The Political Ecology of Sustainable Community Development in Sierra Leone

Submitted by:

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Declaration

I confirm that:

This thesis represents my own work. The contributions of my Supervisors and others to the research and to the thesis were consistent with normal supervisory practices. All sources used are denoted in the references section. Any mistakes of facts, interpretation and presentation are mine.

Ahmed Ojullah Bangura

Date
ABSTRACT. Natural resources are in abundance but have not benefited resource-based communities. The mining industry, especially in developing countries, has fallen short of working towards sustainable community practices. Different governance initiatives adopted by governments to make the communities beneficiaries of these resources are yet to bring sustainable results. Government is seen as the sole actor on policymaking and its implementation, and the production and delivery of goods and services. Acknowledgement is not given to the roles and responsibilities of the resource-based communities to work as co-partners towards sustainable community development. Hence, this thesis argues that government policies should move away from seeing resource communities as recipients and representatives in policymaking towards co-partnership. As such, this thesis aims to explore the dynamics between resource use and achieving sustainable community development by exploring the barriers and potential for sustainable community development in diamond mining communities in Kono, Eastern Sierra Leone. To do this, the thesis uses data from a wide range of in-depth semi-structured interviews, documents and focus group discussions from four case studies representing four chiefdoms to point out a shift from the governance approach of institutionalisation to adaptive governance approach that will make the resource communities self-determined and sustainable. The thesis deals with three objectives. First, a focus is put on the relationship between resource exploitation and community governance in mining communities through an analysis of key actors and their roles at a range of scales. Second, in an attempt to find out the scope of sustainability in resource-based communities, attention is given to the ways mining communities utilise their assets and undertake practices that contribute towards sustainable community development. Third, in finding answers from issues arising in these communities and the prospect for effective mining policies, the thesis attempts to identify both the structural and community-based barriers to promoting sustainable community development in mining communities and then make policy recommendations for community development in such communities.

Key Words: Resource Exploitation; Community Development, Community Governance, Sustainable Development, Sustainable Community Development
## TABLE OF CONTENTS

**CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION** ................................................................. 8
1.1 Introduction ...................................................................................... 8
1.2 Background and Context: Statement of the Problem ......................... 16
1.3 Governance (good or bad) ............................................................... 18
1.4 Community Development ............................................................... 20
1.5 Sustainable Development ............................................................... 23
1.6 Theoretical Approach ..................................................................... 23
1.7 Contribution to Existing Literature ................................................... 27
    Aim and Objectives ........................................................................... 29
1.8 Methodology .................................................................................... 30
1.9 Organisation of Work ....................................................................... 36

**CHAPTER 2 ASSESSING THE SUSTAINABILITY IN POLITICAL ECOLOGY** ................................................................. 38
2.1 Introduction ...................................................................................... 38
2.2 Understanding Political Ecology and Sustainable Development .......... 39
    Political Ecology ............................................................................... 39
    Sustainable Development: The Brundtland Report ............................. 40
    Theoretical Pluralism: Political Ecology and Sustainable Development ... 41
2.3 Conceptual Issues: Paradigm shift in Political Ecology ....................... 44
    Political Ecology: Is it about people or places? ................................ 45
    Political Ecology: Is it political or ecological? .................................. 46
2.4 Conceptual Approaches of Political Ecology .................................... 46
    Geographical Approach .................................................................... 48
    Stakeholders’ Approach ................................................................... 48
    Socio-Economic Approach ................................................................ 50
2.5 Community Governance and Sustainability Practice ......................... 51
    Government Perspective .................................................................. 51
    Social Capital and Community Capital ............................................. 52
    The Resource Abundance and Resource Curse .................................. 54
2.6 Sustainable Community Development ............................................. 56
    Concept of Community .................................................................... 56
CHAPTER 4 METHODOLOGY .................................................................107
4.1 Introduction ..................................................................................107
4.2 Methodology ................................................................................108
  Limitations ....................................................................................110
4.3 Research Strategy and Approach .................................................111
  Case Study Approach .....................................................................111
  Types of Case Study .......................................................................113
  Weaknesses and Strengths of Using a Case Study Approach ..........114
  Induction .......................................................................................114
4.4 Research Design: Strategy and Approach ....................................115
  Cases Studied in Research .............................................................116
4.5 Conducting the Research: Preparation of the Fieldwork/Data Collection Procedure .................................................................118
4.6 Case Study Timetable and Data Collection Procedures ..............123
  Data Collection Techniques and Processes ...................................124
  Documentary Analysis ...................................................................124
  Key Informant Interviews ..............................................................125
  Focus Groups ..............................................................................126
4.7 Data Analysis and Interpretation ..................................................127
  Categorising the Data ....................................................................129
  Theory and Narrative Building .....................................................129
4.8 Conclusion ...................................................................................130

CHAPTER 5 RESOURCE EXPLOITATION: AN OVERTURE OF RESOURCE CURSE .................................................................131
5.1 Introduction ..................................................................................131
5.2 Resource Exploitation ..................................................................132
  Resource Exploitation Activities ..................................................133
  Basics of Resource Exploitation ....................................................141
  Finance as a Tool of Exploitation ...................................................141
  Marketing and Pricing as a Tool of Exploitation .........................143
5.3 Evidence of Resource Exploitation ..............................................146
  Environmental Impact of Diamond Mining in Kono District ..........147
  Accommodation ...........................................................................150
CHAPTER 6 APPROACHES TOWARD SUSTAINABLE COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT

6.1 Introduction..................................................................................165
6.2 Community Assets in Perspective....................................................166
6.3 Community Assets and Activities of Actors........................................168
   Natural Capital.............................................................................169
   Human Capital..........................................................................174
   Economic Capital......................................................................177
   Physical Capital.......................................................................179
   Social Capital..........................................................................181
   Cultural Capital.......................................................................183
6.4 Sustainability Approach: Strong and Weak Sustainability...............185
6.5 Sustainable Community Development and Governance .................187
   Sustainability Practice..............................................................190
   Participation and Representation..............................................193
6.6 Conclusion..................................................................................195

CHAPTER 7 ENHANCING THE RESOURCE-BASED COMMUNITIES TOWARDS CO-PRODUCTION AND CO-GOVERNANCE.........197
7.1 Introduction..................................................................................197
7.2 Community Governance..............................................................198
   The Structural Barrier...............................................................198
   Community Barriers.................................................................204
Empowerment ...........................................................................206
Participation .............................................................................209
7.3 Sustainable Community Development........................................211
Limitations to Sustainability .........................................................212
Sustainability Awareness .............................................................213
7.4 Conclusion.............................................................................219

CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSION: THE FINDINGS, IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .................................................................222
8.1 Introduction.............................................................................222
8.2 Political Ecology.................................................................223
8.3 Community Governance.......................................................228
8.4 Sustainable Community Development....................................229
8.5 Policy and Practical Recommendations.................................236
8.6 Recommendations for Further Research ................................241

BIBLIOGRAPHY............................................................................244
LIST OF TABLES
Table 2.1: Theoretical Pluralism: Political Ecology and Sustainable Development…42
Table 2.2: Types of Community Assets.................................................................65
Table 3.1: Sierra Leone Kimberley Certification Scheme.................................104
Table 4.1: Summary of Research Methodology..................................................107
Table 4.2: Community Selection: Case Studies in the Research.........................117
Table 4.3: Specification Questions and Sources of Data.................................122
Table 4.4: Timetable for Data Collection.............................................................123
Table 4.5: Participants Interviewed.................................................................125
Table 4.6: Focus Group Discussion.................................................................126
Table 5.1 Typology of Respondents on Resource Exploitation.........................134
Table 5.2: Domestic Mining Actors.................................................................155
Table 5.3: Community Composition...............................................................162
Table 6.1: Types of Assets...............................................................................167
Table 6.2: Attitudes towards Community Assets in the Four Chiefdoms..........168
Table 6.3: Community Composition...............................................................188
Table 6.4: Types of Communities and their Composition.................................213
Table 7.1: Sustainability Limitations...............................................................197

MAPS AND PHOTOS
Map of Sierra Leone..........................................................................................2
Map of Sierra Leone Showing Neighbouring Countries.................................3
Map of the Kono District.................................................................................4
Photo A & B......................................................................................................150
Photo C...........................................................................................................153
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

APC: All People’s Congress
DACDF: Diamond Area Community Development Funds
DPC: Diamond Trading Company
ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States
EIA: Environmental Impact Assessment
EO: Executive Outcome
GDP: Gross Domestic Product
IUCN: International Union for Conservation of Nature
KHL: Koidu Holdings Limited
KPCS: Kimberley Processing Certification Scheme
MAB: Man and the Biosphere
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NDMC: National Diamond Mining Company
NGO: Non-Governmental Organisation
NMJD: Network Movement for Justice and Development
NPRC: National Provisional Ruling Council
PAC: Partnership Africa Canada
PMMC: Precious Metal Mining Company
RE: Resource Exploitation
RUF: Revolutionary United Front
SAP: Structural Adjustment Programme
SEIA: Sustainable Environmental Impact Assessment
SLAF: Sierra Leone Armed Forces
SLPP: Sierra Leone Peoples Party
TNC: Trans-National Corporations
UNESCO: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
WBG: World Bank Group
Map of Sierra Leone

Source: Maps.com

Map of Sierra Leone Showing Neighbouring Countries

Source: Maps.com
Map of Chiefdoms in the Kono District

**Source:** Map.com  
http://www.faqs.org/sec-filings/111017/Sterilite-Solutions-Corp_8-K_A/map5.jpg
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To the resource-rich communities, I hope to use my expertise with you at all levels of my capacity.
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

This thesis explores the potentials and barriers for sustainable community development in diamond mining communities in Kono, Eastern Sierra Leone. It aims to explore the dynamics between resource-use and achieving sustainable community development. In an attempt to achieve this, the thesis argues that achieving a sustainable diamond mining industry that can benefit present and future communities requires a governance initiative that incorporates co-governance and co-production in these resource-based communities. The former is the community’s capacity to be able to play a partnership role with the state on policy formulation and implementation, and the latter is focused on production and management of goods and services (Osborne and McLaughlin, 2004) and (Brandsen and Pestoff, 2006). Whilst resources are a requirement for achieving development, over the years the mining communities have experienced degradation of community assets by the actions and reactions of both domestic and external actors that have undermined the prospect of sustainable community development. Over the years, various governments have attempted to make the mining communities benefit from natural resources through the Kimberley Certification Scheme (global initiative) and the Diamond Area Community Development Funds (internal initiative) governance initiatives. Despite these governance initiatives the state has been the sole determinant of resources and development policies. There is an absence of ‘transitional’ community governance and sustainability practices. To further simplify this, I have used the term ‘transitional’ to explain that despite the central government’s decentralisation Act of 2004, overwhelming power still rests with them. In spite of the amendments made to mining policies, these resource-based communities have been seen as tools or instruments of the state, dictated to and provided for. In such circumstance, the communities’ capacity is undermined. According to Somerville (2011), the capacity of the community is subject to its ability to the command and unity it exercises on available resources and the organisational capacity to organise those resources efficiently.
Sierra Leone is endowed with an abundance of natural resources. It was ranked the tenth producer of diamonds, by volume, in 2010 (Kimberley Process Rough Diamond Statistics, 2011). Ironically, it is ranked 177 out of 183 countries in the human development index (HDI) in 2012 (HDI Report) with 70 percent of its 5 million population living below the $1 poverty line; 65 percent of the rural population is without pure drinking water, and it has 54.47 years and 59.56 years life expectancy for men and women respectively (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sl.html). Paradoxically, I can state that Sierra Leone is rich in natural resources but poor in economic development. The vast wealth has paid insignificant economic gains to resource communities in particular and the national economy in general. Since diamonds were discovered during the colonial era to independence, the industry has been marred by looting and smuggling of diamonds, involving state actors, internal non-state actors and external non-state actors. With the activities of some of these actors, the resource-based communities have become ecologically unsustainable and the sustainability approaches are neither strong nor weak. Hence, the optimism for sustainable community development, drawing on their vast natural resources since the post-colonial period, is at a crossroads.

Some commentators like Collier, Hoeffler, and Le Billon attribute the problems of natural resources to portability, abundance and conflict, and have seen those resources as a curse to countries that have them. Collier and Hoeffler (2005) and Campbell (2003) examined the links between lootable resources, poor governance and underdevelopment in sub-Saharan Africa. Their proposition on lootable resources such as diamonds, underdevelopment and poor governance is linked to large alluvial mineral deposits (abundance) that are not monitored effectively. Le Billon (2002) argued that developing economies with vast natural resources have experienced underdevelopment, political instability, corruption, and this has often resulted in violent conflict. That is why Ocheje (2006) argued that the answer to the resource curse lies in good governance whereby government and extractive companies working in the resource rich economies must commit to “higher standards of transparency and accountability” (Maconachie, 2008, p 3). In addition to Ocheje’s argument, Gberie (2002) argues that the problem with Sierra Leone’s diamond industry over the years is corruption. He concluded that the only remedy depends on how the diamond industry or the extractive industry is managed.
Efforts have been taken to make the extractive industry profitable and sustainable through governance initiatives to assist resource communities to gain from the resources. Internationally, the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPSC) was adopted in 2002 to curb the flow of illicit diamonds and increase international transparency in the diamond industry. Though this approach was seen as a governance and economic strategy, it has security impetus emanating from fears of resources being used by clandestine or shadow actors for destructive purposes. Internally, the government in collaboration with NGOs through the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI) implemented the Diamond Area Community Development Funds (DACDF) in accordance with the ‘What you Pay initiative’ adopted during the 2002 Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg (Maconachie, 2008; http://www.publishwhatyoupay.org).

The purpose was to transfer a stipulated percentage of funds from the export revenue gained from the sales of diamonds to resource communities. It failed to consider the role the community can play towards this aim. All the stakeholders involve are elites. There is no involvement of the wider community members in the process. Thus, the governance initiative, though it is a step in the right direction, is limited and unsustainable. The initiative is marred by corruption and unaccountability from community elites (Chiefs). At national level, the Minerals Advisory Board is charged with the responsibility for advising and making recommendations to the Minister of Mines on licences, exploration, mining, processing, import and export, marketing of minerals, and monitoring and implementation of government policy relating to minerals (Ministry of Mineral Resources and Political Affairs, 2009; 2011). This top-bottom approach excludes the community. Hence, it undermines the capacity of the communities to determine how issues affecting them can be resolved.

Globally, one of the worst affected natural resource areas in the developing world is Africa, which has been experiencing resource-based conflicts since the post-colonial era. Despite the revenue gain from the sales of these resources, Africa’s minerals have become more of a burden than a blessing and the continent’s communities suffer underdevelopment. For instance, Sierra Leone, Namibia, Angola, Nigeria, D.R. Congo, and Chad have experienced wars and retrogressive development owing to their abundant natural resources (Kabia, 2006). The natural resources have
empowered the political elites and their cohorts through patrimonialism and clientelism against the interest of the resource-based communities.

Like Sierra Leone, Zimbabwe is an example of bad governance initiative on diamond mining, while on the other hand Botswana is a good example of good governance initiative on diamond mining. The latter has been called the ‘African Miracle’ because of the great socio-economic and political successes associated with the use of their natural resources. After a protracted (1965-1979) civil war, the country which in 1980 changed its name from Rhodesia to Zimbabwe deteriorated into a grave economic crisis (The Worldfact Book, 2011). Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe share some features in common on their natural resources. They both have natural resources to provide investment environment and prospective growth and development; they both share the Kimberley experience or governance initiative but not effective policy regulation and implementation of its mining industry.

Zimbabwe is rich in natural resources (Department of State, 2011) and an exporter of diamonds (McMahon, 2010). But international monitors accused the government of running smuggle syndicates and providing falsified information (The Worldfact Book, 2011). Like Sierra Leone, Zimbabwe’s rich natural resources could have led to its economic recovery and prosperity if only there is an effective governance initiative and viable economic distribution of wealth. Zimbabwe had had a 14 year civil conflict (Shillington, 2005) industrial strike that included civil servants, health workers by mid- 1990s and rising food prices (Department of State, 2011). By 2000 the economy contracted by 40 percent (Department of State, 2011) due to agricultural decline (The Worldfact Book, 2011). With evidences of economic and political shocks, Zimbabwe was measured as the worst performing of African mining countries in 2008/09. Unlike Botswana’s $3.6 billion sales of diamonds in 2009, Zimbabwe’s legitimate sales accounted for $20 million (Mutsaka et al., 2010). Zimbabwe’s economic woes are often associated with their controversial land reforms undertaken by the ZANU PF and linked to patron-client land distribution (Robb, 2012). I acknowledge that the land issue has varying effect on agriculture, national economy and political situation (The Worldfact Book, 2011) but that effect can not be directly linked to the poor diamond revenue. The policies governing mineral resources are top-bottom and highly centred on the state as a sole policy determining and implementing actor. Robb (2012) argues
that the ability of providing investment from diamond revenues depends on effective regulation of the diamond sector. He (2012, p11) states that Zimbabwe’s Mine and Mineral Act (ZMMA) “is a needlessly complex document, resulting in poor transparency”, despite her voluminous 27 sections of 125 pages, that are three times that of Botswana’s Mines and Mineral Acts (Mines and Mineral Act, 1961). Like Sierra Leone where the Minister of Mines has vested rights on mineral resources (Mines and Mineral Act 2009), ZMMA has vested mining rights in the President of Zimbabwe (Mines and Mineral Act, 1961) and the Minister decides on what is and what is not a mineral, the sole authority to market prices, regulate royalties, determines representations from the Chambers of Mines and regulate on matters arising when necessary (Robb, 2012). From this analogy, co-governance and co-production in resource communities is highly undermined and determined by the state as a dominant player with little or no empowerment from resource-based communities. However, few countries have made a difference.

Unlike Zimbabwe, and Sierra Leone, Botswana is a good model of countries with good reputation of natural resource use. Its economy depends more on diamond mining (The Worldfact Book, 2011) with effective mining laws that have benefitted the entire country (Robb, 2012). From its precarious and poverty-stricken economic state in 1966 (Lewis 2006), Botswana was labelled by Abdi Ismail Samatar as ‘African Miracle’ (Samatar, 1999). A combination of efficient economic and political factors has contributed to this admired wonder. Botswana’s diamonds were discovered by DeBeers in the early 1960’s and became a dominant industry in early 1980s (Department of State, 2011). Unlike Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe’s staggering economic growth, Botswana’s economic growth grew at an annual average of 9 percent, largely from diamond revenues (Department of State, 2011). The country has a stable economy and effective regulations governing the mining industry. The country’s diamond exports account for 30 percent of world diamond sales which is one-third of the GDP and 70 percent of the country’s export (Our Diamonds, 2012). In 2009, the country earned $3.6 billion from its diamond sales. In contrast, Zimbabwe’s legitimate sales accounted for $20 million (Mutsaka et al., 2010). Botswana’s diamond sector accounts for 33 percent of the country’s GDP and 76 percent of its export revenue with an annual growth rate of 7 percent. Namibia’s diamond industry accounts for 10 percent of GDP and 40 percent of export revenues
while Canada produces C$1.5 billion worth each year (http://www.diamondfacts.org). Unlike those discussed above, these countries have made remarkable use of their resources and have demonstrated evidence of strong sustainability.

The disparity between Botswana and Sierra Leone/Zimbabwe is not only on the economic growth but also on the structure of mining. Firstly, Botswana has an effective partnership relationship with DeBeers called Debswana (Department of State, 2011) under the Diamond Trading Company (DTC) and assigned to sort diamonds. Sierra Leone had a similar investment partnership with DeBeers that was extended to the defunct SLST in Kono district. In contrast, the investment was characterised by mass patron-client corruption under the leadership of Siaka P. Stevens and J.S. Momoh who used diamonds resources for greed purposes. The second part is that Botswana has moved from exploration and extraction to cutting, polishing, and marketing, providing incremental jobs opportunities and revenue for the economy (Department of State, 2011). Hence in 2008, the former President of Botswana, Festus Gontebange Mogae was awarded the Mo Ibrahim Prize for Achievement in African Leadership (Howden, 2008) for the country’s strong democracy enshrine in the rule of law and the frantic effort in combating corruption. In spite of the high rate of HIV/AIDS pandemic, the former ‘development leader’, as I would like to name him, led and maintained the country’s continued stability and prosperity, distribution of wealth, poverty declination and equitable opportunities across other sectors without being engulf in the so-called ‘Dutch Disease’. Notwithstanding, these examples are enhanced by the need, desire and value of diamonds through their demand and supply.

The demand for diamonds could be for two main purposes but the means of getting the diamonds have varies, ranging from official and unofficial means. The demand and supply of diamonds is driven by wants/desire, purpose and price. Diamond prices often fluctuate due to economic shocks, especially during the great economic shock that affected most developing countries including Sierra Leone between 1980 and 2000s. Overtly, the economic and social yarning for the gem stone has led to spontaneous environmental impacts.
The demand and supply of diamonds commenced in ancient times in India around 2000BC in alluvial pits and rivers (Harts, 2001). In modern era, by 1720 AD, alluvial deposits were discovered in Brazil (Haggerty, 1999) and by the 19th Century Brazil dominated India and became the world’s leading diamond producer (Hart, 2001). By 1880, De Beers Mining Company Limited was formed by Cecil Rhodes (Hart, 2001) after purchasing a firm originally owned by de Beers brothers (2001). The new formed company, “De Beers” gained full control of the assets of the competitive companies such as Compagnie Francaise des Mines de Diamond du Cap de Bon Esperance and Kimberly Central Diamond Mining Company (Baldwin and Webster, 2005).

By 1990, De Beers controlled 90 percent of the world’s diamond by controlling the flow of production and sales to boast prices by strategising planned scarcity in diamonds through what Baldwin and Webster called “Supply Management” (Baldwin and Webster, 2005). De Beers enforced this through the establishment of ten world largest cartels, and succeeded in influencing the supply and prices of diamonds through the allocation of certain percentage of output in exchange for market data. De Beers gauged demand and supply to maximise price (Stein 2001). The Central Selling Organisation (CSO) purchased the diamond output of the De Beer’s mines and properties around the world (Baldwin and Webster, 2001) and transferred to their London headquarters, and separated the diamonds into lots called “boxes” according to their quality and quantity. The cartel members called “sightholders” regularly conducts weekly inspection of these segregated boxes. DeBeers sets a non-negotiable price for each box in advance and determined the quantity and quality of diamonds each sightholder could get (Baldwin and Webster, 2001). By the end of the 20th century, DeBeers diamond hegemony declined from 90 percent to 66 percent (Kay, 2001). Subsequently in 2004, De Beers cut down the number of cartel members by 20 percent (Jeweler, 2004).

Diamonds are needed for jewellery and industrial uses. It is estimated that 50 percent of extracted gemstones are used for jewellery. Polished diamonds account for about 440 percent of all jewellery, manufacturing and engagement (Diamond Industry Report, 2011). The demand side encourages supply; the supply of diamonds is largely connected to its discovery and commercialisation. In 1870 South Africa commenced
commercial production, and was engaged in the diamond rush (Hart, 2001). Since then, diamond mining has expanded to four continents and by 2005 to include Russia, Canada and Australia, producing 133 million carats in 2010. Russia’s commercial production accounts for nearly one-quarter of global diamond output, followed by Botswana. In Australia, the geologists discovered the largest diamond deposit in the world in Argyle pipe in 1979. In 1994, the Argyle mine produced 43 million carats of diamonds (Diamond Industry Report, 2011). In recent times, Canada has had new diamond discoveries as huge deposits were found in 1992 at Point Lake in Northwest Territories. Consequently, it has become obvious that the discovery, demand and supply of diamond resources are mutually inclusive. However, although diamonds are needed for jewellery and industrial purposes, in recent times it has been linked to war in countries such as Sierra Leone, DR Congo and Angola. From their purpose of being transformed into consumer and industrial goods, diamonds have become a tool of war in these countries, leading to widespread deaths and destruction by those I call ‘Blood Diamond Merchants’, dealing in so called ‘Blood Diamonds’ by some political scientists like Kabia (2009) and Francis (2001).

The demand for diamond resources provokes its supply through various financial actors to the international market. Roberts (1994) claims that the demand for diamonds is one of lust. In their famous slogan “A diamond is forever” DeBeers tried to convince women in America that they needed a diamond ring to get engaged or married. However, the demand did not take into consideration the source and process of supply. The source of supply in developing countries have been characterised by violent conflicts at community and national scales, and it is marred by underdevelopment. International calls came from environmental groups to address human needs and resource sustainability, such as Friends of the Earth during the Brundtland report in 1987 (WCED, 1987), Global Watch in 1998, Partnership Africa (PAC), the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) in 2002. The calls are not often heeded to with the utmost attention because of geo-politics and global interest. Internally, for example, the call for urgency in regulating natural resources such as the ‘blood diamond trade’ in Sierra Leone was ignored until tens of thousands of civilians were killed. Externally and for security reasons, the United States and the West became interested in enforcing anti-blood diamond policies when, it was alleged, that Al-Qaeda was involved in the trade (Douglas, 2002). The global players
showed interest where interest pays off and neglected the resource-based communities. Accordingly, I could argue that a global commitment to sustainable use of mineral resources might arise when those resources become a threat on a global scale.

1.2 Background and Context: Statement of the Problem

Environmental problems are not limited to any particular country in the world. However, the degree of the problems differs, and the willingness and capability of responses to such threatening impacts in our societies is inadequate and variable. In natural resource-rich countries, environmental problems start from the exploration to the extraction of minerals from the earth’s crust and by the cutting down of flora and the dissipation of the ecosystem.

From an economic point of view, the mining industry is a viable sector for economic development. The rate and volume of extraction of these minerals should be commensurate to the scale of development. Ironically, the revenue from resources is parallel with the development and colossal ecological misery in resource communities. With the resource-based communities having unprecedented adverse socio-economic impacts and environmental injustice, the resource revenues from the trade have benefited only a few actors. There is a widening gap between the rich and poor with the majority of the population surviving on less than US $2 per day (MMSD, 2002). The governance initiatives undertaken so far have not addressed fundamental issues affecting the diamond industry and the resource communities in particular. The latter are often subjected to ‘privileged options’ to make them vulnerable and submissive. Assistance given to these communities is not taken as mandatory but rather as a charitable gesture. As such, socio-economic conflicts arising from community and national greed have ensued at a community scale. The conflicts have often occurred in two forms: on one hand, among the community actors; on the other hand, it ensues between the community and corporations. From this correlation, I have distanced this community conflict from the national scale conflicts that Collier, Francis, and Kabia denote as armed conflict. These community conflicts have not been managed effectively and, in the case of Sierra Leone, they became a source of attraction by warlords to recruit actors of various capacities who destroyed almost all forms of capital or assets to get to diamond resources.
Political influence and control of mineral resources by the state has superseded ecological interest. The state acts as a sole actor capable of determining policies and development. This state-led approach emanates from the post-colonial era when most African economies adopted the statist conceptions of development, economic nationalism and political patronage to enhance state-owned enterprises (Bayart, 1982). Hence, the communities’ access to resources in their locality is restricted by government policies. There is disparity between ownership of diamond resources in cultural and legal terms. Culturally, the land belongs to the community; legally the resources belong to the state. This contradictory analogy, characterised by greed, often leads to discontent, community conflict, visible and invisible (‘shadow’) scrambles for diamonds, leading to the exploitation of resources and the unbearable ecological destruction. As such, governments, NGOs, academics, and environmentalists advocate for mitigation and solutions through environmental policies or governance initiatives.

As a result, the government often enacts and implements policies to project sustainable mining that would regulate the mining industry. Despite this attempt, the gap that excludes the resource communities from the co-governance and co-production governance approach still exists. For instance, various mineral Acts (1994; amended 1999; 2009) have been enacted to the effect. The 2009 new Mines and Minerals Act vested ‘all rights’ of ownership and control of all minerals in the state. The Act, like the previous legislations, ignores the community capacity to deliberate on their common future. In addition to the exclusion of the resource communities, Gberie (2002) says that corruption has been a problem in the diamond industry since the pre-independence era. With the state at the centre of natural resources, the industry is affected by various actors with varying capacity and interests. Hence, the implementation of these policies has become ineffective. Gouldson and Murphy (1998) posit that the effectiveness and efficiency of policies depend on how they are planned and implemented. According to the 2009 Minerals Act, the state controls and implements everything. Policies made to curb environmental problems are influenced by technocrats at ministerial capacity. This top-down approach adopted is tactical, mechanical, gradual and end-of-pipe (Cater, 1994). The approach only seeks the consultation and participation of the elite in resolving environmental problems. It ignores the consultation and participation of the majority that are affected by
ecological damages and resource exploitation. Sustainable mining industry is not only a matter of policy formulation; rather, it is about the cooperation between the communities and government on policy formulation and implementation, and on the provision of goods and services. Often, when it comes to discussing resources in those resource-based communities, the communities are misrepresented by individuals who are not accountable to them. The government of Sierra Leone, having the post-colonial statist conceptions of development and political patronage (Bayart, 1982) has seen itself as the sole actor in addressing environmental problems, and planning and implementing mining policies. The role of the resource communities is marginal and polarised. Even the pretext of a bottom-up approach through the 2004 Decentralisation Act lacks information capacity, consultation and acknowledgment of community actors. The resource communities cannot take independent or collaborative actions; they lack the community governance structures to provide and deliver community services (co-production) and create joint policies (co-governance). In essence, a mutual power relation is required in order to promote the supply and demand of natural resources wherein the community’s capabilities, participation, and empowerment become effective. Hence, this thesis will explore three theories on governance, community development, and sustainable development. These theoretical concepts will be addressed in the literature review chapter, which assesses the pluralism of political ecology and sustainable development. The next sub-section will discuss governance.

1.3 Governance (good or bad)
It is expedient to give some definitions of governance in order to provide a better understanding for those who might be contemplating what governance is all about at both national and community levels. In this thesis, the focus is not on governance on the communities but on governance within the communities. Some may perceive governance as democracy of the elected few to govern the majority. As these elected few are embodied with the legitimacy to rule through established institutions, they should give in return the legitimacy that is to be questioned and account for their actions. It is not about democratisation through the right to vote and be voted for. According to the secondary sources and historic political narratives discussed in chapter 3, democratisation or legitimate power can be used for coercive purposes and resource exploitation. Whatever the views of people may be, in this thesis,
governance infers a relationship between state actors and the governed, and between
the community actors (authority) and the wider community members. In addition, it
warrants knowing how answerable these actors are to those they govern and how
answerable the people are to their communities and the state. Furthermore,
governance is not only about establishing institutions which are defunct. Following
this account, I examine the World Bank’s definition of governance as ‘the traditions
and institutions by which power in a country is exercised for the good of all’
(Kaufmann and Kraay 2002, p. 5). This definition centres on state authority. Often,
the central authority tends to transfer power through institutional establishments in the
form of decentralisation. In this case, power is projected to be transferred from the
central government to local governments. But the question is how decentralised is the
local government in relation to the local people at community level? In Sierra Leone,
the decentralised government cannot pass laws on mining. All they can do is
implement orders from the Ministry of Mines and Mineral Resources. In that case,
any focus on institutions to justify governance has limitations. Institutional
establishments alone will not enhance equal opportunities to exercise power between
various actors in order to determine the use of community resource for sustainable
community development. The actors of these decentralised institutions are answerable
only to the central government because, as the reader will notice in chapter 5, there is
a high level of political allegiance of local councillors to the central authority. The
stakeholders’ involvement is ineffective and the rules of the policy are a zero-sum
game where those who agree gain whilst those who disagree are bound to lose or be
penalised. The idea of governance is about who makes a decision, who sets the rules,
how, and when. Graham et al. (2003) further explained that governance is: ‘the
traditions, institutions and processes that determine how power is exercised, how
citizens are given a voice, and how decisions are made on issues of public concern’
(Graham et al., 2003, p. 1).

Whilst I agree with Graham and colleagues’ commentary on governance, I criticise
their proposition on the basis that they focus on governance as the interrelationship
between the state and the people. They ignore the governance that happens within the
community or that should exist there. Focusing on any forms of governance that
ignores the purpose for which communities exist undermines community capacity.
Graham and his colleagues ignore the fact that governance cannot be effective without
the communities being incorporated in decision-making and in ‘equity’ participation on goods and service delivery. Communities should be able to operate in partnership with other actors on policies, production and service delivery. Without this, we cannot talk of community development.

How people can be heard and contribute to decision-making is very important in governance. Their involvement has to be active and not passive; it has to be participatory and not representative. As Gaventa (2004) argues, citizen participation has to move people from being users or choosers of public service policies deliberated by others and made by others, to ‘makers and shapers’ of decision-making themselves on matters affecting them all. This demonstrates that the process has to move away from indirect participation towards direct participatory involvement. Such a process changes the monopoly role of the state, moving towards an enabling environment in which everybody is involved (Moore and Putzel, 2002). There should be a shift from national control over on communities to allowing non-state actors (communities) to control decision-making and implementation (Hutter, 2006). This will mean a shift from government as the sole determinant of policymaking and implementation (co-governance) and as a service provider (co-production), to ‘deliberative’ governance with communities for effective sustainable community development. Other commentators such as Hyden et al. (2004, p. 50) note that governance is about: ‘the formation and stewardship of the rules that control the public realm – the space where state as well as economic and societal stakeholders interact to make decisions’.

Like Graham and others, this definition focuses on ‘macro-governance’ - governance considering the arms of government, probably though electioneering. I presume that interaction in making decisions does not imply equality in participation. There is often participatory inadequacy in communities in developing countries when it comes to governance on development issues.

1.4 Community Development
Here, I consider community development on the basis of political, socio-economic, and ecological nomenclature. Taking into consideration the ideal of empowerment, with emphasis on social and spatial dimension of development, community development approaches place people and communities at the centre of development.
According to Wolfe (1996), community development refers to any act of development that enhances the improvement of the living standards and general infrastructure of a community. Frank and Smith (1999) define community development as the planned fruition of the economic, social, cultural, and environmental factors of community well-being. This can be achieved by encouraging communities to organise and take up inventiveness of their own (Friedmann, 1992). It involves the interaction between various actors working towards that common goal that will benefit all in the midst of viable institutions. Such interaction has to be for the interest of present communities without compromising the needs and welfare of future communities. However, the evidence from this study identifies how the mining activities in these resource-based communities have endangered the environment, (resources), assets and communities (people). In the diamond mining industry, there has been action and reaction between the state and the communities. On one hand, the state actors utilise the natural resources for political and economic gains. On the other hand, because of unfair distribution of wealth, the various community actors pursue the resources with different self-interest in different ways. Hence, these have caused unprecedented social and ecological damage in these communities. Apparently, to a certain extent, the resource-based communities have become victims of natural resource and policy exclusion. But according to their actions, they are perpetrators of ecological damage and depletion of assets.

Over the years, the interrelationships between local people, investors, government, and resource-based communities have been questionable. The government and the investors or corporations have become the economic leaders, determining what is to be done and how, while the resource-based communities have become the economic followers, accepting the dictates of the state-corporate collaborative concessions. From this perspective, Somerville (2009a) categorises such communities as being weak. From an economic point of view, Joseph differentiates communities from what she called the capitalist society. She maintains the differences on the basis of alienation, rationality and bureaucracy (Joseph, 2000). Joseph argues that a community is autonomous from a capitalist society but that they are linked to each other. Joseph emphasises that the economic factors fall short of recognising a community as an agent of social change. In addition to this critique, Strickland (2004) posited that Joseph ignores the traditional class difference and likeness that form the
basis of identity politics. In essence, Joseph’s argument of community and capital society undermines Frank and Smith (1999) argument of community development that calls for planned fruition of the economic, social, cultural, and environmental factors of community well-being. However, I want the reader to know that the scope of the thesis limits itself to just the community capacity of the internal community actors. Their roles will explain whether governance has shifted from the state to the communities. This is because, over the years, the government has awarded mining contracts and concessions to corporations without the communities’ approval (NACE, 2009). Both the public (government) and private actors (corporations) have failed to act responsibly by signing investment contracts that take no consideration of sustainability of the resources and the co-role of the resource-based communities to attain sustainable community development. Instead, the government has used state security institutions to bring mayhem to communities when their level of discontent over lack of social and environmental justice perpetuated by corporations reached saturation point. Such actions occurred in the diamond rich Kono district in December 2007 between Koidu Holdings Limited (KHL, but now called OCTEA), and the community (NACE, 2009) and recently on December 19th 2012. In all these incidents, the state used its institutions to primarily protect the corporations at the expense of killing the community workers. Contextualising this from a theoretical perspective, in accordance with the principles of sustainable development and some relevant theories, the people’s entitlement, capacity and welfare are affected. This undermines people’s legal rights and public benefits (Gore, 1993) and runs contrary to Gwin’s (2005) capacity explanation that people should have the ability to administer their affairs successfully. There is a desperation and need for the state to achieve development goals and the rent-seeking agenda by corrupt regimes (Ebrahim-Zadeh, 2003) who collaborate with corporations and who have also failed to adhere to their corporate social responsibilities, which has subjected the “resource-based communities” to become mere hosts of natural resources. They are restricted by unsustainable mining policies, in which they are neither fully represented nor fully informed (Goodland, 2004). Such actions have undermined the prospect of community development, and these effects will affect the capacity, capital or assets, living standards and infrastructure of future communities (generations) as well.
1.5 Sustainable Development
In the section above on community development, I identified the capacity of communities to work on improving their living standards and infrastructure. However, such a process must not compromise with succeeding communities. Considering the Brundtland report (1987), achieving development at the cost of resources and human capital does not meet the fundamental principle of sustainable development. The definition of sustainable development, according to the 1987 United Nations World Commission on Environment and Development’s document, which was entitled ‘Our Common Future’, is to ‘meet the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’ (WCED, 1987). Therefore, as we aspire to have a better life through strong and or weak sustainability approaches, our actions should not affect the chances of future generation to meet their own welfare needs. In contrast, the increasing exploration and extraction of natural resources in resource-rich communities in the developing world has affected intra-generations and inter-generations. Evidence shows that intra-generations have witnessed social upheavals, neglect, economic shocks, and land degradation. Subsequently, in the case of the Kono district in Sierra Leone, decades of mining in the past have affected the present generation and may affect the future generations if the communities remain incapacitated to co-govern in policymaking and implementation, and co-produce in producing and delivering community services.

Acknowledging this anomaly surrounding resource-based communities, this thesis identifies the long overlooked mechanisms within the resource-based communities in order to work towards the principles of sustainable community development based on the community’s needs and priorities, and their related capacity to undertake collective action in individual resource-based communities. This draws upon the specificities of the role of the different identified actors, their capacity as individuals and as a community, their activities, and their knowledge about sustainability practice which leads towards sustainable development.

1.6 Theoretical Approach
In this thesis, I have combined political ecology and sustainable development. The choice of these two interrelated literatures as a theoretical framework for this thesis is justified on the basis that they both explore the use of resources and sustainability
approaches undertaken by different actors of varying power roles in the exploitation of the resources. They also consider the role and limitations of the resource-based communities to provide, deliver, and participate in sustainable development practices without compromising the needs and welfare of future generations. In this respect, as the outcome of this thesis is determined by the role of various actors, this piece of work is based on the stakeholder approach to a wide range of ecological discourses drawing on the 1987 Brundtland report. These diverse aims and interests of the actors have affected most resource-based communities and have limited their sustained development over time contrary to the Brundtland report (WCED, 1987), which argues that present actions should not affect the welfare of future generations. Evidence from the diamond rich district of Kono in Sierra Leone shows that mining activities have affected present-day communities (intra-generation) and will subsequently affect succeeding generations through the activities of different actors (see chapters 5 & 6). This scenario is exacerbated by the absence of co-governance and co-production strategies that have been adopted by the government of Sierra Leone since port independence from what Bayart (1982) called the statist conceptions of development. In the pluralism on political ecology and sustainable development, the thesis will identify both the roles and interests of different actors on natural resources by acknowledging the impact of their activities, and the strategic approaches of sustainability through governance structure. From the interconnectedness between political ecology and sustainable development, the thesis will identify the governance issues of who participates, how, and where, on policy formulation and implementation in order to achieve sustainable community development. Furthermore, it will suggest procedures and present credible evidence, clearly define priorities, and demonstrate approaches for achieving them. Since the availability, access and control of natural resources is influenced by a network of actors, and the aim of the thesis is to explore the dynamics between resource-use and achieving sustainable community development, it becomes explicit that the two theoretical literatures are relevant to this study.

1.7 Contribution to Existing Literature
The aim of the thesis is to explore the dynamics between resource-use and achieving sustainable community development. The thesis seeks to understand and contribute to the existing literature on political ecology and sustainable development. In achieving
this, the thesis takes into consideration the literature on governance and community
development. Years of resource exploitation in the past have affected the present
generation and resulted in the current circumstances. This is likely to affect the future
generations as well if no substantive action is undertaken. The thesis attempts to
understand political ecology and sustainable development as a theoretical framework
linking natural resources and sustainability approaches. It will also deliberate on the
community capacity of the different domestic actors in achieving sustainable
community development. Often, the existence of natural resources and the role of the
domestic actors have led to conflict of interest, parallel communities and
unsustainable activities. As such, despite continual mining policy reforms and
Minerals Acts by every succeeding government, and the repatriation of minimal funds
to the mined communities through the EITI governance initiatives, the principles of
sustainable development do not exist. These principles have not been achieved
because of limitations in community governance. Legally, through Acts of
Parliament, the government has become the sole determinant of how the community
resources should be managed and contracted. This legal leverage on resources has
incapacitated the resource communities’ ability to consent and participate in decision-
making and implementation. The limited services in these communities are
government-controlled. The question is how and when will these communities
overcome these limitations and become sustainable?

Many writers or theorists have contributed to specific sustainable community
development literature, but little or nothing has dealt specifically with the case of
Sierra Leone’s diamond mining. Instead, we have got substantial literature on the
political economy of conflict diamonds (blood diamonds) and resource-curses. I have
deviated from the argument on resource-curses and conflict diamonds and will
contribute to the wider debate of natural resources and sustainable community
development that calls for the role of the resource communities at the centre of
community development. The contribution emanating from the findings will assist
researchers, academics and policymakers in both the public and private sectors to
develop sound and effective response mechanisms to ecological problems within
communities, especially in developing countries.
It is argued that natural resources are often a prerequisite for economic development and this has been the subject of many articles, book chapters and reports. Natural resources, especially non-renewable resources, have become more of a burden than benefit in most resource-based communities in the developing world, with the communities given short-term lip service. Inferring from that, I will just be dealing with some specific contributors; a full literature reviews is provided in chapter 2. Collier and Hoeffler (2005) examined the link between what they called ‘lootable’ resources, poor governance and underdevelopment in sub-Saharan Africa, which are centred on greed and grievance. Like Ross (2003), they explained that abundant natural resources in Africa reap limited reward for the resource countries. Rather it has brought political instability, corruption, underdevelopment, and sometimes insurgencies. Therefore, in an attempt to resolve these upheavals, Ocheje (2006) calls for a high standard of transparency that both the government and the extractive corporations investing in these resource-rich developing countries must conform to. But there is unwillingness to achieve this because of corruption. Gberie (2002) supports this argument by stating that the scourge of Sierra Leone’s diamond industry is corruption. This justifies my earlier assertion that unlike the resource-curse hypothesis, there is a ‘state-corporate’ curse situation. The ‘state-corporate’ curse hypothesis goes beyond corrupt policies to include a situation whereby the state uses its institutions to suppress social, economic and environmental descent.

However, not everybody or every institution agrees that resource abundance, greed and grievance are the causes of underdevelopment and armed conflict in Sierra Leone. Unlike Collier and Hoeffler (2005), who attribute the cause of armed conflict to greed, the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in its 2004 report titled ‘Witnessed to Truth’ espoused the idea that the cause of the war was the result of years of bad governance, endemic corruption and denial of basic human rights, which created the appalling situation that made war inevitable (TRC, 2004). This neglect resulted in young people fending desperately for natural resources at the expense of the environment. On this, Zack-Williams (2001), argues that youths who were helpless and marginalised before the war experienced control as they grew to be perpetually involved in fighting sprees, which offered them the opportunity to empower themselves and coercively take back natural resources that the government had deprived them of. In this juncture, I see the greed factor and the reaction through
grievance as evidence of bad governance that is demonstrated through inequity distribution of wealth. In a similar contribution, Le Billon, (2001) and Collier and Hoeffler (2000) argue that the relationship between resources and human activities, especially in developing countries, have led to a breakdown of control, mismanagement, and ecological destruction. That is why some proponents argue that resources have become a curse (Humphrey et al., 2007; Ebrahim-Zadeh, 2003), leading to violence and conflicts (Collier, 2000; Ross, 1999), and leaving behind unsustainable communities with declining social, economic, environmental conditions and an unequal use of power (Doppelt, 2003). In contrast with Collier and Hoeffler, Francis (2010) disputed this ‘greed proposition’ and argued that the situation was caused by fundamental political, economic and socio-cultural differences. In an attempt to address these fundamental issues, Maconachie examined the institutionalisation strategy adopted to salvage the on-going problem with diamond resources in particular. In a 2008 Working Paper for the Brooks World Poverty Institute, Maconachie examined diamond mining and governance initiatives and post-conflict development in Sierra Leone. This working paper assesses the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) and the Diamond Area Community Development Fund (DACDF) as the two main governance initiatives in the country’s diamond sector. In summary, they see the establishment of institutions as a governance strategy for the long-term diamond resource problems in Sierra Leone. Although the above body of literature has argued that an abundance of resources is counter-productive in sub-Saharan Africa’s development, and Maconachie’s concludes that diamonds in Sierra Leone will continue to be a ‘double edged sword’, they have ignored the indisputable role of the community in the governance process. In this thesis, I have argued that the resource-based communities should not just be seen as a recipient of development promises through the DACDF, but as an indelible element in the co-provision of goods and services and in creation of policy for the sustainable community development that is indispensable to the extraction of resources and the development of the community. The communities should not be seen as followers and recipients but as leaders and joint actors of their own community goals. This is why political ecologists have been working to understand the interconnectedness between different actors, what they do, how they do it, and under whose control it is done. By this, the interests and welfare of present and future communities are not compromised. Accordingly, political ecology explains the
dynamic and changeable interaction between society and natural resources in the midst of class disparity (Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987). In Blaikie and Brookfield (1987), political ecology is used to look at the interrelationship between local people, national and political economies, and the ecosystem. This demonstrates the use of power, the right to use resources and control resources, and the protection of the environment (Bourdeau, 2004).

In addition, these contributors discussed above have failed to acknowledge the social networking that has collapsed within the communities owing to conflict over resources in recent years. They have failed to differentiate between community conflict emanating from socio-economic factors at community level and armed conflict driven by political and economic factors. It is evident from the study that the communities are at a crossroads with one set of actors blaming another. The absence of functional social networking coordination among community actors on one hand and the state on another becomes detrimental to the communities’ ecological discourses and the governance structure. This existing interstrife cannot be ignored if we are to successfully work towards sustainable community development. This is why Somerville (2011) argues that a community should be a place of common interest, common characteristics, values and culture.

As such, some proponents acknowledge the different stakeholder interpretations and strategies relating to social issues and environmental hazards connected to resource extraction in developing countries (Eggert, 1994). The communities are acknowledged only as grassroots participants. As such, less emphasis has been laid on the ability of weaker stakeholders at the grassroots level to compete with powerful actors on political and economic issues (Bryant and Bailey, 1997). The weaker stakeholders are passive in pursuing their own community goals, and are often suppressed and rejected in issues that affect them. Apparently, the relationship between government, society and resources in political, economic, social and ecological issues has often been inadequate. As such, the so-called grassroots stakeholders have often resorted to avoidance behaviour (Adas, 1981) and sometimes this results in violent conflicts. This is evident in the recent August 16th 2012 Marikana violence in South Africa that left 3 dead and 78 wounded. Also the Koidu
community riot against the KHL (now OCTEA) in 2007 left 2 dead (NACE, 2010), and another two dead on the 19th December 2012 by state security.

Political ecologists have attempted to link local social oppression and environmental degradation to wider political and economic concerns (Blaikie, 1985; Bunker 1985). Cliffe and Moorsom (1997), Hedlund (1979) and O’Brien (1985) in their publication titled the Review of African Political Economy discussed unequal power structures, identified local environmental conflicts in terms of class interactions and linked surplus extraction to global capitalist production (Bryant and Bailey, 1997). Within these prevailing circumstances, the local communities have become or have been ascribed the role of hosts of the natural resources. They have only customary control of the land but are not legally owners of the resources. In spite of this they are adversely affected by actions of government and other actors within the communities. The communities lack community capacity in the form of empowerment, entitlement, information, active participation and trust to determine what affects them and how, and how to avoid being exploited and made vulnerable. According to Holmes, (2003a), participation brings sustainable practices. Therefore, the broad research aims and objectives relating to the issue of resources and communities in this thesis are focussed on working towards the principles of sustainable community development in the resource-rich communities as stated below.

**Aim and Objectives**

**Aim:** This research aims to explore the dynamic relationship between resource usage and the aim of achieving sustainable community development in the Kono district, Sierra Leone.

**Objectives:**

1. To identify the relationship between resource exploitation and community governance in mining communities through an analysis of key actors and their roles at a range of scales.
2. To examine if and in what ways mining communities utilise their assets and undertake practices that contribute towards sustainable community development.
3. To identify both the structural and community-based barriers to promoting sustainable community development in mining communities and to make policy recommendations for community development in such communities.

1.8 Methodology
In this section, I have given a summary of the methodology, with details explored in chapter four. The research was entirely qualitative using a multi-case study approach and employed triangulation techniques for data collection (see chapter 4). The discussions are centred on the adoption of an inductive approach to theory building from evidence collected in the data. The inductive approach attempts to establish new theories in order to explain resource use and community sustainability instead of testing an existing theory in a deductive manner (Blaxter et al., 2001). I have constructed theories using induction, abduction and retroduction by looking for regularities common to social (community) and political actors, their roles, and their involvement in sustainable community development.

Qualitative research centres on events in a social world through the eyes of the studied group (Bryman, 2008). Yin (2009; 2007) explains that qualitative methods create knowledge that is more socially useful and can contribute to a more effective development policy. It provides a better understanding of human interpretations and interactions. Hence, I find it justifiable to use it in this study. The triangulation techniques used include semi-structured interviews, documents, and focus group discussions. Since some actors are unwilling to participate in in-depth interviews, the combination of these techniques provided the opportunity for cross-validating the data from different sources. I used the case study approach because of its usefulness. Yin (2009) argued that case studies are appropriate as they offer a vivid story of what happened and how. Case studies are concerned with how and why things happen, allowing the investigation of contextual realities and the difference between what was planned and what actually happens. The approach conforms to the triangulation technique I adopted in an attempt to achieve a balanced representation through using semi-structured interviews, documentary data (secondary data), and focus groups discussions to complement the data generated. The case study approach adheres to the understanding of post-positivism relating to the bases of reality and it being socially constructed (Yin, 2009; Nee and Taylor, 2000). It was of interest to the researcher to
analyse the disparity between what is in the documentation and what actually happens in the communities.

**Limitations**
Qualitative methodology is not without limitations. It has the tendency of being protracted with unnecessary issues. Lofland and Lofland (1995) argued that there is the peril of deviating away from the purpose of the study. But this has been overcome with the adoption of triangulation techniques.

