

# **An Intellectual and Political Biography of Leopold Amery (1873-1955)**

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## Abstract

This thesis analyses the political and intellectual trajectory of Leopold Charles Maurice Stennett Amery. Although Amery has been mainly known as a staunch advocate of the British Empire/Commonwealth, and particularly of the introduction of imperial preference, he was involved in numerous political issues, such as Army Reform in the Edwardian era, the making of British foreign and defence policy, the constitutional reforms in the imperial peripheries, the establishment of the British Commonwealth as a new imperial framework, and the European Movement after 1945. While the existing literature has often focused on specific aspects of Amery's politics, this thesis tries to describe how those elements interacted within his wider world view. Since he was deeply involved in the transformation of British imperialism and Conservatism in the first half of the twentieth century, the case study will serve to gain more sophisticated understanding of the process of the change.

During his lifetime, British Conservatives came to terms with the rise of mass democracy. Unlike their ideological counterparts in Europe, they marginalized or accommodated radical political ideologies in the 1930s. In the same period, British imperial rhetoric was liberalized or internationalized. The Dominions was reconceptualized as equal partners of the UK in the British Commonwealth. The British government endorsed the constitutional reforms in the dependent colonies, and ultimately decolonization in those regions. Amery reluctantly and opportunistically approved of these changes. By contrast, he was tenaciously committed to the cause of Tariff Reform throughout his political career. This thesis argues that his consistency and inconsistency were two sides of the same coin. His acceptance of the principle of democracy and the devolutions the imperial peripheries pose several questions to Amery: how to prevent democracy from degenerating into irresponsible rule by majority, how to implement social reform for the mass electorate without resorting to socialistic confiscation of the wealth, and how to retain imperial unity when the centrifugal tendencies were strengthened in the Empire/Commonwealth. In his world view, imperial preference was supposed to solve all these questions by spreading the sense of duty among citizens, expanding the economy and populations on an imperial scale, and creating a common economic interest in the Empire/Commonwealth.

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## Abbreviations and Conventions

AC	Austen Chamberlain Papers
AMEJ	Julian Amery Papers
AMEL	Leopold Amery Papers
BBK	Beaverbrook Papers
BL	Bonar Law Papers
BWL	British Workers' League
CACA	Central and Associated Chambers of Agriculture
CHAR	Churchill Papers
<i>EB</i>	<i>The Empire at Bay: The Leo Amery Diaries, 1929-1945</i>
EEU	Empire Economic Union
ELEC	European League for Economic Cooperation
EIA	Empire Industries Association
EMB	Empire Marketing Board
EPU	European Payments Union
EUC	Empire Unity Campaign
FBI	Federation of British Industries
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GLLD	George Lloyd Papers
HHW	Henry Wilson Papers
IMF	International Monetary Fund
JC	Joseph Chamberlain Papers
LG	Lloyd George Papers
MFN	Most-Favoured-Nation (Clause)
NC	Neville Chamberlain Papers
NUM	National Union of Manufactures
<i>TP</i>	<i>The Transfer of Power 1942-7, vol. 1-7</i>
TRL	Tariff Reform League

## Introduction

On 7 October 1954 Leopold Amery made a speech at the Conservative annual conference, which was the last one he attended before his death, in order to defend Victor Raikes's amendment of the resolution regarding the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to 'restore freedom of action in respect of Imperial Preference'. It was an annual ritual for the post-war party conferences to pass a resolution calling for the protection of imperial preference. Amery, who had been forced to retire from parliament when he lost his seat in 1945, remained politically active. As a lifelong campaigner for Tariff Reform, he was always a speaker in these sessions. At the 1953 conference, his evocative speech successfully helped an addendum put forward by Baron Balfour of Inchrye to be carried unanimously. The content of this addendum was almost the same as that of Raikes's. In 1954, however, Amery and Raikes received a critical reply from Peter Thorneycroft, President of the Board of Trade. Thorneycroft asserted that the GATT was essential to 'a policy of wider trade and payments' and that the amendment would disturb the unity of the Empire/Commonwealth, most of whose members accepted the framework of the GATT. The amendment lost 'by a substantial majority'. Amery's diary cynically praised Thorneycroft's reply as 'a good speech for a Liberal Conference' and confessed that he felt like 'poor old Sisyphus'.<sup>1</sup> The episode symbolizes the relationship between Amery and the Conservative leaders in his entire political life.

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<sup>1</sup> Annual Conference minutes 1954, 51-58, Conservative Party Archive, NUA 2/1/61; Annual Conference minutes 1953, 59-66, NUA 2/1/60; Amery diary, 7 October 1954, AMEL 7/48; 9, 10 October 1953, AMEL 7/47. Amery made a speech for imperial preference in the 1946, 1947, and 1952 conferences as well. See the minutes in NUA 2/1/55, 56, 59.

Leopold (Leo) Amery (1873-1955) was a British Unionist/Conservative politician in the first half of the twentieth century. Although for the most part Amery was outside the leading group of the party, he always tried to orient the future direction of policies in various areas by acting as a wire-puller. In particular, he has been regarded as one of the staunchest advocates of the British Empire/Commonwealth. In fact, he was also involved in many other issues, including Army Reform, Tariff Reform, social reform, reorganization of the national and imperial constitutions, regeneration of agriculture, and the attempted stabilisation of international politics. Although historians have depicted specific aspects of Amery's politics, the interconnections between the different parts of his world view have not yet been comprehensively described and analysed. This thesis elucidates the intellectual and political trajectory of Amery in a thematic way including all the elements that interacted within his thought process.

The introduction comprises seven sections. A short biography of Amery is presented first. The following four sections are allocated to the literature review to clarify my perspective and methodology. As this thesis analyses the multi-faceted nature of Amery's politics, a literature review on each specific topic is given at the beginning of each chapter. The review in the introduction will, thus, discuss fields which are most relevant to the overarching argument of this thesis: research focusing on Amery, the Conservative Party, British imperialism, and Tariff Reform. The sixth and seventh sections explain my methodological stance and the structure of the thesis respectively.

## **A Short Biography of Amery<sup>2</sup>**

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<sup>2</sup> This section mainly draws on Deborah Lavin, "Amery, Leopold Charles Maurice Stennett

Leopold Charles Maurice Stennett Amery was born in 1873 in the North-Western Provinces of India. As his father, an official in the Indian Forestry Commission, behaved adulterously, his mother, Elizabeth, returned to England with her son in 1877. With financial sacrifices of his mother and scholarships, he entered Harrow School in 1887 and matriculated at Balliol College, Oxford, in 1892. After finishing his studies, he joined *The Times* in 1899 and acquired a seven-year fellowship at All Souls College with which he had a lifelong connection. In those years, Amery acquired a basic command of French, German and Turkish, as well as classical Greek and Latin; although it is unclear to what extent he was a genuine polyglot. As a student, he was fascinated by both imperialism and socialism, and therefore joined both the Chatham Club and the Fabian Society. He did not, however, yet have a firm view of his own position in British party politics.

The armed conflict in South Africa led him to become the chief war correspondent of *The Times* in 1899-1900. During the war, he became acquainted with two mentors: Joseph Chamberlain, the Colonial Secretary, and Alfred Milner, the High Commissioner for South Africa. The blunders of the British Army at the initial stage of the war deepened Amery's sense of national and imperial crisis, inducing him to become involved in Army Reform. Subsequently, Amery's mind was captured by Chamberlain's Tariff Reform, to which he was firmly committed throughout his life. Affected by these political movements, Amery began seeking an alternative career in the political world. After four consecutive defeats as a Unionist candidate in the elections of 1906,

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(1873–1955), politician and journalist." *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*. 23 Sep. 2004; Accessed 24 Feb. 2022.  
<https://www.oxforddnb.com/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-30401>.



1908, January, and December 1910, he finally got a seat in the 1911 by-election of Birmingham South (later Sparkbrook), which he retained until 1945.<sup>3</sup>

During 1911-1914, Amery acted as one of the Die-Hards, opposed to the Parliament Act and the Irish Home Rule Bill. After the First World War broke out, he temporarily went to Europe to serve as an intelligence officer in Flanders and the Balkans. When Asquith's coalition was replaced with Lloyd George's national government, the new Prime Minister appointed Milner as a minister without portfolio. Owing to Milner's recommendation, Amery became a junior assistant of the War Cabinet Secretariat. When Milner was transferred to the top of the Colonial Office in 1919, Amery followed him as his parliamentary undersecretary. When Milner resigned in 1921, Amery became a parliamentary and financial secretary of the Admiralty. In the final phase of the Lloyd George government in October 1922, Amery participated in the coup against the coalition. He served as the First Lord of the Admiralty until the formation of the first Labour government. Amery finally became the Colonial Secretary in the second Baldwin government (1924-1929). He also succeeded in persuading his colleagues in the Cabinet to realize his long-cherished dream, the creation of the Dominions Office, over which he presided as Secretary of State from 1925. Whilst he contributed to the political reorganization of the British Empire in the 1926 Imperial Conference, his plans for imperial economic development were thwarted by the strenuous objection from the Treasury and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Winston Churchill.

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<sup>3</sup> After the schism of the Liberal Party in 1886, the Liberal Unionist Party and the Conservative Party came to cooperate in the parliament, though it was not until 1912 that they were officially merged. 'Unionist', originally meaning the political group composed of the two parties, was often used as an interchangeable label with 'Conservative' even in the interwar period. In order to avoid confusion, the thesis will use 'Conservative' as the name of the party after 1912. 'Unionist' will mean 'Liberal Unionist' before 1912, as long as it is used as a name of political parties.

The 1929 general election marked the beginning of a decade in the wilderness. Concluding that the Conservative electoral defeat resulted from its lukewarm economic policy, Amery pressurized the Conservative leaders to adopt fiscal and monetary policies in line with the spirit of Tariff Reform. After the international trade system collapsed in 1929-31, the British economy apparently proceeded in the direction of Tariff Reform. However, Amery, who was never offered a ministerial job in the National Government, was dissatisfied with the results of the Ottawa Conference. While working as a director on the boards of several companies to improve his financial situation, Amery acted as a discontented backbencher throughout the 1930s, particularly with respect to trade policy. Although Amery, unlike the Die-Hards, supported the Government of India Act of 1935, he criticized Neville Chamberlain's overly lenient concessions to Germany in spite of Amery's approval of German hegemony in Central Europe as a principle. On 7 May 1940 Amery's speech in the House of Commons helped dissolve the wartime government of Chamberlain by quoting Cromwell: 'In the name of God, go'.

Replacing Chamberlain as Prime Minister, Churchill offered Amery a disappointing reward, the Secretaryship of State for India, which Amery grudgingly accepted. The relationship between Churchill and Amery deteriorated immediately. Whereas Amery insisted that the UK should pledge to give Indian people self-governance after the war to soothe Indian nationalism, Churchill found that policy too revolutionary. When the Labour Party snatched a victory in 1945, the unanswered Indian question was left to the Attlee government, ending in independence and the partition of India, both of which Amery wanted to prevent. Unwearied by his personal defeat in the 1945

election and the execution of his elder son, John, for treason,<sup>4</sup> Amery continued to propagate the principle of imperial preference, vehemently condemning the emergent international economic order founded by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the GATT. He died in September 1955.

### **Historical research on Leopold Amery**

This thesis is based on an analysis of public and private documents in archives as well as published materials. The most important are the Amery Papers in the Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge. One should bear in mind that the Amery Papers were not open to the public until January 2005, although historians had been able to consult it on a private basis.<sup>5</sup> Present researchers can systematically perform archival work without constraints.

Amery wrote a three-volume autobiography in his late years.<sup>6</sup> Some parts of his voluminous diary were also published as a two-volume book with the editors' meticulous annotations.<sup>7</sup> David Faber's biography has a detailed account of Amery's life.<sup>8</sup> These texts offer sufficient information for readers interested in who was Leopold Amery and what he did.

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<sup>4</sup> John Amery was the eldest son of Leopold. After running away from Harrow School, he led a vagabond life mainly in Europe. Driven by anti-communism, he took part in the Spanish Civil War on the side of Franco. During the Second World War, he became a Nazi collaborator and helped German propaganda campaigns. Captured in northern Italy, he was hanged for treason at Wandsworth prison in December 1945. M. R. D. Foot, "Amery, John (1912–1945), traitor." *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*. 23 Sep. 2004; Accessed 24 Feb. 2022. <https://www.oxforddnb.com/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-37112>.

<sup>5</sup> Richard S. Grayson, 'Imperialism in Conservative Defence and Foreign Policy: Leo Amery and the Chamberlains, 1903–39', *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 34:4, 506.

<sup>6</sup> L. S. Amery, *My Political Life*, vol. 1–3 (London: Hutchinson, 1953). His drafts of the 4<sup>th</sup> volume can be found in the Amery Papers.

<sup>7</sup> John Barnes and David Nicholson, eds., *The Empire at Bay: The Leo Amery Diaries, 1929–1945*, vol. 1–2 (London: Hutchinson, 1987). The entries related to his work for the Southern Railway were also republished in John King, ed., *Gilbert Szlumper and Leo Amery of the Southern Railway: The Diaries of a General Manager and a Director* (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Transport, 2018).

<sup>8</sup> David Faber, *Speaking for England: Leo, Julian and John Amery, the Tragedy of a Political Family* (London: Free Press, 2005).

This thesis analyses the relations or negotiations between Amery's political activities and his world view. As for the academic analysis of his politics, Roger Louis's political biography is still the most significant work, depicting Amery as an imperial theorist.<sup>9</sup> Patricia Watkinson's PhD thesis is also informative on this aspect.<sup>10</sup> David Whittington's thesis fully covered his involvement in Indian politics during the Second World War.<sup>11</sup> W. D. H. Freeman delineated his consistent commitment to Tariff Reform.<sup>12</sup> Recent researchers have been particularly intrigued by his views on defence policies.<sup>13</sup> Many other articles and monographs have mentioned specific aspects of his politics.<sup>14</sup>

However, the existing literature lacks a comprehensive analysis of Amery's world view. Louis's book is not a standard biography but an academic essay based on lectures. Other works have focused on the authors' main topic, and some were written before the disclosure of the Amery Papers. The thesis sheds light on the multi-faceted and multi-dimensional nature of Amery's politics and reveals the interconnections of elements in his world view. Of course, it does not cover every aspect of his activity, for instance, mountaineering, his lifelong hobby.<sup>15</sup> However, this thesis offers an answer to an intriguing question about

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<sup>9</sup> WM. Roger Louis, *In the Name of God, Go!: Leo Amery and the British Empire in the Age of Churchill* (New York & London: W.W. Norton, 1992). As a sequel, also see, idem., 'Leo Amery and the Post-War World, 1945-55', *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 30, no. 3 (2002): 71–90.

<sup>10</sup> Patricia Ferguson Watkinson, 'Leo Amery and the Imperial Idea 1900-1945' (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Virginia, 2001).

<sup>11</sup> David Whittington, 'An Imperialist at Bay: Leo Amery at the India Office, 1940-1945' (unpublished PhD thesis, University of the West of England, 2015).

<sup>12</sup> William David Freeman, 'Last Stand for Empire: Leo Amery and Imperial Preference' (PhD thesis, Texas A & M University, 1998).

<sup>13</sup> Richard S. Grayson, 'Imperialism in Conservative Defence and Foreign Policy: Leo Amery and the Chamberlains, 1903-39', *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 34, no. 4 (2006): 505–27; idem., 'Leo Amery's Imperialist Alternative to Appeasement in the 1930s', *Twentieth Century British History* 17, no. 4 (2006): 489–515; Katherine C. Epstein, 'Imperial Airs: Leo Amery, Air Power and Empire, 1873-1945', *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 38, no. 4 (2010): 571–98; David John Mitchell, 'The Army League, Conscription and the 1956 Defence Review' (PhD thesis, University of East Anglia, 2012).

<sup>14</sup> See the literature review in each chapter.

<sup>15</sup> Amery composed autobiographies focusing on mountaineering. L. S. Amery, *Days of Fresh Air* (London: Jarrolds, 1939); idem., *In the Rain and the Sun* (London: Hutchinson, 1946).

Amery: why did he dogmatically call for Tariff Reform throughout his whole career, while at the same time his views on other aspects of British domestic and imperial governance changed, often seemingly in an opportunistic way? The gist of my argument is that imperial preference was an antidote to the dilemma posed by his lukewarm adaptation to the age of British geopolitical decline, mass democracy, and colonial/anticolonial nationalism. The following section will make the argument clearer by bringing it under the broad historiography of British Conservatism, imperialism, and Tariff Reform.

### **Historiography of the Conservative Party**

Until a few decades ago the Conservative Party attracted less academic attention from political historians than the Liberal and Labour Parties, despite the fact that it has been the dominant force in British politics since the late nineteenth century. The tide turned in the 1980s-1990s. Since then, research on British Conservatives has made arguably the most salient progress in any field of British political history.

The foremost political factor that caused this change was the Thatcher government from 1979 to 1990. It led scholars to doubt the relevance of their traditional frameworks such as primacy of 'class' in political alignment, 'politics of consensus', and the assumption that British Conservatives, unlike their political opponents in the UK and their counterparts on the European Continents, had not bothered about their 'ideological' identity but only about practicality and power struggle.<sup>16</sup> Although British Marxist historians had already destroyed economic reductionism and paved the way for cultural history in the

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<sup>16</sup> As an attempt to deconstruct the myth of the British peculiarity, see Stefan Collini, *Absent Minds: Intellectuals in Britain* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).

1960s, the cultural and linguistic turns in the 1980s encouraged historians to explore the politics of other identities such as gender and nation.<sup>17</sup> Moreover, historians inspired by Stedman Jones' *Languages of Class* have revealed that popular politics, often appropriating the languages of constitution and nation, was much more multifaceted and amorphous than assumed.<sup>18</sup>

In parallel with the reinterpretation of popular politics, the cultural and linguistic turns also promoted the creation of the so-called 'new political history'.<sup>19</sup> Instead of focusing too much on political dramas among politicians and officials, new research trends explore political culture and ideas. It has, thus, revealed how politicians and political parties attempted to construct their representation and identities to mobilize people and how voters as active agencies interpreted the discourses presented by politicians. Recent review articles have pointed out that it is misleading to overemphasize a rupture between 'high politics' school and the 'new political history', since historians of high politics sowed many seeds for the development of the latter and their successors have recently converged to the new trend.<sup>20</sup> Indeed, we should

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<sup>17</sup> Dennis Dworkin, *Cultural Marxism in Postwar Britain: History, the New Left, and the Origins of Cultural Studies* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997); David Feldman and Jon Lawrence, 'Introduction: Structures and Transformations in British Historiography', in *Structures and Transformations in Modern British History*, ed. Feldman and Lawrence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 1-8.

<sup>18</sup> Eugenio F. Biagini and Alastair Reid, eds., *Currents of Radicalism: Popular Radicalism, Organised Labour and Party Politics in Britain, 1850-1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Eugenio F. Biagini, ed., *Citizenship and Community: Liberals, Radicals and Collective Identities in the British Isles, 1865-1931* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); James Vernon, ed., *Re-Reading the Constitution: New Narratives in the Political History of England's Long Nineteenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). As for the position of Stedman Jones in historiography, see Feldman and Lawrence, 'Introduction', 8-18.

<sup>19</sup> As for 'new political history', see Susan Pedersen, 'What Is Political History Now?', in *What Is History Now?*, ed. David Cannadine (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 36-56.; Lawrence Black, "'What Kind of People Are You?' Labour, the People and the 'New Political History'", in *Interpreting the Labour Party*, ed. John Callaghan, Steve Fielding, and Steve Ludlam (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003), 23-38; Steve Fielding, 'Looking for the "New Political History"', *Journal of Contemporary History* 42, no. 3 (2007): 515-24.

<sup>20</sup> Pedersen, 'What Is Political History Now?'; David M. Craig, "'High Politics" and the "New Political History"', *The Historical Journal* 53, no. 2 (2010): 453-75.

refrain from taking at face value novelties of any new methodology.

Nevertheless, the emergence of the 'new political history' was meaningful in that it has enabled scholars to conceptualize new research agendas such as political culture more explicitly and clearly. The raging controversy over the relevancy of the linguistic turn to history in the 1990s is a thing of past.

Historians now utilize 'language' and 'rhetoric' as analytical tools without seeing them as absolute determinant factors.<sup>21</sup>

In this context, the historiography of British Conservatism has developed. Books and articles on Conservatives have burgeoned since the 1980s, although some important works were already written by 1979.<sup>22</sup> There are several books on the general history of the Conservative Party.<sup>23</sup> Recognizing that the conceptions such as 'Villa Toryism' or working-class people's 'deviance' or 'deference' cannot explain Conservative predominance in the House of Commons, the new generation of historians has been digging up Conservatives' efforts to attract people's support through engaging in the politics of various

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<sup>21</sup> For instance, Martin Thomas and Richard Toye, eds., *Rhetoric of Empire: Languages of Colonial Conflict after 1900* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2017); David M. Craig and James Thompson, eds., *Languages of Politics in Nineteenth-Century Britain* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).

<sup>22</sup> For instance, Robert Blake, *The Conservative Party from Peel to Churchill* (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1970). Maurice Cowling, *The Impact of Labour 1920-1924: The Beginning of Modern British Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971); idem., *The Impact of Hitler: British Politics and British Policy, 1933-1940*, (London & New York: Cambridge University Press, 1975); Gregory D. Phillips, *The Diehards: Aristocratic Society and Politics in Edwardian England* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979); Alan Sykes, *Tariff Reform in British Politics 1903-1913* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979).

<sup>23</sup> Robert Stewart, *The Foundation of the Conservative Party, 1830-1867* (London & New York: Longman, 1978); Richard Shannon, *The Age of Disraeli, 1868-1881: The Rise of Tory Democracy* (London & New York: Longman, 1992); Richard Shannon, *The Age of Salisbury, 1881-1902: Unionism and Empire* (London & New York: Longman, 1996); John Ramsden, *The Age of Balfour and Baldwin 1902-1940* (London and New York: Longman, 1978); idem., *The Age of Churchill and Eden, 1940-1957*, (London, 1995); idem., *The Age of Churchill and Eden, 1940-1957* (London & New York: Longman, 1995); Anthony Seldon and Stuart Ball, eds., *Conservative Century: The Conservative Party since 1900* (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); Stuart Ball, *The Conservative Party and British Politics, 1902-1951*, (Harlow, 1995); John Charmley, *A History of Conservative Politics, 1900-1996* (New York: Macmillan Education, 1996); Ball, *Portrait of Party: The Conservative Party in Britain 1918-1945*, (Oxford, 2013)..

identities.<sup>24</sup> Historians have also found that ideas or thoughts played a significant role in the politics of Conservatives. Scholars of intellectual history such as Michael Freeden have neutralized and reconstructed the conception of ‘ideology’ as a map everyone lives with.<sup>25</sup> Research on the ideologies of Conservatism has been an important area of the new political history.<sup>26</sup>

As a consequence of the historiographical progress, a master narrative of British Conservatives has been formed. After the split of the Liberal Party in 1886, Unionists/Conservatives succeeded in retaining a majority in parliament for approximately two decades.<sup>27</sup> However, a sense of crisis spread among the younger generation, who perceived Britain’s decline in many aspects. Those young and diffident Conservatives, who E. H. H. Green has called ‘Radical Conservatives’, launched political campaigns, the most vociferous of which was Tariff Reform started by Joseph Chamberlain in May 1903. Their opposition to Free Trade, which was embedded in British national identity at the time, caused internal feuds among Unionists/Conservatives, culminating in a landslide defeat

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<sup>24</sup> For instance, see Francis, Martin, and Zweiniger-Bargielowska, eds. *The Conservatives and British Society 1880-1990*. Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1996; Jon Lawrence and Miles Taylor, eds., *Party, State and Society: Electoral Behaviour in Britain since 1820* (Aldershot: Scolar Press, 1997).

<sup>25</sup> Michael Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); Aletta J. Norval, ‘The Things We Do with Words: Contemporary Approaches to the Analysis of Ideology’, *British Journal of Political Science* 30, no. 2 (2000): 313–46.

<sup>26</sup> E. H. H. Green, *The Crisis of Conservatism: The Politics, Economics and Ideology of the Conservative Party, 1880-1914* (London & New York: Routledge, 1995); idem., *Ideologies of Conservatism: Conservative Political Ideas in the Twentieth Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Mark Garnett and Kevin Hickson, *Conservative Thinkers: The Key Contributions to the Political Thought of the Modern Conservative Party* (Manchester & New York: Manchester University Press, 2009); Bernhard Dietz, *Neo-Tories: The Revolt of British Conservatives against Democracy and Political Modernity (1929-1939)*, trans. Ian Copestake (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2018); Kit Kowol, ‘The Conservative Movement and Dreams of Britain’s Post-War Future’, *The Historical Journal* 62, no. 2 (2019): 473–93. However, the work of G. C. Webber is still important. G. C. Webber, *The Ideology of the British Right 1918-1939* (London & Sydney: Croom Helm, 1986).

<sup>27</sup> Shannon, *The Age of Salisbury*; Jon Lawrence, ‘Class and Gender in the Making of Urban Toryism, 1880-1914’, *The English Historical Review* 108, no. 428 (1993): 629–52; Matthew Roberts, ‘“Villa Toryism” and Popular Conservatism in Leeds, 1885-1902’, *The Historical Journal* 49, no. 1 (2006): 217–46.



in the 1906 general election.<sup>28</sup> The First World War ushered in a new political situation, in which the Conservative Party was more adaptable than the other parties.<sup>29</sup> After the collapse of the Lloyd George coalition, the Conservative Party under the leadership of Stanley Baldwin regained hegemony. Historians have found various tactics of Conservatives to acclimate themselves to the age of democracy brought by the Representation of the People Acts 1918 and 1928.<sup>30</sup> As for representation of political identity, Ross McKibbin has stressed the negative mobilization of a majority by making a minority, comprised of the organized labour and the unemployed, internal enemies.<sup>31</sup> Alternatively, Philip Williamson has emphasized the role of Baldwin, who appealed to people by conjuring up the image of moderate, harmonious, constitutional, and pastoral Englishness via various medias.<sup>32</sup> Subsequent works have complemented the 'Baldwinite hegemony' thesis.<sup>33</sup>

However, some historians have recently challenged this narrative. For instance, David Thackeray has criticized the exaggeration of 'the crisis of Conservatism' in Edwardian Britain by contending that the Tariff Reform movement left the party positive legacies to adapt to the new democratic age.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> As for the special significance of Free Trade in British society, see A. C. Howe, *Free Trade and Liberal England 1846-1946* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998); Frank Trentmann, *Free Trade Nation: Commerce, Consumption, and Civil Society in Modern Britain* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

<sup>29</sup> Nigel Keohane, *The Party of Patriotism: The Conservative Party and the First World War*, (Farnham & Burlington, 2010).

<sup>30</sup> David Jarvis, 'Mrs Maggs and Betty: The Conservative Appeal to Women Voter in the 1920s', *Twentieth Century British History* 5, no. 2 (1994): 129–52.

<sup>31</sup> Ross McKibbin, *The Ideologies of Class: Social Relations in Britain, 1880-1950* (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 259-293; idem., *Parties and People: England 1914-1951* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).

<sup>32</sup> Philip Williamson, *Stanley Baldwin: Conservative Leadership and National Values* (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999). Regarding the changing reputation of the political leaders in the 1930s, see Andrew Thorpe, *Britain in the 1930s: The Deceptive Decade* (Oxford & Cambridge: Blackwell, 1992).

<sup>33</sup> Neal R. McCrillis, *The British Conservative Party in the Age of Universal Suffrage: Popular Conservatism, 1918-1929* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2016); Clarisse Berthezène, *Training Minds for the War of Ideas: Ashridge College, the Conservative Party and the Cultural Politics of Britain, 1929-54* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2015).

<sup>34</sup> David Thackeray, *Conservatism for the Democratic Age* (Manchester: Manchester University

Thackeray, David Jarvis, and Geraint Thomas have also demonstrated stratified strategies of the Conservative Party in the interwar period, tailored to respond to the demands of the locality and economic classes.<sup>35</sup> This implies that Conservative politics was more diverse than the term 'Baldwinite hegemony' connotes. In addition, research laying weight on conjunctures in high politics has shown the following: Baldwin's leadership was not so stable especially in 1929-1931; the Conservative Party, confronted with the fluid political situation in the 1930s, had no choice but to form the National Government; and there were conflicting strands other than Baldwinism within the party.<sup>36</sup> The attempt to grasp how those strands both lingered and transformed from the turn of the century to the postwar period has just begun.<sup>37</sup> In short, Conservative politics was not consolidated enough to be monopolized by Baldwinism. This thesis will be a useful case study for comprehending the diversity of British Conservatism.<sup>38</sup>

Almost all the research, both old and new, has been predicated upon one meta-narrative: British Conservatives succeeded in coming to terms with the age of mass democracy. This relates to the interpretation that Conservative constitutionalism in the UK helped them defy or tame the appeal of anti-

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Press, 2013).

<sup>35</sup> Ibid.; David Jarvis, 'British Conservatism and Class Politics in the 1920s', *The English Historical Review* 111, no. 440 (1996): 59–84; Geraint Thomas, *Popular Conservatism and the Culture of National Government in Inter-War Britain* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020).

<sup>36</sup> Robert Self, *Tories and Tariffs: The Conservative Party and the Politics of Tariff Reform, 1922–1932* (New York: Garland Publishing, 1986); Stuart Ball, *Baldwin and the Conservative Party: The Crisis of 1929-1931* (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1988).

<sup>37</sup> Alan Sykes, *The Radical Right in Britain: Social Imperialism to the BNP* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); Richard Carr, *Veteran MPs and Conservative Politics in the Aftermath of the Great War: The Memory of All That* (Surrey: Ashgate, 2013); Kit Kowol, 'The Conservative Party Movement'; N. C. Fleming, *Britannia's Zealots, Volume I: Tradition, Empire and the Forging of the Conservative Right* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2019).

<sup>38</sup> As for Amery and Baldwin, see Chapter 8 and 9. There are some recent case studies on British Conservatives. See Matthew Coutts, 'The Political Career of Sir Samuel Hoare during the National Government 1931-40' (PhD thesis, University of Leicester, 2011); Christopher Cooper, 'Conservatism, Imperialism and Appeasement: The Political Career of Douglas Hogg, First Viscount Hailsham 1922-38' (PhD thesis, University of Liverpool, 2012).

democratic authoritarianism in the 1930s, to which Conservatives in Continental Europe tended to succumb. As recent works on history of 'democracy' have revealed, at the beginning of the long nineteenth century, the British elite imagined their polity as a 'mixed constitution', represented by the King, the Lords, and the Commons, which was differentiated from the alien and dangerous conception of 'democracy'.<sup>39</sup> Over the period, the term changed from an object of contempt to a legitimate norm. However, what happened was not an abrupt collective conversion but a gradual process in which political actors appropriated the language of democracy for their own political purposes.<sup>40</sup> Moreover, the value of 'stability' and 'balance', which was supposed to be the virtue of the mixed constitution, was carried over into the debate over democracy, where people, while accepting 'democracy' itself, discussed how to prevent the advent of mob rule and to balance various interests in society.<sup>41</sup> Based on this premise, many politically minded Britons envisaged their ideal forms of democracy.<sup>42</sup>

Amery's lifetime overlapped with the key moment in the democratization of British political culture.<sup>43</sup> British Conservatives accepted 'democracy' as an

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<sup>39</sup> Robert Saunders, *Democracy and the Vote in British Politics, 1848-1867: The Making of the Second Reform Act* (London & New York: Routledge, 2011); Joanna Innes and Mark Philip, eds., *Re-Imagining Democracy in the Age of Revolutions: America, France, Britain, Ireland 1750-1850* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), chapter 7-9; Jussi Kurunmäki, Jeppe Nevers, and Henk te Velde, eds., *Democracy in Modern Europe: A Conceptual History* (New York & Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2018), chapter 1-2.

<sup>40</sup> Robert Saunders, 'Democracy', in *Languages of Politics in Nineteenth-Century Britain*, ed. David M. Craig and James Thompson (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 142-67.

<sup>41</sup> Henk te Velde, 'Democracy and the Strange Death of Mixed Government in the Nineteenth Century: Great Britain, France and the Netherlands', in *Democracy in Modern Europe: A Conceptual History* (New York & Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2018), 42-64.

<sup>42</sup> For instance, see, Peter Clarke, *Liberals and Social Democrats* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978); Julia Stapleton, *Political Intellectuals and Public Identities in Britain since 1850* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001); Marc Stears, *Progressives, Pluralists, and the Problems of the State: Ideologies of Reform in the United States and Britain, 1909-1926* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Kavanagh, Dennis. 'British Political Science in the Inter-War Years: The Emergence of the Founding Fathers'. *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 5, no. 4 (2003): 594-613; Ross McKibbin, *Democracy and Political Culture: Studies in Modern British History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), chapter 2-3.

<sup>43</sup> Jon Lawrence, 'The Transformation of British Public Politics After the First World War' 190,

essential element of British freedom but feared the effect of the universal suffrage. The ambivalent attitude was epitomized by the Baldwinian strategy, simultaneously pandering to and educating the electorate. Amery's theory of the British Constitution, which laid stress on the guiding role of the executive in the practice of democracy, could be seen as another example of lukewarm adaptation.<sup>44</sup> It is not sufficient to regard this stance just as 'Burkean' because the influence of Edmund Burke was widely diffused and appropriated in different ways.<sup>45</sup> This thesis will more concretely describe how Amery tried to address the question of 'democracy' in his attempt to create persuasive rhetoric for his political projects such as National Service and Tariff Reform (Chapter 1 and 8). It will also reveal that his constitutional theory, particularly on 'functional representation', was designed not only for domestic politics but also for imperial governance in the British Commonwealth and dependent colonies, such as India and East/Central Africa (Chapter 5-7). Moreover, his ideological position in interwar Conservatism, which was somewhere between Baldwinism and the radical right, is clarified in Chapter 10.

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no. 1 (2006): 185–216. The role of voluntary associations in the process has been emphasized by Helen McCarthy. See Helen McCarthy, 'Parties, Voluntary Associations, and Democratic Politics in Interwar Britain', *The Historical Journal* 50, no. 4 (2007): 891–912; idem., Helen McCarthy, 'Whose Democracy? Histories of British Political Culture between the Wars', *The Historical Journal* 55, no. 1 (2012): 221–38; Helen McCarthy, *The British People and the League of Nations: Democracy, Citizenship and Internationalism, c. 1918-45* (Manchester & New York: Manchester University Press, 2011). As for Amery's constitutional theory in the context of British Conservatism, see John Barnes, 'Ideology and Factions', in *Conservative Century*, ed. Seldon and Ball, 317-318.

<sup>44</sup> David H. Close, 'The Collapse of Resistance to Democracy: Conservatives, Adult Suffrage, and Second Chamber Reform, 1911-1928', *The Historical Journal* 20, no. 4 (1977): 893–918; Stuart Ball, 'The Conservative Party and the Impact of the 1918 Reform Act', *Parliamentary History* 37, no. 1 (2018): 23–46.

<sup>45</sup> Jones, Emily. *Edmund Burke and the Invention of Modern Conservatism, 1830-1914: An Intellectual History*. Oxford: Oriental University Press, 2017. The influence of Burke on Amery has been lightly pointed out in John D. Fair and John A. Hutcheson, Jr., 'British Conservatism in the Twentieth Century: An Emerging Ideological Tradition', *Albion: A Quarterly Journal Concerned with British Studies* 19, no. 4 (1987): 563.

## Historiography of the British Empire

The process of the evolution of imperial history in the UK was similar to that of the history of Conservatism. John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson provided the first great impetus in the post war historiography of the British Empire. Challenging reductionist explanations of the left and the right for 'imperialism', they argued that the British Empire was mainly enlarged by a series of responses to crises on the spot, which was at the same time ad hoc and based on some principle such as 'imperialism of free trade'. Their frameworks inspired the following research, especially in Oxbridge, culminating in the five-volume *Oxford History of the British Empire*.<sup>46</sup> P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins attempted to present another framework, 'gentlemanly capitalism', by placing emphasis on the primacy of the economic interests in the City and reworking the Hobsonian model.<sup>47</sup> More recently, John Darwin's monumental books, absorbing elements of Gallagher/Robinson and Cain/Hopkins, have depicted a grand narrative of the rise and fall of the British Empire by mainly focusing on geopolitics and political economy, as well as by connecting the British case with global history.<sup>48</sup> That is, while apprehension of the centrifugal trend of imperial history or its fragmentation into regional histories has often been expressed, historians' constant attempts for synthesis have galvanized research on the British Empire.<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>46</sup> WM. Roger Louis, ed., *Imperialism: The Robinson and Gallagher Controversy* (1976: New York & London, New Viewpoints); Ronald Robinson and John Andrew Gallagher, *Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of Imperialism* (Macmillan: London, 1961).

<sup>47</sup> P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, *British Imperialism* (London & New York: Longman, 1993); As for J. A. Hobson, see P. J. Cain, *Hobson and Imperialism: Radicalism, New Liberalism, and Finance 1887-1938* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

<sup>48</sup> John Darwin, *The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World-System, 1830-1970* (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009); idem., *After Tamerlane: The Rise and Fall of Global Empires, 1400-2000* (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2009); idem., *Unfinished Empire: The Global Expansion of Britain* (London: Allen Lane, 2012).

<sup>49</sup> As for the apprehension, see David Fieldhouse, 'Can Humpty-Dumpty Be Put Together Again?: Imperial History in the 1980s', *Journal of Imperial & Commonwealth History* 12, no. 2 (1984): 9–23.

However, the school, now represented by Darwin, has sometimes been criticized as conservative or even Conservative for not being open to a new trend of research: postcolonial studies and new imperial history.<sup>50</sup> Reflecting the cultural turn, the new current has investigated the nature and functions of imperial culture and discourse.<sup>51</sup> The problem is that many historians were repelled by postcolonial studies, which were often conducted within the realm of literature, imbued with the jargon of postmodernism, and lax from the standpoint of empirical research. Furthermore, postcolonial studies were not the only source of research on imperial culture. John Mackenzie's pioneering research and the Manchester University Press series 'Studies in Imperialism' have enriched the cultural history of the Empire. To complicate matters, cultural historians have not always had amicable attitudes towards postcolonial studies.<sup>52</sup> However, according to Dane Kennedy, despite the seemingly lingering conflict between conservative and new imperial histories, a common ground has appeared recently because some postcolonial studies have come to seriously consider historical contexts, while some historians have come to learn much from the perspectives of postcolonial studies.<sup>53</sup> As with political history, present researchers can easily adopt an eclectic approach.

It could be said that the 'turns' have helped the 'new political history' or 'new intellectual history' of empire flourish. Recognizing that 'empire' is as much 'imagined community' as 'nation state', historians have discussed to what extent

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<sup>50</sup> Dane Kennedy, *The Imperial History Wars: Debating the British Empire* (London & New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2018).

<sup>51</sup> As for key texts of postcolonial studies, see Bart Moore-Gilbert, *Postcolonial Theory: Contexts, Practices, Politics* (London & New York: Verso, 1997).

<sup>52</sup> John MacKenzie, *Propaganda and Empire: The Manipulation of British Public Opinion, 1880-1960* (Manchester & Dover: Manchester University Press, 1984); idem., *Orientalism: History, Theory and the Arts* (Manchester & New York: Manchester University Press, 1995).

<sup>53</sup> Kennedy, *The Imperial History Wars*. Also see a critical, but constructive, comment towards new imperial history in Richard Price, 'One Big Thing: Britain, Its Empire, and Their Imperial Culture', *Journal of British Studies* 45, no. 3 (2006): 602–27.

imperial factors affected British politics, society, and national identity.<sup>54</sup> As for intellectual history, some scholars have started to research how the British Empire, 'Greater Britain', or 'British Commonwealth' was imagined and conceptualized by intellectuals, scholars, and politicians.<sup>55</sup> Of course, it is not fair to exaggerate the rupture in historiography. There were some pioneering works on politics and ideologies of empire.<sup>56</sup> A large number of political biographies, the traditional format of British historiography, have analysed world view of champions of the British Empire. Above all, the political biography of Leopold Amery was authored by WM. Roger Louis, the chief editor of *The Oxford History of the British Empire*.<sup>57</sup>

One meta-narrative in imperial intellectual history is highly relevant to the thesis: the liberalization or internationalization of imperial rhetoric after the First World War. British imperialists not only admitted the formation of the British

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<sup>54</sup> It is impossible to enumerate all important publications on the topic. The followings are just some examples about the modern era. Andrew Thompson, *Imperial Britain: The Empire in British Politics, c. 1880-1932* (Harlow: Longman, 2000); Bernard Porter, *The Absent-Minded Imperialists: Empire, Society, and Culture in Britain*, (Oxford, 2004); Thompson, *The Empire Strikes Back?: The Impact of Imperialism on Britain from the Mid-Nineteenth Century* (Harlow: Pearson Longman, 2005); Alex Windscheffel, *Popular Conservatism in Imperial London, 1868-1906* (Woodbridge: Royal Historical Society & Boydell Press, 2007); Bill Schwarz, *Memories of Empire: The White Man's World*, vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); John MacKenzie, 'The British Empire: Ramshackle or Rampaging? A Historiographical Reflection', *Journal of Imperial & Commonwealth History* 43, no. 1 (2015): 99–124; Luke Blaxill, 'The Language of Imperialism in British Electoral Politics, 1880–1910', *Journal of Imperial & Commonwealth History* 45, no. 3 (2017): 416–48.

<sup>55</sup> For instance, see David Armitage, *The Ideological Origins of the British Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Jennifer Pitts, *A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005); Bart Schultz and Georgios Varouxakis, eds., *Utilitarianism and Empire* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2005); Duncan Bell, *The Idea of Greater Britain: Empire and the Future of World Order, 1860-1900* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007); idem., *Reordering the World: Essays on Liberalism and Empire* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016); Theodore Koditschek, *Liberalism, Imperialism, and the Historical Imagination: Nineteenth-Century Visions of a Greater Britain* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Daniel I. O'Neill, *Edmund Burke and the Conservative Logic of Empire* (Oakland: University of California Press, 2016); P. J. Cain, *Character, Ethics and Economics: British Debates on Empire, 1860-1914* (London & New York: Routledge, 2019).

<sup>56</sup> A. P. Thornton, *The Imperial Idea and Its Enemies: A Study in British Power* (London: Macmillan, 1959); Bernard Semmel, *Imperialism and Social Reform: English Social-Imperial Thought 1895-1914* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1960); John Edward Kendle, *Round Table Movement and Imperial Union* (Toronto & Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1975); P. S. Gupta, *Imperialism and the British Labour Movement, 1914-1964* (London: Macmillan, 1975).

<sup>57</sup> Louis, *In the Name of God, Go!*

Commonwealth for the Dominions but also, in contrast to their predecessors in the Victorian era, approved of local self-government in the dependent colonies, albeit to a limited extent. The League of Nations and its mandate system promoted this change.<sup>58</sup> Recent works have scrutinized how imperial theorists re-conceptualized the Empire/Commonwealth during this period.<sup>59</sup> These theorists did not intend to dissolve the empire but to maintain imperial unity through the reconfiguration of its framework. John Darwin and D. A. Low had already pointed out the ambiguous stance of British imperialism during this period. Low has characterized the British approach to nationalists in imperial peripheries as less conciliatory than American attitude towards the Philippines but less confrontational than French and Dutch imperial policies.<sup>60</sup> This

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<sup>58</sup> Michael D. Callahan, *Mandates and Empire: The League of Nations and Africa, 1914-1931* (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2008); Susan Pedersen, *The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015). However, one should bear in mind that colonialism/imperialism was always a contested conception among internationalists, who did not simply justify or criticize 'empire'. See Martti Koskenniemi, *The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870-1960* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); R. M. Douglas, Michael D. Callahan, and Elizabeth Bishop, eds., *Imperialism on Trial: International Oversight of Colonial Rule in Historical Perspective* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2006); Mark Mazower, *No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009); Andrew Fitzmaurice, *Sovereignty, Property and Empire, 1500-2000* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014). As for British liberal internationalism in the period, see Casper Sylvest, *British Liberal Internationalism, 1880-1930: Making Progress?* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009); Michael Pugh, *Liberal Internationalism: The Interwar Movement for Peace in Britain* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); Gaynor Johnson, *Lord Robert Cecil: Politician and Internationalist* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013).

<sup>59</sup> Andrea Bosco and Alex May, eds., *The Round Table: The Empire/Commonwealth and British Foreign Policy* (London: Lothian Foundation Pless, 1997); Suke Wolton, *Lord Hailey, the Colonial Office and Politics of Race and Empire in the Second World War: The Loss of White Prestige* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000); Daniel Gorman, *Imperial Citizenship: Empire and the Question of Belonging* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006); W. David McIntyre, *The Britannic Vision: Historians and the Making of the British Commonwealth of Nations, 1907-48* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); Andrea Bosco, *The Round Table Movement and the Fall of the 'Second' British Empire (1909-1919)* (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2017); Amanda Behm, *Imperial History and the Global Politics of Exclusion: Britain, 1880-1940* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018); Tomohito Baji, 'The British Commonwealth as Liberal International Avatar: With the Spines of Burke', *History of European Ideas* 46, no. 5 (2020): 649–65; Jaroslav Valkoun, *Great Britain, the Dominions and the Transformation of the British Empire, 1907-1931: The Road to the Statute of Westminster* (New York & London: Routledge, 2021).

<sup>60</sup> John Darwin, 'Imperialism in Decline? Tendencies in British Imperial Policy between the Wars', *The English Historical Review* 23, no. 3 (1980): 657–79; idem., 'A Third British Empire?: The Dominion Idea in Imperial Politics', in *The Oxford History of the British Empire*, ed. W.M. Roger Louis and Judith M. Brown, vol. 4 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 64–87; D. A.



interpretation resonated with the master narrative of British decolonization: although politicians and officials assumed until the late 1950s that the colonies in Africa could be retained for another generation, they relatively orderly accepted the reality of decolonization in the 1960s.<sup>61</sup> Recent research has tended to emphasize the violent or turbulent nature of British decolonization and the role of domestic, imperial, and global contingencies in policymaking to debunk a myth of British magnanimous imperialism.<sup>62</sup> Nevertheless, it is important to examine how policymakers' ideologies negotiated with those contingencies in the process of convincing themselves that Britain's imperial/international status could be retained by devolutions.

Despite the emergence of intellectual history of the Empire, Amery has not attracted due academic interest, whilst his political mentors and rivals continue to receive scholarly attention.<sup>63</sup> As revealed in Chapter 3-7, his stance

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Low, *Eclipse of Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); idem., *Britain and Indian Nationalism: The Imprint of Ambiguity 1929-1942* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

<sup>61</sup> David Goldsworthy, *Colonial Issues in British Politics 1945-1961: From 'Colonial Development' to 'Wind of Change'* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971); John Darwin, *Britain and the Decolonisation: The Retreat from the Empire in the Post-War World* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1988); Goldsworthy, 'Keeping Change within Bounds: Aspects of Colonial Policy during the Churchill and Eden Governments, 1951-57', *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 18, no. 1 (1990): 81-108; Darwin., *The End of the British Empire: The Historical Debate* (Oxford & Cambridge: Blackwell, 1991); Martin Lynn, ed., *The British Empire in the 1950s: Retreat or Revival?* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).

<sup>62</sup> John Springhall, *Decolonization since 1945: The Collapse of European Overseas Empires* (Basingstoke & New York: Palgrave, 2001); Frank Heinlein, *British Government Policy and Decolonisation 1945-1963: Scrutinising the Official Mind* (London & New York: Routledge, 2002); Martin Thomas and Andrew Thompson, 'Empire and Globalisation: From "High Imperialism" to Decolonisation' 36, no. 1 (2014): 142-70; Martin Thomas and Andrew Thompson, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of the Ends of Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018). To be fair to D. A. Low, he was not blind to violent natures of British imperial policy. The term, the 'Second Colonial Occupation' was coined by him and J. M. Lonsdale, though it originally meant British administrative interference in East African society and economy. D. A. Low and J. M. Lonsdale, 'Introduction: Towards the New Order 1945-1963', in *History of East Africa*, ed. Low and Alison Smith, vol. 3 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976), 12-16. As for the extended definition of the term in the current historiography, see Dane Kennedy, *Decolonization: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), chapter 2.

<sup>63</sup> As some latest examples, see J. Lee Thompson, *A Wider Patriotism: Alfred Milner and the British Empire*, (London, 2007); Richard Toye, *Churchill's Empire: The World That Made Him and the World He Made*, (London, 2010); Travis L. Crosby, *Joseph Chamberlain: a Most Radical Imperialist*, (London, 2011).

experienced changes similar to those of his contemporary imperial theorists. Simultaneously, his imperial thought was idiosyncratic, different from that of Lionel Curtis, Philip Kerr (Lord Lothian), Alfred Zimmern, Richard Jebb, Jan Smuts, and Frederick Lugard.<sup>64</sup> Therefore, the case study of Amery in this thesis will be indispensable for describing the topography of British imperialism. The chapters also address the question: to what extent did the Whiggish tradition/ideas make British imperial policy moderate. While not denying that tradition shaped path dependency to some extent in his imperial thought, I will show that his changes tended to be opportunistic and reactive.<sup>65</sup> As a 'politician-historian' like Churchill, Amery created historical narratives or invoked historical examples and analogies to justify his policy. Every time he changed his policy, his theoretical and historical justifications were altered accordingly.<sup>66</sup> These ad hoc and post hoc adjustments meant that, notwithstanding his confidence in the principle of Empire/Commonwealth displayed in his public statements, Amery was concerned about whether it could really halt the centrifugal tendency in the imperial peripheries.

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<sup>64</sup> Lavin Deborah, *From Empire to International Commonwealth: A Biography of Lionel Curtis* (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); John Turner, *The Larger Idea: Lord Lothian and the Problem of National Sovereignty* (London: The Historians' Press, 1988); J. D. B. Miller, *Richard Jebb and the Problem of Empire* (London: The Athlone Press, 1956); Simon Potter, 'Richard Jebb, John S. Ewart and the Round Table, 1898–1926', *The English Historical Review* 122, no. 495 (2007): 105–32; Tomohito Baji, *The International Thought of Alfred Zimmern: Classicism, Zionism and the Shadow of Commonwealth* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2021); Saul Dubow, 'Smuts, the United Nations and the Rhetoric of Race and Rights', *Journal of Contemporary History* 43, no. 1 (2008): 45–74; Mazower, *No Enchanted Palace*.

<sup>65</sup> My argument about Amery is in line with S. E. Stockwell's about British policy making on decolonization rather than with D. G. Boyce's emphasis on the Whiggish tradition. See S. E. Stockwell, 'Britain and Decolonization in an Era of Global Change', in *The Oxford Handbook of the Ends of Empire*, ed. Thomas and Thompson, 65–84; D. G. Boyce, *Decolonisation and the British Empire, 1775-1997* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999).

<sup>66</sup> As for 'politician-historian', see B. J. C. McKercher, 'The Limitations of the Politician-Historian: Winston Churchill, Rearmament, Appeasement, and the Origins of the Second World War', in *Winston Churchill: At War and Thinking of War before 1939*, ed. McKercher and Antoine Capet (London & New York: Routledge, 2019), 127–52.

## Tariff Reform, Amery, and the overarching argument of the thesis

Since Tariff Reform caused disastrous effects, scholars have put forward various academic conceptions to explain why and how it attracted some of the Unionists/Conservatives. Bernard Semmel has regarded it as one of the schemes of 'social imperialists', who thought that an amalgam of imperialism and social reform could be a solution to the national crisis after the South African War.<sup>67</sup> G. R. Searle, analysing almost the same people as Semmel, has seen it as an example of the campaigns for 'national efficiency'.<sup>68</sup> E. H. H. Green's research, focusing more on the Unionist/Conservative Party, has argued that Tariff Reform represented a strategy of 'Radical Conservatives', who tried to reconstruct the identity of their party amidst the social and political change at the turn of the century.<sup>69</sup> Alternatively, recent research has frequently utilized another conception, 'constructive imperialism' in order to emphasize the primacy of 'empire' in the campaign.<sup>70</sup> As there is no academic agreement on

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<sup>67</sup> Semmel, *Imperialism and Social Reform*. Andrew Porter has perceptively pointed out that the Semmel's definition of 'social imperialism' was different from that in German historiography. Andrew Porter, *European Imperialism, 1860-1914* (London: Macmillan, 1994), 34-35. Recent historians tend to avoid use 'social imperialism', probably because it was abused. See Peter Clarke's review of Scally's monograph. Robert J. Scally, *The Origins of the Lloyd George Coalition: The Politics of Social-Imperialism, 1900-1918* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975); Clarke, *The English Historical Review* 91, no. 361 (1976): 873-875.

<sup>68</sup> Geoffrey Russell Searle, *The Quest for National Efficiency: A Study in British Politics and Political Thought, 1899-1914* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1971).

<sup>69</sup> Green, *The Crisis of Conservatism*.

<sup>70</sup> The term was directly derived from the title of a compilation of Milner's speeches, used by S. B. Saul for the first time in the academia, and established by Cain as an academic conception. Though Cain has concisely defined it as 'true believers' in the cause of tariff reform, it is generally used to refer to people, including Amery, who believed that solutions to a multi-dimensional predicament of the UK and the British Empire lay in imperial development and cooperation. Alfred Milner, *Constructive Imperialism* (London: The National Review Office, 1908); S. B. Saul, 'The Economic Significance of "Constructive Imperialism"', *The Journal of Economic History* 17, no. 2 (1957): 173-92; P. J. Cain, 'The Economic Philosophy of Constructive', in *British Politics and the Spirit of the Age: Political Concepts in Action*, ed. Cornelia Navari (Keele: Keele University Press, 1996), 41-65. In line with the conception, Andrew Thompson has argued that tariff reformers' primary aim was imperial consolidation. Andrew Thompson, 'Tariff Reform: An Imperial Strategy, 1903-1913', *The Historical Journal* 40, no. 4 (1997): 1033-54.

the interpretation of the movement, these historians have appropriated Amery's imperial and economic thought to reinforce their arguments.<sup>71</sup>

By contrast, historians reached a consensus on Amery's position in the politics of fiscal reform. Although the introduction of tariffs was an important agenda among Unionists/Conservatives, they had diverse attitudes towards the question of the extent and purpose of imposing tariffs. In the political spectrum, Amery was consistently located at the extreme end because he never ceased to call for the introduction of fully-fledged imperial preference as an ultimate goal.<sup>72</sup> The Conservative leaders, who were often more moderate, practical, and concerned about its impact on the elections, found him recalcitrant. His experience in the 1954 conference epitomized his difficult relations with them.

What remains to be asked is why Amery was so tenacious about imperial preference while he adjusted his stance towards democracy and imperial governance, albeit with lukewarm enthusiasm. His stance shared some general principles with Tariff Reformers, such as a backlash against the Gladstonian orthodoxy of economics and a sense of crisis about the relative 'decline' of the UK.<sup>73</sup> However, these cannot fully explain Amery's personal motives and trajectory, as the anti-laissez-faire stance could contain various and mutually conflicting ideologies.<sup>74</sup> As revealed in Chapter 9, Amery himself loosely expanded the meaning of 'orthodoxy' in order to criticize all the people who did

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<sup>71</sup> A more detailed review of the existing literature will be given in Chapter 8.

<sup>72</sup> Alan Sykes, 'The Radical Right and the Crisis of Conservatism before the First World War', *The Historical Journal* 26, no. 3 (1983): 661–76; W. R. Garside, 'Party Politics, Political Economy and British Protectionism, 1919-1932', *History* 83, no. 269 (1998): 47–65; Stuart Ball, 'The Conservative Party, the Role of the State and the Politics of Protection, c.1918–1932', *History* 96, no. 323 (2011): 280–303.

<sup>73</sup> David Cannadine, 'Apocalyptic Britain?: British Politicians and British "Decline" in the Twentieth Century', in *Understanding Decline: Perceptions and Realities of British Economic Performance*, ed. Peter Clarke and Clive Trebilcock (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 263-269; Louis, *In the Name of God, Go!*, 34-35.

<sup>74</sup> Searle, *The Quest for National Efficiency*; Daniel Ritschel, *The Politics of Planning: The Debate on Economic Planning in Britain in the 1930s* (Oxford University Press, 1997).

not accept his schemes including not only the Treasury but also the timid leaders of the Conservative Party. Therefore, avoiding forcing his ideas into the preconceived conceptions, Chapter 8 will reveal the process Amery, by selectively absorbing economic expertise, reached the conclusion that the spiral increase of production and population was necessary on an imperial scale. This theoretical conviction made him a persistent campaigner for Tariff Reform.

The thrust of my argument is that his consistent stance towards imperial preference was necessitated by other aspects of his political thought: the co-ordination of imperial defence policy would not be attained without economic growth brought by preferential tariffs; devolutions to the imperial peripheries would just exacerbate the centrifugal tendencies but for common material interests forged by preferential tariffs; social reform would end in confiscation of wealth and the class war without economic development fostered by fiscal reform. In short, Amery imagined imperial preference as a panacea for all dilemmas in his world view. However, it did not actually solve all the problems. Amery was at times forced to qualify his propositions to persuade the electorate or to be loyal to the party. Nor was his economic thought static. Chapter 11 reveals that his desire to protect imperial preference and the sterling area paradoxically made him an advocate of cooperation between the Empire/Commonwealth and integrated Europe.

## **Methodology**

Though this research analyses what Amery said and wrote, it does not treat Amery as a scholar in a secluded ivory tower. He was a prolific publicist, passionate, not to say excellent, orator, and campaign organizer, always trying

to both educate and pander to 'the public'.<sup>75</sup> He attempted to have a presence in the public sphere by writing letters and articles for newspapers and journals. His writings and speeches were composed to intervene in specific contexts. As Quentin Skinner has argued, historians should first try to retrieve the original intentions of those statements.<sup>76</sup> Indeed, recovering past contexts could end in excusing what people did and said.<sup>77</sup> However, historians have been developing strategies to explain the interactive relationship between texts and contexts. For example, scholars have come to see 'ideology' as a more diverse and fluid conception. As Mark Bevir has said about socialism, historians have to recover different meanings that any political movement had for its participants.<sup>78</sup> They should also recognize that politicians are not passive receivers of knowledge but active agencies who interpret and appropriate it in the context of contemporary political culture.<sup>79</sup> The study of rhetoric in history is an effective approach for describing the interaction between texts and contexts.<sup>80</sup>

This research, benefiting from these new perspectives, will avoid reifying any political ideologies as a fixed entity and instead try to locate the changing position of one political actor in the historical context without simple exoneration or condemnation, by weighing both contingencies and his inner intellectual

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<sup>75</sup> In the sense, he is one of the politicians who took part in the game of defining the meaning of the public or people. Lawrence, *Speaking for the People*; James Thompson, *British Political Culture and the Idea of 'Public Opinion'* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

<sup>76</sup> Quentin Skinner, 'Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas', *History and Theory* 8, no. 1 (1969): 3–53.

<sup>77</sup> Bernard Bailyn, *On the Teaching and Writing of History: Responses to a Series of Questions* (Hanover: Montgomery Endowment, 1994), 58-60

<sup>78</sup> Mark Bevir, *The Making of British Socialism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), 14; Also see, Green, *Ideologies of Conservatism*; Richard Toye, 'Keynes, Liberalism, and "The Emancipation of the Mind"', *The English Historical Review* 130, no. 546 (2015): 1182–91.

<sup>79</sup> E. H. H. Green and D. M. Tanner, eds., *The Strange Survival of Liberal England: Political Leaders, Moral Values and the Reception of Economic Debate* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 1-16. Also see Bevir's argument on 'situated agency'. Mark Bevir, 'Construction of Governance', in *Governance, Consumers and Citizens: Agency in Contemporary Politics*, ed. Bevir and Frank Trentmann (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 25–48.

<sup>80</sup> Richard Toye, *Rhetoric: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oriental University Press, 2013).

world.<sup>81</sup> The title of the thesis 'an intellectual and political biography' expresses this eclectic methodology. This research intends to present a concrete example of fusion of the traditional format of political biography and the newer perspectives nurtured by the various 'turns' in the academia.

Although the primary aim of this research is to clarify one politician's thoughts and politics, it could contribute to the historiography of British political and intellectual history in general. Skinner shrewdly has pointed out that historical texts 'help to reveal ... the essential variety of viable moral assumptions and political commitments.'<sup>82</sup> As mentioned above, Amery was involved in numerous aspects of governance in the UK and the British Empire. This research will help gain a more sophisticated understanding of the assumptions of politicians, by analysing Amery's thought, a useful window through which to see the contemporary political world.

### **Structure of This Thesis**

The first two chapters scrutinize Amery's views on military and foreign policy. Chapter 1 reveals how his campaign for Army Reform and National Service in the Edwardian Era affected his imperial and economic thought. It emphasizes the idea of simultaneous centralization and decentralization, which he learned from the Prussian model of the General Staff, as a lasting legacy in his way of thinking. Chapter 2 describes the development of his geopolitical vision. It will show that by the end of the First World War, the co-existence of several 'empires' became his ideal for international politics, which was

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<sup>81</sup> I do not deny the value of works which try to describe general characteristics or traditions of specific ideologies. For instance, see Ball, *Portrait of a Party*, chapter 1. This thesis just indicates that research focusing on individuals will be also necessary with a view to depicting more precise topography of ideologies.

<sup>82</sup> Skinner, 'Meaning and Understanding', 52.

incompatible with the supremacy of self-determination under the auspice of the League of Nations.

The following five chapters analyse how Amery imagined and reconceptualized the Empire/Commonwealth. To understand continuity and ruptures in his imperial thought, the chapters analyse his role and motive in the following questions: the South African Question (Chapter 3), the Irish Question (Chapter 4), the Indian Question (Chapter 5), the making of the British Commonwealth of Nations (Chapter 6), and the issues of white settlers in the Empire (Chapter 7). These describe how he transformed from a typical Die-Hard to a reluctant approver of imperial devolutions. However, it is also emphasized that he changed his policy opportunistically and reactively.

The last four chapters scrutinize his economic discourse. Chapter 8 depicts his intellectual trajectory until he became a true believer in Tariff Reform and his attempt to translate his cause into party politics until 1923. Chapter 9 analyses how Amery, in the interwar period, developed his imperial fiscal and monetary policy and embraced the Manichaeian dichotomy between economic nationalism/imperialism and laissez-faire individualism. Chapter 10 locates his corporatism and constitutional theory in the ideological topography of British Conservatism in the 1930s. The logic of his defence of cooperation between the Commonwealth and united Europe is fully discussed in Chapter 11.



# 1 The Impact of the South African War

Recently, the relationship between the history of the British Empire and that of British defence/diplomatic policy has attracted increased scholarly attention.<sup>1</sup> Whether this reflects the overall trend or not, all recent journal articles focusing on Amery have treated his military and defence/diplomatic policy in a broad sense.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, David Mitchell's PhD thesis, based on the recognition that Amery's 'contribution to the national defence debate from the Boer war onwards is largely neglected as a separate study', has traced Amery's involvement in the politics of the military.<sup>3</sup> We should also be aware that all the recent work is not without precedence in the literature, which has already shed light on the role of Amery in the movements for Army Reform, National Service, and British strategy making.<sup>4</sup> However, these studies have tended to only focus on the military dimension of Amery's politics. In contrast, other historians scrutinizing his economic or political thought have often passed over his military politics. This is unfortunate, considering the fact that Amery was involved in Army Reform in parallel with Tariff Reform in the Edwardian era, and that he urged his

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<sup>1</sup> Greg Kennedy, ed., *Imperial Defence: The Old World Order 1856-1956* (London & New York: Routledge, 2008); John C. Mitcham, *Race and Imperial Defence in the British World, 1870-1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016).

<sup>2</sup> Richard S. Grayson, 'Leo Amery's Imperialist Alternative to Appeasement in the 1930s', *Twentieth Century British History*, 17.4 (2006), 489–515; idem., 'Imperialism in Conservative Defence and Foreign Policy: Leo Amery and the Chamberlains, 1903-39', *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 34.4 (2006), 505–27; Katherine C. Epstein, 'Imperial Airs: Leo Amery, Air Power and Empire, 1873-1945', *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 38.4 (2010), 571–98.

<sup>3</sup> David John Mitchell, 'The Army League, Conscription and the 1956 Defence Review' (University of East Anglia, 2012).

<sup>4</sup> Edward M. Spiers, *The Army and Society, 1815-1914* (London & New York: Longman, 1980); R. J. Q. Adams and Philip P. Poirier, *The Conscription Controversy in Great Britain, 1900–18* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1987); Michael Howard, *The Continental Commitment: The Dilemma of British Defence Policy in the Era of the Two World Wars* (London: Temple Smith, 1972); M. J. Allison, 'The National Service Issue, 1899-1914' (PhD thesis, University of London, 1975); Denis Hayes, *Conscription Conflict: The Conflict of Ideas in the Struggle for and against Military Conscription in Britain between 1901 and 1939* (London: Sheppard Press, 1949).

contemporaries to bear in mind that foreign, industrial, commercial, and defence policies 'formed but one single policy'.<sup>5</sup>

This chapter will describe and analyse the interaction between his military thinking and other aspects of his politics in the Edwardian era. After describing his experiences in South Africa, the following two sections will reveal that his schemes for a General Staff a new troop in South Africa affected his imperial ideas, particularly concerning Britain's relationships with the settler colonies. The fourth section will argue that in his view, Tariff Reform and Army Reform were complementary policies to adapt to the new age of democracy and nationalism. However, in the last section on his campaign for National Service, I will argue that his attempt to appropriate the language of democracy showed the dilemma between his willingness to accommodate common people in democratic society and his desire to teach them the necessity of civic duties.

### **The impact of the South African War**

It is acknowledged that the South African War shattered the already precarious complacency of the British political milieu, the relatively young members of which embarked on the movement for 'national efficiency'. Amery was deservedly included in the list particularly by virtue of his membership of the Coefficients, a discussion group formed around the Webbs.<sup>6</sup> Though the most conspicuous branch of the movement was Tariff Reform, of which Amery became a passionate believer, his initial interest lay in Army Reform.

Unlike almost all of the British public, Amery witnessed the war on the spot as a war correspondent for *The Times*. The most disheartening thing he found

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<sup>5</sup> L. S. Amery, 'Imperial Defence and National Policy' in C. S. Goldman, ed., *The Empire and the Century* (London: John Murray, 1905), 176.

<sup>6</sup> Geoffrey Russell Searle, *The Quest for National Efficiency: A Study in British Politics and Political Thought, 1899-1914* (University of California Press, 1971).

was the considerable inefficiency of the British Army. Even before being informed of the detailed results of the 'Black Week', Amery hoped:

if the series of reverses goes on public opinion will be stirred – not against the government – but against the War Office and the whole military system, with its red tape, its archaic conservatism, its absolute paralyzing of all individual initiative and its centralisation in London.<sup>7</sup>

The subsequent blunders strengthened his conviction that the whole army system required 'changing root and branch'.<sup>8</sup>

The fundamental principle of his reform plan was materialized by the end of March 1900.<sup>9</sup> Amery took advantage of his position as a chief-editor of *The Times History of the South African War* to spread his suggestion for Army Reform.<sup>10</sup> Cultivating his ideas by communicating with soldiers and army officers on the spot, he published his comprehensive plans in the anonymous articles of *The Times* under the title of 'The Problem of Army' in 1903, which developed into his first book in the winter of that year.<sup>11</sup> These articles, including denouncement of the ongoing reform by the government, intrigued the discontented young Unionist/Conservative MP group called the 'Hughligans', which included Winston Churchill and Hugh Cecil, who utilized the argument similar to that of Amery to criticize the Brodrick reforms. Amery's memoir

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<sup>7</sup> Amery to Moberly Bell, 13 December 1899, Moberly Bell Papers, CMB/1/.

<sup>8</sup> Amery to Chirol, 9 January 1900, Amery diary, *EB*, vol. 1, 32.

<sup>9</sup> Amery to Bell, 28 March 1900, CMB/1/.

<sup>10</sup> *The Times History of the War in South Africa* (London: Sampson Low, Marston), vol. 1 and vol. 2 was completed in November 1900 and April 1902 respectively. As for Amery's reform plan, see vol. 1, chapter 1 and vol. 2, chapter 1.

<sup>11</sup> Jan 21, 23, 27, 29, Feb 3, 4, 11, 17, 21, 23, 24, 1903 *The Times*. Additional articles appeared in 28 Feb and 12 Sept. The book was completed by November 1903. L. S. Amery, *The Problem of the Army* (London: Edward Arnold, 1903).

boasted that he became an informal adviser of the Esher Committee, and personally assisted Arnold-Forster, who superseded Brodrick as Secretary of State for War.<sup>12</sup> We should take this remark with a grain of salt. However, Amery was surely one of the vocal lobbyists, if not a puppet master. Even after the general craze for Army Reform was assuaged by the dextrous Secretary of State, Richard Haldane, Amery continuously spoke and wrote materials on the military and participated in the National Service League. Based on these preceding experiences, he took part in the movement for conscription during the First World War and bombarded the War Cabinet with a barrage of memoranda, containing many military matters.

### **‘The brain of an Army’**

Amery deduced three military lessons from the South African War. According to his assessment, Britain’s initial failure in the war was caused by three problems: 1. the lack of information about the enemy, the country, and the fighting method; 2. the wrong strategy, in which the bulk of the army was placed in remote regions, which made the initial defeats inevitable; 3. the fact that neither the army officers nor the rank and file were sufficiently trained.<sup>13</sup> Amery presented each solution to each problem, though they were interconnected with each other. Since these suggestions had a lasting influence on his way of thinking, the following three sections will analyse their contents and legacies individually.

Amery argued that the sheer lack of information about how to fight against Boer soldiers did not result from the idleness of army officers but from a

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<sup>12</sup> L. S. Amery, *My Political Life*, vol. 1 (London: Hutchinson, 1953), chapter 8.

<sup>13</sup> Amery, *The Problem*, 10-13.

structural defect peculiar to the British Army. In his view, the foremost *raison d'être* of any army should be to gain victories in battles, but in Britain, unlike on the Continent, no department specialized in the preparation for war. Instead, army officers were too absorbed in clerical or administrative work such as managing barracks. The War Office, as a whole, suffered from a chronic congestion of work. His remedy was simple and clear: as in other national armies in developed countries, he proposed abolishing the vague position of Commander-in-Chief and establishing the General Staff.<sup>14</sup>

This does not mean that Amery was proposing to introduce a fully top-down model into the army. On the contrary, he emphasized that the new technologies, such as the invention and spread of smokeless powder, rifle guns, and machine guns, made each military unit small and mobile, and that they often had to be scattered over fields and had to move around without their senior officers' instruction for several hours. To make them effective, they needed to have the right to make a judgement call through decentralization. Notwithstanding the enlarged discretion of sub-units and individuals, it would not necessarily lead to chaos and anarchy in the organization, as long as the General Staff was, as the Prussian system showed, well in contact with the body of the army so that the executive could keep 'the army going in accordance with the general principle laid down by the staff'. In wartime, operations would be 'conducted by the generals, but throughout inspired and guided by the staff'.<sup>15</sup> The gist of his principle was the balanced installation of centralization and decentralization. In other words, he said, there was a need to set 'discipline on a higher plane'.

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<sup>14</sup> For historians' account of the General Staff in Britain, see Brian Bond, David French, and Brian Holden Reid, eds., *The British General Staff: Reform and Innovation c. 1890-1939* (London: Frank Cass, 2002).

<sup>15</sup> Amery, *The Problem*, 124-125.

The passive, automatic discipline of the ear must give place to the active, conscious discipline of mind and of the will. The soldier must have a clear idea of what his superiors want of him, and through a long day's fighting must be imbued with and sustained by unwavering conscientious resolve to carry out their instructions.<sup>16</sup>

Using the same logic, Amery claimed that the War Office should be revamped by 'the scientific division of the work and the due distribution of the responsibility'.<sup>17</sup>

Amongst his propositions, the call for the General Staff was most widely shared in the military milieu. As Amery himself recognized, the abolition of the Commander-in-Chief and the establishment of the General Staff had already been proposed by the Hartington Commission in 1890.<sup>18</sup> Spenser Wilkinson, one of the most renowned military writers, propagated the need in the public sphere by publishing 'The Brain of an Army' in 1890.<sup>19</sup> Moreover, the idea of flexible but disciplined relationships between the General Staff and sub units was first theorized by Helmuth von Moltke.<sup>20</sup> It is clear that there was no originality in Amery's argument about centralization and decentralization.

However, his contemplation on the issue had a tremendous influence on his world view. Amery, according to his recollections, learned the need of the General Staff from one of the two officers who influenced his view most, Gerald

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<sup>16</sup> Ibid., 181-182.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., 154.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid., 51-52.

<sup>19</sup> Jay Luvaas, *Education of an Army: British Military Thought, 1815-1940* (London: Cassel & Company Ltd, 1965), chapter 8.

<sup>20</sup> Azar Gat, *The Development of Military Thought: The Nineteenth Century* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 66-69.

Ellison (the other was Henry Wilson). Ellison, who was ‘the most “German” British soldier’ Amery ever met, taught the subject to Amery based on his intimate knowledge of the German Army. In hindsight, Amery admitted that ‘the true nature of the General Staff principle’ coloured his subsequent thinking:

As regards the Commonwealth, Ellison’s description of the German Army with its practically autonomous Army Corps Commands held together, not by central War Office control, but by the fact that their senior officers had all passed through Moltke’s great General Staff, strengthened in me an already growing conviction that Imperial unity would depend far more on unity of political methods and outlook and on close contact through free co-operation than on any kind of rigid constitutional structure. It was that conviction, as well as my economic views, that led me to throw myself with such passionate and sustained enthusiasm into Joseph Chamberlain’s campaign for Imperial Preference, while whatever earlier views I held in favour of some scheme of Imperial Federation gradually faded out altogether.<sup>21</sup>

Imperial federation was a denominator in the collective imagination of Victorian imperial theorists. While some twentieth-century successors, most notably the Round Table, attempted to reify the conception, its connotation of centralization often elicited suspicion and doubt from Dominion leaders, who officially rejected a federal scheme in the resolution of the 1917 imperial conference. On the other hand, some critics of the Round Table, including Amery and Richard Jebb, claimed to respect colonial nationalism and preferred a looser form of imperial

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<sup>21</sup> Amery, *My Political Life*, vol. 1, 192-195.

unity based on a common material interest of Imperial Preference.<sup>22</sup> The actual form of the British Commonwealth of Nations was much closer to the non-federal scheme. Therefore, as far as Amery's personal imperial thought is concerned, we might be able to see a military origin of the British Commonwealth in his scheme of institutional reform of the army.

Indeed, it is not advisable to take his self-portrait at face value and to assume that he was a benign sympathizer with colonial nationalism in the white settlement colonies. As he implied in the last sentence, the General Staff principle did not immediately make Amery discard the ultimate ideal of imperial federation, and he retained it as a long-term goal until around 1910. In fact, Amery used the analogy of the General Staff in a slightly different way in his comment on the Committee of Imperial Defence, which was established by the Balfour government in December 1902.<sup>23</sup>

Balfour's declaration about the Committee of Defence sounds good as far as it goes and may yet become the beginning of great things. I see a dim vision of the Empire run as far as policy goes by a great council (not great in numbers) representing purely thinking and intelligence departments, (commercial and diplomatic as well as military intelligence), while as far as administration is concerned each part remains self-governing as before – the underlying principles of the Prussian General State System being applied to the whole of Imperial Policy.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> Simon Potter, 'Richard Jebb, John S. Ewart and the Round Table, 1898–1926', *The English Historical Review* 122, no. 495 (2007): 105–32.

<sup>23</sup> As for the origin of the Committee, see Rhodri Williams, *Defending the Empire: The Conservative Party and British Defence Policy, 1899-1915* (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1991), 18-19, 22-23.

<sup>24</sup> Amery to Milner, 20 Feb 1903, Milner dep. 176.



Compared with the principle of loose cooperation stipulated by the Balfour Report in 1926, Amery's scheme for imperial unity before the First World War still leaned towards a centralized model in that he always demanded the creation of an imperial governing organization, if not an imperial parliament, separated from the local politics in each country, which should be a concrete step to an ultimate goal of imperial federation.<sup>25</sup> It reflects the fact that Amery's imperial thought at this stage still, relatively explicitly, emphasized the importance of British supremacy.<sup>26</sup>

His dilemma between British national interest and colonial nationalism can be found in his specific scheme for the General Staff. Amery insisted that the coming General Staff should be gradually imperialized by encouraging communication between the Imperial Council of Defence and the General Staff in Britain. Similarly, as the German General Staff reconciled decentralization with unity in military matters, a political General Staff namely an Imperial Advisory Council, composed of representatives and experts, might direct the whole policy of the Empire 'without interfering in the practical independence of every part. Such a solution might succeed in avoiding those difficulties and dangers in the way of any ordinary scheme of federation which, to many thinkers, seem to present an insuperable barrier to a truly united empire.'<sup>27</sup> The idea of the imperial General Staff was not his original invention, which was already in place in the late nineteenth century, but it gave him a crucial platform

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<sup>25</sup> As for the idea of an imperial conference and Amery's involvement, see John Edward Kendle, *The Colonial and Imperial Conferences, 1887-1911: A Study in Imperial Organization* (London: Longmans, for Royal Commonwealth Society, 1967).

<sup>26</sup> See Chapter 3.

<sup>27</sup> Amery, *The Problem*, 134-136.

where he grasped the issue of centralization and decentralization in the imperial framework, as well as in the military requirement.

As we can see above, we should not simply ascribe his aversion to imperial federation only to his struggle with the problem of the Army. After that, his imperial thought underwent other modifications and concessions.<sup>28</sup> That being said, his participation in the discussion over Army Reform undeniably made him amenable and sensitive to 'colonial nationalism' even before Richard Jebb coined the term. Moreover, the proper combination of centralization and decentralization became a fundamental format in his way of thinking. He would frequently resort to the idea when he encountered difficulties in domestic and imperial governance.

### **The distribution of the Army**

Amery attributed the delay in the arrival of additional forces in the first stage of the South African War to the structural defects of the distribution system initiated by Edward Cardwell in the 1870s. In the Cardwell system, each regiment was composed of two battalions, one of which was deployed in the UK, and the other of which was dispatched to foreign countries, meaning, for the most part, India. Amery admitted that the principle of the Cardwell reform was reasonable at the time. The considerable weight attached to the defence of the UK and India was a natural reaction to the shock of the Indian Mutiny and the Franco-Prussia war. Britain did not realize the true meaning of her naval supremacy until Alfred Mahan preached it, as a result of which Cardwell assumed that home defence needed a large number of reservists in the British

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<sup>28</sup> It can be said that the course was similar to the general change of imperialist defence principle from an Imperial Army to a Britannic Alliance. See, Mitcham, *Race and Imperial Defence*, chapter 7. As for the change of Amery's imperial thought, see chapter 6 of this thesis.

Isles. The subsequent passing of time, however, made the system completely obsolete and unworkable. As a consequence of the competitive expansion of empires in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the new strategic front of the British Empire emerged mainly in Africa and Asia. The problem was that it was necessary to increase the number of battalions put near the front with the military budget, already becoming abnormally high, maintained or even lowered. Furthermore, the Cardwell system bequeathed a vicious legacy in the recruiting system. Its service term was too short to be a life-long professional soldier, but too long to build a second career. With deficient payments and poor working environments, it formed a reason why the bulk of the Army consisted of unrespectable youngsters suffering from poverty and hunger. Therefore, Army Reform had to attain three goals at the same time: meet British strategic requirements, ease the strain on finance, and solve the recruiting problem.<sup>29</sup>

His ultimate ideal was consistent since his letter to Bell on 28 March 1900. The new system should be founded on a clear division between a long-service army for overseas and a short-service army for home defence that could furnish an adequate expeditionary force on mobilization. The linked battalion system should not be demolished, lest it should vitiate the traditional value of esprit de corps in regiments.<sup>30</sup> And yet, the regimental system should be more overseas-oriented; for example, each regiment should consist of one battalion for home defence and three for imperial service.<sup>31</sup> Under the current geopolitical circumstance of the British Empire, while a war against any powers on the European Continent was inconceivable at that moment, Asia and Africa had


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<sup>29</sup> Amery, *The Problem*, 58.

<sup>30</sup> As for historians' account on the role of the regimental system in Britain, see David French, *Military Identities: The Regimental System, the British Army, and the British People c.1870-2000* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

<sup>31</sup> Amery, *The Problem*, 59, 138.

been and would continue to be the main battlefields for the British Army. Considering the fact that it would be the Royal Navy, not the Army, that would take the decisive role in home defence, it was absurd to place half of the Regular Army in the UK.



The map was used by Amery to illustrate the strategic front of the British Empire. See his article in *The Times*, 21 January 1903. It was reprinted in *The Problem of the Army*.

In terms of geopolitics, the majority of the land forces should be in the white settlement colonies, including Canada, Australia, and pacified South Africa. These regions would not only provide large training grounds and relatively comfortable living environments, but also ‘develop still more rapidly in the near future under the stimulus of preferential trade within the Empire’.<sup>32</sup> Furthermore, the scheme would serve to strengthen the imperial unity within Great Britain by

<sup>32</sup> The quoted sentence was not in original articles in *The Times* in January 1903, but added to the book edition published in the winter. Amery, *The Problem*, 61.

inducing some white colonial citizens to be enlisted in the imperial (British) army. The ongoing Brodrick reforms, which attempted to organize the Home Regular Army into 6 Army Corps, missed the point in that they prioritized home defence and ignored the imperial dimension.

His emphasis on the importance of the imperial network was to become an indispensable element in his imperial vision. In addition to its geopolitical necessity, Amery applied this logic to the political and economic dimensions. To simultaneously achieve the centralization and decentralization of the imperial polity, the network for mutual consultation should be established.<sup>33</sup> In his scheme for imperial economic development, the intra-imperial trade and Britons' emigration to the Empire played a cardinal role.<sup>34</sup> The development of physical and institutional network was a premise in his imperial thinking.

As a concrete step towards the redistribution of the Army, Amery particularly suggested that a dozen battalions should be put in South Africa and that they should be treated as a part of the Home Establishment.<sup>35</sup> This could smoothly reduce the size of forces in the UK (and, by this means, the total size of the Regular Army) as well as meet any strategic requirements. This was Amery's first political project. His main target was Joseph Chamberlain, as well as Balfour. This episode has been already covered in the second section of Richard Grayson's journal article.<sup>36</sup> In January 1903, when he stayed in South Africa, Chamberlain, in consultation with Milner and Alfred Lyttelton, realized a need to retain some force in South Africa to maintain the order. Reading Amery's article sent by his son, Austen, and encountering the same agitation posed by Lieutenant-General Henry Settle, who had proposed a similar plan as

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<sup>33</sup> See Chapter 6.

<sup>34</sup> See Chapter 8.

<sup>35</sup> Amery, *The Problem*, Chapter 3.

<sup>36</sup> Grayson, 'Imperialism in Conservative Defence and Foreign Policy'.

of 1902, Chamberlain wrote to Edward VII that a force permanently stationed in South Africa should be regarded 'not as foreign garrison but as part of Home Army placed here for the convenience of the situation in event of any future war and as best possible ground for training and manoeuvres.'<sup>37</sup>

We can easily trace the process of their intrigues from the correspondence between Amery and Milner. Milner, understanding the outline of Amery's South African troop scheme through telegraphs, exhorted Amery: 'What I am writing for is to tell you to fight hard. Now is the time to fight.'<sup>38</sup> Amery's reply boasted that he had already got on with lobbying. He, in cahoots with an insider army officer, Ian Hamilton, had been trying to spread their views among MPs. For instance, they planned to talk separately with Balfour about this scheme on the same day, without revealing their collusion, in order to give Balfour the impression that the civilian and the soldier, coincidentally, had the same opinion.<sup>39</sup> Although Milner refused to lead the campaign because of his work in South Africa, they agreed to seduce Chamberlain into doing so. This was why Milner advertised the campaign while Chamberlain was staying in South Africa and why Amery, in cooperation with Hamilton, appealed to Chamberlain. In fact, the intrigue was on the verge of success. Chamberlain, without knowing the collusion of Amery and Hamilton, found their scheme satisfactory and circulated his memorandum among the cabinet. In completing it, he used 'some 30 pages of foolscaps' as a reference, which was a handwritten memorandum concocted by Amery.<sup>40</sup> In this context, Amery felt alarmed at first, rather than enthused, at Chamberlain's famous speech for Tariff Reform in May 1903.

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<sup>37</sup> Joseph Chamberlain to the King, 30 Jan 1903, JC 18/12.

<sup>38</sup> Milner to Amery, 26 Jan 1903, AMEL 1/3/40.

<sup>39</sup> Amery to Milner, 20 Feb 1903; 6 March 1903, Milner dep. 176.

<sup>40</sup> Milner to Amery, 6 April 1903, AMEL 1/3/38; Amery to Milner, 24 April 1903, Milner dep. 176.

I am afraid the question of the Army in South Africa has been completely over-shadowed by the great issues raised by Mr C and I doubt if we can now reckon on the same amount of support from him.<sup>41</sup>

His hunch turned out to be right. The cabinet members agreed to retain a 25,000 garrison in South Africa without any redefinition of their status, which was eventually withdrawn to Britain by Richard Haldane. Chamberlain, despite his agreement with Amery in principle, rejected resuming the fight and confessed: 'if I were out of Office I would gladly support the movement you have started, but it would be, I am sure, considered disloyal if I were to appear in the matter of the present time.'<sup>42</sup> Just before his resignation from the cabinet, he again rejected taking up the question of Army Reform because he wanted to keep himself 'entirely to the Fiscal Question.'<sup>43</sup>

Richard Grayson has pointed out that Amery advocated recruiting from colonists, whereas Chamberlain preferred to send more British soldiers, and explained the difference as follows:

Amery wanted to build enthusiasm for the empire by recruiting for home units from within the colonies .... In contrast, Chamberlain wanted to draw the colonies more closely into the empire through South Africans meeting British soldiers, and some of those soldiers eventually remaining as colonists themselves ....

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<sup>41</sup> Amery to Milner, 20 June 1903, reprinted in *EB*, vol. 1, 46-47.

<sup>42</sup> Chamberlain to Amery, 15 July 1903, AMEL 2/5/2.

<sup>43</sup> Chamberlain to Amery, 5 September 1903, AMEL 2/5/2.

Using a historiographical analogy, Grayson claimed that Amery made a 'peripheral' argument for intra-colonial development of imperial unity, while Chamberlain was 'metropolitan'.<sup>44</sup> However, the interpretation is problematic, albeit not completely wrong. First of all, he refers to one letter from Chamberlain to Amery as evidence showing that Chamberlain disagreed about the colonial recruiting but, actually, in the letter, there is no mention of this.<sup>45</sup> Moreover, it is too simplistic to categorize their attitude as such a dichotomy. In Amery's private memorandum, '30 pages of foolscaps' sent to Chamberlain, he explicitly advocated the scheme as a means of promoting mass emigration to South Africa.

If a battalion in S. Africa costs 80000£ or over we may reckon that fully 50000£ will be spent locally. That means probably adding 100 English families to that district and through them and through business the anglicising or at any rate loyalising of many Dutch families. ... The reservists who settles, grows tobacco and c, will find a ready market in his own old regiment.<sup>46</sup>

Amery already knew the rebuttal from the War Office that the South African battalions could not be immediately dispatched to the war zone unless sufficient reservists chose to settle in South Africa. He consulted Milner about how to make this possible.<sup>47</sup> In this memorandum, Amery connected this with a more

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<sup>44</sup> Grayson, 'Imperialism', 508-510.

<sup>45</sup> See, *Ibid.*, 509 and Chamberlain to Amery, 2 April 1903, JC 18/12. Grayson also made a mistake in that he assumed that Chamberlain and Amery already discussed the South African garrison scheme in 1902 by citing Chamberlain to Amery 4 Nov 1902. The topic of this letter was not the army but the land settlement board in South Africa.

<sup>46</sup> Amery's handwritten private memorandum, JC 18/12.

<sup>47</sup> Amery to Milner, 6 March 1903; 13 March 1903, Milner dep. 176.



ambitious project of migration. As will be revealed in Chapter 3, he unreservedly supported the Milnerite scheme of anglicising South Africa by bringing in British farmers. Even after the infamous scheme failed, he justified its principle and qualitative effect and hoped that imperial preference would attract British immigrants. Amery did not announce this intention in any other published materials so explicitly, though he implied that localising the battalions in self-governing colonies would make it easier for reservists to find a new job there than in England.<sup>48</sup> He might also have been aware that the 'Anglicisation' project was controversial enough to baffle potential supports of the scheme.<sup>49</sup> Given his consistent calls for increased settlement, it was more probable that Amery valued the social aspect of the scheme. In this sense, Grayson is right in arguing that Amery had a wider vision of imperial unity than Chamberlain.<sup>50</sup> However, we should not see Amery as a champion of the 'peripheral' approach. In his scheme, sympathy with colonial nationalism and the cause of British supremacy coexisted confidently, but somewhat awkwardly, side-by-side and this would be another important feature of his imperial thinking.<sup>51</sup>

### **Tariff Reform and Army Reform**

Before turning to the third suggestion of his scheme, the interconnection between Tariff Reform and Army Reform should be clarified. After Chamberlain abandoned the South African troop scheme, Amery placed high expectations on

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<sup>48</sup> In the memorandum sent to Balfour, he only discussed the beneficial effects on the organization of the Army. 'Some Consequences of the Placing of 30,000 men in South Africa on the Home Establishment', Balfour Papers, Add MS 49775.

<sup>49</sup> Actually, Hamilton confessed in 1908 that he found impractical the Milnerite ambition to establish 'a British majority by what are really artificial means'. Hamilton to Sellar, 5 Nov 1908, Hamilton 21/3.

<sup>50</sup> Grayson, 'Imperialism', 509-510.

<sup>51</sup> See Chapter 3-7.

Arnold-Forster, who replaced Brodrick when Tariff Reform forced Balfour to reshuffle the cabinet in 1903. He was the only Secretary of State for War who shared Amery's ideal: that is, the two-tier system of the Army. Amery's memoir tells an interesting episode. When Arnold-Forster suffered from a nervous breakdown, Amery was called in and asked to write a 6000-word memorandum on his behalf. A letter from the Forster's wife indicates that this was true. Amery wholeheartedly supported the Secretary, who was vehemently criticized, even by Unionists/Conservatives due to his stubborn personality and his premature attempt to trim down the Militia.<sup>52</sup>

Aside from this fruitless attempt, facing Chamberlain's indifference to Army Reform after May 1903, Amery needed to conceptualize it in a broader context. Instead of replacing Army Reform with Tariff Reform, he tried to create a common cause in which both of them could complement each other. This was part of the reason why Amery engaged with the launch and management of the Compatriots Club. His letter to Lord Roberts in May 1904 explained that it was 'a league of keen and, mainly junior, people and anxious to push forward the idea of imperial unity and to press for any constructive policy, fiscal, political or defensive that may help towards that end.'<sup>53</sup>

Amery expressed his systematized view on the military aspect of 'constructive imperialism' in his article titled 'Imperial Defence and National Policy' in *The Empire and the Century*, a collection of essays published by the imperial milieu in 1905.<sup>54</sup> As can be seen from his criticism of the Cardwell

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<sup>52</sup> Amery, *My Political Life*, vol. 1, 211; Mary Arnold-Forster to Amery, 15 July 1904, Amery to Arnold-Forster, 18 July, 20 July 1904, Arnold-Forster to Amery, 19 July 1904, AMEL 1/1/15; Albert Tucker, 'The Issue of Army Reform in the Unionist Government, 1903-5', *The Historical Journal* 9, no. 1 (1966): 90-100.

<sup>53</sup> Amery to Roberts, 11 May 1904, Roberts Papers.

<sup>54</sup> Amery, 'Imperial Defence and National Policy' in C. S. Goldman, ed., *The Empire and the Century* (London: John Murray, 1905), 174-196.

system, he applied the rhetoric of the economic historical school to defence policy. This article substantially extended this argument. He started it by lamenting that British people had forgotten the fundamental truth that defence was an essential part of national life. According to his view of history, the connection between industry and defence was not wholly lost from view in the age of the navigation laws, whereas, for two generations after Waterloo, Englishmen were taught to regard national life 'under a single aspect – the aspect of unregulated commerce' thanks to the reaction against militarism agitated by the Little Englander and the Cobdenite school of thought. As a result, Britain lost control of their own commerce, which enriched the American economy and led British emigrants to the US. The British Empire thus suffered from the sluggish development of the economy and population growth. Amery said, 'it is no exaggeration to say that we lost a greater colonial empire to the United States in the nineteenth century than we did in the eighteenth.'

The situation had been changing since the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Inside the UK there emerged a loftier imperial ideal in which, unlike Anglo-centrism in the past, the Empire was imagined as being 'composed of equal and independent yet indissolubly united States'. Moreover, Britain now faced external threats. In terms of both military and economic strength, Britain was about to be outstripped by other superpowers, meaning that what was in jeopardy was not just mainland Britain but the British Empire as a whole. For the security of the whole empire, Britain needed to retain naval hegemony and form an efficient army that was capable of expanding in response to emergency. Taking into account the rapid development of other nation states, however, it would get harder and harder for the UK alone to incur all the cost of imperial defence and even to maintain the Two Power Standard, the premise of

all security. There would be 'only one way to get out of difficulty – that is to find the material basis of our defence policy not in the United Kingdom but in the British Empire'. It was still impossible to ask the settlement colonies to increase their financial contribution to imperial defence, simply because they were not yet wealthy enough. Amery urged readers to recognize that Britain could not survive the new era without achieving economic development and population growth in the Empire.

That English interest should be defended by the whole Empire is only right and natural. But if it is desired that the whole forces of the Empire should be organized for the defence of English interests, it is essential that those interests should be as far as possible assimilated with those of other parts of the Empire. Economic unity must be regarded as an essential step towards unity of defence.<sup>55</sup>

Amery finally acquired the languages required to unite Tariff Reform and Army Reform into a comprehensive policy to destroy lingering Gladstonian Liberalism.

The fusion, in turn, affected his language regarding Tariff Reform. In his note for a speech in Wolverhampton in December 1906, he praised Milner's speech, to be delivered on the same day, for identifying two big issues, 'the defence of our Empire and the defence of our industry'. As British citizens should recognize their duty to be ready to serve their country in any war, they should grasp their economic duty for their nation.

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<sup>55</sup> Ibid., 182-192.

