An International Relations Analysis of Citizenship and Intercultural Dialogue among Minority Youth in Berlin and London:
A Levels-of-Analysis Approach

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Abstract

Corresponding to the rising threat of terrorism and heightened security concerns throughout Europe, potential parallel communities have come under increased scrutiny and pressure to engage and integrate in the politics and society of the country of settlement. Meanwhile, immigrants and the descendants of immigrants have lived in the countries of Western Europe for up to three and four generations. In this discussion, the tools of intercultural dialogue and citizenship have been proposed to bridge the ‘gap’ between ‘majority’ and ‘minority’ communities, permeating state practices from the national to the local level.

This dissertation proposes to contribute to the field of International Relations by examining an often excluded space, that is, the local arena. Moreover, it expands the field in terms of giving attention to the role that youth play in international politics. Using a levels-of-analysis approach and a comparative case study method, comments from students, teachers, and parents in Berlin and London were analysed in keeping with a critical constructivist methodology. I found that, in spite of their different histories and immigration experiences, the perceptions of citizenship and intercultural dialogue have more in common than not. The main contributing factors to their experience appeared to be notions of belonging ingrained in the respective national imaginary in the context of globalization. In each case, the overlapping, intersecting experiences of minority youth cross-cut political and juridical boundaries. Far from being confined to a city district, the ramifications of these intersections are global in scale. From local participation to media culture, minority youth participate in an ongoing navigation of international issues in their day-to-day lives.
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1. **Introduction: Research, Rationale, and Methodological Considerations**

Since the end of the Cold War, Europe’s relations with its neighbours have changed dramatically. European Union (EU) expansion to include former Soviet countries as well as states in the Mediterranean has impacted both the internal structure and institutional make-up. The reduction of internal barriers and the free movement of trade and labour have raised concerns of security and citizenship, contributing to questions about Europe’s present and future identity. Compounding the challenge is the presence of so-called semi-integrated, ethnically defined minority communities. Responding to these changes, a number of countries have reformed their naturalisation policies in the last two decades, sometimes advocating a shift from *jus sanguinis* to *jus soli* citizenship by reinventing the nation to be defined by territory instead of (or as well as) descent. It was reasoned that *jus soli* citizenship may have the capacity to partially correct for the democratic deficit experienced by a number of Western European countries (Joppke & Morawska 2003). Thus far, however, the transition to this new national self-conception has not progressed smoothly, since both the country of settlement and those of immigrant descent have a reinforced sense of national allegiance based on features of ethnicity such as language and religion.

After the initiation of the Barcelona Process in 1995, these concerns were not only relevant to domestic or even internal EU policy, but rather, they inform the foreign policy and relationships of the EU with its neighbours in the Mediterranean area. With this in mind, EU policy has emphasised the need for a ‘ring of friends’. Using intercultural dialogue as a tool to build bridges of understanding, the EU has constructively engaged with its neighbours, wielding normative power in order to make its geographic surroundings more stable. To this end, the EU aims to support literacy, economic stability, and religious tolerance without imposing foreign loyalties and social structures (Bensalah et al 2003). Even so, European countries are confronted from within by concerns of security, xenophobia, national identity, changing citizenry, and the formulation of a coherent regional policy for 27 member countries.

In this context, minority youth are often caught at the intersection of international, national, and local streams of policy-making alongside transnational linkages. Sometimes first generation and other times second or third, their experiences are, to say the least, difficult to untangle as they encounter choices of citizenship that constrain the lived reality. Their cultural experiences and attitudes resist categorisation or pigeonholing.
Primarily oriented to the discipline of International Relations (IR), this research will interrogate how citizenship and intercultural dialogue are articulated and perceived on the ground among minority youth. Comparing London and Berlin, this research will show that in both cases, the perceptions of citizenship and intercultural dialogue reflect notions of belonging incorporated in the respective national imaginaries alongside processes of globalisation. Employing what Hage (2005, 474) calls ‘double gaze’, this work is situated at the nexus of local experiences alongside global structures, traversing the multi-scalar space of local, national, international, and transnational linkages.

The two case studies included in this research are Germany and the UK, more specifically, Berlin and London. These case studies exhibit different approaches to integration, contrasting criteria for citizenship, and differing management of minority demands. Germany has a strong ethnic heritage and the presence of a large minority community from Turkey alongside immigrants from several other Middle Eastern and East European countries, not to mention EU nationals. The policies and relationship with the Turkish community have often served to perpetuate cultural and ethnic boundaries, their presence overshadowing the numerous other ethnicities living within Germany. Likewise in the UK, the large presence of immigrants of Afro-Caribbean and Asian descent often dominates centre stage in a much more territorially defined political context, while the needs and demands of smaller communities are not commonly known. Nonetheless, the presence of these smaller communities shapes and even offers unique insights into the local and transnational experience of minority youth.

The aim of this chapter is to introduce the disciplinary context and objectives of this research as well as the methodological choices made in the research design. Following from there, the case studies will be briefly discussed along with the methods of data collection and analysis.

1.1. Disciplinary Context and Research Objectives

Before engaging in a discussion of the methodological choices or even the research objectives, it is important to set forth the disciplinary context of this research. As a formal academic discipline, IR only dates back to the beginning of the twentieth century when, in 1919, the Woodrow Wilson Chair was established at Aberystwyth University. Since its conception, International Relations has primarily emphasised the role of states as they interact in and engage with the international system. It has sought to explore and develop theories around interstate relations, such as the balance of power, regional hegemony, international security, reciprocity through international trade, and the prevention of war (see Keohane 1986; Mearsheimer 1990; Morgenthau 1948; Waltz 1964). Along with the political interaction of states in the international system, IR scholars have also investigated economic relations and economic interdependence, particularly regarding the potential for war. However, the role of economic interdependence in pre-
venting war was questioned after World War I as many of the countries involved were economically linked (Panke and Risse 2007, 90). Another strand of liberal IR theory contends that democracies do not go to war with each other. Known as the ‘democratic peace thesis’, it is considered to be one of the most empirically grounded of IR theories. Nonetheless, it is contested from within the discipline as to how a democracy is defined and what counts as war (Owen 1994, 86). In all of these theories, the focus is generally on broader regional or global trends.

More recently, scholars have engaged with the role of globalisation, including international social movements and activists (see Agnew 1994; Bloom 1993; Cerny 1996; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Smith, Chatfield, and Pagnucco 1997). These scholars have served to broaden the scope of the field to include actors beyond the unitary state and question its status as the primary unit of analysis. In particular, Agnew (1994) raises the ongoing prominence of territoriality in International Relations theory and the need to move beyond such models. He highlights the prevalence of three key assumptions in IR scholarship: (1) the state is a fixed unit of sovereign space, (2) the geographic space is also the boundary of the society, and (3) there is a distinct divide between domestic and foreign affairs. These assumptions have led to the perpetuation of IR paradigms, such as global anarchy, where states operate as separate political units under no sovereign authority (Keohane 1986, 1). In contrast, recent theorising has contested this assumption to some extent, focusing on the hierarchical relationships between states and different institutions of governance (Sharman 2013).

Around the same time as the IR field began to widen its scope, some IR scholars began to incorporate work on immigration. However, even in these cases, questions were most often posed in the framework of security (see Browning and McDonald 2013; Huysmans and Squire 2009; Watson 2009; Weiner 1992/93). For example, Baldwin (1997) comments that national insecurity is often exhibited in the reformulation of immigration laws. This relationship between security and immigration was developed further to engage with the position of refugees, international law, and human rights (see Betts and Loescher 2011; Pettman 2005; Risse-Kappen, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999; Simmons 2009). Bellamy and McDonald (2002), for example, highlight the need to depart from the state-centric model of IR in approaches to human security. Zürn and Leibfried (2005) take this one step further to propose that international law may, at some point, be the dominant legal system with states as sub-regional governing institutions.

Other scholars have taken the topic of immigration in a different direction, exploring it in terms of the relationship between immigration, economics, and globalisation (see Borjas 1994; Hain-mueller and Hiscox 2006, 2007; Hollifield 2004). As Risse (2002) states, the transnational actors can be divided into many categories, including NGOs, multinational corporations, and other international organisations (religious or otherwise). Some occasional work examined the role of
the state and nation in the context of diasporas (Adamson and Demetriou 2007; Hägel and Peretz 2005).

Whether the focus is state security or economic relations, the majority of IR research emphasises broad-scale analyses of the international system and rarely brings into question the role of the local on the international stage. The obvious exception to this statement are areas of violent conflict, where a neighbourhood or city becomes the focus of vast amounts of research, e.g. Belfast, Mostar, Jerusalem, and Kirkuk, to name a few. This is also increasingly true for those working in the research of radicalisation (see Githens-Mazer 2008). Cases of violent conflict are also the rare occasion when the role of youth is investigated in IR research (see Broklehurst 2006; Fox 2005; McEvoy-Levy 2006; Watson 2006). The role of children and youth in processes of globalization still remains largely unaddressed within the IR field. For examples from other disciplines on the role of children and youth in globalization, see Fass (2003), Nayak (2003), and Nilan and Feixa (2006).

This research aims to combine a focus on immigration with a much-needed emphasis on the local setting, largely absent from the IR discipline. It will show that the local setting is a vital component of international politics. This is evident in the transnational practices of migrants as explored in other disciplines, where local households and even the viability of the national economy depends on remittances (Salih 2003, 53). Moreover, in terms of traditional IR concerns of security, this work challenges the notion that violence only occurs in cases of physical confrontation and draws on more critical conceptions of the constant contestation that takes place in everyday politics, i.e. politics is the continuation of war by other means (Foucault 2004). Secondly, it will show that the role of youth is no less to be ignored than the local setting as they have increasing access to the international stage. The value of these two areas to IR research will be exhibited by investigating perceptions of citizenship and intercultural dialogue among minority youth in Berlin and London, using a levels-of-analysis approach. Here, ‘youth’ is not a reference necessarily to age or psychological phases of development but is a term to define a ‘social and mutable category that continues to have different meanings in different times and places’ (Nayak 2004, 3). It should also be noted that words like youth, young people, students, and pupils are all used interchangeably in this work.

The examination of citizenship and intercultural dialogue has been largely left to other research areas, including comparative politics, sociology, geography, and anthropology (Pettman 1996, 4). (An exception is Malmvig 2005, which offers an analysis of the relationship between security and intercultural dialogue in the Euro-Mediterranean area.) This work will draw on some concepts from these disciplines. For example, comparative politics utilises the idea of political culture, which centres around the study of political beliefs, values, ideas, attitudes, and orientations, the influence that religion has on politics, and the effects of ‘accumulated’ histories of
states (Wiarda 2007, 9, 66). Assessments of political culture are often based on public opinion surveys of the state-bounded citizenry. However, in conjunction with changing international norms, travel, and globalisation, political culture has increasing implications for the international system. A political occurrence in one state may shape politics on the other side of the globe. Moreover, by being embedded in networks of political interaction, state and non-state actors can shape international politics from economics to the environment (Held 2004, 364-365). Thus, the aforementioned implications relate, on the one hand, to traditional IR questions of security, economics, and concerns surrounding political disengagement, but on the other, they highlight the intangible but no less important aspect of citizenship that encompasses moral equality, rights, and access, bringing into question the state-centric citizenship model. This model has come into question in IR theory to some extent (see Chapter 2), but it has not been grounded in the kind of empirical analysis included in this work. Likewise, intercultural dialogue must be further examined as it is functioning as a tool of regional diplomacy, translated to and from the local level by domestic and international institutions, e.g. educational establishments and national consulates. While drawing on literature from other disciplines throughout the empirical analysis, this research remains firmly oriented to and rooted in International Relations research in hopes of fulfilling a need to examine the international influence of local settings, particularly by minority youth.

For this project, there is one overarching objective, that is, to understand how citizenship and intercultural dialogue are expressed, perceived, and accommodated among minority youth. There are numerous perspectives that could have been employed in the design and analysis of this research, including a focus on the role of race, class, gender, or religion. While all of these aspects will be raised in a limited manner in the analysis of young people’s comments, they were not the basis for the primary question and thus, are not the main focus of this analysis. Rather, the objective, based on a constructivist approach, was to understand the way that citizenship and intercultural dialogue constitute and engage with the local and international system. The underlying questions of the project, therefore, are:

- How do minority youth engage with different spheres/scale/spaces of belonging;
- How do young people’s perceptions of citizenship shape their relationship with the local, state, international, and transnational levels;
- How do cultural exposures and accommodation reinforce or challenge notions of intercultural dialogue;
- And what are the implications of these findings for IR?
The project brings together several inter-connected spheres of interaction, ranging from local to transnational and interregional contexts. The methodology, presented in the following paragraphs, will help to clarify the general assumptions, purpose, and limitations of this investigation.

1.2. Methodology

As discussed previously, conventional IR approaches tend to focus on interstate relations and conflict. This research, however, is in keeping with a widening of the theoretical field, which occurred in the latter half of the twentieth century. Moving beyond realism, liberalism, and Marxism, these new approaches to international relations suggested that old issues could be explored in new ways, which, in turn, would provide the capacity to address changing threats (Dunne, Kurki, and Smith 2007). These theoretical developments can be classified under two general headings, that is, the rationalist and the reflectivist approach (Smith 2007, 5). Rationalist approaches would include theories with positivist leanings, such as neorealism and neoliberalism, whereas reflectivist approaches would include postcolonialism or poststructuralism. A positivist approach suggests that scientific knowledge can only be gained through the collection of observable (measurable) data, which would lead to the observation of patterns and eventually the formulation of laws (Kurki and White 2007, 17). In his 1988 presidential address to the International Studies Association, Robert Keohane presented the increasing tension between rationalist approaches (with their positivist underpinnings) and reflectivism. Reflectivism emphasises reflexivity and the embeddedness’ of international institutions in the frame of human subjectivity (keohane 1988, 379). This contrast might be better understood as a distinction between a scientific approach and an interpretive approach. However, constructivism, the approach that will be used in this work, tends to bridge the rationalist/reflectivist divide.

Constructivism assumes that actors and structures mutually constitute each other in a social context, leading to a key question being how this shaping occurs and with what outcomes (Finne-more and Sikkink 2001, 394). It operates on the understanding that international relations may be influenced by individual actors but take particular historical, political, and cultural forms as a product of social structures. From this, it is evident that constructivism is comprised of the interaction of two key components: structures and actors. The structures are based on social interactions, e.g. rules, norms, or language, that draw on shared knowledge, material resources, and practices (Baylis 2008, 234). These structures act as constraints that regulate the behaviour of actors in the system (Hopf 1998). Actors, on the other hand, would typically be defined as states or international institutions. However, this research will argue that actors can also be individuals engaged in local institutions that interact with the international context. This helps to overcome a challenge in constructivism as it was originally conceived, where states’ identities were a
‘given’ (Zehfuss 2001). In contrast, this research argues that from the local to the international level, the identity of actors and structures is continually and mutually constituted.

Unlike previous approaches, constructivism accounts for the social aspects of international relations, problematising the conception of an objective reality (Fierk 2007, 168). By understanding how actors and structures interact and mutually constitute each other, it is possible to unravel what leads to specific political outcomes (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001, 394). In this way, constructivism highlights the agency of actors, not in a climate of no constraints, but by acknowledging that choices are made in the context of social interactions (Fierk 2007, 168). For example, regarding ethnicity, constructivists would argue that an ethnic identity is formed when a group incorporates and internalises a social identity, usually constructed in response to discrimination, domination, or exclusion from the larger society (Walker 1998, 5). This approach focuses on the way that ethnicity is a social process, not a cultural given that one might inherit (Wimmer 2008, 971).

As a middle ground between rationalism and reflectivism, constructivism is not without theoretical challenges and limitations. This is particularly evident in conventional constructivism in the combination of an epistemological distinction between the external world and the internal decision-making processes of individuals alongside a social ontology (Fierk 2007, 172). However, this research will fall under the more critical constructivist understanding that aligns a social ontology with a social epistemology, overcoming this inconsistency, while moving it closer to poststructuralism. In this branch of constructivism, there is a belief that ‘constructions of reality reflect, enact, and reify relations of power’ (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001, 398). This means that critical constructivists are less inclined to see ideas, norms, and social structures as autonomous, as they may prove to have links to power relations.

Constructivism, however, is but one of a myriad of IR theories that could have been used in designing and conducting this research. Some of the theoretical frameworks, such as realism and liberalism, are somewhat IR-specific, while more recent approaches have drawn from other disciplines to apply new perspectives to the IR field, including poststructuralism, postcolonialism, and feminism. Each theory, however, shifts the focus and remit of the research to different epistemological and methodological angles, just as putting a different lens before one’s eyes will lead to a different visual perspective (Smith 2006, 11). For example, realism would focus on the power structures between states, often associated with conflict and the assumption of a generally objective reality. Similarly, liberalism emphasises the cooperation of states with an eye to preventing conflict. Both of these incorporate limited consideration for the differences in history, politics, and culture. Moreover, as the two cases in question are not involved in violent conflict with each other, and the cooperation established in the initial agreements of the European Union (then European Coal and Steel Community [ECSC]) is not the focus of this work, these
theories did not seem appropriate. Furthermore, the goal of these theories is to explain and develop broader trends of understanding, while this research does not claim to develop laws or even patterns that can be universally applied to other case studies.

Unlike liberalism and realism, several of the other potential theoretical frameworks do not seek to explain or develop laws of international interaction, but they would, nonetheless, shift the focus of the project from the investigation of structures and actors to ask different questions. For example, postcolonialism would approach the case studies and interview data by looking at the histories and relationships between countries and their colonies and how these form present-day conceptions of power and identity, examining how these aspects persist in policy-making and interstate relations (Grovogui 2007, 230). While international hierarchies and postcolonial relations will come into the analysis under the critical constructivist approach, it will not be the primary lens through which I interpret the data. Feminism, another more recent IR perspective, seeks to use gender analysis to understand the impact of the interstate system on women and men through a broad-scale examination. In this light, it re-addresses traditional IR concepts such as sovereignty and security (Tickner and Sjoberg 2007, 186). Similar to postcolonialism, gender will certainly appear in this research as a limited part of the analysis, since it affects social norms and values, but gender is not a focus of the research objectives, and thus, this perspective would not help us to achieve these goals or answer the main research questions.

Poststructuralism, on the other hand, shares some distinct overlap with critical constructivism as noted previously. Poststructuralism brings issues of interpretation, representation, and the politics of identity to the fore (Campbell 2007, 206). As such, it is not a theory of International Relations but is more of a critical attitude. It interrogates the basis for state borders, insider and outsider, and has been used to problematise old paradigms, questioning their foundational assumptions and formulation.

Using critical constructivism as the epistemology and methodology, I opted to apply a levels-of-analysis approach, borrowed broadly from Kenneth Waltz (1959) and J. David Singer (1961). In analysing the cause of war, Waltz used various levels or ‘images’: the individual, the state, and the international system. J David Singer (1961, 77), writing two years later, posited that, while levels of analysis are a component of many research undertakings, they remain under-theorised in International Relations. He goes on to highlight the value of defining these levels as part of the research design in order to formulate the methodology more clearly. For example, studying the level of the international system allows for the examination of patterns of interaction and to develop generalisations about these interactions, e.g. coalitions or power configurations (Singer 1961, 79). Other scholars, including Cordell and Wolff (2009) Brubaker (1996), and Wolff (2003), have employed a levels-of-analysis framework, whether explicitly or implicitly, in the investigation of nationalism and ethnic conflict. (I would like to note here that the levels-of-
analysis approach is more prevalent in a closely related subfield of Political Science, comparative politics, in terms of the examination of multi-level identities (see Evans and Davis 1999; Jones and Smith 2001; Laurence 2011). In this case, it is used to facilitate a more comprehensive view of the relationship between the individual and the collective unit and helps to avoid the assumption of homogeneity within a political unit (Peters 1998, 44).

Traditionally, the use of levels of analysis is associated with a realist approach to IR, distinguishing between different levels in order to isolate patterns and trends of influence. I plan to use this framework with the hypothesis that these levels cannot be fully isolated from one another and are constantly changing even as they are still evident. The definition of the levels and their boundaries is subject to variation and perpetual constitution, both in size and function.

Beginning with an overview of some of the major works in the field of IR and the recent engagement in studies of migration, this section chapter has shown so far how the analysis of the local setting is still needed in order to fully understand the international implications of immigration. This is even more the case in the relationship of young people to the international system, since their position and contribution is often excluded or subsumed under the experiences of other categories in IR research. Yet, their interaction on a global scale increases in keeping with rapid advances in, availability of, and access to communications technology and transportation. From there, the research objectives presented the primary goal and focus of this research, followed by the methodological considerations. In so doing, I presented the scope and also the limitations of this research. The following section will introduce the methods use in the process of data collection as well as the two case studies.

1.3.  **Methods and Data Collection**

From the moment that one chooses a research topic to the formulation and analysis of data, the researcher plays an active and involved role. Also known as ‘bifocality’, this term, borrowed from anthropology, describes the break-down of distance between us and them. In this way, the researcher is drawn to analyse his or her own perspective and recognise the personal relationship to the research. It encourages the examination of motivations and interest in the project as a part of the research design (Marcus 1998, 14-15). Social research, by its very nature, is political (Kobayashi 1994, 76). Knowledge about a situation is or can also be a weapon within that situation (Foucault 2004, 172). However, even as I draw on literature and research from other disciplines here and elsewhere, the qualitative methods used in this research are not to be taken in the context of a discipline outside of IR or Political Science, broadly defined. For example, I am not an anthropologist, and as such, am not accountable to the practices of that disciplinary orientation, as the perspective, questions, and approach are also not in keeping with this discipline. As outlined above, there are certainly a myriad of other approaches that could be used in this
work and possible perspectives that could be employed, including, for example, structural explanations of locality. However, I have chosen to use a constructivist approach and engage with the data in the context of the work by IR scholars as they incorporate qualitative methods into their research designs. The following pages will explore the methods employed in the collection of data in these two case studies and how this data was analysed along with some of the challenges that were encountered. The section will conclude with an outline of the thesis structure before turning to the next chapter.

**Case Studies and the Comparative Method**

Within the IR discipline, there is immense discussion between proponents of qualitative and quantitative methods. In both cases, they posit that their tools of social inquiry provide more rigorous and accurate assessments. This is particularly so for quantitative researchers. In a landmark piece, *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*, Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba (1994) attempted to bring qualitative methods to the same standards as quantitative ones. Implicit in their book is the superiority of quantitative methods. They argue that the logic of inference underlies both traditions, but soon after state that this logic is only apparent in the ‘best’ qualitative research (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 1). They emphasise three components of how social scientific research should be designed: science, inference, and assumptions (Collier, Seawright, and Munck 2004, 32).

For King, Keohane, and Verba (1994), the component of inference is of utmost importance, stating that, whether descriptive or causal, the research should be applicable to cases beyond those under investigation. Preferably illustrating a causal connection, the data should also take into account key assumptions of the causal data and the interaction of certain variables. The prominence of the logic of inference in King, Keohane, and Verba’s approach is not left unchallenged, even by other quantitavists, however. Bartels (2004, 70) acknowledges the problem in the jump from ensuring rigorous research methods and design to stating that all good research must fall under the same logic of inference.

King, Keohane, and Verba (1994) also emphasise well-formulated, testable theories. However, qualitative research, particularly case-oriented research, does not take this as a starting point. In fact, it can be argued that these approaches fall under a positivist methodology and are not suited to a different epistemological perspective (discussed in the previous section) (McKeown 2004, 140). This research takes the perspective that there are qualitative methods that are used widely in Political Science and International Relations that should be incorporated in their own right, rather than as far as they conform to quantitative guidelines (Munck 2004, 106). These include tools, such as the case study method, small-N analysis, the comparative method, the
comparative historical method, ethnographic field research, interview data, and qualitative content analysis (Brady, Collier, and Seawright 2004, 4; Checkel 1998, 334).

The qualitative-quantitative debate encounters particular challenges with regards to case-oriented research vs. variable-oriented research (Ragin 2004, 123). The difference lies, not in the hopes of uncovering valuable findings but in the logic by which these conclusions can be reached. Quantitative approaches may stress the need for numerous cases to test hypotheses, imposing this requirement on qualitative researchers, but the use of numerous cases increases the potential for the loss of contextual data and conceptual stretching (Brady, Collier, and Seawright 2004, 7; Munck 2004, 106). Moreover, qualitative research does not necessarily seek to develop generalisations as may be the goal from statistical data. Instead, the focus is on considering the same question from a number of different angles (Della Porta 2008).

Rather than beginning with clearly defined variables and case sets, in case-oriented research, the majority of the research is a process of constituting and conceptualising the case studies. It begins with the idea that phenomena in similar settings (cities, countries, or regions) may have enough in common to permit useful comparisons or contrasts. ‘Cases’ refer to ‘meaningful but complex configurations of events and structures...singular, whole entities purposefully selected, not as homogeneous observations drawn at random from a pool of equally plausible selections’ (Ragin 2004, 125). Thus, the emphasis shifts from the general to the specific, even where multiple cases are under investigation. Another definition states that a case is ‘an intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units’ (Gerring 2004, 342). While the discoveries of variables in a case study does not necessarily have to be generalisable to other cases, the usefulness of this definition is in the conception of the ‘unit’, which can refer to a nation-state, a political party, or even an individual. Implicit in this starting point is the understanding that as the research develops, some cases may be added or discarded based on the research questions and the potential for meaningful parallels is uncovered. In other words, the casing of a case study involves an ongoing process of delineation and demarcation as the object of study is brought into focus (Vennesson 2008).

In contrast to the methods put forward by King, Keohane, and Verba (1994), where the emphasis is on the relationship between the independent and dependent variable, this research does not intend to isolate specific variables in the statistical sense or confirm broader theories. A case-oriented approach does not require the use of 30 to 50 cases to uncover meaningful findings. Rather, it takes the view that ‘understanding’ a case, even by itself, is a legitimate social science (Ragin 2007, 67). The case study method finds its strength in the potential to uncover many contributing factors as well as gaining a rich understanding of the context (Platt 2007, 100). It also considers that there are influences from structural and agent-based factors, interaction of
actors across many levels of analysis as well as path dependencies (Bennett and Elman 2007, 171).

In order to highlight the factors that are present in the perceptions and experiences of citizenship and intercultural dialogue, this research will use a comparative approach. The comparative method is employed to discover empirical relationships as opposed to being a method of measurement (Lijphart 1971, 683). This does not shift the research’s orientation from IR to Comparative Politics, although this is a blurry line as both cases belong to the EU, and the discussion of whether EU policy analysis should belong to comparativists or IR scholars is not a new debate (see Hix 1994; Hurrell and Menon 1996). Jupille and Caporaso (1999) argue that the difference of opinion is largely divided by the Atlantic, where European scholars tend to view EU-level decisions and relations as falling under Comparative Politics, while US scholars approach it with IR tools. In each case, the scholarship uncovers different and valuable findings that contribute to the understanding of the EU. Equally, this research could be approached from either perspective and contribute to Political Science; however, the focus on global processes of interaction make it more appropriately analysed within IR.

The challenge of the comparative method is the potentially vast number of factors that could be uncovered and incorporated. It is important to keep in mind that using the comparative method does not imply an exhaustive study of all factors (Lijphart 1971, 690). Perceptions and experiences of citizenship and intercultural dialogue in Germany and the UK participate in a complex causal relationship, meaning that there are interacting factors that cannot be isolated from each other, and case studies may display equifinality, i.e. similar outcomes can develop from a variety of combinations of factors or sequential paths, in which no one aspect appears to be necessary or sufficient (Bennett and George 2001, 154-155). Comparing case studies must accept that multiple causation is part of conducting case study research (Peters 1998, 141). In contrast to some variable-oriented approaches, this is not to be avoided as politics are anything but clear-cut causal sequences. Another potential challenge is the verifiability of the findings, given that this work only draws on two case studies. However, the significance of the findings drawn from even one case study should not be discounted (as they would be in statistical research, where one case provides only one observation), though drawing on more than one case does strengthen the findings (Bennett and George 2001, 152). A related limitation is the determination of error variance, particularly regarding human error. Few checks on error variance exist, and observations and findings may be shaped by a theoretical perspective or other biases. Moreover, it is difficult to replicate case study research, and when it is replicated, it is often from a different theoretical framework (Peters 1998, 144). While every effort was made to conduct this research thoroughly and systematically, it is not possible or desirable to try and distance oneself from the
research at hand, as will be discussed shortly. I will now turn to discuss the manner in which the data was gathered in London and Berlin.

**Interviews**

Regularly employed by constructivist scholars in IR, my data collection relied upon semi-structured and in-depth interviews with groups and individuals (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001, 395). Here, the interview is not taken as occurring in a sterile and bias-free context. Rather, interviews are ‘active’ and interactive, not to be seen as a ‘neutral means of extracting information’ (Holstein and Gubrium 2004, 140). To the contrary, the interviewer is central to the production of the talk, taking part in what is a ‘social encounter’ in which the participants discuss and co-construct social norms (Rapley 2001, 323). The extreme interpretation of this perspective is that the interview is an independent social encounter, from which no information can be trusted to represent the world beyond the interview. However, this research is in keeping with the perspective that interviews provide access to the meanings that people ascribe to their social worlds, even as they are perpetually contested and constructed (Miller and Glassner 2004, 125). I take the view that it is in the context of qualitative interviews (as opposed to positivist ones) that mutual understanding can be achieved, and thereby, attain knowledge about perceptions and interactions beyond the interview encounter.

My interviews consisted of 31 students in Berlin, 18 in London; 2 parents in Berlin, 11 in London; 16 teachers in Berlin, 4 in London; and 9 miscellaneous informants in Berlin and 9 in London (see Appendix B for more details). In total, I spoke with 58 people in Berlin and 42 in London.

These interviews were conducted in September 2009 through February 2010 (in London) and in March through June 2010 (in Berlin). They took place in several community centres and schools. These were chosen as one point of access where minority youth are engaged on a regular basis within the context of Germany and the UK. In both countries, education is compulsory for the majority of a young person’s life (varying in number of years depending upon the region in Germany and currently under discussion in the UK). This is not to imply that there are not many other institutions or locations where these interviews could have been conducted, e.g. social clubs, after-school programmes, or random sampling, but in educational settings, particularly state-run schools, minority youth negotiate the contestation and contradictions of their situation (Gibson and Rojas 2006, 70). Educational settings are an intersection point of the levels of analysis, particularly the local and the transnational aspect but not excluding the national or supranational levels.

A traditional view of education states that it is by definition ‘socialisation within, and on behalf of, a particular political order’ (Kaplan 2006, XV). However, even in the case that the educa-
tional establishment is not part of the state education system, e.g. supplementary language schools or cultural community centres, they are most times under the jurisdiction of the state, receiving funding and approval from this quarter. The role of education is not limited to local experiences, however. It has come to the fore in national and supranational policy-making and strategising for integration as a sphere in which intercultural dialogue can take place. Under the commissioner for education and training, initiatives such as the Socrates or Leonardo da Vinci program help to broaden cultural exchange and an appreciation of diversity among countries, while other programs under the intercultural dialogue initiatives specifically support youth for the furthering of citizenship and integration. Launched in March 2000, the Lisbon Strategy highlighted education and training and their potential to ensure social inclusion and active citizenship by transmitting and enhancing social solidarity and participation. Education is also intended to fulfil the positive aim of decreasing crime, fostering democratic institutions, and enhancing the general quality of life (Focus, Lisbon Strategy).

On the national level, citizenship has been incorporated, directly and indirectly, into curricula in a number of EU member states. In England, citizenship education was introduced in 2000, emphasising active engagement with society and democracy and became a compulsory subject of secondary education as of 2002 (Osler and Starkey 2001, 288). Its efficacy in young people’s lives has been assessed in such reports as “Citizenship Education in England 2001-2010: Young People’s Practices and Prospects for the Future,” based on the Citizenship Longitudinal Study (CELS) (Keating et al 2010). Citizenship education is also supported by organisations, including the Citizenship Foundation and the Association for Citizenship Teaching (ACT). In spite of the recent controversy over its place in the national curriculum, Michael Gove, the Secretary of State for Education, confirmed on 7 February 2013 that it will remain a subject in English secondary schools. Particularly relevant to the examination of the British case in this research, citizenship and intercultural dialogue are also factors in the positioning of community centres, as they engage members in cultural activities and directly shape civic practices.

In Germany, by contrast, citizenship is not a formal subject in secondary education. Nonetheless, “Politische Bildung” or “Political Education” is incorporated in a cross-curricular manner in secondary education (Himmelmann 2004). It is often taught in combination with other subjects, including law, economics, history, or geography. While each state/county is responsible for devising its own curriculum, there is a nationwide agency, call the ‘Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung’ or the ‘Federal Centre for Political Education’, which organises events, publishes books, and funds conferences in the field.

Given these factors, educational environments provided a meaningful access point to interview young people along with those most involved in their lives. However, the interviews were not solely focused on educational experiences or the school. The questions encompassed much
broader themes, and thus, educational structures are incorporated in the context of this work as one institution among others, including immigration policies and EU influences (see Chapters 3 and 4).

As may be noted, there are some differences in numbers as to whom I spoke within each location. These differences are directly related to the access that I had and the location in which the majority of interviews took place. For example, in Berlin, I had access to a local school and the full support of several teachers. They helped to organise interviews with their students and even permitted me to take them from their regular classes. While I ultimately gained access to a local school in London, it was not without its difficulties (recounted below). In London, therefore, the majority of the interviews took place in community centres. This also explains the higher numbers of parents in London and the lower number of teachers, as the parents at the community centres were also willing to participate. Ideally, I would have had access to the same number of interview partners in each location; however, in qualitative research, one encounters limitations and challenges of this nature. Therefore, I utilised the data that I was able to gather and achieved insights from the perspective of minority youth and those involved in their citizenship and cultural awareness.

**Interview Sites**

As Germany and the UK had already been chosen for their contrasting citizenship and immigration policies, I narrowed the focus to their respective capital cities because of their borough structure, experiences of large numbers of minorities, and their relationship to the global stage. Berlin, the capital of the unified Germany, covers an area of about 892 square kilometres with a population of 3,442,700 according to the Amt für Statistik Berlin-Brandenburg as of 2009. Similar to many large cities, Berlin is divided into districts with local councils and officials. The districts are such that, as one informant stated: ‘Each part is like a village unto itself’ (BE83). One notes this in the inhabitants, the languages spoken, the restaurants and food on offer, and the opportunities for recreation. In Berlin Mitte, for example, one might hear French, Spanish, and English in addition to German.¹ In Kreuzberg or Neukölln, one is more likely to hear Turkish, Arabic, or Polish. According to the Mayor of Neukölln, Heinz Buschkowsky, this district, in particular, is home to about 300 thousand inhabitants from more than 160 nationalities. In recognition of the multicultural nature of this district, the European Commission and the Council of Europe chose it to participate in the Intercultural Cities Programme to compare good practices with other European cities as well as share policies and mapping of governance strategies.²

¹To avoid confusion: The district areas in Berlin are sometimes referred to simply by name or preceded by ‘Berlin’; thus, ‘Berlin Mitte’ and ‘Mitte’ refer to the same place. Similarly, ‘Berlin Neukölln’ and
²More about the Intercultural Cities programme, concept paper and key findings can be found here: http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/cultureheritage/culture/cities/default_en.asp.
Thus, from the very outset that a relatively small section of a capital city can participate in policy transfer on an international scale.\textsuperscript{3}

It must also be noted here that Berlin’s not so distant experience of formal division between East and West Berlin has played a profound role in its development. Even if many visible signs of the Berlin wall have been removed or worn away, the memories of boundaries and the experience of division and reunification live on in people’s minds. As one teacher noted: ‘There is still always the problem of East and West Berlin, not divided but divided in their minds’ (EL154, Author’s translation). In 2009, Research affirms that roughly 96 percent of people with a migration background live in the former West Germany and Berlin (Schönwälder and Söhn 2009, 1443). These settlement patterns shaped the positioning of minorities. Previously living along the wall, on the edge of the divided Berlin, many of these areas have now become central to Berlin as a broader spatial unit. Thus, as geographical boundaries shift, centres and peripheries are also in a process of change and redefinition.

London is roughly twice the population of Berlin with 8.2 million according to the 2011 census, covering an area of about 1,572.1 square kilometres (Census Result... 2012). It is also made up of a district structure with 32 boroughs next to Berlin’s 12 districts. Similar to Berlin, London also experiences the conflation of some areas into general regions. For example, the borough of Haringey is often listed with neighbouring boroughs of Hackney and Enfield and lumped into the general description ‘North London’, in the same way that Neukölln is listed with Kreuzberg and even combined to be called Kreuzkölln.

Interview partners from the centre in Harringay, a district in the borough of Haringey, often mentioned Hackney as the home of relatives or their own home. Thus, these boroughs, though administratively separate, often overlap in the experience of London residents. This overlap did

\textsuperscript{3} Policy transfer is the borrowing of knowledge, administrative tools, and institutions from a particular time or place and used in the development of these structures in another time and place (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996). It is evident in the experience of Berlin and London as will be seen in later chapters. At times, policy transfer is voluntary, involving the active decision-making authority of political actors; yet, at other times, as with certain supranational institutions, it may entail more pressure towards policy convergence. As a major policy-shaping institution, the European Union is just such a body that, while it generally cannot force policy transfer, has means of introducing ideas and solutions into state institutions (Radaelli 2000, 25). Examples might include immigration policies or the dissemination of good practices for the integration of minority youth (see Chapter 4). Europeanisation might even contribute to the regionalisation of such policy-making processes as local officials fuse together EU and national interests, formulating an even greater variety of policy implementation (James and Lodge 2003, 187; Wessels 1997). There are at least two potential pitfalls: macro-level theories are applied to concrete situations without taking into account the mediating processes while micro-level approaches might not take broader structural processes into consideration (Evans and Davies 1999, 363). In this light, the fluctuating nature of participation as an experience that is constructed, contested, and transferred inevitably shapes the policies and experiences of local settings and vice versa for both Berlin and London.
not come up in my interviews in Berlin except among teachers, who often lived in various other districts. Even one pupil who lived about 40 minutes away from the Gymnasium still technically lived in Neukölln.

For clarification, The Berlin ‘district’ is equivalent to the London ‘borough’, while in London, ‘district’ and ‘neighbourhood’ are used to identify the smaller sub-sections of the borough with no formal equivalent in Berlin. For example, some London interviews took place in Dalston, Harringay, and Leyton, all neighbourhoods within larger boroughs. Unlike London, these subdivisions do not exist in Berlin’s districts, except in the experience and observations of those who live there.

London experiences extremely high levels of diversity. As of January 2005, a Guardian writer reported that more than 300 languages were spoken in London with more than 50 non-indigenous communities of more than ten thousand (Benedictus 2005). As a world city, this is not particularly surprising. Locally-born individuals have tended to move out from the centre to be replaced by the representatives of international capital along with labour from former colonies and international tourists (King 1990). As such, London (and Berlin) can be classified as super-diverse. A term coined by Steven Vertovec (2007, 1024), it denotes that these locations are characterised by a ‘dynamic interplay of variables among an increased number of new, small and scattered, multiple-origin, transnationally connected, socio-economically differentiated and legally stratified immigrants’. Moreover, large cities act as specific locations of interaction where patterns of settlement and incorporation are often different even from other cities in the same country. Thus, although one can observe transnational linkages in this case, the conclusions drawn in these locations cannot necessarily be generalised to the entire country’s patterns of incorporation (Glick Schiller and Çağlar 2008). Moreover, large cities, particularly capital cities, often act to counter the national immigration and integration policies (Glick Schiller 2010). In these cases, in particular, both Berlin and London have distinct histories and patterns of urban development that shape their reaction to and interaction with the presence of large numbers of minorities that may or may not be consistent with other large cities in the country.

Finally, both Berlin and London can be classified as world cities, linking them economically and politically to the international system, illustrating the levels of interaction in their connections. The development of large cities as influential points on the global map, sometimes called ‘global cities’ is linked to the globalisation of capital and the increasing regionalisation and territorialisation of states (Brenner 1998). Multinational and transnational companies are increasingly working beyond the borders of states, establishing a global network of production and distribution (Hamnett 1994). The interconnected nature of corporations has influenced the development of a hierarchy of urban centres, at the top of which are what Friedmann and Wolff (1982) denote as ‘world cities’. These urban centres are tightly linked through decision-making
and international finance. World cities highlight that many of the resources that are necessary to global economic activities are firmly entrenched in geographic spaces (Sassen 2000, 79). London has a history of fulfilling the role of ‘world city’ since before the twentieth century (King 1990). Although more recent in this role, Berlin can also be classified as such. Global cities are, in a way, acting to reterritorialise the state borders, not erasing them, but simply re-organising the role of space in the context of change. In this process, modern cities contribute to the so-called ‘crisis’ of democratic participation (Sennett 2002, 45-46). Those who live in these cities tend to use them for economic purposes but do not always demonstrate the same civic commitment as historically was the case. This directly relates to the question of citizenship, a main focus of this piece.

In spite of their similarities, there are certainly differences. For one, the city districts in Berlin do not exhibit ethnic enclaves. In the North American context, an ethnic enclave is identified where 30 to 40 percent of the population of a given city area belongs to one ethnic background, where in Germany, researchers found only one city unit where a concentration over 30 percent existed (Schönwälder and Söhn 2009, 1446). More often than not, German cities have ethnically mixed neighbourhoods where ethnic Germans still remain in the majority. In contrast to Germany, the presence of ethnic enclaves is more pronounced in London. As of 2001, 22 percent of Indian descent and almost 30 percent of those with Bangladeshi descent lived in areas with a concentration of more than 30 percent of the respective ethnic group (Schönwälder and Söhn 2009, 1449). In contrast, only one third of the Turkish minority in Germany live in areas of a concentration higher than 10 percent, a far lower rate of ethnic segregation. While ethnic enclaves as such will not come into this work a great deal, it is worth noting this difference in settlement patterns at this point.

Within the cities, the interviews were primarily conducted at several key locations. Both schools at which interviews were conducted reflected the city district in which they were located. Situated on a main street in Neukölln, the Berlin school is made up of about 500 pupils and 40 teachers, somewhat smaller than other schools in the area (EL134). The school is representative of the area of Neukölln in that a majority of pupils are from a ‘migration background’. One teacher explained to me that for the first generation of migrants when he started teaching, perhaps twenty percent were from a ‘migration background’ in the schools, but now, it is closer to 95 percent in his classes (EL154, Author’s translation). This illustrates very clearly how much this area of Berlin has changed in only a few decades and depicts, at least in part, the multicultural nature of this school. The largest sub-groups of pupils are of Turkish or Arab background with smaller groups of Albanian, Bosnian, Polish, and Vietnamese. The presence of Germans is noticeably few except among the teachers, who are all ethnically German.

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4 The official term used in Germany to define the children of immigrants, regardless of generation is ‘Kinder mit Migrationshintergrund’ or ‘children with a migration background’.
Similar to the Berlin school, only 6 percent of the students at the London college identified as White-British, while the rest of the school’s population included Chinese, Turkish, West Indian, and others. The most noticeable difference between the two schools was that diversity was present also among staff members with only roughly 58 percent being of White-British ethnicity. Far from the exception, a pupil from a different school affirmed that this was also the case there: ‘My secondary school has most cultures there, like 80; it’s different and nice, too; the teachers seem to like it; [they’re] mostly African’ (LL42).

Functioning in predominately working class areas, both schools prepared students to take exams for university admission. As a London college, students attended this school after completing secondary school. Here, they engage in specific classes before taking their A-level exams. While not just for older students, the Berlin school, too, had the final option of the Abitur, which students would need to complete if they wanted to attend university. As part of the regulations from the Berlin regional authority, all interview partners in this school were over the age of fourteen.

As mentioned previously, however, the majority of interviews in London took place in community centres. These organisations were originally established to meet the educational, cultural, religious, and welfare needs of the immigrants they serve (Küçükcan 2004). They are examples of non-governmental organisations stepping in to meet the needs of refugees in London (Wahlbeck 1998, 218). As with many refugee associations in London, many of the workers are volunteers (Olden 1999, 213). However, they do not serve groups exclusively according to ethnicity, culture, or religion. For example, after a short time at one of the Kurdish cultural centres, I noticed the use of Turkish to be far more prevalent than Kurdish. Even the English teacher for the parents instructed in Turkish. I soon discovered that this was because of the diversity within this community centre’s participants, as Turkish-Cypriot, Turkish, and Kurdish (from Turkey and Iraq) took advantage of the services offered as well as mingling in social events. At the same time, other research notes that Kurdish refugees in general find it difficult to present themselves as a united group as many of them do not speak the same language (Wahlbeck 1998, 218). Thus, Turkish was the lingua franca in this setting. The centre acted as a point of blending and blurring of ethnic lines at the same time as pictures of PKK (Workers’ Party of Kurdistan) leader, Abdullah Öcalan, hung on the walls of the main room. The centre focused mainly on supporting culture through music and dance classes, and teaching Kurdish to young people. The centre also offered services to help newly arrived immigrants, documented and undocumented, to find their way in British society. English classes were offered throughout the week.

While the first centre purported to be oriented to the Kurdish community, the second centre was defined religiously. With a member-run charity downstairs to support their transnational community and a café upstairs, it was a place for all ages. This centre fulfilled the role that many
centres of worship might: it was where ceremonies from weddings to funerals were held. A university student described her experience of the centre this way: ‘My parents weren’t really involved in [the centre]…He [my father] was a member and gave money to help; they would go there if someone dies. They would meet there, rather than going to their house’ (LL712).

Both of these centres exhibited transnational involvement. For example, in reference to the charity shop in the second centre, one of the young people noted how her mother had come that day because ‘Mum has to come, she sells things, and the money goes to people who can’t afford education in Turkey’ (LL42). In addition, both of the centres participate annually in a march on 15 February to commemorate the imprisonment of the PKK leader, whose pictures were mentioned before. Ostergaard-Nielsen (2003) argues that, for Turkish and Kurdish political actors abroad, there is inevitably an element of diaspora/homeland politics entwined with migrant politics, as particular political messages for recognition or expression are sent transnationally to the Turkish government. This is true for many refugee communities who are not able to establish a unified ethnic collectivity in the country of settlement. Their orientation tends to link them with the country of origin, and the politics of that country often play into the affiliations and aspirations of associations in the country of settlement, divided along similar fault lines (Wahlbeck 1998, 215). The participation of minority youth in such activities exhibits how their citizenship practices are not just based on the country of residence.

In this section, I introduced the main focus of the case studies, that is, Berlin and London. However, within these two cities, the interviews were mainly conducted at two schools and two community centres. The comparisons and contrasts made in the empirical data rely heavily on the data gathered in these locations.

Interview Schedule Design

A short time in the field confirmed the complexity of the two case studies, breaking down the conception that ethnic communities are cleanly bounded collectivities, aligning with Brubaker’s critique of what he refers to as ‘groupism’. This is the ‘tendency to take discrete, sharply differentiated, internally homogeneous and externally bounded groups as basic constituents of social life, chief protagonists of social conflicts, and fundamental units of social analysis’ (Brubaker 2002). The homogeneity of groups has been contested from a number of perspectives, including race, gender, class, and even generation. For example, researchers investigating the positioning of second-generation Irish in England in relation to race and generation found that they not only exhibit a distinct experience from their parents’ but have not assimilated based on the colour of their skin, contrary to the assumptions within the English political imaginary (Hickman et al 2005). Likewise, scholars including Yuval-Davis (2006b) and Brah and Phoenix (2004) have detailed the deconstruction of assumptions concerning the intersectionality of gender, class, and race (to be discussed shortly).
With this in mind, investigating the experience of only one ethnically-defined group would be to potentially impose or reify a boundary that is continually fluctuating based on the intersectionality of experiences, politics, and society. In this usage, intersectionality refers to the way that social divisions and other categories of belonging intersect in an infinite number of ways, where each facet helps to construct all of the others. Originally coined by Kimberle Crenshaw (1989), she pointed out how conceptions of discrimination influence the assumption that disadvantage occurs along a single categorical axis. Intersectionality refers to the ‘complex, irreducible, varied, and variable effects which ensue when multiple axes of differentiation (economic, political, cultural, psychic, subjective, and experiential) intersect in historically specific contexts’ (Brah and Phoenix 2004, 76). Therefore, a person’s social group does not determine that person’s political or cultural values but may inform these choices. In other words, an individual’s identity is more than the sum of its parts.

In keeping with these critiques, I observed an immense variety of interaction and intersection among the people with whom I spoke, thus raising my extreme discomfort with any of the terms that denote static, homogeneous groupings of people. Beyond limiting the agency and personhood of potential interview partners, they have the additional effect of creating an implicit power relation and distance between the researcher and researched, and artificially reifying boundaries that may or may not exist.