**Case Study Approach**
The research adopted the multiple case study approach, which helps the researcher to be more focussed because of the potential proximity to real life situations (Yin, 2007). Yin (1993) argues that studies on multiple-cases should follow a replication, and not a sampling logic. The use of multiple-case study enhances confidence in results (Yin, 1993). Unlike other researches or commentaries on diamond mining in Sierra Leone, this research undertakes a relatively new direction to exploring the problems associated with the mining industry in Sierra Leone. The study is not aimed at investigating land degradation and conflict diamonds. Instead, the research is aimed at achieving a sustainable diamond mining industry that can benefit present and future communities and requires a governance initiative that incorporates co-governance and co-production in the resource-based communities. In that respect, four chiefdom headquarter towns or communities that are actively involved in mining were explored in detail.

**Research Design: Strategy and Approach**
A research design is “a logical plan for getting from here to there” (Yin, 2009, p. 26). It helps the researcher to avoid moving away from the focus of the study. It is a “blueprint” for a study addressing important problems: what question to study, what data is appropriate, what data to collect, and the analysis of the results (Robson, 2003).

**Cases Studied**
I investigated four mining chiefdoms (Nimiyama, Gbense, Nimikoro and Tankoro) in the Kono district in the eastern part of Sierra Leone, which are instrumental in
drawing generalisations on sustainable community development. The first diamonds were discovered in this district in 1930 and since then all forms of mining have been taking place on small and large scales, legal and illegal (Smillie et al., 2000; Bangura, 2006, 2008), by domestic and external actors, in the form of alluvial and Kimberlite (NACE, 2009; Zack-Williams, 1995). These resource-based communities have been affected environmentally, socially, politically and economically.

**Conducting the Research**

The researcher visited the Ministry of Mines and had discussions with mines officials. I had an insight into the operations of Sierra Leone’s artisanal diamond mining and the efforts made by the government to achieve community development in mining communities. I also visited the ‘Network Movement for Justice and Development’, who are an advocacy NGO for ‘just mining’. I also attempted to contact the Local Authority/Councillors who were presumed to be representatives of the communities. They are aware of traditional norms. I contacted an official of the most powerful corporate mining company, Koidu Holdings Ltd (now OCTEA) in Koidu town (Gbense and Tankoro Chiefdoms). The next focus was on the artisanal mining actors. They were selected at random taking into consideration their relevance and access.

**Case Study Timetable and Data Collection Procedures**

The research was undertaken between February and July 2011. The timetable for collecting documents, conducting interviews and meetings for focus groups was not consistent. With officials reluctant to speak, most of the documents were accessed online at the Mines Ministry websites, Koidu Holdings Ltd, and the Network Movement for Development and Justice (NMJD). The artisanal participants showed a willingness to cooperate despite being busy with their mining activities. I also had a random selection of them for the focus group discussions. Due to their busy mining schedule, the numbers for each focus group was uneven. However, the information collected from them was credible as it shows consistency, as a case report was produced and analysed for each case. This conforms to Charmaz’s (2005) principles on data collection and analyses where both are presumed linked and work simultaneously. The method of data collection and analysis was appropriate because of the homogeneity of the problem, the, actors and activities in all the cases
Data Collection Techniques and Process
This entails the nature of data collection, the techniques and the process used to analyse the data. I used documentation, semi-structured interviews, and focus group discussion. I drew a table where necessary for each of the techniques explaining the demographic description of the respondents interviewed, and coded the focus groups. I used at most two focus groups for each case.

Documentary Analysis
Documents are significant in collecting data (Yin, 2009). Documents used in the thesis included those from the Ministry of Mines and Mineral Resources, the Network Movement for Justice (NMJD) and other articles including those by Partnership Africa Canada (PAC).

Key Informant Interviews
I used interviews to get primary data from credible respondents. Interviews are used as a medium of conversation with a specific purpose. Robson (1993, p. 228) defines interviews as ‘a conversation with a purpose’. The researcher adopted semi-structured interview with eight focus groups in the four chiefdoms, and 20 individual community members. A total of 37 respondents were engaged. Subsequent questions depended on the previous answer given by the respondent.

Focus Groups
According to Powell et al. (1996) a focus group is a group of individuals identified and gathered by the researcher to discuss an issue and comment on it from their individual understanding of an area of study. The focus groups were met at convenient locations. Using focus groups helped to minimise the chances of inconsistencies. The researcher used the focus groups to ignite discussion and provoke answers in order to get better responses.

Data Analysis and Interpretation
After data collection, I reviewed, coded, categorised and analysed the raw data to achieve the aim and objectives and answer the research questions. According to Gohar (2002), data analysis is the construal of raw data to understand the causes and effects of problem under consideration. Recorded information and semi-structured
interviews were transcribed, coded and analysed thematically to explain conformity and disagreements on the research propositions and new theories that emerged. The researcher adopted an inductive approach to theory building, coding and categorising the themes to arrive at the conceptual ideas by using theoretical contributions, which guided me to formulate the research questions.

Categorising the Data
The next step was to categorise the data and link the relating concepts to each other. I was more interested in the general issues related to the research aims and objectives than developing them into meaningful theoretical concepts. The text is simplified into three coded data sources and then used for theory building, playing with and investigating these codes and building data into significant pattern of relationships (Coffey and Atkinson, 1996). I used category structures around the thematic concepts of the actors, community governance, and sustainable community development. These themes go alongside concepts such as roles or activities of actors, sustainability practice and assets. These themes or contexts were used to categorise all the cases, and linked the issues across these multiple case studies one at a time, bringing the categorisation together. Because of the responses being almost the same in each context, I used a theoretical comparison between the reviewed bodies of literature in the theoretical chapter (2).

Theory and Narrative Building
I started the theory building from particular or specific issues. I identified the phenomenon and related it by using ideas and theories for all of the cases. I used diagrams and tables where required to identify the questions and the sources of data. With this, I was able to give emphasis to certain differences from the empirical data of the participants, the role of the actors and their activities on the available asset limits of sustainable community development and I then made analytical generalisations. According to Yin (2005), these generalisations help the researcher to understand the process and the relationship between the various concepts arising from the data. Conclusively, I link the interrelationship between the groups of concepts on community governance and sustainability practice in building my theories.
Ethics of the Research

Research should work with the whims and caprices of research ethics with considerable respect for human dignity. Creswell (1994, p. 165) states, “...the researcher has an obligation to respect the rights, needs, value and desires of the respondents”. This research involved various actors who were key sources of information. They included government officials, businesses, miners and community people. Hence, the ethical issues and challenges were taken into consideration whilst undertaking the research with the respondents.

Researching a topic relating to diamonds in a country that where their presence had a contributory negative influence on a decade-long brutal war, which was largely fuelled by the trade in ‘blood diamonds’, is obviously difficult. The district is inhabited by people who depend either directly or indirectly on diamond mining and trade as their main source of livelihood. There were ethical issues with a high sense of moral responsibility for the researcher relating to the security, privacy, and wellbeing of the interviewees (Bryman, 1988). Taking these issues into account, there was a sense of responsibility needed in order to adhere to the required ethical standards when conducting the research under review.

I took into consideration issues like informed consent, confidentiality and anonymity, security risks, and social status. I also considered the high rate of illiteracy when conducting semi-structured interviews with community participants. The local Krio language was used to communicate and solicit their consent. The purpose of the research was explained before the interviews and respondents were informed of their freedom to withdraw their consent at any stage of the interview. With these measures put in place, the interviews and discussions were friendly and productive.

Despite all the efforts aimed at protecting participants, there were some difficulties getting government officials and members of local authorities to express themselves like the other community members. This is due to the nature of what I call ‘political psychology’. This remains an issue and most people are often afraid to respond to key issues especially when they may risk their job. This was evident in the brief discussions with some government officials and the administrator of Koidu Holdings Ltd, who all made several references to their websites for the information sought.
These websites provide information that fine-tuned the work of the institution. The information was not always comprehensive. This is often true of government information which is drafted and published in order to suit the needs of the government of the day. However, using the triangulation technique, effort was made to secure information and protect respondents without identifying them by name. This was done in my work by giving prefix code of S for Sewafe, K for Koidu and Y for Yengema, and the suffix-coded letter shows the status of the respondent.

1.9 Organisation of Work
The thesis is organised into eight chapters. The first four chapters are theoretical and include the conceptual framework chapter (2) and the methodology (chapter 4). The rest of the four chapters include the analysis chapters (5, 6 & 7) and the conclusion chapter (8).

The introductory chapter has outlined the research focus and the core arguments as well as the theoretical approach, the aim and objectives, a summarised methodology (see details in chapter 4) and the organisation of the thesis. Chapter two is a combined theoretical framework chapter of political ecology and sustainable development. In this chapter, I have justified the combination of the two literatures subject to the objectives of the research. I have looked at the conceptual issues and approaches of political ecology, resource curse, and community governance and sustainability. In addition, I have discussed the concept of sustainable development using the Brundtland report, the strong and weak sustainability approaches, community assets, sustainable community development, and the challenges. Chapter three discusses the political geography of Sierra Leone’s mining industry. In the chapter, the roles of both state and non-state internal actors, including non-state external actors, are discussed. It gives a brief background political history of Sierra Leone and its diamond industry. This chapter is a theoretical platform to chapter five, which limits its scope on internal actors.

Chapter four is the methodology. It highlights the approaches, the data collection and how the data was analysed. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 deal with the analysis of the data collected and addresses the objectives of the research, respectively. Chapter five includes resource exploitation and resource curse, environmental impacts, the actors,
and community governance. Chapter six deals with sustainable community development, community assets and how the various actors’ activities affect sustainability approaches according to the Brundtland report. Chapter seven looks at the outcome of the findings in chapters 5 and 6 and addresses the structural and community-based barriers to promoting sustainable community development. In it, I have made suggestions and recommendations on policy for community development in the mining communities. The last chapter (8) deals with the comprehensive summary of the thesis findings and suggests areas of possible future research. It is a preparatory chapter for more work that can be investigated in the wider field of political ecology and sustainable community development. Specifically, it is an exploratory chapter on further research in developing resource-based communities, with development that brings gains in the present without compromising the well-being of future communities.
CHAPTER TWO
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Assessing the Sustainability in Political Ecology

2.1 Introduction

This chapter focuses on two main bodies of literatures: political ecology and sustainable development. It attempts to harmonise the ideological and epistemology of how the two inter-connected concepts embrace pluralism and how they contribute to the outcome of the research objectives. Political ecology has incorporated a series of methodological approaches that interprets and assesses sustainability. Among these include intergenerational equity (Padilla, 2002) and the concept of strong versus weak sustainability (Neumayer, 2003). In that case, political ecology may be understood as an attempt to refine and apply the basic idea of sustainable development using the Brundtland report, which calls for how our present actions should not be compromised in reference to the needs of future generations.

In an attempt to harmonise these two literature sources, I will define the concepts of political ecology and sustainable development. In addition, I will review the pluralism on specific literature on sustainable development using the Brundtland report (1987) and political ecology. The Brundtland report (WCED, 1987) is used in the thesis as the pivot of sustainable development within the bulk of the literature because of its inclusiveness of actors’ present actions and the possible effect and reactions in the future. In essence, it conforms to the stakeholder approach adopted in political ecology, in order to determine how the actions of various actors affect the present and future communities. From an ecocentric point of view, sustainable development shows the relationship between humans and the natural environment they find themselves in. The human factor implies the role of actors and how their activities influence others.

Secondly, I will look at the conceptual issues or paradigm shifts in political ecology in three debatable questions. Thirdly, the next section will discuss the conceptual approaches of political ecology with key references made to the stakeholder approach. The fourth section that follows will examine community governance and sustainability practice. Here, I will include social capital, and the resource abundance
and curse debate. The fifth section will deliberate on sustainable community development and the concept of community. In the sixth section, I will discuss the strong and weak sustainability approaches in the context of political ecology. In this section, I will discuss the various assets within the communities, and end it with the challenges of sustainable community.

Though I discuss the need for the resource-based community to exercise their right to partnership in policymaking and implementation, and for them to determine the production and delivery of services, I will discuss three main theoretical propositions in the nexus of the literature. Firstly, sustainable development is universal but the approaches towards achieving it vary and are subject to the process of achieving it at micro level (of community). This is why so many conferences have yet to confer on a conclusive agreement for a comprehensive strategy for sustainability. Secondly, focusing on the issues at macro level (international policies) or internal governance initiatives without taking into consideration the co-governance and co-production approaches is unproductive. Thirdly, because of the north-south divide or differences between the developed and developing countries in the composition, culture, and governance structure, real solutions for sustainability are yet to be achieved. As such, focus should be a shift from state-led governance to state-community governance.

2.2 Understanding Political Ecology and Sustainable Development
Before discussing the theoretical pluralism between political ecology and sustainable development, I will discuss their definitions and interpretations to give a summarised scope of these two theoretical concepts used in this chapter. This will make the discussion on the interdisciplinary relationship clearer. I will start with political ecology and subsequently discuss sustainable development using the Brundtland report.

Political Ecology
The concept commences as a framework involving the intricacy between local people, national and global political economies, and the ecosystem (Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987; Schmink and Wood, 1987), and how their interrelationship alters the availability of resources and control over resources amid conflict of interest, conflict of control and use of resources (Peterson 2000). In addition, political ecology
addresses ecological issues and the political economy by way of harmonising the changing dynamics between ecological changes and humans (Walker, 2005; Peterson, 2000).

According to Peterson (2000), ecological change caused by, influenced by, or controlled by human action alters resources and services. Hence, political ecology incorporates the dynamics involving humans, institutions, and natural resources in both geographical and non-geographical ways over time. This dynamics between humans and resources require political decisions, economic activities, and management of resources that should benefit the host, the producer, and the advocator (government, local authority, the buyer, and the consumer). This means that political economy cannot ignore ecology nor can ecology ignore the political dynamics in achieving sustainability. This shows that political ecology can interconnect with other discipline. Zimmerer and Bassett (2003b, p. 2) and Neumann (2009, p. 1) cited from Neumann (2009) in ‘Political ecology: Theorizing scale in the Journal of Progress in Human Geography’, argue that: “Political ecology is discipline based; there exists a ‘productive tension’ between the field and its home discipline that can be explored for potential theoretical advancement.”

In that case, political ecology is a discipline which has the potential to go beyond the present parameters of its study. Hence, I think it can justify my decision to use it aside sustainable development, which considers the role of actors, resources and communities in this thesis.

Sustainable Development: The Brundtland Report
This section will broaden our understanding of the concept and principle of sustainability used in this chapter and in the thesis by discussing a generally acceptable and working definition. Like other disciplines, there is a problem in gaining a consensus definition acceptable to all. Regardless of that, the appropriateness of the definition matters to its context. After years of environmental concerns globally, the United Nations World Commission on environment and development produced the report titled ‘Our Common Future’ in 1987, and sustainable development emerged undoubtedly as a global policy instrument to ‘meet the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to
meet their own needs’ (WCED, 1987). That is why, for the purpose of this thesis, I have chosen the Brundtland definition as the appropriate conceptual definition because of its inclusion of present activities and how they must not be detrimental now (intra-generation) and in the future (inter-generation). Also, the Brundtland definition includes the actors (generations) who, as discussed in chapters 5, 6 and 7, have played diverse roles in resource-based communities. At national community level, I argue that present activities must not be detrimental to intra-community and inter-community interests. In the following section, I will deliberate further on the relationship between political ecology and sustainable development.

Theoretical Pluralism: Political Ecology and Sustainable Development

This section shows the relevant common factors that can be used in this thesis to justify the use of political ecology and sustainable development. To substantiate this link, I consider the contributions on political ecology given by Blaikie and Brookfield (1987), and Peterson (2000) as a framework involving the intricacy between local people, national and global political economies, and the ecosystem (Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987). This concerns how their interrelationship alters the availability of resources and control over resources amid conflict of interest, conflict of control and use of resources (Peterson, 2000), and the Brundtland report, which ‘meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’ (WCED, 1987). The analogy between political ecology and sustainable development deliberate on the actors, the resources and the short and long-term effects. Development processes fosters community development in people and resources at but how the actions of the actors in achieving their development goals affect future generation or communities cannot be ignored. This relation is summarised in the table 2.1. The table is divided into three columns showing the actors, their actions and the effects on present and future communities. From this table, I will discuss how each of them interrelates with each other from a political ecology and sustainable development point of view.
Table 2.1 Theoretical Pluralism: Political Ecology and Sustainable Development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actors: there are diverse actors with varying interest.</th>
<th>Actions</th>
<th>Effects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The dominant actors give unsustainable activities a sustainable outcome</td>
<td>a) Use of power: legitimate power could be used for (i) coercive purpose (ii) reward purpose (patron-client relation)</td>
<td>a) Present communities: the actions of the actors affects present communities in diverse ways, e.g. assets depletion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Use of resources: this is determined according to how the actors exercise power</td>
<td>b) Future communities: there is a spill-over effect on future communities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Sustainability approach is neither strong nor weak in resource communities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Author’s construct

In the first column, I have divided the actors into three categories with each having its sub-categories. The second column shows the tool (power and resources) these actors use and which approach of sustainability it is used, and the third column identifies the effect on present and future communities arising from the first two columns.

Political ecology has incorporated a series of methodological approaches that interprets and assesses sustainability. Among these include intergenerational equity (Padilla, 2002) and the concept of strong versus weak sustainability (Neumayer, 2003). On the other hand, Sneddon et al. (2005) explain the theoretical and normative aspect of sustainable development as a policy discourse and development practice that is simultaneously accustomed to the peril of dominant actors hoping to give unsustainable activities a sustainable outcome. They call for decision that overhauls everything in a world where decisions over environmental governance prevails. Drawing from this proposition, it brings the role of actors in an ecologically unstable world where economic value on resources has become a bone of contention. The resources have been used by various actors, for diverse needs, and through ethical and unethical means. Some of these actors include communities, state agents and capitalist business. Their actions have often proven detrimental especially in resource-rich communities with neither a strong nor a weak sustainability. Most of these actors, like the proponents of weak sustainability, focus on the economic value of nature than the qualitative improvement of all forms of capital (Baker, 2006). Subsequently, the
effect transcends one generation to another. Hence, the essence of pluralistic sustainability requires the acknowledgment of the political nature of the conflicts that arise among actors. Such interventions have been in the form of environmental policies through various global conferences on man and his environment. As such, political ecology may be understood as an attempt to refine and implement the broad idea of the role of actors in sustainable development using the Brundtland report that calls for our present actions not compromised with the needs of future generations. Achieving this requires a flagrant use of the forms of power within the capacity of the actors.

The role of power from local to global scales maintains a consistent scale in political ecology and transcends through the need of how actors and communities use power on people and resources to either benefit present development needs without any compromise of future communities or destroy present development needs and compromise the resources and needs of future generations. Thus, the analysis of how power is used and its relationship between various actors is a central concern of political ecology and sustainable development. Guha (2000) has provided leadership and intellectual contributions to political ecology by addressing the social and ecological implications of power relations. Flynn (2011) and Price (2009) state that power has the ability to influence others decision either in a positive or negative way. In that case, it can be used for either moral or immoral purposes. Robbins and Judge (2011) contributed to the acquisition of power, stating that people who have power deny it; people who want power try not to look like they are seeking it; and those who are good at acquiring it are secretive about how they got it (cited in Lunenburg, 2012, p. 1). This shows that power is a natural process in the framework of organisational way of doing things (Hauggaard and Clegg, 2012; McClelland and Burnham, 2003). The process involves various ways depending on how it is acquired, used and purpose. Power could be legitimate and acquired through a position of assigned authority and the right to govern. It could be in the form of a reward that gives the individual the ability to influence the behaviour of others by luring them with things they may appreciate. The latter is associated with the patron-client relations whereby the client exercises the political leverage of the patron in self-interest (Kabia, 2006). This form of power develops gradually to coercive power and gives the patron or client the ability to influence the behaviour of others by inflicting direct punishment
or through implied threat to do so (Lunenburg, 2012). Evidence from both primary and secondary data has proven that legitimate power could be used to reward or coerce others. In many cases, especially in the developing world, evidence has shown how patron-client relation has affected resources and other subordinate actors.

2.3 Conceptual Issues: Paradigm Shift in Political Ecology

Like other disciplines or theoretical concepts, political ecology has attained prominent recognition in the field of human geography and sustainability in both developed and developing countries. However, it has remained at a crossroads and is interpreted in varying ways. Understanding of the concept has evolved over the years. The concept developed as a framework outlining the interaction between local people, national economies, global political economies and the ecosystem (Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987; Schmink and Wood, 1987). For some commentators, political ecology is often linked to ecological issues from a political economy perspective by way of harmonising the changing dynamics of ecological changes and humans (Walker, 2005; Peterson, 2000).

The dynamics of political ecology have changed over time. In my attempt to incorporate it in this study and show the shift in ideas about the discipline, I ask many questions and raise concerns in my discussion of the literature. I use the questions as a way of systematically highlighting the various ideas according to their theoretical contributions. My first area of concern is exploring if political ecology is trans-disciplinary. Here, my concern is to see how the adoption of political ecology as a theoretical framework can connect with the literature on community governance and sustainable community development, which is described in chapter three. For example (Zimmerer and Bassett, 2003b, p. 2) and (Neumann, 2009, p. 1) cited from Neumann (2009) in ‘Political ecology: Theorizing scale in the Journal of Progress in Human Geography’, argue that: “Political ecology is discipline based; there exists a ‘productive tension’ between the field and its home discipline that can be explored for potential theoretical advancement.”

Thus political ecology is a discipline which has the potential to go beyond the present parameters of its study. Hence, I think it can justify my decision to use it in this thesis. However, there are more questions which need to be answered in order to demonstrate
the body of ideas within the discipline. I am still interested in how far it can connect with my theoretical areas. An attempt to fill this gap was the contribution of Paulson et al. (2003), which links the discipline to political economy and cultural ecology. Even though this work is not focused on the conceptual side which links political ecology to political economy and cultural ecology, the discourse qualifies political ecology as being inter-disciplinary or trans-disciplinary. With these contributions, I surmise that the appropriateness of using political ecology can be transferred to sustainability.

*Political Ecology: Is it about people or places?*

My other question is whether the study of political ecology is about the geography of humans and places? Fundamentally, I am trying to find out if we should only pay attention to the welfare of people who live in a place or should we be interested in understanding how they live with each other and coexist with their environment? On this aspect, and in trying to find salient contributions to the piece of work, my focus is on how they can coexist as a social entity. In my quest for answers, I note how Neumann (2009) attempted to integrate the discipline of political ecology with human geography that connects with places and region. In addition, Neumann (2005) and Zimmerer and Bassett (2003b, p. 2) quoted from Neumann (2009) in ‘Political ecology: Theorizing scale’ in the *Journal of Progress in Human Geography* noted that “the field of political ecology has involved significantly the study of human environment relations”. Drawing from the contributions by Zimmerer, Bassett, Neumann, and Paulson and their colleagues, the above discussions demonstrate the relevance of the revolving issues to political ecology and its relationship with other disciplines, and the connection between humans and their environment. They fall short of identifying that human relationships with the environment are sometimes not equal. Some humans exert more influence than the others. In normal circumstances, we expect some form of authority among humans. Therefore there is a likelihood of having to pass laws. This therefore provokes another question that asks whether the focus of political ecology should be on questioning whether it is really political, or whether it is more relevant to focus on how power or politics determine issues such as the sustainability of the ecology and the environment.
Political Ecology: Is it political or ecological?

Walker (2007) questions whether political ecology is satisfactorily political. By contrast, Vayda and Walters (1999) state that political ecology has become politics without ecology. I see both Walker and Vayda and Walters discussing the same issue but with a different focus. Whilst Walker was more interested in the political side but critical of the political fulfilment in political ecology, Vayda and Walters critique a focus on the political which omits considering the ecology. They see the political aspect of political ecology as being concerned with the issue of power whilst ignoring the influence of power on ecology itself. I agree with their discourse since my area of concern, as discussed above, is about how power or politics can determine the sustainability of resources and communities. This we shall also observe in the analysis chapters later, which show how politics has dominated ecology. In those chapters, I explained how the state has given more control of natural resources to the minister of mineral resources to preside over mining policies and the level of community benefit from the resources. Alongside my commentary, Paulson et al. (2005) explained that power is attributed as a social relation built on the unbalanced distribution of resources. Indeed, though their contribution is of relevance, they failed to show who has the political leverage to determine the distribution of resources. There are various actors in play when it comes to natural resources. Often, as this work has discovered, the community actors are subdued by political influence and political submissiveness or loyalty. Inferring also from the contribution of Walker (2007, p. 2) that: “the verbal commitment in political ecology to not only to study but to wield political power to make a difference, ‘to plant a seed’ for both the humans and nature appears not to be in question”.

2.4 Conceptual Approaches of Political Ecology

The approaches of political ecology are essential for harmonising people in the community with their natural resources. Despite having similar political, social and economic perspectives, political ecologists have attempted to adopt different approaches in dealing with the interrelationship between humans and their environment in developing countries (Bryant and Bailey, 1997). Taking into consideration the issue of resource burden and sustainability, these approaches outline the differing viewpoints or commentaries from different contributors on how to work
towards political ecology. This difference, according to my argument here, is understandable because there is variation in the development process between developed and developing nations, as people’s environment and culture influence their way of life, and there is variance in governance structures across nations and communities. As a result, approaches to ecological issues are bound to differ. In some instances, political ecologists combine two approaches in examining human and environmental issues. This could be appropriate, because no one approach is regarded to be the most suitable, apart from where it is deemed to be the most applicable. Indeed, it suffices to say that the outcome of any approach is determined by its effectiveness.

Rangan and Kull (2009) outline three approaches of social action in political ecology, which are operation, observation, and interpretation, and how they can work together to produce an outcome of material process and power (scale). Through this, ecological, social and economic changes are made political, transformative, descriptive and evolutionary at local, national and international levels. In this commentary, we can see the concerns of these commentators for a desirable outcome. Nonetheless, this commentary does not say how much control the communities have and how their operation, observation and interpretation could transform the communities. However, this could be a workable approach in an already functioning sustainable community. Elsewhere, some commentators have argued that political ecology approaches have developed around three sets of concepts: first, marginality, in which political, economic and ecological expressions may be mutually reinforcing whereby “Land degradation is both a result and a cause of social marginalisation” (Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987, p. 23). Secondly, based on the pressure of production on resources that is transmitted through social relations resulting in the imposition of onerous demands on the environment (Watts, 1983b). Third, there is “the plurality of positions, perceptions, interests and rationalities in relation to the environment” (Blaikie, 1985, p. 16). In this case, there are critical analyses of institutional and development processes informed by movements for social and environmental injustice (Bryant, 2002; Zimmerer, 2000). Like Blaikie and Brookfield (1987) and Watts (1983b) the discourse is concerned with the physical side of ecology with a specific focus on land degradation. Land degradation has been Blaikie’s concern since the early days of political ecology. This concern did not go beyond considering the
socio-political relationship between the community and the actors they interact with. In addition, their commentary was centred on mitigating environmental impact instead of the inaction of community governance and the sustainability of the communities, including the various assets in the communities. In addition to the approaches outlined above, and in an attempt to conceptualise them in theoretical argument, there are three other approaches I am going to discuss below. They have been comprehensively categorised, issues in them identified and explained, along with the critique or contribution I have made on them.

*Geographical Approach*

This approach is directed at understanding the human impact on physical geography (Goodie, 1993) but according to Bryant and Bailey (1997) it is associated with the political economy. This is one of the approaches adopted by political ecologists in developing countries, which focuses on a specific environmental problem or set of problems such as tropical deforestation, land degradation, soil erosion and water pollution. Blaikie (1985) researched the political economy of soil erosion and identified hierarchical issues linking social, political and economic forces taking place at local, regional and global scales (Bryant and Bailey, 1997). Like Blaikie and Brookfield’s (1987) research on land degradation, studies were also carried out in Brazil by Hecht and Cockburn (1989), in Indonesia (Daurergne, 1993/4), on rangeland degradation in Sahelian Africa (Turner, 1993), and on water scarcity in Botswana (Peters, 1984). This approach, though appropriate for its context and specific environmental problems, does not include the use of natural resources and the role of the actors in the socio-economic setting. In an attempt to further simplify it, the approach does not take into consideration aspects of governance and sustainability.

*Stakeholders’ Approach*

Another form of approach adopted by political ecologists focuses on a range of questions, which take into consideration the different stakeholders and how their influence or discourses affect the participation of other stakeholders and their interests (Escobar, 1996). This is the approach adopted in this thesis to expound on the different actors as discussed in chapter 5. The actions of the actors could have either positive or negative effects. That is why stakeholder interests, their characteristics and
actions are significant in understanding political-ecological conflicts (Bryant and Bailey, 1997). This approach seeks to argue that such conflicts are an outcome of diverse aims and interests (Long and Long, 1992). Putting this in perspective, the interest of the government may differ from that of the community, and the interest of a corporation may be entirely based on profit maximisation, unless there are workable regulations protecting the communities and the environment. The interest of a political ecologist should not be on resource conflict resolution. Rather, it should focus on acknowledging the scope and limitations of each actor to avoid conflict. For instance, Leonard (1988), Pearson, (1987) Mooly (1996) and Morehouse (1994) investigated the interrelationship between local political conflicts, transnational corporate strategies and environmental degradation in Mexico, Papua New Guinea, India and Namibia. Similar work was done to identify the struggle of different stakeholders with the state, as well as inter-sectoral conflicts (Bryant and Bailey, 1997). The categories of actors involved in ecological issues are both internal and external. Whilst some theorists shift the cause of the problem to external actors, others ascribed it to internal actors such as the state or their associates. Girvan (1976) links environmental problems to what he called the ‘new imperialism’. According to Girvan, the ‘new imperialism’ is associated with corporate imperialism, which sees the external capitalist actors dominate, control, and exploit the periphery (internal). Girvan (1976) explains the instrumental theories of Marxism, where power as an instrument is exercised by government and business elites over the people, protecting corporations during instances of ecological damage. Girvan sees no difference between the political imperial actors and the economic imperial actors’ domination and exploitation of natural resources and their method of cleverly subduing the resource rich nations. Girvan’s study on mineral exporters or the resource rich ‘South’ concludes that: “in spite of the supposedly favourable conditions for economic development represented by the resource flows from the mineral industry, these economies remain both structurally underdeveloped and externally dependent” (Girvan, 1976, p. 11).

Accordingly, Girvan (1976) argues that the developed nations give political protection to their corporations in developing countries and, often, ignore the devastating socio-ecological damage inflicted on communities. I agree with Girvan on corporate protection given to multinational companies investing in developing countries. For
instance, the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico (May 2010) in the United States of America is being taking seriously because of the location of the damage, unlike a situation in Nigeria where oil spills or pollution are the order of the day with little or no international attention for decades. Practically, observing past and present events of environmental crises, a premium is laid on developed economies or core states, whose populations lobbied for the protection of their ecosystems. In contrast, little or no attention is paid to the environment by governments in developing countries. However, Girvan’s explanation is not without criticism. Like Blaikie, Girvan is focused on the role of the structuralists or capitalists and their corporations in developing countries. When this is the case, finding a sustainable ecological solution in the source of resources becomes difficult. Girvan focussed on the roles of external actors and overlooks the role of internal players that are as equally devastating as the external actors.

**Socio-Economic Approach**

This approach explores political-ecological questions through a socio-economic framework that includes ethnicity, class and gender. Such an approach highlights the structural legacy associated with the local conflicts under the parameters of a capitalist means of production and the ensuing class conflict (Bryant and Bailey, 1997). The issue of ethnicity is very sensitive and falls under the parameters of this thesis. Bryant (1996b) and Smith (1994) made a remarkable contribution on the situation of ethnic minorities that are politically and economically marginalised, and carry the burden of environmental degradation when they looked at the impact of state-sponsored logging on local people and communities in Sarawak (Malaysia) and the impact on ethnic minority groups in Burma. However, in this thesis I am emphasising the issues of class and gender roles. These two are either systemic or structural in the communities I have investigated owing to existing cultural and power roles. Bourdeau (2004) argues for the use of power, the right to use resources and control resources, and the protection of the environment. The way power is used by internal actors in process of governance can maintain a strong internal community that can influence the role of external players. That is why I have focussed on the internal actors in this thesis. Looking back at what is stated about political ecology, there is emphasis on the significance of the interrelationship between local environmental issues and global political and economic processes (Walker, 2005; Nightingale,
2002). However, this interrelationship is only substantial where there is the ability and capacity of communities to act and react on issues of governance and sustainability (see 2.5) below.

2.5 Community Governance and Sustainability Practice

In the commentary above, I have discussed the various approaches that could be adopted in addressing ecological issues. Among the three approaches discussed, the thesis focuses on the stakeholder approach because of the role played by various actors in the utilisation of natural resources. Here, I am going to review the aspect of the literature that connects community governance and sustainability.

The body of literature on community and sustainability is enormous. Hence, my main focus here, as the focus of this thesis is on sustainable community development, is to connect community governance to sustainable community development. This is important because the research is focused on resource-rich communities, which, after years of mining activities, are underdeveloped and lack sustainability practices. I will focus on two viewpoints in this section. One is how government sees itself a sole agent of resource policies and the other will be on what happens when the community is ignorant of what government is doing. Put another way, what is the importance of the community’s involvement in governance?

**Government Perspective**

From the first viewpoint, the government’s role is appreciated in a community development agenda but it excludes the community as a potential partner in controlling and managing resources. This exclusive control by the central government is made obvious through legal means enshrined in the mining policy Acts. This action by the state in neglecting the community on issues of sustainability implies the absence of community development. The exclusion shows the decision of the state to perceive the community as an instrument of the state. When the community is seen as a tool or instrument of the state, it implies a shift from co-governance to government rule (sole-governance). In that case, in contrast to Osborne and McLaughlin (2004) and Brandsen and Pestoff (2006) on co-governance and co-production, the community will not be able to play a partnership role with the state in policy formulation and implementation, and in production and management of goods and
services. For instance, in Sierra Leone, the government has incorporated community development into mining policy and introduced the Diamond Area Development Fund (DADF) (MMR, 2012). There seems to be much optimism in the shift in mining regulations compared to past mining policies. However, this optimism overlooks the role of the resource-based communities in promoting sustainability. The communities are mere recipients whilst the government is the decider of policies. The vested powers to formulate and implement mining policies still rest on the central government institution.

Social Capital or Community Capital
The next point of consideration remains on the community’s capacity to involve and contribute on issues that concern them. We have seen above that the state has seen itself as the dominion over matters of development and sustainability practice. However, the community is seen by some commentators to be inseparable and worthy above the state. Hopkins (2008) and McCarthy (2005) made discourses on the need to bypass the state and/or market processes, with the conviction that the community is more efficient on managing resources than the state. In addition, their ideas, which are linked to those of neo-liberals, call for the role of the state to be diminished. As such, the communities are required to have the requisite ability to act on matters affecting them. This demonstrates the importance of social capital or community capital, as Robbins and Rowe (2002) called it, which argues that communities should have the capacity to act without fear or intimidation. Evans et al. (2004) states that there should be a network of strengthened relationships between the people that leads to trust and reciprocity. Apparently, the basis for such a social relationship requires the shift of authority from central control to the communities in legal and practical terms. Within the literature on social capital (Murray, 2000, pp. 100-101) noted that: “building social capital rests on a foundation of three requirements: (1) a sense of hope by citizens that a solution is possible; (2) sufficient opportunities for engagement with those with the necessary motivation and skills; (3) opportunities to nurture community service life-skills.”

I agree with Murray’s explanation when I consider the co-governance and co-production discourses made by Brandsen and Pestoff (2006) and Osborne and McLaughlin (2004), as discussed above. Working towards policy or service delivery
under the taxonomy of community governance and sustainability requires hope for a solution to a problem, a favourable political atmosphere of engagement at community level, and also between the community and the state at another level, and the sustainability of the process and the outcome of actions taken.

The discourses show that a community’s role is not limited to the relationship between networks of individuals, but is inclusive of the process of engagement, with the capacity for dialogue to reach a desirable outcome. Seyfang and Smith (2007) perceive the community as an opportunity to new practices and norms, which are generally accepted by the community with regard to sustainability practice. While this is a useful contribution to the field of study, the limitations are political, legal and customary. In most communities in the developing world, like those discussed in the methodology chapter (4), community actors are very likely to be politicised, mining policies have a legal limitation on ownership of natural resources, and the customary role of women limits them when pursuing an active community role (see chapter 6). Whilst these vices prevail, the framework of sustainability is questionable. Hence, I argue the role of the community in sustainability is linked to participation in decision-making by all without limitations. Relating to this, Agyeman (2005), in an attempt to explain environmental justice and public participation, discussed two models called the ‘information deficit’ model, and ‘deliberative and inclusionary process procedures’ model. The former explains the behaviour paradigm or the concept of ‘attitude-behaviour gap’ (Southerton et al., 2004; Agyeman, 2002) to explain the discrepancy between stated attitudes and behaviour on environmental issues. As (Agyeman, 2003, p. 347) noted when explaining public participation, this: “...stresses the interdependency of contemporary environmental, social and economic issues that are the focus of sustainable communities and calls for a civic renewal and power sharing between communities and local governments with new forms of public participation to create innovative solutions.”

Agyeman (2003) included three components of sustainable development, which are economic, social and environmental, and justifies the role of the community in sustainability through participation. Even though Agyeman did not include the cultural and physical issues or assets, I infer that the issue of sustainability requires decision-making, participation and a desirable outcome by/ with the community
actors and government institutions. Hence, there should be an absence of individual and rent-seeking behaviour. As (Cannon, 2000, p. 367) noted when discussing community development: “Because community development specialises in mobilising people in the interest of social justice and in developing social relationships based on cooperation rather than individualism it should have a central role in the processes of confronting the environmental crisis, and in designing more sustainable futures which place people centre-stage without divorcing them from their (ecological) environment.” Taking the argument from there, understanding how these actors interact with their environment and resources will move this discussion to the next section, which examines the pros and cons of resource availability and abundance.

The Resource Abundance and Resource Curse

In this section of the literature, I will be looking at the various arguments given for the burden resources have brought to some countries in general and resource-based communities in particular. In the discussion, I will attempt to connect the relation between political ecology and sustainable development. Accordingly, the different roles of the various actors have significant impact in the resource-based communities. They show evidence of rent-seeking and social disparity and have no central community development agenda. The question remains if the cause of this rent-seeking and underdevelopment is as a result of the resources.

Many commentators have argued that the whole problem of resource conflict is linked to an abundant natural endowment. In my understanding, that is not the case. The problem has to do with bad governance exercised through legal limitation and exclusion of resource communities on policy making and implementation. I suppose that a mutual power relation is required to promote the supply of resources from the communities, and demand or commensurate recipient gains from the natural resources. It is when this fails that the impact arising from discontent ends in community violence. Collier and Hoeffler (2005) argue that the issue of ‘lootable’ resources, poor governance and underdevelopment in sub-Saharan Africa centre on greed and grievance. It is a fact that the absence of mutual consent between the state actors and the communities is an indicator of governance flawed. But what I will disagree with is the direct link between community grievance and the armed conflict in Sierra Leone. The key factor to the armed conflict was political before it became
associated with the socio-economic factors to sustain it. However, the community violence out of grievances did not cause the armed conflict; rather, it was a dormant breeding ground. This implies that the political motives arising from patron-client took advantage of the socio-economic grievances in resources communities.

I need to emphasise here that proponents that link diamonds to armed conflict have over exaggerated the relationship at national and global scale without making distinction on community violence. What has occurred over the years is discontent and violence fermented by political and economic greed by the elites, social exclusion, and economic deprivation. The reaction, in the form of grievances has been maintained at community scale. It has never been directed to armed conflict. Rather when the war broke out for political and economic reactions, these community grievances were magnetised by warlords. Partly, it was a reason why some of the youths were easily conscripted into a fighting force. The grievances arising among the communities, especially the youths, though it has an indication of flawed governance, arise from socio-economic exclusions and deprivation. From my assumption on ‘state-corporate’ curse hypothesis, the community grievances reach expression of growing discontent and become conflict, especially from the youths when the state uses its institutions to suppressed social, economic and environmental descent. This affirms Zack-Williams’ (2001) argument that youths were helpless and marginalised before the war.

Inferring from the above discussion, Ross’s (2001a) hypothesis explained the paradox within resource rich economies. These economies, Ross explained, are poor and violent in spite of abundant natural resources (Ross, 2001a). Despite the abundance of resources, only the elite and their agents or associates have benefited through a dogmatic doctrine of patrimonialism and clientelism (Le Billon, 2001). Whilst the elites gain, the resource-based communities do not benefit but carry the burden of the environmental impact. Consequently, the uneven distribution of wealth from natural resources has turned resource rich nations into nations of conflict (Collier, 2000; Ross, 1999). However, what happens when these economies result in violence is another matter. In such circumstances, political ecologists may want to know the role the resource plays in such conflicts. According to Ross (2001b) and Le Billon (2001), the availability of resources shortens or prolongs resource violence. They further
explain that the dependency on natural resources may exacerbate civil conflicts and that civil conflicts could conversely exacerbate resource dependence (Ross, 2001b). In this case, there is what I will call the ‘paradox of abundance’. Meaning that, the abundance resources could lead to conflict because of inappropriate governance, and this in turn increases the over reliance on natural resources. In any case, Ross failed to understand that the resources are not the problem but the people who manage them. As I have explained in the previous sentences on the ‘paradox of abundance’ above, the relationship between resource dependence and conflict has to be taken in the context of a time and place. Also, I see resource dependence as a problem during a conflict and not before it. It could only be a problem prior to conflict when the governance structure is ineffective. For instance, diamonds in Sierra Leone became an instrument of war only during the war and not before it. Circumstantially, the state institutions before the outbreak of the war in 1991 become ineffective because of corrupt officials. Inferring from this, I argue that resource dependence is a consequence of war and not a driver of conflict. The most potent issue of resource abundance before the war could be governance flaws, especially those operating between the resource-based community and the state.

2.6 Sustainable Community Development

Here, I will discuss the concept of community and the concept of sustainable community development. Before discussing sustainable community development, it is good that I will discuss what a community is before understanding how it can work towards being sustainable. Under sustainable community development, I will attempt to expatiate on the line of difference between community development and sustainable community development.

Concept of Community

The meaning of what a community is varies in both the national and global contexts. Consideration of the geographical aspects of what a community is could vary from one part of the world to another or from one sector of an economy to another. Nevertheless, a community should be able to have a common vision. Hence, this can provide a definition that incorporates who is, who is not, where they belong, and how they belong, which is necessary.
Some contributors define community as a geographical location, whilst others could mean it to be non-geographical, comprising of shared beliefs or characteristics like ethnicity, sexuality or social class (Minkler and Wallerstein 1997). Others, such as Joseph (2002), differentiated a community from what she calls the capital society. What Minkler and Wallerstein (1997) identify as a community may include: a) a pattern of social cohesion, b) functional spatial units fulfilling sustenance needs, c) a sense of collective identity and d) groupings motivated as one to act in a political manner and participate in changing circumstances affecting them. Joseph sees community as boundaries between them and us that are established through reference to race, identity, place and culture. However, Joseph (2002) sees a variation between a community and society that shows internal coherent (continuous) and autonomous (discontinuous) structures separately from each other. Society is argued to mean denature that crosses borders and sees everything and everyone equivalent. Minkler and Wallerstein (1997) identified two theories that characterised a community that is inclusive of all regardless of the variations of the community. Though Joseph differentiated community from society on the basis of how community operates within social boundaries whilst society works across boundaries, Minkler and Wallerstein’s account of community is synonymous with what Joseph calls a society. This shows that the use of the concept of community depends on the context of one’s proposition.

Minkler and Wallerstein (1997) posit that a community has to be perceived as both an ecological system and a social one. The ecological system is comprised of the size of the population, heterogeneity, density, the physical environment, technical factors and social structures. The social systems includes economic, political and ‘subsystems’ existing within a particular community and how they co-exist with each other outside the community systems (Minkler and Wallerstein, 1997). This definition might not be wholly adopted in all cases. However, in this thesis, it suits the characteristics of the communities the research considered. Another definition of community states that it is ‘a group of people with diverse characteristics who are linked by social ties, share common perspectives, and engage in joint action in geographical locations or settings’ (MacQueen et al., 2001 p. 1929). Whether the community is perceived as an ecological system or a social one, other commentators examined the porosity of what a community looks like. Somerville (2011) argues that a community can be conveyed
as being homogeneous or heterogeneous, integrated or segregated, strong or weak, cohesive or fragmented, open or close, united or divided, and inclusive or exclusive. Homogeneous communities are generally strong, empowered to pursue and express similar attitudes on many issues affecting them. On the contrary, Somerville (2009a) characterised weak communities with acquaintanceship and permeable sociability, comprising of people from different cultures and backgrounds. Despite most communities being multicultural, especially in developing countries like Sierra Leone, I posit that the weakness of the communities is not as a result of a variation of cultures from diverse background. Rather, the permeable and impermeable, strengths and weaknesses of the communities arise from patronage and self-seeking interest by actors who do not serve the interest of the community in which they live. In essence, I can deduce that an individual or group can live in a locality but do not belong to that community because of actions that are inimical to the common existence of the community. This narrative gives us the understanding that belongingness in a community varies and is bound by fussy, rigid, flexible, stable and unstable states. Despite a community being perceived as people living in a place with a common interest, common characteristics, values and culture, they are determined by their weak and strong connections. In that case, Clarke et al. (2007) posit that the relationships that hold a community together are characterised by the way in which members share enjoyment.

The different attributes of a community discussed above could be available and workable for a time, but cannot necessarily be sustained indefinitely. This is true of developing countries where the structures of the social society are unstable due to cultural and governance issues. The prevalence of such unstable societal conditions leads to underdevelopment and unsustainable communities. That is why some countries consider the term sustainable community instead of just community. For instance, the United Kingdom’s 2005 report on sustainable communities defined a sustainable community as a place where people would want to live and be employed, at the present and for the perceived future (Defra, 2009). The communities have to be safe and wide-ranging to meet the different needs of present and future members. The communities have to be well planned and offer parity of opportunities for all (Maliene and Malys, 2009). This definition has an element of sustainability according to the Brundtland report (1987). Hence, in this thesis, I discern a community as a component
of development that is meaningful to both short-term and long-term members. This shows that a community should involve political deliberations, environmental concerns, social issues and economic activities over time. These are issues that affect communities from one point in time to another. Therefore, a community underpins the attainment of improved productivity, or economic growth (Haynes, 2005; Dobb, 1963), social and economic equality (Calvert, 1989), improved institutions, attitudes and development policy (Haynes, 2005). Such choices and works could mitigate underdevelopment and maintain sustained development. Taking these discourses into consideration, I have focused on sustainable community development instead of community development in mining communities, where the stakeholders co-work with the communities in the production and delivery of goods and services, and in policymaking and implementation.

**Community Development and Sustainable Community Development**

I will differentiate the thin line separating community development from sustainable community development. I will explain the difference between community development and sustainable community development using two arguments: one is by using the Brundtland report and the other by using an analysis of the condition of what I call the ‘capacity of self-reliance’.

Considering the Brundtland report, I look at a step towards the sustainability of a community by examining the interrelationship between a community and development for present goals and future needs. According to Frank and Smith (1999), community development is defined as the planned fruition of the economic, social, cultural, and environmental factors of community well-being. The community members work collectively to act on problems affecting them and to find solutions for them. Economic, social, cultural and environmental factors are components of the Brundtland report which, when adopted, attempts to move the community from being just a community to an instrument of development. However, for the community to develop sustainably, it requires a process of social capacity or community capacity among the community actors to develop in order to be able to determine their vision.

In that sense, sustainable development emphasises the importance of bridging the gap between ecological views and development aspirations, taking into consideration the
social relationships that exist in the community. It incorporates the promotion of local community activities over development decisions (Baker, 2006). By this, the community working under the ideas of sustainability needs a workable social capital, institutions and actors who are proficient in engaging with the process of community development and sustainability and know when, where and how this is appropriate. This process advances the social capacity of the community in what I consider the ‘self-reliance capacity’, whereby the communities can determine policies and community services. The discussion has however shown that the process differentiates community development from sustainable community development.

Going further in order to discuss the concept of sustainable community development, drawing on the above discourse, I infer that an understanding of the social relationship discussed above, that for a community to be a sustainable one, it involves the people, their entitlements, environment, and the welfare concerns of future generations. According to Gore (1993) entitlement is peoples’ unhindered access to their legal rights and other public benefits. This cannot go on without the promotion of social rights, including legal rights. The promotion of social change aims at accomplishing human and non-material needs, enhancing organisational efficacy, progressing social equity and developing human and technical capacity focussed towards sustainability (Roseland, 2000). As such, we see the community thriving not based on geographical factors and composition but through a process of social change. The entitlement and right to legal and public service enjoyed by the community will strengthen the social capacity of the community. However, it is not the end but a means to the end when the actions and impact of the present communities are considered in the light of how such actions affect future communities. Otherwise, the whole of social change in the community becomes short lived. According to Baker (2006) “the objectives of sustainability require the protection of the natural resource based upon which future development depend” (Baker, 2006, p. 5). This supports my argument regarding sustainable communities, linking it with the enshrined principles incorporated in the Brundtland commission report: ‘development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of the future generations to meet their own needs’ (WCED, 1987), and the capacity building approach, which works towards achieving sustainable development under Agenda 21 (Khan, 1995).
According to Gwin (2005), capacity is the ability that people, societies and organisations have to administer their affairs successfully. A community’s ability for capacity building includes good leadership, supportive institutions, inspiration and a willingness to act on issues affecting them (Frank and Smith, 1999). However, sustainability does not only limit itself to capacity building but rather a continuous long-term capacity building process in which every stakeholder participates (UN, 2006). To support this assertion, Domeisen and Sousa (2006) state that capacity building without an emphasis on long-term holistic dispensation is unrealistic. For that reason, I see participation and not representation as an essential aspect of sustainable community development. There should be a collective response and participation of all community members in determining their destiny (Narayan, 2000; Bunwaree et al., 2005). In fact, collective response has to be on-going in order to sustain the goals of the community. Short-term capacity building may not give the required results for sustainability unless the process is continual and able to give a desirable outcome. However, long-term political interregnums and instabilities have affected the living standards of people in most resource-rich communities in the developing world. The paradox is that the more resources extraction occurs, the more the well-being of the communities is affected. Apparently, as I have indicated above with examples of the 2007 incident in Koidu, a recent one on December 19th 2012 that left two protesters dead, and the Marikana massacre in August 2012, some forms of investment in the resource-rich economies are hindrances to attaining sustainable community development. The resources are mismanaged and the local communities are not informed nor do they consent to the awarding of mining contracts to companies or corporations. Politically, governments have taken unilateral command and control decisions without consideration of local community interests. Evidence of such political interference and complacency has affected sustainable community development. This has often led to armed conflicts (Le Billon, 2001; Collier, 2000; Ross, 1999) characterised by a decline in social, economic, environmental conditions and unequal power relations (Doppelt, 2003). Such measures inhibit the aspiration for sustainable community development when the actions of the actors fail to reconcile social progress, economic activity and environmental protection (Baker, 2006). The development process in communities in the developing world should not operate in a form of a game theory where communities and sectors grow at the expense of others in the form of a zero-sum game. In a process like this, activities in the economic
sector like mineral extraction are offset by a loss in other sectors (resource pull effect) (Humphreys et al., 2007) and consequently the payoff is zero.

2.7 Strong Versus Weak Sustainability

This section is of vital importance in understanding the effects of approaches adopted by various actors in resource-based communities. Earlier, primarily from a political point of view, I have discussed the use of power on people and resources. Here, by focusing on the resources, the effect of the actors’ actions shows which aspect of sustainability is achieved. Subsequently, the effect could be limited or extended to affect all resources and future communities. Hence, we need an enabling ecological community that harmonises with nature according to the Brundtland report. However, there are various ways the actors may use to achieve this. Baker (2006, p. 5) suggests works towards preserving nature, and noted that establishing an ecological society implies “reconciling economic activity, social progress, and environmental protection”. This view is not accepted by others who consider economic activities central to environmental protection. Considering Meier’s (1989) call for holistic approach to development, Peet’s (1992) opinion on infinite growth on a finite planet, and Humphreys et al.’s (2007) conception of a ‘spill-over effect’ on other sectors, these arguments highlight whether the role of various actors can constitute sustainable development.