He [Milner] has made us realize that it is the duty of every citizen to see that in following his private interests he should at the same time help out his fellow citizens, to recognize that in every business transaction he enters upon he is affecting the employment and livelihood of his fellow citizens, and has no right to disregard the consequences of his dealings. He has laid stress on the duty of the state towards all classes of society, and above all towards the great body of producers who depend for their livelihood and their happiness upon the opportunity for employment. That is a truer and nobler socialism or nationalism than that which thinks it can benefit one class by plundering another. It is a policy whose object is to raise the standard of well-being to level up and not to level down. And in that policy tariff reform, industrial defence, is an essential element though not the only element.<sup>56</sup>

Since his schooldays, he was susceptible to the feeling that the hegemonic ideologies appropriated by Gladstonian Liberalism were not suitable for the coming era. This general feeling led him to be a member of the Fabian Society, as well as to be an imperialist.<sup>57</sup> The impact of the South African War, however, decisively oriented his politics. Amery stopped his flirtation with socialism and concluded that the British Empire could offer comprehensive security in both military and social terms based on a new social contract. The next section will discuss a significant element in his scheme for the social contract.

### **The issue of National Service**

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<sup>56</sup> AMEL 1/2/17.

<sup>57</sup> This topic is fully discussed in Chapter 8.

The third lesson of the war was the lack of proper training. The existing literature already shed light on the role of Amery in the movement for National Service. He joined the National Service League with Milner and acted as a ghost-speechwriter for the president of the League, Lord Roberts.<sup>58</sup> Thus, there is no need to repeat the description of the details of his involvement. What has not been resolved are the questions, why and how he advocated the cause. This section will address this.

Historians have revealed the complex and diverse arguments in favour of National Service. There was a consensus among its supporters that 'National Service' did not mean conscription but a system of compulsory training similar to the Swiss system. While advocates of conscription regarded this as a compromise, true believers of National Service claimed that it was the very system that would fit into British culture and society. Some emphasized the necessity of preventing or dealing with possible invasion from the European Continent, while others attached importance to its effect on national morale and discipline.<sup>59</sup> Where can we locate Amery's position?

Michael Howard has presented an answer to this question. According to his interpretation, Amery (and Milner) supported it not for tackling invasion but 'on the neo-Hegelian grounds that it was as necessary to the moral well-being of the individual as to the security of the State'. The interpretation was generated based on Howard's conviction that there were two different directions in British strategy making; the continental commitment and the imperial commitment. He depicted Amery as a typical imperialist who was so obsessed with the imperial commitment that he underestimated the importance of the continental

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<sup>58</sup> Amery, *My Political Life*, vol. 1, 217-218. One handwritten draft for Roberts can be found in AMEL 1/2/6.

<sup>59</sup> Hayes, *Conscription Conflict*; Allison, 'The National Service Issue, 1899-1914', 1975; Adams and Poirier, *The Conscription Controversy in Great Britain, 1900-18*.

commitment.<sup>60</sup> The dichotomy was somewhat simplistic, as Chapter 2 will argue later, but as far as the argument regarding 'morality' is concerned, Howard was not incorrect. As early as in 1903, Amery propagated the idea of national military training by emphasizing its spiritual and moral effects as well as a need to strengthen the national physique. If people are trained as a part of general education, they could acquire not only the aptitude of the soldier, but the habits of discipline and self-restraint which would be useful to any career. The morality which the training would bring could fill the gap generated by the decline of religion. Moreover, it would be completely unfair if only patriotic citizens who participated in a Militia or a Volunteer had to spend their spare time doing so.<sup>61</sup>

Though what the adjective 'neo-Hegelian' exactly means in Howard's definition is unclear, he explained the principle by quoting Amery's remark: 'it is the duty of all citizens to be trained in their youth to the use of arms'. It indicates an authoritarian state binding their nation by imposing duties. The nature of the activism and organization of the National Service League has been depicted by historians as aristocratic, hierarchical, authoritarian, and exclusive.<sup>62</sup> It is a quite proper conclusion, given the fact that the issue of National Service failed to gain wider appeal in popular politics. However, aside from the historical assessment of the movement, we should also shed light on how those activists tried to represent their cause. Amery actually justified his scheme as a progressive, not conservative, project.

First of all, he believed that Army Reform should be a form of social revolution. He excoriated wealthy but incompetent people who infiltrated the

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<sup>60</sup> Howard, *The Continental Commitment*, 34-39.

<sup>61</sup> Amery, 'National Military Training', *The Times*, 4 February 1903.

<sup>62</sup> See David Thackeray, *Conservatism for the Democratic Age* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013), 6-7. 47-49.

military service via the Militia after failing to be admitted into Sandhurst. He also hated aristocratic officers in the cavalry who joined the Army just to enhance their honour. Favouritism needed to be replaced by promotion by merit. All these arguments resonated with his plea for efficiency and decentralization.<sup>63</sup>

What is more important is the fact that Amery tried to characterize National Service as 'democratic'. From the outset he anticipated that critics would stigmatize compulsory training as un-English or militaristic. His counterargument was that compulsion itself was not un-English because education and taxation were compulsory systems. And if the latter was not compulsory, people would find it unfair.<sup>64</sup> Amery developed this into a more general argument.

It [National service] will infuse a spirit of discipline and organization into our masses; while it will at the same time be democratic, bringing every class together to the same common work, and inspiring them with a common sense of duty. It will afford an opportunity for raising the standard and prolonging the period of the national education. It will give a healthy physical training to the masse of our people .... It will enable anything like physical degeneration to be at once noted, and will call for its instant cure.<sup>65</sup>

Amery devised his case for National Service as an essential part of a progressive policy for the democratic age.

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<sup>63</sup> Amery, 'The Selection and Training of Officers', *The Times*, 23 February 1903.

<sup>64</sup> Amery, 'National Military Training'.

<sup>65</sup> Amery, 'Imperial Defence and National Policy', 196.



No matter how hard he tried to persuade the public, however, he could not convert the majority. Liberals ruthlessly denounced Amery's support for protection and conscription as 'retrograde'.<sup>66</sup> After seeing the harsh reality, he ceased to propagate National Service in the election campaigns, as he started to present Tariff Reform as a protectionist rather than an imperial policy.<sup>67</sup> The Edwardian Labour Party, in terms of its relations with people, faced the dilemma 'between the desire to represent and the desire to reform.'<sup>68</sup> The case study of Amery implies that some of Unionists/Conservatives agonized over the same dilemma. Amery himself seemed to be unconsciously aware of the problem. In refuting the expected criticism that his proposals would destroy the British character, such as its embrace of personal liberty and its material well-being, Amery claimed that they would actually be beneficial to the people, trade, social well-being, and education in the long run.<sup>69</sup> The fact that he refrained from adding 'liberty' to this list symbolized the dilemma.

## Conclusion

Amery's campaign for Army Reform and National Service had a lasting influence on his world view. He learned the principle of simultaneous centralization and decentralization from the Prussian model of the General Staff, which nurtured his views on imperial constitution. However, it also posed a question that haunted him all his life: to what extent power should be centralized or devolved. His scheme for troops in South Africa embraced the contradiction between British national interest and colonial nationalism in South

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<sup>66</sup> George White's speech for the 1908 by-election campaign, covered in an undated press cutting in AMEL 5/5.

<sup>67</sup> See Chapter 8.

<sup>68</sup> Jon Lawrence, *Speaking for the People: Party, Language and Popular Politics in England, 1867-1914*, Cambridge, 1998, 266.

<sup>69</sup> Amery, 'Imperial Defence and National Policy', 196

Africa. After the launch of the Tariff Reform movement in 1903, he justified the imperialization of fiscal policy as being complementary to that of defence policy. His rhetoric to urge the electorate to accept those changes as civic duties, however, brought another dilemma. As symbolized by his attempt to appropriate the language of democracy for the National Service campaign, his mind was torn between the need to adapt to the democratic age and his desire to establish his ideal form of democracy in Britain.

## 2 Geopolitics

The political history of the British grand strategy in the first half of the twentieth century was long shaped by the dichotomy between the continental (European) commitment and the imperial commitment. Amery was naturally seen as an advocate of the latter. For instance, regarding the strategy in the First World War, Paul Guinn has regarded Amery as one of the champions of 'New Imperialism' who tried to secure territories indispensable to imperial defence and prioritized the Eastern Front.<sup>1</sup> This reflected the dominant historical narrative that depicted strategy-making during the war as a conflict between the 'Westerners', composed of 'brass hats', and the 'Easterners', mainly consisting of 'frock coats'. The latter was always on the offensive because they were able to present an alternative that could have ended the trench war earlier.<sup>2</sup> Amery assisted the formation of this myth by claiming that he was a consistent Easterner.<sup>3</sup>

The calamity of the Second World War added another twist to the historical narrative. Some influential scholars argued that it was Britain's tenacious commitment to the overstretched empire that resulted in Neville Chamberlain's policy of appeasement and Britain's unpreparedness in the subsequent war.<sup>4</sup> This interpretation was in tune with the age of decolonization and the relative

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<sup>1</sup> Paul Guinn, *British Strategy and Politics 1914-18* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), 192-196

<sup>2</sup> For instance, see David Lloyd George, *War Memoir*, vol. 1-2 (London: Odhams Press, 1938); Liddell Hart, *The Real War 1914-1918* (London: Faber and Faber, 1930). Liddell Hart acted as an assistant for Lloyd George in writing his war memoirs. George M. Egerton, 'The Lloyd George "War Memoirs": A Study in the Politics of Memory', *The Journal of Modern History* 60, no. 1 (1988): 55-94.

<sup>3</sup> Amery to Liddell Hart, 8 April 1935, Liddell Hart Papers, 1/14; Amery, *My Political Life*, vol. 2, chapter 1-5.

<sup>4</sup> Michael Howard, *The Continental Commitment: The Dilemma of British Defence Policy in the Era of the Two World Wars* (London: Temple Smith, 1972); Brian Bond, *British Military Policy Between the Two World Wars* (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 1980).

'decline' of Britain. In this big picture, Amery was portrayed as a man on the imperial side, who called for the imperial commitment strongly enough 'to disregard the European balance'.<sup>5</sup> This interpretation awkwardly coexisted with his reputation as a consistent, but also cautious, anti-appeaser.<sup>6</sup>

However, since around the 1980s, a series of new studies has presented revisionist explanations.<sup>7</sup> Although it is inappropriate to call these diverse studies a 'school', they have tended to agree that the dichotomy between imperialists and continentalists is too simplified. British policymakers did not necessarily neglect the continental commitment and often prioritized the third element, that is, home defence.<sup>8</sup> The conflict over the strategy during the Great War has been reinterpreted as disagreement concerning how to preserve the status and security of the UK and the Empire, and not as a clear-cut division between the Westerners and the Easterners.<sup>9</sup> Reflecting these trends, recent research has presented more nuanced interpretations of Amery's geopolitical thinking, which was certainly imperialist but did not always neglect other elements.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Howard, *The Continental Commitment*, 34.

<sup>6</sup> A. L. Rowse, *All Souls and Appeasement* (London: Macmillan, 1961); Neville Thompson, *The Anti-Appeasers: Conservative Opposition to Appeasement in the 1930s* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971).

<sup>7</sup> For instance, John Robert Ferris, *The Evolution of British Strategic Policy, 1919-26* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989); David Edgerton, *England and the Aeroplane: An Essay on a Militant and Technological Nation* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991); Christopher M. Bell, *The Royal Navy, Seapower and Strategy Between the Wars* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000); Edgerton, *Warfare State: Britain, 1920-1970* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). Also see the articles in *The International History Review* 13, no. 4 (1991).

<sup>8</sup> G. C. Peden, 'The Burden of Imperial Defence and the Continental Commitment Reconsidered', *The Historical Journal* 27, no. 2 (1984): 405–23; B. J. C. McKercher, 'The Foreign Office, 1930–1939: Strategy, Permanent Interests, and National Security', *Contemporary British History* 18, no. 3 (2004): 87–109; idem., 'National Security and Imperial Defence: British Grand Strategy and Appeasement, 1930–1939', *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 19, no. 3 (2008): 391–442; David G. Morgan-Owen, *The Fear of Invasion: Strategy, Politics, and British War Planning, 1880-1914* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).

<sup>9</sup> David French, *British Strategy & War Aims, 1914-1916* (London & Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1986); idem., *The Strategy of the Lloyd George Coalition, 1916-1918* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995). However also see Millman's criticism of French. Brock Millman, *Pessimism and British War Policy, 1916–1918* (London: Frank Cass, 2003).

<sup>10</sup> Richard S. Grayson, 'Imperialism in Conservative Defence and Foreign Policy: Leo Amery and the Chamberlains, 1903-39', *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 34, no. 4

The progress in research on appeasement has also made our understanding of Amery's position more sophisticated. Since the 1990s, historians have ceased to ascribe the cause of appeasement solely to personal or structural factors. Recent research has tended to focus on the question of how and upon what assumptions the actors chose their positions.<sup>11</sup> Roger Louis and Richard Grayson have revealed Amery's assumption, in which the imperial commitment and (anti-)appeasement was co-related. According to them, Amery admitted, in principle, the German domination of Central Europe, as well as Japanese expansion in East Asia and the Italian occupation of Abyssinia. Yet, he did not approve of Neville Chamberlain's over-generous attitudes towards Germany. In short, he had an imperialist alternative to both collective security through the League of Nations and unprincipled appeasement of the National Government.<sup>12</sup>

This chapter does not intend a radical reinterpretation of these findings but offers a more nuanced and long-term description of his position. His stance on geopolitics was not abruptly formed in the interwar years. Like other areas in his political thought, his geopolitical thinking should be seen as a process of negotiation between his ideological beliefs and his responses to the changing circumstances. While the imperial commitment was certainly his primary

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(2006): 505–27; Katherine C. Epstein, 'Imperial Airs: Leo Amery, Air Power and Empire, 1873–1945', *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 38, no. 4 (2010): 571–98; David John Mitchell, 'The Army League, Conscription and the 1956 Defence Review' (PhD thesis, University of East Anglia, 2012).

<sup>11</sup> The best summary of the historiography is Sidney Aster, 'Appeasement: Before and After Revisionism', *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 19, no. 3 (2008): 443–80. The followings are some examples of the recent research. R. A. C. Parker, *Chamberlain and Appeasement: British Policy and the Coming of the Second World War* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 1993); Michael L. Roi, *Alternative to Appeasement: Sir Robert Vansittart and Alliance Diplomacy, 1934–1937* (Westport: Praeger, 1997); Frank McDonough, *Neville Chamberlain, Appeasement and the British Road to War* (Manchester & New York: Manchester University Press, 1998).

<sup>12</sup> WM. Roger Louis, *In the Name of God, Go!: Leo Amery and the British Empire in the Age of Churchill* (New York & London: W.W. Norton, 1992), 111–119; Richard S. Grayson, 'Leo Amery's Imperialist Alternative to Appeasement in the 1930s', *Twentieth Century British History* 17, no. 4 (2006): 489–515.

concern, Amery opportunistically emphasized the importance of home defence and even the continental commitment. The first two sections of this chapter will describe how Amery formulated his peculiar vision of international order, the 'balance of imperial power', by the end of the First World War. The third section will argue that it was this vision that made him a lukewarm anti-appeaser about Germany and a hardliner about the Middle East.

### **Before 1914**

At the beginning of the chapter on the First World War in Amery's autobiography, in hindsight, he acclaimed himself a prophet: 'Ever since the South African War I had dreaded a major European War which would find us once more unprepared. .... I had for ten years ... steadily preached the need for an army to match the foreign policy to which we were committed.'<sup>13</sup> This self-justification glosses over his wavering about the British grand strategy in the pre-war period. At the same time, the existing research, which has tended to emphasize Amery's imperialist aspects, has overlooked the fact that his self-portrait was not a mere fabrication, particularly on the eve of the Great War. This section will depict the crooked line of his thought in the period.

As shown in the previous chapter, one of the fundamental propositions in *The Problem of the Army*, published in 1903, was that the troops in the Army should be redistributed to reinforce the imperial front. To highlight the anachronism of the Cardwell system, Amery explicitly emphasized the improbability of a war with any country on the Continent and the uselessness of the Army in such a war, in which decisive battles would be fought at sea. That is, the Army's primary role would be to deal with colonial insurgencies and any

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<sup>13</sup> Amery, *My Political Life*, vol. 2, 9.

clash with other powers in the imperial peripheries.<sup>14</sup> These statements indicate that his attitude could be categorized as a stereotypical advocacy of the imperial commitment. It also means that Amery reckoned that neither France nor Germany was an immediate potential enemy.

Amery's interest in geopolitics in Central and Eastern Europe and the Middle East can be traced back to the pre-Boer-War years. In fact, it was the topic that his first formal publications discussed. After gaining a fellowship of All Souls, he spent a few weeks in Constantinople in 1896 to learn Turkish, which was required by the Imperial Institute scholarship. The stormy political situation there (he arrived just two days after the massacre of the Armenians in the city) sparked his interest in the region. After receiving a commission to write articles about the region from C. P. Scott of the *Manchester Guardian* in 1897, he wandered around Eastern Europe and the Balkan peninsula. In the following year, he visited Eastern Europe with F. E. Smith and, then, the Balkans. Throughout the period, he contributed articles about the political situations in the region to various newspapers and periodicals.<sup>15</sup>

These articles show not only his early thinking on relations between nationalism and empires, which will be dealt with in Chapter 6, but also his contemplation of British foreign policy in the past and the future. In a review article in *The Edinburgh Review*, Amery attempted to protect Disraeli's reputation against criticism of his indirect compliance with Turkish mismanagement of their empire, including the failure to prevent the massacre of Armenians, by alleging that the true object of Disraeli's policy was 'to bring Turkey in Asia completely under British control'. He was aware that it was now

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<sup>14</sup> Amery, *The Problem of the Army*, 3-5.

<sup>15</sup> Amery, *My Political Life*, vol. 1, chapter 3.

out of the question to make the Ottoman Empire a British protectorate. Instead, Britain should try to maintain an open door for its commercial and industrial interests. Although the most obvious opponent to this policy was the German Empire, Amery claimed, German ambition could be compatible with British interests in the Middle East. Both countries desired not annexation but the material and moral development of the Ottoman Empire. Above all, they shared the need to eliminate the Russian influence from the region. According to his prediction, Britain and Germany could mutually admit each other's sphere of influence in the Middle East.<sup>16</sup> These proposals implied that Amery thought the most dangerous potential enemy was Russia and Britain and Germany could extend their informal empires hand in hand in the Middle East.

Amery had pointed out in his memoir that he had had this assumption at that time. However, his memoir also claimed that the optimistic assumption was demolished by anti-British sentiments he witnessed first-hand when he stayed in Berlin in 1898. He seemed to be especially shocked by his conversation with Theodor Mommsen. Mommsen's long tirade on England's unfair treatment of Prussia throughout history, which was almost the same as the content of violently nationalistic newspapers, poured cold water on Amery's reverence for him as a historian.<sup>17</sup>

However, we should be cautious about the extent to which this short stay fundamentally altered Germany's position in Amery's grand strategy. According to the minutes of the Coefficients, which Amery and Mackinder authored, they discussed 'What should be relations of Britain to the great European powers' on 27 April 1903. The majority agreed that Russia's advance against the weak

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<sup>16</sup> Amery, 'Asia Minor', *The Edinburgh Review*, April 1899.

<sup>17</sup> Amery, *My Political Life*, vol. 1, 95-99.



states of Asia was the most serious problem, while the minority retorted that German ambition was a more urgent threat.<sup>18</sup> It was likely that Amery belonged to the majority. Amery urged Balfour to intervene more actively in the East to halt Russian aggression, especially to take offensive actions to hold 'Seistan'.<sup>19</sup> Once the Russo-Japanese war broke out, Amery contended that Britain should instigate a nationalist insurrection in Finland and even occupy Finland to wrest it from Russia.<sup>20</sup> He anticipated that the global great game with Russia would last for another generation. The *détente* between Russia and Britain after 1905 did lower the priority of Russia in his mind, but the conflict with the Russian Empire was never removed from his emergency list.<sup>21</sup>

With the tension in the relationship with Russia subsiding, Amery gradually took the German menace more seriously. The foremost reason for this change was the naval race with Germany. Amery repeatedly maintained that the Two Power Standard was a necessary minimum in British defence policy. In his view, overwhelming armaments were deterrents to wars. His speech in 1909 declared:

I am as convinced as I stand here that there were at almost half a dozen occasions in last 15 years, when France, Russia, or Germany or two or some of them would have gone to war with us, if our navy had not been so strong as to make it hopeless for them to try.

At the same time, Amery frankly acknowledged that it was now difficult to retain this policy due to the rise of German naval power. The possible loss of sea-

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<sup>18</sup> Papers of the Coefficients, ASSOC 17.

<sup>19</sup> Amery to Balfour, 27 November 1903; 2 December 1903. Add MS 49775

<sup>20</sup> Amery to Balfour, 5 November 1904. Ibid.

<sup>21</sup> A speech draft written for Lord Roberts in 1907. AMEL 1/2/6.

power could be a fatal blow to Britons because it could disrupt all supply chains of British industries.<sup>22</sup> Amery was gradually forced to recognize that the threat from the Continent was as urgent an issue as imperial defence was.

The alteration of his grand strategy influenced his aim of National Service. Amery's purpose in supporting the movement has been interpreted in various ways. Michael Howard, who assumed that Amery was indifferent to the continental commitment, has argued that Amery embraced the cause 'on the neo-Hegelian ground'. On the other hand, D. J. Mitchell has noted that the reason for Amery's support had strategical substance; as an imperialist downplaying invasion scares, Amery believed that a large reserve, which would be created by National Service, could enable the Regular Army and the Navy to cope promptly with colonial emergencies without being tied up in the British Isles.<sup>23</sup> To sort out his various causes, we need to grasp his discourse as a process rather than a static entity. His primary aim for National Service changed from a spiritual to a strategical one tailored for both imperial and home defence.

Although from the outset Amery envisaged that National Service could create a foundation for an effective auxiliary force, he, at first, tended to justify national training as a means of reforming the British nation, regardless of its military effectivity.<sup>24</sup> Why did Amery understate its possible effect on home defence? It was mainly because he criticized Brodrick's reform plan to reorganize the land force for home defence as an extravagant and anachronistic attempt to maintain the Cardwell system. Thus, while Amery claimed that 'an absolutely defenceless England' would shackle the Navy and

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<sup>22</sup> Amery's draft of a speech in Bolton on 18 March 1909. AMEL 1/2/6

<sup>23</sup> Howard, *The Continental Commitment*, 34-39. Although Mitchell has been aware that Amery later on accepted the possibility of invasion threat from Germany, he has not taken into account its influence on his idea of National Service. Mitchell, 'The Army League', 59.

<sup>24</sup> Amery, 'Imperial Defence and National Policy' in C. S. Goldman, ed., *The Empire and the Century* (London: John Murray, 1905), 195.

that however unlikely, the possibility of a war with any state in Europe should not be left out of calculations, he concluded: 'in such a case the existence in England of large numbers of men and officers possessed of some military training, and, what is almost more important, the existence of a vigorous military spirit in the nation, will prove invaluable.'<sup>25</sup> As explained in the previous chapter, Amery's foremost goal of Army Reform was a two-tier force composed of a long-service Regular Army for imperial defence and a short-service local force for home defence. Given the psychological impact of the South African War and the fear of Russian expansion, it is understandable that he paid more attention to imperial defence and emphasized the spiritual, rather than the military, effects of National Service on home defence.

In the course of the 1900s, however, Amery turned into an all-frontal scaremonger. He pointed out that the British Empire was so 'continental' in the borderland of Egypt, India, and even Canada that Britain could not completely depend on the Navy.<sup>26</sup> In parallel with highlighting the inadequacy, in both quality and quantity, of the Territorial Force established by Richard Haldane, he argued that a National Militia, which would be re-composed from the Territorial Force through training, could have a genuinely military function in providing a sufficient force for home defence to liberate the Regular Army and the Navy, and in providing a source of expansion in a war.<sup>27</sup> That is, National Service became a fundamental piece of his scheme to secure imperial and home defence.

Moreover, in a 1913 memorandum, he finally became an advocate of the continental commitment. According to his prediction, aside from minor colonial

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<sup>25</sup> Amery, *The Problem of the Army*, 92-93.

<sup>26</sup> Amery's speech draft for Lord Roberts AMEL 1/2/6.

<sup>27</sup> Amery, 'The Case for National Service', in idem., *Union and Strength: A Series of Papers on Imperial Questions* (London: Edward Arnold, 1912), 165-166.

insurgencies, there were three cases of a great struggle for which Britain would have to dispatch an Expeditionary Force.<sup>28</sup>

There is the defence of our position in India against Russian aggression. There is the defence of Canada against the United States. And thirdly, there is the possibility of our being compelled to take the field in Europe as members of an alliance ....

He explicitly stated that the third case meant a war 'on behalf of France against Germany'. Amery devised a National Militia scheme (including national military training) to achieve all these goals. Now his geopolitical policy incorporated not only home and imperial defence but also a commitment to the Continent.

Returning to the quotation from Amery's memoir, his self-evaluation had considerable distortion and exaggeration. He was not by any means a consistent admonitor of a war against Germany. On the contrary, he was inclined to distance himself from the mainstream of the National Service League, which was obsessed with the invasion scare.<sup>29</sup> At the same time, it is wrong to dismiss him as an imperialist who ignored the Continent. Certainly, his Army Reform movement started with a plea for more effective imperial defence. However, each time a new threat emerged, his geopolitical scheme incorporated another countermeasure rather than replacing one measure with another. Consequently, his scheme expanded into a chimaera that could beat

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<sup>28</sup> Amery, 'Notes on the Military Situation', AMEL 1/3/2.

<sup>29</sup> Amery criticized the official line of the National Service League, because of its lack of imperial strategy: 'the scheme contains no provision at all for the reinforcement, temporary or permanent, of any part of the Empire without completely dislocating the national training arrangements'. Amery, 'Notes on the Military Situation', AMEL 1/3/2. As for the official line of the League, see Roger T. Stearn, "'The Last Glorious Campaign": Lord Roberts, the National Service League and Compulsory Military Training, 1902-1914', *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research* 87, no. 352 (2009): 312–30.

any enemy but existed only on paper. Amery believed that National Service could be a catalyst to transform the military system, though he adjusted the meaning of National Service to adapt to changing circumstances. In this period, his concern concentrated on how the UK and the British Empire could survive the international competition. It was the experience of the Great War that made Amery acquire a perspective on the international order.

### **The balance of imperial power**

Amery was a supporter of the Gallipoli campaign in 1915. After the failure of the operation, he consoled Ian Hamilton, the commander of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force and his personal friend, by pointing out that historians would realize the difficulty of achieving a success by using 'such an inadequate force'.<sup>30</sup> This means that his obsession with the Eastern Front should not be solely attributed to his territorial concern about the peace settlement or the general pessimism among policy makers after 1917.

Three factors made Amery one of the earliest 'Easterners'. Firstly, in 1915 he worked as a member of the Balkan intelligence section under C. E. Callwell. These personal experiences in the Balkan peninsula convinced him of the importance of Eastern Europe and the Middle East in the war strategy of the Allies.<sup>31</sup> He tried to devise a diplomatic/territorial arrangement that could attract Greece or/and Bulgaria to the British side without alienating Serbia.<sup>32</sup> The second factor was his apprehension about the possible negative effect of defeat on the Eastern Front on imperial defence. 'The loss of prestige' that could be

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<sup>30</sup> Amery to Hamilton, 21 October 1915, Ian Hamilton Papers, 7/1/52.

<sup>31</sup> Mitchell, 'The Army League', 66. As the international politics of the Balkans during the war, see David Dutton, *The Politics of Diplomacy: Britain and France in the First World War* (London & New York: I. B. Tauris, 1998).

<sup>32</sup> Amery's memorandum, 'The Diplomatic Situation in the Balkans', 11 July 1915, AMEL 1/3/26.

caused by an evacuation from the Balkans would inflict more serious damage on the British Empire than on other countries. If Britain left the straits to France alone, Germany could gain predominance in the area when France asked for peace.<sup>33</sup>

The last factor, which has not been pointed out by historians, was a military lesson from the South African War. In his narrative of the war, the initial defeats of the British Army, which partly resulted from the inefficient leadership of R. Buller, were reversed only thanks to the reinforcements led by Roberts and Kitchener.<sup>34</sup> *The Times History* depicted Roberts as a wise commander, who not only made the Army more 'mobile' through the reform of its organization and field transport but also understood 'the uselessness of direct frontal attacks against the enemy like the Boers'. He urged 'the necessity of flank or enveloping movements' and carefully chose the invasion route into the Orange Free State.<sup>35</sup> This lesson had a lasting influence on Amery's military thinking. The Western Front in the First World War seemed to him a battlefield where mutual frontal attacks were repeated. His letter to Henry Wilson presented an analogy that France and Belgium were 'the Natal' while Hungary was 'the Free State'.<sup>36</sup> One of his memoranda explicitly suggested that Britain should create a mobile field force, like the one organized by Roberts and Kitchener, and make it strike at some vital point in the East.<sup>37</sup> In other words, his conviction as a military journalist as well as his imperial vision affected his view on the war strategy.

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<sup>33</sup> Amery's memorandum, 'Salonika and Gallipoli', 30 November 1915, AMEL 1/3/28.

<sup>34</sup> Amery's contempt for Buller was such that in 1901 he launched a press campaign in *The Times* to prevent Buller from being appointed as Commander in Chief at Aldershot. *My Political Life*, vol. 1, 153-157.

<sup>35</sup> *Times History*, vol. 3, 346-357.

<sup>36</sup> Amery to Henry Wilson, 18 July 1915, HHW 2/77/16.

<sup>37</sup> Amery's memorandum, 'The Dardanelles Position', July 1915, AMEL 1/3/25.

In 1917 and 1918, his concern about the war aims and the peace settlement loomed larger in his geopolitical thinking. It is incorrect to see him as a fanatic imperialist-Easterner who paid little attention to the Western Front. As an assistant to the Cabinet Secretariat, Amery was in charge of the administration of Cabinet memoranda on the Western Front.<sup>38</sup> He did not deny the importance of a victory there and hoped for reconciliation between the Easterners and the Westerners.<sup>39</sup> Under the pessimistic premise that a decisive victory would be impossible, however, his persona as an imperialist led him to argue that there was an indispensable minimum that the British Empire should secure in a peace settlement.<sup>40</sup> His memoranda argued that the principle of the 'balance of power' should be extended to include not only Britain's relations with Europe but also the security of the British Empire. Based on the assumption that a decisive victory against Germany would be improbable, he tended to tolerate the German hegemony in Central Europe. However, German and Turkish dominance in the Middle East had to be prevented to protect the British imperial network. Therefore, while Britain should still prioritize the Western Front, any further offensive operations should be attempted in the East.<sup>41</sup> The British Empire should also deprive Germany of its African colonies for its own security.<sup>42</sup> In short, Amery insisted that Britain should make sure that its imperial sphere would be enlarged in the Middle East and Africa even when the war ended in a negotiated settlement.

By August 1918, his grandiose vision of new world order was crystallized. In his view, the post-war world would need 'something in the nature of a series of

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<sup>38</sup> Mitchell, 'The Army League', 68.

<sup>39</sup> Amery to Henry Wilson, 17 January 1917, and enclosed memoranda, HWW 2/8.

<sup>40</sup> As for the factor of 'pessimism', see Millman, *Pessimism and British War Policy, 1916–1918*.

<sup>41</sup> Amery, 'Notes on Possible Terms of Peace', 11 April 1917, AMEL 1/3/49; idem., 'War Aims and Military Policy', 15 June 1918.

<sup>42</sup> Amery, 'The Future of the German colonies', 8 November 1917, AMEL 1/3/51.

Monroe doctrines'; the world should be divided into several regions under the auspices of leading powers. The region around the Indian Ocean would be governed by the British Empire; the American Continent by the US; China (Manchuria) by Japan; Central Europe by Germany. Western Europe, with its African colonies, should be also integrated.<sup>43</sup> This new vision derived from his conviction that small states could not survive economic and geopolitical competition with larger states or empires unless they were integrated into larger units.<sup>44</sup> Amery applied his imperial vision to the dimension of international politics. The new ideal, which can be called the 'balance of imperial power', became an indispensable element of his imperial thought.

Therefore, the principle of national self-determination, which was preached by Woodrow Wilson and Lenin, was anathema to Amery.<sup>45</sup> As of 1917, he claimed that the creation of small nation states in Central Europe would not necessarily bring about promising results because of their minority problems and their economic and military vulnerability. Unless those nation states were federated or integrated, these problems would not be solved.<sup>46</sup> This conviction led him to take an ambivalent stance towards the idea of a League of Nations. While Amery agreed with Smuts that the 'British Commonwealth' could be a role model for the League of Nations, he insisted that the League should set up several 'minor Leagues of Free Nations'.<sup>47</sup> The League, in his view, should preside over the establishment of the balance of imperial power.

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<sup>43</sup> Amery to Balfour, 16 August 1918; 22 August 1918, Balfour Papers, Add Mss 49767.

<sup>44</sup> Amery, *Union and Strength*, chapter 4 and 5. Also see Chapter 1 and 8 of this thesis.

<sup>45</sup> As for the principle, see Arno J. Mayer, *Wilson vs. Lenin: Political Origins of the New Diplomacy, 1917-1918*, 2nd ed. (Cleveland & New York: The World Publishing Company, 1964).

<sup>46</sup> Amery, 'Notes on Possible Terms of Peace'. In 1917, Amery was fascinated by Friedrich Naumann's idea of 'Mitteleuropa'. Amery diary, 26 May, 6 June 1917, AMEL 7/13.

<sup>47</sup> Amery to Smuts, 17 December 1918, AMEL 2/2/24.



The post-war settlement betrayed his expectations. The conception of self-determination encouraged nationalist movements in the British Empire and the small nation states burgeoned in East and Central Europe.<sup>48</sup> Amery's new aim was to secure the imperial interests within the Versailles order. While acknowledging the mandate system as a tool to educate the US that Britain was not 'a lang grabbing Power', he insisted that the British Empire should hold strategically important areas, especially Palestine, as new mandates.<sup>49</sup> The retreat from the Middle East was an unacceptable option to Amery. He could tolerate the transformation of Egypt from a protectorate to an ally, albeit on the condition that Sudan and the East Bank of the Suez Canal were separated from Egypt.<sup>50</sup> During the interwar period, however, Amery was gradually convinced that the Versailles order was unworkable.

### **The influence of the 'balance of imperial power' on Amery**

The principle of the balance of imperial power had a tremendous influence on Amery's world view after 1918. First of all, it led him to become a fierce critic of the League of Nations. The conflicts among the new nation states in Eastern Europe and the League's intervention in the British administration of its mandates strengthened his belief that the League was an obstacle to his imperialist ideal.<sup>51</sup> Collective security through the League seemed to Amery a shackle that could drag the UK into an unnecessary commitment to Europe.<sup>52</sup>

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<sup>48</sup> Margaret Macmillan, *Peacemakers: The Paris Conference of 1919 and Its Attempt to End War* (London: J.Murray, 2002); Erez Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).

<sup>49</sup> Amery's memorandum, 'The United States and the Occupied Enemy Territories', 20 December 1918, AMEL 1/3/37.

<sup>50</sup> Amery to Milner, 8, 14 January 1920, Milner Papers Add., MS. Eng. hist. 703.

<sup>51</sup> See Chapter 7 and 11.

<sup>52</sup> Gaynor Johnson, *Lord Robert Cecil: Politician and Internationalist* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013), 132, 148-151; Amery, 'Empire System as Model for Collective Security', *The Sunday Times*, 25 July 1937.

This stance distanced Amery from other imperial theorists who advocated the League of Nations as a complementary corollary of the British Commonwealth.<sup>53</sup>

Another factor making Amery hate the League was the policy of international disarmament stipulated in Article 8 of the Covenant. Amery was a constant critic of Britain's participation in the international attempts to limit the national armaments. As in the Edwardian era, he still believed that a strong force with its pre-emptive effects, rather than disarmament, could secure peace.<sup>54</sup> In the interwar period, he called for the balanced development of the air force, the Navy, and the Army. Amery was one of the earliest advocates of the air force.<sup>55</sup> In his view, the development of aviation would strengthen the imperial network and facilitate the suppression of colonial insurgencies.<sup>56</sup> However, he, at first, opposed the exaggeration of the potential of strategic bombing and insisted that the air force should be coordinated with the sea and land forces.<sup>57</sup> Regarding the Navy, while accepting the limitation of capital ships in the Washington Conference, Amery backed the construction of the Singapore Base and more cruisers.<sup>58</sup> This stance naturally led him to become a vocal opponent of the London Naval Treaty.<sup>59</sup> Nor did he disregard the Army. As a

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<sup>53</sup> As for the intellectual strand, see Mark Mazower, *No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009). Alfred Zimmern was one of the representative theorists in the school. In 1938, Amery discussed the international security with Zimmern in a radio broadcast. While Amery presented his vision of balance of imperial order, Zimmern advocated the principle of collective security, in which the League of Nations and the British Commonwealth would play complementary roles. Amery and Zimmern, 'Imperial Security', *The Listener*, vol. 19, 476, 23 February 1938.

<sup>54</sup> Carolyn Kitching, *Britain and the Problem of International Disarmament, 1919-1934* (London & New York: Routledge, 1999), 27-28, 31, 71-72, 90; L. S. Amery, *The Forward View* (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1935), 23-24.

<sup>55</sup> Katherine C. Epstein, 'Imperial Airs'.

<sup>56</sup> Amery, *The Forward View*, 58-59, 199-200.

<sup>57</sup> Epstein, 'Imperial Airs', 583-586.

<sup>58</sup> Raymond W. Westphal Jr, 'Parliamentary Politics and the Singapore Base: A Surplus of Opinions and Few Answers, 1918-29', *The Mariner's Mirror* 97, no. 4 (2011): 346, 351; Amery, 'Britain's Weakness in Modern Cruisers', *Current History*, vol. 20, 2, 1924, 230-232.

<sup>59</sup> Amery, *The Forward View*, 63-66.

founding member of the Army League, Amery put the essence of his Edwardian reform scheme, the two-tier army, as an alternative to the Cardwell system, in the report of the League.<sup>60</sup> Based on these programmes, Amery became a supporter of rearmament.

By the 1930s, Amery had formed his Manichaeian economic ideology in which his ideal of economic nationalism/imperialism was contrasted with the outdated economic individualism of the nineteenth century.<sup>61</sup> He came to regard the League of Nations, which was a hindrance to the balance of imperial power, as a concomitant of the latter.<sup>62</sup> The connection of his geopolitical and economic ideology was promoted by his conviction that the Treasury, an embodiment of economic individualism, hampered rearmament.<sup>63</sup> Due to this stance, his relations with popular politics were again strained. In the interwar period, the League of Nations Union acted as an influential association to propagate the cause of the League.<sup>64</sup> The result of the by-election in Fulham East and the Peace Ballot seemed, to the political leaders at that time, to corroborate the impression that the British public approved of disarmament and collective security.<sup>65</sup> In response to these results, Amery, while preaching the

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<sup>60</sup> David John Mitchell, 'The Army League, Conscription and the 1956 Defence Review' (PhD thesis, University of East Anglia, 2012), 78-93. Amery's personal draft of the report was enclosed in Amery to Liddell Hart, 1 March 1937, Liddell Hart Papers, 1/14.

<sup>61</sup> See Chapter 9.

<sup>62</sup> Amery, *The Forward View*, 9-15.

<sup>63</sup> Regarding his criticism of Treasury control, see, *ibid.*, 389-397. The policy of the Treasury was actually more nuanced. Robert Paul Shay Jr., *British Rearmament in the Thirties: Politics and Profits* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977); G. C. Peden, *British Rearmament and the Treasury, 1932-1939* (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1979).

<sup>64</sup> D. S. Birn, *The League of Nations Union, 1918-1945* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981); Helen McCarthy, *The British People and the League of Nations: Democracy, Citizenship and Internationalism, c.1918-45* (Manchester & New York: Manchester University Press, 2011).

<sup>65</sup> Martin Ceadel, 'The First British Referendum: The Peace Ballot, 1934-1935', *The English Historical Review* 95, no. 377 (1980): 810-39; Helen McCarthy, 'Democratizing British Foreign Policy: Rethinking the Peace Ballot, 1934-1935', *Journal of British Studies* 49, no. 2 (2010): 358-87. As for the 1933 Fulham East by-election, recent research has tended to argue that 'peace' was actually not the most important agenda in the election. However, it has also been agreed among historians that contemporary politicians regarded the result as a reflection of the public feeling towards 'peace'. Martin Ceadel, 'Interpreting East Fulham', in *By-Elections in British Politics*, ed. Chris Cook and John Ramsden (London: Routledge, 2003), 94-111. Also

cause of the balance of imperial power and rearmament, blamed pacifists/pacificists for misguiding the public by simplifying the complicated reality of geopolitics and diplomacy.<sup>66</sup> Here, he refrained from saying that the public opinion was wrong. That is, as he did in the Edwardian era, Amery faced the dilemma between his desire to educate the public and the electoral need to pander to them.

In a sense, the collapse of the Versailles order, caused by Japan, Italy, and Germany, vindicated Amery's propositions. He tended to tolerate the expansionism of the revisionist countries as a step towards the balance of imperial power. Since the 1920s, Amery insisted that Britain should remain on friendly terms with Japan to confront Russia together.<sup>67</sup> The Japanese occupation of Manchuria did not alter this stance. His Far Eastern policy was the formation of new Anglo-American-Japanese relations based on a recognition of 'the state of Manchukuo'.<sup>68</sup> His attitude towards the Abyssinian crisis was similar. Amery was a spearhead of the Conservative opposition to the international sanctions against Italy.<sup>69</sup> His peculiar attitude towards

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compare the following two articles. R. Heller, 'East Fulham Revisited', *Journal of Contemporary History* 6, no. 3 (1971): 172–96; C. T. Stannage, 'The East Fulham By-Election, 25 October 1933', *The Historical Journal* 14, no. 1 (1971): 165–200.

<sup>66</sup> Amery, 'East Fulham', *The Times*, 1 November 1933; 'The Peace Ballot: A Discussion between the Rt. Hon. Viscount Cecil of Chelwood and the Rt. Hon. L. S. Amery', *The Listener*, 13 March 1935. As for the diversity of the peace movement in the period, see, Martin Ceadel, *Pacifism in Britain, 1914-1945: The Defining of a Faith* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980); Richard Davis, 'The British Peace Movement in the Interwar Years', *Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique* 22, no. 3 (2017), <http://journals.openedition.org/rfcb/1415>.

<sup>67</sup> Amery to Cecil Clementi, February 1927, Clementi Papers, MSS. Ind. Ocn. S. 352/6/1. His stance was in line with British official policy. Harumi Goto-Shibata, *Japan and Britain in Shanghai, 1925-31* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995).

<sup>68</sup> Amery, *The Forward View*, 285-291.

<sup>69</sup> Amery's letter to *The Times*, 4 Oct 1935; 'Mr. Amery on the Crisis', *The Times*, 9 October 1935. Amery naturally sympathized with Samuel Hoare, who was forced to resign as Foreign Secretary due to the Hoare-Laval affairs. He consoled Hoare by asserting that Hoare had 'done the right thing'. Amery to Hoare, 16 December 1935, AMEL 2/1/25. As for the affair, see R. A. C. Parker, 'Great Britain, France and the Ethiopian Crisis 1935-1936', *The English Historical Review* 89, no. 351 (1974): 293–332; James C. Robertson, 'The Hoare-Laval Plan', *Journal of Contemporary History* 10, no. 3 (1975): 433–63; W. N. Medlicott, 'The Hoare-Laval Pact Reconsidered', in *Retreat from Power: Studies in Britain's Foreign Policy of the Twentieth Century*, vol. 1 (London: Macmillan, 1981), 118–38.

Chamberlain's appeasement, admitting the German hegemony in Central Europe but criticizing Chamberlain's over-lenient stance towards German demands and the plan to return ex-German colonies in Africa, also stemmed from his personal imperial/international vision.<sup>70</sup>

The fact that he had relatively conciliatory views on the revisionist countries is already known among historians.<sup>71</sup> What this chapter has revealed is that these policies stemmed from the principle of balance of imperial power. Therefore, Amery's stance was different from that of Anthony Eden, who resigned as Foreign Secretary due to his objection to Chamberlain's conciliatory approach towards Italy. Munich enabled their awkward cooperation as two leaders of anti-appeasers.<sup>72</sup> Amery's vision was also buttressed by his unchanged opinion that Russia should be kept out of the European circle.<sup>73</sup> However, he did not hope for Britain's participation in the Axis camp. In his strategical design, British rearmament was required as a deterrent to the potential threats from those countries.<sup>74</sup> Moreover, as before the Great War, his position concerning the continental commitment shifted opportunistically in the

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<sup>70</sup> Richard S. Grayson, 'Leo Amery's Imperialist Alternative'.

<sup>71</sup> See the introductory section of this chapter.

<sup>72</sup> David Dutton, *Anthony Eden: A Life and Reputation* (London & New York: Arnold, 1997), 127-131. As for Amery's criticism of Eden's attitude towards Italy, see Amery diary, 5 November 1936, *EB*, vol. 2, 429. It is debatable whether the Eden-Amery group existed. Robert Boothby recalled that there were three groups of anti-appeasers, under Eden, Amery, and Churchill. Boothby claimed that he belonged to both the Churchill group and the Amery group. Robert Boothby, *Recollections of a Rebel* (London: Hutchinson, 1978), 128. According to Harold Nicholson, there was a group led by Eden, which was distinct from the Churchill group, and Amery belonged to the group. However, Nicholson also reported that the Eden group decided not to advertise themselves as a group in order to act more flexibly. Nicholson to his wife (V. Sackville-West), 9 November 1938, in Harold Nicholson, *Diaries and Letters 1930-1939*, ed. Nigel Nicholson (New York: Atheneum, 1966), 377-378.

<sup>73</sup> Amery maintained that construction of preferential networks among European countries would have geopolitical, as well as economic, advantages in that it would promote the 'elimination' of Soviet Russia from Europe. Amery to Garvin, 26 October 1936, AMEL 2/1/36. As for the USSR as a factor in British foreign and imperial policy, see Keith Neilson, *Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919-1939* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Antony Best, "'We Are Virtually at War with Russia': Britain and the Cold War in East Asia, 1923-40", *Cold War History* 12, no. 2 (2012): 205-25.

<sup>74</sup> Amery, *The Forward View*, 278, 289.

late 1930s. Amery, who had doubted the effectiveness of strategic bombing, started to emphasize the threat of invasion via air and used it as a justification of the campaign for Citizen Service.<sup>75</sup> Amery tolerated the expansionism of the Axis countries only if it did not jeopardize British national and imperial security.

Amery's grandiose vision made him a hard-line imperialist as far as the defence of strategically important areas was concerned. He did not allow India to acquire autonomous control of defence policy even when he advocated Indian constitutional reform. This premise continued to constrain his Indian policy.<sup>76</sup> In the last years of his life, he took a hawkish line towards the nationalist demands in the Middle East. Amery was disheartened by the British 'scuttle' from Palestine and criticized Britain's lack of policy for the region, which aggravated the Arab-Israeli conflict and invited the spread of Communism. Since Russian dominance of the region would destroy the network of the Empire/Commonwealth, the importance of the Suez Canal was enhanced despite the decolonization of India.<sup>77</sup> Facing Egyptian demand for the Canal, Amery was involved in organizing the Suez Group, where his son, Julian, and Enoch Powell acted as secretaries.<sup>78</sup> He expected that Britain's hard-line stance would make the world understand that Britons were 'still alive' and had 'a heart

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<sup>75</sup> Amery's speech for the Citizen Service League, republished in Amery, *The Framework of the Future*, 113-120; Mitchell, 'The Army League', 93-105. Regarding the Conservative campaign for National Service in this period, see, N. J. Crowson, 'The Conservative Party and the Call for National Service, 1937-39: Compulsion Versus Voluntarism', *Contemporary Record* 9, no. 3 (1995): 507-28. As for the diverse effects of the fear of the air raids on British politics, see, Uri Bialer, *The Shadow of the Bomber: The Fear of Air Attack and British Politics 1932-1939* (London: Royal Historical Society, 1980).

<sup>76</sup> Amery *The Forward View*, 230-235. As for his Indian policy, see Chapter 5 of this thesis.

<sup>77</sup> The following articles were published by Amery in *The Times*. 'British Policy in Palestine', 14, 19 May 1948; 'Policy in the Middle East', 11 January 1949; 'Arab-Israeli Relations', 12 August 1950; 'The Middle East Revisited', 1, 2 August 1950. Also see Amery to Churchill, 13 February 1953, AMEL 2/2/4.

<sup>78</sup> Sue Onslow, *Backbench Debate within the Conservative Party and Its Influence on British Foreign Policy, 1948-57* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1997), 115-118; Amery to Powell, 12 December 1953, POLL 1/1/11. Also see his articles in *The Times*. 'Anxiety over Suez', 20 February 1953; 'Keeping Suez Canal Open', 25 September 1953; 'Talks on Canal Zone', 30 September 1953.

as well as teeth and claws.<sup>79</sup> After Amery died in 1955, Julian played a leading role in the Suez Group on behalf of his father.

## **Conclusion**

As a staunch advocate of the Empire/Commonwealth, Amery consistently attached importance to imperial defence. However, he did not altogether neglect home defence or the continental commitment. When Britain's relations with Germany were seriously strained, he opportunistically behaved as a prophet of the European war and adjusted the aims of his campaign for national training and (re)armament. By the end of the Great War, Amery embraced his unique vision of the new international order in which the world would be allocated to several empires. This geopolitical vision was complementary to his imperial economic ideology. To promote intra-imperial trade, the protection of the imperial network was indispensable. This fact made him a hawkish imperialist regarding the strategically important areas, in particular, the Middle East.

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<sup>79</sup> Amery to Churchill, 21 March 1953, AMEL 2/2/4.

### 3 The South African Question

The impact of the South African War on Amery was not confined to the military dimension. The war was the most prominent military conflict in which Britain was involved between the Crimean War and the First World War. Although the British establishment assumed they could win the war in a relatively short time, the British Army experienced a debacle at the initial stage and was dragged into a guerrilla war after the capture of the capitals of the Boer Republics. The UK spent two and a half years and more than £200 million, and mobilized between 250,000 and 450,000 British and colonial troops as well as between 10,000 and 30,000 Africans.<sup>1</sup> The protracted process strengthened the sense of national crisis or decline among politically conscious people, some of whom engaged in the movement seeking for 'national efficiency'.<sup>2</sup> This also paved the way for various movements for the reconfiguration of imperial polity in terms of constitutional, economic, and defence policy.

Amery landed in Cape Town in September 1899 as a correspondent for *The Times* at first to cover the expected negotiations for a peace settlement with the South African Republic. However, the subsequent breakout of the war made him the paper's chief war correspondent at the age of twenty-five. He stayed in South Africa until August 1900 and went back again in April 1902 till October to report on the negotiation process for the Treaty of Vereeniging. Amery became directly acquainted with British soldiers and politicians, including Alfred Milner,

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<sup>1</sup> Donal Lowry, ed., *The South African War Reappraised* (Manchester & New York: Manchester University Press, 2000), 2.

<sup>2</sup> Geoffrey Russell Searle, *The Quest for National Efficiency: A Study in British Politics and Political Thought, 1899-1914* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1971); Bernard Semmel, *Imperialism and Social Reform: English Social-Imperial Thought 1895-1914* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1960).



Cecil Rhodes and their followers, as well as Boer politicians and military officers. He not only regularly dispatched leaders to *The Times*, but also played a significant role in the making of the seven-volume *The Times History of the War in South Africa* as its chief editor.<sup>3</sup>

Amery was just one of many journalists who reported the war. Unlike the pupils of Milner's Kindergarten, he did not participate in the management of post-war reconstruction policy.<sup>4</sup> Thus, his influence on British public discourse and policymaking should not be exaggerated. However, *The Times* still occupied a distinct position among the British media, though it struggled to compete with the new popular press.<sup>5</sup> *The Times History* was also seen as a relatively authoritative or semi-official work amongst a bunch of contemporary writings on the South African War. Analysing Amery's views on the war will contribute to the research on the relationship between the press and the war.<sup>6</sup> It also will shed light on Conservative rhetoric used to justify the war, which has been studied less than that of the Liberals or Radicals.<sup>7</sup> Last but not least,

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<sup>3</sup> *The Times History of the War in South Africa: 1899-1902*, vol. 1-7, (London: Sampson Low, Marston, 1900-09). The last volume was an appendix, mainly composed of general index. Amery outsourced the editing of vol. 4 and vol. 5 to Basil Williams and Erskine Childers respectively. As for the process of the making of *History*, see Ian F. W. Beckett, 'The Historiography of Small Wars: Early Historians and the South African War', *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 2, no. 2 (1991): 276–98.

<sup>4</sup> 'Milner's Kindergarten' was composed of Oxford graduates hired by Milner for post-war reconstruction in South Africa, including Lionel Curtis, Philip Kerr, Robert Brand, Lionel Hitchens, and Geoffrey Robinson (Dawson). May, Alex. "Milner's Kindergarten (act. 1902–1910)." *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*. 22 Sep. 2005; Accessed 17 Feb. 2022; Walter Nimocks, *Milner's Young Men: The 'Kindergarten' in Edwardian Imperial Affairs* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1968); John Kandle, *The Round Table Movement and Imperial Union* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978).

<sup>5</sup> Stephen Koss, *The Rise and Fall of the Political Press in Britain*, vol. 2 (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1984).

<sup>6</sup> Andrew Porter, 'Sir Alfred Milner and the Press, 1897-1899', *The Historical Journal* 16, no. 2 (1973): 323–39; Kenneth O. Morgan, 'The Boer War and the Media (1899–1902)', *Twentieth Century British History* 13, no. 1 (2002): 1–16; Simon Potter, *News and the British World: The Emergence of an Imperial Press System, 1876-1922* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); idem., 'Jingoism, Public Opinion, and The New Imperialism: Newspapers and Imperial Rivalries at the Fin de Siècle', *Media History* 20, no. 1 (2014): 34–50.

<sup>7</sup> P. J. Cain, *Hobson and Imperialism: Radicalism, New Liberalism, and Finance 1887-1938* (Oxford: Oxford University Press); Simon Edward Mackley, 'British Liberal Politics, the South African Question, and the Rhetoric of Empire, 1895-1907' (PhD thesis, University of Exeter, 2016).

though he was not an official member of the Kindergarten, he acted as a sympathetic outsider and a temporary informal member during his trips to South Africa. He also took part in launching the Round Table with other members to concoct and propagate their scheme to reform the imperial polity. Certainly, he was to dissociate himself from the group due to their difference over Tariff Reform, but it should not blind us to the fact that Amery's imperial thought had affinity as well as disagreement with its members such as Curtis and Philip Kerr. While existing literature has well described the impact of the war on his economic views, the impact on his views on imperial governance has not been fully revealed.<sup>8</sup> The armed conflict and the post-war reconstruction gave him a significant opportunity to reflect on how the British Empire should cope with colonial resistance and forge stable governments in the heterogeneous matrix of imperial peripheries.

This chapter will address the following questions: how Amery justified the British cause in fighting with the Boer Republics; how he interpreted the process of reconstruction and eventual unification of post-war South Africa; what he thought and said about the 'native' question in South Africa.<sup>9</sup> It will show that though he did not deny Boer nationalism itself, in his view, it had to be transformed into colonial, and not anti-colonial, nationalism, which could be compatible with the cause of British supremacy. His stance towards the Boers was slightly softened after 1905 when the members of the Kindergarten, in contrast to their leader, promoted the formation of the Union of South Africa.

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<sup>8</sup> As for Amery as a campaigner for national efficiency, see Searle, *The Quest*.

<sup>9</sup> I am aware that, at present, the adjective 'native' is problematic. However, it was quite common at the time to call indigenous people 'native' and to refer to the issue revolving around the treatment of those people as the 'native question'. Therefore, this chapter will consistently use it as a purely historical term to describe the ideologies of imperialists. Ideally, the term should be used with quotation marks. But the thesis avoids doing so in order not to annoy readers.

However, Amery constructed a historical narrative to advocate Milner's harsh policies as a necessary foundation for the making of the Union. His imperial vision was still white supremacist at this stage, which made him endorse the idea of segregation.

## **Justification**

What caused the conflict has been the most controversial topic in the historiography of the South African War. Although the historiography itself has a long and winding history, as far as historical research written in English is concerned, we can detect two schools: one has emphasized the factor of economic interests, such as the mining industry in the Transvaal or the financial sectors in the City, whereas the other has considered the political conflict to be more important. If J. A. Hobson was a progenitor of the former, Amery's *The Times History* can be regarded as a pioneering work of the latter.<sup>10</sup> The Hobsonian indictment of the war as a capitalist plot had already been placed in the South African press before Hobson incorporated it into his systematic criticism, and Amery himself encountered it on the spot as of 1899.<sup>11</sup> His leaders and writings tried to deny the causation and present an alternative explanation. While undoubtedly, as Iain Smith has revealed, Amery wrote history 'frankly from the point of view of one who is convinced that the essential right and justice of the controversy have been with his own country', Jacqueline Beaumont has commented that amongst the correspondents of *The Times*, only Amery 'had any sympathy or understanding for the Boer point of view', though it

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<sup>10</sup> Iain R. Smith, 'A Century of Controversy of Origins', in Lowry, ed., *The South African War Reappraised*, 23–49. He also has presented his own eclectic synthesis in Iain R. Smith, *The Origins of the South African War, 1899-1902* (London & New York: Longman, 1996).

<sup>11</sup> Smith, *The Origins*, 394-5. Amery, 'The Orange Free State', 19 Oct 1899, *The Times*.

'was limited by his imperialist, Conservative political views.'<sup>12</sup> This section will more precisely describe his contradiction.

In the debate in the House of Commons immediately after the breakout of the war, discussing whether the government's conduct of the negotiation with the Transvaal was appropriate, the Unionist/Conservative government raised two themes to justify the British cause: the grievances of Uitlanders and the need to secure British supremacy in South Africa.<sup>13</sup> Amery shared the belief that the two things were the causes of the crisis.<sup>14</sup> His priority was clear from the outset. While claiming that the grievances were real and not invented by capitalists, he understood that this could not crush suspicion that Milner and Chamberlain provoked an unnecessary war by utilizing the technical question of franchise as an excuse. To refute this argument, Amery laid stress on the importance of British supremacy.

At first sight it seems absurd to suggest that a small Republic, almost completely surrounded by British territory could ever pretend to enter into rivalry with the British Empire, nor would it be reasonable to exaggerate the possible danger from such a source. Nevertheless, this pretension, however foolish, has been the secret spring of policy at Pretoria and the cause of constant unrest in the whole country. The ultimate ideal aimed at by Transvaal politicians ever since the discovery of the mines on the Rand placed great material resources at their disposal has been a Dutch Republic of South Africa, with its centre at

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<sup>12</sup> *The Times History*, vol. 1, vi; Jacqueline Beaumont, 'The Times at War, 1899-1902', in *The South African War Reappraised*, ed. Lowry, 81.

<sup>13</sup> Hansard, HC 19 October 1899 vol. 77, 254-371.

<sup>14</sup> Amery, 'The South African Crisis', 9 Oct 1899, *The Times*.

Pretoria, in which the English element should play but a subordinate part.

According to Amery, Kruger's refusal of the compromise regarding the franchise stemmed from Afrikaners' nationalistic ambition to oust British influence from the region. 'The whole object of the Imperial Government in taking up the question of the Uitlanders' grievance ... was to make a change in an impossible situation.'<sup>15</sup> He particularly praised Milner for his persistent determination, by arguing that Milner was aware that 'only the most resolute action could stay the drift of South African affairs towards civil war or else towards the slipping away of the Imperial supremacy'.<sup>16</sup>

His justification was composed of this dual strategy. On the one hand, he boasted about the moral superiority of the British causes such as 'progress, honest government, political liberty and equality'.<sup>17</sup> He even drew an analogy between the South African War and the American Civil War. The grievances of Uitlanders were likened to those of the slaves in the Southern States. *The Transvaal from Within* by Percy Fitzpatrick played the same role as *Uncle Tom's Cabin* by Harriet Stowe did in the USA. Therefore, he predicted:

It is probable that the verdict of British and of South African opinion on the justice of the war and the necessity of the suppression of the Dutch Republics will be as unanimous as that of American opinion on the justice and necessity of the suppression of the Southern Confederacy.

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<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

<sup>16</sup> *The Times History*, vol. 1, 252.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., vol. 1, iv

This confidence was connected with his views on nationalism and imperialism. While Amery was glad to see the advent of the age of nationalism replace that of economic cosmopolitanism, he rejected sanctifying aggressive forms of nationalism. In the case of the South African War, Amery alleged, those 'who hold that the creation of a nation state ... is the one supreme object of political development ... will naturally tend to be on the side of the Afrikaner Republics.' By contrast, the British goal was 'the growth of a common South African patriotism within the limits of which both Dutch and English national feeling, British Colonial self-Government and Republican independence, should each have free play'.<sup>18</sup>

On the other hand, however, Amery did not hide his concern about British geopolitical interests. He genuinely believed that Kruger's true object was 'to shake off the fetters of the London Convention' and 'to expel the British power' from South Africa. Amery admitted that the Boers had their own good reasons for hatred of Britain such as the Jameson Raid. But he asked readers of *The Times History* whether Britain should lose its hold over South Africa because of those mistakes in the past.<sup>19</sup> In his letter to Valentine Chirol, Director of the Foreign Department of *The Times*, discussing the 'blessing' results of the Jameson Raid, he divulged his frank opinion about the war aims.

It [the Jameson Raid] awakened the British public and hastened on the breach. And I think our experience already in this war shows us what a fortunate thing it is that it has come now and not later. Five years hence the Transvaal would have been almost invincible, at any cost of life or

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<sup>18</sup> Ibid., vol. 1, vi-vii, 3-21

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., vol. 1, 18-19.

money that England would spend. It is equally fortunate too that the Raid failed. An Anglo-Cosmopolitan financier republic would have been a terrible business. It's a good thing too that the Franchise scheme failed: it was much too dangerous and gave into Kruger's hands trump cards he could have used with wonderful effect if he had not been a fool. Things have happened in the best of all possible ways if only our military people can do their duty.<sup>20</sup>

This paradoxical rhetoric for self-justification and lukewarm complacency became the nucleus of his interpretation of the war. However, preaching the lofty war aim of Britain was one thing; putting it into practice was quite another. Would protection of British supremacy be compatible with the creation of common South African patriotism? Amery faced this question in the years of reconstruction.

## **Reconstruction**

Among historians on South Africa in the post-war period, there has been a debate over the continuity and rupture in British policy: to what extent did Milner's departure from South Africa in 1905 mark the turning point? Some historians have emphasized the failure of Milner's attempts to secure British supremacy through the suspension of the Cape Constitution and immigration of British farmers. His anglicisation project enraged Afrikaners, who gained dominant political power in each new responsible government established by the Liberal government. As a result, Britons and Afrikaners reached a

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<sup>20</sup> Amery to Chirol, 11 December 1899, AMEL 1/1/2.

compromise in the form of a new unified Dominion.<sup>21</sup> On the other hand, Marxist historians have maintained that the lasting legacy of Milnerism was manifest in the economic and racial structures in South Africa.<sup>22</sup> More recently, Saul Dubow has deployed an eclectic argument. While admitting that there were continuities in political and cultural ideologies as well as in economic and social dimensions, Dubow clarified the difference between Milner and his followers in the Kindergarten, who acted as political advisers after their master left South Africa. Where Milner was top-down, coercive, and too explicitly in favour of British supremacy, his heirs were aware of the significance of a conciliatory approach. In short, they sufficiently pandered to 'colonial nationalism' and their experiences there paved the way for the growth of the concept of 'Commonwealth' in the Round Table. Dubow has argued that even Milner got closer to this conciliatory stance towards the end of his reign in South Africa by quoting his farewell speech: 'The true Imperialist is also the best South African.'<sup>23</sup> The following section will reveal that Amery, well aware of the difference in the tone between Milner and the Kindergarten, constructed a mediatory narrative to describe South African history from the war to unification as Whiggish progression.

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<sup>21</sup> L. M. Thompson, *The Unification of South Africa 1902-1910* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960); Donald Denoon, *A Grand Illusion: The Failure of Imperial Policy in the Transvaal Colony during the Period of Reconstruction 1900-1905* (London: Longman, 1973). As for the policy of the Liberal Government, see Ronald Hyam, *Elgin and Churchill at the Colonial Office 1905-1908: The Watershed of the Empire-Commonwealth* (London: Macmillan, 1968), chapter 4 and 7.

<sup>22</sup> Shula Marks and Stanley Trapido, 'Lord Milner and the South African State', *History Workshop Journal* 8 (1979): 50–80.

<sup>23</sup> Saul Dubow, 'Colonial Nationalism, the Milner Kindergarten and the Rise of "South Africanism", 1902-10', *History Workshop Journal*, 43 (1997), 53–85; idem., 'Imagining the New South Africa in the Era of Reconstruction', in *The Impact of the South African War*, ed. by David Omissi and Andrew S. Thompson (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 76-95; idem., *A Commonwealth of Knowledge: Science, Sensibility, and White South Africa 1820-2000*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 159-161; idem., 'How British Was the British World? The Case of South Africa.', *Journal of Imperial & Commonwealth History*, 37.1 (2009), 14-15.



The previous section has already revealed that Amery's war aims included the creation of 'common South African patriotism'. However, this does not mean that his approach was more conciliatory than that of Milner. On the contrary, Amery supported every controversial policy of Milner. On the eve of the war, Amery expressed his sympathy with Milner's determination to annex the Republics immediately after the war and to put on hold the federalization of South Africa.

He [Milner] is convinced now that war is the only satisfactory solution and after war annexation, or a very sharp pruning down of the Convention. If it is war I think I am for annexation. .... If it [war] is followed too soon by a S. African confederation and that federation has a Dutch majority, the whole thing would be upside down - worse than before.<sup>24</sup>

Amery was to express this stance in his articles for the press.<sup>25</sup> The reason was, as he implied above, his fear of the emergence of Dutch majorities in South African colonies.

After annexation there must be a period of isolation under crown colony government for a while. There can be no federation in SA for some years perhaps not for 15 or 20 years. Before it is possible some of the bitterness of this war must have quieted down and you must be sure

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<sup>24</sup> Amery to Chirol, 19 Sept 1899, AMEL 1/1/2.

<sup>25</sup> Amery, 'The South African Crisis: Reconstruction', 28 Nov 1899, *The Times*.

that you have a working majority of English in Rhodesia, Transvaal and Natal, and if possible a Progressive Government in Cape Colony.<sup>26</sup>

Amery thought that an over-conciliatory approach would make the same mistake as Gladstone did after 1881 and only generate more demands from the Boers. Rebels thus should be punished, and loyalists should be recompensed by an indemnity charged on the Transvaal.<sup>27</sup> Likewise, despite his support of the cause of a common South African nation, in consonance with his advocacy of British supremacy in South Africa, Amery sided with Milner's policy of Anglicization of the South African population, especially through encouraging British farmers to settle in the country of South Africa, where the Boers accounted for the majority of the white population. In his view, to transform Boer nationalism into colonial nationalism, Boer nationalists must be beaten down first and overwhelmed in terms of the size of the population by Britons. This stance led him to even support Milner's controversial request to suspend the Cape Constitution, which was rejected by Chamberlain.<sup>28</sup>

The changing circumstances forced Amery to gradually alter his stalwart attitude. Once the British Army started their counterattack, he recognized a need to contrive a more constructive policy for the post-war period.

Consequently, his demand for a huge indemnity was discarded.

Once S. Africa is developed and loyal, it will lay its share to the common expenses through some scheme of imperial federation. There is no other way except federation by which the British taxpayer can get relief

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<sup>26</sup> Amery to Buckle, 10 Nov 1899. AMEL 1/1/2.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

<sup>28</sup> Amery to Moberly Bell, 24 July 1902, Bell Papers, CMB/1.

from his pressing burden, and there is no way to federation except through preferential tariffs, customs union or whatever it is – that is the alpha and omega of the whole imperial institution.<sup>29</sup>

This letter shows that Amery preached the necessity of imperial preference before Chamberlain's initiative in order to deal with the South African question.<sup>30</sup> At this juncture, his policy shifted from punishment to development.

Milner's land settlement scheme ended with disappointing results, and he left South Africa in 1905. In the dusk of the Milner era, he and the Unionist/Conservative Government tried to orient the constitutional development of the Transvaal into a desirable direction for them. Facing the agitation of Afrikaners for a responsible government and the prospect of an electoral defeat of the Unionists/Conservatives, Alfred Lyttelton, Colonial Secretary after Chamberlain's resignation, persuaded Milner to take a pre-emptive measure to frame a desirable form of self-government. As a result, the so-called Lyttelton Constitution was created. It was stipulated to prevent the Boers from holding administrative power; the executive, separated from a legislative assembly, would be managed only by British officials; the franchise would be restricted to exclude landless Boers, all women, and all non-whites.<sup>31</sup>

The Lyttelton Constitution was naturally unpopular among the Boer political leaders. They regarded the formation of the Liberal Government in 1906 as a timely opportunity to urge their demands. J. C. Smuts visited the UK in early 1906, distributed his memorandum crying out for the fair treatment of the Boers,

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<sup>29</sup> Amery to Moberly Bell, Bell Papers, 29 August 1901.

<sup>30</sup> This point will be fully discussed in Chapter 8.

<sup>31</sup> As for the Lyttelton Constitution, see Thompson, *Unification*, 22-23; Hyam, *Elgin and Churchill*, 98-102.

and interviewed Liberal politicians, including Lord Elgin (Colonial Secretary), Churchill (Parliamentary Under Secretary), and Campbell-Bannerman.<sup>32</sup> Amery, as a loyal follower of Milner, warned Churchill not to alter the Lyttelton scheme: 'If you make a change, Smuts' gratitude will take no very tangible form, whereas Johannesburg's – or rather British South Africa's – indignation will lead to a pretty serious explosion out there ....'<sup>33</sup> Right after the date of this letter, however, the Liberal Government decided to revoke the constitution. Alternative constitutions were formulated and promulgated by 1907 to establish responsible governments in the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony.<sup>34</sup>

The abortion of the Lyttelton scheme exasperated Unionists/Conservatives. To make matters worse for them, the elections in South Africa during 1907-1908 gave the Boers political hegemony in each region. Het Volk, led by Botha and Smuts, won the majority in the Transvaal, as did Orangia Unie in the Orange River Colony. Even in the Cape Colony, the Progressive Party were defeated by the South African Party. Milner accused the Liberal Government of handing over power to the Boers and diminishing South Africa's ties with the British Empire.<sup>35</sup> Amery, calling 'the reversal of Lord Milner's policy' a 'catastrophe', also lamented that the Liberal's decision divided the South African British into the 'Progressives' and the 'Moderates', who were willing to cooperate with the Boers to keep the former in check, and consequently brought 'an overwhelming Boer majority into power'.<sup>36</sup> Milner opposed the new loan for the Transvaal proposed by the Liberals in 1907.<sup>37</sup> Amery, joining in the

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<sup>32</sup> Thompson, *Unification*, 23-24.

<sup>33</sup> Amery to Churchill, 7 February 1906, CHAR 10/8.

<sup>34</sup> Thompson, *Unification*, 26-29; Hyam, *Elgin and Churchill*, 102.

<sup>35</sup> His speech on 30 May 1907, in Alfred Milner, *The Nation and the Empire: Being a Collection of Speeches and Addresses* (London: Constable, 1913), 179-182

<sup>36</sup> Amery's speech titled 'The Present Situation in South Africa' at the Compatriots Club on 3 April 1908, AMEL 6/1/91.

<sup>37</sup> Milner's speech in the House of Lords. Hansard, 27 August 1907, vol. 182, 344-352.

campaign, was particularly angry at one of Churchill's statements in parliament: 'The Transvaal Government desire [sic] to raise a loan ... and if they had not the British Government to fall back upon, they would have had to go cap in hand to Sir P. FitzPatrick, Sir Julius Wernher, Messrs. Albu and other defenders of the "gilt-edged Union Jack"'.<sup>38</sup> Amery swiftly published a letter in *The Times* to criticize Churchill's attack on the leaders of the mining industry.

A Liberal Ministry apparently considers it perfectly natural and proper that the Imperial Government should lend its credit to the Boer Ministry in the Transvaal in order to enable it to treat with complete indifference the interests and representations of the British population .... That is the state of affairs which Liberal politicians are pleased to call self-government.<sup>39</sup>

Despite their chief's antipathy towards the Liberal policy, the Kindergarten made another constructive move for South Africa on the premise of self-government. Seeing the anti-imperial sentiments of the Boers and the inter-colonial conflicts over the railways and the customs, they concluded that a closer union of the South African colonies would be the sole solution to these problems. Their discussions and consultations with Lord Selborne, who succeeded Milner as High Commissioner, led to the publication of the Selborne Memorandum, which was mainly written by Lionel Curtis.<sup>40</sup> The effect of this document on the process of unification should not be exaggerated. The Boer

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<sup>38</sup> Hansard, HC 19 August 1907, vol. 181, 176-177.

<sup>39</sup> Amery, 'Mr. Churchill and South Africa', *The Times*, 23 August 1907.

<sup>40</sup> For a detailed account of the making of the memorandum, see Lavin Deborah, *From Empire to International Commonwealth: A Biography of Lionel Curtis* (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), chapter 4.

leaders suspected that the Kindergarten were attempting to manipulate South African politics. On the part of the Kindergarten, it was recognized that federation or unification should be attained by the Boers themselves. Though Milner admitted the ultimate necessity of federation, he claimed that the project should be postponed until the British became a majority through mass immigration. On the other hand, the Kindergarten and Selborne surmised that only by federalization would they achieve the immigration of British farmers.<sup>41</sup>

Amery was kept informed via correspondence within the circle of the Kindergarten and the pro-imperial politicians of the South African opposition parties such as Jameson, FitzPatrick, and Farrar. Farrar's pessimistic view on the future convinced Amery that federation would be the sole solution.<sup>42</sup> His trip to South Africa in the autumn-winter of 1907 confirmed the view. He expected that once South Africa was unified, the Boers would lose their common goal and be politically divided. In that situation, pro-British politicians such as Jameson might be called upon to be a leader to settle the conflicts. Alternatively, there might emerge a coalition of Botha-Smuts and FitzPatrick-Farrar, with Het Volk and the Progressives merging into one political force. Moreover, if Tariff Reform was adopted in the UK, the attraction of a unified market would induce Britons to head to South Africa, which would anglicise the regions and prevent 'Kaffirization'. In this sense, he was a self-proclaimed optimist concerning the South African question.<sup>43</sup> Amery, who had been at first opposed to granting self-government and federalizing South Africa, assured Selborne: 'It [the draft of the

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<sup>41</sup> Thompson, *Unification*, 64.

<sup>42</sup> Amery to Geoffrey Robinson, 16 July 1907, Dawson 62.

<sup>43</sup> Amery to Milner, 11 November, 1907, Milnder dep 218; Amery to Chamberlain, 7 March 1908, AMEL 2/5/7; Amery 'The Present Situation in South Africa', AMEL 6/1/91.

1910 Constitution] seems to be both remarkably good as a constitution and very fair as a settlement between the two races.’<sup>44</sup>

What was dispiriting to Milner’s disciples was their chief’s unsympathetic attitude towards their new policy. Coming back to Britain with a sense of disappointment, Milner regarded the South African question pessimistically. Hearing Amery’s proposition for South Africa at the Compatriot Club, Milner called it ‘a characteristically hopeful view’ and blatantly presented his prediction that South Africa would be ‘a weak link in the Imperial chain’. He preferred a ‘hands off’ approach in British policy towards the region.<sup>45</sup> Milner advocated federation or unification per se.<sup>46</sup> His complaint was that too many concessions had been made to the Boers in the course of unification. For instance, in his project on anglicisation, he always insisted that English should be ‘the language of all higher education’ and that Dutch should only be used to teach English.<sup>47</sup> In the 1910 Constitution, however, English and Dutch acquired equal status.<sup>48</sup> Milner grumbled to Curtis:

The so-called “equality of languages” is, as you know well, a gross injustice. .... I am more than ever impressed, after my visit to Canada by the fact that the only real and permanent tie of Empire is race. I do not mean for a moment that we should try, or can expect, to make all the great self-governing States of the Empire “British”, but without a strong and enduring British leaven, a large mass of the population to whom

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<sup>44</sup> Amery to Selborne, 10 March 1909, Selborne 66.

<sup>45</sup> See Milner’s response in Amery ‘The Present Situation in South Africa’, AMEL 6/1/91.

<sup>46</sup> Milner, *The Nation and the Empire*, 339-340.

<sup>47</sup> Milner’s memorandum sent to Hambury Williams, 27 December 1900, in Alfred Milner, *The Milner Papers: South Africa 1899-1905* (London & Melbourne & Toronto & Sydney: Cassel & Company Ltd, 1933), ii, 242.

<sup>48</sup> Thompson, *Unification*, 192-198.

British traditions, British history, and the British language are dear, it is impossible permanently to retain any great white community in political connection with the mother country.<sup>49</sup>

Amery himself saw Milner complain about South African unification that the Boers behaved in a friendly way first and tricked Britain in the end.<sup>50</sup> He tried to persuade Milner to approve the unification, but found his chief obstinate on the issue.<sup>51</sup> One of his letters begged Milner to 'come forward and claim your right to deal with the Union as the result of your work; otherwise, 'our people in S Africa', who made 'a really good fight' for the constitutional project, would feel 'very sore and discouraged'.<sup>52</sup> Although Amery ultimately failed to convert Milner, his letter to Selborne alleged that Milner's attitude was positive, probably in order not to dishearten the British in South Africa.

He [Milner] thinks it good as a constitution .... Meanwhile, he is not anxious to come forward and give it his blessing in public, lest he should be understood thereby to be approving the Liberal policy in the last three years and admitting that the situation is better than it would have been if there had been continuity of policy.<sup>53</sup>

Amery was clearly aware that in Milner's mind, his departure in 1905 marked a rupture in British policy towards South Africa. As seen in his attack on the

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<sup>49</sup> Milner to Curtis, 1 December 1908, Curtis MS 1.

<sup>50</sup> Amery diary, 7 January 1909, AMEL 7/8.

<sup>51</sup> Amery diary, 17 February 1909, AMEL 7/8.

<sup>52</sup> Amery to Milner, 5 July 1909, Milner dep 36.

<sup>53</sup> Amery to Selborne, 10 March 1909, Selborne 66. This letter is reprinted in D. G. Boyce, ed., *The Crisis of British Power: The Imperial and Naval Papers of the Second Earl of Selborne, 1895-1910* (London: The Historians' Press, 1990), 408-409.



abortion of the Lyttelton Constitution, Amery shared this feeling to some extent. Unlike his chief, however, he believed that the making of the Union was a necessary concession to the Boers to hold them in the British Empire. As a journalist and publicist, he now recognized a need to invent a historical narrative confirming that there was continuity and no contradiction between Milner's policy and unification. This was what he did in the concluding volumes of *The Times History of the War in South Africa*.

Amery authored the concluding chapter of Vol. 5, *The Times History*, discussing the peace treaty in 1902. He depicted the process as a conflict between Kitchener, who desired more for peace, and Milner, who hesitated to negotiate for peace lest it should endanger British supremacy. Amery admitted that each side had reasonable points and drawbacks.

Milner overestimated the moral transformation, great as it apparently was, which the individual burgher or even commandant underwent on capture; he may have exaggerated the strength and unity of the British element in the population upon which, as the solid basis, he hoped to build up the Transvaal of the future; he may have relied too much on the stability of British politics at home as a condition of successful carrying out of the task of reconstruction ....

Despite acknowledging that Milner's expectations were over-optimistic, Amery concluded that Milner, as well as Kitchener, had attained their goals because the actual settlement was formed based on British sovereignty.<sup>54</sup> In these

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<sup>54</sup> *The Times History*, vol. 5, 574-576.

pages, Amery simultaneously admitted Milner's failure and justified the overall intention and result of his policy.

In the same way, the final volume of *The Times History* tried to exonerate Milner. For example, regarding British immigration to South Africa, while admitting that Milner had hoped for a much larger number of settlers, Amery argued that Milner's motivation was not 'British Krugerism' to displace Afrikaners. To Milner, it would need 'a solid basis of British population' for South Africa to imbibe British values. Furthermore,

its real effect was intended to be qualitative... it aimed at diminishing the racial factor ... by getting rid of the sharp division between a purely British urban population and a purely Dutch farming population.

Amery portrayed Milner as a more prescient leader than he actually was. Milner knew, Amery alleged, that nothing could restrain the demand for self-government for many years, so he tried to finish the indispensable preparation for it, namely reconstruction and development, before the demand became too vocal. The immigration of progressive farmers would galvanize the South African economy, and it would bring about 'over-spill' to encourage the development of manufacturing. It would also enable the country not to be a black agricultural society but a 'white South Africa', based on which Union of South Africa, and ultimately Union of Empire, would be formulated. The importation of Chinese indentured labour was just a necessary evil to achieve a revival of the gold mining industry, without which only few settlers would come. Certainly, the result of his scheme did not live up to expectations.

But there can be no doubt that even the small number actually established, together with the settlers introduced by private agencies, has already exercised a very considerable moral and economic effect in bringing the races together, and in stimulating agricultural progress.<sup>55</sup>

Amery acknowledged that if the Liberal Government had not granted self-government at the time, the formation of the Union would have been delayed for years. However, he refused to attribute all the achievements to Liberal initiatives since it could not have been attained but for a foundation cemented by Milner. Milner and Chamberlain aimed at the making of a united South Africa as a Dominion in the British Empire from the outset, but he could not afford to get on with the process because 'the stern duty of clearing the ground for union had inevitably severed him from the Dutch'. That was why he left the rest of work to his disciples 'imbued with his conceptions ... but freed from his burdens and his difficulties'.<sup>56</sup>

What implication will this case study have to the academic controversy over the change and continuity between pre- and post-Milner years in South Africa? It must be pointed out first that to what extent we can emphasize the difference between Milner and his pupils is debatable. For instance, his heirs continued to believe that the unification of South Africa could secure economic stability to attract large-scale immigration from Britain.<sup>57</sup> Amery himself expected that the introduction of imperial preference and consequent growth of agriculture in South Africa would attract settlers.<sup>58</sup> Moreover, Milner, and Amery, certainly laid

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<sup>55</sup> *The Times History*, vol. 6, 17-19, 56-60.

<sup>56</sup> *The Times History*, vol. 6, 207, 220-223.

<sup>57</sup> Thompson, *Unification*, 64.

<sup>58</sup> L. S. Amery, 'South Africa and Imperial Preference', in idem., *Union and Strength: A Series of Papers on Imperial Questions* (London: Edward Arnold, 1912), 264.

out the goal of a united South Africa as a settlement colony. That being said, there is no doubt that Milner's disciples took a much more conciliatory and cautious approach not to inflame Boer leaders. However, Amery deliberately understated the difference and attempted to depict the whole story, from the war to unification, as teleological and, even, Whiggish history. That is, Amery recounted the whole episode as a success story of the British Empire, albeit with many mistakes and lessons: Kruger's aggressive and intolerant nationalism was crushed by the necessary war; Milner's bitter medicine laid the groundwork for reconstruction, and the Union was formed by the new responsible governments to become an ostensibly white Dominion. Amery confirmed this triumphant narrative again at the end of the First World War. As a result of the reconciliation of the two races, South Africa was being transformed into 'a partner in the free Union of the British Commonwealth', which was the goal both Milner and Botha aimed at. Indeed, there were discontented 'South African Sinn Feiners', such as Hertzog, but 'the future is not with them'.<sup>59</sup> His complacency was to be shattered in the 1924 general election, which ousted Smuts from power. Amery, as Dominions Secretary, had to deal with Hertzog's demand for more autonomy.

### **The 'native' question**

The issue of discrimination against natives or non-whites in South Africa has been one of the thorniest topics in historiography. Historians have made strenuous efforts to locate the foremost factors that, or perpetrators who, gave rise to Apartheid.<sup>60</sup> Amongst them, Martin Legassick's indication that British

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<sup>59</sup> Amery's pamphlet, *The Constitutional Development of South Africa*, AMEL 8/226.

<sup>60</sup> As for the historiography, see William Beinart and Saul Dubow, eds., *Segregation and Apartheid in Twentieth-Century South Africa* (London & New York: Routledge, 1995).

administrators in South Africa agreed with segregation is still relevant. So is Saul Dubow's research on political and intellectual history of segregation, founded on Legassick's work.<sup>61</sup> It is worthwhile to analyse Amery's view on the native question in order to understand the British world views on the question as well as to grasp his attitude towards non-white people in the empire.

In published works, Amery did not often mention the sensitive question. That said, for example, one of the chapters in Vol. 1, *The Times History*, expounding history of South Africa up to the war, contrasted the attitude of the Dutch colonists, still trapped in the age of slave trade, with 'that exaggerated sentimentalism about the noble savage' in England. As is apparent from his wording, Amery was not necessarily in favour of the British side. He even depicted missionaries as being 'fanatical and prejudiced' regarding the native question.<sup>62</sup>

His private letters more frankly expressed his opinion. First of all, Amery did not assent to mustering the natives for the battle.<sup>63</sup> Regarding the location of the natives in his reconstruction plan, his letters to Chirol are telling.

I hear the Liberals are making a great fuss about settling Englishman on the Transvaal as if it were a sin and an injustice to the Boer: what a God forsaken crew they are. I hope shortly to write an article on the native question ...: the gist of it, that it is necessary for the future of S. Africa, not only to rigidly exclude Indians and Chinese but gradually to expel the nigger too, from one district after another ....<sup>64</sup>

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<sup>61</sup> Martin Legassick, 'British Hegemony and the Origins of Segregation in South Africa, 1901-14', in *ibid.*, 43-59; Saul Dubow, *Racial Segregation and the Origins of Apartheid in South Africa, 1919-36* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989).

<sup>62</sup> *The Times History*, vol. 1, 27-28.

<sup>63</sup> Amery to Chirol, 25 October 1899, AMEL 1/1/2.

<sup>64</sup> Amery to Bell, 29 Aug 1900, Bell Papers, CMB/1.

This was the most radical remark in his racial discourse. However, he did not necessarily advocate elimination of the non-white from the colonies. His other letter to Chirol put forward his realistic proposition on the native question.

We have done one good thing towards conciliating the Dutch, that is, we have shown our resolve not to let the natives get out of bounds. We enforce the pass laws, we repress looting. There must be no nonsense about giving the native a franchise in the new colonies or of straight way abolishing the pass law. The rights he has under the existing law are sufficient providing it is fairly and justly administered, which it usually has not been.

My own idea of the settlement of the native difficulty is to encourage native self-government in local matters, and eventually even have a sort of native house of assembly, able to legislate on matters concerning natives, subject to a veto of the White House.

His solution was a mixture of segregation and separate self-government. By his standard, 'a gradual equalisation and intercourse' regarding politics, business, and education would be acceptable, but not any social intercourse and marriage. Amery called his scheme 'a sort of caste system'. He assumed that the origin of the caste system was essentially 'racial' and that it had continued to work to the day.

No doubt as in India the racial distinctions of the castes will decrease. In 500 years time I expect the South African white man will contain strong

dark blend, and the end of all things may be a brown South African race, comparable to the Abyssinians or Somalis. That doesn't matter, what does matter is that there should not be too quick a mixture now or for the next few centuries. South Africa must develop as a white man's country under the guidance of white men, and not as a bastard county like most of S. America.<sup>65</sup>

In these statements, Amery not only was shackled with a general fear of miscegenation but also disapproved of the equalisation of franchise in the immediate future. Even after the failure of the scheme of mass British immigration, Amery fancied that the effects of imperial preference could attract large-scale British immigration, which would 'entirely modify the proportion between the white and native populations in South Africa'.<sup>66</sup> His tour in Africa in 1907 made him believe that the situations in the dependent colonies were so different from that in Dominions that the Colonial Office should be divided into two offices. In parallel with this, Amery came to claim that Dominions needed more autonomous constitutional status, while the dependent colonies needed economic, not political, development.<sup>67</sup> That is, the result of the South African War helped him conclude that the Imperial Government should have the double-standard about its approach to white and non-white subjects at least in the near future.

## **Conclusion**

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<sup>65</sup> Amery to Chirol, 7 July 1900, AMEL 1/1/2.

<sup>66</sup> L. S. Amery, 'South Africa and Imperial Preference', in Amery, *Union and Strength*, 264.

<sup>67</sup> See Chapter 6.

Through his involvement in South African politics, Amery had an important opportunity to nurture his views on the need to foster and come to terms with colonial nationalism in white settlement colonies. And yet, it did not prevent him from initially advocating Milner's uncompromising reconstruction policy. Indeed, he later came to approve of the more conciliatory approach of the Liberal Government and Milner's successors, but he also attempted to depict Milner's politics in South Africa as a success by emphasizing continuity of their goals and by re-defining Milner's policy as a necessary foundation for self-government and unification. A conciliatory attitude should be taken only after fervent nationalism is knocked down. Moreover, the native question in South Africa not only exposed his view on racial policy towards the natives, but also convinced him that the non-whites could have the same political rights as the white only in the distant future. Hence, it is hardly surprising that he objected to yielding to the demands of Irish Nationalists in the Home Rule Crisis and that he did not approve of giving self-government to India at this stage. Amery deduced a lesson from the war that nationalism in white settlement colonies should be turned into colonial nationalism by raising their status or, if necessary, even by force, while as for non-white elements in the empire, Britain should concentrate on developing their economies and societies for the time being. It needed another imperial crisis for him to change this position.



## 4 The Irish Question

Amery witnessed the most turbulent phase in modern Anglo-Irish relations. The Irish question was foregrounded again in British politics in 1910. The lukewarm Liberal victories in the 1910 general elections augmented the government's dependence on the Irish Parliamentary Party (and the Labour Party). After the House of Lords was emasculated by the Parliament Act, Liberals submitted the Home Rule bill in 1912, triggering fervent Unionist counter-movements, particularly in Ulster, which caused severe reaction among Nationalists, in turn. Their intensified conflict would possibly have led to a civil war if the war against the Central European powers had not broken out. While the war transformed the British political scene, enabling the coalition government to present an alternative solution, the Government of Ireland Act 1920, the state of affairs in Ireland was also drastically changed after the 1916 rebellion, where radicalised Sinn Fein rose to power and rejected the new Act. The provisional consequence of the War of Independence was the 1921 Treaty, which stipulated Ireland, apart from six northern counties, as a Dominion.

Once Amery became an MP in 1911, he immediately got involved in the politics of the Irish Question. His views on it changed over the years. Overall, Amery, as a young and dissident backbencher, supported the Die-Hard stance during the Home Rule Crisis, insisting that Unionists/Conservatives should try to prevent the bill from passing by any means. However, after the outbreak of the Great War, he became an advocate of the Irish Convention and the 1920 Act and ended up by acquiescing in the 1921 compromise. Indeed, historians have observed that conversion to moderation was a common tendency among many

Unionists/Conservatives, and they have attributed the change to the impact of the First World War.<sup>1</sup> However, as far as Amery is concerned, this generalisation is not necessarily correct. The Great War did have an impact on his world view. But the process of his conversion was neither straightforward nor simple. For instance, he started to take a softer stance, in particular towards federalism, at the end of 1913, albeit in parallel with launching the radical campaign for the British Covenant. Moreover, even after his 'conversion', his view continued to have some essence of his previous position.

Through tracing the trajectory of Amery's thinking on Ireland, this chapter will contribute to historiography in two ways. The first aim is to locate his position regarding Ireland in contemporary British politics, particularly among Unionists/Conservatives. Many historians have written articles and books on the Irish question, some of which carry valuable comments about Amery.<sup>2</sup> But, while some politicians have attracted historians' interests to the point that monographs have been published, even an article focusing on Amery and Ireland remains to be written.<sup>3</sup> This is the gap that this chapter will fill. It will also serve to re-assess what effect the Home Rule Crisis had on the Edwardian Conservative Party. A few generations ago, historians in Britain and Ireland

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<sup>1</sup> Nigel Keohane, *The Party of Patriotism: The Conservative Party and the First World War* (Farnham & Burlington: Ashgate, 2010), chapter 3; John Stubbs, 'The Impact of the Great War on the Conservative Party', in *The Politics of Reappraisal 1918-1939* (London: Macmillan, 1975), 1–13.

<sup>2</sup> As for the Anglo-Irish relationship in general, see D. G. Boyce, *The Irish Question and British Politics, 1868-1996* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 1996). There is thorough research on each of the British two parties during the Home Rule Crisis 1912-14. Patricia Jalland, *The Liberals and Ireland: Ulster Question in British Politics to 1914* (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1993); Jeremy Smith, *The Tories and Ireland: Conservative Party Politics and the Home Rule Crisis, 1910-1914* (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2000). The ideological settings in the UK and Ireland have been also depicted by historians. G. K. Peatling, *British Opinion and Irish Self-Government, 1865-1925: From Unionism to Liberal Commonwealth* (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2001); Paul Bew, *Ideology and the Irish Question: Ulster Unionism and Irish Nationalism, 1912-1916* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998).

<sup>3</sup> Notable examples are followings: Catherine B. Shannon, *Arthur J. Balfour and Ireland 1874-1922* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1988); John Kendle, *Walter Long, Ireland and the Union, 1905-1920* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1992); Paul Bew, *Churchill and Ireland* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).

often repudiated Conservative tactics to destroy the bill as too radical and unconstitutional.<sup>4</sup> By contrast, recent researchers have tended to emphasize the strength of the constitutional or rational elements in Unionist/Conservative politics.<sup>5</sup> Saunders has gone so far as to say that the Home Rule Crisis could be regarded as one of the processes in which Conservatives came to terms with democracy through adopting the language of democracy to criticize Liberal ‘tyranny’ in the Commons.<sup>6</sup> Furthermore, historians of popular politics, or political culture, have argued that popular opposition to Irish Home Rule was actually strong and that the Irish question had a positive influence on the Conservative Party in that it brought an agenda about which the party as a whole could be united.<sup>7</sup> If this kind of reinterpretation goes too far, however, it could lead to understating the difficulty of the conundrum in which contemporary politicians were trapped. Hopefully, this chapter, through revealing Amery’s vacillating attitude, will direct the readers’ attention to its divisive effects on Unionists/Conservatives.<sup>8</sup>

The second purpose, closely connected with the first, is to evaluate the impact of the Irish question on Amery’s imperial thinking. Although Ireland was, technically speaking, not a colony, the Irish question was often debated as one

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<sup>4</sup> George Dangerfield, *The Strange Death of Liberal England* (London: Constable & CO LTD, 1935); Robert Blake, *The Unknown Prime Minister: The Life and Times of Andrew Bonar Law, 1858-1923* (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1955). As for Irish historians’ view, see Bew, *Ideology and the Irish Question*, vi-vii.

<sup>5</sup> Smith, *The Tories and Ireland*; R. J. Q. Adams, *Bonar Law* (London: John Murray, 1999).

<sup>6</sup> Robert Saunders, ‘Tory Rebels and Tory Democracy: The Ulster Crisis, 1900–14’, in *The Foundations of the British Conservative Party: Essays on Conservatism from Lord Salisbury to David Cameron*, by Bradley W. Hart and Richard Carr (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013), 65–83.

