How Corporate Entrepreneurs Navigate Rule Breaking Behaviors to Create Positive Impressions

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Abstract

This study uses an Entrepreneurship as Practice (EAP) approach, specifically Goffman's dramaturgical lens, to address: what practices do corporate entrepreneurs use to cultivate positive impressions, while simultaneously engaging in rule-breaking to accomplish their innovations? While decision-makers in large organizations typically disapprove of employees who break rules, corporate entrepreneurs often see rules as inhibiting innovation. Corporate entrepreneurs face an interesting conundrum: they must undermine organizational processes to launch their innovation, while simultaneously gaining decision-makers' support.

Although extant theory suggests that successful innovators operate under the radar, it remains silent on the specific practices they engage in to create and maintain positive impressions with their decision makers. Based on archival data and 138 interviews with decision-makers and corporate entrepreneurs, I find that through dramaturgical realization the latter successfully demonstrated that their rule-breaking was pro-social in nature.

This study's theoretical contributions lie in using the newly emerging EAP lens to identify how corporate entrepreneurs' impression management practices connect with the practices of the larger organization, thereby contributing to both corporate entrepreneurship and impression management literatures. This study's practical contributions lie in sensitizing corporate entrepreneurs on how to manage impressions when engaging in (prosocial) rule-breaking.

Keywords: Corporate entrepreneurs, dramaturgical realization, Entrepreneurship as Practice (EAP), prosocial rule breaking, impression management, innovation, schemata

Why it pays to break the rules at work — Francesca Gino, Entrepreneur Magazine, 2018

1. Introduction

Asking for forgiveness rather than permission is a well-known maxim in the world of entrepreneurship and in entrepreneurial organizations. Corporate entrepreneurs, or intrapreneurs —individuals who act as entrepreneurs within existing organizations (Antoncic & Hisrich, 2001; Kuratko & Goldsby, 2004; Pinchot, 1985)— succeed in accomplishing their innovations by regularly breaking organizational rules. Corporate entrepreneurship literature is replete with examples of entrepreneurs who regularly engage in bootlegging organizational resources, undermining organizational processes, and engaging in otherwise unapproved practices (Augsdorfer, 2005; Jelinek & Schoonhoven, 1990; Kannan-Narasimhan, 2014; Morris, Kuratko, & Covin, 2011; Starr & MacMillan, 1990). Entrepreneurs must often break rules to take advantage of entrepreneurial opportunities (Brenkert, 2009).

Rule-breaking behaviors by entrepreneurs leads them to be seen as "low tricksters, wily competitors, clever enterprisers, audacious rule breakers" (Brenkert, 2009, p. 449). While popular literature on entrepreneurship sometimes lauds those, who break rules to accomplish their innovations, decision-makers in organizations often frown upon these same behaviors (Brenkert, 2009; Kuratko & Goldsby, 2004). While breaking rules allows corporate entrepreneurs to accomplish their innovations, they are also perceived as "rogue middle managers" (Kuratko & Goldsby, 2004, p. 13) who might selfishly break the rules for personal gain while harming the organization (Giacalone & Greenberg, 1997; Jackall, 1988; Morrison, 2006; Puffer, 1987; Robinson & Bennett, 1995; Vardi & Weitz, 2004). Stories abound of entrepreneurial organizations that succeeded when individuals flagrantly broke rules, ultimately causing ethically and morally problematic outcomes for their stakeholders (Kuratko & Goldsby, 2004), including in recent years: Enron, Tyco, WorldCom (Kuratko & Goldsby, 2004), Volkswagen, Juul, and Uber, amongst others.

While entrepreneurs are inclined to break rules, organizational decision-makers prefer when individuals follow rules (Jackall, 1988). Since entrepreneurs have a strong bias towards action (Bhide, 1996; Hannafey, 2003), as well as an intrinsic understanding of the quality of their innovations (Zott & Huy, 2007) which decision-makers may not share, they may continue to keenly pursue their innovations even if it means breaking the rules. However, when individuals break rules, they challenge decision-makers to assess if they are behaving in the interest of the organizations through pro-social rule breaking—rule breaking that benefits the organization—or if they are acting as rogue middle managers to further their own agendas (Harris, Sapienza & Bowie, 2009). Pro-social rule breaking occurs when individuals violate an organization's policies or procedures with the primary intention of benefiting the organization or promoting its welfare (Morrison, 2006). Decision-makers will likely support entrepreneurs when they see their activities as benefiting the organization, rather than when they see them as pursuing their own self-interests. Since maintaining positive impressions with decision-makers is paramount for entrepreneurs to gain support for their ventures (Zott & Huy, 2007), as they go about breaking rules entrepreneurs must also carefully manage decision-makers' impressions of their efforts.

Without the approval and support of the decision-makers, corporate entrepreneurs are not likely to gain the necessary support or adoption for their innovations; thus, impression management is a critical skill. Impression management is defined as behaviors that individuals employ to create, protect, maintain, or alter how a target audience perceives them (Bolino, 1999; Gardner & Martinko, 1988; Nagy, Pollack, Rutherford, & Lohrke, 2012; Rao, Schmidt, &

Murray, 1995). Prior research has repeatedly underscored the importance of impression management behaviors for entrepreneurs (Baron & Markman, 2003; Benson, Brau, Cicon, & Ferris, 2015; Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001; Nagy, Pollack, Rutherford, & Lohrke, 2012; Zott and Huy, 2007), as well as for other employees in organizational settings (Bolino, 1999; Goffman, 1959; Rosenfeld, Giacalone, & Riordan, 1995).

While breaking rules to accomplish innovations is a key concern in ethical entrepreneurship (Brenkert, 2009), literatures on corporate entrepreneurship as well as impression management are silent on how corporate entrepreneurs manage to both break the rules while maintaining positive impressions of themselves to legitimize their actions. While corporate entrepreneurship has mostly offered generalized checklists of corporate entrepreneurs' rule-breaking activities (Augsdorfer, 2005; Jelinek &Schoonhoven, 1990; Kannan-Narasimhan, 2014; Morris, Kuratko, & Covin, 2011; Starr & MacMillan, 1990), and demonstrated that corporate entrepreneurs operate surreptitiously (e.g., Crisculo, Salter, & Ter Wal, 2014; Kannan-Narasimhan 2014), very little prior research has addressed how these surreptitious activities and practices lead to positive impressions for the corporate entrepreneur. Impression management literature fails to adequately focus on how individuals connect their impression management activities with the wider context of their institutions to successfully manage their impressions.

Recent developments in Entrepreneurship-as-Practice (EAP) (Gartner, Stam, Thompson, & Verduyn, 2016; Champenois, Lefebvre & Ronteau, 2019) allow us to effectively explore how corporate entrepreneurs leverage their understanding of their organization's context to create positive impressions on their decision-makers despite breaking the rules, if their innovations warrant rule breaking. EAP is an offshoot of the practice lens (Bourdieu, 1990; Giddens, 1984; Schatzki, 2001; Schatzki, Knorr-Cetina, and Von Savigny, 2001), which recognizes practice as a unit of analysis to explore how individuals' activities and interconnected practices make sense to both corporate entrepreneurs and the observers in the same social context (Feldman & Worline, 2016). The power of practice theory lies in foregrounding action and its relationship to meaning making (Feldman & Orlikowski, 2011; Jarzabkowski & Whittington, 2008; Nicolini, 2012).

I use Goffman's (1959) interpretive practice approach that focuses on the shared understandings of the actors and the practices they use to create and make sense of their context (Rasche & Chia, 2009). Specifically, I focus on his dramaturgical analysis (Goffman, 1959) whose primary focus is the meaning of a performance for the actor and the audience (Feldman, 1995). I draw upon the concepts of frontstage and backstage to understand how entrepreneurs manage impressions. Goffman (1959) defines the 'front' as the site where the individual enacts the performance to define the situation for observers. The 'back' is the site where the performer knowingly contradicts the front-facing performance. Given the contradiction that corporate entrepreneurs face—to engage in unapproved practices for innovating while maintaining positive impressions— the front and back dialectic afforded by dramaturgical analysis sheds light onto how individuals craft strategies to shape decision-makers' impressions about them.

To explore my research question, I selected Silicon Valley's high technology industry — a hotbed of innovation where decision-makers routinely make assessments about entrepreneurs. I use 138 interviews with decision-makers and corporate entrepreneurs, field observations, and archival data to gain a deeper understanding of decision-makers' and corporate entrepreneurs' interpretations. Results indicate that corporate entrepreneurs successfully created positive impressions when they could both resonate with their decision-makers' shared schemata of the innovation's value as well as show that they had successfully overcome the constraints necessary to accomplish the innovation. Schemata are assumptions, mutual understandings, and frames of reference that guide how members of an organization think and act (Feldman, 2004; Howard-Grenville, 2007; Rerup & Feldman, 2011). Schemata enable actors to generate meaningful action within a given organizational setting (Feldman, 2004; Howard-Grenville, 2007). Corporate entrepreneurs enabled their decision-makers to understand that their innovation would create value for the organization, and to accomplish the innovation they must creatively buck rules.

Through dramaturgical realization, corporate entrepreneurs were able to show that their rule breaking was pro-social in nature. In the front stage of dramaturgical realization, they demonstrated that they created external value for their organization through their innovation and had buy-in from internal stakeholders — two aspects that decision-makers valued in innovations. In the backstage they broke the rules and developed materials and social artefacts that enabled them to create idealization in the front stage. Given that both decision-makers and corporate entrepreneurs shared schemata of their organization’s constraints and what constitutes a valuable innovation in their organization’s context, the corporate entrepreneurs were able to capitalize on the dramatic juxtaposition between gaining buy-in for an innovation valued by the organization despite their organization’s constraints to create positive impressions for themselves.

This study’s most important theoretical contribution to ethical corporate entrepreneurship literature and impression management literatures lies in highlighting how corporate entrepreneurs justify rule-breaking behaviors through impression management practices. This study highlights how corporate entrepreneurs manage impressions to demonstrate that their rule breaking, which the literature typically views as a negative behavior (Giacalone & Greenberg, 1997; Puffer, 1987; Robinson & Bennett, 1995; Vardi & Weitz, 2004), is prosocial; ultimately benefiting the organization and should therefore be viewed positively.

