TRANSLATION AND THE COLD WAR

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INTRODUCTION

The chief battle of the Cold War was fought over the hearts and minds of citizens on both sides of the Iron Curtain. While the Cold War is generally characterised as a conflict between capitalist and communist powers, the cultural cold war was a battle fought not only between these opposing sides, but also, even primarily, on the home front: governments in the USSR and the West were preoccupied with persuading their own citizens of both the merits of their own political systems and the evils of the opposing side’s. Translation, a key way in which a foreign ‘other’ can be represented to a domestic audience, was intimately bound up with cultural policies and propaganda in the West and East. This chapter will consider how translation was used by the authorities in both the USSR and the West to shape the image of the ‘other’ in various aspects of the cultural cold war, in projects largely funded by or at least connected to government. It will examine how translation and translators played a role in both cooperation and competition between East and West, while at the same time engaging with translation on their own terms and with their own agendas.

It is understood that in the USSR that the State initiated and funded much cultural activity; although ‘the West’ is a far loosely term than ‘the USSR’, referring to a transatlantic constellation of countries united in their opposition to Soviet Communism, the cooperation between governments and intelligence agencies created an organized alliance with defined policies and objectives, and which collaborated on specific projects. For the purposes of this discussion, the term ‘the West’ will refer to this cooperation, led by but not entirely controlled by the USA and specifically the CIA.

TRANSLATION IN THE USSR

The representation of the West in the USSR was inevitably shaped by the political and cultural attitude towards Western Europe and the USA. Samantha Sherry has identified how the USSR’s
attitude towards the West was a complex combination of a rejection of Western free markets, 
capitalism and bourgeois culture, but at the same time emulation of high culture and technological 
superiority (Sherry 2013: 2). In the sphere of culture, and especially literature, the USSR’s difficulty 
in working out which elements of Western culture were acceptable and which were not illustrates 
the nuances of the relationship. On the one hand, the West was seen as bourgeois, decadent and 
unproductive. This line had been taken since the early days of the Revolution and was clearly set out 
at the Writers’ Congress of 1934, with attacks on James Joyce, for example, as a decadent writer 
(Scott 1977: 150–163). On the other hand, the Soviets did not reject the Western canon of literature, 
upon which their own culture and ideals of literature and culture rested. Giants such as 
Shakespeare, Dante and Cervantes were permanent features of translation publishing; and in terms 
of literary form, much of Soviet literature was indebted to the nineteenth-century. Soviet literature 
from the 1930s onwards was heavily biased towards the Realist novel, with models such as Dickens 
and the Russian greats Tolstoy and Dostoevskii as immediate precursors. Not only was this Western 
cultural tradition crucial as a precursor to the revolutionary thinking of the late nineteenth century 
and then the weighty tomes of socialist realist novels, it was also the foundation of high culture that, 
by the onset of the Cold War, had come to be seen as part of the education of the ordinary Soviet 
citizen. Particularly anxious not to appear an uncultured or parochial culture itself, the USSR boasted 
that it was ‘the best-read nation’ of the world, and, in the later Soviet period, it was not uncommon 
to find Soviet citizens who had themselves become convinced of at least elements of this cultural 
superiority complex, claiming, for example, that they knew English poetry better than the English 
themselves.

Since Western literature could not be rejected outright as ideologically harmful, yet was also 
deemed to contain decadent and bourgeois writers, the Soviet cultural authorities had to police the 
USSR’s ‘cultural borders’, ensuring the wrong material did not filter through. For this reason, 
translators came to be seen by the Soviet state as ‘ideological fighters’, engaged in a war against 
harmful, Western influences. As Sherry summarises,
Soviet translation was not [...] simply a ‘window on the West’; it did not present to the Soviet reader an uninterrupted view onto foreign lands but, controlled by censorship, sought to present a suitable, ideologically correct version of the West to readers. (Sherry 2013: 173)

The system of censorship combined with other processes less prescriptive and not officially organized, but no less effective: the selection and editing work done by editorial committees and the self-censorship exercised by translators themselves, all too aware of the often unwritten rules of what could appear in print. The combination formed a fairly effective filter of Western literature available to Soviet readers, but the details of what was available changed over time, as Soviet policy grew more liberal or more reactionary. The beginning of the Cold War coincided with late Stalinism, when Soviet politics were dominated by xenophobia and isolationism. After 1953, however, and especially after 1956 saw the introduction of the Thaw, a politically rather liberal period under the leadership of Nikita Khrushchev, foreign literature returned to the USSR.