This issue came doubly to my attention as I described my research to participants. To explain it using the typical terms with which immigrants or their descendants are discussed would be to initiate the Othering process before the interview even began. As Baumann (1996, 10) notes, such a definition of community is to impose a limitation on a set of people that may or may not reflect the reality, and in doing so, the argument is self-fulfilled. These communities are not put forward as imagined entities but are inevitably purported to be static and ‘Other’ (Worley 2005, 489). Vertovec (2007, 1043) experienced the same discomfort in the similarly essentialist idea of mapping particular cultures onto places, since a variety of cultures and identities come together in any definition of place boundaries. Where essentialism refers to the static, unchanging nature of cultures and identities, social constructionists emphasise the ‘contingent, fractured, ambivalent and reflexive nature of culture and identity’ (Werbner 1997a, 228).

From these observations and my research objectives, I developed three sets of interview questions aimed at students, parents, and teachers, respectively. All three sets served to facilitate semi-structured interviews with varying degrees of further questioning, depending on the willingness of the interview partner. The in-depth interview material was mainly gained from informants within the community who took hours to explain different dynamics of their experiences. These informants included university students, educators, and community activists.
When designing the questions, I encountered challenges of phrasing and terminology. The main challenge came after contact with the German regional authorities who had to approve my research. They refused to allow me to ask for such information as nationality or citizenship status. I imagine that this reaction is due to the potential that I mentioned previously, i.e. perpetuating an emphasis on ethnicity that may or may not be a practical aspect of young people’s interactions. Combined with Germany’s national history, such information and any question related to citizenship or ethnic background is handled with the utmost sensitivity. This resulted in the exclusion of any such question on the census until 2005 when the term ‘Migrationshintergrund’ or ‘migration background’ was introduced. Having a ‘migration background’ would be used to describe people ‘who were born abroad, those who possess (solely) non-German citizenship, were naturalised or have at least one parent who was or still is a foreign national or who immigrated to Germany’ (Schönwälder and Söhn 2009, 1441).

In response to these obstacles, my interviews became highly dependent on what the interview partner would offer when I asked: ‘Have you always lived in this country?’ In the end, this strategy of using broad and open-ended questions allowed the interview partners to follow their own ‘paths of association’, bringing out information or perspectives that were not previously known or offering a new framework in which to understand the subject at hand (Yow 1994, 41). It also gave them more freedom to interpret my questions and to offer what they thought might be relevant. It brought the interviews into keeping with ‘active listening’, where the interviewee is given substantial freedom to talk about ideas and meanings in the overarching theme of the project (Silverman 2006, 109). The strategy did occasionally leave gaps in the information, such as which passport(s) they held. This explains the blanks on the spreadsheets where the data for the participants is included in the appendices.

Only occasionally was the broadness of the questions an issue. For example, during one interview, I explained that the questions are very open (intentionally), and one student said: ‘That’s the problem. Because it’s open, we can’t say very much’ (ES2242). Nonetheless, this strategy was generally very effective in creating a space for young people and teachers to share their opinions and ideas as freely as possible with less influence from direct questions.

**Access**

Access to interviewees and interview sites was shaped by a few key factors. First, at both schools where I conducted interviews, a teacher at the school played a primary role in arranging for me to visit and meet with students. Secondly, a willingness to volunteer in English classes at community centres and the Berlin school opened the door. I was often asked to help in leading conversation classes. My students’ level ranged from beginners to relatively advanced, but at all levels, they offered very interesting insights into their lives in the UK and Germany, though they were not explicitly asked.
Obtaining access to a school in London was perhaps the most challenging step. My calls to schools, approaches to Local Education Authority members, and school heads went generally unanswered. One school even said that the head had decided to deny all future research requests, since they receive two to three enquiries a day. Some possible reasons for the difficulty may have been busy teachers and the inspections from Ofsted (Office for Standards in Education Children’s Services, and Skills). Alternatively, schools may have been uneasy with their reputation being damaged by a report on their pupils, since there is fierce competition among schools for ratings. My eventual access to a local college came through a chance encounter with a teacher at a local church.

Once the schools had informally agreed to permit my research, the formal process was different in each case. Having already obtained ethics approval from the University of Exeter and completed a CRB check, I was allowed to visit the London college at any time convenient for the teacher and me as soon as consent was gained by sending my list of questions to the appropriate member of staff. In Berlin, on the other hand, I had to follow a rigorous procedure of translating my research proposal, information sheet, interview questions, and data agreements (including how the data would be handled and by whom), and submitting these with a formal request to the ‘Senatsverwaltung für Bildung, Wissenschaft und Forschung’ or ‘Senate Department of Education, Science, and Research’. Without this approval on the regional level, the head of the Berlin school could not allow me to conduct interviews. These experiences suggest that, while entry to both schools was facilitated by a teacher, the school in the wider context has different freedoms. In Berlin, the regional (county equivalent) administration had to approve my project before I was allowed to enter, while the London college seemed to operate with much more autonomy, as their resources are distributed on the local level. Practically speaking, the contrasting relationship was most apparent to me in the time it took to gain formal access to the London school in comparison to the Berlin school.

Access to the community centres was a much more informal process. After numerous emails, I received one response from a local centre in Harringay, and after a ten minute discussion, I was welcome to volunteer, interview, and visit at any time. Access to the other centres came through university students who responded to online postings or through colleagues working in the area of immigration and refugee studies. Only once was I asked to provide the formal explanation of my research in writing for one of the centre’s records.

In both the schools and the community centres, I organised interviews in conjunction with staff members. There were certain aspects beyond aiding in English classes that both helped (and sometimes limited) my access. For one, I have lived as a foreigner in both German and British contexts, learning and observing the cultural dynamics and having to acclimate to differences of expression and institutions. While I am not in the same position as a refugee or economic mi-
grant, I do know that this helps me to identify with my interviewees. At the same time, the distance that I have from both the German and British culture allowed my interviewees to speak more freely about their experiences and perceptions, as I was also an outsider in a manner of speaking.

Being an outsider in addition to the component of gender, however, may have been an obstacle at times. While I received a good deal of openness from groups of women in social settings along with a number of young people, access to male interviewees was much harder to gain, particularly among parents. I only spoke with a very low number of fathers, and they were interviewed primarily as community leaders with their role as fathers being secondary.

I am not the first researcher to encounter such obstacles around the component of gender in the field. One’s gender, particularly in relation to the gender of those being interviewed, affects how one is defined and, by extension, what one is able to discover (Silverman 2006, 84). Additionally, gender can be a distinguishing factor as to whether a person is deemed an insider or an outsider, and on that basis, may have access to more or less information (Scheyvens and Leslie 2000, 122). There is also a difference in how gender might affect the way that access and rapport are gained and maintained, e.g. impressions of competence, confidence, and whether the researcher is threatening or not (Gurney 1985). This is particularly the case for a female in a male-dominated setting. Nonetheless, it is important not to use gender as a ‘explanatory catch-all’, where class, age, and even language may have also played a part (McKeganey and Bloor, 1991, 196). Male interview partners in their teens or twenties were included much more often than their older counterparts. Furthermore, in a number of cases, they had grown-up in the UK or Germany, and thus, the interview language was not an obstacle. Of course, I cannot fully rule out gender either, as many of the older women with limited language skills were willing enough to participate. The role of gender in these contexts was confirmed by comments made by minority youth in our conversations, sometimes explicitly, and other times, implicitly highlighting this aspect of their experience (included at various points in the empirical chapters). Understanding how these components may shape access and rapport are crucial to the interview analysis. I will take the approach that this tendency in the interviewing method is not something to be artificially excluded but should be incorporated into the details of the study with as much consistency and awareness as possible.

Rather than trying to maintain distance from the interviewee, an essential feature of a successful interview was making the other person comfortable enough to trust me with very personal details of their lives and families. The interviews often began with a time to ask me questions about where I am from and why I am interested to speak with them. I then proceeded to my questions. This format encouraged the openness of conversation through reciprocal relationships and mutual respect, serving to lessen the distance between researcher and researched.
Moreover, basing the interview on a reciprocal relationship where the interview partner is the authority on their situation, responds to the asymmetrical power relations by shifting some of that power to the interview partner (England 1994, 82).

When interviewing, I relied on taking notes and digital recordings. Recordings became more difficult when I met interview partners in coffee shops or cultural community centres where there was too much noise to record. However, I found that people are often more comfortable to speak freely if they are not being recorded. Likewise, I found that asking for written consent disrupted the interview process and rapport of the exchange. Rather than being a person who is genuinely interested in the experiences of the people I was talking to, it gave the impression of formality and distance, both of which were not desirable. For this reason, I only obtained written consent on rare occasions. Of course, I always explained the terms of the research and gained oral consent.

The rapport of the interviews was also shaped by the presence of my guide-dog, Freddie, a large, friendly black Labrador retriever, who was present at every interview and visit to community centres. While I was reluctant to include him in the written component of this research, as I conducted fieldwork, I realised that I could not exclude him. Several interview partners asked a lot of questions about him, played with him, or simply stroked him throughout the interview. One person who described the interview as ‘therapeutic’ was stroking him every time she took a moment to think (LL712). I am sure that his presence acted as an ice-breaker in a number of instances. This conclusion that my guide-dog shaped both access and rapport is perhaps further verified at the occasional negative response, whether from personal preference, cultural practices, or at times, religious beliefs.

It is important here to mention some limitations of this research. First, although fieldwork was an essential part of conducting this research, it is not to be understood in the same frame as anthropological fieldwork. Only a short time was spent in each location, and while some observations will be incorporated into the analysis, the details will not encompass the kind of depth as may be expected in an ethnography. Nonetheless, the data gathered on-the-ground adds some awareness of the day-to-day experiences, an often excluded component in IR research.

Second, there are certain biases in the collection of data. For example, The people who are involved in cultural or ethnic associations or community centres most likely feel a sense of identity that links them to people of a similar cultural or ethnic background. The bias of self-selection was evident in schools as well. The teachers and students were not required to participate in the interview, and since I did not do random sampling, and the interview was not mandatory, people’s willingness, from young pupils to mature adults was based on their interest in my project.
and their trust and impression of me. Very few expressed unwillingness when asked; however, there were a small number who declined to take part.

Third, this research only engages with a limited number of spaces within Berlin and London. While it was sufficient to see the way that the local is engaged with global issues, it is not sufficient to make generalising statements about all of the experiences of minority youth in these cities or in the country. Fourth, the inclusion of two case studies helps us to see the contrasts and similarities between the two cases but, because of the limitations of space, the focus and inclusion of information from these cases is not all-encompassing. Moreover, the depth that may have been incorporated in a single-case examination is not possible. Nonetheless, the contextual chapters and empirical analysis aim to highlight the most relevant factors to the position of minority youth in Berlin and London.

Transcription, Translation, and Qualitative Content Analysis

After gathering the data, there were several steps in the process of the analysis. Recorded interviews had to be transcribed, and interviews that took place in German had to be translated. The quotes used throughout this work are taken from these interviews and are represented as accurately as possible. I recognised that I am imposing my own grammatical structures on these quotes as I attempt to accurately recreate the quote as I heard it. Since many do not speak in sentences, replete with punctuation markers, it is left to me to act as mediator between my interviews and the reader. With language, too, I have tried to maintain the highest level of integrity to the experience. Unfortunately, accents cannot always be represented in writing. When it was possible, I did incorporate these nuances, though they would be more appropriate to a sociolinguistic study than the primary emphasis of this work.

After transcribing and translating the interviews, the next step was to analyse their content. Opting to use qualitative content analysis, I developed three key categories that related to the main research objectives. These were: location, citizenship, and culture, broadly defined. It is important to note that none of these themes can be analysed in isolation from the other, and the imposition of these key categories represents my perception of and interaction with the data.

For a start, location was understood as far more than a one-dimensional geographical intersection of longitude and latitude. It is more accurate to conceive of it as a multidimensional space that, although it can be found on a map, is defined by many other features and influences. In this category, I included quotes that referred to spaces such as the district, city, country, or school. It shows the levels of interaction in young people’s lives.

In the theme of citizenship, I included both the legal and political references to belonging. These were combined with perceptions of citizenship, such as the passport or dimensions of experi-
ence that undermine the validity of civic belonging. e.g. race or ethnicity. They also show the connection, civic or otherwise, to other states.

In the theme of culture, I incorporated observations of community activities and friendships, in order to show how these are in no way isolated from the broader community and interaction in their current social, political, and economic context. Under this heading, I also chose to include the many comments referring to media, ranging from books to MTV. Elements of transnational interaction were evident in this space as some of the students I interviewed spoke up to five languages with varying degrees of fluency. They referenced the media as part of this development. In particular, I deemed it important to include this aspect, especially with the increasing role that images play on the international stage, even shaping interstate relations. Moreover, media brings interstate conflict into the halls of local schools. These three categories make up the three empirical chapters of this project as described in the thesis structure below.

1.4. Thesis Structure

This chapter has introduced the main context of this research as well as the objectives, methodology, and methods. The next chapter, by contrast, will focus on the theoretical framework of citizenship and intercultural dialogue as they have developed in the context of migration and globalisation.

Chapters 3 and 4 comprise a two-part overview of national and regional trends in the areas of citizenship and intercultural dialogue. Chapter 3 introduces Germany and the UK as separate entities, drawing primarily on secondary literature to show the shifts in immigration policy and politics. It is a focus on the state level. This chapter only depicts minimal overlap in policies or the give and take as two members of the European Community. Chapter 4, by contrast, aims to bring the two countries into the European and global framework of interconnected policy-making, where national demands are uploaded and regional protections are downloaded in an exchange on the very levels previously discussed. Here, I will introduce the notions of intercultural dialogue and how these extend internally to minority communities and externally to the Mediterranean. Chapter 4 also begins to draw on empirical data from interviews as well as other observations made during fieldwork in order to enhance its analytical capacity.

Chapters 5 through 7 present the empirical evidence for this research. With the emphasis on location, Chapter 5 explores the multi-scalar spaces of identity and belonging. It demonstrates how the perceptions of boundaries subdivide formalised district lines and at the same time, supersede state borders through transnational connections to locations geographically distant but emotionally contiguous. Emotional and social ties, just like political ones, can play a part in perpetuating the sense of participating in a diaspora (Brubaker 2005, 2). Diaspora elicits the notion of continuity in the face of fragmented locations and identities (Soysal 2000, 2).
Chapter 6 focuses on citizenship, dissecting the way that legal membership and participation shape the interaction across these spaces. Students’ and teachers’ comments on citizenship, as represented by the passport, and a more expansive meaning of the term show that citizenship is a highly complex experience, affected by the aforementioned spaces as well as other factors that shape notions of belonging and participation. Not everyone who lives in the same geographical space and contributes to the political community enjoys the same citizenship privileges (Wiener 1999, 199). Chapter 7 explores how social and cultural norms function in the lives of minority youth, problematising the notion of static cultures and the role of intercultural dialogue as a policy practice. From friendships to media consumption, their experience is not limited by city boundaries but influences international interactions and participation on a global scale.

Chapter 8 concludes this piece by highlighting the key findings as well as re-visit ing the questions presented here. The main contributions to the IR field will be discussed as well as suggestions for further research. With this structure in mind, let us now turn to the theoretical framework of citizenship and intercultural dialogue.

Prior to the nationalist movements of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, geographical and political borders were generally demarcated by multinational empires, kingdoms, and federations, from which the modern state emerged alongside the transitions to industrial economies. While they had strong centres in many cases, the outer edges were extremely porous with unclear lines of where one sovereign space ended and the next began (Anderson 1991, 19). The era of industrialisation encouraged a shift, where the central hierarchy of authority was re-established in an increasingly horizontal consciousness at the same time as the porous and changing borders were exchanged for stable and precise borders. These newly demarcated borders formed the basis for a simplistic understanding of the way that boundaries operate. As Bauböck (1997) notes: ‘The political map of the modern world has a quality of simplicity and clarity that almost resembles a Mondrian painting’. The basic definition of a state is a territory consisting of precise borders, a stable population, institutional structure, and the diplomatic recognition by other states of that state’s right to govern within its territory (Mingst 2004, 100). However, as IR scholars engaged in environmental research note, the pictures of the Earth from space show a very different scene: one where the lines of the modern world appear somehow insignificant, as environmental challenges transcend political and territorial boundaries (Steans et al 2010). Nonetheless, these borders continue to shape jurisdiction, leading to questions of sovereignty, citizenship, and even belonging.

The secondary literature employed in this chapter will draw on IR as well as other disciplines to show how citizenship and intercultural dialogue intersect with local, state, transnational, and international levels. It will demonstrate how conceptions of culture as static and unchanging as well as conventional citizenship models are not sufficient to respond to an increasingly globalised world, laying the foundation for the case studies and the empirical data to be presented in the following chapters.

The discussion will begin with an exploration of collective identity and how these identities were instituted in the nation-building projects through religious symbols, memory, and education. Moreover, these identities fed into the conceptions of the ‘abstract’ citizen, forming a legal and political boundary between insiders and outsiders. The second part of the chapter shows how these conceptions have informed policies of integration and the responses to immigration, and how, in turn, the presence of immigrants has challenged these notions, as evidenced through the contestation of belonging and interaction. This will set the theoretical backdrop to respond
to the research questions (posed in the last chapter) through the contextual chapters and the empirical data.

2.1. **Collective Identities**

Whether nation-state, minority group, or ethnic community, these terms refer to the boundaries of groups, at the root of which lie certain commonalities of rationale. Identity, one of the most elusive terms in studies of migration and the Social Sciences more broadly, revolves around the ‘ways in which people conceive of themselves and are characterised by others’ (Vertovec 2001, 573). Taylor (1994, 25) describes identity as shaped by the recognition, lack of recognition, or misrecognition by others. This process of identity formation takes place on many levels of interaction or a ‘multi-scalar identity space, including national, subnational and transnational forms of differentiation and identification’ (Simonsen 2004, 356). These ethnic and political identities appear to perpetually establish and articulate performative binaries, we versus they and us versus them (Faas 2007, 47), or, as Francis Fukuyama (2001, 8) puts it: ‘There appears to be a natural human proclivity for dividing the world into friends and enemies that is the basis for all politics’. While this may appear to be true in some cases or on a superficial level, the intersectionality of these identities is all too apparent when one looks a little closer. In the following pages, the goal is to unpack some of the main components of the nation-building projects and how these identities can be approached and thus, how foreigners within their borders are understood and accommodated in national policies.

**Nations and Nationalism**

Methodological nationalism, described by Andreas Wimmer and Nina Glick Schiller (2002, 302) is the assumption of the nation/state/society as the ‘natural social and political form of the modern world’. It assumes that the social and historical processes are contained within the geographical borders of the nation-state (Glick Schiller and Çağlar 2008). Others call this the ‘container’ theory of society, where scholars including Durkheim and Weber have confined their analysis of society to the geographical and institutional boundaries of the nation-state. In this conception, societies are ‘subordinate’ to states and the authority structures therein (Beck 2000, 3). This is in distinct contrast to the dynamic complexity of influences that actually shape the interaction of migrant and country of settlement; however, it is useful to explore collective identity in the way that it was conceived in the nation-building processes, for it is in this way that it is incorporated into national institutions and influences national immigration and integration policy.

Defining the elements of a ‘nation’ is particularly challenging as it is highly reliant on cultural and political context. One author defines a ‘nation’ as a group of people who share a sense of a common fate or community; they are not necessarily bounded within the borders of a state, and
they often have cultural boundaries or recognised features, physical or otherwise, that separate them from other groups of society (Hosking 1997). In his groundbreaking book on the topic, Imagined Communities, Benedict Anderson (1991, 6) defined a nation as ‘an imagined political community and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign’. These two definitions among many illustrate two specific trends. The first definition focuses on the basic elements that serve to form a community with an emphasis on the static nature of this community and the criteria by which it is defined. Anderson’s definition, by contrast, focuses on the origin and motivation of such distinctions. Sometimes, nations are geographically bounded. Other times, a state forms the cohesive fabric for the institutional framework. It might find its borders in its mode of communication, i.e. language. A culture that is united or defined by the means of communication may use this unifying factor as an ‘instrument of distinction’ to legitimise and subordinate other cultures (or subcultures) to the ‘dominant culture’ (Bourdieu 1977, 115).

Rather than trying to define the nation, however, it may be more useful to examine the foundational components of the national collective identity. Grillo (1998, 15) posits that the nation could be defined as either broadly ‘Gesellschaft’, a community by consent or association, or broadly ‘Gemeinschaft’, community based on blood. In a community defined as ‘Gesellschaft’ or having a civic conception of identity, the group has certain unwritten rules or codes that the group knows, and even after many years of change, the core identity will have some elements or hints of these ‘original references of codes’ (Eisenstadt and Giesen 1995, 76). This civic construction of identity stems from a ‘historically developed complex of rules, routines, and institutional arrangements’ (Tempelmann 1999, 18). Rather than being clearly defined, these boundaries are made up of mostly unwritten rules that, to a member of that community, are common sense. Outsiders are recognised by their unfamiliarity in these routines. Meanwhile, these routines may appear as simply a matter of daily habits, but they are formulated around the society’s institutions, thus ‘constituted’ by those who live in the society, demarcating the social and cultural boundary (Eisenstadt and Giesen 1995, 80).

While a community by descent may seem much more clear-cut than one by consent, it is important to keep in mind that descent is also subject to contestation, particularly in cases of formal membership for those living abroad for multiple generations. The ‘Gemeinschaft’ or primordial conception of collective identity emphasises the givens of a particular group. In some societies, a sense of kinship, ancestry, or blood relations is key to cultural cohesion and belonging. This conception of collective identity would be classified as primordial. The primordial approach to identity formation focuses on the ‘givens’ or shared parts of a culture and emphasises the ‘archaic’ cultural basis of identities, making the crossing of boundaries extremely difficult (Tempelmann 1999, 18; Young 1983, 659). When describing those not within the group, Eisenstadt and Giesen (1995, 78) state: ‘the “others” cannot be converted and adopted…, they
cannot be educated, developed or even understood…’. This puts the Other below in addition to outside of the boundaries. As John W. Dower (1986) argues in his analysis of the war in the Pacific, primordialisation led to the Japanese being perceived as sub-human and super-human, both categories of Other that could not be adopted into the category of simply human. These processes and rationale of identity formation also highlight the unknowability of the Other. No matter how the identity is defined or articulated, it is crucial to consider them as perpetually changing perspectives of the world, rather than static subsets within it (Brubaker, Loveman, and Stamatov 2004, 32).

Regardless of the basis for the national identity, rising national awareness combined with increasingly stable borders led to the development of nationalist movements across Western Europe and beyond. The ideological aim of nationalism was to align the political unit (the state) with the cultural unit (the nation) (Fox and Miller-Idriss 2008, 536). Thus, geographical spaces became, not a starting point of contestation or a stable constant of discussion, but a product of social and political identities (Turton 2005, 258). Far from being arbitrarily determined, territory intersects with structures of power, culture, and nature (Berezin and Schain 2003). Furthermore, implicit in nationalist movements was the distinction between those who belong (legally and culturally) and those who do not.

Alter (1994, 19) divides nationalism into two general manifestations: ‘risorgimento’ and ‘integral’ nationalism. The goal of risorgimento nationalism is to include as many people groups as possible on the basis of some unifying element such as language. It is ‘an emancipatory political force’ whose ‘adherents stress the right of every nation, and with it the right of each and every member of a nation, to autonomous and equal development’ (Alter 1994, 19). Integral nationalism is the exclusive nationalism that unites the majority population of the state and excludes those minorities who are trapped within the borders but not part of the majority community. In both cases, however, a group is formed on the basis of certain criteria for citizenship with the illusion of homogeneity, whether based on ethnic characteristics, such as language, heritage, or an ancestral homeland, or founded on civically defined norms, such as personal freedom of speech or religion.

In cases like Germany, this homogeneity was founded on the ideological justification of ethnicity (Grillo 1998, 18). Ethnicity refers to a boundary of symbolic and social relevance that shapes individual and group actions and mental orientations, ingrained in various social and cultural differences (Alba 2005, 22). Beyond that, ethnicity relies on a ‘subjective belief in common descent’, whether real or imagined (Weber 1968, 389). An ethnic group can be conceived of as a segment of a larger society whose members are perceived (by themselves or by the society as a whole) as having a common origin, sharing elements of culture and activities in which the common origin and culture are significant, and sharing some mixture of language, race, reli-
gion, and an ancestral homeland (Yinger 1985: 159). For this research, the construction of ethnicity has a situational, volitional, and dynamic character of identities, organisation, and action (Nagel 1994, 152). Yet, the homogenising effect of ethnic boundaries acts as a tool of state control (Beck 2000, 3).

Whether entwined with ethnic conceptions of identity, as in Germany, or territorially-defined as in the UK, the ‘institutionalisation of social relations’ in the nation-building projects served to crystallise the distinction between members and non-members, or more appropriately, nationals and non-nationals (Silverman 1992, 33-34). In every act of inclusion, there is an act of exclusion. It is perhaps not surprising, then, that the increasing trend is of conflict within states rather than between them (Buchanan 2003, 204). When violence or denial of claims is introduced to the situation, those who wish to ‘assert’ a given identity are compelled to take an ‘absolute position’ (Weller 2005, 4), thereby limiting the fluidity and negotiability of political and cultural boundaries.

Culture may be defined as responding to and acting in accordance with certain social and institutional rules that have been ingrained in perceptions and worldview since an early age. In a cultural context, actions and reactions are defined by a frame of reference, which the others in the cultural context can interpret to obtain a fairly accurate understanding of intention and meaning. The ideas and attitudes of many people within a society are not drawn or based upon pure observation but are ideas that are adopted in a cultural context (Mounce 1973; Winch 1964). These cultural norms manifest themselves in certain institutions and practices that define cultures from one another, giving them unique perspectives and traits that form their societal fabric. However, like community, the manifestation of culture is elusive and the conception of a monolithic culture in any context, nonexistent.

If culture emanates from the shared ‘customs’ or ‘civilisation of a group or people’, then each number of people who consider themselves, or are considered by others, to have something in common have a culture (Kymlicka 1995, 18). By extension, basically every locale and state could be considered multicultural because of the contested and diverse claims made by its members. This arises because of the implicit diversity of individual interactions with social norms, not to mention the flows of material and ideas on a global scale.

Understood as the cultural dynamics of ‘deterritorialisation’, which refer to ethnic groups, sectarian movements, and political formations, along with transnational corporations and the like, these patterns of movement and information-sharing transcend specific territorial boundaries and identities, effectively loosening the connections between people, wealth, and territory (Appadurai 1996, 49). The incorporation of terms like ‘deterritorialisation’ is useful to develop our theoretical framework. In International Relations, the nearest term is ‘extraterritorial’, which is
generally related to the jurisdiction of international law in economic matters beyond state borders (see for example: Lowe 1981; Maier 1982). This term is not quite sufficient to capture the redefinition of the role of territory. Bringing the concept of deterritorialisation into IR helps us to grasp the shifting claims of groups and individuals on the state but also the international system. It highlights the transnational space beyond the actions of NGOs, MNCs, or international organisations and draws attention to the uneven and sometimes unpredictable actions and interactions of groups and individuals across the levels of analysis. Yet, these changes in the relationship to territory are in tension with national definition.

The national definition and cultural boundaries rely on the mobilisation or instrumentalisation of a common memory. Within the national imaginary, social memory and that memory’s identification with a certain territory or homeland play an important role. It is not easy to generalise about this phenomenon, however, because for each nation, the memory revolves around different images and aspects of the community’s past. Memories are fundamental to the development of identities. As Anthony Smith (1986, 2) puts it: ‘…there can be no identity without memory (albeit selective), no collective purpose without myth, and identity and purpose or destiny are necessary elements of the very concept of a nation [and ethnic community]’. The past, or conception of the past, enters the present, thereby forming a ‘fundamental medium of ethnohistory’ (Marcus 1998, 64).

The memory informs the nation’s past and shapes a nation’s present and future. However, for the immigrant and the minority community, memory plays an exclusionary role. On the part of the country of settlement, memory encircles the native or majority population to create an exclusionary and homogenising effect on the minority communities within its borders (Huyssen 2003, 149). Immigrants may have a different memory and experience, a different ‘homeland’ and territory to which they may perceive themselves (and may be perceived) to belong. The way that one exits the homeland also impacts the memory of that land and the relationship to the present and future in the new as well as the ties to a person’s past life. More often than not, diaspora memory, whether of immigrants or refugees, forms a contrasting discourse to that of the national memory. Thus, in order for integration to occur, rigorous means of anti-discrimination have to be in place including legal protection in addition to the representation of immigrants and foreigners in the media, government policy documents, and textbooks (Kymlicka 1995, 96).

The next few pages will highlight two ways that identity and belonging were perpetuated through the incorporation of religious institutions and education in the nation-building projects. There are numerous institutions through which this process took place, but religion is of particular importance to this work as many of the minority youth with whom I spoke were Muslim, and as young people, a substantial amount of their time is spent in educational establishments. The homogenising effect of exclusion and incorporation often elaborates on and is mediated through
religious and cultural symbols to define the culture of belonging. Religion was fundamental to
the preservation and transition of ethnicities into modern nations (Smith 1986, 4). It has particu-
lar implications for the Other as religion and culture are often conflated, overriding the great
diversity that may exist in the institutionalisation and interaction of cultural and religious prac-
tices. Education, too, is a key feature of national definition in the way that it mediates between
the state and society. These two aspects capture the institutionalisation of belonging. They also
reflect the interaction of the levels of analysis as religious institutions cross-cut state borders
and education encompasses local and transnational relations.

Religion has only relatively recently become a part of IR discussions, based on ethno-religious
conflicts of the 1990s and foreign policy decisions of major powers (Fox 2001, 53; see also Pe-
itio and Hatzopoulos 2003, Seiple and Hoover 2004, Phillips 2011). While education is not as
well-accepted in the IR field, I would argue that there is evidence for its role beyond the borders
of the state. One must note the role of education in areas of violent conflict (see Bush and Salta-
relli 2000). As mentioned in the previous chapter, it is also a key part of EU policy, both intern-
ally and externally. The discussion of these factors aims to unpack the way that notions of be-
longing were institutionalised from the local to the international level.

Religion and the Nation

In the Enlightenment period, as religion was increasingly rejected philosophically through ra-
tionality and science and practically through industrial revolutions, so the nation began to re-
place religion as a main codifier of identity in European consciousness. A new conception of the
relationship between fatality and continuity had to be explored and reframed through a secular
lens (Anderson 1991, 11). Yet, as secularism moved into first position, the role of religion was
not lost. While the processes of modernisation significantly limited the role of religion in politi-
cal life, relegating it to a 'subsystem of the cultural realm and superstructure-as mere ornament
or as the opium of the people’ (Minkenberg 1997, 63), the symbols of religion in modern politi-
cal life are all but absent.

With the rise of national movements and the strengthening of political aims, the nation adopted
various symbols of religious identity. The process of nationalism led, in many cases, to the
secularisation of religion alongside a parallel sanctification of the nation (Alter 1994, 5). While
some have argued that the secular nation entirely left behind the religious associations and tradi-
tions of the pre-Enlightenment era, it is a more accurate reflection to see an intermingling of
religious and secular, where the motifs of religious institutions are maintained in the context of
rejecting some of the practices and ideas, such as imminent salvific promises (Smith 2003, 18).

These religious institutions are often subsumed under the ‘traditional’ heading and formulate
part of the traditional/modern binary. Like the rise of nationalism and the construction of We-
They binaries, modernity, too, had to be defined in contrast to something, namely, tradition (Sa-lih 2003, 16). While nationalism established institutions to define insiders and outsiders, creating a hierarchy within a given territory, the labels of traditional and modern contributed to the development of a similar hierarchy on a global scale, which would soon be visible locally in the settlement and accommodation of immigrants. This binary constructs the developed world as modern and progressive as opposed to the developing world, which is traditional and ‘backward’ (Fougere and Moulettes 2007). Here, traditional refers to a static, non-European, historically determined, undeveloped society, where ‘modern’ denotes developed, democratic, and European.

Beyond dividing the world into an artificial binary of traditional and modern, nationalist movements disguised the incorporation of religious symbols and the celebration of religious festivals. Through these, the place of religion within nationalism became almost invisible to the majority community, raising an even stronger contrast to the religious activities and symbols of minority communities. As such, religion became an integral part of the discourse of belonging, whether recognised or not, encircling the members of the community with the sense of having found a universal feature of their society. Such was the case when great musical festivals in Germany celebrated well-known biblical narratives throughout the late nineteenth century, drawing people together to participate in their heritage.

Though religion has long been underestimated as a player in international politics, the dynamics of church-state relations, the role of Islamist movements, and securitisation have brought religion to the fore of immigration and integration discussions, demonstrating the salience of this issue for majority and minority communities alike (Fox and Sandler 2005, 317). While religion as a practiced faith may have faded in European society, the historical influence of Christian traditions is implicitly present in European culture and legal and political institutions (Silvestri 2007, 15).

The emphasis on Christianity as a shared European heritage has been reiterated by right-wing politicians, as exemplified by Angela Merkel’s statement on the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the European Economic Community in 2007: ‘the Judeo-Christian values...sustain the EU’ and ‘we are marked by this Judeo-Christian past’ (quoted in Yilmaz 2007, 298). It is perhaps not necessary to point out the essentialism inherent in this statement and its explicit connection to a national, even continental, memory (Martiniello 1995, 16). However, such ideas are not unusual in the discussions of immigration, integration, and European identity. Essentialism refers to the assignment of a ‘fundamental, basic, absolutely necessary constitutive quality to a person, social category, ethnic group, religious community, or nation’; it entails a sense of timeless continuity, implying ‘internal sameness and external difference’, excluding any form of dependence or contingency on external relations, ‘autonomous and separate, as if such a subject
could be demarcated out of context, unrelated to an external other or discursive purpose’ (Werbner 1997a, 230). Such processes of Othering are a typical part of popular and political discourse and easily influence preconceptions and worldviews.

In contrast to Christianity, however, Islam is not always celebrated as a component of cultural diversity, but rather, adherence to Islam is sometimes construed as ‘reactionary’ or as ‘evidence of an unwillingness to integrate’ (Geddes 2003, 92-93). At the same time, the ethnicities within the Muslim community are blurred as religion becomes the primary discourse in the country of settlement. The assumption of an unwillingness to integrate and the potential to control membership through citizenship led to a rise in various citizenship and integration tests, imposed likewise on long-time residents and newcomers in a number of European countries (Boukhars 2007; Kostakopoulou 2008). As Gary Younge puts it: ‘in the west, Muslims have been asked to commit to patriotism, peace at home, war abroad, modernity, secularism, integration, anti-sexism, anti-homophobia, tolerance and monogamy ...But Muslims are not being asked to sign up to them because they are good or bad in themselves, but as a pre-condition for belonging in the west at all’ (quoted in Meer 2008, 68).

In part, this mistrust can be credited to the connection between Muslims and political Islam, particularly since 9/11 and 7/7 (see Chapter 3), though several other factors are involved (Silvestri 2007, 17). Religion has the capacity to unite people as an identifying feature, not necessarily involving faith or allegiance to a set of beliefs, but rather, simply to a cultural sense of religious tradition (Agadjanian 2001, 480-482). Religious identity acts as a consolidator of ethnicity especially when national identity and religious identity overlap or act to represent the boundaries of insider and outsider for majority and minority groups alike. In Germany, religion was incorporated as a part of historical tradition, linked closely to the national memory discussed previously. In the UK, religion also played a deep role in the history of the country that is preserved even as the secular dominates social and political agendas. In Germany, numerous holidays are openly named after Christian religious days, similar to the naming of holidays in France (Silverman 1992, 114). In the UK, the Church of England plays a continued role in politics through such institutions as the House of Lords and the head of state also being the official head of the Church. One author goes as far as to point out that Christian symbols suffuse the majority culture in such a way that churches have been ‘elevated’ from the private to the public sphere, and the state has played a significant part by facilitating the Church’s role in politics and the definition of public institutions, such as schools, as following a ‘Christian orientation’ (Simmel 1996, 28, 30-31). While this may be true at least in part, the more relevant aspect of this comment is the analysis of the grey area between public and private, which will be raised in more detail later in this chapter.
To summarise, in the processes of national codification, religion has been incorporated into the civic institutions of both the UK and Germany. They now pervade the cultural celebrations, most palpable to a person who does not share the attachment to those symbols. Evidence of their influence on the international level is demonstrated through the comments of political leaders who allude to them in civic terms as part of the European identity. In contrast, the religion of minorities is often highlighted at the expense of a nuanced examination of religious symbols and practice and how they are mobilised and instrumentalised in relations between communities with an immense diversity of cultural, linguistic, and political interconnections. The institutionalisation of insiders and outsiders based on national awareness, memory, and religious symbols is perpetuated through education. The logic of the education system and its role in the formation of the nation are particularly relevant to the experience of minority youth as it is a key site of forming and perpetuating notions of belonging.

**Education and the Nation**

Our contemporary notion of education stems from processes of modernisation, which required a common culture in order to operate effectively, including a common language which would be used in economic, political, and educational institutions with the goal of developing an educated, literate, and mobile work-force (Kymlicka 1995, 76-77). The development of institutions that embody and in some way protect cultural practices is intimately linked to modernisation (Gellner 1983). Perhaps a better way to state this is to say that modernisation and nationalism have certain linkages in the processes of codifying and systematising cultural practices for the purpose of dissemination, communication, and unity. Rather than the institutions protecting certain cultural practices only on a central basis, where weakened authority allowed peripheral territories to operate as they saw fit, the processes of modernisation made the relationship of geography and authority more consistent. From these institutions and negotiations of identity developed a ‘societal culture’, which ‘provided its members with meaningful ways of life’, and thereby sharing common institutions and practices along with shared memories and values (Kymlicka 1995, 76). In this light, many states were compelled to ‘impose’ a national language, a national education system, national military service, and control right of access to its borders (Halfmann 2000, 42).

The establishment of states and the codification of nations involve the founding of certain political institutions, which ‘monopolised authority in the entire state territory and integrated the population into that polity’ (Butenschon 2000, 16). Henceforth, the dual prospect of the monopolisation of knowledge and the subsequent integration of the population were presented as interlinked keys to the national project, or alternatively, the two blades of a pair of scissors that could define and re-define insider and outsider. Within this framework, politically-motivated groups have the possibility to codify their ideas in national education structures and curricula,
perpetuating ideas of economics, public good, and community membership so as to internalize a national perspective and identity as a part of a ‘common sense’ (Kaplan 2006, XVIII).

Education proposes to perpetuate the most common ‘givens’ within a society. This has a manifold function. First, it serves to link the past with the present in future. The curriculum is defined by the past, instilled in youth who interact with the past and present, in preparation for the future. In France, the national culture was assembled in the court society of Versailles as early as the seventeenth century and transmitted through the school system and other sources of information alongside norms of conduct (Tilly 1996, XX). In Germany, the Federal Constitutional Court has described the school setting as the ‘place where the cultural heritage, including the religious heritage, of the German society is transmitted to the young generation, and renewed’ (McGoldrick 2006, 108). Education policy encompasses an exchange of generations that embodies both continuity and change.

Second, the educators try to associate education and the related curricula with ‘self-evident, disinterested facts that transcend opinion’ (Kaplan 2006, XVII, 20-21). In some cases, these curricula are openly biased; however, in other contexts, most notably, ‘liberal’ states, governments promote education as an extension of neutrality towards religions and cultures. However, Western democracies find it exceedingly difficult to act in a fully ‘neutral’ manner (Bauböck 2002, 168). The tension remains between the pluralist attitude of granting equality and yet, guaranteeing fundamental values of liberal democracies that all people have equal rights, and Consequently, limiting the institutionalisation of other groups’ family and gender relations (Zolberg and Long 1999, 31).

Education often tries to instil a contrast between arbitrary popular knowledge and opinions alongside an understanding of accepted and unaccepted. A clear distinction between these two tracks is a creation of an artificial divide between elite forms of knowledge and indigenous ones, central knowledge and periphery (Kaplan 2006, XVIII). However, the popular and educational knowledge cannot be perceived to be as separate courses since they are deeply interrelated and mutually constituted, incorporating the tensions of the national and political identities and the pressures of the state. Thus, the traditional role of the education system at all levels serves the purpose of consolidating, codifying, and standardising those who are involved.

If the mere transference of accepted knowledge that describes a debatable reality is not challenged, it will lead to the prevention of the development of critical consciousness and reinforce political illiteracy (Freire 1985, 104). However, the compulsory nature of education allows it to act as a venue for change and participation of the population of all cultures and socio-economic backgrounds. At the same time, the structures and material are constantly contested at all levels. This occurs through international incidents, the exchange of ideas, and the mere presence of
people who represent different cultures, religions, and nationalities. In this way, mandatory education functions as a means of requiring children to gain information about other ways of life in liberal societies (Kymlicka 1995, 82).

Furthermore, inherent in the structure and nature of education, broadly speaking, there are regular changes to curricula along with vitality through the introduction of new teachers and methods (Faas 2007, 49). New teachers and methods can implicitly indicate to the pupils that there is not a monopoly of knowledge or exclusivity in the relationship between the educator and pupils. The educators also have the opportunity to veer from the practice of mere transference of knowledge to the conscious participation of all those present in the learning experience (Freire 1985, 105-106). This flexibility within education allows it to either maintain cultural boundaries or assist in forming the bridge to cross them. For example, the education system in a number of European countries has been influenced by multiculturality and adapted to it, even if multiculturalism is not the guiding principle (Bauböck 2002, 161). Areas like language instruction and cultural or social studies, in particular, can help to raise awareness and develop a sense of cultural fluency or civic identity. Nonetheless, it is crucial to remember that it remains an institution that is established by the state with particular aims, and the management of cultural diversity often reflects wider policies of the same kind (see Chapter 4).

There are three trends that can help to understand state policies towards cultural accommodation in the education system in Germany and the UK. The nationalist mode, whether it is civic or primordial, tends to focus on a much stronger sense of identity that is more static, at least in theory, than it is flexible and open to change. The civic republican and libertarian strands offer more opportunities for influence from those who participate. In contrast to the nationalist mode, civic republicanism purports that the main function of education is for citizenship (Bauböck 2002, 167). In this conception of education, learning about the constitution or other aspects of their country’s regulatory institutions is one of the least important aspects. Citizenship is not something that can be taught since the relationship of the teacher and the student is hierarchical, bringing into question current ideas about citizenship education in the UK, in particular. The place where pupils learn to be citizens is among their peers as an ‘equal member in a community of equal members’ (Bauböck 2002, 167). Rather than becoming like the tower of Babel as a variety of social, religious, and cultural ideas mingle, it is proposed that it will lead to the de-ethnicisation of culture, making them a shared human capital (Parekh 2006, 232). Rather than contributing to the fragmentation of identity, the goal would be to promote a critical multiculturalism that goes beyond the acknowledgement of difference and analysis of stereotypes to develop a trend of ‘understanding, engaging, and transforming the diverse histories, cultural narratives, representations, and institutions that produce racism and other forms of discrimination’ (Giroux 1997, 237). The libertarian approach, in contrast, makes room for the development of a
voucher system to allow parents more options to educate their children alongside the establishment of private institutions based on faith or cultural similarity (Bauböck 1994, 166). In other words, provisions for culture are left to non-governmental associations and organisations.

Not many countries fall exclusively under one of these categories. However, in many cases, one can see a distinct privileging of one group over another or certain elements of belonging that are perpetuated through educational institutions. In the UK, for example, the language of instruction is English; however, numerous supplementary schools instruct young people in the grammar and culture of their heritage. Likewise, in Germany, where a more distinctly nationalist trend has dominated education policy, bilingual modules and even entire schools are becoming part of the educational discussion (see Meier 2010).

Many countries have systems of education that favour the majority community, particularly those of higher socio-economic status. Examples include explicit selective education systems where pupils are designated to a branch of education at a relatively young age (10-12 years) with little opportunity to change, or the more subtle privileging of more affluent (generally majority community) city districts with better teachers and facilities. Thus, democratic citizenship in terms of equal standing among peers is thwarted by the early distinction and categorisation. In this complex position, the children of immigrants and first generation immigrant youth negotiate the cultural, social, and political spaces related to their learning. While both Germany and the UK have elements (implicit or explicit) of a selective structure, disadvantaging certain socio-economic and racial groups, it is not accurate to make a blanket statement of this sort. For example, Tahir Abbas (2004) examines the relationship of British South Asians in the British education system and finds that class, race, and capital (e.g. networks) all play a role in their educational success. Similarly, German education shows distinct gaps between ethnic German and Turkish youth, but this is cross-cut by class and does not necessarily apply to other minorities within Germany (see Chapter 4 for more details).

From nationalist movements and the definition of territory to the role of religion and establishment of educational institutions, the interplay of collective identities is evident, which define and re-define insider and outsider. The themes of supposed neutrality and the tensions between civic and ethnic logics of belonging persist. In this context of national codification, the formulation of citizenship policies took place. In keeping with nationalist boundaries, it perpetuates national awareness through cultural belonging and territoriality, particularly coming into question in recent years with the movement of people across state borders.

Citizenship and the Nation

According to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: ‘Everyone has the right to a nationality’, and ‘no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his
nationality’ (1948, Article 15). Yet, since the writing of this document, nationality has not necessarily represented citizenship. This may be because of the ambiguity of the term itself, referring in some languages to membership in an ethno-national group, regardless of whether that group belongs to a state (Bauböck 2006, 17). Another author proposes that nationality refers to the legal concept whereas citizenship refers to the political one (Faist 2007, 8). For our purposes, citizenship will refer to the formal equality of individuals before the law, whereas nationality is entwined with notions of a ‘moral and cultural’ community (Mannitz 2004b, 242). However even here the ambiguities and variety of usages of the term are acknowledged. Nationality and citizenship may define very different experiences, depending on the political context and legal infrastructure of a state and society and its wider relationship with the international community.

Citizenship is a codification of rights based on a territorially defined space, but this definition does not take place in an autonomous setting. Rather, citizenship has value and represents international hierarchies as distinctly as economic and political signifiers. This illustrates Marshall’s comments that citizenship acts in some ways as the formalisation and legitimisation of inequalities of class (Marshall 1950). As the next few pages will show, these inequalities are based around more than social class, and many of them can be linked to the initial stages of the nation-building project.

In its initial understanding, the term ‘citizenship’ referred to a ‘city dweller who enjoys certain rights of immunity and corresponding privileges’, linked closely to the legal history of the burgh and the borough (Turner 2000, 32). In this way, it was connected to the local level. Historically, it was not meant to be something that could be reduced to a passport or even a set of rights and duties in relation to state institutions (Smith 1986, 135). Rather, it was initially meant to depict a much more total relationship between the individual and society (Yuval-Davis 1999, 120). It was also not instituted in the context of large, territorially defined states. Thus, the civic republican model is not easily applied to large, complex societies (Lister 1997, 25). Today, however, citizenship represents ‘bounded populations, with a specific set of rights and duties, excluding others on the grounds of nationality’ (Soysal 1994, 2).

Citizenship is the composite of the relationship between an individual and a community, entailing the entitlement to belong to that community, which has both a right and a duty to represent community interests (Wiener 1999, 199). In this formulation, there are three variables that need to be considered: the individual, the community, and the relationship between the two. These dimensions come into play at each level of analysis, challenging the conventional conception of citizenship, as first denoting the relationship to a city, followed by loyalty to and protection from a state, and now relating the individual to a transnational and international community. In terms of the individual, too, conventional conceptions have been challenged by examining for
whom these policies are made. Before going further, however, let us begin by unpacking the term, ‘citizenship’.

Citizenship can be divided into roughly four components: legal status, rights, participation, and a sense of belonging (Blömaad, Korteweg, and Yurdakul 2008, 153). Let it be noted that this is only one way to think about the dimensions of citizenship, and these components are not entirely distinct, but rather, they overlap and reinforce each other. For example, debates over who should have access to legal membership are intrinsically linked to perceptions of what a ‘good society’ looks like and how authority relations should be organised within it (Pettman 1996, 16). This shows that the first dimension and the final one are strongly connected. In the development of national institutions, this instrument of closure has been framed and re-framed to emphasise different aspects of citizenship more fervently than others. Each state has different criteria for citizenship and varying approaches to obtaining that citizenship. With increasing emphasis on human rights along with the role of supranational entities like the EU, not to mention the presence of millions of immigrants, many countries have experienced a great deal of debate regarding who can be a citizen and what rights can be obtained without citizenship.

A basic distinction in the development of legal membership rests on the basis by which a person has the right to be a full member of the polity: either by blood (jus sanguinis) or by territory (jus soli). Jus sanguinis refers to the notion that a person has rights to citizenship even if s/he was not born in the country. In fact, citizenship can be claimed even with several generations of non-residency. In contrast, jus soli declares that the territory formulates the right to citizenship, thus granting citizenship on the basis of being born in a particular place. Jus sanguinis can be linked to a conception of nationhood based on a primordial conception of identity and loosely tied to Grillo’s idea of a nation based on ‘Gemeinschaft’, as previously discussed.

