

# **A comparison of the protest waves of the Umbrella and Anti-Extradition Bill Movements in Hong Kong**

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## Abstract

This comparative case study aims to identify common factors that contribute to the differences in the protest waves of social movements in general by using a mechanistic approach to assess the political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing processes of the Umbrella Movement and the Anti-Extradition Bill Movement. These two protest waves are different in the emergences, longevities, and declines. An analytical framework is developed on the relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variables through mechanisms. The mechanisms are used as the intermediate variables between the IVs and the DVs, and the quantitative analysis on the IVs makes the mechanisms operational. This thesis adopts mixed methods. A quantitative approach of network analysis and protest event analysis fully examines the relationships between the IVs – actors (leaders, SMOs/groups, influential allies) & frames and DV – waves of protest which studied by protest event analysis. The qualitative approach of mechanisms is used to describe the impacts of the mechanisms – *attribution of opportunity and threat, repression, radicalization, competition* and *diffusion*. Specifically, the mechanistic approach is the overall methodological approach, and network analysis (social network analysis and discourse network analysis) and protest event analysis are specific methods.

The original contribution to knowledge of this research was adopting a mechanistic approach based on a broader political process theory to the protest waves in hybrid regimes. Merely having the classic social movement theories – political opportunities, mobilizing structures and framing processes accessible is not enough for the explanation of the differences in protest waves. This thesis adds new knowledge to the theories field of Hong Kong's democratic movements. It also has policy implication for the future of Hong Kong and the relationship between China and Hong Kong.

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## List of Abbreviations

AEM	Anti-Extradition Law Amendment Bill Movement
AML	Anti-mask law
ASAEduHK	Academic Staff Association of the Education University of Hong Kong
BJ	Beijing
BPA	Business and Professionals Alliance
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CE	Chief Executive
CHRF	Civil Human Rights Front
CityUSU	City University of Hong Kong Students' Union
CRC	Cooperative Resources Centre
CUHK	Chinese University of Hong Kong
CUSU	Student Union of the Chinese University of Hong Kong
CY Leung	Leung Chun-ying
DAB	Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong
DNA	Discourse network analysis
DoC	Dynamics of contention
DP	Democratic Party
DUS	Double universal suffrage
DYCHK	Diocesan Youth Commission Hong Kong
ELAB	Extradition Law Amendment Bill
Eye4HK	Eye For Hong Kong
FCs	Functional constituencies
Fixing HK	Fixing Hong Kong
HAEA	Hospital Authority Employees Alliance
HK	Hong Kong
HKADPL	Hong Kong Association for Democracy and People's Livelihood
HK Alliance	Hong Kong Alliance
HKAWSW	Hong Kong Association of Women Social Workers
HKBUSU	Hong Kong Baptist University Students' Union
HKCI	Hong Kong Christian Institute
HKCTU	Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions
HKECG	Hong Kong Education Concern Group
HKEdA	Hong Kong Educators Alliance
HKFCS	Hong Kong Federation of Catholic Students
HKFS	Hong Kong Federation of Students
HKHRDA	Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act
HKHRM	Hong Kong Human Rights Monitor
HKJA	Hong Kong Journalists Association
HKJP	Justice and Peace Commission of the Hong Kong Catholic Diocese
HKPTU	Hong Kong Professional Teachers' Union
HKPU	Hong Kong Polytechnic University

HKPUSU	Hong Kong Polytechnic University Students' Union
HKS	Hong Kong Shield
HKSAR	Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
HKSWGU	Hong Kong Social Workers' General Union
HKU	The University of Hong Kong
HKUSTSU	Hong Kong University of Science and Technology Students' Union
HKUSU	Hong Kong University Students' Union
HKVSA	Hong Kong Victoria Social Association
HKWWA	Hong Kong Women Worker's Association
HQ	Headquarters
HSUHKSU	Hang Seng University of Hong Kong Students' Union
ICT	Information and Communication Technologies
LegCo	Legislative Council
LSD	League of Social Democrats
MDSD	Most Different Systems Design
MK	Mong Kok
MP	Meeting Point
MSSD	Most Similar Systems Design
MTR	Mass Transit Railway
NGOs	Non-governmental organizations
NPC	National People Congress
NPCS	Standing Committee of the National People's Congress
NSL	National Security Law
NWSC	Neighbourhood and Worker's Service Centre
OCLP	Occupy Central with Love and Peace
OCTS	One Country, Two Systems
OSCPs	Opportunity structures for citizens' participation
OUHKSU	Open University of Hong Kong Students' Union
PEA	Protest event analysis
POS	Political opportunity structure
PP	People Power
PPT	Political Process Theory
RMT	Resource mobilization theory
RSWM	Reclaiming Social Work Movement
SCMP	<i>South China Morning Post</i>
SFD	Student Fight for Democracy
SMOs	Social movement organizations
SNA	Social network analysis
SNS	Social networking service
S-V-O	Subject-verb-object
SYUSU	Student Union of Hong Kong Shue Yan University
TUS	True universal suffrage
UDHK	United Democrats of Hong Kong
UM	Umbrella Movement

# Chapter 1: Introduction

This thesis is about two protest episodes in Hong Kong. My research compares and contrasts the protest waves of the Umbrella and Anti-Extradition movements in Hong Kong using a mechanistic approach derived from McAdam et al.'s (2001) *Dynamics of Contention*. In this introductory chapter I specify my aims, objectives and research questions, and I explain how I use the notion of a protest wave. I also explore protest politics in a hybrid regime and explain my case selection, academic contribution, as well as the rationale and the structure of the thesis.

The Umbrella Movement (UM) flourished from September 26 to mid-December 2014. It ultimately produced few concrete results for pro-democracy activists. It had unexpectedly occurred from students' strikes around a major claim: 2017 Chief Executive's democratic election. It opposed the legal constraint that Beijing was imposing on Hong Kong, under which the CE Election became a small-scale election. All qualified candidates need over half the votes from the 1,200-member committee, mostly composed of business elites, but not a majority of the popular votes. On the other hand, the Anti-Extradition Movement (AEM) from 2019 to 2020 opposes an extradition bill introduced by the Hong Kong government. The Bill would empower local governments to arrest and extradite criminal suspects wanted in regions that Hong Kong lacks extradition treaties with, including mainland China, Taiwan, and Macao. It suggested that individuals, including foreigners, would be permitted to be extradited to mainland China to face charges. Demonstrations began in March but escalated in June 2019 and had not decreased significantly until the arrival of the epidemic in 2020. Protests evolved into violent conflicts between activists and police. Altogether, the series of protests together formed a decentralized movement without

formal leadership and organizations. Both movements are a vital part of Hong Kong's protracted democratisation and its resistance to interference from China, attracting worldwide attentions. This indignation and disappointment for democratization and de-democratization were intensively demonstrated in the Umbrella Movement and the Anti-Extradition Movement. In a word, the two not only showed Hong Kong people's protest against the central government, but also their demand to retain and improve democracy in Hong Kong. All in all, this thesis aims to compare and contrast the protest waves of the UM and the AEM. It conducts this through comparative research on the factors and mechanisms that lead to the emergence, peak, and decline of the movements. It uses protest event analysis of multiple media sources, mechanistic analysis, social network analysis and discourse network analysis to understand the utility of an analytical framework that combines political opportunity structure, resource mobilisation, and framing theories as methods to explain the two movements' diverse protest waves.

## **1.1 Aims, Objectives and Research Questions**

### **1.1.1 A statement of the research questions**

My main research question asks 'what factors and mechanisms can explain the contrasting protest waves of the Umbrella Movement and the Anti-Extradition Law Amendment Bill Movement in Hong Kong?'

I use McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly's (2001) key elements of research design – mechanisms – to explain differences in the protest waves, including emergence, longevity, and decline. More specifically, political opportunities, mobilizing structures and framing processes constitute a broader political process theory (and are also classic social movement theories), which constitute essentially my theoretical



framework. The mechanisms I deploy are derived from political opportunity structure (POS), resource mobilization theory (RMT) and framing processes, and they are applicable concepts, not systematic and complete theories.

The main question is supported with several sub-questions. Sub-questions which will be researched are as stated below:

- 1) What are the differences in the protest waves of Umbrella and Anti-Extradition movements?
- 2) To what extent does a broad political process theory comprising of a synthesis of political opportunities, mobilizing structures & framing theories explain the differences found in the emergence, peak, and decline of the two protest waves? If there is a need to modify the theory to fit a hybrid regime, how might it be improved to best do so?
- 3) How useful is a mechanistic approach in interpreting the different protest waves of the two movements?

### **1.1.2 A more elaborate statement of the aims and objectives of the thesis**

By comparing and assessing the mechanisms – the intervening variables that shape the political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing processes of both movements – this study will seek to explain and compare the emergence, longevity and decline of the Umbrella Movement and the Anti-Extradition Bill Movement. It has three key objectives: 1) to identify common factors that contribute to the protest waves of social movements in general, 2) to understand the relevance of existing theories to a hybrid regime context, 3) to generate new explanations by teasing out mechanisms that may be specific to particular cases and thus explain their contrasting protest waves. In summary, to date there is little theoretical or comparative analysis of

mechanisms, the structure of political opportunity and their interactions with mobilizing structures and framing processes in a hybrid regime. The aim of this thesis is to identify causes that can help us understand divergence in the emergence, longevity, and decline of the two Hong Kong protest waves. The application of a dynamics of contention (McAdam et al., 2001) approach to a hybrid regime setting contributes to a better knowledge of social movements and democratic movements in Hong Kong. In addition, the study has policy implications for Hong Kong's future and examining China's fulfilment of its political promise of "One Country, Two Systems", as well as for China's international relations.

## **1.2 Defining protest waves**

As stated by Tarrow (1994), a protest cycle is 'a phase of heightened collective conflict and contention across the social system that includes: a rapid diffusion of collective action from more mobilized to less mobilized sectors; a quickened pace of innovation in the forms of contention; new or transformed collective action frames; a combination of organized and unorganized participation; and sequences of intensified interaction between challengers and authorities which can end in reform, repression and sometimes revolution' (p. 153). I adopt Tarrow's definition of a protest cycle. Nevertheless, I tend to employ the term wave rather than cycle. The concept of a cycle indicates a series of cyclical phenomena that recur does not hold water (McAdam et al., 2001). The wave does not indicate such suppositions of regularity, but only means the powerful growth and following decline of the protest levels (Koopmans, 2004). My views on protest waves differ from Tarrow's model mainly in that protest politics under different regimes are different. To be specific, in terms of emergence and longevity, variations in political situations encourage "early risers" to make use of the fresh opportunities for movement (Tarrow, 1994, p. 86). Movements that emerge later are

“easy riders,” who fruitfully utilize a political opportunity that others strived to exploit (Tarrow, 1991, p. 84). The information signalled by effective protests becomes the crucial sign of political opportunity for arising movements and pushes forward the progression of extensive waves of movements (Minkoff, 1997). However, this is not always the case, as the success gained in the early stage may lead to the decline of protests. Besides, contingent conditions of political opportunity structure are not necessarily grasped by early risers, the emergence of a social movement also depends on pre-existing resources and activist networks (including elite allies); also, some decentralized movements last not because of their influential organizational power marked by intensive networks or leadership (Cai, 2017), and despite spontaneous and resolute participants following their own aspiration that does not necessarily empower the movement. Also, collective activities are not necessarily diffused from more mobilized sectors to less mobilized sectors, they can diffuse from less mobilized ones to more mobilized ones, then to less mobilized sectors. In addition, apart from reform (including policy adjustment), repression and revolution, the end result of social movements may be natural demise because of competition among SMOs/groups, and/or the failure of protesters’ action to escalate. Besides, in some cases, the absence of escalation due to repression from police originates from international pressure and/or sensitive issues, such as democratization or de-democratization. In short, I have different views on protest waves from Tarrow mainly owing to the different protest politics in democracies and hybrid regimes.

### **1.2.1 A brief narrative of the two protest waves of UM & AEM**

In August 2014, “decision 831” was passed by the Chinese authorities in Hong Kong. This decision decreed that the Chief Executive of Hong Kong must be loyal to both Hong Kong and China and that the Central People’s government would have

ultimate authority to make their appointment. This decision provided the impetus for the Umbrella Movement, which emerged in September 2014. The central demands of the movement were to a) implement true universal suffrage, b) withdraw “831 decision”, c) restart political reform. The founding organisations and activists were the Occupy Central with Love and Peace (OCLP), the Hong Kong Federation of Students (HKFS), Scholarism, Benny Tai, Chan Kin-man, Chu Yiu-ming, Joshua Wong, Alex Chow and Lester Shum. Joshua Wong was the founder of Scholarism. Alex Chow and Lester Shum were the Secretary-General and Deputy Secretary-General of the HKFS, respectively. Associate Professor Benny Tai, the Department of Law of the University of Hong Kong, Associate Professor Chan Kin-man of the Department of Sociology of the Chinese University of Hong Kong, and Protestant pastor Chu Yiu-ming in Hong Kong began in early 2013 to propose limited, non-violent civil disobedience as a means to practice true universal suffrage. The Occupy Central with Love and Peace was derived from this. Later the OCLP secretariat was formally established. Hong Kong Federation of Students (HKFS) is the largest student organization to promote student movements, and Scholarism was a Hong Kong pro-democracy student activist group. The Umbrella Movement was derived from the strike rally initiated by the HKSF and Scholarism. On the night of 26 September, the “Civic Square operation” kicked off the movement and forced “Occupy Central with love and peace” was officially launched in the early morning of 28 September. In the evening of the same day, the riot police used tear gas to disperse the demonstrators, and even raised a warning flag to open fire at one point, which aroused strong public anger. A great number of residents allied in solidarity with the students and protested that the police dispatched riot police to deal with the demonstrators. Protest crowds climaxed at the end of September 2014. In general, the rapid mobilization of the Umbrella Movement

developed from the protests organized by the students, and the Occupy Central with Love and Peace had to announce the early start of the occupation. This involved camping in tents and erecting umbrellas. The rapid expansion of the Umbrella Movement was related to its new form of protests – “occupation”. As the police indiscriminately fired tear gas at protesters, the movement began to conduct an investigation into police brutality. Throughout the movement, organized and unorganized protests were simultaneously existing. A part of occupants did not recognize the OCLP, the HKFS, and Scholarism as the organizers of the movement. At the same time, the action also deviated from the original model, changing from “wave after wave” of protests to long-term occupation. On 21 October 2014, student leaders started a dialogue with government representatives that did not lead to an agreement. Finally, as the protest escalation at the end of November 2014 failed, the police carried out a final wave of clearing operations and the Umbrella Movement and the umbrella movement faded away.

The Anti-Extradition Movement emerged in March 2019 in response to the Extradition Law Amendment Bill, which would allow the Chinese government to use Hong Kong’s judicial system to extradite “suspects” from Hong Kong to China. The movement had five demands, including a) complete withdrawal of the Extradition law amendment bill, b) Withdrawal of demonstration “riot” characterization, c) to cancel the charges of the arrested demonstrators, d) to establish an independent investigation committee to investigate the abuse of force by the police, e) to realize “true double universal suffrage”. The founding organisations and activists were the Civil Human Rights Front (CHRF), Demosistō and the Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions (HKCTU) as well as Jimmy Shaw, Nathan Law, Joshua Wong, Lee Cheuk-yan etc. The CHRF is an NGO concentrating on Hong Kong’s political and democratic

problems, related to most democratic groups in Hong Kong, and it aims to fight for greater democracy in the region. Jimmy Shaw was the convener of the CHRF during the period of the AEM. Demosistō is a youth activist organization promoting democracy in Hong Kong, and it was led by Joshua Wong and Nathan Law, who were student leaders of the UM. The HKCTU was a pro-democracy labour and political organization in Hong Kong, mainly composed of trade unions. Lee Cheuk-yan was the General Secretary of the HKCTU. The expansion of the Anti-Extradition Movement is from two SMOs, the Civil Human Rights Front and Demosistō, which mobilized more, to other sectors that mobilized less. As early risers, the Civil Human Rights Front and Demosistō did seize the opportunity and provide a free ride effect to the latecomers. In addition, as latecomers, non-governmental organizations in various industries (such as a group of Hong Kong mothers, civil servants, legal community) could quickly initiate protests also depended on the previously developed social networks. During the march on 1 July 2019, some demonstrators occupied the Legislative Council Complex, and later changed the appeal of Carrie Lam's resignation to "immediately realizing the real dual universal suffrage of the Chief Executive and the Legislative Council", namely, realizing the real demand for democratic universal suffrage. Since then, demonstrators have staged protests almost weekly. On 21 July, the Yuen Long attack took place after the march, which became a landmark event for the movement and a turning point for the movement, as clashes between demonstrators and the police intensified. Yuen Long attack means a mob attack in Yuen Long, a town of New Territories in Hong Kong on the evening of 21 July, 2019. In mid-August, demonstrators paralyzed the Hong Kong International Airport twice. The demonstrations entered November. There were violent clashes between the police and the people at the two campuses of PolyU and CUHK, and many people were

injured. In addition, in response to this wave of demonstrations, the United States stepped in to announce the passage of the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act. Generally, “be water” meant protestors were deft to prepare for forceful action by the police like water, made the protest channels to be expanded to the greatest extent, and well continued the whole movement, making the police do not know how to respond, which showed the success of this new strategy. In the middle and late stage, the movement was filled with organized and unorganized protests, as well as peaceful, rational, nonviolent and violent radical protests. With the violent suppression and abuse of power by the police, the demand for an independent investigation of the police had become no less than a protest demand for the withdrawal of the extradition bill. The final demise of the movement was largely due to the sudden attack of the emergence of COVID 19 and the ensuing pandemic, which leads to the failure of the behaviour of dense crowds.

### **1.3 Application of Western social movement theory to a hybrid regime**

When taking the impacts of regimes on contention into account, three kinds of regime are identified: closed autocratic regimes, where the act of publicly expressing dissatisfaction is illegal in law or in fact; liberal democratic regimes where contention is a daily part of the political process; and regimes that fall somewhere in the middle are categorised as hybrid regimes (Robertson, 2011). Because, in theory, protest is allowed by hybrid regimes and could have a legal impact in the political realm, large-scale suppression is not anticipated as the regime’s first response to the public appearance of dissidents (Robertson, 2011). Additionally, the regime does not advocate a monopolization on political actions or organizations and allows social movement organizations (SMOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to

operate (Robertson, 2011). In general, it is expected that more political protests and more appeals to public manifestations of value, solidarity, quantity, and devotion or collective actions emerge in hybrid regimes (Robertson, 2011). Furthermore, regarding how protests in hybrid regimes are compared with protests in democratic regimes, existing research is either equivocal or conflicting (Robertson, 2011). There is an academic faction that analyses hybrid regimes from political opportunity theory used originally to analyze the protests in developed industrial democracies (Robertson, 2011). Eisinger (1973) and Tarrow (1998) argued that there is a curvilinear relationship between protests and the opening of political institutions to influence from outside. When institutionalised channels are restricted, the level of protest activities is low since it is almost impossible to impact on protestors and inspire them; when institutionalised channels are available, the motive for protest is also very small, since the appeals can be conveyed mainly via institutionalised channels; yet, in the middle zone, as long as there is a specific approach to channels, there are high levels of motivation to inject into protest activities to affect certain decisions and extend the approach (Eisinger, 1973; Tarrow, 1998). Simply put, the middle degree of openness is related to the highest level of protests. In brief, it may be expected that the degree of protests from authoritarian countries is low and that from democratic states is higher. However, the degree of protests in hybrid regimes is the highest. In hybrid regimes, there are some opportunities to employ institutionalised channels, but there are still many reasons for dissatisfaction with institutionalized methods (Robertson, 2011).

On the whole, the Western-centred political opportunity structure approach provides a basic outline for POS in hybrid regimes, but the components perform differently. The aggravation of elite divisions plays a leading role in the emergence of a protest wave, and the resolution of elite conflicts may end the protest wave. In fact,



in contrast to those under stable democracies, protests in hybrid regimes tend to be elaborately organized by elites (Robertson, 2011). This means that in the protests of hybrid regimes, the elites are not only influential allies, but also organizers and initiators. Moreover, elite division not only produces opportunities for the protestors, but also elite division and its mobilization strategies usually directly decide who are mobilizers and the timing (Robertson, 2011). Besides, in hybrid regimes SMOs may react differently to the similar situations hinging on the modes of elite loyalty and elite division (Robertson, 2011). Leaders and SMOs can have close relations with allies under hybrid regimes. Furthermore, repression can be seen as part of the regime's strategy to unite elites, as repression is not only aimed at combating existing challengers, but also to discouraging future ones (Robertson, 2011). In reality, many crackdowns are aimed at uniting elite alliances, and the target audience of the crackdown is mainly the existing pro-government elites. Therefore, a broad understanding of suppressive strategies is needed, including broad policies, practices and institutions that add the cost of street mobilization, as well as actions to add the cost of organizing elites beyond the prevalent alliance (Robertson, 2011). For example, these policies contain nominating local governors by a central government, disqualifying candidates, as well as severe and oppressive prevention, banning activities of civil society organizations, and pro-government mobilization.

By and large, hybrid regimes are not just midway between democratic states and authoritarian states. The number of protests is not simply proportional to the extent of political openness. Research on social movements in hybrid regimes would be very likely to need a very different conceptualisation of the political opportunity structure than Western democracies, which lays emphasis on the core characteristics of Western political institutions like the voting system, the political party system, and the

separation of the three powers (Kriesi et al., 1995). That is to say, among the four dimensions of the political opportunity structure (POS) approach, as a classic social movement theory, ‘the relative openness or closure of the institutionalised political system’ (McAdam, 1996, p. 27) is a stable component, and concrete political opportunity structures, including ‘availability of influential allies’, ‘emerging splits within the elite’ (Tarrow, 2011, p. 164-165), and ‘state’s capacity and propensity for repression’ (McAdam, 1996, p. 27), namely the other three dimensions of POS, are more applicable to hybrid regimes.

## **1.4 Why Hong Kong?**

### **1.4.1 Brief History of Hong Kong**

After Britain beat China in the First Opium War from 1839 to 1842, China surrendered the rule of Hong Kong Island to Great Britain (Yi, 2015). On 1 July 1898, China went on to rent other sections of Hong Kong, particularly the New Territories, to Britain for 99 years. Under the rule of the British, Hong Kong underwent an economic take-off with light industries. In the 1970s, Hong Kong was well-known as an “Asian Tiger” as it developed into one of the area’s economic superpowers (“Hong Kong Profile-Timeline,” 2019). In 1982, with Hong Kong enjoying a prosperous economy, China and Britain started their conversation to discuss Hong Kong’s future at the time at which its let to Britain expired (Yi, 2015). In 1984, Britain and China signed the “Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People’s Republic of China” (also called as the “Sino-British Joint Declaration”). Moreover, the Sino-British Joint Declaration was a considered clearly stated agreement declaring Hong Kong’s return to China’s government on 1 July 1997. The declaration furthermore expounded the kind of ruling that Hong Kong should adopt under China’s control. Concretely, the declaration

announces that Hong Kong would go on to “enjoy a high degree of autonomy” (quotations from Chinese Government, 2007, section 3 part 2) with the “one country, two systems” policy. Also, the declaration guarantees that Hong Kong’s socioeconomic institutions “will remain unchanged for 50 years” (quotations from Chinese Government, 2007, section 3 part 12). Thus, Hong Kong people’s democratic rights and freedoms were to be defended, which involved “those of the person, of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of travel... [and] of strike” until 2047 (from Chinese Government, 2007, section 3 part 5). The sovereign rights of Hong Kong were officially restored to China on 1 July 1997. The Beijing government chose Tung Chee Hwa, a former shipping magnate born in Shanghai, as the first chief executive of Hong Kong (Yi, 2015). Nevertheless, Hong Kong people were unhappy with Tung, particularly with his proposal of the disputed Anti-Subversion Act during his tenure. This was the reason 500,000 Hong Kong citizens took to the streets in July of 2003 and attended a demonstration against Chief Executive Tung and his suggested Anti-Subversion Act (Yi, 2015). As a result, this demonstration led to the cancellation of the bill and Chief Executive Tung’s stepping down afterwards. Though this was an achievement that Hong Kong citizens obtained, Beijing gained the power to veto any democratisation progresses in 2004, such as direct elections for the chief executive (“Hong Kong Profile-Timeline,” 2019). Following this statement, Hong Kong people have been keeping attending the yearly July 1st marches striving for full democracy in Hong Kong (“Hong Kong Profile-Timeline,” 2019).

#### **1.4.2 Hong Kong as a hybrid regime**

After the transfer of power in 1997, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) has been ruled following the constitutional principle of “one country, two systems” and has been broadly classified as a hybrid regime (Kuan & Lau, 2002),

merging liberal and authoritarian components (E. W. Cheng, 2019). Or to be more exact, the Chinese and British administrations, along with the local business community, arranged a government that both wanted, which would merge deliberative the parliamentary system with decisive authoritarianism (Overholt, 2001). It was also called “executive-led government” (Overholt, 2001, p. 1). A variety of academics define Hong Kong as a hybrid regime as it implements merely a certain level of parliamentary democracy. In general, Hong Kong has retained its autonomous status in law, but in politics, the central government has aggressively attempted to draw local elites over to its side and interferes in local politics (Ma, 2016). Hong Kong keeps autonomy with the policy of “one country, two system”, but simply for the sake of being beneficial to the Chinese economy, and hence Beijing endorses the maintenance of Hong Kong liberties and democratic systems provided it is conducive to Hong Kong’s financial success and then China’s too (Yi, 2015). Furthermore, though a legislature of 70 members is elected, it consists of not only geographic MPs voted for by the whole electorate, but also functional MPs voted for mainly by businessmen (Yi, 2015). Businessmen working as legislators for the Hong Kong people weakens HK’s democracy since bills clearly not for the sake of the public interest but are instead beneficial to businesses and industry. Besides the legislature, the Chief Executive selected by Beijing holds nearly all the control of power necessary to carry out a range of proposals and decisions (Overholt, 2001). In summary, the Chief Executive is very dominant such that important bills cannot be passed without the Chief Executive’s ratification (Overholt, 2001). All in all, Hong Kong’s obedience to Beijing and the divergence in interests between Beijing and the HKSAR is intensified (Abb, 2019). Hong Kong has not only the divisions between the central government and the local government, but also the splits between local political elites. The executive-led

government and pan-democratic members of the Legislative Council have not been able to constitute a majority, but the judiciary is independent and there is free media and information flow. Unlike a hybrid regime that has transitioned from an authoritarian system, Hong Kong's civil society is very developed, with a free market and civil liberties, but no universal suffrage, making Hong Kong a very interesting case as a unique hybrid regime.

### **1.4.3 Social movement studies in Hong Kong**

In previous research on social movements in Hong Kong, scholars have studied factors leading to the protests including: the rise of pressure group politics (M. K. Lee, 1987), political opportunity (Chan & Lee, 2007), the governance philosophy and performance of the HKSAR government (Ming Sing, 2009; Ray Kin-man Yep, 2013; Joseph Yu-shek Cheng, 2014), the theory of relative deprivation (Kun Eng Kua Pearce & Gilles Guiheux, 2009), the lack of democracy (Ngok Ma, 2011; Alvin So, 2011), and collective consensus (Edmund Cheng, 2016). The contribution of my work lies in the analytical framework established by the introduction of mechanisms to analyze what factors lead to different protest waves, among which *brokerage* is the most important mechanism, and *brokerage* is especially effective to explain leaderless and decentralized movements. I now explain, in more depth, the contribution that scholars of Hong Kong social movements have made to the field of research on social movements.

Until recently, social movement studies were marginalised in Hong Kong studies (K. H. Chan, 2014). Since political stability used to dominate, the main issue to be solved was invariably the stability of the antiquated colonial institutional arrangement (K. H. Chan, 2014). Seemingly, it was not necessary to refer to the causes for the emergence of social movements. However, forerunners in this realm

aimed to debunk the “fairy tale” of political stability in some of their research (Lui & Chiu, 1997; 1999) and bring social movements to light, which had been ignored because of the high cost of instability (Lui & Chiu, 2000). Starting from challenging the fairy tale, researchers who studied social movements were attracted by a wave of social movements in the 1970s. They investigated social movements from a variety of points of view (Chiu, 1987; B. K. P. Leung, 1992) and at times comprehensively, as in the rise of pressure group politics (M. K. Lee, 1987). However, they seldom focused on the methods of protest. Lui interpreted why social movements in 1970s appeared as a mode of protest, using political opportunity theory to interpret the emergence of protests in the 1970s and the access to formal institutions in the 1980s (K. H. Chan, 2014). That is to say, the emergence of protests in 1970s was the outcome of the relatively closed political structure, while the reason for its demise was the emerging political opportunities caused by the specific historical background (Lui & Chiu, 1997).

Again, Chan and Lee (2007) employ “political opportunities” to indicate the features of the political system and political culture in a society, which increase the possibility of effective mobilization, but they did not try to conduct a thorough analysis on the political opportunity structure in Hong Kong over the past several tens of years and focused only on the democratic movement. Democratization in Hong Kong started at the beginning of the 1980s. Yet, over the whole decade, the political opportunities in favour of pro-democracy movements were constrained (Chan & Lee, 2007). Here, Chan and Lee (2007) focus on two main aspects of the changing political opportunities for democratic movements in Hong Kong, namely, the extent to which the formal institutionalised channels were available to democratization and the extent to which a democratic and participatory culture had grown in Hong Kong. In practical terms, after the transfer, particularly after the start of Tung Chee-hwa’s second tenure of office,

Hong Kong's political opportunities had changed, which gave the impetus for pro-democracy politicians to build a close coalition with social activists beyond the formal political system (Chan & Lee, 2007). Simultaneously, the continuous growth of urban political culture had created a citizenry with high participation prospects. Together, these prerequisites smoothed the way towards the revival of democratic movements (Chan & Lee, 2007). At the meso-level, the merger of mass media and residents' spontaneous mobilization via their own informal social networks compensated for the absence of strong and ingenious SMOs (Chan & Lee, 2007). In studying recent social movements in Hong Kong, in leaderless movements like the AEM, there are interim leaders. Because of this, it seems more appropriate to view the role of leaders as *brokerage* in leaderless movements. Similar to the role of leaders, the role of SMOs in the current popular decentralized movements can also be interpreted by brokerage. Moreover, networking → *social appropriation* and networking → *scale shift* are critical to the longevity of Hong Kong's movement waves.

According to Ming Sing (2009), Ray Kin-man Yip (2013) and Joseph Yu-shek Cheng (2014) the governing concept and performance of the HKSAR government should be to blame. Every government was unwilling or unable to push forward democracy and defend existing civil rights and liberties, which was the reasons for spurred outcries and protests from the public (E. W. Cheng, 2016). In addition, Kun Eng Kuah-Pearce and Gilles Guiheux (2009) supported the theory of relative deprivation and they argue that the expanding gap between the rich and poor in the city aroused the anti-globalization movement. Both Ngok Ma (2011) and Alvin So (2011) connected the expansion of contentious activities to the split of post-industrial society because of the lack of a democratic system, under this system, the disadvantages of party politics accumulated, but its advantages were late. However,

Edmund Cheng (2016) pointed out that weak system or relative deprivation is not enough to explain the spread of contentious activities. On the contrary, public outcries surrounding the recurring but unsettled disputes strengthened the collective consensus that the post-colonial administrations are the root of discontent and stagnation (E. W. Cheng, 2016). Furthermore, Francis Lee (2020) provides an explanation about how unity between the moderates and radicals of the 2019 Anti-Extradition Bill movement is generated and maintained. Edmund Cheng and Samson Yuen (2020) conceptualized the 2019 Hong Kong Anti-Extradition Bill movement as a bottom-up form of comprehensive mobilization. The comprehensive mobilization was based on idle civil social networks hidden after the Umbrella Movement, which was triggered by fear of being extradited the authoritarian regime and rage at the police abuse. Meanwhile, protest scale, mobilizing structure, protest space and group unity of the movement were further studied (Cheng & Yuen, 2020). Moreover, Tin-yuet Ting (2020) described the protest waves of the AEM as the 'Water Revolution' (p. 362), by innovatively using social media and mobile technology, protestors worked together to fight riot police in 'wildcat actions' (p. 362). At the peak period of AEM, the application of the new strategy "be water" made the protest method more flexible, new tactics emerged one after another, and the protest venues expanded. In a word, new tactics → *diffusion* and networking → *scale shift* are conducive to the continuation of the movement wave of AEM. All in all, for the recent social movements in Hong Kong, most scholars attribute the root cause to the incompetence of the SAR government. The government incompetence could lead to the division of elites or the formation of influential alliances, in other words, it was a precondition for the emergence of political opportunities. For social movements in Hong Kong, foreign governments can exert pressure on the local government and the central government, sometimes with more



dramatic effects. In short, the role of international allies is also played through *certification*. In the emergence stage of social movements in Hong Kong, leaders and SMOs acted as brokers from the very beginning, i.e., disseminating information, explaining to potential voters their goals and methods for doing so – diagnostic framing and prognostic framing, in addition to building the contacts with supporting organisations and groups (networking → *social appropriation*).

As for the usefulness of my analytical framework for explaining the movement waves of UM and AEM, during their emergence phase, the analytical framework was already in place. Coupled with publicity in the streets and stations, and targeted explanations by core activists, the entire society was widely mobilized. AEM had a higher degree of mobilization in the early stage and generated a higher degree of frame resonance than UM. One reason is that a specific and clear diagnostic framing is key to resonating with potential supporters, figuring out what is wrong and determining who is to blame, which can generate resonances with the masses, which led to a shorter mobilization period in the early stage of the AEM. In terms of frame alignments, the combination of frame extension and frame transformation results in the continuation of the movement. In the later stage of movements, it is significant to have useful prognostic framing, which is crucial for the duration of the movement. This is illustrated in the UM and the AEM. The reduced *certification* from influential allies throughout the later stages of the movement resulted in shorter protest waves. As for the decline phase of UM, the analytical framework is well explained. A small group of protesters escalated their actions before being crushed by police. In addition to the divisions and infighting among the protest groups, the whole movement naturally came to an end. In contrast, in the decline phase of AEM, the analytical framework is completely inapplicable. Instead of ending the movement, police *repression* and

*radicalization* produced the opposite effect. All in all, these are not mentioned in the previous literature, and my main academic contribution to Hong Kong's social movements is establishing an analytical framework that studying the relationship between independent and dependent variables via intermediate variables (mechanisms). IVs – networking and framing, mechanisms – *brokerage*, *social appropriation*, and *scale shift* are useful for explaining different protest waves of UM and AEM. *Brokerage* and *social appropriation & scale shift* can explain the horizontal and vertical differences in the protest curves. However, in this analytical framework, the role of influential allies is not reflected, and the role of international allies cannot be quantitatively analyzed. The roles of *social construction* and *object shift* are not as obvious as those of frame extension and frame transformation. In addition, there is no obvious answer as to what would lead to the decline of a movement in a hybrid regime. How to improve this analytical framework still needs examination of more cases and methodological exploration.

#### **1.4.4 Why research the Umbrella & Anti-Extradition movements?**

The Umbrella Movement aimed at democratization, in contrast, the Anti-Extradition Movement was explicitly opposed to the de-democratization from rising authoritarianism. As an unstable regime that was first liberalized and then democratized (Trejo, 2012), Hong Kong seems more in line with the curved concept of protest and democratic levels (Eisinger, 1973). Protests are also more likely to be accompanied by violence. Facing surging authoritarianism after the Umbrella Movement, mass mobilization fell into a period of stagnation, until the introduction of the Extradition Law Amendment Bill, when the Chinese saying analogy that a stone stirs a thousand waves became apt. The anger and fear of the public reached its peak, breaking the static balance that existed before. Splits in the elite had reached their

culmination, new political opportunities arise, and a larger-scale protest was about to emerge. Overall, in response to the “closedness” of the political system, the Anti-Extradition Movement differed from the Umbrella Movement in three main aspects: the AEM lasted longer than the UM, was more radicalized and used much more violence; the moderates were not in favour of the radical camp’s escalation of action, causing internal discord, in contrast to the UM, the AEM maintained sustained solidarity and provided a basis for prolonged violence; the widespread promotion of the AEM beyond the local area marked a turning point in the history of Hong Kong movements (Ku, 2020), ‘non-governmental public diplomacy’ became a supplement to street protests (Chung, 2020, p. 60). All in all, I have chosen to study the Umbrella Movement and the Anti-Extradition Movement because I intend to continue to explore the continuity and change of the Hong Kong’s pro-democracy movements based on previous research and analyse the different political process approaches in which these two social movements emerged, peaked, and declined.

These two protest waves are the two largest civil disobedience movements in the history of Hong Kong, and as such, they are worthy of attention. Not only are there links between them, but they also have different causes, processes, and outcomes. In a word, the UM and the AEM provide highly appropriate material for a productive comparative case study, namely the two protest waves in Hong Kong. The importance and value of studying these movements are self-evident.

## **1.5 The contribution to the literature on social movements**

This study contributes to the fields of theory, method and policy in general. With regard to the academic contribution on social movement studies (theoretical and methodological), the thesis contributes 1) the theoretical application of classic Western social movement theories (combination of political opportunity structure, resource

mobilization with framing theories) to a hybrid regime, 2) a novel study of two waves of contention in a hybrid regime, 3) the use of “mechanisms” to understand how IVs (independent variables) derived from the classic social movement theories shape the DVs (emergence, peak, and decline of waves of contention) through a comparative research design, 4) a mixed methods approach to understanding waves of contention, combining PEA (protest event analysis), SNA (social network analysis), and discourse network analysis (DNA) to analyse data.

Moreover, the findings of this study provide both important theoretic and practical implications for comprehending the factors that contribute to social movements in Hong Kong. My thesis will benefit the study of protest politics under hybrid regimes and protest movements in Hong Kong. A number of scholars have studied the political opportunity structure of protests in Hong Kong but have not conducted a comprehensive and thorough analysis (I will employ a broader political process theory, including political opportunity structure, mobilizing structure, and framing theories), in addition to which the political opportunity structure itself is constantly changing. Besides, these two social movements involve democratization, de-democratization, authoritarian invasion, and their impact on the China’s international relations and the world structure. In summary, though these two movements are pro-democratic movements, the UM was to strive for more democracy, and the AEM was to resist the de-democratization. And thus, this thesis shows that Hong Kong is going backwards on democracy. Overall, this study will have several policy implications and develop an understanding of practical issues: 1) implications for Hong Kong’s pro-democracy movements, 2) the status of “One Country, Two Systems” arrangement, 3) China-Hong Kong relationships, 4) international reputation of China when responding to large-scale social movements, 5) as an authoritarian

state, China is facing obvious challenges of popular protests from Chinese people (Hong Kong people are also Chinese people, though not Mainlanders), 6) China's international relations. For the protesters, the important lesson learned might be whether unorganized campaigns would bring the expected results. Moreover, the space for protests in Hong Kong in the future will be further reduced, such as, some originally legal protests may not be approved, or/and actions initiated by activists will be ones approved by the government.

## **1.6 The rationale of the thesis**

The theoretical contributions of the whole research stem from these four aspects: political opportunity structure (POS), resource mobilization theory (RMT) and framing processes, as well as a variant of the dynamics of contention (DoC) approach (McAdam et al., 2001) through the application of the mechanisms. By the 1990s, political opportunity structure, resource mobilization, and cultural framing were increasingly considered as components of "a broader political process" approach, inasmuch as any one of them simply appears inadequate to be a complete explication of social movements (Edelman, 2001, p. 290). Hence a strong political process theory came into being, and three explications of political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing theories were combined together to account for social movements (Chen, 2016). In addition to this, McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald (1996) were among the first to form a comparative perspective of political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing processes. More than that, Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly (2001) create a mechanistic approach to explain the dynamics of contention, simply put, a process is composed of mechanisms. And therefore, the mechanisms are the best way to explain protest waves. Besides, the mechanisms of McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001) stem from the theories of political opportunity structure, resource

mobilization, and framing processes. In a word, in this thesis I will examine and construct a novel analytical framework based on the three classic social movement approaches and mechanisms above, to study the processes of social movements, namely their protest waves: emergence, longevity, and decline. Put differently, this thesis attempts to investigate whether the classic social movement theories can explain the difference in protest waves and introduction of mechanisms become necessary. Overall, the first important academic contribution of this doctoral thesis is to apply the classic theories of social movements in Western democracies to a hybrid regime to examine which of these theories are applicable and which are not applicable, and why. Another important contribution is the introduction of mechanisms that originally only have a descriptive role as intermediate variables, forming one-to-one correspondences between the independent variables (derived from the classical social movement theories) and the dependent variable (the shape and character of wave phases), making mechanisms operable and usable for quantitative analysis. All in all, the analytical framework for the relationship between independent variables and dependent variables via mechanisms is the crystallization of the academic research results of this doctoral dissertation.

## **1.7 The structure of the thesis**

Chapter 1 is the introduction and Chapter 2 presents the literature review of the thesis, consisting of political opportunity structure, mobilizing structure, framing theories. Chapter 3 is the holistic application of the theories of Chapter 2 to the emergence, longevity and decline of the two social movements. Chapter 4 is the methodology section. Chapter 5, Chapter 6, Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 summarise the data analyses and results. Chapters 9 and 10 present respectively the discussion and conclusion sections.

Chapter 2 defines political opportunity structure (POS), consisting of the relative opening or closing institutionalised political system, emerging divisions within the elite, availability of influential allies, and the regime's capacity and tendency for repression. It also presents the notion of mobilizing structure built on resource mobilization theory (RMT), composed of leadership, SMOs and movement structures, social networks, and action tactics. This chapter discusses frames and framing processes, covering collective action frames, master frames, frame alignments (frame bridging, frame amplification, frame extension, and frame transformation), and frame resonance etc. In short, Chapter 2 contains a summary and critique of all the three theories, selecting the useful fragments for each of POS, RMT and Framing.

Chapter 3 presents the application of POS, RMT and Framing to the emergence, longevity, and decline phases of the Umbrella Movement (UM) and the Anti-Extradition Movement (AEM) of Hong Kong, namely, Emergence UM / AEM - all the three theories, Longevity UM / AEM - all the three theories, and Decline UM / AEM - all the three theories, which are based on secondary sources.

Chapter 4 is the methodology of the thesis, which focuses on five parts: comparative analysis, a mechanisms-based analytical framework, protest event analysis (PEA), social network analysis (SNA), and framing analysis using discourse network analysis (DNA). The analytical framework demonstrates the relationship between IVs and DVs via mechanisms. In the section on PEA, the chapter explains how to avoid biased reports by the media and defines how a protest is operationalised and categorised.

Chapter 5 uses protest event analysis (PEA) to analyse dependent variables – emergence, longevity and decline phases of the Umbrella Movement and the Anti-Extradition Movement, respectively.

Chapter 6 adopts social network analysis for analysis of independent variables (leaders, SMOs, networking, and influential allies). The roles of mechanisms – *brokerage*, *social appropriation*, and *certification*, are also explored in this chapter.

Chapter 7 employs discourse network analysis (DNA) to conduct the frame analysis, dealing with the independent variable – frame – and the mechanisms of *social construction* and *object shift*. This chapter runs in the order of emergence stages, peak stages, and decline stages of the Umbrella Movement and the Anti-Extradition Movement.

Chapter 8 addresses the remaining independent variables – propensity for repression, use of violence, SMOs/groups, elite division, and new tactics, as well as mechanisms – *repression*, *radicalization*, *competition*, *opportunity-threat attribution*, and *diffusion*. This chapter discusses and compares the forms of protests in the UM and the AEM, and the character and number of the policing events associated with the movements. Also, this chapter studies the relationship between *repression*, *radicalization*, and the protest waves of the AEM, using the protest event analysis once again.

Chapter 9 is the discussion chapter, looking back to the literature review – pointing out where the thesis supports and challenges existing research, explaining the overall value of the analytical framework, and evaluating the effectiveness of this approach for the two different cases. The chapter then provides an overall comparison of the two cases, explains how the mechanisms account for the differences between



the two cases, and identifies what mechanisms best explain the different characteristics of the two protest waves. Finally, this chapter provides some insights for future directions for challenges facing the future pro-democracy movements in Hong Kong.

Chapter 10 provides a relatively concise response to each of the research questions, discusses the value of this western-centric approach for a hybrid regime, and presents the avenues for future research that are opened up by this thesis.

## Chapter 2: Literature Review

This chapter combines the political opportunity structure approach, resource mobilization theory/mobilizing structure and framing theory. Social movement academics from different states standing for different theoretical approaches have been found to emphasize the significance of the same three aspects in analysing the occurrence and evolution of social movements (McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996). These three aspects involve the structure of political opportunities and restrictions faced by the movement; the organizational forms (informal and formal) accessible to protesters; and the collective processes of explanation, ascription, and social construction that liaise between opportunity and action (McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996). Hence, this thesis tries to engage with this view by dealing with these three dimensions that have long aroused movement academics' interest and determine the relationships between these three factors that are seen to be particularly crucial in causing the occurrence, evolution and decrease of social movements (McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996).

Specifically, as one of the theoretical pillars of this thesis, political opportunity structure theory introduces a structural approach to social movement studies by affirming the 'importance of the broader political system in structuring the opportunities for collective action' (McAdam et al., 1996, p. 2). However, there are many complicated and inconsistent concepts of POS, and thereby POS is subject to criticism. The main critique of POS is its all-embracing characteristic. In my view, POS is not so much a sponge as a useful and multi-faceted analytical tool. I will attempt to gain more clarity on the different types of variables used in studies of POS through examining the protest waves of social movements. Moreover, a major contribution of the RM theory

is to account for the development of mobilization, to identify the kinds of resources and organizational characteristics adopted by social movement activists, and by concentrating on resource operation, and strategy, it underlines the significance of strategic action (Canel, 2009). It tests a level of collective action in which the actors' decisions influence the results of clashes and affect the future and the potency of social movements (Canel, 2009). Nonetheless, in order to prevent resource mobilization from paying too much attention to formal rational organization and ignoring decentralized and spontaneous action, I take the decentralized movement structure as an important factor of mobilizing structure in this thesis. And finally, similar to political opportunities, framing processes are as crucial to the destiny of the continuing movement as they are in forming the appearance of social movement (McAdam et al., 1996). Framing is a concept to comprehend how 'collective processes of interpretation, attribution, and social construction.....mediate between opportunity and action' (McAdam et al., 1996, p. 2). Although framing analysis pays too much attention to elites and lacks empirical analysis, in my research, I will overcome these two defects through focusing on rank-and-file activists' frames in the two decentralized case studies and discourse network analysis (a quantitative content analysis). In brief, I will apply a broader Political Process Theory (PPT) of a synthesis of political opportunities, mobilizing structure and framing theories throughout this dissertation and create a wave of social movements: emergence, longevity, and decline.

This chapter will discuss several aspects of POS, mobilizing structure, and framing theories. I proceed as follows. Firstly, I will seek to define POS and discuss its critique, as well as four dimensions of the POS. Secondly, I will introduce what is resource mobilization theory and mobilizing structure and provide a critique of RMT, and then offer a theoretical architecture consisting of leadership, social movement

organizations and structures, social networks, and action tactics. Then, this chapter will provide a comprehensive framing structure encompassing concepts and processes, namely collective action frame, master frame, diagnostic framing, prognostic framing, and motivational framing, and frame alignment processes (frame bridging, frame amplification, frame extension, and frame transformation). Finally, this chapter will discuss the relationship between social movement theory and waves of protest and build an analytical framework to understand how political opportunities, mobilizing structure, framing processes contribute to the emergence, longevity, and decline of protest waves in a hybrid regime.

## **2.1 Political Opportunity Structure (POS)**

Tarrow (2011) points out that social movements appear when average citizens, occasionally inspired by leaders, recognise opportunities that decrease the costs of social movement activity, disclose possible allies, reveal where elites and governments are most susceptible, and set social networks and collective identities into motion surrounding collective objectives. This means that timing is very key to the appearance of social movements. In this thesis, I will integrate McAdam and Tarrow's four dimensions of political opportunity structure: 'the relative openness or closure of the institutionalised political system' (McAdam, 1996, p. 27), 'availability of influential allies, emerging splits within the elite' (Tarrow, 2011, p. 165), and 'the state's capacity and propensity for repression' (McAdam, 1996, p. 27).

### **2.1.1 What is POS**

One of the characteristic contributions of politics to the social movement approach has been the idea of the political opportunity structure (POS) (Xie & van der Heijden, 2010). POS developed in responding to resource mobilization approaches

which attach importance to the interior of social movements, seeking to identify elements outside social movements that have an impact on their mobilization, strategies, or consequence (McAdam, 1982; Tarrow, 1998; Tilly, 1978). Eisinger (1973) is considered by most social movements investigators as the first academic to create the term of “political opportunity structure”, when he conducted wide research to help explain variations in protests in forty-three American cities. He describes a political opportunity structure as the extent to which organizations are tolerated by the regime to protest for change (Eisinger, 1973). What is more, Eisinger (1973) hypothesizes that the relation between POS and collective political action is curvilinear. If POS is midway between open and closed, protest is high; if POS is open, protest declines. Also, other scholars provide different definitions of political opportunity structure. Kitschelt (1986, pp. 58) describes political opportunity as a distinctive constitution of resources, system design and historical antecedents for social movements, which promote the evolution of protest activities in some cases and restrict them in others. In addition, Brockett (1991) gives a functioning definition of the political opportunity structure in a study of the peasant protests in Central America. It is the arrangement of powers in a latent or real organization’s political context that affects that organization’s affirmation about political demands (Brockett, 1991, pp. 254). Moreover, political opportunity theory has been adopted in the broader field of participatory studies from the 1990s (Zhang, Jennings, & Zhao, 2018). Nentwich (1996) is the first academic to employ POS to explain the public involvement of the European Union. He defines “opportunity structures for citizens’ participation (OSCPs)” (p. 2) as the assorted ways of approaching the public domain and the processes of formulating and carrying out policy which are applicable for individuals; and defines POS as the accumulative architecture of OSCP in a certain political institution (Nentwich, 1996).

Also, Tarrow (2011, pp. 163) provides a concise and useful explanation of POS, that it is the constant, yet not definitely formal or perpetual, aspects of the political context that offer stimuli for people to engage in social movement by influencing their anticipations of success or failure. Additionally, Koopmans (1999, pp. 96) describes political opportunities as the limitations, probabilities, and risks that develop external to movement organizations, but which have an impact on its opportunities for mobilizing and/or achieving its shared interests.

As for the dimensions of political opportunity structure, McAdam (1996) proposes four aspects: 'the relative openness or closure of the institutionalised political system; the stability of that broad set of elite alignments that typically undergird a polity; the presence of elite allies; and the state's capacity and propensity for repression' (1996, p. 27). In addition, according to Tarrow (2011), the essential elements scholars most frequently refer to are '(1) opening of access to participation for new actors; (2) evidence of political realignment within the polity; (3) availability of influential allies; and (4) emerging splits within the elite' (p 164-165). Moreover, Gamson and Meyer (1996, pp. 289) distinguish the institutional dimensions from the dynamic dimensions of political opportunities. The institutional dimension is the comparatively stable constituents of political opportunities, such as conventions and procedural factors of governments at all levels; the dynamic aspects of political opportunities vary over time, such as public policies, political discourse, and elite instability that influence a given movement's ebb and flow (Gamson & Meyer, 1996, pp. 289). Saunders (2013, pp. 95) similarly distinguishes structural opportunities from contingent ones. The difference between institutional and dynamic dimensions of political opportunities stresses the changing political environment where social movements thrive instead of the interior development of movements (Gamson & Meyer, 1996, pp. 289). Furthermore, Meyer

and Minkoff (2004, pp. 1464) divide the political opportunity structure into general and particular issues. The general political opportunity structure means a general breach of the government's form, while the issue-specific structure means the opening to particular supporters. Diverse factors have been identified by numerous academics, but a widespread element is the extent of openness of the political institution (Meyer & Minkoff, 2004, pp. 1462). Additionally, Xie and van der Heijden (2010, pp. 54) propose a worldwide applicable concept of POS. They have adopted this model to study the environmental movement in China and its political opportunities, including: 1) 'formal institutional structure (open - closed)'; 2) 'informal elite strategies (integrative - exclusive)'; 3) 'configuration of power (divided elite - united elite)'; 4) 'political output structure (weak - strong)' (p 54). As a result, for the clarity of this study, I synthesise McAdam and Tarrow's conceptions of the relevant dimensions of political opportunity structure, and this integrated POS consists of 1) 'the relative openness or closure of the institutionalised political system' (McAdam, 1996, p. 27), 2) 'availability of influential allies', 3) 'emerging splits within the elite' (Tarrow, 2011, p. 165), and 4) 'the state's capacity and propensity for repression' (McAdam, 1996, p. 27).

### **2.1.2 Assessment of POS**

The purpose of the political opportunity approach is to portray and explicate the situations and conditions which promote or restrain people's participation in social movements (van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2009, pp. 12). It stresses the influence of political context on citizens' collective actions and social movements. Despite the dominant position of the political opportunity approach, there are several criticisms. First, this framework focuses on social movements in mature democracies and transnational comparative analyses of the European social movements are more common, e.g., studies of Kitschelt (1986) and Kriesi et al. (1995). Although the use of

the political opportunity approach for non-developed democracies has been put forward (Boudreau, 1996; Jenkins & Schock, 1992), systematic adaptations of political opportunities to authoritarian regimes or hybrid regimes is lacking. Second, there is a great deal of protest event analysis research based on case studies of single and successful social movements, suggesting that bias of selection may create a problem (Schock, 1999). The notion of POS is very broad. For example, Gamson and Meyer (1996) argue that the notion of political opportunity structure is, 'in danger of becoming a sponge' that sucks up almost all aspects of the social movement – political systems and culture, a variety of crises, political coalitions, and policy changes (p. 275). The central aspects of political opportunities must be specified and always employed so as to make effective comparative analysis over time, throughout countries, and for different kinds of movements (Gamson & Meyer, 1996). Third, there is a propensity of ambiguity about what political opportunities are de facto explicating (Gamson & Meyer, 1996; McAdam, 1996). Scholars should be clear about what they are attempting to account for by using a political opportunity framework, such as mobilization, form, or results of collective actions. Put differently, political opportunities affecting the mobilization of a movement may not function or may have a similar impact on the form or the result of the campaign (Schock, 1999). Fourth, the international environment of political opportunities has been overlooked. For instance, McAdam (1996, 1998) indicates that an important element ignored in his previous political process approach was the international environment of political opportunities.

To overcome those limitations one by one, I will apply POS to a hybrid regime (Hong Kong), make a comparative analysis of the UM and the AEM in Hong Kong to avoid single case selection bias. The main academic contribution of this chapter is to make a protest wave constituted of emergence, longevity, and decline, explicit in what



conditions and circumstances facilitate which section of the protest wave of social movements in a hybrid regime. The international context of political opportunities will be an important consideration in this study, typically reflected in the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act passed by both the U.S. House and Senate which is a highly important policy outcome the AEM achieved.

### **2.1.3 Application of POS**

This section will discuss and analyse political opportunities in a hybrid regime, consisting of the relative openness or closure of the institutionalised political system, emerging divisions within the elite, availability of influential allies, and the regime's capacity and propensity for repression.

#### **2.1.3.1 Institutionalised political system**

The related input and output architectures that decide the power of the regime include the congressional sphere and the administrative sphere (Kriesi et al., 1995, pp. 27). Different from immediate and direct outcomes of congressional resolution adaption, policy execution processes entail successive negotiations, interchange, redefinition and rereading of political goals (Kriesi et al., 1995, pp. 28). In a word, the openness of the regime is foremost an effect of the institutional configuration of the congressional sphere, and key factors are the number of parties, cliques, and groups, and the development of feasible policy alliances (Kriesi et al., 1995). Furthermore, the more complicated the collision architecture and the greater the extent to which there is a proportional voting system, the larger will be the number of political parties (Kriesi et al., 1995, pp. 29). From the perspective of a challenging group, proportional representation provides more channels than plurality or majority representation. More importantly, with a greater number of parties, the activists of social movements will more probably form an alliance with the political parties (Kriesi et al., 1995, pp. 29).

These partners may contain small competitive parties and large leading parties that adjust and modify their positions facing the challenge from the smaller parties (Kriesi et al., 1995, pp. 29). So, the size of parties decides at least in part the process of alliance formation (Laver & Schofield, 1991).

In the administrative sphere, the formality of the approach to policy-making as well as the competency to act are decided by the quantity of resources controlled by the administrative section and its interior structure, by the makeup of its dialogists in the mechanism of interest mediation, firstly the interest groups, and by the architecture's compositions that have been fixed between the two (Kriesi et al., 1995, pp. 31). Furthermore, it is anticipated that the larger the quantity of resources controlled, and the higher the extent of its agglomeration, internal reconciliations, and specialization, the more powerful it will be (Kriesi et al., 1995). This reliance will, yet, not voluntarily make the regime open to outside challengers in the social movement industry; that will emerge merely if the vested interest groups are frail, inasmuch as a resource abundant, consistent, and specialised arrangement of interest groups may also be capable of rendering outsiders unable to access the regime (Kriesi et al., 1995, pp. 31). Moreover, activists are hindered in the arrangement of very institutionalized and inclusive policy discussions between the administration and interest groups (Kriesi et al., 1995).

It is noteworthy that it is necessary to attach importance to the intricacy of national structure and accidental and unpredictable respects of state/region reactions to social movement (Rootes, 1999, pp. 81). Some sections of the evolving, tactics and consequences of social movement are affected by a series of accidental and unpredictable variables, and different situations were fundamentally dependent on the

political considerations and arrangements of key political players instead of influences of structures (Rootes, 1999, pp. 79).

### **2.1.3.2 Emerging splits within the elites**

Divisions within the internal elite is the configuration of power, constituting a more dynamic variable of POS. Configuration of power means whether the ruling elite of the form of government is essentially disunited or unanimous (Xie & van der Heijden, 2010, pp. 54). Elite divisions in democracies are inclined to involve economic or social policies instead of the governmental form (Schock, 1999, pp. 361). An advantage of democracy is that elections offer conventional and institutional channels for elite re-disposition (Schock, 1999). To some degree, elites need to arouse a certain scope of allegiance of the masse. In non-democratic cases, elite divisions may have more profound outcomes for social reform as they emerge not only aiming at economic and social policies, but also the form of government (Schock, 1999). The lack of conventional and institutional mechanisms of elite contest and replacement raises the probability that any indication of elite divisions or re-disposition will generate elite competition (Schock, 1999). Moreover, Kriesi (1989, pp. 296) has suggested that states adopting an exclusive tactic that is suppressing riots will tend to have an ideologically homogeneous ruling alliance and lead to polarization and clashes with the challenging group. Conversely, regimes with a contained tactic, co-optation or pre-emption, will be ideologically heterogeneous and exoteric to outsiders (Kriesi, 1989, pp. 296). By and large, the condition in hybrid regimes lies between democracies and non-democracies. Elite divisions entail not only social or economic policies, but also more or less the political systems, and this varies case by case.

### **2.1.3.3 Availability of influential allies**

As for the availability of influential allies, according to Kitschelt (1986, pp. 67), the (im)potency of a campaign rests not only on its approach to decision formulators but also on the capability of a form of government to efficaciously carry out policies upon the request of campaigns. In this respect, Kitschelt (1986) differentiates the powerful political output structures (centralised regime, government's domination of market), between the weak political output structures (decentralised regime, laissez-faire policy toward market). In addition, social movements function in a multi-organizational arena, interplaying with diverse players. They can look for both partners and rivals within the administrative section, and the party structure, as well as within interest groups and societal dimension (Xie & van der Heijden, 2010, pp. 54). Moreover, the authority can consent or disagree to protest's demands, inasmuch as campaign aims are recognised by some of the sections while others are against them. In addition, whole sections of the regimes have their respective aims and interests; some of them may concur with campaign aims and interests, but others not (Xie & van der Heijden, 2010). Thus, the smaller the number of opportunities within the system, the greater significance of coalition to help protests to gain an approach to the formulation process (Xie & van der Heijden, 2010).

The political architectures incline to be comparatively open in arenas entailing a broad variety of stakeholders, clashes between officialdom and incorporated groups over policy programs, and the lack of systematic channels for preclusion (Ng, 2013, pp. 194). Under these circumstances, it will be more convenient for challenging groups to get access to the decision-making process. The extent to which SMOs can affect procedure and policy formulation brings about the mode of opportunities and anticipated results when movements confronting the government are launched (Ng,

2013, pp. 194). Conversely, these chances and anticipated results influence the inclination of social players to engage in and form their trajectory of acts.

#### **2.1.3.4 A regime's propensity for repression**

The notion of informal strategies is more confined than the notion of political culture, in that the former centres on the programs that members of the political institution use when they are treating activists, and in that it does not mention such extremely ambiguous notions as 'zeitgeist', 'civic culture,' or 'national moods.' (Kriesi et al., 1995, pp. 33). The informal plans and predominant tactics regarding activists are 'either exclusive (repressive, confrontational, polarizing) or integrative (facilitative, cooperative, assimilative)' (Kriesi et al., 1995, pp. 34). Integrative tactics appear to be promoted by the small-scale of a governmental form and its openness to the international market (Katzenstein, 1985). Furthermore, Tilly (1978) makes a distinction between facilitation and repression. The former means any act by other parties that reduces the costs of protest activities; the latter contains any exterior action adding such costs. Nevertheless, protest activities are not just influenced by the replies people provide to the question of 'What will happen if we act?' but also by their anticipations about 'What will happen if we do not act?' (Kriesi et al., 1995, pp. 38). Reform means a circumstance where collective interest is anticipated even without movement, and threat stands for a circumstance where collective loss is anticipated if there is no movement (Kriesi et al., 1995). On the whole these four elements are seen as specific opportunities. Facilitation, reducing the costs of action, will usually result in rising mobilization. It may adopt a variety of modes, among which the most significant are the allowance of SMOs conceded by the authority or other sections of the polity; direct methods of approach to policy formulation, such as a formal or informal advisor, probabilities for judicial appeal, or direct democratic programs, and immediate aid by

generally acknowledged roles like political parties for collective actions (Kriesi et al., 1995, pp. 38-39). And, as generally acknowledged roles and the authority are its primary origins, facilitation will usually be aiming at comparatively temperate groups and acts, and thus will result in larger scale, and milder modes of mobilization (Kriesi et al., 1995). Moreover, the consequences of repression are less obvious, at least in terms of its effect on the size of mobilization. While it is clear that an excessively high intensity of repression will render social movements unappealing for most of their potential constituency, it is less evident whether growing repression can lead to demobilization when the level of mobilization is lower (Kriesi et al., 1995, pp. 39).

RMT argues that the path from circumstance to acting hinged on the utilization of resources and changes in the opportunities for social movements (Canel, 2009, para. 3). Therefore, political opportunity structure alone is not enough to explain the emergence of social movements, and resources and organization are also essential. In the next part, I will move on to the part of resource mobilization theory.

## **2.2 Resource mobilization theory (RMT) & mobilizing structure**

Apart from the political-interactive approach created by a combination of Tilly's (1978, pp. 52) "polity model" and McAdam's (1982, pp. 42) "political process model", the other main model "resource mobilization approach" (McCarthy & Zald, 1977, pp. 1213) concentrates on organizational development, leadership, and resource operation (Canel, 2009, para. 9). Resource mobilization scholars interpret the rise and fall of social movements through features within the movements such as the accessibility to resources and organizations. Yet, RMT contains various concepts and lacks a unified and clear-cut mode, so the introduction of mobilization structure becomes necessary. In this section I will introduce the mobilizing structure consisting

of leadership, social movement organization and movement structure, social networks, and action tactics.

### **2.2.1 What are RMT & mobilizing structure**

Placing grievances in a secondary place in theories accounting for the ebb and flow of social movements directly brought about a stress on mobilization processes or the developments and strategies of social movements and their rise, fall and variation (van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2009, pp. 25). Rucht (1996, p. 186) affirms that the mobilization of massive and continued social movement campaigns needs resources, e.g., 'people, money, knowledge, frames, skills, and technological tools to process and distribute information and to influence people'. Based on the role of mobilizing structures, Zirakzadeh (1997, pp. 9) stresses the function of leadership in raising resources and affirms that a movement for and by aggrieved people simply occurs after coalitions are formed between a group of discontented supporters and an organization or person who owns the appropriate political experience, view, or resource to aid that group of supporters. Additionally, a social movement organization is the compound or formal organization with an aim to launch a social movement or a countermovement and efforts to put the aim into practice (McCarthy & Zald, 1977, pp. 1218). Zirakzadeh addresses what a number of researchers call SMOs as the "indigenous-community" approach (1997, p. 13). 'That is how local level social institutions, such as neighbourhood clubs, union clubs, and community churches, can provide organizational building blocks, communication networks, and leadership skills for later social movements.' (Haddadian, 2012, p. 16). Altogether, resource mobilization refers to the processes through which a collective of aggrieved individuals accumulates and allocates resources to take collective action for seeking the group's objectives (van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2009, pp. 25). Nonetheless, resource

mobilization seems to be an all-embracing theory containing assorted concepts and mechanisms, and there is no unified and clear pattern to analyse the emergence and outcome of a social movement. For the sake of clarity, mobilizing structure is defined as a mixture of elements, via which people mobilize and participate in social movements, and in my study those factors include leadership, social movement organizations and structures, social networks, and action tactics.

RMT studies the diversity of resources that need to be utilized, the connections of social movements to like-minded groups, the reliance of movements on outside support for successful outcome, and the strategies employed by governments to manipulate or assimilate movements (McCarthy & Zald, 1977, pp. 1213). Resources can refer to anything from tangible resources, such as occupations, earning, funds, and the right to particular products and services to more abstract resources, like power, leadership skills, ethical commitment, reliance, comradeship, technical ability and so on (van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2009, pp. 25). In short, from the point of view of resource mobilization, people protest as they are capable of generating resources and perceive political effectiveness; typical protestors are rational, highly organized, expert, and talented people who conduct carefully prepared social movements aiming to resolve social issues (van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2009, pp. 26). Furthermore, by concentrating on social networks, organizational development, and political processes, it succeeds in fully distinguishing factors of continuance among present-day collective actors (Canel, 2009, para. 30). In a word, Melucci (1984, pp. 828) points out that RMT is helpful to account for that how tactics, decisions and capital are integrated to determine the rise of a social movement. In addition, regarding why people persistently support groups for seeking collective goods, Olson (1965, pp. 51) provided an answer that organizations convince members



to participate through allocation of selective incentives, which refers to benefits to members that provide stimulus to participate through shifting the cost-effective proportion to members' advantage. However, incentive foundations for collective action, including universal suffrage, democracy, etc., are much wider than simple material benefits. For instance, people may take part in organizations for a feeling of belongingness, which is to promote solidarity and raise awareness or common interests (Saunders, 2013, pp 153). Subsequently, a number of researchers have extended the notion of selective incentives to contain social, emblematic and prescriptive stimuli (e.g., Cress & Snow, 1996, pp. 1100; Saunders, 2013, pp. 178).

### **2.2.2 Assessment of RMT**

Resource mobilization theory (RMT) calls into question the functionalist rationale of collective behavior theory, which stressed combination, balance, and consonance, and presented a conflict pattern of collective action (Canel, 2009, para. 5). The conflict pattern holds that group action is caused by ingrained gaps in society, not by short-term pressure due to dramatic social change (Canel, 2009, para. 5). Hence resource mobilization theorists argue that according to traditional approaches of collective behavior, the research subject was not the social movement itself but the system's origins of imbalance which brought about an increase in the number of collective actors (Canel, 2009, para. 5). Instead, resource mobilization theory renders social movement organizations the research target. What is more, resource mobilization theorists intend to shift away from a strong hypothesis about the central roles of deprivation and discontents to inferior ones, rendering discontents a composition – sometimes a subordinate one – in the era of social movements (McCarthy & Zald, 1977). More concretely, relative deprivation studies presume that group activities sprang from observed states of deprivation and the senses of

frustration related to these observations (Canel, 2009). All in all, RM theory indicates that dissatisfaction and imparities could simply be regarded as the prerequisites for the emergence of social movements; the association of imparity and control were perceived in all sides of social life, but only in some cases would they be queried, and the emergence of organized movements targeting to solve these problems was simply one possible result (Canel, 2009).

However, the instrumentally-oriented resource mobilization model is still deficient owing to the disproportional emphasis placed on rational organizations (Kitschelt, 1991, pp. 334-337). Through resource mobilization, social movements are rapidly conceptualized in an isolated manner that gives preference to 'reform movements and formal organisations' (Buechler, 2004, p. 54). Not all movement behaviours centre on reform, also they are not limited to the behaviours of formal organizations. Piven and Cloward (1977), to illustrate with an example, underline the function of loosely organized protest and mass rebellion in deprived people's movements. With such a perspective, resource mobilisation attaching importance to formal organisation is equivalent to notional blinkers that exclude experts from examining other styles of protest (Buechler, 2004, pp. 56), and that implies that RMT totally ignores unplanned actions, recently appearing links, and rank-and-file alignments that are often crucial to the fruits of victory of social movements (Bystydzienski & Schacht, 2001, pp. 3). Put more emphatically, Crossley (2002, pp. 66-67) indicates that the very idea concept of self-interested rational protest on which resource mobilization is resting is laughable. Simon's (1991, p. 132) idea of 'bounded rationality' finds that individuals select options of behaviour that are sufficiently favourable but not 'ideal', even 'satisfactory'. He implies that it is the outcome of emulative needs for time and concern as well as constraint on individual cognition,

which is one more reason why there is a need to look beyond a rational actor model (Saunders, 2013, pp. 80).

In general, supporters of resource mobilization theory suggest that the model is established within a profitable or implemental interpretation of rationality, by which actors look for the most cost-efficient methods for achieving interests (Crossley, 2002, pp. 58). The model should not be discarded for overstressing the rational and formal aspects. That is in part owing to the fact that resource mobilization is not a mega account for which supportive evidence must be unearthed, but instead an analytical instrument to help understand specific aspects of movements (Saunders, 2013, pp. 79). Nevertheless, it should be cognizant of the fact that such formal organizations are just one portion of the story, and that rationality simply in part dominates the action of even in formal SMOs (Saunders, 2013), and thus it is critical to look beyond it to get a fuller story. Accordingly, to avoid resource mobilization focusing too much on formal rational organization, and ignoring dispersed and spontaneous actions, I consider decentralised movement structures as an important element of mobilizing structures in my study; besides, for the Anti-Extradition Movement, formal rational organization was not indispensable. Even the Occupy movement itself is not an organization, but an organizing process, continuously under construction. Also, “occupy” is a sort of idea and culture. In addition, given that social movement organizations are not entirely subject to instrumental reason, one has to consider include culture, collective identity and cohesion, which will be involved in framing (the following chapter), making up for the deficiency of RMT. Another innovation of this chapter is a supplement to the social networking approach to the study of social movement. The “bloc recruitment” (Oberschall, 1973, p. 125) of pre-existent cohesive organizations is the most effective method of enlisting and seems to be most common among mass movements of

system transformation (Snow, Zurcher & Eckland-Olson, 1980, pp. 790). However, decentralised movements that have emerged in Hong Kong in recent years and months have challenged this. The masses were spontaneously mobilized without the support of formal networks.

### **2.2.3 Application of mobilizing structure**

Having discussed and defined what is resource mobilization and mobilizing structure, and assessed RMT, in the next section I will elaborate on the elements constituting the theoretical framework of mobilizing structures in the thesis: leadership, SMOs and movement structures, social networks, and action tactics.

#### **2.2.3.1 Leadership**

Leaders of social movement are described as tactical decision-makers who stimulate and marshal others to take part in protest activities (Morris & Staggenborg, 2004, pp. 171). Leaders are crucial to social movements: they encourage commitment, garner resources, make and identify the occasion, design tactics, frame requirements, and affect results (Morris & Staggenborg, 2004). There are frequently four most suitable categories of leadership layers within movements: The first layer is composed of leaders who hold the highest formal leadership status of SMOs (Morris & Staggenborg, 2004). The second layer is composed of those who are members of the lineal leadership group of formal leaders. Such leaders frequently hold subordinate formal status intra organizations (Morris & Staggenborg, 2004). The third leadership layer comprises bridge leaders. According to Robnett (1997), Goldstone (2001) notes that 'bridge leaders are those neighbourhood and community organizers who mediate between top leadership and the vast bulk of followers, turning dreams and grand plans into on-the-ground realities' (Goldstone, 2001, p. 158). The fourth layer of leadership

is constituted of those organizers who establish linkages between members of a protest group and are conducive to expanding organizations, and they regularly participate in leading activities as well (Morris & Staggenborg, 2004). Those assorted layers of leadership are significant in bringing about different movement results. By and large, bridge leaders and organizers influence the movement's success or failure through their engagement in the protest activities, arranging the needful assistance to implement collective action strategies, which lead to specific gains for the campaign (Robnett, 1997). The formal leaders of organizations or groups are critical to interior movement developments, and they have a significant impact on elites beyond the movement (Morris & Staggenborg, 2004), and successful formal leaders probably turn out to be elite competitors who have links with elites in other parts, e.g., political parties, interest groups and social media (Schmitt, 1989).

Leaders frequently emerge from extant social movements, leadership impacts may be inward, as an indispensable part of an organization's ability to maintain unity and centre on its objectives, or they may be outward, crossing the frontiers of the organization and the context where it exists, producing exchange to those outside of the organization and bringing relevant news into the organization (Koustova & Kwantes, 2013, pp. 35). These roles may be formalized, with one or more individuals having devised assignments for playing diverse leadership roles in the organization, or as in the instance of leaderless organizations, may be informal and obscure (Koustova & Kwantes, 2013, pp. 35). In addition, informally structured movements do not manipulate the choice of the spokesperson to the public provided that they consider that it should be wholly without a spokesperson; however, the media would pick out someone to speak on behalf of the movement (Freeman, 2013, pp. 238). Particularly, rotating leadership is a leadership pattern by which leadership is assigned

amid group members instead of being concentrated on only one leader (Carson et al., 2007, p. 1217). Rotating leadership is similar to 'distributed leadership and shared leadership' (Brunink, 2014, p. 3). The leader of a guiding leadership model has a powerful and formal status, yet the formal and powerful status of the leader is not present within rotating leadership (Brunink, 2014, pp. 3). Put differently, rotating leadership is characterised by equality (Cunha et al., 2003). In a word, those with the know-how in a social movement start taking on the role of ad hoc leaders.

### **2.2.3.2 SMOs and movement structures**

While social movements are not equal to the organizations that energize them, organizations frequently have a very significant impact on them. Similar to any types of organization, SMOs energize social movements and play several roles, including enticing participants to provide their services; setting organizational goals; handling and harmonizing donations; garnering resources from their surroundings; choosing, cultivating, and substituting members (Della Porta & Diani, 2006, pp. 137). In brief, organizations significantly continue to encourage people to participate in the movement, not only in relation to identity, but also to aspects of action (Della Porta & Diani, 2006, pp. 138). Besides, social movements would suffer extreme mutability and challenging groups' political influence would be much more confined than it is in reality in the absence of organizations (Della Porta & Diani, 2006, pp. 138).

Movement structure means the architecture of relationships that situate between all entities entailed in a particular protest (Willems & Jegers, 2012, pp. 69). Entities refer to individuals, organizations, groups, political parties, the government or even entire sections of political system or society. The structure occurs quite spontaneously and depends very much on the collective identity of the participants in

the collective activities (Willems & Jegers, 2012). However, it appears that the structure per se is volatile, and normally actors begin making their behaviours official and/or start to become experts in particular forms of activities, fighting for more specific targets and accomplishments (Willems & Jegers, 2012, pp. 76).

Furthermore, it is observed that the most prevalent category of organization for SMOs is neither centralized and bureaucratic nor structureless, but one that is a segmented, polycentric, and combined network (Gerlach, 2001). New sections are produced by dividing old ones, by supplying new ones, or by dividing and appending new effects. Sections overlay and cross intricately, and thus a number of individuals are team members of a few sections simultaneously (Gerlach, 2001, pp. 290). A person may be a leader in one section and an adherent in another. Regarding polycentric structures, Gerlach (2001, pp. 294) indicates that these movements have a large number of leaders or leader cores, and that many leaders are not ultimately guided or instructed via a string of orders issued by a top leader. Analogous to sections, the leaders are not organized in the form of power structures; they are 'heterarchic' (Gerlach, 2001, p. 294). No one can declare to speak on behalf of the campaign overall, and there is not any group representing the campaign (Gerlach, 2001). People can be leaders mainly by encouraging and affecting others instead of by being selected for their political or organizational competence (Gerlach, 2001). Also, movement actors are not just connected internally, but also with other movements whose participants have common positions and views (Gerlach, 2001). Through these connections, a movement can attract physical assistance, enlist new members, and increase the scope of cooperation. All in all, unstable, informal, and decentralised social movements seem to become more and more popular, as they are better able to adapt

to the mission of producing a challenging, dynamic society and culture than a centralized organization.