Authors whose works were translated and published in the Thaw period were in many cases politically sympathetic towards the USSR: poets such as the Chilean Pablo Neruda and the Turkish Nazim Hikmet were feted, for example. Some foreign communist writers such as the Australians James Aldridge and Jack Lindsay, both of whom lived in England, were published more widely and became more famous in translation in the USSR than in their own countries. But the USSR needed to publish a wider range of writers than this: readers wanted access to contemporary world literature, and anxiety about cultural parochialism meant the authorities too saw benefit to translating and publishing selected writers. Among the landmark publications of the Thaw period were some works of Ernest Hemingway, beginning with The Old Man and the Sea in 1955; the most popular authors in translation also included Erich Maria Remarque and Heinrich Böll (Friedberg 1977: 66). Even under Leonid Brezhnev’s leadership (1965–1982), a period characterized often as one of stagnation and cautious re-Stalinization, the publication of foreign literature continued, with a major landmark in the publication of Kafka in translation first in 1965.
Aside from such landmarks, the shape of foreign literary canons in Soviet translations betrays the selection criteria that were in operation; not surprisingly, these have much in common with the Soviet Socialist Realism that governed domestic literary production. There were, most obviously, political proscriptions; these included any criticism of the USSR or Soviet communism, and any positive comments regarding white Russian émigrés. It was not the case that texts had actively to support Soviet communism, of course, but there was clearly preference given to texts that were critical of the West and especially America. Given the tradition of liberal writers criticizing their own states and systems, and since there was very little censorship operating in the West, there were many authors to choose from. Classics of Soviet translation of the Cold War period include Salinger’s *Catcher in the Rye*, the novels of William Faulkner, and of John Updike. The themes of racism in the USA, in particular, but also of social inequality and deprivation were welcome to the USSR’s propaganda goals of showing the social and political failings of the Western democracies.

Other proscriptions under Socialist Realism, found also in the selection and publication of translations, included overt sexual references and obscene language. This was a particular challenge for translators, since many Western texts that they wanted to translate included both (Sherry 2015: 124–32). Censorship also concerned the form of literary works, though there was far more lenience in the treatment of foreign texts than Soviet. Works which were experimental in their literary form could be considered as decadent, indulging in the bourgeois preoccupation of art for art’s sake. Ironically enough, outside the USSR, experiment in form – especially in poetry but also in prose – was often associated with radical political ideas, and thus many writers sympathetic to communism around the world were producing work that was not seen as socialist realist. Scholarship has shown, that many of these works did in fact appear in translation in the USSR, and the translation of more experimental poetic form in some cases prompted discussions of the Russian tradition of experimental poetry, all but anathematized during the Stalin period (Zavialov 2008; Lygo 2013).
Soviet involvement in the third world was reflected also in the literature published in translation. Vociferous in its opposition to Western imperialism, the USSR was keen to promote its own meddling and bids for power and influence as acts of liberation and support for anti-colonial movements. The translation and publication of writers from newly independent countries and those engaged in anticolonial wars was politically an important part of literature translated for the Soviet domestic readership, calculated to shape understanding of world politics and in particular the struggle of the third world against the exploitative capitalist West; authors from Africa and South-East Asia, were often featured in anthologies or selections in a journal publication of works taken from one country or region. Though some were famous as writers, including for example the Moroccan writer Mohammed Aziz Lahbabi and the South African novelist Dan Jacobson, others were politically correct choices, probably made through Party organizations and hierarchy, and presented in groups that could be characterised even as vaguely as ‘Voices of two continents’ including writers from Bangladesh, Ivory Coast, Egypt, India, Iran, South Africa, North and South Vietnam, Nepal, Pakistan and Japan.

This is not to say, however, that the state had absolute control over what eventually appeared in print. As with other processes in the USSR, the selection and translation of foreign texts for domestic consumption was subject to negotiation between various parties. In particular the Soviet authorities’ presentation and interpretations of Western culture were at once both dependent on and also challenged by the intelligentsia, from which most Soviet translators were drawn. The state did not have total control over the process. Contrary to the official image of translators as ideological fighters, many in fact saw themselves as the rightful heirs to and carriers of Western culture, and in opposition to the state-sponsored values of collectivism and cultural superiority (Baer 2010). It is well known that many talented Russian writers of the Soviet period retreated into translation and children’s literature during periods when culture was subject to particular oppression and official publication was simply closed to many writers: the censorship of translation was relatively lenient, certainly in comparison with original literature in Russian. This was
perhaps most notable as a phenomenon from the late 1930s to the early 1950s, when writers such as Boris Pasternak and Anna Akhmatova were translating, but it existed before and after this period as well. Translators worked hard to get as much past the censor as they could, sometimes by exercising self-censorship, and by negotiating with the demands made by editors and censors.