Until 2000, Germany was a classic example of the principle of jus sanguinis, where some fourteen million ethnic Germans resettled in Germany in the late 1980s and early 1990s and were provided with special support for language acquisition and education on the basis of German ethnicity (Munz and Ulrich 1997, 75). In contrast, the presence of millions of foreign workers was politically denied as Germany perceived itself to be ‘kein Einwanderungsland’ or ‘not a country of immigration’ (Joppke and Morawska 2003, 63-64). This maxim remained a persistent aspect of immigrant politics until after reunification even though, between the years 1950 and 1993, the net migration of West Germany was approximately 12.6 million, with four million in the years 1988-1992, roughly 80 percent of the country’s population growth (Geddes 2003, 79; Joppke 1999, 63). While the UK’s relationship with territory and descent is somewhat more complex, as will be discussed in Chapter 3, there is still some sense of one’s place of birth shaping one’s identity and community in the dominant discourse (Baumann 1996, 5). In a compelling anecdote, he relates how a conversation at a pub served to challenge this discourse by
declaring that a person of West Indian heritage is apparently the only ‘English’ person among them, since he was born and grew up in Southall.

The conception and institution of legal citizenship controls people’s access to the second dimension of citizenship, that is, scarce resources, which, as a citizen, become rights, including political rights (e.g. freedom of expression), economic rights (e.g. access to food and shelter), and cultural rights (e.g. welfare and education) (Turner 2000, 38). Based on these rights and citizenship, a person is afforded protection and support from and by state institutions. Likewise, standards of access to education, protection against discrimination, and so on are implemented.

The third dimension of citizenship focuses on the expectation of active participation. The growth of a healthy civil society, according to the classical liberal view, relies heavily on the existence of independent and voluntary associations and institutions that ‘link the anomic individual to the abstract state’ (Turner 2000, 34). This implies that the traditional and contractual relations will be overcome by legal relationships that ensure the rights and obligations of the individual on a voluntary basis. Civil society is the ‘totality of self-initiating and self-regulating volitional social formations, peacefully pursuing a common interest, advocating a common cause, or expressing a common passion; respecting the right of others to do the same, and maintaining their relative autonomy vis-a-vis the state, the family, the temple and the market’ (Ibrahim 1998, 374). Citizenship regulations in both the UK and Germany among other EU member states have increasingly emphasised the participatory aspect of citizenship in the context of migration, even to the point of making voluntary associations a seeming obligation. Coined the ‘duties discourse’ by Maurice Roche (1992), the emphasis on obligation of citizenship is increasingly replacing the postwar social rights paradigm (Lister 1997, 19). However, minority communities have also learned to use this emphasis to their advantage in the formation of community centres and cultural engagement.

Some Muslim communities' demands and goals mirror the institutions and illustrate political competences in the country of settlement. One example is the demand for halal food in schools. In the UK, Muslim pupils argued for halal as a right due to them as a community in a national context formed on the basis of multiple communities. The UK is a composite of four communities: English, Irish, Welsh, and Scottish. As such, it is much easier to gain acknowledgement of multiple communities within the broader society. In the national context of the Netherlands, by contrast, when Muslim pupils wanted halal food for their annual dinner, they argued for halal meat to be offered to everyone, not provided as a separate option, thereby echoing the focus on consensus-building over sectional interests in Dutch society (Baumann 2004, 4).

In the UK, the Church of England has generally accommodated religious pluralism, leading to the freedom of current religious associations that can deal directly with local authorities to press
for changes in issues from religious education to dietary requirements (Casanova 2008, 141). Religious associations organise and mobilise to gain not only religious rights but also political, social, and economic rights, operating through formalised and secular structures of the country of settlement (Soysal 1994, 115). However, it is important to keep in mind that these actions are not solely responses to political opportunity structures in these countries (Ostergaard-Nielsen 2003). While there is some evidence for the adoption of institutional mechanisms in the country of settlement to make demands (Soysal 1994, 110), it is not completely accurate to say that ethnic ties are left behind except when they are a useful means of organisation. Ethnicity and community maintain local links that form connections of identity outside of the top-down institutions.

This brings us to the fourth dimension of citizenship: a sense of belonging to the nation-state. This component highlights the less than synonymous nature of citizenship and political loyalty to one’s nation-state (Cordell and Wolff 2005; Faist 2007, 3). Citizenship, as already seen in the legal aspect, is profoundly linked to a cultural identity. To this end, much of the debate regarding citizenship in political theory relates to questions of collective identity in the face of pluralisation (Turner 2000, 39). A sense of belonging to a political community, such as the nation-state, entails something more than the other three dimensions. It touches on the basis of the nation-building project, communitarianism, and the particularist nature of these identities. The justification is one of social cohesion, but again, by what basis and to what end should this be defined?

The analysis of citizenship is limited, however, in that the citizen discussed in these terms remains a primarily abstract subject of the state. Turner (1993) argues that, on paper, the abstract citizen is equal to all other members in a society. On the formal level, this is historically limited, and exclusions have occurred on the basis of gender, race, religion, class, and so on (Blömraad, Korteweg, and Yurdakul 2008, 156). Yet, even in cases where formal rights to participation have been extended (though not everywhere, equally), formal citizenship is not congruent with the substantive level of citizenship (Arat 2000, 277). For example, a ‘citizen’ may refer to a person who ‘embodies a bundle of obligations and rights’; this ‘person’, however, generally refers to an independent, male citizen and does not account for the position of women, taking into consideration the role of gender in citizenship practices (Hobson 1999, 149). In IR, gender refers to a set of socially constructed characteristics that define what men and women ought to be (Tickner and Sjoberg 2007, 186). Characteristics, such as strength, rationality, or independence are conventionally linked with masculinity, while weakness, emotionality, and relational are often ascribed to femininity, though individual men and women may not embody these characteristics. Another perspective views gender as a ‘key relational dimension of human activity and thought’, which are informed by cultural and individual notions of what constitutes men and
women, thereby shaping their ‘social or cultural positioning and the ways in which they experience and live their lives’ (McSpadden 1999, 243). While this second perception incorporates the first, it goes a step further to emphasise the relational aspect of these terms, stating that gender is not something that only affects women but inherent in its relational nature shapes both women and men.

A gendered perspective can uncover how this instrument of closure functions differently for women and men. As argued by Charles and Hintjens (1998), the collective identities discussed in the previous pages, which were then institutionalised in the national projects, were tied to middle class norms, including gender and ethnicity. These norms were then formalised through citizenship structures. Thus, the formal legal regulation of citizenship as well as the substantive practices of membership are entwined with these norms. This phenomenon is not limited to the nation-state, though. International law was also deemed to be abstract and gender-neutral, until a systematic critique from a feminist perspective showed that asylum-seeking institutions and refugee law, for example, were primarily based on men’s experiences (Crawley 1999, 308). Along the same lines, a study of migrant sex-workers from postcommunist European countries shows how the perception of this activity as a form of international, organised crime (seemingly the best way to address the issues of potential abuse and exploitation) actually heightens barriers to migration and danger to those involved, while not providing assistance to actual victims (Berman 2003).

Beyond this, for those who immigrate to a different country, these intersecting aspects of class, gender, and ethnicity have even more effect as immigrants are negotiating at least two sets of practices. For example, in her analysis of the positioning of Ethiopian and Eritrean male refugees, Lucia McSpadden (1999) asks the question: ‘which context is relevant to refugees?’ Amid experiences of unequal power relationships and struggles to reconstruct social identity, she argues that one cannot assume migrants’ attachments to specific places or the bounded nature of culture and territory, but that these relationships between power, belonging, and space must be understood through a transnational lens (discussed in more detail later in this chapter). In other words, she examines the ways that being an Ethiopian or Eritrean particularises the gendered experience of these men as refugees, e.g. in terms of socio-economic status, race, and even refugeeness’ (characterised by ambiguity, questions of basic life issues, fear, and force).

Even though the more recent emphasis on citizenship through activism will help to include women more equally and may raise gender to the attention of policy analysts, participation and activism are not independent of power relations (Hobson 1999, 149). It can be argued that these power relations were instituted in the very fabric of national institutions through myths of origin (Benton 1998, 29). In countries such as the United Kingdom, a social contract between the state and its people holds a place of prominence. As Favell (1998, 125) puts it, citizenship is ‘behav-
iour in which individuals respond to the civic duties that extend beyond their own selfish interests, and which is not necessarily expressed through the formal political sphere. As such, the national myth rests on the understanding that consent has been gained from all involved, whether leader or led, dominant or subordinate, thus defining the relationship between gender, class, race, and numerous other social divisions that distinguish between insider and outsider, belonging and not. It is not surprising, then, that citizenship practices lack neutrality also with respect to these divisions in society (Joseph 2000, 4).

The lack of neutrality and presence of social divisions beyond legal citizenship status is also apparent in the treatment and experience of racialised minorities. Although they have legal membership, they may not have the guarantee of access to scarce resources or to inclusion in the national community (Pettman 1996, 16). To use my case studies as illustrations concerning these points, Germany restricted legal access to citizenship for decades, while extending some rights to resources. The UK, on the other hand, extended legal membership, but the politics of the second half of the twentieth century exhibit the inequality of racial minorities.

The fundamental place that these divisions hold in the national identity can be seen in the attempts to preserve them, particularly (but not only) in the rise of the radical right across Europe. As Rob Ford (2012) comments, their resentments represent a complex mixture of being ‘against immigration and multiculturalism, corrupt and self-serving elites, a liberal popular culture and the lax morals it tolerates, and the decline of national culture and national sovereignty’. These demands are mobilised in the face of challenges to the national myths of hierarchy and homogeneity. They centre around ethnic nationalism (protecting the national identity from foreign influence), authoritarianism (preserving social order), and xenophobia (hostility towards anyone perceived as ‘Other). Populism, a fourth dimension, is a reaction to the perception that the current political system is not doing enough to preserve the polity as it ought to be maintained. Moreover, ethnic nationalism and xenophobia are increasingly conflated, forming what some call xeno-racism – the blending of traditional racism with new signifiers of difference that exclude migrants, refugees, and asylum-seekers. Rather than being based on old forms of biological racism, xeno-racism manifests as an opposition to foreigners, but at its heart, represents the exclusionary nationalist model, from which formal and substantive citizenship practices are derived. For the radical right, the incorporation of xeno-racism has enabled a refinement of its electoral programme, expanding their electoral support (Delanty, Wodak, and Jones 2008, 1, 57).

Perhaps not very surprising, the rise of extreme polarisation and the resistance to the blending of identities occurs in the face of increasing cultural mixing on a global scale (Werbner 1997b, 3). Before shifting to look at the role of citizenship in the global setting, however, let us turn to the
examination of state responses to diversity. Here, collective identities continue to shape the management of cultural pluralism across Europe.

2.2. States and Difference

The concerns in multiethnic societies are often answered by institutional corrections to problems that arise from the original nation-building projects. The nation-state was founded upon the incorporation of diverse peoples under one or more mechanism of continuity. In this process of incorporation, new elements of differentiation were created, forming the fault-lines of future conflict (Grillo 1998, 1). Thus, the demands for equality, framed in nationalist and ethnic vocabulary, continue to assert the rights of minority groups to have equal recognition on the local, national, and international level. As Silverman puts it: ‘Alongside the claim for the ’open nation, constituted through the voluntary association of individuals, is the closed nation, constituted by the predetermined nature of the community; alongside the claims for universalism are a multitude of particularisms; alongside assimilation there is always difference’ (Silverman 1992, 24-25). These processes of differentiation belie the multiplicity of identities by imposing a unitary nature on the subjects of categories, such as race, gender, or ethnicity (Anthias 1998). Likewise, Schnapper (1998) argues that it is over simplistic to conceive of the modern nation-state as either civic or ethnic (primordial), but rather, there are elements of each in national identity (cited in Kyntaja 2003, 186-187). The contractual and ethnic aspects of identity exist in both, developing a tension and dichotomy in political communities translating into insecurity in the national identity. In the discussion of immigration experiences, it is vital to note how these tensions interact and respond to each other, developing into modes of assimilation and differentiation, reforming in expression and institution to cope with new challenges of consciousness and belonging. These, in turn, feed into notions of citizenship, where contestation over rights/duties and ethnic and civic belonging come to the fore.

In the latter half of the twentieth century, many countries attempted integration policies to correct for the gaps between immigrant populations and societies of settlement. The countries of Europe usually drew on institutional resources that generated different patterns of incorporation (Soysal 1994, 79). Thus, they embarked on a journey of path dependency where the first choices constitute the response and later institutional corrections implemented by the country of settlement (Favell 1998, 6).

Integration policies can be placed on a spectrum from assimilation to extreme forms of pluralism. Assimilation, in this usage then, is both a policy and also a category of analysis. This research will draw on the idea that differentiation and assimilation can be seen as part of the same process (Silverman 1992, 19). Reaching back to the nationalist precursors through to the accommodation and implementation of citizenship and immigration policies, this section aims to
look beyond these categories and untangle the presence of both and how these interact with the perceptions of immigrant populations. The first heading will attempt to highlight the theoretical backdrop of an integration typology before discussing some of the ways that these are implemented. In any case, it is important to keep in mind that these descriptions are of the theories in the extreme form. They are intended to provide a framework of analysis before the following chapters explore the country case studies.

**Integration Policies**

In the industrialisation of the nineteenth century, immigrants from Eastern Europe filled the labour shortages in Germany and France, followed by immigrants from other European countries in the interwar period, who withstood rather harsh assimilation measures (Joppke and Morawska 2003, 4). The past immigrant integration has been reconstructed to seem easy in comparison to the integration of non-Europeans (Silverman 1992, 81). The long traditions of diversity and multiethnic goes missing from the ‘Western political tradition’ (Kymlicka 1995, 2). Seldom mentioned is the position of Jews from Eastern Europe in nineteenth-century Britain with a seemingly contrasting policy of labour recruitment from Italy and Poland after World War II (Phillimore and Goodson 2008, 4-5). Even the hardships endured by Irish Catholics in Bradford, UK, which anticipated the experience of Pakistanis in many ways, are often overlooked (Lewis 1997, 127). Yet, in the era of liberal democracy and human rights, old methods of immigrant incorporation have been discredited.

Integration was born out of a postwar liberalism and human-rights discourse, applied to immigration (Joppke and Morawska 2003, 5). ‘Integration’ refers to a ‘characteristic’ of a social system or society, where ‘the more a society is integrated, the more closely and the more intensely its constituent parts (groups or individuals) relate to one another’ (Entzinger and Biezeveld 2003, 7). It was reasoned that (1) ‘integration is an intransitive process where the state can set the parameters but not determine or guarantee the outcome’, and (2) ‘the immigrant is under no mandate to adopt the substantive culture of the receiving society’ (Joppke and Morawska 2003, 5). The term was coined to describe a kind of moderate assimilation, a middle ground between the majority community and the migrant communities. As Favell (1998, 17) puts it, integration is a process of finding the thin layer of ‘overlapping moral consensus’ to which citizens with potentially conflicting cultural and ethical beliefs can agree to form the basis for regulating their social and political interaction. According to the Council of the European Union, integration is a ‘dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of the Member States’ (Council of the European Union 2004, 19). This acknowledges that the receiving society has to accommodate and foster full economic, social, cultural, and political participation (Joppke 2007, 3). However, it should be noted that, even in instances where a two-way
process exists, it is not often entirely equal. An imbalance remains between the dominant and subaltern norms (Noiriel 1996, 269).

Integration operates, at least in part, on an understanding of the division of private and public spheres. It denotes a toleration of differences in the private realm, but in public, minorities must accept the nation’s ideals and identify with the common culture of citizenship, as defined by the ‘majority community’ (Kostakopoulou 2008). However, the private and public realm are inherently connected, since the actions in the private realm inevitably shape and formulate the choices and interactions of the public realm and vice versa. Moreover, Rex (1991) asserts that private and public spheres cannot be separated into two independent sociocultural subsystems. Rather, they are inherently linked through institutions that are necessarily interrelated. Culture is a space where public and private spheres intersect, touching on aspects of life such as religion, codes of dress, education, and women’s rights (Sharma 2009). Religious practices, in particular, cannot be limited to the private sphere as they are also social (Lyon and Spini 2004, 336). In the case of religion, in particular, the culture of the majority community may directly clash with the practices that, according to that culture, should remain in the private sphere. Indeed, Connolly (1996) notes that this ‘integration’ is usually rooted in an Anglo-Saxon and Christian worldview (cited in Kostakopoulou 2008). One must also recall that many religious symbols were integrated into the nationalist movements, thus posing challenges to all levels of society, upsetting the status quo as the national identity comes into question. In this light, it is understandable that a religion such as Islam, which explicitly affects both the public and private spheres is viewed as potentially unassimilable in certain aspects (Modood 2008, 165).

These aspects of integration are linked to a process termed ‘civil enculturation’. Rhum (1997 describes it as emphasising ‘the process by which an individual acquires the mental representations (beliefs, knowledge, and so forth) and patterns of behaviour required to function as a member of a civil culture...’ (quoted in Baumann 2004, 2). Expectations are shaped by a particular tradition and history, defining interactions and allowances in a public sphere, which is often designated as ‘secular’. This secular imaginary reinforces a particular conception of The boundary between public and private, patrolling who can participate and how.

Of particular note is France, where the boundary between public and private, secular and religious is constructed alongside a dualism of universality and particularism. Here, for example, Muslim women and images of the veil evoke a sense of threat to the cultural integrity of France and to secular values, such as tolerance, freedom, and gender equality. For this reason, the headscarf has been a subject of debate since the late 1980s, when three teenage girls arrived at their local school wearing headscarves (Killian 2003, 567). About 15 years later, the debate is no less heated. Yet, as Fernando (2009) highlights, another kind of Muslim woman, a self-acclaimed secular Muslim, has appeared in the French public sphere, contributing to political life but not
escaping the dualism of French particularism and universality. This occurs since, even as secular Muslim women fulfil the universal promise of abstract citizenship, they do not meet the racial or cultural criteria of Frenchness. As Silverman (1992, 102) describes: integration is a ‘complex ordering of social relations, in which a process of racialisation and racism has played a fundamental role’. By regulating the means of participation in this way, the state reproduces instruments of inclusion and exclusion (Baumann 2004, 3). Yet, the maintenance of social and political boundaries is not always as clearly defined. Sometimes, policies of exclusion are expressed through seemingly innocuous policies and structures. The next few sections will examine the broad spectrum of some of these policies of incorporation. They each tend to emphasise certain aspects of the migrant’s relationship with the country of settlement to promote and enhance the integration process but not without underlying cultural and political claims to maintain the definition of the national community.

**Assimilation and Pluralism**

Assimilation and pluralism are very difficult to untangle. They almost inevitably feed off one another and can be interpreted to reinforce or remove barriers to integration. For the sake of clarity, it may be easier to place assimilation and pluralism on either end of a continuum or a scale from one to ten. Let us say that extremely aggressive assimilationist policies would be ranked as one, whereas pluralist policies that are directed at territorially-bounded groups with autonomy for language and cultural policies would be at ten. The latter is not a focus of this research but should be included on the continuum nonetheless. Both assimilation and pluralism refer more explicitly to cultural rights. Yet again, this distinction is difficult to make as cultural rights are entwined with measurements of participation and economic status.

Formal assimilation policy originates from the incorporation of industrial immigrants in the context of imperialist state rivalry and European nation-building projects in the latter half of the nineteenth century (Joppke and Morawska 2003, 4). Assimilation is a process of ‘boundary reduction’ that can occur when members of two or more societies of ethnic definition meet and form a group of individuals, knowledge of whose ethnic origin reveals no distinguishing characteristic beyond their ancestral history (Yinger 1985, 154). Similarly, assimilation was defined by Park and Burgess (1921) as ‘a process of interpenetration and fusion in which persons and groups acquire the memories, sentiments and attitudes of other persons and groups, and, by sharing their experience and history, are incorporated with them in a common life’ (quoted in Kostakopoulou 2008).

Both of these definitions reference an interaction and exchange between two nationalities. While interpenetration is inevitable on some level, the degree of this interpenetration varies. Some policies of majority communities toward minorities emphasised conformity over interactive processes. The newcomer had to, in essence, be transformed into a ‘standardised unit of the
state-bearing nation’ (Joppke and Morawska 2003, 5). This is in keeping with a description of
the assimilation process as requiring minority communities to ‘renounce their particular ethnic
or cultural identity and to embrace the culture of the majority community’ (Kostakopoulou
2008).

Overt assimilation (as a set of aggressive standardising policies) was dropped for the most part
in the postwar era in the United States and in Germany, as the term was ‘contaminated’ and
‘disqualified’ because of forced homogenisation (Brubaker 2001, 533). In liberal terms, it was
accepted that to force a substantive culture on someone was a violation not only of their dignity
but of their autonomy; thus, only a thin and procedural culture of liberalism could be required
(Joppke and Morawska 2003, 5).

France is the notable exception to this trend, maintaining the logic that equality can only be at-
tained through the ‘full adoption of the rules and values’ of the country of settlement and the
‘avoidance’ of aspects of diversity (Rodríguez-García 2010, 253). The French republic was
founded on a political contract between individuals and the state, allowing anyone who agreed
to those principles to be full members (Penninx 2000). However, with the polarising debates
regarding immigration and integration, it has become increasingly clear that the assimilationist
model has distinct failings. Even in states that are not overtly assimilationist, it is doubtful that
the logic behind the policies completely disappeared as later policies retain echoes of their as-
similationist precursors.

Pluralism has an equally long history and its own varieties of present-day implementation. It
dates back to the multinational empires, where certain groups wished to maintain autonomy and
protection of certain rights, whether tied to a territory or not. This logic was passed down
through the nationalist movements. Yet, it was not translated into policies towards immigration
until some time after World War II under the terms of multiculturalism.

Multiculturalist policies have their roots in the 1960s when academics and policy-makers began
to promote the idea that communities might wish to maintain their cultural distinctiveness de-
spite being resident and active in the society of settlement (Entzinger and Biezeveld 2003, 8-9).
Bauböck (2002, 161) identifies this shift as a real change of institutions and norms in Western
liberal democracies, spilling over into the discourse and rhetoric in the 1980s and 1990s in Eu-
rope and North America. It applied a normative differentialist frame of thought to all of society,
not only immigration (Brubaker 2001, 532).

Multiculturalism is a ‘doctrine that cultural diversity should be recognised as a permanent and
valuable part of political societies’ (Tempelmann 1999, 17). Another definition posits that mu-
ticulturalism is the ‘idea that immigrants should not have to abandon their ethnic identity in or-
der to integrate…, but rather should be able to visibly express their ethnic identity in public, and
have public institutions accommodate this’ (Kymlicka and Patten 2003, 6). These two definitions both emphasise the role of culture, not only in private, but the ability to participate in institutions despite cultural differences. The underlying hypothesis of multiculturalism proposes that increased support for ethnic groups enhances the potential for a ‘positive ethnic identity’, and increased levels of openness and acceptance towards ethnic out-groups (Verkuyten 2005, 121). Such a hypothesis would be supported by Social Identity Theory (SIT), which argues that people want to achieve a positive social identity that, in turn, fosters high self-esteem (Brown 2000, 636). Research in the United States highlights that awareness of one’s own ethnic identity can contribute to higher self-esteem, academic self-confidence, and purpose in life (Martinez and Dukes 1997, 503). However, the debate over the empirical evidence for the multiculturalism hypothesis continues.

The differentialist conceptions have been translated into policy in many European states, granting media rights and language instruction to many groups. It introduced a ‘new’ politics of identity based on the cultural identification of communities (Çağlar 1997, 171). In some ways, multiculturalism can contribute to the very problem it aims to solve, highlighting ways of thinking about difference that have their roots in racial theory (Malik 2005, 361). It fosters the reification of group identities for the sake of recognition and mediation, creating the potential (as will be noted later) for continued fragmentation and societal cleavages. However, more important to this work is the aspect of multiculturalism that, if not explicitly, denotes the loosening of the relationship between culture and territory, where a myriad of groups and customs are brought into the national identity (Gupta and Ferguson 1992, 7).

Multiculturalism is not a one-size-fits-all policy, however. Joppke and Morawska (2003, 8) divide state multiculturalist policies into two categories: ‘de facto’ and ‘official’ multiculturalism. Similarly, Bauböck (2002, 163) suggests to define multiculturalist policies as a division between moderate and radical multiculturalism, whereas Grillo (2006) refers to it as ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ multiculturalism. These distinctions refer to more or less the same phenomenon. For this work, I will mostly use the pairing of official or de facto multiculturalism. De facto multiculturalists have as their endpoint some form of integrated society, though respecting and appreciating the diversity of backgrounds. De facto multiculturalism echoes the neutrality of liberal states because of their nature, whereas ‘official multiculturalism’ is conveyed through a set of policies and state-organised recognition and protection of distinct ethnic groups. Returning to the continuum, de facto multiculturalism might be somewhere in the middle, whereas official multiculturalism would be higher on the scale. Countries that actively protected minority groups through language and media might be at eight or nine, while other countries who had hints of these policies would be lower. Countries that have a stronger sense of national identity based in
ethnic or linguistic terms often lean towards official multiculturalist policies and would rank higher on the scale.

Moderate multiculturalism, however, is in the middle at around six. This perhaps shows how it borders on assimilation, for moderate assimilation might be at four or five. This highlights the inherent challenges in defining France as assimilationist, since, even as it proposed to assimilate immigrants, some of its later integration policies actually appeared to be something closer to de facto multiculturalism, increasing with the emphasis on ‘positive discrimination’ (Sharma 2009).

In de facto multiculturalist settings, liberal proceduralism might be present. Liberal proceduralism refers to the legal-political aspect of belonging. According to Parekh (1998; 2000), liberal proceduralism is evident in the ‘cautious recognition’ of collective identities, diversity and the ‘promotion of civic national belonging’ (cited in Kostakopoulou 2008). Founded on this basis, a very loose and unforced multiculturalism allowed immigrants to live in their own communities, speak their own languages, and even provided public support for these services and institutions. In essence, integration by this definition refers to a thin layer of integration requisites that can be observed in multiple liberal states aside from the ad hoc policies made in context-specific scenarios without any uniform philosophy of integration (Joppke and Morawska 2003, 8).

Two criteria of integration in this mode seem to be the acceptance of the constitution and knowledge of the language, where knowledge of the language is a requirement for citizenship in most western countries (Kymlicka and Patten 2003, 5). These procedural elements are demonstrated in the German citizenship reform law of 1999 where acceptance of the constitution and competency in the language were the main criteria for naturalisation (Joppke and Morawska 2003, 6). Thus, while immigrants are given some cultural freedoms, there are certain contractual elements and language requirements that must be met. The emphasis on accepting the constitution and liberal values has only increased over the past years. Heightening focus is placed on attitudes and intentions, however unquantifiable these might be.

Official multiculturalism presents more issues than de facto multiculturalism in that it reinforces social and cultural boundaries, sometimes even increasing the fragmentation of ethnic groups. This can also be classified as a ‘segregationist or exclusion model’, though it seems to be more a sub-aspect of pluralism, rather than a separate integration logic (Rodríguez-García 2010, 253). This occurs as multiculturalism accentuates, as may be apparent, the cultural rights of the minority communities as a means to foster a pluralist society. However, emphasis on ‘supposed’ racial, ethnic, and cultural differences can develop into ‘social chasms’ between the society of settlement and newcomers (Geddes 2003, 23-24). Such is the case in Sweden as they wished to integrate the minority communities on an individual basis but actually reinforced collective and
ethnic lines via the corporatist model (i.e. the relationship between the state and ethnic communities is similar to the relationship between the state and other corporatised groups) that they used to implement these goals (Soysal 1994, 46-47).

In spite of its shortcomings, proponents of official or radical multiculturalism see ‘cultural distinctness and institutional separation’ as the only way for groups to maintain their identity (Bauböck 2002, 163). Yet, most regulated versions of official multiculturalism put emphasis on ethnic-cultural heritage and exhibit restrictions on access to citizenship based on ethno-racial criteria such as jus sanguinis (Rodríguez-García 2010, 253). As a result, official multiculturalism has come under increasing scrutiny for not creating a liberal society, but rather, leading to varying levels of fragmentation and socio-economic inequality. It has been blamed for isolation and lack of national identification among other things (Sharma 2009). Moreover, multiculturalism can act to defend the national culture and tolerance becomes an instrument to keep imagined communities separate from each other (Delanty, Wodak, and Jones 2008, 2).

**Interculturalism**

The largest measurable gaps in European society have occurred in the context of multiculturalist policies (Joppke 2007, 5), leading to the statement by the head of the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) in the UK, Trevor Phillips, that Britain is ‘sleepwalking into segregation’, echoing the analysis of the Cantle Report of some years earlier (Casciani, BBC News 2005). Both Germany and the UK fall under the multiculturalist approach, though the UK has generally implemented more de facto multiculturalist policies, where Germany, for many years, fell under the official and even exclusionist model. Both have experienced discomfort with the outcomes as Chancellor Angela Merkel in October 2010 stated that multiculturalism had ‘utterly failed’, followed in February 2011 by a similar statement from Prime Minister David Cameron (Hewitt BBC 2010; BBC News 2011). Yet, in both cases, it is possible to see how these approaches and responses have come out of national and international processes of codification, interacting with and responding to history and current trends. Thus, the collective identities of the nation-building projects inform the processes of acculturation and adaptation for the immigrants who reside there.

Acculturation refers to the processes of interaction and incorporation and need not include only assimilationist models. Acculturation is defined as the ‘phenomena which result when groups of individuals, having different cultures come into continuous, first-hand contact with subsequent changes in the original culture patterns of either or both groups’ (Redfield, Linton, and Herskovitz 1936, 149). The analysis of acculturation strategies aims to identify and somehow classify the relationships between immigrants’ motivations to adopt the culture of the country of settlement vs. maintaining their own culture. From these two options come a range of possibilities, including multiculturalism (maintaining their own culture and adopting that of the country
of settlement), assimilation (loosening ties to country of origin and adopting culture of the
country of settlement), separation (maintaining culture of the country of origin and not adopting the
culture of the country of settlement), and marginalisation (rejecting both the culture of the
country of origin as well as the country of settlement) (Berry 1997, 9). For this work, I will replace
this definition of multiculturalism with something closer to the previously discussed ‘integration’,
defined by sharing a common identity with those of the country of settlement while still
being able to distinguish themselves from the majority in a positive sense (Zagefka and Brown

It is important to note certain assumptions implicit in these options. They may not be applicable
in many cases, since minorities often do not have unconstrained choices of how or whether to
maintain or adopt cultural norms but are compelled by political manoeuvrings in the country of
settlement (and sometimes, by the country of origin as well). Moreover, given the fluctuating
tendency of culture as a whole, it is hard to define the lines of overlap and intersection, as will
become clear in later chapters. Thus, any classification of acculturation strategies may be better
understood on a spectrum ranging from not adopting to adopting and loosening to maintaining.
This leaves us with an immense variety of intersections that might more accurately reflect the
diversity of approaches, not to mention the still missing facet of the national model and the re-
action of the majority context in the country of settlement. Acculturation can manifest in several
different ways including: (1) reactive, where both groups resist change, (2) creative so that both
groups develop new norms, and (3) delayed where the changes do not appear in detail for some
years (Berry 1997, 7). No matter how the interaction takes place, cultures develop from and are
influenced by each other. Trade and commerce multiplied by travel and ever-increasing speed
of communication shape and form cultural interactions and perspectives. Even languages bear
definite signs of relations due to immigration, wars, imperialism, and perpetually changing po-
litical structures and institutions.

Some scholars have perhaps more aptly named this process ‘interculturation’, meaning, accord-
ing to Clanet (1990), the ‘set of processes by which individuals and groups interact when they
identify themselves as culturally distinct’ (quoted in Berry 1997, 8). This has been incorporated
into a new strand of thinking on the political level, called interculturalism, which proposes to
overcome the problematic nature of assimilation and multiculturalism. It is defined as the ‘inte-
active process of living together in diversity, with the full participation and civic engagement of,
and social exchange between, all members of society beyond that of mere recognition and coe-
xistence, in turn forming a cohesive and plural civic community’ (Rodríguez-García 2010, 260-
261). This model would allow for the expression and initiation of change to come from any
member or group in the society, including minorities. It necessitates, however, citizenship as a
starting point for full political participation with the recognition of transnationalism, globalisa-
tion, and localisation. An ‘intercultural citizen’ is a person who is an active citizen in a community united by a shared language and shared meanings in a local, regional, or national, in addition to the ‘attitudes, knowledge and skills of intercultural competence which enable them to participate in multilingual and multicultural communities’ (Byram et al 2009, 3).

This approach has been taken up on the national as well as international level, particularly by the EU. Intercultural dialogue, according to the EU’s definition, is ‘a process that comprises an open and respectful exchange or interaction between individuals, groups and organisations with different cultural backgrounds or world views. Among its aims are: to develop a deeper understanding of diverse perspectives and practices; to increase participation and the freedom and ability to make choices; to foster equality; and to enhance creative processes’ (see ‘What is Intercultural Dialogue?’). As a focus of EU policy, not only limited to internal intercultural relations but also aimed at fostering better interregional relations, it becomes essential for IR scholars to examine these policies, from conceptualisation to implementation.

According to the EU’s White Paper on the concept, the EU identifies seven conditions that shape the atmosphere in which intercultural dialogue can occur. These are:

1. Equal dignity of all participants;
2. Voluntary engagement in dialogue;
3. A mindset (on both sides) characterised by openness, curiosity and commitment, and the absence of a desire to ‘win’ the dialogue;
4. A readiness to look at both cultural similarities and differences;
5. A minimum degree of knowledge about the distinguishing features of one’s own and the ‘other’ culture;
6. The ability to find a common language for understanding and respecting cultural differences.

However, it is not clear that this concept completely overcomes the challenges of multiculturalism. The use of words like ‘both sides’ and ‘similarities and differences’ lead one to the idea of a juxtaposition of static cultures within the dialogue, whereas an immense diversity could be found within and among the groups who are supposed to be from the same culture. In everyday practices, cultures and communities overlap and interact among individuals and groups as will be seen in Chapter 7. The boundaries of a group or community, just like those of a nation are porous. They are constantly under construction and deconstruction and can even deconstruct
themselves. However, the conception and perception of culture and community as constantly changing is in perpetual tension with the use of ‘culture’ and ‘community’ in political discourse, where cultural and community rights have de facto and artificially reified the boundaries and limitations of these perceptions. As Baumann (1996, 9) notes, ‘political discourse is couched in the language of separate communities defined by their cultures that demand collective recognition and rights’. Based on the assumption of the incompatibility of cultures, it perpetuates the ‘abnormalisation’ (othering) and exclusion of ethnic minorities (Verkuyten and Mason 1995, 137).

Even terms, such as hyphenated and hybrid identities, cannot fully escape the underlying assumptions that two or more cultures will come together to mix, forming some combination of the parts involved. Hybrid identities, in this case, refer to the mixing and blending of identities as a result of the interconnections between diasporic and ethnic affiliations alongside political identities, such as being ‘German’ (Bhabha 1990). In contrast, a hyphenated identity might refer to an expression of perpetual mediation between two primarily political identities that connect them to two or more distinct cultures or territories (Çağlar 1997). Faas (2009, 304) argues that minority youth in Germany and the UK tend to articulate hybrid identities, ever fluid while reacting and contributing to the discourses and contexts in which they are found, as opposed to remaining static and connected to particular territorial boundaries. Yet, in actuality, these identities might not even be the foremost signifiers of belonging. Furthermore, this may only be an echo of a well-known othering process, where ‘hybridisation’ is similar to the use of the word ‘diversity’ to refer to the Other (Çağlar 1997, 175; see also Chapter 5). Finally, at its basis, there is still the underlying conception of territorialised, bounded identities as are present in political discourse.

In the conversations about intercultural dialogue, ‘Social cohesion’ and ‘community cohesion’ have become political catch-phrases. Yet, the situation that these terms seem to respond to is the perception, realistic or otherwise, of disengaged, partially integrated or even parallel communities. For this project, I will base the concept of social cohesion on the definition from the Council of Europe: ‘Social cohesion denotes the capacity of a society to ensure the welfare of all its members, minimising disparities and avoiding polarisation. A cohesive society is a mutually supportive community of free individuals pursuing these common goals by democratic means’ (Section 1.4, para. 24). This definition is seemingly innocuous, but several of the terms used indicate a reaction to the presence, supposed or not, of disengaged groups, acting in non-democratic ways. These disengaged groups, i.e. parallel communities, refer to a ‘politically framed term’ that suggests that immigrant community’s ‘actively and deliberately segregate’, not using state programs to help them acquire basic language or vocational skills, leading to high rates of unemployment (Cyrus 2005, 16). These parallel communities are seen as the
breeding ground for terrorism and a threat to national stability. They provide a justification for certain policies, such as language requirements or integration tests, which would otherwise be labelled as verging on assimilationist strategies of the past. In many ways, old mechanisms of group definition are presented in a new way to reinforce a collective identity.

Integration in Practice

Both assimilationist and pluralist measures have struggled to accomplish what states intended for integration. Various measures were needed to assess integration and ascertain the missing element(s). Entzinger and Biezeveld (2003, 10) identify three primary dimensions by which integration can be measured: legal-political, economic, and cultural integration. They include ‘ac-culturation’ (the adoption by the immigrant population of some cultural characteristics of the majority community without ‘abandoning their cultural identity’ or ties to the home country) as an interlinking dimension that shapes the success and failure of the other dimensions. These dimensions are created and perpetuated by the state to measure the state (Beck 2000, 4). They may seem familiar as they are closely tied to the components of citizenship discussed in the first part of this chapter. Thus, as I discuss these dimensions, I am, in actuality, examining citizenship policies and the potential for their re-formulation.

The legal-political dimension is highly important in determining the function and direction of the other aspects of integration. Whether or not immigrants are perceived as potentially full members of the polity shapes the other dimensions of inclusion and exclusion (Penninx 2000). Naturalisation, itself, has been identified as one means to correct for the failures of integration policies thus far. It is thought to encourage full participation in a society by giving full legal and political access to the state. Yet, the historical emphasis on the abstract citizen is deeply entrenched in law and policy, thus making changes in definition and implementation an arduous process. At the same time, the state as a territory with institutions and citizenship cannot, in the moment of national awareness and identity politics, be analysed in isolation from international and transnational politics.

Transnational, in this context, is taken to mean an arena above and beyond the space within or between states (Wahlbeck 2002). As defined by Risse-Kappen (1995, 3), transnational relations are ‘regular interactions across national boundaries when at least one actor is a non-state agent or does not operate on behalf of a national government or intergovernmental organisation’. This definition includes non-state actors from the individual to multi-national corporations (MNCs), from social movements to non-governmental organisations (NGOs). For this work, I am not focusing on all of these actors but have limited it to the connections, interactions, and linkages of migration in this space as one level of analysis.
Unlike previous migration moments, many of the postwar immigrants maintained linkages to their country of origin, not following the pattern of incorporation into the society of settlement. More aptly understood as ‘transmigrants’, their ‘daily lives depend on multiple and constant interconnections across international borders and whose [their] public identities are configured in relationship to more than one nation-state’ (Glick Schiller, Basch, and Szanton Blanc 1995, 48). For immigrants, the institutional environment influences the practice and function of transnational networks and the messages they choose to disseminate. Transnational participation can be classified along a continuum with either ‘core’ or ‘narrow’ participation at one end and ‘expanded’ or ‘broad’ connection at the other (Ostergaard-Nielsen 2003). On the one end of the continuum, one might find those who are exceptionally involved in transnational affairs, from political rallies to financial or media support. They might vote or work for political ends through international organisations. On the ‘expanded’ or ‘broad’ end of the continuum, one might find those who have only occasional contact with the community. Along this continuum, one might also find diaspora/homeland politics, often reserved to define particularly sensitive issues of national identity or state security. It is important, however, not to view this continuum in a linear fashion, since there are many levels and categories of involvement, some that may not be particularly quantifiable but nonetheless maintain a transnational linkage of some sort. Regardless, this practice of transnational migration, the ‘process by which immigrants forge and sustain simultaneous, multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement, has shaped and challenged conceptualisations of citizenship (Glick Schiller et al 1995).

Two distinct trends can be identified in the way that states have responded to the presence of transmigrants. The first, primarily represented through the theory of ‘postnational membership’, revolves around the international pressure of human rights and the increasing value of personhood. The second has to do with the perceived failure of integration policies and the possibility of correction through legal membership. In the 1990s, a theory of membership was explored to explain what was in fact happening in a number of European countries. ‘Denizen’, a term coined by Tomas Hammar (1990), was increasingly used to denote the full participation in all but formal naturalisation of migrants. The historical use of the term refers to those who are within the country with a number of citizens’ rights but not having full citizenship. Building on this conception, Soysal (1994) developed the theory around the idea of ‘postnational membership’, arguing that, though the immigrants to European countries were not intended to stay and participate in the national polity, they were included through a structure of rights founded around the ideas of universal personhood. Rather than extending naturalisation to immigrant communities, states implemented a structure of rights that even unnaturalised residents could claim, allowing access to institutions such as national education, welfare, and labour markets. Postnational membership illustrates what Turner describes as the political aspect of globalisa-
tion in the tension between citizenship rights (of the nation-state) and human rights (Turner 2000, 34-35). Human rights implicitly undermine the national boundaries through universal and deterritorialised obligations on the basis of the individual, echoing what Joppke (2007, 15-16) calls a kind of Rawlsian liberalism that emphasises equality, individual rights, and neutrality, compelling an extension of rights and participation to minority communities.

Hammar (1990) argued that denizens ‘are fully accepted, and treated as if they were almost citizens’. However, alongside the extension of rights and protections, other weaknesses have appeared in terms of socio-economic inequality, integration, and social cohesion. The gap between the experience of belonging and legal protection persists (Mandel 2008, 15). This brought about a resurgence of territorial jus soli citizenship in Europe (Joppke and Morawska 2003, 18-19). Based on the function of citizenship as a boundary that can equally include or exclude, states across Europe have attempted to use citizenship to correct for rifts in integration and integration policies. It is thought that it can encourage full participation in a society by giving full legal and political access to the state. It can correct for the shortcomings of postnational membership, for, while membership may have many privileges, it cannot protect from such things as expulsion from the state even generations after arrival (Joppke and Morawska 2003, 16). It also attempts to address the state concerns of the breakdown in national cohesion, always present in processes of assimilation (Silverman 1992, 81).

The success of naturalisation has been limited. Immigrants and their children have to face restrictive naturalisation processes, with residency requirements of five to ten years, depending on the country (Soysal 1994, 24). The ethno-political agendas, requirements, and allegiances that are constructed and instituted in relation to citizenship make it one of the most elusive actors in the context of migration, highlighted in the debate over dual citizenship (discussed shortly). In the modern state, there exists an ideal that citizenship will override all of the other political and social structures, making the state the uppermost signifier of identity (Butenschon 2000, 13). However, this is far easier in theory than in practice, since there is more than one dimension to citizenship.

The legal-political shifts in naturalisation policy around Europe primarily address the first component of citizenship, but the competences of youth and integration can relate to the way that they entered the society and the way that they perceive, relate, and are accepted by a society. Many of the immigrants after World War II arrived in northwest Europe as labour migrants. In many European cases, questions of identity and belonging were not addressed in the initial processes of immigration but were merely introduced into the economy through what Favell (1998, 48-49) calls the ‘politics of insertion’. As the next chapter will show, this did not necessarily go hand-in-hand with legal rights or imply integration. Even so, some countries still rely heavily on the socioeconomic aspect of integration to lay the foundation for the other dimensions. In other
words, some degree of success in the second component of citizenship (access to scarce resources) was thought to affect the substantive quality of the legal-political dimension.

Britain has been one of the main supporters of integration through individual economic interactions in the society (Soysal 1994, 53). Britain (like Switzerland) does not rely as heavily on policy instruments from above. The market is the primary decider of how many immigrants enter the country. This, therefore, also shapes the experience and integration of these immigrants.

Socio-economic integration might be highlighted for two reasons. For one, socioeconomic integration would indicate a utilisation of all resources in the society, promoting the goals of becoming a global competitor by 2010 through social inclusion as highlighted in the Lisbon Strategy (Joppke 2007, 17). Secondly, linked to unemployment are various other measurements regarding prejudice and discrimination, opportunities for involvement, and equality of education. One author identifies equal access to education and employment as one of four key instruments to promote integration in EU member states (Groenenduk 2006, 8). Yet, the process of economic integration has not led to equal opportunities. Significantly lower employment levels between the minority and majority population are evident in the UK and across Europe. In order to cope with high rates of unemployment, attention has shifted to making immigrants self-sufficient from the time that they enter the receiving community, the state’s goal being to make them independent of the state (Joppke 2007, 4). Thus, even in the moves related to the second component, the focus shifts from the state to the immigrant or minority community.

To summarise, the legal-political component of citizenship has not corrected for the inequalities experienced by minorities, nor has the attention to the second component had much success. The duties discourse, mentioned previously, responds to a third dimension of citizenship, particularly promoted by neoconservative and communitarian politicians. It has led to the introduction of citizenship in British secondary schools, for example. By introducing such modules in school curriculum, in some ways the weight of a society is put onto the youth to contribute and participate above and beyond their parents, replicating the duties discourse across generations. Overall, it has not achieved the kind of integration that meets all of the dimensions of abstract citizenship. This is because of the final dimension and the basis of the cultural community, which is challenged by the presence of those who do not fit into the national imaginary. These three dimensions of citizenship, which have been addressed in many different ways across Europe cannot resolve the issues at hand, since they do not have a way to cope with changing notions of belonging that are shaped by a globalised world. While potentially the most difficult to pinpoint, it nonetheless compels us to re-think the bounded citizenship model and even the idea of intercultural dialogue as potential solutions.
Beyond the Nation-State

The conception of citizenship moving beyond the nation-state is not an entirely new concept. In fact, with regards to dual citizenship, it has quite deep roots in national and international relations. In the current context, transnational citizenship has sought to meet the need for new conceptions of membership. For example, people have an interest in participating in more than one country’s elections and having the protection of those rights. Yet, just like citizenship in its simplest form, dual citizenship is laden with the burdens of history. In other words, transnational citizenship is interwoven with the criteria for citizenship and notions of belonging that formed the basis of the nation-building project.

Citizenship was reinforced in the age of empire as ‘sending states’ wished to maintain links with emigrants and settlers overseas. To use Italy as an example, if a person is born of Italian ancestry, no matter where s/he has lived, s/he is entitled to full citizenship as long as s/he did not acquire another citizenship (Fedi 2006). However, with recent immigration trends and new settlers coming to Western Europe, jus sanguinis citizenship rules created a ‘severe deficit of democratic inclusiveness’ (Joppke and Morawska 2003, 18-19). Many immigrants were excluded from naturalisation and thereby rights of political participation, challenging the conception that liberal democracies have already achieved full political inclusion and equality (Bauböck 2006, 16).

Providing easier access to citizenship was intended to foster a sense of empowerment among third-country nationals, giving them a voice and role in civil society. This recognition led a number of Western European states to augment their jus sanguinis rules with jus soli rules, evident in Germany’s 1999 citizenship law. Joppke and Morawska (2003, 18-19) argue that because citizenship is now being founded upon birth in a certain territory, the ‘state-constituting citizenry’ or nation can no longer be conceived of in ethnic terms. However, the transition is much more complex; old conceptions of national identity cannot be transformed overnight even if the legal basis has changed. The legal-political institutions that European countries have begun to implement have their own limitations as their impact on integration may not necessarily increase civic identification with the country of residence. Furthermore, the culture and implications of citizenship in the sending countries must be taken into consideration. Issues such as heritage rights and legal access to resources in the sending country persist. Though the new citizenship laws exhibit a certain step in the right direction, the experiential status of immigrants, even second and third generation, is that of continued barriers to participation, leading to a rise in dual citizenship.

Dual citizenship is explicitly embraced in some countries and tacitly tolerated in others. It can be viewed simultaneously as a de-ethnicisation of citizenship and as a perpetuation of ethnic
ties, depending on perspective. To refer back to the case of Italy, the Italian government recognised in 1992 that people needed to participate in the country in which they lived but still had a desire to participate in Italian politics. For that reason, Italy followed the example of other countries of Europe by expanding jus soli naturalisation for its immigrants but re-extending jus sanguinis for its emigrants from 1992-1997. However, many Italian immigrants in Australia did not take Italian citizenship for fear of losing their Australian citizenship (Fedi 2006). By 2002, the Australian Parliament recognised dual citizenship, but it was already too late for the Italian immigrants. This example shows the complexity of transnational citizenship in taking into account multiple states’ policies.

Some might argue that dual citizenship only promotes the ethnicisation of national citizenship, allowing a ‘homeland’ to maintain ties with its diaspora. Such might be the case in the moves by the Polish government to issue the ‘Karta Polaka’ to members of its diaspora since 2009. Instituted by the Polish Parliament in 2007, the card is widely criticised by Polish communities abroad and the countries in which they live (Gobert 2010). On the other hand, many immigrants in Germany who had the chance to naturalise would not unless they could have dual nationality (Soysal 1994, 27). Even in the 1990s, at the peak of naturalisation by Turkish immigrants, it was only with the introduction of the pink card, ‘Pembe Kart’, from Turkey in 1995, which allowed them to maintain heritage rights in that country (Anil 2007). However, there is more to the story.