<sup>7</sup> Daniel Jackson, *Popular Opposition to Irish Home Rule in Edwardian* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2009); David Thackeray, *Conservatism for the Democratic Age* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013), Chapter 4; idem., ‘Rethinking the Edwardian Crisis of Conservatism’, *The Historical Journal* 54, no. 1 (2011): 191–213.

<sup>8</sup> Some historians have emphasized the divisive effects. See, Richard Murphy, ‘Faction in the Conservative Party and the Home Rule Crisis. 1912-14’, *History* 71, no. 232 (1986): 222–34; E. H. H. Green, *The Crisis of Conservatism: The Politics, Economics and Ideology of the Conservative Party, 1880-1914* (London & New York: Routledge, 1995), 275-281.

of the imperial questions.<sup>9</sup> The third Home Rule Crisis was no exception. All the parties used colonial analogies or comparisons to justify their claims. Amery, quite aware of it, attempted to deny the plausibility of the opponents' imperial rhetoric. Furthermore, it gave him another opportunity to contemplate whether endowing self-governance could soothe nationalism in the imperial peripheries. He, as well as other imperial thinkers, especially members of the Round Table, tried to work out a possible solution based on their experiences in South Africa. The consequence of the Irish question, which was a defeat, or a compromise at best, to Amery, was to influence his later thinking. Existing theses focusing on Amery have not paid much attention to the Irish question.<sup>10</sup> This chapter thus will offer more sophisticated understanding of Amery as an imperial theorist.

The chapter is composed of five sections. The first part will explore what Amery thought about Ireland before the Home Rule Crisis. The second part will deal with the period of 1910-13. In this phase, Amery came to oppose not only a colonial solution (giving Ireland a Dominion status) but also a federal solution (federalization of the UK). The next part will focus on Amery's contradictory activities in the first half of 1914. In the final stage of the crisis, he converted to a more conciliatory attitude towards federalism as well as launching militant campaigns to wreck the bill. It will conclude that it is hard to find plausible consistency between these activities, which directly reflected his dilemma at the time. The fourth section will analyse Amery's trajectory in 1916-1920, showing that Amery came to recognize the necessity of constitutional changes and to become an ardent federalist. The concluding part will argue that the lesson of the Irish question made him distance himself from the Die-Hards and get closer

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<sup>9</sup> Green, *The Crisis of Conservatism*, 56-61

<sup>10</sup> WM. Roger Louis, *In the Name of God, Go!: Leo Amery and the British Empire in the Age of Churchill* (New York & London: W.W. Norton, 1992), 58-60; Patricia Ferguson Watkinson, 'Leo Amery and the Imperial Idea 1900-1945' (PhD thesis, University of Virginia, 2001), 64.

to the Round Table as far as the governance of imperial peripheries was concerned, which paved the way for his views on Indian self-governance in the 1930s-1940s.

### **Before the storm**

It is unclear when Amery began to take the Irish question seriously. There is no evidence to show his reaction to the 1886 and 1893 Home Rule bills in his private papers, though it was probable that he felt antipathy towards the bills, considering his enthusiasm for the Empire in his schooldays. He did not systematically develop his views on the problem until the 1910 general elections. However, he occasionally had opportunities to consider the future of Anglo-Irish relations.

The first one was the meeting of the Coefficients on 18 April 1904. The agenda, which was, 'How far, and by what Methods, is a partial devolution of Government possible within the British Islands', was opened by Richard Haldane. The minutes were solely authored by Amery.<sup>11</sup> Those in attendance talked about ostensibly contradictory tendencies in methods of governance: decentralization, such as devolution to specialists or the creation of local governments, and centralization, for instance, observed in the federations of Canada and Australia. According to the minutes, their conclusion was that two tendencies were 'really correlative' in that while matters on external relations were centralized, devolution was introduced where local powers were more suitable. The discussion moved on to where the central power should permit devolution. They reached the agreement that it would devolve powers only to local bodies which would meet a certain minimum standard in efficiency,

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<sup>11</sup> The paragraph is based on the minutes of the Coefficients, ASSOC 17, LSE Archives.

morality, and patriotism. Ireland was continuously cited as an unsuitable example.

It is unclear to what extent this reflected Amery's personal view. However, the premise of their argument, the complementary progress of centralization and decentralization, had already been advocated and used by him when he had designed his plan for Army Reform.<sup>12</sup> This was to become a central concept in his way of thinking on both domestic and international matters. In the context of the Irish question, the point is that the logic of simultaneous centralization and decentralization itself did not preclude the possibility of home rule. Rather, it could be used by Liberals and Nationalists to propagate its legitimacy. This makes it all the more important that Amery encountered the argument that Ireland should be left out of self-governing communities due to the lack of qualification.<sup>13</sup> Amery was to appropriate the rhetoric later.

His experiences as a Unionist candidate also made him encounter the Irish question. His electoral leaflets for the 1906 election and the 1908 by-election in Wolverhampton East included his short statement that opposed Irish Home Rule.<sup>14</sup> In the 1908 by-election, which was caused by Henry Fowler's decision to take a peerage, Amery lost just by an eight-vote margin. In his memoir, he reflected on several factors causing his defeat and concluded: 'the major deciding factor' was 'the Roman Catholic vote'.<sup>15</sup> As of October 1910, after he left the constituency to look for another one, he informed a would-be candidate of the same impression: 'There are, further, some 600 or 700 Irish Catholics who I believe have at the last moment always voted Liberal under orders from

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<sup>12</sup> See Chapter 1.

<sup>13</sup> His address, delivered in March 1908, declared that 'over three million Irishmen' were 'politically hostile to the Empire'. Amery, *Union and Strength: A Series of Papers on Imperial Questions* (London: Edward Arnold, 1912), 87.

<sup>14</sup> These leaflets can be found in AMEL 4/5.

<sup>15</sup> Amery, *My Political Life*, vol. 1, 333.

the Nationalist executive.<sup>16</sup> It was, thus, not sheer invention formulated by hindsight<sup>17</sup> That is, Amery perceived the Irish question as a nuisance, which stymied his political ambition.

More important was his participation in drafting 'the unauthorized programme', concocted by Tariff Reformers and published in the *Morning Post* in 1908.<sup>18</sup> According to Amery,

It has been the result of a series of symposia and interchanges of letters extending over a little more than a year. Milner, Austen, B. L., have been the leading people in it on the political side and through Austen Joe has also been consulted. Among the minor people were Jebb, Ware, Hills and myself. In the end the actual editing of a draft was undertaken by Jebb.... it is ... an attempt to discover and state the chief points on which what we may call the advanced wing of the Unionist party are in general agreement. It is a basis for discussion and not an attempt to run a policy or to queer a pitch.<sup>19</sup>

The document attempted to maximise the fascination of Tariff Reform.<sup>20</sup> They first tried to extend the meaning of 'union' and 'unionism'.

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<sup>16</sup> Amery to Levita, 26 October 1910, AMEL 2/5/9

<sup>17</sup> The Irish Question was already politicized in mid-1910. The next sentence following the quotation was: "If anything comes of this Home Rule all round conference the situation may again be materially modified." Ibid. In 1908, the local press in Wolverhampton published a manifesto by the Irish Party, which urged the Catholic and Irish community to vote against Amery. See undated press cuttings in AMEL 5/5.

<sup>18</sup> Regarding the making of the programme, see Alan Sykes, *Tariff Reform in British Politics 1903-1913* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 195-198,

<sup>19</sup> Amery to Maxse, 8 October 1908, Maxse Papers 458, quoted in *ibid.*, p. 319

<sup>20</sup> 'Unionist Policy: Constructive Proposals: An Important Document', *Morning Post*, 12 October, 1908.

The basis of all Unionist policy is union. All national questions, whether domestic or Imperial, should be treated in relation to this fundamental principle. Implying union of classes within the State, National union of Great Britain and Ireland. Imperial union of self-governing nations and dependencies under the Crown.

Now, unionism assumed not just territorial but also social and imperial meaning.<sup>21</sup> Authors presented Tariff Reform as a panacea to solve all these problems. As for Ireland, the root of the political unrest lay in ‘the continued economic depression of the country’. Tariff Reform could settle the grievances by transferring the burden of Irish taxpayers to imported commodities, giving Irish agriculture a preference, and protecting Irish infant industries. They also tried to make Tariff Reform a new chapter of the mythology of ‘constructive unionism’,<sup>22</sup> by stating that it would be ‘a natural complement of the land-purchase policy already developed by the Unionist Party.’ They concluded that while Unionists/Conservatives should strive to substantiate these economic solutions, they should object to any proposals to give Ireland a special status within the UK because it would end in intensifying their outcry for more political autonomy.

Probably, the authors, including Amery, could not claim a copyright on the rhetoric, since it was already in circulation among Tariff Reformers.<sup>23</sup> In fact, his 1908 electoral leaflet, using the rhetoric, argued that Tariff Reform, and not

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<sup>21</sup> Though Stephen Evans has argued that ‘unionism’ was redefined from territorial to social in the 1920s, this evidence indicates that the redefinition was already begun by Tariff Reformers in the Edwardian age. Stephen Evans, ‘The Conservatives and the Redefinition of Unionism, 1912–21’, *Twentieth Century British History* 9, no. 1 (1998): 1–27.

<sup>22</sup> With regard to the myth and reality of ‘constructive unionism’, see Andrew Gailey, *Ireland and the Death of Kindness: The Experience of Constructive Unionism, 1890-1905* (Cork: Cork University Press, 1987).

<sup>23</sup> For instance, see *Monthly Notes on Tariff Reform*, vol. 7, no. 4, October 1907, 278.



Home Rule, would rectify the economic plight in Ireland, which caused by Free Trade.<sup>24</sup> It deserves due attention that he came to recognize that a voting bloc of Irish Catholics might be a nuisance to Unionists/Conservatives unless their longing for home rule was mollified and that he found the rhetoric of Tariff Reform useful in addressing the Irish question. Amery more systematically deployed the rhetoric during the Home Rule Crisis.

### **Anti-federalist phase, 1910-13**

In January-March, 1912, Amery serialised articles in the *Morning Post* to criticize the Home Rule Bill, which were published as a pamphlet, *The Case against Home Rule*, in the same year. The articles denied the validities of the federal scheme (federalization of the UK, in which Ireland would be equal to England, Scotland, and Wales under the federal government) as well as the Dominion scheme (giving Dominion status to Ireland). Peatling has aptly pointed out that these two types of schemes were considered as possible forms of Irish Home Rule.<sup>25</sup> While most Unionists/Conservatives rejected the Dominion scheme at this stage, the federal scheme fascinated some of them, as well as some Home Rulers. Federalism was an important undercurrent in history of British political thought.<sup>26</sup> In particular, with federation formed in Canada and Australia, the possibility of federalization of both the UK and the whole British Empire was frequently discussed in the second half of the long nineteenth century. The discussion over the former was mainly caused by widespread concern about the excessive workload in the House of Commons and about the Irish question. Although various plans of the federated UK were

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<sup>24</sup> Amery's leaflet for the 1908 by-election in AMEL 4/5.

<sup>25</sup> G. K. Peatling, *British Opinion and Irish Self-Government*, 69-70.

<sup>26</sup> Michael Burgess, *The British Tradition of Federalism* (Madison: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1995); John Kendle, *Federal Britain: A History* (London: Routledge, 1997).

published, there was no consensus about the definition of 'federalism'. On the contrary, federalism was appropriated by conflicting political parties, whose designs ranged from fully-fledged federal systems like those of Canada or the USA to variants of devolution. The lack of a strict definition was well demonstrated by the fact that 'devolution', 'federalism', 'home rule', 'federal home rule', 'home rule all round', and 'federal devolution' were used interchangeably at the time.<sup>27</sup>

As the Irish question became a more high-profile issue after 1910, some Unionists, as well as Liberals, came to think that the federation of the UK could be a solution.<sup>28</sup> Despite Amery's opposition to the scheme in 1912, Jeremy Smith, who has done the most thorough research on Conservative attitudes towards the Home Rule Crisis, has categorized Amery as one of the 'tactical federalists', who 'believed that a strong campaign now would not harm the federalist cause but would in the longer term create the political impasse from where the opportunity to construct a truly federal bill could develop'. But he has failed to recognize that Amery was an anti-federalist during 1912-13. What made Smith fail to notice the change was some evidence that Amery was supportive of federalism in 1910.<sup>29</sup> Historians of the Round Table or its members have recognized that there was a diversion on the issue and that Amery was on the side of anti-federalism, though they did not mention his

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<sup>27</sup> John Kendle, *Ireland and the Federal Solution: The Debate over the United Kingdom Constitution, 1870-1921* (Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1989), 3-7.

<sup>28</sup> Most thorough research on this is Kendle, *Ireland and Federal Solution*. But also see idem., 'The Round Table Movement and "Home Rule All Around"', *The Historical Journal* 11, no. 2 (1968): 332-53.; idem., *Round Table Movement and Imperial Union* (Toronto & Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1975), esp. chapter 6; Patricia Jalland, 'United Kingdom Devolution 1910-14: Political Panacea or Tactical Diversion?', *The English Historical Review* 94, no. 375 (1979): 757-85.

<sup>29</sup> Smith, *The Tories and Ireland.*, 26, 74.

wavering attitude in 1910.<sup>30</sup> This section, composed of two parts, will first trace his trajectory in this period, and then analyse his views during this phase.

Amery started to publish his personal views on Ireland in the first 1910 general election. His leaflet for the election repeated the purport of the unauthorized programme.

**In Ireland**, the Unionist policy of land reform has already worked wonders. But there, too, the full benefit of the policy can only come with Tariff Reform. **I recognise the duty of Tariff Reformers not to rest till they have restored to Ireland the population which she has lost as the result of sixty years of Free Trade**, and to make her the home of a prosperous and contented people. But I am entirely opposed to the policy of tearing up and tramping on the Union which Mr Asquith has announced in hope of securing Nationalist votes.<sup>31</sup>

His main agenda was to introduce imperial preference, and not to resolve the Irish question. Only one short paragraph was allocated for Ireland. Obviously, it was used just to promote Tariff Reform.

What made Amery take the Irish question seriously was the discussion in the Round Table group. It was formed by ex-members of Milner's Kindergarten, such as Lionel Curtis and Philip Kerr, in 1909. Amery frequently attended the 'Moot' of the group in 1910-11.<sup>32</sup> Their discussion was primarily over a way to make the relationship between the mother country and the Dominions closer. However, as the Irish question turned out to be a stumbling block to the inter-

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<sup>30</sup> Kendle, *The Round Table*, 147.

<sup>31</sup> The bold letters are original. AMEL 4/9.

<sup>32</sup> See its minutes in Round Table Papers, Bodleian Library, MS. Eng. Hist. c. 776.

party conferences in 1910, they began to wonder whether it should be regarded as an imperial issue or not. Among others, F. S. Oliver, an influential guru of the Kindergarten and the Round Table, published his suggestion under the pseudonym of `Pacificus` in letters to *The Times*, insisting that the inter-party conference should consider a federal scheme as a possible compromise. According to Kendle, Amery and some other members objected to the view that federalization of the UK or 'home rule all round' could be a stepping-stone for an imperial federation, or that a federal solution could solve the congestion in parliament, which was mainly argued by Curtis and Oliver. Failing to reach a consensus, in the moot at Blackmoor on 12-13 November, they agreed to steer clear of the question in their official policy because the federation of the UK and that of the Empire were totally different issues, though some federalists continued to publish their personal views.<sup>33</sup>

However, what matters was the fact that denying the interdependence of a federation of the UK and the Empire did not necessarily mean denying the possibility that a federation of the UK could solve the Irish question. For instance, Milner, despite being in line with Amery regarding the interdependence, was inclined to admit that a federal scheme might work to make a common ground in the conference.<sup>34</sup> As for Amery, Smith has cited J. S. Sandars' letters in October 1910 as evidence that Amery was one of the young Unionists/Conservatives longing for a federal compromise.<sup>35</sup> Meanwhile, Amery sent three letters to *The Times* at the beginning of November, which announced his scepticism of federalism, particularly the last of which, written immediately after the collapse of the conference, declared that all

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<sup>33</sup> Kendle, *The Round Table*, 130-144.

<sup>34</sup> J. Lee Thompson, *A Wider Patriotism: Alfred Milner and the British Empire* (London: Pickering & Chatto, 2007), 146

<sup>35</sup> Smith, *The Tories and Ireland*, 26.

Unionists/Conservatives had to do was fight in the next election with 'a great ideal' of unionism.<sup>36</sup> These statements distanced him from some colleagues in the Round Table. For instance, a letter from F. S. Oliver, written after reading Amery's second letter to *The Times*, said, 'it seems to me that you and I ought to take entirely different lines.' Oliver ascribed their difference to the fact that Amery had to cling to a politically practical line as a Unionist/Conservative candidate.<sup>37</sup> How can these contradictory primary sources be interpreted?

First of all, Amery's scepticism towards the federalization of the UK was real and even stronger than that of Milner. As soon as Curtis claimed that Irish Home Rule could be a preliminary for the imperial union at the 'moot' of the Round Table in January 1910, he dismissed it as 'vague' and 'irrelevant to the imperial question.'<sup>38</sup> This was a natural reaction as a participant in the debate of the Coefficients, cited above. And he did not approve of its effectivity for the Irish question, either. In the second letter to *The Times* on 8 November, he announced his opinion bluntly:

I see no necessity for us Unionists to have a bee in our bonnet on the subject of Federalism. We claim that we have already worked a profound transformation in Irish affairs by our land policy. We believed that our general economic policy of Tariff Reform applied to Ireland will work a still greater transformation ... than any merely constitutional change possibly can do.

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<sup>36</sup> L. S. Amery, 'Imperial Federation And Home Rule', 01 November, *The Times*; idem., 'A Plea For Steadiness', 08 November; idem., 'After the Conference', 14 November.

<sup>37</sup> Oliver to Amery, 8 November 1910, AMEL 2/5/9.

<sup>38</sup> Amery's diary, 23rd January 1910, AMEL 7/9.

This was based on the spirit of the unauthorized programme. He assigned priority to an economic remedy, and not to a political machination.

On the other hand, Sandars, Balfour's chief assistant, reported to his colleague on his talk with Amery two weeks before Amery's first letter to *The Times*. According to Sandars, Amery was 'one of the young men who were strongly averse to' the breakdown of the conference and thought that a federal scheme might deserve consideration. Amery also told that he did not welcome a new election caused by the failure of the conference.<sup>39</sup> It might seem that he secretly behaved as a young federalist in front of the party leaders, in contradiction of his public statement.

However, his argument was actually more nuanced. His objection to federalization was 'not one of principle but of practical'. Despite his assertion that it was simply impractical, he posed a rhetorical question at the same time.

If we can be convinced by reasonable argument that such a scheme would really workable in practice ... what is there in our principles that would prevent our giving it our assent and even our support?<sup>40</sup>

And he predicted that discussion in the conference would be 'immensely helpful in opening the minds of our leading men to the essential nature of federal problems in general and of the Imperial problem in particular.' Even in the second letter to *The Times*, where he denounced the redundancy of federalism as quoted above, he added:

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<sup>39</sup> Sandars to Short, 24<sup>th</sup> October, Balfour Papers, Add Mss 49767.

<sup>40</sup> Amery, 'Imperial Federation And Home Rule'.

We have no call to be on the rampage after a Federal Constitution for its own sake. But, on the other hand, can we, dare we, refuse point blank to enter upon any discussion whatsoever of any form of local devolution ...? In the present crisis in our history, in the present temper of the electorate, such a course would to my mind savour of sheer obstinate folly.<sup>41</sup>

That is, he made the conclusion on federalism open-ended, despite his reservation and scepticism.

A key to understanding the state of his mind lies in his personal situation at that moment. Amery had attempted to be an MP since 1906. After facing the third defeat in January 1910, he finally decided to give up Wolverhampton and to look for another constituency. His journey to find a new one was protracted. The main reason he met Sandars in October 1910 was not to talk about a federal solution but to negotiate over his candidacy.<sup>42</sup> In all of the sources quoted, his fear of an early election was expressed explicitly or latently. Therefore, Oliver's observation that Amery sacrificed federalism for his personal interest in party politics was inaccurate. He was not such an ardent federalist from the outset. Rather, it was his personal interest that made him a temporary quasi-federalist. Therefore, the failure of the conference enabled him to revert to the spirit of the unauthorized programme in his third letter to *The Times*.<sup>43</sup> Unionists/Conservatives no longer needed to resort to federalism. They should cling to the ideal of extended Unionism, that is, 'the Union of all classes of our

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<sup>41</sup> Amery, 'A Plea For Steadiness'.

<sup>42</sup> Sandars to Short 20 October 1910, Balfour Papers, Add Mss 49767.

<sup>43</sup> It would be more precise to call it a sense of resignation because his seat had not been found yet. He was selected as a candidate for Bow and Bromley on the eve of the election. Amery, *My Political Life*, vol. 1, 364-365.

people, and of all parts of the Kingdom in a common prosperity, the union of all parts of the Empire by the bonds of mutual commerce and mutual support.’ Amery was given candidature for a seat in Bow and Bromley, London for the second 1910 election. As for the Irish question, his election leaflet, probably made in haste, copied the whole text of the previous leaflet for the election in January.<sup>44</sup>

Amery became an MP in May 1911. He upheld the Die-Hard peers in the battle over the Parliamentary Act. Once the act passed, there was no doubt that Liberals would submit a new Home Rule Bill next. In this situation, Amery developed his argument and published it in 1912. The most important text is *The Case against Home Rule*. But his articles devoted to a Unionist pamphlet, entitled *Against Home Rule*, and his speeches are also informative.<sup>45</sup>

To summarize his argument, what Ireland needed was economic development. According to his view on history, Irish agriculture and industry were crippled by British economic policies: purposeful discrimination in the era of mercantilism and lazy neglect in the era of laissez-faire. The trend was reversed since in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Land purchase was facilitated and social welfare was improved. The Unionist/Conservative Party would promote the new trend through introducing imperial preference, developing infrastructure such as train ferries, and giving benefits or bounties to agriculture and industry. Fiscal independence, accompanied by Home Rule, would make these remedies impossible.<sup>46</sup>

Amery also tried to attack the two types of imperial rhetoric for Irish Home Rule. One was the colonial analogy, arguing that Ireland should be given a

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<sup>44</sup> AMEL 4/6.

<sup>45</sup> S. Rosenbaum, ed., *Against Home Rule: The Case for the Union* (London: Frederick Warne & CO, 1912).

<sup>46</sup> Amery, *The Case against Home Rule*, chapter 3-7.



Dominion status, as had been given to the settler colonies. In his view, the analogy was misleading because Ireland should be compared with Quebec, and not with Canada. Considering that the history of each Dominion proved the importance of unity, it would be absurd for the UK to go in the opposite direction. The other was the federal analogy arguing that federalization of the UK could satisfy all parties in Ireland and Great Britain. It would be simply not practical because Ireland fiscally relied on the rest of the UK. Judging from the difference in geographical conditions between the UK and the Dominions, the UK was most similar to the Union of South Africa, meaning federation would not be appropriate in the British Isles. The present bill could not lead to federation because there was no stipulation of dual system or division of the government. The federal element in the bill was just a Liberal pretence or manoeuvre to keep moderate Home Rulers in line, like the lukewarm self-government of the Transvaal under the suzerainty of the Crown after the Majuba. Therefore, in the worst-case scenario, federalization might inflame the ambitions of Irish nationalists and cause another South African War.<sup>47</sup>

These arguments were designed in line with the views of Unionist/Conservative leaders at the time. Actually, all the seeds of *The Case against Home Rule* can be seen in the conclusion of his discussion with George Wyndham.<sup>48</sup> Moreover, their view was no longer unorthodox in 1912. After Balfour stepped down in autumn of 1911, Bonar Law, a Tariff Reformer and anti-Home Ruler, was chosen as the party leader in the House of Commons. Amery now enjoyed short-lived euphoria. Bonar Law wrote to him, 'I entirely

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<sup>47</sup> Ibid., chapter 9-11; L. S. Amery, 'Home Rule and the Colonial Analogy', in Rosenbaum, ed., *Against Home Rule: The Case for the Union*, 128-152.

<sup>48</sup> Wyndham to Amery, 18<sup>th</sup> October 1911, in J. M. Mackail and Guy Wyndham, eds., *Life and Letters of George Wyndham*, vol. 2 (London, 1925), 708-709.

agree with you about the necessity of an economic policy in regard to Ireland.<sup>49</sup> This was why he was adopted as one of authors of *Against Home Rule*, in whose preface Bonar Law declared, 'Our policy is more industry and less politics.'<sup>50</sup>

There has been a historical debate over the relationship between Tariff Reform and the Home Rule Crisis in Unionist/Conservative politics. E. H. H. Green has argued that many Radical Conservatives thought, 'Home Rule could only be defeated if Ireland was offered the benefits of the full tariff programme.'<sup>51</sup> On the other hand, Smith would find the adverb 'only' problematic. He has contended that the constructive and modernizing impulse behind Tariff Reform often resonated with the idea of federalization of both the Empire and the UK.<sup>52</sup> Certainly, some people advocated both Tariff Reform and the federal solution, such as J. L. Garvin and Lord Brassey. But, in the case of Amery in this phase, the generalization cannot be applied. His commitment to imperial preference kept him from being an earnest federalist. That being said, his opposition to federalism was not rooted in the fundamental principle. It implied that he could take the federal scheme as an alternative when there was no other option.

### **Embracing contradiction, 1914**

At the end of December 1913, Amery sent a long letter to Bonar Law. It recommended that a convention composed of at least twenty or thirty representatives of all views should be established and the body should discuss the possibility of some sort of federal scheme of the UK and a selected Second

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<sup>49</sup> Bonar Law to Amery, 18<sup>th</sup> January 1912. BL 33/1-6.

<sup>50</sup> *Against Home Rule*, 13.

<sup>51</sup> Green, *The Crisis of Conservatism*, 275.

<sup>52</sup> Smith, *The Tories and Ireland*, 18.

Chamber. An Irish Convention should be also summoned to decide the detail of an Irish Constitution within the limits of the provincial power assigned.<sup>53</sup> Kettle has argued that it marked Amery's convergence with the line of the Round Table.<sup>54</sup> Certainly, Amery continued to support the federal plan after that, especially in three articles written for the *Quarterly Review* in 1914. However, what has puzzled other historians was the fact that Amery, with Milner, started to prepare for a signature collecting campaign for the British Covenant at the beginning of January 1914. The wording of the Covenant was seemingly militant:

If the Bill is so passed I shall hold myself justified in taking any steps that may seem to be effective to prevent it being put into effect, and more particularly to prevent the armed forces of the Crown being used to deprive the people of Ulster of their rights as citizens of the United Kingdom.<sup>55</sup>

Smith's categorization of 'tactical federalist', in which he has included Amery, probably has been invented to explain these contradictory campaigners. By contrast, other historians have seen Amery as one of the reluctant federalists, 'who might have accepted federation only if it were the only alternative' to the 1912 Home Rule Bill.<sup>56</sup> Furthermore, there have been contrasting arguments over whether the British Covenant was constitutional or not. This section will rethink whether these interpretations are appropriate. It will try to answer why

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<sup>53</sup> Amery to Bonar Law, 27<sup>th</sup> December 1913, BL 31/1.

<sup>54</sup> Kettle, *The Round Table Movement*, 145, 151.

<sup>55</sup> AMEL 1/2/26.

<sup>56</sup> G. K. Peatling, 'The Last Defence of the Union?: The Round Table and Ireland, 1910-1925', in *The Round Table: The Empire/Commonwealth and British Foreign Policy*, ed. Andrea Bosco and Alex May (London: Lothian Foundation Press, 1997), 287.

and how Amery supported federalism and the convention and, at the same time, launched the British Covenant.

One of the historians who presented the reason for Amery's conversion to the conciliatory method is Patricia Watkinson. She has argued that it was the Unionist/Conservative Party's tendency to concentrate on the problem of Ulster and to admit partition, or exclusion of Ulster, which urged Amery to adopt new policies to defend the Union.<sup>57</sup> This reason was what Amery reiterated most explicitly.<sup>58</sup> He pointed out the absurdity that so-called Unionists had renounced the ideal of Unionism. Although his indignation against a plan of partition was a big factor, however, it does not fully explain the reason for his conversion.

Amery often invoked South African history to contend with Home Rulers. In particular, the situation of Ulster Unionists was compared with that of Uitlanders in the Transvaal. In his historical view, the South African War was a justifiable conflict to transform the aggressive nationalism of the Transvaal. Likewise, Amery frequently mentioned the necessity of rectifying narrow Irish nationalism.<sup>59</sup> Nevertheless, there was a big discrepancy between his views on South Africa and Ireland: he really wanted to avoid an outbreak of another South African War in Ireland. For example, his article in the *Quarterly Review* of January 1914 warned:

Whatever its extent, whether it be confined to a week of civil war in Ulster, or end in a general conflagration affecting the whole United Kingdom, and whatever its outcome, its consequences are bound to be disastrous. The spirit of civil strife, once awakened, is not easily laid to

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<sup>57</sup> Patricia Ferguson Watkinson, 'Empire's Champion: Leo Amery and the Imperial Idea 1900-1945' (PhD thesis, the University of Virginia, 2001), 64.

<sup>58</sup> Amery to Bonar Law, 27<sup>th</sup> December 1913, BL 31/1.

<sup>59</sup> Amery, *The Case against Home Rule*, chapter 8.

rest. ... It will weaken our authority in the Empire and our influence in the council of nations at a time when the need of both may be at their greatest to secure the maintenance of the fabric of Empire against centrifugal forces within and assaults from without.

He published the same apprehension multiple times in the next six months.<sup>60</sup> It was to prevent a civil war that Amery embraced the cause of federalism. What he hoped through implementing a dual process of the UK and Irish Conventions, which was designed based on the South African experiences, was to skip the battle phase of the South African War and hold a peace conference.

As William Freeman has indicated, another factor behind Amery's conversion was the halt of the Tariff Reform Movement in the Unionist/Conservative Party.<sup>61</sup> In the anti-federalist phase, his argument centred on the potential benefits of Tariff Reform to Ireland. To his regret, the friction over food taxes within the party worsened again in the course of 1912. Eventually, Bonar Law and Lord Lansdowne made the party accept the removal of food taxes from immediate policies by threatening their resignation. Amery was one of several MPs who resisted until the end. This meant that Amery and Tariff Reformers lost their antidote to Home Rule. He was afraid that the compromise could appear to say to Ireland, 'No Home Rule, but a tariff conceived in the interests of Great Britain only'.<sup>62</sup> His desire to be 'constructive' did not allow him to leave everything to the conventions without any potential alternative. Smith's generalization about the affinity between Tariff Reform and federalism might be applicable to the decision of Amery in the sense that his

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<sup>60</sup> Amery, 'The Home Rule Crisis', *Quarterly Review*, January 1914, 270-271.

<sup>61</sup> William David Freeman, 'Last Stand for Empire: Leo Amery and Imperial Preference' (PhD thesis, Texas A & M University, 1998), 111.

<sup>62</sup> Amery to Austen Chamberlain, 27 December 1912, AC 10/3/1.

longing for constructiveness converted him. Nonetheless, Peatling's interpretation, i.e., Amery as a reluctant federalist, is still more appropriate because, in the case of Amery, federalism was chosen negatively after imperial preference lost its immediate appeal. Furthermore, he strove to make his own federal scheme just a variant of moderate provincial devolution. Federalization of the UK should be still conducted along the line of the Union of South Africa, and not Canada or Australia.

His attempt to find an alternative in federalism and national conventions was facilitated by his relationship with the Round Table. Oliver's propositions in 1910 included the adoption of 'the conference or convention method' to settle the constitutional crisis.<sup>63</sup> Amery discussed the possibility of the UK convention with Oliver in 1911.<sup>64</sup> It was unsurprising that the idea of the convention method appeared among the milieu of the Round Table given that they resorted to the same method in South Africa. Amery himself was conscious of his convergence to the views of the Round Table. He even recommended Bonar Law to read a relevant article in their journal.<sup>65</sup> But this makes it all the more troublesome that he established the campaign for the British Covenant. How did the militant campaign co-exist with the convention method in his world view?

People familiar with British historiography might feel that the question is too naïve. Recent research has found that constitutionalism and radical movements were not incompatible. Radical campaigners often appropriated the language of constitutionalism.<sup>66</sup> This applied to the Covenanters, including Amery. Despite the audacious wording of the Covenant, he alleged that he was a

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<sup>63</sup> Kendle, *Ireland and the Federal Solution*, 118.

<sup>64</sup> Amery diary, 7<sup>th</sup> July 1911, AMEL 7-10.

<sup>65</sup> Amery to Bonar Law, 27 December 1913, BL 31/1.

<sup>66</sup> James Vernon, ed., *Re-Reading the Constitution: New Narratives in the Political History of England's Long Nineteenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

constitutionalist and was ready to modify some phrases to attract more moderate people.<sup>67</sup> The British Covenant was, after all, just a signature collecting campaign for a petition, which was a traditional format of radical political movements. Some historians may well argue that it was just a constitutional institution, unlike other quasi-paramilitary organizations.<sup>68</sup> What Amery himself wanted to do on the eve of the establishment of the Covenant was to discover how 'to defeat and upset the Government before things reach the stage of open civil tumult.'<sup>69</sup> The conclusion of his memorandum in June, summing up his tactics, emphasized the importance of both future policy (the federal scheme and the convention method) and immediate fighting policy, saying, 'the two things are, indeed, essentially part of the same policy, and each justifies and supports the other.'<sup>70</sup> All these sources seem to verify the validity of Smith's label of 'tactical federalists'.

However, seeing Amery in this phase in only constitutional or tactical terms could lead to underestimating the aggressive aspects of his politics. His fighting policy was not confined to campaigns in the Covenant. For instance, when he talked with Henry Wilson on New Year's Day of 1914, they discussed 'the possibility of the Territorials doing something that would make the Governments realize the situation, e. g. transferring themselves bodily to a Union Defence Force.'<sup>71</sup>

With regard to another example, he told Robert Cecil a tip given by one lady in January 1914:

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<sup>67</sup> Amery to Robert Cecil, 23 January 1914, Cecil of Chelwood Papers, Add MS 51072.

<sup>68</sup> Thackeray, *Conservatism*, 75-76.

<sup>69</sup> Amery to Cecil, 9 January 1914, Add MS 51072.

<sup>70</sup> This memorandum was enclosed at least in his letters to Selborne and Cecil. MS Selborne 77; Add MS 51072.

<sup>71</sup> Amery diary, *EB*, vol. 1, 97.

One cheerful suggestion made to me by a lady at dinner last night was that the moment trouble broke out in Ulster and anybody got shot we should at once get a friendly magistrate to issue orders for the arrest of Asquith, and as many other Ministers and Radical members as might seem desirable, on the charge of having conspired to instigate murder and break up the King's peace. It did strike me that something might conceivably yet come to our help from that cardinal fact in British constitutional life that the law is above and not under the executive.<sup>72</sup>

Though Amery did not take seriously the lady's concrete suggestion, he was to contrive his own plan based on the idea of 'the King's peace', after the Curragh Incident developed his sense of impending crisis.<sup>73</sup>

In May, he concocted secret memoranda discussing how Ulster could take such an action to 'make the Government openly contemptible in the eye of its followers' but not to 'give too severe or sudden a shock to the British instinct of legality.' His plan was to convene lieutenants, deputy lieutenants and magistrates in Ulster, who took more responsibility in keeping the King's peace than the Crown and ministers. They would appoint a Provisional Committee. This would be a de facto provisional government which would not assume any general administrative function that could cause friction with the existing administration but assist magistrates to keep the peace, especially in organizing a force of special constables. It would put the Liberal Government into the

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<sup>72</sup> Amery to Cecil, 9 January 1914, Add MS 51072.

<sup>73</sup> When the Liberal government tried to transfer some forces of the British Army to Ulster, most officers in the Curragh camp announced on 20 March 1914 that they preferred resigning to obeying the order. Amery truly believed that Churchill and Seely tried to carry out military and naval operations on the assumption that it would provoke an armed conflict and that a military conflict was barely avoided thanks to the passive resistance of the courageous officers. L. S. Amery, *The Plot against Ulster* (Union Defence League, 1914).



stalemate because to dismiss lieutenants and magistrates would inevitably cause protest against the tyranny and promote the legitimacy of the provisional government.<sup>74</sup>

It can be certainly said that Amery tried to act within the constitutional framework, no matter how much he stretched it. The secret plan, however, deviated from the format of a petition. It would have been unlikely that the plan would be accepted as official policy since even the method of the British Covenant baffled moderate Unionists/Conservatives.<sup>75</sup> In fact, none of these measures was put into effect. As was often the case, his string-pulling bore little fruit in the world of high politics.

Though the death of Joseph Chamberlain at the beginning of July strengthened Amery's determination to fight, he had few concrete options to do so.<sup>76</sup> His anonymous article in the *Quarterly Review*, July 1914, admitted that the conditions for his alternative (federation and convention) did not exist at that moment. He merely proposed that Unionists/Conservatives should declare to reject the bill whatever amendment was added to, to attract the votes of non-radical people in the election. But how could the government be dissolved to hold the election? Amery confessed, 'it is impossible to say at this moment'.<sup>77</sup> His principle of being constructive became hollow in the end.

While Amery could not accept the Home Rule Bill or the compromise of partition, his fear of a civil war was genuine. He was determined to take any 'constitutional' means to avoid all of these measures. He would allege that he was a tactical federalist who combined long-term conciliatory policy with short-

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<sup>74</sup> Amery's memorandum in MS. Milner dep. 157.

<sup>75</sup> William S. Rodner, 'Leaguers, Covenanters, Moderates: British Support for Ulster, 1913-1914', *Eire-Ireland* 17, no. 3 (1982): 68-85.

<sup>76</sup> Amery, 'Stand Firm', *The Covenanter*, 5 August 1914, 4.

<sup>77</sup> A copy of his article from the *Quarterly Review*, July 1914. AMEL 1/2/25.

term fighting policy. However, he had to adopt one fighting plan after another, being at the mercy of changing circumstances. His opportunistic wavering was not 'tactical' at all. He had no choice but to just reject the bill without any practical alternative in the final stage of the Home Rule Crisis. Amery was in a position to rejoice in 'bloody peace' brought by the July Crisis in Europe.<sup>78</sup>

### **Becoming a true believer in federalism**

The First World War suspended the Irish question by postponing the enforcement of the bill. However, this did not allow British politicians to revel in amnesia about Ireland. Though British politics no longer revolved around Ireland, it remained their bugbear, especially after the Easter Rising in 1916. Amery, working as one of the junior assistants to the War Cabinet from 1916, sent a barrage of letters and memoranda on a wide range of topics, including the situation of Ireland.

Amery did not show any immediate reaction to the Rising; he was too absorbed in the movement for conscription at that moment. His obsession affected his view of Ireland. In a letter to Lloyd George, who conducted a mission to reach an agreement with John Redmond and Edward Carson, he fancied that the extension of compulsory service to the whole of Ireland might unite Ulster and the rest of Ireland and turn them into a true nation.<sup>79</sup> Though conscription in Ireland became a serious problem in the spring of 1918, his letter had no immediate impact in 1916.

Amery started wire-pulling regarding Ireland in February 1917. After the failure of Lloyd George's mission, the Irish Convention was summoned to find a

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<sup>78</sup> The phrase was used by Churchill, according to Asquith. Michael Brock and Eleanor Brock, eds., *H. H. Asquith: Letters to Venetia Stanley* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 129.

<sup>79</sup> Amery to Lloyd George, 7 May 1916, LG/D/14.

possible form of agreement. Amery sent letters to propose it on the eve of its formation and was regarded as one of the originators of the idea by historians.<sup>80</sup> As mentioned above, however, it is wrong to argue that the idea suddenly appeared during the war. He had propagated the idea in 1913-14. He himself was conscious of recycling his proposals of 1913-14.<sup>81</sup> His concrete suggestions in 1917, a combination of the convention method and the federal scheme, were almost the same as the previous ones. The Home Rule Bill, now in the Statute Book, should be discarded to find new common ground in federalism, and not in a Dominion solution. 'Federation' should be implemented along the lines of the Union of South Africa, that is, just 'provincial devolution'. While the UK government would decide the limit of power devolved to Ireland, the detail of the Irish constitution would be decided by Irish people in the Irish Convention. Only the idea of the UK convention was dropped.

However, there was a big difference in his attitude. His memorandum in February 1917 pointed out that the Conservative Party had 'always advocated economic regeneration as the true solution of the Irish problem', whereas the Liberal party concentrated on making 'a scheme of self-government'. But both measures were not thought out or carried out wholeheartedly. Thus,

The conclusion here advocated is that both policies should be carried out in conjunction and each thoroughly. Self-government, whatever its compass, should be real self-government, an Irish measure framed by Irishmen to suit Irish needs and resting on Irish revenues. The

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<sup>80</sup> R. B. McDowell, *The Irish Convention 1917-18* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970); Alvin Jackson, *Home Rule: An Irish History, 1800-2000* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 206.

<sup>81</sup> Amery to H. K. Duke, 6 April 1917, AMEL 1/3/6.

regeneration must be real regeneration, an honest effort on a really large scale, to make good the mischief and neglect of centuries.<sup>82</sup>

Amery explicitly admitted the necessity of a political or constitutional scheme as well as an economic one. Before the war, federalism was just an alternative to an imminent civil war or a substitution for Tariff Reform. However, he thought of it as an essential part of the solution to the Irish question under the framework of the Union. In short, in 1917 Amery moved from being a reluctant federalist to being an ardent federalist. He again joined the discussion over the federal scheme held by the Round Table group.<sup>83</sup> It was an ironic coincidence that in the same period he concluded that an imperial federation, a grand strategy of the Round Table, was unnecessary for the relationship between the UK and the Dominions. It was also ironic that the Irish Convention distrusted a federal proposal in the same way as Amery did in 1912, regarding it as a camouflage: to Irish Nationalists, a pretext for depriving Ireland of powers; to Ulster, an excuse for handing over Ulster to Nationalists. Amery now wholeheartedly contended that a federation could remedy their concrete grievances.<sup>84</sup>

The German Spring Offensive in 1918 made the Irish question a serious problem again. It convinced British politicians to extend conscription to Ireland to overcome the lack of manpower. As expected, however, the prospect of compulsory service triggered protest movements there. Amery, a seasoned campaigner for National Service, tried to find a way to persuade the Irish public. His plan was not a federal bill for just Ireland but a UK bill for immediate

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<sup>82</sup> Amery, 'The Irish Situation', CAB/24/6.

<sup>83</sup> Kendle, *Ireland and the Federal Solution*, 192-193. As for the federal scheme during this period, see D. G. Boyce and J. O. Stubbs, 'F. S. Oliver, Lord Selborne and Federalism', *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 5, no. 1 (1976): 53-81.

<sup>84</sup> Amery, "The Irish Convention and the Federal Solution", a memorandum enclosed in Amery to Lloyd George, 25 April 1917. LG F/2/1

federalization of the whole of Britain. His conversion to federalism was such that he believed this was the only line to convince the Nationalists and Ulster Unionists, the Dominions, and the United States.<sup>85</sup>

Another slight concession was related to his attitude towards the Dominion scheme for Ireland. He had consistently disapproved of it. In April 1918, he still told Curzon that the 'Dominion autonomy' the Irish Nationalists were asking for was 'impossible for a variety of reasons.' His preference for a federal scheme was partly based on his aversion to the dual system that existed between Norway-Sweden and Austria-Hungary because it always tended towards increasing separatism. Even in this letter, however, he suggested:

Anything ... which makes it clear that the national government so to be created is equal in status with that of other nations in the Empire will be of real assistance [to persuade Nationalists].<sup>86</sup>

Amery also proposed to Lloyd George that a stipulation on Customs and Excise in the coming bill should be modified to assure Nationalists that 'unless within seven years the federal scheme can be completed, then Ireland is to have Dominion Home Rule or as near as may be consistent with military security'.<sup>87</sup> Although his aim was still the federation of the UK, he was now willing to use Dominion status as bait.

His wire-pulling ended in vain, again. Conscription in Ireland was never implemented. The Irish Convention was closed. Sinn Fein attained a landslide

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<sup>85</sup> Amery to Lloyd George, 17 April 1918, LG F/2/1. Amery came to think that some kind of special treatment of Ulster was permissible, as long as it was implemented within a new federation of the UK. Amery, 'The Exclusion of Ulster', 1 May 1918, enclosed in Amery to Austen Chamberlain, 1 May 1918, AC 18/2.

<sup>86</sup> Amery to Curzon 22 April 1918, AMEL 2/1/1.

<sup>87</sup> Amery to Lloyd George 24 April 1918, LG F/2/1.

victory in the 1918 general election and seceded from the British parliament. Armed conflict between Irish Republicans and Britain broke out and intensified. This meant that Britain failed to avoid another South African war. The coalition government passed the new Home Rule Bill, which Kerr, a member of the Round Table, was involved in making. Amery became an advocate of the bill. According to him, the bill was completely different from previous ones. The old bills had some defects in common; devious approaches to win Irish seats; inadequate safeguards for Ulster; and vagueness about the relationship between Ireland and the rest of the UK. The new bill overcame all of them. However, regarding the last point, he made a further conditional concession to Nationalists.

They [inextricable common interests of Ireland and Great Britain] are not inconsistent with the widest measure of national or "state" self-government within the framework of a federal United Kingdom. They do not necessarily preclude even the status of a Dominion within the British Commonwealth, for that status still recognizes community of flag, of citizenship, a common interest in defence, and, in a growing measure, a common trade interest. But they do absolutely preclude complete national secession, the setting up of an Irish Republic.

Whether the Home Rule government would acquire a Dominion status or remain in the federal United Kingdom would depend on Irish Nationalists. If they accepted the spirit of the new act and convinced Ulster Unionists that they would not be discriminated against, Ireland, as a whole, would become a new Dominion. If they behave in an anti-British spirit, or if Ulster refuses to be unified

with them, the two portions of Ireland would remain under the control of the federal government.<sup>88</sup> It is debatable to what extent we should take his proposition at face value. Certainly, it could be swollen bait to attract Nationalists. But, considering the grave situation in Ireland and his attitude towards it, it is safe to think these words were genuine. His priority was to neutralise republican terrorists and to restore law and order in Ireland. He even approved of the suppressive operation by the paramilitary forces formed under Hamar Greenwood.<sup>89</sup> The situation made it all the more important to win moderate Nationalists over to the British side. The following sentence represented his desperation: 'Nationalist Ireland will probably work it (his plan of Government scheme) ... once it realizes the Government is in earnest.'<sup>90</sup> One might still see it as bait. However, Amery had to change fake bait into live bait, in the end.

Amery's view on Irish Home Rule in this phase was characterized by gradual concessions. The former reluctant federalist became an ardent federalist in 1917. Then, in 1920 he became a reluctant home-ruler in the imperial (Dominion) line, which he had earlier dismissed as out of the question. That said, the stance of Amery at this point should not be described as just conciliatory since he claimed that the Government should continue to fight the second 'South African War' in Ireland determinedly. His concession was to dissociate moderate Nationalists from Republicans to win the battle.

## **The 1921 Treaty**

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<sup>88</sup> Amery, 'The New Irish Home Rule Bill: A Look into the Future', *Ottawa Journal*, 19 June 1920.

<sup>89</sup> His official letter to his constituency in 1920, AMEL 4/9.

<sup>90</sup> Amery, 'The New Irish Home Rule Bill'.

Amery's struggle with the Irish question ended in an anti-climax. The coalition government made a treaty with Sinn Fein without consulting the Commons. The Treaty, barely ratified in Southern Ireland, gave the Irish Free State the same status as that of Canada. Judging from his point of view, Amery could have protested it. But, he did not. He confessed in his autobiography that he only remembered 'the sense of shame and indignation with which I walked out of the House after the announcement.' He also guessed that he was so occupied with other topics such as the estimate of the Navy and the Empire Settlement Bill that he did not pay enough attention to Ireland.<sup>91</sup> A contemporary primary source, however, shows that his opportunistic turn was taken more swiftly than he would admit. His official letter to his constituency was sent right after the publication of the treaty.

In Ireland the Sinn Fein campaign for separation from the British Empire continued to be waged throughout the first half of the year by ruthless terrorism and by the most criminal methods of murder and outrage. The policy of stern repression initiated by Sir Hamar Greenwood would undoubtedly, in the end, have restored order. But the Government, anxious to save the innocent population of both islands from further bloodshed, and willing to confer upon Ireland the most generous measure of self-government compatible with Imperial unity, British security and justice to Ulster, proclaimed a truce and invited the Sinn Fein leaders to a Conference. That Conference has resulted in an agreement which the Imperial Parliament has ratified, but which, at the moment of writing, still waits for the approval of the representatives of

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<sup>91</sup> Amery, *My Political Life*, vol. 2, 230-231.



Southern Ireland. I hope the result may be peace by agreement. If not, the British Government will be able to take its own measures to restore peace and assert the supremacy of the Crown in Ireland, with the approval of public opinion, not only here, but throughout the world.<sup>92</sup>

Certainly, he did not deny the possibility of resuming the battle if the treaty was not accepted by Republicans, but when it was ratified in the parliament of Southern Ireland, he lost any excuse. In a leaflet for the 1922 general election, he virtually approved of the Treaty just by reiterating the policy of the Government:

The Government is pledged to play its part in making good the Irish Treaty letter and in the spirit. It is equally pledged to safeguard the rights of Ulster, and to secure fair consideration for the just claims of the innocent and loyal victims of recent disturbances in Southern Ireland.<sup>93</sup>

## **Conclusion**

Initially, Amery, firmly committed to Tariff Reform, claimed that the true root of Irish grievances lay in the economic dimension, denying the validities of all the political or constitutional reforms for Ireland, including both a Dominion solution and federal schemes. In the course of the Home Rule Crisis, he acted as a hard-liner in the Unionist Party, trying not to repeat the default in the battle of the Parliamentary Act. However, confronted with the deteriorating situation in Ireland and the Great War, he became a reluctant federalist first, an ardent

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<sup>92</sup> 'To my Fellow-Workers in the Sparkbrook Parliamentary Division', AMEL 4/9.

<sup>93</sup> 'To the Electors of the Sparkbrook Division of Birmingham', AMEL 4/10.

federalist subsequently, and even a reluctant approver of Irish Dominionship in the end. Though the First World War made considerable influence on Amery's view, all the changes cannot be attributed to the war. His opinion was altered gradually and crookedly.

In his memoir, Amery made an excuse that most Conservatives were prepared to accept the Anglo-Irish Treaty, at least at first, albeit grudgingly.<sup>94</sup> However, he was reticent about the fact that some members of the Die-Hard persisted in their opposition. For instance, the *National Review*, edited by Leopold Maxse, consistently criticized the coalition government's policies on Ireland, including the 1920 bill and the treaty. He even denounced politicians who prided themselves on being 'practical' and acquiesced in the settlement.<sup>95</sup> He also excoriated the Round Table's conspiracy behind the attempts to change the British and imperial constitutions.<sup>96</sup> Amery had already distanced himself from the Round Table regarding the idea of an imperial federation.<sup>97</sup> However, as far as Ireland was concerned, he was closer to the Round Table than to the Die-Hards. He was affected by the former more than he was willing to admit.

This does not mean that there was a clear-cut dichotomy between the conciliatory Round Table and the opinionated Die-Hards. Members of the former were as staunch Unionists as those of the latter. Some of them were tempted to sign the British Covenant and most of them defended the battle with Republicans. Not until 1921 did some members, such as Curtis, approve of a more ambitious scheme than the federal scheme, while other federalists,

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<sup>94</sup> Amery, *My Political Life*, vol. 2, 231.

<sup>95</sup> See Maxse's leading articles, *The National Review*, May 1920, 321; *ibid.*, January 1922, 576-581.

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid.*, June 1917, 418-420; October 1922, 176; October 1923, 192-193.

<sup>97</sup> Amery to Richard Jebb, 10 Oct. 1918, AMEL 2/1/1.

including Oliver, could not swallow the 1921 settlement.<sup>98</sup> Moreover, the growing differences over the Irish question did not break the relationship between Amery and the Die-Hards. The *National Review* continued to acclaim Amery as a successor of Milner.<sup>99</sup> Amery did take part in the revolt against the coalition in October 1922.

Nevertheless, the Irish question was important to Amery in that it gave him the first opportunity to take a different line from that of the Die-Hards. Moreover, it brought a crucial transition in his imperial and political career. Amery, like Curtis, learned from the lesson of the Irish question that some political remedies were needed to soothe nationalists and that earlier adoption of federation or federalism could avoid crises in the imperial peripheries. His changed attitude towards Ireland was a precursor to that towards India in the 1930s-1940s. Confronted with the Indian question, Amery was to defend a federal scheme and a Dominion scheme in a more pre-emptive way.

The year 1921 was not the end of the relationship between Amery and Ireland. When he became the Secretary of State for Colonies and that for Dominions Affairs, whose office he took an initiative to create, he faced a defiant government of the Irish Free State. The newest Dominion, loosely cooperating with the others, made a series of attempts to expand the status of 'Dominion'.<sup>100</sup> Amery's response was ambivalent: he could welcome pleas for equalization of the constitutional status between the UK and the Dominions to lay down the framework of the Commonwealth, whereas he was cautious of accepting demands which were too audacious and could loosen the imperial

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<sup>98</sup> Peatling, 'The Last Defence of the Union?'

<sup>99</sup> *The National Review*, February 1921, 755-756.

<sup>100</sup> Gerard Keown, *First of the Small Nations: The Beginnings of Irish Foreign Policy in the Interwar Years, 1919-1932* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), chapter 3-6.

tie.<sup>101</sup> The compensation for Southern loyalists in Ireland, which Amery pledged to cope with in his election leaflet quoted above, was another thorny issue, which he had difficulty in handling.<sup>102</sup> After the moderate Cosgrave government was replaced by that of De Valera in 1932, Amery admitted that the situation in Ireland was an exceptional failure in the British Commonwealth in that exclusive and anti-imperialist nationalism, closer to European nationalism than to Dominion nationalism, came to power. He proposed that Britain keep the Irish Free State 'side-tracked from the economic and political intercourse of the Britannic family', until it recognized the importance of imperial cooperation.<sup>103</sup> The necessity of some constitutional concession to soothe nationalism in dependent colonies came home to Amery all the more thanks to the rise of Fianna Fáil.

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<sup>101</sup> R. F. Holland, *Britain and the Commonwealth Alliance, 1918-39* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1981), chapter 1-4.

<sup>102</sup> Niamh Brennan, 'A Political Minefield: Southern Loyalists, the Irish Grants Committee and the British Government, 1922-31', *Irish Historical Studies* 30, no. 119 (1997): 406–19.

<sup>103</sup> L. S. Amery, *The Forward View* (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1935), 20-22, 200-201.

## 5 The Indian Question

This chapter will analyse Amery's views and policy on India. As of the middle of the 1980s, R. J. Moore bemoaned the lack of research on the roles of the key figures in the transfer of power to India, such as Amery, Wavell, and even Churchill.<sup>1</sup> There is no longer any need to repeat the same criticism. We have acquired a number of biographies and monographs analysing the mindsets and deeds of those actors.<sup>2</sup> As a result, recent researchers have come to present more sophisticated narratives of the process; the decolonization in India ceased to be solely attributed to either demands from Indian nationalists or the magnanimous policy of the British authorities.<sup>3</sup> As for the latter, it has been generally agreed that although Conservative politicians in the Cabinet of the National Government promoted Indian constitutional reform in the 1930s by suppressing the Die-Hard faction, they intended to retain essential British interests in India, particularly in the sphere of a defence policy.<sup>4</sup> While most leaders in the Conservative and Labour Parties recognized the need to protect British interests as well as to placate the discontent in India, their positions were different enough that the post-war Labour Government brought about a swift

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<sup>1</sup> R. J. Moore, 'The Transfer of Power: An Historiographical Survey', *Journal of South Asian Studies* 9, no. 1 (1986): 83–95, 86.

<sup>2</sup> For instance, see Gowher Rizvi, *Linlithgow and India: A Study of British Policy and the Political Impasse in India, 1936-43* (London: Royal Historical Society, 1978); Philip Ziegler, *Mountbatten: The Official Biography* (Glasgow: Collins, 1986); David Dutton, *Political Biography of Sir John Simon* (London: Aurum Press, 1992); Richard Toye, *Churchill's Empire: The World That Made Him and the World He Made* (London: Henry Holt & Company, 2010); Peter Clarke, *The Cripps Version: The Life of Sir Stafford Cripps* (London: Allen Lane, 2002); Muhammad Iqbal Chawla, *Wavell and the Dying Days of the Raj: Britain's Penultimate Viceroy in India* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2011); Matthew Coutts, 'The Political Career of Sir Samuel Hoare during the National Government 1931-40' (PhD thesis: University of Leicester, 2011).

<sup>3</sup> H. V. Brasted and Carl Bridge, 'The Transfer of Power in South Asia: An Historiographical Review', *Journal of South Asian Studies* 17, no. 1 (1994): 93–114.

<sup>4</sup> R. J. Moore, *The Crisis of Indian Unity, 1917-40* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974); Carl Bridge, *Holding India to the Empire: The British Conservative Party and the 1935 Constitution* (London: Oriental University Press, 1986).

relinquishment albeit causing a bloody partition and facing Conservatives' criticism of conducting a premature retreat.<sup>5</sup> In short, British politicians' attitudes towards India cannot be categorized into a simple dichotomy: pro-imperial or anti-imperial. Each actor's position, often somewhere between the two extremes, can only be interpreted in the context of the political spectrum at the time.

The academic debate over Amery's role in the Indian question is a good example reflecting the historiographical trend. Amery's support for the Indian constitutional reforms and his conflict with the Die-Hards, particularly Churchill, has been depicted as proof that his view on India was relatively flexible compared with other British Conservatives.<sup>6</sup> On the other hand, from the Indian point of view, Amery was just another reactionary, whose inadequate concessions disappointed both Hindu and Muslim leaders, and who, as India Secretary, cracked down on the protest movement during the Second World War.<sup>7</sup> The most definitive and sophisticated interpretation has been presented by David Whittington's PhD thesis, which focuses on Amery's tenure at the India Office.<sup>8</sup> Amery certainly recognized the need to offer some sorts of constitutional reforms in India, but he never assented to introducing British style of democracy into India or giving dominant power to the Indian National Congress or the All-India Muslim League. Though his alternative goal was the

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<sup>5</sup> H. V. Brasted and Carl Bridge, 'The British Labour Party and Indian Nationalism, 1907-1947', *Journal of South Asian Studies* 11, no. 2 (1988): 69–99; idem., 'The British Labour Party "Nabobs" and Indian Reform, 1924–31', *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 17, no. 3 (1989): 369–412; Nicholas Owen, 'The Conservative Party and Indian Independence, 1945-1947', *The Historical Journal* 46, no. 2 (2003): 403–36.

<sup>6</sup> WM. Roger Louis, *In the Name of God, Go!: Leo Amery and the British Empire in the Age of Churchill* (New York ; London: W.W. Norton, 1992); Richard Toye, *Churchill's Empire: The World That Made Him and the World He Made* (London: Henry Holt & Company, 2010).

<sup>7</sup> Yasmin Khan, *The Raj at War: A People's History of India's Second World War* (London: Vintage, 2015).

<sup>8</sup> David Whittington, 'An Imperialist at Bay: Leo Amery at the India Office, 1940-1945' (PhD thesis, University of the West of England, 2015).

Swiss, American, or Austrian model of a federal constitution, his concrete policy was often created by a practical response to the immediate issues. In the course of the war, Amery increasingly lost influence in the War Cabinet, trust from the Viceroy, Linlithgow and Wavell, and, as a consequence, general control of the situation in India. Whittington's verdict is that Amery 'had proved to be a better technocrat than constitutional reformer'.<sup>9</sup> Whittington's conclusion resonates with D. A. Low's argument on decolonization: British imperial policy was ambiguous in that it simultaneously oppressed nationalist movements and approved of gradual constitutional reforms. Amery's position can be located in the ambiguity.<sup>10</sup>

It is not profitable for this chapter to trace all his involvements in Indian politics because Whittington's thesis has already done the job. What remains to be revealed is his motives rather than his deeds. What made it impossible for him to approve of the introduction of British parliamentary democracy into India, even when he almost leaned towards handing over control of the defence of the country? We cannot comprehend why his pragmatism translated into a specific form of policy unless we grasp his ideological background behind the scenes. A similar approach has been recently adopted by Andrew Muldoon to research on some Conservative actors involved in the making of the 1935 Act.<sup>11</sup>

The chapter will elucidate how his imperial ideologies negotiated with the changing circumstances in India. The first section will delineate how Amery,

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<sup>9</sup> Ibid., 361.

<sup>10</sup> D. A. Low, *Britain and Indian Nationalism: The Imprint of Ambiguity 1929-1942* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); idem., *Eclipse of Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); idem., *Lion Rampant: Essays in the Study of British Imperialism* (London: Frank Cass, 1973), 153-154

<sup>11</sup> Andrew Muldoon, *Empire, Politics and the Creation of the 1935 India Act: Last Act of the Raj* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009). There is a counterpart on the British political left. Nicholas Owen, *The British Left and India Metropolitan Anti-Imperialism, 1885-1947* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

who was a typical Die-Hard in the Edwardian era, became a lukewarm constitutional reformer in the interwar period. It will particularly shed light on his idiosyncratic definition of 'responsible government', which was formulated to advocate the federation of the whole of India, based on a non-Westminster model. But his logic was not plausible to Hindu and Muslim nationalists. The second section will argue that his failure to become a successful constitutional reformer resulted from his ideological stance and passiveness since the 1930s, as well as from structural restraints. Facing the intense negotiations between Britain and the various interests in India, his constitutional thinking became more conservative during the war. What he was able to do after partition was just a post hoc justification of British rule in India.

### **Imperial history and Indian constitutional reform in the 1930s**

First of all, we should recognize that the course of Amery's conversion concerning India followed that of his views on Ireland. In the Edwardian era, he was just a typical Die-Hard Conservative who objected to Home Rule in Ireland and India. In the interwar period, he came to advocate the federal scheme formulated by the Simon Commission and the 1935 Act, as he did so about the Irish question from 1914 onwards. Once he became the Indian Secretary in 1940, he proposed that Britain should give up imposing a constitutional framework on India from above and allow the Indian people to frame their constitution with a Dominion status after the war. This step was equivalent to his plea for the formation of the Irish Convention in 1917, mimicking the precedent in South Africa, which itself followed the methods of federalization in other Dominions.<sup>12</sup> That being said, Amery did not mean to sanction whatever forms

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<sup>12</sup> L. S. Amery, *India and Freedom* (London: Oxford University Press, 1942), 18-19.



of constitution; he still clung to the conviction that some safeguards, particularly regarding defence policy, should be retained and that a new constitution should adopt federal polity to prevent the partition of India or the persecution of Muslim minorities and the Princely States.<sup>13</sup> In this sense, the discretion Amery was ready to grant to Indian politicians was limited. Even this reservation was similar to his stance on Ireland in 1917-1918, which urged the Irish Convention to adopt the federal scheme to avoid partition. Ironically, in both cases, he had to reluctantly approve of the emergence of new Dominions as well as the partitions. Of course, his views on Ireland and India were not completely the same.<sup>14</sup> However, his intellectual struggle with the Irish question helped him forge the course of his conversion on India. Cuthbert Morley Headlam, a Conservative backbencher, seeing the Statute of Westminster criticized by Churchill and defended by Amery, felt that there occurred an amusing change of viewpoints since he remembered that 'the former surrendered Ireland and the latter was then opposed to him very properly'.<sup>15</sup> Headlam overlooked Amery's softening attitude towards Ireland, which catalysed a wider change of his imperial ideology. When the Conservative Die-Hards opposed the indictment of Michael O'Dwyer after the Amritsar massacre, Amery, as a member of the Coalition, voted for the government. His stance had already changed from that of the Die-Hards in the 1920s.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> Ibid., chapter 3.

<sup>14</sup> It was easier for him to advocate a federal scheme on India than on Ireland, because he initially claimed that the geographical unity of the UK precluded the possibility of federalization there, while he emphasized the continental vastness and diversity of India from the outset. Amery, *The Case against Home Rule*, 76-81; idem., *The Forward View* (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1935), 211-212.

<sup>15</sup> Stuart Ball, ed., *Parliament and Politics in the Age of Baldwin and Macdonald: The Diaries of Sir Cuthbert Headlam, 1924-35* (Chippenham: The Historians' Press, 1992), 224.

<sup>16</sup> See Hansard, HC 8 July 1920, vol 131, 1705-1819. As for the reaction of British politicians to the massacre, see Derek Sayer, 'British Reaction to the Amritsar Massacre 1919-1920', *Past & Present* 131 (1991): 130-64. Amery also opposed the attempt of the Die-Hards to censure Montagu in February 1922. Hansard, HC 14 February, vol 150, 865-975.

However, Headlam's perception indicated another feature of Amery's response to nationalist movements; he never agreed with the lenient treatment of colonial insurgents, even though he often sought a constructive alternative to a purely negative policy. That is, paradoxically, his 'constructive' policy except for Tariff Reform was often a responsive compromise, only grudgingly endowed, based on gradualism, and always combined with the oppression of rebellious movements. After he wrote the history of the South African War, Amery repeatedly expressed the view that over-generous concessions would never fail to end in attracting more ambitious requests from the other party.<sup>17</sup> In fact, his concessions were just practical responses to nationalist' discontent at worst or an awkward combination of carrot and stick at best. Based on his apprehension about over-generous concessions, Amery participated in the low-key campaign of some Conservatives to prevent Baldwin from endorsing the Irwin declaration in 1929.<sup>18</sup>

On the other hand, the unwavering resistance of the Conservative Die-Hards was just as problematic to Amery. George Lloyd, for instance, complained that the British surrender in Ireland generated such dismal repercussions in Egypt and India that the same mistake should not be repeated in India.<sup>19</sup> Amery agreed that the 'surrender to revolutionary violence' was unfortunate; but, to him, an ideal alternative would have been a 'generous concession to the idea of Irish nationality'.<sup>20</sup> Moreover, in his retort to Lloyd, Amery contended that it was no longer possible to ignore 'the educated class' in

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<sup>17</sup> The logic was used to justify Milner's non-conciliatory policy before and after the South African War and the British Cause in the Irish Independence War. We can also see it in his opposition to appeasement. See Chapter 2-4.

<sup>18</sup> Amery to Baldwin, 5 November, AMEL 2/1/18. As for the campaign, see Moore, *The Crisis*, 80-94.

<sup>19</sup> George Lloyd to Baldwin, 5 March 1931, GLLD 19/5.

<sup>20</sup> Amery, *The Forward View*, 201.

Egypt and India.<sup>21</sup> The conflicting need to flex muscles and make concessions dogged him. *The Forward View* tried to show the way out of the conundrum.

We are not yielding either to agitation or to terrorism. We are acting in the full consciousness of our power to act otherwise .... We are acting on our own judgment, though the detailed conclusions ... have been influenced and shaped at every stage by contact with the best brains of India. All this gives ground for hope that our gift ... will be accepted with good will in India .... We on our side can increase that good will and double the value of our gift by the spirit in which we give it, by making it the gift of our confidence and friendship, and not the grudging concession of reluctant statesmanship.<sup>22</sup>

These dialectic phrases should not blind us to the fact that Amery had to simultaneously cope with 'agitation' on the spot and the need to show 'grudging concession' during the Second World War. Given his contradictory resolution, it was not surprising that Amery had no hesitation in giving his consent to the arrest of the Congress leaders and had no sympathy with Gandhi's fast.<sup>23</sup>

Unless Amery acknowledged that his conversion regarding India was due to nationalist agitation, he had to present an ideological reason behind it. Before the First World War, he reiterated the inconceivability of any immediate introduction of self-government in the dependencies, including India. Although, he maintained, self-government could be achieved in the distant future, they had still a long way to go before reaching that stage of civilization.

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<sup>21</sup> Amery's diary, 5 March 1933, 7/27.

<sup>22</sup> Amery, *The Forward View*, 235.

<sup>23</sup> Whittington, 'An Imperialist at Bay', chapter 6.

Few parts of it have yet reached a stage at which even a moderate degree of local self-government is possible. ... Even in India, with its intelligent peoples and its historic civilisation, we are still only a little way on the road towards self-government, and it is a road on which we dare not proceed except by very gradual and tentative stages.<sup>24</sup>

It is often said that the conception of civilization played a significant role in the sense of history among Victorian intellectuals.<sup>25</sup> Even after the theory of evolution spawned many types of scientific or biological racism, the conception of civilizational history was a core ingredient of British racism.<sup>26</sup> It was also a useful ideological tool to justify the Raj.<sup>27</sup> Amery picked up the rhetoric diffused in the public sphere to formulate his imperial ideology.<sup>28</sup>

There has been an ongoing debate over to what extent British imperialists were sincere in their words that they were civilizing Indian people to raise their 'stage'. Recent research has tended to argue that in the course of the latter half of the nineteenth century British intellectuals gradually gave up closing the gap

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<sup>24</sup> L. S. Amery, *Union and Strength: A Series of Papers on Imperial Questions* (London: Edward Arnold, 1912), 10-11.

<sup>25</sup> As for this topic, see the following controversy. Peter Mandler, "Race" and "Nation" in Mid-Victorian Thought', in *History, Religion and Culture: British Intellectual History 1750–1950*, ed. Stefan Collini, Richard Whatmore, and Brian Young (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 224–44; H. S. Jones, 'The Idea of the National in Victorian Political Thought', *European Journal of Political Theory* 5, no. 1 (2006): 12–21; Georgios Varouxakis, "Patriotism", "Cosmopolitanism" and "Humanity" in Victorian Political Thought', *European Journal of Political Theory* 5, no. 1 (2006): 100–118.

<sup>26</sup> J. W. Burrow, *Evolution and Society: A Study in Victorian Social Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966); Paul B. Rich, *Race and Empire in British Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).

<sup>27</sup> Thomas R. Metcalf, *Ideologies of the Raj* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), chapter 2-3.

<sup>28</sup> It does not mean that Amery was not affected by biological theories. On the contrary, one of his speeches for the BBC in 1931 emphasized 'the growing importance of eugenics'. However, he referred to 'eugenics' not to describe the innate inferiority of specific races but to criticize 'short-sighted sentimentalism' of the British government, whose economic and social policies lacked a long-term perspective. Amery, 'What I Would Do with the World', *The Listener*, 18 November 1931.

between Western and Indian culture. Thus, the rhetoric of liberal imperialism turned into just an alibi to justify the quasi-permanent Raj.<sup>29</sup> There is evidence to show that Amery used the rhetoric in this way. In the heyday of Army Reform, Amery suggested that the Imperial Army should recruit young men from the white settlement colonies, as it would encourage white men in the British Empire to think imperially. In addition, he proposed that the same principle should be applied to the Indian Civil Service, where administrators could learn what imperial management was. However, he was adamant in his opposition to holding examinations for the Service all over the Empire. In that case, 'clever young Babus who are able to cram up' would inevitably pass the tests.

That would be a disastrous result to the efficiency of government in India. ... The value of examination is very real and very great under certain conditions. One of the conditions under which competitive examinations are held in England is that certain qualities of government such as resource, self-reliance, honesty, impartiality, energy, may all be taken for granted in the bulk of the candidates. .... But when you are examining Indians, you cannot presuppose these qualities which you find in the average Englishman, and which are the most important for the purposes of administration, and you may run the risk of getting a man who may be more intelligent than many of the English candidates, but who lacks the other qualities which are far more important than those which show themselves in the examinations.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> Metcalf, *Ideologies*; Karuna Mantena, *Alibis of Empire: Henry Maine and the Ends of Liberal Imperialism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010).

<sup>30</sup> L. S. Amery, *Union and Strength*, 57.

In his image of the imperial hierarchy, even the elite in India, no matter how intellectually superior they were to British people, was inherently defective in the cultural dispositions necessary for self-government. In other words, Amery in the pre-war period was just a typical late-Victorian who postponed Indianisation of governance in India for an indefinite period despite the promise of liberal imperialism.

During the First World War, his stance changed. In 1917, the British War Cabinet announced the goal in their policy on India: 'increasing the association of Indians in every branch of the administration and the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realization of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire'. Amery not only endorsed the official policy but also insisted that the Conservative Party should incorporate it in their policy, though self-government should be only gradually introduced at the provincial level.<sup>31</sup> A practical reason behind his conversion was probably the urgent need to secure and reward mobilization in India. But one private letter referred to an important source of ideological inspiration.

I rang up Wilson this morning to find out if you [Austen Chamberlain] had read Curtis's latest effusion on the subject of the future self-government of India. ... it seems to me to contain germs of some sound and fruitful ideas. One is that in talking of the future self-government of India we must make it clear that we mean India the Nation dealing with

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<sup>31</sup> Amery's memorandum, 26 November 1917, AMEL 1/3/50.

its internal problems and not India the Empire which has been carrying on the military and foreign policy of the British Empire as a whole ....<sup>32</sup>

It is worth remembering that this was in the year Amery cooperated with the Round Table to attain the federalization of the UK for the Irish question. The letter indicates that his mingling with the Round Table also affected his thinking on India.

'Curtis's latest effusion' was a part of *Letters to the People of India on Responsible Government*, published in 1917. It was this book that had a lasting effect on Amery's imperial thought.<sup>33</sup> Curtis was an adviser pulling strings behind the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms, which established the dyarchy at the provincial level.<sup>34</sup> The basis of Curtis's proposition was that constitutional reforms should be promoted in the spirit of John George Lambton, 1st Earl of Durham.<sup>35</sup> In the world view of British imperialists, the Durham Report was a glorious watershed in the historiography of the British Empire. The myth has already been debunked by Ged Martin, but it was a myth that all British imperialists lived by until the dissolution of the British Empire.<sup>36</sup> According to the narrative, the First British Empire collapsed due to the inappropriate interference of the British in the American colonies. When the same discontent disturbed the social order in Canada, Lord Durham saved the Second Empire

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<sup>32</sup> Amery to Austen Chamberlain, 30 June 1917, AMEL 1/3/6.

<sup>33</sup> In the 1930s, Amery cited it as a book, which 'exercised a profound effect on political thought both in India and at home.' Amery, *The Forward View*, 215.

<sup>34</sup> Regarding Curtis and India, see S. R. Mehrotra, 'Imperial Federation and India, 1868-1917', *Journal of Commonwealth & Comparative Politics* 1, no. 1 (1961): 29-40; Lavin Deborah, *From Empire to International Commonwealth: A Biography of Lionel Curtis* (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); Andrea Bosco and Alex May, eds., *The Round Table: The Empire/Commonwealth and British Foreign Policy* (London: Lothian Foundation Press, 1997), chapter 17-18.

<sup>35</sup> Lionel Curtis, *Letters to the People of India on Responsible Government* (London: Macmillan, 1918), 7.

<sup>36</sup> Ged Martin, *The Durham Report and British Policy: A Critical Essay* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972).

by pronouncing that 'responsible government', which had been formed in the home country, should be replicated in Canada. Based on this principle, the white settlement colonies evolved into the white Dominions. In short, the Durham Report was a 'Magna Carta' in Whiggish imperial historiography.<sup>37</sup>

But this narrative was so common in the public sphere that Amery probably did not encounter it for the first time in Curtis's book. What Amery learned from Curtis was a specific lesson about the governance of the colonies from the episode of the Durham Report. According to Curtis, what caused American Independence and the 1837-8 revolt in Canada was the existence of the imperfect legislatures on the spot. As long as the legislature had no say about the policymaking in the executive in London, the colonial legislature would become increasingly infuriated by the executive. The solution was either to abolish an elective principle in the legislature or to make the executive responsible to the legislature. Lord Durham wisely chose the latter option. Curtis presented it as a universal formula in constitutional theory which was relevant regardless of race. It became a theoretical foundation in his support for the gradual introduction of 'responsible government' in India.<sup>38</sup> Amery in the 1930s explicitly accepted 'the central conclusion' of Curtis's argument that responsibility should be extended before any further extension of irresponsible representation.<sup>39</sup> Following the spirit of the Durham Report, he had already been involved in the making of the 1921 constitution of Malta, which established the executive responsible to the legislature.<sup>40</sup> Based on this world view, India

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<sup>37</sup> The analogy with the Magna Carta was presented by an article of the *Quarterly Review* in 1898. *Ibid.*, 100.

<sup>38</sup> Curtis, *Letters*, 34-35.

<sup>39</sup> Amery, *The Forward View*, 215-6.

<sup>40</sup> J. J. Cremona, *The Maltese Constitution and Constitutional History since 1813* (San Gwann: Publishers Enterprises Group, 1994), chapter 4, esp. 35-36.



was finally put on the same course of constitutional development as the white Dominions.

However, Curtis did not mean that India could and should immediately obtain the same status as the Dominions in the imperial constitution. Parliamentary democracy could only succeed where provincial democracies were mature. A practical remedy was to gradually transfer some functions, whose burden Indian people were ready to carry, to the provincial executives responsible to the electorate.<sup>41</sup> This logic helped Amery to formulate a reform plan suitable for the social and geographical peculiarity of India.

In supporting the federal scheme presented by the Simon Commission and incarnated by the 1935 Act, Amery added Conservative twists to Curtis's idea. He praised the seemingly reactionary change of the 1933 White Paper made by the Joint Select Committee in 1934, which decided that members of a new central legislature should be elected by the indirect direction in each local polity. The change has been attributed to the government's appeasement of the Conservative Die-Hards.<sup>42</sup> Amery, who conflicted with the Die-Hards on India, gave a theoretical eulogy to the Joint Select Committee Report. It was closely linked with his redefinition of 'responsible government'. Since, in 1917, the British government set it as a goal in India without providing any strict definition, 'responsible government' soon became a contested term in the British Empire.<sup>43</sup> In the interwar period, Amery shaped his version of its meaning. According to

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<sup>41</sup> Curtis, *Letters*, 46-51.

<sup>42</sup> Sumit Sarkar, *Modern India 1885-1947* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1989), 336. The first move for the change of the electoral method was initiated by Austen Chamberlain, who was a member of the Joint Select Committee. He certainly thought that the change would make it easier for the bill to be accepted by the Conservative MPs. Bridge, *Holding India*, 113-116.

<sup>43</sup> John Darwin, 'Durham in the East?: India and the Idea of Responsible Government 1858-1939', *Journal of Canadian Studies/Revue d'études Canadiennes* 25, no. 1 (1990): 144-61. The term was adopted in the Montagu declaration thanks to Curzon, but there is no consensus about what he wanted to mean by using the term. Regarding Curzon's role, also see, R. J. Moore, 'Curzon and Indian Reform', *Modern Asian Studies* 27, no. 4 (1993): 719-40.

him, it meant the government that was responsible to 'the Crown' (the principle of good government) as well as to the parliament.<sup>44</sup> Anathema to him was the government controlled by the party caucus that secured a majority in parliament. Responsible government based on party support was intrinsically vulnerable to the rise of a dictatorship by a hegemonic party: in the case of India, the Indian National Congress. It was, in fact, 'only possible if the issues dividing parties are not pushed too far'.<sup>45</sup> 'Government by mere arithmetical majority from below through party machinery' would 'fail in India even more disastrously' than in Europe. Given religious heterogeneity, the electoral system, even in the provinces of British India, needed to be communal to give a voice to the religious minorities. The existence of the Princely States made it difficult to select members for the Federal (Central) Legislature based on direct elections. Hence, indirect elections through the provincial legislature would provide a representation more in line with the representation from the Princely States. As will be discussed later, Amery, here, resorted to the idea of functional representation in the 'Corporate State' as a solution to the Indian question.<sup>46</sup> Capitalizing upon the logic of 'functional' representation, Amery even justified the adoption of an indirect election for a Central Assembly, whose member would be elected by the Provincial Legislatures rather than the Indian electorate.

It [the Federal Legislature] will be much more a standing conference in which India as it exists to-day, in its divisions into States and Provinces, and in its religious and racial communities, will be faithfully represented.

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<sup>44</sup> The theoretical background against his conceptualization will be fully explained in Chapter 6.

<sup>45</sup> Amery, *The Forward View*, 171-172.

<sup>46</sup> See Chapter 10.

Its Ministries also are bound, even more than Federal Ministries elsewhere, to make certain that all these local and communal interests are represented in their ranks, before they can think of assigning primary importance to considerations of party policy.<sup>47</sup>

The 'responsibility' to the Crown also offered the rhetoric to justify the notorious 'safeguards' in the 1935 Act. In his logic, they were devised not to retain British interests but as a reinforcement of self-government by enabling the representative of the Crown, namely the Governor-General, to work as a mediator to keep India from 'the dangers of party violence or communal prejudice'. What the 1935 Act would offer was a more clear-cut dyarchy:

which assigns to the sphere of Indian responsible government the whole social and economic life of India in all its aspects, provincial, central, external, and to the sphere of the Governor-General's authority functions which hardly affect the ordinary life of the Indian citizen, and whose exercise no Indian would, today at least, wish to see in partisan hands.<sup>48</sup>

In other words, the 1935 Act was not designed to crush the achievements of the 1919 Act but to attain its true aim, which was proffered by Curtis but distorted by 'doctrinaire' Liberals, such as Montagu.<sup>49</sup> His argument that the 1935 Act would establish dyarchy at the centre is in line with historians' standard account of the

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<sup>47</sup> Amery, *The Forward View*, 221-222. Amery acclaimed that the Report of the Joint Select Committee well reflected the true meaning of 'King in Parliament'. Ibid., 120. About his justification of the Report, also see, Amery, 'The India Report: A Conservative view', *The Spectator*, 30 November 1934, AMEL 1/5/28.

<sup>48</sup> Amery, *The Forward View*, 222-227

<sup>49</sup> Ibid., 215-216.

intentions of Britain.<sup>50</sup> But Amery rationalized it as an attempt to form a genuine 'responsible government' in India.

Nor did Amery directly countenance giving Dominion status to India. As mentioned above, he privately objected to the Irwin declaration in 1929. In the 1930s, his position slightly softened. When the Statute of Westminster stipulated the definition of 'Dominion', Churchill predicted that the full Dominion status, now firmly defined by the Statute, would bring a 'frightful disaster' to India. Amery cautiously admitted that the government should carefully consider what power and position India would acquire if it gained full Dominion status.<sup>51</sup> However, when Churchill claimed that the 1926 formula of the Commonwealth changed the meaning of 'Dominion status' to dodge the criticism that in 1921 he as Colonial Secretary acknowledged the possibility that India could become a Dominion, Amery retorted that the 1926 formula just put into words the principle already accepted by the members of the Commonwealth. He added, 'India's advance towards full equality will take place ... in a political atmosphere which will only reinforce the practical reasons which, in her case, make for continued close association.'<sup>52</sup> At the same time, however, Amery ascertained that Indian constitutional status could not have the same functional power over defence and foreign policy as the other Dominions had. India, geographically vulnerable to possible attacks from Russia and Japan, could not survive without military and financial cooperation with the UK. He did not oppose 'the ultimate equality of India with the Dominions' as a goal, but emphasized, by citing the 1926 formula, that the functions and constitutional machinery of new Dominions should 'vary with the circumstances and conditions of each case'. Therefore, he

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<sup>50</sup> B. R. Tomlinson, *The Indian National Congress and the Raj, 1929-1942* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1976), 30.

<sup>51</sup> Hansard, 20 November 1931, vol 259, 1197-1198, 1206.

<sup>52</sup> Amery, 'Dominion Status', *The Times*, 19 February 1935.

suggested that Britain and India should find a constitutional compromise to reconcile India's aspiration to equality of status and the continuance of de facto partnership with the UK on defence.<sup>53</sup>

### **Amery and India in the 1940s**

The appointment of Amery as Secretary of State for India aroused certain expectations in both Britain and India. A leading article in the *Manchester Guardian* explained that the new Secretary, who was an opponent of Churchill regarding the 1935 Act, was 'the most Liberal of all the Tories'. *The Times of India* positively quoted the article.<sup>54</sup> In the course of the war, however, these newspapers published critical opinions on Amery.<sup>55</sup> The electoral defeat of the Conservative Party and Amery in 1945 was generally welcomed in India. He was stigmatized by both the Indian National Congress and the Mahasabha as a reactionary Conservative and an enemy of India.<sup>56</sup> Amery often ascribed the failure of Indian constitutional reforms to Churchill's obstinance. This section will argue that the reason he was detested by all the parties of Indian nationalists was his own political stance, which became even more conservative than in the 1930s.

The essence of Amery's new Indian policy was announced in the August Offer of 1940. The political drama, which mainly took place between Amery, Churchill, and Linlithgow, has been already described by historians.<sup>57</sup> Despite his conflict with Churchill, Amery was eventually satisfied with the fact that the

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<sup>53</sup> Amery, *The Forward View*, 229-235.

<sup>54</sup> *The Manchester Guardian*, 14 May 1940; *The Times of India*, 15 May 1940.

<sup>55</sup> For instance, see 'Indian Goodwill at Stake', *The Times of India*, 12 October 1942; 'No Contribution', *The Manchester Guardian*, 2 April 1943.

<sup>56</sup> 'Expectations Roused in Political Circles', *The Times of India*, 27 July 1945; the Government of India to the Secretary of State, 1 August 1945, Nicholas Mansergh *The Transfer of Power 1942-7 (TP)*, vol 6, 1-2.

<sup>57</sup> Louis, *In the Name of God*; Toye, *Churchill's Empire*; Whittington, 'An Imperialist at Bay'.

Offer, which was redrafted by Churchill, contained all the elements of the original draft.<sup>58</sup> Churchill's interference, thus, did not fundamentally change the policy devised by Amery and Linlithgow: 1. Permitting an Indian constituent assembly to frame a constitution of the new Dominion after the war; 2. Expansion and Indianization of the Viceroy's Executive Council. As for the former, the Offer added two conditions: 1. Britain would not concede any power if a new Indian government disregarded the views of minorities; 2. A new constitution would be adjusted by a treaty between the UK and India to enable the UK to hold some responsibilities on defence policy.<sup>59</sup> These reservations reflected Amery's theoretical justification of the 1930s constitutional reform: the 'safeguards' in the 1935 Act should be retained in a new constitution; a parliamentary system based on the rule of the majority should not be introduced. Amery confided to Reginald Coupland that the true aim of the Offer was to prevent the Congress from dominating a constituent assembly, whose members, he argued, should be elected on a functional basis.<sup>60</sup>

There were changes, as well as continuities, in his Indian policy. The August Offer more clearly pledged future Dominion status and Indians' right to self-determination. These changes mainly resulted from opportunistic adjustments. Amery, as new Indian Secretary, learned from Lord Zetland, his predecessor, the fact that at the outbreak of the war the Government of India confirmed that a goal of Britain's Indian policy was giving Dominion status.<sup>61</sup> Amery's primary aim was to efficiently mobilize the war effort in India, and he recognized the

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<sup>58</sup> Whittington, *Ibid.*, 104.

<sup>59</sup> The final form of the August Offer was republished in L. S. Amery, *India and Freedom* (London: Oxford University Press, 1942), 123-125.

<sup>60</sup> Amery to Coupland, 11 October 1940, AMEL 2/2/6. Also see Amery, *India and Freedom*, 46-47.

<sup>61</sup> Whittington, 'An Imperialist at Bay', 90.

necessity to grant some forms of constitutional guarantee for that purpose.<sup>62</sup> As for a new Indian organization that was supposed to frame a new constitution after the war, Amery initially preferred a small body not containing the party leaders in India. But he quickly switched to the scheme for a constituent assembly in order not to arouse suspicion from Indian nationalists. A decisive factor was the worsening situation of the war on the Continent. His apprehension was that unless 'some sort of constitution agreement' was forged, Indian political leaders might think that the British Empire was 'finished' and would dissolve India into independent 'Pakistan' and 'Congress India'.<sup>63</sup>

Amery's anti-Congress stance did not mean that he was pro-Muslim. Rather, he equally abhorred Jinnah's demand for an independent Pakistan. As an ex-Unionist, he drew an analogy between Ireland and India: 'a complete break-up of India on Ulster and Eire lines, seems a most disastrous solution'. The North-Western part would include a Sikh minority while a Muslim majority in the North-Eastern part would be narrow. This fact led Amery to conclude that the Pakistan scheme would be 'the prelude to continuous internal warfare in India'.<sup>64</sup> Amery used the Irish analogy in his criticism of *The Times* to the effect that they, like Edwardian Liberals, did not know the existence of 'Ulster' in India.<sup>65</sup> The principle of the August Offer was named by him 'India First'. 'India', in this context meant, 'the real India' as it existed and not 'the theoretical India which any particular element or party has inscribed upon its banner'.<sup>66</sup> Although this claim was conflated with his desire to preserve imperial interests in India, Amery

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<sup>62</sup> Amery to Linlithgow, 30 May 1940, AMEL 2/3/22.

<sup>63</sup> Amery to Linlithgow, 17 June 1940

<sup>64</sup> Amery to Linlithgow, 16 September 1940, AMEL 2/3/22.

<sup>65</sup> Amery to Linlithgow, 5 January 1942, *TP*, vol. 1, 12.

<sup>66</sup> Amery, *India and Freedom*, 36-37.

had genuine hopes for Ambedkar's campaign to enhance the political right of the 'Scheduled Castes'.<sup>67</sup>

His unionism towards India seemingly contradicts his deed at the time of the Cripps Mission. The new offer granted provinces a right to opt out of a new constitution.<sup>68</sup> Gandhi protested to Cripps that the clause would be 'an invitation to the Moslems to create a Pakistan'.<sup>69</sup> It was Amery who strongly demanded the inclusion of the clause in the India Committee.<sup>70</sup> When Feroze Khan Noon, Minister of the Labour of the Executive Council, opposed Indianization of the Council, Amery even advised Linlithgow to assure Noon that the 'Pakistan option' in the Offer would protect the interests of Muslims.<sup>71</sup>

However, the apparent change was caused not by his ideological conversion but by the dynamics of high politics. The point was that Amery was one of the most reluctant approvers of the Cripps Mission. The Mission was implemented as a result of British politicians' attempts to respond to Tej Bahadur Sapru's proposal for constitutional reform.<sup>72</sup> Amery recognized the need to make some sort of positive reply, but preferred continuance of the present system with the pledge of the August Offer to any new proposal.<sup>73</sup> Amery's miscalculation was that Churchill started to actively promote the making of the Cripps Offer. Amery lamented that Churchill, who was exhausted by his work, ignorant of the Indian situation, and pressurized by the USA, China and the Labour Party, just acquiesced in the schemes produced by the Labour

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<sup>67</sup> Amery, *India and Freedom*, 38-39; Amery to Linlithgow, 13 December 1940, AMEL 2/3/22.

<sup>68</sup> The final draft of the offer was republished in Amery, *India and Freedom*, 126-128.

<sup>69</sup> Cripps' note on 27 March 1942, *TP*, vol. 1, 499.

<sup>70</sup> Amery diary, 25-27 February 1942, AMEL 7/36.

<sup>71</sup> Amales Tripathi and Amitava Tripathi, *Indian National Congress and the Struggle for Freedom: 1885-1947* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 286.

<sup>72</sup> D. A. Low, 'The Mediator's Moment: Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru and the Antecedents to the Cripps Mission to India, 1940-42', *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 12, no. 2 (1984): 145-64.

<sup>73</sup> Amery diary, 25 January 1942, AMEL 7/36.



members of the India Committee, Cripps and Attlee, who tried to establish a majority rule in India for the Congress. Unlike his position in the conflict over the August Offer, Amery belonged to the reluctant camp in January-March of 1942. The only thing he could do was to make the Offer retain the principle of 'safeguards' and the constitutional role of the Crown and to add the Pakistan clause in order not to alienate Indian Muslims.<sup>74</sup> Whittington is right in arguing that Amery lost the power to control the situation regarding the Cripps Mission.<sup>75</sup> It was natural that Amery felt relieved to hear the failure of the negotiations: 'I think we are well out of the wood. We can now go ahead with the war with a clear conscience'.<sup>76</sup> His report on the Mission in the House of Commons clearly stated that the goal remained 'a united all-India'.<sup>77</sup>

Aside from his involvement in the negotiations, Amery continued his personal attempt to find an ideal form of a Indian constitution that could be an alternative to the 1935 Act. In the course of the process, his view actually became more conservative than in the 1930s. As of June 1940, he already envisaged a clear separation between the legislature and the executive both in provinces and at the centre.<sup>78</sup> His new premise was that a new constitution must be different from the British type and that 'responsible government' must be removed as a principle. Judging from his writing in 1953, Amery probably knew that the direct cause of the failure of the all-India federation prescribed in

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<sup>74</sup> Amery diary, 11, 12, 16, 22, 24-28 February, 1, 3, 7, March, AMEL 7/36. As for historians' account of the mindsets of the key actors, see R. J. Moore, *Churchill, Cripps, and India, 1939-1945* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979); Toye, *Churchill's Empire*; Peter Clarke, *The Cripps Version*. The attitudes of the Labour Party towards the Congress were more ambivalent than Amery claimed. See Nicholas Owen, 'The Cripps Mission of 1942: A Reinterpretation', *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 30, no. 1 (2002): 61-98.

<sup>75</sup> Whittington presented the interpretation as a criticism of Peter Clarke's, which has argued that Amery was such a Machiavellian that he tried to assuage Linlithgow by saying that the new offer was within the framework of the August Offer.

See Whittington, 'An Imperialist at Bay', 181; Clarke, *Cripps Version*, 288.

<sup>76</sup> Amery diary, 10 April 1942, *EB*, vol. 2, 795.

<sup>77</sup> Amery, *India and Freedom*, 103.

<sup>78</sup> Amery to Linlithgow, 13 June 1940, AMEL 2/3/22.

the 1935 Act was the hesitation of the Princely States to join it.<sup>79</sup> However, Amery, as Indian Secretary, attributed the failure to autocratic regimes formed by the Congress in some provinces after the 1937 election. Politics in those areas was dominated by the party caucus of the Congress. The monopolization of offices by Hindus there alarmed Muslims and the Princes. The order of the Congress Executive at the outbreak of the war, which caused the mass resignation of ministers in those regions, symbolized the unsound state in British India. The idea of Pakistan was an extreme, but inevitable, reaction to this among Muslims. Hence, 'Parliamentary Responsible Government for India', envisaged by the 1917 Declaration and worked out in the 1935 Act, would be 'no longer in the picture'. His rejection of Sapru's proposal was deployed based on this principle.<sup>80</sup>

His tentative alternative plan can be found in his letters to Reginald Coupland. Amery recommended Coupland as a constitutional adviser to Linlithgow in the early stage of the war. Later, he supported Coupland's attempt to survey and propagate a possible form of an Indian constitution which could be compatible with the interests and the framework of the Commonwealth.<sup>81</sup> His frequent suggestion to Coupland was that the Swiss system could be a handy reference point in devising a scheme for India.<sup>82</sup> One of his concrete propositions was 'a Central Executive not responsible to the Legislature and directly commanding the confidence of Provincial and State Governments'. Its

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<sup>79</sup> Amery, 'Indian Constitutional Development: The War Years', *Asian Review*, 49.180 (1953), 255-256, AMEL 1/6/25. As for historians' accounts, see S. R. Ashton, 'Federal Negotiations with the Indian Princes, 1935-1939', *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 9, no. 2 (1981): 169-92.

