

## Chapter 7

### Fundamentalism and Conversion to *Eastern* Orthodoxy in the *West*:

#### Reflections on the Myth of Orthodoxy

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#### Introduction

Religious fundamentalism above all has to do with the search for a unitary, safe, and sure identity in a modern pluralistic context, which is diffuse, heterogeneous, and liable to disintegration under multifarious political, social, and market forces. Often in the detailed discussion of fundamentalist phenomena, one can lose sight of the fact that we are talking about real persons searching for their place and their selves in the world and in specific religious communities, who exhibit the beliefs and the characteristics which we call *inter alia* “ultra-traditionalist,” “rigorist,” or “fundamentalist” Orthodox. The whole area of conversion brings the element of identity formation or individuation to the fore when looking at persons or communities who could be called fundamentalist. This is particularly important in America, as the trickle of Western converts to Orthodoxy from Protestantism and Catholicism that started in the 1970's has now quite transformed certain churches, notably, the Orthodox Church in America (OCA, whose Metropolitan Tikhon (Mollard) (b. 1966) (elected Metropolitan in 2012) is a convert from Episcopalianism and whose mother is an Episcopal priest) and the Antiochian Orthodox Christian Archdiocese in North America. One only has to go to many of the major Orthodox seminaries in the USA to see that there are now a majority of students who have converted from some other Christian tradition. With this influx of converts into the Orthodox Church in North America, from roughly the mid-1980's to the early 1990's, have come many gifts to the Orthodox churches from Western Christian traditions, largely evangelical Protestant: systematic evangelism, greater scriptural

understanding, better preaching and catechesis, and church tithing as a regular mode of Christian existence. Yet there also has arisen, it would seem as a *partial* consequence of the influx of Protestant and to a small degree conservative Catholics (as zealotry also has arisen in the same period in rest of world Orthodoxy in traditionally Orthodox countries), a particular species of religious fundamentalism, often indebted to the legacy of evangelical American Protestantism.

In this short study, I want to explore a few select theological aspects of the conversion phenomenon that I think can help illumine Orthodox fundamentalism, drawing strongly on my own personal journey from evangelical Anglicanism into Orthodoxy in the early 1990's. This essay will not look at the statistical, historical, and anthropological work that has been done on convert Orthodoxy. I will attempt to set out a preliminary case for the existence of fundamentalism in North American convert Orthodoxy as particularly found in those from evangelical Protestant backgrounds such as my own, and then give a sketch of Orthodox identity, showing why this reality has arisen.

I will, unusually for an academic study, periodically make personal references to my own biography at points, as this matter is not purely academic for me. It touches on my own life, for I was received into Orthodoxy on the west coast of Canada in 1994 in "convert" Orthodox circles, comprised of mostly ex-evangelical Protestants. Here I found a warm, loving and accepting home. It is not a surprise I was attracted to it, for, in retrospect, it was very familiar theologically and in its ethos similar to the parish in which I was raised which was that of the eminent English-Canadian evangelical theologian, J. I. Packer (1926-2020).

#### Talking about and Defining "Fundamentalism"

I first will define what I mean by "fundamentalism." I then will argue that conversion in America very often exhibits many of the characteristics of "restorationism," or a return to the original Church, here understood as "tradition"; but in this construction of tradition, I will

illustrate some of the fundamentalist characteristics from the contemporary Orthodox convert scene. Indeed, an object of this study is to participate in the beginning of the process of making a sociological case for the existence of fundamentalism amongst Orthodox converts in North America. I do this because many ultra-conservative and reactionary converts actually reject wholesale the description of “fundamentalism” for themselves.

I then will argue that Orthodox fundamentalism or “rigorism” is a by-product of a post-colonial reaction to Western cultural imperialism and colonialism. Here, and this is the second object of the essay, the dialectic of East and West, which is presupposed by much convert discourse, is formative of Orthodox identity and plays a key role in many of the fundamentalist distinctives. I want to suggest that what we see with many Orthodox fundamentalist converts with their rejection of the West and modernity is a paradoxical phenomenon, in that these converts are modern cultural Westerners who, as part of their identity formation, have appropriated the resentments towards the West of Eastern Christian cultures that are not native to them. I will close with some broad reflections on Orthodox Eastern identity in relation to the modern West.

#### Defining “Fundamentalism”: Is There Such a Thing as “Orthodox Fundamentalism?”

What is often mentioned by some contemporary conservative Orthodox scholars like Edith Humphrey when the term “fundamentalism” is used in reference to Orthodox is that it is one of many “emotive terms”<sup>1</sup> that can mean anything and nothing; it avoids looking at whether subjects absolutize Tradition in a defensive manner, whether they have valid concerns about modernity and the West, and whether their idea of Tradition is just simply too narrow. These same scholars often will say in the same breath that the term “fundamentalist” cannot widely be used for the Orthodox, even for Orthodox converts from a highly sectarian Protestant (or sometimes, Catholic) background who regularly recreate their restorationist sectarianism and culture-wars mentality in an Eastern Christian context.

The term “fundamentalist,” these same conservative Orthodox scholars say, only applies to the fundamentalist-modernist debate within the Presbyterian Church of the USA in the 1920’s and 1930’s. Those who are “fundamentalists,” they say, are Protestants who opposed modernism and held or who hold to the following views: a) the inerrancy of Scripture; b) the literal nature of the Biblical accounts, especially in regard to the Creation accounts in Genesis; c) the Virgin Birth; d) the Bodily Resurrection and physical return of Christ; and e) the penal substitutionary atonement provided by Christ on the cross. Orthodoxy clearly does not subscribe to all these views; therefore, the argument of the scholars who question the existence of “Orthodox fundamentalism” runs, any conservative Orthodox by definition, however reactionary and even if one seems to see parallels, can never be legitimately called “fundamentalist.” Yet this is an etymological “magicking” away of a term and a religious reality these scholars fear—for, to be honest, they, too, might find themselves all too easily falling under its cover.

Now, one could simply reply to these scholars that terminology and words are in no sense locked into one original meaning. This is sometimes called the etymological fallacy (a species of the genetic fallacy), that is, the notion that the present-day meaning of a word should be similar, if not even identical to its historical meaning. To see this is the case, one simply has to look at the entries to the complete *Oxford English Dictionary*, which give the earliest use of a word and trace it to its multiple historical occurrences. This sort of exercise can give you a sense that words change over time, so the argument outlined above, that “Orthodox fundamentalism” by definition cannot exist, is patent nonsense. Yet there are other reasons to be suspicious of this sort of argumentation.

For at least 40 years or more, scholars have used “fundamentalism” in a far broader sense than how it was used within American Protestant debates in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century. Here one thinks of the massive five volumes (1987–1995) of the religionists Martin Marty and R.