The practical contribution of this study is to sensitize entrepreneurs on how to manage positive impressions despite engaging in rule-breaking behaviors. While previous research suggests that corporate entrepreneurs simply break the rules, or ask for forgiveness rather than permission, it does not highlight the practices corporate entrepreneurs use to successfully manage positive impressions of themselves. Highlighting corporate entrepreneurs' dramaturgical practices enables us to offer concrete advice to individuals on how to manage organizational constraints when launching innovations that their organizations are not readily set up to do.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. An overview of corporate entrepreneurs and their rule breaking behaviors is elaborated in Section 2. A summary of the literature on impression management in organizations is offered in Section 3. The study's methodology is provided in Section 4. Data analysis is discussed in Section 5. Key findings are discussed in Section 6. A discussion of the contributions of this study and implications for future research are explained in Section 7. Conclusions from this study are discussed in Section 8.

2. Corporate Entrepreneurs and Rule Breaking Behaviors

Decision-makers in large organizations prefer when their employees follow the rules and incentivize conformist behavior (Jackall, 1988). Managers prefer rules because they guide organizational success and survival with ironclad procedures for navigating unknown complexities; they are themselves trained to follow rules to make the world work. Decision-makers thus not only formulate these rules but are also bound by them (Jackall, 1988). In organizations, rules govern supreme, and the social contexts in which these rules apply are the principal gauges of action for determining whether or not an action is appropriate (Jackall, 1988).

Corporate entrepreneurs, especially those pursuing innovations not already endorsed by the organization, often encounter rules as inhibiting entrepreneurial action. These constraints include product design and strategic constraints, organizational design constraints, and resource allocation constraints (Dougherty & Heller, 1994; Kannan-Narasimhan & Lawrence, 2018; Smith, 2014). To overcome these and pro-actively launch innovations, corporate entrepreneurs are compelled to circumvent rules and engage in unapproved activities like scavenging, tin cupping, bootlegging, finagling, and stealing (Augsdorfer, 2005; Jelinek &Schoonhoven, 1990; Kannan-Narasimhan, 2014; Morris, Kuratko, & Covin, 2011; Starr & MacMillan, 1990). Such rule-breaking activities surely violate organizational policies, and decision-makers will likely not only frown upon individuals engaging in them, but also impose organizational sanctions such as reprimand, termination, write-up, or suspension (Morrison, 2006).

In general, organizational literature views rule breaking as deviant, antisocial, noncompliant, a sign of low commitment to the organization, and even as self-interested advantage-taking of the organization (Giacalone & Greenberg, 1997; Puffer, 1987; Robinson & Bennett, 1995; Vardi & Weitz, 2004). Managers of organizations consider rules in terms of their practical function, they typically consider employees who fail to follow them as aberrantly focusing on personal gain and inflicting harm on the organization (Jackall, 1988; Morrison, 2006). Entrepreneurs pursue their rule-breaking innovation-related activities in secrecy because, in addition to personally adverse outcomes, they fear the project's discontinuation; thus, they try to stay under the radar until they achieve proof of concept (e.g. Kannan-Narasimhan, 2014; Sakhdari & Bidakhavidi, 2016).

Corporate entrepreneurs pursuing an innovation face a multi-pronged challenge: they may have to break organizational rules to accomplish their innovation; they must keep these rule-breaking activities under the radar until they are able to demonstrate their innovation's intrinsic quality; and at the same time they must manage their impressions with decision-makers and other resource providers so they can eventually gain acceptance for their innovations. Neither entrepreneurs nor their innovations can succeed without managing impressions.

2.1 Impression Management in Corporate Entrepreneurship Literature

Despite the importance of impression management for corporate entrepreneurs, very little research in the field of corporate entrepreneurship has looked at how they cultivate positive impressions. Previous research on corporate entrepreneurship has mostly addressed how corporate entrepreneurs manage to gain acceptance for their innovations rather than themselves (Burgelman, 1983; Dougherty & Heller, 1994; Kannan-Narasimhan, 2014; Kannan-Narasimhan & Lawrence, 2018, Van Dijk, Berends, Jelinek, Romme, & Weggeman, 2011). These findings align with research in the larger field of entrepreneurship, which also focuses on impression management for the venture rather than the entrepreneur. Research from this field suggests that entrepreneurs must engage in a variety of impression management practices to gain legitimacy for their ventures with a variety of decision-makers, such as venture capitalists and other stakeholders (Baron & Markman, 2003; Benson, Brau, Cicon, & Ferris, 2015; Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001; Nagy, Pollack, Rutherford, & Lohrke, 2012; Zott & Huy, 2007).

3. Impression management in organizations

Although research on impression management by entrepreneurs in organizations has been sparse, impression management in organizations in general has been widely studied across different organizational levels. These range from impression management by individuals (e.g. Anderson, 1960; Springbett, 1958; Swider, Barrick, Harris & Stoverink, 2011; Waung, McAuslan, DiMambro, & Miegoc, 2017) and teams (e.g. Lewin & Reeves, 2011; Mulvey, Bowes-Sperry &

Klein, 1998) to organization-level impression management (Allen & Caillouet, 1994; Elsbach & Sutton, 1992; Highhouse, Brooks, & Gregarus, 2009; Tata & Prasad, 2015).

Researchers have also studied impression management in several organizational settings, such as employment interviews, supervisor and subordinate relationships, and performance appraisal and feedback-seeking (e.g. Bolino & Turnley, 2003; Wayne & Liden, 1995; Villanova & Bernardin, 1989; Bolino, Kacmar, Turnley, & Gilstrap, 2008; Chen & Fang, 2008; Singh, Kumra, & Vinnicombe, 2002; Swider et al., 2011). While a majority of this stream of research has investigated impression management directed upwards, a parallel stream of research has also investigated how leaders and managers use impression management to influence their subordinates (e.g. Rudman & Phelan, 2010; Sosik, Avolio, & Jung, 2002) and peers (Tsui, Ashford, St Clair, & Xin, 1995). Thus, impression management research has explored several important questions, such as the effectiveness of different types of impression management behaviors, cross-cultural impression management, and how to measure impression management (Bolino, Long, & Turnley, 2016).

A few studies also explicitly consider the context in which impression management is accomplished. Although a majority of impression management studies do not explicitly consider the context, this is an important perspective, because interactions to manage impressions occur between layers of context from the institutional to the localized level (Jarzabkowski, 2005). Exploring the broad social situation that provides institutionally embedded codes of conduct and micro interpretations of the situation is key to constructing impression management within organizations (Jarzabkowski, 2005).

Some studies focus on the context-specificity of impression management practices and use concepts from Goffman (1959) but not in the context of corporate entrepreneurship. For example, Golden-Biddle and Rao (1997) discuss how an organization's identity influenced the construction and enactment of roles by the board of directors and how the board managed impressions of their role with other directors and managers. Similarly, Collinson (1999) discusses how workers' perceptions that they are disposable or will be blamed encourages them to conceal their practices, which runs counter to the safety culture of the organization. Moeran (2005) discusses how authenticity in the context of cultural reproduction is important for the interpretation of cultural stereotypes. In a more recent study, Solomon, Solomon, Norton, & Joseph (2011), show that investors and investees employ Goffman's impression management techniques in their private meetings for managing social and environmental accountability as a front stage performance rather than as a genuine mechanism for addressing social and environmental concerns.

Thus, a review of previous research on corporate entrepreneurship and impression management suggests that this literature has two main gaps. First, although it is a key activity for corporate entrepreneurs, previous research has not addressed how corporate entrepreneurs manage positive self-impressions in general or when breaking organizational rules. Furthermore, generic impressions of rule-breaking behavior by corporate entrepreneurs are negative. Corporate entrepreneurs are usually seen as adopting questionable behavior, such as padding an expense account or using a copyrighted computer program (Brenkert, 2009; Hannafey, 2003; Longenecker, McKinney, & Moore, 1988) to accomplish their innovations. This does not positively contribute to their impression management. Secondly, given that impression management is carried out by individuals in a given social context, understanding the practices that enable entrepreneurs to be successful in a given context is important. Thus, focusing the situatedness of impression management in the context of corporate entrepreneurship helps us understand how activities at the localized level interact with the institutional level to manage meanings for observers (Jarzabkowski, 2005). However current theory does not explain how entrepreneurs or corporate entrepreneurs manage impressions in a situated context.

3.1 Entrepreneurship as Practice, Goffman, and Impression management

The Entrepreneurship as Practice (EAP) perspective, which is an offshoot of the practice perspective, focuses on viewing entrepreneurship practices as socially situated, for which entrepreneurship professionals use specific tools and skills (Gartner, Stam, Thompson, & Verduyn, 2016). Practice theory asserts that practices are fundamental to the reproduction of social reality (Feldman & Orlikowski, 2011). Goffman's practice lens de-emphasizes the subject and moves away from subject-centered explanations to material social practices that enable actors to produce acts of meaning (Rasche & Chia, 2009; Schutz, 1967). Adopting the practice perspective offers a theoretical lens to delineate individuals' micro actions (Jarzabkowski, Balogun, & Seidl, 2007) by simultaneously considering how prevailing practices in the field enable or constrain such action (Feldman & Orlikowski, 2011; Golsorkhi, Rouleau, Seidl, & Vaara, 2010; Vaara & Whittington, 2012). This lens provides us a unique perspective to understand how individuals leverage social practices to convey meaning to others.

Goffman's dramaturgical analysis focuses on how human beings accomplish meaning in their lives (Edgley, 2003). The key assumption of dramaturgical analysis is that performances have meaning for observers (Feldman, 2004). Drawing on Mead's (1934) symbolic interactionism as well as Kenneth Burke's dramatism (Edgley, 2003), Goffman suggests that meaning arises out of a behavioral consensus between human beings and elaborates on how the subject produces meaning through material social practices (Rasche & Chia, 2009).

Dramaturgical framework aims to identify how individuals express themselves to and in conjunction with their audiences to create meaning (Gardner & Avolio, 1998).