Civic notions of citizenship can be used to discredit but also defend dual citizenship (Faist 2007, 2). Dual citizenship may be able to enhance the already present reality of global mobility and enable increased political participation even from citizens who live abroad. It also promotes the conception of world citizenship, where membership is ‘defined by the boundaries of humanity, dignity and solidarity’ rather than attachment to a nation-state (Fedi 2006). Practically speaking, there are challenges in store even for a civic conception of dual citizenship. The nations that have loosened regulations to allow for dual citizenship are potentially undermining a developing international structure to handle asylum-seekers and refugees (Koslowski 1998, 735). These structures attempt to regulate dual nationality in hopes of limiting the demographic delineation of boundaries. With increasing globalisation, however, it is important to look beyond the confines of nation-state or even trans-nation interaction to processes made on a different level. A distinction made by Michael Kearney (1995, 548) identifies transnationalism as linking two or more nation-states, while the study of globalisation goes beyond these units of analysis.

In globalisation, the spacial units of the nation-state and levels of interaction are being reorganised. Globalisation ‘denotes the processes through which sovereign national states are criss-crossed and undermined by transnational actors’ (Beck 2000, 11). In many ways, it is a more accurate reflection of world politics than a sole focus on interstate relations (Keohane and Nye
However, the globalisation process does not override politically defined borders or entirely erase their role in social and economic interactions. Even postnationalists reluctantly admit that the manifestation of global connections and interactions takes place within the context of the nation-state (Koopmans and Statham 2003, 196). Globalisation cannot be conceived as a ‘place-less’ phenomenon (Brenner 1998). Rather, it is putting the emphasis on large-scale urbanised regions, superimposing a different spacial scale onto the political map as global cities take centre stage. This occurs in that, even as globalisation produces universalism and standardisation, it accelerates the ‘rebirth of difference and localisms’, often based on claims of cultural belonging, religion, or ethnicity (Lyon and Spini 2004, 339).

The boundary between domestic and foreign, territorial and not, if it ever was in place, is now, more than ever, called into question through new forms of transport, modes of communication, and the speed of this communication (Held 2004, 365). Globalisation reflects the ‘unbundling’ of the relationship between sovereignty, political power, and territory (Ruggie 1993). Territory and the domestic-foreign divide profoundly influenced the way that institutions were formed in the past, but their effectiveness in the face of such rapid change is questionable.

Some shifts have already been made. One need not look beyond Europe to see that institutions that respond to crime, for example, have moved beyond the territorial confines of the state in the International Criminal Police Organisation (ICPO). Better known as ‘Interpol’, it was founded in 1923 as a generally unofficial collaboration between police officials to exchange information across borders; however, it has now expanded its mandate to include police training, the coordination of international police operations, and counterterrorism (Barnett and Coleman 2005, 595-596). Another example is the increasing importance of regional and international law. The European Court of Human Rights has contested the national sovereignty of the British state, most memorably in the discussion of whether or not prisoners should be allowed to vote (Ford 2012). This is not to say that states have lost their sovereignty entirely. This would be by no means accurate. It is merely to stress the expanding jurisdiction of regional and global institutions and the relationship of the local setting with these institutions.

Globalisation and localisation might be seen as two sides of the same coin, affecting and informing the structure, agency, and manifestation of the other. It is vital not to isolate or assign agency only to globalisation, for example, as this replicates imperialist constructions of the ‘West’ and the ‘rest’, where globalisation is perceived to be a product of the ‘West’ and localities become reconstructed as the ‘rest’ (Salih 2009). By this construction, the levels-of-analysis approach could merely reiterate old hierarchies in a new, seemingly less exclusionary model. To avoid this pitfall, it is all the more vital to examine how localities shape globalisation and transnationalism.
The participation of immigrants across these levels exhibits the give-and-take of the global and the local. Not isolated from globalisation, immigrants’ connections have led to the existence of so-called global ethnoscapes. A term borrowed from Arjun Appadurai (1996, 48), ‘global ethnoscapes’ expresses the changing nature of ethnography. Rather than the subject of study being geographically confined with a bounded, historically unaware identity, a group’s memories and loyalties may have pieces to the puzzle located in different countries and even hemispheres. In the context of globalisation, culture effectively undergoes a deterritorialising process (Gupta and Ferguson 1992, 7). Deterritorialisation occurs on a day to day basis as people do not merely discard old identities in the process of crossing geographic boundaries. In particular, first generation immigrants do not usually make a psychological break with their country of origin, but rather, they bring traditional practices with them to the country of settlement (Jasch 2007, 345). Tradition, in this context, refers to the attempt to maintain a sense of continuity in the face of change (Hobsbawm 1983). Although, in some cases, traditions are not invented and are accumulations of long-term practices over time (McCulloch and McCaig 2002, 238). (This is not to be confused with the distinction between traditional and modern societies, discussed previously.) In addition to globalisation shaping the patterns of immigrant settlement, immigrant activities on the local level have shaped state and international policy-making. For example, Salih (2004) explores the way that second-generation Muslim youth in Italy are participating on local, national, and European levels to resist constructions of identity and trends of national policy that relegate Muslim identities to minority status.

Also termed ‘glocalisation’, this give-and-take of the global and the local scale represents a reconfiguration of space and interaction. Swyngedouw (2004) defines it as: (1) ‘the contested restructuring of the institutional level from the national scale, both upwards to supra-national or global scales and downwards to the scale of the individual or local body or local, urban or regional configurations; and (2) the strategies of global localisation of key forms of industrial, service and financial capital’. This work focuses heavily on the first point and sees the continued role of the nation-state in the ways that the global and local pressures interact, leading to the need for analysis of these relationships from an IR perspective. The way that the state is involved in the definition of its national community is linked to the definition of that state’s national interests, which are expressed in the international system (Pettman 1996, 16). This indicates that if the state is representing a particular community based on citizenship practices, then it follows that the state’s national interests on the international stage can be influenced as minorities make demands on the national community for inclusion.

Beyond reconfiguring the multi-scalar space, glocalisation affects people’s everyday lives, regardless of whether they are transnationally connected or not, leading to the manifestation of cosmopolitanism. This can take the form of ‘thick’ cosmopolitanism (rooted or situational) or a
‘thin’ cosmopolitanism, where detachment allows one to transcend culture and space (Roudometof 2005, 113). However, labels such as ‘transnational’ and ‘cosmopolitan’ are not without their biases. For example, cosmopolitan is sometimes used to describe the experience of middle or upper class global interaction, while transnational refers to economic migrants (Featherstone 2002, Roudometof 2005).

The notion of cosmopolitanism as only applying to middle and upper class experiences of mobility is perhaps not without foundation. Globalisation is certainly not an equal playing field. In fact, there are parallels between the role of citizenship within the nation-state and the promises of nationalism in the global context. In the state, the combination of secularism and nationalism led to the conception of the neutral citizen, where difference was denied on the basis of universalism (Scott 2005, 4). Likewise, nationalism implied equality of the state in the global context. As Anthony Smith (1986, 1) notes, ‘the claim to nationhood is, of course, the claim to equality of international treatment, at least in theory’. In both cases, internally and externally, however, there exists a disconnect between the formal and substantive level of international and domestic membership, as power relations connect and overlap with the basic map of simplistic borders to create hierarchies (Gupta and Ferguson 1992, 8). For example, all parties may have a seat at the negotiating table, but it does not mean that they are equal. To paraphrase David Held (2004, 370), it is the difference between quantity and quality in how various stakeholders are represented. It is the contrast between large delegations, technical expertise, and financial backing versus a one-person delegation. As an extreme example of imbalanced representation, 24 industrialised countries hold 10-11 seats on the executive board of the IMF, where 42 African countries hold two seats.

Even in areas where transnational practices and globalisation are most evident, it is characterised by asymmetric social and economic relations, not only between states but also non-state actors (Keohane and Nye 2000, 167). For example, Ruba Salih (2001) highlights the role of gender and class in the transnational activities of migrants between Italy and Morocco. In so doing, she shows that transnational structures shape a different experience for women than for men, based on available options for travel and settlement as well as each holding distinct positions in the country of origin and the country of settlement. In other words, cultural rules and citizenship practices in the countries spanned by the lives of immigrants can affect the experiences of groups differently. These findings are affirmed in the multiple case studies presented in the edited volume, Women Resist Globalisation, where rights have diverse meanings in different contexts and intersect with issues of poverty and inequality (Rowbotham and Linkogle 2001). Yet, a focus on solely the movement of women can be just as problematic as one that focuses only on men (Pessar and Mahler 2003), thus compelling the examination of factors that constrain and facilitate migration, whether gender, class, or race. As Calhoun and Brubaker
(2003, 544) state: ‘all actually existing cosmopolitanisms reflect influences of social location and cultural tradition’, meaning that regardless of its formulation, cosmopolitanism is not free from the boundaries, hierarchies, and identities of the past.

A second conception of cosmopolitanism contains the hope of global democratisation along with the establishment of values, institutions, and lifestyles that are less ‘directly imbedded’ in nation-state societies (Featherstone 2002, 1). Held (2004, 382) proposes that a new system of governance must be eventually established. What he calls ‘cosmopolitan multilateralism’ starts with the assumption of overlapping communities, where different levels would be responsible for different policy areas. Education and housing would be managed on the city, region, or state level, whereas health could be managed on a global scale. He argues that wherever people are joined together in terms of social relations, they have a right to share in the control (Calhoun and Brubaker 2003, 539). While Held acknowledges that these multiple and overlapping levels will be under constant debate (as they are already), he sees the value of this framework in that the decisions and contestations would not be left to dominant states and geopolitical forces. Along the same lines, he proposes the need for multilevel citizenship, where it is not based on membership in a territorially defined community but based on rules and principles, such as those related to democracy and human rights (Held 2004, 386).

A final strand of cosmopolitanism, and the one that will be incorporated into this work, challenges conventional notions of identity, belonging, and citizenship (Hall 2002, 25). This strand of cosmopolitanism goes beyond the potential pitfalls of liberal universalism and the supposed neutrality of the state and is in keeping with the conception of the ‘multi-layered citizen’, as proposed by Nira Yuval-Davis. She depicts citizenship as a ‘multi-layered construct, in which one’s citizenship in collectivities in the different layers -- local, ethnic, national, state, cross- or trans-state and supra-state --is affected and often at least partly constructed by the relationship and positioning of each layer in specific historical contexts’ (Yuval-Davis 1999, 121). This conception puts forward a way of thinking about these different activities. Moreover, it proposes a framework that can be incorporated to in an IR approach to understand the role of local, national, transnational, and international levels in the belonging and engagements of minority youth. Young people across the world engage in the processes of globalisation from local markets to media consumption. They participate in cultural innovation and social transformations (Nayak 2003, 4). Yet, their activities take place at an intersection point of local, state, transnational, and international movement, where they are shaped by and shape these levels.

**Conclusion**

This chapter began by exploring some of the underpinnings of the nation-building projects. En-twined with symbols of religion, cultural memory, and perpetuated through education, the na-
tionalist norms were institutionalised in citizenship policies. These citizenship policies crystallised the boundaries between insider and outsider, member and non-member. More subtly, however, they legitimised legal and even political inequality. Even as the formal rights to political participation have expanded, substantive citizenship has not always followed suit, particularly emphasising (but not limited to) social divisions of race, class, and gender.

In the face of large numbers of immigrants and increasing emphasis on multiculturalism, states re-addressed the composition of the cultural community and political participation. From liberal proceduralism to official multiculturalism, however, all of the policies thus far reveal an inability to cope with the situation in an adequate manner that guarantees equal citizenship, participation, and protection. The measurements of integration do not account for a changing citizenry with transnational connections and global interaction. The movement of people is no longer periphery to centre and centre to periphery in the traditional sense. Rather, the periphery can be found overlapping everywhere in the centre and the centre in the periphery: Pakistanis in Japan, British in Hong Kong, Americans in Mexico, and many others (Soysal 2003, 492). Thus, new conceptions of cultural and political interaction are required, leading us to the discussion of cosmopolitanism and multi-layered citizenship.

While the theories and discussions addressed here are not new to the questions posed in other disciplines, e.g. history, law, sociology, or anthropology, and even other subfields of Political science (particularly, comparative politics), the implications of these issues as they pertain to minority youth are rarely addressed in IR. Thus, the chapter aimed to bring some key contributions of other disciplines into the framework of an IR piece by showing how collective identities as manifested through citizenship and intercultural dialogue are not limited to the internal workings of states but inform the function and interaction of the international level.

The following chapters will move to the contextual aspects of the levels of analysis before moving to the empirical analysis of the comments of youth. The next chapter will engage with the two case studies more directly by exploring the immigration policies.
3. Germany and the UK in Transition

As the countries of Europe rebuilt their economies and laid the foundations for future economic growth after World War II, they established institutions to encourage immigrants to fill the shortages in the factories and foundries in mainland Europe and the UK. In many ways, these immigrants were responsible for the postwar economic miracle or ‘Wirtschaftswunder’, as they provided unlimited labour during key moments of economic expansion (Hollifield 1992, 4). Yet, Germany and the UK present distinct approaches to their own national self-conception as well as the way that they cope with large numbers of immigrants within their borders. The boundaries of Germany were mostly made in the political imaginary, thus making it very difficult to include or accept the presence of many non-ethnically German immigrants. In contrast, the limits of the British Empire made the political borders too wide for the nation (Joppke 1999, 100). Writing from a comparative political economy perspective, Hollifield (1992) argues that states tend to justify opposition to immigration based on either economic reasoning or a more nationalist rationale. However, both aspects seem to be apparent in the British and German case to some extent. While Germany tends towards a stronger ethno-cultural heritage, immigration controls were generally economically oriented, whereas in the UK, former relations with the Empire and on-going racial tensions shape the reaction and response to immigration, framed and justified by economic needs.

Focusing primarily on the state level, this chapter will examine the immigration policies and major integration trends in the UK and Germany. The majority of the young people with whom I spoke were first or second generation immigrants. Thus, the immigration policies which allowed them or their parents to enter contribute to the experience and perceptions of citizenship and intercultural dialogue. This chapter is not intended to provide in-depth analysis of every shift in policy, but rather, to set the stage for the later analysis of comments from minority youth. It will show how, in the process of formulating immigration policy, states indicate who may at some point become a citizen and how belonging is to be negotiated. In this way, the inclusion or exclusion of people begins at the point of crossing the border (Yuval-Davis, Anthias, and Kofman 2005, 518). As an extension of these inclusionary and exclusionary policies, changing relations with minority communities are reflected back into immigration restrictions, particularly in the UK.

The exploration of the policy background will centre around the years after World War II, divided into two main sections of before 1980 and after 1980. This year was chosen as the breaking point as major shifts in the definition of citizenship occurred in the UK during the early 1980s along with changing relations between former West and East Germany, shaping immigration trends. These shifts significantly affected immigration and citizenship policies in both countries alongside legal and social responses to the presence of minorities.
The major difference in the two countries is the early recognition and persistent restriction and focus on integration in British immigration regulations. In Germany, by contrast, legal integration began later and the recognition of the need for reformed naturalisation regulations only began in the 1990s.

The other contrast is the inclusion in the UK sections of brief notes on the specific patterns of Turkish migration to the UK. Turkish immigration to Germany, as one of the largest migrant groups, is highly accounted for in terms of research on immigration and integration trends. Moreover, as the largest immigrant group, Turkish immigration poses the most challenges to the boundaries of national identity, and as such, will figure most prominently in the formulation of policies and boundary maintenance (Alba 2005, 22). In contrast, Turkish immigration to the UK is somewhat distinct from other migration experiences and may not be adequately accounted for in broader immigration and integration analysis. Starting with migration from North Cyprus and followed by Turkish and Kurdish migration from mainland Turkey, I thought it relevant to include specific information on these migration patterns as many of my interviews took place with people of Turkish or Kurdish identity. This specific group is possibly more comparable to Turkish immigration to Germany, not in terms of numbers, but in that Turkey did not have a colonial relationship with the UK, unlike many of the other countries of origin of UK immigrants (Küçükcan 2004, 246). Moreover, the positioning of the Turkish and Kurdish communities in London highlights the role of ethnicity in national notions of belonging, as Turks are the most visible minority in Germany but often go unaccounted for in British policy-making. This is even the case in the context of increased racialisation of Islam, as religion is largely a symbolic attachment for Turkish youth (see Chapter 7). Let us now turn to the context of postwar immigration.


In the years following World War II, the allies encouraged the establishment of a federal structure in West Germany in order to minimise resurgent nationalism (Erk 2003, 298). In spite of the federal structure, Germany regarded itself as an ethnically defined society. This identity was initially enshrined in the first Nationality Law of 1913, where Germany defined itself as a community of descent according to a jus sanguinis principle (Geddes 2003, 93). This ethnic identity was later incorporated into the constitution (‘Grundgesetz’ or ‘Basic Law’), describing the territory of former West Germany as a ‘vicarious, incomplete nation-state, home for all Germans in the communist diaspora’ (Joppke 1999, 63). This self-conception made it extremely difficult to become a citizen or integrate socially, for as Brubaker (1992, 78) states: it ‘involved a social transubstantiation that immigrants have difficulty imagining, let alone desiring’. 
Parallel to this development, Germany, along with other countries of Western Europe, initiated programmes to fill the labour shortages in the booming economy, especially as migration flows from Eastern Europe slowed to a halt with the erection of the Berlin Wall. Germany devised the guest-worker programme and signed bilateral recruitment agreements with countries including Turkey, Italy, Greece, Spain, Portugal, and Yugoslavia and its successors for the ‘exchange’ of workers, though the flow of people was generally one-way (Hill 1987, 275). Since it was presumed to be a temporary arrangement and because it was organised primarily through economic institutions, the influx of foreigners did not immediately conflict with the parliamentary self-conception within public policy that Germany was an ethnically defined nation-state.

Unlike Germany, the UK has never imagined itself to have a monocultural basis. Rather, it has been formulated from four different nations, thus making the borders of membership highly reliant on physical or geographical boundaries as opposed to those of culture (Favell 1998, 102). In the years after World War II, the geography of Britain actually extended much farther than the UK itself. In the 1948 Nationality Act, citizenship was an expansive term, giving social, legal, and political access to people from Britain’s colonies and the Commonwealth simply by stating ‘civis Britannicus sum’ (I am a British citizen)’ (Geddes 2003, 32). The underlying purpose of this nationality act and the 1946 and 1947 Free and Assisted Passages schemes was to shore up the remaining connections of Great Britain with each of its territories, while recognising the changing times (Paul 1995, 236). The nationality act enabled a potentially huge number of people to have the option to immigrate to the UK. Yet, it was not intended to signify equality. Free movement within the Empire was not a new phenomenon, but was always limited by policies that differentiated on the basis of class, gender, and race, thus perpetuating competing definitions of Britishness through an inclusive formal nationality and an exclusive informal national identity (Paul 1997). These tendencies were perpetuated in internal policies as will be seen. As in Germany, immigration was actively encouraged, at least at the beginning.

Germany

In Germany, the immigrants of the postwar period were only expected to remain temporarily. To that end, immigration was primarily organised and facilitated through a kind of ‘client politics’, where arrangements for workers involved employers and federal offices to sort through the requirements of residence permits, work, and transportation into Germany (Joppke 1999, 65). One of the primary institutions involved in this recruitment was the ‘Bundesanstalt für Arbeit’ [BA] (now the ‘Bundesagentur für Arbeit’ or ‘Federal Employment Agency’), which was responsible for administrating the recruitment and placement of foreign workers. The ‘bundesanstalt für Arbeit’ also established offices in several of the main ‘sending countries’, including Italy, Turkey, Greece, and Yugoslavia.
Like France and the Netherlands, Germany’s promotional migration policy was driven by the need for extra labour with considerations of legal status and integration taking second position (Huysmans 2000, 753-754). Unlike France, however, the BA issued both work and residence permits, thus indicating that the agreement was not only between the recruited guest-worker and the employer, but it was also a contract between the guest-worker and the state (Hollifield 1992, 60). Work and residence permits were only issued for specific jobs with specific time limits. Thus, within the agreement, it was stipulated that the guest-workers would return to their country of origin after two to three years (Faas 2007, 46). Thereby, the state would benefit from their labour, but not have to support the structural costs (Joppke 1999, 65).

Operating under the ‘buffer theory’, it was assumed that workers would fill the shortages in periods of economic growth and return home when the economy experienced a downturn (Dobson, Latham, and Salt 2009, 5). However, this theory does not account for temporary workers who become long-term residents. The effect of such a situation was that the structures formulated to support guest-workers were also temporary and ad hoc, meeting needs as they arose, but being driven primarily by what employers expected rather than the reality of what was actually taking place.

Guest-workers from Italy and former Yugoslavia settled primarily in southern Germany, while Turkish guest-workers settled in the Ruhr region, Cologne (Köln), Hamburg, and Berlin (Schönwälder and Söhn 2009, 1444).

The provisional arrangement is most clearly observed in the army-style housing for the primarily single men. In Cologne in the early 1970s, for example, many Turkish guest-workers were housed a distance from the city centre (Clark 1975, 65). They might also be housed as groups in wooden huts on the work site (Castles 1985, 519).

Berlin is somewhat unique in this respect. Minorities settled primarily in the inner city. This occurred as the authorities intended to demolish much of the pre-1914 housing, so German residents were re-located to other neighbourhoods throughout the city. Since the guest-workers’ stay was intended to be short-term, it seemed reasonable and profitable to rent these buildings to the guest-workers who were denied access to modern rented housing. When it became apparent that the guest-workers would remain, the demolition plans were withdrawn, and these areas of Berlin became neighbourhoods where high concentrations of immigrants reside (Schönwälder and Söhn 2009, 1451).

Worth noting at this point is the presence of generally unacknowledged Kurdish immigration to Germany. Though largely invisible in the initial years of the guest-worker programme, many of the economic migrants from Turkey originated from Kurdish areas of southeastern Anatolia (Adamson and Demetriou 2007, 501). However, a Kurdish political identity was not mobilised
until much later after the 1980 military coup and the increasing political repression in the 1980s. Thus, the political framework in Germany was mainly directed and identified as responding to the presence of Turkish immigrants, rather than recognising those of Kurdish ethnicity from the outset. For the Turkish population, the contrast between the Christian civil culture and Islam quickly became one of the key features of boundary maintenance. Acting mainly as a symbolic boundary, the perception of incompatibility played into the early foundations of the immigration and integration experience (Diehl et al 2009, 278).

Four years after the 1961 signing of the bilateral agreement between Turkey and Germany, the Aliens Regulations, last revised in 1938, were replaced by a new Foreigners Law (Geddes 2003, 81). Though praised for its liberality in facilitating entry and residence permits, this law primarily served to subordinate work and residence permits to the economic interests of the German state, granting increasing rights to regional governments. The old law made the ‘entry and stay’ of a foreigner contingent on the ‘subjective worthiness’ of a person, while the new law formed its criteria around ‘objective’ state interests (Joppke 1999, 66). The interests of the migrant were not the deciding factor (Entzinger and Biezeveld 2003, 26). Under this law, the executive (whether federal or regional) had all the authority, and the foreigner experienced a distinct absence of rights, which had to be corrected over subsequent years.

Second, the 1965 foreigner legislation gave considerable authority to the Länder (German states or counties) to determine who received residence permits. Who was and was not granted residence was largely dependent on the ‘political complexion’ of each region (Geddes 2003, 81). By and large, states like Baden-Wurttemberg and Bavaria, where the ‘presence of Christlich Demokratische Union’ [CDU] (Christian Democratic Union) or ‘Christlich-Soziale Union’ [CSU] (the equivalent of CDU in Bavaria) was strong, policies fell along a restrictionist line by imposing tougher family reunification rules than recommended by the federal government. In Hesse and Bremen, where the ‘Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands’ [SPD] (German Social Democratic Party) dominated politics, the state governments pursued a more liberal policy (Meier-Braun 1988). Baden-Württemberg also had a good deal to do with the 1980s federal policies of ‘inducing’ return migration or limiting ongoing immigration (Joppke 1999, 69). According to these regulations, foreigners were at a substantial disadvantage unless they could fulfill an economic need of the state.

Third, the Foreigner Law did not have protective provisions for family reunification of guest-workers (Joppke 1999, 67). Based on the framework of the guest-worker program, those involved would return home to establish or rejoin families. The provisions for family reunification of guest-workers or the ‘Decree on the Socially Responsible Regulation of Family Reunification’ were not added until 1981 (Geddes 2003, 81). When they were added, conservative Länder governments rose up against the SPD/FDP (‘Freie Demokratische Partei’ or ‘Free Demo-
cratic Party’) federal government, protesting the provisions as they were not deemed restrictive enough.

The CDU/CSU believed that family reunification should occur but only in the country of origin. This claim was based on a discussion of integration, arguing that return migration must be encouraged because, as CDU parliamentary leader, Alfred Dregger, put it, some foreigners ‘could not and should not’ be integrated, in which group he included both Turks and Asians (quoted in Joppke 1999, 81). These return migration policies underlined the social sentiment that there were too many immigrants in Germany, thereby legitimising the occurrences of xenophobic violence of the time (Borkert and Bosswick 2007, 5-6).

By the latter half of the 1960s and into the early 1970s, several countries in Western Europe including Germany began to reconsider their recruitment policies, which had effectively become open-door policies (Hollifield 1992, 32). Nonetheless, the recruitment programme continued between Germany and several other countries until the early 1970s when global economic pressures brought about by the Arab oil crisis slowed the German economy. After 1973, the SPD government under Chancellor Willy Brandt was forced to ban the further recruitment of guest-workers. The number of Turks recruited fell from 118,000 in 1973 to 6,000 in 1974 (Dobson, Latham, and Salt 2009, 7). However, the number of migrants living in Germany did not decrease (Behrens, Tost, and Jager 2002, 105; Faas 2007, 46). Some argue that the ban on further recruitment and policies of voluntary return migration unintentionally reinforced migrants’ resolve to stay in the country as reentry was almost impossible (Borkert and Bosswick 2007, 5; Sayari 1986, 97). Over the next few years, the ethnic composition of the guest-workers began to change to include less Italians and Yugoslavs and more Turks, increasing from 13 percent of the foreign population in the early 1970s to 33 percent by 1980, and 1.4 million by 1981 (Geddes 2003, 81; Joppke 1999, 66).

Their presence conflicted with Germany’s self-conception as an ethnic community, forming the basis for the maxim of ‘kein Einwanderungsland’ or ‘not a country of immigration’, officially adopted in the 1977 naturalisation regulations but present in public policy before that (Joppke and Morawska 2003, 63-64). This maxim was reflected in the political sector, which did not develop a coherent immigration policy until after German reunification (Borkert and Bosswick 2007, 2). Rather, the state attempted to control the demographic composition of the foreigner population through ad hoc policies such as restricting the number of entry visas to Turks in 1980 (Behrens, Tost, and Jager 2002, 104; Martin 1998). Overall, however, the guest-worker program in Germany (and other European countries) was deemed a failure, as the guest-workers did not leave with the tightening economy, and incentives to encourage repatriation had limited success (Hollifield 1992, 78).
The next few years were characterised by a shift in immigration. While there is not specific data on family reunification, it is widely assumed that much of the migration after 1973 included more families, joining those who had opted to remain in Germany. This is also confirmed by the demographics (age and gender) of those arriving in West Germany (Velling 1993). From 1974-1984, the number of females over 16 rose from 585 to 715 per 1,000 men. Likewise, the number of children rose from 364,000 in 1969 to 1.1 million in 1984 (Castles 1985, 520). Research notes that the majority of these children were between the ages of 6 and 15, presumably because of the lower level of care that they would require upon arrival, in addition to tightening restrictions on age (Velling 1993). However, it is not fully accurate to see the movement of more females as limited to female dependents joining a male breadwinner (Kofman 2004, 248). Rather, these years exhibit increasing diversity of female engagement in the migration process, including participation in labour migration and asylum-seeking in addition to family reunification (Kofman 1999, 270). This diversity within emigration is evident as early as the 1950s in West Germany for unmarried, widowed, or divorced women immigrating to Australia under the specific terms of an agreement between the two governments (Eubel 2010). The reality of female migration for other than family reunification is still present today in the globalisation of domestic service (Lutz 2002). Women comprise roughly 46 percent of the ‘foreign-born population’ in Germany and arrived under a variety of circumstances. However, even as citizenship and legal protection expanded over the next decades to incorporate men, women’s socio-economic and political integration into Germany was inhibited by discriminatory legal practices that generally classify them as ‘permanently provisional’ (Mushaben 2009).

Even as women were not accounted for as individuals, the increased prevalence of immigrant families led Germany to recognise the failings of the buffer theory. Government policies regarding recruitment, placement, and integration of foreigners would have to be re-thought. Moreover, the state began to acknowledge the need for a better social infrastructure to respond to the housing, welfare, and educational needs of the now-resident, non-German population (Hollifield 1992, 70). For example, German schools, mainly operating under Ausländerpädagogik, focused on school problems, educational attainment, and transition to the labour market (Worbs 2003, 1015). Yet, the integration of foreigners was not thoroughly addressed in national politics until much later. Instead, parties might use the topic of immigration as a playing card in inter-party competition to justify economic policies and cutbacks (Faist 1994). Thus, citizenship and other social and political rights were left for later discussions. On the surface, this indicates Germany’s leaning towards the economic argument for immigrant regulation. However, the underlying basis for this argument was Germany’s self-conception as an ethnically defined nation-state and ‘not a country of immigration’. The developments in Germany’s political terrain regarding these issues will be discussed in the latter part of this chapter.
The United Kingdom

From the beginning, the UK’s immigration policies after World War II were significantly more contested than the guest-worker programme in Germany. With the last vestiges of the Empire gaining independence, the transition from subjectship to citizenship and from empire to nation inevitably influenced the nature of immigration policies in the years after 1948. While there may be an underlying centre-periphery tension in Germany’s relations with its guest-worker partner countries, the UK experienced a much more explicit re-definition as it attempted to preserve and re-formulate elements of its national identity. Amid the flow of immigrants from former colonies and the Commonwealth into the territorial confines of the United Kingdom, the policies aimed to ‘carve out the historic homeland nation from the vast empire, and to subject the rest’ (Joppke 1999, 101). Yet, the 1948 Nationality Act gave equality of rights to all subjects, based on allegiance to the crown (Paul 1995, 237). All subjects could enter the UK, vote for Parliament, and take employment. This formal and theoretical basis for equality gave the impression of the British Empire/Commonwealth as universal and united. However, the contested nature of immigration extended from the highest level of government to the local demands of city districts.

Within Whitehall, the Colonial Office and the Ministry of Labour were at odds regarding the open-door policy (Geddes 2003, 33). The Ministry of Labour questioned the preparedness of the workers to fill the employment gaps. In the late 1950s, race riots in several locations in England revealed the increasing discontent of the populace with the open immigration policies, leading to immigration restrictions particularly for black and Asian migrants. While one can debate the source and logic behind immigration policy, I will mainly focus here on the main outcomes and how the tension in the immigration policy shaped immigration, rather than where it was initiated or debated. It is important to note that economics played a less explicit role in the formulation of immigration policy when compared to Germany or France; at the moment of Germany’s agreement with Turkey to accept more guest-workers, the UK enacted the first of successively restrictive immigration policies. Controls on immigration were implemented well before the 1973 oil crisis, which spelled the end to the guest-worker programme in Germany (Joppke 1999, 102).

The earliest controls on immigration actually date back to 1793, when Grenville’s Aliens Act gave the first parliamentary controls over the expulsion of aliens brought to the UK through trade and slavery, then clearly distinguished from ‘denizens’ or privileged foreigners (Phillimore and Goodson 2008, 4). In 1848 (a complete century before the aforementioned British nationality Act), the Removal of Aliens Act gave the Home Secretary the authority to expel those who threatened the ‘peace and tranquility of the realm’. Passed into legislation well before the twentieth century, these two policy decisions laid the foundation of the main themes that
shape the logic of British immigration and integration policy. While Favell (1998, 109-111) argues that the logic of internal integration and external discrimination policies was different, it seems that the underlying theme of race and the goal of public order based on deeply ingrained preconceptions about race and ethnicity align the two strands of policy formulation.

In the aftermath of the empire, citizenship did not have a meaningful core definition. Since nationality was not a significant characteristic, racial and ethnic definitions have been the primary paradigm of integration (Penninx 2005, 140). It has also been argued elsewhere that the British Empire was actually the ‘incubator’ of modern-day racism (Howe 2003, 287). In so saying, it indicates the deep roots of British race relations, and the spillover of colonial institutions into immigration and integration policies. Race was used as a proxy to define those who belong and those who do not (Joppke 1999, 101). Formally, Britain has practised an inclusionist policy, but the case of the UK illustrates the difference between formal inclusion and ‘inclusion in practice’ (Penninx 2005, 140). This is further highlighted in Chapter 6, where different perceptions of citizenship are discussed by minority youth in the UK.

On the national stage, immigration policies were fraught with inequalities. Gender, class, and skin colour indirectly and directly shaped immigration policy decisions (Paul 1995, 237). Most relevant to this research, policies were formulated in a manner to keep race and ethnicity from becoming a potentially divisive issue. While there might have been ‘externalities of benefit’ to ethnic minorities, their well-being was not the central concern even of progressive integration policies (Favell 1998, 109). Through the measures surrounding these notions of connectedness by culture and race, the restrictions on immigration develop to exclude and inhibit future waves of immigration, keeping net migration extremely low (Joppke 1999, 101). Where Germany is known as a no-immigration country, the UK is known as the zero immigration country. Unlike Germany, however, this maxim was actually lived in reality with an extremely low net migration. From the years 1961 to 1981, emigration even outweighed immigration by one million (Joppke 1999, 101).

With the backdrop of the 1948 Nationality Act, migrants from Britain’s former colonies began to enter the UK with attractive incentives and active recruitment to work in public transport, the recently established National Health Service, and textile and car industries (Geddes 2003, 32). Like Germany, the recruitment process shaped the settlement patterns of migrants. Generally migrating with clear goals of employment, immigrant populations became concentrated in London, the industrial Midlands, the northwest, and Yorkshire. For the most part, they settled in the inner neighbourhoods of industrial cities and towns alongside working-class ‘Whites’ and often took jobs at the bottom end of the labour market (Abbas 2011).
In 1948, eight hundred million people had the right to migrate to the UK based on citizenship as co-nationals (Joppke 1999, 101). The ethnic make-up of the migrant population was quite diverse with large numbers coming from Asia, Africa, and the Caribbean. Like Germany, however, it was assumed that they would return home as soon as their employment ended or the economy tightened (Abbas 2011, 46). Perhaps one of the most longstanding of the ethnically Turkish communities began to immigrate to Britain from northern Cyprus around this time.

In 1878, Cyprus became a British colony, annexed in 1914, and thus, Cypriots had the right to immigrate to the UK as subjects of the crown (Issa 2005, 5; Küçükcan 1999, 60). In fact, the first wave of migration from Cyprus pre-dates the focus of this research to the years before World War II. In general, however, it is difficult to find exact numbers of immigrants from Cyprus and Turkey due to methods in counting those entering the UK. They did not distinguish between Turkish and Greek of those coming from Cyprus, not to mention the numbers of undocumented (illegal) immigrants (Ali 2001, 6). Some scholars have asserted that, in the years after World War II, the number of migrants to the UK roughly matched the ratio of the island, i.e. one Turkish Cypriot to every Greek Cypriot (Issa 2005, 5). The gaps in the data reflect a broader issue of invisibility, faced by Cypriots as they negotiated the circumstances of their new life (Robins and Aksoy 2001, 685). This aspect of the Turkish-Cypriot migration experience extends to those migrating from the Turkish mainland to the UK as will be discussed shortly.

Many of them came seeking economic opportunity. They seem to be a mixture of young people, some single and others married, though those who were married often came alone at first, to be joined in a year or two by their spouse (Issa 2005, 5). Unlike other countries, immigration from Cyprus (and later mainland Turkey) was not organised by Turkey or Britain in terms of setting up specific emigration centres. Instead, migration built upon individual initiatives and social networks (Küçükcan 2004, 247). After Cyprus became independent in 1959, a sudden flow of immigrants came to the UK. Those who had helped in the colonial administration were offered a passport and a lump sum to settle in the UK, so many took the opportunity (Ali 2001, 6). This first wave of immigrants from the Commonwealth was slowed somewhat by the 1962 Immigration Act.

The 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act drew a line between citizens of Britain and its colonies versus belonging to independent Commonwealth countries. The Colonial Office effectively lost the struggle to maintain the lingering hope of the Commonwealth ideal, and the reality of the limitations of market growth became evident; in addition, race riots in London took the concerns of immigration onto the level of national awareness (Geddes 2003, 33). The restrictive measures may have slowed the wave of immigration in some respects, but in some quarters, it had the opposite effect. In a similar pattern to immigration to Germany, immigrants from Cyprus joined other nationalities in heightened immigration in fear that the gates would soon close.
Immigrants coming from the Commonwealth countries were subject to controls under the justification of the UK becoming overcrowded, though many argue that this was merely a response to the racial character of some immigrants (Geddes 2003, 33-35). Using colour as a way to recognise unwanted immigrants was justified in that it identified those coming from economically disadvantaged countries (Favell 1998, 110-111).

The 1968 Act saw the beginning of the one-grandparent rule, where a person could immigrate to the UK if they could prove one parent or grandparent was born, adopted, or a naturalised citizen (Geddes 2003, 37). In 1971, all preceding legislation was replaced with this rule under the conservative government, limiting immigration, in short, to relatives and strictly monitored marriages (Favell 1998, 106-107). This legislation had the effect of indirectly reinforcing the racist undertones of immigration policy, for most of those who could claim citizenship under this criteria were white (Phillimore and Goodson 2008, 6). In 1980, the Conservative government instituted the ‘primary purpose’ rule, which gave immigration authorities the right to probe the true reason for immigration and deny entry if a marriage was formed solely for the purpose of gaining entry to the UK (Geddes 2003, 35). This differs from countries like Germany, mainly because the UK did not (and does not) have a codified constitution that would set out the rights of the family. Instead, these needs had to be provided for by statute.

The 1970s saw the first concentrated wave of people migrating from mainland Turkey. They were mostly legal workers followed by families, numbering at around four thousand, who joined the Turkish Cypriot community (Issa 2005, 8). These numbers are far lower than the numbers of Turkish immigrants to other European countries. Unlike their Turkish-Cypriot counterparts who often had British passports, they came on work permits that had to be renewed every year. However, they were able to become residents after five years, though they still maintained their Turkish nationality in order to keep their rights in Turkey (Issa 2005, 8). Many of these Turks came from the countryside of Turkey. One author notes that records show people coming to Western Europe from the cities, but that the actual origin of these migrants is obscured by internal migration in Turkey beforehand (Ali 2001, 7). Over the same years, the next influx of people from Cyprus came. As an after-effect of the military intervention and occupation of Turkey in 1974, many immigrated as refugees to the UK. Large numbers of these were Greek Cypriots, but also a number of Turkish Cypriots came to the UK (Ali 2001, 6; Issa 2005, 6).

Unlike Germany, the question of how immigrants should or should not be integrated was an issue from an earlier point. Roy Hattersley, a Labour politician, described the relationship between external control and internal protection by saying: ‘Without integration limitation is inex-usable, without limitation integration is impossible’ (quoted in Geddes 2003, 36). The relationship between immigration and integration was connected from an early stage. The issues sur-
rounding the presence of minority communities were apprehended long before their counterparts in Germany. However, the second part of this maxim was highlighted far more than the first, almost justifying the limitations on immigration by the challenges (real or exaggerated) of integration. It shows the close link between external controls and internal order in British policy formulation. Later in the 1960s, two distinct trends within British integration policy emerged that can both be derived from Hattersley’s remarks. On the one hand, there is the ideal of a diverse, inclusive society, and on the other, a prediction of destruction and mass ghettoisation based on the numbers and demands of immigrants.

To illustrate the two contrasting views, let us take two quotes from the late 1960s. Roy Jenkins from the Home Office in 1966, stated that integration is not ‘…the loss, by immigrants, of their own national characteristics and culture’, ‘…not as a flattening process of uniformity, but cultural diversity, coupled with equality of opportunity in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance’ (quoted in Favell 1998, 104-105). This statement represents a loose policy of integration, including elements of de facto multiculturalism and liberal proceduralism (see Chapter 2).

In direct contrast, Enoch Powell predicted in his ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech (1968) that the very tools of integration and racial protection would provide the arsenal for minority communities’ demands, leading to social fragmentation and the complete capsizing of society. For Powell, descent was what made a person English, and by extension, permitted cultural and political belonging (Yuval-Davis 20061, 210). Powell’s approach posited that de facto multiculturalism would become a means of maintaining social and cultural boundaries between the minority and majority communities.

These two opposing views exhibit, though with different vocabulary and justifications, the same tension between particularism and universalism that comes to the fore in German integration policy. Furthermore, these two strands of thinking illustrate the complex position of the foreigner in the UK, even before the oil crisis of the 1970s. In both cases, Germany and the UK show degrees of openness regarding legal protection, while both exhibit political trends of closure. Immigrants to the UK from the Commonwealth may have had full political rights and formal membership, but that did not provide guarantees against discrimination (Hammar 1990). Thus, it is clear that the legal-political aspect of citizenship is not enough to guarantee equality (Penninx 2005, 140).

With the need to manage race riots and maintain public order, more inclusive integration policies were implemented (Favell 1998, 106-107). Like other European countries, the UK began the process with multiculturalist policies in the 1970s. However, they were quickly contested for their perceived paternalism (Abbas 2011, 111; for further critiques of liberal multicultural-
ism, see Malik 2005). Not long after, a subtle shift was made to focus more on anti-racist policies.

These were particularly aimed at inner city areas. Built in the postwar boom, these areas were initially assumed to be covered by the welfare state. However, in the 1960s, growing awareness of poverty and ‘uneasiness’ about increased black immigration into older British cities culminated in a 1968 programme under the Labour government towards the inner cities. Its effectiveness was limited in several significant ways. First, while it had bipartisan support, it lacked financial support. Second, it operated under the assumption that very few people would not be able to succeed economically and would not need support. Finally, the programme was managed under the jurisdiction of the Home Office (responsible for immigration), rather than being managed under urban policy (Parkinson 1989, 427-428). This would only come under more scrutiny in the following decade.

In the 1970s, attention shifted to Northern Ireland, and so progressive policies regarding race were pushed through without receiving a high profile. In the Race Relations Act of 1976, the third of its kind in eleven years, the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) was founded. While its work was more symbolic than proactive, it did cover indirect discrimination, and it had mechanisms to deal with situations on the local level (Favell 1998, 107). It was intended to go after discrimination in education, employment, and ensure racial equality, broadly speaking. It also brought many local activities and community-based efforts to tackle race relations under one state umbrella. The 1976 Act responded to racial tensions, but it also reacted to partisan pressure within the Labour party to balance the continually restrictive immigration policies (Lieberman 2002, 149).

Labour also implemented changes in policies towards the inner city. The assumption of the individual as primarily responsible for economic success shifted to a broader understanding of the effects of economic change (Parkinson 1989, 428). Moreover, the inner city programme was expanded and moved from the Home Office to the Department of the Environment along with the rest of urban policy-making. With increased budget, they focused on the social and economic factors for decline and committed to generating wealth in the cities along with providing services for those who remained excluded from the mainstream economy. These programmes towards the inner city, however, would experience continual change under Thatcher and a different form of economic policy, discussed in the next portion of the chapter.

Examining the way that these policies played out, one can see the establishment of a hierarchy of centre and periphery, nation and empire, replicated on the domestic stage. By the early 1980s, race was again on the agenda with the Brixton riots of 1981, and after an investigation of the situation by Lord Scarman, it was posited that deprivation and institutional racism were at the
heart of the problem, leading to the proposal and establishment of community-based policing approaches (Phillimore and Goodson 2008, 7).

Unlike black or Asian minorities, the Turkish-Cypriot community and the growing Turkish community were not identified as non-white. In this way, the highlighting of race as a point around which the discourse of integration was mobilised put this community in a unique position of almost being invisible, though also experiencing many of the challenges of other non-white communities. Research on the presence of Muslims in a Copenhagen neighbourhood posited that these experiences of visibility and invisibility are highly based upon national, even local, contextualisations of interactions (Schmidt 2011, 1218). This dynamic of invisibility and visibility continues to the present with the way that census data is gathered. The 2011 census primarily addressed categories of ethnicity based on colonial immigration or relations with Ireland, leaving non-Arab Middle Eastern and all European, North American, and South American to be subsumed under the category of ‘White other’. This is a very interesting contrast to Germany, where the Turkish community is the most visible ethnic minority. By putting the two contexts side by side, one can conclude that defining features of race and ethnicity are highly dependent on their historical and national surroundings (Wimmer 2008). Naturally, not all of these patterns were as apparent at the time as they are in retrospect. Yet, by the 1980s, significant steps had been made in both countries that would lay the foundation for future relations and current challenges.


While the UK exhibited the management of ethnic minorities and the prospects of responding to immigration and integration before 1980, Germany maintained its self-conception as not a country of immigration for the most part, politically denying the presence and needs of immigrants. This mindset dominated politics. Legally, however, Germany began to approach the issues of family reunification and individual rights of immigrants within the border, de facto converging with the policies of its European neighbours. At the end of the twentieth century, both countries experienced the need for more stringent regulations and established policies to respond to immigrants in the climate of increasing numbers of asylum-seekers.

Germany

Though the political identity of the nation was not open to immigrants, the legal framework of the constitution has continually expanded and extended rights to protect foreigners against state interests, showing hints of a civic understanding of nation by protecting the rights of individuals over their ethnic belonging. Soon after it became clear that the guest-workers were staying, activist courts began to defend the rights of all foreigners based on a constitution that drew from the experience of German history, particularly recent German history under the Third Reich.
They subordinated the state to the rights of the individual and guaranteed the most fundamental rights regardless of nationality (Joppke 1999, 69). Legal scholars laid out the protections of foreigners according to the constitution, but actual court rulings had to bring these principles into practice.

A range of court rulings and the elaboration of constitutional protection of foreigners demonstrates a trend in Germany to a universalist mode of identification. This is clearest in the words of Josef Isensee in his report presented to the 1973 Convention of the Society of Constitutional Lawyers. Isensee made the important distinction that before a foreigner is admitted to the state, the state is sovereign, but once the foreigner is admitted to the territory, that person has the equal protection of the law, and the state’s ‘discretion’ is limited by the full arsenal of constitutional rights, for ‘In the age of human rights the foreigner does not enjoy guest but home rights’, and that the longer a foreigner remained in the territory, the more constitutional protection he should be afforded even to the point of being equal with Germans (quoted in Joppke 1999, 71,74). These rulings began to slowly trickle into policy-making, leading to the eventual recognition that immigration was taking place.

The Basic Law, evidences a trajectory of protecting and expanding the rights of foreign nationals. In fact, some Turkish people in Germany highlight the many rights granted them through welfare protection and family reunification as a reason not to apply for naturalisation (Anil 2007, 1372). Through this sense of obligation and duty ratified into policy, the case of the Turkish minority has been transformed from that of guest-worker to permanent resident and increasingly to legal citizen (Joppke 1999, 64).

Here, it is important to distinguish between the legal protections and the experience of those protections. For a foreigner with limited knowledge of the German language, the system remained opaque with varied experiences depending on the county. Furthermore, even if the legal-political boundaries have become more fluid, the social sentiments against immigration have become more strongly felt than ever.

In the 1980s, the second oil crisis and increasing unemployment sparked a social backlash against foreigners. The repeated attempts of the German government to foster return migration had little effect (Hollifield 1992, 83). To the contrary, the number of immigrants entering under family reunification provisions was causing concern. While about half of the foreign nationals in Germany today originate from one of the six major recruitment countries, many of those arrived after the guest-worker agreements were ended as students, employees, refugees (from Turkey and Yugoslavia), followed by labour migration from the European Union, more refugee movements and resettlement of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe in the 1980s and 1990s.
In spite of the diverse origins of German immigration, the ethnic composition of the foreigners also began to come under social scrutiny in the 1980s. The Turkish community as the largest minority began to replace the ‘foreigner problem’ in people’s minds as the ‘Turkish problem’ (Joppke 1999, 78). It can be argued that the Turks had the fewest advantages, not because they were less skilled but because of their larger numbers and coming in the last wave of recruitment (Geddes 2003, 92).

The following years saw repeated attempts to tighten and restrict the foreigner law, which mostly succeeded in causing rifts between political parties and no law was made (Joppke 1999, 82). These laws were often restrictive in the extreme, matching the social sentiment of the time and reiterating Germany’s self-conception as ‘not a country of immigration’. In 1986 and 1987, for example, the national election campaign emphasised the ‘serious threat to German national identity by multicultural foreign infiltration’, pointed at non-European asylum-seekers (Borkert and Bosswick 2007, 5).