### **2.2.3.3 Social networking**

According to Diani (1992), networking is central to the definition of a social movement. For him, 'a social movement is a network of informal interactions between a plurality of individuals, groups and/or organizations, engaged in a political or cultural conflict, on the basis of a shared collective identity' (p. 13). Social networking influences the participation in protest activities, conversely, the participation forms networking, intensifying preexisting ones or producing new ones (Della Porta & Diani, 2006, pp. 115). It is true that individuals frequently become involved in social movements through their personal ties to pre-existing participants. Those ties contribute to surmounting the countless barriers and difficulties that people commonly are confronted with when thinking whether to be engaged in a certain undertaking (Della Porta & Diani, 2006). Apart from the micro-mobilization above, meso-mobilization actors play a comparable role in this informal interactive networking; conversely, however, they arouse not individuals but factions, organizations, and networks (Gerhards & Rucht, 1992, pp. 558). To accomplish this goal, they have two roles. Firstly, they offer a structural combination by linking organizations with one another, gathering resources, designing collective actions, and handling external relations; and secondly, they target at a cultural synthesis of the diverse organizations and networking in forming a shared frame of meaning (Gerhards & Rucht, 1992). This is enough to understand the issue at a critical juncture and to connect the particular attentions to this issue. Consequently, the mobilizing structure for protests works both ways, composing both meso-mobilization and micro-mobilization participants (Gerhards & Rucht, 1992). The first connects and combines assorted micro-



mobilization organizations; the second inspires and arouses individuals within and beyond these organizations (Gerhards & Rucht, 1992, pp. 559). In brief, the larger the strength of preexisting links among the meso-mobilization actors, the higher the number of successful protest campaigns they have been launched before, and the faster evolving the entire basic structure of protest activities, the more success the movement will achieve (Gerhards & Rucht, 1992, pp. 571).

In terms of networked structure in decentralized movements, the various factions of a movement are not separated from one another. Rather, they develop a combined networking or reticular formation through equal social connections among those who participate in them and through common comprehensions, identities, and rivals these participants have (Gerlach, 2001, pp. 295). Networking allows movement actors to communicate information and thoughts and to take concerted actions. Networking does not have a clear-cut boundary but extend or shrink as groups interplay or are separated (Gerlach, 2001). Furthermore, participants in decentralized movements can be divided into three types, namely, a) participants who attend the movement as individual and separate actors – they are self-inspired and self-mobilized, not pertaining to any extant protest organization; b) participants from a circle of friends or acquaintances shaped after they get involved in the movement; and c) members of previous organizations mutually isolated (Cai, 2017, pp. 10). Additionally, social media also has a great impact on the formation of movement networking. The surge of social media on the Internet recently was observed to produce a powerful positive effect on campaigns, as it changes the course of connection and interaction within movements by linking people in geographically disjointed zones and contributes to the formation of networking across national boundaries (Carty, 2002, pp. 132). Moreover, decentralized movements seem to occur often among those mobilized via new ICT or

new social media (Cai, 2017, pp. 5). The arrival of new information technologies has dramatically transformed the development of mobilization, and deepened preexisting online networks in mobilizing participants as well. New ICT, particularly the Internet, Web-based forums, mobile phones, and other correspondence means, e.g., Facebook and Twitter, function as influential instruments to promote off-line protest activities (Cai, 2017). As a result, individuals in movements may not be mobilized by a certain organization. One cause is the fewer opportunities for continuous personal connections than before, and another is the multiple choices available for people looking for organizations to join (Tarrow, 2011, pp. 212).

#### **2.2.3.4 Action tactics**

Demonstrators choose tactics, which are the particular method of carrying out strategy and the forms of protest activities adopted by movement participants (Meyer & Staggenborg, 2007, pp. 11). Tactics, like marches and litigations, are necessary for publicizing objectives in a variety of sites (Meyer & Staggenborg, 2007). Taylor and Van Dyke (2004, pp. 270) assert that tactics are purposeful endeavours to produce change, which entail competition with objectives and the formation of collective identity within protest organizations. Within this, tactical repertoires contain “cultural performances” and immediately targeted operations, and both inwards and outwards planned operations generate both cultural and political variations (Taylor & Van Dyke, 2004, p. 268-271). In a word, the selection of tactics is a crucial one not just inasmuch as tactics influence results, but also inasmuch as they have a significant role in generating adherents and activists (Meyer & Staggenborg, 2007, pp. 12). Furthermore, Shattuck (2013, p. 7) organised categorised tactics into either non-contentious, e.g., “conventional” or “institutionalized”, or contentious, such as “confrontational” or “radicalized”. On the other hand, Tarrow (1993, p. 332) distinguished “conventional”

from “confrontational” movement tactics. Conventional forms function to generate change by extant institutional approaches and regulation of political participation. Instances of such forms range from petitions, writing letters to authorities, lawsuits and convening public assemblies (Tarrow, 1993, pp. 332); when considering “confrontational” forms, Tarrow depicts them as ‘unfamiliar, unexpected,’ and even ‘rejected as illegitimate by elites and the mass public alike’ (Tarrow. 1993, p. 332). Furthermore, in order to succeed, SMOs must own moral superiority and be considered as justifiable, sensible, and expert, and all those are satisfied when selecting non-confrontational forms (Shattuck, 2013, pp. 9). In addition, individuals form a taste for specific tactics, in part separating from their effectiveness in achieving formal external aims (Jasper, 1997, pp. 235). Some may prefer to remain within the limits of legitimacy, others moving beyond them; some may be proud of their mild requirements and strategies, others of being pioneers or aggressive (Polletta & Jasper, 2001, pp. 293). And thus, they may form collective identities built on those strategic tastes. Strategic and organizational identities frequently occur simultaneously, inasmuch as organizations reflect action strategies (Polletta & Jasper, 2001, pp. 293). Hence those with tactical identities may view themselves as at the forefront, or they may take pride in specific modes of collective behaviours, e.g., nonviolence or civil disobedience (Polletta & Jasper, 2001, pp. 293). In general, tactical decisions may not ever immediately enable a movement to achieve success; yet, a tactic can mediate influence success by influencing the support of an intermediate variable, often in a place beyond the movement, e.g. popular support, media concern, or allied networks (Shattuck, 2013, pp. 10).

In the beginning of the 1980s, a range of social movement academics critiqued the main views of social movement research as it overemphasized structural aspects

and was unable to grasp the micro dimension of social construction that brings about a movement (Klandermans, 1992; Tarrow, 1992). Academics depict a procedure of meaning making by adopting the verb framing (Snow & Benford, 1988; Snow et al., 1986, pp. 464). In general, framing has shifted the sphere outside the structural determinism of a political opportunity approach and away from the uncertain psychology of rational choice theory of resource mobilization (Benford, 1997, pp. 411). Besides, inasmuch as people do not take collective action in the absence of favourable excuses, to assert a link between collective action frames and protest waves may have practical relevance (Snow & Benford, 1992, pp. 151). Therefore, in the next section I will discuss framing theory.

## **2.3 Framing**

The adoption of framing in social movement studies is owed to the work of David Snow and his collaborators (Snow et al., 1986). The frames, which protest organizers utilize, are described by Snow and Benford (1992, p. 137) as “interpretive schema that simplifies and condenses the ‘world out there’ by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of one’s present or past environments”. Framing processes, from a social-psychological perspective, arouse the public to take part in movements. This has been researched broadly and identified as one of the core notions in how to interpret social movements (Benford & Snow, 2000; McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996). Framing processes deal with how a SMO interfaces with others by employing a corresponding frame – frame bridging, frame amplification, and frame extension, and explains to the public exhaustively – frame transformation (Snow et al., 1986, pp. 464). And those are what I will focus on in this section.

### **2.3.1 What is framing in social movement research**

Snow et al. firstly introduced “frame” from Goffman (1974). A “frame” means a ‘schemata of interpretation’ that is used to pinpoint, recognise, confirm and tag an apparently incalculable number of specific events (Goffman, 1974, p. 21), and thus framing refers to interpretation of the events, and it describes the process of understanding and explanation. In other words, there may exist an objective reality, but people take action following their own subjective interpretations. Social movement frames function partly by delimiting and accentuating significant respects of actuality, namely, by rendering events and contexts understandable as much as by promoting a gripping viewpoint (Polletta & Ho, 2006, pp. 188). Furthermore, there is a view that SMOs need to let their potential adherents recognize their frame, which is the means they use to explain the circumstance and roles of the protest and organization for the purpose of guaranteeing their resources and sustainment (Snow et al., 1986, pp. 477). Put another way, frames can be considered as slogans originating from protest campaigns and organizations/groups, which theatrically put forward the opinions and belief systems of these protests, and as interpretations of actuality (Hardnack, 2015, pp. 24). What is more, by making events and happenings connotative, framing operates to collate experience and direct action, no matter who or what is the individual or group (Snow et al., 1986, pp. 464). In addition, framing analysis provides an indication of the relevant inter ‘micro- and macrostructural phenomena’ (Snow & Benford, 1992, p. 151). That is, how framing processes at the microsystem level of SMOs and players can have meaningful insights for macroscopical phenomena, such as protest waves (Snow & Benford, 1992). In sum, framing infiltrates the black box of spiritual life in movements and are conducive to meaning construction and preservation for potential adherents and onlookers (Johnston, 2002, pp. 63).

Snow and his colleagues sketch the frame alignment process which pays attention to the connection of personal and organizational explanatory directions as a result that ‘some set of individual interests, values and beliefs’ and organization’s activities, aims and ideology are consistent and supplementary (Snow et al., 1986, p. 464). They (1986) further specify four frame alignment processes: frame bridging, frame amplification, frame extension, and frame transformation. Moreover, in well-developed movements, framing processes are much more likely to be formed by intentional and tactical decisions in terms of SMOs, the focus of fierce debate between activists on behalf of the movement, the government, and any existent counter-movements (McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996, pp. 16). Furthermore, Snow and Benford (1988) examined and specified the three foundational effects of the framing process more accurately in their later work, which are diagnostic framing, prognostic framing, and motivational framing. Building on this, William Gamson (1992) presents three elements of collective action frames – identity, agency, and injustice. *Identity* means the delimitation of “we”, contrary to some “they” with dissimilar opinions and interests (Gamson, 1992, p. 7). In the absence of a rival, the possible goal of a social movement remains vague. *Agency* means awareness that social movements are likely to change the status quo and related policy (Gamson, 1992). Social movement frames suggest some degree of collective effect and repudiate the invariance of some unwanted circumstance. *Injustice* means ethical outrage (Gamson, 1992). An injustice frame needs an awareness of inspired social actors to take responsibility for causing hurt and pain (Gamson, 1992). In short, injustice, agency, and identity are corresponding to diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational framing one by one.

### **2.3.2 Assessment of framing literature**

Since its initial introduction into social movement theory more than twenty-five years ago (Snow et al., 1986), framing has arisen as one of the dominant theoretical approaches to comprehending social movement activity (Snow et al., 2014). It has injected new passion for the study of conceptual, explanatory, constructional, and cultural aspects of social movements (Benford, 1997). By and large, framing analysis will likely sustain a lasting influence, and could be reinforced by dealing with two notable defects prevailing in the present literature (Benford, 1997), namely elite partiality and ignoring methodologically empirical studies.

Elite partiality is the inclination to concentrate on the framings of movement elites or leaders, ignoring ordinary participators, possible new members, onlookers, and others (Benford, 1997, pp. 421). Snow et al. (1986) suggest that on the basis of much of the research, it seems that mobilization is just a matter of protesters pressing the right flashy keys. Despite that, some scholars concede framing risks and eventualities (Benford, 1993; Erwin, 1993; Griffin, 1992; Snow & Benford, 1988; Snow et al., 1986; Swart, 1995), these originally emerge as problems movement leaders/elites can resolve so long as they design an efficacious or resounding framing plan. Generally, elite partiality partly mirrors the methods by which academics usually investigate social movements. One inclines to make research on movements either by interviewing persons acknowledged as core protestors through searching originators and SMOs' social media posts or most often newspaper articles, or by examining movement-produced or associated materials (Benford, 1997, pp. 421). In a word, one gains sources that are likely to show the viewpoints of movement leaders and elites outside of the movement (Benford, 1997). Scholars' framing analyses repeatedly have an embedded, top-down partiality. To avoid elite bias and to obtain the rank-and-file activists' framings, I will focus on newspaper articles which involve the interactions,

talks, even conflicts about framings between rank-and-file activists and leaders (Benford, 1997). Another method is to explore rather spontaneous, rank-and-file movements as they become increasingly popular to initiate and mobilize around a range of issues (Benford, 1997). Just as my case studies, both the UM and the AEM are relatively spontaneous and decentralised mass movements. Elite framings did not always play a leading role throughout the movements, especially in the AEM in which no obvious leaders existed.

The volume of the social movement framing knowledge has been absorbed in concept evolving or on the adoption of framing theory to certain cases. Yet this overlooks more robust methodologically empirical research (Benford, 1997). It would appear that the time is ripe for methodologically empirical research of movement framing processes as its theoretical progress has been developing for decades. That is not to say that no empirical research of movements was made on the basis of framing notions in the past. Despite that, those studies are conducive to the development of scholarship in this realm, there is a lack of methodologically empirical analyses studies over 'cases, movements, and time' (Benford, 1997, p. 411). This is because of various feasible and material causes, the majority of movement studies are established on case studies (Benford, 1997). Though the case study method has generated plentiful examinations of evolving social movement, it is not able to indicate that one of the concepts, collective action frames, influences mobilization (Benford, 1997). Specifically, a key prevailing lacuna is the single case tendency (Johnston & Alimi, 2013; Polletta & Ho, 2006). A large number of framing analyses merely study one social movement or social movement organization. The focus on single cases renders it hard to recapitulate consequences of framing (Ketelaars, 2016, pp. 343). Also, there is a lack of studies of negative cases, when framings are unable to facilitate



social movements (Benford, 1997); on the contrary, movement framing analyses are frequently troubled by tautological models where indemonstrable causal linkages are signified (Stoecker, 1995; Swart, 1995). Put differently, one is prone to reason out retrogradely from effective mobilization to the framings protesters provided and then hypothesize a check relation between the two (Benford, 1997). To fill the lacuna, comparative analysis such as I use in my study can be an effective method to identify the linkages between mobilization and framings. Despite it being hard to establish a one-to-one correspondence between framings and the change of the number of protests, it is feasible to find a relation between framings and stages of a protest wave (emergence, peak, and decline). Considering movement decline allows me to avoid the aforementioned problem of retrograde reasoning. That is to say, I emphasise which frames and framing processes primarily contribute to each stage. Moreover, I carry out a comparative analysis on two waves of protests in the identical system, which can demonstrate that similar frames generate different effects on mobilizations and results, as the two waves have contrasting processes and endings.

### **2.3.3 Application of framing theory**

Among the interrelated notions and processes that have appeared as the framing literature has grown, there are several that can be considered as fundamental (Snow, Vliegenthart, & Ketelaars, 2018, pp. 421). They are based on one another, and they constitute a conceptual framework that has promoted much research discovering the correlation between framing and mobilization, from experience and theory (Snow, Vliegenthart, & Ketelaars, 2018, pp. 421). These core notions or processes are: 1) collective action frames, 2) master frames, 3) main framing means, 4) frame alignment processes.

#### **2.3.3.1 Collective action frames**

Collective action frames are produced by two fundamental interactional and excursive framing mechanisms: 'frame articulation and frame amplification' (Benford & Snow, 2000, p 623). Collective action frames are the synthetic outcomes of framing action within the social movement sphere. They are comparatively consecutive collections of act-oriented convictions and implications that justify and stimulate protests and actions (Snow, Vliegenthart, & Ketelaars, 2018, pp. 395). As with daily explanatory frames, collective action frames concentrate awareness, concatenate, and narrate in detail the components of the frame, and usually convert the implications related to the matters to be examined (Snow, Vliegenthart, & Ketelaars, 2018, pp. 395). In addition, what makes the resulting collective action frame novel is its capacity to provide a way to put its conceptual components together and enunciate them rather than their creativity or novelty, thus providing a new perspective, favourable position and / or explanation (Benford & Snow, 2000). Most importantly, collective action frames differentiate from daily interactive frames in the aspect of their main mobilization roles: to mobilize or stimulate movement's potential supporters in order that they move, in a metaphorical manner, 'from the balcony to the barricades (action mobilization)'; to transform onlookers to supporters, hence extending the movement's base (unanimity mobilization); and to counteract or deactivate opponents (anti-mobilization) (Snow, Vliegenthart, & Ketelaars, 2018, p. 395). Furthermore, collective action frames are built partly because advocates of the movement develop a common interpretation of some problematical circumstances regarded as what may need to change, identify who or what is to blame, clarify a series of substituted solutions, and call for collective action to influence reform (Benford & Snow, 2000, pp. 615). In other words, collective action frames are featured by central framing means – diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational framing.

### **2.3.3.2 Master frames**

Master frame was at first developed as a concept for the sake of explaining the empirical examination that protest waves occur by chance without an advantageous political opportunity structure (POS) (Benford, 2013, pp. 723). A master frame means a general category of collective action frame that is wider in range and effect than ordinary social movement frames (Snow & Benford, 1992, pp. 138). Moreover, a master frame's expressions and attributes are adaptable enough and sufficiently all-embracing in order that many other social movements can effectively borrow and apply it to their activities (Benford, 2013, pp. 723). Generally, once a social movement shapes and embraces a very resounding frame that is broadly useful, other social movements within a protest wave will alter that frame and adopt it to their own undertaking (Benford, 2013). For instance, the US civil rights movement in the 1950s and 1960s achieved a large number of successes relying on an 'equal rights and opportunities master frame' (Benford, 2013, p. 723). Consequently, some other movements, such as 'the American Indian, women's, gay and lesbian, Chicano/a, and Gray Panthers', applied and provided an analogous frame in their particular movement activities (Benford, 2013, p. 723). As a result, only a few collective action frames have been recognized as being wide enough in ranges of inclusiveness, adaptability, and cultural consonance to play a part of master frames, including rights frames (Valocchi, 1996; Williams & Williams, 1995), and the environmental justice frame (Cable & Shriver, 1995; Čapek, 1993), culturally pluralist frames (Berbrier, 1998; Davies, 1999), and a "return to Democracy" frame (Noonan, 1995, p. 98).

Additionally, the proposition of moral shock (Jasper & Poulsen, 1995) stresses the mobilizing effect of an unexpected and greatly emotional stimulation. Moral shocks may occur owing to unexpectedly imposed resentments (Snow, Vliegenthart, &

Ketelaars, 2018, pp. 403). Emotion is at the centre of “shock” framing, in that its supposed goal is to inspire “reflex emotions,” e.g., alarm, rage, and detestation (Goodwin, Jasper, & Polletta, 2004, p. 416). Generally, what is connected to the occurrence of a protest wave is the evolution or establishment of a novel master frame. For example, it was the growth of a novel master frame exceeding a diagnosis to contain a primary prognosis and an obvious appeal for action that partly explains the recurrence of peace movement activity in the 1980s (Snow & Benford, 1992). Conversely, without such a frame, if all other factors are held constant, public mobilization has a lower probability (Snow & Benford, 1992). In a word, once structural opportunities appear mature, the inactivity of public mobilization may be partly due to the lack of a resounding master frame (Snow & Benford, 1992, pp. 143-144).

#### **2.3.3.3 Main framing means**

The comparative success of collective action frames in playing their mobilizing roles is in part dependent on the degree to which they are handling the three basic framing elements namely diagnostic framing, prognostic framing, and motivational framing (Snow & Benford, 1988). All three basic framing elements are necessary to mobilize participators. Consensus mobilization (common resentments and objectives) does not ensure action mobilization (de facto participation), and effective diagnostic framing ensures neither potent prognostic nor motivational framings (Snow & Benford, 1988). As Sedgwick (2010) observed in his study into al-Qaeda’s framing actions, a great number of Muslims may use al-Qaeda’s diagnosis in common, yet fewer Muslims are touched by the organization’s prognostic and motivational framings. More concretely, diagnostic framing contains two aspects: a diagnosis of some issues or respect of civic life or form of government that cause problems and needing to be modified or changed and the assignment of fault or duty for problematic situations

identified (Snow, Vliegenthart, & Ketelaars, 2018, pp. 396). Diagnostic framing supplies solutions to the problems of ‘What is or went wrong?’ and ‘Who or what is to blame?’ (Snow & Byrd, 2007, p. 124). Many studies exploring the essence of collective action frames indicate that diagnostic framing usually identifies or re-identifies an incident or condition as an ‘injustice’ (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 615). In short, though the term injustice may not be directly quoted, it is an obvious clue to the problematisation and imputation elements of diagnostic frames, which is theoretically one of the more solid and resultant diagnostic frames expressed in the last half century (Snow, Vliegenthart, & Ketelaars, 2018, pp. 396).

In addition, prognostic framing entails the linkage of a presented answer to the question, involving a plan for action and the frame-corresponding strategies for implementing it, and frequently a confutation of the antagonist’s present or presented answers (Snow, Vliegenthart, & Ketelaars, 2018, pp. 396). The degree to which correlation between a movement’s diagnostic framing and prognostic framing exists may vary over environments, yet there appears to be impressive corroboratory proof of such correlation (Snow, Vliegenthart, & Ketelaars, 2018). The final central framing element, motivational framing, entails detailed explanation of an appeal to adherents or the guiding principle for activities that exceed the diagnosis and prognosis (Snow, Vliegenthart, & Ketelaars, 2018, pp. 396). In this sense, it can be interpreted as the ‘agency’ factor of collective action frames (Gamson, 1992, p. 7). Motivational framing involves the establishment of ‘vocabularies of motive’ that powering action by defeating both the fear of crisis frequently related to social movement and the alleged “free-rider” problem, such as the reason why to help to achieve some big aim when that aim composes a “public good” as an inalienable and nonexclusive benefit (Snow, Vliegenthart, & Ketelaars, 2018, p. 396). Moreover, motivational framing deals with

these barriers to action by underlining the seriousness of the question, the emergency of taking immediate action, the possible effect of recruiting others into the campaign, the ethical precedence of such action, and the consolidation or improvement of one's position (Snow, Vliegenthart, & Ketelaars, 2018, pp. 397). As in the case of suicide attackers, no matter whether the attacker is flying an airplane, or driving a vehicle fitted with a bomb, they are guaranteed at least among a minority audience to obtain a variety of sacred grace for their justice acts (Snow & Byrd, 2007).

#### **2.3.3.4 Frame alignment processes**

Frame alignment processes are the tactical endeavours of collective actors and SMOs to connect their interests and targets, potential followers, and resource suppliers in order that they will be helpful in some way to movement activities (Benford & Snow, 2000, pp. 624). Snow et al. (1986, pp. 464) discover and elaborate four essential tactical alignment processes: frame bridging, frame amplification, frame extension, and frame transformation.

Frame bridging entails the connection of two or more ideologically consistent but unlinked frames in composition concerning a specific problem (Snow et al., 1986). Bridging can emerge between a movement and individuals, by means of the connection of a SMO or group to a collective of inactive emotion and public opinions, or between social movements (Snow, Vliegenthart, & Ketelaars, 2018, pp. 400). One instance of such bridging is the German anti-World Bank and anti-IMF protesters who effectively articulate their frames with those of ecology, peace, community, feminist, and labour movement organizations (Gerhards & Rucht, 1992, pp. 584). In a word, frame bridging can be regarded as a particular mode of frame connection, with the particular purpose of linking the movement's major frame to one with a broader resonance with society (Snow, Vliegenthart, & Ketelaars, 2018, pp. 400). Frame

amplification involves the ornamentation, clarification, and animation of an explanatory frame so that it is more noticeable and influential than other extant ones (Snow et al., 1986). There are arguments that this is possibly the most resonant alignment tactic since it is based on existent opinions and beliefs, trying to make them more important, instead of attempting to stretch or alter them (Snow, Vliegenthart, & Ketelaars, 2018). Hence for rights movements, the emphasis lies in the importance of equality of opportunity, yet for movements shifted toward the political rights, there may be more stress laid on individualism not subject to the rights of others (Snow, Vliegenthart, & Ketelaars, 2018). For example, among American values, both types of values probably exist in the value system of most people, but one type or subcategory of values is more prominent than the other (Snow, Vliegenthart, & Ketelaars, 2018, pp. 401).

Additionally, frame extension is the attempt of a movement to absorb participants by expanding the boundaries of the presented frame to contain the opinions, interests, or emotions of possible supporters (Snow et al., 1986, pp. 472). This happened in the case of the expansion of the environmental movement (Rootes, 2004, pp. 668) which spread from groups affected most seriously by environmental damages, and the development of the environmental justice movement (Taylor, 2000, pp. 512). Finally, frame transformation happens when the presented frame may not produce sympathetic response with, sometimes may even be opposed to existing explanatory frames, and hence new comprehensions and interpretations are needed for guaranteed support (Snow et al., 1986). Apart from being usually related to individuals changing their religion, such transformations also emerge easily in more political environments as demonstrated in Berbrier's (1998) analysis of the inversion and correspondence framing tactics of the 'New Racist White Separatist Movement' and exhibited in the aims of the allegedly right-wing movement's 'National Policy

Institute' to defend the inheritance, sense of identity, and future of European descendants in the U.S., and all over the world (Taub, 2016, para. 13).

There is a basic proposition that the framing process and the subsequent conceptual networks that some movements rotate or that arise from the combination of protest activities can be critical to the occurrence and trajectory of protest waves as well (Snow & Benford, 1992). Furthermore, since structural and organizational factors are insufficient to explain cyclical variation in the level of protest activities, framing processes become critical to interpreting the congregating of protests (Snow & Benford, 1992). Thus, in the following section I will apply social movement theory to construct a protest wave: from emergence and longevity to decline.

## **2.4 Application of social movement theory to protest waves**

Tarrow (1998) enumerates the characters of a protest cycle: protest activities and mobilization spread rapidly, because emerging social movements produce political opportunities for others to participate in; novel protest forms; formation or significant modification of collective action frames; organized and spontaneous protests coexist; the interaction between challenging groups and authorities escalates. Therefore, next I will analyse how a mixture of the above factors and episodes, which are derived from POS, RMT and framing, form protest waves of social movements.

### **2.4.1 Emergence phase of a protest wave**

In the light of Tarrow (1989b), social movements appear when new opportunities, such as a less suppressive atmosphere, disunities within the elite, or the existence of influential allies or advocates are in sight. When the pro-democracy faction holds power in regimes, the necessity for mobilization of social movements reduces due to anticipated opportunities of reform to their advantage, meanwhile, their



protest actions are not backed by their most influential partner any longer (Kriesi et al., 1995, pp. 60). In a word, the predictable outcome is an obvious lower level of participation in movements. In turn, when the pro-democracy faction disappears, the possibility of mobilizing social movements rises, since the opportunities of reform to their advantage become more greatly restricted (Kriesi et al., 1995). This only applies to hybrid regimes or non-democratic regimes. In an established democracy, if a radical party is in power, it is relatively unfavourable for the emergence of protests, and otherwise it will. In addition, the threat that the government will execute policies going against the demands of social movements weighs heavily, concurrently, and in this situation their initiation is probably helped by their strongest alliance (Kriesi et al., 1995). In short, among all regimes, the total volume of mobilization increases with the frailty of the regime and the tolerance of elite tactics and will be greatest where the two are integrated (Kriesi et al., 1995, pp. 46). Moreover, reform and threat will particularly have an effect on the volume of mobilization. Activists who do not regard collective action as the final choice will resort to collective action with comparatively high cost only if it becomes a necessity. In the case of reform, when state actors are devoted to the aims of a movement, collective action turns to be unnecessary and thus would not happen; in the case of threat, a policy to be implemented that greatly reduces the challenger's opportunities of getting what he or she seeks, might backfire (Kriesi et al., 1995). Therefore, under these contexts, the cost of social movements is reduced and mobilization becomes more attractive compared to the expensive model of stagnation, even if it may attain little more than an extension of the status quo or even only a simplification of the predicted exacerbation (Kriesi et al., 1995).

For RMT scholars, mobilizations of social movements need to gain access to resources in favour of activity. SMOs are considered to develop from existent social

networks, taking advantage of internal and external resources to undertake movement activities (Webster, 2015). In the instance of the US Civil Rights Movement, resources supplied by church groups and by outward receipts were regarded as indispensable to the campaign's mobilisation (McCarthy & Zald, 1977). Resources conducive to the rise of movements make SMOs gather to devise and arrange, enlist new members, exchange their opinions, and fund their activities (Webster, 2015, pp. 49). Particularly, campaigners themselves come to be significant movement human capital, as long as they attend protest activities, enlist new members, build connections to other groups and create provisions, like banners, leaflets, and booklets, etc. (Webster, 2015, pp. 49). However, accessibility of resources alone cannot fully account for why movements develop to be energetic and are busy with protest activities. The significance of campaigners' networks to a movement has already been identified (Crossley, 2008; Crossley & Ibrahim, 2012; Hanna, 2013). Campaigners require assembly locations, posts, and communication, and they also want mutual help in a team to take collective action. For example, campuses and student associations enable student protestors to share their dissatisfactions, political opinions, and tactical designs for protest activities, though they only partially explain how a movement arises (Webster, 2015). In a word, RMT emphasises the indispensability of resources and activist networks for the rise of movements. What is more, the first phase of a social movement's protest wave is featured by personalised, but prevailing senses of dissatisfaction (Christiansen, 2009). Movements in this phase are short of well-defined tactics for attaining aims and own few organizations. Also, in the beginning activists can draw together concerns with less forceful and less adventurous acts (Kriesi et al., 1995). In addition, formal and professional SMOs do not have predominant impacts on the inception stage of a social movement (Kriesi et al., 1995). Briefly,

capriciousness, freshness, and volatility are an initial movement's key characteristics, and this beginning tactical model is intrinsically volatile and replaceable tactical choices increasingly come to be more appealing (Kriesi et al., 1995).

From the perspective of framing theory, it has been found that framing attempts frequently are unable to activate activism or guide social movements inasmuch as they fail to strike a chord with the viewer or the chord dies out (Snow & Corrigall-Brown, 2005). The final yardstick of the potency of provided collective action frames and the relevant alignment tactics is whether they arouse sympathy with a potential constituency (Snow, Vliegenthart, & Ketelaars, 2018). Hence the emergence of movement mobilization suggests some extent of chord resonance, with appropriate problem diagnosis, ascription of responsibility and/or appeals for action (Snow, Vliegenthart, & Ketelaars, 2018). It is central to problematize the notion of chord resonance by trying to confirm the components that explain it happening or not happening in the two aspects of theory and experience (Snow, Vliegenthart, & Ketelaars, 2018). For instance, Ketelaars (2016) found that: '[F]rames that appeal to people's everyday experiences resonate more than abstract or technical frames ... [and that] resonance is higher when blame for the issue is put on a specific person or organization than when intangible forces or causes are held responsible' (p. 341). In addition, Hewitt and McCammon (2004) as well as Morrell (2015) have specified several other elements as well, such as specialized knowledge, which can influence the expectation of frame resonance. Besides, dissimilar mechanisms operate to enlist strangers via ethical shocks and cultural significances, and enlist acquaintances by the method of propinquity, emotive ties, and cultural significances (Jasper & Poulsen, 1995). Without networks, cultural significance and ethical shocks may be essential as a substitute for enlisting outsiders, and the most successful of these are transmitted

by strong 'condensing symbols' (Jasper & Poulsen, 1995, p. 493). In the case of animal rights and anti-nuclear protesters, animal rights protesters were frequently enlisted immediately by ethical shocks through optical and speech tropes (Jasper & Poulsen, 1995).

#### **2.4.2 Longevity phase of a protest wave**

Protest is diffused through the spread of strategic inventions made use of by pioneering protesters to other subjects, organizations, and arenas (Kriesi et al., 1995, pp. 118). Aggressive demonstrations meeting those conditions, such as occupations, sit-ins, and barricades, are crucial to the extension stage of a social movement (Kriesi et al., 1995, pp. 136). Force is not an attractive option in that the public and the media have severe ethical concerns and movements will use force only as a last resort. Accordingly, vanguard activists tend to take actions that are sufficiently innovative and radical to draw media coverage and adequately violent to attract considerable attention from the government, but that does not rely on the efficacy of well attended protests (Kriesi et al., 1995, pp 136). Moreover, in a specific condition of anti-government movements, suppression may bring a *radicalization* of the strategies (Kriesi et al., 1995). Anti-government movements recreate their collective identity in the process of interacting with opponents, most prominently with authorities, and thus they regularly take confrontational actions against governments (Kriesi et al., 1995). Such a disruption can be achieved solely by highly aggressive means, if not the movement produces no reaction (Kriesi et al., 1995). What is more, enhanced suppression may have stimulated more protesters to resort to violence. A crackdown on nonviolent demonstrations delegitimizes the regime's domination of force and consolidates the status of those protesters who regard responsive violence as justifiable (Kriesi et al., 1995, pp. 127). Also, reverting to violence is encouraged

inasmuch as the price of violence relative to the price of nonviolent confrontation reduces. Briefly, it is supposed that the ultimate outcome of these counterbalancing forces is to efface the moderate position of the strategies, namely nonviolent disruptions, and the concurrent evolving of temperance and *radicalization* (Kriesi et al., 1995, pp. 127).

In addition, the participation of professional SMOs and external allies does not only imply absorbing protests into the system (Kriesi et al., 1995, pp. 129). Owing to the resources these organizations dominate, they are also playing a significant role in expanding activities to the masses, hence activities backed by external allies or professional SMOs incline to encourage a greater number of people to join in (Kriesi et al., 1995, pp. 129). One of the reasons is that professional SMOs and outside allies are capable of looking for potential adherents by joining extra-institutional activities. Nonetheless, in a movement in which actors voluntarily take part, those who are determined to keep on engaging in protest activities are self-selected (Cai, 2017, pp. 11). These purposeful participators will help to maintain or even escalate the campaign, and some of them develop into new leaders or become more powerful as their confrontational suggestions are better accepted by the demonstrators. Subsequently mild leaders will be marginalised in a continuous protest action (Cai, 2017, pp. 11). To this end, Oberschall (1973) indicates that the ordinary members normally are conscious of what they need, and they have a clear understanding of which leaders and campaigners act for their interests. Consequently, certain movements endure not because of their concentrated and powerful organizational influence featured by intensive networks or an influential leadership, but instead because of the decentralized leadership (Cai, 2017, pp. 11). In that case, resolute participators maintain the movement following their own wishes which do not inevitably authorize

the movement. In short, the diffusion stage of movements is neither spontaneous nor organized, but a commonly erratic merging of the two (Kriesi et al., 1995).

Framing is a developing process that can vary over time, environments, and objects (Snow, Vliegenthart, & Ketelaars, 2018, pp. 399). One is likely to note the creation of substituent, contending diagnostic, prognostic and/or motivational framings (van der Meer et al., 2014, pp. 752), and this is particularly given that most framings are inlayed in a discursive sphere (Snow, Vliegenthart, & Ketelaars, 2018, pp. 399). Nevertheless, as the target of the controversial framings turn stale or problematize and / or there are signs of increase showing more support for one controversial frame than another, a pooling of public opinion surrounding some framings over others occurs (Snow, Vliegenthart, & Ketelaars, 2018). In the case of the French disturbances in 2005, Snow, Vliegenthart, and Corrigan-Brown (2007) discover relevant diagnostic framing during the three weeks, from the beginning of the disturbances on 27 October to their end on 19 November 2005. There was a wide decrease in framing the problem on the part of 'social categories or groups', such as young people with criminal tendencies and over-reacting 'control agents', and an appropriate rising in framing the problem on the part of structural elements, such as the unsuccessful integration of minority and / or the economic conditions and educational system (Snow, Vliegenthart, & Ketelaars, 2018, p. 400). In a way, the reduction in framing the social groups' problem and the increase in the structural framing could prolong the French disturbances. Moreover, though most collective action frames are environment- and movement-specific, those that arise early in a wave of protest (Tarrow, 2011, pp. 31) at times turn to play a role in some manner that they embellish and confine the directions and campaigns of other movements within the wave, so that ensuing collective action frames within the wave are imitative or reflecting (Benford & Snow,

2000; Snow & Benford, 1992). All in all, new frames and / or frame shift entailing the displacement of one frame by another provide a major chance for a prolonged social movement. Such a new frame and frame shift can originate from unexpected and turning events. Cultural significances and ethical shocks cause a rapidly increasing level of mobilization, and then extend the whole movement.

### **2.4.3 Decline phase of a protest wave**

Protest surges play a mediator role between regular collective actions and rebellions. Differing from regular protests, protest surges vibrate the bases of the form of government; dissimilar to rebellions, they eventually lead to relatively constrained changes (Tarrow, 1989a). Tarrow (1989a, pp. 119) observes that nonviolent and antagonistic acts, such as barricades and occupations, peak in the early stage of a protest episode, whereas more temperate and demonstrative forms of actions peaked later, and traditional allies, such as unions, were gradually involved in them. Violence is the commonest in the later phase of protest waves, after other strategies start to lose effectiveness (Tarrow, 1989a). Besides, large-scale violence is gradually substituted by more polarizing violence by cliques (Della Porta & Tarrow, 1986, pp. 618-619; Tarrow, 1989a, pp. 306). In addition, with novel strategies fading out, the government and police grasp how to react more efficaciously (Kriesi et al., 1995, pp. 121). Gradually, institutionalization and *radicalization* result in a decline in protests (Kriesi et al., 1995). Mild factions are no longer involved in social movements as their concerns divert to routine means of political participation, and the polarizing acts of radical groups become too expensive for most protesters (Kriesi et al., 1995). Furthermore, radical camps become closed to fresh campaigners inasmuch as they are compelled to shift to underground tactics and inasmuch as they shape secret beliefs and organizational architecture (Kriesi et al., 1995). The merged outcome of

these inclinations is the decline stage, decreasing mobilization capacity. Also, the suppression and marginalization of these factions provoke factional strife and distrust among protesters, which transfers enthusiasm from external activities and discourages outsiders from joining (De Nardo, 1985, pp. 139). Finally, if *radicalization* escalates into polarisation, like extreme violence or terrorism, it may backfire and undermine the overall legitimacy of movements (Kriesi et al., 1995, pp. 139). Generally, the passage of a protest wave of social movements has been divided over tactics, and the mild and radical factions are progressively distant (Kriesi et al., 1995, pp. 138). This split is not necessarily having direct harmful influences on the movements. At the beginning, adding influential allies may expand the allegiance of the masses for the protest activities and increase the media exposure of the protests (Kriesi et al., 1995, pp. 138). However, if institutionalization and *radicalization* proceed, movements will eventually decline.

When protests start to decline, this period of a social movement's protest wave normally signifies the end of public mobilization. The states of the ill-structured sections of protests turn out to be even more volatile. To cope with decreasing participation, a social movement needs to own either a lasting organizational architecture with resources which do not rely on people engaging (McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1988, pp. 716) or a powerful identity that enables them to keep on mobilising even under disadvantageous conditions (Kriesi et al., 1995, pp. 137-138). However, the spontaneous groups that govern the beginning stage of social movements are short of the resources and inward cooperation to contend efficaciously with professional SMOs and recognized allies for media exposure and allegiance of the masses, and they are also deficient in the powerful identity that highlights the mobilization ability of radical factions (Kriesi et al., 1995, pp. 137), meaning these



groups probably come to be the first victims of decline (Jenkins & Eckert, 1986, pp. 816). Meanwhile, leadership lacks accredited legitimacy or representativeness, is incapable to design efficacious tactics, or is deficient in coordinating ability or resources to carry out tactics (Cai, 2017, pp. 10). All in all, the final stage, decline or institutionalization, may appear to be a failure, but it does not necessarily imply a failure. Movement results are classified into four types: 'full success; cooptation (acceptance but no benefits); preemption (benefits but no acceptance); and failure' (Gamson, 1975, p. 217). Therefore, failure, as a sort of decline, would arrive when leaders or/ and dominant groups are not able to handle the rapid extension or internal conflict, which lead to the collapse because of organizational or tactical failings.

Collective action frames with the aim to mobilize one constituency may unexpectedly offset or counteract the mobilization of another group of possible followers (Snow, Vliegenthart, & Ketelaars, 2018, pp. 403). Instances of contending and rival framings of incidents, problems, or people exist widely almost every day in the media. Particularly, at present, media businesses are flooded with the various and strengthened political alliances (Berry & Sobieraj, 2014) and the surge of fake news (Tavernise, 2016). In a word, the dwindling or fading of a protest wave is partially attributive to the cultural variations that make the pillaring master frame ineffective (Snow & Benford, 1992). This further implies that protest events can at times start to elapse or defeat a master frame and then weaken its empirical reliability or its correlation of experience (Snow & Benford, 1992, pp. 149). In addition, frames that question or contend with the movement's master frame begin to surface, and the presence of contending frames can undermine the mobilizing effect of the primary master frame. Under such circumstances, the occurrence of contending frames can indicate the dominant master frame's fragilities and non-correlation with the current

situation, then questioning its reverberation and making it ever more ineffective (Snow & Benford, 1992, pp. 150). Not only external competing frames, but it would also be sensible to presume that internal movement frame disputes are counteractive in that they are likely to result in disagreement and fabrication (Snow, Vliegenthart, & Ketelaars, 2018, pp. 404). Afterwards, the movement separates itself from the master frame; owing to the lack of a powerful master frame, the movement tends to be on the wane. Generally, existing master frames can either lose their explanatory power because of the abundance of incidents and the increase of optional frames or be offset by the suppressive strategies of more influential groups, or a combination of both (Snow & Benford, 1992, pp. 151).

## **2.5 Conclusion**

To sum up, this chapter has developed a broader political process theory, the combination of political opportunity theory, resource mobilization theory and framing theory, to analyse protest waves of social movements. Most political movements are caused by social changes, which make the fixed political order easier to be challenged (McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996, pp. 8). Yet these political opportunities are only indispensable prerequisites for action. Without adequate organization(s) (either formal or informal), such an opportunity is unlikely to be taken (McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996, pp. 8). Moreover, the intermediary between the structure demands of opportunities and organizations is the emerging implications and interpretations (or frames) shared by the proponents of the emerging movement (McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996, pp. 8). As theorists of collective behaviour and new social movements have long advocated, the motivation of action is not only a cultural building, but also an effect of structural fragility. Whether a change is significant or not, it would become an opportunity only if certain protestors are organised to take action in accordance

with this common interpretation of the circumstances (McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996, pp. 8). In a word, their influences are interactive rather than discrete (McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996). In the beginning of social movements, there are two crucial interactions. The first involves the relationship between the framing processes and various objective political variations, which are designed to promote the appearance of movements (McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996, pp. 8). The key is that these variations not only facilitate mobilization through the objective influence on power relationship, but also furthermore undermine the legality of regime or its observed variability by initiating the framing processes (McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996). The second concerns an analogous interactive dynamic which interprets the relation between mobilizing structure and framing processes (McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996, pp. 8). When activists attempt to organise and begin to act to raise their consciousness of the illegality and fragility of regime, the framing processes obviously promote mobilization; meanwhile, the potentiality of the key framing processes is constrained by the conditions for the actors to approach numerous mobilizing structures (McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996). Mobilizing structures and framing processes intermediate the influence of political opportunities. All in all, the nature of opportunities may determine the main type of movement, but the form and ideological nature of the movement are more susceptible to the direct influence of the forms of organization(s) and ideology accessible to protestors (McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996). These, conversely, are mainly the outcome of the mobilizing structures, with the protestors buried in the run-up to the movement.

Regarding the relationship between waves of protests and political opportunities, resource mobilization theory and framing processes, political opportunities not only matter during the emergence phase of a social movement, when

political opportunities disappear, for example, the violent escalation of protesters is unpopular, or/and the police's suppression overwhelms the momentum of radicalization, the movement would be dissolved. From the RMT point of view, the continuation of protests is neither spontaneous nor organized, but rather a frequently erratic combination of the two. Waves of protest often began with disruptive but nonviolent confrontational actions, and afterwards moved on to a phase manipulated by milder popular mobilization and concluded with a symbiotic combination of being inducted into the system and being militant (Kriesi et al., 1995, pp. 124). Successful movement organizations generally aim at specific objectives, adopt alternative stimuli, own wide support, employ disruptive methods, and make their requests amidst socio-political crises. Whereas decentralized structures can achieve individual transformation as much as possible, and thus arousing rank-and-file groups' involvement and guaranteeing group sustenance, but usually at the expense of tactical effectiveness (Jenkins, 1983, pp. 542). From a framing perspective, framing processes and the notions of collective action frames and master frames supply a foundation for interpreting the process via which social movement is encouraged and authorized (Snow & Benford, 1992). In order to mobilize followers, a SMO must proffer an appealing frame to have resonance with members; if not, with the presence of contending frames pushed forward by the authority or the counter-movements, the movement may be deficient (Snow et al., 1986). Movements are no less relying on the common comprehensions of their followers in the late phases of uprising than in the beginning (McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996). In conclusion, the political opportunity structure has a significant impact on the emergence and outcome of protest waves, while the mobilizing structure contributes to the continuation of protest waves, and the framing theory has a key impact on the emergence and maintenance of protest waves.

In general, my doctoral thesis is to apply the classic social movement theories under Western democracies to waves of protest movements in hybrid regimes, and on the basis of that a discussion was held. In the following chapter I will apply this holistic approach (a broader political process theory) to understand the protest waves of the Umbrella Movement (UM) and Anti-Extradition Movement (AEM) in Hong Kong.

# Chapter 3: Holistic application of the theories to UM & AEM

This chapter introduces Hong Kong's political opportunity structure (POS), mobilizing structures and framing processes of the UM and the AEM, and then make the holistic applications of the theories of these three sets of factors to the emergence, longevity and decline (protest waves) of the two movements. In this way, I aim to show more concretely how the POS, the leaders / resources / tactics and framing are related to each other. Based on previous scholars' research on Hong Kong's social movements and protest politics, political opportunities, mobilizing structures and framing processes have all been individually studied, but these three have never been combined and used to interpret waves of protest. I will make up for this academic gap. Protest waves involve the process of a movement, which itself is a very important research perspective.

## 3.1 Background of UM & AEM

In 2007 Beijing declared that it would allow Hong Kong citizens to directly vote for the next chief executive in the 2017 election ("Hong Kong Profile-Timeline," 2019). The Standing Committee of the National People Congress (NPC) announced its resolution on 29 December 2007, responding to the pro-democracy movement's requirement for a schedule and arrangement (J. Y. Cheng, 2014). It declares, 'appropriate amendments may be made to the specific method for selecting the fourth chief executive and the specific method for forming the fifth term Legislative Council of the HKSAR (Hong Kong Special Administrative Region) in the year of 2012. The election of the fifth chief executive of the HKSAR in the year 2017 may be implemented by the method of universal suffrage; that after the chief executive is selected by

universal suffrage, the election of the Legislative Council of the HKSAR may be implemented by the method of electing all the members by universal suffrage' (quotations from HKSAR Government, *Consultation Document: Methods for Selecting the Chief Executive and for Forming the Legislative Council in 2012*. 2009, p 42). It seemed that the resolution gave Hong Kong citizens one possibility that it would execute universal suffrage to elect the chief executive and the entire Legislative Council in 2017 and 2020 separately at the earliest (J. Y. Cheng, 2014). However, the pro-democracy movement had no sense of certainty about this resolution, rather a deep fear aroused among Hong Kong people over whether the chief executive would be permitted to be elected through universal suffrage by 2017, or he/she might be elected simply from a list of qualifiers accepted by Beijing (J. Y. Cheng, 2014). Not only that, the lower living conditions and the expanding of the social wealth gap in Hong Kong are considered as the fundamental reasons of the territory's resentments and discontents and as the elements which have caused the appearance of protests (E. W. Cheng, 2016). In this situation, the public obviously attribute the faults to the government. In particular, they have been dissatisfied with government policies beneficial to the business communities, and the "avarice" and dishonesty during the terms of office of the Donald Tsang and C. Y. Leung (E. W. Cheng, 2016). In general, critiques against the three governments from 1997 have spread, but there has been an absence of useful plans (E. W. Cheng, 2016). These have been also interpreted as related to the lack of democratic elections. In short, advocates of the pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong have been indignant and disappointed in the last few decades with the absence of headway towards democracy (J. Y. Cheng, 2014).

Under the environment of rising political constraints by the Beijing government, in September 2014, an Occupy movement arose in Hong Kong, known as the

Umbrella Movement (UM). The Umbrella Movement responded to the controversial statement issued by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (NPCSC). The NPCSC decided on 31 August 2014 that Hong Kong people could elect their chief executive in 2017 according to Beijing's promises, but they could only vote in the case of nominees from the Hong Kong government (A. Wong, 2020). That is to say, candidates must first obtain the approval of the nomination committee composed of pro-Beijing members. The NPCSC's domination was broadly regarded as a limiting policy equivalent to the CCP's pre-selection of Chief Executive candidates in the so-called democratic Hong Kong (A. Wong, 2020). Consequently, protestors went onto the streets to demand the complete universal suffrage to choose their own Chief Executive and also expand to a broader campaign against rising Beijing government influence on the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) (Lagerkvist & Rühlig, 2016). In a word, the impetus for Hong Kong people to seek true universal suffrage constituted the motivational basis for the Umbrella Movement (A. Wong, 2020). The Anti-Extradition Movement engulfed Hong Kong in 2019, during which a range of protests started in March 2019, the large-scale mobilizations on 9 June and 16 June 2019 effectively suspended the discussion of the bill in the Legislative Council, yet, the protestors were enraged at the police's suppression of the June 12<sup>th</sup> demonstrations and insisted that the government conduct an investigation into police wrongdoing and called for the resignation of the chief executive, Mrs Carrie Lam (O. Lam, 2019). Differing from the Umbrella Movement, the Anti-Extradition Movement was sparked by Hong Kong people who regarded the government as depriving them of their original basic democratic rights and was regarded as a greater threat, both of which were conducive to the protracted and militant nature of the protests (A. Wong, 2020). The extradition bill allowed Hong Kong citizens deemed to be under suspicion



to be put to trial in accordance with the legal system of China, which blurred the boundaries between the rule of law of Hong Kong and that of Beijing. It was assumed that Hong Kong had a powerful system of law that could protect the freedom of action and speech of every citizen (A. Wong, 2020). That is where Hong Kong citizens could feel at ease after its return. In a word, when the rule of law was menaced by the extradition bill, it triggered a fierce and militant reaction (A. Wong, 2020).

Pro-democracy protestors paralysed much of the city centre in 2014, involving the blockage of many major roads for over two months. By comparison, the protestors were using more flexible strategies in 2019, frequently masking their faces to avert monitoring, and wearing black clothes, which posed greater challenges to the police (Pomfret et al., 2019). Front-line officials became exhausted, expressing they never knew where protestors were going next (Pomfret et al., 2019). In general, the Anti-Extradition Movement (AEM) began with a rally on 31 March 2019 sponsored by the local non-governmental organization the Civil Human Rights Front (CHRF), which also organized the marches on 9 June and 16 June 2019. The CHRF has close links with the pan-democracy camp and most of its advocates are political liberals and constitute a moderate faction (O. Lam, 2019). Besides this dominant organization platform, there were a large number of other marginal actions, as well as online mobilization via the LIHKG forum and Telegram mobile phone information mediums (O. Lam, 2019). These self-generated networks were not linked to the CHRF, and participants in these networks did not act according to orders of the CHRF or any other pan-democratic MPs (O. Lam, 2019). During the movement, some celebrities provided some help for the protestors. In 2014, the main areas were occupied statically, while in 2019, rapid and unpredictable actions - or, in Bruce Lee's words "be water" - led to the protest activities that far exceeded the Umbrella Movement in longevity, scale and strength

(Hui, 2019). Many of the protestors saw the protest in 2014 as a failure and learned from their mistakes (Hui, 2019). Moreover, a large number of campaigners targeted the abuse of violence by police and the lack of answerability to the government similar to the CCP's approach to the ruling state (J. Wong, 2020). Consequently, the demonstration had evolved into a more extensive democratic movement, requiring the government to assume greater responsibility and the universal suffrage (Dapiran, 2019). In brief, the authorities' control on the Basic Law weakened the protection of citizens, and thus the Anti-Extradition protests turned into a state in disorder and quickly became uncontrollable (A. Wong, 2020).

## **3.2 POS of Hong Kong**

In terms of regime type, Hong Kong is a unique hybrid regime ("Democracy Index," 2021), and is featured by multiparty competition, a comparative press freedom, an independent judicial organ and pressure groups having a pivotal function (Xi, 2014). Hong Kong has a strong and active civil society, yet it is hard for social groups in Hong Kong to gain access to the input of the system. Here I will discuss the four dimensions of Hong Kong's political opportunity structure.

### **3.2.1 Institutionalised political system of Hong Kong**

Hong Kong's electoral system is a proportional one. Initial political parties formed in the post-1989 period, consisting of 'the United Democrats of Hong Kong (UDHK), Meeting Point (MP), the New Hong Kong Alliance, the Citizens Forum and the Liberal Democratic Foundation' (Cullen, 2004, p. 6). The Cooperative Resources Centre (CRC) (which afterwards became the Liberal Party) (J. T. M. Lam, 1997) and the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong (DAB), which is the primary pro-Beijing party, emerged soon afterwards (Cullen, 2004). Furthermore, in 1994 the

UDHK and MP combined to establish the Democratic Party (DP). Meanwhile, a number of pro-Beijing businessmen established the Hong Kong Progressive Alliance in 1994 (Ma & Choy, 2003). To summarise this complex scenario, at present the leading parties are the Democratic Party, the DAB and the Liberal Party, and other minor parties are inclined to revolve around them (Cullen, 2004). DP represents the pro-democracy camp, the latter two are part of the pro-government/pro-business camp. The Liberal Party has no immediately elected members of Legislative Council, but it owns a great number of functional electoral districts' members; both the DP and the DAB hold 'directly- and functionally-elected members of LegCo', which appeal sizeable endorsement from the grass roots (Cullen, 2004, p. 6). In short, both the DAB and the Liberal Party maintain a good relationship with the Beijing government, but multiple pro-democracy parties rarely have direct ties with Beijing (Ma & Choy, 2003).

The hybrid regime in Hong Kong is featured by civil liberties, an independent court and developing electoral politics, as well as corporatist ruling and a quick-witted local government supported by an authoritarian state (E. W. Cheng, 2016). Hong Kong provides an example of a weak public administration. Policy networks may be potent in certain areas, but they lack an inclusive character helpful for linkages between various policy arenas, and both the pan-democracy camp and pro-establishment camp are quite fragmented (J. Y. Cheng, 2014). Also, the comparatively open election system adds one more method for formally approaching the institutional structure, yet, it is still difficult for SMOs and the pro-democracy parties to oppose the government (J. Y. Cheng, 2014), inasmuch as the process of making decisions is dominated 'in the hands of a centralized bureaucracy' (E. W. Lee, 2012, p. 164). Moreover, Lau and Kuan (2002) imply that immature party politics have facilitated unconventional methods of merging and connecting the interests of the governor and citizens. Hong

Kong's pseudo-democracy and its administrative section's reluctance or incompetence to facilitate democratization, defend extant rights and freedoms, stop interference from Beijing were seen to result in protests (J. Y. Cheng, 2005; Sing, 2009; Yep, 2013).

### **3.2.2 Emerging divisions within the elites of Hong Kong**

Hong Kong's hybrid character restricts its methods of wholly institutionalizing or suppressing dissidents (E. W. Cheng, 2016). What renders Hong Kong unique is its multi-layer and entangled compositions consisting of the central and HK governments and the pro-Beijing elites, as well as its pro-democracy camp, which simultaneously brought opportunities for the new protests and counteracted it if the campaign escalated (E. W. Cheng, 2016). Moreover, the potency and severity of organizational activities, although temperate, scared the central government into realigning the hybrid regime, which frequently results in backlash (E. W. Cheng, 2016). Furthermore, the realignments involved an antinomy: as the reach of the Beijing government extended, the power of the HK government was impaired. All in all, this change neither decreased the campaigns nor assimilated the objection into the institution to strengthen stability, rather, it was obvious that regular politics were incapable of protecting extant rights and freedoms and solidifying predetermined Beijing-HK relations (E. W. Cheng, 2016). Moreover, when it became obvious who the ultimate decision-maker was, the target of the movement unavoidably moved from the HKSAR Government to the central government. What is more, when the opportunity to push forward universal suffrage shrank after the Beijing's re-disposition of HKSAR's power, the establishment of a pre-emptive defence line was promoted (E. W. Cheng, 2016). The pioneering group, however, emphasizes that lasting mobilization is a useful method to urge activists to exceed the cooperative mode derived from the old regime and to create a new order

and identity (E. W. Cheng, 2016). Therefore, contingency is constructed by the regime's hybridity where the interests of Beijing and HKSAR deviate from time to time and election results count, giving opportunities to be examined (E. W. Cheng, 2016).

Some pro-democracy parties, e.g., the Civic Party, turned out to be more aggressive, and worked together with the traditionally radical LSD in 2009 to launch a 'de facto referendum' to exert tension on Beijing (Ma, 2011, p. 59). Yet, the Democratic Party, worrying that the referendum would estrange moderate voters and influence the democratic campaign's hard-won legitimacy and public empowerment (Ma, 2011), preferred to participate in a hidden negotiation with Beijing's elites. They came to a settlement and a mild political reform plan was approved in the legislative body, with the aid of another mild pan-democratic party, Hong Kong Association for Democracy and People's Livelihood (ADPL) (Mok, 2015). After that, the Democratic Party and the ADPL turned to be primary objects of attack by the comparatively more radical factions (Mok, 2015). To a great extent, they were harshly blamed for forsaking democracy and Hong Kong. Such blame received a positive response among young people.

### **3.2.3 Availability of influential allies of Hong Kong**

The level of openness of political structure relies on the degree to which legislators can play the role of mediator in giving challenging groups the option to approach the decision-making process. This is particularly the case in Hong Kong, with its asymmetrical power relation between government and society (Ng, 2013). Due to being precluded from the decision-making process, actors of movements must depend on arousing the moral sense of normal people and introducing third parties, such as the media and members of the legislature (Ng, 2013). This may frequently occur because of Hong Kong's diversified media industry and partially democratic legislature. However, in policy spheres where monetary domination and legislative

impact from the LegCo are greatly limited, the government probably has a large amount of space to function separately from public organizations and media protests (Ng, 2013). This space can cause officialdom to promote disputable policies provided they are highly consistent with social-economic elites (Ng, 2013).

In addition, Beijing has adopted a united front tactic to extend the pro-establishment camp before Hong Kong's Return aimed at guaranteeing a favourable interim (E. W. Cheng, 2016). Prior to the Umbrella Movement, SMOs and political parties periodically held assemblies and marches, and participators became involved in predetermined pathways and procedures that lowered the level of confrontation to only being part of a regular activity (E. W. Cheng, 2016). The main aim was to raise the stakes of the pan-democratic parties to seek for compromise from the government (E. W. Cheng, 2016). Besides, mobilized demonstrations selected the advantageous tactics: as to the pan-democracy camp, its primary task was to maintain enthusiasm in accordance with the rise and fall of the protest wave, guide and spread the public if necessary; regarding the demonstrators, their involvement did not count unless it was consistent with election politics, such as demonstrations at predesigned crucial points; as to the HK government, it would often wait and disperse protests. All protests would be controllable in the end, and antagonism was costly and unnecessary (E. W. Cheng, 2016). In general, although protest activities had become more frequent, large-scale, and political, the HK government weathered them through retaining elite unity, the help of legal interference and backing from Beijing (E. W. Cheng, 2016), which was reflected in the Umbrella Movement. Consequently, together with seasoned SMOs organizing collective actions, pan-democrats expressed their disapproval in the LegCo and attempted to delay the amendments (Cheng & Yuen, 2020).

#### **3.2.4 Propensity for repression of Hong Kong**

It is noteworthy that repression intensifies the collective identity that countercultural protesters form through conflictual interplay, and it provokes rather than impedes enlargement of participation (Kriesi et al., 1995). Both the Umbrella Movement and the Anti-Extradition Movement provide examples of this. The authority's potential and tendency to suppress is immediately, not counter, relational to movement participation level in the Occupy Central movement (Chen, 2016). Moreover, the growing degree of the regime's propensity for repression, either in the use of tear gas, arrestment, or the Chief Executive giving strongest warning has shown to merely be in direct proportion to the involvement rate of campaigners (Kan, 2013). During the social riots, public cohesion for the Umbrella Movement peaked when the police began to hurl tear gas at random to disperse demonstrators (J. Chan, 2014). The same applies to the Anti-Extradition Movement. As a result, it is the authority's oppressive tactics to cope with occupants that caused a great number of people to take to the streets (Glaser & Vitello, 2015).

By and large, the city's political culture was an efficacious obstruction against radical collective action, but since the Anti-Extradition Movement emerged, the public became increasingly tolerant of violence used by protesters, compared to violent crackdown by the police and distrust in government. The major factor contributing to the gradually increasing radical political culture is that the number of young radical protesters has enlarged (J. Y. Cheng, 2014). Young people feel frustrated about the consequences for their career consequences and future life (J. Y. Cheng, 2014), and their primary grievance is the lack of genuine universal suffrage and increasing intervention in freedom. Consequently, tolerance may still be the best method to handle radical social movements in Hong Kong (J. Y. Cheng, 2014); repression has a

propensity to backfire in the long run, particularly when it is executed by an invidious government with defects in terms of legality (J. Y. Cheng, 2014).

The political opportunity structure in Hong Kong has been discussed. As described in Chapter 2, political opportunities alone are not enough, and relevant initiators and/or organizations need to seize the opportunities, and related resources are also indispensable. So, in the next section I will separately introduce the UM and AEM's mobilizing structures involving these factors.

### **3.3 Mobilizing structures of UM & AEM**

Regarding mobilizing structure, I will explicate how leadership, social movement organizations and movement structures, social networking, and action tactics are integrated into the mobilizing structures for the UM and the AEM of Hong Kong, respectively.

#### **3.3.1 Leaders of UM**

The plan of occupying the Central District of Hong Kong had been proposed and propagated from January 2013, long before the campaign began (Tai, 2013). Among the three initiators, Benny Tai Yiu-ting and Chan Kin-man were university professors, and Chu Yiu-ming is a Reverend. They had planned and prepared for the mass protest by organising a range of activities before Occupy Central. Benny Tai, the Democratic Party and a number of legislators who approved of the plan accepted that civil disobedient action was an indispensable measure so as to have sufficient authority to pass bills opposing the government (Halmai, 2015). Benny Tai, Chan Kin-man and Chu Yiu-ming were the initiators of OCLP; they were highly significant owing to their political knowledge and skills, and self-controlled and practical style (Halmai, 2015). In addition, the most powerful student leaders of the campaign, Joshua Wong



and Alex Chow, applying a more utopian and militant form, were less experienced and inclined to adopt fewer empirical plans of action (Halmai, 2015). Joshua Wong was the leader of Scholarism, and he had been a fairly energetic pro-democracy protester. In 2011, he raised 120, 000 persons to oppose the central government's bill of education for patriotism (Halmai, 2015). He is an aspiring activist with a belief that every struggle must be regarded as the ultimate one to keep the indispensable resolution to strive for specific goals (Kaiman, 2014). Besides, the character of Joshua Wong, his public declarations and talk shows, as well as the activities he launched demonstrated the remarkable awareness of social identification (Halmai, 2015). Also, Scholarism was one of the most powerful student organizations that had participated in the collective action. Additionally, Alex Chow was the leader of the HKFS, Scholarism's intimate collaborator, who also preferred a more aggressive stance (Halmai, 2015). Chow thought that Hong Kong's yearly demonstrations would need to be escalated and evolve into a more radical manner of objection, which would provoke backlashes and secure support (Kaiman, 2014). Consequently, when the clash erupted in the Civic Square, the student leaders became the focus, making the three initiators of the OCLP marginal in the campaign (R. Lee, 2014).

However, no identifiable leader had stable leadership or was sufficiently powerful to dominate the whole campaign, particularly after the conversation between the HKFS and the HK government did not make significant progress (Lin, 2017). Besides, the failing of the conversation brought a serious leadership and legality crisis to the student leaders and reinforced the division between various occupied sites (Lin, 2017). Furthermore, while the student leaders still prompted protesters to keep them together so as to better push their demands and fight for their objectives, their leadership had been so terribly weakened that they could not efficaciously mobilize

the masses (Lin, 2017). Afterwards, the campaign moved into a new phase where the crowd, the normal occupants, turned out to be in leading roles of the campaign and the leaders themselves, carrying out a form of leaderless and horizontal organization (Yates, 2015). In short, specialised styles of leadership, particularly the soft style of leadership that is accommodated to volatile and changeable organizations in the Internet era, are still key to mass mobilization (Lin, 2017).

### **3.3.2 SMOs and movement structure of UM**

The Umbrella Movement was distinct from a variety of prevalent spontaneous and leaderless insurrections from start to finish, with identifiable leaders and organizations, for instance, the OCLP, the HKFS, and Scholarism were the perceived organizations of the movement (Lin, 2017). In fact, it was an internal split within these SMOs that paved the way to the UM. Benny Tai Yiu-ting acknowledged that his justification for launching the OCLP was that he thought the division between the moderate and the radical factions was too wide, so that no one owned the legitimacy to hold talks with Beijing (Mok, 2015). The moderates gave OCLP a guarded welcome, and many traditional SMOs acceded to it as well. Also, the HKFS was attempting to force the OCLP to put into practice the occupation, however, even when Beijing stated the “831 decision”, the OCLP’s design for occupation was just an idea on paper, with little intention for actual confrontational approaches (Mok, 2015).

Additionally, organizational conversion went through a trial run, and a decentralized organizational architecture was shaped, which was composed of some branches mirroring distinctions, contradictions, and even clashes (Lin, 2017). Furthermore, in this situation, the Umbrella Movement was divided into three separate occupation sites, Admiralty, Mong Kok, and Causeway Bay, among which the campaign overall could not guarantee coordinative effects and discussion by interplay

between numerous actors (Castells, 2012). Moreover, each zone had shaped a special form of civil resistance, and they did not genuinely accommodate divergences among them. More specifically, some protestors in Mong Kok were observed to show discontent with Admiralty, grumbling that the occupants in Admiralty were merely amusing themselves, and the campaign in Mong Kok was the 'real street protest with tears and blood' (Lin, 2017, p. 64). There were even assorted "villages" in each zone, such as "Sino Village and Nathan Village", among which a particular kind of defence against external people was set up (Lin, 2017, p. 64). In general, the overall decentralized, haphazard movement was reshuffled in every occupied zone at the micro level to some degree, with low-profile small leaders finally occurring in these small camps. Each occupied zone had splits, consisting of first lines of resistance, neighbourhood forums, physical assistance stations, and emergency stations (Lin, 2017).

### **3.3.3 Social networking of UM**

In Hong Kong, civil society organizations such as teaching unions, religious communities, parenting groups, and student organizations, etc. played an important part in the Umbrella Movement (Ma, 2005). Those organizations benefited from previously established social networks and had once launched or joined protest campaigns. Each network linked people to a broader world that delivers new messages and experience to individuals. During the UM, some participants built diverse small groups where every member created an intimate relationship and established interactive coordination (Lin, 2017). Moreover, neighbourhoods in the urban community had always been comparatively weak but during the occupation, resisters who resided in high streets and back lanes formed certain connections with their new "neighbours" (Luk, 2015). They treated them as friends. Although they had

not known each other previously, they helped and took care of each other. Some of them even kept in contact after the movement. In a word, informal networks of friends and comrades formed. In general, individuals resorted to their social networks to seek for endorsements by remarks, debates, and sharing (Luk, 2015).

In addition, online social networks deeply influence interpersonal communication. Facebook, as the most used SNS around the world, was highly effective at converting informal networks, making up the new connections with the outside, and attracting global attention during the UM (Luk, 2015). For instance, one certain Facebook account owned a total of 2,064 friends, among whom 33 percent expressed their positions about the UM through their profile pictures (Luk, 2015). More importantly, when individuals updated their postings on Facebook to make friends aware of what had happened, this drew some like-minded friends to take to the street (Luk, 2015). What is more, students' organizations called for a students' strike and urged students to upload their own previous photos dressed in school uniforms as their Facebook profile picture to express their endorsements for the demonstrators (Luk, 2015). Besides, activists tapped resources from their sympathizers via social media, through which, they showed photos of supporters delivering goods, such as food, water, umbrellas, tents, mats, masks and so on (Luk, 2015). That drew more individuals to make a donation and do voluntary work. In the first week, they had already garnered and allocated sufficient provisions from the populace. Thus, though the Umbrella Movement was loosely organized, the participants developed face-to-face networks in the occupied sites, in addition to digital networks, and pre-existing social networks shaped a 'network of networks' (Castells, 2012, p. 221).

#### **3.3.4 Action tactics of UM**

The UM in Hong Kong was an outcome of a less radical occupation-built tactic, dependent on interim blocks laid to occupy the space in places in which most of the nonviolent acts took place (Mulberry, 2014). However, the city government tackled this by blaming the occupation for disturbing ordinary life, business, and stopping persons from getting to work and even entering hospital (Mulberry, 2014). In addition, the latest occupations seem to be characterized by their openness, availability, and public presence, which appears to render them both vigorous and susceptible (Mulberry, 2014). This feature enables them either to be attractors for participation both by common people and those linked with authority or other antagonists, or when suppression emerges, this mode inclines to show a sign of an actual or observed weakness of impetus (Mulberry, 2014). All in all, "Occupy" as a kind of movement tactic is essentially unsustainable, albeit every emergence of violence against protesters, either from police or ruffians, was foreseeably counter-productive, promoting more support for the otherwise disputed devastating tactics of action (Hui, 2015).

Art is extremely important for social movements. The Umbrella Movement included civil disobedience, so non-violence was the first new tactic of the whole campaign. In addition, the police used pepper spray to disperse the crowd, who refused to leave, compelling protestors to attempt to protect themselves with umbrellas, which subsequently became a symbol of non-violent protest in the UM around the world and had proven to be an effective strategy in gaining sympathy and building a broader support base for the movement. Art students created umbrella-themed works, including a giant canvas made from umbrellas damaged by tear gas, while volunteers created umbrella souvenirs by hand (Hui, 2015). In addition, during the occupation, participants were taught science, boxing, illustration, and other skills, as well as sorts

of artworks. Everyone was empowered to express their ideas through the mouthpiece of art work. In brief, countless ordinary protesters brought umbrellas, face masks, helmets, tents, snacks, and even home-cooked meals, forming a unique scene.

### **3.3.5 Leaders of AEM**

“A leader is best when people barely know he exists,” Lao Tzu, the ancient Chinese philosopher and founder of Taoism, is considered to have explained, “When his work is done, his aim fulfilled, they will say: ‘We did it ourselves.’” (Serhan, 2019, para. 1). Regarding the Anti-Extradition Movement, the protestors revealed that their movement was leaderless. To some extent, it was a response to the Umbrella Movement in 2014, when many leaders were arrested and sentenced to terms in jail. Differing from those protest actions, where leaders such as Joshua Wong came to be a widely acknowledged name, front-line activists intentionally hid under the radar and used pseudonyms, with masks and sunglasses to cover their faces (Pomfret et al., 2019). Social media has largely rendered the leaderless leadership of the protest movement possible (Pomfret et al., 2019). Joshua Wong and other well-known activists attended numerous protests, and sometimes approached the front lines. When they were trying to exert leadership on the streets, the protestors debated with each other and consulted their phone group about what actions they would take (Pomfret et al., 2019). Of course, it is not merely social media that enables movements to avoid conventional top-down leadership, besides, the leaderless characteristic is crucial (Serhan, 2019). In fact, the appearance of leaders makes it easier for authorities to follow them, target them, arrest them, and discredit them (Serhan, 2019). On the other hand, leaderless protests are harder to crack down on. In addition, many demonstrators clearly oppose the power being concentrated in the hands of a few people. The protestors have no sympathy for any concentration of power within

movements (Serhan, 2019). Furthermore, with the movement evolving, this leadership structure agreed with seasoned pro-democracy SMOs to make “universal suffrage” one of the five demands, instead of “political resignation”, and thus transforming the defensive campaign into a pre-emptive one (Cheng & Yuen, 2020). All in all, student leaders and young politicians who won a city-wide reputation in the Umbrella Movement continued to be regarded as the mouthpieces of this movement, and they turned to foreign countries to establish global coalitions through their lobby groups (Lee et al., 2019).

### **3.3.6 SMOs and movement structure of AEM**

The seasoned SMOs were still the pioneers in mobilizing protest actions. On 15 March 2019, Demosisto launched a sit-in at the Government Headquarters in Admiralty. Nine campaigners were taken into custody, but the proposal was approved. Demosisto was a local political organization that promoted greater democracy in Hong Kong, had been behind a number of rallies, some of which ended up with violent conflicts with riot police, initiated by the members of Demosisto (Pomfret et al., 2019). On 31 March and 28 April 2019, the Civil Human Rights Front launched two assemblies, ‘12,000 and 130,000 participants’ were present, separately (Cheng & Yuen, 2020, p. 8). In respect of the structure, “be water” was not merely an emotional and strong appeal for young protestors, but also a strong organization strategy: similar to the approach noticed in the course of the Umbrella Movement in 2014 (E. W. Cheng, 2019), the protests of the Anti-Extradition Movement seem to emerge in a non-hierarchy and diverse way from the bottom-up networks, relying more on the self-generated actions of individual participants than on the top-down organizations dominated by movement leaders (Holbig, 2020). At the level of protest actions, this strategy of overlapping “leaderless” social movements has a dual aim: protecting

against police authority and charging campaigners, meanwhile, the organizational fluxility makes possible very effective lateral interaction between dispersed groups of protestors (Holbig, 2020). Additionally, although Beijing's tough policies in the post-occupation phase effectually hindered traditional SMOs and major campaigners were put in jail, they also set the conditions for the emergence of a leaderless organization structure (Lee et al., 2019). Moreover, this leaderless structure was maintained through the use of digital media and online discussion of Telegram and LIHKG, which are mobilization vehicles and sources of information (Lee et al., 2019). These digital vehicles allowed the spontaneous mobilization of participants, occasionally from different backgrounds. While these digital vehicles were essential for promoting spontaneous mobilization, prompt dissemination of information, and sometimes group discussions and self-control among protestors, they were helped by on-site networks and promoters that appeared earlier (Lee et al., 2019). For example, the initiators of the city and district gatherings were mostly politicians or campaigners who had been vigorously involved in community movements from 2014 (Lee et al., 2019).

### **3.3.7 Social networking of AEM**

Although the whole of Hong Kong had not been mobilized in the Umbrella Movement, after 2014, grassroots groups, sectoral actions and digital networking initiatives have emerged to maintain and continue the struggle for unrealized ideal during the 79-day occupation (Lee & Chan, 2018; Ma & Cheng, 2019; Pang, 2020). These groups and mediums rising in the post-Umbrella period skilfully spread their interpretation of civil freedoms and civic rights and formed a loose "network of networks" (Castells, 2012, p. 221) by means of grassroots' infiltration and digital communication (Cheng & Yuen, 2020). Moreover, a large number of these groups were informal, reliance was established on private, social, or occupational



relationships, and activities were co-ordinated via WhatsApp communities or Facebook groups (Cheng & Yuen, 2020). In the 7 months since June 2019, digital networks had launched large-scale assemblies and strikes, blocked public buildings and transportation centres, boycotted pro-Beijing shops, blocked roads, and occupied many university campuses (Holbig, 2020). Specifically, assistants were enlisted through LIHKG and other public Telegram teams, and it merely took one night to recruit two hundred picketers, some of whom were from the ingroup, yet most of whom were newcomers (Cheng & Yuen, 2020). In addition, an internal Telegram team was established to plan for responsibilities, and a public group to spread messages (Cheng & Yuen, 2020). Some were responsible for propaganda, others were in charge of logistics; once having decided what to do next, the details were transmitted back to the main teams (Cheng & Yuen, 2020).