<sup>80</sup> Amery, *India and Freedom*, 26-27; Amery's memorandum for the War Cabinet, 'The Indian Political Situation', 28 January 1942, *TP*, vol. 1, 81-90; Amery, 'India's Constitutional Future' *The Asiatic Review*, 1941, 81-90.

<sup>81</sup> Amery to Linlithgow, 8, 23 November, 3 December 1940. AMEL 2/3/22.

<sup>82</sup> As for Amery and the Swiss method, see Whittington, 'An Imperialist at Bay', 91, 133. Amery continued to refer to it as an idea. For instance, see Amery to Linlithgow, 21 June 1943, *TP*, vol. 4, 26; Amery's memorandum, 5 January 1945, *TP*, vol. 5.

members would be chosen based on nominations from the provincial governments, the Princely States, and the Viceroy, which would keep the Congress from holding a majority.<sup>83</sup> As for a voting system, he claimed that indirect elections should be adopted in the provincial legislatures as well as at the centre to weaken the party caucus: 'general elections are not necessary for democracy, even in the Provinces'.<sup>84</sup>

One should bear in mind that there was not a great rupture in his constitutional thinking. In the 1930s, Amery already expressed his doubt over majority rule in India and advocated the indirect election for the federal legislature. In this sense, the change of his vision was subtle. However, it was significant that Amery explicitly discarded the aim of 'responsible government' for India. The concept was the core element in Whig history of the British Empire. This was why Amery in the 1930s preached the feasibility of 'responsible government' in India by extending the definition of the term. Facing the Congress's anti-British campaign during the war and the intense communal conflict between Hindus and Muslims, he had to give up clinging to the idiosyncratic rhetoric. In other words, his experiences at the India Office made his view on India slightly more conservative.

The new stance of Amery affected his alternative schemes to the so-called Wavell's plan. Archibald Wavell, replacing Linlithgow in October 1943, had an intention to achieve constitutional compromise. His plan was the formation of an interim central government composed of a new Executive Council representing all the large parties in India.<sup>85</sup> Amery was at first not impressed by Wavell's initiative, predicting that it would be rejected by Indians as was in 1942. His

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<sup>83</sup> Amery to Coupland, 8 February 1943, AMEL 2/2/6.

<sup>84</sup> Amery's comments on Coupland's draft of *The Future of India*, 21 June 1943, AMEL 2/2/6.

<sup>85</sup> Whittington, 'An Imperialist at Bay', 317-318.

alternative was leaving the Executive Council untouched and setting up a conference where the influence of the Congress and the Muslim League should be suppressed as much as possible.<sup>86</sup> After reviewing both of the schemes, the new Indian Committee decided to re-formulate a constitutional offer.<sup>87</sup>

Amery wrote a memorandum for the Committee at the beginning of 1945. In the process of preparation, he found, in hindsight, the report of the Simon Commission preferable to the report of the 1934 Joint Select Committee because the creation of 'responsible government' was no longer acceptable to him. His new policy was to reverse the priority in the Cripps Offer by giving India independence first within the present framework and then encouraging them to frame a new constitution. It was premised on his optimistic expectation that once the sense of subordination was eliminated, there would emerge a communal consensus in India.<sup>88</sup> In his concrete design, the executive of India would be severed from Whitehall and not responsible to the central legislature. Necessary modifications of the 1935 Act would be implemented by Order in Council or issuing instructions to the Viceroy and the Governors. In the latter case, the British Government should order the Viceroy to form a coalition ministry that would include representatives of minority parties.<sup>89</sup> At this stage, Amery did not acknowledge the idea of 'selection by the Legislature' unless the legislature adopted the Swiss system and selected the executive by proportional representation.<sup>90</sup>

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<sup>86</sup> Amery's memorandum for the War Cabinet, 22 November 1944, *TP*, vol. 5, 214-218.

<sup>87</sup> See the minutes on 7 December 1944, *TP*, vol. 5, 274-279. The Committee consisted of Amery, Attlee, Cripps, Simon, John Anderson, James Grigg, R. A. Butler, Edward Bridges, and Gilbert Laithwaite. Amery felt that all the members except for Cripps had Die-Hard views on India. Amery diary, 6 December 1944, AMEL 7/38.

<sup>88</sup> Amery diary, 24, 28, 31 December 1944, AMEL 7/38.

<sup>89</sup> Amery's memorandum, 'The Indian Problem', 5 January 1945, *TP*, vol. 5, 365-376.

<sup>90</sup> Amery to Wavell, 18 January 1945, *TP*, vol. 5, 418-419.

The scheme of Amery was criticized as 'irresponsible Viceroy' and not accepted by both the Labour members and the Die-Hards in the India Committee. In addition to these criticisms, Coupland's apprehension about the Viceroy's power being 'in the air' finally persuaded Amery into modifying his view. He formulated two safeguards to improve the undemocratic nature of his design: 1. giving members of the Executive Council to directly appeal to the Indian Secretary or the Supreme Court; 2. allowing the provincial government to submit lists from which the Viceroy would choose members of the Executive Council.<sup>91</sup> Thus, by the end of March 1945, Amery came to think that the executive should be selected by the nomination method or the Swiss system.<sup>92</sup> Cripps was not impressed by the first point (the legal one) of Amery's new scheme. Regarding the nomination method, however, he proposed a similar proposal in the India Committee, which was eventually adopted as British policy for the Simla Conference.<sup>93</sup>

Without noticing the change of Amery's view, Whittington has presented a critical assessment of Amery's role in the India Committee to the effect that while Cripps took a leading part in finding a consensus, Amery's diary always exaggerated his contributions as if every conclusion of the Committee had been derived from his own ideas.<sup>94</sup> It was undoubtedly true that Amery tended to exaggerate his importance in policymaking. However, Amery's vision converged with, if it did not have a great influence on, that of Cripps in this phase. The process of the convergence was in fact mutual. As Nicholas Owen has revealed, the attitudes of the Labour Party towards the Congress were highly ambivalent. They had a common suspicion that the Congress only represented

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<sup>91</sup> Amery diary 10 March 1945, AMEL 7/39; Amery to Cripps, 13 March 1945, *TP*, vol. 5, 687.

<sup>92</sup> Note by Amery 19 March 1945, *TP*, vol. 5, 708-711.

<sup>93</sup> Whittington, 'An Imperialist at Bay', 337.

<sup>94</sup> *Ibid.*, 337, 339.

the capitalist class of India and not general citizens. Attlee wholeheartedly embraced this world view. Amery at first praised Attlee for having 'no sentimental illusions' on India, but at the time of the India Committee, he complained that Attlee's Die-Hard position, not so far from Churchill's, was an obstacle to compromise. After the failure of the 1942 Mission, Cripps also strengthened the negative feeling towards the Congress.<sup>95</sup> Cripps told Sapru that India should follow not the British type of majority rule but the Swiss or Soviet system.<sup>96</sup> In the India Committee, Attlee expressed his fear of Ministers in the Executive Council being 'merely members of a party caucus outside'.<sup>97</sup> In the context of this convergence, the Amery-Cripps-Wavell axis emerged and quarrelled with Churchill and the Conservative Die-Hards in the India Committee.<sup>98</sup> They managed to devise the British proposal for the Simla Conference, that is, the reconstitution of the Executive Council based on nomination from the Central and Provincial Legislatures. When Amery fully explained this policy in the House of Commons, Attlee paid him a compliment.<sup>99</sup>

At the same time as the collapse of the Simla Conference, Amery was ousted from the India Office. The entry of his diary on the day divulged his frank feelings:

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<sup>95</sup> Nicholas Owen, *The British Left and India Metropolitan Anti-Imperialism*, 276-283.

<sup>96</sup> Cripps to Sapru, 18 December 1944, *TP*, vol. 5, 348-349.

<sup>97</sup> The minutes of the meeting on 5 April 1945, *TP*, vol. 5, 842.

<sup>98</sup> This does not mean that Wavell's relations with Amery was always cordial. As of August 1943, Wavell found that Amery had 'very liberal views about India'. In the discussion of the India Committee during April-May 1945, Amery was inclined to be supportive of Wavell, but he was gradually annoyed at Amery's lack of influence and naive optimism. Wavell's verdict on Amery was: 'What a gallant, loyal, straight little man he is, but a little detached from realities and more occupied with ideas and theories than persons and facts'. Penderel Moon, *Wavell: The Viceroy's Journal* (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), 14, 128. Louis has cited the first half of this remark as a compliment, but it was, in fact, a cynical criticism. Louis, *In the Name of God, Go!*, 122.

<sup>99</sup> Hansard, HC 14 June 1945 vol. 411, 1831-48.

I am relieved to think that so far as India is concerned I shall not have to go on fighting an endless uphill battle and see no reason why my Socialist successor should not work happily with Wavell and carry things further on the lines that I have laid down. I certainly cannot claim to have settled the Indian problem in these five years. .... But I think I have set it moving in the right direction ....<sup>100</sup>

The sense of exhaustion made him relatively lenient with the Labour government's handling of the Indian question. Recent research has revealed that the Conservatives' position regarding Labour's Indian policy tended to be more hostile than is often assumed.<sup>101</sup> In this context, Amery's attitude was exceptional. He genuinely endorsed and supported the 'Cabinet Mission' in 1946, Labour's attempt to establish an interim government in India.<sup>102</sup> Amery also gave some advice on possible forms of an Indian constitution to Lord Pethick-Lawrence, though officials and Labour politicians were not necessarily happy with the ex-India Secretary's interference in the Indian question.<sup>103</sup>

The breakdown of the negotiations and the intensification of the communal conflicts depressed Amery to the point of predicting that in fifty years, people might find Churchill's negative view on Indian self-government correct.<sup>104</sup>

However, when he heard Attlee's decision to exit India in February 1947, he felt as if the Labour government had followed his policy, that is, had given the

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<sup>100</sup> Amery diary, 26 July 1945, *EB*, vol. 2, 1049.

<sup>101</sup> Owen, 'The Conservative Party and Indian Independence'.

<sup>102</sup> Amery diary, 16, 30 May, 29 July, AMEL 7/40; Amery 'Action in India', *The Times*, 18 May 1946; Amery, 'India: The stands are running down very fast', *Sunday Express*, 8 December 1946; Amery 'Par la déclaration d'indépendance: Les Anglais reussiront-ils a sauver l'unité de l'Inde?', *Une Semaine Dans Le Monde*, 11 May 1946. His original English draft is in AMEL 8/71.

<sup>103</sup> Amery to Pethick-Lawrence, 17 April 1946, *TP*, vol. 5, 300; Turnbull to Clauson, 19 May 1946, *ibid.*, 632; Pethick-Lawrence to Wavell, 2 January 1947, *TP*, vol. 9, 444-445; Pethick-Lawrence to Wavell, 16 January 1947, *ibid.*, 506-507.

<sup>104</sup> Amery diary, 23 November 1946, AMEL 7/40.

Indians independence first and then let them frame their constitution.<sup>105</sup> Amery, in talking with Mountbatten, even accepted the partition of India as an inevitable conclusion and wrote a letter to *The Times* to 'steady Conservative opinion' on Mountbatten's policy.<sup>106</sup> At this stage, Amery still believed that India could retain its unity, even after partition, by forming an Indian Commonwealth among the new independent states.<sup>107</sup>

Contrary to his expectations, the partition of India resulted in a large number of casualties. His last aim on the Indian question was to keep India, Pakistan, and Ceylon in the Commonwealth.<sup>108</sup> Though he suggested his own formula of the new Commonwealth to Attlee, the London Declaration in 1949 seemed to him an acceptable compromise. His letter to Duncan Hall alleged that he was not so shocked by the 'Indian solution' as his Conservative colleagues were because he understood the constitutional importance of accords between the Crown and representatives.<sup>109</sup> In a typically Whiggish way, he declared that the formation of the new Dominions in South Asia was attained based on the inherent nature and tradition of the Commonwealth from the Durham Report to the Statute of Westminster.<sup>110</sup> It was also repeatedly emphasized that the new Indian constitution, adopting, seemingly, a Presidential model, was actually closer to the British type of responsible government system, which the Commonwealth countries had in common.<sup>111</sup> Considering his war-time

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<sup>105</sup> Amery diary, 21-22 February 1947, AMEL 7/41.

<sup>106</sup> Amery diary, 27 May, June 3, 1947, AMEL 7/41; Amery, 'A Wise Decision', *The Times*, 4 June 1947; Amery to Churchill, 4 June 1947, AMEL 2/2/4.

<sup>107</sup> Amery, 'A Wise Decision'; Amery diary, 2 January, 12 May, 18, 20 June 1947, AMEL 7/41; Amery to Churchill, 19 June 1947, AMEL 2/2/4.

<sup>108</sup> Amery to Attlee, 30 November 1948, MS. Attlee dep. 76; Amery to Attlee, 14, 19 April 1949, MS. Attlee dep. 81.

<sup>109</sup> Amery to Duncan Hall, 11 May 1949, AMEL 2/2/11.

<sup>110</sup> Amery, 'The Commonwealth of To-Day', *The Journal of Royal United Service Institution* 96.582 (1951), 204.

<sup>111</sup> Amery, 'Commonwealth Unity', *The Times*, 29 April 1949; Amery to Hall, 26 September 1949, AMEL 2/2/11



argument that the British type of 'responsible government' would not be suitable for India, this justification was a product of opportunism and hypocrisy.

Amery's lenient attitude towards Labour's Indian policy was in marked contrast to his criticism of the 'scuttle' from Palestine.<sup>112</sup> The difference in the results was certainly one reason: while India and Pakistan remained in the Commonwealth, Britain left the rule of Palestine to the United Nations, which Amery disdained as much as the League of Nations. As of 1946, however, he still maintained that 'to walk out of India and leave anarchy behind' was 'the one thing we cannot'.<sup>113</sup> Partition was also what Amery tried to avoid as Indian Secretary. After all, he swallowed the undesirable consequence based on his conclusion that Britain had done everything it could. In other words, the Indian question, like the Irish question, made Amery swallow a regrettable compromise. As a Whiggish Conservative, Amery again constructed a historical narrative for a post hoc justification of British imperial policy. His 1953 speech for the East India Association emphasized that all the British governments in the 1930s-1940s, including his tenure in the India Office, sincerely tried to solve the Indian question with their 'goodwill' towards India.<sup>114</sup> His franker self-evaluation was in his letter to Churchill, summarizing their different stances: while Churchill thought that India was 'not fit for self-government', Amery was 'trying to secure the least ruinous solution'.<sup>115</sup> Here, Amery unconsciously admitted that he was not an enlightened visionary but a passive and reluctant reformer.

## Conclusion

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<sup>112</sup> Amery et al., 'British Policy in Palestine', *The Times*, 14 May 1948; Amery, 'British Policy in Palestine', *The Times*, 19 May 1948.

<sup>113</sup> Amery's English draft for *Une Semaine Dans Le Monde*, 'The Mission of the British Cabinet to India', AMEL 8/71.

<sup>114</sup> Amery, 'Indian Constitutional Development'.

<sup>115</sup> Amery to Churchill, 16 October 1948, AMEL 2/2/4.

Amery's imperial ideology had a Janus effect on his policy on India. On the one hand, the Curtis formula, the unsustainability of irresponsible executives, deduced from the Durham Report, gave Amery the recognition that some constitutional reforms were needed in India to avert the mistake of the eighteenth century. This conviction differentiated him from the Die-Hard imperialists. On the other hand, his own definition of 'responsible government' made his concession fall short of the demands from both Hindu and Muslim nationalists. It continued to be a dealbreaker in his negotiations with the Congress and the League during the war. While Amery pledged to endow the right for them to frame an Indian constitution on their own, he consistently refused to introduce parliamentary democracy based on party politics and to hold an election for a constituent assembly based on universal adult suffrage. Recognizing the difficulty in solving the communal conflict, he had to eventually discard the ideal of 'responsible government'. His attitude can be regarded as a variant of the British ambiguity about decolonization. In his case, it mainly derived from the negotiations between the practical need to cope with the crises on the spot and his imperial ideology, which he worked out from the lessons of imperial constitutional history.

It is debatable to what extent he deliberately exploited the constitutional theory to reinforce his cause and to what extent the constitutional theory affected and constrained his imperial thinking. Ultimately, it is connected with the question of whether Whiggish ideologies in Britain, particularly on the issue of a constitution, had a benign influence on the process of decolonization.<sup>116</sup> Of

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<sup>116</sup> Ronald Robinson, 'The Moral Disarmament of African Empire 1919-1947', *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 8, no. 1 (1979): 86–104; D. G. Boyce, *Decolonisation and the British Empire, 1775-1997* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999); Harshan Kumarasingham, 'Written Differently: A Survey of Commonwealth Constitutional History in the Age of Decolonisation', *Journal of Imperial & Commonwealth History* 46, no. 5 (2018): 874–908; Robert Guyver, 'The Whig Tradition and Commonwealth History', *Public History Weekly*, 25 October

course, it is absurd to try to find a definitive conclusion about such a chicken-and-egg problem. There was always a mutual interaction between ideologies and contingencies. As far as the case of Amery was concerned, we cannot say that the spirit of Whig history admonished him to initiate glorious decolonization. In the first half of the 1930s, he often told his colleagues that effective propaganda should be made to expound the government's policy on India.<sup>117</sup> It indicates that his constitutional theory and history was contrived to justify the practical expedient to retain India in the imperial orbit. On the other hand, there were certainly some consistent elements in his imperial thinking after the First World War in his attempts to establish a new Indian Constitution based on functional representation and to preserve the British interests on defence. Even regarding those attempts, however, Amery often redefined his strategy and tactics to adjust them into the changing circumstances. In this sense, the Whiggish imperial history, combined with the contingencies, certainly transformed Amery, originally a member of the Die-Hard imperial wing, into a constitutional reformer. The lessons of the South African and Irish questions enabled his transformation regarding India to be smoother. However, as was the case with his attitudes towards these preceding questions, he tended to be a reluctant and passive reformer. Always outstripped by reality, his political and constitutional theory was mainly utilized to make post hoc justifications for the changes in his policy. As the 'Glorious Revolution' was a fig leaf to justify a coup d'état, so the Whiggish framework was used by imperialists to glorify British imperial retreat.

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<sup>117</sup> Amery's diary, 22 May 1933, 4 November 1934.

## 6 The Imperial Constitution

The last three chapters have analysed the crucial moments which catalysed the shifts, or the adjustments, in Amery's deeds and thoughts regarding the imperial framework. Since all those moments were brought about by the crises on the spot, the other important group in the British Empire, the settlement colonies, was omitted in the analysis. To understand his wider imperial vision, Amery's attitude towards the reconfiguration of Greater Britain into the British Commonwealth of Nations needs to be scrutinized. This chapter, however, will not confine its scope to the settlement colonies. As the previous chapters have discussed, the formation and evolution of the British Commonwealth was inextricably intertwined with its sprawling expansion. Nor will this chapter try to document the details about Amery's role in the making of the British Commonwealth because that has been done elsewhere.<sup>1</sup> Therefore, this chapter will, based on the findings in the previous chapters, try to describe and grasp Amery's changing position, thinking, and policy on the future of the imperial constitution as a whole in a more precise way than the existing literature.

This means that, as in the chapter on India, my focus will be on the intellectual background behind Amery's involvement in the imperial transformation. The latest research on Victorian and Edwardian imperial thought has tended to put emphasis on the concept of bifurcated imperial vision, which

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<sup>1</sup> John Edward Kendle, *The Colonial and Imperial Conferences, 1887-1911: A Study in Imperial Organization* (London: Longmans, 1967); Philip Wigley, *Canada and the Transition to Commonwealth: British-Canadian Relations, 1917-1926* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977); R. F. Holland, *Britain and the Commonwealth Alliance, 1918-39* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1981); Jaroslav Valkoun, *Great Britain, the Dominions and the Transformation of the British Empire, 1907-1931: The Road to the Statute of Westminster* (New York & London: Routledge, 2021).

regarded the empire as composed of the white settlement colonies and the dependencies. The imperialists advocated, or at least acquiesced in, the white-supremacist nature of the immigration policies in the settler colonies, and, consequently, reinforced the global colour line.<sup>2</sup> On the other hand, historians working on the interwar period have revealed that imperial theorists not only promoted the devolution of power to the Dominions but also modified their binary racism by promoting gradual self-government in some of the dependent colonies though they did not entirely discard the hierarchical relations between the white Dominions and the rest from their imperial visions.<sup>3</sup>

Amery's intellectual trajectory is a good example to scrutinize the transition in British imperial ideologies. He had a vision of a two-layered empire before the First World War, which eventually led him to split the Dominion Office from the Colonial Office in the 1920s. And yet, as the previous chapters have revealed, he presided over the formation of the Third British Empire or the multi-racial Commonwealth. The existing literature has not sufficiently clarified the rationale behind the twists and turns in his imperial thinking.<sup>4</sup> This chapter will dissect Amery's specific assumptions, anxieties, and solutions regarding the political framework of the Empire/Commonwealth. The following sections will show that,

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<sup>2</sup> Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds, *Drawing the Global Colour Line: White Men's Countries and the International Challenge of Racial Equality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Karuna Mantena, *Alibis of Empire: Henry Maine and the Ends of Liberal Imperialism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010); Duncan Bell, *Reordering the World: Essays on Liberalism and Empire* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016); Amanda Behm, *Imperial History and the Global Politics of Exclusion: Britain, 1880-1940* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018).

<sup>3</sup> John Darwin, 'Imperialism in Decline? Tendencies in British Imperial Policy between the Wars', *The English Historical Review*, 23.3 (1980), 657–79; Daniel Gorman, *Imperial Citizenship: Empire and the Question of Belonging* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006); W. David McIntyre, *The Britannic Vision: Historians and the Making of the British Commonwealth of Nations, 1907-48* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); Behm, *Imperial history*.

<sup>4</sup> Although Behm's research has addressed the overall transition in British imperialism, she has only depicted Amery as a typical late-Victorian imperialist possessed of a bifurcated vision. Behm, *Imperial History*, 108-116, 139-142.

while Amery tended to publicly praise the superiority of the principle of Commonwealth over rigid federalism, he simultaneously suspected that the Commonwealth framework might promote excessive decentralization. This was why he always prioritized the introduction of imperial preference, which would strengthen imperial unity by creating a common economic interest.

### **Imperialism and nationalism**

At the turn of the century, Amery embraced the common conviction that while the nineteenth century was the heyday of 'cosmopolitan individualism', 'nationalism', another idea disseminated in the same period, increasingly triumphed as the former crumbled.<sup>5</sup> This observation was widely diffused across the political spectrum.<sup>6</sup> It can be regarded as part of a general backlash against 'laissez-faire' economics and Gladstonian Liberalism in the last quarter of the nineteenth century.<sup>7</sup> Amery's obsession with the British national interest was always latent in his propositions regarding Army Reform and Tariff Reform.<sup>8</sup> Nevertheless, he was never pleased about the prospect of the age of nationalism. As discussed in the previous chapters, Amery tended to use the rhetoric of anti-exclusive-nationalism when he opposed nationalist demands: the discrimination against the Uitlanders in the Transvaal, the Irish Nationalists' disregard for Ulster Unionists, and the attitude of the Indian National Congress

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<sup>5</sup> Amery, 'Imperial Unity' a speech in 1910 reprinted in idem., *Union and Strength: A Series of Papers on Imperial Questions* (London: Edward Arnold, 1912), 14-16.

<sup>6</sup> For instance, see J. A. Hobson, *Imperialism, A study*, (London: James Nisbet & CO., 1902), 7-9.

<sup>7</sup> The backlash itself spread across the political spectrum. See Peter Clarke, *Liberals and Social Democrats* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978); Michael Freedon, *The New Liberalism: An Ideology of Social Reform* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986); E. H. H. Green, *The Crisis of Conservatism: The Politics, Economics and Ideology of the Conservative Party, 1880-1914* (London & New York: Routledge, 1995); Fulvino Cammarano, *To Save England from Decline: The National Party of Common Sense - British Conservatism and the Challenge of Democracy (1885-1892)* (Lanham: University Press of America, 2001).

<sup>8</sup> See, R. F. Holland, *Britain and the Commonwealth Alliance, 1918-39* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1981), 41-42.

towards Muslims and the Princely States. Moreover, as of 1910, Amery had already alleged that 'an anarchy of conflicting nation-states' could not be resolved by international arbitration or international law, by citing the fact that the first Hague Conference did not prevent the outbreak of the South African War or the Russo-Japanese War.<sup>9</sup>

To Amery, a nobler ideal embodied in the British Empire could be a constructive solution to the issue of nationalism. Under the umbrella of the imperial framework, the United Kingdom and the self-governing nation states had fostered, not restrained, their national lives. These white states were also engaged with the lofty duty of uplifting so-called backward races in the empire, based on 'the idea of trusteeship'. Amery boasted that this higher and organic unity was unique to Britain.

The lawless anarchy of modern nationalism, the threatening ruthless struggle between West and East, the callous exploitation of the backward and helpless – for all these unhappy features of the modern world the British, within its confines, substitutes the rule of law, of conciliation and mutual help, and the inspiration of a wider patriotism.<sup>10</sup>

Amery did not deny that the ideal of universal humanitarianism or 'the federation of the world' was a glorious vision. The problem was that it was simply impractical in the immediate future. On the other hand, the ideal of imperial unity could achieve the same aims in limited regions. In this sense, the British Empire could offer and substantiate 'an ideal whose realization will inevitably

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<sup>9</sup> Amery, 'Imperial Unity', 16.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., 17.

help forward the even broader ideal of the brotherhood of man.’<sup>11</sup> His stance towards international arbitration would be a theoretical foundation for his geopolitical vision in the interwar period.<sup>12</sup>

### **The issue of imperial federation**

In the history of the debate over ‘imperial federation’, which haunted British imperialists, Amery was often depicted as an anti-federalist, particularly in comparison with the core member of the Round Table, Lionel Curtis. This image was disseminated by Amery himself, whose memoir recalled that he dissociated himself from the group because they were indifferent to imperial preference and only committed to impractical constitutional machinations.<sup>13</sup> He also conceptualized the framework of the Commonwealth as an antithesis of an imperial federation that would get on the nerves of colonial nationalists in the Dominions. In this sense, his view was closer to Richard Jebb, a Tariff Reformer and anti-federalist, who coined the term ‘colonial nationalism’. Amery himself admitted that he was affected by Jebb.<sup>14</sup> Some historians adopted this view and depicted Amery, like Jebb, as a theoretical opponent of Curtis.<sup>15</sup> That is, in the dichotomy of the ‘autonomists’ and the ‘federalists’, Amery was categorized as being one of the former. On the other hand, recent research has revealed his more complicated vision. For example, W. David McIntyre has pointed out that Amery tended to characterize the Commonwealth framework as a means of achieving imperial unity not just as that of devolution, though McIntyre still

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<sup>11</sup> Ibid., 21.

<sup>12</sup> See Chapter 2 and Amery, *The Forward View* (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1935), 41-44.

<sup>13</sup> Amery, *My Political Life*, vol. 1, 348-349.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., 270.

<sup>15</sup> Kendle, *Round Table Movement and Imperial Union*, 71; Louis, *In the Name of God, Go!*, 42-43.



labelled Amery 'autonomist'.<sup>16</sup> Jaroslav Valkoun has also depicted Amery as an advocate of both equal partnership in the Commonwealth and imperial unity.<sup>17</sup> Furthermore, Simon Potter, by discussing the dispute between Amery and Jebb over the Imperial War Cabinet, has indicated that Amery was more centralization-oriented than Jebb.<sup>18</sup> Andrew Muldoon has properly pointed out that Amery had apprehensions about the possibility that the Balfour formula in 1926 could loosen imperial unity.<sup>19</sup> However, none of these historians have focused on the trajectory of Amery's personal vision and what made him take his specific position. We cannot precisely understand Amery's conceptualization of the Commonwealth without grasping his view on imperial federation. The following section will analyse his reasonings behind his wavering attitude towards imperial federation.

First of all, we should recognize the fact that Amery was initially a proponent of an imperial federation. Amery, as a schoolboy, was impressed by a lecture of G. R. Parkin, an 'eloquent apostle of Imperial Federation'.<sup>20</sup> When he addressed the issue of surging nationalism in Eastern Europe, he presented federalization as a solution.<sup>21</sup> Moreover, he, during the 1900s, repeatedly said that imperial federation was an ultimate goal of Greater Britain.<sup>22</sup> After all, this common goal encouraged Amery to mingle with other young imperial theorists in Milner's Kindergarten and to join in the Round Table. Their ultimate goal was

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<sup>16</sup> W. David McIntyre, *The Britannic Vision: Historians and the Making of the British Commonwealth of Nations, 1907-48* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).

<sup>17</sup> Jaroslav Valkoun, *Great Britain, the Dominions and the Transformation of the British Empire, 1907-1931*.

<sup>18</sup> Simon Potter, 'Richard Jebb, John S. Ewart and the Round Table, 1898–1926', *The English Historical Review*, 122.495 (2007), 105–32.

<sup>19</sup> Andrew Muldoon, *Empire, Politics and the Creation of the 1935 India Act: Last Act of the Raj* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009), 200-211.

<sup>20</sup> Amery, *My Political Life*, vol. 1, 37.

<sup>21</sup> Amery, 'The Internal Crisis in Austria-Hungary', *The Edinburgh Review*, no. 385, July 1898, 35.

<sup>22</sup> Amery to Bell, 29 August 1901. Moberly Bell Papers, CMB/1.

to forge imperial unity by turning the British Empire into an 'organic union'.<sup>23</sup> As a practical step for the goal, both Amery and other members in the Round Table tried to develop the system of the Imperial Conference, by creating an independent Dominion Office and an Imperial Secretariat. They also shared the aim of equal partnership between the United Kingdom and the Dominions.<sup>24</sup>

What separated Amery from the Round Table, around 1910, was the Tariff Reform Movement. The larger the presence of imperial preference became in his whole political project, the more he was irritated by the indifference of the Round Table to Tariff Reform. However, there was another disagreement in the Round Table about the political framework of the empire. The conflict became manifest in their 'moot' of 1910-1911. Amery's correspondence with Philip Kerr indicates that he submitted several memoranda for their discussion. Unfortunately, not all of them have survived in the archives.<sup>25</sup> But we can, at least, reconstruct the outline of their discussion by analysing the remaining material.

At the beginning of July 1910, Amery wrote a note for the moot on the reorganization of the Colonial Office and the development of the Imperial Conference system.<sup>26</sup> His central proposals were the separation of a new 'Imperial Office', which would deal with the business with the Dominions, from the Colonial Office, the formalization of the Imperial Conference by establishing the 'Secretariat', and letting the Dominions be involved in the making of foreign and defence policy of the Empire.<sup>27</sup> Curtis read the memorandum and sent his

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<sup>23</sup> The minutes of their meetings on 4-6 September 1909 and 15-18 January 1910. Lothian Papers, GD 40/17/11.

<sup>24</sup> Kendle, *Round Table Movement*, 90-91. Also see, John Edward Kendle, *The Colonial and Imperial Conferences*, *passim*.

<sup>25</sup> For instance, see Amery to Kerr, 17 June 1910, 21 July 1910, 22 November 1910, Additional Papers of the Round Table, MS Eng d 3194.

<sup>26</sup> Amery diary, 1, 3, 6 July 1910, AMEL 7/9.

<sup>27</sup> Amery, 'Notes on the reorganisation of official relations between the United Kingdom and the

opinion on Amery's suggestion to Kerr. Curtis's letter was also circulated among the Round Table.<sup>28</sup> While agreeing on the general principle of Amery's argument, Curtis claimed that there was some fundamental difference from his own convictions.

In Amery's scheme, the role of the Dominion High Commissioners in London would be that of 'permanent Under Secretaries' supervising the London branches of their Ministries of imperial affairs rather than that of 'ambassadors'. Curtis thought that Amery's hesitation to 'magnify the importance of the High Commissioners' was derived from his fear of the Dominions considering themselves to be independent states. Curtis alleged that he, as a disciple of Jebb, was not afraid of the aspirations of the Dominions for autonomy. However, unlike Jebb, he did not believe that there was 'some mysterious third alternative' to 'independence or organic union'.<sup>29</sup> Curtis's views on Amery and Jebb clearly shows that neither Amery nor Curtis can be simply categorized into the dichotomy of centralist and devolutionist.

Curtis also found unrealistic Amery's suggestion that Deakin's scheme of a 'Secretariat', which would belong not to any government in the Empire but to the Imperial Conference itself, could be achieved if a step-by-step approach was taken. To Curtis, Amery's way of thinking was too 'British' and alien to the political culture in the Dominions.

It is only natural that people who are satuated [sic] in the lore of the British Constitution should think that another Constitution must be built up like a living organism, cell by cell. .... He and I often discussed the

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Dominions, and the possible developments of the Conference system', AMEL 1/2/16.

<sup>28</sup> Curtis to Kerr, 10 September 1910, Lothian Papers, GD 40/17/12. A copy of the letter exists in AMEL 1/2/16.

<sup>29</sup> Amery, 'Notes'; Curtis to Kerr, 10 September 1910, GD 40/17/12.

matter together and I can see this idea running through his memorandum. .... To a man soaked in Colonial condition the thing appears very differently. The Dominions have never had the least chance of supposing that their Constitutions could grow, they had to be written down .... The idea of a slowly developed Constitution may tend to allay the fears of the people in England, but it could only tend to excite fears and suspicions of people in the Dominions: they think at once that Downing Street is going to ensnare them into something without their knowing it.<sup>30</sup>

Aside from the validity of Curtis's constitutional theory, the observation precisely grasps the feature of Amery's design of an imperial framework. He not just always preferred a 'flexible' form of imperial cooperation but also praised the method as the forte of the British Constitution.

The gap between Amery and the Round Table widened in 1911. According to his diary, the meeting on 19 January saw 'the most interesting point of divergence' between 'the majority', who favoured an American type of imperial constitution, and those who desired to preserve the British type of constitution. Amery, naturally included in the latter, decided to write a memorandum to defend his view and completed it in two days.<sup>31</sup> It is a significant document, in which Amery expressed his ideals on an imperial constitution systematically.<sup>32</sup>

The memorandum had many phrases which Amery was to recycle in the future; the British system was more flexible than the rigid federal system; the Dominions should be treated as nations of equal status with the UK. Despite his

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<sup>30</sup> Ibid.

<sup>31</sup> Amery's diary, 19, 21 January 1911, AMEL 7/10.

<sup>32</sup> The memorandum is in Round Table Papers, Eng. Hist. 776. The following paragraph is written based on its content.

reputation as an autonomist in historiography, Amery criticized federalism from a different standpoint. The problem of federalism was not rigidly binding the member states with the federal government but rigidly restraining the discretion of the central government. When the federal government of the American type tried to readjust the balance of power between itself and the states, it would never fail to lead to legal procedures or disputes. The constitution along the British lines, which would allow the central government to exercise its political power, could, paradoxically, facilitate devolution to the Dominions:

That constitution is unitary and not federal. It is based on the assumption of single governing body, namely the monarch in Imperial Parliament, capable of exercising all functions, legislative and administrative, for the whole Empire, and only delegating such function to subordinate bodies as it may from time to time consider advisable to assign to them. The scope for its authority is defined for it not by a supreme court but by its own political insight and discretion.

Conversely, Amery alleged, 'the Dominions are thoroughly accustomed to dealing with a body theoretically possessed of unlimited powers but only using those which according to constitutional custom or special agreement it is considered entitled to use.' In Chapter 1, I have argued that he tended to seek simultaneous centralization and decentralization to reform any organization.<sup>33</sup> The memorandum exactly reflected this tendency. He was not just an autonomist but also an advocate of centralization. At this stage, moreover, he

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<sup>33</sup> See Chapter 1.

had not yet discarded the hope that the British Empire should aim to form a new Imperial Parliament, one which would be separated from the UK parliament.

As regards the form of the new Imperial constitution I hold strongly that it should be based on the underlying theory of the complete supremacy of the Imperial Parliament. In other words it should be in principle unitary and flexible, not federal and legal, based on the delegation of powers not on the separation of powers, and with the debatable margin of powers settled not by lawyers but by statesmen.

Amery's obsession with Tariff Reform and his initial anti-federal feelings about Ireland had already discouraged him from aligning with the Round Table. However, even at this stage, he did not categorize himself into the autonomist camp. When, in 1912, Richard Jebb complained to Amery about the tendency of 'the Federalist' [the Round Table] to evade the fiscal issue, Amery sent back his lukewarm agreement to him.

As you know, I am a very strong federalist, but I am as convinced as you are that you cannot carry out federalism merely by letting the existing system break down. You must have a practical federal spirit in the air, in other words men who have been accustomed to cooperate [sic] on quasi-federal lines. ... We have got to work together and consult together till we have in existence a really large body of able men who feel themselves member of a federal parliament or council and find

themselves hampered and irritated by the absence of a constitutional machinery corresponding to their feelings and conceptions.<sup>34</sup>

Amery, here, insisted that some kind of 'constitutional machinery' should be created to achieve imperial unity albeit after Tariff Reform was carried out. His private memorandum written in 1912 for the next Imperial Conference, which was supposed to take place in 1915, still preached the ultimate necessity of an Imperial Parliament.<sup>35</sup> In this sense, Amery, in the pre-war years, should be labelled as 'an advocate of the British version of quasi-federalism' rather than a federalist or an autonomist.

Historians agree that the 1917 Imperial Conference was the death knell to the dream of an imperial federation.<sup>36</sup> The Dominion leaders demanded a post-war Imperial Conference to define the status of the Dominions. The Conference declared to dispose of the idea of an imperial federation, which had been irritating colonial nationalism in the Dominions. It obliged all federalists to find another strategy and tactic to retain and promote imperial unity. In the case of Amery, the alternative was institutionalization of the Imperial War Cabinet. In the final phase of the First World War, Amery wrote and circulated a memorandum, which suggested that the Imperial War Cabinet should take place regularly to facilitate political consultation within the Empire. In the last paragraph, he divulged his fundamental purpose.

The whole aim, in fact, of the suggestions above put forward is to attain as far as possible the clear separation of Imperial and domestic policy,

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<sup>34</sup> Jebb to Amery, 20 May 1912; Amery to Jebb 21 May 1912, Richard Jebb Papers. ICS 116 A.

<sup>35</sup> AMEL 1/2/16.

<sup>36</sup> Andrea Bosco, *The Round Table Movement and the Fall of the 'Second' British Empire (1909-1919)* (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2017), 16-17.

as a necessary condition of the development of really effective common Imperial policy, without actually embarking upon the difficult and thorny problem of such a complete change in our whole constitutional system as would be involved in the setting up of an Imperial federal system.<sup>37</sup>

Even after imperial federation was rejected by the Dominions, Amery did not renounce his desire to establish a planning authority, which would be a counterpart to the General Staff in the Army, in the framework of the British Empire. Unfortunately to Amery, this scheme caused fierce controversy between him and Jebb. To Jebb's ears, the Imperial War Cabinet sounded too unconstitutional and smacked of excessive centralization. On the other hand, Amery was so possessed with the necessity of a commanding organization that he was not able to understand why Jebb was angered by this issue. Amery concluded that the quarrel resulted from their different attitudes towards imperial federation: 'I think I occupy a middle position between the more rigid votaries of the Round Table and those who like yourself object to any idea of Federation in principle.'<sup>38</sup>

After the failure of the permanent Imperial War Cabinet scheme, he ceased to advocate quasi-federal lines for the time being. The 1926 Imperial Conference prescribed the formula of the British Commonwealth of Nations. As the Colonial Secretary, who presided over the process, Amery came to assert that the Commonwealth framework, based on looser cooperation and consultation, was completely different from the federal framework. We should recognize, however, that, given his stance until c. 1920, the actual form of the

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<sup>37</sup> Amery, 'Future of the Cabinet System', AMEL 1/3/36.

<sup>38</sup> Amery to Jebb, 10 October 1918, AMEL 2/1/1.



British Commonwealth was accepted as a practical compromise, as was the case with Ireland and India. Furthermore, as an ex-quasi-federalist, Amery strove to secure the unity of the British Commonwealth. For instance, he commented on Smuts's 1921 memorandum, which was written to define equal relationships among Britain and the Dominions in the 1921 imperial conference, to the effect that the document should announce not only an equal partnership but also 'the dissoluble unity ... under king and crown'.<sup>39</sup> When Balfour was drafting the formula for the British Commonwealth in 1926, Amery implicitly pressurized Balfour by sending letters that emphasized the importance of imperial unity.<sup>40</sup> As for the interpretation of the formula, he especially laid stress on the role of the Crown, which unified the member states. This was why he adamantly denied the conception of 'Seven Kings' or a divisible Crown, which was popularized by Sidney Low after the Conference.<sup>41</sup>

The 1926 formula imposed a dilemma on Amery. It was initiated by the demand from the Hertzog government in South Africa for equal status with Britain. As Amery had been ready to accept the principle since the pre-war years, he smoothly presided over its making, only with certain small interferences mentioned above. On the other hand, the formula generated the concern that it might foster centrifugal tendencies in the Dominions. For instance, Smuts anticipated that the mischievous impression that 'a radical transformation of the Empire' had occurred might spread unless Amery or

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<sup>39</sup> Smuts memorandum and Amery's reply to Smuts, 20 June 1921, in Keith Hancock and J. V. D. Poel, eds., *Selections from the Smuts Papers*, vol. 5 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), 67-83. McIntyre aptly cited this document to point out Amery's centralist tendency. McIntyre, *The Britannic Vision*, 132-133. Hertzog invoked the memorandum and Amery's comment to emphasize the importance of the recognition of the Dominion status by international society. Their following discussion and negotiation contributed to the making of the 1926 formula. Valkoun, *Great Britain, the Dominions and the Transformation of the British Empire*, 243-244.

<sup>40</sup> Amery to Balfour, 1 Nov 1926; 8 Nov 1926; 9 Nov 1926. Balfour Papers, Add MS 49775.

<sup>41</sup> McIntyre, *The Britannic Vision*, 220-221.

Baldwin stated that 'the Report made no change but simply formulated and declared the existing situation and practice as it had developed since the Peace Conference'.<sup>42</sup> Thus, Amery was forced to deliver two-faced speeches when he adumbrated the meaning of the Report. While he boasted that it was a landmark which meant that settler colonies grew up to be a nation and that Greater Britain changed from being a hierarchy to an equal partnership, at the same time he qualified the self-acclaim by stating that it just confirmed the rights admitted before.<sup>43</sup> But this approach did not necessarily convince Conservative sceptics. In November 1931, H. A. Gwynne, the editor of the *Morning Post*, blamed Amery for the lack of aftercare about the 1926 conference.

at the 1926 Conference you enunciated the doctrine of the Dominions being independent nations – a doctrine with which all of who had studied the Empire were in perfect agreement – but by dwelling only on the policy which in essence was fissiparous you did nothing to bind the Empire together. I remember telling you at the time of the Conference that the corollary of the Statue of Westminster – which, of course, did not exist then – was document of equal legal force and value which should lay down the lines of an Imperial Federation.<sup>44</sup>

In 1933, Amery finally acknowledged that the Statute of Westminster was 'merely a negative confirmation' of the Dominions' development.

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<sup>42</sup> Smuts to Amery, 22 Feb 1927, Julian Amery Papers, AMEJ 8/5/23.

<sup>43</sup> Amery, 'Some Aspects of the Imperial Conference', *Journal of the Royal Institute of International Affairs*, 6.1 (1927), 2–24.

<sup>44</sup> Gwynne to Amery, 30 Nov 1931, Gwynne Papers, dep. 14. Gwynne was a Tariff Reformer. It is another example showing that Tariff Reform was not always incompatible with imperial federation.

Unless it [the Statute of Westminster] is followed by a positive policy of cooperation in every aspect of the life of our nations, and by the creation of the machinery by which that policy can be made effective, then the freedom attained will soon be diminished if not undone by the arbitrary interference or aggression of economic or political forces without which only organization and unity can overcome.<sup>45</sup>

The re-emergence of 'the creation of the machinery' in his list of constructive policies reflected his despair at the time. Though imperial preference was introduced in the Ottawa Conference, it was not as thorough as Amery expected.<sup>46</sup> His frustration with the National Government made him gradually revert to the quasi-federalist camp. In the course of the 1930s, seeing the deteriorating situations in Europe and the Empire and the stagnant situation in Britain, Amery started to explicitly utilize the language of quasi-federalism.

... the members of the British Commonwealth stand today where the American States stood after 1783. They have attained their freedom. They have no intention of separating. They mean to work together. They have not yet made up their minds exactly how to do it. But sooner or later they will discover the appropriate method. If they fail, the Commonwealth will assuredly not long survive the grave perils that threaten it from without or the disintegrating influences which will develop within.<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>45</sup> Amery, 'How stands Magna Carta today', *The English Review*, September, (1933): 251

<sup>46</sup> See Chapter 9.

<sup>47</sup> Amery, L. S. "On the Eve of the Imperial Conference." *Foreign Affairs* 15, no. 3 (1937): 428.

Even in this phase, however, Amery tended to emphasize the difference between the Commonwealth and federalism. Particularly after the Second World War he again reverted to anti-federalism particularly to urge European countries to adopt the Commonwealth method rather than federalism as a form of integration.<sup>48</sup> His memoir eulogized it as the best form of imperial integration by declaring: 'Lord Durham had built better than Bismarck'.<sup>49</sup> But we should not take at face value his words. As this section has revealed, he frequently wavered between centralization and decentralization. He should be described as a quasi-federalist wearing the mantle of autonomism rather than as an autonomist. His procrastination meant that he was not so sanguine about the inherent strength of the Commonwealth framework. While he bragged about the resilience of the Commonwealth, which elicited spontaneous cooperation without relying on hierarchical dominance, Amery, as a non-true-believer of the Commonwealth framework, thought that the Empire/Commonwealth needed a common economic interest which would be generated by imperial preference more than any other measure.<sup>50</sup> This was why his imperial theory always depended on imperial preference as a *Deus ex Machina*.

### **Imperial and Conservative Whig History**

Amery's lack of confidence in the Commonwealth method did not mean that he made no effort to rationalize its idea. On the contrary, he elaborated a peculiar theoretical justification of the Empire/Commonwealth by invoking British constitutional history. The constitutional history of the UK and the British

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<sup>48</sup> See Chapter 11.

<sup>49</sup> Amery, *My Political Life*, vol. 2, 15.

<sup>50</sup> Amery, 'Some Aspects of the Imperial Conference', 24; L. S. Amery, *The Empire in the New Era: Speeches Delivered during an Empire Tour 1927-1928* (London: Edward Arnold, 1928), 10-12.

Empire, which was moribund after 1945, has been resurrected since the 1990s under the mantle of new political and imperial history. The cultural and linguistic turns helped historians of British political culture to realize that 'constitution' was a contested term or a concept appropriated not only by the establishment but also by radicals or dissenters.<sup>51</sup> More recently, imperial history has also started to recognize the crucial role played by the idea and history of the constitution in shaping historical actors' world views, rhetoric, and policy.<sup>52</sup>

Amery is a useful example to investigate the topic. The Conservatives' defeat in the 1929 general election marked the beginning of his eleven years in the political wilderness. During that time, Amery elaborated constitutional theories and rhetoric to express and reinforce his political views. His fundamental stance on the constitution was fully deployed in *The Forward View*, published in 1935. His constitutional theory was to be reiterated and redeveloped in his later works; for instance, in *Thoughts on the Constitution* and his article contributed to *Parliament: A Survey*.<sup>53</sup> The status of Amery as a constitutional theorist cannot be compared to Bagehot and Dicey, but some scholars have included his works in their list of important works in the constitutional canon.<sup>54</sup> Amery did not compose these texts just for distraction. Rather, he produced them to find a firm theoretical foundation upon which he put forward his political propositions in response to the Indian question, the

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<sup>51</sup> James Vernon, ed., *Re-Reading the Constitution: New Narratives in the Political History of England's Long Nineteenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

<sup>52</sup> Behm, *Imperial History*; McIntyre, *The Britannic Vision*; Dylan Lino, 'Albert Venn Dicey and the Constitutional Theory of Empire', *Oxford Journal of Legal Studies* 36, no. 4 (2016): 751–80; Harshan Kumarasingham, 'Written Differently: A Survey of Commonwealth Constitutional History in the Age of Decolonisation', *Journal of Imperial & Commonwealth History* 46, no. 5 (2018): 874–908.

<sup>53</sup> L. S. Amery, *The Forward View* (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1935); idem, *Thoughts on the Constitution*, 2nd ed (London: Oxford University Press, 1953 (1<sup>st</sup> ed: 1947)); idem, 'The Nature of British Parliamentary Government' in Gilbert Campion, ed., *Parliament: A Survey* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1952), 37-71

<sup>54</sup> Anthony King, *The British Constitution* (Oxford: Oriental University Press, 2009), 28-31.

collapse of democracies in Europe, and the stagnant (to Amery) situation in Britain.

He argued that the essence of British constitutional history was the interaction between the Crown and the Nation. In his terminology, the Crown meant the representation of the government, while the Nation meant representatives of British national interests in parliament. As a result of their negotiations, the British Constitution more or less succeeded in peacefully adapting to changing circumstances, except for the age of the civil war in the seventeenth century.<sup>55</sup> According to Amery, the British Commonwealth of Nations was established by a similar evolution in the process of 'the gradual harmonization of conflicting forces and theories'.<sup>56</sup> In line with this narrative, Amery added the Statute of Westminster to a series of milestones in constitutional history such as the Magna Carta and the Declaration of Rights.<sup>57</sup> In this sense, it can be said that Amery contributed to the imperialization of Whig history by grafting the evolution of the imperial constitution, which he was involved in, to the domestic constitutional history.<sup>58</sup>

However, the narrative of his constitutional history was different from that of the triumph of 'people'. Amery regarded the Norman Conquest not as the yoke but as the foundation of freedom because it brought 'order and unity' to England. Only when King John tried to exercise excessive and arbitrary power, did the 'Nation' protest against the king. The composition of the 'Nation' at the time had also a specific meaning to Amery. In line with his criticism of the abstract concept of the 'individual' in laissez-faire economics, he refused to

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<sup>55</sup> Amery, *Forward View*, 119-20; idem., *Thoughts on the Constitution*, 33.

<sup>56</sup> Amery, *Thoughts on the Constitution*, 105.

<sup>57</sup> Amery, 'How stands Magna Carta today', 248-9.

<sup>58</sup> As for the phenomenon of imperialization of Whig history, see Michael Bentley, *Modernizing England's Past: English Historiography in the Age of Modernism 1870-1970* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), chapter 3.

imagine the Nation, in terms of constitutional functions, as an abstract group. He insisted that the representatives of the Nation should genuinely represent the functional interests in the context of each time and place.<sup>59</sup> In the case of the Magna Carta, the English Nation was properly represented 'by the barons, great and small, by the bishops and clerics, by the mayor and citizens of London'.<sup>60</sup> It implied that British politics had been driven not so much by majority rule as by a series of efforts to balance the various interests.

In that Parliamentary system the various elements and interests, the Crown, the great nobility, the shires and the borough, met and balanced each other, and their balance was an important factor in the maintenance of liberty. The attempt to distort that balance in the seventeenth century, first in favour of the Crown and then in favour of the House of Commons, ended in 1660 in what was in both senses of the word a Restoration. That it was restoration, and not a reaction in favour of continental absolutism, had to be reasserted in 1688.<sup>61</sup>

The national predilection for 'balance' discouraged people from making any claim of abstract rights. Using this logic, Amery emphasized and justified the unrevolutionary nature of the formula of the British Commonwealth: 'the great landmarks in our constitutional history, from Magna Carta to ... the Statute of Westminster in our day, have taken the shape of a declaration of established

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<sup>59</sup> This was linked with his positive evaluation of 'functional representation' and 'Corporate State'. See Chapter 10.

<sup>60</sup> Amery, *The Forward View*, 119.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid*, 119-120.

and admitted principle rather than that of any assertion of something professedly new.<sup>62</sup>

This Conservative version of Whig history stemmed from his criticism of previous constitutional theorists. Montesquieu's description of the separation of powers in Britain was made obsolete by the formation of the responsible government, where the legislative and the executive was virtually merged. Walter Bagehot, who corrected Montesquieu's misunderstanding, made another fatal mistake. Founded upon the fallacy of Liberal individualism in the nineteenth century, Bagehot assumed that the central organization in the British Constitution was the parliament, whose members were chosen by the electorate, rather than the Cabinet, which was regarded as a committee of the parliamentary majority. Amery complained that the exaggeration of the importance of the parliament was a tenacious fallacy found in the texts of progressive scholars ranging from John Stuart Mill to Harold Laski.<sup>63</sup> Amery inverted the order in the Liberal and the Socialist theory. The starting point or mainspring of action is the government, represented by the Crown; the monarch appoints the Prime Minister; the PM chooses his cabinet members and summons the parliament, in the name of Crown; the government formulates laws and policies in cooperation with civil servants; the government just gets consent from representatives of the Nation in the parliament.<sup>64</sup> While inheriting the conventional concept of the 'King in Parliament' from preceding legal scholars, Amery explicitly emphasized the importance of 'King' rather than

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<sup>62</sup> Amery, 'How stands Magna Carta', *English Review*, September 1933, 248-9.

<sup>63</sup> Amery, *Thoughts on the Constitution*, 11-14. Needless to say, the political thinking of these intellectuals was more complicated. For instance, see Stefan Collini, Donald Winch, and J. W. Burrow, eds., *That Noble Science of Politics: A Study in Nineteenth-Century Intellectual History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), chapter 4 and 5; Michael Newman, *Harold Laski: A Political Biography* (London: Macmillan, 1993).

<sup>64</sup> Amery, 'The Nature of British Parliamentary Government', 66.



'Parliament'. Similarly, in his definition, 'responsible government' meant a government responsible not merely to the majority in parliament but also to 'the Crown, as representing the unity and continuity of the life of the nation and of the Empire, for defending the wider national and imperial interest.'<sup>65</sup> To Amery, the spirit of 'strong and stable government' was the essence of the British constitution. Therefore, the first-past-the-post system and the two-party system were natural corollaries of the British Constitution.<sup>66</sup> Though he denounced the idea of 'government from below' as 'misconception', we should not see Amery as an anti-democratic politician. What he advocated was democracy based on the British system: 'Our system is one of democracy, but of democracy by consent and not by delegation, of government of the people, for the people, with, but not by the people.'<sup>67</sup>

Amery's Conservative Whig History did not appear out of nowhere in the 1930s. In *Thoughts on the Constitution*, he referred to John Seeley, A. Lawrence Lowell, Dicey, and, above all, W. E. Hearn as sources of inspiration concerning the primacy of the government. The connection of domestic and imperial constitutional history was firmly established by Duncan Hall's *British Commonwealth of Nations*, which Amery cited as an important piece.<sup>68</sup> However, we should not overemphasize the influence of those authors on Amery. He did not read works of Lowell and Hearn until 1946, and merely quoted them to reinforce his own argument.<sup>69</sup> Considering the content of Amery's 1911 memorandum for the Round Table quoted above, he probably

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<sup>65</sup> Ibid., 39.

<sup>66</sup> Amery, *Thoughts on the Constitution*, 16- 18, 30. However, his support for the first-past-the-post system was not unconditional. See Chapter 10.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid., 20-21. The tenth chapter of this thesis will more deeply analyse his conception of democracy.

<sup>68</sup> Duncan Hall, *The British Commonwealth of Nations: A Study of Its Past and Future Development* (London: Methuen, 1920); Amery, *Thoughts on the Constitution*, 105.

<sup>69</sup> Amery diary, 22 March, June 4, 23 1946, AMEL 7/40.

acquired the view on the centrality of government by the time of the Constitutional Crisis. His constitutional theory and history sprang from his actual experiences and involvement in the political issues. Amery's plea for the establishment of the General Staff in the time of Army Reform was a precursor to his preference for a planning authority free from daily mundane chores. It was also possible that Amery imbibed the ideal of government above party politics from the teachings of Tariff Reform, whose supporters often alleged that their movement was not affiliated with any party.<sup>70</sup> Though each component of his argument was borrowed from other thinkers, Amery cut and pasted them into his own mould to make it a foundation of his political propositions.

His definition of 'King in Parliament' was also utilized when he, after the 1940s, reconceptualized the framework of the Commonwealth as an antithesis of imperial federation. In explaining the inferiority of federal polity to the Commonwealth, he pointed out that federalists were trapped in the assumption that government must rest upon some ultimate basis of sovereignty and must be delegated by an electorate. In the British constitution, there was no ultimate sovereignty, but 'government from above subject to popular consent, the two balanced and harmonized in Parliament'. The Commonwealth succeeded in achieving efficient unity by adopting the British system, based on common allegiance to the Crown, which enabled it to dodge the insoluble question about how to allocate voting power.<sup>71</sup>

In Amery's lexicon, this state of the Commonwealth meant a true 'organic' union. When Amery discussed his post-war reconstruction plan, titled 'Organic Reconstruction', with Curtis in 1943, he finally captured their disagreement on

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<sup>70</sup> See Chapter 8.

<sup>71</sup> Amery, *Thoughts on the Constitution*, 143-144.

the definition of the term 'organic'. According to his understanding, while Curtis used it to describe something structural, 'i.e. possessing a definite constitutional structure in contrast to looser associations', Amery utilized it 'in the sense of something that grows and develops in its relationship to the whole life'. His objection was not necessarily to 'a more rigid structure' itself but to the neglect of the fact that those structures could succeed if they were imposed without regard to 'the traditions and instincts'. Amery admitted that the current structure of the British Empire was 'weak'. And yet, in his belief, the Commonwealth framework, if combined with imperial preference, would be more promising than mechanical entities such as the League of Nations and federal polity.<sup>72</sup>

The previous chapter has shown that Amery accepted the new formula of the Commonwealth in the 1949 London Declaration, which redefined the Crown as 'the symbol of their free association'. In his view, the new Commonwealth was now knit by the common tradition of the constitution and the reign of law. As for the constitutional status of the Crown, Amery, while acknowledging that the Crown had become functionally and constitutionally divisible, argued that, unlike the Hanover dynasty, it was still 'a jewel of many facets' and not 'a string of disconnected pearls'.<sup>73</sup> The constitutional change of the Crown was justified by using a Whiggish logic.

... the Crown as the symbol of unity was recognized as existing in its own intrinsic psychological quality independently of its legal and constitutional origins. Only the event can prove or disprove the wisdom of the decision taken. It was a great act of faith in the dynamic strength

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<sup>72</sup> Amery to Curtis, 16 March 1943; 25 March 1943; 22 June 1943, MS Curtis 26; 22 October 1943, MS Curtis 28.

<sup>73</sup> Amery, *Thoughts on the Constitution*, 162-163, 168-169.

of freedom. Such acts of faith have more than once been justified in our history.<sup>74</sup>

The quotation shows that, despite his conversion to clearcut anti-federalism, Amery was not completely confident about the future of the framework. After all, his imperial vision was still dependent on the unifying effect of imperial preference. Therefore, he claimed in 1953 that the Commonwealth would need 'further development in the direction of practical co-operation to meet the economic problems of the post-war situation'.<sup>75</sup>

## **Conclusion**

All the rationales for Amery's imperial thinking were assembled to make the Commonwealth a constructive alternative to surging intolerant nationalism in both Europe and the imperial peripheries and Liberal internationalism, embodied by the League of Nations and the United Nations. He tried to make the Empire/Commonwealth a place where common patriotism could accommodate the nationalism of each component. This seemingly lofty ideal was often in dissonance with the actual circumstances of the Empire, which forced the constant adjustments of the imperial constitution and made Amery, as a quasi-federalist, waver between centralization and decentralization. This was why the establishment of common economic interests in the Empire/Commonwealth was constantly most important in his imperial vision. Amery certainly came to preach the superiority of the Commonwealth to federalism, particularly after the 1940s, and his ideology of Conservative

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<sup>74</sup> Ibid., 162.

<sup>75</sup> His preface for the second edition of *Thoughts on the Constitution*. Ibid., VIII.

Whiggism did serve to justify the change of his views on the imperial constitution. However, the dilemma between imperial unity and the centrifugal nature of the Commonwealth lingered intact, which led him to devise a new scheme to protect imperial preference in the 1950s.<sup>76</sup>

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<sup>76</sup> See Chapter 11.

## 7 Settler Colonialism

This chapter delineates Amery's changing views on settler colonialism. Because the term is an invention by recent scholars, it should be made clear how and why I appropriate the conception for analysis of Amery's imperial thought. Since the publication of Patrick Wolfe's *Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology* in 1999, 'settler colonialism' has given historiography a new impetus and is now firmly embedded in the lexicon of academia.<sup>1</sup> The term has been used to describe a particular type of colonialism where settlers established sovereign societies by eliminating indigenous people or subjugating them to inferior status. The research on settler colonialism has generally been based on a criticism of the current societies of ex-settler colonies because it has implied that decolonization did not essentially occur to indigenous people there.<sup>2</sup>

Scholars theorizing settler colonialism have tended to emphasize the difference between settler colonies and other types of colonies. However, in its actual case studies, the boundary between settler colonies and colonies with settlers has not been strictly drawn. After all, parts of the British Crown Colonies in Africa, such as Kenya and Rhodesia, where the number of settlers was not large enough to sweep away indigenous populations, have had some traits and

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<sup>1</sup> Patrick Wolfe, *Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology: The Politics and Poetics of an Ethnographic Events* (London & New York: Cassell, 1999). As for the overview of this conception and its relations with historiography, see Edward Cavanagh and Lorenzo Veracini, eds., *The Routledge Handbook of the History of Settler Colonialism* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017); Lorenzo Veracini, "'Settler Colonialism': Career of a Concept", *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 41, no. 2 (2013): 313–33; idem, *Settler Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).

<sup>2</sup> Dane Kennedy, *The Imperial History Wars: Debating the British Empire* (London & New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2018), chapter 5.

legacies of settler colonialism.<sup>3</sup> The conception has been also utilized in intellectual history of British imperialism. For instance, settler colonialism is a significant leitmotif in the works written by Duncan Bell and Amanda Behm, with both having adopted the conception to shed light on the white-supremacist nature in the thought and discourse of imperial theorists in the Victorian and Edwardian eras.<sup>4</sup> In other words, the conception of Settler Colonialism has encouraged historians of imperial thought to re-evaluate the whiteness or exclusive nature of Greater Britain. Of course, the perspective was in place before the rise of the settler colonialism studies under the banner of history of racism.<sup>5</sup> White exclusiveness on the part of the British settler colonies has not been neglected by historians, either.<sup>6</sup> Nevertheless, it can be at least said that the conception has provided historians with a useful parameter in analysing the imperial discourses. Though the term settler colonialism was not used at the time, officials and politicians often debated over what would be ideal relationships among settlers, indigenous communities, other immigrants, and the imperial authority. Amery was one of those actors. The following sections will use the term to specifically focus on this aspect of his imperial thought.

In accordance with the general trend in intellectual history, recent research on Amery has been apt to elucidate the intolerance of his view towards non-white subjects and immigrants in the Empire, although not all of them employ the conception of settler colonialism. Behm, by focusing on Amery's

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<sup>3</sup> See the following review article. Chris Youé, 'Settler Colonialism or Colonies with Settlers?', *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 52, no. 1 (2018): 69–85.

<sup>4</sup> Duncan Bell, *Reordering the World: Essays on Liberalism and Empire* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016); Amanda Behm, *Imperial History and the Global Politics of Exclusion: Britain, 1880-1940* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018).

<sup>5</sup> Paul B. Rich, *Race and Empire in British Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).

<sup>6</sup> John Eddy and Deryck Schreuder, eds., *The Rise of Colonial Nationalism: Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and South Africa First Assert Their Nationalities, 1880-1914* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1988).

involvement in the establishment of the Beit Professorship of Commonwealth History in Oxford in 1905, has revealed that Amery had a typical two-layered vision of the British Empire, composed of white Greater Britain and the others.<sup>7</sup> Daniel Gorman and David Whittington, in discussing Amery's policy towards East Africa in the 1920s, have argued that he adopted a policy in favour of white settlers and consequently enraged indigenous people and Indian immigrants.<sup>8</sup> As Behm herself has discussed, however, after the First World War, British imperialists were gradually obliged to modify their bifurcated vision of the Empire, though their view still retained elements of racial hierarchy. Amery's conversion towards Ireland and India means that he underwent a typical transformation in the contemporary context. Nor was Amery's view on settler colonialism totally static.

The chapter will analyse his discourse on settler colonialism at greater length. It will show that, as Amery was forced to reify the rhetoric of Victorian liberal imperialism about India, he was increasingly inclined to substantiate the rhetoric of the civilizing mission about the Crown Colonies in Africa, though his purpose was not decolonization but the establishment of harmonic relationships between the 'natives', white settlers, and other immigrants within the imperial polity. His stance was in line with British Conservatives' attitude towards the African Colonies in the 1950s. Recent research has revealed that Conservative policymakers believed up until the late 1950s that, while self-government would and should be gradually promoted in Africa, independence of the colonies would not occur in the near future. In this context, federalization of neighbouring

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<sup>7</sup> Behm, *Imperial History*, 108-116.

<sup>8</sup> Daniel Gorman, 'Organic Union or Aggressive Altruism: Imperial Internationalism in East Africa in the 1920s', *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 42, no. 2 (2014): 258–85; David Whittington, 'An Imperialist at Bay: Leo Amery at the India Office, 1940-1945' (PhD thesis, University of the West of England, 2015), chapter 2.



colonies seemed to them an effective means to harmonize and develop them.<sup>9</sup> This chapter will give a case study as to the question why some Conservatives had high hopes on the federal schemes in Africa.

After explaining Amery's bifurcated vision of settler colonialism in the Edwardian era, the following two sections discuss how he was forced to modify the vision by analysing his involvement in the administration of Palestine and East Africa. It will be revealed that the political framework for settler colonies in his vision, while retaining the hierarchical relations between the white and the non-white, was changed to enable the natives and non-European immigrants to participate in local self-government. The last section will argue that this change led him to have an ambivalent evaluation of South African Apartheid and to advocate federalization of East and Central Africa as a promising attempt to harmonize the multi-racial communities in the regions.

### **Settler colonialism and the challenge of liberal internationalism**

As discussed in Chapter 3, Amery's discourse on the origin and the result of the South African War demonstrated the cause of British supremacy underlying the lofty ideal of British imperialism. In the opening section of the first volume of *The Times History of the War in South Africa*, he pointed out the similarity between the status of Uitlanders in Transvaal and that of black people in the Southern States of the USA before the Civil War with a view to indicating that

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<sup>9</sup> David Goldsworthy, 'Keeping Change within Bounds: Aspects of Colonial Policy during the Churchill and Eden Governments, 1951–57', *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 18.1 (1990), 81–108; Philip Murphy, *Party Politics and Decolonization: The Conservative Party and British Colonial Policy in Tropical Africa 1951-1964* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); Michael Collins, 'Decolonisation and the "Federal Moment"', *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, 24.1 (2013), 21–40; Martin Lynn, ed., *The British Empire in the 1950s: Retreat or Revival?* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).

the British cause was as just as Lincoln's. It was a proper analogy as long as it suggested that the majority in settlers should implement an inclusive policy towards the minority within settler communities, if we can call the black slaves 'settlers'. On the other hand, this analogy could perturb the order of all settler colonies if it means the racial equality between white and black. Amery had no intention of adopting the latter view. Amery fancied that mass emigration from the UK would dilute the Dutch element in South Africa.<sup>10</sup> In short, he was a loyal follower of Milner's British race patriotism, though he gradually recognized the need to qualify the cause of British supremacy to reconcile Afrikaners. Probably because he realized at some point the awkwardness of the analogy between Uitlanders and slaves in the US, the concluding volume of *The Times History* instead picked French Canadians to compare with Uitlanders.<sup>11</sup> This change implied the conviction of Amery that the circle of self-governing colonial nationalism was exclusive to white Europeans.

The rise of liberal internationalism after the Great War, however, did not allow the bifurcated vision to survive intact. Although the British Empire is supposed to have reached its apogee in the interwar period in terms of its territorial vastness, all new territories were gained as 'mandates'.<sup>12</sup> Amery, a believer in the balance of imperial power, did not welcome the emergence of the League of Nations as a new actor in the international relations. And yet, he recognized the need to respond to the resurgent momentum, particularly in the US, towards international arbitration in place of imperial power politics. It thus led him to approve of the League, unless it inhibited formation of 'a free

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<sup>10</sup> See Chapter 3.

<sup>11</sup> *The Times History*, vol 6, 1-2.

<sup>12</sup> Technically speaking, the British Empire became largest in 1945, though it was ephemeral. Ashley Jackson, *The British Empire and the Second World War* (London & New York: Hambledon Continuum, 2006), 5.

association of lesser units'.<sup>13</sup> As for the definition of 'mandate', Amery boasted that it would not bring any new obligation to the British Empire.

I do not think that that mandate is likely to impose upon us any conditions which we would not impose on ourselves or which we have not been in the habit of imposing upon ourselves whenever we dealt with subject peoples. We have always in very large measures treated native territories under our rule as a mandate to us in the interests of the inhabitants and of the world at large, and we have justified our authority not merely in our own interests, but by the general consent of other nations with regard to our rule. It is our task now to do this work more successfully than ever ....<sup>14</sup>

He certainly had used the language of civilizing mission in the pre-war years, but the cause of British supremacy had always been latent inside the rhetoric. As Karuna Mantena has maintained about late Victorian imperialism, the language or rhetoric was utilized as an alibi to highlight the cultural difference between the white and the non-white and to postpone the latter's self-government for an indefinite period.<sup>15</sup> Now, facing the rise of liberal internationalism, Amery was compelled to prove that these words were sincere. The challenge to him was how to reconcile the new ideal and the cause of settler colonialism.

## **Palestine**

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<sup>13</sup> Amery to Smuts, 17 December 1918, AMEL 2/2/24.

<sup>14</sup> Amery's speech, Hansard, HC 30 December 1919, vol. 118, 2175.

<sup>15</sup> Karuna Mantena, *Alibis of Empire: Henry Maine and the Ends of Liberal Imperialism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010).

Amery's mother was a Jewish descendant. The rumour concerning his Jewishness already existed in his lifetime, although Amery himself was reticent about this.<sup>16</sup> It was not until the end of the last century that his Jewish roots were verified by W. D. Rubinstein. The fact about his identity is all the more ironical because his delinquent son, John Amery, was hanged due to his cooperation with the propaganda campaign of Nazi Germany during the Second World War.<sup>17</sup> The problem of Rubinstein's article was that he too straightforwardly ascribed Amery's support for Zionism to his Jewish identity.<sup>18</sup> Other historians have already revealed more nuanced relations between Amery and Zionism. The primary reason for his support for the Balfour declaration was the geopolitical significance of Palestine in the Middle East; from the outset, he had no intention to allow Jewish settlers to monopolize Jerusalem; Amery expected that settlers could peacefully coexist with indigenous Arabs; the recurrent violent conflicts between Jews and Arabs in the inter-war period made him accept partition of Palestine, recommended by the Peel Commission and the Woodhead Commission, only as a second-best solution.<sup>19</sup>

What is particularly relevant to his view on settler colonialism was his naïve optimism in the 1920s about the coexistence of the two groups. According to Amery, the Balfour Declaration never intended to set up 'a Jewish nationalist state' characterized by the intolerance based on the racial or linguistic idea.

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<sup>16</sup> A. G. Gardiner, *Certain People of Importance* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1926), 247; David Faber, *Speaking for England: Leo, Julian and John Amery, the Tragedy of a Political Family* (London: Free Press, 2005), 117-118.

<sup>17</sup> William D. Rubinstein, 'The Secret of Leopold Amery', *Historical Research* 73, no. 181 (2000): 175-96.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, 183-184.

<sup>19</sup> WM. Roger Louis, *In the Name of God, Go!: Leo Amery and the British Empire in the Age of Churchill* (New York & London: W.W. Norton, 1992), 70-74, 89-94; Harry Defries, *Conservative Party Attitudes to Jews, 1900-1950* (London & New York: Routledge, 2001), 53-56, 63, 117-118, 145-146, 153-155, 160-3, 168-169, 185-186.

What Britain sought for was a common patriotism which could accommodate Jewish and Arab nationalism.

Its basic conception is toleration: the right of both Jew and Arabs to develop a true national life within the framework of a common Palestine state, just as French and English Canadians have each developed their national life and culture within the wider framework of the Dominion of Canada.<sup>20</sup>

Notwithstanding the analogy with the Quebec question, this denoted a new aspect of his attitude towards settler colonialism. Unlike the case of Canada or South Africa, Amery here invited non-white indigenous people into the circle of self-governing communities. On the eve of the 1936 Arab revolt in Palestine, he still supposed that functional representation might be a solution to the Jew-Arab conflict there.<sup>21</sup> If we must choose between 'pro-Jewish' and 'pro-Arab' in describing Amery's policy concerning Palestine, he was certainly pro-Jewish. He was a promoter of the Jewish settlement and regarded Jewish settlers as bringers of European civilization into the region. When the National Government rejected the scheme of partition, Amery denounced the policy as appeasement of the Arabs at the expense of the Jews.<sup>22</sup> However, his approval of Zionism was not unconditional. While Amery was a friend and supporter of Chaim Weizmann, he cautiously distanced himself from Jabotinsky's Revisionist Zionism.<sup>23</sup> While accepting the cause of Zionist settler colonialism, he did not

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<sup>20</sup> Amery, 'the future in Palestine', *The Pioneer*, December 1929, 5-6.

<sup>21</sup> Hansard, HC 24 March 1936 vol. 310, 1129-1134.

<sup>22</sup> Defries, *Conservative Party Attitudes to Jews*, 117-118, 168-169.

<sup>23</sup> Amery to Edward Wood, 17 June 1935, AMEL 2/1/25; Amery diary, 23 July 1936, *EB*, vol. 2, 426. As for Jabotinsky and Revisionism, see Yaacov Shavit, *Jabotinsky and the Revisionist Movement 1925-1948* (Abingdon: Frank Cass, 1988).

hope that it would be translated into exclusive nationalism. The case of Palestine demonstrated that, in the interwar period, Amery's bifurcated imperial vision was forced to be reshaped into a more multi-layered mould.

## **East Africa**

Historians' verdict on what Amery did on East Africa in the 1920s-31 has been almost unanimously negative; Amery was such a pro-white-settler imperialist that his white paper in 1927 replaced the doctrine of 'native paramountcy' announced by the Devonshire Declaration in 1923 with the principle of 'dual policy' to grant white settlers more governing power within the framework of federal polity; His attempt to promote a closer union in East Africa alienated indigenous people and Indian immigrants, who regarded it as a vicious scheme to strengthen settlers; this policy, propelled by Conservative imperialists such as Amery and Edward Grigg, the Governor of Kenya, was in marked contrast to that of the Labour government, which was relatively more pro-native and more amenable to liberal internationalism. To sum up, the extant literature has tended to depict Amery as a straightforward advocate of settler colonialism in East Africa.<sup>24</sup> Historians have often quoted Thomas Jones' diary to describe Amery's stance in one sentence. The entry of 13 February 1929 reported that important figures familiar with governance in Africa, such as

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<sup>24</sup> George Bennett, 'Settlers and Politics in Kenya, up to 1945', in *History of East Africa*, ed. Vincent Harlow, E. M. Chilver, and Alison Smith, vol. 2 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), 265–332; Robert G. Gregory, *India and East Africa: A History of Race Relations within the British Empire, 1890-1939* (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), chapter 9; Levi I. Izuakor, 'Kenya: The Unparamount African Paramountcy, 1923-1939', *Transafrican Journal of History* 12 (1983): 33–50; WM. Roger Louis, *In the Name of God, Go!*, 94-99; Judith M. Brown and WM. Roger Louis, eds., *The Oxford History of The British Empire: Volume IV: The Twentieth Century* (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 268-269; Bernard Porter, *The Lion's Share: A History of British Imperialism 1850-2004*, 4th ed. (Harlow: Longman, 2004), 260-266; Susan Pedersen, *The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 223-224; Daniel Gorman, 'Organic Union or Aggressive Altruism'; David Whittington, 'An Imperialist at Bay'.

Reginald Coupland, J. H. Oldham, and Frederic Lugard, feared that Amery would 'stampede the Cabinet and get a pro-Delamere [3<sup>rd</sup> Baron Delamere, a leader of the settler community in Kenya] policy'.<sup>25</sup>

The important fact, however, was that Amery ceased to state that his policy took a squarely pro-settler line. The slogan he put up was 'dual policy': 'the complementary development of native and non-native communities'.<sup>26</sup> The research quoted above has interpreted it as just a fig leaf to his intention to enable white settlers to become co-trustees in the local government. Certainly, it is not wrong to find the pro-settler bias in his proposition, particularly when it is compared with the rhetoric of 'native paramountcy'. Nevertheless, if we scrutinize his view on East Africa in the longer term, we can realize that the dual policy was not just a superficial excuse but also a constraint which led Amery to reshape his policy in East Africa. The following section will show how his conceptualization of the settler colony in East Africa was transformed. It will conclude that Amery was certainly an advocate of settlers, but not a straightforward one.

Amery visited Kenya and Uganda for the first time in 1908 on his way home from South Africa. Seeing the Colonial administration there convinced him that 'the separation of Colonial from Dominion problems was no less necessary in the interest of the Colonies than of the Dominions' because a single Colonial Office could not overcome 'a laissez-faire outlook towards creative work in the Colonies'.<sup>27</sup> In this sense, the trip to East Africa contributed to the making of his two-layered imperial vision. Moreover, Amery asserted that British people

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<sup>25</sup> Thomas Jones, *Whitehall Diary*, ed. Keith Middlemas, vol. 2 (London: Oriental University Press, 1969), 171. It reflected Jones' own sympathy with Oldham. See *ibid.*, 158. As for instances of quotations, see Whittington, 'An Imperialist at Bay', 73.

<sup>26</sup> Amery's memorandum (white paper), 'Future Policy in regard to Eastern Africa', CAB/24/187.

<sup>27</sup> Amery, *My Political Life*, vol. 1, 321.

should be encouraged to settle as farmers in the highland area of Kenya, the climate of which was suitable to European settlers. He dodged the possible criticism that the settlement project ignored the 'native' communities in the region. Though indigenous people should be treated with 'reasonable consideration for vested interests' or be granted 'due compensation', it was completely wrong to see it as 'a black man's country'.

The uplands are not a true black man's country, and the negro is, if anything, more of an exotic in them than the white man. Neither physically nor socially is there anything in the native tribes of the uplands that makes their multiplication and development specially desirable, or in any way comparable in desirability with the development of a white community.

British colonists there would be 'indigenous and not exotic' and would develop into 'a white population of two or three millions' like the South Island of New Zealand. The white settlers should play a leading part in the economic exploitation and the military defence of East Africa. Within the whole framework of East Africa, the highlands would become 'a self-governing colony with a predominantly white population' in a distant future, though other regions should be treated differently. In this way, the East African uplands would be, with South Africa and Egypt, 'permanent advanced bases of civilization which shall give to our dominion in Africa an effectiveness and a permanence beyond that of any our rivals.'<sup>28</sup> There was literally no room for self-government of indigenous

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<sup>28</sup> Amery, 'Our East African Empire', the letters to *The Times* in February 1908, republished in idem., *Union and Strength: A Series of Papers on Imperial Questions* (London: Edward Arnold, 1912), 277-284.



people in Amery's imperial thought before the First World War. As discussed before, in this period, he claimed that only the relations with the white Dominions needed constitutional reforms to forge equal partnership, while the dependent colonies needed economic and educational development to reach a higher stage of civilization.<sup>29</sup> In line with this principle, Amery urged the Treasury to drop its parsimony and to boost the inflow of settlers and money into the region through Tariff Reform in order to attain 'our mission to uplift races sunk in barbarism'.<sup>30</sup>

The triumph in the First World War brought Tanganyika, ex-German East Africa, to the British Empire as a 'mandate' in 1922. The territorial transformation was accompanied by the emergence of new political questions: it gave a new impetus to the movement for a federation of East Africa; South Africa expressed its ambition to stretch its sphere of influence; Indian nationalists began their campaign to stop the unfair treatment of Indian immigrants all over the Empire as well as to elevate the constitutional status of their own country.<sup>31</sup>

Amery came to recognize these issues in the course of his campaign for overseas settlement. Although the Empire Settlement Act mainly aimed to promote the migration to the white Dominions, African colonies such as Rhodesia and East Africa attracted attention from the committee for overseas settlement as prospective destinations for settlers.<sup>32</sup> Amery directly involved in

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<sup>29</sup> See Chapter 3-6.

<sup>30</sup> Amery, 'Our East African Empire', 276, 281-291.

<sup>31</sup> WM. Roger Louis, *Great Britain and Germany's Lost Colonies, 1914-1919* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967); Ronald Hyam, *The Failure of South African Expansion, 1908-1948* (London: Macmillan, 1972), chapter 1; C. J. D. Duder, 'The Settler Response to the Indian Crisis of 1923 in Kenya: Brigadier General Philip Wheatley and "Direct Action"', *Journal of Imperial & Commonwealth History* 17, no. 3 (1989): 349-73; P. J. Yearwood, 'Great Britain and the Repartition of Africa, 1914-19', *Journal of Imperial & Commonwealth History* 18, no. 3 (1990): 316-41; Robert J. Blyth, *The Empire of the Raj: India, East Africa and the Middle East, 1858-1947* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), chapter 5.

<sup>32</sup> CO 721/2.

the process of the discussion as the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of the Colonial Office. His letter to Milner indicated that his support of white settlers was getting less unconditional. Amery criticized the Government's policy on East Africa, which had reluctantly approved of white settlement and had taken 'a more or less successful rearguard action against the white settlers demand for native labour'. Britain had had no positive policy on Indian immigration, either.

My own belief is that what is needed is a comprehensive policy of colonization and settlement. Settle as many whites as you can. Deliberately settle the native as an agriculturalist either individually or in small tribal colonies alongside of the white settler and then furnish him with teachers, implements, and otherwise deliberately set to work to create alongside of the white settler a working native community in which there is always a certain surplus of labour available to work on the settlers' farms. Again, we ought to open out other parts of the country and deliberately settle Indian ex-service men or Indian labourers who have worked for a certain period of time with white farmers, on the land, giving them the same sort of assistance (suited, of course, to their requirements) as the Dominion governments give to white settlers, working the whole thing in co-operation with Indian settlement officers and getting India to bear a portion of the expense. With such a general policy of settlement and development, regarding the country frankly as one meant to be developed by white and black and brown all together (though not necessarily in the same areas), I believe we ought to make East Africa a great country and source of

immense wealth within a very few years. It is your old Transvaal and O.R.C reconstruction task over gain, but under much easier conditions and with much greater prospect of rapid development.<sup>33</sup>

Encouraging as much white settlement as possible was still his foremost goal in the policy on East Africa. However, he was no longer able to just declare that East Africa should be led only by white settlers. Echoing his advocacy of economic Unionism in the UK, the region should be developed by the whole communities in cooperation. Though his main interest still lay in the economic dimension, this marked a harbinger to his shift in his tenure in the Colonial Office.

British policy on East Africa veered among the triangle of interests in the 1920s. As pointed out above, historians have been inclined to argue that Amery, as the Colonial Secretary in 1924-29, reversed the pro-native principle set by the Devonshire Declaration in 1923. In order to rethink the question, we ought to turn to the context in the making of 'dual policy'. First of all, he came to criticize the illusion that East Africa could be a demographically white country. When Smuts, in his letter to the new Colonial Secretary, emphasized the need for 'a resolute white policy' in East Africa, especially regarding the highlands area, and expressed his concern about the possibility that East Africa might be 'a purely Native State with an Indian aristocracy in charge', Amery indicated his agreement, but with a significant reservation.

Like you, I always felt that the real civilisation of Africa must depend upon the influence of the white element and that the geography of the

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<sup>33</sup> Amery to Milner, 12 February 1919, AMEL 1/3/42.

eastern half of the Continent has given us a unique opportunity in that respect. That last thing I should like to contemplate would be the elimination of the white element in East Africa, though I can hardly conceive East Africa ever becoming quite as much of a white country as South Africa is. But we have got to hit the true balance in these matters, and I am by no means clear yet ....<sup>34</sup>

Amery had to look for a concrete step to 'hit the true balance' after 1926. White settlers in Kenya, frustrated at the rhetoric of 'paramountcy of native', continuously pressurized Edward Grigg, Governor of Kenya and one of the members of the Round Table, to establish a closer union in East Africa where settlers could form a responsible government. Grigg in turn urged Amery to take this solution more seriously in order to accommodate discontented settlers.<sup>35</sup> Amery had not only found federal schemes promising as for the governance in imperial peripheries since the Irish Home Rule Crisis but also already recognized the economic importance of forming a union in East Africa. His enthusiasm for the colonial development in economy, infrastructure, and education was consistent and genuine. During his tenure, the Colonial Office established many committees to investigate into the economic, medical, and educational issues in African colonies. The East African Loan was one of the few achievements, or compromises, he won from the Treasury.<sup>36</sup> His economic vision fitted in with 'dual policy', defined in the conclusion of the Governors' Conference in 1926: 'the dual policy means that native production and production by European settlers are both to have the fullest opportunity in the

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<sup>34</sup> Smuts to Amery, 25<sup>th</sup> November 1924; Amery to Smuts, 22 December 1924, AMEJ 8/5/23.

<sup>35</sup> Grigg to Amery, 15 Oct 1926, AMEL 2/4/14.

<sup>36</sup> Stephen Constantine, *The Making of British Colonial Development Policy 1914-1940* (London: Frank Cass, 1984), chapter 6.

areas which suit them best.<sup>37</sup> To Amery, the project of a closer union was above all a concomitant of this wider economic vision.

However, his white paper in 1927, published to announce the outline of his policy on East Africa, marked the important difference from his pre-war imperial thought in terms of political framework of a closer union. Notwithstanding its notoriety about allowing white settlers to be co-trustees in the colonial governance, it meant to extend the meaning of the 'dual policy'. In contrast to his pre-war writings, it explicitly set an aim to gradually promote native self-government.

The dual policy in regard to economic development must have its counterpart in the political evolution of the territories. ... although in some places it may be many years before the native can take a part in representative institutions as he is doing in West Africa, his place in the body politic must be provided for, and steps taken to create the machinery whereby native self-government, at first quite local, later over larger areas, can be developed.

Therefore, the white paper promised to 'provide both for increasing responsibility on the part of the immigrant communities and more effective machinery for native representation' as well as to achieve the federation of the whole of East Africa.<sup>38</sup>

This new definition of 'dual policy' was not invented by Amery but by J. H. Oldham, the secretary of the International Missionary Council. In the process of

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<sup>37</sup> *Conference of Governors of the East African Dependencies, 1926: Summary of Proceedings*, London, 44.

<sup>38</sup> Amery's white paper, CAB/24/187.

the making of the white paper, some people sent Amery their opinions about the framework of East Africa. Frederick Lugard, as a true believer in the cause of 'trusteeship', opposed federalization which could enable settlers to control the whole area. Because white settlers did not necessarily understand a proper way to manage the government, nor did representation of indigenous people offer any solution to this, Lugard preferred demarcation of a 'liberal area' for settlers and the rest which would be governed by the Governors.<sup>39</sup> He was to be a persistent opponent of 'a closer union' on the Conservative side.

The difference as well as the common ground between Lugard and Amery should be more precisely clarified to grasp the diverse strands in British imperialism. Lugard, the architect of Nigeria, became one of the most influential imperial theorists in the interwar period by publishing *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa* in 1922. Lugard obtained Amery's feedback in writing chapters on administrative machinery in London and on taxation.<sup>40</sup> Though Amery had to persuade Lugard that imperial preference would not be detrimental to the dependent colonies as long as it was fully introduced, he had no objection to Lugard's famous suggestion for indirect rule. Like Amery, Lugard urged simultaneous centralization and decentralization for efficient imperial management. In addition, he even approved of the necessity of integration of fragmented colonies as a natural concomitant of the policy. Both expected that, in wider units of the empire, the more discretion would be given to men on the spot, the more the central authority could concentrate on planning and co-ordination.<sup>41</sup> But there was already a seed for the later conflict in their

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<sup>39</sup> Lugard's memorandum, Lugard Papers, 64/1.

<sup>40</sup> F. D. Lugard, *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa* (Edinburgh & London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1922), vii.

<sup>41</sup> Lugard, *The Dual Mandate*, 94-98, 179-182; Amery to Lugard, May 30 1921; June 7 1921; 22 August 1921; November 12 1921, Lugard Papers, 26/3.

interaction. As a method of colonial integration, Lugard preferred 'amalgamation', which meant the Nigerian method he implemented, to 'federation' because, in the African condition, the formation of federal authority would bring about too much interference in its member colonies. Amery failed to notice the differentiation in Lugard's argument.<sup>42</sup>

The conflict of Amery and Lugard over East Africa should not be understood as pro-settlers versus pro-natives. More precisely, it was a clash of two different types of paternalism. Like Amery, Lugard had recognition that the principle of 'decisions by a majority' was not suitable to 'mixed' communities like East Africa. A restricted franchise would give settlers the preponderant position, while extension of votes would allow the natives to 'swamp the white'. Unlike Amery, however, Lugard dismissed any adjustment of franchise as futile and claimed that parliamentary politics was too alien to indigenous societies. His solution was indirect rule through tribal chiefs, which he had adopted in Nigeria. To justify the cause, Lugard appropriated the language of Passfield's white papers in 1930, 'the development of native social and political institutions on native lines'.<sup>43</sup>

The opposition from the imperialist milieu forced Amery to contrive a counterargument. It was Oldham's phraseology that offered a third way, an alternative to both an undelegated imperial trusteeship and handing over the governing power to white settlers: 'increasing transfer of authority to ... a body in which all interests are adequately represented'.

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<sup>42</sup> Lugard, *The Dual Mandate*, 181; Amery's note enclosed in Amery to Lugard 30 May 1921, Lugard Papers 26/3.

<sup>43</sup> F. D. Lugard, 'Native Policy in East Africa', *Foreign Affairs*, 9.1 (1930), 65–78. As for the Nigerian method of indirect rule, see idem., *The Dual Mandate*, chapter 10 and 11.

The only real future for East Africa seems to me to lie in the recognition that the Dual Policy, which has been accepted in the economic sphere, must also have a political application.<sup>44</sup>

Amery re-used these wordings of Oldham in his white paper. He also tried to persuade Lugard by using it.

The dual policy in the economic field must also have its counterpart in the political field ... native institutions must be gradually built up and ultimately linked up with the central legislature of the colonies or the federation<sup>45</sup>

The fact that the redefinition of dual policy derived from Oldham might be seen as evidence to prove Amery's argument that there was no rupture between the Devonshire Declaration and his white paper because Oldham was involved in the making of both documents.<sup>46</sup> More recently, however, Robert M. Maxton has corrected previous historians' exaggeration of Oldham's role in the making of the Devonshire Declaration. The substantial ideas in the declaration had been already shared among the Colonial Office officials. What Oldham gave them was 'useful phraseology' and 'vital support' to sell the policy.<sup>47</sup> The same evaluation can be applied to his contribution to Amery's white paper. Amery already realized the need to strike a balance among the conflicting interests. The extension of 'dual policy' was a useful watchword to express his

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<sup>44</sup> Oldham to Amery, 27 May 1927, Lugard 64/1.

<sup>45</sup> Amery to Lugard, 17 June 1927, Lugard 67/1.

<sup>46</sup> George Bennett, 'Paramountcy to Partnership: J. H. Oldham and Africa', *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute* 30, no. 4 (1960): 356–61.

<sup>47</sup> Robert M. Maxton, 'The Devonshire Declaration: The Myth of Missionary Intervention', *History in Africa* 18 (1991): 259–70.



policy in an impressive way and to sell 'a closer union'. Furthermore, Amery's view was not identical to that of Oldham in every aspect. Oldham joined in the Hilton Young Commission organized by Amery to investigate into how a closer union could be put into practice and became one of the authors of its majority report, which disappointed Amery.

The Hilton Young Report did not dump schemes for a closer union altogether. And yet, it said that a closer union could be established only by taking gradual steps and that responsible government for white settlers would be impractical until the native became able to have the same share in self-government. The lukewarm nature of the report frustrated Amery, Grigg, and settlers. This was why he set up the new commission led by Samuel Wilson to find a way to reach the formation of a closer union more smoothly. His defiance towards the majority report, however, seemed too 'pro-settlers' to indigenous communities and Indian immigrants. Labour politicians also repudiated Amery with the same logic in the House of Commons. The criticism had a point. Amery's speech divulged the lingering bifurcated vision of Kenya by saying that a white community had 'self-government in its blood'. However, he added, 'handing over responsible self-government to that small body' was 'out of question'; since colonial representative governments that were not responsible to an elected body were doomed to fail, Britain should endeavour to 'build up a tradition of responsibility from the beginning'; the natives should be incorporated into that framework, for instance, via native councils of chiefs.<sup>48</sup> This speech shows that the logic of dual policy did not allow Amery to become an

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<sup>48</sup> Hansard, HC 30 April 1929 vol 227 cc 1421-1425.

unconditional supporter of settlers. He would more systematically develop his theory of responsible government to deal with India in the 1930s.<sup>49</sup>

Amery's attitude towards the closer union scheme and white settlers has been bracketed with that of Grigg. For instance, Gorman has argued that both Amery and Grigg, Conservatives associated with the Round Table, preferred 'organic union' as a method of colonial governance.<sup>50</sup> In fact, however, the difference of their places affected their stance towards white settlers. Grigg, as Governor, was literally surrounded by settlers on the spot. The fact inevitably made him more sensitive to their claim. He warned against Amery:

I am full of the feeling that people at home do not realise what dangers confront imperial policy in East Africa if the settler community and the native community are not handled with consummate care. The settler community is, I am sure, on the verge of a reaction. ... This is an Ulster in that sense, and there will trouble indeed if you force settlers into an Ulsterian attitude, while the natives for their part adopt the attitude of Sinn Fein.<sup>51</sup>

Though Amery recognized the condition on the spot via correspondence, he, as Colonial Secretary in London, was surrounded by critics of the closer union. This situation forced or enabled him to aloofly preach the cause of the dual policy. Therefore, Amery tended to ask Grigg not to make a haste for the closer union scheme before getting consent from the non-white interests.<sup>52</sup>

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<sup>49</sup> See Chapter 5.

<sup>50</sup> Gorman, 'Organic Union or Aggressive Altruism', 260-262.

<sup>51</sup> Grigg to Amery, 18 October 1928, AMEL 2/4/14.