This translation work could provide a Soviet writer with much-needed income and an invaluable occupation, to avoid accusations of parasitism; but its significance to the intelligentsia was more than this, and contributed to its identity as defined in opposition to – or at least distinct from – the Soviet authorities. Brian James Baer has argued that the translators who worked on Western literature, in particular the classics but also modern works that were not propagandistic or Marxist, saw their project as a moral or ethical task unsullied by the State’s ideology. He argues that ‘[w]hat was perceived and celebrated in intelligentsia circles as translators’ selfless devotion to the “word” and to the genius of individual artists was put forward as an alternative to the active, collective heroism of socialist realism’ (Baer 2010: 151). Figures such as Tatiana Gnedich, translator of Lord Byron’s *Don Juan*, and I. Likhachev, translator of Herman Melville and Emily Dickinson, both carried out their work in prison, and preserved it secretly until they were released and eventually able to publish it (Baer 2010: 163–4). Members of the intelligentsia came to see such work as serving not the Soviet state, but the higher cause of culture.

The significance of translation in the USSR as a cultural activity is underlined by Sherry in her account of unofficial ‘samizdat’ (self-published) translations of foreign works not passed for translation or publication in the USSR (Sherry 2015). George Orwell, particularly, was politically *persona non grata* for his criticism of the USSR and his works were available to Soviet readers only through unofficial and self-published translations. While the act of translating and self-publishing a text such as *Animal Farm* or *1984* constituted a political crime under Soviet law, Sherry points out that the motivations of individuals involved, even in the case of Orwell’s very political texts,
should not be understood only as representations of dissidence; notwithstanding these ‘underground’ activities, those who produced such texts continued to engage with the state where necessary in other spheres of their lives. Additionally, these texts demonstrate the careful attention of the translator to literary factors, suggesting that the transmission of ‘political’ information was, although important, not the sole aim for the translator(s). (Sherry 2015: 164)

Sherry’s examination of the translations of Orwell remind us that as an interface between cultures, at the juncture of literature, culture, language and politics, translation should not be seen reductively as a solely political activity, even in the heavily politicised context of the Cold War. Much of the censorship of foreign works was only political in the broadest sense: texts could be proscribed from Soviet culture on grounds of their aesthetics, or their vindication – explicit or implicit – of art for art’s sake, or of elite or hermetic literature. The battle to get literature into translation in the USSR was often not so much part of Cold War politics, but of an internal battle over intellectual culture. For religious, literary and political underground groups in the USSR, translation was similarly not necessarily in itself as an act of political resistance or the self-conscious alignment with the West, but more a way of evading the censorship and restrictions on life imposed by the Soviet authorities.

For professional translators, the ideals of independence and serving the higher cause of culture were necessarily tempered with pragmatism. The resistance of Soviet translators to be co-opted by the state, and their desire ‘to exist outside the state system and engage in what they conceived of as "pure" literary production’ (Sherry 2015: 39), was in most cases balanced by their professional activity, which often entailed the translation of some pro-Soviet literature either from the Soviet Republics or pro-Soviet foreign writers, often not of the highest quality. Even this did not guarantee protection from accusations of ideologically harmful activity and dangerously pro-western, decadent sympathies however: most famously, Joseph Brodsky’s translation work, evidence for which included some contracts with publishers and also the endorsements of highly-
respected Soviet translators, was not enough to prevent him from being tried and found guilty of parasitism in 1962. Brodsky’s later emigration to the West and prominently anti-Soviet position is an important example of how a writer and translator who started out believing he might find a niche for himself in the Soviet literary establishment, could be pushed by the logic of the binary politics of the Cold War into an increasingly anti-Soviet and pro-Western position.