Scott Appleby's "Fundamentalism Project" that looked at the politics, societal background, theologies, and history of conservative religious movements.<sup>2</sup> They identified various broad family characteristics of all fundamentalisms, including a strict Patriarchal order; a rigid rule obsession; the rejection of all hermeneutic and societal plurality; a golden age/nostalgic vision of the past which is unchanging; and a strict insider/outsider understanding characteristic of all sects. Sadly, they tended to collapse conservatism and fundamentalism, and ignored Orthodoxy.<sup>3</sup>

Another approach to defining fundamentalism as a universal religious phenomenon is from the discipline of religious psychology, as seen in the "Fundamentalism Scale" developed by the Canadian scholars Bob Altemeyer and Bruce Hunsberger in 1992 and then revised in 2004.<sup>4</sup> It was developed to attempt to psychologically measure attitudes about religious beliefs rather than adherence to any particular set of beliefs. The idea was that fundamentalism was not a creed but a mind-set or *phronema* (to use language well-known in Orthodoxy). What matters for Altemeyer and Hunsberger in defining fundamentalism is the *attitude* towards, say, God or the divine, rather than what specifically what one would hold that the divine might be in terms of the positive content of one's beliefs. Altemeyer and Hunsberger were trying to identify the common underlying psychological elements in the thinking of many different groups of people they called fundamentalists, including Christians, Hindus, Jews, and Muslims. They thought that a fundamentalist of any major faith group would affirm the fundamental, basic and inerrant truth about God, humanity, and the world. Fundamentalists, Altemeyer and Hunsberger argued, would also see this fundamental truth being opposed by forces of evil—forces one needed to oppose with all one's heart and soul; and would believe that the truth had to be followed according to certain specific unchanging practices passed on by tradition. Finally, they argued, all fundamentalists who followed these

beliefs would have a unique and, in some ways, exclusive relationship as the elect to the divine/God.

Originally, in the 1992 version of Altemeyer and Hunsberger's scheme, there were 20 statements to which one had to give a reaction, on a scale ranging from -4 (You very strongly disagree) and -3 (You strongly disagree), and so forth, to 1 (You slightly agree with this statement), on to 4 (You very strongly agree). Eventually the 20 statements were refined down to 12, including "God has given humanity a complete, unfailing guide to happiness and salvation, which must be totally followed" and "*All* of the religions in the world have flaws and wrong teachings. There is *no* perfectly true, right religion." Here fundamentalism for Altemeyer and Hunsberger is more form than content. It is then possible under this scheme to be an Orthodox liberal fundamentalist.

This conclusion might be surprising for many observers of contemporary Orthodoxy. Is there such a thing as an Orthodox liberal fundamentalist?! Yet I would say I have experienced this strange beast first-hand. Usually, I would identify as Orthodox liberal fundamentalists those who are some form of ideologically-driven Schmemannite (turning the theology of Alexander Schmemann into an ideology he would not have recognized). They are a small sub-group of world Orthodoxy who have their own publications; their own preferred (almost always Russian-tradition) churches and jurisdictions, driven heavily by nostalgia (e.g. the once progressive and broadminded Rue Daru Russian Exarchate/Archdiocese of Orthodox Churches of Russian Tradition in Western Europe, which exemplifies the collapse of Russian emigrée nostalgia with Orthodoxy seen in its "returning home to its mother" in joining the Moscow Patriarchate, which is a body which is antithetical to the Exarchate's traditions and values); and their own liberal heroes/saints (whose writings are often read uncritically: including Metropolitan Anthony (Bloom), Frs. Sergii Bulgakov, Alexander Schmemann, Alexander Men, and Mother St Maria (Skobtsova)). They often will have their own assured

assumptions, such as that one can *without any difficulty* radically revise certain characteristic conservative moral teachings in Orthodoxy (e.g. concerning homosexuality), or advocate liturgical gay marriage in the Church, and that certain Orthodox traditional teachings are simply irrational or even gnostic (e.g. tollhouses), and can be dispensed with in a blink of the eye.

Finally, another approach to defining fundamentalism comes from the great Israeli sociologist of modernity Shmuel Eisenstadt (1923—2012), who is perhaps most famous for his “multiple modernities” thesis. Eisenstadt argued that fundamentalist movements, contrary to what people normally think, were modern political movements of a Jacobin or revolutionary character, promulgating “an anti-modern traditionalistic ideology” which was couched in modern terms.<sup>5</sup> This means Eisenstadt saw these fundamentalist movements as an *anti-modern modern traditionalism*. He argued that across different religions—*so it is unclear why some converts to Orthodoxy in North America would be a special exception, if we follow Eisenstadt*—these fundamentalist movements shared specific characteristics as follows:

- They were all characterized by being sectarian, past-oriented, and utopian.<sup>6</sup>
- They all aimed at renewing their religion according to a pristine vision (a “renovative utopian sectarianism”) rooted in the past, or a tradition that was said to be from time immemorial.
- Eisenstadt identified in them a hostility to modernity, understood as the Enlightenment tradition, and often the West (which they conflated); a revolutionary and culture-wars dogmatism on sexuality and gender, that is, a stern patriarchal tenor (what Derrida called *logophallocentrism*), which was utterly unquestionable;
- They shared an intolerance towards any construction of tradition involving complexity, gradual unfolding of the truth, and heterogeneity—that is, they shared a literalist hermeneutic which rejects all ambiguity and that is “anti-traditional in the

sense that they negate the living tradition [...] and instead they uphold a highly ideological conception of tradition as an overarching principle of cognitive and social organization” or tradition as essentialist and totalizing;<sup>7</sup>

- They shared a totalizing utopian-sectarian-eschatological vision of a golden age or pristine past (akin to the post-Pentecostal church of Acts 2:42-47), rejecting modernity and seeing contemporary political and cultural events in an eschatological and dualistic interpretation, where the pure body of elect believers were in an end time Book of Revelation style tribulation scenario being assaulted and polluted by an impure group of those outside, who were often seen in diabolical terms;
- They shared a belief that the world outside the Church, which is a refuge from chaos and disorder and falsehood, and other non-Orthodox churches are corrupt and become ever more increasingly graceless, thus making for the need to set up multiple differentiating buffering layers of sacramental, liturgical, calendaric, and dress markers (what Eisenstadt called the “‘ritualization’ of the symbols of traditional life”)<sup>8</sup> to preserve the sacred community from the infection of the modern world.

Now Eisenstadt, and those who have followed him, in no way argue that all forms of fundamentalism have all these characteristics, or that if some groups have some of these characteristics then they *necessarily* are fundamentalist. Thus, to be conservative *per se* is not to be fundamentalist. Orthodoxy itself, or, say Orthodox Judaism or Shinto, are all religious traditions that work on the level of a trust in the traditions of the forefathers and ancestors, of established rituals and laws, and they all likewise have a sense of the holy and the impure. But in mainstream Orthodoxy, these conservative elements are not made wholly static or frozen, but are negotiated and interpreted within the life of the community, involving a dialogue with the past in full awareness that there is a need to embody that past according to the pastoral needs of the present (this is often referred to as “pastoral economy”). This form



of religious conservatism exists within set parameters, it is not a free-for-all; but there is an ongoing living understanding of the religion precisely because there is no attempt in these mainstream forms of religious practice to return to a pure essential religion of the past to escape the impurity of the world that ever laps at the edges of the community. Fundamentalism, then, is almost always nostalgic, and this is why it can even try to preserve profoundly ideologically modernist and liberal views as long as those views represent to the fundamentalist a golden-hued and pristine past that the fundamentalist determines as embodying their sacrosanct “traditions.” Yet most of the time, it should be acknowledged, fundamentalism is identified with ideologically conservative views, especially in regards to morality and religious rites.