<sup>52</sup> Amery to Grigg, 6 May 1927, AMEL 2/4/14. The root of this difference can be traced back to the mutual hostility between Whitehall and white settlers in the Edwardian era. Bennett, 'Settlers and Politics in Kenya', 268.

Amery's departure from the Colonial Office in 1929 did not oust him from the circle of East African politics. He was invited to become a member of the Parliamentary Joint Select Committee, whose report in 1931 stipulated the principle of the policy for East Africa in the 1930s. It suspended the scheme for a closer union but confirmed the continuation of the dual policy as well as the cause of the native paramountcy.<sup>53</sup> The joint committee was composed of Amery, Lugard, Passfield, C. R. Buxton, Lord Parmoor, and Lord Phillimore among others.<sup>54</sup> Amery's apologetic letter to Grigg, written after the completion of the report, explained that it was no use advocating a closer union in the committee, dominated by Socialists, Liberals, and unsound Conservatives such as Lugard. What he was able to do was no more than to add a nuance: 'the rejection of the closer union was based on the situation of to-day and not declared as a matter of permanent principle'.<sup>55</sup> According to the document, titled 'Marshalled List of the Amendments', which shows how each member tried to modify the content of the report, Amery certainly tried to change phrases so as not to deny the possibility that the closer union might be adopted in the near future.<sup>56</sup>

Moreover, his more substantial contribution can be also seen in the process of making the conclusion of the report vague. The joint committee scrapped not only the closer union but also the idea of separate parallel governments for settlers and the natives suggested by Lugard and Robert Hamilton. Amery, an

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<sup>53</sup> Judith M. Brown and WM. Roger Louis, eds., *The Oxford History of The British Empire: Volume IV: The Twentieth Century* (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 270.

<sup>54</sup> As for the making of the report, see Michael D. Callahan, 'The Failure of "Closer Union" in British East Africa, 1929-31', *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 25.2 (1997), 267-93; idem., Michael D. Callahan, *Mandates and Empire: The League of Nations and Africa, 1914-1931* (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2008), chapter 9.

<sup>55</sup> Amery to Grigg, 1 Oct 1931, AMEL 2/1/20.

<sup>56</sup> 'Marshalled List of Amendments to be moved to Part I by the Joint Committee on East Africa', 10-11, Lugard 71/2.

advocate of the closer union, naturally did not like it.<sup>57</sup> Now both the union and the separation were rejected, he tried to present an eclectic conclusion. One of his amendments summed up the objection to the Lugard scheme in the committee; separate governments would not be continued indefinitely, as the natives got trained and politically minded; the aim should be 'equal citizenship for all civilized men of whatever colour' based on the British type of parliamentary sovereignty. Therefore, the conclusion was that the committee felt 'unable to recommend the adoption, at the present time, of any scheme in preference to the existing system of government.' At the same time, however, he added that 'careful study' of schemes submitted to the committee should be continued because the time might come at any date when 'the adoption of an alternative system of government' was felt desirable.<sup>58</sup> Amery thus at least succeeded in making the verdict on the closer union open-ended in 1931.

There were two combined external factors which made Amery sustain the seemingly neutral stance of the dual policy towards the triangle of interests in East Africa as well as encouraged the joint committee to suspend the closer union scheme: the League of the Nations and Germany. Amongst the East African colonies, Tanganyika was a part of ex-German East Africa, whose control was taken over by the UK as a class B mandate of the League of the Nations. When the closer union of East Africa became an agenda in the late 1920s, the Weimar Republic opposed the scheme by arguing that it would transgress the premise of the mandate system.<sup>59</sup> British legal officers tended to agree with Germany's argument. The joint committee succumbed to the view,

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<sup>57</sup> This was indicated in his diary, 10 September 1931; 16 September 1931; 24 September 1931, AMEL 7/25.

<sup>58</sup> 'Marshalled List of Amendments to be moved to Paragraphs 83 to 107 of the Draft Reports by the Joint Committee on East Africa', 1-2. Lugard 71/2.

<sup>59</sup> As for the controversy in the League of the Nations, see Pedersen, *The Guardians*, 222-231.

though Amery was never convinced by this interpretation of the mandate system.<sup>60</sup> The German interference exasperated Amery and compounded his animosity towards the League of the Nations. It was also a prequel to Nazi Germany's claim for the return of their ex-colonies.<sup>61</sup> Amery, exasperated by the colonial claim in the 1930s, tried to convince Ormsby-Gore, Colonial Secretary, that the sovereignty of the mandates was completely in the hands of the UK, and not shared by the League, but in vain.<sup>62</sup> These episodes should be grasped in the long-term history of the Anglo-German rivalry in Africa.<sup>63</sup> In British imperial discourses, the image of Britain's benevolent rule in Africa, distinguished from Germany's brutal rule, was widely diffused.<sup>64</sup> In order to oppose the German claim, Amery resorted to this image so as to justify the continuation of British rule.<sup>65</sup> But this rhetoric in turn obliged Amery to be true to the ideal of the dual policy. The new environment of international politics did not allow him to promote purely pro-settler policy in East Africa.

### **Searching for a proper balance in the matrix of settler colonialism**

After the failure of the closer union scheme, Amery was never directly involved in the policymaking on the region. However, he did not cease his

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<sup>60</sup> Callahan, 'The Failure of "Closer Union" in British East Africa, 1929–31'; idem., *Mandates and Empire*, 177–186.

<sup>61</sup> British Government tried to appease Germany by proposing the redistribution of colonies. WM. Roger Louis, 'Colonial Appeasement, 1936–1938', *Revue Belge de Philologie et d'Histoire* 49, no. 4 (1971): 1175–91; J. Crozier, *Appeasement and Germany's Last Bid for Colonies* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1988).

<sup>62</sup> Amery to Ormsby-Gore, 12 March 1937, AMEL 2/1/27. Ormsby-Gore was parliamentary under-secretary to the Colonial Office, when Amery was Colonial Secretary. He was more earnest to the spirit of the League. See Pedersen, *The Guardians*, passim. However, Amery's memoir praised Ormsby-Gore as 'so able and enthusiastic a co-adjutor'. Amery, *My Political Life*, vol. 2, 300.

<sup>63</sup> Prosser Gifford and WM. Roger Louis, eds., *Britain and Germany in Africa: Imperial Rivalry and Colonial Rule* (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1967).

<sup>64</sup> Barbara Bush, *Imperialism, Race and Resistance: Africa and Britain, 1919–1945* (London & New York: Routledge, 1999), 30.

<sup>65</sup> Amery, 'The Story of East Africa', *The Sunday Times*, 25 June 1939. This is his review of Coupland's *The Exploitation of East Africa, 1856–1890*.

attempt to contrive a concrete scheme for the dual policy. A tentative plan for East Africa was published in *The Forward View*. His top priority there was still a closer union for economic development rather than constitutional reform.<sup>66</sup> At the same time, however, Amery for the first time systematically explained his view on settler colonialism in order to find a solution to the East African question. He began his argument by comparing the situation in East Africa with those of the precedent settler colonies in history; in North America and Australia, white settlers dispossessed 'scanty native populations'; In Central and South America, Spanish and Portuguese became absorbed in the native and slave populations; in the Union of South Africa, the native question was 'solved, so far, by a policy of separation and subordination'.<sup>67</sup> In his view, all the examples could not be a role model to East Africa. What is particularly important here is that Amery came to make a critical evaluation of South African native policy.

The South African solution, destined sooner or later to break down in the Union itself, could hardly hold the field in areas where the white element must always be far smaller and the field of native activities wider, even if it were not directly inconsistent with the doctrine of trusteeship as professed by this country.<sup>68</sup>

Amery obviously made his criticism modest and attributed the unsuitability of the South African model to East Africa mainly to the different demographic

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<sup>66</sup> L. S. Amery, *The Forward View* (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1935), 256.

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*, 252.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*, 253.

situations. But it still indicated that he took a more ambivalent stance towards South African native policy.

His alternative solution was of course 'dual policy' or 'the fullest recognition of the rights of each'. The problem was how to translate the vague principle into practice. Amery endorsed the compromise in the 1931 report ('the maintenance of the present system') in the immediate future, but only 'with an increasingly close association with those whose practical experience in the work of economic development entitles their views on consideration.' He made it clear that the purpose of making white settlers 'co-trustees' was not handing over control to them but training them to care about 'the welfare of the whole community' including 'native interests'. As for further constitutional reform, his idea was synchronized with the one for the Indian Question. In order to prevent a conflict between settlers and London, an irresponsible legislature should not be created. A promising alternative would be 'functional representation by self-governing bodies, representing special interests and occupations' and 'an increasing association of such bodies with the work of the government.' This would also promote self-government in native and Indian communities without dividing East Africa into white and black areas, which was suggested by Lugard.<sup>69</sup> In short, the combination of functional representation and federation became his favourite prescription for diverse communities in the imperial peripheries.

His lukewarm stance towards settler colonialism was exemplified by his policy on the South African Protectorates as well. The three Protectorates, Swaziland, Basutoland, and Bechuanaland, were supposed to be transferred from British rule to the Union. However, all the negotiations between the UK and

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<sup>69</sup> Ibid., 254-256.

the Union failed and the Protectorates eventually turned into independent nation states through decolonization.<sup>70</sup> The issue continued to be a bone of strife between the two governments throughout the first half of the twentieth century.

When Amery as Colonial Secretary was confronted by Hertzog in 1927, he declared that a transfer of the Protectorates was 'out of question for some time to come'.<sup>71</sup> He even urged Baldwin to increase the British population in the Protectorates as well as in Rhodesia.<sup>72</sup> In the 1930s, he was again involved in the Protectorates question as a member of the parliamentary committee investigating the issue under Selborne. In the preliminary meeting for the committee attended by Amery, Cazalet, Lothian, and Selborne, they decided that although the Protectorates except for the Northern part of Bechuanaland could be gradually transferred to the Union, concrete schedules should not be made before the Union government and parliament published 'a definite native policy' lest the transferred natives undergo any noticeable change in their treatment.<sup>73</sup> *The Forward View*, written in 1934-35, also maintained that an immediate transfer would be difficult 'in the still somewhat uncertain state of Union native policy' without sufficient safeguards; it would be predicated upon joint agreements on the native policy between the UK and the Union, whose process would take 'a period of years'.<sup>74</sup>

However, the political realignment in South Africa did not allow Amery to simply dodge the demand. In the 1920s, he easily dismissed it as an ambitious claim of the Nationalists. On the other hand, after 1934, the UK had to negotiate with the coalition government led by Smuts and Hertzog. As far as the

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<sup>70</sup> Hyam, *The Failure of South African Expansion, 1908-1948*.

<sup>71</sup> Amery diary, 6 September 1927, *EB*, vol. 1, 522.

<sup>72</sup> Max Beloff, *Dream of Commonwealth, 1921-42* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989), 106.

<sup>73</sup> A copy of the minutes of the meeting on 31 July 1934, AMEL 1/5/31.

<sup>74</sup> Amery, *The Forward View*, 259.



Protectorates question was concerned, Smuts was as adamant as Hertzog. Smuts' private letters warned Amery that it could be a thorny issue between the two governments. While Amery begged Smuts to understand that in Britain the transfer scheme was attacked by both the Left sentimentalists and the old Conservative imperialists, he proposed that the transfer of Swaziland should be undertaken as a first step. Smuts approved of the idea.<sup>75</sup>

After his agreement with Smuts, Amery sent a letter to *The Times* to rebut the Bishop of the Southhampton's criticism of South African native policy. The letter emphasized that the Union native policy, albeit still haunted by racial division, was being improved. Even in the Northern white areas, where the 'mischievous fallacy' prevailed that 'the native was a mere instrument of production', the 1936 Report of the Union Native Affairs Commission showed that the Union Government carried out policy for 'the progressive advancement of the native on his own lines', for instance, by the Urban Areas Act and the Natives Taxation and Development Act. More importantly, he alleged that the native territories such as the Transkei came to be managed by the same principle as that of British native policy in the Protectorates, that is, 'the native paramountcy of native interests in native areas'. The new policy was symbolized by the Native Trust and Land Act of 1936, which secured the native reserves. Amery told readers that this was an auspicious sign for the transferred native because the Protectorates would be categorized into the native areas by the Union.<sup>76</sup> The letter, however, sparked a controversy in the press over the nature of the Union native policy.<sup>77</sup> He had to send an excuse to

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<sup>75</sup> Amery to Smuts, 14 July 1937; 22 November 1937; Smuts to Amery, 9 December 1937, AMEL 2/2/24.

<sup>76</sup> Amery, 'the South African Natives', 23 December 1937, *The Times*. See also Arthur Southampton, 'The South African Protectorates: Opposition to the Transfer', 17 December 1937, *The Times*. He was the bishop of Johannesburg in 1922-33.

<sup>77</sup> Arthur Southampton, 'South African Natives: Case for Delay of Transfer', 30 December 1937;

Owen Clough and John Harris to the effect that he did not mean to approve of the Union native policy in general, while their policy in the native areas was not far from the native policy in the Protectorates. He also confessed to Clough his wishful thinking regarding possible effects of gradual transfer: 'my own belief is that there would be no very appreciable change, but that the wider responsibility will, if anything, tend to strengthen those elements in the Union that believe in a responsible treatment of the natives.'<sup>78</sup>

Amery was a supporter of South African colonial nationalism, and not of its aggressive nationalism or expansionism. Since the late 1930s, he had expressed apprehension about the racialism of Malan and even called 'Malan and Co.' a South African counterpart of the Indian National Congress under Gandhi.<sup>79</sup> Smuts' electoral defeat in 1948, his death in 1950, and Malan's introduction of apartheid enabled Amery to more frankly discuss the native question in settler colonialism. He was neither a simple critic nor champion of apartheid. Like recent scholars on settler colonialism, Amery tried to grasp the native question in a long-term perspective from the ancient times to the modern era, albeit in a sketchy way. Based on the recognition that conquest for settlement was embedded in history of human beings, he claimed that the first and primitive form of apartheid emerged in the time of the Aryan conquest of India as the caste system. Subsequent settler colonies dealt with the native question in various ways. He regarded the White Australia policy as another example of Apartheid but did not necessarily denounce it. Although it was debatable whether promiscuous immigration would have developed their

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Peter Rennell Rodd, 'South African Natives', 3 January 1938; John Harris, 'South African Natives' 5 January 1938; William Cullen, 'South African Natives', 15 January 1938, John Harris, 'Missionaries in South Africa', *The Times*.

<sup>78</sup> Amery to Clough, 8 February 1938; Amery to Harris, 11 February 1938, AMEL 1/5/31.

<sup>79</sup> Amery to Smuts, 24 May 1938; 2 October 1940, AMEL 2/2/24.

economy more rapidly, Australia at least succeeded in avoiding 'many difficult adjustments which multi-racial community must face before it can eventually settle down to anything like a common national life and sentiment'.<sup>80</sup>

In the case of apartheid in South Africa, Amery admitted that the system was established by the collusion of the British Government and settlers:

Apartheid ... was partly invented by the British Government in order to protect the natives from wholesale expropriation by land hungry settlers, partly left to develop by the settlers themselves in the shape of reserves convenient for the supply of additional labour.

As the first half of the sentence implied, he did not oppose the policy of apartheid per se. He even argued that social segregation was 'a natural consequence wherever communities differ widely in their habits and outlook on life'. The problem of South African apartheid was that their aim was to impose a too rigid restriction on the social mobility of indigenous people. Amery expected that this particular type of apartheid would collapse in the long run.

What the Brahmins of the new South African caste system refuse to recognize is that all the ordinary economic, political and social forces that exercise their continuous influence in South Africa, as elsewhere in the world, are undermining the legislative dykes which they put up faster than they can be repaired.

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<sup>80</sup> Amery, 'The Colour Problem and its Background', AMEL 1/7/90.

He had a pessimistic anticipation that the regime would end in violent collapse unless they integrated 'the more advanced elements of the non-European population' into their society.<sup>81</sup>

After all, to Amery, the South Africa of Malan was a failure in the British imperial project as much as the Ireland of De Valera was. His last ray of hope was the formation of the East and Central African federations. Amery finally concocted a comprehensive answer to Lugard's criticism of the closer union scheme. Whereas his indirect rule was suitable to Nigeria, whose climate was a bulwark against European immigrants, the situations in Central (Northern and Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland) and Eastern Africa were more favourable to federalization.<sup>82</sup> He especially thought highly of the potential of the Central African Federation. His feeling towards settlers was still ambivalent. Amery confessed to 5<sup>th</sup> Marquess Salisbury that while settlers' fear of rapid Africanization of North Rhodesia was understandable, their 'irresponsible character', particularly their defiant attitude towards the British South Africa Company, was equally problematic.<sup>83</sup> Regarding the native question, however, he applauded the mindset of the white population there, which was removed from both the sentimentality of British critics of apartheid and the grievance of Afrikaners. Amery expected that Rhodesian white settlers would, learning from the lesson of South Africa, take proper doses of apartheid and integration/partnership with the 'natives'.<sup>84</sup> His concrete scheme was, as always, functional representation or the Swiss system.<sup>85</sup> That is, Amery tried to

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<sup>81</sup> Ibid.

<sup>82</sup> L. S. Amery, 'The Crown and Africa', 52.208 (1953), 179–85. As for the federal scheme of East Africa in this period, see N. J. Westcott, 'Closer Union and the Future of East Africa, 1939–1948: A Case Study in the "Official Mind of Imperialism"', *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 10, no. 1 (1981): 67–88.

<sup>83</sup> Amery to Salisbury, 29 March 1949; Salisbury to Amery, 27 March 1949, AMEL 2/2/20.

<sup>84</sup> Amery, 'The Colour Problem and its Background', AMEL 1/7/90.

<sup>85</sup> Amery, 'Thoughts on forms of self-government for the Colonies', 9 October 1951, AMEL

imagine new African federations as utopian settler colonies where settlers, the natives, and Asian immigrants would peacefully coexist under the guidance of the imperial/European civilization.

This vision was too optimistic with hindsight. However, as discussed in the introductory section, this wishful thinking was largely shared by Conservatives at the time. The rhetoric of ‘partnership’, or multiracialism, was adopted by them to advocate their African policy.<sup>86</sup> Amery’s changing attitude towards settler colonialism foreshadowed the formation of the rhetoric. The reason he embraced the wishful thinking was, in addition to the geopolitical necessity of the region, probably his sense of desperation.<sup>87</sup> Throughout his career as an imperial politician/administrator, Amery contemplated how different nations or communities could coexist in colonies such as South Africa, Ireland, India, and Palestine. In all the cases, the results were disappointing to Amery. East and Central Africa were the last colonies where the British Empire could challenge the question. Considering the change of Amery’s view on settler colonialism, the trajectory of his son, Julian, was ironic. In the 1950s, Julian, like his father, was a supporter of the Central Africa Federation. Once the Federation was dissolved, however, he became a Die-Hard champion of white-settlers’ interests in Rhodesia.<sup>88</sup> Since Leopold Amery did not necessarily deny the

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<sup>86</sup> Philip Murphy, *Party Politics and Decolonization: The Conservative Party and British Colonial Policy in Tropical Africa 1951-1964* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), chapter 3. In fact, the rhetoric was appropriated diversely by various actors. See, *ibid.*, chapter 8; Anthony King, ‘Identity and Decolonisation: The Policy of Partnership in Southern Rhodesia 1945-62’ (PhD thesis, University of Oxford, 2001).

<sup>87</sup> Historians have discussed what was the foremost reason for the making the federation. See, Ronald Hyam, ‘The Geopolitical Origins of the Central African Federation: Britain, Rhodesia and South Africa, 1948-1953’, *The Historical Journal* 30, no. 1 (1987): 145–72; Philip Murphy, ‘“Government by Blackmail”: The Origins of the Central African Federation Reconsidered’, in *The British Empire in the 1950s: Retreat or Revival?*, ed. Martin Lynn (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 53–76; Andrew Cohen, *The Politics and Economics of Decolonization in Africa: The Failed Experiment of the Central African Federation* (London & New York: I. B. Tauris, 2017).

<sup>88</sup> Frank Fazio, ‘Nothing New Under the Setting Sun: Patrick Wall, Julian Amery, and the Death

preponderance of white settlers, he might have become a champion of settlers like his son, if he had been alive in the 1960s-1970s. But it was just a counterfactual question. Leopold Amery was able to die as a critic of Malan.

## Conclusion

Amery continuously advocated the spread of settlers in the British Empire. Britons' emigration to the Dominions was an important element in his scheme for imperial economic development.<sup>89</sup> Moreover, he praised the 'love of adventure and exploration' as an important element of British national character, which acted as a driving force for empire-building.<sup>90</sup> This vision, which was probably linked with his love of mountaineering, indicates that Amery was proud, and not ashamed, of British settler colonialism.<sup>91</sup> In the interwar period, however, facing the pressure from liberal internationalism and the conflicts in Palestine and East Africa, he had to reconceptualize his vision of settler colonies to permit the limited political participation of indigenous people and non-European immigrants. This conception of multi-racial framework was widely used by Conservatives to advocate the formation of the Central African Federation in the 1950s. Amery's opportunistic adjustments of his views on settler colonialism reflected and contributed to the transformation of British imperialism.

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and Afterlife of the British Empire' (MA thesis, George Washington University, 2020).

<sup>89</sup> See Chapter 8.

<sup>90</sup> Amery, *The Forward View*, 169.

<sup>91</sup> He endorsed the restrictive immigration policy of the Dominions as a wise decision to gain 'ultimate strength'. Ibid, 209-210.

## 8 An Ideology of Tariff Reform

Amery was committed to the politics of imperial preference throughout his political career. It is virtually impossible to discuss the history of Tariff Reform without mentioning his name.<sup>1</sup> William David Freeman went so far as to devote his whole PhD thesis to tracing Amery's involvement in the politics of imperial preference, though he had to do so without any access to the Amery Papers, which were yet to be opened to the public.<sup>2</sup> Thanks to the existing literature, we already have an overall view of his experiences in the movement. Once the Tariff Reform Movement was launched with the speech of Joseph Chamberlain in May 1903, Amery became a member of the most loyal faction, called Whole-Hoggers, and organized or joined the extra-parliamentary associations such as the Tariff Reform League (TRL), the Compatriot Club, and the Trade Union Tariff Reform Association. As a Conservative/Unionist MP, he persistently tried to prevent the lukewarm party-leaders, Balfour, Bonar Law, and Baldwin, from circumscribing the aim of Tariff Reform. As Colonial and Dominions Secretary in the 1920s, Amery, establishing the Empire Marketing Board (EMB), tried to

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<sup>1</sup> Published works most relevant to Amery's involvement in Tariff Reform are as follows. Ian M. Drummond, *British Economic Policy and the Empire, 1919-1939* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1972); Idem, *Imperial Economic Policy, 1917-1939: Studies in Expansion and Protection* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1974); Alan Sykes, *Tariff Reform in British Politics 1903-1913* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979); Self, *Tories and Tariffs: The Conservative Party and the Politics of Tariff Reform, 1922-1932* (New York: Garland Publishing, 1986); David Dutton, *His Majesty's Loyal Opposition: The Unionist Party in Opposition, 1905-1915* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1992), chapter 4, 5, and 8; E. H. H. Green, *The Crisis of Conservatism: The Politics, Economics and Ideology of the Conservative Party, 1880-1914* (London & New York: Routledge, 1995); Tim Rooth, *British Protectionism and the International Economy: Overseas Commercial Policy in the 1930s* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Andrew Marrison, *British Business and Protection 1903-1932* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996); Andrew S. Thompson, *Imperial Britain: The Empire in British Politics, c. 1880-1932* (Harlow: Longman, 2000); WM. Roger Louis, 'Leo Amery and the Post-War World, 1945-55', *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 30.3 (2002), 71-90.

<sup>2</sup> William David Freeman, 'Last Stand for Empire: Leo Amery and Imperial Preference' (PhD thesis, Texas A & M University, 1998).

expedite intra-imperial trade and the development of the dependent colonies, only to be thwarted by Churchill and the Treasury. The seemingly imperialist commercial system in the 1930s, ushered in by the Import Duties Act and the Ottawa Conference in 1932, did not satisfy Amery, who continued to claim for a more comprehensive preferential network as a core member of the Empire Economic Union (EEU) and the Empire Industries Association (EIA). The post-war international economic regime represented by the GATT and the Bretton Woods system was, to Amery, a malicious scheme of the USA to cut down British imperial preference and the sterling area, which he strove to preserve until the end of his life.

The following section does not trace his politics of imperial preference, which has already been described elsewhere. Instead, it will clarify how Amery interacted with contemporary expertise and ideologies in formulating and conveying his policy of Tariff Reform and, conversely, how his involvement in it affected his political ideologies and activities. Historians have already found diverse, and, at times, mutually conflicting, propositions in the logic of Edwardian Tariff Reform. As Andrew Thompson has adroitly categorized it, four different types of tariffs, namely protective, retaliatory, revenue-raising, and preferential, awkwardly co-existed in the visions of Tariff Reformers.<sup>3</sup> Reflecting this multi-faceted nature of the movement, historians have presented various answers to the question regarding what the focal point of Tariff Reform was. Bernard Semmel and Geoffrey Searle treated it as one variant of the revolt across the political spectrum against Gladstonian consensus, which they named movements for 'social imperialism' or 'national efficiency'.<sup>4</sup> Alan Sykes has

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<sup>3</sup> Andrew Thompson, 'Tariff Reform: An Imperial Strategy, 1903-1913', *The Historical Journal* 40, no. 4 (1997): 1034.

<sup>4</sup> Bernard Semmel, *Imperialism and Social Reform: English Social-Imperial Thought 1895-1914* (Harvard University Press, 1960); Geoffrey Russell Searle, *The Quest for National Efficiency: A*



modified the narrative about 'social imperialism', by showing that Tariff Reform started as an imperialist project but, after 1906, it gradually changed into a remedy for domestic issues, in the course of which the Whole-Hoggers, paradoxically called 'social imperialists' by Sykes, were effectively defeated by more cautious Conservatives.<sup>5</sup> E. H. H. Green has described Tariff Reform as a distinctively Conservative attempt to respond to social, economic, and political changes in the UK since the 1870s.<sup>6</sup> Challenging the emphasis on its domestic aspect, Thompson has argued that imperial unity founded on preferential tariffs was their cardinal aim not just at the outset but throughout the movement.<sup>7</sup> Peter Cain's interpretation can be seen as a synthesis in that he has clarified the interconnection between Tariff Reformers' zeal for imperial unity and their apprehension about the future of British industry in the minds of 'constructive imperialists'.<sup>8</sup>

This chapter does not mean to present a new narrative of Tariff Reform which could be an alternative to those of the works quoted above. Rather, I will use these authors' arguments as working hypotheses to check to what extent their explanations fit the case of Amery. Its aim is to more precisely grasp what intellectual course Amery took in the political and ideological topography at the time. As he was born in 1873, the last quarter of the nineteenth century was a formative period for him. Certainly, recent historiography has ceased to see this period as a clear-cut watershed in British history, which was once represented

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*Study in British Politics and Political Thought, 1899-1914* (University of California Press, 1971).

<sup>5</sup> Alan Sykes, *Tariff Reform in British Politics 1903-1913* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979); Alan Sykes, 'The Radical Right and the Crisis of Conservatism before the First World War', *The Historical Journal* 26, no. 3 (1983): 661-76.

<sup>6</sup> E. H. H. Green, *The Crisis of Conservatism: The Politics, Economics and Ideology of the Conservative Party, 1880-1914* (London & New York: Routledge, 1995).

<sup>7</sup> Thompson 'Tariff Reform'.

<sup>8</sup> Peter Cain, 'The Economic Philosophy of Constructive Imperialism', in *British Politics and the Spirit of the Age: Political Concepts in Action*, ed. by Cornelia Navari (Keele: Keele University Press, 1996), 108-137.

by historical terms such as the Great Depression, the Revival of Socialism, or the New Unionism.<sup>9</sup> Though there are a variety of new interpretations, they tend to emphasize continuities from the preceding age.<sup>10</sup> As for the trend in intellectual history, the historical essay by Peter Clarke on British popular understanding of economy has even called the period from the 1880s to the 1920s ‘the golden age of free trade with its Gladstonian provenance’, which would be replaced by the age of Keynes.<sup>11</sup>

However, the survival of Gladstonian languages in the hegemonic economic discourse did not mean that there were no dissenting voices. The emergence of various socialist strands, the formulation of the New Liberalism, and the Tariff Reform Movement in the Conservative/Unionist Party shared their aim to challenge or reform the hegemony. Though it is inappropriate to overstate the strength and the mutual consensus of those movements, we should not neglect the presence of those dissenters/nonconformists in the contemporary public sphere.<sup>12</sup> As an impudent youngster, Amery had a personality quite susceptible to those unorthodox intellectual currents.

The first section of this chapter will reveal the making of Amery’s tariff reform ideology. As the following section will show, in the eye of young Amery

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<sup>9</sup> Regarding the historiographical discussion about the periodization of modern British history, see Jon Lawrence, *Speaking for the People: Party, Language and Popular Politics in England, 1867–1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), chapter 1-3.

<sup>10</sup> For instance, *Currents of Radicalism: Popular Radicalism, Organised Labour and Party Politics in Britain, 1850-1914*, ed. by Eugenio F. Biagini and Alastair Reid (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, *British Imperialism* (London & New York: Longman, 1993); Ian Packer, *Liberal Government and Politics, 1905-15* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).

<sup>11</sup> Peter Clarke, ‘The Making and Remaking of “Common Sense” about British Economic Policy’, in *The Art of the Possible: Politics and Governance in Modern British History, 1885-1997: Essays in Memory of Duncan Tanner*, ed. Chris Williams and Andrew Edwards (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2015), 16–30.

<sup>12</sup> As for the heterodox strands other than Tariff Reform, Geoffrey Foote, *The Labour Party’s Political Thought: A History*, 3rd ed. (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997), chapter 2-3; Mark Bevir, *The Making of British Socialism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011); Michael Freedon, *The New Liberalism: An Ideology of Social Reform* (Oxford: Clarendon University Press, 1978); Stefan Collini, *Liberalism and Sociology: L. T. Hobhouse and Political Argument in England, 1880-1914* (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

the ideological world of economic heretics/heterodoxies looked so fluid that he flirted with many ideas and ideologies, including socialism, in his adolescence. However, once he chose to advocate Chamberlain's campaign for imperial unity, the legacy of the flirtation helped him come to believe the versatile potential of Tariff Reform as a project for the balanced development of the economy and population of the Empire. At the same time, Amery, as a Unionist/Conservative candidate, finally found a comfortable ideology in a specific type of 'Unionism' preached by the Whole-Hoggers. Despite their disagreement over the motive and the aim of Tariff Reform, historians have generally agreed that while it increasingly became a part of official Conservative policy, only a few wholeheartedly supported the entire scheme of imperial preference especially when the cry against food taxes doomed their electoral prospects.<sup>13</sup> Amery has been properly categorized as belonging to the minority group. This section will argue that what made him such an adamant campaigner was the fact that the fully-fledged Chamberlainite scheme offered what he had been looking for during his intellectual apprenticeship. This argument shared an overall stance with Green's explanation about the Conservative adoption of Tariff Reform, but here I will show that Amery, contrary to Green's framework, became a Unionist/Conservative because of Tariff Reform, and not vice versa.<sup>14</sup> His specific vision of the balanced development of the national and imperial economy led him to take a relatively negative attitude towards the result of the Ottawa Conference in the 1930s. That is, his involvement in politics of imperial preference cannot be fully explained unless we understand the features of *his* Tariff Reform and *his* economic theory. For this reason, the first section will

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<sup>13</sup> Dutton, *His Majesty's Loyal Opposition*, 185; Alan Sykes, 'The Radical Right'; N. C. Fleming, *Britannia's Zealots, Volume I: Tradition, Empire and the Forging of the Conservative Right* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2019), 42-43.

<sup>14</sup> Green, *Crisis*, 10-22.

discuss how he appropriated contemporary economic knowledge and theory to his tariff reform ideology and how he related it to other political ideologies. This method is in line with the approach consistently taken in this thesis: avoiding reifying political ideologies as a whole and paying more attention to how contemporary individuals perceived them.<sup>15</sup> I do not mean to content myself with just promoting the fragmentation of the historiography or to deny the validity of attempts to draw broader pictures of ideologies. My suggestion is that both types of research should be continued to complement each other. Aside from the argument on methodology, Amery's position in the movement will simply justify this research. Though he was not a representative of Tariff Reform, a status no one would deserve, he was one of the most consistent and consequently salient advocates of the cause. In short, it is impossible to complete thorough research on Tariff Reform without more precisely grasping Amery's personal view.

The second section will delineate Amery's struggle to translate his tariff reform ideology into actual politics. Though Tariff Reform made him a Conservative/Unionist politician, that level of enthusiasm and conviction about the cause was not shared by all the MPs in the party. This fact led the Whole-Hoggers like him to characterize their campaign as one for the whole nation and the whole Empire rather than for a specific party, while most of them actually belonged to the Conservative/Unionist Party. Amery had to embrace this dilemma at the time. Furthermore, the peculiar feature of British popular politics shackled his language for Tariff Reform. The Edwardian era was, in terms of the development of British democracy, a transitional period, where only registered citizens had votes and popular politics still retained the vulgar and violent nature

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<sup>15</sup> See the section on methodology in the Introduction.

of Victorian political culture. The battle between Tariff Reform and Free Trade was staged as a theatrical political drama in that context.<sup>16</sup> Due to these factors, Amery was not able to construct a stable connection between his ideology and party politics. The First World War changed the political setting. Amery chose to promote his cause by taking advantage of his status as an inner member of the decision-making circle around Lloyd George. In this sense, Amery gave his lot for the Coalition even by temporarily dropping food taxes from his policy list. As economic policy returned to austerity, however, his expectations for the Coalition waned and he took part in the revolt of the under-secretaries in October 1922. Seeing the rise of Baldwin, who was from the milieu of Tariff Reform, Amery finally redefined the cause of the Conservative Party as linked with his tariff reform ideology. To conclude, his intellectual journey to find a suitable political party was provisionally sealed by 1923, though the subsequent general election immediately shattered his euphoria.

## **1 The Making of Amery's Tariff Reform Ideology**

### **Idealism, socialism, and political economy**

After he finished studying at Harrow School, Amery spent his undergraduate years at Balliol College. His link with Oxford continued after his graduation because he won a fellowship at All Souls College. His memoir and draft notes provide his own recollections of intellectual influences on his thoughts.<sup>17</sup> Regarding texts he wrote in the 1880s-1890s, dozens of his notebooks in those years can be found in his private papers which shows that he was an industrious and bookish student.<sup>18</sup> Of course, we should be cautious

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<sup>16</sup> Trentmann, *Free Trade Nation*; Thackeray, *Conservatism*; Lawrence, 'The Transformation'.

<sup>17</sup> In addition to *My Political Life*, three draft notes, titled 'Economics', 'Philosophy', 'Politics', are useful sources. AMEL 6/1/77. All of them were written in 1948.

<sup>18</sup> They are in AMEL 6/1/39-73.

in using these as primary sources. It was often unclear when and for what purpose they were written. It was, thus, debatable to what extent we should read into the texts, which might comprise just recaps of books or lectures. We should also recognize the fact that the majority of the notebooks were used to study the two classical languages, Greek and Latin. For all these reservations, there is no reason not to use such a valuable resource, which gives us a glimpse into the intellectual world of a diligent student.

According to his own account, Amery came to Oxford with 'a more or less conservative view on domestic affairs and an ardent belief in the Empire', and with little interest in party politics or little knowledge of political economy. Yet, he was before long negatively impressed by the theory of the 'orthodoxy economists'.<sup>19</sup> Balliol was an epicentre of Idealism in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Scholars has recognized that the intellectual impetus of Idealism contributed to the emergence of collectivist thoughts, though its relations with socialism or New Liberalism were not always cordial or straightforward. Equally, Green has shown the influence of Idealism on Conservative thinkers and politicians who had a collectivist tendency. Amery was, naturally, included in that list.<sup>20</sup> However, Amery's recollections confessed that he was as much shocked by the dominance of 'the prevailing Hegelian wooliness' in Balliol as that of economic orthodoxy. He was neither impressed by German thinkers, except for Schopenhauer, nor the British followers of Hegel

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<sup>19</sup> Amery, 'Economics'; 'Politics at Oxford', AMEL 6/1/77. The term 'orthodox economists' was not used as an academically rigorous conception here. Researchers on history of economics has revealed the impossibility to give clear-cut labels, orthodoxy or unorthodox, to any economist. For instance, see Geoffrey Hodgson, 'Alfred Marshall versus the Historical School?', *Journal of Economic Studies* 32 (2005): 331–48. But what is more important in this context is the fact that economic orthodoxy did exist as intellectual construction in the minds of contemporary people such as Amery. The adjective 'orthodox' is used only in this sense in this chapter.

<sup>20</sup> E. H. H. Green, *Ideologies of Conservatism: Conservative Political Ideas in the Twentieth Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), chap. 2.

such as T. H. Green, Bernard Bosanquet, and F. H. Bradley.<sup>21</sup> Considering his anti-orthodox proclivity, it is probable that he had a general antipathy towards the hegemonic currents in philosophy as well as in economics. But that does not mean that he completely steered clear of Idealism. He made an encyclopaedic list of German Idealists, from Leibnitz to R. H. Lotze, in one of his notebooks.<sup>22</sup> He also seemed to do a close reading of the works by Kant and T. H. Green. In the latter's argument, Amery found an eclectic synthesis of individualism and collectivism. He jotted down, 'G never confuses wholes with aggregates. Every aggregate is a whole and an organic complex'. Therefore, 'the ideal is not only personal but also social .... The perfection of character which is the final good is only got in the performance of function'.<sup>23</sup> All these elements were to be used by Amery when he, as a Tariff Reformer, attacked the fallacy of composition in economic individualism.<sup>24</sup> E. H. H. Green appropriately pointed out the similarity between the relationship of the state and individuals in the Idealist vision and that of Britain and the colonies in Amery's framework.<sup>25</sup> That is, it can be said that for all his defiance of its hegemony, Amery was unconsciously affected by Idealism. But his alleged antipathy against Idealism also meant that he had to look for different intellectual strands to express his revolt against the economic orthodoxy.

While Amery claimed that he was keen on imperial preference from his school days, the remaining evidence only proves that socialism and bimetallism resonated with his heretical instinct at this stage. He recalled that in reacting to the orthodoxy of Benjamin Jowett and James Strachan-Davidson in Balliol, he

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<sup>21</sup> Amery, 'Philosophy', AMEL 6/1/77; *My Political Life*, vol. 1, 49-50.

<sup>22</sup> AMEL 6/1/47.

<sup>23</sup> AMEL 6/1/40.

<sup>24</sup> L. S. Amery, *The Fundamental Fallacies of Free Trade* (London, 1908), chapter 1.

<sup>25</sup> Green, *Ideologies*, 68-69.

was most influenced by *Looking Backward*, a socialist-utopian science fiction novel by Edward Bellamy.<sup>26</sup> His intellectual inclination led him to become a founding member of the Oxford branch of the Fabian Society. However, it does not mean that young Amery was a pure socialist because he also attended meetings of some Liberal clubs and joined the Chatham Club, from which, on one occasion, he was nearly expelled, along with Lionel Curtis and Nugent Hicks, due to their socialistic views. It would be more precise to say that he was politically promiscuous. His self-analysis was that he was a 'socialist-imperialist' when he left Oxford.<sup>27</sup> He had no affinity with any political party, as John Simon, one of his old friends, pointed out: 'You are not very certain which side is most like you, and in the end you are certain ... to quarrel with them both.'<sup>28</sup>

There is little evidence showing in what way he was attracted by socialism. His memoir is relatively reticent about this topic probably because of his later shift to anti-socialism. The Amery Papers contain one text in which young Amery expressed his sympathy with socialism: 'On Socialism' an essay published in a periodical issued by the Harrow School in 1891, one year before his matriculation at Oxford.<sup>29</sup> It means that his attachment to socialism took shape earlier than his memory claimed. Amery began the essay with his summary of the history of social progress from ancient times to the monopolistic stage of capitalism in the manner of Marxist materialism. His verdict on the result of the Industrial Revolution was the same as that of the school of pessimists propagated by Fredrich Engels and Arnold Toynbee. In spite of the tremendous increase in the total amount of wealth, 'the condition of the poorer

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<sup>26</sup> Jowett's view on political economy was not so dogmatic as Amery claimed. Warren J. Samuels, 'Benjamin Jowett's Connections with Political Economy', *Journal of the History of Economic Thought* 7, no. 2 (1986): 33–43.

<sup>27</sup> Amery, 'Economics', AMEL 6/1/77;

<sup>28</sup> Simon to Amery, August 1896, quoted in *My Political Life*, vol. 1, 52.

<sup>29</sup> Amery, 'On Socialism' in *Prolusiones*, 1891, AMEL 6/1/45.



classes remained very nearly the same'. The monopolist twist to capitalism aggravated the problem. Once a glut in the market took place, capitalists regulated the pace of their production, reducing the number of their workmen. It was 'of such workmen that the enormous class of the unemployed, or rather the irregularly employed workmen of the present-day consists.' He also had no trust in the possibility that monopolistic capitalists would behave for the sake of the public good. What made him attracted to socialism was his apprehension about 'the condition of people', particularly the unemployed and underemployed among them. One thing portending his economic nationalism was that he blamed foreign immigrants for worsening national unemployment.<sup>30</sup>

Subsequently, the essay traced a history of political and economic thoughts on alternative societies from Plato to modern socialism. He most sympathetically described the utopian society imagined by Bellamy. Its vision was typical of utopian etatism in that the state would take over the total management of the economy, infrastructure and supply chains. However, the state would not degenerate into an authoritarian machine because it would comprise representatives, chosen by the chiefs of each province, chosen by the chiefs of each district, chosen by foremen, elected by their fellow-workmen in each art and manufacturing industry. Only regarding the external policy, would the predominance be given to the intellectuals.<sup>31</sup> However, he frankly admitted that none of the socialist schemes were practical at that time. To make a concrete step to the ideal, Amery suggested several policies, including aid for the poor through state assistance and private charity, the emigration of the unemployed to 'a greater Britain', and the nationalisation of the railways and

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<sup>30</sup> Ibid., 52-3.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., 59-60.

mines, though he warned that the state could not carry out them unless the public was awakened to the need to improve the condition of 'the downtrodden classes'.<sup>32</sup>

There were both lasting and ephemeral elements in his socialist propositions. The fact that Amery was fascinated by *Looking Backward* implied his political preference. No sooner was the utopian novel published in 1888 than it made an impact in the US and the UK.<sup>33</sup> Bellamy's socialist utopia was reformist and eclectic in that it was neither idyllic anarchism nor the dictatorship of the proletariat or plutocrats. Because of this ambiguous nature, the work elicited various reactions from a wide range of people.<sup>34</sup> While William Morris criticized the etatist aspect of Bellamy's vision, in 1948 Clement Attlee was to tell Bellamy's son that his government was 'a child of the Bellamy ideal'.<sup>35</sup> Amery's position was closer to the latter. In this sense, his participation in the Fabian Society, which Morris disliked even more than Bellamy, was a natural result.<sup>36</sup> Amery's invocation of Bellamy's scheme presaged his support for functional representation in the interwar period as well as his plea for separation of domestic governance and imperial management since the Edwardian era.<sup>37</sup> However, it is not appropriate to only see continuities in his trajectory. His emphasis on the importance of redistribution and nationalization at this stage

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<sup>32</sup> Ibid., 62-3.

<sup>33</sup> As for its impact in the UK, see Peter Marshall, 'A British Sensation', in *Edward Bellamy Abroad: An American Prophet's Influence*, ed. Sylvia E. Bowman (New York: Twayne, 1962), 86–118.

<sup>34</sup> Matthew Beaumont, 'Introduction', in Edward Bellamy, *Looking Backward: 2000-1887*, Oxford World's Classics Edition, (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 2007, vii- x .

<sup>35</sup> John Bew, *Clement Attlee: The Man Who Made Modern Britain* (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 98-101.

<sup>36</sup> As for Morris' view on Bellamy and the Fabian Society, see Krishan Kumar, 'News From Nowhere: The Renewal of Utopia', *History of Political Thought* 14, no. 1 (1993): 133–43; Matthew Beaumont, *Utopia Ltd.: Ideologies of Social Dreaming in England 1870-1900* (Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2005), 69-81; Seamus Flaherty, 'Reappraising News From Nowhere: William Morris, J. S. Mill and Fabian Essays', *Modern Intellectual History* 17, no. 4 (2020): 951–80.

<sup>37</sup> See Chapter 6 and 10.

would have embarrassed Amery as a Tariff Reformer who thought that social reform would be enabled only by the spiral expansion of the market, production, and the population, and not by mere redistribution. Amery might well have dismissed his early thinking as adolescent radicalism. Still, it must be recognized that he did not find the invisible hand or economic chivalry an answer to the poverty of the working class, even before he became a Tariff Reformer.

Although, in his late years, Amery confessed his doubt about the validity of such abstract concepts as capital, labour, and rent,<sup>38</sup> one of his university notebooks contained some incomplete draft essays where he grappled with contemporary economic expertise. In these essays, one can detect not only his revolt against the orthodoxy but also some genesis of his tariff reform ideology. For instance, two essays about the determinants of value discussed the cost of production and supply/demand relationships with reference to John Stuart Mill and John Elliot Cairnes.<sup>39</sup> Amery appreciated Cairnes more than Mill concerning the theory of the cost of production because Cairnes recognized the value of human effort, or 'sacrifice', connected with the process of production, as a variable factor, while Mill lumped it together with other factors under the single heading. Therefore, he argued that the wages should be seen as 'not only remuneration for service, but also return for the abstinence of his [a worker's] parents in apprenticing him to his work or his own efforts in acquiring his skill'. Amery tried to disentangle the two factors by using a traditional method of political economy, that is, by setting some abstract imaginary conditions and speculating each result. But his conclusion was closer to the

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<sup>38</sup> *My Political Life*, vol. 1, 50-51.

<sup>39</sup> 'cost of production as a determinant of value'; 'supply and demand as determinants of value', AMEL 6/1/53.

historical school than his methodology: 'No general law of relation of the two great factors can be given; that relation can only be found only in the case of each particular article by tracing the whole history of its manufacture.'<sup>40</sup>

Regarding supply and demand, however, Amery argued that Cairnes made the same mistake as Mill by sticking to the conventional notion that the aggregate demand would be identical with the aggregate supply. In this case, both of them skipped measuring 'sacrifice', that is, demand as desire. Amery tried to separate two factors of desire, quantitative and qualitative; the former can be measured by the numbers of articles which is desired, while the latter can be measured 'by the price paid for it or the sacrifice made to procure it'. The incomplete essay subsequently tried to present his own theory of supply and demand, albeit to no avail.<sup>41</sup>

Though it is impossible to confirm whether Amery perused Mill and Cairnes or just relied on the contents of lectures or secondary sources,<sup>42</sup> what is more important is that Amery learned some tips from Cairnes to fight orthodoxy. Cairnes has sometimes been regarded as one of the last classical economists, but his modification of Mill's arguments could be interpreted as going beyond that.<sup>43</sup> Cairnes' emphasis on the qualitative nature of 'sacrifice' was reworked by Amery as a Tariff Reformer, who separated individual capital from 'national capital', which consisted of 'the territory of the nation with its resources, the skilled energy, moral character, industrial and political organization of its

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<sup>40</sup> 'cost of production', *ibid.*

<sup>41</sup> 'supply and demand', *ibid.*

<sup>42</sup> For instance, Sidgwick's famous text discussed the views of Mill and Cairnes on cost of production. Henry Sidgwick, *The Principles of Political Economy*, 2nd edn (London: Macmillan, 1887), 189-195.

<sup>43</sup> Black, R. (2004, September 23). Cairnes, John Elliot (1823–1875), economist. *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*. Retrieved 21 Nov. 2020, from <https://www.oxforddnb.com/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-4345>.

citizens'.<sup>44</sup> Free Traders, in his view, neglected the necessity of maintaining and fostering these elements. Moreover, Cairnes also opened his eye to the idea that the economy operated as an organic cycle:

there is no such thing as a transaction between supply and demand. What takes place is a transaction between a demand or desire of one kind backed up by a certain supply and desire of another kind backed up by a different supply, the supply of the one being the object of desire of the other.

In this respect, Cairnes' argument was more advanced than Mill's. And yet, Cairnes, Amery lamented, did not develop this point enough.<sup>45</sup> In fact, Cairnes did not renounce but revived the wage fund doctrine, which was to be a key theoretical barrier to Amery's tariff reform ideology that population and economy could expand mutually.<sup>46</sup>

Amery found another source of inspiration to solve the problem: Henry George's *Progress and Poverty*. The work written by the US publicist was arguably the most popular book on political economy in 1880s Britain, the sales of which possibly reached 100,000.<sup>47</sup> George himself visited the UK several times to propagate his ideas. In other words, it was difficult for any Briton who was interested in political economy to neglect him. In particular, Radical

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<sup>44</sup> Amery, *Fundamental Fallacies*, 22.

<sup>45</sup> 'supply and demand'. Also see his discussion on wages in 'cost of production', AMEL 6/1/53.

<sup>46</sup> Mark Donoghue, 'John Elliot Cairnes and the "Rehabilitation" of the Classical Wage Fund Doctrine', *The Manchester School* 66, no. 4 (1998): 396–417. Mill was alleged to have recanted the doctrine, but there has been an intensive debate on the true meaning of so-called 'recantation'. See Robert B. Ekelund and Robert F. Hébert, *A History of Economic Theory and Method*, 6th ed. (Waveland Press, 2013), 207-208.

<sup>47</sup> Elwood P. Lawrence, *Henry George in the British Isles* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1957), 34.

Liberals, including Joseph Chamberlain, and socialists positively learned some elements from George, though most of them did not accept his propositions in its entirety.<sup>48</sup> The most famous and influential part of the book was its advocacy of land value taxation. But Amery turned to another part of George's theory: the frontal attack on the wage fund doctrine. George, by seeing the process of production as a cycle, concluded that wages were not an advance paid out of a wage fund but money deriving from the output of labour.<sup>49</sup> Based on this premise, Amery wrote an essay titled 'Capital and Wages'.<sup>50</sup> As the previous paragraphs shows, since Amery had already absorbed the idea of cyclic production from Cairnes, only one more small step was needed to accept George's argument: '... as a matter of fact wages are not supported from capital at all. Wages are simply the commodities given in exchange for labour.' But in considering the legacy of Henry George on Amery's tariff reform ideology, the corollary of this argument was more important. If population growth does not necessarily lower the average wage, and if the quantity of labour is not fixed by the capital, what determined demand for labour? George's and Amery's answers were that it was the demand for commodities. In other words, capital is 'not the support but the controller and organizer of labour'.

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<sup>48</sup> Lawrence, *Henry George*; Peter d'A. Jones, 'Henry George and British Socialism', *The American Journal of Economics and Sociology* 47, no. 4 (1988): 473–91; Bernard Newton, 'The Impact of Henry George on British Economists, I: The First Phase of Response, 1879-82; Leslie, Wicksteed and Hobson', *The American Journal of Economics and Sociology* 30, no. 2 (1971): 179–86; idem., 'The Impact of Henry George on British Economists, II: The Second Phase of Response, 1883-84; Marshall, Toynbee and Rae', *The American Journal of Economics and Sociology* 30, no. 3 (1971): 317–27; idem., 'The Impact of Henry George on British Economists, III: The Third Phase of Response, 1885-1901; Rogers, Symes and McDonnell', *The American Journal of Economics and Sociology* 31, no. 1 (1972): 87–102.

<sup>49</sup> Philip J. Bryson, *The Economics of Henry George: History's Rehabilitation of America's Greatest Early Economist* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 50-54.

<sup>50</sup> 'Capital and Wages', AMEL 6/1/53. All quotations in this paragraph are from this text. If you want a proof for Amery's theoretical dependence on George, you can find him jotting down the title of the essay, the name of the book (*Progress and Poverty*), and the name of the author (Henry George) on the page before the beginning of the essay. The essay itself explicitly refers to George in the last paragraph.

it also holds good that taking a nation as a whole the greater the desire for commodities the greater the industry called into play and vice versa. This depends on the fact that taken as a whole all consumers and producers are identical and that if they want to enjoy more they must work more for those enjoyments.

The interconnection between demand and employment was a prototype of the theory of underconsumption. The potential possibility of mutual growth of the population and economy would be a common ray of hope that anti-imperialist Hobson and imperialist Tariff Reformers believed in.

But, if underconsumption was a problem, how was Britain able to overcome it? Another one of Amery's essays, titled 'Productive and unproductive consumption, capital saving', addressed the question.<sup>51</sup> In this text, he contemplated the difference between productive and non-productive production/consumption. Though he was careful enough to concede that the boundary should never be strictly drawn and that there were always important elements other than material prosperity, he still argued that there were some types of production/consumption which would be of little utility to the cycle of production. In terms of consumption, if the rich who tended to indulge in non-productive consumption gained more wealth, they would be likely to spend it on luxuries, which made it more difficult for the poor to get the necessities. The problem was that the poor were often the very section engaged in productive production. Thus, the vicious spiral continued. Society could get out of the conundrum only by wealthy people 'saving'. Amery explained what this meant:

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<sup>51</sup> 'productive and unproductive consumption, capital saving', AMEL 1/6/53.

Saving however does not mean hoarding but on the contrary it implies rapid spending, but spending on the advancement of productive labour and not for personal luxuries. As long as nation confines itself to the production and consumption of useful things the greatest extravagance is compatible with success and prosperity.

The underconsumption syndrome can only be cured by 'the rapid circulation of money' as a means of promoting productive production. More concretely, however, how could the society reverse the tide? Amery, after 1903, would have said that Tariff Reform could accomplish it. But he was not a Tariff Reformer at this stage. Radical dirigisme might be another answer. But even the socialistic persona of Amery did not reckon that it was practical politics. Towards the second half of the 1890s, Amery was fascinated by bimetallism as an alternative solution.

## **Bimetallism**

Amid the financial crisis of 1931, Amery recalled the origin of his interest in the 'silver question'.

It began with having to do an essay for the Master early in 1893 I think. I could get no material except Giffen's 'Case against Bimetallism' which was however quite enough to convince me the other way, and I wrote my essay as a bimetalist.<sup>52</sup>

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<sup>52</sup> Amery diary, 23 July 1931, *EB*, vol. 2, 165-6.



This confession is further proof of his proclivity for unorthodoxy. There are two draft essays on monetary questions in his notebooks, though we cannot know whether these essays were the ones his recollections referred to. They did not explicitly advocate bimetallism, but they mentioned the recent demonetization of silver. Whether he wrote them as a bimetallist or not, as these essays exhibited his heterodox view on currencies, they are worth brief analysis here.

In the first essay on metallic money, Amery pointed out the possibility that the current metallic standard might not last forever because the desirability of the precious metals was maintained by governments retaining the system. This fact was demonstrated at that time by a recent decline in silver prices after many countries had demonetized silver. He concluded, 'perhaps the same fate may someday happen to gold as well and all the civilized states issue only token or paper money.'<sup>53</sup> The second essay on paper money developed the conclusion further.<sup>54</sup> In dwelling upon the difference between convertible and inconvertible paper money, Amery implied that the 1844 Bank Act, though it substantiated the metallic standard in the UK, failed to prevent financial crises by regulating the quantity of money supply because cheques and letters of credit had taken the place of the bank note in many transactions.<sup>55</sup> His doubt about the automatic adjustment by the metallic standard was in accordance with his view that in determining the value of paper money 'confidence' in the currency and the issuer (the government) was more important than its quantity, regardless of its convertibility. The only difference between inconvertible paper money and precious metals lay in the fact that the latter's value was internationally recognized. Therefore, Amery concluded, 'with a sufficient

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<sup>53</sup> 'nature and use of metallic money', AMEL 1/6/53.

<sup>54</sup> 'convertible and inconvertible paper money', AMEL 1/6/53.

<sup>55</sup> This was also implied in another incomplete draft essay, titled 'banking and c', AMEL 1/6/53.

agreement between states it is quite possible that the precious metals may get be demonetized altogether and only IPM [inconvertible paper money] used.<sup>56</sup>

These essays were more radical than bimetallism in that they anticipated the abolition of the metallic standard. His suspicion about the correlations between the value and the quantity of money was not in agreement the monetarist nature of the bimetallist campaign. But he did not necessarily write these papers as a practical proposal. Moreover, they also clearly demonstrate his tendency to doubt the conventional economic wisdom. The gold standard was not an article of faith to Amery. On the contrary, he seemed to believe that the government's intervention could make important difference in the monetary dimension. His defiant inclination led him to support bimetallism.

Whether he was already a bimetallist in 1893 or not, he did not act as a campaigner until 1897. In this year, Amery, as a fellow in All Souls, together with William Grenfell (later Lord Desborough), delivered a speech in the Oxford Union in favour of bimetallism, though their motion failed to be carried.<sup>57</sup> Fortunately, his draft for the speech survives in his private papers. Before analysing it, we need to grasp the broader context of the British bimetallist movement in the 1880s-1890s.

The last quarter of the nineteenth century saw the international monetary norm gradually move from bimetallism to the gold standard. In the broadest sense, 'bimetallism' means a situation whereby authorities admit both gold and silver as the standard metal. According to Ted Wilson, there were three types of bimetallism: 1. *De jure* bimetallism with a *de facto* gold standard; 2. *De jure* bimetallism with a *de facto* silver standard; 3. *De jure* bimetallism with a full

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<sup>56</sup> 'convertible and inconvertible paper money', AMEL 1/6/53.

<sup>57</sup> Amery, 'Economics', AMEL 6/1/77; Amery to Bernard Osborne, 3<sup>rd</sup> May 1934, LAdd 695, the University of Birmingham.

bimetallic system and statutory gold/silver ratio.<sup>58</sup> The history of bimetallism in England/Britain could be summarized based on this categorization: a long period of *de facto* silver standard from the Middle Ages to the end of the seventeenth century, a gradual transition to *de facto* gold standard in the eighteenth century, a temporary suspension during the Napoleonic Wars, and institutionalisation of the gold standard after 1816. With the 1844 Bank Act, the UK finally discarded *de jure* bimetallism.<sup>59</sup> The decision was exceptional at the time. Many other states continued to retain *de jure* bimetallism until the German Empire announced its adoption of the gold standard in 1873.

The collapse of international bimetallism coincided with the beginning of 'the Great Depression', which contemporaries perceived as such. In this context it is not surprising that some attributed the latter to the former. Besides, to people in the 1880s-1890s, it was still uncertain whether the gold standard would form an international monetary order for the following decades. To policymakers outside the UK, the norm was still bimetallism. It was why international conferences took place to restore the previous monetary order and why popular outcries for bimetallism intensified in the period, culminating in the free silver movement in the US. However, the British bimetallist movement was far less intense and widespread than its US counterpart. Even the cotton interests in Lancashire, a hotbed of bimetallism, were divided about the issue. That is, British bimetallism was no more than a minority heterodoxy.<sup>60</sup>

Amery's arguments for bimetallism were typical but comprehensive.<sup>61</sup> As Green succinctly explained, there were two logical propositions underpinning

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<sup>58</sup> Ted Wilson, *Battles for the Standard: Bimetallism and the Spread of the Gold Standard in the Nineteenth Century* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000), 8-9.

<sup>59</sup> Albert Feavearyear, *The Pound Sterling: A History of English Money*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963).

<sup>60</sup> Wilson, *Battles for the Standard*, 181-182.

<sup>61</sup> Amery's draft for the speech for bimetallism, AMEL 6/1/73. Following analysis is based on

the movement: 1. Re-monetization of silver would increase the money supply on the global scale, consequently stopping the fall of prices; 2. Restoration of global bimetallism would be a solution to the disruption of the trade between gold-using countries and silver-using countries, mainly located in Asia, which had been caused by the depreciation of the silver price after its demonetization.<sup>62</sup> Amery advocated bimetallism by citing both propositions. As a bimetallist, he believed that the 'unparalleled depression' in agriculture and industry was 'almost entirely due to the great fall in prices and the violent dislocation of trade from the gold to the silver using countries'. Deflation had a ruinous effect on 'those who work and venture'. Only 'the drones of the community, the inheritors of money, and the gamblers on exchange' gained a profit in this situation. Equally, the dislocation of trade with the East was a serious problem for British producers, not only due to British manufacturers being shut out from the silver areas but also because of the virtual dumping by such silver-using countries as India, Argentina, and Japan. As for the latter point, Amery cautiously avoided using the language of British supremacists so as not to upset India. He claimed that only 'a small class in India' gained benefits, while the Indian Government lost such a vast amount of money annually that the investment in railways had to be halted and Indian taxpayers were ultimately squeezed, though it is not clear whether Amery here meant the Home Charges swollen by the changes in the exchange rate.<sup>63</sup>

When considering the legacy of bimetallism in Amery's tariff reform ideology, there is a relevant academic controversy in British historiography between E. H. Green and Stephen Howe. As Green depicted the bimetallist

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this draft.

<sup>62</sup> Green, *Crisis*, 38.

<sup>63</sup> Amery's speech draft, AMEL 6/1/73.

campaign as a revolt of the producers' alliance (agriculture and manufacture) against money interests in the City, he insisted that the bimetallic movement should be seen as one of the dissenters' schemes to challenge the consensus of liberal political economy as with Tariff Reform.<sup>64</sup> Howe criticized this argument as a simplified dichotomy. He emphasized the facts that there were bimetallicists inside the City and that producers' opinions were also divided. He also pointed out that one should not identify bimetallicists with protectionists because some free traders became bimetallicists.<sup>65</sup> In a reply to Howe, Green, while admitting that there were internal conflicts within both parties, did not accept Howe's perspective on 'the relationship of bimetallicism to the tariff campaign and the issue of economic nationalism versus cosmopolitanism.'<sup>66</sup>

To what extent can we regard Amery's bimetallicism as a harbinger of his Tariff Reform?<sup>67</sup> On the one hand, many seeds of Tariff Reform can be found in his speech. Amery deliberately set bimetallicism up as the antithesis of *laissez-faire*. In describing the popularity of bimetallicism in the US, Amery quipped, 'They [farmers in the US] have no lecturers of *laissez-faire* political economy to tell them that to attempt to grow now is folly and that they ought to content themselves with starving.' He also quoted a remark by George Goschen to ridicule dogmatic guardians of the gold standard: 'most monometallicists hold

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<sup>64</sup> E. H. H. Green, 'Rentiers versus Producers? The Political Economy of the Bimetallic Controversy c. 1880-1898', *The English Historical Review* 103, no. 408 (1988): 588-612.

<sup>65</sup> A. C. Howe, 'Bimetallicism, c. 1880-1898: A Controversy Re-Opened?', *The English Historical Review* 105, no. 415 (1990): 377-91.

<sup>66</sup> E. H. H. Green, 'The Bimetallic Controversy: Empiricism Belimed or the Case for the Issues', *The English Historical Review* 105, no. 416 (1990): 673-83. This academic conflict was to be appropriated in another wider controversy about the conception of 'gentlemanly capitalism'. Naturally enough, Green's argument was absorbed in the grand narrative of 'gentlemanly capitalism', while its critics sympathized with Howe. See, P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, *British Imperialism* (London & New York: Longman, 1993), 143-145; Martin Daunton, "'Gentlemanly Capitalism' and British Industry 1820-1914', *Past & Present*, no. 122 (1989): 126, 151; idem., "'Gentlemanly Capitalism' and British Industry 1820-1914: Reply', *Past & Present*, no. 132 (1991): 183-184.

<sup>67</sup> All quotations in the following two paragraphs are from his speech draft in AMEL 6/1/73.

their views so strongly that like some orthodox religious people they are unable to give an account of their relief'.<sup>68</sup> His emphasis on the importance of producers in the national economy was also to be a central theme in his tariff reform ideology. More specifically, bimetallism gave his economic thought an inflationist-monetarist slant. Anti-deflation became a significant, if not more than Tariff Reform, element in his policy menu. He would appropriate a simplistic version of the quantity theory of money to deny the universal merit of free trade when he claimed that the mid-Victorian boom had been triggered by the gold rush in Australia and California as well as the fortuitous locomotive boom rather than the repeal of the Corn Laws.<sup>69</sup> In this sense, Green's argument about continuity between bimetallism and Tariff Reform seemed to the point as far as the mindset of Tariff Reformers was concerned.

On the other hand, however, the wordings in the speech indicated that we should be more cautious about the causal relations between bimetallism and Tariff Reform, even in the case of Amery. The bimetallist campaign, particularly concerning the disruption of trade with the East, could be interpreted as both a petition for protection and a plea for sound free trade. Henry Chaplin, an inveterate protectionist regarding agrarian interests, did not hesitate to declare that bimetallism was a practical substitution for protection.<sup>70</sup> By contrast, some free traders in Lancashire and the City believed that bimetallism was a natural corollary of Free Trade, which had been artificially distorted by the gold standard.<sup>71</sup> Amery's stance was seemingly closer to the latter. While he

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<sup>68</sup> Amery did not refer to the source. In fact, the remark of Goschen was from his comment in a meeting with bimetallist campaigners. The Bimetallic League, *The Bimetallic Question: Deputation to the Prime Minister and to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, May 30th, 1889* (Manchester, n. d.), 58.

<sup>69</sup> Amery, *Great Question*, 2-3; Amery, *Balanced Economy*, 18.

<sup>70</sup> Henry Chaplin, *Bimetallism and Agriculture* (Manchester: the Bimetallic League, 1888), 11.

<sup>71</sup> Howe, 'Bimetallism', 387-388.

vituperated 'the drones of the community' as mentioned above, he distinguished a diligent group of creditors from them.

Even the Bankers who as a whole have got so strongly for monometallism are really losing. They are debtors just as much as creditors and after all they live by the prosperity of their customers. If the ruin of trade destroys a debtor the creditor loses all.

Most probably, this categorization was borrowed from the works of Henry Gibbs, a director of the Bank of England and bimetallist, who was actually referred to twice in Amery's speech.<sup>72</sup> In terms of the long-term growth of his economic thought, Amery, based on the lesson from Henry George, mastered the rhetoric that everyone was simultaneously consumer/creditor and producer/debtor so as not to alienate the former. Indeed, this rhetoric could be seen as a precursor to that of Tariff Reformers because Joseph Chamberlain used a similar inclusive rhetoric about the financial interest.<sup>73</sup> But at this moment, Amery justified bimetallism from the point view of free traders. He criticized the artificial condition that Indian and Argentinian farmers undersold British farmers 'due to protection'. In delineating the harmful effect of the plummeting rupee, he made his stance clearer.

Is it a good thing either for India or England that our commerce should be shut out? That is protectionist argument of the worst type. The principle of Free Trade is that both parties gain and of Protection that

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<sup>72</sup> Gibbs differentiated the 'worker bees' including bankers from the 'drones. Daunton, "Gentlemanly Capitalism", 151.

<sup>73</sup> Cain and Hopkins, *British Imperialism*, 195-196.

both parties as a rule lose. And it is the worst conceivable form of Protection: varying from day to day and making no contract safe.

Though it is debatable whether Amery differentiated 'the worst type' of protection from protection in general, it is worthwhile to emphasize the fact that Free Trade was positively contrasted with Protection, which was inconceivable in his later discourse. As far as his bimetallist idea is concerned, it is impossible to definitively judge whether he was a bimetallist-free trader or a bimetallist-protectionist because the boundary was often blurred. After all, the language of free trade could be appropriated by those for and against it. Hence, it would be safe to only say that bimetallism was not a direct catalyst to making him a Tariff Reformer, but it offered him plenty of intellectual ingredients to elaborate on his tariff reform ideology afterwards.

### **From imperial preference to Tariff Reform**

Amery's recollections concerning the focal point of the Tariff Reform Movement resembles the interpretation by Alan Sykes in that both found it transformed from imperial preference for imperial unity to a more multi-dimensional policy, including protection and social reform. Amery's memoir concisely described the change as follows: 'Imperial Preference' turned into 'Tariff Reform' in the course of the fight against Free Trade. According to his interpretation, the change took place by the autumn of 1903, whereas Sykes has located the watershed somewhere around 1907.<sup>74</sup> However, it might be more precise to think that the interpretation reflected his own change more than

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<sup>74</sup> *My Political Life*, vol. 1, 237; Sykes, *Tariff Reform*.



that of the movement as a whole. Regarding his view on Free Trade before 1903, his memoir confessed:

While I had always been a firm believer in imperial preference as for imperial unity, I had not seriously looked into the question of our trade and had been content to assume that Free Trade was, by and large, a convenient policy which we could always modify when necessary.

It means that he did not 'look into the question' until the beginning of the Tariff Reform campaign.<sup>75</sup> His conciliatory rhetoric toward Free Trade in the speech on bimetallism, analysed above, seems to corroborate the self-evaluation.

It was unclear when he encountered and came to advocate the idea of imperial preference. For all his claims, little evidence implies that Amery found imperial preference an important cause in the 1890s. As discussed below, the remaining sources only prove that it was not until that the end of the South African War that imperial preference began to attract his mind. However, Amery, at first, imagined imperial preference merely as a tool to imperialize the political and administrative framework of the British Empire. In other words, he seemed not to clearly recognize the basic fact that the introduction of imperial preference would inevitably entail the wholesale reform of British fiscal policy. Given the state of British custom duties at the time, this assumption was utterly absurd, with hindsight. His memoir apologetically said that once the Tariff Reform Movement had been launched, he quickly realized that it was vital to combat the foundation of the 'Free Trade theory'.<sup>76</sup> His papers after 1903 show

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<sup>75</sup> *My Political Life*, vol. 1, 242-3.

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*, 243.

that he equipped imperial preference with plenty of theoretical weapons one after another. In this sense, Amery certainly developed his idea of imperial preference into his tariff reform ideology. This section will discuss its process and its meaning.

The South African War brought Amery an opportunity to ruminate on the economic aspects of the imperial framework. In devising a reconstruction scheme for South Africa, he explicitly advocated imperial preference for the first time. Though he upheld the annexation of two Boer republics, he was opposed to imposing a heavy indemnity on them. The combination of an imperial federation and the development of South Africa, he argued, would be more beneficial to Britain in the long run, if the network of preferential tariffs was established among the members of the federation.<sup>77</sup> Amery, at this point, did not renounce the ideal of an imperial federation yet and predicted that the common imperial revenue and expenditure generated by imperial preference would facilitate formation of a Federal Council.<sup>78</sup> Deriving from a post-war reconstruction scheme, in his mind, imperial preference became a necessary premise for imperial unity. This way of thinking was in harmony with his idea on Army Reform, where the imperialization of the defence policy was a central proposition. Although, as discussed in Chapter 1, Amery's initial reaction to Chamberlain's Tariff Reform was a concern that Chamberlain's assistance would be distracted from Army Reform, in the same letter, where he expressed this feeling, he tried to convince himself that:

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<sup>77</sup> Amery to Moberly Bell, 29 August 1901, Bell Papers, CMB/1.

<sup>78</sup> Amery to Moberly Bell, July 1902. The date is illegible. CMB/1.

One thing Joe's policy when it comes off will make the Imperialization of the army and navy possible for it will tend to an equalization of wages and cost of living between England and the colonies, a rise in the one and fall in the other. I am very annoyed with our Liberal Imperialist friends. Quite apart from the question of developing the colonies by preferential trade, it seems to me impossible ever to get the colonies really interested in our foreign policy and consequently ready to take their part in it or contribute towards the necessary armaments which that foreign policy is so largely directed by the peculiar economic interests of our Free Trade system.<sup>79</sup>

That is, to Amery, imperial preference mainly meant an essential step to the imperialization of the defence services and, ultimately, the entire political framework.

However, Amery had another opportunity to grasp the possibly multi-dimensional effect of imperial preference before Chamberlain's speech. In a meeting of the Coefficients held on 19 January 1903, they had a debate, opened by William Hewins, over how far and upon what conditions preferential tariffs were desirable and attainable. According to the minutes written by Amery and Mackinder, there was 'a considerable divergence' in members' views. The structure of the conflict foreshadowed the national controversy starting six months later.<sup>80</sup> Pro-preference members argued that Britain had to develop and make the most of the potential market and resources in the self-governing colonies to galvanize its industry and maintain its international status as well as

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<sup>79</sup> Amery to Milner, 20 June 1903. Milner dep. 176.

<sup>80</sup> After Chamberlain's speech, Amery was to tell Hewins that the topic at the meeting was not 'Zukunftsmusik'. Amery to Hewins, 3 June 1903, Hewins Papers, 46.

to politically unify the Empire. But they were confronted by a range of rejoinders: a greater desire to extract a tax from the wealthy; the impracticality and possibly disastrous results of throwing away the delicate commercial mechanism; any harmful effect on international security, and the probable hostility from colonial manufacturers.<sup>81</sup> Though the minutes did not say which participants were on which side, Hewins' memoir reported that only Amery and Maxse supported Hewins' argument.<sup>82</sup> It means that Amery at least heard with sympathy Hewins deploying the multi-faceted justification of imperial preference which involved more than imperial unity.

If his focus lay on imperial defence and federation as of May 1903, he was soon forced to widen the front of the project. When the letter signed by the 'fourteen professors' criticizing Chamberlain's project was published in *The Times* on 12 August, Amery immediately joined in the campaign to vituperate it under the pseudonym of 'Tariff Reformer'.<sup>83</sup> Using this name, he wrote and sent a dozen letters in 1903-4 to refute a series of arguments by anti-tariff reformers in the correspondence columns of *The Times*. The discussions were, for the most part, over the expected effects of preferential tariffs on the domestic economy. Based on these experiences, Amery presented a theoretical justification of imperial preference in lectures at the Compatriot Club and published them as a pamphlet, *The Fundamental Fallacies of Free Trade*, in 1906.<sup>84</sup>

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<sup>81</sup> Papers of the Coefficients, ASSOC 17.

<sup>82</sup> W. A. S. Hewins, *The Apologia of an Imperialist: Forty Years of Empire Policy* (London: Constable, 1929). Also see H. G. Wells' recollection on Amery and the Coefficients, H. G. Wells, *Experiment in Autobiography* (London: Victor Gollancz & the Cresset Press, 1934), vol. 2, 764-765; idem., *The New Machiavelli* (London: The Bodley Head, 1911), 337-339.

<sup>83</sup> 'Professors of Economics and Fiscal Policy', *The Times*, 18 August 1903.

<sup>84</sup> Though I use the 2<sup>nd</sup> edition published in 1908 in this thesis, the content was almost the same as the 1906 edition except for some modification of figures. L. S. Amery, *The Fundamental Fallacies of Free Trade* (London, 1908).

In the course of that process, he elaborated his own theory of Tariff Reform, in which national and imperial interests were inextricably connected. Preferential tariffs would not mean either a rise in the price of food or a new burden on British taxpayers, not only because non- or low-taxed colonial corn could make up for the loss in food importation from foreign countries but also because it was not British consumers but foreign producers that would incur the cost of any new tariffs as a result of their efforts to retain a reasonable amount of their trade. Rather, tariffs would bring Britain more stable employment, higher wages, and consequently more consumption/production by protecting national industry from unfair dumping.<sup>85</sup> Most vulnerable to criticism from Free Traders was the question of whether preferential tariffs could sufficiently compensate for the loss in trade with foreign countries. Amery rebutted the suspicion. Contrary to Free Traders' misgivings, he claimed, the profit of Tariff Reform would be generated not in the revenue from the duty but in the market secured by the duty. Moreover, it was wrong to underrate the potential of the colonial market because preferential tariffs, by developing their whole economy and by attracting migrants from Britain, would expand the colonial populations, that is, the size of the colonial market. He argued: 'To belittle the possibilities of our trade with the Colonies on account of its present dimensions is as absurd as it would have been for a New Englander 60 years ago to have belittled the possibilities of the Central and Western States of the American Union.'<sup>86</sup> In this sense, Amery's tariff reform ideology demonstrates the veracity of David Thackeray's argument that the dream of intra-imperial trade was, above all, buttressed by the *expectation* of the expansion of the imperial market in the

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<sup>85</sup> *The Times*, 1 September, 8 September, 7 November 1903

<sup>86</sup> *The Times*, 24 August, 1 December.

future.<sup>87</sup> Tariff Reformers often claimed that without imperial unity and preference, Britain would not be able to pay for social reform or armaments. His brief comment in a meeting of the Compatriot Club well summarized this most important point in one sentence: 'The real issue was not fiscal one but the economic one, viz. the material strength required to sustain British policy'.<sup>88</sup>

In short, what Tariff Reform would bring was, to Amery, mutual growth of production and consumption on an imperial scale. This stemmed from his struggles to differentiate Tariff Reform from retaliation or passive protection. In response to Balfour's proposal about retaliatory tariffs in October 1903, his letter to *The Times* deprecated the Unionist/Conservative leader's futile attempt to avoid the split of his party by 'an economic criticism, and at the same time a rehabilitation, of Cobdenism'. He emphasized that Tariff Reformers' 'economic nationalism', which was trying to protect and expand markets for British industry, was completely different from Balfourite compromise. The latter was impractical, likely to elicit more resentment than general tariffs from targeted countries, and unlikely to exclude food taxes, which would be indispensable in bringing pressure on the United States or Russia.<sup>89</sup> On the other hand, his pamphlet for his constituency in 1905 assured the readers that the objects of Tariff Reform were neither protecting 'inefficient industries' nor 'landlordism' at the expense of other interests; they just aimed to secure fair conditions of production, which would accomplish better employment and wages in Britain and imperial unity by both securing and growing the British and imperial markets.<sup>90</sup> The argument that Tariff Reform was not a palliative dole but a

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<sup>87</sup> David Thackeray, *Forging a British World of Trade: Culture, Ethnicity, and Market in the Empire-Commonwealth, 1880-1975* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019).

<sup>88</sup> Amery diary, 29 January 1909, AMEL 7/8.

<sup>89</sup> 'The Sheffield Conference', *The Times*, 3 Oct 1903.

<sup>90</sup> *The Case for Tariff Reform*, July 1905, AMEL 1/1/17. In this context, Amery attributed the decline of British industries solely to the extraneous factor rather than to their inefficiency. He

structural development policy that would enable social reform was typical rhetoric of the Whole-Hoggers' cause.

This forward nature was in accordance with his economic policy for the dependent Empire. Amery's two-tiered imperial vision urged uplifting the civilizations of the dependent colonies by fostering their economies.<sup>91</sup> His article on British East Africa in 1908 claimed that the aim of investment in the colonies was not confined to civilizing their culture. A temporal increase of the British expenditure would bring better long-term returns from East Africa, which would be not only self-supporting but also offer a market and a purveyor of raw materials for Britain. Of course, Amery warned, whether all the potentialities would be fulfilled depended on the success of British fiscal reform in the future, without which foreign products would flood the developed colonial market.<sup>92</sup> Colonial development was imagined by Amery as a piece in the grandiose project of Tariff Reform. A chief obstacle was, Amery complained, the hesitation of the Treasury to provide more loans for or investment in the colonies.<sup>93</sup> It exactly presaged the conflict between the Colonial Office and the Treasury in the 1920s.<sup>94</sup>

The cause of the imperial/colonial market, however, brought a dilemma for Tariff Reformers; if the settler colonies or the Dominions hoped to protect their infant industries, how should their desire be reconciled with the cause of imperial preference? This was a corollary of the issue of agrarian protection in the UK; if imperial preference promoted food importation from the Empire, how

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claimed that the unfair condition in trade was the cause of inefficiency. *Ibid.*, 5-6. Also see *Fundamental Fallacies*, 92.

<sup>91</sup> L. S. Amery, *Union and Strength: A Series of Papers on Imperial Questions* (London: Edward Arnold, 1912), 11,

<sup>92</sup> *Ibid.*, 281-291.

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid.*, 276, 290.

<sup>94</sup> Stephen Constantine, *The Making of British Colonial Development Policy 1914-1940* (London: Frank Cass, 1984).

could British farmers' demand for protection be met? These had been thorny questions since the period of the Fair Trade Movement.<sup>95</sup> Amery spared much space in his writings to deal with the issue.

Amery had no slight interest in the protection of British agriculture. Tateshi Mori has shown that, particularly after the interwar period, Amery came to advocate the balanced development of agriculture and industry in each country of the British Empire.<sup>96</sup> However, it is not correct for Mori to argue that Amery did not sufficiently recognize the importance of British agriculture before the Great War.<sup>97</sup> This argument corresponded with Amery's self-interpretation in the 1930s that ,while Joseph Chamberlain's campaign for the most part cared about British manufacturers, the experience of the First World War taught 'a lesson on the danger of neglecting agriculture'.<sup>98</sup> Contrary to this statement, since the very first response to the 'fourteen professors', Amery had recognized a need to protect and restore British agriculture.<sup>99</sup> To emphasize the importance of agriculture, he conjured up the ghost of Adam Smith and his wage fund doctrine as a punching bag. Amery contended that the history of the British and German economies negated the existence of any trade-off between industry and agriculture. Contrary to the wage fund doctrine, expanding agricultural production and the population enlarged a market for industry.<sup>100</sup> This sanguine view about the mutual growth of the economy and populations was clearly

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<sup>95</sup> Green, *Crisis of Conservatism*, 28-35. As for the precedent movements, see Benjamin H. Brown, *The Tariff Reform Movement in Great Britain 1881-1895* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1943).; Anna Gambles, *Protection and Politics: Conservative Economic Discourse, 1815-1852* (Suffolk: Royal Historical Society & Boydell Press, 1999).

<sup>96</sup> Tateshi Mori, 'Eimeri to Igrisu Teikokushugi: Kokuminkeizai to Nogyo-hogo' (Amery and British Imperialism: National Economy and Agricultural Protection), *Keizai to Keizaigaku*, no. 65 (1990): 45-60; idem, *Igrisu Nogyo Seisakushi* (The History of British Agricultural Policy) (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 2003).

<sup>97</sup> Mori, 'Eimeri', 49.

<sup>98</sup> L. S. Amery, ed., *A Plan of Action* (London: Faber and Faber, 1932). 41-42.

<sup>99</sup> *The Times*, 18 August 1903; 24 August 1903.

<sup>100</sup> Amery, *Fundamental Fallacies*, 31-34.



derived from the teachings of Henry George. It was probably strengthened by the experience of witnessing Milner's reconstruction plan in South Africa. Milner's key policy was to develop the gold mines as rapidly as possible to generate an 'overspill' of revenue, consuming power, industrial ability, and increase of white labour, which would be available for the development of agriculture and other mineral resources. The 'overspill', thus, was essential to 'lift' South Africa.<sup>101</sup> Amery found role models in South Africa, Germany, and the US, all of which intervened in the economy to artificially trigger a positive spiral of growth. Amery grumbled that British agriculture declined thanks to Cobdenism which exposed British farmers to unfair competition. The current co-prosperity of agriculture and industry in Germany marked a stark contrast.<sup>102</sup> From the standpoint of the British national economy, Amery never insisted that British agriculture should be allowed to languish.

Concurrently, in response to Free Traders' suspicions about whether the settler colonies would be willing to tolerate an influx of British manufactured products, Amery had to declare that imperial preference could be a win-win deal for British and colonial industries at the expense of foreign manufacturers.<sup>103</sup> Colonial/Dominion supporters of imperial preference did not accept the unrestricted inflow of British products. For instance, even Alfred Deakin, the leader of the Australian Protectionists, who kept in touch with Amery, prioritized protection rather than imperial preference.<sup>104</sup> Amery, as an approver of colonial

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<sup>101</sup> This policy was not just for economic development but also for securing whiteness of South Africa with British immigrants having the upper hand. The introduction of Chinese labour was justified as an expedient to achieve the 'overspill'. *The Times History of the War in South Africa: 1899-1902*, vol. 6 (London: Sampson Low, Marston, 1900), 18-19, 111-112. Also see, *My Political Life*, vol. 1, 174. For historians' account, J. Lee Thompson, *Forgotten Patriot: A Life of Alfred, Viscount Milner of St James's and Cape Town, 1854-1925* (Madison NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2007), 227.

<sup>102</sup> Amery, *Great Question*, 14-15.

<sup>103</sup> *The Times*, 24 August 1903.

<sup>104</sup> Emmett Sullivan, 'Revealing a Preference: Imperial Preference and the Australian Tariff, 1901-14', *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 29.1 (2001), 38-39, 55-57.

nationalism, was particularly sensitive to their aspirations for industrial development.<sup>105</sup> But his two-layered imperial vision came into play here again. In a debate with Edgar Vincent, a Unionist free trader, Amery frankly admitted that imperial preference would not change the situation of Bombay, whose industry had been 'sacrificed to Lancashire' due to the lack of tariff autonomy in India. What India would gain from preference would be more prosperous agriculture, which employed millions of Indians, at the price of 'a handful of Bombay millowners'.<sup>106</sup> As evidenced by his view on East Africa, Amery still saw the dependent colonies just as permanent purveyors of foodstuffs and raw materials at least before the First World War.

Aside from the issue of dependent colonies, what was a concrete solution to give reasonable protection to British agriculture and Dominion industry? Amery answered that imperial preference could be devised flexibly enough to mediate all the interests within the Empire. Imperial Free Trade or a British Zollverein was out of the question for the purpose.<sup>107</sup> 'Imperial preference with moderate internal tariffs' was 'likely to lead to a greater total development'.<sup>108</sup> The forte of imperial preference was that it could 'harmonize divergencies of interest and so create the political conditions for successful co-operation'.<sup>109</sup> His optimistic expectation about the versatile flexibility of the preference system was constructed based on the Tariff Commission's attempt to devise 'scientific' tariffs, which would reconcile all the interests in the British Empire. The idea of

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<sup>105</sup> Thompson, *Imperial Britain*, 87.

<sup>106</sup> *The Times*, 5 March 1904.

<sup>107</sup> As of 1904, Amery approved of Imperial Free Trade as an ultimate object, though he emphasized a need of a step-by-step approach to attain it. By 1909, he came to argue that its ultimate desirability was 'extremely doubtful'. *The Times*, 29 February 1904; Amery, *Great Question*, 47.

<sup>108</sup> Amery, *Fundamental Fallacies*, 55. In this phase (1906), Amery still assumed that the internal tariffs would decrease 'as economic conditions are equalised'.

<sup>109</sup> Amery, *Great Question*, 52.

the 'scientific taxation' was publicly preached by Joseph Chamberlain's speech on 6 October 1903.<sup>110</sup> The Tariff Commission was established to devise a concrete tariff scheme based on research and statistics. Under the guidance of Hewins, the organization devoted several years of efforts to the project, though the result fell short of their initial ambition.<sup>111</sup> Amery himself was not a frequent user of the adjective 'scientific'. But when Michael Hicks Beach, ex-Chancellor of the Exchequer, ridiculed the idea of the 'scientific taxation', Amery's anonymous letter to *The Times* quickly refuted the criticism.<sup>112</sup> He was also regularly involved in the meetings of the Tariff Commission, where he must have strengthened his optimism.

In fact, the Tariff Commission and Hewins never neglected the interests of British agriculture.<sup>113</sup> On the contrary, they tried to find a proper balance between industry and agriculture and also to adopt a non-fiscal supplementary policy for agriculture. Especially Jesse Collings' scheme to promote small-holdings became the central core of the Conservative non-fiscal policy.<sup>114</sup> Amery found Collings' scheme promising and incorporated it into his electoral programme. However, typical of his stance, his electoral leaflet said that what could make agriculture 'a paying business' would be 'only Tariff Reform'. In his scheme, development through Tariff Reform preceded all other social reforms and the land reform played second fiddle in his agricultural policy.<sup>115</sup>

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<sup>110</sup> Charles W. Boyd, ed., *Mr. Chamberlain's Speeches*, vol. 2 (London: Constable, 1914), 162-163.

<sup>111</sup> As for historians' accounts of the scientific tariff, see Green, *Crisis*, 19, 184-193; Marrison, *British Business*, 29-37, chapter 2 and 7.

<sup>112</sup> *The Times*, 7 November 1903.

<sup>113</sup> Andrew Marrison, 'The Tariff Commission, Agricultural Protection and Food Taxes, 1903-13', *Agricultural History Review* 34 (1986): 171-87.

<sup>114</sup> Sykes, *Tariff Reform*, 263, 274; Green, *Crisis*, chapter 6, 8. Jesse Collings himself emphasized the importance of the combination of his land reform and Tariff Reform. Jesse Collings, *Land Reform: Occupying Ownership, Peasant Proprietary, and Rural Education* (London: Longmans, Green, 1906), 303.

<sup>115</sup> The leaflet for the second 1910 election. AMEL 4/6.

Amery's letter to the *Midland Evening News* in 1909 more concretely discussed three beneficial effects of Tariff Reform on agriculture: 1) restored industries would offer an enlarged market for agriculture; 2) surplus revenues generated from Tariff Reform could be used to reduce the local rates and to carry out the land reform; 3) tariffs could be adopted to protect some specific products, such as barley, oats, poultry, and so on. However, he excluded wheat and meat from the list of protection by citing the difficulty of imposing tariffs without a price increase.<sup>116</sup> The reservation certainly demonstrated that Amery's agricultural policy was more lukewarm than in the 1930s when wheat and meat became the two most important commodities in his trade policy.<sup>117</sup> He also at times frankly confessed that sustaining the industrial strength of the home country was the most important provisional measure to preserve the British Empire.<sup>118</sup> That being said, Amery did not omit the issue of colonial industry and British agriculture even before 1914. The impact of the First World War was a catalyst to make him take it more seriously and not the origin of the issue. Rather, his belief that preferential tariffs could be flexible and 'scientific' enough to reconcile all the interests elevated the scheme of imperial preference to a panacea in his imagination.

After 1903, Amery finally embraced the logic of the historical school of economics. While not all the historical economists supported Tariff Reform, their relativist interpretation of economic history and criticism of the classical economists tended to be in tune with the cause of the fiscal reform. In fact, H. S. Foxwell, W. Cunningham, W. J. Ashley and Hewins came to be academic

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<sup>116</sup> Amery's letter to *Midland Evening News*, 8 February 1909. AMEL 5/7.

<sup>117</sup> See chapter 9.

<sup>118</sup> Amery, *Union and Strength: A Series of Papers on Imperial Questions* (London: Edward Arnold, 1912), 244.

proponents of Chamberlain.<sup>119</sup> Hewins was probably the most important private teacher to Amery. Wearing the mantle of the historical economists, his *Fundamental Fallacies* made a full-frontal attack on the orthodoxy preached by Adam Smith among others.<sup>120</sup> The book, by at times positively citing Friedrich List, tried to puncture the ‘fallacies’ of economic individualism such as the fallacy of composition, the wage fund doctrine, and the assumption regarding the natural virtue of retrenchment and the universal desirability of concentrating on a sector having a comparative advantage.<sup>121</sup> To compete with Free Traders’ invocation of the memory of the ‘Hungry Forties’, Amery, claiming that the actual lessons of English history contradicted the theory of Free Trade, delineated historical positive impacts of the government’s intervention in and protection of the national economy, which he learned from List’s ‘System of National Economy’ and Cunningham’s *The Growth and of English Industry and Commerce*.<sup>122</sup> Cunningham’s was a popular textbook on the subject, the first edition of which was published in 1882, and the sixth in 1938. As Cunningham converted to Tariff Reform around 1902, suggestions of introducing tariffs were added to the 1903 third edition, which Tariff Reformers cited as an authoritative source.<sup>123</sup> But non-expert campaigners like Amery often went beyond the relativism of the British historical economists to the point of indicating that the

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<sup>119</sup> As for historical economics in Britain, see Gerard M. Koot, *English Historical Economics, 1870-1926: The Rise of Economic History and Neomercantilism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Green, *Crisis*, 149-169.

<sup>120</sup> In his recent article, Marc-William Palen has included Amery in his list of imperialists who positively appropriated Adam Smith. Marc-William Palen, ‘Adam Smith as Advocate of Empire, c. 1870-1932’, *The Historical Journal* 57, no. 1 (2014): 190. However, as far as Amery was concerned, his lip service to Smith was rather exceptional. In *Fundamental Fallacies*, which Palen cited, Amery more consistently treated Adam Smith as an enemy who represented economic orthodoxy. Amery, *Fundamental Fallacies*, 4-5, 23-32, 121-124.

<sup>121</sup> Amery, *Fundamental Fallacies*, 6-7, 23-24, 29-30, 58, 62, 118-125.

<sup>122</sup> *Ibid.*, 6-7, 114-127.

<sup>123</sup> Bernard Semmel, *Imperialism and Social Reform: English Social-Imperial Thought 1895-1914* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1960), 191-201; Kensuke Sasaki, *Igirisu Rekishigakuha to Keizaigaku Ronso* (The British Historical School and the Methodological Controversies in Economics) (Sapporo: Hokkaido University Press, 2013), 250-254.

laissez-faire policy in the nineteenth century was a deviation from the universally more appropriate principle of 'conscious and constructive statecraft working'.<sup>124</sup>

For all these influences from the historical economists, however, the ideas which he deployed to justify Tariff Reform neither suddenly appeared nor just derived from the teaching of the historical school. As discussed in the previous sections, Amery had already acquired many elements of the ideologies of Tariff Reform such as the logic of underconsumption, the inextricability of producers and consumers, and the compatibility of population growth and economic expansion. That is, what Amery obtained from the teachings of the historical economists was not a set of new ideas but a framework to synthesize his scattered ideas deriving from his antipathy towards the economic orthodoxy. From the present standpoint, it is certainly easy to dismiss his output on economy in the 1880s-1900s as sophomoric. But in the process of cherry-picking convenient elements of Idealism, socialism, classical economics, and bimetallism, he nurtured his own economic heterodoxy. It was this idiosyncratic trajectory that made him one of the staunchest advocates of Tariff Reform as, in his world view, the campaign sprang not from political fads but from his intellectual conviction.

## **2. Amery's Tariff Reform Ideology in Party Politics and Popular Politics**

### **Political ideologies and party politics**

After the South African War, Amery decided to become a politician as a Tariff Reformer. He was chosen as the Unionist candidate for Wolverhampton

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<sup>124</sup> Amery, *Fundamental Fallacies*, 127. Also see, Garvin, 'Principles of Constructive Economics as Applied to the Maintenance of Empire', in *Compatriots Club Lectures*, ed. by The Committee of the Compatriots Club (London: Macmillan, 1905), 13.

East in 1905. This inevitably forced him, having been politically promiscuous, to define his stance towards each political ideology and party. This section will analyse the making of his ideology and its practice.