Performances are embedded, or situated, in a social setting and can be directly observed by audiences through the behavior of actors and not a value, belief, or an attitude (Manning, 2008) that has to be indirectly inferred. Thus, meaning is conceived as a behavioral act rather than a cognitive process (Mead, 1934; Edgley, 2003). Dramaturgical analysis focuses on linking action to its sense rather than behavior to its determinants (Geertz, 1983). Meaning is socially emergent and is continually accomplished and established by the process of continually acting and interacting with others (Edgley, 2003). The meanings the actor produces for the observers or audiences is enabled by their organization's interpretive schemata (Feldman, 2004; Howard-Grenville, 2007; Rerup & Feldman, 2011). By engaging in behaviors that enact recipient schemata to create shared understandings, innovators can effectively manage their self-impressions with their observers or decision-makers.

To understand how people create, maintain, transform, or destroy common understandings of reality (Kivisto & Pittman, 2008), dramaturgical analysis includes five key terms or generating principles: a) the act, or what is being done in thought or deed; b) the scene that includes the background of the act and the situation; c) the agent or the person performing the act; d) the agency or how the act was carried out (its instrumentation or means); and e) the purpose or why the act was done (Edgley, 2003).

Of specific interest to this study from Goffman's dramaturgical analysis is the distinction between front and back stages. The social front displayed by the performer gives rise to abstract socialized expectations that are institutionalized in a given context (Goffman, 1959). These expectations take on meaning and stability apart from the specific tasks performed in the name of expectations. When taking on a role in the front (here it is that of a corporate entrepreneur) an actor has to choose a particular front that is established for it (Goffman, 1959); in this case the appropriate front for displaying the innovation. While Goffman's (1959) initial conceptualization of front and back stages included physical spaces where people can physically see each other, later researchers (e.g. Meyrowitz, 1985; Ringel, 2019) offer a more expansive understanding of front and back stages. Given the advances in communication technology, they define the front as not only includes physical spaces, but as communication spaces in which a performance is enacted. Thus emails, online chatting, other social media include social situations where the performance is continually enacted over time rather than a physical performance at a given point in time. Thus, the front stage is defined as communication spaces that reflect institutionalized norms of appropriateness where actors present performances to observers, for whom meaning is created (Ringel, 2019). The back is where actors prepare for such appearances (Ringel, 2019). As with physical spaces, observers are not privy to activities and communication in the backstage.

While a comprehensive literature review of Goffman is beyond the scope of this study, a review of the corporate entrepreneurship literature and dramaturgical literature suggests that impression management among corporate entrepreneurs in their organization's context, although critical for their success, has been largely overlooked in corporate entrepreneurship literature. Furthermore, although Goffman's dramaturgical framework—a powerful framework for understanding impression management—has been used to understand several phenomena relating to impression management in different settings (e.g. Allen & Caillouet, 1994; Collinson, 1999; Golden-Biddle & Rao, 1997; Moeran, 2005, 2009; Ringel, 2019), it has not been studied in the context of entrepreneurship. In this study I attempt to fill this gap by exploring the impression management by entrepreneurs in the context of corporate entrepreneurship.

4. Methods

I use data collected from a sample of decision-makers and corporate entrepreneurs primarily within Silicon Valley's high technology industry in the information technology and computing sector. I restricted my sample to this sector because Silicon Valley is a hotbed of innovation (e.g., Hamel, 1998; Saxenian, 1991), where we are likely to find individuals who behave as entrepreneurs in their organizations. Furthermore, focusing on a single sector enables the comparison of innovators' impression management practices (Hallen & Eisenhardt, 2012).

To access these organizations, I contacted our university's entrepreneurship center, which had contacts with alumni in Silicon Valley companies. I also used personal contacts to identify senior managers who would identity the corporate entrepreneurs within their organizations. I used snowball sampling, or the chain referral sampling method. Since corporate entrepreneurs are a hidden population, this is an appropriate method to identify them. I followed the standard methodology used by previous researchers of peer identification in identifying the hidden population of innovators in large companies (e.g. Bankins, Denness, Kriz & Molloy, 2017; Hornsby, Naffziger, Kuratko & Montagno, 1993; Howell & Higgins, 1990; Markham, 1998).

I chose a range of large organizations, including young and old firms in the areas of integrated circuit and consumer electronics manufacturing, software service providers, internet search organizations, and database firms. I approached many firms, such as Hewlett-Packard (HP), Cisco, International Business Machines (IBM), Intel, Google, and Oracle.

When I approached individuals in these firms, I identified myself as a researcher who was keen to understand how corporate entrepreneurs succeed in large organizations. To establish rapport with participants, I discussed my work experience in Silicon Valley prior to my academic career and indicated that I have seen several good ideas fail in established organizations. I also mentioned that the purpose of this study was to learn from them. My aim was to clarify that I was not there to judge them or their methods, but to learn from them. I assured them about data confidentiality and their anonymity in published research. In exchange for their time and a candid discussion, I promised a copy of the final report and other publications from the study so that they can learn and compare the process of entrepreneurship in different companies.

I was successful in gaining access to 14 firms, ranging in age from 12 to 114 years and with annual revenues at the beginning of this study ranging from approximately $1.34 billion to $118 billion. These firms have an employee base ranging from 13,000 to 170,000. The names of firms that provided access are not disclosed due to confidentiality and intellectual property agreements. Each interview quote in this study is credited to a subject's pseudonym and fictitious organizational affiliation.

I conducted interviews with 72 individuals. Of these, 34 were decision-makers who were asked to identify others whom they considered as corporate entrepreneurs. The other 38 were individuals identified as corporate entrepreneurs. Decision-makers were on an average 43 years old with 18 years of total work experience (range = 5–32 years). They had an average tenure of 12 years in their current organization (range = 3 months to 30 years), and their titles ranged from vice president, director, general manager, distinguished engineer, fellow, senior engineer, and engineering manager. The majority of decision-makers, about 70%, held a master's degree. Of the 34 individuals only three held a bachelor's degree. The remaining held advanced degrees beyond master's, such as a doctorate degree, including some post-doctoral work. Only 6 of the 34 decision-makers, or about 18%, identified themselves as female, while the other 28 decision-makers identified themselves as male.

Corporate entrepreneurs were on an average 44 years old, with 20 years of total work experience (range = 4–38 years). They had an average tenure of 15 years (range = 1.5–32 years) in the current organization and held titles such as general manager, senior vice president, CEO (of a new successful venture), fellow, vice president, director, senior engineer, and engineering manager. The educational qualifications of corporate entrepreneurs ranged from an associate's Degree to advanced doctoral degree. About 57% of the corporate entrepreneurs had earned master's degrees, while one quarter held bachelor's degree. Six of the 38 corporate entrepreneurs held advanced doctorate degree while one had an associate degree. Of the 38 entrepreneurs identified, only 5 corporate entrepreneurs, or 13%, identified themselves as female. The other corporate entrepreneurs identified themselves as male. As someone who would like to see more female managers and entrepreneurs in Silicon Valley, given their low representation in these companies (Howard, 2017, para. 1), I was discouraged by this disproportionate identification of women as decision-makers and corporate entrepreneurs. However, given that my research question for this study was not gender-specific, I continued my study to understand the individuals who decision-makers spontaneously identified as corporate entrepreneurs. I did not choose to influence the research question or design at this stage by identifying female decision-makers or asking decision-makers to specifically identify female corporate entrepreneurs who successfully managed their impressions.

I interviewed each individual twice through a series of semi-structured questions. When I met with decision-makers I asked them what they understood by the term 'corporate entrepreneur' or 'intrapreneur,' followed by the question: "Can you give me an example of someone in your organization who you would consider as a corporate entrepreneur?". Given that some decision-makers were familiar with the term 'intrapreneur,' while others were familiar with 'corporate entrepreneur' or 'innovator,' I used these terms interchangeably in my interviews and notes. Decision-makers identified a range of employees within their organizations, which included individuals that reported to them as well as their peers.

I then interviewed the identified corporate entrepreneurs. Before the interviews, I acknowledged to corporate entrepreneurs that based on my experience I knew that launching innovations that do not readily fit the organization is no easy feat that sometimes involves bending or breaking rules. The purpose of this was to ensure that they felt comfortable in sharing these details with me. I then congratulated them on creating a positive impression on their decision-maker, since a decision-maker in the organization had chosen them as an exemplar of a successful corporate entrepreneur. I segued into the interview by asking corporate entrepreneurs to comment on why they thought that a decision-maker in their organization recognized them as such. In subsequent questions, I asked corporate entrepreneurs to elaborate on the innovation that the decision-makers had mentioned, discuss the challenges they faced with it, and explain how they overcame these challenges. I also asked them to discuss their organization's environment, its challenges, how they navigated them, and the support they received for their innovation.

By asking both decision-makers and corporate entrepreneurs to comment on the same set of events, I was able to corroborate their stories and reduce the risk of ex-post rationalization (Vuori & Huy, 2016). I asked for concrete examples that not only supported their stories, but also enabled respondents to rely on episodic memories. Relying on episodic memories enabled respondents to recall more comprehensive accounts, increasing recall accuracy as they described what they did in the past as well as how they felt (Tulving, 2002; Vuori & Huy, 2016). This helped ensure data trustworthiness.

I interviewed each manager and corporate entrepreneur twice. The first interview helped to build rapport with the participant, while the second interview provided an opportunity to clarify issues. Qualitative researchers suggest that second interviews help researchers assess the accuracy of their inferences from their first interview (Charmaz, 2003). The questions in subsequent interviews were refined based on findings from the previous interview (Corbin & Strauss, 2008). Interviews were taped with permission and transcribed. I conducted 138 interviews. Of these, 34 were first interviews with decision-makers and 38 were first interviews with corporate entrepreneurs. The remaining 66 were second interviews. The average interview time was 60 minutes and the transcription documents comprise over 3,000 pages.

As I interviewed innovators and decision-makers, I also collected documents from multiple archival sources. Archival documents included: organizations' websites; their mission statements, values, and current initiatives; media reports on the organization, including trade journals, blogs written about the innovation by corporate entrepreneurs and other individuals; and presentations made by corporate entrepreneurs to launch their innovations. This exercise provided me an opportunity to understand the corporate entrepreneurs and decision-makers' organizational context. Most of the interviews were conducted onsite, which gave me the opportunity to observe the organization and take extensive field notes.