The Soviet authorities’ concern with manipulating translation extended beyond the domestic readership and the territory of the USSR. One major state publishing house, established in 1931 and named Progress Publishers in 1963, was responsible for publishing Soviet and Russian classical literature translated into foreign languages for distribution outside the USSR. Famous for its publications of the works of Soviet leaders and an extensive list of titles on Marxist theory and Soviet politics in translation, it also produced collections of Soviet literature translated into English and other languages. The translators employed by Progress were often native English speakers who were living in the USSR or other Soviet bloc countries because of their political convictions or marriage or both. These publications, as much as domestic ones, formed part of the USSR’s Cold War cultural diplomacy, shaping the image of the USSR abroad through its cultural exports. The more political titles were arguably less significant in this regard than the more general titles, for while these were likely to be bought by readers already sympathetic to the USSR, literary titles were aimed at a broader readership. And while Progress published the canon of Socialist Realism and publicized writers little known outside the USSR, it is also true that it included poets who were well known abroad and not always published at home. In a 1976 Progress anthology The Tender Muse (Kazakova 1976), for example, the poetry is largely apolitical, and the prominent inclusion of the figure of Anna Akhmatova, who was seen by many as a representative of pre-revolutionary culture and had fallen out of favour with the authorities in the post-war period, underlines that this is a liberal publication showing Soviet literature to be inclusive and not entirely dominated by politics.
The distributors of Progress books were left-wing bookshops abroad. In London, for example, one important outlet was Collets in Charing Cross Road, which was taken over by prominent radical Eva Collet Reckitt in 1934 and flourished until the collapse of the USSR. The USSR’s relatively straightforward access to readers in the West via such shops gave it a considerable advantage over Western governments, which had no channel for distributing literature in the USSR that was not state approved or censored. It is true that translations of some works were smuggled into the USSR and then reproduced and distributed clandestinely through samizdat, but these were rather few. George Orwell’s Animal Farm, for example, was one significant work to be smuggled in (Sherry 2015: 160–3). This asymmetry of the Soviet bloc’s authoritarian regimes and the West’s pluralist society certainly presented Western intelligence agencies with challenges, even though it was this very contrast between the societies that they sought to draw attention to and use to criticise the Soviet system.

TRANSLATION IN THE WEST

Notwithstanding the efforts of individual translators, the state’s control of both the censorship and publication of Soviet translations places them firmly in the realm of state-controlled cultural production. In the West, by contrast, translation like most cultural activities was fragmented, with publishers, translators, academics and other specialists, and émigrés all involved in the process. In the Cold War battle for political, military and also cultural domination, Western intelligence agencies, led by the CIA, came to believe that without their intervention in this pluralist and fragmented cultural sphere, the Soviets would be able ruthlessly to exploit the West’s lack of ideological coherence and unity (Stonor Saunders 1999: 47–56). They feared it would use Western left-wing and communist groups to promote communism and portray the West as culturally and politically inferior and inadequate. Led by the CIA, they intervened in the process of translation and publishing to a remarkable degree in their efforts to promote Western political values and denigrate Soviet communism.
Although the US, British and other Western governments of the Cold War era cannot be said to have subscribed to a defined ideology in the way that the Soviet state did, they were all anti-communist, and this opposition united them. They also feared neutrality in the Cold War conflict, seeing this indifference as abetting communism and failing to challenge its threat to Western values and way of life. Cooperation between intelligence agencies became an important element of the Cold War, and facilitated significant cultural initiatives, often funded by the newly-established CIA. As the CIA established its modus operandi, its directors and staff were concerned by what they judged to be an uneven playing field, in which the USSR was not at all honest about its use of front organizations. The Congress for Cultural Freedom was conceived as an answer to Soviet tactics: an umbrella for many front organizations which would give the West a chance to challenge Soviet arguments about the inconsistencies and failures of Western liberal democracies, and, at the same time, promote US-style free market capitalism (Stonor Saunders 1999: 86—9). It targeted in particular the ‘non-communist left’ with its propaganda and events. An important part of the Congress’s activity was its publishing project, which began with Der Monat in Berlin, and soon after continued with what would become the Congress’s flagship magazine Encounter published in London, but with joint English and American editorship. As the Congress grew, developing many branches across the world, its publications multiplied to include monthly magazines in Mexico City, Rio de Janeiro, Vienna, Paris, Sydney, Mumbai, Rome and Kampala (Rubin 2012: 9); all were united by anticommunism, and the mission to challenge neutrality in the Cold War conflict.