Amery formally terminated his membership of the Fabian Society in July 1905.<sup>125</sup> The timing indicates that the action was caused by his acquirement of the Conservative candidacy. As anti-socialism was a consistent element of British Conservative identity since the last quarter of the nineteenth century,<sup>126</sup> it was sensible for the new Unionist/Conservative candidate to cancel his affiliation with socialism. However, by 1904, Amery was already disappointed enough by the Fabians and the Liberal imperialists because of the controversy over Tariff Reform. For instance, at the meeting of the Coefficients on 9 November 1903, they discussed the national minimum, the core concept in Webb's economic thought. Notwithstanding their general agreement on the necessity of securing the minimum standard of well-being, the discussion turned into a debate over the fiscal reform by the Tariff Reformers' suggestion that a protective tariff should be the logical complement to the national minimum.<sup>127</sup> As Searle has argued, Tariff Reform was a dividing issue to campaigners for 'national efficiency'.<sup>128</sup> Though socialists' attitudes towards imperialism were diverse, the grandiose project of imperial preference, for the most part, alienated them. The Webbs were never persuaded by Tariff Reformers despite their sympathy with Chamberlain's general outlook. Green's speculative

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<sup>125</sup> Amery to Pease, 12 July 1905, Fabian Society Papers, A6-1.

<sup>126</sup> Fforde's monograph has delineated this aspect of British Conservatism. Matthew Fforde, *Conservatism and Collectivism, 1886-1914* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1990). However, it overstated the strength of libertarian tendencies in Conservatism by identifying anti-socialism with anti-collectivism. David Jarvis, 'The Road to 1931: The Conservative Party and Political Realignment in Early Twentieth-Century Britain', *The Historical Journal* 36, no. 2 (1993): 469-75.

<sup>127</sup> Papers of the Coefficients, ASSOC 17.

<sup>128</sup> Searle, *The Quest*, 148.

argument that the division in the Coefficients over Tariff Reform led imperialist members to form the Compatriot Club is probably correct.<sup>129</sup> As a Unionist candidate, Amery came to use the language of anti-socialism more explicitly than Milner, who was aloof from party politics.<sup>130</sup> Amery's leaflets for the election campaigns announced that he would support social reform, such as the old-age pension, but not socialism which was preaching class hatred and exploitation.<sup>131</sup> His ex-Fabian background was used by the Liberal local press in his constituency as proof of his unreliability as a candidate.<sup>132</sup> Taking advantage of the allegation, one of his leaflets for the second 1910 election announced that he had belonged to the Fabian Society and, therefore, his criticism of socialism was not based on prejudice but on a careful study of socialist views.<sup>133</sup> This statement was all the more necessary because his opponent was George Lansbury, a socialist and future Labour leader, who was backed by the Progressive Alliance.

However, in the private sphere, Amery was not so harsh on British socialism. When he met Lansbury for the first time in 1906, Amery found him 'very reasonable'. They agreed that unemployment would be a non-temporary problem, though they naturally disagreed on Tariff Reform.<sup>134</sup> In addition, Amery reported to Balfour that in his discussion with Sidney Webb on unemployment they had reached an agreement:

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<sup>129</sup> Green, *Crisis*, 166-167. Regarding socialists' response to imperialism and Tariff Reform, also see Andrew Thompson, 'The Language of Imperialism and the Meanings of Empire: Imperial Discourse in British Politics, 1895-1914', *Journal of British Studies* 36, no. 2 (1997): 147-77; Frank Trentmann, 'Wealth versus Welfare: The British Left between Free Trade and National Political Economy before the First World War', *Historical Research* 70, no. 171 (1997): 70-98.

<sup>130</sup> Milner's speech delivered in Wolverhampton for Amery used the term 'a nobler Socialism', which was differentiated from a rapacious type of socialism, to advocate attempts to raise well-being and efficiency of the poor. Alfred Milner, *The Nation and the Empire: Being a Collection of Speeches and Addresses: With an Introduction* (London: Constable, 1913), 161.

<sup>131</sup> See his leaflets for the 1908 by-election and the first 1910 general election. AMEL 4/5.

<sup>132</sup> Undated press cutting in AMEL 5/5.

<sup>133</sup> The leaflet is in AMEL 4/6.

<sup>134</sup> Amery's diary, 21 November 1906, AMEL 7/7.



It is much better to give the work in the ordinary way to skilled workmen and help the unemployed indirectly than to employ men who do the work badly and then subsidize the municipality by the extent of the loss.

These examples show that Amery shared a Fabian conviction that unemployment would be remedied by helping efficient workers rather than indiscriminately offering doles or public works.<sup>135</sup> The issue of sweated labour, a key concept to the Webbs, was to make its way onto his list of social problems.<sup>136</sup> In this sense, Fabian socialism helped Amery to become a Tariff Reformer carrying the aim of social reform.<sup>137</sup> Publicly, however, Amery never distinguished Fabian socialism from socialism in general. The experience of reading *Das Kapital* in 1909 strengthened his doubts about Marx. After that, he consistently explained the unworkability of 'socialism' deliberately based solely on his criticism of Marxist socialism.<sup>138</sup> In any case, once he found a concrete prescription for society in Tariff Reform, he lost his sympathy with Fabian socialism except for their common diagnosis.

On the other hand, it is unclear whether Amery was aware of the emergence of what historians now call 'the New Liberalism'. As his disappointment at the Liberal Imperialists shows, his antagonism towards Free Traders was such that he probably paid little attention to the difference between old and new Liberalism and between classical and neoclassical economics.<sup>139</sup>

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<sup>135</sup> Amery to Balfour, 24 October 1908, Add MS 49775.

<sup>136</sup> Amery's memorandum, 'Unionist Policy', 1917, AMEL 1/3/50.

<sup>137</sup> Amery declared that his and the Compatriots' political goal was to further 'Imperial unity and social reform' and that social reform and national strength was not trade-off but complementary. Amery, *Fundamental Fallacies*, 1, 41.

<sup>138</sup> Amery's diary, 21 January 1909. AMEL 7/8.

<sup>139</sup> 'Tariff Reformer's targets included Hobhouse and Pigou. *The Times*, 23 October 1903; 16 November 1903.

As for the actual Liberal policy, however, Amery, in the 1920s, observed that the Liberal Party had discarded laissez-faire individualism, at least regarding domestic affairs.<sup>140</sup> As for Lloyd George, Amery in the 1930s included Lloyd George's 'Radical Social Reform' in the list of eclectic collectivism in the UK.<sup>141</sup> Although Amery's retrospective verdict on Lloyd George was not necessarily negative, in the pre-war years, he criticized the new Liberal direction as quasi-socialism, which was a typical Conservative reaction to new Liberal policies. When Lloyd George politicised taxation and annual budgets towards the end of the 1900s, Amery argued that Tariff Reform could bring a third source of revenue, a possible alternative to an increase in direct or indirect taxation. Amery here, again, laid more stress on the expected increase of production/population triggered by preferential tariffs than on expected direct revenues from tariffs. The development of the British economy would effectively and justly broaden the incidence of taxation.<sup>142</sup> In this way, he conceptualized Tariff Reform as a forward-looking project differentiated from the redistributive policy of the Liberal government. At the time of the Constitutional Crisis, Amery more explicitly blamed the Chancellor of the Exchequer for using languages of class hatred to justify 'the wholesale confiscation of the property'.<sup>143</sup>

Rejecting the ideologies of the Progressive Alliance, Amery finally found a congenial political ideology, 'Unionism', as propounded by the Whole-Hoggers' manifesto, which was known as 'the unauthorised programme' in *The Morning*

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<sup>140</sup> L. S. Amery, *National and Imperial Economics* (Westminster: National Unionist Association, 1923), 11.

<sup>141</sup> Amery, *The Forward View* (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1935), 126.

<sup>142</sup> Amery, *The Great Question*, 38-44.

<sup>143</sup> Amery, 'The Strike and its Lessons', *The Conservative and Unionist*, September 1911, 136, AMEL 1/2/20. Amery used the same logic in criticizing Lloyd George's unemployment policy for the 1929 election. 'Liberal "Prospective": Mr. Amery on Mr. Lloyd Gorge's Proposals', *The Sunday Times*, 14 April 1929. This stance led him to argue that Keynes's greatness as an economist was exaggerated. In his view, internal spending without tariff reform was not a fundamental remedy. See Amery, *My Political Life*, vol. 2, 499-500; Amery diary, 21 April 1946, AMEL 7/40.

*Post* in 1908. This document redefined Unionism, from its original meaning of a political union of the British Isles to mean a union of all the regional units of the UK, of all economic classes in the UK, and of all members of the British Empire. In their programme, imperial preference assumed the role of a magic bullet to attain all these unions.<sup>144</sup> Though Amery was involved in the making of the document only as a lesser assistant, after being an MP he was to use the definition of Unionist ideals over and over again. 'Unionism' was not just an ideal compromise between collectivism and individualism but also, to Amery, a more inclusive concept than socialism and the New Liberalism in that it would not sacrifice any particular interest in the British Empire for the sake of the others.

... against the demoralising and ruinous policy of doles, we must preach the constructive and practical policy of Tariff Reform and Imperial Preference, of Land Reform and of Social Regeneration by creation of fair conditions for individual effort and individual self-reliance.<sup>145</sup>

Can this particular type of 'Unionism' be seen as Liberal Unionism, distinguished from Conservatism? Historians have an unfinished controversy over whether Liberal Unionism existed as a distinctive political identity or group and whether Tariff Reform was a product of Liberal Unionism.<sup>146</sup> But even the approver of the existence of Liberal Unionist principles has agreed that Tariff Reform divided, and consequently contributed to the demise of, the Liberal

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<sup>144</sup> 'Unionist Policy: Constructive Proposals: An Important Document', *Morning Post*, 12 October 1908. More detailed explanations about this document with a quotation are in Chapter 4.

<sup>145</sup> Amery, 'The Strike and its Lessons'. Also see Amery, 'Programme of Unionism', *Standard*, 26 October 1912. AMEL 1/2/20.

<sup>146</sup> Green, *Crisis*, 5-8; Ian Cawood, *The Liberal Unionist Party: A History* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2012).

Unionist Party.<sup>147</sup> Technically speaking, Amery became a Liberal Unionist MP in Birmingham South in 1911. But he has no special attachment to Liberal Unionism per se. On the contrary, since before being an MP, he urged the amalgamation of the two parties to enhance the efficiency of their electoral campaigns.<sup>148</sup> His support for Tariff Reform thus did not stem from his political consciousness as a Liberal Unionist.

On the other hand, this type of 'Unionism' might be more plausibly seen as being on the constructive, radical, or progressive side of Conservatism. Tariff Reformers were fond of describing their idea as 'constructive'.<sup>149</sup> Moreover, the Earl of Malmesbury, in an introductory chapter to a collection of Unionist reform plans including Tariff Reform and National Service, called their stance, readjusting the constitution while preserving its principles, 'Progressive Unionism', which was distinguished from Radicalism and old Toryism.<sup>150</sup> Some Unionist Free Traders found the 'constructive' or 'progressive' nature problematic. Hugh Cecil claimed that whether Tariff Reform was right or wrong, any 'polemical constructive policy' would be 'bad electioneering' because a 'negative' attitude was always more popular 'in England'.<sup>151</sup> Besides the preference for opportunism, other Unionist Free Traders such as Robert Cecil and Lord Balfour of Burleigh contended that the cause of Tariff Reform was too radical to be Conservative and was closer to socialism.<sup>152</sup> In this sense, one

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<sup>147</sup> Cawood, *The Liberal Unionist Party*, chapter 6.

<sup>148</sup> A memorandum written by Amery and Alfred Lyttelton, enclosed in Amery to Sandars, 31 January 1911, Balfour Papers, Add MS 49775.

<sup>149</sup> Hewins had used the conception the 'constructive imperialism' before 1903. Koot, *English Historical Economics*, 175-176. Aside from its exact origin, the adjective rapidly got into the lexicon of Tariff Reformers. For instance, Garvin, 'Principles of Constructive Economics'; Alfred Milner, *Constructive Imperialism* (London: The National Review Office, 1908). As for Amery, one can find many examples of using 'constructive' in previous quotations. For instance, Amery, *Fundamental Fallacies*, vii.

<sup>150</sup> J. E. H. Malmesbury, ed., *The New Order: Studies in Unionist Policy* (Francis Griffiths, 1908), 6.

<sup>151</sup> Hugh Cecil to Leopold Maxse, 12 November 1910, Maxse Papers, 462.

<sup>152</sup> David Dutton, 'The Unionist Party and Social Policy 1906-1914', *The Historical Journal*,

might well be tempted to think that Unionism/Conservatism had splintered into progressive and reactionary factions.

However, as John Charmley has argued, the conflict should not be interpreted as 'old Conservatism' versus 'new Unionism' or landed versus commercial interests, since no sociological boundary tallied with the actual dividing line. But his alternative line, the conflict between those who were for and against social reform was also problematic.<sup>153</sup> Even Richard Rempel's work, which Charmley's has been based on, has pointed out that not all Unionist Free Traders were unsympathetic towards social reform.<sup>154</sup> For example, on the level of principle, Hugh Cecil spoke almost the same language as that of Tariff Reformers; Conservatives would support social reform as long as it was carried out without confiscating the property of any particular class.<sup>155</sup> This meant that most British Conservatives/Unionists embraced the Burkean principle of self-adjusting Conservatism, as well as antipathy towards class politics.<sup>156</sup> What divided them was a matter of degree. Similarly, Green has argued that throughout the twentieth century 'paternalistic' and 'libertarian' Conservatives debated over the extent to which and in what area the state should leave their work and power to the agencies of civil society.<sup>157</sup> Nevertheless, we should not forget that contemporary Conservatives themselves utilized the conception of old and new Conservatism amid the polemic. The dichotomy was real as long as it meant intellectually constructed

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24.4, 875.

<sup>153</sup> John Charmley, *A History of Conservative Politics, 1900-1996* (New York: Macmillan Education, 1996), 35-36.

<sup>154</sup> Richard A. Rempel, *Unionist Divided: Arthur Balfour, and Joseph Chamberlain and the Unionist Free Traders* (Newton Abbot: David & Charles, 1972), 113-114.

<sup>155</sup> Hugh Cecil, *Conservatism* (London: Williams and Norgate, 1912), 195-198.

<sup>156</sup> As for the invented tradition of Burkean Conservatism, see Emily Jones, *Edmund Burke and the Invention of Modern Conservatism, 1830-1914: An Intellectual History* (Oxford: Oriental University Press, 2017).

<sup>157</sup> Green, *Ideologies*, chapter 9.

identities not sociologically defined groups. This can be an answer to an unresolved question posed by Green: 'why both positions [paternalistic and libertarian] could be held by the same individual or group within the party simultaneously'.<sup>158</sup> If we define the conflicting ideologies or positions as intellectual construction, they can be seen as rhetoric that Conservatives loosely appropriated to reinforce their concrete propositions. Of course, it does not mean that politicians always controlled the rhetoric as they liked. At times, they were also driven by, or even slaves to, the rhetoric, as was the case with the relationship between Amery and 'Unionism'.

This premise serves to recognize the fact that there was a gradation of intensity in campaigners' commitment to the cause of Tariff Reform and to locate the position of Amery in the spectrum. Even when Tariff Reformers composed their 'unauthorised programme' in 1908, they had internal friction regarding the details of their concrete proposals. Most ominously, Bonar Law, at one point, went so far as to object to the publication of the programme because he appreciated Balfour's efforts to adapt and adjust Tariff Reform.<sup>159</sup> Sykes' journal article, which addressed the diversity of Conservatism in the pre-war years, has indicated that a group of the 'social imperialists' or the 'Milnerite', those most comprehensively committed to Tariff Reform, was a small minority. For instance, Willoughby de Broke, an influential Conservative aristocrat, had an ambivalent attitude towards 'constructive' propositions despite his support for Tariff Reform.<sup>160</sup> It might be even inappropriate to call the core group 'Milnerite' because Milner actually tended to think that the food taxes could be separated from the recipe of Tariff Reform. Amery tried to persuade his mentor out of it.<sup>161</sup>

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<sup>158</sup> *Ibid.*, 279.

<sup>159</sup> Sykes, *Tariff Reform*, 197-198.

<sup>160</sup> Alan Sykes, 'The Radical Right'.

<sup>161</sup> Amery diary, 17 August 1911, AMEL 7/10.

That is to say, if Amery's position was located in the spectrum of Edwardian tariff reform ideologies, it was undoubtedly extremist, even among the small minority, in terms of the strength of his belief in the cause of 'Unionism'.

What distinguished Amery from most Tariff Reformers was that he had long nurtured the theoretical equipment for Tariff Reform, which was elaborate enough to make himself believe that only his approach could be the true remedy. The key point was for Amery to regard the Reform as essentially a development policy. Some historians have recognized that this aspect was part of the Tariff Reformers' project. Although Andrew Thompson is included in the list of those historians, as far as the case of Amery is concerned, he was not altogether correct when he emphasized the importance of imperialist nature of Tariff Reform. Amery did not advocate imperial preference just for imperial unity but also because it was an indispensable central cog to spin the wheel of his gigantic scheme for economic regeneration. Thompson effectively referred to Amery's remark to reinforce his argument: 'Imperial preference to-day is, first and foremost, a matter of sentiment and of political principle, and not of economic theory.'<sup>162</sup> However, if it is taken at too much face value, it could lead to the distortion of his tariff reform ideology. As discussed above, Amery never downplayed 'economic theory' in Tariff Reform. What Amery meant in the statement was that the 'economic theory' of Tariff Reform became such a panacea that it could grow to become a 'political principle'.

E. H. H. Green has regarded Tariff Reform as Conservatives' answer to their crisis since the last quarter of the nineteenth century. This explanation does not fit with the case of Amery, though it is more relevant as an overall interpretation of the movement. As discussed above, Amery did not become a

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<sup>162</sup> 'Preference as a Principle', 30 *The Times* 1907; Thompson, *Imperial Britain*, 83.

Tariff Reformer just because he had been a Conservative. Rather, it was Tariff Reform that made him decide to become a Conservative politician after a long period of intellectual wandering. Thus, he started his political career not as a loyal party politician but as a man of ideas. He chose the Conservative/Unionist Party to realize his project of Tariff Reform. In this sense, his tactic was similar to that of 'permeation' adopted by Sidney Webb to spread his socialist ideas among the Liberal elite.<sup>163</sup> 'Unionism', as preached by the 'unauthorised programme', offered Amery a comfortable ideological accommodation. The Central Office of the Conservative Party was naturally angry at Tariff Reformers' propaganda campaigns. The condescending rhetoric of the TRL, claiming that Tariff Reform transcended party politics, compounded the internal conflict.<sup>164</sup> Amery himself used this type of rhetoric, which was closely linked with his case for an imperial constitution to prevent domestic party politics from causing too much influence on imperial policy.<sup>165</sup> In May 1907, he expressed his optimistic feeling to Alfred Deakin that there was gradually emerging 'one party all over the empire' bonded by 'the same political and economic philosophy' aiming for imperial unity.<sup>166</sup> In reality, however, Tariff Reform could not be attained without the assent of the British parliament, and it had few supporters outside the Conservative/Unionist Party. Therefore, while Tariff Reform marked the end of Amery's intellectual apprenticeship, he began his new unsuccessful battle to make the Conservative/Unionist Party embrace his tariff reform ideology.

## Democracy and popular politics

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<sup>163</sup> 'Permeation' was a contested conception among the Fabians. In contrast to Webb, Bernard Shaw used it as a tactic to lure the radicals from the Liberal Party. See, Bevir, *The Making of British Socialism*, chapter 10.

<sup>164</sup> Thompson, *Imperial Britain*, 49.

<sup>165</sup> Amery, *Union and Strength*, 7-8.

<sup>166</sup> Amery to Deakin, 19 May 1907, AMEL 2/2/7.



A series of electoral defeats in 1906-1910 was another formative experience for Amery, in which he formed his view on democracy. Edwardian popular politics still retained the festive and violent nature of the preceding ages.<sup>167</sup> Frank Trentmann has adroitly analysed how the Liberal Party succeeded in mobilizing people for Free Trade by their effective electoral campaigns to construct and tap into the public's consciousness as consumer-citizens.<sup>168</sup> On the other hand, David Thackeray has revealed that Tariff Reformers deployed equally fervent, multi-faceted, and sophisticated campaigns to attract people. He also has argued that one of the reasons why the rank and file of the Conservative Party supported Tariff Reform was the fact that it offered them a timely opportunity to deal with the emerging democratic politics. In this broad picture, Amery was depicted as one of the young men who were frustrated by the Conservative establishment and became an ardent campaigner for the Reform.<sup>169</sup> This is certainly a valuable correction to the image of Amery as a blind follower of Milner's anti-democratic authoritarianism.

However, Amery did not straightforwardly welcome the advent of democracy. His earliest views on democracy can be found in another essay for the Harrow School periodical.<sup>170</sup> It discussed what impact democratization would make on liberty, culture, and religion. In his view, democracy would not necessarily promote political, social, and religious liberty, since the 'tyranny of majority' could be more irrational and irresponsible and introduce an interfering

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<sup>167</sup> Angus Hawkins, *Victorian Political Culture: Habits of Heart and Mind* (Oxford: Oriental University Press, 2015); Jon Lawrence, *Electing Our Masters: The Hustings in British Politics from Hogarth to Blair* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

<sup>168</sup> Frank Trentmann, *Free Trade Nation: Commerce, Consumption, and Civil Society in Modern Britain* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

<sup>169</sup> David Thackeray, *Conservatism for the Democratic Age* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013), 18-19, 24.

<sup>170</sup> The following paragraph is based on Amery, 'The Influence of Democracy upon Liberty, Culture, and Religion', *Prolusiones*, 1892, AMEL 6/1/45. A handwritten draft of this essay is in AMEL 6/1/52.

force of 'social compulsion or public opinion' into societies. A forte of democracy was that it would encourage the development of culture in all spheres, such as art, literature, and philosophy. The contrast of the situations in England and the US with 'the ignorance and apathy' in Turkey and Russia was presented as proof of this. However, Amery warned that even the intellectual culture could be destroyed by disturbing forces of political dissension in democracy.

Hence a nation ought to be sufficiently civilised and settled before receiving democracy; even then the change should not take place too suddenly, but by slow and gradual degrees, as the people show themselves capable of undertaking the task of self-government.

Though we should not read too much into the teenager's essay, it still well indicated his ambivalent stance towards democratization. Amery did not deny the value of democracy, but he did not agree with its sanguine prospect, either. The essay was written in the pre-universal-franchise era. It actually observed that the English Constitution, albeit increasingly democratized, 'more nearly resembles an aristocracy than a democracy'. It was still unclear at this stage whether he hoped for further democratization.

The South African War gave Amery a sense of delusion about the aristocratic rule in the British Army.<sup>171</sup> However, the experiences of the actual electoral campaigns gave him a realistic view of working-class people. His memoir explained the practical lesson that in delivering economic arguments to working-class audiences, even the use of terms like 'imports and exports'

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<sup>171</sup> See Chapter 1.

should be avoided to make it easy to understand, remember, and repeat .<sup>172</sup>

This approach was most evidently reflected in his electoral pamphlets. When he became a Unionist candidate in July 1905, he circulated a 19-page pamphlet in his constituency, which explained all the details of his tariff reform ideology and begged readers to carefully read and think it over many times.<sup>173</sup> But he probably found this tactic ineffective. From 1906 onwards, he only issued an ordinary short leaflet for electoral campaigns. Moreover, those leaflets presented Tariff Reform as an essentially protectionist policy aimed at preserving employment and raising wages.<sup>174</sup> The *Express and Star*, a Liberal local newspaper, noticed and singled out his retreat from his original propositions. Its article observed that his new position, just focusing on protecting the home market, was different from Chamberlain's (imperial preference) or Balfour's (broadening taxation).<sup>175</sup> His willingness to adapt to Edwardian democracy was real as his involvement in the management of the Trade Union Tariff Reform Association symbolized.<sup>176</sup> But as was the case with his movement for National Service, the situation made him speak duplicitous language to both educate and pander to people.<sup>177</sup> Amery was not suited for standing out in the sphere of popular politics. In fact, he confessed that he disliked the theatrical manner of the leader of the Confederates, Comyn Platt.<sup>178</sup>

His involvement in the organization reform of the Unionist/Conservative Party in 1911 also does not mean that he advocated simple 'democratisation' of

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<sup>172</sup> *My Political Life*, vol. 1, 287.

<sup>173</sup> Amery, *The Case for Tariff Reform*, AMEL 1/1/17.

<sup>174</sup> See his leaflets in AMEL 4/5; 4/6.

<sup>175</sup> *Express and Star*, 5 May 1908, AMEL 5/5.

<sup>176</sup> See a circulated confidential letter written by Amery and J. W. Hills for fund-raising. AMEL 1/1/17.

<sup>177</sup> See Chapter 1.

<sup>178</sup> Amery diary, 28 January 1909. AMEL 7/8.

the party.<sup>179</sup> Disappointed at the personal and general results of the second general election in 1910, Amery, after discussing the issue with Alfred Lyttelton, concocted his scheme for organizational reform of the Party and sent it to Sandars. He claimed that the Unionist/Conservative failure in the election was due to a lack of 'efficiency' and not to 'any popularity of our policy'. Though he summarized his scheme as 'a proper system of decentralization', what he actually suggested was simultaneous decentralization and centralization. He did not assent to laissez-faire devolutions to the local constituencies because he did not believe that people could 'organize themselves effectively without continuous pressure'. His diagnosis of the defects was expressed by explicitly using analogies with the British Army before the South African War.

The situation is very much the same as that in the War Office under the old regimes. The Chief Whip, like the old Commander-in-Chief, is responsible for so many tasks that none of them are properly attended to, and the whole machine, from top to bottom, suffers from the want of proper direction. What is wanted at Party headquarters, as at Army headquarters, is a proper division of the work into its branches, with a responsible chief over each.<sup>180</sup>

His motivation for the reform was not just a young candidate's frustration at the lack of channels to express his opinion; it more fundamentally stemmed from the spirit of the movement for 'national efficiency'.

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<sup>179</sup> As for the reform of the party organization, see John Ramsden, *The Age of Balfour and Baldwin 1902-1940* (London and New York: Longman, 1978), chapter 3.

<sup>180</sup> Amery to Sandars, 31 January 1911, and an enclosed memorandum. Add MS 49775.

All these examples show that Amery did not simply support 'democracy from below'. Since his schooldays, Amery feared the possibility that democracy would degenerate into an irresponsible rule by majority. The electoral campaigns taught him the difficulty in effectively mobilizing people. Even when he supported the 'democratisation' of any organization, it meant decentralization combined with virtual centralization to enhance efficiency. It does not completely deny that Amery was one of the young Conservatives trying to re-shape the Party to make it more suitable for the democratic age. However, it must be recognized that his view on democracy was, at best, ambivalent and that his scheme for democratization contained both bottom-up and top-down approaches. His ambivalent stance on democracy was a harbinger of his Conservative interpretation of 'British democracy' in the 1930s, which will be analysed in Chapter 10.

### **The Impact of the first world war and the coalition**

Historians of the Conservative Party have generally agreed that the war-time coalition harmed the vigour and principle of Conservative politics in the short term, but the impact of the war was beneficial to the party in the long run, which promoted the dissolution of the Liberal Party and prepared the Conservative hegemony in the interwar period.<sup>181</sup> On the other hand, it should be recognized that no one was able to foresee the triumph of the Conservative Party before 1922 when the situation of British high politics was fluid. Though most of the scholars doubt if there was a 'social imperialist' consensus among the actors of the Lloyd George Coalition, the creation of a permanent Coalition

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<sup>181</sup> John Stubbs, 'The Impact of the Great War on the Conservative Party', in *The Politics of Reappraisal 1918-1939* (London: Macmillan, 1975), 1–13; Ramsden, *The Age of Balfour and Baldwin*; Nigel Keohane, *The Party of Patriotism: The Conservative Party and the First World War* (Farnham & Burlington: Ashgate, 2010).

government was a possible political deal until the Carlton Club revolt drove a nail into its coffin.<sup>182</sup>

As revealed in the previous section, Amery became a Conservative/Unionist primarily because of Tariff Reform. His subsequent career was in contrast to the other leading campaigner of the TRL, Henry Page Croft, who challenged the Coalition by forming the National Party.<sup>183</sup> Amery was able to believe that the ideal of 'Unionism' could be gradually achieved under the leadership of Lloyd George at least for the time being. David Thackeray has argued that in the division of Radical Conservatism between the 'Imperial Activists', who prioritized Tariff Reform above all, and the 'Gradual Unionists', who were more loyal to the Conservative/Unionist Party, Amery, despite being a member of the former group, pursued a ministerial career instead of following Page Croft.<sup>184</sup> Eventually, however, the policy of the Coalition did not live up to the high expectations. Amery acted as one of the discontented under-secretaries who brought about a coup on 19 October 1922. The process of his political adjustment has been already documented by Freeman mainly based on Amery's memoir and published diary.<sup>185</sup> The following section will shed more light on how he ideologically justified his ad hoc conversion.

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<sup>182</sup> The interpretation of 'social imperialism' has been given by Robert J. Scally, *The Origins of the Lloyd George Coalition: The Politics of Social-Imperialism, 1900-1918* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975). As for the process of the demise of the Coalition, see Maurice Cowling, *The Impact of Labour 1920-1924: The Beginning of Modern British Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971); Michael Kinnear, *The Fall of Lloyd George: The Political Crisis of 1922* (London: Macmillan, 1973); Kenneth O. Morgan, *Consensus and Disunity: The Lloyd George Coalition Government, 1918-1922* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979); Green, *Ideologies of Conservatism*, chapter 4.

<sup>183</sup> William D. Rubinstein, 'Henry Page Croft and the National Party 1917-22', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 9.1 (1974), 129-48; Larry L. Witherell, 'Sir Henry Page Croft and Conservative Backbench Campaigns for Empire, 1903-1932', *Parliamentary History*, 25.3 (2006), 357-81; David Thackeray, 'The Crisis of the Tariff Reform League and the Division of "Radical Conservatism", c.1913-1922', *History*, 91.301 (2006), 45-61.

<sup>184</sup> Thackeray, 'The Crisis', 51-55, 60.

<sup>185</sup> Freeman, 'Last Stand for Empire'.

The activity of the TRL did not stagnate, even after the outbreak of the First World War.<sup>186</sup> However, as far as Amery's personal situation was concerned, his involvement in Tariff Reform was diluted during 1914-1916, when he was often away from the UK for the service on the Continent. It was after he gained an advisory job for the War Cabinet of Lloyd George that he again started contemplating the future of domestic social and economic policy. His fundamental stance did not change from his pre-war vision of 'Unionism'. 1917 was the year when serious attempts to find desirable peace terms and reconstruction plans burgeoned.<sup>187</sup> One of those plans was produced by the British Workers' League (BWL), which seceded from the British Socialist Party under the guidance of Victor Fisher. The organization was aided by various non-socialist supporters, including Milner.<sup>188</sup> Amery was naturally sympathetic to the BWL and tried to convince Page Croft that the TRL should refrain from quarrelling or interfering with the BWL.<sup>189</sup> Seeing the BWL's reconstruction intrigue young Conservatives/Unionists, Amery felt that his struggle to find fellow-travellers within the working class in the Trade Union Tariff Reform Association paid off in a different way, but also suggested that the Conservative/Unionist Party should have its own scheme rather than copying that of the BWL.<sup>190</sup>

Amery completed a memorandum on 26 November 1917, which comprehensively shows his personal vision of post-war Unionist policy.

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<sup>186</sup> Thackeray, 'The Crisis'.

<sup>187</sup> As for British reconstruction plans, see P. B. Johnston, *Land Fit for Heroes: The Planning of British Reconstruction, 1916-19* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968).

<sup>188</sup> As for the BWL, which would develop into the National Democratic Party, see Roy Douglas, 'The National Democratic Party and the British Workers' League', *The Historical Journal*, 15.3 (1972), 533-52; J. O. Stubbs, 'Lord Milner and Patriotic Labour, 1914-1918', *The English Historical Review*, 87.345 (1972), 717-54; P. S. Gupta, *Imperialism and the British Labour Movement, 1914-1964* (London: Macmillan, 1975), 21-26.

<sup>189</sup> Amery diary, 15 August 1917, AMEL 7/13.

<sup>190</sup> Amery diary, 8 November 1917, AMEL 7/13.

Regarding economic policy, he virtually repeated the contents of his pre-war 'Unionism'; the Unionist Party must be a party of 'all classes' and be both national and imperial; to increase public efficiency, the state should ensure the minimum standard of well-being for everyone through social reform. The national minimum, which was propagated by the Webbs, was a common cause in the movement for national efficiency. But Amery added imperialist traits to the recipe. The essence of his policy was still to maintain a high volume of production at good wages. Direct state control of export and import through licences, Amery maintained, was effective but too restrictive. Thus, it must be replaced by a tariff system at some point. In his view, the 'definite insistence on the need for a tariff system' would make the Conservative/Unionist policy distinctive from that of the BWL.<sup>191</sup>

In understanding his deference to the Coalition, it should be first recognized that British trade policy did seem to change in his preferred direction. The McKenna duties were introduced in September 1915 to protect several sectors of British industry. The Allies concluded the Paris resolutions in 1916 to promote their mutual cooperation in trade and commercial policy, which denied most-favoured-nation treatment for the enemy countries.<sup>192</sup> The committee, chaired by Lord Balfour of Burleigh, proposed a modification of laissez-faire policy. Amery regarded the committee's suggestion in favour of imperial preference as 'a great triumph'.<sup>193</sup> However, the difference between Amery and Page Croft, who was not so impressed by these new omens, cannot be explained without acknowledging their status in the Party. Thanks to the formation of the Lloyd George government, Amery was promoted from the backbenches to the fringe

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<sup>191</sup> Amery's memorandum, 26 November 1917, AMEL 1/3/50.

<sup>192</sup> Anne Orde, *British Policy and European Reconstruction after the First World War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 9-10.

<sup>193</sup> Amery diary, 15 February 1917, AMEL 7/13.



of the decision-making machinery. For the first time, he gained a sense of participation in orientating the course of the state/empire. In April 1917, the Imperial War Cabinet issued a resolution approving of imperial preference but avoiding a commitment to food taxes. Pre-war Amery would have found it unsatisfactory, as his indignation towards the Bonar Law Memorial indicates. But this time, he felt proud that he had contributed to the making of the resolution to the point of declaring that 'thus ended the 12 years fight on imperial preference'.<sup>194</sup>

Another factor in the making of Amery as a coalitionist was Lloyd George's power of electoral appeal. Amery became an MP thanks to being unopposed at the 1911 by-election. In 1918, he had to fight against the Co-operative and Liberal candidates in Sparkbrook. Moreover, the 1918 Parliament Act established the quasi-universal suffrage, which Amery had predicted would harm the Conservative/Unionist Party unless proportional representation accompanied it.<sup>195</sup> Under the circumstance, Amery, as a candidate with a 'coupon', took pains to place a letter from Lloyd George and a photo of Lloyd George and himself walking together in his electoral pamphlet.<sup>196</sup> He also designed an electoral postcard for himself. It was modelled on the Union Jack, on whose white stripes the messages were typed in red: "VOTE FOR", 'BONAR LAW', 'LLOYD GEORGE', and 'AMERY'.<sup>197</sup> These materials show that Amery tried to make the most of his coalitionist credentials to court the expanded electorate.

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<sup>194</sup> Amery diary, 24, 26 April 1917, AMEL 7/13.

<sup>195</sup> Amery to Dawson, 17 November 1917, *Amery Diaries*, vol.1, 180.

<sup>196</sup> See a series of letters from Amery to Florence Amery (his wife) in AMEL 6/3/38. A copy of the pamphlet exists in AMEL 4/8. The photo was republished in Amery, *My Political Life*, vol. 2, on the page between 188 and 189.

<sup>197</sup> *Ibid.*

The approval of the Coalition obliged Amery to convince himself and his supporters in the constituency that his political ideal would be compatible with the new government. He presented his case for the need for the Coalition at his adoption meeting on 25 November 1918.<sup>198</sup> His speech there contended that post-war reconstruction should be conducted free of pre-war party prejudices, which had failed to solve the Irish Question and to secure sufficient preparation for the war. As for trade policy, he pilloried Asquith's statement that the UK could not reach the threshold of reconstruction before deciding whether it should be based on Free Trade, arguing that jettisoning Free Trade was now a national or even international consensus stipulated by the Paris resolutions.<sup>199</sup> As far as the 'national' aspect was concerned, his argument had some truth. The electoral manifesto published under the names of Lloyd George and Bonar Law pledged to protect British key industries from unfair competition and to forge preferential tariffs within the Empire. However, following the cabinet resolution in 1917, it also promised that those preferences would be given only upon 'existing duties' and that no fresh taxes would be imposed upon food or raw materials<sup>200</sup>. Amery swallowed the compromise. As of November 1917, he had already told an audience in Birmingham that imposing tariffs was just one of many methods of imperial preference and could be subordinated to the others in immediate post-war years.<sup>201</sup> His 1918 adoption speech asked the audience to send him to the parliament not as a Tariff Reformer but as a guardian of British industry. He would assess tariffs, or other means, on case-by-case basis. Regarding agriculture, food taxes would be not necessary for the near

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<sup>198</sup> Amery diary, 25 November 1918, AMEL 7/14.

<sup>199</sup> Amery's speech draft in AMEL 4/8.

<sup>200</sup> The 1918 manifesto, republished in *Conservative Party General Election Manifestos, 1900-1997*, ed. by Iain Dale (London & New York: Routledge & Politico, 2000), 21.

<sup>201</sup> Amery diary, 12 November 1917, AMEL 7/13.

future because the Corn Production Act saved British farmers and there were various non-tariff preferences for imperial agriculture.<sup>202</sup>

All in all, Amery spent happy years in the first half of the Coalition period. Amery finally got to participate in the administration of the British Empire, as the parliamentary under-secretary under his mentor, Alfred Milner. During Milner's mission to Egypt, he even acted as proxy Secretary of State. Robert Self has argued that politicians' evaluation of the Coalition depended on where they observed it: 'the camaraderie felt within the tight confines of Cabinet was not matched by instinctive sympathy or enthusiasm further down the party structures.'<sup>203</sup> In this sense, Amery was in a position where he could relish some degrees of this camaraderie.

The general economic policy of the Coalition also seemed, at first, propitious to Amery. The 1919 budget actually employed modest imperial preference. Amery and "the old guard of the preference movement", such as Henry Chaplin and Austen Chamberlain, celebrated their 'final victory'.<sup>204</sup> More importantly, he presided over the drafting of the Empire Settlement Bill until its completion in 1922, which was the most tangible achievement of non-tariff imperial preference. The Bill succeeded in being passed due to such contingencies as demobilization and the unemployment issue after the busting of the post-war boom.<sup>205</sup> However, Amery consistently maintained that the imperial migration project was not an expedient for domestic unemployment but a long-term

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<sup>202</sup> Amery's speech draft, AMEL 4/8.

<sup>203</sup> Robert Self, *The Evolution of the British Party System 1885-1940* (Harlow: Pearson Education, 2000), 136

<sup>204</sup> Amery diary, 22 May 1919, AMEL 7/15.

<sup>205</sup> As for the process, see Ian M. Drummond, *Imperial Economic Policy, 1917-1939: Studies in Expansion and Protection* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1974); Dane Kennedy, 'Empire Migration in Post-War Reconstruction: The Role of the Oversea Settlement Committee, 1919-1922', *Albion: A Quarterly Journal Concerned with British Studies* 20, no. 3 (1988): 403-19; Kent Fedorowich, *Unfit for Heroes: Reconstruction and Soldier Settlement in the Empire between the Wars* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994).

solution to enlarge the imperial economy. Considering the continuity in his rhetoric following the Edwardian era, it was not just a superficial excuse to placate the Dominions' apprehension that the UK was trying to dump the unemployed in their countries. Amery genuinely believed that the redistribution of people could contribute to the mutual growth of production and population (purchasing power) in the British Empire.<sup>206</sup>

What, then, transformed Amery into one of the frustrated under-secretaries by October 1922? In the 1950s he criticized the lack of constructive policy, the reversion to austerity as seen in the 'betrayal' of agriculture, and the ascendance of Churchill and Birkenhead into the quadrumvirate, comprising those two, Lloyd George, and Austen Chamberlain.<sup>207</sup> It is impossible to precisely trace his reaction to each reversal of the initial post-war measures because he wrote few entries in his diary in 1920-1921. The problem for Amery was the fact that anti-Coalition Conservative voices, represented by the Anti Waste Movement, criticized the budgets as being extravagant.<sup>208</sup> In his letters to his constituency, Amery repeatedly denounced these criticisms as 'nonsense' or 'unfair' until 1921; the swell of the budget was inevitably needed to hold imperial defence and implement social reform; the Coalition did introduce imperial preference and the Safeguarding Bill, both of which Conservatives would have been proud of if a purely Conservative Government did so.<sup>209</sup>

Amery ultimately found the coalition's policy too lukewarm rather than too radical. The sign of his resentment, which was triggered by the speech of

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<sup>206</sup> Amery diary, 14 January 1919, AMEL 7/15; Amery to Bonar Law, 20 December 1921, BL 107; Amery's electoral pamphlet for the 1922 election, AMEL 4/11; Amery, *Empire Settlement and Empire Development*, 1923 in AMEL 1/5/1

<sup>207</sup> Amery, *My Political Life*, vol. 2, 224-227; L. S. Amery, *A Balanced Economy* (London: Hutchinson, 1954), 37.

<sup>208</sup> Amery's letters to his constituency. AMEL 4/8; 4/9.

<sup>209</sup> Amery's Christmas letter in 1921; 'Notes for Unionist Workers & Speakers 1921', AMEL 4/9.

Gordon Hewart (Coalitionist Liberal) criticizing the Safeguarding Act, appeared in his letter to Austen Chamberlain in January 1922.

... unless the Liberal Coalitionists are prepared to meet us to some reasonable extent on the recasting of our fiscal system, the only alternative to a complete break up of the Coalition is that we should have a modus vivendi for the present but make clear what the Unionist policy as such is ... and leave it to future developments to see which wing within the Coalition can carry its way.<sup>210</sup>

When Balfour made a reconciling speech on 3 August to the effect that only the difference of policy would justify any action but it did not exist at that moment, Amery said to himself that it did exist 'retrospectively on Ireland and prospectively on the fiscal question'.<sup>211</sup>

As Maurice Cowling has argued, the power struggle was also undoubtedly an important factor.<sup>212</sup> With Milner's retirement in February 1921, Amery was transferred to the Admiralty. This meant that he gained leeway to plot a coup with Conservative Under-Secretaries. However, as discussed above, he was not necessarily alienated in the Coalition. On the contrary, Lloyd George encouraged Amery to be involved in the making of trade policy in July 1922.<sup>213</sup> After all, he was not a spearhead of the Conservative revolt but a relatively passive intriguer who rode the tide. He sent a friendly farewell letter to Lloyd George after the Carlton Club meeting.<sup>214</sup> Therefore, it would be best to interpret

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<sup>210</sup> Amery to Austen Chamberlain, 21 January 1921, AC 32/3/3.

<sup>211</sup> Amery diary, 3 August 1921, *EB*, vol. 1, 290.

<sup>212</sup> Maurice Cowling, *The Impact of Labour 1920-1924: The Beginning of Modern British Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971).

<sup>213</sup> Amery diary, 24 July 1922. Also see, 1, 4 August, 18 September 1922, AMEL 7/16.

<sup>214</sup> Amery diary, 13, 16-19, October 1922, AMEL 7/16; Amery to Lloyd George, 19 October

that his frustrated aspiration for preferential tariffs and political opportunism mutually reinforced each other's effect on his gradual dissociation from the government.

As post-war Amery was no longer a reckless backbencher, he agreed with Bonar Law's electoral pledge in 1922 that a new Conservative Government would not introduce any major change in fiscal policy. The electoral speech (manifesto) of Bonar Law, in the making of which Amery himself participated, urged the promotion of intra-imperial trade but did not mention any concrete measure to attain it.<sup>215</sup> Once the Conservative Government was formed, however, Amery again started to annoy Bonar Law by preaching the advantage of duties over other bureaucratic control of trade that had been imposed by the Coalition.<sup>216</sup>

As an ex-Coalitionist, Amery now needed to create a new post hoc narrative to justify his conversion. The task was done in his three articles in the *National Review*, which were published as *National and Imperial Economics*.<sup>217</sup> They claimed that there existed close links between the political ideologies and the political parties in post-war Britain: Individualism-the Liberal Party, Socialism-the Labour Party, and the historical, national and imperial conception of economics-the Conservative Party. The point was that the first two ideologies were based on the same erroneous premise: laissez-faire individualism. This view derived from his pre-war definition of Marxist socialism as an inverted version of Liberalism.<sup>218</sup> The true antithesis, Amery argued, was not between individualism

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1922, LG F/31/2.

<sup>215</sup> In sending his draft, Amery assured Bonar Law that he 'covered up the fiscal question sufficiently vaguely', Amery to Bonar Law, 24 October 1922, BL 110. As for the final version of the speech see, *Conservative Party General Election Manifestos*, 23-25.

<sup>216</sup> Amery to Bonar Law, 7 April 1923, BL 117.

<sup>217</sup> L. S. Amery, *National and Imperial Economics* (Westminster: National Unionist Association, 1923),

<sup>218</sup> *Ibid.*, 16-28.

and socialism but between ‘the concrete, scientific and historical analysis’ and ‘the method of unscientific, a priori abstraction’. Therefore, the coalition of ‘Tories and doctrinaire Liberals’ was ‘essentially unnatural and sterile’. What was needed was ‘a positive constructive economic policy of our own’.<sup>219</sup> His concrete suggestions were almost the same as his recipe in the era of Tariff Reform: an appropriate combination of protection and imperial preference to produce a positive cycle of expansion of production and the market in the UK and the British Empire.<sup>220</sup>

## Conclusion

Amery, as an intellectually rebellious student, defied the epistemological orthodoxy from his early years. However, the difficulty in organizing his ideas into more systematic ideologies and translating them into actual politics made him undergo a politically promiscuous apprenticeship: acting as a member of the Fabian Society, serving as a secretary to the Radical-Liberal MP (Courtney), and defending Conservative/Unionist policy in South Africa as a journalist in *The Times*. Tariff Reform and ‘Unionism’ as its official ideology gave Amery what he had long searched for. In his view, the defects of laissez-faire economics could be completely overcome by the new imperial alternative. In short, the cause of Tariff Reform considerably fitted well with his intellectual trajectory. The problem was that most Conservatives/Unionists did not share that level of enthusiasm for the grandiose project. With his personal promotion in 1917-1922, Amery temporarily pinned his hopes on the Lloyd George government to gradually establish imperial preference in various ways.

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<sup>219</sup> Amery, *National and Imperial Economics*, 9-11.

<sup>220</sup> *Ibid*, chapter 2 and 3.

However, as his expectations withered in 1922, he contributed to the fall of the Coalition.

His 1923 redefinition of Conservative aims seemingly sealed his long journey to finding a congenial ideology/political party. Though his narrative to justify Conservative independence was crafted opportunistically, it continued to affect his later political discourse. From then on, Amery tended to be suspicious of coalitionism, which led him to oppose, at first, the National Government in 1931. Stuart Ball has argued that the negative memories of the Coalition affected the Conservative Party in the interwar period.<sup>221</sup> In the case of Amery, the narrative created by himself rather than being based on actual memory impacted his path dependency. All he had to do was to persuade the Conservative Party to adopt 'constructive' policies and not indulge in negative anti-socialism. Baldwin's sudden conversion to protectionism in 1923 seemed to make his dream come true. The subsequent Conservative defeat in the 1923 election, however, immediately shattered his euphoria. After his struggle with Churchill and the Treasury in the 1920s, he regretted that Churchill's hostility towards imperial development and safeguarding made the second Baldwin government 'the type of Coalition Government which I tried to avert' in 1922.<sup>222</sup> In the 1930s, Amery had to restart his journey to find or define fitting ideologies and to translate them into practice.

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<sup>221</sup> Stuart Ball, 'The Legacy of Coalition: Fear and Loathing in Conservative Politics, 1922-1931', *Contemporary British History*, 25.1 (2011), 65–82.

<sup>222</sup> Amery diary, 3 June 1929, *EB*, vol. 1, 597-598.



## 9 Economic Policy in the Interwar Period

This chapter analyses the trajectory and nature of Amery's economic thought in the interwar period. It will mainly focus on his reaction to the financial authorities' decisions in the 1930s rather than on his achievements in the second Baldwin government. A part of the reason is that his struggle for developing the Safeguarding Act and the colonial loans has been already analysed by historians.<sup>1</sup> However, a more important point is that it was in the period after the second Baldwin government that Amery revised his world view. The new situations in the 1930s, including the Great Depression, the ostensible accomplishment of Tariff Reformers' dream, and the rise of Fascism and Communism, made him feel an urgent need to relocate his stance. Moreover, his ambivalent attitude towards the results of the Ottawa Conference was a precursor to his unique role in envisioning the relation of Europe and the Commonwealth in the post war years.

The deeds of Amery as a frustrated growler at the Ottawa Conference have been already depicted by historians.<sup>2</sup> This chapter instead analyses the intellectual trajectory of his views on monetary and trade policy. It will show that, by the middle of the 1930s, Amery formulated a grandiose vision of the imperial economy, composed of the stable exchange-rate system and imperial preference. Although monetary and trade policy of the National Government experienced the imperial turn, the result fell short of his ideal. Amery thus came

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<sup>1</sup> Robert Self, *Tories and Tariffs: The Conservative Party and the Politics of Tariff Reform, 1922–1932* (New York: Garland Publishing, 1986); Stephen Constantine, *The Making of British Colonial Development Policy 1914–1940* (London: Frank Cass, 1984); Stuart Ball, *Baldwin and the Conservative Party: The Crisis of 1929–1931* (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1988).

<sup>2</sup> Rooth, *British Protectionism*, 87, 95–97.

to think that not only the Treasury but also the Conservative leaders of the National Government were still trapped in economic individualism of the nineteenth century. The trade agreements with non-imperial countries after Ottawa, especially the 1938 Anglo-American Trade Agreement, was a serious mistake to him because he perceived that the UK prioritized the Cobdenite vision of the US rather than the principle of the balance of imperial power. All these problems would not just continue to exist but also deteriorate in his post-war struggle to protect imperial economic unity.

## **1 Before Ottawa**

### **Amery as Colonial and Dominions Secretary**

The triumph of the Conservative Party in the 1924 general election brought Amery the ministerial job he had long craved. However, the way the victory was gained was ominous to Amery. The 1923 general election, called by Baldwin to release his party from the 1922 Bonar Law pledge, brought home to Conservative politicians that the electorate was not ready to accept fundamental change in fiscal policy. Amery had to be sensitive to the limit of practical politics, particularly because he was in charge of drafting the Conservative manifestos in both 1923 and 1924.<sup>3</sup> While the two manifestos were not fundamentally different, both of which were in favour of expanding protection and imperial preference but excluded the food taxes from their immediate policy, the wording in the latter had to be qualified to the point of declaring, 'a general tariff is no part of our programme'.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Amery, *My Political Life*, vol. 2, 285, 296-297.

<sup>4</sup> Iain Dale, ed., *Conservative Party General Election Manifestos, 1900-1997* (London & New York: Routledge & Politico, 2000), 27-28, 31-32.

In his own electoral contest, Amery, albeit forced to be reticent about food taxes, retained the language of 'Unionism' particularly in respect of the protection of industries. He criticized Labour's policy as 'more doles and less work' and the abolition of the McKenna duties as 'incredible folly'. At the same time, deflationists' urge to 'level down' the wages for a revival of the export trade was dismissed as the 'wholly fallacious and misleading' assumption. His remedy was to safeguard the British industries and to develop intra-imperial trade. Whether this policy would be implemented by tariff measures as the Conservatives had promised a year before or by the development of the Safeguarding Act was 'a matter of detail'.<sup>5</sup> Amery, as a loyal member of the new Cabinet, adopted the second option.

The 1924 manifesto was vague with regard to the threshold between the general tariff and 'safeguarding'. However, Baldwin set a strict limit on increase in tariffs by appointing Churchill, still a free trader at this juncture, as Chancellor of the Exchequer.<sup>6</sup> Amery was not happy with Churchill's attempt to return to the Conservative Party and personally supported Otho Nicholson in the 1924 by-election in Westminster Abbey.<sup>7</sup> As Colonial Secretary, he tried to take advantage of every opportunity to foster protection/imperial preference and economic development in the colonies. Though Cunliffe-Lister and Neville Chamberlain acted as his allies in the Cabinet, most of their demands were effectively spurned by Churchill and the Treasury. This does not mean that

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<sup>5</sup> Amery's electoral leaflets in 1924, 'Wages: Up or Down?: The Contrast between Sheltered and Unsheltered Industries'; 'To the Electors of the Sparkbrook Division of Birmingham'. AMEL 4/12.

<sup>6</sup> As for Churchill's economic thought, see Peter Clarke, 'Churchill's Economic Ideas, 1900-1930', in *Churchill*, ed. Robert Blake and WM. Roger Louis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 79-95; Richard Toye, 'Trade and Conflict in the Rhetoric of Winston Churchill', in *A Global History of Trade and Conflict since 1500*, ed. by Lucia Coppolaro and Francine McKenzie (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 124-41.

<sup>7</sup> Robert Rhodes James, ed., *Memoirs of a Conservative: J. C. C. Davidson's Memoirs and Papers, 1910-37* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1969), 194-195.

there was no modification of fiscal and trade policy in the 1920s. Amery succeeded in establishing the Empire Marketing Board (EMB) to conduct research for imperial economic development and to promote intra-imperial trade.<sup>8</sup> The EMB, in cooperation with the Imperial Economic Committee, helped and encouraged scientific, especially agricultural, research.<sup>9</sup> The second Baldwin government not only restored the McKenna duties, but also gradually extended the coverage of the Safeguarding Act and imperial preference.<sup>10</sup> Amery managed to pass the East African Loans Bill in 1926 as well. But these measures fell short of derogation from Free Trade. The loan was eventually emasculated by the Treasury and only £3,500,000 was spent by 1929.<sup>11</sup> The additional safeguards were only applied to some luxurious products, and as of 1930 only 2 or 3 percent of the total value in importation was affected by protective duties.<sup>12</sup> The EMB was, from the outset, pressurized to be thrifty by the Treasury until its demise in 1933.<sup>13</sup> Despite its flashy propaganda campaign, the EMB failed to produce tangible economic effects.<sup>14</sup> The most

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<sup>8</sup> The EMB had the dual purposes, research and propaganda. Historians' attention concentrated on the latter. Stephen Constantine, 'Bringing the Empire Alive': The Empire Marketing Board and Imperial Propaganda, 1926–33', in *Imperialism and Popular Culture*, ed. John MacKenzie (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1986), 200–220; Felicity Barnes, 'Bringing Another Empire Alive?: The Empire Marketing Board and the Construction of Dominion Identity, 1926–33', *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 42, no. 1 (2014): 61–85; Uma Kothari, 'Trade, Consumption and Development Alliances: The Historical Legacy of the Empire Marketing Board Poster Campaign', *Third World Quarterly* 35, no. 1 (2014): 43–64.

<sup>9</sup> Amery's memoir has still given the best account of the research side of the EMB. *My Political Life*, vol. 3, 347–351. Regarding the Imperial Economic Committee, see David Thackeray, *Forging a British World of Trade: Culture, Ethnicity, and Market in the Empire-Commonwealth, 1880–1975* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 55–56.

<sup>10</sup> Forrest Capie, *Depression and Protectionism: Britain between the Wars* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), 41–44.

<sup>11</sup> Constantine, *The Making*, 118–135.

<sup>12</sup> G. C. Peden, *British Economic and Social Policy: Lloyd George to Margaret Thatcher* (Oxford: Philip Allan, 1985), 100.

<sup>13</sup> Robert Self, 'Treasury Control and the Empire Marketing Board: The Rise and Fall of Non-Tariff Preference in Britain, 1924–1933', *Twentieth Century British History* 5, no. 2 (1994): 153–82. Some work of the EMB was taken over by the Imperial Economic Committee, Thackeray, *Forging a British World of Trade*, 59.

<sup>14</sup> David Higgins and Brian Varian, 'The Empire Marketing Board, 1926–33: Britain's Failed Attempt at Soft Trade Policy', *VoxEU & CEPR*, 27 April 2019, <https://voxeu.org/article/economic-failure-britain-s-empire-marketing-board>.

devastating blow to Amery was the government's rejection of the application from the iron and steel industry for entering in the list of the Safeguarding Act.<sup>15</sup> Churchill contended that concessions about iron and steel, 'one of the fundamental basic raw materials of national industry', could be a catalyst leading to the formation of a general tariff.<sup>16</sup> The very significance of iron and steel in the industrial ecosystem made Amery adamant about the issue.

When the General Strike broke out in 1926, Amery tried to convince the electorate in his constituency that the strike was not an industrial dispute but an unconstitutional intimidation of the public and the government to win a subsidy for the coal industry. He also assured them that the government would try to raise the standard of living, but the aim could be accomplished only by 'increasing our trade and extending and securing our markets', and not by 'taxing all the wage earners of the country in order to pay a subsidy to one particular set of workers'.<sup>17</sup> Though this letter refrained from mentioning fiscal reform, in the sphere of high politics Amery used the General Strike as a pretext to convert the Cabinet's attitude towards the application of the iron and steel industry, maintaining that protection of iron and steel could create a demand for 10 to 20 million tons of coal, which would be a more effective boon to the mining industry than any rationalisation.<sup>18</sup>

Beneath the internal battles in the Cabinet, there was fundamental difference between the constructive imperialists' strategy and the Treasury view. In the era of the Keynesian hegemony, the Treasury view was seen as a

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<sup>15</sup> The protracted process of the abortive negotiation has been well documented by Self, *Tories and Tariffs*, chapter 8; Freeman, 'Last Stand for Empire', chapter 5; David Freeman, 'Baldwin's Bulldog: Churchill's 1925 Fight against Tariffs', *Cercles* 37 (2020): 25–38.

<sup>16</sup> Churchill to Baldwin, 12 June 1925, Baldwin Papers, Baldwin 28.

<sup>17</sup> Amery's letter to his constituency, May 1926, AMEL 1/4/7.

<sup>18</sup> Amery to Baldwin, 17 May 1926, Baldwin Papers, Baldwin 28.

force of economic conservatism.<sup>19</sup> Historians have now tended to draw less caricatured pictures, according to which the Treasury had their own rationale which was at least more rational than their opponents claimed.<sup>20</sup> The high officials in the Treasury did not intend to sacrifice national industries for the interest of the City. Rather, they truly believed that the combination of retrenchment, wages decreasing, and restoration of the international trade would revive British export industries. To Amery, a true believer in expansion of the market, populations, and production, this programme seemed simply 'negative' and just worsening the 'vicious circle' of the economic shrinkage.<sup>21</sup>

A series of setbacks increased Amery's discomfiture at the Conservative leadership. Towards the end of his tenure, he urged Baldwin to replace Churchill with Neville Chamberlain and to declare that the next Conservative government would address the issue of protection and imperial preference without any limitation.<sup>22</sup> He ascribed the subsequent defeat in the 1929 election to the lack of constructive policy in the Conservative policy. It was against this background that he developed sympathy with Beaverbrook's movement for Empire Free Trade. As the previous chapter discussed, Amery differentiated imperial free trade from imperial preference, which could be flexibly designed to balance all interests in the Empire/Commonwealth. Amery confided in a meeting of the EIA that the aim should be altered from 'Empire Free Trade' to

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<sup>19</sup> The best work among the examples is Robert Skidelsky, *Politicians and the Slump* (London & Melbourne & Toronto: Macmillan, 1967).

<sup>20</sup> For the account of the 1920s Treasury view, see G. C. Peden, *The Treasury and British Public Policy 1906-1959* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), chapter 4 and 5; Peter Clarke, *The Keynesian Revolution in the Making, 1924-1936* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), chapter 2 and 3; Clara Elisabetta Mattei, 'Treasury View and Post-WWI British Austerity: Basil Blackett, Otto Niemeyer and Ralph Hawtrey', *Cambridge Journal of Economics* 42 (2018): 1123–43.

<sup>21</sup> Amery to Baldwin 10 April 1927, Baldwin 28; Amery to Baldwin 27 February 1929, Baldwin Papers, Baldwin 98.

<sup>22</sup> Amery to Baldwin, 24 September 1928, AMEL 2/1/15; 11 April 1929; 27 April 1929, AMEL 2/3/6.

'Empire Fair Trade'.<sup>23</sup> He tried to persuade Beaverbrook that the idea of Empire Free Trade should be modified. Nevertheless, he could not help expecting that the movement would create an impetus to change the tide in public opinion and ultimately the attitude of the Conservative leadership.<sup>24</sup> Beaverbrook's decision to start independent party politics in cooperation with Lord Rothermere disappointed Amery, who exhorted Beaverbrook to treat his organization 'mainly as a propagandist and educationalist one' to make the Conservative party take a more positive line towards food taxes.<sup>25</sup> Another factor which made Amery court Beaverbrook was the Indian Question. Amery suspected that Churchill chose the anti-Baldwin agenda to gain support from Rothermere and Beaverbrook and to make himself a sole candidate of a Prime Minister in a possible political crisis. Amid the peak of the anti-Baldwin press campaign, Amery was shocked to know that even Douglas Hogg, 1<sup>st</sup> Viscount Hailsham, the Conservative leader in the House of Lords, was inclined to think that Churchill could be one of the leading members in the post-Baldwin regime.<sup>26</sup> In this game of political struggle, it was important for him to retain Beaverbrook on his side. Amery's aim was neither to promote the crude conception of Empire Free Trade nor to split the Conservative Party but to convert the Party to his tariff reform ideology. In other words, his experiences in the second half of the 1920s did not change his economic thought but fortified it.

### **Politics of imperial preference in the 1930s**

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<sup>23</sup> Minutes of a meeting of the parliamentary committee, 13 November 1929, Papers of the EIA, MSS 221/1/1/1. In the course of the Empire Free Trade Movement, Beaverbrook gradually recognized this issue. Jerry M. Calton, 'Beaverbrook's Split Imperial Personality: Canada, Britain, and the Empire Free Trade Movement of 1929-1931', *The Historian* 37, no. 1 (1974): 26-45.

<sup>24</sup> Amery to Beaverbrook, 24 July 1929; 2 December 1929, BBK/C/5.

<sup>25</sup> Amery to Beaverbrook, 19 February 1930; 28 February 1930, *ibid.*

<sup>26</sup> Amery diary, 30 January 1931, 6 March, AMEL 7/25

Amery's tenacious stance towards economic policy, combined with the lack of his aptitude as a speaker/orator, led to the loss of trust in him amongst the leading members in Whitehall and the Cabinet. Amery and the Colonial and Dominions Office were despised by the Treasury. Otto Niemeyer dubbed Amery 'Mad Mullah Minister'.<sup>27</sup> Austen Chamberlain in April 1929 privately argued that if Baldwin won the election, Amery had to go from the next Cabinet because he was 'well-meaning but ineffective'.<sup>28</sup> Of course, this perception was probably affected by their political conflicts with Amery in the preceding years. But it is undeniable that his passionate campaign for imperial economics backfired against his personal career, leading to his exclusion from the new Cabinet of the National Government. Amid the 1931 crisis Amery, in cooperation with Page Croft and Beaverbrook, iterated the same old suggestion; the true solution would be tariffs rather than retrenchment. By August 1931, even Neville Chamberlain started to find Amery tiresome and doctrinaire.<sup>29</sup>

Amery spent the period from 1929 to 1940 as a backbench campaigner/publicist. Regarding the campaign for imperial economic unity, two organizations, the EIA and the Empire Economic Union (EEU), became its epicentre. The EIA originated from the idea of Amery and Neville Chamberlain to create an alternative successor to the Tariff Reform League, which virtually ceased to function by the middle of the 1920s. It was established in 1925 and immediately absorbed the British Commonwealth Union and the Empire

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<sup>27</sup> Drummond, *Imperial Economic Policy*, 128-129.

<sup>28</sup> Balfour moderately opposed this opinion, but Chamberlain reminded him that while they heard Amery talking in the Cabinet, Balfour himself ridiculed his long speech secretly between them. Diaries of Lady Betty Balfour, 14 April 1929, Papers of the Balfour family of Whittingehame, East Lothian, Earls of Balfour, GD433/2/379. As for negative evaluations of Amery, also see Philip Williamson, *The Modernisation of Conservative Politics: The Diaries and Letters of William Bridgeman, 1904-1935* (London: The Historians' Press, 1988), 230.

<sup>29</sup> Philip Williamson, *National Crisis and National Government: British Politics, the Economy and Empire, 1926-1932* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 357-358.



Development Union.<sup>30</sup> The EIA, mainly composed of industrialists and politicians, ran lobbying and propaganda campaigns under the Chairmanship of Henry Page Croft. Amery, at first, had to distance himself from the EIA because of his ministerial status, though he was indirectly involved in its management from the outset.<sup>31</sup> The 1929 defeat of the Conservative Party allowed him to attend its meetings.<sup>32</sup> He was elected as the president of the association in 1931, and retained the position until the end of his life.<sup>33</sup> The EEU was established in 1929 on the initiative of Amery and Lord Melchett (Alfred Mond) and its activity eventually focused on research about intra-imperial trade and imperial agriculture/industry.<sup>34</sup> The EEU produced memoranda to promote imperial trade with representatives of agriculture, the Federation of British Industries (FBI), and the National Union of Manufactures (NUM). The series of the reports was published as *A Plan of Action* right before the 1932 Ottawa Conference to make the British Delegate understand their scheme.<sup>35</sup>

Although a merger of the EIA and the EEU was at times proposed, they chose to retain separate organizational forms.<sup>36</sup> However, the two organizations closely cooperated with each other to the extent that the EEU's expense was flexibly used for the EIA during the Second World War.<sup>37</sup> Amery was an important person linking the two organizations. In terms of division of labour, it can be said that the EIA was a descendant of the Tariff Reform League, while

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<sup>30</sup> Marrison, *British Business*, 358-362.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., 368-371.

<sup>32</sup> 'Minutes of a meeting of members of Parliament', 23 July 1929, Papers of the EIA, MSS 221/1/1/1.

<sup>33</sup> 'Minutes of the annual general meeting', 25 November 1931. Ibid; 'Minutes of a meeting of the executive committee', 23 November 1955, MSS 221/1/2/3.

<sup>34</sup> *My Political Life*, vol. 3, 19-20; *The Times*, 19 December 1929.

<sup>35</sup> L. S. Amery, ed., *A Plan of Action* (London: Faber and Faber, 1932).

<sup>36</sup> 'Minutes of a joint meeting of the executive and finance committee', 3 October 1945, MSS 221/1/2/2, 'Minutes of a meeting of the executive committee', MSS 221/1/2/3.

<sup>37</sup> 'Minutes of a joint meeting of the executive and finance committee', 4 February 1943, 23 February 1944, MSS 221/1/2/2.

the EEU was of the Tariff Commission. Historians have tended to emphasize the difference between pre-war Tariff Reform and the EIA's interwar campaign; while the TRL was a militant organization to mobilize popular politics, the EIA acted as a pressure group; the difference has been attributed to the degradation of national enthusiasm for Free Trade and to the transformation of political culture after the Great War.<sup>38</sup> Trentmann has argued that ex-Tariff Reformers such as Amery, as well as staunch Free Traders, were out of place in the 1930s, when Free Trade versus Tariff Reform was no longer a foremost national concern.<sup>39</sup> However, it should not be overlooked that imperial preference was still a big issue inside the Conservative Party. Furthermore, the language of the Edwardian controversy was carried over into the sphere of high politics in the 1930s.

What characterized the economic policy of Amery and the EIA in the period was their relatively negative reaction to the Ottawa Conference. The Import Duties Act and imperial preference forged at Ottawa ostensibly sealed the long battle of Tariff Reformers. As Peter Clarke has succinctly pointed out, however, the Ottawa regime was unsatisfactory to Tariff Reformers and intolerable to Free Traders.<sup>40</sup> It was formulated by a series of bilateral agreements between the participants. As each state had their own domestic interest, the negotiations at Ottawa revealed that there was not much room for mutual concessions. What accentuated the agreements was confirming protective tariffs rather than spreading preference. Moreover, British policy makers did not intend to

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<sup>38</sup> N. C. Fleming, *Britannia's Zealots, Volume I: Tradition, Empire and the Forging of the Conservative Right* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2019), 131-134; Frank Trentmann, *Free Trade Nation: Commerce, Consumption, and Civil Society in Modern Britain* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), chapter 4-7; Jon Lawrence, 'The Transformation of British Public Politics After the First World War' 190, no. 1 (2006): 185-216.

<sup>39</sup> Trentmann, *Free Trade Nation*, 346-347.

<sup>40</sup> Peter Clarke, *Hope and Glory: Britain 1900-2000* (London: Penguin, 2004), 176.

establish an exclusive trade bloc but to protect industries and to offset its detrimental effect through the trade agreements with non-imperial countries.<sup>41</sup> The failure to bend the direction of the agreements left him with a sense of bitterness. His letter to Neville Chamberlain after the conference concisely told what specific points he was dissatisfied with: 'meat and sugar or, what I think more important, monetary policy'.<sup>42</sup>

## 2 Monetary Policy

### The imperial monetary schemes after the First World War

After the fall of the bimetalist movement, Amery said little about monetary policy. His interest in the issue was re-galvanised during the First World War via North America. The US entry into the First World War in April 1917 caused severe economic frictions with the British Empire. The American Treasury was appalled by Britain's expectation that the US would generously provide financial support for the Allies. William Gibbs McAdoo, Secretary of the Treasury, especially anticipated that the Congress would not endorse the aid unless it was accepted as a 'war purpose'. The US tight lending policy put Britain on the verge of an exchange rate crisis in July 1917.<sup>43</sup> Moreover, the US government insisted that funds from the US should be used only for purchases in the US and not in Canada. They also imposed an embargo on Canadian borrowing in New York, which would make it impossible for the Canadian government to give

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<sup>41</sup> As for the negotiation, the result, and the aftermath of Ottawa, see Keith Hancock, *Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs*, vol. 2 (London: Oxford University Press, 1942); Drummond, *Imperial Economic Policy*; Drummond and Norman Hillmer, *Negotiating Freer Trade: The United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, and the Trade Agreements of 1938* (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1989); Rooth, *British Protectionism*.

<sup>42</sup> Amery to Neville Chamberlain, 7 December 1932, AMEL 1/3/29.

<sup>43</sup> As for Anglo-American financial and monetary relations in the period, Kathleen Burk, 'J. M. Keynes and the Exchange Rate Crisis of July 1917', *The Economic History Review* 32, no. 3 (1979): 405–16; idem., *Britain, America and the Sinews of War, 1914-1918* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1985), chapter 9.

monthly advances to the Imperial Munitions Board beyond June 1917. Munition supply from Canada was about to be halted by the summer of the year.<sup>44</sup>

These monetary and financial crises were narrowly averted through negotiations. However, the conflicts were alarming incidents to the imperial milieu in the UK. The liaison and local representative of the Imperial Munitions Board, R. H. Brand, was an ex-member of Milner's Kindergarten in South Africa.<sup>45</sup> Most probably through the connection, the Milnerites in Britain paid attention to the Canadian situation. According to Amery's diary, on 9 July 1917, Amery and Milner discussed for the first time the exchange question and the risk of 'being financially enslaved to the States' and seeing production plants transferred from Canada to the US. Amery attributed the crisis to British reluctance to 'treat the Empire as a single unit from the currency point of view' and to agree with Canada to treat British paper money as their currency and 'if necessary inflate it somewhat'.<sup>46</sup> Amery started to propagate the idea among his fellows.<sup>47</sup> Amery directly urged Robert Borden to recognize that the British Empire stood 'at the parting of the ways'. If the Empire adhered to the existing financial notion, they would increasingly lose their assets and industrial strength to the US. He suggested:

actual munition contracts for the British Government should be paid in British paper, or the British paper deposited with the Canadian

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<sup>44</sup> David Carnegie, *The History of Munitions Supply in Canada, 1914-1918* (Longman, 1925), 262-263; Keith Neilson, 'R.H. Brand, the Empire and Munitions from Canada', *The English Historical Review* 126, no. 523 (2011): 1430-55.

<sup>45</sup> Neilson, 'R. H. Brand'.

<sup>46</sup> Amery diary, 9 July 1917, AMEL 7/13. The entry and his letter to Robert Borden says that Amery suggested a similar proposal about the Canadian currency to Borden and Richard Bedford Bennett two years before. But the Amery Papers do not contain evidence to prove it. Also see Amery to Borden, 11 July 1917. AMEL 1/3/6.

<sup>47</sup> Amery diary, 10, 11, 16, 20 July, and 18, 21 August 1917, AMEL 7/13.

Government, which could then issue Canadian notes in payment to the manufacturers.<sup>48</sup>

Borden's reply three weeks later assured Amery that the crisis would be averted by issuing Dominion notes and getting securities from the British Government.<sup>49</sup>

Amery's concern about the currencies in the Empire did not wane with the end of the Canadian crisis. He frequently consulted Laming Worthington Evans, Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Munitions, about imperial issues at the time.<sup>50</sup> On 22 August, Worthington Evans made Amery aware of 'some interesting facts' about the exchange problem in India caused by the rise in silver price.<sup>51</sup> The sterling-rupee relationship, which was one of the central issues in the British bimetalist movement, again seized Amery's mind. Three days later, when Amery mentioned the exchange question in a private meeting with Milner, Milner recommended that Amery should write a memorandum on the exchange question together with Worthington Evans and Keynes.<sup>52</sup> At some point in the year, Milner also pulled in another important figure, John Ford Darling, from the banking industry to their circle. According to Darling's recollections, Milner, in the spring of 1917, asked him to scrutinize the question of an Empire currency, the formation of which would be, Milner believed, 'of the utmost importance for the future of the Empire'. Darling got on with the task in

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<sup>48</sup> Amery to Borden, 11 July 1917, AMEL 1/3/6.

<sup>49</sup> Borden to Amery, 31 July 1917, AMEL 1/3/6.

<sup>50</sup> Amery diary, 8, 22 June, 31 July 1917. AMEL 7/13.

<sup>51</sup> Amery diary, 22 August 1917, AMEL 7/13. Although the Indian monetary system shifted to the gold exchange standard at the turn of the century, Indian people were still allowed to convert paper notes into the token silver coins they preferred to store. However, wartime control of precious metals imports and increasing issuance of currency notes fuelled distrust in the paper currencies and inflamed demand for silver so much that the silver was on the verge of ceasing to be a token coin. The Indian government's additional import of silver compounded the problem by enhancing the price of silver. G. Balachandran, 'Britain's Liquidity Crisis and India, 1919-1920', *The Economic History Review* 46, no. 3 (1993): 577-578.

<sup>52</sup> Amery diary, 25 August 1917, AMEL 7/13.

the 1920s, by which he retired from the active management and moved to the bank board.<sup>53</sup> Darling became the most prolific and influential publicist in the monetary branch of constructive imperialism.<sup>54</sup> His pamphlets and books can be found in the Milner and Amery Papers.<sup>55</sup> In this way, the collective efforts of constructive imperialists to formulate imperial monetary policy was set in around the summer of 1917.

Their efforts resulted in a memorandum submitted to the Cabinet in April 1920. It was composed by Amery and Worthington Evans and had appendixes written by Darling and Ewart Grogan. The India Office, the Treasury, and the Board of Trade made negative replies to the scheme. The authors of the monetary memorandum refuted them in official and private memoranda.<sup>56</sup> Darling developed his scheme into the idea of 'Empire Currency Bills' to prepare for the 1923 Imperial Economic Conference. The Bills, issued by a management commission, would take place of the British Treasury Bills within the Empire and of some portions of debts of the Dominions. Furthermore, there should be convertibility between each currency and the Bills, which would be backed by a 5-10 per cent gold reserve. In this manner, Darling argued, both stabilization of the exchange rates and the promotion of trade would be achieved.<sup>57</sup> Ralph Hawtrey, an economic adviser in the Treasury, found it hardly of avail in remedying the fundamental problem that the fluctuating sterling disturbed the exchanges in the Empire. The Bills would be, if anything, detrimental to imperial

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<sup>53</sup> J. F. Darling, 'Lord Milner as a Banker', *The Banker*, 2.6 (1926), 44-48. Darling met Milner for the first time in 1908 in the process of the amalgamation of the London Joint Stock Bank, one of whose directors was Milner, and the York City and County Bank, whose general manager was Darling. Milner left the bank at the end of 1916 to enter into the Cabinet. *Ibid.*

<sup>54</sup> As for his economic thought, see Kamitake Yoshiro, 'Darling, Goodenough and McKenna: Economic Thoughts of the City towards British Return to Gold in 1925', *Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics* 27 (1986): 167-80.

<sup>55</sup> See AMEL 1/5/22, 8/263; MS. Milner dep. 604, 605, 607.

<sup>56</sup> All these documents are in AMEL 1/3/60.

<sup>57</sup> J. F. Darling, *Currency Co-Operation in the British Empire* (London, 1922).

credit by becoming floating debts.<sup>58</sup> Darling's scheme evoked some sympathetic responses among the Dominions in the 1923 Conference, but the Treasury succeeded in shelving it.<sup>59</sup>

Since Amery was an autodidact on monetary policy, he cared more about stating an overall principle than designing a concrete mechanism.<sup>60</sup> This means that although his memoranda were written as ad hoc responses to specific contingencies, we can detect some elements which had a long influence on his monetary thought. Amery's and other publicists' foremost concern was about the national debt, particularly to the US.<sup>61</sup> Amery and Worthington Evans pointed out two features of the contemporary monetary situation. Firstly, the exchanges within the British Empire were disorganized. The appreciation of the Canadian dollar and the rupee, which was linked to gold rather than sterling, hampered these countries' export to the UK. On the other hand, the low exchange in the UK was protecting domestic industries and giving them an opportunity to undersell the US. Based on the observation, Amery and Worthington Evans suggested that the combination of unified imperial monetary system and its low exchange against the outside world would 'constitute a most effective, and politically non-contentious form of Imperial preference'. The exchange thus should be managed below the old gold parity 'for the period of Imperial reconstruction and development'. The authors were aware of the possibility that depreciation in one area of the Empire could spread inflation

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<sup>58</sup> 'Mr. Darling's Schemes', T 208/70.

<sup>59</sup> Robert W. D. Boyce, *British Capitalism at the Crossroads 1919-1932: A Study in Politics, Economics, and International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 47-48.

<sup>60</sup> Amery confessed to Vincent Meredith, President of the Bank of Montreal, that he did not have deep understanding of 'the technical details of the problem'. At the same time, however, he was confident about the principle that a single stable exchange covering Canada would be 'a natural correlative of imperial preference'. Amery to Meredith, 11 August 1920, AMEL 2/1/2.

<sup>61</sup> Darling, 'Annexure A: Suggestions for an Empire Currency and an Empire Bank', 12 March 1920. AMEL 1/3/60

throughout the Empire. As for concrete schemes to restrict inflation, the memorandum just recommended schemes presented in its appendixes written by Darling (an Imperial Central Bank issuing and managing bills of exchange) and Grogan (an Imperial Currency Board issuing and managing imperial notes).<sup>62</sup>

Reactions in Whitehall were unanimously negative. All replies mentioned the long-term neutrality of money as a fundamental obstacle to the memorandum's scheme. The logic was that any beneficial effect of depreciation or inflation on the trade would be only ephemeral because prices, wages, and exchanges would be all re-adjusted. Basil Blackett, the first Controller of Finance in the Treasury, complained that it was unreasonable to reverse the decision of the Cunliffe Committee (getting back to gold) to cause such a temporal phenomenon. Even Robert Horne, who was to be an unorthodox Chancellor of the Exchequer and a companion of Amery on the monetary question in the 1930s, felt that it would be highly problematic if the restoration of the gold standard took a long time, though he did not deny that the prospect of the stabilisation of the imperial exchanges itself was worthy of exploration.<sup>63</sup>

The most sophisticated counterargument came from Hawtrey. He also referred to the long-term neutrality of money by arguing that it was purchasing power that determined the exchange rates and not vice versa.<sup>64</sup> However, Hawtrey was not a naïve believer in the price-specie flow mechanism of the gold standard. He well understood that the classical gold standard had been mainly managed by the Bank of England and not driven by the automatic

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<sup>62</sup> Amery and Worthington Evans, 'Imperial Exchange and Currency', April 1920, AMEL 1/3/60.

<sup>63</sup> B. P. Blackett, 'Proposals for a Uniform Imperial Currency', 6 May 1920; 'Memorandum by the President of the Board of Trade', 3 July 1920, AMEL 1/3/60.

<sup>64</sup> Hawtrey, 'Imperial Exchange and Currency', 3 May 1920, AMEL 1/3/60.



mechanism.<sup>65</sup> Though he approved of the conclusion of the Cunliffe Committee, his aim was the institutionalization of the managed monetary order under the leadership of London and New York founded on the gold exchange standard where credits could be generated more flexibly than under the gold bullion standard.<sup>66</sup> Keynes, as a critic of the gold standard, regarded this stance as an unsatisfactory compromise.<sup>67</sup> Hawtrey's opposition to Amery and Darling was based on this specific stance. Unlike Blackett, Hawtrey agreed that it would be possible for rapid restoration of exchanges with the US dollar or the gold standard to injure British trade and employment. Nevertheless, he contended that Darling's scheme had an inherent defect in that the Dominions would be forced to expand or contract their currencies to keep up with sterling and that the self-liquidating bill of exchange would easily give rise to an inflationary spiral. Moreover, what Darling desired was not so different from the actual imperial monetary mechanism in the pre-war years, where the Dominions regulated their currencies via credit transactions in London. It was the depreciation of sterling that made the uniformity of inter-imperial exchange lost for the time being. Hence, Hawtrey's ultimate solution was to restore the convertibility at the old gold parity.<sup>68</sup>

Amery was not persuaded by Hawtrey's argument about the long-term neutrality of money and the danger of an inflationary spiral. He argued that if a true effect of low exchange may be temporal, adjustments would take more time

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<sup>65</sup> For historians' account of the classical gold standard, see Barry Eichengreen, 'Conducting the International Orchestra: Bank of England Leadership under the Classical Gold Standard', *Journal of International Money and Finance* 6, no. 1 (1987): 5–29.

<sup>66</sup> Peden, *The Treasury*, 155-156; Píerre-Hernán Rojas, 'The Structural Asymmetry of the International Gold Standard in Hawtrey's Works', *The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought* 26, no. 3 (2019): 587–621.

<sup>67</sup> John Maynard Keynes, *A Tract on Monetary Reform* (London: Macmillan, 1923), 173-176.

<sup>68</sup> Hawtrey, 'Imperial Exchange'; idem., 'Mr. Darling's Proposal for an Empire Bank' 28 April 1920, AMEL 1/3/60.

than Hawtrey expected because it was overlooked that workers would not admit wage-cuts so smoothly.<sup>69</sup> But looking at the Treasury's memoranda, he, as an ex-bimetallist, seemed to re-consider the issue of silver in India. He wrote down his own monetary scheme in his private memorandum in April 1921. By this point, the economic trend in the UK had been reversed. The memorandum thus attempted to design a monetary system to tackle both issues of debt and industrial depression. Amery warned that restoration of gold convertibility accompanied by deflation would exacerbate both problems. As for the debt to the US, he claimed that, as demonetization of silver lowered its value after the 1870s, re-monetization of gold would raise the price of gold, meaning an increase of the value of the debt defined in gold. Perhaps because of the criticism from the Treasury, he put forward the price stability as a goal instead of exaggerating the benefit of inflation. The ideal condition could 'only be secured by a currency whose total volume' would be 'in a constant proportion to total volume of production' regardless of a foreign demand for precious metals.<sup>70</sup>

But Amery had learned from the Treasury the fact that the metallic standards were often advocated as a means of securing the international monetary order. It made him draw a roadmap to reach the stabilization of the international exchanges without vitiating the national and imperial economy. His strategy was to stabilize the exchanges, 'firstly within the Empire and secondly with both gold and silver using countries'. In his view, Darling's or Grogan's schemes were optimistically expected to work well. But Amery cared less about concrete mechanism than its effect, which would permanently stabilize the imperial exchanges as well as eliminate the use of gold within a large part of the

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<sup>69</sup> Amery, 'Imperial Exchange and Currency', July 1920, AMEL 1/3/60.

<sup>70</sup> Amery, 'Our Money Policy', 3 April 1921, AMEL 1/3/60.

Empire. The process of incorporation of the Canadian dollars and the rupee would be a bridge to the second stage. Regarding the silver issue in India, Amery insisted that, in addition to issuing Empire notes or inconvertible rupee notes, a new sterling–silver parity should be arranged. This would accomplish stabilization of exchanges with all silver using countries in Asia and South and Central America. But this should not mean the resurrection of bimetallism; except for in India, silver would be legal tender only as bank reserves and used for remittances to silver using countries. Amery presented his tentative conclusion as follows:

It [the new money system] would be based primarily on inconvertible national or imperial sterling paper itself based by law on the wealth and credit of the nation and of the Empire. But it would also comprise both gold and silver maintained at a fixed ratio to sterling and to each other, as necessary concurrent elements in the money system for the purposes of foreign exchange.

Amery lost trust in any form of classical metallic standards, including bimetallism, by the beginning of the 1920s. However, he did not favour the complete demonetization of gold. On the contrary, he upheld the re-monetization of silver. Although the role of precious metals, especially gold, in his plan was not necessarily clear, we could call his scheme, so to speak, imperial monetary system based on the bimetallic exchange standard. We can see some legacies of bimetallism in it, such as the anti-deflationist tendency and the concern about economic relations with India. But, unlike in the 1890s, Amery located monetary policy in his whole imperial project. The monetary

scheme was one example of Amery's attempts to devise non-tariff preference, including the Empire Settlement Act and the Buy British Campaign. In other words, it was designed to attain his fundamental goal, the balanced expansion of production and population on an imperial scale.

As was the case with the 'scientific tariff' in the Edwardian era, overoptimism and delusion dogged the monetary policy of constructive imperialists. They were too sanguine in their expectation that the internal interests within the Empire could harmonize. Otto Niemeyer's doubt was pertinent to the question: 'Does he [Darling] imagine Canada giving up the dollar, or India the rupee?'.<sup>71</sup> Though neither Darling nor Amery said that the Dominions or the colonies should renounce their own currencies, the unification of imperial exchanges would restrict the autonomy of each countries' monetary policy. Of course, the loss of autonomous fiscal policy in the trilemma of international finance occurred in the international gold standard as well. But the imperialist monetary scheme inevitably looked more arbitrary than the alleged 'knave-proof' quality of the gold standard. The centralist nature was all the more problematic because of the growth of centrifugal desires in the Empire/Commonwealth in the interwar period. Amery was to face the problem again in the 1930s.

### **Back to the gold standard**

On 28 April 1925 Churchill, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, informed the House of Commons that the pound sterling, with the imperial currencies linked to it, would return to the gold standard.<sup>72</sup> The exchange rate was set at the pre-

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<sup>71</sup> Quoted in Eric Helleiner, *The Making of National Money: Territorial Currencies in Historical Perspective* (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 2003), 145.

<sup>72</sup> Hansard, HC 28 April 1925, vol. 183, 52-58.

war parity, 1 : 4.86 in terms of the sterling-dollar rate. Keynes blamed the return for overvaluation of the pound and for its probable harmful effect on employment.<sup>73</sup> The Keynesian interpretation still has influence on historians, but the historiography has revealed that Churchill was not just a mouthpiece of the Treasury. He made the decision after weighing the pros and cons; the Treasury and the Bank of England did not intend to sacrifice or neglect the industrial interests but to re-galvanize the export industries through restoration of the international trade. These financial authorities, which were aware of possible damages to industries, also cautiously chose the timing in consultation with the Federal Reserve Board, though they certainly had optimistic expectations and miscalculated about the price changes in the US.<sup>74</sup> Experts on cliometrics still debate over whether the parity was really overvaluation and to what extent it affected the British economy.<sup>75</sup>

What matters to this thesis is contemporary people's perceptions. The Keynesian interpretation became orthodox after the Great Depression, while only few figures such as Keynes and Reginald McKenna were opposed to the return during the 1920s.<sup>76</sup> As the previous section has discussed, Amery reached the conclusion that the amount of credits should not be regulated by that of metal reserves. If he had clung to this position, Amery would be on the

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<sup>73</sup> John Maynard Keynes, *The Economic Consequences of Mr. Churchill* (London: Leonard and Virginia Woolf at the Hogarth Press, 1925).

<sup>74</sup> Regarding Churchill's attitudes, Paul Addison, *Churchill on the Home Front, 1900-1955* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1992), 246-250. As for general accounts of the return in 1925, D. E. Moggridge, *The Return to Gold 1925: The Formulation of Economic Policy and Its Critics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969); idem., *British Monetary Policy, 1924-1931, the Norman Conquest of \$4.86* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972).

<sup>75</sup> Pioneering revisionist work is K. G. P. Matthews, 'Was Sterling Overvalued in 1925?', *The Economic History Review* 39, no. 4 (1986): 572-87. As for a summary of the overall debate, see Roger Middleton, 'Macroeconomic Policy in Britain between the Wars', *Economic History Review* 64, no. 3 (2011): 5-10.

<sup>76</sup> Unlike Keynes, McKenna's opposition was to the timing not to the return per se. Rogério Arthmar and Michael Mclure, 'On Britain's Return to the Gold Standard: Was There a "Pigou-McKenna School"?', *Economic Record* 92, Special Issue (2016): 1-14.

list of the dissenters. But he did not. So, why and how was he reticent about the monetary issue during the period?

*My Political Life* was untypically magnanimous about the political decision in 1925. Though Amery admitted that the 'disastrously over-valued' pound aggravated the deflationary pressure and hampered British exports, he added that it would be not fair to criticize Churchill for the decision, which 'was endorsed by nearly all the financial authorities of the day'. Amery tried to make readers notice that so many people at the time did not understand 'the distinction between convertibility and the exchange rate' that the gold standard and the old parity were virtually 'synonymous terms'.<sup>77</sup> However, Amery, versed in pseudo-academic discussions on currencies, was not ignorant enough to be exonerated. The other justification of his silence was that he was just back from Iraq, so that 'it was too late to protest'.<sup>78</sup> Certainly, it was probable for the new and busy minister to give up picking a fight on some fronts.

Once acquiescing in the return to the gold standard, Amery apparently continued to restrain himself from politicizing the monetary issue. But it obliged him to readjust the position of monetary policy in his political project. One year after the return, Amery delivered a speech at the annual dinner of the British Overseas Banks Association.<sup>79</sup> In the speech, while implying that he was personally discontented over the return, he desisted from discussing 'the merits or demerits of the policy' because it would be 'a fatality to talk about abandoning it [the gold standard]' when Britain as a nation had determined to make 'the great sacrifice' to secure it. At the same time, he warned bankers in the

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<sup>77</sup> *My Political Life*, vol. 2, 480-482.

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*, 481.

<sup>79</sup> It took place on 16 March 1926 at the Hyde Park Hotel. The speech was fully reported in *The Bankers' Magazine*, vol 121, 1926, 612-615. A clipping from the magazine can be found in AMEL 1/4/12.

audience that it would be impossible to maintain the standard unless the adverse balance of trade, particularly against the US, was improved. His remedy was, as usual, increasing visible and invisible exports to the British Empire.<sup>80</sup> Amery now swallowed the gold standard at the old parity, but he started using it as a bargaining chip to promote the intra-imperial trade. Amery tried to elicit concessions about fiscal policy and empire development from Churchill by pointing out that they were indispensable to preserve the gold standard. He even called a flat-rate *ad valorem* duty in his proposition 'a Gold Standard Duty'.<sup>81</sup>

His expedient tactics, however, restricted discretion in pursuing imperial monetary policy. Darling invented his new scheme based on 'Empire Consols' and strove to make it a part of the agenda for the forthcoming imperial conference. He naturally tried to castigate the Dominion Office and Amery.<sup>82</sup> Amery seemed to be intrigued by the scheme and recommended Richard Bennett, leader of the Conservative Party of Canada, who was also fascinated by 'the possibility of having uniform currency throughout the Empire', to peruse Darling's memorandum.<sup>83</sup> But Amery was not susceptible to Darling's agitation. When Darling asked him to arrange a meeting between Darling and Churchill, he declined it by saying that Churchill was occupied with too many other issues.<sup>84</sup> Furthermore, when Darling, concluding that the 1925 decision resulted in a crash between finance and industry in the UK, tried to urge the government

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<sup>80</sup> Ibid., 619-622.

<sup>81</sup> Amery to Churchill, 17 May 1926; 6 December 1926, Baldwin 28.

<sup>82</sup> J. F. Darling, *Empire Consols*. (London: Sir Isaac Pitman & Sons, 1928); Darling to De Stage, 1 July 1928, AMEL 2/1/15.

<sup>83</sup> Bennett to Amery, 21 June 1928; Amery to Bennett, July [undated] 1928, AMEL 2/1/15.

<sup>84</sup> Amery to Darling, 5 July 1928; Darling to Amery, 8 July 1928, AMEL 2/1/15.

to appoint a committee for investigating the connection of fiscal and monetary policy, Amery apologetically declined the request.<sup>85</sup>

What made Amery give up politicizing monetary policy in the second Baldwin government? The political contingencies and his opportunistic adaptation to them were undoubtedly important factors. But it was also true that Amery chose to lower the priority of imperial monetary policy to concentrate on the fiscal front in his conflict with the Treasury. In other words, the connection between monetary policy and fiscal policy became again unclear in his imperial thought.

### **Rehabilitation of silver: second wave of Bimetallism?**

Amery turned his attention to monetary policy in the summer of 1931. What firstly captivated him was the idea familiar to him since the 1890s: bimetallism. The nineteenth century bimetallists believed that the worldwide deflation could be cured by re-monetization of silver. Because the price index began to fall in 1929 on a global scale, it was not surprising that some people were attracted by the same idea for the same reason. Besides, like the nineteenth-century movement, the silver question in the 1930s assumed a global and imperial nature. The plummeting price of silver not only disrupted trade with silver-using regions, but also devastated the silver mining industries all over the world. The global concern about the silver price led to the agreement in the 1933 World Economic Conference to raise the silver price. In the US, the silver mining industries made the Roosevelt government pass the Silver Purchase Act in 1934.<sup>86</sup> The consequent drain of silver to the US caused a serious problem in

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<sup>85</sup> Darling to Amery, 16 December 1928, with an enclosed copy of his article for *National Review*, 'An Over-Valued Pound'; Amery to Darling, 20 December 1928, AMEL 2/1/15.

<sup>86</sup> William L. Silber, *The Story of Silver: How the White Metal Shaped America and the Modern World* (Princeton & Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2019), chapter 4-6; Fred L. Israel,



China, which was still on the silver standard. The shortage of silver motivated the emerging Nationalist government of China to embark on the currency reform, which triggered the negotiations between the US, the UK, and Japan over the monetary order in China.<sup>87</sup> As for India, Britain had to carefully handle the issue of the Indian currencies so as not to infuriate the silver interests in the US.<sup>88</sup> That is, the silver question was still a big issue in international politics in the 1930s.