Apart from digital networking mobilizations, sectoral mobilisations were also an important part of the movement. On 11 June 2019, the day before the protest activities became violent, some Christian communities launched public prayer rallies close to the government headquarters to sing *Hallelujah to the Lord* (Cheng & Yuen, 2020). Religious rallies, which could be launched in the absence of a permit, had constituted the peaceful protests. In the following weeks, mothers launched sit-in demonstrations, students laid siege to police stations, pro-democracy politicians restrained police behaviours on the front lines, medical staff provided emergency treatments to the wounded, social workers provided treatments for people with nervous breakdowns, and lawyers established hot-lines to rescue the detained (Cheng & Yuen, 2020). These different operations and services were carried out without prior arrangement or adequate supply, but operated through relative positions and personal expertise in informal networks (Cheng & Yuen, 2020). Furthermore, mobilizations of different

industries changed the protests to a great extent. For example, on 5 August 2019, protestors launched a general strike of labour, students, and shopkeepers throughout the city. The Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions revealed over 350,000 people from fifty industries attended the general strike, creating the biggest industrial action after the Canton-Hong Kong strike in 1925 (Cheng & Yuen, 2020). Additionally, during the suspension of the pro-democracy campaign between 2016 and 2019, increased regime suppression and communication efforts in network establishment promoted the rapprochement process between different pro-democracy sectors (Cheng & Yuen, 2020). The election outcomes of the 2017 Chief Executive Electoral Committee demonstrated the power of these networks while the movement was stagnant. The pan-democracy faction successfully increased the number of voters from 205 in 2012 to 327 in 2017 by a co-ordinated set of activities and won over a quarter of seats in most of the constituencies with a considerable individual electorate bases (Cheng & Yuen, 2020). In brief, the protest impetus had been embedded into every part of society step by step.

### **3.3.8 Action tactics of AEM**

“Be water” provided a creative way to solve the frequent strategic inflexibility in networked movements (Ting, 2020). Withdrawal from occupied areas was no longer seen to be cowardly, but nimble and thoughtful (Cheng & Yuen, 2020). Also, it encouraged other activity agreements via social media channels to reconcile ideological differences (Cheng & Yuen, 2020). Non-violent and radical factions were sympathetic to each other, allowing protestors to maintain a united front (Cheng & Yuen, 2020). In a word, young protestors in Hong Kong deliberately avoided the inflexible and unmoving occupation tactics adopted in the past and approved of a very fluid and nimble protest mode (Dapiran, 2019). More concretely, an assembly might

develop into a parade; a parade might start in one direction and suddenly turned to another; the focal point of a specific protest activity might simply appear during the procession of the parade (Dapiran, 2019). During the protests, small-scale protestors purposefully and adventurously occupied a government building, surging into the entrance halls, escalators, and elevators (Dapiran, 2019). When the government announced that the building was shut off and laid off employees for the day, the protestors scattered and shifted to the next targeted building (Dapiran, 2019). It is important to note that, only in the absence of leadership, could they find a feasible way (Taber, 2019). In a word, the protestors also indicated that the absence of leadership motivated everyone to participate in and make contributions to the movement. By doing this, the protestors were implementing the sort of participatory democracy they wanted to see (Dapiran, 2019). Additionally, a gesture was handed over through the throng and returned to the supply stations, where the supplies had been delivered to the vicinity of the protest zone, and then the needed objects were delivered through the throng down the human chain returning to where requested. These human supply chains extended to one kilometre, which was remarkable (Dapiran, 2019). Volunteers with loudspeakers or interphones took responsibility for announcing and coordinating, but they were not “leaders” (Dapiran, 2019). In short, besides avoiding the excessive dependence on key figures through the use of technology, the protestors did not depend on only one communication channel (Taber, 2019).

In addition to political opportunities and mobilizing structure, a distinct difference between the UM and the AEM lay in their different demands, such as the different slogans for mobilizing the masses. Framing processes played an indispensable role in the UM and the AEM, especially in the contrasting stages of

longevity. In the following section, I will introduce the framing and framing processes of the two movements.

### **3.4 Framing and framing processes of UM & AEM**

In this part, I will introduce the framing – collective action frames and master frames, and framing processes – frame transformations. I have established a complete structure about framing and framing processes in Chapter 2 but based on the reality of the UM and AEM and the limitations of the research that scholars have done, I can only summarize limited frames and framing processes.

#### **3.4.1 Framing Occupy Central: The major collective action frame (UM)**

The notion of framing underlines the significance of understanding the issues and discontents in authorizing and mobilizing social movements (Chapter 2). That implies that the Occupy Central movement used a frame related to the deadlock in democratic development to provide reasons to obtain the public support for the campaign (H. M. Leung, 2016). On the whole, Occupy Central included four major collective action frames. The first was the scheme that the demand for universal suffrage is justifiable according to the constitution. The first frame can play both the diagnostic and prognostic roles of framings. Not only does it indicate that the prolonged democratization is a constitutional issue, but it also points out that the blame should be assigned to the authorities (H. M. Leung, 2016). Additionally, it can also account for the partial specific steps of the Occupy Central movement. In the light of the initial programme, the most important section of the campaign was the disobedience, aiming at paralysing Central, the centre of finance in Hong Kong (H. M. Leung, 2016). The reason for aiming at Central was to force the government to keep its word and carry out the political reform to achieve universal suffrage and this would

add to the cost for the government if the commitment to democracy was not fulfilled (H. M. Leung, 2016). In a word, the first frame empowered the sponsors of Occupy Central to target the government (H. M. Leung, 2016). Furthermore, the second frame entailed the view that the execution of universal suffrage is essential (H. M. Leung, 2016). This proposition can be considered as complementary to the first one, stressing the central function of universal suffrage in solving problems in the existent political system (H. M. Leung, 2016). The second frame increased the grounds for initiating the movement by identifying the structural causes for the government's underperforming and asserting the urgency of carrying out universal suffrage, rather than merely placing emphasis on constitutional factors (H. M. Leung, 2016).

The former two frames were used to vindicate the motivation of the movement, and the latter two frames were used to rationalize the movement's non-violent resistant action. The third frame was the precept of "one person, one vote", which was seen as a fundamental standard for universal suffrage by the campaigners (H. M. Leung, 2016). The government's incompetence in presenting a political reform with that principle was the cause to initiate non-violent resistance. The public may want justification for the movement to commence largescale disobedient action. In view of the roles of the framing processes, it is essential to persuade people that such action is indispensable and helpful, in order to draw a great number of persons to join the campaign (H. M. Leung, 2016). Moreover, the last frame was the conception that civil disobedience was functional, which gave grounds for it as the sponsors' elected methods to act (H. M. Leung, 2016). This frame in the movement was a detailed explanation for the presented scheme of occupation as a form of civil resistance (H. M. Leung, 2016). The sponsors established this frame in two ways. One was in accordance with the specific effect opposed to authoritarian government. The other

way to establish this frame was based on civil consciousness, as expounded and proved by the instances of Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King, among which, the self-devotion spirit is underlined (H. M. Leung, 2016). Self-devotion awareness was reflected in the specific steps of the act. Particularly, all participants of the movement were resolute not to instigate any disobedience, even though the government were putting down the non-violent occupation using violence (H. M. Leung, 2016).

### **3.4.2 The Master Frame: “I want real universal suffrage” (UM)**

When the police withdrew after the riot on the night of 28 September 2014, the movement developed into another phase, by which in addition to the total change in the options of protest activities, a master frame formed (H. M. Leung, 2016). Master frames are wide configurations of conceptions that may be used by a great number of SMOs and groups within the campaign. In the Occupy Movement, the requirement for a political reform seeking for universal suffrage was broadly recognized by all activists disregarding the cliques they belonged to, as illustrated by the widespread adoption of the slogan “I want real universal suffrage” spreading all over the occupied zones (H. M. Leung, 2016). Moreover, a detailed study of this master frame displays that it encompassed signs of the four collective action frames. Firstly, the requirement for universal suffrage was analogous to the conceptions of the former two frames of Occupy Central, namely the Basic Law frame and the election issue frame. Both were employed to support the plan for long-run occupation and permitted the requirement for genuine general elections for the Chief Executive and members of Legislature to be still an element of the master frame (H. M. Leung, 2016). Secondly, the term “genuine universal suffrage” underlined the “authenticity” of the universal suffrage. It was the idea of the third collective action frame – the democracy frame. The thirst for

“real universal suffrage” was established on the precept of “one person, one vote” and an impartial nominating procedure (H. M. Leung, 2016). Resembling the initial democracy frame, it was a reaction to the limited election reform programme Beijing proposed, which involved a filtering mechanism during the nominating process (H. M. Leung, 2016). First and last, as a replacement of Occupy Central, the Occupy Movement kept its democratic aspiration. It was logical that the frame emerged after the replacement possessed the common ideas of the prior movement (H. M. Leung, 2016).

Although Snow and Benford (1992) indicated that the universality of generally recognized thoughts in the master frame enables the discontented groups to employ it to arouse the public, this was not applicable to the Occupy Movement. The Occupy Movement succeeded Occupy Central after the students’ strike and the turmoil during the night of 28 September 2014 (H. M. Leung, 2016). By that time, the initial leadership had crumbled, without any alternative developing subsequently. In and of itself, the master frame of the Occupy Movement was not purposely presented by any instigator with an aim to mobilize the people (H. M. Leung, 2016). The student organizations performed a crucial function in fostering the master frame. As a result, the students’ voice for democracy gained consent from pan-democrats, enabling the requirement for democratization to be the master frame of the Occupy Movement (H. M. Leung, 2016).

### **3.4.3 Framing Occupy Central to Occupy Movement: The frame transformation (UM)**

“Occupy” is a strategy that involves occupying a public space as a form of protest, often with a campsite in a symbolic location. In Hong Kong, it is possible to differentiate between the Occupy Central and the Occupy Movement. As a conception,

Occupy Central formed in 2013, with an aim to paralyse the financial centre if the government's proposal will not meet the international standards for universal suffrage. However, Occupy Central was only in the conception stage, and when it was put into practice, it became Occupy Movement. The 79 days' occupation and the growth of the occupied zone were not concentrated in Central, but only an assembly of a non-violent sit-in was held in Central (H. M. Leung, 2016). Put differently, the "Occupy Movement" deviated from the primary plan of "Occupy Central" (H. M. Leung, 2016, p. 5). The weak leadership of the occupation rendered the situation out of control, which rendered the initial plan of Occupy Central unable to cope and spontaneously generated a new arrangement of Occupy Movement (H. M. Leung, 2016). In this respect, the conversion from Occupy Central to Occupy Movement was a replacement of an unrehearsed campaign, not a structural plan (H. M. Leung, 2016).

The students' strike was the crucial point of the whole campaign and played a key role in converting Occupy Central into the Occupy Movement. The first phase of the campaign made a major difference to the movement, as the eruption of clashes in this phase completely transformed the initial leadership and the programme of Occupy Central and developed the movement into its second and third phases – a long-run occupation with various protest activities and rifts among groups separately (H. M. Leung, 2016). In addition, the feeling of outrage and an array of eventualities were the driving force that resulted in the expansion of the occupation and the transformation of the movements, however, which were incapable of accounting for the length of the entire movement (H. M. Leung, 2016). It was clear that emotions were not the only element that impelled persistent protesters to occupy streets for over three months (H. M. Leung, 2016).



### **3.4.4 “Five demands and not one less”: The major collective action frames (AEM)**

The Extradition Bill aroused strong public concerns about the political motives of the Beijing and the Hong Kong government. In response to the Fugitive Offenders Ordinance amendment, protestors required that Chief Executive Carrie Lam retract the Extradition Bill. Lam firstly rejected making any adjustments to the bill. However, with the escalation of the demonstrations, Lam was compelled to declare the postponement of the Extradition Bill on 15 June 2019, yet this was not a complete retraction (A. Wong, 2020). As a response, protestors made five demands, chanting “five demands and not one less”. The five demands included: 1. To officially retract the Extradition Bill; 2. To withdraw the “riots” characterization of the protestors; 3. To set free and exonerate the arrested protestors; 4. To set up an independent investigation committee to investigate the police behaviour and use of force during the protests; 5. Carrie Lam should resign and to implement double universal suffrage (Hsu, 2019). These five demands laid the foundation for the continuous Anti-Extradition Movement (A. Wong, 2020). Not only that, in the Anti-Extradition protests many slogans appeared and spread widely. In the study of social movements, slogans are usually regarded as the embodiment of collective action frames (Benford & Snow, 2000). They are a tool for meaning formation or the “action-oriented sets of beliefs and meanings” enlightening and legitimizing social movements (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 4). Among the many slogans, “No rioters, only tyranny” and “Hong Kong police know the law but break it” were identified as the most recognized (Lee et al., 2019, p. 20-21). In addition, “We go up and down together”, “brothers climb a mountain together, each has to make his own effort” and “no snitching, no severing of ties”, which were less recognized, were designed to promote unity and mutual respect among protestors with different

opinions (Lee et al., 2019, p. 21). Equally important, “Hongkongers, add oil” and “Liberate Hong Kong, revolution of our times” were similarly recognized (Lee et al., 2019, p. 21).

In contrast, “I want universal suffrage” was the main slogan of the Umbrella Movement, but it was not so popular and not seen as being representative of the Anti-Extradition protests, although political reform was one of the requirements of the AEM (Lee et al., 2019, p. 21). The long-term structural problems of the Legislative Council had been significantly exposed on 1 July 2019. Hundreds of demonstrators dressed in black rushed into the Legislative Council Complex in Admiralty, which is the emblematic seat of Hong Kong’s political authority. Specifically, the portraits of the current and former presidents of the Legislative Council were removed and damaged (H. Chan, 2019). The protestors also painted several places with the slogan “abolish functional constituencies” (H. Chan, 2019, para. 26). Moreover, one protestor showed his discontent with the political construction of Hong Kong by tearing a copy of the Basic Law from the LegCo president’s chair, which became an insurgent symbol (H. Chan, 2019). Since then, it was clear-cut that the majority of protestors would not stop unless they attained “double universal suffrage”: the general elections of legislators and Chief Executive in Hong Kong (H. Chan, 2019). Ultimately, the reluctance of Hong Kong people to retreat and their endurance to keep on protesting demonstrated how determined if without hope the people were to ensure democracy and political security for the future of Hong Kong (A. Wong, 2020), they could not help fighting, because there is no other way. However, the protestors did not consider the meaning of universal suffrage, which was the mere pre-emptive requirement (Cheng & Yuen, 2020). It can be inferred that the main function of democracy lies in defending civil rights and the rule of law in this free enclave.

### **3.4.5 “No China extradition!” to “Five demands, not one less!”: The frame transformation (AEM)**

Considering motivation, though the Anti-Extradition Movement stemmed from opposition to a single policy advocacy, the collective motivation of the protesters advocating political reform and opposing the establishment showed the cumulative resentments against the political system and numerous autocratic violations in the past decade (Lee et al., 2019). Although no leader adjusted the protest frames and coordinated actions, the protestors quickly gave up the expediency of demanding that the principal official accountable for proposing the bill resign (Lee et al., 2019). On the contrary, the appeal for Carrie Lam to resign was quickly substituted by the call for universal suffrage in the Legislative Council and Chief Executive elections, which has been primary advocated by the pro-democratic faction for over ten years, including the Umbrella Movement, and has been invariably ignored (Holbig, 2020). Besides, they reached an internal consensus that precedence should be given to investigating the police and to carrying out universal suffrage (Lee et al., 2019). The former was not only essential to resolve misconduct throughout the campaign, but also essential to prevent Hong Kong from turning into a police state; the latter is the basis for enabling the Hong Kong government to be responsible for its people. In a word, the movement developed into a wider objective, namely, to resist the dictatorship of Hong Kong society (Lee et al., 2019). By and large, frames for police cruelty resonated most among the protestors. Besides, frames that stress solidarity and team spirit composed another extremely resounding classification of frames (Lee et al., 2019). Keeping collective identity among protestors, which is a critical factor that contributes to continue collective mobilization (Polletta & Jasper, 2001), had also become an inner

goal in the Anti-Extradition protests, in addition to the retraction of the bill and an independent inquiry into police cruelty.

So far, I have tackled all elements composing the POS, the mobilizing structure, and the framing processes I studied on the UM and AEM, among which I focus more on leaderless and structureless movements as the UM and the AEM had many more characteristics in these respects. In the following sections I will analyse how these three sets of factors combined to explain the protest waves of the UM and the AEM, consisting of the emergence phases, longevity phases, and decline phases.

### **3.5 Emergence UM / AEM**

#### **3.5.1 Emergence phase of UM**

In Hong Kong protests are primarily seen as a sign of crisis in governance or of institutional dissatisfactions (E. W. Cheng, 2016). The Hong Kong government adopted a hybridity of elite unity, well-directed retaliation and counter-movements to deal with street protests, for example, by 2010, pro-regime civic groups had arisen, among which the most prominent were “Caring Hong Kong Power” and “the Silent Majority for Hong Kong” (E. W. Cheng, 2016, p. 400), claiming to stand for the reticent majority who value order, commerce, and harmony (E. W. Cheng, 2016). Afterward these pro-regime groups were allied to launch the Blue-Ribbon movement countering the Yellow-Ribbon Umbrella Movement. Overall, weak institutions could not adequately account for the spread of protests (E. W. Cheng, 2016), the government’s incapability of resolving contentions and a series of contingent events may have aroused the public discontent, causing massive protests.

In 2014, affected by the global Occupy movements, scholars Benny Tai and Chan Kin-man, along with a Christian pastor, Chu Yiu-ming, were determined to

launch a non-violent occupy movement in Hong Kong, aiming at striving for universal suffrage of the CE (Mok, 2015). They joined forces with the SMOs and pan-democratic camps to make preparations for the campaign, and called the movement Occupy Central with Love and Peace (OCLP) (Mok, 2015). Occupy Central leaders undertook diagnostic framing of the problem by complaining to what they considered to be a menacing and authoritarian Beijing government, an incapable local government which was blamed for operating a 'legitimacy deficit,' which needs Beijing's backing (J. Y. Cheng, 2014, p. 211), and the connivance between local bureaucrats and pro-Beijing big businessmen (Chen, 2016). Also, the authoritarianism of central government was framed by demonstrators as desiring a 'democratic show without democratic substance' when they explained the NPC's 8.31 political reform programme (Ma, 2011, p. 66). Diagnostic frames became clearer when pro-democracy activists demonstrated that the validity of this undemocratic political system had been subjected to severe damage among circumstances of increasing social inequality, increasingly overt nepotism, failed economic structure adjustment, lacking political responsibility, and rising threats to freedom (Sing, 2009). Not only that, but activists also quickly acquired and employed the framing produced by their leaders and began to request that the Hong Kong government followed 'international standards for democracy' (Davis, 2014, p. 212). This motivational framing of the alleged international norms for democracy is highly influential in exposing the unachieved disparity Hong Kong has with the rest of the world, irritating the Hong Kong people's senses of injustice and envy (Chen, 2016). Besides, thanks to motivational framing, Occupy Central organizers effectively provided a moral foundation for the campaign and convincing portions of the Hong Kong people to accept their nonviolent disobedient act as reasonable and democracy as extremely and urgently needed in Hong Kong (Chen, 2016). The title of the Occupy

Central movement in full is “Occupy Central with Love and Peace.” The addition of “love and peace” to the name of the nonviolent disobedient movement by leaders was to call on the masses by emphasizing the peaceful essence of the occupation and their virtuous purpose (Chen, 2016). In addition, Occupy Central organizers grasped the opportunity to reinforce their diagnostic framing by specifying the Hong Kong government as blameworthy when Leung Chun-ying was captured in a bribery scandal that he confidentially accepted a remittance of HK\$50 million from an Austrian firm before assuming office (Griffiths & Robertson, 2014). Besides, the Occupy Central leaders framed Chief Executive CY Leung as being against the poor and pursuing the minority domination of the political system in Hong Kong according to the contents of an interview by the foreign media (Agence France-Presse, 2014; Brown, 2014). In short, effective diagnostic framing and motivational framing, which were arranged by experienced and well-reputed social movement leaders, played the important roles in the emergence of the Occupy Central movement.

Nevertheless, the situation did not go as the OCLP planned. Although most SMOs engaged in the preparation activities, such as a set of “Deliberation Days”, some more radical camps and parties felt worried about the progress (Mok, 2015), as they feared that pre-preparation taking much time would count against its official initiation and chances of success. The main purpose of Deliberation Days was to gather the people of Hong Kong who are striving for democracy to exchange views on issues that the movement may face, and to establish a culture of rational deliberation on public affairs (Tong, 2013). Also, localist groups and leaders asserted that the OCLP would be a failure. Localism is a political group that has sprung up in Hong Kong recently, which opposes pan-democracy parties and SMOs (H. M. Leung, 2016). Localist groups uphold Hong Kong’s autonomous rule and are against Beijing’s

interference in Hong Kong governance (H. M. Leung, 2016). Localist groups were against using peaceful methods to protest and claimed that protests should be “valiant” (H. M. Leung, 2016, p. 63). Furthermore, after the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress in Beijing made an official decision on 31 August 2014, refusing to implement genuine democratic elections in Hong Kong (“831 decision”), the campaign was started by schedules on 1 October 2014 in Central, the CBD of HK (Mok, 2015). However, the students lost patience. Then when the students’ rallied in late September and their action developed into an unanticipated conflict with the police, Tai unexpectedly proclaimed the commencing of the OCLP at midnight on 27 September. This caused many protesters to go out with the purpose of backing the students. On 28 September 2014, protesters poured into the main commuting roads in front of the government HQ (Headquarters) (Mok, 2015). A period of nearly 80 days of occupation started, with Admiralty and Mong Kok as the major occupied zones. As a result, the student organizations HKFS and Scholarism turned into the unarguable SMOs in the UM, although the initiators of the Occupy Central movement made great efforts and the pan-democrats provided resources in the early stage.

### **3.5.2 Emergence phase of AEM**

Political opportunities were obstructed, and SMOs were hindered in Hong Kong prior to summer 2019. In the post-Occupy period, Beijing and the Hong Kong government developed an alliance to support nationalistic discourse and a wearying strategy that simultaneously absorbed elites and placated objection (Guo, 2019; Cheng & Yuen, 2020). Mild pro-Beijing politicians were substituted by reliable subordinate officers, and the approachable policy avenues for inside-system deliberation were closed. Accordingly, though some social and business elites were deeply concerned about the extradition bill in April 2019, they were called together by

high-ranking officials of the central government in May 2019 to stand by the Hong Kong government without condition (Cheng & Yuen, 2020). However, the wearying strategy of the governments at that moment was limited by the rule of law, which provided room for the maintenance of civil society networks (Cheng & Yuen, 2020). What is more, the opposition faction's organizational resources and inside-system channels were significantly impaired. Though the pan-democratic faction obtained two more seats in the elections of the Legislative Council in 2016, core activists were put into jail in the middle 2017 which produced an intense feeling of hopelessness subsequent to disqualifying lawmakers voted in late 2016 (E. W. Cheng, 2020). Moreover, the growth of localism generated an ideological split within the pan-democracy faction, stopping seasoned political parties from enlisting young and talented activists (Ku, 2019), in addition to a persistent decrease in the level of civic effectiveness as time went on. As a result, it is true that these determined activists simply could not explain the unparalleled mobilization in 2019, however, their potential networks were accumulated as key nodes to play particular roles in different phases of mobilization (Cheng & Yuen, 2020).

A small group of campaigners had a high level of cooperation in the Anti-Extradition Movement, and many of them were involved in the Umbrella Movement when Beijing refused to approve universal suffrage in Hong Kong (Pomfret et al., 2019). What is more, at least sixty grass-roots community-based organizations were established after the Umbrella Movement; at the same time, doctors, lawyers, social workers, and accountants established over twenty occupational organizations during and after the Umbrella Movement (Ma, 2020). The concealment of these organizations enables them to perceive the border between propaganda and mobilization, and sometimes make judgements and express opinions. As opposed to Hong Kong's



confrontational activities in the past, these prolonged networks stressed the connection between politics and daily life, established ties with unrelated individuals, reassessed previous protests, and expanded the civil imaginative power of democracy (Cheng & Yuen, 2020). Moreover, a range of spontaneous online petitions in May 2019 was a substantive step toward mobilization. The petitions began in high schools and universities in Hong Kong, and finally diffused rapidly to diverse sectors: lawyers, financiers, accountants, reporters, doctors, nurses, and skilled workers all wrote their own petitions using their voices (Cheng & Yuen, 2020). They were followed by parents, housewives, immigrants, churches, residents' communities, and various interest groups (Cheng & Yuen, 2020). Moreover, most sponsors of these petitions disseminated via the Internet relied on data communication and social identity to mobilize unrelated individuals (Cheng & Yuen, 2020). Apart from petitions, more aggressive protests emerged in succession. In the past, only those with powerful corporate relations, like teachers, lawyers, and social workers, often protested in the name of their industries. Nevertheless, as early as July 2019, mobilizations from different sections of society emerged in an endless stream. Teachers, lawyers, social workers, public officials, pastors, airline stewards, accountants, transportation workers, mothers and old people all organized sit ins or gatherings according to their profession, industry, or social identifications (Cheng & Yuen, 2020). In brief, civil society networks were essential for the protest activities in the coming months.

The extradition bill undermined the identity of Hong Kong people as an autonomous region separated from the mainland and was a major spark for the anti-government movement in 2019 to produce stronger and more extensive protests than the Umbrella Movement in 2014, in addition to that it violated the "one country, two systems" principle that China must adhere to. The government's lack of responsibility

to protect the democratic values of Hong Kong people promoted the city's growing anxiety, causing the protests to evolve into an anti-establishment campaign. Since British colonial rule, the Western concepts of freedom and the rule of law have been deeply entrenched in Hong Kong society and are a central part of Hong Kong's identity (A. Wong, 2020), although the democratic system is incomplete. Nevertheless, the space for political liberties possessed by Hong Kong citizens is becoming smaller and smaller, and political liberties can solely be maintained if the government abides by the city's laws and be responsible to its electorate (A. Wong, 2020). What is more, the Extradition Bill revealed to Hong Kong citizens that their government could no longer be constrained by its own laws or electorate, and it ignited a tinderbox to provide impetus to the Anti-Extradition Movement. As Paul Shieh, past chairman of the Hong Kong Bar Association, underlined the increasing alarm by illustrating that for Hong Kong people, it is hard to imagine that a country is ruled by law without real democracy (J. Wong, 2020). Consequently, the protestors made Hong Kong citizens determined to struggle for their own rule of law, democracy, and liberties, which is the unique means to preserve their distinctive identity to be a Hong Konger (A. Wong, 2020).

### **3.6 Longevity UM / AEM**

#### **3.6.1 Longevity phase of UM**

The leading student organization, the HKFS, which is constituted of students' unions of the main universities in Hong Kong, started to boycott classes in late September and rallies were hosted close to the government headquarters in Admiralty. The other leading student organization Scholarism was established by a number of secondary school students and had organised a protest defending the autonomy of Hong Kong's education policy from Beijing's influence. Both HKFS and Scholarism owned pre-existing broad networks, as well as OCLP gaining support base, which

formed extensive activist networks. During the Umbrella Movement millions of activists who had demonstrated in the past ten consecutive years had rightly gained the fame of 'being peaceful, rational and non-violent' (E. W. Cheng, 2016, p. 395); by comparison, the crucial incidents invariably entailed occupying, besieging, hunger strikes or barricades (E. W. Cheng, 2016). The police responded by expanding their personnel and equipment, frequently using force, and taking the lead in accusing the activists; yet these measures did not stifle increased levels of public mobilization (E. W. Cheng, 2016). Subsequently conflicts erupted between the activists and the police. The police's violent reaction triggered more protesters to join in. Then, police forces made efforts to disperse the crowds with tear gas but were never successful; rather, protesters still blocked the roads, and some shifted to occupy other zones: Mong Kok (MK), a bustling commercial district and living quarters over Victoria Harbour, and Causeway Bay, another commercial area close to Admiralty (Mok, 2015). The protest waves entered the expansion phase. Afterwards, besides the traditional media lens became interwoven with the off-line repertoires of declarations, deliberation, and the referendum, with the evolving of the campaign, an array of online repertoires arose (Lin, 2017). For instance, many Facebook pages and communities, e.g., "United for Democracy: Global Solidarity with Hong Kong," "Translating Umbrella Movement," and "Umbrella Movement Art Preservation," were set up to organize people to join the campaign in diverse ways (Lin, 2017, p. 58).

In brief, the continuation of the protest waves was caused by a number of factors. Firstly, the important feature is that the masses can show sympathy for the movement and its undertaking (de Roode, 2017). Nonviolent action rendered the protest activities more accessible and support less controversial. Secondly, leaders can make great efforts to build a solid pillar for the campaign through charismatic

addresses or their expansive networks (de Roode, 2017). Moreover, from the beginning to end of the UM, student leaders, professional SMOs, OCLP, and the pan-democracy camp forged an unstable alliance, linked by a “platform meeting” (Mok, 2015, p. 22). Although the relationship between the HKFS’s and the pan-democratic parties was labelled as both clashing and collaborative (Mok, 2015), the latter still partly contributed to the continuation of the movement. Lastly, Occupy Central would not have been able to extend to a wider range of the population in the absence of the SMOs’ wide previous organizational and interorganizational network as well as their digital networks.

Occupy Central was launched through the social network merging the pan-democracy camp and SMOs. Nevertheless, the Occupy Movement also encompassed localist groups and a large number of spontaneous activists, whose primary motive for attending it was their rage at the police’s use of force and tear gas to disperse activists (H. M. Leung, 2016). The desertion of the civil disobedience frame arose mainly amid the localist and spontaneous activists. Some spontaneous protesters thought the scheduled means of civil resistance was not sufficiently strong to force the central government to succumb to their requirements (H. M. Leung, 2016). In other words, the self-devotion spirit, which was a central component of the arranged civil resistance, rendered those spontaneous irresolute. Besides, highlighting self-devotion and the action tactic renders it challenging to recruit participants apart from the likes of existing protesters and students (H. M. Leung, 2016). What is more, after the tumult in the first phase of the Occupy Movement, the initial leadership of Occupy Central crumbled and their scheduled disobedience act programme collapsed, signifying the failing of the civil disobedience frame (H. M. Leung, 2016). As a result, the fading of that frame accidentally caused the involvement of more potential constituency, in that there was

no plan for capitulation any longer, which brought adaptability for activists of assorted camps to act, and which enabled them to take various actions that maintained the campaign for over three months (H. M. Leung, 2016). Therefore, this milestone was pivotal for prolonging the movement and drawing thousands more to take part in the occupation. In addition to a series of incidents turning the Occupy Central mobilization into the Occupy Movement, the framing processes witnessed a variation manifested as the appearance of a master frame and the dismissal of the primary nonviolent resistance frame, which eventually evolved into the long-range participation of both the non-partisans and localist occupants (H. M. Leung, 2016).

### **3.6.2 Longevity phase of AEM**

During the Anti-Extradition Movement, the Hong Kong government depended on the police to control the campaign. The Hong Kong police had employed undue force to crack down on the protesters, which paradoxically angered more resentful citizens to take to the streets and confront the policemen (Ngai, 2020). A vicious spiral was formed: to safeguard the defenseless demonstrators, front-line fighters were ranged against the police, and the police upgraded the military forces to scatter and arrest the demonstrators (Ngai, 2020). While the police officers targeted tear gas at protesters, took them into custody, accused them of riots, and made criminal charges, inciting conflicts, waves after waves of the assemblies, processions, demonstrations, and street battles aroused greater rage. As a result, the hatred was generated, and the anti-government protests settled into a deadlock (Ngai, 2020). Furthermore, by 30 June 2020 this aggressive strategy of the police had resulted in the launch of '21,000 rounds of teargas, 9,216 arrests and 3,000 injuries' (Cheng & Yuen, 2020, p. 10). By comparison, no police officer had yet been subject to disciplinary action or been charged. These outcomes created a feeling that the local administration and legal

system were no longer able to protect the freedom of assembly and control the police's conduct (Cheng & Yuen, 2020). In brief, the stage of stalemate combining the intensification of police repression with the escalation of protesters helped to sustain the movement.

From August 2019, district protests, industrial protests and riots had apparently substituted mass gatherings to maintain the campaign (Cheng & Yuen, 2020). While the campaign remained stagnant, the mobilization activities provided new places and occasions by which to gather new supporters (Cheng & Yuen, 2020). This accumulation of the grass roots, working places and international initiatives was similar to the path of mass rallies. For example, on 7 July 2019, the protest activities moved to Salisbury Garden in Tsim Sha Tsui, which was the first mass gathering launched in Kowloon since 1989 (Cheng & Yuen, 2020). Furthermore, over the next few months, large-scale mobilization triggered community protests. These district mobilizations linked local issues to the deprivation of political rights or excessive governance, thus widening the distance from the constituency (Cheng & Yuen, 2020). This interplay facilitated campaigners and common protestors to exchange ideas and co-ordinate strategies. Moreover, senior politicians or campaigners presented over 70 percent of the 120 assented mass demonstrations' applications during the campaign (Cheng & Yuen, 2020). These heavyweights held discussions with the police about the parade paths, enlisted enough picketers, and were held responsible for any misconduct during the parades (Cheng & Yuen, 2020). Also, the expertise and experience explained why some protest applications were successful and others were rejected prior to the prohibition of any demonstrations (Cheng & Yuen, 2020). Nevertheless, those high-stakes pioneers could not coordinate district gatherings which relied on highly atomised and horizontal networks of protests (Cheng & Yuen, 2020) created by the

widespread utilization of social media and mobile technology (Ting, 2020). Particularly, the online forum LIHKG, together with a series of Telegram communities, served as a predominant communicative channel for instant on-site strategies and consideration of long-term tactics. To sum up, LIHKG promoted the ‘crowdsourcing of leadership’ associated with strong feedback circuits (Ting, 2020, p. 364). Altogether, decentralized groups maintained the momentum of the campaign by acknowledging the dedication of others and trusting one another unconditionally (Cheng & Yuen, 2020). Substituted places for protests allowed civil society to merge with digital communication networks to promote a division of work to contain protestors’ different levels of risk endurance, specialized knowledge, and social contacts (Cheng & Yuen, 2020). This role division linked scattered individuals to their relative advantage arena. Consequently, every protestor felt like he/she belonged to the campaign and helped to keep the campaign energetic (Cheng & Yuen, 2020).

Protestors were convinced that the Hong Kong government was dominated by Beijing to a large extent, which was the reason why it did not make compromises. For a large number of protesters, it would be a futile campaign or a “hopeless” future: returning to mainland China would be an inevitable destiny, and the Hong Kong government was considered as impotent in response to their political claims (Ngai, 2020). The concept of “no future” generated a pressing and hostile situation that maintained the impetus for this campaign, and therefore there was an urgent need to claim political rights (Ngai, 2020). These were often referred as the “five demands”. Besides, the smartness of the campaign lied in that it naturally shifted from a centralized request to withdraw the extradition bill to a true democratic request, that was double universal suffrage. Furthermore, although millions of Hong Kong residents protested and put forward the “five demands”, the Hong Kong government just ignored

them, leading to a stalemate: no conversation, no reform (Ngai, 2020). However, the stalemate did not terminate the protest activities. When confronted with the full mobilization, the wearying strategy of the government was no longer effective. Rather, the publicity machines were unable to popularize the governmental framing, legal instruments were not sufficient to arouse alarm, and the counter-campaigns did not receive the expected attention (Cheng & Yuen, 2020). For the protestors, they could merely appeal to force until the governments made concessions. Additionally, in terms of internal coordination of protesters, although at times there were serious discussions and even disputes between them, they thought highly of the campaign slogans: “Not cutting”, “Be water” and “Buddies climb your own mountain” (Ngai, 2020, p. 335). These slogans indicated that solidarity was established in the campaign and interior clashes were avoided. Besides, the common sentiment accounted for why the protestors insisted on pursuing fairness for their comrades (Cheng & Yuen, 2020). Moreover, the decentralized protest structure was comparatively potent in producing frames and agreements so that protestors could explain the circumstances and understand their involvement (Cheng & Yuen, 2020). For example, protestors often made decisions for themselves at the scene, and if there were disagreements, they divided into sub-teams and continued to act alone (Ngai, 2020). Therefore, the despair of unanswered demands and the frames that emphasized internal solidarity sustained the whole movement.

### **3.7 Decline UM / AEM**

#### **3.7.1 Decline phase of UM**

Direct acts impose costs on the regime and display the activists' dedication (Graeber, 2009). In the context of high levels of popular mobilization, it was very impossible that activists would be agreeable to a concession until the reform package



was genuine (M. Y. H. Wong, 2016). From the perspective of Beijing and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR), since elite endorsement is indispensable in crisis periods, penalization needs to be sufficiently serious to produce a convincing warning but not incur a 'snowball defection' (E. W. Cheng, 2016, p. 399-400). For example, when James Tien tried to join the Occupy Central Movement, he was instantly dismissed from the 'Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference' but was still regarded as a member of the 'patriotic force' (E. W. Cheng, 2016, p. 399). In other words, this macrosystem level administration made political elites certain that their greatest benefits rest with forming alliances with the incumbents rather than opposing them (Robertson, 2011; Slater, 2010).

Uncertainty generated impatience and riots during the UM. The student leaders enjoyed strong support at the very start but were not able to figure out a way to sustain their legitimacy during the period of blockage (Mok, 2015). Besides, their inability to provide a specific orientation bred discontentment and splits (Mok, 2015). The circumstances could be in part accounted for by the notion of "authority work" (Einwohner, 2007, p. 1306), but it was not the whole story (Mok, 2015). Indeed, the HKFS did not do a lot of "authority work" – giving guidance – in advance, as the occupation itself was rather impromptu (Mok, 2015). Not only that, but the leaders also failed to exchange ideas efficaciously with the occupants in the zones to avoid misinterpretations and misrepresentation (Mok, 2015). They were not able to show up in the clashes, causing a rapid decline in the number of protesters (Mok, 2015). For instance, a crowd of activists tried to block the main entrances of the government HQ but finally abandoned it, yet they were prohibited from addressing the protesters on the main stage who took charge of it (Kwan, 2014). Several occupants besieged the stage to express rage, and subsequently more clashes erupted between a number of

occupants and the stage (Mok, 2015). In short, these sets of collisions turned out to be symbolic moments displaying how those elements were intertwined and resulted in splits (Mok, 2015). Additionally, social media had its effects. It was said that before attempting to revoke the stage, rumours were disseminated on Facebook that the picketing team in Admiralty had dismantled a small stage dominated by the localists (Mok, 2015). News that this was happening, though not confirmed, circulated rapidly in the Golden Forum (Mok, 2015). In a word, social media aggravated the internal conflict by generating misinterpretations and misrepresentation (Mok, 2015). Altogether, it was a combination of localist emotions, discontents with the pan-democratic camp and traditional SMOs, as well as the HKFS's failure to exchange ideas efficiently with those in the zone and to provide an obvious path (Mok, 2015). Furthermore, during the Umbrella Movement, the weakness of the pan-democracy camp itself was a significant defect of the dominant alliance (Mok, 2015). Students wanted the resources supplied by the pan-democracy camp, but afterwards they had to be subjected to reduced recognition as the pan-democrats were considered by many young activists as outdated (Mok, 2015). Briefly, the collisions between the student leaders and pan-democracy camp demonstrated that the alliance itself was precarious, and this caused the proposition of radicals that escalated action became necessary, rather than relying on the elite allies (Mok, 2015). Eventually the escalation of action put an end to the Umbrella Movement.

The shift of frames changed the campaign and drew the involvement of numerous occupants without party bias and localist activists. Yet, when evolving towards the final phase of the campaign, there was a sharp decrease in the number of protesters and internal conflict inter factions (H. M. Leung, 2016). Among Diani's four types of coordination (2015), during allied patterns of social movement there are

high levels of resource interflows and weak identity ties (Diani, 2015). An alliance might be seen as a smarter means to assemble loosely but at least with feebly interwoven belief systems as well (Roth & Saunders, manuscript in draft). Hence alliances' declaration of aims may be framed in such a manner – those organisations with at least a partial overlap in their functions cannot help but discover compassion (Corrigal-Brown & Meyer, 2010; Gerhards & Rucht, 1992; Roth, 2010). Weak identity ties render alliances hard to maintain (Roth & Saunders, manuscript in draft). Consequently, alliances crumble owing to disputes related to ideology (Roth & Saunders, manuscript in draft), crackdown or resource disputations (Krinsky & Reese, 2006). In the Occupy Movement, though being based on the master frame, compositions of occupants were actually varied, each of which taking their own view of the circumstances. Subsequently, substitutes of the movement frames came into being (H. M. Leung, 2016). In a word, the understanding of the localist occupants brought about the antagonistic attitude opposing the pan-democracy alignment and social protesters which gave rise to infighting (H. M. Leung, 2016). Moreover, Occupy Central organizers failed to resist some of the competing frames from outside, involving blaming the militant factions of the social movement for violating the legal spirit, for sacrificing 'collective interests for personal political ambition,' and causing huge 'economic losses' that led to the weakening of 'Hong Kong's competitiveness,' (Kan, 2013, p. 76). Furthermore, it was accused of increasing huge inconvenience for the community (J. Chan, 2014). Hence, in addition to contending frames of the groups and the outside, the lack of specific leadership and the amorphous organization of the campaign, there was no co-ordination mechanism to settle the disputes and conflicts inter different factions, which prevented the movement from extending (H. M. Leung, 2016).

### **3.7.2 Decline phase of AEM**

In a way, the fluidness of the protest movement was able to produce both advantages and disadvantages. Although the widespread and innovative utilization of digital media administered to continuing the movement with time evolving and place shifting, it might have facilitated the atomization of the campaign, making it hard for protestors to enunciate representative origins and generate a consistent plan of action to confront the authorities (F. L. F. Lee, 2019). Meanwhile, although it enabled participants to exchange ideas effectively and to be flexible over spaces, events and forms of protests, the anonymous tactics and extendibility of the fight with faces covered may simultaneously have motivated them to be more willing to take risks to violently confronted with riot police (Holbig, 2020). Yet the paradox was that the mobility and toughness of the movement were understood by Beijing officials as the testimony of careful-planning and unity among the SMOs, as well as the connections of participants with training abroad and foreign control (Wong, Sum, & Ng, 2020). This reflected the deep-seated problem of Hong Kong protests: the more effective the protestors were at responding to the rising suppression, the greater the price they paid for criminal acts (Holbig, 2020). Nonetheless, the chain reaction of the movement was evidently reflected in the election triumph of the opposition and the endeavours of trade unions against a backdrop of national corporatism (Cheng & Yuen, 2020). Nevertheless, some consequences, which included enforcement of the National Security Law, large-scale voting in the opposition's primary election, intensification of political consumption, and strong opposition to censorship on the press in the post-AEM era, hinted at another wave of movement stagnation (Cheng & Yuen, 2020). Furthermore, because of the Coronavirus epidemic, the Anti-Extradition Movement evolved into a phase of "forced suspension" at the beginning of February 2020, but

the protest activities had not ended completely (F. L. F. Lee, 2020). Ching-kwan Lee (2019), a sociologist, indicated that the Anti-Extradition Movement itself is a “permanent revolution” (para. 13) and was in the process of building a “Hong Kong community” (para. 6), established on emotive unity and adaptable resistant modes embedded in the populace’s daily lives. However, it is undeniable that Hong Kong’s hybrid and sub-national political power structure limited the ability of the movement to change (Chung, 2020).

The space for protest extended to the international arena. Besides framing themselves as “freedom fighters” on the brink of authoritarian invasion (Cheng & Yuen, 2020, p. 13), the aggressive protestors established a discourse of “jade and stone burned together”. This discourse assumed that if the Chinese authorities took drastic action, both Hong Kong and China would be subject to international sanctions (Cheng & Yuen, 2020). Under the background of the deteriorating economic conditions in China and the continued competition between China and the United States, using Hong Kong’s financial position to escalate actions was not only an emotional reaction, but also a strategical consideration that compelled the governments to make compromises (Cheng & Yuen, 2020). Ultimately, when different repertoires and substituted protest places had not been able to press the government to concede, the entire mobilization ground to a halt (Cheng & Yuen, 2020). As a result, the entire mobilization seriously damaged the static balance of the hybrid regime and stimulated those in high positions of the Beijing government to change the political environment of the semiautonomous region by enforcing the National Security Law (Cheng & Yuen, 2020). In protests against the National Security Law, “Hong Kong independence. The only way.” (Siu & Lau, 2020, para. 14) and “Hongkongers, revenge!” (para. 31) became the popular slogans. Altogether, Hong Kong’s pro-democracy protestors at

present encounter a greater risk of punishment, and it is not clear whether Hong Kong people's political liberty can be defended (Chung, 2020).

### **3.8 Conclusion**

To sum up, in this chapter I summarised the emergence, longevity, and decline phases of the Umbrella Movement and the Anti-Extradition Movement in Hong Kong applying the theories of political opportunity structure, mobilizing structures and framing processes based on secondary analysis of scholarly work. The Umbrella Movement and the Anti-extradition Movement are ideal cases to discuss and analyse the political opportunity theory. The HKSAR is a weak regime, but backed by the strong central government, and the latter tend to be aligned with pro-Beijing elites, playing a dominant role in leverage. For example, the imposition of the National Security Law bypassing the Hong Kong Legislative Council has brought forth strong reactions worldwide and many Hong Kong citizens are afraid of the undermining of Hong Kong's independence of judicature since its unique common-law jurisdiction does not conform to China's judicature (J. Chan, 2018). So invisibly, Hong Kong's political structure is changing, and it is moving closer to an authoritarian system. More importantly, POS in hybrid regimes have an important variable, unlike in Western democratic states, that is international force. International factors play a critical role in the social movements of Hong Kong, especially pro-democracy actions, such as "the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act of 2019" (HKHRDA), which was overwhelmingly passed in both houses of Congress, creating a strong deterrent to Beijing and the HK government. The HKHRDA largely influenced the consequences of the AEM. In the longer run, Hong Kong has always been a window for China's foreign exchanges and a buffer zone for easing the differences between China and the West. Now the further tightening of Hong Kong also shows that the contradictions between China and the

Western world are irreconcilable. As a hybrid regime, Hong Kong is leaning towards the authoritarian system, and the institutional tightening, in terms of the structure of political opportunity.

Political opportunities alone are not enough to explain the difference between the two protest waves. The reasons are that in addition to the explanations of the literature review in Chapter 2, it is also true in the case studies of the two movements. The movement leaders and extensive movement networks, the radicalization of the movement and the adoption of new strategies obviously affected the processes and results of the movements. More importantly, the factors of the political opportunity structure need to be examined with the elements of the mobilizing structure. For instances, there was a fuzzy boundary between the role of influential allies and the role of leaders and needs to be investigated together; the repression of the regime and the radicalization of the movement checked and balanced each other, which had an obvious impact on the process of the movement. In addition, the role of the framing cannot be ignored. Frame transformation was directly related to the suppression of the police. The frame transformations were proposed by SMOs or leaders, and some frames were used to unite the participants and maintain a wide network of the movement. Therefore, in the case studies of the UM and the AEM, political opportunity structure, mobilizing structure and framing processes are indispensable and complementary to each other.

In this paragraph, I will sum up the main points of and assess the political opportunity structure, mobilizing structure and framing processes of UM and AEM respectively, so as to find out what are the gaps and/or deficiencies in the literature review of these three aspects. For this reason, I need to employ research methods different from those previous scholars used to analyse the material and make up for

the deficiencies. In terms of POS, elite divisions and influential allies of the political opportunity structure have been described in detail in the literature, for example, when discussing the elite divisions, it is mentioned that the blame generally turned to the central government, which is a very important point. However, there is no discussion on how the elite divisions and influential allies affected the processes of the two movements. As far as the mobilizing structure is concerned, the literature describes in detail the roles played by protest leaders, such as charismatic speeches and active international lobbying; the civil human rights front, a SMO, organized large-scale demonstrations; the participation of grassroots groups and the mobilization of various industries demonstrated that the social networks of the two movements are very wide. Most importantly, the UM and the AEM would not have been able to mobilize the broader masses if it had not reached a larger digital network (de Roode, 2017), such as Telegram, LIHKG discussion forum and Facebook. However, these do not establish the interactive relationship between social movement actors and the corresponding relationship between actors and the movement processes. Using social network analysis and protest event analysis, I can find out how many main actors involved in the same protest event and the closeness of the relationship between actors. Here, the main actors refer to leaders, SMOs/groups, influential allies. As for the framing processes, the literature describes the frame transformations well, but lacks other aspects of the framing processes. Moreover, I have different views on the master frames from the literature, and the collective action frames are less summarized. In a word, I can make up for these deficiencies by employing discourse network analysis. In conclusion, the research method – protest event analysis is used to analyse the process of a movement, while social network analysis and discourse network analysis



can investigate the constituent elements of political opportunity structure, mobilizing structure and framing processes to the greatest extent.

So far, I have completed a literature review and the holistic application of all three sets of theories. This chapter just summarizes a preliminary analysis / set of expectations that require more robust research to be more fully explored. In the next chapter I will proceed to the section of the research design and methodology. In Chapter 4 I will further develop these two by explaining the relevant mechanisms as part of my research design.

# Chapter 4: Research Design and Methodology

This chapter introduces my research design, which consists of comparative analysis, using a mechanisms-based analytical framework, and my methodology, which utilises (1) protest event analysis (PEA), (2) social network analysis (SNA), and (3) a form of framing analysis called Discourse Network Analysis (DNA). Specifically, I will illustrate this study's analytical framework (Figure 4.1), which is the relationship between IVs and DVs via mechanisms that I expect will act as intervening variables between IVs from the broader political process approach and DVs constituting protest waves. Then I will evaluate PEA in terms of newspaper bias and explain my data collection methods, including a definition and classification of protest. I apply PEA to the study to map the change in the number of protests reflected the wave of the two social movements. PEA studies and explains the occurrence and characteristics of a large number of protests in the using of content analysis (Koopmans & Rucht, 2002). To date, PEA has been employed mainly to examine and improve propositions associated with the political process theory (Hutter, 2014). Data resources are primarily newspaper reports. Also, I will explore issues with newspapers' reporting bias, which I overcome by using multiple sources of data. Moreover, social network analysis provides a method to explain the structure of the network, which is the modes of links between nodes (Diani, 2002). Nodes in my study, refer to individuals, collective actors, and events. Links include coalitions, coordinated actions of the mobilizing events, spread of information, sharing experience and skills, assistance, and others (Diani, 2002). In my network analysis, the study subjects are the relations between nodes and their structure (Martino & Spoto, 2006). Additionally, framing analysis is absorbed in

how thoughts, culture, and beliefs are adopted, understood, and intertwined with particular circumstances or events so as to build certain ideational modes through which the outside world is interpreted by constituency (Caiani, 2014). It is preoccupied with how somewhat accepted constructions of ideology are applied tactically to frame a certain issue, similar to a photo frame that stresses particular objects, conceals others, and bounds off actuality in a deliberative manner (Caiani, 2014). Finally, in the section on data collection methods, I will provide details about which newspapers and other sources were used to collect data.

#### **4.1 Comparative Analysis**

Comparative study is mainly defined as an approach to select cases (Halperin & Heath, 2012). Comparative research entails several dissimilar methods. These methods can be differentiated mainly on the basis of how many states or cases are compared, and how the cases for study are chosen (Halperin & Heath, 2012). Furthermore, there are generally three main approaches: 'large-N studies (involving the analysis of many cases), small-N studies (involving the analysis of a small number of cases, typically 2,3,4, but with no real upper limit) and single-N studies (otherwise known as case studies)' (Halperin & Heath, 2012, p. 211-212). N refers to the number of cases that are investigated. I will employ two single-N studies (case studies) to carry out the research. Furthermore, comparative politics is often framed on the basis of comparative research of states' differences or similarities, but it can also be employed to compare differences between 'units' within states (Halperin & Heath, 2012, p. 212). In my study I will make comparative analysis of differences of the 2014 Umbrella Movement and the 2019-2020 Hong Kong Anti-extradition protests. Generally speaking, comparative methods can function through three modes: (1) 'to apply existing theory to new cases', (2) 'to develop new theory or hypotheses', (3) 'to test

theory' (Halperin & Heath, 2012, p. 212). In particular, the major merit of the case study is that by centring on a small number of cases, those cases can be thoroughly investigated (Halperin & Heath, 2012). Good case studies are almost invariably located in a comparative environment. They try to form statements and theories that are related to many other environments, and not just discuss significant and interesting aspects of the cases under investigation, but also explore significant universal political phenomena (Halperin & Heath, 2012). Especially, George and Bennett (2005, p. 6-9) discovered that case studies are particularly appropriate for theoretical evolution inasmuch as that they deal with these matters better than other approaches: 'process tracing' that connects reasons and results, examining supposed 'causal mechanisms' in detail, developing and examining historic interpretations, comprehending the sensitiveness of notions to environment, forming new suppositions and new research questions, brought about by abnormal cases. Comparative analysis of two protest waves of Hong Kong will apply classic social movement theories of western democracies to a hybrid regime, develop them and build new theories, as well as make the mechanisms behind those explanations clearer. That means this study will provide an approach with great potential to develop classic social movement theories.

Given that Hong Kong is a typical hybrid regime, protests against authoritarian China and its democratisation are very interesting and meaningful case studies. There are two main approaches that have been adopted to choose cases for small-N studies. They are the 'Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD) and Most Different Systems Design (MDSD)' (Halperin & Heath, 2012, p. 218): both cases existed in Hong Kong, but they otherwise differ in terms of their protest waves and key mechanisms. I use MDSD. As in both, in theory, case selection rests with the independent variables, not on the dependent variables (Halperin & Heath, 2012). Selection bias cannot be totally

avoided, and it is impossible to make strong general proposition when there are only two or three cases under investigation (Halperin & Heath, 2012). Because of this, small-N studies usually produce theory better than examining theory (Halperin & Heath, 2012). Moreover, academics select cases for comparative analysis where the changes they discover are studied in the circumstance of stressing common bases, utilizing the common characteristics of their cases to find the reasons for the dissimilarities (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001). Researchers proceed from the common bases approach by utilizing 'paired comparisons', not to maximize similarity or even to identify discrepancies among all states, but to find out whether similar concatenation of processes push forward variations in greatly different epochs, sites, and authorities (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001, p. 82). Besides, the aim of the paired comparison of unusual instances is to explore how analogous mechanisms of variation merge diversely with changing ambient conditions (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001). Pinpointing causal mechanisms in broadly dissimilar instances can also more effectively account for results that are rarely comparable or are even contradictory (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001). Put simply, analogous mechanisms might lead to contrasting results in different historical epochs. The comparisons not just emphasize such mechanisms but also disclose how they cross one another and interact with environmental characters of the single cases (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001). Also, they can demonstrate how dissimilar environments, orders, and amalgamations of mechanisms generate radically different political progress and results (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001). Thus, if mechanisms are important, they will appear in both cases (UM and AEM), regardless of the differences in emergence, duration, leadership structures etc. Likewise, their processes and outcomes are different, even if not contrasting.

Furthermore, case studies do not necessarily represent a type of qualitative research. Case studies can make use of various different material-collecting methods, such as 'interviews, surveys, ethnography, focus groups, historical documents, policy documents, and speeches.' (Halperin & Heath, 2012, p. 215). In fact, numerous single-state case studies make use of the quantitative data (Halperin & Heath, 2012). As a result, a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods will be most effective, as in my research. I will merge PEA, SNA, DNA as methods to understand mechanisms. The time dimensions of this comparative analysis are from December 2013 to August 2014 during the UM, and from March 2019 until May 2020 during the Anti-extradition protests.

## **4.2 A mechanisms-based analytical framework**

### **4.2.1 Mechanisms**

Mechanisms refer to a demarcated series of variations that change nexus amid an identified series of factors in the same or highly resembling manners across assorted circumstances (Tilly & Tarrow, 2015). Mechanisms decompose into processes. Mechanisms can explain the processes and dynamics of social movements, based on the 'interplay among mobilization, actors, and trajectories rather than treating them as three independent phenomena' (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001, p. 71). In my thesis, I use mechanisms as a way to understand the relationship between independent variables derived from the classic social movement research agenda and dependent variables that represent different aspects of the protest wave of movements. In previous research, a series of mechanisms were frequently observed to recur across prolonged episodes of social movements (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001). From the multitude of mechanisms (over 30) introduced in McAdam et al (2001), I focus on 11 mechanisms that are potentially useful explanations. These

are *opportunity-threat attribution*, *brokerage*, *social appropriation*, *scale shift*, *certification*, *social construction*, *object shift*, *competition*, *diffusion*, *repression*, and *radicalization*. I propose that there is a link between IVs and mechanisms. Elite divisions operate via *attribution of opportunity or threat*. Influential allies manifest the function of *certification*. Propensity for repression becomes a reality via *repression*. Leaders and organizations have an effect of *brokerage*. Networking demonstrates the *social appropriation* and *scale shift*. Adopting new tactics functions by *diffusion* of innovative collective action. Use of violence illustrates *radicalization*, the division between protest groups is caused by *competition* and framing displays *social construction* and *object shift*.

Overall, a mechanistic approach to social movements has the following advantages, for example, it is broader in scope, can generalise across cases, and is not too linear (Saunders, forthcoming). It also allows scholars to be responsive to the occurrence of a contingent situation and be used for qualitative analysis. However, it has also been criticised. Mechanisms sometimes appear to be applied as “magic bullets” to explain phenomena that do not suit standard theories (Saunders, forthcoming). Another criticism centres around an apparent lack of conceptual clarity. For example, “*social appropriation*” seems to be very similar to “*brokerage*”. To overcome these criticisms, I will provide greater conceptual clarity to the mechanisms that I deploy in my study. I will select mechanisms that correspond with my independent variables. “*Brokerage*” will mainly correspond to “leaders” and “SMOs”; “*social appropriation*” and “*scale shift*” to “networking”; “*social construction*” and “*object shift*” to “frame”. In addition, though the “DoC” approach has sporadically resulted in research outputs with more specific attention to mechanisms (see, e.g., Jennifer et al., 2004; Jung, King, & Soule, 2014; McAdam & Su, 2002; Saunders, forthcoming), and

refers to *social construction*, but does not explicitly identify it as mechanism. I use it as mechanism in my study. Moreover, I give more clear and relevant definitions of key mechanisms – *brokerage*, *social appropriation*, and *certification*. In brief, the mechanisms will be combined with protest event analysis (PEA), social network analysis (SNA) and discourse network analysis (DNA), as research methods to analyse the protest waves of two protest episodes.

In what follows, I will discuss at length *brokerage*, *social appropriation*, and *certification*. *Brokerage*'s most critical attribute rests with its potency to link actors who are not in contact due to some particular political or social obstacle, instead of only the lack of available opportunities (Diani, 2013). In some senses, leaders are the most important brokers. These key movement actors can play a major *brokerage* role in the spread of ideas, information, and resources, establishing internal and external links, and high level of mobilization. Especially, the most typical brokers are unofficial leaders who play a part in linking activists in a mass membership organization to the central leaders of these groups. Besides, *brokerage* can play a role of 'frame bridging', which links ideologically consistent frames to unrelated constituencies to the movement, and through which ideological substance spreads (Krinsky & Crossley, 2014, p. 4). In addition, *social appropriation* is a challenging group's ability to utilize enough organization and quantities to offer a social or organizational infrastructure, but not the organization itself, which enables mobilization to emerge (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001). Or more specifically, *social appropriation* means that non-political organizations are transformed into political actors by utilizing their organizational and social foundations for mobilization (Tilly & Tarrow, 2015). Moreover, *certification* refers to the recognition of activists, their actions, and their demands from external elites and government (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001), including foreign governments and



politicians. To be more specific, *certification* means support and/ or recognition from authorities, political elites, politicians, and political parties, the forms of *certification* manifest cooperation with leaders and/or activists of actions, material, financial, manpower and other support, openly expressing support through speeches, press conferences, and media, as well as passing bills and implementing policies etc. Briefly, *brokerage* appears as a critical mechanism in explaining the process of social movements, both owing to brokers' significance in the spread of protests and owing to the parts that brokers play in the exchange of ideas, information, and resources within the movement and the authority they accumulate by taking this approach (Krinsky & Crossley, 2014). Compared to *brokerage's* positive role, *social appropriation* is more passive seizure. *Certification* reflects the influence of external forces, including international forces.

Now let us turn to other mechanisms. *Attribution of opportunity or threat* is a triggering mechanism which partly contributes to the mobilization of inactive masses earlier (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001). No opportunity, even if it is objectively open, will incur mobilization unless it is both perceptible to latent provokers and interpreted as an opportunity (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001). The same applies to threats. *Scale shift* refers to a variation in the size and degree of social movements, which leads to wider mobilization relating to larger number of actors and building bridges between their demands and identities (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001). Most social movements never grow out of the place, category, or institutional circumstances where they first appeared. Yet in significant protest events of social movements, as the term suggests, a certain degree of *scale shift* usually takes place (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001). *Social construction* involves the meaning, conception, or implication laid on a target or incident in a society and employed by the residents of that society concerning how

they treat or address the target or incident (International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 2021). In this regard, *social construction* as a concept would gain widespread acceptance by society (“Social constructionism,” 2021). Both individuals and organizations are involved in the interpretation of the social actuality they have viewed, not individually. *Object shift* renders political actors to shift their appeals to local authorities, state government, and international community, with homologous changes among frames, tactics, oratories, and classifications (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001). *Competition* means that social movements are rarely cohesive; they are composed of supplementary and occasionally opposing factions with distinct favours and leaders, and those factions frequently weaken each other (Gamson, 1990). *Diffusion* refers to dissemination of a tactic of social movement, a problem, or a method of framing it from one place to another (Tilly & Tarrow, 2015). *Repression* is defined as the effort by a nation or its agents against protesters so as to attempt to put an end to their activities by detaining them, intruding on them, or destroying their organizations (Tilly & Tarrow, 2015). The effect of *repression* may be optional, in this sense it can separate more violent wings, block them off and force them to adopt moderate methods, or it can push tolerant factions towards the ultras (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001). What is more, the opposite of protest event analysis is policing event analysis. Policing events refer to police resorting to various repressive methods, including tear gas and rubber bullets to expel protesters, arresting protesters, destroying protest sites, and use of excessive force and even torture and ill-treatment. In a word, propensity for repression → *repression* causes effect through policing events. In terms of *radicalization*, most social movements start with regular activities and a greater number of them are still conventional (Tilly & Tarrow, 2015); yet, if a counter-movement, the police, or the authority react fiercely, protesters frequently escalate their actions

and make their demands more radical (Alimi et al., 2015; Della Porta, 2013). *Radicalization* intensifies conflict between prevalent demands, plans, 'self-descriptions, and descriptions of others' over such a contradiction (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001, p. 162). It needs to be mentioned that protest event analysis's objects not only include all protest events, but also involve sub-protest events divided according to protest forms (see the analysis on forms of protests in Chapter 5), like the analysis of violent protest events. Because the mechanism – *radicalization* is corresponding to the independent variable – use of violence, a graph of violent protest events can reveal the trend of *radicalization*.

#### **4.2.2 Analytical Framework**

The idea guiding my thesis is that the combined effects of political opportunities, mobilizing structures and framing processes through mechanisms may be able to account for the differences in the emergence, longevity, and decline of the Umbrella Movement (UM) and the Anti-Extradition Law Bill Movement (AEM) in Hong Kong. In this part I introduce the research hypothesis which is to analyse the relation between the DVs and IVs via mechanisms, as shown in Figure 4.1 (Analytical Framework), and explain the differences of the protest waves of the UM and the AEM using mechanisms. Protest event analysis is used to illustrate the DVs. It is very important to note that one of the sections of the protest waves of my research question is longevity, but I will use longevity of the peak as a substitution variable to establish the hypothesis. The reason for this is that a significant difference between the UM and the AEM is the longevity of the peak phases. Besides, using peak as a DV can make the project more operational; meanwhile, the wave of protest can be considered as an interlocking whole. Accordingly, the DVs are the emergence of the UM and the AEM, the duration (or longevity) of the peak of the two movements, and the decline of the two movements.

Elite divisions, influential allies, and repression, networking, new tactics, and use of violence, as well as framing comprise the IVs.


Elite divisions, influential allies, and repression are IVs that derive from the four dimensions of the political opportunity structure, namely, emerging divisions within the elite, availability of influential allies, and the state's capacity and propensity for repression, except for formal institutional structure (open - closed) as it experienced no change within 20 months. Elite divisions refer to the internal split between different political elites and/or different political camps. Influential allies mean the cooperation and/or support from authorities, mainly the pro-democracy camp or its members, and this sort of alliance is the partnership in the political and social realms. The propensity for repression refers to the tactics of using force to stop activists taking further actions and/or restrict their freedoms, mostly the police's countermeasures. Furthermore, leaders, SMOs, networking, new tactics, and use of violence stem from the mobilizing structure. The type and quality of leadership plays a significant role in the protest wave of a social movement. Good decisions probably come from a team of the leaders who start the creation process via collaborative discussions and brain storming (Ganz, 2000). As to SMOs, over the wave of a social movement, with the change of popular will, highly structured SMOs more probably utilize the context to their advantage as they are more ready for this (Brannan, 2009). Mature social movements frequently comprise diverse organizations. Morris and Staggenborg (2004) pointed out that various types of organizations improve the success chances of social movements through complementary roles. For the purposes of this thesis, networking means SMOs' pre-existing networks, the collaboration and exchange with other 'like-minded' organizations and groups (Brannan, 2009, p. 9). SMOs that cooperate with like-minded groups are more likely to help a protest wave emerge and reach its peak, as

this kind of collaboration can capture the attention of the media, collect money, and complete other activities. In addition, the networking as an IV here does not include the links to political elites, as the latter have been included in the variable influential allies or elite division. Furthermore, the fifth independent variable in this section is adoption of new tactics. New tactics here indicate the new and creative, even transgressive forms of protests, ranging from artworks, music performances, dancing, to ceremony, motorcade, placards and more. Organizations that adopt new tactics in social movements improve their mobilization level. When a new tactic is employed, the number of protests would reach its maximum (McAdam, 1997). Also, creativeness appeals to outside individuals, and this is conducive to disseminating consciousness about the problems. Another independent variable is the use of violence. Violence, like creativeness, can be helpful to SMOs as it draws attention (Brannan, 2009). Organizations who have engaged in militant action show they have made a choice to escalate action. The movement is highly likely to decline without escalation. That means the use of violence can increase longevity to some extent. But it is also often associated with the decline phase of a social movement, causing splits and factions before movement disappearance. Finally, framing means the interpretation and publicity of goals and intentions, values and beliefs, and repertoire of social movements.

However, PEA has a problem that is the quantity of protests does not necessarily equate to intensity of the contention. In other words, simply the number of protests cannot give an all-round account of a protest episode. Therefore, PEA will quantitatively analyse DVs, the combination of mechanisms and SNA, framing analysis will make quantitative and qualitative analysis on IVs, which can provide a full description about the dynamics of movements. Each independent variable

corresponds to a mechanism, as shown below (Figure 4.1). Figure 4.1 demonstrates the relation between IVs and DVs through intermediate variables (mechanisms), which provides the analytical framework for my entire dissertation.

### Analytical Framework



**Figure 4.1: Analytical Framework on the relationship between IVs and DVs via mechanisms**

I will now elaborate my analytical framework. When the pro-democracy faction holds power in regimes, the necessity for mobilization of social movements reduces due to anticipated opportunities of reform to their advantage, meanwhile, their protest

actions are not backed by their most influential partner any longer; on the contrary, when the pro-democracy faction is not in power, the possibility of mobilizing social movements rises, since the opportunities of reform to their advantage become more greatly restricted (Kriesi et al., 1995). In other words, participants in a movement who do not consider collective action as a goal will only choose a relatively high-cost collective action when it is necessary. Under the circumstances of reforming, authorities are striving to achieve the objective of a movement, and collective action will be unnecessary and hence will not emerge; under the circumstances of threatening, authorities threaten to carry out policies that dramatically decrease a challenging group's possibilities of obtaining what he or she desires, which will have the reverse effect (Kriesi et al., 1995). Accordingly, elite division contributes to the emergence of a social movement through the mechanism "*opportunity-threat attribution*". In addition, the effects produced by the framing of mature movements rely on initial and much more circumstantial explanatory "moments" in the course of a certain protest episode (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001, p. 48). Framing is not regarded as a distinguishable "box" or variable in the beginning of social movements, however, framing and understanding play a role of *social construction* (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001, p. 48). That means that the public's resistance consciousness has been mobilized via *social construction* in the initial stage of a social movement. In short, mobilization is based on group attempts at interpretation and *social construction*. Moreover, the advantage of new tactics, not only referring to the media concern it draws, depends on its uncertainty and the unreliability it brings about among vested actors about the boundaries and outcomes of activities (Tarrow, 1989a). In the beginning stage of protest waves, newness is the most significant power base. The masses largely are not yet mobilised, and earlier protests draw few participants, so

activists can cause concern with less forceful and less adventurous behaviours (Kriesi et al., 1995), among which new tactics become the preferred choice. Briefly, the function of new tactics is implemented by *diffusion*. In addition, available resources facilitate the advent of collective action, and make SMOs come together to design and coordinate, enlist new members, exchange their thoughts, and fund their activities (Webster, 2015). Resource mobilisation theory underlines that resources and activist networks become necessary to the appearance of a social movement (Webster, 2015). In a word, networking contributes to the emergence of social movements through mechanism *social appropriation*.

Then it comes to the peak phase, powerful allies are critical as they are grounded in the institutional structures. Especially, the more limited the institutional opportunities, the more significant the existence of political allies to help protesters to approach to the policy formulation process (Xie & van der Heijden, 2010). Moreover, various leadership categories and modes are necessary to efficaciously execute the assorted tasks intrinsic to social movements (Aminzade et al., 2001; Ganz, 2000; Goldstone, 2001). In one of these tasks, bridge leaders link members of the neighbourhood to the campaign and they link leaders to each other (Robnett, 1997) as well as act as an intermediary between top leaders and the large group of adherents (Goldstone, 2001); another type of leadership refers to those organizers who establish links between members of a SMO and is conducive to growing organizations, and they also regularly undertake leading activities (Morris & Staggenborg, 2004). These two kinds of leaders play out the mechanism of *brokerage*. Besides, the initial phase of a protest wave features personalized, but general emotions of resentment (Christiansen, 2009). Movements in this phase are short of well-defined tactics for attaining aims. Also, the primary pattern of organizations with loose structure is hard to maintain



(Oberschall, 1979). The reason is that they are lacking the resources and interior cooperation to contend efficaciously with professional SMOs and exterior allies for media attention and popular support, and they are short of the powerful identity that emphasises the mobilization ability of radical factions, therefore these organizations are gradually marginalized (Kriesi et al., 1995). In other words, professional SMOs become crucial to a prolonged movement progressing to the peak phase by means of *brokerage*; pro-democracy allies play the role of facilitating the mobilization, and this facilitation is realized through *certification*. Furthermore, to sustain progress when facing a descending level of mobilization, social movements have to possess either a lasting organizational architecture with resources that do not count on rank-and-file involvement (McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1988) or a powerful identity that enables them to keep on agitating even under disadvantageous conditions (Kriesi et al., 1995). In this situation, a new claim helps to mobilize the public once again. Framing functions by *object shift*. In addition, SMOs are established by extant social networks, utilizing interior and exterior resources to organize protest actions (Webster, 2015). Mobilizations of social movements need to garner resources to facilitate action, but merely accessibility of resources cannot account for why movements come to be dynamic (Webster, 2015). The significance of activist networks to campaigns has already attracted attention (Crossley, 2008; Crossley & Ibrahim, 2012; Hanna, 2013). Meanwhile, discussions of social media platforms like Twitter and Facebook produce social networking, which functions under the trustful and reciprocal principles to mobilise resources and exchange information (Sajuria et al., 2014). Under these circumstances, expanded activist networks and spread effect of social media cause the *scale shift* of mobilization. In short, the mechanism *scale shift* undoubtedly is a key to maintain and enlarge protest waves at peak stage. Furthermore, when new tactics

were adopted, such as occupying space, governments are usually unprepared for such tactics, whose newness and impressive character ensure broad attention from the media, and therefore these innovations in part counter the imbalance of power between activists and government, and their primary success helps to bring about the fast *diffusion* of protest waves (Kriesi et al., 1995).

In the beginning phase of a protest wave, the loosely structured organizations often have their own particular positions. With the wave evolving, they are gradually facing *competition* from professional SMOs and outside allies on one side, and from radical factions on the other (Kriesi et al., 1995). In a word, during the process of protest waves social movements are divided over action tactics and split into the temperate and radical groups (Kriesi et al., 1995). This split does not necessarily produce instantaneous detrimental effects on the campaigns. However, the trend of institutionalization and *radicalization* were promoted by the increasing participation of professional SMOs and exterior allies one side, and the rising *repression* of antagonistic activities on the other side (Kriesi et al., 1995). In the later period of the social movement, these propensities become ever more apparent (Kriesi et al., 1995). Moreover, the government can select two main responses: 'confrontation or integration' (Kriesi et al., 1995, p. 124). The *radicalization* of a social movement's activities is intensified by the government's countermeasures. Losing temperate allies internal to and external to the movement, militants face intensive *repression* (Kriesi et al., 1995). In other words, it may be that severe *repression* causes moderation and *radicalization* simultaneously, and the ultimate outcome may be a mixed strategy, integrating a temperate majority with a highly militant minority (Kriesi et al., 1995). Particularly, *repression* against peaceful campaigns delegitimises the nation's domination of violence and consolidates the status of those protesters who view responsive violence

as legal (Kriesi et al., 1995). Besides, compared with the cost of nonviolent confrontational action, resorting to violence is promoted inasmuch as the cost of using violence reduces. What is more, in the peak period of waves, tightening limits from political power and decreased political opportunities are unable to demobilize social movements, but spark *radicalization* (E. W. Cheng, 2016). Few protesters make preparation for suffering the *repression* that militant actions bring about. Meanwhile, the *repression* and marginalisation of these factions trigger internal strife and mistrust among campaigners, which is also called *competition*. The process transfers vigour from exterior activities and impedes outsiders from joining in (De Nardo, 1985). As a result, when institutionalisation and *radicalization* proceed, movements begin to ebb.

## **4.3 PEA**

### **4.3.1 Explanation of PEA**

The analysis is based upon a dataset of protests in the Umbrella Movement lasting 20 months and the AEM lasting 15 months. This investigation takes the form of time series cross-sectional data, in which the dependent variable is the wave of protests over 20 months, and the independent variables consist of elite divisions, influential allies, repression, networking, adopting new tactics, use of violence, and framing. Protest event analysis (PEA) has been a central approach of social movement study in the last few decades (Hutter, 2014). Scholars depend on PEA to methodically evaluate the size and characteristics of protests over diverse geographic regions – from the local level to the cross-national level, and across time – from short term to centuries (Hutter, 2014). Generally, social movement academics apply newspaper content as primary information sources, but the scope of sources has enlarged as time goes by and now contains others, e.g., data from new social media as well as police and government reports (Hutter, 2014). Moreover, each PEA entails

qualitative interpretation of text information, yet an essential goal of PEA is to 'transform words into numbers', and thus statistical techniques are often employed to examine the information gathered (Hutter, 2014, p. 355). To some extent, this suggests PEA is a quantitative method, but it can be integrated with other qualitative methods, e.g., framing analysis. Besides, PEA is able to use hybrid-approaches, that are an integration of quantitative examinations with qualitative data (Hutter, 2014). Furthermore, information collected on movements using PEA can be associated with material from other realms so as to analyse the origins and outcomes of social movements (Koopmans & Rucht, 2002). Especially, according to Klandermans and Staggengborg (2002), as a creative approach of political process theory, protest event analysis offers a method for measurement of the impacts of political opportunities on comparative data. It allows a diachronic relation to be built between the dynamics of protests and social environment (Fillieule & Jiménez, 2003), identifying and delineate protest waves, and observe how campaigns make the corresponding change with variations in their contexts, such as alliance, economic changes, or with assumed movement consequences such as parliamentary decisions, and government action (Hutter, 2014). For instance, PEA allows an analysis of whether the configuration of the authority has an effect on the amount of protest, and to decide whether a campaign becomes radical in the stage of lower level of mobilization (Koopmans & Rucht, 2002). All in all, PEA is an approach that enables the quantitative study of numerous characteristics of movements, such as rates of occurrence, opportunity and longevity, site, demands, volume, types, vehicles, and objectives, as well as direct outcomes and responses, such as repression from the police, destruction, and counter-movements (Koopmans & Rucht, 2002). However, apart from newspapers' selection bias, PEA has another limitation, which is that it reflects the number of protests rather

than their size. I will provide a detailed explanation of both and my proposed solutions below.

#### **4.3.2 Newspapers' Bias of PEA**

Newspapers make choices about what is reported. A large rally possibly produces greater news value by drawing the attention of reporters and news agencies (Jennings & Saunders, 2019). Compared to smaller and conventional protest actions, bigger and confrontational movements are expected to guarantee greater concern about protest activities in the short-term (Jennings & Saunders, 2019). More specifically, it is anticipated that large rallies, by indicating devotion and displaying compelling scenes, have an impact on media reporting that has longevity by arousing attention and disseminating issues in a broader sphere (Jennings & Saunders, 2019). Once a problem has resulted in conflict, it more probably attracts a plethora of news reports, as the journalists swarm to relevant figures and incidents (Matusitz & Breen, 2012). Moreover, Gaby and Caren (2016) signified that the protest activities of militant groups generate an indirect positive impact on persistent newspaper reports. However, according to Jennings and Saunders (2019), force and/or hostility can reduce the effectiveness of 'discursive eruption' (p. 33), even if force and hostility result in a rapid increase in the media concern in the short period. In a word, force, hostility, scale, and social arguments can be anticipated to influence reports of diverse modes of actions in corresponding developmental manners; for instance, a militant strike may arouse media interest in the immediate aftermath of protest, even if attention sharply decreases in the longer-term (Jennings & Saunders, 2019). In addition, just as protest affects the newspaper agenda, it is conceivable that the newspaper coverage also affects the level and forms of mobilization, which generate positive responses that enable media reports to result in further mobilization (Jennings & Saunders, 2019).