Encounter and other Congress magazines set out at least partly to convey the sophistication of American culture to Western Europe, countering Soviet claims to cultural superiority and outdated assumptions that America was good at making hamburgers and labour-saving devices but fell short of any achievements in high culture (Stonor Saunders 1999: 30–31). But they also aimed to give coherence and shape to an intellectual movement ideologically opposed to the USSR, united by belief in Western liberal democracy. It featured work primarily by leading American and European intellectuals, but also drawn from a wider spectrum of global figures. These intellectuals did not
necessarily require translating, since many were drawn from Western-educated elites, graduates of Oxford, Cambridge and Ivy League universities who wrote in English. But translation was also significant for the magazine: it published literature, essays and articles that were translated were not only works from other Western countries and anti-Soviet writers, but also dissident or nonconformist writers from the USSR. In May 1958, for example, at the time when the Italian publication of Boris Pasternak's novel Dr Zhivago became a sensation (see below), *Encounter* published an article about the history of the novel's fate in the USSR and the West. It was written by Max Hayward, one of the translators working at that time on the English version, and contained extensive quotation from the English translation (Hayward 1968).

The translators for *Encounter* have yet to receive significant academic attention, though more broadly the significance of their work has. The translator Max Hayward was not a chance collaborator in 1968; five years earlier, his translations of Russian literature had already featured in the magazine, and he was connected to the Congress for Cultural Freedom through friendships and professional associates. Hayward was a fellow in Russian at St Anthony's College, Oxford, which was strongly associated with Cold Warriors and spies. His own relationship to Russian culture went much further than the binary politics of the Cold War, but his friendships with émigré Russians and championing of writers in the USSR who had suffered at the hands of the authorities were enough to define him as anti-Soviet in many people's eyes (Fitzpatrick 2012). His friendship with other Oxford figures such as Isaiah Berlin, also in the orbit of the Congress for Cultural Freedom, and with his fellow translator Patricia Blake, married for a time to Nicholas Nabokov of the CCF, also underscore his credentials as a translator for the magazine.

While *Encounter* and the many other Congress publications were cultural in nature, they were part of a larger anti-Communist project, and published materials often had a discernible pro-democratic or anti-communist agenda. Examining specifically the role of translation in the CCF, Andrew Rubin has argued that the apparatus for the Congress – well supplied as it was with
translators, funding, and access to print, radio and other media – enabled the Americans to promote their own version of world literature, and should be understood as a political project. Specifically he suggests that the reach of the Congress, and its ability to publish authors translated into many languages almost simultaneously, meant that it had the power to promote authors who shared their political position to fame and high status very quickly (Rubin 2012: 45). His argument sees this establishment of this world literature the achievement of domination in world culture, and argues that at this point America assumed this dominant global position, taking over from the British Empire.

Rubin’s argument that CIA front organizations were essentially an imperial project has been supported by Wole Soyinka, who commented that the discovery of CIA funding for events such as the All-African Congress of Writers and Intellectuals, Encounter and other magazines retrospectively undermined the sense participants had had at the time of establishing a post-colonial identity (quoted in Rubin 2012: 60). Rubin argues that the CIA’s hidden hand was in effect ‘a way to regulate, sanitize, and co-opt the literature of de-colonization, as it would publish these writers on certain subjects and not others’ (Rubin 2012: 60). This view of the CIA as a pied piper calling the tune, manipulating intellectuals into acting as propagandists for the Western political system and doing its best to silence other voices, echoes that put forward by Francis Stonor Saunders (1999). As in her study, there has been a broader trend of seeing culture as subordinate to politics, of the value of cultural production as tainted by the political forces that enabled it. In contrast with the politically committed culture of the inter-war period, the Cold War, and studies of its culture since the collapse of the USSR as well, tends to see politics as corrupting art and culture.

The explicit political control over cultural production by the Soviet state has been studied in itself, but as a corollary to this there has also been extensive scholarly attention paid to the power of individual agency to temper or subvert state control. In their work on translation Sherry (2015), Baer (2010), Friedberg (1997) and Witte (2016), among others, highlight the extent to which Soviet
translators pursued their own agendas while working within the official structures of official literature. While there has been much made of individuals’ ability to subvert and resist Soviet attempts at control, less consideration has been given to how individuals in the West operated within the context of the CIA’s projects. The question is perhaps complicated by clandestine nature of the CCF project that has led to it attracting particular criticism: although many suspected the agency’s involvement, it was not proven until 1966, when it was exposed by the *New York Times*. In many cases contributors alleged they had had no idea that their intellectual property was serving the purposes of the CIA in its conflict with the USSR, and felt abused retrospectively. Nevertheless, there is surely a question of how far individuals – and indeed organizations – were able to take advantage of the CIA’s funding to pursue their own agendas.