At the end of the 1980s, political debates culminated in the success of the Foreigner Law of 1990, which had, as CSU leaders noted, no mention of Germany as ‘not a country of immigration’ and also no mention of return migration (Joppke 1999, 84). In fact, the new law was intended to replace the state interests enshrined in the 1965 law with individual rights. The 1990 Foreigner Law incorporated the existing ‘administrative rules and legal constraints’ that had been extended to foreigners under the Basic Law, essentially ratifying constitutional court rulings that had been long since established in addition to incorporating measures stemming from moral obligations to families (Joppke 1999, 84-85). In other words, the Foreigner Law made a trajectory from basing acceptance on the subjective worthiness of the person to basing it on state interests to formulating it around individual rights. It is interesting that on either end of this trajectory, the foreigner law focuses on the individual. However, in contrast to the subjective worthiness of the person, individual rights come out of the discourse of human rights applied to immigration, contributing to the theories of postnational membership that were discussed in the previous chapter.

According to Borkert and Bosswick (2007, 6), the new law introduced several significant changes including (1) taking away some of the discretionary power of the Länder, (2) guaranteeing re-entry to Germany of foreigners with permanent residence permits, and (3) adding new provisions for naturalisation after living in Germany for a given number of years, introducing the concept of *jus domicilii*. The number of Turkish naturalisations increased dramatically in the following years, reinforced by the Turkish government’s encouragement to naturalise (by im-
plementing a programme for tacit dual nationality) (Anil 2007, 1366). The Foreigner Law, however, did not remove the distinction between Germans and foreigners. Even if the words extended a much more cooperative tone, it still drew lines between non-privileged and privileged foreigner or EU national in contrast to a third-country national; for example, ‘Turks were singled out as an undesired, ‘difficult’ foreigner group’ (Joppke 1999, 76).

To make matters more complicated, the 1990s brought a new challenge for the German economy and institutions. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the flow of asylum-seekers to Germany increased dramatically from about 120 thousand in 1989, reaching just under 440 thousand by 1992, between 60-70 percent of refugees in Western Europe (Joppke 1999, 50-51). This brought increasing pressure from the mainstream and extreme right-wing parties to increase state control of immigration (Geddes 2003, 87). In states like Baden-Württemberg, mainstream right-wing parties picked up almost eleven percent of the vote in 1991 (Geddes 2003, 87). These increasing pressures on the domestic front combined with Germany’s participation in the ever-closer union of the European member states enabled and influenced a shift in immigrant policy in the late 1990s. The European context in which Germany found itself increased the liberality of various measures to promote immigrant integration, enhancing the possibilities for educational initiatives to correct for long-neglected ethno-national boundaries while also strengthening the state’s instruments to restrict immigration.

In the context of tightening immigration policy, family formation increasingly replaced family reunification. Marriage to someone with legal residence in the country provided legal residence for the spouse (Caldwell 2007). As of 2002, approximately 53 percent of Turks live in Germany as a result of family reunification or marriage in comparison to 33 percent who arrived as guest-workers (Anil 2007, 1365). This phenomenon has several implications for the relationship of Germany and its minority population. For one, it means that the number of first generation Turks in Germany is continually being renewed. It also affirms the notion that the Turks who came to Germany to participate in the guest-worker programme defined themselves, by and large, ethnocentrically, looking for employment in Germany, not a new culture (Anil 2007, 1370), though this emphasis on ethnicity may have been heightened by the reception, conditions, and experience in Germany. The constant influx of first generation Turkish immigrants helps to keep the identity linked to the country of origin. However, one must be extremely careful in assuming that the ethnic definitions of the country of origin will be reflected in exactly the same way in the country of settlement. Furthermore, not all immigrants to Germany from Turkey belong to the same group in terms of educational attainment, economic (business) aspirations, and political or religious views.

Adding to the complexity of this internal diversity, there are formal organisational links between Turkey and those living in Germany. Many migrant associations have the difficult role of
responding to national and international pressures through transnational links as well as meeting the requirements for integration in the country of settlement (Amelina and Faist 2008, 91). Such organisations include the well-known DITIB (Turkish-Islamic Union of the Presidency of Religious Affairs) or the IGMG (Islamic Community milli Görü) among many others.

The lack of a coherent immigration policy or programmes for the integration of new arrivals began to be addressed in earnest after 1998 with the election of the SPD and Green coalition (Geddes 2003, 88). To this point, an us-them philosophy had dominated German policy-making (Faas 2008, 110). The government proposed a new naturalisation law with added elements of the jus soli principle. The new Nationality Act, which took effect in 2000, supplemented being ‘German’ by descent with being ‘German’ by birth on German soil (Nationality Act [Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz]).

It is not coincidental that the renewed interest in expanding naturalisation policies came at this point in time. Beyond the expansion of rights through the court system and the influence of the EU, German reunification also had a substantial role to play. Germany’s ethnic definition had to be protected as long as East and West Germany were divided, as the ethnic definition of the state was seen as one bridge to eventual reunification. However, when reunification occurred in 1990, the polity was prepared to consider an extension of the citizenry to include the foreigner population (Joppke 2010, 51). Nonetheless, the law was indicative of the persistent ambivalence towards the presence of the foreigners.

The law contained what some authors describe as two contradictory elements: (1) a very extensive jus soli for the second generation and (2) restrictive measures to avoid dual citizenship well beyond its neighbours (Gerdes, Faist, and Rieple 2007, 46-47). Though the eventual law was not as liberal as the original, it still succeeded in causing a reaction in the political landscape in some regions. Hesse, for example, although traditionally electing state officials belonging to the SPD, they voted in a CDU government in 1999 with a primary reason being foreigner issues (Geddes 2003, 96).

In August 2001, the then Interior Minister, Otto Schily proposed the first coherent immigration system. Originating in the report by the Independent Commission on Migration, ‘Zuwanderung gestalten, Integration fördern’ or ‘Structuring immigration, fostering integration’, this was the first time that Germany was declared to be a country of immigration that needed immigration to compete, and state-organised programmes of integration were no longer optional (Boswell, Chou, and Smith 2005, 13; Geddes 2003, 89).

The first German federal immigration and integration law came into effect in 2005 (Anil 2007, 1365). It was intended as a long-term framework to cope with immigration to Germany with a view to the relationship with EU member states and Germany’s foreign inhabitants, which, in
2005, measured about one fifth of Germany’s population (Angenendt 2007). However, socio-economic inequality, discrimination, and marginalisation persist. Even with the expansion of rights and changing citizenship policies, identities and notions of belonging are maintained.

The United Kingdom

While Germany experienced a gradual shifting as legal protections spilled over into politics, eventually changing Germany’s self-conception from a no-immigration country to a country that requires immigration to succeed, the UK’s immigration experience in the years after 1980 was a continual process of tightening the borders. The means of border maintenance included a major change in the British Nationality Act and the switch to a points-based immigration scheme. While Germany, too, has increasingly emphasised the duties of immigrants, the points-based system explicitly makes the process of becoming a citizen one of earning a particular right to belong.

In 1981 (1983), the revised Nationality Act changed the conception of British citizenship dramatically. From 1948 to this point, citizenship and immigration regulations gave all subjects of the crown the right to enter Britain (Geddes 2003, 31). The new Nationality Act closed some loopholes for family reunification as well as changing the relationship with overseas dependencies. More importantly, it took away automatic citizenship for children born of non-British parents on British soil or jus soli. This ushered in a new era of a confusing tripartite citizenship status (Favell 1998, 109 114).

The three categories of citizenship include (1) being British ‘culturally’ for those who have direct UK connections and residency, (2) being a British citizen as a subject of the sovereign (including other Commonwealth citizens who were formerly British subjects), and (3) being a British national with a right of abode (including citizens of British dependent territories) (Favell 1998, 113). The tripartite dimension of citizenship lessened the value of the notion as a signifier of moral equality and emptied it to entail only the minimal right of abode. It had the simultaneous and perhaps more significant effect of stripping any lingering postcolonial implications and shrinking the conception of the nation-state (Geddes 2003, 37, 40). It institutionalised increasing denials of family reunification, particularly the requests of women and children from the Indian subcontinent (Joppke 1999, 118). Furthermore, it made it increasingly difficult for non-whites to gain entry to the UK and was only reinforced by the 1988 act that limited access to social provisions for ethnic minorities and the ability to bring their families to the UK (Farrall 2006, 264). It likewise hindered husbands joining their wives. To this end, eleven Muslim women wrote a letter to the Guardian, expressing their sense of frustration. As British citizens who were either born in the UK or brought as small children, they were denied the right to be
joined by their husbands because of the primary purpose rule (later revised) (Lister 1997, 4; for a more detailed discussion of marriage and British immigration policy, see Joppke 1999).

In order to understand this dramatic change in the conception of British nationality, it is helpful to briefly examine the political climate of the 1980s and the rising emphasis on race relations. In 1979, Margaret Thatcher was elected as British prime minister and leader of the Conservative government. At least in part to respond to government overload, ‘Thatcherism’ employed a four-fold strategy to relieve this pressure and stabilise the country’s economy (Garnett and Lynch 2012, 54). These four elements were monetarism (controlling the money supply), privatisation (the selling of state-owned industries), trade union reform (placing restrictions on trade union rights), and hiving off (giving responsibility for central government functions to semi-autonomous agencies). Thatcher enthusiastically embraced monetarist ideas as a way to boost the British economy. Monetarism included raising interest rates, lowering taxes, and less spending (Hansen and King 2001, 259). Privatisation and deregulation affected companies like British Airways, national transportation, and telecommunications providers. Tax revisions generated more wealth but also more socioeconomic inequality. These reforms also brought about rising unemployment in manufacturing but rising employment in the services sector and self-employment (Mathews et al 1987). Before Thatcher, policies were implemented to aid those of lower socioeconomic status. As such, the market mechanisms implemented after the Conservatives came to power had particular effects on marginalised or lower income groups (Farrall 2006, 258). This is confirmed in the reaction of large urban areas, which countered the Conservative assumption of the benefits of privatisation. Labour-dominated, they supported the public sector as the only way to respond to the private sector’s disinvestment in cities (Parkinson 1989, 429).

In general, the Thatcher government did remarkably well at meeting its pledges to reform the economy. The one area where they did not actually fulfil their pledges of 1979 was immigration as they were viewed as too strict, even among other Conservative party members (Royed 1996, 68). Immigration was a hot topic for Thatcher even before becoming elected. Similar to earlier comments by Enoch Powell, she was reported as saying that Britain may be “swamped by people of a different culture’ (quoted in Charteris-Black 2006, 570). The Thatcher government promised tight restrictions on immigration. For the most part, however, the issues surrounding the question of immigration reached a stalemate, especially regarding the limitations of family reunification. The Thatcher government tried to require registers of dependents in order to limit family migration, but sending countries were not particularly willing to cooperate with British immigration controls that were perceived to be discriminatory. At the same time, race relations within the UK became the major issue (Geddes 2003, 40). In other words, the actual movement
of people became less the focus as social and political relations on the domestic level took first position.

Occurring intermittently throughout the 1980s, the race riots blew the topic back onto centre stage (Favell 1998, 108). They demonstrated the tenuous relations of minorities within Britain and the failure to obtain the social cohesion through integration that Roy Jenkins described in 1966. The Scarman Report, previously mentioned in this chapter, identified the relationship between race, education, and accommodation (Neal 2003, 58).

The mechanisms to respond to racial inequality were limited, however. Where the Labour government had planned to raise the budget of the Commission for Racial Equality by almost 25 percent, Thatcher raised it by less than 5 percent and continually cut its budget over the next several years (Lieberman 2002, 151). Efforts to expand the powers of the CRE were also repeatedly ignored. Moreover, minority incorporation into the British political system was limited with only minimal integration in the party system and no strong social movements to back their cause. Also, unlike Germany, the British judicial system did not offer a viable alternative for political inclusion. Already citizens in many cases, the major issues to be addressed were in regards to discrimination. However, the courts generally acted to review the operation of the CRE and put limitations on its powers, rather than offering a course of action for minority groups.

In the 1980s, after the change in citizenship policies, the third major segment of migration from Turkey began. Comprised mostly of Kurds, they came after the military coup in 1980 and throughout the 1980s because of persecution from Sunni fundamentalists (Issa 2005, 9). At first, they applied as asylum-seekers, but for the most part, the UK evaluated them as economic migrants, rather than bona fide refugees. Numbers of Kurds living in London remain unclear, however, because they are classified under Turkish nationality. At the same time, many intellectuals fled to Europe; some sought political asylum in the UK (Ali 2001, 7).

The 1990s marked a shift in migration patterns, however. In part, this was due to the changing geopolitical structure of Europe with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Ethnic violence in Eastern Europe, particularly the former Yugoslavia, forced millions of people to flee. Additionally, traditional countries of emigration, for example in southern Europe, quickly became countries of immigration. These shifts are still evident years later with the expansion of the EU and continued controversy over the full participation of newly acceded member states in the free movement of goods, capital, and people (Favell 2008, 701).

The 1990s also saw changes in the migrant profiles more broadly. Migration trends included the presence of asylum-seekers, refugees, students, labour migrants, and economic migrants, leading to an overall diversification of the communities living in the UK in general and in London, in particular. ‘New’ migration refers to the labour market demands from economic growth
throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, where ‘old’ migration was a result of post-war labour demands or family reunification (Gidley and Jayaweera 2010). Such high levels of migration and interaction make national origin a very ‘imperfect measuring-rod’ of identities that intersect with ethnicity, religion, language, and so on (King et al 2008; Vertovec 2007, 1025).

Of particular note is the increased and changing participation of women in migration. Mentioned briefly in the first section of this chapter, conventional assumptions limited female migration to moving as a companion or as part of family reunion has shifted as women participate in the labour market and make use of greater rights and freedoms to move across borders (Marinucci 2007). Also called the ‘feminisation of migration’, it refers to the increased mobility of women as they make use of opportunities to live and work outside of their home country, whether legally or illegally (Lutz and Koser 1998, 2). This does not always indicate a shift in gender roles, however, since much of the female migration is integrated into the economy through domestic work. In a way, it is a replication of gender responsibilities, as women who work employ other women to clean and care for their home (Labadie-Jackson 2008). Women also participate in the service sector, but reportedly experience exploitation through prostitution and the entertainment industry. Women account for almost half of immigration numbers worldwide, but these numbers vary based on the region (Yinger 2007). In the UK, the increased movement of women across borders and the higher number of female asylum applicants have led to the critique of British asylum policy as being interpreted based on the experiences of men, thereby reflecting and reinforcing the gender biases within states (as discussed in terms of citizenship practices in the last chapter) (Crawley 1999, 309).

Also during the 1990s, thousands of Kurds left for Europe and stayed with extended families and friends, seeking political asylum. The rapidly growing numbers of asylum-seekers put an immense burden on boroughs of North London, forcing Kurdish organisations, churches, and other local associations to step in and help provide for their needs (Wahlbeck 1998, 217). This has had a substantial impact on the life of the community in the UK along with implications for education (Ali 2001, 8).

In 1997 and the election of New Labour, a communitarian approach dominated politics, focusing on the ‘moral relevance of communities and the rights and responsibilities of individuals within them’ (Geddes 2003, 41). Within the UK, however, race relations remained tenuous at best. The Macpherson Report, which investigated the murder of Stephen Lawrence, echoed the findings of the Scarman Report and the need for changes in an institutionally racist police force (Neal 2003, 58). The recommendations included an examination and reformulation of the way that police responded to, worked with, and engaged minority communities.
Steps towards more anti-racist measures were taken, including the Race Relations Amendment Act of 2000 (which put responsibility for racial equality on the shoulders of the local authority) and the removal of the ‘primary purpose’ rule from immigration legislation. The emphasis of race relations shifted to the community and away from strictly multiculturalist policies. This allowed for the deracialisation of terminology, but at the same time, the emphasis on community cohesion hearkened back to older notions of assimilation and, by extension, social exclusion (Worley 2005, 483). Moreover, the community-based policies have been reconfigured with ‘active citizenship’ to highlight individual duties to participate in the community.

With the rise of the extreme right across Europe, national governments justified increased restrictions on asylum-seekers, gaining support in the face of debates over citizenship and the politicisation of immigration (Hollifield 1992, 33; Yuval-Davis, Anthias, and Kofman 2005, 514). Since 1992, the UK government has tried to protect external frontiers and use stricter controls on applications made from within the country. Asylum reached a high in 2002 with a continuous fall until the present. According to RDS research for the Home Office, the main groups applying for asylum came from Iran, Afghanistan, China, Somalia, and Turkey (in the early 2000s) among others.

Like Germany, the UK has revised and re-organised its immigration policies in recent years. This re-ordering has involved the establishment of the UK Border Agency, the Migration Impacts Forum, the Migration Advisory Committee, and the new points-based system to assess applications coming from outside of the European Economic Area (EEA). The system was designed in a period of economic growth but is now being implemented in a time of recession with the aim of using the Points-Based System to control the number of non-EEA migrants, responding to the demands of the labour market (Dobson, Latham, and Salt 2009, 5). As Europe experienced an increased polarisation of immigration in terms of skills in the 1990s (Lutz and Koser 1998, 2), this system could also be seen as playing into and reinforcing this polarisation for the sake of immigration control.

The points-based system applies only to immigrants coming from outside of the European Economic Area. It offers more or less rights and privileges, depending on the tier to which a person belongs (Tannock 2009, 246). Tier 1 is for highly skilled migrants; Tier 2 is for skilled migrants, and Tier 3 for unskilled migrants. Tiers 4 and 5 are designated for students, temporary workers, and youth. However, it is not uncommon for someone to enter the UK in Tiers 4 and 5 and try to find ways to remain as a part of one of the other tiers. Only Tiers 1 and 2 are able to bring families with them and embark on the path to residency and full citizenship.

The opening up of skilled migration and limitations on asylum-seeking has created a skills-based stratification, spilling over into perceptions of migration in general. It directly affected
those migrating for economic reasons, but it also seemed to affect whether asylum is granted (Tannock 2009, 247).

Even in the face of increasing restrictions on immigration, the question of integration remain. In 2001, racial disturbances in Bradford, Oldham, and Burnley led to the commissioning of the Cantle Report by then home secretary, David Blunkett. The overarching approach of multiculturalism was under more scrutiny, as it was perceived to reinforce social divisions, particularly inter-ethnic relations (Clayton 2009, 482).

The September 11 attack in 2001 and the 7/7 London bombing in 2005 only added to the growing unease and an increased criminalisation of irregular migrants and asylum-seekers, particularly young men (Yuval-Davis, Anthias, and Kofman 2005, 515). Initiated well before (but heightened by) these two events, Islam was increasingly racialised. Racialisation refers to the process by which physical and cultural differences are ascribed to a group (Barot and Bird, 2001, 601). The Islamic Human Rights Commission has taken careful note of the physical, cultural, and racial discrimination experienced by Muslims in Britain across the spheres of social life, from healthcare to education (Abbas 2011, 55). The UK is not the only country to experience the racialisation of Islam in recent years. Also termed ‘Islamisation’, Salih (2004) notes the way that this aspect of identity has come to supersede ethnicity, for example, in Italian political culture. Likewise, Scholars in the Australian context report a similar process of Othering. Their assertion is based on three key findings, that is, the persistence of the notion of threat as linked with Islamophobia in public opinion surveys, the racialisation of Muslims and their spaces, and the role of Islamophobia in the selection of asylum-seekers (Dunn, Klocker, and Salabay 2007, 564). Like the UK, Australian Muslims are quite diverse in terms of ethnic background and in religious practices. Nonetheless, the racialisation process in both countries has led to the stereotyping of a particular group based on religious affiliation, contributing in media and society to an Othering process. While these processes have not resulted in extreme violence, it is important to note that racialisation of religious minorities is not unprecedented in Europe, as one considers the treatment of Jewishness in the early twentieth century and the more recent ethnic cleansing of Bosnian Muslims (Modood 2010, 36).

Out of the Cantle report came a strong emphasis on community cohesion as the new race relations strategy (Worley 2005, 487). One can see a shift as social problems became the responsibility of marginalised communities, including inter-ethnic conflict (Clayton 2009, 482). The government began to highlight the need to emphasise common values, social order, and a shared sense of belonging. This led to the 2002 institution of the ‘Life in the UK’ citizenship test, which requires applicants to know certain facts about the UK in order to attain indefinite leave to remain or naturalisation. However, the underlying definition of British nationality remained unclear. In 2004, for example, Gordon Brown, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, delivered the
annual lecture to the British Council on the concept of ‘Britishness’ and its crucial role in numerous aspects of life in the UK, ranging from public services to multiculturalism (Garnett and Lynch 2012, 84). He highlighted two core values, that is, liberty anchored in civic duty and a commitment to tolerance and fair play (Brown 2004). While other concerns were raised in response to this speech, the one most relevant to this discussion is the implication that those who do not meet the criteria of ‘Britishness’ do not belong in Britain (Garnett and Lynch 2012, 84). The notion of citizenship as based on participation was also critiqued in that those who would have time to participate would be those who were paid more for fewer hours, thus permitting them to dedicate time to voluntary activities and becoming more informed about social and political issues. In other words, participatory citizenship hints at a class-oriented perspective. For similar reasons, David Cameron’s notion of ‘Big society’ was critiqued as being oriented to the middle class.

Whether formalised through citizenship practices and limits on immigration or informally defined by experiences of exclusion, the debate over what it means to ‘belong’ in Britain continues. The shared experience of the increasing racialisation of Islam, the need to protect borders, and maintain state controls, however, raise state-level practices to the level of international analysis.

**Conclusion**

The trajectories of immigration policy and citizenship in Germany and the UK over the second half of the twentieth century and into the twenty-first century exhibit the tensions between economics, politics, and popular demands on the one hand, cross-cut by civic and ethnic definitions of nationality on the other. With a more consistently ethnic protectionism present in German policy-making, the increasing coverage of rights and undercurrent of civic inclusivism undermine the supposed ethnic homogeneity of the nation. Further complicated by the return of millions of Russian remigrants, the romanticised national imaginary exhibited gaping cracks when confronted by reality, compelling the recent hard-won shifts in naturalisation policies.

In the UK, the experience is more complex. Without a clear definition of nation after the diminished empire, a historic homeland was derived in the face of seeming obligations to millions of co-nationals. The racist nature of some policies and clear presence of race as an issue on the national stage makes it doubtless that it played a fundamental role in shaping the national identity.

In each case, the chapter showed the complex interlinking of immigration, citizenship, and national self-conceptions that confront those defined as outsiders, whether on the basis of nationality, race, or religion. With respect to border controls, both countries have experienced considerable restraints due to rising human rights concerns, opening of borders for EU trade, and in-
creasing free movement. However, the EU has also enabled countries to recover some of their lost authority in the area of immigration.

Having now explored the context of the two case studies on the state/national level, let us now turn to the local and international levels. As noted in the previous chapter, processes of glocalisation reconfigure national spaces, drawing them to intersect with supranational and local spaces. Thus, the underpinning logic of the immigration and integration policies is perpetuated in EU border controls and local educational establishments.
4. From EU External Policy to Local Education

Since its foundation, the EU has drawn European nation-states to form a sense of community in the context of a historically war-torn continent. This ‘ever closer union’ was established at the same time as the entry and settlement of millions of non-European immigrants, leading to questions of identity and belonging. As discussed in the last chapter, these rights and duties of living and participating in a different national context are deeply entangled in the definition of national identity alongside questions of citizenship. However, these norms are not only national but entwined with international norms of cultural accommodation (Bloch 2000). This is particularly evident in the current era of globalisation, multinational corporations, and the movement of labour from unskilled to very highly skilled – from one country to another, where high emphasis is put on the components that make such mobility possible. Education and skills are generally associated with mobility (Tannock 2009, 243). This includes both socio-economic and geographic mobility, for there are presumably employers in multiple locations who desire a particular expertise. Free movement is not intended for or granted to all members of society equally, however. It is contingent upon a person’s citizenship status, rights, and opportunities, as can be seen in the debates over the elimination of border controls within the EU. Hollifield (1992, 38) states: ‘It is not the internally mobile European population that is the problem, but a potentially mobile foreign population’.

The increasing influence of EU institutions has shaped both intercultural dialogue and citizenship policies on the domestic level, giving member states more control over their borders and more ability to regulate the entry and stay of new immigrants. Policies of the supranational structure have also fed into the education system, since a key feature of EU policy is to develop a knowledge-based society. This could be interpreted as the continuation of the process of regulation and standardisation that is present in immigration and integration policies (Phillimore and Goodson 2009, 10). It is also an illustration of how the local government is responsible for managing the concrete effects of international and national decisions, particularly in large cities of high immigrant concentration (Penninx 2000).

Local schools affect a pupil’s success, integration, employment opportunities, and identity in numerous and profound ways, but they also reflect broader scale trends, including those entwined with national and regional identity. In each case, however, the institutional context of the education system demonstrates that, even on the local level, pupils encounter a series of exclusionary processes that put the emphasis on the individual to ‘belong’ and succeed.
Across the multiple levels of interaction, three distinct themes can be traced: economic competitiveness, social cohesion or security, and human rights through protection of people and cultures. As may be apparent, the aspect of protection is often in tension with economic competitiveness and at times, social cohesion. Even in the UK, where humanitarian interests have been strong, these trends are conditioned by political and economic priorities (Zetter and Pearl 2000, 675). With these three factors in mind, the EU and member states have justified and implemented a wide range of policy decisions and reforms with sometimes contradictory and exclusionary logic. This chapter will begin with an examination of how the internal management of people echoes external relations, in this case, of the EU and its neighbours, effectively replicating the international arena in national and local contexts through immigration policy and educational initiatives. The second part of the chapter turns to the local level and explores the way that educational structures are subject to remarkably similar pressures as are present on the international and national levels.

4.1. **External Relations, Internal Replication**

Parallel to the beginnings of postwar immigration, six European countries established the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). This economic project progressed into what is now known as the European Union, which entails facets of national and international relations ranging from a common currency to conflict regulation capabilities. At the same time as the borders and relations among European countries deepened, the external borders of the European Union (formerly European Community [EC] and European Economic Community [EEC]) became increasingly protected in legal terms as well as in the political imaginary.

In European symbols and documents, the history and origins of Europe as a region were emphasised. These roots highlight religion alongside other historical infrastructures and institutions, effectively linking the notion of European culture with a contiguous and unbroken notion of Europe as a geographic space. This shift in the political culture affected the way that Europe relates with countries of the Mediterranean, but perhaps more significantly, the place of the immigrant became a living contradiction. In terms of geographic location, they were within Europe, and yet, they often experienced social and political exclusion. Building on this experience, the reaction to processes and policies of countries of settlement have been framed and re-framed according to cultural signifiers, often underlining differences based on religion, race, and language. Throughout this history, the terminology related to the Other is conflated and misinterpreted as ‘foreigner’, ‘immigrant’, ‘non-European’, and Muslim become confused and intertwined in the conceptions of the outsider. More precisely, several distinct categories have been merged into the discussion of the ‘problem of immigration’ leading to the designation of certain people or groups to be defined as a ‘threat to national unity and national identity’ (Silverman 1992, 3). In this way, ‘the political dialectic between the West and the Middle East and North
Africa is increasingly internalised and reproduced or reconstructed within Europe itself’ (Joffe 2007).

The fundamental role of migration in the design and logic of the European Union dates back to the early years of the European project. With the goal of developing a competitive economy of scale, the EEC defined the goals of the free movement of goods, capital, and services (including labour) as intrinsically part of integration (Schierup, Hansen, and Castles 2006, 48). In the 1980s, a debate regarding the ‘free movement of persons’ emerged over whether it should apply to EU citizens only (i.e. citizens of fully acceded member states) or should apply to everyone (Phillimore and Goodson 2009, 10). In practice, free movement for only EU citizens would mean that border checks would have to be in place to control the movement of non-EU nationals. Since a consensus could not be reached, France, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands opted to create a territory without internal borders in 1985, which would be known as the Schengen area. While 13 countries joined the Schengen area after the signing of the Treaty of Amsterdam, the UK has remained opposed to open borders unless the other countries impose the same rigorous restrictions.

In 1993, the Maastricht Treaty signed into effect the political and social union of the member states (White 1997, 754). While member states were deepening economic relationships, sharing resources, and realising the goals of the Single European Act and the removal of internal borders, the policies toward immigration soon revealed incoherency and questions of security. While bilateral agreements had been signed for the exchange of workers with many non-EU countries, the prospect of how to manage their presence on a long-term basis was not clear. The questions surrounding immigrant integration only increased in the 1990s when issues of second and third generation migrant workers were compounded by the arrival of asylum-seekers from Eastern Europe.

Lavenex (2001, 24) argues that EU policies towards asylum and immigration can be divided into a realist and liberal strand of thinking. The realist strand focuses on issues of security, while the liberal strand encompasses the humanitarian protection offered to refugees. However, based on the underlying logic of immigration and the primary basis upon which it was first controlled in countries like Germany, I add to these the aspect of economic competitiveness. On the state level, the issues of market demands, security, and the presence of refugees (draining the welfare system) are often conflated in issues of race and ethnicity, playing a large role in popular and political rhetoric. In the following sections, I will show how these three strands are entwined and echoed in EU policies for free movement as well as efforts for education.
Asylum and Immigration in the EU

As addressed in Chapter 1, the nationalist movements of the 19th century combined with industrialisation instituted the exchange of strong centres with porous borders for a more horizontal consciousness and distinct state controls of territory. Yet, given the development of immigration policies, the Schengen area, and the mistrust of the borders of newly acceded member states, the European Union asylum and immigration policy is a distant echo of the multi-national and porous-bordered regional unions of the past. Even as postwar economies acknowledged the need for workers, issues of security paralleled the increasing presence of migrants and asylum-seekers. This left the nation-states to maintain and re-assert their sovereignty through border controls and their own sets of immigration restrictions (Caviedes 2004, 289). With the introduction of Schengen and the increasingly restrictive policies on Europe’s borders, the term ‘fortress Europe’ began to be used to describe the external controls (Phillimore and Goodson 2009, 11). Thus, at the same time as workers were being invited to fill the gaps in labour throughout northern and central Europe, the borders of countries, and moreover, the social boundaries within them, were increasingly tightened with the justification of higher demands for security.

Huysmans (2000, 752) calls this process the ‘spillover of the economic project of the internal market into an internal security project’. The security discourse has enabled states to govern their citizenry and maintain the sovereignty of the state (Kaya and Kentel 2005, 4-5). It also justifies the suspension of human rights and indefinite imprisonment (Yuval-Davis, Anthias, and Kofman 2005, 516).

During the Cold War, security referred to traditional instruments of the state such as the military and ideological threats. Yet, as immigration and related issues of identity are cast as a disruptive and possibly violent phenomenon, the focus of security measures has shifted from the state and its borders to society and individuals.

In the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997, asylum and immigration was moved from the third pillar to the community pillar (Kostakopoulou 2000, 498). This shift stemmed from the increasing concerns of countries of settlement as relations extended eastward with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. EU member states saw increasing convergence on asylum and immigration policy, aligning more and more with those countries who were known for restrictive policies (Phillimore and Goodson 2009, 11). Moving asylum and immigration policy to the first pillar did not resolve all the problems. Rather than formulating a coherent and integrated policy with consideration for the future of European citizenship and identity, national executives uploaded national policies, building on domestic experiences and national restrictive laws to design international policy (Kostakopoulou 2000, 498). In this respect, the EU adopted some of the policies and goals of member states.
In a bid to regulate the movement of migrants, particularly asylum-seekers, the EU increased its emphasis on protection against discrimination and the integration of third-country nationals through the development and better regulation of issues relating to asylum. The Dublin Convention attempted to limit asylum-shopping by stating that asylum must be sought in the first EU country that a person enters. Based on the ‘first host country principle’, the examination of the asylum application or return of illegal immigrants is the responsibility of the first state that allowed entry (Lavenex 2001, 29). It is also aimed to stop the application for asylum in more than one country at once. While these policies are framed as protection for asylum-seekers, they often are a re-packaging of border controls and regulation of third-country nationals. Where integration used to be concerned with citizenship, it is now more closely aligned with the idea of restricting and discouraging further migration (Kostakopoulou 2008).

The cooperative framework of EU policies does not tend to empower the individual or transnational communities, but rather, it is a way of ‘returning arbitrary powers over individuals and populations back to the nation state’ (Favell and Geddes 1999, 26-27). Not unlike other member states, the EU assisted Germany in regaining some state control that was taken away by court rulings (Guiraudon 2003, 264). Yet, this reassertion of state rights was accompanied by an enhanced cooperation on immigration policies, evidenced in the application and involvement of EU integration policies.

The amendment of Article 16 in the Asylum Compromise of 1993 brought German practices and law into line with other governments of EU member states and with the Dublin Convention of 1990 (later replaced by the Dublin Regulation of 2003) (Geddes 2003, 87). The buffer zone, that was constructed around the EU by designating some countries like Poland and the Czech Republic as safe third countries, and the signing of bilateral ties with Germany’s eastern neighbours helped to reassert governmental control over its borders. In attempting to combat organised crime and terrorism, coordination across the police, judiciary and customs was improved alongside the development of the Schengen Information System to exchange data on people’s identities (Phillimore and Goodson 2009, 11). The UK, on the other hand, has always insisted on protecting and maintaining its own border, policing all entries to the UK in spite of the goal of no internal barriers within the EU (Joppke 1999, 135).

Even as security concerns heralded the closing of borders, the Amsterdam Treaty included a new article 13 that gave the Commission power to ‘introduce proposals to combat discrimination on the grounds of race, ethnicity, religion, age, disability and sexual orientation’; while this did not directly forbid certain forms of discrimination as previous treaty articles had done, the legal basis at the EU level raised the possibility for action toward the social inclusion of migrants (Geddes 2000, 220). In 2000, the EU passed anti-discrimination laws to protect EU citizens of immigrant and ethnic minority origin as well as third-country nationals. In a way, this
would enable a new form of ‘citizen’, as predicted by Hollifield (1992), who would be able to invoke rights and seek protection at the European (supranational) level through the European Court of Human Rights or the European Court of Justice. With regards to family reunification, this is already in place to some extent, protecting the rights of EU citizens and third-country nationals. These directives do not apply across all EU member states, however, specifically excluding Ireland, Denmark, and the UK (Groenendijk 2011, 216).

In 1999, the European Council in Tampere, Finland laid the framework for a common EU immigration policy. The framework, adopted in 2004 with the Hague Programme on Strengthening the Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice, emphasised objectives including the fair treatment of legal third-country nationals, the implementation of a more ‘vigorous’ programme for integration, implemented to give third-country nationals the rights and obligations comparable to citizens, and to enhance measures against social, economic, or cultural discrimination (Carrera 2006, 3). At this point, EU member states also agreed to coordinate best practices in the area of integration and incorporate these eleven common best practices [CBPs] into their national integration plans (Leise 2007).

In September 2005, the European Commission adopted the communication ‘A Common Agenda for Integration – Framework for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals in the European Union’, which encouraged the member states to develop comprehensive integration strategies (COM 2005, 389). Among the good practices to promote integration, it explicitly suggested education as well as various forms of intercultural dialogue, including dialogue with religious minorities. Between 2004 and 2007, the EU supported these national developments with three annual reports that provided overviews of migration trends along with an analysis of changes and actions taken in the area of admission and integration of immigrants at the national and EU level. The European Commission also published two editions of the ‘Handbook on Integration for policy-makers and practitioners’, which was supposed to facilitate the exchange of information and good practice by detailing national integration programs in different member states. These policies evolved into a noticeable emphasis on integration of peoples and communities in order to enhance the social cohesion and identity of Europe. Most recently, the focus has centred on intercultural dialogue as a means to encourage third-country nationals to integrate and become citizens of Europe. The INTI projects, for example, serve to develop citizenship and integration on a local level.

This section showed how, over the fifty years since the EU has been involved in immigration (in different ways and under different names), discourses of competitiveness, regulation, and humanitarian protection inevitably feed into one another and reinforce the other, in some cases leading to the securitisation of migration by emphasising its destabilising effects. The ‘political construction of migration as a security issue’ resembles broader trends of defining belonging in
Western Europe (Huysmans 2000, 751-752). This conclusion is reinforced by the trajectory of EU relations with the Mediterranean. The first member states were aware of the potential for economic migration from developing countries of North Africa and hoped to combat any issues through cooperation and association agreements. In the early 1990s, however, with the development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and increasing caution about these relationships, normative rhetoric concerning human rights and transformation of governance entered the equation. Since the turn of the century, these policies have been overshadowed by concerns of transnational terrorism, though former EU terminology and normative goals of democratisation have not changed (Joffe 2008, 148). The following section will show how, more often than not, education and intercultural dialogue serve as a mirror of underlying motivations of EU asylum and immigration policy.

**Education and Intercultural Dialogue**

Following closely on the heels of EU immigration and asylum policy, the way that education has been mobilised and highlighted in EU discourse has a very similar underpinning logic to the regulation of borders and control of foreigners. As mentioned in the introduction to this work, education is included as young people in the UK and Germany are required to attend school for a certain number of years in addition to the positioning of educational institutions as cross-cutting the geographical levels of analysis. As will be shown, it may be formulated on the state and regional levels, but it is subject to influences on the supranational level, which feed down to the very local experiences of young people. On the EU level, the increasing emphasis on education and intercultural dialogue as a tool for integration has a three-fold purpose: (1) to increase the economic advancement of Europe as a region, (2) to act as a security measure within and across national borders through enhancing social cohesion, and (3) to fulfil the liberal aim of equality of opportunity. In other words, the logic of the earlier strands of policy (competitiveness, control, and protection) underpins these policies.

In 2000, in response to increasing globalisation, heads of state and government at the Lisbon Council declared education to be fundamental to creating a socially cohesive, knowledge-based economy (Fredriksson 2003, 521). The Lisbon Council, ‘Towards a Europe of Innovation and Knowledge’, marked the moment when ‘education and training’ were identified as major strategic tools of EU policy to enhance cohesion and competitiveness, though education remains in the intergovernmental pillar as outlined in articles 126-127 (formerly articles 149-150) of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union (Fredriksson 2003, 522).

The Lisbon Strategy was complemented by the Bologna Process, a commitment of EU member states to restructure higher education, reaching beyond the geographical boundaries of the EU (Keeling 2006, 203). Exemplifying the goals of creating a knowledge-based, mobile society, the
efforts to restructure and align EU education through to the university level built on long-established programmes including the ERASMUS mobility programme (launched in 1987), which allows students to spend periods of their study at another EU member state university. The expanding role of the European Commission in higher education allowed for the development of the SOCRATES framework, followed by language programmes (LINGUA), distance and e-learning (MINERVA), adult education (GRUNDTVIG) as well as new arrangements with non-EU states through TEMPUS and Asia-Link (Keeling 2006, 204). Thus, the policies are aimed at developing a competitive society through the exchange of skills and mobility of students. Cohesion, the other goal of the Lisbon Strategy is not as easily achieved.

Social cohesion developed out of the idea of equality and identity, formulated on the basis of those who belong in contrast to those who do not. A European identity is a difficult concept to accurately unpack as the concept often receives support without consensus on the underlying content of such an identity (Strath 2002, 388). As such, European identity purports to meld together the ‘preservation of cultural difference with the surge for synthesis’ (Baraldi 2006, 53). However, in the context of EU enlargement, relations with the Mediterranean in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, and concerns of terrorism, a disconnect existed between the ‘political reality’ of needs for security in the face of European expansion on the one hand and hopes for cultural understanding on the other (Schäfer 2007, 333). This duality of approach and tension of goals became increasingly evident after the turn of the century.

After September 11th, according to one report, foreigner and Muslim began to be synonymous in people’s perception (Mühe 2007). Religion was subject to the overflow of the war on terror, placing anyone related with Islam under suspicion. Islam, in this light, began to be equated with threats to freedom and democracy, European and Christian values, and the civil order established in the West (Fekete 2004, 4). This extended to migrant communities that had been living in Europe for decades, naturalised or not.

In Germany, support for these concerns increased when it was discovered that a terrorist cell in Hamburg had been involved in the September eleventh attacks. Other occurrences within Germany and Europe have alerted German government and society to the presence of its Muslim minority and the possibilities of extremism developing in so-called parallel communities. Likewise, the July 7th bombing in London raised the threat, and indeed, presence of radicalism to the government’s attention. Out of this context arose the measures to actively approach Muslim communities to establish good relations and implement education strategies that meet their needs to help integration prospects on both sides.

Education is seen to have the capacity to partially correct for some of the security concerns of the free movement of people. It is also hoped to confront growing fears of the development of
‘parallel communities’. Apart from the concerns of social cohesion and rising xenophobia in many European states, these parallel communities are seen as the breeding ground for terrorism. Thus, the educational initiatives that help to increase the chances of disadvantaged populations and reestablish a sense of identity, even if it is framed in European terms, could act as a counter-terrorism practice.

Educational initiatives are also proposed to resolve the tension between rights and cohesion in language policy, both on the national and supranational level. The linguistic diversity of the EU is upheld and prized as one of the key features of cultural identity. As cultural identity, the EU supports the right of all to speak and write their own language, extending this right to minority and migrant languages as well. In 2002, the Council meeting in Barcelona set the target for Mother tongue plus two for European citizens to have the tools to compete and communicate in an integrated market, fitting into the Lisbon strategy framework. In 2008, during the European Year of Intercultural Dialogue, language was again highlighted as an instrument to enhance mutual understanding and integration. According to a report, entitled ‘Towards a comprehensive strategy for multilingualism in the European Union’ (2007), language can be understood in two ways: a means of communication or an important aspect of ‘personal, social, and cultural identity’.

At the same time, fluency in the language of the country of settlement has been promoted as the route to integration. Language proficiency has been increasingly linked to rights of residency and citizenship, not to mention unofficial social acceptance. In Germany, the extreme emphasis on language acquisition for integration dates approximately to the turn of the century. Along with the integration courses on German laws, culture, and history that were part of the new naturalisation requirements, extensive language courses were initiated to help the immigrant to have the tools for active citizenship (Schily and Myers 2005). Germany offered a quicker track to an unlimited residence or work permit to those who passed a German language test or added delays to family reunification to those who did not learn German (Geddes 2003, 89). Language acquisition in this light was seen as a way to help the minority become integrated and active citizens.

Many are wary of such strategies for integration, however. Some call it assimilationist. Others call it protectionist. Some see it as a reaction to the loosening citizenship regulations. For example, when the citizenship law of 1999 lowered the residency requirement from fifteen to eight years, it was accompanied by a tightening language requirement, and in some states like Bavaria, it became extremely difficult to pass the language tests (Joppke and Morawska 2003, 19). Kostakopoulou (2008) notes similar trends in other European countries including the adding of language proficiency requirements to British naturalisation policy in 2002, leading, as she
writes, to integration being a ‘means of filtering the flow of population, restricting the entry of migrants and of promoting an official mono-culturalism’.

While the place of language in the integration or protection of minorities is yet unclear, it is apparent that equity in education has become a cornerstone of EU strategy. In 2006, the Commission presented proposals within the Lisbon general framework entitled ‘Efficiency and equity in European education and training systems’ to the Council and Parliament, promoting the education and training of the most disadvantaged, stating that: ‘While contributing to the objectives of competitiveness and social cohesion, the integration of these principles will also make it possible to reduce long-term costs caused by inequalities in education and training and address challenges both inside and outside the EU’ (COM(2006) 481). In this communication, one sees the intertwined nature of social cohesion, economic competitiveness, and external relations, acknowledged even at the international level.

In 2007, under the German Council presidency, the Potsdam Conference ‘Equal Opportunities – a Challenge for Education Legislation and Education Policy in Europe’ targeted the role of governments in equalising educational opportunities for disadvantaged populations in order to foster socio-economic integration. The conference brought together experts on educational law, political leaders, government officials, and civil society representatives with the emphasis being on sharing integration practices. Germany’s then Interior Minister, Wolfgang Schäuble, said: ‘Integration policy must ensure that the diversity which migration brings with it does not lead to a splintering of society’ (Press Release 11 May 2007). Thinking back to the previous chapter, this sounds remarkably similar to comments from British politicians in the 1960s.

In July 2008, the Commission produced a green paper, ‘Migration and mobility: challenges and opportunities for EU education systems’ (COM (2008) 423), which addressed the presence of large numbers of migrant children in schools from a weak socio-economic position. It stated that schools must play a leading role in creating a socially inclusive society, since they are the primary venue where children of different ethnic backgrounds can become aware of others’ way of life. It identified that new methods of outreach to migrant communities and families will need to be implemented to ensure the equalisation of opportunities, and by including migrant youth in education, the chances of perpetuating the pattern of low-level education and segregation in the next generation would be decreased. In addition to adding to Europe’s competitiveness as a regional economy, educational measures may reduce costs in other areas such as unemployment and crime. The cooperation on education is part of a response to the increasingly open borders between EU countries, not only for goods and services but also for people. While the green paper addressed similar themes to other EU policy activities, it is the first to identify the location of the school as a key actor in the process, beyond the curriculum or general skills.
According to a report for the European Commission, ‘Sharing Diversity: National Approaches to Intercultural Dialogue in Europe’ (2008), the new emphasis on integration, cohesion, and intercultural dialogue can be seen in many areas, such as education, sports, and other youth activities in countries that have experienced the inflow of migrant workers and the establishment of semi-integrated, ethnically-bounded communities. The authors divide intercultural dialogue strategies into two general categories: the social cohesion and the cultural diversity approach (‘Sharing Diversity…’ 2008). The social cohesion approach aims at a more unified society to promote political stability, security, and equal opportunities for everyone. The second approach has to do with the recognition of distinct nations or minority groups, often regionally bounded, that are provided with particular economic, cultural, or political rights. While the social cohesion approach is more relevant to this research in general, it is important to keep in mind the cultural and political rights extended to minority groups under the auspices of multiculturalism and how these interact with the new emphasis on engagement. Moreover, as later chapters will show, it is important to question the underlying assumptions of such policies in contrast to the day-to-day exchange, flows, and interactions of ideas and cultural practices among minority youth.

From the examination of various EU policies and documents throughout the first half of this chapter, one can see the persistent strands of economic competitiveness, security and cohesion, and protection coming through at each turn. These intersect with and elucidate goals of intercultural dialogue and education on the international level as a facet of the context for this research. The following section will explore these patterns on the national and subnational level, regarding the accommodation of minority youth in education in general and how the structures shape this experience more specifically.

4.2. Member State Accommodation and Education Structures

The new developments regarding the lowering of internal barriers, a desire to build a European citizenry, and increased concerns about terrorism have encouraged soft power tools such as education and intercultural dialogue to rise to the forefront in EU and member state policy. As SPD Chairperson for the Working Group on Education, Eva-Maria Stänge (2010), stated: ‘Education will bring the country forward’. This new emphasis has increasingly highlighted education as a medium to support these aims.

By and large, compulsory education was instituted as a response to the international context of an increasingly competitive and industrialised nineteenth-century Europe. Instituted to revitalise or to reinforce the nation, education systems were intended to establish the nation as the foremost facet of identity in citizens’ lives (Ramirez and Boli 1987, 3). Similar to the need for mobile labour today, industrial education was intended to equip citizens to be mobile and ‘ex-
While this section will not explore pre-World War II structures in great detail, it is important to note that in both Germany and the UK, mass education was not intended to entirely flatten or undo the hierarchies of power and wealth. In the case of Germany, compulsory education was instituted to provide basic knowledge to everyone through village schools, while the richer strata of society could afford private tutors or attended Gymnasium (grammar school). In England, the best schools remained in private or Church hands until late in the nineteenth century, when compulsory education was instituted as a play to maintain national cohesion and increase national competitiveness in the face of rising contestants on the world stage including Germany and the United States (Ramirez and Boli 1987, 9). Thus, there is evidence of a long tradition of the relationship between education, national competitiveness, and interstate relations. The following analysis will show how the education policies directed at migrant and minority youth along with the structures themselves exhibit the tension between liberal inclusion and equality of opportunity, on the one hand, and the goal of control, social cohesion, and national competitiveness on the national and local level, on the other.

**Education policies**

The education policies extended to minority youth in Germany and the UK bear resemblance to national immigration and integration policies, as may be expected. Germany’s treatment of minority youth aligns with its ethnic conception of citizenship and self-conception as ‘not a country of immigration’, slowly shifting over the years to extend a more inclusive model. In the same way as the UK responded to the presence of immigrants more rapidly than Germany, its education policies and analysis were on the table much sooner. In both cases, there is the alignment with national immigration policies alongside the broader EU trends mentioned above.

In Germany between 1955 and 1973, the pedagogical framework extended to foreign youth was not very different from that extended to youth with disabilities. Their foreignness, in some ways, was equated with other possible difficulties. Essentially, this was an assimilationist model where the inability to speak German was viewed almost as a handicap alongside physical or mental challenges (Faas 2008, 110). As one informant said in reference to the German education system, particularly in terms of disabilities: ‘The German education system is based on exclusion; you only need to integrate someone who has been excluded at some point...’ (BE1511). In other words, the need for integration stems from the previous exclusionary policies extended to minorities of various kinds in the German education system.

Entering in this context, children of immigrants found themselves at a great disadvantage. Their performance suffered because of inadequate language skills and insufficient support. Lack of
awareness of the education system and lack of fluency in German left them in an uncompetitive position at the point of receiving teacher recommendations for their secondary education. In addition, Turkish youth, in particular, had to cope with low expectations within the schools and administration (Bommes 2000, 108).