The full story of British involvement in the global politics of silver in the 1930s remains to be written. The most detailed explanation is still the contemporary work written by Gustav Cassel.<sup>89</sup> One of the early critics of the gold standard as he was, Cassel regarded bimetallism as ‘unnecessary’ and depicted the new bimetallists as misguided.<sup>90</sup> Cassel’s argument on the redundancy and contradiction of the new silver movement in Britain was essentially correct in hindsight. However, no matter how absurd it was from the present standard, it is worthwhile to ask why and how the silver question attracted some attention in the political and business world. The case study of Amery will show an example of nuanced relations between imperialism and the silver question.

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*Nevada’s Key Pittman* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1963).

<sup>87</sup> Silber, *The Story of Silver*, chapter 7; Shigeru Akita, ‘British Informal Empire in East Asia, 1880-1939’, in *Gentlemanly Capitalism and British Imperialism: The New Debate on Empire*, ed. Raymond E. Dumett (London & New York: Longman, 1999), 127–40; Yoich Kibata, ‘Reasserting Imperial Power? Britain and East Asia in the 1930s’, in *Gentlemanly Capitalism, Imperialism and Global History*, ed. Shigeru Akita (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 169–84.

<sup>88</sup> G. Balachandran, *John Bullion’s Empire: Britain’s Gold Problem and India Between the Wars* (Surrey: Curzon Press, 1996).

<sup>89</sup> Gustav Cassel, *The Downfall of the Gold Standard* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936), chapter 7.

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.*, 166-169; Irwin, Douglas A. ‘Who Anticipated the Great Depression? Gustav Cassel versus Keynes and Hayek on the Interwar Gold Standard’. *Journal of Money, Credit and Banking* 46, no. 1 (2014): 199–227; Cassel to Amery, 12 October 1931, AMEL 1/5/21.

Trust in the gold standard gradually eroded after 1929. Amid global deflation, some scholars and politicians started to suspect that the fall in prices resulted from general shortage of gold or the maldistribution of gold; notwithstanding the fact that an immense amount of gold was hoarded by the US and France, both countries were unwilling to increase overseas investment or to invite more imports by lowering their tariffs; the sterilization of gold thus led to a contraction of liquidity almost all over the world.<sup>91</sup> The currently influential view of the Great Depression, initiated by Barry Eichengreen, has acknowledged that the unfair asymmetrical nature was an inherent defect of the international gold standard. It has also been argued that the shift from the gold standard to the floating currency system was a potential solution to the global recession if only there had been international cooperation and coordination.<sup>92</sup> Unlike present historians, however, contemporary people did not know the subsequent course of monetary history. There burgeoned many monetary schemes as alternatives to the gold standard in the 1930s.

Amery recognized the maldistribution of gold as a cause of monetary contraction by the beginning of June 1931. And yet, his remedy was still not change of monetary policy but of fiscal policy: reducing the US surplus through Tariff Reform.<sup>93</sup> It means that the low priority of monetary policy in the 1920s still lingered despite his release from the ministerial duties. However, at some point of that month, Amery found the craze for silver resurrected. For instance, as of January 1931 Lord Hunsdon, a son of the bimetallist banker, Henry Gibbs, suggested that the central banks should agree to accumulate some proportion

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<sup>91</sup> For examples of those people, see Rojas, 'Structural Asymmetry'; Irwin, 'Gustav Cassel'.

<sup>92</sup> Barry Eichengreen and Jeffrey Sachs, 'Exchange Rates and Economic Recovery in the 1930s' 45, no. 4 (1985): 925–46; Eichengreen, *Golden Fetters: The Gold Standard and the Great Depression, 1919-1939* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).

<sup>93</sup> Amery, 'The Gold Supply', 1 June 1931; 'Hoarded Gold', 12 June 1931; 'Payment in Gold', 18 June 1931, *The Times*.

of their reserves in silver to gradually return to international bimetallism.<sup>94</sup>

Amery was pleasantly surprised by the situation.

It is very interesting to me to find that my old views on silver are beginning to come on top again. When I suggested the remonetization to Darling just after the war, and putting Europe on a silver basis, he thought I was rather cranky, just as he thought the same of my suggestions for re-valueing [sic] the pound sterling at four dollars. Now he, and many others like Horne for instance, take these things in their stride. It would be interesting if, having been a convinced bi-metallist since 1893, I should now play some part in carrying the thing through.<sup>95</sup>

Another impetus to the new bimetallists was publication of the Macmillan Report in July 1931. The Committee on Finance and Industry (the Macmillan Committee) was established by the second MacDonald government to scrutinize the relations between finance and industry. Among the main members was Keynes, who tried to put the abridged argument of *A Treatise on Money* in the Report. He succeeded in making it adopt his framework in the descriptive part but not in its suggestions.<sup>96</sup> As for monetary policy, the report's suggestion was after all the maintenance of the international gold exchange standard. At the same time, however, the report frankly admitted that the gold standard was not functioning well due to such causes as the reluctance of the two creditor countries, France and the US, to employ their lending power and insisted that regulation of currencies based on reserve should be more flexibly

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<sup>94</sup> Lord Hunsdon, 'Gold in Central Banks', 12 January 1931, *The Times*.

<sup>95</sup> Amery Diary, 1 July 1931, AMEL 7/25.

<sup>96</sup> Regarding the making of the Report, Peter Clarke, *The Keynesian Revolution in the Making, 1924-1936* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), chapter 5-9.

managed in order to raise the global price index.<sup>97</sup> Although there was no mention of bimetallism, its analytical part, discussing the malfunction of the gold standard, appealed to bimetallists.<sup>98</sup> Ironically, the Report was frequently cited in bimetallists' writings.<sup>99</sup>

Amery's letter to *The Times* on 23 July succinctly explained the argument of the bimetallist movement.<sup>100</sup> He came to admit that the UK should alter monetary policy as well as fiscal policy because it would be impossible to see 'a revolution in the banking, tariff, and lending policies of the creditor nations' in the near future. There were only two options to deal with the scramble for gold: letting the world completely go off the metallic standard or maintaining it by adding silver to the reserves. Amery claimed that the second one was preferable, judging from the regulative mechanism of metallic standards to prevent excessive inflation. A concomitant rise in silver price would also increase purchasing power in China and India and facilitate the trade between the West and the East. Especially the silver question in India was pertinent to his wider political stance towards India. Amery supported the UK government's attempt to introduce constitutional reform in India. But like his views on Ireland, he believed that a real cause of the rise of Indian nationalist movements was their economic grievance. He therefore argued:

The constitutional problem in India will, no doubt, have to be solved on constitutional lines. But only a return to prosperity can create the atmosphere in which a reasonable settlement can be worked out, and

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<sup>97</sup> Report of Committee on Finance and Industry, cmd. 3897.

<sup>98</sup> Amery Diary, 13 July 1931. AMEL 7/25.

<sup>99</sup> For instance, Lord Hunsdon, 'A Plea for Silver' 22 July 1931; Amery, 'The Functions of Money', 23 July 1931; Horne, 'Value of Silver' 24 July 1931, *The Times*.

<sup>100</sup> The following paragraph is based on Amery, 'The Functions of Money'.

only the re-establishment of solvency will save any new constitution from certain disaster.

However, Tariff Reform could not be recommended as a panacea in the case of India because the Indian protective tariff was a source of the conflict between India and Lancashire.<sup>101</sup> Although his diary confessed that he relished a sense of *schadenfreude* at the desperation of the cotton industry in Lancashire,<sup>102</sup> Amery recognized a need to devise an expedient so as not to sacrifice either party. Re-monetization of silver was an ideal policy in that it would simultaneously restore the value of Indian savings and the Indian market for Lancashire.<sup>103</sup>

The new bimetallist movement attracted some politicians and businessmen, and they formed the Silver Association on 22 September 1931. Amery became a member of its executive committee.<sup>104</sup> *The Financial Times* featured the silver question the next day and the leading members of the Association, including Amery, contributed articles to the issue.<sup>105</sup> But it was at that moment that circumstances changed drastically. The National Government suspended the

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<sup>101</sup> Since India gained tariff autonomy, fiscal policy was a thorny question between Lancashire and India. As for the background, see B. R. Tomlinson, *The Political Economy of the Raj 1914-1947: The Economics of Decolonization in India* (London: Macmillan, 1979); Basudev Chatterji, *Trade, Tariffs, and Empire: Lancashire and British Policy in India 1919-1939* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1992); Andrew Muldoon, "'An Unholy Row in Lancashire": The Textile Lobby, Conservative Politics, and Indian Policy, 1931-1935', *Twentieth Century British History* 14, no. 2 (2003): 93-111; Martin Pugh, 'Lancashire, Cotton, and Indian Reform: Conservative Controversies in the 1930s', *Twentieth Century British History* 15, no. 2 (2004): 143-51; N. C. Fleming, 'Lancashire Conservatives, Tariff Reform and Indian Responsible Government', *Contemporary British History* 30, no. 2 (2016): 151-76; Matthew Stubbings, 'Free Trade Empire to Commonwealth of Nations: India, Britain and Imperial Preference, 1903-1932', *The International History Review* 41, no. 2 (2019): 323-44.

<sup>102</sup> '... if any set of people live in a world that has passed away it is the Lancashire cotton people. Someone ought to tell them the truth, namely that they are being punished for Lancashire's treatment of India in the past, but I am afraid it is not possible for anyone in politics to say what needs saying.' Amery diary, 29 April 1931, AMEL 7/25.

<sup>103</sup> As Cassel criticized, bimetallists tended to neglect a possible deflationary pressure on manufacturers in silver using countries. Cassel, *The Downfall of the Gold Standard*, 167-169.

<sup>104</sup> *The Times*, 23 September 1931.

<sup>105</sup> *The Financial Times*, 23 September 1931.

gold standard on 21 September.<sup>106</sup> Instead of going back to the metallic standard, Britain started to manage the exchange rate of the sterling through the operation of the Exchange Equalisation Account from 1932 onwards.<sup>107</sup> If floating currencies can be regulated and managed irrespective of the metallic reserves, it would be meaningless to use silver as a complement to gold. Bimetallists were forced to respond to the situation.

Amery was aware that, if the suggestion of the Macmillan report to loosen the quantitative regulation of money by the gold reserve was developed thoroughly, it could lead to complete abolition of metallic reserves or to the sterling standard. But his initial reaction to the suspension of the gold standard was to state his conviction that people still psychologically needed the metallic basis and that the international monetary order should be back to bimetallism rather than the gold standard.<sup>108</sup> Considering the argument in his 1921 memorandum that paper money should be regulated by wealth of the states and not by the amount of metallic reserves, his endorsement of bimetallism seemed 'reactionary' if we see history of money as evolution from money backed by precious metals to floating currencies. However, Amery quickly had second thoughts and tried to reconcile the silver question with his original monetary scheme and the Macmillan report.

He found Irving Fisher's 'compensated dollar plan' useful for the adjustment.<sup>109</sup> His letter to *The Times* on 1 December 1931 presented his own

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<sup>106</sup> As for high politics behind the decision, see Philip Williamson, *National Crisis and National Government: British Politics, the Economy and Empire, 1926-1932* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), Part III.

<sup>107</sup> Susan Howson, *Sterling's Managed Float: The Operations of the Exchange Equalisation Account, 1932-1939* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980).

<sup>108</sup> Amery's memorandum for the Silver Association, 'The Silver Problem', AMEL 1/5/21.

<sup>109</sup> As for Fisher's scheme, Don Patinkin, 'Irving Fisher and His Compensated Dollar Plan', *Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly* 79, no. 3 (1993): 1-34.; Rebeca Gomez Betancourt and Jérôme de Boyer des Roches, 'Origins and Developments of Irving Fisher's Compensated Dollar Plan', *European Journal of the History of Economic Thought* 20, no. 2 (2013): 261-83.

scheme based on Fisher's plan.<sup>110</sup> Its overall aim was to attain the stability of exchanges without sacrificing the stability of price in the domestic market. This would be enabled by linking the pound sterling with gold 'not at a fixed rate, but at a rate varying inversely with the index of wholesale prices as measured in gold'. It meant the value of sterling would be moved in accordance with commodity prices. Amery claimed that the eclectic scheme would be superior to complete inconvertible money in that the gold element could work as 'a convenient make-believe' and more easily secure trust in the world of international finance. Furthermore, this scheme would be compatible with 'the increased use of silver' in combination with gold.

Amery's aim changed from bimetallism to rehabilitation of silver, i.e., raising price of silver by promoting its use. His belief in policy of enhancing silver price as an economic means to consummate the Indian constitutional reform survived intact.<sup>111</sup> But he ceased to think that re-monetization of silver was indispensable to increase the money supply. Rather, he started to deploy a more modest argument that a general rise of silver price and purchasing power in the East would indirectly help turn the tide of worldwide deflation. In other words, the position of the silver question in his monetary policy was lowered from the overarching aim to one part of the wider imperial project to forge the sterling area. His concrete proposals in subsequent years were designed to encourage the use of silver in the process of managing sterling, though they were not necessarily practical, rational, or mutually consistent. At any rate, his propositions about silver were shunned by the government and the financial

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<sup>110</sup> Amery, 'Silver and Gold', 1 December 1931, *The Times*. This letter referred to Irving Fisher, 'A Compensated Dollar', *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 27, no. 2 (1913): 213–35. Later on, Amery realized that in addition to Fisher, Alfred Marshall and George Warren devised similar monetary schemes. Amery to Dawson, undated, AMEL 2/1/23.

<sup>111</sup> Amery to Smuts, 7 July 1933, AMEL 2/1/23; Amery diary, 14 June 1933.

authorities. Amery perceived that their reluctance to tackle the silver issue reflected their 'disregard for the Imperial aspect of monetary policy'.<sup>112</sup>

### **In search of imperial monetary order**

When Britain went off the gold standard, many other countries chose or were forced to follow suit and to link their currencies with pound sterling. As a result, the sterling area appeared in a visible form in the 1930s, though it was not institutionalised until the outbreak of the Second World War.<sup>113</sup> In response to the new situation, Amery switched the main aim in his monetary policy to the development of the sterling area. The silver issue became one front of this wider project. However, it should be recognized that the project did not suddenly appear in 1931. As discussed in the previous section, the Milnerites were absorbed in devising schemes for imperial monetary unity after the First World War. Amery temporarily retreated from the front line of the project in the 1920s, but it does not mean that he deserted the monetary movement. The report published by the research committee of the EEU in 1930 suggested that imperial monetary unity should be one of the agendas in the 1930 Imperial Conference.<sup>114</sup> With the report unheeded, Amery and the EEU furthered their research to devise a concrete monetary proposition, which was for the most part completed before September 1931.<sup>115</sup> Britain's withdrawal from the gold standard gave Amery and his fellows a timely opportunity to make the government implement their monetary policy.

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<sup>112</sup> Amery, *The Forward View*, 329.

<sup>113</sup> Ian M. Drummond, *The Floating Pound and the Sterling Area, 1931-1939* (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

<sup>114</sup> 'Report of the Research Committee', in L. S. Amery, ed., *A Plan of Action* (London: Faber and Faber, 1932), 127-8.

<sup>115</sup> Amery's foreword for 'Report on Empire Monetary and Financial Policy', in *A Plan of Action*, 213.



Amery and the EEU tried to propagate their monetary scheme for the 1932 Ottawa Conference. Amery contributed an article to *The Banker* in February 1932.<sup>116</sup> The article was reprinted in *A Plan of Action*, where the report of the EEU was also published.<sup>117</sup> The report was produced by the committee composed of four members of the EEU (Amery, Horne, Basil Blackett, and H. G. Williams) and four representatives of the FBI (Frederick Williams-Taylor, William Larke, Roland Nugent, and R. G. Glenday).<sup>118</sup> Based on reading of the Macmillan Report, they asserted that the global depression was essentially a monetary crisis caused by the maldistribution of gold. But as for a remedy, rather than being satisfied with the Macmillan Report's suggestion to reform the gold standard, they demanded imperialization of trade and monetary policy.<sup>119</sup> Amery resorted to his clichéd rhetoric: as the era of economic internationalism symbolized by the gold standard ended, monetary policy should be managed by the principles of economic nationalism and imperialism.<sup>120</sup> In order to emphasize the primacy of imperial policy, the report dared to claim that even remission of reparations and war debts would not stop the drain of gold to France and the US, unless structural reform of monetary and financial system was implemented.<sup>121</sup>

Their concrete alternative to the international gold standard was not imposing a single currency system on the Empire but establishing permanent

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<sup>116</sup> Amery, 'A Sterling Monetary System', *The Banker*, vol 21, February 1932, 110-117.

<sup>117</sup> 'Report of the Research Committee', in *A Plan of Action*, 214-266. Amery's article was in 267-275. The article was reprinted again in *My Political Life*, vol. 3, 415-420.

<sup>118</sup> Amery, 'Foreword', in *A Plan of Action*, 212.

<sup>119</sup> 'Report', *ibid.*, 216-219, 226-228, 237-239.

<sup>120</sup> Amery, 'A Sterling Monetary System', *ibid.*, 274-5.

<sup>121</sup> 'Report', *ibid.*, 223; Amery, 'A Sterling Monetary System', *ibid.*, 267. The war debts were in fact a bugbear to British finance throughout the interwar period. Its remission was the most important British demand in the international politics to the point of being an obstacle to a success of negotiations. See Patricia Clavin, *The Failure of Economic Diplomacy: Britain, Germany, France and the United States, 1931-36* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996); Robert Self, *Britain, America and the War Debt Controversy: The Economic Diplomacy of an Unspecial Relationship, 1917-1941* (London: Routledge, 2006).

parity of exchange within the Empire based on sterling through voluntary cooperation.<sup>122</sup> By optimizing a radical part of the Macmillan Report, the EEU report suggested that the gold reserve should be retained only for exchange purposes.<sup>123</sup> Amery gave a silver hue to his personal scheme, which recommended that silver as well as gold should be used as metallic reserves and that silver should be linked with sterling at a fixed rate. He believed that this would extend the sterling area to silver-dominated regions and ultimately lead to re-linking sterling and gold on the basis of Irving Fisher's model.<sup>124</sup> However, Amery failed to make the EEU swallow his silver policy entirely. Although its report emphasized the necessity to raise price of silver, it was more loyal to the Macmillan Report's anticipation that a financially developed community would not need any metallic backing. It also added that, if all the governments confined the use of metallic reserves to international exchange, 'the supply of gold alone might well be sufficient' for that purpose.<sup>125</sup>

The authors of the report were not naïve enough to believe that cooperation for permanent parity would be formed spontaneously. Reform of the financial constitution, they reckoned, was necessary to extricate the Empire from the 'state of monetary chaos'. Concretely, they proposed the establishment of an Empire Central Bank, which would act as a clearing bank for all the central banks in the Empire or imperialization of the board of the Bank of England. In either case, their fundamental aim would be fulfilled: preventing the City in

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<sup>122</sup> 'Report', in *The Plan of Action*, 237-8.

<sup>123</sup> *Ibid.*, 235-7.

<sup>124</sup> Amery, 'A Sterling Monetary System', *ibid.*, 272-4. Also see his statement in a discussion with Horne at the Royal Empire Society on 12 April 1932. *The Currency Problem* (London: The Royal Empire Society, 1932), 14-17, AMEL 1/5/21. There, Amery even raised the possibility of introducing aluminum into the metallic reserve. *Ibid.*, 18. In line with the silver policy, he also proposed an unsuccessful amendment to enable the Exchange Equalisation Account to use silver in its reserve. Hansard, 25 May 1932 vol. 266 cc 441-471.

<sup>125</sup> 'The Report', *The Plan of Action*, 233.

London from taking a predominant role and giving voices to the local financial interests in the Empire. They hoped that imperialization of monetary policy would be discussed at the Ottawa conference.<sup>126</sup> The idea of an imperial central bank had been nurtured by Darling in the 1920s.<sup>127</sup> Amery and his fellows tried to materialize it in the 1930s.

The imperial monetary theorists had some comrades in the Dominions. Particularly, R. B. Bennett, Prime Minister of the host country, was always fascinated by the idea of imperial monetary unity. In January 1932, Amery urged Bennett not to let the British Treasury shelve the currency question at Ottawa. Albeit not mainly due to Amery's agitation, the Canadian Government actually submitted to Britain a proposition that monetary policy should be discussed in the coming conference, which horrified the Treasury. In response to the demand, Richard Hopkins concocted memoranda which were to define British monetary policy in the 1930s: while formation of 'Imperial sterling standard' was desirable, the sterling area 'would be best left for a time to grow'; 'A sane management of sterling', rather than transformation of the financial constitution, would be a best way to develop it.<sup>128</sup> The Treasury view after all prevailed in the conference. Neville Chamberlain and his officials succeeded in emasculating the Committee on Monetary and Financial Questions.<sup>129</sup> The report issued by the committee seemed eclectic and equivocal from the standpoint of Amery. Whilst the necessities of raising the price level and forming the sterling area as an expedient were endorsed, the report sanguinely observed that a rise in wholesale prices would be the most desirable means to secure stable exchange rates within the Commonwealth. Furthermore, it was

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<sup>126</sup> 'The Report', *ibid.*, 237-239; Amery, 'A Sterling Monetary System', *ibid.*, 270-1.

<sup>127</sup> Kamitake, 'Darling, Goodenough and McKenna', 168-170.

<sup>128</sup> Drummond, *Imperial Economic Policy*, 208-214.

<sup>129</sup> Regarding the details of the negotiation, see *ibid.*, chapter 6.

declared that 'the ultimate aim of monetary policy should be the restoration of a satisfactory international monetary standard'.<sup>130</sup>

Disquieted by the result of Ottawa, Amery started to assume that a Treasury's conspiracy to get back to gold was going on. He suspected that the 1933 World Economic Conference in London was held to resurrect the fixed-rate international gold standard. His article in the *English Review* before the conference complained that 'the nineteenth-century outlook and phraseology' was dominant among the delegates, especially among the British ones.<sup>131</sup> Naturally, Amery appreciated Franklin Roosevelt's intervention for wrecking the conference and clearing a path for 'the nationally planned world'. He insisted that the conference should be quickly reworked by the members of the Commonwealth to establish 'an effective sterling monetary system'.<sup>132</sup> Albeit not due to Amery's advice, the members of the Commonwealth issued the British Empire Currency Declaration at the end of the conference. But it turned out to be just a restatement of the Ottawa Monetary Report.<sup>133</sup> After seeing these disappointing consequences, *The Forward View* concluded that the Bank of England, the Treasury, and even many members of the government, including Baldwin, were under an internationalist or 'pre-Copernican' illusion, and restated the monetary schemes deployed in *The Plan of Action*.<sup>134</sup>

It should be recognized that Amery's dichotomic interpretation of his battle with the financial establishment, imperialism versus internationalism, was too simplistic from the standpoint of recent historians. By March 1932, Hopkins and

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<sup>130</sup> 'The Ottawa Monetary Report' reprinted in Charles Morgan-Webb, *Ten Years of Currency Revolution, 1922-1932* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1935), 243-245.

<sup>131</sup> Amery, 'The Problem before the World Conference', *English Review*, June 1933, 607-608.

<sup>132</sup> Amery, 'Work Left for the Conference', *The Times*, 8 July 1933.

<sup>133</sup> 'The British Empire Currency Declaration' reprinted in Morgan-Webb, *Ten Years of Currency Revolution*, 246-250.

<sup>134</sup> Amery, *The Forward View*, 100-110, 322-335.

Frederick Phillips in the Treasury came to acknowledge that British economy would gain more from cheap money policy than from a return to gold.<sup>135</sup> As was clear from Hopkins's memoranda and the Ottawa monetary report, the Treasury did advocate development of the sterling area. They just needed to be more open-ended about monetary agreements with other superpowers than inveterate imperialists like Amery. As Balachandran has observed, it is not appropriate to interpret Britain's economic policy in the interwar years in terms of the simple dichotomy of internationalism and imperialism.<sup>136</sup> Both Amery and the Treasury approved of the ultimate necessity of restoring an international standard with a condition that the old system's tendency to exacerbate deflation would be rectified. Where Amery differed from the Treasury was a question as to whether a new machinery or mechanism should be created to establish imperial permanent parities. Neville Chamberlain's reply to Amery's criticism symbolized the Treasury's apprehension: 'the interests of the Dominion and of the Mother Country might not exactly harmonize on all occasions'.<sup>137</sup> The sterling area thus was managed without rigid monetary union. But their conflict should not be interpreted as centralists versus decentralists. As discussed above, the EEU report justified an imperial central bank as a means to enable the Dominions to participate in policymaking. This scheme accentuated their optimistic assumption that consultation within the Empire would promote imperial unity, which was always an undercurrent in Amery's thought since the

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<sup>135</sup> Susan Howson, *Domestic Monetary Management in Britain, 1919-38* (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 82-86. Also see Phillips' similar comments in 1935. *Ibid.*, 119.

<sup>136</sup> G. Balachandran, *John Bullion's Empire: Britain's Gold Problem and India Between the Wars* (Surrey: Curzon Press, 1996), 2-8.

<sup>137</sup> Neville Chamberlain to Amery, 10 March 1933, AMEL 2/1/23. This letter was often cited in explaining the Treasury's monetary policy. Drummond, *The Floating Pound*, 19; Catherine Schenk, 'The Sterling Area 1945-1972', in *Handbook of the History of Money and Currency*, ed. Stefano Battilossi, Youssef Cassis, and Kazuhiko Yago (Singapore: Springer, 2020), 774.

Edwardian era. The Treasury and the Bank of England did not neglect the necessity of imperial cooperation, either. They in fact encouraged the members of the Empire/Commonwealth to establish their own central banks.<sup>138</sup> It is debatable which policy was more sensitive to the feelings of the Dominions. What is certain is that both of them optimistically assumed that their respective monetary schemes would be welcomed by the Dominions.<sup>139</sup>

Amery came to see the perceived lack of commitment to imperial monetary policy as a sign of the lingering nineteenth-century economic conviction in Westminster and Whitehall. Based on the simple dichotomic view of imperialism and internationalism, he categorized all lukewarm monetary policy which did not fully meet his ideal into the latter. In other words, it was in the 1930s that the position of monetary policy in his world view was elevated to the indispensable second fiddle. This stance foreshadowed his hostility to the Bretton Woods system in the 1940s and 1950s.

### 3 Trade Policy

Amery's reaction to the preferential network established at the Ottawa Conference was mixed. He did eulogize the reversal of British fiscal policy and did not want his colleagues to think that he was generally critical of the achievement.<sup>140</sup> However, compared with the retrospective verdict in his memoir, his immediate assessment was relatively negative. Amery, in 1935, blamed the British delegation at the Ottawa Conference for having been possessed with the ideal of Free Trade and the ghost of the 'food-taxes' terror,

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<sup>138</sup> Cain and Hopkins, *British Imperialism*.

<sup>139</sup> See Cain's comparison of Amery and the gentlemanly capitalists in P. J. Cain, 'The Bank of England, Canada, and the Sterling Area, 1932-1936', *The Economic History Review* 49, no. 2 (1996): 336-57.

<sup>140</sup> Amery to Violet Milner, 3 September 1932, MS Violet Milner 31.

which was exemplified by Runciman's subsequent decisions to conclude trade agreements with Argentina and Denmark.<sup>141</sup> Historians generally agreed that the actual changes in British trade policy in the 1930s were not what Edwardian Whole Hoggers had desired. Some have regarded the changes as being shaped for the sake of the financial interest,<sup>142</sup> others as the result of a series of *ad hoc* attempts to make the most of both imperial and non-imperial trades.<sup>143</sup> At any rate, the Ottawa regime did not convince all Conservative imperialists that the project of Joseph Chamberlain had been fully accomplished. In the case of Amery, his initial disappointment sprang from the lack of meat duties. Why was the specific issue so important to him?

### **Meat duties and re-composition of scientific tariff**

Agriculture was still a thorny question within the fiscal reform movement in the 1920s. Incorporation of agrarian elements into a list of tariffs would inevitably provoke the chronic fear of 'food taxes'. The will of the electorate demonstrated in 1923 was a harsh lesson to the Conservative Party. Industrialists' pressure groups such as the FBI and the NUM increasingly leaned towards protectionism, but preference was at best secondary in their scheme.<sup>144</sup> The EIA was distinctive in that its some members, particularly Alfred Mond, nurtured the idea of balanced development of agriculture and industry in the Empire through preference.<sup>145</sup> This minority view eventually prevailed from 1930 onwards, culminating in the reports produced by joint work of the EEU, the

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<sup>141</sup> *My Political Life*, vol. 3, 90-92; *Forward View*, 348-349.

<sup>142</sup> P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, *British Imperialism* (London & New York: Longman, 1993), vol. 2, chapter 5; Scott Newton, *Profits of Peace: The Political Economy of Anglo-German Appeasement* (Oxford: Oriental University Press, 1996), chapter 2.

<sup>143</sup> Drummond, *Imperial Economic Policy*; Rooth, *British Protectionism*.

<sup>144</sup> Marrison, *British Business*, 329-355.

<sup>145</sup> *Ibid.*, 383.

FBI, the NUM, and the Central and Associated Chambers of Agriculture (CACA), though even at this stage the consensus among industrialists about preference was not firm.<sup>146</sup> It was Amery that presided over the joint project.

The 1929 electoral defeat enabled Amery to publicly advocate imperial preference again. He quickly updated his rhetoric, which was acquired in the EIA and the EEU. Technological advance made the question, Free Trade or Protection, obsolete. Mass production could not last without mass consumption, namely, a large market. In the new era, 'Protection by itself is no complete remedy.' Furthermore, the large market should be 'properly balanced' between industry and agriculture. A true remedy would of course be imperial preference.<sup>147</sup> It did not mean sacrifice of Dominion industries or British agriculture.<sup>148</sup> Sound 'balance' should be secured within the UK and the Dominions. Therefore, 'the object of any policy of Imperial Preference must be, not to supplant our own farming, but to make good the natural limitations in the volume and range of its production'.<sup>149</sup> 'Balance' became his watchword. It was also connected with the concern about the economic imbalance between the USA and the rest of the world, which could be only corrected by 'the building up of great rationalised co-operative groups, largely self-contained and self-regarding, but also peacefully negotiating and trading with each other'.<sup>150</sup> He was to restate the principle of 'balance' in a comprehensive way in his swan song book.<sup>151</sup>

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<sup>146</sup> Ibid., chapter 13; R. F. Holland, 'The Federation of British Industries and the International Economy, 1929-39', *The Economic History Review* 34, no. 2 (1981): 287-300.

<sup>147</sup> Amery, 'The Economic Case for Empire Co-operation', *National Review*, 94 (1929), 525-532.

<sup>148</sup> Ibid., 531-532; Amery, 'Mr. Bennett's Offer and After', *National Review*, 95 (1930), 905-906.

<sup>149</sup> Amery's address and a following discussion at the Central and Associated Chambers of Agriculture, 'British Agriculture in its Relation to the Dominions', *The Journal of the Central and Associated Chambers of Agriculture and the Agricultural Record* 31, no. 1 (1931), 33-39, AMEL 1/5/12. The speech part was republished in *My Political Life*, vol. 3, 409-414. The quotation is from *My Political Life*, vol. 3, 411.

<sup>150</sup> Amery, 'British Fiscal and Financial Policy', *National Review*, 96 (1931), 335.

<sup>151</sup> L. S. Amery, *A Balanced Economy* (London: Hutchinson, 1954).



By the beginning of the 1930s, politicians came to recognize that there were various methods to regulate British trade. The Independent Labour Party proposed bulk purchase in domestic and international trades as an alternative to tariffs.<sup>152</sup> Labour's trade policy in the 1930s tended to resort to similar trade regulation through import and export boards, since its leaders retained an anti-tariff stance after they jettisoned Free Trade policy with Philip Snowden.<sup>153</sup> Neville Chamberlain and the Conservative Research Department (CRD) were attracted to a quota scheme. As of 1930, he dared to suggest that the Conservative Party should drop food taxes altogether and adopt the quota as an expedient.<sup>154</sup> Although Amery thought that quota would be viable regarding some commodities, he still strove to convince his colleagues that tariffs were inherently superior to the other methods. 'Bulk purchase or import boards' would involve 'a far greater interference with the liberty'. Its rigidity and directness would entail 'vexation and favouritism' and irritate trading partners. Quota might be useful to protect British production of specific crops, but in other cases more flexible methods were preferable. Tariffs had not only economic but also political and moral advantages:

Of all the ways of influencing the course of trade, the most flexible and convenient is the tariff. .... It involves the minimum of bureaucratic interference with the freedom of the individual. The individual citizen remains free, subject to the duty, to buy the foreign article, ... and his

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<sup>152</sup> Adrian Oldfield, 'The Independent Labour Party and Planning, 1920–26', *International Review of Social History* 21, no. 1 (1976): 1–29.

<sup>153</sup> Richard Toye, *The Labour Party and the Planned Economy, 1931–1951* (Woodbridge: Royal Historical Society & Boydell Press, 2003), 158–159.

<sup>154</sup> Andrew Fenton Cooper, *British Agricultural Policy, 1912–36: A Study in Conservative Politics* (Manchester & New York: Manchester University Press, 1989), 99–103, 105–106. As for the CRD and Neville Chamberlain, see John Ramsden, *The Making of Conservative Party Policy: The Conservative Research Department since 1929* (London & New York: Longman, 1980).

right to do so is a valuable check ... upon the home producer. The foreign producer still remains free, subject to the duty, to sell his wares.<sup>155</sup>

The new rhetoric of balance was a typical example of old wine in a new bottle, and not indication of any fundamental change of his stance. As the previous chapter shows, in the era of Tariff Reform, he had already agreed that 'scientific tariffs' could be devised to harmonize all imperial interests including British agriculture and Dominions industries.<sup>156</sup> Amery's optimism about scientific adjustments endured in the interwar period.<sup>157</sup> In this sense, we should qualify the argument of A. F. Cooper that Amery as Colonial Secretary did not hesitate to increase the importation of imperial agricultural products through the EMB's activity. Cooper has cited Amery's 1924 letter to Bledisloe which justified the priority of imperial producers by denouncing domestic producers' votes in 1923.<sup>158</sup> But we should not read too much into this letter, which was written when he had vivid memory of the 1923 election.

Concentration on the development of industrial safeguard and non-tariff preference was an inevitable choice in practical politics. In terms of principle, there was substantial continuity in his belief that British agricultural prosperity could co-exist with imperial economic unity. In fact, after 1929, he forged personal connections with the agrarian interests in both the UK and the Empire. He became a chairman of the Sugar Federation of the British Empire and

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<sup>155</sup> L. S. Amery, *Empire and Prosperity*, 2nd edn (London: Faber and Faber, 1931), 46-49. The first edition was published in 1930.

<sup>156</sup> See Chapter 8.

<sup>157</sup> G. C. Webber, *The Ideology of the British Right 1918-1939* (London & Sydney: Croom Helm, 1986). 34.

<sup>158</sup> Cooper, *British Agricultural Policy*, 85-86. The quoted letter was Amery to Bledisloe, 22 December 1924 in Bledisloe Papers.

pressurized the British government to raise duties and expand preference.<sup>159</sup> In the process of producing the EEU report, he was also involved in the CACA and became its chairman of 1933.<sup>160</sup> Amery participated in the Ottawa Conference as an unofficial representative of these two organizations.

The real change lay in not principle but in concrete schemes for scientific tariffs. The Joint Committee of the CACA and EEU, whose chairman was Amery, issued a report on agricultural policy in July 1931.<sup>161</sup> The report revealed a new comprehensive tariff scheme to balance the agricultural interests of Britain and the Dominions. Amery incorporated the scheme into his own economic thought and tried to popularize it in his speeches and writings. In order to harmonize the variegated interests, the scheme classified agricultural products into three categories: 1. crops whose production in the UK should be secured at a certain minimum standard; 2. crops which, but for the dumping from foreign countries, British agriculture could meet the whole national demand for; 3. crops which Britain could not meet the whole national demand for. The first type such as wheat and sugar beet should be maintained by combination of quota and guaranteed price. The second group should be protected by duties. It was regarding the third category that preferential tariffs towards the Dominions should be set to encourage them to complement the supply for Britain. The category included apples, pears, dairy products, poultry, and above all 'meat of all kinds'.<sup>162</sup>

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<sup>159</sup> *An Empire Sugar Policy Statement by the Rt. Hon. L. S. Amery*, (London, 1930), which can be consulted in the British Library; *British Sugar Duties and Empire Preference: Report of a Deputation from the Sugar Federation of the British Empire*, (London, 1931), AMEL 8/258.

<sup>160</sup> W. Philip Jeffcock, *Agricultural Politics 1915-1935: Being a History of the Central Chamber of Agriculture during That Period* (Ipswich: W. E. Harrisons & sons, 1937), 137.

<sup>161</sup> *Ibid.*, 19. The report was republished in Amery (ed.), *A Plan of Action*, 44-64.

<sup>162</sup> *A Plan of Action*, 45-48; Amery's address at the CACA in Amery, *My Political Life*, vol. 3, 412-414.

The fact that the scheme covered wheat and meat symbolized the development of imperialists' agricultural policy. In the Edwardian era, the Tariff Commission and Amery precluded both products from the list of their tariff plan.<sup>163</sup> Amid the election campaign in 1923, Hewins claimed that imperial preference would not bring duties on wheat and meat.<sup>164</sup> In October of the year, Amery was told by Stanley Bruce that the meat and wheat question should be suspended for the time being, and by Philip Lloyd-Greame (Cunliffe-Lister) that it would be impossible to give preference to Australian beef.<sup>165</sup> In the interwar search for 'balance', wheat was eventually transferred to the list of the quota system. On the other hand, meat became the main article in the list of preferential tariffs. While imperial preference was still a core of their vision, its coverage had to be narrowed down to secure 'balance'. The dilemma made meat duties all the more important in their new scheme. As of February 1932, Amery deplored the exclusion of meats from the Import Duties Act but expressed his belief that the British government would surely intend to discuss the matter with the Dominions at the Ottawa Conference.<sup>166</sup> In other words, the inveterate explorers of 'scientific tariffs' believed that the future of imperial preference hinged upon whether meat duties would be successfully formed in the Conference.

The conflict revolving around meat was the 'main drama' at Ottawa.<sup>167</sup> However, its protagonist was not Amery but the Australian delegate. To curtail the threat from foreign meat industries, particularly Argentinian chilled beef, Bruce asked for restriction on foreign bacon, chilled beef, mutton, and lamb

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<sup>163</sup> See Chapter 8.

<sup>164</sup> Marrison, *British Business*, 360.

<sup>165</sup> Amery diary, 13 October 1923, AMEL 7/17.

<sup>166</sup> Amery's speech at the Bedfordshire Chamber of Agriculture, *The Times*, 22 February 1932.

<sup>167</sup> Rooth, *British Protectionism*, 90.

through imposition of duties.<sup>168</sup> The British delegation did not come with any consensus on meat policy; the preparatory documents offered various prediction of possible effects of duties, but their estimates were generally negative. The Non-Conservative delegates, Thomas and Runciman were not ready to swallow the food taxes.<sup>169</sup> The intensive negotiation among the UK and the Dominions drove the Conference to the verge of a breakdown. Amery, as an adamant advocate of meat duties, inflamed the conflict. They barely reached the agreement, which imposed quantitative control on foreign meats.<sup>170</sup> This meant a defeat of the EEU-CACA scheme, which disappointed Amery. On the other hand, Neville Chamberlain was so irked by Amery's deeds at the Conference that he condemned Amery for 'stirring up' the Dominions' demands. Amery justified his cause and action:

I came here with definite instructions from the chamber of agriculture to support joint programme agreed upon between them and the National Farmers' Union of a duty on all meat as well as some element of quantitative restriction. .... I knew I had little chance of success. I knew I should probably only annoy old friends who, from the outset, have been in a difficult position. But I could only do, what at the risk of further annoyance, I must do again, appeal to you to meet the Dominions on the outstanding issues on which, after all, they are only standing for the things you and I always fought for.<sup>171</sup>

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<sup>168</sup> Drummond, *Imperial Economic Policy*, 255-256.

<sup>169</sup> Drummond, *Imperial Economic Policy*, 254-255; Rooth, *British Protectionism*, 84-85.

<sup>170</sup> Drummond, *Imperial Economic Policy*, 254-266; Rooth, *British Protectionism*, 90-94.

<sup>171</sup> Amery to Neville Chamberlain, 17 August 1932. NC 7/11/25/1-2

Amery underestimated Chamberlain's effort to create some degrees of meat duties. But, as he only acted as an outsider of the negotiation, it seemed to him that the British Government flatly turned down the Dominions' request and consequently ruined the core of imperial preference.

The Ottawa Agreements were not a final solution to the meat problem. Britain tried to establish a more comprehensive network of quantitative control by forging the trade agreement, the Roca-Runciman Pact, with Argentina in 1933. After they found that periodic negotiations on quota constantly caused friction, the Government took a new tactic, 'levy-subsidy', which was similar to Amery's. Though the new approach led to the conclusion of the Eden-Malbrán Pact with Argentina, which imposed modest meat duties, the National Government discarded the idea of 'levy-subsidy' by 1937 since they faced various protests and claims from the Dominions, foreign countries, and Whitehall. Britain now chose to keep agricultural subsidies not by imposing duties but by using some money from their budget (Exchequer-subsidy).<sup>172</sup> In the course of the twists and turns, the meat issue in imperialists' minds was increasingly absorbed by their wider and more imminent concern about the trade agreements with non-imperial countries.

### **Opposition to the non-imperial trade agreements**

In the post-Ottawa years, Britain concluded a series of bilateral trade agreements with non-imperial countries. True believers of imperial preference complained that these agreements betrayed the spirit of Ottawa. Keith Hancock,

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<sup>172</sup> Drummond, *Imperial Economic Policy*, chapter 7; Rooth, *British Protectionism*, chapter 8; idem., 'Trade Agreements and the Evolution of British Agricultural Policy in the 1930s', *British Agricultural History Society* 33, no. 2 (1985): 173–90; R. Duncan, 'Imperial Preference: The Case of Australian Beef in the 1930s', *Economic Record* 39, no. 86 (1963): 153–65; Joseph S. Tulchin, 'Decolonizing an Informal Empire: Argentina, Great Britain, and the United States, 1930–1943', *International Interactions* 1, no. 3 (1974): 123–40.

one of the earliest critics of the complacent conception of the Third British Empire, has argued that Britain and the Dominions realized the insufficiency of the imperial market for their productive capacities by the end of the 1930s, when the bilateral agreements among the UK, Canada, and the US re-opened the Empire-focused trade to the world.<sup>173</sup> Recent historians have tended to be more cautious about the liberalizing effects of the agreements and to emphasize the imperialization of British trade in the late-1930s.<sup>174</sup> However, what drove politicians was not historical statistics or interpretation but contemporary perception. Critics actually regarded these agreements as attempts to liberalize British trade and emasculate imperial preference.

Historians have already documented the opposition to these agreements by old imperialists such as Amery and Beaverbrook.<sup>175</sup> What is still neglected is the fact that Amery was not a lone wolf. The EIA, whose president Amery became, consistently expressed their concern about the economic agreements with foreign countries. After the Ottawa Conference, the EIA's parliamentary committee, composed of approximately 50 MPs, carried the resolution that protection should be extended to agriculture by measures such as 'a duty on all meats'. In the following annual meeting, Amery stated that despite Ottawa, 'there was yet room for further development'.<sup>176</sup> This feeling and policy were widely shared among the EIA.<sup>177</sup> In this context, it was not surprising that they felt the subsequent British trade policy proceeded in the reverse direction. In

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<sup>173</sup> Hancock, *Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs*, 259-267. As for Hancock's stance, see Behm, *Imperial History*, 211, 213-215.

<sup>174</sup> Drummond and Hillmer, *Negotiating Freer Trade*; Tim Rooth, 'Retreat from Globalization: Britain and the Renewal of Imperial Trade between the Two World Wars', in *A Global History of Trade and Conflict since 1500*, ed. Lucia Coppolaro and Francine McKenzie (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 105-23.

<sup>175</sup> Freeman, 'Last Stand for Empire'.

<sup>176</sup> 'Minutes of a meeting of the parliamentary committee', 8 November 1932; 'Minutes of the annual general meeting', 1 December 1932, Papers of the EIA, MSS 221/1/1/1.

<sup>177</sup> For instance, see 'Minutes of a meeting of the council' on 14 March 1933, which Amery did not attend. *Ibid.*

assessing the trade agreements with Denmark, Germany, Norway and Argentina, the parliamentary committee agreed that tariffs on industrial products 'had been reduced to a dangerous extent'.<sup>178</sup> From 1933 onwards, Amery and the EIA continuously expressed their anxiety that the imports of foreign manufactured goods were excessively increasing due to the trade agreements. Unemployment was ascribed to the lowered duties.<sup>179</sup> The Treasury recognised the increasing trade deficit as a serious issue. Nevertheless, Lieth-Ross claimed that import reductions through further protection were not desirable since it would ultimately harm British exports by reducing foreign purchasing power. His constructive suggestion was that Britain should have market-sharing agreements with Germany and Japan, with which Britain would compete in the third market.<sup>180</sup> In this sense, the conflict between the Treasury and imperialists in the 1920s, further exportation or protection, continued in the 1930s.

What particularly disgruntled Amery was the government's decision to keep the Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) clause in the trade agreements with non-imperial countries.<sup>181</sup> It was generally recognized that imperial preference would violate the principle of MFN. Amery and the EEU thus suggested to completely scrap the MFN clause before Ottawa.<sup>182</sup> The Ottawa agreements certainly were dissociated from the MFN clause. However, the Board of Trade decided to retain it in the negotiation with foreign countries after Ottawa because they feared probable discrimination against British trade and possible trade-partners' resistance to its abolition. They concluded that Britain should try

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<sup>178</sup> 'Minutes of a meeting of the parliamentary committee', 9 May 1933, *ibid.*

<sup>179</sup> 'Minutes of the annual general meeting', 12 December 1934; 'Minutes of a meeting of the parliamentary committee', 12 February 1935, *ibid.*; 'Minutes of a meeting of the council', 27 February 1935.

<sup>180</sup> Rooth, *British Protectionism*, 276.

<sup>181</sup> 'Minutes of a meeting of the parliamentary business committee', 27 June 1933, Papers of the EIA, MSS 2/1/1/1.

<sup>182</sup> Amery, *Empire and Prosperity*, 42; Amery (ed.), *A Plan of Action*, 122.



to benefit from its position on the border between imperial preference and MFN.<sup>183</sup> MFN was not a rigid rule and was always used to various extents and with exceptions. In other words, MFN was a matter of politics as well as economics. Britain's double standard on MFN was embedded in the Ottawa Conference's resolution that future MFN agreements between the Commonwealth members and foreign countries should not interfere with the inter-Commonwealth agreements, while preferential agreements among foreign countries should not override MFN agreements which the Commonwealth members had with those countries. It actually helped abort the Ouchy Convention.<sup>184</sup> Britain's duplicity was and has been criticized. R. A. Mackay, a Canadian political scientist, wondered how long the British Commonwealth could 'continue to have the cake of fiscal independence and eat it'.<sup>185</sup> Inside Whitehall, it was covertly agreed that if successful legal challenges forced Britain to choose MFN or imperial preference, the government had no choice but to renounce the former.<sup>186</sup>

Amery criticized MFN not just as an anachronistic remnant of nineteenth-century internationalism but also because of harmful effects of the cakism. He claimed that in the age of bilateral trade agreements, the MFN clause, contrary to its principle, acted as an obstacle to freer trade by making each state in trade negotiations hesitate to give effective concessions. When the government needed to conclude an agreement for specific export interests, damages of concessions would cause trouble other sectors as was the case with the effect

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<sup>183</sup> Rooth, *British Protectionism*, 109-111.

<sup>184</sup> Richard C. Snyder, *The Most-Favored-Nation Clause: An Analysis with Particular Reference to Recent Treaty Practice and Tariffs* (New York: King's Crown Press, 1948), 151-153; Ger van Roon, 'Great Britain and the Oslo States', *Journal of Contemporary History* 24, no. 4 (1989): 1989.

<sup>185</sup> Robert A. MacKay, 'Imperial Economics at Ottawa', *Pacific Affairs*, 5.10 (1932), 883.

<sup>186</sup> Rooth, *British Protectionism*, 110.

of the 1933 Anglo-German agreement on British manufacturers.<sup>187</sup>

Furthermore, turning the Cobdenite language upside down, he argued that MFN was in the way of 'peace and prosperity' on the European Continent. As discussed before, his geopolitical ideal was the balance of imperial power based on economic cooperation in each larger regional group, which was his alternative to the unilateral appeasement.<sup>188</sup> For this purpose, Amery advocated the Pan-European movement and the 1930 Briand plan. As of the middle of the 1930s, he conjectured that if two economically integrated groups, the Gold Block and the Danubian and Balkan states, were formed and coalesced into a single preferential system, 'the European problem' would be 'more than half way towards its solution'. This was also expected to mitigate German expansionism and to stop their claim for Tanganyika, their ex-colony.<sup>189</sup>

Amery and the EIA noticed the change of the government's tactics towards levy-subsidy and hoped that the renewal of the Anglo-Argentine agreement would bring meat duties.<sup>190</sup> The Eden-Malbrán Pact thus should have dispelled their doubt over the official trade policy. However, the doubt was more strengthened by another factor, namely, the negotiation for the Anglo-American trade agreements.<sup>191</sup> In the world view of Amery and the EEU-EIA, the foremost cause of the Great Depression was the economic imbalance between the US and other developed countries. Therefore, they found it a folly to whittle away

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<sup>187</sup> Amery, *The Forward View*, 344-345, 371-372.

<sup>188</sup> See Chapter 2 and Richard S. Grayson, 'Leo Amery's Imperialist Alternative to Appeasement in the 1930s', *Twentieth Century British History* 17, no. 4 (2006): 489-515.

<sup>189</sup> Amery, *The Forward View*, 374-375.

<sup>190</sup> *Ibid.*, 350; 'Minutes of a meeting of the parliamentary committee' 28 April 1936, Papers of the EIA, MSS 221/1/1/2.

<sup>191</sup> The negotiations involved not just the UK and the US but also the Dominions. For detailed accounts, see Drummond and Hillmer, *Negotiating Freer Trade*; M. Ruth Megaw, 'Australia and the Anglo-American Trade Agreement, 1938', *Journal of Imperial & Commonwealth History* 3, no. 2 (1975): 191-211; Charlie Whitham, 'Seeing the Wood for the Trees: The British Foreign Office and the Anglo-American Trade Agreement of 1938', *Twentieth Century British History* 16, no. 1 (2005): 29-51.

imperial preference by increasing imports from the US.<sup>192</sup> Amery was particularly alarmed by the fact that Cordell Hull, US Secretary of State, urged an agreement by utilizing the Cobdenite language to preach causal relationships between trade liberalization and international peace.<sup>193</sup> The political situation in Britain also aggravated his frustration. Amery was again excluded from Neville Chamberlain's Cabinet. Moreover, the Chancellorship went to Simon, the leader of the National Liberals, and the presidentship of the Board of Trade was taken by Oliver Stanley, who had 'never been a real believer in protection or preference'.<sup>194</sup> Hence, from the standpoint of Amery, the British Government seemed to willingly succumb to the demand from American internationalists.<sup>195</sup> The conclusion of the Anglo-American trade agreements just compounded his sense of desperation.

The continuous activity of the EIA to protect imperial preference challenges the conventional interpretation in the historiography that the primary aim of the Conservative right changed in the 1930s from Tariff Reform to other issues such as India.<sup>196</sup> In fact, the role of Amery as one of the leaders of the collective movement helped improve his relationship with the Die-Hard, which had been strained by the Indian Question. For instance, Patrick Donner appreciated Amery's long struggle for protection and preference and expressed his regret at his conflict with Amery over the 1935 bill.<sup>197</sup> The *National Review*, which had

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<sup>192</sup> Amery, 'Empire Trade: Case for Imperial Preference', *The Times*, 8 June 1937; idem., 'Anglo-American Trade', *The Times*, 25 June 1937; 'Minutes of a meeting of the parliamentary committee', 8 June 1937; 'Minutes of the annual general meeting', 18 November 1937, Papers of the EIA, MSS 211/1/1/2.

<sup>193</sup> Amery to Bruce, 12 May 1937; Amery to Bennett, 22 November 1937, AMEL 2/1/27.

<sup>194</sup> Amery to Winterton, 29 May 1937; Amery to Hoare, 29 May 1937, AMEL 2/1/27.

<sup>195</sup> Amery here too much caricaturized the stance of the government. British policymakers were not obedient to the US government. The agreements were forged as a result of the intensive negotiations in the context of the deteriorating situation in Central Europe. Drummond and Hillmer, *Negotiating Freer Trade*.

<sup>196</sup> G. C. Webber, *The Ideology of the British Right 1918-1939* (London & Sydney: Croom Helm, 1986), 37

<sup>197</sup> Donner to Amery, 14 June 1937, AMEL 2/1/27.

explicitly criticized Amery about India, allowed him to write again his case for imperial preference.<sup>198</sup> The question ‘tariffs or free trade’ was certainly no longer a national agenda, unlike in the Edwardian period. However, the cause of Joseph Chamberlain had still an important presence inside Conservative politics.

It was in this context that the Empire Unity Campaign (EUC) was launched by the EIA in 1936. Originally started as a campaign to celebrate the centenary of Joseph Chamberlain’s birth, it turned into a propaganda campaign to promote imperial integration. Amery was involved in the campaign as a core member of the Chamberlain Centenary Committee.<sup>199</sup> Its concrete propositions included almost all items in Amery’s imperial policy; imperial preference, industrial and agricultural protection, fiscal and financial policy for inter-imperial migration, development of inter-imperial transportation via sea and air, imperialization of defence policy, and resistance to the German colonial claim.<sup>200</sup>

The stance of the EUC towards the Conservative Party demonstrated the dilemma of Amery and Conservative advocates of imperial preference. The meeting of the Centenary Committee in October 1936 decided that the EUC would not attack the National Government, while it would preach ‘the positive Imperial policy’. This derived from a realistic observation that ‘the majority of meetings were being organized by the Conservative and Unionist

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<sup>198</sup> Amery, ‘The Future of Imperial Preference’, *National Review*, 108 (1937), 573-581.

<sup>199</sup> See the minutes of the committee, Papers of the EIA, MSS 221/6/2/1. The existing literature indicated that the Empire Unity Campaign of the EIA existed both in the 1930s and the 1940s. N. C. Fleming, *Britannia’s Zealots, Volume I: Tradition, Empire and the Forging of the Conservative Right* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2019); Richard Toye, ‘Churchill and Britain’s “Financial Dunkirk”’, *Twentieth Century British History* 15, no. 4 (2004): 329–60. But it should be recognized that the Campaign had two different phases. The first campaign for Chamberlain’s centenary waned during the war and the centenary committee was officially closed in 1948. At the same time, however, the Empire Unity Campaign was relaunched by the EIA as a campaign to protest against the new international economic order forged by the US.

<sup>200</sup> See a pamphlet issued by the Campaign for the demonstration, which Amery participated in as chairman, on 9 December 1937. AMEJ 8/2/210. Also see the official pamphlet of the campaign. The Empire Unity Campaign, *Empire Awake!*, 1937.

Associations'.<sup>201</sup> The strains between campaigners for imperial preference and the Conservative Party were chronic since 1903. Edwardian Tariff Reformers often maintained that their cause was a matter of nation and not of party politics, but most of them were politically Conservatives/Unionists.<sup>202</sup> The EIA, in its initial stage, tried to be a non-party organization by inviting Labour sympathizers in vain.<sup>203</sup> No matter how they proclaimed to be 'national', the campaigns for imperial preference were for the most part Conservative.

The problem for Conservative advocates of preference was that the party leaders were not as much convinced of effectivity and practicality of their cause. This conflict continued throughout the 1930s. In the initial stage of the National Government, the EIA concentrated on criticizing non-Conservative free traders in the cabinet.<sup>204</sup> However, once free traders were ejected from the government, they had to blame the Conservative ministers for lingering economic internationalism in their minds and for their failure to notice the detrimental nature of the post-Ottawa trade agreements.<sup>205</sup> In this context, the EUC chose not to heavily criticize the government so as to keep cordial relations with local Conservatives. Alarmed by the trade negotiations with the US, however, Amery began to demand that the EUC should intensify its criticism of the government and run meetings independently of the Conservative Party when local associations refused to cooperate.<sup>206</sup> This proposition did not seem to be heeded. This means that, with respect to trade policy, Amery's

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<sup>201</sup> 'Minutes of a meeting of the executive of the Chamberlain Centenary Committee', 28 October 1936, Papers of the EIA, MSS 221/6/2/1.

<sup>202</sup> Thompson, *Imperial Britain*, 49.

<sup>203</sup> Marrison, *British Business*, 365-372.

<sup>204</sup> 'Minutes of a meeting of the executive committee', 28 January 1932, Papers of the EIA, MSS 221/1/2/2.

<sup>205</sup> Amery, *The Forward View*, 349-350. Here, Amery partly exonerated ministers by pointing out excessive business in the cabinet caused by structural defects.

<sup>206</sup> 'Minutes of a meeting of the executive of the Chamberlain Centenary Committee', 10 June 1937, 9 May 1938, Papers of the EIA, MSS 221/6/2/1.

political position towards the government and the Conservative Party was the most aggressive and radical even in the EIA.

## **Conclusion**

Amery expected that the Ottawa agreements should mark the victory of economic nationalism and imperialism over nineteenth-century internationalism and individualism. Both monetary and trade policy established there fell short of his ideal of 'imperial currency' and 'scientific tariffs'. In the course of the decade, his world view became increasingly Manichaeian, where economic internationalism, which incarnated by the US, consistently struck back. The outbreak of the Second World War temporarily suspended this battle. However, Amery soon felt that the issue of the Washington Loan and the negotiations for reconstruction of the international economic order confirmed his suspicion since the 1930s. Based on this perception, he was to make a last-ditch attempt to rescue the sterling area and imperial preference from 'American imperialism'.<sup>207</sup>

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<sup>207</sup> See Chapter 11.

## 10 Conservatism, Democracy, and Corporatism

In the 1930s Amery was required again to redefine *his* Conservatism for conjunctural and personal reasons. The decade witnessed the rise of ‘extreme’ political ideologies and the collapse of democratic regimes on a global scale. Historians have tended to agree that Britain exceptionally succeeded in marginalizing or accommodating the extreme ideologies.<sup>1</sup> However, we should not understate the presence of those ideologies in the British public sphere. Some politicians and intellectuals, who were disappointed at the government of the ‘old gang’, were fascinated by more interventionist approaches. It is certainly true that only a minority in the establishment became Fascists or Communists. This was symbolized by the fact that, while the New Party of Oswald Mosley attracted many young politicians, most of them did not follow him into the British Union of Fascists.<sup>2</sup> Amery himself had intellectual sympathy for the Mosley Manifesto in 1930, but did not participate in his political campaign.<sup>3</sup> However, how to appropriate, deal with, or tackle Communism, Fascism, and Nazism within and outside Britain was an unavoidable and divisive agenda to politically-minded Britons.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Andrew Thorpe, *The Failure of Political Extremism in Inter-War Britain* (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1989).

<sup>2</sup> See the articles in *Contemporary British History*, 23.4 (2009) which featured ‘Oswald Mosley and the New Party’; Matthew Worley, *Oswald Mosley and the New Party* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).

<sup>3</sup> Amery diary, 12 December 1930, *EB*, vol. 2, 143-144; Hugh Dalton diary, 7 December 1930, Ben Pimlott, ed., *The Political Diary of Hugh Dalton: 1918-1940, 1945-1960* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1986), 134.

<sup>4</sup> Ben Pimlott, *Labour and the Left in the 1930s* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977); Michael Newman, ‘Democracy versus Dictatorship: Labour’s Role in the Struggle against British Fascism, 1933–1936’, *History Workshop Journal* 5, no. 1 (1978): 67–88; Richard Griffiths, *Fellow Travellers of the Right: British Enthusiasts for Nazi Germany 1933-1939* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983); David Blaazer, *The Popular Front and the Progressive Tradition: Socialists, Liberals and the Quest for Unity, 1884-1939* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); N. J. Crowson, *Facing Fascism: The Conservative Party and the European Dictators 1935-1940* (London & New York: Routledge, 1997); Dan Stone, *Responses*

There was a personal dimension in Amery's intellectual wandering. During the decade, Amery was a backbench MP of the Conservative Party. However, the Die-Hard faction, which he had belonged to in the pre-war years, was no longer congenial to his imperial policy. Historians on the Conservative Right have pointed out that, with the formation of imperial preference at the Ottawa Conference, Conservative dissidents' main agenda changed from Tariff Reform to the objection to self-government in India and to the German claim for restitution of its ex-colonies in Africa.<sup>5</sup> As discussed in Chapter 9, Amery was not satisfied with the post-Ottawa trade and monetary situations. While Amery was a spearhead of the opposition to the German colonial claims, he was a loyal supporter of the 1935 India Act. In other words, his political stance did not fit with the ideal type of the Die-Hard. Amery himself began to use the term 'the Die-Hard' with a pejorative connotation to refer to the Conservative objectors to the formation of the all-India federation.<sup>6</sup> Reciprocally, leading articles of the *National Review*, written by Violet Milner, explicitly criticized Amery's attitude towards the India Act.<sup>7</sup> Although his relations with the periodical were not severed by this issue, the episode symbolized his awkward position among the backbench imperialists.<sup>8</sup>

According to his autobiography, the reason he wrote *The Forward View* in 1933-35 was 'the absence of any clear Conservative policy since the war'. The

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*to Nazism in Britain, 1933-1939: Before War and Holocaust* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003); Paul Corthorn, *In the Shadow of the Dictators: The British Left in the 1930s* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2006); Nigel Copsey and Andrzej Olechnowicz, eds., *Varieties of Anti-Fascism: Britain in the Inter-War Period* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).

<sup>5</sup> G. C. Webber, *The Ideology of the British Right 1918-1939* (London & Sydney: Croom Helm, 1986), 37; N. C. Fleming, *Britannia's Zealots, Volume I: Tradition, Empire and the Forging of the Conservative Right* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2019), 137, 155-194.

<sup>6</sup> For instance, Amery diary, 26 January, 9 February, 7 March, 9 March, 22 June 1931, AMEL 7/24.

<sup>7</sup> *National Review*, vol. 104, 1935, 4-5, 576-577.

<sup>8</sup> Amery's opposition to the sanction against Italy quickly recovered the relations. *National Review*, vol. 105, 1935, 564-566.



rise of new political ideologies and his unstable position in the Conservative Party urged him to present 'an up-to-date and forward-looking restatement of Conservative principles' to 'the rank and file of the Party in Parliament and in the country'.<sup>9</sup> Actually, while he had some inspiration from the new foreign ideologies, the book defined British Conservatism by differentiating it from them. The following section will show how both appropriation and otherness worked in his interwar construction of Conservatism.

Of course, a conclusion that seemingly 'radical' or 'foreign' political movements in fact tapped into 'constitutional' or 'national' languages has been already truism in the historiography.<sup>10</sup> To go beyond this cliché, the following section will also attempt to locate Amery's ideological position within the spectrum of Conservatism. His commitment to imperialism and quasi-fascist corporatism was radical enough to convince the staff of the Ashridge College to categorize Amery, bracketed with Page Croft and Lord Lymington, into the right wing of the party.<sup>11</sup> Amery himself told his son that the reason he was excluded from the 1937 Cabinet was probably Neville Chamberlain's intention to prevent the government from being moved to the right.<sup>12</sup> Historians sometimes adopted the interpretation.<sup>13</sup> However, the YMCA group including Harold Macmillan and Robert Boothby, which was often categorized into the left wing of the party, was supported by Amery in respect of its proposals for economic planning and

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<sup>9</sup> Amery, *My Political Life*, vol 3, 138-139.

<sup>10</sup> James Vernon, ed., *Re-Reading the Constitution: New Narratives in the Political History of England's Long Nineteenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Paul Ward, *Red Flag and Union Jack: Englishness, Patriotism, and the British Left, 1881-1924* (Woodbridge, 1998).

<sup>11</sup> Clarisse Berthezène, *Training Minds for the War of Ideas: Ashridge College, the Conservative Party and the Cultural Politics of Britain, 1929-54* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2015), 110.

<sup>12</sup> Amery to Julian, 31 May 1937, AMEJ 3/1/1.

<sup>13</sup> Daniel Ritschel, *The Politics of Planning: The Debate on Economic Planning in Britain in the 1930s* (Oxford University Press, 1997), 202.

industrial self-government.<sup>14</sup> Instead of putting Amery on the right-left spectrum, which was not always an effective way of analysing political actors, this chapter will describe his position by comparing his political and economic proposition with other Conservative intellectual strands. This process will also help draw a more sophisticated topography of interwar Conservatism. It will conclude that, while Amery's disappointment at the post-Ottawa regime and the National Government played a role in his adoption of corporatism, his main aim still lay in the imperial monetary and trade policy, which distanced Amery from other Conservative corporatists. In contrast to the more radical stance of the *English Review* group, Amery retained faith in the Whiggish evolution of British constitution and democracy, which was preached by Baldwin. Not satisfied with any creed of the Conservative factions in the 1930s, he was in limbo until the European crisis changed the situation.

### **British Conservatism and foreign ideologies**

The previous chapter has shown that Amery found the economic policy of the National Government inadequate and tainted with old Liberalism.<sup>15</sup> Compared with lukewarm Britain, continental Europe and even the United States seemed to establish more radical alternative regimes. Amery assented to Geoffrey Lloyd's view that the UK should take its own line rather than imitate foreign experiments. *The Forward View* repeated this argument.<sup>16</sup> Insofar as they emphasized the alien nature of Fascism and Communism to the British constitutional tradition of *via media*, Amery's stance was not so far from

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<sup>14</sup> Berthezène, *Training Minds*, 110; Ritschel, *The Politics of Planning*, 202.

<sup>15</sup> Chapter 9 of this thesis. Also see Amery, *The Forward View* (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1935), 95-116.

<sup>16</sup> Amery diary, 2 March 1934, AMEL 7/28; Amery, *The Forward View*, 117-118.

Baldwinian Conservatism.<sup>17</sup> Yet, in his view, the Baldwinian method too much leaned towards complacency and Britain should learn positive as well as negative lessons from the foreign authoritarian regimes.

### 1. Soviet Communism

Due to the zigzag of the official line of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Comintern, it was not clear, even to the CPGB, what an actual Communist regime would be like at least until the late 1920s. Although the case study of the Webbs by Kevin Morgan has shown that there was long and winding process in their conversion to Soviet Communism, it was still the case that the collective 'Marxist turn' in the British left did not happen until the 1930s.<sup>18</sup> Likewise, while 'Bolshevism' was loosely synonymous with socialism in Amery's lexicon in the 1920s, in the 1930s he came to see it as a distinctive variant of socialism.<sup>19</sup>

Amery had already defined Marxist socialism as inversion of economic individualism of Adam Smith.<sup>20</sup> *The Forward View* stated that Bolshevism was an extreme type of *this* socialist approach. As a result of the revolutions, Russian socialists happened to secure control. To transform the agrarian society inherited from the Russian Empire, they ruthlessly destroyed all non-proletarian elements and rapidly industrialized manufacture and agriculture paradoxically, or naturally in Amery's personal view on socialism, 'on strictly

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<sup>17</sup> Philip Williamson, *Stanley Baldwin: Conservative Leadership and National Values* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 204-212, 255-256.

<sup>18</sup> Kevin Morgan, *The Webbs and Soviet Communism* (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 2006); Ben Jackson, *Equality and the British Left: A Study in Progressive Political Thought, 1900-64* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007), chapter 4.

<sup>19</sup> His speech at the Worcester Branch of the Junior Imperial League on 18 March 1927, AMEL 1/4/10.

<sup>20</sup> See Chapter 8.

capitalist lines, and on methods largely borrowed from America'. Consequently, there emerged 'capitalist slavery' in post-revolution Russia.<sup>21</sup>

What enabled the drastic and brutal transformation was a tyranny by the party caucus. While they formed a government and an assembly on 'quasi-democratic lines' to deal with routines, all important decision making was conducted by 'a few chiefs' or 'a single man'. Amery described the political organization by invoking his favourite analogy; the division of function in the USSR corresponded to the division between 'General Staff and Army administration which was perfected by Moltke'; 'men like Lenin and Stalin' were 'the chiefs of the Soviet Great General Staff'. Furthermore, Amery claimed that their post-imperial constitutional framework also followed the Prussian military model. The combination of centralization and decentralization, that is, redesigning the imperial territory into 'a number of nominally autonomous republics', achieved more effective unity than Tsarist Russia.<sup>22</sup> He implied here that the constitutional framework of the USSR was rearranged in a similar way to the British Commonwealth.

All in all, his evaluation of the Soviet regime was negative. What Bolsheviks did was to convert 'Marx's intellectual nightmare into a grim reality'.<sup>23</sup> However, his invocation of the analogy with the Prussian model indicated his acknowledgement that there were relevant reasons behind the perceived efficiency of the USSR in the 1930s. Although he did not share the aspiration for Soviet Communism with some left intellectuals, Amery at least regarded it as a workable, if not desirable, regime in the post-laissez-faire era.

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<sup>21</sup> Amery, *The Forward View*, 128-130.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, 130-131.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, 130.

## 2. Italian Fascism

Amery's view on Italian Fascism was much more positive than his view on Soviet Communism.<sup>24</sup> Although it is unclear to what extent Mussolini actually read *The Forward View*, he sent a letter to Amery to appreciate 'the impartiality, and the serene and frequently favourable opinions expressed in regard to Italy and Fascism' in the book.<sup>25</sup> There was a diplomatic reason for their mutual praise. Amery opposed the international sanctions against Italy. To the Italian diplomats, he was a useful figure with whom to curry favour.<sup>26</sup> Yet, there was not always causal relationship between politicians' personal feeling about dictatorship and their support for appeasement, which often derived from 'a sense of realism'.<sup>27</sup> In fact, Amery's admiration of the Fascist regime had more concrete substance than superficial flattering remarks that were often stated by British Conservatives.<sup>28</sup>

What particularly appealed to Amery was Italy's adoption of corporatism and functional representation. He regarded the measures as proof that Mussolini, despite being an ex-socialist, comprehended the organic, or 'totalitarian' in the Fascist terminology, nature of a national life. Amery was one of the British corporatists who assented to the argument that a parliament

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<sup>24</sup> 'Whereas Lenin was a cold, relentless fanatic who contrived to translate the abstract theories of Karl Marx into action, Mussolini's claim on history will be that of an original thinker on the fundamentals of politics as well as a great patriot, a shrewd and far-sighted statesman.' *Ibid.*, 134.

<sup>25</sup> Mussolini to Amery, 15 November 1935, AMEL 2/1/25.

<sup>26</sup> Amery often met Dino Grandi, the Italian ambassador in the UK and ex-Foreign Minister, in the 1930s. Amery diary, 10 October, 6 December 1935; 24 February, 28 April 1936, 31 March 1938., *EB*, vol. 2, 400-401, 404, 409, 415, 500-501. As for Grandi's effort to court British politicians, see William C. Mills, 'The Chamberlain-Grandi Conversations of July-August 1937 and the Appeasement of Italy', *The International History Review* 19, no. 3 (1997): 594-619; Ishida, *Japan, Italy and the Road to the Tripartite Alliance* (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), chapter 5.

<sup>27</sup> N. J. Crowson, *Facing Fascism: The Conservative Party and the European Dictators 1935-1940* (London & New York: Routledge, 1997), 21.

<sup>28</sup> As for Conservatives' compliments towards Mussolini, Richard Griffiths, *Fellow Travellers*, 13-15.

should represent each function of national economy and society rather than arithmetically and geographically allocated constituencies. This, he insisted, should be a guiding principle in the next age.<sup>29</sup>

However, he admitted that Fascist Italy had a 'seamy side'. The Blackshirts violently abolished the 'old gang' within and outside parliament. Notwithstanding their claim that Fascists represented not sectional interests but a nation, Italy was after all ruled by a one-party dictatorship. The Italians had little leeway for freedom of speech and print.<sup>30</sup> Amery never argued that Britain should adopt the means used in the Fascist revolution. The stance provoked a question as to how he thought Britain should appropriate the Italian regime. In other words, to what extent was Amery's scheme quasi-fascist, non-fascist, or anti-fascist? Before answering this question, we should turn to Amery's opinion on Nazism.

### 3. Nazism

Amery's view on German National Socialism was ambivalent as well, but it was more negative than his view on Italian Fascism. In the course of studying the ideology of Nazism, Amery confessed that he could not help sympathizing with the underlying ideas of Rosenberg's *Der Mythos des 20. Jahrhunderts* and found Hitler's *Mein Kampf* 'very interesting and stimulating'. After all, Amery felt that as with Fascism, Nazism was another world view based on a national idea in the age of post-Liberalism. At the same time, he was horrified by the Nazis' megalomaniac antagonism against Jews and socialists. Therefore, unlike Fascism, Nazism was explicitly blamed by Amery for its inherent anti-parliamentarism, fanatic racialism, and anti-Christianity nature.<sup>31</sup> It was no

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<sup>29</sup> Amery, *The Forward View*, 135-137.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, 134, 137-138.

<sup>31</sup> Amery diary, 18 March 1934; 14 May 1934, *EB*, vol. 2, 377, 380; Amery, *The Forward View*, 141-148.

wonder he was disgusted by antisemitism because, besides his own Jewish identity, he justified Jewish immigrants in Palestine as bringers of European Civilization to the Middle East.<sup>32</sup> As for Christianity, Amery, a more or less secular man, had never put importance on it before. After seeing Rosenberg scorn its ethics, Amery started to emphasize the value of Christianity as well as ancient Greece and Rome as foundational elements of the European civilization.<sup>33</sup> In discussing Rosenberg's world view, Amery quipped:

It is curious that with all his fanatical hatred of the Jews and desire to expunge the Old Testament, and most of the New including St Paul, from his new religion, that religion itself is really only a replica of the narrowest tribal religion of the Jew in their earlier days. Certainly it is the very opposite of anything that Christianity brought to the world.<sup>34</sup>

When Amery had an interview with Hitler at Berlin in August 1935, he noted the 'fundamental similarity' of their ideas. This most probably referred to a necessity of a larger economic sphere, or *Lebensraum*, as he recommended Hitler to mutually set preferential tariffs with Holland and Belgium, which would naturally cover their colonies.<sup>35</sup> Amery tolerated the prospect of German

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<sup>32</sup> See Chapter 7.

<sup>33</sup> Amery, *The Forward View*, 143. The rhetoric was reused when he advocated the European integration in the post-war world. See Amery's speech in 1947, 'European Unity and Imperial Preference', AMEL 1/7/16; Amery to the Archbishop of Canterbury [Geoffrey Fisher], AMEL 1/7/39. As for the role of Christianity in the empire-building, Amery emphasized the difference of religious policy between the British Empire and the others such as the Spanish and French Empires. According to his claim, while the others missionary empires promoted proselytization, what guided the former was 'the essential spirit of Christianity', that is, 'the recognition of the rights and point of view of others'. This is another example demonstrating his tendency to see Christianity as an element of civilization. Amery, *The Forward View*, 173-175. As for Churchill's vision of Christianity and European civilization, see Richard Toye, "'This Famous Island Is the Home of Freedom": Winston Churchill and the Battle for "European Civilization"', *History of European Ideas* 46, no. 5 (2020): 666–80.

<sup>34</sup> Amery diary, 18 March 1934, AMEL 7/28.

<sup>35</sup> Amery diary, 13 August 1935, *EB*, vol. 2, 396-397. This idea was his alternative sop to the

hegemony in Central and Eastern Europe, unless their territorial ambition extended to their ex-colonies in Africa. When Nazi Germany broke up the Geneva Disarmament Conference and withdrew from the League of Nations, he even thanked Hitler for helping finish 'the era of Wilsonism'.<sup>36</sup> Even after the breakout of the Second World War, Amery maintained that Germany, as well as Italy, was the epicentre of the worldwide revolution and that pre-revolutionary Europe should not be restored after the war.<sup>37</sup> But, again, he was convinced that National Socialism had too many disagreeable aspects. In his talk with Hitler, Amery deliberately avoided 'controversial subjects like Austria, constitutional liberty, Jews or Colonies'.<sup>38</sup> In short, Nazism was another example of post-laissez-faire ideologies but less attractive than Fascism in his world view.

#### 4. A British way

Amery's arguments indicated that all those foreign regimes had serious defects in common. One party dictatorship in the authoritarian regimes destroyed democracy and freedom. Indeed, he complained that there were too many residues of Liberalism in British interwar economic and foreign policy, but he did not deny the fundamental value of 'freedom' or 'liberty'. Rather, 'the welfare and full development of the individuals' were a more important aim of political organization than 'national strength or prosperity'. Amery argued that the very aspiration for individualism, which gave momentum to the Liberal

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German colonial claim. Amery assumed that if the colonial markets possessed by other European countries was opened to Germany via preference, its expansionist zeal would be qualified. This anticipation was also linked with his support for the Pan-Europa movement. See Chapter 11.

<sup>36</sup> Amery diary, 14 Oct 1933, vol. 2, 306-307.

<sup>37</sup> Amery, *The Framework of the Future*, chapter 8; Amery to Garvin, 11 December 1940, AMEL 2/1/36.

<sup>38</sup> Amery diary, 13 August 1935, *EB*, vol. 2, 397



movement in the nineteenth century, caused the suppression of individuality in the European Continent and Russia.<sup>39</sup> In Chapter 5 and 6, I have explained Amery's conceptualization of British democracy. To sum up again, in his personal view, the core essence of the British Constitution was a strong and stable government or executive not merely responsible to parliament but also to the 'Crown', contrary to Liberal assumptions about the primacy of the popular sovereignty.<sup>40</sup> . It was the fallacy of Liberal individualism disseminated from Britain to the rest of the world that contributed the worldwide collapse of democracy. The European states, truly believing in the popular sovereignty and not understanding the virtue of strong and stable government, tended to adopt proportional representation, multi-party systems, and weak governments. As a result, they paved the way for the rise of dictatorship by the party caucus.<sup>41</sup>

The 'British Constitution' in his conception could be a bulwark to the tide of anti-democracy from the Continent. Amery boasted that the tradition of 'British freedom' was older and more embedded in their national life than 'the abstract doctrines of individualist liberalism'. The indispensable condition of true liberty was law and order, which could be preserved only by stable government.<sup>42</sup> However, he was not so complacent about the contemporary situation in the UK. The introduction of universal suffrage, a logical conclusion of Liberal individualism, reinforced the idea of control by voters over government and parliament. Like in the European Continent, the power of the party caucus became too powerful, to the point that its executives could control parliament and government. Therefore, he suggested that the British political system should implement two reforms of the machinery. First, the parliamentary system

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<sup>39</sup> Amery, *The Forward View*, 414-415.

<sup>40</sup> See Chapter 5 and 6.

<sup>41</sup> Amery, 'Future of Parliament', AMEL 1/6/45.

<sup>42</sup> Amery, *The Forward View*, 118

should introduce some elements of corporative or functional representation to its election. Secondly, a smaller Cabinet which would focus on important decision making should be formed.<sup>43</sup>

### **British Conservatism, Fascism, and democracy**

There was certainly a paradox in Amery's proposition. His aim was to prevent the collapse of democracy, which happened in the Continent. But his concrete position, functional representation and empowerment of the executive, certainly seems to be quasi-fascist. One might condemn him for trying to import Fascism through the backdoor under the banner of democracy. To what extent could we say that his political and economic thought took on a fascist hue?

Scholars have debated over the relations between Conservatism and Fascism/Nazism in Europe.<sup>44</sup> The majority of historians have tended to argue that, in the UK, the Conservative Party successfully marginalized domestic Fascism by sticking to constitutionalism and accommodating radical factions inside the party. Most recently, Philip Williamson recredited this interpretation by highlighting the force of Baldwinite Conservatism.<sup>45</sup> On the other hand, Martin Pugh has argued that 'there was a flourishing traffic in ideas and in personnel between fascism and the conservative right'.<sup>46</sup> Amery is a useful example in investigating into the conflicting arguments. Edwardian social imperialism has sometimes been regarded as a domestic origin of British Fascism.<sup>47</sup> As Amery

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<sup>43</sup> Ibid., 122; Amery, *Thoughts on the Constitution*, 65.

<sup>44</sup> Martin Blinkhorn, ed., *Fascists and Conservatives: The Radical Right and the Establishment in Twentieth Century Europe* (London & Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1990).

<sup>45</sup> Philip Williamson, 'The Conservative Party, Fascism and Anti-Fascism 1918-1939', in *Varieties of Anti-Fascism: Britain in the Inter-War Period*, ed. Nigel Copsey and Andrzej Olechnowicz (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 73–97.

<sup>46</sup> Martin Pugh, *Hurrah For The Blackshirts!: Fascists and Fascism in Britain Between the Wars* (London: Jonathan Cape, 2005).

<sup>47</sup> Alan Sykes, *The Radical Right in Britain: Social Imperialism to the BNP* (Palgrave, 2004).

was an archetype of social imperialists, it is of value to clarify his relations with fascist force and ideas in the 1930s in understanding the ambivalent relations between Radical Conservatives and Fascists. It will be argued here that Amery, albeit with no intention to introduce Fascism, was one of the interwar Conservatives who intended to tame mass-democracy by diluting its populist nature.

As Pugh has pointed out, corporatism was the most fascinating element of Fascism to British Conservatives.<sup>48</sup> However, the idea of corporatism and functional representation was disseminated beyond the pro-fascist minority.<sup>49</sup> What made them corporatist was their doubt about whether the British parliament properly represented social functions. The motivation itself was not necessary fascist. It is thus important to examine when and how he acquired the idea.

The first opportunity for him to encounter the idea of functional representation was his reading of Bellamy's *Looking Backward*, which depicted a utopian society where an assembly was composed of representatives of 'all the occupations and manufactures'.<sup>50</sup> In the real world, he first advocated the introduction of a similar model in the imperial peripheries. During the South African War, Amery privately suggested institutionalization of a caste system in South Africa to overcome racial conflicts. Later on, he proposed and advocated the principle of representation based on religious and social functions for

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<sup>48</sup> Pugh, *Hurrah*, chapter 11.

<sup>49</sup> L. P. Carpenter, 'Corporatism in Britain in 1930-40', *The Journal of Contemporary History* 9, no. 1 (1976): 3-25; Valerio Torreggiani, 'Towards an Orderly Society: Capitalist Planning and Corporatist Ideology in Britain in the Great Slump (1931-1934)', *The Journal of European Economic History* 45, no. 1 (2016): 67-97; Nigel Harris, *Competition and the Corporate Society: British Conservatives: The State and Industry, 1945-1964* (London: Methuen, 1972); A. W. Wright, *G. D. H. Cole and Socialist Democracy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979).

<sup>50</sup> Amery, 'On Socialism'. AMEL 6/1/45.

conflict-stricken regions such as Ireland, East Africa, and India.<sup>51</sup> That is, functional representation, as well as federalization, became a panacea in his schemes for imperial governance.

Amery had also had interests in a reform of the domestic electoral method in the British parliament since the beginning of his political career. After graduation from Balliol, he worked as a private secretary to Leonard Courtney, a Liberal MP. As he was already an anti-Gladstonian and imperialist, he differed 'on almost every subject' from his master. However, the sole exception was their agreement on proportional representation.<sup>52</sup> Although remaining evidence does not tell his initial motivation, he, at first, acted an inveterate critic of the first-past-the-post system.

The only opportunity for him to state his own case came during the cross-party minority campaign for proportional representation in the national discussion over the Fourth Reform Bill.<sup>53</sup> Amery, instigated by his ex-chief, Courtney, supported the movement.<sup>54</sup> He recognized some Conservatives' opinion that proportional representation in urban areas was indispensable to mitigate the effect of the reform.<sup>55</sup> But in the debate inside the House of Commons, Amery invoked a different reason to justify it. In July 1917, the amendment to the Representation of the People Bill, which tried to introduce proportional representation and the alternative vote, was rejected. Though Amery was loyal to the government in the final vote, he presented a rejoinder to

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<sup>51</sup> See Chapter 3-7.

<sup>52</sup> Amery, 'How I Achieved Success', *Ideas*, 28 August 1914, AMEL 1/3/12.

<sup>53</sup> Jenifer Hart, *Proportional Representation: Critics of the British Electoral System, 1820-1945* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), chapter 8. As for the debate over the method of representation in the Victorian era, see, Gregory Conti, *Parliament the Mirror of the Nation: Representation, Deliberation, and Democracy in Victorian Britain* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019).

<sup>54</sup> Courtney to Amery, 30 March 1917, AMEL 1/3/6.

<sup>55</sup> Amery to Waldorf Astor, 3 April 1917, AMEL 1/3/6. As for this view, see Hart, *Proportional Representation*, 182-3.

Austen Chamberlain's criticism of the amendment. He claimed that the reform was needed to secure 'stability and real soundness of judgment'.

The fault of the present system, undoubtedly, is that it encourages the return of extremists. If a man swallows the party ticket, it does not matter how much he goes beyond it, or what fads he adds on to it. The men of his party are bound to return him. If, on the other hand, in any matter, if it be such a question as Tariff Reform, he falls short of what is the official party programme and approximates to a middle position, then he is at once a traitor to the party, he weakens the cause, he diminishes the fighting spirit, and must be kept out at all hazard. I do not think proportional representation will do away with parties. ... but I think the tendency will be for the moderate rather than for the extreme man to be returned ...<sup>56</sup>

This is tricky rhetoric. Amery emphasized a need to stop letting in 'extremists' and 'cranks', but his hatred was cast towards non- and anti-Tariff Reformers in the Conservative Party. His ultimate aim was to go beyond 'the old party dogmas' and to achieve efficient post-war reconstruction. He warned that, if politicians ignored the complexity of social problems by clinging to 'the outlook of the old keen party man working to down the other party in his particular constituency', it could end in a disaster, such as revolution or something like Cæsarism. Therefore, proportional representation was advocated as an

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<sup>56</sup> Hansard, HC 4 July 1917, vol. 95, 1193-1198.

essential means of 'bringing democracy up to date with the immense needs of the time.'<sup>57</sup>

There was continuity between this rhetoric and Edwardian Tariff Reformers' plea for a national, rather than party, perspective. It was not so surprising that Amery, who had been frustrated to see the suspension of imperial preference by Conservatives/Unionists and the stalemate in the parliament on Irish Home Rule, desired to overcome the conflict of the sectional interests in party politics. Moreover, after the defeat in the second 1910 election, he complained that agents in local organizations often searched for rich candidates as their paymasters and that candidates were expected to behave as a chief treasure and organizer. Decentralization of the Central Office was thus proposed by him to give support to local campaigns and to enable 'the selection of candidates primary for their effectiveness as candidates and not as paymasters'.<sup>58</sup> These views indicate that Amery championed proportional representation in order to reduce the number of party politicians without political principle as well as to attain more proper representation. Though this stance was idiosyncratic, he acted as a member of the Proportional Representation Society at least until the early 1920s.<sup>59</sup> He even became one of the seven Conservatives who voted for the 1924 Proportional Representation Bill.<sup>60</sup>

Amery adjusted his view on representation by the 1930s. During the Second Labour Government, the bill for the alternative vote caused political controversy again.<sup>61</sup> This time, he joined the camp opposing to the bill. Amery

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<sup>57</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>58</sup> Amery and Alfred Lyttelton's memorandum enclosed in Amery to Sandars, 31 January 1911, Balfour Papers, Add MS 49775.

<sup>59</sup> See *The Times*, 3 April 1912; 1 May, 1913; 23 May, 1922; *The Daily Telegraph*, 6 December 1921.

<sup>60</sup> *The Times*, 5 May 1924.

<sup>61</sup> Hart, *Proportional Representation*, chapter 10.

came to praise the simple electoral system in Britain, which tended to form a stable government by contrast to the system in the European Continent. At the same time, however, Amery also believed that the object of the 1885 introduction of the individual constituency, 'enabling each element, each characteristic difference in the life of England, to be expressed in Parliament', was still relevant in 'any truly democratic Parliament'. Therefore, 'mere arithmetical or geographical democracy' would have to be modified by proportional representation or 'by special functional electorates enabling special elements of the community to be represented'.<sup>62</sup>

All these speeches indicate that Amery always pursued a dual purpose in electoral forms: formation of an efficient government and introduction of functional representation. The Italian corporatist regime provided a useful preceding model to solve this dilemma. However, Italy was not the only foreign source of inspiration. For instance, when he visited Austria in February 1934, Amery was impressed by the design of the new corporatist constitution and enjoyed a talk with Engelbert Dollfuss.<sup>63</sup> Moreover, his corporatist proposition was less drastic than the Italian and Austrian constitutions. His concrete plan was to create a Chamber of industry as the third house of the parliament based on functional representation.<sup>64</sup> But he had no intention to replace the British parliamentary system with an alternative corporatist constitution. In other words, Amery just proposed to add another chapter to Whig history of the British Constitution. While Amery criticized the rise of the party caucus, he did not deny a necessity of party politics in deciding the course of economic policy.<sup>65</sup> When

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<sup>62</sup> Hansard, HC 3 February 1931 vol. 247 1749-62. Also see his speech on 12 May 1931. Hansard, HC 12 May 1931 vol. 252, 1038-1043.

<sup>63</sup> Amery diary, 24-26 February 1934, *EB*, vol. 2, 373-376.

<sup>64</sup> Amery, *The Forward View*, 411-13, 457.

<sup>65</sup> Amery, 'Politician v Business Man', a script for the BBC Radio on 29 March 1935, AMEL 1/7/17.

Lymington resigned as a Conservative MP in 1934 for his antipathy towards the National Government, Amery told his wife that, while Lymington's feeling was understandable, politics needed 'infinite patience'.<sup>66</sup> He was not a true believer in extra-parliamentary radical activism.

The idea of strong and small executive was also not necessarily fascist. As Amery admitted in *My Political Life*, the fundamental stance originated from his support for the making of the General Staff in Edwardian Army Reform. His direct reference point in the 1930s was the War Cabinet of Lloyd George.<sup>67</sup> Amery found it a pleasant coincidence for André Tardieu's *L'heure de la Décision* to call for protection of the cabinet from 'the tyranny of parliament' in France.<sup>68</sup> In this sense, his aspiration for the guiding central machinery stemmed both from his consistent stance since the Edwardian national-efficiency movement and from the influence of the worldwide intellectual tendency of Conservatism. Italian Fascism was just one of the sources of inspiration.

Varello Terreggiani has recently argued that corporatism could be interpreted as a constitutional regime in the British tradition.<sup>69</sup> Though Amery would have delightedly approved of this, we should be more cautious about endorsing the invented tradition. The conception of corporatism was diversely appropriated and contested in the 1930s. Therefore, it is necessary to compare Amery's stance with those of contemporary Conservative politicians and

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<sup>66</sup> Amery to his wife, 17 February 1934, AMEL 6/3/51. As for Lymington's radical politics, see Dan Stone, 'The English Mistery, the BUF, and the Dilemmas of British Fascism', *Journal of Modern History* 75, no. 2 (2003): 336–58; idem., *Responses to Nazism*; Dietz, *Neo-Tories*.

<sup>67</sup> Amery to Bledisloe, 2 May 1934, AMEL 2/1/24.

<sup>68</sup> Amery diary, 25 March 1934, AMEL 7/28.

<sup>69</sup> Valerio Torreggiani, 'Corporatism and the British Constitutional Heritage: Evidences from the History of Ideas', *Estudos Históricos* 31, no. 64 (2018): 151–72.



intellectuals in order to grasp the characteristic of Amery's thought in interwar Conservatism.

## **Locating Amery's position in interwar Conservatism**

### **Capitalist planning and the YMCA group**

It is now widely known that the conception of 'planning' captured some capitalists and Conservatives, as well as socialists and fascists, in the 1930s. The movement was initiated by the Political and Economic Planning (PEP) and the Industrial Reorganization League, culminating in the campaign for the Self-Government for Industry Bill in 1933-1934.<sup>70</sup> Its leader on the side of the political world was Harold Macmillan, who was seen as a core member of the young Conservative rebels, called the YMCA. *Industry and the State*, co-authored by Macmillan, Robert Boothby, John Loder, and Oliver Stanley in 1927, urged the state to facilitate industrial re-organization as a middle way between doctrinaire Marxian socialism and individualism.<sup>71</sup> Their scheme in the early 1930s, the Self-Government for Industry Bill, tried to enable industrial associations to form industrial corporations or councils and to impose discipline on each sector.<sup>72</sup> Although their attempt to pass the bill failed, Macmillan continued his campaign by forming the Next Five Years Group, affiliating with the Popular Front movement, and by presenting his idea through his writings such as *The Middle Way*.<sup>73</sup>

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<sup>70</sup> Daniel Ritschel, *The Politics of Planning: The Debate on Economic Planning in Britain in the 1930s* (Oxford University Press, 1997), chapter 4-5; Torreggiani, 'Towards an Orderly Society'.

<sup>71</sup> Robert Boothby et al, *Industry and the State: A Conservative View* (London: Macmillan, 1927).

<sup>72</sup> Ritschel, *The Politics*, 196; Julian Greaves, *Industrial Reorganization and Government Policy in Interwar Britain* (London: Routledge, 2005), 88-90.

<sup>73</sup> As for Macmillan's thought and politics on planning, see Ritschel, *The Politics of Planning*, chapter 5-8; E. H. H. Green, *Ideologies of Conservatism: Conservative Political Ideas in the Twentieth Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), chapter 6; Mark Garnett and Kevin Hickson, *Conservative Thinkers: The Key Contributions to the Political Thought of the Modern Conservative Party* (Manchester & New York: Manchester University Press, 2009), chapter 1;

In contrast to Amery's colleagues in the Cabinet, Macmillan and Boothby commemorated him as a wise senior politician who deserved a better position.<sup>74</sup> Though their relations with Amery became closer only after the late 1930s, Amery found their idea of 'planned development' interesting and gave 'moral support' to their campaign for industrial self-government at the 1934 annual party conference.<sup>75</sup> As far as self-regulation of industry was concerned, it was by Macmillan as well as by the Agricultural Marketing Acts that Amery was deeply influenced.<sup>76</sup>

The intellectual background of the rise of industrial reorganization was the conception of 'poverty in the midst of plenty': how come still many people suffered from poverty in the age of technological advances and mass production? Though 'planners' attributed the economic paradox to various causes, such as underconsumption and excessive governmental interference, they often agreed that one of the main factors was the anarchistic competition in the market.<sup>77</sup> This intellectual climate affected Amery. When he inspected some German factories a half month before the formation of the Nazi Government, the extent of the mechanization there struck him. In one diary entry during the trip, he confessed:

I see the time coming when some one [sic] with experience of modern works will write an anti-Marxian economics showing that "Labour" is of

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Valerio Torreggiani, 'The Making of Harold Macmillan's Third Way in Interwar Britain (1924-1935)', in *New Political Ideas in the Aftermath of the Great War*, ed. Alessandro Salvador and Anders G. Kjølsvædt (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 67–86.