Wilford’s study *The CIA, the British Left and the Cold War* (2003) engages with the question of how far the CIA was successful in co-opting the British Left – including its cultural publications and intellectuals. He suggests that the situation was not monolithic or entirely ‘top-down’, that intellectuals and politicians in Britain attempted to use the CIA’s agenda to further their own causes and were at times actively resistant to attempted control. He suggests, for example, that Stephen Spender used the CIA’s concern to combat neutralism in Britain in order to edit his own English-language magazine, and that Malcolm Muggeridge, while apparently helping redress the imbalance of the CIA’s funding the lion’s share of CCF activities in Britain, sought funding from the Secret Intelligence Services in Britain for the British Society for Cultural Freedom ‘in order to win himself and his friends some independence from American influence’ (210). Most Western writers and translators, however, have yet to be considered in this light.

The role of translators in CCF activities offers rich potential for examining just this question. As in the USSR, where translators were the intellectuals with the understanding and education necessary to identify which foreign texts ought to be translated and presented to Soviet readers, so in the West, those with expert knowledge of Soviet culture and literature were often its translators.
Max Hayward, for example, was one of the most prominent and prolific British translators of Russian-language literature during the 1960s and 1970s. Hayward’s view of Soviet politics was certainly not opposed to CIA anti-communism, and his affiliation at St Anthony’s College Oxford from the late 1950s situates him firmly in a ‘cold warrior’ camp. His correspondence, however, demonstrates that his translation activities were intimately bound up with his wide network of contacts with Russian writers and intellectuals. He not only translated, together with Manya Harari, *Dr Zhivago*, but was also committed to Pasternak personally, and campaigned on behalf of Olga Ivinskaia and her daughter when they were arrested and sent to the Gulag after Pasternak’s death in 1960. He translated Solzhenitsyn’s *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich*, and worked to protect Solzhenitsyn’s reputation in the west at a time when the KGB, for example, was plotting to smear his name and reputation at home and abroad. Furthermore, he corresponded and worked alongside widows and daughters of Isaak Babel and Evgenii Zamiatin, among others, in the translation and publication of Russian writers in exile. While the translation and publication of Russian literature not approved by the Soviet regime was undoubtedly seen as key to the cultural Cold War, at the same time, Hayward’s personal connections and commitment to individuals suggests that his primary motivation was not outside politics, and that the funding and opportunities provided by *Encounter* and funding by the Ford and other Foundations was welcome help in furthering his aims (Hayward Archive, St Anthony’s College, Oxford).

Hayward worked on several projects with his close friend and fellow translator Patricia Blake. She was certainly no stranger to the CCF and its CIA contacts, having been married to Nicolas Nabokov, general secretary of the CCF from 1951 to 1967; with connections and inside knowledge, it appears that she was instrumental in finding funding for projects such as the translations of Andrei Voznesenskii’s poetry collection *Antiworlds* (*Voznesenskii* 1964) by contemporary American poets (*Voznesenskii* 1966). But again, her focus was not necessarily primarily political; Blake was interested in Russian literature and the Soviet literary world for much of her career as a journalist and edited, translated and published several volumes of Soviet poetry. She, Hayward and others did not focus
exclusively on writers outside official Soviet literature. Hayward and Blake’s *Dissonant Voices in Russian Literature* (1962), for example, presents not a canon of writers banished from Soviet publishing, but an alternative to the Soviet canon that features some who paid the ultimate price for their writing alongside others marginalized or associated with the de-Stalinization of the Khrushchev Thaw. As they explain in the introduction:

Most of the voices represented here are dissonant, not in any political sense, but in that they do not speak in that trite and monotonous accent which, owing to the long and bitter years of Stalin’s dictatorship, is still regarded by many people in the West as the sole voice of Soviet literature. The editors have given pride of place to those who were murdered, hounded into silence, or otherwise persecuted (e.g. Babel, Pilniak, and Pasternak) and to some others (e.g. Ehrenburg and Paustovskii) who despite their overtly “conformist” past have attempted, in the years since Stalin, to restore the literary and human values all but destroyed by him. (7)

Their and others’ engagement with and promotion of Soviet literature and culture certainly benefitted from CCF funding, but Hayward, Blake and others’ intellectual projects should not necessarily be seen as dancing to the tune of the CIA.

