9-10, Connor (1971) 207-209, Musti (1995) 58, Lapini (1997) 11, Robinson (1997) 50-51 (especially n. 54), Gray (2007) 57-58, Marr and Rhodes (2008) 3-6, Hornblower (2010a) 327-343, Centanni (2011) 81-82, Osborne (2017) 4-5 and 10-11. See also Marr and Rhodes (2008) 31-32 (who, while opting for 425-424, provide a brief overview of some of the main datings suggested by different scholars), and more recently, Mitchell (forthcoming) 20 n. 54.
[27] [Xen.], *Constitution of the Athenians* I, 10-12. For an analysis of this passage with specific focus on the use of the terms ἀκολασία and ἰσηγορία see Cataldi (2000); see also Nakategawa (1995) 30 and 34-37.
[28] Marr and Rhodes (2008) 79.
[29] See, for instance, Peterson (1929) 283, Casevitz (1992) XIX, Raaflaub (2004a) 223 and Landauer (2012) 185; see also Konstan (2012) 11.

'freedom of speech' and 'free speech',[30] I have opted for 'outspokenness' as I believe that this is the translation which best reflects the etymology of the word.[31] According to Raaflaub, παρρησία rose 'just before and at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War' when 'political polarization reached a new height'.[32] The importance gained by παρρησία in the second half of the fifth century is indeed manifest in Euripides' tragedies, starting from *Hippolytus* (428). In this play, Phaedra justifies her decision to kill herself by saying that she does not want to bring shame upon her husband and children, and claiming that the awareness of wicked acts committed by a parent enslaves even a 'bold-hearted' (θρασύσπλαγχνος) man. Rather, she wishes that her sons will live in Athens as 'free men' (ἐλεύθεροι), enjoying παρρησία as well as 'being flourishing' (θάλλοντες).[33] Therefore, here παρρησία and ἐλευθερία appear to be closely interrelated in the life of a democratic πόλις like Athens.

The essential role that παρρησία assumed in fifth-century Athens as a cornerstone of democracy and mark of Athenian citizenship is exemplified also through the words that Ion addresses to Xuthus in the homonymous Euripidean tragedy, which has been described as a 'parrhesiastic play' *par excellence*.[34] After finding out that Xuthus is his father, Ion's main concern consists in unveiling the identity of his mother. Should he fail to do so, his life would become 'insupportable' (ἀβίωτος). He then clarifies why finding his mother is so crucial to him: only if she is Athenian will he be able to enjoy παρρησία, otherwise his mouth will be enslaved as it happens to foreigners coming to Athens, who are citizens only in words and thus are not granted παρρησία.[35]

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[30] See Saxonhouse (2006) 86, who, despite accepting these two translations, underlines the fact that both phrases tie the term 'too strongly to the passive language of rights rather than the active expressions of one's true beliefs'. Monoson (2000) 52 n. 5 opts for 'frank speech'.

[31] This translation is adopted also, for instance, by Mirhady and Too (2000) 158-159 and Marr and Rhodes (2008) 79; see also Konstan (2012) 7.

[32] Raaflaub (2004a) 224; see also Saxonhouse (2006) 94.

[33] Eur., *Hippolytus* 419-425. On this passage see Barrett (1964) 236. See also Camerotto (2012) 55. More in general, on the close relationship between παρρησία and ἐλευθερία see Monoson (1994) 176-177.

[34] Foucault (2001) 27. Concerning the date of the play, there is no certain evidence, yet Swift (2008) 30 reaches the conclusion that it was composed between 420 and 410, more precisely 'towards the middle or later part of this period'.

[35] Eur., *Ion* 668-675, where the importance of παρρησία, which is used twice, is clearly stressed. See Burnett (1970) 73 and Scarpat (1964) 30-32 as well as Spina (1986) 83. See also Carter (2004) 215 who argues that the comparison between lack of freedom of speech and slavery that we find here does not 'make free speech a right in the same sense as freedom from slavery, merely a privilege that derives from one's citizen status'. On the issue of Ion's civic status see Brock (2010) 99.

Similarly, the main downside of exile which Polynices complains about during his stichomythia with Jocasta in the *Phoenician Women* (ca. 409)[36] is precisely the fact that he has no παρρησία. This makes his lot comparable to that of a slave and forces him to endure the 'ignorance' (ἀμαθία) of the rulers.[37] So, the Euripidean occurrences of παρρησία that we have analysed so far suggest that being able to speak with outspokenness represents 'the chief characteristic of the fully entitled citizen' as well as 'the elementary quality of a free person',[38] and thus embodies the opposite of slavery.

Likewise, παρρησία gains more and more importance during the fourth century, when the two terms ἰσηγορία and παρρησία continue to coexist side by side but there is an even clearer shift from the former to the latter, in the sense that παρρησία tends to be employed much more often and to overshadow (although not replacing) ἰσηγορία. The increasing prominence that παρρησία acquires in the fourth century is apparent if we consider the number of occurrences of these two words in fourth-century oratory. For example, Isocrates and Aeschines use the noun παρρησία and the verb παρρησιάζομαι several times, whereas they both employ ἰσηγορία only once in their works.[39] Indeed, the Athenians did treasure παρρησία and were convinced that individual self-expression had to be subordinated to common welfare. They even named a trireme Παρρησία[40] and were thus proud of what they regarded not only as a right, but also, and most importantly, as a duty to be performed in the interest of the πόλις.[41] This is the reason why there were restrictions on who could be granted παρρησία which affected even Athenian citizens, and which are mentioned, for instance, by Aeschines in *Against Timarchus* 28-32.[42] Such legal restrictions not only ensured 'the safety of the city but served also as a punishment for those who had defied the moral standards of the community, for

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[36] On the date of Euripides' *Phoenician Women* see Craik (1988) 40-41. See also Papadopoulou (2008) 24 according to whom 'the period of 411 to 409 remains the most plausible for dating the production of the *Phoenician Women*'.

[37] Eur., *Phoenician Women* 385-394. See Craik (1988) 193, who underlines the role of παρρησία as 'a political catchword in the late fifth century'. See also Radin (1927) 215, Foucault (2001) 28-29 and Camerotto (2012) 56-57. On the role of freedom of speech in this passage and, more generally, in the whole play see also Saxonhouse (2006) 138-145.

[38] Raaflaub (2004a) 223.

[39] Isoc., *Archidamus* 97 (on which more below) and Aeschin., *Against Timarchus* 173.

[40] IG II² 1624.81; see, for instance, Saxonhouse (2006) 90 and Christodoulou (2012) 100.

[41] See, for example, Henderson (1998) 256 who stresses that παρρησία was 'ideologically and procedurally essential in maintaining the integrity of the democratic system, so much so that it could be considered not merely a citizen's right but his moral obligation'.

[42] See also Aeschin., *Against Timarchus* 3 and 14; Dem., *Against Androtion* 29.

those who lacked any sense of shame'.[43] Therefore, the fact that the denial of παρρησία was imposed as a form of punishment seems to confirm the high value that the Athenians placed on this practice.

However, as highlighted by Sluiter and Rosen, παρρησία is a *vox media* in the sense that it 'may in and of itself be used as a simple descriptor, e.g. of a practice commonly associated with democracy, which may be evaluated as either a good or bad thing depending on the views of the speaker'.[44] This means that the word, and thus the notion itself of παρρησία, is characterised by an intrinsic tension. Consequently, it does have, as we shall see, also a negative side, insofar as saying whatever comes into one's mind without reserve could give rise to unbridled and insulting speech.

3. The role of παρρησία in Isocrates

The inherent flexibility characterising παρρησία is particularly well attested in Isocrates' usages of the term throughout his corpus. Thus, in the following sections, I will provide an in-depth examination of the three main meanings that παρρησία takes on in his works. In doing so, I intend to show their interconnections and their significance inside the corpus itself and, more broadly, within fourth-century political thought. Owing to the essential role that, as we saw, it played in Athens, its importance to Greek political thought and its inherent complexity, παρρησία as a political idea has been the subject of a number of specialist studies. So, we need to consider, first of all, the ways in which modern scholars have explored it, before turning to Isocrates' usages.

The first monograph entirely centred on παρρησία is the one published by Scarpat in the 1960s.[45] In his landmark study, by means of a linguistic examination and a philological approach the Italian scholar focuses on the history of the term παρρησία as well as on the nuances that differentiate it from ἰσηγορία and ἰσονομία. Moreover, Scarpat devotes particular attention also to the use of παρρησία in early Christian literature and to the Latin terms employed to render it (such as *licentia* and *libera vox* or *libera oratio*), even though he

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[43] See Saxonhouse (2006) 96-97. See also Monoson (1994) 181.
[44] Sluiter and Rosen (2004) 4.
[45] See Scarpat (1964); for a revised edition published under a slightly different title see Scarpat (2001).

highlights that there were few attempts to translate the Greek word, and that none of the Latin terms which he takes into consideration reflects its original meaning.[46]

The topic was then re-examined around twenty years later by Spina, who employs a methodology quite similar to that of Scarpat, but concentrates only on the Greek side.[47] Indeed, his study begins with the analysis of the occurrences of the concept and the issues posed by it in the Homeric poems, paying special attention to *Iliad*, II 48-277 with the well-known episode of Thersites. While Spina's work might appear at times to be mostly compilatory, its main quality lies in presenting a more detailed and deeper analysis of the uses of παρρησία in the fifth and fourth centuries than the one provided by Scarpat.[48] Nonetheless, both Scarpat and Spina have the merit of drawing attention to the complex and varying usages of παρρησία in Greek literature.

Furthermore, παρρησία represented one of Foucault's predominant research interests at the beginning of the 1980s. Indeed, it is at the heart of the courses that he held at the Collège de France between January and March 1983 and then between January and March 1984.[49] Παρρησία is also the topic of the six lectures delivered in English at the University of California at Berkeley in Autumn 1983,[50] in which Foucault devoted particular attention to the issue of 'truth-telling as a specific activity', clarifying that his purpose 'was not to conduct a sociological description of the different possible roles for truth-tellers in different societies', but to analyse 'how the truth-teller's role was variously problematized in Greek philosophy'.[51] However, even though he asserts that his main focus is on the 'problematization' of the notion of παρρησία,[52] Foucault refers only in passing to Isocrates' works, in which, as I shall argue, such a problematisation is particularly evident. In addition, his interpretation of the few

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[46] On the Latin terminology see also, for instance, Colclough (2005) 12-15 and 25-37, and Spina (2005) 317-346 as well as Raaflaub (2004b) 55-57, Chrissanthos (2004) and Morton Braund (2004).
[47] See Spina (1986).
[48] For a positive evaluation of Spina's work see Tedeschi (1987), whereas Hannick (1988) presents a rather harsh review.
[49] See Foucault (2010) and Foucault (2011). Both volumes, published posthumously, consist in a transcription of Foucault's lectures using the recordings made by some of his audience members.
[50] See Foucault (2001). This volume as well has been published posthumously and consists in a transcription, based mainly on tape recordings, of Foucault's six lectures.
[51] Foucault (2001) 169.
[52] Foucault (2001) 171-173.

Isocratean passages that he mentions appears to be somehow misleading, as we shall see.

Most recently, the political scientist Saxonhouse has concentrated her attention on the idea of speaking frankly in order to illuminate our modern understanding of free speech by counterposing it to the very different form of free speech which was practised in Athens. More specifically, she combines the analysis of παρρησία, which she describes as 'the democratic practice of shamelessness',[53] with that of αἰδώς, namely 'respect for modes of behavior' setting 'limits on both the exercise of democratic self-rule and freedom of speech that goes along with it'.[54] Furthermore, she highlights that, even though these two notions are opposing points, they are both necessary elements of any stable government.

Scholarship has thus underlined the importance of speaking freely and openly to Greek political thought, but very scant attention has been paid to the role of this topic in the Isocratean corpus. Indeed, none of the above-mentioned works provides a comprehensive and systematic examination of the usage and function of παρρησία within Isocrates' political thought. The only study devoted to the investigation of παρρησία in the Isocratean corpus is, to my knowledge, a relatively recent article by Christodoulou, who can be credited with acknowledging, and attempting to illuminate our understanding of, the key role of this concept in Isocrates' works.[55] However, by basing his analysis predominantly on the instances of the term and cognate verb in *Areopagiticus*, *On the Peace* and *Antidosis* and arguing that Isocrates' references to παρρησία reveal his alleged anti-democratic political views, Christodoulou presents an interpretation that, in my view, is partial and ultimately distorted.

Therefore, my investigation of the occurrences of παρρησία and παρρησιάζομαι throughout the whole Isocratean corpus has a twofold aim. On the one hand, I wish to fill what appears to be a gap in the scholarly debates both on Isocrates' political thought and on the notion of παρρησία. On the other hand, I intend to point out how Isocrates' varied and multifaceted usages stem from the tension embedded in παρρησία, rather than from his supposedly anti-

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[53] Saxonhouse (2006) 89.
[54] Saxonhouse (2006) 8.
[55] See Christodoulou (2012). For a discussion of some of the Isocratean usages of παρρησία see also Landauer (2012) who, starting with an examination of the fourth-century literary depictions of the use of παρρησία in non-democratic contexts, ultimately argues that παρρησία in Athens was tightly linked to the role of the δῆμος as τύραννος.

democratic agenda. In order to do so, I shall examine, first of all, the instances in which παρρησία and its cognate verb bear a positive sense. Secondly, I will highlight the hesitation that at times Isocrates shows in speaking freely and openly. Such moments of hesitation appear to be motivated by the awareness of the dangers and drawbacks that can result from παρρησία. Nevertheless, Isocrates always portrays himself as overcoming any shilly-shallying and eventually choosing to speak with outspokenness. Lastly, I will devote special attention to the instances of παρρησία conveying a negative meaning since, as I shall highlight, they acquire particular relevance within Isocrates' own political vocabulary and are distinctly notable in the wider framework of fifth- and fourth-century literary usages of the term.

3.1 Positive use of παρρησία

I will thus start my investigation by concentrating on the several instances in which Isocrates uses the notion of παρρησία in a positive way. In doing so, I shall highlight how Isocrates, when employing παρρησία in its usual positive sense, regards it as a civic value that not only characterises orators like himself (who, in contrast to flatterers, speak the truth in the interest of their interlocutors), but also one that good monarchs can and should acquire.

Παρρησία in *To Nicocles*

Such a positive meaning is indeed particularly evident in the two occurrences of παρρησία in *To Nicocles*. In this speech, which along with *Nicocles* and *Evagoras*, belongs to the so called Cyprian orations, Isocrates addresses the young king of Salamis, who most probably had also been one of his pupils,[56] shortly after his father Evagoras' death in 374, with the aim of offering him 'the most beautiful and the most useful gift' (καλλίστη δωρεὰ καὶ χρησιμωτάτη), that is, defining what pursuits Nicocles should yearn for and which ones he should avoid in order to govern his kingdom in the best possible way.[57] This topic, Isocrates argues, deserves special attention because of the particular lifestyle of kings which prevents them from enjoying all the positive elements that characterise the education of ordinary citizens. In this respect, Isocrates goes

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[56] See, for instance, Mathieu (1925) 110 and Usher (1999) 309.
[57] Isoc., *To Nicocles* 2; see also Isoc., *To Nicocles* 6-7.

on to list the numerous features that, in his view, play a key role in the education of private citizens and are likely to contribute to make them better men:

> (…) μάλιστα μὲν τὸ μὴ τρυφᾶν, ἀλλ᾽ ἀναγκάζεσθαι περὶ τοῦ βίου καθ᾽ ἑκάστην βουλεύεσθαι τὴν ἡμέραν, ἔπειθ᾽ οἱ νόμοι, καθ᾽ οὓς ἕκαστοι πολιτευόμενοι τυγχάνουσιν, ἔτι δ᾽ ἡ παρρησία καὶ τὸ φανερῶς ἐξεῖναι τοῖς τε φίλοις ἐπιπλῆξαι καὶ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς ἐπιθέσθαι ταῖς ἀλλήλων ἁμαρτίαις· πρὸς δὲ τούτοις καὶ τῶν ποιητῶν τινες τῶν προγεγενημένων ὑποθήκας ὡς χρὴ ζῆν καταλελοίπασιν.[58]

> (…) above all, the absence of luxuriousness and the need to deliberate on their livelihood every day, then the laws through which each one is governed, further, outspokenness and the possibility openly granted to friends to rebuke and to enemies to attack each other's faults; in addition, some of the earlier poets have left instructions on how one needs to live.

On the contrary, Isocrates claims, τύραννοι,[59] who more than others need to be trained, are unable to enjoy these advantages, since they are 'unadmonished' (ἀνουθέτητοι), and the great majority of people do not associate with them, while those who do have dealings with them only aim to gain their 'favour' (χάρις). Furthermore, Isocrates continues, even though they have authority over the greatest wealth and most important matters, they do not use such advantages properly, and this is one of the main reasons why the life of ordinary citizens who are reasonably successful is often regarded as preferable to that of 'those who are τύραννοι' (οἱ τυραννεύοντες).[60] Indeed, Isocrates continues, people usually consider the latter as 'equal to gods' (ἰσόθεοι) because of their honours, wealth and power, but once they have realised the

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[58] Isoc., *To Nicocles* 2-3.
[59] Concerning the translation of τύραννος and its cognates in Isocrates' works, I have opted to maintain the Greek terminology due to the multifaceted meaning that the τυρανν- stem conveys in the Isocratean corpus, especially in the Cyprian speeches where it does not carry a derogatory connotation. More precisely, on the use of τύραννος with no negative sense and as a synonym for βασιλεύς throughout *To Nicocles* see Mirhady and Too (2000) 158 n. 2 and 159 n. 3; see also Levi (1958) 401-402 and Usher (1999) 309 n. 55. More on the meaning of τύραννος and its cognates in the Cyprian orations will be said in Chapter 5 section 2.1.
[60] Isoc., *To Nicocles* 4.

fears, dangers and misfortunes that 'monarchs' (οἱ ἐν ταῖς μοναρχίαις ὄντες) have to face, they drastically change their opinion.[61] Thus, in drawing a picture of the fundamental elements that characterise the education of ordinary citizens as opposed to the lack of training of kings that he intends to remedy with his present speech, Isocrates underlines the didactic function of παρρησία.

The notion of παρρησία is also closely linked to Isocrates' advice to Nicocles concerning the selection of friends. Indeed, later in the speech, focusing on Nicocles' entourage, Isocrates urges the Cyprian king to become friend only with those who are worthy of his nature. More specifically, Nicocles must not give his friendship to those with whom he spends his time most pleasantly, but to those with whom he can best administer Salamis. Moreover, Isocrates goes on, Nicocles should subject his associates to 'accurate examinations' (ἀκριβεῖς (…) δοκιμασίαι), since he will be considered not only similar to them by all who are not close to him, but also responsible for their actions.[62] Contextually, Isocrates warns once again the Cyprian king against flatterers by urging him to consider as 'trustworthy' (πιστοί) not those who praise everything he says and does, but those who rebuke him when he makes a mistake, and to grant παρρησία 'to those who think well' (τοῖς εὖ φρονοῦσιν) so that they can examine along with him the matters about which he is doubtful. In doing so, Nicocles should distinguish 'those who flatter with skill' (οἱ τέχνῃ κολακεύοντες) from 'those who serve with goodwill' (οἱ μετ᾽ εὐνοίας θεραπεύοντες).[63]

Significantly, here Isocrates recommends Nicocles to give παρρησία not to everybody, but only to people who have sound judgment. The point that I would stress here is that in Isocrates' view citizenship is not a sufficient requirement to enjoy παρρησία: what really matters in order to be granted outspokenness is the speaker's moral virtue. In other words, παρρησία represents the hallmark of citizenship and of a well-governed society, but being a citizen does not automatically mean that one can be allowed to speak with παρρησία, since, in order to do so, he must demonstrate that he possesses the moral characteristics which make him worthy of enjoying outspokenness and

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[61] Isoc., *To Nicocles* 5. For a similar emphasis on the life of ordinary citizens as being preferable to that of rulers see Isoc., *To the Children of Jason* 11.
[62] Isoc., *To Nicocles* 27.
[63] Isoc., *To Nicocles* 28. On the crucial role of Nicocles' entourage as counsellors on specific issues see also Isoc., *To Nicocles* 6.

thus likely to benefit his πόλις when airing his opinion. Indeed, while in Euripides' *Ion* citizenship by itself, as we saw, seems to guarantee the possibility of employing παρρησία, in Isocrates speaking frankly preserves a manifest political connotation, but, at the same time, it does assume a noticeably moral meaning.

It is worth highlighting that the crucial role of moral value in connection with παρρησία appears to be hinted at already in the above-mentioned passage from Euripides' *Hippolytus*, where having parents who are Athenian citizens is not enough to be granted παρρησία: the key factor is that they both have to be honourable parents. Therefore, as Foucault underlines, besides citizenship, 'a good reputation for oneself and one's family' is the *conditio sine qua non* to be allowed to speak freely in Athens. This means that παρρησία, as depicted in the Euripidean passage, 'requires both moral and social qualifications which come from a noble birth and a respectful reputation'.[64] So, I agree with Spina when he points out that it is possible to grasp an ethical nuance here.[65] Yet, it is in Isocrates that we can find for the first time a consistent and manifest emphasis on the moral connotation of παρρησία. In particular, 'thinking well' (εὖ φρονεῖν) and possessing 'goodwill' (εὔνοια), which represent two crucial notions in the Isocratean corpus as we will see later on in this study,[66] emerge as the essential qualities that make one worthy to be granted παρρησία.

Isocrates' self-portrait as παρρησιαστής

As we saw in *To Nicocles*, Isocrates presents παρρησία as the opposite of flattery, and it is in this sense in particular that it plays a key role in his own self-characterisation as a trustworthy orator who speaks frankly and only in the best interest of his interlocutors. Thus, it is no coincidence that in the Isocratean corpus almost all the other occurrences of the noun παρρησία and its cognate verb παρρησιάζομαι conveying a positive meaning refer to Isocrates himself. For instance, in the opening section of *Busiris*, an *encomium* of the mythical king of

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[64] Foucault (2001) 31. See also Carter (2004) 215, who interprets the 'loss of *parrhêsia*' mentioned in the Euripidean passage not as 'actual slavery' but as 'loss of self-confidence'.
[65] See Spina (1986) 82, who underlines that here political and moral values are both present. On the contrary, Scarpat (1964) 32 assigns to the Euripidean passage a merely political value.
[66] More on the key role played by εὔνοια in Isocrates' political thought will be said in the last two chapters, especially Chapter 4, while for a more detailed discussion of the relevance that the phrase οἱ εὖ φρονοῦντες acquires in the Isocratean corpus see Chapter 5 section 3.3.2.

Egypt generally regarded as having being written between 391 and 385,[67] Isocrates employs the verb παρρησιάζομαι in addressing the Athenian sophist Polycrates. More specifically, Isocrates states that he would have been greatly pleased to speak with outspokenness about the whole process of education (περὶ ὅλης ἐπαρρησιασάμην τῆς παιδεύσεως) on which Polycrates has been constrained to spend his time due to financial reasons. Indeed, Isocrates claims that all who, like himself, are more accurately versed in φιλοσοφία should be naturally disposed to help those who, like Polycrates, are undeservedly unfortunate and thus seek to make money from this occupation.[68] In this context, Isocrates stresses that the more accurately people are admonished the more harshly they react; nonetheless, he continues, 'those who are well disposed toward anyone' (οἱ εὐνοϊκῶς πρός τινας ἔχοντες) must not hesitate to face this 'hatred' (ἀπέχθεια) and should attempt to modify such a hostile reaction 'towards those who give advice' (πρὸς τοὺς συμβουλεύοντας).[69] Remarkably, this passage from *Busiris* hints at Isocrates' awareness of the negative reaction that speaking frankly frequently provokes, an aspect on which I shall focus in the next section. Moreover, I would underline that in these opening sections of the speech the notion of παρρησία expressed by the verb ἐπαρρησιασάμην is related to the concept of εὔνοια conveyed by means of the phrase οἱ εὐνοϊκῶς πρός τινας ἔχοντες. Indeed, the close link between παρρησία and εὔνοια that we find here can be compared to the association of the two concepts which has come to light in *To Nicocles* 28, and points once again to the relevant role played by εὔνοια in the Isocratean definition of the meaning of παρρησία.

Isocrates' self-portrait as παρρησιαστής emerges also in a passage from *Panathenaicus* where, focusing on proving that Athens has been of greater service to the Greeks than Sparta, he acknowledges that he has shifted from the mildness which he had when he began to write the speech to the discussion of matters he had not planned to address, more boldness than he normally has and a lack of control over some of his statements due to the multitude of things

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[67] See Mirhady and Too (2000) 49. On the debated question of the dating of *Busiris* see also Eucken (1983) 173-183 and Livingstone (2001) 3 and 40-47 who stresses the difficulty to determine the exact date of composition and ultimately suggests a later dating, that is, the early 370s.
[68] Isoc., *Busiris* 1.
[69] Isoc., *Busiris* 3.

to mention.[70] Within this framework, Isocrates declares that 'speaking with outspokenness' (τὸ παρρησιάζεσθαι) has suddenly come upon him and he has thus opened his mouth (λέλυκα τὸ στόμα).[71] So, here Isocrates appears to depict παρρησία not only as an intrinsic feature of his speech, but also as a sort of natural instinct, an irrepressible impulse that urges him to be bold in taking the floor, especially when he is dealing with topics he originally had not intended to address.

3.2 Hesitation and awareness of negative outcomes

If, on the one hand, Isocrates seems to refer to παρρησία as a constant and inescapable characteristic of his discourses, there are, on the other hand, some passages where he is hesitant to speak with παρρησία and shows some concern about the possible consequences or the opportuneness of doing so. Nonetheless, as it is hinted at, at least *in nuce*, in the passage from *Busiris* and as we shall see in this section, such hesitation is short-lived and can ultimately be considered as an aspect of παρρησία when understood in its positive sense as opposed to the negative meaning which I will discuss towards the end of the present chapter.

I shall begin my examination by briefly looking at non-Isocratean examples. Indeed, signs of a somewhat similar kind of hesitation and awareness of potential negative outcomes for speakers who employ παρρησία can be found already in Euripides' *Electra* (422-417).[72] Despite the fact that Clytemnestra has openly encouraged her to speak with παρρησία, Electra hesitates and wonders whether her mother lets her speak frankly simply to harm her afterwards; thus, before taking the floor Electra asks Clytemnestra to bear in mind that she has just allowed her to make use of παρρησία and begins to give her own speech only after her mother has reassured her.[73] Likewise, in

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[70] Isoc., *Panathenaicus* 95.
[71] Isoc., *Panathenaicus* 96. Both Carter (2004) 213 and Saxonhouse (2006) 89 point out that the phrase λέλυκα τὸ στόμα employed by Isocrates seems to recall the image of the tongue in fetters that we find in Aesch., *Persians* 591-592. Furthermore, Carter (2004) 201 stresses that here the verb παρρησιάζεσθαι implies 'freedom, specifically freedom from fear of causing offense'.
[72] This is the most likely dating according to Cropp (2013) 31-33.
[73] Eur., *Electra* 1049-1059, where the word παρρησία occurs twice. See Foucault (2001) 33-36. Spina (1986) 83 highlights that this passage demonstrates the semantic variety which παρρησία acquires in Euripides, and argues that here the term is used not in a political scenario, but in a private setting. I am not persuaded by Carter (2004) 213, who, instead of focusing on Electra's

Bacchae, a herdsman, who has come from Mount Cithaeron as messenger to report about the Maenads, is reluctant to speak with παρρησία and explicitly asks Pentheus for permission to employ outspokenness:

βάκχας ποτνιάδας εἰσιδών, αἳ τῆσδε γῆς
οἴστροισι λευκὸν κῶλον ἐξηκόντισαν,
ἥκω φράσαι σοὶ καὶ πόλει χρῄζων, ἄναξ,
ὡς δεινὰ δρῶσι θαυμάτων τε κρείσσονα.
Θέλω δ᾽ ἀκοῦσαι πότερά σοι παρρησίᾳ
φράσω τὰ κεῖθεν ἢ λόγον στειλώμεθα·
τὸ γὰρ τάχος σου τῶν φρενῶν δέδοικ᾽, ἄναξ,
καὶ τοὐξύθυμον καὶ τὸ βασιλικὸν λίαν.[74]

I have seen the wild bacchant women, who ran from this city in madness with their feet in rapid motion, and I have come to tell you and the city, my lord, that they are doing strange deeds that outstrip wonder. But I want you to tell me whether I should speak freely about what happened there or be circumspect in my speech. I fear your mind's hastiness, my lord, its irascibility, and your all too royal temper.[75]

It is thus evident that speaking with παρρησία is presented not only as corresponding to speaking the truth, but also, most importantly, as entailing a potential danger for the speaker who does so. The awareness of the risk that one faces when he decides to employ παρρησία seems to emerge even in Democritus Fr. 226 DK, where the close bond between παρρησία and ἐλευθερία also comes to light:[76]

οἰκήιον ἐλευθερίης παρρησίη, κίνδυνος δὲ ἡ τοῦ καιροῦ διάγνωσις.

Outspokenness is proper to freedom, but the danger lies in distinguishing the exact time.

Turning to the analysis of Isocrates' works, it is worth highlighting that in a couple of passages he seems to admit that παρρησία does not befit all discussions. For instance, in the discourse that he addresses to Demonicus and that probably belongs to the same period as the Cyprian orations (namely, between 374 and 370),[77] Isocrates appears to be suggesting that there are some subjects about which one cannot speak with παρρησία:

ἡγοῦ κράτιστον εἶναι παρὰ μὲν τῶν θεῶν εὐτυχίαν, παρὰ δ' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν εὐβουλίαν. περὶ ὧν ἂν αἰσχύνῃ παρρησιάσασθαι, βούλῃ δέ τισι τῶν φίλων ἀνακοινώσασθαι, χρῶ τοῖς λόγοις ὡς περὶ ἀλλοτρίου τοῦ πράγματος· οὕτω γὰρ τὴν ἐκείνων τε γνῶσιν αἰσθήσει, καὶ σεαυτὸν οὐ καταφανῆ ποιήσεις.[78]

Consider that the best thing is good luck from the gods and good counsel from ourselves. Concerning the matters of which you are ashamed to speak with outspokenness, but you wish to take counsel with some of your friends, speak as about another man's affair; in this way you will learn their opinion, and will not make manifest your own matter.

Similarly, in *Antidosis*, Isocrates argues that some of the things which he has written, 'being outspoken expressions about φιλοσοφία and making manifest its power' (περὶ δὲ φιλοσοφίας πεπαρρησιασμένα καὶ δεδηλωκότα τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῆς), are not appropriate to be uttered in a court of justice.[79]

Therefore, if we examine the corpus carefully, we can notice that Isocrates at times casts doubts on the opportunity to make use of παρρησία. In *To Philip* 72, for example, Isocrates states that he has finally decided to disclose a matter which he had previously hesitated to talk about, that is, the

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[77] See Mirhady and Too (2000) 19 on this dating, the close link of this speech with the Cyprian orations and its authenticity (which has been mistakenly rejected by some scholars, such as Mathieu and Brémond (1928) 117-119).
[78] Isoc., *To Demonicus* 34.
[79] Isoc., *Antidosis* 10. See Too (2008) 99-100.

fact that Philip is brought into discredit by some Athenians. He justifies his decision by arguing that he has reached the conclusion that it is useful for the king of Macedonia to hear about this issue, and that it befits Isocrates himself to speak 'with outspokenness' (μετὰ παρρησίας), as he is accustomed to do (ὥσπερ εἴθισμαι). So, Isocrates decides to comply with the frankness that, he claims, usually characterises his discourses. However, he acknowledges that he has had doubts about the appropriateness of employing παρρησία in this specific case, doubts that he has overcome through a rational analysis of the benefits deriving from speaking openly.

In a similar way, in *Antidosis* 43, he questions whether telling the truth is going to be profitable for him, since it is difficult to guess at his fellow citizens' thoughts. Yet, despite this initial perplexity, he makes once again the decision to speak with outspokenness (παρρησιάσομαι).[80] Isocrates' doubts appears to be based on the awareness of potential bad outcomes resulting from παρρησία. Indeed, since speaking with outspokenness often implies voicing criticism and swimming against the tide, it can result in negative consequences for the frank speaker, who must be bold enough to make use of παρρησία despite knowing the dangers he will incur in telling the truth. As Monoson puts it:

> just as important as this truth claim was the suggestion that the speaker willingly embraces considerable risks by speaking–risks to his reputation, financial well-being, and personal safety. When one spoke out in the Assembly, one risked being disliked, shouted down, humiliated, fined, or brought up on any one of the variety of charges, some of which could carry stiff penalties. The climate of personal risk was, in fact, emphasized by the orators. The presence of the risks made more credible the orator's claim to be saying what he thinks is true and right, that is, what he thinks is in the best interest of the polis in contrast to what might benefit him personally.[81]

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[80] See Too (2008) 118.

[81] Monoson (1994) 182. See also Monoson (1994) 175, who stresses the constant and frequent close association of παρρησία with both 'criticism and truth telling'. Furthermore, Monoson (1994) 178 underlines that the risks associated with παρρησία 'were not thought to undermine or even conflict with the right of free speech; rather, they affirmed that the speaker could be held accountable for the advice ventured' and, at the same time, 'illuminate what made it so valuable an idea for the democrats. The free democratic citizen presupposed by the ethic of parrhesia was daring and responsible, self-confident and eager to enter the fray, the very antithesis of the slavish subject of a tyranny'.

Thus, boldness, awareness of potential negative outcomes and willingness to speak openly regardless of the drawbacks that could derive from doing so represent the crucial features which characterise Isocrates' self-representation of his own use of παρρησία. For instance, in the *encomium* of the Cyprian king Evagoras (written most probably around 370),[82] Isocrates claims that he is speaking not only concisely, with no reserve and no fear of arousing 'envy' (φθόνος), but also with 'outspokenness' (παρρησία) when he states that no one, neither mortal, nor demigod nor immortal, has obtained kingship 'more fairly' (κάλλιον), 'more splendidly' (λαμπρότερον) and 'more piously' (εὐσεβέστερον) than Nicocles' father. Furthermore, he adds that he has spoken 'boldly' (θρασέως) about the king of Salamis not because he is eager to exaggerate, but 'because of the truth of the matter' (διὰ τὴν τοῦ πράγματος ἀλήθειαν).[83] Here the connection existing, in Isocrates' view, among outspokenness, truth and boldness becomes very clear: speaking with frankness implies telling the truth, but it also requires to be bold, in the sense that the outspoken speaker has to accept the dangers which are associated with the exercise of his παρρησία, such as, in this specific case, the possibility of giving rise to φθόνος in his audience.

Moreover, in *Antidosis*, he underlines that speaking with outspokenness requires special patience from the audience:

> ἀξιῶ δ᾽ ὑμᾶς, ἢν ἄρα φαίνωμαι λόγους διεξιὼν πολὺ τῶν εἰθισμένων λέγεσθαι παρ᾽ ὑμῖν ἐξηλλαγμένους, μὴ δυσχεραίνειν ἀλλ᾽ ἔχειν συγγνώμην, ἐνθυμουμένους ὅτι τοὺς περὶ πραγμάτων ἀνομοίων τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀγωνιζομένους ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι καὶ τοῖς λόγοις τοιούτοις χρῆσθαι περὶ αὐτῶν. ὑπομείναντες οὖν τὸν τρόπον τῶν λεγομένων καὶ τὴν παρρησίαν, καὶ τὸν χρόνον ἐάσαντες ἀναλῶσαί με τὸν δεδομένον ταῖς ἀπολογίαις, ὅπως ἂν ὑμῶν ἑκάστῳ δοκῇ δίκαιον εἶναι καὶ νόμιμον, οὕτω φέρετε τὴν ψῆφον.[84]

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[82] For this dating see, for instance, Mirhady and Too (2000) 139. Other scholars, such as Jebb (1876) 104, date this speech to 365.
[83] Isoc., *Evagoras* 39.
[84] Isoc., *Antidosis* 179. On this passage see Too (2008) 182.

But, if going through in detail I appear to make speeches which are much different from those you are accustomed to, I expect you not to be displeased but to judge kindly, considering that those who contend in court about matters which are dissimilar to the others must make use of such speeches. So, bearing the manner of my speeches and my outspokenness, and allowing me to use up the time assigned to the speeches in defence, give your vote as to each of you it seems fair and conformable to law.

Significantly, a similar concern can be found in Demosthenes, who, like Isocrates, urges his fellow citizens to be patient if he speaks the truth 'with outspokenness' (μετὰ παρρησίας).[85] Furthermore, in the letter addressed to Agesilaus' son Archidamus III (356), Isocrates urges the king of Sparta not to wonder at the fact that he recalls Agesilaus' mistakes, since he is accustomed to speak always 'with outspokenness' (μετὰ παρρησίας). He also covers one of his favourite topics, the attack against flatterers, stating that he would prefer to be hated for having justly censured than to make himself agreeable by praising inappropriately.[86]

In short, Isocrates declares himself to be very much aware of the fact that speaking frankly is likely to provoke bad outcomes, that is, some negative reactions in the addressees of his speeches, but he concomitantly stresses his willingness to take that risk. Indeed, his hesitation appears to be only momentary and his doubts are always overcome and eventually he chooses to speak with παρρησία. Moreover, it is important to note that παρρησία itself preserves a positive meaning. Rather, the awareness of negative outcomes and the decision to speak regardless of the damages he could face in doing so are the very features that, in Isocrates' view, mark him out as a good rhetorician who is useful to Athens because he does not flatter his fellow citizens, but speaks the truth in their best interest, even if it is not what they want to hear. Thus, outspokenness plays a key role in Isocrates' self-representation, and he appears to possess all the features which, according to Foucault,[87] characterise

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[85] Dem., *Third Olynthiac* 3 and Dem., *Fourth Philippic* 53-54. See Monoson (1994) 182 who rightly highlights that 'Demosthenes often explicitly identifies his efforts to criticize a common Athenian viewpoint with the ideal of speaking with parrhesia and contrasts his speech with flattering, deceitful, or self-promoting oratory'.
[86] Isoc., *To Archidamus* 12.
[87] Foucault (2001) 13-20.

the παρρησιαστής: he speaks the truth freely and as directly as possible, takes a risk in doing so and is well aware of potential negative outcomes, but considers speaking frankly and openly as an unavoidable duty.

It is worth highlighting that Demosthenes (as we have already partly seen) and Aeschines often claim that they are speaking the truth with παρρησία in the interest of Athens, despite being conscious of the dangers that this entails, and they both underline the intrinsic relationship existing between παρρησία and ἀλήθεια.[88] Concerning the risks related to παρρησία, Aeschines, for example, condemns the physical punishments (including glossotomy) with consequent death which Nicodemus of Aphidna had to face at the hands of Aristarchus after speaking with outspokenness (ἐπαρρησιάζετο).[89] Moreover, while Aeschines complains that his fellow citizens are making use not of παρρησία but of an uncertain and obscure language, Demosthenes at times condemns the current corruption of παρρησία. In particular, he criticises the extension of παρρησία to aliens and slaves in Athens,[90] a complaint that calls to mind the above-mentioned claim by [Xenophon] that the Athenians have set up 'equality of speech' (ἰσηγορία) between slaves and free men as well as between metics and citizens. Yet, παρρησία itself remains, in Demosthenes' view, a good practice even though he complains that it is now misused and granted to people who are not worthy of enjoying it. So, the positive use of παρρησία as a crucial element in the self-portrait of a rhetorician along with the awareness of negative consequences resulting from speaking frankly are key features in Attic oratory, which Isocrates appears to share with Demosthenes and Aeschines.

3.3 Pejorative use of παρρησία

Most occurrences of παρρησία in the Isocratean corpus, as we have seen, convey a positive meaning, including the instances in which he shows initial hesitation and awareness of bad outcomes, as it is the case also for Demosthenes and Aeschines. However, I shall now focus on some passages

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[88] See, for instance, Dem., *First Philippic* 51, *On the Chersonese* 21, 24, 32; Aeschin., *Against Timarchus* 177, *On the Embassy* 70.
[89] Aeschin., *Against Timarchus* 172. On this passage and, more broadly, on the relationship between glossotomy and παρρησία see Spina (1986) 61-66.
[90] Dem., *Third Philippic* 3.

where Isocrates, unlike Demosthenes and Aeschines, strikingly employs the notion of παρρησία with a manifestly negative sense.

Nevertheless, before turning to such occurrences in Isocrates' works, it is worth pointing out that a similar pejorative tinge of the term seems to be already present in Euripides' *Orestes* (408) when the messenger, who has come to report what the Argive assembly has decided, describes the debate which has taken place and during which different speakers have expressed their opinion. In particular, he uses very harsh words to depict the speech of the anonymous speaker who has taken the floor just after Talthybius and Diomedes and has suggested to put both Orestes and Electra to death by stoning:

> κἀπὶ τῷδ᾽ ἀνίσταται
> ἀνήρ τις ἀθυρόγλωσσος, ἰσχύων θράσει·
> [Ἀργεῖος οὐκ Ἀργεῖος, ἠναγκασμένος,
> θορύβῳ τε πίσυνος κἀμαθεῖ παρρησίᾳ,
> πιθανὸς ἔτ᾽ αὐτοὺς περιβαλεῖν κακῷ τινι.
> ὅταν γὰρ ἡδύς τις λόγοις φρονῶν κακῶς
> πείθῃ τὸ πλῆθος, τῇ πόλει κακὸν μέγα·
> ὅσοι δὲ σὺν νῷ χρηστὰ βουλεύουσ᾽ ἀεί,
> κἂν μὴ παραυτίκ᾽, αὖθίς εἰσι χρήσιμοι
> πόλει. θεᾶσθαι δ᾽ ὧδε χρὴ τὸν προστάτην
> ἰδόνθ᾽· ὅμοιον γὰρ τὸ χρῆμα γίγνεται
> τῷ τοὺς λόγους λέγοντι καὶ τιμωμένῳ].[91]

Then there stood up a man with no check on his tongue, strong in his brashness; [he was an Argive but no Argive, suborned, relying on noise from the crowd and the obtuse license of his tongue, persuasive enough to involve them in the future in some misfortune. When someone of pleasing speech but without sense persuades the people, it is a great misfortune for the city. But those who always give good counsel with intelligence are useful to the city in the long run, if not

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[91] Eur., *Orestes* 902-913.

immediately. One should look at the leader this way: the same thing applies to the public speaker as to the holder of offices;].[92]

In giving an account of the speech made by the third speaker, the messenger brands the anonymous character, whose opinion will prevail at the end of the debate,[93] as ἀθυρόγλωσσος, a term which indicates 'someone who is an endless babbler, who cannot keep quiet, and is prone to say whatever comes to mind',[94] and thus has 'no regard for the value of *logos*, for rational discourse as a means of gaining access to truth'.[95] It is not surprising, then, that the παρρησία which the anonymous speaker has made use of acquires, in the messenger's report, a negative meaning. Indeed, in this case παρρησία appears to slip into saying all without caring for the truth and the interest of the πόλις and to connote over-boldness deriving from lack of μάθησις (as suggested by the adjective ἀμαθής that characterises παρρησία) and inevitably leading to misfortunes. Furthermore, παρρησία is explicitly associated with θόρυβος, the confused noise and hubbub of a crowded assembly causing intimidation and disorder.[96] However, the verse in which παρρησία occurs is often regarded as an interpolation,[97] and, even if it were genuine, this would be the only Euripidean instance in which the term παρρησία is manifestly viewed in a negative light. In addition, I would stress that the adjective ἀμαθής does contribute, at least partially, to the pejorative sense that παρρησία takes on in this passage.

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[92] Trans. Kovacs (2002b) 512-513. On the interpolation indicated by the square brackets see below.

[93] See Eur., *Orestes* 944-945.

[94] Foucault (2001) 63.

[95] Foucault (2001) 64. See also Carter (2004) 218 who employs this passage to support his argument that the Athenians agreed on the following statement: 'All citizens have *isêgoria*, but they must not exercise this with too much *parrhêsia*'; thus, the anonymous speaker's main fault, Carter concludes, consists in exercising ἰσηγορία in the Argive assembly 'with 'untutored' *parrhêsia*. He does not appear to know the etiquette: perhaps this is why the messenger who relates this scene appears to doubt his citizenship'.

[96] On the relationship between θόρυβος and freedom of speech see Spina (1986) 66-68, who devotes particular attention to the Euripidean passage, Wallace (2004) 223-227 and Balot (2014) 62-63. More generally, on the role of θόρυβος in the Athenian assembly see Tacon (2001) 173-192.

[97] See West (1987) 245-246, who expresses doubts concerning the authenticity of these lines, stating that '907-13 at least are evidently interpolated'. Willink (1986) 232 goes further than West, and deletes lines 904-913 altogether, despite admitting that '[t]he status of 904 and 905 is indeed more arguable than that of 906 and 907-13'; in particular, regarding line 905, Willink argues that it is 'rendered suspected by its context (between 904 and 906-13)', even though he acknowledges that the negative meaning of παρρησία is 'not in itself impossible in a late fifth-century tragedy' and could be 'symptomatic of the reaction against democratic values in the closing years of the Peloponnesian War'. See also Wright (2008) 113 and 149 n. 51.

Similarly, in Plato's *Phaedrus* 240e, where Socrates refers to the 'immoderate and barefaced outspokenness' (παρρησία κατακορὴς καὶ ἀναπεπταμένη) used by the lover to address his beloved when he is drunk, the presence of adjectives conveying a pejorative connotation plays a significant role in the negative sense attributed to παρρησία.[98] Moreover, Monoson argues that 'Plato's texts mingle a repudiation of democratic politics with a subtle affirmation of the celebrated democratic ideal of parrhesia. They defend the democratic conceptualization of parrhesia and appropriate it for philosophy', not 'substantially altering its content', but working 'with the common understanding of parrhesia. Plato draws on the ideal of parrhesia both in his representation of the practice of philosophy and in his account of the fundamental failure of democratic politics to deliver on its promise of parrhesia'.[99] Therefore, Isocrates might well be the first author known to us to employ παρρησία with a manifest pejorative connotation.

In any case, regardless of whether or not Isocrates is the first to attest explicitly the derogatory sense that παρρησία can take on, the wide range of Isocratean occurrences in which the term conveys a clear negative meaning as well as the noteworthy coexistence of both negative and positive instances have no parallel, and thus mark a watershed in the history of this notion as attested in our surviving literary evidence. One of the earliest occurrences of the use of παρρησία in a pejorative sense within Isocrates' works can be found in *On the Team of Horses*, one of his six forensic speeches, which was written for Alcibiades' son most probably in 396/5.[100] Here, while stressing that he has passed over his father's achievements as general because almost everyone remembers them, Alcibiades the Younger complains that the Athenians revile the rest of Alcibiades' life 'too licentiously and boldly' (λίαν ἀσελγῶς καὶ θρασέως) and 'using such outspokenness' (τοιαύτη παρρησία χρώμενοι) that they would have feared to employ if he were alive.[101] Indeed, Alcibiades the Younger continues, they have come to such a degree of 'folly' (ἄνοια) that they believe they will gain good repute in speaking ill of him. Interestingly, in this

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[98] See Sluiter and Rosen (2004) 4-5. See also Spina (1986) 94.
[99] Monoson (1994) 185.
[100] See Mathieu and Brémond (1928) 48, Bianco (1993) 17 and Eck (2015) 33. Other scholars, such as Sacerdoti (1970) 10, Too (1995) 107 and Gribble (1999) 92, opt for 397, while Häusle (1987) 96 dates it to 395/4. More on the content of *On the Team of Horses* will be said in Chapter 4 section 3.
[101] Isoc., *On the Team of Horses* 22.

same passage the negative meaning taken on by παρρησία is underlined by its association not only with madness but also with the 'outrageous discourses' (ὑβριστικοὶ λόγοι) given by 'the worst of men' (οἱ φαυλότατοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων).[102]

Παρρησία bears a pejorative sense also in *Busiris* and *Panathenaicus*. In the former speech Isocrates accuses Polycrates of not taking any interest in the truth and of following the slanders of the poets whose tales about the gods are more outrageous than anyone would dare tell about their enemies. Thus, Isocrates warns against imitating such discourses and against esteeming lightly 'the outspokenness towards the gods' (ἡ δ᾽ εἰς τοὺς θεοὺς παρρησία). In this respect, Isocrates goes on to argue, one must keep guard and consider as equally impious those who give such speeches and those who rely on them.[103] So, in this case παρρησία in its pejorative sense is closely linked with βλασφημία.[104] Furthermore, as anticipated above, the negative meaning of παρρησία recurs also in *Panathenaicus* when Isocrates comments on the claims made by his pro-Spartan former pupil:

> Ταῦτα δ᾽ αὐτοῦ διαλεχθέντος ἀπεδεξάμην μέν, οὐχ ὡς διαλυόμενόν τι τῶν κατηγορημένων, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἀποκρυπτόμενον τὸ πικρότατον τῶν τότε ῥηθέντων οὐκ ἀπαιδεύτως ἀλλὰ νοῦν ἐχόντως, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπολελογημένον σωφρονέστερον ἢ τότε παρρησιασάμενον. [105]

> After he said that, I accepted it, not because it put an end to any of the charges, but because it kept hidden the sharpest aspect of the things then pronounced, not without education but with intelligence, and because what has been spoken in self-defence about the other issues was more moderate than what was then said with outspokenness.

In this passage the participle παρρησιασάμενον, which indicates the outspokenness employed by Isocrates' former student, acquires a pejorative tinge. In this regard, the negative connotation that the notion of παρρησία bears

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[102] Isoc., *On the Team of Horses* 23.
[103] Isoc., *Busiris* 38-40.
[104] On the derogatory meaning of παρρησία in Isoc., *Busiris* 40 see Livingstone (2001) 179. See also Scarpat (1964) 55-56.
[105] Isoc., *Panathenaicus* 218.

here is emphasised by the contrast with the virtue of σωφροσύνη as expressed through the comparative adjective σωφρονέστερον.

Still, in the opening section of *Busiris* and in *Panathenaicus* 96, the verb παρρησιάζομαι, as I considered earlier, conveys a positive meaning. So, *prima facie*, Isocrates could seem to be incoherent in his use of παρρησία, since within the same speech he attributes to the notion of speaking with outspokenness a positive sense in one section and a pejorative meaning in another. Nonetheless, this ostensible contradiction, as we shall see, should not be dismissed as a mere incongruity or as a move revealing his alleged anti-democratic stance.

3.3.1 Παρρησία **versus** ἰσηγορία

The seeming inconsistency in the Isocratean use of the term and its cognate verb can be found also in *Archidamus* (366)[106] where παρρησία is employed both in a positive and in a negative sense. Indeed, in section 72, Archidamus, the *persona loquens* of the homonymous speech, in arguing against peace with Thebes proudly declares that he will not hesitate 'to speak with outspokenness' (παρρησιάσασθαι), and highlights that, although the plan of action that he is about to propose might be difficult, it is certainly a finer strategy to be made known to the Greeks and more suitable to Sparta than what other Spartans recommend.

However, later in the speech, παρρησία appears to be opposed to ἰσηγορία and to take on a pejorative meaning. More precisely, Archidamus complains that the Spartans in the past did not uphold 'the equal rights of speech of free men' (αἱ τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἰσηγορίαι), whereas now they openly bear even 'the outspokenness of the slaves' (ἡ τῶν δούλων παρρησία).[107] Significantly, in this passage, which presents the only occurrence of ἰσηγορία in the corpus, Isocrates couples it with the notion of ἐλευθερία. It is important to stress this link because it calls to mind the strong connection between the two concepts that, as we have seen above, clearly emerges in Herodotus, V 78. Furthermore, in a like manner, Demosthenes in *Against Meidias* connects

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[106] See Papillon (2004) 109-110 for 366 (i.e. the date of the meeting held at Sparta to discuss the peace negotiations with Thebes promoted by the Corinthians) as the dramatic date of this speech with the possibility of a later date for its actual composition.
[107] Isoc., *Archidamus* 97; Archidamus' complaint calls to mind the above-mentioned remarks by [Xen.], *Constitution of the Athenians* I, 10-12 on the use of ἰσηγορία in Athens and by Dem., *Third Philippic* 3 about παρρησία being granted to aliens and slaves.

ἰσηγορία and ἐλευθερία claiming that the man who by fear debars any citizen from obtaining reparation for his wrongs is taking away from the Athenians their equality of speech and their freedom.[108] Similarly, in *On the Liberty of the Rhodians*, Demosthenes refers to ἰσηγορία and ἐλευθερία as fundamental qualities characterising democratic governments as opposed to oligarchies. More specifically, he stresses the fact that when Athens wages war against oligarchies, unlike when it engages wars with other democracies, it is fighting for its own 'constitution' (πολιτεία) and 'freedom' (ἐλευθερία). Thus, it is more useful to fight all the Greeks under democracies than to have them as friends under oligarchies. For it is easy, Demosthenes goes on to argue, to make peace with men who are free, while with those who are under an oligarchy it is not even possible to establish a sound friendship, since the few will never be well-disposed toward the many, nor those who seek to rule toward those who have chosen to live 'with equal right of speech' (μετ᾽ ἰσηγορίας).[109]

So, returning to the above-mentioned second passage from *Archidamus* and bearing in mind the Spartan setting of the Isocratean speech, we can reach a twofold conclusion. On the one hand, in linking ἰσηγορία specifically to ἐλευθερία, Isocrates proves to be consistent with the traditional use of the term that we find in Herodotus and then also in Demosthenes. On the other hand, he manifestly distinguishes ἰσηγορία from παρρησία.[110] His usage of παρρησία is thus extremely original, since, instead of associating it with the notion of freedom, he links it to the idea of slavery. In this way he turns upside down the coupling between παρρησία and ἐλευθερία, which, as we have seen earlier, characterises the use of παρρησία in the fifth century. In doing so, Isocrates carries out a striking overturning which constitutes a remarkable innovation within the framework of our surviving literary sources.

3.3.2 Παρρησία **versus** ἰσονομία

The negative sense that παρρησία can take on in the Isocratean corpus is even clearer in *Areopagiticus* 20. Here Isocrates claims that those who administered the πόλις in the time of Solon and Cleisthenes did not establish a 'constitution' (πολιτεία) that in name only was the freest and mildest, nor one that 'educated'

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[108] Dem., *Against Meidias* 124.
[109] Dem., *On the Liberty of the Rhodians* 17-18.
[110] On the distinction between ἰσηγορία and παρρησία in this passage see Carter (2004) 202.

(ἐπαίδευσε) the citizens to regard 'intemperance' (ἀκολασία) as 'democracy' (δημοκρατία), 'transgression of law' (παρανομία) as 'freedom' (ἐλευθερία), 'outspokenness' (παρρησία) as 'equality under the law' (ἰσονομία), 'power to do everything one wants' (ἐξουσία τοῦ πάντα ποιεῖν) as 'prosperity' (εὐδαιμονία), but rather a constitution that by hating and punishing such men made all the citizens 'better' (βελτίους) and 'wiser' (σωφρονέστεροι). Interestingly, here Isocrates refers to παρρησία as one of the negative qualities which characterise contemporary democracy and opposes it to ἰσονομία.[111] Such a use of παρρησία appears to be, at least at first sight, once again problematic if we compare it not only with all the positive occurrences we have analysed so far, but also with what Isocrates says in *On the Peace* 14. Indeed, in this passage he complains that, although Athens is a democracy, there is no παρρησία except for the most foolish speakers in the assembly and the comic poets in the theatre. Therefore, in *On the Peace* παρρησία is presented as a characteristic inseparably linked to democracy and itself positive, even though it is currently enjoyed by people who do not deserve it.

The distinction between two different kinds of outspokenness, one positive and the other one negative, thus becomes crucial in understanding the complex role of παρρησία within Isocrates' political thought. Moreover, I would point out that the determining factor in such an opposition lies in the qualities, or lack of them, of those people who exercise παρρησία. The existence of two different types of παρρησία has been outlined in general terms by Foucault. However, I argue that we can reach a conclusion diametrically opposed to the one expressed by the French scholar: in Isocrates' eyes what is incompatible with 'true democracy' is not 'real *parrhesia*' (namely, παρρησία in its critical and positive meaning), as Foucault believes,[112] but παρρησία in its pejorative sense. The negative connotation of this kind of παρρησία, which according to *On the Peace* 14 is predominant in fourth-century Athens, depends on who exercises παρρησία (e.g. the most foolish speakers in the assembly) and, more specifically, on the speaker's lack of those qualities that characterise a good παρρησιαστής, *in primis* εὖ φρονεῖν and εὔνοια as I have illustrated above.

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[111] More on ἰσονομία will be said in Chapter 3 section 2.
[112] Foucault (2001) 80-83.

3.4 Positive παρρησία versus negative παρρησία

An additional key to understanding more fully Isocrates' complex use of the notion of παρρησία is provided by *To Antipater* (340-339), where Isocrates appears to mention two opposite types of outspokenness. More particularly, in this letter addressed to the regent of Macedonia, παρρησία plays a significant role with two occurrences of the verb παρρησιάζομαι and one of the noun itself. Indeed, Isocrates praises his pupil Diodotus for possessing, among various qualities, 'the greatest outspokenness' (πλείστη (…) παρρησία), not 'the one that is not befitting' (ἣ οὐ προσῆκεν), but that which represents the most important sign of 'goodwill' (εὐνοία) toward friends and which noteworthy rulers honour as being useful. Conversely, weaker rulers dislike this kind of outspokenness since it forces them to do something they have not chosen to do. In this respect, such rulers are not aware, Isocrates continues, that men who dare 'contradict' (ἀντιλέγειν) them 'about what is advantageous' (περὶ τοῦ συμφέροντος) are the only ones able to provide them with 'the greatest power' (πλείστη ἐξουσία) to do what they want.[113]

Isocrates, therefore, clearly enhances the role of παρρησιασταί, and opposes them to 'those who always choose deliberately so as to please' (οἱ ἀεὶ πρὸς ἡδονὴν λέγειν προαιρούμενοι): it is because of the latter that not only monarchies (which bring on many inevitable dangers), but even constitutional governments (which usually enjoy greater security) cannot last, whereas 'because of those who speak with outspokenness in favour of what is best' (διὰ τοὺς ἐπὶ τῷ βελτίστῳ παρρησιαζομένους) many things are preserved even of those which were likely to be destroyed. Thus, Isocrates argues, all monarchs should hold in greater esteem 'those who display the truth' (οἱ τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἀποφαινόμενοι) than men who speak exclusively to gratify in all they say, but, in reality, say nothing worthy of gratitude. Yet, the former are valued less by some leaders, as Diodotus himself has experienced among some rulers in Asia: even though he made himself 'useful' (χρήσιμος) not only in giving advice, but also in taking risks, 'because of his speaking with outspokenness' (διὰ τὸ παρρησιάζεσθαι) to them about their own interests, he was deprived of honours as well as hope, and his 'good services' (εὐεργεσίαι) were obscured by 'the

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[113] Isoc., *To Antipater* 4-5.

flatteries of everyday men' (αἱ τῶν τυχόντων ἀνθρώπων κολακεῖαι). So, owing to this previous experience, Isocrates claims, Diodotus has hesitated to present himself to Antipater.[114]

Remarkably, in *To Antipater* 4 Isocrates manifestly refers in the very same sentence to the existence of two different kinds of παρρησία, one inappropriate and thus negative, expressed through the relative clause ἣ οὐ προσῆκεν, the other one positive, inextricably associated with εὐνοία and praised throughout the letter. In this regard, *To Antipater* acquires particular importance for our understanding of Isocrates' complex usage of this notion not only because it presents all the three different Isocratean uses of παρρησία that we can find throughout the corpus, but also, and most importantly, because it suggests that, by exploiting the semantic richness which characterises the history of παρρησία, Isocrates identifies two different, or rather opposite, kinds of παρρησία. As a result of this polarisation, he splits the notion itself into a positive παρρησία and a negative παρρησία which are opposed to, and incompatible with, one another. Indeed, while the former consists in telling the truth unreservedly in the interest of the interlocutors and thus reveals the speaker's goodwill towards them, the latter ultimately corresponds to flattery. In this respect, it is worth stressing that in his study on friendship, when discussing the use of παρρησία in *To Antipater*, Konstan notes that in this epistle Isocrates depicts παρρησία 'as a mean between rude presumptuousness and dishonest flattery'.[115] Konstan's remark is certainly true with regard to the positive kind of παρρησία which is possessed by Diodotus and marks him out as an excellent friend. However, as we have seen, *To Antipater* does bear witness also to an opposite kind of παρρησία that Isocrates criticises throughout the letter and, in a master-stroke, identifies precisely with κολακεία.

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[114] Isoc., *To Antipater* 6-8.
[115] Konstan (1997) 94. See also Konstan (1997) 98, who highlights how 'the triad of friendship, flattery, and frankness of speech' that characterises Isocrates' *To Antipater* represents a key topic in Plutarch's treatise *How to discriminate a flatterer from a friend*.

4. Conclusions

To sum up, the idea of speaking frankly and openly goes back to the roots of democratic thinking and Isocrates marks, or at least bears witness to, a turning point in the history of one of the main terms that expressed such a notion, namely, παρρησία. First of all, it is worth noting that in the Isocratean corpus the use of παρρησία is characterised by a combination of the standard political connotation and a moral value which is emphasised to an unprecedented level in our literary sources. Secondly, we can identify three different usages of παρρησία in Isocrates' work: a positive meaning, the awareness of negative outcomes, and the pejorative sense which fulfils a particularly remarkable and innovative role in the development of the idea of outspokenness in Greek political thought. Significantly, the second use has to be considered as part of the first one since only παρρησία in its positive sense involves risk-taking. In addition, these three stages coexist, with no clear temporal break, in the corpus. Indeed, the pejorative sense emerges as early as the forensic speech *On the Team of Horses*, so it cannot be regarded merely as a later development in Isocrates' political vocabulary.

Throughout this chapter I have also pointed out that Isocrates' intricate and varying usage of this term appears to have no precedent and no parallel in our fifth- and fourth-century literary evidence. In particular, whereas Scarpat argues that παρρησία in Euripides has only a political value,[116] I believe that Spina is right in stressing that marks of the manifold connotations which the notion can take on are already present *in nuce* in some of the works of the tragic poet.[117] Yet, even though in the Euripidean passages that I have taken into consideration it is possible to notice different shades of meaning concerning the use of παρρησία, it is in the Isocratean corpus that the problematisation of παρρησία reaches its peak, and, that, consequently, we find a striking semantic variety in the use of the noun and its cognate verb. Furthermore, while there are some instances of both the first and second kind of meaning in Demosthenes and Aeschines, neither of them appears to refer to παρρησία in a negative sense and, more generally, no fourth-century author seems to employ this notion with the same semantic intricacy that we find in the Isocratean corpus.

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[116] See Scarpat (1964) 36-37.
[117] Spina (1986) 83-84.

Moreover, as we have seen, the positive sense and the negative meaning are at times present in the same work and, in one case (that is, *To Antipater* 4), even in the same passage. A plausible explanation for this apparent incongruity in the use of παρρησία lies in the fact that Isocrates operates a splitting of the notion of παρρησία at semantic level. As a result, it is possible to identify the presence in his corpus of a dichotomy between a positive παρρησία and a negative παρρησία. The former consists in speaking the truth without fear of voicing criticism and facing all the dangers that may arise. Additionally, positive παρρησία reveals the goodwill of the speaker towards his audience as well as his sound judgment, and is, of course, the one that Isocrates claims to be employing. Instead, παρρησία understood in its pejorative sense represents the opposite polarity, is thus characterised by the lack of those qualities possessed by good παρρησιασταί (e.g. εὖ φρονεῖν and εὔνοια) and is fundamentally assimilated to flattery.

Therefore, Isocrates is not in a contradictory manner conveying both a positive and negative meaning to the same concept, but he is consciously distinguishing two deeply different kinds of παρρησία, even though he does not dwell explicitly on such a distinction. Positive παρρησία and negative παρρησία end up being identical at a linguistic level (since they are expressed by the same term), but they are diametrically opposite from a semantic point of view. Thus, rather than revealing an inconsistent or anti-democratic use of the notion, the instances of παρρησία and παρρησιάζομαι throughout his works show how Isocrates is well aware of, engages with, and even expands, the inherent tension which is a hallmark of παρρησία since its origin. In doing so, he further problematises the meaning of παρρησία in light of some key concepts like εὔνοια and εὖ φρονεῖν, which, as we shall see later on, are prominent in the corpus and most dear to him.

Chapter 3
The Notion and Language of Equality

1. Introduction

The notion and language of equality were at the very heart of Greek political thought in the fifth and then, even more clearly, in the fourth century when the idea of equality started to be rethought. Isocrates, as we shall see, is very interested in equality and, at the same time, plays a crucial function within the fourth-century revision of this notion. Nevertheless, we still miss a systematic examination of the role of equality, and the vocabulary related to it, in the Isocratean corpus. Therefore, in this chapter I aim to fill this gap in the current scholarship by providing a thorough analysis of Isocrates' complex and manifold usages of the language and notion of equality.

In order to do so, I intend to focus on three aspects in particular. More specifically, I will begin my investigation by discussing the occurrences of ἰσονομία in Isocrates' works and how they fit into the wider context of the other instances of this term and its cognates in our literary sources. I shall then consider how Isocrates employs the doctrine of the two kinds of equality before turning to the examination of the Isocratean occurrences of the concept of ἰσομοιρία and its application to foreign politics.[1] As a result, I will show how Isocrates' varying usages of the language, and thus of the idea, of equality play a relevant role not only within his political thought but also, more broadly, in the contemporary debate around this notion.

2. Ἰσονομία

One of the main terms employed to express the idea of equality was ἰσονομία, whose first occurrences in our literary sources can be dated back to the end of the sixth or beginning of the fifth century. While ἰσονομία appears to be a crucial

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[1] Even though ἰσηγορία does belong to the vocabulary related to the notion of equality as shown in the previous chapter, I have chosen to discuss it in Chapter 2 because of its semantic affinity with παρρησία. On the resonance of Isocrates' own name with ἰσοκρατία, another key term belonging to the language of equality, see Appendix III.

concept in Greek political discourse during the fifth century, its use tends to decrease progressively in the following century when Isocrates is the only author, beside Plato, to employ it.[2] Indeed, during the fourth century there seems to be a shift from ἰσονομία to τὸ ἴσον and ἰσότης, which express the notion of equality in more general terms.[3] In this respect, it is worth highlighting that Isocrates is the only Attic orator to make use of ἰσονομία.[4]

The etymology of the word has been debated: while the prefix ἰσο– does not usually pose any interpretation problems, –νομία has been regarded as deriving either from νέμω or from νόμος.[5] Concerning its meaning, scholars often believe that ἰσονομία has to be interpreted as 'an earlier name for what was later called democracy'[6] since the tight bond between ἰσονομία and δημοκρατία, as we will see, is prominent in the use of the former term throughout the fifth century. Nonetheless, the two words cannot be considered as mere synonyms. As Ostwald remarks, rather than referring to a specific kind of constitution, ἰσονομία indicates 'the principle of political equality, which, though it is of course more closely associated with a democratic constitution than with any other, is not necessarily confined to it'.[7] Indeed, the link between ἰσονομία and democracy is deeply-rooted and solid, yet not exclusive, as I shall illustrate more in depth below.

Owing to its complexity and its pre-eminent role within Greek political discourse, ἰσονομία has been the object of several studies, especially during the second half of the last century. Here I will provide just a snapshot of some of the main investigations which have been devoted to this subject. One of the first scholars to pay particular attention to ἰσονομία was Vlastos, who upholds the idea that this word was employed to refer to democratic governments before δημοκρατία came into use.[8] In addition, Ostwald, within his detailed study devoted to νόμος, discusses the –νομος compounds attested before 464/3,

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[2] See Lévy (2005) 120-121 for an outline of the occurrences of the noun and its cognates in the fifth and fourth centuries.

[3] See Ostwald (1969) 182 and Huffman (2005) 212. On the 'verbal flexibility' of the terminology conveying the notion of equality see Cartledge (2009) 9; on the various ἰσο- words see also Hansen (1999) 81.

[4] In Andoc., *On the Mysteries* 15 we can find the personal name Ἰσόνομος. Additionally, the phrase τὴν ἴσην ἔννομον πολιτείᾳ in Aeschin., *Against Timarchus* 5 is often regarded as a periphrasis for ἰσονομία. However, neither of the two orators ever employs the actual term ἰσονομία.

[5] See Ostwald (1969) 61; see also Lévy (2005) 122-125.

[6] Larsen (1948) 6.

[7] Ostwald (1969) 97.