Altogether, it is argued not only that environments are related to the effect of movement in the media agenda, but that this effect is developmental, not unchanged (Jennings & Saunders, 2019).

What is more, considering the principle of media selection, some of the more traditional forms of action documented may not be well reproduced by newspapers. Because this form of action is sometimes reported, the resulting bias is more subtle, which may give people the illusion that journalists are producing a balanced report on the repertoire effectively used by the organizations (Fillieule & Jiménez, 2003). In addition, PEA may provide an indicator of the organizations' media strategies' professional level rather than an index of efficacious degrees of action at times (Fillieule & Jiménez, 2003). Put differently, the breakdown of the direction formed by methods of PEA is likely to be more of an indicator of the evolution of protest actions than an alternation in the media strategy (Fillieule & Jiménez, 2003). Nonetheless, in fact researchers need to methodically escape reading the volume of media reports as a sign of the success of movements inasmuch as such phenomenon can be an indicator of co-optation by the authority or community's elites as well (Fillieule & Jiménez, 2003). Moreover, one has to draw lessons from those who have sifted news material, considering that protest events with a smaller number of activists have a lower chance of being the target of press reports (Fillieule & Jiménez, 2003). All in all, newspapers are not always the best source of data for protest event studies. While newspaper articles are the first and foremost choice of analysis, other social media is used as a complementary source of information.

Facebook is the most popular and dominant social media platform. Facebook is a necessary social networking tool for contact between activists and for maintaining protests currently. Because Facebook pages and groups are public, researchers have

unrestricted public view of all Facebook data. Organizers of movements often establish Facebook groups to spread relevant information and mobilize people. Therefore, I can search for existing public pages of Facebook groups related to the protest events and needed to be used for social network analysis and framing analysis, and then collect the data presented in the pages. Facebook groups, including the Occupy Central with Love and Peace, the HKFS, Scholarism, the CHRF, Demosistō, and the HKCTU were the main SMOs of these two social movements, so it is natural to choose their Facebook groups, and their Facebook pages provided sufficient information for relevant research. In addition to Facebook, I chose local newspapers as much as possible as my data source because their reports cover a wide range of protests and more deeply, in order to avoid missing information. International newspapers' coverage acts as a supplement. Moreover, in terms of protest waves, it is important to focus on specific social media according to different phases of movement. More specifically, researchers or students may rely on Facebook groups during the emergence phase, as there are often no major or frequent protests and consequently little reporting. This phase does not attract the attention of the media. But at this stage, there are some conventional activities, such as petition-signing, seminars, meetings etc., as well as a large number of framing activities and the establishments of social networks. All that information is usually posted by organizers. Regarding the peak phase, newspapers play an overwhelming role in obtaining information. Pro-protest media pay more attention to police repression and the individual activities of protesters. To understand the whole process, one has to rely on more neutral mainstream and authoritative media; competitive framing is spread by government media. When it comes to the decline stage, both newspapers and Facebook give relevant news. Compared to those at the former two phases, they

become minor. Therefore, newspapers are the primary data source for PEA and other social media provides supplementary information. To avoid the newspaper bias to the greatest extent, the quality and quantity of reports should be considered (see Table 4.1).

**Table 4.1: Sources used for PEA**

Source (newspapers/Facebook/Tweet)	Description (neutral/biased/local/national/movement focused)	Phase of movement wave
<b>South China Morning Post (SCMP)</b>	Neutral and local	Peak and Decline phases
<b>Apple Daily</b>	Biased and local	Peak and Decline phases
<b>Occupy Central with Love and Peace (Facebook)</b>	Movement focused	Emergence and Decline phases
<b>HKFS (Facebook)</b>	Movement focused	Decline phase
<b>HKFS (Tweet)</b>	Movement focused	Peak phase
<b>Scholarism (Facebook)</b>	Movement focused	Decline phase
<b>CHRF (Facebook)</b>	Movement focused	Emergence and Peak phases
<b>Demosistō (Facebook)</b>	Movement focused	Emergence and Peak phases
<b>HKCTU (Facebook)</b>	Movement focused	Peak and Decline phases



<b>Stand News</b>	Local	Peak and Decline phases
<b>Hong Kong In-media</b>	Local	Decline phase
<b>Ming Pao</b>	Middle and local	Decline phases
<b>House News</b>	Local	Decline phases
<b>BBC</b>	International	Peak and decline phases
<b>The New York Times</b>	International	Peak phase

### 4.3.3 Protest Definition and Classification

Protest is the most significant activity of ‘social and political movements’ in a number of ways (Saunders, 2013, p. 9). Protest is the action that movements take so as to defy some existent component of the political institution and thus it is conducive to achievement of movements’ goals (Saunders, 2013). Hence protest applies wide-ranging diverse modes, from taking part in a teach-in to destructive action. Not only does protest differ in the forms of action elected, but is contingent on the objects targeted, which could be local or national authorities, the political institution, local residents, associations, international organizations and others (Saunders, 2013). Furthermore, I follow Fillieule and Jimenez (2003)’s methods by identifying a protest in the following ways, and then carefully summarising what they say. (1) Protest has been characterized by an action or, at any rate, appealing to others to take action. Protest events mainly have a ‘verbal nature’ but are not limited to showing dissatisfaction. Furthermore, due to the styles of the protesters or the special types of

action, they usually go beyond the normal programmes (Fillieule & Jiménez, 2003, p. 28). (2) The protest action has to be associated with political appeals. This appears usually in a negative way, such as expressing discontent via condemnation or protest action; also, it emerges in a positive way, like proposing a policy option (Fillieule & Jiménez, 2003). Especially, artistic shows and other cultural activities, as well as public talks, seminars, and others, were not identified as protests, provided that they were not connected with any political or social issue (Fillieule & Jiménez, 2003). (3) The protest usually possesses a public feature, that is, it has to appear in public or be aimed at public issues and public advantages (Fillieule & Jiménez, 2003). (4) The sponsors of the protest event need to be non-individual and non-state actors (Fillieule & Jiménez, 2003). A team of sponsors occurs when the protest event is implemented by no less than three people (Fillieule & Jiménez, 2003). (5) The protest event is decided by the combination of space, duration, form of protest, requirement, and originating team (Fillieule & Jiménez, 2003). The length of a protest event is mutable and may span from several minutes to a few weeks. Merely in rare instances are protests in separate locations highly interconnected by a provable symbol that they identify as one protest event (Fillieule & Jiménez, 2003). Concurrent protests with the same interests or demands but in separate locations and by dissimilar originating organizations form independent protest events; similarly, concurrent actions by the identical group in separate locations compose independent protest events (Fillieule & Jiménez, 2003). Furthermore, consecutive protest events are isolated from one another by gaps. If the identical mode of protest event for the same demand by the same protester at the identical site restarted after a provisional node, 24 hours needs to have passed for the sake of two independent protest events to be counted (Fillieule

& Jiménez, 2003). As a result, normally re-emerging protest events were counted as independent protest events (Fillieule & Jiménez, 2003).

Regarding protest forms, Rochon (1990, p. 108) identifies three factors of movement strength: 'militancy, size, and novelty'. Those three factors are significant for three major action tactics: demonstrative protests aim mainly to attract significant numbers; confrontational protests are most appropriate to taking advantage of novelty; and violence obviously targets at shifting policies through a demonstration of militant power (Kriesi et al., 1995). Furthermore, social movements have power in numbers (De Nardo, 1985), the larger the population organised, the more the legitimacy of the governments and their decisions are questioned (Kriesi et al., 1995). The strength of novelty, not only from the media concerns it gains, rests with its capriciousness and the unreliability it incurs among publicly known actors about the limitations and aftermaths of protests (Tarrow, 1989a). Militancy is the most immediate origin of strength accessible to social movements. Aggressive protest activities, particularly if entailing force, almost always draw media attention (Kriesi et al., 1995). Nevertheless, violence can enter the media spotlight in the short term, while larger-scale protests can maintain media attention in the long term (Jennings & Saunders, 2019). Besides, drawing on but modifying Rootes (2003) I distinguish between six types of protest. These are Rootes's types: conventional, demonstrative, confrontational, property damage, and violence; with the addition of cyberprotest. Conventional protest refers to information dissemination (such as petitions, letter-writing campaigns, meeting announcements, press conferences, organization formation announcements, statements, signature campaigns, teach-ins, seminars, leaflets, and others), lawsuits and so on. Demonstrative protests include rallies and marches, parades, assemblies, ceremonies, vigils, pickets, prayers, hikes, symbolic displays (graffiti, signs, banners,

standing displays, slogan cards, cardboards, street theatres, dancing, dramaturgical demonstrations, flash mobs, images, cartoons, objects, graphic arts, musical performances, protest songs, poems, etc.). Confrontational protests consist of blockades and sit-ins, occupations, camping, motorcades, strikes, hunger strikes, boycotts, attacks, conflicts, clashes, insults, etc. Property damage concerns minor acts to attack or damage public or private property, and violence involves using force toward another human being or group including pushing, striking, smashing, sabotaging property, hurling (burning) objects, verbal threats, riots, melees, mob violence, and so on. In addition, there is “cyberprotest” (van de Donk, et al., 2004), which spans from sending online postal cards to launching cyber strikes (coordinating access to servers to crash them) (Saunders, 2013).

#### **4.4 Social Network Analysis**

Social network analysis (SNA) formulates and ‘operationalizes’ a social structure about networks of connections among units (Caiani, 2014, p. 368). The two major notions of SNA are nodes and links. A node stands for each unit (Martino & Spoto, 2006). Nodes can stand for ‘an individual, as well as organizations, objects, or events, and even frames’ (Caiani, 2014, p. 370). Likewise, a link stands for a relationship or some other link between these units (Martino & Spoto, 2016). Generally, the sorts of social relationships refer to: 1) ‘social roles’ such as professor, teacher, journalist, lawyer etc. 2) kinship (father, mother, brothers, sisters etc.). 3) emotional relationships such as friendship, neighbourhood, appraisal of someone (e.g., ‘like, respect, hate, etc.’); 4) ‘cognitive relations’ including understanding and news, 5) membership of an organization, such as a syndicate, communication of news, shift in resources, coexistence, joint action in a rally, and so on; 6) activities, like discussing, assaulting, occupying, camping, sitting-in, etc. (Caiani, 2014, p. 371). In a word, the


subjects investigated are not individuals and their properties, but the relations between individuals and their architecture (Martino & Spoto, 2006). Networks function as independent, or set of independent, variables, the consequence is a dependent variable (Caiani, 2014), that is the wave of the two protest episodes of Hong Kong (their emergence phases, peak phases, and decline phases). The superiority of such analysis is to read social processing as an outcome of the relations among social existences (Martino & Spoto, 2006). Furthermore, another of the strengths of the network analysis mode is that it can let the scholar centre on multilevel analysis concurrently (Hanneman & Riddle, 2014). Analysis can centre on the entire network, exploring its systemic characteristics at the macro-level; on single nodes, illustrating the features and contact networks of individual groups or organizations at the micro-level; or on a larger group of nodes, seizing the development of alliances among them at the meso-level (Caiani, 2014). Also, each level of SNA analysis needs different measuring methods. In a word, those networks of all levels constitute independent variables. In the case of the UM and the AEM, the subjects of micro-level analysis are key brokers and organizations; at the meso level, the subjects under observation are coalitions between organizations, influential allies etc.; the subject at the macro-level is the interaction of governments and protest actors.

In my study I will carry out micro-level and meso-level analyses, as IVs created and mechanisms employed pertain to the first two levels. Generally, SNA will be combined with PEA to examine whether mechanisms can explain the contrasting protest waves (emergence, peak, and decline phases) of the Umbrella Movement and the Anti-Extradition Movement, that is, whether four of my expectations are realised: leaders → *brokerage*, SMOs → *brokerage*, networking → *social appropriation*, influential allies → *certification* (see the Analytical Framework). In addition, there are

usually two modes of network analysis: actor-by-actor or event-by-event, and actor-by-event. I will adopt the actor-by-event mode and the actor-by-actor mode because in actual operation, variation in the number of events represent my DVs, and actors involved in the events refer to my IVs. The nodes represent actors (leaders, SMOs or other organizations, and influential allies) and events. Leaders and SMOs are also brokers. The links represent mobilization, sharing or spreading information, designing strategies, organization and arrangement, collaboration, social appropriation etc. Moreover, regarding actors, it is easy to identify leaders albeit only symbolic or adhoc ones as they often addressed a crowd or made public statements. As to SMOs, the HKFS (Hong Kong Federation of Students) and Scholarism were widely recognized organizers of the UM, and the OCLP (Occupy Central with Love and Peace) was initiator; Demosistō and the Civil Human Rights Front are major SMOs of the AEM. Influential allies are pan-democrats. Besides, SNA will be conducted month by month, which is consistent with PEA, illustrating the variation over the same time frame.

The following is an example diagram of SNA. Nodes (including leaders, SMOs and other groups, influential allies, and events) are interconnected within a network. As mentioned above, the interconnection can be cooperation, exchanging information and others. An event can be associated with event(s), an actor can be associated with actor(s), and an event can be associated with actor(s). This research focuses on the latter two, because the trend of events is the dependent variable, and the actors are the dependent variables, so relations between actors and an event, and relations between actors involved in an event become the focus of attention.

**Schematic diagram of social network analysis (Figure 4.2)**



### 4.5 Framing Analysis

According to Snow and Benford (1988), framing analysis concentrates directly on the reasons for mobilizing and participating in a movement. It has been stated that framing analysis unlocks a set of ideas and beliefs in the social movement analysis, to uncover the mystery of ideology in accounting for mobilization (Snow & Byrd, 2007). The framing analysis mode has been frequently used in social movement research in which “frames/framing” are viewed as either independent or dependent variables (Lindekilde, 2014, p. 201). Moreover, studies examining collective action frames as independent variables usually centre on how framing has influenced movement effects,

in regard to mobilization success and political influence (see, e.g., Cress & Snow, 1996; Koopmans & Statham, 1999). Such studies are frequently based on the notion of “resonance” (Snow & Benford, 1988) to gauge and investigate how successful framing causes a tremendous response in the focus group or from the masses (Lindekilde, 2014).

I adapted the quantitative approach of framing analysis that uses story-grammar analysis, which converts the extracted meaning into a simple sequence of symbols that a computer can read and process (Johnston, 2002). The “subject-verb-object (S-V-O) approach” is the basic grammar for indicative sentences. The S-V-O strategy provides a feasible and recognized methodology to regenerate the dynamic framing processes in a triple way and underlines the internal frame structure via concretization of the key frame concepts (Johnston & Alimi, 2013). A “subject” refers to issue protestors are complaining about, usually about ‘a social problem or social institution’ (Johnston, 2002, p. 80), “object” refers to an opponent or opponents, and “action” means what protestors or related actors are doing, including “street protests”, “legislative strategies”, “nonviolent site occupation”, “petitions” etc. (Johnston, 2002, p. 80). In short, “subject”, “action”, and “object” are related to a variety of actors in a contentious circumstance (Johnston, 2002). Furthermore, it is assumed that most text materials and data can be simplified to the basic story-grammar elements. According to the understanding of collective action frames, text materials and data can be shortened to brief sentences, including the effects of frames, who produces them, targeting whom, in order that the coder can sort movement documents and newspaper articles, and carry out data aggregation for quantitative processing (Johnston, 2002). As a result, the story-grammar of collective action frames can be described with ‘numerical assignments’ at each node indicating the intensity of coverage of frames



(Johnston, 2002, p. 81). Not only that, the “S-V-O approach” provides hope for some parts of the most different areas to corroborate in framing theory. For instance, frame bridging can be analysed by extracting a large number of text samples from different information and statements issued by SMOs; afterward, the frame structure can be built on the basis of nodes in the structure and the quantitative correlation of different SMOs’ nodes is conducted to prove the frame bridging empirically (Johnston, 2002). The intensity of connections among nodes can be statistically assessed and measured. Likewise, an analogous analysis can be employed for frame amplification. Different frame structures can be shown at different points in a movement’s path, to demonstrate that original secondary nodes or new factors in the frame structure are becoming more and more important (Johnston, 2002). In addition, a master frame is a significant notion from a framing point of view but is usually analysed by sensitively reading texts instead of standardised procedures to measure frame features and influences (Johnston, 2002). However, a story-grammar approach assures that master frames are empirically studied as they are established directly on their texts, not investigated through questionnaires, an approach that risks regarding the frame as specified instead of revealing its structure (Johnston, 2002).

I will now introduce discourse network analysis (DNA) to conduct the S-V-O strategy in this study. DNA is an adaptable method combining qualitative content analysis based on categories with quantitative network analysis (Leifeld, 2017). As a kind of descriptive hybrid method, discourse network analysis empirically analyses political discourse (Leifeld, 2017). Discourse is interdependent: what one claim maker states affects what others say. The discourse is interchangeable over-time, but also interesting to study in cross-section (Leifeld, 2017). I study three cross-sections at three different points in time for each cycle (emergence, peak & decline) to capture

the dynamics of discourse. Furthermore, the main aim of actors is actually to affect or draw lessons from other actors, which is a relational behaviour (Leifeld, 2017). In brief, the purpose of discourse network analysis is to depict the relational structure of political discourse and derive its generation process through computer processing using a software program for network analysis. Furthermore, regarding my discourse network analysis, a node represents a frame, an actor, or an object, and I apply three different modes: actor-by-frame mode, frame-by-frame mode, and frame-by-object mode. A schematic diagram is shown in Figure 4.2. The steps are as follows. First, the data is sorted by identifying subject(s), verb – action(s), and object(s), among which subject means issue protesters are complaining about, action means what they are doing, and object refers to an opponent. Moreover, for an action, (an) actor(s) is/are bound to be involved. Briefly, subject, action, object, and actor can form a complete sentence. In other words, whether they constitute a complete sentence constitute the basis for me to determine which subjects, objects, and actors for my discourse network analysis. Then, the data is coded according to actor-by-subject(frame) mode and subject(frame)-by-object mode. Here a subject is substituted by a frame because frame is a concept of social movement studies, besides, framing exists as an independent variable based on the literature review. It is worth noting that frames here need to be simplified to short phrases. The complete description of the frames is provided in appendix II. Finally, in sociograms, actor-by-frame mode aims to analyse frame resonances, frame-by-frame mode is intended for master frames and frame alignment processes (frame bridging and frame extension), and frame-by-object mode is designed to examine the mechanisms – *social construction* and *object shift*.

#### **4.6 Data Collection Methods**

I collected data through a range of sources including the *South China Morning Post*, the Occupy Central with Love and Peace (Facebook group and Official Website), *Apple Daily*, the HKFS (Facebook group and Tweet group), Scholarism (Facebook group), Civil Human Rights Front (Facebook group), Demosistō (Facebook group), the Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions (Facebook group), *Black Club Clothes*, *Ming Pao*, *House News*, *Stand News*, *Hong Kong In-Media*, *Hong Kong Economic Journal*, *Citizen News*, *The Epoch Times*, *Local Press*, *The New York Times*, *Time*, *BBC*, *Now*, *The Wall Street Journal*, *The Daily Telegraph*, *Reuters*, OCLP website, change.org, Hong Kong Government website, Civic Party website, the Hong Kong Journalists Association. Regarding the UM, Occupy Central was used for search terms across *South China Morning Post (SCMP)*, OCLP Facebook community and *Apple Daily's* report on the First Anniversary of Umbrella Movement gave a serial detailed description, other sources, such as *Ming Pao*, *House News*, *Hong Kong In-Media*, *The New York Times*, *BBC* and others, stemmed from the links or clues given by OCLP Facebook community. As for the AEM, the newspaper resources mainly included the CHRF Facebook, Demosistō Facebook, *SCMP*, the HKCTU Facebook. Anti-extradition protests were used for search terms over *SCMP*. Data from *Stand News*, *Hong Kong In-Media*, *Ming Pao*, *Apple Daily*, change.org etc. came from the links or clues provided by the CHRF Facebook and Demosistō Facebook.

Furthermore, I obtained information from the websites in a time sequence. Facebook, *South China Morning Post*, *Apple Daily*, *Stand News*, *Hong Kong In-Media* were the main data. *SCMP* is one of Hong Kong's free daily top-selling English-language newspaper, and distributed on paper and on the web with a centre-right position in favour of the pro-establishment camp and bias towards the middle class, with very detailed coverage of the peak of the movement, and covered 166 protests

(UM) and 1098 protests (AEM); on the other hand, *Apple Daily* is one of the best-selling Chinese newspapers, not free, sympathetic to the pan-democracy camp and against the central government, reporting 71 protests. *Stand News* is a local online media, whose position is considered to favour the democrats. *Hong Kong In-Media* is a local participatory online media promoting the ideas of private journalists. These four newspapers are the popular mainstream newspapers in Hong Kong, possessing a large readership. What is more, they were chosen not only because they were the most detailed newspapers covering the movement, but also as they stand for radically different positions, providing a comprehensive and balanced nature of data sources. Furthermore, Occupy Central with Love and Peace in Facebook (160 protests), the HKFS on Facebook (12 protests) and Twitter (12 protests), Scholarism on Facebook (17 protests), the CHRF on Facebook (171 protests), Demosistō on Facebook (117 protests), and the HKCTU on Facebook (7 protests) were created by social movement organizations which posted information covering the whole process from the beginning to the end of the movement. Posts showed the reflections and experience of the SMOs, less in the protests during the peak of the campaign, on which newspapers were providing supplementary information. Facebook was selected not because that SMOs' media is always and necessarily better than newspapers, or that they avoid the issue of selectivity, only that for the subject of this research the data sources are the most comprehensive and reliable sources available. In a word, newspapers and Facebook constituted complementary data sources. In particular, for the UM, the OCLP Facebook group provided almost all of the information of protests from December 2013 to August 2014, and from February 2015 to August 2015, *SCMP* focused on the period between September 2014 and December 2014 (peak phase), and *Apple Daily* offered the most relevant coverage from November 2014 to January 2015. With regard

to the AEM, *SCMP* gave a complete overview of the process of each major demonstration, particularly in the peak and decline stages; the CHRF and Demosistō Facebook groups focused on the emergence and middle periods, providing information about leaders, organizational arrangements, allies, social networking, and framing. In addition, regarding how to filter out duplicates, even though there were actually very few, the duplicates are few, and it is easy to filter them out in light of date, time, figure, event etc. For example, I preferred a more detailed and comprehensive as well as neutral coverage about protest events, such as *SCMP*, if duplicates occurred; I chose Facebook when needing to elaborate in greater detail on independent variables.

The official beginning event of the Umbrella Movement was September 2014, and the official ending was December 2014. I set the time frame of 20 months from the emergence stage to the decline stage, not only because choosing a longer period of time can reveal the correlation between independent variables (IVs) and dependent variables (DVs) to the greatest extent possible. In other words, IVs and a greater number of protests can provide a better argument from PEA. More specifically, I use the month as the unit of analysis to demonstrate the applicability of PEA over considerable spans of time. Though the UM officially started from the end of the September 2014 to mid-December 2014, the Occupy Central with Love and Peace (OCLP) was planned in March of 2013, but had no obvious activities until December of 2013, except for the first Deliberation Day in June of 2013. Instead, from the start of December of 2013, the OCLP initiated a series of activities to mobilize individuals from all walks of life, such as Women's Associations, Religious personages and so on, to take part in the second Deliberation Day in March and third Deliberation Day in May of 2014. Besides, the Civil Human Rights Front, which is composed of forty-eight

NGOs and political groups, organized the annual New Year's Day parade (Civil Human Rights Front, 2021). In addition, the OCLP campaign was originally scheduled to start in July of 2014. In short, choosing December of 2013 as the beginning time of PEA is appropriate, as it is sufficient, almost half a year before the scheduled time, to observe and analyse of changes in various variables. Furthermore, although the Umbrella Movement officially ended in December of 2014, extending the time to August 2015 can explore related events that took place afterwards, such as subsequent punishments, the Mobile Democracy Classroom, a certain scale of tents appearing outside the Legislative Council and Government Headquarters for a period of time in March of 2015, the Political Reform Program being under consideration by the Legislative Council in June 2015, the Community Citizenship Charter Movement continuing the spirit of the Umbrella Movement in June 2015, the annual July 1st parade in 2015, and so on. In particular, the "831 decision"<sup>1</sup> caused the Occupy Movement, and 31 August 2015 was exactly the day after a year, and thus selecting 31 August 2015 as the end time of PEA signifies that the analysis of the whole campaign may have come to a temporary close. All in all, applying PEA to the extension of time can test variables more comprehensively and provide more accurate conclusions, even new findings, and networking and the presence of framing were the most important factors in the increased number of protests.

In contrast, the AEM was spontaneously organised and was evolving without any official beginning and ending time but can be defined according to frequency and

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<sup>1</sup> "831 decision" was a significant document that not merely provides Hong Kong's five million entitled voters the chance to choose their Chief Executive through a system of one person, one vote, starting in 2017. Meanwhile, it designed the rules for the specific procedures of election of Hong Kong's Chief Executive via universal suffrage, substitute the former Election Committee consisting of 1,200 members predetermined with the Nominating Committee by simply changing the name, and two or three prospects would need obtain over 50% votes from members of the Nominating Committee (Pepper, 2016).

escalated methods of protest activities as well as their decline. The Hong Kong government first introduced an amendment to the Fugitive Offenders Ordinance in February 2019. As early as 15 March 2019, Demosistō launched a sit-in at the government headquarters and requested the withdrawal of the amendment bill. In March and April 2019, the Civil Human Rights Front launched two demonstrations. Generally, the movement began to develop in March 2019 and became a large-scale protest movement in June 2019, until the end of January 2020, due to the escalating cases of COVID-19 in Hong Kong, protest activities decreased significantly. Therefore, I set the beginning time as March 2019, the peak stage was from June 2019 to January 2020, the decline stage was between February to May 2020. Due to the imposition of the national security law, street protests are currently showing signs of rising, yet the momentum so far cannot be compared with that in 2019. Moreover, protesters' demands and strategies are different from those of the AEM, and the dynamic trend is also different. Additionally, because of this project's schedule, I set the time frame of the AEM of fifteen months from March 2019 to May 2020. On the whole, regarding the UM, the number of protests was not relatively larger between official beginning and ending time, and it is necessary to extend forward and backward, because a larger number of IVs and protests are needed so as to provide a better PEA argument; in contrast, the AEM consists of protest activities in a large quantity and can be demarcated in the light of frequency and intensity. It can therefore be stated that the longevity of the AEM is longer than the UM, though the time frame of the UM is 20 months, which once again helps explain the adoption of longevity of peak stage as measurement of the whole movement's longevity.

## **4.7 Conclusion**

To conclude, this chapter has discussed my research design and methods including comparative analysis, PEA, mechanisms, SNA, and DNA (as a method of framing analysis). Mechanisms are creatively integrated with SNA, FA, and PEA. In the section on PEA, as the research method for DVs, I have addressed the definition and classification of protest. I have described precisely how to identify a protest and explained how duplicates were filtered out, also discussing media bias and how to overcome it. My data collection methods were introduced, and I have provided a clear account of which sources used for which parts of the analysis. What is more, in the analytical framework, I have illustrated clearly what the independent variables are, which concepts they operationalise and how I defined and evaluated mechanisms. Besides, I have discussed how I used the notion of mechanisms and processes to discover a link between my IVs and DVs, also justifying the time frames. Finally, how to use social network analysis and framing analysis have been illustrated.

The introduction of mechanisms is the pioneering work of the methodology of this thesis. In particular, the classic social movement theories – political opportunities, mobilizing structures, framing processes – give a standard method of posing questions, yet produce answers which are far from satisfactory (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001). The results are disappointing inasmuch as they are not dynamic, as they illustrate individual actors instead of interactions amid actors, or at most they recognized possible links instead of causal relationships (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001). Hence the introduction of small-scale mechanisms relating to causality that reoccur in various amalgamations with dissimilar integrated outcomes in shorter term changes the contingent political opportunity structure. This dynamic process driven approach compensates for the defects of the standard classic social movement agenda by considering more intricate and contingent transformations of elements and events




(McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001). And more importantly, the one-to-one correspondence between the mechanisms and the independent variables can make the mechanisms more operable as a method. The mechanisms are no longer descriptive but can be demonstrated and explained with quantitative results. To summarise, mechanisms can demonstrate causal sequences more accurately from a qualitative analysis perspective, and thus the introduction of mechanisms is a major methodological contribution of this thesis; meanwhile, mechanism as a qualitative research method and qualitative research methods – protest event analysis, social network analysis, and discourse network analysis constitute mixed methods.

# Chapter 5: Data Analysis and Results of Protest Event Analysis

In this chapter I will present the Protest Event Analysis (PEA). This chapter is based on Chapter 4 in the following ways. The chapter proceeds as follows. Firstly, I will make a brief comparison of the protest waves of the Umbrella Movement and the Anti-Extradition Movement and give an overview of each, respectively. Secondly, I will demonstrate the forms of protests. Thirdly I will divide the two protest waves into three phases: emergence, peak, and decline, and compare their differences, respectively. Also, in this section I will summarize the main protest events at each stage of UM & AEM.

## 5.1: Protest waves of UM and AEM



**Figure 5.1 Protest waves of UM and AEM**

Figure 5.1 demonstrates the protest waves of the UM and the AEM. Simply put, compared to those of the UM, the number of protest events of the AEM were

significantly higher and the duration of the peak phase was obviously longer. The similarity is that both movements did not have fluctuation in the level of activities in the process of the campaigns. As for the UM, the protest events were clustered around between September and December 2014 and peaked in October 2014. The peak stage was from September 2014 to December 2014 (Month 10 - Month 13), the emergence stage was between December 2013 and August 2014 (Month 1 – Month 9), and the decline stage was from January 2015 to August 2015 (Month 14 – Month 21). Regarding the AEM, the emergence phase was set from March 2019 to May 2019 (Month 1 – Month 3), the peak phase from June 2019 to January 2020 (Month 4 – Month 11), and the decline phase from February 2020 to May 2020 (Month 12 – Month 15). Here is a brief overview of the progress of the two social movements.

A series of street protests in the form of occupation, usually called the Umbrella Movement, or the Occupy Movement, took place in Hong Kong from 26 September to 15 December 2014. The Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (NPCSC) passed a resolution on the mooted reform of Hong Kong's electoral system. This resolution was generally considered to be strictly limited, which was equivalent to the CCP's pre-selection of candidates for the Chief Executive of Hong Kong (T. Cheung, 2014). From 22 September 2014, the students went on strike to protest the NPCSC's resolution, and the Hong Kong Federation of Students (HKFS) and Scholarism began to protest outside the government headquarters on 26 September 2014 ("Thousands of Hong Kong Students Start Week-long Boycott," 2014). On 28 September, the protests were growing larger rapidly. The Occupy Central with Love and Peace declared the official beginning of their civil disobedience movement ("Hong Kong Police Clear Pro-Democracy Protesters," 2014). Moreover, police strategy, including using tear gas, and underworld gangster assaults on occupants resulted in

more residents joining the protests and occupying Causeway Bay and Mong Kok (Buckley, Ramzy, & Wong, 2014). As a result, the number of protestors reached a peak of over '100,000' at any one time, overpowering the police and leading to encirclement failures (L. Chan, 2015, para. 8). More than that, the protest activities aroused cracks in the Hong Kong society and stimulated young people (formerly non-political sectors of society) to participate in political activities or raise consciousness of citizen rights and responsibilities (L. Chan, 2015). In general, the duration of occupied zones was different, among them, the occupied areas of Admiralty, Causeway Bay and Mong Kok lasted for nearly two months. After the occupation lasted for 79 days, the occupied areas of Causeway Bay and the Legislative Council demonstration area were finally cleared on 15 December 2014 (W. Leung, 2014). After the clearing of the venue, the occupiers used non-cooperative movements such as "mobile occupation" and "campaign anti rent and tax" to continue their struggle, while some demonstrators still occupied the sidewalk from the Civic Square on Tim Mei Avenue to the Legislative Council for half a year.


The Anti-Extradition Bill Movement (AEM) started in March 2019 and had mobilised large-scale protests by June 2019. As early as 15 March 2019, Demosistō had initiated a sit-in at the government headquarters to withdraw the amendment to the Fugitive Offenders Ordinance. During March and April 2019, the Civil Human Rights Front (CHRF) launched demonstrations twice. On 9 June, the CHRF launched a march, which had 1.03 million participants according to the organizers (SCMP Reporters, 2019). On 12 June 2019, as the second reading debate of the Hong Kong Legislative Council would resume, there was a violent conflict between the protestors and the police. The police were accused of abusing their power and using excessive force. After that, the protestors put forward "five demands", which were complete

withdrawal of the amendment bill of the Fugitive Offenders Ordinance, withdrawal of the characterisation of “612 riots”, withdrawal of all the protestors’ charges, investigation of the police force’s abuse of power, and the resignation of the chief executive Carrie Lam. On 16 June, the CHRF launched another larger march, and nearly 2 million people were claimed to have taken part (SCMP Reporters, 2019). During the July 1<sup>st</sup> march in 2019, the organisers announced that 550,000 people turned out (“Organisers Say 550,000 Attend Annual July 1,” 2019). Some of the protestors occupied the Legislative Council complex. Later, they added an additional demand “realize the real double universal suffrage of the chief executive and the Legislative Council immediately” (“Reasons for the Anti-Extradition”, 2020). From August 2019, the protestors launched normal protest activities almost every week, with more violence. The police-civilian conflicts became more intensified and violent. Later, the movement spread to all parts of Hong Kong. About ‘350,000 people’ were estimated to have participated in a general strike on 5 August 2019 organised by the Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions (HKCTU) (“Another General Strike Possible,” 2019, para. 2). In mid-August, the protestors incapacitated the Hong Kong International Airport on two occasions. On 18 August, the CHRF held a large-scale peaceful rally again, proclaiming that at least 1.7 million people participated (Siu et al., 2019). On the afternoon of 4 September 2019, Mrs. Lam announced four actions and the withdrawal of the Extradition Bill Law. However, because the protestors believed that only one of the “five demands” in the movement had been achieved, they did not stop protest activities. On 1 October 2019, a violent demonstration broke out, and thus Carrie Lam cited the Emergency Regulations Ordinance to enact the Anti-mask law on 4 October, which led to a more serious conflict. As the demonstration entered November 2019, with the launch of a new round of three strikes, the level of violence

by demonstrators and public antagonism further escalated, and many people were injured. As a result, the voting rate of the District Council elections reached a record high. The Democratic faction obtained 388 of the 450 seats, which caused unprecedented serious damage to the pro-establishment faction (“The Opposition Wins Almost 90 Percent of Seats,” 2019). In addition, in response to this wave of demonstrations, the United States announced the passage of the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act. After a landslide victory in the District Council election, the protestors pursued victory and there were marches and radical demonstrations in December 2019 and early January 2020. Over 800,000 people took part in the December 8<sup>th</sup> march, launched by the CHRF (Griffiths, 2019). During the New Year march in 2020, more than one million people turned out (“Organisers Say Over 1mn Took Part,” 2020). Following this the whole campaign was at a low ebb owing to the outbreak of coronavirus in late January 2020, and SMOs focused on fighting the epidemic in February and March 2020. Medical staffers’ strikes occurred during this period to press the government to close the border. In April 2020, Beijing openly interfered in the meeting of the House Committee of the Legislative Council, which got the protestors back on the streets. In May 2020, the proposal of the National Security Law touched off another wave of protests.

## **5.2 Forms of protests**

## Forms of UM protests




**Figure 5.2 Forms of UM protests**

Figure 5.2 demonstrates the variation of different forms of protests in the Umbrella Movement. Generally, all types of protests reached a climax in October 2014, among which, the total of demonstrative protests were the most numerous; confrontational protests were concentrated in the peak phase (from September to December 2014), and almost no at the other phases; conventional protests were not as fluctuating as the former two, but the total number was second only to demonstrative protests; there were few incidents of violence and rare minor damage to property. To be specific, “Unyielding Attitude Fight against Silence and Support Free Speech” was a march on 23 February 2014, as an example of demonstrative protest (inter.uni.comm.graduates, 2014). On 23 October 2014 on top of the Lion Mountain, a huge yellow banner with an umbrella sign was hung by protesters, declaring, “I want universal suffrage” (Peng, 2014). Hanging a banner can be classified as a demonstrative protest. Also, Lennon Wall which was an artistic work, one type of demonstrative protests, has been expressing the messages of freedom, demanding

democracy, and universal suffrage from 2014 until today. In addition, Occupy Central with Love and Peace (OCLP) held the “Constitutional Reform Deliberation Day” on 6 May 2014 (Occupy Central with Love and Peace, 2014). Deliberation Days were very important activities in the emergence stage. Seminars like this are a typical form of conventional protests and play a role of information distribution. In addition, occupations, camping, blockades were very common forms of confrontational protests in the peak stage, also, Joshua Wong started a hunger strike at the end of the campaign so as to press the government. As to attack on property, a demonstrator nicknamed “French”, who was suspected to be a member of the Civic Passion, broke into the Legislative Council with a motor bike smashing the glass exterior wall (Leung, Sheh, & Chu, 2014). Regarding the use of violence, one example took place, on 24 November 2014 when three presumed policemen in plain clothes with Hong Kong police badges and batons, were pursued towards the way out of Admiralty MTR station via Admiralty Centre (Lee et al., 2014). One policeman was knocked unconscious. Protestors shouted: “Put away batons!” before they were detained, and the stunned policeman was carried on a stretcher to an ambulance (Lee, et al., 2014, para. 99).



## Forms of AEM protests



**Figure 5.3 Forms of AEM protests**

Figure 5.3 demonstrates the change of different forms of protests in the Anti-Extradition Movement. In the emergence stage from March to May 2019, street stations became one of the main conventional forms of protests. SMOs and democratic legislators set up street stations to publicise major parades and mobilise the public. Also, petition was a protest method for all walks of life to express dissatisfaction and request change. Additionally, demonstrative protests included peaceful rallies, parades and demonstrations, flash mobs, singing protest songs and others. By comparison, the UM mainly took the form of seminars and various creative approaches in the emergence phase, except for the rallies and parades in March 2014 in support of a journalist who were attacked, and “Trailwalks” in June 2014. “Trailwalk for Universal Suffrage” was held for seven consecutive days. Participants planned to travel a total of 140 kilometres in all districts in Hong Kong, urging votes along the way, and calling on the public to participate in the referendum from 20 to 22 June 2014 to

support the “true universal suffrage” plan (Siu, 2014). At the critical juncture, there must be enough Hong Kong citizens to step out and take one more step, so that people can see Hong Kong people’s determination for democracy (Siu, 2014).

Confrontational and violent protests predominated in the whole movement. Aggressive protestors used the tactic of “be water”, frequently in a flexible way to move and confuse the police (Hale, 2019). As the police came, they usually moved away and reappeared in other places. Additionally, the protestors wore black masks to conceal their identities. Moreover, the protestors distracted the police with laser pens and caused interference to the functioning of the cameras of the police stations (K. Cheng, 2019). Under many circumstances, at the time of arrest they would call their names out loud because they were worried that their lawyers and family members would not be able to contact them during detention (Tufekci, 2019). At the protest sites, the protestors communicated by gestures, and the materials were conveyed through human chains (Dapiran, 2019). Different protesters played different roles. Some were investigators who delivered live-updating information when they found the police (Fung & Wai, 2019), others were “firemen” who used kitchen appliances and traffic cones to clear tear gas out (“Hong Kongers Get Creative with Traffic Cones,” 2019). Since August 2019, radical protestors had escalated their disputed use of violence and intimidation. They dug out paving blocks and threw them at the police, and they were armed with gasoline bombs, caustic fluids, and slingshots targeting the police, police stations and police cars (“Hong Kong: Petrol Bombs Tossed at Police,” 2019). While besieging the universities, the protestors made temporary catapults to fire gasoline bombs, and after the siege was terminated, thousands of them were discovered on the campus (“Hong Kong Police Retrieve Fresh Trove,” 2019). In addition, there were several cases of police injuries and physical attacks during the entire movement


(Asher & Tsoi, 2019), a police officer's neck was cut with a utility knife ("Sergeant Slashed in the Neck," 2019).

Moreover, the protesters destroyed wantonly pro-Beijing companies, like Best Mart 360, Yoshinoya and Maxim's Caterers ("Maxim's Distances Itself from 'Rioters' Remark," 2019), mainland institutions such as the Bank of China (Chatterjee & Roantree, 2019) and Xiaomi and Commercial Press. Parallel trading shops were also damaged and set on fire or sprayed with lacquer (Su et al., 2019). Also, the protesters damaged the offices of the government and pro-Beijing legislators, and vandalized the logos standing for China (Roxburgh, 2019). After the protesters condemned the railway operators of yielding to the pressure of the Chinese media (Creery, 2019), a large number of stations were damaged and set on fire. Furthermore, the protesters put up barricades, vandalized traffic lights ("Around 100 Yau Tsim Mong Traffic Lights," 2019) deflated bus tires (Yau, 2019). In addition, protesters sporadically intimidated and attacked mainland Chinese people (SCMP Reporters, 2019). For example, on 13 August the protesters attacked journalist Fu Guohao at the airport, as he had spoken in support of Hong Kong Police (E. Cheung, 2019).

In contrast, the UM used little violence throughout the campaign, which was one of the biggest differences between the UM and the AEM. Even though in October 2014 (the peak phase), the confrontational protests were still at the same level as the demonstrative protests, and the proportion of conventional protests was not low, unlike the AEM, whose most conventional protests occurred in the emergence phase, the demonstrative protests' proportion was relatively low from the beginning to the end. In short, confrontational and violent protests, together with minor attacks on property, predominated in the peak phase of the AEM.

## 5.3 Differences in protest waves at emergence, peak and decline and a summary of the main protest events

### 5.3.1 Protest waves – Emergence phases



**Figure 5.4 Protest waves at emergence phases of UM and AEM**

From Figure 5.4, the changing trends during the emergence stages of the UM and the AEM were clearly different, being manifested in two aspects: the former progressed slowly and lasted for a long time; the latter rose sharply in a short time. In short, these are the differences in level and duration.

### UM at emergence

#### Deliberation Days

Catholic General Election Deliberation Day on 1 December 2013 was held by the Justice and Peace Commission of the Hong Kong Catholic Diocese, Chu Yiu-ming was one of the speakers (Occupy Central with Love and Peace, 2013). On the same day Deliberation Day of Women & Gender/Difference & Minority was sponsored by the Association for the Advancement of Feminism, the Network for Women in Politics,

the Teen's Key and the Hong Kong Women Christian Council (Occupy Central with Love and Peace, 2013). Meanwhile, the Professional Commons hosted the professional circles' deliberation day on 1 December 2013, when Prof. Chan Kin-man made an introductory speech (Occupy Central with Love and Peace, 2013). Deliberation Day II was held by Occupy Central with Love and Peace (OCLP) Secretariat held the second public deliberation day on 7 December 2013 (Occupy Central with Love and Peace, 2013). College Christian Democratic Reform Deliberation Day was organised by the Inter College Christian Fellowship - ICCF, the Hong Kong Christian Council and the CityU Christian Fellowship on 26 January 2014 (Occupy Central with Love and Peace, 2014). The OCLP elected 3 political reform proposals including citizen nominations on the Deliberation Day held on 6 May 2014. Participating groups included the Civic Party, the Christians Support Democratic Political Reform, the Comic Daemons and representatives of the arts and cultural circles, the Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions, the Hong Kong Association for Democracy and People's Livelihood, the social welfare circles' supporters of Occupy Central, the Hong Kong Professional Teachers' Union etc. (Occupy Central with Love and Peace, 2014).

### **Trailwalks**

The OCLP organised "Trailwalks for universal suffrage" from 14 June to 20 June, participating groups included the CHRF, the HKFS, the HKCTU, the Hong Kong Social Workers' General Union, the Hong Kong Professional Teachers' Union, the Hong Kong Women Worker's Association, Scholarism, the Justice and Peace Commission of the Hong Kong Catholic Diocese (HKJP), the Labour Party, the Civic Party, the Democratic Party etc.

### **Official statement**

The Occupy Central with Love and Peace (OCLP) made an official statement in response to the decision of the NPC Standing Committee to set an extremely narrow framework for the 2017 Chief Executive election. The framework stifled genuine universal suffrage and rendered the second-round constitutional reform consultation by the HKSAR government a farce. All chances of dialogue had been exhausted and the occupation of Central would definitely happen (Occupy Central with Love and Peace, 2014).

### **Citizen Voice Rally**

Benny Tai, Chan Kin-man, and Chu Yiu-ming initiated “Citizen Voice Rally”. The OCLP, the Alliance for True Democracy, the HKFS, the CHRF, Scholarism, and the Democratic Party would organise a series of protest actions at “Citizen Voice Rally” on 31 August 2014 (Occupy Central with Love and Peace, 2014).

### **AEM at emergence**

#### **Demosistō**

The Demosistō team members, including Kokhin Chan and Joshua Wong, were chasing the Secretary for Justice Teresa Cheng in the Southern District Council on 12 March 2019 (Demosistō, 2019). And then on 13 March, the Demosistō team members, including Kokhin Chan, Joshua Wong, Ivan Lam and Wong Lee Lee took another action to pursue the Secretary for Security John Lee (Demosistō, 2019).

During the period from 20-25 May 2019, Demosistō, together with a number of NGOs and community work teams, set up street stations in various districts of Hong Kong. These groups included the Souther Net House, the Community March, the Hung To Alliance, the Hong Kong Group of Democracy Promotion, the Student Labor Action Coalition, the PolyU Pavilion, the Reclaiming Social Work Movement, the Student

Union of the Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUSU), the Current Affairs Committee of HKUSU Council, the HKPUSU, the Hong Kong Baptist University Students' Union, the Workercom, Ivan Wong, Johnny Chung Lai Him, the Life in Fortress Hill, the Hong Kong Victoria Social Association (HKVSA), and the Fixing HK (Demosistō, 2019).

### **Civil Human Rights Front**


The Civil Human Rights Front issued a statement in March 2019, strongly opposing the amendment of the extradition Ordinance (Civil Human Rights Front, 2019). The CHRF and pan-democratic MPs organised the march on 31 March 2019. Martin Lee, Cardinal Joseph Zen, Margaret Ng, the Progressive Lawyers Group and the Scholar Alliance for Academic Freedom (Lam, 2019), Jimmy Lai Chee-ying, the Demosistō, Ivan Lam, Joshua Wong, Nathan Law, Kokhin Chan, Avery Ng, Helena Wong, Raymond Chan, Lam Wing-kee, Claudia Mo, Leung Yiu-chung, Au Nok-hin, Gary Fan, Alvin Yeung, Jimmy Sham, Shiu Ka-chun, and James To etc. turned out for the march (H. Chan, 2019).

The CHRF and pan-democracy parties consisting of the Labour Party, the People Power, the Democratic Party and the League of Social Democrats etc. protested in the Legislative Council on 17 April 2019 (Civil Human Rights Front, 2019). Moreover, the CHRF organised the April 28th march after four leaders of Umbrella Movement were imprisoned. Figo Chan, Chu Yiu-ming, Tommy Cheung, Claudia Mo, Margaret Ng, Raymond Chan, Leung Kwok-hung, Lee Wing-tat, Martin Lee and Kwok Ka-ki etc. turned out (Creery, 2019). The CHRF launched three actions from 13 to 14 May, consisting of protest on Tim Mei Road, Chief Executive office protest, protest outside the Legislative Council (Civil Human Rights Front, 2019).

### **Professional Groups**

On 3 March 2019 the joint Professional Groups issued the statement regarding the HKSAR Government’s proposal to amend rendition arrangements. Joint professional groups signatories included the Act Voice, the ArchiVision, the Artists Action, the CM Doctors Cure, the Democratic Action Accountants, the Financier Conscience, the Frontline Tech Workers, the HKEd4All, the HK Psychologists Concern, the Insurance ARISE, the IT Voice, the Médecins Inspirés, the Nurse Politik, the OccuFocus, the Physio Action, the Progressive Lawyers Group, the Progressive Scholars Group, the Progressive Teachers’ Alliance, the Radiation Therapist and Radiographer Conscience, and the Reclaiming Social Work Movement (Progressive Lawyers Group, 2019).

### 5.3.2 Protest waves – Peak phases



**Figure 5.5 Protest waves at peak phases of UM and AEM**

It can be observed in Figure 5.5 that there are two differences. The differences between the peak phases of the UM and the AEM are reflected in the number of



protests and the longevity, the former only lasting for four months, the latter eight months.

## **UM at peak**

### **Shaving heads to show aspirations**

On September 9, 2014, Benny Tai, Chan Kin-man, and Chu Yiu-ming shaved their heads in front of the public with 43 citizens who supported the OCLP. Tai explained that shaving meant no retreat and there was no chance of compromise. Forty-three supporters included Tanya Chan, Yeung Sum, Wu Chi-wai, Chan Kai-yuen and so on (Occupy Central with Love and Peace, 2014).

### **Official launch**

At 01.00am on 28 September 2014, the OCLP officially started “Occupy Central” and announced the two requirements about political reform, to revoke the NPCSC decision and start the electoral reform process again (Occupy Central with Love and Peace, 2014). Benny Tai, Chan Kin-man, Chu Yiu-ming, pan-democracy politicians Emily Lau Wai-hing, Albert Ho Chun-yan, Fernando Cheung Chiu-hung, Yeung Sum and scholar Joseph Cheng Yu-shek, and the HKFS were present (SCMP Reporters, 2014).

### **HKFS & Scholarism & OCLP**

The HKFS was organising an assembly with 25 mass organizations on 24 September 2014 without informing the police, though being cautioned (HKFS, 2014).

On 26 September, Scholarism declared that 1,200 middle school students had joined the class boycott (Scholarism, 2014).

On 28 September, the HKFS set a deadline of midnight for the HKSAR and Beijing to satisfy their requirements, if not, they would escalate their actions by students' strikes unlimitedly (SCMP Reporters, 2014).

On 30 September, the HKFS, Scholarism and the OCLP appealed to the whole Hong Kong people to stand up with them to occupy the three main democratic squares that have been captured: Admiralty, Causeway Bay and the major streets of Mong Kok (Occupy Central with Love and Peace, 2014).

The HKFS and Scholarism were appealing to students to attend the unlimited students' strike on 30 September 2014 (HKFS, 2014).

On 3 October the HKFS, Scholarism, and the OCLP issued a joint statement that if the Hong Kong government did not immediately stop organized attacks on supporters of the campaign, the dialogue between the students and the government will be terminated (Occupy Central with Love and Peace, 2014).

The HKFS, Scholarism, and the OCLP held a rally in Admiralty at 7:30pm on 10 October 2014 to protest the government's blockade of dialogue and reaffirmed its adherence to the streets (Sung, 2014).

Between 5.30pm to 10.00pm on 28 October there was a rally to commemorate the courageous defiance of teargas on 28 September. Activities included silent standing, creative photography, dance, installations, singing, drama, and sharing sessions. The HKFS, Scholarism, the OCLP, the Hong Kong Shield, medical team, journalists, teachers, social workers, religious groups, cultural workers, grassroots, the United Front in Support of Students' and People's Struggle participated it (Occupy Central with Love and Peace, 2014).

Five platforms, including the HKFS, Scholarism, the OCLP and pan-democracy camp discussed the feasibility of a referendum triggered by the resignation of members of parliament on 2 November 2014 (“Five Party Platform to Discuss Divergences,” 2014).

Scholarism would launch the first Umbrella Movement Community Day from 4 pm to 6 pm on 16 November to set up publicity street stations in the five districts of Hong Kong to win public support for the Umbrella Movement and ask the government to withdraw 831 decision (Scholarism, 2014).

On another Umbrella Movement Community Day (23 November), the OCLP went deep into Hong Kong, Kowloon and the new territories to promote ideas, connect communities and strive for the future of Hong Kong (Occupy Central with Love and Peace, 2014).

The HKFS and Scholarism called upon to encircle government headquarters and press on Leung Chun-ying government, and four offensive and defensive battles broke out with the police line overnight on 30 November (Mak, 2014).

The HKFS urged the public to come to Admiralty on 10 December night, non-violently disobey and stay until the last minute (HKFS, 2014).

### **Assembly of Inheritance of Civil Disobedience**

On 17 October 2014 there was an assembly of Inheritance of Civil Disobedience. Student leaders Joshua Wong, Nathan Law, Alex Chow, Daisy Chan Sin-ying, Leung Kwok-hung and others exchanged their opinions, respectively (Occupy Central with Love and Peace, 2014).

### **Hong Kong Shield**

On 10 October 2014 Hong Kong's culture, arts, and academia established the Hong Kong Shield to condemn the Hong Kong government for their suppression ("Hong Kong's Culture and Performing-arts Circles Set up Tents," 2014). The "All Citizen Acton against Police Brutality" Campaign was organised by the Hong Kong Shield at the police headquarters on the morning of 30 November 2014 and about 50 people attended the rally, Denise Ho was involved in it ("The Police Dragged the Hair," 2014). Furthermore, different Christmas holidays would begin on 25 December 2014. The first battle would be a peaceful night rally sponsored by the "Student Awakening". It would be followed by the three major occupied areas' flash campaigns initiated by the Hong Kong Shield. Denise Ho took part in it. Finally, it would return to the University Mall where the strike originated to hold a concert ("Citizens firstly gau-wu (shopping)," 2014).

### **Civil Human Rights Front**

On 9 November 2014 the Civil Human Rights Front (CHRF) launched a march to the Liaison Office of the Central People's Government in Hong Kong to prompt withdrawal of the resolution of the National People's Congress and call for dialogue ("The CHRF's Failure of Appeal," 2014). Moreover, the CHRF organised protest against detaining stewards of OCLP exterior to Police Headquarters at 2pm on 13 November 2014 in Harcourt Road (Occupy Central with Love and Peace, 2014).

### **Professionals**

Twenty doctors, academics, lawyers, intellectuals and pastoralists arrived outside Chai Wan Police Headquarter on 3 December afternoon to protest against and condemn the excessive use of violence by the police in Mongkok and Admiralty ("Professionals Condemn the Violent Clearance," 2014).

## **Black robe parade**

College teachers launched a black robe parade at 3.00pm on 5 December 2014 demanding that the government immediately resume dialogue with students, resolve the current impasse, and condemning the police for excessive violence (“Colleges And Universities Sponsored a,” 2014).

## **AEM at peak**

### **Civil Human Rights Front**

The Civil Human Rights Front initiated the 9 June 9<sup>th</sup> march, Jimmy Sham, Studentlocalism, the Students Independence Union, Demosisto, Fernando Cheung, the League of Social Democrats, Margaret Ng, and Figo Chan were present (SCMP Reporters, 2019).

The CHRF appealed to the citizens to wear black shirts to parade on 16 June 2019, condemn the police suppression, and demand the withdrawal of the evil law and that Carrie Lam step down (Civil Human Rights Front, 2019).

The CHRF organised a rally to investigate police abuse of power on 22 June (Civil Human Rights Front, 2019).

The CHRF organised G20 Free Hong Kong Rally on 26 June 2019, Jimmy Sham read the declaration (Yang, 2019) and Nathan Law addressed the assembly (Mak, 2019).

The CHRF organised the July 1st parade and appealed to the public wear black (Civil Human Rights Front, 2019). Participants included Ted Hui Chi-fung, Fernando Cheung, Eddie Chu Hoi-dick, Leung Yiu-chung, the Civic Party, Martin Lee, Lam Cheuk-ting, etc. (SCMP Reporters, 2019).

The CHRF launched the July 21<sup>st</sup> demonstration, Lam Cheuk-ting, Ted Hui, Alvin Yeung, Figo Chan, Eddie Chu Hoi-dick, Au Nok-hin, and Denise Ho attended it (SCMP Reporters, 2019).

On 18 August 2019, the Civil Human Rights Front held a 'peaceful, rational, non-violent' parade (Civil Human Rights Front, 2019). Jimmy Sham, Leung Kwok-hung, Lee Cheuk-yan, and Jimmy Lai appeared.

The CHRF initiated the global joint petition in September 2019 to request the Hong Kong government to submit a human rights report and call on the United Nations to review the situation in Hong Kong (Civil Human Rights Front, 2019).

The CHRF held a rally of "Resisting Authoritarianism and Welcoming Dawn" on 28 September ("Notice of No Objection," 2019).

The Civil Human Rights Front organised the December 8<sup>th</sup> parade and calculated 800,000 protestors paraded from Victoria Park in Causeway Bay to Chater Road in Central. Jimmy Sham, Eric Lai Yan-ho and Kenny Ip were present (SCMP Reporters, 2019).

The Civil Human Rights Front launched the New Year's Day Parade on 1 January 2020, Ted Hui Chi-fung, Jimmy Sham, Roy Kwong and others were present.

### **Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions**

On 5 August 2019, a citywide strike was organised by the Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions (HKCTU, 2019). On 28 August 2019, the HKCTU launched Edinburgh Square Assembly (HKCTU, 2019). Tanya Chan attended it (Carvalho, 2019).

### **Demosistō**

On 2 June evening, Demosistō continued to set up street stations outside Kwai Chung square to fight against extradition, Agnes Chow and Wong Yik Mo were present (Demosistō, 2019). Demosistō issued a statement on 9 June 2019 and determined to launch an action of “blocking the Legislative Council” to call on the public to take a resistant step (Demosistō, 2019). Demosistō continued to call on all the people of Hong Kong to continue their strike on Monday, 17 June 2019 (Demosistō, 2019).

Demosistō, Demovanilech, and the Hong Kong ANTI-FOO Student Alliance initiated Class Boycott Rally at Statue Square (Demosistō, 2019). The 2016 anti-interpretation law march was sentenced on 11 September 2019. Rally of support was held by the League of Social Democrats (LSD), the Student Fight for Democracy and Demosistō (Demosistō, 2019).

### **Legal profession**

The legal profession held a silent march in black on 6 June 2019 to oppose the amendment of the Fugitive Offenders Ordinance. Dennis Kwok initiated the march, Alan Leong, William Waung, Martin Lee, Albert Ho and others were present (“Nearly 3000 People in the Legal Profession Have Marched,” 2019). Moreover, thousands of lawyers in Hong Kong attended a second silent parade on 7 August 2019 (Su, 2019). Organizer was Dennis Kwok.

### **Hong Kong Journalists Association**

At least 1,500 reporters and their followers organised a silent parade on 14 July 2019, and seven media organizations attended it, including the Hong Kong Journalists Association (HKJA), which co-organized the parade (Lam, Low, & Mok, 2019).

### **Civil servants**

A group of government workers staged a rally at Chater Garden on 2 August 2019, and organisers included Michael Ngan Mo-chau and Cheung Ka-po (Lam, 2019). Over three hundred and fifty civil servants of Hong Kong initiated a second petition on 15 August (Lum, 2019).

The Union for New Civil Servants issued a statement on 2 January 2020, expressing its dissatisfaction with the police's suspension of the New Year Parade (Union for New Civil Servants, 2020).

### **12 June march**

Participants included Charles Mok and Fernando Cheung, Studentlocalism, Andrew Wan, Lam Cheuk-ting and Helena Wong Pik-wan, Avery Ng, Au Nok-hin, Nathan Law, Leung Kwok-hung, Hong Kong Buddhist Association, Catholic Diocese of Hong Kong, the Confucian Academy, the Chinese Muslim Cultural and Fraternal Association, the Hong Kong Christian Council, the Hong Kong Taoist Association, and Jimmy Sham (SCMP Reporters, 2019).

### **Eye For Hong Kong Campaign**

Some netizens launched the "Eye For Hong Kong Campaign" (Eye4HK) campaign in LIHKG, calling for photos to be taken out of their right eyes. The participating pan-democrats included Jeremy Tam, Alvin Yeung, Au Nok-hin, Jimmy Sham, Figo Chan, Gary Fan, Fernando Chiu-hung Cheung, Charles Mok and Raymond Chan Chi-chuen (Civil Human Rights Front, 2019).

### **Medical staff**

More than 700 medical staff from the Eastern District Hospital launched real-name petition on 6 June 2019, including doctors, nurses, chemists, radiologists, physical therapists, and clerks ("More Than 700 Doctors," 2019). Over one thousand



health care personnel from thirteen public hospitals on 13 August launched sit-in (Chung & Cheung, 2019). Thousands of health care staff and their followers staged a peaceful assembly in Central on 26 October (Ting, Sum, & Low, 2019). Furthermore, medical demonstrators gathered at Edinburgh Place to press the authorities with strikes on 11 December. Law Cheuk-yiu and Carol Ng Man-yee appeared (Chan & Ng, 2019).

### **University student unions**

Various university student unions issued the solemn statement on the killing of the city by police, including the Joint Students' Union of Caritas Institute of Higher Education and Caritas Bianchi College of Careers (JSUCICB), the Student Union of Chu Hai College of Higher Education Acting Executive Committee (SU Chu Hai), the Hong Kong Academy for Performing Arts Students' Union (HKAPASU), the Hong Kong Polytechnic University Students' Union (HKPUSU), the Hong Kong Baptist University Students' Union (HKBUSU), the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology Students' Union (HKUSTSU), the Education University of Hong Kong Students' Union (EdUHKSU), the Hong Kong Design Institute and Hong Kong Institute of Vocational Education (LWL) Student Union (HKDVESU), the Hang Seng University of Hong Kong Students' Union (HSUHKSU), the Hong Kong University's Students' Union (HKUSU), and the Open University of Hong Kong Students' Union (OUHKSU) ("Solemn Statement of the Hong Kong Higher Institutions," 2019).

Thousands of people participated in a rally on 16 August 2019, aiming at "Stand with Hong Kong. Power to the people", which was co-sponsored by eleven student unions and users from LIHKG (Kao. 2019, para. 1-2).

### **Hong Kong Professional Teachers' Union**

Thousands of black-clad teachers marched on the streets on 17 August 2019 (K. Leung & McCarthy, 2019). Organizer was the Hong Kong Professional Teachers' Union (HKPTU).

### **Middle school students**

Off campus Assembly of middle school students was held on 2 September 2019. The venue was Edinburgh Square, Central (Demosistō, 2019). On 9 September, 138 secondary schools in all districts of Hong Kong responded to the action of the whole secondary school people chain (Demosistō, 2019). On 2 October 2019, students of Ho Chuanyao middle school, Kau Yan College, and Wah Yan College responded to the strike (Demosistō, 2019).

### **Hong Kong Human Rights Monitor**

The Hong Kong Human Rights Monitor issued a statement on 17 November to strongly condemn the police for attacking PolyU this afternoon with water cannon, armoured vehicles and a large number of tear gas ("Hong Kong Human Rights Monitor Warns Hong Kong Police," 2019).

### **Advertising industry**


Over one thousand advertising workers of Hong Kong started a strike lasting for a week on 2 December 2019 with an assembly in Central (Cheng & Lam, 2019).

### **Social workers**

Approximately two hundred social workers gathered in Central on 17 December 2019 to encourage Hong Kong protestors to participate in a strike lasting three days, supported by the Social Welfare Sector Strike Committee (Sum, 2019). Moreover, hundreds attended a peaceful parade and assembly on 19 December held by a crowd

of social workers to appeal for international interference, backed by the Social Welfare Sector Strike Committee (Sum, 2019).

### 5.3.3 Protest waves – Decline phases



**Figure 5.6 Protest waves at decline phases of UM and AEM**

The protest waves of the UM and the AEM at their decline stages were contrasting. In terms of the number of protest events, the UM stayed below 10 most of the time; in contrast, the AEM kept at a higher level. From the change curve, the former remained flatter, while the latter was more variable. From the trend chart of the protest curves, the UM had come to an end, yet the AEM was not completely over yet. I set the time frame of the AEM’s decline stage from February to May 2020. Street protests were on the rise owing to the implementation of the national security law, but the momentum so far was not comparable to that in 2019, and soon subsided. Additionally, because of the schedule of my research project, I set the time frame of the AEM from March 2019 to May 2020 (fifteen months).

#### UM at decline

## **CHRF & HKFS & Scholarism**

The Civil Human Rights Front launched a march for universal suffrage. The march started at about 2:30 p.m. on 1 February 2015 and was led by Benny Tai, Chan Kin man, Chu Yiu-ming, Martin Lee and Daisy Chan (“The CHRF Sponsored March,” 2015). Participating groups included the HKFS, Scholarism, the Student Fight for Democracy, and the Umbrella Parents (Scholarism, 2015).

## **Frontline Tech Workers Concern Group**

“Frontline Tech Workers Concern Group” set up by a group of front-line IT personnel initiated a petition of political reform proposals. It opposed the “831” framework of the NPC and hoped that the industry would sign and support it (“The Scientific and Technological Circles Initiated a Petition,” 2015).

## **Scholars**

In May 2015 a group of scholars launched a joint action to link up with professionals from all walks of life and appealed to members of the Legislative Council to veto the scheme of false universal suffrage. The eight core values presented included freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law (“Scholars Launch a Petition,” 2015).

## **Professionals**

A total of 12 professional groups were stationed in Mongkok for a propaganda against the government’s pseudo-universal suffrage scheme. Those twelve professional groups included the Progressive Lawyers Group, the Médecins Inspirés, the Concern Group of Nurses Politik, the Act Voice, the Progressive Teachers’ Alliance, the Frontline TechWorkers, the Hong Kong Psychologists Concern, the Radiation Therapist and the Radiographer’s Conscience, the ArchiVision, the IT Voice, the

Artists Action, and the Reclaiming Social Work Movement (“The Entertainment Circle Joined Twelve Professional Groups”, 2015).

### **Christians**

A group of Hong Kong Christians, including the Christians Support Democratic Reform, the Ekklesia Hong Kong, the Christian Social Concern Fellowship, the Christians for Hong Kong Society and the Umbrella City Cyberchurch launched an online petition on 27 May that ask legislators to reject the political reform package submitted by the government (“Christians Launched a Petition,” 2015).

### **University student unions**

The May Day Parade began, and a large number of university student unions, including the HKFS, the Student Union of the Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUSU), Hong Kong University of Science and Technology Students’ Union (HKUSTSU), the Open University of Hong Kong Students’ Union (OUHKSU), the City University of Hong Kong Students’ Union (CityUSU), the Hong Kong Polytechnic University Students’ Union (HKPUSU), the Hang Seng University of Hong Kong Students’ Union (HSUHKSU) and others were stepping out of Victoria Park (HKFS, 2015).

### **HKJP**

The Justice and Peace Commission of The Hong Kong Catholic Diocese (HKJP) launched a “30-year Democracy Hardship Road” parade on 13 June to appeal to the public to adhere to the original intention of striving for universal suffrage and reject the old political reform plan (“[Political Reform] 400 People Marched against 831 Scheme,” 2015).

### **Campaign of All People Rejecting Fake Universal Suffrage**

Nathan Law, as a representative of the HKFS, attended a press conference on the “Campaign of All People Rejecting Fake Universal Suffrage” on 11 June 2015. The campaign included parade on 14 June, assembly on 15 June, assembly on 16 June, rally outside the Legislative Council on 17 June. Sponsoring groups included the Um dot dot dot, the Labour Party, the Civic Party, the Democratic Party, the CHRF, the HKJP, the HKFS, the Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions, the Ignite Your Belief, the Archives, the Defense of HK Freedom, the Umbrella Parents, the Umbrella Blossom, and Scholarism. Chan Kin-man, Nathan Law, Leung Kwok-hung, Joshua Wong were main guests (HKFS, 2015).

## **AEM at decline**

### **Hospital Authority Employees Alliance**

The Hospital Authority Employees Alliance launched strikes of medical staff beginning on 3 February 2020 (Lam, 2020).

The Hospital Authority Employees Alliance and several trade unions held a joint press conference on 29 February to protest against unreasonable suppression of employees who had participated in the strike (S. Chan, 2020).

### **Demosistō**

On 2 February 2020, Demosistō, together with the hksstrike2019 and Concern Groups of other secondary school, went to Tuen Mun, Mong Kok, Huangpu, Tseung Kwan O and other districts to appeal for support for the medical strike launched next day (Demosistō, 2020).

On the first reading day of the national anthem on 13 May 2019, Demosistō suddenly attacked the five-star flagpole, Agnes Chow, Wong Lee Lee, Joshua Wong, Liu Wai Lim, and Ivan Lam were present (Demosistō, 2020).

Demosistō initiated global petition to European leaders against National Security Law for Hong Kong (Demosistō, 2020).

### **Civil Human Rights Front**

In response to the police's indiscriminate arrest of '831' protestors, the CHRF issued a statement on 28 February 2020 (Civil Human Rights Front, 2020).

### **Hong Kong UPR Coalition**

The Hong Kong UPR Coalition issued a statement, expressing serious concern about the arrest of fifteen pan-democracy activists on 18 April 2020 (Hong Kong UPR Coalition, 2020).

### **League of Social Democrats**

On 30 April 2019, the League of Social Democrats protested at the police headquarters, severely denouncing the police for aiding tyranny and banning the May Day parade (League of Social Democrats, 2020).

### **Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions**

The HKCTU issued the May 1<sup>st</sup> statement. The joint agencies included the Personal and Community Services Workers General Union, the Chinese University of Hong Kong Employees General Union, the Hong Kong Dockers Union, the Confederation of Tertiary Institutes Staff Unions, the Construction Site Workers General Union, the Hospital Authority Workers General Union, the Retail, Commerce and Clothing Industries General Union, the Insurance and Finance Practitioners' Rights and Interests Branch, etc.

### **Media trade unions**

On 11 May 2020 seven media trade unions issued a joint statement to protest against that the police force had repeatedly trampled on the freedom of interview.

Those media trade unions included the Hong Kong Journalists Association, the Hong Kong Press Photographers Association, the Hong Kong Nonprofit Journal, the Journalism Educators for Press Freedom, the Radio Television Hong Kong Programme Staff Union, the Ming Pao Staff Association, and the Next Media Trade Union (“Seven Major Media Trade Unions Jointly Protested,” 2020).

### **hksstrike2019**

The hksstrike2019 and the Hongkongers Education Support called on students to strike for one day on 27 May in response to the three strikes (“The CCP’s Draconian Law Ensued,” 2020).

### **Anti-government demonstrations**

Anti-government demonstrations went back to the streets of Hong Kong on 1 May 2020, and Carol Ng Man-yee, Lee Cheuk-yan, Joshua Wong, Mak Tak-ching and members of the League of Social Democrats attended it (Cheung & Leung, 2020).

## **5.4 Conclusion**

To conclude, the main innovation of the research approach in this study is the combination of PEA and other methods in explaining the process and dynamics of the Umbrella Movement in comparison to the Anti-Extradition Movement. PEA’s approach is to transform words into numbers, to a certain degree, it implies a quantitative method, in addition to which, PEA can be combined with other methods.

The main differences between the two protest curves are that longitudinally, the number of protest events in the AEM greatly exceeds that of the UM; transversely, the AEM lasted longer at the peak phase than the UM. Besides, the AEM had significantly more violence than the UM. In terms of the main protest events, the Deliberation Days and “Trailwalks for universal suffrage” were the main protest activities in the



emergence phase of the UM. The protest population peaked at the end of September 2014. The main protest organizations involved the HKFS, Scholarism and the OCLP. During the decline phase of the UM, protest groups involved IT personnel, scholars, professional groups, Christians, university student unions, etc. The major protest involved Campaign of All People Rejecting Fake Universal Suffrage. As for the AEM, at its emergence phase, the main SMOs involved were Demosistō, the Civil Human Rights Front. During the peak stage, the Civil Human Rights Front organised marches on 9 June, 16 June, 22 June, 26 June, 1 July, 21 July, 18 August, 28 September, 8 December, and New Year's Day Parade on 1 January 2020. Demosistō launched a series of street station activities. Other major protest groups involved legal profession, Hong Kong Journalists Association, civil servants, medical staff, university student unions, Hong Kong Professional Teachers' Union, middle school students, advertising industry, social workers. During the decline stage, the main protest organizations included the Hospital Authority Employees Alliance, Demosistō, the Hong Kong UPR Coalition, the League of Social Democrats, the HKCTU, media trade unions, hksstrike2019, the Hongkongers Education Support. On 1 May 2020, anti-government demonstrations went back to Hong Kong streets because of the imposition of the National Security Law.

In this study, protest event analysis is used to analyze dependent variables, namely, PEA discusses the DVs including the emergence, peak, and decline phases of the UM and the AEM. Social network analysis (SNA) and framing analysis are used to investigate dependent variables. In the next two chapters I will discuss social network analysis and framing analysis.

# Chapter 6: Data Analysis and Results of Social Network Analysis

In this chapter I will present the Protest Event Analysis (PEA) and Social Network Analysis (SNA) used in this thesis. This chapter builds on Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 in the following ways. Specifically, I apply the mechanistic analytical framework from Chapter 4. The chapter proceeds as follows. Firstly I will make a brief comparison of the protest waves of the Umbrella Movement and the Anti-Extradition Movement and give an overview of each, respectively. In a second step I will divide the two protest waves into three phases: emergence, peak, and decline, and compare their differences, respectively (namely PEA). Thirdly I will discuss the operation of independent variables (leaders, SMOs, networking and influential allies) via mechanisms (*brokerage*, *social appropriation*, *scale shift* and *certification*) in each stage, combining them with sociograms. The last and most important step is an analysis of tables to understand whether mechanisms (*brokerage*, *social appropriation*, *scale shift*, and *certification*) can explain the differences in the protest waves of the two movements at emergence, peak, and decline stages.

In the following section the changing trends of the emergence, peak and decline stages of the UM and the AEM will be compared and contrasted, and the conditions of IVs in these three different stages will be observed and analysed to discover which factors cause the differences of the protest waves between the UM and the AEM and understand whether the mechanisms work in the manner anticipated and how effective they are.


## 6.1 Emergence phases of UM & AEM

As for IVs, the three sponsors of “Occupy Central with Love and Peace” (OCLP) naturally became the leaders of the UM with important influence. They promoted the propaganda of Occupy Central and established contacts by participating in and organizing seminars in various industries. Regarding the leaders of the AEM, the core activist Joshua Wong participated more in the non-conventional protest actions, as to other leaders’ role, SNA cannot provide sufficient analysis, and thus I will use *brokerage* to discuss the role of another important leader, Nathan Law. In terms of SMOs, the OCLP and the HKFS were the major SMOs of the UM. The OCLP established contact with all walks of life through Deliberation Days, by comparison, the HKFS did not play that role as *brokerage*. The SMOs of the AEM, namely, Demosistō and the CHRF performed similar functions to the OCLP and the HKFS. That is to say, Demosistō served as a broker, yet the CHRF did not. With regard to networking, civil society constituted a strong social base for the UM and the AEM. The differences between the two lay in that the latter had wider networking than the former, and the organizational base of the UM was appropriated by the OCLP while the AEM’s networking was mainly formed by the spontaneous actions of various social groups, which lacked coordination, except for the marches on 31 March and 28 April 2019. In summary, this kind of appropriation of organizational base is *social appropriation*. As for influential allies, the scope, number, and degree of the pan-democracy camp’s participation in the emergence phase of the AEM was significantly greater than those of the UM, also, foreign governmental circles showed concerns for the AEM, but not in the UM. Influential allies’ participation and the act of expressing concern were actual actions. The existence of influential allies indicates a state of relationship, and there should be a mechanism between this relationship and actual actions that works, that is *certification*.

To explore in greater detail the issue of IVs → mechanisms leading to the sharp contrast in the protest waves at the emergence phases, the social network analysis (SNA) results will now be discussed.



Figure 6.2 SNA actor-by-event at AEM emergence:




- **Events**
- **Leaders**
- **Organizations**
- **Influential allies**

Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.2 illustrate the relationship between the actors (leaders, SMOs or other organizations, and influential allies) and events. The nodes stand for actors and events. The vectors represent joint participation in protest events. The similarity between the UM and the AEM was that there were some large protests in the two emergence stages, which involved more participants and participating groups. The basic difference between the UM and the AEM was that the connection between the nodes of the former was loose, while that of the latter was very close, as shown in Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.2. This means that protest events occurred more frequently in the emergence stage of the AEM which involved more actors than those of the UM. Also, the protests in the UM were mostly in the form of seminars and “Trailwalker” activity, while for the AEM, the March 31<sup>st</sup> march and the April 28<sup>th</sup> march successively took place. The protest events of the latter were clearly more aggressive. Additionally, it is important to observe from Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.2 that the main actors included the OCLP, the HKFS, Benny Tai, Chan Kin-man, Chu Yiu-ming, and Demosistō, the CHRF, Joshua Wong, Claudia Mo, respectively (refer to Tables 6.1 and 6.2 below). Next, let us move to the relationship between the actors.