In fact, what Hayward, Blake and many other intellectuals, translators and academics who were sometimes also involved with the CCF were engaged in doing reminds us that while a certain symmetry between East and West existed in terms of the authorities’ attempts to control and co-opt culture for Cold War purposes, in other respects the countries were asymmetrical. While Western literature translated in the USSR was almost always published at home, literature from the USSR translated and published in the West was often unpublished in the USSR. The desire of Western translators, publishers and readers to discover suppressed voices of the Stalinist period and in particular of the Gulag, was a genuine and understandable response to the propaganda, censorship, distortion of history, and human rights abuses of the USSR. Translations of works of testament about
the Stalin period by authors including Anna Akhmatova, Evgeniya Ginzburg, Nadezhda Mandel’shtam and Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn largely shaped Western understanding of the Terror and the Gulag system until the end of the Soviet period. Beyond this recovery of history, translation also brought to the West and to a readership works of literature not passed for official publication in the USSR, and smuggled out to the West. These works were usually published in émigré journals or presses in Russian first, but many then also published in translation.

The most famous work of literature to be smuggled from the USSR and published abroad during the Cold War was probably Boris Pasternak’s *Dr Zhivago*. It appeared in 1957 in Italian and in 1958 in Russian and English, among other languages. In the same year, the awarding of the Nobel Prize to Pasternak drew the world’s attention to the novel and its publication history and it thus became a symbol of the USSR’s continuing repression of culture and criticism. Recent research has documented how the CIA became interested in the novel and worked to secure its publication in Russian in the West and also its consideration for the Nobel Prize, but this should not suggest that the *Zhivago* affair was orchestrated by the American secret services. Pasternak himself chose to send the manuscript abroad and knew well what the consequences for himself and those close to him could be (Mancosu 2013: 28); the translators of the English version, Manya Harari and Max Hayward, were excited about the emergence of such a significant work of Russian literature, not the chance to score political points in the Cold War (Hayward Archive). Indeed, alongside *Dr Zhivago*, Harvill Press published many volumes of the memoirs of Konstantin Paustovskii, a member of the intelligentsia who was no doubt a liberal but who had also spent his life within the Soviet literary elite. The texts that were translated and published by Harvill, like those in the anthology *Dissonant Voices*, could not be easily divided into Soviet and non-Soviet, and as such acknowledge the spectrum of political positions found within Soviet literature. The picture they paint is not of anti-Soviet literature, but of a far broader conception of Soviet literature than was permitted in the USSR.
The range of Russian literature published in translation in the West was further expanded by the inclusion of works by émigrés from the Soviet regime. Among émigré writers who made a name for themselves internationally perhaps the best known is Vladimir Nabokov, who left Russia shortly after the October Revolution, immigrated to the USA in 1940, and became famous as a writer with the publication of *Lolita* in 1955. In the Cold War period, and especially from the late 1960s onwards, writers of the third wave began to join him in the USA, including the famous names Joseph Brodsky, Vasilii Aksenov, Vladimir Voinovich, Sergei Dovlatov, and the essayists Genis and Vail’, to name but a few. Translation was important as a way to try to reach an audience beyond the small Russian émigré community, and there are interesting trends in self-translation and writing in English that have recently received scholarly attention, in particular the self-translations of Joseph Brodsky. However, the question of the proximity of the Third Wave writers to organizations such as the CCF and the CIA, and the extent of their engagement in the cultural Cold War, is an area not yet fully researched.