5. Data Analysis

I began data analysis after collecting the first set of data (Corbin & Strauss, 2008), using the methods described by Gioia, Corley, & Hamilton (2012). I used Nvivo; a qualitative software management program for maintaining and coding data. In the initial stages, I used an open-ended approach for coding. The initial codes covered several categories, such as constraints entrepreneurs faced, strategies the entrepreneur employed to navigate those constraints, and the value created by the corporate entrepreneur for the organization. In qualitative coding each text segment could potentially fit in multiple categories. Therefore, following previous researchers, when coding, I checked carefully to identify the main idea that was being conveyed and assigned a single code for each text segment (Creswell, 2016; Elliott, 2018; Miles, Huberman, & Saldaña, 2014). In the next step, I used axial coding (Corbin & Strauss, 2008) and looked for relationships among and between these first-order categories to arrive at second-order themes (Corley & Gioia, 2004; Gioia & Thomas, 1996; Van Maanen, 1979). In the next step, I focused on finding aggregate dimensions based on these first- and second-order categories.

Even in the initial stages of data analysis, I found that the corporate entrepreneurs expressed significant frustrations about navigating organizational constraints to launch their innovation and the need to stay backstage until they could find some traction. For example, Bob, a corporate entrepreneur, described it as:

> "breaking the rules and finding a way to get things done. … [Just] having the ideas, in my experience, isn't worth a lot. Because I've had lots and lots of ideas that have gone nowhere ….but the important thing is that you don't give up and you keep trying and eventually some of your seeds start to grow and good things get done."

This led me to code as new themes in the data on what corporate entrepreneurs demonstrated to decision-makers versus their practices behind-the-scenes. At this stage, I also used numerous memos to develop potential theoretical insights. When iterating between coding, data, and theory, my theorizing consisted of three main themes: the types of organizational constraints experienced by corporate entrepreneurs and the resulting frustrations; the practices innovators used for instantiating the innovation while keeping it under the organizational radar; and the reasons why decision-makers recognized some individuals as corporate entrepreneurs.

The power of dramaturgical analysis as a potential theoretical lens was made evident to me during one of my visits to Helion's printing factory. During the field observation, I was touring the printing lab with Jared, one of my corporate entrepreneurs. Jared was a part of Glen's team, and both Glen and Jared were identified as corporate entrepreneurs by Helion decision-makers. While we were touring the shop floor, Jared discussed an innovation: a large printing machine valued at about $2 million. Jared asked me to stop at a particular spot and then turn around. I was startled to find a massive printing press directly behind me, hidden among other machines and equipment. I was startled! When I asked Jared to reiterate the details of how this was accomplished, he explained that the massive amount of work done in the shop was all under the radar. Having succeeded in keeping his innovation hidden, senior decision-makers at Helion were similarly surprised when Glen's team revealed the giant printing press hidden in plain sight. I asked Glen if this method of introducing the printing press and startling observers was deliberate. Glen responded:

> "Very, very deliberate. … I remember one day, we were having a review with [a senior decision-maker and Glen's supervisor] and then a tour of the lab … and we had saved this one as a surprise for him …. [H]e had, year and a half prior to that, told us 'stop all work, get out of this,' so I didn't want to tell him about it … And so, instead of spending the year and a half arguing about why we should try it again, I spent a year and a half showing what we could do. And when we showed what we could do and how far we'd already taken it, he was incredibly pleased and it really moved quickly from that point on."

When I asked Glen how it was possible that no one ever knew that this huge printing press existed, Glen responded that given that most people are not observant, and it was a big factory floor, even something that large could be undetected for long periods of time.

Until this moment, based on findings from previous literatures I coded these 'under the radar' and 'rule-breaking' practices of entrepreneurs as routes to gaining resources. From Jeff and Glen, I learned that innovators used their behind-the-scenes practices not only to gain resources or keep the innovation from being shut down by decision-makers, but for another reason—they wanted to create a dramatic effect about the innovation to their decision-makers, because it would have a persuasive effect. Although I did not begin the study with dramaturgical analysis as a pre-established theoretical lens, this event clarified its importance in how corporate entrepreneurs managed impressions. This event, combined with numerous backstage and frontstage practices, highlighted dramaturgical realization as a key aspect of impression management. At this stage, I returned to Goffman's (1959) dramaturgical analysis and started viewing corporate entrepreneurship as a performance. I refined my coding procedures according to my evolving understanding in the field and carefully started discerning the practices that corporate entrepreneurs carried out under the radar and the practices through which they brought forth innovations. I continued open coding to various practices, but also clustered the first order concepts into second order themes.

In the next stage, I used a method similar to constant comparison to identify concepts and generate the category's theoretical properties. I noted patterns and variations in data (Corbin & Strauss, 2008). For example, I found during interviews that decision-makers across organizations consistently referred to certain organizational aspects to determine whether the innovation created external value. These included revenue and market share. In determining whether the innovation added internal value, decision-makers looked at aspects of cost and productivity. The coding for the category of value was completed and theoretical saturation (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Guest, Bunce, & Johnson, 2006) was reached when no new schemata emerged to describe value creation for the organizations. I applied the same procedure to all of the other concepts that emerged during data analysis. This iterative process resulted in the data structure used for this study (see Figure 1).

Insert Figure 1 here

In Table 1, I provide representative quotes that correspond to the data structure in Figure 1.

Insert Table 1 here

At this stage, to ensure data validity and trustworthiness (Corley & Gioia, 2004; Shah & Corley, 2006), I used steps suggested by Lincoln and Guba (1985). I also used peer and expert debriefing to discuss my theoretical model and its relationships. During my second interviews with the innovators and decision-makers, I presented my emerging findings to find out if my understanding of their schemata was accurate. I also leveraged my contacts who worked in the information and technology industry but were not formally a part of my study to assess whether my understanding of the organizations was correct.

6. Findings

The key finding from this study was that successful corporate entrepreneurs used practices of dramaturgical realization (Goffman, 1959) to create positive impressions of themselves with decision-makers by demonstrating that although they broke organizational rules to accomplish their innovations, their rule breaking was pro-social in nature and inevitable for creating value for the organization. Corporate entrepreneurs tapped into two specific schemata to create this meaning for their decision-makers: that the innovations they proposed had internal or external value; and that, given their organization's constraints, they had no choice but to break rules. Through dramaturgical practices corporate innovators demonstrated that their innovation was valuable as well as had buy-in from other stakeholders. Decision-makers were able to juxtapose these accomplishments by innovators against the backdrop of their organization's constraints to determine that their rule breaking was prosocial.

6.1 Perceptions of Organizational Constraints

Both innovators and decision-makers held shared schemata of organizational constraints on what inhibited successful realization of the innovation. The schemata of organizational constraints identified by decision-makers and corporate entrepreneurs fell into three categories as identified by previous literature: product design constraints, organizational design constraints, and resource allocation constraints (e.g. Dougherty & Heller, 1994; Kannan-Narasimhan, 2014; Kannan-Narasimhan & Lawrence, 2018; Smith, 2014). To overcome these constraints and pursue their innovations, corporate entrepreneurs had to engage in rule breaking.

Product Design Constraints

Product design constraints typically related to products, target markets, or the organization's overall strategy, including issues relating to the innovation's lack of fit with the organization's existing strategy, technology, and product markets (Dougherty & Heller, 1994; Kannan-Narasimhan & Lawrence, 2018; Smith, 2014). For example, Vish, a decision-maker at Yeti, highlighted an innovation's misfit with the organization's overall strategy:

> "You cannot come up with an idea or a new idea which is completely different from what the corporation might be doing and expect that the corporation might actually support that … Because when you are part of an organization, you're trying to align yourself to the vision or the view of the company as a whole … otherwise, you could have 10 different people coming up with 10 different ideas and you're actually evaluating the effort of the goals of the company. You won't be focused, right?"

Dan, a corporate entrepreneur at IXI indicated issues that stem from a lack of market fit:

> "You have this technological advantage. Now how do you take this technological advantage and turn it into a product? … it had to fit in with an existing set of customers who could use it for a specific purpose [and be] broad enough to be commercially viable or valuable to them."

Organizational Design Constraints

Organizational design constraints related to whether it was possible to execute the innovation within the organization's current structure as well within the accepted procedures and processes of the organization. Anup, a senior decision-maker at Infieon, highlighted this constraint:

> "[T]here's a particular way an organization runs. And there are processes and methods and policies … in that laid-out manner, there are certain things that you can or cannot do. Now, some of those are defined by the legality constraints or the laws of the land and the stated strategic objective of the company, the core value system, and so on."

Jared, a corporate entrepreneur at Helion, reported his challenges with one of the current innovations he was proposing that conflicted with his organization's procurement system. He mentioned how with the existing systems of procurement it was difficult to get the exact materials needed to build the product.

> "But it's never in the way they want… we've built a prototype and someone's looking at it saying, 'Well, this is the type of steel I would use.' Or, 'I can't procure this,' 'You got a completely different system here.' "

Resource Allocation Constraints

Resource allocation constraints faced by the corporate entrepreneur primarily stemmed from two different but interrelated issues. The first was the organization's challenge in reallocating resources, because as Gerard, a decision-maker at Yeti, points out, a disruptive project "takes resources away from existing projects." The second challenge was the organization's wisdom in infusing resources into an untested innovation. When I asked corporate entrepreneur at Yeti, Sandra, if she was able to access the necessary resources from her organization to launch her innovation, she responded:

> "No, I didn't, but they had to find the resources…. They were concerned initially since it's never been done. What's the level of effort associated with it, right? So even though you put a hypothetical model together, since it's never been done at this scale, there was a concern that we hadn't validated everything … because when you simulate, you make a lot of assumptions that may or may not pan out."