In 1978, the German parliament was confronted with rising social unease regarding problems with housing, medical services, and school education. This unrest led Parliament to approve the establishment of a ‘Commissioner for the Promotion of Integration of Foreign Employees and their Families’ affiliated with the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (Borkert and Bosswick 2007, 5). It became obvious in the next few years that something had to be instituted to assist foreigners, especially in the area of education. The 1979 guidelines promoted second generation integration into social and economic life (excluding political life) (Geddes 2003, 91). Shortly after, the first Commissioner for Matters Relating to Aliens, Heinz Kühn, published a report, demanding policy-makers to admit that immigration had taken place. However, the federal government reacted by passing a resolution on foreigner policy that placed emphasis on conformation to the ‘German way of life’ or Leitkultur (Behrens, Tost, and Jager 2002, 105). The following two decades of restrictive immigration policy and social backlash against foreigners managed to quell these fresh attempts at the integration of foreign youth through education, and the plans to devise a comprehensive integration programme stagnated by 1983 (Borkert and Bosswick 2007, 5).

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, there was a distinct shift in the framing of foreigner rights and education in spite of the persistent restrictionist domestic politics. In education, the language of ‘foreigner pedagogy’ shifted to that of ‘multicultural’ or ‘intercultural’ education (Faas 2008, 110). Policies were implemented within Germany with the goal of promoting foreigner involvement in the ‘economic, social, and cultural life in the Federal Republic of Germany’, which included accepting the fundamental values of the German constitution such as women’s rights and religious tolerance (Behrens, Tost, and Jager 2002, 106). This shift laid the foundation for later policies and the raising of education as a tool for integration onto the national level. Yet, the selective school system (discussed shortly) continued to act as a barrier to equality of opportunity.

Since the 1990s, there has been increased discussion in Germany on new ‘aims’ and ‘instruments’ of cultural policy including emphasis on dialogue (Sievers and Wagner 2008). In October 1996, the KMK released a policy paper, ‘Cross-cultural Education in School’, highlighting the complex and pluralistic nature of modern societies. In response to rising social tensions and violence, the paper affirmed that all students should receive a common cross-cultural education that is directed both at the majority and minority groups in the society with the goal of cooperation (Behrens, Tost, and Jager 2002, 115). Similarly, in the 2000 report, the German commis-
sioner for Foreigner Affairs made the statement that ‘there is no German monolithic culture’ or *Leitkultur* that immigrants will be asked to share, for German society consists of a ‘multiplicity of coexisting lifestyles’ (cited in Joppke and Morawska 2003, 5).

The issues and responses surrounding education reached UK policy before arriving on centre stage in Germany. The Swann Report of 1985 explored ethnic disadvantage, focusing on immigrants from the Caribbean and Asian population. More importantly, in the same report, there is an awareness that, in order to foster a pluralist society in a multiracial Britain, different modes of attachment to the conception of Britishness must be acknowledged and accepted (Favell 1998, 129). This move to a multicultural and anti-racist model represents a distinct shift from the 1960s when assimilation and integration dominated education policy (Reynolds 2008). Along with anti-racist measures, the 1980s also raised other concerns in the British education system as a whole, since the number of those leaving secondary education without any qualification were not good, and those going on to further education were not increasing, thereby limiting the UK’s national competitiveness (Machin and Vignoles 2005). In response, successive conservative governments introduced various market mechanisms to compel schools to improve.

In the Education Reform Act of 1988, the market-oriented reforms were introduced alongside a national curriculum. The national curriculum was introduced to meet the rising concerns about pupil success rates and competence in basic skills (Machin and Vignoles 2005). The national curriculum emphasised the longstanding traditions of ‘Englishness’ in terms of literature and history, proposing unity primarily based on a simplistic and possibly invented national conception (Donald and Rattansi 1992). The market mechanisms that were introduced engaged pupils’ parents to play a more active role in school choice and management. This compels schools to increase their performance. Parents could participate as members of school governing bodies, and school funding became more closely linked to numbers of pupils, thus raising the incentive to admit more students (Machin and Vignoles 2005). The process of school scoring was also initiated and adapted to league-tables by the media.

The persistence of these trends to the present is exemplified in the following communication. On 13 September 2011, an email with the subject ‘Find and compare schools’ performance’ was sent to the mailing list of the Department for Education, which read:

> The Department for Education has launched a new web tool helping parents find and compare local schools’ performance. It significantly improves parents’ ability to choose the right school for their child. The ‘compare schools’ tool brings together a wide range of performance data in a single place. Parents can find schools by name, keyword or location or browse via an interactive map. Each school has its own mini-site with a range of useful information such as spend per pupil and test and exam results. Parents can also compare their school with others nearby – or with any other school in England.
As can be seen from this communication, parents are encouraged to take an active role in choosing their child’s school, putting increased pressure on the school to perform and maximise available funding. The increased role of the parents has been shown to lead to inequalities for socially disadvantaged groups, including minorities. Wealthier parents may have the knowledge and awareness to capitalise on a market-oriented approach and choose the best schools for their child. Moreover, the role of peer groups could contribute to the improvement of equality of opportunity (where an even mix of socio-economically defined pupils occurs or a lower number from lower socio-economic backgrounds in a majority higher socio-economic background school). In the context of increasingly socio-economically segregated schools, this would be difficult to achieve (Machin and Vignoles 2005). Preliminary research conducted over the years after the 1988 reform shows, however, that the potential for inequality has not taken place to such an extreme as might be expected. Certain inequities clearly remain, however.

The other outcome of increased parental involvement was the ability of parents to make certain demands on the political system through the sphere of education. Education has historically acted as the intersection between politics and minority communities, since the relationship between public and private is not maintained as a distinct line as in France, for example. The sphere of education has a good deal of freedom to make allowances for non-participation, special uniforms, or special dietary requirements, demanded from organised parents of pupils of a minority background (Favell 1998, 126-127).

This is all the more obvious as another shift from multiculturalism to inclusion dominates the English educational environment. With goals of cohesion replicated from the EU’s external relations down to local education policy, schools are intended to promote and foster strong positive relations among pupils of different cultural backgrounds (Reynolds 2008).

In 2007, efforts at community cohesion became the legal duty of British schools. In recent years, both German and UK governments have instituted various policies to ensure that community cohesion is taking place as well as supporting disadvantaged pupils. Programmes like ‘Every Child Matters’ and Kein Kind zurücklassen (no child left behind) were initiated to provide a range of support possibilities. Following from the Children Act 2004, Every Child Matters is a set of reforms to provide for all children, no matter their background or circumstances (e.g. ethnic background, disability, etc.) to be healthy, safe, and successful. However, three of the five goals stated on the Department for Education’s web site refer to the ability of a child to achieve, contribute, and attain economic well-being (Every Child Matters, Department for Education). In practice, Every Child Matters reinforces two main themes of education more generally and the British system, more particularly. In the first place, it emphasises to some extent the goal of the child to produce and achieve. While this will help the child individually, it will also help the economic and social needs on a broader scale, as illustrated by EU and member state
policies. The implementation of the reforms falls primarily to the Local Authority to work with families and young people in the district to find reasonable and successful means of fulfilling these goals. In Germany, characteristic of the regional structure of education, programmes associated with this motto have been implemented on the state level, calling for an end to the selective education structure that generally favours socio-economically privileged, ethnically German youth.

This section aimed to introduce some of the ways that the three strands of thinking on the EU level are also present on the national and local level alongside the distinctly national model. The next section will take us deeper into the educational structures in both the UK and Germany to see how these are responding to or developing out of these kinds of policies.

Educational structures in transition

As discussed before, all educational establishments are introduced for a particular purpose. Once instituted, it is difficult to bring about change. Yet, in both Germany and England, transitions and contestation regarding the structure and purpose of education occur, which are influenced by the political complexion of local and regional authorities and shaped by supranational influences and the needs of changing national demographics. In both cases, the tension between meeting the demands of a globalised context and ensuring equality of opportunity for all students exists.

The selective education system in Germany dates back to before World War II, but after World War II, with the cooperation of Länder representatives in the Kultusministerkonferenz (KMK), the three-track structure of education was instituted in a more cohesive manner across the Western regions than ever before (Führ 1997, 11). In its simplest form, the selective education system is made up of three tracks, which pupils enter after completing primary school. In primary school or Grundschule, pupils remain in a general class, usually until before the fifth grade or a required four years (Behrens, Tost, and Jager 2002, 108). Unlike other regions, Berlin and one other state have a six-year primary education requirement (Baumert and Kohler 1984, 367). Based on their scholastic achievement up to that point, teachers and parents of the pupils recommend them for one of three tracks for their secondary education.

The three tracks include Hauptschule (leading to a general certificate), Realschule (leading to an intermediate qualification), and Gymnasium or ‘grammar school’ (Behrens, Tost, and Jager 2002, 108). The Hauptschule provides general, non-academic education, normally up to the minimum school leaving age. The Realschule programme usually lasts a total of ten years, lead-

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5 The education system instituted in the former East Germany was based on a different curriculum and philosophy and will not be explored in this research. As the main focus of immigration as well as the areas of observation and fieldwork were located in the West, it is not relevant to include the different education structures and related strengths and weaknesses.
ing to jobs in middle management, engineering, or administration (Baumert and Kohler 1984, 367). Lasting twelve or thirteen years, Gymnasium is the highest qualification. It prepares students for academic or professional opportunities such as attending university or medical school.

The three-track system has been contested for the past fifty years, particularly by SPD party leaders. As far back as the 1960s, they argued that selective education reinforced generational cycles of deprived children, cutting them off from higher education (Führ 1997, 128-129). The SPD and the Education and Science trade union proposed the initiation of Gesamtschulen or comprehensive schools to promote equality.

Since educational requirements, curriculum, and even length of schooling are decided and administered on the regional level, the political complexion of the region largely influenced (and continues to influence) both the educational structures and the way that the presence of minority youth was managed. In typically SPD-led states, various forms of comprehensive schools were initiated. These included Hesse, Berlin, and the other city-states. These comprehensive schools took two general forms. The Kooperative Gesamtschule means that the three branches of secondary education exist under one roof, but classes and tracks are separate. In Berlin and Hesse, the Gesamtschule exists in an explicitly integrated form as well: Integrierte Gesamtschule, where the three tracks are even more connected and overlapped than in other cases (Baumert and Kohler 1984, 367). Pupils have more flexibility but also more responsibility to choose their own classes and levels of study within the school (Hessisches Kultusministerium, Gesamtschule). Some subjects, like social studies or religion, are taught in a general class with only slight differentiations among students for ‘different needs’ (abilities or disabilities), but other subjects, including mathematics or English, are still differentiated by level (Führ 1997, 125). The value of the comprehensive school for migrant youth was demonstrated in a study by Diefenbach (2005), which showed that between 1990 and 2000, more migrant students completed Realschule and Gymnasium certificates in the comprehensive school setting than in separated schools (cited in Heckmann 2008, 25).

By contrast, in typically conservative regions such as Baden-Württemberg or Bavaria, leadership pushed to maintain the separation of these tracks, pointing to the fact that the three track-system should be able to adapt to changing times. While outside the scope of this research, this sentiment was extended to East German regions after reunification. This led to a large-scale reordering of the authoritarian, unitary school model and changes in roles for numerous teachers and administrative staff (Mintrop 1996). More than a decade later, however, the pre-reunification models are being reconsidered, since, even with the expansion of Gymnasium to include growing numbers of German students, minorities appear to remain continually underrepresented in higher levels of education (Heckmann 2006, 12-13).
The outcome of education policies, though they were reframed and sometimes reformed, was found to be a startling gap between German students and students of minority background in Germany. This deficit was revealed in the Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) of 2003. Germany ranked much lower than its European peers. As Jutta Allmendinger, President of the Berlin Social Science Research Centre, put it: ‘this is a catastrophe for a highly educated country like Germany…we have extreme differences between the regions, and they are getting bigger, not coming together’. Moreover, the gap in performance between native German pupils and pupils of a minority background was greater in Germany than most other countries with Turkish having the lowest in comparison to their German peers (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD] 2006). Interestingly, the gap between first and second generation pupils and their native peers seemed to increase rather than decrease (Faas 2008, 109). This unusual occurrence was highlighted in a conference report entitled ‘Pathways to success in education for young migrants’ (2006), in which it proposed that good educational performance of immigrant youth is a crucial element of successful integration. Given the disadvantage of language, the low number of contact hours in German schools, and not much time to overcome these difficulties, Turkish children in Germany and Austria are among the most disadvantaged (Crul 2007). This, in turn, has contributed to limited opportunities in the German labour market for equal employment or job mobility (Constant and Massey 2005, 489). Germany is not alone in its education structure, although the European Commission affirms that the ‘streaming’ of pupils after so little time into different programs ought to be avoided since it can act as a ‘source of inequity’, particularly in the case of disadvantaged and migrant youth (COM 2006, 481).

A teacher offered his comments on the system, perceiving its limitations in coping with diversity and how the individual takes the blame for not succeeding.

When there are problems, then, the problems will be personalised [blamed on the person]. The system is very, very bad; it is like when you drive a car but the brakes don’t work properly. The car still works, and they say ‘Now, drive with this car’, and when there is an accident, it is not the car or the system that is at fault or whoever said to drive the car, but rather, you as a person (EL116, Author’s translation).

The system does not accommodate differences of background, socio-economic status, and a myriad of other factors that may contribute to a pupils’ success. They are seen as the responsibility of the pupil, rather than being taken into account in the system overall.

In the initial years of the guest-worker phase, having a lower educational degree did not mean exclusion from employment; yet, in the past decades, the level of education and the expansion of Realschule and Gymnasium has decreased the value of a degree from the Hauptschule (Baumert and Kohler 1984, 370; Hill 1987, 282). According to ‘Muslims in the EU – Cities Re-
port: EU Monitoring and Advocacy Program Germany’, many minority youth are almost automatically put on the track to certain apprenticeships in industry and commerce (Mühe 2007, 31). In other words, the system appears to perpetually disadvantage minority youth, increasingly evident in the higher emphasis on developing a skills-based society across Europe.

In Berlin, the education system has recently been restructured to have two main types of schools: secondary school (which will include the *Hauptschule* and *Realschule*) and *Gymnasium* (which will remain distinct). Some schools are also applying to be ‘all day’ schools, allowing for more hours and increasing their competitiveness as a school of choice for parents. Other schools are applying to have pupils join them after the fifth form, including the school where this research was conducted. The principal explained that they had applied (and were subsequently not approved) to take students at an earlier age so that they could have more time with them to improve language skills and work on other areas; they thought that it may also attract more ethnic Germans to make the school more demographically balanced as these schools are sought after in Berlin (EL76B).

In England, the situation of education is somewhat more complex. While vestiges of the selective structure remain with a few grammar schools (the equivalent of *Gymnasium*) still present throughout the country, many schools are comprehensive schools or ‘community schools’. Many of the issues relating to school status and structure involve the financial management and funding of the school, linking back to the market-oriented approach and the role of economic competitiveness in the education system. As the Chair of Governors for a primary school in Devon, England, put it: ‘It comes down to funding…I do feel that the types and organisation of schools is largely down to money, at least here in Devon with a very rural area and often smaller schools at Primary level’ (EE159). While this was a broad generalisation, as the interview partner acknowledged, it does help to understand the different categories of school in England.

The schools can be divided into two main categories: state and public. State schools are funded by the state, including sixth form colleges. There are small minorities of faith-schools, generally run by the Church of England or the Roman Catholic Church. The public schools charge tuition, while state schools are free. Most of the state schools are encouraged to specialise in a particular area in order to gain extra funding.

There are a number of different categories of state school, including ‘free schools’ (run and administered by parents or an organisation), federations (where a number of schools come together to share administrative and financial resources, particularly beneficial for small, rural schools), and academies (where the school is free from the management and support of the local authority). Among these, there are still other schools where a church or organisation may sup-
port and direct a school. More often than not, funding plays a distinctive role in how the school defines itself and who can obtain access to it.

In England, primary and secondary education make up four key stages from 5-16. After each key stage, the pupil sits for a nationally administered exam, occurring at ages seven, eleven, fourteen, and sixteen. The results of these exams are published and affect the school’s ranking. From that point, a pupil can choose to continue to a sixth form college to complete an A Level qualification. The A levels would be equivalent to the Abitur, received after completing exams at Gymnasium in Germany. English schools are allocated a certain amount of funding per student, and where a student is considered socially disadvantaged (usually based on the criterion of qualifying for free lunches according to household income), a premium of funding is attached to that pupil.

In 2010, the government proposed to invite all schools, including primary schools, the option to become academies. Previously, only schools who received outstanding assessments from Ofsted had this option. This would mean more freedom from local authorities and ability to make choices regarding the curriculum, staff, and management of the school (Harrison, BBC News 26 May 2010). In other words, this would encourage an even greater decentralisation. The danger of such a programme would be the re-location of better teachers and well-to do pupils joining academies where there is more freedom and autonomy from the local authority and the state, while disadvantaged youth would not benefit as much. This could occur as parental choice plays a role in school preference. This point is highly debated, however. Schools in rural areas and generally smaller schools would also struggle to meet the financial requirements of the academy, where larger schools would be able to manage without the protection of the local authority. In essence, there is the fear of a further tiered system developing between academies and the schools that cannot survive as such.

Loosely related to the funding debate is the recent decision to raise university fees to a maximum of 9,000 pounds, beginning in September 2012. Quoted previously, the Chair of Governors at a Devon primary school noted that

> it will create a large gap in the educational standards. People from the lowest income group will be eligible for grants of up to 3,250 pounds, which will cover tuition fees for many, but not all, courses along with people from very high income groups who will have access to the best education, leaving out a large chunk in between (EE159).

At the sixth form college in London, students expressed that this raise in fees would dampen their motivation, since they would have little chance of affording a university education and

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6 The leaving age for compulsory education was raised to 18 in 2008, based on the Education and Skills Act 2008; however, this will not come into full effect until 2015.
would be forced to enter into vocational training. As one student at a Waltham Forest college said: ‘Some people are going to just be put off education in college because they can’t look forwards to university any more…because you either get into uni or not’ (LL143B2).

Meanwhile, the cultural wishes of some groups have developed into the establishment of supplementary schools. Located in neighbourhood schools or local centres (renovated to meet the community’s needs), they host language lessons (in mother-tongue and English in addition to homework support) as well as exposing pupils to customs of dance, food, and religious celebrations on the weekends. In Haringey, London, there are supplementary schools in the categories of African (8), African-Caribbean (2), Arabic (1), Bangladeshi (1), Chinese (1), Iranian/Persian (1), Islamic (1, which incidentally mentions only languages in its subjects), Jewish Orthodox (1, also mentioning only languages), Kurdish (3), Polish (1), and Turkish (5). Generally open to the entire family, they allow parents to socialise while their children are learning about their culture. Based on demand and support, they are the first indicator of the role of location in the population and participation of various groups in the local community. Involved in transnational politics, these centres sometimes even perpetuate the mobilisation of a political identity in order to maintain the collective identity (Küçükcan 2004). For example, Turkish/Cypriot organisations may intentionally keep the issue of Cyprus alive in order to maintain young people’s identity and inspire nationalist feelings.

Given that many of the immigrants to the UK in the early years would have spoken English at least to some extent, it is interesting that, as early as 1963, the Department of Schooling instituted an ‘English for Immigrants’ education policy (Rattansi 1992). This policy was primarily aimed at Asian communities, but schools were also concerned with the Anglicisation of the pigeon English of Afro-Caribbean pupils. In other words, this was a policy of English to English. It has been noted elsewhere that British Muslims, in particular, suffer from challenges of language, integration, and teacher expectations (Abbas 2011, 65). In the late 1990s, a policy was introduced to complement the national education curriculum, that is, literacy and numeracy hours. It became compulsory for primary school teachers to dedicate one hour per day to literacy and numeracy. While the success of such an innovation is hard to measure, there is evidence that suggests the policy has improved literacy and numeracy on a national scale (Machin and Vignoles 2005).

Unlike the variety of policies in Germany that de facto perpetuated ethnolinguistic boundaries, UK policies focused on almost blatantly assimilationist measures, financially supporting those schools with non-English-speaking and/or culturally ‘Other’ populations. The tension between

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7 It should be noted that the categories are taken directly from the Haringey directory for supplementary and community language schools.
equipping pupils for achievement and imposing a particular way of life is present throughout policy-making, implementation, and assessment in both the UK and Germany.

In both the UK and Germany, location and demographic trends play a dynamic role in the place and space of a school. School populations are generally drawn from a certain area in the vicinity of the school. In England, these are called catchment areas or priority admission areas, directly shaping the needs, challenges, and environment of the school. This, in turn, reflects the settlement patterns and urban layout discussed in the previous chapter.

As is certainly evident, both the UK and Germany are at the moment of transition in terms of their education structures. New challenges of seeing to the needs of minority youth alongside changing international pressures has led to the implementation of market mechanisms in the English system and restructuring of the selective system in some parts of Germany. Naturally, such changes take time to implement, and the advantage of these changes to minority youth is not guaranteed. Rather, the underlying trends of economic competitiveness and cohesion appear to remain in tension with the goal of equality of opportunity and outcome.

**Conclusion**

While the last chapter centered around state policies of immigration and integration, this chapter introduced the context from the other levels of analysis, namely the EU as representative of an international structure and the education system as a local level institution that has far-reaching influence. The juxtaposition of these levels was intentional, as it shows very clearly how themes of cohesion, competitiveness, control, and protection are present and overlapping. One can see the influence of state policies on EU trends, and at the same time, the influence of EU policy on state practices.

In terms of education, state policies of security, economic competitiveness, and cohesion are evident. Over the second half of the twentieth century through to the present, both the British and German education system have experienced the trajectory of state policies shifting from assimilation to multiculturalism to inclusion or integration. The English system seemed to arrive at these shifts at an earlier time; however, this would logically parallel the changing race relations and immigration policies. While the education structures are generally more decentralised in the UK with more room for parental involvement, the recent changes are no less controversial than those in Germany. In contrast, the role of funding and a market-oriented approach is not foremost in the German education system, but the persistence of the selective system perpetuates clear biases against minority and socio-economically disadvantaged youth.

Having now explored the context of the national, international, and local levels, I will now turn to the analysis of the empirical data. The next three chapters are arranged thematically with the
first focusing on the interaction of young people with multi-scalar spaces before moving to perceptions of citizenship and intercultural dialogue in this context.
5. Location: Levels and Interactions

As discussed in the previous four chapters, processes of immigration and integration highlight the role of continued perceptions of territorially-based identities that are anchored in different scales. Contrary to the simplistic worldview, migrants’ transnational ties, shaped by business, media, politics, and religion among other influences, are activated and embedded in networks across multiple states, reflecting multiple locations through identities and cultural production (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004, 598). The interplay between rights and social rules confronts and changes cultural contexts from personal experiences to policy decisions. However, the political space, both geographic and social, in which such interactions occur demonstrates the function and prevalence of imagined norms and shapes very real experiences. This is not to say that such boundaries are static or unchanging, but to highlight that the potential paranoia of essentialistic investigation can obscure processes of self-representation and collective representation (Werbner 1997a, 230).

The dynamic interplay of space and place came up upon one of my first visits to a community centre in London. As I waited in the main office to meet with the project manager, the police entered and asked to speak with the very person I was waiting for. The entire atmosphere changed. There were tense jokes with forced laughter. The police explained that they were there to work with the centre to find ways that they could better reach the community, both in terms of the ethnic community and the neighbourhood.

It struck me how this centre was the embodiment of a border even as it was a location, placed firmly in the grey area of being within a geographic boundary but not within the social boundary and simultaneously, presumably, acting as a civic bridge to cross these boundaries. It was intended to serve the need for a safe place for documented and undocumented migrants but in a dialogue with the state. In the latter role, the state approved. However, the element of cultural, even transnational, reinforcement and the perception that the centre had the trust and access of many people who are un-engaged with the state give it a tentative position. Moreover, the centre’s transnational positioning complicates this relationship through political activism, particularly related to Kurdish issues in Turkey. For the most part, the position of such community centres and similar refugee community-based organisations is that they remain almost as marginalised as the people whom they serve (Zetter and Pearl 2000, 675).

Building on the national and supranational contexts of the last two chapters, this chapter will analyse the extent to which the boundaries of culture and territory have been perpetuated and
simultaneously challenged in the context of location. The comments from young people concerning location highlight the multi-territorality of their experiences. These intersect in the district as well as shaping educational spaces, juxtaposing the local and transnational spaces. These transnational ties and international awareness serve to transform the current locations through the ‘placing’ of immigrants’ identities and establishing local ties (Ehrkamp 2005, 346).

The first part of the chapter will explore the comments that exhibit the multi-territorial identities, analysed using the levels-of-analysis approach as it helps to conceptualise these spaces and intersections. The second half of the chapter moves to the comments pertaining to the local school. The school serves to bring into focus the intersection of these spaces introduced in the first section with more details about their scope and function in the lives of minority youth.

5.1. Locations in Practice

Throughout the discussions of multiculturalism and intercultural dialogue, the aspect of ‘location’ as a variable is implicit and yet rarely openly addressed. Intercultural or multicultural education, understood as education that somehow takes into account the ethnic or cultural differences between pupils (Eldering 1996, 318), takes a very different shape if, for instance, a teacher implements the same programmes in Cornwall versus Warwick, UK.

These regional variants exist in most countries of the EU. In Germany, regional distinctions exist in terms of population, dialect, and even culinary specialities. While regional differences are often demarcated by county lines or federal markings, the boundaries and varieties of interculturality and perception are even more complex than regional divisions within countries. In the greater London area, a number of districts are known, in colloquial terms, by their ethnically defined population. This understanding of location goes beyond the legitimised borders of countries or counties to the perceptions of difference and plurality on a very local scale. As Appadurai (1996, 178-179) describes, the neighbourhood is a social form in which locality is realised, whereas a locality is simply a dimension of social life. In using these definitions, I avoid the possibility of taking for granted that a geographical space is merely a dimension of interaction, and give it more weight in the way that it actually embodies a particular social interaction, that is unique to that area, as the following comments will illustrate.

When living in such highly diverse cities as London and Berlin, the awareness of living in a global city came through in young people’s comments. As one pupil stated: ‘it’s a big city with a lot to experience’ (ES1661, Author’s translation). However, within the city boundaries, many pupils highlighted sub-locations and supra-locations that connected them to other people via travel and even media. By sub-location, I mean a subdivision of a politically-demarcated border, while supra-location refers to the translocal capacity of many of these connections. Translocality emphasises the relationship between local, potentially relatively small geographic areas
across time and space, possibly in keeping but also possibly in tension with the nature of broader trends and national interests. A translocality is ‘a place whose social architecture and relational topologies have been reconfigured on a transnational basis’ (Conradson and McKay 2007, 168). Classically speaking, communities, referring to shared values and identities, have been mapped onto localities that form a frame of reference entwined with notions of homogeneity; however, a person’s identity (or that of a group or even a society) is not solely or even mostly reliant on the ‘observable, concentrated activities within a particular locale’ (Marcus 1998, 62). Young people readily state that they have their lives in their neighbourhoods, and they do not often cross the boundaries to other neighbourhoods, not because they cannot, but because there is not a need or desire. The local neighbourhood forms the basis for friendships and social relations but not without varying complexities and intersections of race, class, and other aspects of boundary formation.

The district (used interchangeably to denote neighbourhood as previously mentioned) and the school were most often identified in many interviews and group discussions as forming the basis for friendships. A London student explained: close friends are from ‘the area you live, the place you live, you’re born there and you see them from when you’re small, I’n’t it, so you know them for a long time and stuff’ (LL143B1). This comment begins to hint at the role of exposure in the development of friendships, community, and the feeling of belonging. The experience of being born in a place and living there to that point was echoed by a pupil in Berlin. ‘Yeah, I’ve always been in Neukölln, we just moved to another flat one year ago, but it’s also in Neukölln, so I was here my whole entire life’ (ES106A1).

Another pupil in Berlin confirmed the effect of location and local activities on her friendships: ‘My friends are from—part of them are from school, but a little part are from school. The small part is from the football team or from Gegend [neighbourhood]…my friends are from the football team because they also accompany their brothers to this’ (ES204D2). Here, she depicts her relationships as developing out of common local activities, not simply based on mere spacial proximity.

In a separate interview, another pupil commented that his friends are from more diverse locations and walks of life: ‘For me, I don’t know, from my surroundings, so to say, no idea, from my environment, where I go out. For example, I play football with some people and with other people play football, and then you get contacts, I don’t know…almost none [from the school];
most of my friends are finished with school, and some are already working. They weren’t at a school like this, not at Gymnasium but at other schools’ (ES1661, Author’s translation).⁸

From these quotes, one can see the trend of young people to interact in their local areas. However, this tendency is not as straightforward as it might seem. There are underlying divisions, perceptions, and rationalisations based on these experiences that come through in the following discussions about the multicultural nature of the districts, the prevalent socio-economic status there, and the notions of belonging.

**Internal Divisions**

When viewing a map of a city, the street names, underground lines, and other markings carry only a limited amount of information about those places. It is only when speaking with inhabitants, traversing the city, and getting to know the local usages of space and place that one begins to build associations. Drawing on comments about these lines and the patterns of interaction this section will help to draw out some of those associations and internal boundaries that exist in Berlin and London, though they are unofficial and porous lines of demarcation.

In one of my first interviews in Berlin, the deputy headmaster of the school highlighted the importance of district lines as he described the contrast between Kreuzberg, Wedding, and Neukölln (three districts with high numbers of immigrants) and Hellersdorf or Marzahn (where low numbers of migrants live) (EL154). Another teacher explained that differences existed even between Neukölln and Wedding, where one could see more people of Black-African background (EL96).

One of the pupils, originally from Turkmenistan, elaborated on the contrast that she observed when her family moved from different districts of Berlin: ‘And then we moved to Berlin Hellersdorf. Have you heard about that area? It’s an awful area; usually there are lots of, erm, Nazis, or they hate foreigners, and that is the reason why we moved to Neukölln, which is just the total opposite’ (ES2844).

In some cases, the lines of division within the city are formalised, as illustrated in the above pupil’s experience of moving from Hellersdorf to Neukölln. However, further subdivisions appear to exist. In London, these lines, too, are sometimes formalised through district lines, such as Harringay in Haringey and Leyton within Waltham Forest. Berlin is somewhat more complicated, however.

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⁸ In this quote, the student used the German word ‘Umgebung’, which can be translated as surroundings, environment, and setting. I chose to translate it as both ‘surroundings’ and ‘environment’ to capture what I think he meant in trying to capture the area around him.
The deputy head pointed out the variations between north and south Neukölln (EL154). He noted the difference in minority concentrations as well as the socio-economic differences of these district subdivisions. Like Neukölln, Waltham Forest, the borough of the London college, is very different from its northern to southern part. The southern portion, including Leyton, is very diverse, similar to neighbouring districts of Newham, Hackney, and Haringey. Northern Waltham Forest is reputed to be generally of a substantially higher socio-economic status in contrast to southern Waltham Forest; however, north Neukölln is generally seen as more multi-ethnic than the south.

As one teacher explained: ‘Neukölln has north and south; in the south, there are far fewer [migrants]’ (EL76B, Author’s translation). Another teacher took it one step further to denote certain roads of Neukölln by their ethnic make-up. He thought that Sonnenallee, a major road in the district, was mainly Arab, while Hermannstrasse, a similarly well-used road, was more Turkish (EL96). The same teacher made the observation that Neukölln is almost monocultural in its multiculturalism (EL96). In saying this, he meant that the pupils are accustomed to a certain level of diversity that becomes the norm to them, even if it is not reflected equally across Germany or even Berlin.

This perspective was confirmed by a pupil who stated: ‘I think here in Neukölln, you are used to meet people from other cultures every day, so we don’t realise that they are from other cultures, so we just go to him or her and talk…I prefer to talk to different people with other religion, culture, we can learn from each other, so if we only talk to Turkish people, we can’t learn something’ (ES204A2). This quote emphasises the multiethnic and mixing tendencies of city districts, reaffirming by experience the data from Schönwälder and Söhn (2009) that showed Germany’s ‘ethnic neighbourhoods’ to be very mixed areas, rather than ethnically homogeneous.

When asked if she has friends from other cultures, however, one Berlin pupil said: ‘Yes, I guess not so many, only, for example, with Germans from our class, and otherwise, I have very many Turkish friends or Arab, and our culture is very, very similar…Yes, there are still some differences. We know other cultures now, only what we know ourselves through friends’ (ES204B1, Author’s translation). She explained that they might get to know other cultures in the school, Albanian, for example, but mostly ‘not really’. This comment points to the perceived similarity of many of the ethnic groups in this area of Berlin, even if they are not exactly the same ethnicity.

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9 It is important to note that, while the assistant principle may not have included this in his comments, Hellersdorf and Marzahn are home to significant percentages of German-Russian remigrants or *Spätaussiedler*, who can be described as migrants even if they hold a German passport and are not as visible as the minorities in Neukölln.
Another pupil, however, who is Polish and whose best friend is half Libyan and half German, shows from his experience that the multiethnic neighbourhoods are not limited to Middle Eastern even, thus presenting even the multi-regional layers in this setting and expressing the presence of Germans, even if they are not numerous. ‘Most of my friends are from Turkey,’ he commented, ‘because I live my whole life here in Neukölln, and in Neukölln, there are lots of Turkish people, but I have also some Arabic [Arab] people…friends, yes, Germans as well’ (ES2845).

One pupil, whose mother is Egyptian and father is German, took this analysis one step further by adding the element of the German framework to his description. ‘I think for us here in Berlin or in Neukölln, especially, it doesn’t… or it’s hard to see if someone is from another culture, all of our friends are Middle Eastern, Middle Eastern country, and of course, we are living in Berlin, Germany, and we know, I would say, German culture’ (ES204C2).

In his statement, he highlights that they have the commonality of Middle Eastern culture, but there is also the mutual framework of German culture. From his analysis, it seems to act as a kind of uniting and defining factor, a recognition of a civic understanding of multiplicity of identities and the living reality of interacting in a German context.

His comments echo the experience of researchers who visited a German school and noticed the prevalence of the attitude of ‘freiheitlich-demokratische Grundordnung’. Taken directly from the German constitution, it emphasises the principle of democratic order and ‘its internalisation by the responsible individual who must believe in it and serve it conscientiously’ (Baumann and Sunier 2004, 27). In other words, the abstract order of German society perceivably shapes their interactions without being a concrete and direct presence, such as the researchers observed in the relationship with civil society in a London school. Comments from some London pupils affirm this assertion, using location to formulate the basis for a non-ethnic, civic understanding of their community, though it was still bounded by geography.

When I was discussing my project with a coordinator of citizenship education in North London, he described an occasion when they did some research on the theme of Britishness. ‘the people in inner London have a localised perception of their lives but it is a very diverse community’ (EE833). This is further confirmed in that, when a girl from London was asked about who she would call her community, she stated that her community ‘is just the area I live in; I count that as like my community’ (LL143A1). Though she does not elaborate, it is clear that when she refers to the area where she lives, she does not mean the geographical location alone but the people, institutions, and tendencies of that area of London.

A London student from the same college but in a different group commented that: 'You wouldn’t be the same person’ (LL143B2). Her peer added: ‘Yeah, because the people around
you like have a big effect on like your everyday life…” (LL143B4). This comment illustrates the awareness that the people around them formulate their identity and their sense of belonging.

Another student in London expanded on the way that she sees community, going against the more apparent tendency to develop ethnic enclaves in the UK. Her community is not so much like ethnicity like the black community I wouldn’t say that; nobody wants to be talked about that [way] because then you get into the whole segregation stuff; you’re black, you’re white, you’re Asian; so I think it’s just like the people that are around you, like where—the area you live in, the people around you, your neighbourhood…and I have a Christian community, the people that I fellowship with and I count them as my community, too (LL143A2).

This comment evokes the very local context of a civic community alongside a religious affiliation in that context. However, she, too, refers to community as being based on a geographic location that forms the boundaries for certain norms and practices. Another student at the school said that her community is ‘where ever you are at the time’ (LL143B3).

One student diverged from many of his peers in applying the multicultural experience of London to the entire UK, discarding the geographic boundaries of the neighbourhood as a focus for multiculturality. ‘In this country, you have lots of different accents, clothes, lots of those things, so I’m used to having a lot of these things around, so I don’t really notice [different cultures]’ (LL301C). While his comment is accurate in the diversity of the UK in general, the large majority of minorities, statistically, live in London and the surrounding areas with certain other cities of high diversity.

**Belonging**

Beyond the context of the neighbourhood as a geographic location with familiar sights and sounds, pupils sometimes referred to other aspects that made them feel as if they belong to these areas. While the subject of ethnicity and a sense of belonging based on such perceptions will be addressed in more detail in the following chapter, I thought it significant enough to include in this chapter as well, since it forms yet another facet of these locations. For a number of pupils, a perception of difference based on hair/eye colour or general physical features made them feel as if they belong to this part of Berlin or London more than other parts of the city or country. Visibility and invisibility are inextricably linked to the cultural and geographical context of social interaction. In Germany, those from the Middle East stand out and are the most visible minority, while in the UK, they are incorporated as ‘White other’ and experienced oversight for many years as an invisible minority. Likewise, within Turkey itself, people of Kurdish descent are often recognised by darker features, while to an outsider, they might appear as no different from the general population.
In the interviews that I conducted, it was significant that young people were very aware of their physical features and their difference to the typical ethnic German features, but also dependent on the context. When discussing why they stayed mainly in the Neukölln district, one group of two girls explained:

ES362: …everyone like to be in his Kiez [urban neighbourhood] because you know each other and you know your histories

ES361: and you won’t be diskriminiert [discriminated against]. We won’t go to I don’t know—Schönhausen, it’s another village in Berlin; there are living a lot of Germans and they mostly, I don’t know, react kinda strange when we arrive there with our dark hair, brown eyes….

In this exchange, both the identity of the neighbourhood of where we have always lived (echoes the previous section) along with the acknowledgement by the second pupil that part of the sense of belonging relates to her physical appearance and the way that people might react to it outside of this part of Berlin.

At another point in the conversation, the same two girls described some of their experiences further:

ES361: For me, I know that like Albanians in Switzerland are like Turkish people in Germany, so when we go to Macedonia, and we meet Albanians from Denmark or from Switzerland, I just think about them and about Turkish…

ES362: for me, I’m always in Germany, in Berlin, I don’t travel a lot, but when I was in Birmingham, there was a lot of Pakistanis and Indian people, and this was very interesting to see that in England there are a lot of other people and not English ones. Because in England, there are a lot of immigrations, too like in Germany.

In the first comment, the pupil observes that the context in which people live shapes their visibility and the general treatment and attitudes of the broader societal context. She knows that Albanians experience similar treatment in other countries as Turks in Germany. The second girl explains her observations of the differences in Birmingham when she visited with her school. She sees the differences in immigrant populations but also the similarities in that both countries have immigration.

A Berlin teacher acknowledged that this aspect plays into his plans for class trips in terms of protecting his pupils from feeling unwelcome in certain areas of Germany:

For example, I’ve had experiences, if I travel with pupils to Brandenburg, that in practice, our pupils will be eyed critically—or else, to some extent, they have to listen to disparaging remarks, without anything having happened [to provoke it]. What one must very clearly say is that they are not accepted in some areas; one must say very plainly—or also in other areas where the extreme right is very
popular, there are definitely experiences of marginalisation. Well, I would also
not necessarily want to do our class trips in certain regions of the country, since I
simply—well, that is indeed sad, but I would simply be afraid. I wouldn’t do it
again (EL116, Author’s translation).

His comments were offered sincerely, having clearly considered the discomfort his pupils felt
under the scrutiny and biases against them in these areas. His comments demonstrate something
beyond a sense of exclusion by expressing a fear that his pupils may be in danger.

Another pupil in Berlin confirmed this perception of feeling more visible in general: ‘There are,
I guess, two groups, the native Germans and the foreigners…there are different ones, polish,
Russian, there aren’t only Turkish – Muslim ones, so to say, but of course, one feels more seen’
(ES204B1).

Similarly, when a London teacher asked his students whether they travel much beyond east and
north London (Waltham Forest), one girl responded: ‘I don’t really like to…Yeah, I wouldn’t
like to because if it’s not like a mixed background like how it is here, then I wouldn’t really feel
comfortable, and it’s harder to relate’ (LL143B4). Here, she starts to mix the features of culture
and her sense of belonging, admitting, if indirectly, that her sense of belonging has some under-
lying relationship to ethnicity. She is clear that it is not a one-to-one correlation, but this com-
ment shows that there is some interaction.

In some way, these comments were confirmed by people who do not have the typical outward
appearance of the minority. For example, one pupil unpacked her own perceptions as a Turkish
girl with blond hair. She expresses a tension between the social and the ethnic markers, saying:

I never had problems, and I hope I will never have some because maybe it’s be-
cause of my outward appearance because I’m blond, and I don’t look like a typi-
cal Turkish or Arabic girl. Lots of people think I’m German. Maybe it’s because
of that because you can’t just see that I’m—and when someone with a different
background, and I know lots of people here, and they know that I’m Turkish, but
I never have problems with them, so maybe I saw things happening but they
never happened to me. Maybe it’s because I’m not so different from the people
here. There are also people who stick to their old rules and are very ignorant.
Maybe it’s because we were born here and we know the Western lifestyle and
we integrated, so maybe it’s because of that (ES106A1).

Even as she expresses the experience of tolerance, she differentiates between her interaction and
those of more traditional social understandings in the district. Her comments highlight the
awareness of ethnic markers alongside a hope for more civic understandings of identity.

Likewise in London, a Turkish woman explained to me that when she came to the community
centre and asked if I was there, the people were surprised that she spoke Turkish because she is
blonde. ‘They were confused because I didn’t fit their expectations’ (LP30112).
These comments, mostly offered out of the experiences and observations of women, may indicate the role that they play in the national and ethnic boundary. Yuval-Davis and Stoetzzer (2002), for example, explore the relationship between women and the nation, as they reproduce the biological and cultural collectivity. These experiences refute the idea that sexuality does not play a role in ‘secular’ societies (Scott 2009). This theme will be discussed further in later chapters, but for now, as an extreme example, the most vivid manifestation of this process of boundary maintenance is in the context of ethnic conflict. It is argued that acts of rape and related violence towards women constitute a strategy of expanding ethnic territory, as women embody this boundary in their sexuality (Handrahan 2004, 437).

The notion of visibility denotes a sense of belonging based on less civically defined aspects of identity; yet, these, too, are a function of institutions as well as national and international memory. As I turn to discuss the international level, it is evident that family ties connect young people across distant geographies but are not separate from the notions of belonging that subdivide city districts.

**Transnational Connections**

Even as human rights discourses and claims of universalism move social contexts to the background, memory discourses remain tied to the ‘specific memories of social groups in time and place’ (Huyssen 2003, 148). In this instance, the common memory could stem from the shared experience of being an outsider or descended from immigrants in Germany. It may be derived from the knowledge, based on internal social markers, of where one’s family originated before migration. These trends highlight the role that this memory plays in political, social, legal, and cultural interactions. Such is the case when students discuss cultural markers based on transnational ties and the international past.

In many of the interviews and in general conversation, there was an assumption among pupils that one’s transnational ties run strong into present behaviour and cultural tendencies. While the last section focused on the district as the context in which internal divisions and aspects of identity play out on a daily basis, students also introduced the theme of location in terms of their relationship to their family or their family’s country of origin, incorporating the international or transnational level of interaction into their everyday lives.

The role of background came through when pupils were asked what they notice when they meet people from other cultures or backgrounds. One pupil responded: ‘At first I am interested in where he or she comes from’ (ES204A1). This statement and the use of the word ‘where’ reiterate the importance of location and belonging.
As one teacher explained, in Germany, you are used to asking people where they are from if they look different at all. He went on to describe a cartoon, depicting a black guy and a white guy, and the white German guy says ‘Go back to where you are from’, and the black guy says: ‘Where, Dortmund?’ (EL134). As with many political cartoons, there is an element of truth in the commentary.

When other pupils were asked the same question about meeting people from other cultures, two pupils in London said:

LL301A1: Whether they cover their hair.

LL301A2: Skin colour, when you see someone who is white, you think that they are Christian; if they have brown skin, you think they are Asian background.

In these comments, ‘white’ is synonymous with Christian (a religion), sandwiched by a statement about covering one’s hair and another skin colour that identifies someone as Asian. Here, one can see the overlap of visible markers of identity and the association of these markers with particular religious affiliations. These visible markers include racial categories, but a reference is also made to a person covering their hair. This visible marker brings together a religious affiliation, usually (but not exclusively) Islam, and another aspect, gender. Thus, there are at least two elements that are not explicitly mentioned but are referenced in the exchange based on who would generally cover their hair and what this, in turn, would symbolise. Moreover, the comment about covering hair is the first comment made, giving it some significance in the perception of these young people.

A Berlin pupil also referenced physical markers in determining ethnicity, but she does not appear to incorporate religious affiliation into her analysis. She is also careful to include both male and female pronouns in her hypothetical situation. ‘If I see someone well at first I look at the way he look like, and then I ask for his or her name so I can guess from which country he comes from or she comes from’ (ES2242). Beyond visible ethnic markers, she highlights the strong role of names in defining ethnicity in both Germany and Turkey, not to mention other European and Middle Eastern countries. This is confirmed by research conducted in the Swedish labour market found that the call-back rate for applicants with a Middle Eastern-sounding name was 50 percent lower than for those with a Swedish-sounding name, where the rest of the application was the same (Carlsson and Rooth 2007).

The role of ethnicity in young people’s lives is reaffirmed by the readiness of many pupils to identify themselves by their parents’ country of origin. For example, one pupil who was born in Germany and has lived in Germany all his life, stated: ‘I am from Turkey’ even though his parents arrived in Germany when they were no more than teenagers (ES134). Similarly, a pupil at
the London school said: ‘I am from Jamaica, Panama, and Portugal’ (LL143B4). When I pressed her to know whether her answer would stay the same whether she were in the UK or abroad, she responded that her answer would stay the same. The teacher of the group who was present at the time suggested: ‘I think maybe it’s a feature of America, you’re American and that’s the way you describe yourselves, and obviously, I’ve seen Goodfellows, and they say I’m an American, I am Irish—It’s a particular USA thing; I think they would—our students would describe themselves as West Indian or Turkish or—wherever they were. I don’t think it matters’ (LT144).

As the teacher remarked, the comments of the students are in contrast to many Americans, who would identify by their ethnic background only to other Americans but would identify as American outside of the US. This may be related to what Mary C. Waters (1990) calls the ‘ethnic options’ that are exhibited in the American context. In the introduction to her book, she outlines how the role of ethnicity in society has gone from being the foremost factor in immigrant identity, entwined with racialising processes to being something that many scholars expected to entirely disappear in the experience of ‘white’ immigrants. However, it did not disappear. For many of these immigrants, ethnicity continued to play a role, even if it was to link them symbolically to an ethnic collectivity through something as small as a favourite song or a remembered phrase. This symbolic ethnicity is evidenced by the increased ethnic political activity of the latter half of the twentieth century, where the political activity was actually an ‘increase in visibility’ (Gans 1979, 4). It drew on a sense of identity but in the context of third and fourth generation immigrants who were well-established outside of ethnic enclaves and participating in middle class careers with little to connect them to the identity of their ancestors.

In this light, it is not hard to understand the perspective proposed by David A. Hollinger in his book, Postethnic America, where he argues for the value of a postethnic perspective. In his discussion, postethnicity makes room for voluntary identifications and ethnicity based on situational circumstances, where multiculturalism does not (Hollinger 1995). While Waters (1990) rightly does not presume to lump all ethnic identification into symbolic ethnicity, and Hollinger (1995) has some application in the U.S. context, the experience of being American but with ethnic options or ‘postethnic’ does seem to exhibit a different reality from minority youth in London and Berlin where very few appeared to have the option to identify as one ethnicity or another (see Chapters 2 and 7 for further discussion of hybrid, hyphenated, and cosmopolitan identities).

The trend of identifying with their parents’ country of origin was confirmed by another London pupil, interviewed on a separate occasion who said that when he thinks of Turkey, ‘I think of
home and holiday as well; we go to Turkey every summer, Adana every summer’ (LL301C).\footnote{Adana is a large city in Turkey, near the Mediterranean Sea, sharing the name with the province where it is located. It is reputed for the Adana Kebab (Kebap, as it is called, locally).}

In his statement, he describes Turkey as both home and holiday. This is a fascinating and perplexing duality of roles. ‘Home’ is no simple term. It is understood and analysed differently based on the disciplinary orientation and can refer to place(s), space(s), feeling(s), practices, and/or a state of being (Mallett 2004, 65).

In German, there are two terms for ‘home’: \textit{Heim} and \textit{Heimat}. \textit{Heim} refers to one’s house, where one lives. \textit{Heimat}, on the other hand, refers to one’s homeland. There is yet another term, which I wish to introduce, \textit{zu Hause}, which means to be at home. Since we know from the statement that he does not live in Turkey, we can deduce that it is not \textit{Heim}, but it could be \textit{Heimat} and/or \textit{zu Hause}. Regardless of which was his exact meaning, to put this in a statement alongside holiday brings a permanent identity into the same frame as a temporary one.