#### Orthodox Converts: Examples of Fundamentalism?

But can we see these broad characteristics of fundamentalism in Orthodox converts in North America? The movement of conversion from evangelical Protestantism, conservative Anglicanism in all its varieties, and (to a far lesser degree) ultra-conservative Roman Catholicism to Eastern Orthodoxy began intensively in the late 1970's and early 1980's in North America and in the last decade, what started as a trickle has become a flood. Recent survey work of US Orthodox parishes in early 2020 by the sociologist of religion Alexei Krindatch has shown that the percentage of converts in the Greek Orthodox parishes is now about 30% compared with those in the Orthodox Church in America (OCA) and Antiochian Archdiocese parishes, where it is a rather staggering 50%.<sup>9</sup> It is not a surprise that as of mid-2020, most mainline Orthodox Churches in America and Canada have a sizable percentage of clergy, and now even many hierarchs, who joined Orthodoxy from some Western confession or body. Statistics of the Standing Conference of Orthodox Bishops in America (SCOBA) from 2006 have shown that 59% of the OCA's clergy were then converts.<sup>10</sup> It is likely that this percentage has only increased.

## The Case of Three American Orthodox Seminaries

In the last decade, this conversion phenomenon has been particularly noticeable as multiple key educational institutions of Orthodoxy in North America are being taken over by conservative converts. Here one thinks of Fr Chad Hatfield, the President of St Vladimir's Orthodox Theological Seminary (OCA) in Yonkers, New York (just outside Manhattan). St Vladimir's Seminary, whose past Deans include such leading 20<sup>th</sup> century theologians as Frs Georges Florovsky, Alexander Schmemmann and John Meyendorff, was once considered one of a handful of leading centres in the world for the academic study of Orthodox Christianity. Fr Hatfield is a former conservative Anglican priest from Kansas who, before St Vladimir's, successfully ran the tiny St Herman Theological Seminary in Kodiak, Alaska (OCA). He has done much to build up the seminary and establish its pastoral training on a much surer footing than before and put at the centre of all its work the need for mission in the contemporary secular world. However, to considerable controversy,<sup>11</sup> Fr Hatfield invited the well-known controversial conservative journalist and blogger and Orthodox convert Rob Dreher to give, in January 2021, the 38<sup>th</sup> Annual Alexander Schmemmann Lecture.<sup>12</sup> The Schmemmann Lecture is one of the most prestigious and oldest established academic annual lectures in world Orthodoxy and past presenters include such theological luminaries as Elizabeth Behr-Sigel, Rowan Williams, Met. Hilarion (Alfeyev), Peter Brown, John Chryssavgis, Avery Dulles and John McGuckin. The lecture, Dreher claimed, was a summary of his new book (*Live Not By Lies: A Manual for Christian Dissidents* (2020)) and was entitled, "Living in Truth: How the Communist-Era Suffering Church Can Prepare Us to be Dissidents."<sup>13</sup> It was dedicated to exploring lessons for the Orthodox seminarians listening concerning what can be learned from Christian anti-Communist dissidents for a new era in America in which the "woke left" persecutes "Christian dissidents", that is, conservative Christians, including especially the Orthodox. Dreher took time during his lecture (which was on Zoom given the pandemic) to

attack “Orthodox progressives” who he claimed attempted to cancel his lecture (“de-platform”), thanking the seminary for its robust defense of him. Dreher argued that there was no point in engaging in dialogue with Orthodox liberals as dialogue was simply a tactic to wear down conservatives in power and once the left gained power all dialogue ceased.<sup>14</sup>

Another example of this capture by conservative converts of key Orthodox institutions in North America is Fr Alexander F. C. Webster, who was very briefly (2017-2019) the Dean of the Russian Church Outside Russia’s (ROCOR) Holy Trinity Orthodox Seminary in Jordanville, New York and an ultra-conservative convert from Roman Catholicism who was a military chaplain for many years and known academically for his strong defense of an Orthodox version of the just war theory.<sup>15</sup> The seminary is the flagship of ROCOR which (since 2007) is a semi-autonomous, traditionally conservative, pro-monarchist, anti-communist, Russian nationalist and old calendarist church in the Moscow Patriarchate. Holy Trinity is in upstate New York and adjoins the monastery of the same name founded by Russian White emigres fleeing communism in 1930. Notably, Fr Webster spearheaded, working closely with David Ford and Fr John E. Parker III of St Tikhon’s Orthodox Theological Seminary, the first of two recent conservative conferences defending the traditional family against Orthodox liberal progressives and the so-called “gay lobby.” The first conference in March 2019, “Chastity, Purity, Integrity: Orthodox Anthropology and Secular Culture in the 21st Century”, was held at Holy Trinity Seminary and had attacks on secularism, the “transgender movement” and advocated the theology of the complementarity of the sexes and encouraging youth to take up chastity as an ideal.<sup>16</sup> Speakers included Frs Webster, Hatfield, Parker, Edith Humphrey and Rod Dreher amongst others. Webster collaborated in January 2018 with many of the same conservative figures from the Jordanville conference, including Fr Hatfield and Prof Ford, on a public statement cum petition signed by

multiple ultra conservative figures in North American Orthodoxy decrying the threat posed by the then recent ordination of Orthodox deaconesses by the Patriarch of Alexandria.<sup>17</sup>

Fr John E. Parker III, another conservative former Anglican priest convert to Orthodoxy, has collaborated with Fr Webster on various conservative initiatives. Fr Parker is the Dean of St Tikhon's Seminary which is in rural Eastern Pennsylvania and adjoined by the oldest Orthodox monastery in North America (of the same name and founded in 1905). He helped organize with David Ford, after the successful Jordanville conference, a second conservative conference in November 2019 at his own seminary, "Speaking the Truth in Love: A Conference Addressing Sexuality and the Human Being." This included multiple papers on resources to combat the "sexual degradation of modern culture", others attacking abortion, advocating a theology of complementarity and analyzing modern culture in relation to sex and gender.<sup>18</sup> Fr Parker has been a vocal presence in a growing conservative theological network of scholars across America (many of whom are on the staff or are adjuncts at the three seminaries mentioned), often being Protestant converts to Orthodoxy. To give some idea of Fr Parker's approach to Orthodoxy one only needs to turn to a lecture he gave in June 2018 in Crete at a conference on digital media and pastoral care in Orthodoxy. Here he attacked liberal Orthodox appeals for pastoral compassion and a wider discussion of the prohibition of committed same sex relations, especially, critiquing Fordham University's Orthodox Christian Studies Centre's popular blog Public Orthodoxy as by implication an "instrument of the devil" and advocating the Orthodox adapting the now defunct (abolished in June 1966) Roman Catholic Index of Forbidden Books which he suggests that the Orthodox hierarchy create a list of websites warning the faithful would endanger their salvation.<sup>19</sup>

The picture I have sketched above through the initiatives of three of the Deans of leading Orthodox seminaries is not isolated. There now exist ultra-conservative and fundamentalist converts with a wide following through the internet and social media who have

brought with them to Orthodoxy some of the distinctives of Protestant and sometimes Catholic fundamentalism thereby distorting Orthodoxy and arguably turning it into a crypto-Protestantism or crypto-ultra-conservative Roman Catholicism with a culture wars mentality focused very often on the evil of abortion, gay sex, the scourge of transgender ideology and the alleged persecution of Christians in America. Some of these people I count as close family friends and indeed I am a graduate of St Vladimir's Seminary and revere it as an institution. Thus, Orthodoxy's basic problem for me is not merely academic, but deeply personal.