6.2 Dramaturgical Realization

Dramaturgical practices of successful entrepreneurs fell into two distinct categories: backstage practices and frontstage practices. Backstage practices were typically under-the-radar, involving rule-breaking behaviors that enabled corporate entrepreneurs to create material and social artefacts that could appeal to decision-makers' schemata of value in their organization. The three specific backstage practices that corporate entrepreneurs focused on were: breaking the rules, creating material and social artefacts, and maintaining expressive control. When creating material and social artefacts, corporate entrepreneurs, used expressive control to ensure that they did not prematurely reveal unintended cues to the decision-makers that would interfere with their frontstage performance of the innovation.

Backstage Practices: Breaking the Rules

To pursue their innovations in a timely manner, innovators had to break organizational procedures. As I show in the example of Jared, innovators broke rules—sometimes hidden in plain sight, some constituting blatant violations, and some a mere slip through the cracks. Ken, a corporate entrepreneur at Helion, required a large room to test his innovation. The normal process of contacting facilities and requesting approval would have taken at least two months, and Ken needed to move fast to impress a customer who was interested in the prototype. So, unknown to his decision-makers, Ken broke into an unused conference room:

> "[W]e came in at eight o'clock at night, took … an old video conferencing room … that nobody ever used. It was storing boxes and took a bunch of saws in there. Just cut it all out and threw it away and then started [re-]building the room, and by the time they figured out what we were doing, it was too late."

Another corporate entrepreneur at IXI, Tony who was a Senior Software Engineer discussed a subtler form of rule breaking: he slipped his prototypes for his innovation into other deliverables that his team is working on without telling his decision-makers. As he described:

> "What I try to do is … align the deliverable. … I don't say I'm building a prototype per se. I say I'm building some additional function to enhance and then that becomes an offshoot eventually. … [Basically,] I'm stealing resources … so nobody has to know about it …[while] building what the company says we're building. … those [hidden elements] then become a feature that would then become official in the next release."

Like Tony, corporate entrepreneurs broke the rules to create material and social artefacts that would eventually help in demonstrating the value of innovation to their decision-makers.

Backstage Practices: Creating Material and Social Artefacts

The purpose of creating these artefacts was to tap into their decision-makers' shared understandings or schemata to help them understand their innovation. Corporate entrepreneurs created artefacts that mediated the decision-makers' understandings regarding organizational constraints, proposed innovations, and the innovators' actions (Miettinen & Virkkunen, 2005). Depending on the innovation, these artefacts were either material, social, or both and represented new open-ended conceptions and solutions that enabled decision-makers to interpret the proposed innovations. Innovators used the artefacts to capture the organization's schemata about their innovation in a tangible format (Miettinen & Virkkunen, 2005).

While material artefacts aimed to demonstrate the technical feasibility of the project, social artefacts highlighted key stakeholder support. For example, to show the technical feasibility of his prototype, Arthur from Animation sought informal support from co-workers before bringing it to the attention of managers. This not only helped with the technical building of the prototype, but also helped Arthur show the social artefact of support for his innovation. Arthur said:

> "I went off and started prototyping … [and] part of solving the task required talking to people and asking some questions. … you find people that you can convince to help you out. You need to get a lot of buy-in first from others."

In contrast, Bob, a Senior Technical Staff Member at IXI , worked on the prototype (a material artefact) on his own, but emphasized the importance of showing stakeholder support (a social artefact). He emphasized that he gained buy-in for his innovation to his managers:

> "I love doing the impossible. … I go off in the corner, and … I coded by myself. It was a fair amount of code but I designed it, I coded it, I tested, I delivered it."

David, a senior software engineer from Animation, similarly described how he first makes progress on an innovation and creates artefacts that appeal to his decision-makers:

> "I try to get it going. After I have it going, then I'll tell people about it."

Why did innovators want to wait before telling their decision-makers about the material and social artefacts that they were creating?

Backstage Practices: Maintaining Expressive Control

When trying to manage audiences' impressions, innovators manage cues about themselves and their innovation. Innovators did not want to convey any cues about their innovation that devalued it or contradicted its importance, or that would raise doubts about their judgment in pursuing it. To avoid premature scrutiny, innovators decided to maintain expressive control until the material and social artefacts were ready to share with their decision-makers.

These actions are in line with dramaturgical theory (Goffman, 1959), which suggests that innovators will try to maintain an appearance so that these unintended cues are not made prematurely visible to decision-makers. Even if these cues are visible, they should either convey no impression or convey an impression consistent with the definition they are trying to portray for their innovation. Just as a single off-key note can disrupt an entire musical performance (Goffman, 1959), a single discordant event could interfere with an innovation's success. Thus, innovators are careful about the information revealed about their innovation. Paul, a corporate entrepreneur from Helion, stated how when innovators have little support they have to operate "under the radar screen…because, the more people that know, the more antibodies that will come up."

Previous research has primarily highlighted this phase of corporate entrepreneurship as product championing and resource mobilization (e.g., Burgelman, 1983; Jelinek & Schoonhoven, 1990; Kannan-Narasimhan, 2014), entailing gaining resources without the knowledge of decision-makers. However, a key aspect of this stage has been overlooked: that the maintenance of expressive control is important for corporate entrepreneurs not only to gain resources, but also to manage perceptions — to ensure that anything that might be blameworthy or interfere with the idealized performance (Goffman, 1959) in the front stage is hidden from decision-makers.

Frontstage Practices

In the front stage, corporate entrepreneurs focused on idealization — that is, on delivering a performance molded to fit the understandings and expectations of the society to which it is presented (Goffman, 1959). Innovators' focus in the front stage is to impress decision-makers by showing how their innovation exemplifies what their organization values through new possibilities. While earlier they were somewhat reluctant to disclose all practices related to their innovation to avoid presenting unintended or premature cues, when bringing their innovation from the background to the foreground they were ready to show decision-makers their innovation's value through an idealized performance. During the idealized performance, corporate entrepreneurs' practices focused on highlighting their innovations' external accomplishments as well as internal buy-in. External accomplishments included accolades received or customers that were interested in the innovation. Innovators also demonstrated to their decision-makers that several key internal stakeholders also supported their innovation. As Dima, a corporate entrepreneur from AMX, put it:

> "[W]e don't bring uncooked food to the table…I'd rather prefer to do my homework, invest my extra time and efforts and make sure that even if it's a little bit of food, it's done. So [that] somebody who will judge it, or judge the future of this product, will have time to get a right impression of it."

Frontstage Practices: External Validation

Corporate entrepreneurs' frontstage practices were aimed at demonstrating their innovation's accomplishments through external validation. This included validation for the innovation at conferences and external stakeholders such as customers who were willing to buy the product. External validation showed decision-makers that the innovation had legitimacy outside their organization. Sai, an innovator from ORC, highlighted to his decision-makers that his presentations at conferences were well-attended, thereby indicating that his idea was intriguing.

> "[W]hen I presented at a conference in Beijing, it was attended by 400 people, so… I mean like, in another conference last week I presented to 300 people. It is a big conference, and it is a privilege for anybody, a student, PhD, etc., to get their paper accepted…. So it's that big a deal."

Similarly, Rich, an innovator from Helion, produced a product and sold it to customers; he describes the day the customer sent a check to Helion for their purchase:

> "[T]hey didn't know how to pay us so they actually sent a personal check to Helion, care of me … So I got this check in the mail and I walked over to our controller and I said, 'Hey isn't this great? We got our first check!' And he just about died."

Frontstage Practices: Internal Buy-In

In addition to external legitimacy, the frontstage practices of innovators also focused on showing that their innovations had buy-in from key internal stakeholders using the social artefacts that they had created in the backstage. Decision-makers in organizations paid attention to whether or not innovators accomplished internal buy-in such as people from other departments, decision-makers, employees, and stakeholders in the firm, in addition to external validation. For example, Swapan, Director of High Technology and Marketing Solutions at ORC, when identifying an intrapreneur in his organization stated:

> "he also developed a prototype and convinced the group [to develop it,] and so I think most of the intrapreneurs in the different groups, they are actually successful when they have the idea. Also, they are trying to work outside their boundary, [they] develop something, and then bring it and sell it to the group of people."

Arnab, a Senior Director at another organization Yeti echoed similar sentiments about his corporate entrepreneur:

> "[He] had to sell the entire management line, he had to go over the resources, he had to basically work with everyone from user experience development all the way back to operations. We are the core engineering team and we tend to focus on back-end stuff. We tend not to focus on user experience and other things. But this guy reached outside of his organization and worked all the way across Yeti. He even went and sold it to the CEO and got his support so that was a phenomenal job."

6.3 Prosocial Rule Breaking: Positive Impressions of Corporate Entrepreneurs

Decision-makers in this study thought of corporate entrepreneurs as engaged in prosocial rule breaking, when the latter were able to demonstrate to their decision-makers that they had violated their organization's policies and procedures with the primary intention of benefiting the organization by accomplishing a valuable innovation.

Schemata That Show Value Creation: Innovations That Create External Value

In some organizations, such as Helion, decision-makers only seemed to consider as valuable and indicative of corporate entrepreneurship those innovations that generated significant revenues. For example, Helion decision-makers emphasized presenting an innovation that would generate substantial revenues. Frank, a director at Helion, reiterated the company's emphasis on emphasizing a vision with substantial market potential:

> "Helion has $110 billion in revenue … that makes you a Fortune 100 company. When you have ideas that are only $50 million-dollar ideas—it takes several of those to have a material impact on the top line or the bottom line … more people have left Helion to go start their own businesses because they had an idea that could generate $10 million a

> year, but for Helion, it wasn't a big enough business to be interested in."

At Infieon, too, decision-makers considered the transformational impact of the innovation on revenues or costs when identifying corporate entrepreneurs. Pranav, a senior decision-maker at Infieon, said:

> "Anybody who does any new initiative within a large company with an established business is an entrepreneur. What we're trying to do is really create that value. And value for both the customer as well as for the stakeholder. And you really create value by either trying to increase revenue for both your clients as well as for yourself or you're controlling costs. So you know, initiatives have to fall very clearly under one of these umbrellas."

Given Infieon's context, where only transformational initiatives were considered of value, several decision-makers identified Gary, who had built a new solutions business as a corporate entrepreneur. Anup, a senior manager at Infieon, brought up Gary as an example of his definition of corporate entrepreneurs as:

> "those who take transformational initiative within an organization. And discusses with a bunch of people and validates the thought process…. So Gary is one example ... He came up with an idea … created a business plan … we did launch a new service and he is running it."