[8] See Vlastos (1953) and Vlastos (1964).

namely εὐνομία, ἀνομία and ἰσονομία. Concerning the last term, Ostwald observes:

> Its connotations (…) are from its first appearance until at least the end of the fourth century B.C. purely political, and the context in which it is first attested associates it closely with the reforms of Cleisthenes. In other words, the appearance of ἰσονομία seems to be linked with the beginnings of the Athenian democracy, and this, in turn, suggests that the adoption of νόμος as the technical term for 'statute' to replace θεσμός forms part of the same picture.[9]

In a somehow similar way, Raaflaub has stressed the link between Cleisthenes' reforms and ἰσονομία, although he highlights the aristocratic origin of the term. Indeed, he suggests that ἰσονομία, understood as 'an "order based on equality," became an ideal and catchword in the aristocracy's struggle against the tyrant's usurpation of power' and thus that it 'may have originated elsewhere much earlier', while 'in Athens it was probably used first by the aristocratic opponents of the Peisistratids'; so, Raaflaub concludes, '[i]ts meaning was soon expanded, when "equality" became (…) the code word for the new political order introduced by Cleisthenes after the fall of tyranny'.[10] The aristocratic origin of ἰσονομία was argued for already by Ehrenberg, who also stressed that '[t]he idea of equality (…) had strong roots in the aristocratic forms of communal life such as the life of the Spartan 'peers', the *Homoioi*'.[11] More recently, further attention has been devoted to ἰσονομία. Indeed, Lombardini, by focusing particularly on the relationship of ἰσονομία with both εὐνομία and δημοκρατία, has reached the conclusion that ἰσονομία indicates 'a type of balanced order that is created through the equal distribution of political power' (i. e. 'equal order' different from the concept of 'good order' conveyed by εὐνομία) and can thus be regarded as pointing towards 'a democratic response to the charge that democracy bred disorder'.[12] The discussion around ἰσονομία (with specific reference to its correlation with δημοκρατία) has been resumed

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[9] Ostwald (1969) 96.
[10] Raaflaub (2004a) 94.
[11] Ehrenberg (1946) 89. More generally, on the link between the idea of equality and the notion of ὁμοιότης see, for instance, Cartledge (1996) 178-181 and Cartledge (2009) 9.
[12] Lombardini (2013) 413; see also Lombardini (2013) 417.

also by Vannicelli who considers the following view as the most plausible: while having an aristocratic origin and deriving etymologically from ἴσα νέμειν in the sense of a fair distribution, in the fifth century (if not already at the time of Cleisthenes) ἰσονομία acquired the meaning of 'equality before the law', being thus related to νόμος and becoming a political principle closely, although not solely, connected with democracy.[13] Yet, Cartledge has highlighted the inherent adaptability of ἰσονομία which, in his view, 'stood for the most general and unspecific principle of political equality'.[14] Overall, the shift in the meaning of the term was most probably less clear-cut than Vannicelli presents it and it is likely that the broader sense of 'equality of political participation'[15] was never entirely abandoned. Indeed, ἰσονομία appears to retain a certain ambiguity, as the overview of its literary usages below will suggest.

A great deal of scholarly attention has thus been devoted to analysing the usages of ἰσονομία in our surviving literary sources. However, the instances of the term in the Isocratean corpus have generally been either overlooked or referred to only in passing. So, in this section I aim to offer a detailed examination of the occurrences of ἰσονομία in Isocrates in order to show not only how they contribute to our understanding of his political thought and his use of democratic vocabulary in particular, but also, more broadly, how they fit into the wider development of this notion in Greek political thought.

Ἰσονομία **before Isocrates**

Before turning to the usage of the term in Isocrates' works, I shall, first of all, provide a comprehensive framework for the analysis of the Isocratean instances by means of an overview of the occurrences of ἰσονομία in our literary sources. The very first instances of the term most probably belong to the late sixth or early fifth century. Indeed, in two σκόλια preserved by Athenaeus and praising the tyrannicides Harmodius and Aristogeiton, it is said that, by killing Hipparchus, they 'made Athens a place of political equality'[16] (ἰσονόμους τ'

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[13] See Vannicelli (2014) 134. Cf. Musti (1981) 55-61.
[14] Cartledge (1996) 178. Cf. Lévy (2005) 128 and 132 on the vagueness characterising ἰσονομία.
[15] Raaflaub (1996) 143 who stresses that ἰσονομία indicated 'both legal and political equality (that is, equality before the law and equality of political participation)'.
[16] Trans. Olson (2012) 165.

Ἀθήνας ἐποιησάτην).[17] Hence, here the notion of ἰσονομία, expressed through its cognate adjective, is opposed to tyranny. Additionally, in a fragment preserved through a paraphrase by the doxographer Aëtius, the philosopher and physician Alcmaeon of Croton, who was probably active between 500 and 440,[18] applies the concept to the medical field by allegedly stating that health consists in 'the equality of the properties' (ἰσονομία τῶν δυνάμεων), of the wet and the dry, the cold and the hot, the bitter and the sweet and so on; on the contrary, the 'sovereignty' (μοναρχία) of one of the four elements, is responsible for causing disease.[19] Such a contrast between ἰσονομία and μοναρχία creates, according to Ostwald, a picture that is 'very much in line with the practice of Presocratic thinkers to explain physical phenomena in political or social images'.[20] Therefore, Ostwald argues that in this fragment Alcmaeon employs both ἰσονομία and μοναρχία in a metaphorical sense 'not as medical but as political concepts intended merely to help him expound certain facts about the (human) body by analogy with certain features in the state'.[21] In this respect, this is the only occurrence of ἰσονομία in Greek medical vocabulary and the absence of the term in medical writings could thus be linked to the intrinsic political meaning that ἰσονομία conveys since its very first occurrences.[22]

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[17] PMG 893; 896. Cf. Ath., XV, 695 a-b. The date of the two σκόλια has been much debated among scholars: Ostwald (1969) 136, for instance, suggests that they were composed 'shortly after 507', whereas other scholars, such as Lévy (2005) 120 and 133-134, opt for a later dating due to the historical inaccuracy that these σκόλια display (cf. Thuc., VI 54-59). More recently, Azoulay (2014) 70-74 has emphasised the role of Athenaeus in fixing the text of the drinking songs compared to its high level of flexibility in the Classical period.

[18] Concerning Alcmaeon's dates see Ostwald (1969) 98-99 and Costa (2003) 46-47, Mansfeld (2013) 78 n. 1. While some scholars, such as Larsen (1948) 9 and Ehrenberg (1950) 535, explicitly refer to Alcmaeon as a Pythagorean, Vlastos (1953) 344-347 firmly rejects the assumption that Alcmaeon was a Pythagorean. Ostwald (1969) 98 is likely to be right in adopting an intermediate position by pointing out that Alcmaeon was presumably influenced by Pythagoreanism but was not a member of that school. It is also worth noting in passing that Isoc., *Antidosis* 268 refers to Alcmaeon as one of 'the ancient sophists' (οἱ παλαιοὶ σοφισταί) to whose theories the young Athenians should not devote too much of their time.

[19] DK 24 B 4. Here Alcmaeon also describes physical health as ἡ σύμμετρος τῶν ποιῶν κρᾶσις, on which see Ostwald (1969) 102-105. Cf. Brock (2005) 33-34. It is worth mentioning that, against the commonly held view, Mansfeld (2013) has questioned the attribution of ἰσονομία and especially of μοναρχία to Alcmaeon himself suggesting that the presence of the latter word in Aetius' lemma could be due to the influence of the use of μοναρχία in Herodotus' Constitutional Debate (on which see below).

[20] Ostwald (1969) 99-100.

[21] Ostwald (1969) 100

[22] See MacKinney (1964) 80, who claims that, since Alcmaeon's fragment is probably 'derived from a treatise *Concerning Nature* (…), strictly speaking, one could assert that no known medical writing of the ancient Greek world contains the word *isonomia*. Whether any Greek *physician* ever used it orally, must of necessity remain an open question'[his italics]. Indeed, MacKinney (1964) 87 reaches the conclusion that 'members of the medical profession were not familiar with the term *isonomia*', although they appeared to be 'motivated by the general concept of equilibrium, balance, blend, mixture, and the like, expressed in terms such as

Nonetheless, Ostwald also suggests that, even though in the σκόλια in honour of the tyrannicides as well as in Alcmaeon ἰσονομία appears to be contrasted with one-man rule, this should not lead us to regard 'opposition to tyranny' as 'the primary factor inherent in ἰσονομία'.[23] Yet, the link between ἰσονομία and rejection of tyranny has recently been re-asserted.[24] The concept was indeed multifaceted, while at the same time it was usually closely associated with democracy. In this regard, Ostwald believes that the inextricable relationship between ἰσονομία and δημοκρατία can be inferred already from Alcmaeon as ἰσονομία seems to have 'closer affinities with democracy than with any other form of government' and to denote 'in some ways (…) the principle of equality–the equality of νόμος for ruler as well as for ruled–which a democracy embodies'.[25]

Both the complexity of ἰσονομία and its strong ties with democracy are exemplified in Herodotus. More precisely, as Lombardini highlights, 'Herodotus provides the most thorough examination of *isonomia* in our extant sources, and it is his use of the term that best reveals its connection to the concept of *dêmokratia*'.[26] This is particularly true in the first occurrences of the term that we encounter in Herodotus, that is, in the well-known Constitutional Debate, which allegedly preceded Darius' accession to the Persian throne. In this passage ἰσονομία appears twice in order to refer to the government promoted by the Persian Otanes. Indeed, after suggesting to turn the government over to the Persian people (ἐς μέσον Πέρσῃσι καταθεῖναι τὰ πρήγματα), Otanes harshly criticises 'monarchy' (μουναρχίη), which he depicts as being characterised mainly by ὕβρις and lack of accountability and as being able to corrupt even 'the best among all men' (ὁ ἄριστος ἀνδρῶν πάντων) and lead him to subvert the 'ancestral customs' (νόμαια πάτρια). On the contrary, 'the mass that rules' (πλῆθος ἄρχον), Otanes points out, 'has the most beautiful name of all' (οὔνομα

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eukrasia, isomoiria, symmetron, harmonia, pepsis, etc., as applied to general conditions of health'. See MacKinney (1964) 87-88 for possible explanations concerning 'the avoidance of Alcmaeon's term *isonomia* by his medical successors'.

[23] Ostwald (1969) 101, who also believes that the opposition between ἰσονομία and μοναρχία in this fragment 'is not necessarily exhaustive' and does not automatically mean that Alcmaeon did not know the term ὀλιγαρχία, but only that 'he did not need it for his purposes in this fragment'. Ostwald (1969) 102 n. 1 adds that '[e]ven if the noun ὀλιγαρχία was not available to Alcmaeon, he might have employed a periphrasis to describe it', thus 'the fragment cannot be used to prove that Alcmaeon knew only two forms of government'.
[24] See, for instance, Azoulay (2014).
[25] Ostwald (1969) 106.
[26] Lombardini (2013) 408.

πάντων κάλλιστον ἔχει), that is, ἰσονομία, and presents the opposite features compared to the rule of a 'monarch' (μούναρχος): election by lot, accountability of those who hold offices and all deliberations being conducted publicly. Otanes thus concludes his speech by insisting on the need to put an end to monarchy and 'to increase the power of the multitude' (τὸ πλῆθος ἀέξειν), since 'in the majority lies the whole' (ἐν γὰρ τῷ πολλῷ ἔνι τὰ πάντα).[27] Then, after Megabyzus and Darius have expressed their opinion on the matter supporting oligarchy and monarchy respectively,[28] Herodotus specifies that Otanes' proposal to establish ἰσονομία among the Persians is rejected as it is Darius' point of view that ultimately prevails.[29]

Significantly, while Megabyzus' and Darius' interventions present a threefold opposition, the speech delivered by Otanes revolves around a binary contrast.[30] Owing to the opposition to one-man rule[31] and the features that characterise ἰσονομία according to Otanes' depiction, the two occurrences of the term in the Constitutional Debate (Hdt., III 80, 6; 83, 1) have generally been interpreted as referring to a democratic constitution, and thus as synonyms for δημοκρατία.[32] This seems to be corroborated later on, in book VI, when in narrating that Mardonius established 'democracies' (δημοκρατίαι) in 492 in Ionia (while depositing all the Ionian tyrants), Herodotus employs the infinitive δημοκρατέεσθαι in order to summarise the stance adopted by Otanes at the

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[27] Hdt., III 80. The translation of the sentence ἐν γὰρ τῷ πολλῷ ἔνι τὰ πάντα is rather problematic and has been highly debated; in adopting the above-mentioned translation I agree with Musti (1995) 57 (cf. Vannicelli (2014) 135), Lanzillotta (1998) 40-41 and Costa (2003) 51-52.

[28] Hdt., III 81-82.

[29] Hdt., III 83, 1.

[30] See Musti (1995) 54-55. Conversely, Cartledge (2009) 73 stresses how all three speeches present 'the form of a Protagorean antilogy, directed predominantly against one of the other two speeches, not against both equally'.

[31] See Cartledge (2009) 75 who specifies that the target of Otanes' criticism is 'autocracy (non-responsible tyranny, the worst form of rule by one)'. In this respect, it is worth noting that, in order to refer to the one-man rule against which he argues, Otanes uses mainly μούναρχος (Hdt., III 80, 2; 6) and μουναρχίη (Hdt., III 80, 3; 6), but we also find, in one instance, τύραννος (Hdt., III 80, 4).

[32] See, for instance, Musti (1995) 54-57 who also stresses how the occurrences of πλῆθος and the participle ἄρχον call to mind δῆμος and κράτος, respectively, thus suggesting the presence of a web of allusions to δημοκρατία throughout Otanes' speech; cf. Vannicelli (2014) 135-136. I agree with Musti (1995) 56 (cf. Vannicelli (2014) 134) in believing that in Otanes' speech the term δημοκρατία is avoided because of Herodotus' '[r]ispetto storico (…) per la *parola*'[his italics] rather than, as Cartledge (2009) 74 suggests, because of the potentially negative connotation embedded in the term. For a broader discussion on the key role of Herodotus' Constitutional Debate in Greek political thought see, for instance, Connor (1971) 199-206 (especially 202-204 on ἰσονομία) and Lévy (2003).

time of the Constitutional Debate.[33] Indeed, in this passage, which presents the earliest occurrence of the noun δημοκρατία in our extant literary sources,[34] Herodotus appears to assimilate explicitly Mardonius' institution of δημοκρατίαι in Ionia with the ἰσονομία promoted by Otanes thirty years earlier.

Nevertheless, it has been noted that here Herodotus might have used δημοκρατία simply as an antonym to tyranny[35] in a somehow similar way to how in book IV δημοκρατέεσθαι is opposed to τυραννεύεσθαι in the remark made in 512, at the council of the Ionians, by Histiaeus of Miletus to indicate, and thus argue against, the outcome that would result from the Scythians' advice (upheld by Miltiades) to set Ionia free from Darius' rule.[36] In brief, while the two instances of the term in the Constitutional Debate suggest the existence of an inextricable link between ἰσονομία and democracy, such a link, as we shall see even more clearly below, was not exclusive. Indeed, the Herodotean usage of ἰσονομία, like that of δημοκρατία and its cognate verb, is more nuanced than might appear at first reading.[37]

In this respect, the multifaceted meaning conveyed by ἰσονομία emerges also in the other two passages, in addition to the Constitutional Debate, where Herodotus makes use of it. In the first case, the term is related to the constitution that Maeandrius of Samos attempted to establish after the death of Polycrates. More specifically, Herodotus narrates that in 522/1, that is, at around the same time when the Constitutional Debate is set,[38] Maeandrius, desiring to act with justice after Polycrates' death, set up an altar to Zeus Eleutherius and then called an assembly of the citizens (ἐκκλησίην συναγείρας πάντων τῶν ἀστῶν) during which he stated that, although it was in his power to rule over them (μοι παρέχει νῦν ὑμέων ἄρχειν), he did not intend to commit the same mistake made by Polycrates, namely being master of people who were fundamentally very similar to himself (δεσπόζων ἀνδρῶν ὁμοίων ἑωυτῷ). Rather, he intended to put the power in the middle and proclaim ἰσονομία (ἐγὼ δὲ ἐς

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[33] See Hdt., VI 43, 3.
[34] See Coviello (2005) 147. The second occurrence of the noun in Herodotus can be found in Hdt., VI 131, 1.
[35] See Coviello (2005) 147-148.
[36] Hdt., IV 137, 2; see Coviello (2005) 146-147 on the use of δημοκρατέεσθαι in this passage and in Hdt., VI 43, 3.
[37] See Ostwald (1969) 113 who, in commenting the use of the term in the Constitutional Debate, has defined ἰσονομία as 'the principle of political equality; (…) not a constitutional form'. See, instead, Costa (2003) 51-52 and Coviello (2005) 145-146 n. 22 who explicitly challenge Ostwald's remark by stressing the profound connection between ἰσονομία and democracy.
[38] See Coviello (2005) 144; *pace* Lévy (2005) 120 who ascribes Maeandrius' proposal to 516.

μέσον τὴν ἀρχήν τιθεὶς ἰσονομίην ὑμῖν προαγορεύω) granting freedom to his fellow citizens (τὴν ἐλευθερίην ὑμῖν περιτίθημι) and requesting only two things: six talents of Polycrates' wealth as well as the priesthood of Zeus Eleutherius for himself and his descendants. However, Herodotus continues, a certain Telesarchus, an 'esteemed' (δόκιμος) citizen, answered back underlining not only that Maeandrius was not worthy to rule over them since he was a low-born and a 'plague' (ὄλεθρος), but also that he had to give an account of the money he had handled. At this point, Maeandrius realised that if he let go of power, someone else would make himself tyrant, so he did not go ahead with his proposal and began instead to imprison his own fellow citizens.[39]

A somehow similar attempt to establish ἰσονομία is represented by the other Herodotean occurrence of the term, which appears in the context of Aristagoras of Cyme's revolt against the Persians. Indeed, Herodotus affirms that in 499, when revolting openly against Darius, Aristagoras, pretending to give up tyranny, established ἰσονομία, first of all, in Miletus (λόγῳ μετεὶς τὴν τυραννίδα ἰσονομίην ἐποίεε τῇ Μιλήτῳ), in order to encourage the Milesians to join in his revolt. He then did likewise in the rest of Ionia, driving out some of the tyrants and handing over to their own πόλις those tyrants whom he had taken out of the ships that sailed with him to Naxos, because he aimed to ingratiate himself with the other Ionian πόλεις.[40] Thus, in both cases (Hdt., III 142, 3; V 37, 2), the term cannot be regarded as referring *sic et simpliciter* to democracy considering that the main element that ultimately seems to characterise Maeandrius' and Aristagoras' attempts to establish ἰσονομία is an ambiguous and fundamentally self-interested opposition to tyranny.[41] So, overall the Herodotean occurrences suggest that ἰσονομία can be employed not only as a synonym for δημοκρατία *tout court* but also, more broadly, as an antonym for one-man rulership[42] as it is already hinted at in the above-mentioned σκόλια praising the tyrannicides.

The multifaceted meaning that ἰσονομία can take on is exemplified by the occurrences of the noun and its cognates in Thucydides, who refers to the concept four times. More precisely, there are two passages in which

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[39] Hdt., III 142-143, 1. On the reference to the cult of Zeus Eleutherius in this passage see Raaflaub (2000) 253-255.
[40] Hdt., V 37.
[41] See Ferrucci (2013) 80-81.
[42] See, for instance, Lévy (2005) 126.

Thucydides makes use of the noun itself: in the first case, while recounting the στάσις that took place in Corcyra in 427, he highlights that the leaders in the different πόλεις employed on each side specious names supporting either ἰσονομία πολιτική for the 'mass' (πλῆθος) or 'moderate aristocracy' (ἀριστοκρατία σώφρων) and pretending to take care of the common good, but in reality committing the most terrible deeds with no regard for justice and the interest of their own πόλις.[43] Significantly, concerning the Thucydidean use of the phrase ἰσονομία πολιτική, Cartledge has noted that its 'speciousness was due (…) not only to the alleged motives of its propagators but also partly to the slogan's inherent radical ambiguity, or vapidity'.[44] The second occurrence of the noun appears in the account of the expedition of the Spartan commander Brasidas to Thrace in 424. Indeed, in this passage Thucydides points out that 'the mass of the Thessalians' (τὸ πλῆθος τῶν Θεσσαλῶν) has always been 'well-disposed' (εὔνουν) to Athens, so, if Thessaly had been under an ἰσονομία rather than under a δυναστεία,[45] Brasidas would not have been able to traverse its territory.[46] Here ἰσονομία has been regarded as interchangeable with δημοκρατία.[47]

Nevertheless, Thucydides' use of its cognate adjective suggests that ἰσονομία is not exclusively a synonym of δημοκρατία *stricto sensu*. More specifically, Thucydides affirms that in 427 the Theban spokesmen, in order to defend their πόλις from the accusation of medism during the Persian Wars, stated that at that time Thebes was compelled to submit to the Persians since it was governed 'neither by an isonomic oligarchy nor by a democracy' (οὔτε κατ᾽ ὀλιγαρχίαν ἰσόνομον οὔτε κατὰ δημοκρατίαν), but by a δυναστεία of few men, opposed to the laws and to the most moderate constitution, and very similar to a tyranny (ὅπερ δέ ἐστι νόμοις μὲν καὶ τῷ σωφρονεστάτῳ ἐναντιώτατον, ἐγγυτάτῳ δὲ τυράννου, δυναστεία ὀλίγων ἀνδρῶν εἶχε τὰ πράγματα).[48] While the fact that ἰσόνομος here characterises an oligarchy hints at a more nuanced meaning of

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[43] Thuc., III 82, 8.
[44] Cartledge (1996) 177; cf. Lévy (2005) 127 (especially for the interpretation of the meaning of πολιτική) and 129. See also Vlastos (1964) 8-9
[45] See Ostwald (1969) 113 who stresses that the term is employed by Thucydides to designate a 'narrow form of oligarchy'; for this meaning of δυναστεία in the Thucydidean passage see also, more recently, Lévy (2005) 129.
[46] Thuc., IV 78, 2-3. On the contrast between ἰσονομία and δυναστεία in this passage see Lévy (2005) 126.
[47] See Vlastos (1964) 17.
[48] Thuc., III 62, 3. See Brock (1991) 168-169. See also Mitchell (2006) 182.

ἰσονομία than a mere synonymy with δημοκρατία, what emerges from this passage is also the contrast between the idea of an isonomic form of government (albeit oligarchy) and the notion of tyranny. Finally, the idea of equality is prominent in the speech that, according to Thucydides, Athenagoras of Syracuse gave in 415 in response to Hermocrates. Here ἰσονομία is referred to by means of its cognate verb when Athenagoras implies that the young Syracusans, whom he brands as oligarchs, are unwilling to accept ἰσονομία and thus reject the notion that the same people should be deemed worthy of the same rewards (ἀλλὰ δὴ μὴ μετὰ τῶν πολλῶν ἰσονομεῖσθαι; καὶ πῶς δίκαιον τοὺς αὐτοὺς μὴ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀξιοῦσθαι;).[49]

Overall, the Thucydidean occurrences of ἰσονομία and its cognates bear witness to the deeply-rooted link between ἰσονομία and democracy.[50] However, they concomitantly corroborate the view that ἰσονομία could also be related to non-democratic forms of government, although it retained an intrinsic sense of antonym of one-man rulership as illustrated in Thuc., III 62, 3. Indeed, in this passage, as we saw, the adjective ἰσόνομος is employed to characterise an oligarchy with the concurrent suggestion of its opposition to tyranny.

Ἰσονομία in Isocrates

This overview of the origin and development of ἰσονομία in Greek political thought will help us understand more fully the meaning, significance and role of the two Isocratean occurrences of the term not only in the framework of Isocrates' own works, but also, more widely, within the evolution of the concept of ἰσονομία in Greek political discourse. Two instances might seem as a very small, not to say insignificant, number. Nonetheless, they acquire much greater weight once we analyse the context in which they appear and we bear in mind that, as I stressed earlier, Isocrates is the only fourth-century author, to employ the term, other than Plato. The use of ἰσονομία in Plato, though, appears to be ironic and all in all not particularly significant. Indeed, in the *Republic* he employs the adjective ἰσονομικός and the noun (coupled with ἐλευθερία) in his

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[49] Thuc., VI 38, 5. On the use of ἰσονομεῖσθαι in this Thucydidean passage see Hornblower (2010b) 413. See also Mitchell (2016) 61-62 who stresses how here the notion of ἰσονομία indicates 'quantitative equality in the distribution of honours'; on the theory of the two types of equality hinted at in this passage see section 3 of this chapter. More on Athenagoras' speech will be said in section 4.

[50] See Musti (1995) 11-12 for a tmesis of ἰσονομία in the Funeral Oration (Thuc., II 37, 1), to which I will return in section 4.

attack against democracy.[51] An ironic sense has been identified also in his use of the term in *Menexenus* 239a, where Plato states that ἡ ἰσογονία (…) κατὰ φύσιν leads the Athenians to seek ἰσονομία (…) κατὰ νόμον.[52] It is also worth pointing out that the adjective ἰσόνομος and the noun itself occur in the *Seventh Letter* where they are both employed in a positive sense.[53] In the first passage in particular the notion of ἰσονομία is opposed to τυραννίς and ὀλιγαρχία but also, simultaneously, to δημοκρατία. In this respect, arguing against Plato's authorship of the epistle, Vlastos has underlined that while in theory it would have been possible to contrast ἰσονομία with democracy by connecting ἰσο- with proportionate equality, in practice Plato himself was unlikely to make such a move due to the deeply rooted link between ἰσονομία and democracy; this is also confirmed, Vlastos continues, by the absence of any reference to ἰσονομία in Plato's subsequent discussion of the theory of the two kinds of equality in the *Laws*.[54] Nevertheless, Lévy has rightly highlighted that even if we regard the Seventh Letter as spurious, Plato's overall usage of ἰσονομία does not display a derogatory tone towards the notion *per se* despite the ironic way in which it is employed in the *Republic* and *Menexenus*.[55]

Turning now to the Isocratean instances, I shall begin by focusing on *Areopagiticus* 20, where we can find the first occurrence of the term in the corpus. Remarkably, in this passage (which I have already examined in Chapter 2 section 3.3.2 in relation to the use of παρρησία) ἰσονομία is mentioned among the main features allegedly characterising Athens' democracy at the time of both Solon and Cleisthenes. Indeed, here Isocrates sets up a direct opposition between ἰσονομία, which marks out past Athenian democracy, and παρρησία, which is defined as one of the main negative aspects of contemporary Athens.[56] The Isocratean passage thus appears to confirm the privileged link between ἰσονομία and δημοκρατία, a close association which, as we saw, permeates the

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[51] Pl., *Republic* 561e, 563b; see Sancho Rocher (1990) 257 and Lévy (2005) 132.

[52] See Sancho Rocher (1991) 258 and Lévy (2005) 128, 132. See also Lévy (2005) 124 who stresses how here Plato appears to imply that ἰσονομία does not derive from νόμος and that it is opposed to φύσις.

[53] Pl., *Seventh Epistle* 326d, 336d.

[54] See Vlastos (1964) 34. On proportionate (or geometric) equality see section 3 of this chapter, where I shall, nonetheless, highlight that it should not necessarily be regarded as opposed to democracy.

[55] See Lévy (2005) 128.

[56] For a comparison between this passage and Thuc., III 82, 4 see, for instance, Costa (2003) 36-37. In this regard, it is worth noting that, according to Nouhaud (1982) 115, this passage is a response to Pl., *Republic* 560d-561a, rather than being inspired by the above-mentioned Thucydidean account of the στάσις in Corcyra as it is frequently assumed.

history of the term and is already evident, for instance, in Herodotus' Constitutional Debate.

Nonetheless, in this passage from *Areopagiticus*, rather than being employed as a synonym for democracy, as it is generally assumed to be the case in the Constitutional Debate, ἰσονομία occurs along with, not in place of, δημοκρατία. In fact, δημοκρατία, ἐλευθερία, ἰσονομία and εὐδαιμονία are contrasted with ἀκολασία, παρανομία, παρρησία and ἐξουσία, respectively. The use of ἰσονομία as the polar opposite of παρρησία is rather remarkable and striking at first reading, since it is not the word that one would have expected to find as the antonym of speaking frankly and openly. Indeed, as Ostwald points out, 'ἰσηγορία would have been a more natural contrast', but 'ἰσονομία is quite comprehensible as a thoroughly respectable principle of political equality, of which freedom of speech was one of the main characteristics in the fourth century'.[57] Furthermore, since ἰσονομία is retrojected into the past to denote the ancestral constitution, not contemporary democracy, and since, as we saw, the term in the fourth century is extremely rare, the fact that Isocrates chooses to employ it in this specific context can plausibly be interpreted as reflecting his willingness to archaise.

The second occurrence of ἰσονομία in the Isocratean corpus can be found in *Panathenaicus*. More specifically, in his last speech Isocrates states that, after the Dorians' invasion of the Peloponnese, Sparta was in a state of civil strife (στασιάσαι) more than any other πόλις. Then, when 'those who have over-high thoughts toward the mass' (οἱ μεῖζον τοῦ πλήθους φρονοῦντες) prevailed, they did not adopt the same measures that had been put into action in other πόλεις affected by a similar issue. In fact, Isocrates continues, 'those of the Spartans having sense' (Σπαρτιατῶν οἱ νοῦν ἔχοντες) did not consider it possible to administer their πόλις safely (ἀσφαλῶς πολιτεύεσθαι) while living alongside those people who had been in discord with them. This is why, Isocrates argues, they established among themselves ἰσονομία and 'such a democracy' (δημοκρατία τοιαύτη) that is needed by 'those who are destined to agree all the time' (οἱ μέλλοντες ἅπαντα τὸν χρόνον ὁμονοήσειν), while they concurrently reduced the δῆμος to the condition of Perioeci by enslaving them.[58]

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[57] Ostwald (1969) 180-181.
[58] Isoc., *Panathenaicus* 177-178; on the reference to the Perioeci in this passage see Mossé (1977), who highlights that here Isocrates is not confusing the Perioeci with the Helots, contrary to what some scholars, such as Roth (2003) 205, generally assume.

Moreover, Isocrates points out that, after having done this, they took hold of the land, 'of which it was befitting that each one had an equal part' (ἧς προσῆκεν ἴσον ἔχειν ἕκαστον), and grasped for themselves, though they were few, the best part of it and more than any other Greeks ever possessed. Conversely, they granted to the 'mass' (πλῆθος) only a small portion of the worst land, and then divided them into extremely small groups settling them into many little regions which had less power than the demes of Attica. And, having deprived them of all the rights which 'free men' (οἱ ἐλεύθεροι) should enjoy, they imposed upon them the vast majority of dangers, especially during military campaigns.[59]

Significantly, here, as in the occurrence of the term in *Areopagiticus* 20, ἰσονομία is once again closely associated with δημοκρατία and retrojected into the past. Indeed, in this passage from *Panathenaicus* Isocrates emphasises the deep connection between ἰσονομία and δημοκρατία even more clearly than in *Areopagiticus*, since the two terms are explicitly combined and set out in a sort of semantic unity. Nonetheless, while in *Areopagiticus* ἰσονομία and δημοκρατία are employed to refer to Athens' ancestral constitution, in *Panathenaicus* Isocrates strikingly makes use of these two words in connection with Sparta.[60]

In this respect, it is worth pointing out that there is also another key passage in the corpus in which Isocrates not only closely associates the notion of equality with that of democracy, but also employs the term δημοκρατία to label Sparta. Indeed, around twenty years prior to *Panathenaicus*, in *Areopagiticus* 60-61 Isocrates states:

> Ἔπειτα κἀκεῖθεν ῥᾴδιον γνῶμαι τὴν ἐμὴν διάνοιαν· ἐν γὰρ τοῖς πλείστοις τῶν λόγων τῶν εἰρημένων ὑπ᾽ ἐμοῦ φανήσομαι ταῖς μὲν ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ ταῖς πλεονεξίαις ἐπιτιμῶν, τὰς δ᾽ ἰσότητας καὶ τὰς δημοκρατίας ἐπαινῶν, οὐ πάσας, ἀλλὰ τὰς καλῶς καθεστηκυίας, οὐδ᾽ ὡς ἔτυχον, ἀλλὰ δικαίως καὶ λόγον ἐχόντως. Οἶδα γὰρ τούς τε προγόνους τοὺς ἡμετέρους ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ καταστάσει πολὺ τῶν ἄλλων διενεγκόντας καὶ Λακεδαιμονίους διὰ τοῦτο κάλλιστα πολιτευμένους, ὅτι μάλιστα δημοκρατούμενοι τυγχάνουσιν. Ἐν γὰρ τῇ τῶν ἀρχόντων αἱρέσει καὶ τῷ βίῳ τῷ καθ᾽ ἡμέραν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐπιτηδεύμασιν ἴδοιμεν ἂν παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς τὰς ἰσότητας καὶ τὰς ὁμοιότητας μᾶλλον ἢ παρὰ

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[59] Isoc., *Panathenaicus* 179-180.
[60] On the use of ἰσονομία in Isoc., *Panathenaicus* 178 see Costa (2003) 49.

τοῖς ἄλλοις ἰσχυούσας· οἷς αἱ μὲν ὀλιγαρχίαι πολεμοῦσιν, οἱ δὲ καλῶς δημοκρατούμενοι χρώμενοι διατελοῦσιν.

It is then easy to know my intention from that fact: in most of the speeches that I have pronounced it will be manifest that I censure the oligarchies and the undue gains, while I commend the equalities and the democracies, not all, but those which are well established, not at random, but justly and reasonably. I know, indeed, that under this constitution our forefathers far excelled the others and that the Spartans are very well governed because of the fact that, above all, they have a democratic constitution. Indeed, in the choice of magistrates, in the everyday life, and in the other ways of living we would see that among them equalities and similarities are more powerful than among others; principles against which the oligarchies are at war, but which those who have a good democratic constitution continue to make use of.

In this passage, where Sparta is referred to in positive terms, Isocrates emphasises the strong connection between δημοκρατία and ἰσότης. These two words, and thus the notions that they convey, represent indeed an inseparable pair of values, which is contrasted with the opposite pair (formed by ὀλιγαρχίαι and πλεονεξίαι) by means of a chiastic structure.[61]

In addition, here, even more clearly than in *Panathenaicus* 178, Sparta is strikingly labelled as δημοκρατία. More specifically, δημοκρατία and ἰσότης are presented as the key features which mark out, and make praiseworthy, both Athens' ancestors and contemporary Spartans. In focusing on the latter, Isocrates places special emphasis on ἰσότης and ὁμοιότης as the key aspects characterising good δημοκρατίαι, of which Sparta becomes an emblem.[62] Nonetheless, unlike in this passage from *Areopagiticus* where Sparta is commended and associated with Athens' ancestral constitution, in

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[61] See Bouchet (2007) 484-485, who underlines that the terms πλεονεξίαι and ἰσότητες indicate 'des types de comportement associés à chacun de ces régimes (cupidité et ambition pour le premier, égalitarisme pour le second): tout comme les oligarchies s'opposent aux démocraties, les πλεονεξίαι seraient opposées aux régimes fondés sur l'égalité, ou sur la justice et l'ordre', as it is the case in Isoc., *Areopagiticus* 70 where the pair ὀλιγαρχίαι/πλεονεξίαι is contrasted with the phrase δικαίαι καὶ κοσμίαι πολιτεῖαι.
[62] See Coppola (1956) 82 who stresses that the two terms ἰσότης and ὁμοιότης should be regarded as synonyms and that here the use of ὁμοιότης is due to the fact that the Spartiates were also called ὅμοιοι.

Panathenaicus 178, as we saw, the Spartans are presented in critical terms for limiting δημοκρατία and ἰσονομία to themselves while enslaving the δῆμος. Regarding the Isocratean depiction of Sparta in a negative light, it is worth underlining that towards the end of *Panathenaicus* his philolaconist pupil stresses that throughout the speech Isocrates has represented the Athenians' forefathers as 'peaceful' (εἰρηνικοί), 'fond of the Hellenes' (φιλέλληνες) and 'leaders of the equality in the constitutions' (τῆς ἰσότητος τῆς ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις ἡγεμόνες), whereas he has depicted the Spartans as 'contemptuous' (ὑπεροπτικοί), 'warlike' (πολεμικοί) and 'greedy' (πλεονέκτες).[63]

These remarks of the Laconising pupil on the alleged Isocratean characterisation of the Spartans in the speech appear to contradict what Isocrates himself states not only in *Areopagiticus* 60-61 but also in *Panathenaicus* 178. Indeed, in both passages equality is presented as one of the Spartans' distinctive features. Isocrates' seemingly ambivalent attitude towards Sparta is a complex and much debated issue.[64] Here I would like to focus in particular on Isocrates' description of Sparta as the best among democracies in *Areopagiticus* 60-61. Indeed, the fact that in this passage Isocrates refers to Sparta by means of the noun δημοκρατία and its cognate verb has been regarded as proof of his alleged attempt to promote an anti-democratic agenda in disguise[65] and as a striking way to defend himself from the charge of supporting oligarchy.[66] However, I would suggest a different reading of the Isocratean use of δημοκρατία and δημοκρατέομαι in reference to Sparta. In addition to the fact that the nature of the Spartan constitution was *per se* contested and open to different interpretations,[67] in *Areopagiticus* 60-61 Isocrates might well have retrieved the dichotomous meaning of δημοκρατία as anti-tyrannical government. Indeed, Musti in particular has explained in this sense the uses of δημοκρατία and δημοκρατέομαι in Herodotus, VI 43, 3 and IV 137 2 respectively, as well as the allusions to δημοκρατία itself in Otanes'

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[63] Isoc., *Panathenaicus* 241; see also Isoc., *Panathenaicus* 242, in which Isocrates' pupil emphasises once again the portrait of the Athenians as champions of equality (οἱ τῆς ἰσότητος προεστῶτες).

[64] On the issue of the discordant representations of Sparta in the Isocratean corpus see Ollier (1973) 327-371 and, more recently, Blank (2014).

[65] See Bearzot (1980) 113.

[66] See Blank (2014) 407.

[67] See, for instance, Arist., *Politics* 1294b. Additionally, it is in the text of the *Great Rhetra* that δῆμος and κράτος are attested for the first time in conjunction with one another (see, for instance, Musti (1995) 13).

speech.[68] More specifically, Musti has shown how this binary opposition characterising the meaning of δημοκρατία predates, and coexists in parallel with, the threefold scheme within which δημοκρατία indicates a democratic constitution *stricto sensu*.[69] I would thus argue that in presenting Sparta as one of the δημοκρατίαι that he praises Isocrates recovers precisely this original sense of δημοκρατία as an antonym to one-man rulership clearly hinted at in Herodotus, with the plural in this passage suggesting indeed a concrete rather than abstract meaning of the noun (as in the case of the Herodotean passage narrating Mardonius' establishment of δημοκρατίαι in Ionia).[70] However, while employing the noun in its binary sense, Isocrates modifies the polar opposite: in *Areopagiticus* 60-61 δημοκρατία is no longer contrasted with μοναρχία/τυραννίς (as it was the case, for instance, in the Herodotean use) but with ὀλιγαρχία. The reason behind this shift is twofold. First of all, in a speech where Isocrates defends himself from the accusation of being μισόδημος[71] and thus of being a sympathiser of oligarchy, showing his fellow citizens, or rather reminding them of, the inherent ductility of the label δημοκρατία and its wide range of application is particularly fitting. Additionally, it is worth highlighting that such a shift is also in line with the neutral, even positive, value that Isocrates attributes to one-man rulership, including τυραννίς, which is motivated, at least partly, by his connections with the Cyprian kings as we shall see more in detail in Chapter 5 section 2.1.

The use of ἰσονομία in conjunction with δημοκρατία in *Panathenaicus* 178 to refer yet again to Sparta could be explained in a somehow similar way. Indeed, in the same way in which Isocrates seems to me to reclaim the binary meaning of δημοκρατία in *Areopagiticus* 60-61, he might well have employed ἰσονομία in *Panathenaicus* in the dichotomous sense of opposition to monarchy/tyranny that is attested in the above-discussed Herodotean occurrences of the term. However, here the polar opposite in the binary use of ἰσονομία appears to remain one-man rulership, as it is the case in the traditional dual scheme, plausibly because in this last speech defending himself from the charge of supporting oligarchy is a less urgent matter, but also because Sparta,

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[68] See Musti (1995) 53-57 (cf. Vannicelli (2014) 131).
[69] See Musti (1995) XXIV, 13 and 24.
[70] On use of the plural δημοκρατίαι in Hdt., VI 43,3 as indicating a concrete meaning see Vannicelli (2014) 131.
[71] Isoc., *Areopagiticus* 57 (cf. Isoc., *Antidosis* 131).

as we saw, is subject to criticism despite the use of ἰσονομία and δημοκρατία to describe it. Thus, rather than revealing an ironic tone as it is the case in Plato, the occurrences of ἰσονομία in *Areopagiticus* and *Panathenaicus* hint at how Isocrates bears witness to, and even expands, the inherent malleability characterising the democratic vocabulary to which ἰσονομία ultimately belongs.

There are two additional aspects coming to light from the overall analysis of the above-mentioned Isocratean passages that I would like to stress: first of all, Isocrates' emphasis on the inextricable connection between the concept of equality (expressed through either ἰσονομία or ἰσότης) and the term δημοκρατία; secondly, the fact that he contrasts equality with πλεονεξία, an opposition which is particularly evident in *Areopagiticus* 60 and which emerges also in *Panathenaicus* 241 with the adjective πλεονέκτες employed by his pupil, as we saw, to refer to Isocrates' depiction of the Spartans in a supposedly negative light throughout the speech.[72] I shall return to the Isocratean usages of πλεονεξία and its cognates in section 4 of the present chapter. Concerning the first aspect, namely the link between democracy and equality, it is worth stressing that Vlastos points out how this association emerges also from *Areopagiticus* 69, where Isocrates describes 'the leaders of the restored democracy as men who, unlike the Thirty, wished to be governed "on terms of equality" with their fellow-citizens (τοῖς δὲ πολίταις ἴσον ἔχειν)'; hence Vlastos reaches the following conclusion:

> Even when inveighing against the "bad" democracy, he [Isocrates] never hints that it is "unequal". Thus he leaves democracy, good and bad, in secure possession of *isonomia*, though with the implied warning that its *ison* ought to be, so far as possible, that "more useful" and "righteous" equality which proportions awards to merit.[73]

Indeed, the difference between good and bad democracies, in Isocrates' view, lies not in the lack of equality itself, but in the specific kind of equality which they make use of, that is, proportionate and arithmetic equality, respectively. I shall return to the theory of the two kinds of equality and Isocrates' use of it in the

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[72] It is worth noting that a somehow similar opposition between πλεονεξία and ἰσότης can be found also in a fragment by Archytas of Tarentum (DK 47 B3), as we shall see towards the end of the following section.
[73] Vlastos (1964) 21.

next section. For now, I would stress, in agreement with Vlastos, Isocrates'
focus on the strong correlation between ἰσονομία and δημοκρατία. This
inextricable link was already clear in the Constitutional Debate, as we saw
earlier.

Nevertheless, even in Herodotus, as I discussed above, ἰσονομία is not
employed solely as a synonym for δημοκρατία. And, as it emerges even more
clearly in the Thucydidean usages, ἰσονομία can be related to oligarchy while
simultaneously retaining an inherent sense of opposition to one-man rule. In
addition, it is significant to note that [Xenophon] appears to have rejected the
inextricable link generally existing between ἰσονομία and δημοκρατία. Indeed, in
Constitution of the Athenians I, 4 [Xenophon] argues that in order to preserve
their democracy the Athenians 'everywhere distribute more to the worthless, the
poor and those who are in favour of the δῆμος than to the worthy' (πανταχοῦ
πλέον νέμουσι τοῖς πονηροῖς καὶ πένησι καὶ δημοτικοῖς ἢ τοῖς χρηστοῖς).[74] In
this respect, Ferrucci has highlighted that the phrase πλέον νέμουσι calls to
mind *e contrario* ἰσονομία, thus pointing towards the incompatibility existing in
[Xenophon]'s view between ἰσονομία and δημοκρατία.[75]

So, while the link between ἰσονομία and democracy is deeply rooted but
not exclusive, Isocrates' usage of ἰσονομία suggests that he rethinks, and aims
to consolidate, the inextricable connection between these two notions that
[Xenophon] had endeavoured to deny. In doing so, Isocrates also attempts (in
Areopagiticus in particular) to break the connection between
ἰσονομία/δημοκρατία and the rejection of tyranny as part and parcel of his
reformulation of τυραννίς in positive terms.

Conclusion

To summarise, ἰσονομία was more nuanced than might appear at first reading.
It was generally used to refer to, and in association with, democracy but it could
also be employed in relation with non-democratic governments while retaining
an intrinsic sense of opposition to one-man rule. Then, in the fourth century it
became extremely rare as it started to be replaced by other terms expressing
equality, namely τὸ ἴσον and ἰσότης. So, in the context of the history of ἰσονομία

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[74] More on the use of δημοτικός by [Xenophon] not only in this passage but, more broadly,
throughout the whole *Constitution of the Athenians* will be said in Chapter 5 section 2.2.
[75] See Ferrucci (2013) 61-91 (cf. Vannicelli (2014) 141-142).

in Greek political discourse, the Isocratean occurrences have particular significance as they embody precious instances of the very few fourth-century usages of the term.

The analysis of these two occurrences shows, as we have seen, that Isocrates focuses his attention particularly on (re)affirming the inextricable link between ἰσονομία and democracy. As a result, he emphasises the democratic value of ἰσονομία which was predominant in many of the previous instances of the term. In doing so, he reinterprets and broadens the field of application not only of ἰσονομία itself, but also of δημοκρατία and the pair equality/δημοκρατία, as it is suggested particularly by his close association of the two concepts to describe Sparta. Indeed, while underlining and consolidating the deeply entrenched relationship between ἰσονομία and δημοκρατία, Isocrates rethinks the meaning of both terms. More specifically, in employing ἰσονομία (*Panathenaicus* 178) and δημοκρατία (*Areopagiticus* 60-61) in reference to Sparta he reinstates the sense of a binary opposition, which both words can take on, and in the case of δημοκρατία even shifts the focus of the contrast from one-man rulership to oligarchy. The Isocratean occurrences of ἰσονομία can, therefore, be interpreted as hinting at, and as an example *par excellence* of, how he problematises, and stretches the boundaries of, the intrinsic flexibility that characterises political vocabulary, with specific reference to the language and concept of equality in this case in particular. Moreover, Isocrates' attempt to break the connection between the assertion of ἰσονομία/δημοκρατία and the rejection of tyranny can be interpreted in light of his reformulation of τυραννίς in positive terms, on which more will be said in Chapter 5 section 2.1.

3. Two kinds of equality

Equality was indeed a complex notion which, as Huffman rightly points out,[76] 'had become a deeply problematic concept in the first part of the fourth century'. It was '[i]n response to these difficulties about the simple conception of equality', Huffman argues, that 'there arose a distinction between two different sorts of equality', conventionally labelled, geometric (or proportionate) and arithmetic

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[76] Huffman (2005) 213.

equality, respectively. Throughout this section I will employ these convenient labels, even though it is worth noting that Isocrates himself does not explicitly make use of the terms 'geometric' and 'arithmetic' when he refers to the existence of two kinds of equality. Yet, as we shall see throughout this section, one of the main aspects of Isocrates' use of the language and notion of equality is precisely the focus on the existence of two different equalities. Nonetheless, modern scholarship has paid scant attention to the role of these two kinds of equality in the Isocratean corpus, with very few exceptions, such as Harvey's study.[77] However, Harvey does not focus solely on the Isocratean instances and in the present section I will challenge, at least partially, his conclusions about Isocrates' use of the two equalities.

Furthermore, Isocrates' discussion of the theory of geometric and arithmetic equality has often been dismissed as inconsistent and ambiguous. So, I shall examine it in depth in order to suggest that the Isocratean reference to the two types of equality is more complicated and multifaceted than it could appear at first reading. In doing so, I intend not only to cast some light on the role that such a theory plays within the Isocratean corpus itself, but also, more broadly, to underline Isocrates' crucial contribution to the contemporary debate on these two kinds of equality.

Geometric versus arithmetic equality in *Areopagiticus*
In *Areopagiticus* Isocrates appears to refer manifestly to the existence of two kinds of equality. Indeed, just after the above-quoted passage where he opposes current παρρησία to the ἰσονομία which, in his view, characterised Athens at the time of both Solon and Cleisthenes, Isocrates notes:

> Μέγιστον δ᾽ αὐτοῖς συνεβάλετο πρὸς τὸ καλῶς οἰκεῖν τὴν πόλιν, ὅτι δυοῖν ἰσοτήτοιν νομιζομέναιν εἶναι, καὶ τῆς μὲν ταὐτὸν ἅπασιν ἀπονεμούσης, τῆς δὲ τὸ προσῆκον ἑκάστοις, οὐκ ἠγνόουν τὴν χρησιμωτέραν, ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν τῶν αὐτῶν ἀξιοῦσαν τοὺς χρηστοὺς καὶ τοὺς πονηροὺς ἀπεδοκίμαζον ὡς οὐ δίκαιαν οὖσαν, τὴν δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν ἕκαστον τιμῶσαν καὶ κολάζουσαν προῃροῦντο καὶ διὰ ταύτης ᾤκουν τὴν πόλιν, οὐκ ἐξ ἁπάντων τὰς ἀρχὰς κληροῦντες, ἀλλὰ τοὺς

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[77] Harvey (1965).

βελτίστους καὶ τοὺς ἱκανωτάτους ἐφ᾽ ἕκαστον τῶν ἔργων προκρίνοντες. Τοιούτους γὰρ ἤλπιζον ἔσεσθαι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, οἷοί περ ἂν ὦσιν οἱ τῶν πραγμάτων ἐπιστατοῦντες.[78]

But what contributed the most towards managing the πόλις well was the fact that, acknowledging the existence of two equalities, the one which assigns to all the same and the one which assigns what is befitting to each, they did not fail to recognise the more useful, but rejected as being unfair that which deems worthy of the same rewards the good and the bad, and preferred that which honours and punishes each one according to the merit, and through this they managed the πόλις, not assigning the offices by lot from all, but selecting the best and the most competent for each matter. Indeed, they expected that the others would be such as those who were in charge of the affairs.

In order to support his opposition to election by sortition Isocrates argues that, when selecting by lot, 'fate' (τύχη) plays a key role, so that 'those who long for oligarchy' (οἱ ὀλιγαρχίας ἐπιθυμοῦντες) are likely to be assigned the offices; on the contrary, by appointing 'the most capable' (οἱ ἐπιεικέστατοι), the δῆμος is entitled to choose 'those who love most the established constitution' (οἱ ἀγαπῶντες μάλιστα τὴν καθεστῶσαν πολιτείαν).[79] The focus on the notion of competence (particularly conveyed by means of the superlative forms of ἱκανός at the end of section 22 and of ἐπιεικής here in *Areopagiticus* 23) might suggest, as Romilly points out, that the distinction between the two kinds of equality could have been considered as 'une réponse au problème de l'aveuglement populaire'.[80] Additionally, it is worth noting that the idea of the δῆμος as κύριος that emerges in section 23 recurs also at the end of *Areopagiticus* 27 when Isocrates highlights, by means of a rhetorical question, that it would be impossible to find a democracy 'more steadfast' (βεβαιότερα) and 'more just' (δικαιότερα) than the one existing at the time of Solon and Cleisthenes, which put 'the most able' (οἱ δυνατώτατοι) in charge of public affairs while making the δῆμος 'master' (κύριος) over them. In this regard,

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[78] Isoc., *Areopagiticus* 21-22.
[79] Isoc., *Areopagiticus* 23.
[80] Romilly (1975) 50.

Isocrates' description of the δῆμος as κύριος calls to mind both the lines in Euripides' *Suppliants* in which Theseus states that he brought the δῆμος into a μοναρχία[81] and Aristophanes' *Knights* where the δῆμος is personified and referred to as μόναρχος and as βασιλεύς of the Greeks.[82]

As Harvey points out in his discussion of the doctrine of the two kinds of equality in *Areopagiticus*, it is worth stressing, first of all, that 'the theory is retrojected into the remote past' and, secondly, that 'arithmetical equality is associated specifically with the lot'.[83] Concerning the first point, Harvey[84] makes a comparison with *Moralia* 719a-c where Plutarch assigns the introduction of the doctrine of the two equalities to Lycurgus connecting arithmetic equality with democracy and geometric equality with non-democratic governments. Likewise, we can find two other passages in which Plutarch associates the doctrine of the two kinds of equalities with Solon. More specifically, in the *Life of Solon* XIV, 2, Plutarch states as follows:

> λέγεται δὲ καὶ φωνή τις αὐτοῦ περιφερομένη πρότερον, εἰπόντος ὡς τὸ ἴσον πόλεμον οὐ ποιεῖ, καὶ τοῖς κτηματικοῖς ἀρέσκειν καὶ τοῖς ἀκτήμοσι, τῶν μὲν ἀξίᾳ καὶ ἀρετῇ, τῶν δὲ μέτρῳ καὶ ἀριθμῷ τὸ ἴσον ἕξειν προσδοκώντων.

> It is also said that a certain utterance of his which was current before his election, to the effect that equality bred no war, pleased both the men of substance and those who had none; the former expecting to have equality based on worth and excellence, the latter on measure and count.[85]

In a somehow similar manner, in *Moralia* 484b Plutarch attributes the introduction of arithmetic equality to Solon, stressing its link with democracy:

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[81] Eur., *Suppliants* 351-352.
[82] Ar., *Knights* 1330; 1333. See Brock (1986) 25-26 and Mitchell (2013) 156. Cf. Hoekstra (2016) 40-42.
[83] Harvey (1965) 112.
[84] Harvey (1965) 120-123.
[85] Trans. Perrin (1914) 439.

Ὁ μὲν οὖν Σόλων ἀποφηνάμενος περὶ πολιτείας, ὡς ἰσότης στάσιν οὐ ποεῖ, λίαν ἔδοξεν ὀχλικῶς ἀριθμητικὴν καὶ δημοκρατικὴν ἐπεισάγειν ἀναλογίαν ἀντὶ τῆς καλῆς γεωμετρικῆς.

When Solon, speaking of principles of government, said that equality does not create sedition, he was thought to be playing up too much to the crowd by introducing an arithmetical proportion, a democratic principle, instead of the sound geometrical proportion.[86]

According to Harvey, the projection into the past of the theory of the two kinds of equality in the last two Plutarchean passages has an opposite result compared to the retrojection of such a doctrine carried out by Isocrates in *Areopagiticus*:

For Isocrates, the Solonian constitution was an example of geometric proportion; for Plutarch's source it was arithmetical equality: those of Solon's supporters who wanted geometric equality were greatly disappointed. It is not difficult to see the origin of the discrepancy. Isocrates believed that Solon instituted, not the radical democracy of the fourth century, but the "good old democracy" – in other words, not a democracy at all: hence geometric proportion. Plutarch's source, on the other hand, believed that Solon was the founder of the democracy; so arithmetical equality is appropriate. It throws a bright light on the practical value of these theories that the two opposite and incompatible equalities could both be thought of as symbolizing the same constitution.[87]

I agree with Harvey when he points in the direction of the malleability that characterised the theory of the two equalities and the language related to it. Nevertheless, the conclusions that he draws from the comparison between the Plutarchean passages and *Areopagiticus* 21-22 pose some issues. In Chapter 5 section 3.3.1 I will devote special attention to the Isocratean discussion of Athens' ancestral constitution in *Areopagiticus*, with specific reference to Solon.

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[86] Trans. Helmbold (1939) 281.
[87] Harvey (1965) 121-122.

What I shall note here is, first of all, that the link, on the one hand, of arithmetic equality with democracy, on the other hand, of geometric equality with non-democratic constitutions is much less straightforward in Isocrates than it appears to be in Plutarch. In other words, rather than simply making use of this clear-cut association, Isocrates bears witness to, and problematises, its ductility in the first half of the fourth century.

The second aspect underlined by Harvey in relation to *Areopagiticus* 21-22, namely the inextricable connection of arithmetic equality with election by lot, suggests that '[t]he idea [sc. of arithmetic equality] is growing, and new concrete ideas are being added'. Moreover, it is important to stress that the link between arithmetic equality and sortition is present 'also in Plato's *Laws*, but not in any earlier occurrence of the theory'. In this respect, despite acknowledging that *Areopagiticus* is generally regarded as pre-dating the *Laws*, Harvey argues that this 'new detail' cannot be ascribed to Isocrates 'not on the ground that Isocrates was incapable of an original thought, but because when a writer takes over a theory and states it briefly and generally, it is not likely that he will make a small but important innovation of this nature'. So, while excluding that it was Isocrates who associated election by lot with arithmetic equality, Harvey suggests, instead, three different scenarios: firstly, the existence of 'an earlier version of the *Laws* used by Aristotle', secondly, the possibility that 'if the *Laws* is simply a record of what Plato had been urging in lectures and conversations for many years, Isocrates may perhaps have heard of it in that way', and, thirdly, the existence of 'a common source, now lost', perhaps Archytas of Tarentum,[88] on whom I shall focus further below. Although Harvey is certainly right in underlining the difficulty in establishing who first connected election by lot with arithmetic equality, the argument through which he rules out the possibility of an Isocratean innovation does not seem to me particularly strong. In this regard, Isocrates' usages of παρρησία, especially in its negative sense as I attempted to show in the previous chapter, suggest that he might well have been capable of introducing apparently minor, but significant innovations in political language without dwelling on theoretical explanations. So, *Areopagiticus* 21-22 can indeed be regarded as presenting the first manifest instance known to us of the association of arithmetic equality with the lot.

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[88] Harvey (1965) 112-113.

Moreover, in addition to linking arithmetic equality with the lot, in this passage from *Areopagiticus* Isocrates highlights the importance of geometric equality as the key feature that, above all, marked out Athens at the time of Solon and Cleisthenes as a well-governed constitution. Indeed, geometric equality, Isocrates argues, is both useful and fair compared to arithmetic equality. The link between expediency and justice, which is a frequent theme in Isocrates' works, suggests that the emphasis on moral value plays an important part in his representation of the opposition between the two kinds of equality. As Desideri points out, Isocrates considers the alleged misinterpretation of the concept of equality operated by his fellow citizens (which leads them to favour arithmetic equality, and thus election by lot, over geometric equality) as reflecting the current ethical and political degradation.[89] Indeed, Isocrates complains that in contemporary Athens his fellow citizens fight over the offices, regarding them as an invaluable opportunity to ensure great personal enrichment, not as a public service to be performed in the best interest of the whole πόλις.[90] As opposed to arithmetic equality, geometric equality is inextricably related to the idea of deserts and the meritocratic tone deeply pervades the text as Isocrates stresses the fact that true equality consists in giving everyone what they deserve according to their merit.

In this respect, *Areopagiticus* 21-22 can thus be compared with Pericles' Funeral Oration. Isocrates' *Areopagiticus* has usually been regarded as sharply opposed to Pericles' speech. So, the comparison between these two texts has often been employed to sustain the recurring argument that Isocrates' statements in support of democracy are a mere façade.[91] However, such an interpretation appears to me to be misleading, since it runs the risk not only of oversimplifying both the Isocratean passage and the Funeral Oration, but also of overlooking the presence of some relevant contact points between the two. For instance, Pericles does not focus either on equality or on the role of sortition to attain high offices in Athens. Rather, as Romilly argues, he seems to suggest that 'une compétition ouverte à tous, visant à distinguer les gens de valeur et à mettre à profit leur talents' is associated with, and corrects the effects of, ἰσονομία; this means that '[l]'égalité se combine avec la recherche systématique

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[89] Desideri (1969) 46-48.
[90] Isoc., *Areopagiticus* 24-25.
[91] See, for instance, Bearzot (1980) 124-125 and Loraux (1986) 219-220.

des mérites qui sont inégaux'.[92] In other words, the notion of merit could indeed be regarded as a way to avoid the excesses of democracy (which arose from the idea of equality for all) and thus as compatible with, rather than necessarily antithetical to, democracy itself.

In addition, concerning sortition, it is worth noting that in the Constitutional Debate, as we saw earlier, Otanes points out that one of the main advantages of the ἰσονομία that he upholds, lies precisely in the fact that all offices are assigned 'by lot' (πάλῳ).[93] Similarly, in Euripides' *Suppliants*, in addressing the Theban herald, Theseus points out that the Athenian democracy is characterised by annual sortition as well as equal rights for the poor and the rich.[94] So, by the end of the fifth century election by lot was closely linked with, and considered as one of the key principles of, democracy. However, such a bond was not unbreakable. For instance, in two different passages from book VIII Thucydides does associate election by lot with the oligarchic regime of the Four Hundred, thus hinting at the fact that sortition was not a feature always and exclusively employed to characterise a democratic government.[95]

And while Pericles leaves aside the significance of sortition, it is possible to grasp a particular emphasis on meritocracy in his Funeral Oration. Indeed, he states that concerning one's 'reputation' (ἀξίωσις), 'as each person is of good repute in something' (ὡς ἕκαστος ἔν τῳ εὐδοκιμεῖ), when it comes to public affairs people are not preferred ἀπὸ μέρους[96] more than ἀπ᾽ ἀρετῆς. Then, as Gomme notes, Pericles specifies, 'as a necessary reminder, since ἀξίωσις, if not ἀρετή, so often accompanies wealth, that no poor man is barred from serving the state by his obscurity'[97] (ἀξιώματος ἀφανείᾳ).[98] In this respect, Gomme believes that 'there is in effect very little distinction between ἀξίωσις (ὡς ἕκαστος ἔν τῳ εὐδοκιμεῖ) and ἀξίωμα (…) –the estimation in which a man is

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[92] Romilly (1975) 49. See also, for instance, Rusten (1989) 137.
[93] Hdt., III 80.
[94] Eur., *Suppliants* 406-408.
[95] Thuc., VIII 70; 93. See Rhodes (1993) 115-116 and Mitchell (2016) 60.
[96] The meaning of the phrase ἀπὸ μέρους has been the subject of many debates among scholars. See, for instance, Hornblower (1991) 300-301, according to whom it means 'in rotation'; for this interpretation see also Gomme (1956) 108 and Rhodes (1988) 220. On the other hand, for the interpretation of ἀπὸ μέρους as meaning 'from a class of the civic body' see, for example, Vlastos (1964) 8 and Lévy (2003) 154 (cf. Loraux (1986) 188). For an overview of the different interpretations (with reference to the idea of geometric equality) see Fantasia (2003) 378-380.
[97] Gomme (1956) 108.
[98] Thuc., II 37, 1.

held and the position he occupies in his own world'.[99] Nonetheless, Musti has pointed out the difference existing between the two notions by stressing how the nouns ending in –σις, which usually indicate an active process, differ from those in –μα, which instead generally denote the result of an action; so, while ἀξίωμα tends to indicate a static condition, ἀξίωσις should be regarded as an ongoing process of evaluation characterised by a dynamic nature and thus bearing a democratic connotation.[100]

The distinction existing between ἀξίωσις and ἀξίωμα in the Funeral Oration has been highlighted also by Loraux, who stresses that 'democratic equality distinguishes between *axioma*, social consideration, rank, and *axiosis*, the judgment passed by Athenians on one of their number, a judgment that relates beyond the obscurity of a poor citizen's situation, to his real worth'; yet, at the same time, Loraux believes that '*axioma* is also an echo of *axiosis*, and the very construction of the sentence (*oud' au*: nor, conversely) indicates that we have not left the sphere where work is assessed, the sphere of elective responsibilities in which prestige is a determinant factor', and she suggests that Pericles is constantly, though not explicitly, identifying democracy and ἀρετή, a 'strange identification'.[101] The emphasis on ἀρετή and the lack of focus on sortition in the Funeral Oration have indeed given rise to discussions among scholars. In this respect, Loraux not only underlines the 'aristocratic character of this eulogy of democracy' as well as the issues that it poses,[102] but also she provides a possible explanation, arguing that Pericles, when describing contemporary Athenian democracy, 'had to submit, *qua* official orator, to the influence of a genre dominated by aristocratic representations'.[103] Indeed, since in Pericles' definition of democracy there is a particular stress on the aristocratic value of ἀρετή, Loraux regards ἰσονομία as being 'relegated to the sphere of private relations, *worth* becomes the only measure of political life: to *kata tous nomous* is opposed *kata ten axiosin*', and thus '[i]n Platonic (or Aristotelian) language (…) to arithmetical equality, the norm of private relations, is opposed a sort of geometric equality, the principle governing accession to responsibility'.[104]

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[99] Gomme (1956) 110.
[100] See Musti (1995) 99-102. Cf. Fantasia (2003) 378.
[101] Loraux (1986) 188.
[102] Loraux (1986) 190.
[103] Loraux (1986) 192.
[104] Loraux (1986) 186 [her italics].

Nonetheless, Musti has persuasively argued that these two aspects are interrelated features that coexist in the text of the Funeral Oration, although apparently on two different levels, namely that of the private interests (τὰ ἴδια) and that of the public affairs (τὰ κοινά), two spheres which here, according to Musti, are balanced in an equilibrium that is not static and unchanging but constantly full of tension.[105] In this respect, Musti has highlighted that in the phrase μέτεστι δὲ κατὰ μὲν τοὺς νόμους (…) πᾶσι τὸ ἴσον (Thuc., II 37, 1) we can find a tmesis of ἰσονομία and that δέ (in μέτεστι δέ) here indicates not an opposition to, but a clarification of, the well-known definition of δημοκρατία that occurs in the preceding sentence (καὶ ὄνομα μὲν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐς ὀλίγους ἀλλ᾽ ἐς πλείονας οἰκεῖν δημοκρατία κέκληται).[106]

So, even though Isocrates does not appear to harmonise geometric and arithmetic equality, the comparison between *Areopagiticus* 21-22 and the Funeral Oration (which, following Musti, I regard as fundamentally presenting 'una teoria democratica della democrazia')[107] suggests that the idea of merit described in the two texts could indeed be associated with the Athenian democracy in the framework of a genuine praise of this form of government.

The widespread assumption that the idea of merit which Isocrates supports in *Areopagiticus* promotes equality just in words while, in reality, aiming at inequality, is often related to the interpretation of the meaning of οἱ βέλτιστοι in the Isocratean speech. For instance, Silvestrini notes that the phrase οἱ βέλτιστοι has mainly a social value and only secondarily a moral one,[108] and thus claims that, by trying to reverse the fundamental principles of Athenian democracy, *Areopagiticus* is operating towards a timocratic system.[109] I would, instead, stress the moral sense that οἱ βέλτιστοι takes on in this work and, more broadly, throughout the Isocratean corpus. Indeed, Desideri is right in underlining that the moral connotation inherent in οἱ βέλτιστοι can easily end up indicating 'the aristocracy'. Nonetheless, it is worth pointing out that in *Areopagiticus* 21, as Desideri himself acknowledges, οἱ βέλτιστοι has first and foremost an ethical value considering also that the context of this passage shows that here the phrase means 'the best from a moral point of view', just as

[105] See Musti (1995) 100-101 and 114-115. Cf. Lévy (2003) 155.
[106] Musti (1995) 11-12 (cf. Vannicelli (2014) 141), *pace* Loraux (1986) 186.
[107] Musti (1995) VI, *pace* Loraux (1986) 220.
[108] Silvestrini (1978) 173.
[109] Silvestrini (1978) 175.

οἱ ἱκανώτατοι in the same text should be considered as referring to 'those who are more technically prepared' rather than 'the wealthy'.[110]

It is true that in *Areopagiticus* 26 Isocrates seems to identify οἱ βέλτιστοι and οἱ ἱκανώτατοι with the wealthy citizens, since he argues that, given the role of the δῆμος as τύραννος, the care of the public affairs in the πόλις should be entrusted to 'those who are able to enjoy ease and who procure for themselves sufficient means of living' (οἱ δὲ σχολὴν ἄγειν δυνάμενοι καὶ βίον ἱκανὸν κεκτημένοι). The phrase οἱ βέλτιστοι had, indeed, become a class label as it is manifest, for example, in [Xenophon]'s *Constitution of the Athenians*, where it is constantly opposed to the δῆμος. However, all five occurrences of οἱ βέλτιστοι in the text of [Xenophon] are classified by Marr and Rhodes as 'morally evaluative' rather than either 'socially evaluative' or 'both morally and socially evaluative'.[111] In other words, in [Xenophon]'s work the 'moral and intellectual differences between classes are mainly inherent (…) and they are in themselves part of the way the two classes are to be defined'.[112] This suggests that, even though the phrase tended to be used as a class designation, it still conveyed a significant ethical value.