The proponents of strong sustainability advocate that it can be achieved by recognising the finite nature of the earth, greater resource protection and the improvement of natural assets. They emphasise that the problem is not about the pursuit of economic growth but its pattern, which causes environmental problems (Hamstead and Quinn, 2005; Baker, 2006). They argue that strong sustainability should focus on the qualitative improvement of all forms of assets instead of limiting on the focus on the quantitative expansion of any one form of capital. The essence of is to foster a better life without depleting the natural resources at the expense of the future community. As such, it will become clearer why I have focused on sustainable communities with literature on political ecology and sustainable development. Development and provision of welfare services should be done without rapid depletion and extinction of the natural capital. The process of welfare and service provision should be rational. Supporting this commentary, Roseland (2005) explains
that well-being can be improved through different types of community assets (natural, economic, environmental, social, human and cultural). Rather, what has been evident in most resource-rich countries, especially in the developing world, is the utilisation of natural resources for self-seeking gains using power relations between powerful actors and their associates.

On the other hand, weak sustainability advocates argue that there should be no limit to the fundamental system of economic growth. Their proposition calls for infinite growth from the utilisation of natural capital to create economic capital. They ignore the impact infinite growth has on the environment. Here, the environment includes the natural capital itself, as well as the community. In real terms, they even ignore the impact on human capital. They advocate for a human-centred approach to the human-environment relationship, and argue that environmental problems could be resolved through technology innovations, efficient use of resources, substituting manufactured goods or capital for the available natural capital or asset, and a focus on individualism, private property, a limited role of the state, and dependence on market and technological innovations to remedy environmental and social problems (Baker, 2006; Friedmann, 1987). This assumption seems unsustainable because the actions do not take into consideration the effect on natural resources and communities of the future. It is obvious from the analysis that the political ecology is associated to sustainable development. The role of the actors on resources is directly or indirectly linked to the needs and resources of future generations. In that respect, I posit a connection between weak sustainability and the resource curse hypothesis or resource exploitation on two assertions. Firstly, it has to do with ecology and, secondly, it has to do with the distribution of the vast wealth that is often characterised by rent-seeking and client-patron establishment. Often, as in the case of Sierra Leone, the vast resources have been extracted but the argument made for weak sustainability proponents for economic growth is yet to be achieved. As such, from the ecological perspective of strong sustainability, there is deep-rooted environmental degradation and loss of assets ranging from natural, physical and social assets. The outcome of the research supports this argument, as the diamond industry shows neither a strong nor a weak sustainability approach.
Community Assets in Perspective
This section begins with the identification of assets or capitals outlined by Roseland (2005) in table 2.2. These are necessary in working towards sustainable community development as they uphold the pillars of sustainable development given by Ekin (2000) and Khan (1995). Green and Haines (2002) gave four forms of community capital, which are human, physical, financial, and environmental. It might appear that the amount of required community capital varies depending on the nature of sustainability in the community. Achieving sustainable development, according to Baker (2006, p. 8) is: “an on-going process, whose desirable characteristics change over time, across space and location and within different social, political, cultural, and historical contexts”.

Unlike Ekin (2000) and Khan (1995), who commented on a limited number of assets, Baker (2006) went further to include other aspects. However, among their various contributions, Roseland (2005), and Daly and Howell (2006) have mentioned all of the assets I mention in the communities investigated. The consideration of these assets is significant because I see the sustainability of the communities as a function of them. Therefore, talking about sustainable community development co-exists with the quantitative and qualitative improvement of the available assets in these communities. In chapter 5 the reader will learn of the evidence of exploitation, which shows a lack of infrastructural development. Roseland (2005) and Daly and Howell (2006) identified six types of assets that we can examine: (i) Human capital (ii) Natural capital (iii) Economic capital (iv) Social capital (v) Physical capital and (vi) Cultural capital. To understand the context within which these communities can work towards a sustainable community development, it will be expedient to give an overview of the compositions and state of the various assets. I have identified these assets, and I will discuss them one after the other, according to table 2.2 on the following page.
Table 2.2 Types of Community Assets

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identified Assets</th>
<th>Composition of Assets</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Natural Capital (Ecological or Environmental)</td>
<td>Comprises of biophysical resources, living systems and life-support services of our planet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Capital</td>
<td>Covers knowledge, health, skills, competence, motivations, emotional and spiritual capacity of the individual that enhances the establishment of personal, social and economic well-being</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Capital (Manufactured or Produced)</td>
<td>Includes the stock of material resources such as buildings, equipment, infrastructure and machinery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Capital (Financial)</td>
<td>It is a derived form of capital from others’ assets. Involves ways of resource allocation, investment, cash, and the monetary system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Capital</td>
<td>An outcome of shared traditions, values, customs, identity, heritage, and history.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Capital</td>
<td>Operates formal structure (government) and informal organisation (social networks). Consists of relationships, structures and networks, institutions that enhances shared knowledge, understandings and blueprint of interactions among a group of people, families, communities, political systems etc.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Roseland (2005, pp. 4-14)

**Natural Capital**

According to Roseland (2005), natural capital encompasses biophysical resources, life support services, and living systems. Precisely, natural capital is the natural endowment base that includes ecological elements such as land, flora and fauna. Ekin (2000) described the ecological element as to involving the functioning of both the social and economic factors and their effect on the environment and resources. In economic terms, land is a factor of production and includes natural resources. However, it has been viewed not only as a factor of production but also as a unique social amenity. Ghimire (2001) explains that land is a secure form of holding wealth and gaining social and political advantages and establishing family food security. The outcome of the research discussed in chapter 6 shows that the capacity of the community members to conceptualise what land means to them determines how they interact with it.
Human Capital

According to (Rose 2005), human capital includes knowledge, health, skills, competence, motivations, and the emotional and spiritual capacity of the individual all of which enhance the establishment of personal, social and economic well-being. Every community needs access to these enshrined elements to increase their community capacity and economic well-being. Investment in human capital through education, training and health services works towards economic growth, development and sustainability. However, these are lacking in most resource-based communities. This inadequacy cannot maintain a steady transformation towards a sustainable community. According to Meir (1989), development involves a holistic transformation. However, I argue that the transformation is dependent on the availability and utilisation of the assets.

Economic Capital

It is undisputable that, as part of a holistic sustainability approach, economic capital is vital to developing a sustainable community. Roseland (2005) identified economic capital as a derived form of capital emerging from the other assets. It involves the methods of resource allocation, investment, cash, and the monetary system. Ekin (2000) explains that economic capital concerns the allocation and distribution of relatively scarce resources. Ekin is completely correct in limiting his work to the scarcity of resources. Often, we have seen resource problems arising not because they are scarce but because the process of allocation and distribution is in the hands of the few who determine how and what should happen. For instance, Ross (2001b) argues that the resource curse is attributable to resource abundance. Indeed, the petroleum problem in Nigeria and the conflict over diamonds and resources in Sierra Leone, Angola, and D.R. Congo have nothing to do with resource scarcity. However, Ekin is right to include the issues of allocation and distribution of resources.

Physical Capital

Roseland (2005) defined this form of capital as the capacity of a group of individuals to affect standards, regulations, and put into effect the regulations that determine the distribution of resources and the approaches that are used. According to Roseland,
physical capital includes the stock of material resources such as buildings, equipment, infrastructure and machinery.

**Social Capital**

Roseland (2005) identified social capital to include formal structures (government) and informal organisations (social networks), political systems, relationships, structures and networks, institutions that enhances shared knowledge, understandings and a framework of interactions among a group of people, families, and communities. Social capacity enhances the establishment of social networks, structures, institutions and organisations, which leads to calls for collective action and shared knowledge, understanding, and interactions that can bring desirable outcomes (Roseland, 2005). Phillips and Pittman (2009) note that social capital or social capacity affects the extent to which a community can collaborate together effectively to plan, set goals, get things done, make group decisions and develop and sustain strong relationships. In addition, Craiz (2005) and Daly and Howell (2006) argue that social capital is necessary for capacity building within social relationships and to increase opportunities. In essence, Daly and Howell (2006) argued in support of engagement and the norms that foster community development. This asset is of significance when I consider the nature of community governance and political ecology with respect to the role of the important actors.

**Cultural Capital**

This is not only an important aspect of these community assets but also a sensitive one in communities that hold strong cultural beliefs. It is a form of capital that determines the way the communities understand the environment around them, the norms, values and the steps towards change (Daly and Howell 2006). Roseland (2006) explains it as the outcome of shared experience through customs, traditions, heritage, history and identity. These customs and traditional beliefs are often highly respected in many communities. The details of the outcome of the research on them will be seen in chapter 8.

**Sustainable Community Challenges**

I have discussed above that the various assets and the direction of the approaches towards sustainable development can be conceptualised as being of either strong or
weak sustainability. Achieving a sustainable community is not without challenges. Over time various actors have exerted increasing amounts of pressure on natural resources, degraded the land and their actions have affected the communities and subsequent communities. Some commentators argue that these challenges are owing to the prevalence of endemic poverty, corruption, disease and violence (Dobie, 2002) while others attribute it to the inherent systems of governance (Graham et al., 2003). Despite the availability of some of the assets I discussed above, there is a complex interaction between humans and their environment. The Brundtland report says that the human and ecology relationship has become a significant problem emanating from the lack of institutional and infrastructural capacities to effectively manage these intricate situations (Brundtland, 1987). The effect of the human and ecological ‘collision’ in most resource rich nations in the developing world has shifted subsistence from poor agricultural activities to mining activities. As such, most of the fertile agricultural land has been utilised for mining activities by individuals and companies (Humphreys et al., 2007). In addition, there are also problems associated with lack of accessible public information, government transparency, public consent in decisions affecting well-being, and the non-existence of enforceable environmental laws (Hecht, 1999).

Minkler and Wallerstein (1997) discuss that a community is not only characterised as being ecological and social, but is also classified into three distinct models of practice: a community’s locality development, its social planning and the social action (Rothman and Tropman, 1987). These are challenging issues especially when considering policy and decision-making, and production and service production. Rothman and Tropman (1997) deliberated on the issues with respect to the model of practice. They made their argument on the basis that locality development portrays community identity as a sense of belongingness, that social planning focuses on how problems affecting the community are resolved, and that social action is comprised of both aspects of locality development and social planning as well as community engagement and community participation (Cohen et al., 2008). In order to be effective, participation has to include preventative measures, mitigation, and compensation (Goodland, 2004). It works side by side with engagement and empowerment.
According to Cohen et al. (2008), community engagement is a process of soliciting people’s contribution on significant policy issues, and their integration into decision-making and social action. They reiterate that better planning, real commitment and inclusiveness are the fundamental principles of community engagement. At the initial stage of planning, objectives are required but can only become workable with participatory commitment by the various stakeholders. However, this is not often the case, as I will discuss in chapter 8. What normally happens is that the national and local authorities exercise a command and control policy. Command and control, according to Carter (2001), is any efforts by an authority (e.g. national government, local government, administration) to influence the decisions of businesses and people through explicit standards and employed state employees, and a concurrent legal system that implements the policies (Cater, 2001). This imposition from one stakeholder in order to compel others to adhere to an environmental policy or action cannot be sustainable. It can only lead to social disorder and has been common practice leading to elitism and patrimony, as evident in chapters 6 and 7.

The other challenge associated with engagement and participation is empowerment. These issues are obviously interrelated. The actors have to be empowered to exercise their rights without fear or limitations. Morse and Fraser (2005) argue that it is attainable through bottom-up community participation, working toward the goals of the community. This is because, according to Holmes (2003b), the participation of local communities can provide an explanation of the relationship between communities and their environment. The Tamarack Institute (2008) states that it allows an evaluation of the principle of community engagement through an interactive process. According to the Tamarack Institute (2008), recognising the community’s commitment enables them to identify their own action plans. However, often, the choice of participants affects the ultimate achievement of sustainability. When and which people in the community are actively involved matters in what the World Bank Group (WBG) called meaningful participation (Goodland, 2004).

2.8 Conclusion
This chapter has reviewed the contributions of academics and researchers in developing a conceptual framework for political ecology that meets the challenges of community and resource sustainability. Drawing from this body of literature, I have
attempted to identity and critique sections of the literature that will enhance the outcome of the research, which could aid further investigation. I critique the changed context in which the commentators have laid down their arguments and the practical issues affecting communities in resource-based areas. In doing so, I reviewed elements of political ecology that deliberate on that. I also considered the different approaches in the field that have been challenged in the field of ecology and communities. Most of the decisions or policies undertaken by the state pose serious social risks and operational difficulties. A theoretical state-policy framework that cooperates in partnership with the communities intensifies a power disorder that reinforces the power base of the elites. The new context therefore calls for a co-governed and co-managed/production framework that will promote ecology, sustainable use and sustainable communities. Looking at the prevailing predicaments of resource curse in the developing world, power should be linear in order to conform to state institutions and community institutions both in legal terms and in practice in order to engage with practical questions that will induce practical solutions. Unlike those who concentrate on external actors, I have also argued in the chapter that the role of internal actors should be considered seriously. The internal actors are as equally destructive as their external counterparts. I also examined the theory of resource curse, which is attributed to resource abundance and conflict. In addition, with inefficiency and misrepresentation in state institutions through institutionalisation and the denotation and connotation of governance, I briefly explained the definitions on governance from a national and community point of view. I also deliberated on community governance and sustainability. I argue that community governance can no longer be looked at in isolation without considering sustainability if we think there is a need for sustainable community development. Alongside this, the chapter explains that because there is variation in the development process between developed and developing nations, people’s environment and culture influence their way of life. As such, consideration should be taken of the variance in governance structures across nations and communities, which influence the achievement of ecological solutions.
CHAPTER THREE
POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY OF SIERRA LEONE’S DIAMOND MINING INDUSTRY

3.1 Introduction

This chapter is of great importance in this thesis as it serves as a theoretical precept for chapter 5. The first objective of this thesis is to identify the relationship between resource exploitation and community governance in mining communities, through an analysis of key actors and their roles at a range of scales. Mining has been going on since 1931, but years of diamond mining have had limited development on infrastructure in resource communities. From a strong sustainability perspective, the natural assets have been extracted at an unprecedented state; in a weak sustainability approach, the extracted resources have not brought the desired economic development in resource communities in particular. When the war broke out in 1991, the diamond communities became places of interest for state and non-state actors, including external actors. Even though the thesis focuses mainly on community actors, the purpose of this chapter is to identify some key actors whose roles on resource exploitation from time to time transcend from community or national level to global level. From a political ecology viewpoint, the power role of various actors varies over time at the detriment of the environment and the communities. This is exemplified in the patron-client relationship in the midst of personalised national institutions and natural resources.

Some academics like Le Billon (2001) links the problem to resource abundance and Collier (2000) argue that the problem has to do with greed. Collier and Hoeffler (2005) argue that the link between what they call ‘lootable’ resources, poor governance and underdevelopment in sub-Saharan Africa is centred on greed and grievance. In an attempt to make the diamond resources benefit the communities, Maconachie argues for the establishment of institutions as a governance strategy for the long-term diamond resource problems in Sierra Leone. Maconachie (2008) discussed the governance initiatives in the diamond industry in post-conflict development in Sierra Leone by assessing the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) and the Diamond Area Community Development Fund (DACDF) as two main governance initiatives in the country’s diamond sector to salvage the problems in the communities. Ocheje (2006) calls for a high standard of transparency
that both the government and the extractive corporations investing in these resource-rich developing countries must conform to. Firstly, it should be known that abundance has nothing to do with the malfunctioning of the diamond industry; rather it is about the political and economic construct of state and non-state actors for rent-seeking purpose. Secondly, Ocheje’s argument limits the need for transparency in the industry to two main actors: the government and corporations. In addition, the formation and implementation of the two governance initiatives ignores grassroots community involvement. Excluding other actors who play a role or who are affected is flawed and cannot achieve a sustainable diamond industry. In an attempt to identify various actors in the Sierra Leone diamond industry, I argue that achieving sustainable diamond mining should include the root causes of various actors’ involvement in the diamond industry in Sierra Leone.

In that case, this chapter will start by discussing the political history of Sierra Leone and shifts from optimism to pessimism. This shift is discussed in the next section that examines the political economy of Sierra Leone in the pre and post-independence era. This will be followed by the history of its diamond industry. The next section will identify both state and non-state actors. This section is followed by the governance initiatives that have not adequately involved most of the actors. The last section will be the conclusion that summarises the chapter.

3.2 Political History of Sierra Leone
Sierra Leone’s political history could be dated from the arrival of Pedro Da Cintra along the coast of Sierra Leone in Freetown in 1462, to the first group of captured slaves by Sir John Hawkins in 1562, to the abolition of the slave trade in England by Lord Chief Justice Mansfield, to the arrival of the first group of freed slaves in 1787 by Granville Sharpe, Thomas Clarkson and William Wilberforce, and to colonialism and independence in April, 1961 (Alie, 1990). These men, abolitionist presupposed that these ‘freed slaves’ would engaged in commerce and agriculture by creating the right conditions and prospect to evolve in a free and self-governing community according to western civilisation (Wyse, 1989, cited in Francis, 2001). It can be argued that the first mistake of governance in community of freed slaves may have commenced from the imposition of an alien culture that did not take into consideration the already existing governance structure among the natives. This
‘cross-roads’ governance structure of western style and the indigenous way became even apparent in the two systems of rule by the colonial government which was imposed after Sierra Leone became a British crown colony in 1808 and had a protectorate in 1896.

Sierra Leone was thought by some to be a success story of a nation that would see rapid development after independence in April 1961, when the vast mineral deposit was projected to be a blessing to the small West Africa state. In contrast, that optimism eroded over the years as it was marred with interface between patron-client relation and the politics of decline in what Reno called the ‘Shadow state’. The governance structure became the interest of those connected to the political association. Subsequently, discontent arose and conflict ensued, and most actors became interested in the war because of the role that diamonds play. The focus that was laid on the abundant natural resources above the governance structure was, to me, the first mistake of the resource exploitation. Little or nothing was done to remedy the colonial legacy of divide and rule or the act of prioritising resources above the resource communities, which was demonstrated through the development of feeder roads and rails for the transportation of natural resources to seaport. The former US Ambassador to Sierra Leone, John Hirsch described the situation: “Sierra Leone’s history reflects a fundamental paradox before: independence it was, at one level, a remarkable example of peaceful coexistence among people of diverse religious beliefs and backgrounds. Fourteen different ethnic groups lived according to Islamic, Christian and animist traditions. Intermarriage was common and there was little ethnic tension. Yet geographically base ethnic tensions between Mendes in the south and the Temne and Limba in the North, manipulated by politicians were to be at the root of the state’s progressive collapse in the nearly four decades since independence” (Hirsch, 2001, p. 24).

The ten year old war that broke out on March 23rd 1991 when the RUF invaded the eastern town of Bomaru near the Liberian border was notorious for its extreme nature and levels of violence perpetrated by both internal state and no-state actors, who were aided clandestinely by eternal actors. The conflict was not for diamond resources nor were the diamond resources used during the war because of abundance, as instead they were drivers of the conflicts. The impact of the conflict affected every sector and
assets of the resource-based communities and the national economy. With civilians being at the crossroads of bad governance and resource exploitation emanating from colonial rule, after years of politicising economic and political interest, and neglect resulting in the rise of clientelism and patrimonialism, 50,000 civilians were killed and 100,000 were mutilated (UNIFEM, 2007; Kabia, 2006). This contradicts commentaries by conflict analysts that African conflicts are marred by ethnicity (Kabia, 2006). This limited analogy, without considering the underlying economic, social, political, colonial and international factors, overshadows the historical context of bad governance and resource exploitation that has its roots in the colonial era and has extended to present day Sierra Leone. The network of these factors has given rise to weak and failing state in Sierra Leone in what Francis called the ‘politics of decline’ (Francis, 2001).

The ‘politics of decline’ has manifested in Sierra Leone and is characterised by clientelism and neo-patrimonialism, which has culminated in insurgency (David, 2001), a formal and informal trade in arms and mineral resources, and the destruction of community assets. Evidently, this characterisation was exemplified during the civil conflict in Sierra Leone. Not surprisingly, this has contributed to the emergence of various actors who could be either victims or perpetrators. As such, Kaplan in Kabia (2006) categorised the violence that gripped Sierra Leone as ‘new barbarism’ and linked the causes of this ‘barbarian war’ to the social breakdown caused by population pressure and environmental collapse (Kaplan, 1994). However, his position was challenged by Richard (1996) and Francis (2001) who stated that these factors had not fomented the war in Sierra Leone. Intuitively, I disagree with Kaplan’s propositions. Evidence from the research work undertaken shows no evidence of population pressure even in the midst of environmental degradation caused by years of formal and informal structured licit and illicit forms of mining.

Sierra Leone’s economy became marred by resource exploitation and violence. Some conflict commentators and the World Bank point at economic factors as the pivotal cause of civil conflicts (Kabia, 2006). Hence, in the quest for causes and resolutions, Collier’s greed and grievance debate in Berdal and Malone’s edited book, titled ‘Greed and Grievances: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars’, showed that states saw economic opportunities are far more likely to cause conflict than grievance (Collier,
This economic factor was supported by Smillie et al. (2000) in ‘The Heart of the Matter’, which stated that diamonds (resources) are the root cause of the Sierra Leonean conflict. Political commentators also argued that the conflict in Sierra Leone was overtly or covertly for diamond resources. The argument linking diamonds to the conflict in Sierra Leone between 1991 and 2001 was also supported by state actors. For instance Sierra Leone’s permanent representative to the United Nations at the time, Ibrahim Kamara, argued that the root cause of the conflict remains diamonds, diamonds and diamonds (quoted in David, 2005; Kabia, 2006). If the argument was generally accepted it would support the argument by Ross (1999) that the abundance of natural resources is the cause of conflict in resource-rich nations, especially in developing world. I have disregarded this claim on the basis that diamonds (resources) are economic drivers that sustained the war to achieve political and economic aims through arms conflict and not drivers that started the conflict. In addition, the conflict that has to do with socio-economic deprivation and political exclusion has been primarily centred within the communities. Armed conflict led by political factors and subsequent economic interest only takes advantage of the internal strife within the communities in order to recruit aggrieved youths. This became evident when the RUF occupied the rich diamond district of Kono in Eastern Sierra Leone in 1992, 1995 and 1999 and took their ultimate march to Freetown on the 6th January 1999. However, that success was short lived when the Nigerian ECOMOG forces thwarted their advance towards the west of the city and flushed them back to the provinces. The emergence of the conflict and the role of various actors interpreted what type of state Sierra Leone has been.

3.3 Political Economy of Sierra Leone

This section is intended to cover the political and economic aspect of Sierra Leone by establishing a basis for analysis on the link between natural resources and the nature of domestic politics based on the neo-patrimonialism and the politics of decline. Neo-patrimonialism explains that there is no peculiarity between public and private relationship of political life (Francis, 2001). The political economy of Sierra Leone presents the basis for natural resource use and the politics of underdevelopment. Neo-patrimonialism is a form of post-independence political relationship typified by underdevelopment, where public authority has been appointed by formal office holders, politicians, military officers, family and personal
associates in a surreptitious usage of the res publica (Jean Francois Medard quoted in Francis, 2001). Hence, this will give an explicit understanding of how domestic politics, through the patron-client relationship utilises diamond resources for rent-seeking purpose, and the subsequent collapse of state institutions. The political economy of Sierra Leone presents the basis for natural resource use and the politics of underdevelopment.

Sierra Leone attained independence from Britain on 27th April 1961 as a parliamentary democracy with Sir Milton Margai as the first Prime Minister. Politically, this independence was sought during a controversial and authoritarian period when Siaka P. Stevens was behind bars for opposing the terms and conditions of independence. Sir Milton Margai was seen as a close ally of Britain during the Cold War between the Communist east and the capitalist west, who were strongly opposed to Communist penetration in Sierra Leone. Like many other African countries that gained the right to self-rule from unwelcome colonial presence, Sierra Leone adopted what Bayart (1982) called the statist conceptions of development and economic nationalisation to enhanced state-owned enterprises from foreign dominance. This idea was however, undermined by political patronage and rent-seeking clients in different political administrations in Sierra Leone characterised by both democracies and military government. Apparently, both forms of administrations have played diverse exploitative roles on the abundant natural resources. In addition, both have attempted to find a remedy but are yet to provide a sustainable resource control and development in resource rich communities.

During the dawn of independence in Sierra Leone, the economy was structured to depend on its vast natural resources. Manufacturing and services were ignored and this continues to this day. Sir Milton established the economy on a solid agricultural sector, revenue from diamond deposits and the mounting importance of prospective industries such as marine and petroleum (Melady, cited in Pham, 2004). Perhaps also, his approach to an agro-based economy conforms to the era of a structural system based on a relationship between the core or developed economies and the periphery, which was structured to supply the most needed natural resources. Sir Milton never knew that the mining sector would become a curse in Sierra Leone. The extraction of mineral resources such as diamonds has brought an economic,
social, political and environmental burden to the communities involved. Likewise, with political interregnums and reckless governance in Sierra Leone, the succeeding governments after independence have also become cursed. The mineral policies are yet to substantially transform these communities who live where the vast natural wealth is exploited. Despite these vast natural resources, the national government has failed to provide the basic requisites of economic development and environmental protection. Instead, they collaborate with corporations to exploit the resources and shift the ecological damage onto the resource-based communities. Hence, the euphoria for socio-economic development and good governance that was once predicted in the early days of independence has become unsustainable.

Like patrimonialism, clientelism in Sierra Leone has become a seriously consistent practice of distributing state resources. One government after another maintained very entrenched patron-client relationships that allowed only supporters and sympathisers of the regime to benefit from the natural resources. According to Clapham (1982, p. 4), clientelism is ‘a relation of exchange between unequals’ (cited in Kabia, 2006). Since the early post-independence era in 1961, the resource-based communities have not been equal to the state actors and their institutions. Hence, the utilisation of the natural resources in Sierra Leone has become a tool of political appeasement with no sustainable mining and development policies. As such, this has led to ineptitude and considerable corruption in the running of the state institutions and resource communities. State institutions and resource communities in Sierra Leone are weakened, and some even have collapsed gradually and simultaneously. The available resources for developing national and community institutions were used to satisfy the patron-client class. Because of the prevailing circumstances, Reno (1991) noted that: “political leaders ‘convert wealth into political resources, buying the loyalty of some and buying weapons to coerce others and thus gather more resources and so on’” (Reno, 1991, p. 1). With weakening state institutions, natural resources such as diamonds have become instruments of private interest for political patrons and their clients. As such, the state of Sierra Leone has become replica ‘market’ or what I may call a ‘proxy market’ where individuals in public institutions accumulate unscrupulous wealth (Lamarchand, 1988 cited in Francis, 2001). This patrimonial nature, (Kandeh (1999) posited as “conversion of state offices and public resources into personalised wealth. Government contracts were deceptive and
manipulated and salaries allocated to non-existence workers or ‘ghost workers’ became salaries for corrupt officials managing the Parastatals. Sham investigations to correct such corrupt practices were known as ‘contractgate’, ‘vouchergate’, ‘die-man racket and ‘squandergate’ were conducted.

This became a factor in the resource-cursed economy and the basis of the cursed-state burden that squarely falls on the resource communities. Corruption became endemic as political clients used their influence for rent-seeking by accepting kickbacks on contracts alongside their ‘official’ duties. This inter-marriage between corruption and state politics is what Reno termed as the ‘shadow state’ (Reno, 1999). Within a deteriorating political atmosphere, the state was incapacitated and unable to deliver even some of its most basic needs (Reno, 1999). Therefore, this supports my assertion that the state is a curse to the communities because of its unwillingness to build economic transformation, and a situation of declining social services, depreciated infrastructure, weak economy, and widespread poverty prevails. In such a case where the state cannot deliver, community owned initiatives and socio-economic development will not be expected. As such, the communities become weak, permeable, fussy, segregated, and led by a status quo ideal. In essence, the existence of connections in the communities fuelled the scramble for natural resources such as forests and diamonds; thus leaving behind an unprecedented environmental destruction (Bangura, 2008).

Between the 1960s and 1970s, the Sierra Leone economy was dominated by revenue from diamond production, accounting for about 70% of the country’s foreign exchange earnings (Clapham, 2001). In 1960, annual diamond production was estimated at 2 million carats. This volume dropped in subsequent years. Subsequently, after years of resource mismanagement and poor governance, the economy began to experience a swift decline in the late 1970s. In 1988, the official diamonds exports were estimated as US$22,000 (Francis, 2001). The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) fell from US$1.1 Billion in 1980 to US$857 million in 1990 and in 1995 Sierra Leone had a debt burden of US$1.2 billion (Kandeh, 1999). This led to pervasive economic shocks for both patrons and clients. However, as the situation is today, it was the communities that suffered the most. The growing ‘informal structures’ and the weakening of state institutions affected the diamond industry
immensely in Sierra Leone. There has been social, political and economic discontent among resource community members, and the scramble for these rich minerals became a weapon of war during the ten-year conflict. Within the period of the war, human, social, political, and natural capital were affected beyond all proportion. The diamond industry became an institution of unprecedented unethical economic gains and widespread environmental degradation (Bangura, 2008). This form of exploitation has been in existence since the early days of independence under the dictates of patrimonialism-clientelism relationship. Such relationship was established under the SLPP government of Sir Milton Margai (1961-1964) and continued by Sir Albert Margai (1964-1967), and was later entrenched during the reign of Siaka P Stevens and his hand picked successor, Joseph Saidu Momoh,during his one party rule (1968-1985) and (1985-1991) respectively. In all of this, politics of decline has entrenched itself in almost every sector of the economy for personal gains by politicians and associate clients. This unprecedented way Siaka P Stevens and Joseph Saidu Momoh operated the state as personal property was illustrated by Coleman and Rosberg as ‘Fuherism’, and ‘Sultanism’ by Weber (Coleman and Rosberg, 1996, quoted in Francis 2001).

When Siaka P. Stevens defeated Albert Margai in 1968, he turned politics as a tool to appease close associates of the ruling circle (Kabia, 2006) with political positions and access to diamond resources. The inner circle controlled and used their position to promote personal wealth. This became apparent after Milton Margai in 1964. Albert Margai who succeeded his brother, implemented the 1965 Public Order Act to silence opponents and even ordered the paramount chiefs not to encourage the APC in their chiefdoms (Kabia, 2006). Apparently, after defeating Sir Albert Margai in 1967, Siaka Steven became a pivotal actor within the illegal diamond trade with personal wealth gained from this subversive business amounting to over $500 million between 1967 and 1985. For this reason, his seventeen years of rule was code-named the ‘seventeen year plague of locusts’ (Meredith, 2005). In the history of Sierra Leone’s governance system, Siaka Steven was a vivid example of patrimonialism and the father of the subsequent ‘shadow state’ (Reno, 1999) and his ‘politics of decline’ was characterised by patrimonialism, clientelism, corrupt practices and state failure (Francis, 2001). This ‘shadow state’ and ‘politics of decline’ have not been reformed
but rather have been transferred and sustained by succeeding governments in Sierra Leone.

Siaka Stevens was the Mines Minister in 1951 - appointed by Britain’s government. He was aware of the illegal diamond trade and how to gain illegal wealth from diamonds and personally controlled state resources (Gberie, 2002). In 1971, President Stevens nationalised DeBeers SLST and formed the National Diamond Mining Company with 51% of its shares owned by the government and 49% by SLST. 12% of the government’s share was personalised by Stevens. Due to widespread corrupt practices with state institutions and resource exploitation, Stevens’ regime was described as ‘Kleptocratic’ - meaning that there is little distinction between personal finances and those of the state.

Siaka Stevens compensated his political clients with security, public office and resources (Thompson, 2004). Kabia (2006) commented further that this patron-client relationship resulted in a flawed approach that affected the distribution of state-scarce resources. I agree with Kabia that this affected the distribution of resources, but I would disagree that the state’s resources were scarce. During the rule of Siaka P. Stevens, before the hosting of the Organisation of Africa Unity (OAU), now the African Union summit (AU), in 1980, Sierra Leone had a very strong economy and a comparatively better standard of living than today. In addition, the patron-client relation did not only affect distribution of state resources but also limited the access to resources to clientelistic networks that benefited from state resources and institutions. In that regard, bad governance led to endemic corruption and individualistic and one-sided political gains used rent-seeking. Such political status quo has been adopted by succeeding regimes in Sierra Leone amid institutional decline in public services and corporations caused by widespread corruption and neglect. This type of connection between corruption and politics in Sierra Leone has come to be referred to as the ‘Shadow State’ (Reno, 1999).

Siaka P. Stevens effectively manipulated national politics for the benefit of his supporter and close associates of the ruling All Peoples Congress (APC) political party, including a patrimonial network of unscrupulous Lebanese businessmen at the inner core. Among them were Henneh Shamel and the Afro-Lebanese Jamil Sahid
Mohamed who, as examples of private self-interest actors, became the closest business associate of Siaka Stevens and enjoyed a remarkable influence on state policy (Kabia, 2006; Gberie, 2002). Jamil’s political leverage was not designed to foster a political position in the administration; instead, he used his political influence for resource access and economic gains. In an attempt to entrench the system of patrimonialism within such bad governance, Siaka P. Stevens declared a one party system of rule in 1978. This re-enforced the absolute transfer of power to the hand of Siaka P. Stevens and his closet associates. In addition, these political patrons used power covertly and overtly to break the fabrics of the political, economic, social, cultural and ecological institutions in the day-to-day running of the state and in relation to diamond resources. Politically, in an attempt to entrench his political rule, he established the Special Security Division (SSD) to suppress any opposition to their political strength, economic gains, social breakthroughs and access to control and use of natural resources (diamonds) at will. A similar tool was used by his predecessor, Sir Albert Margai, after he succeeded Sir Milton Margai by enacting his controversial 1965 Public Order Act that criminalised ‘libel’ as a political tool to silence political critics (Kabia, 2006).

Even in the midst of contemporary democracy, it is alleged that “the then exiled SLPP government (1997-98) of Dr Ahmad Tejan Kabba was mining to sustain their hegemony when staying exile in Guinea”. Such similar allegations were linked to the present APC led government as a campaign tool to secure votes in Kono by promising the youths access to diamond gravel if they voted in during the 2007 parliamentary and presidential elections. This shows that the view of the resource curse regarding the diamond resources in particular is subject to political and economical reasons, and is exercised through patron-client on one hand, and electioneer-client on the other. This shows how politicians of both democratic and non-democratic regimes use diamond resources to exploit the people, the resources and degrade the land. This is a serious political, economic, social, and an unfriendly environmental, tactic used by state machinery to exploit citizens using diamonds as a political tool.

This exposes how the ‘politics of decline’ in Sierra Leone was marred by mismanagement of the natural resources, especially the diamond economy. Subsequent decades saw a U-turn on the economy with a considerable decline on
diamond exports, despite the government’s initiatives to curb smuggling. Gradually, the economic decline arising from bad governance in the form of patron-client relations ignited grievances that were exploited in the notorious civil war that Sierra Leoneans could ever have imagined. The diamond resources became the drivers of the war as both state and non-state actors scrambled for the control and exploitation of the diamond-rich districts, especially Kono in Eastern Sierra Leone.

It is no surprise, therefore, that the diamond industry in Sierra Leone became a tool for political exploitation under the hand of Fred Kamil, Henneh Shamel, Jamil Sahid Mohamed and few ‘political clients’ who, for selfish reasons, labelled Sierra Leone as a resource-cursed country. Without learning lessons from the past, the present regime might follow the same anomalies inflicted on the people and the environment by not adequately addressing the present bone of contention between the Koidu community and Koidu Holdings (now the OCTEA group) to re-start Kimberlite operations without reviewing obsolete mining policies and the concerns of the aggrieved, deprived and vulnerable people of the Kono district.

3.4 Sierra Leone’s Diamond Industry
Diamond mining in Sierra Leone has gone through different forms and serves various objectives from the Colonial Era (Pre-Independence) to the Independence era (Economic-Nationalisation). The mining spree has, in many occasions, resulted in excruciating consequences on the people and their environment. It is apparent that the causal factors that have contributed to widespread uncontrollable mining and inflicted environmental degradation have been historically for political and economic reasons carried out through patronage structures. This has created a situation where self-interest has been put ahead of national development. Since 1930, politics has been a game of political and economic appeasement in Sierra Leone’s diamond mining industry. Diamonds have also been used by various regimes to enrich themselves and their sympathisers at the expense of the people and the environment. However, political decisions are expected to be influential in ecological policymaking to help sustain development in an environmentally-friendly mining activity. Unfortunately, many of the decisions have been unpatriotic, ineffective, disastrous, rent-seeking, patron-clientelistic, and lack well-defined property rights. Democratic rule and military regimes alike have always been interested in seeking political sympathy.
during general elections and reign of power. This was evident by late president Siaka P. Stevens who used diamond resources to get voting appeasement. The RUF, during their ‘reign of terror’, used diamond resources to maim, kill and degrade the land without prudence. But the politicisation of natural resources commenced during the colonial era.

Despite the abundant and widespread diamond resources in every district in the southern, eastern, and parts of the northern provinces, Sierra Leone remains one of the poorest countries in the world (NACE, 2011); ranked 174 out of 177 in the UN Human Development index (GoSL, 2011), as 82 percent of the country’s 6.4 million people live in relative poverty, and 21 percent in extreme poverty (consuming less than what is needed to meet basic needs). Unemployment is pervasive among the youth (aged 15-34), particularly in rural areas (Fanthorpe, 2001). With limited employment opportunities in other sectors, most of the unemployed have taken to the diamond mining sector as the only source of employment. This occurrence of a rising natural resource boom associated with a decline in other sectors of the economy is a peculiarity of resource-rich economies. According to Ebrahim-Zadeh (2003) resource-rich countries suffer the “Dutch disease” a phenomena that first emerged in the decline of the manufacturing industry in the Netherlands in the 1970s. One way the resource curse occurs is through the movement of labour from declining sectors into the mining sectors.

Sierra Leone is an agricultural fertile land. Agriculture had been the most substantial sector of the economy in employment and viability. The economy was structured as extractive economy with immense focus on cash crops. The economy was not only a subsistence producer but was also an exporter of food crops until the 1970s and 1980s, which was when the economic U-turn occurred and led the country from being an exporter of food to an importer of food such as rice (Gberie, 2005). Conversely, diamond exports were gradually increasing, unlike agricultural crops. It is obvious that as the export of diamonds became lucrative, and the role of the diamond resources in the economy became complicated. Subservient state actors took advantage of their political leverage to control mining resources through rent-seeking practices. In the process of this ‘rent-seeking’ attitude through corruption and institutional collapse, diamonds become the central economic asset in the political
system in Sierra Leone. On one hand, the natural asset was initially a legitimate tool. Economic good, on the other hand, became a political tool. In simple terms, controlling the diamond resources enhanced the control of the economy. Diamond resources have been used for different purposes depending on the objective of the state and non-state actors. The state actors use the diamond resources (a natural asset) for patron-client satisfaction through corruption practices and state failure in what Francis (2001) calls the ‘politics of decline’.

Diamond mining has become one of the most remunerative economic activities outside of agriculture in Sierra Leone. It is not holistically controlled and can be easily penetrated by potential miners without any rigid requisites. Most mining activities are small-scale, with low-tech mineral excavation and processing. The large-scale mining undertaken by major companies such as Koidu Holdings Ltd, which include rigorous economic and legal barriers to entry, have also caused grave damage to the resource-based communities. However, years of mining have not been sustainable in these resource-based communities. Accordingly, Ross (2001) argued that resources are a curse in developing countries because they bring more destruction than development. Though the scope of the thesis does not go as far as looking into the role of corporations, evidence of corporate irresponsibility by Koidu Holdings provoked violence in Kono in December 2007 (NACE, 2009) and on December 19th 2012. The approach of Lonmin in Marikana on August 17th 2012 resulted in a similar outcome. The manner in which both governments and their security apparatuses unleashed terror and death are convincing examples of a shift from the concept of resource-curse to the concept of what I will call ‘state-corporate curse’. Despite corporate responsibility and socially responsible investing policies, most of the mining companies in Sierra Leone have ignored the ethical aspects of investment. In addition, they have the ignored long-term hazards emanating from mining activities. They have ignored the impact of their mining activities on existing communities and future generations or communities. This has affected the various components of sustainable development. According to Spicker (1995), environmental problems affect the basic welfare needs of affected mining areas (communities), their health, their work and leisure, their quality of their neighbourhood, and even their ability to participate fully on issues affecting their communities. This implies that environmental problems affect not only community capacity but also the sustainable
development of the communities. Internally, in the resource communities, these issues are seen and felt; externally, they have been concealed with what I have called the ‘website’ strategy, which is used as a smokescreen to portray the companies as exemplars of corporate responsibility, while the government and NGOs are presupposed as being ‘resource ambassadors’ of the communities.

Over the years, the communities have been subjected to structured participation on both social and political issues. They are merely ‘resource captives’ who occupy a land without legal control over the natural resources. Hence, their participation becomes meaningless because of the inequality within social structures, which leads to ‘recycling poverty’ or the ‘paradox of poverty’, and the inefficacy of the institutions. According to Spicker (1995), such structured inequalities widen and strengthen the social relations gap, stemming from the way that society is organised (social division), rather than intrinsic human characteristics. This has been a common occurrence affecting resource-based communities in Sierra Leone since the colonial period. In contrast, Collier (2000) argues that economic opportunism and deep-rooted grievances rather than structural inequalities are the cause of social unrest. Collier failed to recognise that it is the propensity for greed that paves the way for structural inequality in society. For instance, the greed evident in the distribution of the wealth from diamond revenues was a deliberately structured framework implemented through clientelism and neo-patrimonialism. This inevitably led to grievances and conflict between the deprived poor and the structured system. According to Dobson (1991) and Martell, (1994), the worst examples of resource exploitation led to environmental degradation.

With corruption prevalent in the mining industry in Sierra Leone, and inadequate and ineffective coordinating institutions, the revenue from the royalties and taxes levied on diamonds is yet to benefit the mining communities. Politicians have always collaborated with small and large mining companies through the bribing of government officials and the practice of purchasing diamonds below market value. Humphreys et al. (2007) noted that the short-term availability of huge financial assets augments the prospect of the larceny of such assets by politicians. Such diabolic action was exemplified by the eccentric Jamil Sahid Muhammad, who with the help of the then APC regime of Siaka P. Stevens and his successor Joseph Saidu Momoh,
clandestinely cheated the state revenue by purchasing diamonds below market value whilst paying kickbacks to corrupt officials (Smillie et al., 2000). According to Humphreys et al. (2007), corruption in natural resource-rich economies has different dimensions.

The corruption in the diamond mining industry is not limited to just individuals but also within multinational companies with government collusion. Multinational companies in countries rich in natural resources maximise their cost by acquiring resources below market value through kickbacks to government officials or by making them shareholders. One of these companies, Executive Outcome, was hired in 1992 as a mercenary group and later given a stake in the diamond industry as a pay-off for liberating and securing diamond rich districts in the eastern and southern part of Sierra Leone from the notorious RUF rebels (Smillie et al., 2000; Musah, 2000). Resource corruption in Sierra Leone cannot be proven openly, but it is implied from the failure of state institutions to hold the corporations accountable in the event of their corporate failures. State-corporate corruption inhibits people’s access to resources, income, social security, and ownership to land. These resentments have fuelled social upheavals and unrest in mining communities. Like the Marikana riot, the unrests are often cowed by the wrath of the security institutions of the government, who act as a security force against the discontented and dissatisfied communities. However, one thing the policymakers fail to understand is that the failure to address the social and economic injustice in this social disorder will always culminate in reoccurrence of civil violence. For instance, the violent youth-led protests of 2007 against the Koidu Holdings diamond mining company in the Kono district is an example of discontent (NACE, 2009) after decades of suppressed silence.

Most of the diamond mining activities in Sierra Leone draw on the alluvial deposits, which are easily accessible with less sophisticated and crude mining tools. Only a very percentage of Kimberlite pipe mining has been undertaken in Sierra Leone. This form of mining needs sophisticated deep horizontal or vertical mining techniques and is done mainly by multinational corporations such as Koidu Holdings (now the OCTEA Group). Many academic commentators attribute the success of the economic story of the diamond resources in Botswana to the Kimberlite deposits rather than that of multinational companies. Access to this form of mining requires huge capital and
technical expertise. Even though this analogy is true to some extent, the inaccessible Kimberlite mining in the Kono district, Eastern Sierra Leone has proven contrary. It is as comparatively destructive in its mining activities in the resource-rich communities through the blasting of rocks at the heart of the district headquarter town of Koidu, and its controversial relocation and building project fuelled indignation, violence and deaths in December 2007 and also in 2012.

On the alluvial side, the lack of technical skills to commence mining invited many youths and businessmen from within the country and outside of Sierra Leone to mining districts. This move threatens other variables such as agriculture in rural communities. The youths shifted their interest from agriculture to diamond wealth through an economic drive, socio-cultural factors among peer groups and community perceptions. Though many commentators like Clapham (2001) attribute the problem of the mines to being easy access using unskilled techniques, the facts rest on failure by the state to manage the resources for the national benefit since independence. The diamond wealth was for the benefit of politicians and their supporters, clients, and tribesmen through corrupt practices with internal and external economic actors. Also, the government’s attempts to control both mining and marketing of diamonds was not in the national interest. It was meant to put control of the government diamond office into the hands of clients and political associates like Henneh Shamel and Jamil Sahid Mohamed. Apparently, instead of the scramble for resources by structural colonial imperialism, there was an internal scramble for diamond wealth through corrupt practices by politicians and paramount chiefs (Clapham, 2001). These states’ clients had leverage to exercise their power by using the state as a facade to pursue essential private forms of political management and wealth accumulation at the expense of resource communities and national interest in what Reno called a ‘shadow state’ (1999). It is not surprising, therefore, that after years of such bad governance, violent conflict was set to unleash a war that destroyed all forms of capital (natural, social, cultural, economic and political) in March 1991 and did not officially end until 2001.

During the war and the scramble for diamond rich districts, youths benefitted very little from the gains garnered from these natural resources. Instead, they were used as forced labour to the increase the gains of their superiors and the warlords. These diamonds used to fuel the conflict became known as ‘blood diamonds’ (Keen, 2005)
and the illicit and inhuman trade was carried out by individuals (domestic and international), governments (democratic and military regimes), intervention forces (ECOMOG; UN Peace Keepers), mercenary groups (Executive Outcome; Sandline, UK), and warring factions (Sierra Leone Armed Forces [SLAF]; Revolutionary United Front [RUF] (Smillie et al., 2000). Much of the wealth went to warlords and to those I call war ‘enhancers’ or actors. These stakeholders in such a devastating trade I have connotatively referred to as ‘Blood Diamond Merchants’ because they deal with ‘Blood Diamonds’. This term refers to the types of business that either used diamonds in exchange for weapons or in any way that exacerbated the ten year long brutal war. These are merchants who sought to trade in ‘Blood Diamonds’ and even sometimes evaded taxes on the trade in illicit diamonds that provoked, inflicted and sustained the conflicts and destruction in lives, infrastructure, and the environment in Sierra Leone.

As a result, the domestic scramble for diamonds catalysed the high volume of school withdrawals. Most of the diamonds became ‘war tools’ during the decade-long war in Sierra Leone. Not surprisingly, alluvial diamond mining is expanding on agricultural land. According to an NACE report, the number of artisanal miners in the country varies from 100,000 to 400,000 (NACE, 2009). In 2005, the World Bank approximated the figure as between 200,000 and 400,000 people dependant on artisanal mining for their livelihood. The rapid increase in artisanal miners is attributed by some to poor education. Fanthorpe (2003) states that a dysfunctional education system helps to create a large legion of unemployed and partially literate youth that are easily hired by both political and criminal factions. This stance is similar to that of Zack-Williams (2001), who argues that the lack of education and employment opportunities were the key grievances for many youths before the outbreak of the war. However, from the research, lack of literacy is not the limited factor that influences youths’ involvement in diamond mining. There are other associated social discontents responsible, as discussed in chapters 6 and 7.

Another phenomenon associated with endemic mining is the customary nomenclature operating mainly in rural districts. Contemporary substantiation explains that customary law and the traditional chieftaincy system also contributes to the alienation of youths and middle-aged adults, thus driving them into political participation and a socio-economic corral. The sham governance in the form of decentralisation from
central to local community level is without social cohesion and economic gains. Also, there is disjointed power to rule and control resources among community actors and the state. In 2004, the World Bank reiterated that the tenets of customary law-including land allocation (property rights) and distribution needed to be revised in order to uphold a crystal-clear rural opportunity structure (World Bank, 2004). This is yet to bring the desired result because one imminent obstacle to sustainable social security is the lack of community capacity, which will be discussed in chapter 6. Paintin (2008) supports this argument on the basis that, despite the provision of local and district councils to identify and resolve the concerns of the youth, they lack capacity, they are under-funded, and barely have clear programmes for action. On the other hand, the communities are limited by the government’s legal apparatus, which states that anything underneath 6ft belongs to the state. In practical terms, people will lose their right to the surface when resources are discovered under their land. In essence, they receive instructions rather than consultations. Above all, there appears to be no attempts made to deal with the serious land tenure problems caused by chiefs’ right to appropriate the land of community members.

Despite the above discussion, the government’s policy initiative on diamond mining is export-oriented. It is largely controlled by a small number of dealers and exporters who are mostly of Lebanese and West Africans descent, most of whom reinvest very little in the mining communities they exploit (Gberie, 2002). The diamond-rich districts remain among the least developed districts in a country without social infrastructure and amenities. Richards (2003) called the diamond fields the ‘rural slums’ of Sierra Leone. According to PRSP (2005), the people in the diamond-rich Kono district suffer a higher level of poverty than inhabitants of other parts of the country (GoSL, 2005). This is no surprise because the number of poverty-affected people is swollen by migrants from other parts of the country. In the rural Kono district, the poverty level, which is 79.6 percent, is higher than rural Pujehun with 59.6 percent while Urban Kono has 56.3 percent. Among these miners, 75% of them are between the ages of 21 and 30 (PAC, 2006). With the numbers increasing rapidly, the government has not been exercised by concerns about the exhaustion of diamond deposits, the destruction of the ecosystem, and the changing landscape (Peters, 2007). Sierra Leone, as a country emerging from civil war, is keen on economic recovery with little or no emphasis on environmental impacts and sustainable community
development. With no time for resilience in the ecosystem to revive, previously mined places are neglected over the years (NACE, 2009) and the communities have a long way to go to become sustainable. Following this narrative, I will discuss below the actors involved in the diamond trade. It will show us who they are and how involved they have become in the trade.

After the discovery of diamonds in Sierra Leone in 1930 in the eastern forested country side in the Kono district, legal mining operations were commenced in 1931 by the Sierra Leone Selection Trust (SLST), which became a DeBeers subsidiary after it had gained mining concessions from the colonial government in 1934. In that respect, SLST paid 27% income tax on its diamonds to the government (Gberie 2000). However, this legal mining was short-lived and the present day illegal mining can be traced from that period.