Schemata That Show Value Creation: Innovations That Create Internal Value

In contrast, in organizations such as GIX and Infieon, senior decision-makers considered everything from revenue generation to cost reductions to improvements in employee morale as innovations that created internal value. At GIX, value creation comprised anything that enhanced the search experience for users. A technical review blog of GIX stated that GIX was able to build a dedicated audience on the web by focusing on internet users and by emphasizing the interests of the user as it first priority. To create positive impressions at GIX, the key was finding innovations that added value to users. Another decision-maker at GIX, Jeff, reiterated that a variety of ideas could be considered corporate entrepreneurship, such as “launching a new product, launching a new feature, or implementing some sort of idea that they originated.”

At GIX, in contrast to Infieon and Helion, value added activities included improvements in support staff functions that contributed to the bottom line. As Migal, a decision-maker at GIX, described:

> You know you can be corporate entrepreneurial in HR…. But if you can make people happier, like organizing activities [or] change the way that we recruit people…Or it could increase morale, which would increase productivity. … I don’t think that boils down to dollars and cents.

Beena, at GIX, explained why her innovation added internal value to GIX:

> “[T]he idea was to figure out tools and systems to fight spam and abuse across our various apps… the idea was to try and come up with a platform that provided a set of tools across various dimensions for all our applications. … I don’t think it has to be tied to revenue or cost. I think it just has to be an interesting, different, new way to do something. Something that adds value to users.”

Schemata That Rule Breaking is Unavoidable: Pursuing Unexpected Opportunities

Apart from discerning the value that an innovation created for the organization, decision-makers also paid attention to how corporate entrepreneurs upended decision-makers' previously held assumptions of what was possible in their organization's context. Decision-makers realized that these unexpected opportunities were new to the organization and the organization did not have established procedures to follow them. Decision-makers were aware of the product design, organizational design, and resource allocation constraints in their organization; showing validation for an innovation at the appropriate time enabled decision-makers to consider the innovation against the backdrop of their organization's complex context. They seemed surprised that the innovators could accomplish the unexpected by bucking their organization's constraints.

Decision-makers formed positive impressions of individuals who were able to create unexpected value for their organization. For example, Giri a technical manager at Yeti identified a corporate entrepreneur who managed to launch something in just three months to pursue an unexpected opportunity, when it typically took six to nine months in their organization's context:

> "[A]ll of the pieces needed to actually get it on to market—so, he has to fire on all cylinders to be able to achieve that goal. And that's why I view this guy very highly. Because he managed to get it done in a very complex web-like environment in Yeti."

Rich, a corporate entrepreneur at Helion, challenged preconceived notions of how long it should take to execute a given product. He discussed his innovation and elaborated on how he brought it forward to his decision-maker:

> "[W]e just really spent time with [the customer] and showed him the detailed information that he needed to see and then he was compelled … he actually said, 'No, I'll pay full price for the first time and if it doesn't work then I'd ask you to you know make sure you did it right.' But the first time came out.… I think we quoted him about 20 days cycle time and … they were getting from Xix [a competitor] something around 90 days …We

quoted him 20 days and I think we had the wafer lying in his hands in about 14 days."

Schemata That Rule Breaking is Unavoidable: The Necessity to Creatively Buck Organizational Constraints

Decision-makers also assessed if corporate entrepreneurs could successfully push through their organization's barriers to make successful positive impressions. I asked Rich (Helion) why he his decision-makers had positive impressions of him and he said it was because he was known as someone who could successfully overcome barriers.

> "You know mostly, mostly starting up new businesses or emerging technologies … I've been pushing against the barriers … Very flat forehead at this point I think [laughs]."

Ted, a Vice President at HIX, a decision-maker stated that "someone who's able to fight through the barriers and find the time and the energy and the creativity to resolve a problem … would certainly be … very favorably looked upon." Decision-makers picked up on cues about whether or not corporate entrepreneurs could push through their organization's barriers, and thereby judged the effectiveness through which corporate entrepreneurs succeeded in bucking their organization's constraints.

7. Discussion

The main research question that I set out to address in this research study is: what are the practices that corporate entrepreneurs engage in to create positive impressions for themselves with their decision-makers while engaging in rule-breaking behaviors when accomplishing their innovations? This study's most important contribution to ethical entrepreneurship lies in highlighting how corporate entrepreneurs make ethically questionable rule-breaking behaviors acceptable in their organization's context through impression management practices.

Previous research in organizations suggests that corporate entrepreneurs break rules, even though their decision-makers would prefer employees to follow organizational rules (e.g. Jackall, 1988; Jelinek & Schoonhoven, 1990), but it does not address how such individuals create positive impressions on decision-makers despite their rule breaking. This study attempts to address this research question using the newly emerging EAP perspective (Gartner, Stam, Thompson, & Verduyn, 2016; Champenois, Lefebvre, & Ronteau, 2019).

Interestingly, using a practice perspective to ask corporate entrepreneurs to elaborate upon their practices led to an unexpected finding: innovators managed their impressions more intuitively than consciously. When decision-makers elaborated on why they had positive impressions of certain individuals and identified them as successful corporate entrepreneurs, they touched upon the value created by the innovation, the buy-in corporate entrepreneurs had with others, and the successful execution despite their organization's constraints. In contrast, when I interviewed corporate entrepreneurs and asked why they were identified as successful corporate entrepreneurs, they answered that they had introduced an innovation that was valuable to their organization. Only when I probed further did they elaborate on the constraints, rule-breaking practice, and impression management. Thus, first and foremost, corporate entrepreneurs paid attention to the value created by their innovation. They were unaware that they were identified as such because they had engaged in rule breaking; yet, they had managed their impressions successfully. This is consistent with prior research findings that corporate entrepreneurs' optimism and enthusiasm about their ventures limits their ability to identify or judge ethical issues (Hannafey, 2003), such as breaking the rules or engaging in impression management.

This is one of the first studies that brings an EAP perspective to rule breaking and impression management in the context of corporate entrepreneurship. Research studying ethics and entrepreneurship has highlighted that although rule breaking is morally wrong, it should be ethically acceptable because it is a part of the creative destruction that corporate entrepreneurs bring (Brenkert, 2009). However, given the decision-makers' preference that employees follow the rules, impression management provides a route through which corporate entrepreneurs make their rule breaking seem ethically acceptable. However, very little previous research explores how entrepreneurs within large organizations manage their impressions despite rule-breaking.

This study's theoretical contribution lies in filling this research gap and allowing us to explore the practices by which corporate entrepreneurs link their performance to shared organizational understandings of what is positively viewed in a given organizational context (Golsorkhi et al., 2010). Using an EAP lens sensitizes us to the connections between the web of practices that corporate entrepreneurs engage in and the schemata at the organizational level that enable these practices to succeed. Although impression management has been a strong field of study in organizational theory for the past thirty years (Bolino, Long, & Turnley, 2016), its focus has been on individual action or what individuals do to manage positive impressions (e.g., Bolino, Kacmar, Turnley, & Gilstrap, 2008). While a majority of research focuses on actor's actions, impression, and targets, this analysis is incomplete without considering the context in which action is situated. This study contributes to the emerging perspective of Entrepreneurship as Practice — (Gartner, Stam, Thompson, & Verduyn, 2016; Champenois, Lefebvre, & Ronteau, 2019) in entrepreneurship literature.

Furthermore, although I have explored prosocial rule breaking in the context of corporate entrepreneurship, findings from this study could be applied to prosocial rule breaking and impression management in other contexts. For example, when employees break rules to engage in a prosocial behavior such as whistleblowing, what impression management practices might they be able to borrow from this study to be successful in their whistleblowing attempts to minimize retaliation (e.g. Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005)?

Findings from this study challenge previous theoretical findings and our taken-for-granted assumptions in corporate entrepreneurship literature. For example, this study provides a counter perspective on why corporate entrepreneurs engage in certain actions. A dominant assumption in corporate entrepreneurship research is that one of the main reasons that individuals keep their practices hidden is to gain resources and work outside existing organizational constraints (e.g., Crisculo, Salter, & Ter Wal, 2014). Although this is true, this study demonstrates that another important motivation for corporate entrepreneurs to hide their practices is to manage impressions about themselves and their innovations. Maintaining expressive control is a key backstage impression management technique. However, existing studies overlook this practice and implicitly assume that the main motive for the innovators to stay under the radar is to gain resources to instantiate their innovation. In this study, we see that corporate entrepreneurs have dual motives when it comes to maintaining expressive control. While one is certainly to gain resources and maintain their autonomy, an equally potent motive is to maintain their self-impressions. Thus, by not acknowledging the role of expressive control, previous studies also do not address the link between the under-the-radar practices employed by corporate entrepreneurs and the resultant cues that they generate for senior decision-makers.

A key practical contribution of our study is helping individuals train on when it is acceptable to break moral rules for instantiating their innovation. Breaking moral rules might be acceptable in an organization's context if the broader, ethical perspective of their organization allows this rule breaking (Brenkert, 2009). By taking into consideration their organization's broader, ethical schemata, corporate entrepreneurs might be able to manage their impressions more effectively. This is an important skill for corporate entrepreneurs that has not been sufficiently addressed by existing literature. Research suggests that individuals who are successful at managing their impressions are likely to receive better recognition or support from decision-makers in their careers (Finkelstein, Costanza, & Goodwin, 2017). Thus, in addition to launching successful innovations. it is imperative for innovators in organizations to learn the nuances of impression management, to be deemed as corporate entrepreneurs.

An interesting future research avenue is to explore the moral responsibility of decision-makers when corporate entrepreneurs engage in rule breaking and the decision-makers yet cannot assess whether or not it is prosocial in nature. During my research I found that supervisors and decision-makers were occasionally aware of rule breaking by corporate entrepreneurs and other backstage practices. However, they deliberately chose to ignore them and avoided “getting their hands dirty” by implicitly acknowledging unacceptable practices the corporate entrepreneur employed. Future studies ought to look into the role of decision-makers, executive sponsors, and others in how they help corporate entrepreneurs navigate rule breaking and impression management behaviors and the ethical and moral implications of such practices.