Figure 6.3 SNA actor-by-actor at UM emergence:

- MP employees
- JPAVU
- Freedom HK
- Comm gradts
- HK Perform stu
- CHK Link
- HKUSU
- Finan profess
- College stu
- HK Alliance



- Me-workers
- Bus drivers

- ICA
- HKBU







Figure 6.4 SNA actor-by-actor at AEM emergence:



**Table 6.1 SNA actor-by-actor at UM emergence**

<b>Names of actors - Full names</b>	<b>Betweenness</b>
<b>OCLP - Occupy Central with Love and Peace</b>	<b>432.689</b>
<b>HKFS - Hong Kong Federation of Students</b>	<b>428.291</b>
<b>Scholarism - Scholarism</b>	<b>216.452</b>
<b>Benny Tai - Benny Tai</b>	<b>213.000</b>
<b>CHRF - Civil Human Rights Front</b>	<b>127.452</b>
<b>Democ Party - Democratic Party</b>	<b>92.078</b>
<b>Chu Yiu-ming - Chu Yiu-ming</b>	<b>78.556</b>
<b>Net Women - Network for Women in Politics</b>	<b>49.789</b>
<b>Assc Ad Fem - Association for the Advancement of Feminism</b>	<b>49.789</b>
<b>Teen's Key - Teen's Key</b>	<b>49.789</b>
<b>HKJP - Justice and Peace Commission of the Hong Kong Catholic Diocese</b>	<b>43.537</b>

**Table 6.2 SNA actor-by-actor at AEM emergence**

<b>Names of actors - Full names</b>	<b>Betweenness</b>
<b>Demosistō - Demosistō</b>	<b>2209.486</b>
<b>Progr Law Gro - Progressive Law group</b>	<b>1087.920</b>
<b>Claudia Mo - Claudia Mo</b>	<b>936.042</b>
<b>Fixing HK - Fixing Hong Kong</b>	<b>743.668</b>
<b>RSWM - Reclaiming Social Work Movement</b>	<b>728.287</b>
<b>Ivan Lam - Ivan Lam</b>	<b>394.208</b>
<b>Nathan Law - Nathan Law</b>	<b>344.142</b>
<b>Alvin Yeung - Alvin Yeung</b>	<b>313.054</b>
<b>Chan Kok-hin - Chan Kok-hin</b>	<b>294.230</b>

<b>James To - James To</b>	<b>229.413</b>
<b>Chung Lai Him - Chung Lai Him</b>	<b>218.144</b>
<b>Ivan Wong - Ivan Wong Yun-tat</b>	<b>218.144</b>
<b>Leung Kwok-hung - Leung Kwok-hung</b>	<b>204.731</b>
<b>PP - People Power</b>	<b>162.953</b>
<b>LSD - League of Social Democrats</b>	<b>162.953</b>
<b>Democ Party - Democratic Party</b>	<b>162.953</b>
<b>Labour Party - Labour Party</b>	<b>162.953</b>
<b>Joshua Wong - Joshua Wong</b>	<b>155.686</b>
<b>Wu Chi-wai - Wu Chi-wai</b>	<b>145.000</b>
<b>Eddie Chu - Eddie Chu</b>	<b>143.124</b>
<b>Prog Tea Allia - Progressive Teachers Alliance</b>	<b>141.293</b>
<b>HKEd4All - HKEd4All</b>	<b>141.293</b>
<b>Au Nok-hin - Au Nok-hin</b>	<b>120.119</b>
<b>Raymond Chan - Raymond Chan</b>	<b>106.081</b>
<b>Jimmy Sham - Jimmy Sham</b>	<b>106.081</b>
<b>CHRF - Civil Human Rights Front</b>	<b>106.081</b>

Betweenness centrality weighs the frequency a node situated at the shortest route between other nodes, illustrating which nodes are ties between nodes in a network (Disney, 2020). Betweenness is used to find the liaisons that affect the system dynamic (Disney, 2020). The role of *brokerage* is to contact originally unrelated activists, and this role of such an intermediary is equivalent to liaison. In other words, a broker is equivalent to a liaison. In the diagrams of social network analysis, nodes

stand for actors or events, and betweenness centrality can identify which actors tie the most actors, and these actors mean the most important brokers.

From Figure 6.3 and Figure 6.4, it can be observed that the UM had a higher degree of aggregation, which was in the form of a monoblock, while the AEM had a looser connection and presented a scattered linear shape. Moreover, the UM had more important intermediators, who established more connection with more actors, than the AEM did. As for the UM, these powerful intermediators included the OCLP, the HKFS, Scholarism, Benny Tai, Chan Kin-man, and Chu Yiu-ming (according to Table 6.1). For the AEM, the influential intermediators included Demosistō, Claudia Mo, the Progressive Law group, the Fixing Hong Kong, RSWM, and Nathan Law (according to Table 6.2).

Next, the roles of various IVs (leaders, SMOs, networking, and influential allies) will be discussed in detail, whether they work through the mechanisms or not will be analysed, namely, the tenability of leaders → *brokerage*, SMOs → *brokerage*, networking → *social appropriation*, and influential allies → *certification* will be examined. Then whether and how *brokerage*, *social appropriation*, *scale shift* and *certification* can explain the differences between the UM and the AEM will be discussed.

### **6.1.1 Leaders → *brokerage***

As for the UM in the emergence phase, Benny Tai, Chan Kin Man and Chu Yiu-ming were the notable leaders. The activities they engaged in are as follows. The Catholic General Election Deliberation Day on 1 December 2013 was held by the Justice and Peace Commission of the Hong Kong Catholic Diocese (HKJP), Chu Yiu-ming was one of the speakers (Occupy Central with Love and Peace, 2013). The

Deliberation Day provided a special session for deaf and hearing-impaired persons on 11 January 2014 at Baptist University, and Professor Tai Yiu-ting presided over the meeting (Occupy Central with Love and Peace, 2014). In addition, on 9 March 2014 all DDay2 participants (especially those who had signed the letter of intent for OCLP, who were responsible for organizing and assisting) were invited by Benny Tai, Chan Kin Man and Chu Yiu-ming, to gather once again to sum up and share their experiences in the DDay2 Summary and Forward-looking Conference (Occupy Central with Love and Peace, 2014). On 21 April 2014, the Hong Kong Unison organised the first seminar on democracy, political reform, and minority rights especially for ethnic minorities (EM). Benny Tai was invited as a guest speaker (Occupy Central with Love and Peace, 2014). Finally, Benny Tai, Chan Kin-man, and Chu Yiu-ming initiated “Citizen Voice Rally” on 31 August 2014 (Occupy Central with Love and Peace, 2014). Generally, social movement leaders are considered as strategic decision makers who motivate and mobilize others to participate in protests (Morris & Staggenborg, 2004). Only one kind of leaders can be regarded as brokers. Brokers are unofficial leaders, who play a part in linking activists in a mass membership organization to the central leaders of these groups. Put differently, a broker is a bridge builder. Someone in an official position of leadership can be a bridge builder / broker, but lots of leaders do not do *brokerage*. In a word, the formal role of a leader sometimes cannot be described as *brokerage*. In the case of UM, the role of Benny Tai, Chan Kin Man and Chu Yiu-ming played is not typical of a leader, it is more appropriate to describe them as brokers. So, leaders → *brokerage* was tenable here.

Regarding the AEM, the activities Joshua Wong was involved in included chasing the Secretary for Justice Teresa Cheng on 12 March 2019 (Demosistō, 2019) and pursuing the Secretary for Security John Lee on 13 March 2019 (Demosistō,

2019). Also, Joshua Wong attended the March 31<sup>st</sup> parade (H. Chan, 2019) and the April 28 march (Creery, 2019), as well as the protest against the amendment of extradition ordinance on 17 April 2019. Basically, these actions are non-conventional protests. Leaders → *brokerage* was not applicable to Joshua Wong in the emergence stage of the AEM. But that was not true for Law. Nathan Law and three members of the Legislative Council went to Taiwan in March 2019 to discuss with the various parties and media in Taiwan the amendment of the extradition provisions (Demosistō, 2019). In May, several members of Hong Kong's NGOs organized special groups to travel to Canada and the United States to reflect the impact of the amendment on Hong Kong. Participants included Martin Lee, Lee Cheuk Yan, Nathan Law, Margaret Ng and others (Demosistō, 2019). Thus, it can be seen, leaders → *brokerage* was applicable to Nathan Law. In brief, the roles played by the leaders of the UM and the AEM were different, though both could be described as *brokerage*, the role of the former was reflected in internal coordination, while the latter adopted the international route. In summary, leaders → *brokerage* was tenable for both movements.

Overall, as for how *brokerage*, *social appropriation*, *scale shift*, and *certification* explained the differences of the protest waves in the emergence phases of the UM and the AEM, it is necessary to refer back to Figure 6.2 and Figure 6.3 (and also to refer to the following Tables). First and foremost, by comparing the scores of the actors' betweenness centrality, it is clear that the AEM greatly exceeds the UM. Among them, the score of Demosistō as the highest ranking the AEM is 5 times higher than the OCLP, the highest ranking the UM (OCLP), and the first five actors (Demosistō, Progressive Law group, Claudia Mo, Fixing Hong Kong, and Reclaiming Social Work Movement) of the AEM are higher than any of those of the UM. Not only that, there are 12 actors with higher scores (betweenness centrality) in the AEM than the third

highest (Scholarism) in the UM. All in all, nodes (leaders, SMOs/groups, influential allies) in SNA diagrams are also seen as brokers, and therefore betweenness is used as an indicator of *brokerage*. The gap between the UM and the AEM's score of betweenness centrality is directly proportional to the gap in the number of protests in the three stages, respectively. That is to say, *brokerage* reveals the difference in the levels of the protest waves at all stages. What is more, not only leaders and SMOs, but also influential allies (such as Claudia Mo, RSWM, Alvin Yeung and James To) play an important role through *brokerage*. Even among the main brokers, influential allies account for a greater proportion, which proves that influential allies work through *brokerage*, namely, influential allies → *brokerage* is valid. In conclusion, although it can be seen from the tables above that the role of leaders as brokers is not as obvious as that of SMOs as brokers, leaders → *brokerage* in the AEM (such as Ivan Lam, Nathan Law and Chan Kok-hin) produces greater effects than that of the UM (such as Benny Tai).

### **6.1.2 SMOs → *brokerage***

The OCLP and the HKFS served as the main SMOs during the emergence stage of the UM. The OCLP's activities mainly comprised holding various Deliberation Days, ceremonies, "Trailwalks", street stations and demonstrative protests. To be specific, the OCLP invited friends from engineering, planning, measurement, accounting, law, and other professional sectors to participate in the Professional Commons' deliberation day on 1 December 2013 (Occupy Central with Love and Peace, 2013). Also, Deliberation Day II was held by the OCLP Secretariat held the second public deliberation day on 7 December 2013 (Occupy Central with Love and Peace, 2013). The anti-silencing parade, "February 23<sup>rd</sup> Freedom of expression", was organised by the Hong Kong Journalists Association, and the OCLP called on people

to participate in it (Facebook, 2014). On 12 April 2014, the OCLP held an oath to participate in the “OCLP” ceremony (Occupy Central with Love and Peace, 2014). Moreover, the OCLP elected three political reform proposals including citizen nominations on the Deliberation Day held on 6 May 2014 (Occupy Central with Love and Peace, 2014). The OCLP organised “Trailwalks” for universal suffrage from 14 June to 20 June 2014, participating groups included the CHRF, the HKFS, and Scholarism (Occupy Central with Love and Peace, 2014). Finally, the OCLP, the Alliance for True Democracy, the HKFS, the CHRF, Scholarism, and the Democratic Party organised a series of protest actions at the “Citizen Voice Rally” on 31 August 2014 (Occupy Central with Love and Peace, 2014). On 31 August 2014, the OCLP issued the official statement in response to the “831 decision” of the NPCSC, regarded it as not only stifling universal suffrage but as a brutal blow to “one country, two systems” (Occupy Central with Love and Peace, 2014). In general, the OCLP disseminated information and established contacts through Deliberation Days and street stations, and therefore SMOs → *brokerage* was valid for the OCLP.

As for the HKFS, its activities included holding an Academic Referendum Discussion Conference on 5 January 2014 (HKPUSU, 2014), requesting Government officials to face up to the wishes of the people of Hong Kong and establish a nomination procedure and election method without political screening on 5 February 2014 (HKFS, 2014). In addition, on 9 March 2014, the HKFS issued a petition on the attack of Kevin Lau, strongly condemning violence and urging police to arrest the culprits as soon as possible (HKFS, 2014). By and large, although the Discussion Conference can be regarded as fulfilling the role of *brokerage*, the HKFS’s protests were relatively few, and there is insufficient evidence to prove that SMOs → *brokerage* was applicable to the HKFS.



In the emergence stage of the AEM, SMOs including Demosistō and the CHRF played a decisive role. Regarding Demosistō, the Demosistō team members were pressurising the Secretary for Justice Teresa Cheng in the Southern District Council on 12 March 2019 (Demosistō, 2019); one day later, the Demosistō team members took another action to lobby the Secretary for Security, Mr. John Lee, demanding that the government should withdraw the amendment (Demosistō, 2019). Also, on the eve of the March 31<sup>st</sup> parade 2019, the Demosistō team set up a street station in Wan Chai to make a final appeal (Demosistō, 2019). Moreover, the Demosistō team distributed protest information through street stations on 31 March and inspire more people to participate in protest activities and/or support protest claims, for example, lifting placards written in twelve languages called other states' attention to the proposal which might have an impact on their citizens in HK (Lum, Cheung, & Lam, 2019). The Demosistō team continued to strive for the support of the public and create greater mobilization in the future through street stations on 14 April 2019, including Joshua Wong (Demosistō, 2019). Similarly, on 28 April 2019, from noon, Demosistō members, including Joshua Wong, stood outside the Causeway Bay MTR station and appealed to the public to go to the streets (Demosistō, 2019). In addition, Demosistō, together with the Progressive Teachers' Alliance, the HKEd4All, the Youth Policy Advocators and the Umbrella Parents and the Edu Lab launched a petition and demanded the reform of the Curriculum Development Council (Demosistō, 2019). Furthermore, during the period from 20-25 May 2019, Demosistō, together with a number of NGOs and community work teams, set up street stations in various districts of Hong Kong to invite Hong Kong people to actively participate in the June 9<sup>th</sup> parade (Demosistō, 2019). Hence, it can be clearly seen that the Demosistō's job mainly involved the street

stations and the liaison with other educational groups, and SMOs → *brokerage* was tenable here.

As for the Civil Human Rights Front, it issued a statement on 4 March 2019, strongly opposing the amendment of the extradition ordinance (Civil Human Rights Front, 2019). Following this, the CHRF and pan-democratic MPs organised the parade on 31 March 2019 (H. Chan, 2019). The CHRF and the pan-democratic parties were holding a protest against the amendment of the extradition ordinance on 17 April 2019 (Civil Human Rights Front, 2019). Also, the CHRF organised the April 28<sup>th</sup> march after four leaders of the Umbrella Movement were imprisoned (Creery, 2019). Moreover, seeing that the Democratic faction was struggling to resist in the Legislative Council, the CHRF appealed to the people of Hong Kong to come out to participate in the rally launched by the CHRF on 10 May 2019 to show support with the number of protestors (Shiu, 2019). Subsequently, the CHRF launched three actions from 13 to 14 May 2019, consisting of the protest on Tim Mei Road, Chief Executive office protest, protest outside the Legislative Council (Civil Human Rights Front, 2019). Therefore, the CHRF launched a series of non-conventional protests. SMOs → *brokerage* was not tenable here.

Altogether, both the HKFS and the CHRF functioned as SMOs, the former was involved in conventional activities, and the latter took confrontational actions. Yet, the OCLP and Demosistō played roles of *brokerage*, the former spread information through holding or attending Deliberation Days, while the latter facilitated the mobilization via setting up street stations. In summary, SMOs → *brokerage* was tenable for the OCLP and Demosistō, but not tenable for the HKFS and the CHRF. As discussed in the last section, SMOs, as brokers, play a greater role than leaders in the UM and AEM, besides, the score of Demosistō's betweenness centrality is more than

5 times those of the OCLP and the HKFS. This suffices to prove that SMOs → *brokerage* can explain the difference between the two protest curves in the longitudinal direction at their emergence stages (the one difference of the protest waves at the emergence stages).

### **6.1.3 Networking → *social appropriation / scale shift***

With regard to the networking events of the UM, it mainly involves various religious organizations, women's organizations, student organizations, journalists' associations, and others. For example, the Catholic General Election Deliberation Day on 1 December was held by the Justice and Peace Commission of the Hong Kong Catholic Diocese (HKJP) (Occupy Central with Love and Peace, 2013). On 1 December 2013, the Deliberation day of Women & Gender / Difference & Minority was sponsored by the Association for the Advancement of Feminism, the Network for Women in Politics, the Teen's Key and the Hong Kong Women Christian Council, and co-organized by the Hong Kong Women's Coalition on Equal Opportunities, the Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions - Women's Commission, the Advocacy Group, Transgender Resource Center, the HKFS, and the League in Defense of Hong Kong's Freedoms (Occupy Central with Love and Peace, 2013). Moreover, the College Christian Democratic Reform Deliberation Day was organised by the Inter College Christian Fellowship - ICCF, the Hong Kong Christian Council and the CityU Christian Fellowship on 26 January 2014 (Occupy Central with Love and Peace, 2014). The Martin Luther King Memorial Day Party on 20 January 2014 was sponsored by the Preparatory Committee of the Prayer for Love and Peace (Occupy Central with Love and Peace, 2014). Also, the Hong Kong Christian Institute launched a Christian Prayer Meeting on 2 March 2014 to promote justice and defend freedom of the press without fear of censorship threats (House News, 2014). The Hong Kong Journalists

Association launched “Anti-violence silent stand action” at Tamar Park on 2 March 2014 (House News, 2014). In addition, on 9 March 2014 the HKFS issued a petition on the attack of Kevin Lau, strongly condemning violence and urging police to arrest the culprits as soon as possible, participating in the petition included the Student Union of the Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUSU), the Student Union of Hong Kong Shue Yan University (SYUSU), Scholarism, the Hong Kong Federation of Social Work Students (HKFSWS), the Hong Kong Community College Students’ Union (HKCCSU), the Education University of Hong Kong Students’ Union (EUHKSU) and the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology Students’ Union (HKUSTSU) (HKFS, 2014).

Furthermore, the OCLP elected 3 political reform proposals including citizen nominations on the Deliberation Day held on 6 May 2014. Participating groups included the Christians Support Democratic Political Reform, the Comic Daemons and representatives of the arts and cultural circles, the Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions, the Hong Kong Professional Teachers’ Union, the Inter College Christian Fellowship - ICCF, the Hong Kong Women Worker’s Association, HKJP, the League in Defense of Hong Kong’s Freedoms, the Women & Gender/Difference & Minorities Dday2 Preparatory Committee, HKFS, and many more (Occupy Central with Love and Peace, 2014). The OCLP organised “Trailwalks” for universal suffrage from 14 June to 20 June 2014, participating groups included the HKCTU, the Hong Kong Social Workers’ General Union (HKAWGU), the Hong Kong Professional Teachers’ Union (HKPTU), the Hong Kong Women Worker’s Association (HKWWA), HKJP, the Hong Kong Federation of Catholic Students - HKFCS, the Hong Kong Christian Institute, the Network for Women in Politics, the Association for the Advancement of Feminism, the Teen’s Key, the Diocesan Youth Commission Hong Kong (DYCHK), the Hong Kong

Association of Women Social Workers (HKAWSW), the Comic Daemons (Occupy Central with Love and Peace, 2014). Taken together, the networking of the UM in the emergence stage was broad, besides, support from circles of religion, women, education, press, student unions, and social work sector etc. was inseparable from the exchanges of the seminars organized by the OCLP. And the absorption of these social groups is *social appropriation*, which was mainly achieved through Deliberation Days and Trailwalks for universal suffrage. So, networking → *social appropriation* was tenable here.

Regarding the networking events of the AEM, during the period from 20-25 May 2019, a number of non-governmental organizations and community work teams set up street stations in various districts of Hong Kong, so that the public could have a better understanding of the damage and impact of this amendment, hoping that Hong Kong people would be ready for another wave of large-scale resistance in June (Demosistō, 2019). These groups included the Souther Net House, the Community March, the Hung To Alliance, the Hong Kong Group of Democracy Promotion, the Student Labor Action Coalition, the Polyu Pavilion, the Reclaiming Social Work Movement, the Student Union of the Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUSU), the Current Affairs Committee of the HKUSU Council, the HKPUSU, the Hong Kong Baptist University Students' Union (HKBUSU), the Workercom, the Life in Fortress Hill, the Hong Kong Victoria Social Association (HKVSA), and the Fixing Hong Kong (Demosistō, 2019). Equally, professional groups issued a joint statement regarding the proposal to amend extradition arrangements on 3 March 2019, pointing out that once Hong Kong courts could transfer people from Hong Kong to the mainland for trial, the boundary between one country and two systems would be blurred (Progressive Lawyers Group, 2019). Joint professional groups signatories included the Act Voice,

the ArchiVision, the Artists Action, the CM Doctors Cure, the Democratic Action Accountants, the Financier Conscience, the Frontline Tech Workers, the HKEd4All, the HK Psychologists Concern, the Insurance ARISE, the IT Voice, the Médecins Inspirés, the Nurse Politik, the OccuFocus, the Physio Action, the Progressive Lawyers Group, the Progressive Scholars Group, the Progressive Teachers' Alliance, the Radiation Therapist and Radiographer Conscience (Progressive Lawyers Group, 2019). In a nutshell, a wide range of civil society groups from all walks of life in Hong Kong were opposing the extradition bill. The AEM's networking was formed spontaneously, not used by challenging groups and transformed into political groups.

However, that was not the whole story, and there are some aspects of contentious politics that have not yet been discussed because they were not part of the protest networks. In particular, top business elites opposed the proposal. The previous Chief Secretary of Hong Kong Henry Tang Ying Yen, chairman of the Lai Sun Development Company Peter Lam Kin Ngok, and Jeffrey Lam Kin Fung, a member of the Executive Council, all raised concerns about the scope of the bill (T. Cheung, 2019). On 6 March 2019, the American Chamber of Commerce cautioned that the extradition bill would harm the city's prestige as a safe harbour for international commerce (T. Cheung, 2019). Complaints came not only from the business community. On 8 April 2019 all members of the Election Committee Subsector Election (Legal) issued a joint statement, including many lawmakers, which urged the Security Bureau to withdraw the draft. Once adopted, the statement claimed, the draft would seriously damage the international community's confidence in Hong Kong's criminal justice system and human rights protection ("Withdraw the Fugitive Offenders Bill," 2019). Moreover, three senior judges stated that the amendment to the Fugitive Offenders Ordinance was one of the most serious challenges facing Hong Kong's legal system. Judges

have traditionally not commented on political or legislative matters. This was the first time that judges openly discussed this issue (Demosistō, 2019). In brief, both the political and business circles had questioned the extradition bill, which promoted the emergence of the mobilization to a certain extent, but they are not part of the mobilization, so *social appropriation* does not apply here.

Generally, networking → *social appropriation* was tenable for the UM but untenable for the AEM. In terms of networking, the networking of the AEM was more extensive than the UM in the emergence stages and the peak stages, and almost the same in the decline stages. From the figures, networking does not seem to be positively related to the protest number of UM and AEM since the protest events of the AEM in the three stages is more than those of the UM in its three phases. As for the relationship between networking and the longevity of the UM and the AEM, compared to the those of the UM, AEM had the shorter durations at the emergence stage and the decline stage and the longer protest wave at the peak stage, and thus not only networking can neither explain the difference in the number of protest events between the UM and AEM, nor can it explain the difference in the longevity between the two. Hence, *social appropriation* is going to be introduced and discussed its role. Here we need to review the definitions of networking and *social appropriation*, networking means SMOs' pre-existent networks, the cooperation and communication with other 'like-minded' groups and communities (Brannan. 2009, p 9). *Social appropriation* refers to that challenging groups transform non-political actors to political actors participating in the movement (Tilly & Tarrow, 2015). Networking refers to the spontaneous participation of like-minded organizations, and *social appropriation* refers to challenging groups' utilization and transformation of potential protest groups. In this sense, we could conceive of networking as a precursor to social appropriation. Linking

up to collaborate is a first-step towards appropriating a cause. During the emergence phase of the UM, religious groups, women's groups, student organizations, social work organizations and others were appropriated to participate in the activities launched by the OCLP, and *social appropriation* is also seen as preliminary mobilization of the initial stage, which takes more time, and naturally lasts longer than spontaneous protests by unrelated groups. In contrast, *social appropriation* did not occur in the initial stage of the AEM. Therefore, I suppose that *social appropriation* provides an explanation for the longer duration of the UM than the AEM (the other difference of the protest waves at the emergence stages). Regarding *scale shift*, because *scale shift* is generally not obvious yet at the emergence phases of both, I do not discuss *scale shift* until later in this chapter.

#### **6.1.4 Influential allies → certification**

Influential allies refer to the pan-democratic legislators district councillors, and political parties as well as foreign governments and politicians. As for the UM in the emergence phase, influential allies engaged in activities including street stations, deliberation days, debates, and "Trailwalks". More specifically, Tanya Chan, a founding member of the Civic Party, handed out leaflets with OCLP volunteers on 9 April 2014, making efforts to sow the seeds of democracy on the streets (Occupy Central with Love and Peace, 2014). On 25 May 2014, the OCLP Volunteer Team and Tanya Chan in Great George Street, Causeway Bay were appealing to the public to vote together from 20 to 22 June 2014 (Occupy Central with Love and Peace, 2014). Moreover, the OCLP elected 3 political reform proposals including citizen nominations on the Deliberation Day held on 6 May 2014. The influential allies involved included the Civic Party, the Hong Kong Association for Democracy and People's Livelihood, the Democratic Party, the Labour Party, the League of Social Democrats (LSD)



(Occupy Central with Love and Peace, 2014). Also, on 7 June 2014 the first open debate including the proponents of the three OCLP programmes began. Representatives of the three political reform programs included Professor Joseph Cheng of the True Universal Election Alliance, Christopher Lau of the People Power and Alex Chow of the HKFS (Occupy Central with Love and Peace, 2014). On the same day, the Democratic Party Founding Chairman Martin Lee attended a publicity campaign on the street outside the McDonald in Yue Man Square, Kwun Tong (Occupy Central with Love and Peace, 2014). Finally, the OCLP organised “Trailwalks” for universal suffrage from 14 June to 20 June 2014, participating groups included the Labour Party, the Civic Party, the Professional Commons, the Democratic Party, the Reclaiming Social Work Movement (RSWM), the League of Social Democrats (LSD), the Hong Kong Association for Democracy and People’s Livelihood (HKADPL), the Neighbourhood and Worker’s Service Centre (NWSC), and the Neo Democrats. (Occupy Central with Love and Peace, 2014).

Concerning the AEM, the CHRF’s conveners held a press conference on 3 March 2019 with the pan-democrats on the “March against the Amendment of Extradition Ordinance”, including Jimmy Sham, Claudia Mo, Raymond Chan, Gary Fan, Leung Kwok-hung, Alvin Yeung, Helena Wong, and Shiu Ka-chun, Roy Tam etc. (Civil Human Rights Front, 2019). Moreover, the CHRF and pan-democratic MPs organised the March 31<sup>st</sup> parade 2019. Martin Lee and Margaret Ng (J. Lam, 2019), Avery Ng, Helena Wong, Raymond Chan, Claudia Mo, Leung Yiu-chung, Au Nok-hin, Gary Fan, Alvin Yeung, Jimmy Sham, Shiu Ka-chun, and James To turned out for the march (H. Chan, 2019). The CHRF and pan-democracy parties consisting of the Labour Party, the People Power, the Democratic Party, the League of Social Democrats, and others were holding a protest against the amendment of the

extradition ordinance on 17 April 2019, and Jimmy Sham, Lee Cheuk-yan, Raymond Chan Chi-chuen, Gary Fan, Jeremy Tam, Wu Chi-wai, Claudia Mo, and Alvin Yeung participated (Civil Human Rights Front, 2019). Also, various political parties participated in establishing street stations to launch publicity campaigns on 24-27 April 2019, including the Democratic Party, the Civic Party, the League of Social Democrats, the Labour Party, the People Power, Eddie Chu, Claudia Mo, James To, Mok Kin Shing, Mak Tak Ching, Alan Leong, Leung Kwok-hung, and Alvin Yeung (Civil Human Rights Front, 2019). What is more, the CHRF organised the April 28<sup>th</sup> march after four leaders of the Umbrella Movement were imprisoned. Figo Chan, Tommy Cheung, Claudia Mo, Margaret Ng, Raymond Chan, Leung Kwok-hung, Lee Wing-tat, Martin Lee and Kwok Ka-ki took part (Creery, 2019). Before the June 9<sup>th</sup> march 2019, the Democrats set up more than 200 street stations in all districts of Hong Kong to explain to the public the serious consequences of the draconian law. The pan-democracy camp included the People Power, the League of Social Democrats, Ivan Wong, Leung Kam Wai, Wong Bing Kuen, Hui Kei Cheung, the Neighbourhood and Worker's Service Centre (NWSC), the Neo Democrats, the Democratic Party, the Civic Party, the Labour Party, Eddie Chu, Claudia Mo (Civil Human Rights Front, 2019). Not only that, but the international community also expressed serious concerns. The European Union had expressed concerns about a Hong Kong government plan to allow the transfer of fugitives to mainland China (J. Lam, 2019). The US House speaker Nancy Pelosi took the same view (Churchill, 2019). The British Consul General in Hong Kong, Andrew Richard Heyn, had formally expressed his concern, criticizing the short consultation process of the Hong Kong government, which was insufficient to incorporate public opinion (Lum, 2019).

Overall, influential allies → *certification* was tenable for both the UM and the AEM, showing the supportive and acceptable attitude of the local influential allies, yet the scale and degree of the pan-democratic camp's participation in the two were different, as can be seen from Tables 6.1 and 6.2, the AEM had a stronger and more direct participation from the influential allies than that of the UM. Moreover, international influential allies played a role in the AEM but not the UM. Overall, by observing the three stages of influential allies' *certification* and comparing the protest curves of the UM and the AEM, I find that compared to those of the UM, a higher degree of *certification* in the emergence stage and the peak stage of the AEM but a lower degree *certification* in the decline stage of the AEM is not commensurate with the larger quantity of protest events from beginning to end of the AEM. Equally, the higher degree of *certification* in the emergence stage and the peak stage of the AEM do not correspond to the shorter longevity of the AEM at the emergence stage and greater longevity of the AEM at the peak stage, in comparison with those of the UM. In a word, *certification* cannot interpret the differences of the protest waves at the emergence stages.


## **6.2 Peak phases of UM & AEM**

The Umbrella Movement was not a characteristically “leaderless movement,” as Castells (2012) found in other insurrections throughout the world; instead, the leaders and SMOs of the UM forged a special coalition to establish a forum as a formal apparatus to integrate internal divergences and coordinate protest activities during the peak phase (Lin, 2017). Compared to the UM, the Anti-Extradition Movement was a typical decentralized and leaderless movement. The protest leaders of the AEM were more like brokers. They could not speak as a spokesperson representing protest activities but could deliver information and provide assistance as ordinary participants.

With respect to the SMOs of the AEM, the CHRF, Demosistō and the HKCTU were main agencies. They not only provided assembly information and assistance, but also built connections between organizations, yet they were unable to control the trend of the protest activities, merely operating as participating actors in the process. In brief, the CHRF and Demosistō operated in a similar way to the functions of the UM's SMOs. Moreover, networking at the peak phases of the UM and the AEM was broad, however, there was an evident *scale shift* in the AEM, from street to community, and then to strikes in various industries, while the UM's protests mainly concentrated on the city's streets. Besides, *certification* of international political circles, like the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act, has a significant impact on the movement outcome and subsequent development.



Figure 6.6 SNA actor-by-event at AEM peak:



As can be seen from Figures 6.5 and 6.6, the AEM involved more events and actors, the UM was more concentrated in the relationship between actors, and the AEM was more spontaneous and decentralized. It is easy to identify the main leaders and SMOs from Figure 6.5, including Joshua Wong, Alex Chow, Benny Tai and Chan Kin-man, Nathan Law, the HKFS, Scholarism and the OCLP. By comparison, it is not so easy to find core leaders and SMOs, and Jimmy Sham, the CHRF and Demosistō are only relatively identifiable.

Figure 6.7 SNA actor-by-actor at UM peak:







Figure 6.8 SNA actor-by-actor at AEM peak:



**Table 6.3 SNA actor-by-actor at UM peak**

<b>Names of actors - Full names</b>	<b>Betweenness</b>
<b>Joshua Wong - Joshua Wong</b>	<b>615.966</b>
<b>HKFS - Hong Kong Federation of Students</b>	<b>529.476</b>
<b>Scholarism - Scholarism</b>	<b>508.658</b>
<b>Lester Shum - Lester Shum</b>	<b>407.259</b>
<b>Benny Tai - Benny Tai</b>	<b>367.906</b>
<b>HKU - The University of Hong Kong</b>	<b>332.000</b>
<b>Chan Kin-man - Chan Kin-man</b>	<b>259.601</b>
<b>Albert Ho - Albert Ho</b>	<b>188.304</b>
<b>Alex Chow - Alex Chow</b>	<b>172.032</b>
<b>Lee Cheuk-yan - Lee Cheuk-yan</b>	<b>127.537</b>
<b>OCLP - Occupy Central with Love and Peace</b>	<b>123.623</b>
<b>HKS - Hong Kong Shield</b>	<b>120.966</b>
<b>Martin Lee - Martin Lee</b>	<b>101.820</b>

**Table 6.4 SNA actor-by-actor at AEM peak**

<b>Names of actors - Full names</b>	<b>Betweenness</b>
<b>HKCTU - Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions</b>	<b>1665.070</b>
<b>Jimmy Sham - Jimmy Sham</b>	<b>1246.440</b>
<b>CHRF - Civil Human Rights Front</b>	<b>916.729</b>
<b>Tanya Chan - Tanya Chan</b>	<b>827.267</b>
<b>Wu Chi-wai - Wu Chi-wai</b>	<b>640.927</b>
<b>Ted Hui - Ted Hui</b>	<b>627.452</b>
<b>Jeremy Tam - Jeremy Tam</b>	<b>594.475</b>

<b>Lee Cheuk-yan - Lee Cheuk-yan</b>	<b>577.340</b>
<b>Ventus Lau - Ventus Lau</b>	<b>511.091</b>
<b>Demosistō - Demosistō</b>	<b>477.134</b>
<b>Dennis Kwok - Dennis Kwok</b>	<b>462.992</b>
<b>Joseph Lee - Joseph Lee Kok-long</b>	<b>419.092</b>
<b>Lam Cheuk-ting - Lam Cheuk-ting</b>	<b>354.903</b>
<b>Eddie Chu - Eddie Chu</b>	<b>334.826</b>
<b>Roy Kwong - Roy Kwong</b>	<b>252.794</b>
<b>Fernando Cheung - Fernando Cheung</b>	<b>243.715</b>
<b>Figo Chan - Figo Chan</b>	<b>219.609</b>

From Figures 6.7 and 6.8, the AEM was more decentralized, with multiple clusters, by contrast, the actors of the UM appear to be connecting with each other as a whole. As show in the Figures 6.7 and 6.8, UM's influential intermediators included Joshua Wong, the HKFS, Scholarism, Lester Shum, Benny Tai, HKU, Chan Kin-man, Albert Ho, and Alex Chow (according to Table 6.3); the AEM's powerful intermediators were the HKCTU, Jimmy Sham, the CHRF, Tanya Chan, Wu Chi-wai, Ted Hui, Jeremy Tam, Lee Cheuk-yan, and Ventus Lau (according to Table 6.4). Among these actors, Albert Ho, Tanya Chan, Wu Chi-wai, Ted Hui, and Jeremy Tam were influential allies, who clearly played a more important role in the peak phase of the AEM than that of the UM.

### **6.2.1 Leaders → *brokerage***

Regarding the UM, its leaders included Joshua Wong, Alex Chow, Nathan Law, Lester Shum, Benny Tai, Chan Kin-man, and Agnes Chow. The main activities they were engaged in are as follows: Benny Tai and Chan Kin-man went to the Central

Government Offices on the morning of 27 September 2014 to support the students in their sit-in for regaining the Civic Square (Occupy Central with Love and Peace, 2014). On 30 September 2014 student leaders Lester Shum and Agnes Chow gave a speech in Central, expressing gratitude to all those who attended, saying the turnout was amazing (“Occupy Central - Day three,” 2014). Then, on 1 October 2014, Joshua Wong and other Scholarism members turned their backs to the flag, lifting their hands in the shape of a cross and displaying yellow ribbons, when the national flag and Bauhinia flag were hoisted (“Occupy Central - Day four,” 2014). On 9 October 2014 pan-democrats and protest leaders appealed to the public to assemble at Harcourt Road, which they had renamed “Umbrella Square” (“Occupy Central - Day 12,” 2014). Lester Shum, Alex Chow, Chan Kok-hin, Sunny Cheung, Tommy Cheung, Benny Tai, Joshua Wong, and Nathan Law turned out (“Occupy Central - Day 12,” 2014). What is more, on 11 October student leaders issued a public letter to President Xi Jinping, in which they emphasized that the Umbrella Movement was not a colour revolution and Chief Executive CY Leung was responsible for the present deadlock. The letter made three demands: (a) Hong Kong officials must respond to their actions, respond to the Hong Kong people, and open the way to address the political reform; (b) it is a necessity to establish a completely democratic, equal rights electoral system; (c) the tenet of “one country two systems” should be adhered to, that is Hong Kong issues must be handled by Hong Kong, and political problems need to be resolved by political means (“Occupy Central - Day 14,” 2014). Apart from establishing external links, their leadership was reflected in the coordination of activities and the connection of actors, for example, on the morning of 14 October 2014, Alex Chow, called at the Causeway Bay protest site and made clear that none of the occupied zones in Hong Kong would be abandoned (“Occupy Central - Day 17,” 2014). Subsequently, on 17 October there

was an assembly of “Inheritance of Civil Disobedience”. Joshua Wong, Nathan Law, Alex Chow, Daisy Chan, and others exchanged their opinions, respectively. The assembly ended with a film show (Occupy Central with Love and Peace, 2014). A rally that illustrated the power of civil society and organizations was held in Umbrella Square on 18 October, and participants included Joshua Wong, Nathan Law, Alex Chow (Occupy Central with Love and Peace, 2014). Furthermore, a dialogue between the Hong Kong government and student leaders occurred on 21 October (Master, 2014). On 22 October 2014, an Umbrella Square Meeting was convened from 20:00 to 22:00. Joshua Wong, Nathan Law and Alex Chow were present, with surveys and protest music (Occupy Central with Love and Peace, 2014). Briefly, those leaders played the roles of typical leaders, put differently, leader → *brokerage* seems not to be applicable here. This is because there is no need to introduce *brokerage*. The lack of relationship between leadership and *brokerage* serves to reinforce the conceptual difference I noted between the two concepts on page 240.

The student leaders of the UM and the leaders of the AEM were basically the same group of people, including Joshua Wong, Nathan Law, Agnes Chow, Lester Shum (being elected to be a member of the Tsuen Wan District Council for Hoi Bun), only Alex Chow was no longer the leader of the AEM. In short, key members of Demosistō could be regarded as leaders of the AEM, including Isaac Cheng, Ivan Lam and Wong Yik Mo. In addition, Jimmy Sham and Figo Chan were the convener and the vice-convener of the Civil Human Rights Front, respectively. They were naturally the leaders of the AEM. Jimmy Sham is a member of the League of Social Democrats, which is a political party. In November 2019 Jimmy Sham was elected to be Lek Yuen District Council Member, Sha Tin District Council. And thus, Jimmy Sham was indeed an influential ally, but he also was one of the most influential leaders of the AEM. This

once again illustrated the ambiguity of the boundary between leaders and allies. Leaders were also influential allies. In terms of the non-conventional protest activities these leaders took part in, the activities included: the CHRF organised G20 Free Hong Kong Rally on 26 June 2019, Jimmy Sham read the declaration (Yang, 2019) and Nathan Law addressed the assembly (Mak, 2019). On 28 July 2019, citizens initiated a parade from Chater Garden in Central to Sun Yat Sen Memorial Park, and Ventus Lau applied for permission for the parade (“Chater Rally to March,” 2019). In addition, over 40,000 people met to launch another day’s strike on 3 September 2019. Easy Kwok was among one of the sponsors. Jimmy Sham and Rebecca Sy On-na spoke at the scene (K. Leung, 2019). Moreover, tens of thousands of demonstrators crowded a city centre park and rolled up to neighbouring streets on 14 October evening, pressing members of the US Congress to approve an act that would impose sanctions on government officials weakening Hong Kong’s democracy and civil liberties (Low, Choi, & Ng, 2019). Joshua Wong and Dennis Kwok gave speeches. Also, Sunny Cheung was among the organizers of the “Sparking the World Afire Assembly” on 23 December 2019, and Ventus Lau was also present (Magramo & Cheng. 2019, para. 6). In brief, most involvement of important brokers did not count as the actions of typical leaders.

In addition to playing an arousing and supporting role in the AEM, its leaders took international action. For instance, Nathan Law sent a letter to the US Secretary of State on 26 June 2019, proposing that the talks at the G20 summit should not focus only on Hong Kong’s economic and trade issues; the US contingent should urge the Chinese side to fully respect “one country, two systems” and safeguard Hong Kong’s high degree of autonomy, freedom, human rights, prosperity, and stability (Demosistō, 2019). What is more, under the leadership of Nancy Pelosi, speaker of the House of

Representatives, the delegation to the United States, including Joshua Wong, Nathan Law, Denise Ho and Brian Leung Kai-ping who was only one demonstrator pulling his mask when occupying the Legislative Council on the evening of 1 July 2019 and issuing the protest declaration, held a historic call with Congress in September 2019 to jointly support and promote the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act (Demosistō, 2019). Moreover, Wong Yik Mo, a member of Demosistō, was invited to the annual meeting of Junge Liberale, the Youth League of the Liberal Democratic Party of Germany in October 2019 (Demosistō, 2019). Wong said that Hong Kong had become a police city, and police violence happened every day. He called on the world to stand with the people of Hong Kong and urged Germany to put pressure on China on the issue of human rights (Demosistō, 2019). In a word, Joshua Wong, Nathan Law, Agnes Chow and Wong Yik Mo played roles of the international brokers.

Altogether, leaders → *brokerage* was applicable to the leaders of the AEM in the peak phase, but not applicable to the leaders of the UM. *Brokerage* can explain the significantly higher number of protest events of the AEM than those of the UM. Similar to the discussion concerning *brokerage* at the emergence phases, the HKCTU's (the top actor of the AEM) score of betweenness centrality was over twice as high as Joshua Wong (the top actor of the UM) at the peak phases. Moreover, there are eight actors (HKCTU, Jimmy Sham, CHRF, Tanya Chan, Wu Chi-wai, Ted Hui, Jeremy Tam and Lee Cheuk-yan) with a higher score of betweenness centrality in the AEM than the second highest (HKFS) in the UM. Also, the important brokers of the UM were Joshua Wong, Lester Shum, Benny Tai, Chan kin-man, and the equivalents were Jimmy Sham and Lee Cheuk-yan. Compared with the UM, there were not so many leaders in the AEM who played such a pivotal role.

### **6.2.2 SMOs → *brokerage***

As for the UM, the main SMOs in the peak phase were the HKFS and Scholarism. The HKFS is composed of multiple university student unions and Scholarism was a Hong Kong pro-democracy student organization. The series of activities they undertook were as follows: the HKFS was organising an assembly with 25 mass organizations on 24 September 2014 without informing the police, despite being cautioned (HKFS, 2014). The HKFS, the CHRF and the Civic Party organised a public assembly throughout 27 September in the eastern and western sidewalks of Tim Mei Ave (Occupy Central with Love and Peace, 2014). At 01.00am on 28 September, the OCLP officially started “Occupy Central” and announced the two demands about political reform, revoking the NPCSC decision and restarting the electoral reform process (Occupy Central with Love and Peace, 2014). Then, on 30 September the HKFS, Scholarism and the OCLP appealed to the whole population of Hong Kong people to stand up with them to occupy the three main democratic squares that had been captured: Admiralty, Causeway Bay and the major streets of Mong Kok (Occupy Central with Love and Peace, 2014). Additionally, the HKFS and Scholarism were appealing to students to attend the unlimited students’ strike on 30 September 2014 (HKFS, 2014). On 26 September, Scholarism declared that 1,200 middle school students had joined the class boycott (Scholarism, 2014). Furthermore, on 3 October the HKFS, Scholarism, and the OCLP issued a joint statement that if the Hong Kong government did not immediately stop organized attacks on supporters of the campaign, the dialogue between the students and the government would be terminated (Occupy Central with Love and Peace, 2014). The HKFS, Scholarism, the OCLP and pan-democrats started a new round of non-cooperative actions on 10 October to protest the government’s blockade of dialogue and reaffirmed its adherence to the streets (Sung, 2014). Moreover, five platforms, including the HKFS, Scholarism, the OCLP



and the pan-democracy camp discussed the feasibility of a referendum triggered by the resignation of members of parliament on 2 November (“Five Party Platform to Discuss Divergences,” 2014). What is more, on 15 November 2014, the HKFS published an open letter to Li Keqiang, the prime minister of China. Without democratic reform, the credibility crisis of political power would not be resolved, and the government would find it difficult to effectively govern (“The HKFS Published an Open Letter to Li Keqiang,” 2014). Also, Scholarism launched the first Umbrella Movement Community Day from 4-6pm on 16 November 2014 to set up public street stations in the five districts of Hong Kong to win public support for the movement and ask the government to withdraw the ‘831 decision’ (Scholarism, 2014). Finally, the HKFS urged the public to come to Admiralty on the night of 10 December, to non-violently disobey and stay until the last possible moment (HKFS, 2014). Altogether, the vigour and impetus rapidly shifted from the elites in society and the opposition parties to student groups, and the HKFS and Scholarism played an influential role in maintaining and extending the movement even when encountering diverse directions of violent crackdown from the police (R. Lee, 2014).

Among the SMOs of the AEM, the Civil Human Rights Front (2021) was a coalition, consisting of almost pan-democratic parties and other civil society organizations, such as the Civic Party, the Democratic Party, the League of Social Democrats, the Labour Party, the Hong Kong Journalists Association (HKJA), the Hong Kong Human Rights Monitor, the Justice and Peace Commission of the Hong Kong Catholic Diocese (HKJP), the Hong Kong Alliance, the Hong Kong Social Workers’ General Union, the Hong Kong Professional Teachers’ Union (HKPTU), the Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions (HKCTU), and so on. In brief, the CHRF was a SMO containing influential allies, similar to leaders, the boundaries between this

SMO and allies were unclear. Another important SMO was Demosistō, which was a pro-democracy localist organization. Its key members included almost all leaders, as discussed above. Additionally, the Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions (HKCTU) is a pro-democracy labour and political organization in the Hong Kong, primarily composed of trade unions in various industries.

The CHRF was a central SMO in the Anti-Extradition Movement. In addition to the March 31<sup>st</sup> parade and the April 28<sup>th</sup> march, the CHRF launched the June 9<sup>th</sup> march, the June 16<sup>th</sup> march, the June 26<sup>th</sup> rally, the July 1<sup>st</sup> march, the July 21<sup>st</sup> parade, the August 18<sup>th</sup> march, the September 28<sup>th</sup> rally, the December 8<sup>th</sup> rally, and the New Year Parade. Every march and rally were large-scale. Among them, the CHRF announced that 1.03 million people attended the June 9<sup>th</sup> march of 2019, about two million people attended the June 16<sup>th</sup> march, 1.7 million people were estimated to participate in the August 18<sup>th</sup> rally, and about 200,000 to 300,000 people participated in the September 28<sup>th</sup> rally of 2019 (A. Chan, 2019). Additionally, Demosistō, Demovanilech, and the Hong Kong ANTI-FOO Student Alliance initiated “Class Boycott Rally” at Tamar Park (Demosistō, 2019). Furthermore, the HKCTU organised a citywide strike on 5 August 2019 (HKCTU, 2019). On 28 August 2019, the HKCTU launched the Edinburgh Square Assembly, marching to Pacific Place. This assembly called for an end for stopping the white terror from the police, withdrawing the dismissal decision for the Cathay Pacific employees, and defending freedom of speech (HKCTU, 2019). The HKCTU took a growing role in the latter stage of the campaign. A total of 42 trade unions set up street stations in the New Year Parade, calling on all demonstrators to register immediately to join trade unions, and the HKCTU also provided support at the end of the parade (Civil Human Rights Front, 2019). All walks of life were able to continue in an organized way, support democratic demands through the labour

movement, resist liquidation, and prepare for the three strikes in the future (Civil Human Rights Front, 2019).

Overall, by comparing the SMOs of the UM and the AEM, the work of the CHRF and Demosistō was similar to that of the OCLP, the HKFS and Scholarism, and their similarity can be explained via SMOs. In addition, Demosistō that played a pivotal role in the emergence stage is not so significant in the peak stage of the AEM, which demonstrates the natural division of labour of different SMOs at the different stages. Similarly, the OCLP played a vital role in the emergence stage of the UM and was gradually replaced by the HKFS and Scholarism. Furthermore, the CHRF is related to almost pan-democratic groups, and thus was naturally the most influential intermediary or broker, although this role of CHRF was not obvious in the emergence stage, as many of its members had not got involved. Likewise, the HKCTU played a very powerful part in connecting various groups. In a word, the role the CHRF and the HKCTU performed differed from that of the SMOs of the UM. Thus, it can be seen that SMOs → *brokerage* is applicable for the CHRF and the HKCTU (AEM), while not applicable to Demosistō and the UM's SMOs. Besides, in the peak phase of the UM, the leaders and SMOs played equal parts, while the SMOs had a significantly greater impact than the leaders on the peak phase of the AEM, such as the CHRF and the HKCTU which were the most significant SMOs, even the most prominent leader Jimmy Sham was also the convener of the CHRF. Thus it can be concluded that these two SMOs played a pivotal mobilization effect during the peak phase of the AEM.

### **6.2.3 Networking → *social appropriation / scale shift***

The networking of the Umbrella Movement during the peak phase was very extensive. The process began when the class boycott campaign at the end of September 2014 launched by Scholarism and the HKFS captured the Civic Square,

which represents democracy and freedom, then following this trend Occupy Central commenced its activities. On 28 September 2014, the Hong Kong Professional Teacher's Union (HKPTU) declared that it would go on strike the next day to oppose the police's brutal crackdown of the demonstrators ("Occupy Central - The First Night," 2014). On 29 September 2014 approximately 1,000 social workers and social work students assembled at the Hong Kong Polytechnic University to show support for the Occupy Movement ("Occupy Central - Night Two," 2014). On 3 October 2014 three members of the Macau Youth Dynamics Group participated in the Occupy movement in the closing of a two-day visit to HK ("Occupy Central - Day Six," 2014). On 4 October about 800 law professionals and law students gathered in front of the High Court to hold a candlelight rally to pray for the future of Hong Kong ("Candlelight Rallies From the Legal Profession," 2014). Then, on 10 October 2014 Hong Kong's culture, arts, and academia communities established the Hong Kong Shield to condemn the Hong Kong government for their suppression ("Hong Kong's Culture and Performing-arts Circles," 2014). Subsequently, on 28 November 2014, the Mong Kok Shopping Revolution marched in Yau Tsim Mong District (Mak, et al., 2014). In addition, the "All Citizen Acton against Police Brutality" Campaign was organised by the Hong Kong Shield at the police headquarters on 30 November morning and about 50 people attended the rally, including Denise Ho ("The Police Dragged the Hair," 2014). Also, twenty doctors, academics, lawyers, intellectuals, and pastoralists arrived outside the Chai Wan Police Headquarter in the afternoon of 3 December 2014 to protest against and condemn the excessive use of violence by the police in Mongkok and Admiralty ("Professionals Condemn the Violent Clearance," 2014). College teachers launched a black robe parade at 3.00pm on 5 December 2014 demanding that the government immediately resume dialogue with students, resolve the current impasse, also

condemning the police for excessive violence (“Colleges and Universities Sponsored a Black-robed Parade,” 2014). More than 10 groups launched an anti-police march on 7 December 2014 in the name of “Umbrella Parents” (“2,000 Parents’ Parade against Police Violence,” 2014). Furthermore, different Christmas holidays would begin on 25 December 2014. The first battle would be a peaceful night rally sponsored by the “Student Awakening”. It would be followed by the three major occupied areas’ flash campaigns initiated by the Hong Kong Shield (“Citizens Firstly Gau-wu (Shopping),” 2014).

With regard to the AEM, most participants became spontaneously involved in the activities, rather than through their pre-existing networks. The self-organized networking included the legal profession, the advertising industry, the aviation industry, journalists, medical staff consisting of doctors, nurses, chemists, radiologists, physical therapists, and clerks, teachers, accountants, secondary school teachers, as well as fire and ambulance personnel and social workers, a group of Hong Kong mothers, civil servants, and white-collar workers, and others. Examples of their activities are as follows: the legal profession held a silent march in black on 6 June 2019 to oppose the amendment of the Fugitive Offenders Ordinance (“Nearly 3000 People in the Legal Profession Have Marched,” 2019); the Hong Kong Mothers’ Anti-Extradition Rally was held at Chater Garden at 7 pm on 5 July 2019, to demand power-holders to curb their arrogance, respect lives, and accept the demands of Hong Kong young people as soon as possible (Hong Kong Mothers’ Anti-Extradition Rally, 2019); at least 1,500 reporters and their followers organised a silent parade on 14 July, and seven media organizations, including the Hong Kong Journalists Association (HKJA), co-organized the parade (Lam, Low, & Mok, 2019); moreover, a group of government workers staged a rally at Chater Garden on 2 August (J. Lam, 2019); hundreds of Hong Kong

members of the Catholic Churches from four Christian groups, including the HKJP, paraded in candle light on 8 August night (Ting, 2019); thousands of people participated in a rally on 16 August, aimed at “Stand with Hong Kong, Power to the people”, which was co-sponsored by eleven student unions and users from LIHKG (Kao, 2019, para. 1-2); thousands of black-clad teachers, organized by the HKPTU, marched on the streets on 17 August 2019 (Leung & McCarthy, 2019); furthermore, an off-campus assembly of middle school students was held on 2 September 2019, and the venue was Edinburgh Square, Central (Demosistō, 2019); thousands of health care staff and their followers staged a peaceful assembly in Central on 26 October 2019 (Ting, Sum, & Low, 2019); approximately two hundred social workers gathered in Central on 17 December 2019 to encourage Hong Kong protestors to participate in a strike lasting three days, supported by the Social Welfare Sector Strike Committee (Sum, 2019). In general, not only local networking, but also international networking was occurring. For example, Hong Kong citizens from seventeen cities, including the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Germany, Australia, and Japan, organized their own meetings on 9 June 2019 to respond to the Hong Kong parade and jointly say no to the extradition policy (Demosistō, 2019).

On the whole, since 1 July 2019, protest actions had diffused to different districts in Hong Kong including Sheung Shui, Sha Tin and Tsim Sha Tsui and so on (K. Cheng, 2019; Creery, 2019). An appeal for a general strike on 5 August 2019 was responded to by about ‘350,000’ people as stated by the HKCTU (“Another General Strike Possible,” 2019, para. 2). In other words, *scale shift* of the AEM occurred from street protests to district protests then to strikes. Of course, the Umbrella Movement had also undergone *scale shift* in different zones (from Admiralty, Central, Wan Chai to Mong Kok, Causeway Bay). In a word, networking → *scale shift* is tenable for the

UM and the AEM in their peak stages. When it comes to *social appropriation*, it did appear in the AEM but not the UM at their peak stages. From the above, it can be found that all walks of life are mobilized during the peak of the UM, ranging from lawyers, medical team, journalists, teachers, social workers, to religious groups, cultural workers, doctors, academics, intellectuals, pastoralists and so on. Most of the mobilization of the UM was spontaneous, the same applies to the AEM, but unions were appropriated to join this anti-government movement in the form of political strike in the AEM. Unions under the HKCTU had mobilized workers to join the general strike on 5 August 2019, including bus drivers, airline stewards and stewardesses, Metro employees, universities and college staff, cleaners, and superintendents (K. Cheng, 2019). As a top broker, HKCTU attained the *social appropriation* of trade unions, which had played a great role in the peak phase. Thus, *social appropriation* can account for the difference between the UM and the AEM at their peak stages. Meanwhile, *scale shift* can explain the different protest waves of the UM and the AEM, because it means not only the change of protest platform (from street protests to other forms of protest such as political strike), but also the change of protest location (from main streets to residential districts). Although these two kinds of *scale shift* did occur at the peak stages of the UM and AEM, the former cannot be compared with the latter regardless of scale or degree. Briefly, the momentum of protest cannot be maintained without *scale shift*, as single platform and unchanging place hardly make movement sustainable (the occupation was concentrated on major city streets during the UM). *Social appropriation* and *scale shift* accounts for the different longevity of the UM and the AEM at their peak phases.

#### **6.2.4 Influential allies → *certification***

In addition to fighting on the parliamentary front, pan-democrats directly participated in the occupation activities of the UM. To be more specific, on 2 October 2014 Carrie Lam had a meeting with four pan-democrats, including the Civic Party leader Alan Leong, the Labour Party's Cyd Ho, the Democratic Party chairwoman Emily Lau and Charles Mok. The pan-democratic legislators pressed Lam to meet the students as quickly as possible to alleviate the urgent situation ("Occupy Central - Night Five," 2014). Also, the pan-democrats actively engaged in occupation activities. For instance, on 29 September 2014 hundreds of people assembled on a blocked section of Hennessy Road in Causeway Bay, where Civic Party legislator Kenneth Chan Ka-lok was giving a lecture ("Occupy Central - Night Two," 2014). On 9 October members of the Neo Democrats demonstrated at the Independent Commission Against Corruption headquarters in Quarry Bay ("Occupy Central - Day 12," 2014). Then, on 15 October 2014 several pan-democracy groups, including the League of Social Democrats, the Labour Party, the Neo-Democrats, and the Neighbourhood and Worker's Service Centre, organised a range of demonstrations exterior to the police headquarters in Wan Chai to condemn what they considered misuse of police power ("Occupy Central - Day 18," 2014). Moreover, there were two major forms of rectification teams to keep order in the occupation areas in Admiralty. One was under the command of the pan-democracy left-wing groups, the Labour Party and the League of Social Democrats, and the other was established by the spontaneous activists by themselves (H. M. Leung, 2016). In a word, pan-democrats provided assistance both internally and externally to maintain the Umbrella Movement.

The pan-democrats participated in and supported the entire Anti-Extradition Movement by directly initiating protest activities and international lobbying. In terms of non-conventional activities, the legal profession held a silent march in black on 6 June



2019 to oppose the amendment of the Fugitive Offenders Ordinance. Pan-democratic lawmaker Dennis Kwok, a member of the legal profession, initiated the march and pointed out that the number of participants in the procession was 2500-3000, which was the largest in the five legal parades in black since the handover of Hong Kong's sovereignty; Alan Leong, Martin Lee and Albert Ho were present ("Nearly 3000 People in the Legal Profession," 2019). Then, pan-democrats held a press conference on 10 June 2019, demanding that Carrie Lam step down and pro-establishment lawmakers pull back. These pan-democrats included Leung Kwok-hung, Claudia Mo, Leung Yiu-chung, Gary Fan, Alvin Yeung, Lam Cheuk-ting, Eddie Chu, Fernando Cheung, Jeremy Tam, Wu Chi-wai, Kenneth Leung, Helena Wong, Charles Mok, and Roy Kwong (Civil Human Rights Front, 2019). Furthermore, the pan-democratic lawmakers and the CHRF made an emergency joint statement on 1 July 2019. The Democrats had asked for a meeting with Mrs. Lam this day to try to alleviate the major political crisis. However, Carrie Lam's continued refusal showed that in the view of the Civil Human Rights Front (2019) her so-called listening was only the most hypocritical political lie. Some netizens launched the "Eye For Hong Kong Campaign" (Eye4HK) campaign in LIHKG in August 2019, calling for photos with their right eyes covered. The participating pan-democrats included Jeremy Tam, Alvin Yeung, Au Nok-hin, Gary Fan, Fernando Cheung, Charles Mok and Raymond Chan (Civil Human Rights Front, 2019). In addition, in August 2019 two pan-democratic legislators, Dennis Kwok and Alvin Yeung met the U.S. administration officials and business elites. They intended to convey the truth about what was going on in Hong Kong to international society (Xu, 2019). Kwok stressed that Hong Kong people were merely pursuing what had been legally committed to by the basic law (Xu, 2019). What is more, the High Court had ruled earlier that the Emergency Regulations Ordinance (ERO) and the Anti-mask law

were unconstitutional, and the court of appeal granted a short-term temporary suspension of execution until 10 December 2019; the Court of Appeal this day issued a judgment rejecting the application for the government's suspension order, in other words, the Anti-mask law was officially invalid. The judicial review of the ERO and the Anti-mask law was proposed by twenty-four pan-democratic legislators and Leung Kwok-hung of the League of Social Democrats ("The Court of Appeal Rejected the Government's Application," 2019). Therefore, not only were the pan-democracy camp actively involved in the anti-government protests, but they also played a decisive role in the smooth continuation of protests via legal challenge.

The international community also expressed its support for the protests. The British Foreign Minister suggested that President Xi Jinping of China should "let go" to permit Hong Kong's freedom to be protected, meanwhile he expressed sympathy for the demonstrators who attacked the Hong Kong's legislative body on 1 July 2019 (Lau, 2019). Taiwan's President Tsai Ing-wen appealed to the Hong Kong government to end oppression and start a dialogue with the protestors (Chung, 2019). Moreover, leaders and other social activists as well as pan-democratic legislators were involved in international lobbying. For example, Lee Cheuk-yan, the Secretary General of the HKCTU, Jeremy Tam, a member of the Legislative Council of the Civic Party and Eric Lai, deputy convener of the CHRF, visited Australia to lobby Australian members of Parliament to promote the Australian Version of the global Magnitsky Act, which was regarded as the Australian Version of the bill of rights and democracy ("The Australian Parliament Will Consult Whether to Enact," 2019). Among the international lobby activities, the most successful was both the House and Senate passing the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act, owing to the efforts of the Demosistō's members, especially Jeffrey Ngo who was a delegate of Demosistō to Washington, D.C. Actually,

as early as 2014 members of Demosistō had realized the importance of international links to the democratic movement and started lobbying for the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act.

Generally, influential allies → *certification* is applicable to the UM and AEM. However, compared to that of the UM, during which the pan-democrats provided more assistance at the parliamentary and government levels, in the AEM, the pan-democrats fought directly on the front lines and in the international effort, and even the roles of pan-democrats and protest leaders were blurred. As for the influence of international allies, because they are not directly involved in the protest events, they cannot be demonstrated in the sociograms, which also indicates that it is impossible (at least in a protest event analysis) to quantitatively evaluate the impact of international allies on the level and duration of the protest waves. In summary, referring to the discussion on *certification* at the Section of Emergence phases, influential allies → *certification* cannot interpret the different protest waves in the peak phases of the two movements.

### **6.3 Decline phases of UM & AEM**

The leaders of the UM and the AEM were engaged in similar activities during their decline phases, for example Joshua Wong's speech on a radio show in January 2015, and Joshua Wong, Nathan Law and Agnes Chow holding a press conference in May 2020 to respond to the sanction mechanism from the US. The SMOs of the UM carried out a series of activities, their performance was more active and richer than that of the AEM. The scope of the UM's networking is equivalent to that of the AEM during the decline phases. In terms of influential allies, in the first two stages, the involvement of local allies did not have much weight during the Umbrella Movement,

but in the decline stage, the involvement of allies gradually increased; on the contrary, the participation of influential allies accounted for a large proportion in the first two stages of the AEM, not smaller than that of the leaders, but in the decline phase, the participation of allies was drastically reduced.

Figure 6.9 SNA actor-by-event at UM decline:






Figure 6.10 SNA actor-by-event at AEM decline:



The difference between the two figures is not very marked. Both the UM and the AEM had a major protest event, which involved a large number of participating actors. As can be seen from Figure 6.9, there were three main SMOs, while in Figure 6.10, there were no obvious SMOs or groups.

Figure 6.11 SNA actor-by-actor at UM decline:







**Table 6.5 SNA actor-by-actor at UM decline**

<b>Names of actors - Full names</b>	<b>Betweenness</b>
<b>RSWM - Reclaiming Social Work Movement</b>	<b>693.000</b>
<b>HKFS - Hong Kong Federation of Students</b>	<b>522.063</b>
<b>Benny Tai - Benny Tai</b>	<b>408.000</b>
<b>CHRF - Civil Human Rights Front</b>	<b>237.052</b>
<b>SFD - Student Fight for Democracy</b>	<b>204.305</b>
<b>Scholarism - Scholarism</b>	<b>199.828</b>
<b>Joshua Wong - Joshua Wong</b>	<b>195.119</b>
<b>Umb Par - Umbrella Parents</b>	<b>93.052</b>
<b>Chan Kin-man - Chan Kin-man</b>	<b>93.052</b>

**Table 6.6 SNA actor-by-actor at AEM decline**

<b>Names of actors - Full names</b>	<b>Betweenness</b>
<b>HKEdA - Hong Kong Educators Alliance</b>	<b>1288.175</b>
<b>Demosistō - Demosistō</b>	<b>749.181</b>
<b>Carol Ng - Carol Ng</b>	<b>685.491</b>
<b>Joshua Wong - Joshua Wong</b>	<b>647.008</b>
<b>HAEA - Hospital Authority Employees Alliance</b>	<b>463.948</b>
<b>Jimmy Sham - Jimmy Sham</b>	<b>253.581</b>
<b>HKCTU - Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions</b>	<b>253.581</b>
<b>Agnes Chow - Agnes Chow</b>	<b>39.210</b>

From Figure 6.11, it can be seen that conspicuous actors included the RSWM, the HKFS, Benny Tai, the CHRF, the SFD, Scholarism and Joshua Wong (according

to Table 6.5). From Figure 6.12, prominent actors comprised the HKEdA, Demosistō, Carol Ng, Joshua Wong, the HAEA, Jimmy Sham and the HKCTU (according to Table 6.6).

### **6.3.1 Leaders → *brokerage***

As for the leaders of the UM, the activities they participated in were as follows: when participating in a radio show, Joshua Wong said that democracy is not one generation's matter; the Basic Law is not sacred and inviolable, and pan-democrats should have more imagination about the constitutional amendments and sovereignty issues of 2047 (Scholarism, 2015); furthermore, the Civil Human Rights Front (CHRF) launched a march for universal suffrage. The march started at about 2:30 p.m. on 1 February 2015 and was led by Benny Tai, Chan Kin Man, Chu Yiu-ming, Martin Lee, and Daisy Chan ("The CHRF Sponsored March," 2015); many non-governmental organizations, scholars and college students launched the Community Citizenship Charter Movement in June 2015, hoping to inspire ordinary citizens to participate actively in community public affairs in the post-period of political reform. Charter advocates included Margaret Ng, Alex Chow, Benny Tai, Shiu Ka-chun and Eddie Chu ("Continuing the 'Umbrella Movement'," 2015); in addition, on 17 June 2015, the academic meeting for constitutional amendment was held by the Student Fight for Democracy (SFD), and Wong Ching Fung, Leung Hiu-yung, Sunny Cheung and Joshua Wong spoke as guests (Scholarism, 2015).

Regarding the AEM, Jimmy Sham and Carol Ng debated with the public on the resurgence of the battle front in April 2020 (Civil Human Rights Front, 2020). Also, Joshua Wong and Agnes Chow launched a lawsuit against the authorization for searching phones and the Facebook office by police officers in April 2020 (Lau & Wong, 2020). Furthermore, anti-government demonstrations went back to the streets of Hong

Kong on 1 May 2020, and Carol Ng, Lee Cheuk-yan, Joshua Wong, Kwok Wing-kin, Mak Tak-ching and members of the League of Social Democrats attended (Cheung & Leung, 2020). On the first reading day of the national anthem on 13 May 2020, the Demosistō members suddenly attacked the five-star flagpole, Agnes Chow, Wong Lee Lee, Joshua Wong, Liu Wai Lim, and Ivan Lam were present (Demosistō, 2020). Moreover, Nathan Law, Joshua Wong, journalist Gwyneth Ho, Jannelle R. Leung, a district councillor in Kwun Tong District and Sunny Cheung distributed leaflets at the flyover of Hung Hom Station in the evening of 23 May 2020, calling on Hong Kong people to fight and go to the streets again (Demosistō, 2020). In response to the US President Trump's plan to launch the sanction mechanism and discontinue Hong Kong's special treatment, Joshua Wong, Nathan Law and Agnes Chow held a press conference to respond on 29 May 2020 (Demosistō, 2020).

Altogether, the activities leaders were engaged in during both movements were similar, in the form of confrontational actions and teach-ins, which cannot count as typical roles of leaders, so leaders → *brokerage* was tenable for both. Referring to the previous discussion, *brokerage* explained as always the greater number of protests in the AEM than that of the UM at the decline stages.

### **6.3.2 SMOs → *brokerage***

With regard to the SMOs of the UM in the decline stage, Scholarism occupied a pivotal position. Specifically, on 24 January 2015 from 4-6pm, Scholarism set up street stations in the four districts of Hong Kong to appeal to the public to support the rejection of the political reform plan under the "831 Framework" and to request that the government restart the political reform programme (Scholarism, 2015). Scholarism issued an open letter again in February 2015, requesting talks with Carrie Lam to discuss the two major issues of restarting political reform and universal suffrage

(Scholarism, 2015). On 9 February 2015, Scholarism appealed to the public to go to the Youth Square immediately to surround Carrie Lam and ask the government to restart the political reform as soon as possible (Scholarism, 2015). Moreover, the HKFS participated in the press conference of “Anti-Water Cannon, Withdrawal of the Application” initiated by the CHRF on 16 April 2015 (HKFS, 2015). The HKFS and the student unions of universities were expressing their dissatisfaction with electoral reform during Carrie Lam’s speech at the BOAO Youth Forum for Asia in 2015 (HKFS, 2015). Also, Carrie Lam attended the naming ceremony of the square at Polytechnic University on 18 May 2015. The Polytechnic Students’ Union and a group of members of the HKFS demonstrated at the scene against the fake universal suffrage scheme (HKFS, 2015). Furthermore, Scholarism set up street stations on 9 June 2015 to put pressure on pro-establishment lawmakers, to call for a veto over the political reform (Scholarism, 2015). Scholarism’s symposium “a tale of cities in 1989” was held in Victoria Park on 4 June 2015 (Scholarism, 2015). What is more, on 17 June 2015 Scholarism appealed to the citizens to participate in the rally, join in watching the live broadcast of the electoral reform debate outside of the Legislative Council to witness the moment of veto, and to think about the way out for the political reform and the democratic movement after the rally (Scholarism, 2015). The CHRF, whose convener was Daisy Chan, organised the July 1<sup>st</sup> march in 2015, but the turnout was lower than expected (Choi, 2015).

By comparison, the SMOs of the AEM during the decline stage were not as active as those of the UM. To be more specific, on 2 February 2020, Demosistō, together with the hksstrike2019 and Concern Groups of other secondary schools, went to Tuen Mun, Mong Kok, Huangpu, Tseung Kwan O, and other districts to appeal for support for the medical strike launched the following day (Demosistō, 2020). In

addition, in response to the police's indiscriminate arrest of "8.31" protestors, the CHRF issued a statement (Civil Human Rights Front, 2020) and the HKCTU issued the May 1<sup>st</sup> statement (HKCTU, 2020). According to the statement, the spirit of the revolution of the times was embedded in the daily life of Hong Kong people. Moreover, Demosistō issued a statement on the US President Trump's sanctions policy against Hong Kong (Demosistō, 2020). In May 2020, Demosistō initiated a global petition to European leaders against the National Security Law for Hong Kong (Demosistō, 2020).

Taken together, SMOs of the UM played a more active role in the decline stage than ones of the AEM. *Brokerage* was tenable for the AEM, while it was applicable to half of SMOs' activities and not applicable to half of the activities at the UM's decline phase. Similar to leaders, SMOs → *brokerage* accounts for the higher level of mobilization of the AEM than that of the UM in their decline stages.

### **6.3.3 Networking → *social appropriation***

The networking in the decline phase of the UM was very broad, which covered the following activities: a new organization, the Progressive Lawyers Group, was set up by young lawyers. Its members also participated in the February 1<sup>st</sup> march (Stand News, 2015); "Frontline Tech Workers Concern Group" set up by a group of front-line IT personnel initiated a petition to oppose the "831" framework of the NPCSC and hoped that the industry would sign and support it ("The Scientific and Technological Circles Initiated a Petition," 2015); the Umbrella University HK ran mobile democracy classrooms in the demonstration area of the Legislative Council (Mobile Democracy Classroom, 2015); in May 2015 a group of scholars launched a joint action to "link up" with professionals from all walks of life and appealed to members of the Legislative Council to veto the scheme of false universal suffrage ("Scholars Launch a Petition," 2015); a total of 12 professional groups were stationed in Mong Kok in May 2015 for

a demonstration against the government's pseudo-universal suffrage scheme, including the Progressive Lawyers Group, the Médecins Inspirés, the Concern Group of Nurses Politik, the Act Voice, the Progressive Teachers' Alliance, the Frontline TechWorkers, the Hong Kong Psychologists Concern, the Radiation Therapist and the Radiographer's Conscience, the ArchiVision, the IT Voice, the Artists Action, and the Reclaiming Social Work Movement ("The Entertainment Profession Joined Twelve Professional Groups", 2015); a group of Hong Kong Christians, including the Christians Support Democratic Reform, the Ekklesia Hong Kong, the Christian Social Concern Fellowship, the Christians For Hong Kong Society and the Umbrella City Cyberchurch launched an online petition on 27 May 2015 that asked legislators to reject the political reform package submitted by the government ("Christians Launched a Petition," 2015); the May Day parade began, and a large number of college student unions, including the HKFS, the Student Union of the Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUSU), the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology Students' Union (HKUSTSU), the Open University of Hong Kong Students' Union (OUHKSU), the City University of Hong Kong Students' Union (CityUSU), the Hong Kong Polytechnic University Students' Union (HKPUSU), the Hang Seng University of Hong Kong Students' Union (HSUHKSU) and others were marching from Victoria Park (HKFS, 2015); on 4 June 2015 the CUSU, the Student Union of Hong Kong Shue Yan University (SYUSU), the CityUSU, and the HKPUSU put up a sign saying on the platform of the Hong Kong Alliance: "Government and business collapse, totalitarian powerlessness, independent destiny, Hong Kong people revise constitution" (Scholarism, 2015). The Student Fight for Democracy and the Age of Resistance marched to the Hong Kong Liaison Office (Scholarism, 2015).

The spirit of the revolution of the times was embedded in the daily life of Hong Kong people, and multiple fronts developed, such as the yellow economic circle in consumption; the lobbying front in the international arena; and the trade unions in the workplace. Specifically, supporters of the yellow economic circle boycotted “blue shops”. Supporting “yellow shops” meant supporting the protesters, while supporting “blue shop” meant supporting the Hong Kong police force. Brokers keep lobbying foreign politicians for support. Trade unions would continue to protest against the government in the form of street stations and strikes. During the decline stage, the AEM’s networking mainly involved the trade unions. More concretely, the HA Employees Alliance launched strikes of medical staff beginning on 3 February 2020 (C. Lam, 2020). On 21 March, the Hong Kong Education 4 All, the Progressive Teachers’ Alliance, Demosistō, the Ideologist, Demovanile, the Hong Kong Education Concern Group, and the Reclaiming Social Work Movement initiated a petition that because of the worsening epidemic situation, the diploma examination should be postponed (Demosistō, 2020). The Hong Kong UPR Coalition issued a statement, expressing serious concern about the arrest of fifteen pan-democracy activists on 18 April 2020 (Hong Kong UPR Coalition, 2020). Moreover, the HKCTU issued the May 1<sup>st</sup> statement. The joint agencies included the Personal and Community Services Workers General Union, the Chinese University of Hong Kong Employees General Union, the Catering and Hotel Industries Employees General Union, the Hong Kong Bartenders Association, the Railway Power, the Hong Kong Aviation Staff Alliance, and the Hong Kong Information Technology Workers’ Union (HKCTU, 2020). On 11 May 2020 seven media trade unions issued a joint statement to protest that the police force had repeatedly obstructed the freedom of interview. Those media trade unions included the Hong Kong Journalists Association, the Hong Kong Press Photographers



Association, the Hong Kong Nonprofit Journal, the Journalism Educators for Press Freedom, the Radio Television Hong Kong Programme Staff Union, the Ming Pao Staff Association, and the Next Media Trade Union (“Seven Major Media Trade Unions Jointly Protested,” 2020). Also, the Hong Kong Professional Teachers’ Union strongly condemned the Education Bureau for constraining the education profession and stifling the space for rational discussion (Hong Kong Professional Teachers’ Union, 2020). Furthermore, the education section had jointly stated that it opposed political interference in the diploma exam, and it should not damage the interests of candidates. Initiating groups included the Ideologist, Demovanile, Demosistō, the HKEd4All, the Hong Kong Educators Alliance, the Progressive Teachers’ Alliance, the Hongkongers Education Support, the Hong Kong Education Concern Group, the Academic Staff Association of the Education University of Hong Kong (ASAEduHK), and We are Hong Kong Teachers (“Opposition to Political Interference in the Diploma Examination,” 2020). The hksstrike2019 and the Hongkongers Education Support called on students to strike for one day on 27 May 2020 in response to the three strikes (“The CCP’s Draconian Law Ensued,” 2020).