Illegal mining and smuggling became prevalent through organised banditry and thuggery. With the diamond boom becoming like a whirlwind, many actors became interested. An estimated number of between 400 and 500 men started incursions on areas controlled by the SLST Corporation in the government’s diamond producing areas. Without any doubt, the illegal trade in diamonds became a lucrative business. With Siaka Stevens’ clandestine economic nationalisation drive to nationalise the diamond mining, SLST withdrew in 1984 when legal mining and exporting declined (Le Billion, 2005). This move was preceded by a considerable decline in legitimate diamond exports from 2 million carats in 1970 to 595,00 carats in 1980, to an even smaller amount of 48,000 carats in 1988 (Gberie, 2005). This decline falls within the reign of Siaka P. Stevens, who used stated resources for patron-client relations and during the Momoh reign of power. The clandestine policies were on-going with smuggling and lower government revenue from diamond trade.

3.5 Analysis of Actors in the Diamond Industry
This section is crucial to chapter 5 and will review some of the analyses of the domestic and external actors in the Sierra Leone conflict’s diamond trade. Unlike the wider thesis, which focuses on community actors, this section gives the broad base composition of the actors. It was then marred by economic collapse, social crisis, society, resource exploitation and environmental degradation. The Sierra Leone
diamond industry is eclectic and encompasses a variety of factors and stakeholders. I distinguish their distinct role in the diamond industry. These are the socio-economic, political, and ecological roles which each of the actors could play (Bangura, 2006). These actors include state and non-state participants. I have dealt with state actors at various points in this chapter. The non-state actors comprise both internal and external state players. Each one of them is closely linked with the uncertainty surrounding the ethics of responsible investment that raises a number of important questions for research as well as how they can influence domestic policies. The scope of ethical investment is broad and has not been dealt with in this chapter. Here, I consider the idea of ethical investment in simple moral terms. Ethical investment and corporate responsibility is flawed and ineffective. This ineffectiveness creates serious socio-economic challenges in the exploitation of diamond resources and the linked threats to ecology. This threat comes from acts of patronage relation and the existence of invisible (unaccounted for) actors. As these actors are unaccounted for, so are the diamonds which go through from one actor to another within Sierra Leone and across its’ borders.

Patrimonialism and clientelism are pertinent to understanding the role of different internal actors in the governance process and on the use of resource for either national benefit or private-self-interest or public-self-interest. I connote private self-interest for non-state actors who gained from their association with the political system at a point in time, and the public-self-interest to mean actors who use their public or political position for self-gains. The act of patrimonialism and clientelism has been a contesting governance problem that has affected resource-based communities. Patrimonialism, according to Thompson (2004, p. 115) is a form of political order where power is concentrated in the personal authority of one ruler. The state is their private property, and the act of ruling is consequently arbitrary: Thompson’s definition on patrimonialism re-enforces my attempt to differentiate public self-interest from private self-interest. It is very likely that actors with political hegemony could exercise power vested in him by personalising power, abusing power by ruling arbitrarily. On the contrary, the private self-interest actor enjoys a patron-client affiliation by the powers vested in the public or political figure by virtue of political, economic and social affiliation.
Non-state Actors in Sierra Leone’s Diamond Resources

The war in Sierra Leone was not only fought directly by state actors but also with non-state actors at home and abroad. This chain of actors became notorious for dealing with illegal diamonds, which later came to be referred to as ‘Blood Diamonds’ (Kabia, 2006), and I have referred to these actors as ‘Blood Diamond Merchants’ (BDM). The activities of such actors affected the resource-based communities, exploited the diamond resources and destroyed other forms of capital. The chain of these non-state actors flows from Sierra Leone, West Africa and Europe and to trading hubs such as Antwerp and Tel Aviv (Clapham, 2001). There was essentially evidence of greed, and years of discontent encouraged illicit mining, illegal trade whereby these grievances were translated into active participation during the outbreak of the war in 1991. Apparently, the outbreak attracted a wide range of actors both at home and abroad. As the diamonds became drivers of the war in Sierra Leone, their easy access and revenue motivated the warlords to continue the arms conflict at the expense of all forms of capitals and development. The diamond trade created internal and external beneficiaries to the war through arms and diamond resource smuggling (Le Billon, 2005).

Internal Non-state Actors in the Diamond Mining Industry

There were both national and international actors involved during the ten year conflict; they include the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), Sierra Leone Arm Forces (SLAF), civil defence forces, mercenary groups (Executive Outcome, Sandline, UK) and regional (ECOMOG) and international peacekeepers (UN Peace Keeping Forces). These forces are in one way or another involved in some form of diamond mining activities in Sierra Leone. Their activities shifted to either illicit mining or illicit trade activities or coercion. Though it is acceptable for military forces to keep the peace in conflict, they have no legal mandate to be involved in mining activities. I will now discuss the actors one after the other below.

The RUF as Diamond Agents

Among the agents of the blood diamond activities was the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), the rebel group that commenced the war in 1991 and seized the diamond rich district of Kono in 1994, primarily for fund raising activity to solicit arms deal with merchants of war and alleged sympathisers, such as Charles Taylor, the former...
president of Liberia. The RUF was notorious and desperate to find internal sources of funding to continue the war. As a result, they were determined to seize more diamond fields in the East and South of the country. They succeeded because the state security forces were incapable of protecting the land, lives and properties. The RUF was successful in infiltrating every diamond district with ease. The scale of the mining was not only extensive but was also destructive in ecological terms (Bangura, 2006). The RUF made more diamond sales than the entire government of Sierra Leone. The estimated yearly account of diamond sale by the RUF during the conflict fluctuates from around $25 million to about $125 million (UN, 2001), while the government of Sierra Leone recorded an official export of 8,500 carats in 1998. According to diamond reports from DeBeers, it was estimated that around $20 million worth of diamonds were exported by the RUF in 1999. Whatever the imprecise estimates, the scale of export from an armed group signifies a major source of revenue to finance their war activities, which in turn was detrimental to the people and the environment. Referring to the agents of this unethical diamond trade, the RUF is by no means the only agent of blood diamonds in Sierra Leone. The RUF with the help of Charles Taylor used revenue from diamond sales to acquire drugs, arms and ammunition (Smillie et al., 2000).

Sierra Leone Armed Forces as Agents
As the war continued, the armed forces of Sierra Leone became unable to provide security. At the same time, the soldiers who were meant to protect life and property involved themselves in both protecting their personal mining ‘holes’ and in forced labour. The situation worsened when, in the mid-1990s, some elements of the Sierra Leone’s Armed Forces collaborated with the RUF, overthrew the democratically elected government in 1997 and then extended their diamond mining spree. The collaboration started in secret until it became apparent in May 1997, when some military officers of the SLAF and RUF united to overthrow the government of the then president Alhaji Tejan Kabbah (Kabia, 2009). This was the time the war became a free for all. Consequently, rampant diamond exploitation was the order of the day by men in uniform who then used forced labour to extract the diamonds. The army lost its legitimacy and any trust in it to protect the state. Instead, the military institution became a thorn in the flesh of the country that adopted a mining approach that is neither demonstrative of strong or weak sustainability.
Civil Militia Agents

Since the integrity of the Armed Forces was questionable and incapable of delivering security, the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) government employed civil militias, mainly from the South and East of Sierra Leone, to provide state security and fight the rebels. However, there was a regional factor in this decision. Ethnic groups from the north have always dominated the army so the sense of distrust in the army displayed by the ruling SLPP, which is mainly supported by elements of Southern and eastern ethnic groups. It could not rely on the loyalty of the army because of the 29 Sierra Leoneans killed including the army officer Yaya Kanu and the Inspector-General of police, Bambay Kamara, both from the north, by the NPRC in 1992 in revenge for an alleged attempted counter-coup to reinstate the northern influenced ousted Momoh APC government. The civil militia were dominated by groups called the Kamajors, Kapras, Gbathes, Donsos, and the Tamaboros. These names are based on their strong ethnic element. Unlike the other militia groups whose role was limited, the Kamajors were the pivotal civil militia in the government of the Sierra Leone Peoples Party (SLPP) between 1996 and 2002 and utilised as a utility force. As their influence grew, the pro-government Kamajors militia involved themselves in serious mining activities in their controlled areas. During the overthrow of the SLPP and the struggle to reinstate it, the Kamajors took control of the mining towns, including Tongo and Bama Konta in the Kenema district. Even though they were initially welcomed as a preferred substitute for the disgraced Sierra Leone Armed Forces, they led an unprecedented ethnic killing spree focussed on non-indigenes accused of supporting the AFRC-RUF junta in their areas of control. It was clear that as more actors became involved in the political sphere, and as a result of the exploitation of natural resources, the phenomenon of clientelism and neo-patrimonialism became prevalent and caused an unimaginable negative impact on the people and the environment.

The Lebanese

The Lebanese are internal state and non-state actors depending on their role. Their involvement in the political economy in Sierra Leone can be traced from colonial era. This section will examine the pros and cons side of the Lebanese involvement in the state of affairs in Sierra Leone since they arrived in Sierra Leone in 1893, and another 41 of the Maronite Christians who settled in Freetown in 1901 (Gberie, 2002). They made their way to West Africa in general and Sierra Leone in particular as refugees
fleeing the silkworm crisis in the 19th century that came as a result of the once great Ottoman Empire. This migration occurred during the colonial era. Their composition was a mixed one with some Maronites being Christians and others being predominantly Shiite Muslims who arrived from Southern Lebanon in 1903. This category of Lebanese was impoverished and educated (Leighton, 1992). In this section, it is argued that the role the Lebanese have played in the political economy of Sierra Leone diamonds is historic and was made possible due to a political and economic colonial administrative hegemony that arose out of an attempt to subdue economic rivalry in the protectorate. Being refugees from the Middle East, their interest was enhanced by the British colonial administration to overshadow the rising economic interest of the Krio business people in the protectorates (provinces). Economically, they are involved in trade (licit and illicit); socially, they have married indigenes but not equitably verse versa; politically, they have been political clients. Their patron-client relation since 1901 is historic and coordinated by the colonial administration in Freetown (Colony).

Prior to their visit and involvement in trade, there was a ‘silence dispute’ between the colonial administration and the Krio, who are descendants of returned slaves residing in the land in Freetown solicited from King Tom and ratified by King Naimbana or Nemgbaana of Koya Chiefdom. The Krio had penetrated the protectorate as professional elites and successful business people. This economic purpose threatened the economic interest of the colonial economy. One thing that made it possible was that, unlike the Krio, who penetrated the interior part of the protectorate of trade, the colonial officials did not do so because of hazardous conditions. Hence, they wanted a way to counter the influence of the Krio they presumed as being disloyal (Gberie, 2002). In that case, the timely arrival of the Lebanese was an opportune moment to hinder the economic influence of the Krio business people.

The colonial government used financial assistance to help the impoverished and desperate Lebanese, who were encouraged to move into the hinterland (protectorate). The colonial government established a patron-client relation with the Lebanese as a notion of economic interest to maintain their hegemony on the natural resources in the protectorate. This is still evident in present day Sierra Leone, with Lebanese merchants in resource-based communities undertaking clandestine diamond trades.
under the guise of retail business. The colonial patron-client relation with the Lebanese was enhanced by infrastructural development on the construction of feeder roads and the use of vehicles to transport agricultural produce from the resource communities (supply) to the seaports or urban communities (demand). The Lebanese became proprietors in the colonial established businesses and dominated the produce trade, and their influence also extended to retail trades in Freetown. Though the post-colonial patrons gave political appointments to their client, the colonial patrons did not and instead used unfair and corrupt means to suppress fairness. Siaka P. Stevens during his reign as Prime Minister and President of Sierra Leone in 1967 had clients of Lebanese economic elites to absorb, through corrupt means, within the diamond industry (Gberie, 2002). But the relationship between the colonial administration and the Lebanese economic elites was short lived when they were accused by the local population of hoarding and smuggling basic food commodities to cause an artificial scarcity that drastically increased prices. Consequently, in 1919, two Lebanese nationals were deported by the British colonial administration following widespread riots targeted at Lebanese merchants (Van der Laan, 1975).

The type of patron-client relation between the Lebanese and their colonial patrons was what I call economic-clientelism. It was not meant to attain political influence for them but instead eliminate the economic power of the Krio. Later, the Lebanese used that economic-clientelism to indulge in rent-seeking gains. This was the beginning of resource exploitation by non-state actors and set the platform for the resource-curse hypothesis on the diamond industry in Sierra Leone. Taking advantage of this relationship, the Lebanese settled in the diamond rich district of Kono as early as 1930, when diamonds were discovered under the guise of trade even before the establishment of a diamond office in 1932, and ahead of the Sierra Leone Selection Trust (SLST), which was granted exclusive prospecting and diamond mining rights for every part of Sierra Leone in 1935. Though mining was made illegal until 1956, the few Lebanese residing in the resource district became involved in illegal mining and illegal trade in diamonds by funding Africans to mine. This unauthorised diamond business by the Lebanese encouraged diamond smuggling. As a result, the colonial authority between the 1940s and the 1950s deported most of those unscrupulous Lebanese (Van der Laan, 1975). Not surprisingly, in the 1950s, 20 percent of diamond leaving the shores of Sierra Leone to the international market was
smuggled by Lebanese and Madingo agents (Gberie, 2002). The diamond smuggling activity from Sierra Leone through Liberia attracted other Lebanese people in other West African countries who had been socially connected to such Lebanese people as Kassim Basma and his family since the 1950s (Fithen, 1999). This demonstrates that resource exploitation is influenced both internally and externally.

The colonial authority was interested to curb illicit mining and the trade in diamonds. They decided to nullify the 1935 mining rights law that prohibited non-SLST individuals to mine by enacting the Alluvial Diamond Mining Scheme of 1956, which paved the way for mining licences to be granted to private individuals including the Lebanese actors. It was estimated that 32 Lebanese had mining licences by 1956. Ironically, the legitimacy for legitimate mining did not curb the smuggling of diamonds. The trade seemed to be more lucrative than the legitimate diamond mining trade. As such, the authorities amended the Alluvial Diamond Mining Act to warranty non-Sierra Leonean diamond dealers to deposit £3000, which could be forfeited if the licence owner was caught in illicit diamond trade. Yet again, this step made no significant gains as the illicit trade proved lucrative.

The attempt to control the diamond industry saw a further setback in the 1950s and 1960s when the capacity influence of the Lebanese actors became more obvious. Three Lebanese nationals, Fred Kamil, Henneh Shamel and Jamil Sahid Mohamed, engaged themselves in various capacities from arms confiscation of diamonds, from dealers travelling along the porous Sierra Leone-Liberia border, to patron-client relation. Fred Kamil operated in Liberia along the Liberia-Sierra Leone border with his gang of Liberian descent to attack and confiscate diamond possessions of smugglers in alleged retaliation for being cheated by a diamond smuggler (Kamil, 1979). During that period, DeBeers had the service of a former Director-General of MI5, Sir Percy Sillitoe, to curb the smuggling of diamonds. Sillitoe contacted Kamil and guaranteed him protection and one-third returns on any intelligence that led to information on weapons and diamond smuggling. Henneh Shamel of the Shiite descent from South Lebanon was a close client of Siaka P. Stevens. He had about 1,100 men working for him in the gold mines in Sierra Leone in 1936 but quickly involved himself in the smuggling of diamonds in 1950. His patron-client relationship with Stevens was short-lived when in 1969 diamonds worth $3 million were stolen.
from him at Hastings Airport in Freetown. He was charged with theft and acquitted but was deported (Gberie, 2002).

Many alleged the theft was a conspiracy by the Afro-Lebanese national Jamil Sahid Mohamed. He had been sentenced to six months for unlawful possession of diamonds in 1959. But that did not stop Siaka Stevens from using him as an economic client. In 1971, after nationalising SLST to the National Diamond Mining Company (NDMC), with 51% of shares owned by the government of Sierra Leone and 49% by SLST, and the company being managed by 6 government appointed nominees and 5 from SLST, he appointed Jamil to take over 12% of the government’s shares (Gberie, 2002). On one hand, the nationalisation drive could have been viewed as part of the African governments’ drive towards economic nationalisation under the statist conceptions of development in an attempt to reduce foreign dominance on national economic and political decisions (Bayart, 1982). On the other hand, it was a political patronage attempt to establish and maintain a patron-client relation through corruption. Siaka Stevens and other successors used the latter for their clients through a structured form of corruption.

Evidently, SLST diamond shipment declined considerably whilst Jamil and his associates misappropriated the diamond revenues through stealing and smuggling. The patron-client objective was realised when SLST decided to sell their shares in 1984 to a company (Precious Metal Mining Company) owned by Jamil (Gberie, 2002). Subsequently, the Precious Metal Mining Company (PMMC) in 1986, after claiming to be no longer viable, terminated its management with NDMC. But the true intention manifested itself when there was considerable decline on diamond exports from 2 million carats in 1970 to 595,000 in 1980, and to 48,000 in 1988 (Gberie, 2002). The role of the Lebanese in the political economy in Sierra Leone even transcended the shores of Sierra Leone to include Lebanon, Palestine and Iran’s interest in Sierra Leone through a Sierra Leone born-Lebanese, Nabih Berri.

External State Actors
As stated earlier in the thesis, other agents of the Sierra Leone diamond trade were external. Most of the external actors are state-led. Cote d’Ivoire, Liberia, and Ukraine supplied arms whilst Libya under the late Muhammad Gadhafi played a controversial
role in the conflict through his ‘green book’ and military training. Before the war started in Sierra Leone the small diamond industry in Cote d’Ivoire had not been operating since the 1980s. Ironically, the Ivoirian government exported an average of 1.5 million carats to Belgium between 1995 and 1997 (Kabia, 2011). In another development, whilst Liberian diamond exports averaged between 100,000 and 150,000 carats, their official export to Belgium between 1994 and 1998 was estimated at around an average of six million carats a year or thirty-one million carats during that period. This identifies what I have seen as the difference between production capacity and export capacity. Sierra Leone had the production capacity but exported less diamonds than Liberia and Cote d’Ivoire, the two countries had lesser production capacity but exported more diamonds than Sierra Leone. This was an indication of the dark side of Sierra Leone’s diamond industry with her neighbours.

Liberia was a very close associate of the RUF through the then-president, Charles Taylor, who is now serving decades behind bars for his role in the conflict in Sierra Leone. Charles Taylor’s ‘godfather’ influence in Sierra Leone came to international prominence through his giving uncut diamonds to the British supermodel Naomi Campbell in South Africa in 1999 (The Telegraph, 2012). Like Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire became a transit point for illicit diamonds from Sierra Leone and for arms shipments to Sierra Leone. Unfortunately, Charles Taylor is the only external player accused and jailed for the conflict in Sierra Leone.

In addition to external state actors such as Liberia, Burkina Faso engaged in serious and notorious gun running for the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) from Ouagadougou (the capital city of Burkina Faso) into rebel axis in Sierra Leone. On behalf of the government of Burkina Faso, the chartered Engineering and Technical Company Limited, through the assistance of a Ukrainian state-owned company (Ukrspetsexport), exported 68 tons of weapons and ammunition consisting of 715 boxes of weapons and cartridge powder, surface to air missiles, rocket-propelled grenade launchers and anti-tank weapons to Ouagadougou for the RUF in March 1999 (UN Security Council, 2000). This demonstrates the extent of involvement by outside players in the Sierra Leone diamond industry by ‘Blood Diamond Merchants’.
Mercenary Agents

The agents of the diamond trade did not only limit their influence to domestic levels or state conspiracy with the rebels. Both military regimes and democracy utilised the proceeds from diamonds to employ the services of mercenaries and even gave them mining rights to secure mining areas and restore democracy. This is where I question who is a legitimate and who is an illegitimate mercenary. It is an answer that requires more research and cannot be answered in this section because it is an enormous subject. In April 1995, the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC), which overthrown the then ‘One Party’ rule APC government of Joseph Saidu Momoh, hired the services of the South African Mercenary firm, Executive Outcomes (EO), to provide security and secure diamond areas (Kabia, 2010). Without any doubt, they did secure mining areas from the RUF until when they were asked to leave as part of the conditions the RUF asked for before a ‘peace deal’. As part of the deal between the NPRC and the mercenary group, the NPRC contracted Branch Energy (a subsidiary of EO) mining and prospecting rights (Musah, 2000).

The role of mining corporations in the Sierra Leone conflict was a mixed blessing. On one hand, they involved themselves with mercenary groups like Executive Outcome and Sandline. Diamond Works was a Canadian company in London at the time of the Sierra Leone conflict. They acquired Branch Energy Limited in 1995. As their interest in diamond resources in the Sierra Leone became inevitable, the company introduced Executive Outcome and Sandline to President Strasser who, with other military officers, overthrew Joseph Saidu Momoh’s APC regime. The success made by EO to prevent the rebels from taking over the capital city of Freetown and the subsequent successes in driving the rebels in the mining district of Kono gave resources access in the diamond industry. Branch Energy had a 25-year lease and concession on the diamonds in Sierra Leone. In addition, other companies such as Rex Diamond, which assisted the Strasser coup’s administration in acquiring spare parts, engines, and ammunitions worth $3.8 million, had mining concessions in the Zimmi and Tongo fields (Gberie, Smillie and Hazleton, 2000 with Partnership Africa Canada).

The SLPP-led government also colluded with mercenaries in the ‘blood diamond’ tale. It was reported that whilst in exile in Guinea, after the 1998 coup that revealed the inter-marriage between the Armed Forces and the RUF, President Kabbah had
discussions with individuals connected to Sandline International, a London-based private military company. This was facilitated by the then UK High Commissioner Peter Penfold and Rakesh Saxena, a Vancouver-based business tycoon who was financing the US$10 million deal in exchange for mining rights, and was accompanied by the presence of Nigerian-led ECOMOG military representatives (Kabia, 2009). It was employed to bring about the swift restoration of democracy in Sierra Leone after the 1998 coup. It is seen here that the resource curse on Sierra Leone is not only limited to the unequal distribution of wealth and the subsequent poverty that prevails, but also the in use of the natural resources for political and economic reasons. In a bid to execute the deal, Sandline imported into Sierra Leone about 35 tons of Bulgarian weapons for the use of the pro-SLPP Kabbah Kamajor militia, and gave intelligence and logistic support to the Nigerian led ECOMOG (Africa Confidential, 1998).

ECOMOG
When the internal security apparatus became weakened and the diamonds became a tool to fund warring factions, the ECOWAS military wing, ECOMOG, was assigned to keep the peace after a successful intervention in May 1998. Unfortunately, the Nigerian-led ECOMOG became involved in wide-scale diamond mining at all levels of exploitation including artisanal mining. The provision of security was no longer paramount. Their role shifted from state security to diamond security. According to Gen. Jetley, the Nigerian army became interested in staying longer in Sierra Leone due to their gains from illicit diamond activities (Jetley, 2000). The evidence to support this claim came from many eyewitnesses of the RUF attack on the diamond rich district of Kono in December 1998, when the Nigerian-led ECOMOG forces were caught off guard whilst deeply concentrating on securing their mines. A memoir released by the former Nigerian Commander of the 24th Brigade in charge of the Kono district, made this statement: “Most of the personnel of units deployed at Kono district except those located at Njaima Nimikoro were deeply involved in illegal mining of diamond. Our boys forgot our main mission in Sierra Leone and opted for material gains due to the influence of the SLA soldiers. The allure of having a few gemstones in their pockets was too tempting to resist especially as the only gratification to take back to Nigeria was a paltry $150 as opposed to $900 they often
collect while on UN operations. This unprofessional attitude reduced their will to fight tremendously” (Adeshina, 2002, p. 143; cited in Kabia, 2006).

3.6 Governance Initiatives
After years of misappropriation of diamond resources in conflict economies such as Sierra Leone, there was the need for both internal and external actions to avert or mitigate the illegal flow of diamonds from potentially volatile or struggling, or deprived economies. Internally, the government introduced the Diamond Area Community Development Fund (DACDF); externally, at global level, the Kimberley Process Certification scheme through internal governance and control of diamond resources.

*Kimberley Processing Certification Scheme (KPCS)*
In May 2000, an attempt to curb illicit flow of ‘blood diamonds’ or corrupt diamonds from conflict areas and now in resource rich developing nations was initiated by the government of South Africa when some governments, industry and civil NGOs had a joint initiative to curb the flow of these rough diamonds by ‘rebel’ movements to finance wars against legitimate governments through the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS). It was later adopted at a ministerial meeting in Interlaken in Switzerland in November 2002 (Maconachie, 2008; Gberie, 2002). There was grave concern that diamonds from conflict countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola and Sierra Leone, driven by resource exploitation, might affect the legitimate diamond trade. In addition, one could argue that the present KPCS wants to prevent potential use of diamond resources for illegal actions.

In Sierra Leone, prior to the KPCS, the Security Council passed Resolution 1176 in 1998 to prevent diamonds from RUF conflict zones from reaching the international market. That made little signs of curbing the dangers of diamond exploitation by the RUF to carry out their bloodthirsty campaign. Therefore, the Security Council passed another resolution (1306) in 2000 that called for a complete ban on Sierra Leonean diamond exports until a proper mechanism was put in place to eradicate or mitigate smuggling of diamonds from Sierra Leone. In the same year, after Resolution 1306,
the UN Security Council, in September, introduced the diamond certification scheme with the assistance of the Belgium Diamond High Council (BDHC).

Understanding the political economy involving the diamond industry in Sierra Leone since the colonial period, a sustainable solution on the certification scheme must not be seen as a targeted policy on conflict diamonds alone but rather on any diamond that may not go through the legitimate government regulatory systems. This is because even though there is an absence of war or conflict diamonds, there is evidence of smuggled diamonds passing through unofficial channels. According to Gberie (2002), 60 percent of diamonds from Sierra Leone are smuggled to Guinea Conakry and the Gambia. Gambia, which does not produce diamonds, exports a considerable amount of diamonds smuggled in diplomatic bags. In addition to this, some merchants could prefer to smuggle diamonds as a means of laundering drug money, black money, or hidden money.

Between 2000 and 2009, the aims of the certification scheme became obvious. Sierra Leone had been experiencing a high export level of diamonds through legitimate channels (see Table 3.1) and has denied, at least for now, potential warlords and corrupt individuals the use of diamonds for conflicts. The flow of conflict diamonds reduced considerably by 15 percent compared to the outflow in 1990 (MMMR, 2009). With this progress, the UN Security Council lifted the Resolution on Sierra Leone diamonds in 2003 and the KP has continued to be effective. However, despite this governance initiative approach to address the illicit diamond trade, it has made insignificant progress on redressing poverty, inequality, and the bizarre working conditions of small-scale miners (Olsson, 2006; Silberfein, 2004). In my contribution from the evidence gained from mining communities, it has also failed to address the issue of child labour.
Table 3.1: Sierra Leone Kimberley Certification Export Scheme

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Carats</th>
<th>Value (USD) in millions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>77,372.39</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>222,519.83</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>341,859.23</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>506,723.37</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>499,242.43 (A)</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>58,030.54 (K)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>552,044 (A)</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>116,665 (K)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>209,762 (A)</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30,631 (K)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>603,623</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>371,260</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Strasser-King (2004:9); GGDO Diamond Export Figures, 2001-2006; Kimberley Process

(A) Alluvial
(K) Kimberlite

Diamond Area Community Development Fund (DACDF)

To compliment the governance initiative of the KPCS, other alternatives in the artisanal sector were initiated. For instance, the now disbanded Peace Diamond Alliance (PDA) or the Integrated Diamond Management Programme (IDMP) was modelled to redress the shortcomings of the KPSC (Levin, 2005). One of the governance initiatives brought forward by the PDA is the Diamond Area Community Development Fund.

The government of Sierra Leone through the Ministry of Mines and Mineral Resources approved the DACDF in December 2001. It scheme was intended to be a community-based, decentralised and participatory approach to natural resource management across sub-Saharan African (Maconachie, 2008). I have used the word ‘intended’ to substantiate the difference between theory and purpose of the DACDF.
The outcome of the DACDF is a mixed story. On one hand, Temple (2005) reported that some chiefdom councils for financing education, infrastructure, health and vocational skills centre have used the fund wisely. For instance, the Chiefdom administrators in Kayima (Sandor chiefdom) used the fund to rehabilitate the Native Administration police quarters; Panguma in the Lower Bambara chiefdom used theirs to rehabilitate the community centre. On the other hand, in a series of ad hoc reports in 2002, it was revealed that a number of chiefdoms are not using the funds effectively. There was a lack of transparency, community participation in decision-making and community awareness. Jackson (2007) highlights that the evidence of misuse of DACDF due to lack of an accountability mechanism. In addition, a report in the Integrated Diamond Management Programme (IDMP) for the government of Sierra Leone’s High Level Diamond Steering Committee reveals that the accountability performance of the Sandor chiefdom was very poor. This led to the temporal suspension of the disbursement in 2004. This was evident on the basis of disparity between rural elites and the general community such as women and youths (Temple, 2005). Richard (2005) attributes this disparity or inequality between the rural elites and the community to the war, and existing dissatisfaction among the youths with traditional hierarchical political structures in rural Sierra Leone. I may agree with Richard but would include that the problem has been historic or endemic with little or no attempt to avoid the deprivation mechanism of the ‘ruled’ by the ruling elites. In conclusion, from the evidence discussed above, the network of all stakeholders should enhance monitoring and accountability mechanisms in order to
ensure that the DACDF operates for the genuine benefit of the mining communities.
This is why this thesis calls for community-state governance at all levels of policy formulation and implementation.

3.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have been able to link past colonial activities with post-colonial Sierra Leone. I identified the role played by various actors, the issue of bad governance in the form of patron-client relation that originated during colonialism when the colonial administration encouraged a top-down approach by giving more unquestionable powers to the chiefs, and used the Lebanese as economic clients against the Krio. The issue of patron-client is historic and the negative side of it bred the smuggling of diamonds by colonial clients. The colonial-Lebanese clientelism became a root for the Lebanese to become involved in illegal mining and smuggling in the Kono district. The mining industry has also attracted both internal and external non-state actors. Their economic interests superseded the ecological interests. The resolutions adopted to make diamonds resources benefit the communities have received mixed blessings. The corruption in the diamond mining industry is not limited to just individuals but also within multinational companies with government collusion. Multinational companies in countries that are rich in natural resources maximise their relationship with state actors at any levels and to any extent. One of these companies, Executive Outcome, was hired in 1992 as a mercenary group and later given a stake in the diamond industry as a pay-off for liberating and securing diamond-rich districts in the eastern and southern parts of Sierra Leone from the notorious RUF. Resource corruption in Sierra Leone cannot be proven openly, but it is implied from the failure of state institutions to hold the corporations accountable in the event of their corporate failures. Hence, finding a sustainable mining industry should be devoid of preferential status quo of any actor or groups of actors.
CHAPTER FOUR
METHODOLOGY

4.1 Introduction
This chapter identifies and explains the methodology, the method of data collection that entails the use of multi-purpose case studies or triangulation, and the design and information on the study area that was used in arriving at the aim and objectives of the research. The adoption of such a methodology is consistent with the theoretical aspects of the research, the body of literature and with the issue of sustainable community development under consideration.

I have outlined the research design of the thesis in this chapter by describing the logic of the research approach and explaining how I have applied it. I will begin by explaining the research methodology and discuss the approaches to the research, which are qualitative, inductive, and include a case study. I then continue to explain the use of the methods in detail by discussing the manner of data collection and analysis. I have made a summary of this framework in the form of tables and will discuss them one after the other.

Table 4.1 Summary of Research Methodology

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Methodological Elements</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Methodology</td>
<td>Critical realism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy</td>
<td>Realistic evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approach</td>
<td>Qualitative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inductive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Case study</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methods of data collection</td>
<td>Secondary data: Documentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Primary data: (i) Semi-structured interviews (ii) Focus groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analysis methods</td>
<td>Coding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Categorising of codes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Theory building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Descriptive analysis</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
After the table above (Table 4.1), I will now commence discussion on the critical issues of the research methodology. This is an attempt to show its applicability to the research.

4.2 Methodology

The effectiveness of a research project is determined by the appropriateness of the methodology. Taking this into consideration the research work must be important and the aims achievable. In the field of research, there are two distinct research methodologies used by social scientists and physical scientists in finding answers to questions. The methodology is either quantitative or qualitative or a mixture of both. With these two, there is an on-going argument as to which one of them is most appropriate for particular research questions. As such, different contributors have made different contributions to them. Denzin and Lincoln (1994) defined qualitative methodology as a process and a way of understanding phenomena that cannot be either quantified or measured. Denzin and Lincoln argued that quantitative research is less capable of exploring certain social issues. However, Levine (1993) argues that despite the strong opposition from qualitative proponents to quantitative social science, it still prevails. These arguments, as in other fields of study, will always remain. The fact is that both research methodologies may share basic principles of some social science phenomena, differing in varying ways, but can both achieve an outcome depending on how the researcher uses them. Their appropriateness depends on the outcome of the study undertaken. Each method has its advantages and constraints with regard to how they influence social research.

The research was entirely qualitative, using a case study and employing triangulation techniques for data collection. For the purpose of clarity, Yin, (2003, 2009) and Nee and Taylor (2000) explain that triangulation is a method of exploring different areas to derive an answer to a question. Triangulation works in combination with semi-structured interviews, documents, and focus group discussions. In the thesis, triangulation provided the opportunity for cross-validating the data from different sources before coding, categorising and inducing a new theory. Its adoption was relevant as its exposes the same problems in the communities using the same techniques.
Qualitative methodology is important because it can create knowledge that is more socially useful and can contribute to more effective development policy (Yin, 2009). It can provide a better understanding of human interpretations and interactions. This is significant in this research, which is focussed on community. According to Bryman (2008), qualitative research centres on events in a social world through the eyes of the studied group. It conforms to a post-positivist approach that deals with the understanding of subjective social phenomena (Finch, 1986). In essence, qualitative methods build knowledge that is socially constructed (Yin, 2007). As such, qualitative methodology is appropriate in most social science research like the area in question. Unlike a quantitative methodology that is often measured in quantity and frequency (Denzin and Lincoln 1994), some researchers tend to be interested in insight, discovery, interpretation of data rather than testing hypotheses (Merriam, 1988). Thus, qualitative research has proven to be a significant research method in most social science research in developing countries in order to rigorously examine the characteristics of social phenomenon (Narayan et al., 2000). Mackenwash (2009) argued that qualitative data can give more descriptive outcomes that help to understand human interactions and interpretations. Unlike quantitative methodologies that gather facts and their frequencies and transform them into theoretical and methodological assumptions (Neuman, 1994), qualitative research looks at the various constructs and importance that people develop out of their experiences (Easterby-Smith, 1991). The compassionate position of seeking to understand issues through the eyes of the respondents conforms to interpretivism and expresses the epistemological relations with phenomenology (Bryman, 2008). This illustrates that the researcher must embrace the meaning of actions portrayed by the respondents. It also justifies why semi-structured interviews in a qualitative research are valuable sources of data collection under such circumstances. These arguments further support its adoption in this research, which is interested in the actors, their role, and the limitations of resource and community sustainability.

Qualitative methodology is flexible and collects relevant data, facilitates researchers’ accounts and allows explanations of processes and meanings in a particular social context (Miles and Huberman, 1994). Bryman (2008) describes qualitative research as fostering commitment to events in the social context, in case they are investigated. The epistemology underlying qualitative research is that it guarantees the utmost
efficiency of the researcher’s constructivist approach in a social phenomenon by exploring the concealed or ignored issues through reflection (Neuman, 2006). Lofland and Lofland (1995, p. 16) state that their approach: “underlies significant points in social research that the researcher could induce the mind of the respondents by assuming his or her role to acquire social knowledge”. It is as a result of this theoretical assumption that most qualitative researchers build claims into their research (Bryman, 2008).

**Limitations**

However, qualitative methodology is not without limitations. Lofland and Lofland (1995) argued that there is the risk of the researcher deviating away from the purpose of the study, not understanding how far the research should go, and the possibilities of participating in unethical activities. This concern was also raised by Bryman (2008), who argued that qualitative methods appear to be preoccupied with apparently trivial facets, and that qualitative research tends to be too long, with too much to read. However, in contrast to Lofland and Lofland (1995) and Bryman (2008), Yin (2009) argues that these points are mostly necessary for the researcher because of what the researcher wants to know and the account it gives of the respondents’ behaviour. It is under these circumstances that Geertz (1973, quoted in Bryman, 2008) advocated the proviso of social settings, events, and individuals. He argued that the researcher should adopt qualitative techniques in order to collate the accounts of respondents.

However, in an attempt to allay the fears raised by critics of qualitative research, the researcher works on the propositions of the study by trying to be more focussed on the issues alongside the network of evidence. Patton (2001) explains that propositions assist the researcher to be steadily focused on key data that will help to define alternative explanations. As qualitative methodology helps to explore and describe the information in real social life situation, the case study approach (4.3.1) below is adopted in order to give an explanation of the complexities of real-life situations which many previous researchers and writers may have ignored by utilising quantitative or physical science research.
4.3 Research Strategy and Approach

In this section, I explain the strategy and approach undertaken in the research. Though there could be other similar approaches, I have identified and made use of the approaches that are very relevant to the overall direction of the study. My first attempt is to explain that the research takes a qualitative and case study approach, which I have explained in section below. The second discussion is centred on the adoption of an inductive approach to theory building from evidence collected in the data (4.4).

Case Study Approach

The research has undertaken a qualitative and case study approach based on key case studies in the resource-based communities. Here, I have avoided commenting on the qualitative aspect of the literature as much of it has been explained in the methodology section (4.1) above. Unlike other researches or commentaries on diamond mining in Sierra Leone, this research undertakes a relatively new direction to exploring the problems associated with the mining industry in Sierra Leone. The study is not focused on land degradation and conflict diamonds. Instead, the research is focused on sustainable community development. In that respect, four chiefdom headquarter towns or communities that are actively involved in mining were explored in detail. In an attempt to understand the approach, I will first surmise some of the key issues arising from the body of literature on case study research, and comment on why I have used this approach. I will then identify and discuss the case studies, taking into consideration the general characteristics in the districts and the influence of the political, social, economic and ecological factors. Finally, I will explain the sources of data within each of the cases chosen and show the timetable of the research on each of the cases.

The case study approach helps the researcher to be more focussed because of the potential proximity to real life situations (Yin, 2007). This contradicts the criticism that qualitative methodology diverts the researcher away from the purpose of the study and contains the possibilities of participating in unethical activities (Lofland and Lofland, 1995). A case study is often misunderstood by many to mean either a participant-observation data collection technique (Nachmias and Nachmias, 1992) or an ethnographic method (Yin, 2009). However, a meaningful definition of case study could be the scope of study or a technical perspective on a real-life situation, the
forms of data collection, analysis and strategies (Yin, 2009). According to Anderson (1993), case studies are concerned with how and why things happen, allowing the investigation of contextual realities and including the difference between what was planned and what actually happens. Another definition describes case study as: “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (Yin, 2009 p. 18).

The other definition points out that case study research: “…copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there will be many more variables of interest than data points, and as one result relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion, and as another result benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis” (Yin, 2009, p. 18).

All of these contributions are essential in a social setting. However, it should be clear to the reader that case study work is not limited to qualitative research (Creswell, 2007). Case studies at times are applicable to both qualitative and quantitative evidence (Yin, 2009). In this respect, other researchers gave offer a similar focus on defining it as a unit of study, an entity around which there are boundaries that define what the study is all about (Robson, 2003). Whilst Stake (1994, 1995) defines it as an integrated system, Smith (1978) defines it as a bounded system. On the other hand, Miles and Huberman (1994) describe a case as a phenomenon of some form of phenomena in a bounded context. Case studies are descriptive, explanatory, or exploratory (Yin, 1993). For instance, Anderson (1993) classifies a case study as a method to show how and why things happen, and to investigate the contextual realities and the differences between what was planned and what actually occurred. This adheres to the researcher’s earlier comment distinguishing between what the documents say and what actually happens in the field. That is why Patton (1987) says that a case study is particularly useful where the researcher needs to understand an area of study of a particular situation in great-depth.

Multiple sources of information in a research project are needed to provide an all-inclusive perspective of the issues under examination. Such sources of evidence come
from the combination of observations, semi-structured interviewing, and document analysis. In a case study, this will assist the researcher to use different data information to validate and cross-check findings (Patton, 1990). Collecting data could be from a single source or multiple sources. Therefore, it is pertinent to explore the different types of case studies as outlined below in section (4.4).

Types of Case Study
Yin (2003, 2009), classified the case study approach into two categories. The first one is the single case study, and the other is the multiple-case study. A single case study simply means the use of one unit of analysis or case to investigate an issue. On the other hand, a multiple case study implies the use of at least two cases within the same study to allow for generalisations based on various sources of evidence (Yin, 1993, 2009). In this research, I adopted the multiple case study approach. Yin (1993) argues that studies on multiple cases should follow a replication, and not a sampling, logic. The replication is derived out of the use of multiple-case study and enhances confidence in results (Yin, 1993). Some fields of study in political science and public administration have used the term ‘comparative case method’ as a distinctive form of multiple case studies in order to distinguish between the two types of case studies. This explains why case study research is not only limited to qualitative research as stated earlier (Yin, 2009; Creswell, 2007). It may have a mixture of qualitative and quantitative sources of information, and single or multiple case studies. This implies that the researcher, irrespective of whether the choice is for single case or multiple-cases, needs to take a decision before any data collection starts. The adoption of a multiple-case study approach allows for generalisation (Hartley, 1994), and is argued to be more robust (Yin, 2009). This, according to Yin, explains why the analytic outcome arising from at least two different cases will be more reliable than of a single case (Yin, 2009).

Case studies in a social science setting are holistic (Gummesson, 1991). This enables the researcher to have an insight into certain phenomenon with the help of various sources of evidence. This, despite some criticisms, allows for generalisation because it uses multiple sources that can arrive at some form of replication (Yin, 2009). Another advantage of a case study is its capacity to assist the researcher to capture emergent
and imminent properties of a situation in the unit being investigated (Hartley, 1994). However, the advantages also come with some limitations, as discussed below.

**Weaknesses and Strengths of Using a Case Study Approach**

Despite its relevance, the case study method or approach is not without limitations. A case study is regularly considered to be unsystematic and full of extraneous data and it is argued that it does not address the issues of generalisation (Noor, 2008; Johnson, 1994). Others have criticised it for lacking scientific rigidity and reliability (Johnson, 1994). However, the question often asked in a single case study is ‘how can a researcher generalise from a single case’? This is why Yin (1989) was quick to contest the criticism by bringing into the argument a constructed explanation of the difference between analytic and statistical generalisation. Yin (1998) argues that analytical generalisation builds up theory use to compare the outcome of the case study. For example, ‘Blood Diamonds in Sierra Leone’, written by Campbell (2004), has been argued to explain a situation, provide the basis for providing solutions to a problem, explore a phenomenon, build upon a theory to produce a new theory, and to contest a theory. Despite these reservations over the case study research, its usefulness is immeasurable as it leads us to another important aspect, which is discussed in (5.3.3) below.

**Induction**

The researcher used a case study method with an inductive approach in the thesis because the research is instructive and attempts to establish new theories in order to explain resource use and community sustainability, instead of testing an existing theory in a deductive manner (Blaxter et al., 2001). This is justified in the analysis chapters (5, 6 and 7) where new theories are induced from the information gathered from the field. Inductive approaches test and create new theories from data collected and analysed from case studies. This is what Charmaz (2005) describes as an ‘iterative process in qualitative methodology’ that attempts to establish new theories in new areas of study. Other researchers such as Blaikie (2000) theorised the inductive approach as ‘abduction’ and ‘retroduction’. He refers to abduction as a research strategy that aims to describe and understand social life phenomena in terms of social factors, motives and the relevant accounts of participants. On the other hand, he refers to ‘retroduction’ as a research strategy which tries to “discover underlying
mechanisms to explain observed regularities” (Blaikie, 2000, p. 101) that tests data in an interactive way. Suitably, I have constructed theories using induction, abduction and retroduction. I looked for regularities common to social (community) and political actors, their roles, and their involvement in sustainable community development. These theories are outlined in the body of literature critiqued in chapter 2. With this body of literature and the formation of new theories in chapters 5, 6 and 7, it is therefore of importance to have an overview of the research design outlined (4.4) below.

4.4 Research Design: Strategy and Approach

According to Yin, (2009) an all-encompassing research design for case study research is yet to be developed. Yin has tried to improve case study research with one overall research design. However, before I identify it, it is worth knowing what a research design is. According to Yin, (2009, p. 26) a research design is: “…a logical plan for getting from here to there. The ‘where’ may be defined as the initial set of questions to be answered, and there is some set of conclusions (answers) about these question”. Yin explains that between the research questions and the answers lay necessary steps, including data collection and data analysing. Another definition describes research design as: “...a plan that guides the investigator in the process of collecting, analysing, and interpreting observations. It is a logical model of proof that allows the researcher to draw inferences concerning causal relations among the variables under investigation” (Nachmias and Nachmias, 1992, pp. 77-78)

A research design is a “blueprint” for a study addressing significant problems: what question to study, what data is appropriate, what data to collect, and how the results are analysed (Robson, 2003)? The plan has helped the researcher to avoid moving away from the focus of the study. In summary, Yin (2009) identified five significant components of a research design, which the research took into consideration in the research process. These are: research questions; its proposition where necessary; unit of analysis; logical framework linking the data to the propositions; and the principles for interpreting the findings. The importance of these components is illustrated in the framework of the research, with the research aim and objectives as outlined below.
Aim and Objectives

Aim: This research aims to explore the dynamics between resource use and achieving Sustainable Community Development in the Kono district, Sierra Leone.

Objectives:

1. To identify the relationship between resource exploitation and community governance in mining communities through an analysis of key actors and their roles at a range of scales
2. To examine if and in what ways mining communities utilise their assets and undertake practices that contribute towards sustainable community development
3. To identify both the structural and community-based barriers to promoting sustainable community development in mining communities and then make policy recommendations for community development in such communities

Case Studied in the Research

I engaged in four case studies in four mining chiefdoms that are instrumental in drawing generalisations on sustainable community development. The adoption of these cases is designed to investigate the problem of political ecology in the mining communities. I have drawn a table (Table 4.2) in section 4.4.2 below to show the cases investigated. Prior to that, I want the reader to engage with a summarised background of Kono and its relationship to the research.

The research study was undertaken in the Kono district, in the eastern part of Sierra Leone. The first diamond discovered in this district in 1930 was found by a British geologist, J. D. Pollet, in the Gbobora River, near the village of Fintigaia in the Kono district (NACE, 2009; Zack-Williams, 1995). The district has a population of 335,401, which is 6.74 percent of the national population and a low population density of 61.4 persons per sq. km (Statistics Sierra Leone, 2006). Despite the influx of people into the district in search of diamonds, the concentration is centred mainly in urban or suburban towns.

Since the initial discovery, diamond activities have been taking place on small and large scales, legal and illegal (Smillie et al., 2000; Bangura, 2006, 2008), by domestic and external actors, in the form of alluvial and Kimberlite (NACE, 2009; Zack-
Williams, 1995), by private and ‘private government functionaries’, and mined during the day and at night. As different actors with different mine at all levels, the impacts of mining in diamond mining communities vary. These mining communities have been ‘polluted’ environmentally, socially, politically, and economically. Consequently, this has affected the way the communities have sustained themselves since mining activities commenced and there seems to be no sign of this abating. This is a motivation for the researcher to explore the aims of the research and find answers to the objectives as outlined in chapter 1 and in section 4.4 above.

**Table 4.2 Community Selection: Case studies in the research**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case name</th>
<th>Chiefdom</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Koidu Town (Sefadu)</td>
<td>Gbense</td>
<td>Cosmopolitan district headquarter town with both corporate and small-scale mining actives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koidu Town (Sefadu)</td>
<td>Tankoro</td>
<td>Cosmopolitan district headquarter town with both corporate (Koidu Holdings Ltd) and small-scale mining actives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yengema</td>
<td>Nimikoro</td>
<td>Home of the defunct SLST and former NDMC headquarters. Mining is still ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sewafe</td>
<td>Nimiyama</td>
<td>Along the Sewafe River. Mining is ongoing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Geographically, diamond mining activities are dominant in the Eastern and Southern provinces of Sierra Leone. The diamond mining in the Northern Province is not at a level comparable to the other two provinces. In the Eastern province, there are three districts involve in diamond activities, and in the South, there are three districts. However, regarding units of analysis, the research limits its case studies to four chiefdoms (Nimiyama, Gbense, Nimikoro and Tankoro) in the Kono district with common problems and research questions. The choice of Kono district is justified by the fact that the district is nationally and internationally known for the most excessive mining activity since the first diamond was discovered there in 1930 (NACE, 2009).
Young men or youths are a large component of the mining activities and serve as a unit of analysis, being an important part of the mining community.

The identification of these selection units as multiple case studies, in order to get answers to the aims of the study, re-enforces the argument for triangulation (Yin, 2003, 2009). This assisted me in confirming the validity of the research process and serves as a useful technique for linking the data to the researcher’s propositions. According to Patton (2001), validity and reliability are two factors that any qualitative researcher should take into consideration while designing a case study, collecting data, analysing results and answering research questions.

4.5 Conducting the Research: Preparation for the fieldwork/Data collection procedures

This section is of immense importance to this study because it puts into practice the theoretical ideas discussed above. The research adopts significant purposeful sources of data as a sampling strategy to justify the multi-case study approach and triangulation.

The fieldwork was undertaken in four chiefdoms (Gbense, Tankoro, Nimikoro and Nimiyama) in the Kono district, Eastern Sierra Leone, which were engaged as case studies. Kono’s main town is Koidu. Before going further, I would like the reader to know that Koidu town is embedded in Gbense and Tankoro chiefdoms. That is why I labelled it in table 4.2 above as being a cosmopolitan community. The researcher’s first visit was to the Ministry of Mines in order to have a discussion with some officials. The Director of Mines office, at the Ministry of Mines Head Office in Freetown, gave an insight into the operations on Sierra Leone’s artisanal diamond mining and the efforts made by the government to achieve community development in mining communities. The exposition of community development in the mining policy paper is very limited, and much of the discussion was centred on the government’s achievements in reviving the mining sector and the reviewing of mining policies. Referring to The Ministry of Mines website was suggested for all that one may wish to know about the mining activities in the area under the research. Therefore, government documents and other secondary data became a pivotal aspect of the
research, in order to ascertain what is in government documents and what actually happens in the communities.

This motivated the researcher to make the second visit to the ‘Network Movement for Justice and Development’. Though NGOs that claim only to be advocates of just mining are actually actors in their own capacity, the research did not necessarily focus on their role in the community. The researcher was interested in finding a bridge between the ideas of both community and government documents. The researcher had a discussion with one of the managers’ in-charge of Mining and Extractives for the Network Movement for Justice and Development [NMJD]. Like within most parallel actors, the views of the NGO differ. The manager contributed to the comparison of the mining policies and the practices on the ground. The manager also identified resource persons in mining communities. The resource staff supported me with documents, which were instrumental in my data collection and analysis. This approach was significant for the researcher, who wanted to know the story of those who have knowledge and links with the mining activities and construct the story in a different way from the government officials or websites. Jack’s (1987) commentary supports my approach, when he states that the most direct method of selecting key informants is by consulting experts who are experienced and analytical in the study area.