Furthermore, the emphasis on the moral meaning, rather than the social value, appears to be predominant in most of the other occurrences of οἱ βέλτιστοι in Isocrates, especially when it is coupled with οἱ φρονιμώτατοι[113] as well as with οἱ σωφρονέστατοι.[114] In this respect, it is important to point out that οἱ βέλτιστοι has been identified by Azoulay as one of the labels emerging between the end of the fifth and the fourth century which Isocrates employs in his redefinition of the Athenian élite in terms of cultural and intellectual pre-eminence.[115] Therefore, without denying the presence of a social sense in the phrase and the overlap between the two meanings, it is plausible to assume that in *Areopagiticus* and, more broadly, in the whole Isocratean corpus the moral value is firmly rooted in οἱ βέλτιστοι. Indeed, as Nouhaud rightly highlights, 'la personnalité d'Isocrate (…) fait que les préoccupations politiques

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[110] See Desideri (1969) 45.
[111] Marr and Rhodes (2008) 171-172.
[112] Marr and Rhodes (2008) 68.
[113] Isoc., *Panathenaicus* 109 and 133.
[114] Isoc., *Antidosis* 290.
[115] See Azoulay (2010) especially 26 and 29. For a list of all the occurrences of οἱ βέλτιστοι in the Isocratean corpus see Azoulay (2010) 44.

ne sont jamais détachées du souci moral'.[116] This aspect is particularly clear in *Areopagiticus*, where the political reform that Isocrates promotes is closely linked to (and even dependent on) a profound moral reform, and is even more evident, as we shall see, in the case of the second allusion to the theory of the two equalities that we find in the Isocratean corpus.

Geometric versus arithmetic equality in *Nicocles*

Indeed, *Areopagiticus* is not the only speech in which Isocrates appears to refer to the existence of two kinds of equality. In fact, around twenty years prior to *Areopagiticus*, he alludes to the doctrine of geometric and arithmetic equality in one of his Cyprian orations, namely *Nicocles*. Here the king of Salamis defines as 'most terrible' (δεινότατον) deeming both 'the worthy' (οἱ χρηστοί) and 'the worthless' (οἱ πονηροί) as deserving the same rewards. Instead, it is 'most just' (δικαιότατον), Nicocles argues, to draw distinctions between the two categories and not to treat alike those who are dissimilar, but to honour each one 'according to the merit' (κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν).[117] Having said that, Nicocles opposes oligarchies and democracies to monarchies precisely on the basis of the different kind of equality that they promote. More specifically, on the one hand, he criticises both oligarchies and democracies claiming that they 'seek equalities for those who share in the governments' (τὰς ἰσότητας τοῖς μετέχουσι τῶν πολιτειῶν ζητοῦσι) and that they support the idea that no one can have more than another, a principle that, in Nicocles' view, benefits 'the worthless' (οἱ πονηροί) as opposed to 'the worthy' (οἱ χρηστοί). On the other hand, the Cyprian king praises monarchies on the grounds that they 'distribute the greatest reward to the best man, the second to the one after him, the third and the fourth to the others according to the same reasoning' (πλεῖστον μὲν νέμουσι τῷ βελτίστῳ, δεύτερον δὲ τῷ μετ᾽ ἐκεῖνον, τρίτον δὲ καὶ τέταρτον τοῖς ἄλλοις κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον),[118] although he admits that, while this is the

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[116] Nouhaud (1982) 99.
[117] Isoc., *Nicocles* 14.
[118] In this case I have adopted the Greek text in the Loeb edition, rather than the one in the Budé edition (Mathieu and Brémond (1938) 123) which has the following version: Αἱ δὲ μοναρχίαι πλεῖστον μὲν νέμουσι τῷ βελτίστῳ, δευτέρῳ δὲ τῷ μετ᾽ ἐκεῖνον, τρίτῳ δὲ καὶ τετάρτῳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον ('La monarchie au contraire réserve la place prépondérante au meilleur, la seconde à celui qui vient ensuite, la troisième, la quatrième et les autres, conformément à la même règle'). The Budé text is accepted by Forster (1912) 136, who translates the sentence as 'and proportionately to the second best after him, and the third and fourth best and so on', interpreting δευτέρῳ as 'second (in point of excellence)'. However, the

'purpose' (βούλημα) of such a type of government, in practice this is not always the case.[119] 'And indeed who of those who think well would not accept to partake of such a constitution in which being good does not escape notice (…)?' (καίτοι τίς οὐκ ἂν δέξαιτο τῶν εὖ φρονούντων τοιαύτης πολιτείας μετέχειν ἐν ᾗ μὴ διαλήσει χρηστὸς ὤν (…);), Isocrates concludes by means of a rhetorical question.[120]

Harvey casts some doubts on the fact that in this passage Isocrates is making a reference to the doctrine of the two kinds of equality claiming that here Isocrates does not promote geometric equality, but rather regards 'equality itself' as 'wrong'.[121] Nonetheless, eventually Harvey himself seems to acknowledge the Isocratean allusion to the doctrine of the two equalities not only when he notices that Nicocles' words recall the language employed, for instance, in Plato's *Republic* 558c in relation to such a doctrine, but also when he refers to the passage from *Nicocles* as an instance of how the theory of the two kinds of equality can be used 'to justify absolute monarchy'.[122] So, although the language employed here might appear less explicit than the one used in *Areopagiticus* 21-22 to refer to the existence of two equalities, it is highly likely that here Isocrates intends indeed to allude to the same idea, even though we do not find a detailed and manifest theoretical exposition. Furthermore, it is worth stressing that in order to describe the functioning of proportionate equality Isocrates puts into the mouth of the Cyprian king the same phrase that he uses later on in *Areopagiticus* 22, namely κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν, thus stressing, once again, the link existing between merit and this kind of equality.

In addition, it is also possible to draw a comparison between the passage from *Nicocles* and the idea of meritocracy that emerges in Xenophon. More particularly, in the *Cyropaedia* Chrysantas, one of Cyrus' generals and counsellors, rejects arithmetic equality by stating that he regards as extremely unfair to deem worthy of an equal reward both 'the bad' (ὁ κακός) and 'the good' (ὁ ἀγαθός).[123] Likewise, Cyrus includes in his innermost circle Pheraulas, who

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translation in the Budé edition does not seem to me to be a literal translation of the Greek text adopted.

[119] Isoc., *Nicocles* 15. See Forster (1912) 136 according to whom the meaning of πολιτεῖαι in this passage is 'political rights'.

[120] Isoc., *Nicocles* 16.

[121] Harvey (1965) 111.

[122] Harvey (1965) 111, see also 128; 142 n. 172.

[123] Xen., *Cyropaedia* II, 2, 18 (more on this passage will be said in section 4 devoted to ἰσομοιρία).

was 'one of the people' (ὁ ἐκ τῶν δημοτῶν) and had supported the proposal that everyone should be honoured 'according to the merit' (κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν).[124] Thus, the depiction of Cyrus' reorganisation of his army as entirely meritocratic hints at the significant influence that proportionate equality had on Xenophon.[125] This also confirms the increasing importance acquired by the debate on the two equalities in fourth-century political discourse as well as the prominence of geometric equality within this debate. Indeed, Xenophon, like Isocrates, appears to be very interested in proportionate equality, although Isocrates deals more explicitly with this topic.

Going back to the passage from *Nicocles*, the fact that here geometric equality is associated with monarchy, while arithmetic equality is linked to both democracy and oligarchy in a harsh criticism of these two forms of government might appear at first reading inconsistent with what Isocrates says in *Areopagiticus* 21-22, where, as I illustrated earlier, geometric equality is praised as the distinctive feature of Athens' ancestral constitution. Nevertheless, this seeming incongruity should not encourage us to share Harvey's conclusion that Isocrates is exploiting the doctrine of the two kinds of equality 'to justify absolute monarchy'.[126] Firstly, while bearing in mind that the *persona loquens* in the speech is not Isocrates himself but the Cyprian king, it is plausible to assume that the object of Isocrates' criticism, through Nicocles' words, is not democracy *per se* as a constitutional form. Rather, the target is most probably the degeneration of contemporary democracy, which Isocrates repeatedly condemns in *Areopagiticus* and, more generally, throughout his corpus. Moreover, here, as later on in *Areopagiticus*, Isocrates makes a key reference to οἱ βέλτιστοι as those who deserve to receive the highest reward. The vocabulary employed in the two passages to allude to the two kinds of equality is indeed almost identical. In addition to the phrase κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν highlighted above, in both texts we find οἱ βέλτιστοι assimilated to οἱ χρηστοί and opposed, unsurprisingly, to οἱ πονηροί. Concurrently, it should be noted that while the terminology in *Nicocles* 14-16 and *Areopagiticus* 21-22 is largely similar, the former text stands out for the specific mention of οἱ εὖ φρονοῦντες and their implicit identification with οἱ χρηστοί suggested by the rhetorical question in

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[124] Xen., *Cyropaedia* II, 3, 5.
[125] See Mitchell (2013) 159.
[126] Harvey (1965) 111, see also 128.

section 16. The equivalence that emerges from *Nicocles* 14-16 is thus as follows: οἱ βέλτιστοι=οἱ χρηστοί=οἱ εὖ φρονοῦντες. Although Isocrates does not refer explicitly to οἱ εὖ φρονοῦντες in *Areopagiticus* 21-22, the same identification can be applied there. Indeed, as I discussed earlier, the phrase οἱ βέλτιστοι has first and foremost an ethical meaning (rather than a social one) in *Areopagiticus* and, more broadly, throughout the Isocratean corpus. In this regard, the passage from *Nicocles* sheds further light on who these οἱ βέλτιστοι might be in Isocrates' view. Indeed, the assimilation of οἱ βέλτιστοι with οἱ εὖ φρονοῦντες acquires particular significance especially because of the key role played by the notion of εὖ φρονεῖν in Isocrates' works. In this respect, while more will be said in Chapter 5, I have already highlighted in the previous chapter the crucial role played by this phrase in *To Nicocles* 28 where 'those who think well' are the only ones to whom the king of Salamis should grant παρρησία. In *Nicocles* 14-16 the emphasis has shifted from speaking frankly to equality but the principle of εὖ φρονεῖν remains core to Isocrates. The same notion can be regarded as being implied in *Areopagiticus* 21-22 when he refers to οἱ βέλτιστοι. Thus, in Athens as well as in Salamis on Cyprus it is of paramount importance to recognise the worth of, and reward accordingly, those men who show to possess good judgment. As Isocrates complains elsewhere and as I shall discuss more fully in the final chapter, contemporary Athenians, unlike their ancestors, are failing to do so. Hence, the criticism that emerges from *Nicocles* 14-16 towards democracy and the kind of equality it allegedly makes use of.

Geometric and arithmetic equality in Archytas of Tarentum?
In order to evaluate more fully the broader role that Isocrates' use of the doctrine of the two equalities plays not only in his own corpus, but also, more widely, in Greek political thought, we need to consider briefly the origins of the idea of geometric and arithmetic equality, which are often deemed to be Pythagorean. In this respect, it is worth noting the Pythagorean philosopher, mathematician and political leader Archytas of Tarentum, who flourished in the first half of the fourth century and was thus a contemporary of Isocrates, in one of his fragments employs a terminology which calls to mind that generally used in relation to the two kinds of equality:

μέσαι δέ ἐντι τρῖς τᾷ μουσικᾷ. Μία μὲν ἀριθμητικά, δευτέρα δὲ ἁ γεωμετρικά, τρίτα δ᾽ ὑπεναντία [, ἃν καλέοντι ἁρμονικάν]. ἀριθμητικὰ μέν, ὅκκα ἴωντι τρεῖς ὅροι κατὰ τὰν τοίαν ὑπεροχὰν ἀνάλογον, ᾧ πρῶτος δευτέρου ὑπερέχει, τούτῳ δεύτερος τρίτου ὑπερέχει. Καὶ ἐν ταύτᾳ <τᾷ> ἀναλογίᾳ συμπίπτει εἶμεν τὸ τῶν μειζόνων ὅρων διάστημα μεῖον, τὸ δὲ τῶν μειόνων μεῖζον. ἁγεωμετρικὰ δέ, ὅκκα ἔωντι οἷος ὁ πρῶτος ποτὶ τὸν δεύτερον, καὶ ὁ δεύτερος ποτὶ τὸν τρίτον. τούτων δ᾽ οἱ μείζονες ἴσον ποιοῦνται τὸ διάστημα καὶ οἱ μείους. ἁ δ᾽ ὑπεναντία, ἃν καλοῦμεν ἁρμονικάν, ὅκκα ἔωντι <τοῖοι ᾧ> ὁ πρῶτος ὅρος ὑπερέχει τοῦ δευτέρου αὐταύτου μέρει, τούτῳ ὁ μέσος τοῦ τρίτου ὑπερέχει τοῦ τρίτου μέρει. Γίνεται δ᾽ ἐν ταύτᾳ τᾷ ἀναλογίᾳ τὸ τῶν μειζόνων ὅρων διάστημα μεῖζον, τὸ δὲ τῶν μειόνων μεῖον.[127]

There are three means in music: one is the arithmetic, the second geometric and the third sub-contrary [, which they call "harmonic"]. The mean is arithmetic, whenever three terms are in proportion by exceeding one another in the following way: by that which the first exceeds the second, by this the second exceeds the third. And in this proportion it turns out that the interval of the greater terms is smaller and that of the smaller greater. The mean geometric, whenever they [the terms] are such that as the first is to the second so the second is to the third. Of these [terms] the greater and the lesser make an equal interval. The mean is subcontrary, which we call harmonic, whenever they [the terms] are such that, by which part of itself the first term exceeds the second, by this part of the third the middle exceeds the third. It turns out that, in this proportion, the interval of the greater terms is greater and that of the lesser is less.[128]

Indeed, in this fragment Archytas identifies three different 'means' (μέσαι), with the term μέση appearing to refer to mathematical relations rather than equality.[129] Although it is unlikely that Archytas was the first to discover them,

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[127] DK 47 B 2. The square brackets indicate the phrase that according to Huffman (2005) 162 and 173 is a gloss by a later commentator which has been mistakenly included in the text and should be omitted in order to avoid ambiguity with what Archytas says about the third mean in lines 8-9.
[128] Trans. Huffman (2005) 163.
[129] On this term and its origin see Huffman (2005) 177.

his fragment most probably represents 'the first text in which these means were set out as a group and defined carefully', considering also that 'he probably coined the term "harmonic" for the third mean'.[130]

Focusing on the first two means, which are the ones directly related to my analysis, it is worth highlighting that Harvey regards Archytas as the first to apply the geometric and arithmetic means to politics and supports this claim through his interpretation of the meaning of λογισμός in the following fragment:

δεῖ γὰρ μὲν ἢ μαθόντα παρ᾽ ἄλλω ἢ αὐτὸν ἐξευρόντα, ὧν ἀνεπιστάμων ἦσθα, ἐπιστάμονα γενέσθαι. τὸ μὲν ὦν μαθὲν παρ᾽ ἄλλω καὶ ἀλλότριον, τὸ δ᾽ ἐξευρὲν δι᾽ αὐταυτον καὶ ἴδιον· ἐξευρὲν δὲ μὴ ζατοῦντα ἄπορον καὶ σπάνιον, ζατοῦντα δὲ εὔπορον καὶ ῥᾴδιον, μὴ ἐπιστάμενον δὲ <λογίζεσθαι> ζητεῖν ἀδύνατον.

στάσιν μὲν ἔπαυσεν, ὁμόνοιαν δὲ αὔξησεν λογισμὸς εὑρεθείς. πλεονεξία τε γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι τούτου γενομένου καὶ ἰσότας ἔστιν· τούτῳ γὰρ περὶ τῶν συναλλαγμάτων διαλλασσόμεθα. διὰ τοῦτον οὖν οἱ πένητες λαμβάνοντι παρὰ τῶν δυναμένων, οἵ τε πλούσιοι διδόντι τοῖς δεομένοις, πιστεύοντες ἀμφότεροι διὰ τούτω τὸ ἶσον ἔξειν. κανὼν δὲ καὶ κωλυτὴρ τῶν ἀδικούντων <ἐὼν> τοὺς μὲν ἐπισταμένους λογίζεσθαι πρὶν ἀδικεῖν ἔπαυσε, πείσας ὅτι οὐ δυνασοῦνται λαθεῖν, ὅταν ἐπ᾽ αὐτὸν ἔλθωντι· τοὺς δὲ μὴ ἐπισταμένους, ἐν αὐτῷ δηλώσας ἀδικοῦντας, ἐκώλυσεν ἀδικῆσαι.[131]

For it is necessary to come to know those things which you did not know, either by learning from another or by discovering yourself. Learning is from another and belongs to another, while discovery is through oneself and belongs to oneself. Discovery, while not seeking, is difficult and infrequent but, while seeking, easy and frequent, but if one does not know <how to calculate>, it is impossible to seek.

Once calculation was discovered, it stopped discord and increased concord. For people do not want more than their share, and equality exists, once this has come into being. For by means of calculation we

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130 Huffman (2005) 169.
[131] DK 47 B3. The infinite λογίζεσθαι in line 5 is an emendation by Huffman (2005) 196-200. On the authenticity of this fragment see Huffman (2005) 183-184.

will seek reconciliation in our dealings with others. Through this, then, the poor receive from the powerful, and the wealthy give to the needy, both in the confidence that they will have what is fair on account of this. It serves as a standard and a hindrance to the unjust. It stops those who know how to calculate, before they commit injustice, persuading them that they will not be able to go undetected, whenever they appeal to it [sc. as a standard]. It hinders those who do not know how to calculate from committing injustice, having revealed them as unjust by means of it [i.e. calculation]'.[132]

Indeed, Harvey argues that here by means of the term λογισμός, whose most frequent meaning is 'calculation', Archytas intends to refer to geometric proportion.[133] However, as Huffman remarks, '[s]uch a usage would be unparalleled', since 'λογισμός never means simply proportion, let alone a specific sort of proportion such as geometric proportion', so it is more likely that here it indicates 'numerical calculation', being regarded by Archytas 'as including both of the proportions commonly applied to politics in the later tradition, the arithmetic and the geometric, and it is also conceivable that he thought other sorts of proportions were applicable as well'.[134]

Moreover, even though Archytas does appear to be interested in equality, his main focus is on λογισμός and its ability to produce ὁμόνοια. In this respect, Huffman has convincingly noted that, rather than identifying different kinds of equality 'to solve the problem of political discord', Archytas in reality operates 'in an environment where distinct aristocratic and democratic conceptions of equality have not yet become hardened positions'.[135] Therefore, what seems to emerge in Archytas' fragments is a 'unified conception of equality'.[136] So, despite showing a general concern for the idea of equality, the Pythagorean philosopher, unlike Isocrates, does not ultimately appear to be applying the distinction between different means to politics.

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[132] Trans. Huffman (2005) 183.
[133] Harvey (1965) 104-107.
[134] Huffman (2005) 204-206.
[135] Huffman (2005) 214-215.
[136] Huffman (2005) 214.

Conclusion

To sum up, at the end of the fifth and beginning of the fourth centuries the notion of equality, as we have seen in this section, started to be rethought and was then more fully revised in the middle of the fourth. Isocrates' discussion of the two kinds of equality thus fits in, and significantly contributes to, the broader debate around this theory which appears to be particularly vivid at the time. The fact that Isocrates, though consistent in supporting geometric equality throughout his corpus, associates it with monarchy in one speech and with democracy in another should not lead us to dismiss his usages as incongruent or as a proof of his alleged anti-democratic political agenda. Rather, the allusions to the existence of two equalities that we find in both *Nicocles* and *Areopagiticus* suggest that we should be cautious in labelling geometric equality as merely antithetical to democracy.

Furthermore, his discussion of the two kinds of equality also hints at the fact that the notion of the two equalities and the language related to it were still very unstable in the first half of the fourth century. In this respect, the Isocratean instances represent a transition point between the beginning of the fourth century, when there was not yet a sharp distinction of two opposite equalities, as the analysis of Archytas' fragments seems to reveal, and the middle of the fourth when a clearer distinction between geometric and arithmetic equality took hold. Hence, Isocrates engages with, and plays a crucial role in, the contemporary debate revolving around the two kinds of equality.

Overall, Isocrates' usages of this doctrine appear to challenge common assumptions which constantly identify arithmetic equality with democratic equality and couple geometric equality with non-democratic constitutions. What emerges from his references to the two equalities is indeed a much more variegated picture, which is free from oversimplified schemes and in which moral value becomes pre-eminent as exemplified by the assimilation of οἱ βέλτιστοι to οἱ εὖ φρονοῦντες in *Nicocles*.

4. Ἰσομοιρία

As we have seen throughout this chapter, the language used to express the idea of equality was particularly complex and variegated with different terms and expressions employed to convey various aspects and nuances of such a notion. In this section, I will focus on a specific instance of the vocabulary of equality, namely the concept of ἰσομοιρία, as its usage in Isocrates' works is a topic which deserves, in my view, special attention. Indeed, as we shall see, a thorough examination of the occurrences of the verb ἰσομοιρέω in his corpus will lead us to highlight the original way in which Isocrates employs this notion by bringing it into the very heart of his political thought.

The need for an in-depth investigation of the usage of ἰσομοιρία in the Isocratean corpus is accentuated by the fact that, to my knowledge, there are no studies devoted to providing a detailed examination of the role of this notion in Isocrates' works and, more generally, in the rest of Greek literature. As a matter of fact, while there is an extensive body of scholarship on equality and the language related to it in Greek political thought, the analysis of ἰσομοιρία and its cognates has been somehow neglected in this discussion.

An exception in this sense is represented by Borecký's essay which focuses on the expressions conveying the idea of equality understood in the sense of equality of shares. According to Borecký, 'the idea of equality as allotment or ownership of the same portion, which is so characteristic of the thought of the Classical period,' can be traced back to 'the life of the primitive tribe', namely to 'the collective distribution of common property among members of the same tribe', and it is thus possible to identify a 'continuity in development between the Homeric terms and the terms used in the Classical period'.[137] Indeed, Borecký reaches the following conclusion:

> In the Homeric poems can be observed the beginning of the terminological shift from the group of expressions (ἴση) μοῖρα, δαίομαι, λαγχάνω to the group of expressions ἴσον (μέρος), νέμω, δίδωμι and ἔχω. (…) In the shift from δαίομαι to νέμω, δίδωμι and from λαγχάνω to ἔχω the change was reflected from collective distribution of property

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[137] Borecký (1963) 45.

among the members of the tribe to distribution by the authority of the state and from the common property of the tribal collective to individual private ownership of the individual. With the rise of private ownership and the state, however, the old terms of collective distribution did not die out completely. They lived on, naturally only in some traditional fields, especially where either the konwledge [*sic*] of the original common ownership was preserved (inheritance, booty) or where the concept of an equal share which automatically falls to man without interference from some mediating powers lived on (for instance the equality of lots of death). This limitation could be seen particularly clearly in the occurrence of the words ἰσόμοιρος, ἰσομοιρία and ἰσομοιρέω.[138]

Therefore, Borecký's study lays the foundations for widening the analysis of ἰσομοιρία and its cognates. Nonetheless, it refers to the Isocratean instances of the verb ἰσομοιρέω only in passing, considering also that it does not focus solely on ἰσομοιρία. The present section thus aims to fill this gap by providing a careful examination of the meaning and significance of this concept within Isocrates' works. In doing so, I shall illustrate how he redefines and problematises the notion of ἰσομοιρία by applying it to international politics and, more specifically, to his discussion of Athens' hegemonic role over Greece. However, before turning to the usage of ἰσομοιρέω in Isocrates' writings, I shall provide an overview of the occurrences of ἰσομοιρία and its cognates from Homer until the fourth century with the purpose of positioning the Isocratean instances of this political value within their wider literary context.

Ἰσομοιρία from Homer to the fourth century

The earliest occurrences of the notion of ἰσομοιρία can be found in book XV of the *Iliad* when Poseidon claims to be 'equal' (ἴσος) to Zeus, who has ordered him not to interfere in the war anymore.[139] In order to demonstrate that he is on the same level with Zeus, Poseidon argues that he is 'held in equal honour' (ὁμότιμος) with Zeus since he himself, Zeus and Hades received each a portion

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[138] Borecký (1963) 60.
[139] Hom., *Iliad* XV, 167; 183.

of the world by lot.[140] Poseidon thus claims to be 'equal' (ἰσόμορος) and 'destined to the same share' (ὁμῇ πεπρωμένος αἴσῃ).[141] So, it is clear that in order to prove that he is on an equal footing with his brother Zeus, Poseidon emphasises, and makes use of, the concept of equality of share, which is conveyed not only by the phrase ὁμῇ πεπρωμένος αἴσῃ, but also, even more clearly, by the adjective ἰσόμορος (the Homeric form for ἰσόμοιρος) employed to indicate 'him who receives an equal share, a person with equal rights'.[142] Significantly, in these lines the distribution of the universe among the three sons of Cronos and Rea is described in terms very similar to those employed elsewhere by Homer to depict the division of food, booty, land and inheritance among men.[143] Therefore, as Borecký points out, 'in Homer the position of a god similarly to that of man in society is determined by the size of the share falling to him in primitive division. Equal rights are here expressed by equal shares'.[144]

While the *Iliad* provides us with the earliest occurrence of the adjectival form, the noun ἰσομοιρία first appears in our surviving literary sources in a fragment by Solon[145] preserved in [Aristotle], *Constitution of the Athenians* XII, 3. In the two final lines of this fragment Solon states that he does not want the 'good' (ἐσθλοί) 'to have an equal share' (ἰσομοιρίην ἔχειν) of the rich land with the 'bad' (κακοί), although the exact meaning of the term ἰσομοιρίη in this context is not easy to determine. Rhodes stresses that these closing lines of the fragment as well as the words used by [Aristotle] to introduce it (καὶ πάλιν δ᾽ ἑτέρωθί που λέγει περὶ τῶν διανείμασθαι τὴν γῆν βουλομένων) and his similar remark in *Constitution of the Athenians* XI, 2 on the expectations of the δῆμος confirm that 'there were extremists among the poor who wanted not merely the unencumbered possession of the land which they occupied but a redistribution of land'.[146]

Nonetheless, it is worth pointing out that, according to Rosivach, the interpretation of the fragment provided by [Aristotle], who considers these lines

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[140] Hom., *Iliad* XV, 185-195.
[141] Hom., *Iliad* XV, 209.
[142] Borecký (1963) 44.
[143] See, for instance, Hom., *Odyssey* XIV, 208-210 regarding the division of the inheritance among Castor's sons.
[144] Borecký (1963) 44.
[145] Fr. 34 West.
[146] Rhodes (1993) 174.

as evidence that Solon rejected the idea of confiscating the land of the wealthy and redistributing it to the poor, was incorrect as it was deeply influenced by the inextricably related fourth-century ideas of ἀναδασμός γῆς ('redistribution of land') and χρεῶν ἀποκοπαί ('abolition of debts').[147] Indeed, Rosivach argues that the κακοί referred to in final line of Solon's fragment should be identified not with the poor but with a small number of 'comparatively rich non-aristocrats' whose 'wealth was primarily landed wealth'.[148] In this respect, Rosivach might well be right in believing that the Solonian fragment, rather than reflecting 'the notion that Solon considered and rejected redistributing land to the poor' (as [Aristotle]'s interpretation seems to suggest), should be regarded as depicting his refusal to seize the land belonging to his political opponents in order to redistribute it to his supporters, that is, some 'wealthier landed non-aristocrats'.[149]

In the fifth century the notion of ἰσομοιρία appears, by means of its adjectival form, to be related to natural elements both in Empedocles and in Sophocles' *Electra*. More precisely, according to Aëtius, in explaining his theory of evolution Empedocles identifies four different stages. In the fourth stage animals and plants are derived no longer from homogeneous elements, like earth or water, but from one another. The species of all the animals belonging to the fourth generation are thus distinguished by the different mixtures of elements in them, and within this context the adjective ἰσόμοιρος is employed to characterise a specific category of these animals.[150] In Sophocles' *Electra* the adjective ἰσόμοιρος occurs in the very first words that the protagonist pronounces in the monody which she sings at dawn coming out of her palace and addressing the light of the sun and the air as follows: ὦ φάος ἁγνὸν | / καὶ γῆς ἰσόμοιρ᾽ ἀήρ.[151] The interpretation of these two lines, where the fact that

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[147] See Rosivach (1992) 154 (with reference to Isoc., *Panathenaicus* 259 for the two ideas of χρεῶν ἀποκοπαί and ἀναδασμός γῆς). See also Rosivach (1992) 155 who stresses that the first manifest allusion in our iterary evidence to the confiscation of the land of the wealthy in order to redistribute it to the poor is in Pl., *Republic* 565e-566a.

[148] Rosivach (1992) 156.

[149] Rosivach (1992) 157.

[150] DK 31 A72; cf. Aët., *Doxographia Graeca* 430.

[151] Soph., *Electra* 86-87. It is worth pointing out that, while καὶ γῆς ἰσόμοιρ᾽ ἀήρ represents the transmitted text, Finglass (2007) 122 accepts the conjecture καὐγῆς ἰσόμοιρ᾽ ἀήρ. Paley (1880) 119 not only suggests that the presence of the adjective in line 87 can be associated with 'the doctrine of equivalents i. e. equipoise or parallel extension' taught by the Ionic philosophy but he also makes a comparison with the use of ἰσόμοιρος in Aesch., *Libation Bearers* 319. Nevertheless, as Rose (1958) 148 points out, the reading which is usually adopted in this line of

Electra calls on the two natural elements clearly marks her solitude,[152] poses some issues. In this respect, Kamerbeek has noted that:

> The natural interpretation of γῆς ἰσόμοιρ᾽ ἀήρ is: ἴσην μοῖραν ἔχων τῆς γῆς <τῷ φάει> (…). In that case γῆ means: 'the world wherein we live' including its light and its air. The alternative interpretation is: 'and, earth's equal partner, air', ἰσόμοιρος then means that air has an equal share <in the universe> with earth, γῆς in the genitive denoting the partner.[153]

Nonetheless, regardless of the specific interpretation of the Sophoclean line in which ἰσόμοιρος occurs and provided that both options appear to be valid, what it is important to stress for the purpose of my analysis is the use of the concept of ἰσομοιρία to characterise natural elements and thus without a political meaning.

Conversely, the notion of ἰσομοιρία is employed primarily, although not exclusively, in a political sense in Thucydides, in whose work we find the highest number of fifth-century occurrences of the noun and its cognate verb. The first Thucydidean instance of ἰσομοιρία occurs in book V chapter 69. Here, on the eve of the battle of Mantinea (418) the Argives are encouraged by their commanders to fight for the upholding of 'their ancient supremacy and their once equal share in the Peloponnese' (ἡ παλαιά ἡγεμονία καὶ ἡ ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ ποτὲ ἰσομοιρία). In other words, in this passage the noun ἰσομοιρία refers to 'the equality of the three original Dorian kingdoms of the Peloponnese'.[154]

In addition, two instances of the verb ἰσομοιρέω can be found in book VI. The first one occurs in the speech delivered in 415 by Alcibiades, who, in trying to convince his fellow citizens that he deserves to lead the Athenian expedition against Sicily, argues that:

Aeschylus' *Libation Bearers* is not ἰσόμοιρον, but rather ἀντίμοιρον, 'which speaks not only of equality but of replacing darkness with light'.
[152] See Finglass (2007) 122.
[153] Kamerbeek (1974) 32.
[154] Gomme (1970) 117.

οὐδέ γε ἄδικον ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτῷ μέγα φρονοῦντα μὴ ἴσον εἶναι, ἐπεὶ καὶ ὁ κακῶς πράσσων πρὸς οὐδένα τῆς ξυμφορᾶς ἰσομοιρεῖ· ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ δυστυχοῦντες οὐ προσαγορευόμεθα, ἐν τῷ ὁμοίῳ τις ἀνεχέσθω καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν εὐπραγούντων ὑπερφρονούμενος, ἢ τὰ ἴσα νέμων τὰ ὁμοῖα ἀνταξιούτω.[155]

> And there is nothing wrong if someone with good cause for pride does not treat others as equals, just as those in poor state do not expect others to share their misfortunes. If we are in trouble, people shun us: by the same token no one should complain if the successful look down on him —or else he should give others equal treatment before claiming parity of esteem for himself.[156]

The second Thucydidean instance of the verb ἰσομοιρέω occurs in Athenagoras' speech where the idea of equality plays a key role. Indeed, in this passage we can find not only the infinitive ἰσονομεῖσθαι[157] (as we briefly saw in section 2 of this chapter), but also the infinitive ἰσομοιρεῖν.[158] More specifically, Athenagoras refers to the existence of three classes, namely 'the wealthy' (οἱ πλούσιοι), 'the wise' (οἱ ξυνετοί) and 'the many' (οἱ πολλοί), and states that in a democracy they have an equal share. On the contrary, Athenagoras continues, 'an oligarchy gives a share of the dangers to the many' (ὀλιγαρχία δὲ τῶν μὲν κινδύνων τοῖς πολλοῖς μεταδίδωσι), and, at the same time, when it comes to the benefits it does not just claim more than its due, but takes everything for itself.[159] Thus, this occurrence of the verb ἰσομοιρέω is particularly significant since it hints at the existence of a close link between the Syracusan democracy as described by Athenagoras and the notion of ἰσομοιρία.[160]

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[155] Thuc., VI 16, 4.
[156] Trans. Hammond (2009) 316.
[157] Thuc., VI 38, 5.
[158] Thuc., VI 39, 1.
[159] Thuc., VI 39, 2. See Hornblower (2010b) 415 for the use of ἰσομοιρέω in this passage (with a brief reference to the other Thucydidean occurrences of the verb and noun).
[160] On this passage see Bringmann (1965) 24 who has stressed that here ἰσομοιρία is depicted as a crucial element of democracy and at the same time as opposed to πλεονεξία (which is regarded in turn as a key feature of oligarchy). See also Mitchell (2016) 62 who highlights that 'the kind of equality Athenagoras then goes on to propose is not the quantitative equality suggested in rule by all, but the qualitative equality which seems to inform Pericles' meritocracy'. On the actual nature of the constitution of Syracuse in the second half of the fifth century see Rutter (2000).

Finally, the noun ἰσομοιρία occurs again in book VII when Thucydides describes the Athenian withdrawal after the battle in the Great Harbour of Syracuse in the summer of 413. More particularly, Thucydides states that 'the equal share of ills' (ἡ ἰσομοιρία τῶν κακῶν) among themselves entailed some relief for the Athenians, although it remained difficult for them to endure their present hardship especially when they considered the reverse of their fortune.[161] Therefore, in this passage ἰσομοιρία, like its cognate verb ἰσομοιρέω in Alcibiades' speech, is employed to describe 'the moral sharing of misfortunes'.[162] So, such occurrences of the noun and cognate verb can be interpreted as suggesting that in Thucydides the concept of ἰσομοιρία, while being employed politically, is not confined exclusively to a political meaning.

I shall now conclude this overview by focusing on the occurrences of the notion of ἰσομοιρία in the fourth century outside of the Isocratean corpus. In this regard, special attention has to be devoted to Xenophon who employs ἰσομοιρία and its cognates to refer to the equal sharing of honours and prizes. Of the eight occurrences of ἰσομοιρία and related terms in Xenophon's works one is in the *Apology*,[163] while all the other seven are concentrated in the *Cyropaedia* where they are used in relation to the discussion on how to distribute booty among soldiers.[164] Of particular interest are indeed the passages of this work in which Xenophon employs ἰσομοιρία and its cognates within the framework of Cyrus' meritocratic reorganisation of his army. As I have already mentioned in the previous section of this chapter, Cyrus, in discussing the best way to distribute rewards to the soldiers, suggests (with the support of his general Chrysantas) to reward each one according to their merit. Remarkably, in this context proportionate equality, and thus the idea of meritocracy based on it, are contrasted precisely with ἰσομοιρία. The opposition between proportionate equality and ἰσομοιρία is especially evident, for instance, in *Cyropaedia* II, 18 where ἰσομοιρεῖν is used by Chrysantas as a synonym for

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[161] Thuc., VII 75, 6; see Gomme (1970) 452 who highlights that it is likely that, rather than ἡ ἰσομοιρία, in this passage 'Thucydides wrote καὶ τῇ ἰσομοιρίᾳ or καὶ ἰσομοιρίᾳ'.
[162] Ostwald (1969) 178. See also Borecký (1963) 56.
[163] Xen., *Apology* 21.
[164] Xen., *Cyropaedia* II, 1, 31; II, 2, 18 (two occurrences); II, 2, 21; II, 2, 22; II, 3, 5; IV, 6, 12. See Borecký (1963) 59 who underlines the presence in Xenophon' *Cyropaedia* not only of a high number of occurrences of ἰσομοιρία and its cognates, but also of an interesting 'interchange between the old and the new expressions in the distribution of booty' since 'along with ἰσομοιρία we read πλέον ἔχειν and μεῖον ἔχειν (Xen. *Cyr.* 2, 2, 22) and along with ἰσομοιρεῖν we read ἴσον ἔχειν (Xen. *Cyr.* 2, 3, 5)'.

the unfair awarding of equal shares to both the bad and the good. Similarly, in the same passage the notion of ἰσομοιρία (expressed by means of the phrase ἰσομοίρους πάντας ποιεῖν) is opposed to the proper way of distributing prizes, namely examining every man's deeds and bestowing honour on each one commensurate with their services.

We can encounter references to ἰσομοιρία also in fourth-century oratory. Indeed, besides Isocrates himself, the notion of ἰσομοιρία occurs five times in Isaeus who uses twice the verb ἰσομοιρέω in *On the Estate of Cleonymus*[165] and three times the adjective ἰσόμοιρος with one occurrence in *On the Estate of Philoctemon*[166] and the other two in *On the Estate of Apollodorus*.[167] The verb occurs also three times in *Against Olympiodorus*[168] with respect to 'those who divide inherited property among themselves'.[169] Therefore, most fourth-century instances of ἰσομοιρία and its cognates, unlike the Isocratean occurrences, do not take on a political sense as their meaning remains confined to the division of inheritance. In this respect, while Xenophon does use the concept of ἰσομοιρία politically, Isocrates, as we shall see, is the only fourth-century author to apply the notion of ἰσομοιρία to the field of international relations.

Ἰσομοιρία in Isocrates

After this overview of the occurrences of ἰσομοιρία and its cognates in our extant literary evidence from Homer until the fourth century, we can now turn to the analysis of the two Isocratean usages. Interestingly, in both occurrences we find the infinitive aorist of the verb ἰσομοιρέω apparently used in a similar way though in two speeches that are, at least at first sight, very different from one another. The first occurrence can be found in *Panegyricus* (380) when Isocrates states that those speakers who encourage the Greeks to put an end to their hostilities against each other and to turn against the Persian king Artaxerxes II are certainly right, but they miss the crucial point. Indeed, Isocrates stresses, since some Greeks are under the influence of Athens while others under that of Sparta, the constitutions through which they manage their πόλεις have set them

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[165] Is., *On the Estate of Cleonymus* 2; 35.
[166] Is., *On the Estate of Philoctemon* 25.
[167] Is., *On the Estate of Apollodorus* 19; 22.
[168] [Dem.], *Against Olympiodorus* 19; 32; 38; for the grounds on which Demosthenes' authorship has been rejected see, for instance, Scafuro (2011) 336.
[169] Borecký (1963) 58.

apart. So, Isocrates argues that it is not reasonable to assume that the other πόλεις will do anything good 'by common consent' (κοινῇ) before Athens and Sparta, the two leading πόλεις, are reconciled.[170] Consequently, he who does not want merely to make a 'declamation' (ἐπίδειξις), but aims to accomplish something should seek the arguments which will persuade both Athens and Sparta 'to have an equal share with each other' (ἰσομοιρῆσαι πρὸς ἀλλήλας), 'to divide the supremacies' (τὰς ἡγεμονίας διελέσθαι) and to gain from the Persians the 'advantages' (πλεονεξίαι) which they currently desire to get for themselves from the other Greeks.[171]

It is worth pointing out that a very similar idea to the one expressed in this section of *Panegyricus* can be found in *To Philip* 9 where by using almost the same phrasing Isocrates states that in *Panegyricus* itself he had already advocated that Athens could be at peace only if all the greatest πόλεις would put an end to their mutual hostilities, carry the war into Asia and get from the Persians the 'advantages' (πλεονεξίαι, once again) that they now think it proper to gain for themselves at the expense of the Greeks. This syntactical similarity points towards a thematic affinity between the two speeches despite their seemingly irreconcilable difference in content. Another hint in this same direction is that the second occurrence of the notion of ἰσομοιρία in the Isocratean corpus appears precisely in *To Philip*, as we shall see.

But let us now focus on the use of ἰσομοιρέω in the above-quoted passage from *Panegyricus* where Isocrates' reference to the notion of ἰσομοιρία in section 17 provides some interesting points for reflection. First of all, it is worth noting that the meaning of the verb ἰσομοιρέω in this passage is not explicitly clarified. Indeed, Isocrates employs the phrase ἰσομοιρῆσαι πρὸς ἀλλήλας to allude to the need for Athens and Sparta to share the leadership in the war against Persia but, as Usher underlines, he 'does not define the areas in which the shares should be equal'.[172] In this respect, the meaning of the verb ἰσομοιρέω, which is probably left intentionally rather vague, seems to be closely

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[170] Isoc., *Panegyricus* 15-16. On section 16 see Buchner (1958) 29 who points out that a similar idea of Greece divided into two different camps (one under the influence of the Athenians, the other under that of the Spartans) can be found also, for instance, in Xen., *Hellenica* VI 3,14.
[171] Isoc., *Panegyricus* 17.
[172] Usher (1990) 154. See also Buchner (1958) 30 who stresses that ἰσομοιρῆσαι πρὸς ἀλλήλας should be interpreted as meaning '»gleichen Anteil haben«, »gleiches Recht haben«, »gleichgestellt sein mit jemand«' and at the same time acknowledges that Isocrates' phrase is in itself very general as 'er besagt nicht, worin man gleichgestellt sein soll'.

linked to, and can somehow be clarified by, the other two key words that we can identify in the same passage, namely ἡγεμονία and πλεονεξία.[173] This is why a detailed examination of the notion of ἰσομοιρία in *Panegyricus* cannot be separated from an in-depth discussion of the meaning that ἡγεμονία and πλεονεξία take on in this text.

In this regard, it is worth highlighting that the structure of *Panegyricus* 17 appears to be tripartite. The three parts which form this section are closely interrelated and in a certain sense complementary to one another.[174] Furthermore, I would stress that in each of the three main parts which form *Panegyricus* 17 we can single out a key word, precisely ἰσομοιρία, ἡγεμονία and πλεονεξία, respectively. Thus, on the basis of the tripartite structure of this passage, I will carry out my investigation by examining, first of all, the notion of ἰσομοιρία in conjunction with that of ἡγεμονία as the two concepts are closely associated with one another. I shall then focus on the third key concept, namely πλεονεξία, and its link with ἰσομοιρία, which appears to be somehow more complex than the one between ἰσομοιρία and ἡγεμονία and which can thus give rise to different interpretations

So, beginning with the analysis of ἰσομοιρία in association with ἡγεμονία, it is worth pointing out that, while, as I have mentioned above, the meaning of ἰσομοιρῆσαι is rather vague, the sense of the phrase τὰς ἡγεμονίας διελέσθαι 'seems clearer - that Athens and Sparta should each enjoy a separate command, though again he does not here or elsewhere define the limits of each command'.[175] In addition, the use of both the verb ἰσομοιρέω and the noun ἡγεμονίαι can be interpreted as alluding to Isocrates' support of a joint leadership of Greece as part of his appeal for Panhellenic unity. Indeed, Isocrates has often been regarded as a champion of Panhellenism also in the light of this passage from *Panegyricus* where he appears to depict the need for Athens and Sparta to share leadership as an essential step towards unifying all Greek forces in the campaign against the Persians.[176] In this respect, it is worth

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[173] See Bringmann (1965) 31-32.
[174] As Buchner (1958) 32 puts it, the three key concepts which we can identify in *Panegyricus* 17 are: 'Herstellung des Gleichgewichts und der Gleichberechtigung zwischen Athen und Sparta, gemeinsame Führung durch diese beiden Städte, und zwar in einem Krieg, den sie zusammen gegen die Barbaren unternehmen sollen'. See also Buchner (1958) 34.
[175] Usher (1990) 154.
[176] On the concept of Panhellenism in the Isocratean corpus see, for instance, Bloom (1955) 60-134. For a reappraisal of this theme see Pownall (2007).

pointing out that, as Mitchell underlines, the theme of joint leadership of Greece against the barbarians, which appears to be a topic very dear to the Athenians, most probably goes back to the time when Athens assumed the leadership of the Delian League, and became even more frequent and relevant in the late fifth century and then in the fourth century.[177] Therefore, the Isocratean use of the verb ἰσομοιρέω in *Panegyricus* 17 fits into this Panhellenic trend.

Nonetheless, Isocrates, who has plausibly in mind mainly Gorgias' *Olympic Speech* and *Funeral Oration* as well as Lysias' *Olympic Speech*, attempts to distinguish himself from previous speakers who addressed the topic by claiming, as we saw, that while they were right in urging the Greeks to put an end to mutual conflicts and to come together against Persia, they made the crucial mistake of not indicating the way in which all this had to be achieved.[178] So, the reference to ἰσομοιρία in *Panegyricus* 17 would seem, at least at first reading, to confirm the widespread portrait of Isocrates as a convinced supporter of Panhellenism.

However, in the next section of the speech Isocrates strikingly appears to change his position. Indeed, in *Panegyricus* 18 he claims that, while Athens can be easily induced to adopt joint leadership in the war against Persia, it is much more difficult to persuade the Spartans since they wrongly believe that it is their ancestral right to lead the Greeks. However, Isocrates continues, if someone could show to the Spartans that this 'honour' (τιμή), namely hegemony over Greece, belongs to the Athenians rather than to them, perhaps they might stop arguing about this issue and start focusing on their 'advantage' (συμφέρον). Thus, here we can notice a rather surprising shift from the emphasis on joint leadership over Hellas to a programme which promotes sole Athenian leadership leaving the Spartans out, or at least at the margin, of the picture. In other words, Isocrates appears to turn rather suddenly and in a seemingly inconsistent manner from encouraging concord between Athens and Sparta and their joint leadership over the Greeks to supporting an Athenian-only hegemony over Greece.

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[177] See Mitchell (2007) 14-15. On the theme of joint leadership see also Buchner (1958) 31. On the development of the Panhellenic ideal see also, for instance, Jaeger (1944) 72-74.
[178] See Kessler (1911) 8 who also points out that Isocrates detects that 'eine Einigung aller Hellenen nur möglich war in der Form eines Staatenbundes, einer συμμαχία, unter einer starken Vormach'.

Indeed, there has been much debate among scholars on the real aim of Isocrates in *Panegyricus* and, more particularly, on whether or not he really supports dual hegemony. Some scholars, such as Blass, believe that Isocrates' primary goal is to promote the sharing of leadership over Greece between Athens and Sparta in the campaign against Persia, and thus interpret *Panegyricus* 17 as referring to the division of commands between the Spartans and the Athenians with the attribution of hegemony over sea to Athens and command on land to Sparta.[179] On the contrary, other scholars, by arguing that Isocrates' main aim in *Panegyricus* consists in showing Athens' pre-eminence, regard passages like section 17 as places where Isocrates disguises his actual view under the mask of joint leadership. For instance, according to Kessler, since in 380 Sparta was more powerful than Athens, Isocrates does not dare support openly Athenian leadership over Greece and, as a consequence, in section 17 he conceals the true purpose of his speech by pretending to promote the sharing of hegemony between Athens and Sparta; nevertheless, Kessler goes on to argue that in some other passages, such as section 18, we can glimpse at the actual opinion of Isocrates, who, rather than genuinely supporting dual hegemony, is implicitly addressing his speech against Sparta.[180]

In this context, particular attention has to be paid to Buchner's study *Der Panegyrikos des Isokrates* according to which the speech is constituted by two different parts, one epideictic represented by sections 20-128 and the other symbouleutic consisting of sections 133-186. More precisely, Buchner claims that the epideictic part includes praise of Athens on the model of the ἐπιτάφιοι and is designed to show that the Athenians alone are entitled to the hegemony over Greece, whereas in the symbouleutic part, which is modelled on the speeches traditionally delivered at Panhellenic gatherings, Isocrates advocates joint leadership.[181] Therefore, the epideictic segment can be regarded as a

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[179] See Blass (1892) 86-87, who while underlining Isocrates' variable attitude towards Sparta argues that because of the main goal of the speech, namely urging the Greeks to reconcile with one another, Isocrates is careful in criticising Sparta; see also Blass (1892) 255-256.
[180] See Kessler (1911) 9-10. See also Kessler (1911) 12-13 who presents *Panegyricus* as a Panhellenic speech from which we can infer the 'panhellenische Mission' assigned by Isocrates to Athens, and suggests that what Isocrates is actually urging the Greeks to reach is 'die Einigung Griechenlands unter der Form eines Staatenbundes' based on 'eine gemäßigte Demokratie im Vorort Athen und die Autonomie aller Mitglieder'.
[181] Buchner (1958) 8. See also Blass (1892) 255 according to whom Isocrates 'verflicht so mit der symbuleutischen Rede, der auch der Nachweis über die Hegemonie angehört, eine Lobrede'. Thus, Blass (1892) 256 describes *Panegyricus* as a 'μεικτὸς λόγος, ohne indes seinen eingetlichen Charakter als symbuleutische Rede zu verlieren'.

mere means to achieve the goal of the symbouleutic one. In other words, according to Buchner's interpretation, Isocrates, being well aware of Athens' inferiority to Sparta after 404, and even more so after the Peace of Antalcidas, promotes sole Athenian hegemony in the hope of convincing the Spartans to share leadership over Greece with the Athenians and thus of obtaining for Athens at least joint leadership.

Among those scholars who believe that Isocrates is aiming mainly at Athens' sole hegemony, Buchner's theory, in particular, has been favourably received.[182] Nonetheless, as Porciani points out, Buchner's clear-cut division of the speech into an epideictic part praising Athens and a symbouleutic one based on a Panhellenic programme and designed to support the splitting up of hegemony between Athens and Sparta appears to be ultimately too schematic and rigid.[183] Moreover, Porciani argues that Isocrates' emphasis on the superiority of the Athenians when it comes to seapower[184] should not be interpreted as an attempt to scale down Athens' hegemony reconciling it with the programme of joint leadership proposed in the *incipit*; rather, it is designed to support Athens' claim to leadership by stressing that the Athenians deserve exclusive hegemony over Greece precisely because of the superiority of their seapower.[185] In this respect, Porciani suggests that the reference to joint leadership in the beginning of the speech and then again in the epilogue represents a rhetorical means employed by Isocrates to obtain the favour of his imaginary Panhellenic audience and thus gradually persuade them of the need to accept Athens' leadership.[186] While I believe that Porciani is right in explaining the shift from dual Athenian/Spartan leadership to Athenian-only hegemony in the perspective of a rhetorical strategy, this should not lead to conclude that Isocrates is being insincere in the *incipit* as Porciani seems to

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[182] See, for instance, Seck (1976).

[183] See Porciani (1996) 34.

[184] See especially Isoc., *Panegyricus* 21.

[185] See Porciani (1996) 32-33. Porciani (1996) 38-39 n. 32 argues that in Isoc., *Panegyricus* 133-182, even though concord among Greeks is a key element, there is no reference to the theme of an equal division of commands between Athens and Sparta (unlike in the beginning and the epilogue of the speech); rather the kind of ὁμόνοια which Isocrates promotes throughout these sections implies the acceptance by all Greeks (including the Spartans) of Athenian hegemony.

[186] See Porciani (1996) 37-39. See also Porciani (1996) 36 who underlines that to the shift from joint leadership to sole Athenian hegemony corresponds a considerable shift from a Panhellenic audience to an Athenian-only one as it is clearly shown, for instance, by the use of ἡμῖν in section 15 and in section 16: in the former ἡμῖν designates all Greeks whereas in the latter (and throughout the rest of the speech) it is employed by Isocrates to refer only to the Athenians.

imply when he describes the beginning of *Panegyricus* (in particular section 17) as 'un'apertura non del tutto sincera'.[187] Indeed, in embracing Porciani's theory we should avoid reference to the idea of insincerity as the use of such a concept in this context is misleading and rather unsuitable.

After having focused on the meaning of the notions of ἰσομοιρία and ἡγεμονία as well as their link with one another in *Panegyricus* 17, I shall now devote special attention to the third key point present in this passage, namely πλεονεξία, and its relationship with the verb ἰσομοιρέω, even more so as the close link which emerges here between the two terms has often been overlooked. Furthermore, the fact that in *Panegyricus* 17 the concept of ἰσομοιρία appears to be somehow associated with that of πλεονεξία deserves special attention also because the two notions, as we will see, are closely related even in the second occurrence of ἰσομοιρέω in the Isocratean corpus, that is, in *To Philip* 39. In this respect, Bringmann argues that in *Panegyricus* 17, as in the passage from *To Philip*, Isocrates makes use of ἰσομοιρέω as a 'Gegenbegriff' opposed to πλεονεκτέω.[188] However, while in *To Philip* 39 the two concepts are clearly opposed to one another, here the relation between ἰσομοιρία and πλεονεξία is in my view somehow different. Indeed, in *Panegyricus* 17 I would not regard the two concepts of ἰσομοιρία and πλεονεξία as antonyms in sharp contrast with one another.

In other words, provided that in *Panegyricus* 17 ἰσομοιρία is certainly depicted in a positive sense as a desirable and crucial aim, it seems to me that here Isocrates presents in a negative light not what πλεονεξία in its plural form refers to, namely the material advantages (in terms of both land and wealth) that Athens and Sparta wish to get, but the fact that both πόλεις seek to gain those advantages at the expense of the other Greeks rather than to the detriment of the barbarians. In this regard, while in both *Areopagiticus* 60 and *Panathenaicus* 178 πλεονεξία is opposed to the idea of equality,[189] this is not the case in *Panegyricus* 17 where the concept of πλεονεξία is not in itself negative and where, in my view, it is not possible to detect a sharp contrast between ἰσομοιρία and πλεονεξία. Rather, the material advantages that both Athens and Sparta seek and that consist most probably in 'aisance économique

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[187] Porciani (1996) 37.
[188] Bringmann (1965) 31. See also Bringmann (1965) 24. Similarly, Borecký (1963) believes that the notion of πλεονεξία is contrasted with that of ἰσομοιρία in both Isocratean passages.
[189] See section 2 of the present chapter.

ou installation de colonies'[190] are highly desirable; what is wrong is the way in which they have tried to achieve them.

Nonetheless, the link between the notion of ἰσομοιρία and that of πλεονεξία does indeed emerge also in *To Philip* 39, and in this case the two concepts appear to be clearly opposed to one another. Indeed, in replying to an hypothetical objection which could be raised against the fact that he is encouraging Philip to unify the Greek πόλεις in a campaign against Persia, Isocrates states:

> Τάχ' οὖν ἄν τις ἐνστῆναι τοῖς εἰρημένοις τολμήσειε, λέγων ὡς ἐπιχειρῶ σε πείθειν ἀδυνάτοις ἐπιτίθεσθαι πράγμασιν· οὔτε γὰρ Ἀργείους φίλους ἄν ποτε γενέσθαι Λακεδαιμονίοις οὔτε Λακεδαιμονίους Θηβαίοις, οὔθ' ὅλως τοὺς εἰθισμένους ἅπαντα τὸν χρόνον πλεονεκτεῖν οὐδέποτ' ἂν ἰσομοιρῆσαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους.

> So, someone might perhaps dare to object to the things I have said stating that I attempt to persuade you to set yourself to impossible deeds; indeed the Argives would never become friends with the Lacedaemonians, nor the Lacedaemonians with the Thebans, and on the whole those who have always been accustomed to have more than their due could never have an equal share with each other.

Then in the following section Isocrates goes on to say that he himself believes that nothing of what he had suggested could be accomplished at the time when either Athens or Sparta held power (ἐδυνάστευε) over Greece as each of these two πόλεις could have easily prevented any attempt to put his instructions into practice. However, Isocrates acknowledges that he has had a change of heart and has thus come to a different conclusion. Indeed, since all πόλεις have been levelled by misfortunes (οἶδα γὰρ ἁπάσας ὡμαλισμένας ὑπὸ τῶν συμφορῶν), they will prefer 'the advantages coming from concord' (αἱ ἐκ τῆς ὁμονοίας ὠφέλειαι) to 'the gains derived from the deeds accomplished at that time' (αἱ ἐκ τῶν τότε πραττομένων πλεονεξίαι).[191]

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[190] Bouchet (2007) 483.
[191] Isoc., *To Philip* 40.

Thus, it is important to focus, first of all, on the opposition between ἰσομοιρία and πλεονεξία which comes to light in section 39. Here the verb ἰσομοιρέω is contrasted with πλεονεκτέω in a mutually exclusive relationship, in the sense that according to Isocrates the fact that the Greeks have always focused on their own selfish interests makes it impossible for them to share alike with each other. So, while in *Panegyricus* 17 Isocrates criticises how Athens and Sparta attempt to get material advantages, not those advantages themselves (which he encourages them to seek), in *To Philip* 39 ἰσομοιρία and πλεονεξία are depicted as two opposite poles incompatible with one another, with ἰσομοιρία representing the positive one and πλεονεξία the negative. The pejorative sense that πλεονεξία can take on emerges also in the following section of *To Philip* where the selfish gains that came from past actions of the Greeks are contrasted with the mutual advantages that would arise from concord among them. Thus, πλεονεξία and its cognates are employed by Isocrates in a complex and ambivalent way.

Indeed, Bouchet, who has devoted specific attention to the examination of the usages of πλεονεξία in the Isocratean corpus,[192] has argued that the singular form, which is employed more frequently than the plural, has mostly a negative meaning (apart from a few cases in some of the latest speeches where it bears a positive sense), while the plural πλεονεξίαι has generally a positive meaning (except in *Areopagiticus*). Bouchet has certainly the merit of providing us with a much needed and detailed analysis of the manifold meanings that πλεονεξία can take on in Isocrates' works highlighting the complexity and originality of his usages of this notion especially when compared to fifth- and other fourth-century instances of the term and its cognates. Nonetheless, when it comes to the occurrences of the concept of πλεονεξία in *To Philip* 39-40, I would note, first of all, that Bouchet does not examine in depth the role of πλεονεκτέω in section 39. Hence, on the basis of Bouchet's correct remark that this verb does not have in itself a pejorative sense but rather conveys either a positive meaning or a negative one depending on the different contexts (just like the noun πλεονεξία and its cognate adjective),[193] I would stress that πλεονεκτεῖν in *To Philip* 39 represents an instance precisely of the negative sense that the

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[192] See Bouchet (2007).
[193] See Bouchet (2007) 487.

term at times conveys in Isocrates, even more so as it appears to be used as an antonym to ἰσομοιρῆσαι.

Additionally, although Bouchet does devote particular attention to the occurrence of πλεονεξία in *To Philip* 40, I do not agree with him when he argues that in this passage there is no antithesis between πλεονεξίαι and ὠφέλειαι. More specifically, Bouchet claims that it is not possible to state that here there is 'une connotation méliorative dans ὠφελείας et, au contraire, dépréciative dans πλεονεξίας', as in his view 'l'opposition est plutôt à chercher du côté de leur environment': while ὠφέλειαι 'apparaît préférable, donc positif, parce qu'il est lié à la concorde, une idée largement développée par Isocrate, et désigne toute sorte d'intérêts', πλεονεξίαι 'qui n'est pas en lui-même négatif, se trouve associé à une réalité qui ne peut plus exister en 346, celle d'un impérialisme, d'une ἀρχή, d'ailleurs présentée de façon bien allusive'.[194]

Bouchet is certainly right in stressing the ambivalent meaning that πλεονεξία conveys in the Isocratean corpus depending on the different contexts and thus the fact that the concept (unlike, for instance, in Plato and Aristotle) is not *per se* negative. Nevertheless, it seems to me that in *To Philip* 40 the term can plausibly be regarded as having a pejorative sense that is corroborated, and even somehow accentuated, by the positive meaning attributed to ὠφέλειαι. Moreover, the negative sense which πλεονεξία takes on here corresponds to the pejorative meaning conveyed by πλεονεκτέω in the previous section, where this verb is manifestly contrasted with ἰσομοιρέω.[195] Therefore, the Isocratean use of the notion of πλεονεξία in *To Philip* 39-40 appears to be rather different compared to the meaning of πλεονεξίαι in *Panegyricus* 17. Indeed, if we compare *Panegyricus* 17 with *To Philip* 39, we can note a difference not only, as we have just seen, in the meaning of the notion of πλεονεξία, but also in the use of the concept of ἰσομοιρία.

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[194] Bouchet (2007) 486.
[195] I am thus not entirely persuaded by Bouchet's distinction of the meanings of πλεονεξία depending on whether the term is used in the singular or plural form, since this criterion appears to be in some cases a bit too rigid (besides the fact that such a theory can be applied obviously only to the occurrences of the noun and not to those of the verb and the adjective). Indeed, in following blindly this kind of criterion we might run the risk of caging the occurrences of the term in rigid patterns, thus forgetting, as Bouchet (2007) 487 himself points out, that Isocrates' usages of the notion of πλεονεξία are far from being schematic. Instead, the second criterion that Bouchet employs, namely the differentiation of the meanings of πλεονεξία and its cognates according to whether they are used in the context of private life or in that of international relationships seems to me much more convincing and valid.

Nonetheless, there are, at the same time, some similarities between the two passages. Let us focus, first of all, on such resemblances. In the first place, it is worth pointing out that the verb ἰσομοιρέω in *To Philip* 39 is employed in a phrase very similar, at least at first sight, to the one that we find in *Panegyricus* 17: in both cases we encounter the infinitive aorist active followed by πρός and the accusative plural of ἀλλήλων (feminine in *Panegyricus* referring to Athens and Sparta, masculine in *To Philip* indicating the Greeks). This syntactical similarity can be interpreted as hinting at the existence of a basic thematic affinity between the two texts. Indeed, a crucial similarity in terms of content between *Panegyricus* 17 and *To Philip* 39 lies in the fact that both occurrences of ἰσομοιρέω are related to external politics as the concept of ἰσομοιρία is applied to the relations between πόλεις. In this regard, in both speeches ἰσομοιρία among the Greeks is presented in a positive light not only as a desirable goal but even as an indispensable prerequisite for leading a successful campaign against Persia, one of Isocrates' key topics. Concurrently, while in both passages we find a link between the notions of ἰσομοιρία and πλεονεξία, there is a clear difference not only in the meaning of πλεονεξία itself (which, as we saw, in *To Philip* 39, unlike in *Panegyricus* 17, takes on a derogatory sense) but also, as a result, in the kind of relationship between the two concepts. Indeed, whereas in *Panegyricus* ἰσομοιρία and πλεονεξία are not at all opposed to one another, in *To Philip* 39 the two ideas are clearly antithetical.

Moreover, in comparing the two Isocratean occurrences of the verb ἰσομοιρέω it comes to light that, although the phrase used in *To Philip* appears to be very similar to that which we find in *Panegyricus* 17, the context in which the concept of ἰσομοιρία is employed is rather different. In *Panegyricus* Isocrates claims that it is definitely possible to find valid arguments to persuade Athens and Sparta to share alike with each other and that, once they have achieved ἰσομοιρία, the other πόλεις will follow the example of the two leading ones. Isocrates does not deny the difficulties that achieving ἰσομοιρία involves and shows himself to be aware of the complexity of such a task. Nevertheless, even when he expresses doubts on the feasibility of convincing the Spartans to share alike with the Athenians, Isocrates still relies on Athens' hegemony over Greece and its ability to lead the Greeks against Persia. Conversely, in *To Philip*, written in 346 shortly after the Peace of Philocrates, ἰσομοιρία is not

anymore a goal that the Greek πόλεις can achieve on their own, not even under Athens' leadership. In fact, Isocrates specifies that ἰσομοιρία was an impossible result to get at the time of Athens' (or Sparta's) hegemony; only now that the Greeks have been brought down to the same level by their misfortunes and that, Isocrates hopes, they have learnt the lesson from their previous mistakes, will they realise the necessity of stopping their mutual warfare and sharing alike with one another. Ἰσομοιρία is still attainable but it can be achieved exclusively by Philip as, in Isocrates' opinion, the Macedonian king is the only one able to 'reconcile' (διαλλάξαι)[196] the Greeks and then lead their unified forces against Persia. Indeed, Isocrates, who by 346 might well have reached the conclusion that Athens' military leadership in a campaign against the Persians was no longer a realistic option, regards Philip's leadership 'as a way for a Greek to lead the Greeks'[197] against the barbarians.

In this respect, I nonetheless agree with Bouchet, who, in his study of ἡγεμονία and related terms in the Isocratean corpus argues that in the 350s Isocrates puts into place a shift from promoting Athens' military leadership over Greece to emphasising its cultural pre-eminence.[198] More specifically, through an in-depth examination of the language of hegemony employed in *To Philip* Bouchet shows that when Isocrates turns to the king of Macedon he expects Philip to be merely a military chief, not a political leader, and still hopes that Athens will be able to maintain a prominent role.[199] In particular, in noting that, of the five occurrences of ἡγεμονία and its cognates in the speech, only one refers to Philip himself, namely the participle future ἡγεσόμενος in section 97, Bouchet observes that here the verb does not imply the attribution to Philip of a leading role in a political or cultural sense, since it refers exclusively to the military field; this is the case also, Bouchet continues, for the meaning of ἁπάντων in the subsequent phrase βουλευσόμενον περὶ ἁπάντων that we find in this same section of *To Philip*.[200] In other words, Isocrates, far from suggesting that Greece should be subject to the Macedonian king, confines Philip to the role of military leader of the Greeks in the campaign against Persia by regarding

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[196] Papillon (2004) 74.
[197] Isoc., *To Philip* 41.
[198] Bouchet (2014), on which see Chapter 1 section 3.
[199] See Bouchet (2014) 86.
[200] Bouchet (2014) 87-88.

him as a προστάτης, that is a guarantor of ὁμόνοια among the Greeks.[201] Moreover, on the basis of this constant Athenocentric attitude, Bouchet also points out that we should reconsider Isocrates' Panhellenism and scale it down by avoiding the need to regard the Athenian orator as 'l'avocat de l'union et encore moins de l'unité grecques'[202] since 'son panhéllenisme ne suppose pas une égalité des cités grecques, mais il revendique l'existence d'une cité prééminente, d'une capitale politique, militaire, économique et culturelle, dans la guerre comme dans la paix'.[203]

Therefore, I would suggest that in order to understand more fully the role of ἰσομοιρία in Isocrates (an aspect that is not investigated by Bouchet) we should link the examination of Isocrates' usages of this concept with Bouchet's analysis of the language, and thus the notion, of hegemony in the corpus. In this regard, the two occurrences of ἰσομοιρέω can be interpreted in relation to, and in the light of, the semantic shift in the meaning of hegemony which, as Bouchet argues, we can identify in the Isocratean works starting from the middle of the fourth century. Indeed, an in-depth analysis of the use of ἰσομοιρέω in *Panegyricus* 17 in conjunction with the wider context of the speech hints at Isocrates' confidence in Athens' military superiority and its capacity to lead a successful campaign against the barbarians. The occurrence of the same verb in *To Philip* 39 reveals, on the other hand, that ἰσομοιρία is still positive and essential in order to wage war against Persia, but can now be achieved only under Philip's leadership, not Athens'.

Nonetheless, as Bouchet has shown, if we look more broadly at the usage of the language of hegemony throughout *To Philip*, it becomes clear that, rather than embracing or promoting the idea that Athens (and the rest of Greece) should be subject to the political domination of Philip, Isocrates wishes the king of Macedon to be simply a εὐεργέτης of the Greeks, thus confining his leading role to the military area.[204] So, within this framework, Isocrates not only employs the notion of ἰσομοιρία in a political sense but even expands its range of application to foreign politics. In this respect, the concept of ἰσομοιρία represents a red thread in the broader context of his views on international

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[201] Isoc., *To Philip* 16; see Bouchet (2014) 88-90 who offers a thorough analysis of the meaning of the verb προστῆναι in this Isocratean passage.
[202] Bouchet (2014) 193.
[203] Bouchet (2014) 194. Cf. Too (1995) 130-149.
[204] See Bouchet (2014) 95.

relations from *Panegyricus* to *To Philip*: in both 380 and 346 it emerges as the *conditio sine qua non* to wage war successfully against Persia while pointing towards the existence of a fundamental thematic affinity between the two speeches that ultimately lies in Isocrates' steady Athenocentric attitude.