On the whole, the UM’s networking involved a wider range of groups, ranging from lawyers, IT personnel, scholars, Christians, university student unions to medical circles, education circles, and others. By comparison, the AEM’s networking was only related to trade unions and educational groups. *Social appropriation* was untenable for the UM and the AEM, since the networking of these groups were formed spontaneously, not exploited by challenging groups. The formation of networks at the decline stage of the UM was inspired by the Umbrella Movement and the networking of the AEM was reflected on the viability of multiple protest routes. Meanwhile, *scale shift* was tenable for both, because scale naturally had shrunk during the period from

peak to decline. Besides, *scale shift* occurred in the shift of protest arena, for the UM, “Community Citizenship Charter Movement” aimed at inspiring ordinary citizens to participate actively in community public affairs and “Umbrella University” referred to mobile democracy classrooms to teach civic education; for the AEM, “Yellow Economic Circle” meant consumption at shops supporting protestors and “trade union front in workplaces” indicated that various industries established trade unions to protect personal interests of their members participating in protests. In a word, in the decline phases, there was *scale shift* to non-protest (conventional) activities. All in all, the networking of the UM covered more actors from all walks of life than the AEM, and the AEM simply involved trade unions and educational groups. The breadth of the networking is not proportional to the duration, shape and size of the protest waves, because the networking of the AEM was wider than that of the UM in the emergence stages and the peak stages, and the networking of the UM was wider than that of the AEM in the decline stages. However, the longitudinal curve of the AEM is higher in all three stages, while the horizontal curve of the UM is longer than that of the AEM in the emergence stages and decline stages, and the AEM is longer than the UM at their peak stages. Moreover, according to the discussion in the Section 6.3.3, *social appropriation* is related to the lifespan of the protest waves, but networking → *social appropriation* is not applicable here. And thus, *social appropriation* cannot provide an explanation for that the UM had a longer duration than the AEM at the decline stages. As for *scale shift*, as described in detail above, it did take place in the decline stages of both the UM and the AEM, while *scale shift* seems to have nothing to do with their different protest curves.

#### **6.3.4 Influential allies → *certification***

As for the influential allies in the decline stages of the UM and the AEM, their activities were almost non-conventional protests as detailed in this section. The Hong Kong Alliance launched “Memorial Day of the June Fourth Incident” on 31 May 2015. The marchers were mainly middle-aged and elderly. Pan-democrats Albert Ho, Richard Tsoi and Leung Kwok-hung were at the scene (Choi, 2015). Furthermore, Nathan Law, as a representative of the HKFS, attended a press conference on the “Campaign of All People Rejecting Fake Universal Suffrage” on 11 June 2015. The campaign included the June 14<sup>th</sup> parade, the June 15<sup>th</sup> assembly, the June 16<sup>th</sup> assembly, and the June 17<sup>th</sup> rally outside the Legislative Council. Sponsoring and participating groups included the Um dot dot dot, the Labour Party, the Civic Party, the Democratic Party, the CHRF, the HKJP, the HKFS, the HKCTU, the Ignite Your Belief, the Archives, the Defense of HK Freedom, the Umbrella Parents, the Umbrella Blossom, and Scholarism, the Neo Democrats, the Reclaiming Social Work Movement (RSWM), the League of Social Democrats, and the Neighbourhood and Worker’s Service Centre (NWSC) (HKFS, 2015). On the afternoon of 31 August 2015, the HKFS, together with the People Power, the Mong Kok Shopping Revolution and other groups participated in the parade initiated by the League of Social Democrats, marching to the Malaysian Consulate in Hong Kong to demonstrate their support for the Bersih 4.0 rally in Malaysia (HKFS, 2015).

Regarding the influential allies of the AEM, hundreds of protestors staged demonstrations at five sites on 16 February 2020 opposing governmental programmes to establish quarantine centres or sifting clinics close to their houses, and pan-democrats Alvin Yeung, Wan Siu-kin and Ng Kim-sing were presented (Siu & Chan, 2020). In addition, Joshua Wong and Shiu Ka-chun held a press conference to expose the abuse of political prisoners by correctional staff at the Pik Uk Correctional

Institution (Demosistō, 2020). Moreover, on 30 April 2020, the League of Social Democrats protested at the police headquarters, fiercely denouncing the police for aiding tyranny and banning the May Day parade (League of Social Democrats, 2020). On 10 May 2020 hundreds of protestors assembled at more than ten shopping malls, shouting slogans, and singing the song “Glory to Hong Kong”, Roy Kwong was present (Sum, Cheung, & Low, 2020). International political circles were also playing a part. For instance, the U.S. government was concerned about the detention of media tycoon Jimmy Lai Chee-ying and two senior Democratic politicians at an illegal rally, appealing to the Hong Kong authorities not to enforce the law selectively for political intentions (Lum, 2020). More than thirty members of the European Parliament jointly issued two open letters on 22 April 2020 (local time) condemning the Hong Kong government’s arrest of several Democrats on 18 April, urging that fifteen people, including Martin Lee and Jimmy Lai, be removed from custody (“[April 18<sup>th</sup> Siege] More Than 30 Members of the European Parliament,” 2020).

Overall, the number of local allies involved in the AEM is smaller than that of the UM. Most importantly, in the decline stages the sharp decrease of local allies’ participation in the AEM was in contrast to the increase of the UM allies’ participation (including RSWM, Leung Kwok-hung, Margaret Ng, LSD), which constituted a factor to prolong the duration of the UM in the later stage. It can be seen from Table 6.6 that the most important broker of the UM was the Reclaiming Social Work Movement (RSWM), which is a pan-democracy party established by a group of social workers. Consequently, the support of influential allies is indispensable in maintaining momentum in the later stage of a movement. Influential allies → *certification* explains the difference in the length between the UM and the AEM during their decline stages.

## 6.4 Conclusion

To conclude, social Network Analysis (SNA) studies the relationship between the actors/events and their structure (Martino & Spoto, 2006). Networks operate as the cause, the outcome is viewed as the dependent variable (Caiani, 2014). In short, in this study SNA examine the IVs consisting of leaders, SMOs, networking and influential allies. Most importantly, key mechanisms have been explored, namely, whether leaders → *brokerage*, SMOs → *brokerage*, networking → *social appropriation*, and influential allies → *certification* can help explain the contrasting protest waves of the UM and the AEM. Mechanisms articulate various episodes so as to provide a more comprehensive and dynamic explanation for the social movement, and mechanisms do not miss contingent and irregular situations, which are often significant to the changing and outcome of the entire movement. In other words, mechanisms operate as a qualitative method (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001). Hence, combining SNA and mechanisms integrates quantitative and qualitative analysis.

It is important to discuss the mechanisms in detail. As intervening variables, mechanisms function during the relationship between IVs and DVs. *Brokerage*, *social appropriation*, and *certification* are the main and most frequent mechanisms linking IVs and DVs. It is worth mentioning again how to define the boundary between *brokerage* and *social appropriation*, as well as *brokerage* and *certification*. In theory they have ambiguous boundaries. For clarity, I define leaders and SMOs → *brokerage*, networking → *social appropriation*, networking → *scale shift*, influential allies → *certification*. In general, though some participants of a movement, not leaders and members of SMOs, sometimes may play a partial role of *brokerage*, more often they provide the effect of *social appropriation*. The same applies to influential allies. Influential allies played the part of *brokerage* to some extent, even if the boundary between leaders and allies was blurred, the analysis here must link influential allies to

*certification*, because the one-to-one correspondences between the independent variables and the mechanism must be established. Generally, using mechanisms as intervening variables between IVs and DVs can describe the processes and variations more accurately. As for the mechanisms themselves, the advantage lies in their operability and wider applicability as applicability to other social science research.

In the case studies of the UM and the AEM, *brokerage* can explain the difference in the number of protests between the two protest waves of the UM and the AEM, and *social appropriation*, *scale shift*, and *social appropriation & certification* interpret the differences between the two protest waves in the emergence phases, the peak phases and the decline phases, respectively. In particular, the betweenness centrality of the main brokers at the three phases was proportional to the number of protests, which can be interpreted by *brokerage*. In addition, networking mainly refers to the already existing organizations and resources, and *social appropriation* means that turning non-protest groups into protest groups. *Social appropriation* indeed occurred in the UM and the AEM, and it is the key to the continuation of the two campaigns. *Scale shift* is a mechanism related to *social appropriation*, and the former is essential for prolonging the longevity of the AEM during its peak period while the latter provides an explanation for the different duration of the two movements at their emergence and peak periods. Furthermore, the presence of influential allies is crucial to the continuation of the later period (decline stage) of a movement, moreover, international allies can have an impact on the outcomes of campaign under a hybrid regime by promulgating policies. Nonetheless, there is one limitation that the analysis of international allies' role here is not a quantitative analysis with the help of sociograms (the selection of protest events was based on Hong Kong).

In the next chapter, I will discuss whether the independent variables – frame and mechanisms – *social construction* and *object shift* can explain the differences of the two protest waves.

# Chapter 7: Data Analysis and Results of Framing Analysis and PEA

In this chapter a discourse network analysis is conducted as an approach to framing analysis, which corresponds to the parts of Framing Processes I explored in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. Frame analysis focuses on how to use and explain ideas, culture, and ideology, and how to combine them with specific circumstances or phenomena, so as to build specific thinking modes via which the constituency can understand the issues (Lindekilde, 2014). Discourse network analysis is a way to conduct mixed methods, integrates qualitative content analysis with quantitative social network analysis (Leifeld, 2017). As one of the three parts of the literature review, Chapter 3 – Application of Literature Review discussed the two social movements' core framing concepts – collective action frames, master frames, diagnostic framing, prognostic framing, and motivational framing and framing processes – frame bridging, frame amplification, frame extension, and frame transformation. In this chapter I will address the independent variables and mechanisms related to 'frame'; namely, my mechanistic analytical framework from Chapter 4 will be employed, and discuss the IV – frame, and the mechanisms – *social construction* and *object shift* in this chapter. The chapter proceeds as follows. In the first step I will carry out the discourse network analysis of the emergence phases of the UM and the AEM, discuss and compare key framing means (including diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational framing), frame resonance, and frame alignments, such as frame bridging, frame extension. Following this I will conduct the discourse network analysis of the peak phases of the UM and the AEM as described above. The third step will deal with the decline phases of the two movements.



## 7.1 Emergence phases

In this section I will firstly explain the main frames themselves during the emergence stages of the UM and the AEM, and then consider framing through the Discourse Network Analysis (DNA) frame-by-frame illustrated with figures and tables, including collective action frames, master frames, as well as frame alignment which refers to the linkage between explanatory frames of social movement groups and those of potential adherents and de facto or possible suppliers of resources (Snow et al., 1986). Next, I will illustrate frame resonances via the DNA actor-by-frame figures. Frame resonance means the capability of a collective action frame to evoke sympathy with or attract a well-directed constituency (Snow & Benford, 1988). Frame resonance is vital to build the connections between social movement organizations (Murase, 2014). And lastly, the mechanisms – *social construction* and *object shift* will be presented by means of the DNA object-by-frame figures.

As for the formation of these main frames (as shown in Table 7.1 and Table 7.2), details will be provided below. Financial professionals who supported the peaceful Occupy Central published an open letter in the newspaper on 23 April 2014, expressing the ten demands of Hong Kong people to President Xi Jinping, including the implementation of universal suffrage in line with international standards (C. Lam, 2014). “Establish true universal suffrage” was born. “Safeguard press freedom” was proposed by the HKJA (Hong Kong Journalists Association). The HKJA on 26 February 2014 initiated a silent standing protest, and the action declaration included: the freedom of the press is guaranteed by the Basic Law, and everyone has the right to freedom from fear; the government should strive to safeguard press freedom and act in the public interest (Hong Kong Journalists Association, 2014). Additionally, at the Citizens Voice Rally on 31 August 2014, the initiators of the OCLP announced that

civil disobedience was about to take place, calling for citizens to support true universal suffrage and the whole people to speak out (Tai, 2014). “Support true universal suffrage” stemmed from here. It is noteworthy that I chose frames from actors’ documents on the basis of the date the document appeared. This is how the frames were formed, and the other actors more or less used them in a similar way.

With regard to the employment of the major frames of the AEM, the Civil Human Rights Front (CHRF) strongly opposed the amendment of the extradition ordinance. In the eyes of the Chinese government, the court is a part of the political governance team and a tool of the party (Civil Human Rights Front, 2019). However, Hong Kong should fulfil its responsibilities under international human rights conventions and should not transfer fugitives to countries without human rights and fair trial (Civil Human Rights Front, 2019). “Withdraw the Extradition Bill”, “No fair judicial trial in Mainland” and “No human rights in Mainland” stemmed from here. Amnesty International Hong Kong requested Teresa Cheng to stop political prosecutions against nine leaders of the Umbrella Movement and other peaceful protesters, in an effort to prevent citizens from participating in peaceful assemblies and silence the opposition (Amnesty International Hong Kong, 2019). “Stop political prosecutions against UM leaders” came into being. Moreover, according to the Civic Party (2019), proposing the extradition bill was more politically motivated than legal, and China and Hong Kong have not reached an extradition agreement after many years of discussions because the mainland has refused to accept the human rights principles that Hong Kong has always implemented. This action of the SAR government was depriving Hong Kong citizens of their legal protection. “No legal protection” was born.

## 7.1.1 Frames & frame alignments – Emergence

Figure 7.1 DNA frame-by-frame at UM emergence:

- Academic free
- Intervene judiciary indepe
- Restrict rights
- Equal elected
- BJ contro CE ele







Figure 7.2 (DNA frame-by-frame at AEM emergence):

- Seizure assets
- Challenge justice



**Table 7.1 DNA frame-by-frame at UM emergence**

<b>Names of frames - Full names</b>	<b>Betweenness</b>
<b>Estab TUS - Establish true universal suffrage</b>	<b>36.000</b>
<b>Press freedom - Safeguard press freedom</b>	<b>14.000</b>
<b>Support TUS - Support true universal suffrage</b>	<b>1.000</b>

**Table 7.2 DNA frame-by-frame at AEM emergence**

<b>Names of frames - Full names</b>	<b>Betweenness</b>
<b>Withdraw ELAB - Withdraw the Extradition Bill</b>	<b>428.333</b>
<b>Unfair trial - No fair judicial trial in Mainland</b>	<b>35.167</b>
<b>No hum right - No human rights in Mainland</b>	<b>28.333</b>
<b>Nol Pros - Stop political prosecutions against UM leaders</b>	<b>5.000</b>
<b>No legal protect - No legal protection</b>	<b>1.167</b>

In Figures 7.1 and 7.2, the links between frames work in a way of coherence and complementarity. These links imply frame alignment. Put more simply, a line is drawn between two frames when they are shared by the same actor. For other frames' full names, please refer to Appendix II.

Framing conduces to making events or happenings significant and thus play the role of organizational experience and action guidance (Snow & Benford, 1988). Collective action frames also play this explanatory role by reducing and concentrating aspects of the "world out there," but in ways that are aimed to arouse possible followers and constituency, to gain the support of passers-by, and to demobilise opponents (Snow & Benford, 1988, p. 198). In a word, collective action frames are action-directed series of persuasions and interpretations that arouse and justify the actions of SMOs

(Benford & Snow, 2000) and in accordance with common meanings negotiated within the social movement (Gamson, 1992). In this sense, those main frames above of the UM and the AEM (including those in the tables that follow) were collective action frames, because they emerged most frequently, resonated among SMOs, and mobilized to a larger extent (as shown in Figures 7.3 and 7.4).

Moreover, referring back to the framing section of Chapter 2, it can be concluded that collective action frames are featured by central framing means – diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational framing. Diagnostic framing means problem identification, prognostic framing refers to proposed solution to the problem identified by diagnostic framing, and motivational framing is meant to call for action. Among the three, diagnostic framing and prognostic framing are well-defined, however, motivational framing is relatively general and difficult to clearly define, and here those frames designed to inspire morale without clear objects (there can be multiple objects in general terms) are defined as motivational framing. In this way, it can be determined that which of these following collective action frames are aimed for diagnostic framing, and which are prognostic framing and motivational framing.


In the cases of the UM and the AEM, “Establish true universal suffrage” aimed at prognostic framing now that they provided solutions to the problem, and “Adhere to press freedom” and “Support true universal suffrage” indicated motivational framing as it is designed to encourage citizen participation; in comparison, “Withdraw the Extradition Bill” and “Stop political prosecutions against UM leaders” reflected prognostic framing, “No fair judicial trial in Mainland”, “No human rights in Mainland”, and “No legal protection” pointed to diagnostic framing because they pointed out what the problem is. It can be concluded from the above that among the AEM’s main frames, most ones are actually an interpretation of the reasons for “Withdraw the Extradition

Bill”, which means that diagnostic framing facilitates prognostic framing, and thus the mobilization will be speeded up. In short, the composition of the AEM’s main frames is more complete than that of the UM’s ones.

As for master frames, according to Figure 7.1 and Table 7.1, “Establish true universal suffrage” is the largest cluster among the frames, and it displayed the equal rights master frame in the emergence period of the UM; by comparison, “Withdraw the Extradition Bill” obviously had the highest degree of connection at the emergence stage of the AEM, demonstrating the injustice master frame.

## 7.1.2 Frame resonances – Emergence

Figure 7.3 DNA actor-by-frame at UM emergence:







■ Frames

● Actors

Figure 7.3 and Figure 7.4 demonstrate the relationship between the actors (leaders, organizations/groups, influential allies, activists, and public figures) and frames. The nodes stand for actors and frames in both diagrams. The vectors stand for framing processes in both diagrams.


One difference between the UM and the AEM was that there was not an obvious frame in the UM, in contrast, “Withdraw ELAB” (Extradition Law Amendment Bill) became the biggest point of consensus among protest groups, protesters and potential supporters in the AEM. Another difference was that the nodes of the UM were loosely connected, while those of the AEM were closely related, involving significantly more actors. In brief, the collective action frame “Withdraw the Extradition Bill” effectively resonated or appealed to a more targeted audience, while the UM’s frames did not produce this effect during this period. What is more, “Establish true universal suffrage” and “Safeguard press freedom” were totally different frames, but they were compatible, and both were connected via demands for democracy, so the combination of the two showed frame bridging. Likewise, “Stop political prosecutions against UM leaders” was originally irrelevant to the “Withdraw the Extradition Bill”, but they were closely linked in the process of opposing de-democratization and authoritarian intrusion. This linkage showed frame bridging.

### **7.1.3 Mechanisms (*social construction & object shift*) – Emergence**

The notion of a framing refers to a subjective interpretation of specific events, and *social construction* refers to the meaning of an object or event that is widely adopted by a constituency (International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 2021). Frames target events, and *social construction* targets objects or events, in this study I

focus on the object of *social construction* for two reasons. The first is that the subject-verb-object story grammar is my framing analysis' methodology (see the Methodology Chapter). Emphasis on objects helps to lead to consistent data analysis. The second is that framing targeting events, and *social construction* targeting objects can work well as an analytical supplement mechanism. *Object shift* is based on a clear object, that is, *object shift* is built on *social construction*. Next let us move on to the case analyses of the UM and the AEM below.

Figure 7.5 DNA object-by-frame at UM emergence:





■ Frames

● Objects

### 7.1.3.1 Framing → *Social construction* – Emergence

Regarding the major collective action frames during the UM's emergence phase, "Establish true universal suffrage" and "Support true universal suffrage" were aimed at Beijing and Hong Kong government. "Safeguard press freedom" complained to CY Leung and Hong Kong government. By comparison, "Withdraw the Extradition Bill" and "Stop political prosecutions against UM leaders" were aimed at the Hong Kong government. "No fair judicial trial in Mainland", "No human rights in Mainland" and "No legal protection" describe the rule of law and judicial trials in the mainland of China, and thus they were directed at Beijing. All in all, all main collective action frames in the UM's emergence stage had more than one object, in contrast, each one had only one object during the emergence stage of the AEM. In other words, the latter had clearer objects than the former. In brief, *social construction* and framing means (diagnostic framing) interpreted the AEM's rapider mobilization than UM, that is, it did not need as a much time as the UM.

### 7.1.3.2 Framing → *Object shift* – Emergence

*Object shift* refers to a change in the object of actors, i.e., from local government to central government or subordinate sections. As can be seen from the above, there was *object shift* occurring in the emergence stages of the UM and the AEM. For example, in the UM's emergence stage, "Establish true universal suffrage" and "Support true universal suffrage" put pressure on Beijing through the HK government. Similarly, during the emergence phase of the AEM, "No fair judicial trial in Mainland", "No human rights in Mainland" and "No legal protection" pointed out Beijing's alleged behind-the-scenes manipulation by demanding the HK government to withdraw the

bill, though “Withdraw the Extradition Bill” suggested the main object was the Hong Kong government. Briefly, different protest curves of the UM and the AEM at the emergence stages cannot be accounted for via *object shift*.

## 7.2 Peak phases

In this section, I will first show how the main frames shaped during the peak phases of the UM and the AEM, and then explore collective action frames, master frames and frame alignments by means of the Discourse Network Analysis (DNA) frame-by-frame figures and tables, then demonstrate the frame resonances through the DNA actor-by-frame figures, finally, show the mechanisms – *social construction* and *object shift* via the DNA object-by-frame figures.

Regarding the application of the main frames of the UM, on 14 September 2014, the OCLP and civil organizations besieged the city through Black-cloth March to reveal to the world the crime of the regime betraying, because the government repeatedly broke its trust and stifled Hong Kong’s democracy (Occupy Central with Love and Peace, 2014). “Government breaks its trust” and “Government stifles democracy” were derived from here. On 22 September 2014, the OCLP issued a statement on police’s political prosecution against social activists: the government never listened to the reasonable demands of the people, and the police brutally suppressed peaceful protesters (Occupy Central with Love and Peace, 2014). When power becomes a reality, disobedience is an obligation. “Police repression” stemmed from here. On 27 September 2014, the OCLP called for citizens to watch for students who were trying to regain the Civic Square by peaceful means (Occupy Central with Love and Peace, 2014). “Regain Civic Square” was born. Furthermore, On 28 September 2014 the OCLP officially launched “Let Love and Peace Occupy Central” and made two solemn demands on political reform: to withdraw the NPCSC’s decision and restart political

reform consultation (Occupy Central with Love and Peace, 2014). “Restart political reform” was generated. Subsequently, the HKFS and Scholarism issued a joint statement: open Civic Square and Tim Mei Avenue for mass gatherings; CY Leung and the political reform trio should step down; withdraw the NPCSC decision; citizen nomination is essential and abolish the functional constituencies of the Legislative Council (HKFS, 2014). “CY Leung resign” was derived here. Also, pan-democratic legislators demanded: (1) to immediately stop violent suppression of citizens and start dialogue with citizens to solve problems, (2) to reopen the Civic Square and restore the public’s right to use it reasonably, (3) the NPCSC should withdraw its 831 decision and restart the five steps of political reform, (4) to impeach Chief Executive and urge CY Leung to step down (“Hong Kong Legislative Council’s Members’ Statement,” 2014). “Dialogue” appeared. On 1 October 2014, the HKFS and Scholarism held a Flyover Rally in Harcourt Road, putting forward political reform and insisting occupation and resistance (HKFS, 2014). “Occupation and resistance” came from here. On 12 October, Alex Chow made clear that the HKFS would stick to the streets and communicate with the strike committees of universities and civil society groups (HKFS, 2014). “Stick to streets” was generated. Moreover, on 14 October, King’s College took the lead in putting forward the demand “Implement true universal suffrage”, and then the HKFS and the Civic Party put forward a “trilogy” of the aims: to withdraw the NPCSC’s ‘831 resolution’, restart political reform discussions, and implement true universal suffrage (“Groups Prepare for Umbrella Community Day,” 2014; HKFS, 2014). “Implement true universal suffrage” emerged. On 15 October 2014, the OCLP issued a strong condemnation of the use of extrajudicial punishment by the police and demanded an investigation of use of excessive force against protesters (“OCLP strongly condemns police use of extrajudicial punishment,” 2014).



“Police abuse” and “Inquiry into police conduct” came in being. On 17 October, the HKFS appealed for Hong Kong people to protect the occupied areas and unite forces so as not to lose ground, and request a dialogue before Wednesday without delay (HKFS, 2014). “Unite forces” was born. On 26 October, Lester Shum, Benny Tai, Joshua Wong, and Nathan Law encouraged everyone present to shout slogans “strive for democracy”, “unite”, and “pledge not to bow together” (Lam & Pak, 2014). “Strive for democracy” was from here.

Most of the main frames of the AEM were derived from the five demands. The details were as follows: As early as 11 June 2019, the Civil Human Rights Front strongly condemned the police for abusing their police power, creating white terror and making citizens afraid to participate in peaceful gatherings committee (Civil Human Rights Front, 2019). “Creating white terror” emerged. On 12 June over two hundred pro-democratic members from the Election Committee initiated an e-petition, appealing for the resignation of Chief Executive Carrie Lam and withdrawal of the extradition bill (SCMP Reporters, 2019). They also asked the police to stop using force. “Withdraw the Extradition Bill”, “Carrie Lam resign” and “Police stop force” came into being. At that time, Chief Executive Carrie Lam had just officially announced that she would postpone the plan to promote the amendment of the “extradition law” on 15 June 2019, yet this movement of Hong Kong people in pursuit of human rights and freedom had not ended (Demosistō, 2019). On 15 June 2019 Demosistō took the lead in putting forward four demands: 1. withdrawal of the Extradition Law Amendment Bill, 2. to revise the characterisation of the “612 riots” and stop searching for the protestors, 3. to investigate the responsibility of violent suppression, 4. Carrie Lam must step down (Demosistō, 2019). At that point, “Retract the ‘riots’ characterisation” and “Police repression” took shape. Then, the CHRF responded to the police’s statement on 22

June 2019, once again reiterated their demands: to cancel the charges, to withdraw the characterization of the riot, and to thoroughly investigate the abuse of power by the police through the independent investigation committee (Civil Human Rights Front, 2019). “Inquiry into police conduct” and “Police abuse” came into being. Furthermore, in the face of police repression, at the end of July Demosistō launched workers’ strikes and students’ strikes, declaring that in order to conquer tyranny, the whole people of Hong Kong must be mobilized (Demosistō, 2019). “Strikes to conquer tyranny” occurred. The hksstrike2019 held a press conference on 7 September 2019 to announce the summary of various information on the strike action in the first week of September, and put forward a call for the next wave of action, showing that in the face of the white terror, although they are young, but will never be silent (Demosistō, 2019). “Never be silent” was generated. On 5 September HKICC Lee Shau Kee School of Creativity issued a statement, to denounce Junius Ho for disturbing the school, and ask to restore the campus peace (HKICC Lee Shau Kee School of Creativity, 2019). “Restore campus peace” arose. In addition, in September 2019 Benny Tai stated that withdrawing the bill was absolutely not enough, the government must withdraw the “831 decision” and implement true universal suffrage, to make sure that withdrawal of other bad laws would become unnecessary (SCMP Reporters, 2019). “Implement true universal suffrage” appeared. In September 2019, a group of Hong Kong’s democracy activists visited the United States and held a historic meeting with Congress to jointly support and promote the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act, and Nathan Law highlighted the threat of China’s authoritarian expansion to democratic values (Demosistō, 2019). “Authoritarian expansion” was born. During the protests on 22 September, Tsang Kin Shing of the League of Social Democrats displayed a 30-meter-long banner that read “Glory to Hong Kong”, the title of a popular protest song (SCMP

Reporters, 2019). “Glory to Hong Kong” was derived from here. Moreover, in October 2019 the CHRF condemned Lam’s government’s establishment of the Anti-mask law, which suppressed the legal and peaceful right to protest of the exploited communities (Civil Human Rights Front, 2019). “Withdraw Anti-mask law” stemmed from here. Chung Chin Kiu, Joseph Zen, and Chan Ka Lok attend the Forum 2000 in Czech in October issued a statement to urge the Hong Kong government to meet the requirements for democratic governance of Hong Kong people and respect their right to defend human rights and the universal values of democracy (Demosistō, 2019). “Defend human rights” was derived from here. Furthermore, Justice Centre Hong Kong issued an open letter to French President Emmanuel Macron during his visit to China in November 2019, expressing that the anti-extradition demonstration evolved into a movement for accountability and democratic reform as the freedom of speech, assembly and association in Hong Kong was repeatedly damaged (“Please Raise Concern over Human Rights in Hong Kong,” 2019). “Democratic reform” was generated. Hong Kong Human Rights Monitor issued a statement to warn the Hong Kong government and police to stop attacking the campus and not to worsen the humanitarian disaster (“Hong Kong Human Rights Monitor Warns Hong Kong Police,” 2019). “Not worsen humanitarian disaster” was from here. “Five demands, not one less” was a popular slogan in the Anti-Extradition protests.





**Table 7.3 DNA frame-by-frame at UM peak**

<b>Names of frames - Full names</b>	<b>Betweenness</b>
<b>Imple TUS - Implement true universal suffrage</b>	<b>258.223</b>
<b>Dialogue - Dialogue</b>	<b>211.424</b>
<b>GOV no trust - Government breaks its trust</b>	<b>154.839</b>
<b>Stifle demo - Government stifles democracy</b>	<b>154.839</b>
<b>Police abuse - Police abuse</b>	<b>143.396</b>
<b>Re polit reform - Restart political reform</b>	<b>137.466</b>
<b>Police repress - Police repression</b>	<b>117.435</b>
<b>Strive demo - Strive for democracy</b>	<b>101.977</b>
<b>Unite forces - Unite forces</b>	<b>101.977</b>
<b>Regain Civ Sq - Regain Civic Square</b>	<b>89.868</b>
<b>Stick to streets - Stick to streets</b>	<b>82.941</b>
<b>CY Leung resign - CY Leung resign</b>	<b>76.315</b>
<b>Inquire police - Inquiry into police conduct</b>	<b>71.000</b>
<b>Occup resist - Occupation and resistance</b>	<b>69.355</b>

**Table 7.4 DNA frame-by-frame at AEM peak**

<b>Names of frames - Full names</b>	<b>Betweenness</b>
<b>Withdraw ELAB - Withdraw the Extradition Bill</b>	<b>1005.470</b>
<b>Police abuse - Police abuse</b>	<b>789.880</b>
<b>Inquire police - Inquiry into police conduct</b>	<b>759.597</b>
<b>Police repress - Police repression</b>	<b>374.685</b>
<b>TUS - Implement true universal suffrage</b>	<b>286.856</b>
<b>Retract “riots” - Retract the ‘riots’ characterisation</b>	<b>285.477</b>

<b>Five demands, not one less - Five demands, not one less</b>	<b>267.014</b>
<b>Dem reform - Democratic reform</b>	<b>212.000</b>
<b>White terror - Creating white terror</b>	<b>205.008</b>
<b>Police stop force - Police stop force</b>	<b>165.222</b>
<b>Withdraw AML - Withdraw Anti-mask law</b>	<b>130.318</b>
<b>Authorit expan - Authoritarian expansion</b>	<b>119.994</b>
<b>Never silent - Never be silent</b>	<b>118.867</b>
<b>Humani disaster - Not worsen humanitarian disaster</b>	<b>107.000</b>
<b>Restore peace - Restore campus peace</b>	<b>107.000</b>
<b>Glory to HK - Glory to Hong Kong</b>	<b>107.000</b>
<b>Conquer tyranny - Strikes to conquer tyranny</b>	<b>99.996</b>
<b>Defend hum right - Defend human rights</b>	<b>66.540</b>
<b>Carrie Lam resign - Carrie Lam resign</b>	<b>61.372</b>

It is important to note that unlike figures about frame structures in the emergence and decline phases, Figures 7.7 and 7.8 only demonstrate the structures of frames shared by more than two actors. If it were provided a full picture, the density would be too high, and the key nodes also not clear enough. In order to illustrate the centrality of key frames as shown in the Figure 7.7 and Figure 7.8, I manipulate with affiliation matrices so that two frames become linked if more than two actors share them, put differently, if fewer than three actors share them, they are not connected to each other. I chose three as a cut-off point because the networks were otherwise so densely connected that it was difficult to interpret the data. In this way, I focus on the most important and more enduring links.

In terms of central framing means, in the UM, “Implement true universal suffrage”, “Dialogue”, “Restart political reform”, “CY Leung resign”, “Regain Civic Square” and “Inquiry into police conduct” realized prognostic framing. “Government breaks its trust”, “Government stifles democracy”, “Police abuse” and “Police repression” indicated diagnostic framing. “Strive for democracy”, “Unite forces”, “Stick to streets”, and “Occupation and resistance” attained motivational framing. As for the AEM, “Withdraw the Extradition Bill”, “Inquiry into police conduct”, “Implement true universal suffrage”, “Retract the ‘riots’ characterisation”, “Democratic reform”, “Carrie Lam resign”, “Withdraw Anti-mask law”, “Police stop force” and “Restore campus peace”, “Not worsen humanitarian disaster” and “Defend human rights” achieved prognostic framing. “Police abuse”, “Police repression”, “Creating white terror” and “Authoritarian expansion” attained diagnostic framing. “Five demands, not one less”, “Never be silent”, “Glory to Hong Kong” and “Strikes to conquer tyranny” reflected motivational framing. All in all, it can be concluded from the above that prognostic framing is critical to maintaining the momentum of protests during peak stage of movements. Besides that, diagnostic and motivational framing are essential for peak periods, especially motivational framing for sustaining the passion of movement participants.

Based on Figure 7.7 and Table 7.3, it is discovered that “Implement true universal suffrage” is shared by most actors, and “Withdraw the Extradition Bill” is the largest common denominator joining all the smaller frames in Figure 7.8 and Table 7.4. That is to say, during the peak phases, the UM indicated the justice master frame while the AEM revealed the injustice master frame. In brief, a protest wave can be partly a result of developing a resonating master frame (Benford, 2013). Compared with that



of the UM, the emergence stage of the AEM developed a resonant injustice master frame.





It can be seen from the comparison of the two figures that in terms of frames' popularity and quantity, the AEM was more significant than the UM. The AEM had more widely accepted collective action frames, i.e., "Withdraw the Extradition Bill", "Police abuse", and "Inquiry into police conduct". Put another way, the AEM was more successful in frame resonance.

### **7.2.3 Mechanisms (*social construction & object shift*) – Peak**





### 7.2.3.1 Framing → *Social construction* – Peak

As can be seen from Figure 7.11, “Implement true universal suffrage”, “Dialogue” and “Strive for democracy” targeted Hong Kong government, Beijing; “Government breaks its trust” and “Government stifles democracy” were directed against Hong Kong government; “Police abuse”, “Police repression” and “Inquiry into police conduct” were aimed at police; “Restart political reform” pointed to Hong Kong government, Beijing and CY Leung; “Regain Civic Square” was directed against police and Hong Kong government; “Unite forces” and “Occupation and resistance” were targeted at Hong Kong government, Beijing, CY Leung and police; “CY Leung resign” was aimed at CY Leung; “Stick to streets” targeted public power, Hong Kong government and police.

Regarding the AEM’s peak stage, from Figure 7.12, “Withdraw the Extradition Bill”, “Implement true universal suffrage” and “Democratic reform” targeted Hong Kong government and Beijing; “Inquiry into police conduct” and “Not worsen humanitarian disaster” were aimed at Hong Kong government and police; “Retract the ‘riots’ characterisation” pointed to Hong Kong government; “Carrie Lam resign” was directed against Carrie Lam; “Withdraw Anti-mask law” was aimed at Carrie Lam and Hong Kong government; “Police stop force”, “Police abuse” and “Police repression” targeted police; “Restore campus peace” pointed to Junius Ho; “Defend human rights” and “Authoritarian expansion” were directed at Beijing; “Creating white terror” was aimed at Hong Kong government, Beijing, Carrie Lam, police, Junius Ho, Priscilla Leung and Education Bureau; “Five demands, not one less” pointed to Hong Kong government, Beijing, police and Carrie Lam; “Never be silent” was targeted at Junius Ho and Priscilla Leung; “Glory to Hong Kong” was aimed at Hong Kong government, Beijing

and Carrie Lam; “Strikes to conquer tyranny” pointed to Beijing, Hong Kong government and police.

All in all, both the UM and the AEM during their peak phases had the same four objects (Hong Kong government, Beijing, police, and the chief executive (CY Leung / Carrie Lam), most frames pointed to multiple objects, and *social construction* cannot provide an explanation for the differences between the two protest waves at the peak phases.

### 7.2.3.2 Framing → *Object shift* – Peak

When police fired tear gas at protestors, mostly students, at the beginning of the Umbrella Movement, a large number of residents took to the streets spontaneously. They did not even know what the students’ real demands were and they just stood with the students to protect them (H. M. Leung, 2016). Likewise, it was a tidal wave of indignation throughout the city that caused the occupation to continue (Dapiran, 2019). What caused this resonance was the brutal police suppression, which was partly explained by frame extension, but not sufficiently, “Police stop force” was an emergent frame that object shifted, and therefore *object shift* is necessary here to provide additional explanation. As for the AEM’s peak period, among the major collective action frames, allegations about the police accounted for more than half as shown above. Since the extradition bill had been announced to be formally withdrawn but the movement still continued. The shift of demands from the withdrawal of the extradition bill to the establishment of an independent investigation committee, which aimed to thoroughly investigate the abuse of power by the police force, directly pushed forward the maintenance of the movement. Thus, a merge of frame extension and *object shift* / frame transformation contributed to the maintenance of the two movements in their peak stages, or to be more precise, it is not *object shift* but object addition that



describes the emerging process of targeting objects, which is not equivalent to frame transformation. In short, frame extension and *object shift* can interpret that both the UM and the AEM continued a relatively long time after reaching only one apex.

### **7.3 Decline phases**

In this section I will firstly describe the frames formed in the decline stages of the UM and the AEM, and summarise collective action frames, master frames and frame alignments by the Discourse Network Analysis (DNA) frame-by-frame figures and tables, then the DNA actor-by-frame figures will display the frame resonances. Lastly, the DNA object-by-frame figures will reveal the mechanisms – *social construction* and *object shift*.

Regarding the formation of the main frames of the UM, on 9 January 2015, Albert Ho, a Democratic Party Member of the Legislative Council, announced his resignation to initiate a referendum after the Legislative Council had vetoed the fake universal suffrage plan, and requested that the central government restart the five steps of political reform and implement the 2017 genuine election of the chief executive (C. Lam, 2015). “Restart political reform” was formed. On 1 February 2015, the HKFS, Scholarism, the Student Fight for Democracy, and the Umbrella Parents initiated a “one person one letter” campaign, hoping that the government would face up to the citizens’ demands for true universal suffrage (Scholarism, 2015); on the same day, the Civil Human Rights Front (CHRF) launched a parade for true universal suffrage, Benny Tai, Chan Kin-man, Chu Yiu-ming, and Martin Lee took the lead and held high slogans such as “I want true universal suffrage” (“The Civil Human Rights Front Parade Started,” 2015). “Face up to true universal suffrage” and “I want true universal suffrage” were derived from here. In May 2015, the Progressive Lawyers Group, the Médecins Inspirés, the Nurse Politik, the Progressive Teachers’ Alliance,


the Act Voice and other groups started the art industry's action, telling the government that any plan following the "831 decision" would not be a true universal suffrage, and the government was required to withdraw the plan and immediately fulfil its constitutional responsibility ("The Entertainment Profession Joined Twelve Professional Groups," 2015). "Reject '831 Resolution'" and "Constitutional responsibility" emerged. On 4 June 2015, the Student Union of the Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUSU), the Student Union of Hong Kong Shue Yan University (SYUSU), the City University of Hong Kong Students' Union (CityUSU), and the Hong Kong Polytechnic University Students' Union (HKPUSU) hung up a banner on the platform of the Hong Kong Alliance: "Government and business collapse", "Totalitarian powerlessness", "Independent destiny", "Hong Kong people revise constitution" (Scholarism, 2015). Obviously, "Revise constitution" stemmed from here. On 18 June 2015, the HKFS made a statement "Defend the dignity of Hong Kong people and regain the autonomy of the city" about the veto on the political reform plan (HKFS, 2015). "Regain autonomy" appeared. On 6 August 2015, CHRF, Umbrella Parents and Hong Kong Shield pointed out that police violated the law and threatened the rule of law (Civil Human Rights Front, 2015). "Police violation" was from here.

When it comes to how the AEM's major frames shaped, the CHRF was furious at the police's persistent arrests and infringements, strongly condemned them, and indicated that the actions of the police would only make Hong Kong people more united and determined to persevere together (Civil Human Rights Front, 2020). "United" occurred. Moreover, various trade unions issued the May Day statement: to fight against totalitarianism, the Hong Kong people have re-understood their relationship with society, recovering every field and turning it into the strength of resistance (HKCTU, 2020). "Fight against totalitarianism" was derived from here. On 26 May 2020,

the hksstrike2019, the Hongkongers Education Support and numerous middle school students' groups made a statement on Beijing's forcible imposition of the national anthem law and national security law, considered them as attempts to stifle the freedom of speech and expression of teachers and students, and stigmatize local education with nationalism ("The CCP's Draconian Law Ensued," 2020). "Curb expression freedom" emerged. Moreover, the CHRF issued a statement in response to police's indiscriminate arrest of "831" demonstrators, and strongly condemned it (Civil Human Rights Front, 2020). "Police abuse" stemmed from here. In March 2020, the Democratic Party accused the police of abusing the law, and called the incident a blatant act aimed at harming speech freedom in society and aimed at creating cold cicada effect in society (Lum, Leung, & Zhang, 2020). "Harm speech freedom" was derived from here.



Figure 7.14 DNA frame-by-frame at AEM decline:



**Table 7.5 DNA frame-by-frame at UM decline**

<b>Names of frames - Full names</b>	<b>Betweenness</b>
<b>Reject 831 - Reject '831 Resolution'</b>	<b>376.500</b>
<b>Revise constit - Revise constitution</b>	<b>192.000</b>
<b>I want TUS - 'I want true universal suffrage'</b>	<b>116.917</b>
<b>Face up TUS - Face up to true universal suffrage</b>	<b>110.250</b>
<b>Police violation - Police violation</b>	<b>93.333</b>
<b>Re autonomy - Regain autonomy</b>	<b>61.167</b>
<b>Constitu duty - Constitutional responsibility</b>	<b>12.250</b>
<b>Re polit reform - Restart political reform</b>	<b>3.583</b>

**Table 7.6 DNA frame-by-frame at AEM decline**

<b>Names of frames - Full names</b>	<b>Betweenness</b>
<b>United - United</b>	<b>48.000</b>
<b>Curb express free - Curb expression freedom</b>	<b>27.500</b>
<b>Fight totalit - Fight against totalitarianism</b>	<b>13.000</b>
<b>Police abuse - Police abuse</b>	<b>9.500</b>
<b>Harm speech free - Harm speech freedom</b>	<b>1.000</b>


With regard to central framing means, “Reject 831 Resolution”, “Revise constitution” and “Restart political reform” reflected prognostic framing, “Constitutional responsibility” and “Police violation” fulfilled diagnostic framing, and “Regain autonomy”, “Face up to true universal suffrage” and “I want true universal suffrage” showed motivational framing. “Curb expression freedom”, “Police abuse” and “Harm speech freedom” indicated diagnostic framing, “United” and “Fight against totalitarianism” mirrored motivational framing. From the comparison of the two framing

means, those of the UM involved diagnostic framing, prognostic framing and motivational framing, while those of the AEM were diagnostic framing and motivational framing, no prognostic framing. Hence, I assume that in the later period of a movement, a proportion of prognostic framing is needed to make the whole movement last longer.

As for the master frames, on the basis of Figure 7.13 & Table 7.5 and Figure 7.14 & Table 7.6, “Reject 831 Resolution” was the largest common frame during the decline stage of the UM, while “United” connected the most actors in the decline period of the AEM. In other words, the UM showed injustice master frame at the decline phase; for the AEM at this period, it involved the oppositional master frame. In summary, the UM maintained the justice & injustice master frames from peak to decline, while the AEM’s oppositional master frame in the decline phase is far from the injustice master frame at the peak stage, which also explains why the UM had a longer duration in its decline stage, because it effectively continued the unfulfilled objective at the peak stage.

### **7.3.2 Frame resonances – Decline**

Figure 7.15 DNA actor-by-frame at UM decline:







Here is the contrast of the two figures, it can be discovered that in the former, the relationship between nodes is closer and more concentrated, while in the latter, it is more dispersed and separate. This means that the UM had a more unified object than the AEM. There was an obvious collective action frame “Reject 831 Resolution” in the decline period of the UM, while the AEM had no equivalent frame.

### **7.3.3 Mechanisms (*social construction & object shift*) – Decline**





### 7.3.3.1 Framing → *Social construction* – Decline

Among the major collective action frames of the UM, “Reject ‘831 Resolution” pointed to the Legislative Council of Hong Kong, Beijing, and the Hong Kong government. “Restart political reform” targeted the HK government, Beijing, Leung Kam-chung, Charnwut Chan, Lam Woon-kwong, Henry Tang and Carrie Lam. “Revise constitution”, “Constitutional responsibility” and “Face up to universal suffrage” pointed to Beijing and the HK government. “Regain autonomy” was directed against Beijing. “I want true universal suffrage” was aimed at CY Leung, the HK government and Beijing. By comparison, during the decline stage of the AEM, “United” targeted Carrie Lam, police, and the HK government. “Curb expression freedom” and “Fight against totalitarianism” were directed against Beijing, police, and the HK government. “Police abuse” was aimed at police, “Harm speech freedom” targeted Beijing and police. All in all, it can be found that during the decline periods, most main collective action frames of the UM and the AEM had more diversified objects. Therefore, *social construction* cannot account for that the AEM had a shorter protest curve than the UM at the decline phases.

### 7.3.3.2 Framing → *Object shift* – Decline

It can be observed from the above, object shifted from the Hong Kong government to Beijing during the decline period of the UM, while *object shift* did not occur obviously in the decline phase of the AEM. In short, *object shift* could not interpret the difference in the two protest curves in the decline periods.

## 7.4 Conclusion

In summary, the subject-verb-object story grammar is the basic research approach of framing analysis in this study, and discourse network analysis is one

research method that can be used to implement the approach. Empirical discourse network analysis is established by merging content analysis based on categories and network analysis (Leifeld, 2017). Generally, one and two mode sociograms of nodes (leaders, SMOs, participating groups, and other actors as well as frames) are used to prove the frame resonances. The intensity of connections among nodes in a frame structure can be statistically assessed and measured, and thus similar analyses can be employed for frame bridging and frame extension. When it comes to the validity of *social construction* and *object shift*, *social construction* focuses on objects and can better identify who is to blame and who is accountable. *Object shift* / frame transformation does not work alone and combines with frame extension to provide a more complete explanation in the expansion of mobilization scale or/and continuation of campaign duration, as the newly added frames leading to the increase of object. Or it is more accurate to use object addition than *object shift*. It should be noted that the confirmation of objects requires an accurate grasp of data and materials and research context.

Overall, the major difference between the Umbrella Movement and the Anti-Extradition Movement is the degree of frame resonance, especially in the emergence and peak phases. The reason for this difference was the core demand. The Umbrella Movement demanded the withdrawal of the “831 decision”, restarting political reform, and implementing true universal suffrage, while the Anti-Extradition Movement aimed to withdraw the extradition bill and to implement an independent inquiry into police conduct. The former was a positive pursuit of what had never been obtained, while the latter was a negative response to the deprivation of the freedom and rights that had always been enjoyed. The latter obviously produced a greater and more lasting frame resonance than the former. Specifically, diagnostic framing, prognostic framing and

*social construction* demonstrate the difference between the UM and the AEM during their emergence stages, since the AEM had clearer objects than the former and required shorter mobilization time. As for the peak stage of the two movements, both had achieved successful frame resonance, which can be explained by prognostic framing, frame extension and *object shift*. As regards the frame networks in the decline phases of the UM and the AEM, the former was more concentrated, while the latter was more separate. That is to say, after the civic education of the Umbrella Movement, various groups had become more unified in their goals which were “Reject 831 Resolution” and “Restart political reform”; after the Anti-Extradition Movement, the relevant actors seemed to be more distracted, because of a bewildering situation brought about by the National Security Law. There were two reasons. The first was that COVID-19 prevented people from gathering to the greatest extent; the second was that it took only ten days for the National Security Law from being proposed to being passed, leading to the protesters’ rapid response in a short duration. In brief, a sudden rise in the decline phase of the AEM was mainly due to the outbreak of the epidemic, in addition to the imposition of the National Security Law, which explained the strange curve shape in this stage.

Regarding how mechanisms and framing theory account for the two different protest waves, *social construction* and diagnostic framing explain that the AEM spent less time on the mobilization than UM, prognostic framing accounts for the difference (longevity) at the decline phases.

The next chapter will consider with the remaining independent variables – elite division, propensity for repression, SMOs/factions, new tactics and use of violence as well as the mechanisms – *attribution of opportunity and threat, diffusion, repression,*

*radicalization, competition,* and explore how these IVs and mechanisms explain the differences between the protest waves of the UM and the AEM.




# Chapter 8: Data Analysis and Results of Mechanisms

In this chapter I will make assessment of the impotence of the mechanisms in my analytical framework. The chapter is based on Chapter 3, and I apply my mechanistic analytical framework from Chapter 4, therefrom the relationship between the independent variables and the mechanism is established. Namely, elite division → *attribution of opportunity and threat*, new tactics → *diffusion*, propensity for repression → *repression*, use of violence → *radicalization*, and SMOs/factions → *competition* will be investigated in this chapter. The chapter proceeds as follows. In the first step I will discuss and compare the forms of protests in the Umbrella Movement and the Anti-Extradition Movement. Following this, the number of policing events of the UM and the AEM will be analysed and compared. In the third step the relationship between *repression*, *radicalization*, and protest wave of the AEM will be expounded and studied. Fourthly I will examine the effects of *competition* produced. In the final step, I will discuss and analyse other mechanisms, namely *diffusion* and *attribution of opportunity and threat*.

In the next section, the differences between the number of policing events of the UM and the AEM will be compared and discussed.

## 8.1 The number of policing events of UM and AEM



**Figure 8.1 The number of policing events of UM and AEM**

When comparing the policing events of the UM and the AEM, the difference was wide. The latter was much more numerous than the former in quantity and intensity level. As for the UM, a massive and cruel police crackdown occurred at the end of September 2014. On 27 September 2014, the police used pepper spray on the peaceful protestors without any warning (Occupy Central with Love and Peace, 2014). At 12.30pm on 28 September 2014 police shot a few rounds of tear gas to disperse the protestors in Harcourt Road and the Connaught Road Central flyover in Admiralty (“Occupy Central - The First Night”, 2014). Tension escalated while the police repeatedly used ‘pepper spray, batons, and riot shields’ to scatter the demonstrators, and the demonstrators put on ‘masks, goggles, and raincoats, with umbrella in hand’ to shelter from the pepper spray when attempting to blockade the police officers (H. M. Leung, 2016, p. 90). When the sun went down, ‘the police escalated their use of force by firing as many as six rounds of tear gas into the crowd while hitting them with batons’ (H. M. Leung, 2016, p. 90). Demonstrators dispersed and the leaders of OCLP

and the HKFS appealed to demonstrators to withdraw to the protest area at Tamar Park, exterior to the Civic Square (H. M. Leung, 2016). Moreover, chaos occurred soon when the riot police dressed in green uniforms equipped with what was looking like shotguns reached the area, and demonstrators scattered towards Wan Chai and Central District (H. M. Leung, 2016). For a lot of participants, the compassion for students was the major motivation for participating in the campaign (H. M. Leung, 2016). A few of them were not aware of the cause of the student demonstrations and occupying action yet firstly joined the political assembly driven by ‘supporting students’ and ‘protecting students’ (H. M. Leung, 2016, p. 86). A few of them depicted the countermeasures imposed by the police as ‘ridiculous’, ‘too much’, ‘unbelievable’ and ‘unreasonable’ (H. M. Leung, 2016, p. 86). Students who occupied the Civic Square were ultimately cleared by the police in early afternoon of 27 September (H. M. Leung, 2016). Their arrests caused plenty of demonstrators to continue demonstrating so that the police’s efforts of clearance were futile. Consequently, the situation had thoroughly shifted from the initial plan for Occupy Central. The turmoil at Admiralty had extended to Central and Wan Chai, and even more suddenly, to Causeway Bay and Mong Kok, where roads were occupied as well (H. M. Leung, 2016). The occupation in Causeway Bay was, to some degree, caused by the police’s constant shooting of tear gas in Admiralty and Central (H. M. Leung, 2016). In brief, police fired tear gas at the crowds at the beginning leading to the number of participants in the campaign peaking in the first few days. It was the police *repression* that allowed the UM to expand, which was similar to the situation of the AEM.

Later, in mid-late November 2014, the police used massive force. In Mong Kok over two days riot police carried out “hit as soon as you are seen” campaigns against demonstrators, volunteers at first aid stations, street walkers and other citizens (“The

Police Beat People Seen,” 2014). Not only did the police sweep Mong Kok violently but planted charges to intimidate journalists (Lam & Wong, 2014). Following the situation at the end of November, after police recaptured Lung Wo Road, demonstrators rushed out of Wan Chai to occupy it. Near 7 a.m. on 2 December 2014 the police suddenly attacked, and about 1,000 demonstrators were confronting only around 100 police officers. However, the police not only sent out “water cannons” to disperse the demonstrators but swung their batons and beat demonstrators indiscriminately. Most of the demonstrators were demoralised. Only ten people resisted for ten minutes with homemade shields, and soon they gave in (“The Police Used Water Cannon,” 2014).

For the AEM, the police generally adopted a strategy combining tightening and loosening, which means sometimes suppressing protestors forcefully, sometimes showing tolerance and restraint. Arresting important democratic activists at every major demonstration served as a deterrent but stimulated greater resistance. More concretely, on 12 June 2019, the protestors occupied several main roads in Hong Kong’s business district and clashed with the police, which was similar to that of “Occupy Central” in 2014. Police repeatedly fired tear gas, rubber bullets and other approaches to disperse the demonstrators. After that, the police characterized the conflict on 12 June as riots (“Hong Kong Demonstration: A Review of Historical Scenes,” 2020). On 31 August, the police at Prince Edward station chased passengers indiscriminately (Cheng & Leung, 2019). The police entered the Prince Edward station to disperse the protestors, who accused the police of using excessive force in the process (“Hong Kong 831 Protest: Gasoline Bombs,” 2019). In mid-to-late November, the demonstrators occupied the campus of Hong Kong Polytechnic University for several days and clashed with the riot police present. The police used water cannon


vehicles, armoured vehicles, and tear gas to try to enter the campus (“‘Siege’ of Hong Kong Polytechnic University was raised,” 2019). On 18 April 2020, Jimmy Lai and more than ten Democrats in Hong Kong were arrested. It was reported that the reasons for the arrests involved illegal rallies and the previous year’s anti-extradition demonstration activities (“Jimmy Lai and More Than Ten Pan-democrats,” 2020).

By and large, this suppressive strategy merely aroused strong objections by taking the more than 8000 protestors into custody (Nancy, 2020). The arrests included not only protesters, but also reporters, medical volunteers, and NGO observers. Excessive and illegal police violence had only expanded the public support for the movement, even from mild professional bodies such as civil servants, financial staff, bookkeepers, architects, measurers, and cabin attendants (Chen, 2019). The escalation of the actions of radical demonstrators and the police’s clearance and *repression* put an end to the Umbrella Movement. However, the opposite was true of the Anti-Extradition Movement.

In the following section I will discuss in detail the relationship between the *repression* and the *radicalization* during the AEM and analyse how they drove the AEM forward (the reason for not discussing the relationship between *repression* and *radicalization* in the UM is that its peak phase was relatively short where the violence and policing events occurred intensively, the positive correlation between them was not significant, as previously discussed). Before that, I first explain the propensity for repression → *repression*, and using violence → *radicalization*. Propensity for repression refers to a possibility and strategy, and has not yet become a reality, while *repression* refers to real attempt. Using violence refers to the strategy and mode of action adopted by social movements, and *radicalization* means one trend in the development of social movements. The transition from use of violence to *radicalization*

demonstrates that a social movement has evolved into the middle and later period of its protest wave.

## 8.2 Correlation of *repression & radicalization* and protest wave of AEM



**Figure 8.2 Correlation of *repression & radicalization* and protest wave**

In the chapter on methodology, I mentioned that policing events analysis is used to analyze the mechanism – *repression*, and the analysis of violent political events is employed for the analysis of the mechanism – *radicalization*. The number of policing events was positively proportional to the amount of violence used by radical protestors. In June 2019, the Anti-Extradition Movement soon accumulated momentum via two massive parades launched by the Civil Human Rights Front (CHRF). The first was the June 9<sup>th</sup> march, with about one million participants. However, there was no sign of any concession from Hong Kong government. Then, it was reported that a 35-year-old man whose surname was Leung committed suicide on 15 June due to the political situation in Hong Kong, leading to the protestors to

accumulate more strength, causing about two million people to take to the streets on 16 June 2019 (Lee et al., 2019). The size of the June 16<sup>th</sup> parade had no precedent in the history of Hong Kong, forcing Chief Executive Carrie Lam to admit that the legislation had failed, and immediately the bill was suspended on 15 June 2019 (Lee et al., 2019). However, the government insisted to formally withdraw the bill, which had aroused widespread anger in the whole society was not necessary, and the brutal actions and misfeasance of the police on 12 June 2019 fuelled the fire. Besides, characterising the June 12<sup>th</sup> march as “riots” triggered strong dissatisfaction among its participants so that retraction of the “riots” characterisation became one of the five demands. Subsequently, the July 1<sup>st</sup> rally pushed the AEM protests towards *radicalization*. When some of the protestors rushed into the Legislative Council building, they demolished its walls and issued a declaration setting out their five demands (Lee et al., 2019). Over the next few weeks, the escalation of the conflict led to more protests and spread to different places. Violent confrontations broke out between protestors wearing hard hats and gas masks and reinforced a police force, using tear gas and rubber bullets (Lee et al., 2019). Then, on 9 July 2019 Carrie Lam declared that the bill was “dead”. Furthermore, on 21 July evening, when thousands of people marching to the Hong Kong Liaison Office violently clashed with the police, a gang of thugs dressed in white shirts beat people indiscriminately at Yuen Long station (Lee et al., 2019). The assault caused many injuries and caused widespread condemnation, not only against the thugs, but against the police, a lot of protesters believing that the police had deliberately permitted the assault to occur. In short, the Yuen Long incident sparked a new round of escalated confrontation. In the following weeks, the degree and intensity of the confrontation increased significantly. Protests became regular events every weekend, many of which ended with militants besieging

the local police stations or fighting with riot police in the streets and subway stations using umbrellas, bamboo poles, bricks and even gasoline bombs (Lee et al., 2019). As Beijing had instructed the Hong Kong government to calm the protests, the police stepped up the crackdown, increased the use of force and arrested as many of the protesters as possible (Lee et al., 2019). Briefly, as shown in Figure 8, the protesters' *radicalization* reached the first climax in August 2019, that was when police *repression* peaked, and the protest wave also reached its peak.

The Hong Kong government ordered to 'stop the violence and halt the chaos' stemming from the protests, and on 4 October 2019 invoked the Emergency Regulations Ordinance to proclaim the prohibition of wearing masks at public assemblies (Ku, 2020, p. 112). The Anti-mask law aroused a strong backlash from the protesters, gave the protests more energy, and exceeded their original strength. In this way it turned into a massive social insurrection. As Figure 7.4 shows, the *radicalization* peaked in October 2019. Furthermore, on 8 November 2019 a 22-year-old college student named Chow Tsz-lok died suddenly and suspiciously, then the movement seemed to be moving towards a standoff with the authorities, with the slogan 'If we burn, you burn with us' (Ku, 2020, p. 113). The protesters expanded their confrontation by starting the 'Dawn Operation', including the construction of road barriers, the reactivation of boycotting classes, strikes, shopkeepers' strike, and others (Ku, 2020, p. 113). Moreover, police *repression* reached its second climax in November 2019 when besieging the Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK) and the Hong Kong Polytechnic University (HKPU). Both universities are linked with the overpasses of the main arteries of traffic, and during the resistance in November 2019, protesters hurled objects on the streets to block traffic. The situation at HKPU was especially severe, with over 1000 people (mostly students) trapped in the campus and surrounded by the



police officers for several days (Ku, 2020). The dilemma was eventually settled on 29 November by conciliations from lawmakers, university presidents and other relevant parties (Ku, 2020). Later, the number of protests in December 2019 and January 2020 were much fewer than before. Thus, the police *repression* and the protestors' *radicalization* went hand in hand, both sides using violence against violence, and the escalation of violence under the interaction between the two sides pushed the movement forward.

All in all, the rising trend of *radicalization* and *repression* is basically consistent with the protest wave of the whole AEM, which reflected that the rising trend of *radicalization* and *repression* promoted the whole movement, making it last longer than the Umbrella Movement, which is a difference between the UM and the AEM's peak phases.

### **8.3 SMOs/factions → Competition**

Whatever the advantages of moderate and radical factions in a particular movement, conflicts within the movement can demoralize the demonstrators and undermine public support (F. L. F. Lee, 2020). The division between the occupants in Mong Kok and those in Admiralty, which had been present from the very start of the Umbrella Movement, turned to be much more obvious (H. M. Leung, 2016). The student leaders had never gone down well with occupants in Mong Kok, as the occupants there were detested by the students due to their calls to withdraw at the night of 28 September, when hearsay that the police were attempting to crackdown violently were spreading (H. M. Leung, 2016). Not only that, any effort by the student leaders to put up a platform in Mong Kok would be prevented instantly by the occupants there, because they were anxious that the students would try to call for them to withdraw once more (H. M. Leung, 2016). For example, on 12 October 2014

in Mong Kok representatives of the HKFS, along with members of the League of Social Democrats and the People Power, were prevented from entering by protestors (“Occupy Central - Day 15,” 2014). Furthermore, as the campaign became a deadlock after the conversation between the government and student leaders was not successful, divergences bred among activists (H. M. Leung, 2016). The protestors accused the HKFS of attempting to take over the leaderless occupied zone and trying to declare dominance in Mong Kok to make decisions for them, such as political compromises with the government (“Occupy Central - Day 15,” 2014). Joshua Wong stated that he disapproved of the use of force by student groups to fight police’s clearance with violence (Scholarism, 2014). Yet, some radical protesters believed that the social movement could not go on without escalation. In late November 2014, when radical protestors tried to burst into the Hong Kong Legislative Council (LegCo) building, some important moderate figures blocked them and denounced their actions (F. L. F. Lee, 2020). This incident intensified the pre-existing frictions between the moderate and radical factions. What is more, Joshua Wong announced a hunger strike on stage, which took the HKFS by surprise, even though it had been reported that act aroused dissatisfaction in the HKFS (“The HKFS Did Not Know That Scholarism,” 2014). This showed that not only were there conflicts among different factions about the escalation of actions, but there were also disagreements between student leaders and between SMOs. As a result, the infighting not only led to the demise of the Umbrella Movement, but also caused a high level of anxiety among many central activists (F. L. F. Lee, 2020).

Contrary to the Umbrella Movement, a distinctive feature of the Anti-Extradition Movement was the high degree of unity between its moderates and radicals (F. L. F. Lee, 2020). The most commonly occurring campaign slogans in the online discussion

forums were “no splitting and no severing of ties”, “brothers climbing mountains, each offering one’s efforts”, and “going up and down together” (F. L. F. Lee, 2020, p. 19). Put differently, the unity morality in the movement was elaborated and regularly aroused (F. L. F. Lee, 2020). In spite of the direction of strategic radicalism, unity persisted. AEM’s protest strategy had developed from putting up barricades and hurling bricks in mid-June 2019 to making bottled gasoline bombs, setting fires, and sabotaging subway stations and targeted shops from August and September 2019 (F. L. F. Lee, 2020). Indeed, among the campaign participants there were arguments about the legitimacy of these violent actions, and sometimes even fierce arguments, but the moderates basically did not strongly condemn those extreme measures. On the contrary, all participants had a strong sense of unity. For example, according to Jimmy Sham, the convener of the CHRF, as a representative of peaceful, rational, and non-violent soft anti-extradition bill protesters, the CHRF definitely insisted on not separating, not dividing, and not condemning in this movement. Hence, the unity helped to sustain the movement and played a crucial part in its dynamic development.

In brief, in these two social movements, the relationship between the moderates and the radicals was quite different, *competition* among SMOs/factions led to the demise of the UM, while solidarity sustained the AEM. SMOs/factions → *competition* can accurately explain this difference.

## **8.4 Other mechanisms (*Diffusion & Attribution of Opportunity and Threat*)**

### **8.4.1 New tactics → *Diffusion***



Figure 8.3 The Umbrella Man statue at the Lennon Wall (Matchar, 2014).

The Umbrella Movement incorporated acts of civil disobedience, so non-violence was a characteristic feature of the whole campaign. Its creativity was also another feature, reflected in the Culture Salon, “One Person One Photo to Support Freedom”, “Trailwalk for Universal Suffrage”, artworks, umbrella, yellow ribbon, Lennon Wall and so on. In terms of Culture Salon, Occupy Central with Love and Peace promoted democratic discussion and universal empowerment for genuine universal suffrage, which had bloomed everywhere in Hong Kong since 2013 (Occupy Central with Love and Peace, 2014). In order to encourage citizens to engage in multiple forms of political participation and raise funds for the campaign for genuine universal suffrage, Occupy Central with Love and Peace invited conscientious intellectuals to hold Cultural Salon to share a democratic life attitude belonging to Hong Kong people (Occupy Central with Love and Peace, 2014). The University of Hong

Kong Student Union launched an action “One Person One Photo to Support Freedom” to defend press freedom in March 2014 (Freedom HK, 2014). In general, as the organizers and main participants of the Umbrella Movement were students, scholars, individuals in cultural circles and the entertainment industry, creativity was emerging in an endless stream and produced a publicising effect. In particular, the occupied areas had become the creative “recreational and artistic area” for Hong Kong people. Roads were full of various sorts of public art products, such as ‘banners, chalks drawings, canvases, patchworks, installation art works,’ and so on (H. M. Leung, 2016, p. 101). Inasmuch as umbrellas were the primary protective implement employed by the demonstrators to shelter from pepper spray and tear gas attacks, and yellow ribbon was the symbol applied in the student’s strike, yellow umbrellas developed to be the practical and lasting symbol of the Umbrella Movement, and hence it occurred in many public arts decorating the occupied zones, e.g., on the roadblocks and carvings (H. M. Leung, 2016). What was also notable was “Lennon Wall” on which campaigners and their followers had attached thousands of post-it notes. Messages included: “Citizens’ Awakening”, “I want my HK back!” “HK is our home! If we don’t stand up, who? If we don’t stand up now, when?” (“Occupy Central - Day Eight,” 2014, para. 106-111). Also, on 4 October 2014, along the street in the pedestrian zone in Sai Yeung Choi Street South, only a block away from the occupied site, street performers were entertaining pedestrians with songs and dances (“Occupy Central - Night Seven,” 2014). In brief, among these creative forms of action, umbrella, yellow ribbon and Lennon Wall were most significant and became symbols of the Umbrella Movement. Protestors usually expected that such creative actions could attract more onlookers to come to the protest zones or join the campaign.

## AEM



Figure 8.4 Violent clashes between riot police and demonstrators in a residential area (K. Chan, 2019).

Strategically, the tactical principle of “be water”, and the related mobility of the Anti-Extradition Movement, are the opposite of the long-term fixed occupation of the “Umbrella Movement”, which aroused dissatisfaction among the general public and dampened the enthusiasm of the protestors (Lee et al., 2019). Apart from marches, rallies, sit-ins, and strikes, some new forms of protest appeared, such as ‘forming human chains, taking wildcat strike actions, participating in flash mobs with chanting, choral singing and holding citizens’ press conferences’ (Ku, 2020, P. 114). Instead of acting in accordance with a certain route or assembling at a specific location, as happened in most previous protests in Hong Kong, the AEM protests frequently became flowing and shapeless, though starting from certain places, and were formed by the agreement on site in a spontaneous manner and according to interplay with the

police officers (Lee et al., 2019). Additionally, with the chorus of the protestors, the latest theme song of the campaign “Glory to Hong Kong” reverberated in the shopping malls. A YouTube music video of this song within two weeks had already obtained over 1.5 million comments (Chow, 2019). Some had showed their love for the song on LIHKG and Twitter (Chow, 2019). In a word, according to Hou (2019, para. 20), the public space was being “liquefied” by this strategy. Hong Kong’s finite public space became abundant rapidly and unexpectedly. Streets and other ‘public, semi-public, and privately-owned public spaces’ (Hou, 2019) in the form of “liquefaction” allowed this movement with leaderless leadership to thrive and continue. Briefly, the protests spread to a variety of areas of the city, and those spontaneous protests turned all kinds of daily micro spaces into sites for citizens to struggle, from streets to shopping centres, from subways to airports (Ku, 2020).

In general, the similarity of the UM and the AEM was that their new tactics were diffused from one place to another, namely, the spread of new tactics was an outcome of *diffusion*. New tactics → *diffusion* was working. In the UM, umbrellas and yellow ribbons were diffused through protestors, Twitter, Facebook, and other social media; the spread of the occupation, as a form of protest, was carried out by the moving occupants. Apart from these, other new tactics were not really diffused, but stayed in situ. As for the AEM, the new tactics adopted by protestors were fewer than those of the UM, and *diffusion* of the new tactics was achieved by the “liquefied” strategy. Protests spread rapidly and shapelessly from one site to another, during which the new tactics were also diffused. In short, “be water”, as a strategy, could diffuse new tactics to the greatest extent. The different effects of new tactics adopted by the UM and the AEM can be illustrated by Figure 7.1 and Figure 7.2, respectively. Occupation is a confrontational form of protest, and the confrontational protest curve in Figure 7.1

corresponds to the protest wave of the Umbrella Movement; “be water” strategy was mainly embodied in confrontational, violent protests and minor attacks on property. From Figure 7.2, it can be seen that these three protest curves are roughly commensurate with the protest curves of the entire Anti-Extradition Movement. Therefore, the occupation and “be water” strategy could demonstrate the different protest curves of the UM and the AEM in their peak phases, because these two new tactics were mainly used in the peak phases of the two.

#### **8.4.2 Elite divisions → *Attribution of Opportunity and Threat***

On 31 August 2014, Beijing precluded “genuine universal suffrage” in the chief executive election of 2017 (Yi, 2015). Beijing announced that it would pre-choose the subsequent chief executive candidates, further weakening Hong Kong’s democratisation (Yi, 2015). Following this statement, tens of thousands of Hong Kong people occupied the main streets of the city, objecting to Beijing’s resolution (Yi, 2015). Those who were regarding the Occupy Central movement as a threat were mainly the pro-establishment camp (pro-Beijing camp), business group and Central Government. For instance, an escort of 30 vehicles loading members of a pro-establishment camp one day previously headed towards the government headquarters in Admiralty to demonstrate their objection to the Occupy Central. They depicted Occupy sponsors as extorting ruffians (S. Chan, 2014). Furthermore, the five powerful chambers of commerce stood together on 28 July 2014 against the Occupy Central, with a caution that the pro-democracy civil disobedience campaign may cause economic loss to the city, similar to that brought by the political movements in Thailand (Lam & Chiu, 2014). What is more, Chief Executive Leung Chun-ying joined the signature campaign of the Alliance for Peace and Democracy launched to show his anti-Occupy position. By contrast, on 27 August 2014 twenty-six pan-democratic members of the Legislative



Council vowed not to pass political reform programs that did not meet international standards, and 26 votes would be enough to veto the political reform plan (Civic Party, 2014). On 31 August 2014, the Standing Committee of the NPC clarified the resolution for the 2017 Hong Kong Chief Executive election arrangement. It stated that the candidates would be voted on by the current Election Committee consisting of 1200 members prior to submitting them for a general election (H. M. Leung, 2016). As a result, the non-progressive 831 decision became a fuse and sparked the Umbrella Movement.

Subsequently, on 29 September 2014 twenty-three pan-democracy legislators released a joint declaration which called for an urgent meeting to discuss a proposal for impeaching Chief Executive Leung Chun-Ying ("Occupy Central - Night Two," 2014). Furthermore, in order to badmouth the Occupy Central movement, the pro-establishment camp of the Legislative Council proposed to investigate the sources of funds and organizers of the Occupy Central using the Powers and Privileges Ordinance (Lui, 2014). The pan-democratic members of Legislative Council jointly opposed the proposal on 10 October 2014, accusing them of engaging in "white terror" and helping the police and national security staff to collect information about occupants (Lui, 2014). They also pointed out that the Powers and Privileges Ordinance was reduced to a tool for the public trial of citizens. Moreover, the 23 pan-democratic legislators decided to boycott the meeting with Leung Chun-ying on the policy address, and instead submit a joint program proposal to the Chief Secretary for Administration, Carrie Lam and the Financial Secretary, Tsang Chun-wah ("23 Pan-democratic Parliamentarians' Boycott," 2014). Briefly, the elites were split over whether to support the Occupy Central movement.

As for the Anti-Extradition Movement, the Democratic Party of Hong Kong soon gave a warning that the variation in the law could make it easier for political dissenters to return to the Mainland (Purbrick, 2019). Similarly, the Civic Party was strictly opposed to the proposal. The Civic Party believed that the proposal would undoubtedly open the door to criminal cooperation and transfer of fugitives with mainland China as demonstrated by a case in Taiwan (Civic Party, 2019). The political motive was greater than the legal need. Even traditional pro-Beijing personages expressed concerns. On 22 February 2019, Priscilla Leung Mei-fun, a vice-president of the Business and Professionals Alliance (BPA), indicated that business people had expressed concerns and she proposed the exemption from extradition proposal for white collar suspects (T. Cheung, 2019). Moreover, the Extradition Bill completed its first reading in the Legislative Council on 3 April 2019. The pan-democratic faction initiated delaying tactics that hindered the Bill's advance to a second reading (A. Chan, 2019). On the morning of 17 April 2019, the first meeting of the Legislative Council was held to discuss the "Extradition Ordinance". The most senior member of the Legislative Council, Mr. James To Kun-sun, presided over the bill, after that, the pro-establishment camp protested on the agenda (Demosistō, 2019). Then, the House Committee of the Legislative Council held a special meeting on 4 May 2019, the pro-establishment camp tried to seize the chairmanship of Mr James To (Shiu, 2019). Seeing that the Democratic faction was struggling to resist, the CHRF appealed to Hong Kong people to come out to participate in the rally launched by the CHRF on 10 May 2019 to support the Democratic faction, and to protest the government and the pro-establishment (Shiu, 2019). So, the parliamentary struggle provided an opportunity for civil protest.

The Hong Kong government was evasive about restarting constitutional reform even though the political storm turned the city into a battlefield. On 31 August 2019, the government disregarded a petition by 24 pan-democracy legislators who appealed to Beijing to restart political reform as an approach to solve the deep-seated conflict in the city (J. Lam, 2019). However, a government spokesman revealed that the unsuccessful attempts of 2014 had produced severe clashes in the community, the circumstances should be evaluated cautiously before pushing the issue forward (J. Lam, 2019). However, the Civic Party's leader Alvin Yeung berated the government, denouncing the government's evasion and irresponsibility. He said that the present turmoil resulted from the unfair and unjust constitutional system, and the introduction of universal suffrage according to the promises given by the basic law would be the only way out (J. Lam, 2019). What is more, a leaked recording of sound at a closed-door meeting in early September 2019 indicated that who would step down for bringing inexcusable devastation to the city if there was a choice. But she denied the speculation using very clear and powerful language that it was herself or someone of her government team who deliberately released the recording to the media in an attempt to transfer the responsibility to Beijing (G. Cheung, 2019). However, her explanation obviously could not dissipate this doubt that she was keeping herself away from Beijing by revealing to a group of businessmen at a private gathering that there was no alternative for her, considering that the strong reaction against the extradition bill had been escalated to a country level and to a kind of sovereign rights and security level (G. Cheung, 2019). Moreover, Chinese University's political scholar Ivan Choy voiced that in view of her work experience in the governmental sector, Lam should have anticipated the hazards of her statement being leaked but she still opted to speak out openly (G. Cheung, 2019). Therefore, it seemed that the relationship between the

Chief Executive and Beijing was not monolithic, and the leaked recording was accompanied by the formal withdrawal of the bill.