#### Restorationism as the Turn to Tradition by Orthodox Converts

Many converts, and I can speak personally to this, joined the Orthodox Church from backgrounds that were looking for the “original” or “ancient church” or “church of the Book of Acts” or “the Fathers.” Here we see a classic fundamentalist trait: the view that religious teaching is eternal and unchanging. This should not be a surprise, for, as Fr Oliver Herbel has argued so persuasively,<sup>20</sup> Orthodox church history in America has been characterized by “restorationism” through the vehicle of tradition. Here Orthodox converts were simply adapting elements that have long existed in Protestantism in America. Thus, during the Second Great Awakening, which was a Protestant revivalist movement in America that flourished during the early part of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, we see movements such as the Stone-Campbell movement or the American Restoration Movement that sought to reform and reunite the church, bringing it back to what they believed to be its original New Testamental form as seen in Acts. Tradition, for the Orthodox, in turn—albeit a curated tradition, shaped idiosyncratically according to need and identity—was chosen as the means by which Christians could return to the ancient Church. Here one thinks of the popular Orthodox bumper sticker in America: “Orthodox Christianity, founded 33 AD.”

Perhaps the best-known example of a mass body converting to Orthodoxy in North America from a Protestant background was the ultra-conservative and sectarian Evangelical

Orthodox Church (EOC), led by Fr Peter Gillquist (1938-2012). It was founded in 1979 and came out of the Campus Crusade for Christ movement, but eventually was received into the Antiochian Church in 1989. This group became known as the Evangelical Orthodox Mission until it was disbanded in 1995 and was integrated into normal church structures. It saw itself as an historical instantiation of the “Ancient Church” also seen in Orthodoxy: it was restorationist in character. It would join Orthodoxy and renew it by its evangelical fervor.

The EOC are best known for the *Orthodox Study Bible*, which is a sort of strange hybrid of evangelical Protestantism and Orthodoxy.<sup>21</sup> It came out of the Shepherding movement, which flourished in many evangelical and charismatic churches such as the Vineyard (which my parents attended briefly in the 1980’s in between Anglican churches, so I know of what I speak). This movement had a strong emphasis on the Church as being composed of *sheep*, and certain chosen and assigned spiritually charismatic *shepherds*. Young people, including couples, were assigned often to an older couple in the community, with the husband of the couple taking headship over those under him just as he headed his wife and family. In turn, the elder would ultimately answer to a pastor, and often that pastor to a senior “bishop” or arch-pastor. Those outside this network were regarded as suspicious and all socialization and even work was done within the shepherding structure. I remember, growing up in this sort of community, that there were special Vineyard church aerobics, and many of the parishioners worked for different members of the church. We were given lists of Christian businesses for the community members to patronize. One would not do anything in these communities without first receiving a blessing from one’s shepherd and/or pastor. I remember one young man keeping a picture of the pastor next to his bed, and young people having to ask blessings from the leaders of their cell groups to date others.

Now, the spiritual structure and ethos I have sketched, or something akin to it, was replicated in the EOC and indeed in other ex-evangelical Orthodox communities I have

encountered throughout America and Canada. Indeed, some of these convert parishes often will even have anomalous liturgical peculiarities, such as the passing of the peace or speaking (what are traditionally) all-silent priestly prayers at top volume, practices that their pastors claim, often from studying Robert Taft or other liturgical historians, are closer to the practices of the ancient church. Often, the bishop for these Protestant converts was treated as the chief shepherd or, as sometimes happened, a monastic elder, whose word was treated as equal to God's. Yet in contrast, one will also encounter a spirit of extreme parochialism, in which the bishop is completely marginalized and ignored, and only acknowledged when he comes to "check up" on the community (who will serve the liturgy according to their hierarch's wishes only when he is present).

One encounters, then, both extreme obedience to authority, and clashes with it. There was, for example, the case of the EOC parishes of Ben Lomond, California, which clashed with their Antiochian bishops over the remarriage of Fr Joseph Allen (which bothered the EOC's puritan morality), the EOC's promotion of certain restorationist liturgical practices, and their adherence to monastic spirituality and extreme asceticism. Thus, one can see Protestant converts ending up supporting the hierarchism and "elder fever" of some traditional Orthodox countries, but because they were acting out of their own *Protestant* backgrounds. Here we see one of the characteristics we saw above with fundamentalism: a strict insider/outsider boundary, marked by unquestioned patriarchal authorities, and a belief that the body is the keeper of an eternal and authentic ancient Christian teaching (restorationism).

But can we see other characteristics in these convert communities that might be regarded as fundamentalist? I will not belabor the many examples of converts to Orthodoxy who proof text the Fathers and argue for a literal, anti-evolutionary interpretation of Genesis (e.g. the writings of Fr Seraphim Rose of Platina);<sup>22</sup> or who are actively engaged in a culture-wars approach to the faith which includes attacking feminism as an "evil"; or who produce

open letters against the ordination of women to the diaconate as we saw earlier, or theological arguments for headscarves, or write regarding the impurity of menstruating women and the necessity of upholding various traditions concerned with the purification of women; or who attack as a “heretic” anyone who dares call for more detailed theological and pastoral discussion of women’s ordination and committed same-sex unions (as indeed I have done in my own academic work).<sup>23</sup>

#### The Case of an Orthodox Clerical Convert Blogger

But let us now see if Jacobinism or some form of revolutionary politics and an sectarian-utopian eschatological perspective, which Eisenstadt claimed was especially characteristic of religious fundamentalism, can be found amongst convert clergy in the media and online. One immediately sees the restorationism and drive for purity characteristic of much fundamentalism in the popular Orthodox convert blogger and podcaster, Fr Andrew Stephen Damick. Damick was from a family of missionaries. He converted from evangelical Protestantism, was educated at St Tikhon’s Seminary (now led by Fr John Parker)<sup>24</sup> and is now an Antiochian priest. He is far from the crude stereotype of a fundamentalist. He is well-read, albeit in a somewhat eclectic and often superficial sense, and is an engaging writer and speaker, notably writing a series of blogs and podcasts on the spiritual significance of J. R. R. Tolkien. (For reasons unclear to me, many Orthodox fundamentalists often have an obsession with this most Western and most English of modern religious literary movements, the Oxford Inklings.) Damick is the author of the humbly titled *An Introduction to God: Encountering the Divine in Orthodox Christianity* (2014) and *Orthodoxy and Heterodoxy: Finding the Way to Christ in a Complicated Religious Landscape* (2017), which has been so popular that it is now available in a second revised and greatly expanded version. The latter volume even has a website dedicated to it by its author, where the author regularly hosts guest posts.<sup>25</sup> Both



volumes, and many others of like perspective, are published by Ancient Faith Publishing, which is linked to the Antiochian Archdiocese (which absorbed the EOC).