In conversation with a woman from Germany who now lives in the UK, I sensed a similar tension. Her residence is in the UK; her family resides in Germany, and this remains, at least in some sense, home, although she makes her life in the UK. Thus, when she visits her family, she, too, is bringing the permanent understanding of ‘home’ alongside what her visit looks like in practice, which is much closer to a holiday. I raise this point to show the complexity of the way that we conceive and use the term ‘home’, for I can think of many instances in which a young professional might travel a distance to go ‘home’, where, in practice, it is a holiday from their place of residence, irrespective of the distance that separates the two locations. In other words, these perceptions of home and holiday look something alike in practice but are far apart in sentiment.

Along the same lines, a Berlin pupil commented:

\begin{quote}
For me, it’s [Turkey] a kind of home because it’s my Herkunft [background], and yes, I like to go to Turkey because everybody is also Turkish but also a problem there that we come from Germany that we have a difference to the people there, and here it’s also the same problem (ES451).
\end{quote}

Likewise, in a group of three girls who have grown up in Neukölln, one affirmed: ‘We are not really at home in Germany but also not at home in Turkey; there we would appear as the Turks from Germany, and here, we are the foreigners. That’s why, for us, it’s only a holiday destination, a nice holiday destination’ (ES204B1, Author’s translation).

As they live in Germany, it goes without saying that Turkey is not their \textit{Heim}. Rather, the distinction is between a sense of \textit{Heimat} or \textit{zu Hause}. In the first one, spoken in English, the pupil acknowledges that it is only a ‘kind of home’, meaning that she still feels some discomfort with...
this terminology, since she is not accepted fully there. The second statement, spoken in German, used the term *zu Hause*, which, given the precision of the German language, indicates a rather deep sense of belonging, and moreover, acceptance and identification. This sense of belonging goes beyond some other notions of collective identification in that being ‘at home’ generally adds the element of space and place, though not referring only to a house (Yuval-Davis 2011, 10). However, she expresses the tension of not quite having this feeling in either location, based upon the response she perceives from the society around her. Regardless of these sentiments, all three of these pupils have their place of residence in London or Berlin.

From their conversation, it is evident that the students feel a tension between themselves and the world around them, both in the country of origin of their parents and in Germany, or perhaps more aptly stated, they feel the perception of being the Other in both contexts. This data is affirmed by research released in 2009 that was conducted by Info Research, a company based in Berlin and Liljeberg Research International, based in Antalya, Turkey. This was the first large-scale poll to gather opinions from a thousand Germans, Turks, and Turks living in Germany (presumably based on ethnicity rather than legal citizenship). The research found, among other things, that many immigrants feel out of place in both countries, and many younger Turks intend to return to Turkey (more than their elders), though the researchers acknowledge the imbalance of opinions gathered in the small size of the younger population sample. Only 21 percent overall felt happy to call Germany home, while more than half felt like Turks in Germany and Germans in Turkey (Hemmerich 2009, Spiegel Online; for further discussion of home and belonging, see Chapter 6).

The comments about re-settling in Turkey of those whom I interviewed, however, were mixed. Though some students noted the nicer weather there, they were very clear that they did not wish to live in Turkey long-term. One pupil said: ‘when I’m in Turkey I just can be four weeks there—five weeks—it’s too much, and I always want to come back to Germany; I miss my friends and the whole life here in Germany; I miss it’ (ES204A2).

Nonetheless, only a very few students had a clear break between their parents’ country and their home. A London student’s association with Turkey was ‘where they [my parents] come from, their village, their family, uncles, aunties’ (LL301B2). Unlike his peers, he refers to his parents’ origin in Turkey, rather than his own. However, he does allude to a topic of particular interest in terms of location in migration. This was not the only time that the topic of the village came up.

When assisting with adult English classes in a community centre, one of the students described how she was looking after the children of a person who was in the hospital (LP30111). The teacher asked if they were related. The woman explained that they were not, but they were from the same village in Turkey. Her sister was also participating in looking after the children. In this
way, the location from Turkey was replicated in the relationships and interactions, even in the country of settlement. Küçükcan (2004) recorded similar findings as a result of immigration to the UK being formed around social networks, kinship patterns, and patronage, leading to concentrations of settlement in London. I was informed that similar patterns of settlement occurred in Berlin, where villages and families resided in a particular districts.

Family ties did not always play the role of connecting young people to the country of origin, however. Ethnic connections also tied them more closely to the lines of the district through family businesses or after-school jobs. Many worked in family-owned restaurants or local businesses. When describing his free-time activities, one student in Berlin explained: ‘I help my father with the restaurant’ (ES204C2).

When I was speaking to two experienced London teachers who are Turkish, they explained that many students of Turkish background are not technically dropping out of school. It is more often that they begin to work for the family in the family business. It is also very standard that they marry very young (LP30112). This is confirmed by research from the University of Sussex, where they note that many youth leave school with few qualifications and find employment through kinship and social networks in places like coffee houses or kebab shops (King et al 2008). In this way, they participate in an ethnic economy, managing to sustain themselves in some of the most deprived areas of London. However, this trend does not apply equally to all members. One university student in London explained that her family reacted to this pattern in not allowing her to work.

Most people are just trying to finish [school], but my parents always supported me in education because they want me to be independent. When they had their businesses, they never asked me to go and help—never wanted me involved in working and earning money because they thought that would bring me into earning money, and then, I would get into gratifying my needs, and I would forget about my education (LL712).

Her parents were local business owners with their own good and bad experiences in the local market. She elaborated:

Before I came [to London at age six], my parents gave my brother to a caretaker while they worked. They thought that if they make some money, they can go back. My mum didn’t really want to go back because the [extended] family often turns to my father [the eldest of a large family] for financial support...My father’s brother, who lives in Switzerland, decided to invest in London in a social club; they wanted to change it into a restaurant, but because they didn’t know about the way that you have to apply for a licence, my dad put his name on behalf of his brother, which led to a loss of more than 80 thousand pounds. My mother was fuming, and they had to sell their first business because they were in debt, but his brother was in denial about how much they had lost, and they’re not speaking any more (LL712).
From this narrative, one can see the role of the transnational family in the local context of North London’s socio-economic circumstances. The student described how her parents actively responded to the pattern that they observed in the community around them. They wanted to promote their daughter’s independence, although for their part, they still do not speak good English or interact beyond their own businesses and community networks.

The transnational and local connections of the family take place in the context of globalisation. Communication, travel, and interaction are heightened in transnational and international spaces. For example, the globalisation of telecommunications networks has developed into a ‘network of networks’ (Townsend 2001, 1697). These networks are enabling a widespread diffusion of connectivity, where the traditional hubs of communication (London, New York, and Tokyo) are increasingly finding the rise of other hubs in their regions. Furthermore, the changes in affordability and availability of transportation have opened possibilities to visit and maintain connections. This affirms the assertion by Al-Ali and Koser (2002, 3) that international migrants’ activities are indicative of participating in the globalisation process through their use of transport, telecommunication, resources, and global markets along with their association with new political challenges, social forms, and cultural resources, not tied to a specific geographic location but linking multiple sites together.

This interaction on the global level is illustrated by a student’s response to a question about where he knows his close friends: ‘From here, from Berlin, but I have also friends from all over the world, because I am sometimes in chat rooms; most people come from England or Mexico or USA…because I like to communicate with many cultures and speak English more fluently’ (ES204A1). His participation in chat rooms opened him to relationships and interaction across the globe.

This sense of global engagement also shaped one informant’s perception of community. Thinking far beyond the boundaries of the neighbourhood or even the state, he saw community as much farther reaching. He described it as ‘friends, family,… the world wide web. I think community is everywhere, a person should be able to, should have the courage to talk, so if someone doesn’t talk, there is no community…Community starts with communication’ (ES204A1). This comment also highlights the role of dialogue in the formation of communities and the building of friendships.

Beyond communication, the aspect of travel in the globalisation process is somewhat more complex than one might initially suppose. Many people live with the assumption that travel is optional and increasingly accessible to everyone. This was the case when I spoke to one London parent about what she misses in Turkey. ‘I missed a lot at first, but it’s only three hours by
plane; at the moment—missing—I’m not missing much because I belong more to here than there’ (LP301B).

She explained that Turkey is not that far by plane but that, over the years, she has developed a sense of belonging to the London context more than Turkey. Furthermore, with the new technology, it was much easier to connect: ‘We also have internet, TV, MSN; we can reach our missed ones more easily than before’ (LP301B). This highlights the rapid advances in technology over the past ten to twenty years and how they, in turn, contribute to one of the facets of citizenship as identified in Chapter 2. Where it used to be extremely expensive to make an international phone call, options such as Skype, MSN (as mentioned by the interviewee), Google, and even Facebook offer possibilities to communicate with loved ones around the world, while maintaining engagement in the local setting, with the only requirement being an internet connection. These technologies even allow one to be seen with the use of web cameras.

However, for others, the choice and availability of free movement is not entirely even a matter of the country of settlement but also reflects the situations from which people migrate. For example, one mother could not return to Turkey for seven years due to political reasons. She said: ‘I missed Istanbul, my friends, the atmosphere’. She stayed in the UK until she was granted indefinite leave to remain, and now, she travels once or twice a year to visit friends (LP301C).

Many others do not have the financial means or political freedom to travel this often. Some are undocumented migrants and only able to remain as long as they elude discovery. Others are reliant on minimal support from charity organisations and the government as they struggle to feed themselves and provide for families. In one group of women in a community centre, one explained that she had been to Iraq a few months before, but her husband did not want to go; he had waited nine years to obtain a British passport (LP23111). Another woman in the group had not been back to Turkey for seven years (LP23113). This ‘access to mobility’ is, according to Bauman (1998), increasingly tied to global stratification. As these two comments illustrate, the increased travel seems to apply to a sub-group of people and does not universally apply. In particular, it does not appear to provide the same access to economic migrants or refugees. Moreover, it is also argued elsewhere that it does not apply equally to women and men, but rather, their place in the country of settlement and in the country of origin is defined differently, according to social and legal structures (Salih 2001, 656).

These experiences and conceptions of travel, communication, transnational linkages and the limitations thereof shape the world of young people in Berlin and London. Just as the distinct nature of their district, sense of belonging, and transnational ties form the basis for many of their relationships and their general interaction, it also feeds into the school. As discussed previously, the school, like other local and state institutions, is based on a given geographical area.
This means that many of the issues that are identified in a certain neighbourhood are replicated in the context of the school.

5.2. The School

Much of the pupils’ time and experience is spent in the context of the school. This necessarily shapes their relationships, from friendship to opportunities later in life. As one student put it: ‘it’s the place where we are nearly eight hours a day, so it’s naturally the place where we get to know our friends’ (ES106A2). Yet, the institution of education is not voluntary or organic. Rather, it is compulsory and based on factors that include limited options and choices on the part of the students and parents. Often based on district lines, the space of the school brings pupils from numerous cultural backgrounds into one context, directed and supervised by the state.

When asked about friendships, a pupil offered: ‘My friends are mostly at school and yes others are from childhood’ (ES204D1). One student said that she knows her friends mainly from school or from the Islamic school, which takes place once a week, but she also has friends from other neighbourhoods including Zehlendorf and Charlottenburg (ES154). An Albanian student commented that she knows her close friends ‘from school, mostly from school, some of them, the others, are Albanian who I met or are in my family, or when I was somewhere, but the other people, German or Turkish are from school’ (ES106C2). The final statement shows how the school functions beyond the family context to expose and introduce her to people of other cultural backgrounds.

One group described it this way:

ES204C1: for me it’s uh, I’m not a person who goes all the time outside and I spend a lot of time at home computer, and when I’m at school, I talk to other people and helps me to get into society.

ES204C2: if I lived in Germany, there’s a what’s the name of Pflicht?...requirement for school, ten years, and I think somebody who goes to school here, then he will maybe get some what’s up, what’s new with society, so I think it’s a one of the best ways to get to know what’s up in society or in other communities.

This exchange shows the role of the school in drawing some students out of their home context, bridging the gap for introverted personalities or tendencies to remain closely bonded with family, albeit extended. The student identifies clearly that the school helps to bring people into society, and the response identifies the clear link to the exposure to different ideas and worldviews.

Similarly, another student said: ‘Yes, if we had no school, it would be very boring; we always say we want to be in the holidays, but when we are in the holidays, we want to go to school be-
cause our friends’ (ES204A2). Again, one sees the role of the school as a place of contact and relationship building.

This experience held true even for those I interviewed at community centres in London. They told me that they get to know their close friends from school, and even when I asked further about their friends from the community centre, they reiterated: ‘No, [we know them] mostly from school’ (LL301A1 and LL301A2). Another confirmed that he has known his friends ‘since primary, from school’, and the other person in the group agreed (LL301B2, LL301B1). An older interviewee said that he knows his friends ‘from college’ (LL301C). Some of the college students identified their friendships from secondary school (LL143B3).

In these particular schools, pupils relate to cultures on a daily basis and articulate a remarkable cultural competency and interest in learning about other lifestyles and speaking other languages. As Parekh (2006, 232) argues, rather than leading to the tower of Babel as cultures and languages are appreciated, it leads to the de-ethnicisation of culture, making them a shared human capital. Another pupil, whose mother is German and father is Libyan, said: ‘My best friend is from Poland, my other friends, most of them are from Turkey, from other Arab countries, for example, from Egypt or from Tunisia, and most of my friends are in the school’ (ES2843).

One pupil explained: ‘It’s not like the Germans sit on one side and we sit on the other side; we do a lot together, and in the classroom, there isn’t any—no one would be ausgeschlossen [left out] (ES204B1).

In London, by contrast, one teacher described how he observed that ‘in many classrooms, the lines of ethnicity are not just in courtyards and public spaces but also in the classrooms; all the Asian girls sit together, etc’ (LT143). Another teacher at the same school said: ‘It’s a criticism that some teachers make out that students, to us from our perspective, they seem to mix with their own ethnic groups, obviously there’s more to it than that, but outwardly, it seems to be ethnicity the determining factor, but it’s also probably just cultural feeling’ (LT144). As we were in a group setting, the teacher then asked the students who were present if this were the case, that it is actually culture, not colour that drew them together, and they confirmed it.

A London university student who attended a multicultural all girls secondary school had similar recollections: ‘People from the same region hung out together, unless the girls who were Sunni were not practicing to the proper level—like secular Turks versus those those that wear hijab’ (LL712). This highlights the multilayered identities of young people in that lines of ethnicity could be superseded by the degree to which a person adheres to religious practices. On the other hand, if the comment about it being culture that draws the students together, such a division would actually make complete sense and not diverge from this pattern.
This experience was varied, however. Another pupil in London commented: ‘Sometimes, we go to special trips with our school; our head teacher always says that “our school is not a school but a community…Everyone is valued equally”’ (LL301A2). All of these statements illustrate the presence of boundaries that are ‘inscribed’ in social spaces, and the existence of many groups within a given space seems to have only a limited effect on interaction (Wessel 2009, 5). In other words, intergroup interaction is not only based on the sharing of the same space, as will be discussed shortly.

In the shadow of such high concentrations of diversity lies the possibility of ghettoisation of people who are not ethnically German or White. In other contexts, this has been commonly called ‘white flight’ (Kruse 2007). For example, Kreuzberg and Neukölln might be trendy locations for university students and artists, but as soon as they have children, they move out of these areas. One teacher in Berlin alluded to this possibility when he described how the school places are based on district lines, but if parents have money, they will likely move to another district when their child is ready to begin primary school (EL134).

Another teacher remarked that ‘There is a concentration of Arab and Turkish students [in the school], and a mixture doesn’t take place any more’ (EL76B). The teacher who described the unmixed nature of the school (meaning the line between Germans and non-Germans) went on to outline two challenges that this raises, namely, the completion of the Abitur (A-Level equivalent) and a changing of the status quo, i.e. the unmixed nature of this setting. In so saying, she highlights a crucial point, that is, if pupils are not mixed at secondary school and have difficulty in obtaining the Abitur, will the proper mixture of society ever take place?

At another point in the interview, she explained that this situation starts long before the final exam. ‘Most German parents try to find another school’ (EL76B). Here again, the divisions are apparent within districts being magnified. In this statement, the district lines shape the first impressions and family exchanges of the pupils and then go on to shape the school experience in terms of who attends which school. The teacher went on to explain that the places at Gymnasium are limited; they made another class from the south of Neukölln, ‘but the parents didn’t want it, so they went to private school’ (EL76B).

Along the same lines, when a teacher at the London college asked his students whether a mixture occurred at the college, the following conversation ensued:

LL143B4: Not really

LL143B1: There is, like if you go to a college like out of town, you wouldn’t see like a mix of everyone together, but in [south Waltham Forest], you see a mix of everything.
L143b4: I don’t think like, I don’t think there’s a big mix.

Lt144 [teacher]: Not many white people, are there, not many white students, are there?

LL143B4: Yeah, so I don’t think that that’s a good mix to me

LT144 [teacher]: I think [LL143B4] has a good point because it’s what, 6 percent white, 40 percent Asian, maybe you know, 40-50 percent Black…

It struck me that two students in the same room could have such differing perceptions of the same setting. Within seconds of each other, one said that there is a mixture and the other said there isn’t. They were not speaking one after the other as the transcribed conversation would indicate but almost interrupting each other to express their views. The student who argued that it is a good mix was naturally saying that there are a variety of backgrounds in the local setting and in the college, but his peer highlighted that it was not an equal mix of all people in society but excluded White-British. In this way, the school is not an accurate reflection of the greater society.

As the discussion continued, the theme switched from the issue of ethnic or cultural mixing to that of socio-economic lines or the role of class. The London teacher introduced the subject by raising the issue of being a working class area and even belonging to the working class himself:

LT144 [teacher]: And you know there's not many classes here; I mean, we're mostly, I mean, I’m working class background; I think we're mostly working class people, we’re not skiing in February, or we don’t go to the Seychelles on holiday, do you know what I mean, or for the gap year, we’re talking about working in the gap year. You aren’t travelling to the Himalayas or to India.

LL143B4: Yeah, it’s not a good mix, there’s not like a big variety of people , that’s not equal.

LT144 [teacher]: [LL143B4] has a point, because if there were more middle class kids, you don’t have to be white to be middle class, do you, there’s lots of black and Asian middle class people, but if you had some middle class people, you’d get ideas from them like where to go, what to do, whereas at the moment, we don’t really have, in this college, we don’t have many kids going to Oxford or Cambridge or the top universities. I think last year only one went to Oxford and one went to Cambridge out of two thousand students; that’s incredible isn’t it, how can we be mixed, that would b really giving you fellows a chance.

LL143B4: that’s how [this college] wants to show themselves to other people; I think in their booklet, prospectus, it’s a really mixed background, but really it’s not. But it also shows that in there, because it says that some of the how a lot of students went to Oxford and things like that when that shows itself that it’s not as a mix background as what they’re trying to put it across, so it like kind of doesn’t really support itself, some of the sources don’t support what they’re trying to say about [this college].
The teacher observed a real lack of class mixing at the college, as evidenced by the students who aspire or attain entry to top universities in the UK. He also notices it in the options for the gap year, holiday, and so on. His comments raise the intersectional experiences of these young people as generally belonging to the working class and also an ethnic minority in the British context. For some, there is yet another division, that is of gender. These three divisions cannot be isolated, but nor should they be conflated, thereby homogenising the very complexly intertwined identities which initiated the intersectional debate (Yuval-Davis 2006b, 196). In other words, it cannot be assumed that inequalities based on race are the same as those related to class or gender. Such assumptions have been critiqued on the EU level, in particular, as policies shift from responding to gender inequality to multiple inequalities without questioning the differences that lie at their basis (Verloo 2006, 211). The intersection of these social divisions is not a new phenomenon and can be traced in multiple states’ histories (for further discussion, see Brah and Phoenix 2004).

The student added to the conversation by her observations of the college’s advertising scheme. Where it tries to depict itself as a college of great variety, her feeling echoes the teacher from Berlin who commented that Neukölln is almost monocultural in its multiculturality and that actually, a really representative mix does not occur. When another student was asked her opinion of the mix, she responded: ‘I think it’s a minority kind of people’ (LL143B5).

At the root of the differing opinions among the London students is some ambiguity over the term ‘diversity’. For one student, this meant simply the presence of some variety, while the other student expected diversity to mean a true mixture of cultural and socio-economic backgrounds. Research conducted in the United States used in-depth interviewing to explore the meaning of this term in the US context and found that, in general, ‘diversity’ could not be discussed in concrete terms without the involvement of racial Others. As such, ‘diversity’ became a euphemism for discussing race and other normative presumptions of Whiteness in US culture (Bell and Hartmann 2007, 895). According to the second student’s analysis, the college’s advertising scheme appears to be taking this approach, not in an intentionally negative way, but rather, in an attempt to celebrate the backgrounds of the students, it is also in some sense contributing to the othering process and disguising the inequality inherent in the social and spacial relationships across London.

After this part of the discussion was completed, one of the students raised another point, questioning whether having more of a mixture would actually lessen the divisions or possibly add to them.

LL143B2: But even if there was more class, there would be more division

LL143B4: I don’t think there would be more division if there was more mix.
LL143B2: because you can see like, in sociology we’re learning that upper class people, if they did come here…they tend to keep to themselves like within their own class; I mean, we feel comfortable here because it’s all working class; that’s only one of the factors.

This particular exchange echoes a key debate in the effect of sociopolitical spaces in urban contexts on intergroup relations. Based on the contact hypothesis, prejudice could be reduced (if not deeply ingrained) in the context of a) equal status, b) common goals, c) intergroup cooperation and d) support of authorities or institutional arrangements (Wessel 2009). Extensive studies have shown that this last aspect, the support of the authority structures, is, in fact, the most important to generating positive outcomes. However, outside of the laboratory, situations are not as clear-cut. A study conducted in South Africa on a beach showed that, although people were using the same public space, segregation persisted, and intergroup contact was limited as evidenced by the division of umbrella areas, the patterns of interaction across the beach, and even the unspoken awareness of which times to be at the beach (Durrheim and Dixon 2005). In this way, the student who thought that divisions might occur in spite of sharing the same school location could be as accurate as his peer who thought that mixing may very well occur beyond racial and socio-economic lines. Interestingly, the student who thought that class would not mix did not seem to have the same preconceptions about ethnicity. At another point in the interview, he said: ‘If you get to know one another, you’re more likely to be open, unlike just like staying restricted within your own background’ (LL143B2).

The theme of socio-economy is a thread passing through much of this discussion, implicitly and explicitly. In an interview with Cem Özdemir, Co-Chair of the Green Party in Germany, he made a reference to the PISA study that compared pupils’ achievement on an international basis. He said:

One mistake we did at the beginning was that we thought the bad results had to do with the high number of people of colour, so if you would exclude them, that we would be perfect. But then we had to realise that that’s not the case, because German working-class children are not doing well in the German school system either (Özdemir 2011).

A representative from the Türkischer Bund in Berlin-Brandenburg (TBB) expanded on the added challenges for parents of this socio-economic background: ‘In this social class, the parents...have, in part, not a lot of interest in these things, and when they do have it, they do not know what they should do’ (BE446). In this social class, he specifies that ethnicity or background does not matter; it is the same for Turkish, Arab, Irish, and so on. He identifies this as one of the reasons that parents do not participate more in school activities, including parent evenings. ‘The education system is oriented towards the middle class’, he commented later in the interview. Here is just one of the first aspects where it plays a role in setting the boundary.
From friendships to socio-economic standing, divisions exist in the experiences and interactions of these young people, shaping their exposures, worldviews, and opportunities. The challenges of these areas of Berlin and London exist alongside immense cultural capital and global awareness that broadens the interactions of young people, connecting locations around the world. In this way, disconnected geographies intersect with local neighbourhoods, informing perceptions of belonging and citizenship, as will be discussed in the next chapter.

**Conclusion**

This chapter explored how young people’s lives encompass an intersection point of multiple territories. Using the levels of analysis, one can see that these spaces both supersede and subdivide political and ethnically defined boundaries. In both cases, minority youth expressed ties to particular spaces of their city. Yet, these were not defined simply by geography, but exhibit multi-dimensional notions of belonging. The districts were defined by their diversity alongside socio-economic status. In Berlin, this is exemplified in the statements concerning the population of their district as being mainly Middle Eastern or non-German. This was highlighted in its relationship to education, since young professionals might live in the area until they have children and then move away, thus contributing to the perpetuation of social divisions through ‘white flight’. In London, this aspect came to the fore in the discussions in the school and whether or not it can be considered as ‘diverse’ if it is not representative of the population as a whole but is predominately non-white.

Along the same lines, the chapter also highlighted the role of visibility and invisibility in notions of belonging. This certainly came through more explicitly in the Berlin students’ comments but was not entirely absent in the London context. A reason for the stronger appearance of this factor in Berlin is potentially not because it is a more relevant issue but because the majority of those with whom I spoke in London are of Turkish or Kurdish ethnicity and are often subsumed in wider society as an invisible minority (Enneli, Modood, and Bradley 2005). This highlights the differing racialisation processes in each national context. In terms of the other levels, however, students in Berlin and London had similar notions of the transnational space, connected through their family and use of internet and transportation technology. Thus, one can see how local connections interact with global spaces and the globalisation process overall. Such interactions are no longer confined to large cities or even states but come into play in interstate relations, heightening the need to examine these spaces through an IR lens.

The following chapter will turn from multi-scalar spaces to explore the function of citizenship. It will show how the passport functions in the practices of minority youth in a wider context and how it, in turn, relates to the complex and recently changing meaning of ‘citizenship’, both on the local and the international levels.
6. Citizenship: From the Passport to Local Engagement

The context of changing norms of national sovereignty, human rights, interstate and intrastate conflicts, and heightened power of international organisations, citizenship as a signifier of identity has increasing power to shape the experience and integration of migrants and refugees. The passport as the internationally recognised representation of this legal-political signifier denotes one’s relationship to a society as well as the relationship between societies, sometimes mirroring global hierarchies and patterns of the uneven processes of globalisation and reproducing narratives of homogeneity. These hierarchies exist in the areas of trade, international law, and global governance, resulting in the overlap of domestic and global inequalities (Castles 2005, 203).

When I was returning from Germany in December 2009, I was waiting in Immigration at Stansted Airport when a girl was refused entry. She had somehow arrived on UK territory without the appropriate visa. She argued with the immigration officer that it was against her human rights for him to deny her access, but when she could not answer his demand for her to quote where that was stated, she was told to wait until all the other non-EU citizens had passed through.

In a completely different context, another informant, who holds a Cypriot passport, described an occasion when he was entering Germany at Stuttgart Airport.

The passport dude kept me waiting without saying anything and checked my Cypriot passport very thoroughly, and in the meantime, people who were waiting behind me all joined the other queues and passed the immigration, so I was the last one to go through. After five minutes, he asked me what language I speak. English or Deutsch? I said: ‘English’. He asked me what was the purpose of my journey. At that point – already angry at him because I thought he singled me out and he didn't ask a single question to other people – I told him that though my passport is an old issue and as such doesn't say EU on the cover, but actually Cyprus is a EU member state and he shouldn't be questioning me (EE53).

In these two instances, the possession of a certain passport and citizenship acts as an instrument of closure at home but possibly more acutely while abroad. These two occasions illustrate the relationship of EU and non-EU, and more controversial and latent patterns of hierarchy of EU to EU. Although Cyprus has been a member state since 2004, the same informant reported several other instances of a similar kind. Ironically, when he visited Canada, he had no problems: ‘I think Commonwealth functions better than EU sometimes, anyway, joking, but I'm really worried about this German look-down attitude towards Eastern Europeans and the Mediterranean’ (EE273).
For the immigrant and transmigrant, such questions and obstacles are not optional as in the case of those who travel for work or pleasure. As Olden (1999, 212) notes in his research on Somali refugees in London: ‘The world may be a global village in the media sense, but on the ground, the borders of the village are far more rigorously policed...’. Migrants are inexorably entwined with the immigration experience of entry and engagement, sometimes finding themselves on the social and political border even after entering the geographical one. Facing the tension between rights and identity, which are increasingly coupled in European citizenship policies (Soysal 2000, 1), immigrants have the possibility to acquire citizenship of the country where they now live, but with what cost and what logic? What does the passport say? What does citizenship mean to them?

In the post-war years, the changing face of Euro-Mediterranean relations and Britain’s relationship with its former empire began to lay foundations for the challenges to national identity now faced across Western Europe. The manner in which the boundaries were protected, re-imagined, and reinforced through citizenship illustrates the elusive balance, contradictions, and contested realities of economics, ethnic, and civic identity. In this context, citizenship became a process of definition that, over the years, presents distinct challenges to a territorial notion of a state. Citizenship is the legal basis upon which a state can deny access to certain people and provide access to others. It acts as an instrument of closure, framed by a ‘conceptual, legal, and ideological boundary between insider and outsider’ (Brubaker 1992, X). Highlighting this awareness, one student commented that citizenship made him think of nationalism (LL143B2).

By extension, the passport acts as a measure to patrol international movement. ‘The passport is nothing in and by itself but becomes of significance the moment a closed border is to be passed. Thus the point is not to study the passport in isolation but to follow its use in practice...’ (Lotherington 2011). In other words, the passport is just one actor in a network of many actors that patrol formal and informal boundaries. In Germany and the UK, the relationship between the passport and citizenship illustrates nuanced and divergent perceptions. For youth in Berlin, ‘passport’ and ‘citizenship’ were all but synonymous, viewed in primarily pragmatic terms, while British students rarely used them interchangeably. In both cases, however, citizenship reflects a complex, and sometimes contradictory, process for later generations as it indicates the crossing of an invisible but highly maintained internal border, the dimensions of which remain both highly fluid and yet highly patrolled. Also known as ‘informal boundaries’, they are specified according to a sense of belonging to a particular collectivity (Wiener 1999, 198).

While the last chapter discussed the levels of analysis in young people’s lives as they are manifested in multi-scalar spaces, this chapter explores the way that citizenship interacts across these levels. In contemporary notions of citizenship, the paradox of particularism legitimised through universal personhood inevitably shapes the processes of claims-making, identity mobilisation,
and practices of citizenship in general (Soysal 2000, 1). This chapter will be divided into two main sections. The first section will focus on the perception of legal citizenship, and the second section will focus on the increasingly emphasised aspect of the term citizenship to indicate the obligation or intention of participation in a community.

By exploring how the passport functions in practice, one can see that the passport is assigned a value ranging from resource to identity in the experience of minority youth. Simultaneously, and perhaps more importantly, perceptions of ethno-political divisions within society alongside social perceptions weaken the value of citizenship in guaranteeing the moral equality of all members. In a way, therefore, legal citizenship is overridden (or undermined) by a sense of value put on the migrant, in what I want to call the ‘valuisation’ process. In this process, various social institutions and state policies put a value on immigrants, sometimes based on their ethnicity, but increasingly based on their skills and even intelligence, working in a contrary motion to the trend of universal human rights. This pattern is evident in earlier immigration and integration policies, particularly in the UK, where racist policies were used to limit the entry of unskilled migrants (see Chapter 3). This process is touched upon in literature that discusses the desirability or undesirability of certain migrant groups, i.e. how the borders of a state are protected, or the preferences prevalent in immigration laws in many countries of Europe and North America (Bauböck 2006, 18), but I propose that it requires further investigation within states and a terminology that captures the experience of worth and value among migrants and the passport that they hold. Moreover, understanding the way that citizenship operates will help us to develop appropriate IR tools to study how these trends affect interstate relations.

The second section will move away from citizenship as it is embodied in travel documents and the actors in that network to focus on the community centres and schools, investigating the terrains of social engagement. Similar to Leitner and Ehrkamp (2006) and the experience of transmigrants, the section will show that in the vacuum left by the unfulfilled guarantees of citizenship, minority youth develop multiple allegiances and identities that exist simultaneously.

6.1. Citizenship in Practice

In the process of gathering data for this research, I attended a workshop on citizenship education. When one of the participants turned to me and asked: ‘What does citizenship mean to you?’, I was taken aback, and not only because I was trying to play the inconspicuous researcher. Having a passport that allows me to travel relatively easily in and out of most countries in the globe, I was made keenly aware of how little I thought about citizenship.

One of the teachers at the Berlin school echoed this sentiment when I asked him his thoughts on citizenship: ‘It is difficult for me [to say] because I am a German citizen; for me, I don’t think
of anything special about it’ (EL154, Author’s translation). However, this was not universally the case, even in Germany.

One teacher described how he grew up very close to the line that demarcated West and East Germany. He recognised how the slightest shift of a political border could have changed his life.

I always said, if the border had run a little differently, then, I would have been a GDR citizen. Well, everything depends on chance, I think. And now, when we see citizenship, for example, we have Europe, we have a united Europe, where one says it is important to say, one is German, or European or has to say we are world citizens (EL68A, Author’s translation).

This quote highlights how the very local impact of a border would have changed his life dramatically. Furthermore, it demonstrates how the changing face of Europe has made the local presence of the EU an everyday experience of identity, even stretching one’s sense of participation and ownership to global issues. However, the value of belonging to a certain polity is not often fully ascertained by those who have it but more often by those who do not. This observation is illustrated as citizens of EU countries can move freely between member states; US citizens and other preferred countries can stay for three months without any extra documentation, while citizens from another set of countries must obtain Schengen or tourist visas in advance to spend even a few days and register with the police if remaining any longer. The patrolling of borders and the perception of difference is keenly felt by those who do not have the same access and free movement, in spite of long-term residence and even birth in a European member state.

The challenge of formulating citizenship policies is evident in Germany’s response to Russian remigrants in contrast to measures towards guest-workers. Ruth Mandel (2008, 5) notes the contradiction of experience and ‘historically charged projections of identity’ in the circumstances of the Russian remigrants or Aussiedler returning to Germany in the 1990s. She explains that, along with bearing the high costs of reunification, it became apparent that the ‘ethnic Germans’ from the former Soviet Union spoke Russian and possessed elements of Soviet culture and did not have a particular interest in appropriating the particularisms of Germanness. Nonetheless, the Basic Law led to Germany’s inclusion of more than a million people of German descent coming from Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and accepting them into full political and civic incorporation (Brubaker 1992, 14). In stark contrast, the Turkish guest-worker population remained outside of the citizenry until the citizenship reforms of the 1990s (Hansen 2003, 89). In this way, the Russian remigrants illustrate the breakdown of the ethno-national imaginary, though they were one of the primary reasons that it was so vehemently maintained after World War II, reinforcing the conception that the ‘state-constituting citizenry’ was bounded in primordially ethnic terms (Joppke and Morawska 2003, 18). It could be argued that this realisation,
alongside pressures from EU neighbours led to the change in the nationality act in the late 1990s.

While German citizenship leaned towards an ethnic definition, the British tendency shifted from an expansive, imperial citizenship in 1948 to an increasingly closed definition by 1981 (Geddes 2003, 31). However, in the same way that Germany’s immigration and integration trajectory shows the civic and universalist undertones of the nation in spite of the overriding emphasis on no-immigration policy, so too, the British immigration policy emphasises the civic nature of citizenship but with heightened and explicit focus on race. Thus, one can see again the tension between civic and ethnic conceptualisations of citizenship and how these operate in practice within the national imaginaries, rather than between them.

This difference in national policy can be observed in part through the way that data on race and ethnicity are gathered in the respective national contexts. Until 2005, statistics only offered numbers for naturalised and unnaturalised individuals in German society. While this method almost certainly emerged from Germany’s own national history and the need to avoid any such potentially discriminatory practices, the method is not foolproof in terms of developing solutions. The logic of this may also hint at the difficulty of obtaining German citizenship until very recently. Still, it does not help to analyse distinctions between groups or particular challenges of diaspora communities. These obstacles led to the development of the complementary concept of ‘migration background’ in 2005. The advantage of this identifier is that it relies on objective factors, rather than on the self-assessment used in the British census method (Schönwälder and Söhn 2009, 1441). The difficulty in the self-assessment method is that with so many options of mixed and varying racial categories, the number of categories will only grow, as is evident in comparing the 2001 to the 2011 census categories. It also may contribute to the carrying of identities forward through the conception of racial heritage. On the other hand, the difficulty with the German concept of migration background is that, while it may account for two generations of heritage, it does not extend beyond this by this definition, where the experience of citizenship may still isolate that person based on ethnic markers.

In other words, this idea is a time-sensitive categorisation, based on generations, which will have different effects on various groups of youth. Thus, in the examination of how legal citizenship functions in practice, it is important to keep in mind a wide range of factors including: ethnicity and the reinforcement of ethnic markers (from both sides), the valuisation process of the passport and legal citizenship, in addition to the disconnect between this legal citizenship and the sense of belonging and equal standing in the society.

When I asked pupils about the meaning of citizenship in their lives, it became increasingly evident that the words they used were associated with value. When was it useful? When had it
made things easier? How did it reflect on their worth? They did not purely associate it with identity or even participation. Their perceptions contain a composite understanding of both how they perceive citizenship and how they feel themselves to be perceived, as a function of citizenship and other markers that lessen the value of it in their lives. Cross-cutting these perceptions are trends of the local and global spaces that intersect their understanding and identity. The next sections will show how the perceptions of citizenship range from being a resource to identity, followed by the perceptions of citizenship as a mechanism of control without offering equality within a given geographical space. Finally, some pupils completely reject the notion of citizenship in their lives and articulate the discourse of human rights in their perception of themselves and their social context.

**A Resource-Identity Continuum?**

With increasing free movement between EU countries and restricted cross-regional flows, it is no wonder that the advantages of holding an EU passport have been elucidated by many. Obstacles of residency and employment decrease, instrumentalising the passport as an object, something to have in order to activate more rights, rather than representing anything about the individual. This phenomenon is not limited to the EU, however. When Hong Kong was to return under Chinese rule, roughly ten percent of the population held multiple passports as protection against Chinese rule. They provided confidence in the context of political insecurity and global trade (Ong 1999, 1). In the following comments, these themes extend to the reasons that minority youth take the citizenship of the country in which they live. Political insecurity and movement on a supranational level both appear in the comments of young people. Pupils expressed a range of perceptions. Some clearly had no use for the passport beyond its practical function. Others linked it more closely to their identity, and still others, seem to recognise the tensions and apparent contradictions between the purpose and actual function of the passport in their lives. In the moments when pupils and teachers refer to identity, their comments include a variety of perceptions concerning the fluidity and possibility of hybrid identities, sometimes alluding to a specific concept of Germanness in contrast to the understanding of many multiple and overlapping identities.

The voices of the London students are fewer in terms of having the passport for the sake of practicality, since most of them have always had a British passport and have not faced the question of whether they would or should take it. This echoes the change in the British Nationality Act that may have perpetuated more open citizenship policies but not necessarily the moral equality generally connected to political belonging. The Berlin pupils, in contrast, express scepticism about the meaning of citizenship as linked to identity. Both groups, however, contribute to the next section where they express misgivings regarding the passport’s function. For some,
the experience, the ideal, and the purpose exhibit three intertwining (but not parallel) trends of the way that citizenship operates in the country of settlement.

Throughout the comments, the essentialisation of culture seemed to be linked to some extent with the idea of taking a passport for pragmatic reasons. For example, when I interviewed one of the teachers at the Berlin school, who has worked there for twenty years, he observed: ‘For the Turkish or immigrants, many of those at our school and their parents have German citizenship, but I believe it is not connected with the adoption of German culture. It has pragmatic reasons’ (EL154, Author’s translation). His assessment highlights research into integration and boundary-crossing in France, Germany, and the US, where the boundaries of citizenship, language, religion, and race were found to be much more ‘bright’ in the European context than in the US (Alba 2005, 20). In so saying, the ‘brightness’ of the boundary is based upon the group’s awareness (on both sides of the boundary) of where they stand with regard to the boundary. While one can naturally contest a generalisation along these lines, the sentiment remains for this teacher at least that he does not observe a distinct crossing of the boundary to taking on a German identity. This teacher was one of the first to identify something called ‘German culture’ within my study. This conception maintains hints of a European, Judeo-Christian normative worldview alongside an adoption of language and even cultural norms of behaviour in public and private spaces. The perception is that, in taking this step across a so-called ‘bright’ boundary, it would be akin to a conversion, leaving some aspect of an identity behind in order to take on the new one (Alba 2005, 24).

The very conception of this bright boundary seems to play into the decisions and comments of other students and community leaders with whom I spoke. However, it is important to say from the outset that this perception is not universally held. An outsider notices very quickly that ‘German culture’ is very diverse within itself and particularly across the different regions of Germany. Nonetheless, pupils and teachers alike alluded to the sense of Germanness.

The following conversation with two pupils shows how they would take citizenship but not because it changed anything for them except in practical terms. One pupil who has a Turkish passport said:

I thought about taking, getting German citizenship but I don’t know why I should take it, get it. Well, I have the right to live here, and how do you say, allowance to live here, so I don’t know if it would be important for me, if it would give me the chance, if it would be more easy for me to get a job or something like this, then I would change it, my citizenship, because for me it doesn’t matter what is written on the paper, German or Turkish, it really doesn’t matter (ES106A1).

Her classmate said: ‘I also have the Turkish citizenship, but my mother told me that I should get the German one because, she meant [thought] that I wouldn’t get so much troubles later…’
Both of these express a detachment from the significance of the passport to the pupils’ personal or social identities. The first pupil asserts that it has no effect on her, whether the passport ascribes one or another nationality. The second pupil also does not see the use of having German citizenship but comments that her mother believes she should have it.

The notion of taking citizenship for practical reasons is not a new one. Euwals et al (2007) present findings of provisional research in a comparison between the labour market and naturalisation in Germany in the Netherlands. They found that there is a negative correlation between naturalisation and tenured employment in Germany and account for it based on the requirements for economic self-reliance in immigration policies. Their findings highlight the need for in-depth research on case studies before proposing any generalisable results or recommendations for further changes, since seemingly inconsequential immigration policy decisions can entirely shift naturalisation and employment trends. Aihwa Ong (1999, 113) takes the argument a step further to posit that, although conceptions of citizenship often link it to a sovereign and bounded political state, global markets have introduced economic calculation to immigrants’ decision-making process regarding citizenship as well as the way that such states formulate immigration and naturalisation policies. This is what she refers to as ‘flexible citizenship’, where professionals attempt to navigate, circumvent, and benefit from a variety of naturalisation policies and global positions.

Further to this discussion, the representative of the TBB with whom I spoke explained that, even if German citizenship is not desirable, they still encourage young people to get German citizenship when they turn 18, if they have that option.

...you have to get it, A. because that you don’t have to do with the foreigner laws; you have formally and legally equal rights; this is for you very important...And the second: we don’t have other possibilities, than it is a democratic instrument, that means voting and voters (BE446).

His comments highlight again the pragmatic aspects of taking German citizenship but with even a longer term view than getting a job or even a position in the global market. In this way, they have legal equality, and even if it is not equal in practice, it is a step in the right direction, allowing them to participate fully in political action. Similarly, research conducted among Tamil, Somali, and Congolese communities in the London borough of Newham showed the importance of immigration status in relation to the social and economic settlement of asylum-seekers and refugees (Bloch 2000, 75). Even if it does not make an immediate change, the status of the immigrant shapes social, political, and economic interaction in the long-term trends.

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11 Here the student translated the German verb ‘meinen’ and used the English word ‘mean’, which is a false cognate in this instance, where the German actually means something closer to ‘in her [the mother’s] opinion’.
This conception of citizenship fits closely with some work on rational choice theory and its relationship to identity and expression (for an overview, see Calvert 2001). Much of the research in this area so far focuses on electoral politics and participation of various groups through voting, partisanship, and occasionally ethnic politics and conflict. In countries like Switzerland, where non-citizens are permitted to vote in some cantons at the local level, rational choice theory of this kind might be useful and easily tested. However, regarding the situation in Germany, citizenship is essential to full political participation and legal protection. Thus, one can take rational choice theory as far as it seeks to explain the instrumental choices of individuals and subgroups in the process of whether even to consider full political and legal citizenship in the community. In this regard, social interaction enables individuals in a given group (assuming that they interact primarily within that group or somewhat related subgroups) to benefit from cooperation and exchange of resources (Calvert 2001, 44). In this case, this cooperation and exchange of resources might refer to the political experience of organisations that advocate on the part of minorities; it may refer to the legal awareness or economic support of transnational connections. Additionally, it could simply refer to the influence of the family on young people’s decision-making process as they position themselves for employment, as evidenced by the aforementioned comments. On the other hand, rational choice theory cannot account for all of the comments made by young people regarding this choice.

Two girls from Macedonia recognised that, while they might maintain their cultural identity with Macedonia and their heritage as Albanians, they wanted German citizenship for the purposes of rights and because they identified with the setting in which they live. One commented: ‘I am still Albanian, and I have the Macedonian passport, but I want to get the German passport because then you have more rights, of course’ (ES106C1). Her classmate continued: ‘Me too. I don’t have a German passport, but I want to get it because I think if you live for a long time, or I’ve lived for a long time in Germany, and I’ll go there [Albania] for four or five weeks, and so sometimes, I see myself not as German, but I feel good here (ES106C2).

The first statement shows an already nuanced experience of national belonging, expressing a hybrid identity. The pupil identifies herself as Albanian with a Macedonian passport, and does not feel a loss of either identity by obtaining the German passport for the purpose of rights. This transitions nicely to her classmate’s comment, where the thin civic understanding of equal rights is complemented by a slight shift towards a sense of belonging to Germany. Her mention of ‘feeling’ in this context denotes an attachment to Germany beyond legal and political factors. This focus on feeling as the way to determine belonging brings in the aspect of emotionality.

Nira Yuval-Davis (2006a) provides a way to think about belonging based on three constructed levels: (1) social location (e.g. class, race, gender, or other social divisions which express particular points on a grid of power relations), (2) an individual’s identifications and emotional at-
tachments to various collectivities (e.g. narratives of identity that depict ‘who they are and who they are not’ and often contain elements of emotional investments and attachments), and (3) political and ethical value systems according to which people determine their own and others’ belonging (e.g. defining insiders and outsiders). The comments above lean distinctly towards the second of these points, though, as with all analytical tools, these are not entirely independent aspects of belonging. This second aspect, however, is highlighted because of its involvement with emotional attachment. It is not simply a matter of cognitive distinction of collective identities but indicates a further ‘longing to belong’ (Yuval-davis 2006a, 202). As with other perceptions, emotions depend on the context and may be heightened if there is insecurity or threat to a particular identity or to belonging. As such, the constructed nature of belonging is emphasised. As Anne-Marie Fortier (1999, 42) comments, group identities encompass a ‘manufacturing’ of cultural and historical belongings that demarcate the boundaries of ‘fitting in’. In other words, ‘belonging’ is a sense of feeling ‘at home’ (Yuval-Davis 2011, 10). This identification, also briefly discussed in the last chapter, forms the bridge between the imagined national community and individuals’ emotions of belonging or loyalty (Mannitz 2004b, 242). Other studies, such as the one analysing the ‘emotional citizenship’ of Singaporean migrants in London, highlight the role of emotions in social structures and relations that produce political citizenship (Ho 2009, 788).

Although often linked to a particular place, this sense of being ‘at home’ can also be a connection to particular cultural ideas and values that one attempts to reproduce or reinvent, even in a transnational space (Al-Ali and Koser 2002, 7-8). Such is the case for diaspora movements, where ‘chaotic order’ connects a potentially huge variety of places, times, and practices, and at the same time, is located in a non-place (i.e. defined as everywhere but an ancestral homeland) (Werbner 2002, 119). This transnational space that connects places and ideas is not fixed, and may exhibit emotional attachments. For example, research on the meaning of home for Syrian Christians in Germany and Turkey shows that it is linked to notions of identity and belonging. This identity revolves around a history and memory that is ‘both nostalgic and tragic’, and ‘home’ was connected to functioning social relationships and Syrian Christian values (Armbruster 2002, 22). These conceptions of home had been defended for centuries in the face of Ottoman persecution and later Turkish modernisation, thus requiring reinforcement in the German context where essential features of ‘home’ had to be reconfigured.

For many of the young people with whom I spoke, however, being ‘at home’ often had a distinct territorial component in addition to the emotional one, and they envisaged citizenship in this light. For example, a pupil stated:

I also think that it – citizenship – is important because then you belong to a community, to a country, but I think you should get citizenship where you feel at
home. I think when you feel at home in Turkey, you should have the Turkish citizenship. For example, I’m living in Germany, I was grown up here, and that’s why I applied for the German citizenship (ES106B1).

Like the second girl from Albania, the element of belonging plays a higher role than that of rights and pragmatic reasoning, even proposing so-called return migration in the case of those who do not feel at home in Germany. There is also an implied alignment of home, belonging, and citizenship in this comment.