Furthermore, in December 2019, the pan-democratic legislators put forward a proposal to impeach the Chief Executive, due to her “many unconstitutional decisions” to promote the highly controversial extradition bill and her handling of the fierce conflict since June (Sum, 2019, para. 1). Moreover, in April 2020, after 14 meetings of the House Committee of the Legislative Council, the chairman could still not be elected. The Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office and the Hong Kong Liaison Office issued statements one after another on 13 April 2020, criticizing the pan-democratic legislator for deliberately procrastinating, violating their oaths, and permitting misconduct of public officials (D. Wong, 2020). Then pan-democratic members of the Legislative Council held a press conference on 14 April 2020 morning to respond to the incident and intervention in Hong Kong’s local affairs (D. Wong, 2020). They warned the central government that the basic law should be respected and urged Hong Kong people to unite in the face of repression (D. Wong, 2020). Consequently, some well-known social activists encouraged the public to take to the streets to protest against the interference by the central government.

All in all, elite divisions may provide a good timing for the outbreak of protests, nevertheless, elite divisions → *attribution of opportunity and threat* cannot account for the differences between the protest waves of the UM and the AEM. Moreover, it is difficult to quantify the impact of elite divisions, and therefore *attribution of opportunity and threat* can only be employed as a qualitatively descriptive explanation of key timing and events.

## **8.5 Conclusion**

To sum up, this chapter has investigated five mechanisms, namely *repression*, *radicalization*, *competition*, *diffusion*, and *opportunity-threat attribution*. Among them, the first three mechanisms can best explain the different longevities of the Umbrella Movement and the Anti-Extradition Movement at the peak phases. The last period of the Umbrella Movement was a phase of infighting. It was frustration in the dialogue inter the government and student leaders as well as physical and lawful attack from the anti-Occupy groups that caused an appeal for the escalation of the campaign, in which certain protestors began to seek for the feasibility of the use of force and militant acts (H. M. Leung, 2016), eventually leading to the decline of the movement. On the contrary, during the Anti-Extradition Movement, moderate and radical protestors were highly united. Among the most often occurring protest slogans on social media forums were “no splitting and no severing of ties” and “brothers climbing mountains, each offering one’s efforts” (F. L. F. Lee, 2020, p. 19). Besides, *repression*, *radicalization*, and *competition* are interrelated and interact on each other. The police *repression* can arouse the *radicalization* of some protestors, which will bring about different opinions the moderates and radicals have within the movement, leading to *competition* or solidarity; at the same time, the radical actions of the protestors will cause police *repression*, and both escalate alternately. In addition, the major advantage of the new tactics lies in its unexpectedness, which makes the authorities’ response perplexed and maintains the momentum of a movement. The new tactic “be water”, as well as masking protestors’ faces, which aimed to prevent being caught and being settled after the fall, effectively achieved *diffusion*. The effect produced by the occupation was not so effective in comparison. Finally, *opportunity-threat attribution* is a matter of timing, and it can have an important impact on the emergence and results of movements.

# Chapter 9: Discussion

In this chapter I will refer to the literature review, which included political opportunity structure, mobilizing structure and framing processes. Here, I will discuss the general literature review and its application in the two protest waves (Hong Kong's Umbrella Movement and Anti-Extradition Movement) together, so that we can understand how theoretical insights derived to understand western democracies apply to those under a hybrid regime, or whether they break the mould; and, if they do, which ones break the mould at which stages of the protest wave. Then I will point out where my work supports and challenges existing research. Where it challenges it, I will offer reasons why I think this is the case. Furthermore, this chapter includes an evaluation of the usefulness of my analytical framework. I end the chapter by discussing the future of pro-democracy movements in Hong Kong.

## 9.1 Political opportunity structure

Among the four dimensions of the political opportunity structure, the presence of an institutionalised political system is a stable concept – i.e., it does not vary over the course of protest waves, and therefore provides little analytical value in my comparison of the protest waves of UM & AEM. Therefore I will focus on the other three dimensions, namely elite divisions, influential allies, and a regime's propensity for repression.

### 9.1.1 Elite divisions

According to the literature review, the functional constituency of the Hong Kong Legislative Council ensures that pro-Beijing members can maintain a majority, and pro-democracy parties should never be able to hold a majority. Similarly, the

candidates for the chief executive are also decided by an election committee composed of a majority of pro-Beijing members, which means that the elected chief executive should also always be a pro-Beijing politician. This characterises Hong Kong as a hybrid regime. The faction in power cannot be replaced by the opposition faction legally and institutionally. In a word, the institutional arrangements cannot reflect public opinion. In contrast, in democracies the division of elites can shape elite realignment, while under a hybrid regime it cannot or cannot be smoothly achieved. On the whole, the findings in the literature review seem valid, but there is little analysis of the fact that is the moderate faction and radical faction of the pro-democracy camp united in opposition to the pro-establishment (pro-Beijing) camp in the Umbrella Movement and the Anti-Extradition Movement, and the moderate pro-democracy parties did not seek cooperation with the pro-establishment parties.

### **9.1.2 Influential allies**

In Hong Kong pan-democratic parties and SMOs customarily organised gatherings and parades from time to time (E. W. Cheng, 2016), and the former are natural allies of the latter, or more exactly the line between the two is blurred. This is my major suggested amendment to the literature on social movements. For example, the Civil Human Rights Front (CHRF), as the main SMO of the AEM, is composed almost completely of pan-democracy political parties and NGOs (“Civil Human Rights Front,” 2021). So the mechanism - *brokerage* can also be used to describe influential allies, not just leaders. Furthermore, as mentioned in the literature review, as an important force outside the political institutions, the media is also playing a significant role since the free media is an excellent medium via which grievances can be converted into protests (Schock, 1999). Although the free media and free flow of information are not considered as an aspect of political opportunities under democratic

regimes (Schock, 1999), they are significant mechanisms in hybrid regimes and authoritarian states which can promote information exchanges within the protest groups and fight an external propaganda battle outside the group, putting pressure on the regime. Especially for Hong Kong now, after pan-democratic legislators resigned collectively, the media has become the backbone of social movement alliance networks. This is my second key contribution to the literature. Finally, influential allies in hybrid regimes can also be foreign governments, which is my third contribution to the literature. For hybrid regimes, foreign governments can put pressure on their own regimes, sometimes producing a more significant effect. In a nutshell, the roles of international allies also come into play through the mechanism of *certification*.

### **9.1.3 Regime's propensity for repression**

In democracies, intensive crackdowns will make social movements unattractive to most possible followers (Kriesi et al., 1995). The probability and proneness of the authorities to repress was directly related to the degree of participation of the Occupy Central movement (Chen, 2016). Besides, the regime was gradually inclined to suppress, whether by means of tear gas and arrests, or by means of the stern warnings issued by the chief executive, which was only proportional to the increase in the participation of activists (Kan, 2013). This is especially true of the Anti-Extradition Movement. In short, it can be inspired from the Hong Kong protest movements that democracies and hybrid regimes are different in relation to their propensity for repression. Besides, the propensity for repression refers to a possibility, it is the mechanism - repression that transforms this possibility into reality.

## **9.2 Mobilizing structure**

### **9.2.1 Leadership**



As for leadership, according to Morris and Staggenborg (2004), there are usually four levels in a social movement. But, in fact, in Hong Kong some leaderless (bridge leaders and organizers) social movements exist, and the other two levels of leadership (highest formal leaders and subordinate formal leaders) do not exist, such as the AEM. In the hybrid regime I studied, the configuration of leadership is different from what the western-centric movement theory implies. In leaderless movements like the AEM, ad hoc leaders existed. For example, before every temporary action, there would be a debate among protesters about the place and what kind of action to take and the protestor whose plan was adopted was the ad hoc leader of the operation. This kind of ad hoc leader can also be understood as equal rotating leadership (Cunha et al., 2003) which is a leadership style where leadership is allocated among team members, not concentrating on an individual leader (Carson et al., 2007). In a word, “a leader is best when people barely know he exists,” Lao Tzu, the ancient Chinese philosopher, proposed (Serhan, 2019, para. 1). Because of this, it seems more appropriate to regard leaders’ roles as *brokerage* in leaderless movements. Looking back at the UM, the leadership shifted from the moderate Occupy Central trio to more aggressive and younger student leaders. Although the former and the latter did not maintain good control of the movement, they were identifiable leaders of UM. In short, contrasting leadership styles differentiate the UM and the AEM.

### **9.2.2 SMOs and movement structures**

If SMOs are absent, social movements will suffer the greatest volatility, and the leverage of challenging groups will be reduced (Della Porta & Diani, 2006). The most common movement structure is not centralized, hierarchical or unstructured, but divided into parts that are loosely connected to each other, multi-centered and integrated (Gerlach, 2001). Accordingly, there are multiple leaders and leadership

cores under this structure, and the organizational structure of leaders is not divided by power, but heterogeneous (Gerlach, 2001). No one can claim to be a spokesman/spokeswoman of the whole movement, and no organization can represent the movement (Gerlach, 2001). In the case studies on Hong Kong, both the UM and the AEM's movement structures were decentralized. However, in the former, the decentralized structure was accompanied by disagreement and decoupling. In the latter, although the degree of decentralization was higher, apart from the public demonstrations initiated by the CHRF and there were also many spontaneous mass protests, different factions within the movement interacted and connected horizontally and maintained a high degree of solidarity. In general, the SMOs of the former were the OCLP, and the HKFS and Scholarism, the latter included the CHRF and Demosistō; the movement structures of both were decentralized, but the latter was more decentralized in both degree and breadth. Therefore, similar to the roles of leaders, the roles of SMOs in the current popular decentralized movements can also be interpreted by *brokerage*. In short, on the basis of my analysis, my position is strongly in accord with established western theories of social movements.

### **9.2.3 Social networks**

Social networks affect the involvement of participants, and also involvement in social movements develops networks, strengthening existing networks or generating new networks (Della Porta & Diani, 2006). Networks enable collective actors to spread information and opinions and to act in concert (Gerlach, 2001). In the network structure of a decentralized movement, different camps do not sever mutual links, but shape an integrated network or mesh structure by means of equal social links among participants and by means of their empathy and antagonists (Gerlach, 2001).

In case studies, although the Umbrella Movement was disorganised and did not mobilize the entirety of Hong Kong (Lee & Chan, 2018; Ma & Cheng, 2019; Pang, 2020), a combination of face-to-face networks formed among participants in the occupied areas, digital networks and pre-existent social networks composed a 'network of networks' (Castells, 2012, p. 221). During the seven months from June 2019 in the Anti-Extradition Movement, digital networks had initiated mass gatherings and strikes (Holbig, 2020). Recruitment of newcomers were mainly completed via LIHKG and Telegram (Cheng & Yuen, 2020). Overall, both the UM and the AEM involved meso-mobilization and micro-mobilization. The micro-mobilization of the UM included face-to-face networks and digital networks, while the AEM's micro-mobilization mainly referred to the digital networks. The reason was that occupation was the main form of protests in the UM. This means that participants occupied certain sites for a long time, developing face-to-face networks. For the AEM, protestors adopted a fluid mode of protesting. The frontline protesters mainly negotiated the protest time and plan on social media, which was derived from temporary intentions not long-planned. So it was the digital networks that generated the micro-mobilization of the AEM. When it comes to meso-mobilization, the UM was mainly initiated by the student organizations, and naturally students were the main participants; by comparison, the meso-mobilization of the AEM primarily stemmed from professionals (e.g., medical staff, social workers, lawyers, and civil servants) and various newly established trade unions. In general, the AEM was more extensive than the UM in terms of *social appropriation*, so the scope of *scale shift* is wider as well. Networking → *social appropriation* and networking → *scale shift* are crucial to the longevity of movements' waves. Briefly, my findings lead me to consider that the branch of literature on movement networking that I discussed in my literature review is as

relevant to the hybrid regime of Hong Kong as it is to the western democracies where it was derived and first applied.

#### **9.2.4 Action tactics**

Shattuck (2013, p. 7) divides action strategy into either “conventional” or “institutionalized” ones, or “confrontational” or “radicalized” ones. On “confrontational” modes, Tarrow (1993) frames them as ‘unfamiliar, unexpected,’ and even ‘rejected as illegitimate by elites and the mass public alike’ (p. 332). Some people would rather stay within the scope of legality, while others want to get rid of the shackles of legality; some people may take pride in their gentle appeals and tactical arrangements, while others are vanguards or antagonistic (Polletta & Jasper, 2001). In a word, they may develop a collective identity on the basis of certain tactical preferences.

The UM in Hong Kong was the result of a less aggressive occupational tactic, which relied on temporary roadblocks to preserve space where most non-violent behaviours occurred (Mulberry, 2014). The “occupations” seemed to be open, available and exposed, making them both energetic and vulnerable (Mulberry, 2014). This unique action form attracts the participation of ordinary people as well as those who are associated with the regime or other rivals, revealing a lack of motivation of this mode to some extent (Mulberry, 2014). In a nutshell, “Occupy” as a form of protests is naturally not sustainable (Hui, 2015). “Be water” offered the opportunity to solve the common strategy rigidity in networked movements (Ting, 2020). The flexibility of “be water” could also settle the disputes between different camps and unite peaceful demonstrators and radicals (Cheng & Yuen, 2020). Meanwhile, due to the lack of leadership, everyone actively participated in and contributed to the movement, and therefrom the participants achieved the participatory democracy they would like to pursue (Dapiran, 2019). Altogether, from a tactical point of view, “be water” is more

suitable for the movements, which can continue even with violence. To sum up, the literature review reflects my position.

## **9.3 Frames and framing processes**

### **9.3.1 Collective action frame**

My findings on framing differ from those presented in the literature. In my data analysis and results of the framing analysis, I collected as much text material as possible from movement documents and newspaper articles to perform the quantitative correlation analysis. Therefore, I sum up far more main collective action frames in the light of the different stages of the two movements and can provide more detailed analysis.

Existing literature claims that there were four main collective action frames in the UM, including “It is constitutional and legitimate to demand universal suffrage”, “Implementing universal suffrage is actually necessary”, “One person, one vote”, “Civil disobedience is a useful mode of action” (H. M. Leung, 2016). Based on my data analysis, I have the following findings. In the emergence phase, the UM involved “Establish true universal suffrage”, “Safeguard press freedom”, “Support true universal suffrage”; in the peak phase, the UM contained “Government breaks its trust”, “Government stifles democracy”, “Police repression”, “Regain Civic Square”, “Restart political reform”, “CY Leung resign”, “Dialogue”, “Occupation and resistance”, “Stick to streets”, “Implement true universal suffrage”, “Police abuse”, “Inquiry into police conduct”, “Unite forces”, “Strive for democracy”; during the decline phase, the UM included “Restart political reform”, “Face up to true universal suffrage”, “I want true universal suffrage”, “Reject ‘831 Resolution”, “Constitutional responsibility”, “Revise constitution”, “Regain autonomy”, “Police violation”. All in all, the struggle for universal

suffrage promoted the early mobilization of the Umbrella Movement. At the peak phase of the Umbrella Movement, in addition to the police, the governments were also to blame, “Government breaks its trust”, “Government stifles democracy”, “Regain Civic Square”, “Restart political reform”, “Implement true universal suffrage”, “CY Leung resign”, and “Dialogue” all reflected that the governments were the main targets. “Occupation and resistance”, “Stick to streets”, “Unite forces” and “Strive for democracy” aimed at motivational framing for encouraging continued occupation. Furthermore, true universal suffrage remained the main demand in the decline stage of the Umbrella Movement because it had not yet been achieved, reflected by “Face up to true universal suffrage” and “I want true universal suffrage”. On how to achieve true universal suffrage, protesters resorted to political and constitutional reform, mirrored by “Restart political reform”, “Reject ‘831 Resolution’”, “Constitutional responsibility” and “Revise constitution”.

The literature of the AEM only summarized “five demands”. According to my findings, in the emergence phase of the AEM, collective action frames include “Withdraw the Extradition Bill”, “No fair judicial trial in Mainland” and “No human rights in Mainland”, “Stop political prosecutions against UM leaders”, and “No legal protection”. “Withdraw the Extradition Bill” was the core demand of protestors, and “No fair judicial trial in Mainland”, “No human rights in Mainland” and “No legal protection” were the interpretations of its reasons for the core demand. In the peak phase of the AEM, collective action frames consist of “Creating white terror”, “Withdraw the Extradition Bill”, “Carrie Lam resign”, “Police stop force”, “Retract the ‘riots’ characterisation”, “Police repression”, “Inquiry into police conduct”, “Police abuse”, “Implement true universal suffrage”, “Withdraw Anti-mask law”, “Defend human rights”, “Democratic reform”, “Strikes to conquer tyranny”, “Never be silent”, “Restore campus

peace”, “Glory to Hong Kong”, “Authoritarian expansion”, “Not worsen humanitarian disaster”, and “Five demands, not one less”. “Withdraw the Extradition Bill”, “Retract the ‘riots’ characterisation”, “Inquiry into police conduct”, “Carrie Lam resign” and “Five demands, not one less” were the five demands of protesters. “Creating white terror”, “Police stop force”, “Police repression” and “Police abuse” targeted the police. In addition, true universal suffrage has always been the demands of Hong Kong democratic movements, and therefore “Implement true universal suffrage” and “Democratic reform” became two of the main collective action frames. “Strikes to conquer tyranny” aimed at calling a strike. “Withdraw Anti-mask law” was intended to oppose the mask law introduced by the government. “Glory to Hong Kong” was the anthem of the Hong Kong protests. In the decline phase of the AEM, collective action frames contain “United”, “Fight against totalitarianism”, “Curb expression freedom”, “Police abuse”, and “Harm speech freedom”. Freedom of expression becomes the focus of attention, such as “Curb expression freedom” and “Harm speech freedom”. “Police abuse” was the unfulfilled demand of protesters. “United” and “Fight against totalitarianism” became the motivational framing that inspired anti-government protests.

On the whole, summarizing as many collective action frames as possible by means of a quantitative method is helpful to establish the master frames, framing tasks, and frame alignment processes as discussed below. At the same time, it can be observed that the variation of collective action frames over the three stages from emergence, peak to decline reflects the changes in protesters’ demands and movement objectives.

### **9.3.2 Master frame**

My views on the master frame differ from the literature review in which Ho Man Leung (2016) defines “I want real universal suffrage” as the master frame for the Umbrella Movement, because he holds that master frame is a wide configuration of ideas, which can be adopted by all groups in a movement (H. M. Leung, 2016). In my opinion, this definition is a little broad, and I employ a more classic and prudent interpretation, namely, only a few abstract and general collective action frames are considered as master frames. Hence, based on my summary in the data analysis and result of framing analysis, the equal rights master frame and the justice master frame occurred in the emergence stage of the UM, by comparison, the AEM involved the injustice master frame; during the peak phases both the UM and the AEM were related to the equal rights master frame as well as the injustice and justice master frame; in the decline phases, the equal rights master frame and the injustice & justice master frame appeared in the UM, and the AEM included the oppositional master frame.

### **9.3.3 Framing processes**

With respect to framing processes, the literature review only mentioned the frame transformations – from Occupy Central to Occupy Movement in the UM and from “No China extradition!” to “Five demands, not one less!” in the AEM, and I present frame resonance, frame bridging, frame extension and frame transformation. I used actor-by-frame sociograms to demonstrate the frame resonances in the social movements at different stages. During the emergence and peak stages, the frame resonance of the AEM was more successful than the UM, and in the decline stages, the two were almost the same. Regarding frame bridging, in the UM “Establish true universal suffrage” and “Safeguard press freedom” formed frame bridging; in the AEM, “Stop political prosecutions against UM leaders”, “Withdraw National Anthem Law” and “Withdraw the Extradition Bill” composed frame bridging. Moreover, at the peak phase



of the UM, what caused the frame resonance was the cruel police repression, which was partly attributed to frame extension, but not enough, “Police stop force” was an emergent frame, reflecting frame transformation to some extent. As for the AEM’s peak phase, demanding from withdrawing the extradition bill to setting an independent commission of inquiry is the direct driving force to maintain this movement. Consequently, a combination of frame extension and frame transformation led to the continuation of the AEM.

## **9.4 Waves of protest**

### **9.4.1 Emergence phase of protest waves**

#### **9.4.1.1 How POSs differ in the emergence phases**

The mobilization scale increases with the vulnerability of the regime and the extent of elite tolerance, and it should be the largest where the two combine (Kriesi et al., 1995). But in the case studies of Hong Kong, weak institutions or relative deprivation has been found inadequate to account for the spread of protests (E. W. Cheng, 2016), the government’s failure to resolve disputes and a string of contingencies can cause public dissatisfaction, leading to large-scale protests. Additionally, in the case of a threat where those with a vested interest threaten to carry out policies that significantly decrease a dissident’s opportunities to obtain what he or she would like, this is probably counter-productive (Kriesi et al., 1995). Student leaders of the UM running for the Legislative Council were either disqualified or radical pro-democracy legislators were disqualified. Within the UM and the AEM, the pro-democratic camp suffered a serious defeat, until the introduction of the Extradition Bill by the chief executive when the divisions between elites were maximized, which was a favourable time for protests to erupt. In brief, the conclusions of the literature review are consistent with my view. Elite divisions can be a chance for the outbreak of a

campaign, put another way, *attribution of opportunity and threat* can provide a partial explanation for the occurrence of a protest episode.

#### **9.4.1.2 How mobilizing structures differ in the emergence phases**

RMT researchers have pointed out that the mobilization of social movements requires resources conducive to relevant activities and SMOs are thought to grow from existent social networks, using interior and exterior resources for collective actions (Webster, 2015). Resources beneficial for the appearance of movements bring SMOs together to make plans and arrangements, absorb new members, discuss views, and finance activities (Webster, 2015). Besides, the vital importance of protesters' networks to a movement has been acknowledged (Crossley, 2008; Crossley & Ibrahim, 2012; Hanna, 2013). It is true that these have been illustrated by the UM and the AEM. For the UM, Benny Tai, Chan Kin-man and Chu Yiu-ming and the OCLP gathered together the possible network and resources through communication with the seminars of all walks of life, Deliberation Days, as well as their propaganda. Therefore I believe the literature review should be supplemented by the presentation of various organizations and groups involved in the early mobilization, such as the Justice and Peace Commission of the Hong Kong Catholic Diocese, Hong Kong Journalists Association, the Association for the Advancement of Feminism, the Network for Women in Politics, the Teen's Key, the Hong Kong Women Christian Council, the Hong Kong Christian Institute, and the Hong Kong Professional Teachers' Union. Generally speaking, the UM's *social appropriation* was more significant than that of the AEM, and the AEM's actions were more immediate and spontaneous, which also explained why the UM's emergence stage took longer than the AEM.

For the AEM, the networks had penetrated into all aspects of society. After the Umbrella Movement, nearly eighty grassroots community and professional

organizations had been set up (Ma, 2020). Contrary to the prior antagonistic acts in Hong Kong, these extended networks underlined the link between political affairs and daily life, built connections between separate people, rethought prior collective actions, and broadened the citizens' imagination of democracy (Cheng & Yuen, 2020). So early in July 2019, mobilization from all walks of life was continuing without end, involving teachers, lawyers, social workers, government employees among others (Cheng & Yuen, 2020). However, the importance of the Civil Human Rights Front (CHRF) was not mentioned in the literature. The two large-scale parades in March and April 2019 were launched by it, and it also connected the pan-democrats. Therefore, the CHRF was the first important bridge connecting all parties. Likewise, according to the literature, formal and professional SMOs produce no significant effect on the emergence phase of social movements (Kriesi et al., 1995). Nevertheless, this is not the case, in the UM and the AEM formal professional SMOs did play an important role, which is largely *brokerage*.

#### **9.4.1.3 How framing processes differ in the emergence phases**

The ultimate criterion of the effectiveness of certain collective action frames is whether they can attract the sympathy of possible adherents (Snow, Vliegenthart, & Ketelaars, 2018). The appearance of mobilization indicates a certain degree of frame resonance, with proper problem diagnosis, responsibility attribution, and/or call to action (Snow, Vliegenthart, & Ketelaars, 2018). What is more, Jasper and Poulsen (1995) proposed the "moral shock", emphasizing the mobilization function of unanticipated emotional stimulation (Snow, Vliegenthart, & Ketelaars, 2018). Moreover, Snow and Benford (1992) assume that the growth or formation of a new master frame is related to the emergence of a protest wave.

The leaders of Occupy Central identified the origin of the problem by accusing the Beijing government of rising authoritarianism and a powerless SAR government (J. Y. Cheng, 2014). When pro-democratic campaigners proved that the effectiveness of this undemocratic political system was severely undermined in the context of growing social inequality, blatant nepotism, unsuccessful economic restructuring, lack of political answerability, and increasing threat to liberties, the diagnostic framing became more understandable (Sing, 2009). As to motivational framing, the initiators of Occupy Central efficaciously provided the moral ground for this movement and convinced a proportion of Hong Kong citizens to identify non-violent disobedience as legitimate and democracy as a highly urgent necessity for Hong Kong (Chen, 2016). In addition, in my opinion, “Establish true universal suffrage” and “Reject fake universal suffrage” also reflected the protesters’ prognostic framing, making demands on the SAR government and Beijing. In short, in the initial stage of the Umbrella Movement, organizers carried out framework tasks around the demands of universal suffrage and democracy.

With regard to the AEM, from the British colonial domination the Western view of freedom and the rule of law has become rooted in Hong Kong society and is a core part of Hong Kong’s identity, and the Extradition Bill exposed that for Hong Kong citizens, their government would no longer be restrained by its laws (A. Wong, 2020). The demonstrators called for resolute action by Hong Kong citizens to safeguard their own rule of law, democracy, and freedom. This is a unique method of maintaining their unique identity as a Hong Kong citizen, which lit a fire to provide momentum for the fight in the Anti-Extradition Movement (A. Wong, 2020). Apart from this motivational framing, in my view, “Withdraw the Extradition Bill” pointed to prognostic framing, “No fair judicial trial in Mainland”, “No human rights in Mainland”, “Beijing controls Hong

Kong”, “Destruction of Hong Kong’s legal system”, “ELAB dealt with dissenting voices”, and “Breaking the rule of law in Hong Kong” reflected diagnostic framing. These constituted a clear explanation for “Withdraw the Extradition Bill”. In other words, SMOs and pan-democrats gave good grounds for the mobilization of collective actions. There is no fair trial in the mainland, and suspects do not have human rights when they are tried. The bill would destroy Hong Kong’s legal system and it was aimed to deal with dissidents. In short, the Extradition Bill was a manifestation of Beijing’s violation of Hong Kong’s autonomy.

All in all, the observations in the literature review appear sound, but need some additions. The UM revolved around an abstract goal, namely universal suffrage and democracy, but the AEM was aimed to oppose a specific bill. From the perspective of responsibility attribution, the SAR government had the power to withdraw the bill, while it cannot decide the issues of universal suffrage and democracy alone and must be approved by the central government. The extradition bill triggered more serious emotional stimulation than universal suffrage and democracy in a short time, and therefore, the AEM had a higher level of mobilization and generated a greater degree of frame resonance than the UM. One of the reasons was that a specific and clear diagnostic framing is a key to resonating with potential supporters, that is, to figure out what the problem is and to determine who is to blame can arouse intense resentment among the masses.

## **9.4.2 Longevity phase of protest waves**

### **9.4.2.1 How POSs differ in the longevity phases**

During the longevity phase of a protest wave, protestors probably turn to violence when the cost of violence is lower than that of nonviolent confrontation (Kriesi et al., 1995). The offsetting effect can erode the intermediate position of peaceful

antagonism while developing moderation and *radicalization* (Kriesi et al., 1995). Turning to violence shows an action, *radicalization* indicates a trend, in contrast to moderation. Accordingly, use of violence → *radicalization* is necessary. In the Umbrella Movement, the police's tear gas caused people who were not concerned about the issue to take to the streets; in the Anti-Extradition Movement, the violence of the police and radical protesters kept escalating in the process of catching up with each other, providing the new impetus for the continuation of the movement. In summary, the literature review accord with my position, unlike the literature in Western democracies, under hybrid regimes the trend of moderation and radicalism at the peak of movements may not lead to the separation of non-violent demonstrators and radical protesters. The two factions can maintain a high degree of unity, and the two can hold protests separately with a lot of supporters.

#### **9.4.2.2 How mobilizing structures differ in the longevity phases**

The actions taken by pioneering activists are innovative and radical enough to attract media coverage, and violent enough to arouse great attention from the regime (Kriesi et al., 1995). Leaflets, hearsay, intensified media coverage or brutal police repression may function as mobilisers in the short-term but are often unable to control the enthusiasm the vanguard protesters have given vent to. On this condition, the expansion phase of the movement is neither self-generated nor organised, but usually an unstable integration of the two (Kriesi et al., 1995). Oberschall (1973) suggests that normal members often know what they are pursuing, and they have a good idea of which leaders and activists are making efforts for their benefits. Therefore, the reason why some movements continue is not due to their centralized and influential organizational strength, but due to their non-centralized leadership (Cai, 2017).

For the UM, public sympathy, charismatic leadership, and extensive networks led to the continuously spreading wave of protests. Nonviolence makes collective actions more acceptable and less controversial. For the AEM, when it was at a standstill, the alteration and expansion of protest venues provided new space and opportunities for gathering new followers (Cheng & Yuen, 2020). Community protests, strikes and non-governmental diplomacy complemented the approach of public assembly (Cheng & Yuen, 2020). What is more, the online forum LIHKG and a range of Telegraph groups became the main means of communication for real-time on-site tactics and long-term plans (Ting, 2020). The dispersed structure gave impetus to the protests through respecting others' efforts and unconditional trust among participants (Cheng & Yuen, 2020). Role division could connect the decentralized individuals with their respective merits, so that everyone was able to make his/her own contribution and everyone had a sense of belonging, in favour of maintaining the vitality of the movement (Cheng & Yuen, 2020). Moreover, this was also able to make the *scale shift* of the AEM happen more smoothly than the UM, and therefore *scale shift* explained that the former has a longer protest wave than the latter. All in all, my findings concur with the literature review. The continuation of both the social movements was inseparable from the excessive police suppression and SMOs' extensive social network and digital network; the difference between the two was that the AEM was more decentralised and leaderless, and the AEM mobilized more effectively than the UM, and the radicals and moderates in the AEM were very united.

#### **9.4.2.3 How framing processes differ in the longevity phases**

When the goals of a contentious framing become obsolete or problematic, and/or there are symptoms that one contentious frame is getting more support than another, public opinion is around some frames rather than others (Snow, Vliegenthart,

& Ketelaars, 2018). Besides, if there is no network, cultural meaning and moral shock may be important alternatives to attract newcomers, and the most efficacious shocks are spread through powerful 'condensing symbols' (Jasper & Poulsen, 1995, p. 493). In a word, new frame and/or frame transformation leads to displacing one frame for another, which provides great opportunities for long-term social movements.

"Occupy Central with Love and Peace" was put forward by three organizers, after the turmoil in the first stage of the Occupy Movement, the original leadership of the Occupy Central flopped and the original plan of action for disobedience went to ruin, which marked the failure of the civil disobedience frame (H. M. Leung, 2016). Unlike "Occupy Central", "Occupy Movement" involved the main motivation for the participation that was the anger at the use of force and tear gas by the police to disperse the unarmed protesters (H. M. Leung, 2016). Even some radical protesters considered that the predetermined method of non-violent resistance was as powerful as necessary to compel Beijing to respond to their requests (H. M. Leung, 2016). Consequently, the disappearance of this frame circumstantially attracted more potential voters to participate, because there was no longer a plan to surrender, which enabled different factions to employ different tactics to maintain the movement for more than three months (H. M. Leung, 2016).

Participants of the AEM felt exhausted and were incapable of action, being assimilated by China seemed to be an unescapable fate, and the Hongkong government seemed to be powerless for their political demands (Ngai, 2020). The negative perception of the situation made the protesters keep on fighting, demonstrating their pressing political appeals which reflected in the "five demands" (Ngai, 2020). Furthermore, the protesters maintained a high degree of unity, shown in the slogans "Not cutting", "Be water" and "Buddies climb your own mountain" (Ngai,



2020, p. 335), and they would insist on not dividing until the “five demands” had been implemented, to some extent forming an identity of Hong Kong people. In short, the despair at the status quo and the hopelessness for the future, as well as this kind of identity based on unity produced the incessant driving force for the movement.

Altogether, I basically concur with the literature review that the continuation of the protest action is related to the frame transformation, which is reflected in the two case studies. The mechanism corresponding to frame transformation is *object shift*. To a large extent, anger at the excessive suppression of the police continued the movement, but for the UM, the differentiation of different factions became an opportunity for the continuation of the movement, while the unity within the protest groups provided the impetus for the maintenance of the AEM. Additionally, I would like to add to the literature review that prognostic framing is very important for the continuation of peak phases of movements. It is important to have a clear plan on how to achieve protest goals so that protesters would not feel confused and unsure of their commitment.

### **9.4.3 Decline phase of protest waves**

#### **9.4.3.1 How POSs differ in the decline phases**

In contrast with literature on movements in Western democracies, the trend of moderation and radicalisation in hybrid regimes does not necessarily lead to movement decline. In addition, I make two points. Firstly, elite divisions provided constrained opportunities for the emergence of social movements, while the frailty of the alliance with elites can be a symbol of the decline of a movement. In other words, the reduced *certification* from influential allies in the later stage of the entire movement causes a shortening protest wave. That was illustrated in the UM and the AEM. Secondly, as the new strategy fades out, the government masters how to respond

more successfully (Kriesi et al., 1995). That means that if the protesters' new tactics are always effective and the government cannot find a way to deal with them, then the movement is likely to continue. In turn, the movement will decline. This is what I want to add to the literature review of Hong Kong. During the Umbrella Movement, the strategy of occupation had been made public for some while, and the government and the police had prepared well to deal with it. In addition, the prolonged occupation caused traffic jams, inconveniences to normal activities, and dissatisfaction of the public. The government adopted a "strategy of attrition" (Yuen & Cheng, 2017) to drag down the protestors, so the concept of occupation lost its innovative advantage; in the Anti-Extradition Movement, wearing masks and the mobile protest mode made the police physically and mentally exhausted and helpless, and the government was unable to control the development of the movement. In a word, the *diffusion* effect of new tactics is a key to the extension of protest waves. Finally, the demise of the AEM was due to a non-human control factor, namely COVID-19.

#### **9.4.3.2 How mobilizing structures differ in the decline phases**

According to the literature review, in order to handle the decline of participation, a social movement needs to have a durable organizational structure able to withstand a drop in the number of participants (McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1988), or a strong identity making participants continue to inspire even under adverse conditions (Kriesi et al., 1995). The AEM fits in with the latter. In addition, the literature states that increased radicalisation may also lead to a decrease in social movements, however, this does not necessarily happen in a hybrid regime, and the opposite is just as likely to occur. Likewise, moderates and radicals may not be alienated from each other due to tactical differences.

In the case study of the Umbrella Movement's decline stage, student leaders received wide support from the beginning, but they could not find a solution to continue their recognition during the occupation (Mok, 2015). Not only that, they were unable to give a clear direction of the whole campaign, which gave rise to dissatisfaction and division, and leaders were also unable to make themselves understood by residents in the occupied area because of the inconvenience to everyday life caused by the occupation (Mok, 2015). In the case study of the Anti-Extradition Movement's decline stage, the decentralisation of the movement made it difficult for the protestors to propagate the origin of representativeness and produce a consistent strategy for action in the face of the regime (F. L. F. Lee, 2019). Besides, the anonymity and scalability of resistance with masks might also make them more easily inclined to fighting against riot police (Holbig, 2020). In the final analysis, the more intensity in the protestors' response to the ever-increasing crackdown, the more they answered for their crimes (Holbig, 2020). To sum up, for the UM, internal strife between different factions led to the end of the movement, namely, SMOs → *competition* was at work; for the AEM, lacking a unified action plan settled a matter by leaving it unsettled. In the demise phase of movements, the arguments derived from Western democracies are not applicable to a hybrid regime.

#### **9.4.3.3 How framing processes differ in the decline phases**

According to the literature review, the decline of a protest wave is related to the reduction of the mobilization effect of the master frame (Snow & Benford, 1992). A collective action frame designed to mobilize one constituency may accidentally counterweigh the mobilization of another group of potential adherents (Snow, Vliegenthart, & Ketelaars, 2018). Exterior contending frames can be considered to be counterproductive, because they may lead to dissensions (Snow, Vliegenthart, &


Ketelaars, 2018). For instance, the Occupy Central initiators were unable to withstand the challenge from some external competitive frames, such as the radical camps of the campaign being accused of violation of the spirit of the law, immolating 'collective interests for personal political ambition,' and bringing about great financial losses and resulting in Hong Kong's decline in competitiveness (Kan, 2013, p. 76). Also, the illustrative power of an existent master frame may fade due to the diversity of events and the addition of substituted frames (Snow & Benford, 1992). In the case of the AEM, apart from framing themselves as "freedom fighters" while facing the incursion of authoritarianism, the aggressive protestors established a discourse of jade and stone burned together (Cheng & Yuen, 2020, p. 13). This discourse assumed that if the Chinese authorities took drastic action, both Hong Kong and China would be subject to international sanctions (Cheng & Yuen, 2020). With the advent of the National Security Law, the crowd broke into chants of "Hong Kong independence. The only way." (Siu & Lau, 2020, para. 14) and "Hongkongers, revenge!" (para. 31), indicating the emergence of new frames. Put differently, the five demands have lost their original substance and only exist as symbols. Simultaneously, the master frame of the AEM transformed from the equal rights as well as the injustice and justice to the opposition.

All in all, the literature generally provides a sound analysis, but I cannot give a definite answer whether the presence of a master frame has such a large mobilization effect. Probably collective action frames have such a large mobilization effect, but how to judge this is unclear. Just as the master frame of the Umbrella Movement had not changed from beginning to end, it seemed that collective action frames played a great role in its protest wave. Not only that, despite the fact that the occupants adhered to the master frame, they had their own opinions on the situation (H. M. Leung, 2016). This also proved that the presence of a master frame is not strong enough to sustain


the alliance, and master frames are not invariably more important than collective action frames. Moreover, I would like to add to the literature review that in the later stages of movements, it is still important to have a useful prognostic framing. In a word, prognostic framing is critical to the duration of movements.

## 9.5 Valuation of the Analytical Framework

Figure 9.1: Analytical Framework for UM



**Figure 9.2: Analytical Framework for AEM**



### 9.5.1 Emergence phase

In terms of the emergence stage of a protest wave, as Figures 9.1 and 9.2 show, the IVs – networking and framing indeed play important roles in building solid networks and gathering resources, as well as constructing the interpretation for the object(s) and upcoming actions. In the initial stage of the Umbrella Movement, the analytical

framework effectively explains the situation. In fact, leaders and SMOs began to perform functions of *brokerage* at the initial stage, that is, disseminating information, explaining to the potential constituencies their targets and methods for doing so, that is, diagnostic framing and prognostic framing (framing → *social construction*), besides, establishing contact with potential supportive organizations and groups (networking → *social appropriation*). Figure 8.2 shows the Analytical Framework for the Anti-Extradition Movement. In the emergence stage of the AEM, the analytical framework was in place. Because of the panic about the extradition bill, coupled with street and station propaganda, and directional explanations from core activists, the entire society was widely mobilized in a short time. Compared with the UM's early mobilization in the initial stage, which was dominated by conventional protests, the AEM involved a certain proportion of demonstrative and confrontational activities at the emergence stage. All in all, leaders, SMOs, and influential allies' participation was mainly reflected through *brokerage* and *social construction*. Meanwhile, a large number of social organizations, including grassroots groups, were mobilized, even if they were not political organizations, so *social appropriation* had already occurred in the early stage. Unlike the networking shaped during the peak stage where a large part of public participation is spontaneous, namely micro-mobilization, the networking in the emergence stage involves meso-mobilization in which there are inherent and close ties among SMOs and groups, and even influential allies, and they often have past mobilization experience. Therefore, *social appropriation* was related to meso-mobilization. Likewise, the public mobilization is inseparable from SMOs and leaders' interpretation of the movement objectives and action plans. Supporters who have been persuaded by this interpretation at the initial stage are likely to support the entire

movement from beginning to end. This process of being persuaded can also be understood as *social construction*.

In summary, IVs – leaders/SMOs, networking and framing, and mechanisms – *brokerage*, *social appropriation* and *social construction* are very useful for explaining the different protest curves at emergence stages. Elite divisions and *opportunity-threat attribution* do not exist only in emergence stages, they may appear in both peak stages and decline stages, so their roles have no special significance for peak stages. Besides, elite divisions function through *opportunity-threat attribution*, which is not suitable for operational quantitative analysis, and can describe contingent events and conditions. In addition, new tactics can indeed work through *diffusion*, but the *diffusion* of new tactics is not inevitable during the emergence phase of movements. As for how *brokerage*, *social appropriation* and *social construction* explain the differences in movement waves, *brokerage* can explain the number of protests in movement waves. *Social appropriation* is the transformation of non-protest groups into protest groups, and this transformation process may take a long time. This period of time spent becomes a factor leading to different protest waves at emergence stages. As to *social construction*, clear opponent(s) is/are conducive to rapid cognitive mobilization.

### **9.5.2 Peak phase**

IVs – leaders, SMOs, influential allies, networking, new tactics, and framing all form significant parts of a peak phase. In the climax phase of UM, the occupation as a novel form of protest at the beginning effectively continued the Occupy Movement, due to the loss of the novelty of the strategy, the occupation strategy could not be used to maintain this level. Moreover, the influential allies provided solid support for the whole movement. Besides, as the police sprayed tear gas indiscriminately, it aroused public sympathy for the students, and this resulted in frame extension and *object shift*,



in addition to *social appropriation*, which did prolong the entire campaign. By comparison, in the peak phase of AEM, the application of the new strategy “be water” made the ways of protest more flexible and the venues for protest were expanded, in which new tactics diffused. Both *social appropriation* and *scale shift* were conducive to the continuation of the movement wave, but the latter had a greater impact than the former. Moreover, for leaders, they were not so much leaders as brokers, and the SMOs also performed a similar function. Besides, influential allies continued to play the role of *brokerage* like leaders and SMOs. The boundaries between leaders and influential allies became blurred. Furthermore, with the escalation of the police violence, new frames formed, similar to what happened in the UM, and frame extension and *object shift* led to the extended longevity in the climax stage of the AEM. Overall, in a decentralized and leaderless movement, the roles of leaders and SMOs are even more accurately described as *brokerage*. The performance of leadership is inapparent and leaders were just ordinary participants in the street demonstrations and cannot speak as representatives of the movement. Furthermore, the roles of SMOs can be mainly reflected in the release of organized protest information (spontaneous marches are not counted), coordination support during the protests, and providing legal assistance after the protests. Still, leaders and SMOs can produce an effect on encouraging a fighting spirit and maintaining unity. Moreover, the use of new tactics and *scale shift* may make the authorities unsure how to respond, so that the morale of the struggle can be kept high and the longevity of a movement would be extended. And this effect of new tactics is indeed achieved with the help of *diffusion*. In addition, in terms of networking at a peak stage, it usually includes meso-mobilization and micro-mobilization, and *scale shift* also involves both. In a word, the effects of *scale shift* and *diffusion* are similar. Furthermore, frame transformation and

frame extension should rely on *object shift*, and these two framing alignments are positively correlated with the continuation of a movement. Influential allies, especially international allies do exert influence through *certification*. Despite the fact that it cannot be used to describe the scale and extent of the allies' participation, *certification* can still show the attitude of the allies and be indicative of their behaviours. Finally, it is generally agreed that police *repression* and *radicalization* of demonstrators will cause the demise of movements. But this is not suitable for all situations, especially for hybrid regimes, under which police *repression* and *radicalization* of protesters may intensify and balance each other. Not only might it not lead to the decline of a movement, but it might keep the movement at its climax.

In general, *brokerage*, *scale shift*, *social appropriation*, *diffusion*, *object shift*, *repression* and *radicalization* are useful for the interpretation of the peak period, as for the validity of *certification*, no affirmative answer can be given. *Brokerage* explains the size of movements, and *social appropriation & scale shift* interpret the length of movements at peak stages. It is true that *diffusion* as a mechanism corresponds to IV - new tactics here, but *scale shift* does play a similar role to *diffusion*, and *scale shift* corresponds to IV - networking. *Object shift* leads to frame extension, and some frames resonate with more people, so the size of the whole movement is enlarged, and the movement continues. *Repression* and *radicalization* are related to the size and duration of movements in a hybrid regime.

### **9.5.3 Decline phase**

As for the decline stage of UM, the analytical framework was well explained. A small group of protesters escalated their actions and then was suppressed by the police. Together with the differences and infighting among the protest groups, the whole movement naturally came to an end. In contrast, at the stage of decline of AEM,

the analytical framework is completely inapplicable. Police *repression* and *radicalization* did not end the movement but had the opposite effect. And *competition* within the challenging groups did not develop. To be brief, this is, to a large extent, a feature of a protest wave in hybrid regimes. Protest movements under democracies generally do not tolerate violent protests. The spread of violence would lead to a decrease in protest movements. At the same time, in Western democracies there should not be as much institutional violence, which makes people even more intolerant, as under hybrid regimes. In comparison, in hybrid regimes the public are relatively tolerant of violent protests.

By and large, *competition* among protest groups is a key mechanism leading to a decline phase whether protest groups compete with each other leading to infighting, or stay united inspiring each other, their impacts on the tendency of a movement are definitely different. The former would weaken the overall strength of challenging groups and cause the movement to go downhill; the latter would maintain fighting spirit, though it is not certain that it would not decline, it is definitely better than “a heap of loose sand”. Not only that, but the reduced role of *brokerage* would also lead to fewer protests and the declining influential allies’ *certification* would accelerate movements’ demise.

#### **9.5.4 Outcome**

International allies have a noncommittal role in social movements under hybrid regimes, and they would have an impact on outcomes of the movements by supporting movement leaders, issuing a series of policies, and imposing economic sanctions. If the power of authoritarian governments is too strong to be deterred by protests and demonstrations, international allies would produce a more direct influence upon them.

The utility of the mechanisms will be discussed and summarized in the next chapter.

## **9.6 The future of pro-democracy movements in Hong Kong**

Firstly, some brokers are resorting to the international front and contact foreign politicians to put pressure on this authoritarian government by cancelling economic cooperation with China. In other words, they are mobilizing international forces to put pressure on China in order to survive in this uneven-gap struggle is the main strategy of this pro-democracy movement at present. Secondly, the media's role as an influential ally in an undemocratic regime is crucial. Compared with other hybrid regimes, Hong Kong's civil liberties are more fully enjoyed. Although freedom of the press and freedom of speech are being eroded, they can still play their roles. Besides, compared to Xinjiang and Tibet, Hong Kong's advantage lies in its soft power and ability to connect to the international community. The importance of Western countries' economic interests in Hong Kong enables them pay long-term attention to the Hong Kong issue. In a word, freedom of the press makes what is happening in Hong Kong spread to the international community without information blockage. Third, Hong Kong has a strong civil society, which has grown by itself, and its power will not fade in a short time. As individuals in this civil society, everyone can choose to maintain their position and does their best to maintain universal values, which is the root and source of resistance. In addition, a platform on behalf of protesters in the struggle is still needed to gather the fighting forces to mediate and negotiate with the authorities to avoid the self-diminishing of the fighting forces.

Then, although there was no intention to do so, Hong Kong's democratic movement is part of a movement for democracy in China. Hong Kong protesters only want to democratize Hong Kong, in which China and the Chinese people would

inevitably be involved. The mainland people should not be regarded as opponents, and this has more easily evolved into a dispute between patriotism and non-patriotism. That is to say, the objective of the protesters should not be confined to universal suffrage. Even if they have won universal suffrage, it does not mean there would be no need to struggle anymore, because the instability of a hybrid regime may lead to a retrogression and lose what has been achieved. In short, the target of the protesters is actually authoritarian rule. It is not realistic to have the mentality of accomplishing the whole task at one stroke. And last, the failure of peaceful methods to achieve the goal does not mean that violence can solve the problem, although violence can attract the attention of the media (Jennings & Saunders, 2019). Social movements in Hong Kong can be linked with social movements in Southeast Asian countries, such as Thailand and Myanmar, which can also keep the media and the international community focused. Because most Southeast Asian countries are hybrid regimes with comparatively large variability and have much in common with Hong Kong. In fact, Hong Kong's social movements have provided incentives and references for social movements in other countries in the world, such as Thailand; in turn, the social movements of Hong Kong and Southeast Asian countries can unite to form transnational movements, generating greater leverage effect, which can exert greater pressure on authoritarian governments.

# Chapter 10: Conclusion

In this chapter I will address my research questions, consider the generalizability of my findings to other hybrid regimes, and explore the future avenues of research.

## 10.1 Summative answers to the research questions

My main research question is 'what factors and mechanisms can explain the contrasting protest waves of the Umbrella Movement and Anti-Extradition Bill Movement in Hong Kong?'. This research question is based on three sub-questions: (1) What are the differences in the protest waves? (2) Can broader political process theory comprising of a synthesis of political opportunities, mobilizing structures & framing theories explain the differences found in the emergence, longevity (peak), and decline of the two protest waves? If not effective, how to adjust it? (3) How useful is a mechanistic approach to interpret the different protest waves of the two social movements? Below, I will answer these three sub-questions separately, and then respond to the main question.

### 10.1.1 What are the differences in the protest waves?

The differences between the two protest waves of the UM and the AEM lie in the height and length of the protest curves, that is, the differences in the size and duration of the movements. As for the shape of the protest waves, the AEM had an upward trend in the decline stage, which showed that the AEM had not completely ended and there was a new stimulus that led to a rise in the protest curve. Regarding the types of protests, the UM had the largest number of demonstrative and confrontational protests, followed by conventional protests, and the others were not

obvious; the AEM had the greatest number of confrontational and violent protests, followed by minor attacks on property, and conventional protests were only significant at the early stage.

**10.1.2 To what extent does a broad political process theory comprising of a synthesis of political opportunities, mobilizing structures & framing theories explain the differences found in the emergence, peak, and decline of the two protest waves? If there is a need to modify the theory to fit a hybrid regime, how might it be improved to best do so?**

The Anti-Extradition Movement was more leaderless and decentralized than the Umbrella Movement. Different from the UM, no leader of the AEM could speak on behalf of the entire movement, and the SMOs could not control the trend of the movement. Besides, the AEM's leaders extended the role of brokers to the international arena, urging foreign governments to impose economic sanctions against China through non-governmental diplomacy. This was also the experience and lessons learned from the UM because leaders had realized the strength of local resistance was weak. Accordingly, the notion of mobilizing structures only could partly explain the leadership of the UM and is very limited in explaining for the AEM. In addition, the AEM had a wider degree of mobilization. Suffice it to say that almost the entire society had been mobilized and there were many spontaneous demonstrations. Arguably, the AEM realized the plans or aspirations for participatory democracy to some extent pursued by the protesters in the UM. Also, the AEM was more effective than the UM in the adoption of new tactics. So, the broader mobilization is owing to *scale shift* and *diffusion* of new tactics, and networking and new tactics of mobilizing structure did not have enough explanatory power. Furthermore, there were divergences and even internal strife among different factions of the UM, while the AEM was extremely violent and radicalized, but maintained a high degree of unity between

the peaceful and the radical protestors. Although the use of violence is a difference between the UM and the AEM, the alternating upward trend of *radicalization* and *repression* needs to be corresponding to the entire protest trend line so as to explain the difference between the two protest waves. In short, mobilizing structures cannot explain the differences in the protest waves of the UM and the AEM. In terms of political opportunities, there was no major change of institutionalised political system (open-closed), elite divisions, influential allies, regime's propensity for repression between the UM and the AEM, and thus obviously the political opportunity structure cannot provide a satisfactory explanation for the different protest curves. As for framing and framing processes, prognostic framing and diagnostic framing can interpret the different longevity of the protest curve in the peak and decline phases.

All in all, the political opportunity structure and the mobilizing structure alone cannot explain the differences observed in the emergence, peak, and decline phases of the UM and the AEM, which can be partly explained by framing theories. In terms of political opportunity structure, the range of influential allies is not limited to local allies, but also involves international allies. For a protest movement under a hybrid regime, the attitudes and positions of foreign governments and dignitaries can even determine the dynamics and outcome of a movement. This is the first point where the political opportunity structure needs to be adjusted. In addition, as mentioned in the previous discussion, the media can also be an important ally in the protest politics under hybrid and authoritarian regimes. Also, an aggressive crackdown from police will not necessarily make the movement unattractive but will arouse public sympathy and support for the movement. Similarly, violent protests will not necessarily lose the support of the masses if they are angrier at the violent suppression by the police. Therefore, police *repression* in the structure of political opportunity and the use of



violence in the mobilizing structure are different from those in Western democracies, and adjustments need to be made, that is, the alternating intensification of police *repression* and protest violence will prolong the entire movement. Last but not least, in the increasingly popular decentralized movements today, the leadership of leaders and SMOs is more reflected in the occurrence of *brokerage*, which is applicable to all types of regimes. Thus, in a decentralized movement, it is not so much a leader and SMO as it is a broker. This is another point where adjustments have been made to the mobilizing structure.

### **10.1.3 How useful is a mechanistic approach interpret the different protest waves of the two social movements?**

#### **10.1.3.1 Overall comparison of UM and AEM**

In the emergence of the two protest waves, the AEM's influential allies played a greater role than the UM, and it can even be said that the line between ally and leader is blurred. The role of the influential allies is *brokerage*. Leaders of social movements are depicted as strategic decision makers who encourage and guide others to participate in protests (Morris & Staggenborg, 2004). The key characteristic of *brokerage* is its ability to connect players who are not connected because of some specific political or social barrier, not just a deficiency of accessible opportunities (Diani, 2013). Influential allies refer to those who support the protests within the regime, often pro-democracy lawmakers. In the AEM the public had been greatly mobilized mainly through two demonstrations, while the mobilization of the UM was mainly through seminars and Deliberation Days. Put differently, UM showed more *social appropriation* than AEM. *Social appropriation* refers to that non-political groups are turned into political actors by use of the organizational and social bases to mobilize protest actions (Tilly & Tarrow, 2015). For the leaders, in addition to propaganda and mobilization, as

utilised by the UM, AEM leaders also travelled abroad to contact with foreign allies. In addition, the new tactics had appeared and spread in the initial stage of the UM, but new tactics were only applied in the peak stage of the AEM. In short, *brokerage* appeared to be a convincing explanation for the differences in protest size, and *social appropriation* helps us to understand the longer duration of the AEM.

In the peak phases of the two movements, compared with the UM, the AEM was a more leaderless and decentralized movement. The leaders and SMOs of the UM could speak for the movement or negotiate with the government as representatives, while the leaders and SMOs of the AEM could not be representatives of the entire movement. Moreover, the AEM leaders were only ordinary participants in the parades and demonstrations, and continued to play the role of international brokers, which was completely absent among the UM leaders. Influential allies continued to play no less important a role than leaders. As far as movement networking is concerned, the AEM had a higher degree of mobilization than the UM owing to *scale shift*. Additionally, the AEM's new strategy was more successful than the UM, expanding the space and opportunities for protest activities. More importantly, the AEM was more radical than the UM and used a high level of violence, but the AEM was more united than the UM, and there were divergences among the challenging groups within the UM. In short, *brokerage* constantly resulted in the different protest sizes, while *scale shift* and *diffusion* caused the different longevities.

In the decline phases, one difference is that the frame network of the UM was more concentrated, while that of the AEM was more scattered. This is because the citizen awakening was achieved after the civic education given by the Umbrella Movement and the public agreed on a common goal – universal suffrage. *Social appropriation* had also been mobilized to a large extent. By comparison, the AEM fell

into temporary confusion during its decline stage. Moreover, although both *social appropriation* and *scale shift* occurred in the decline phases of both, *social appropriation* of the UM is significantly more extensive than that of the AEM; as for *scale shift*, both involved the transfer of protest platforms, but the AEM's protests are mostly conventional protests (such as making statements). In short, the differences in *social appropriation* and *scale shift* can interpret the difference in the duration of the two protest waves. In addition, the factors for the end of the two are different. As for the decline of the UM, the failure of the action escalation led to a decline in the momentum of the protests, besides the method of occupation was also difficult to sustain, and the occupation ended naturally with police crackdown; while for the AEM, due to the outbreak of the COVID epidemic, the protests spontaneously diminished until they disappeared. Put differently, it was an uncontrollable external cause that ended the Anti-Extradition Movement. In a word, the COVID epidemic and the lack of clear prognostic framing made the AEM difficult to sustain in the later period.

#### **10.1.3.2 Utility of mechanisms**

Among the eleven mechanisms shown in the analytical framework, *brokerage*, *social appropriation*, *scale shift* and *certification* are those which best explain the different characteristics of the two protest waves (which I have discussed in the Chapter 6). *Brokerage* is the most useful mechanism as it is an indicator of the number of protests. *Brokerage* could interpret the more leaderless nature and decentralized Anti-Extradition Movement. Leaders were unable to control the entire movement but focused on coordination and communicating information as brokers. This kind of coordination and communication brought *social appropriation*. Because of the 'leaderless' leadership, the more spontaneous actions of the AEM could also be carried out autonomously. Moreover, leaders with leaderless leadership expanded

their brokerage to the international arena, and paid visits to other countries step by step to draw potential international allies. This brought *certification* of international influential allies, which had an important impact on the outcome of the AEM in Hong Kong. It was very necessary to introduce *certification* for interpreting protest movements in hybrid regimes. *Certification* from allies determines whether a movement can continue at the decline phase. What is more, *social appropriation* and *scale shift* are key mechanisms to prolong the duration of movements in the early and peak periods, respectively. When it comes to the broader mobilization and longer duration of the AEM than the UM, *scale shift* and *diffusion* could account for this. “Be water”, as a new strategy, through *diffusion*, enabled the flowing protest mode to be developed without regional restrictions, for example, penetrating deep into residential communities. The same can be applied to *scale shift*. Also, many spontaneous and flexible protests diffused. In addition, *diffusion* not only corresponds to the application of new tactics, and *diffusion* is originally a very useful mechanism to explain the maintenance or expansion of the scope of movements. Finally, the alternate interaction between *radicalization* and *repression* as well as *competition* could explain the obvious difference (longevity) between the UM and the AEM. However, *competition* is not always useful. In reality, *competition* often coexists with unity. The kind of effect that can be produced depends on which has the greater weight. Moreover, the effects of *repression* and *radicalization* are very different under a democratic regime and a hybrid regime, so *repression* and *radicalization* cannot be applied generally. *Social construction* and *object shift* might also be used to explain the differences between protest curves, although it does not apply in the case studies here. *Attribution of opportunity and threat* does not necessarily correspond to elite

divisions, but the former can interpret the critical time and timing and is also a useful mechanism for qualitative analysis.

In general, *brokerage*, *social appropriation*, *scale shift*, and *certification* are the most effective mechanisms for explaining the variation in the size and duration of movements, respectively. *Diffusion*, *radicalization*, *repression*, and *competition* provide supporting explanations as secondary important mechanisms. By comparison, *social construction* and *object shift* have no more explanatory impact than frame theory – prognostic framing and diagnostic framing. *Attribution of opportunity and threat* only performs a descriptive role as well. In other words, *social construction*, *object shift*, and *attribution of opportunity and threat* are not very effective mechanisms.

### **10.1.3.3 My contribution to the literature specifically on Hong Kong pro-democracy movements**

My work makes a contribution to the literature in three ways. First, it provides a mixed methods methodology for studying the relationship between independent variables – constituents derived from classic social movement theories and dependent variables – protest waves. Second, it applies a broader political process theory integrating political opportunity structure, mobilizing structure, and framing theories to examine protest movements of Hong Kong as a hybrid regime. Third, it introduces mechanisms to interpret the course of protest waves as intervening variables between independent and dependent variables. As IVs and DVs are quantitatively investigated, the mechanisms as intervening variables perform quantitative analyses to some extent, although they are originally intended for qualitative description.

How decentralized and leaderless movements maintained the momentum of protest become the focus of research on Hong Kong's pro-democracy movements, among which this type of movement has become common. Cheng (2016) considers

that it is dissatisfaction and reduced participation costs that lead to the Umbrella Movement, though spontaneous, voluntary and decentralized organizational structures maintained protest momentum. According to Cheng and Yuen (2020), the totality of mobilization hinged on a set of tolerant and productive conditions: civil society networks hidden after the Umbrella Movement were activated by fear of extradition to repressive regimes and by anger at unregulated police action. Furthermore, in his book *The Occupy Movement in Hong Kong: Sustaining Decentralized Protest*, Cai (2017) develops a new framework for explaining the persistence of decentralized protests without strong movement organization and leadership. Continued protests may not only lead to more violent action, but also to the proliferation of protests or to major policy changes. Ku (2020) highlights the political establishment by which young protesters have used a range of local, diaspora and international resources to steer this leaderless movement. Moreover, Lee, Yuen, Tang and Cheng (2019) illustrate that protestors were self-mobilization and technological support, which was highly consistent with the movement's leaderless ethic; and protestors demonstrated an unprecedented high level of solidarity, which provides the impetus for escalation and radicalization. Also, Lee (2020) attempts to explain how solidarity is created, maintained and negotiated. All in all, these scholarly works above mentioned that the decentralized structure and leaderless movements maintained the momentum of protests. However, they did not explain that how the decentralized structure and leaderless leadership continued the movement. In my research, I establish the analytical framework to analyze how the independent variables – leaders and SMOs, and mechanism – *brokerage* affect the longevity of the movements.

Scholars who have studied pro-democracy movements of Hong Kong in the past have also focused on the structure of political opportunity. Chan and Lee (2007) discuss the macro-, meso-, and micro-level factors that lead to the rise of demonstrations. At the macro level, it has been argued that changing political opportunities in cities lead to alliances between political elites within institutions and street activists. While SMOs are important in organizing protests, media and interpersonal interactions are important in actually encouraging people to participate. In addition, the research in the book *The Umbrella Movement: Civil Resistance and Contentious Space in Hong Kong* analyzes occupation as a spontaneous, emotional act of argument that takes advantage of public spaces and creative passions. Ma and Cheng (2019) also show how civil resistance is shaped and constrained by hybrid regimes and place the Hong Kong movement in a broader comparative perspective, with reference to past student movements in China and protests in Taiwan and Macau. Overall, academic works have studied previous political opportunities, which are constantly changing. In my research, I systematically studied the impact of the constituent elements of political opportunity structure on the protest waves. Ma and Cheng (2019) made a horizontal comparative analysis of the democratic movements in Hong Kong and the mainland, Taiwan and Macao, while my research is a vertical comparative analysis of the democratic movements in Hong Kong, so as to establish an analytical framework for protest politics under hybrid regimes.

Regarding framing analysis, Leung (2016) employs concepts of repertoire, framing and vision to explore why did the occupiers join the movement and how did the occupiers justify their actions in the movement. Cheng (2019) constructs a counter-frame that conceptualizes the Umbrella Movement as a civil resistance movement of the people, thereby questioning the official and media frame of the Occupy movement

as an illegal assembly and separatist movement. In terms of movement strategy, Chung (2020) indicates the organic combination of “peaceful, rational, non-violent” actions and “militant” confrontation demonstrates an unexpected evolution of the controversial repertoire of social movements in Hong Kong. In my research, I use quantitative data collection and analysis to summarize more collective action frames, compared to Leung (2016)’s work, and the master frame is different from it. In terms of movement strategies, I employ new tactics and use of violence to explore how the combination of these two and other factors affects the protest curves.

Some scholars considered that the root cause of the protests was the government’s irresponsibility. According to Cheng (2014), political radicalization in Hong Kong was due to worsening living standards and widening gaps between rich and poor is overwhelming. In this situation, the government is naturally to blame. Wong (2020) shows that Hong Kong’s transformation into a special administrative region has fundamentally shaped its current political vulnerability. The 2019 Anti-ELAB protests were more anarchic than any previous political movement. In my study, it involves mechanisms – *social construction* and *object shift*. In the discussion of the two, not only that the HKSAR government is to blame, but the central government is also the target.

All in all, previous scholars who have studied Hong Kong social movements have either considered decentralized organizational structures, mobilizing structures, political opportunities, or only framing, broad political process theory is better than a non-holistic approach that looks at only one aspect, it is better to consider all three in tandem. Moreover, the introduced mechanisms matter in intervening in the IV - DV linkage, yet other studies on Hong Kong movements lack the in-depth consideration of the precise mechanisms that allow an IV to result in a phase of protest wave. In




short, PPT (political process theory) is not perfect and tends to be Western-centric, for example, repression will not end the movement, but invigorate protest activities in a hybrid regime. The explanatory power of mechanistic approach will need to be tested by more empirical research, especially by protest movements under hybrid regimes.

## **10.2 Generalisability of my findings to other hybrid regimes**

In the classic Western social movement theories, the structure of political opportunity should be significantly different in different regime types, so it is the most significant variable in the application of Western political theory to hybrid regimes. The intensification of elite division plays a dominant part in the emergence of a protest wave, while the settlement of elite conflicts probably puts an end to the protest wave (Robertson, 2011). In addition, the mobilization ability of organizations would also be more restricted under hybrid regimes, such as legally banning social movement organizations, issuing notices of disapproval to relevant organized activities, monitoring and preventing organized non-protest activities, and so on. In terms of frame theories, it is less affected by the regime types, and hence the application of frame theories to hybrid regimes is not significantly different from those under Western democracies. In short, linking political opportunity structure & mobilizing structure and mechanisms are more significant than framing theories.

Next, on the basis of my analyses on the two protest waves in Hong Kong, I will analyse the generalisability of my findings to other hybrid regimes in combination with the diagram (Figure 10.1), please refer to Figure 9.1 (UM) and Figure 9.2 (AEM) for comparison.

**Figure 10.1: General analytical framework for hybrid regimes**



In terms of the emergence phase, the public needs to understand and sympathize with protestors' demands before being mobilized, and the broader the mobilization network, the more conducive to the emergence of protest waves. These two tasks – *social construction* and *social appropriation* are often completed by leaders

and SMOs through *brokerage*, even if spontaneous protest actions account for a large proportion. In short, leaders/SMOs → *brokerage*, networking → *social appropriation* and framing → *social construction* are also true for other hybrid regimes.

As for the peak phase, influential allies will become a solid force for the continued existence of a movement, and the continued pressure of allies on the government will greatly weaken the recognition and legitimacy of the government. In the AEM, the roles of influential allies and leaders were similar, which can be described as *brokerage*, but in most hybrid regimes, this situation may not necessarily happen, hence influential allies → *certification* is universally applicable to other hybrid regimes. Moreover, although not all protest movements are decentralized and leaderless in hybrid regimes, this type of protest mode is very popular at present, and it is no exception in a hybrid regime, thus leaders/SMOs → *brokerage* is widely applicable. For example, in the Thailand protests, the protesters were mostly students and young people without a complete leader (Tostevin, 2020). Their activities seemed to be unplanned apart from day-to-day demonstrations, which may be caused by the absence of a centralised structure (English, 2020). As for networking, its extensity is indeed achieved through *social appropriation* and *scale shift*, which is also generalisable in hybrid regimes. In the case of 2020-2021 Thailand protests, student protesters were considered as more innovative, more linked, and more tech-savvy than the government (Achakulwisut, 2020). After 18 July 2020, the protests began to spread all over the country. The first one occurred in Chiang Mai Province and Ubon Ratchathani Province on 19 July (Boyle, 2020). As of 23 July, demonstrations took place in over twenty provinces (The Bangkok Insight Editorial Team, 2020). *Scale shift* occurred. Moreover, with the progress of the movement, it is inevitable to produce (a) new frame(s), under which *object shift* often occurs. On 19 January 2021, student

activist Benja Apan protested at the Iconsiam shopping mall by lifting a slogan that read “Monopolizing the vaccine to give the spotlight to the monarchy”, which was straightly related to Vajiralongkorn’s Siam Bioscience pharmaceutical company (“Mall Security Guard Slaps Activist,” 2021, para. 1).

With respect to other mechanisms, the relationship between protest groups can be *competition*, unity, and cooperation or separate. Disagreements or parting ways between protest groups will indeed intrigue the momentum of protest, causing it to decline, and thus SMOs/factions → *competition* is true for other hybrid regimes, as happened in the UM. In addition, the protest forms have been seriously affected by the political opportunity structure (Koopmans, 1999). For example, violence as a form of protest is more common in hybrid regimes than in democracies, also, violent protests and *radicalization* may or may not lead to the demise of movements in hybrid regimes. What is more, the balance between *radicalization* and *repression* which might continue a whole movement does not often happen, so this does not necessarily apply to other hybrid regimes. However, propensity for repression → *repression* would put an end to a movement, which is true for hybrid regimes, although this did not occur in the AEM. If without epidemic, it is difficult to determine that the police crackdown would not end the street protests, because the momentum of the protesters had gradually weakened, not to mention the National Security Law in the later have inhibited the protest activities to the greatest extent and led to the low ebb of protests. In short, the gradual self-extinguishing of a movement in its later period is often mixed with police *repression*, and the former cannot deny the effect of the latter. More importantly, most other hybrid regimes do not have a weak (local) government and strong civil society like Hong Kong, so the effect of police *repression* will be more obvious in other hybrid regimes. Finally, the *certification* of international allies can usually play a great role in

the outcome of protest movements in hybrid regimes, hence international allies → *certification* is universal applicable to hybrid regimes.

To sum up, I have discussed the relevance of a political process mechanistic approach to understanding protest waves of movements in another hybrid regime (Thailand). Due to the limitation of material, I only did a rough analysis on the protests in Thailand, and I will pay more attention to them in future research. All in all, compared with that in Western democracies, the political opportunity structure in hybrid regimes varies from regime to regime with a wider variation, and its components tend to merge with factors of mobilizing structure to form a distinctive and complete picture.

### **10.3 New avenues for future research**

First, in terms of a broader political process theory, the media has attracted attention from scholars, who have believed that it can be one factor of political opportunity structure in non-democracies. I believe that media freedom and information circulation can also be regarded as part of the political opportunity structure under a hybrid regime. Besides, the current protest activities employ a variety of social media tools, and social media research has not been more involved in my research due to methodological limitations, and this may be a new approach area that can be explored. In addition, as far as the mobilizing structure I have established, consisting of leaders, SMOs and movement structures, social networking and action tactics, more case studies are needed to prove this mobilizing structure's applicability. In particular, movement structure is a relatively new perspective, which can be combined with social networking to observe the relationship between participants. Moreover, regarding the relationship between framing processes and protest waves, I have proposed that frame resonance promotes the occurrence of protests, and the frame conflicts cause the decline of protests, which need more empirical research.

Then, when it comes to mechanisms, *brokerage* is the most important, especially in the movements with leaderless leadership and decentralized structure, its role is particularly noticeable. As an intermediate variable, *brokerage* fills the vacuum for the area which cannot be described as leadership roles, in a word, it can effectively interpret some sort of leaderless leadership. Regarding *social appropriation* and *scale shift*, they have a more accurate explanation than networking. *Social appropriation* can use more organizations to participate in protests to expand mobilization base, and *scale shift* can offer an explanation of how to maintain the size of mobilization in the middle period of the movement. More importantly, the impact of international forces can be interpreted by *certification*, and international factors can play a pivotal role in movements under hybrid regimes. In short, *brokerage*, *social appropriation* and *scale shift* may provide more effective interpretations and applications, and those need to be explored and improved. As far as *social construction* and *object shift* are concerned, they are significant for understanding frame theories. *Social construction* and *object shift* focus on the targets, which is conducive to the realization of diagnostic framing and prognostic framing, because the first two determine who is to blame and who is responsible. Still, the relationship between *social construction* & *object shift* and framing can be explored in more depth. In addition, as for *diffusion*, as the intermediate variable of new tactics, the latter really exerts its effectiveness through the former. In addition to this effect in the local area, *diffusion* also has a similar influence in the international field, and protests in other countries would imitate certain new tactic(s). Therefore, *diffusion* can indeed play a role in transnational movements, and the relationship between *diffusion* and new tactics can be tested more effectively in transnational movements.

In terms of methodology, mechanisms introduced as intermediate variables can be combined with quantitative analyses (such as PEA, SNA, and DNA) to conduct mixed methods research, and they can also be used for qualitative analysis alone (e.g., *opportunity-threat attribution, competition, and diffusion*). All in all, mechanisms can be used to play a descriptive role, but now they can be operational and verifiable as methodology, which has huge potential initiative and more empirical research is needed to support and improve it. As for framing analysis, employing discourse network analysis to conduct one-mode analysis can discover collective action frames and master frames, as well as frame alignment processes; two-mode analysis can explore the relationship between frames and actors – frame resonance, the relationship between frames and objects – *social construction* and *object shift*. In a nutshell, the use of discourse network analysis for framing analysis in the study of social movements is an extremely promising innovation, opening new avenues for similar research, and there is also much room for improvement.

As far as my personal research development in the next five years, I will have the following plans. First, I will test my analytical framework in other hybrid regimes (such as Thailand) to observe which ones are useful, which are not, and identify the reasons, and then explore modifications. Second, as for these mechanisms, I would like to investigate whether they can be applied not only to protest movements but also to state mobilisation. In other words, I intend to study the dynamics between movements and counter-movements. Third, I am going to carry out more violence analysis to discover under what circumstances a movement would become violent. Fourth, I plan to do research on the relationship between political emotion and social movements. Finally, with regard to *diffusion*, I intend to explore more fully the transitional *diffusion* of social movements (especially in hybrid regimes).