In a May 2012 piece, which is fairly typical for Damick and many like him, especially in the Antiochian Archdiocese and OCA, entitled “Saving the World from Suicide: Localism, Christian Evangelism and the Culture War,” he lays out many of the peculiarities of the conservative form of Orthodox convert fundamentalism. Damick’s piece is premised on support for Rod Dreher with Dreher’s ideas later expressed in *The Benedict Option* (2018). Dreher argues for the notion that because Western Civilization, founded as it was on Christendom, is in moral and ideological collapse, one must now, like the Benedictines of old with their monasteries, turn within to fortified communities which will preserve true Christianity (=Orthodoxy) in the new dark ages, these last times. To quote the back of Dreher’s *The Benedict Option*: “Today, a new post-Christian barbarism reigns. Many believers are blind to it, and their churches are too weak to resist. Politics offers little help in this spiritual crisis. What is needed is the Benedict Option, a strategy that draws on the authority of Scripture and the wisdom of the ancient church. The goal: to embrace exile from the mainstream culture and construct a resilient counterculture.”<sup>26</sup> As we have seen above, Dreher’s influence in conservative and fundamentalist Orthodoxy in North American convert circles has become pervasive.

Damick says that Dreher is right: that conservative Christians have lost the culture war, and that they should use “libertarian strategies” to preserve their “religious liberty” before “they find their churches, businesses, education and even private behavior overwhelmed and even outright persecuted.” We are told, using apocalyptic language, that the “time is coming when Christians will not be allowed merely to tolerate moral dictates that are contrary to their own doctrines but will be expected to endorse and participate in them, or else face real penalties.” The religious liberty that Damick believes has been put at risk by the

courts, and this is an obsession with many Orthodox fundamentalists, is opposition to gay marriage, which was made law in all 50 states of the USA in 2015. Damick says (showing his literary flair by alluding to Orwell's *Nineteen Eighty-Four*) that "Christian doctrine is already thoughtcrime in countries not terribly unlike ours, and I have little reason to believe that we will somehow remain exempt." He says, quoting Dreher, that the "essence of the problem" is the "collapse of Christianity as the foundational bulwark of our civilization." He tells us that this dates not only to before the Sexual Revolution but also before America's founding, in the Enlightenment. It is unclear why this predates the Enlightenment, though, given Damick's own oeuvre (especially his *Orthodoxy and Heresy*), one would assume the culprit is the "Great Schism" which produced the "new religion" of Catholicism. (We see some very sophisticated thinkers espousing ideas similar to this, such as Philip Sherrard,<sup>27</sup> showing once again that Damick is well read, although lacking as much nuance or depth as his sources, and tending to the merely rhetorical utilization of serious ideas).

There is no point, Damick argues, fighting the culture wars and defending Christendom. "Look around, folks. *Christendom has already fallen*. All we have left are the ruins." Typical to this genre of Orthodox fundamentalist rhetoric is the entry of militaristic language. But if the culture wars are finished, then how can one fight, one might ask? Here the writer veers from seeing Orthodox conservatives as insurgent Maoists, fighting in the jungle, to seeing them as potential martyrs, which somehow is identified with fighting "the Machine," localism, Orthodox evangelism, home-schooling, and gardening (Ivan Illich and Wendell Berry are heroes of many of the "Crunchy Cons" (Dreher)<sup>28</sup> or environmentalist anti-establishment romantic converts to Orthodoxy similar to Damick). Damick's flight of rhetoric is a feat of conceptual acrobatics that is admirable, even if it is ultimately superficial and dangerous, as it simply encourages an Eastern-tinged version of Protestant fundamentalist sectarianism and does not get to the deeper issues at stake:

We cannot act any longer as though we are imperial soldiers defending the borders of the empire from the barbarians. We are resistance fighters engaged in a guerrilla battle against an occupying force that conquered us generations ago. Or, if you like, we are now in much the same situation of the Apostles, who had no particular dreams of reforming the government but were instead concerned with getting the light of Gospel into a world covered in darkness. So what, then, do we do? I think we have to continue to speak sanity clearly even in the halls of the insane, and we have to be willing to suffer for it. [...] If there is going to be any hope for Christians in a post-Christendom culture, it can only be found in that primal Apostolic fire that once, long ago, turned the world upside down. We may well have to suffer some martyrdom. But we will also have to show an increasingly inhuman society what it means to be human. That is the real purpose behind a Christian localism—to demonstrate a humanity of love to those who can receive it, who are right next to us and mostly only know the Machine. This is also the purpose of our evangelism—not only to save individual souls (though that would be enough!) but also to build a new culture, refounded on the one foundation of Christ. The Church has always been counter-cultural, but in some points in history the contrast with the surrounding culture is greater than others. [...] All this is part of the great worth of homeschooling, pilgrimage, gardening, opting out of the 24/7 entertainment/infotainment culture, knitting church communities more tightly together, and learning all the skills that many of our pioneering forebears had to know for survival.<sup>29</sup>

Orthodox identity, for the ultra-conservative and fundamentalist converts I have described (and Damick is one of the more eloquent and better read of them), is born out of a fear of being polluted by the world and of transgressing tradition, understood as a repository of

unchanging truth and morality. They generally will brook no ambiguity or hermeneutic complexity on issues to do with morality and doctrine (which they often collapse). They need clear, often highly literal readings of the Bible and the Fathers, which mirror the clear lines of Patriarchal authority by which they as converts can understand themselves in relationship to others, and which are often simply borrowed *holus bolus* from their fundamentalist Protestant evangelical backgrounds. Once again, these men, and with a few exceptions they are almost always men, are not crude and uneducated, but very often have a literary flair. But having such literary gifts, which would seem to allow for ambiguity, seems to have no bearing here on the rigid hermeneutic they espouse. Here one remembers, echoing Damick, the work of the erudite and widely read Protestant fundamentalist writer Francis A. Schaeffer (1912-1984)<sup>30</sup> who was at once an intellectual of sorts and a rigid culture warrior brooking no theological ambiguity with a tendency to argue that Christians must form their own radically counter-cultural communities separated from a polluted Western society. Francis Schaeffer's son Frank was briefly an Orthodox fundamentalist in the mid-1990's, with a widely influential and highly polemical publication, *The Christian Activist: A Journal of Orthodox Opinion*. (He now is a self-described "Christian atheist" and political liberal).<sup>31</sup> Orthodox fundamentalism produces a strident reaction to any challenges to their vision: a sort of anti-secular revolutionary politics. Or, if you wish, call it an incense-smelling, post-Christendom movement of resistance fighters preparing for martyrdom!