Conclusion

In brief, I would highlight that Isocrates' usage of the concept of ἰσομοιρία acquires particular significance within his political thought while also standing out compared with previous and contemporary occurrences of the noun and its cognates in our extant literary sources. Indeed, the two Isocratean occurrences of the verb ἰσομοιρέω are clearly related to politics. More precisely, they are both employed to refer to foreign affairs with specific reference to the overarching theme of the Panhellenic campaign against Persia. Nonetheless, such a theme goes hand in hand with Isocrates' profound interest in Athens' position abroad. In this regard, the analysis of the uses of the concept of ἰσομοιρία in the corpus can offer us a special lens through which to examine, and somehow reconsider, his ideas on international affairs with a particular focus on Athenian hegemony (a topic to which I shall return in the next chapter).

So, the way in which Isocrates employs the notion of ἰσομοιρία fits into his remarkable (re)use of the rich vocabulary of equality, a key feature of his usage of political, especially democratic, language, which I have already argued for in the discussion of the occurrences of ἰσονομία and of the theory of the two kinds of equality in the corpus. In other words, although the instances of the notion of ἰσομοιρία in Isocrates could seem to be irrelevant from a quantitative point of view, at a closer look it emerges how Isocrates employs the idea of equality of shares in a particularly original way: he redefines, so to say, the concept by applying it to external politics and thus effectively expanding its field of action, within the perspective of his constant Athenocentric interest in international relations.

5. Conclusions

My analysis of Isocrates' usages of the notion and vocabulary of equality has moved through three specific instances: ἰσονομία, the theory of the two kinds of equality and ἰσομοιρία. Taken together, the examination of these three case studies reveals that Isocrates not only is deeply interested in the idea of equality in its various aspects and nuances, but also problematises and reshapes the vocabulary, and thus the concepts, related to it in order to convey some key ideas of his political thought. Thus, Isocrates appears to be actively engaged (rather like Xenophon) in the debate around equality and the language connected with it, a debate that was particularly vivid precisely in the first half of the fourth century when the notion itself started to be rethought.

In addition, it is important to note that the problematisation that Isocrates puts into effect is not limited to the idea of equality and the language related to it since it involves also the connection existing between this notion and other key-words (and thus the concepts that they convey) in Greek political thought. For instance, the occurrences of ἰσονομία reveal that he challenges the deeply rooted association between ἰσονομία and δημοκρατία in order not to reject it in the perspective of a supposedly anti-democratic agenda but to rethink and consolidate such a close link. Furthermore, in alluding to the theory of the two kinds of equality Isocrates redefines the meaning of οἱ βέλτιστοι in light of a notion at the very heart of his whole corpus, namely εὖ φρονεῖν. In this sense, he suggests the identification of οἱ βέλτιστοι/οἱ χρηστοί with οἱ εὖ φρονοῦντες. Isocrates also problematises the relationship between equality and πλεονεξία in the sense that, although he tends to oppose these two notions with one another, he does not generalise this contrast. Indeed, Isocrates' manifold uses of the idea of equality as well as of πλεονεξία and its cognates throughout his corpus show that he is constantly exploiting, and in a certain sense recovering or even bringing to light, the intrinsic malleability and complexity characterising these terms, and the concepts that they convey, in Greek political discourse. Finally, in the specific case of ἰσομοιρία Isocrates extends the range of application of the notion of equality even beyond the boundaries of internal politics in connection with his interest in (re)affirming Athens' leading role within the Hellenic world.

Overall, his usage of the rich vocabulary of equality perfectly exemplifies how Isocrates rethinks, and stretches the boundaries of, political, especially democratic, language. Significantly, he does not do so arbitrarily and with the narrow-minded purpose of promoting an alleged oligarchic agenda. Rather, he retrieves, highlights and further problematises the ductility embedded in this terminology in order to engage with the wider contemporary debate around these notions as well as in light of his steady interest in consolidating Athens' position abroad. The crucial role that such an interest plays in the Isocratean corpus is hinted at by his usages of the notion of ἰσομοιρία and shall emerge even more clearly in the following chapter.

Chapter 4
Leadership within and by Athens

1. Introduction

Throughout his whole corpus Isocrates appears to show a deep interest in political leadership comparable to that which we find in Xenophon's works. However, while Xenophon's interest in this topic has long been acknowledged and has recently been the object of further analysis,[1] Isocrates' views on leadership have often been overlooked, as I briefly discussed in the opening chapter.[2] Moreover, as Balot points out, Isocrates, while participating in the Greek tradition on this theme, 'additionally teaches that leadership inherently presents underlying dangers'.[3] Indeed, in his works he reflects on, and attempts to deal with, the problems posed by it in both internal and external politics. This chapter thus aims to shed light on Isocrates' approaches to political leadership with particular attention devoted to his ideas on what makes a good leader not only in domestic affairs, but also in international relations.

In line with the lexical methodology applied in this dissertation, I shall devote the first part of the present chapter to examining the occurrences of the term δημαγωγός and its cognate verb δημαγωγέω in the Isocratean corpus in order to unearth the relevance of Isocrates' usages to our understanding of his views on leadership. In doing so, I will suggest that in contrast to the generally negative connotation that the δημαγωγός family of words appears to have acquired by the fourth century, Isocrates retrieves the originally neutral sense of δημαγωγός with the purpose of problematising its meaning as part of his own reflection on political leadership. Within this context, rather than condemning the concept of δημαγωγία altogether, he introduces a binary distinction between bad and good δημαγωγοί and emphasises the need for the Athenians to select the latter. By means of this polarisation Isocrates promotes a reshaping of internal leadership that goes hand in hand with his attempt to uphold a renewed model of foreign politics. In considering how he presents Pericles as an

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[1] See, for instance, Bianco (2011), Gray (2011), Buxton (2016a), Buxton (2016b), Humble (2016).
[2] See Chapter 1 section 2.
[3] Balot (2014) 23.

instance of the positive pole in this binary opposition, I will argue that the use of δημαγωγός to depict him, rather than revealing an insincere praise of the Athenian leader, hints at the crucial role of the Athenian δῆμος, and its faults, in the great man-community dynamics. Additionally, I will make a comparison between Isocrates' problematisation of δημαγωγός and his rehabilitation of the term σοφιστής in order to suggest that the former, like the latter, can be ultimately interpreted in connection with Isocrates' defence of the rhetorical education provided by his school. I will then conclude the investigation of the Isocratean usages of δημαγωγός and δημαγωγέω by focusing on the two instances in which this terminology is retrojected into Athens' past and the one in which it is applied to a non-Athenian and non-democratic context. Indeed, in examining these three occurrences we shall see how Isocrates problematises even further the inherent malleability of δημαγωγός and its cognate verb.

In the second half of the chapter I shall employ the Isocratean depiction of Alcibiades as a case study since his interest in this figure fundamentally mirrors, and can thus enhance our understanding of, his more general ideas on leadership. In this respect, we shall see how both Isocrates' description of Pericles and his characterisation of Alcibiades ultimately throw light on his awareness of, and attempt to deal with, the issues posed by the problematic relation between leaders of great merit and the democratic πόλις. The overall representation of Alcibiades focuses, in particular, on the need for the great man to secure the εὔνοια of his fellow citizens. In addition, it also reveals how the notion of goodwill becomes a cornerstone of the renewed model of foreign politics promoted in the Isocratean corpus.

Taken together, the investigation of Isocrates' usages of δημαγωγός and his depiction of Alcibiades hint at, and cast some light on, the crucial role that his views on leadership, especially by and within Athens, play in the broader context of his political thought.

2. Δημαγωγός

The origin, meaning and development of the term δημαγωγός ('leader of the people') are particularly noteworthy. Indeed, the English counterpart 'demagogue' has a negative connotation and is usually employed to describe with disparaging intent those politicians who are regarded as manipulating and flattering the people to win their support. Conversely, it is generally believed that δημαγωγός and its cognates originally did not have any derogatory meaning, although by the fourth century they had probably acquired a pejorative connotation.[4]

Nonetheless, it is worth pointing out that there has not been unanimous agreement among scholars on the original meaning and subsequent development of the term. For instance, Finley appears to assume that δημαγωγός has always had an intrinsically negative sense,[5] even though in the final part of his study he abruptly refers in passing to a neutral meaning of the word.[6] On the contrary, according to Connor, δημαγωγός (together with ῥήτωρ and προστάτης τοῦ δήμου) belongs to the new terminology employed to indicate political leaders that began to appear in Athens in the last third of the fifth century.[7] Within this context, Connor stresses that the word originally did not have a pejorative meaning and that the decisive factor in determining whether the noun takes on a neutral, negative or even positive sense is represented by the context in which it is employed, so that '[e]ven in the fourth century one can speak of "good demagogues" without seeming excessively oxymoronic'.[8] A somehow similar view has been expressed, more recently, by Lane who rejects Finley's conclusions, and thus questions the existence in Athenian politics of 'an evaluative distinction between terms signifying the good statesman and the bad demagogue'.[9] More particularly, she argues that neither δημαγωγός nor δημηγόρος had an inherently negative meaning before Plato and suggests that the concept of δημαγωγός in its pejorative sense became clearly demarcated only with Plato (who, nonetheless, never employs the word δημαγωγός and its

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[4] See Hornblower (2015).
[5] See Finley (1962) 4.
[6] See Finley (1962) 19; on Finley's study and his sudden reference to the neutral meaning taken on by δημαγωγός see Lane (2012) 182-183.
[7] See Connor (1971) 108-109.
[8] Connor (1971) 110.
[9] Lane (2012) 179.

cognates) and Aristotle, adding that the distinction between statesmen and demagogues was forged not in Classical Athens, but by Plutarch.[10]

However, the negative tinge conveyed by the δημαγωγός family of words is attested already in the Aristophanic use of the noun δημαγωγία in *Knights* 191, the adjective δημαγωγικός in *Knights* 217 and the verb δημαγωγέω in *Frogs* 419 as well as in the two Thucydidean occurrences, which refer to Cleon and Androcles respectively,[11] *pace* Lane who argues that both Aristophanes and Thucydides employ this terminology in a merely descriptive way.[12] In the following century, the derogatory sense that δημαγωγός and its cognates could convey appears to emerge also from the Xenophontic instances, as I shall illustrate below.

In this respect, of particular importance is Saldutti's relatively recent study that offers a concise but comprehensive lexical analysis of the occurrences of δημαγωγός, δημαγωγία and δημαγωγέω in the fifth and fourth centuries.[13] Indeed, in his article, to which I shall refer in greater detail below, Saldutti suggests that δημαγωγός and its cognates, despite being coined shortly after δημηγόρος and προστάτης τοῦ δήμου, belong to a different historical and political context and thus take on, since their first occurrences, a negative meaning.[14] In other words, according to Saldutti, δημαγωγός carries an intrinsically and irrevocably pejorative connotation and, even when the term is connected with adjectives indicating a neutral or positive sense, the ultimate aim consists in stressing the unbridgeable gap between a merely hypothetical good leader of the people and the despicable conduct of the actual demagogues.

Saldutti has certainly had the merit of providing us with a thorough examination of the occurrences of the δημαγωγός family of words, and, more specifically, of highlighting the relevance of the Isocratean usages within the

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[10] See Lane (2012) 181-183, 189-192.

[11] Thuc., IV, 21, 3 and VIII, 65, 2 (where we find the noun δημαγωγία to indicate one of the reasons why the young oligarchic conspirators decided to put Androcles to death in 411). On the pejorative sense conveyed by the Aristophanic and Thucydidean occurrences of the δημαγωγός family of words see, for instance, Saldutti (2015) 81-88. On the pejorative sense of δημαγωγός and δημαγωγία in Thucydides see Yunis (1996) 101 n. 32.

[12] See Lane (2012) 184-187.

[13] See Saldutti (2015).

[14] See Saldutti (2015) 104 who points out that προστάτης τοῦ δήμου is a hypernym (not a mere synonym) of δημαγωγός, while δημηγόρος is a hyponym of δημαγωγός since the meaning of δημηγόρος remains primarily linked to oratorical skills even if in the fourth century it can at times be employed, more broadly, to refer to political leaders in general.

framework of the development of this terminology. However, in the present section I shall challenge his conclusion concerning the inherently negative connotation of δημαγωγός. In doing so, I shall base my interpretation of the Isocratean occurrences on the assumption that δημαγωγός and its cognates had an originally neutral meaning even though by the fourth century they had taken on a negative connotation. In this respect, I will argue that, while retrieving the initial ethical neutrality of the δημαγωγός family of words, Isocrates problematises the meaning of the notion of δημαγωγία by dichotomising it and extending its range of application even beyond the boundaries of Classical Athens. This problematisation, rather than hinting at an ill-concealed anti-democratic agenda, suggests, as we shall see, that by exploiting the intrinsic flexibility of δημαγωγός and its cognate verb Isocrates upholds the need to rethink and reshape Athenian leadership in both internal and external politics within the broader context of the debate going on in fourth-century political thought on these topics and in light of his more general ideas on leadership.

2.1 Good versus bad δημαγωγοί

The analysis carried out in the present section will primarily revolve around the occurrences of δημαγωγός in *On the Peace*. I will thus begin by contextualising such occurrences within the framework of the harsh criticism towards contemporary leaders of the people, which represents the main background for the use of the term in this speech. Nonetheless, we shall see how, far from condemning the role of δημαγωγοί *per se*, Isocrates recovers the ethically neutral connotation of δημαγωγός and ultimately suggests a dichotomy between bad and good δημαγωγοί. Before turning to the discussion of how Isocrates presents Pericles as belonging to the latter category and of what this entails, we shall also see how this binary opposition reflects Isocrates' attempt to promote a reshaping of internal leadership that represents a *conditio sine qua non* for implementing his renewed model of foreign politics. The section will then end with a comparison between the rehabilitation of δημαγωγός (effected by means of the distinction between good versus bad δημαγωγοί) and that of the term σοφιστής, both of which can be interpreted as pointing in the direction of Isocrates' attempt to rehabilitate rhetorical culture.

The attack on bad δημαγωγοί in *On the Peace*

My investigation of the Isocratean usages of δημαγωγός and its cognate verb δημαγωγέω shall take as its starting point the occurrences of the noun in *On the Peace* as this work presents the highest number of instances of δημαγωγός in the corpus. This speech was written most probably around 356/5, that is, towards the end of the Social War[15] and the specific historical setting in which it was composed appears to have deeply influenced its content.[16] Indeed, at about the same time as Philip captured Amphipolis (357), some of its allies, namely Chios, Rhodes, Cos and Byzantium revolted against Athens helped by Mausolus, the Persian satrap of Caria, and eventually managed to withdraw from the Second Athenian League.[17] *On the Peace* is thus generally considered as 'something of an anti-imperialist, anti-war tract'[18] whose main goal consists in advocating peace, as it appears to be suggested by the title itself. The second widespread assumption regarding this work involves the interpretation of Isocrates' strong criticism towards the political leaders of contemporary Athens, as being part of his alleged negative attitude towards democracy.[19]

These two presumptions are closely related to one another. Indeed, according to Bearzot, Isocrates presents peace as a *conditio sine qua non* for the safeguard of democracy in order to label the current leaders of the people as warmongering individuals who damage the Athenian democracy with their warlike attitude; in doing so, Bearzot continues, Isocrates intends to defend

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[15] For the date of *On the Peace* see Jebb (1876) 182-183, according to whom the speech 'was probably written while negotiations for peace were pending, *i.e.* in the first half of 355'; see also Norlin (1929) 5, Gillis (1970) 196, Davidson (1990) 21. Conversely, Mathieu (1925) 116-117 and Cloché (1963) 105-106 believe that Isocrates wrote it in 356, that is, in the midst of the war. *On the Peace* is the title of the speech in the manuscripts Urbinas 111 (G, from the end of the ninth or beginning of the tenth century AD) and Ambrosianus O 144 (E, late fifteenth century AD), as well as in Dion. Hal., *On the Style of Demosthenes*, 17. Nonetheless, the other manuscripts and Arist., *Rhetoric* III, 17, 10 give the title *On the Confederacy* (Ὁ Συμμαχικός); on this matter, see Norlin (1929) 2 and Davidson (1990) 21 n. 3.

[16] It is, nonetheless, worth noting that some scholars have downplayed the historical significance of this speech and its intention to influence contemporary politics. In this respect, Harding (1973), by claiming that *On the Peace* is merely a rhetorical exercise, has suggested that, due to their antithetical nature, *On the Peace* and *Archidamus* should necessarily be taken together and considered as being antilogical, with the former making the case for peace and the latter for war; for a rather similar view see, more recently, Ghirga and Romussi (1997) 250. However, Moysey (1982) has convincingly rebutted Harding's thesis point by point showing the role of *On the Peace* as 'an actual political advice to the Athenians towards the end of the Social War' and thus highlighting its historical and political relevance. See also Davidson (1990) 21 n. 3. For a discussion of Harding's hypothesis (with a brief reference also to Moysey's counter-argument) see Too (1995) 66-67.

[17] See Musti (2006) 598-599.

[18] Goldhill (1990) 105. See also, for instance, Too (1995) 95. Cf. Brock (1998) 236.

[19] See Bearzot (1980) 122.

himself from the allegations of being a supporter of oligarchy by turning those charges against Athens' δημαγωγοί.[20] I shall return to the first assumption and its confutation more in depth below. For now, let us begin with the analysis of the Isocratean usages of the term δημαγωγός in the speech, which shall lead us to rebut the second inference. Indeed, I aim to show that the harsh criticism voiced throughout *On the Peace* against the leaders of contemporary democracy should not be dismissed as confirming Isocrates' supposedly anti-democratic sympathies. Rather, it should be interpreted within the framework of the division between good and bad δημαγωγοί that he effects in the speech.

The attack on contemporary statesmen that characterises *On the Peace* has been interpreted as directed against Chares and Aristophon of Azenia, with both leaders being responsible for Athens' aggressive attitude in international politics and with the latter having prosecuted Timotheus, Isocrates' pupil.[21] Yet, I would note that, while these are indeed the specific leaders that Isocrates is targeting, through his sharp criticism he might also intend to draw a broader portrait of bad leadership in general. More particularly, in the opening sections of *On the Peace* Isocrates claims that the Athenians have been deceived for a long time by those leaders whose only ability is 'to lie' (φενακίζειν) and who despise 'the mass' (τὸ πλῆθος) so much that, whenever they wish to wage war against any other πόλις, they take bribes and misleadingly urge their fellow citizens to follow the example set by their ancestors.[22] Throughout the rest of the speech Isocrates intertwines his discussion on Athens' position abroad with his attack on contemporary political leaders, which becomes particularly prominent in the final part of *On the Peace*. Here, he deals a heavy blow against those leaders who, in his view, gratify their fellow citizens in the present moment without caring at all for the future (οἱ ἐν τῷ παρόντι μὲν χαριζόμενοι, τοῦ δὲ μέλλοντος χρόνου μηδεμίαν ἐπιμέλειαν ποιούμενοι) and against those who claim to love the people but in reality only damage Athens (οἱ φιλεῖν μὲν τὸν δῆμον φάσκοντες, ὅλην δὲ τὴν πόλιν λυμαινόμενοι), comparing such leaders to men of similar character who in the past have led the city to 'folly' (ἄνοια) and consequent misfortunes.[23]

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[20] See Bearzot (1980) 120-122.
[21] See Moysey (1987) 85. Cf. Arist., *Rhetoric* III, 17, who explicitly states that Isocrates has directed *On the Peace* against Chares. On the role played by Chares in determining Athens' foreign policy in the 350s and on Isocrates' hostility towards him see also Moysey (1985).
[22] Isoc., *On the Peace* 36; see also Isoc., *On the Peace* 38.
[23] Isoc., *On the Peace* 121.

Owing to the leadership of such men, Isocrates goes on to claim, the Athenian δῆμος is worse off than 'those who are subject to the oligarchies' (οἱ ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις δουλεύοντες) and is mistakenly convinced that it has to 'rule over others' (τῶν ἄλλων ἄρχειν).[24] Furthermore, Isocrates insists on criticising the attitude of contemporary political leaders by accusing them of having gained profits at the detriment of their fellow citizens: although they claim to care for the public good, and thus to be unable to attend to their private interests, in reality they have cultivated the latter while 'the mass' (τὸ πλῆθος) is in such a sorry state that no citizen can live 'pleasantly' (ἡδέως) or 'lightly' (ῥᾳθύμως) and Athens is 'full of lamentations' (ὀδυρμῶν μεστή).[25]

This attack on contemporary statesmen reaches its climax when Isocrates warns his fellow citizens that no 'group' (γένος) is 'more ill-disposed toward the mass' (κακονούστερον τῷ πλήθει) than 'worthless rhetoricians and leaders of the people' (πονηροὶ ῥήτορες καὶ δημαγωγοί) who know that those who can manage their own affairs by means of their private resources are on the side of the πόλις and of the wisest orators (οἱ τὰ βέλτιστα λέγοντες),[26] unlike those who rely on the income deriving from the law courts and assemblies.[27] Thus, instead of providing a livelihood for the poor, they seek to reduce to poverty the wealthy so that they can hold power over them.[28] So, here the term δημαγωγός is employed in the context of the harsh criticism towards the behaviour of contemporary Athenian leaders who support a warlike policy and who, according to Isocrates, cultivate not the interests of the πόλις but their own. Such statesmen are presented as embodying a negative kind of leadership, which is opposed to the conduct of the wise orators and which is depicted as having detrimental effects on Athens in its domestic but also in its foreign politics (as suggested particularly by the reference to the excessive activism of the Athenian δῆμος towards the other Greeks in *On the Peace* 125).

In this passage from *On the Peace* the word δημαγωγός can thus appear, at least at first reading, to be used with a derogatory connotation. Nonetheless, δημαγωγός here might well have, strictly speaking, a neutral sense, considering that it is possible to suggest that the pejorative weight is borne not by the noun

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[24] Isoc., *On the Peace* 125.
[25] Isoc., *On the Peace* 127.
[26] Isoc., *On the Peace* 129.
[27] Isoc., *On the Peace* 130.
[28] Isoc., *On the Peace* 131.

δημαγωγός itself, but by the adjective πονηρός. Indeed, despite what some modern translations have suggested,[29] πονηροί can be regarded as referring not only to ῥήτορες but also to δημαγωγοί.[30] This reading is in accordance with the neutral sense that, as it shall emerge in the course of my investigation, δημαγωγός and its cognate verb convey throughout the Isocratean corpus. Moreover, the use of δημαγωγός in conjunction with the adjective πονηρός calls to mind not only a similar juxtaposition of the two terms in Aeschines' *Against Ctesiphon* 134 (i.e. οἱ πονηροὶ τῶν δημαγωγῶν) but also, *e contrario*, the phrase δημαγωγὸς χρηστός from section 78 of the same speech, where Aeschines states that a man who is a 'bad father' (πατὴρ πονηρός) cannot be a 'good leader of the people'. These two instances hint at the fact that in the fourth century the term could indeed be employed in an ethically neutral sense.

The neutral meaning of the term in *On the Peace* emerges even more clearly from yet another occurrence of δημαγωγός, still in the context of the attack against fourth-century leaders, which, as we have seen, represents the framework for the use of the term in the speech. Indeed, contemporary Athenians prefer as 'leaders of the people' (δημαγωγοί), Isocrates complains, 'not men who are of the same mind as those who made the πόλις great' (οὐ οἱ τὴν αὐτὴν γνώμην ἔχοντες τοῖς μεγάλην τὴν πόλιν ποιήσασιν), but 'men who say and do the same things as those who destroyed it' (οἱ ὅμοια καὶ λέγοντες καὶ πράττοντες τοῖς ἀπολέσασιν αὐτήν), despite knowing that 'the worthy' (οἱ χρηστοί) are superior to 'the worthless' (οἱ πονηροί) in making Athens prosperous, and that under the leadership of the former democracy remained unchanged for many years, while under the latter in a short amount of time it has already been overthrown twice.[31] So, Isocrates argues that, despite being fully aware of the opposite effects that these two different kinds of leadership have had on their πόλις, his fellow citizens are pleased with 'the knavish tricks of the rhetoricians' (αἱ τῶν ῥητόρων πονηρίαι) even though most Athenians have been deprived of their patrimony precisely 'because of the war and the troubles' (διὰ τὸν πόλεμον καὶ τὰς ταραχάς) caused by such men, who have instead enriched themselves.[32]

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[29] See, for instance, Ghirga and Romussi (1997) 315.
[30] This reading appears to be the one adopted by Mathieu (1960) 46, who translates the above-mentioned phrase as follows: 'les mauvais orateurs et les mauvais démagogues'.
[31] Isoc., *On the Peace* 122-123.
[32] Isoc., *On the Peace* 124.

Here Isocrates reiterates against contemporary δημαγωγοί the accusations levelled against the political leaders of the end of the fifth century[33] turning against them the charge of damaging the Athenian democracy and of being ultimately sympathisers of the oligarchy, as suggested by the reference to the oligarchic coups of 411 and 404. Nonetheless, it is plausible to argue that the term δημαγωγός does not bear an intrinsically pejorative meaning since being a leader of the δῆμος is not depicted in itself with a derogatory connotation. Rather, it is the specific category of individuals selected by his fellow citizens as δημαγωγοί that Isocrates views in a negative light. In other words, I would suggest that in this passage from *On the Peace* he hints at a dichotomy between bad and good δημαγωγοί.

This polarisation, which appears to take root in a comparison with the leaders of the past, is applied to fourth-century statesmen and is presented in terms of an opposition between οἱ χρηστοί and οἱ πονηροί. Therefore, here the use of δημαγωγός manifestly contradicts, in my view, Saldutti's contention according to which, as I mentioned above, the δημαγωγός family of words has at its origin a negative connotation and invariably preserves it in subsequent usages. What Isocrates condemns is not being a δημαγωγός in itself but the particular kind of individuals on whom his fellow citizens' choice falls. So, far from using the term in an entirely pejorative sense, and thus excluding altogether the existence of good δημαγωγοί, he highlights the possibility, or rather the need, to select better leaders of the δῆμος.

Furthermore, I would note that special attention has to be devoted to the association of δημαγωγός with ῥήτωρ that emerges in particular from *On the Peace* 129, where we find the phrase πονηροὶ ῥήτορες καὶ δημαγωγοί. Significantly, a similar juxtaposition of the two terms occurs also, as we shall see later on, in the definition of Pericles as δημαγωγὸς ἀγαθὸς καὶ ῥήτωρ ἄριστος in *Antidosis* 234. It is thus possible to suggest that in connecting the two terms Isocrates is alluding to the phrase ῥήτορες καὶ στρατηγοί that, as Hansen stresses, was employed to indicate fourth-century Athens' political leaders.[34] In this respect, by replacing στρατηγοί with δημαγωγοί Isocrates might well intend to shift the focus in the definition of leadership from military skills to rhetorical culture considering also that bad δημαγωγοί are presented as closely

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[33] See Saldutti (2015) 90.
[34] See Hansen (1983a) 37; cf. Hansen (1983b) 151 and Hansen (1999) 345.

associated with the figure of flatterers. Thus, if bad δημαγωγία is linked with κολακεία it follows that, in Isocrates' view, good δημαγωγία is opposed to flattery and assimilated to the ability of employing rhetorical skills in the best interest of one's fellow citizens without paying court to them.[35] And, if this is indeed the case, we could identify a parallelism not only with παρρησία in its positive sense (see Chapter 2 section 3.4) but also with the semantic shift of ἡγεμονία from referring to Athens' military superiority to indicating its cultural pre-eminence, as argued by Bouchet and discussed in the previous chapter (see Chapter 3 section 4).

Good δημαγωγία and good ἡγεμονία

In this respect, I intend to make a comparison between Isocrates' ideas on internal leadership and his views on Athens' position abroad as expressed in *On the Peace*. More specifically, in the same way as his attack on contemporary δημαγωγοί does not indicate that he opposes the role of δημαγωγοί *per se* and ultimately reveals that he considers good δημαγωγία as achievable and necessary, an in-depth analysis of his criticism towards Athens' contemporary leadership over Greece in *On the Peace* suggests that Isocrates fundamentally upholds the need to rebuild on different foundations, not reject *in toto*, Athenian hegemony. Indeed, Davidson has referred to 'good imperialism' as an innovative and characteristic feature of this speech and as an element absent from both Thucydides and Plato.[36]

Nonetheless, as I briefly mentioned earlier, *On the Peace* is often regarded as a pacifist speech. This commonly-held view arises from the fact that Isocrates explicitly urges his fellow citizens to make peace not only with their former allies, who have revolted and have thus given rise to the Social War, but also, more broadly, with all mankind.[37] Furthermore, the *prima facie* goal of advocating peace goes hand in hand with a vigorous criticism towards Athens' empire and its sea power. Indeed, throughout the speech Isocrates sharply condemns Athens' allegedly unfair behaviour towards its allies, who, he argues, are entitled to be disposed harshly towards Athens since they have suffered many terrible wrongs at the hands of the Athenians and have had to be

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[35] See Arist., *Politics* 1313b39-41, who associates δημαγωγία with κολακεία (without distinguishing, unlike Isocrates, between good and bad δημαγωγία).
[36] Davidson (1990) 36.
[37] Isoc., *On the Peace* 16.

subject to their 'insolence' (ἀσέλγεια).[38] The strong criticism against the Athenian empire expressed in *On the Peace* has led to the widespread opinion that the whole speech is dominated by a very pessimistic tone and that Isocrates condemns without appeal Athens' hegemony suggesting that the Athenians should right away give up their leadership over Greece. In this regard, through a blend of arguments from justice, possibility and expediency[39] Isocrates attempts to convince his fellow citizens that the 'empire' (ἀρχή) is not 'just' (δικαία) nor 'possible' (δυνατή) nor 'useful' (συμφέρουσα).[40] So, his harsh criticism appears to lead, at least at first sight, to a firm condemnation of Athenian hegemony without the possibility of appeal.

However, some studies have suggested that in *On the Peace*, unlike what one could assume at first reading, Isocrates ultimately aims not to reject Athenian hegemony over Greece altogether but to reshape it and rebuild it on different foundations.[41] In this respect, of particular interest is Bouchet's *Isocrate l'Athénien ou la belle hégémonie* that, as we saw, argues for a semantic sliding in meaning of ἡγεμονία which goes hand in hand with Athens' progressively decreasing capacity to exercise a merely military power.[42] According to Bouchet, such a shift emerges, first and foremost, precisely in *On the Peace* where the term, rather than indicating Athens' military leadership, becomes

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[38] Isoc., *On the Peace* 79; see Gillis (1970) 205. Tincani (1923) 104 states that οἱ βέλτιστοι in this passage refers to 'gli Oligarchi, che Atene o scacciò o tentò di scacciare da ogni dove', but in Chapter 3 section 3 I have already shown that the meaning of the phrase in the Isocratean corpus should not be interpreted as a mere synonym for oligarchs. On Athens' harsh attitude towards its allies see also Isoc., *On the Peace* 115 where we find a comparison with how badly the Thebans treat the other Boeotians.

[39] See Gillis (1970) 204-205. See also Gillis (1970) 199 who, concerning the arguments from justice and expediency employed by Isocrates in this speech, notes that, unlike in *Panegyricus* where the two arguments appear to be used mostly separately, in *On the Peace* Isocrates employs 'both types woven into its texture without regard for symmetry'.

[40] Isoc., *On the Peace* 66.

[41] For instance, Gillis (1970) 195 makes a brief reference to the 'different direction in foreign policy' offered by Isocrates consisting, first of all, in peace, but secondly in a renewed 'hegemony based on the good-will and trust of the allies'. More recently, Balot (2014) 150 has referred to the Isocratean 'theory of enlightened hegemony'. In this respect, Balot (2014) 153-154 highlights that 'Isocrates generally distinguishes *archē* from *hēgemonia* at a terminological level; and, despite the slight fluidity of Isocrates' terminology, he certainly drew a conceptual distinction between hegemony and empire', adding that, while Isocrates strongly criticises imperialism regarding it as 'the selfish, aggressive, and unjust acquisition of power over others and their possessions' and thus as 'an operation of enslavement and tyranny', hegemony in his view is 'an enlightened form of leadership in which the Athenians cultivated the prosperity of their allies and thereby promoted their own advantage'. See also Davidson (1990) 22 n. 7 on the use of the terms ἀρχή and ἡγεμονία in *On the Peace*. It is, nonetheless, worth noting that although the above-mentioned studies allude to the Isocratean attempt to shape a new model of foreign politics, none of them has at its core a thorough examination of his ideas on Athens' leadership over Greece, unlike Bouchet (2014), on which see below.

[42] Bouchet (2014) on which see Chapter 1 section 3 and Chapter 3 section 4.

'synonyme de prééminence ou de primauté (culturelle, économique, voire politique)'.[43] It is therefore in this speech that Isocrates clearly attempts to uphold the need not for peace *per se* as it is generally assumed, but for a renewed kind of Athenian hegemony within the Hellenic world, which is indeed that 'belle hégémonie' referred to in the title of Bouchet's volume.

Moreover, it is worth noting that the Isocratean attitude towards Athenian hegemony which emerges from *On the Peace* can be compared with Xenophon's views on this same topic, with particular reference to *Ways and Means*. In this work, which was written precisely at the same time as Isocrates' speech, Xenophon appears to make the case for peace stating not only that 'the most prosperous cities' (εὐδαιμονέσταται (…) πόλεις) are those which enjoy the longest period of peace, but also that among all Greek cities Athens is by nature the most suited 'to increase in power' (αὔξεσθαι) during peace times.[44] However, Xenophon also mentions the need for Athens to regain its 'leadership' (ἡγεμονία) and in doing so he resorts to historical examples by referring to the Athenians who lived at the time of the Persian Wars. In this regard, he argues that at that time the Athenians reached a position of leadership within the Hellenic world not through coercive force (βιαζόμενοι) but by means of good services done to the other Greeks (εὐεργετοῦντες) and by refraining from injustice (τοῦ ἀδικεῖν ἀπεσχόμεθα).[45]

Therefore, as Farrell points out, in *Ways and Means*, rather than adopting an anti-imperialist stance, Xenophon appears to suggest that in order to regain their hegemony over Greece after the defeat in the Social War his fellow citizens should aim to obtain the voluntary obedience of their allies, and thus need to redirect their imperial aspirations towards a '*rule* over the willing' and away from 'a *tyranny* over unwilling subjects'.[46] In doing so, he reiterates ideas that are not only expressed throughout the rest of his corpus (especially in *Cyropaedia* and *Hiero*) but also similar to the views which we find in *On the Peace*. Nonetheless, Farrell also highlights how, in spite of the numerous similarities, Xenophon's *Ways and Means* differs in some respects from *On the Peace*:

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[43] Bouchet (2014) 209.
[44] Xen., *Ways and Means* V, 2-3.
[45] Xen., *Ways and Means* V, 5-6.
[46] Farrell (2016) 339 [his italics], who stresses how the reference to the Second Athenian League in Xenophon's *Ways and Means* has often been neglected by scholars.

Whereas Isocrates rejects all manifestations of Athenian hegemony after Pericles, Xenophon complements [*sic*] the Athenian achievements of the early fourth-century and reiterates that the foundation of the fourth-century hegemony offered a positive paradigm for leadership. Xenophon here refers to the Second Athenian Confederacy.[47]

While their judgment on the Second Athenian League might well be discordant, what is worth pointing out here is that for both Isocrates and Xenophon condemning Athens' fourth-century hegemony does not necessarily equate with rejecting its leadership over Greece *in toto*. Thus, far from expressing a merely pacifist stance, Isocrates in *On the Peace*, as we shall see more clearly below, provides a crucial and idiosyncratic contribution to the contemporary debate on Athenian leadership in the Hellenic world by upholding the need to reshape and rethink it.

And it is in this respect that Isocrates' much debated judgment on the Second Athenian League comes into play. More particularly, the question is raised whether he regards the Second Athenian League as having embodied the pattern of external leadership which he draws in *On the Peace*. Indeed, Cargill has argued that the Isocratean work '*does not provide a single specific example of imperialistic Athenian behavior between the end of the Peloponnesian War and the outbreak of the Social War*'.[48] In this regard, while sharing the common interpretation according to which *On the Peace* consists in a harsh condemnation of the Athenian imperialism, Cargill reaches the conclusion that:

Isokrates does not equate the Second Athenian League, or Athenian hegemony *per se*, with "the Empire of the sea". A benevolent Athenian hegemony, he consistently holds, is a good thing for the Greeks, but during the war it has been perverted into Empire. It is the war, he explicitly says, that has gained Athens the enmity of the Hellenes.[49]

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[47] Farrell (2016) 347.
[48] Cargill (1981) 177 [his italics]. In this regard, it is worth noting that Cargill (1981) 178 bases his argument mainly on the interpretation of Isoc., *On the Peace* 141 by arguing that in this passage the aorist participles εὖ φρονήσαντας and γενομένους as well as the aorist infinitives προστῆναι, κληθῆναι and ἀναλαβεῖν should be considered as referring to past events rather than being translated, as it generally occurs, in their aspectual sense and so with present tense forms.
[49] Cargill (1981) 177.

In other words, according to Cargill, all the examples of Athens' imperialistic behaviour present in *On the Peace* refer exclusively to either the fifth century or the time of the Social War, thus Isocrates' overall view on the Second Athenian League is rather positive and laudatory with the only exception being the period of the Social War. Nevertheless, Bearzot has convincingly rebutted Cargill's thesis by highlighting the vagueness and generic nature of most of the historical examples in *On the Peace* as well as the likelihood that in some of the other instances employed in the speech Isocrates might be alluding to the time prior to the Social War.[50] So, we can share Bearzot's conclusion according to which Isocrates believes that the kind of renewed hegemony which he upholds in *On the Peace* can still be (re)gained, but has not been achieved by the Second Athenian League.[51]

Indeed, the Isocratean purpose of remodelling, not rejecting, Athenian hegemony over Greece, which emerges throughout *On the Peace*, becomes even more manifest in the final part of the speech where by pulling together the threads of his analysis and by making use of various examples once again drawn mainly from Athens' past, Isocrates urges his fellow citizens to rethink and reshape their leadership within the Hellenic world. In doing so, he attempts to convince them to adopt a renewed model of foreign politics that should consist in retrieving the 'goodwill' (εὔνοια)[52] and the 'good repute' (εὐδοκιμία)[53] allegedly enjoyed by the Athenians of the generation of the Persian Wars as well as in championing once again the freedom and autonomy of Greece. Such a renewed pattern will result, according to Isocrates' programme, in the voluntary subjection of the other Greek πόλεις to Athens' hegemony and will thus enable the Athenians to gain 'the leadership for all time' (ἡ ἡγεμονία εἰς τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον).[54] Therefore, εὔνοια, εὐδοκιμία and the consequent willing subjection of the rest of Greece represent the cardinal points around which

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[50] See Bearzot (2003) 66-68 who focuses especially on Isoc., *On the Peace* 29, 36, 46 and 134 to refute Cargill's view.

[51] Bearzot (2003) 74. In this respect, it is worth mentioning that Bearzot (2003) 75 also refutes the definition proposed by Asheri (2000) 199 of Isocrates as a 'neo-imperialist'.

[52] On the various meanings of εὔνοια see Romilly (1958) 92. On the wide range of meanings that the term can take on depending on the different contexts see also Mitchell (1997) 28.

[53] On the Isocratean usages of the notion of εὐδοκιμία throughout the corpus see Alexiou (1995) 34-40.

[54] Isoc., *On the Peace* 142. For a comparison between Isocrates' remarks and Xenophon's emphasis on the notion of willing obedience see section 3 of this chapter.

Isocrates structures the model of hegemony that he urges his fellow citizens to adopt.

I shall discuss further these cornerstones, especially εὔνοια, in the second part of the present chapter. For now, I intend to highlight the possibility of drawing a comparison between Isocrates' emphasis on the need for Athens to (re)gain the good ἡγεμονία (allegedly enjoyed in the past and achievable anew in the future) and his attempt to convince his fellow citizens to opt for the good kind of δημαγωγία hinted at by his usages of the term δημαγωγός in the speech. The inextricable link between these two aspects is reiterated and heightened towards the end of the speech. More specifically, in *On the Peace* 133-135 when he recapitulates the key steps which, in his view, the Athenians should take in order to improve their current situation, the very first aspect that Isocrates mentions consists indeed in urging his fellow citizens to select as advisers on public affairs the same kind of men as they would choose for their private matters. Secondly, Athens should treat its allies as 'friends' (φίλοι), not as 'independent in words' (λόγῳ αὐτόνομοι) while 'in fact' (ἔργῳ) giving them over to Athenian generals (with a clear allusion to Chares)[55] who do with them whatever they please, and should thus stand over them not 'like a master' (δεσποτικῶς) but 'like an ally' (συμμαχικῶς) considering also that Athens is stronger than any single πόλις but weaker than them all together.[56] Thirdly, his fellow citizens, Isocrates goes on to argue, should consider nothing, except 'reverence towards the gods' (εὐσέβεια), as more important than 'being of good repute among the Greeks' (τὸ παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν εὐδοκιμεῖν) who 'willingly' (ἑκόντες) confer power as well as leadership (αἱ δυναστεῖαι καὶ αἱ ἡγεμονίαι) precisely to those who are highly esteemed. Therefore, by establishing a link of cause and effect between the two aspects, Isocrates presents once again the willing subjection of the rest of Greece to Athens' hegemony as a direct consequence and a somehow automatic result of the Athenians' regaining of their good repute within the Hellenic community.[57]

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[55] See Norlin (1929) 90-91 n. *d*.

[56] An allusion to the need to structure the relation with the allies in terms of φιλία also occurs shortly afterwards in Isoc., *On the Peace* 139 where it is stated that everyone will be eager to share in Athens' friendship once they see that the Athenians are not only 'the most just' (δικαιότατοι) and 'those possessing the greatest power' (μεγίστην δύναμιν κεκτημένοι) among all Greeks but also both willing and able to save the rest of Greece without needing any help for themselves.

[57] We can find a reference to the voluntary bestowal of hegemony to the Athenians also in Isoc., *On the Peace* 138, where Isocrates even goes one step further by claiming that, if harmed by

Significantly, in indicating the moves that contemporary Athenians should make to curb the degeneration affecting their πόλις Isocrates reserves the first place in the list to the need to rethink internal leadership. This passage thus shows that the selection of good δημαγωγοί to lead Athens cannot be disentangled from, and is a *conditio sine qua non* for, the renewal of the Athenian hegemony over Greece. In other words, in Isocrates' view, the rethinking of Athens' position abroad goes hand in hand with the reshaping of domestic leadership, which is implicitly articulated in terms of a distinction between good and bad δημαγωγία.

Pericles as good δημαγωγός

The dichotomy characterising Isocrates' use of δημαγωγός comes to light even more manifestly in his portrait of Pericles. Indeed, in *On the Peace* 126-127 Isocrates explicitly opposes the above-mentioned attitude of contemporary political leaders, who support war and allegedly focus only on their own interests to the detriment of Athens, to that of Pericles, who was the 'leader of the people' (δημαγωγός) before such men. In this regard, Isocrates specifies that Pericles took over the πόλις 'when it was less wise than it had been before it gained the empire' (χεῖρον φρονοῦσα ἢ πρὶν κατασχεῖν τὴν ἀρχήν), but was still governed 'in a tolerable manner' (ἀνεκτῶς), and adds that he did not aim at his own personal gain. As evidence of his statements, Isocrates points out that Pericles not only left an estate smaller than the one that he had received from his father, but also brought up into the Acropolis eight thousand talents apart from the sacred treasures. Therefore, in this passage from *On the Peace* Isocrates emphasises the fact that Pericles, unlike contemporary political leaders, put Athens' interests before his own personal affairs.

In addition, it is worth noting that in the forensic speech *On the Team of Horses* he is described as 'the most temperate' (σωφρονέστατος), 'the most just' (δικαιότατος) and 'the wisest' (σοφώτατος) among all citizens.[58] Likewise, in *Antidosis* 111 Isocrates mentions the exact same 'democratic virtues',[59] namely

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the other leading πόλεις, the Greeks will flee for refuge to Athens and offer it 'not only the leadership but also their own selves' (οὐ μόνον ἡ ἡγεμονία ἀλλὰ καὶ σφεῖς αὐτοί).
[58] Isoc., *On the Team of Horses* 28. I will return to this passage in the next section when devoting specific attention to the characterisation of Alcibiades emerging from *On the Team of Horses*.
[59] See Too (2008) 204.

σοφία, δικαιοσύνη and σωφροσύνη as the main qualities of Pericles in the broader context of his defence of his former pupil, the Athenian general Timotheus, and with specific reference to the victory over Samos. Timotheus is indeed compared to Pericles for the reason that when subjugating Samos in 366/5, he managed to do so in a shorter amount of time as well as with far less financial and military resources than Pericles did in his campaign against the island in 441/39. So, here the praise of Pericles ultimately aims to emphasise the relevance of Timotheus' achievements by presenting them as even greater than Pericles'. Nevertheless, the positive portrait of Pericles emerging from this passage reiterates, and is thus consistent with, the favourable elements that we can find not only in *Antidosis* but also in the other two references to Pericles in the Isocratean corpus, namely the one in *On the Peace* and that in *On the Team of Horses* mentioned above.

Furthermore, the term δημαγωγός is employed again to describe Pericles in *Antidosis* 234. Here, as I briefly mentioned earlier when discussing Isocrates' peculiar move of replacing στρατηγός with δημαγωγός in the phrase ῥήτορες καὶ στρατηγοί, Pericles is praised as 'a good leader of the people and an excellent rhetorician' (δημαγωγὸς (...) ἀγαθὸς καὶ ῥήτωρ ἄριστος). Additionally, in this same section Isocrates states, firstly, that Pericles adorned the πόλις to such a degree that even contemporary visitors regard Athens as being worthy of ruling not only the Greeks but also the rest of the world (οὕτως ἐκόσμησε τὴν πόλιν καὶ τοῖς ἱεροῖς καὶ τοῖς ἀναθήμασι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν, ὥστ᾽ ἔτι καὶ νῦν τοὺς εἰσαφικνουμένους εἰς αὐτὴν νομίζειν μὴ μόνον ἄρχειν ἀξίαν εἶναι τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων); secondly, that he stored in the Acropolis a sum of not less than ten thousand talents. Indeed, Pericles is mentioned just after Solon, Cleisthenes and Themistocles[60] as an instance of those historical figures whose excellence in rhetorical skills proves that far from damaging the Athenians, rhetoric has led the πόλις to greatness.

And it is plausible to assume that later on in the speech Isocrates implicitly refers once again to Pericles in laudatory terms. More particularly, in *Antidosis* 250, in order to highlight the contradictions of the fictional charges moved against him, Isocrates complains that his alleged accusers look with greater favour upon those men who train in gymnastic exercises than upon

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[60] See Isoc., *Antidosis* 232-233.

those who pursue φιλοσοφία, despite acknowledging the superiority of the mind over the body and the fact that it is not 'through bodily vigour' (διὰ εὐεξίαν σώματος), but 'through practical wisdom of a man' (διὰ φρόνησιν ἀνδρός) that Athens has become 'the most prosperous' (εὐδαιμονεστάτη) and 'the greatest' (μεγίστη) among all πόλεις in the Greek world. Interestingly, here ἀνήρ has been interpreted by some scholars as an allusion to Pericles and, more precisely, as echoing what Isocrates has said about him in section 234,[61] considering also that in sections 253-257 Isocrates resumes the discussion in sections 232-237 by detailing how rhetoric has benefited mankind.[62] So, throughout his corpus Isocrates refers to Pericles in favourable terms.

In this regard, the overall Isocratean depiction appears to differ significantly from what Henderson defines as 'the view of Pericles' opponents among the traditional élite' and regards as being reflected, for example, in the attacks on him that we find in Cratinus and Hermippus.[63] Nonetheless, there has been some scholarly discussion on the actual Isocratean judgment of the figure of Pericles. More specifically, the positive assessment of Pericles which emerges from Isocrates' works has been questioned precisely on the basis of the use of the term δημαγωγός that, as we saw, is employed in both *On the Peace* 126 and *Antidosis* 234 to describe him. For instance, Bearzot argues that since the term has already acquired an ambiguous meaning at the time when Isocrates makes use of it, the fact that Isocrates employs it to refer to Pericles casts a shadow over his apparently laudatory portrait and thus contributes to unmask the ill-concealed anti-democratic agenda that, according to the Italian scholar, underpins the Isocratean corpus.[64] It is indeed highly likely that by the fourth century the δημαγωγός family of words had taken on a negative connotation. This derogatory sense is well exemplified in the occurrences of δημαγωγός and δημαγωγέω in the Xenophontic corpus. More specifically, δημαγωγός is used in a derogatory sense in *Hellenica* II, 3, 27 by Critias who in his speech attacks Theramenes for, *inter alia*, opposing the Thirty's wish to put some of the leaders of the people out of the way.[65] The second occurrence of

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[61] See, for instance, Norlin (1929) 324 n. *b* and Too (2008) 213.
[62] See Too (2008) 214-215 who has highlighted that this praise of rhetoric closely recalls the well-known *encomium* of λόγος in *Nicocles* 5-9.
[63] Henderson (2003)162.
[64] See Bearzot (1980) 121.
[65] See, for instance, Krentz (1995) 130 on the negative connotation that δημαγωγός takes on in this Xenophontic passage.

the noun in the Xenophontic corpus can be found in *Hellenica* V 2, 7, where the adjective βαρύς has been interpreted as simply reinforcing the negative meaning already inherent in δημαγωγός.[66] Here Xenophon points out that, after the capitulation to Sparta in 385 with the consequent demolition of the fortifications and the division of Mantinea into four separate villages, the Mantinean owners of landed property were pleased to be relieved from the troublesome leaders of the people (ἀπηλλαγμένοι δ᾽ ἦσαν τῶν βαρέων δημαγωγῶν) within the framework of an opposition between aristocracy and democracy. Finally, the pejorative meaning that δημαγωγός and its cognate verb convey in the Xenophontic corpus emerges even more clearly in the *Anabasis* where δημαγωγέω describes Xenophon himself.[67] More particularly, the term is used by the Spartans as an explanation for the word φιλοστρατιώτης that Seuthes of Thrace has just employed to point out a negative aspect of Xenophon's personality. I will return to this passage from the *Anabasis* below with specific reference to the application of δημαγωγέω to a non-Athenian context. For now, I would stress that the derogatory sense conveyed by the verb appears to be in line with the pejorative meaning taken on by the two above-mentioned occurrences of the noun in the *Hellenica*, *pace* Lane.[68]

Thus, the Xenophontic instances reflect the negative connotation that the δημαγωγός family of words had acquired by the fourth century. In this respect, Bearzot is not mistaken in stressing, as I mentioned above, that at the time when Isocrates makes use of it to describe Pericles, the noun has already taken on an ambiguous meaning. However, the occurrences in the Isocratean corpus differ from most of the contemporary usages since, as I have attempted to show in the analysis conducted so far, rather than employing such terminology with a negative connotation, Isocrates reinstates its original ethical neutrality. And it is this neutral sense that, in my view, underpins the use of the word when Isocrates employs it to depict Pericles in both *On the Peace* 126 and *Antidosis* 234.[69]

In this respect, I disagree with Saldutti's contention that, due to the intrinsically negative meaning of δημαγωγός and its cognates, any reference in

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[66] See Saldutti (2015) 87-88; on this passage from the *Hellenica* see also Cartledge (2009) 100-101 who interprets it as embodying Xenophon's alleged oligarchic sympathies.
[67] Xen., *Anabasis* VII, 6, 4.
[68] Lane (2012) 188.
[69] See, for instance, Too (1995) 94.

our literary sources (thus including the one in *Antidosis*) to a good δημαγωγός has to be regarded merely as an ideal, but in practice unfeasible, standard of comparison.[70] More specifically, starting from the recognition that Isocrates, unlike Plato, does not intend to reject Athens' democracy *per se* but rather to redefine it, and that his pedagogical programme aims to educate successful political leaders, Saldutti justifies the description of Pericles in laudatory terms as δημαγωγὸς ἀγαθός as an exception that proves the rule. Indeed, the phrase δημαγωγὸς ἀγαθός represents, according to Saldutti, an outlier that can be explained in the framework of Isocrates' strenuous defence of his παιδεία in *Antidosis* and as a response to the attack in Plato's *Gorgias* against the Athenian democracy, which includes an attack against the relevance of rhetoric and also against Pericles himself.[71] Nonetheless, while his praise of Pericles in *Antidosis* might well have been dictated, as Saldutti believes, by the need to refute Plato's negative statements in *Gorgias*, I would suggest that the depiction of Pericles in laudatory terms hints, more broadly, at the dichotomy between good and bad δημαγωγία that, as we saw, emerges implicitly from the usages of δημαγωγός in *On the Peace*.

  Additionally, it is worth noting that the full extent of Isocrates' *encomium* of Pericles has been put in doubt not only on the assumption that in referring to him in *On the Peace* and *Antidosis* Isocrates employs δημαγωγός in its pejorative connotation (more common in the fourth century) rather than in its original neutral sense, but also on the basis of the omission of his name in a passage from *On the Peace* that enumerates the best Athenian leaders of the past. Indeed, in *On the Peace* 75-76 in order to demonstrate that the sea empire has caused many ills to the Athenians instead of benefiting them, he makes a comparison between Athens' condition before and after the πόλις acquired this 'power' (δύναμις). Isocrates thus argues that the constitution in the earlier time was 'better' (βελτίων) and 'stronger' (κρείττων) than that established later as Aristides, Themistocles and Miltiades were 'better men' (ἄνδρες ἀμείνους) than Hyperbolus, Cleophon and 'those who now make popular speeches' (οἱ δημηγοροῦντες). Furthermore, 'the people' (ὁ δῆμος) who governed Athens at the time were not full of 'idleness' (ἀργία) 'poverty' (ἀπορία) and 'empty hopes' (ἐλπίδες κεναί). On the contrary, they not only were able to

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[70] See Saldutti (2015) 89.
[71] See Saldutti (2015) 90-92.

conquer in battle all those who attacked them and were deemed worthy of 'the meed of valour' (ἀριστεῖα) in the dangers that they faced in defence of Greece, but also were so trusted that most Greek πόλεις readily put themselves into Athens' hands. In stressing that Pericles is not mentioned among the best Athenian politicians who administered the πόλις in the past, Musti compares this passage from *On the Peace* with [Aristotle], *Constitution of the Athenians* XXVIII, 3-5.[72] Indeed, according to [Aristotle], from Cleophon onward 'the leadership of the people' (ἡ δημαγωγία) was handed on by 'those who were most willing to be bold and to gratify the many' (οἱ μάλιστα βουλόμενοι θρασύνεσθαι καὶ χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς πολλοῖς). On the other hand, 'the best among the politicians in Athens after those of early time' (βέλτιστοι (…) τῶν Ἀθήνησι πολιτευσαμένων μετὰ τοὺς ἀρχαίους) were Nicias, Thucydides and Theramenes. More specifically, [Aristotle] says that Nicias and Thucydides were not only 'noble and good' (καλοὶ κἀγαθοί) but also 'statesmanlike' (πολιτικοί), and that they administered the whole πόλις 'like fathers' (πατρικῶς), while he acknowledges that the judgment on Theramenes is controversial due to the constitutional changes (ταραχώδεις αἱ πολιτεῖαι) that took place in his time.[73]

In comparing this passage from the *Constitution of the Athenians* with *On the Peace* 75, Musti identifies two main similarities. First of all, Isocrates does not detail explicitly the names of fourth-century leaders, and Aristotle mentions manifestly only one of them, namely Callicrates of Paeania. Therefore, in both passages the politicians of fourth-century Athens remain anonymous. This anonymity, Musti argues, goes hand in hand with the increase in the number of politicians at that time as well as with their lower stature. The second resemblance is precisely that neither Isocrates nor Aristotle mention Pericles among the best Athenian leaders of the past. In the Aristotelian passage, in fact, although he belongs to the period prior to the chronological caesura represented by Cleophon, Pericles is not explicitly included among the βέλτιστοι. In both cases he thus appears to be relegated, as Musti puts it, to a

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[72] Musti (1995) 210-211. See also Connor (1971) 141-142 who hints at a connection between the Isocratean passage and [Arist.], *Constitution of the Athenians* XXVIII, 1.

[73] See Rhodes (1993) 358-359, who specifies the reasons why we should be surprised to find these men singled out for praise, and highlights that 'Nicias, as a first-generation politician and a second-generation rich man, was not one of the καλοὶ κἀγαθοί but made himself acceptable to them'.

sort of '*no man's land*: (…) una zona intermedia di rispettoso, ma certo non esaltante silenzio'.[74]

While the comparison and remarks made by Musti are certainly insightful, I would argue that the subtle criticism that one can deduce from the absence of any reference to Pericles in *On the Peace* 75 concerns the Athenian δῆμος of the time of Pericles, rather than Pericles himself. Indeed, as we have seen, the term δημαγωγός employed to describe Pericles in *On the Peace* 126 and *Antidosis* 234 appears to be used in its originally neutral sense. Moreover, the the latter passage in particular (with specific reference to the juxtaposition of the adjective ἀγαθός) presents Pericles as exemplifying the positive model of δημαγωγία achieved in the past, and still achievable, as opposed to the negative one embodied by contemporary leaders of the people.

So, the omission of the name of Pericles in *On the Peace* 75 should not be explained, in my view, as the result of Isocrates' insincere, or ultimately not very enthusiastic, words of praise. Rather, it arises from his negative judgment on the δῆμος contemporary to Pericles. In this respect, it is worth stressing that in *On the Peace* 126, as we saw, Isocrates states that Athens had already entered a downward spiral when Pericles became δημαγωγός. In doing so, Isocrates might well aim to oppose Pericles' laudable actions not only to the deeds of fourth-century leaders of the people but also to those of the anonymous collectivity of the time of Pericles himself. Another element pointing in the same direction is the remark that Isocrates makes in *On the Peace* 75-76, where, as I noted earlier, after mentioning Aristeides, Themistocles and Miltiades among the best politicians of the past, he praises the δῆμος of the time by enumerating its qualities and by implicitly contrasting it with the current one. It is thus possible to suggest that Isocrates does not mention Pericles because of the conviction that the δῆμος contemporary to him, unlike that of the time of Aristeides, Themistocles and Miltiades, had already degenerated and so could not be included among the examples to follow.

Within this context, I would argue that Isocrates shows his awareness of, and intention to shift the focus on, the tense and problematic interaction between leaders of great merit like Pericles and the Athenian δῆμος. In this regard, he appears to challenge, at least partially, the well-known statement by

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[74] Musti (1995) 210-211 [his italics].

Thucydides according to which Pericles led the multitude instead of being led by them.[75] Indeed, the picture that Isocrates implicitly draws seems to be somehow more nuanced as he presents the leadership of Pericles as praiseworthy, while simultaneously acknowledging the relevant role played by the δῆμος of the time and condemning its actions, which, in his view, ultimately led to Athens' misfortunes.

In upholding this interpretation I share the viewpoint expressed by Azoulay in his recent study devoted to Pericles, where he warns against two opposite risks in dealing with this kind of biographical inquiry: on the one hand, personalisation, which by focusing excessively on the role of great men can lead to commentators overlooking that of the δῆμος, and, on the other hand, an overemphasis on the actions of the Athenian collectivity, which tends to overshadow the role played by Pericles.[76] By distancing himself from both tendencies Azoulay shifts the attention towards the 'complex interaction between the crowd and its leaders' and stresses the need to 'succumb neither to the illusion of the power of one great man nor to that of the all-powerful masses', focusing instead on 'the productive tension that developed between the *stratēgos* and the Athenian community'.[77] Thus, the absence of Pericles in *On the Peace* 75-76, if evaluated together with the subtle criticism towards the Athenian δῆμος of the time after the Persian Wars in the same passage as well as with the laudatory references to Pericles throughout the corpus, can be interpreted as part of Isocrates' attempt to throw some light upon the existence, and relevance, of the tension referred to by Azoulay.

Furthermore, by shining the spotlight on the problematic interaction between the great man and the δῆμος, as exemplified by the case of Pericles, Isocrates hints at the fact that the necessary rethinking of Athens' domestic and external leadership (promoted especially in *On the Peace* as noted above) ultimately involves a reshaping of its δῆμος since the two aspects cannot be disentangled. Indeed, as Simonton points out:

> both common people and rhetors likely would have agreed that it was
> the demos that made Athens great. But who made 'the demos'? It was

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[75] Thuc., II 65, 8.
[76] See Azoulay (2014) 3.
[77] Azoulay (2014) 4.

> an unceasing, ever-changing collaborative effort between everyday
> citizens and the elite politicians who rose to speak on their behalf.[78]

So, Isocrates, by upholding the dual nature of δημαγωγία does acknowledge that good δημαγωγοί play a crucial and irreplaceable role in the functioning of the Athenian democracy, in both internal and foreign politics. Nonetheless, he also suggests that they cannot ultimately be successful if the decisions made by the δῆμος are not sound. If bad leaders of the people get the upper hand over the good ones the responsibility lies ultimately in the Athenian δῆμος itself that, as a consequence of its degeneration (a degeneration that is first and foremost moral, as highlighted in *On the Peace*), needs to be addressed.

The reform of the Athenian democracy suggested by Isocrates in his corpus should, therefore, be regarded as closely linked to, or rather originating from, his interest in political leadership. Indeed, Isocrates shows himself to be especially aware of the issues posed by leadership, with specific reference to the relation between individual leaders of great merit and the democratic πόλις but also between Athens as leading πόλις in the Hellenic world and the other Greeks. These two aspects are indeed inextricably related to one another, as it will emerge even more clearly below in the analysis of the Isocratean characterisation of Alcibiades.

Good δημαγωγοί and good σοφισταί

I shall conclude this section by suggesting that Isocrates' problematisation of the term δημαγωγός can be compared, at least to a certain extent, with the rehabilitation of σοφιστής emerging from *Antidosis*. In this speech Isocrates, while not rejecting the current widespread pejorative connotation taken on by the term, attempts to redefine its meaning positively.[79] More particularly, as Too highlights, Isocrates puts in place a pluralisation of σοφιστής that comes to denote not only '[c]ontemporary 'sophists' (…) who falsely lay claim to this title, cheating their pupils and working only for self gain', but also '[g]enuine sophists, like himself, (…) who benefit both their pupils and their communities through their teaching and writing'.[80] Remarkably, in order to rehabilitate the term,

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[78] Simonton (2018) 235.
[79] See Too (2008) 13.
[80] Too (2008) 195-196.

Isocrates employs it to refer to Solon in *Antidosis* 235. Indeed, Isocrates has already devoted special attention to Solon in *Antidosis* 232 by describing him as προστάτης τοῦ δήμου, just before depicting Pericles as δημαγωγὸς ἀγαθός in *Antidosis* 234. In *Antidosis* 235 he focuses again on these two historical figures with the purpose of supporting his overall argument that rhetoric should be considered as the crucial element that has guaranteed, and can continue to guarantee, Athens' greatness.[81]

More specifically, here Isocrates points out that Solon was included among the Seven Sophists and that Pericles' teachers, namely Anaxagoras of Clazomenae and Damon, were also σοφισταί; he thus stresses that the label σοφιστής, despite the contemporary negative meaning, was far from being derogatory in the past. Similarly, in *Antidosis* 313 Isocrates complains that, whereas in the past the Athenians' ancestors drew a clear dividing line between sophists and sycophants admiring the former and blaming the latter for the misfortunes experienced by their πόλις, in contemporary Athens there does not exist a definite distinction between the two categories anymore. And it is in order to support his statement that in this section, located towards the end of the speech, he refers once again to Solon by describing him as the first Athenian to receive the title of σοφιστής and as being deemed worthy to become προστάτης τῆς πόλεως.

Therefore, in *Antidosis* 234 and 313 Isocrates attempts to reclaim the term σοφιστής as a positive label, first and foremost, by recalling the example of Solon, that is, 'through a historicisation which sets out to demonstrate that verbal ability has been responsible for many of the things which made and now continue to make Athens a great city'.[82] And as evidence that the question of who might be regarded as σοφιστής becomes of paramount importance in the fourth century, Too stresses that the rehabilitation of the term in *Antidosis* can be compared with the redefinition of its meaning in Plato's *Symposium*, where Socrates appears to be presented as a sophist. More precisely, with particular reference to the analogy between Socrates and Eros and the description of the latter as both φιλόσοφος and σοφιστής in *Symposium* 203d, Too notes that 'if Eros is a sophist, then so too must the philosopher be one'; indeed, she

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[81] See also Aesch., *Against Timarchus* 25 where Solon and Pericles, along with Themistocles and Aristeides, are praised as examples of wise rhetoricians whose manners are opposed to those of the current leaders; on this passage from Aeschines see also Too (2008) 201-202.
[82] Too (2008) 13; see also Too (2008) 201.

continues, 'Plato redefines what the sophist is for this dialogue in an attempt to define the true philosopher, although elsewhere he emphatically draws a distinction between sophist as charlatan and philosopher'. Too then concludes her remarks by pointing out that here in the *Symposium*, as in the *Apology of Socrates*, in order to rebut the Aristophanic depiction of Socrates in *Clouds* Plato aims 'to show that the noun 'sophist' need not denote the unsavoury and abstracted teacher of the comedy': since 'the case against Socrates is one derived from the misattribution of sophistic activity to a true philosopher, (…) the defence is based on the abolition of distinctions between philosopher and sophist'.[83]

The comparison with the use of σοφιστής in *Antidosis* is based on the fact that Isocrates attempts to defend himself from the fictional charges brought against him precisely by means of a rehabilitation of σοφιστής that does not entail a rejection of the current derogatory connotation but seeks to show that the negative meaning represents neither the exclusive nor the original sense. As Too herself puts it:

> If Isocrates has to be regarded as a 'sophist', it is as the inheritor of the Solonic mantle; he is Athens' self-appointed political saviour and political wise man, and not the disruptive political trouble-maker of present-day Athens. Since the *Antidosis* is in part an attempt to combat what the author depicts as the crisis of signification at Athens, the εἰκών that he announces himself as offering of his life, character and work is one which has the function of stabilizing, by historicizing, language in this world.[84]

Too is indeed right in identifying a certain similarity of Plato's redefinition of σοφιστής with its rehabilitation in *Antidosis* and her remarks concerning the Platonic use of the word in the *Symposium* are reflected in some more recent attempts to suggest that Plato employs the label in a rather loose way and thus

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[83] Too (2008) 12.
[84] Too (2008) 14. Furthermore, Too (2008) 15 stresses that 'Isocrates is also to be regarded as the professional teacher who in his turn bequeaths the Solonic mantle to his students' with the specific example of Timotheus who was condemned by his fellow citizens despite his services to Athens precisely because contemporary Athenians are, as Too notes, 'ignorant of the true sophist's role'. More on the Isocratean depiction of Timotheus will be said in section 3 of the present chapter.

not necessarily with a pejorative connotation.[85] Nevertheless, even if we accept, as these views on Plato's usage of σοφιστής suggest, the existence at least in some Platonic dialogues of a less clear-cut distinction between philosophers and sophists than it has previously been acknowledged, it is in the context of Isocrates' attempt to rehabilitate rhetoric that we find the explicit assumption that the term can actually bear a positive meaning.

In this respect, I would stress that Isocrates' redefinition of σοφιστής can be assimilated to his problematisation of δημαγωγός, even though the rehabilitation of σοφιστής appears to be more explicit than that of δημαγωγός. In other words, the dichotomy between good and bad δημαγωγία can be interpreted in parallel with the distinction between two opposite categories that take on the label of σοφισταί: on the one hand, contemporary sophists who do not differ from the sycophants and are thus responsible for the derogatory sense that the term has acquired; on the other hand, the true σοφισταί of the past (like Solon) but also of the present (like Isocrates himself) who act solely in the interest of Athens. Similarly, Isocrates attempts to redefine the meaning of δημαγωγός by presenting contemporary δημαγωγοί as embodying the negative pole as opposed to the good δημαγωγοί of the past (such as Pericles). By reclaiming a positive signification for δημαγωγός, Isocrates intends to highlight that good δημαγωγία should not be regarded as a merely abstract basis of comparison, *pace* Saldutti,[86] or as being relegated to the Athenian past. Instead, it represents a concrete option that can, and should, be (re)gained, similar to the case of good σοφισταί in *Antidosis*. In this regard, both good δημαγωγοί and good σοφισταί (although the latter more explicitly than the former) point towards Isocrates' strenuous attempt to rehabilitate rhetoric.