## Appendix I

Name of actor or event	Full name	Type of actor	
HKJP	Justice and Peace Commission of The Hong Kong Catholic Diocese	2	
Chu Yiu-ming	Chu Yiu-ming	1	Type of actor
Assc Ad Fem	Association for the Advancement of Feminism	2	1= leader
Net Women	Network for Women in Politics	2	2= SMO / Group
Teen's Key	Teen's Key	2	3= Influential allies
HKWCC	Hong Kong Women Christian Council	2	4= Events
WCOEO	Hong Kong Women's Coalition on Equal Opportunities	2	
Advo Group	Advocacy Group	2	
Transgender	Transgender Resource Center	2	
HKFS	Hong Kong Federation of Students	2	
LDHKF	League in Defense of Hong Kong's Freedoms	2	
WCHKCTU	Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions – Women's Commission	2	
Catholic GE DD	Catholic General Election Deliberation Day	4	
DDWGM	Deliberation day of Women & Gender/Difference & Minority	4	
OCLP	Occupy Central with Love and Peace	2	
Dday II	The second public deliberation day	4	
Profess Com	Professional Commons	2	
Chan Kin-man	Chan Kin-man	1	
PC Dday	Professional circles' deliberation day	4	
Benny Tai	Benny Tai Yiu-ting	1	
HKWWA	Hong Kong Women Worker's Association	2	
Charity sale	Charity sale of glutinous rice buns	4	
ICCF	College Christian Fellowship	2	
CityU Christ	CityU Christian Fellowship	2	
HKCC	Hong Kong Christian Council	2	
Christ Dday	College Christian Democratic Reform Deliberation Day	4	
Prayer Love	Preparatory Committee of the Prayer for Love and Peace	2	
MLKMDD	Martin Luther King Memorial Day Party	4	
Acade Refere	Academic Referendum Discussion Conference	4	
MP employees	Ming Pao employees	2	
Distri ribbon	Distribute ribbons to call for supporting freedom of the press	4	
Margaret Ng	Margaret Ng Ngoi-yee	3	
Shiu Ka-chun	Shiu Ka-chun	3	
Cult Sal 18 Jan	OCLP Cultural Salon on 18 January	4	



CHRF	Civil Human Rights Front	2
NYDP 2014	New Year's Day Parade 2014	4
JPAVU	Joint Press Anti-Violence Unit	2
Signa Campa	Signature Campaign of 'Anti-Violence and Promoting the Police to Arrest the Killers'	4
Me-workers	A number of media workers	2
Bus drivers	Grass-roots minibus drivers	2
March SFS	March in support of freedom of speech and Kevin Lau	4
Freedom HK	Freedom HK	2
Flash 28 Feb	Flashed in all areas, resisting actions to silencing on 28 February 2014	4
RSWM	Reclaiming Social Work Movement	3
Anti-vio 26 Feb	Condemning Violence and Protecting Conscience' on 26 February	4
HKJA	Hong Kong Journalists Association	2
23 Feb parade	Anti-silencing parade "2.23 Freedom of expression"	4
Comm gradts	Inter-University Communication graduates	2
27 Feb rally	A spontaneous rally on 27 February 2014	4
2.23 parade	2.23 Freedom of expression	4
HKFS peti	HKFS's petition on 5 February 2014	4
APEC state	Statement about the sudden cancellation of APEC meeting	4
HKCI	Hong Kong Christian Institute	2
Prayer-M 2 Mar	Christian Prayer Meeting on 2 March 2014	4
Anti-vio stand	Anti-violence silent stand action	4
HK Perform stu	Students of Hong Kong Academy of Performing Arts	2
Lifting slogan	Raising slogan cards showing "speak now", "speak the truth" etc.	4
CHK Link	Canada-Hong Kong Link	2
Letter 10 Mar	Publish the letter to Chief Executive on 10 March	4
KUC	Kowloon Union Church	2
CCCSOC	Church of Christ in China Shum Oi Church	2
EPPY	Ecumenical Pastoral Platform for Youth	2
QTA	Queer Theology Academy	2
JJJA	JJJ Association	2
HKCCGJG	Hong Kong Christian Council Gender Justice Group	2
On Body	On Body in Christ	2
CSW	Christian Social Workers	2
Christ Times	Christian Times	4
HKUSU	Hong Kong University Students' Union	2
Person-photo	"One person one photo" campaign	4
Tanya Chan	Tanya Chan	3
Stand street	Standing in the street, advocating "Free Speech", "Free Press"	4
ICA	Independent Commentators Association	2
HKBU	Hong Kong Baptist University	2

Seminar 15 Mar	Seminar on 15 March	4
Dday2 Summary	Dday2 Summary and Forward-looking Conference	4
Cult Sal 29 Mar	OCLP Cultural Salon on 29 March	4
KL petition	HKFS issued a petition on the attack of Kevin Lau	4
VK Meeting	OCLP Volunteer Kick-off Meeting	4
CUSU	Student Union of the Chinese University of Hong Kong	2
SYUSU	Student Union of Hong Kong Shue Yan University	2
Scholarism	Scholarism	2
HKFSWS	Hong Kong Federation of Social Work Students	2
HKCCSU	Hong Kong Community College Students' Union	2
EdUHKSU	Education University of Hong Kong Students' Union	2
HKUSTSU	Hong Kong University of Science and Technology Students' Union	2
HK Unison	Hong Kong Unison	2
Audrey Eu	Audrey Eu Yuet-mee	3
Leung Kwok Hung	Leung Kwok Hung	3
EM seminar	Seminar on democracy, political reform, and minority rights especially for ethnic minorities	4
Finan profess	80 financial professionals	2
Finan letter	Financial professionals opened a letter to Xi	4
Leaflets SSD	Handing out leaflets to sow the seeds of democracy	4
OCLP oath	Oath to participate in the "OCLP" ceremony	4
Leaflets HK	Handing out leaflets in HK Island, Kowloon and New Territories for three weeks	4
Appeal 25 May	Appealing to the public to vote together from 20 to 22 June	4
Ed Chin	Edward Chin Chi-kin	1
Fifth Cult Sal	The fifth OCLP Cultural Salon	4
Civic Party	Civic Party	3
CSDPR	Christians Support Democratic Political Reform	2
CDRACC	Comic Daemons and representatives of the arts and cultural circles	2
HKCTU	Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions	2
HKADPL	Hong Kong Association for Democracy and People's Livelihood	3
SWCSOC	Social welfare circles' supporters of Occupy Central	2
HKPTU	Hong Kong Professional Teachers' Union	2
FPOC	Financial Professionals for Occupy Central	2
WGMDPC	Women & Gender / Difference & Minorities	2
Democ Party	Dday2 Preparatory Committee	2
Labour Party	Democratic Party	3
	Labour Party	3

MCDSCE	Major Coalition of the disabled for the supervision of CE	2
LSD	League of Social Democrats	3
Dday 6 May	Deliberation Day held on 6 May 2014	4
College stu	A group of junior college students	2
Str Sta 3 Jun	OCLP Street Station on 3 June 2014	4
Str sta 4 Jun	OCLP Street Station on 4 June 2014	4
HK Alliance	Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements of China	2
4 Jun march	March for the 25th anni. of 4 June	4
Joseph Cheng	Joseph Cheng Yu-shek	3
Chris Lau	Christopher Lau Gar-hung	3
Alex Chow	Alex Chow Yong-kang	1
Debate 7 Jun	The first open debate of the three OCLP programmes	4
Martin Lee	Martin Lee Chu-ming	3
Publici Cam	Publicity campaign on 7 June 2014	4
Sang song	OCLP volunteer team sang " <i>Who Has not Made a Sound</i> "	4
State CWP	Statement on 22 June to strongly condemn the White Paper	4
HKSWGU	Hong Kong Social Workers' General Union	2
HKCCLA	Hong Kong Catholic Commission for Labour Affairs	2
HKFCS	Hong Kong Federation of Catholic Students	2
Mary Church	Immaculate Heart of Mary Church	2
Apostle Church	St. Thomas the Apostle Church	2
JPIC	Franciscan Order Hong Kong JPIC Group	2
DYCHK	Diocesan Youth Commission Hong Kong	2
HKAWSW	Hong Kong Association of Women Social Workers	2
Com Daem	Comic Daemons	2
Neo Demo	Neo Democrats	3
NWSC	Neighbourhood and Worker's Service Centre	3
Trailwalks	Trailwalks for universal suffrage from 14 June to 20 June 2014	4
Leaflets 4 Jun	Distribut leaflets to the public on 4 June 2014	4
Refere day	"Referendum day" from 20 June to 29 June 2014	4
Johnson Yeung	Johnson Yeung Ching Yin	1
March 1 Jul 14	March 1 July 2014	4
Confer Ref	A press conference was held to summarize the results of the referendum	4
Letter to CL	Benny Tai's open letter to Carrie Lam	4
State DNPC	OCLP's official statement responding to the NPC's decision	4
Alliance TD	Alliance for True Democracy	2
Citiz Voi Rally	Citizen Voice Rally	4
Assem OPH	Assembly outside Police Headquarters on 2 August 2014	4
Albert Ho	Albert Ho Chun-yan	3

Alan Leong	Alan Leong Kah-kit	3
Briefing 1 Sep	Briefing on political reform on 1 September 2014	4
State OCWE	OCLP Secretariat made a statement that Occupy Central would emerge	4
Black march	Black-cloth march	4
Yeung Sum	Yeung Sum	3
Wu Chi-wai	Wu Chi-wai	3
Chan Kai-yuen	Chan Kai-yuen	3
Shaving heads	Shave their heads in front of the public with 43 citizens who supported OCLP	4
Sit-in Civ Squ	Sit-in for regaining Civic Square	4
Assem 27 Sep	Public assembly all day of 27 September 2014	4
Emily Lau Fernando	Emily Lau Wai-hing	3
Cheung	Fernando Cheung Chiu-hung	3
28 Sep occupy	Occupation on 28 September	4
HKBU stu	A group of students from Baptist University	2
Ming Kei stu	Ming Kei College students	2
29 Sep strike	Students' strike on 29 September 2014	4
Social workers	Social workers	2
Lester Shum	Lester Shum	1
Agnes Chow	Agnes Chow Ting	1
Kenneth Chan	Kenneth Chan Ka-lok	3
Oscar Lai	Oscar Lai Man-lok	1
29 Sep occupy	Occupation on 29 September	4
30 Sep occupy	Occupation on 30 September	4
Lee Cheuk-yan	Lee Cheuk-yan	1
Stick to occupy	HKFS, Scholarism and OCLP appealed to the whole Hong Kong people to stand up with them to occupy Admiralty, Causeway Bay and Mong Kok	4
Petition 28 Sep	HKFS set a deadline of midnight for the HKSAR on 28 September	4
Assem SOGO	Assembly exterior to SOGO	4
30 Sep strike	Hong Kong University Students' Union's class boycott	4
Mid-stu	Middle school students	2
26 Sep boycott	1,200 middle school students had joined the class boycott	4
Assem 24 Sep	HKFS was organising an assembly with 25 mass organizations	4
Bauhinia assem	Scholarism members turned their backs to the flag at Golden Bauhinia Square	4
CityU stu	A number of creative media students from City University	2
Demo-tree	The artistic equipment, named "the tree of democracy", was composed of umbrellas and roadblocks	4
2 Oct occupy	Occupation on 2 October	4
Cheung Yin-tung	Cheung Yin-tung	3

3 Oct occupy	Occupation on 3 October	4
Canopy	A giant colourful canopy of 200 broken umbrellas	4
Join-state	On 3 October HKFS, Scholarism and OCLP issued a joint statement	4
Law profess	Law professionals	2
MYDG	Macau Youth Dynamics Group	2
Hig Cou rally	Rally in front of the High Court on 4 October	4
5 Oct occupy	Occupation on 5 October	4
HKU	The University of Hong Kong	2
Jimmy Lai	Jimmy Lai Chee-Ying	1
7 Oct occupy	Occupation on 7 October	4
St perform	A group of street performers	2
Claudia Mo	Claudia Mo Man-ching	3
Helena Wong	Helena Wong Pik-wan	3
Kwok Ka-ki	Kwok Ka-ki	3
Eason Chung	Eason Chung Yiu-wa	1
8 Oct occupy	Occupation on 8 October	4
HK Bar Asso	Hong Kong Bar Association	2
Bar's state 2014	Hong Kong Bar Association censured the police firing undue tear gas	4
Chan Kok-hin	Ian Chan Kok-hin	1
Sunny Cheung	Sunny Cheung Kwan-yang	1
Tommy Cheung	Tommy Cheung Sau-yin	1
Nathan Law	Nathan Law Kwun-chung	1
9 Oct occupy	Occupation on 9 October	4
HKS	Hong Kong Shield	2
Gary Fan	Gary Fan Kwok-wai	3
10 Oct occupy	Occupation on 10 October	4
11 Oct occupy	Occupation on 11 October	4
PP	People Power	3
A band	A band singing Westlife's "My Love"	2
12 Oct occupy	Occupation on 12 October	4
Cons workers	10 construction workers	2
13 Oct occupy	Occupation on 13 October	4
Albert Chan	Albert Chan Wai-yip	3
Tam Tak-chi	Tam Tak-chi	3
Cheung Kwok-che	Peter Cheung Kwok-che	3
14 Oct occupy	Occupation on 14 October	4
15 Oct occupy	Occupation on 15 October	4
Ken Tsang	Ken Tsang Kin-chiu	3
16 Oct occupy	Occupation on 16 October	4
Daisy Chan	Daisy Chan Sin-ying	1
17 Oct occupy	Occupation on 17 October	4
Big Boyz	Big Boyz Club	2
United Hawkets	United Hawkets Development Platform	2
Land Justice	Land Justice League	2
18 Oct occupy	Occupation on 18 October	4

Leung Yiu-chung	Leung Yiu-chung	3
Charles Mok	Charles Peter Mok	3
19 Oct occupy	Occupation on 19 October	4
Lingnan grats	Graduates from Lingnan University	2
Lingnan cere	Lingnan University held a graduation ceremony	4
Driver volunt	Driver volunteers	2
22 Oct occupy	Occupation on 22 October	4
Ip Kin-yuen	Ip Kin-yuen	3
27 Oct occupy	Occupation on 27 October	4
Medical staff	Medical staff	2
Journalists	Journalists	2
Teachers	Teachers	2
Reli-groups	Religious groups	2
Cul-workers	Cultural workers	2
Grassroots	Grassroots	2
UFSSPS	United Front in Support of Students' and People's Struggle	2
28 Oct occupy	Occupation on 28 October	4
30 Oct occupy	30 Oct occupy	4
ITUC	International Trade Union Confederation	2
ITUC's letter	1,000 representatives of the International Trade Union Confederation signed one-person-one-letter to protest	4
CUHK	Chinese University of Hong Kong	2
HKUST	Hong Kong University of Science and Technology	2
CityU	City University of Hong Kong	2
Yellow ban	Giant yellow banners "I want universal suffrage"	4
Five platforms	Five platforms discussed the feasibility of a referendum	4
V men	V masked men	2
MMM	"Million Mask March" campaign	4
Gen Edu Um	"General Education under the Umbrella"	4
Liaison march	March to the Liaison Office on 9 November	4
Sharing HKUST	Sharing at HKUST on 12 November 2014	4
Demon PH	Protest against detaining stewards of OCLP exterior to Police Headquarters	4
Trailwalkers	Trailwalker participants	2
Oxfam	Oxfam Trailwalker	4
EdU grats	Graduates from the Department of Creative Arts and Culture, Education University	2
EdU cere	Education University of Hong Kong held its graduation ceremony	4
UMCD 1	The first Umbrella Movement Community Day	4
QC stu	A group of students from the Queen's College	2

	A group of students from the Queen's College hung a banner "I want true universal suffrage"	4
Banner QC		
Civic Passion	Civic Passion	3
Violence LegCo	Violence against the Legislative Council	4
CUHK grats	CUHK graduates	2
Commen cere	Commencement ceremony	4
Dancers	Dancers	2
Dance shadow	Dancing shadows	4
Alvin Yeung	Alvin Yeung Ngok-kiu	3
Yvonne Leung	Yvonne Leung	1
	Another Umbrella Movement Community Day (23 November, 2014)	4
UMCD 2		
MKSR	Mong Kok Shopping Revolution	2
Wong Ji-yuet	Prince Wong Ji-yuet	1
	"Fight for Democracy targeting the Regime" meeting	2
Fight demo		
	Encircle government headquarters and press on Leung Chun-ying government	4
Encircle GOV	"All Citizen Acton against Police Brutality"	
	Campaign	4
Citiz anti-Brutal		
Doctors	Doctors	2
Academics	Academics	2
Lawyers	Lawyers	2
Intellectuals	Intellectuals	2
Pastoralists	Pastoralists	2
	Protest outside Chai Wan Police Headquarter	4
Protest CWPB		
	Hunger strike launched by members of Scholarism	4
Hunger strike		
Col-teachers	College teachers	2
Black robe	Black robe parade	4
	HKFS urged the public to come to Admiralty on 10 December night	4
HKFS's appeal		
Carol group	A carolling group of the Church	2
Church reports	Church reports good news	4
Umbr Bloss	Umbrella Blossom	2
Mob Demo Cla 1	Mobile Democracy Classroom 1	4
Stu Awaken	Student Awakening	2
Xmas battles	Christmas battles	4
Umb Par	Umbrella Parents	2
Leung Ka-lau	Leung Ka-lau	3
HKPDA	Hong Kong Public Doctors' Association	2
	Seminar on political reform in the medical profession	4
Seminar PRMP		
CRO	Civil Rights Observer	2
Chalk girl	Activity on chalk girl's graffiti	4
	Mong Kok Shopping Revolution's march on 24 January	4
SR March		
1 Feb march	March on 1 Feb 2015	4
SFD	Student Fight for Democracy	2

Progr Law Gro	Progressive Lawyers Group	2
	Members of Progressive Lawyers Group	
PLG march	participated in the march	4
UB Lecture 1	One of a series of lectures in Feb 2015	4
	National Registration Day on 28 February	
Nat Regist Day	2015	4
	Scholarism issued an open letter again,	
Letter pol refo	requesting to talk with Carrie Lam	4
Surround CL	Surround Carrie Lam	4
FTWCG	Frontline Tech Workers Concern Group	2
	Frontline Tech Workers Concern Group	
	initiated a petition of political reform	
IT Concern	proposals	4
Umbr Uni HK	Umbrella University HK	2
Mob Demo Cla 2	Mobile Democracy Classrooms 2	4
UB Lecture 2	A series of lectures in March 2015	4
"Chosen by		
times"	Discussion forum "We chosen by the times?"	4
SSP	Secondary Students Parliament	2
	Seminar on Political Engagement of General	
Semi pol enga	Studies	4
Hui's pre-con	Hui Lai-ming held a press conference	4
Anti-Water	Press conference of "Anti-Water Cannon,	
Cannon	Withdrawal of the Application"	4
	A joint action to "link up" with professionals	
Link-up	from all walks of life	4
Méde Insp	Médecins Inspirés	2
Nurse Politik	Concern Group of Nurses Politik	2
Act Voice	Act Voice	2
Prog Tea Allia	Progressive Teachers' Alliance	2
Front Te Work	Frontline TechWorkers	2
HK Psych Conc	Hong Kong Psychologists Concern	2
Rad The Radi	Radiation Therapist and the Radiographer's	
Con	Conscience	2
ArchiVision	ArchiVision	2
IT Voice	IT Voice	2
Artists Action	Artists Action	2
	Propaganda against the government's	
Propag AGPSC	pseudo-universal suffrage scheme	4
CSDR	Christians Support Democratic Reform	2
Ekklesia HK	Ekklesia Hong Kong	2
CSCF	Christian Social Concern Fellowship	2
CFHKS	Christians For Hong Kong Society	2
UC Cyberchurch	Umbrella City Cyberchurch	2
	A group of Hong Kong Christians online	
Christ E-peti	petition on 27 May, 2015	4
Boao Summit	2015 Boao Forum for Asia Youth Summit	4
	Demonstration at Polytechnic University on	
Demon PolyU	18 May, 2015	4
	Open University of Hong Kong Students'	
Ouhksu	Union	2



HSUHKSU	Hang Seng University of Hong Kong Students' Union	2
CityUSU	City University of Hong Kong Students' Union	2
May Day Parade 15	May Day Parade 2015	4
Richard Tsoi	Richard Tsoi	3
4 Jun Memo-Day	Memorial Day of the June Fourth Incident on 31 May	4
Demo Hard Rd	"30-year Democracy Hardship Road" parade	4
Eddie Chu	Eddie Chu Hoi-dick	3
Com Citi Chart	Community Citizenship Charter Movement	4
Age Resis	Age of Resistance	2
Sammy Ip	Sammy Ip	1
Wong Ching Fung	Wong Ching Fung	1
Leung Hiu-yung	Leung Hiu-yung	1
4 Jun platform	4 June platform of the Hong Kong Alliance	4
Alma Mater str sta	Scholarism set street station at alma maters of legislators	4
Symposium 89	Symposium "a tale of cities in 1989"	4
Um dot	Um dot dot dot	2
Ignite Belief	Ignite Your Belief	2
DHKF	Defense of HK Freedom	2
Archives	Archives	2
2047HKM	2047 HK Monitor	2
80s momen	80s momentum	2
Citizens' Radio	Citizens' Radio	2
IWDM	Island West Dynamic Movement	2
Power Demo	Power for Democracy	2
Justice League	Justice League	2
Rainb Act	Rainbow Action	2
Wom Coali	Women Coalition of HKSAR	2
CSSAIC	Comprehensive Social Security Assistance Income Coalition	2
We Future	We are the Future Campaign	2
Dennis Kwok	Dennis Kwok Wing-hang	3
Campa Reje US	Campaign of All People Rejecting Fake Universal Suffrage	4
Legal state	Members of the legal profession of the election committee issued a statement on 11 June, 2015	4
1 Jul march	1 July march 2015	4
Leaflets 1 Jul	Leaflets distributed by HKFS on 1 July, 2015	4
Parade MC	Demonstration at Malaysian Consulate in Hong Kong	4
Jeffrey Ngo	Jeffrey Ngo	1
Sem UofT	Seminar on "post Umbrella Hong Kong Democratic Process" at the University of Toronto	4
Jimmy Sham	Jimmy Sham Tsz-kit	1

Raymond Chan	Raymond Chan Chi-chuen	3
Roy Tam	Roy Tam Hoi Pong	3
31 Mar mar PC	“March against the Amendment of Extradition Ordinance” on 3 March, 2019	4
Sta anti extra	Statement strongly opposing the amendment of the extradition Ordinance	4
PolyU rally	PolyU Student Union held a rally on 7 March, 2019 to support the students who had been punished	4
CM Doct Cure	CM Doctors Cure	2
Demo Act Acco	Democratic Action Accountants	2
Finan Cons	Financier Conscience	2
HKEd4All	HKEd4All	2
Physio Action	Physio Action	2
OccuFocus	OccuFocus	2
Insur ARISE	Insurance ARISE	2
Prog Scho Gro	Progressive Scholars Group	2
Tobias Leung	Tobias Leung Yin Fung	1
State rend	Professional Groups issued the statement regarding the HKSAR Government’s proposal to amend rendition arrangements	4
Chasing Cheng	Chasing the Secretary for Justice Teresa Cheng on 12 March, 2019	4
Ivan Lam	Ivan Lam	1
Wong Lee Lee	Wong Lee Lee	1
Pursue Lee	pursue the Secretary for Security John Lee	4
Ho Ka Yau	Ho Ka Yau	1
Chu Yan Ho	Chu Yan Ho	1
Liu Wai Lim	Liu Wai Lim	1
Chan Wing Yan	Chan Wing Yan	1
Block GH	Action to block the lobby of the government headquarters in March 2019	4
Avery Ng	Avery Ng Man-yuen	3
James To	James To Kun-sun	3
Sch Alli Aca Fre	Scholar Alliance for Academic Freedom	2
31 Mar march	CHRF and pan-democratic MPs organised the march on 31 March, 2019	4
Demosistō	Demosistō	2
Isaac Cheng	Isaac Cheng Ka Long	1
LkChing	LkChing	1
Str sta 31 Mar	On the eve of 31 March parade, the Demosistō team set up a street station	4
Nati Anth	Public hearing of the National Anthem law on 16 March, 2019	4
State Han	Statement that the Hong Kong Liaison Office has no right to represent Hong Kong	4
Raid Cheng	Demosistō raided the residence of the Secretary for Justice and asked for direct dialogue	4
Cou sup JW	Demosistō appealed to comrades in arms and supporters to support Joshua Wong outside the court	4

AIHK	Amnesty International Hong Kong	2
AIHK petition	Urgent petition to stop political prosecution of nine Umbrella leaders	4
Wong Yik Mo	Wong Yik Mo	1
Str sta 14 Apr	Demosistō team make greater mobilization through street station on 14 April, 2019	4
Asso Boston	Association of Overseas Hong Kong Chinese for Democracy and Human Rights in Boston	2
Can-HK Link	Canada-Hong Kong Link in Toronto	2
HK Mac	Friends of Hong Kong and Macau of Boston	2
HK Forum	Hong Kong Forum and Movement for Democracy in China	2
Joi sta US-CA	Overseas Chinese organisations in the US and Canada, released a joint statement prompting HKSAR to retreat its disputed extradition motion	4
Jeremy Tam	Jeremy Tam Man-ho	3
17 Apr protest	Protest on 17 April, 2019	4
Lau Chi Kit	Lau Chi Kit	3
Lo Wai Ming	Lo Wai Ming	3
Hui Kei Cheung	Hui Kei Cheung	3
Alfred Lai	Alfred Lai Chun Wing	3
Wong Hoi Ying	Wong Hoi Ying	3
Kwok Long Fung	Kwok Long Fung	3
Kelvin Sin	Kelvin Sin Cheuk-nam	3
Ng Ting Lam	Ng Ting Lam	3
Chow Hiu Laam	Chow Hiu Laam	3
Lam Tsz King	Lam Tsz King	3
Chong Wing Fai	Chong Wing Fai	3
Chu Tsz Lok	Chu Tsz Lok	3
Ramon Yuen	Ramon Yuen Hoi-man	3
Chow Wing Heng	Chow Wing Heng	3
Tsang Tsz Ming	Douglas Tsang Tsz Ming	3
Li Wing Yin	Cindy Li Wing Yin	3
Lai Kwong Wai	Kenny Lai Kwong Wai	3
Ma Hei-Pang	Ma Hei-Pang	3
Cheung Mau Ching	Cheung Mau Ching	3
Tang Wai Keung	Tang Wai Keung	3
Rosanda Mok	Rosanda Mok	3
Wu Chi Kin	Wu Chi Kin	3
Lai Po-kwai	Lai Po-kwai	3
Chan Lee Shing	Chan Lee Shing	3
Shum Wan Wa	Shum Wan Wa	3
Wan Ka Him	Wan Ka Him	3
Wong Kai Ming	Wong Kai Ming	3
Cheng Keng leong	Cheng Keng leong	3
Edith Leung	Edith Leung Yik-ting	3

Mok Kin-shing	Mok Kin-shing	3
Lin Kuan-tsun	Lin Kuan-tsun	3
Ip Tsz Kit	Ip Tsz Kit	3
So Yat-hang	So Yat-hang	3
Bonnie Ng	Bonnie Ng Hoi-yan	3
Chow cheuk ki	Chow cheuk ki	3
Mak Tak-ching	Mak Tak-ching	3
Ho Wai Lun	Ho Wai Lun	3
Yeung Yuk	Yeung Yuk	3
Daniel Kwok	Daniel Kwok	3
Mbi Nur Clin	Mobile Nursing Clinict (Singyi)	2
Lucia Chiu	Lucia Chiu	3
Fixing HK	Fixing Hong Kong	2
	80 street stations to launch publicity campaigns in the district on 26 and 27 April, 2019	
80 str sta		4
28 Apr str sta	Demosistō's street station on 28 April, 2019	4
Figo Chan	Figo Chan	1
Lee Wing-tat	Lee Wing-tat	3
Ted Hui	Ted Hui Chi-fung	3
28 Apr march	CHRF organised 28 April march	4
	Legislative Council demonstration on 4 May, 2019	
LegCo dem		4
	Rally launched by the CHRF on 10 May to support the Democratic faction	
Democ rally		4
	Demosistō team's street station in Wan Chai District	
5 May str sta		4
You Pol Advo	Youth Policy Advocators	2
Edu Lab	Edu Lab	2
	Curriculum Development Council's related private report conference	
CDC confe		4
	Petition demanding the reform of the Curriculum Development Council	
CDC petition		4
	Demosistō issued a statement on the consultation among political parties	
State 15 May 13-14 May actions		4
	Three actions from 13 to 14 May	
20-25 May SS	Street stations in various districts of Hong Kong on 20-25 May, 2019	4
Sou Net Hou	Souther Net House	2
Com March	Community March	2
Hung To Allia	Hung To Alliance	2
HKGDP	Hong Kong Group of Democracy Promotion	2
SLAC	Student Labor Action Coalition	2
PolyU Pavi	PolyU Pavilion	2
Workercom	Workercom	2
Ivan Wong	Ivan Wong Yun-tat	3
Chung Lai-him	Johnny Chung Lai-him	3
Life Fort Hill	Life in Fortress Hill	2
HKVSA	Hong Kong Victoria Social Association	2
Leung Kam-wai	Leung Kam Wai	3

Wong Bing-kuen	Wong Bing-kuen	3
Demo Ground	Democracy Groundwork	2
Lee Hin-long	Timothy Lee Hin-long	3
Sam Yip	Sam Yip Kam-lung	3
Lam Siu-pan	Lam Siu-pan	3
Chu Kong-wai	Chu Kong-wai	3
Wu Sui-shan	Suzanne Wu Sui-shan	3
Lee Kwok-kuen	Lee Kwok-kuen	3
Frank Ho	Frank Ho	3
Natalie Tsui	Natalie Tsui Wai-fong	3
	200 Street stations in all districts of Hong Kong	
200 str sta		4
26 May colloqu	26 May patriotic and democratic march	4
	CHRF initiated Global Signing: Against Extradition to China	
Global Signing		4
	Joint Students' Union of Caritas Institute of Higher Education and Caritas Bianchi College of Careers	
JSUCICB		2
4 Jun Forum	June 4 forum at HKU 2019	4
	Students and teachers' Internet petitions opposing the extradition bill	
Stu E-petit		4
2 Jun str sta	Street station on 2 June, 2019	4
4 Jun str sta	Street station on 4 June, 2019	4
	Discussing movement in 1989 and the Anti-extradition movement	
4 Jun discussion		4
	June 4th candlelight party in Victoria Park 2019	
4 Jun vigil		4
Kenneth Leung	Kenneth Leung Kai-cheong	3
6 Jun march	March on 6 June, 2019	4
7 Jun str sta	Street station on 7 June, 2019	4
	9 June "Anti Extradition Law" demonstration press conference was hosted by pan-democrats	
9 Jun pre con		4
	10 members of the Demosistō sat in front of the Legislative Council	
Sit-in LegCo		4
	Pan-democrats held press conference, demanding that Carrie Lam to step down on 10 June, 2019	
Pan-de 10 Jun		4
Demovanilech	Demovanilech	2
HK AT-FO Stu	Hong Kong ANTI-FOO Student Alliance Class Boycott Rally at Statue Square on 12 June, 2019	2
12 Jun Cla Boyc		4
HK Mothers	A group of Hong Kong mothers	2
HK Mo 14 Jun	Hong Kong mother's Rally on 14 June in Chater Garden	4
Ral		4
Osman Cheng	Osman Cheng Chung Hang	3
	CHRF organised a rally to investigate police abuse of power on 22 June, 2019	
22 Jun rally		4
	CHRF organised 26 June G20 Free Hong Kong Rally	
26 Jun G20		4
Studentlocalism	Studentlocalism	2
Stu Inde Union	Students Independence Union	2

Johnson Yeung	Johnson Yeung Ching Yin	1
20 Artists	20 Artists	2
9 Jun march	9 June march 2019	4
Air staff	Cabin crew and airline staff	2
Con-nurs-ther	Consultants, nursing staff and therapists	2
100 arts groups	100 Hong Kong arts groups	2
12 Jun strike	12 Jun strike 2019	4
HK Bud Asso	Hong Kong Buddhist Association	2
Cath Dio HK	Catholic Diocese of Hong Kong	2
Confu Acad	Confucian Academy	2
	Chinese Muslim Cultural and Fraternal Association	2
CMCFA		2
HK Tao Asso	Hong Kong Taoist Association	2
Chan Ho-tin	Andy Chan Ho-tin	3
Jockey Club	Jockey Club	2
12 Jun march	12 June march 2019	4
	A group of about 40 former students from St Francis' Canossian College	2
SF Col alum		2
16 Jun march	16 Jun march 2019	4
21 Jun protests	21 Jun protests 2019	4
1 Jul parade	1 Jul parade 2019	4
	A group of Hong Kong mothers' rally at Chater Garden on 5 July, 2019	4
HK Mo 5 Jul Ral		4
Leung Kam-sing	Leung Kam-sing	1
Recovery SS	Recovery of Sheung Shui	4
Yeung Ke-cheong	Yeung Ke-cheong	3
14 Jul parade	14 Jul parade 2019	4
19 Jul str sta	19 Jul street station 2019	4
	Civil Human Rights Front prepared an open letter to consulates of various countries	4
23 Jul letter		4
Ventus Lau	Ventus Lau Wing-hong	1
Chin Po-fun	Chin Po-fun	1
28 Jul parade	28 Jul parade 2019	4
HKU members	2,103 members of the HKU community	2
	A petition pressing Zhang Xiang to withdraw the previous statement	4
HKU petition		4
14 Jul sil march	A silent parade on 14 July, 2019	4
Old residents	A crowd of Hong Kong's old residents	2
	Old residents marched from Central to government headquarters in Admiralty on 17 July, 2019	4
Old resi march		4
Church group	Church group	2
21 Jul march	21 Jul march 2019	4
Max Chung	Max Chung Kin-ping	1
27 Jul march	27 Jul march 2019	4
Civil servants	Civil servants	2
Ngan Mo-chau	Ngan Mo-chau	1
Cheung Ka-po	Cheung Ka-po	1
HK Indigenous	Hong Kong Indigenous	2

2 Aug rally	2 Aug rally 2019	4
5 Aug strike	5 Aug strike 2019	4
Chow Nok Hang	Jaco Chow Nok Hang	3
Semi Strate Citiz	Seminar "Strategies for Citizens' Survival in A Society of Police Violence"	4
Bonnie Leung	Bonnie Leung Wing Man	3
18 Aug parade	18 Aug parade 2019	4
hkssstrike2019	hkssstrike2019	2
18 Aug str sta	18 Aug street station 2019	4
Eye4HK	Eye For Hong Kong Campaign	4
East Ho peti	Medical staff from the Eastern District Hospital launched real-name petition	4
Finan staff	Office workers from Hong Kong's financial department	2
2 Aug flash mob	Finanical staff staged a flash mob	4
7 Aug parade	Thousands of lawyers in Hong Kong attended a second silent parade on 7 August, 2019	4
Catho march	Hundreds of Hong Kong members of the Catholic Churches paraded with candle flames on 8 August night, 2019	4
10 Aug protests	10 Aug protests 2019	4
Chiu Ka-yin	Chiu Ka-yin	3
11 Aug march	11 Aug march 2019	4
Wong Lok-yu	Tim Wong Lok-yu	1
13 Aug sit-in	Over one thousand health care personnel from thirteen public hospitals launched sit-in on 13 August, 2019	4
15 Aug petition	Over three hundred and fifty civil servants of Hong Kong initiated a second petition on 15 August, 2019	4
11 stu unions	11 stu unions	2
16 Aug rally	16 Aug rally 2019	4
Fung Wai-wah	Fung Wai-wah	1
Teach' march	Thousands of black-clad teachers marched on the streets on 17 August, 2019	4
Vincent Lam	Vincent Lam	1
To Kwa Wan	To Kwa Wan Baptist church	2
Mok Ka-han	Rosanda Mok Ka-han	3
17 Aug march	17 Aug march 2019	4
Accountants	Accountants	2
Account parade	Thousands of accountants attended a silent midday parade	4
24 Aug protests	24 Aug protests 2019	4
25 Aug protests	25 Aug protests 2019	4
Rebecca Sy	Rebecca Sy On-na	1
28 Aug rally	Hundreds of protestors assembled in Central on 28 August to back a cabin crew union leader who was dismissed by Cathay Pacific	4
CUHK stu	Hundreds of students from CUHK	2

	Transforming the scheduled welcoming event for freshers into an anti-government assembly	4
CUHK rally	Jacky So Tsun-fung	1
So Tsun-fung	Napo Wong Weng-chi	3
Wong Weng-chi	Off campus Assembly of middle school students was held on 2 September, 2019	4
2 Sep Assembly	A press conference held on 7 September 2019 by hksstrike2019 to call for the next wave of action	4
7 Sep confer	Hong Kong Institute of Contemporary Culture Lee Shau Kee School of Creativity	2
HKICCLSKSC	A statement on 5 September, denouncing Junius Ho for disturbing the school	4
5 Sep state	138 secondary schools in all districts of Hong Kong	2
138 schools	Hong Kong high school students' chain action	4
Stu chain	Rally supporting anti-interpretation law march	4
Anti-interp rally	CHRF initiated the global joint petition requesting the Hong Kong government to submit a human rights report	4
Petition-UN	Rally of "Resisting Authoritarianism and Welcoming Dawn"	4
28 Sep rally	Middle school students staged a one-day strike on 30 September, 2019	4
30 Sep strike	1 Sep protests 2019	4
1 Sep protests	Easy Kwok	1
Easy Kwok	3 Sep strike 2019	4
3 Sep strike	The Bar Association released a statement denouncing police's abusing power	4
Bar's state 2019	7 Sep protests 2019	4
7 Sep protests	8 Sep march 2019	4
8 Sep march	Lun Chi-wai	1
Lun Chi-wai	Four hundred people attended an assembly on 16 September	4
16 Sep assembly	The University of Hong Kong students	2
HKU stu	The University of Hong Kong students waged a parade in the campus on 20 September, 2019	4
20 Sep parade	Tsang Kin-shing	3
Tsang Kin-shing	22 Sep protests 2019	4
22 Sep protests	Over one hundred primary school students dressed in school uniform	2
Primary stu	23 Sep flash 2019	4
23 Sep flash	San Uk Ling Human Rights Concern Group	2
SUKLHRCG	Jackie Chen Hung-sau	1
Chen Hung-sau	27 Sep rally 2019	4
27 Sep rally	Ho Chuanyao middle school	2
Ho Chuanyao	Kau Yan College	2
Kau Yan	Wah Yan College	2
Wah Yan		



2 Oct strike	2 Oct strike 2019	4
Fire persnel	Nearly 200 fire and ambulance personnel of different ranks and grades	2
Confe 8 Oct	Civil press conference on October 8 2019 denouncing the leaders of the disciplinary forces as putting politics above the rule of law	4
Arnold Chung	Arnold Chung Chin Kiu	1
Forum 2000	A seminar of Forum 2000 on "Hong Kong and its future"	4
1 Oct protests	1 Oct protests 2019	4
7 Oct protests	7 Oct protests 2019	4
14 Oct rally	14 Oct rally 2019	4
20 Oct march	20 Oct march 2019	4
Lau Hoi-man	Lau Hoi-man	1
Joseph Lee	Joseph Lee Kok-long	3
Arisina Ma	Arisina Ma Chung-yee	1
26 Oct assembly	26 Oct assembly 2019	4
2 Nov meeting	2 Nov meeting 2019	4
8 Nov march	8 Nov march 2019	4
9 Nov rally	9 Nov rally 2019	4
10 Nov gathering	10 Nov gathering	4
12 Nov campaign	12 Nov campaign 2019	4
16 Nov parade	16 Nov parade 2019	4
USU state	Various university student unions issued the solemn statement on the killing of the city by police	4
SU Chu Hai	Student Union of Chu Hai College of Higher Education Acting Executive Committee	2
HKAPASU	Hong Kong Academy for Performing Arts Students' Union	2
HKDVESU	Hong Kong Institute of Vocational Education (LWL) Student Union	2
HKHRM	Hong Kong Human Rights Monitor	2
Monitor state	A statement on 17 November strongly condemning the police for attacking PolyU	4
17 Nov protests	17 Nov protests 2019	4
Carol Ng	Carol Ng man-yee	1
6 Dec pre con	Pan-democrats attended a press conference concerning 8 December march	4
Advert workers	Over one thousand advertising workers of Hong Kong	2
Anthony Yiu	Anthony Yiu Koon-tung	1
2 Dec rally	An assembly in Central on 2 Decemebr, 2019	4
6 Dec rally	Hundreds of protestors assembled in city central district of Hong Kong on 6 December night	4
11 Dec rally	Medical demonstrations on 11 December, 2019	4
Eric Lai	Eric Lai Yan-ho	1

8 Dec march	"International Human Rights Day March" on 8 December, 2019	4
SWSSC	Social Welfare Sector Strike Committee	2
17 Dec rally	17 Dec rally 2019	4
19 Dec march	19 Dec march 2019	4
23 Dec assembly	Sparking the World Afire Assembly	4
Ha Gao	Ha Gao	1
30 Dec rally	"Grief of us" assembly at Edinburgh Place on 30 December, 2019	4
Zachary Wong	Zachary Wong Wai-yin	3
Henry Wong	Henry Wong Pak-yu	3
UNCS	Union for New Civil Servants	2
HKHEU	Hong Kong Hotel Employees Union	2
HKECEU	Hong Kong Early Childhood Educators' Union	2
CSIWU	Cleaning Service Industry Workers Union	2
HKTIIGU	Hong Kong Tourism Industry Innovation General Union	2
HKCEEGU	Hong Kong Construction and Engineering Employees General Union	2
HKITWU	Hong Kong Information Technology Workers' Union	2
HAEA	Hospital Authority Employees Alliance	2
SWOEU	SWOEunion	2
HKGUP	Hong Kong General Union of Physiotherapists	2
UHKOT	Union of Hong Kong Occupational Therapists	2
HKFIEGU	Hong Kong Financial Industry Employees General Union	2
HKTCU	Hong Kong Testing and Certification Union	2
Railway Power	Railway Power	2
2 Jan state	A statement on 2 January 2020, expressing its dissatisfaction with the police's suspension of the New Year's Day parade	4
3 Jan rally	Rally of educational circles was held on 3 January	4
23 Jan state	Statement demanding that the government immediately withdraw the appeal of the masked law, rescue the whole city	4
Union Confe	A number of trade unions held a press conference on 24 January to urge the government and employers to take action	4
Peti anti-COVID-19	Petition urging the government to tighten its immigration policy	4
Anti-Mainla parade	Parade opposing Mainlander shoppers and parallel traders	4
6 Jan rally	Demonstrators assembled at different sites in Hong Kong on 6 January, 2020	4
HKCAT	Hong Kong Civil Assembly Team	2
12 Jan rally	An assembly in Hong Kong's commercial area on 12 January, 2020	4
Johnny Mak	Johnny Mak Ip-sing	3

21 Jan rally	Hundreds peacefully rallied at Yuen Long MTR station on 21 January, 2020	4
Medical strike	HA Employees Alliance launched strikes of medical staff beginning on 3 February, 2020	4
Stu med str sta	“Student support medical staff” street stations	4
28 Feb state	In response to the police’s indiscriminate arrest of 831 protestors, the CHRF issued a statement	4
Winnie Yu	Winnie Yu Wai-ming	1
Michael Ngan	Michael Ngan Mo-chau	1
29 Feb pre con	A press conference on 29 February to protest against unreasonable suppression of employees	4
Mak Tsz-kin	Mak Tsz-kin	3
12 Feb protest	12 Feb protest 2020	4
Kalvin Ho	Kalvin Ho Kai-ming	3
Ng Kim-sing	Ng Kim-sing	3
16 Feb protests	Hundreds of protestors waged demonstrations in five sites on 16 February, 2020	4
19 Mar con	A press conference on 19 March to explain how the anti-terrorism Ordinance and Article 23 have damaged the freedom and rights of Hong Kong people	4
21 Mar Forum	Legislative front Forum on 21 March, 2020	4
HK EduCG	Hong Kong Education Concern Group	2
21 Mar petition	A petition that because of the worsening epidemic situation, the diploma examination should be postponed	4
HKUPRC	Hong Kong UPR Coalition	2
418 state	A statement expressing serious concern about the arrest of fifteen pan-democracy activists on 18 April, 2020	4
30 Apr discuss	Discussion on the resurgence of the battle front	4
30 Apr protest	On 30 April, 2020 the League of Social Democrats protested at the police headquarters	4
16 Apr lawsuit	Joshua Wong and Agnes Chow launched lawsuit against authorization for searching phones and Facebook office by police officers	4
PCSWGU	Personal and Community Services Workers General Union	2
CUHKEGU	Chinese University of Hong Kong Employees General Union	2
HKDU	Hong Kong Dockers Union	2
CTISU	Confederation of Tertiary Institutes Staff Unions	2
CSWGU	Construction Site Workers General Union	2
HAWGU	Hospital Authority Workers General Union	2

RCCIGU	Retail, Commerce and Clothing Industries General Union	2
IFPRIB	Insurance and Finance Practitioners' Rights and Interests Branch	2
HKSNTSU	Hong Kong School Non-Teaching Staff Union	2
HKDTDA	Hong Kong Dumper Truck Drivers Association	2
CIWU	Concrete Industry Workers Union	2
FHKTWO	Federation of Hong Kong Transport Worker Organizations	2
HKBA	Hong Kong Bartenders Association	2
HKASA	Hong Kong Aviation Staff Alliance	2
AMIE	Association of Manufacturing Industry Employees	2
HKTMPEU	Hong Kong Trading Merchandising and Purchasing Employee Union	2
UHKPO	Union of the Hong Kong Professional Optometrists	2
NWFBCSU	New World First Bus Company Staff Union	2
HKELCSSU	Hong Kong Evangelical Lutheran Church Social Service Union	2
HKSKHWCWTU	Hong Kong Sheng Kui Hui Welfare Council Workers Trade Union	2
CHKCRCG	Caritas Hong Kong Civil Rights Concern Group	2
TWGHSMCG	Tung Wah Group of Hospitals Social Movement Concern Group	2
HKREARBGU	Hong Kong Real Estate Agents Rights and Benefit General Union	2
HKCSPA	Hong Kong Company Secretarial Professionals Association	2
CSELAB	Christian Service anti-Extradition Law Amendment Bill	2
HKBMTU	Hong Kong Beauty and MakeUp Trade Union	2
HKCCCEU	Hong Kong Cultural Creativity and Craft Employees Union	2
HKTRSSU	Hong Kong Teaching and Research Support Staff Union	2
CLEU	Citybus Limited Employees Union	2
YMMSSPCSA	Yang Memorial Methodist Social Service Preparatory Committee of Staff Association	2
HKHREU	Hong Kong Human Resources Employees Union	2
HKBMSWGU	Hong Kong Buildings Management & Security Workers General Union	2
CDU	Coach Drivers Union	2
HKBUFSU	Hong Kong Baptist University Faculty and Staff Union	2
UHKPOE	Union of Hong Kong Post Office Employees	2
BBIWS	Bar Bending Industrial Workers Solidarity	2
MTSITU	Maritime Transport Services Industry Trade Union	2

1 May state	Trade union's 1 May statement	4
	A press conference to expose the abuse of political prisoners by correctional staff at Pik Uk Correctional Institution	4
5 May pre con	HKGFreedomOnline	2
HKGFreeOn	HKGFreedomOnline launched "Tamar Action" on 1 May, 2020	4
Tamar Action	Hong Kong Press Photographers Association	2
HKPPA	Hong Kong Nonprofit Journal	2
HKNJ	Journalism Educators for Press Freedom	2
JEPF	Radio Television Hong Kong Programme Staff Union	2
RTHKPSU	Ming Pao Staff Association	2
MPSA	Next Media Trade Union	2
NMTU	On 11 May 2020 seven media trade unions issued a joint statement to protest against that the police force had repeatedly trampled on the freedom of interview	4
11 May state	Hong Kong Professional Teachers' Union strongly condemned the Education Bureau for trampling on the education profession on 15 May, 2020	4
HKPTU'S censure	Academic Staff Association of the Education University of Hong Kong	2
ASAEduHK	We are Hong Kong Teachers	2
WHKT	Hong Kong Educators Alliance	2
HKEdA	Hongkongers Education Support	2
HKEduS	The education section had jointly stated that it opposed political interference in the diploma exam	4
15 May petition	Gwyneth Ho	1
Gwyneth Ho	Jannelle R. Leung	3
Jannelle Leung	Nathan Law, Joshua Wong, Gwyneth Ho, Jannelle R. Leung, and Sunny Cheung sent leaflets at the flyover of Hung Hom Station in the evening of 23 May, 2020	4
23 May str sta	hksstrike2019 and Hongkongers Education Support called on students to strike for one day on 27 May, 2020	4
27 May Strike	Demosistō initiated global petition to European leaders against National Security Law for Hong Kong	4
NSL petition	Joshua Wong, Nathan Law and Agnes Chow were holding a press conference to respond to US President Trump's sanctions plan on 29 May	4
29 May pre con	Mak Tak-ching	3
Mak Tak-ching	Kwok Wing-kin	3
Kwok Wing-kin	Hong Kong lunch-time demonstrators came back after COVID-19 social alienation regulations were relaxed on 8 May, 2020	4
8 May protests	Roy Kwong Chun-yu	3
Roy Kwong		

10 May protests	On 10 May 2020 hundreds of protestors assembled at more than ten shopping malls	4
24 May demon	Thousands demonstrated against Beijing's proposed national security law on 24 May, 2020	4

## Appendix II

<b>Name of frame</b>	<b>Full name</b>
Estab a nomi proce	Establish a nomination procedure and election method without political screening
Trampl rights	Trample on the equal rights of citizens as set out in the Basic Law
Main neutral	Maintain neutrality during the consultation period and stop packaging the CCP's political decisions with legal perspectives
Press freedom	Adhere to press freedom
Estab TUS	Establish a true universal suffrage system that meets international standards
Sup speech free	Support speech freedom against being silenced
Demo demands	The democratic demands of Hong Kong people cannot be avoided
Academic free	Defend academic freedom
Achieve demo	Democracy will finally be achieved on the streets of Hong Kong
Imple SB Decl	Implement the Sino-British Joint Declaration
Support OCTS	Support "one country two systems"
High autonomy	A high degree of autonomy
Demo spirit	Continue the democratic spirit of 1989 with citizen action
Expa BJ power	Expand the central government's full range of powers that had been exercised in the Hong Kong
Viola Basi Law	Violate the spirit of the Basic Law
Weak OCTS	Undermine the promise of one country, two systems
Interve judicia indepe	Interfere with Hong Kong's judicial independence
Reje fake uni suf	Reject the fake universal suffrage proposal
Fight for demo	Determination of Hong Kong people to fight for democracy
Restrict rights	"Public Security Ordinance" grants the police to restrict civil rights
Consensus	The consensus is not the submission of the minority to the majority, but the pursuit of solutions acceptable to the majority
Civil disobed	The problem in Hong Kong now is not that too many civil disobediences lead to chaotic social order, but that too many citizens confess their fate
Choose CE	Hong Kong people should be given a real choice for the Chief Executive
Equal elected BJ contro CE ele	Not only the right to vote should be "ordinary" and "equal", but also the right to be elected should be "ordinary" and "equal"
Support TUS	The central government highly controlled the chief executive election
831 damag OCTS	Call for citizens who support true universal suffrage to attend
	"831 decision" was a brutal blow to one country, two systems

BJ no faith	The Central Committee had lost faith
Depriv livelihood	The Central Committee had deprived the people's livelihood
Prom partici	One important meaning of OCLP was to promote public participation
Fight demo & jus	Fulfill the student's civic responsibility to fight for democracy and justice for Hong Kong
831 no TUS	The decision of the NPCSC had given Hong Kong no chance to have true universal suffrage
No retreat	Shaving one's head meant "no retreat"
GOV no trust	The government repeatedly broke its trust
Stifle demo	The government stifled Hong Kong's democracy
Police repress	Police brutally suppressed protesters
Civic educat	School strikes gave a civic education class in a street classroom
NV-P-R	Adhere to non-violent resistance, express a peaceful and rational attitude
Citizens' supp	One must rely on the support of a large number of citizens
Police stop force	Ask the police to stop using excessive force
Listen opinion	Urge the government to listen to real public opinion
Imple TUS	Urge the government to implement real universal suffrage
Design TUS	Call on the authorities to design a universal suffrage scheme that allows Hong Kong people to enjoy universal and equal suffrage
Come scene	Call on citizens to come to the scene to support and protect the students
Regain Civ Sq	Regain the Civic Square
Express free	The SAR government must respect citizens' freedom of expression
Police lying	Condemn the police for blatantly lying
Tramp assem free	Condemn the police for trampling on the freedom of assembly of citizens
Peace trust hope	Hold firm to the principals of safety, peace, trust and hope
Demo victor	Democracy will be victorious
Stu to strike	Call on students to strike
Withdraw 831	Withdraw the NPCSC's decision
Re polit reform	Restart political reform consultation
Open Civ Sq	Open the Civic Square
CY Leung resign	CY Leung to step down
Trio resign	The political reform trio to step down
Citiz nomina	Citizen nomination is essential
Abolish FCs	Abolish the functional constituencies of the Legislative Council
Stick to streets	HKFS would stick to the streets
Dialogue	Start dialogue with citizens to solve problems
Occup resist	Occupation and resistance
GOV fault	The greatest responsibility for the current situation of occupation rested with the government
Leung account	CY Leung must be held accountable
Release	Release of the arrested protesters
Screen media	Strong objections to CY Leung for screening media's exclusive interview
Estate hegem	Real estate hegemony occupies citizens' lives
GOV uncontr	It was the government really out of control

Police enforce just	Urge the police to strictly enforce the law to prevent people from sabotaging the peaceful occupation
Dis polit refo	Frankly discuss the political reform plan with student representatives
Resp assem free	To respect the assembly rights of peaceful protestors
Apolog tear gas	To apologize to the public for the decision to use tear gas on students of peaceful demonstrations
Inquire police	Demand investigation of use of excessive force against protesters
Deve polit sys	Express to the government the demand on the development of the political system
Speech free	Resolutely defend Hong Kong freedom of press and speech
Unite forces	Unite forces so as not to lose ground
Love & peace	Peace and love
Take blame	Take blame
Civil disobed	Civil disobedience
Regain future	Regain the future
831 shakable	The NPCSC's decision was not unshakable
Strive demo	Strive for democracy
Not bow	Pledge not to bow
Bring justice	Bring the perpetrators to justice
Report safety	Commit to protect the safety of any frontline reporters
Leung unaccept	CY Leung had lost political recognition to govern Hong Kong
Talk with BJ	Call for dialogue with Central Government
Return free	Return the freedom of Hong Kong people
BJ fault	The instigators are the central government that has not fulfilled its promises
Self-goven	Realize the real administration of Hong Kong by Hong Kong people
Fulfil demo	To fulfil the promise of democracy in Hong Kong during the Sino-British negotiations
Origin intent	Do not forget the original intention and return to the origin of civil disobedience
Fight TUS	Fight for true universal suffrage and demand to abolish the coterie system
Press free	Suppressed freedom of the press
Aim at power	Aim at the power
Vow for demo	Vow for democracy
GOV ignore	The government ignores political demands
Judicial abuse	The judiciary assisted in abuse
Police abuse	Police abused power frantically and "escalates"
Commu move	Now is the time to transform the power of the masses into a continuous civil society movement
A. Tsang to blame	Demand that the Commissioner of Police Andy Tsang be held accountable and apologized
GOV respond	Urge police restraint and prompted government to make response to the demands for genuine universal suffrage
GOV apathy	Condemne the government and the police for being insensitive to students
Brainstorm	Call on the public to be creative, brainstorm and promote non-cooperative movement
White terror	Criticize the authorities for creating white terror
Select enforce	Criticize the police for selective law enforcement



No! Pros	Withdrawal of prosecutions
A. Tsang resign	Andy Tsang to step down.
I want TUS	"I want universal suffrage"
Reject 831	Rejection of the political reform plan under the "NPCSC's 831 Framework"
Face up TUS	Hope that the government would face up to the citizens' demands for true universal suffrage
Illegal 831	The 831 framework was illegal and did not conform to the principle of universal suffrage
Constitu duty	Require the government to assume constitutional responsibility
Labour glory	The glory of labour belongs to the workers
Resistance	Non-violent resistance
Uphold freedom	Uphold freedom
Democracy	Democracy
Human rights	Human rights
Rule of law	The rule of law
Reject screen	Reject unreasonable screening
Respond TUS	Ask Lam to respond to the public's demands for true universal suffrage
Totalit powerless	Totalitarian powerlessness
Indepe destiny	Independent destiny,
GOV-bus collapse	Politics and business collapse
Revise constit	Hong Kong people revise constitution The so-called "one country, two systems" of the CCP is nothing more than two systems in the economy, not a difference in the political system
System problem	system
Defend dignity	Defend the dignity of Hong Kong people
Re autonomy	Regain the autonomy of Hong Kong
Retake future	Continue unfinished ambitions to retake the future of the city
We'll be back	"We'll be back!"
We love HK	"We love Hong Kong"
We stand toge	"We stand alone together"
Parade cohesion	The parade is an important part of strengthening the cohesion of civil society
BJ invade rights	CCP wantonly invades the political rights of Hong Kong people
Self-determin	Hong Kong people have the right to self-determination
Police violation	Police violating the law and threatening the rule of law
Abuse of law	The laws of this government are used to suppress protesters, not to protect ones' freedom and human rights
UM again	In the future, movements of the same scale as the umbrella movement would surely happen again in Hong Kong
Self-directed	The fight for democracy can no longer be led by the government, and Hong Kong people should lead the direction of political reforms
Preserve values	The most important thing for Hong Kong people in the future is to preserve Hong Kong's existing core values, including freedom of the press and judicial independence
TUS for CE	Hong Kong people would fairly and directly elect the chief executive and all members of the Legislative Council who truly represent them to govern Hong Kong

No hum right	Hong Kong should not transfer fugitives to countries without human rights and fair trial
Unfair trial	Hong Kong should not transfer fugitives to countries without human rights and fair trial
Blur OCTS	The boundaries of one country, two systems would become blurred more quickly
No legal protect	This action of the SAR government was depriving Hong Kong citizens of their legal protection
Withdraw ELAB	Withdraw the controversial proposal, which allowed fugitives to be transferred to mainland China
Unnece violence	Condemn the security guards for inflicting unnecessary violence on the demonstrators
Ignore opinion	Criticize the officials for blatantly ignoring public opinion
Anti-extradition	Oppose extradition of persons in Hong Kong to China for trial
Withdraw anthem	Request the government to immediately withdraw the national anthem legislation
Limit free&auto	It is unacceptable that the national anthem law restricts Hong Kong people's freedom and autonomy
Stipulate teach	The National Anthem Law stipulates the content of teaching
Absolute power	The National Anthem Law gives absolute power to the Director of the Education Bureau
BJ control HK	Beijing, through the Hong Kong Liaison Office, has a high degree of control over Hong Kong's internal affairs
Dissent voice	Even if some crimes were excluded from the current law amendments, the regime still had considerable room for manipulation to deal with dissenting voices
No rule of law	Breaking the world's only confidence in the rule of law in Hong Kong
Weak status	Weaken Hong Kong's status as an international business centre
Weak justice	Seriously undermine the confidence of the international community in Hong Kong's criminal justice system
Weak hum right	Seriously undermine the confidence of the international community in Hong Kong's human rights protection
Weak rule law	The rule of law in Hong Kong would be undermined
Weak protect	The existing protections for Hong Kong people from unfair trials would be greatly weakened
Damage legal	Wanton destruction of Hong Kong's legal system
No independ	Destruction of Hong Kong's legal system and its independence
People key	The difference between victory and defeat lies in the people
Resist totalit	Stop political prisoners, resist totalitarian justice
Strong HK	To be strong for Hong Kong
Diverse	A civic movement, without an authoritarian leader, cannot control the direction of the masses. This is the greatest value of civil society. It is diverse.
Imperil speech	The personal and freedom of speech of Hong Kong people would be in danger
Damage judicia	The judicial system would be damaged
Alien safety	the safety of foreigners in Hong Kong would be difficult to protect
Adhere constitu	Adhere to the constitutional convention and guard against negotiation traps
Carrie Lam resign	Carrie Lam should step down
Lam apologize	Carrie Lam should apologize
Meet Lam	Request a meeting with Chief Executive Carrie Lam

United again	At a critical moment, the people of Hong Kong united once again
Support free	Would always support freedom
Stand up for HK	Stand up for Hong Kong
Seizure assets	Beijing could demand the seizure of Hong Kong people's assets
Challenge justice	The Fugitive Offenders Ordinance amendment bill was the most severe challenge to justice
Guard HK	Guard Hong Kong and withdraw the draconian law
Fight for oneself	Fight for oneself
Fight for younger	Fight for the next generation
Fight hum right	Fight for human rights
Fight for free	Fight for freedom
OCTS gone	One country, two systems is almost gone
Damage rule law	Destruction on Hong Kong's rule of law
Damage OCTS	Destruction on Hong Kong's "one country, two systems" The "Sending to China" ordinance was one example of the Chinese government once again invading Hong Kong's high degree of autonomy and the rule of law
BJ invade HK	
To freedom	Running towards freedom
Lam, enemy	"Carrie Lam, people's enemy"
Ignore opinion	Condemn the SAR government for ignoring public opinion Condemn the SAR government for betraying the rights and interests of Hong Kong people
Betray Hkers	
Shelve ELAB	Asked the SAR government to shelve the amendment
No dismissal	"No Withdrawal, No Dismissal"
Solve deadlock	Call on the Chief Executive to resolve the deadlock
Retract "riots"	Retract the characterization of 612 riots
Account shoot	Investigate the shooting responsibility
Exoneration	Withdrawal of all charges
Stop chasing	Stop chasing the demonstrators Demand Commissioner of Police Stephen Lo's accountability for the bloody suppression
S. Lo to blame	
Free HK	"Withdraw the Extradition Bill! Free Hong Kong!" The United States should urge China to fully respect the wishes of Hong Kong people
Respe HK wish	
Be confident	Be confident and believe in the camp of free value
Condemn Lam	Severely condemn Hong Kong leader Carrie Lam
Hold on	"Hold on"
Just hope	"Because we are just hope"
No sever	No one blames one another nor breaks off with one another
TUS	True universal suffrage
General election	Immediately general election
A blind eye	Condemn the regime for turning a blind eye to the underworld atrocities Police and criminals cooperated and the authority of governance was gone
Authority gone	Urge the SAR government officials to conduct a comprehensive review of the relevant incidents and establish an independent investigation committee in this regard
Full inquiry	
Conquer tyranny	Workers' strike and students' strikes, conquer tyranny

Defend press free	"Stop police violence, defend press freedom" Call for an independent investigation into reports of journalists being impeded in covering the extradition bill protests.
Inquire cover	
Imple DUS	Implement double universal suffrage
Hinder press free	Severely condemn the Hong Kong police for deliberately shooting our reporters, seriously obstructing interviews and freedom of the press
Threat hum right	Hong Kong's human rights are seriously threatened
Threat freedom	Hong Kong's freedom are seriously threatened
GOV indulge	Denounce the government for indulging police abuses and violence
No fear	No fear of political violence or white terror
Non-democracy	The spread of political violence is rooted in non-democracy The extradition bill would lead to censorship issues and affect freedom of speech, which is essential for the arts and culture
Censorship	
Affect speech free	The extradition bill would affect freedom of speech
Stand with HK	"Stand with Hong Kong"
Power to people	"Power to the people"
Protect younger	"Safeguard the next generation"
Conscience speak	"Let our conscience speak" Insist that the police seriously investigate and take responsible for sexual violence during the anti-extradition bill protests
Sexual violence	
Liberate HK	"Liberate Hong Kong"
Revolution times	"Revolution of our times"
HK not China	"Hong Kong is not China" Call on Beijing to restart constitutional reform to resolve deep-rooted conflicts
Constitut reform	
Five demands, not one les	"Five demands, not one less"
Never silent	"Facing the white terror, although we are young, we will never be silent"
Disturb school	Denounce Junius Ho for disturbing the school
Restore peace	Demand that Junius Ho restore the campus peace If Hong Kong people surrender to fear, it will only make tyranny stronger
No surrender	
Authorit expan	The threat of China's authoritarian expansion to democratic values
Anti-authority	"Revolt against authority"
Welcome dawn	"Welcome the dawn" Strongly condemn the arrest by the police for abuse of power, which was undoubtedly the creation of white terror
Unjust arrest	The people of Hong Kong wanted a comprehensive political reform of the Hong Kong government
Reshuffle	
Freedom off	"Our freedom, dignity and justice are taken away in Hong Kong"
Dignity away	"Our freedom, dignity and justice are taken away in Hong Kong"
Justice away	"Our freedom, dignity and justice are taken away in Hong Kong"
Police ignore	Accuse the police of ignoring the role of Hong Kong social workers
Glory to HK	"Glory to Hong Kong" "We are not rioters" and "We support police in enforcing the law. Just kidding!"
We're not rioters	
Strugg for happy	The struggle is for the happiness of the masses, and also for the happiness of themselves and the people around them

GOV abuse	The Carrie Lam government had exercised their right to directly skip legislature to push this malevolent law
Defend hum right	Urge the Hong Kong government to meet the requirements for democratic governance of Hong Kong people and respect their right to defend human rights
Defen dem values	Urge the Hong Kong government to meet the requirements for democratic governance of Hong Kong people and respect their right to defend the universal values of democracy
Police city	Hong Kong has become a police city The action of the Hong Kong police against Mosque not only violated international standards, but also reflected the barbarism of the Hong Kong police
Police savage	
Damag hum right	Human rights and freedoms in Hong Kong, especially the freedom of speech, assembly and association, have been repeatedly damaged
Damag freedom	Human rights and freedoms in Hong Kong, especially the freedom of speech, assembly and association, have been repeatedly damaged
Dem reform	The anti-extradition demonstration had evolved into a movement for accountability and democratic reforms
End one-party	"We come here for the cause of democracy and demand the Chinese Communist Party end one-party rule"
Breach Constitu	Lam bypassing LegCo violated the Constitution
Respe hum right	"Respect human rights"
Contro PC power	"Control police power"
Withdraw AML	Require the authorities to withdraw the "Anti-Masking Law"
Police reform	"Police reform, now!"
Stu innocent	Students are not guilty
Tyranny die	Tyranny should die
No assau campus	Warn the Hong Kong government police to stop attacking the campus
Humani disaster	Not to worsen the humanitarian disaster
Withdraw siege	"Withdraw the siege and release the PolyU protesters unconditionally!" Hope Chris Tang would awaken his wisdom and conscience in addition to his courage and understand that only fundamental reforms in the system can restore peace to Hong Kong society
System reform	CHRF urging the central government to respect Hong Kong's local judicial system
Respe judicicia	
No split	Not splitting
No snitch	Not snitching
No condemn	Not condemning
Lam abuse	Lam had committed "serious violation of the law"
Lam derelict	Lam had committed "dereliction of duty"
Take revenge	"Hongkongers, take revenge!" "We in Hong Kong cannot remain silent. We must not give up. We need to shine a light of freedom to China."
Freedom light	
GOV inaction	Strongly condemn the government's inaction in epidemic prevention "We walk with medical staff and resist the regime's moral extortion of medical staff."
Moral extort	
Unite as one	"Say no to white terror" and "Educators, unite as one"
Openness	Require to uphold the core values of openness
Editorial independ	Require to tolerate, respect and support the editorial decisions of the creators of Headliner

Political liquidat	Strongly condemn the political liquidation of the Carrie Lam regime and demand immediate release
United	The actions of the police would only make Hong Kong people more united
Harmony	The actions of the police would only make Hong Kong people persevere in harmony
Oppose 831	Oppose the "831 decision" of NPCSC
Insist TUS	Insist on true double universal suffrage
Suppress	Protest that employees who participated in the strike were unreasonably suppressed
Fight tyranny	"We must turn public opinion into seats, and we must fight tyranny within the system and be just!"
Be just	"We must turn public opinion into seats, and we must fight tyranny within the system and be just!"
Harm freedom	Condemn the police's abuse of violence and arrest procedures for harming the personal freedom of Hong Kong people
Respe press free	Urge Carrie Lam to live up to her promise to respect press freedom
Punish police	Urge Carrie Lam to live up to her promise to severely punish police who violated the rules and laws in attacking journalists
Harm speech free	Strongly condemn the arrests, call the incident as "a blatant act aimed at harming the freedom of speech in society
BJ intervene HK	Bombard that Central Government's "taking advantage of the fire" to intervene in Hong Kong's local affairs
Respe Basi Law	Warn the Central Government to respect the Basic Law
Face suppress	Call on the people of Hong Kong to face the suppression in unity
Rule law dead	"The rule of law is dead" may already be the basic consensus
Protect hum right	Urge the Hong Kong government to respect and protect human rights in accordance with local and international laws, including freedom of speech, freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and freedom of association
Curb express free	Severely condemn the police for abusing power by public security laws, in the name of epidemic prevention, banning May Day demonstrations, curbing freedom of expression
Tramp labor digni	Severely condemn the police for abusing power by public security laws, in the name of epidemic prevention, trampling on labor dignity
Violate privacy	Complain that the four previous court orders granted to police to use their phones and personal information in the city's Facebook office violated their privacy.
Fight totalit	To fight against totalitarianism, Hong Kong people have re-understood their relationship with society
Resist power	"Recovering" every field and turning it into the strength of resistance
Tramp press free	Oppose the police repeatedly trampling on the freedom of interviews
Hum right above sovereig	Claim that human rights are greater than sovereignty and that the people are greater than the country", and oppose the government's use of "maintaining the national symbol" to suppress freedom of expression
Tramp education	Strongly condemn the Education Bureau for rudely trampling on the education profession
Stifle discussion	Strongly condemn the Education Bureau for stifling the space for rational discussion
Interfere exam	Oppose political interference in the diploma exam
Arrogate power	Criticize the pro-establishment camp for arrogating power, taking away the power of Dennis Kwok to chair meetings

Subvert rules	Criticize the pro-establishment camp for subverting all the rules of the Legislative Council
Face darkest	Hong Kong people can face the darkest generation through public opinion wars, international lines and the strongest will
Strongest will	Hong Kong people can face the darkest generation through public opinion wars, international lines and the strongest will
OCTS dead	One country, two systems is dead in name
CCP to blame	if foreign capital withdraws and Hong Kong's economy collapses, the CCP will be responsible for "igniting fire." "As long as we have a breath, we must show Hong Kong people's persistence in democracy and freedom to the international community, as well as our integrity and courage to stand on the front line against the totalitarianism of the CCP."
Persistence	"As long as we have a breath, we must show Hong Kong people's persistence in democracy and freedom to the international community, as well as our integrity and courage to stand on the front line against the totalitarianism of the CCP."
Integrity	"As long as we have a breath, we must show Hong Kong people's persistence in democracy and freedom to the international community, as well as our integrity and courage to stand on the front line against the totalitarianism of the CCP."
Courage	"As long as we have a breath, we must show Hong Kong people's persistence in democracy and freedom to the international community, as well as our integrity and courage to stand on the front line against the totalitarianism of the CCP."
Libel HK educat	Stigmatize local education in Hong Kong with nationalism
No autonomy	Pushing National Security Law meant the loss of Hong Kong's autonomy
NSL grave	The implementation of the National Security Law will be the grave of Hong Kong's freedom
Withdraw NSL	The international community is forced to use international sanctions to force the CCP to withdraw its draconian laws
Fight for free	"Fight for freedom!"
Independ way out	"Hong Kong independence is the only way out!"
NPC no power	The NPC' top body had no legal power to bypass the Hong Kong Legislative Council to enact the National Security Law
Moderate scholars	Moderate scholars
Financial group	A group of finance and banking professionals
Legal profess	Legal profession
Trailwalk	Trailwalk Secretariat
Pan-democrats	Pan-democrtic legislators
FSTE	Federation for Self-financing Tertiary Education
Lee Shing Pik	Po Leung Kuk Lee Shing Pik College
RTHK Union	Radio Television Hong Kong Program Staff Union
Ming Pao Asso	Ming Pao Staff Association
King's College	A group of students and alumni of King's College
Designers	800 Hong Kong designers, design educators and design students
TVB employees	60 current and former TVB employees
Wong Yuk-man	Raymond Wong Yuk-man
HK Shield	Hong Kong Shield
Derek Lam	Derek Lam
Professionals	20 doctors, scholars, lawyers, intellectuals and pastors
Colle teachers	College teachers

Umbr Parents	Umbrella Parents
Nurses	A group of nurses
Frontline Tech	Frontline Tech Workers Concern Group
Uni unions	Student unions of a group of colleges and Universities
Scholars	A group of scholars
HKPUSU	Hong Kong Polytechnic University Students' Union
Progre Lawyers	Progressive Lawyers Group
Médecins	Médecins Inspirés
Progre Teachers	Progressive Teachers' Alliance
HK Christians	A group of Hong Kong Christians
Elect Committ	Members of the legal profession of the election committee
CM Doctors	CM Doctors Cure
Demo Action	Democratic Action Accountants
Amnesty Interna	Amnesty International Hong Kong
HRW	Human Rights Watch
AOHKCDHRB	Association of Overseas Hong Kong Chinese for Democracy and Human Rights in Boston
C-HK Link	Canada-Hong Kong Link in Toronto
Friends HK	
Macau	Friends of Hong Kong and Macau of Boston
HKFMDC	Hong Kong Forum and Movement for Democracy in China
Senior judges	Three senior judges
Literary-art circles	Elected members of the Hong Kong Arts Development Council and professionals from the sports, performing arts, culture and publishing functional sectors
Education circles	More than 23,000 students, alumni and teachers from all public universities and one in seven secondary schools in Hong Kong
Anthony Wong	Anthony Wong Yiu Ming
Creators	A group of creators who love Hong Kong
Airline employees	Hundreds of cabin crew and airline employees
Former nominees	Seven former political appointees, including former secretary for labour and welfare Stephen Sui Wai-keung, undersecretary for transport and housing Yau Shing-mu, former political assistants to the financial secretary Law Wing-chung and Frankie Yip Kan-chuen, and former political assistant to the secretary for environment Linda Choy
Anson Chan	Anson Chan Fang On-sang
GOV lawyers	Government Counsel
FCC	Foreign Correspondents' Club of Hong Kong
Uni presidents	Two presidents of government-funded universities
Rice Post	Rice Post
Finance-hotel	More than 500,000 Hongkongers representing industries ranging from finance to hospitality and arts
Artists	More than 1,600 Hongkongers from the movies, performing arts, music and design sectors
HK Catholics	Hong Kong Catholics
Police relatives	Police relatives
WCEO	Women's Coalition on Equal Opportunities
Middle stu	A group of middle school students on strike



HKICC	Hong Kong Institute of Contemporary Culture
Creativity	Lee Shau Kee School of Creativity
Brian Leung	Brian Leung Kai-ping
HKBUSU	Hong Kong Baptist University Students' Union
Office staff	Office staff
Blue-collar	Blue-collar workers
Bar Associat	Bar Association
Medical workers	A group of 190 medical professionals from Ruttonjee Hospital and Tang Shiu Kin Hospital
Joseph Zen	Cardinal Joseph Zen
Secondary stu	More than 100 pupils from five secondary schools in Wong Tai Sin
Fire &	
ambulance	Nearly 200 fire and ambulance personnel
ACSVAW	Association Concerning Sexual Violence Against Women
Now News	Now News
Chan Ka Lok	Kenneth Chan Ka Lok
Justice Centre	Justice Centre Hong Kong
CUHK president	The president of the Chinese University of Hong Kong Rocky Tuan Sung-chi
HKPUSU	Hong Kong Polytechnic University Students' Union
Pro-dem	
veterans	Pro-democracy veterans
Students Power	Students Power
Trade unions	Multiple trade unions from different sectors
Teachers	Thousands of teachers and their supporters
RTHK Advisory	A group of members of RTHK's Programme Advisory Group
Wan Siu-kin	Andrew Wan Siu-kin
District Councils	Chairmen and Vice-Chairmen of the 17 District Councils and pan-democratic representatives of the Islands District
Au Nok-hin	Au Nok-hin
Lam Cheuk-ting	Lam Cheuk-ting
Natalie Bennett	Natalie Bennett
Ideologist	Ideologist
HKEA	Hong Kong Educators Alliance
HKES	Hongkongers Education Support

<b>Name of object</b>	<b>Full name</b>
HK GOV officials	HKSAR government officials
CY Leung	Leung Chun-ying
HK GOV	Hong Kong SAR government
Beijing	The Chinese Central Government
Police	Hong Kong police
Lee Ka-kit	Peter Lee Ka-kit, a member of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) National Committee
Xi Jinping	Xi Jinping
Zhang Xiaoming	Zhang Xiaoming, the former director of the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office
Carrie Lam	Carrie Lam
Alliance Pea & Dem	Alliance for Peace and Democracy

Li Fei	Li Fei, the chairman of the Basic Law Committee of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
Rimsky Yuen	Rimsky Yuen Kwok-keung, the third Secretary for Justice of Hong Kong from 2012 to 2018
Raymond Tam	Raymond Tam Chi-yuen, the former Secretary for Constitutional and Mainland Affairs
Public power	Public power
Mainland police	Mainland Chinese police
Li Keqiang	Prime Minister Li Keqiang
Unjust system	Unjust system
Account officials	Accountable officials for political reform
Judiciary	Judicial branch
Andy Tsang	Andy Tsang Wai-hung, the former Commissioner of the Hong Kong Police Force
Leung Kam-chung	Antony Leung Kam-chung, the former Financial Secretary of Hong Kong
Charnwut Chan	Bernard Charnwut Chan, the incumbent Non-official Convenor of the Executive Council
Lam Woon-kwong	Lam Woon-kwong, the former Convenor of the Executive Council
Henry Tang	Henry Tang Ying-yen, the former Chief Secretary of Hong Kong
Legislative Council	Legislative Council of Hong Kong
Bourgeoisie	Bourgeoisie
Security Bureau	The Security Bureau of Hong Kong
Teresa Cheng	Teresa Cheng Yeuk-wah, the Secretary for Justice of Hong Kong
Security guards	Security guards during the public hearing of the National Anthem law
Patrick Nip	Patrick Nip Tak-ken, the former Secretary for Constitutional and Mainland Affairs
Liaison Office	The Liaison Office of the Chinese Central Government in Hong Kong
John Lee	John Lee Ka-chiu, the Secretary for Security
Pro-Beijing legislators	Pro-Beijing legislators
Tyranny	Tyranny
Stephen Lo	Stephen Lo Wai-chung, the former Commissioner of Police of Hong Kong
Power-holders	Power-holders in Hong Kong
Junius Ho	Junius Kwan-yiu Ho, a member of the Legislative Council
Priscilla Leung	Priscilla Leung Mei-fun, a Hong Kong Legislative Councillor
Chris Tang	Chris Tang Ping-keung, the current Commissioner of Police of Hong Kong
Education Bureau	The Education Bureau of Hong Kong
Leung Ka-wing	Director of the Radio Television Hong Kong
Hospital Authority	The Hospital Authority of Hong Kong
Institution violence	Institution violence
Magistrates	Magistrates

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