#### Post-Colonialism, Resentment and Individuation

So much of the fundamentalism I have described amongst North American converts to Orthodoxy exhibits a marked anti-modern *and* anti-western streak. This marks it out, as George Demacopoulos has shown,<sup>32</sup> as but one more an instance of a long post-colonial reaction to the very real cultural imperialism and intellectual and cultural colonization of the Christian East by the West—a reaction that stretches from St Nikodemos the Hagiorite (1749-

1809) and Ivan Kireevsky (1806-1856) to Georges Florovsky (1893-1979), Photios Kontoglou (1895-1965) and Vladimir Lossky (1903-1958). In older neopatristic language, I am talking about the reaction to the “Western” or “Latin” or “Babylonian captivity” of Orthodoxy<sup>33</sup> in a return to the Greek Fathers, church arts, liturgy, and spiritual traditions of the Eastern Orthodox Church. This post-colonial reaction was and is identity-forming in that the recovery/self-formation in the last century of Orthodox identity is a universal Eastern Christian identity, which was the core of Western Christianity. It has been the result of an often unconscious Othering of the West, oblivious to its own dependence on the West and borrowing the West’s own ideas and concepts of “East.” In other words, Orthodoxy has undergone much Eastern self-othering and it is arguable that this includes the denomination of itself as “Eastern” as opposed to some essential notion of the “West”.<sup>34</sup>

We can see this not just in how, as I have argued elsewhere, two of the key theological architects of modern theological visions of Eastern Orthodoxy, Florovsky and Lossky, borrowed their ideas for interpreting the East from Romanticism and the very Western-tainted Russian philosophy they eschewed,<sup>35</sup> but also in how Protestant evangelical converts like Damick regularly repackage Protestant theological notions, from headship to inerrancy (of the Fathers and Scripture), and then pass them off as Orthodox. There has been and continues to be much self-orientalization<sup>36</sup> in this process of Eastern individuation.

The difficulty of all of this long movement is that it is unconscious to its dependence on the West. We don’t creatively choose our identity, but let it happen to us in reaction, fear, and violent hatred of the Other. We are oblivious to the fact that much of this identity is sometimes stolen from Western sources. There is little awareness that Orthodoxy is Orthodox now as *East*, the remnant of a pre-modern vision of the Christian narrative, precisely in its situatedness in the West, which has become the totalizing modern horizon across the globe so that, arguably, Islam, Buddhism, and other non-Western religions all have struggles similar

to the Eastern Orthodox.<sup>37</sup> Ironically, as Westerners, Orthodox converts have taken on as their own the Eastern post-colonial reactions of cradle Orthodox members in the West. In a way, they take on a history, a narrative, and an identity, and, with them, centuries of resentment against an Other that is not theirs, historically, but which helps them articulate simultaneously their sense of dislocation in the modern West and their desire for a pre-modern home beyond the modern. Thus, we see the bizarre sight of Western converts getting emotionally worked up about the Sack of Constantinople by the Western crusaders during the Fourth Crusade in 1204, or, say the fact that the Orthodox Church was heavily latinized under the Polish Commonwealth and the contemporary existence of “Uniate” churches.

But what this should lead us to see is that “the West” and “the Orthodox East” are socially constructed tropes that, though they certainly have a foundation in history, are better understood as part of a modern myth of a pre-modern Christian vision of a world beyond the totalizing horizon of modernity. By myth, I do not mean a falsehood, but a sustained vision or story that helps us structure reality. This vision is open alike to the cradle or ethnic Orthodox, who is shaped by a continuously existing traditional Orthodox culture (here I do not count the churches of the Soviet bloc which are special cases of conversion after the break of Communism) and to converts who are grafted into the tree of the Church. The “Fall of the West” and the corruption of the “modern” found in so much convert ideology (and we saw version of it in Damick and Dreher) is, then, the *mythos* or tragic horizon of modern Orthodox Western self-captivity. The point of such myths is to provide us with a narrative explaining the origins of our own inner spiritual malaise as Orthodox, but also as Westernised beings, through a totalizing description, what Nietzsche called a “horizon,” of a civilizational vision that is tragically ravaged by a sort of ontological-cum-spiritual virus.

We are thereby directed to another mode of life, another horizon and vision, one of health and joy, which supposedly existed before the Fall—that is, the rise of the West—and

of which we can barely conceive as it goes beyond our present horizon's limitations, the absolute presuppositions of our present existence.<sup>38</sup> Historical myths of this sort are goads to action, tools of self-critique, and inspirers of transformation spiritually and politically. To criticize the West and to attack the modern, as so much convert fundamentalism does, drawing on Orthodox writers past and present, is to trace one's own psychic and personal history, one's place in the common myth, with all its sin and brokenness. It is, in the midst of the Fall, to turn in repentance from this distorted mode of life and attempt to grasp after another horizon beyond one's present, which is a sort of civilizational paradise or Orthodox East, but a paradise that is a living goal for transforming and transfiguring every aspect of reality from the self to the monetary system. Here one might see the weaving of the *mythos* of the Fall as the rise of the West, and the vision of Eastern Orthodoxy, the Church triumphant, lying just beyond the present horizon, as akin to Dante's allegorical narrative of the ascent of Mount Purgatory, with the earthly Paradise at its peak, from which one jumps off to heaven, ready for the stars.

So Damick, in a way, is (partially) right. I agree with him and other Orthodox fundamentalists (both liberal and conservative) that Eastern Orthodoxy is in some sense a world apart from the West which has lost its way, but not for the reasons that he and the Dreheres of the world espouse. Their mistake is in not seeing that they are acting out of a myth of Eastern Orthodoxy, albeit a necessary one, a life-saving one, which must be adapted according to need, context, and the circumstances of the Church to transform the West precisely as Eastern Orthodox in the West grasping towards an alternate modernity illumined by Orthodox tradition. Or to quote a great American poet who knew about the value of both myths and conversion (for Stevens converted to Catholicism on his death bed): "To find the real,\ To be stripped of every fiction except one,\ The fiction of an absolute".<sup>39</sup>

Conclusion

I am conscious that this short study seems to be an unrelenting attack on conservative and fundamentalist converts to Orthodoxy in America. I am not anti-conservative. (Indeed, I try to get to an Orthodox monastery at least once a year and I am finishing writing this while on retreat on the Holy Island of Patmos in the midst of the pandemic sweeping the world, ravaging the West in the autumn of 2020. My first visit to Athos, the Holy Mountain, was during my honeymoon.) It would be a mistake to overlook the insights we can gain from some of these fundamentalist converts like Damick, my brothers in arms, which is that Orthodoxy retains (in its worship and spirituality) a non-Western Christian vision that is unique and distinct. It is a symbolic world apart from the West. I am not in any way advocating a marginalization of Orthodoxy, or questioning its unique status as the “Body of the Living Christ”<sup>40</sup> to which all are called to unite. Where the fundamentalist conservative converts are wrong, and this essay was a short exercise in elaborating this point, is in failing to see that we cannot escape the West (even into a Benedict Option of alternative Crunch-Con living as Damick espouses); and that any identity as Orthodox, as different, as distinct, as unique, as apart, as Eastern, is in a dialectical relationship to the West. Such an Orthodox Eastern identity—and this is what so many fundamentalist Orthodox, converts and cradle, are blind to—is never ever static, appealing to an essential and an eternal tradition that is absolutely clear and non-complex. Rather, Orthodox Eastern identity always exists in the midst of the stream of modernity that is the West, even if we are attempting to move against the current. This is the key Russian émigré idea of *zhivoe predanie* (living tradition). But such a movement against the times, being separate in a world which is now swallowed by the West, such a living myth of Eastern Orthodoxy, requires creativity. It requires an approach to tradition and the world which sees tradition as flexible enough to embrace that world in all its challenges, in all its waywardness, and in all its goodness, for “whatever is true, whatever is honorable, whatever is just, whatever is pure, whatever is lovely, whatever is gracious, if there is any



excellence, if there is anything worthy of praise” in the modern Western world, we are called, Eastern Orthodox, convert and cradle alike, to affirm them (Phil. 4:8).