<sup>74</sup> Harold Macmillan, *Winds of Change, 1914-1939* (1966: Macmillan, 1966), 253; idem., *The Blast of War, 1939-1945* (London: Macmillan, 1967), 69-70; Robert Boothby, *Recollections of a Rebel* (London: Hutchinson, 1978), 128, 144-145, 163.

<sup>75</sup> Amery diary, 8 March 1933, AMEL 7/27; 5 Oct 1934, *EB*, vol. 2, 386.

<sup>76</sup> Amery, *The Forward View*, 408-410.

<sup>77</sup> Rischel, *The Politics*, 183-184.

practically no importance in the creation of wealth, and that planning brain and higher technical direction are everything, and that the only reasonable form of government is one which entrusts all power to the planners. The members of the manual class will in any case require drastic "liquidation" by continual drafting off the land and to other less mechanized occupations ... and by birth control. For the first time my complacent faith in the impossibility of general overproduction has been qualified by a sense of the enormous adjustments to be made before consumption and diversification can catch up with the technical improvement of production.<sup>78</sup>

This statement apparently demonstrates his shaken trust in imperial preference as a panacea. His faith in mutual growth of production and population was the core of both his criticism of classical economists and his case for Tariff Reform.<sup>79</sup> It might certainly seem the case that Amery turned to corporatism because of his disillusion about the potential benefit of fiscal reform.

However, we should not regard this as his complete conversion. Only one month after his trip to Germany, his diary blamed Neville Chamberlain, Chancellor of the Exchequer, for having no plan beyond 'balancing the Budget' and 'restriction of output'.<sup>80</sup> As was obvious from his activity in the EIA, his campaign still aimed for development of imperial preference. No matter how latently qualified his confidence in the policy was, corporatism to him was a complement, and not an alternative, to imperial fiscal and monetary policy. It was this stance that differentiated Amery from the YMCA group. Though the

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<sup>78</sup> Amery diary, 18 January 1933, AMEL 7/27. The full quotation of this part can be found in Amery, *My Political Life*, vol. 3, 126.

<sup>79</sup> See Chapter 8.

<sup>80</sup> Amery diary, 16, 17 February 1933. AMEL 7/27.

latter did not neglect the importance of imperial trade policy, *Industry and the State* advertised industrial reorganization as a less controversial and more fruitful method than tariffs.<sup>81</sup> Amery thought that Macmillan's *Reconstruction* contained 'some quite good ideas' but 'with no sort of touch of national or Empire sentiment to liven it'.<sup>82</sup> He praised Boothby's 'thoughtful well prepared speech' to attack the lack of clear monetary policy in the Commons but also disagreed with its conclusion that Britain should restore parity with the US dollars as soon as possible.<sup>83</sup> Amery regarded Oliver Stanley as an enemy of imperial preference, who actually, as President of the Board of Trade, helped forge the 1938 Anglo-American agreements.<sup>84</sup>

These young Conservatives belonged to the Lost Generation. Their keen interest in unemployment derived from their experiences on the war front, the industrial decline in their constituencies, and the influence of new political ideas, such as Italian corporatism and Noel Skelton's 'property owning democracy'.<sup>85</sup> They were naturally disappointed with the 'old gang' in the establishment and captured by the idea of 'planning'. Amery was an exceptional figure among the older generation, who sympathized with the radical stance of the young generation.<sup>86</sup> But he had already undergone the South African War before the First World War and his world view was formed in the movements for Edwardian Army Reform and Tariff Reform. Although he imbibed new ideas in

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<sup>81</sup> Boothby et al, *Industry and the State*, 22-26, 109-127.

<sup>82</sup> Amery diary, 11 December 1933, *EB*, vol. 2, 310; Harold Macmillan, *Reconstruction: A Plea for a National Policy* (London: Macmillan, 1933).

<sup>83</sup> Amery diary, 21 December 1934, AMEL 7/28.

<sup>84</sup> See Chapter 9.

<sup>85</sup> Richard Carr, *Veteran MPs and Conservative Politics in the Aftermath of the Great War: The Memory of All That* (Surrey: Ashgate, 2013); David Torrance, *Noel Skelton and the Property-Owning Democracy* (London: Biteback, 2010). As for the long-term influence of 'property-owning democracy', see Ben Jackson, 'Property-Owning Democracy: A Short History' in *Property-Owning Democracy: Rawls and Beyond*, ed. by Martin O'Neill and Thad Williamson (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), 33-52.

<sup>86</sup> Carr, *Veteran MPs*, 83-84, 101-102.

the interwar period, they were grafted onto his faith in imperial economic policy, which was not shared by the YMCA.

### ***The English Review Group***

*The English Review* was one of the influential Conservative periodicals in interwar Britain.<sup>87</sup> Intellectuals and publicists around this journal, such as Charles Petrie and Douglas Jerrold, has recently attracted a great deal of historians' attention. It is probably because they had such multi-faceted identities that their writings could be analysed from various standpoints.<sup>88</sup> The most relevant to this thesis was Bernhard Dietz's research. He has argued that the *English Review* group was not comprised of naïve fellow travellers of Fascism but represented a British variant of the Conservative Revolution in Germany, which tried to introduce a corporatist regime in constitutional ways.<sup>89</sup>

This means that Amery's argument for corporatism was similar to that of the *English Review* group. Both observed that mass democracy based on geographical representation was at breaking point and that functional representation should be introduced. They also gained lessons about corporatism from Italian Fascism but preferred a constitutional method rather than a violent one.<sup>90</sup> Amery was, in fact, loosely associated with the group; he contributed articles to the journal in the early 1930s, delivered speeches at the

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<sup>87</sup> Gary Love, 'The Periodical Press and the Intellectual Culture of Conservatism in Interwar Britain', *The Historical Journal* 57, no. 4 (2014): 1027–56.

<sup>88</sup> Richard Griffiths, *Fellow Travellers of the Right: British Enthusiasts for Nazi Germany 1933-1939* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983); Tom Villis, *British Catholics and Fascism: Religious Identity and Political Extremism Between the Wars* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Bernhard Dietz, *Neo-Tories: The Revolt of British Conservatives against Democracy and Political Modernity (1929-1939)*, trans. by Ian Copestake (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2018); Gary Love, "'Real Toryism' or Christian Democracy? The Political Thought of Douglas Jerrold and Charles Petrie at the New English Review, 1945–50", *Historical Research*, 93.261 (2020), 551–76.

<sup>89</sup> Dietz, *Neo-Tories*; idem., 'The Neo-Tories and Europe: A Transnational History of British Radical Conservatism in the 1930s', *Journal of Modern European History*, 15.1 (2017), 85–108.

<sup>90</sup> Dietz, *Neo-Tories*, 80-83, 94-95, 112-126.

group luncheons, and sponsored the Right Book Club, which was launched in 1937 to counteract the influence of the Left Book Club and supported by the *English Review* group.<sup>91</sup> Above all, Amery gave lowkey support to the aborted intrigue of the group to establish an alternative strong government under the leadership of George Lloyd in 1933.

However, there was an intellectual and ideological gulf between Amery and the group. Dietz has already pointed out that Amery's corporatist model, that is, establishment of a third chamber of industries, was not an alternative to parliamentary democracy, as the *English Review* group sought for, but an economic response to make the existing system more efficient.<sup>92</sup> This section will not fundamentally modify this view but shed more light on their difference to delineate the feature of Amery's corporatism.

To sum up their attitude towards the status quo, the language of the *English Review* group was overtly anti-democratic and yearned for regime change through a constitutional revolution from above, while, in Amery's view, a centralized government was necessary for preserving democracy. The gap was most clearly reflected in their disagreement over the effectivity of imperial preference. In February 1933, Amery explained the ideal of economic nationalism in the luncheon club of the *English Review*.<sup>93</sup> But it did not impress all the audience. An article by Douglas Jerrold, the editor of the journal, acknowledged that 'State capitalism' would be saved only by 'the adoption of an expansionist currency policy within the framework of a protectionist economy',

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<sup>91</sup> Amery diary, 15 February 1933, AMEL 7/27, 13 February 1936, *EB*, vol. 2, 407-408; 19 April 1937, AMEL 7/31. Amery was one of the patrons of the Right Book Club. See the advertisement of the club in the press, for instance, 4 March 1938, *The Daily Telegraph*. As for the Right Book Club, see Green, *Ideologies*, chapter 5; Terence Rodgers, 'The Right Book Club: Text Wars, Modernity and Cultural Politics in the Late Thirties', *Literature & History*, 12.2 (2003), 1-15; Dietz, *Neo-Tories*, 95-98.

<sup>92</sup> Dietz, *Neo-Tories*, 152.

<sup>93</sup> Amery diary, 15 February 1933, AMEL 7/27.

which was preached by Amery. But Jerrold doubted the feasibility of balanced imperial development since it would be hard to accommodate manufacturers in the Dominions and farmers in Britain. Moreover, he claimed that it was pointless to sustain 'State Capitalism', which meant in his lexicon 'the continued identification of the State with property ... at the price of a guarantee to the propertyless of fixed dividend in goods and services' because 'State capitalism' was doomed to 'intensify the prejudice against State inefficiency and State interference'. In short, imperial preference was just an expedient to extend the life of the undesirable present regime.<sup>94</sup> In a reply to this article, Amery frankly confessed that Jerrold's definition of his imperial policy as an advocacy of 'State capitalism' puzzled him and he tried to clarify his own conception of economics, which was neither individualist capitalism nor mechanical socialism but 'historic and biological'.<sup>95</sup> Amery here did not notice that, whatever his economic principle was, Jerrold would not be impressed as long as his imperial policy was designed to reform the present regime. To the *English Review* group, promotion of imperial trade was subordinated to establishment of a new corporatist regime as a fundamental solution.<sup>96</sup>

The similar difference can be spotted in Jerrold's critical comment on Amery's scheme for a strong and small Cabinet. His autobiography admitted that Amery was, like himself, not a 'harmonious element in the democratic machine'. Jerrold, however, did not find Amery's scheme promising.

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<sup>94</sup> Douglas Jerrold, 'The Future of the English Political Parties', *The English Review*, October 1933, 337-358.

<sup>95</sup> Amery to Jerrold, 4 October 1933, AMEL 2/1/23

<sup>96</sup> Similarly, Francis Yeats-Brown imagined corporatism as an alternative to Conservative policy of imperial preference, as well as to the dictatorship by fascists or socialists. Dietz, *Neo-Tories*, 148.

The cabinet system could, no doubt, be so modified, but its virtue, in democratic eyes, is its supreme efficiency in not interfering with changes which are being brought about by other agencies. A Cabinet which persisted in interfering with that form of interested cog-rolling which somnolent old professors call the process of evolution would be out of office in a week.<sup>97</sup>

To the *English Review* group, as long as mass democracy resumed, there was no chance for political and economic transformation. Therefore, it was natural that Amery's stance looked too lukewarm to them.

Equally, Amery had little sympathy with their anti-Whig and Catholic interpretation of British history. The inter-war period was ambivalent years for Whig constitutional history. Although effective academic onslaught was begun by Herbert Butterfield and Lewis Namier, Whiggish view on history survived the attack and retained influence in academia and the public sphere.<sup>98</sup> Whig history itself was not a static entity. After the First World War, G. M. Trevelyan, an orthodox successor of the school, got out of the sectional Whiggism and came to argue that the English Constitution was developed by both Tories and Whigs. The conversion made him a supporter of Baldwinian Conservatism.<sup>99</sup> However,

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<sup>97</sup> Douglas Jerrold, *Georgian Adventure* (London: William Collins, 1938), 329.

<sup>98</sup> Regarding the two historians, see Michael Bentley, *The Life and Thought of Herbert Butterfield: History, Science and God* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Linda Colley, *Namier* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1989); D. W. Hayton, *Conservative Revolutionary: The Lives of Lewis Namier* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2019). Regarding the long-term history of anti-Whig views and lasting influence of Whig history, see P. B. M. Blaas, *Continuity and Anachronism: Parliamentary and Constitutional Development in Whig Historiography and in the Anti-Whig Reaction between 1890 and 1930* (The Hague & Boston & London: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978); Michael Bentley, *Modernizing England's Past: English Historiography in the Age of Modernism 1870-1970* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), chapter 1-4.

<sup>99</sup> David Cannadine, *G. M. Trevelyan* (London: HarperCollins, 1992). Trevelyan's conversion was epitomized by the changing relationship between him and Amery. At the beginning of the twentieth century, Trevelyan criticized Amery's imperialism. However, when Amery sent his *The Empire in the New Era* to Trevelyan in 1928, he browsed it with 'delight and interest' and said:



it should be also recognized that the stereotypical view on Whig history existed as a straw man at the time. The *English Review* group propagated another anti-Whig strand in inter-war Britain. Influenced by Hilaire Belloc, they depicted the Reformation and the Glorious Revolution not as milestones but as the beginning of corruption. According to their historical view, these events destroyed the ideal medieval society, unduly weakened the power of the monarchy, and carved the downgrading path for mass democracy. Their praise of Mussolini was linked with the revival of Monarchism.<sup>100</sup> Charles Petrie's harsh review of Trevelyan's *England under Queen Anne* epitomized their stance: 'Professor Trevelyan makes not the slightest attempt to understand, still less to interpret, the Tory and Jacobite point of view'.<sup>101</sup>

It was unsurprising that Amery, a non-Catholic, did not embrace the religious interpretation of history. Belloc was matriculated at Balliol College one year after Amery.<sup>102</sup> Amery's autobiography recalled that Belloc was 'a considerable phenomenon in Oxford life'.<sup>103</sup> But, in 1934, he dismissed Belloc's *Charles I* as 'a bad book full of his cranks'.<sup>104</sup> As for the royalist revisionism, it was not solely brought about by the Catholic milieu. Works of Conservative historians such as Namier and Arthur Bryant contributed to the surge of the intellectual trend.<sup>105</sup> Amery's emphasis on the significance of the Crown in

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'there is nothing better, in this queer world, than the British Empire.' Amery recommended Trevelyan's *History of England* as 'a good piece of work'. Trevelyan to Amery, 10 December 1901, a non-dated letter, 25 September 1903, AMEL 2/5/2; Trevelyan to Amery, 13 October 1928, AMEL 2/1/16; Amery to Smuts, 24 January 1927, AMEJ 8/5/23.

<sup>100</sup> James R. Lothian, *The Making and Unmaking of the English Catholic Intellectual Community, 1910-1950* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Presse, 2009), chapter 1-3; Dietz, *Neo-Tories*, 44-51.

<sup>101</sup> Charles Petrie, 'More Whig History', *The English Review*, November 1932, 562-563.

<sup>102</sup> Edward Hilliard, *The Balliol College Register, 1832-1914*, 1914, 406

<sup>103</sup> Amery, *My Political Life*, vol. 1, 54.

<sup>104</sup> Amery diary, 25 May 1934, AMEL 7/28.

<sup>105</sup> Regarding Bryant, see Julia Stapleton, *Sir Arthur Bryant and National History in Twentieth-Century Britain* (London: Lexington Books, 2005); Reba Soffer, *History, Historians, and Conservatism in Britain and America: From the Great War to Thatcher and Reagan* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), chapter 4-5.

imperial and national constitution can be located in the fringe of the fashion. He certainly had apprehension that the universal suffrage gave excessive power to the party caucus, which motivated him to argue that its harmful effect should be offset by functional representation and strong executive and the Crown. But he did not see any problem in the development of British Constitution until 1918. In Amery's view, the balance of power between the Crown and the Nation was appropriately adjusted in the course of British history, though there was Conservative flavour in his interpretation that the adjustment was decisively achieved in 1660 and just reasserted in 1688.<sup>106</sup> Amery revered Bryant not as a royalist but as a historian who showed how the 'English tradition and character' managed to work its way through 'a principle true within limits, but utterly false when pushed to its logical conclusion'.<sup>107</sup> David Marquand is quite right in describing Amery's interpretation of constitution as a fusion of 'a Whig notion of organic evolution and adaptive statecraft' and 'a Tory notion of executive leadership'.<sup>108</sup> Though Amery agreed that the universal suffrage had defects, he had no nostalgia for the medieval society idealized by the English Review group.<sup>109</sup> He approved of the extension of the franchise in the nineteenth century as a reasonable process to deal with the changes of the British economy and society. Corporatism was imagined by him as a new electoral reform in British Whig history.

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<sup>106</sup> Amery, *The Forward View*, 120.

<sup>107</sup> This was his view on Bryant's *English Saga (1840-1940)*. Amery to Bryant, 21 December 1940, Bryant Papers, C/70. The correspondence between Amery and Bryant in C/70 shows that they often mutually sent their writings.

<sup>108</sup> David Marquand, 'Democracy in Britain', *The Political Quarterly*, 71.3 (2000), 269.

<sup>109</sup> In order to idealize Medieval England, the radical right in the interwar period often invoked the image of 'Merrie England'. Dietz, *Neo-Tories*, 49-51. Amery used the term as a title of one chapter of *The Forward View*. However, the chapter contained no nostalgia for the Middle Ages and just discussed his concrete schemes of social reform to develop the welfare of the whole community without hampering individual freedom. Amery, *The Forward View*, chapter 10.

## Duncan Sandys and the British Movement

Duncan Sandys's ideological position was close to Amery's. Sandys changed his career from diplomacy to politics in the early 1930s and was elected in the 1935 by-election in Norwood. But he was one of the young Conservatives who were frustrated by the overall policy of the National Government. During 1934, he led the short-lived campaign called 'the British Movement'. Though his politics in the 1930s has sometimes been interpreted as quasi-fascist, Gary Love has shown that the movement was more constitutional and loyal to the Conservative Party. The stance essentially resembled that of *The English Review*, whose editor, Petrie, was actually appointed as editor of the British Movement's news-sheet. The goals of the movement included several constitutional reforms such as introduction of corporatism in local or consultative levels but were not intended for fundamental regime change. It also suggested that imperial unity should be strengthened through establishment of an imperial council and imperial preference, but Sandys steered clear of his future father-in-law's attempt to stymie the 1935 India Act.<sup>110</sup>

Amery played a role in the formation of Sandys' political identity. When Sandys was still wavering about his future career in politics, Amery admonished him to join the Conservative Party because its members were supposed to have ample leeway in their personal political activity.<sup>111</sup> Though Amery's influence on Sandys should not be exaggerated, Sandys chose to be an internal critic of the party like Amery. One year later, Amery was impressed by the propositions of Sandys' new political campaign.

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<sup>110</sup> Gary Love, 'The British Movement, Duncan Sandys, and the Politics of Constitutionalism in the 1930s', *Contemporary British History* 23, no. 4 (2009): 543–58.

<sup>111</sup> Amery diary, 29 July 1933, AMEL 7/27; Love, 'The British Movement', 554.

His British Movement is now definitely on lines that I entirely sympathise with i.e. national Imperial and progressive, and neutral on the subject of India. I rather think he will be able to get in touch through Lindsay with P.E.P. and somewhat combine forces. He is not out for getting rid of the National Government if it can do the job.<sup>112</sup>

Of course, the importance of the convergence should not be overstated. The British Movement was closed before Sandys became an MP. Its programme was not necessarily detailed in every point. In other words, it was vague enough for Amery to fail to find its defects. The similarity lay in the dimension of overall stance and not in that of concrete policy. Still, the mutual interaction epitomizes the position of the two men in interwar Conservatism. Amery was to cooperate with Sandys more closely in the post-war European Movement.<sup>113</sup>

### **The Conservative leaders of the National Government**

Amery initially disapproved of the new coalition in 1931 which would delay the introduction of the general tariffs further.<sup>114</sup> However, he again quickly swallowed the conclusion of the negotiations among the party leaders, and publicly stated that the National Government was temporarily necessary to get over the crisis caused by 'socialist extravagance', while repeating that a real remedy would be not economy but growth of imperial and national production enabled by tariffs.<sup>115</sup> The economic policy of the new government achieved an

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<sup>112</sup> Amery diary, 23 July 1934, AMEL 7/28; Love, 'The British Movement', 551.

<sup>113</sup> See Chapter 12.

<sup>114</sup> Williamson, *National Crisis*, 357. As for Amery's antipathy towards 'coalition', see Chapter 8 of this thesis.

<sup>115</sup> Amery, 'The First Crisis – and the Next', 9 September 1931, *The Daily Mail*.

equivocal outcome to Amery; the comprehensive tariffs and imperial preference was introduced, but not enough to live up to his expectations.<sup>116</sup> However, even after he started to criticize the government, he did not deny the necessity of the coalition.

I believe that the country on the whole still wants a National Government. I doubt whether it would wish either India or the recasting of our system of social insurance entrusted to a purely Right Wing Conservative Government. It certainly does not yet wish for a Socialist Government .... But it undoubtedly will return a Socialist majority at the next election if the present Government fails to grapple with its task more vigorously, more confidently, and in a more definitely national and Imperial spirit than it has done hitherto.<sup>117</sup>

Historians have tackled the question as to why the Conservative Party retained the coalition despite its dominance in the Commons. As Geraint Thomas has shown, the umbrella framework of the National Government was diversely appropriated by local Conservative activists to adapt to each regional issues. Many interwar Conservatives, who did not have historians' hindsight regarding Baldwinian hegemony, genuinely believed that they could not continue to win elections without creating a new narrative of national recovery based on the fusion of anti-Socialism and a more positive economic policy.<sup>118</sup> Amery, now annoyed at the Die-Hards' plea for economy and doctrinaire stance towards

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<sup>116</sup> See Chapter 9.

<sup>117</sup> Amery, 'What is Wrong with the Government', *The Nineteenth Century and After*, April 1933, 395.

<sup>118</sup> Geraint Thomas, *Popular Conservatism and the Culture of National Government in Inter-War Britain* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020). As for factors in the realm of high politics, see Nick Smart, *The National Government, 1931-40* (London: Palgrave, 1996).

India, reached the pro-National-Government attitude from his personal perspective.

Amery and the Conservative leaders of the National Government, Baldwin and Neville Chamberlain had many things in common in their world views. Baldwin, born in 1867, was educated at Harrow School and Trinity College, and imbibed the Conservative Whig spirit of constitutional historiography. This was the core element in his moderate but paternalistic view on British democracy and constitution.<sup>119</sup> He also pragmatically endorsed the necessity of social reform and tariff reform.<sup>120</sup> In other words, Amery and Baldwin were products of the same episteme.<sup>121</sup> However, Baldwin consciously took the middle ground of British Conservatism, steering 'between Harold Macmillan and John Grettton'.<sup>122</sup> The principle of Baldwin's economic policy was to balance 'sound finance' with social-service expenditure.<sup>123</sup> Amery's tariff reform ideology was a nuisance to Baldwin.<sup>124</sup>

Amery and Neville Chamberlain also had common ground. It was Chamberlain who organized findings of policy committees into *Looking Ahead*, the manifesto of 'New Conservatism' of the Baldwin government.<sup>125</sup> According to Amery's diary, Amery and Chamberlain, in their private talk of 1922, agreed

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<sup>119</sup> Williamson, *Stanley Baldwin*., 114-121 and chapter 7. As for the significance of history education in British higher education, see Reba Soffer, *Discipline and Power: The University, History, and the Making of an English Elite, 1870-1930* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994).

<sup>120</sup> Williamson, *Stanley Baldwin*, chapter 6.

<sup>121</sup> Amery found Baldwin's view on democracy, presented in the House of Commons, 'not bad'. Amery diary, 11 March 1935, AMEL 7/29.

<sup>122</sup> According to R. A. Butler, Baldwin advised Butler to take this way. Butler's memorandum in July 1935, republished in Philip Williamson and Edward Baldwin, eds., *Baldwin Papers: A Conservative Statesman 1908-1947* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 343.

<sup>123</sup> Williamson, *Stanley Baldwin*, 177.

<sup>124</sup> Williamson and Baldwin, eds., *Baldwin Papers*, 209, 296, 299.

<sup>125</sup> John Ramsden, *The Age of Balfour and Baldwin 1902-1940* (London and New York: Longman, 1978), 195. It included a concrete programme of social reform. *Looking Ahead: A Re-Statement of Unionist Principles and Aims: With Three Speeches by Rt. Hon. Stanley Baldwin* (London: National Unionist Association, 1924).

that the Conservative Party needed 'constructive policy'.<sup>126</sup> Both of them were predicated upon the same premise that the Conservative Party had to update itself to the age of post-laissez-faire.<sup>127</sup> What set apart them was the different extent to which they were committed to the cause of Tariff Reform. While Amery's review of the official biography of Chamberlain praised him as a successor of his father, particularly regarding social reform, he privately complained that Neville and Austen did not wholeheartedly inherit their father's imperial policy.<sup>128</sup>

However, it would be too unfair to Neville if we assumed that Amery was the true successor of Joseph Chamberlain. Neville always conjured the legacy of his father in advocating imperial preference and strove to maintain the key interests of imperial preference.<sup>129</sup> He did not just believe that 'tariff' would occupy a central position in imperial economic policy quite as tenaciously as Amery.<sup>130</sup> Like Baldwin, Chamberlain did not doubt the importance of sound finance.<sup>131</sup> The tough negotiation at the Ottawa Conference reduced his rosy expectation for intra-imperial cooperation. Moreover, as Prime Minister, Chamberlain was required to balance British imperial interests and the need to forge friendly relationships with other superpowers.<sup>132</sup> For instance, the reason he decided to negotiate with the US about a trade agreement was as follows:

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<sup>126</sup> Amery diary, 24 March 1922, AMEL 7/16. Chamberlain also reported his talk with Amery. In his view, Amery was 'one of the few men who has constructive ideas'. Neville Chamberlain to Hilda Chamberlain, 26 March 1922 in Robert Self, ed., *The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters*, vol. 2 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000), 104.

<sup>127</sup> As for Chamberlain's ideological position, see Ramsden, *The Age of Balfour and Baldwin*, 255-257; Robert Self, *Neville Chamberlain: A Biography* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 48; Nick Smart, *Neville Chamberlain* (London: Routledge, 2009), 54-55, 81-83.

<sup>128</sup> Amery, 'He Worked for Peach', *The Onlooker*, January 1947; Amery's diary, 27 May 1937.

<sup>129</sup> Smart, *Neville Chamberlain*, 173; Ian M. Drummond and Norman Hillmer, *Negotiating Freer Trade: The United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, and the Trade Agreements of 1938* (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1989).

<sup>130</sup> Self, *Neville Chamberlain*, 167-174.

<sup>131</sup> *Ibid.*, chapter 9.

<sup>132</sup> *Ibid.*, 190-192.

Why I have been prepared (pace Amery & Page Croft) to go a long way to get this treaty is precisely because I reckoned it would help to educate American opinion to act more & more with us and because I felt sure it would frighten the totalitarians.<sup>133</sup>

In short, Chamberlain was more adept an opportunist and pragmatist than Amery. Considering that Joseph Chamberlain also often opportunistically altered his political view, including even the one towards Free Trade, it could be said that Neville loyally followed his father's path.<sup>134</sup>

Towards the late 1930s, Amery lost trust in the National Government in general. His relations with Chamberlain were severely strained when he was angered by Amery's letter to the effect that his exclusion from the 1937 Cabinet meant Chamberlain had no motivation to introduce any new policy.<sup>135</sup> Amery was famous for putting the final nail in the coffin of Chamberlain as Prime Minister by quoting the Cromwell's speech on 7 May 1940. But their friendship had become feeble long before the climactic moment.

## Conclusion

Amery's constitutional ideology was not so overtly anti-democratic as that of the *English Review* group. Therefore, the German historiographical

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<sup>133</sup> Neville Chamberlain to Hilda Chamberlain, 21 November 1937, in Robert Self, ed., *The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters*, vol. 4 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), 284.

<sup>134</sup> As for Joseph Chamberlain's initial advocacy of Free Trade, see Peter Marsh, *Joseph Chamberlain: Entrepreneur in Politics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), 294; Richard Jay, *Joseph Chamberlain: A Political Study* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), 190-192.

<sup>135</sup> Neville Chamberlain to Amery, 30 May 1937; Amery to Chamberlain, 4 June 1937; Chamberlain to Amery, 7 June 1937, AMEL 2/1/27. Amery had told Chamberlain that he was ready to become a new Chancellor of the Exchequer. Chamberlain's view on the request was: 'I simply cant [sic] understand how people can be so conceited.' Neville Chamberlain to Hilda Chamberlain, 10 April 1937 in Self, ed., *The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters*, vol. 4, 245.



framework of 'Conservative Revolution', which Dietz has appropriated to characterize the English Review group, is not applicable to Amery's political thought.<sup>136</sup> It could be more appropriately interpreted if it is put in the wider context of the popularity of the conception of non-Liberal democracy in the interwar period, on which recent scholars have shed light.<sup>137</sup> So-called Liberal democracy became orthodox in the western world only after 1945. In the interwar period, there burgeoned the literature on crisis of democracy, which often advocated the introduction of authoritarian elements into democracy.<sup>138</sup> Amery actually read such books as M. A. Pink's *A Realist Looks at Democracy* and Eustace Percy's *Democracy on Trial*.<sup>139</sup> Perhaps, Amery's case for small and strong executive and increasing plural votes according to voters' social function would look too authoritarian and even undemocratic to the present criteria of liberal democracy.<sup>140</sup> As far as his intention was concerned, however, Amery meant not to discard but to update and protect democracy from the global upsurge of more genuine authoritarianism. It has been argued that Conservatives in the interwar period faced a need to come to terms with the advent of mass-democracy by adjusting themselves and taming democracy.<sup>141</sup> Too much emphasis has now been put on the importance of Baldwinian Conservatism in the process.<sup>142</sup> Despite his criticism of Baldwin's leadership

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<sup>136</sup> Dietz, 'The Neo-Tories and Europe'.

<sup>137</sup> Jan-Werner Müller, *Contesting Democracy: Political Ideas in Twentieth-Century Europe* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013); Marcus Llanque, 'The Edges of Democracy: German, British and American Debates on the Dictatorial Challenges to Democracy in the Interwar Years', in *Democracy in Modern Europe: A Conceptual History*, ed. Jeppe Nevers and Henk te Velde (New York & Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2018), 182–207.

<sup>138</sup> Llanque, 'The Edges of Democracy'.

<sup>139</sup> Amery diary, 2, 3, 6 January 1932, AMEL 7/26.

<sup>140</sup> Amery, *The Forward View*, 452.

<sup>141</sup> As for Conservatives and democracy, see David H. Close, 'The Collapse of Resistance to Democracy: Conservatives, Adult Suffrage, and Second Chamber Reform, 1911-1928', *The Historical Journal*, 20.4 (1977), 893–918; Brian Girvin, *The Right in the Twentieth Century: Conservatism and Democracy* (London & New York: Pinter, 1994).

<sup>142</sup> Williamson, *Stanley Baldwin*.

and his radical proposal for constitutional reform, Amery ultimately tried to preserve the democratic nature of British society, which Fascist sympathisers and the *English Review* group attacked. In that sense, Amery played a unique role in the process in which British Conservatives accommodated the radical elements. This also meant that, in the 1930s, Amery was alienated from both the leading group of the party and the Die-Hards. In 1937, Amery told his son, Julian, 'if my chance does not come you can always take up the running later on.'<sup>143</sup> Like Churchill, Amery was a politician whose political fortune was saved by the European Crisis.

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<sup>143</sup> Amery to Julian, 31 May 1937, AMEJ 3/1/1.

## 11 The Commonwealth and European Integration

This chapter will analyse Amery's attitudes towards the movements for European integration from the interwar period to the early 1950s. Amery was among the earliest supporters of the Pan-European Movement in Britain. He also became a campaigner for the United Europe Movement, as well as a political sponsor of the Tory Strasbourgers such as Harold Macmillan, Robert Boothby, and his son, Julian.<sup>1</sup> The European dimension of his politics has not been neglected by historians. It has already been revealed that his advocacy of European unity was complementary, rather than contradictory, to his imperial cause.<sup>2</sup> But the entire trajectory of his attitude has not been analysed. As his imperial thinking changed, so did his stance towards European integration. After the Second World War, he came to argue that the Empire/Commonwealth and united Europe should cooperate in trade and financial policy. The seemingly idiosyncratic argument was not accepted by seasoned Tariff Reformers such as Beaverbrook. But his vision was not only widely shared by the Tory Strasbourgers but also resonated with the orthodoxy of the Continental Europeanists, among whom 'Eurafrica' was an important element of Pan-Europeanism. Recent historical research has shed light on the imperial origin of

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<sup>1</sup> The term 'Tory Strasbourgers' referred to the Conservative delegates to the Council of Europe. N. J. Crowson, *The Conservative Party and European Integration since 1945: At the Heart of Europe?* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007), 107.

<sup>2</sup> Richard S. Grayson, 'Leo Amery's Imperialist Alternative to Appeasement in the 1930s', *Twentieth Century British History* 17, no. 4 (2006): 500-502; idem., 'Imperialism in Conservative Defence and Foreign Policy: Leo Amery and the Chamberlains, 1903-39', *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 34, no. 4 (2006): 517-518; Sue Onslow, *Backbench Debate within the Conservative Party and Its Influence on British Foreign Policy, 1948-57* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1997), 16-17; Crowson, *The Conservative Party and European Integration since 1945*, 76-77, 120; Richard Carr and Bradley W. Hart, 'Machinations of the Centre-Right and British Engagement with the Pan-European Ideal, 1929-48', in *The Foundations of the British Conservative Party: Essays on Conservatism from Lord Salisbury to David Cameron* (New York & London, 2013), 107-32.

European integration and Britain's role in the process.<sup>3</sup> However, those scholars have not put Amery's personal role in that picture. This chapter will argue that his influence in the discursive dimension was more substantial than has been previously observed. Moreover, it will locate the position and the legacy of Amery in the genealogy of British Conservative thought on a united Europe. The conclusion will be that while Amery left divisive legacies, which were appropriated by conflicting factions, his optimistic prospect of a future relationship between the Commonwealth and Europe was in line with the meta-assumption which drove all most all British political leaders; that is, that Britain would continue to retain a special status in international society.

### **Federalism or the Commonwealth**

It is not wrong to say that Amery, particularly in the 1920s, prioritized relationships with Commonwealth countries more than with those in Europe, when compared with Austen Chamberlain.<sup>4</sup> However, it is not proper to assume that he completely distanced himself from politics on the Continent. On the contrary, he was one of the earliest sympathizers of the Pan-European Movement initiated by Coudenhove-Kalergi. Amery was fascinated by Coudenhove-Kalergi's idea during his London tour in 1925.<sup>5</sup> Inspired by Briand's initiative for a European Federal Union in 1929, Coudenhove-Kalergi urged Amery to galvanize the campaign for Pan-Europe in Britain. Amery

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<sup>3</sup>Katherine Sorrels, *Cosmopolitan Outsiders: Imperial Inclusion, National Exclusion, and the Pan-European Idea, 1900-1930* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016); Peo Hansen and Stefan Jonsson, *Eurafrica: The Untold History of European Integration and Colonialism* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014); Laura Kottos, 'A "European Commonwealth": Britain, the European League for Economic Co-Operation, and European Debates on Empire, 1947-1957', *Journal of Contemporary European Studies* 20, no. 4 (2012): 497-515.

<sup>4</sup> Richard S. Grayson, *Austen Chamberlain and the Commitment to Europe: British Foreign Policy 1924-1929* (London: Frank Cass, 1997).

<sup>5</sup> Benjamin James Thorpe, 'The Time and Space of Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi's Pan-Europe, 1923-1939' (PhD thesis, University of Nottingham, 2018), 17.

eventually accepted the offer. Though the Briand plan was aborted following unenthusiastic replies from governments, Amery continued to support the Pan-European Movement in the 1930s, and he helped Coudenhove-Kalergi's migration and campaign in the USA during the Second World War.<sup>6</sup>

Amery's sympathy with Pan-Europe was closely connected with his geopolitical vision. Chapter 2 has revealed that by the end of the First World War, he came to envisage a new world order based on the coexistence of several empires.<sup>7</sup> The result of the peace-making in Versailles was contrary to his vision.<sup>8</sup> In his world view, the combination of self-determination and the League of Nations was an unfortunate amalgam of individualism and cosmopolitanism; the Balkanization of Europe had caused endless conflicts based on tariff wars and irredentism. Amery supported Pan-Europe as an alternative to the failure of Versailles.<sup>9</sup>

Amery had a clear vision about the relationship between the Empire/Commonwealth and Pan-Europe. As Britain was a core member of the Commonwealth, it was not able to be a part of Europe, though their relations should remain friendly.<sup>10</sup> Coudenhove-Kalergi agreed and urged Amery to spread the following idea among the British public: 'a continental Pan European organization is by no means constituting a danger for the politics of the British Empire, but on the contrary is forming a necessary element of equilibrium towards the Soviets and America.'<sup>11</sup> The peculiar position of Britain in Europe

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<sup>6</sup> As for Briand's project, see Carl H. Pegg, *Evolution of the European Idea, 1914-1932* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1983), chapter 13-17. The correspondence between Amery and Coudenhove-Kalergi during the war is in AMEL 2/2/5.

<sup>7</sup> See Chapter 2.

<sup>8</sup> As for the result, see Erez Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).

<sup>9</sup> L. S. Amery, 'The British Empire and the Pan-European Idea', *Journal of the Royal Institute of International Affairs* 9, no. 1 (1930): 2-11.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 7-8.

<sup>11</sup> Coudenhove-Kalergi to Amery, 7 March 1931, AMEL 2/2/5.

made it impossible to become an ordinary member of a new European Union. The British role would be to promote the process of integration as an outside adviser. This meant that Pan-Europeanism could cooperate with British imperialism. Meanwhile, the French and Belgian colonies were included in the territorial vision of Pan Europe, and some champions of Pan-Europe, including Coudenhove-Kalergi, were, at the same time, advocates of Eurafrica.<sup>12</sup>

Amery did not agree with every aspect of Coudenhove-Kalergi's idea. Rather, he embraced Pan-Europe in his own way. Regarding Eurafrica, while Amery did not use the term, his positive stance towards European colonisation of Africa, which was demonstrated by his opposition to the sanctions against Italy during the Abyssinian crisis, overlapped its cause. However, he never approved of the German claim for their ex-colonies in Africa. As an advocate of imperial preference, Amery argued that Pan-Europe would bring each member state access to the colonial market in Africa via preferential tariffs. The suggestion was not so much altruistic advice as an imperialist attempt to divert German ambition away from the British mandates.<sup>13</sup> In short, Amery was too committed to the British interest to be called a Eurafrican.

The most conspicuous and important feature of his Pan-Europeanism was his rejection of federalism.<sup>14</sup> As discussed in Chapter 6, in devising the scheme of establishing a group of nations, by the 1940s Amery came to prefer the method of the Commonwealth (the spontaneous associations knitted by the common allegiance to the Crown) to federalism, though he retained quasi-federalist approval of centralization. When he encountered the idea of Pan-

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<sup>12</sup> Benjamin James Thorpe, 'Eurafrica: A Pan-European Vehicle for Central European Colonialism (1923–1939)', *European Review* 26, no. 3 (2018): 503–13; Hansen & Jonsson, *Eurafrica*.

<sup>13</sup> See Chapter 7 and 9.

<sup>14</sup> Crowson, Crowson, *The Conservative Party and European Integration since 1945*, 81.

Europe, Amery presided the making of the British Commonwealth. He was, at least in his public speeches, proud of the fact that the form of the Commonwealth adopted free cooperation rather than federal polity, where national sovereignty must have been sacrificed to some extent. Amery recommended that Europe should follow suit.<sup>15</sup> The idea of 'Commonwealth' became a keystone of his position regarding European integration from then onwards. In the introduction to Coudenhove-Kalergi's book, Amery explained that their solution to the present European anarchy was 'a single European Commonwealth' based on 'a common European ideal, transcending, without weakening, national patriotisms, and including, as a matter of course, the fullest toleration of minorities in each State.'<sup>16</sup> In his imperial thought, the Commonwealth was a solution to the dilemma between nationalism and international anarchy. Therefore, it was natural logic that diverse nations in Europe could be more easily united in the line of the Commonwealth. But Coudenhove-Kalergi did not necessarily follow this idea. He wavered over concrete constitutional schemes for Pan-Europe. When Coudenhove-Kalergi asked Amery to read a manuscript for his forthcoming book in 1941, Amery complained that the term 'federal' was confused with 'Commonwealth' and implied that the only attainable thing would be a European Commonwealth rather than a Swiss federal system, which Coudenhove-Kalergi referred to as a role model. Coudenhove-Kalergi explained his intention to choose 'Bundesstaat' and not 'Staatenbund'; he came to believe that 'only the sacrifice of vital sovereign rights' from Germany and other nations could bring peace.<sup>17</sup> This was an ominous sign for the post-war conflict between the two models.

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<sup>15</sup> L. S. Amery, 'The British Empire and the Pan-European Idea', 9-10.

<sup>16</sup> R. N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Europe Must Unite*, trans. Andrew McFadyan (Glarus: Paneuropa Editions Ltd., 1940), 12.

<sup>17</sup> Amery to Coudenhove-Kalergi, 20 May 1941; Coudenhove-Kalergi to Amery, 27 June 1941,

The Second World War made Pan Europeanism a more urgent project to its supporters. In his private memorandum, written in 1940, for post-war reconstruction, Amery restated the need to establish a European 'living room' (Lebensraum) based on European patriotism and free cooperation and not on a Nazi-style hierarchy. His policy did not fundamentally change; political integration should be founded upon the Commonwealth model and economic cooperation, entangling their colonies through monetary agreements and preferential tariffs.<sup>18</sup> His address in the United Nations University Centre, the University of London, repeated the same argument on 26 November 1945.<sup>19</sup> He also sent a suggestion for a European Commonwealth to Churchill.<sup>20</sup> As for Britain's relations with a new European Union, Amery's stance slightly changed; Britain would not be an actual member 'in the fullest sense' but should give a lead to create the framework.<sup>21</sup>

Amery rejoiced when he read Churchill's Zurich speech on 19 September 1946.<sup>22</sup> His letter to Duncan Sandys said, 'Winston has indeed done the big thing in a big way'.<sup>23</sup> His diary also divulged his belief that 'the whole line' of Churchill's speech was based on Amery's 1945 address quoted above.<sup>24</sup> Here, Amery overestimated his influence on Churchill, since Churchill had nurtured the concept of 'the United States of Europe' at least since the 1930s.<sup>25</sup>

However, it was true that Amery, whose instinct as an intriguer was stimulated

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AMEL 2/2/5.

<sup>18</sup> A copy of the memorandum exists in AMEL 4/20. It was republished in L. S. Amery, *The Framework of the Future* (London & New York & Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1944), chapter 7.

<sup>19</sup> This was republished as a pamphlet. Amery, *British Links with Europe*.

<sup>20</sup> Amery to Churchill, 12 November 1945, AMEL 2/2/4.

<sup>21</sup> Amery, *British Links with Europe*, 6.

<sup>22</sup> Amery's reaction to the speech has been documented by Felix Klos, *Churchill's Last Stand: The Struggle to United Europe* (London & New York: I. B. Tauris, 2018), 93.

<sup>23</sup> Amery to Sandys, 20 September 1946, AMEL 1/7/39.

<sup>24</sup> Amery diary, 19 September 1946, AMEL 7/40.

<sup>25</sup> Klos, *Churchill's Last Stand*; Allen Packwood, 'Churchill and the United States of Europe, 1904-1948', *Comillas Journal of International Relations*, 7 (2016), 1-9.



by the Zurich speech, immediately started a manoeuvre with Sandys to translate the buzz into a tangible political movement.<sup>26</sup> It grew into the United Europe Movement, which later bore the European Movement. Therefore, Amery was not a manipulator of the whole scene, but he was closely involved in the new movement from its inception.

In 1947-48, Amery's position regarding the possibility of British participation in a united Europe gradually softened. At the same time, his reservations about federation were unchanged. Amery repeatedly warned that if Europe proceeded along a federal line, it would make it impossible for Britain to join. While still thinking that British external ties with the Empire/Commonwealth and the USA made it impossible that Britain would become an integral member of a European Union, Amery came to argue: 'without our active participation and, indeed, leadership, the movement for European Union would not get very far in present circumstances.' Moreover, he added, as long as European integration proceeded in the direction of Commonwealth, Britain would take part in the European Union because 'the Commonwealth or co-operative principle is elastic enough to enable individual members of a Commonwealth ... to participate to a considerable extent in the co-operative activities of another Commonwealth'. However, if Europe was to adopt federalism, the story would be totally different. Amery was frightened by European federalists who insisted that a federal government preside over industrial activities and social services, as well as policies related to external affairs, defence, and finance.

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<sup>26</sup> AMEL 1/7/39 contains many letters related to the manoeuvre. For instance, see Amery to Sandys, Sandys 20 September 1946; 18 October 1946; Amery to Walter Elliot, 1 October 1946; Amery to Walter Layton, 1 October 1946; Amery to the Archbishop of the Canterbury, 31 December 1946; Amery to Churchill, 10 January 1947.

If and when any such scheme were acceptable to the nations of the European mainland, it would obviously not be one in which we could become actual partner members. With our high wage standards and social services we could certainly not afford free trade with our competitors on the Continent, nor with our world wide responsibilities could we surrender our freedom of action to the control of a new sovereign body with interests and outlook very different from our own.

He explicitly asserted that the Commonwealth principle was totally different from 'any federal constitution involving a surrender of sovereignty by its members'.<sup>27</sup>

In the context of the 1940s-1950s, this was typical British inter-governmental rhetoric. Most of the so-called 'pro-European' Conservatives, such as Churchill and the Tory Strasbourgers, shared this position. It was the pressure from Britain that prevented the Council of Europe, an offspring of the European Movement, from becoming a supranational body.<sup>28</sup> In this sense, Amery's support for non-federal integration was not unique. However, it is worth pointing out that Amery had acted as a populariser of the non-federal integration model since as early as the inter-war period and, moreover, that the rhetoric had an imperial origin. Scholars on federalism have emphasized that the tradition of federal ideas in British imperial thinking, including the Imperial Federation League and the Round Table, galvanized the renaissance of federalism on the Continent in the post-war period.<sup>29</sup> On the other hand, Amery nurtured another strand of British imperial tradition. He clearly contributed to the

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<sup>27</sup> All quotations are from the following article: Amery, 'The British Commonwealth and European Unity', *National Review*, vol. 131, 1948, 413-423.

<sup>28</sup> David Gowland, Arthur Turner, and Alex Wright, *Britain and European Integration since 1945* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010), 25-26.

<sup>29</sup> Andrea Bosco, ed., *Federal Idea: The History of Federalism from the Enlightenment to 1945* (London: Lothian Foundation Press, 1991), 12, 152.

mythology of British inter-governmentalism in contrast to federalism or supra-nationalism on the Continent by connecting it to the model of the Commonwealth. In his speech for the United Europe Movement in 1954, he explicitly juxtaposed the Commonwealth and the Council of Europe as products of the same political tradition.<sup>30</sup> Amery was not the sole epicentre of the myth-propagation. For instance, Lord Altrincham (Edward Grigg), another survivor of the Round Table and a new editor of the *National Review*, suggested that European integration should adopt a combination of economic preference and Commonwealth-like loose cooperation rather than federalism.<sup>31</sup> The importance of Amery's role lay in the fact that, as an actual campaigner, he had a relatively direct influence on the phraseology of pro-European Conservatives. 'A European Commonwealth rather than a European federation' was imbibed, in particular, by Macmillan.<sup>32</sup>

As did most of the 'pro-European' politicians in Britain at the time, Amery hoped that the Six Powers would take a non-federal line. Ironically to him, Continental federalists often referred to the failure of the League of Nations to justify federal integration. After reading Amery's argument for a 'Commonwealth', Jean Monnet replied that for the members of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) the method of loose cooperation would 'contain within itself the weakness which led to the collapse of the pre-war League of Nations'. But Monnet did not deny, if not the participation of the UK,

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<sup>30</sup> Amery, 'Opening of the U. E. M. Conference', AMEL 1/7/48.

<sup>31</sup> Lord Altrincham, 'Federalism and the Commonwealth', *National Review*, 1949, 323-338. This article was originally published as 'The British Commonwealth and Western Union' *Foreign Affairs*, July 1949.

<sup>32</sup> Macmillan's memorandum, 16 January 1952, in *Documents on British Policy Overseas*, ed. by Roger Bullen and M. E. Pelly, 2 (London: Foreign Office, 1986), I, 812-818; John M. Young, 'Churchill's "No" to Europe: The "Rejection" of European Union by Churchill's Post-War Government, 1951-1952', *The Historical Journal* 28, no. 4 (1985): 923-37.

the possibility of an association between the ECSC and the UK.<sup>33</sup> Likewise, on the part of Amery, while making it clear that Britain would not enter into the Six Power Federation, he claimed that the Commonwealth and the European Federation could cooperate. Because his motive was mainly economic, we should now turn to how Amery envisaged post-war Britain's economic policy.

### **Facing American economic imperialism**

As an inveterate critic of laissez-faire economics, Amery was positive about the emergence of the welfare state. As historians have revealed, he was a supporter of 'family allowances' since the 1930s and welcomed the Beveridge Report.<sup>34</sup> But the traits of his economic ideology firmly lingered in his plea for economic reconstruction. While he continued to urge the necessity of economic planning, he also hoped to reconcile it with freedom of individuals and distinguish Conservatism from Liberalism and Socialism as national, organic, and concrete.<sup>35</sup> His reaction to the Beveridge Report was not completely affirmative. When Amery found his colleagues in the EIA dismissing the Report as a socialist scheme of redistribution, he admonished them to refrain from publishing negative comments. In his view, the proposals in the Report such as family allowances were in line with Conservative principles, only if the scale of the expenses were to be more modest. A real defect of the Report to Amery lay in its neglect of the probability that the cost of the welfare policy would bring about a tax increase and do harm to export industries. In other words, the Beveridge plan would not be attainable without proper trade policy. Therefore:

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<sup>33</sup> Jean Monnet to Amery, 14 March 1955, AMEL 2/1/51.

<sup>34</sup> Jane Lewis, 'The English Movement for Family Allowances, 1917-1945', *Histoire Sociale/Social History* 11, no. 22 (1978): 447, 454-455; José Harris, *William Beveridge: A Biography* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), 420-421.

<sup>35</sup> Amery, 'Conservatism and the Future', *Ashridge Journal*, April 1943.

the Beveridge scheme affords a splendid opportunity for us to restate, in fresh language, the case for domestic protection and Imperial Preference without doing anything that would create hostility to our movement from the point of view of the great body of people ... who think the scheme in its main outlines at any rate sound ....<sup>36</sup>

His economic vision, after all, still retained a strong flavour of Edwardian Tariff Reform.

A similar imperialist tone was also apparent in his monetary policy. The Sterling Area was legally institutionalized at the beginning of the war. In addition to the aids and loans from the USA, the monetary network helped the UK survive the financial strain of the war. At its expense, vast 'Sterling Balances' were accumulated by the end of the war. There has been a historiographical controversy over whether the post-war Sterling Area was a burden to Britain and the members of the Empire/Commonwealth. Amery would have liked Catherine Schenk's revisionist conclusion that the Sterling Area was a useful framework for both Britain and the Dominions/Colonies in the 1950s.<sup>37</sup> In the contemporary dispute over the Sterling Balances, Amery maintained that they were different from the debts to the USA in that all forms of the balances were tied to the British legal tender. As long as the Sterling Area remained intact and

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<sup>36</sup> Amery to Page Croft, 13 January 1943, AMEL 1/7/25. Also see Amery to W. A. Wells, 13 January 1943, *ibid.*

<sup>37</sup> See the controversy between Schenk and Krozewski. Catherine Schenk, *Britain and the Sterling Area: From Devaluation to Convertibility in the 1950s* (London: Routledge, 1994); Gerold Krozewski, 'Finance and Empire: The Dilemma Facing Great Britain in the 1950s', *The International History Review*, 18.1 (1996), 48–69; Catherine Schenk, 'Finance and Empire: Confusions and Complexities: A Note', *The International History Review*, 18.4 (1996), 869–72; Krozewski, *Money and the End of Empire: British International Economic Policy and the Colonies, 1947-58* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001).

its member states mainly traded with each other, the apparent debts would not jeopardize British finance. What Britain should do was either to limit the external trades of the member states or to manage the balances via an Imperial central bank.<sup>38</sup> This ambitious vision was not the same as the motives of policymakers in the Sterling Area. Historians have generally agreed that the Sterling Area system was 'always seen as a temporary measure, born of the necessity to generate trade and income during a time of shortages' rather than 'a long-term alternative to freer trade and payments'.<sup>39</sup> Amery's goal was exactly the latter. Based on this recognition, he called upon Canada to join the Area.<sup>40</sup> The gulf between Amery and the financial authorities was as deep as in the 1930s. They were ready to take advantage of the imperial economy for their own sake but had no intention to wholly imperialize their policy.

The most serious external threat in his economic imagination was the international economic order envisioned by the USA. Since his struggle to protect imperial interests from American post-war policy has already been documented elsewhere, this section will only show the outline of the process and the feature of his discourse.<sup>41</sup> Amery's suspicion of American trade policy had already been expressed in his opposition to the 1938 trade agreements. In the course of the Second World War, the suspicion grew into conviction. Both the Atlantic Charter and the Anglo-American Mutual Aid Agreement included the principle to fend off 'discriminatory treatment in international commerce'.<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>38</sup> Amery's memorandum, enclosed in Amery to Hubert Henderson, 19 June 1944, AMEL 1/7/25; Amery, 'Sterling System', 10 May 1947, *The Times*; Amery to Beddington-Behrens, 17 November 1949. AMEL 1/7/41.

<sup>39</sup> Schenk, *Britain and the Sterling Area*, 130.

<sup>40</sup> Amery, 'Canada and the Sterling Area', *The National Review*, vol. 133, 1949, 317-322.

<sup>41</sup> Randall Bennett Woods, *A Changing of the Guard: Anglo-American Relations, 1941-1946* (Chapel Hill & London: The University of North Carolina Press, 1990); William David Freeman, 'Last Stand for Empire: Leo Amery and Imperial Preference' (PhD thesis, Texas A & M University, 1998); WM. Roger Louis, 'Leo Amery and the Post-War World, 1945-55', *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 30, no. 3 (2002): 71-90.

<sup>42</sup> Article 7 of the Mutual Aid Agreement.

Keeping eyes on the ongoing negotiation of the Richard Law Mission, however, Amery was unhappy to find that the British Government was inclined to yield to the American position. He even urged Law to stop the Mission by threatening to resign.<sup>43</sup> The new monetary system discussed at Bretton Woods was also nothing more than degradation to the universal fixed exchange of the gold standard.<sup>44</sup>

Ousted from the Commons in the 1945 election, his energy in his late years was concentrated on criticizing the American imposition of the principle of non-discrimination and 'defeatism' on the part of the British Government. The conditions attached to the Washington Loan Agreement in 1946 particularly angered him.<sup>45</sup> The protest made him reembody the Empire Unity Campaign of the EIA, which was to be relaunched at full scale in 1948.<sup>46</sup> The EIA became his political base, from which he pressurized the government to abandon the MFN guarded by the GATT. Of course, the actual stance of the UK and US governments was more nuanced than Amery's interpretation. As the Communist sphere expanded in the late 1940s, American hostility towards the European Empires softened. The US government acquiesced in the 1949 devaluation and came to think that the Sterling Area was a useful bulwark against Communism. It also swallowed the demand of the British Labour Government to preserve imperial preference in the Geneva negotiation in 1947.<sup>47</sup> In other words, the system of so-called 'Embedded Liberalism' was

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<sup>43</sup> Amery to Richard Law, 5 April 1944, AMEL 1/7/25. Also see, Amery to John Anderson, 22 December 1943; 5 February 1944, *ibid*.

<sup>44</sup> Amery to Boothby, September 1944, *ibid*.

<sup>45</sup> L. S. Amery, *The Washington Loan Agreements: A Critical Study of American Economic Foreign Policy* (London: Macdonald, 1946).

<sup>46</sup> Amery's speech for the campaign at Caxton Hall in 1946, AMEL 1/7/30.

<sup>47</sup> Schenk, *Britain and the Sterling Area*, 14; Richard Toye, 'The Attlee Government, the Imperial Preference System and the Creation of the GATT', *The English Historical Review* 118, no. 478 (2003): 912–39.

applied to the Empire/Commonwealth from the outset.<sup>48</sup> However, Amery was indifferent to the nuances of the pragmatic compromise. The restriction of further extension of imperial preference was sufficient to convince him that the Manichaeian economic battle between individualism/cosmopolitanism and nationalism/imperialism resumed. The electoral victory of the Conservative Party did not make the situation better for Amery. In the annual party conferences of the early 1950s, he regularly urged the need to extend imperial preference.<sup>49</sup>

Amery rearranged his ideology and language to fight against the American economic hegemony. In confronting the influential historical interpretation that attributed the economic origin of the Second World War to the collapse of the international gold standard and the tariff war in the 1930s, Amery singled out the unbalanced economic hegemony of the US after the First World War and its withdrawal of investments due to the national recession after 1929 as the foremost economic reason for the war. Therefore, it was the unsound worldwide economic dependency on the US economy and the futile attempts to restore international monetary parity that put Hitler in power.<sup>50</sup> In his view, the US government were trying to perpetuate the international disparity, guided by the belief of 'Cobden or Bright in bygone days, a blend of quasi-religious Free Trade fervour with a pushful economic imperialism'.<sup>51</sup> Amery asked for 'a British Declaration of Independence' against the atavistic imperialism of Free Trade.<sup>52</sup> As a remedy, he rearranged his argument in the 1930s in a more

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<sup>48</sup> John Gerard Ruggie, 'International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order', *International Organization* 36, no. 2 (1982): 379–415.

<sup>49</sup> See Introduction of this thesis.

<sup>50</sup> Amery to Oliver Lyttleton, 14 April 1944, AMEL 1/7/25; Amery's speech for the International Monetary Conference in 1953, AMEL 1/7/38.

<sup>51</sup> Amery, *America and Imperial Preference*, 1945, AMEL 1/7/18.

<sup>52</sup> Amery, 'The Washington Loan Agreement', *The Ashridge Journal*, 125, 1946, 1-3.



comprehensive way, restoring a balance in all dimensions: consumers and producers, agriculture and industry in each national economy, and economic powers among the integrated groups of nations.<sup>53</sup> Preferential tariffs and the Sterling Area were essential tools to accomplish the ultimate aim.

### **Economic cooperation between the Commonwealth and Europe**

The overwhelming hegemony of the US economy was a key to understanding the economic dimension of Amery's post-war European policy. He recognized a need to build up 'self-balancing economic units' 'comparable in resources and internal market' to the US and the USSR.<sup>54</sup> It naturally led to the view that the establishment of an integrated economic sphere in Western Europe itself would be a counterblow to the non-discrimination principle and, thus, useful for a 'justification of the British Commonwealth'.<sup>55</sup> Moreover, as he came to emphasize the British leadership in European integration, he also began to advocate economic cooperation between the Commonwealth and integrated Europe. His concrete policy was composed of two elements: mutually setting second preference to promote their trade and interlocking the Sterling Area and a new payment system of Europe. A sign of the shift was visible in the 1930s. *The Forward View* mentioned the possibility of giving second preference to the Scandinavian countries and Argentina. However, his priority at the time was still the establishment of the self-contained imperial economy.<sup>56</sup> The post-war situation shattered his complacency.

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<sup>53</sup> L. S. Amery, *A Balanced Economy* (London: Hutchinson, 1954).

<sup>54</sup> Amery to Garvin, 4 October 1945, AMEL 1/7/34.

<sup>55</sup> Amery to Grigg, 1 October 1946, AMEL 1/7/39.

<sup>56</sup> Amery, *The Forward View* (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1935), 350, 373. The Scandinavian countries had a special status in his imperial vision because, in his view, they were most akin to Britain in 'race', 'political outlook', and 'social life'. *Ibid.*, 267. The idea of giving second preference to Scandinavia was formed in Whitehall when Britain negotiated with Denmark for a trade agreement. Amery appropriated it for his anti-MFN campaign. Tim Rooth, *British*

Despite his compliments regarding the Sterling Balances, Amery privately admitted the harsh fact that it would be impossible to attain self-sufficiency within the Sterling Area. Before the end of the war, he tentatively argued that the incorporation of Europe into the Area might be a solution:

It does seem to me that the more we can include European industrial countries like Belgium, France, Sweden (or even Germany) in the Sterling Area, the easier it will be to supply other sterling holders with the manufactures which we may not be able to deliver and at the same time transfer sterling from them to new customers of other goods that we may be able to supply from her or from our Colonial Empire.<sup>57</sup>

Amery consulted Keynes about the feasibility of the idea.<sup>58</sup>

The UK-centred nature of his scheme was modified in the course of the United Europe Movement. Some of his Conservative colleagues suspected that a European Union might be economically detrimental to imperial preference. In his reply to such a criticism by Herbert Williams, Amery assured Williams that as long as Europe entered into a moderate inter-preferential scheme and not into a rigid customs union, Britain could get some arrangement which 'would not interfere with the development of empire preference'.<sup>59</sup> The tentative scheme of second preference was designed by 1948.<sup>60</sup> In a memorandum, which he dictated for Harold Macmillan in October 1949, he summarized it.

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*Protectionism and the International Economy: Overseas Commercial Policy in the 1930s* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 110, 319. Amery also argued that giving second preference to the US would be a better alternative to forging a trade agreement with the US. Amery to Smuts, 22 November 1937. AMEL 2/1/27.

<sup>57</sup> Amery to Walter Layton, 13 January 1945, AMEL 1/7/25.

<sup>58</sup> Amery to Keynes, 13 January 1945, AMEL 1/7/25.

<sup>59</sup> Amery to Herbert Williams 30 May 1947; Williams to Amery 20 January 1947, AMEL 1/7/39.

<sup>60</sup> Amery to Beaverbrook, 9 July 1948, BBK c-4.

We naturally would wish to give the maximum of preference to our partners in the Commonwealth, a preference above everyone else including Europe. On the other hand, we have an economic and a defensive interest in Europe's unity and prosperity which justifies our giving a preference to our trade with Europe over our preference with the rest of the world. .... The natural sequence is home producer first, Empire producer second, European producer third, then the rest of the world.<sup>61</sup>

In the 1930s, Amery claimed that flexible preference could reconcile the diverse interests of the UK and the Dominions. After 1945, 'Europe' was taken into the rosy picture as a third actor.

The change stemmed from his recognition of the economic weakness of the Commonwealth and Europe. For all his apparent optimism regarding the Sterling Balances, Amery regarded the 'dollar gap' as the most serious issue in the post-war era. The enormous debts to the US made it impossible for Britain and Europe to refuse the imposition of the MFN. This was why the Commonwealth and Europe need to cooperate for the time being to close the dollar gap.<sup>62</sup> Amery argued that the Commonwealth and Europe could play complementary roles in their development since the former could provide Europe with more foodstuffs and raw materials, while the latter could supply more industrial equipment to Commonwealth countries. He also, in line with his appreciation of the Commonwealth framework, emphasized the flexibility of

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<sup>61</sup> Amery's memorandum enclosed in Amery to Macmillan, 3 October 1949. Macmillan dep. C. 506.

<sup>62</sup> Amery 'The United States, Europe and the British Commonwealth', 1952, AMEL 1/7/16.

preferential treatment. The preferential system was 'elastic' enough to enable two different systems of preference to set up secondary preferences for each other. In this way, he claimed, Britain should interlock the Commonwealth and forthcoming preferential system in Europe because the UK had 'a direct interest in securing such a preference in the European market in iron and steel and not leaving a monopoly of that market to the Schuman Combination'.<sup>63</sup>

Amery also approved of the formation of the European Payments Union (EPU). The EPU, which was designed to coexist with the Sterling Area, was a monetary concomitant of the second preference scheme.<sup>64</sup> To Amery, the EPU need to be a stepping-stone for further cooperation between the Commonwealth and Europe by allowing the Dominions to be represented in the EPU and the OEEC. Historians have long debated over what the UK gained or lost in the negotiations for the establishment of the EPU.<sup>65</sup> The preservation of the Sterling Area was certainly a major concession that Britain won from the US.<sup>66</sup> But if it had been just a negative compromise, Amery would not have accepted it, as his attitude towards the GATT demonstrated. The EPU was necessary for him to create a monetary environment that would facilitate economic cooperation between the Commonwealth and Europe.

His scheme was tailored for, so to speak, the European rescue of imperial preference.<sup>67</sup> In recognizing that 'Europe and the Commonwealth need each other', Amery implicitly admitted that declining Britain should turn more to

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<sup>63</sup> Amery's draft of speech for Empire Industries Association Annual Review, 3 December, 1952. AMEL 1/7/16.

<sup>64</sup> Amery's speech at the Second Westminster Conference in 1954, 'Economic Future of Europe', AMEL 1/7/44.

<sup>65</sup> As for a critical review of the historiography, see Richard Toye and Till Geiger, 'Britain, America and the Origins of the European Payments Union: A Reassessment', Working Paper, 2008.

<sup>66</sup> James Ransom, 'A Little Marshall Plan': Britain and the Formation of the European Payments Union, 1948–50', *The International History Review* 32, no. 3 (2010): 437–54.

<sup>67</sup> It is of course named after Alan S. Milward, *The European Rescue of the Nation State* (London: Routledge, 1992).

Europe.<sup>68</sup> He constructed a new historical interpretation of the Ottawa regime to justify his new position: the Ottawa Agreements were not intended to create a narrow autarky but were to enable the Commonwealth members to do more trade both among themselves and with the outside world.<sup>69</sup> Recently, David Thackeray has revealed that British high expectations for the potential of the Dominions' market started to wither away by the middle of the twentieth century.<sup>70</sup> The alteration of Amery's stance towards Europe shows that even the life-long Tariff Reformer had to face the new reality. After all, he was too deeply committed to Tariff Reform to pretend to be unaware of the inconvenient truth that the Commonwealth had no promising prospect of development on its own. Can we say that Amery's reasoning paradoxically paved the way for the decision of Harold Macmillan in 1961 to join the European Common Market? To answer the question, we should locate his position in post-war Conservatism.

### **The position and the legacy of Amery in the Conservative Party**

Although Amery's view did not represent the majority of the Conservative Party, he had a small group of political allies in the British Branch of the European League for Economic Cooperation (ELEC). The Origin of the ELEC was traced back to the pre-war organization, the Union Économique et Douanière Européenne, which was split into the Union Économique et Fédérale Européenne and the Comité d'Action Économique et Douanière by the end of 1945. Following the initiative of Paul van Zeeland, the latter expanded into the Independent League for European Cooperation (ILEC), which was later renamed as the ELEC. The ILEC/ELEC was essentially a body of experts. The

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<sup>68</sup> L. S. Amery, 'Europe and the Commonwealth', *Listener*, 7<sup>th</sup> February 1952.

<sup>69</sup> Amery's speech in 1947, 'European Unity and Imperial Preference', AMEL 1/7/16.

<sup>70</sup> Thackeray, *Forging a British World of Trade*.

organization became 'an informal adviser to the Council of Europe'. The British section, which attracted many influential public figures such as Harold Butler, Beddington-Behrens, William Beveridge, and Walter Layton, gradually occupied a dominant position in the organization.<sup>71</sup> The list also included several young Conservatives: Sandys, Macmillan, Boothby, David Eccles, and Peter Thorneycroft. Amery participated in the ELEC with his son Julian. In fact, the ELEC, along with the EIA, offered an outlet for his frustrated political energy in the 1950s.

Laura Kottos has recently revealed the significant role of the British members of the ELEC in the post-war Eurafrican project. The idea of economic cooperation between the Commonwealth and Europe was widely shared among them as a solution to the dollar gap. The point was that some members of the ELEC, including Julian Amery, Boothby, and Macmillan, became British delegates to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe. Those Tory Strasbourgers tried to translate the ELEC plan into an official proposition via the Council of Europe. Since their claim resonated with the desires of other European countries for Eurafrica, they succeeded in passing the Strasbourg Plan in 1952, which specified economic cooperation between the member states of the Council and the overseas countries with which they had constitutional links. Though the Plan was rejected by the British Government, its Eurafrican nature was, ironically, taken over by the Treaty of Rome.<sup>72</sup>

Kottos' article does not mention Amery at all. Considering Amery's role as a populariser of Commonwealth-type integration and second preference, it would

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<sup>71</sup> Heribert Gisch, 'The European League for Economic Co-Operation (ELEC)', in *Transnational Organizations of Political Parties and Pressure Groups in the Struggle for European Union, 1945–1950*, ed. Walter Lipgens and Wilfried Loth, vol. 4 (Berlin & New York: De Gruyter, 1991), 186-193.

<sup>72</sup> Kottos, 'A "European Commonwealth"'.

be unfair to leave him out from the process. His personal influence on the Tory Strasbourgers should be particularly emphasized. The most obvious example was Amery's son, Julian. In contrast to his wayward brother, John, Julian started his political career by replicating his father's discourse. Julian was already fascinated by Pan-Europeanism when he became acquainted with Coudenhove-Kalergi in Austria in 1937 following his father's introduction.<sup>73</sup> Entering the Commons in 1950, Julian supported Commonwealth-Europe cooperation by using his father's language particularly about the Commonwealth model and second preference.<sup>74</sup> Julian's report for the Second Economic Conference of Westminster of the European Movement in 1954 was almost completely based on his father's memorandum.<sup>75</sup> Julian's article, written in 1973, indicated that Julian fully understood his father's view on possible cooperation between the Commonwealth and Europe.<sup>76</sup>

Amery's role as a political sponsor of Macmillan and Boothby was equally significant. My analysis of their corporatism in the 1930s has concluded that those young Conservatives did not share Amery's commitment to Tariff Reform.<sup>77</sup> In the post-war years, however, their position towards the Commonwealth and Europe got closer. Therefore, Amery and Macmillan had more reasons for political cooperation than because of their children's marriage.<sup>78</sup> Macmillan was invited by Amery to deliver a speech for the EIA on 29 September 1949. Before the event, Amery 'got most of the necessary ideas' to Macmillan and was glad to hear him propagate almost the same idea as that

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<sup>73</sup> Richard Bassett, *Last Imperialist: A Portrait of Julian Amery* (Settrington: Stone Trough Books, 2015), 34.

<sup>74</sup> Kottos, 'A "European Commonwealth"', 504; Bassett, *Last Imperialist*, 134-135.

<sup>75</sup> See the two memoranda in AMEL 1/7/44.

<sup>76</sup> Julian Amery, 'For Europe and Empire: Leo Amery', *The Daily Telegraph*, 22 November 1973.

<sup>77</sup> See Chapter 10.

<sup>78</sup> Julian Amery married Catherine Macmillan in 1950.

of Amery: the importance of imperial preference, the need to close the dollar gap without depending on American aid, and Commonwealth-European cooperation via second preference.<sup>79</sup> Boothby became Amery's political companion at the time of appeasement. During the war, they mutually confirmed their hostility towards the American reconstruction plan.<sup>80</sup> As a result, Boothby, explicitly based on Amery's world view, concluded that Britain would need both the Commonwealth and Europe to survive the post-war world.<sup>81</sup> In short, Macmillan and Boothby came to recognize the importance of the imperial economy as well as of European integration. Their most conspicuous cooperation occurred at the 1949 annual conference of the Conservative Party. Sandys proposed the motion that the conference should promote European unity, which would be consistent with imperial unity. Amery gave a supportive speech. Both Boothby and Macmillan not only followed Amery but also preached the cause of second preference.<sup>82</sup>

One should not overstate Amery's influence on them. They did not necessarily accept the whole of Amery's vision of imperialism. While Amery imagined cooperation with Europe as a step to achieving the balance of imperial power, they were inclined to see it as an opportunistic option to survive the financial hardship and stop the rise of European Communism. Macmillan's diary shows his mixed feeling towards Amery. When Macmillan, with Amery, attended the conference of the ELEC at Brussels, he reported:

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<sup>79</sup> Macmillan's speech draft, Macmillan, dep, 727. Amery diary, 14 September; 29 September, AMEL 7/43.

<sup>80</sup> Amery to Boothby, 24 April 1944; 13 May 1944, 28 September 1944, AMEL 1/7/25; Boothby, 'International Trade after the War', *The National Review*, vol. 122, 1944, 377-384.

<sup>81</sup> Boothby, 'Britain's Future', *The Times*, 31 July 1947; idem, 'Free Trade in Practice', *The Times*, 24 September 1947; idem, 'European Unity', *The Times*, 1 October 1948; idem, 'Conservative Policy', *The Times*, 9 March 1949; idem, 'Conservative Policy', *The Times*, 12 March 1949; idem, 'Sterling Area and Europe', *The Times*, 3 November 1949.

<sup>82</sup> Annual Conference Minutes 1949, 60-65, Conservative Party Archive, NUA 2/1/57.



The Amerys (father and son) were respected and feared for they still believe in the British Empire, Imperial Preference, Britain as the financial centre of the world – indeed, a lot of things which are painful to Americans.<sup>83</sup>

This description indicated Macmillan's aloof respect towards Amery's obsession with imperial preference. On the other hand, Macmillan was distraught regarding Julian's Die-Hard stance in relation to the Egyptian question. In addition to complaining that Julian was 'unduly influenced by his old father', he denounced Amery as 'generally wrong about everything', though this short-term outburst of anger should be weighed together with his sympathetic private obituary of Amery.<sup>84</sup> After all, what Amery and the Tory Strasbourgers had in common was not the imperialist ideologies of Tariff Reform but a desire for Britain's leadership in international circles and antipathy towards American economic policy and European federalism. Young pro-European Conservatives appropriated Amery's languages for their own sake.

Amery's influence on the actual course of the movement should also be cautiously evaluated. He had always tried to convert Churchill to Commonwealth-European economic cooperation. In fact, Churchill, who lost enthusiasm for Free Trade by the 1930s, came to approve of the idea, regardless of Amery's agitation. Although Amery tended to depict Churchill as a dogmatic Victorian until the end, he, in fact, had an opportunity to witness Churchill's change. According to Amery's diary, when he encountered Churchill

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<sup>83</sup> Macmillan diary, 31 May-2 June 1951 in *The Macmillan Diaries: The Cabinet Years, 1950-1957*, ed. by Peter Catterall (London: Macmillan, 2003), 76.

<sup>84</sup> Macmillan diary, 31 July 1954:16 September 1955 in *ibid.*, 341-342, 477.

at the Conservative annual conference in 1947, Churchill asked him, 'Can you put in four or five sentences, that preference, which I mean to back, is not incompatible with European trade or with English speaking cooperation'. Amery 'dashed off a dozen sentences' for Churchill.<sup>85</sup> We should regard the making of the ELEC scheme not as Amery's manipulation but as a result of collective efforts. But it can be at least said that Amery contributed to the process through his activity in the ELEC. In advocating the idea of second preference, the Strasbourg Plan quoted Amery's speech at the ELEC in 1951 to show a concrete example of preferential tariff schemes.<sup>86</sup> These episodes indicated that Amery was treated by his fellow campaigners as a senior economic adviser. Thus, we should not neglect his influence in rhetorical or discursive dimensions.

Not all advocates of imperial preference were convinced of the necessity of European rescue. The most vocal uproar came from Lord Beaverbrook. Amery and Beaverbrook shared antipathy towards the US imposition of free convertibility and non-discriminatory trade. One of Amery's letters dared to say that a true Empire Crusade had got to come.<sup>87</sup> However, immediately after the Hague Conference, Beaverbrook expressed his suspicion that the resolution about customs union might mean the elimination of imperial preference. Amery replied that Europe would adopt their internal preference and not implement a customs union. But Beaverbrook was never persuaded regarding the effects of second preference. His letter repeatedly criticized Amery's idea of a Western Union.<sup>88</sup> His newspaper also attacked Macmillan's 1949 speech in the EIA quoted above. The day after the speech, *The Daily Express* published a column

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<sup>85</sup> Amery diary, 2 October 1947. AMEL 7/41.

<sup>86</sup> The Secretariat-General, *The Strasbourg Plan* (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 1952), 31-32.

<sup>87</sup> Amery to Beaverbrook, 22 February 1944. AMEL 1/7/25.

<sup>88</sup> Beaverbrook to Amery, 5 July 1948; Amery to Beaverbrook, 9 July 1948; Beaverbrook to Amery, 8 April 1949; BBK c-8.

titled 'Tory nonsense', which dismissed the idea of second preference as 'a betrayal of Empire interests'.<sup>89</sup> Amery's memorandum for Macmillan, which is also quoted above, was most probably dictated to defend Macmillan from the criticism. Beaverbrook was to clash over the European issue with the Tory Strasbourgers in the 1950s.<sup>90</sup> Amery warned Coudenhove-Kalergi that Beaverbrook was 'just negative to anything European, thinking that it distracts interest from the affairs of the British Commonwealth'.<sup>91</sup> The cause of the difference was the same as at the time of the Empire Crusade. While Beaverbrook could be satisfied with the Imperial Free Trade as a tool to unify the Empire, to Amery preferential tariffs were indispensable to balance all the interests within the Empire.<sup>92</sup> It was Amery's logical conclusion that if that balance could not be retained on an imperial scale, other partners should be added to the preferential network.

We should now evaluate his legacy on the genealogy of Conservative thinking on European integration. On the one hand, his dichotomic rhetoric on federalism and the Commonwealth provided a verbal weapon to Anti-Marketeers, Eurosceptics, and Brexiteers. Though Amery died before seeing the Treaty of Rome, he repeated that Britain could not be a part of federal Europe. Moreover, the protection of British, or English, national sovereignty was consistently a significant leitmotif of anti-Europe campaigners.<sup>93</sup> Amery's discourse was a missing link connecting Whig history, the

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<sup>89</sup> *The Daily Express*, 1 October 1949.

<sup>90</sup> For instance, see Beaverbrook to Boothby, 2 August 1952; Boothby to Beaverbrook, 11 August 1952, Boothby Papers, ACC 12929/3.

<sup>91</sup> Amery to Coudenhove-Kalergi, June 30 1950, AMEL 2/2/5.

<sup>92</sup> As for Amery's complaint about Beaverbrook's confusion about preference and customs union, see Amery to Elliot, 10 September 1947, AMEL 1/7/34.

<sup>93</sup> Robert F. Dewey, *British National Identity and Opposition to Membership of Europe, 1961-63: The Anti-Marketeers* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009); Robert Saunders, *Yes to Europe!: The 1975 Referendum and Seventies Britain* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018).

Empire/Commonwealth, and post-war intergovernmentalism. But he had a more direct influence on so-called 'pro-European' Conservatives, such as Macmillan and Boothby. Here, we should be cautious about the simple labels 'pro-' and 'anti-'. Meanings and criteria of 'pro-Europe' have been constantly contested and changed. Therefore, as Crowson has recommended, we should consider 'Conservative Europeanism' as a 'tendency'.<sup>94</sup> The pro-Europeanism of the Tory Strasbourgers was founded upon the assumption that Britain could lead non-federal European integration and that the Commonwealth and united Europe could obtain economic benefits through the establishment of layered preferences. From the present standpoint, these arguments do not seem quite 'pro-European'. Rather, they could be seen as the earliest symptom of British cakeism.

It is impossible to know whether Amery would have accepted the decision of Macmillan to apply for the EEC. In fact, at the time of the 1961 campaign, the legacy of Amery was appropriated in a divisive way. The Tory Strasbourgers were able to recycle Amery's language to defend the campaign: the compatibility of the economic interests of the EEC and the Commonwealth; the need for Britain to join the European community to prevent further federalization from within.<sup>95</sup> On the other hand, the anti-Marketeers emphasized the incompatibility between the two economic interests. Beaverbrook used this logic in his press campaign.<sup>96</sup> Some anti-Marketeers actually invoked Amery's imperialism to justify their argument.<sup>97</sup> Last but not least, the Commonwealth Industries Association, which was renamed from the EIA, while refraining from

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<sup>94</sup> N. J. Crowson, *The Conservative Party and European Integration*, 105.

<sup>95</sup> For instance, see Macmillan's speech published as Harold Macmillan, *Britain, the Commonwealth and Europe* (London: Conservative and Unionist Party, 1962).

<sup>96</sup> Dewey, *British National Identity*, chapter 2.

<sup>97</sup> *Ibid.*, 180-181; Peter Walker, *Staying Power* (London: Bloomsbury, 1991), 10-13, 30.

explicitly opposing Britain's entry into the Common Market, urged the government to recognize its harmful effects on the Commonwealth, despite the fact that Amery's plea for Commonwealth-European cooperation was the EIA's official line until his death.<sup>98</sup>

Julian's trajectory after the 1950s was suggestive. He consistently defended British entry into the EEC by using his father's rhetoric.<sup>99</sup> In the concluding chapter of the biography of Joseph Chamberlain, Julian did to his father what Amery had done to Milner in his *The Times History of the War in South Africa*: create a historical narrative to justify and appropriate the legacy of his mentor. Julian connected Chamberlain's Tariff Reform and his father's struggle for imperial preference with post-war European integration in the same tradition which aimed to devise larger economic spheres.<sup>100</sup> The narrative was not plausible to readers outside the milieu of pro-European Imperialism. Gilbert Bentley's critical review quipped, 'Chamberlain might well have been as surprised as is this reviewer that he should come to such an end'.<sup>101</sup>

## Conclusion

His vision of the balance of imperial power made Amery one of the earliest supporters of Pan-Europeanism in Britain. His conviction regarding the superiority of the Commonwealth principle over federalism led him to recommend the same approach to European integration. In the interwar period,

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<sup>98</sup> Amery's memorandum for the Parliamentary Committee of the EIA, enclosed in Amery to Baron Balfour of Inchrye and W. A. Wells, 30 October 1952, AMEL 1/7/14; the speech of Maurice Petherick (Chairman) at the annual general meeting in 1961, 'minutes of the annual general meeting', Papers of the CIA, MSS. 221/1/1/2; a leaflet issued by the CIA, 'Commonwealth or Common Market?', MSS. 221/4/3/1-3

<sup>99</sup> For instance, see Julian's speeches in the Commons, Hansard, HC 7 April 1975 vol. 889, 867-874.

<sup>100</sup> Julian Amery, *Joseph Chamberlain and the Tariff Reform Campaign*, vol. 6 (London: Macmillan, 1969), 1050-1056.

<sup>101</sup> Bentley Gilbert, *The Historian*, 33: 3, 1975, 475.

however, Amery imagined a united Europe just as another regional group, one which Britain would not necessarily be involved in. The catastrophe of the Second World War and the consequential hegemony of the US economy modified his stance. He claimed that the UK must lead the process of integration using the Commonwealth line and that the Commonwealth and Europe should establish economic cooperation via payments agreements and second preference. Although his imperialism and advocacy of national sovereignty could be appropriated by anti-Marketeters, Amery had a more visible influence on so-called 'pro-European' Conservatives. In this sense, Amery played the role of John the Baptist for pro-European imperialism in post-war Britain.

## Conclusion

During Amery's lifetime (1873-1955), the UK and the British Empire underwent substantial transformation. As a result of the electoral reforms of the 1910s-1940s, parliamentary democracy based on universal suffrage and first-past-the-post became the norm of British politics. Gladstonian economic policy gave way to the principle of a mixed economy and welfare state. The British Empire gradually metamorphosed into the Commonwealth, although in the 1950s the Conservatives did not expect that decolonization of most African colonies would be forthcoming in the foreseeable future. Amery was neither progressive nor reactionary towards these overall changes. He participated in some movements to accelerate transformation, such as abandonment of the laissez-faire economics and unilateral free trade policy. While he never tolerated any move for the dissolution of the empire, he approved of devolutions to imperial peripheries as long as their aim was to strengthen, and not weaken, imperial ties. Likewise, he did not oppose the adjustments of franchise to make parliament more properly reflect the composition of society, while he did not endorse 'democracy from below', which he suspected would easily degenerate into dictatorship by the majority. Existing research, which has often only focused on specific aspects of Amery's politics, has not sufficiently explained why Amery had this duality. The thrust of my argument, deployed in the thesis as a whole, is that his consistent commitment to Tariff Reform and his reluctant concessions on domestic and imperial governance were two sides of the same coin. In his world view, imperial preference was supposed to solve all problems possibly

caused by the concessions. This concluding chapter summarizes how various elements of his politics were interrelated.

The publication of *The Expansion of England* in 1883 was a wake-up call for the generation born in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, and Amery recalled that it induced him to become an imperialist.<sup>1</sup> However, Seeley's imperial vision was ingrained in complacent assumptions of the late Victorian era, which became anachronistic to Amery's generation. His conception of Greater Britain mainly covered colonies established by British emigration, from which India and Africa were excluded. Nor did Seeley see an urgent need to forge imperial preference. He argued that there were three bonds that would develop a community into one State: common nationality, common religion, and common interest. Greater Britain, Seeley frankly admitted, did not have the third bond. However, he did not reckon that the situation was problematic because it was united by the other two bonds, 'blood and religion'.<sup>2</sup>

The South African War shattered complacency and changed the premise of British imperial thought.<sup>3</sup> As Amery witnessed the war as a journalist, it gave him acute awareness of the impending crisis. Gaining awareness of the British and imperial vulnerability to external threats and internal insurgencies, he recognized a need to imperialize defence policy. Moreover, in line with the cross-party movement for national efficiency, Amery proposed proper centralization and decentralization of Britain's military machinery to rationalize its governance and operations. This principle became the foundational core of

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<sup>1</sup> The other sources were J. A. Froude's *Oceana* and a lecture delivered by G. R. Parkin at Harrow. Amery, *My Political Life*, vol. 1, 37.

<sup>2</sup> J. R. Seeley, *The Expansion of England* (Boston: Roberts Brothers, 1883), 50-51.

<sup>3</sup> Duncan Bell, *The Idea of Greater Britain: Empire and the Future of World Order, 1860-1900* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 3, 39-40.



his later suggestions for institutional reforms including those for the British Commonwealth and the British Constitution.

The war also provided him with a model example of facing nationalists' resistance. The texts written by him to justify the war contained many elements which lingered in his imperial thought. Britain should not too leniently surrender to nationalists' demands because it would produce another demand.

Nationalists' resistance which could be a threat to British supremacy which should be beaten even by force if necessary. Once armed conflicts were over, Britain should try to accommodate their nationalism in the imperial framework by making colonial leaders devise a new constitution which could reconcile all imperial and national interests. His reaction to the Irish and Indian nationalists followed more or less this pattern.

However, this did not indicate that Amery responded to the surge of nationalism as an enlightened imperialist. In the case of South Africa, he narrated the process from the war to the unification in 1910 as a teleological success story. His bifurcated vision of the empire, composed of the whites and the non-whites, survived intact. This complacency enabled him to be a typical Die-Hard on the Irish Question, who rejected any form of Home Rule. And yet, facing the crisis of a civil war and the stalemate in parliament, he gradually swallowed the federal scheme and even the conditional endowment of Dominion status upon Ireland. Though he supported the violent oppression of the Republicans in the Irish War of Independence and thus found its abrupt end unpalatable, he tended to steer clear of the Die-Hards' opposition to the treaty and to acquiesce in the formation of the Irish Free State.

The lesson on the Irish Question prevented Amery from becoming a Die-Hard on the Indian Question. Affected by Lionel Curtis, he was convinced that

legislative assemblies to which governments were not responsible would end in inflaming nationalists' antipathy towards the imperial authority. The ultimate necessity of the responsible government was a common consensus among the students of imperial Whig history. However, this does not mean that Amery was a straightforward ally of the Indian National Congress or the Muslim League. Since British parliamentary politics would allow the Congress to sweep away all other interests in India, his maximum concession was within the framework of the 1935 Act. Even after 1940, he expected Indian political leaders to spontaneously create their new constitution, similar to the federal scheme. In justifying the 1933 White Paper, he redefined the conception of the 'responsible government', which meant government not just to parliament but also to the Crown. This logic was useful in defending the indirect election in the federal legislature and some safeguards reserved for the British authority. As was the case with the Irish Question, his optimistic assumption was overthrown by the hard negotiations with Hindu and Muslim nationalists during the Second World War and the eventual partition of India. However, his belief in the potential of a federal scheme and functional representation in East and Central Africa continued until his death.

Historians have revealed that imperial discourses in the UK were linked with their views on domestic society and their national identity.<sup>4</sup> Duncan Bell has shown that concerns about the rise of democracy were one of the factors contributing to the resurgence of imperialism in the late nineteenth century.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> For instance, see Mrinalini Sinha, *Colonial Masculinity: The 'Manly Englishman' and the 'Effeminate Bengali' in the Late Nineteenth Century* (Manchester & New York: Manchester University Press, 1995); David Cannadine, *Ornamentalism: How the British Saw Their Empire* (New York & London: Oxford University Press, 2001); Catherine Hall, *Civilising Subjects: Metropole and Colony in the English Imagination 1830-1867* (Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press, 2002); Krishan Kumar, *The Idea of Englishness: English Culture, National Identity and Social Thought* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2015), Chapter 2 and 7

<sup>5</sup> Bell, *The Idea of Greater Britain*, 2 and Chapter 2.

Amery's ambivalent attitude towards democracy inherited the traits of his predecessors. He welcomed the gradual extension of suffrage in British constitutional history and provided lukewarm support to the suffragist movement. Concurrently, he always emphasized the duties, as well as the rights, of citizens in democratic societies. His campaign for National Service and producer-oriented trade policy was based on this moral foundation, though his electoral speeches did not explicitly divulge this intention lest they should provoke the audience.

His search for a proper way of representation and his apprehension about the populism of mass democracy crystalized into conceptions of functional representation and the Corporate State in the 1930s. Though they originated from Fascist Italy, Amery appropriated them for a new constitutional reform in line with British Whig history. He believed that the creation of a third House representing industrial interests combined with an empowered small executive could not just be an antidote to the rise of party dictatorship in the Continent and Russia, but also make the British government as efficient as other authoritarian regimes. Hence, in his political thought functional representation became a panacea applicable to both the Empire and the UK.

Regarding his political stance towards democracy, Amery located himself in the via media between his two mentors, Joseph Chamberlain and Alfred Milner. Chamberlain was an adroit populist and organizer, whose radical disposition resonated with the age of democracy, whereas Milner was an administrator and wire-puller, rather than a politician, who disdained party politics. In the Edwardian era, Amery wavered between these two role models. While he himself felt that he was no match for Chamberlain in mobilizing people for popular movements, unlike Milner, he found the work of MPs meaningful

enough to deserve his whole career and managed to enter into the Commons without being dispirited by his initial electoral defeats. By the 1930s, he finally formulated his own ideal, namely, 'government of the people, for the people, and with, but not by, the people'. While he defended democracy in parliamentary politics, he repeatedly pointed out that excessive power of the party caucus could destroy democratic polity. *The Forward View* even singled out 'Mr. Chamberlain's Radical Caucus' as a precursor to the Labour Party's organization.<sup>6</sup>

What motivated Amery to become a Unionist/Conservative politician was his enthusiasm for Tariff Reform. The popularity of Tariff Reform among imperialists symbolized the change of the tide after Seeley. They came to feel that, without common economic interests created by preferential tariffs, the Empire would not be able to stop internal centrifugal tendencies. Furthermore, imperial preference also offered him a satisfactory answer to his intellectual journey in the first three decades of his life, when he struggled to find an alternative to the current economic orthodoxy. Therefore, in his mind, Tariff Reform must mean not merely protection but the spiral development of industries, wages, and population on an imperial scale. He also acquired the assumption or belief that 'scientific tariffs' could harmonize all the economic interests in the Empire/Commonwealth, including British agriculture and the Dominions' industry. However, although permanent imperialization of economic policy remained the nucleus of his vision, from the 1930s onwards, Amery started to recognize that imperial autarky would not be feasible at least for the foreseeable future. His plea for the cooperation between the Commonwealth

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<sup>6</sup> L. S. Amery, *The Forward View* (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1935), 130.

and integrated Europe was his last-ditch attempt to protect his most important political project.

What was historical role and legacy of Amery on British Conservatism and imperialism? He played an ambivalent role in the process in which British Conservatives accepted the spirit of democracy and the welfare state. His conception of democracy undoubtedly seems too authoritarian and elitist in terms of the present standards. However, he at least defended 'democracy' as a label or signifier and tried to keep Britain from the domino-like collapse of 'democracy' in interwar Europe. Regarding the economic dimension, his antipathy towards economic individualism enabled him to advocate a reasonable extent of state interference and encouraged him to be a supporter of social reform. However, his social reform was predicated upon not mere redistribution of national wealth, but the development of the imperial economy as a whole, where people were expected to perform their duties to receive rewards.

Likewise, his role in British imperialism was not straightforward. Amery was a politician, who, like Churchill, wanted to prevent 'the liquidation of the British Empire' by any means necessary, to the point that he had little scruple in suppressing the nationalist movements in South Africa, Ireland, India, and the Middle East by force. Concurrently, he well recognized the need to create an economic bond and to transfer a reasonable amount of power to the peripheries. He often used the language of Whig history to explain a series of gradual concessions. However, this did not mean that Amery endorsed concessions in an orderly manner based on his benevolent imperialism. Although I do not deny that Whiggism at some points contributed to shaping path dependency, it was appropriated by various actors in negotiations with the

circumstances for the sake of their own interests. While it certainly drove Amery to be an advocate of the 1935 India Act and the Dual Policy in East Africa, he also redefined the rhetoric for ad hoc and post hoc justifications of the limited nature of his concessions.

Amery's imperialism could be characterized by the term 'pessimistic optimism', though he would have preferred the adjective 'realistic'. He accepted the reality that the UK was no longer an absolutely dominant power, as it was in the mid-nineteenth century. At the same time, he believed that Britain could continue to hold the status of superpower as long as it retained her connections with the Empire/Commonwealth. In his view, imperial preference was an indispensable tool for retaining the connections. John Darwin has argued that one factor which kept British decolonization less turbulent was the Conservatives' assumption that political decolonization would not necessarily deprive Britain of influence in global politics.<sup>7</sup> Of course, Amery never intended to promote 'decolonization'.<sup>8</sup> Rather, his imperial policy including crack-downs, concessions, and reluctant acquiescence was his desperate obsession with status power. Even after the Second World War, when Britain faced the two dominant superpowers, Amery likened Britain in 1948 to the Elizabethan age; as was England in the 16<sup>th</sup> century, Britain was now relatively weak but at the dawn of a new prosperous age and in the path to becoming the global empire.<sup>9</sup> Considering how rosy his expectations were, Amery probably passed away at the best timing – in 1955, one year before the Suez Crisis.

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<sup>7</sup> John Darwin, *The End of the British Empire: The Historical Debate* (Oxford & Cambridge: Blackwell, 1991), 32-33.

<sup>8</sup> Recently, Stuart Ward has pointed out that the term 'decolonization' was firstly used by liberal imperialist such as Lord Hailey to mean a shift in imperial governance form hierarchy to partnership. In this broader sense of the term, Amery could be regarded as a supporter of decolonization. Stuart Ward, 'The European Provenance of Decolonization', *Past & Present* 230, no. 1 (2016): 227–60.

<sup>9</sup> L. S. Amery, *The Elizabethan Spirit* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1948).

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