The third contact was with local authority/councillors, who are supposedly representatives of the communities. They are aware of how land is transferred from the legitimate communal ownership to a license holder or a mining company. They are mainly indigenes of the mining communities but with ambiguous roles. Three local authority officials were interviewed in four chiefdoms: Gbense, Tankoro, Nimikoro and Nimiyama. A total of 35 community members in these communities were interviewed in an average time of 25 minutes each. Some respondents interviewed were part of the focus groups. Hence, I consider the individual respondents interviewed than the focus group. Also, the two respondents in Freetown did not take formal interviews, instead, they gave me directives to sources of information.
The fourth visit was at Koidu Holdings Ltd (now OCTEA). One official was interviewed from Koidu Holdings. It is the most powerful corporate mining company in the area and has had conflicts with the communities in Koidu town (Gbense and Tankoro Chiefdoms). I had an interview with one of the administrative officers, whom I had contacted by email and telephone beforehand. Though he answered my questions, he tolerated no extra questions because he claimed to have a meeting to go to. However, the discussion showed the discontent between the communities and the corporations, despite the social activities undertaken as part of their corporate responsibilities. He gave me a clear indication of the relationship between the company and the community, which, even though it has improved, is yet to be amicable.

The fifth contact was with random selection of common artisanal mining ‘companies’. These are companies according to the government’s definition, but fall short of professional or formal management. They equally contribute to the destruction of the environment but government policy on Environmental Impact Assessment [EIA] and community development is targeted only on highly capital-intensive mining companies like Koidu Holdings Ltd. This contact was very significant as all those who were interviewed demonstrated no evidence of community projects in the areas they mine.

This motivated the researcher to talk with community members individually and in small focus groups. Eight focus groups with a composition of between four and seven community members were engaged. Like with the individual participants, the two focus groups in each of the chiefdoms were undertaken with consent. The participants were enthusiastic to participate and in high spirits. This demonstrated how prevalent the endemic issues affecting them are and illustrates the level of discontent. This interaction was crucial. Kitzinger (1994) explains that interaction is the crucial feature of focus groups because the interaction between participants draws out their views of the world, the language they use on an issue, and their beliefs and values about a situation.

After getting the necessary information from the above key informants through semi-structured interviews, the next step was an attempt to review the necessary significant
documents such as journals, articles, and newspapers from the libraries of Njala University and Fourah Bay College, in addition to those collected from the Ministry of Mines and Mineral Resources, and the Network Movement for Justice [NMJD]. Some of these articles were written by myself as an attempt to expose the predicaments mining communities face. The researcher did not depend on the university libraries because they are not well-equipped for this subject. However, the different varieties of documents provided detailed demographic and socio-economic characteristics of the case study chiefdoms and provided information on government policies on mining and community. They were helpful in arriving at some summary findings on what government pronounces and what actual happens in the communities. Chapters from Local Agenda 21 (chapter 28, chapter 8, chapter 25, chapter 36 etc.) were also used and served as a precursor for identifying policy flaws and finding answers about sustainable communities during the research. The next part of this chapter looks at the data sources of the research. I have constructed a table (4.3) and included key research questions, the respondents who were asked, and the information sought from them. This table is not discussed in detail and the issues identified in them have been simplified. It only gives a foresight of what will be discussed in section 4.6 below.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research Questions</th>
<th>Source of data</th>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>Data Collected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What are the roles of the actors and do their actions influence resource exploitation and community governance?</td>
<td>(i) Documentation</td>
<td>Ministry of Mines; NMJD</td>
<td>The information on the actors and their activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(ii) Interviews</td>
<td>Miners; Financial supporters; Local counsellor; NMJD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(iii) Focus groups</td>
<td>Randomly selected (voluntary)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How do their roles affect sustainable community development?</td>
<td>(i) Interviews</td>
<td>Miners; Financial supporters; Local counsellor</td>
<td>The information on the actors and their activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(ii) Focus groups</td>
<td>Randomly selected (voluntary)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What are their activities that contrast with community governance and sustainability?</td>
<td>(i) Documentation</td>
<td>Mining policy (MMR website); NMJD</td>
<td>The information on the actors and their activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(ii) Interviews</td>
<td>Miners; Financial supporters; Local counsellor</td>
<td>Information on community social structure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(iii) Focus groups</td>
<td>Randomly selected (voluntary)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What assets are available and are they used?</td>
<td>(i) Interviews</td>
<td>Miners; Financial supporters; Local counsellor; Others</td>
<td>Background information on community assets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(ii) Focus groups</td>
<td>Randomly selected (voluntary)</td>
<td>The activities on these assets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What are the limitations to sustainable community development?</td>
<td>(i) Documentation</td>
<td>Mining Policy (MMR website)</td>
<td>Community perceptions on sustainable community development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(ii) Interviews</td>
<td>Miners; Financial supporters; Local counsellor; Others</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(iii) Focus groups</td>
<td>Randomly selected (voluntary)</td>
<td>What they think are the limitations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

122
4.6 Case Study Timetable and Data Collection Procedures

The research on the four cases was undertaken between February and July 2011. The schedule for collecting documents, conducting interviews and meetings for focus groups was not consistent. Regarding the issue of documents, the challenge was relatively easier because most of the documents were online at government websites (MMR), and those of Koidu Holdings Ltd and the Network Movement for Development and Justice (NMJD). These categories of respondents hardly responded to questions for personal reasons. All brief comments were directed to the websites. The other participants showed a willingness to cooperate, but had to leave to undertake their mining activities. I had to chase them after work or meet them on their way from work. I also had a random selection of them for the focus group discussions. This also made the numbers for each focus group uneven. However, the information collected from the respondents was credible as it shows consistency as a case report was produced and analysed for each case. This conforms to Charmaz (2005) principles on data collection and analyses where both are presumed to be linked and work simultaneously. The collaboration between data collection and analysis was appropriate for me because of the homogeneity of the problem and the actors and activities in all the cases. As a result, the collaboration enhances my attempt to link the research problem with a theoretical explanation. After each case, a case report was compiled and the result analysed and a gradual theoretical development was induced using an inductive analytical technique. In light of this narrative, I have constructed a table below that shows the different cases and the location.

Table 4.4: Timetable for Data Collection

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period of data collection</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>No. of respondents interviewed</th>
<th>No. in focus groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>02/11-03/11</td>
<td>Freetown</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03/11-04/11</td>
<td>Koidu</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9 (5+4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/11-05/11</td>
<td>Yengema</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7 (4+3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06/11-07/11</td>
<td>Sewafe</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7 (3+4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>37</strong></td>
<td><strong>23</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Data Collection Techniques and Processes

In this section, I will explain the nature of data collection, and the techniques and the process used to analyse the data. First, I will discuss the data collection procedure by discussing the techniques in detail. The techniques I used are documentation, semi-structured interviews, and focus group discussion. Second, I will draw a table where necessary for each of the techniques, explain the demographic description of the respondents that I interviewed, and code the focus groups. I used at most two focus groups for each case. Referring to my earlier explanation, the number of respondents is not even in all the cases. One of the reasons is the respondents are very busy. The other is that Koidu is located within two chiefdoms which cannot be always be differentiated.

Documentary Analysis

Documents are significant in collecting data (Yin, 2009). Documents used in this thesis include those from the Ministry of Mines and Mineral Resources, the Network Movement for Justice (NMJD) and other articles including those by Partnership Africa Canada (PAC). Silverman (2001) justifies using documents by arguing they are a permanent and reliable investigating record. They are required for multiple analysis and help to fill in gaps that enhances the credibility of this study. Documents allow a re-examination of issues and provide the basis for comparing past and present events (Yin, 2003, 2008). Documents became very instrumental in cross-validating field data and answering research objectives (1), (2) and (3).

However, documents sometimes suffer from the problems of validity and reliability. Access to documents from government officials and non-governmental organisations was problematic with more references made to websites because of the bureaucracy involved in accessing documents, especially from government departments. This was accepted and the documents derived from the websites were used in arriving at the outcome of the thesis. With varying documents collected, effort was made to avoid or mitigate inconsistency problems by adopting the four quality control methods of “authenticity, credibility, meaning of a document and representativeness” as outlined by Scott (1990). Bryman (2008) says that documents need to be cross-checked for approval in an engaged rather than detached manner. Though not necessarily always accurate, the sources of the documents were legitimate and reliable. Some critics are
critical of the over-reliance on documents in case study research (Patton, 2001; Yin, 2009) because they do not always reveal the truth. However, Yin (2009) emphasises that documents must be carefully used and should not be accepted as literal recordings of events that have taken place. However, other sources of data collection or triangulation help to minimise the deficiencies.

**Key Informant Interviews**

**Table 4.5 Participants Interviewed**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case study</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>No. of people interviewed</th>
<th>Duration of the interview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Koidu</td>
<td>March, 2012</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>00:25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yengema</td>
<td>April, 2012</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>00:25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sewafe</td>
<td>May, 2012</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>00:35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freetown</td>
<td>February, 2012</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>00:30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>37</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I used interviews to get primary data from those really affected. Interviews are used as a medium of conversation with a specific purpose. Robson (1993, p. 228) defines interviews as ‘a conversation with a purpose’. The rationale is to obtain data relevant to the purpose of the research. In between structured and unstructured interviews lies the semi-structured interview. The researcher adopted a semi-structured interview approach with eight focus groups in the four chiefdoms (4.4) and 20 individual community members. Succeeding questions here depend on the previous answer given by the respondent. Hence, semi-structured interviews gave the researcher the opportunity to modify the order and wording of questions and probe further into certain responses from respondents. This enabled the researcher to clarify ambiguous issues on resource ownership and the role of members of the community. Unlike documentary analysis, interviews gave the interviewer an opportunity to observe the non-verbal cues of interviewees. Many of them expressed the desire to vent their discontent. A semi-structured interview with the respondents in a face-to-face manner enabled the researcher to ask questions, observe the respondent’s body language, and make generalisations about different perspectives on key issues (Jack, 1987). This enabled me to understand the underlying intentions and perceptions of interviewees.
Interviews gave me the opportunity to understand the issues, induce new knowledge and answer research objectives (1), (2), and (3). Denzin (1988) explains that data collection provides an insight into the experiences, trust levels and relationship of people based on a mutual understanding. This is something that I considered cautiously in the research in order to get the desired result for the study. With consent from the respondents, some of the interviews were recorded with a tape-recorder. The interview was precise and focused on the key issues to avoid overburdening the participants. There was no consistency with the duration of each interview because of the pattern of work schedules and availability of respondents. The average time of the interview was 25 minutes at the convenience of the respondents.

However, there were sometimes problems of interviewee bias especially with the rate of discontent among the community members and the public role some respondents hold. Some interviewees gave ambiguous and sometimes defensive information, especially when the issue at hand affected their job security and interests. This was peculiar to government officials and local authority employees who are susceptible to political change. That was why I did not focus on them. However, this problem was overcome by the triangulation method that I adopted by utilising various other sources such as documents and focus groups in order to validate the responses. Using semi-structured interviews was time-consuming and also difficult when considering the research topic, the high illiteracy rate, the intricacy and protraction of the problem, and the characteristics of respondents. Efforts were made to make the interviews precise and interesting by listening carefully and watching the body language of the respondent.

**Focus Groups**

**Table 4.6 Focus Group Discussion**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case study</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Focus group A</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Focus group B</th>
<th>Duration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Koidu</td>
<td>March, 2012</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>00:45</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>00:30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yengema</td>
<td>April, 2012</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>00:50</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>00:40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sewafe</td>
<td>May, 2012</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>00:50</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>00:35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The focus groups were a pivotal part of this study and were carried out in order to support the ultimate aims of the study. It also helped to minimise the chances of eliciting inconsistencies. According to Powell et al. (1996), a focus group is a group of individuals identified and gathered by the researcher to talk about an issue and comment on it from their individual understanding of an area of study. Kitzinger (1994) describes focus groups as a crucial interface because of the interaction between various participants on their views of what goes on around us, their understanding of the issues and their beliefs and values about a circumstance. The researcher used the focus groups to ignite discussion and provoke answers to the research questions. This involved key respondents selected randomly, with their consent, to discuss issues at a particular time and location that related to the research. Two focus groups of uneven numbers were held in each of the chiefdoms. Some groups amounted to five members whilst others went down to three. I was very cautious not to involve too many people in a group in order to increase the chances of clear participation. Merton et al. (1990) argue that the size of the group should take into consideration the number of people involved. A very large group might not enhance adequate participation from most members; conversely, a very small group may fail to provide a considerably greater outcome of responses compared to a one to one interview. For the purpose of gaining a greater outcome from smaller groups, I questioned two focus groups from each of the chiefdoms. The research focussed on the communities and the discussion was done in an atmosphere of equal participation in order to moderate attitudes, feelings, beliefs, experiences and responses in a way that can induce respondents to speak out willingly and meaningfully. The participants felt empowered to freely express their opinions and ideas. I informed the would-be participants of the focus groups what the research was all about and how it would proceed. This mitigated the fears many community members have in discussing certain issues affecting them. Since most of the participants were relatively illiterate, every question and discussion was done in Krio, a local language commonly spoken by all in the area.

4.7 Data Analysis and Interpretation
This research is solely qualitative, as I have explained in the methodology above in section 4.2. After collecting the data, I was faced with the task of analysing the raw material to achieve the aim and objectives and answer the research questions. According to Gohar (2002), data analysis is the construal of raw data to understand
the causes and effects of problem under consideration. Since the study undertaken is qualitative, some relevant documents from government departments and related institutional documents on the subject of natural resources and mining activities are reviewed, coded, categorised and analysed. In addition to the documents, field notes and recorded information are prudently transcribed, coded, and analysed thematically to explain conformity and disagreements on the research propositions and new theories that emerged.

The research undertakes an inductive approach to theory building, coding and categorising the themes to arrive at the conceptual ideas. I used the theoretical contributions, which guided me to formulate the research questions that were designed to facilitate the fulfilment of the objectives. In arriving at the inductive approach, I transcribed a few of my interviews from recordings. Most of the respondents were not accepting of recordings, and so by virtue of the ethics of the research I focused on getting the information through semi-structured interviews and documents.

After collecting the information from the various sources and respondents, I coded the data, categorised the codes and identified key accounts. After coding, I linked categorisation and focused carefully on theory building. This was drawn from Strauss and Corbin’s (1998) explanation of qualitative analysis to include description, conceptual understanding and theory building. The first step after collecting the data was to code the text. Coffey and Atkinson (1996) note that coding is an attempt to index a large amount of text, which can be regained in various ways. It helps the researcher to become familiar with the data, identify patterns, and build a structure from it (Ibid). I have taken these propositions and adopted them to be more attributable to the data. I followed recommendations made by Richards (2005) and Mason (2002) to have multiple readings of the data and coding content of the various interviews. Through this, I took into consideration what the interviewees’ perceptions about issues are and how they understand and discuss them. Therefore, my coding was more focused on the content and analysis. At first instance, I concentrated on the content of the semi-structured interviews, as I explained above, and subsequently after being conversant in the technique I shifted my focus to analytical coding. In both
steps, I was able to verify each code. This assisted me with finding clues to what I was looking out for, as it gave me an open approach to the data.

**Categorising the Data**

The next step I used was to categorise the data and link how the concepts relate to each other. Qualitative analysis involves a lot of text that could be overly complex. The text is simplified into three coded data and then used for theory building, playing with and investigating these codes, and building data into significant pattern of relationships (Coffey and Atkinson, 1996). At this stage, I was more interested in the general issues related to the research aims and objectives rather than developing them into meaningful theoretical concepts. This approach is what Weiss (1994) called issued-focused categorisation and case-focused analysis that and looked at the multiple cases in order to build on the theories. This theoretical literature on categorisation codes assisted me. I employed category structures around the thematic concepts of the actors, community governance, and sustainable community development. These themes go alongside concepts such as roles or activities of actors, sustainability practice and assets.

I used these themes or contexts categorising in all the cases, and linked the issues across these multiple case studies one at a time, bringing the categorisation together. This did not create difficulties because, as I explained earlier, the communities or cases have many things in common. The responses are almost the same in each context. Thereafter, I used a theoretical comparison between the bodies of reviewed literature in the theoretical chapter (2). This adheres to the ideas of case-focused or narrative analysis. I worked on the accounts and explanations given to me by the respondents case by case through context mechanisms, outcomes, and theory. In practice, this is consistent to the case study approach taken in the thesis that is concerned with why and how things happen.

**Theory and Narrative Building**

This is the final stage moving from the data collection in the field to the narration of the story-building. I explained this in the inductive approach above (4.3). I used the process to build up the theories and portray the real situation with regard to the subject matter. The aim was to describe and understand social life phenomena in
terms of factors, motives and relevant accounts (Blaikie, 2000). I started the theory building from particular or specific issues, identified the phenomenon, and related it by using ideas and theories for all of the cases. This step gave me an explanatory structure to build on the story within the thesis and compare and contrast the reviewed literature with the new theories. In an attempt to arrive at the narrative from the body of theories, I used diagrams and tables where necessary to identify the questions and the sources of data. Richards (2005) and Huberman and Miles (2002) supported this approach, arguing that diagrams and tables explain who the participant is, how his actions affects, and completes or gives the conclusion. I identified the essential characteristics in the body of categorisation and attempt to understand them. With these characteristics or this categorisation, I was able to emphasise certain differences from the empirical data of the participants, the role of the actors and how their activities on the available assets limit sustainable community development. From this, I made analytical generalisations. According to Yin (2005), these generalisations help me to understand the process and the relationships between the various concepts emanating from the data. As I did this, I linked the interrelationship between the groups of concepts on community governance and sustainability practice in building my theories.

4.8 Conclusion
The use of qualitative methodology and a case study approach for this thesis assisted me to solicit information and gain answers to the research questions. The preference given to this research method in conducting the study attests to its usefulness in allowing me to collect and analyse my data, and thus achieve the purpose of the study. However, this method has its own weaknesses and strengths. Like in any other methods, such weaknesses cannot be totally avoided. However, prudent efforts were made to ensure that these limitations did not affect the study. That is why the case study method incorporates a multiple case study approach. All efforts, including ethics, were done to credibly achieve a valid and reliable outcome. The rapport between the researcher and the respondents who have lost confidence in a system of highly literate people was overcome through their own epic discontent and by the researcher’s humility, by being free of bias, and being flexible and adaptive.
CHAPTER FIVE  
RESOURCE EXPLOITATION: AN OVERTURE OF RESOURCE CURSE

Analysing the role of actors in resource exploitation and community governance in mining communities

5.1 Introduction

This chapter answers the first research objective (1), which identifies the relationship between resource exploitation and community governance in mining communities through an analysis of key actors and their roles at a range of scales. It argues that resource exploitation is done at all levels and by all actors, and it is an overture to resource curse. That is why, in chapter three, I argue that achieving sustainable diamond mining should include the root causes of various actors’ involvement in the diamond industry in Sierra Leone. As such, in the context of the aim of the thesis that explores the dynamics between resource use and achieving Sustainable Community Development in the Kono district, Sierra Leone, it is important to unravel what and how resource exploitation operates. Also, since humans undertake the activity, it is imperative to identify the actors and explain their role in diamond resource activities, and the environmental impact caused. In addition, taking into consideration the relationship between resource exploitation and community governance in the first objective, stated above and discussed in the literature in chapter two, the nature of the community’s involvement in community governance is significant enough for discussion. The three issues discussed in this chapter will provide the framework for the following chapters (6 and 7), which discuss the ways in which mining communities utilise their assets and undertake practices that contribute towards sustainable community development. It will seek to identify both the structural and community-based barriers to promoting sustainable community development in mining communities.

In the first part of this chapter, I will document resource exploitation in the four case studies sought. In this section, I used interviews and documents to epitomise the notion of resource exploitation (RE) by defining and investigating how the activities of some actors have led to resource exploitation. In addition, I start by looking at the preconditions for resource exploitation and how it is coordinated. I then go further to discuss the empirical evidence for resource exploitation, which contrasts with the idea.
of sustainable community development. Prior to that, I will introduce a brief section on the environmental impact of diamond mining in Kono district caused by various actors. The main finding here is that resource exploitation is a forerunner of the resource curse.

The second part deals with domestic actors’ involvement in the mining sector. I will start by explaining who they are and how I categorise them. Often, focus has been directed at the foreign players such as multinational corporations and famously the role of the warlord and former President Charles Taylor of Liberia and their impact on the mining industry in Sierra Leone. In that case, I can see deviation away from the internal actors who are as equally potent in ecological destruction as the multinationals and other external players. I have concentrated on internal actors. This group of actors I have categorised in the narrative as economic, political and social elites, whilst others who are subjected to economic and political vulnerability I have labelled as the ‘commoners’. I use both primary and secondary sources of data to discuss the issues of the various actors by understanding their practices using mining policy documents, other secondary data and interviews.

The third part of this chapter addresses resource-exploitation and community governance. Here, I discuss the relationship between community capacity and government hegemony over the resources. It explains the complex issue of ownership and control. Inferring from that, I will look at the community’s rights over resources and their sense of identity and belonging, which may help them to work towards a sustainable vision of community. This will mean investigating their entitlement to and participation in community governance. In my contribution, I see resource-based communities as sustainable entities capable of working towards self-reliance. However the evidence shows that the requisite resources for community capacity and self-reliance are not available.

5.2 Resource Exploitation

In order to demonstrate the importance of sustainable community development in resource-based communities, it is important to start with resource exploitation that I have linked to the resource curse. Resource exploitation (RE) is systematic process and has now become a systemic problem. Its roots can be traced to the earlier years of
diamond discovery in Sierra Leone. Despite recent government reviews on diamond mining, it is too early to evaluate the effectiveness of their actions. From the government perspective expounded by the Ministry of Mineral Resources website (MMR, 2012), resource exploitation is an illusion. However, by going to the resource-based communities, the evidence and interviews demonstrate the existence of exploitation. As such, even though I consulted secondary data on this subject, my focus was on what really is happening in the communities I interviewed. In an attempt to understand the context of resource exploitation (RE) and identify it as a pre-stage to the resource curse, this section proceeds by discussing the activities of resource exploitation. Secondly, I will illustrate the preconditions and coordination of resource exploitation. Finally, I will present an analysis of the evidence of resources exploitation.

**Resource Exploitation Activities**

In this section, I examined resource exploitation in both a human and resource hypothetical context. The debate on the resource curse has been extensively researched in recent years. In this section, the discussion will be limited to the ‘abundance factor’, the ‘ownership and control’ factor, the ‘distribution factor’, and policy or implementation inadequacy.

Many commentators have linked resource abundance to the resource curse, problems with distribution, and conflict (Rose, 2001b; Collier, 2000). Others like Collier (2000) focused on the problem with in reference to the vast availability of resources to greed. Collier and Hoeffler (2000) argue that the relationship between resources and human activities, especially in developing countries, have led to breakdown of control, mismanagement, and ecological destruction. That is why some proponents argue that resources have become a curse (Humphrey et al., 2007; Ebrahim-Zadeh, 2003), leading to violence and conflicts (Collier, 2000; Ross, 1999), and leaving behind unsustainable communities with declining social, economic, environmental conditions and unequal use of power (Doppelt, 2003).

In the literature on the resource curse, I have made the distinction between community violence arising from socio-economic exclusion and deprivation from the armed conflict that commenced in March 1991. The form of conflict discussed here is
limited to community level instead of the national level. Besides, the thesis looks at
how to achieve sustainable communities through a governance initiative that
incorporates co-governance and co-production in resource-based communities.

To find answers to this on-going debate, interviewees were asked if the problem of
diamond resources concerns abundance or distribution of wealth. In order to get
answers to these questions, I differentiated secondary from primary data sources.
Each of the questions was asked in each case study, except for Koidu, which lies in
two chiefdoms. Except for some quotes I will directly state, I have summarised some
of the answers because they address the same issues. I have used codes respectively
as you can see in the question column. I have not taken a quantitative approach in
table 5.1 to illustrate the key issues. As I stated earlier in the methodology (chapter
4), the mining conditions and effects are very similar. In the categorisation of the
cases, I have ignored the social, economic and political class of the respondents. My
interest is to identify the problems. In responses where the status of the person is seen
to influence the response, I decided to ask further questions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Thematic cause</th>
<th>Koidu Town Interviewees (seven)</th>
<th>Yengema Interviewees (six)</th>
<th>Sewafe Interviewees (five)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abundance (A) or distribution (D)</td>
<td>D, D, D, D, D, A</td>
<td>D, D, D, D, D, A</td>
<td>D, D, D, A, A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inadequate policy (IP) or Ineffective implementation (IM)</td>
<td>IP, IP, IP, IM, IM, IM, IM</td>
<td>IM, IM, IM, IM, IM, IM, IP</td>
<td>IM, IM, IM, IM, IM, IM, IM, IM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Author’s construct

With regard to the first question, on whether the problem stems from abundance as
argued by some commentators, or whether it is about distribution, the responses were
focused on the distribution of the wealth rather than on abundance. The same
responses were garnered from the focus groups. This was not a surprise to me because
some of the respondents interviewed individually were also part of the focus group
discussion. In addition, the agony is almost the same among all the people. Notwithstanding this, many of the responses were similar to this: “The problem is not because we have plenty of diamonds. The diamonds have no problems. We suffer because of the manner those at the top use our diamonds” (Yrm1, Yengema). Except for few of the respondents who blame ‘Mother Nature’ for giving them an abundance of diamond resources, the majority agreed that the problem lies with the distribution of wealth. The few who attributed it to abundance said it out of lost hope and agony. According to the interviewee in Koidu town: “If nothing (diamond) was available, they wouldn’t have been suffering” (Krm1, Koidu).

The ‘distribution’ factor can be closely linked to the greed factor on the grounds that years of mining since 1931 have been marred by patron-client control of diamond resources with state actors, corporations, West African and Lebanese dominance in the mining and marketing of resources, which is economic driven at the expense of resource communities. Considering the existing literature on natural resource, Rose, (2001b) and Collier, (2000) have linked resource abundance to resource curse, distribution, greed and conflict. On one hand, the outcome conforms to Rose and Collier’s posits on distribution and greed, and on the other hand it refutes their argument on resource abundance. It is pertinent to know that the availability of resources or its abundance cannot be seen as a problem because development requires the use of resources. Rather, it is a matter of how the resources are used. Hence, the role of the actors becomes an indisputable anchor in the resource rich communities. From the community side, the prospect of conflict will be mitigated if the actors scorn at rent-seeking agenda and work for the interest of all. In contrast to this, there is the tendency of community discontent, conflict, the emergence of spiral groups working for their own livelihoods and ecological destruction. Precisely, this is a matter of the relationship among various actors and the available resources. Collier and Hoeffler (2000) posit that the relationship between resources and human activities, especially in developing countries, have led to breakdown of control, mismanagement, and ecological destruction. Blaikie’s (1985) and Bunker’s (1985) link local social oppression and environmental degradation to wider political and economic concerns, but failed to acknowledge the role of the various actors.
Rent-seeking is an attribute of what I call economic clientelism. This is a situation where powerful elite actors collaborate among themselves to exploit natural resources for their own selfish reasons at the detriment of natural resources and the community. From secondary sources discussed in chapter three, the diamond resources have been used to sustain the political elitism. This shows the mishap on the use of resources. From a political ecology point of view, the role of power becomes significant in resource distribution. Paulson et al. (2005) explained that power, as a social relation, is built on the unbalanced distribution of resources. The unbalanced distribution is an evidence of greed and it can be swiftly sustained through power. This can be supported from Walker’s argument that “the verbal commitment in political ecology is to wield political power to make a difference” (2007). It indicates that power plays a key role in distribution and greed. This is an indication illustrating that finding a sustainable use of resources can not be prioritised at global level when the internal governance upheaval is as equally detrimental as the global upheaval. When the cause of the problem is focused on the global, we may deviate from the pertinent issues affecting the communities emanating from inadequate and ineffective national policies or governance mechanisms. This analysis also shows that the study of political ecology should be considered at the level between the state and the resource-based communities, and among the various actors within the community. In addition, the social relations affecting the power roles among the actors are very significant and cannot be ignored.

I raised a question on the Diamond Area Community Development Fund (DACDF), which is used to support the mining communities. This is one of the governance initiatives implemented by the government of Sierra Leone in collaboration with the Extractive Industry Transparency International (EITI). This was an attempt to know how the community in general is involved. The first thing I learnt was that the majority of the respondents are not aware of this fund. One respondent says: “I do not even know what that is” (Yrm$_2$, Yengema).

Those who know say that the money is for the Chiefs. I had the same response from all the focus groups except those who knew nothing about the fund. Not surprisingly, the respondents in the focus group in Koidu commented that the money should be
given to them: “The money should be distributed to everybody instead of going to the Chiefs” (Kfg2, Koidu)

The DACDF has had mixed blessings from corruption to lack of accountability. On one hand, Gberie (2002) supports this argument by stating that the scourge of Sierra Leone’s diamond industry is corruption. From the other point of view, the advocacy on accountability was limited to state and corporation. Ocheje (2006) calls for a high standard of transparency that both the government and the extractive corporations investing in these resource-rich developing countries must conform to. The focus on state and corporation underscores the role played by community elites (Chiefs) on the distribution of resource wealth. It exposes the disparity between rural elites and the general community (Temple, 2005). This is why Collier and Hoeffler (2000) posit that the relationship between resources and human activities have to be considered to avoid breakdown, mismanagement, and ecological destruction. Richard (2005) attributes this disparity or inequality between the rural elites and the community to existing dissatisfaction among the youths with traditional hierarchical political structures in rural Sierra Leone. It is convincing to say that inequality and greed factor has caused community conflict. Collier and Hoeffler (2005), and Kabia (2008) have linked diamonds to armed conflict, greed and grievance. The greed factor and the reaction through grievances as evidence of bad governance are demonstrated through unequal distribution of wealth. However, I argue that socio-economic conflicts arising from community and national greed have ensued at community scale and have not caused armed conflict. It should be known that conflicts have often occurred in two forms: one form is evident among the community actors; the other form ensues between the community and the corporations. In essence, I have distanced this community conflict from the national arms conflict that is historically linked to the rebel war that commenced on March, 23rd 1991. Community conflicts, in the case of Sierra Leone, only became a source of attraction by warlords to recruit actors of various capacities who destroyed almost all forms of capital or assets in order to get diamonds.

The second discourse concerns the inadequacy of mining policies or ineffective implementation. From the above responses, it shows that though the majority agreed that there is a problem with distribution, there is also evidence of it taking place in the
form of the DACDF sent to communities. However, there appears to be a limitation on the way the distribution is done. This was explored as an issue of policy efficacy or an absence of entitlement. Overwhelmingly, the respondents placed a stress on the inefficiency of policy implementation. They argued that if the policy is effective, the DACDF money will be accounted for: “If the money is distributed and accounted for by those who receive it, it will be used for the benefit of all of us” (Kfg2, Koidu).

Practically, distribution of wealth goes with policies and institutional establishments at national and local level. Hence, some commentators attribute resource problems to these factors. Nightingale (2002) ‘Pressure and Release’ model explains lack of institutions that make certain places and people susceptible to physical events (Wisner et al., 2004). On the contrary, evidences revealed that institutionalisation is not a sufficient reason for underdevelopment in the communities. The government of Sierra Leone has established institutions to administrate people and resources but they have been ineffective and misrepresentative, and can be linked to greed. For this reason, the ‘ill-governance factor’, over resource-wealth distribution has pushed people into poverty. The idea of the ‘ill-governance’ factor provoked my next question.

My sub-question is to find out if they know what is the money is for. One quote reads: “The Chiefs know because they receive it… we know nothing” (Sfg2, Sewafe). I also asked them if they trust the tribal authorities. The answers, like the previous responses, were unanimously in agreement with what the following quote states: “There is a lack of trust. They are all liars trying just for their own ‘pot to boil’ (trying for their own welfare). Those who have the ‘upper hand’ send their families to good schools and abroad whilst we suffer. You see, we all need to benefit from these diamonds but that is not happening. So what would you expect if we do not have the fair share of the cake (diamond revenue)? The DACDF is used for the chiefs’ glory. They build ‘barrays’ (royal huts)” (Yrm5, Yengema). There seems to be an element of distrust on this matter. Many, especially the youths, are critical of their tribal authorities, which they blame for most of the problems. There is a lack of trust between the Chiefs and their subjects. Evidently, unlike Collier and Hoeffler, and Kabia, the lack of trust is connected to greed and distribution problems. Collier and Hoeffler (2005), and Kabia (2008) have linked diamonds to armed conflict, greed and grievance. In the communities, distribution of diamond wealth is linked to greed, absence of trust, and community conflict. The expectation of the community is to
have development projects that can serve the entire community without limitations. ‘Barrays’ are traditional huts used by the chiefs to adjudicate on matters arising and welcoming guests. The money collected from fines arising from adjudication becomes the chiefs’ income without accountability. It also emphasises the issue of inequality discussed above.

The third discourse is about control or ownership. I wanted to know if the problem of abundance and distribution is linked to control and ownership. The common understanding is that someone needs to have either control or ownership or both to exercise leverage over the resources. Literally, getting an answer from the indigenes on this is easy. By customary beliefs, they own the land and anything on it and it can only be used by non-indigenes with tribal consent. For all the indigenes asked, the response was the same: “The land is ours” (Srml, Sewafe). They strongly believe that the land is owned by them through the Chiefs, but can be temporarily transferred to non-indigenes for activities other than farming. The following quote supports this: “Land is owned by us but controlled by the chiefs. A stranger will never hold a piece of land… It is given to him for temporary use. He cannot use it for other purposes without telling the chief. We can use land for farming, but as you can see it is used for mining also” (Yrm4, Yengema).

However, the legal right to own and control land may differ from what an indigene may mean. This disparity is not only between the indigenes and non-indigenes. It is also between the tribal authorities and the national government. As noted, even though the general community members blame the Chiefs for their predicament, the Chiefs see themselves as being sidelined. This apparent contradiction was supported by the secondary data that demonstrated that any mineral that is six feet below the earth surface belongs to the state (MMMR, 2012). Another secondary source claims that: “The local authority and the people of Kono are like strangers in their own land, with mining companies having exclusive control over the land and its resources” (NMJD, 2009).

Whilst they believe that they own the land and all that is on it, the government actually owns what is in it or below six feet. This is the contradiction the community have not understood. In recognising this discrepancy, I theorise that the idea of
owning the land is a cultural construction, but the ownership of the resources is based on a legal definition. Unlike the strong belief in land ownership demonstrated by the indigenes, the non-indigenes see the argument differently. One of their responses illustrates their position: “This country belongs to us all. We have the right to enjoy the properties (resources) in this land” (Yrm5, Yengema). However, they also acknowledged that the land belongs to the indigenes as the following quote states: “We believe that land belongs to the Kono people” (Yrm5, Yengema). According to Blaikie and Brookfield, (1987) and Schmink and Wood, (1987) Political ecology involves the intricacies between local people, national economies, global political economies, and the ecosystem. In addition, Walker, (2005) and Bassett, (1988) argued that political ecology in the developing world should link local production process and decision-making with a global political economy. These political ecologists have taken into consideration local people, national and global political economy, and decision-making in a macro level but have not delved with the intricacies at a micro-level (communities). The evidence illustrates that control and ownership differs and both are subject to the caprice of the dominant actor. The issue of ownership and control has two dimensions. Within the community, the indigenes’ demonstrate their leverage over those they consider non-indigenes. On the other hand, the state overrides the resource communities. The irony that the community owns the top soil whilst the state owns what is imbedded beneath the earth the top soil is an indication of state ownership and control contrary to the co-governance postulation presented in this thesis.

Non-indigenes argue that resources are for the benefit of all regardless of where you come from. Such views cannot be freely expressed because they conflict with the views of the indigenes on ownership and control. To the non-indigenes, land belongs to the indigenes but the resources belong to the state, and should be utilised for the good of all. The indigenes believe they own the land and should control the resources. The ideas vary from one set of people to another depending on their interests. The contradictory perceptions among the different sections of the community pave the way for what I call ‘the first step to resource exploitation’. In addition, it emerges that the problem with resource exploitation is how resources are owned, controlled and distributed instead of the relative abundance. In view of that, the next sections will explore the prerequisites for exploitation and the evidence of exploitation.
**Basics of Resource Exploitation: Preconditions and Coordination**

In this section, my intention is to purposefully discuss how the preconditions of resource exploitation are coordinated. Above, I concluded that resource exploitation is discursive. Here, we are going to look at the practical preconditions that exist in resource-based communities. In spite of the contrasting views of the indigenes and the non-indigenes, the process itself is mixed. Many indigenes are involved in mining and employ both indigenes and non-indigenes as a source of labour. Cautiously, I need to explain that the interviewees were never categorised as either indigenes or non-indigenes. The identities became prevalent as they responded to certain questions. This part of the research was directed towards individual respondents instead of using the focus group discussions. It is a sensitive area that could steer up tensions and discontent. Again, it is not reliable to only get the responses of the relatively better-off actors in the community who have leverage over the vulnerable labour force. Like government authorities, they shy away from critical questions. I decided to focus on the miners who were enthusiastic to comment despite their busy schedule.

**Finance as a Tool of Exploitation**

For resource exploitation to be successful, the human factor has to be subjected to ‘opportunity syndrome’, which simply implies that the miners in particular and their immediate ‘supporters’, who also rely on their superiors (masters), have to be reduced to a state of seeing the financier as ‘survival-economic Lord’. To generate discussion at the start of each interview, in all of the case studies investigated, interviewees were asked what concerns them the most during their mining activities. For the miners, financial support is the key tool being used to exploit both the resources and them. In their response during one to one interviews, the answers were relatively consistent: “We can not support ourselves financially. We require help from people who have to do that; unfortunately, they take advantage of us” (Yrm3, Ghaya, Yengema).

Here, the notion of resource exploitation is used to identify the behaviour of actors with relative economic power. What happens in these mining communities is that, after a piece of land is secured for mining through the licence holders, the supporter looks for a labour force. This ‘loose labour’ is not difficult to get. Some are indigenes whilst others are from other parts of the country, especially from the North. They comprise mainly young boys and middle-aged men who are often unskilled, literate or
illiterate. When a supporter or financier gets miners, he finances them and goes into negotiating when a piece of diamond acquired. My subsequent question is in order to know how the non-binding contract operates. The response was consistent again and one notable quotation reads thus: “The supporter opts to provide food and accommodation or gives money as an alternative to food. Health opportunity is supplementary but it is not contractual. The ‘supporter’ provides the working tools such as shaker, shovel, and pickaxe to the group of miners (an average of 4) to commence work” (Krm6, Koidu).

The miners, who are almost desperate, have a limited choice when accepting or taking work in the self-catering section of mines I will discuss later. Other interviewees expressed that:
“Sometimes the supporter can either decide to prepare the breakfast (‘Korjeh’) and dinner meal for us, or give us an equivalent of a £1 or £2 (equivalence depends on the exchange rate) per day as an alternative to providing them food” (Yrm4, Yengema). Subsequently, I asked them why, despite all these odd conditions, they are still accepting such exploitation? The answer is far and near. In response to this question, the reasons given are all similar, except for non-indigenes whose acute expectations are derived from their place of origin. However, according to this quote these differences do not alter the general outcome of the question: “There is no other job to do” (Krm4, Koidu).

In a country where unemployment is high and systemic corruption ravages every sector of the economy, the mining sector becomes the most flexible arena within which an individual can make money. For the immigrants from other parts of the country the prospect of going back without anything to take home encourages them to stay even longer. One of these responses states: “I left my home five years ago. I cannot go back like this. My family expects me to go back with money” (Krm5, Koidu). Further, I asked them about alternatives to mining. Sierra Leone lies south of the Sahara with fertile agricultural land. Therefore, I asked them if they could undertake agriculture as an alternative to working in the rough mining conditions. The respondents had a strong conviction that it is better to stay mining than to go into agriculture. According to this respondent: “Cocoa is seasonal. How long can we wait to harvest and sell it when we have family members to feed (take care of). I have 6
children and four other children from family members. You can imagine what that means” (Krm₁, Koidu).

Cocoa is one of the cash crops grown in the Kono district which many have been abandoned in order for people to get involved in mining. Often, the land has even been converted to a mining field when there is scant evidence of diamond deposits. Apparently, the mining sector looks far more lucrative to them because the expectation can be realised overnight and the industry is transitory.

Marketing and Pricing as a Tool of Exploitation
Here, only one businessman and two financial supporters in Ghaya were willing to comment on what the miners said regarding the selling and buying of gem stones. Their replies confirmed the accusatory responses of the miners I interviewed separately. These miners depend on the buyers and financial supporters for their diamond activities. Hence, I cautiously tried to protect their privacy. Both formal and informal agents carry out the buying and selling, and the process is either legal or illegal. With the miners so desperate to mine in spite of the bizarre mining conditions, I asked them how the diamond price is negotiated with the financial supporters. Regarding the buyers and financial supporters, I gathered two responses from this sub-set of respondents. This was done in Koidu and in Ghaya, Yengema, which has many of these agents doing this trade and where I had a buyer and a financial supporter who were willing to comment. During these discussions with the miners over the above question, a number of discourses revealed this growing but controversially ignored aspect of the diamond trade. The response was thus: “The financial supporter will tell us to sell the diamond to either him or to another buyer. But often, the immediate financial supporter coerces the miners to sell the diamond to the superior financier. In either case, the money is divided into three parts. One is for us, the second is for the feeding and accommodation (rough), and the third is for the financial support. Because the chances to resist such action from the supporter are limited, we sometimes look out for an opportune time to steal a piece of diamond during the washing of the gravel and sell to these illegal buyers and sometimes to agent dealers” (Yrm₄, Yengema)
Are you not risking your financial support, I asked? “We have no choice but to steal the diamond; we suffer so much and we gain very little,” the miner (Yrm₃) lamented. In my next question, I tried to find out from them what the other issues between miners and their immediate financiers were. From the quote of the miner in Koidu: “We do not trust each other”, Why, I asked: “they fear us and we too fear them. We have no hope to gain when we hit the ‘jackpot’ (get a diamond). They know the game. So, we watch each other closely” (Kr₃₃, Koidu).

Their responses highlighted that the whole trade is marred with fear, distrust, greed and exploitation. There is a ‘paradox of fear’ in the mining areas between the miners and their mining superiors. The miners on one hand fear that they will not get the payment for their efforts. On the other hand the ‘supporters’ have no trust in the miners. These issues were raised by Yrm₃ (Yengema) as an important narrative during the interview between them and their supporters. The supporters have developed this resentment because of two reasons: firstly, some of these financiers were miners themselves and know the ‘rule of the mine’; secondly, some of these financiers have either bought stolen diamonds or know of a similar casual trade with other financiers. Above all, the greed factor exercised by the financiers to exploit these desperate and deprived miners encourages the miners to steal diamonds and sell them at prices below their real value. Ironically, the under sale price is higher than what they could get from their financiers who exploit them. In essence, the greed and grievances factors attributed to armed conflict prevail within the communities and between the financiers and their economic lords.

Because of the miners’ discontent, they often steal the diamonds and sell to agents who are willing to buy. So, I asked them who they sell to and how is the price determined. The responses were of equal significance. The miners identified a group of informal agents who buy their diamonds. As Yrm₃ (Yengema) responds: “We sometimes sell to the Banda Banda or ‘Jula’ men whom we can easily penetrate. They often work for recognised agents. They also give us ‘windfall assistance when things are hard” (Yrm₃, Yengema).

This informal diamond route has this class of illegal buyers who fill in the gap between the financial supporters and the agents and or dealers. Accordingly, these are
a group of non-formal actors working on behalf of some of the most unscrupulous dealers in the diamond trade. They have no offices and operate without any licenses. Penetrating them was difficult. The only confirmation I got was from the miners and two financial supporters who accused them of encouraging the miners to be involved in stealing diamonds. One of these responses reads as follows: “These guys float around mining sites and communities on motorbikes luring our miners to steal. They have no office so that they cannot be traced. They pay low prices for the diamonds. But they are not working alone. They work as a team with the corporation of some dealers” (Yrs6, Yengema).

What these supporters highlighted was that these agents go around mining sites and occupy ‘Atire base’, ‘Ghettos’ or traditional coffee shops, waiting for the ‘fast’ diamonds from either ‘Gardo’ miners or stolen diamonds from miners working under supporters. These non-formal actors pay unfairly for these ‘highway’ diamonds, as I have codenamed them. Comparatively, their price seems to be better than the price offered by the financial supporter. Otherwise, the miners would see no reason to steal a piece from a financial supporter who cares for them.

I asked the buyer or dealer why they buy stolen diamonds from the miners who have no authority to sell diamonds. The dealer of such diamonds argues that: “We cannot distinguish between genuine diamonds and stolen ones. The diamond industry is not well structured. A piece of diamond can be bought from anyone” (Krd7, Koidu). Subsequently, I posed the question to him of why they underpay for the diamonds. The response was swift: “We do not underpay for a diamond. We value and pay accordingly” (Krd7, Koidu). This argument is fraudulent. It is used as a way of not admitting that they buy stolen diamonds. They cannot be forced to admit to this practice either. However, what the respondent highlighted was that, despite government mining policies, there was an absence of a structural framework to address the mining process including the access to the minerals, the labour conditions, and the marketing of the diamonds. One obvious aspect of the trade in diamond resources (be it formal or informal) is that the prices are determined selectively and subjectively. There is no criterion to determine the true value of the diamonds in the mining communities, but rather there are obvious criteria to devalue the diamond by raising issues about the smoothness, brightness, and by linking its value to the
fluctuations of the US dollar. Political Ecologists takes into consideration the different stakeholders and how their influence or discourses affect the participation of other stakeholders and their interests (Escobar, 1996). That is why stakeholder interests, their characteristics and actions are significant in understanding political-ecological conflicts (Bryant and Bailey, 1997). The role of different stakeholder shows the outcome of their diverse aims and interests (Long and Long, 1992). This is the evidence we have seen during the recruitment, mining, negotiations on diamonds between miners and their financial-lords, and legal and illegal marketing of diamond resources. Every actor works according to their purpose and interest irrespective of the flawed of legality. The interest of various stakeholders differs from each other and works against each other like a zero-sum game. The issue of stakeholdership has been often considered between the state, corporations and communities on diamond resource. Little or no attention is given to the diverse aim and interests among the actors within the community on diamond resources.

These responses also illustrate that policy papers by government, civil society (NGOs) and other stakeholders have not been able to demonstrate sustainable mining policy because of the inadequacies in the mining policies, which are yet to evaluate the underpinning impact of how this unaccounted for labour force works, and how much the miners gain from their activities. Government mining policies have targeted macro issues such as reviewing of mining contracts and licensing conditions, and the Environmental Impact Assessment. Though this is a formidable step, absence of a micro level analysis of the situation of the miners will enhance their physical, social and economic exploitation. It will also encourage them to stay longer in the mining business, usually as long as it takes to become well off.

5.3 Evidence of Resource Exploitation
Another aspect of exploitation is the evidence of underdevelopment in the resource-based communities. Communities with resources should be capable of working with each other and in collaboration with government on the provision of goods and services (Osborne and McLaughlin, 2004; Brandsen and Pestoff, 2006). Apparently, over the years, the communities and miners alike are yet to partake in sustainable activities or at least commensurate activities in the community. Rather, the diamond industry has exacerbated social, political, economic and ecological destruction in the
mining communities. More analysis of this will be offered in chapter 6 when I discuss the issue of assets. Both Kimberlite and Artisanal mining have caused mammoth damage to the communities and the environment. Koidu Holdings Limited (KHL), the only Kimberlite mining company, blast rocks at will using unreasonable health and safety measures and the effective relocation of the residents is only 200 metres from the epicentre of the blast. Quality of life is a component of sustainable development. Evidence from the photos below shows the contrary. Sustainability incorporates health and safety, poverty, migration and the diseases of employees and society (Welford, 1997). Therefore, sustainable business requires environmental justice, social equity and business ethics. This is not the case with mining activities in the Kono district. All the forms of mining taking place there ignore the safety of its workers and the communities. As environmental security is closely linked to the human security and sustainable community, I will introduce a brief section of environmental impacts in Kono district. This aspect focuses on secondary data which further explains the evidences. For the primary data, I interviewed miners, supporters, an administrator of Koidu Holdings Ltd and a counsellor. The evidence I will be discussing below is obvious to an observer in the mining areas. (See photos A, B & C)

Environmental Impact of Diamond Mining in Kono District

Environmental impact caused by diamond mining can be linked to human security in resource-rich communities. It is caused by actors, affect actors, some of whom are perpetrators themselves. These actors include miners of varying role as discussed in [5.4]. Their activities continue as the demand and supply of diamonds continue alongside new discoveries or prospective sites. Diamond mining, like other forms of mineral mining activities accelerate the rate and extent of changes on the landscape, destruction of flora, dispersal of fauna and inhibits the cycle of the ecosystem with short and long term consequences on man and the environment. The environmental impacts in the diamond industry vary depending on the method and process of extracting the diamonds. According to Lubovich and Suthers (2007) the impact of diamond mining is deep rooted from waste disposal, leaching and ground water contamination. In Sierra Leone, the two main forms of mining, alluvial and kimberlite have had negative impacts on the environment and people. The impact is not limited to the uncovered pits dug during mining but includes also the effects of chemical and harmful substances on land, air and water. The process of diamond mining leaves
small and large man-made craters. These abandoned pits or craters have caused enormous health and safety risks, decline on community livelihood, and a threat to economic and ecological sustainability. Despite mining by individuals, small-scale companies and multinational companies, the land is often not reclaimed due to negligence and ineffective environmental policies and implementation. Hence, the craters reduce prospective agricultural land and have become breeding places for a host of disease agents such as mosquitoes (see photo C). A study carried out in Gbakima, south-western Sierra Leone shows evidences of schistosomiasis and other parasitic diseases. During mining activities, due to lack of lava and refuse disposal, urine and fetal samples are excreted into streams and bushes and later washed away into the streams causing widespread infection in the community.

The physical environmental has sustained extensive damage as miners move from one pit to newer site where diamonds have been discovered (IRG, 2005). The situation has become worse with decline in agricultural productivity from 1.7 percent a year (FAO, 2004) as against a rapid pollution growth of 3.5 percent annually (World Bank, 2007). Diamond mining in Kono district is done in small and large scale, highly mechanised or poorly mechanised, and deep, including kimberlite and alluvial. Irrespective of the form diamond mining is carried out since 1930; it has caused widespread environmental destruction. Despite the use of modern techniques and implements, and changes and counter changes of mining policies towards governance initiatives in resource-based communities, diamond mining has brought ecological disturbances on the physical environment, water, biodiversity and humans in Kono district. Lubovich and Suthers (2007) states that in kimberlite mining processes tons of kimberlite is given away as waste as huge quantity of waste water and barren rocks are thrown away. These destruction and impact has been challenged by community youths, who ironically are themselves perpetrators of land degradation. In December 2007, the level of discontent reached the climax and was characterised by confrontation and deaths (NMJD 2009). Koidu Holding (Octea diamond group) is a foreign direct investment company undertaking vast and hazardous technique of rock blasting (noise pollution) in relatively populated Koidu town in the Gbense and Tankoro chiefdoms. The blasting often causes huge dust clouds (air pollution), polluted nearby streams (water pollution), devastating houses and leaves land barren, causing people to temporarily and permanently relocate (Lubovich and Suthers, 2007).
Environmental impact of mining is not only limited to Kono or other developing countries. Russia, a transition economy, had one of the worst man-made craters in the world in 2004 with the dept of 1700 feet, an equivalent of 1/3 of a mile (http://www.thisissierraleone.com/top-10-worst-diamond-mines-in-the-world/). The crater produced 10 million carats each year. From simple analogy, I can posit that the period and production capacity of diamond extracted could be proportional. Another example of environmental impact is The Jwaneng Diamond Mine owned by Russian foreign investment in Botswana. In 2012 it was one of the largest man-made craters in the world. In addition to its topographical impact, the waste water it produces contaminates the soil (http://www.thisissierraleone.com/top-10-worst-diamond-mines-in-the-world/). Such pollution is common in almost every mine in Kono district as shown in photo A.