Conclusion

In summary, my analysis of the usages of δημαγωγός in *On the Peace* (the Isocratean work with the highest number of occurrences of this word) has attempted to challenge the assumption that Isocrates makes use of the term mainly or exclusively with a pejorative connotation and as part of an allegedly ill-concealed oligarchic agenda. Indeed, even though such instances are employed by Isocrates within the broader framework of his attack on

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[85] See Silva (forthcoming).
[86] See especially Saldutti (2015) 85.

contemporary δημαγωγοί, they should not be interpreted as revealing an overall criticism towards the role of δημαγωγοί *per se*. Rather, Isocrates retrieves the originally neutral meaning of the δημαγωγός family of words in order to make a distinction between good and bad δημαγωγία. More specifically, the usages of δημαγωγός in *On the Peace* show that in this speech, while strongly attacking fourth-century leaders of the people (whom he regards as embodying a negative pattern) Isocrates upholds not only the feasibility but also the imperative necessity to select good δημαγωγοί to lead Athens. This emphasis on reshaping internal leadership goes hand in hand with Isocrates' attempt to promote the rethinking, not the complete rejection, of Athenian hegemony over Greece.

Furthermore, I have suggested that the Isocratean polarisation of the concept of δημαγωγία is well-exemplified in the references to Pericles in the corpus. In this regard, I have argued that Isocrates' use of δημαγωγός in *On the Peace* and *Antidosis* to describe Pericles should not be interpreted as throwing a shadow over his laudatory portrait. Rather, it presents Pericles as embodying an instance of good δημαγωγία and ultimately hints at Isocrates' interest in the issues posed by the complex relation between great men and the Athenian δῆμος. Lastly, I have highlighted how the distinction between good and bad δημαγωγοί drawn by Isocrates can be assimilated to his attempt to rehabilitate the term σοφιστής within the context of his defence of rhetoric.

2.2 Δημαγωγός beyond Classical Athens

In order to conclude my analysis of the Isocratean usages of the δημαγωγός family of words I shall now turn to the three remaining instances of this terminology in the corpus. Taken together, these occurrences show how Isocrates extends the range of application of the notion of δημαγωγία to the time prior to Classical Athens and even to a non-democratic context by reintroducing its original ethical neutrality.

The Isocratean retrojection of δημαγωγός to Athens' past is first attested in *Helen*, which was most probably written in 370.[87] Indeed, towards the end of the *excursus* on Theseus it is stated that, rather than retaining his sovereignty

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[87] See Mirhady and Too (2000) 32 on the debated date of this speech.

by means of an alien force, he was protected by the 'goodwill' (εὔνοια) of his citizens as by a bodyguard, and that he administered Athens as a τύραννος[88] by means of his authority while, at the same time, leading the people by means of his benefactions (Καὶ γάρ τοι διετέλεσεν τὸν βίον οὐκ ἐπιβουλευόμενος ἀλλ᾿ ἀγαπώμενος, οὐδ᾿ ἐπακτῷ δυνάμει τὴν ἀρχὴν διαφυλάττων, ἀλλὰ τῇ τῶν πολιτῶν εὐνοίᾳ δορυφορούμενος, τῇ μὲν ἐξουσίᾳ τυραννῶν, ταῖς δ᾿ εὐεργεσίαις δημαγωγῶν).[89] The use of δημαγωγέω in conjunction with τυραννέω in this passage from *Helen* is dismissed by Saldutti as merely paradoxical,[90] whereas according to Bearzot it confirms Isocrates' tendency to adulterate the true meaning of δημοκρατία and related terms as part of his allegedly anti-democratic agenda.[91]

Bearzot draws a similar conclusion from the occurrence of δημαγωγέω in *To Nicocles*,[92] where Isocrates advises the Cyprian king as follows:

(…) Μελέτω σοι τοῦ πλήθους, καὶ περὶ παντὸς ποιοῦ κεχαρισμένως αὐτοῖς ἄρχειν, γιγνώσκων ὅτι καὶ τῶν ὀλιγαρχιῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτειῶν αὗται πλεῖστον χρόνον διαμένουσιν αἵτινες ἂν ἄριστα τὸ πλῆθος θεραπεύωσιν. Καλῶς δὲ δημαγωγήσεις, ἐὰν μήθ᾿ ὑβρίζειν τὸν ὄχλον ἐᾷς μήθ᾿ ὑβριζόμενον περιορᾷς, ἀλλὰ σκοπῇς ὅπως οἱ βέλτιστοι μὲν τὰς τιμὰς ἕξουσιν, οἱ δ᾿ ἄλλοι μηδὲν ἀδικήσονται· ταῦτα γὰρ στοιχεῖα πρῶτα καὶ μέγιστα χρηστῆς πολιτείας ἐστίν.

(…) Take thought of the mass and consider as most important of all to rule them acceptably, knowing that these among oligarchies as well as among other constitutions last for the greatest time, whichsoever take care of the mass. You will lead the people well if you allow the crowd neither to commit nor to suffer outrage, but behold that the best shall have the honours, while the others shall not be wronged at all; these are indeed the first and the most important elements of a good constitution.[93]

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[88] On the use of the τύραννος family of words in the Isocratean corpus (with particular focus on the Cyprian orations) see Chapter 2 section 3.1 n. 59 and Chapter 5 section 2.1.
[89] Isoc., *Helen* 37.
[90] See Saldutti (2015) 89.
[91] See Bearzot (1980) 117.
[92] See Bearzot (1980) 118.
[93] Isoc., *To Nicocles* 15-16.

While Bearzot suggests that the use of δημαγωγέω in this passage from *To Nicocles*, as in *Helen* 37, hints at Isocrates' intent of promoting an oligarchic programme in disguise, I would stress that here the adverb καλῶς can be interpreted as providing a positive connotation to the neutral meaning of the verb.[94] Indeed, καλῶς δημαγωγέω implies the opposite possibility of κακῶς δημαγωγέω and thus points towards the polarisation between good and bad δημαγωγοί that, as I have attempted to show, Isocrates implements in his corpus.

Moreover, it is particularly interesting to underline that this occurrence of δημαγωγέω in the Cyprian speech might represent the first instance in our literary sources of the use in a non-democratic context of a term belonging to the δημαγωγός family of words. In this respect, it is worth pointing out that Saldutti regards the above-mentioned passage from Xenophon's *Anabasis* (where δημαγωγέω is employed in a military backdrop to refer to Xenophon himself) as presenting the earliest usage in a non-Athenian framework of this terminology.[95] However, the date of composition of the *Anabasis* is very much debated and uncertain,[96] with some scholars regarding the 360s as a plausible dating.[97] So, the occurrence of the verb in *To Nicocles*, which as we saw in Chapter 2 section 3.1 was most probably written in the 370s shortly after the death of Evagoras, can lead us to consider Isocrates as the first author who, by taking part in an ongoing debate on leadership, extends the application of the concept of δημαγωγία beyond the boundaries of Athenian democracy.

In this respect, Morgan has described this passage from *To Nicocles* as a clear instance of the Isocratean 'constitutional relativism' which she argues for in her study.[98] Indeed, she considers as noteworthy the use of δημαγωγέω here 'since "demagogue" is a term that can express the most extreme disapproval of democratic politicians', but she also stresses that 'Isocrates' vision of benevolent despotism rehabilitates the demagogue as monarch and the monarch as demagogue', so that 'monarchy does not rule out gratifying the people or being a "popular" leader'; at the same time, the reference in the passage to paying court to the citizens as a principle ensuring long life to

[94] *Pace* Usher (1990) 207.
[95] See Saldutti (2015) 88.
[96] See Brownson (2001) 8-9.
[97] See Waterfield (2009) XVIII.
[98] See Morgan (2003) 201-202.

oligarchies and other constitutions alike is interpreted by Morgan as confirming her view on Isocrates' 'affected indifference to constitutional form (…). Monarchy, democracy, and even oligarchy begin to merge'.[99]

Significantly, Saldutti believes that the idea of 'constitutional relativism' promoted by Morgan should be applied also to the last occurrence of δημαγωγός in the Isocratean corpus, that is, the one that we find in *Panathenaicus*.[100] More specifically, in section 148 of this speech Isocrates states that Pisistratus, 'having become a leader of the people, having caused much harm to the πόλις and having thrown out the best among the citizens' (δημαγωγὸς γενόμενος καὶ πολλὰ τὴν πόλιν λυμηνάμενος καὶ τοὺς βελτίστους τῶν πολιτῶν (…) ἐκβαλών) by accusing them of being 'inclined to oligarchy' (ὀλιγαρχικοί), eventually 'overthrew democracy and established himself as τύραννος' (τόν τε δῆμον κατέλυσε καὶ τύραννον αὐτὸν κατέστησεν). According to Bearzot, by employing the term δημαγωγός to refer to Pisistratus, Isocrates implicitly intends to make a comparison between Pisistratus' despotic behaviour and that of the leaders of contemporary democracy in order to condemn the latter and present his own political reform as democratic (although, in Bearzot's view, this is so only on the façade).[101]

The interpretation advanced by Bearzot entails that the term is used with a pejorative connotation. However, this negative meaning would differ from the neutral sense that the noun and its cognate verb take on, as we have seen, throughout the Isocratean corpus.[102] In this regard, I would suggest that in the portrait drawn by Isocrates, Pisistratus appears to be criticised not so much for being a δημαγωγός but rather for the actions which he undertook when he became a leader of the δῆμος by damaging Athens and setting himself up as tyrant. In other words, even when applying it to Pisistratus, Isocrates makes use of the term in its originally neutral meaning in line with the other usages in his corpus. Far from rejecting the role of δημαγωγοί *per se*, he acknowledges the need to select good leaders of the people in order to guarantee the functioning of the Athenian democracy. So, Pisistratus' mistake lies not in obtaining the role of δημαγωγός but in the despotic way in which he behaved when he was at the

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[99] Morgan (2003) 202.
[100] See Saldutti (2015) 92.
[101] See Bearzot (1980) 130.
[102] On the neutral meaning of the δημαγωγός family of words in the Isocratean corpus see also Zajonz (2002) 209.

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head of the δῆμος. In other words, he is criticised for choosing to act not as a good δημαγωγός but as a bad one, and can thus be regarded as somehow exemplifying that negative pole of the concept of δημαγωγία to which belong also the contemporary δημαγωγοί manifestly condemned, as we saw, in *On the Peace.*

Furthermore, one might well interpret the passage from *Panathenaicus* in light of the 'constitutional relativism' highlighted by Morgan, as Saldutti himself suggests. Yet, Isocrates' blending of constitutional boundaries, as I shall discuss in the next chapter, does not necessarily entail an oligarchic programme, as Morgan seems to imply. In this respect, it is worth noting that Saldutti acknowledges in passing Isocrates' contribution to the expansion of the range of application of the δημαγωγός family of words.[103]

However, Saldutti wrongly assumes, as I have already pointed out above, that δημαγωγός and its cognates have always had an intrinsic negative connotation, which in his view is reflected also in the Isocratean usages. Instead, I would stress that the occurrences of δημαγωγός and its cognate verb in *Helen* 37, *To Nicocles* 16 and *Panathenaicus* 148 corroborate that Isocrates reinstates the original ethical neutrality of this terminology. In doing so, he establishes a binary opposition between good and bad δημαγωγία as it is hinted at especially by the use of the adverb καλῶς in conjunction with δημαγωγέω when advising the Cyprian king on how to rule successfully.

In addition to recovering the ethical neutrality, reframing in positive terms and dichotomising the meaning of δημαγωγός, in these three instances Isocrates goes one step further by extending its use beyond the framework of Classical Athens. This overall problematisation demonstrates once again how Isocrates exploits, and simultaneously expands, the intrinsic fluidity of democratic vocabulary. Moreover, rather than being dismissed as part of a supposedly ill-concealed oligarchic agenda, Isocrates' usages of δημαγωγός should be interpreted within the broader context of, and as being deeply influenced by, his more general interest in political leadership and especially in what makes a good leader. But what are the specific features that characterise strong and positive leadership according to Isocrates? An analysis of his characterisation of Alcibiades shall help us provide an answer to this question.

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[103] See Saldutti (2015) 93.

3. The Isocratean portrait(s) of Alcibiades

Isocrates' interest in political leadership, which, as we saw above, emerges clearly from an analysis of the occurrences of δημαγωγός and δημαγωγέω in the corpus, is well exemplified by his portrait, or rather portraits, of Alcibiades. I shall begin though by pointing out that, unlike in the case of Pericles examined earlier, Isocrates never employs δημαγωγός to describe Alcibiades. Moreover, Gribble has highlighted that, although Alcibiades possessed a 'famed ability to manipulate the Athenians rhetorically, his stance of superiority over the *demos* and his 'aristocratic' expenditure on chariot competitions did not fit the classic demagogic pattern'. Gribble's statement appears to be corroborated, for instance, by the absence of any reference to Alcibiades both in the surviving fragments of Theopompus' excursus on the Athenian δημαγωγοί in book IX of his *Philippica* and in [Aristotle], *Constitution of the Athenians* XXVIII, which presents a picture of the development of political leadership in Athens[104] and to which I referred earlier in relation to the omission of the name of Pericles.

However, it is worth highlighting that [Andocides], as I shall discuss below, does make use of the term δημαγωγός to refer to Alcibiades. In addition, I aim to show how Isocrates' portraits of Alcibiades, rather than being inconsistent, reflect his interest in, acknowledgement of, and endeavour to address the intricate issues posed by leadership both within and by Athens. Thus, the choice of focusing on the Isocratean characterisation of Alcibiades as a case study is dictated by the fact that a re-examination of the passages devoted to him throughout the corpus provides a useful means of exemplifying and elucidating Isocrates' views not only on the problematic relation between great men and the democratic πόλις but also on the Athenian hegemony over Greece.

In this respect, I intend to cast some light on Isocrates' general ideas on leadership and, more particularly, to show how they are based, first and foremost, on the notion of εὔνοια. In doing so, I shall also underline how his views on leadership are part of the wider contemporary discussion revolving around this topic in which, as we briefly saw in the introductory chapter, Xenophon was also very much engaged. Furthermore, concerning εὔνοια, it is

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[104] See Gribble (1999) 34.

worth noting that there has not been much scholarly attention devoted to the crucial role that it plays within the Isocratean corpus. A notable exception is represented by Romilly's study, which has concentrated on how Isocrates applies this concept to interstate relations.[105] However, Romilly does not discuss the paramount importance that εὔνοια also has in Athens' internal politics. In this regard, the Isocratean occurrences of εὔνοια have recently been re-examined by Xanthou[106] who devotes particular attention to the use of this concept in *On the Peace* and *Antidosis* arguing that the theory of εὔνοια displayed by Isocrates in these two speeches can be regarded as an early precursor of the modern theory of emotional intelligence. Nonetheless, she does not focus on the key role that such a notion plays within the broader context of Isocrates' views on leadership in external as well as in domestic politics. This is why I believe there is still scope for a re-examination of the Isocratean emphasis on the notion of goodwill.

So, in the present section I will carry out a reappraisal of the seemingly contradictory references to Alcibiades throughout the corpus focusing, first of all, on the portrait that we find in *On the Team of Horses*, but paying special attention also to *Busiris* 5 as well as to *To Philip* 58-61. Moreover, I shall compare the depiction that emerges from these passages to the portraits of Alcibiades drawn by other Attic orators, namely Lysias, [Andocides], and Demosthenes.[107] By means of such a comparison I aim to show how the Isocratean characterisation fits into, but also goes beyond, the lively debate on Alcibiades that, as we shall see, appears to be closely linked on the one hand to the discussion on the intricate relation existing between the élite individual and the Athenian democracy, and on the other hand to the contemporary debate about Athenian imperialism.

My analysis below is anchored, at least partially, in Gribble's study that investigates the characterisation of Alcibiades' lifestyle in our surviving literary sources within the framework of the problematic relationship between the great man and the democratic πόλις.[108] More precisely, Gribble identifies three

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[105] Romilly (1958).
[106] Xanthou (2015).
[107] On fragments of lost speeches regarding Alcibiades see Gribble (1999) 149-153. It is worth noting that, as Nouhaud (1982) 293 points out, we can find a very brief reference to Alcibiades also in Aeschin., *On the Embassy* 9, where he is linked to Themistocles and referred to as one of the most famous men among all Greeks.
[108] Gribble (1999).

different stages, in the literary tradition on the figure of Alcibiades: the fifth century and first half of the fourth century are characterised by a polarised picture with Alcibiades being either highly praised or regarded as a danger for Athens; by the second half of the fourth century polarisation gives way to ambivalence and, finally, in the Hellenistic period, new anecdotes are created as a result of a shift of emphasis from the civic context of Alcibiades' lifestyle to a moralising depiction.[109] While in comparing the Isocratean portraits with the other depictions known to us in Attic oratory, I shall refer to the first two stages highlighted by Gribble, it is also worth pointing out that these categories, from a methodological point of view, were most probably less clear-cut than Gribble presents them. Indeed, Dionysius' statement in Aristophanes' *Frogs*, according to which Athens 'longs for him, and hates him and wants to have him' (ποθεῖ μέν, ἐχθαίρει δέ, βούλεται δ᾽ ἔχειν),[110] suggests that there had always been a mixed view on Alcibiades.

Moreover, concerning the Isocratean representation of Alcibiades, Gribble focuses almost exclusively on *On the Team of Horses* and thus mentions the references to Alcibiades in *Busiris* and *To Philip* only very briefly. So, by providing a comprehensive analysis of Isocrates' portraits of Alcibiades throughout the corpus I aim to point out how his overall depiction, while teetering between praise and blame, is deeply influenced by, and can help us deepen our understanding of, his ideas on leadership and the issues posed by it in both internal and external politics.

Alcibiades in *On the Team of Horses*

The most extensive and generally most well-known representation of Alcibiades in the Isocratean corpus can be found in the forensic speech *On the Team of Horses* written for Alcibiades the Younger.[111] Indeed, soon after he had reached majority, the son of the Athenian general was prosecuted by a certain Teisias[112]

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[109] See Gribble (1999) 31-43.
[110] Ar., *Frogs* 1425.
[111] On this forensic speech see also Chapter 2 section 3.3.
[112] According to both Diod. Sic., XIII 74 and Plut., *Life of Alcibiades* 12 the accuser was a certain Diomedes. Blass (1892) 224 argues that the different name of the accuser in Diodorus and Plutarch depends on a mistake made by Ephorus, whereas other scholars, like Hatzfeld (1951) 139-140, Sacerdoti (1970) 10-11 and Ellis (1989) 51-52, believe that both Diomedes and Teisias had provided Alcibiades with the money to buy the chariot but the lawsuit was brought only by Teisias as Diomedes had already passed away. On the possibility that Teisias might have been Diomedes' son and have resumed the lawsuit after his father's death see for instance Sacerdoti (1970) 17. For the divergence in details in the various accounts see also

on the ground that his father had robbed him of one of the seven four-horse chariots that he had entered at the Olympic festival most probably in 416.[113] While it is generally assumed that the first part of the speech (containing the statement of facts and the citation of evidence) is missing,[114] much of what we have appears to be devoted to both defending and praising Alcibiades the Elder. In this regard, *On the Team of Horses* goes beyond the borders of a simple lawcourt speech in the sense that it assumes the tones of an apology as well as an *encomium* of Alcibiades,[115] through which Isocrates has a say in the lively debate prompted by this controversial figure in the 390s.

Remarkably, the depiction of Alcibiades that emerges from this speech is that of a loyal, convinced and consistent supporter of democracy who was firmly opposed to both oligarchy and tyranny. This depiction, as we will see below, stands out from the portraits drawn by the other Attic orators who refer to him. I shall thus, first of all, focus on identifying the main elements and the vocabulary which Isocrates makes use of in order to convey such an image. In this respect, it is worth noting that Isocrates' characterisation of Alcibiades as a faithful supporter of democracy goes hand in hand with his attempt to defend the Athenian general from the charges of being an oligarch on the one hand, and of aiming at tyranny on the other.

Indeed, the accusations of being involved with the oligarchy made against Alcibiades are refuted throughout the work. More specifically, at the very beginning of the speech, Alcibiades the Younger, after having stressed the fact that the same men accountable for putting down the Athenian democracy were also responsible for his father's exile,[116] argues that the Four Hundred repeatedly invited his father to join them in their attempt to overthrow

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Gribble (1999) 98-100 who reaches the conclusion that in any case the discrepancy of names cannot be employed to argue that the trial which gave rise to Isocrates' speech was an invention.

[113] Although in the reference to Alcibiades' victories in the Olympic games in Isoc., *On the Team of Horses* 32-34 there is no mention of the chariot team which would have led to the current lawsuit, Gribble (1999) 98 argues that section 49 (where Alcibiades the Younger makes an explicit reference to his father's victory at Olympia) proves that the allegations regarded the Olympic games of 416.

[114] See Sacerdoti (1970) 10-11, Bianco (1993) 16, Gribble (1999) 102 and Eck (2015) 33. Conversely, Too (1995) 240-244 argues for the integrity of the speech.

[115] See Eck (2015) 35-36; see also Gribble (1999) 111-117 on the elements that characterise this speech as an *encomium*.

[116] Isoc., *On the Team of Horses* 4; see Sacerdoti (1970) 20 on Isocrates' juxtaposition of the two events. See also Isoc., *On the Team of Horses* 37. See Gribble (1999) 128-129 who stresses that 'the identification of the enemies of Alcibiades responsible for his exile with the oligarchic enemies of the city' aims to portray 'both Alcibiades and the democrats of 403 (…) as involved in a similar attempt to liberate the city from their (and its) natural enemies'.

democracy, but he so vigorously opposed their actions 'remaining faithful to the mass' (πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος πιστῶς διακείμενος) that they thought it impossible to carry out their plan until they had removed him.[117] Therefore, they combined together against him the charge of violating the Eleusinian Mysteries and that of attempting to overthrow the democratic government.[118] As a result, Alcibiades was compelled to go into exile but even then he took great care not to damage his πόλις, and thus went to Argos, where he 'lived quietly' (ἡσυχίαν εἶχεν). Within this framework, his subsequent flight to Sparta is presented as his only means of safety and as an unavoidable consequence of the pitch of ὕβρις reached by his enemies.[119]

In a rather similar way, Alcibiades the Younger denies any involvement of his father with the Thirty Tyrants. In order to do so, he equates his father's misfortunes to those experienced by the Athenian democrats who were banished by the Thirty and who did everything they could to get back to Athens, suggesting that it is precisely for this reason that they should sympathise with Alcibiades who sought to return to take revenge on those who had sent him into exile.[120] Indeed, Alcibiades the Younger argues, his father chose to suffer any misfortune with his πόλις rather than prospering with the Spartans, and he made manifest to all that he was making war not against Athens but only upon those who had banished him and that he desired not to destroy his πόλις but to secure his return.[121] Moreover, Isocrates makes Alcibiades the Younger underline the involvement of the prosecutor Teisias with the Thirty Tyrants,[122] and it is in this context that section 42 of the speech is addressed against Charicles (a relative of Teisias) who was precisely one of the Thirty. Isocrates puts both Teisias' and Charicles' deeds in open contrast with Alcibiades', thus corroborating his defence of the Athenian general against the charge of supporting oligarchy.

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[117] Isoc., *On the Team of Horses* 5. On this passage see Sacerdoti (1970) 21.

[118] Isoc., *On the Team of Horses* 6.

[119] Isoc., *On the Team of Horses* 9. On Alcibiades' flight to Argos see also Plut., *Life of Alcibiades* 23, 1, whereas Thuc., VI 88, 9 states that Alcibiades had flown from Thurii first to Cyllene in Elis and then from there to Sparta; on this matter see Sacerdoti (1970) 24. As Sacerdoti (1970) 25 highlights, in this passage the ὕβρις of Alcibiades' enemies is opposed to the πρόνοια that he demonstrates in avoiding to do any wrong to his πόλις even when he was in exile.

[120] Isoc., *On the Team of Horses* 12-14. For Alcibiades' alleged opposition to the Thirty Tyrants see also Isoc., *On the Team of Horses* 40.

[121] Isoc., *On the Team of Horses* 19.

[122] Isoc., *On the Team of Horses* 43-45.

In addition to defending Alcibiades from the accusation of being an oligarch, Isocrates, as I mentioned, also attempts to reject the charge that he aimed to make himself a tyrant. Indeed, he makes Alcibiades the Younger claim that many Athenians believe that his father was plotting a tyranny not on the basis of his actions but on the assumption that everyone aspires to it and that, in this respect, he had the best chance of becoming a tyrant. Thus, with greater reason, Alcibiades the Younger continues, the Athenians should be grateful to his father who, while being the only citizen worthy of this charge, regarded that he had to be on equal terms with his fellow citizens.[123] Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the Isocratean arguments against the tyranny charge stress Alcibiades' status as an extraordinary individual, who is somehow in competition with the πόλις itself 'almost as if he were another city'.[124] So, *On the Team of Horses* clearly hints at Isocrates' awareness of, and interest in, the intrinsic tension in the relation between great men like Alcibiades and the democratic πόλις.

Furthermore, the defence against the charges of being a sympathiser of oligarchy and of aiming at tyranny is closely linked, as I noted above, to the representation of Alcibiades as a convinced and loyal supporter of democracy, a depiction that is a key element of his portrait in this speech.[125] Not only does the speaker claim that his fellow citizens should be grateful to Alcibiades for the services he offered to Athens before he was exiled,[126] he also enumerates the many benefits that his father allegedly brought to the πόλις when he returned from his exile. In this regard, Alcibiades the Younger underlines the state of στάσις, μανία and distress in both military and financial terms prevailing in Athens before his father's return.[127] And among the various benefits yielded by Alcibiades to the Athenians according to his son, he is credited with restoring democracy in 411 (ἀπέδωκε δὲ τῷ δήμῳ τὴν πολιτείαν).[128] Indeed, Alcibiades

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[123] Isoc., *On the Team of Horses* 38. Gribble (1999) 114, who wrongly refers to this passage as belonging to section 28, regards it as a clear instance of how in the speech 'the encomiastic tone is (…) modulated to suit a democratic context'.

[124] Seager (1967) 12. See also Gribble (1999) 140-141. A similar aspect appears to emerge also from the recount of Alcibiades' participation to the Olympic games in Isoc., *On the Team of Horses* 34 where the speaker states that his father entered a larger number of teams than even the greatest πόλεις had done.

[125] In this regard, it is interesting to note, as Eck (2015) 39 points out, that in *On the Team of Horses* we can find around one quarter of all the occurrences of the word δῆμος in the whole Isocratean corpus.

[126] See Isoc., *On the Team of Horses* 15.

[127] Isoc., *On the Team of Horses* 16-18.

[128] Isoc., *On the Team of Horses* 20. See Gribble (1999) 119-120.

was such a genuine supporter of the Athenian people (δημοτικός), his son claims, that he preferred to suffer injustice at the hands of his own πόλις rather than to betray the Athenian democratic constitution.[129]

Thus, in order to depict Alcibiades as a convinced and loyal supporter of democracy Isocrates endeavours to link his fate with that of the Athenian democracy, an attempt which pervades the speech and reaches its peak in the final part of the work, particularly in *On the Team of Horses* 41. Indeed, in this section Alcibiades is said to have supported the Athenian democracy, suffered the same misfortunes that affected his πόλις and had the same friends and enemies as Athens, running risks at his fellow citizens' hands, on their account, on their behalf, and together with them.[130] In this respect, it is worth pointing out that this passage suggests how in *On the Team of Horses* Isocrates highlights, as Gribble puts it,

> not Alcibiades' similarities to the *demos*, but his *friendship* towards it. (…) The implication is that Alcibiades had a choice about whether to support the existing constitution in a way that other Athenians did not, and possibly even that he as an individual stood in a relationship of equality to the *demos*, their relations being those of individuals or cities with each other (enjoying either friendly or hostile relations).[131]

Furthermore, as Gribble himself notes, '[s]ince Alcibiades is a clear member of the élite of birth' Isocrates is neither able nor willing 'to portray him as an actual member of the *demos*'.[132] In a similar way, Turchi has underlined that the depiction of Alcibiades which emerges from *On the Team of Horses* is that of a leader who is not fettered by pre-conceived political schemes, and thus distances himself not only from the oligarchs but also ultimately from the

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[129] Isoc., *On the Team of Horses* 36. For a detailed examination of the use of the term δημοτικός in the Isocratean corpus see Chapter 5.

[130] For a depiction of Alcibiades as taking risks on behalf of his fellow citizens see also Isoc., *On the Team of Horses* 36. For a reference to Alcibiades sharing Athens' misfortunes see also Isoc., *On the Team of Horses* 38-41.

[131] Gribble (1999) 137-138 [his italics]. It is also worth noting that Gribble (1999) 138 points out that a similar impression can be derived from the defence of Alcibiades in Xen., *Hellenica* I, 4, 13-20.

[132] Gribble (1999) 119.

democrats because of the wrongs he considers to have suffered at their hands.[133]

Therefore, in this speech, along with his attempt to portray Alcibiades as an adamant advocate of the δῆμος, Isocrates (as we saw particularly in discussing the refutation of the charge of tyranny) maintains, and at the same time stresses, his status as a great man. Moreover, he shows himself to be well aware of the intrinsic friction existing in the relation between the élite individual and the democratic πόλις. In this respect, Isocrates tries to ease such a tension highlighting the benefits of Alcibiades towards Athens and thus attempting to find a place for leaders of great merit like him within the democratic πόλις.

In this light, I dissent with the hypothetical explanations provided by Bearzot for the Isocratean depiction of Alcibiades as a firm supporter of the Athenian democracy. More specifically, in addition to stressing the primary nature of *On the Team of Horses* as a forensic speech, Bearzot has suggested that either Isocrates in the 390s has not yet adopted an anti-democratic stance or the depiction of Alcibiades and his deeds in positive terms results from Isocrates' ill-concealed support of oligarchs like Theramenes and Thrasybulus, who had sought the return of Alcibiades to Athens.[134] Thus, Bearzot suggests that this speech might be considered as presenting an embryonic attempt by Isocrates to promote his alleged oligarchic propaganda in disguise. Such hypotheses lead, in my view, to a misinterpretation of the Isocratean characterisation of Alcibiades in *On the Team of Horses* since, first of all, they fail to recognise that Isocrates' ultimate emphasis lies on Alcibiades' special but problematic status as a great man within the democratic πόλις. Significantly, this aspect is not confined to *On the Team of Horses* as it re-emerges in the references to him in *Busiris* and *To Philip*,[135] two passages that are not analysed by Bearzot and on which I shall focus below. Secondly, the interpretations offered by Bearzot overlook the fact that, as we shall see, the speech hints, although *in nuce*, at some of Isocrates' main ideas on external and internal leadership that are then developed throughout the corpus.

In examining the Isocratean portrait of Alcibiades in *On the Team of Horses*, particular attention has to be devoted also to the digression on his

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[133] See Turchi (1984) 116.
[134] See Bearzot (1980) 116.
[135] See Gribble (1999) 137-138.

ancestors since this excursus sheds light on Isocrates' characterisation of the Athenian general and exemplifies, more broadly, his key views on leadership in both foreign and internal politics. Indeed, after stressing that on his paternal side Alcibiades belonged to the Eupatrids,[136] and that on his maternal side he was a descendant of Alcmeon, the speaker focuses on the 'goodwill' (εὔνοια) that the Alcmeonids displayed 'towards the mass' (εἰς τὸ πλῆθος), with specific reference to the time of the Pisistratids when, despite being kinsmen of Pisistratus, they refused to partake his tyranny, preferring to go into exile rather than to see their fellow citizens being enslaved.[137] In addition, Alcibiades the Younger underlines not only the deep hatred of the Pisistratids for the Alcmeonids, but also the fact that during all the period of the rule of Pisistratus and his sons his ancestors continued to be the leaders of the people (ἅπαντα τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον ἡγούμενοι τοῦ δήμου διετέλεσαν) and that Alcibiades (I) and Cleisthenes, his father's grandfathers,[138] after having assumed the leadership of those in exile, 'restored the people' (κατήγαγον τὸν δῆμον) and threw out the Pisistratids.[139]

Indeed, Isocrates, through the words that he puts into the mouth of Alcibiades the Younger, praises Alcibiades' forefathers focusing on three aspects in particular. First of all, 'they established that democracy' (κατέστησαν ἐκείνην τὴν δημοκρατίαν)[140] as a result of which the Athenians were so well trained in bravery that they managed to prevail on their own over the barbarians who had attacked Greece at the time of the Persian Wars. Secondly, they gained so much 'repute' (δόξα) for justice that the Greeks willingly entrusted to them 'the empire of the sea' (ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς θαλάττης). Finally, they enabled the

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[136] While this term could simply be a designation for all aristocrats, Hatzfeld (1951) 3-8 argues that here Isocrates does refer to the actual γένος. See also Gribble (1999) 124 who argues that the reference to the Eupatrids as Alcibiades' paternal γένος can be interpreted as 'an attempt misleadingly to exaggerate the aristocratic status of the family'.

[137] Isoc., *On the Team of Horses* 25, where Alcmeon is described as the first Athenian citizen to win at Olympia with a team of horses.

[138] Cleisthenes in reality was not Alcibiades the Younger's great-grandfather but the uncle of his maternal grandfather Megacles; see Sacerdoti (1970) 37 and Eck (2015) 40. For other Isocratean references to Cleisthenes as being opposed to the Pisistratid tyranny and as the founder of the Athenian democracy see Isoc., *Areopagiticus* 16 (where Isocrates argues that the democratic constitution established by Cleisthenes was a restoration of that which Solon had enacted by law), *Antidosis* 232 and 306 (where Cleisthenes is not explicitly mentioned by name but it is rather clear that Isocrates alludes to him). Concerning Alcibiades (I), this passage from *On the Team of Horses* represents the only evidence for his participation in the expulsion of the Pisistratids.

[139] Isoc., *On the Team of Horses* 26.

[140] I agree with Pownall (2013) 349 in assigning to the verb καθίστημι the meaning of 'to establish' rather than 'to restore'.

Athenians to expand their power so that Athens is rightly regarded as the capital of Greece.[141] Therefore, the speaker continues, Alcibiades not only has inherited from his ancestors a 'friendship with the people' (φιλία πρὸς τὸν δῆμον) that is 'ancient' (παλαιά), 'genuine' (γνησία) and has come into being 'through the greatest services' (διὰ τὰς μεγίστας εὐεργεσίας),[142] but has also proved himself not inferior to his forefathers' legacy.[143]

And it is in this context that the speaker, as we saw in the previous section, mentions Pericles, Alcibiades' uncle and guardian, who is described as 'the most temperate' (σωφρονέστατος), 'the most just' (δικαιότατος) and 'the wisest' (σοφώτατος) of citizens.[144] In this regard, Too, after stressing that here Pericles is presented as the 'paradigm of the civic virtues of moderation, justice and wisdom',[145] adds that:

> Inasmuch as Pericles is an ideal citizen, his education of Alcibiades implies the orphan's allegiance to Athenian values and ideals. The speaker offers this depiction of his father's upbringing in response to the literary tradition, which portrays Alcibiades as the treacherous Athenian, indeed as the antithesis of the citizen. By so doing, he takes issue with the iconography, which presents the general as the student who betrayed what Athenian education and culture had to offer to him.[146]

Therefore, the digression on Alcibiades' ancestors provides interesting points for reflection about some of the key aspects which characterise Isocrates' portrait of Alcibiades in *On the Team of Horses* and, more broadly, about his ideas on leadership, which, as I mentioned earlier, are referred to, at least *in nuce*, in this speech and will be more fully developed later on in the corpus. Indeed, it is worth stressing, first of all, that this excursus appears to be designed mainly to endorse the picture of Alcibiades as a convinced supporter

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[141] Isoc., *On the Team of Horses* 27. The same description of Athens as capital of Greece occurs also in Isoc., *Antidosis* 299.
[142] Isoc., *On the Team of Horses* 28.
[143] Isoc., *On the Team of Horses* 29.
[144] See Isoc., *On the Team of Horses* 28; on the reference to Pericles in this passage see also section 2.1 of the present chapter.
[145] Too (1995) 217.
[146] Too (1995) 218. See also Too (1995) 219, who points out that in the subsequent sections of the speech Alcibiades' 'participation and victory in the equestrian competition become part of the portrayal of the responsible Athenian citizen, personified earlier in this oration by the figure of Pericles'.

of democracy. Moreover, the focus on the Alcmeonids' strenuous opposition to the Pisistratids can be interpreted as supporting the refutation of the tyranny charges brought against Alcibiades, which Isocrates explicitly rejects, as we saw, in section 38. Indeed, the emphasis on the fact that the Alcmeonids went against the tight bonds of kinship[147] when contrasting the Pisistratids further corroborates the argument that they were radical opponents of tyranny.

Remarkably, the Isocratean account of the expulsion of the Pisistratids differs from the one that we usually find in the other Attic orators. Indeed, even though as we shall see below Demosthenes in *Against Meidias* does attribute the liberation of Athens from the tyranny of the Pisistratids to Alcibiades' forebears, Isocrates appears to deviate deliberately from the fourth-century oratorical tradition that generally endorsed the version attributing the expulsion of the Pisistratids to the two tyrannicides Harmodius and Aristogeiton.[148] In this respect, we can make a comparison with what Alcibiades says in the speech that, according to Thucydides, he delivered at Sparta. Here Alcibiades stresses the Alcmeonids' long-standing hostility to tyranny and leadership of the multitude (τοῖς γὰρ τυράννοις αἰεί ποτε διάφοροί ἐσμεν…ἀπ᾽ ἐκείνου ξυμπαρέμεινεν ἡ προστασία ἡμῖν τοῦ πλήθους).[149] However, in specifying that he and his family felt compelled to conform to democracy mainly because it represented the inherited constitution under which Athens had achieved greatness and freedom, Alcibiades does not hesitate to define it as a blatant folly.[150] To that effect, the portrait of Alcibiades and, more broadly, of the Alcmeonids in *On the Team of Horses* differs significantly from the overall picture drawn by Alcibiades himself in the Thucydidean speech.

By giving credit to Alcibiades' ancestors for both the liberation of the πόλις from tyranny and the foundation of democracy, Isocrates intends to substantiate through this digression the main features characterising the representation of Alcibiades in his forensic speech, namely his fervent support of democracy and his strong opposition to tyranny, two aspects that, Isocrates appears to suggest, he inherited from his ancestors. Nonetheless, as I noted above, in the depiction of Alcibiades in the Isocratean speech the emphasis lies ultimately on his status as an élite individual as well as on the issues posed by

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[147] Pisistratus married Megacles' daughter; see Hdt., I 60, 2; 61, 1.
[148] See Pownall (2013).
[149] Thuc., VI 89, 4.
[150] Thuc., VI 89, 5-6.

leadership: first and foremost in terms of the problematic relation between great individuals like him and the democratic πόλις but also, taking an even closer look, with regard to Athens' hegemonic role in international politics.

In other words, I would suggest that some of Isocrates' main ideas on leadership, which we have unearthed in the previous section, arise in *On the Team of Horses* in their early stages from the overall portrait of the Athenian general throughout the speech as well as from the excursus on Alcibiades' ancestors. More specifically, concerning this digression, the first element which comes to light in relation to the Isocratean views on leadership is the crucial role played by 'goodwill' (εὔνοια). Indeed, εὔνοια is a particularly relevant concept, as we saw above, in the reshaping of Athens' hegemony over Greece promoted in *On the Peace*. Significantly, in the excursus on the Alcmeonids their leadership is characterised precisely by the goodwill that they have shown towards their fellow citizens. More precisely, their leadership is framed in terms of both εὔνοια and φιλία towards the people, two elements that are closely interrelated with one another. As Mitchell has pointed out, εὔνοια represents:

> the proper response to φιλία-relationships, whether public or private, because it was the proper response not only to the exchange itself, but to the inclusive relationship that was created.[151]

In this respect, it is worth highlighting that here, unlike in the case of *On the Peace* that we have examined in the previous section, Isocrates applies the concept of εὔνοια not to interstate relations but to domestic politics, namely to the relation between individual leaders of great merit and the Athenian δῆμος. Interestingly, the reference to the εὔνοια of the Alcmeonids anticipates the attribution of the same quality to Alcibiades himself later in the speech when he is described as a perfect example of a man 'most well disposed' (εὐνούστατος) toward the πόλις;[152] his goodwill towards his fellow citizens is indeed easily recognisable not only from his services to them but also from the wrongs he suffered on their account.[153]

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[151] Mitchell (1997) 43-44.
[152] Isoc., *On the Team of Horses* 39.
[153] Isoc., *On the Team of Horses* 41.

Furthermore, what Isocrates makes Alcibiades the Younger say about both his forebears' and his father's goodwill towards their fellow citizens can also be compared to the reference to εὔνοια that we find in *Antidosis* in connection with Isocrates' defence of Timotheus. More particularly, his former pupil is praised for winning the goodwill of the allies towards Athens and for realising that the friendship of the other πόλεις is what made Athens prosperous and powerful.[154] Nevertheless, at the same time he is criticised for making the fundamental mistake of failing to cultivate the goodwill of his fellow citizens towards himself.[155] In other words, in *Antidosis* Timotheus, unlike Alcibiades and his ancestors in *On the Team of Horses*, is described as not having understood the importance of building the crucial, yet problematic, relation between leaders of great merit (like himself) and the δῆμος on mutual εὔνοια. Therefore, if we compare what Isocrates makes Alcibiades the Younger say about both his father and his ancestors regarding εὔνοια with what Isocrates himself states in *Antidosis* about Timotheus concerning the same topic, we can infer that in *On the Team of Horses* Isocrates deals, at least *in nuce*, with one of the key concepts of his political thought. Indeed, εὔνοια turns out to be a notion at the heart of his ideas on leadership and, more specifically, of his discussion of the main features characterising a good leader both within and as a democratic πόλις like Athens.

The second aspect related to Isocrates' interest in leadership that emerges from the excursus on Alcibiades' ancestors is the theme of the other Greeks' willing subjection to Athens. More specifically, in this digression, in addition to referring to internal leadership as we have seen in the case of εὔνοια, Isocrates does also allude to Athens' position as leading πόλις in the Hellenic world when he makes Alcibiades the Younger state that, because of the great reputation for justice reached by Alcibiades' forefathers, all other Greeks voluntarily put into the hands of the Athenians the dominion of the sea. Such a reference, which probably hints at the foundation of the Delian League, is noteworthy since it is the first occurrence in the Isocratean corpus of an allusion to the other Greeks' willing subjection to the Athenian hegemony, a key idea which we find again in his subsequent works.[156] Indeed, Isocrates returns

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[154] Isoc., *Antidosis* 122. See Too (2008) 154
[155] Isoc., *Antidosis* 135.
[156] See Sacerdoti (1970) 38.

to it especially in *On the Peace* where, as I mentioned earlier, he strongly criticises Athens' oppressive conduct in international politics and holds it responsible for leading the allies to replace the goodwill they had accorded to the πόλις with hatred. Contextually, he suggests a new model of foreign relations based primarily on winning back the goodwill of the Greeks and obtaining their willingness to submit themselves to Athens' leadership. Moreover, the same topic also occurs, for instance, in Isocrates' last major speech, *Panathenaicus*, when in his account of the Delian League he stresses that the allies willingly conferred upon the Athenians the supremacy by sea.[157]

Isocrates' reference to the Greeks subjecting themselves *sua sponte* to the Athenians is reminiscent of Xenophon's remarks on willing obedience.[158] And to the extent to which Xenophon is interested in willing obedience, he is also interested, as Romilly notes, 'in establishing such a system of rewards that eunoia should become natural'; yet, as Romilly herself goes on to stress, Xenophon's discussion of willing obedience, and thus his interest in εὔνοια, remain largely (even if not exclusively) confined to military leadership.[159] So, it is only in the Isocratean corpus that the notions of willing subjection and εὔνοια are consistently extended to the field of international politics with specific reference to the need to reshape Athens' hegemonic role within the Hellenic world.

Isocrates' interest in Athens' leadership over Greece in *On the Team of Horses* is revealed also by the fact that, as I underlined above, the speech positions itself within the debate around Athenian imperialism that was particularly vivid at the beginning of the fourth century. In this regard, the positive characterisation of Alcibiades in this Isocratean work can be linked to the renewed imperialistic aspirations of Athens in the 390s.[160] Thus, the overall depiction of Alcibiades in favourable terms that emerges from the forensic speech appears to be closely related to the idea of recovering the power of the great days of the Athenian empire somehow embodied by Alcibiades himself, an idea which took root precisely at that time, namely just before the beginning of the Corinthian War.[161] On the other hand, the allusion to the other Greeks'

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[157] Isoc., *Panathenaicus* 67.
[158] On the relevance of the τόπος of willing obedience in the Xenophontic corpus see, for instance, Gray (2007) 7-8 and Gray (2011) 180-196.
[159] Romilly (1958) 94.
[160] See Gribble (1999) 121.
[161] See Bianco (1993) 19.

willing subjection to Athens in the excursus devoted to the Alcmeonids shows how Isocrates addresses here a key aspect that will become one of the cornerstones of the renewed model of Athenian hegemony that he promotes later on in his corpus.

In short, given the primary nature of *On the Team of Horses* as a forensic speech, it is nonetheless possible to identify in this work the presence, at least *in nuce*, of some crucial elements closely related to the Isocratean views on the topic of leadership in both internal and foreign politics. More specifically, Isocrates refers for the first time to the notion of εὔνοια as well as to the idea of the other Greeks' willingness to subject themselves to Athens' hegemony. Both these key aspects are reiterated and developed throughout his following works in connection with his reflection on what characterises strong leadership and especially on the need to reshape Athens' position abroad accordingly.

Alcibiades in *Busiris*

It is worth pointing out that Isocrates briefly mentions Alcibiades also in *Busiris*. Indeed, in the opening sections of this eulogy of the mythical king of Egypt, Isocrates states that he aims to show that in the *Defence of Busiris* and the *Accusation of Socrates* Polycrates, the author of these two works, missed what was really needed in order to achieve his intended results.[162] More precisely, addressing Polycrates himself, Isocrates points out that in the *Accusation of Socrates* by claiming that the philosopher had been the teacher of Alcibiades, a man who notoriously 'excelled' (διήνεγκε) all his contemporaries, Polycrates actually ends up praising Socrates instead of achieving his alleged purpose of attacking him.[163] Once again, then, Isocrates appears to commend Alcibiades by portraying him in favourable terms. However, the verb διαφέρω, despite being employed mainly in a positive sense (such as in *On the Team of Horses* 11 where it refers likewise to Alcibiades' superiority over his fellow citizens), can at times convey a negative meaning. In this regard, Livingstone has highlighted that this verb means 'occasionally 'to outdo' others in some negative quality', adding that:

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[162] See Isoc., *Busiris* 4.
[163] Isoc., *Busiris* 5. See Too (1995) 216 who, by referring to both this passage and *On the Team of Horses*, highlights how Isocrates, contrasting the contemporary tradition which makes Alcibiades a pupil of Socrates, holds him as pupil of Pericles.

the use of the verb on its own here just about leaves space for divergent assessments of Alcibiades (everyone agrees that he 'was exceptional'— for good or ill), while strongly suggesting (falsely, but as suits the argument) that everyone agrees in a positive assessment.[164]

Thus, in a similar way to the overall characterisation of Alcibiades that emerges from *On the Team of Horses*, this passage in *Busiris* suggests that Isocrates ultimately intends to put the spotlight on his extraordinary status as a great man and the issues inherent to it.

Alcibiades in the other Attic orators

It is nevertheless undeniable that Isocrates' characterisation of Alcibiades in overall positive terms both in *On the Team of Horses* and in *Busiris* 5 appears to differ from the other rhetorical portraits of the Athenian general known to us, which usually convey a negative image. Indeed, Lysias' prosecution speech *Against Alcibiades (I) For deserting the ranks*,[165] written for the trial that took place immediately after the battle of Haliartus (395), consists in an attack against Alcibiades the Younger carried out side by side with that against his father in order to show that, although Alcibiades the Younger was the most contemptible of his breed, father and son, as well as their ancestors, were all enemies of the πόλις and were characterised by the same moral degeneration.[166]

Interestingly, Lysias' speech is closely related to *On the Team of Horses* not only because it belongs to the court actions that, like Isocrates' speech, involved Alcibiades the Younger in the context of the debate on Alcibiades and the wider discussion on the Athenian empire going on in the 390s, but also because we can identify some specific correspondences between the two speeches. For instance, in *Against Alcibiades (I)* the speaker strongly criticises the parallelism between Alcibiades' exile and that of the democrats of 403,[167]

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[164] Livingstone (2001) 109. On the use of the expression διαφέρειν τῶν ἄλλων in the Isocratean corpus to refer to Alcibiades see additionally Gribble (1999) 137, who highlights that such phrase indicates his 'outstanding place not just in the community, but also with regard to all his fellow men'.

[165] This speech along with Lys., *Against Alcibiades (II) For refusal of military service* represents part of a prosecution brought by a certain Archestratides against Alcibiades the Younger for illegally serving in the cavalry.

[166] See Gribble (1999) 101.

[167] See Lys., *Against Alcibiades (I)* 32-33.

which is a key aspect of *On the Team of Horses*. In the Isocratean speech, as we have seen, the enemies of Alcibiades, responsible for his exile, are identified with the oligarchical enemies of Athens.[168] In this regard, while Isocrates stresses that Alcibiades, driven by the desire to return to Athens, had made war not against his πόλις but only against those responsible for sending him into exile, Lysias claims that he had marched more often in the ranks of Athens' enemies against his own πόλις than in those of his fellow citizens.[169]

Moreover, Lysias also refers to the fact that Alcibiades the Younger's great-grandfathers (namely Alcibiades and Megacles) were ostracised twice. In doing so, Lysias intends to corroborate his depiction of Alcibiades' son as a 'hereditary enemy' (πατρικὸς ἐχθρός) of Athens.[170] Conversely, Isocrates, as I have illustrated above, praises his forefathers, thus endorsing the portrait of Alcibiades as a loyal supporter of democracy. As Gribble has pointed out, some of the correspondences between *Against Alcibiades (I)* and *On the Team of Horses* suggest that Lysias is responding to Isocrates, while some others may indicate that Isocrates also replies to Lysias, so it is possible to assume that Isocrates' speech represents a revised version published after *Against Alcibiades (I)* was delivered at the desertion trial.[171]

Be that as it may, Lysias' speech presents a polarised picture of Alcibiades compared to *On the Team of Horses* and the intertextuality between the two speeches bears witness to the widespread debate on Alcibiades, which, as I mentioned earlier, was particularly vivid in Athens at the beginning of the fourth century and which was linked to the debate on Athenian imperialism going on at the same time. Indeed, by portraying Alcibiades (along with his son) in such a negative light, Lysias not only attempts to tone down the favour around him, which was very lively at the beginning of the fourth century, but also appears to highlight, through the figure of Alcibiades, the harmful results of

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[168] See Gribble (1999) 128.
[169] Lys., *Against Alcibiades (I)* 30.
[170] Lys., *Against Alcibiades (I)* 39-40.
[171] See Gribble (1999) 107-111 who challenges the theory of Bruns (1896) 495-500 according to which both Isocrates' *On the Team of Horses* and Lysias' *Against Alcibiades (I)* can be regarded as reworkings of the original court speeches. Bruns' reconstruction had already been questioned by Seager (1967) 16-18 who reached the conclusion that Isocrates' speech preceded a single complete version of Lysias'. See also Nouhaud (1982) 296 n. 201 and Carey (1989) 149-150 who consider *On the Team of Horses* as preceding *Against Alcibiades (I)*; similarly, Bianco (1993) 21 believes that Lysias' speech represents a clear reply to Isocrates.

the fifth-century Athenian empire and thus the need to avoid giving way to the renewed imperialistic aspirations.

Another well-known rhetorical depiction of Alcibiades is represented by the speech *Against Alcibiades*, which has been transmitted among the works of Andocides although many scholars consider it as a spurious work by a later author, probably composed in the mid- or late fourth century.[172] The speech appears to be set in 416/415, since the dramatic occasion is usually regarded as being that of the ostracism of Hyperbolus involving Alcibiades, Nicias and the speaker himself who can perhaps be identified with Phaeax.[173] All events included in the work are indeed prior to this date, so there is no reference, for example, to the performance of the Mysteries or the mutilation of the Herms,[174] and the work assumes the tone of an invective against Alcibiades with attacks upon both his private and public conduct. Concerning the latter aspect, the speaker accuses Alcibiades not only of having recommended the attack against Melos in 416,[175] but also of having damaged Athens' relationship with its allies by doubling the contribution of each member of the Delian League for his own personal interest; thus, Alcibiades' policy towards the allies is contrasted with that of Aristeides, who is said to have assessed the tribute with the utmost fairness.[176]

Furthermore, Alcibiades is considered as not being a genuine supporter of democracy and this charge goes hand in hand with that of refusing to treat his own fellow citizens as equals.[177] In this respect, [Andocides] makes a clear reference to the suspicion that he intends to make himself tyrant[178] and regards his treatment of Diomedes at Olympia as a glaring example of his refusal to accept fellow Athenians as his equals.[179] Indeed, [Andocides] goes on to argue, Alcibiades 'proves that the democracy is worth nothing' (οὐδενὸς ἀξίαν τὴν

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[172] See Gribble (1999) 90. Instead, Raubitschek (1948) 192-193 points to features of the speech which suggest a fifth-century origin; see also Bianco (1993) 15-16 who believes that the speech might indeed have been written by Andocides and regards it as belonging, like Isocrates' *On the Team of Horses* and Lysias' *Against Alcibiades (I)*, to the debate on Athenian imperialism going on at the beginning of the fourth century.

[173] On the identity of the speaker as Phaeax see Bianco (1993) 13 and Gribble (1999) 154.

[174] See Turchi (1984) 117; see also Gribble (1999) 154-155.

[175] See [Andoc.], *Against Alcibiades* 22-23.

[176] See [Andoc.], *Against Alcibiades* 11-12. On Alcibiades' behaviour as being responsible for the allies' hatred towards Athens see [Andoc.], *Against Alcibiades* 28.

[177] See [Andoc.], *Against Alcibiades* 13. On Alcibiades aiming to be superior not only to the other Athenian citizens, but even to the laws, thus endangering the greatest safeguard possessed by the πόλις, see [Andoc.], *Against Alcibiades* 19.

[178] See [Andoc.], *Against Alcibiades* 24.

[179] See [Andoc.], *Against Alcibiades* 25-26.

δημοκρατίαν ἀποφαίνει) since he speaks like a leader of the people but acts like a tyrant (τοὺς μὲν λόγους δημαγωγοῦ τὰ δ᾽ ἔργα τυράννου παρέχων) having realised that his fellow citizens are not concerned about tyranny in itself but only about the word.[180] Significantly, in this context δημαγωγός (which here indicates what Alcibiades only pretends to be) does not appear to bear a derogatory sense. On the contrary, the contrast with τύραννος (which reveals, according to [Andocides], Alcibiades' real attitude) entails the function of δημαγωγός as the positive pole in the antithesis between democracy and tyranny. Therefore, the use of δημαγωγός in this passage from *Against Alcibiades* corroborates what I have pointed out in the first part of the present chapter regarding the possibility of employing the term without any pejorative connotation in itself as it appears to be the case in Isocrates. Nevertheless, while [Andocides] establishes an opposition between δημαγωγός and τύραννος, this is not necessarily the case in the Isocratean corpus. Indeed, as we saw in the previous section, δημαγωγέω and τυραννέω, far from being regarded as incompatible, are employed simultaneously in a positive sense in *Helen* 37 with reference to Theseus.

Going back to the comparison between *Against Alcibiades* and *On the Team of Horses*, it is also worth highlighting that, by means of a contrast between his own family and that of Alcibiades, [Andocides] alludes to the fact that both Alcibiades' grandfathers had been ostracised twice[181] (an episode that, as we saw, is referred to also in Lysias' speech) and that the Athenian general falsely states to be 'well disposed toward the people' (εὔνους τῷ δήμῳ) accusing others of being supporters of oligarchy and enemies of democracy.[182] Particularly noteworthy in this regard is the difference with *On the Team of Horses* where, as we have highlighted, the reference to Alcibiades' ancestors is designed to stress his loyalty to democracy and where special emphasis is put on Alcibiades' and his forefathers' goodwill towards their fellow citizens. So, in the portrait painted by [Andocides], Alcibiades is depicted as being characterised by lawlessness, ὕβρις and violence against his own πόλις.

It is within this framework that his performance in the chariot-race at Olympia is presented as a sign of Alcibiades' '(own) *dunamis*, in direct and

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[180] See [Andoc.], *Against Alcibiades* 27.
[181] See [Andoc.], *Against Alcibiades* 34.
[182] See [Andoc.], *Against Alcibiades* 16. A similar phrase occurs with reference to Alcibiades' son in Lys., *Against Alcibiades (I)*10 where the speaker says that Alcibiades the Younger was not 'well-disposed toward the mass' (εὔνους τῷ πλήθει).

dangerous rivalry with the city', whose power is darkened by that displayed by the élite individual.[183] Nonetheless, [Andocides] underlines that Alcibiades was capable of inspiring not only fear but also awe, thus revealing some sort of admiration towards him and the awareness of his significance for the πόλις.[184] In other words, unlike Lysias who avoids portraying him as possessing a special status and focuses instead on his πονηρία, [Andocides] concentrates his attention on Alcibiades' hybristic attitude. Indeed, the ὕβρις displayed by Alcibiades inevitably gives rise to hostility but also to admiration leading to the recognition of his outstanding position as a great individual within the democratic πόλις.[185]

Lastly, in addition to Lysias' and [Andocides]' rhetorical attacks against Alcibiades, we can find a brief characterisation in apparently not very favourable terms also in Demosthenes' *Against Meidias* (347/6).[186] More specifically, in sections 143-150 of this speech the orator makes a reference to Alcibiades in order to undercut the argument that Meidias, because of his public services, should not be punished severely. As Demosthenes himself points out, the allusion to Alcibiades is designed to prove not only that the Athenians should not tolerate anything, neither birth, nor wealth, nor power, if it is coupled with ὕβρις, but also that Alcibiades' arrogance, although very remarkable, was inferior to that displayed by Meidias. Demosthenes does acknowledge the merits of Alcibiades' ancestors and praises in particular the Alcmeonids for freeing Athens from tyranny by driving the Pisistratids into exile, a version of the story similar to the one that we have found in the Isocratean excursus.

Moreover, he highlights the services which Alcibiades himself rendered to the Athenian democracy referring also to his victory at Olympia, and stressing the εὔνοια that he showed towards his πόλις, a key feature which, as I discussed earlier, emerges as a crucial aspect in *On the Team of Horses*. Nevertheless, Demosthenes criticises his ὕβρις underlining that all his

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[183] Gribble (1999) 65.
[184] See [Andoc.], *Against Alcibiades* 18. [Andocides]' passage calls to mind the statement on Alcibiades in Ar., *Frogs* 1425 that I have mentioned in the introduction to the present section.
[185] See Gribble (1999) 142, who points out that the 'difference of strategy' between Lysias and [Andocides] can be interpreted as 'partly related to the rhetorical purposes of the two speeches' since Lysias aims at 'a conviction of Alcibiades' son for desertion', whereas [Andocides] 'is putting the case that Alcibiades should be ostracized, a context where it is important to argue that the accused is a danger to the community rather than that he is an object of contempt'.
[186] Harris (1989) 121-123 and MacDowell (1990) 10-11 date the speech to 347/6. Concerning its composition and delivery see MacDowell (1990) 23-28 who underlines how the question of whether or not it was actually delivered remains open.

remarkable services did not entitle him to commit outrages upon his fellow citizens and did not prevent him from being exiled. So, the Demosthenic depiction is one in which, while Alcibiades' hybristic attitude is clearly condemned, special emphasis is put on his extraordinary character, and his position of superiority within Athens is particularly stressed in opposition to the representation of Meidias.[187]

The above-mentioned rhetorical portraits can be interpreted in the context of the first two stages of the tradition on Alcibiades that, as I briefly mentioned earlier, have been identified by Gribble: polarisation in the fifth and first half of the fourth century, ambivalence by the later half of the fourth century. Thus, Demosthenes' and [Andocides]' depictions appear to belong to the second stage, whereas the negative characterisation in Lysias' *Against Alcibiades (I)* and the positive one in *On the Team of Horses* can be regarded as polar opposites fitting into the first stage of the tradition on him. Nevertheless, the overall Isocratean depiction is significantly more nuanced than it might appear at first sight.

Alcibiades in *To Philip*

Indeed, the representation of Alcibiades in apparently favourable terms in *On the Team of Horses* and in the brief allusion to him in *Busiris* is problematised by the reference to him in a passage from *To Philip*. In sections 58-61 of this speech Alcibiades is mentioned along with Conon, Dionysius and Cyrus the Great as a historical example to support Isocrates' claim that Philip could easily bring together the Greek πόλεις. More specifically, Isocrates stresses that when he was exiled in 415, Alcibiades, unlike others who had been in the same circumstances before him, did not feel intimidated by Athens' greatness. On the contrary, he tried to return 'by force' (βίᾳ) and thus deliberately made war against his own πόλις. As a result, he caused great 'confusion' (ταραχή) not only for Athens but also for Sparta and the rest of Greece. Focusing then on the Spartans, Isocrates claims that Alcibiades was responsible for plunging them from their previous prosperity into their current state of misfortune. By following Alcibiades' advice to seek sea power, the Spartans ended up losing even their hegemony on land; thus one can reach the conclusion that 'the beginning of

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[187] See Gribble (1999) 142-143.

their present ills' (ἡ ἀρχὴ (...) τῶν παρόντων κακῶν) came when they attempted to gain 'the empire of the sea' (ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς θαλάττης). After having provoked all these troubles, Alcibiades managed to return to Athens winning 'a great reputation' (μεγάλη δόξα), although Isocrates concludes by stressing that not everyone commended him.[188]

So, this passage from *To Philip* appears to present a much less favourable view than the depictions that we find in *On the Team of Horses* and *Busiris* since here Isocrates highlights not only the turbulence into which Alcibiades allegedly threw all Greece but also the fact that even though he managed to reach his goal (namely securing his return), the praise which he enjoyed in Athens was not unanimous. Indeed, in *On the Team of Horses*, as I pointed out, Isocrates apparently justifies Alcibiades' attempt to return to Athens by every means and to avenge himself on his enemies responsible for his exile and identified with the oligarchic enemies of the πόλις itself, whereas in *To Philip* Alcibiades' warlike actions are described as being directed against the whole πόλις, not exclusively against those who had sent him into exile. Although the emphasis on his decision not to accept exile but to secure his return by force can be read as evidence of his greatness of character,[189] it also suggests a critical appraisal of Alcibiades' conduct, even more so as his use of force appears to be opposed to the key notion of εὔνοια, as we will see more in depth below.

It is also worth noting that in *To Philip* the figure of Alcibiades is linked once again to the reflection on Athenian imperialism. Indeed, as we saw, in *On the Team of Horses* the portrait of Alcibiades in positive terms can be related to the revival of Athens' aspirations to the empire at the beginning of the fourth century and to Isocrates' likely support of those renewed ambitions. By contrast, here the fact that Alcibiades is presented as the cause of the ruin of the Spartans for advising them to seek naval supremacy hints at a certain criticism towards sea power, which is indeed described as the beginning of all ills for Sparta. In this regard, we can find the same play of words with the dual meaning of ἀρχή applied to the Spartans (in reference to the reasons that led to

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[188] See Gribble (1999) 128 for a comparison between the depiction of Alcibiades in this passage from *To Philip* and a similar presentation of Evagoras and the actions he took after being exiled in Isoc., *Evagoras* 27-32.
[189] See Gribble (1999) 128, 139.

their defeat at Leuctra) in *On the Peace*,[190] a speech where, as we saw in the first part of the present chapter, Isocrates' sharp criticism towards Athens' empire and its sea power is overt. Nevertheless, as I highlighted above, rather than being an end unto itself, such criticism represents, in Isocrates' view, a necessary path to follow in order to reach the ultimate goal of reshaping, not rejecting, the Athenian hegemony over Greece.

Significantly, a similar *paronomasia* based on the two meanings of the term ἀρχή is employed also in *Panegyricus* 119 where Isocrates argues that the moment when Athens was deprived of its empire marked the beginning of ills for all Greeks. Thus, this passage from *Panegyricus* seems, at least at first sight, to conflict with the use of the same *paronomasia* in *On the Peace* 101. However, in *On the Peace* Isocrates does not entirely reject or abandon the programme put forward in 380. Indeed, the speech, which as we saw was written in the mid 350s, marks a turning point, rather than a breaking point, in the Isocratean views on Athenian hegemony in the sense that it advocates a rethinking on different foundations, not a complete condemnation, of Athens' leadership within the Hellenic world. So, the links emerging both in *On the Team of Horses* and *To Philip* between the depiction of Alcibiades and the discussion on imperialism should not be considered as contradictory. Rather, they can be interpreted in the broader context of the development of Isocrates' ideas on leadership as they emerge especially in *On the Peace*. In this respect, provided the differences in chronology and rhetorical purpose between these speeches, εὔνοια in particular represents a *fil rouge* running from *On the Team of Horses* to *To Philip* through the crossing point of *On the Peace*, in which it is so pre-eminent, as we saw above.

Indeed, after occurring for the first time in the corpus in *On the Team of Horses*, εὔνοια (re-)emerges in *To Philip* as a key feature when discussing Philip's role as military leader of the Panhellenic campaign against Persia. More specifically, after having presented the four historical examples (i.e. Conon, Dionysius and Cyrus, in addition to Alcibiades himself) that corroborate his argument according to which the king of Macedon would easily bring together the Greek πόλεις leading them against Persia, Isocrates, in order to encourage even further Philip to undertake this exploit, states as follows: if Philip manages

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[190] Isoc., *On the Peace* 101.

to achieve such a deed, his 'reputation' (δόξα) will be greatly enhanced, but even if he does not accomplish this goal, he will still gain the εὔνοια of the Greeks. Winning their goodwill, Isocrates continues, is certainly better than taking by force many Greek πόλεις as that entails several negative consequences, such as envy and enmity.[191] The reference to εὔνοια in this passage from *To Philip*, where gaining the goodwill of the Greek πόλεις is manifestly opposed to seizing them by force (with all the negative consequences that result from it), calls to mind by contrast Alcibiades' conduct towards Athens as described in section 58 of the speech. Here, Isocrates, as we saw, underlines that, instead of trying to obtain the goodwill of his πόλις, Alcibiades decided to wage war against it in order to secure his return. Therefore, even though in *To Philip* Isocrates reiterates Alcibiades' excellence (already underlined in *On the Team of Horses* and *Busiris*) by including him among the historical examples of men who accomplished deeds of great magnitude and difficulty,[192] this portrait challenges the overall positive characterisation that appears to emerge from the two previous Isocratean portraits. The determining factor lies precisely in εὔνοια. And, more specifically, in gaining the εὔνοια of the Athenians, which is the key point not only in *On the Team of Horses*, but also ultimately in *To Philip*.[193] Indeed, while in *On the Team of Horses* Alcibiades is praised for displaying goodwill towards his fellow citizens, the main flaw of the Alcibades of *To Philip* consists in failing to acknowledge the relevance of this mutual relation of εὔνοια between great men and the community that they aim to lead. In this respect, disregarding the need to gain the goodwill of the Athenians is a serious error with significant adverse effects as already indicated by the fate of Timotheus in *Antidosis*. Here in *To Philip*, by employing Alcibiades as a rhetorical example and maintaining a fundamentally Athenocentric attitude, Isocrates warns the king of Macedon against making a similar mistake.

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[191] Isoc., *To Philip* 68.
[192] See Isoc., *To Philip* 57.
[193] See Romilly (1958) 99.

Conclusion

To sum up, Isocrates' interest in Alcibiades mirrors, and at the same time goes beyond, the debate on this figure taking place in the fourth century since it hints, more broadly, at his views on leadership in both internal and external politics. In this regard, the overall Isocratean characterisation of Alcibiades that emerges from the references to him in *On the Team of Horses*, *Busiris* and *To Philip* is more nuanced than it is generally assumed, with the boundaries between praise and blame being less sharply defined than what could appear at first reading.

Indeed, Isocrates' multifaceted portraits of Alcibiades interact significantly with the depictions drawn by the other Attic orators while simultaneously standing out for their complex nature. In this respect, they reveal his awareness of, reflection on, and attempt to deal with, the intricate problems posed on the one hand by the difficult relation between the great individual and the democratic πόλις, and on the other hand by Athens' leading role within the Hellenic world. Thus, the references to Alcibiades throughout the corpus, rather than representing inconsistent, irreconcilable or unrelated portraits, can be interpreted as pieces of a varied but at the same time uniform and cohesive mosaic that ultimately points to the key features that, in Isocrates' view, characterise a good leader in domestic as well as international politics.