## Notes

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<sup>1</sup> Edith M. Humphrey, “Fundamentalism: Not Just a Cautionary Tale,” in *Fundamentalism or Tradition: Christianity after Secularism*, eds. Aristotle Papanikolaou and George Demacopoulos (New York: Fordham University Press, 2019), 133-151 at 147.

<sup>2</sup> Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, eds. (1991), *Fundamentalisms Observed* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991) and R. Scott Appleby, “Fundamentalists, Rigorists, and Traditionalists: An Unorthodox Trinity” in *Fundamentalism or Tradition: Christianity after Secularism*, eds. Aristotle Papanikolaou and George Demacopoulos (New York: Fordham University Press, 2019), 165-179.

<sup>3</sup> Yet see recently Appleby, 174-179 and compare George Demacopoulos, “‘Traditional Orthodoxy’ as a Postcolonial Movement”, *Journal of Religion*, 97.4 (2017): 475-499. Vasilios N. Makrides, “‘The Barbarian West’: A Form of Orthodox Christian Anti-Western Critique” in Andrii Krawchuk and Thomas Bremer, eds., *Eastern Orthodox Encounters of Identity and Otherness: Values, Self-Reflection, Dialogue* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 141-158, “Orthodox Christian Rigorism: Attempting to Delineate a Multifaceted Phenomenon”, *Interdisciplinary Journal for Religion and Transformation in Contemporary Society*, 2.2 (July 2016): 216-252, Nikolaos Asproulis, “‘Orthodoxy or Death’: Religious Fundamentalism during the Twentieth and Twenty-first Centuries” in *Fundamentalism or Tradition: Christianity after Secularism*, eds. Aristotle Papanikolaou and George Demacopoulos (New York: Fordham University Press, 2019), 180-203 and Paul Ladouceur, “Neotraditionalist ecclesiology in Orthodoxy”, *Scottish Journal of Theology*, 72.4 (2019): 398-413.

<sup>4</sup> Bob Altemeyer and Bruce Hunsberger, “Authoritarianism, religious fundamentalism, quest, and prejudice”, *The International Journal for the Psychology of Religion*, 2.2 (1994): 113-133 and “A Revised Religious Fundamentalism Scale: The Short and Sweet of It”, *The International Journal for the Psychology of Religion*, 14.1 (2004): 47-54.

<sup>5</sup> S. N. Eisenstadt, *Fundamentalism, Sectarianism and Revolution: The Jacobin Dimension of Modernity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 2.

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<sup>6</sup> S. N. Eisenstadt, “The Jacobin Component of Fundamentalist Movements” in *Comparative Civilizations and Multiple Modernities*, 2 Vols. (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2003), 2: 937-51.

<sup>7</sup> Eisenstadt, 2: 947.

<sup>8</sup> Eisenstadt, 2: 948.

<sup>9</sup> Alexei D. Krindatch, “Second (2020) Census of American Orthodox Christian Churches”, <<https://orthodoxreality.org/latest/second-census-2020-of-american-orthodox/>> (last accessed: August 2, 2021). (I am grateful to Dr Krindatch for his guidance in private correspondence on statistical queries and details of the ‘2020 Census of American Orthodox Parishes’).

<sup>10</sup> Alexei D. Krindatch, *Evolving Visions of the Orthodox Priesthood in America* (Berkeley, CA: Patriarch Athenagoras Orthodox Institute, 2006), 6.

<sup>11</sup> See Denis J. M. Bradley, “Dreher Vs. Schmemmann: Church, World, Mission”, February 16, 2021, <<https://publicorthodoxy.org/2021/02/16/dreher-vs-schmemmann/>> (last accessed: August 4, 2021), Seth Studer, “Rod Dreher Brings His Culture War to Orthodoxy”, December 17, 2020, <<https://orthodoxdiary.com/2020/12/17/rod-dreher-brings-his-culture-war-to-orthodoxy/>> (last accessed: August 4, 2021) and Giacomo Sanfilippo, “St. Vladimir’s Seminary Goes Stark Raving Mad”, December 16, 2020, <<https://orthodoxyindialogue.com/2020/12/16/st-vladimirs-seminary-goes-stark-raving-mad/>> (last accessed: August 4, 2021).

<sup>12</sup> “38<sup>th</sup> Annual Schmemmann Lecture draws hundreds to online event”, January 30, 2021, <<https://www.svots.edu/headlines/38th-annual-schmemmann-lecture-draws-hundreds-online-event>> (last accessed: August 4, 2021).

<sup>13</sup> See Rod Dreher, *Live Not By Lies: A Manual for Christian Dissidents* (NY: Sentinel, 2020); For commentary see Seth Studer, “Live Not By Lies,” Part 1”, February 9, 2021,

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<<https://orthodoxdiary.com/2021/02/09/live-not-by-lies-part-1/>> (last accessed: August 5, 2021), “Live Not By Lies,” Part 2”, February 26, 2021, <<https://orthodoxdiary.com/2021/02/26/live-not-by-lies-part-2/>> (last accessed: August 5, 2021), “Live Not By Lies,” Part 3”, March 3, 2021, <<https://orthodoxdiary.com/2021/03/03/live-not-by-lies-part-3/>> (last accessed: August 5, 2021) and “Rod Dreher’s Spiritual Blind Spots”, July 1, 2021, <<https://orthodoxdiary.com/2021/07/01/rod-dreher-s-spiritual-blind-spots/>> (last accessed: August 5, 2021).

<sup>14</sup> Rod Dreher, “Dreher Gives Schmemmann Lecture”, February 4, 2021, <<https://www.theamericanconservative.com/dreher/dreher-gives-schmemmann-lecture/>> (last accessed: August 5, 2021).

<sup>15</sup> See Alexander F. C. Webster and Darrell Cole, *The Virtue of War: Reclaiming the Classic Christian Traditions East and West* (Salisbury, MA: Regina Orthodox Press, 2004) and Alexander F. C. Webster, “Justifiable War as a ‘Lesser Good’ in Eastern Orthodox Moral Tradition,” *St. Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly* 47, no. 1 (2003): 3–57; But compare Perry T. Hamalis and Valerie A. Karras, eds., *Orthodox Christian Perspectives on War*, (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 2018).

<sup>16</sup> See Bradshaw, “David Bradshaw Reviews Two Conferences on Gender and Sexuality.”

<sup>17</sup> “A Public Statement on Orthodox Deaconesses by Concerned Clergy and Laity”, January 15, 2018, <<https://www.aoiusa.org/a-public-statement-on-orthodox-deaconesses-by-concerned-clergy-and-laity-2/>> (last accessed: August 5, 2021).