The youths are part of the labour force needed in the most unregulated diamond mining in the district. Like the kimberlite mining, the alluvial mining has affected land resources, flora and fauna and evidence of degraded and exposed ‘mined-recycled pits (see photo A, B&C). This exposed and barren land is often open to erosion and has become unsuitable for agriculture. According to IRG (2005) ecological destruction caused from mining activities pollutes air, water and causes health hazards.

Alluvial mining, like Kimberlite causes land degradation and ecological damage. The sector comprises of accountable and unaccountable actors within the resource-based communities and from outside who are driven by socio-economic deprivation and governance issues, despite government’s governance initiatives on Diamond Area Development Fund (DACDF) and the Kimberley Processing. The influx of various actors into the mining communities has affected living conditions too. According to MMR & NMJD, (2006) lack of sufficient housing facilities has caused congestion in homes with an average of about 10 individuals to a single room or 30 individuals per household. According to NMJD (2004) 10,000 miners between the ages of 16 and 18 are actively involved in diamond mining. With ineffective monitoring and self-seeking interest, the rampant alluvial mining which is easily accessible with evasive regulations has contributed immensely to environmental degradation and water pollution (see photo A&C). Evidence of deprivation and desperation, arising from
their socio-economic malaise, has provoked unethical actions of some actors to dig and sink houses (Lubovich and Suthers, 2007; NMJD, 2009).

Kono district was once densely forested. Evidences of that can be seen along the Nimikoro and Nimiyama chiefdoms. Diamond mining activities have deforested large areas with little or no resilience to recover even the secondary forest. The open cast mining involves the cutting down of vegetation, excavation of the soil, and in some cases where minimal machinery is used, surface water has been polluted. It is estimated that between 80,000 and 120,000 hectares of land have been mined in different parts of the country. This shows that though Kono district is the epicentre of diamond mining in Sierra Leone, environmental impact is felt in every mining community. In addition, the fauna comprising of lions, leopards and elephants have become extinct (NMJD, 2009). Much attention has not been given to these health related issues as people in the mining field bath, drink and wash with water contaminated during mining (see photo C). Ironically, some of these affected persons are perpetrators as well. The dependency on diamond mining arising from unstructured and ineffective mining policy, inequitable distribution of wealth has invited many youths into diamond mining.

A. Uncovered mined pit in Yengema  B. A group of deprived miners

Accommodation

In this section, the discussion on accommodation will focus on the conditions of the miners and include the general housing projects in the community operated by Koidu Holdings Limited. Indeed, better or improved housing facilities are a fundamental element of sustainable community development. This requires the broad-based community and the miners to have a respectable place to live. The Ghaya, Yengema participants showed me to their places where they sleep. When I asked them, how
many people sleep in the small room, the participant responded thus: “We are ten inside this room. Living in a room provided for us by our supporter is unbearable. We hope that we get a piece of diamond and return home” (Yrm1, Ghaya in Yengema).

In a further question, I asked them if the situation is like that with most miners. “Yes, and some who fall out with their supporters often live in worse conditions than this” (Yrm2, Ghaya in Yengema) explained. “Some miners could not withstand the incongruity under their supporters or financiers. They end up living alone in the open, faced with confound challenges of getting accommodation and food” (Srm3, Sewafe). One of the miners also commented that: “I have often seen my colleague miners who can not afford accommodation sleep in the open with the expectation of getting a piece of the diamond” (Yrm1, Yengema). In contrast, the dealers live in luxurious houses. This disparity is evident of the gap existing in the mining communities.

Like these miners, the general communities that host the resources live in dilapidated houses. Years of mining have made very insignificant changes to their housing predicament. The few homes built by KHL are for residents whose houses or perimeter has been affected by their operations. The housing projects have often been detested by the affected residents for being sub-standard. Notwithstanding this, I put this concern to the administrator of Koidu Holdings Limited about the type of housing, and who benefits from the project. Answering the second part of the question, the participant revealed that: “Our priority is to cater for those who have direct impact on our mining activities. We cannot provide for everyone” (Krks, Koidu).

For the other part of the question, the participant noted that: “The houses we built are of a standard even better than those we relocated them from. Don’t forget, my ‘brother’, you cannot satisfy people. Whatever you do, they will complain” (Krks, Koidu)

The unfairness here is not only about the type of houses built for the affected communities. Satisfying a few and neglecting many who are victims as well is unrealistic and unsustainable. Many others indirectly affected by pollution are
ignored. The blasting of rocks affects communities beyond those within the blasting zone. This situation is peculiar to Koidu, which hosts Koidu Holdings Limited. These discourses reveal that the reason the miners choose to live such a chaotic and miserable life is centred on their hope of overcoming the daunting social and economic challenges. They are always enthusiastic and are waiting for an opportunity to get rich. Inevitably, it is this ‘hope’ of getting a piece of diamond that has kept these miners in such places, in these deplorable conditions, where they have endured being exploited for years in spite of all the constraints involved.

**No Electricity in the District**
The district of Kono, especially the rural-urban zone, has no electricity supply. The capability to have electricity is dependent on an economic strength that is obvious in houses of diamond merchants, and foreign nationals like the Lebanese. These economic elites have high-powered generators in their places while the great mass of the community lives in darkness with kerosene lanterns. In the next chapter (7), a section deals with assets. This will give the reader a better understanding of the infrastructure in the communities.

**Health and Sanitation**
According to Feachem (1973), “sanitation” refers to all conditions that affect health, viz a vis the control of community water supplies, land, air and water pollution caused by waste water disposal, vectors of diseases, excreta disposal, refuse disposal and atmospheric conditions in semi-urban and rural mining communities. There is absolutely no effective environmental health management in the mining locations; the miners are only interested in getting the pieces of diamonds they could find at any cost, rather than taking the establishment of sustainable conditions into consideration during their actions. However they are not the only ones who suffer. The communities investigated in the case studies suffer along with the miners. I put this question to the councillor who willingly volunteered to give me audience despite all the limitations: “Artisanal and Small-Scale mining (ASM) has caused damages to the flow of streams, swamps and ponds once use to get water and plant crops. All their interest and desperation is to get a diamond” (Yrc7, Koidu).
I put forward another question on the way through which this practice can be eradicated. The participant commented that: “Resolving this needs strong political will from the top. They are a lot of influential players in the mining activities. The miners are just employed. The thing you should know is that they are used by people who are more than them” (Yrc7, Koidu). Having this political will is possible but needs to be far reaching. The government’s mining policies have proven to be inadequate and ineffective. The documents did not take into consideration the grassroots problems in the industry. There is too much focus is on the activities of big companies and the ownership of licenses. Like the wider community, the miners drink the dirty water running around the mine zone. However, the situation is also unhealthy for the miners during mining activities. The miners drink from running water contaminated by mining activities and bathing: “We drink any running water even if we detect faeces in it. We would push the faeces aside and drink… because we believe God can protect us” (Krm3, Koidu) (see photo 3 on the following page).

It was acknowledged by health officials, individual community members, the chairman of the Coalition of Kono Youths and the miners in 2006 that water-borne, water-related, water-based and water-washed diseases are prominent (Bangura, 2006). Five years after this statement, these conditions still prevail. This illustrates the feet-dragging by the local, national, and other stakeholders who have yet to address this predicament.

C. Contaminated mining stream used for bathing

Virtually all the discourse on people depositing human waste in the stream illustrates the lack of toilet facilities in the mining zones. It also qualifies the way mining activities are addressed in mining communities. They are not well regulated and lack sustainable practices.
5.4 Actors of Resource Exploitation

The evidence in this sector is collected from both primary and secondary data. The secondary data includes the Ministry of Mines and Mineral Resources, and the primary source is semi-structured interviews. Observation was not a technique in collecting data but it was very instrumental during the research. This was because most of the activities of the actors were apparent. There are various actors, but with one common perception of self-interest. As such, there is an internal scramble for diamonds in every possible and accessible way. The reader should note that the even though I have limited my participants to domestic local actors, I have not considered that it is only the actors who do the manual work. The financial supporters employing them informally are included. Trying to understand who mines was easy. The only conscious part of it was to know the type of mining the miner does. Again, I have not included some of the actors in chapter four because they are not active in the communities at present. I have drawn a table below (5.2) to identify the actors and their role according to the evidence from the respondents.
Table 5.2: Domestic Mining Actors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mining Type</th>
<th>Types of Actors</th>
<th>Activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Artisanal</td>
<td>A) Visible</td>
<td>They are the obvious day to day miners working for financial supporters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(i) Hand-picked miners</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B) Invisible</td>
<td>They are not easily identified ‘Gardo miners’ have bad experience and work for themselves Do quick hired service for daily survival</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(i) Gardo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(ii) Walker fast</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C) Financial actors</td>
<td>Provide financial assistance to miners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(i) Formal supporters</td>
<td>Hire hand-picked miners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(ii) Informal supporters e.g. Barna Barna; Julamen</td>
<td>Give windfall support and sometimes buy stolen diamonds</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Author’s construct

The Miners

A holistic picture of how resources and humans are exploited cannot be comprehensive if I ignored understanding the miners [‘swing actors’]. I have called them ‘swing actors’ because they move through all the situations of abuse in the mining sector. Evidence of abuse is discussed above in section 5.2. I will identify some of the quotes that show exploitation through financial aid and marketing: “We can not support ourselves financially. We require help from people who have to do that; unfortunately, they take advantage of us” (Yrm3, Ghaya, Yengema).

“The supporter opts to provide food and accommodation or gives money as an alternative to food. Health opportunity is supplementary but it is not contractual. The ‘supporter’ provides the working tools such as shaker, shovel, and pickaxe to the group of miners (an average of 4) to commence work” (Krm6, Koidu)
“The financial supporter will tell us to sell the diamond to either him or to another buyer. But often, the immediate financial supporter coerces the miners to sell the diamond to the superior financier. In either case, the money is divided into three parts. One is for us, the second is for the feeding and accommodation (rough), and the third is for the financial support. Because the chances to resist such action from the supporter are limited, we sometimes look out for an opportune time to steal a piece of diamond during the washing of the gravel and sell to these illegal buyers and some times to agent dealers” (Yrm4, Yengema). Escobar, (1996) has illustrated this by explaining how political ecologists take into consideration the different stakeholders and how their influence or discourses affect the participation of other stakeholders and their interests. From the evidence of exploitation, each set of stakeholders operate in different angles. Long and Long, (1992) emphasise also that the role of different stakeholder shows the outcome of their diverse aims and interests. This is evident in resource rich communities where various actors work according to their purpose and interest irrespective of the flawed on legality.

The formal mining sector operates with miners, supporters, agent dealers, dealers and exporters. The miners form the backbone of the alluvial mining. Apparently, most of them are mainly Sierra Leoneans who are unskilled, mainly school dropouts, vulnerable and desperate and are adolescent boys and middle-aged men. This was supported by Richards (2003), who attempted to explain the link between the causes of the civil war in Sierra Leone by factoring in the alienation of youths who dropped out from the educational system and are unemployed. Peters (2007) also commented that the root causes of the war is linked to the lack of education and jobs, and the failure or unwillingness of a ruling elite to empower the vulnerable and needy in participating in matters affecting them. The evidence shows that these young men go into mining areas to mine because they lack capital to start a business, or are being influenced by peer-group aged miners who are fortunate to get rich during mining. Some of these actors who involve themselves in the diamond trade are not driven by illiteracy and poverty factors. There is evidence that economic deprivation and social exclusion from the gains of the resources and the neglect of the youths has provoked the emergence of what I call ‘parallel and invisible’ groups or communities within the resource-based communities. Though it is a fact that majority of the youths are illiterate, that is not a sufficient reason for their involvement in mining. The majority
of the miners are motivated by the quest for self-improvement and are driven to get rich quickly, due to the uneven distribution of resources. In addition, the findings prove a slight shift from poverty to the notion of anticipating ‘more wealth’. Years of uneven distribution have provoked discontent, diamond drive, diamond rush and sometimes conflict of interests in resource rich communities.

‘Gardo’
I first encountered this group of miners in 2006 from my primary data as part of my 2006 research. In this thesis, I attempted to verify this from the respondents. Only two acknowledge doing it sometimes. The ‘gardos’ are mainly illicit miners who prefer to work for themselves without financial supporters. The choice to work without financial aid emanates from bad experiences of extortion by financiers during bargaining for the price of a piece of diamond. Like those I met in 2006, one of the respondents explains that those who undertake this path do it as a last resort. Yrm₄ states: “Though it is difficult to commence work without a financier, it is worthy when we get the diamonds” (Yrm₄, Yengema). With my interest and focus of this thesis on sustainable communities, I wanted to know how their mining is done. The respondent replied: “We use just buckets, pickaxe, and shakers” (sift) (Yrm₃, Koidu).

The responses show that the ‘Gardo’ miners use crude traditional implements to do their mining activities without any supervision, no licence or Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA). The ‘Gardo’ miners are individuals who have either separated from their former supporters or who have migrated into the mining towns or settlements and are waiting to be picked up informally. ‘Gardo’ miners, according to their activities, do not have legal right to mining of any sort. In addition, these actors do not pay royalties, taxes or purchase small-scale mining licenses. Hence, this category of artisanal and small-scale mining forms the bulk of the illicit mining, by taking advantage of the weak monitoring. When I asked a local councillor to comment on the problem of monitoring, he explained that: “Monitoring the mines is difficult. The problem is endemic. The mine wardens are few and complacent” (Yrc₇, Yengema).

Though government mining policy enshrines the monitoring activity within the mining communities, the evidence in this thesis demonstrates how the present mining
problems are on-going. The ‘Gardo’ are a threat to the environment and are the victims of social conditions. They pay no attention to environmental damage and bear the risk and consequences of health and safety implications during their illicit mining activities.

‘Warker fast’ (Walk Fast Miners)

Another group of miners are the ‘warker fast’ (walk fast). They are similar to the ‘Gardo’ miners but have a distinctive difference. Unlike the ‘Gardo’ miners who are illicit and work for themselves, the ‘walker fast’ miners are not self-employed. They prefer to do this quick service and expect payment immediately. They do not go after diamonds but work for a means of survival. This demonstrates the intricacies of working practices happening in the mining sector, which the government’s macro mining policies have failed to address. They are employed by small-scale mining companies and are paid a daily wage by their ‘service employers’ without any written contractual agreement. With risk close at hand for this group of miners, I asked one of the two accessible respondents if they have no concern about the dangers. He states: “Life is full of risk. We do not fear because they pay us even though the money is small” (Krm3, Koidu).

Unlike the miners working for financial supporters, their employers do not feed this group of miners. By the nature of their informal employment, the employees work hard for an average of six hours a day with no contractual legal agreement. In the absence of labour regulations and the conditions under which these miners operate, they endure the situation in order to work for an average equivalent of £1 per person a day. Krm3, Koidu told me: “We have to survive”… No option (alternative) for now” (Krm3, Koidu). This meagre amount is accepted by these labourer miners because of their peer group, a desperation to get rich and the ‘need to survive’. With no trust of financial supporters due to bitter experiences, the respondent lamented: “We are tired of working for supporters. They do not appreciate our efforts, they exploit us, and we have no right over our labour” (Yrm4, Yengema).

West African Actors

West African actors are as active as the Middle East actors in the Sierra Leone diamond trade. Like the Lebanese of the Middle East block, they have involved
themselves in all sorts of mining ranging from legal to illegal and the smuggling of diamond resources. Among these actors is a group called the 5-Nations Committee, which was established in 1972. Though they did not admit to partaking in illegal diamond trades, their leader, who told me he came to Sierra Leone on the 16th August 1953, acknowledged helping the community and young miners who meet them for help. According to him: “We assist the local community. Our assistance is voluntary. We assist youth groups who ask us for assistance” (Kr\textsubscript{n}9, Koidu).

Throughout the discussion, I was not able to get evidence of any tangible development projects they have undertaken, except for the financial assistance they have been giving to the miners and some license holders. According to their aim, the union of these five countries, Nigeria, The Gambia, Niger, Mali, and Senegal was formed to assist nationals of those countries on immigration matters and other socio-economic matters. In an attempt to vet their activities, I asked them if they are involved in mining activities. The secretary-general replied that: “Yes, some plot (mining land) owners cannot afford to pay for the licenses. So, we come in and pay for the license and take over the mining land under the agreed terms. Some times, they find miners but cannot provide the finance. They come to us for assistance. Later, we buy any diamond they got subject to the assistance we have been given to them” (Kr\textsubscript{n}10, Koidu).

They did not acknowledge any involvement in the illegal diamond trade. Probing them further might have taken the discussion beyond the ethics of the research. However, evidence from the other respondents discussed in chapters 6 and 7 show that assistance given to miners paves the way for an informal relationship, which allows them to buy stolen or unaccounted-for diamonds. They overcome the mining sector regulations by taking advantage of the financial problem associated with selfishness, greed and exploitation. In our on-going discussion, I asked them of factors that hinder their business. The chairman told me: “The Barna Barna buyers are a big problem. They obstruct the trade by buying diamonds anywhere” (Kr\textsubscript{n}9, Koidu). These actors are displeased with the non-formal diamonds agents. The secretary-general lamented that: “These people are hindrance to our business; they operate without licenses but buy diamonds from anybody and everywhere” (Kr\textsubscript{n}10, Koidu). The activities of the Barna Barna were also commented on by a ‘supporter’ in the text.
on the tools of exploitation. One of the quotes about them reads: “These guys float around mining sites and communities on motor bikes luring our miners to steal. They have no office so that they cannot be traced. They pay low prices for the diamonds. But they are not working alone. They work as a team with the cooperation of some dealers” (Yrs₆, Yengema).

Indeed, some of these actors exploit the miners because the system in the mining communities is fragile and unstructured. The policies do not address these loopholes adequately. Hence, the diamond industry and the resource communities lie at the mercy of these unscrupulous traders.

However, though the 5-Nation Committee shift blame onto the Barna Barna, these nationals operate with leverage in the mining communities. They fall under the category of the ‘Influentials’ discussed above. Unlike the 1955 expulsion of foreign nationals from mining areas (Francis 2000), the 5-Nation Committee’s numbers have increased owing to inter-marriages and have regionally proscribed rights to reside within West Africa states within the confines of the law. They have been able to steam through the loopholes in the mining communities and they will continue to exploit these communities as long as they have the capacity. Moore (1993) argued that the availability of national and local policies on resources, the access to them and the roles and conflicts between different stakeholders were initially neglected. In contrast, this thesis reveals that national policies are available but are inadequate and ineffective. In addition, major focus has been given to the macro aspect of the mining whilst neglecting the micro aspect that operates at the community level. This is evident of the exploitation as different stakeholders work contrary to sustainable resource use and community development. Sierra Leone’s mining policies focus on major companies whilst the small companies and ‘invisible’ miners exploited by some actors cause quite substantial damage to the environment and communities. Making analysis from contribution made by Long and Long, (1992), the role of different stakeholder shows the outcome of their diverse aims and interests. In an attempt to support this fact, Escobar (1996) argues that political ecologists should consider the different stakeholders and how their influence or discourses affect the participation of other stakeholders and their interests (Escobar, 1996). Resource exploitation occurs at every level and by various actors ranging from extraction to marketing. That is why
Bryant and Bailey, (1997) argue that stakeholder interests, their characteristics and actions are significant in understanding political-ecological conflicts.

5.5 Resource Exploitation and Community Governance

In the sections above, I dealt with various actions and the ways that resource exploitation works. Here, I will attempt to show the general networking among community actors. This categorisation of the community actors is different from the various mining actors discussed above. In chapter two, I identified the community as an agent of change from resource exploitation and underdevelopment to sustainable community development. I also stated that the community is not only a simple social place or location but is also an entity of authority and a socio-economic locus. Hence, the categorisation in this section is based on community identification. In doing so, I will first identify the composition of the actors.

From the evidence collected, there are social norms that determine the differential ability of people to own, control, claim or make use of resources such as land and common property. I discussed this evidence above and in chapters 6 and 7. According to the table (5.3) below, there are social norms and traditional structures in the resource-based communities. This structure, though customary, is the first form of discrimination and segregation in the communities. According to the evidence, I have identified four sets of people in these communities: (i) the birth right (ii) the influential (iii) the long-term residence and (iv) the visitors (short-term residence). Hence, I was interested in understanding the social relationships between the natives or homogeneous communities and the non-natives. Before going further, I want the reader to know that this composition of actors overlap in some cases. In actuality, there is a very limited process of separation when we consider mining activities and influence.
Table 5.3: Community Composition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sets of Community People</th>
<th>Power</th>
<th>Capacity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Birth Right</td>
<td>Conscious power by virtue of birth from indigenes</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Influential: Social, Economic/Political Elites</td>
<td>Attain power due to social esteem</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long-Term Residence</td>
<td>Enjoys limited power unless he/she can exhibit influence</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visitors: Short-Term Residence</td>
<td>Can hardly be recognised</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s construct

From the table above, the ‘birth right’ or natives enjoy an esteemed social classification except when they are deprived of the wealth from diamond extraction. The next category is the influential group who enjoy relative control over mining affairs based on their social status. The last but not least is the distinctive immigrants. They have members who belong to the influential group as stated above and as explained in chapters 6 and 7. However, the rest of them have limited capacity to influence situations in the communities they reside in. With this categorisation, the evidence shows that there is a problem of access to resources. I will discuss this in the next section.

Access to Resources

In this section, 12 participants were asked about their access to diamond resources. I did not ask them of their identity before the interview. I did it only after the interview to have an in-depth understanding of the social structure. This structure, however, does not give automatic leverage to some of the actors including the ‘birth right’ or ‘homogenous’ sectors. I want the reader to know that access here does not mean access to the roads and medical facilities and other forms of assets. Here, the use of access to resources is about the entrance into diamond mining, in spite of the barriers and limitations. The people in the resource-based communities rely on access to diamond resources and other public assets because they lack resources of their own. Households find it very difficult because they do not have and cannot access the different types of capital, opportunities or services. Hence, talking about community development and sustainable community development in these communities is
fanciful, at least for the time being. Evidence shows that despite the dissatisfaction among the indigenes, there is a sense of identity and belongingness. They want to be recognised regardless of the prevailing mining situation. According to one outspoken respondent in a focus group discussion on community roles: “Everyone is free to do business. But there is always the owner of a place… you cannot go to a place without recognising the native of that place. That is the only difference” (Kfg₁, Koidu).

This might be seen acceptable according to customs. However, it identifies one of the barriers to a collective contribution to sustainable community development, because there is an implied exclusion of people who are seen as aliens in these communities. It brings to attention the silent discontent of some community members and the evidence of what I call the ‘heterogeneous community’ who are seen as ‘strangers’ (aliens). However some respondents believe that even though others are seen as ‘strangers’ (aliens), they contribute to the community in their own small ways. One businessman’s quote states that: “Most of the businesses are owned by people who are not Kono people. But we always see ourselves as strangers. However, we like the people because we do business” (Srbm₆, Sewafe).

It is obvious that the power to access and exercise influence on these assets rests on the first group of people ‘by virtue of birth’ but the power could shift to the ‘influential’ who can influence decisions indirectly. Some respondents in Sewafe ascertained this and one salient quote was: “Those who own money control affairs indirectly. People depend on them for financial help. Most of the dealers are foreigners (non-Kono). Also, most of the things taking place are influenced by politics. If you are a ‘strong’ supporter of a powerful politician, you can control things (policies)” (Srm₃, Sewafe). In summary, according to the evidence, the role of the actors on community assets varies and shifts over time.

5.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have identified the actors who play a crucial role in the mining sector. Some of them are accounted for while others are not. The government’s focus on the accounted actors leaves a loophole in the mining policies. The ignored actors are as destructive as the small-scale companies. I have also discussed the situation the miners go through and how exploitation is operated at micro level. Some existing
literature identifies some actors as victims of resource availability, but ignores their role in the exploitation of the resources. The role of each actor should be considered in order to achieve sustainable community development. This is because evidence shows that the process of exploitation involves different actors and takes various pathways.

The evidence shows that resource exploitation (RE) is a systematic process in resource-based communities. The evidence revealed the variation between resource curse and resource exploitation, the forms resource exploitation takes, and the actors involved. From the evidence, my analysis identifies that resource exploitation is influenced by governance structures within the resource-based communities. Also, from the evidence, I have been able to identify that resource exploitation commences at a micro level and is an overture of resource curse. The role of the actors has also been discussed in the evidence. There is evidence of rent-seeking between the community actors, which identifies the relationships between resource exploitation and community governance in mining communities, through an analysis of key actors and their roles at a range of scales. According to some commentators, focus should be placed on elites or patrimonialism and clientelism. The role of certain actors is not explained as that of perpetrators in the context of the resource-based communities. Instead, they identify some of these actors as being the victims of resource abundance. Ross, (2001a) noted that the abundance of resources has only benefited the elite and their agents or associates under a dogmatic doctrine of patrimonialism and clientelism (Le billon, 2001). This set of actors has been seen as the perpetrators of the resource-curse. Ironically, the evidence shows that it is not only the elite that have gained or contributed to resource exploitation. The exploitation occurs in stratified ways from financial supporters and dealers through to the group who I have called the ‘invisible miners’. Apparently, it is not the resource abundance that causes the exploitation. Rather, it is the governance limitations within the communities.
CHAPTER SIX

APPROACHES TO SUSTAINABLE COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT

Assessing the impact of community activities towards sustainable community development

6.1 Introduction

This chapter answers the second research objective of this thesis, which ‘examines if, and in what ways mining communities utilise their assets and undertake practices that contribute towards sustainable community development’. The goal of this chapter is to look at which assets are available and if the activities undertaken by the actors are sustainable in the resource-based communities. In this chapter I argue that the resource-based communities are polarised and do not have a distinctive approach towards sustainable community development. In an attempt to arrive at the outcome of this chapter’s research objective, I engaged in two methodological strategies. The first stage was to make use of the secondary data, which represents an ‘official’ discourse on the topic, and the second stage was the sample of respondents, including two counsellors who contributed as concern citizens and not in their capacity as counsellors, and the focus groups respondents I spoke to in Koidu town, Yengema and Sewafe town. Each of these towns represents key mining communities in the four chiefdoms I chose, except for Koidu town, which hosts two chiefdoms. I also undertook personal observations and assessments of the availability and dilapidation of assets. Observation was not a methodological technique but an inevitable one that interprets true-life stories in the mining communities. I also questioned and discussed the issues with participants independently for verification of the controversial findings discussed in open groups. In the section that follows below, I will look at the community assets in these resource-based communities.

Firstly, I will categorise the available assets in a narrative way using tables. I have done this in order to avoid using quantitative techniques in identifying them, which was difficult to do. Also, there is no comprehensive secondary data to show the detail of such assets to which people many attribute the excesses of the war. The main finding here is the behaviour or attitude of different actors in the community towards available assets and how such behaviour impacts sustainable community development. As such, I take into consideration the mining documents as a secondary
source in order to understand if the policy sufficiently protects assets. On the other hand, I will use the primary data from semi-structured interviews to assess the behaviour of the actors towards the sustainability of the assets.

Secondly, I will look at the community assets and the activities of the actors. Thirdly, from the assets discussed and the actors’ activities, I will assess the sustainability approach that exists in the communities using two sustainability approaches: strong and weak sustainability. Finally, the primary aim of this research is focussed towards achieving sustainable community development, so I will discuss whether the existing practices will move the communities towards this outcome. The findings of this chapter lay the platform for the third research objective, which is discussed in chapter 7. The next section will begin by identifying the community assets in perspective.

6.2 Community Assets in Perspective
This section begins with the identification of community assets available in the communities and their composition. Here, I present the sustainability of the communities as a prerequisite to achieving sustainable community development in the communities. It is explicit therefore, that exploring ‘Sustainable Community Development’ co-exists with the quantitative and qualitative improvement of the available assets in these communities. I will use both secondary and primary data to analyse this section.

Two of the five practical principles of Sustainable Community Development given by Roseland et al. (2007) elaborate on equity and long-term thinking that gives emphasis to the need for intra and inter-generational equity with respect to environmental, social, resources and opportunities; while the other principles distinguish between development and growth by emphasising qualitative and quantitative development, which comments on environmental quality, quality of life, education, health, cultural diversity and freedom. From the previous chapter (5) we learnt of the evidence of exploitation and the lack of infrastructural resources. In this section, I will be using the term ‘infrastructural resources or assets’ to mean community assets. Roseland (2005) and Daly and Howell (2006) identified six types of assets that we can examine: (i) Human capital (ii) Natural capital (iii) Economic capital (iv) Social capital (v) Physical capital and (vi) Cultural capital. Green and Haines (2002) gave four forms of
community capital, which are (a) Human capital (b) Physical capital (c) Financial capital (d) Environmental capital. As I have identified these assets, I will examine their availability and how they have affected sustainable community development in these resource-based communities. The findings show that these assets once existed but have eroded over time with limited resilience, as is evident in chapter 5. The section below will identify what assets the communities have to make them sustainable by looking at the types of assets. I have also included Roseland’s table on assets in order to provide a comparison with the table on community assets in the case studies and how it deals with their assets.

**Table 6.1: Types of Assets**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identified Assets</th>
<th>Composition of Assets</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Natural Capital (Ecological or Environmental)</td>
<td>Comprises of biophysical resources, living systems and life-support services of our planet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Capital</td>
<td>Covers knowledge, health, skills, competence, motivations, emotional and spiritual capacity of the individual that enhances the establishment of personal, social and economic well-being</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Capital (Manufactured or Produced)</td>
<td>Includes the stock of material resources such as buildings, equipment, infrastructure and machinery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Capital (Financial)</td>
<td>It is a derived form of capital from the others’ assets. Involves ways of resource allocation, investment, cash, and the monetary system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Capital</td>
<td>An outcome of shared traditions, values, customs, identity, heritage, and history.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Capital</td>
<td>Operates formal structure (government) and informal organisation (social networks). Consists of relationships, structures and networks, institutions that enhance shared knowledge, understandings and blueprint of interactions among a group of people, families, communities, political systems etc.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Roseland (2005, pp. 4-14)

In the table above (6.1), the assets and their composition are outlined. In the table below (6.2), I have outlined the assets in the community and summarised the activities
of the actors. The first table represents the theoretical composition of the assets according to Roseland. The table was also discussed in the theoretical chapter (two). The latter is a construct of the researcher that identifies the activities or attitude of actors towards these assets.

Table 6.2 Attitudes towards Community Assets in the Four Chiefdoms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identified Assets</th>
<th>Activities/Attitude of the Actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Natural Capital (Ecological or Environmental)</td>
<td>Flora lost; all potential land including potent agricultural land and swamps converted to mining fields</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Capital</td>
<td>No health and safety measures; no medical opportunities for miners.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Capital (Manufactured or Produced)</td>
<td>Purely diamond production; relatively agro-based community; houses and bridges are destroyed for diamonds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Capital (Financial)</td>
<td>Insufficient financial institution; no structure in the marketing of diamonds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Capital</td>
<td>Traditions affect governance; ignorance, customs and gender limitations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Capital</td>
<td>Mixed social networks or parallel communities; political allegiance influence social institutions; passive consent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Author’s construct

6.3 Community Assets and Activities of Actors

To understand the context within which the community actors act towards the available assets, I have decided to discuss the compositions and state of the various assets in the resource-rich communities one after the other. According to the Brundtland report, titled ‘Our Common Future’, the development process has to ‘meet the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’ (WCED, 1987). In that context, the activities of various actors on the available assets determine how a community can develop. In chapter 5, I identified some of these actors. Discussing these assets will help the reader to gain a prior understanding of the sustainability approaches in section 6.3. This is achieved by
observation and through responses drawn from the respondents. Observation was not deliberately used as a technique. It was inevitable that it would affect the research however, because some of the assets such as the natural environment and the various ‘capitals’ cannot be ignored. In the sub-section that follows below, I will commence discussion on the natural capital.

**Natural Capital**

According to Roseland (2005), natural capital encompasses the biophysical resources, life support services, and living systems. Precisely, natural capital is the natural endowment base that includes ecological elements such as land, flora and fauna. In economic terms, land is a factor of production and includes natural resources. In mining communities it has been viewed not only as a factor of production but also as a unique social and economic amenity. It is a secured form of holding wealth and of gaining social and political advantages and family food security (Ghimire, 2001). The capacity of the community members to conceptualise what land means to them determines how they interact with it. The outlining of community assets and their position among the various actors by examining the natural capital, and using both secondary and primary data, has proven that, traditionally, land in resource-rich communities in Kono district has natural, economic, social and ecological implications.

In summary, 8 interviewees in all of the research communities were then asked to talk about who owns the land and what it means to them in the communities. It was generally acknowledged that holding land is a traditional virtue in the community: “Land is owned by us but controlled by the chiefs. A stranger will never hold a piece of land… it is given to him for temporary use. He cannot use it for other purposes without telling the chief. We can use land for farming, but as you can see it is used for mining also” (Yrm, Yengema).

Ownership seems ambiguous when I consider the secondary source of my data. According to the mining policy documents, everything that lays 6ft beneath the earth surface is owned by the state (MMR, 2012; Mining Watch, 2009). In addition, land ownership has both legal and customary connotations, and shifts from community actors to the state as the issue of diamond resources prevail. This inhibits the
community’s right to determine how the resources can benefit them. According to Gore (1993), entitlement is peoples’ unhindered access to their legal rights and other public benefits. This cannot go on without the promotion of social rights, including legal rights. According to the evidence, the propositions on legality and customary rules are limitations to the promotion of social and legal rights. I have decided not to go into an endless debate on it, which may include both legal and customary conflict. Here, I am interested in the basic understanding of land and how it is used as a natural asset. In legal terms, it is only the surface land that is owned by the chief on behalf of the people.

There is also evidence of political influence, which is endemic when I consider the secondary data of events that have occurred in different political regimes in Sierra Leone. During the one party APC regime of a former Army General, Joseph Saidu Momoh’s ‘Equotay’ regime, who was compensated by Siaka P. Stevens for revealing an alleged coup in March 1971, productive diamond land was misappropriated to his concubines and in-laws (NMJD, 20009). This continued also in the 1992 military coup regime of the National Provisional Council (NPRC), which was led by the unfortunate Captain Valentine Strasser that toppled Joseph Saidu Momoh. The fathers, brothers, military officers and close associates of the regime were awarded lucrative mining concessions at on any land of their own. In the birth of a new ‘democracy’ under the SLPP led government of Dr Ahmed Tejan Kabba, Dr Prince Harding, a serving minister in 2005, was among a band of mining gangs that destroyed the Kansey bridge that separated two chiefdoms in the heart of the district headquarter town, Koidu (Mining Watch, 2009). Since post-independence, politicians have been using diamond resources to compensate their political clients. Corruption has become endemic as political clients used their influence for rent-seeking. Kabia (2006) commented that this patron-client relationship resulted in a flawed that affected the distribution of state scarce resources. I agree with his postulation on how the patron-client relationship affects distribution of resources, but disagree that resources are scarce. What is obvious, as the secondary data emphasise is that the available resources for developing national and community institutions are used to satisfy the patron-client class. Because of the prevailing circumstances, Reno (1991) noted that:
“political leaders ‘convert wealth into political resources, buying the loyalty of some and buying weapons to coerce others and thus gather more resources and so on’” (Reno, 1991: p. 1). This inter-marriage between corruption and state politics is what William Reno termed as ‘shadow state’ (Reno, 1999). This role played by political actors shows how power is used to determine the use of resources in political ecology. Vayda and Walter (1999) have iterated that political ecology is politics without ecology. On the contrary, political ecology and politics should be mutually inclusive. This is important because resolving ecological issues in the study of human relationships with the environment (Walker, 2005; Peterson, 2000) in the context of resource-based communities cannot be achieved without addressing the politics of power over resources.

The Kono district was once a densely forested area known for food production. So, I put the question to all the focus groups in the Sewafe, Yengema, and Koidu as to why the natural landscape has disappeared. Among the responses, the focus group in Koidu states: “These communities had viable subsistence agricultural communities with enviable flora and fauna but have dissipated over time due to, primarily, mining activities; this is all for money… We need money… Money speaks for itself”, they concluded (Kfg 2, Koidu).

In my further questioning, I was interested to know why people have abandoned agriculture for diamond mining. This district was highly productive, producing both cocoa and coffee due to its favourable weather conditions. Among the responses, there is a social and economic reason for that, as one of the respondents in Koidu put it:

“Cocoa is seasonal. How long can we wait to harvest and sell it when we have family members to feed (take care of)? I have 6 children and four other children from family members. You can imagine what that means” (Kfg 1, Koidu).

Another focus group in Sewafe contributed that: “There is quicker certainty in diamond mining than in agriculture” (Sfg 2, Sewafe). The findings have shown that this natural asset is destroyed for economic gains. Ironically, cocoa, which has both economic and ecological value, is destroyed for a quick windfall of economic gain.
There is evidence that farmers have no faith in farming annual and perennial crops. It is not an issue of the duration it takes for the crops to grow before the farmer realises the harvest, but rather it is about short-term lucrative gains linked to their psychological needs. Most of these farmers have extended families to provide livelihood for. Crops, perennial ones in particular, cannot provide the daily livelihood demanded by the residents. Instead, many farmers shift from long-term certainty to short-term probability. From this narrative, it shows that diamond mining is a ‘windfall game’ or activity that can ‘hit the jackpot’ at any time, whilst the production of cocoa or coffee is subject to the seasons. With most communities being either polygamous or extended, as the respondent identified, the hope for a better life rests on the optimistic chance of diamonds rather than the probability chance of partaking in agriculture. Within the prevailing political and socio-economic influence, there exist various sector declines that can be compared to the Dutch disease or to what I call a ‘Zero-sum game’ approach. The outcomes show that the mining sector has affected other sectors in what Ebrahim-Zadeh (2003) call resource pull as labour and resources are diverted to mining activities. But unlike Ebrahim-Zadeh’s (2003) articulation linking the “Dutch disease” to the ‘spending effect’, there is absolutely no connection to that when we consider the diamond industry in Sierra Leone. The economic deprived communities have limited purchasing power to sustain their basic needs even with national production of commodities.

However, regardless of the customary ownership of land, there has been evidence of discontent between the people of Kono and Koidu Holdings Ltd. Sometimes, the discontent is directed at non-indigenes. According to a secondary source: “The local authority and the people of Kono are like strangers in their own land, with mining companies having exclusive control over the land and its resources” (NMJD, 2009).

Hence, I asked the interviewees what the reason for their dissatisfaction is. Like the early years of political dominion over diamond resources, politics and lack of consent from the communities increases discontent and limits the sustainable use of assets. As the focus group in Yengema put it: “We are just informed… sometimes the rich mining areas are given to politicians without us being informed” (Yfg2, Yengema). According to one of the respondents interviewed in Koidu, there is a clash in social perceptions between the elders and the youths:
“We the youths think differently from our people. They sold this land for nothing. We act and they say it is violence. But no one responds when we complain” (Krm₄, Koidu). Another participant commented that: “Politicians cooperate with local ‘powerful’ people to mine prospective areas” (Krm₃, Koidu).

These discourses justify the consensus emerging from individuals and focus group discussions in the research communities that fertile agricultural land, including swamps, has been transformed into mining fields through political influence and rent-seeking community members. This evidence analysis demonstrates that the human-environmental relationship is based on understanding the social strata and the influence of the community actors before exploring the political factor, which is seen as external. Ebrahim-Zadeh (2003) commented on how resource pull, labour shift and economic shocks (spending effect) affect the manufacturing sector. The issue of the ‘Dutch Disease’ in mining communities have not only diverted labour from other sectors to the mines but have equally diverted natural assets for destructive economic purpose for personal and patron-client (political or elitism) purpose. The evidence has shown us how political and rent seeking agenda has affected ecology and community development. Paulson et al. (2005) argue that power is a social relation construct on unbalanced distribution of resources. From a political ecology point of view, the relationship between humans and the environment (Zimmerer and Bassett (2003b), Neumann (2009); Paulson et al. (2003) should commence from human-human relationship (political, social and economic strata) before concentrating on the human and environment relationship. In context, this is particularly true of resource-rich communities or economies like Sierra Leone where natural resources have already being exploited. Owing to the discontent arising from unequal distribution of wealth, there is evidence of internal social conflict among the community actors. The external actors exacerbate the situation through powerful influence. With this prevailing social conflict, the communities have not been able to thread towards community development. Their actions have not given them improved living standards. Instead, the natural asset has been degraded and other sectors have been affected. According to Frank and Smith (1999), community development is the planned fruition of the economic, social, cultural, and environmental factors of community well-being. This can be achieved through the utilisation of various assets for the good of all without compromising with the existence of future communities. This analysis supports the
contribution by Ekin (2000), which explained how the ecological element should involve the functioning of both the social and economic strata and their effect on the environment and resources. From these discourses the influence of some actors over land or natural assets hinders the chances of these resource communities moving towards community development. I conclude that holding land and access to it is subject to customary rules and that political decisions overshadow customary rules. This is also evident of how ineffective governance over resources could inhibit sustainability of resources.

**Human Capital**

When it comes to human capital, like any other assets, the rural communities are even worse-off than the semi-urban communities such as Yengema in the Nimikoro chiefdom and Sewafe in the Nimiyama chiefdom. I have called them semi-urban because the amenities there are not that different from the rural villages or communities. They lack basic essentials for the size of the settlements and households. However, I have not dealt with them separately. Instead, according to the evidence, I have looked at the problem as one that affects every community. According to (Rose 2005), communities need access to good health, knowledge, skills, and motivations to enhance their personal, social and economic well-being.

In all of the communities, I asked them to comment on the health and education facilities in their populations. The response was a consensus of all the respondents on the state of human capital or assets. On health, despite the government’s programme for children under 5 and their mothers to receive free treatment, many community members have no access to medical facilities along with higher or further education. “We earlier welcome government’s assistance to our families… but we are disappointed. We have to travel to the big towns to access medical treatment. Sometimes, they say there are no drugs” (Krm6, Koidu).

They acknowledged that government’s health facilities are inadequate. It costs people to move from one point to another. In addition, the responses show that affordability is another problem. Here, affordability means being able to buy and being able to get access to even the free drugs. They also stated that there is one medical facility provided by KHL for staff and workers only, when I asked them to comment about
such limitations. The discourses emerging from the responses on human assets illustrate they are limited in resource-based communities. Evidence indicates that there is an absence of adequate response within the communities in addressing the issue of human capital. Ironically, this district is labelled the ‘bread basket’ of diamonds in Sierra Leone. With a vehement ‘no’, one of the respondents in Koidu lamented that: “Even though we all suffer, only few people benefit from KHL hospital… so… we depend on ‘peppeh doctors’ (quack doctors)” (Krm3, Koidu).

This discrimination of amenities in a location affected by common environmental degradation limits the scope of what a community looks like. According to the literature, Minkler and Wallerstein (1997) define a community as; (a) a pattern of social cohesion (b) a sense of collective identity (c) functional spatial units fulfilling sustenance needs (d) being motivated as one to act and participate on issues affecting them. In other literature, MacQueen et al. (2001, p. 1929) define a community “as a group of people with diverse characteristics who are linked by social ties, share common perspectives, and engage in joint action in geographical locations or settings’. Minkler and Wallerstein characterise a community as both an ecological system and a social system inclusive of all, regardless of the variations of the community. Social systems, they argue, include economic, political and ‘subsystems’ existing within a particular community and how they coexist with each other outside the community systems (Minkler and Wallerstein, 1997). From a community development point of view, a community has to work towards matters affecting them and enjoy amenities collectively. According to (Rose 2005), communities need access to good health, knowledge, skills, and motivations to enhance their personal, social and economic well-being. MacQueen et al., (2001 p. 1929) contributed on the well-being of the community as ‘...a group of people with diverse characteristics who are linked by social ties, share common perspectives, and engage in joint action in geographical locations or settings’. It is this collective responsibility and purpose that can enable the functioning of a formidable community development. Accordingly, Frank and Smith (1999) define community development as the planned fruition of the economic, social, cultural, and environmental factors of community well-being. This can be made feasible with unison of purpose in resource-rich communities.
Whilst the literature by Minkler and Wallerstein (1997) identifies salient points on identity, engagement in joint action, social cohesion, and participation on issues affecting them, it failed to acknowledge the fragility and malleability of communities, which are characterised by social class boundaries. This is because the communities are characterised by social class boundaries. People are mainly represented within issues affecting them instead of participating in community matters. It also failed to understand the structural composition of communities. In this sense, not all communities are identical and able to work towards a common goal.

There is limited investment in human capital in education, training and health services that work towards economic growth, development and sustainability. Here, I have not limited training to workers of multinationals such as Koidu Holdings Ltd. I have considered training and skills for the general public. However, these are lacking in the communities because the appropriate institutions were not available to transform these communities, both in the past and at the moment. Most children become dropouts due to these constraints. I gained these responses from different respondents on the state of education in the district and the constraints they encounter. They commented thus: “Our children walk a very long distance to attend secondary school in the urban towns” (Krm6, Koidu). “We send them at times to either stay with relatives or friends or send them to the government boarding schools in Magburaka in the north. Unfortunately, we get mixed results… there’s no one to control them. So, they become dropouts and join us again in the mining” (Srm4, Sewafe).

I decided to redirect my focus on the miners’ health and safety issues with their financial supporters. Thirteen miners told me that they receive no medical attention from their financial supporters except for the minor headache tablets given to them. All these participants demonstrated evidence of pale faces and exhaustion as they responded thus: “We do not have safety items during work. We often work barefooted, no hat, not anything. You can see for yourself. When we are sick, we get no medical help except for one or two tablets of paracetamol. In fact, the supporter gets angry with you. They will either say you have stolen a diamond and want to run away or you do not want to work” (Yrm5, Yengema). Another quote, this time from Sewafe says: “It is better to work when you are sick than to stay at home” (Srm5, Sewafe). In summary, these miners face serious abuse and exploitation in the hands of
their superiors, who have taken advantage of their vulnerability and handpicked them for exploitation. This evidence shows the effect of absence of what Osborne and McLaughlin (2004) and Brandsen and Pestoff (2006) called ‘co-governance’: the communities’ participation and delivery and management of shared public service delivery, and co-production: community producing their own policies. Literarily, a vibrant human resource has an evidence of being empowered. Basically, communities can not participate and deliver goods collectively if they are not empowered. On the contrary, in resource communities where government sees itself as the sole policy maker and implementer, the absence of adequate and effective human resource institutions has undermined community development. These discourses highlight the ineffectiveness of the human capital in these communities. Many of these boys who could have attained other skills and spread their expertise are embedded in the mining communities. With no government policy or Local Agenda 21 community policy on health and safety, their welfare is subjected to all forms of exploitations and deprivation. It does not surprise me to learn that the only phrases that dominate the mining communities are ‘money, money’ or ‘diamond, diamond’!

Economic Capital
The participants had varying responses because of their individual profiles. This was dependent on how the participants told their story in a qualitative way. In this section on economic capital, I discuss economic assets such as resource allocation, cash, investments, and the monetary system, derived from and in collaboration with the other assets. It is undisputable that, as part of a holistic sustainability approach, economic capital is vital to having a sustainable community. Primarily, the intent to work in mining is in order to have an income. It is obvious that even those who diversify their income potential by involving themselves in mining whilst doing other primary activities do it for economic reasons.

To generate discussion at the start of the interview, I asked the interviewees why they have chosen diamond mining instead of other forms of economic activities. Like the response given to me by miners who prefer diamond mining to cocoa, selected responses from business people and a farmer were documented thus:

“We met poverty and we still live in poverty. Who can help us? Those we believe (trust) deceive us always, always!” (Srf₂, Sewafe). Another response from one the
‘traders’ (businessman) went further to demonstrate an economic anticipation that: “A single big diamond can change our lives overnight” (Srb5, Sewafe).

The literature by Dobie (2002) suggests that poverty causes over-exploitation of natural resources and long-term social and ecological complexities. However, the findings show a slight shift from poverty to the notion of anticipating ‘more wealth’. Unlike the miners who are deprived, poor and vulnerable, the business people using the same miners are relatively better off. Yet they are involved in mining activities with the aim that they can get rich or richer. In addition, one of the groups was able to expatiate that: “These communities had viable subsistence agricultural communities with enviable flora and fauna but have dissipated over time due to, primarily, mining activities; this is all for money… We need money… Money speaks for itself”, they concluded (Kfg2, Koidu).

“Most of the agricultural land with cash crops such as cocoa and coffee transformed into mining zones are owned by relatively better-off community members” (Kfg2, Koidu).

“There are more banks than we had decades ago; ehm… but the system is still the same. We have no access to borrow because they need guarantees (collateral security).” “Where can we get it”? (Krb11, Koidu)

Evidence identified above also indicates that achieving sustainable community development faces enormous tests. The mining communities struggle with a lack of, or structurally inadequate, financial institutions. This cannot sufficiently justify why people involved themselves in mining. However, one thing that is obvious and sufficient is that it inhibits people’s chances to be involved in other trades. Hence, it causes a sectoral spill-over effect or the ‘Dutch disease’ syndrome. Ebrahim-Zadeh (2003) commented on resource pull as labour and resources are diverted to mining activities. Accordingly, this may have contributed to why there are so many actors involved in mining communities in all the chiefdoms investigated. Also, the issue of collateral security and lack of economic incentives for agricultural produce enhances the movement of labour and diversion of resources to diamond activities. Farmers have no more faith in farming. Realistically, it is not a matter of the duration of the
growing period before the farmer realises the dividend; rather, it is about profitable gains while waiting on the crop. Unlike the macro-economic aspect Ebrahim-Zadeh (2003) analysis linking the “Dutch disease” to the ‘spending effect’ through increase in purchasing power, the ‘spending effect’ driven by the quest for more wealth is another factor diverting resources from other sectors to diamond mining. Hence, the ‘Dutch disease’ is not only about the effect on manufacturing, rather it includes spillover effects on associated sectors and resources. The farmer will choose to substitute mining for agriculture because of the expectation of high returns and not because he is really poor. This demonstrates my findings that there is diversification of economic activities in the diamond sector, which is as a result of the ‘anticipated more wealth’. Paradoxically, this shift from agriculture to the mining sector has destroyed community livelihood assets and has catalysed the rate of poverty.

Physical Capital
Roseland (2005) defined this form of capital as the capacity of a group of individuals to affect standards, regulations, put into effect the regulations that determine the distribution of resources and the approach they used. In order to evaluate the availability and sustainability of physical assets in these mining communities, I explained to some of the participants in Koidu, Sewafe and Yengema what I would be looking at under this categorisation of assets and asked them to reflect on the state of these assets according to their understanding. I interviewed 3 men and 2 women over the age of 60 who had slight knowledge of the state of this asset prior to the war and 8 other men and women. One of the three men was from Yengema and two were from Koidu, whilst the women were both from Yengema. I also attempted to know if the political elites are unaware of the dilapidated roads and lack of sanitation in the mining fields. There is much pessimism from the respondents, whose replies demonstrate that even the physical assets have not been sustainable for decades and that there is a lack of political will, except for the new ‘Agenda for Change’ initiative by the present APC-led government, which aims to construct 20 miles of tarmac roads in all the district headquarter-towns. In this respect, the respondents gave the following responses, starting from roads to bridges, and houses: “The Kono district has always had problem of good road networks. Most of the roads are gravel roads constructed by SLST for their mining operation” (Kfg₂, Koidu).
“Koidu Holding deceives us with stones (granites) on the roads. Is that a good road? The roads SLST and NDMC made to connect their mining sites are even better than these” (Krm₄, Koidu).

“The politicians do not care because they come here only to tell us lies at election time. We will not see them again. Kono has always been neglected. The few roads in Koidu town are not sufficient” (Krm₄, Koidu).