As well as literary texts and memoirs, there were non-fictional texts smuggled out of the USSR and published in Russian and in translation in the West. Among these, the writings of human rights campaigners were particularly significant: these were testaments not of the Stalin-era repressions, but of the continuing human rights abuses of the post-Stalin era. By the 1970s, the Soviet Human Rights movement had developed into a large network, and published regularly the now legendary *samizdat* pamphlet *The Chronicle of Current Events*. The *Chronicle* detailed human rights abuses such as abuse in psychiatric prisons, conditions in the Gulag, the mistreatment of Jewish refuseniks (Jews whose applications to emigrate to Israel were refused and who suffered prejudice and disadvantage thereafter) and miscarriages of Soviet justice. Mark Hurst’s research has described how the British scholar Peter Reddaway began translating the Chronicle informally to begin with, and sharing it with those colleagues at the London School of Economics where he worked who had an interest in its contents. He then gathered these *ad hoc* translations into a book, published in 1972, entitled *Uncensored Russia*, which provided an account of the Soviet dissident
movement (Hurst 2014: 3). After this publication, he began to translate the Chronicle regularly for publication by Amnesty International. There is no doubt that Western intelligence agencies would have been happy to fund and facilitate the production of these materials, since their anti-Soviet stance coincided with the authors of the materials. Their support, however, should not detract from the significance and integrity of the campaigners who wanted to communicate what was happening in the USSR to the rest of the world.

Peter Reddaway and other translators thus played an important role in communicating to Western readers the USSR’s failings and secrets it had rather kept hidden. Many other translators worked on Soviet materials that were not so much hidden as ignored, until developments in the Cold War prompted large-scale translation projects to make information available to the West. Chief among these is probably the cover-to-cover translations of science journals, and in particular Soviet physics journals, which began in the mid-1950s and continued until the fall of the USSR. In 1969, one prominent translator and editor of the journals published a paper discussing the project, its beginnings, and the significance of Soviet science:

It is much to the credit of the American physicists that they recognized the importance of Russian scientific effort and started their translation programme in 1955, before the need became obvious to everyone after the launching of the first Sputnik in 1957. (In fact, the need for the translation of Soviet work was recognized much earlier by Consultants Bureau of New York, who started their first cover-to-cover journal in 1949...) (Tybulewicz 1970: 1)

The journals were translated by professional physicists with native English and a good knowledge of Russian, and the project was run by the American Institute of Physics (AIP). Although it is likely that the American government may have aided the establishment of the project, the translated journals were published without subsidy and were associated with the ‘normal commercial risks in starting new journals’ (Tybulewicz 1970: 57). Translators were paid well, per page regardless of how much text each page contained, and were also allowed to choose which articles they translated.
One translator, John Shepherd, a physicist at the University of Exeter, came to translate for the *Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Physics* and later others, and went on to edit one of the translation journals. He heard about the work from a colleague, also based in the UK, and was put in contact with the editor. The materials would arrive by post from New York, and were sent back there for publication; the translated journals came out 6-8 weeks after Soviet publication. Shepherd was well placed to do the translation after spending a year as an exchange student in Moscow, after completing his doctorate in Oxford. He has explained how for him the job was an excellent way of keeping up with developments in his field (personal interview with J. Shepherd, 14 October 2016), theoretical physics, which was at a very high level in the USSR, in particular since the ground-breaking physician Landau (d. 1970) had inspired a generation of Soviet physicists who worked in high-quality institutes. The cover-to-cover translations were never intended to uncover Soviet cutting-edge or top-secret research; rather, they were important for gauging the level of Soviet science in general, and creating a comprehensive picture of the field. Here again, while the project was in many ways a product of the competition and mistrust between the USSR and the West, for the translators concerned it could be much closer to communication across the Cold War division and represented an opportunity for furthering their own interests and agendas.

**CONCLUSION**

During the Cold War, there were fundamental differences in the way that translation was controlled in East and West: the existence of censorship in the USSR and Eastern bloc gave the authorities control over the representation of foreign countries and cultures to their domestic readership. However, as this chapter has argued, in spite of the fundamental asymmetry between the two, there were also significant similarities. On both sides of the iron curtain, translation became a site for the negotiation of political ideology. East and West used translation to emphasise criticism of the opposite society from within, with the distinction that such texts were freely available from Western pluralist society, which tolerated criticism of itself, but were smuggled out of the USSR, which did
not. As Scott-Smith and Segal have argued, ‘Despite the evident overall differences between political systems and everyday experiences, both power blocs had a lot in common and were less secluded than one might think’ (Romijn, Scott Smith and Segal 2012: 1). Common approaches to translation have also generated common debates: the great deal of discussion about whether *Encounter* was compromised by its covert funding is mirrored in the Soviet context by the question of whether translation for the authorities was inevitably hackwork. What emerges from on both sides, is that much as government and intelligence agencies may have tried to manipulate translation and translators for political gain, but ultimately translators were also able to use their agency to pursue their own aims and interest. The significance of translation in the Cold War cannot be confined to the sphere of politics alone.

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