Within this context, εὔνοια emerges as the cornerstone of Isocrates' more general ideas on strong leadership both internally and externally. More specifically, in a predominantly Athenocentric perspective, Isocrates emphasises how gaining the goodwill of the other Greeks towards Athens goes hand in hand with obtaining the goodwill of the other Athenians towards oneself and vice versa. And even when employing Alcibiades as a rhetorical example in addressing Philip, Isocrates firmly keeps the spotlight on εὔνοια as an indispensable characteristic of good leadership.

4. Conclusions

In this chapter I have attempted to highlight Isocrates' profound, but often overlooked, interest in leadership in both domestic and foreign politics as well as the key role that his views on this topic play within his political thought. In order to do so, I have provided a detailed examination of the occurrences of δημαγωγός and its cognate verb δημαγωγέω throughout the corpus arguing that Isocrates, by returning to the original ethical neutrality of the δημαγωγός family of words, reframes in positive terms the vocabulary, and thus the notion, of δημαγωγία. Furthermore, I have also suggested that Isocrates dichotomises the concept of δημαγωγία. The result is a binary distinction with a splitting of the notion between a positive pole and a negative one, which is similar to his treatment of the notion of παρρησία examined in the second chapter of the present study. Thus, rather than criticising and rejecting the role of δημαγωγοί *per se*, Isocrates acknowledges, and even promotes, the need to choose good δημαγωγοί in opposition to the bad ones currently leading the πόλις. Indeed, he upholds a rethinking of Athens' internal leadership that goes hand in hand with the reshaping (not rejection) of its hegemony over Greece, which he argues for most manifestly in *On the Peace*. In this context, we saw how Pericles represents an instance of good δημαγωγός and how Isocrates addresses veiled criticism not towards him, as it is often assumed, but towards the Athenian δῆμος contemporary to him. Additionally, I have suggested that the rehabilitation of δημαγωγός can be assimilated to that of the term σοφιστής in *Antidosis*. Both cases (although the latter more explicitly than the former) ultimately point in the direction of Isocrates' attempt to rehabilitate rhetoric, or rather, the good kind of rhetoric that he claims he teaches his pupils.

Within the framework of the Isocratean problematisation of the δημαγωγός family of terms, I have also underlined how three passages in particular, namely *Helen* 37, *To Nicocles* 16 and *Panathenaicus* 148, reveal an extension of the range of application of δημαγωγός and δημαγωγέω beyond the borders of Classical Athens. More particularly, the notion of δημαγωγία is retrojected into Athens' past in the first and third passage (with reference to Theseus and Pisistratus, respectively) and applied to a non-democratic context in the Cyprian speech.

Overall, the investigation of the Isocratean occurrences of δημαγωγός and its cognate verb bear witness to the two cardinal points around which the present thesis revolves. On the one hand, Isocrates' use of democratic language interpreted as expanding the ductility already embedded in this vocabulary, not as an arbitrary distortion of the true meaning of such terms (and thus of the notions they convey) dictated by a scantily disguised oligarchic agenda. On the other, his profound interest in political leadership, especially the issues posed by it and the definition of what makes a successful leader in both internal and external politics. In the case of the opposition between good and bad δημαγωγοί, the link between these two key aspects becomes particularly evident.

In the second part of the chapter, I have moved to the analysis of the Isocratean characterisation of Alcibiades as a case study exemplifying his interest in, and views on, political leadership. In doing so, I have focused particularly on the depiction that emerges from *On the Team of Horses* while devoting special attention also to two other passages of the corpus referring to him which are generally neglected, namely *Busiris* 5 and *To Philip* 58-61.

In this respect, Isocrates' depiction of Pericles, which I have examined in the first half of the chapter, and his characterisation of Alcibiades can be regarded as presenting two sides of the same coin. The overall positive portrait of Pericles drawn throughout the corpus implicitly stresses the crucial role of the δῆμος in the relation between leaders of great merit and the democratic πόλις. In a complementary way, within the framework of the same individual-community relation, the comprehensive depiction of Alcibiades emerging from Isocrates' works turns instead the spotlight on great men and their problematic status within the democratic πόλις, thus showing the other side of the coin. In the same way as the δῆμος should make sound decisions and choose good leaders, great individuals have to moderate their hybristic nature by aiming to gain the goodwill of their fellow citizens. Only if the two agents in the δῆμος-great man relation act as suggested by Isocrates, can this crucial and problematic relation prove to be successful for Athens in both domestic and foreign politics, and its intrinsic unavoidable tension can be somehow balanced. Within this context, the main principle that, according to Isocrates, can defuse such a tension and characterises strong leadership both internally and externally is mutual εὔνοια. Hence, Timotheus in *Antidosis* and Alcibiades in *To Philip* are scolded for

disregarding the relevance of goodwill in the relation with their own fellow citizens. Similarly, in international politics successful leadership consists not in ruling by fear and violence but in gaining the goodwill of the πόλεις that one intends to lead and, consequently, their willing subjection.

So, an in-depth examination of the occurrences of δημαγωγός and δημαγωγέω and the analysis of the characterisation of Alcibiades throughout the corpus bring to light Isocrates' interest in, awareness of, and endeavour to tackle, the issues posed by political leadership in both international and domestic politics, thus hinting at the central, yet often overlooked, role that such a topic plays within his corpus.

Chapter 5
The Isocratean (re)definition of δημοτικός

1. Introduction

In the previous chapter I have focused on Isocrates' views on what a good political leader should look like, both in domestic and foreign politics, and I have highlighted the central role that this discussion on leadership plays within his political thought. In the present chapter I shall move one step forward by exploring how his ideas on Athenian hegemony and leadership are inextricably linked to his attempt to define, or rather redefine, what it means to be democratic. In order to do so, I will examine the occurrences of δημοτικός throughout the corpus and make comparisons with some other relevant instances of the term in the fifth and fourth centuries. As a result, I intend to show that Isocrates' usages of δημοτικός should not be interpreted as corroborating the widespread assumption that he aims to promote an oligarchic agenda in disguise. Additionally, I shall suggest that, by exploiting, and at the same time expanding, the intrinsic adaptability of the word in response to the changes occurring in fourth-century Athenian politics and political theory, Isocrates endeavours to recontextualise the notion of being democratic precisely in connection with his interest in, and discussion on, the theme of political leadership.

  The choice to focus my attention on the occurrences of δημοτικός is dictated by various reasons. First of all, in line with the semantic methodology adopted throughout the present dissertation, it is worth pointing out, as noted by Sealey, that δημοτικός, rather than δημοκρατικός, often represents '[i]n Athenian speech the adjective corresponding to *demokratia*'[1] both in the fifth and fourth centuries. For example, we do not find any occurrence of δημοκρατικός in the Attic orators, except one instance in Lysias.[2] With specific reference to the Isocratean works, while there are no occurrences of δημοκρατικός and only one of δημότης,[3] the term δημοτικός is employed fifteen times in total throughout the corpus.

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[1] Sealey (1973) 283.
[2] Lys., *Defence against a charge of subverting the democracy* 8.
[3] Isoc., *Panathenaicus* 145.

Therefore, the numerical weight of the occurrences of δημοτικός appears to be more relevant than that of other contemporary adjectives, like δημοκρατικός and δημότης, derived from the δημ-stem. In addition, apart from the more significant number of instances, the usages of the term between the fifth and the fourth century hint at two key aspects: on the one hand, the inherent adaptability of δημοτικός; on the other hand, the existence of a lively debate taking place at the time on what being δημοτικός truly means. Concerning the first aspect in particular, it is important to stress that, at base, δημοτικός means 'in favour of the δῆμος'[4] and that, as we shall see below, its use is not limited to democratic contexts.

Yet, little scholarly attention has been paid to Isocrates' varying uses of δημοτικός. Rather, when it comes to the manifold occurrences of the term in his corpus, the emphasis is generally put almost exclusively on the use of the adjective to describe Evagoras in the homonymous Cyprian speech and Solon in *Areopagiticus*. Both these occurrences have frequently been interpreted in light of his alleged attempt to promote an anti-democratic political programme. However, through an examination of the usages of the term not only in these two cases but also, more broadly, in the rest of the corpus, as well as by means of a comparison with some relevant fifth- and fourth-century instances, I aim to highlight that the occurrences of δημοτικός in Isocrates' works provide a noteworthy example of his multifaceted and idiosyncratic use of democratic vocabulary and can help us elucidate his political thought.

Indeed, instead of ascribing the Isocratean instances to an allegedly ill-concealed oligarchic agenda, I would suggest that they hint at how, by problematising and expanding the intrinsic malleability of the term in response to contemporary political debates, Isocrates ultimately attempts to redefine the meaning of being in favour of the δῆμος in close connection with his interest in Athens' hegemony over Greece. In this sense Isocrates' use of δημοτικός confirms how his views on democracy cannot be disentangled from, and are somehow subordinated to, his more general ideas on leadership.

The analysis presented in this chapter will thus be divided into two main parts. In the first half of my investigation I shall look at the Isocratean usages of

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[4] See Cartledge (2009) 50. On the meaning of the term see also Ste-Croix (1954) 23, Vlastos (1983) 509 and Brock (1991) 168 who notes that 'δημοτικός originally implies a belief in equality as a democratic virtue, but in comedy it comes to indicate equality run rampant, as in proposals of equal sexual opportunity for all'.

δημοτικός in the context of the blending of constitutional forms and devote my attention to the inherent ductility of the term. In doing so, I will point out how Isocrates not only recovers and exploits, but even stretches the boundaries of, such intrinsic adaptability, thus hinting at a reframing of the meaning of acting in the interest of the δῆμος in terms of his interest in Athens' political leadership.

Such an attempt to recontextualise δημοτικός is examined further in the second part of the chapter, which begins by framing the Isocratean usages of the term within the fourth-century debate around the question of what being in favour of the δῆμος should truly look like, a discussion which, as we briefly mentioned above, appears to be particularly vivid at the time and which is expressed indeed mainly through the term δημοτικός. Therefore, after illustrating the wider background against which Isocrates' redefinition of δημοτικός should be placed, I aim to provide a detailed analysis of the key features characterising such recontextualisation in order to point out how they are deeply influenced by, and overlap with, his ideas concerning Athenian leadership highlighted in the previous chapter.

Consequently, asking whether Isocrates is an oligarch or a democrat is ultimately misleading as it overshadows and flattens the complexity and originality of his political thought. His usages of δημοτικός reveal how he was aware of, and was engaging with, not only the embedded flexibility of political (especially democratic) vocabulary, but also the contemporary blurring of boundaries between oligarchy and democracy, within the context of his constant, overarching and broader interest in Athens' role as leading πόλις in the Greek world and the need for his fellow citizens to (re)affirm such a role.

2. Stretching the boundaries of δημοτικός

In the first half of the present chapter I will begin my analysis by examining the Isocratean depiction of the Cyprian king Evagoras as a case study to explore the use of δημοτικός in relation to the notion of mixed constitution. In doing so, I intend to show that this occurrence of the term should not be regarded as an additional element in favour of the widespread view according to which Isocrates aims to promote an anti-democratic agenda. Rather, the description of Evagoras as δημοτικός, and simultaneously also as τυραννικός, needs to be

understood within the broader framework of the malleability deeply entrenched in these terms on the one hand, and, on the other, of Isocrates' interest in, and engagement with, the dramatic changes in Athenian practical politics and political theory taking place between the fifth and fourth century. I will then provide a brief overview of some of the most relevant instances of the usages of δημοτικός in previous and contemporary authors, from which it should become clear that the term, and thus the notion itself of being in favour of the δῆμος, was characterised by an inherent fluidity and so was rather easily adaptable to a variety of contexts. Overall, I will show that, far from confirming his alleged attempt to promote an oligarchic agenda in disguise, the use of δημοτικός in the context of the merging of constitutional forms suggests that Isocrates problematises the meaning of the term by exploiting, and at the same time expanding, its embedded adaptability.

2.1 Evagoras as δημοτικός and τυραννικός

In this section I will focus my attention on the depiction of the king of Salamis on Cyprus, Evagoras, in the homonymous speech as a crucial starting point for the analysis of the Isocratean usages of δημοτικός within the framework of the blending of constitutional forms. In this respect, I argue that by applying δημοτικός, in conjunction with τυραννικός, to the Cyprian king, Isocrates legitimately makes use of, and takes to its limits, the malleability embedded in these terms with the ultimate aim of attempting to provide his own response to current political issues by widening and problematising the range of application of these words (and thus of the notions they convey) while maintaining an Athenocentric view. More specifically, the problematisation of δημοτικός, but also of τυραννικός, which emerges from *Evagoras* shall point towards the need to expand the horizon of the debate beyond the mere contrast between the interpretation of Isocrates as undercover oligarch on the one hand, and as champion of democracy on the other. Instead, we should look at how the boundaries of this ideological opposition were themselves more and more nebulous in the contemporary political world, and at how Isocrates attempts to deal with the consequent challenges faced by fourth-century Athens both internally and externally.

From a chronological point of view, the first occurrence of the adjective δημοτικός in the Isocratean corpus (with the exclusion of the forensic speech *Against Callimachus* on which I will focus later on) can be found precisely in the prose *encomium* of Nicocles' father written around 370.[5] Indeed, in his portrait of the king of Salamis Isocrates highlights that Evagoras did not lack any of the qualities which characterise monarchs as he selected the best feature from each constitution: he was 'in favour of the δῆμος' (δημοτικός) in his 'service of the mass' (τοῦ πλήθους θεραπεία), 'statesmanlike' (πολιτικός) in the 'administration' (διοίκησις) of Salamis, 'general-like' (στρατηγικός) in his 'good counsel against the dangers' (πρὸς τοὺς κινδύνους εὐβουλία), and 'befitting a τύραννος' (τυραννικός) by excelling in all the above-mentioned features.[6]

Interestingly, here δημοτικός is applied to a non-democratic context in order to refer to one of the key features characterising Evagoras' kingship, which, according to Isocrates, distinguishes itself precisely for the blending of boundaries among different political forms. Even more remarkable is, however, the use of τυραννικός in a positive sense as encompassing δημοτικός, πολιτικός and στρατηγικός. So, before examining further this occurrence of δημοτικός, I will focus on the meaning and relevance that τυραννικός acquires in the depiction of the Cyprian monarch. As we shall see, the Isocratean use of this adjective is not only of particular significance in itself but can also be compared to, and thus contribute to throw some light on, the use of δημοτικός in the same passage.

In this regard, it is worth noting, first of all, that the reading in the manuscript tradition is debated as some manuscripts have μεγαλόφρων instead of τυραννικός: while Mathieu and Brémond opt for μεγαλόφρων,[7] it has been argued that the reading τυραννικός is preferable mainly because of the homeoteleuton -ικός.[8] Furthermore, I would stress that we can find only one passage which refers to the notion of μεγαλοφροσύνη in the whole speech, namely section 27, where Isocrates establishes a close link between μεγαλοφροσύνη and τυραννίς by presenting the former as the key element leading Evagoras to the decision to attempt to establish himself as τύραννος. More specifically, by alluding to the time when Evagoras had to flee to Soli in

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[5] See Chapter 2 section 3.2 n. 82.
[6] Isoc., *Evagoras* 46.
[7] Mathieu and Brémond (1938) 158. See also Janik (2012) 123-124.
[8] See, for instance, Forster (1912) 96 and Alexiou (2010) 135.

Cilicia due to the actions of Abdemon, 'one of those who held power' (εἷς (...) τῶν δυναστευόντων) in Salamis,[9] who had tried to arrest him, Isocrates contrasts Evagoras' behaviour with the general attitude of exiles in similar circumstances.[10] Within this framework, Isocrates observes that, instead of being discouraged in the face of his current misfortunes, Evagoras achieved such 'greatness of mind' (μεγαλοφροσύνη) that, despite having been a 'private individual' (ἰδιώτης) until that time, once he was forced into exile he thought it was necessary for him 'to be a τύραννος' (τυραννεῖν).[11]

Interestingly, in this passage the verb τυραννεῖν does not convey a negative meaning. Indeed, Isocrates reinstates the originally neutral sense of τύραννος and its cognates.[12] Thus, throughout the speech the τύραννος family of words is employed mainly to describe Evagoras' rulership without any kind of derogatory sense. More particularly, this oration presents the highest number of occurrences of τύραννος and its cognates not only in comparison with the other two Cyprian speeches, that is, *To Nicocles* and *Nicocles*, but also, more broadly within the whole corpus. The fourteen instances of the τύραννος family of words which we can find in this speech[13] all present a neutral or even positive sense, with half of them referred to Evagoras himself,[14] and one to his son Nicocles.[15]

In this respect, it is worth pointing out that according to Morgan in his use of 'monarchic vocabulary' Isocrates observes 'both Athenian and Pindaric practice': in the latter case 'the word *tyrannos* and its cognates' are employed 'as if their resonance were ethically neutral', while in the former instance they take on a negative meaning comparable to 'evil kingship'.[16] In order to illustrate the neutral meaning which the τύραννος family of words often conveys in the corpus, Morgan refers precisely to the Isocratean use of such vocabulary to describe Evagoras.[17] Additionally, in stressing the need to analyse the

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[9] On the identity of this man see Forster (1912) 86 and Alexiou (2010) 107-108.
[10] Isoc., *Evagoras* 26.
[11] Isoc., *Evagoras* 27. For μεγαλοφροσύνη being used in the Isocratean corpus as a synonym for μεγαλοψυχία see Alexiou (2010) 108.
[12] See Lewis (2009) 2. Cf. Mitchell (2013) 23.
[13] Isoc., *Evagoras* 26, 27 (τυραννίς and τυραννέω), 28, 31, 32, 34, 39, 40, 63, 64, 66, 71, 78. In particular, in Isoc., *Evagoras* 40, τυραννίς is defined as 'the greatest, the most revered and the most fought about among divine and human goods' (καὶ τῶν θείων ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων μέγιστον καὶ σεμνότατον καὶ περιμαχητότατον) as well as 'the most beautiful of things' (τὸ κάλλιστον τῶν ὄντων).
[14] Isoc., *Evagoras* 27 (the above-mentioned verb τυραννεῖν), 28, 32, 63, 64, 66, 71.
[15] Isoc., *Evagoras* 78.
[16] Morgan (2003) 183-184.
[17] See Morgan (2003) 183.

implications of '[t]he laxity in Isocrates' terminology' Morgan states that '[i]n an Athenian context, giving tyranny ethical neutrality is unusual', and she argues that the justification for this can be found in his 'intention to write for multiple audiences',[18] with the 'multiple potential audiences corresponding to a multitude of potential constitutions'.[19] Indeed, in her study Morgan suggests that Isocrates, like Plato, 'by blurring political, constitutional, and ethical distinctions' promotes 'constitutional relativism' as part of his attempt to implement an anti-democratic agenda.[20]

Within this framework Morgan defines 'the language of Isocratean tyranny' as 'aggressively neutral and designed to make a political point'.[21] Therefore, the occurrence of τυραννικός alongside δημοτικός in the above-mentioned passage from *Evagoras* is interpreted by Morgan as hinting at Isocrates' allegedly undemocratic programme in the context of the collapsing of constitutional boundaries. In her own words, the depiction of the Cyprian king in *Evagoras* 46 shows that:

> [k]ingship expresses itself as ethical preeminence rather than as a defined constitutional form. The adjectives describing Evagoras create a metaphorical climate: it was not a democracy, but Evagoras was like a man of the people, or a general, or a tyrant. Thus we are encouraged to believe in the relativity of constitutions: that a form of government is called a monarchy does not mean it is despotic or unfriendly to the people. Conversely, a democracy does not necessarily serve the best interests of the demos.[22]

In this respect, Morgan believes that Isocrates employs 'constitutional relativism' in the portrait of Evagoras in the same way in which he applies this notion to the Athenian δῆμος 'by problematizing the democratic audience and redescribing it in almost tyrannical terms' with particular reference to

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[18] Morgan (2003) 184.

[19] Morgan (2003) 202.

[20] Morgan (2003) 182. For a reference to Morgan's discussion of 'constitutional relativism' and its application to the use of δημαγωγέω in *To Nicocles* 16 and *Panathenaicus* 148 see Chapter 4 section 2.2.

[21] Morgan (2003) 184.

[22] Morgan (2003) 189. See also Bearzot (1980) 118 for a similar interpretation of the use of δημοτικός in *Evagoras* 46.

Antidosis.[23] In addition, by paralleling the use of τυραννικός in *Evagoras* 46 with the reference in *To Nicocles* 53 to a 'good counsellor' (σύμβουλος ἀγαθός) as τυραννικώτατος among all possessions, Morgan underlines, albeit in passing, the fact that 'the paradox wherein the wise behavior of a king is called tyrannical' which emerges from these two occurrences of the adjective leads to 'a redefinition of "tyranny"'.[24]

In this regard, I would point out that this rethinking of the notion of τυραννίς suggested by Isocrates plays a key role in his problematisation of political terms and notions and goes hand in hand with the reframing of δημοτικός, for which I will argue below. Here I intend to show that while the expansion of the range of application of δημοτικός as well as the reconceptualisation of the τύραννος family of words, which both emerge from *Evagoras* 46, cannot be disentangled from the 'constitutional relativism' stressed by Morgan, such blending of boundaries between political forms should not be regarded as an element in favour of the widespread assumption about Isocrates' oligarchic sympathies. Rather, the merging of democracy and tyranny/kingship hinted at in the Isocratean portrait of the Cyprian king needs to be assessed against the background of the increasing and unavoidable interactions with monarchs,[25] as well as of the change in the political discourse around tyranny between the fifth and fourth century.[26]

Indeed, on the one hand, this passage from *Evagoras* can be interpreted in the broader framework of the renewed notion of civic identity forged by Isocrates, which revolves around refining personal virtues (rather than around the participation in Athens' public life) and which is closely related to his idealisation of ancestral Athens.[27] As it has been noted, this kind of civic virtue is more adaptable and thus, despite originating from and being rooted in the πόλις of Athens, can rather easily be applied to other political contexts, including a monarchical one.[28] While interacting with kings and tyrants became increasingly unavoidable for fourth-century Athenians, the transferability which characterises the revised conception of civic identity upheld by Isocrates

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[23] Morgan (2003) 186.
[24] Morgan (2003) 209 n. 25.
[25] See, in particular, Unruh (2014) 153-155. Cf. Braund (2000) and Mitchell (2019) 461.
[26] See Osborne (2003).
[27] See Unruh (2014) 126 and 155. On Isocrates' praise of the Athenian ancestral constitution see section 3.3.1 of the present chapter.
[28] See Unruh (2014) 155-156.

reflects not only his awareness of the need to communicate with them but even his conviction that it is possible to teach them civic principles.[29] In this respect, Isocrates points to the fact that their civic virtues can have positive and wider applications as it is hinted at also by his discussion of the two kinds of equality in *Nicocles*, as we have seen in Chapter 3 section 3.

On the other hand, the Isocratean description of Evagoras as both δημοτικός and τυραννικός can also be understood, at least partially, against the background of the change in the discourse around tyranny between the fifth and fourth century highlighted by Osborne, who argues that the image of the tyrant shifts from 'an ongoing obsession' to 'a figure sufficiently abstracted from everyday Athenian political reality to be good to think with in the analyses of the strengths and weaknesses of a wide range of political constitutions'.[30] Osborne reaches the conclusion that such change took place because of the oligarchic coup of 412/411 and most importantly of 404/403, which undercut the democracy/tyranny polarisation and, more widely, black and white distinctions among different constitutional types. As Osborne himself puts it:

> If in the earlier fifth century, tyranny had been what played the crucial role in defining, by contrast, what it was to be a democrat, in 403 it was apparent that the quality of "not being tyranny" did not define being a democrat anything like closely enough. There was just too much that would turn out to be not democracy even though it was not on the face of it tyranny. At the same time, the rhetorical use of the term *dēmos tyrannos*, however specialized in its contexts, and the possibility it raised of thinking of democracy as itself tyrannical, can have only further broken down the absoluteness of the opposition between democracy and tyranny.[31]

In this respect, Osborne interprets the 'blurring of constitutional boundaries' highlighted by Morgan in the Isocratean corpus 'as a reflection of the sea

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[29] See, for instance, Unruh (2014) 145-146 who specifies that Isocrates limits the possibility of such interaction and education to Greek kings or tyrants while generally excluding barbarian rulers. Nonetheless, in Isocrates' view, as Unruh (2014) 143-144 points out, even Greek rulers cannot be educated if they are unable and/or unwilling to retain civic values.
[30] Osborne (2003) 251.
[31] Osborne (2003) 268.

change in Athenian perceptions following the events of 412-403'.[32] Thus, rather than stemming from an 'ahistorical approach' biased by an anti-democratic agenda,[33] Isocrates' use of δημοτικός in conjunction with τυραννικός to depict the Cyprian king can be linked to the change in the discourse around tyranny/one-man rule between the fifth and fourth century when the distinctions between opposite regime types became less rigid. Yet, while the opposition to tyranny came to be questioned (as Isocrates himself demonstrates), it was more important than Osborne suggests and remained significant at Athens throughout the fourth century. Indeed, Osborne's view that 'democracy's antityrannical stance had been shown void'[34] appears to overlook the importance of anti-tyanny laws in 410/09 (i.e. Demophantus' law) and in 337/6 (i.e. Eucrates' law).[35] In this context, the occurrence of δημοτικός in *Evagoras* 46 should be regarded as part and parcel of Isocrates' attempt to underpin his redefinition of τυραννίς, which he needs to reformulate in positive terms precisely because of his connections with the Cyprians.

So, to conclude this analysis on the relevance of the Isocratean portrait of Evagoras as both δημοτικός and τυραννικός, I would stress that this depiction of the king of Salamis on Cyprus hints at how Isocrates not only bears witness to, but also stretches to its limits, the inherent flexibility which characterises δημοτικός, and, more broadly, democratic vocabulary as a whole. Contextually, Isocrates reintroduces the original neutral sense of the τύραννος family of words in order to reformulate the notion of τυραννίς in positive terms. By applying δημοτικός to a non-democratic context and coupling it with a seemingly opposite adjective like τυραννικός, Isocrates widens the range of application of δημοτικός while at the same time supporting his reformulation of τυραννίς in positive terms. Indeed, the problematisation of δημοτικός, while (cor)responding to the historical and political challenges faced by contemporary Athens, goes hand in hand with, and is designed to substantiate, the Isocratean attempt to redefine the τύραννος family of words positively. Thus, this occurrence of δημοτικός represents the first step towards the redefinition of the notion of acting in the interests of the δῆμος that, as we shall see, Isocrates implements later on in his corpus.

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[32] Osborne (2003) 269.
[33] Morgan (2003) 201.
[34] Osborne (2003) 269.
[35] See Mitchell (2007) 151-152.

2.2 Adaptability of δημοτικός

The Isocratean use of δημοτικός in the depiction of Evagoras, together with the other occurrences throughout the corpus which I will examine further below, suggests that Isocrates is the Greek author who most strongly and consistently exploits the flexibility of the term. Nonetheless, he is not the only one to bear witness to, and make use of, the adaptability of δημοτικός. Rather, he reinstates this inherent ductility, which is attested in the works of previous and contemporary authors, while at the same time extending it.

Therefore, before analysing additional instances of Isocrates' usage of this adjective and eventually arguing for his recontextualisation of δημοτικός in terms of his views on Athens' leadership over Greece, I shall investigate some relevant occurrences in both the fifth and fourth centuries. In doing so, I aim to point out the original and intrinsic malleability of the adjective, and thus of the notion that it conveys, showing that, although Isocrates does stretch considerably the boundaries of this embedded adaptability, he is not the first or only author to exploit it.

In other words, the extension of the range of application and the consequent problematisation of δημοτικός which are hinted at in the depiction of Evagoras and which shall emerge even more clearly from the analysis of the remaining occurrences in the Isocratean corpus, are indissolubly linked to, and somehow arise from, the deep-rooted flexibility characterising the term, and thus need to be interpreted against this background in order to be fully understood.

Δημοτικός in [Xenophon]

The first occurrence of δημοτικός known to us can be found in Herodotus when, in describing the customs of Egypt, he mentions two different kinds of local writing: one called sacred and the other demotic (διφασίοισι δὲ γράμμασι χρέωνται, καὶ τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν ἱρὰ τὰ δὲ δημοτικὰ καλέεται).[36] More specifically, in this passage, the term is employed to refer to one of the three Egyptian scripts in addition to the sacred or hieroglyphic way of writing and the hieratic one (which, however, is omitted by Herodotus).[37] This use of δημοτικός in a

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[36] Hdt., II 36.
[37] See Lloyd (1994) 163.

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manifestly non-Athenian and non-political context can be regarded as pointing towards the semantic elasticity of the term, which appears to be hinted at even more clearly in the usages of δημοτικός in [Xenophon]'s *Constitution of the Athenians*.

The seven instances that we find in this treatise deserve special attention since they suggest the multifaceted meanings that the term can take on and lead to some significant comparisons with the usages in the Isocratean corpus. For the sake of clarity, I will cluster these occurrences into three main categories, which all appear to present a negative connotation and to refer to the group which [Xenophon] criticises. More precisely, the four occurrences in the introductory sections[38] and the one towards the end of chapter II[39] can be clustered together as in these passages οἱ δημοτικοί is linked to other terms employed with a pejorative sense to label the group condemned by the author, namely οἱ πένητες,[40] οἱ πονηροί,[41] οἱ χείρους.[42] However, the occurrences in *Constitution of the Athenians* I, 15 and II, 19 can be analysed on their own as instances of a specific second and third kind of usage, respectively, and lend themselves particularly well to some relevant comparisons with the Isocratean occurrences.[43]

Indeed, in *Constitution of the Athenians* I, 15, [Xenophon] manifestly criticises the attitude of οἱ δημοτικοί towards Athens' allies stating that they consider more advantageous for the Athenians to appropriate their allies' resources while allowing the allies to own only what is sufficient for their survival instead of possessing enough means to pay for the tribute.[44] In other words, in this passage the opposition between οἱ δημοτικοί and the group which [Xenophon] appears to support is based on their behaviour towards Athens' allies, and thus on foreign politics. In this respect, it is important to highlight that

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[38] [Xen.], *Constitution of the Athenians* I, 4 (three times); I, 6.
[39] [Xen.], *Constitution of the Athenians* II, 18.
[40] [Xen.], *Constitution of the Athenians* I, 4; II, 18.
[41] [Xen.], *Constitution of the Athenians* I, 4.
[42] [Xen.], *Constitution of the Athenians* I, 4.
[43] For a discussion of the three variants available for [Xen.], *Constitution of the Athenians* I, 4, namely οἱ δημοτικοί, οἱ δημόται and ἰδιῶται, see Lapini (1997) 53, who adopts οἱ δημόται despite acknowledging some arguments in favour of the *lectio* ἰδιῶται. It is worth noting in passing that Sealey (1973) 255 rightly points out that some political terms, including δημοτικός, occur more frequently in the introduction of the treatise than in the rest of the work but omits to mention the occurrence of the word in [Xen.], *Constitution of the Athenians* I, 15 when enumerating the exact number of instances of δημοτικός.
[44] On this passage see Lapini (1997) 123-125, Gray (2007) 195-196, Marr and Rhodes (2008) 88-89, Centanni (2011) 141 and Osborne (2017) 22.

the reframing of the meaning of δημοτικός in connection with the topic of Athenian leadership over Greece represents the core of the redefinition of the meaning of δημοτικός implemented by Isocrates, as we shall see in the following sections.

The final occurrence of the term in the treatise is also particularly relevant to our discussion, although it appears to be more problematic as the passage itself and its translation pose some issues. The passage in question reads as follows: καὶ τοὐναντίον γε τούτου ἔνιοι, ὄντες ὡς ἀληθῶς τοῦ δήμου, τὴν φύσιν οὐ δημοτικοί εἰσι.[45] Indeed, as underlined by Bearzot, the key problem in translating this sentence lies in the meaning to be attached to the phrases εἶναι τοῦ δήμου and δημοτικοὶ εἶναι which can both be interpreted in two different ways, namely as referring either to belonging to the δῆμος by birth or to taking the side of the δῆμος.[46] According to the meaning that one decides to assign to the two phrases, the sentence acquires an entirely opposite sense.

If we interpret the first phrase as alluding to being on the people's side and the second one, that is, δημοτικοὶ εἶναι, as indicating those men who are actual members of the δῆμος, the sentence can then be translated as follows: 'Conversely, there are some men who actually take the side of the people, even though they are not by nature commoners'.[47] In this case, the reference would be to those χρηστοί who, despite belonging to the upper class and thus not being members of the δῆμος, have taken its side and have done so, as [Xenophon] claims in the following section, ultimately in order to commit acts of injustice (ἀδικεῖν) having realised that it is easier for wicked men to escape notice in a democratic πόλις than in an oligarchic one.[48]

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[45] [Xen.], *Constitution of the Athenians* II, 19. It is worth pointing out that Marr and Rhodes (2008) 137 regard this sentence as being the *incipit* of [Xen.], *Constitution of the Athenians* II, 20; in this respect, see also Bearzot (2018) 357 who instead stresses the link of the sentence in question with the content of the previous part of [Xen.], *Constitution of the Athenians* II, 19. On the *lectiones* ἔνιον instead of ἔνιοι and γνόντες instead of ὄντες see Lapini (1997) 240-241 and Bearzot (2018) 354.

[46] See Bearzot (2018) 354.

[47] Marr and Rhodes (2008) 137.

[48] [Xen.], *Constitution of the Athenians* II, 20. For the hypothesis according to which in this passage, in criticising those χρηστοί who betray their class by supporting democracy despite not belonging to the δῆμος, [Xenophon] had most probably Pericles specifically in mind see, for instance, Marr and Rhodes (2008) 139-140 and Bearzot (2018) 359-361, who also stress how an allusion to Alcibiades in this context, although possible, would be more problematic. Furthermore, Bearzot (2018) 361-363 suggests that Cleon might be one of the historical personalities who belonged, alongside Pericles and perhaps Alcibiades, to this same group of men labelled as χρηστοί and criticised for supporting the δῆμος, despite not belonging to it, only due to political opportunism.

If, by contrast, εἶναι τοῦ δήμου is regarded as referring to actual commoners and δημοτικοὶ εἶναι as taking the side of the people, then the same sentence can be interpreted as indicating those men who, even though they belong by birth to the δῆμος, are not by nature on its side. This group has been effectively defined as 'popolani che non sono popolari' by Bearzot,[49] who supports this second interpretation of the sentence.[50] As mentioned by Bearzot herself, a similar reading has been adopted also, for instance, by Osborne, who translates the sentence in question as 'those who are in fact of the common people are not sympathetic to the common people by nature' and who underlines that '[t]he adjective *demotikos* in this work always refers to having a populist attitude, not to having a demotic origin'.[51]

In this respect, I agree with Bearzot in considering this reading as more likely, but I would preserve the meaning of δημοτικός as referring to 'being in favour of the δῆμος' (which, as we saw in the introduction to the present chapter, represents the base meaning of the term) rather than 'being democratic'. Conversely, Bearzot appears to opt for the latter translation and to regard these two phrases as synonymous.[52] Indeed, while in the context of this passage by [Xenophon], the distinction between the two translations might well be more nuanced than in other occurrences, I would still opt for the more literal sense of δημοτικός. [Xenophon] would thus be pointing out the paradoxical condition of those men who are members of the δῆμος but, at the same time, do not act in the interest of the δῆμος itself, and consequently cannot be regarded as δημοτικοί.

Additionally, Bearzot suggests that the category of men referred to at the end of *Constitution of the Athenians* II, 19, (i.e. those who, although belonging to the δῆμος, should not be considered as δημοτικοί) was composed of men whose political activity can be exemplified by figures like Pisander and Phrynicus and whom she labels as 'i «trasformisti»'.[53] The interpretation of the

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[49] Bearzot (2018) 358-359; see also Bearzot (2018) 366 where she uses a very similar phrase, namely 'popolani non democratici'.
[50] *Pace* Lapini (1997) 241.
[51] Osborne (2017) 27; see also Osborne (2017) 18 who translates δημοτικός by 'sympathetic to the common people' as opposed to Marr and Rhodes (2008) 67, according to whom the word should be regarded as a mere 'occasional alternative to ὁ δῆμος'.
[52] See especially Bearzot (2018) 356-357.
[53] Bearzot (2018) 363; see also Bearzot (2018) 364-365, who excludes Theramenes from this group by stating that rather than being a '«popolano» antidemocratico', he was a χρηστός who initially supported the δῆμος but then took the side of the oligarchs. Thus, according to Bearzot's definition, Theramenes would not fall within any of the categories drawn by [Xenophon], but

closing sentence in this passage from [Xenophon] as upheld by Bearzot acquires particular significance within the framework of our analysis of the meaning of δημοτικός since it reveals that being δημοτικός is not necessarily an intrinsic feature characterising all members of the δῆμος. So, in the broader context of the development of the usages of the term between the fifth and fourth centuries, this occurrence can be considered as a step on the way towards extending the range of application of the adjective to non-democratic political contexts, as we have seen, for instance, in the case of the Isocratean portrait of Evagoras.

Indeed, such a usage of δημοτικός points toward the actual existence in Athenian politics of a group consisting of 'those who belong to the many but have the *prohairesis* of the few',[54] as indicated in *Constitution of the Athenians* II,19 according to the reading that I endorse, and which was most probably emerging at around the same time when [Xenophon] wrote his treatise[55] (that is, at the end of the fifth century).[56] Thus, the occurrence of δημοτικός in this passage suggests that [Xenophon] hints at the existence of a less sharp distinction between democrats and oligarchs in the Athenian political world than it might seem at first reading.[57]

Overall, the instances of δημοτικός in the text of [Xenophon] point towards the adaptability of the term not only by bearing witness to the negative connotation which it can convey and by hinting at the possibility to link its meaning to Athens' foreign politics, but also by showing how it cannot always be applied to all individual members of the δῆμος.

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would rather occupy an intermediate position between the two groups represented by the minority of χρηστοί who chose to be on the side of the δῆμος without belonging to it and the vast majority of χρηστοί who supported the oligarchs.

[54] Gray (2007) 204, according to whom the other three main categories which emerge from [Xenophon]'s text are as follows: 'the many who are bad and democratic; the few who are good and undemocratic; (…) those who belong to the few but have the *prohairesis* of the many'. For a brief discussion of these four groups identified by Gray see Bearzot (2018) 358-359.

[55] See Bearzot (2018) 359 and 365. For an overview on the general accuracy of the data presented by [Xenophon] see Osborne (2017) 7-8.

[56] On the dating of [Xenophon]'s *Constitution of the Athenians* see Chapter 2 section 2 n. 26.

[57] This interpretation contrasts, at least to a certain extent, the comment on [Xen.], *Constitution of the Athenians* I, 6 by Marr and Rhodes (2008) 69 according to whom [Xenophon] excludes 'the possibility that the self-interest of an individual member of the *demos* might be at variance with that of the *demos* as a whole', and who imply, more broadly, 'automatic class loyalty on the part of all members'. On [Xenophon] presenting an oversimplified and polarised structure of the Athenian society revolving around the rigid opposition between two groups, namely ὁ δῆμος/the poor and οἱ ὀλίγοι/the rich see, for example, Marr and Rhodes (2008) 15, 19-24, 68-69, and Osborne (2017) 9-10. However, [Xen.], *Constitution of the Athenians* II, 19-20 can be interpreted, in my view, as presenting some glimmers of a more variegated picture.

Δημοτικός **in Xenophon**

I will return to the specific relevance of these occurrences of δημοτικός in [Xenophon] in relation to the Isocratean usages in the final section of this chapter. For now let us turn our attention to the instances of the adjective in the Xenophontic corpus, where it is employed five times and where its inherent flexibility emerges even more manifestly than from the fifth-century usages considered above. In this respect, the occurrences of the term in Xenophon provide some significant insights into the different contexts to which the term can be applied and thus lend themselves to relevant comparisons with the instances in Isocrates.

It is worth noting, first of all, that Xenophon appears to make use of the term in both a negative and a positive sense. More specifically, the pejorative meaning is attested in the two occurrences which we find in the *Hellenica*. Indeed, in his reply to the accusations made against him by Critias, Theramenes asserts that he had distanced himself from the views of the Thirty when they started arresting men who were 'noble and good' (καλοὶ κἀγαθοί).[58] As an example of these people wrongly arrested by the Thirty, Theramenes mentions, not only Leon of Salamis, a 'competent' (ἱκανός) man who had never been responsible for any wrongdoing, but also Niceratus, the son of Nicias, who in addition to being wealthy, had never acted in the interest of the people, just like his father (ἐγίγνωσκον δὲ ὅτι συλλαμβανομένου Νικηράτου τοῦ Νικίου, καὶ πλουσίου καὶ οὐδὲν πώποτε δημοτικὸν οὔτε αὐτοῦ οὔτε τοῦ πατρὸς πράξαντος, οἱ τούτῳ ὅμοιοι δυσμενεῖς ἡμῖν γενήσοιντο).[59]

Moreover, later in his speech, Theramenes claims that he never joined either οἱ δημοτικοί or οἱ τυραννικοί.[60] Thus, here δημοτικός represents the opposite pole of τυραννικός, with both terms conveying a pejorative sense. This occurrence of δημοτικός along with τυραννικός can be compared with the use of the term in *Evagoras* 46 where, as we have seen, the two adjectives are employed to characterise the rule of the Cyprian king. Nonetheless, while in the Isocratean passage they convey a positive sense and Evagoras is presented as τυραννικός because he excels, among the other features, precisely in being δημοτικός towards the people of Salamis, when used by Xenophon's

[58] Xen., *Hellenica* II 3, 38.
[59] Xen., *Hellenica* II 3, 39.
[60] Xen., *Hellenica* II 3, 49.

Theramenes δημοτικός and τυραννικός refer to two opposite poles in Athenian political life, both carrying a pejorative meaning. Significantly, this Xenophontic use of δημοτικός and τυραννικός represents a slight and ironic subversion of the normal opposition.

Conversely, Xenophon employs δημοτικός in a positive sense in the *Memorabilia* where it is employed twice in the same passage in connection with Socrates. Indeed, when defending him from the false accusation of exploiting some lines from Homer's *Iliad* in order to endorse the beating of 'the commoners and poor' (οἱ δημόται καὶ πένητες)[61] Xenophon states as follows concerning Socrates' truthful stance on this matter:

> (…) ἀλλ᾽ ἔφη δεῖν τοὺς μήτε λόγῳ μήτ᾽ ἔργῳ ὠφελίμους μήτε ὄντας στρατεύματι μήτε πόλει μήτε αὐτῷ τῷ δήμῳ, εἴ τι δέοι, βοηθεῖν ἱκανούς, ἄλλως τ᾽ ἐὰν πρὸς τούτῳ καὶ θρασεῖς ὦσι, πάντα τρόπον κωλύεσθαι, κἂν πάνυ πλούσιοι τυγχάνωσιν ὄντες.[62]

> (…) But what he did say was that those who render no service either by word or deed, who cannot help army or city or the people itself in time of need, ought to be stopped, even if they have riches in abundance, above all if they are insolent as well as inefficient.[63]

Then, Xenophon carries on his apology of Socrates by adding that he was 'in favour of the δῆμος' (δημοτικός) and 'benevolent' (φιλάνθρωπος), and to support his statement Xenophon highlights that the philosopher not only never requested any fee from his many Athenian and foreign disciples, but also gave to all a share of his own wealth.[64] Moreover, in this same passage, Xenophon goes on to oppose Socrates' behaviour to that of those men who, after having taken a small portion from him for free, sold it to others for a great sum and thus, unlike Socrates, were not 'in favour of the δῆμος' (δημοτικοί) as they refused to converse with the unwealthy.

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[61] Xen., *Memorabilia* I 2, 58. On the phrase οἱ δημόται καὶ πένητες see Gray (2004) 163-164 who specifies that here the two terms are employed as synonyms (cf. Gray (2011) 24-25 who reproduces the content of her 2004 French essay, but mistakenly refers to this phrase as belonging to section 59).
[62] Xen., *Memorabilia* I 2, 59.
[63] Trans. Marchant (2013) 49.
[64] Xen., *Memorabilia* I 2, 60.

In this regard, Gray has pointed out that, since here the reference to Socrates' possessions clearly alludes to 'his wisdom', Xenophon's Socrates, 'though poor by the ordinary definition, (…) fulfilled his own service to the demos 'according to his ability' — massaging the definition of wealth in order to produce a democratic currency that included the wisdom of his company'.[65] The redefinition of the concepts of wealth and poverty carried out by Xenophon's Socrates in this work emerges even more clearly in *Memorabilia* IV 2, 37-39[66] where such a redefinition arises from a discussion on democracy. More specifically, in his dialogue with Euthydemus, starting from the assumption that it is not possible to know democracy without knowing the δῆμος and that the latter consists of 'the poor' (οἱ πένητες), Socrates leads his interlocutor to acknowledge that those men, including some τύραννοι, who are not capable of living within their large means, should be regarded as poor and can thus be included in the δῆμος, whereas the poor who are 'thrifty' (οἰκονομικοί) should be considered as rich.

So, according to Socrates' redefinition, the dividing line between wealth and poverty has to be drawn depending not on the means at disposal but on one's ability, or inability, to live within those possessions, regardless of how scanty or abundant they are. Interestingly, such a redefinition can be regarded as hinting at a blending of boundaries between δημοκρατία and τυραννίς somehow similar to that which emerges from the Isocratean depiction of Evagoras analysed above. Moreover, it is also worth noting that Gray underlines a difference between the portrait of Socrates depicted in the *Memorabilia* and that drawn by Plato in his *Apology*: while in Plato's work 'Socrates does not supply the material support that is normally expected of a patron, nor even the advice that might lead to this', Xenophon's Socrates, Gray goes on to argue, 'does use his wisdom to assist the demos to secure material prosperity (…) through his endorsement of political service to Aristippus and Charmides, and his endorsement of material prosperity as part of the *eudaimonia* that the demos achieves through such leadership'.[67]

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[65] Gray (2011) 27 (cf. Gray (2004) 167). See also Gray (2011) 25 who highlights that 'Socrates is poor and common in a way different from the masses, in his deliberate adoption of poverty and his re-definition of the concept' (cf. Gray (2004) 164). Cf. Pl., *Apology* 30 b.
[66] See Gray (2004) 164 (cf. Gray (2011) 25).
[67] Gray (2011) 27-28 (cf. Gray (2004) 167).

Therefore, the text of *Memorabilia* I, 2, 60, where δημοτικός is used twice, should be interpreted in the wider context of the parallelism between 'évergétismes matériel et philosophique' and the implicit attack against the sophists, two aspects characterising the Xenophontic work, as highlighted by Azoulay according to whom, in Xenophon's view, 'la connaissance, donnée gracieusement et non monnayée comme une vulgaire merchandise, produit l'effet charismatique le plus intense'.[68] In this respect, it is particularly significant that the first occurrence of the term δημοτικός that we find in this passage is coupled with φιλάνθρωπος, an adjective which in the *Memorabilia* is employed to describe Socrates alone, in addition to the gods. Indeed, as Azoulay himself notes, Xenophon, alongside Isocrates, is the first author to apply the notion of φιλανθρωπία beyond the divine sphere to refer to a remarkable man.[69]

I will return to the use of δημοτικός in conjunction with φιλάνθρωπος in this Xenophontic passage further below. For now, I simply stress the positive meaning conveyed by both occurrences of δημοτικός in the *Memorabilia* in clear contrast with the derogatory sense which the term takes on in the *Hellenica*, as we saw above. Furthermore, the use of δημοτικός with a positive connotation in the *Memorabilia*, where both occurrences are employed in relation to Socrates, has to be interpreted in the broader context, highlighted by Gray, of Xenophon's depiction of the philosopher as 'an adequate democrat within the terms of normal democratic ideology', namely as 'an unusual patron of the demos, teaching his associates to enrich the demos in ways that were material as well as moral and endorsing their political engagement for this purpose regardless of the risks'.[70] In this respect, Gray has convincingly argued against the widespread assumption that Xenophon portrays Socrates as undemocratic, and that such a picture is somehow dictated by his own allegedly anti-democratic views.[71]

Lastly, of particular interest in the analysis of the occurrences of the term throughout the Xenophontic corpus is the instance which we find in the *Cyropaedia* where the adjective is employed in the speech delivered by the commoner Pheraulas in favour of the proposal to reward everyone according to

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[68] Azoulay (2004) 137.
[69] See Azoulay (2004) 137, 318-319.
[70] Gray (2011) 32 (cf. Gray (2004) 174).
[71] See Gray (2004), cf. Gray (2011).

their merit introduced by Cyrus and then endorsed by Chrysantas.[72] More specifically, Pheraulas, in supporting the need for geometric equality, not only states that he expects Cyrus to honour him according to his contribution, but also urges his fellow commoners (ὦ ἄνδρες δημόται) to compete with the Persian élite who are currently caught 'in a contest with commoners' (ἐν δημοτικῇ ἀγωνίᾳ).[73] Therefore, the use of the adjective in the phrase δημοτικὴ ἀγωνία, which has also been translated as 'democratic struggle'[74] and 'struggle with the people',[75] should thus be interpreted in the context of the views on meritocracy expressed in the *Cyropaedia* with specific reference to the integration of the Persian commoners in the army.

Indeed, within the framework of the meritocracy which he promotes, Cyrus, also because of the increasing growth of his empire,[76] effects a reorganisation of his army by considering excellence as the key criterion on which to base recruitment, regardless not only of social class but also of nationality, thus including commoners like Pheraulas as well as non-Persians and non-Medes.[77] Cyrus' interaction with Pheraulas points to social mobility and the fact that anyone can become a member of the élite since the élite itself has changed. Moreover, it can be regarded as hinting at how in the Xenophontic corpus, alongside the description of 'forms of public recognition' which 'set rulers apart from their followers', we can find 'a more democratic *charisma*, in which the ruler comes down to mingle with ordinary people, not as a contrivance, but of his natural love of mingling'.[78] So, the inclusion of commoners like Pheraulas in his army should be interpreted within the context of Cyrus' φιλανθρωπία.

Remarkably, such a feature, which characterises the Persian king on different occasions in the *Cyropaedia*,[79] also calls to mind the depiction of Socrates in the passage from the *Memorabilia* already discussed. Indeed, as we have seen previously, the adjectives δημοτικός and φιλάνθρωπος are both

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[72] I have already referred to this discussion from Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* in Chapter 3 sections 3 and 4.
[73] Xen., *Cyropaedia* II, 3, 15. Here for the phrase δημοτικὴ ἀγωνία I have adopted the translation offered by Miller (1914) 185.
[74] Ambler (2001) 76.
[75] Ambler (2001) 292 n. 30.
[76] See Gray (2007) 12; see also Gray (2011) 284.
[77] See Mitchell (2015) 188.
[78] Gray (2011) 375.
[79] On Cyrus' φιλανθρωπία see Gray (2011) 375-376.

employed by Xenophon to describe the philosopher. However, it is important to note that they appear to indicate two distinct and separate layers, with δημοτικός referring exclusively to Athens and φιλάνθρωπος to the rest of the world. As Azoulay puts it:

> (…) le couple «ami du peuple»/«ami des hommes» nous semble faire écho au binôme «citoyens»/«étrangers»: si Socrate est «ami du peuple» (δημοτικὸς) parce qu'il donne aux citoyens athéniens (ἀστοὺς), il est «ami des hommes» (φιλάνθρωπος) parce qu'il donne aux étrangers (ξένους). Ainsi la *philanthrôpia* apparaît-elle comme une vertu en rupture partielle avec l'univers civique: elle ressortit à un échange dont l'horizon dépasse le seul échelon poliade.[80]

In this respect, while in this Xenophontic passage the field of action of δημοτικός appears to be limited to Athens' internal political life, Isocrates, as we shall see, aims to reframe the meaning of δημοτικός beyond the boundaries of the πόλις itself by recontextualising it in the framework of Athens' leadership over Greece.

Furthermore, Xenophon's usage of the term differs from Isocrates' in some additional aspects. For instance, in the Xenophontic corpus δημοτικός can convey both a positive and a negative sense, whereas none of the Isocratean occurrences suggests a derogatory meaning. Moreover, while in *Evagoras* δημοτικός is employed in conjunction with τυραννικός to depict the Cyprian king, in the *Hellenica* the two terms appear to be opposite poles, both taking on a negative connotation.

Nevertheless, the Xenophontic instances provide a relevant basis for comparison with the Isocratean usages as they bear witness to the intrinsic flexibility of δημοτικός which characterises the term since its first occurrences in the fifth century and which becomes even more manifest in the fourth. More specifically, the inherent ductility of the term emerges in Xenophon's works from both the positive and negative sense which δημοτικός takes on in the *Memorabilia* and in the *Hellenica*, respectively, but also from the use of the adjective in the *Cyropaedia* where it is applied to a non-Athenian and non-democratic context and where Pheraulas' reference to a δημοτικὴ ἀγωνία

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[80] Azoulay (2004) 319.

needs to be interpreted against the background of Cyrus' reorganisation of his army on the basis of merit.

So, on the one hand Xenophon, like Isocrates, exploits the intrinsic adaptability of δημοτικός and plays with the ideas of leadership and meritocracy; on the other hand the link between such ideas and the meaning of δημοτικός is tighter and more manifest in Isocrates, whose attempt to reframe the notion of δημοτικός, as I aim to show, revolves around his views on Athens' leadership within the Hellenic world.

Δημοτικός in [Aristotle]

I shall conclude this overview on the inherent adaptability of the term in the fifth and, even more clearly, in the fourth century by mentioning the occurrences of δημοτικός in [Aristotle]'s *Constitution of the Athenians*. While I intend to return to the instances related to the notion of πάτριος πολιτεία in section 3.3.1, here I will focus on the occurrences which refer to Pisistratus.

Indeed, in describing the three factions characterising the rivalry at Athens following Solon's archonship and in identifying Pisistratus as the leader of the third one, [Aristotle] states twice that he appears to be δημοτικώτατος ('most in favour of the δῆμος').[81] Adding that during his tyranny he administered public matters more 'like a citizen' (πολιτικῶς) than 'like a tyrant' (τυραννικῶς).[82]

Furthermore, in describing his tyranny [Aristotle] stresses that Pisistratus was both δημοτικός and φιλάνθρωπος,[83] an association of adjectives which calls to mind the use of these same terms to refer to Socrates in the passage from Xenophon's *Memorabilia* examined above. The application of δημοτικός to Pisistratus, thus to a non-democratic context, by [Aristotle] can be compared to the Isocratean depiction of Evagoras as simultaneously δημοτικός and τυραννικός and points towards the embedded adaptability of the term.

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[81] [Arist.], *Constitution of the Athenians* XIII 5 and XIV 1. See Cartledge (2009) 48-50.
[82] [Arist.], *Constitution of the Athenians* XIV 3; see also [Arist.], *Constitution of the Athenians* XVI 1 where it is reiterated that Pisistratus administered Athens πολιτικῶς.
[83] [Arist.], *Constitution of the Athenians* XVI 8. See also [Arist.], *Constitution of the Athenians* XVI 2 where Pisistratus is described as 'benevolent' (φιλάνθρωπος), 'gentle' (πρᾶος) and 'indulgent towards those who had done him wrong' (τοῖς ἁμαρτάνουσι συγγνωμονικός); in commenting this passage, Rhodes (2017) 228 points out that both φιλάνθρωπος and πρᾶος are terms employed 'particularly by Isocrates'.

Conclusion

In the present section I have underlined the original and ingrained malleability of the term δημοτικός, and thus of the notion that it conveys, by focusing on some relevant occurrences in the fifth century, when such ductility appears to be hinted at, and then in the fourth, when it comes to light even more manifestly. So, after briefly mentioning the use of the term in Herodotus (the first author known to us to employ it), I have moved to examine the occurrences that we find in [Xenophon]'s *Constitution of the Athenians* where it ultimately emerges that not all members of the δῆμος can be labelled as δημοτικοί.

Shifting my attention to the fourth century, I have analysed the five instances in the Xenophontic corpus underlining not only how the adjective can take on both a positive and negative meaning, but also how it is applied to a non-Athenian and non-democratic context within the framework of Xenophon's views on meritocracy. I have then wrapped up the overview on the intrinsic adaptability of δημοτικός by referring to those instances of the term in [Aristotle]*'s Constitution of the Athenians* that are employed to depict Pisistratus. In doing so, I have attempted to emphasise once again the relatively broad range of application of this adjective. Its malleability is indeed a deep-rooted aspect which falls within the wider framework of the adaptability of democratic vocabulary highlighted throughout the present study.

3. Towards the redefinition of δημοτικός

In the first part of the present chapter I have focused, first of all, on Isocrates' use of δημοτικός in conjunction with τυραννικός to describe Evagoras and then on fifth- and fourth-century instances that attest the adaptability embedded in the term itself. I will now move to develop further those insights in order to investigate how by exploiting its inherent flexibility, Isocrates aims to redefine the meaning of being δημοτικός in light of the wider framework of his interest in, and attempt to rethink, political leadership.

Before unearthing the distinctive features of this Isocratean redefinition, I shall begin by showing that there was a broader debate taking place in the fourth century concerning what acting δημοτικῶς truly meant. Such a discussion appears to be particularly vivid in some of Aeschines' and Demosthenes' works.

Nevertheless, the usages of the term made by Isocrates in *Against Callimachus* and, even more manifestly, in the 350s attest that he bears witness to the prominence which the contest centred on the meaning of being δημοτικός gained in the second half of the century. So, after examining the occurrences of the term in *Against Callimachus*, I will devote special attention to the instances of δημοτικός and their significance in *Areopagiticus*, *On the Peace* and *Antidosis* since it is precisely in these three speeches, which are inextricably linked to one another from the point of view of their chronology and content issues, that Isocrates puts forward his attempt to reframe the definition of what it means to be δημοτικός in connection with his views on the need to rethink Athens' hegemonic role in the Greek world. Thus, I shall ultimately argue that an in-depth examination of the usages of δημοτικός in the Isocratean corpus reveals the crucial significance that Isocrates' ideas on Athenian leadership acquire for the interpretation of his political thought and of his political, especially democratic, vocabulary.

3.1 Fourth-century debate on being δημοτικός

The term δημοτικός gains an increasing importance during the fourth century when not only its inherent ductility, already hinted at in some fifth-century occurrences, comes to light more manifestly, but also there appears to be a debate revolving around what it truly means to act in the interest of the Athenian δῆμος. Thus, before analysing the key elements characterising Isocrates' attempt to reframe the notion expressed by δημοτικός, I shall examine the relevance of such a debate as it emerges in the second half of the fourth century from some specific passages in the works of Aeschines and Demosthenes.

Moreover, I will highlight how the existence of this fourth-century discussion concerning the meaning of acting δημοτικῶς is attested, at least *in nuce*, by the criticism that Isocrates voices against what he presents as the view commonly adopted by contemporary Athenians on who ought to be considered as δημοτικός. This criticism appears to arise as early as his forensic speeches, with particular reference to *Against Callimachus*, and lays the foundations for his recontextualisation of the term.

Indeed, the questioning of the meaning allegedly attributed to being δημοτικός by his fellow citizens recurs with greater strength and clarity in the usages of the word in his three main works belonging to the 350s, namely *Areopagiticus*, *On the Peace* and *Antidosis*. In these speeches by challenging the alleged widely accepted definition of δημοτικός Isocrates ultimately intends to redefine the meaning of acting in favour of the δῆμος on the basis of his views concerning the need to reshape Athens' hegemonic role in response to the difficulties faced by its empire in the mid-fourth century. In doing so, he is engaging in, and providing his own peculiar contribution to, a crucial debate about what it means to be truly δημοτικός which plausibly began in the first half of the fourth century before continuing more vigorously in the second part of the century.

Aeschines' definition of δημοτικός

The fourth-century discussion revolving around the meaning to be assigned to acting in the interest of the δῆμος manifestly comes to light in the definition of δημοτικός provided in *Against Ctesiphon*, where we find almost all occurrences of δημοτικός in Aeschines, namely six instances on an overall total of seven in the corpus.[84] Indeed, in this speech Aeschines enumerates the paramount features which a man must possess in order to be regarded as δημοτικός. Firstly, he needs to be 'free' (ἐλεύθερος) on both sides of his parents. Secondly, he has to have inherited from his forefathers some kind of 'well-doing' (εὐεργεσία) towards the δῆμος. Thirdly, he must be 'self-controlled' (σώφρων) and 'moderate' (μέτριος) in his daily life. Then, Aeschines adds that any man who aims to be defined δημοτικός must be 'reasonable' (εὐγνώμων) and 'able to speak' (δυνατὸς εἰπεῖν), specifying that 'considerateness' (εὐγνωμοσύνη) should be preferred to eloquence in case one does not possess both qualities. Finally, he ought to be 'of courageous heart' (ἀνδρεῖος (...) τὴν ψυχήν) in the face of dangers so that he will not desert the δῆμος.[85]

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[84] See Aesch., *Against Ctesiphon* 168, 169, 176, 194 (where the superlative is employed to describe Cephalus of Collytus on whom see Carey (2000) 231 n. 225) and 207. The remaining one of the seven total instances of the word in Aeschines' corpus occurs in Aesch., *Against Timarchus* 173.

[85] Aeschin., *Against Ctesiphon* 169-170. Regarding the reference to eloquence in this passage, Ober (1989) 188-189 suggests that by presenting eloquence as one of the attributes characterising a δημοτικός man, but at the same time as 'subsidiary to good judgement', this definition of δημοτικός offers 'a basis for analyzing the relationship between the two seemingly antithetical attitudes toward rhetoric and rhetorical education' which emerge from Aeschines'

Significantly, Aeschines concludes his enumeration of the essential features which identify a man as δημοτικός by stating not only that such attributes are diametrically opposed to those which characterise 'the oligarchical man' (ὁ ὀλιγαρχικός) but also, unsurprisingly, that Demosthenes does not possess any of them.[86] In this regard, in the following sections Aeschines goes on to show point by point that Demosthenes, despite his claims to be δημοτικός, does not have any of the qualities which enable a man to be defined as such.[87]

Δημοτικός in Demosthenes: link with ἐλευθερία

Consequently, Demosthenes in *On the Crown* openly criticises Aeschines' definition of δημοτικός as expressed in *Against Ctesiphon*.[88] For his part, as underlined by Ober, in this speech Demosthenes, while presenting himself, just like Aeschines, as '*dēmotikos, metrios*, well brought up and incorruptible', at the same time 'balances these demotic virtues with various elite attributes', namely 'his wealthy upbringing and his superior education' as well as 'a rare ability to weigh the meaning of complex events, special and reliable sources of information' and 'the leisure (provided by inherited wealth) to develop policy and to prepare speeches that are genuinely valuable to the democratic state'; in doing so, Ober goes on to argue, Demosthenes intends to point out that:

> the good elite *rhētor* can be, especially in a time of emergency, not only the articulate voice of the unspoken will of the people, but a leader. Democracy is thus not incompatible with the leadership of an elite individual with original ideas, but that individual must demonstrate his complete loyalty to demotic ideals and he must maintain a style of life that is regarded by the *dēmos* as suitably moderate.[89]

In this respect, in *On the False Embassy* Demosthenes, in attacking Aeschines, warns against the danger of allowing any individual to gain more power than

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works, namely 'the Athenian distrust for oratory' on the one hand, and 'the recognition that the orators performed a useful function' on the other.

[86] See Aeschin., *Against Ctesiphon* 170; see also Aeschin., *Against Ctesiphon* 168. The opposition between οἱ δημοτικοί and οἱ ὀλιγαρχικοί is reiterated in Aeschin., *Against Ctesiphon* 207.

[87] See Aeschin., *Against Ctesiphon* 171-176.

[88] See Dem., *On the Crown* 122. It is worth mentioning that δημοτικός occurs also in Dem., *On the Crown* 6 where, however, it refers to Solon (see section 3.3.1 below).

[89] Ober (2000) 139.

'the many' (οἱ πολλοί) and defines as a deed truly in favour of the Athenian people (τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι δημοτικόν) to cast the vote that each man deserves depending solely on his actions, thus disregarding the influence which any prominent individual might have acquired in court.[90]

Interestingly, the phrase τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι δημοτικόν employed in *On the False Embassy* 296 occurs also in *Against Androtion*, a speech written by Demosthenes for Diodorus who delivered it to support the accuser Euctemon. In this context, Demosthenes makes Diodorus pronounce this phrase with reference to the collection of the arrears for the property tax carried out according to the law and for the benefit of all Athenian citizens as opposed to the violent methods employed by Androtion. Indeed, in order to support his statement, the speaker highlights that the main reason why a man would choose to live in a democracy, rather than in an oligarchy, is that 'everything is milder in a democracy' (πάντα πραότερ᾿ ἐστὶν δημοτικόν).[91] In this regard, Androtion is emphatically labelled as being 'more brutal' (ἀσελγέστερος) than any 'oligarchy' (ὀλιγαρχία) as he is accused of having displayed a violent conduct which surpassed even that of the Thirty Tyrants.[92] So, his methods to exact the arrears are presented as particularly reprehensible precisely because, due to the violence which they display against Athenian citizens, they undermine the crucial distinction between free men and slaves and thus act against the law itself.[93]

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[90] Dem., *On the False Embassy* 296-297. The other two occurrences of δημοτικός in this speech, namely Dem., *On the False Embassy* 277 and 280, refer, respectively, to Epicrates, who in 403 participated in the restauration of democracy led by Thrasybulus, and to Thrasybulus himself.

[91] Dem., *Against Androtion* 51. It is worth noting that δημοτικός occurs again, this time in the comparative form, in Dem., *Against Androtion* 67, although some scholars delete this passage as noted by Harris (2008) 193 n. 98.

[92] See Dem., *Against Androtion* 52.

[93] See especially Dem., *Against Androtion* 52-68. It is also worth pointing out that a relatively high number of occurrences of δημοτικός can also be found in *Against Timocrates*, which, like *Against Androtion*, was written to be delivered by Diodorus and where Demosthenes reproduces some passages from *Against Androtion*. More specifically, when recounting Androtion's deeds he repeats almost *verbatim* in the second half of section 162 the opening sentences of *Against Androtion* 51, including the phrase τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι δημοτικόν. Additionally, in *Against Timocrates* 69 Demosthenes appears to echo the connection between δημοτικός and the notion of πραότης expressed in *Against Androtion* 51 although he specifies that, while the fact that the laws are mild is indeed an aspect that can be regarded as δημοτικόν, they are mild towards those men who still have to be brought to trial (not those who have already been convicted). The adjective is also used in Dem., *Against Timocrates* 134 (to describe, alongside χρηστός, Agyrrhius of Collytus) and 174 (in the comparative form). Additionally, in this same speech we find two occurrences of the adverb δημοτικῶς: Dem., *Against Timocrates* 25 (where it is coupled with φιλανθρώπως) and 59 (where it is coupled with καλῶς).

Remarkably, Raaflaub has in mind Demosthenes' *Against Androtion* 51[94] when, in pointing out how '[f]reedom (…) became a function of democracy', he highlights the inextricable link between δημοτικός and ἐλεύθερος:

> What chiefly mattered was whether a measure, law or institution was democratic or "friendly to the people" (*dēmotikos*); this in itself determined whether it was free or supportive of freedom. "Democracy" and "democratic" (*dēmotikos*) thus converged in meaning with *eleutheria* and *eleutheros* and, as the terms designating the precondition of freedom, often attracted the primary association with this value or ideal. What the Athenians perceived as free easily corresponded to, and was expressed by, *dēmotikos*.[95]

Indeed, the close correlation between the two notions of being δημοτικός and ἐλευθερία stressed by Raaflaub is manifestly hinted at not only in Demosthenes' *Against Androtion* but also in Aeschines' enumeration of the key qualities that a man must possess in order to be regarded as δημοτικός[96] with the requirement of being a free-born citizen occupying the first place in the list. Moreover, while Demosthenes is clearly reacting to Aeschines, it should also be noted that, according to Rowe, *Against Androtion* is primarily directed against Isocrates and his associates, with whom Demosthenes was at loggerheads.[97] Androtion was a pupil of Isocrates[98] and throughout the speech he is attacked 'as an Isocratean and not simply as a proposer of an improper decree'.[99] Similarly, Rowe has also suggested that in *On the Peace* and *Antidosis* Isocrates is reacting to

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[94] See Raaflaub (2004a) 356 n. 34.
[95] Raaflaub (2004a) 275-276.
[96] It is worth noting that the close link between being δημοτικός and ἐλευθερία re-emerges in the portrait of Empedocles of Agrigentum which we find in Diog. Laert., VIII 63-64. On the portrait of Empedocles in this passage see Horky (2016) who suggests that the early Hellenistic historian Timaeus of Tauromenion represents the main overarching source for the account of Empedocles' political activities in Diogenes' eighth book. In this lights, Horky (2016) 67-68 reaches the conclusion that in this passage Diogenes ultimately provides us with Timaeus' depiction of Empedocles as 'an advocate for democracy and democratic values, a δημοτικὸς ἀνήρ, that would have resonated with anyone who had read or heard the orators Aeschines or Demosthenes' and 'as a Demosthenic philosopher, a man who ethically rejected the excesses of kingship and protected the rights of the Agrigentine people against the threats of tyranny and oligarchy'.
[97] Rowe (2000).
[98] Rowe (2000) 292.
[99] Rowe (2000) 296.