I was also interested in knowing what is responsible for the state of dilapidation of these roads. One of the respondents told me that: “Most of the destruction of roads and these buildings you see around the former NDMC vast compounds and other areas were done by mining activities” (Yr₇, Yengema).

In these mining communities, the achievement of a sustainable community depends partly on physical capital, such as good roads, markets, hospitals, health centres, storage facilities, toilet facilities and infrastructure. Here, even though some of these things are inadequate, as I have explained earlier, I have limited my questions to just roads and houses that are affected by mining. According to Ebrahim-Zadeh (2003) ‘Dutch disease’ proposition, resources and labour are diverted to mining activities. The evidence shows that, in addition to the resource-pull, assets are not only diverted to mining but destroyed. Decades of mining have progressively degraded the land and destroyed the infrastructure (bridges, houses and the former NDMC quarters). From the discourses given by the interviewees on the nature of these assets, it illustrates that the quest by actors for diamond resources does not take cognisance of ecological or sustainable issues. It is ironic to see built houses (certainty) destroyed for diamonds yet unseen (probability). It is clear that the actions of the individuals are environmentally unfriendly and inhibit the chances of a sustainable community. As earlier discussed, a workable sustainable community development approach can be realised in mining communities in the absence and involvement of the assets mentioned above. From what was discussed so far and acknowledged by the participants, assets have been either destroyed or are in bad shape. Even though many academics put the blame on poverty and the unemployed youths (Fanthorpe 2003), the research unearths motivating factors, which tend towards destruction of these assets or capital. One reason is that many decades of mining brought insignificant gains to the communities and the second is that there are two groups of parallel
communities in Kono: the homogenous group and the heterogeneous group. The heterogeneous group or the ‘desperados’ are the immigrants (nationals and foreign), whose desire is to get rich or survive and return home. They leave no stone unturned to maximise their energy and time. The homogeneous group are the natives who are also actively involved in mining or indirectly supporting the heterogeneous group. That is why, over the years, this ‘native land group’ have a developed a slogan ‘Konoye Konofa’ (it means Kono is for the Kono people). In simple terms, it implies a ‘stranger’ is a ‘stranger’. The conflict of interest has always been between these two groups. But this homogeneity is permeable, weak and fussy. Unlike Somerville (2009a), who claimed that heterogeneous communities are those with different cultures and background, the very existence of these communities I have called homogeneous on the basis of common background and culture are weak, fussy, permeable and underpowered.

**Social Capital**

From the literature, Phillips and Pittman (2009) note that social capital or social capacity demonstrates the extent to which a community can collaborate together effectively to plan, set goals, get things done, make group decisions and develop and sustain strong relationships. To generate discussion with the respondents at the start of the interview, I asked participants how they see their role in the community. In response to this question, the responses were unanimous: “We the youths think differently from our people. They sold this land for nothing. We act and they say it is violence. But no one responds when we complain” (Krm₄, Koidu).

The younger generation have the conviction that the cause of the present degradation and destruction in the mining communities is partly the result of the rent-seeking attitude of the elders, who care only for short-term gains. There is evidence of mistrust and lack of hope. Murray (2000) argues that “building social capital rests on a foundation of three requirements: (1) a sense of hope by citizens that a solution is possible; (2) sufficient opportunities for engagement with those with the necessary motivation and skills; (3) opportunities to nurture community service life-skills” (2000, pp. 100-101). From the literature, political ecologists’ theories have linked local social oppression and environmental degradation to wider political and economic concerns (Blaikie, 1985; Bunker 1985). However, what they have failed to
understand is the shortcomings of social capacity in these mining communities. There is evidence of a social divide and the emergence of parallel communities. It is not a problem solely about social disparity, but includes social exclusion too. The younger generation sees themselves as excluded. Social capacity enhances the establishment of social networks, structures, institutions and organisations that call for collective action and shared knowledge, understanding, and interactions that can bring desirable outcomes (Roseland, 2005). Craiz (2005) and Daly and Howell (2006), argue that social capital is necessary for capacity building within social relationships and opportunities. However, the emergence of a social network in the mining communities comes with a misunderstanding that leads to no common desirable outcome.

This has affected the process of how the community should approach the attainment of community development. The evidence shows that there is a problem of social identity and a role that is either rent-seeking or politically motivated. Phillips and Pittman (2009) note that social capital or social capacity affects the extent to which a community can collaborate together effectively to plan, set goals, get things done, make group decisions and develop and sustain strong relationships. Because of this disunity between the older population and the youths, the communities have been divided into parallel communities who work towards their own interest because they have been marginalised and deprived. The young people commented that: “We are only recognised when they need our political support. You can not reach them again when you need them” (Krm4, Koidu).

Because of the traditional thinking of the old that always sees the young as being young in knowledge, the voices of the young are often ignored. Interestingly, even though the mining effects on the communities do not only affect the youths, from secondary data sources the evidence was that the 2007 December riot was by undertaken by the youths only. According to Craiz (2005) and Daly and Howell (2006) social capital is necessary for capacity building within social relationships and opportunities. The absence of social relationship between the elders and the youths has often provoked discontent and community conflict. Prior to the riot, the affected community complained and cautioned KHL not to undertake the blasting of rocks in the densely populated community of Koidu town but were completely ignored by
even the government, police institutions and by the company. One of the respondents commented this: “We asked the authorities to stop Koidu Holdings from blasting until they found a proper way of doing it. No one listened to us” (Krm4, Koidu).

There is a sense of belongingness among the natives. However, the lack of trust in the authorities has created a parallel community within the homogeneous group themselves. Hence, the ineffectiveness of working collectively and cooperatively in these communities means that the process is unworkable and the outcome is unsustainable. Also, from the discourse, the research shows that the conflict starts from the micro-level between individuals and groups and amid varying interests and conceptions of belongingness. From a political ecologists point of view local social oppression and environmental degradation to wider political and economic concerns (Blaikie, 1985; Bunker 1985). The views of the ‘old class’ of elders are a long way from the reality of things. Partly, the cultural understanding of the old that they know more than the young is a contributing factor to the cause of conflicting parallel communities among the wider homogeneous community. The analysis of the responses from the interview process has shown evidence of social breakdown. This has pushed aside the idea of a common vision in a community where some now blame others. In the last resort, social neglect and social breakdown provokes environmental degradation.

Cultural Capital

This is not only an important aspect of these community assets but a sensitive one in communities that uphold some strong cultural beliefs. This form of capital determines the way the communities understand the environment around them, the norms, values and the steps towards change (Daly and Howell, 2006). Roseland (2006) explains it as the outcome of shared experience through customs, traditions, heritage, history and identity. I am only interested in the participation of actors, especially women, when we look at customs. Positive or negative outcomes of women’s roles are an indicator of governance flaws in the community. Here, I engaged with 2 women and 2 men from each of the four communities. The strong perspective of men was that involving women in decision-making is a negative. One of the quotes was: “A woman is just a woman. They have no common sense” (Srm4, Sewafe).
This is one of many instances where women are as seen excluded from community matters. Intuitively, men exclusively control diamond activity matters; women play insignificant roles. However, I tried to find out if the exclusion is imposed by men or accepted by the women. I discovered that it is accepted because of the family structure or role. One of the quotes from an established community elder woman states that: “We the women have so much daily chores to carry out… going to the market, cooking, farming, taking care of the children etc.” (SrW7, Sewafe).

From this discourse, the reader can understand one more way in which social and cultural capitals are closely interrelated. They both deal with social relations among people. The communities in resource-based communities are accustomed to a traditional form of rule and structure, which cannot be ignored in any attempt towards sustainable community development in mining communities. Talking about community development entails commitment and participation from every community member. There are cultural limitations based on gender roles or responsibilities. This social limitation affects community development. According to Frank and Smith (1999) community development is the planned fruition of the economic, social, cultural, and environmental factors of community well-being. We can see that social and cultural factors are essential in achieving community development in the absence of tradition and complacency. Seyfang and Smith (2007) perceive the community as an opportunity to develop new practices and norms that are generally accepted by the community in sustainability practice. However, from the evidence, sustainability and participation are limited by political, legal and customary (gender) factors. According to Rocheleau et al. (1996), gender reflection demonstrates how environmental change and conflict is related to gender inequalities. The evidence shows that many women, especially the youths, have distanced themselves from community participation and have interest themselves in ‘petty’ trading and early marriages. According to this quote: “I was given to marriage at an early age even though I had interest in being an educated person”. The other commented: “You see, we can not deny our parents. They would disown us with a curse” (SrW7, Sewafe).

It was obvious from the participants that the women who are contributors to community debates are those who can demonstrate political influence. These are the fortunate ones who have reached a high level of literacy and social esteem in society.
and have ignored cultural limitations. The findings from secondary data and the community responses show that the present District Chairlady made it to the top seat because of her family reputation, political influence and the geo-politics of the district. The Kono district, despite its deprivation, is a political contested community that gives leverage to any political party. The just-concluded November 16 elections saw a majority vote from the district for the ruling APC. Hence, the culture of partisan politics dominates even the local authority. Even though the exclusion of women is also associated with illiteracy, the findings show that those who are literate to a relatively higher level prefer to involve themselves in personal activities and mining. A schoolteacher told me that she would prefer to stay quiet and happy than involve herself in community issues that could warrant execution, especially when power (regime) changes hands. Summarily, in contrast to Seyfang and Smith (2007) comment on new practices and norms that are generally accepted by the community in sustainability practice, and Rocheleau et al. (1996) gender inequalities is linked to environmental change, we can see the voluntary and involuntary factors within social capital that have existed in these communities over a period of time. Now, I will move away from the assets and discuss sustainable community development and governance.

6.4 Sustainability Approach: Strong and Weak Sustainability

This section is in one way or the other linked with the section above (6.3). In this section, the reader will learn that there is neither a distinct strong nor weak sustainability in resource-based communities. The aim of the thesis is to establish a sustainable community under the tenets of the Brundtland report (1987). In trying to achieve that, the community needs to acknowledge the assets they have and know how to use them for their own benefit, without limiting the gains of the future generation. Baker (2006, p. 5) noted that establishing an ecological society implies “reconciling economic activity, social progress, and environmental protection”. However, even though Baker’s narrative has not included all the assets I identified according to Roseland (2005) (see 6.2), some community actors have not reconciled these assets due to factors discussed in section 6.2. Instead, they have turned them apart (see table 6.2).
Here, I am not going to discuss the approaches of each community individually. I have earlier discussed in the methodology that these communities share many common characteristics including ecological problems. Before I go further, I need to summarise the main arguments surrounding strong and weak sustainability. This will make my argument clearer when I consider the evidence in order to analyse which way the activities of the actors have taken the communities and if the aim of sustainable community development is achievable through that. Hamstead and Quinn (2005) and Baker (2006) are proponents of strong sustainability and argue that it should focus on the qualitative improvement of all forms of assets instead of limiting the focus to the quantitative expansion of any one form of capital. They advocate that sustainability can be achieved by recognising the finite nature of the earth, working towards greater resource protection and the improvement of natural assets, and emphasise that the problem is not about the pursuit of economic growth but of its pattern, which then causes environmental problems. Roseland (2005) further explains that well-being can be improved through different types of community assets (natural, economic, environmental, social, human and cultural). On the other hand, proponents of weak sustainability say that there should be no limit to the fundamental system of economic growth. Rather, they call for infinite growth from the utilisation of natural capital in order to develop other forms of economic capital. However, I will use the propositions of strong sustainability to make my argument on these approaches. I will summarise these discourses by identifying themes or phrases, qualitative improvement of all forms of assets, recognising the finite nature of the earth and the improvement of natural assets, working towards greater resource protection, and the pattern of economic growth, which causes environmental problems. I will then discuss each of these themes and interpret them alongside the evidence of the assets (see 6.2).

From the discourses on the assets discussed in 6.2, there is no evidence of any improvement of assets. What the evidence shows us is the destruction of natural and physical capital, and the inefficacy of human, economic, social and cultural capital. Considering the evidence, it is apparent that almost the entire flora and most agricultural land (including swamps) have been lost; this is partly owing to mining activities. It shows there is no qualitative improvement of the natural assets and no recognition of the benefit of the natural assets for present and future communities. It
has demonstrated evidence of destruction instead of improving or preserving the earth. Referring to my assessment of Ebrahim-Zadeh (2003) ‘Dutch Disease’ discussed above, I concluded that assets and resources are not only transferred from one sector to another, evidences show that assets are destroyed because of mining. The reason being that as a result of the network of factors ranging from social, human, cultural, and economic, most community actors’ work against resource protection and their activities, which are orientated towards personal economic gain, have caused environmental problems. The same thing occurs with the other assets. In summary, the human capital is characterised by no health and safety measures nor medical opportunities for the miners; for the physical capital, houses and bridges (weak sustainability) have been destroyed for the natural capital (diamond resources); culturally, traditions and customs have governance; above all, the social capital framework has led to parallel communities emanating from political loyalty instead of community loyalty. In all these summarised assets, the reader will learn that it is not only the natural capital that is affected. All the other assets have been affected too. Concluding these discourses, the analyses point out that the effect will be felt not only by these present communities but also by the next generation of communities. This is likely to occur because the present communities inherited a similar impact caused by those who came before them. With nothing or little done to acknowledge this fact, these communities will not be sustainable both in the short and long run.

6.5 Sustainable Community Development and Governance

This section on sustainable community development and governance looks at the sustainable practices and the involvement of non-state actors in decision-making and implementation. According to the scope of this thesis, communities need to exist not as just composition of people in a particular location. Rather, it should be a composition of people in a location capable of determining their community goals and working towards them. In that case, I am interested in what Osborne and McLaughlin (2004) and Brandsen and Pestoff (2006) called co-governance: the communities’ participation, delivery and management of shared public service delivery, and co-production (2006). For that reason, I will be discussing two key issues: sustainability practice and participation. This is because I have placed my focus on actors in the communities in an attempt to solicit their understanding of and capacity to find a common ground on community matters. Owing to the commonality of mining
activities in the communities, I decided to concentrate on two focus groups in Yengema in the Nimikoro chiefdom and in Koidu, which hosts two chiefdoms, Gbense and Tankoro. My concern was to find out if the community understands sustainability practice, how they participate in it and service delivery, if any. In the quest for services, my interest was to know what the communities can do for themselves and by themselves. This is precluded by the composition of the community. We cannot understand governance and sustainability issues without knowing the actors. Indeed, knowing who the actors are in the community will help the reader to understand their attitude towards governance and sustainable practices.

Table 6.3: Community Composition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sets of Community People</th>
<th>Power</th>
<th>Capacity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Birth Right</td>
<td>Conscious power by virtue of birth from indigenes</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Influential: Social, Economic/Political Elites</td>
<td>Attains power due to social esteem</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long-Term Residence</td>
<td>Enjoys limited power unless he/she can exhibit influence</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visitors: Short-Term Residence</td>
<td>Can hardly be recognised</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Author’s construct*

The table above identifies four groups of community actors, their relationship with power and their capacity level. These identifications will be explained in the latter part of this section. From the evidence collected and analysed under assets in section 6.2, there are social norms that determine the differential ability of people to own, control, claim or make use of resources such as land. These social norms are traditionally structured in the society. This structure is the first form of discrimination and segregation in the communities. From the outcome of the research, there are four sets of people in these communities listed in the table below: (i) the birth right (ii) the influential (iii) the long-term residents and (iv) the visitors (short-term residents). Hence, I was interested in understanding the social relations between the natives or homogeneous group and the non-natives. There is a clear distinction. However, that distinction fades when social feuds exist among the indigenes or the birth right group.
In order to evaluate community governance and sustainability practice, the variation of nomenclature in the way people identify themselves or are being identified in the communities needs to be understood. Certainly, their power relations affect the way people react to sustainable practices. In table 6.3 above I have identified, according to the evidence from respondents, the composition of the communities and the scope of their power relations within their communities. Owing to social factors relating to trust, ignorance and lost hope, there is evidence of parallel communities with different goals. As such, below, in table 6.4, I have divided these communities into two main groups and represented their attitudes or actions towards sustainable practices. From the two tables, the reader can understand the relationship between community governance and sustainable actions in the communities.

Table 6.4: Types of Communities and their Composition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of Community</th>
<th>Composition</th>
<th>Actions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Homogeneous</td>
<td>1. Indigenes (<em>General</em>)</td>
<td>Rent-Seeking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Their Deprived Youths</td>
<td>(i) Reactionary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(<em>Social offspring</em>)</td>
<td>(ii) Environmentally Unfriendly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heterogeneous</td>
<td>Immigrants:</td>
<td>(i) Desperate to get rich</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I. Nationals</td>
<td>(ii) Inactive participants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>II. Foreigners</td>
<td>(iii) Environmentally Unfriendly</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author's construct

Before going into the issues in detail, I need to explain the table above. I have categorised the actors in the community into two groups. The categorisation was possible and came out of the evidence given to me by the respondents during the interviews. Here, the categorisation did not take into consideration the social status of the actors. I have named one group as homogeneous and another as heterogeneous. The first group is inclusive of actors who are indigenes, who by virtue of their ‘natural’ sense of belongingness exercise exponential power. The latter is those who are non-indigenes. Their role is relatively limited except when they attain some socio-economic status. The former group is divided into two. One group is the core and the other group are mainly youths who are dissatisfied with the core. Even though they all have relatively ‘natural’ rights, the core has a rent-seeking attitude. As such, there is a
discontent, which causes the youths to take an environmentally unfriendly approach similar to the heterogeneous group. On the other hand, the heterogeneous group is mainly focused on finding the diamond resources. They participation is inactive or passive. Because of their desperation to get rich, and probably return to their respective homes, they are environmentally unfriendly.

_Sustainability Practice_
In chapter 3, I argue that sustainable development emphasises the importance of bridging the balance between ecological views and development aspirations. Also, I reiterated that it takes into consideration the social relationship existing in the community. Here, in an attempt to further understand their relationship, I am identifying the participatory analysis of the actors. According to Baker (2006), sustainable community development incorporates the promotion of fostering local community activities over development decisions. In order to do this, the community needs workable social capital, institutions and actors who are capable of engaging in the process of community development and sustainability, whereby the communities can determine policies and community services, and when, where, and how appropriate they are.

However, what happens when some limitations exist? This was the question that I put to the respondents during the interviews. The outcome shows policy inadequacies, neglect and blame-shifting. Some of the participants demonstrated their indignation at being excluded from the debates over core issues affecting them. In addition, there is evidence of distrust between the community commoners or the youths and the elite core. To demonstrate this, I will use one of the quotes: “Things (policies) are imposed on us. There is no feedback on complaints we make. Only in politics can you see the ‘sweet’ talks and promises” (Yrm₄, Yengema).

“There is lack of trust. They are all liars trying just for their own ’pot to boil’ (trying for their own welfare). Those who have the ‘upper hand’ send their families to good schools and abroad whilst we suffer. You see, we all need to benefit from these diamonds but that is not happening. So what would you expect if we do not have the fair share of the cake (diamond revenue)? The DACDF is used for the chiefs’ glory. They build ‘barrays’ (royal huts)” (Yrm₅, Yengema).
The participants, who are part of what I called the homogeneous group, acknowledged being part of the unsustainable mining. They attributed the cause to community breakdown and the failure of the authorities to provide the basic needs of society. Instead, they are left at the mercy of mining companies. A quote reads: “We the youths think differently from our people. They sold this land for nothing. We act and they say it is violence. But no one responds when we complain” (Krm₄, Koidu).

“I have to take care of my family. No one takes care of them. Not the government. No one...” (Yrm₄, Yengema).

“We are only recognised when they need our political support. You cannot reach them again when you need them” (Sr₃, Sewafe).

“We asked the authorities to stop Koidu Holdings from blasting until they find a proper way of doing it. No one listened to us” (Krm₄, Koidu).

Therefore, the reasons for their outcry were evident in the December 2007 incident between the homogeneous group and KHL (now called OCTEA) in which many of the protesters were natives. One of the placards read: “We say no to Koidu Holdings, papa government should intervene, why are we slaves in our own land? We cry for justice. Who will help us?” (NMJD 2009; NACE 2010)

I put this question to the local counsellor who responded to me as a concerned citizen. I asked him why some people are dissatisfied. This was what he said: “People are heavily loaded with problems. Efforts to meet individual and family commitments are enormous. The community cannot rely on the chief or government to resolve their issues. All they can do is to do it their own way” (Yrc₇, Yengema).

Baker (2006) proposes that sustainable community development incorporates the promotion of fostering local community activities over development decisions. The Tamarack Institute (2008) argues that the community’s commitment enables them to identify their own action plans. In contrast, the evidence shows that, because of deprivation, ill-governance, their dissatisfaction, people become mainly concerned with how to make life comfortable for themselves, disregarding sustainability
practices. The quote reads thus: “There is a culture of negligence or ‘I care not’ in people’s way of doing things; people have a saying that it is not your business when they are reprimanded by others. Besides, sustainability practice is about policy or theoretical and not about daily practice. The policies have brought limited change to the purpose it is meant to address. This is because they are inadequate and lack an enforceable structure” (Yrc7, Yengema).

Indeed, with the prevalence of social discontent and the desperation to meet psychological needs, the people do not consider sustainable mining practices. However, as the evidence shows, the mining document itself does not spell out detailed sustainable mining practices. The government regulation (MMR, 2012) focuses on the requirement for an EIA or SEIA on the big companies and ignores the various artisanal mining activities.

MacQueen et al., (2001 p. 1929) define a community as ‘...a group of people with diverse characteristics who are linked by social ties, share common perspectives, and engage in joint action in geographical locations or settings’. In contrast, there is a paranoid shift of blame from the homogeneous communities to the heterogeneous ones, which the latter group dispute. Though sustainability challenge is not only a matter with non-indigenes, the indigenes on one hand blame the non-indigenes, and on the other hand blame their elders. But, the non-indigenes see themselves as positive contributors to the communities in various ways. Yet, they are blamed for the ecological damage happening in the communities. One prominent quote was that: “They blame us for destroying their land. But look at the composition of this group… you can see Kono people. Most of the people we do work for are Kono people. Know this, the Chiefs mine, teachers mine, traders mine, even the politicians here and from Freetown mine. Everybody is interested” (Yrm5, Yengema).

From the evidence, understanding sustainable mining was not a concern until it came to blaming ‘strangers’. The respondents explained that finding a sustainable practice within the community is hard because every sector of the community is interested in mining. Further, in an attempt to find out their interest and level of participation, I was able to discover that their focus on survival makes most community members less
interested in what is really happening. This further buttresses the earlier points on
discontent and mistrust among community members owing to parallel visions.

*Participation and Representation*

I cannot discuss sustainable community development and governance without
discussing how the community participates. In the early discourses on sustainable
practices, there is evidence of factors that limit its functioning. Since the purpose of
this chapter is to discuss sustainable community development and governance, it is
implied that the notion of community participation or community capacity to
participate cannot be left out. I have used the words participation and representation in
the title above because, most often, representation is presented as participation. In my
quest for answers, I interviewed eighteen participants on this issue. Some reported
family or survival reasons, rent-seeking, absence of information, no consent, political
loyalty and misrepresentative actors. These factors are presented in the following
quotes below. My first question was posed in order to know if people are willing to
participate in community issues and, if they are not, why? This quote identifies the
problem of daily chores or survival: “I have to take care of my family. I leave home in
the morning to mine and come back late and tired. No one takes care of them. Not the
government. No one...” (Yrm₃, Yengema).

This evidence shows that people give preference to their basic needs rather than
thinking about general community goals. They have no hope that local and national
authorities will cater for them. However, another respondent who was a councillor
attribute the reason to inadequate information: “Little is known by the communities of
what is actually happening” (Src₇, Sewafe).

The quotation on inadequate information demonstrates the limits that are set on the
chances that individuals have to ask questions and engage with the authorities. In
essence, the community cannot work collectively. Consequently, those with a relative
advantage work in their own interest as the quote below states: “People cannot work
together because once an individual’s mouth is closed (appeased) he forgets about the
rest” (Src₇, Sewafe).
As such, the rent-seeking attitude leads to what I refer to as misrepresentation instead of community participation. As such, some individuals participate on behalf of the community. The actors, with leverage, by virtue of either political or socio-economic status, represent the people. In this, the respondents question the decision of those actors, implying that they are not aware of who they are representing. The following quotes states: “We get surprised when we hear that ‘we’ the people have agreed to this or that. That is not so. The meetings we hear of are mostly in Freetown… Bintumani. The meetings seldomly held here are for the ‘top brass’ (elites) who benefit from the meetings” (Krm6, Koidu).

“We see the same set of people every time claiming to advocate for us. That is not true. They are representing their interest. Even the NGOs are more corrupt than the politicians (government)” (Kfg1, Koidu).

The issue of NGOs claiming advocacy for justice came up when I referred to them in the discussion. Unlike what they claim to be doing on behalf of the communities, the communities reject any knowledge of what actually is being done and apparently on their behalf. Participation has to be active, especially when the people, on one hand, are the direct victims, and on the other, they are the perpetrators. On the contrary, this is not the case as this quotes supports: “People who advocate justice for the mining communities are not representatives of the people” (Yrc7, Yengema). However, when certain people act on the behalf of the community instead of engaging them, other respondents claims that political loyalty or allegiance is the reason for that. As this quote states: “The cause of things happening in the wrong direction in this district, despite what God has given to us, is the absence of professionalism; people are chosen to represent the communities in the council on a partisan basis and not on our local interests; if SLPP is in power, the councillors should be from the party. If APC is in power, they need APC councillors” (Sfg1, Sewafe).

From the evidence, the authorities are answerable only to their own political affiliations in order to serve longer in their various capacities. They work in the interest of political formations. This shows that even legitimate power can be used for coercive purposes. Power could be legitimate and acquired through a position of assigned authority and the right to govern (Haugaard and Clegg, 2012). This supports
the rent-seeking attitude discussed above. The communities have pre-selected actors who (mis)represent them and participate on their behalf with no gain but actually a loss. Inferring from the use of power from legitimate to coercive or to a rent-seeking purpose is an indication that resource governance structures affect the sustainability of resources and that the community exists as a place. According to Phillips and Pittman (2009), community development takes the form of developing and enhancing people’s ability to act collectively, whilst the outcome means taking a collective action that will improve on the community’s physical, economic, environmental, cultural, political and social capital. This lacks clarity on how to work towards community development by eradicating the vices and educating people. In that case, Frank and Smith (1999) discuss a community’s capacity building and include good leadership, supportive institutions, inspiration and a willingness to act on issues affecting them. In the evidence, a lack of willingness from some community members is manifest. The unwillingness is not voluntary; instead, it is caused by deprivation. The people have not received what they need in order to survive. They have to fend for themselves. Also, the problem is not only about having institutions. The focus should be on how those institutions should be managed and who manages them. According to Gwin (2005), capacity is the ability that people, societies and organisations have to administer their affairs successfully. The promotion of social change is aimed at accomplishing human and non-material needs, enhancing organisational efficacy, progressing social equity, and developing human and technical capacity towards sustainability (Roseland, 2000). However, the power shift and discontent between the community elders or authorities and the youths, and a lack of human capital, shows that the institutional capacity is insufficient and cannot bring about desirable community development. The summary of these discourses shows the absence of what Osborne and McLaughlin (2004) and Brandsen and Pestoff (2006) called ‘co-governance’: the communities’ participation and delivery and management of shared public service delivery, and ‘co-production’, which is the community’s capacity to produce their own goods and services (2006).

6.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have dealt with the different assets in resource-based communities and differentiated these communities from others. Taking into consideration the Brundtland report, I have not seen evidence of the communities working towards the
benefit of both the present and future generations. In addition, the attitude towards activities on all forms of capital shows that the approaches in these communities do not aid the purpose of having a sustainable community. As a result of the depletion of assets, the communities are achieving neither strong nor weak sustainability. Furthermore, there is a legal limitation of the communities’ role in resource and community sustainability. The communities should not be onlookers standing by when it comes to what affects them. Their role should be indispensable and indivisible. They should not be misrepresented. Instead, they should be adequately informed, have the capacity to consent and participate on producing and delivering goods and services, and on policy matters. As such, during a period of discontent, there is an emergence of polarised communities that have a vision independent of the elite community. This, without any doubt, culminates in a collapsed community.
CHAPTER SEVEN
ENHANCING THE RESOURCE-BASED COMMUNITIES TOWARDS CO-PRODUCTION AND CO-GOVERNANCE

7.1 Introduction
This chapter is an outcome of the previous chapters (5 and 6). A summary conclusion of the three chapters (5, 6 and 7) is dealt with in chapter 8. This chapter (7) answers the third research objective:

‘Identify both structural and community-based barriers to promoting sustainable community development in mining communities and make policy recommendations for community development in such communities.’

The main discourse in this thesis, in an attempt to realise the aim of achieving sustainable community development, is to enhance the resource-based communities in order to assist them to work towards co-production and co-governance. This is defined by Brandsen and Pestoff (2006), and Osborne and McLaughlin (2004), as the joint partnership between the state and the communities in participatory policy formation and implementation, and in service delivery. However, the discourses from the four main case studies in the resource-based communities show that these communities are yet to become sustainable. All actors at various levels cause the limitations, which are not associated with inadequate policies and elitism alone; it includes the actors other commentators perceive as victims of elitism. As such, this chapter looks at the limitations in two distinctive categories: community governance (7.2) and sustainable community development (7.3). The content of these categories is drawn mainly from qualitative sources and triangulation techniques using documentary analysis, semi-structured interviews, and focus group discussions.

In chapter 6, I attempted to answer the second research objective. In it I discussed the community assets and the practices of the actors, including the sustainability approaches. The outcome shows that the sustainability approach was neither strong nor weak. Chapter 5 discussed research objective one. It considered community governance with a variety of actors. The outcome of the study shows that their activities are unsustainable. As such, this chapter is interested in the limitations restricting sustainable community development. The main finding shows a direct connection between community governance and sustainable community development.
7.2 Community Governance

In this section, I will begin by presenting the structural barriers with both secondary and primary data. I will discuss this section in two phases. One will be the structural barrier and the second will be the general community barriers. The former includes the government’s sole role in responsibility for mining policy formulation and implementation, whilst the latter deals with the community capacity. In spite of the problem of resources and under development in resource-based communities, the national government sees itself as a sole actor or an all-encompassing communities. The communities are excluded in the whole process and become a mere political tool. In finding sustainable solutions, the communities need to be recognised as able to exercise power in shared development projects instead of being seen as a tool of government. Flynn (2011) and Price (2009) state that power has the ability to influence others decision either in a positive or negative way. Power could be legitimate and acquired through a position of assigned authority and the right to govern (Haugaard and Clegg, 2012). I have discussed in chapter 6 how legitimate power can be used for coercive purposes. The other form of power is exhibiting the patron-client relation through reward and compensation to influence others by direct or implied threat of punishment or by influencing the decisions of others. Haugaard and Clegg (2012) identify that power could be in the form of rewards, which can give the individual the ability to influence the behaviour of others by luring them with things they may appreciate. Hence, this form of power relation should be a process of social, economic and political change. The community is an appropriate agent of social change (Gibson-Graham, 2003; Escobar, 2001). In that respect, Hutter (2006) argues that there should be a shift from national control on communities to non-state actors (community), in both decision-making and implementation. The sub-section will discuss the structural barriers.

The Structural Barrier

In this section, I identify the structural barriers that limit the resource-based communities’ capacity to play a partnership role with the state on policy formulation and implementation, and also on production and management of goods and services. The sole role of the government is not seen as a sustainable actor in finding a sustainable solution on resources. Hopkins (2008) and McCarthy (2005) made
discourses on the need to bypass the state and/or market processes, with the conviction that the community is more efficient on managing resources than the state.

In that case, I will identify two areas of discussion on structural barriers. One visible structural limitation is the legal or mining policy leverage of the government as the sole policy maker and implementing actor, and the second is the political allegiance by some community actors that compromise community development with a rent-seeking agenda. With these statements, it is obvious that the issue of institutions is not a barrier; rather, it is the compromise and illustrates the fusion power roles between the local council and the central government.

In summary then, 13 of the 37 respondents reported that there is inadequate institutional transfer of power from central to local communities. This is contrary to government’s claim that decision-making has been brought to the people (LGA, 2004). This handicaps the role of the local authorities and the community, according to the following quotes: “All ‘decisions’ (policies) concerning the mining are done in Freetown. There is no power given to us to decide” (Kr6, Koidu).

“What is often presented as the communities’ consent is far from that; little is known by the communities of what is actually happening” (Sr7, Sewafe).

“We get surprised when we hear that ‘we’ the people have agreed to this or that. That is not so. The meetings we hear of are mostly in Freetown… Bintumani. The meetings that are seldomly held here are for the ‘top brass’ (elites), who benefit from the meetings” (Krfg1, Koidu).

This is a significant aspect regarding community development. Governance practices should not be seen as a means for the establishment of institutions such as the local council, but should instead adopt the whole of the community into mining policymaking and implementation. Local or community governance should be the way the local authority is organised and legitimised within their jurisdiction. It needs to include how the local space plan and policies are formulated, how the decisions are made, and how those who make and implement these decisions are accountable for any controversial outcomes. The exclusion of the community in policy formulation
and implementation signifies the lack of community capacity. Gwin (2005) explains that people should have the ability to administer their affairs successfully. However, when the state becomes the sole determinant of resources, political influence and control of mineral resources supersedes ecological interest. That is why Hopkins (2008) and McCarthy (2005) made discourses on the need to bypass the state and/or market processes, with the conviction that the community is more efficient when managing resources than the state. However, the communities can barely work towards community development. And with growing discontent perpetrated by individualism above collectivism, the government actors use the power influence to their advantage.

The secondary data confirms the discourse on community exclusion in policymaking. The government of Sierra Leone’s 2009 Mineral Policy document made mention of ‘Community Development’ and exerted political leverage on the ministerial position. It gives overriding powers to the Minister of Mines to determine the community development agreement between the investor and the primary host, in pursuant of section 141 (1) of the Mineral Act 2009 (MMR 2009). The excerpt stipulates that “pursuant to section 141 (1) of the Act, a Community Development agreement is decided by the Minister”. Another phrase stipulates that: “The licence application may be considered by the Mineral Advisory Board and certified to the minister, but the licence shall not be finally decided nor the licence issued until the Community Development agreement had been agreed and the Minster has approved it”.

Here, the reader will note that the communities have no representation in mining policies affecting their well-being. Also, the above excerpts demonstrate that the communities cannot determine and control the vast resources around them. In addition, the government approach towards community development is limited. The mining policy has taken community development as a project rather than a process of sustainable change. Such action contrasts Osborne and McLaughlin (2004) and Brandsen and Pestoff (2006) ‘co-governance’: the communities’ participation and delivery and management of shared public service delivery, and co-production: community producing their own policies. Nonetheless, the facts have shown that, over the years, the resource-based communities have been seen as a tool or instrument of the state, dictated by and provided for. Another clause that supports this structural
barrier is the communities’ incapacity and lack of empowerment according to an excerpt in the Mineral Mines document that stipulates: “The licence holder is required to report annually to the Minister of Mines on activities and expenditure in respect to the Community Development agreement using Form C20 of the Third Schedule” (MMR, 2009).

The document did not make mention of the communities consultation, consent and communication with the Minister or verse versa. This contrasts with the government’s 2004 Local Government Act. Unlike the intended purpose of the Act, the above discourse shows that decentralisation has not brought ‘decision-making’ to the resource-based communities. This contrasts Gwin (2005) proposition that people should have the ability to administer their affairs successfully. Apparently, this structural flaw was exemplified when the community’s request to temporary halt the dangerous blasting of Kimberlite rocks in the heart of two chiefdoms in Koidu town in 2007 was ignored until two people were killed. Because the issues are unresolved, another incidence occurred on the 19th December 2012 with another two deaths. This justifies my proposition that legitimate power can be used for coercive purposes.

Paintin (2008) argues that despite the provision of local and district councils to identify and resolve the community’s concerns and social predicaments, they lack capacity, are under-funded, and barely have a clear vision of programmes for action. Even though I may agree with Paintin that capacity is a factor within the local councils, it is obvious that the way ‘rent-seeking’ positions are acquired, the partisan element in electing councillors or representatives, and the political dominance of the Minister of Mines provokes and exacerbates incapacity and inhibits the enhancement of sustainable community development.

The institutionalised decentralisation set out by the government of Sierra Leone has not been meaningful and has failed to deliver because the community is just a recipient and subordinate, and not a competitive autonomous body capable of determining their own jurisdiction, and have no Local Agenda 21. Even though I agree with Agrawal and Ribot’s (1999) concept of democratic decentralisation, where local officials are elected by their own people, the research shows that even though the mining communities elect their own councillors, according to this quote below,
the process is a ‘partisan democracy’ and lacks the hegemony needed to work sustainably. One respondent states that, “people elect councillors who belong to the party they support instead of the individuals they trust” (Yrm8, Yengema).

The data has shown that there is no joint partnership between the state and the communities in participatory policy formation and implementation, and in service delivery. Hence, the main discourse in this thesis, which aims to achieve sustainable community development through co-production and co-governance, which Brandsen and Pestoff (2006), and Osborne and McLaughlin (2004) highlighted, does not exist. There is no effective community involvement. The communities are often represented by other actors than being representatives themselves. As Gaventa (2004) argues, citizenry participation has to move people from being users or choosers of public service policies deliberated by others and made by others, to ‘makers and shapers’ of decision-making themselves on matters affecting them all. However, Agrawal and Ribot (1999) state that granting local communities' management power over natural resources is a complex task. It implies that the central authority should have dominance over resources. However, the eco-anarchists condemn hierarchical forms of social organisations or rule and call for decentralised, autonomous and local forms of institutionalisation based on ecological principles or social ecology (Bookchin, 1996).

This conforms to Baker’s (2006) contribution on governance that calls for society to work towards collective goals. Without this, there is no prospect of community development. Gibson-Graham (2003) and Escobar (2001) see the community as an appropriate agent of social change. In that case, Hutter (2006) argues that there should be a shift from national control on communities to non-state actors (communities) in decision-making and implementation. As such Hopkins (2008) and McCarthy (2005) made discourses on the need to bypass the state and/or market processes, with the conviction that the community is more efficient on managing resources than the state. These contributions strengthen the co-governance and co-production argument required for resource-based communities.

The communities need to be acknowledged, consulted, represented and should be able to hold accountable those who represent them or the government or non-government
institutions that work contrary to their community goals. In addition to the discourse, using the community as an instrument ignores community participation (Gilchrist, 2003). This is because the powerful actors or elites override the deprived poor in the community. Unfairly enough, some of these actors have legitimate power to adjudicate over the affair of the communities or state. Instead, they use legitimate power for illegitimate purpose. Literally, participation is required in the communities’ own affairs and on matters relating between them and the government. It needs to conform to what Osborne and McLaughlin (2004) and Brandsen and Pestoff (2006) call Co-governance: the community’s capacity to be able to play a partnership role with the state on policy formulation and implementation. This can be possible if the community participates as co-partners to include the sense of identity, belongingness and common community goal. Otherwise, the participant’s motives will be hidden from the community and their real loyalty could be to another agent of authority, which could either be the state or a corporation. This implies that the community should not be under state or corporate pressure to adhere to their whims and caprices. Graham et al. (2003) explained that governance is: ‘the traditions, institutions and processes that determine how power is exercised, how citizens are given a voice, and how decisions are made on issues of public concern’ (Graham et al., 2003, p. 1). The communities have to be motivated by a sense of identity (expressive) and not the individual member or actor’s allegiance to functional and political actors (instrumental). People should have the ability to administer their affairs successfully Gwin (2005) for the sustainability of the community. What I have discovered from the secondary sources and primary data from respondents is that participation is piece-meal. In this study, I argue for an analysis of participation in sustainability, which includes (a) who participates (b) why he participates (c) how far he/she participates (d) with whom he participates and (e) to whom he accounts. The representation of advocates in a so-called stakeholders’ meeting is not a sufficient approach. Such advocacy is just a minor step towards community development.

As such, achieving sustainable community development should consider the change in power dynamics within the community needed in order to have actors who work towards community goals. Those who are involved within and between the community and the state should have the capacity to withdraw consent if their capacity a community is undermined. This demonstrates the importance of the
community as an agent of social change where the individual’s liberty is dependant on the protection of their civil liberties. As Etzioni (1998, p. 42) states: “The preservation of the individual liberty depends on the active maintenance of the institutions of civil society.”

In essence, the process of empowering the community to be an agent of social change should be devoid of top-bottom political control but rather should be engaged in bottom-up community participation. According to Gwin (2005) people should have the ability to administer their affairs successfully. The community as an agent of change should move away from resource exploitation and underdevelopment to sustainable community development. In addition, the section will identify the community not as a mere social place or location but an entity of authority and socio-economic locus. Earlier, I discussed whether political ecology is about humans and place. Realistically, political ecology goes beyond humans and place to reach an understanding the relationship between humans and the environment. As such, the idea of community becomes an appropriate agent of social change through connected concepts of ‘local’ and ‘place’ (Gibson-Graham, 2003; Escobar, 2001). According to Escobar (2001), the concept of place provides the understanding of social movement. Alongside this narrative, I address the issue of ‘place’ as a community with set of actors involved in decision-making and the provision of community services. Hence, in communities, especially those with natural resources, there is the need for community governance for the provision of services and the creation of policy. There should be a shift from national control of communities to involving non-state actors (community) in decision-making and implementation (Hutter, 2006). This will mean a shift from government, as a determinant of policymaking and implementation and service providers, to governance resulting in sustainable community development.

Community Barriers
The discourse above has identified the structural or institutional limitations pertaining to sustainable community development in resource-based communities. Here, I am going to identify the community barriers based on the social and political relationships among the actors. In addition to policy exclusion of the communities, other respondents say the problem is not only about policymaking by the central government in Freetown. This was in response to a question I posed on what else they
think limits their communities from developing. They claimed that some community actors assigned with certain responsibilities adopt a rent-seeking agenda and so fail to act in the interests of the community. They offer loyalty to the whims and caprices of the ruling political party or government: “Despite what God has given to us, there is an absence of professionalism; people are chosen to represent the communities in the council on a partisan basis and not on our local interests; if the SLPP is in power, the councillors should be from the party. If the APC is in power, they need APC councillors. This is our democracy” (Sfg1, Sewafe).

The response shows that officials serving local institutions serve a national interest and their position shifts as the political interregnum changes. This gravely affects the chances that the communities have to work towards the collective benefit of the community. There is also evidence of inadequate information flow in these communities. They are ignorant and not informed of what goes around them. A community member in the village between Sewafe and Bumpeh in the Nimikoro chiefdom was not even aware of who mines, what comes to the community, and which rights he has to the resources in his community. This was often the case following the question I asked the respondents about their perception of the mining activities in this chiefdom: “I have no interest to know because no one cares for me” (Srns8, Sewafe). This evidence identifies a degree of discontent and loss of hope and trust among some community members. This level of discontent comes as a result of a lack of services available to the communities. As such, many community members have accepted their marginalisation and some, according to evidence in chapter 6 and 7, carry out unsustainable activities.

In addition to the above discourses, there is evidence that certain people are excluded on the basis of their origin. This brings attention to the ‘silent’ discontent of some community members and demonstrates the evidence of what I called the heterogeneous community who are seen as ‘strangers’ (aliens). One of the respondents states that this group makes several contributions to the community, even though they are marginalised. He puts it this way: “Most of the businesses are owned by people who are not Kono people. But we always see ourselves as strangers. However, we like the people because we do business” (Srbs6, Sewafe). Some of the indigenes acknowledged their role but emphasised that their native rights should be
acknowledged too. As he put it: “Everyone is free to do business. But there is always the owner of a place… you cannot go to a place without recognising the native of that place. That is the only difference” (Kfg1, Koidu).

This demonstrates one of the barriers, implying an exclusion of people who are seen as aliens in these communities. However, some liberals believe that even though others are seen as ‘strangers’ (aliens), they are often powerful enough to influence situations in the communities. It is obvious that the power to access these assets rests on the first group of people by virtue of birth, but the power could shift to the ‘influential’ group that can affect decisions indirectly. Intuitively, that is why the indigenes feel threatened and require acknowledgement of their native rights. Some respondents in Sewafe ascertained this and one salient quote was: “Those who own money control affairs indirectly. People depend on them for financial help. Most of the dealers are foreigners (non-Kono). Also, most of the things taking place are influenced by politics. If you are a ‘strong’ supporter of a powerful politician, you can control things (policies)” (Srm3, Sewafe).

The findings suggest that some community members have access to resources not because of entitlement but because of unfair individual capacity. There is also evidence of competitiveness rather than cooperativeness in the communities. That is why the ‘influential’ or elite has been able to have dominion over the right to determine the affairs of the community when it comes to mining activities. Some of the respondents blame the non-natives for being behind the destructive mining activities in their communities. This is one of the quotes: “They blame us for destroying their land. But look at the composition of this group… you can see Kono people. Most of the people we do work for are Kono people. Know this, the Chiefs mine, teachers mine, traders mine, even the politicians here and from Freetown mine. Everybody is interested” (Yrm5, Yengema). Next in the explanation of community barriers are the issues of community capacity or social capacity. The absence of these social capitals signifies a significant threat.

*Empowerment*

Here, the same group of respondents were interviewed in the same case studies on community about operating as an agent of change. The institutionalisation taking
place under the Local Council Act of 2004 is not a sufficient step towards a sustainable community development. It will only bring about an increase in what I have referred to as community work or activities, but is not necessary an effective approach to sustainable community development, if it fails to exercise social capital. According to Ife and Tesoriero (2006), empowerment joins with social justice and human rights by increasing the power of the disadvantaged. Here, I am using both the responses from interviews and documentary records to discuss this section. During my discussion with the respondents in the field, I was interested to know how they responded to how the local council establishment has impacted on their community. Basically, I wanted to know if the communities are agents of change. In all of the case studies, there is a consensus of evidence that the communities have not been operating like that. Many reported that very few people gained from the diamond wealth. Hence there is distrust and discontent, according to this quote: “They are all liars trying just for their own ‘pot to boil’ (trying for their own welfare). Those who have the ‘upper hand’ send their families to good schools, and abroad whilst we suffer. You see, we all need to benefit from these diamonds but that is not happening. So what would you expect if we do not have the fair share of the cake (diamond revenue)? The DACDF is used for the chiefs’ glory. They build ‘barrays’ (royal huts)” (Yrm4, Yengema).

“Look at Kono, eh... Mining has been going on before I was born. But look at the condition of the district. Go to Ghaya and you would see how the buildings (former NDMC quarters) are falling. Look at the roads in Sewafo! No electricity. Poor medical care…. Kono should not be like this” (Yrm2, Yengema).

I asked the local councillors in Yengema why some people are dissatisfied. He responded to me as a concerned citizen. This was what he said: “The greatest problem we have is that things retrogress in our communities; more destruction of roads and bridges, the rich become richer, those connected with the system benefit the most, and those unconnected work it their own way” (Yrc7, Yengema). He further reiterated that the problem is systematic and people toe the line and tolerate the inefficiencies: “People work according to the system” (Yrc7, Yengema).

It was evident that the communities’ activities as agents of change are based around rent-seeking perceptions on one hand and the will to change them, if people wish to, on the other hand. The communities have not been an agent of change because of
historic factors too. Instead of power being transferred to the community to cooperatively make and implement policies, and to jointly provide goods and services to the communities, few people were empowered for political reasons.

According to secondary data, Siaka P. Stevens, in an attempt to lure votes, gave power to the deprived or disadvantaged, as Ife and Tesoriero named them, by asking the youths to mine freely (Davis, 2002). This was a political strategy that was unproductive and unsustainable. It was the beginning of ‘legalised’ illicit mining and that form of power does not conform to social justice and sustainable community development. It only appeased the jobless who were deprived and allowed them to do ‘free for all’ mining, for the benefit of the politicians, to the detriment of the resource-based communities. Hence, the communities became driven with parallel communities, as discussed in chapter 7, and demonstrated evidence of unsustainable practices.

Evidence of this parallel situation emerged during the 2007 riot in Koidu town where photo news and a report in the NMJD Mining Watch Newspaper showed a group of staff throwing stones on their own people. The writer put it this way: “Koidu Holdings’ local staff at war with their own brothers” (NMJD, 2009).

The conflict even took another extreme step when, in the Marikana riot in South Africa on August 16th 2012, one saw the state security defending Koidu Holding Limited (KHL) against what was seen as a ‘just protest’, killing two protesters. One of the respondents who were among the protesters gave this quotation when asked why they protested: “We asked the authorities to stop Koidu Holdings from blasting until they find a proper way of doing it. No one listened to us” (Krm4, Koidu). Another quote reads: “We the youths think differently from our people. They sold this land for nothing. We act and they say it is violence. But no one responds when we complain” (Krm4, Koidu). The youths feel marginalised by their people when they speak out. Apparently, they think there is no solution to their concerns because no one is ready to acknowledge their plight and engage with them.

The research also shows that there is not only a conflict of interests and social unrest but there is evidence of social-gender exclusion. There is evidence of voluntary and
involuntary exclusion. The ‘cry for help’, which most bitter and deprived community members expressed in these communities was exclusively done by the men. Though the traditional setting has always been attributed to such exclusion, evidence shows that there is an attitude of self-exclusion. Women have accepted it or limited themselves to certain community roles, which is enforced by their high rate of illiteracy and dependence on men, as illuminated by this quote: “We the women have so much daily chores to carry out… going to the market, cooking, farming, taking care of the children etc.” (Sr8, Sewafe)

Most of the women are of the view that matters pertaining to policies and politics are for men and that women are just responsible for household chores.

**Participation**

The primary and secondary evidence in the case studies shows that there is a wide range of impacts of individual and community participation. Participation is an important aspect of the communities’ drive towards governance and sustainable community development. In this section, drawing on the evidence of ten respondents, the study shows that there is evidence of an ignorance of participation, an inability to participate and an avoidance of participation. Partly, these limitations to participate are not due to high the illiteracy rate or an unwillingness to do so. Rather, it is constrained by survival needs and the inadequacy in meeting the length and breadth of these needs. This is what one of the quotes states regarding individual participation: “I have to take care of my family. I leave home in the morning to mine and come back late and tired. No one takes care of them. Not the government. No one” (Yrm4, Yengema).

The quotation shows that with little or nothing to be hopeful for in the communities they belong to, people ignore their responsibility towards their community. They prioritise their individual needs rather than the community needs. The ‘concerned citizen’ councillor in Yengema puts it this way: “People are heavily loaded with problems. Efforts to meet individual and family commitments are enormous. The community cannot rely on the chief or government to resolve their issues. All they can do is to do it their own way” (Yrc7, Yengema).
From the evidence, there is verification of the existence of structural barriers in decision-making and implementation. Communities have not been involved in any form of mining policy development nor in its implementation. The communities have been dependent on the state and other unrepresented actors acting on the behalf of them. In addition, even when they are represented, evidence shows that there is no flow of communication between the state institution (Ministry of Mineral resources), the self-proclaimed advocacy of ‘Just mining’ and the community. The institutional establishment through the LGA of 2004 has not been meaningful and effective. Despite its establishment, the theoretical transfer of power from the state to the communities has not been put into practice.

We need to understand also that participation is not the same as involvement. This is what the authorities over the years have failed to understand. Escobar, (1996) has illustrated this by explaining how political ecologists take into consideration the different stakeholders and how their influence or discourses affect the participation of other stakeholders and their interests. Hence, we need to talk of meaningful participation among stakeholders that enshrines legal accountability for the benefit of the community. What is obvious from the findings is that communities are misrepresented by representatives who are not answerable to them. Hence, working towards community goals prove futile. The NGOs, which claim to be advocating for ‘Just mining’ are not answerable to the people. So, who are they representing or advocating for? Two of the quotes answer that: “We see the same set of people every time claiming to advocate for us. That is not true. They are representing their interest. Even the NGOs are even more corrupt than the politicians (government)” (Krm1, Koidu).