One of the main limitations of this study is that I used on-site interviews as a primary source of data, which raises concerns about retrospective biases and memory loss in the interviews. To minimize this concern, as discussed in the methods section, I followed the methodology employed by previous researchers (e.g., Vuori & Huy, 2016). I asked both corporate entrepreneurs and decision-makers to rely on episodic memories and they commented on the same set of events in separate interviews to corroborate these stories. It is also possible that given that these interviews were conducted on site, some entrepreneurs were not fully open when sharing their covert behavior. However, previous researchers have suggested (e.g., Danneels, 2011; Kannan-Narasimhan & Lawrence, 2018), an advantage of asking decision-makers and corporate entrepreneurs about past events through retrospective reflections is that it enabled them to be more open about their efforts. Thus, I was able to access these stories to gain a deeper understanding of the backstage practices because entrepreneurs felt comfortable sharing these stories. For example, when highlighting some of the backstage practices, Ken, one of the corporate entrepreneurs at Helion, discussed how he broke into a conference room to test his innovation. He said that he could have been terminated for his action had the decision-makers known about it. It is likely that he might not have shared these interesting backstage practices with me for this study if his innovation was still in progress.

A related limitation is that, in addition to interviews, it would have been ideal to also observe these innovations when in progress to see how the dramaturgical practices are enacted. However, given my research question on rule breaking, corporate entrepreneurs were not willing to let me observe their in-progress innovations as they were breaking organizational rules. Although they were comfortable sharing an innovation that they had succeeded in the past they were not willing to compromise a current innovation. Thus, in using interviews as a primary data source, I follow other researchers who employ Goffman's front stage and backstage as a theoretical lens but use interviews as their study's primary methodology because it is difficult to observe the phenomenon while it is in progress (e.g. Goretzki & Messner, 2019; Ringel, 2019).

Moreover, the representation of corporate entrepreneurs and senior decision-makers who identified themselves as women was low. Although this is reflective of the low representation of women in senior positions in Silicon Valley (Howard, 2017), it is important to understand the effects of gender on impression management in the corporate entrepreneurial process (Koellinger and Block, 2016). I also did not ask for the ethnicity of the participants. Future researchers must explore the effects of gender, ethnicity, nationality, and other demographic characteristics of corporate entrepreneurs to understand how it influences their impression management practices and how these factors influence the shared meaning they create for their decision-makers.

Finally, it is also important to caution the readers to the use of dramaturgical realization in the way the interviewees shared their stories with me and the manner in which the manuscript is currently written. Both decision-makers and corporate entrepreneurs were most likely putting on a frontstage performance during the interview. Similarly, in writing the manuscript, I follow the tradition of previous researchers who have used revelatory examples or exemplars to highlight the phenomenon of interest (e.g. Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Kouamé & Langley, 2018; Laroche, Steyer & Théron, 2019; Weick, 1993). I used examples and quotes that highlighted the phenomenon of interest clearly. Other examples that were less revelatory to demonstrate were used in the coding process but are not presented to the readers.

8. Conclusion

In this study, I use an Entrepreneurship as Practice framework, specifically the lens of dramaturgical realization, to explore a key question in ethical entrepreneurship. How do corporate entrepreneurs create positive impressions for themselves with their decision-makers despite breaking organizational rules? Results of this study indicate that corporate entrepreneurs succeed when they convince decision-makers that their rule breaking is prosocial in nature. Previous researchers studying ethical entrepreneurship have indicated that breaking moral rules might be acceptable if the broader ethical perspective allows this rule breaking (Brenkert, 2009). Through dramaturgical realization, entrepreneurs link their rule breaking practices that might be morally questionable to ethically acceptable organizational perspectives. Hopefully this will stimulate future scholarship to keenly observe the role of embedded practices when studying ethical issues in corporate entrepreneurship.

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Table 1. Data supporting Interpretation of Second Order Themes

Dimensions	Themes	Representative quotes
Perceptions of Organizational Constraints	*Product design constraints*	I would so there's some projects where we do research where we give people a chance to take so in this case if it didn't fit within our needs and I didn't see a great value being created from it, I wouldn't approve it. (Dan, Director, Animation, Decision-Maker) And that's why I wanted to make sure that I keep aligning myself with the organization. Because if you don't, it's a surefire way for him *[decision-maker]* to say, "No, I don't think we should be working on this." (Tony, Senior Software Manager, IXI, Corporate Entrepreneur) (italics added) All along the way in testing whether or not there were gonna be limitations and it was gonna be competitive and it was gonna be able to provide actually more to the customer than the current offerings. And…And that… No one was ever kind of blinded by the lure of the technology. If it wasn't a good fit, we were ready to cancel the program and move on to something else. (Frank, Director, Helion, Decision-Maker) It must fit under my existing line of products. (Sohrab, Infieon, Vice President, Decision-Maker)
	Organizational design constraints	Because the organizational structures are very resilient…you don't want to bang your head against that... there are enough things that you have to get accomplished. But you know it just might not be worth the fight… I think it's just sort of--entrepreneurship is like water, right, I mean you are essentially conforming, and your hope is that by conforming and flowing through the same ridges and valleys you cut deep enough for there to be changes for the next round. (Amit, Senior Manager, Yeti, Corporate Entrepreneur) It should fit programmatically inside the focus area. If it doesn't fit inside the focus area, they should go to a different focus area for the idea. (Amy, Group Product Manager, GIX, Corporate Entrepreneur) Many times, they have to, shortcut processes because otherwise it would never happen because the processes are usually the problem in many organizations. They are many times, if they're leaving their domains, their responsibility area that means they're getting into somebody else's domain. (Alan, EBiz, Senior Manager, Corporate Entrepreneur) So we have you know, we have a lot of bureaucracy… size-wise we um I think we have more constraints, I think it's, it's a little bit tougher to get momentum going in another direction, maybe just because of the legacy that we have here too, we're a company that's 80 years old, almost, 75 or 80 years old, um, so there's a lot left there about how we do what we do. (Janet, Animation, Senior Staff Engineer, Decision-Maker)
	Resource allocation constraints	The antibodies that arise when you're putting something together and it becomes successful, there are a lot of people that will want it not to be successful because you're taking resources away from them or whatever. And so, a lot of overt sort of antibodies that are fighting and making it hard for you and those are a couple of key things that you know need to that we've had to manage through very carefully and stuff. (Paul, Vice President, Helion, Corporate Entrepreneur)

		It's hard to find people to work on the project especially if it's kind of out there…. you need to get resources from somewhere and we don't have people sitting around, I mean that's the nature when you're in kind of a low-cost environment. Like you don't have people sitting around, twiddling their thumbs, or else they would have been out of here. So, you need to actually come up with an idea and argue that it's worth it to pull someone off something else to do this thing. (Arthur, Software manager, Animation, Decision-Maker) Actually, a lot of it depends on the resources. You're trying to ask for 20 people to work on something. You want to have backups to say, Yes, I think this will solve a significant problem in a customer. (Tony, Senior Software Manager, IXI, Corporate Entrepreneur) The problem with that project was lack of resources-we were in a very tight situation, (Anand, Director, Intelligex, Corporate Entrepreneur) And in the meantime, I was searching for engineering resources to help me do this, because nobody was assigning them to me, so I was knocking on all of these doors, saying, you know, this is the plan, this is the long-term strategic value of it, will you give me resources? And it was like, no, no, no, no, no. (Amy, Group Product Manager, GIX, Corporate Entrepreneur)
Dramaturgical realization: Backstage practices	*Breaking the Rules*	And it's true, we need to break the rules a little. Maybe some of the code isn't quite in our component and stuff, but it's ok..." (Bob, Senior Technical Staff Member, IXI, Corporate Entrepreneur) "In general, you can get a lot of things done. Back then we had a tool shop in-house where we could go and get it. And it's – the other thing you have to learn as intrapreneur is how dollars show up in the system. One thing we could is – we used to call the shop the "funny money," because it's kind of this tax. You pay a tax to support the shop, right, just the whole shop. Everybody pays an allocation for that. The dollars aren't every well tracked, so you can't really tell how much I've spent or so and so has spent. So, we did a ton of things through our shop, and it was all under the radar. So, people – you know it is expensive, but it's not traceable. [laughs] Like a track, you know like a travel budget or something is traceable. It's all in the system. It's hard to trace. And by the time you find out, you're done. You're out. (Jared, Principal Engineer, Helion, Corporate Entrepreneur) "if you wanted to install a small piece of software, like an open source piece software…. With a licensee where it says clearly that it is legal for you to install it, you have to go through legal you actually want to do it officially. Of course, people don't do that. We have a program called Firefox which is an, basically an internet browser…. We're technically not allowed to download plug ins to it, but people do. Well because there are possible legal problems with it, and every request is supposed to go through legal, people don't do it. It's the whole idea of and this happens a lot here which is good is do it now ask for forgiveness later kind of thing. (Matt, Senior Software Engineer, Animation, Corporate Entrepreneur) "because we hadn't been an outside business before we didn't have the normal processes for how do you invoice customers, you know any of those things. So, after our first project or first run with the customer [done without following organizational rules], they didn't know how to pay us so they actually sent a personal check to Helion, care of me!" (Rich, Distinguished Technologist & Strategist, Helion, Corporate Entrepreneur) *[] inserted*