Demosthenes' attempt to discredit his school.[100] Thus, the analysis of the contest about acting δημοτικῶς in Aeschines, Demosthenes and Isocrates cannot be disentangled from this broader context.

Δημοτικός in Demosthenes: link with εὔνοια

Interestingly, the highest number of occurrences of δημοτικός in Demosthenes' works appears not in one of his speeches but in Epistle III *Concerning the sons of Lycurgus*[101] where we find ten instances, that is, around one-third, of the twenty-nine total occurrences of the adjective and its cognate adverb δημοτικῶς throughout the Demosthenic works.[102] In this letter, which was written during his exile and most probably a few months before the outbreak of the Lamian War (323-322), Demosthenes' primary goal consists, at least at first sight, in urging the Athenians to release Lycurgus' sons. Nevertheless, throughout the epistle he makes numerous allusions to himself with the ultimate aim of pleading his own return.[103]

More particularly, while stressing that Athens has acquired a 'bad reputation' (φαύλη δόξα) precisely because of its bitter attitude toward the sons of Lycurgus and that Lycurgus himself was widely acknowledged as being 'in favour of the δῆμος beyond anyone else' (δημοτικὸς παρὰ πάντας),[104] Demosthenes simultaneously reclaims also for himself the label of δημοτικός. Indeed, the description of Lycurgus as δημοτικός goes hand in hand with the Demosthenic self-portrait drawn in very similar terms, first and foremost, throughout this epistle but also elsewhere in the corpus.

For instance, concerning the description of Lycurgus in section 3 of the letter, Goldstein has noted that the words employed in this passage are very similar to those which Demosthenes uses to depict himself in section 6 of

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[100] Rowe (2002).

[101] Goldstein (1968) 3-5, 31-34, 64-94, 261-266 has convincingly argued in favour of the authenticity of this letter as well as of the first two letters and the fourth one, while regarding both the fifth and the sixth letter as forgeries.

[102] Dem., *Concerning the sons of Lycurgus* 2, 3, 6, 10, 14, 15, 18, 20 and 31. In addition to the occurrences mentioned so far, the remaining instances of δημοτικός and its cognate adverb in the Demosthenic corpus can be found in Dem., *Philip* 19, *Against Meidias* 183 and 209, *Against Macartatus* 71, and *Against Eubulides* 32 (on the use of δημοτικῶς in this passage see next section).

[103] See, for instance, Goldstein (1968) 211 and Worthington (2006) 114-115.

[104] See Dem., *Concerning the sons of Lycurgus* 5-6. See also Dem., *Concerning the sons of Lycurgus* 10 where Lycurgus' sons are implicitly presented as δημοτικοί and the Athenians' attitude towards them is strongly condemned.

Epistle II *Concerning his own restoration*.[105] In this respect, his allusion to the surrender of Lycurgus demanded by Alexander after the fall of Thebes in 335 grounds his own representation as δημοτικός considering that his fellow citizens would have known that Demosthenes himself was included, alongside Lycurgus, among the Athenians whose extradition Alexander had requested.[106]

Thus, Demosthenes appears to make a distinction between those Athenians like Lycurgus and himself who truly act in the interest of the δῆμος and those who merely pretend to do so. The latter group, Demosthenes suggests, is exemplified by the rhetor Pytheas, who was one of the prosecutors in the trial regarding the Harpalus affair in 323. More specifically, Demosthenes strongly criticises Pytheas for making an about turn from being δημοτικός to being ready to do anything against the δῆμος.[107] So, Demosthenes' attack against Pytheas can be interpreted as alluding to the fact that he switched from an anti- to a pro-Macedonian position since we know that, before participating in the prosecution of Demosthenes in 323, he had opposed Alexander's request for Athenian ships in 335 and then for divine worship in 324. In other words, Pytheas is condemned for his 'sudden change from the appearance of being a patriot to unabashed espousal of the opposite course',[108] as noted by Goldstein who also argues that Demosthenes here refers to his conviction that Pytheas 'waited until he felt sure of his place as an accepted and established politician before "selling his services"', thus implying that his 'apparent patriotism was mere play-acting'.[109]

Therefore, in the context of a letter which Demosthenes exploits as an opportunity to plead for his return, I would stress that his choice to present a subtle distinction between, so to speak, genuine and false δημοτικοί, rather than a sharp and manifest opposition between those who are δημοτικοί and those who are not, can be read as a move designed to disparage one of his accusers while at the same time emphasising, by contrast, how he himself has systematically acted in the best interest of the Athenian δῆμος.

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[105] See Goldstein (1968) 213.
[106] See Dem., *Concerning the sons of Lycurgus* 4; see Clavaud (1987) 163 and Worthington (2006) 117 n. 52 on the reference in this passage to Alexander's request as supporting Demosthenes' attempt to assimilate his self-portrait with the depiction of Lycurgus which he presents in this letter.
[107] Dem., *Concerning the sons of Lycurgus* 29.
[108] Goldstein (1968) 224.
[109] Goldstein (1968) 225.

Demosthenes' strategy appears indeed to be motivated by the fact that it would not have been convincing to accuse Pytheas of having consistently held a pro-Macedonian position since his fellow citizens must have been aware, for instance, of his refusal to comply with Alexander's requests in the two occasions mentioned above. By depicting Pytheas as the prototype of those Athenians who pretend to be δημοτικοί but are not truly so, Demosthenes most likely intends to suggest that his former supposedly anti-Macedonian stance represented only a façade and that his role as prosecutor in the trial related to the Harpalus scandal offers an example of when Pytheas did show his true colours.[110]

In contrast with those Athenians, represented by Pytheas, for whom being δημοτικός is a mere pretence, the group of men truly δημοτικοί (including, first and foremost, Lycurgus and Demosthenes himself) is described as consisting in those Athenians who always fight on the same side of the δῆμος[111] and speak on its behalf.[112] In this regard, Demosthenes seems to exclude the possible existence, hinted at by [Xenophon] as I considered above, of members of the δῆμος who do not necessarily join in its cause and who thus cannot be defined as δημοτικοί. In other words, in assimilating himself to Lycurgus and portraying both of them as δημοτικοί, Demosthenes appears to present the category of genuine δημοτικοί as a unitary and monolithic block whose members, by definition, act unquestionably in the best interest of the Athenian people. However, towards the end of the letter within this same category he operates a slight differentiation between two groups: those, like Lycurgus, who have died and those, like himself, still alive but who have been cast away.[113] In marking this dividing line on the basis of such a simple yet core principle, Demosthenes emphasises his role as true δημοτικός and implicitly urges his

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[110] It is worth noting that, while manifestly condemning Pytheas, Demosthenes never mentions Hyperides who, nonetheless, was one of the ten prosecutors. A possible reason for this choice could be that waging an attack on him on similar lines to those employed against Pytheas might have been more problematic considering Hyperides' well known anti-Macedonian attitude, on which see, for instance, Goldstein (1968) 230. Nonetheless, Goldstein (1968) 150 stresses that 'Hyperides, too, was identified with the "imperiled anti-Macedonian patriots" and may have narrowly escaped being implicated in the Harpalus scandal'; on Hyperides' likely involvement in the Harpalus affair see also Goldstein (1968) 229. On some passages in Demosthenes' letter that can be interpreted as containing polemical allusions to Hyperides. Additionally, it is worth pointing out that the two orators eventually reconciled, as noted, for example, by Edwards (1994) 60; for the possibility that Demosthenes might have sought a reconciliation with Hyperides already at the time of writing this epistle see Goldstein (1968) 149.
[111] See Dem., *Concerning the sons of Lycurgus* 15.
[112] See Dem., *Concerning the sons of Lycurgus* 31.
[113] Dem., *Concerning the sons of Lycurgus* 31-32.

fellow citizens to recall him by alluding to how he retains the ability to benefit his πόλις.

It is in this context that the notion of εὔνοια, which as I have highlighted in the previous chapter is a cornerstone of Isocrates' ideas on leadership, stands out as the key feature characterising those Athenians like Lycurgus and Demosthenes himself who are depicted as truly δημοτικοί. The relevance of εὔνοια in setting out who ought to be regarded as being genuinely δημοτικός emerges precisely in the final part of the letter where, just after the reference to the distinction of true δημοτικοί in two groups, we can find a cluster of occurrences of εὔνοια and its cognate adjective εὔνους[114] with specific focus on the goodwill towards the Athenian δῆμος displayed by genuine δημοτικοί.

Significantly, the emphasis on εὔνοια as the key characteristic of a true δημοτικός calls to mind the significance which this notion acquires, for instance, in *On the Crown* where we can find the highest number of occurrences of εὔνοια and its cognates in the Demosthenic corpus.[115] In the opening of the speech, Demosthenes links the notion of acting in the interest of the δῆμος with εὔνοια by portraying Solon as both εὔνους and δημοτικός.[116] Then, throughout the rest of the speech, Demosthenes highlights his own being εὔνους towards the Athenians in a self-portrait which echoes the above-mentioned depiction of the Athenian legislator.[117]

Nonetheless, stressing his goodwill towards the Athenian people becomes even more important to Demosthenes when he writes *Concerning the sons of Lycurgus* as he aims to be recalled from his exile and is aware of the political turmoil affecting Athens shortly before the beginning of the Lamian War when the Athenians were divided 'between admitting a dangerous mass of

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[114] More specifically, the adjective is used in Dem., *Concerning the sons of Lycurgus* 32 (in the comparative form) and 33, while εὔνοια occurs in Dem., *Concerning the sons of Lycurgus* 34 where it is coupled with φιλανθρωπία. The noun is employed also in Dem., *Concerning the sons of Lycurgus* 35 although in this passage it refers to Demosthenes' goodwill not towards the Athenian people but towards Lycurgus and his sons. In addition, εὔνοια occurs in Dem., *Concerning the sons of Lycurgus* 14 (where Lycurgus' deeds are presented as 'useful' (χρηστά), 'in favour of the δῆμος' (δημοτικά) and inspired by his 'goodwill' (εὔνοια)), 21, 27 40 and 44 (where Demosthenes invites the Athenians to show towards him the same goodwill that he claims to have towards them).

[115] Thirty-nine instances in total: Dem., *On the Crown* 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 54, 80, 84, 90, 94, 110, 153, 167, 171 (one occurrence of the noun and one occurrence of its cognate adjective), 172 (one occurrence of the noun and one of the adjective), 173, 195, 198, 199, 273, 276, 277, 281, 286, 291, 301, 311, 312, 314, 316, 320 (one occurrence of the noun and one of the adjective), 321, 322.

[116] See Dem., *On the Crown* 6.

[117] See Westwood (2020) 300.

subversives and dispossessed (…) or facing the wrath of Alexander, acting through his deputy Antipater'.[118] In other words, in presenting εὔνοια towards the δῆμος and being δημοτικός as going hand in hand and ultimately as distinctive marks of an ardent and consistent anti-Macedonian attitude he intends to emphasise his own loyalty towards Athens and thus secure his return by refuting the suspicion of being colluded with the Macedonian power.

In this respect, it is also worth pointing out, as highlighted by Hansen, that, in the mutual attacks between the two orators, Aeschines presents Demosthenes as anti-democratic while for Demosthenes the debate revolves around his own position as being anti-Macedonian versus Aeschines' pro-Macedonian stance.[119] Moreover, Hansen underlines that, although Demosthenes is frequently regarded 'as a defender of democracy on the grounds that he fights for ἐλευθερία, the cornerstone of every democratic constitution', what he calls for when referring to ἐλευθερία is 'autonomy, the goal of any Greek state, whether oligarchic or democratic'.[120] In this framework, the law of 337/6 proposed by Eucrates against tyranny, by attacking the Areopagus in whose revival in the mid-fourth century Demosthenes might well have been involved, can be interpreted as targeting Demosthenes himself whom his adversaries, like Aeschines, generally portray as an opponent of the Athenian democracy.[121]

Therefore, it is particularly significant to note that Demosthenes puts the focus on εὔνοια when discussing what being δημοτικός truly means in a letter which has been compared to Isocrates' epistle *To the Rulers of the Mytilenaeans* for the author's manoeuvre of 'turning a plea for others into propaganda for himself'.[122] Indeed, as we saw in the previous chapter, εὔνοια plays a key role in the Isocratean corpus in defining successful political leadership, both within and by Athens. So, Demosthenes' emphasis in *Concerning the sons of Lycurgus* on the importance of this notion in singling out

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[118] Goldstein (1968) 231.
[119] See Hansen (1974) 56-57.
[120] Hansen (1974) 58.
[121] See Mitchell (2007) 152. It is worth noting, however, that Goldstein (1968) 234 in commenting on the epilogue of Demosthenes' letter stresses how '[t]he attitude of the Athenian public to the Areopagus at this time was ambiguous', specifying that '[o]rators frequently appealed to its prestige (…), and Dinarchus does so to support the vulnerable indictment', while 'Demosthenes in reply exploits the unpopularity of this "oligarchical" institution; the people might be led to believe that body had framed him, a democratic patriot'. See also Goldstein (1968) 237-238.
[122] Goldstein (1968) 150; see also Goldstein (1968) 133.

those Athenians who truly act in the interest of the people and who can thus be regarded as genuine δημοτικοί, while not necessarily proving direct dependence on Isocrates' views, points towards the existence of a red thread which links εὔνοια, political leadership and the meaning attributed to δημοτικός running from the Isocratean corpus to the discussion around what being δημοτικός really means which we find in Aeschines and Demosthenes.

Going back to the Demosthenic letter, it is possible to conclude that Demosthenes shifts the focus on the definition of δημοτικός from the concept of ἐλευθερία (which, as we saw, characterises the debate around the term, first and foremost, in Aeschines' *Against Ctesiphon* but also in Demosthenes' *Against Androtion* and *Against Timocrates*) to the notion of εὔνοια towards the Athenian δῆμος due to the historical context of the Harpalus affair and of the outbreak of the Lamian War, and in order to secure his own return.

Conclusion

In brief, in the second half of the fourth century there appears to be a debate revolving around what being δημοτικός really means which emerges manifestly from the works of Aeschines and Demosthenes, with the latter attacking not only Aeschines but also, in *Against Androtion* in particular, Isocrates and his school. While the meaning of the word itself stays the same (namely, acting in the interest of the δῆμος), it is a question of what this action truly means, with each different author insisting on the priority of his own definition of acting δημοτικῶς. Isocrates himself takes part in this contest, even though he writes from a different perspective than Aeschines and Demosthenes. Indeed, within this framework, in the next sections I shall suggest that some hints of the existence and relevance of such a discussion about being δημοτικός can be identified also in the Isocratean corpus, where Isocrates reframes and reshapes the meaning of being in favour of the δῆμος in the broader context of his views on leadership.

3.2 Δημοτικός in *Against Callimachus*

Before analysing further the features characterising the Isocratean recontextualisation of δημοτικός in terms of his ideas on Athens' hegemonic role over Greece, I shall focus on the criticism which he voices against what he

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presents as the meaning of δημοτικός commonly agreed upon by contemporary Athenians. Indeed, questioning the allegedly accepted definition of the term is the first step towards, and thus cannot be disentangled from, his reframing of δημοτικός in light of the rethinking of Athenian leadership that he upholds in the 350s.

Interestingly, Isocrates appears to discuss and challenge, at least to a certain degree, the allegedly widespread understanding of the meaning of being δημοτικός as early as his career as logographer. As we saw in the previous chapter, the term is applied to Alcibiades in section 36 of *On the Team of Horses*, where he is depicted by his son Alcibiades the Younger as a loyal supporter of the Athenian democracy against the charges of having oligarchic sympathies and aiming at making himself tyrant. Nevertheless, it is in *Against Callimachus*, which was most probably written in 402 or at the beginning of 401,[123] that we can find some clearer hints of Isocrates' views on who is worthy of being called δημοτικός. The case for which Isocrates writes this forensic speech places itself in the context of the general amnesty of 403 and the subsequent law of Archinus to which Isocrates' client appeals; *Against Callimachus* represents the first speech known to us resulting from a παραγραφή.[124]

It is in this framework that Isocrates puts the term twice in the mouth of the speaker to oppose Callimachus' claim of being δημοτικός. Indeed, in section 48 the speaker points out that, even though Callimachus professes to be 'in favour of the δῆμος' (δημοτικός), he was more eager than anyone else to take part in the regime of the Thirty.[125] Here, the words which Isocrates makes his client pronounce consist in a warning to the jury not to be misled by Callimachus' claims, thus not to misjudge who truly deserves to be called δημοτικός, and at the same time point towards the opposition between who is δημοτικός and who is not as being structured in terms of a sharp contrast between democrats and oligarchs. Therefore, in this passage Isocrates appears to employ δημοτικός simply in the context of internal politics as the antonym of endorsing oligarchy. Supporting oligarchy, indeed, is presented as the true

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[123] On the dating of this forensic speech see Mathieu and Brémond (1928) 16; Mirhady and Too (2000) 96 opt for 402.
[124] See Mathieu and Brémond (1928) 15-16; Mirhady and Too (2000) 96.
[125] See also Isoc., *Against Callimachus* 49 where his participation in the regime of the Thirty is additionally emphasised.

identity of Callimachus whose misappropriation of the label δημοτικός is strongly criticised.

Nonetheless, towards the end of the speech, the use of the term acquires additional significance as the speaker provides a clearer definition of who should, and who should not, be regarded as δημοτικός. More specifically, in *Against Callimachus* 62 he states that the Athenians who ought to be considered as being 'in favour of the δῆμος' (δημοτικοί) are not those who when the δῆμος was powerful were eager to take part in Athens' public life, but those who when their πόλις was experiencing hardship were willing to brave dangers for it. Additionally, in the same section, the discussion is extended to two other areas by defining those to whom 'gratitude' (χάρις) is due (i.e. anyone who has conferred benefits upon Athens) and those towards whom it is not due (i.e. someone who has suffered misfortunes on a personal level), but also by identifying, in the case of men who have become poor, those on whom one must have pity, namely men who have spent their fortunes for the good of their fellow citizens, as opposed to those who have simply lost their property, and who thus should not be pitied for their poverty.

Concerning this last point, in the following section the speaker stresses that he belongs precisely to that group of Athenians whose poverty results from the fact that they have made use of their financial resources to benefit Athens. And, in this context, he underlines how crucial it is for him to enjoy good repute (εὐδοκιμεῖν) among his fellow citizens, emphatically describing being highly esteemed as more important than his property and even than his own life.[126] The sharp distinction between Isocrates' client and Callimachus highlighted in this passage becomes even more manifest in the following sections where Callimachus' unwillingness to run any risk on behalf of his fellow citizens is contrasted with the speaker's own zeal in serving Athens with specific allusion to his activity as trierarch at the time of the Athenian defeat at Aegospotami in 405.[127] As a matter of fact, immediately before indicating who is worthy of being defined as δημοτικός and who is not, the speaker recalls the perseverance which he demonstrated in his trierarchy at the time of the battle of Aegospotami as opposed to the attitude of most of the other trierarchs.[128] He also stresses

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[126] Isoc., *Against Callimachus* 63.
[127] See Isoc., *Against Callimachus* 64-65.
[128] See Isoc., *Against Callimachus* 58-60.

how, in spite of Lysander's threat of condemning to death anyone importing grain to Athens, he managed to seize the grain sent for the Spartans bringing it to the Piraeus.[129]

Therefore, two main aspects need to be highlighted, in my view, in relation to the use of δημοτικός in *Against Callimachus*. First of all, the depiction of who should and who should not be regarded as δημοτικός is closely linked to the broader context of the speaker's self-praise for his achievements in Athenian foreign politics at the end of the Peloponnesian War. So, the definition of being δημοτικός in this forensic speech can be read as foreshadowing, at least to some degree, the crucial role that Isocrates' subsequent views on Athenian international politics play in the recontextualisation of the meaning of δημοτικός which he puts forward in the 350s.

Secondly, in characterising himself as δημοτικός in opposition to Callimachus, the speaker dwells on the importance of gaining good repute among the δῆμος. As we saw in the previous chapter, both εὐδοκιμία and εὔνοια represent key features in the Isocratean discussion around political leadership, especially in terms of the good repute and goodwill which the Athenians should obtain from their allies in the context of the reshaping of their hegemonic role over the Hellenic world. In *Against Callimachus* the relevance of εὐδοκιμία remains confined to the interaction with the Athenian δῆμος with no reference to the relation with the other Greeks as at the time of this speech Isocrates has not yet developed the same arguments on Athenian hegemony which characterise his most prominent works in the mid-fourth century. Nonetheless, it is still significant to point out how even as early as at the very end of the fifth century Isocrates appears to show some interest in the notion of εὐδοκιμία and its link with what it truly means to be δημοτικός in the broader framework of Athens' external politics.

In brief, despite the constraints imposed by the forensic nature of this speech and the fact that at this time Isocrates has not yet fully developed his interest in, and ideas on, political leadership, the usage of δημοτικός in *Against Callimachus* can be interpreted as prefiguring, at least to a certain extent, some of the elements characterising the recontextualisation of δημοτικός which he implements in the 350s. It is indeed around fifty years later, in *Areopagiticus, On*

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[129] See Isoc., *Against Callimachus* 61.

the Peace and *Antidosis*, three speeches which are closely linked to one another chronologically and thematically, that Isocrates attempts to promote this reframing of the meaning of being δημοτικός. In doing so, he criticises his fellow citizens' views on who ought to be called δημοτικός as it comes to light in passages like *On the Peace* 13 and *Antidosis* 303 on which I shall dwell in section 3.3.2 of the present chapter.

For the moment, though, I would want to underline how Isocrates' criticism of the definition allegedly accepted by most Athenians of who has to be regarded as acting in the best interest of the δῆμος is already attested, although *in nuce*, in *Against Callimachus*, and might well bear witness to an ongoing discussion on the meaning of δημοτικός already existing at the very end of the fifth and in the first half of the fourth century, while also foreshadowing the crucial significance which the debate on this term acquires in the second part of the century.

3.3 Recontextualisation of δημοτικός

By engaging in the fourth-century revisions of what it means to be δημοτικός and prefiguring its subsequent increasing relevance, Isocrates strongly condemns his fellow citizens for labelling as δημοτικοί men who, in his view, are not truly so. Nonetheless, as I noted above, he does not limit himself to criticism. Rather, he attempts to offer a redefinition of the meaning of acting in favour of the δῆμος which consists in reframing the meaning of the term in relation to his ideas on leadership with particular reference to his arguments concerning the reshaping of Athens' leading role over Greece.

In the following two sections I shall thus provide an extensive examination of such reframing by devoting special attention to the instances of δημοτικός in *Areopagiticus*, *On the Peace* and *Antidosis*. Indeed, as I considered earlier, although he seems to show some interest, at least *in nuce*, in redefining δημοτικός already in the forensic speech *Against Callimachus*, it is in these three speeches, all belonging to the 350s and thematically linked to one another, that Isocrates endeavours to implement a recontextualisation of the term within the broader framework of the views on Athenian leadership which he was developing at the time.

I will thus begin by analysing the occurrences of δημοτικός in connection with the notion of πάτριος πολιτεία in *Areopagiticus*. In doing so, I intend to show how, rather than corroborating the widespread assumption regarding Isocrates' alleged oligarchic agenda, the use of δημοτικός in relation to the Athenian ancestral constitution ultimately points towards his attempt to reshape the meaning of the term in light of his emerging ideas on the need to rethink Athens' hegemony.

I shall then focus on the key features which characterise this redefinition by examining the remaining usages of δημοτικός in the above-mentioned trio of speeches with specific attention to the instances that we find in *On the Peace*. Indeed, it is in this speech that the reframing of what it means to be δημοτικός, hinted at in *Areopagiticus* and reaffirmed in *Antidosis*, can be identified with greater clarity. In other words, in addition to, or rather on account of, representing a turning point, as we saw earlier, in Isocrates' arguments on Athenian hegemony, *On the Peace* exemplifies his attempt to uphold a redefinition of being δημοτικός in light precisely of the views on leadership which he develops in response to the historical events taking place in the 350s.

Overall, I aim to demonstrate that, rather than indicating the implementation of an anti-democratic programme, Isocrates' discussion on what being δημοτικός truly signifies cannot be disentangled from, and is even subordinated to, his views on what makes successful political leadership.

3.3.1 Δημοτικός and the ancestral constitution

My examination of Isocrates' (re)definition of being δημοτικός shall thus take as a starting point the instances in which he employs the term in relation to the idea of the Athenian traditional constitution. *Areopagiticus* represents the speech *par excellence* in this respect. Here Isocrates strongly and consistently condemns contemporary democracy, praising instead the constitution of the forefathers and urging his fellow citizens to restore it.

Owing to his allusion to the notion of πάτριος πολιτεία and his insistence on the need to give back to the Areopagus its pre-Ephialtic powers, *Areopagiticus* has often been presented as revealing Isocrates' supposedly pro-

oligarchic attitude[130] or, at best, his inconsistency.[131] Even when the attack which is levelled at contemporary democracy in this speech is rightly read as constructive criticism arising from Isocrates' objective of rethinking the Athenian democracy, and not from his alleged desire to reject it *per se*, the scope of such reshaping is presented as being limited to internal politics.[132]

So, in this section I aim to suggest, instead, that *Areopagiticus* shows how Isocrates' views on what democracy and being in favour of the δῆμος should look like are inextricably related to, and even arise from, his interest in, and engagement with, the contemporary issues posed by Athenian leadership and its crisis.

The date of *Areopagiticus*

Before analysing in detail the occurrences of δημοτικός in relation to the notion of πάτριος πολιτεία in *Areopagiticus*, I shall briefly focus on the date of composition of the speech since this point, which has long been debated among scholars, plays a relevant role in the context of my argument for the Isocratean recontextualisation of δημοτικός. Indeed, *Areopagiticus* is frequently regarded as having been written just after the end of the Social War,[133] and thus after *On the Peace*. Nevertheless, some scholars have opted for an earlier dating, suggesting that Isocrates composes this speech shortly before the outbreak of the war.[134]

In this respect, Bouchet, more recently, has persuasively argued that *Areopagiticus* was written around 357/6, namely shortly before the beginning of the Social War and during its first phases, thus preceding *On the Peace*.[135] These two works, together with *Antidosis*, are generally considered as being inextricably related to one another, with *Areopagiticus* concerning itself with

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[130] See, for instance, Bearzot (1980) 122-127; see also Requena (2013) who attempts, unsuccessfully in my view, to refute Sancho Rocher's reading of *Areopagiticus* (on which see n. 132 below).

[131] See Silvestrini (1978) 178.

[132] See Sancho Rocher (2008) 43-46 who, in line with her overall argument, regards *Areopagiticus* as bearing witness not to an undemocratic sentiment but, rather, to Isocrates' attempt to preserve the Athenian democracy by reshaping its ruling class.

[133] For 355 as the most plausible dating see, for instance, Jebb (1876) 203-206 and, more recently, Sancho Rocher (2008) 43. Other scholars, like Mathieu (1960) 55-56 and Roth (2003) 276-278, opt for 354.

[134] See Jaeger (1940) 410-439 who is the first scholar to question the commonly accepted dating and suggests instead 357 as the most plausible date; the same dating has been adopted by Wallace (1986), Due (1988), Nicolai (2004) 11.

[135] See Bouchet (2016) 423-426, who also believes that Isocrates might have started thinking about writing *Areopagiticus* as early as 364.

Athens' internal matters and *On the Peace* focusing instead on the Athenian empire and its foreign policy. However, as Bouchet has pointed out, all these three speeches deal with Athens' hegemony, particularly its sea power.[136]

Therefore, it is misleading to draw a clear-cut distinction between *Areopagiticus* and *On the Peace* by regarding the former as limiting itself to tackling domestic political matters and the latter as dealing exclusively with Athenian international politics. Moreover, dating *Areopagiticus* before or after the Social War is not a minor detail when it comes to the interpretation of this speech. Indeed, by considering it as having been composed after *On the Peace*, most scholars understand *Areopagiticus* as consisting in a harsh attack against contemporary democracy closely connected with the alleged condemnation without appeal of Athens' naval power in *On the Peace*.

Nonetheless, in arguing that *Areopagiticus* precedes *On the Peace*, Bouchet rightly underlines that in *Areopagiticus* Isocrates never shows an antagonistic attitude towards Athens' sea empire but, rather, puts forward his reform of the Athenian democracy precisely with the aim of enabling his fellow citizens to maintain their supremacy over Greece.[137] In this respect, it is worth highlighting that the same key point concerning the constitutional changes suggested in *Areopagiticus* as being ultimately designed to preserve Athens' pre-eminent position within the Hellenic world was presented already by Wallace in the 1980s (see Chapter 1 section 2) but appears to have been mostly overlooked.[138]

I will return to Wallace's and Bouchet's arguments below; for the moment, I intend to stress that I agree with them in regarding *Areopagiticus* not as following, and somehow resulting from, the Athenian defeat at the end of the Social War, but as an endeavour to prevent a similar outcome by amending the democratic government, whose degeneration Isocrates regards as the real culprit for the increasing problems faced by the πόλις in its foreign affairs.

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[136] See Bouchet (2016) 423.
[137] See Bouchet (2016) 426.
[138] See Wallace (1986) 79-80 for a brief reference and Wallace (1989) 166-167 for a further development of this argument; neither study is mentioned by Bouchet (2016).

Isocrates and πάτριος πολιτεία

Despite Wallace's and Bouchet's studies, the crucial link existing in
Areopagiticus between the constitutional changes advocated by Isocrates and
his ultimate goal of preserving Athens' supremacy within the Hellenic world has
generally escaped scholars' attention. I thus aim to show that the usages of
δημοτικός in the speech point precisely in this direction, rather than supporting
an interpretation of *Areopagiticus* as solely focused on internal politics and
designed to promote an anti-democratic agenda in disguise.

More specifically, of the five instances that we find throughout the speech
here I shall focus on the four that Isocrates uses in the context of the discussion
of the ancestral constitution to which he believes his fellow citizens should
return in order to preserve their supremacy abroad.[139] The first two occurrences
of the term appear in sections 16-17. Indeed, after rebuking his fellow citizens
for complaining about the present democracy only in words whereas in fact
preferring it to the constitution of their forefathers,[140] Isocrates states that he
intends to speak in support of the latter and thus urges the Athenians to restore
'that democracy' (ἐκείνη ἡ δημοκρατία) which he presents as having been
instituted by Solon and then re-established by Cleisthenes. It is in this context
that he not only labels Solon as being 'most in favour of the δῆμος'
(δημοτικώτατος),[141] but also claims that it would not be possible to find a
democratic constitution 'more in favour of the δῆμος' (δημοτικωτέρα) and 'more
advantageous' (μᾶλλον συμφέρουσα) for Athens.[142]

Similarly, in section 59, where Isocrates is most probably referring again,
although implicitly, to Solon and Cleisthenes,[143] he describes the ancestral
constitution which he is urging Athens to uphold as having been instituted by
those citizens who are widely acknowledged as being 'most in favour of the
δῆμος' (δημοτικώτατοι). I intend to return to the usages of δημοτικός in
Areopagiticus 17 and 59 towards the end of the present section; meanwhile
here I would highlight that the adjective is also employed in *Areopagiticus* 23
where the appointment of magistrates through the selection of the worthiest
men (αὕτη ἡ κατάστασις), which is described in the previous section as a key

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[139] The fifth occurrence, namely in Isoc., *Areopagiticus* 64, will be analysed in section 3.3.2 as it
is not related to the notion of the Athenian ancestral constititution.
[140] See Isoc., *Areopagiticus* 15.
[141] Isoc., *Areopagiticus* 16.
[142] Isoc., *Areopagiticus* 17.
[143] See, for instance, Desideri (1969) 75.

feature of the traditional constitution endorsed by Isocrates, is defined as 'more in favour of the δῆμος' (δημοτικωτέρα) than filling those magistracies by lot. Then Isocrates goes on to explain this statement by pointing out that the casting of lots often leads to the appointment of 'those who desire oligarchy' (οἱ ὀλιγαρχίας ἐπιθυμοῦντες), whereas the selection of 'the most fitting' (οἱ ἐπιεικέστατοι) would enable the Athenian δῆμος to choose only those citizens who support the current constitution.

The use of δημοτικός in the comparative form in this passage might indicate that Isocrates' view towards the election of magistrates by lot does not necessarily correspond to a condemnation without appeal of this way of filling offices. Nevertheless, Isocrates clearly prefers, and strongly argues for, the selection of 'the best' (οἱ βέλτιστοι) and 'the most competent' (οἱ ἱκανώτατοι) by presenting it precisely as the system which the ancestors adopted in the belief that the rest of the Athenians would have mirrored the character of those in charge of public affairs.[144]

So, as I mentioned earlier, the whole speech is generally considered as endorsing the concept of πάτριος πολιτεία and thus corroborating Isocrates' alleged pro-oligarchic sympathies. In this respect, it is worth pointing out that Isocrates never employs this political slogan in *Areopagiticus* or anywhere else in his corpus. Instead, in order to indicate the kind of constitution for which he advocates, he makes use of the term διοίκησις linking it to the adjective πατρία.[145] Nonetheless, the absence of any instance of the phrase πάτριος πολιτεία throughout the speech is often interpreted as a deliberate move by Isocrates to avoid a slogan which would have unmasked his alleged anti-democratic agenda[146] and revealed his ties with Theramenes.[147]

Indeed, the constitutional changes presented in *Areopagiticus* are frequently dismissed as simply reproducing, and thus aiming to implement, Theramenes' ideas with specific reference to his likely involvement in the reforms which the Thirty advanced in 404.[148] In this regard, the tradition according to which Isocrates was a pupil of Theramenes[149] is generally

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[144] Isoc., *Areopagiticus* 22.
[145] Isoc., *Areopagiticus* 58-59 (*pace* Rhodes (2011) 27 n. 98); on the relevant role played by the concept of διοίκησις throughout the Isocratean speech see Wallace (1989) 150-151.
[146] See, for instance, Bearzot (1980) 123.
[147] See, for example, Bearzot (1980) 123 n. 41.
[148] See Wallace (1989) 144 and 151.
[149] See Chapter 1 section 2.

employed to support such an interpretation of *Areopagiticus*. Furthermore, the concept of διοίκησις, which as we have seen Isocrates manifestly makes use of to refer to the constitution that he urges his fellow citizens to restore, appears to be related to the measures promoted by the Thirty.[150]

However, *Areopagiticus* should not be reduced to a mere attempt to replicate and endorse a presumed Theramenean programme. In this respect, Wallace has claimed that the 'basic argument, of restoring the pre-Ephialtic Areopagos,' around which revolves the Isocratean work, if not directly 'inspired by' the measures allegedly advanced by Theramenes, 'at least came out of a similar tradition'; yet, he has also highlighted the peculiarity of Isocrates' speech by noting that 'in the sources for 404 there is nothing comparable with his description of the Areopagos' early powers or the nature and extent of the powers which it was to exercise under his reform'.[151]

Additionally, the slogan πάτριος πολιτεία itself appears to be debated and intrinsically flexible as it was used not only by oligarchs but also by democrats. More specifically, Rhodes stresses that the phrase was employed at first by the oligarchs, both extremists and moderates, and then also by the democrats after the restoration of democracy in 410.[152] Within this framework, it is worth highlighting that in the speech *Concerning the Preservation of the Ancestral Constitution of Athens* Lysias makes use of this slogan, starting with the title of the work, to contrast the proposal made by a certain Phormisius[153] to restrict civic rights to those men who possessed landed property. In this regard, Todd not only points out that in Lysias' speech the phrase was employed 'to maintain that anything less than full democracy was a betrayal of the constitutional tradition of Athens', but also underlines, more broadly, 'its adaptability' by stressing how it was used both by 'those who wished to impose

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[150] See Wallace (1989) 150 who identifies two additional points in common between the measures promoted by the Thirty and *Areopagiticus*: the attack against election by lot and the emphasis on the moral aspect.

[151] Wallace (1989) 151 who also highlights the lack of clear indications on which specific functions the Thirty intended to restore to Areopagus.

[152] See Rhodes (2011) 16-20; see also Rhodes (2017) 286. *Pace* Fuks (1953) V, who presents his investigation as contrasting '[t]he commonly held view' according to which 'each of the three groups in Athenian politics—the oligarchs, the moderates and the democrats—propounded its own version of the 'ancestral constitution'', and believes instead that 'the launching of the slogan πάτριος πολιτεία, and the employment of the argument from the constitutional past for political purposes of the day' should be regarded as 'particularly connected with the moderate group'. For an interpretation similar to that of Fuks see Desideri (1969) 11 who defines the πάτριος πολιτεία allegedly promoted by the moderates as 'una costituzione mista (…) di elementi democratici e oligarchici'.

[153] On this figure see Todd (2000) 336-337.

a property qualification' and, at the same time, by 'those who wished to maintain the radical democracy' to refer to the Athenian ancestral constitution.[154]

Moreover, Diodorus Siculus, in reporting that the peace treaty of 403 between Athens and Sparta forced the Athenians not only to demolish their walls but also to establish the πάτριος πολιτεία, notes that they did implement the former condition whereas a debate arose concerning the latter clause between the sympathisers of oligarchy and those who supported democracy: while the oligarchs claimed that it was necessary to restore 'the ancient institution' (ἡ παλαιὰ κατάστασις), the democrats, who represented the majority, endorsed the return to 'the constitution of the fathers' (ἡ τῶν πατέρων πολιτεία).[155] Therefore, Diodorus' passage represents the debate around the meaning of πάτριος πολιτεία as an opposition in chronological terms, with the oligarchs placing the πάτριος πολιτεία in a distant past and the supporters of democracy identifying it instead with a much more recent constitution.

Nonetheless, Rhodes has pointed out that after 410 the democrats themselves started to consider the Athenian traditional constitution as going back further in the past with specific emphasis on Draco and Solon.[156] In this respect, Rhodes has noted that after 404/403 'the dispute was finally resolved in favour of the democrats: the restored democracy claimed to be the traditional constitution based on the laws of Draco and Solon'. At the same time, Rhodes goes on to suggest, the ancestral constitution might well have gone from being a contested notion to 'something which gained acceptance for the settlement', namely 'something which both staunch democrats and men who had dallied with oligarchy could declare their allegiance to'; then, by placing Isocrates' appeal to the past within this framework, Rhodes adds:

> [a]fter that nobody in politics would admit to favouring oligarchy, but
> there was an increasing realisation that the democracy could be

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[154] Todd (2000) 335-336. On Phormisius' citizenship proposal see also Rhodes (2017) 21.
[155] Diod. Sic., XIV 3, 2-3. On Diodorus' account of the peace treaty as deriving most probably from Ephorus see Fuks (1953) 56. Concerning the second clause, Fuks (1953) 57-68, who argues against the genuineness of this clause, compares Diodorus' account with that of [Arist.], *Constitution of the Athenians* XXXIV 2-3 noting the similarities (ascribed to a common source employed by Ephorus and [Aristotle], probably Androtion's *Atthis*) but also the differences between the two texts (especially the fact that Diodorus assimilates the position of Theramenes to that of the democrats) and opting for [Aristotle]'s version. See also Rhodes (2011) 19 on [Aristotle]'s account presenting three different groups as opposed to the 'twofold division' between oligarchs and democrats that we find in Diodurus' passage.
[156] See Rhodes (2011) 18-19.

modified, and could even be modified in ways which the fifth-century democracy would have perceived as counter to democracy.[157]

It is thus against the background of this difference between fifth- and fourth-century Athenian democracy as well as in the context of the flexible nature of the slogan πάτριος πολιτεία and, more broadly, of the concept of traditional constitution that the return to the ancestral constitution envisaged in *Areopagiticus* should be interpreted.

Furthermore, as the following analysis of the Isocratean occurrences of δημοτικός in this speech should make even more manifest, the main motivation behind the restoration of the ancestral constitution upheld in *Areopagiticus* cannot be identified with the alleged goal to promote a thinly-veiled oligarchic agenda and goes beyond a possible influence of Theramenean ideas. Rather, the constitutional reform which Isocrates puts forward arises from his interest in Athens' political leadership and his attempt to advocate for those political measures and changes which he thought would enable his πόλις to maintain its leading role within the Hellenic world.

Solon as δημοτικός *par excellence*

First, however, special attention has to be devoted to the description of Solon as being 'most in favour of the δῆμος' (δημοτικώτατος) in *Areopagiticus* 16. Indeed, the portrait of Solon as δημοτικός becomes more and more common during the fourth century.

For instance, δημοτικός occurs, together with εὔνους, to depict the Athenian legislator in Demosthenes' *On the Crown* 6, as we saw earlier. Likewise, still within the Demosthenic corpus, the cognate adverb δημοτικῶς is used in *Against Eubulides* 59 alongside καλῶς to refer to a law concerning the access of an alien to the ἀγορά which was ascribed to Solon and then presumably restored by Aristophon of Azenia.[158] Similarly, the superlative adjective which we find in *Areopagiticus* 16 is employed to describe Solon also by Hyperides in *Against Athenogenes*.[159] In addition, in [Aristotle]'s *Constitution*

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[157] Rhodes (2011) 29.
[158] For the most plausible interpretation of this debated passage see Loddo (2018b); see also Loddo (2018a) 44 and 46.
[159] Hyp., *Against Athenogenes* 21; on the use of δημοτικώτατος in this passage see Whitehead (2000) 323 and Loddo (2018a) 43 n. 17.

of the Athenians the nominative neuter plural form of δημοτικός occurs twice in relation to Solon. First, [Aristotle] makes use of the superlative to refer to three specific features of Solon's constitution;[160] then, shortly afterwards, δημοτικά is employed to indicate some of the aspects characterising Solon's laws.[161]

Nonetheless, from a chronological point of view, the occurrence in the passage from *Areopagiticus* represents the first instance known to us of δημοτικός being used to depict the Athenian legislator.[162] In this respect, Loddo has recently attempted to show that the link between Solon and the Athenian democracy which appears to emerge at the end of the fifth century and becomes even more manifest during the fourth century should not be regarded, at least not exclusively, as heavily influenced by the contemporary debate on πάτριος πολιτεία.[163]

Rather, while acknowledging that there might well have been some cases in which the representation of Solon as the founding hero of the Athenian democracy was dictated by an author's own political agenda with specific reference to the πάτριος πολιτεία propaganda,[164] Loddo suggests that the connection established so frequently during the fourth century between Solon and the Athenian democracy results, at least to a certain extent, from two main areas: on the one hand, the representation of the legislator in comedy, especially in Aristophanes' *Clouds* 1187 where he is depicted as φιλόδημος τὴν φύσιν; on the other hand, some of the laws and measures that he presumably enacted, such as those in favour of orphans and ἐπίκληροι.[165]

In this regard, Loddo seems to imply that the portrait of Solon as δημοτικός which arises from these two aspects coexists with that influenced by the contemporary debate on πάτριος πολιτεία within the context of an oligarchic political agenda. Indeed, she appears to consider πάτριος πολιτεία as a merely undemocratic slogan, rather than as a contested concept which, as we have seen above, could be used by both oligarchs and democrats. Within the framework of this binary origin for the depiction of Solon as δημοτικός, Isocrates'

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[160] See [Arist.], *Constitution of the Athenians* IX 1; on this passage and the use of δημοτικώτατος in it see Cartledge (2009) 48-50.
[161] See [Arist.], *Constitution of the Athenians* X 1.
[162] See Ruschenbusch (1958) and, more recently, Loddo (2018a) 9; *pace* Rhodes (1993) 159.
[163] See Loddo (2018a) 10-12, 40.
[164] See Loddo (2018a) 12.
[165] See Loddo (2018a) 154-155. For a thorough analysis of the depiction of Solon in fifth- and fourth-century comedy see Loddo (2018a) 50-87; for a more detailed discussion of the evergetic measures that he implemented see Loddo (2018a) 123-143.

characterisation of Solon as δημοτικώτατος in *Areopagiticus* 16 is dismissed as a clear instance of the kind of portrait commonly considered as tainted by the πάτριος πολιτεία propaganda, and thus as being part of what Loddo labels as 'la sua crociata antidemocratica'.[166]

While Loddo is right in suggesting that the close connection between Solon and the Athenian democracy which takes hold in the fourth century should not be interpreted as emerging solely from the often distorted and narrow lens of the contemporary debate around the traditional constitution, such a debate, as we saw earlier, was more complex and multifaceted than Loddo seems to assume. Furthermore, her argument concerning a problematisation of the origin of the portrait of Solon as δημοτικός should be extended to the Isocratean description. Instead of being the fruit of an appeal to the concept of πάτριος πολιτεία stemming from an undemocratic political programme, the definition of the Athenian legislator as δημοτικώτατος in *Areopagiticus* might well have been affected by the two main aspects (i.e. his portrait in Greek comedy and his own historical activity) that Loddo identifies as plausible alternative sources (in parallel with the debate on πάτριος πολιτεία) for the close link between Solon and the Athenian democracy which was gaining a foothold in fourth-century Athens.

Moreover, regardless of the possible influence of these two key elements on the Isocratean depiction of Solon as δημοτικός *par excellence*, it should be recognised that Isocrates' portrait cannot be disentangled from a particularly idiosyncratic and essential aspect, namely the Athenocentric views on political leadership which he developed particularly in the 350s. Indeed, as I intend to show below, the use of the adjective to describe Solon, alongside the other instances of the term in the context of the restoration of the traditional constitution upheld in *Areopagiticus*, points to Isocrates' redefinition of the meaning of δημοτικός in relation to his primary interest in securing Athens' leading role abroad.

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[166] Loddo (2018a) 42; see also Loddo (2018a) 119 for Isocrates' allegedly pro-oligarchic views. For πάτριος πολιτεία being presented as an exclusively oligarchic slogan see also Ghirga and Romussi (1997) 201.

Hints of the reframing of δημοτικός

In this section I shall pull together the strings of my analysis of the occurrences of δημοτικός throughout *Areopagiticus* in order to illustrate how in this speech it is possible to grasp some hints of the redefinition of the meaning of acting in favour of the δῆμος in light of Isocrates' ideas on political leadership, with specific reference to the role of Athens as the leading πόλις within the Hellenic world. Indeed, while his views on this topic became more evident in *On the Peace* (see Chapter 4 section 2.1), his interest in, and engagement with, the need to (re)affirm Athens' dominant position in foreign politics emerges already in *Areopagiticus*.

More particularly, in this speech, as in *On the Peace*, Isocrates appears to believe that the increasing issues faced by Athens in international politics are a direct consequence of the degeneration of the quality of its leaders. However, as Wallace explains, the inextricable link existing in *Areopagiticus* between the weakening of Athens' position abroad and the deterioration of its internal politics has generally been overlooked mainly because in this work, unlike in *On the Peace*, Isocrates does not focus extensively on the cause-and-effect relationship between these two aspects (with the exception of a few references at the beginning and at the end of the speech).[167]

Nonetheless, a detailed analysis of the usages of δημοτικός in the framework of the return to the ancestral constitution promoted in *Areopagiticus* reveals the central role that Isocrates' concern with, and consequent attempt to secure, the Athenian supremacy over Greece played in putting forward this constitutional reform. The Isocratean interest in political leadership in this speech emerges, for instance, at the end of *Areopagiticus* 22. Indeed, here, as we saw earlier, he claims that in the traditional constitution for which he advocates the offices were filled not through election by lot but by means of selecting 'the best' (οἱ βέλτιστοι) and 'the most competent' (οἱ ἱκανώτατοι) for every task. Such a way of appointing magistrates, Isocrates continues in the same section, was preferred due to the belief that the Athenians would imitate the qualities of their leaders. Thus, in this passage Isocrates closely links his appeal to the restoration of the Athenian ancestral constitution to the need to reshape internal leadership.

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[167] See Wallace (1989) 167.

Nevertheless, this rethinking of domestic leadership is not an end unto itself but ultimately aims to strengthen Athens' hegemonic role within the Hellenic world. In this respect, Wallace, whose opinion as we saw has remained marginal, by contradicting the commonly held view on the true objective of *Areopagiticus* has underlined how, despite the fact that the constitutional changes upheld by Isocrates 'reflect the interest of Athens' wealthy classes', this does not necessarily mean that his main goal in suggesting those reforms lies in the creation of a timocratic government.[168] Rather, his fundamental purpose goes beyond domestic politics and consists precisely in the consolidation of Athens' position abroad at a time when it was progressively weakening.

Isocrates' strong interest in securing Athens' leadership is hinted at in *Areopagiticus* 59 where, as I mentioned earlier, by alluding most probably to Solon and Cleisthenes, Isocrates employs δημοτικός in the superlative form to describe those Athenians responsible for establishing the πατρία διοίκησις which he is encouraging his fellow citizens to restore. Indeed, in this passage, just before commending its founders, he praises that ancestral constitution for being the source of numerous benefits not only for Athens itself, but also for the other Greeks. In doing so, Isocrates extends from internal to international politics the horizon of the qualities characterising the traditional constitution that he endorses. In other words, the fact that here, in commending the πατρία διοίκησις which he so strongly promotes, Isocrates mentions the advantages it brought to the other Greeks just before, and in conjunction with, the depiction of its founders as δημοτικώτατοι can be interpreted as referring, at least *in nuce*, to the key role which his views on the Athenian leadership over Greece play in shaping his arguments on what it truly means to act in the best interests of the δῆμος and, more broadly, on what democracy should look like.

It is, nonetheless, in *Areopagiticus* 17 that Isocrates' key interest in consolidating Athens' pre-eminent position in foreign politics emerges even more vividly and we can identify a clear indication of the recontextualisation of δημοτικός in light of his ideas on the need to reshape Athenian hegemony over Greece as they emerge in *On the Peace* a few years later. Indeed, after having praised in *Areopagiticus* 16, as we saw above, the democratic government

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[168] Wallace (1989) 166, *pace* Silvestrini (1978) 175 and Ghirga and Romussi (1997) 199.

(ἐκείνη ἡ δημοκρατία) allegedly instituted by Solon (who is defined as δημοτικώτατος) and re-established by Cleisthenes, Isocrates goes on in the following section to claim that it would not be possible to find a constitution 'more in favour of the δῆμος' (δημοτικώτερα) and 'more useful' (μᾶλλον συμφέρουσα) to the πόλις than that. In this respect, he asserts that 'the greatest proof' (τεκμήριον μέγιστον) of his statement lies in the fact that thanks to that government Athens was able to gain the good repute of mankind (παρὰ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις εὐδοκιμήσαντες) and the willing subjection of the other Greeks (παρ' ἑκόντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων τὴν ἡγεμονίαν ἔλαβον), whereas by preferring the present constitution the Athenians have made themselves hated by all men and ran the risk of suffering the uttermost misfortunes at the end of the Peloponnesian War (μικρὸν ἀπέλιπον τοῦ μὴ ταῖς ἐσχάταις συμφοραῖς περιπεσεῖν).[169]

Therefore, the demotic character and the expediency for the πόλις of the ancestral democracy promoted throughout *Areopagiticus* are presented in this passage as being confirmed particularly by two aspects which belong to the context of foreign politics: the εὐδοκιμία enjoyed by the Athenians and the hegemony that the other Greeks conferred *sua sponte* to them. Remarkably, both these elements are key pillars in the views on Athenian leadership that Isocrates develops in the 350s, with particular reference to the reshaping of Athens' prominent role in the Hellenic world argued for in *On the Peace*, as I have shown in the previous chapter.

Furthermore, by claiming that the Solonian and Cleisthenic democracy was δημοτική to the highest level (with the combination in the Greek text of the negative and the comparative conveying the sense of a superlative) precisely because of its ability to enable the Athenians to obtain good repute abroad alongside the willing subjection of the rest of Greece, Isocrates extends beyond the boundaries of internal politics the definition of what makes a democracy identifiable as truly acting in the interest of the δῆμος. In doing so, he points towards the reframing of the meaning of being δημοτικός in light of his interest in, and engagement with, the issues posed by Athens' supremacy, a recontextualisation which, as we shall see in the next section, becomes even more manifest shortly afterwards in *On the Peace*.

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[169] Isoc., *Areopagiticus* 17.

Conclusion

To sum up, in the present section I have devoted my attention to the usages of δημοτικός in connection with the concept of the Athenian ancestral constitution. In doing so, I have focused on *Areopagiticus* since it represents the Isocratean work in which all the occurrences of the term in relation to the notion of the traditional constitution are concentrated. Against the prevailing view that considers this speech as having being written after *On the Peace* and as dealing exclusively with internal politics with the aim of promoting an anti-democratic agenda in disguise, I have emphasised instead that it was most probably composed shortly before the outbreak of the Social War and that it concerns itself, first and foremost, with securing Athens' leadership over Greece, thus hinting at the key role which such a topic played throughout the corpus and especially in the speeches belonging to the 350s.

Therefore, the appeal to restore the constitution that Isocrates defines as Solon's and Cleisthenes' democracy and his depiction of Solon as δημοτικώτατος cannot be confined to the fourth-century debate around the concept of πάτριος πολιτεία. Moreover, the fact that he never uses this political slogan should not be dismissed as a clumsy attempt to avoid an oligarchic phrase that would have unmasked his supposedly anti-democratic sympathies. Not only was the concept of πάτριος πολιτεία in itself contested and multifaceted, but we need to shift our focus in order to understand more fully the nature and purpose of Isocrates' appeal to the Athenian past in this work. Indeed, his discussion of the need to return to the ancestral democracy in *Areopagiticus* goes beyond the boundaries of domestic politics since his constitutional reform stems from his interest in, and attempts to deal with the deterioration of, Athens' position abroad.

In fact, the crucial role played in *Areopagiticus* by the Isocratean concern with the consolidation of the Athenian leading position in the Hellenic world does not emerge, at least at first reading, as clearly as it does in *On the Peace* and so has usually been overlooked. Nevertheless, such a theme is the watermark of the whole speech and the main reason for the constitutional changes promoted by Isocrates. In this regard, my examination of the occurrences of δημοτικός in relation to the concept of ancestral constitution points precisely in this direction.

More specifically, I have argued that the use of the term in the context of Isocrates' appeal to the past hints at his attempt to redefine the meaning of δημοτικός in light of the views on the Athenian leadership over Greece which he was developing at the time as a response to the progressive deterioration of Athens' supremacy. This appears to be particularly evident in *Areopagiticus* 17 where the litmus test for the demotic character of the ancestral democracy that he urges his fellow citizens to restore is that such a government had enabled the Athenians to obtain the εὐδοκιμία and willing subjection of the other Greeks. In other words, Isocrates explains what it truly means for the Athenian democracy to act in the best interests of the δῆμος by referring to two key principles of the rethinking of Athens' leadership argued for shortly afterwards in *On the Peace*, where, as we shall see in the next section, the recontextualisation of δημοτικός hinted at in *Areopagiticus* emerges more prominently.

3.3.2 Δημοτικός and the Athenian hegemony

After having suggested that the use of δημοτικός in *Areopagiticus* in relation to the concept of ancestral constitution ultimately hints at Isocrates' attempt to recontextualise the term in light of his interest in consolidating Athens' position abroad, I shall now examine more in depth how such a reframing of δημοτικός is inextricably linked to his views on the need to rethink the Athenian hegemony over Greece as they emerge particularly in the 350s.

In order to do so, I shall start by analysing the last occurrence of δημοτικός which we find in *Areopagiticus*, since it refers not to the notion of the Athenian ancestral constitution but to the situation in the πόλις towards the end of the Peloponnesian War. Nonetheless, I will show that this final instance as well points to Isocrates' reframing of what it means to be δημοτικός in the broader context of his contemporary discussion on Athenian leadership in a somehow similar way as the above-mentioned occurrences related to the traditional constitution.

The core of this section will then revolve around Isocrates' usages of δημοτικός in his two other main works belonging to the mid-fourth century, that is, *On the Peace* and *Antidosis*. In this regard, specific attention will be devoted to the former speech considering that, as we saw in the previous chapter, it marks a turning point in the Isocratean ideas on Athenian hegemony. As a

result, I aim to provide further evidence for how Isocrates (re)defines what it truly means to act in the best interest of the δῆμος in terms of his ideas on what makes a good leader both in international and domestic politics.

Δημοτικός in *Areopagiticus* 64

Throughout *Areopagiticus* δημοτικός is employed in connection with the theme of the Athenian ancestral constitution, as I considered earlier. However, the final instance of the term in this speech needs to be examined separately since it refers, instead, to the situation at Athens towards the end of the Peloponnesian War. Indeed, in *Areopagiticus* 64 Isocrates claims that when the Athenians were defeated at the battle of Aegospotami (405)[170] the πόλις was split into two opposite groups: on the one hand, the democrats (οἱ δημοτικοὶ καλούμενοι) who were adamant that Athens, after having ruled over Greece, could not be subjected to Sparta, and, on the other hand, the oligarchs (οἱ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας ἐπιθυμήσαντες) who were willing to endure slavery.

Although, as we have seen throughout this chapter, the original and literal meaning of δημοτικός is 'in favour of the δῆμος' (rather than 'democratic') and the term is characterised by an intrinsic adaptability, here the phrase οἱ δημοτικοὶ καλούμενοι should be interpreted as a synonym for οἱ δημοκρατικοί. In this respect, the occurrence of δημοτικός in this passage from *Areopagiticus* echoes, at least to a certain extent, the use of the term in *Against Callimachus* 48, where, as we saw, it is an antonym for supporting oligarchy. Nevertheless, while in that passage the meaning of δημοτικός remains confined to domestic politics, in *Areopagiticus* 64 the boundaries of the distinction between democrats and oligarchs are stretched towards international politics in a way similar to the case of the definition of who is worthy of being labelled δημοτικός and who is not which we have found in *Against Callimachus* 62.

Additionally, it has been suggested that when he refers to οἱ δημοτικοὶ καλούμενοι as strongly opposed to the peace terms with Sparta Isocrates alludes, first and foremost, to Cleophon.[171] Indeed, Cleophon has been portrayed as responsible for leading his fellow citizens to reject peace

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[170] See Coppola (1956) 84, Desideri (1969) 78, Ghirga and Romussi (1997) 233, Mirhady and Too (2000) 196; *pace* Norlin (1929) 144 n. *a*, who believes that here Isocrates alludes to the battle of Arginusae (406).
[171] See Desideri (1969) 78.

negotiations with Sparta already after the Athenian victory at Cyzicus (410)[172] and again precisely after the battle at Aegospotami.[173] In this regard, it is worth highlighting that Isocrates might well be referring to Cleophon again shortly afterwards in *On the Peace* 13, but this time in negative terms, as I shall discuss below.

For now, I would stress that here in *Areopagiticus* 64 and in the following five sections the examples provided to illustrate the key differences between democrats and oligarchs are drawn predominantly from external politics, with specific reference to Athens' interaction with Sparta. In other words, Isocrates' main focus ultimately remains on the repercussions on Athenian hegemony even in the case of the instances concerning domestic politics.[174] Indeed, Isocrates reaches the conclusion that the distinction between the two groups can be summarised as follows: the oligarchs intended to rule over their fellow citizens and at the same time being subject to the Spartans, whereas the democrats aimed to rule over the other Greeks while being on equal terms with their fellow citizens.[175] Thus, even though the use of δημοτικός in *Areopagiticus* 64 represents the only instance in this speech where the adjective is not directly employed with reference to the Athenian ancestral constitution, it can be considered alongside the occurrences more immediately related to the notion of πάτριος πολιτεία as hinting, at least *in nuce*, at Isocrates' attempt to reframe δημοτικός in view of his interest in consolidating the Athenian hegemony in the Hellenic world.

Δημοτικός in *On the Peace* 13

The inextricable link between Isocrates' interpretation of the meaning of δημοτικός and his ideas on Athens' leadership over Greece emerges even more prominently in *On the Peace*. Significantly, Isocrates begins this speech by condemning contemporary Athenians for not acting in the same way in their public life as they do in their private affairs, with specific reference to their selection of advisers. Isocrates' criticism against the alleged incoherence displayed by his fellow citizens reaches a climax at the end of section 13 when he complains as follows:

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[172] See Diod., XIII 53, 2.
[173] See Lys., *Against Agoratus* 8; see also Lys., *Against Nicomachus* 10.
[174] See Isoc., *Areopagiticus* 66-69.
[175] See Isoc., *Areopagiticus* 69.

(…) νομίζετε δημοτικωτέρους εἶναι τοὺς μεθύοντας τῶν νηφόντων καὶ τοὺς νοῦν οὐκ ἔχοντας τῶν εὖ φρονούντων καὶ τοὺς τὰ τῆς πόλεως διανεμομένους τῶν ἐκ τῆς ἰδίας οὐσίας ὑμῖν λειτουργούντων. Ὥστ᾽ ἄξιον θαυμάζειν, εἴ τις ἐλπίζει τὴν πόλιν τοιούτοις συμβούλοις χρωμένην ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον ἐπιδώσειν.

(…) you consider as being more in favour of the δῆμος those who are drunk than those who are sober, those who do not have intellect than those who think well, those who distribute the public money of the πόλις than those who perform public duties for you from their own property. So that it is worth marvelling, if anyone expects that the πόλις will advance towards what is better using such advisers.[176]

This passage does indeed present a clear polemical tone towards three groups of men whom, in Isocrates' view, his fellow citizens mistakenly regard as being more solicitous for the interests of the δῆμος than those Athenians who are truly so. In this respect, an analysis of the three main categories, and their respective opposites, enumerated here will reveal some significant elements concerning the meaning which Isocrates assigns to δημοτικός.

Isocrates on Cleophon

Starting from the first group mentioned in this threefold comparison, it is worth pointing out that when referring to 'those who are drunk' (οἱ μεθύοντες) Isocrates probably alludes to Cleophon. Indeed, according to [Aristotle], *Constitution of the Athenians* 34, after the battle of Arginusae (406), while the Spartans were disposed to evacuate Decelea and make peace, Cleophon persuaded 'the multitude' (τὸ πλῆθος) to reject the offer coming into the Assembly drunk and wearing a breast plate.[177] As I noted above in discussing *Areopagiticus* 64, Cleophon has been credited with rejecting peace negotiations with the Spartans after Cyzicus and after Aegospotami. Thus, it is plausible that

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[176] Isoc., *On the Peace* 13.
[177] See Laistner (1927) 81-82, and Norlin (1929) 14 n. *b*. On [Aristotle]'s passage recounting this episode, see Rhodes (1993) 424-426 and, more recently, Rhodes (2017) 308. On the possible explanations as to why Cleophon wore a breast plate see Baldwin (1974) 44-45. See also Christodoulou (2012) 102 n. 67 according to whom Isoc., *On the Peace* 13 alludes in negative terms not only to Cleophon but also to Cleon.

Isocrates has him in mind when he praises οἱ δημοτικοὶ καλούμενοι who, unlike the sympathisers of oligarchy, have strongly opposed Sparta's peace offers.

This potential positive allusion to Cleophon stands out against the generalised portrait of Cleophon in negative terms as 'intransigent opponent of peace' which we find in fifth- and fourth-century literary sources.[178] It has been suggested that such a derogatory depiction, with specific reference to his alleged role in hindering the peace terms with the Spartans, not only was 'a logical extension of the older image of Cleon', but has also resulted from 'hindsight' concerning the outcome of the Peloponnesian War.[179] Isocrates would thus appear to be a lone voice in presenting a reference in laudatory terms.

However, while in *Areopagiticus* Cleophon might well be alluded to in a positive way for his rejection of Sparta's peace offers, the judgment cast on him in *On the Peace* is rather negative. Not only does Isocrates plausibly target this leader in the disparaging reference to οἱ μεθύοντες in *On the Peace* 13, but in *On the Peace* 75, as we saw in the previous chapter, Cleophon, alongside Hyperbolus and 'those who now make popular speeches' (οἱ δημηγοροῦντες), is contrasted with Aristeides, Themistocles and Miltiades.[180] I would suggest that this apparent incongruity in Isocrates' judgment on Cleophon should be interpreted in light of his views on Athenian hegemony as developed in *On the Peace*, a speech which, as I discussed earlier, represents a turning point in this respect within the Isocratean corpus. In comparison with *Areopagiticus*, *On the Peace* is in fact marked by manifest criticism of Athens' empire, even though such criticism does not equate to a pacifist stance, as we saw in the preceding chapter.

Furthermore, in *On the Peace* Isocrates highlights the pernicious consequences of the empire not only on the Athenians but also on the Spartans.[181] As we saw particularly in Chapter 3 section 2, his attitude towards Sparta throughout the corpus is complex and multifaceted. *On the Peace* appears to adopt an overall favourable approach, as suggested, for instance, by

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[178] Baldwin (1974) 41, whose study stresses the need to rethink such a gloomy picture, especially in light of the evidence from the ostraca.

[179] Baldwin (1974) 43.

[180] On the association of Cleophon with Hyperbolus in this Isocratean passage see Baldwin (1974) 40, who points out that it 'persists at least until the time of Aelian', while also noting that 'Cleophon and Hyperbolus are interchangeable types'.

[181] See, for instance, Isoc., *On the Peace* 64-69.

the fact that at the end of the speech Isocrates even describes the position held by the Spartan kings as the kind of leadership that his fellow citizens should strive to imitate.[182] In brief, these might well be the key reasons why in *On the Peace* Isocrates presents Cleophon in a negative light as opposed to the plausible allusion to him in laudatory terms in *Areopagiticus* 64 under the label οἱ δημοτικοὶ καλούμενοι: on the one hand, the views on Athenian hegemony developed in *On the Peace* mainly as a result of the Social War; on the other hand the complexity of his overall attitude towards Sparta in the corpus.

Regarding the first aspect, Isocrates' stance in *On the Peace* needs to be understood against the wider background of the unprecedented division concerning Athens' foreign politics that emerged at the time within the πόλις itself. In fact, as highlighted by Badian, the wealthy did not intend to support the imperialistic policy anymore, whereas the δῆμος still sought to renew the empire.[183] Isocrates shows once again his original approach to current political issues by adopting an intermediate position. Indeed, as I stressed earlier, in *On the Peace* the emphasis on the importance of making peace with the other Greeks is not an end in itself, but rather an indispensable step in Isocrates' fundamental attempt to reshape, not reject *in toto*, the Athenian hegemony over Greece.

Isocrates on Eubulus

Within this perspective, special attention needs to be devoted to the third category of men that his fellow citizens, as Isocrates complains in *On the Peace* 13, wrongly consider as 'more in favour of the δῆμος' (δημοτικώτεροι), namely those who distribute Athens' public money (as opposed to those who benefit the πόλις at their own expenses). It is likely that in presenting this third group in his threefold comparison revolving around the comparative form of δημοτικός Isocrates intends to refer, first and foremost, to the contemporary Athenian leader Eubulus, who gained prominence especially for his administration of the θεωρικόν.[184] In this regard, it is worth pointing out that Isocrates appears to criticise the theoric fund not only here, but also later on in the speech, that is, in *On the Peace* 82: in this section he describes the surplus derived from the

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[182] Isoc., *On the Peace* 142-144.
[183] See Badian (1995) 101; more on Badian's argument will be said below.
[184] See, for instance, Norlin (1929) 14 n. *c.*

tributes as being divided into talents and brought on the stage during the Dionysia,[185] a move that only resulted in fuelling the allies' hatred towards Athens.