“We get surprised when we hear that ‘we’ the people have agreed to this or that. That is not so. The meetings we hear of are mostly in Freetown… Bintumani. The meetings seldomly held here are for the ‘top brass’ (elites), who benefit from the meetings” (Krm4, Koidu).

From documentary sources, the websites of NGOs such as NMJD (the Network Movement for Justice and Development) claim to be advocating for ‘just mining’ by adopting multi-stakeholder discussions. In the actual sense, the multi-stakeholder
discussion is attended by elites who are not representatives of the communities. The participants are limited by action, inaction and discursive attitudes. As Popple and Redmond (2000) commented on communities being perceived as an instrument, the approach works in contrast to the core values of community development, which intends to act as a liberating framework for the most needy or deprived in the community. Whilst government is known legally as the executive head of the state, there should not be a top-down process of governance in communities. The communities need to be acknowledged, consulted, represented and should be able to hold accountable those who represent them or government or non-government institutions, which work contrary to their community goals. Etzioni (1998, p. 42) states: “The preservation of individual liberty depends on the active maintenance of the institutions of civil society.” In essence, viewing the community as an agent of social change should be devoid of top-bottom political control but rather engaged in bottom-up community participation. With these identified suppositions, there is evidence of what I call parallel communities. The actors, especially the youths, have distanced themselves from those they blame for their predicament. Hence, this has brought in a culture of shifting blame from one set of actors to another, including the non-indigenes.

7.3 Sustainable Community Development

Here, I am looking at the barriers based on the pillars of sustainable development or what others call assets. The section will deliberate on how local communities are affected by improving their own living standards, education, social welfare, and agricultural improvement. According to Frank and Smith (1999), community development is defined as the planned fruition of the economic, social, cultural, and environmental factors of community well-being. This process is not limited to only present welfare needs. Rather, the essence of achieving community development should consider the needs and aspirations of future generations.

Twelve respondents were interviewed and the findings show that the limitations of sustainable community development are owing to the scramble for survival and the political competitiveness, which overshadow cooperativeness. The evidence also proves that the limitation was partly caused by individual unawareness.
Limitations to Sustainability

Retrospecting on the discussions in section 7.2, this section explains that the limitations affecting sustainable community development operate in a form of a game theory whereby some sectors grow at the expense of others in what I have described as a ‘zero-sum game’. It shows that the activities in one economic sector like mineral extraction are offset by a loss in other sectors (resource pull effect) (Humphreys et al., 2007), and consequently the payoff sums fall to zero. Ebrahim-Zadeh (2003) argues that countries with resources that experience similar decline in other sectors arising from one sector (natural assets) are said to have caught the “Dutch disease”. The cycle of such practices in the mining communities has affected the mining areas, which were one time rich in fauna and flora and had a high agricultural productivity in cocoa, coffee and rice. According to one of the quotes in chapter 6, the respondent states: “These communities had viable subsistence agricultural communities with enviable flora and fauna but these have dissipated over time due to, primarily, mining activities; this is all for money… We need money… Money speaks for itself”, they concluded (Kfg₂, Koidu).

Most of the community actors valued the diamond resources more than the other natural assets because quick money is needed for their daily activities, which they presume can be achieved through mining. As one respondent put it: “Cocoa is seasonal. How long can we wait to harvest and sell it when we have family members to feed (take care of)? I have 6 children and four other children from family members. You can imagine what that means” (Kfg₁, Koidu). Another focus group in Sewafe contributed that: “There is quicker certainty in diamond mining than in agriculture” (Sfg₂, Sewafe).

Inevitably, the prospect of working towards progressive and sustainable community development has become an illusion during the years of mining activities. So what these communities have seen over and over again is the shift of labour from other sectors to the mining sector (the resource pull effect). In the process, other assets are destroyed. I realised that the problem was not only about labour shift and destruction of assets. Instead, it could be as a result of the lack of knowledge among community members about the short-term and long-term impacts of their actions. Ebrahim-Zadeh (2003) attributed all the “Dutch disease” to unfavourable balance of trade in the
resource country through what he called the “spending effect”. In this case, there is more competitive influence for imported goods than domestic goods because of abundant wealth or income. According to the evidence in this thesis, the argument of the resource pull effect holds true. However, the case of the “Dutch disease” in resource communities in particular and the national economy in general is illusive.

The communities are economically deprived and struggling to meet their basic existence needs. The findings show that the natural resources and other assets are destroyed in the excavation of diamond resources (another natural asset). In this piece of work, I have named such an action as a ‘paradox of the mine’ or a ‘paradox of resources’. The paradox occurs because the various actors’ individual goals overshadow community goals. The actors have no faith in the community they live in and realise that they have nothing to gain from the resources. This is exemplified by dissatisfaction and discontent. As such, there is an emergence of parallel community actors who involved themselves in all sorts of unsustainable mining activities and have little or no regard for sustainability practice. According to Baker, “the objectives of sustainability require the protection of the natural resource base upon which future development depend” (Baker, 2006, p. 5). Baker’s proposition conforms to the Brundtland commission’s report on sustainable development, which states that it is development that ‘meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of the future generations to meet their own needs’ (WCED 1987). Hence, I was interested in finding out how much understanding the respondents have about sustainability practices.

_Sustainability Awareness_

In this section, I present the findings from both qualitative and quantitative data to address the communities’ awareness of sustainability practices. Analysing the characteristics of the actors in chapter 5 and the sustainability approaches in chapter 6, it is evident that these communities lack sufficient sustainability knowledge and approaches. As a result, this leads to competitiveness for psychological or existence needs instead of cooperation, which in turn leads to ignorance, negligence, and policy inadequacy.
In summary, ten of the respondents show evidence of paying more interest to their own psychological needs, a further eight reported not having any idea of a sustainability consciousness or values (see table 7.1), eight showed evidence of negligence (see table 7.1), and seven said the problem lies in policy inadequacy.

Table 7.1: Sustainability Limitations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Respondents Koidu</th>
<th>Respondents Yengema</th>
<th>Respondents Sewafe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Psychological needs</td>
<td>Participants reported that they are more concerned with their basic needs</td>
<td>Kr1, Kr4, Kr5, Kr6</td>
<td>Yr2, Yr5, Yr6</td>
<td>Sr1, Sr2, SR3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainability consciousness (awareness)</td>
<td>Participants reported that they do not acknowledge the long-term impacts of their actions</td>
<td>Kr1, Kr4, Kr5, Kr6</td>
<td>Yr2, Yr5, Yr6</td>
<td>Sr1, Sr2, SR3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negligence</td>
<td>Participants reported that all they need is money to have a better life</td>
<td>Kr1, Kr4, Kr5, Kr7</td>
<td>Yr2, Yr4, Yr6</td>
<td>Sr1, Sr3, SR4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy inadequacy</td>
<td>Participants reported that the policies do not address all the main issues.</td>
<td>Kr1, Kr3, Kr4, Kr6</td>
<td>Yr1, Yr4, Yr6</td>
<td>Sr1, Sr2, SR3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Author’s construct

In the table above (7.1), the replies of the respondents regarding sustainability practices are outlined. The first column represents the factors responsible for the limitations on sustainability. These factors affect the tenets of community development, and their spill-over effect on subsequent communities limits sustainable community development. The second column explains the factors. The last three
columns list the respondents who entered into the discussion. In addition, I will highlight the sustainability practice limitations and the legal policy deprivation in the communities’ management role over the diamond resources, which is a ‘legitimate but unfair’ limitation on community development.

Here, the respondents interviewed in the four case studies (Koidu belongs to two chiefdoms) reported similar concerns. There was a general consensus around the issues discussed that are affecting community development. This should not surprise the reader since these communities have similar characteristics in location, composition of people, and mining activities, as I discussed in chapter 5.

Evidence reveals that the participants prioritise their basic needs above anything else. With nothing to gain from the wealth of the community, a number of participants think things might not change for the common good. As these quotes put it: “We met poverty and we still live in poverty. Who can help us? Those we believe (trust) deceive us always, always!” (Krm2, Koidu)

“I have to take care of my family. I leave home in the morning to mine and come back late and tired. No one takes care of them. Not the government. No one” (Yrm4, Yengema).

The prospect of community development is limited under such circumstance. Even though the homogeneous community have a common social identity, they have no common economic identity. This makes the various actors to work towards self-seeking agendas through political allegiance and resource exploitation. Cohen and colleagues’ argument on locality development portrays community identity as a sense of belongingness Social planning focuses on how problems affecting the community are resolved, and social action is comprised of both aspects of locality development and social planning, as well as community engagement and community participation (Cohen et al., 2008). The evidence has shown that the homogeneity element in cultural approaches or by location cannot be used to depict common community goals. Achieving community development works with collective purpose of using the available resources to attain sustainable development.
The community should be seen as ‘a group of people with diverse characteristics who are linked by social ties, share common perspectives, and engage in joint action in geographical locations or settings’ (MacQueen et al., 2001, p. 1929). On the contrary, the evidence shows that the communities cannot pursue collective community development goals because the local authorities appear to be powerless and are disconnected from the deprived members of their own communities. Under such circumstances, Peterson (2000) argues that there will always be conflicts of interest and social unrest. According to the evidence, individualism or competitiveness overshadows cooperation among the actors. Seyfang and Smith (2007) explain that the community is an opportunity for new practices and norms, which are generally accepted by the community regarding sustainability practice. Some theorists such as Dobie (2002) suggest that poverty is the cause of exploitation of natural resources and long-term social and ecological complexities.

However, the findings demonstrate contrasting views. Firstly, even though poverty is prevalent, there is a slight shift from poverty to the notion of anticipating ‘more wealth’. There are some actors who are not relatively poor but still involve themselves in mining activities. Secondly, there is the factor of incapacity in transferring the diamond wealth into community wealth. Despite the DACDF, the community cannot provide community services. They have experienced years of expanding mining activities with a high level of ecological damage and underdevelopment. The actors often have different motives and interests, which overlap politically, socially, economically and ecologically. These overlapping roles inhibit the societal cohesion that is needed to develop a sustainable community. As such, the communities have failed to attain improved productivity, economic growth (Haynes, 2005), social and economic equality (Calvert, 1989), improved institutions, and attitudes and development policy (Haynes, 2005).

The decision to focus on daily needs is not limited to men alone. Women are also affected when participating in the discussion on community goals: “We the women have so much daily chores to carry out… going to the market, cooking, farming, taking care of the children etc.” (SrW$_8$, Sewafe)
The respondents also demonstrated evidence of an ignorance regarding sustainability practices and the process of community development. I have used the word ignorance with regard to the state of sustainability in relation to consciousness or awareness. This is a perpetual problem deduced from the replies of the respondents. In spite of the community assets destroyed, the actors or respondents are ignorant of the ecological implications caused by their activities. Ignorance stems from the desperation to survive amid unequal and uneven distribution of the diamond resources and the spill-over effect on community assets. The people’s immediate concern is to meet psychological or basic needs instead of caring for the long-term effects on present and future communities. It indicates another level of rent-seeking among the non-elites. This further justifies my discourse on parallel communities discussed in chapter 6. Indeed, achieving sustainable community goals is marred by uncertainties at the local level and among the actors: “Everybody is interested in the things that matter most to them… we need to think of today’s concerns before thinking of what to come” (Yrm8, Yengema).

Very close to and associated with ignorance is the attitude of negligence among the players. There is a culture of ‘I care not’ in Sierra Leone. It is not peculiar only to the mining communities. In fact, because it is prevalent in every part of the country, it has become an endemic characteristic in the minds of people. The attitude affects people’s intra-personal and inter-personal understanding of matters because no one wants to take responsibility. Instead, they adopt the idea of apportioning blame. As the participant put it: “There is a culture of negligence or ‘I care not’ in people’s way of doing things; people have a saying that it is not your business when they are reprimanded by others” (Yrm8, Yengema).

As such, when grievances increase, there exists a clash among the various actors. The community often engulf into social disorder and becomes violent. But the negligence and silence is often surmounted when they consider it is time for a change. Indeed, the culture of negligence is not deliberate but is subversively preceded by economic deprivation, political patronage and social exclusion. As such, individuals become more interested in their daily survival as opposed to engaging in sustainability practices or community goals that could leave them undecided between sustainability and governance. In that case, some respondents claimed the cause of arrested
community development is due to the inadequacy of mining policies, which are seen by some as simply piece-meal documents: This quote states: “Sustainability practice is about policy or theoretical and not about daily practice. The policies have brought limited change to the purpose it is meant to address” (Krm12, Koidu). Evidence of boomerang mining policy reforms over the years are sufficient to justify the quote above (Krm12). Mining policies have been changed several times as several political regimes have changed over time. Limited progress has been made through changes in rent-tax and royalties, but the communities’ control over their affairs is at a crossroads.

The above discourses show that there is an implied legal limitation in the form of policy or government mining regulation. The mining policy clearly bestows power and control over resources to the Ministry of Mineral Resources. The government’s legal policy of owning and controlling resources below 6ft is what I call ‘legitimate limitation’. The communities are not part of the mining policy when it is enacted nor are they part of their implementation. That is why Hopkins (2008) and McCarthy (2005) made discourses on the need to bypass the state and/or market processes, with the conviction that the community is more efficient on managing resources than the state. Wenger (2008) states that a community is about people sharing their passion for something they do and can learn activities better by interacting often. This is why communities need to be empowered freely and participate impartially. In addition, the document has an insignificant inclusion of community development and fails to outline the role of the communities. Further evidence shows the absence of Local Agenda 21 at national and local level. In summary, there are no local sustainability visions at community level to address ecological protection, community capacity, social equity, and policymaking and implementation.

In addition to the attitude of negligence is what I have identified from respondents in Sewafe, Yengema and Koidu as a subservient culture. I have not differentiated it from the negligence. Even though we have seen few people revolting against Koidu Holding Limited, there is a common culture of silence arising from the way power has been used by the political elites. There is a group of people who, by virtue of the culture of dwelling on the past, are fearful and have a lack of interest in participating and contributing to community development issues. This has affected how other
stakeholders can participate in affairs affecting them. It demonstrates how some stakeholders influence or how discourses affect the participation of other stakeholders (Escobar, 1996). One of the respondents, a ‘petty’ trader in Sewafe, was asked about her community role and she responded that: “I am aware of being a native of Kono and that insecurity has put me far away from participating in something that will risk my life” (Srw8, Sewafe). As such, like others, her reluctance to engage is not based solely on illiteracy or negligence but is a response to the old practices of intimidation.

7.4 Conclusion

In this chapter, I discussed several issues that limit sustainable community development. I categorised them into two parts. One aspect is community governance and the other is sustainability practice, which moves towards sustainable community development. Under community governance, I identified two areas of concern from secondary sources and evidence given by respondents: one is the structural barriers and the other is the community barriers. Contrary to the co-governance and co-production argument in this thesis, the communities appear to be passive recipients of state policies. Despite the LGA Act of 2004, the communities cannot decide on mining policies nor have they got fair representation. Absolute powers on mineral resources lie at ministerial level with the minister having a final decision to make on what they refer to as community development. Under the community barriers, evidence shows a rent-seeking attitude within community elites. They owe allegiance to national politics. However, the rent-seeking attitude is also identified within the non-elites. This buttresses the discourse in chapter 7 on parallel communities with a formal and informal nature, and subservient activities that are capable of causing ecological damages.

This contradicts Wenger (2008), who states that a community is about people sharing their passion for something they do and can learn activities better by interacting often. Positively, that is what is expected of people co-existing together in a place and having common concerns. Negatively, with the apparent emergence of illicit and breakaway homogeneous groups, their sense of belongingness is just defined as an act of community birth right, whilst their actions are centred on commonality. As such, their attitude and actions make the communities unsustainable and undeveloped. In summary, the actors shift from one sector to the mining sector. Alongside this, they
destroy the community assets, as evidence shows that people find it difficult to cooperate within community development for a number of reasons.
CHAPTER EIGHT
CONCLUSION
Findings, implications and recommendations

8.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I will give a comprehensive statement of the lessons and implications of the findings and contributions to the body of knowledge on resource use and achieving sustainable community development, and will also make general contributions to the subject area. The empirical contributions of this thesis can be found in chapters 5, 6 and 7. Within these chapters, I have contributed to the contextual description of political ecology and sustainable community development by linking it to the body of literature in chapter 2. In chapter 1, I dealt with three sets of theoretical concepts: community governance, community development, and sustainable development. I have identified theories that are relevant and provided additions to the body of literature. The development process is influenced greatly by human actions through activities and governance structures, which give an outcome that is desirable or undesirable. As such, the body of knowledge changes and the paradigm shifts over a period of time. Hence, there is always a need for academic research to fill the gaps where and when necessary.

In the thesis, I made two major contributions. The first contribution is topic-based, which relates to the empirical and theoretical contributions on political ecology, community governance, and sustainable community development. The second contribution concerns the general theories that link communities and sustainable development. In this contribution, I will discuss the need for an extension of further research on sustainable community development. The contributions of this thesis are outlined below and reference is made to where the particular contribution is found in the thesis. For clarity, I will state them in sub-sections. I will first discuss the general contributions on political ecology including community governance, and subsequently narrate the contributions to sustainable community development.
8.2 Political Ecology
The first contribution in this thesis is to the political ecology literature. The concept commenced as a framework involving the intricacies between local people, national economies, global political economies, and the ecosystem (Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987; Schmink and Wood, 1987). My first contribution to political ecology is centred on the role of the actors. The thesis offers evidence on the role of the actors and resource exploitation. Contributions by Zimmerer and Bassett (2003b), Neumann (2009), and Paulson et al. (2003) have shown the relevance of the revolving issues on political ecology, its relationship with other disciplines and the connection between humans and their environment. However, they fall short of identifying the unequal human relationships with the environment at community levels. It is obvious from the study that some humans exert more influence than others. In the general political ecology literature the unequal power relation has been focussed on the relationship between the capitalist North and the resource rich but underdeveloped South. Some proponents even argued that, as the world becomes more globalised, political ecology in the developing world should link local production process and decision-making with a global political economy (Walker, 2005; Bassett, 1988).

In contrast, this study shows that the study of political ecology should be considered at the level between the state and the resource-based communities, and among the various actors within the community. In addition, the social relations affecting the power roles among the actors are very significant and cannot be ignored. Unlike Walker’s idea (2005) of linking local production process and decision-making with the global political economy, this thesis focuses on cooperation between the state and the communities in relation to local production, decision-making and implementation. It is often incorrect to link local production and decision-making to global economy when the internal governance structure is as equally detrimental as the global upheaval. When the cause of the problem is focused on the global, we may deviate from the pertinent issues affecting the communities emanating from inadequate and ineffective national policies or governance mechanisms. For instance, when Blaikie’s (1985) and Bunker’s (1985) contributions on developing countries attempted to link local social oppression and environmental degradation to wider political and economic concerns, they failed to acknowledge the role of the various actors.
Furthermore, the idea of whether political ecology is politics without ecology or vice versa is contentious. Vayda and Walters (1999), state that political ecology has become politics without ecology. According to them, the political aspect of political ecology is concerned with the issue of power whilst ignoring the influence of power on ecology itself. On the other hand, Walker (2007) and Paulson et al. (2003) have focused on the political and ignored the whole ecological aspect. However, this thesis reveals that by virtue of the role of the actors and the need for sustainable development that politics and ecology are mutually inclusive. This is because, from evidence of the destruction of assets by actors, a community without sustainability practices could potentially collapse. One visible contribution that can be added to political ecology literature concerns the use of power. Evidence shows that the use of power on natural resources and sustainable development is not limited to legitimacy or illegitimacy. From primary and secondary data, it has become apparent that legitimate power can be used for either coercive or rewarding purposes, which is evident in the patrimonialism and clientelism relations that have been going on in Sierra Leone since the colonial era. Therefore, the power role of various actors is subject to their willingness to act sustainably or unsustainably. This makes it difficult to employ a comprehensive sustainable approach on resource use. In addition, the self-interest of various actors at national and global levels has impeded the chances of a sustainable solution on the political ecology of resource use. Evidence from secondary sources in the research shows that some actors act positively only when the resources are a threat to them. On this basis, I could argue that a global commitment to sustainable use of mineral resources might only arise when those resources become threatened on a global scale.

Some commentators attribute the problem to a lack of institutions. In chapter 5, I found that the failures of institutionalisation and the reviewed mining policies are not sufficient reasons for underdevelopment in the communities. Moore (1993) argues that the availability of national and local policies on resources, the access to them and the roles and conflicts between different stakeholders were initially neglected. However, this thesis reveals that national policies are available but are inadequate and ineffective. Major focus has been given to the macro aspect of the mining whilst neglecting the micro aspect that operates at the community level. The government of Sierra Leone’s mining policies focus on major companies whilst the small companies
and ‘invisible’ miners cause quite substantial damage to the environment and communities. Hence, the interest of a political ecologist should not be focussed on resource conflict resolution. Rather, it should focus on acknowledging the scope and limitations of each actor’s ability to avoid conflict. But the use of the relationship between conflict and resources has a distinction. Unlike Collier, Hoeffler, and Kabia, who link diamonds to armed conflict, greed and grievance, I argue that socio-economic conflicts arising from community and national greed have ensued at community scale and have not caused armed conflict. The conflicts have often occurred in two forms: on one hand this is seen among the community actors; but on the other hand, it ensues between the community and the corporations. In essence, I have distanced this community conflict from the national scale conflict because these community conflicts have not been managed effectively and, in the case of Sierra Leone, they became a source of attraction by warlords to recruit actors of various capacities who destroyed almost all forms of capital or assets in order to get diamonds. In this juncture, I see the greed factor and the reaction through grievances as evidence of bad governance that is demonstrated through unequal distribution of wealth.

Some academics limit their focus on poverty and unemployment to the youths in the mining sector. For instance, Nightingale (2002) developed the ‘Pressure and Release’ model that explains social vulnerability by highlighting the different levels of structural causes of vulnerability such as endemic poverty and lack of institutions that make certain places and people susceptible to physical events (Wisner et al., 2004). However, I disagree that lack of institutions is a significant factor. The government of Sierra Leone has established institutions to govern people and resources but they have been ineffective and misrepresentative. This thesis agrees with Nightingale that pressure on resources could partly emanate from poverty. Instead, it is the ‘ill-governance factor’ over resource-wealth distribution that has pushed people into poverty. In chapters 6 and 7, it is stated that the reason that some of these actors involve themselves in the diamond trade is not only because of poverty. The findings show a slight shift from poverty to the notion of anticipating ‘more wealth’. Not all mining actors are relatively poor. There are two sets of actors I will identify here to elucidate this argument. The first group are the miners or exploited labourers. They are in the mines to get wealth. The second group are the financial supporters
(businessmen, farmers and other elites). They are relatively better off but are involved in mining because of the anticipation of extra wealth.

There is evidence that deprivation and exclusion from the gains of the resources and the neglect of the youths has provoked the emergence of what I call ‘parallel and invisible’ groups or communities within the resource-based communities (see chapter 6). I found also from the focus groups and individual participants that even though the majority of the youths are illiterate, that is not a sufficient reason for their involvement in mining. The majority of the miners are motivated by the quest for self-improvement and are driven to get rich due to the uneven distribution of resources. Therefore, years of uneven distribution have provoked discontent and conflict.

In summary, they involve themselves in mining by exploiting vulnerable miners in order to get richer. In chapter 6, there is evidence that farmers have no more faith in farming. It is not a matter of the duration it takes for the cash crops to grow before the farmer realises the dividend, but rather it is about short-term profitable gains linked to psychological needs. In addition, evidence in chapters 5 and 6 show that the behaviour or attitude of different actors in the community towards available assets limits sustainable community development. This attribute is connected to the prevailing social exclusion, economic deprivation and political control in the form of legal limitations.

When it comes to conflict, commentators either attribute national or global conflict to the abundance of resources. Little attention is paid to the rivalry among community actors. According to Ross (2001b) and Le Billon (2001), the availability of resourcesshortens or prolongs resource violence. They also explained that the dependency on natural resources may exacerbate civil conflicts, which could exacerbate resource dependence (Ross, 2001b). I made a number of contributions here. Firstly, resource abundance could lead to conflict because of inappropriate governance; this in turn increases the over reliance of various actors on the natural resources (‘paradox of abundance’). Secondly, resource dependence is a problem during a conflict and not before it. Thirdly, resource dependence is a consequence of war and not a driver of the conflict. Fourthly, resources are not the problem but rather it is the people who manage them.
Ross and Collier labelled Sierra Leone a ‘resource-cursed nation’ that has experienced brutal war owing to ‘Blood diamonds’ exploited by actors I call ‘Blood Diamond Merchants’ who had leverage over the diamond resources through geo-political situations and security vulnerability. However, from the evidence of this thesis, the resources are not the only curse in these resource-rich countries. There is what I call the ‘state-corporate curse’, which shows that the failure of the state to exhibit its responsibility and deliver, and its complacency towards the corporations and companies who have ignored their corporate responsibility, has provoked discontent, ignited social conflicts and limited the chances of sustainable community development. As such, in the thesis I found out that the resource-cursed theory is argued about at macro level or at national and international level by establishing that the Kimberlite Process Certification Scheme KPCS and the establishment of institutions is presumed to be governance.

However, resource-exploitation has been ignored at various levels with much emphasis laid on the increase in diamond exports. As such, in leaving aside the framework of the literature developed in chapter 2, it is justifiable to say that in the midst of power relations and ecology, resource exploitation operates at micro level and exacerbates the resource curse at national and global levels with threats towards sustainability on the following grounds:

a) Resource exploitation is methodological or structural
b) Resource exploitation occurs when powerful actors exercise influence over the weak in order to control resources at a given time and location
c) Resource exploitation can occur between individuals (e.g. supporters and miners)
d) Resource exploitation could operate when the state’s interest is against national economic growth and development by giving too much in concessions to multi-national corporations and other influential actors.
e) Resource exploitation can occur through the forced labour of the vulnerable by armed groups and their agents
f) When the state agents collaborate with locals and foreign actors to manipulate the local communities
g) Resource exploitation occurs even in the presence of sustainable corporate responsibility or socially responsible investing; regardless of whether there are legitimate mining practices
h) Resource exploitation occurs in the absence of the principles of sustainability
i) Resource exploitation occurs when the communities are ignorant, negligent and not well informed.

8.3 Community Governance
The second contribution offers an explanation of the community governance structures in the light of the existing theoretical and empirical research on political ecology and governance (chapter 2). Absence of an effective community governance structure has inhibited the prospect of sustainable community development. The contributions were made on the nature of the actors (chapter 5) and how control over resources changes in chapter 7. I drew from the literature on governance in chapter 2 that the idea of governance is about who makes a decision, who sets the rules, and how and when they do it. Graham et al. (2003) further explained that governance is: ‘the traditions, institutions and processes that determine how power is exercised, how citizens are given a voice, and how decisions are made on issues of public concern’ (Graham et al., 2003, p. 1). I critique this contribution on the basis that it focuses on governance as the interrelationship between the state and the people. They ignore the governance that happens within the community or that should exist within it. Also, they ignore the fact that governance cannot work without the communities being entrenched in decisions making and in ‘equity’ participation on goods and service delivery. Communities should be able to be in partnership with other actors on policies, production and service delivery. Without this, we cannot talk of community development. It is on this basis that this thesis argues that achieving a sustainable diamond mining industry that can benefit present and future communities requires a governance initiative that incorporates co-governance and co-production in the resource-based communities.

In chapters 6 and 7, I explained how partisan governance inhibits community capacity and provokes social repercussions in decision-making. In an attempt to provide an account of how the officials manage the institutions, the study shows that they serve their own political interests and that their loyalty changes from one national
government to another. It shows that the officials have a rent-seeking agenda, that their responsibilities are politically motivated, and that they ignore cooperative networking with the communities. I also looked at institutionalisation through the government’s decentralisation legislation, resources and responsibilities, and argue that decentralisation without capacity is inefficient. Also, the drive for decentralisation through institutionalisation is theoretical and not a practical means to transform these resources communities into sustainable development loci. Evidently, there are institutions, but they are ineffective because officials are influenced by political decisions and rent-seeking behaviour, instead of administrative assignment.

From the research, in spite of the problem with institutions and poverty, there are cultural limitations based on gender roles or responsibilities and even sometimes on ethnicity. According to Rocheleau et al. (1996), gender reflection demonstrates how environmental change and conflict is related to gender inequalities. It is true that some actors in the communities are discriminated against owing to gender roles, but there are also circumstances where some community actors are marginalised because of their voluntary acceptance of their gender role and choose to exclude themselves. I have decided not to comment on the area of ethnicity because it has no relevance to this study. However, I can conclude that there is a relationship between community governance and sustainable community development.

8.4 Sustainable Community Development

I discovered that there are communities that exist by location, by composition according to their common goal, but not necessarily by common community goals. MacQueen et al., (2001 p. 1929) define a community as ‘...a group of people with diverse characteristics who are linked by social ties, share common perspectives, and engage in joint action in geographical locations or settings’.

Frank and Smith (1999) define community development as the planned fruition of the economic, social, cultural, and environmental factors of community well-being. This can be made feasible with unison of purpose. The Tamarack Institute (2008) argues that the community’s commitment enables them to identify their own action plans. Hence, the research revealed that not all communities are ‘homologous’. Based on the fragility and malleability of the communities, actors identify and engage in joint
action, and partake in social cohesion and participation on issues that personally benefit them. They deviate away from matters affecting the general community. This is because the communities are characterised by social class boundaries. People are mainly represented within issues affecting them instead of participating in such matters. The choice of participants affects the ultimate achievement of sustainability. The role of the community in sustainability is linked with participation in decision-making by all without limitations. Seyfang and Smith (2007) perceive the community as an opportunity to develop new practices and norms that are generally accepted by the community in sustainability practice. However, from the evidence, sustainability and participation are limited by political, legal and customary factors. With that, there is an emergence of parallel communities and invisible miners, and resource conflicts have emanated from the micro level between the elderly and the youths and between the elites and the communities owing to diverse interests and purposes and diverging conceptions of ‘belongingness’. I infer that the issue of sustainability in these resource communities requires decision-making, participation and a desirable outcome by/with the community actors and government institutions in the absence of individual and rent-seeking behaviour.

Another addition of this thesis to the literature on sustainable community development is on the approaches of strong and weak sustainability. The proponents of strong sustainability argue that there should be focus on the qualitative improvement of all forms of assets instead of limiting the focus to a quantitative expansion of any one form of capital (Hamstead and Quinn, 2005; Baker, 2006). In contrast, the proponents of weak sustainability advocate that there should be no limit to the fundamental system of economic growth. Here, also, I have made a few contributions according to the findings. Firstly, the communities have experienced retarded transformation. Assets are destroyed often for the accrualment of anticipated wealth. Secondly, mining policies have focused on the resources without sufficient focus on the role of the community actors’ role in achieving policy formulation and implementation, and sustainability. Thirdly, to summarise the situation as being one where more assets are destroyed and the wealth from the diamonds is yet to benefit the communities, there is neither strong sustainability nor weak sustainability in the resource communities.
This idea that the policies and approaches undertaken in these communities have brought neither strong nor weak sustainability is supported in chapter 7. This shows that governmental approaches are not proactive but rather are politically motivated by geo-political considerations. Within the prevailing political and socio-economic influence, I also contributed that there exist various sector declines that can be compared to the Dutch disease or a ‘Zero-sum game’. In chapters 5, 6 and 7, the outcomes show that the mining sector has affected other sectors. There is evidence of destruction of assets amid growing social, political and economic discontent. As such, this has contributed to community collapse, as community actors cannot exist as one social entity. But unlike Ebrahim-Zadeh’s (2003) analysis linking the “Dutch disease” to the ‘spending effect’, there is absolutely no connection to that when taking it in context on the diamond industry in Sierra Leone. The communities are deprived and have limited economic purchasing power to sustain their basic needs even with national production of commodities.

Ebrahim-Zadeh’s (2003) comment on resource pull is evident in the communities and even beyond with more labour and resources diverted to mining activities. Talking about sustainable community development co-exists with the quantitative and qualitative improvement of the available assets in these communities. However, evidence in chapters 5-7 show that resource exploitation goes beyond diamond resources and affects community assets. The findings show that these assets once existed but have eroded over time with a limited resilience. Probability is prioritised over certainty. Probability for demands for diamond resources (natural assets) supersedes certainty of available assets (physical assets) and other ecological assets. The actors do not take cognisance of ecological or sustainable issues. It is ironic to see built houses (certainty) destroyed for diamonds yet unseen (probability). It is clear that the actions of the individuals are environmentally unfriendly and inhibit the chances of sustainable community development.

In the literature in chapter 2 and the evidence in chapter 6, it is demonstrated that the communities need to exist not as a composition of people in a particular location; they should be a composition of people in a location capable of determining their community goals and working towards them. In this thesis, I am interested in what Osborne and McLaughlin (2004) and Brandsen and Pestoff (2006) called ‘co-
governance’: the communities’ participation and delivery and management of shared public service delivery, and co-production: community producing their own policies. However, the evidence has shown that, over the years, the resource-based communities have been seen as a tool or instrument of the state, dictated by and provided for. The evidence shows a shift from community governance to a government role over resources contrary to what Osborne and McLaughlin (2004) and Brandsen and Pestoff (2006) call co-governance and co-production. Co-governance is the community’s capacity to be able to play a partnership role with the state on policy formulation and implementation, and co-production is the collective production and management of goods and services. Furthermore, the outcomes from the evidence show two forms of governance limitations: customary ownership and legal ownership. Land ownership has both legal and customary connotations, and shifts from community actors to the state. Customarily, land is the property of the community. In legal terms, it is only the surface land that is owned by the chief on behalf of the people. There is also evidence of political influence, which is endemic. In addition, chapters 6 and 7 reveal evidence of cultural limitations. There are social norms that determine the differential ability of people to own, control, claim or make use of resources such as land. These social norms are traditionally structured within the society. This structure is the first form of discrimination and segregation in the communities and some community actors are discriminated against on the basis of ‘birth right’.

The communities should be motivated by a sense of identity (expressive) and not the individual member or actor’s allegiance to functional and political actions (instrumental). According to the evidence in chapters 6 and 7, participation in community development should include (a) who participates (b) why he/she participates (c) how far he/she participates (d) with whom he/she participates and (e) to whom he/she accounts to. The representation of advocates in so-called stakeholders meeting is not a sufficient approach. Such advocacy is just a step towards community development.

In chapter 6, I argue that the communities cannot be limited to being recipients and subordinates; they should be seen as a cooperative autonomous body that is capable of jointly making and implementing policies, and jointly providing and delivering the
services in their communities. Governmental policy and governance mechanisms are limited to just community development rather than sustainable community development. I have argued that community development is limited because the communities cannot work towards the provision of services such as health, agriculture, education etc. Sustainable community development, on the other hand, works with the entitlement, capacity and participation of the community on health, resources, education and available assets and on the provision and delivery of services and policies.

In addition, the thesis contributes to the idea that working towards a sustainable environment cannot be achieved without empowerment. The existing literature in chapter 3 is used as a framework towards the contribution on empowerment in the communities. This was dealt with through participation and representation. The evidence discussed in chapters 6 and 7 show that communities cannot participate. Instead, they are represented by other actors. Ironically, those who represent them are not accountable to them. This explains that even though empowerment fosters a sustainable environment, it can be misleading and even ineffective when it is influenced by ill-thought out political approaches. In chapter 7, I explained how the Brundtland report comments on how the human and ecological relationship is problematic due to the lack of institutional and infrastructural capacities.

Also, it is proven that there are governance-related issues affecting the establishment of sustainable community development: ignorance, negligence and self-exclusion emanating from insecurity and gender roles. Paradoxically, people in the community are interested in the daily tasks of survival rather than the general problems affecting them. This is why long-term neglected issues have led to destruction of assets and the emergence of parallel communities.

In another contribution, I expanded the body of literature on sustainable development as a changing dynamic in order to integrate resources, communities and other actors rather than allowing just a few actors to have the right to determine the destiny of the resource-based communities. I have also made some more general contributions on sustainable development, which are discussed in chapters 6 and 7. Here, I have attempted to discuss the theoretical concept of sustainable community development,
as discussed in chapter 3, by examining the issue and emphasising it as an aspect of further research in resource-based communities.

In a simplified manner, just working towards community development is insufficient for resource-based communities. The evidence in chapters 6 and 7 show no effective process of community development and no on-going prospect of a sustainable community. In chapter 5, the evidence identifies unaccounted-for actors who do everything possible to survive. In chapter 6, the evidence shows that these actors destroy every form of assets in order to access diamond resources. Working beyond community development towards sustainability should be the paradigm in government policies and in the enacted Local Agenda 21 community policy in the resource-based communities. Without this, as evidence has shown of inherited ecological mishaps, the present actions will affect the future communities too. This is why the Brundtland report discussed in chapter 3 is taken as a prefix in discussing sustainability in the investigated communities.

I also made contributions to the literature on social capacity. It was evident that the collapsed communities are preceded by social breakdown between the elderly and the youths, the homogenous group (native) and the heterogeneous groups (alien and parallel group) and between the community authorities and elites. As such, the thesis contributed to the argument that entitlement is not about right but concerns the individual capacity to influence change. As such, it is evident that there is competitiveness instead of cooperation within the communities. Everyone in the community suffers directly or indirectly from ecological mishaps but not everyone enjoys the wealth from the resources. There is a problem of social disparity and social exclusion. This is evident in the social divide and the emergence of parallel communities, as discussed in chapter 6. Any work aiming towards community development has to deal with the social capacity situation. It enhances the establishment of social networks, structures, institutions and organisations that call for collective action and shared knowledge, understanding, and interactions that can bring about desirable outcomes (Roseland, 2005). It is also necessary for capacity building in social relationships and opportunities (Craiz, 2005; Daly and Howell, 2006). The evidence in chapters 6 and 7 show the contrary. The emergence of social networks in
the mining communities comes with misunderstanding and with no common desirable outcome.

The younger generation claimed that degradation and destruction in the mining communities is as a result of the rent-seeking attitude of the elders, who care only for short-term gains. The evidence in chapters 6 and 7 illustrate the problem of social identity and role and such rent-seeking or politically motivated behaviour. As a result of this disunity between the older population and the youths, the communities have been subdivided into parallel communities who work towards their own interests because they have been marginalised and deprived. Traditionally, the old see the young as being ‘young’ in knowledge. As such, the voice of the young is often ignored. Partly cultural, the understanding of the old that they know more than the young is a contributing factor to the cause of diverging parallel communities among the homogeneous community.

Also in chapter 6, there is a sense of belongingness among the natives that exists alongside a lack of trust in the authorities. As such, the effectiveness of initiatives to work collectively and cooperatively in these communities is undermined. These prevailing circumstances in the community are what I call a misplaced priority. The communities have become segregated and the actors have a self-interested purpose. Also, from the discourses, the research shows that the conflict starts from the micro level between different individuals and groups amid varying interests and purpose.

The community should not be under state or corporate pressure to adhere to their whims and caprices. The communities should be motivated by a sense of identity (expressive) and not the individual member or actor's allegiance to functional and political actions (instrumental). According to the evidence in chapters 6 and 7, participation in community development should include (a) who participates (b) why he/she participates (c) how far he/she participates (d) with whom he/she participates and (e) to whom he/she accounts to. The representation of advocates in so-called stakeholders meeting is not a sufficient approach. Such advocacy is just a step towards community development.
Another contribution attempted to explain the general issues that cut across the whole body of literature. This is an area researchers can investigate further in order to understand the social strata and influence of the community actors. There will be no political solution without understanding the social strata of the community. It is evident that ineffective governance over resources inhibits the sustainability of resources. The evidence in chapters 6 and 7 shows that actors at all levels are driven by economic needs because of social exclusion and economic deprivation arising from unfair political dominance by rent-seeking actors. Therefore, the community needs an equitable distribution of wealth and not a transfer of funds under the government’s DACDF. Also, the thesis has shown that a social norm is a structured form of discrimination. These are traditionally arranged to determine the differential ability of people to own, control, claim or make use of resources such as land. Hence, in order to evaluate community governance and sustainability practices, the nomenclature of variations in the way people identify themselves or are being identified in the communities needs to be understood. Working towards this requires policy or service delivery under the taxonomy of community governance and sustainability requires hope for a solution to a problem, a favourable political atmosphere of engagement at community level, and between the community and the state at another level, and the sustainability of the process and outcome of actions taken.

8.5 Policy and Practical Recommendations
The outcomes of research should help policymakers and inspire researchers involved in further research that emanates from gaps in existing theoretical contributions. The first objective of this thesis attempts to identify the relationship between resource exploitation and community governance in mining communities through an analysis of key actors and their roles at a range of scales. Drawing from the stakeholder theory used as a theoretical argument in this thesis, the roles of the different actors were revealed to be unequal, and the power over the resources is also dynamic. From national government to community level, the power to control resources relies on legal grounds. Within the communities, the power lies with who has the economic power to influence political control over natural resources. So in this thesis, the cause of the problem in the four chiefdom communities is exacerbated by poverty chains, negligence, ignorance, and self-acclaimed cultural limitations arising from gender
roles. With the economic activities centred on diamond mining with no subsistence from agriculture, most of the fertile agricultural lands including swamps have been transformed into mining zones by individuals and both small and large companies. Government EIA and ESIA legislation focuses on corporations and ignores the simultaneous destruction caused by small mining companies. In addition, the ‘sway’ miners are not effectively monitored and cause much ecological damage. In general, one of the daunting challenges faced by the mining communities is the social disconnection prevailing in the resource-based communities. The problems of the communities are compounded by the discontent in which the local authorities blame the government and the community blames the elders, the youths blame the elders, and majority of the natives blame the migrants.

The second research objective examined if and in what ways mining communities utilise their assets and undertake practices that contribute towards sustainable community development. In chapter 6, I discussed the various assets in the communities, which are either available or deteriorating as a result of human activities. The destruction of these assets is due to the desperation for survival emanating from socio-economic deprivation. The existing infrastructure is destroyed for potential diamond gains. There is evidence of bridges collapsed, houses dug and roads narrowed for mining activities. This is as a result of an ignorance and negligence towards the sustainability of the assets. In summary, there is no distinct approach of either strong or weak sustainability. Almost all forms of capital or assets are destroyed for diamond resources. In addition, there is an irony regarding land ownership. On one hand it is said that land is communally owned; but on the other hand it is owned by the chief on behalf of the people, whilst in legal terms the state owns anything that is 6ft below the earth’s surface. So the notion of who controls the land and the resources appears to be subject to a misunderstanding. Legally, the government thinks that it has control while in a real sense they are controlled by large companies or corporations through economic pressure, which results in unfair terms of investment. With such unfortunate circumstances, there is more pressure on the assets, and this is exacerbated by increasing numbers of immigrants from the North of Sierra Leone. There is a non-linear form of discrimination among those who have the birth right; the influential; the long-term residents and the visitors. This discrimination
has also given rise to parallel communities that work selfishly for their own good instead of community gain.

Institutionalisation through local council establishment has created a limited capacity basis for the communities and has not influenced people’s capacity and participation positively. The majority of the community members are more interested and involved in their basic daily needs because the institutions are yet to deliver. The lack of capacity and the defunct nature of the institutions inhibit people’s interest in taking initiatives, decisions and control, and in working towards sustainable practice. Above all, the essence of this thesis, which is an argument for communities to be sustainable through co-governance and co-production, cannot be achieved.

In summary, the availability of government mining policies and Mineral Acts on how mining should be carried out from exploration to extraction is incomprehensive. There is inadequate cooperation between the communities and government on policy formulation and on the production and delivery of goods and services. The present mining policy incorporates community development in principle, but does so inadequately. It is a step in the right direction but its content and implementation is inadequate.

Unlike Sierra Leone and D.R. Congo, which have shown imminent threat of resource exploitation, other countries have shown signs of the development gained from the available resources. For instance, Botswana, Namibia and Canada have made sustainable growth from their vast natural resources through improved governance mechanisms. Though I have named other countries with good examples in the diamond mining industry, I have compared two contrasting resource countries in Sub-Saharan African. Like Sierra Leone, Zimbabwe is an example of bad governance initiative on diamond mining, and on the other hand Botswana is a good example of good governance initiative on diamond mining. But the latter has been called the ‘African Miracle’ because of the grand political and socio-economic successes associated with their natural resources. Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe share some features in common on their natural resources; both have natural resources to provide investment environment and prospective growth and development; they both share the
Kimberley experience or governance initiative but not effective policy regulation and implementation of its mining industry. Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe’s rich natural resources could have led to its economic recovery and prosperity if only there is an effective governance initiative and viable economic distribution of wealth. Zimbabwe’s economic success was lost as the country became an aid recipient nation. Like Sierra Leone where the Minister of Mines has vested rights on mineral resources (Mines and Mineral Act 2009), ZMMA has vested mining rights in the President of Zimbabwe (Mines and Mineral Act, 1961). In addition, the Minister is vested with powers to decide what is and what is not a mineral, the sole authority to market prices, regulate royalties, determines representations from the Chambers of Mines and regulate on matters arising when necessary (Robb, 2012). This analogy contrasts co-governance and co-production in resource communities. The policies are undermined and determined by the state as a dominant player without a functional involvement in resource-based communities.

Unlike Zimbabwe and Sierra Leone, Botswana is a good model of resource-rich countries with good use of natural resource use. The economy depends more on diamond mining (The Worldfact Book, 2011) and has efficient mining laws that have benefitted the entire country (Robb, 2012). With stable economy and effective regulation, Botswana’s economic growth grew at an average of 9 percent annually, largely from diamond revenues (Department of State, 2011). The country exports 30 percent of world diamond sales by value, which was one-third of GDP and 70 percent of the country’s export (Our Diamonds, 2012). In contrast to Zimbabwe’s legitimate sales that accounted for $20 million, Botswana earned $3.6 billion from its diamond sales in 2009 (Mutsaka et al., 2010). We have seen that the discrepancy between Botswana and Sierra Leone/Zimbabwe is not only on the economic growth but also on the structure of mining. Botswana has moved from exploration and extraction into cutting, polishing, and marketing, and has provided incremental jobs opportunities and revenue for the economy (Department of State, 2011). In 2008, the former President of Botswana, Festus Gontebange Mogae was awarded the Mo Ibrahim Prize for Achievement in African Leadership (Howden, 2008) for the country’s good governance enshrine in the rule of law and effort in curbing corruption. Botswana has maintained the country’s consistent stability and prosperity, distribution of wealth,
poverty declination and unbiased opportunities across other sectors without being engulf in the so-called ‘Dutch Disease’.

I have discussed how the demand and supply for diamonds could be official and unofficial means, and is driven by wants/desire, purpose and price. Diamonds are needed for jewellery and industrial uses. The role of DeBeers in the diamond history is obvious in controlling the flow of production and sales of diamonds. The economic and social yarning for the gem stone has led to spontaneous environmental impacts. Although diamonds are needed for jewellery and industrial purposes, in recent times it has been linked to war in countries such as Sierra Leone, DR Congo and Angola; diamonds have become a tool of war in these countries, leading to widespread deaths and destruction by those I call ‘Blood Diamond Merchants’. As such, my recommendations for the establishment of sustainable community development in the mining communities, especially those investigated in this thesis, are as follows:

Firstly, there should be an unequivocal, effective and efficient review of all mining policies with the legal right of the resource-based communities to consent and dispute. This is what I call adaptive governance; that is, governance that conforms to the needs and inspiration of the prevailing circumstances and community composition. Many failings have occurred in the quest for remedies within mining activities because most of the so-called stakeholder meetings are undertaken by representation and not by community participants.

Secondly, as a result of the usefulness of stakeholder participation, the policies should be reviewed and assessed by the communities at a level they can understand. In addition to this, the contents of the websites of certain actors advocating on behalf of the communities should be verified and accounted for. No actor should be allowed to exploit the communities for rent-seeking gains.

Thirdly, the past mining institutions and activities had spill-over effects that have affected these present communities, and the prevailing evidence suggests that the present actions will also affect the future communities at a even greater extent. Hence, the policies should protect existing assets. To achieve that, the resource communities should be fully informed, fully involved and fully educated in sustainability practice.
Power and control over resources and policies should not be in the hands of a selective few.

Fourthly, no serving government official should be a shareholder in any of the mining corporations. This argument comes from an unverified accusation that the former president, Ahmed Tejan Kabba (1996-2002), was a shareholder of Koidu Holdings Limited (now OCTEA). Also, from the words of a practising lawyer in Sierra Leone, Former President Joseph Saidu Momoh was a shareholder in the Rutile Company. Recently in the Financial Times, dated 14th September 2012, it is alleged that the President of Liberia Ellen Johnson Sirleaf appointed her son Robert Sirleaf to head the National Oil Company of Liberia (NOCAL). When the issue was raised, the president was prompted to defend her actions by arguing that her son was working for free. If and when such actions continue, there will be further evidence of what I have called earlier the ‘state-corporate’ curse.

Fifthly, like the DeBeers, multinational corporations have become so power in the diamond industry in spite of corporate responsibility. This ‘cartel’ operative can be mitigated at international and internal level through regulations that are accompanied with penalties. If it becomes difficult for individual governments to do that, a regional approach system through economic bodies such as the Economic community of West African States can make a difference through legislations governing member states.

8.6 Recommendations for Further Research
As my research focuses on the sustainability of resource communities by working jointly in the policymaking and implementation and in the production and delivery of services, it also gives a sense of questions for further researchers.

Evidence has shown that there have been no sustainable practices even though mining activities have been going on for decades. Past policies and activities have affected succeeding generations and it is very likely that it will affect future generations. Hence, sustainable community development is still an emerging area of interest in Sierra Leone’s resource-based industries. The government’s inclusion of community development is limited in text and in practice. Therefore, in empirical terms, there is a need for further research in these resource-based communities in order for them to
move away from being cursed and collapsed towards sustainability. Now that I have identified the micro approach towards sustainability, unlike the macro approach targeting corporations and top-bottom policy making, it would be worthy to look at how to change the status quo in legal and practical terms.

Another issue arising from my research is that despite the illiteracy and cultural structures, there should be ways to influence people’s motivation towards the sustainability of their communities and resources. This concern arises from my empirical findings that the majority of the people are illiterate and ignorant of the right thing to do or actions to take. These shouldn’t be excuses for not changing the welfare of resource communities. So, further research should look at how to improve on people’s capacity, despite their limitations, and how they can make them active and accountable participants in their communities.

One more issue relates to the ethos of investment. Investors are required to invest responsibly, and corporations are expected to work according to their corporate responsibilities. In addition, the government needs to act in the interests of the communities. Therefore, despite corrupt accomplices and the ignorance and illiteracy of the community, deception should have no place in investment communities. My argument is that, if every actor behaves responsibly, it will mitigate the limitations on sustainable community development.

Finally, I would like to see more work done on sustainable development research and resource governance. Until now, the policies taken under the auspices of the United Nations Environmental Agency have created universal policies on sustainable development without taking into consideration the disparities in governance structures, and the development process in respective countries and communities. In effect, the prerequisites of individual states need to be addressed separately under the framework of the Brundtland report (WCED, 1987) but no single policy is applicable to all the nations at any particular time. Local Agenda 21 initiatives can be established in every state, and should be workable with legal penalties in the resource communities. Even though having an internal legal system is almost impossible, adopting a domestic legal framework for resource investment may indirectly curb global actors. Hence, further researchers can consider how and when to adhere to
sustainable principles, taking into consideration the prevailing governance structures and assets.
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