	Creating material and social artefacts	You want to have backups [*prototypes*] to say, "Yes, I think this will solve a significant problem in a customer." How do you know that, right? It is to say, "I've talked to a customer, and they have this problem." And this solution fixes this problem. Then, by definition, the customer will like this, because there's a real problem that they have. (italics added) (Tony, Senior Software Manager, IXI, Corporate Entrepreneur) Initially I developed the prototype working with the user and then I felt that was kind of a stand-alone thing just to show the idea and then I started working on integrating it with the 3D and you know I think I had something working within a week. (Brent, Software Engineer, Animation, Corporate Entrepreneur) So, the prototypes typically will address at some level, all layers. . And so, as soon as you put something on paper or something on a screen, right? Or, you know, physically have some touch with the—then you have a little bit of a solidification of it ..., it becomes a little bit solidified as far as where, you know, you want to take that. it's like, "Ok, great, you've got this great idea. Show it to me. Demonstrate it." "Ok, I understand," and then, you know, you start clicking in your head (Yash, Director of Industry Insight, Decision-Maker) We basically had to do our prototypes you know to prove the technology. That's a given what we have to do, but at the same time we also had to go make sure that we showed enough ecosystem attraction to our CEO, which was also important. (Andy, Director of Initiatives and Services, Strategic Planning, Intelligex, Corporate Entrepreneur)
	Maintaining Expressive Control	And organizational dynamics are things that you know that cause the most problems…. you talk a little bit about whether it's about going under the radar or whether it's coming out. I think the trick is to stay under the radar long enough to either have traction or give the impression of traction. Either of those will work. I don't need to do much more than that." (Amit, Senior Manager, Yeti, Corporate Entrepreneur) Do stuff under the radar as long as you can to get a prototype to show and then start showing people and then you know you can get through some of the initial, "Oh that'll never work." When you have a prototype or you have some users who are interested or you know you're able to establish somewhat of a use case for the thing you're building. (Jordan, Product Manager, GIX, Decision-Maker) I won't spend a lot of time on something if I don't think that there's a need or if I don't have buy-in from the users. There are projects here that are unsuccessful where people believe strongly that they know the right thing to do and they know they won't get support and so they go do it on their own you know in secret and then show it when it's almost finished or when they think it's you know good enough and they may spend several months on it. (Brent, Software Engineer, Animation, Corporate Entrepreneur) Unless you're advertising something, what two or three people in their organization are spending part of their time on developing, it's not going to show up on their radar. And so—and if it does that section manager or that first-level manager that's kind of filtering and protecting that, it's an easy come clean, where they say, "Yeah," that's when the downplaying goes on, "Yeah, you know this—I didn't want—maybe because I wasn't sure if it was going to pan out or not; it's at the early stages." (Todd, Senior Manager, Helion, Decision-Maker)
Dramaturgical realization: Frontstage	*External Validation*	Yeah Drupa is the world's largest—it happens once every four years and it's the world's largest commercial printing show. So, attended by over 400,000 people, takes place over two weeks in Germany, ...and we knew we were gonna do something at Drupa, the question was: What could we do? What would we actually end up showing? And you know we quickly put a team together and I think it exceeded everybody's

practices		expectation what we ended up delivering. We actually had Drupa announce a couple of lead customers, we actually had people already committed to buy the product, and we had the product on the show floor printing basically printing a newspaper every day, newspaper and some banking statements, a lot of different—We actually had customers who had—we had been talking to who committed at the show, 'Yeah I want to buy one of these.' We had a lot of other customers who are prospects who came up, "I'm very interested. Can I—how do I get on the list of people who can consider?" (Steve, Vice President, Helion, Corporate Entrepreneur) So, he basically came up with an algorithmic framework…. And he actually built a prototype on his own spare time. ... Eventually he'd lined up a set of customers who would use this stuff and then I said, "Okay go ahead and build it and I'll fund you." (Arnab, Senior Director, Yeti, Decision-Maker) I re-did the heart of that thing and it's actually been received really well by customers. Well yeah. I've got notes that show, people commenting "We've never seen anything like this before." You know? "Possibly the biggest improvement in the history of the product," kind of stuff. (Bob, Senior Technical Staff Member, IXI, Corporate Entrepreneur) Come back to engineering management with the list of customers, "This is who wants it, this is what they want, this is what they're saying. They say that if we build this, they'll use it, they'll want it. They'll be forever in your gratitude," kind of stuff. Basically, I mean part of it is convincing that if this senior manager makes this bet you know to do this thing that they're not going to walk away with egg on their face because they've neglected someone over here. (Jordan, Product Manager, GIX, Decision-Maker)
	Internal Buy In	So, we got the sales team on board. We put the launch together. We put these basic principles together and we got started. And uh we were very—we were very lucky in that that first year. We had a goal of we had done these two big deals and each one of them were for about $20 million. And because you know they—the cost avoidance that they had, the equivalent cost from (other competitors) for the same tools for the same period of time would have been $200 million. (Dan, Director, IXI, Corporate Entrepreneur) Well, I mean, I look to—like I said, just random ideas are a dime a dozen. So, I look to see—is this more than just an idea? And then, who have you—who's—who have you included in on this? Who have you talked to about it? Who have you talked to about this? What did they think? What did they add to it? And—just at the very start. … Someone has really spent some time, good time, really thinking—thinking about it. And that they've elicited some suggestion or they've vetted it with others. And so, just get that kind of feedback and to build upon it. (Glen, Vice-President, Helion) As a corporate entrepreneur, you have to navigate those—the corporate maze. Whereas innovators, you can just have—you can have a great idea and you may need to, you know, promote it and get money, et cetera. The corporate entrepreneur has the ability to influence and to get buy-in from a big group of people and—not only buy-in, but excitement. And maintain that relationship over a long period of time. (Shahzi, Corporate Entrepreneur, GIX) I try to build personal relationships with people on the team and I try to work with the individuals that will be doing the work and to try to get

		buy-in from them. And so, a lot of my success has to do with selling to people individually. (Bob, Corporate Entrepreneur IXI).
Prosocial Rule Breaking: Schemata of value creation	*Innovations that create external value*	So, I would look at somebody as an entrepreneur as somebody who builds, who ideates, evangelizes, and builds out a new product, right, that has a direct connection to the revenue stream. And normally you know so there's a lot of incremental improvements that you have, right. So, you'll have the search engine and you add a bunch of features to it, that's not really entrepreneurship, right. But if you build out a whole new experience, a whole new revenue stream, that's what I would call an entrepreneur. (Arnab, Senior Director, Yeti, Decision-Maker) I mean, an innovator might be somebody who's just very good at putting widgets together that create a device that does something. A corporate entrepreneur is someone who can take a look at that device and maybe not be totally in tune with how they did it. But they understand how—how they can make money with it, if you will. There's a market for something like this. (John, Manager, Helion, Decision-Maker) Intrapreneur is when you find a new way to expand your business. To create a business and expand the business. That is what makes an intrapreneur. (Robert, Director, HIX, Decision-Maker) So, the first phase is obviously creating or thinking that idea. Second phase is okay, implementing that idea. And the third phase is selling that idea, right? So, for my perspective, entrepreneurship is having all those three phases, right? I think the key thing is you know how good the product is and how well you know we have innovated that product to meet customer demands, right? (Dinesh, IXI, Senior Development Manager)
	Innovations that create internal value	So, a corporate entrepreneur is somebody who works in a—in a corporate setting, which is a big company setting. And trying to push his ideas to actually make a difference to the company…so, not every product necessarily needs to generate revenue on its own but how it fits into the ecosystem—so, one classic example is search by itself is not a product that you sell and get revenue, right? But it drives traffic. So, more and more users, if you find a very compelling idea, it causes more users to come and search on Yeti. (Giri, Yeti, Senior Technical Manager) Being entrepreneurial in my mind is more about getting something done, as opposed to building something. Right, and in my mind, the value that they bring is by getting things done at a broader level, which in a nominal situation wouldn't have been possible. So, going back to your other question, yes of course. In the HR space, again… So, at one point in time a bunch of colleagues in our networking department looked at our infrastructure needs and said, "Look, we should have a storage area network because that will improve the effectiveness of how we store data, it will reduce the cost of how we store it," and so on and so forth. Very simple things. (Anup, Decision-Maker, Senior Manager Infieon) Intrapreneur could be either implicitly impacting your customers or explicitly impacting your customers…. Innovation for me is like anything you can do much more efficiently, differently, on building. Innovation could be – the product itself could be an innovative new offering. Solving some of the new pain points, simplifying some pain point. It may very well be a process point of view. (Kaustav, IXI, Decision-Maker Senior Manager) Today in Synx you can face--see yourself actually facing different levels of customers, internal customers and external customers. For somebody who's doing HR, for example, doing IT, to them, the only customer they have is actually all the Synx employees, right. Somebody

		can come up with a process change that would completely change the way people do things, and thereby, you know, improve productivity by 2X or something like that. Those are entrepreneurs. (Li Pen, Synx, Innovator, Technical Lead)
Prosocial Rule Breaking: Schemata of rule breaking as unavoidable	*Pursuing new and unexpected opportunities*	The person that finds a way to bring revenue that is unexpected, using new ways and new ideas to achieve the results (Robert Brazil, HIX, Decision-Maker, Director) In many ways, first the technology that allowed us to do dramatic cost reduction while maintaining roughly the current state of the art, but we also knew it's also gives us dramatically more performance. [*Corporate entrepreneurs are]*.thinking about whole ways, new ways, dramatic new ways to do things (Frank, Vice President, Helion, Corporate Entrepreneur) *(Italics added)* As an intrapreneur you're looking beyond your current business area and you are probably looking at what else do you want to do, you don't spend like 100% of your time just looking at setting up the vision for your business... you know trying to drive change for your business to be more successful three years, five years down the road you're looking to what other new areas, new opportunities do you want to go after— (KayVee, General Manager, APAT, Decision-Maker)
	Creatively bucking organizational constraints	.. it's something totally new. They kind of push it from the point of inception through all the way to productization. They make sure that it happens. They have to break barriers and fight people on all of those things. (Ahsan, Vice-President of Engineering, Synx, Decision-Maker) There are, you know one of the things that we count on, this is one of my secrets and I would hope it doesn't get too much around in Helion, but I count on the bureaucracy that I can outrun it. Very frequently we do stuff before we have permission and then by the time they would say no, it's done. (Ken, Director, Helion, Corporate Entrepreneur) You know IXI puts a lot of focus on innovation, success for corporate intrapreneur, picking those ideas and……and one of the big challenges is to work within the constraints of an organization like this, to drive new ideas to market. (Jay, Director, IXI, Decision-Maker) So, the time that we engaged the lawyers was month one…So we did this, eight months in advance! Because I knew that's not something I can afford. So, I already knew it was gonna be fast, so we had the legal team involved eight months before anyone. And that had a slight advantage, which is they were like, "Wow, this had never happened before." (Amit, Senior Manager, Yeti, Corporate Entrepreneur)

Figure 1. Data structure