In addition to *On the Peace* 13, Isocrates most probably alludes to Eubulus (together with, in this case, Aristophon) also in *On the Peace* 75 when referring to 'those who now make popular speeches' (οἱ δημηγοροῦντες) as the negative pole, alongside Cleophon and Hyperbolus, in the comparison with Aristeides, Themistocles and Miltiades.[186] Remarkably, as we saw in the preceding chapter, the broader context of this passage points towards the Isocratean interest in Athens' foreign politics since the comparison is designed to prove that the sea empire, far from benefiting the Athenians, has been responsible for the numerous misfortunes that they have experienced. In this framework, Isocrates argues that the constitution at the time of Aristeides, Themistocles, and Miltiades was better than that of the late fifth century and of contemporary Athens because it had enabled the πόλις to obtain the willing subjection of the other Greeks as well as to be accorded goodwill and be held in good repute by them.[187]

Another relevant allusion to Eubulus can be found a few sections after *On the Peace* 13, namely in *On the Peace* 16. Here Isocrates opposes the peace terms which had just been negotiated at the end of the Social War and which entailed the secession of Chios, Cos, Rhodes and Byzantium. Although Eubulus is not explicitly mentioned in this passage, such peace terms have often been ascribed to him,[188] so it is likely that Isocrates' criticism was addressed precisely to Eubulus. More specifically, in this section Isocrates states that the Athenians should make peace not only with the πόλεις which have rebelled against them during the Social War, but with all mankind, as I briefly mentioned in the previous chapter in challenging the widespread interpretation of *On the Peace* as a pacifist speech. Isocrates goes on to argue that, rather than the current peace treaty, his fellow citizens should adopt the one which they had entered into with the Persian king and the Spartans. Such a

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[185] See Laistner (1927) 102 and Norlin (1929) 56 n. *b*.
[186] See Laistner (1927) 100 and Norlin (1929) 53 n. *d*.
[187] See Isoc., *On the Peace* 76-78.
[188] See Tincani (1923) 54. By contrast, Badian (1995) 100 points out that the evidence to support Eubulus' alleged main role in the peace negotiations is scant, even though he then clarifies that there is 'no reason to doubt that Eubulus was in favour of that peace (…) and that Aristophon (and probably Chares) opposed it, as Aristophon later opposed the Peace of Philocrates' (n. 58).

treaty, Isocrates specifies, decreed that the Greeks be 'independent' (αὐτόνομοι), the foreign garrisons retire from all πόλεις, and each people control their territory. He then concludes *On the Peace* 16 by claiming that it would not be possible to find 'articles of agreement' (συνθῆκαι) 'more just' (δικαιότεραι) and 'more expedient' (μᾶλλον συμφέρουσαι) for Athens under the present circumstances.

It is generally assumed that the treaty to which Isocrates refers here is the Peace of Antalcidas (387/6).[189] Since in *Panegyricus* Isocrates urges the Athenians to break off the King's Peace,[190] Laistner explains this alleged inconsistency by stating that 'there was no real change of view on the part of the writer, except in so far as that was necessitated by the altered political conditions': in *Panegyricus* Isocrates' criticism concerns 'the abandonment of the Asiatic Greeks to Persia, and the fact that the independence of the Greek cities on the mainland, seeing that Sparta misused her power, was in many cases more apparent than real'. However, at the time of *On the Peace* 'Persian suzerainty over the Asiatic Greeks had long been an accomplished fact and the only way to end it, that Isocrates could see, was a Greek league which would make war on Persia'; so, Laistner continues, the reason why in *On the Peace* Isocrates does not explicitly promote an expedition against Persia, which is a theme of crucial importance throughout his corpus, is that in this speech 'the most immediate need of the Greeks was peace and the resulting opportunity to recuperate from the continuous drain on their manpower and resources, which had been going on all through the fourth century'. Laistner then concludes his analysis by pointing out that 'in 356 the power of Sparta and of Thebes had been broken, and thus there was nothing unreasonable or inconsistent in advocating those terms of the peace of Antalcidas which insisted on the independence of every Greek state, as a basis for the league that Isocrates desired to see realised in fact'.[191]

While Laistner shows how the alleged allusion to the Peace of Antalcidas in positive terms in *On the Peace* 16 would not be incongruent with the condemnation of it in *Panegyricus*, it is worth underlining that it has also been suggested that Isocrates here does not refer to the Peace of Antalcidas but to

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[189] See, for instance, Tincani (1923) 54, Gillis (1970) 200-201 and Papillon (2004) 139-140 n. 11.

[190] Isoc., *Panegyricus* 175-181 (cf. Isoc., *Panegyricus* 115-121).

[191] Laistner (1927) 18; see also Laistner (1927) 83.

another peace agreement between Athens and Sparta which was stipulated in 375/4.[192] According to Diodorus the initiative for this peace treaty came from the Persian king who believed that settling the domestic conflicts taking place in Greece would have enabled him to get Greek mercenaries more easily for his war on the Egyptians.[193] These peace terms, as specified by Diodorus, provided that all πόλεις should be independent and free from alien garrisons,[194] so they resembled those of the King's Peace. In this regard, the peace agreement of 375/4 has often been presented as consisting in a renewal of the Peace of Antalcidas.[195] Nonetheless, Mathieu has pointed out that the absence in the peace of 375/4 of any explicit mention of the clause that the Greek πόλεις in Asia should belong to the Persian King enabled Isocrates to allude to this treaty in *On the Peace* 16 without appearing to be inconsistent with the views on the Peace of Antalcidas which he had expressed in *Panegyricus*.[196]

Beyond the much debated issue of which specific peace treaty Isocrates praised, the crucial point emerging in *On the Peace* 16 as most relevant to our discussion is that Isocrates opposes the peace terms negotiated at the end of the Social War presenting them as too narrow. Indeed, the condemnation of the peace treaty stipulated at the end of the Social War, for which Eubulus was presumably responsible, ultimately suggests a veiled criticism precisely towards this Athenian leader.[197] Remarkably, the likely assumption that in *On the Peace* 13, in describing the third group of men wrongly regarded by his fellow citizens as 'more in favour of the δῆμος' (δημοτικώτεροι), Isocrates intended to allude first and foremost to Eubulus' administration of the θεωρικόν points in the same direction.

The question thus arises of why Isocrates would criticise, at least implicitly, Eubulus' policy in both domestic and international affairs. The answer might well lie in the way in which the Athenian politician handled what Badian

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[192] See Mathieu (1960) 16 n. 1; see also Ghirga and Romussi (1997) 259 n. 7.
[193] See Diod. Sic., XV 38, 1, cf. Philoch., FGrHist. 328 F151. Instead, Xen., *Hellenica* VI 2, 1 states that the Athenians made peace with Sparta mainly because of their concern about the growing power of the Thebans.
[194] See Diod. Sic., XV 38, 2.
[195] See Rhodes (2010) 231.
[196] See Mathieu (1960) 122, who stresses how Isocrates has already referred to the peace treaty of 375/4 in *Plataicus*; for the references to this treaty in Isoc., *Plataicus* 10 and in Isoc., *Antidosis* 109-110 see also Mathieu (1960) 89-91.
[197] *Pace* Mathieu (1960) 124 who, instead, equalises Isocrates' political views in *On the Peace* to those of Eubulus.

defines 'the ghost of empire'.[198] Badian employs such an image to describe how throughout the fourth century, due to both ideological and economic motives, Athens was constantly driven to renew its fifth-century empire despite the manifest negative consequences on the πόλις of this attempt at revival. More particularly, in the mid-fourth century, as briefly mentioned above, Athens was on the verge of a civil strife because of a 'class division on the merits of war and imperialism' between the Athenian δῆμος and the wealthy, with the former 'still possessed by the ghost' and the latter unwilling to pursue an expensive and fundamentally unprofitable activist policy.[199]

Within this framework, Badian illustrates how Eubulus, having identified the danger that the 'ghost of empire' represented for Athens, aimed to disengage the πόλις from 'distant expeditions and wars of aggressions'[200] and through his administration of the θεωρικόν 'succeeded in taming the ghost'.[201] Nonetheless, due to its flexibility, the 'ghost of empire' survived as 'empire by piracy' (with reference to the plundering implemented by the Athenian generals), a phenomenon to which Eubulus was unable, or unwilling, to put an end.[202] Moreover, Badian highlights that Eubulus' main 'weakness' in dealing with the 'ghost of empire' consisted in a 'lack of understanding for the importance of the ideology'.[203] In other words, through his administration of the theoric fund Eubulus addressed the economic motives behind the renewal of Athens' imperialistic ambition, but failed to deal with the ideological ones.[204]

Therefore, two aspects in particular emerge from Badian's study which can explain Isocrates' veiled criticism towards Eubulus' policy. First of all, the attempt to avoid excessive military activism would have presumably represented an obstacle for the attainment of one of Isocrates' main objectives: a panhellenic expedition against Persia. This key Isocratean topic is not explicitly mentioned in *On the Peace* most likely because towards the end of the Social War, when the speech was written, 'the most immediate need of the Greeks was peace and the resulting opportunity to recuperate from the

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[198] See Badian (1995).
[199] Badian (1995) 101.
[200] Badian (1995) 102.
[201] Badian (1995) 103.
[202] Badian (1995) 105. For Chares, Callistratus and Diopithes as the main Athenian generals who embodied this new version of the 'ghost of empire' see Badian (1995) 104.
[203] Badian (1995) 100.
[204] See Badian (1995) 79.

continuous drain on their manpower and resources, which had been going on all through the fourth century', as noted by Laistner.[205] Indeed, as we saw in the previous chapter, *On the Peace* was not a pacifist speech, despite what it is often assumed.[206] Thus, in promoting peace Isocrates devoted special attention to 'the economic and social benefits' that it would bring.[207] Peace was, in Isocrates' view, an essential step for Athens after the Social War in order to recover financially, regain its hegemony within the Hellenic world and subsequently lead the expedition against Persia (the tacit but ultimate goal).

Secondly, in *On the Peace*, as we stressed earlier, Isocrates also began to promote a reshaping of Athens' leadership over Greece with a shift from military supremacy to cultural pre-eminence, as argued by Bouchet.[208] In this respect, Isocrates might well have realised that Eubulus' policy overlooked the ideological element by addressing exclusively the economic reasons behind Athens' attempt to restore its fifth-century empire. Furthermore, while Eubulus appears to tolerate the 'strange transmutation' of the 'ghost of empire' (i.e. the plundering perpetrated by Athenian generals such as Chares),[209] Isocrates manifestly condemns this degeneration. By promoting the rethinking of Athens' hegemonic role he stresses, as we saw above, the need for the Athenians to (re)gain goodwill and good repute among the other Greeks as the only way to reaffirm their leadership in the Hellenic world.

Isocrates and οἱ εὖ φρονοῦντες

Lastly, after having examined the first and third category of men mistakenly regarded as 'more in favour of the δῆμος' (δημοτικώτεροι) in *On the Peace* 13, I shall now focus on the second instance mentioned in this threefold comparison revolving around the comparative adjective. Indeed, the second example which he presents consists in contrasting 'those who have no intellect' (οἱ νοῦν οὐκ ἔχοντες) with 'those who think well' (οἱ εὖ φρονοῦντες). In this context, special attention needs to be devoted to the phrase οἱ εὖ φρονοῦντες which clearly represents the positive pole in the comparison and echoes the reference to

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[205] Laistner (1927) 18.
[206] See Chapter 4 section 2.1.
[207] Laistner (1927) 19 with specific reference to Isoc., *On the Peace* 18-21; *pace* Cawkwell (1963) 52 who regards Isocrates as being 'more concerned with the injustice of the policy of war than with the profitableness of peace'.
[208] See Bouchet (2014).
[209] Badian (1995) 104.

'those who think better' (οἱ ἄμεινον φρονοῦντες) at the beginning of the same section. More specifically, Isocrates opens *On the Peace* 13 by noting his fellow citizens' incongruity in their selection of advisers: contemporary Athenians seek out οἱ ἄμεινον φρονοῦντες as counsellors exclusively in private matters, while whenever they have to deliberate concerning public affairs they systematically rely on 'the most worthless' (οἱ πονηρότατοι).

The use of the present participle of φρονέω exemplifies the key relevance of φρόνησις ('practical wisdom') in Isocrates' works. The central role played by this notion in the Isocratean corpus, along with δόξα ('judgment') has widely been acknowledged and examined.[210] In this regard, it is worth highlighting that the phrase οἱ εὖ φρονοῦντες occurs frequently and is of particular importance throughout the corpus. We have already seen the crucial use that Isocrates makes of it, for instance, in *To Nicocles* when giving advice to the Cyprian king on who deserves to be granted παρρησία (see Chapter 2 section 3.1) and in *Nicocles* in relation to the discussion of the two kinds of equality (see Chapter 3 section 3). Nonetheless, despite its significance in Isocrates' writings, the only extensive study devoted to the Isocratean usages of this phrase is represented, to my knowledge, by Veteikis' relatively recent article in Lithuanian.[211]

In his survey Veteikis identifies the opposition between οἱ νοῦν οὐκ ἔχοντες and οἱ εὖ φρονοῦντες in *On the Peace* 13 as one of the key examples of the Isocratean use of εὖ φρονέω and νοῦν ἔχω as synonyms.[212] Moreover, in stressing the relevance that the image of οἱ εὖ φρονοῦντες acquires in the corpus, Veteikis notes some similarities with the depiction of 'the wise' (οἱ σοφοί) in *To Nicocles* 39 and 'educated' (πεπαιδευμένοι) in *Panathenaicus* 30-32.[213] Importantly, οἱ εὖ φρονοῦντες, as they are portrayed by Isocrates in his works, appear to share his main political views with specific reference to his Panhellenic attitude and his simultaneously Athenocentric standpoint.[214] So, the portrait of οἱ εὖ φρονοῦντες which emerges throughout the corpus, according to Veteikis, takes on the characteristics of heroic figures who constantly benefit

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[210] See, for instance, Poulakos (2001) and Poulakos (2004).
[211] Veteikis (2015). A brief reference to the use of οἱ εὖ φρονοῦντες in Isocrates' works can be found in Azoulay (2010) 27 (cf. Azoulay (2010) 45 for a list of all the occurrences of this phrase in the corpus).
[212] See Veteikis (2015) 22-23.
[213] See Veteikis (2015) 36.
[214] See Veteikis (2015) 42.

their fellow citizens due to their various qualities starting with their sound thinking.[215]

A pivotal moment in Isocrates' positive depiction and praise of οἱ εὖ φρονοῦντες is represented by his explicit self-identification with them.[216] This is an aspect that can be found in his self-portrait in *To Philip* 81 (as we saw in Chapter 1 section 1) and emerges even more clearly in *Panathenaicus*. In this speech when discussing the different kinds of audience, Isocrates claims that he, like 'the other men who think well' (οἱ ἄλλοι οἱ εὖ φρονοῦντες), has always concerned himself exclusively with those auditors who do not fault the length of his speech but, rather, appreciate its content and even attempt to imitate it with specific reference to individual virtues and the features of a well-administered πόλις.[217]

So, in *On the Peace* 13 by presenting οἱ εὖ φρονοῦντες as the second instance in the threefold comparison regarding those Athenians who should be considered as truly acting in the interest of the δῆμος Isocrates might well intend to refer also, if not mainly, to himself. Conversely, as I discussed earlier, he presumably alludes, first and foremost, to specific Athenian politicians of the previous century (i.e. Cleophon) and of the current one (i.e. Eubulus), in the first and third example respectively, in order to urge his fellow citizens to disassociate themselves from the respective policy adopted by these leaders. Indeed, in this threefold comparison Isocrates seems to suggest that an Athenian who truly takes to heart the interest of the δῆμος should endorse an intermediate position between Cleophon's complete rejection of peace (concerning the negotiations with Sparta towards the end of the Peloponnesian War) and Eubulus' allegedly too narrow peace terms (at the end of the Social War). In doing so, he is shifting the focus on the meaning of being δημοτικός from domestic to foreign politics while at the same time assimilating it to the key image of οἱ εὖ φρονοῦντες who, as we have just seen, included himself.

Δημοτικός in *On the Peace* 108 and 133

The two remaining occurrences of δημοτικός which we find in *On the Peace* can be analysed jointly. Indeed, both instances resemble, at least to a certain

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[215] See Veteikis (2015) 43. For an outline of the positive features characterising οἱ εὖ φρονοῦντες in the Isocratean corpus see especially Veteikis (2015) 38-39.
[216] See Veteikis (2015) 38-39.
[217] See Isoc., *Panathenaicus* 135-137.

extent, the use of the term in *Evagoras* 46 (which I have discussed in section 2.1) since the blending of different constitutional forms can be identified as the overall guiding principle that underlies the usage of δημοτικός in these three passages. Nonetheless, while in the encomium of the Cyprian king δημοτικός is coupled with τυραννικός, in *On the Peace* 108 and 133 the collapsing of constitutional boundaries concerns democracy and oligarchy.

In addition to highlighting how the two final occurrences in *On the Peace* bear witness to the use of δημοτικός in terms of the merging of constitutions, I shall suggest that Isocrates goes beyond such a blurring of constitutional boundaries and towards that redefinition of being δημοτικός which, as we saw earlier, is already hinted at in *Areopagiticus*. More particularly, by examining the content as well as the broader context of *On the Peace* 108 and 133 I aim to show the key elements illustrating Isocrates' recontextualisation of δημοτικός in the framework of his deep interest in foreign politics, with specific reference to Athens' leading position within the Hellenic world.

Let us begin by analysing the use of the term in *On the Peace* 108. After having pointed out that both Athenians and Spartans alike have failed in the past to identify the empire as the cause of their misfortunes due to the general inability of most people to choose a right course of action and to desire good things which will benefit them, Isocrates provides a list of instances to support his statement.[218] Among the examples enumerated, he claims that 'because of the wickedness of those who speak in the assembly' (διὰ τὴν τῶν δημηγορούντων πονηρίαν) the δῆμος favoured the establishment of the oligarchy of the Four Hundred in 411; conversely, in 404 all Athenians 'because of the madness of the Thirty' (διὰ τὴν τῶν τριάκοντα μανίαν) became 'more in favour of the δῆμος' (δημοτικώτεροι) than 'those who seized Phyle' (οἱ Φυλὴν καταλαβόντες).[219] Therefore, in this passage Isocrates appears to refer to a lack of clear-cut distinctions between oligarchy and democracy.

A similar reference, at least at first sight, to the blending of constitutional boundaries between democracy and oligarchy can be identified in *On the Peace* 133 where, as we briefly saw in section 2.1 of the previous chapter, Isocrates recapitulates the three-step approach that, in his view, his fellow citizens should take in order to improve their current situation. The very first way suggested by

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[218] See Isoc., *On the Peace* 106-107.
[219] Isoc., *On the Peace* 108.

Isocrates consists in ceasing to regard the sycophants as being 'in favour of the δῆμος' (δημοτικοί) and 'the noble and good' (οἱ καλοὶ κἀγαθοί) as 'oligarchical' (ὀλιγαρχικοί). The Athenians should indeed understand, he goes on to argue at the end of the same section, that 'no one is by nature either of these two, but all and each one want to establish that constitution in which they will be held in honour' (φύσει μὲν οὐδεὶς οὐδέτερον τούτων ἐστίν, ἐν ᾗ δ᾽ ἂν ἕκαστοι τιμῶνται, ταύτην βούλονται καθεστάναι τὴν πολιτείαν).

Isocrates' statement can be compared with what Lysias asserts in the *Defence against a charge of subverting the democracy* when pointing out that no man is 'by nature either oligarchical or democratic' (φύσει οὔτε ὀλιγαρχικὸς οὔτε δημοκρατικός), rather he supports whichever constitution is advantageous to himself (ἥτις ἂν ἑκάστῳ πολιτεία συμφέρῃ, ταύτην προθυμεῖται καθεστάναι).[220] Significantly, the blurring of constitutional boundaries between democracy and oligarchy is hinted at also by Thucydides when Phrynicus asserts that oligarchy or democracy would not make any difference for Athens' allies if they were still enslaved: what they truly aimed for was freedom, regardless of the specific type of constitution.[221] Indeed, Thucydides while being deeply interested in both democracy and oligarchy, appears to undermine the clear-cut distinction between them in order to promote 'his own theoretical innovation', that is, 'the mixed constitution', which he regards as leading to a 'stable political community'.[222] Additionally, by comparing the Thucydidean description of the Five Thousand as 'a regime *in the interests of the few and the many*' with Pericles' definition of Athenian democracy in the Funeral Oration as 'a regime *in the interest not of the few but of the majority*', Mitchell reaches the conclusion that Thucydides' focus ultimately lies on:

> (…) the fact that while the labels of democracy and oligarchy matter because they are emotionally loaded and can polarise political situations, in the end the gap between them becomes artificial. The same political vocabulary can be put together in a different way to

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[220] Lys., *Defence against a charge of subverting the democracy* 8, to which I will return below.
[221] See Thuc., VIII 48, 5.
[222] Mitchell (2016) 58. Nonetheless, Mitchell (forthcoming) notes that, at least on a superficial level, Thucydides describes the conflict between Athens and Sparta during the Peloponnesian War as a marked opposition between democracy and oligarchy, and that he presents such a picture due to his 'privilege of hindsight', while '[i]n the lived experience, that contrast was not anything like as clear, or as dramatic'.

create new meanings: rule in the interests not of the majority, and not rule by all (or by the few), but a more satisfactory – and innovative – measured blend in the interests of the few and the many.[223]

Nevertheless, it is usually assumed that in *On the Peace* 133 Isocrates confines himself to repeating the remark made by Lysias in *Defence against a charge of subverting the democracy* 8.[224] Moreover, despite the general tendency to highlight the similarity between the two texts, Lysias is explicitly defined as a democrat in modern scholarship[225] while Isocrates is often labelled as a sympathiser of oligarchy, as we have seen throughout the present study, on the basis of passages like *On the Peace* 133. In addition to opposing the widespread assumption that Isocrates aims to promote an oligarchically-oriented agenda in disguise, I shall also challenge the commonly held view that *On the Peace* 133 merely reproduces Lysias' statement.

A first difference, although seemingly marginal, between the two passages consists in the use of δημοκρατικός, instead of δημοτικός, in the *Defence against a charge of subverting the democracy*. The two adjectives can be regarded as synonyms in this context, but it is worth pointing out that this occurrence of δημοκρατικός represents the only instance of the term in Attic oratory. Most importantly, I would highlight the presence of a fundamental distinction between the two passages which is generally overlooked. While according to Lysias the determining factor for supporting one constitutional form instead of another lies in the notion of advantage (συμφέρῃ), the discriminating feature in the Isocratean passage is represented by honour (τιμῶνται). Interestingly, the idea that every man acts in his own self-interest when choosing between democracy and oligarchy emerges already from [Xenophon], as we saw in section 2.2, in relation to the δῆμος itself, but also to those members of the δῆμος who are not δημοτικοί and to those men who despite belonging to the upper class take the side of the δῆμος because they have come to the realisation that it is easier to commit injustice in a democracy than in an oligarchy. *On the Peace* is *per se* a speech characterised by a blending of arguments from expediency and from justice as Isocrates chastises his fellow

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[223] Mitchell (2016) 68 [her italics].
[224] See Tincani (1923) 147 and Laistner (1927) 122.
[225] See, for instance, Gastaldi (1998) 163.

citizens' inability to identify their true advantage.[226] Nonetheless, the key element around which revolves *On the Peace* 133 is τιμή ('honour') rather than the notion of advantage.

This aspect is of particular relevance especially because Isocrates' emphasis on τιμή in connection with δημοτικός in this passage from *On the Peace* points to the key role played by his interest in Athens' leadership over Greece. In this respect, concerning the use of the term within the Isocratean corpus, Alexiou has defined τιμή as 'die politische Macht' as well as 'die Rechte, die aus ihr hervorgehen', and had noted that '[e]ine Ehrenwürde' is represented by 'die Hegemonie bei den Griechen'.[227] Similarly, Bouchet underlines that, in Isocrates' view, the Athenian hegemony over Greece can be identified precisely with the notion of τιμή. Indeed, Bouchet specifies that, while even Demosthenes in *On the Crown* 66 links the Athenian pre-eminence in the Hellenic world to τιμή, Isocrates goes one step forward by equating the two ideas throughout his corpus.[228]

So, while the remark that every man upholds the kind of government in which he is held in honour gives rise to the question of being honoured by whom and in what sense, Isocrates appears to suggest that the answer for the Athenians lies in the goodwill and good repute to be (re)gained from the other Greeks. Thus, the reference to the notion of τιμή as the defining factor in supporting democracy instead of oligarchy or vice versa needs to be interpreted within the wider framework of the Isocratean attempt to redefine Athens' leadership over Greece. Significantly, the correlation between the rethinking of the Athenian hegemony and the notion of τιμή as a crucial aspect in *On the Peace* is reiterated in the closing part of the speech. More specifically, in section 144 Isocrates explicitly compares the τιμή which the Spartan kings enjoy from their citizens to the kind of honour that the Athenians should aim to receive from the other Greeks in recognition of Athens' power as an instrument of their security rather than their slavery.[229]

Therefore, by arguing that the distinction between democrats and oligarchs is based not on nature, or advantage (unlike what Lysias states), but on τιμή, Isocrates hints at his interest in, and engagement with, the issues

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[226] See, for instance, Gillis (1970).
[227] Alexiou (2010) 114.
[228] See Bouchet (2014) 48-49.
[229] See Bouchet (2014) 77.

posed by the Athenian hegemonic position in the Hellenic world. In doing so, he suggests a redefinition of being δημοτικός by recontextualising it in the broader picture of Athens' leading role in international politics and the increasing need to rethink such a role. In other words, the fundamental essence of being democratic (with the literal sense of δημοτικός as acting in the interest of the δῆμος) consists in the ability to reshape Athens' hegemony and thus to enable its citizens to be held in honour by the other Greeks while securing its pre-eminence abroad. Should the Athenian democracy fail to do so, the Athenians will inevitably opt for an oligarchic constitution in the attempt to achieve that same goal. This is the potential outcome which Isocrates is warning against, not endorsing.

Δημοτικός in *Antidosis*

From a chronological point of view, the last two instances of δημοτικός in the Isocratean corpus occur in *Antidosis*. Indeed, we find the first occurrence in section 66 of the speech, when Isocrates reproduces the content of *On the Peace* 133.[230] The second and final instance of the term, which represents the core of the following analysis on the use of δημοτικός in *Antidosis*, occurs towards the end of this work. More particularly, in section 303 Isocrates employs the comparative form of δημοτικός in order to rebuke his fellow citizens for regarding those men who have incited hatred towards Athens as 'more in favour of the δῆμος' (δημοτικώτεροι) than the Athenians who cause all those interacting with them 'to be well disposed' (εὖ διακεῖσθαι) towards their πόλις.

This occurrence of the term resembles the use of the comparative adjective in *On the Peace* 13 where, as we saw earlier, Isocrates criticises in a similar way his fellow citizens for misidentifying who should be regarded as truly acting in the best interest of the δῆμος. At the same time, in this passage from *Antidosis* the relevance of Isocrates' profound interest in foreign politics and the recontextualisation of what it means to be δημοτικός in the wider framework of his views on the Athenian leadership over Greece are even more manifest than in *On the Peace* 13. Indeed, the phrase εὖ διακεῖσθαι, which is employed with regard to those Athenians who should be regarded as truly acting in the best interest of the δῆμος, echoes Isocrates' emphasis on εὔνοια among the other

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[230] See Nicolai (2004) 164-168.

Greeks as one of the key pillars, alongside εὐδοκιμία, in the reaffirmation and the reshaping of Athens' leading role within the Hellenic world.

Significantly, the same phrase occurs already in section 278, which belongs, like section 303, to that segment of *Antidosis* devoted to a discussion on the true meaning of φιλοσοφία, as we shall see further below. Here, Isocrates stresses how persuasion of one's audience greatly depends on the perceived character of the speaker: speeches are considered as being 'truer' (ἀληθέστεροι) when they are delivered 'by those who are well disposed' (ὑπὸ τῶν εὖ διακειμένων) than 'by those who are discredited' (ὑπὸ τῶν διαβεβλημένων); this is why being of good repute among one's fellow citizens is of particular relevance (ὥσθ᾽ ὅσῳ ἄν τις ἐρρωμενεστέρως ἐπιθυμῇ πείθειν τοὺς ἀκούοντας, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον ἀσκήσει καλὸς κἀγαθὸς εἶναι καὶ παρὰ τοῖς πολίταις εὐδοκιμεῖν). The emphasis on the notion of goodwill reaches a climax in the following section when Isocrates stresses that, far from ignoring the 'power' (δύναμις) of εὔνοια as it is generally assumed, those men who devote themselves to φιλοσοφία are aware of it more than anyone else.[231] Thus, once again, εὔνοια and εὐδοκιμία emerge as crucial elements in the Isocratean corpus: from persuasion to leadership, goodwill and good repute are indispensable features for success.

In highlighting Isocrates' 'cosmopolitan viewpoint' and then in commenting specifically on *Antidosis* 303, Ober notes:

> The admixture of an extra-Attic perspective, which focused on foreign relations, to the traditional concern with *dēmokratia* per se helped Isocrates to distinguish himself from other Athenian writers of rhetorical *logoi*, while simultaneously linking him to the Thucydidean and Xenophontic critical tradition that viewed Athens within a wider Greek context. (…) Isocrates' implication, that the Athenian citizen masses regarded proponents of Athenocentric policies as inherently more democratic than advocates of policies that took into account the broader Hellenic frame, underlines his establishment of a critically useful antithesis between a cosmopolitan aristocratic/panhellenic perspective and a parochial demotic/polis-oriented habit of thought.[232]

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[231] Isoc., *Antidosis* 279.
[232] Ober (1998) 255; cf. Too (2008) 235.

While Ober is certainly right in underlining Isocrates' interest in international politics as an essential aspect of his works, Isocrates adopts an Athenocentric standpoint which does not contradict, but goes hand in hand with, his Panhellenism.[233] Therefore, I would challenge Ober's interpretation of the passage from *Antidosis* by arguing that here the use of the comparative adjective points to an opposition not between an Athenocentric attitude and a Panhellenic one, but rather between two incompatible approaches to the consolidation of Athens' position abroad in view of a Panhellenic expedition against Persia.

More specifically, Isocrates appears to present as truly acting in the best interest of the δῆμος those Athenians who, instead of fomenting the hatred of the other Greeks, are responsible for (re)gaining goodwill and good repute for their πόλις. The way in which this is achieved consists, as Isocrates has stressed in the previous section of the speech, in cultivating Athens' cultural and rhetorical pre-eminence.[234] In this regard, *Antidosis* should be interpreted as following a line of continuity with *On the Peace* where, as I discussed earlier, the need to reshape Athens' leading role in the Hellenic world is inextricably related to, and casts light on, the Isocratean (re)definition of what it means to be genuinely δημοτικός.

Furthermore, the interpretation of the use of δημοτικός in *Antidosis* 303 cannot be disentangled from the wider context of the segment to which this passage belongs and to which I have briefly referred above. Indeed, from section 270 to section 309, just before the epilogue, Isocrates devotes his attention to discussing the actual meaning of φιλοσοφία, as he understands it, in opposition to the incorrect definition provided by some Athenians (τὴν καλουμένην ὑπό τινων φιλοσοφίαν οὐκ εἶναι φημί, προσήκει τὴν δικαίως ἂν νομιζομένην ὁρίσαι καὶ δηλῶσαι πρὸς ὑμᾶς).[235] More particularly, according to Isocrates, being a φιλόσοφος consists in devoting oneself to gaining the 'practical wisdom' (φρόνησις) which enables one to know what to do and say.[236] The focus on presenting the true meaning of φιλοσοφία reveals Isocrates' 'attempt to recover the linguistic origins of the state'.[237] In this regard, Isocrates

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[233] See, for instance, Bouchet (2014) 194. Cf. Chapter 3 section 4.
[234] See Isoc., *Antidosis* 302.
[235] Isoc., *Antidosis* 270; see also Isoc., *Antidosis* 285.
[236] Isoc., *Antidosis* 271.
[237] Too (2008) 223.

explicitly complains that, due to the contemporary chaotic situation in Athens, some of his fellow citizens, instead of employing the words according to their natural meaning (κατὰ φύσιν), 'transfer them from the most beautiful deeds to the most trivial pursuits' (μεταφέρουσιν ἀπὸ τῶν καλλίστων πραγμάτων ἐπὶ τὰ φαυλότατα τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων).[238] This is why this specific part of *Antidosis* from section 270 to 309 is articulated in such a way that the redefinition of φιλοσοφία leads to, and is thus inextricably related to, a discussion on the true meaning of other key terms, and the notions that they convey, such as πλεονεξία[239] and, precisely, δημοτικός.

Concurrently, Athens' cultural and rhetorical excellence becomes in this same segment of the speech the main basis for the superiority of the Athenians within the Hellenic world.[240] Indeed, here in *Antidosis* Isocrates develops the idea which he had begun to express a couple of years earlier in *On the Peace* concerning, as we saw above, the need for Athens to reaffirm its leadership within the Hellenic world on grounds other than its (increasingly shaky) military power. Thus, the redefinition of the meaning of φιλοσοφία, which represents the apex of the speech occurring just before the epilogue, ultimately points toward the renewed kind of hegemony that, in Isocrates' view, his fellow citizens should uphold in order to consolidate their position abroad. Once again, even in a speech like *Antidosis* which revolves around Isocrates' self-defence, his interest in Athens' international politics prevails in shaping his ideas on internal politics. It is indeed in this framework that being actually δημοτικός is (re)interpreted as bringing benevolence upon the Athenians among the other Greeks by cultivating Athens' cultural and rhetorical superiority. In a speech where, by defending his rhetorical education, Isocrates fundamentally claims his role as a champion of such superiority, the portrait of the true δημοτικός might well have turned into a self-portrait in a similar way as in *On the Peace* 13.

Conclusion

In brief, the use of δημοτικός in *Areopagiticus* 64 (where, unlike the other instances in the speech, the term refers to the situation in Athens at the end of

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[238] See Isoc., *Antidosis* 283 which echoes Isoc., *Areopagiticus* 20 (discussed in Chapter 2 section 3.3.3 and Chapter 3 section 2) with both Isocratean passages recalling the Thucydidean account of words changing their meaning during the civil strife at Corcyra in Thuc., III 82.
[239] See Isoc., *Antidosis* 275, 281-282 and 284 (including a redefinition of the meaning of εὐφυής 'of good natural disposition').
[240] See Isoc., *Antidosis* 293-300.

the Peloponnesian War, not to the ancestral constitution) and, even more clearly, the occurrences in *On the Peace* and *Antidosis* bear witness to the attempt made by Isocrates to recontextualise what it means to act in favour of the δῆμος in light of his contemporary interest in political leadership. In order to do so he tends to shift the focus in the usage of the term from domestic to international politics. More specifically, the depiction of who is actually worthier of the label of δημοτικός which emerges in *On the Peace* 13 points in the direction of a figure who adopts an attitude in between Cleophon's policy and Eubulus' while, at the same time, sharing the characteristics of οἱ εὖ φρονοῦντες ('those who think well'). Interestingly, such a portrait, as we saw, ultimately appears to allude to Isocrates himself.

The occurrences of δημοτικός in *On the Peace* are of considerable importance also because the two remaining instances (that is, *On the Peace* 108 and 133) hint at the blurring of constitutional boundaries between democracy and oligarchy, thus echoing, at least to a certain extent, the use of δημοτικός in *Evagoras*. Nonetheless, in *On the Peace* Isocrates goes beyond the debate on the relativity of constitutions in employing the term. Indeed, by focusing particularly on *On the Peace* 133, I have attempted to show that he reframes the meaning of being δημοτικός in view of his broader interest in, and engagement with, the issues posed by Athens' position in international politics and its relation with the other Greeks. The core of being democratic, according to the reinterpretation offered by Isocrates, does not depend on either nature or advantage and is not confined exclusively to internal politics. Rather, the determining factor when deciding between supporting democracy or oligarchy is represented by the notion of τιμή, which throughout the Isocratean corpus is inextricably related to, and even becomes a synonym for, Athens' hegemony over Greece.

A similar emphasis on international politics can be found in *Antidosis* where the redefinition of δημοτικός occurs in the wider framework of a segment in which the main focus lies in providing a definition of the true meaning of φιλοσοφία and in which the notions of εὔνοια and εὐδοκιμία are of paramount importance. An Athenian can be regarded as being truly δημοτικός only when he is capable of raising benevolence towards Athens in his interactions with other Greeks. The path to take in order to achieve this goal consists in devoting oneself to cultivating Athens' rhetorical and cultural pre-eminence. Indeed, such

a pre-eminence is the main aspect responsible for the esteem in which Athens is generally held abroad. Considering that throughout the whole speech Isocrates vigorously defends his teaching and rhetorical education claiming his prominent role in cultivating those activities for which Athens is admired, he appears to conclude his self-defence by implicitly portraying himself as δημοτικός *par excellence.*

4. Conclusions

The purpose of this chapter has been to investigate the occurrences of δημοτικός throughout the Isocratean corpus in order to argue that, far from promoting an ill-concealed oligarchic agenda with an arbitrary and opportunistic use of democratic vocabulary, Isocrates exploits, and stretches the boundaries of, the inherent malleability of democratic language to tackle contemporary political issues. In doing so, he ultimately shapes his ideas on what it means to be a true democrat (with δημοτικός indicating, *stricto sensu,* acting in the interest of the δῆμος) in light of his views on what makes a good leader, with specific reference to Athens' pre-eminent role within the Hellenic world.

I have thus started this chapter by analysing the use of δημοτικός in *Evagoras* as a case study exemplifying how Isocrates problematises, and at the same time expands, the ductility intrinsically present in political vocabulary. By employing δημοτικός to describe the Cyprian king, Isocrates clearly applies the adjective to a non-Athenian and non-democratic context while simultaneously linking it to τυραννικός. Therefore, in *Evagoras* 46 Isocrates manifestly engages with the blurring of boundaries between constitutional forms. Nonetheless, the original meaning of the term as 'in favour of the δῆμος', rather than 'democratic', makes the extension of its application to the ruler of Salamis on Cyprus less striking than it may appear at first sight.

What is, instead, even more noticeable in this passage is the fact that τυραννικός is used in a positive way. Indeed, as we saw, in *Evagoras* Isocrates appears to be very much interested in the τύραννος family of words considering also that this speech represents the Isocratean work with the highest number of occurrences of this specific political vocabulary. The occurrence of τυραννικός in relation to δημοτικός can thus be interpreted as a means to uphold the

reformulation of the former in positive terms, a reshaping which emerges throughout the Cyprian speech. So, the use of δημοτικός in this context, rather than indicating an anti-democratic move, suggests, in my view, Isocrates' broader twofold aim. On the one hand, by returning to the original sense of δημοτικός as acting in the interests of the δῆμος, Isocrates applies the term, and thus the notion, to a non-democratic context; in doing so, he intends to show that civic virtues are not incompatible with one-man rule, even when it is labelled as τυραννίς, and that rulers like Evagoras are capable of applying those virtues in an effective and positive way. On the other hand, the problematisation operated by Isocrates in employing this political vocabulary reflects a flexibility that was very much needed in the real political world of the fourth century, which was changing dramatically compared with the political reality of the previous century.

To demonstrate how the application of δημοτικός to a wide range of different contexts, rather than being in itself an arbitrary Isocratean innovation, was entrenched in the use of the term in the fifth and fourth centuries, I have moved on to consider some of the main occurrences in our literary sources which attest such an embedded adaptability. From the Herodotean usage to describe one of the three Egyptian scripts and the instances in [Xenophon] in the fifth century to the occurrences in Xenophon and [Aristotle] in the following century, the intrinsic fluidity of δημοτικός emerges as the guiding thread. This proves that the malleability displayed by the Isocratean instances was present in both previous and contemporary usages of the term. Isocrates is certainly responsible for exploiting to a greater degree this flexibility, but he does not arbitrarily create it *ex nihilo* in order to implement an alleged oligarchic agenda in disguise. Rather, he understands that such ductility mirrors the complexity of, and at the same time responds to the issues posed by, fourth-century real politics.

The chapter has then progressed to unearth the discussion that was taking place concerning what it meant to be δημοτικός particularly in the second half of the fourth century. The existence of such a debate revolving around δημοτικός is attested most clearly by Aeschines and Demosthenes. More specifically, I have highlighted how both Aeschines and Demosthenes, in attacking each other, claim for themselves the label of δημοτικός. In this respect, I have pointed out that, by attempting to define the qualities associated

with being actually δημοτικός, Demosthenes (with specific reference to the period of his exile when he pleads for his return) shifts the focus from ἐλευθερία to εὔνοια. This detail acquires particular importance if we consider that a similar link between the two notions of δημοτικός and εὔνοια represents a crucial aspect in the Isocratean redefinition of the meaning of being δημοτικός. Therefore, while the meaning of the term stays the same (i.e. acting in favour of the δῆμος), Isocrates, Demosthenes and Aeschines all claim the priority of their respective definition of what the action itself means. In this respect, Demosthenes and Aeschines are deeply caught-up in internal politics and political point-scoring, whereas Isocrates appears to hold himself aloof from this level of politics. Yet, he is deliberately engaging in the fourth-century contest concerning what it means to act δημοτικῶς although he writes from a very different perspective compared to Demosthenes and Aeschines.

The remaining sections of this chapter are devoted to the analysis of the actual Isocratean definition, or rather redefinition, of what it means to be δημοτικός in light of his views on Athenian leadership over Greece. Indeed, I have suggested that we can identify some traces of this redefinition as early as the forensic speech *Against Callimachus*. In this work, which Isocrates most probably wrote at the end of the fifth century, the speaker criticises, and partly rejects, his fellow citizens' understanding of who should be regarded as δημοτικός; in doing so, he concomitantly stresses the relevance of the notion of εὐδοκιμία in his self-portrait as δημοτικός.

It is, however, in the middle of the fourth century that Isocrates most clearly attempts to reframe the meaning of acting in favour of the δῆμος in the broader context of the views on Athenian hegemony that he was developing at the time. In this respect, I have begun by focusing on *Areopagiticus*, where all occurrences of the term except one are employed in relation to the idea of the Athenian ancestral constitution. The fact that in promoting his reform Isocrates never employs the phrase πάτριος πολιτεία and, simultaneously, makes extensive use of terms belonging to the democratic vocabulary like δημοτικός, has generally been interpreted as a window dressing and a clumsy attempt to conceal under the mask of δημοκρατία what in reality is an oligarchic programme. I have contested this commonly held view by showing that the instances of δημοτικός throughout the speech point in the direction of Isocrates' endeavour to recontextualise the meaning of being democratic in light of his

primary interest in consolidating Athens' increasingly unsteady position in international politics.

My investigation has ended with an examination of the occurrences of the term in the other two major speeches which Isocrates wrote in the 350s, namely *On the Peace* and *Antidosis*. Indeed, I have attempted to show how the redefinition of what it signifies to act δημοτικῶς in view of Isocrates' ideas on leadership that is hinted at a couple of years earlier in *Areopagiticus* emerges even more clearly and strongly in these two works. More specifically, the first occurrence which we find in *On the Peace* consists in the use of the comparative around which Isocrates presents a threefold comparison. The depiction of the true δημοτικός which appears to be alluded to in this passage is that of an Athenian who rejects both an excessively warmongering policy and the avoidance of any military activism. Significantly, upon closer examination, such a portrait seems to turn into a self-portrait, especially when we consider that Isocrates employs the key phrase οἱ εὖ φρονοῦντες (which represents one of the three positive poles in the comparison) elsewhere in the corpus to identify himself manifestly and proudly as one of 'those who think well'.

Lastly, the usage of δημοτικός in *Antidosis* 303 confirms the relevance of the notion of εὔνοια and εὐδοκιμία in defining, or rather redefining, the meaning of being actually democratic. Indeed, the quintessential feature of acting in the best interest of the Athenian δῆμος consists in (re)gaining for Athens benevolence and good reputation when interacting with the other Greeks through the cultivation of its rhetorical and cultural superiority. Once again, as in *On the Peace*, Isocrates, who throughout *Antidosis* stresses his essential role in such a cultivation, appears to claim for himself the label of true δημοτικός. Moreover, the emphasis on obtaining εὔνοια and εὐδοκιμία for Athens suggests the existence of an inextricable connection between the characteristics of a good leader and those of a true democrat. This overlap and the overall use of the term throughout the corpus bear witness to how Isocrates' views on what democracy and being democratic should look like are deeply influenced by, and even arise from, his interest in political leadership, with specific reference to Athens' leading role abroad and the need, increasingly growing in the 350s, to rethink it.

Epilogue

While the significance and influence of Isocrates' pedagogical programme have widely been acknowledged, the relevance and complexity of his political ideas have often been overlooked or underestimated. Despite a renewed interest over the last decades in Isocrates as a political thinker, little or no attention has been paid to his use of political vocabulary, which has frequently been dismissed either as inconsistent or as confirming his alleged intent to promote an anti-democratic agenda under the guise of the label δημοκρατία.

In this thesis I have challenged these assumptions by means of a semantic approach which has consisted in a detailed examination of how Isocrates employs some key instances of democratic vocabulary throughout his corpus. Indeed, I have attempted to show that such a lexical analysis, when contextualised in the historical and literary framework, can not only broaden and deepen our understanding of Isocrates' political views *per se*, but also cast some light, more widely, on how his political thought fits into, and contributes to, the development of Greek political thought.

The present study has thus begun with some preliminary remarks relevant for our understanding of Isocrates' actual interest in, and engagement with, contemporary historical and political issues. In particular, I have stressed how his role as civic educator is inextricably related to his self-portrait as political adviser *par excellence*. Indeed, we have seen that Isocrates strongly emphasises his choice to withdraw from Athenian public life but, at the same time, claims to be a reliable political counsellor not despite, but precisely because of, his ἀπραγμοσύνη. In other words, Isocrates rethinks the τόπος of ἀπραγμοσύνη by presenting it not only in positive terms, but even as the essential prerequisite to be able to provide sound political advice. His innovative use of ἀπραγμοσύνη shows how, far from being a passive and apathetic observer of Athenian political activity relegated to the relative isolation of his own school, Isocrates does intend to influence his fellow citizens' decisions in matters of domestic and international politics.

My investigation has taken as a basis the analysis of the vocabulary related to two notions deeply associated with democracy, namely freedom of speech and the idea of equality, in the second and third chapter, respectively. More specifically, in the second chapter the examination of the concept of

outspokenness conveyed by παρρησία and its cognate verb παρρησιάζομαι has revealed that Isocrates employs the notion in a positive sense, oftentimes in a self-referential manner and as a sign of εὔνοια. Nevertheless, I have pointed out that in the Isocratean corpus παρρησία also acquires a striking pejorative connotation which coexists, at times in the same speech and even in the same passage, with the positive meaning most commonly attributed to the term in our surviving literary evidence. Isocrates' innovative use of παρρησία with an overtly negative meaning hints at his polarisation of the notion, while contextually providing a glaring example of how he exploits, and stretches to its limits, the intrinsic ductility which characterises political, especially democratic, vocabulary.

A similar interest in, and problematisation of, democratic terminology and notions are revealed in the next chapter by means of an analysis of the language of equality in the Isocratean corpus which has revolved around three main aspects: ἰσονομία, the two kinds of equality (i.e. geometric and arithmetic) and ἰσομοιρία. In examining Isocrates' usages of these concepts, I have underlined how he problematises and rethinks not only the notion of equality itself, but also its association with democracy. Isocrates does so not arbitrarily and as part of an alleged anti-democratic agenda, but as a result of his engagement with, and attempt to offer his own original contribution to, the wider contemporary debate that was taking place around the idea and language of equality. Moreover, he applies the malleability embedded in the notion and language of equality to international politics, thus hinting in particular at his constant attempt to consolidate Athens' leading position within the Hellenic world in the framework of a Panhellenic stance which goes hand in hand with an Athenocentric perspective.

Indeed, the crucial role played in Isocrates' works by his interest in political leadership (both by and within Athens), while frequently overlooked, bears witness to the wider contemporary discussion on leadership in which Xenophon was also very much engaged. Thus, following the *fil rouge* provided by the lexical approach, this thesis has progressed in the two remaining chapters to unearth Isocrates' ideas on leadership and their significance for his views on what democracy should look like by focusing on the occurrences of two key instances of democratic vocabulary stemming from the δημ- root. More precisely, in the fourth chapter I have devoted special attention to the usages of

δημαγωγός and its cognate verb δημαγωγέω arguing that, rather than employing these terms in a negative sense as it is generally assumed, Isocrates retrieves their original neutral sense and effects a dichotomic division between good and bad δημαγωγία. In this context, I have included a case study of the Isocratean portrait, or rather portraits, of Alcibiades, from which it ultimately emerges how Isocrates presents strong and effective leadership as based first and foremost on the notion of εὔνοια, with an overlap of the features that characterise a good leader in terms of individual leadership within the πόλις and of Athens' leading role over the other Greeks.

The examination of the occurrences of δημοτικός in the final chapter is indeed closely related to the evidence gathered in the preceding chapter concerning Isocrates' interest in, and more general ideas on, political leadership. Indeed, I have suggested that his usages of the term throughout the corpus ultimately hint at how he aims to (re)define the meaning of being democratic (with δημοτικός indicating *stricto sensu* acting in the best interest of the δῆμος) in light of his broader views on what makes a good leader in both internal and external politics. In doing so, Isocrates exploits and expands the inherent fluidity of the term, not unilaterally but following in the wake of the adaptability of this word attested in the previous and current century and of an increasing contemporary interest in what it means to be δημοτικός. Ultimately, the Isocratean portrait of the true δημοτικός (which implicitly turns into a self-portrait) shares some clear affinities with the characteristics of a good and effective leader, as shown, for instance, by the emphasis on the notion of εὔνοια.

Taken as a whole, the present study has challenged the commonly-held view that dismisses Isocrates' use of democratic language as a mere façade designed to conceal a supposedly anti-democratic programme. In this respect, I have argued for the need of a more sophisticated approach by suggesting that the debate around whether Isocrates was anti- or pro-democracy has to be reframed in order to take into account two fundamental aspects: on the one hand, the inherent ductility of political, especially democratic, lexicon; on the other hand, his constant interest in, and engagement with, the issues posed by political leadership in both domestic and international politics.

Indeed, Isocrates does tend to stretch to its limits the embedded fluidity of terms belonging to democratic vocabulary by extending significantly their

range of application, even beyond the civic boundaries of Athens to non-democratic contexts. Such a problematisation of democratic terminology emerges as a distinctive Isocratean mark that reflects the originality and novelty of his political thought. Nonetheless, this ductility, which Isocrates skilfully bears witness to and expands, has to be interpreted in the broader context of fourth-century Athens where it was needed in a real political world that was clearly changing: fourth-century Athenian democracy was different compared to the democracy of the previous century (despite the extent and nature of such a difference being still *sub iudice*, as we saw in the introductory chapter) and even in fourth-century democracy there were shifts in the power relations between the Areopagus and the δῆμος.

Furthermore, this thesis has attempted to show that Isocrates' innovative use of political, especially democratic, language and his views on what democracy and being democratic should look like cannot be disentangled from, and are deeply influenced by, his crucial interest in political leadership, which was particularly vivid in the 350s as Athens' position abroad was deteriorating. In this regard, εὔνοια emerges throughout the corpus as a key element that good leaders have in common with good παρρησιασταί and true δημοτικοί, and ultimately appears to point in the direction of Isocrates himself and his own school (see especially Isoc., *Antidosis* 302-303). Nevertheless, his political ideas should not be dismissed as self-referential; rather, by means of the lexical analysis adopted in the present study, I have suggested that his discussion of political, especially democratic, terms (and thus of the notions that they convey) is neither a soliloquy nor a monologue confined to the ivory towers of his school. Instead, his engagement with, and problematisation of, democratic vocabulary hints at his awareness of, and attempt to enter into dialogue with, previous and contemporary political views being expressed around those terms and concepts. In doing so, Isocrates interacts with, and at the same time endeavours to provide his own original contribution to, fourth-century political debates in light of his core, and essentially Athenocentric, interest in political leadership.

Appendix I

Outline of Democratic Language in Isocrates[1]

Work	Term	Number of Occurrences	Section
Against Callimachus (402/1)	δῆμος	3	17,49,62
	δημοκρατία	1	35
	δημοτικός	2	48,62
Against Lochites (400-396)	δημοκρατία	3	1,4,10
	δημοκρατέομαι	1	20
On the Team of Horses (396/5)	δῆμος	12	5,6,7,16,20,26(x2),28,36,37,41,46
	δημοκρατία	3	4,27,50
	δημοκρατέομαι	1	37
	δημοτικός	2	36,37
	παρρησία	1	22
Plataicus (373)	δῆμος	1	15
Helen (ca.370)	δῆμος	1	36
	δημοκρατία	1	36
	δημαγωγέω	1	37
To Demonicus (374-370)	δημοκρατία	1	36
	παρρησιάζομαι	1	34
Evagoras (ca.370)	δημοτικός	1	46
	παρρησία	1	39

[1] A similar outline has been presented by Bearzot (1980) 114-115. However, the list produced by Bearzot needs correcting due to a few misprints and in light of TLG. This outline also differs from Bearzot's in the dating of some of Isocrates' works, most importantly *Areopagiticus*, which, unlike Bearzot, I regarded as having been written before *On the Peace* (see Chapter 5 section 3.3.1). Additionally, I have included the occurrences of παρρησία and ἰσηγορία which are absent in Bearzot's outline.

Work	Term	Number of Occurrences	Section
To Nicocles (ca.370)	δημαγωγέω	1	16
	παρρησία	2	3,28
Nicocles (ca.368)	δημοκρατία	2	15,18
	ἰσότης	1	15
Archidamus (366)	δῆμος	1	64
	ἰσηγορία	1	97
	παρρησία	1	97
	παρρησιάζομαι	1	72
Areopagiticus (357/6)	δῆμος	8	16,23,26,27,58,63,68(x2)
	μισόδημος	1	57
	δημοκρατία	11	15,16,20,27,60,62,66,67,69,70,71
	δημοκρατέομαι	2	61(x2)
	δημοτικός	5	16,17,23,59,64
	ἰσονομία	1	20
	ἰσότης	3	21,60,61
	παρρησία	1	20
On the Peace (356/5)	δῆμος	4	75,108,121,125
	δημοκρατία	4	14,51,64,123
	δημοκρατέομαι	1	95
	δημοτικός	3	13,108,133
	δημαγωγός	4	122,126,129,133
	παρρησία	1	14
Epistle IX *To Archidamus* (356)	παρρησία	1	12

Work	Term	Number of Occurrences	Section
Antidosis (353)	δῆμος	5	70,232(x2),306,314
	μισόδημος	1	131
	δημοκρατία	7	27,70,232,306,309,317,319
	δημοτικός	2	66(=*On the Peace* 133),303
	δημαγωγός	1	234
	παρρησία	1	179
	παρρησιάζομαι	1	43
To Philip (346)	παρρησία	1	72
Epistle II *To Philip* (344)	δῆμος	1	15
Panathenaicus (342-339)	δῆμος	5	139,141,147,148,170
	δημοκρατία	8	68,119,131,132,139,147,153,178
	δημαγωγέω	1	148
	ἰσονομία	1	178
	ἰσότης	2	241,242
	παρρησιάζομαι	2	96,218
Epistle IV *To Antipater* (340-339)	παρρησία	1	4
	παρρησιάζομαι	2	6,7

Appendix II
Isocrates in Chios

After his activity as a logographer, Isocrates made the decision to turn to education. In this regard, it is worth highlighting that, according to [Plutarch], Isocrates established three schools, namely, a first one in Athens, a second one in Chios and a third one, the most well-known, once again in Athens when he returned from his sojourn on the island (see Chapter 1 section 1). More specifically, [Plutarch] narrates that when Isocrates set up his very first school in Athens he had turned to φιλοσοφία and to writing down his thoughts in deliberative speeches, such as *Panegyricus*, in order to encourage his fellow citizens and all the other Greeks to think fittingly (ἐπὶ τὸ τὰ δέοντα φρονεῖν).[1] Yet, [Plutarch] continues, after realising that he was failing at this purpose, Isocrates decided, as some say, to move to Chios where he not only founded a school and had nine pupils but also instituted, in addition to some offices, a democratic constitution like the one existing in Athens (καὶ ἀρχὰς δὲ καὶ περὶ τὴν αὐτὴν τῇ πατρίδι πολιτείαν).[2]

[Plutarch]'s reference to an Isocratean stay in Chios is particularly interesting and deserves special attention. While some scholars have been sceptical about the veracity of [Plutarch]'s overall account, the detail concerning the foundation of a school is often regarded as trustworthy.[3] In this respect, of particular interest is the study of Dušanić who links Isocrates' alleged Chian sojourn with the publication of Plato's *Euthydemus* and suggests that the latter work was written shortly after the defensive alliance between Athens and Chios stipulated in the summer of 384.[4] Indeed, Dušanić argues that it was precisely this historical event that led Plato to recall in his dialogue Isocrates' early stay in Chios, which had taken place approximately ten years prior to the conclusion of

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[1] [Plut.], *Moralia* 837b.
[2] [Plut.], *Moralia* 837b-c; see Roisman and Worthington (2015) 148 on [Plutarch]'s account and his suggestion that Isocrates established three schools altogether in the course of his life. On Isocrates allegedly opening a school in Chios see also Phot., cod. 260 p. 486b. On the possibility of Chios having a democratic government already in the sixth century see Robinson (1997) 90-101 (for a slightly different interpretation of the nature of the archaic Chian constitution see Costantini (2017)).
[3] See Pinto (2015) 321-323.
[4] For this dating of Plato's *Euthydemus* see Dušanić (1999) 16. On this alliance between the Athenians and the Chians see also Bruce (1965) and, more recently, Occhipinti (2017).

the alliance between the Athenians and the Chians.[5] More particularly, in addition to sharing the *communis opinio* that the anonymous rhetorician and speech writer presented by Socrates as one of his critics in the brief digression at the end of Plato's work[6] has to be identified with Isocrates,[7] Dušanić believes that the Isocrates implicitly alluded to in the Platonic passage is the one of the Chian period of his life, which Dušanić dates to around 393; in this regard, Dušanić offers a literal interpretation of Socrates' reference to οἱ ἀμφὶ Εὐθύδημον[8] and thus postulates (also on the basis of [Plutarch]'s comments) that, as a result of his pedagogical activity on the island during his sojourn there, Isocrates engaged in debates with local eristics belonging to Euthydemus' circle, with such disputes most probably involving discussions on political issues.[9] Moreover, Dušanić goes on to point out that Socrates' description of the unnamed figure criticised in the passage as partaking of both φιλοσοφία and πολιτικὴ πρᾶξις can be interpreted as referring to 'the diversity of Isocrates' activities on the island, which combined the teaching of rhetoric with an atticizing legislation and, probably, a corresponding party-policy'.[10]

Additionally, by linking some epigraphical indications with prosopographical and literary data, Dušanić notes that Metrodorus, one of Isocrates' pupils on the island, might well have been involved in the conclusion of the alliance between Athens and Chios in 384 considering also that he can plausibly be identified with the pro-Athenian Chian referred to in a fragment from the comedy entitled Φιλομήτωρ by the fourth-century comic poet Antiphanes.[11] By highlighting that Isocrates was Metrodorus' teacher and that the education which he provided to his Chian pupil cannot be disentangled from his endorsement and dissemination of Conon's 'pro-Athenian and anti-Spartan policies',[12] Dušanić reaches the conclusion that 'Isocrates' contacts with the ultrademocratic Chios made him partly responsible in the eyes of the Plato-like

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[5] See Dušanić (1999) 4.
[6] See Pl., *Euthydemus* 305b-306c.
[7] See Gifford (2013) 14-20 for an overview of the different attempts made to identify the logographer criticised in this passage from Plato's *Euthydemus* and the various elements that point towards Isocrates.
[8] Pl., *Euthydemus* 305d.
[9] See Dušanić (1999) 1-2.
[10] Dušanić (1999) 2.
[11] See Dušanić (1999) 5-7 who also stresses that Metrodorus had family links with a certain Theocritus who, according to one of the most plausible restorations of the lacuna in the epigraphic text of the Attic-Chian decree, figures among the names of the Chian envoys to Athens in 384 listed at the end of the decree itself.
[12] Dušanić (1999) 7.

conservatives for the alliance of 384', considering also that they ignored 'the differences between the two radical policies toward Persia', namely, on the one hand the 'medism' of those Athenians (like the rhetor Cephalus of Collytus who led the Athenian embassy to Chios) who promoted the negotiations with the Chians, on the other hand 'Isocrates' conquest of the East'.[13] Therefore, it is plausible that, as Dušanić suggests, in the *Euthydemus* Plato's criticism is directed not only against Euthydemus and his brother Dionysodorus, but also, even if implicitly and less vehemently, against Isocrates. Such criticism would thus be motivated by Isocrates' activity on the island in around 393 and the bonds which he had forged there at that time and which he most probably still maintained in the 380s with some of the Chian politicians and intellectuals who were in the front line in the contemporary negotiations between Chios and Athens.[14]

Indeed, the above-mentioned passage from [Plutarch]'s biography as well as the brief digression in the *Euthydemus* as interpreted by Dušanić appear to stress that during his early stay in Chios Isocrates' role as a teacher was closely interrelated with an active involvement in local politics. In this respect, Dušanić highlights that Isocrates' sojourn on the island and his initiative to establish a democratic constitution there could be seen as being sponsored by Conon after he had defeated the Spartans at Cnidus in 394.[15] So, according to the account which we find in [Plutarch] and the elements that can be inferred from the *Euthydemus* in the light of the likely reference to Isocrates in this dialogue, the Isocratean early stay in Chios can be regarded as historically accurate and as being characterised by a synergy between tutoring and pro-democratic political activity.

In other words, the two aspects should be interpreted as complementary features of Isocrates' sojourn on the island, with the education that he offered in his Chian school being inextricably related to his interest in, and engagement with, political issues and thus representing a remarkable precursor of the school that he opened in Athens when he went back there shortly after Conon's death

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[13] Dušanić (1999) 8.

[14] Concerning Isocrates' links with the island, it is worth noting that he had among his students the historian Theopompus of Chios as noted by [Plut.], *Moralia* 837c, Philostr., *Lives of the Sophists* 506 and [Zos.], *Life of Isocrates* 100. See also [Zos.], *Life of Isocrates* 106-116 where Theopompus and Ephorus of Cyme are described by Isocrates himself as two pupils having opposite characteristics.

[15] See Dušanić (1999) 2-3.

in 392 and Sparta's renewal of its operations in the Aegean in the following year.[16] During his Chian sojourn Isocrates was allegedly directly involved in politics, whereas in Athens he opts for a withdrawal from public life (see Chapter 1 section 1). Yet, in both Chios and Athens Isocrates, far from promoting an anti-democratic agenda, focuses on the interconnectivity between his educational programme and his political ideas.

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[16] On this dating for Isocrates' return to Athens after his Chian sojourn see Dušanić (1999) 2.

Appendix III

Ἰσοκράτης **and** ἰσοκρατία

It is noteworthy that there is a resonance of the idea of equality in Isocrates' own name as Ἰσοκράτης[1] is clearly related to ἰσοκρατία. In this respect, Cartledge has noted that he 'was perhaps aptly named: *isokratia*, though rare, was a term in use for a kind of moderate oligarchy', while also adding that Isocrates' epistles addressed to Philip manifestly show how he was 'a monarchist thinker in all but name'.[2] However, I intend to highlight that the meaning of ἰσοκρατία is more complex than Cartledge suggests.

The term is first attested in the Herodotean speech delivered by Socles of Corinth[3] at the meeting of the Peloponnesian League in Sparta presumably during the spring of 505/4.[4] In opposing the Spartan proposal to restore Hippias (who is present at the meeting) in Athens, Socles contrasts ἰσοκρατίαι ('equalities of power') with τυραννίδες ('tyrannies') labelling the latter as unjust and bloodthirsty towards not only the Greeks but all mankind. According to Musti, in this Herodotean passage ἰσοκρατία should be interpreted as indicating '[u]n regime politico che non è ancora *demokratía*, ma che realizza l'*isótes* contro la tirannide', and thus demonstrates 'la assoluta compatibilità di *krátos* con *íson*, cioè la potenzialità legale e persino ugualitaria di *krátos*'.[5] In a similar way, though moving one step forward, Bordes argues that ἰσοκρατία refers to 'des régimes qui seront plus tard appelés oligarchies mais, comme *isonomia*, il conduit à la démocratie: il en est même plus proche encore puisqu'il associe

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[1] On the occurrences of the personal name Ἰσοκράτης in Attica see Osborne and Byrne (1994) 242. It is not possible to establish whether this was a traditional name in Isocrates' family and, if so, how far back it went since Isocrates' father Theodorus is 'the first known member of his family', as Davies (1971) 245 notes, and none of the later descendants known to us appears to be called Ἰσοκράτης. For Isocrates' family tree see Kirchner (1901) 510; for a more recent and slightly expanded version see Davies (1971) 248. Tuplin (1980) suggests some variations to Kirchner's and Davies' family trees which, however, do not impact the current discussion. For a brief overview of other fifth- and fourth-century personal names beginning in Ἰσο- see Brock (1991) 167 n. 30.

[2] Cartledge (2009) 98.

[3] Hdt., V 92α1. For an in-depth analysis of Socles' speech and its significance within the wider context of Herodotus' work see, for instance, Węcowski (1996), Moles (2007) and Buxton (2012). On the Herodotean depiction of the tyrants of Corinth with specific reference to the image that emerges from Socles' speech see Gray (1996).

[4] On this dating as the most plausible see Ostwald (1972) 277, who also underlines that this represents 'the earliest known formal meeting of the Peloponnesian League'.

[5] Musti (1995) 13.

directement égalité et pouvoir',[6] and this could be the reason why the noun and its cognates are rarely used and do not survive along with δημοκρατία later on.

In this regard, it is worth noting that Vlastos believes that here ἰσοκρατία does not indicate 'oligarchy in preference to (or even on a par with) democracy', since, despite the use of the plural, 'the reference is to Clisthenean Athens, which Herodotus knows as *demokratia* (6. 131. 1). And Socles appeals to the Spartans *qua* haters of tyranny, not *qua* lovers of i*sokratia*'.[7] Conversely, How and Wells stress the concrete sense conveyed by the plural regarding it as meaning 'republics', thus arguing that Herodotus not only employs this term 'to avoid the use of 'democracies', which might be distasteful to the Spartans' but considers it as 'the equivalent of the abstract term ἰσηγορίη (…) and the commoner ἰσονομία'.[8]

Nonetheless, Ostwald (whose essay is, to the best of my knowledge, the only extensive study devoted to this concept) has rightly highlighted that ἰσοκρατία and ἰσονομία are not synonyms since the former 'describes a form of government', whereas the latter 'denotes the principle of political equality'.[9] More particularly, by comparing the constitutions of Corinth, Sparta and Athens at the end of the sixth century Ostwald reaches the following conclusion:

> (…) in its political significance ἰσοκρατία describes a form of government which embodies the bicameral principle of a council which deliberates and formulates policies and an assembly (or a larger representative council) which validates them (…). It is hard to think of a better term which Socles could have chosen as the common denominator for the régimes of Corinth, Sparta, and Athens, which, despite their different constitutions, were equally opposed to tyranny.[10]

Therefore, Ostwald persuasively shows that the term ἰσοκρατία could be applied to both a democratic and an oligarchic government due to their opposition to tyranny. It in this respect that ἰσοκρατία presents, in my view, a

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[6] Bordes (1982) 240.
[7] Vlastos (1964) 9 n. 4.
[8] How and Wells (1912) 51.
[9] Ostwald (1972) 283.
[10] Ostwald (1972) 287.

significant point of contact with ἰσονομία, although the latter is characterised by an inextricable link with democracy that is not attested in the use of ἰσοκρατία.

The notion of ἰσοκρατία occurs also in the adjectival form when Herodotus notes that, among the Issedones, women are 'of equal power' (ἰσοκρατέες) with men.[11] According to Moggi, the use of this adjective in the Herodotean passage demonstrates that ἰσοκρατία, rather than having a specific meaning, can be applied to many different contexts far beyond the notion of political equality.[12] Nevertheless, Ostwald argues that here, instead of alluding to 'physical strength', ἰσοκρατής refers to the fact that:

> men and women enjoyed "equal power", i.e., the same political rights, among this people, and that he [Herodotus] believed this to contribute to a political equilibrium which he characterizes by the adjective δίκαιοι = "just", "righteous". In other words, the elements here are the two groups, sc. the sexes, and the ἰσοκρατία between them produces a just society.[13]

Thus, I believe that Ostwald is right in stressing that in this passage the adjective is employed with a political nuance.

In this respect, it is worth underlining that the two Herodotean occurrences, together with Plutarch, *Moralia* 827a-b,[14] appear to be the only cases in Greek literature where the concept of ἰσοκρατία takes on a political connotation.[15] All other occurrences of the term and its cognates in our extant literary sources can be found almost solely in medical as well as scientific and mathematical contexts, where the red thread is represented by the depiction of 'two or more entities whose "strength" or "potency" is seen as creating a balance in the thing in which they are found'.[16] Overall, Ostwald's analysis of the political and non-political occurrences of this notion suggests that ἰσοκρατία bears a more nuanced meaning than the one presented by Cartledge and, in its

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[11] Hdt., IV 26.
[12] Moggi (2003) 64 n. 33.
[13] Ostwald (1972) 281.
[14] On this passage see Ostwald (1972) 278 and 281-282.
[15] See Ostwald (1972) 278.
[16] Ostwald (1972) 278, cf. 280. For an overview of all the non-political usages of ἰσοκρατία and its cognates from the earliest occurrences until the end of the fourth century see Ostwald (1972) 278-281.

political sense, it should not be interpreted as being linked exclusively to an oligarchic constitution. Thus, not even in his own name was Isocrates anti-democratic.

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