<sup>18</sup> See David Bradshaw, “David Bradshaw Reviews Two Conferences on Gender and Sexuality”, June 15, 2020, <<https://iota-web.org/2020/06/15/david-bradshaw-reviews-conferences/>> (last accessed: August 5, 2021).

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<sup>19</sup> “Second Day—Parallel Session—Live from the Orthodoxy Academy of Crete—2<sup>nd</sup> International Conference on Digital Media and Pastoral Care”, June 19, 2018, <[https://m.facebook.com/story.php?story\\_fbid=996053263897628&id=718911278278496&refsrc=https%3A%2F%2Fm.facebook.com%2F718911278278496%2Fvideos%2F996053263897628%2F&\\_rdr](https://m.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=996053263897628&id=718911278278496&refsrc=https%3A%2F%2Fm.facebook.com%2F718911278278496%2Fvideos%2F996053263897628%2F&_rdr)> (last accessed: August 5, 2021).

<sup>20</sup> Fr Oliver Herbel, *Turning to Tradition: Converts and the Making of an American Orthodox Church* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) and “Resolving the Tension between Tradition and Restorationism in American Orthodoxy,” in *Fundamentalism or Tradition: Christianity after Secularism*, eds. Aristotle Papanikolaou and George Demacopoulos (New York: Fordham University Press, 2019), 152-164.

<sup>21</sup> See the famously scathing review: Archimandrite Ephrem Lash, Review of *The Orthodox Study Bible: New Testament and Psalms*, *Sourozh*, 54 (Nov 1993): 42-49. Found at:

<[https://web.archive.org/web/20160405103003/http://www.anastasis.org.uk/bible\\_review.htm](https://web.archive.org/web/20160405103003/http://www.anastasis.org.uk/bible_review.htm)> (last accessed: August 2, 2021).

<sup>22</sup> See Fr Seraphim Rose, *Genesis, Creation and Early Man: The Orthodox Christian Vision* (Platina, California: St Herman of Alaska Brotherhood, 2000).

<sup>23</sup> See for example the attempt to respond as Orthodox to LGBTQ+/sexual diversity: Brandon Gallaher, “Tangling with Orthodox Tradition in the Modern West: Natural Law, Homosexuality, and Living Tradition”, *The Wheel*, 13/14 (Spring/Summer 2018): 50-63 and the British Council Bridging Voices joint Exeter-Fordham project led by Brandon Gallaher, Aristotle Papanikolaou and Gregory Tucker, “Contemporary Eastern Orthodox Identity and the Challenges of Pluralism and Sexual Diversity in a Secular Age”, <<https://www.fordham.edu/orthodoxy/bridgingvoices>> (last accessed: August 5, 2021).

<sup>24</sup> Matthew Markewich, “An Interview with Fr Andrew Stephen Damick on *An*

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*Introduction to God*”, Found at <<https://bookstore.jordanville.org/blog/an-interview-with-fr-andrew-stephen-damick-on-an-introduction-to-god/>>, (last accessed: August 2, 2021).

<sup>25</sup> Fr Andrew Stephen Damick, *An Introduction to God: Encountering the Divine in Orthodox Christianity* (Chesterton, IN: Ancient Faith Publishing, 2014) and *Orthodoxy and Heterodoxy: Finding the Way to Christ in a Complicated Religious Landscape*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Ed. (Chesterton, IN: Ancient Faith Publishing, 2017)

<sup>26</sup> Rod Dreher, *The Benedict Option* (New York: Penguin Rand House, 2018).

<sup>27</sup> See Philip Sherrard, *The Greek East and the Latin West: A Study in the Christian Tradition* (London: Clarendon Press, 1959)

<sup>28</sup> Rod Dreher, *Crunchy Cons: How Birkenstocked Burkeans, Gun-Loving Organic Gardeners, Evangelical Free-Range Farmers, Hip Homeschooling Mamas, Right-Wing Nature Lovers, and their Diverse Tribe of Countercultural Conservatives Plan to Save America (Or at Least the Republican Party)* (NY: Crown Forum, 2006).

<sup>29</sup> Fr Stephen Andrew Damick, “Saving the World from Suicide: Localism, Christian Evangelism and the Culture War”, May 21, 2012, <<https://blogs.ancientfaith.com/asd/2012/05/21/localism-christian-evangelism-and-the-culture-war/>> (last accessed: August 2, 2021).

<sup>30</sup> Francis Schaeffer, *The Complete Works of Francis A. Schaeffer*, 5 vols. (Westchester, Ill.: Crossway Books, 1983).

<sup>31</sup> Frank Schaeffer, *Crazy for God: How I Grew Up as One of the Elect, Helped Found the Religious Right, and Lived to Take All (or Almost All) of it Back* (NY: Carroll & Graf, 2007) and *Why I am an Atheist Who Believes in God: How to give love, create beauty and find peace* (North Charleston, South Carolina: Create Space Independent Publishing Platform, 2014)

<sup>32</sup> See Demacopoulos, “‘Traditional Orthodoxy’ as a Postcolonial Movement.”

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<sup>33</sup> *pseudomorphosis*: Brandon Gallaher and Paul Ladouceur, eds., *The Patristic Witness of Georges Florovsky: Essential Writings* (London: T & T Clark, 2019), 4, n.12.

<sup>34</sup> See Christopher L. Johnson, “‘He Has Made the Dry Bones Live’: Orientalism’s Attempted Resuscitation of Eastern Christianity,” *Journal of the American Academy of Religion*, 82.3 (2014): 811-840 and Zachary Ugolnik “Names Matter: How to Better Represent the Orthodox Churches in Textbooks and the Academy”, *Journal of Religion*, 96.4 (2016): 506-543.

<sup>35</sup> See Brandon Gallaher, “‘Waiting for the Barbarians’: Identity and Polemicism in the Neo-Patristic Synthesis of Georges Florovsky’, *Modern Theology*, 27.4 (October 2011): 659-691 and “The ‘Sophiological’ Origins of Vladimir Lossky’s Apophaticism”, *Scottish Journal of Theology*, 66.3 (July 2013): 278-298.

<sup>36</sup> See Johnson, ‘He Has Made the Dry Bones Live’.”

<sup>37</sup> See Brandon Gallaher, “Orthodoxy and the West—The Problem of Orthodox Self-Criticism in Christos Yannaras” in *Polis, Ontology, Ecclesial Event: Engaging with Christos Yannaras’ Thought*, ed. Sotiris Mitralaxis (Cambridge: James Clarke & Co, 2018), 206-225.

<sup>38</sup> George Grant, *Time As History*, Massey Lectures, Ninth Series (Toronto: Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 1974 [1969]), 29-30.

<sup>39</sup> Wallace Stevens, “Notes Towards a Supreme Fiction” in *The Collected Poems of Wallace Stevens* (New York: Vintage, 1990), 380-408 at 404.

<sup>40</sup> Georges Florovsky, “The Body of the Living Christ: An Orthodox Interpretation of the Church”, trans. Robert M. Arida in John Chryssavgis and Brandon Gallaher, eds., *The Living Christ: The Theological Legacy of Georges Florovsky*, (London: T & T Clark-Bloomsbury, 2021), 423-484.