Similarly, one London pupil said that citizenship is ‘the country you’re from, community, belonging somewhere, the identity where you belong to’ (LL143B3). In using these words, it gives a sense that citizenship involves more than civic identification and also something beyond the pragmatic attainment of certain rights and privileges, hearkening to citizenship’s role in the sense of Self. As Anastasia Christou notes, while much research has delved into the exploration of mobility of materials, cultures, and people, little investigation has been completed on the way that ‘embodied and emotional mobilities shape migrant lives and identities’ (Christou 2011). For at least a number of minority youth, belonging based on emotional attachment and a sense of acceptance may form the basis for why they choose to take a certain citizenship or not (as discussed to some extent in the last chapter and more so in future chapters).

Another pupil in Germany reiterated this impression by saying:

I think it’s somehow important because some people it’s just that you have a passport, but I think, for me, it’s something like you identify to the country, and if you, for example, don’t feel German at all, you shouldn’t really have German passport because if you don’t feel German, you can’t identify with Germany, you think Germany is a bad country, you shouldn’t change your passport. I, for example, have Polish passport, but I’m going to get my German passport in like half a year, and I’m going to have both (ES106B2).

The pupil explained that, since Poland belongs to the EU, he is permitted to have both passports, which leads to the question of whether he would maintain his position of attaining the German citizenship if he had to give up his Polish passport.

This situation also highlights a contradiction in EU policy, building and reinforcing not only a barrier based on country territories but one based on regional divides. Since Poland is part of the EU, it is not a problem to have dual nationality. In contrast, it is potentially problematic for those coming or originating from outside of the EU. According to the TBB representative, dual citizenship within the EU is normal; EU citizens don’t have to give up one or the other, but Turks have to give one up (BE446). He referenced the comments of the federal interior minister who said that one is not able to serve two states. ‘My God, in that sense, the state has to serve me; I don’t have to serve any state,’ said my informant.
In the European Union, dual citizenship is regular, whether for Italian, Polish, don’t have to give up, but those from outside – Turks – have to give up. What is the definition? The Turks have to serve the state, and the Italians don’t have to. You see, it’s really nonsense and it has, of course, some really, at the edge of racist racism arguments...The people of the European Union are better people; they don’t have this conflict when they have dual citizenship, and we who come from the jungle...we have this conflict (BE446).

In not so many words, he is pointing out the racist undertones of European Union policies towards dual citizenship that filter into and out of national politics. Both of the previously quoted pupils, however, do refer to Germanness as something to feel or something with which to identify, complicating the perception of belonging and whether it should be to a state, a region, multiple states/regions, or something else altogether.

Another pupil’s observations acknowledge both the pragmatic and realistic perspectives of the situation but conclude with his personal identification with Germany along with civic undertones emphasised over emotionality. He said: ‘I think if somebody having the German citizenship has advantages, he travel…when we last went to Egypt, my mother had Egyptian citizenship and she had some problems at the airport, and when she get got the German citizenship she hadn’t these problems’ (ES204C2). Here, he observed the trouble that his mother had while passing through immigration, confirming my informant’s experience from the beginning of this chapter.

The same pupil saw the passport for himself as a key part of identity:

It’s part of the identity; I have German citizenship, and I can’t divide, say, this because German is part of my identity, and so I live here…I want to live here for whole time, and I won’t go back to Egypt when I am older. I am here, and I want to have German citizenship (ES204C2).

Unlike the previous comments, however, his desire for citizenship and sense of belonging seems to revolve around a civic participation. This particular pupil spoke very good German, and from his comments, one could surmise that he is actively involved and aware of the political and cultural context in which he lives.

One of the few German pupils at the Neukölln school explained her views on citizenship, given that she had grown up in this multicultural context. Her views of the role of citizenship echo the experience of those who express a more civic identity, not necessarily representable on paper and not limited to one or the other cultural tradition.

Citizenship—it doesn’t have anything to do with the country you were born in; I think it depends on where you want to live and if you want to. If I was about to move to another country, and I want to live there, I have to get the citizenship, but that can still mean that I have a different cultural background, so it doesn’t mean that I have to have the German citizenship just because I’m German...I
don’t know it’s more—I think you should have to be involved in the culture and the language, but you don’t have to feel German to have the German citizenship maybe because I think it’s important to—you can decide if you want to keep your cultural traditions or if you want to have the German ones, but you can have both, just have to accept both, you have to be tolerant and you shouldn’t be saying ‘yeah, I don’t like Germany, but I live here’ or whatever. I think everybody has to decide this by himself (ES246B).

She first expressed the need for a desire to be in a certain country but not congruent with ‘feeling German’. Her views go against both *jus sanguinis* and *jus soli* criteria for citizenship and even question emotionality of identification as a legitimate basis for getting citizenship. She goes on to acknowledge that a person should be engaged in a society if s/he is a citizen but does not have to leave behind attachments to other cultural customs.

Others sensed more complexity in their experience of what they are ‘on paper’ and their everyday lives. Another group of pupils commented:

> I don’t know. On paper, I am German, and I feel like a German, but still, it’s a strange mix. I know I’m Albanian because my parents are Albanian, but I live, I was born here in Berlin, and I grew up here, so I speak better German than my mother-tongue, so I don’t know. I can’t really answer (ES361).

She described a sense of ‘feeling’ German but the knowledge that she has Albanian heritage. Her classmate said: ‘I was born in Berlin, too, but my parents are Palestinian, and at home, I always talk in German, but I have the tradition and the culture from the Arab cultural tradition, but I feel both ways, German and Arabic, it’s a good mix’ (ES362). This pupil seems to be at peace with her hybrid identity. This can be observed in the contrast of the two adjectives they used. One identified her experience as ‘strange’, where the other pupil said that it was ‘good’.

Another pupil heralded Muhammad Ali as someone she would like to emulate, as he is able to identify where he came from and use this awareness for good: ‘Muhammad Ali is a perfect example I think. He has done a lot for America, but he still knows where he comes from, and he stands for it, he has done a lot of things for the apartheid…and yeah, I think he’s my role model’ (ES204B1).

One teacher offered some insight to the situation:

> I think that many pupils that we have, have German citizenship. But perhaps, they are looking for their identity in other areas, since they, in my opinion, many are marginalised, Well, every person has different identities. I am a teacher; I am a man; I come from North Rhine-Westphalia; but at the same time, I also have German citizenship; I’m Protestant, so there are many ‘identity possibilities’. and I believe, For the pupils, it is sometimes extremely difficult for them to orient themselves, because admittedly, not even here in the district itself have they never experience direct marginalisation…but I believe in other areas and other districts…very probably…and then it is potentially difficult for them to understand
that one indeed now somehow has this German passport, but from the environment, they would not necessarily be seen as—as, how shall I describe it—as normal or belonging (EL116, Author’s translation).

In his comment, he thus explains that pupils have the experience of marginalisation even in Neukölln, overlaid with multiple identities (as he describes himself), complicating the political and personal choices of the pupils, more generally. These perceptions and choices are not always solely the prerogative of the pupils, however. When it comes to citizenship, a great deal depends on the choices and location of the parents, perhaps more so where citizenship is defined by descent but still the case in countries with *jus soli* citizenship.

In one distinct example, a girl described the situation of her father’s immigration to Germany and subsequent choices that continue to affect her and her siblings. Her father arrived in Germany as a political asylum-seeker, giving this status to his children when they were born. Because he chose to keep the Turkish passport when he had the choice, his children were required to do the same for a certain amount of time. Once old enough, the children could opt for German citizenship but not without extensive paperwork, in spite of the fact that they did not take part in their father’s decision to retain Turkish citizenship (ES154).

She described her perception of Turkey this way: ‘Turkey is not my fatherland, also not my homeland, I am not a Turk, but I have the Turkish passport, I am Surchi Kurd and we were discriminated against there…and now are not to be seen in Turkey. A really undemocratic state, I must say, because here [there], for example, the headscarf is sometimes allowed and sometimes not, but in my opinion, mostly not. Lovely country, beautiful countryside, but politically, …not’ (ES154, Author’s translation).

The first portion of her comment exhibited a disconnect between citizenship and identity. She holds a Turkish passport but does not identify as a Turk because of the discrimination, which forced her father to seek asylum in Germany. Based on the second portion of the comment, however, this sense of exclusion may be reinforced by her experience as a girl who chooses to wear a headscarf, since the Turkish state has limited the wearing of headscarves outside of religious places or religious ceremonies since the 1930s (McGoldrick 2006). These two components are linked by her analysis of the Turkish political system as very undemocratic. This highlights, then, that for her, citizenship may not be as much about identity in terms of emotional belonging or even rational choices, but it is about a sense of a democratic system. Her comments counter the teacher’s assessment of marginalisation in implying that, while marginalisation may exist, she has a stronger sense of being able to participate in the German political system than in Turkey.
For young people who have two passports, the choice of which to keep incorporates many of the aspects of the previous section, i.e. rational choice, the sense of belonging, and even their perception of what citizenship represents. This is illustrated in the following two dialogues.

Two slightly younger pupils simply took their citizenship as it was, not concerning themselves with nuances of what they felt or why they had it.

ES1662 (of Turkish heritage): Citizenship? For me, it’s German. I live here, I grew up here, that’s how it is for me (Author’s translation).

ES1661 (of Lebanese heritage): For me, it is German but also Arab because my parents lived here, and I was born, and that’s why both (Author’s translation).

Another group described their observations:

ES2241: Yes [you have to choose], but this is only so when you are when you have two of them, Turkish and German, but I have only the German citizenship.

ES2242: I have a friend and she has both, it’s Turkish and German, but she wants the Turkish one because she thinks Turkey is better than here, and the way they are live, but I would decide the German because I think in Germany, there it’s better, I don’t—there are different opinions.

ES2241: There are also problems when you are—when you have both of them and then you must decide what—you have to decide which you want.

The first pupil acknowledged the situation but that it is not a question for her, since she has German citizenship. The second pupil recounted her friend’s dilemma of having to choose and perceiving the quality of life to be better in Turkey. She notes the different opinions, saying that if she had the choice she would choose German citizenship. The first pupil then confirmed that the process is not an easy one, and that young people with this choice have challenges of a unique nature.

Parents in London had similar perceptions of why someone should take British citizenship. One explained in a group interview: It’s ‘more comfortable, more for my children, more education, more free. We can go out of the country. My children study at university; it’s better’ (LP301A3). Here, the parent mentions certain benefits within England and the greater ease of international travel.

A student in London said that to her, citizenship tells you ‘the country you’re from’ (LL143A1). However, rather than interpreting this in terms of heritage as we might in the German context, in the British context, we can understand it as the territorial country to which you belong.
Another pupil in London commented: ‘I think about the passport, not really about what citizenship is’ (LL301C). In this quotation, one can see the superseding role of the passport over citizenship as a principle of citizenship. In this sense, the passport is taken somewhat out of context and limited in what it represents.

Another London student who commented on this aspect of citizenship hinted that there might be a difference between citizenship and the representation of citizenship in the passport: ‘It [the passport] kinda touches the subject but not—like if you’re thinking of it in the sense of an individual person, then it’s kinda just a representation, rather than actually a citizen’ (LL143A2). The mere possession of a passport does not, on the one hand, signify full participation, and on the other, does not necessarily denote equality. Moreover, the student directs our attention to other factors that shape citizenship beyond the passport.

In general, the students in London had fewer comments relating to citizenship as a resource. This could be because of the perceived distance between citizenship as a concept and the passport. This difference in perspective highlights that the value of citizenship and reasons for obtaining it are highly contingent on other contextual factors such as immigration policies and local boundary maintenance. For the Berlin pupils, the passport and citizenship were generally used interchangeably, while the London students did not see them as synonymous at all.

This section began by introducing the comments of some students who associate citizenship very much with a pragmatic sense of using it as a resource, even if they do not identify with the country in which they live. Other comments, however, begin to show the intertwining sentiments of citizenship as a resource but combined with a sense, however tentative, of belonging. Still others associate citizenship with a broader sense of civic identity, basing their choices on a desire to participate in the country where they live. In these comments, those who take a possibly more essentialist view of ethnicity place less value on having citizenship. They perceive it as crossing a bright boundary, rather than the later comments which highlight the blurring and mixing that occurs in a civically-defined setting. Through it all, the comments of the London students are remarkably few because, for the most part, they have not faced the choice of whether or not to take British citizenship. The next section, however, will show more of their perceptions of how citizenship places a value on them.

A Valuisation Process?

While the previous comments located the experience of citizenship on a continuum of resource to identity, the next set of comments highlight the pupils’ relationship with the state and how they think the passport lacks real meaning or reinforces inaccurate assumptions and hierarchies because of factors including race and ethnicity.
One author begins the discussion of Europe’s minorities by contrasting it with the experience of the US, where, even among the most racist discussions, the shared national culture and full legal citizenship were not a question (Pettigrew 1998). However, looking back into the country’s history, aspects such as limited suffrage for African Americans, not being counted as a full person in the initial understanding of representation, and the continually contested boundaries of Whiteness by newly arrived immigrants since the nation’s founding, indicate a persistently contested claim to full membership that does not play out equally in practice. Both Berlin and London students express a similar experience. It demonstrates the intersection, overlap, and tension of citizenship and the insertion of the international system on the local context.

In an interview in June 2011, Cem Özdemir, aforementioned co-chair of the Green Party in Germany stated: ‘I remember journalists saying “the Turk with a German passport”. What is a Turk with a German passport? As far as I know in our constitution, you are either a citizen or you are not a citizen. There is no third category’ (Özdemir 2011). While these words are strongly spoken, the experience of many in Germany does not align with the legal status. The following quotes show that citizenship, while it may offer rights and maintain a more equal conversation between individuals of a society, its strength as a guarantee of equality is not living up to expectations.

When a girl holding a Turkish passport was asked about citizenship, she said:

Shit, I think it is simply where we are; citizenship is for everyone to get, but in Germany it is complicated. One has to deal with a lot of paper and waiting and then a citizenship test…It is not simple…If we only had a travel document, EU citizen, we could live in Germany, and have an EU passport to go to France, but when a Turkish citizen wants to go to France, she must have a visa. This is basically shit inequality… (ES154, Author’s translation).

The pupil went on to describe the process of joining her peers on a class trip to England. Anyone who did not hold a German passport had to decide a year in advance and were required to go through the complicated visa process: ‘that was shit, about the Turkish, we weren’t allowed without visas like the little black sheep that needed extra effort [from the teachers]…also the Arabs…’ (ES154, Author’s translation). Here, the pupil noted, above the complication of needing the visa, how this made her and her peers feel in comparison to those who had a German passport in her school.

A London pupil affirmed that the passport ‘divides people up’ (LL143B2). In the context of waves of migration, the passport has acted, in particular, to bring the international inequalities

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12 The direct translation of Scheißē is ‘shit’, but it is not necessarily culturally equivalent. Scheißē is used much more frequently in circumstances and social settings (including the classroom) where ‘shit’ would be severely frowned upon in an English-speaking context. It is also sometimes used to intensify the circumstance to which it refers.
into a national and even subnational or local setting. This has had two main effects. On the one hand, it has heightened the value of citizenship for pragmatic reasons, and at the same time, it has lessened its worth as a representation of the people. In a way, this was the very essence of the 1983 British Nationality Act, but it is occurring on a much wider scale.

A Berlin pupil’s comments illustrate how, in his opinion, citizenship has been divorced of its meaning because it does not say anything about him.

it’s [citizenship’s] not very important for me because it doesn’t tell you if when you have the citizenship of Germany that you are German, that Germany is your home country, it only says that you can try for flying in other countries with this citizenship, and from which country we can come (ES204C1).

This statement causes one to ponder how the pupil is using ‘German’. It appears that it is being used in an ethnic sense alongside the marker of the ‘home country’. The difficulty is that such a statement would offer an ethnic conception of citizenship as the normative goal.

Another pupil said: ‘one hears that when one has the German citizenship that one has more rights, and this is in a sense true, I have German citizenship; of course one sees that one is not fully German…some are disadvantage, but one still has more rights’ (ES204B1, Author’s translation). While this statement hearkens back to the notion of the pragmatic reasons for having one citizenship over another, it also approaches the notion of being ‘fully German’. Later in the conversation, another participant in the group said: ‘Alone, it’s not enough to be a German citizen, one must also have a German name in order to be really recognised’ (ES204B3). This sheds some light on the earlier comment about the elements of being fully German and connects to the last chapter and the role of names in determining ethnicity.

For several pupils, the experience of Otherness translated into more concrete hierarchies of interaction. A pupil who holds a Lebanese and German passport said:

Passport? I guess it is just paper because it doesn’t say anything about me. I might have a German passport, but I don’t look German but rather like a foreigner, everyone notices, for example…he [generic person] doesn’t say ‘I am German’ he says, ‘okay, I am Arab or so, or I am Turkish’. It is a lot of paperwork, I guess (ES1661, Author’s translation).13

A girl in London of West Indian background agreed: ‘I think it’s just a piece of paper’ (LL143b4). These comments show that, in spite of the passport, ethnic markers like colouring...
will distinguish these pupils from the titular community, making the passport just a piece of paper in their eyes.\textsuperscript{14}

A university student in London said: Citizenship

doesn’t mean much. It’s supposed to mean something, but experience says it doesn’t mean much. We are all British citizens now; we went through the ceremony, but I don’t see myself as British, more Turkish. I have lived here a long time, so I should have some inside me, but I don’t really (LL112).

This interview partner discusses Britishness as something that she should have inside her, running closely to the idea of something that is innate or incorporated into her nature as a core feature. However, her attendance of a British university, her practice and involvement in British society would indicate that beyond the essentialist view of British or Turkish identity as an ethnic one, she has incorporated a knowledge of the unwritten rules of the social structure in which she operates in her daily life.

Doubly interesting is how she identified herself to those unfamiliar with Turkey and Kurdish issues. In the previous quote, she called herself Turkish, but later in the interview, she said that her community would be the ‘Turkish community, more of an Alevi, but if someone asked where I’m from, I would say Turkish [though technically Kurdish] because I don’t really want to explain the difference because not everyone knows what Kurdish is’ (LL112). This student explained that, for the purposes of simplicity, she would simply adopt the titular community of the country from which she and her family migrated. This adds some complexity to her notion of being Turkish or British, since, technically speaking, she is ethnically Kurdish. In a way, this is more interesting in that many people who are Kurdish in Turkey would not consider this an option, but in the diaspora, she is able to identify with a civic conception of Turkishness that goes beyond ethnicity that may or may not exist in the country of origin.

In addition to shaping perceptions of citizenship, some observed inequality in the process of obtaining it. One university student, who had migrated from Turkey as a child and lived in the Turkish-Kurdish community in North London, commented: ‘I found there’s an exam—I found that really stupid, an exam to become a citizen’ (LL712). She explained how her brother, who has autistic learning difficulties, was the last to obtain citizenship in Britain, ‘which was funny because he was the reason that we stayed’ in the UK in the first place (LL712).

\textsuperscript{14} While I might use the term ‘race’ rather than ‘colouring’, I am very conscious that, in the UK, for example, people with Turkish heritage are considered ‘white’, while in Germany, they are considered as ‘Other’ because of the distinct migration pasts. Thus, using the term ‘race’ would present certain problems of definition and the context of the national narrative. In England, this incorporated aspects of race, while in Germany, other ethnic markers are at the fore of difference.
Commenting on the German citizenship test, pupils in Berlin said that it was generally easy to obtain German citizenship, particularly if you attended German school, but that does not necessarily translate to an open policy. One pupil said: It is not [difficult] for us. I mean, it’s different for people who don’t speak German really well because they have to pass all those tests, but for example, when I applied for a passport, they said you don’t have to take part in any test because if you go to school here, you don’t have to do that…Sometimes, they say you have to be here for I think eight years, but if you tell them that you are going to school here, and you have been born here, they sometimes say, okay doesn’t matter if you are here eight years here or only six (ES106B2).

One pupil holding a Turkish passport described her conclusions about citizenship tests in general by saying:

In the Netherlands, there’s a citizenship test, and most people from the Turkey—my relatives—want to live in the Netherlands, and they have to learn [study] for the test, and but they said that the test isn’t so difficult. It’s easy to learn [study for] the language [section] because there are only several questions about the language (ES261).

Her peer, who has both a German and a Libyan passport, added:

They’re always the same questions; I mean, you have this catalog where are the questions, and you just have to learn the answers, but I think it’s important when you want to become a member of this country or to get the citizenship, for example, in Germany you have to know something about Germany’s history and what happened in the past, so I think it’s quite important for people (ES262).

Another pupil continued:

We had a Turkish friend, he lives here in Germany, I dunno, ten, twelve years, and he had to do this test now, after 10-12 years, and he was very good at this test, and he said there are so many German people who don’t know these answers and so on… (ES263).

At a conference on migration and naturalisation, Helena Wray, Senior Lecturer of Law at Middlesex University posed the question: ‘Are these [citizenship tests] intelligence tests, and if so, is that a liberal way to decide citizenship?’ She was expressing the very experience of closure that the students discussed in their comments. She continued: ‘There are uncontested values in this test [specifically the German citizenship test], not facts, but even in the society, they might be contested’ (Wray 2010). This is again a reiteration of the process of rating on the part of the state towards potential citizens, even limiting full legal access to those resident for multiple generations. This assertion is confirmed by other analysts.

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15 Question asked to paper presenter, Ines Michalowkski; Conference Title: Long Term Residence and Naturalisation in Contemporary Britain; 9 September 2010, Middlesex University, UK.
As an extreme example, in the aftermath of 9/11, German states such as Baden-Württemberg instituted a citizenship test for Muslims, assessing whether the person shared fundamental German principles and values, the irony being that many Germans may not pass or agree with the values put forward (Boukhars 2007). Likewise, the Life in the UK citizenship test has received criticism from more than one quarter. On 13 June 2013, the Guardian reported Dr Thom Brooks of Durham University as commenting that the ‘Life in the UK test, taken by approximately 150,000 people each year, has become a bad pub quiz. It has gone from testing practical trivia to the purely trivial and is a major opportunity lost’ (Press Association 2013). Instead, the test focuses on ‘values and principles’, which are supposed to encourage participation in the UK, over and above learning to navigate trains and the internet. According to the article, the rationale is that the latter would not enhance participation but would encourage people to claim benefits.

Where the previous comments critiqued the notion of citizenship as it is currently implemented, the final comments highlight the interconnected nature of local processes of participation in the district of Neukölln and North London with the wider global process of human rights and the protection and value of personhood. When I asked two pupils about the meaning of citizenship for them, the following dialogue ensued:

ES204A1 [to his classmate]: Do you care?

ES204A2: I don’t really care about this. But the thing is when you are German, passport is German, then you get a better job, but when they see that you have a Turkish passport—when you have a German passport, you have more chances, more privileges.

ES204A1: I don’t care whether I have a Turkish passport or a German because I’m human like everyone, I don’t care.

This dialogue showed the acknowledgement by one pupil of the practical value of citizenship, though he has no personal attachment to it, and the simultaneous rejection of citizenship as a process by the other pupil. His tone of voice expressed how he personally did not ‘care’ but implied that even beyond that, no one should care what his passport shows because of the value of his life as a person.

This section incorporated many comments regarding the function and perceived role of citizenship in the lives of minority youth. Where the first section focused around why a young person might or might not choose to take the citizenship of the country of settlement, the second section explored the function of citizenship more broadly. Many students felt that citizenship did not guarantee the moral equality that it is supposed to represent. Rather, aspects such as race and ethnicity undermine its value. At the same time, on the international scale, they perceived a process of value and worth being set on them as individuals. The sense of worth and value as
related with perceptions of citizenship highlights the constant interplay of the global and local levels. The next section will take up this theme in more detail, exploring the processes and trends of local engagement for minority youth in London and Berlin in both community centres and schools.

6.2. Local-Level Engagement

Over the past decade, governments and policies have shifted the emphasis from citizenship as a legal right of provision and protection to focusing increasingly on the obligations and duties of good citizens to participate and engage in society. This is evident in research from the Netherlands, where a pupil of ‘migration background’ was expected to vote, in particular, because of his background, whereas he points out that this should not affect whether he should or should not vote (Mannitz 2004b, 272). The author notes that what disturbs this pupil is that he is discriminated against as he is told how he should participate. In a similar incident in the Netherlands, when Imam Ahmad Salam refused to shake hands with then Minister of Immigration and Integration, Rita Verdonk, it was perceived as a violation of ‘loyalty to Dutch customs’ (Fadil 2009, 440). Like the student who was supposed to vote because of being from a ‘migration background’, Imam Ahmad Salam was considered to be the object of integration and thus was expected to conform to a cultural imaginary of a homogeneous space. Verdonk’s response was also related to his explicit reference to gender, however, contradicting the ‘liberal-secular’ imaginary, which denies differences based on gender, class, and ethnicity, among others.

While this denial can be found in a number of West European national identities, it does not always translate the same way into citizenship practices, from rights to expectations of participation. For example, in the UK, the emphasis for the participation of ethnic minorities is placed on the local and community level. The British response to diversity has mainly emphasised collective bargaining and collective integration (Schiffauer 1997, 148). The local level is the sphere in which ethnic minorities are supposed to become engaged and involved as good citizens. Communities are viewed as an actor in civil society rather than being part of the state, and this communitarian model, in turn, shapes the way that ethnically defined groups interact with the state (Wahlbeck 1998, 219). While I am keenly aware of the potential of reinforcing this normative approach by dedicating a separate section to it, rather than including it under the perceptions of citizenship discussed before, I thought it best to dedicate a particular part to it in this chapter because of its broader implications and emphasis on separate institutions beyond the individual.

As illustrated by the last several pages of students’ comments, the decision-making process around citizenship is anything but simple. When some students in London were asked what citizenship meant to them, they responded with words and phrases such as ‘community’ and ‘be-
longing’ (LL143A). This may very clearly reflect the educational and social contexts of the different pupil groups. In Germany, the ideas and contexts of citizenship in their families and communities would revolve around the options, obstacles, and exposures of that community. Likewise, in the UK, citizenship is substantially less discussed as a practice or something to possess and more perceived as a political concept, particularly now that it is a subject in British secondary schools. Yet, in both places, the theme of participation came up, and although it was not always discussed explicitly, one could observe ways that it shapes their civic engagement.

Citizenship and Participation

A pupil at the Berlin school stated her position on citizenship and participation, echoing much of the political debate around participation:

I think to get the citizenship, you have to be involved in the society, and I think that’s good because no one should get the citizenship without knowing how to speak German, I think if they want to go to Germany of course, because if I went to England, I would probably learn English before I go there (ES246B).

She makes an interesting jump from participation to fluency in this statement, in some ways, conflating the two. While this approach does not make allowances for the varieties of civic engagement, it does seem reasonable that even if people are civically active, but they do not speak the German language, they remain bounded in the immigrant community, compelled to rely on those with better language skills and higher education to represent them in the mainstream institutions (Cyrus 2005, 55). It also echoes state practices that have increasingly combined language requirements with the naturalisation process. Yet, integration consists of making the mainstream institutions accessible and attaining a certain level of participation beyond a select few, thereby bridging the boundaries of parallel communities.

One of the parents closely echoed the German pupil’s comments. She had lived in the UK for almost 20 years and said: ‘If you’re going to another country, you need to learn the language, what they like and don’t like, you have to learn the language, history, like driving, you can’t just make your own rules’ (LP301B). She felt very strongly about this, even to the point of arguing vehemently with the mother who was interviewed before her. In short, one parent believed that a country sets out certain rules that must be obeyed, while the other argued that every country needed changing, and it was her job to respect and help to improve even a liberal democracy like the UK.

The monarchy doesn’t rule the country; it is symbolic. But my idea is that the monarchy is not necessary in the twenty-first century. As a British citizen, I should have a say about the country, I should have a say about this as an active, responsible citizen, choosing for something. A liberal democracy needs to be improved, needs to be changed, especially about immigrants, education, health system, housing… (LP301C).
It is interesting to note here that the manner and reason for her coming to the UK seem to frame her strong views on these matters. She was born in Eastern Turkey and worked in a tax office for twelve years. For ten of those years, she was a trade unionist, working to establish unions in the public sector. In 1951, they signed the International Labour Agreements. She was sacked twice from her job, had a baby, and her family was in the UK. She sued the government for the right to go back to Turkey. It took her seven years to gain indefinite leave to remain in the UK, and she has only been in the country ten years in total (LP301C). From this description, we see that long before she arrived in the UK, she was an active person in society. A self-declared socialist, it is not surprising that she maintains this attitude of the need for change, even after arriving and settling in the UK long-term. Similarly, in a group of mothers who had all lived in the UK for more than fifteen years, we discussed what brought them to the UK. Answers included more political freedom, better education, and human rights (LP301A [entire group]).

In contrast to popular opinion, research shows that many asylum-seekers come to the UK with the hopes of participating. A research report commissioned by the Home Office found that many asylum-seekers do not choose the UK because of a generous welfare system; rather, their decision is based on the criteria of being in a place that promotes democracy, political freedom, and safety, though these choices might be shaped at some points by family linkages, friends, or the known presence of compatriots in that country (Robinson and Segrott 2002).

A pupil in London affirmed the association of citizenship with active involvement in saying that citizenship made her think of ‘like helping the planet and helping like people in your society that you’re living in’ (LL143B4). Rather than seeing her community on a global scale, she saw her citizenship as drawing her to help those around her, though this could be drawing from the citizenship subject at school.

Another pupil commented that ‘being accepted’ was what made him feel part of a group and ‘being part of a group, talking to people and making decisions…’ made him feel like he played an active role in society (LL301B1).

A pupil in Berlin shared the interest in participating, but felt that he had to make extra effort for his voice to be heard.

I think it’s sometimes hard because well people well they feel different with you, well you have to, if you go to political discussions or something like this I often go, you have to beweisen [show], you have to show that you are smart and that you know about the topic. They think ‘he’s from Neukölln’ and well, not so smart as we are (ES246A1).

This pupil shows a desire to be involved and a record of participation alongside the sense that he has to overcome extra prejudices in political or community discussions. He does not mention
the perception being about his ethnicity in particular but mentions his place of residence, hearkening back to the dynamic role that location plays in identity. In people’s minds, this could be almost synonymous with minorities.

Such sentiments echo conclusions from the British context where minority groups recognise that they may face discrimination in the labour market, and thus, they are compelled to be better qualified than people from the majority group (Khattab 2005). At the same time, institutions and organisations, ranging from community centres to schools, can offer an opportunity for this kind of participation and an increased exposure to issues of this nature.

**Citizenship Through Institutions**

Alongside everyday activism and general thoughts about participation, it is important that the community centres and schools also receive some discussion at this point. I will take a moment to focus on the point at which they affect a person’s citizenship in terms of participation and overall serve to enhance the thick networks of civil society.

There are a large number of centres in London and Berlin, including refugee organisations, immigrant advice centres, and cultural community centres. As a part of civil society, these voluntary associations promote engagement and provide a resource in a new location as well as continuity and a sphere for social and professional networking, but they can also pose certain challenges as they tend to pigeonhole and create expression of particular and sectional interests (Turner 2000, 40-41). Favell argues that in some ways, ethnic minorities replace the guilds of previous times in this relationship with the political sphere. Religious and social organisations act as the medium through which minorities can be managed and also express their demands, often exercising ‘cultural outlets for political grievances’ (Favell 1998, 139). This is exemplified in the presence of a wide variety of community centres and supplemental schools. However, rather than assessing his overarching argument through a broad range of examples, I will focus mainly on the community centres that I visited to explore the topic of participation.

Across the board in the UK, the centres play two distinct and complementary roles. They are often a place where immigration advisors help clients to navigate the difficult and ever-changing terrain of the British legal system, referring clients to legal advice where necessary and working alongside other organisations in the London area. More importantly, they provide a valid stepping stone for integration by bringing clients into a social setting, often highly multicultural, where diversity is expressed and appreciated. Rather than discussing black history month from a distance, for example, clients are encouraged to tell about the country that they come from, the good and the bad. In this way, volunteers and clients alike gain insights into countries that they may never visit in-person. It furthermore reaffirms asylum-seekers confidence that they have something to offer, at the very least, a knowledge of languages and cul-
tures that many people have never heard of. Even where these centres are seemingly monocultural, focusing on service to one ethnic group, they often extend these services to a wide range of ethnicities.

A speaker at a local discussion on migration expressed the constant tension in the role that migration centres play, the tension between campaigning (acting politically) and helping people (EE1410). However, she clarified that neither is completely separate from the other as helping people is part of the politics of helping them to find their way in society, and likewise, campaigning is to serve the purpose of helping people. This very tension was exhibited in the anecdote, recounted at the beginning of the previous chapter, involving the police and the community centre in North London. It denotes the constant two-way function of such centres and any process of participation. Throughout the course of my fieldwork, I visited other centres and spoke to representatives, and this seemed to be the case in many situations.

Such centres also share the common need for funding in order to stay open. Sometimes, the government is very keen on particular policies such as the ‘path to citizenship’. This might not be what they want to focus on, but it is where they can find funding to do it, even to be open another afternoon of the week (EE1410).

Yet, the presence of these locations is very real to young people’s awareness, even ones who have lived all their lives in a place. When I asked one pupil how someone could become more involved in the community, he replied:

I would go to a Verein [club]. There are so many...Here in Neuköln; there are so many Verein. They support the people to integrate here in Neuköln, and I would go there to...Here in our class there are some members of them, M.A.H.D.I. E.V. (‘Muslime Aller Herkünfte Deutscher Identität’ or ‘Muslims of All Backgrounds with German Identity’). They make some exhibitions; I think it’s a good thing (ES204A2).

In London, two of the community centres that I visited also held special events. One was to work with teenagers to prevent crime and drug use. The other was aimed to help women, in particular, with emotional and psychological health. In this way, they were seeing to the needs of the community beyond the activities to promote culture and traditions. They were also arranging to help women to find their way in the society, for many had lived in the area for years and still could not navigate the London underground system. While this is certainly a challenging system to negotiate, it is important to building independence and activity in a society. One’s sense of freedom and self-sufficiency depends highly on one’s ability to move freely and independently. The centres also often offered opportunities for people to eat together and socialise, which, while it is not directly an act of civic engagement, is a potential step to building confidence in multicultural settings. Beyond that, it fulfils a psychological need for society. One woman from
a migration Centre in Hackney related a story of a woman saying that immigrants only come to the centre for the food. ‘Don’t kid yourself; they come because they are lonely. If they stop coming as often, they are becoming better integrated’ (EE1410).

Beyond the role of community centres in promoting activism and enhancing participation, however, the school offers a diverse array of experiences regarding citizenship. On the one hand, the teachers play a key role in the activism of their pupils, but the subject of citizenship is not as universally implemented or received, as illustrated by students’ comments in both London and Berlin.

A Berlin pupil described how her teacher’s contacts and effort to introduce them to policymakers helped her to feel more a part of society. ‘Yeah, Herr [teacher’s name], political teacher, he has a lot of contacts, and one can talk with a lot of politicians, and one can really come into the society’ (ES204B1). She identifies the role of the teacher in helping her and her classmates to be more aware and involved in the society more broadly.

Another pupil referred to the same teacher when discussing how (or if) school helped her to be a part of the community. She said:

> Partially, for example, I learned how to read, or I discovered Political Science; but not a lot because the school is also not so helpful, only political science or ethics lessons, maybe German lesson, but the others are a bit stupid. They are simply too boring…I believe…teachers like Herr [teacher’s name]…are role models for their pupils and how one learns to become a part of society (ES154, Author’s translation).

This pupil waves off the usefulness of many of her school classes, except for Political Science and Ethics. Ethics is far more than what we might think of in an English-speaking setting. It is essentially a subject intended to replace the religious education present in schools across Germany. As one teacher explained:

> The Berlin Senate has decided to rather incorporate knowledge of all the great religions in a newly established subject called ‘ethics’ [Ethik in German]. The Christian Churches are very much against it, because they are afraid – and probably correctly so – that they will lose quite a number of the students who formerly went to the voluntary Religious Education lessons provided by them (EL316).

From my observations, Ethics is a class in which pupils discuss issues from racism to religion. Political Science, as this pupil states, is where she has learned most and even puts this particular teacher forward as a role model of how one might be involved in society.

Her experience has developed into an interest in organising discussions in the school or debating issues with a friend. ‘My friend from school and I pick a topic, for example, Iran or Ameri-
ca, and we have to find out something about the economy or political system or culture, and then we meet together and discuss’ (ES154, Author’s translation).

When asked if she learned about citizenship in school, she reflected on the narrow focus of her lessons: ‘not so much. We always learn about Hitler, Vietnam, Hitler again, always first World War and then second world war, America, England, America, England, that’s all…History is always about Europe and North America’ (ES154, Author’s translation).

On the other hand, some pupils seemed to think that citizenship, broadly defined, was a topic in the Berlin school:

> We have PW, political science, we are talking about the politics, about society, and yes, we can make our own views and tell our own opinions, and yes—difficult question…Sometimes, we learn [about citizenship] because if we haven’t learned that so, we will be racist person, humans, and wouldn’t care, and we would live our life, but we, yes, we care about racism, and it’s wrong, and it’s important to have such a lesson—course—for every pupil to make a better view for them, to open their horizons (ES204A1).

Another pupil explained how it comes into the discussion by way of other topics.

> Well, we don’t talk often about this, maybe sometimes in English, we learn about the citizenship in America or in England and we combine [compare] this to the citizenship in Germany, and yes, well, sometimes in geography we also maybe do this but or in politics, but it’s not a big topic I would say (ES246A1).

This comment shows that citizenship is discussed as a sub-theme of other topics throughout lessons, even though it does not have a set curricula or subject in the school.

Not all of the teachers are as keen to discuss citizenship or promote this kind of activism, expressed in the following dialogue between a pupil and me.

> ES246A1: I would say it’s different from teacher to teacher, for some it’s very important and well they really want us to know this and others just do it to because they have to and it’s not interesting to them.

Christine: for the students?

> ES246A1: I think for the students it’s very interesting and always when we speak about themes like this, there are big discussions, yes, and well, I would like the teachers to teach us more about this because it’s, well, Germany is a special citizenship in Germany, and well, I think it’s important that the students or the kids are, well, know about this, what is the reason for this.

Thus, the pupil states clearly that he would like to learn more about this topic. However, drawing on London students’ comments, it is not as easily implemented as may be thought.
One student described some of the activities that she remembered: ‘We had to do a project where we were going to change one of the laws, and we had to like make a campaign about how we would change it and why we would change it’ (LL143B4).

When asked what citizenship meant to her, another student from London, now attending university, said: ‘not much, I wouldn’t have an idea; It didn’t mean much then when I had the citizenship class. I’ve been here a long time, but I didn’t know what it was, and now, it still doesn’t mean much’ (LL112).

One pupil who attends college said: ‘I don’t learn citizenship [the subject]’, but he remembered that he learned ‘how many people live in London and in other cities; how many people does work; lots of facts’ (LL301C). Another said that he has learned about ‘stuff to do, like about voting and stuff’ (LL301B1). A group of Berlin pupils also acknowledged that they learned about voting rights in school (ES204B). All of these students described a kind of class where they had to learn another set of information. However, if one speaks with those who design the citizenship curricula, their goal is something far more all-inclusive.

The person I spoke with has extensive experience in coordinating and designing materials for the broader citizenship curriculum and the Association for Citizenship Teaching (ACT) as well as hands-on experience in North London schools. He explained that the ideal for the citizenship programme is a long-term goal of community engagement far beyond the school. The plan is that ‘the school gets involved and the schools are supposed to do an extended programme to the community, getting parents in and also the community and forging those links’ (EE833). He went onto explain that different programmes within education are run by different entities, and they’re ‘not making links because the communication is not as open as it should be, almost because the person at the top doesn’t see those opportunities, so they don’t step back and reflect, and then, they don’t see the value of getting the whole community involved’. According to his analysis, there is something missing at the upper levels of school direction and the implementation of citizenship programmes where people are not quite grasping the immense potential for the programme that he thinks is so important and would be successful with full community engagement. However, he does note at another point in the interview that part of the problem is, of course, the issue of time for teachers and other staff members in addition to challenges of accessing parents. ‘Parental involvement ‘is almost the missing part of the jigsaw; it is very difficult; teachers are very busy...but without that piece, you never have the whole solution’ (EE833).

This challenge is clearly not London-specific. One teacher in Berlin asserted that very few parents come to meet him, roughly three from about 25, though he acknowledged that he is not a class teacher. In Turkish culture, he explained, you have the parents’ respect but not necessarily
their involvement; in other cultures, you have over-involvement of parents and perhaps not as much respect (EL76). The head of the school expressed a similar distinction in parental involvement:

they are not so present in the school; they have language problems but also fear of embarking on something new. They come when someone personally contacts them for an appointment or with certain problems—then, they come—but not so often or on their own initiative as I know from another school [where I taught] (EL76B, Author’s translation).

From these comments, we see the extent of complexity involved in a term like citizenship. It was seemingly innocuous until I began to delve deeper into the experiences, hierarchies, and attitudes attached to and reproduced by travel documents and the perceived belonging (and right to citizenship) within a given community. As in Chapter 5, however, the levels of analysis are apparent in the way that citizenship is acted out and understood. One person, who is a student from Turkey who has done research and studying in the UK and Germany, stated this most apparently when she said:

I feel differently about my citizenship in different countries. When I am in Germany where there are a lot of prejudices about being a Turk, I am a lot more conscious about my national identity and because of the feeling of belonging to an oppressed national group, I tend to feel more on my Turkish side, although my Turkishness is just on paper (my passport) plus some technicalities like visa etc., and I am more an international researcher in Berlin rather than a member of the immigrant Turkish community. In England most people I meet don't have a negative idea about Turkey and Turks. The reactions I get are more like how great it is that I am from Istanbul. They always want to visit Turkey and the beaches…so my citizenship doesn't have an important meaning here, and therefore, as a total anti-nationalist, I can be citizenship-free here. I don't feel anything about it. It doesn't matter here that I am from Turkey, Peru or Iceland. Of course there are the visa issues again, international fees, but apart from that, I am just an individual in the UK and I don't have the constant consciousness of my national identity as I feel when I am in Germany. When I am in Turkey I struggle with the daily issues, and usually we are angry with the political agendas of the parties in charge. Again, being an anti-nationalist, I am never proud of my nationality- or would be with any other nationality if I had another, and when I am in Turkey I am kind of staying on the opposite side of my given citizenship, whereas I feel like I have to be supporting it when I am in Germany because we are oppressed there. When I am in Turkey, I don't like being surrounded by these nationalist people (the majority of the population) who are so proud of being a Turk, Kurd whatever…Bullshit! One thing never changes though: I think I love the cuisine of Turkey on top of other cuisines and I am always in search of Turkish food wherever I am (BE478).

Her comments about being citizenship-free in the UK in contrast to feeling sympathetically to her nationality in Germany and very discontented with it in Turkey illustrate most poignantly the diverse claims to dimensions of belonging, based on the national context and very local space in which institutions mark the terrain of participation. As a self-acknowledged anti-nationalist, she still feels these sentiments, which begs the question of what a person who is
more nationally inclined might feel. Her final comment about food, however, exhibits a social and cultural identity that transcends and overrides the nationalist one based on the passport and citizenship. While these processes of belonging cannot be completely disentangled, the next chapter will explore how the attachments to certain cultural norms play into everyday life, affecting the community and the way that institutions function, although often misinterpreted by mainstream politics.

This section began by introducing some of the shifts in policy with respect to citizenship and proceeded to explore some of the ways that citizenship is manifested on the local level through community centres and schools. In the latter case, citizenship modules have been introduced throughout the English education system in addition to other parts of the UK. However, the practical function of these modules is yet to be seen. According to the comments I received, it was not yet operating as it is envisioned. Overall, however, this section illustrated the great diversity of engagement and opportunities for involvement that shape the interaction of minority youth across the levels of analysis.

**Conclusion**

Perceptions of citizenship among minority youth are one instance of contestation, challenging the meaning of belonging and participating in state institutions. This came through in the comments concerning the value of the passport as a representation of identity and belonging (in the eyes of the state) and as an instrument of closure. Their perceptions ranged from accepting the passport as only a piece of paper that may smooth the way for travel or work to actually denoting something of their identity. Others recognised the passport as assigning a value to them or being altogether ineffective as a means of inclusion as the markers of Otherness remain. Still others rejected the passport entirely, reiterating their exposure to locally activated international patterns of recognition on the basis of the individual in community participation.

The more expansive citizenship policies, reaching to all migrants from the Commonwealth throughout many years after World War II made the question of why one would take British citizenship less of an issue. This, too, can be traced back to the different conceptualisations of citizenship. Germany’s nation-building project emphasised a common culture and language to unite principalities. In contrast, Britain never identified itself as monocultural or based around a distinct set of ethnic markers, and thus, holding a British passport did not change the affiliation with the country of origin.

Both groups, however, expressed overlapping comments on the function of citizenship as not entirely succeeding in fostering equality of citizenship or changing the actual context of integration in a hierarchical international system. This may explain the lack of comments on the part of London students in terms of the function of citizenship (as it had not resolved other perceptions
of difference), and on the other hand, clarify the comments of the Berlin students’ position who thought it was merely a practical matter. Both groups also had interesting insights into the citizenship test as an instrument of closure but expressed that their community participation generally did not coincide with national or state borders or even ethnicity. Rather, their engagement, friendships, and perceptions of the world were shaped by a global, transnational, national, and local context.

Drawing on these varied responses in districts of Berlin and London where many minorities live, the role of citizenship and its embodiment in the passport is anything but clear-cut. Building on the last chapter’s discussion of multi-scalar spaces, the legal-political instrument of closure serves to highlight the access, contestation, and interaction of state and interstate policies. Moreover, responses indicate the perpetuation of belonging as it was entwined in the nation-building projects of the respective countries, thus compelling minority youth to re-define their belonging on a transnational and global level. The next chapter will explore how these spaces are also the intersection point of diverse cultural and linguistic pressures.
7. Intercultural Dialogue?: Exposures and Influences

The last two chapters focused on the way that location and citizenship link minority youth to their local neighbourhood as well as distant cities. This chapter, by contrast, will centre around the way that culture operates in young people’s experiences. Rather than being a fixed and bounded construct as is implicit in policies of multiculturalism and even intercultural dialogue, the transnational flows of ideas, capital, labour, people, and goods have contributed to the increasing permeability and fluidity of identity boundaries to the point that ‘culture’ as a static process of boundary maintenance does not capture the multiple, fluid identities of minority youth (Çağlar 1997, 168). At the same time, certain norms reinforce and maintain cultural boundaries. Moreover, blatant examples of the way static conceptions of ethnicity influences political discourse are not hard to find.

Coined in April 1990 by the British conservative politician, Norman Tebbit, the ‘cricket test’ asserted that supporting the team of the country of origin could be considered as ‘harking back to where you came from’ (quoted in Soneji 2006, BBC News). First mentioned to me by a teacher in London, he explained that most of the staff at his school would be ‘leaping around for Bangladesh’ (LT143). Such a test defined national belonging and loyalty based on a cultural practice. In Germany, belonging might be defined by a local accent. As an example, Cem Özdemir, co-chair of the Green Party, uses his mastery of the Swabian dialect to assert his Germanness in the face of those who consider him a foreigner (Giglio 2008, Spiegel Online). In this way, a national, even distinctly regional, element of culture contributed to signify belonging and loyalty that supersedes (yet in some way reinforces) ethnic boundaries. Thus, at the same time as the lived reality of culture is ever-changing and fluctuating, assumptions of bounded, territorialised cultures and communities run strong through the political and popular imaginary.

This chapter aims to highlight the tension between the supposedly fixed cultural boundaries (implicit in policies like intercultural dialogue) and the experience of immense fluidity. It exhibits the connections between the local, transnational, and even international levels, and it shows, above all, that shifts in cultural exposures reflect back into the cultural life of the political community (Held 2002, 48). From hip hop workshops to the role of media in ethnic conflict, the presence of minorities shapes the context in which they live, affecting state and interstate relations. Young people, in particular, have access to new quantities of information and venues for expression, experiencing the role of these shifting identities in the context of globalisation on a day-to-day basis.
The chapter is divided into three sections. The first centres around informal cultural exposures, if it can be termed as such, discussing aspects of friendship and informal boundaries. The second section focuses on the role of media. The third section explores some of the ways that these exposures have shaped educational contexts, influencing the dynamics of local schools and the potential for mediation of international conflicts.

**7.1. Internal Tensions, Cross-Cultural Friendships**

As may be apparent already, the influences on young people’s lives are not limited only to the subnational and supranational levels. Rather, age, gender, politics, and religion generate tendencies towards splits and cleavages between and within groups (Yalcin-Heckmann 1997, 94). At the same time as it is exceedingly difficult to pin down a definition of culture in the face of ever-shifting subjectivities and ‘truths’ and identities that resist isolation for the purposes of analysis (Çağlar 1997, 170), this section is intended to highlight some of the themes that were raised in my interviews around the more general topics of citizenship and intercultural dialogue. The comments exhibit some of the social pressures of their experience alongside the tensions they observe. The comments then move into their observations of what connects them to their friends. As may be guessed, there is not a clear answer to any of these questions; rather, we see the overlapping threads of citizenship and location that feed into experiences of social interaction and cultural identities.

I wish to introduce the subject by drawing on some comments from parents about their transition from Turkey to the UK. When asked what she missed about her past life, one parent said: ‘We were very close with each other; the neighbours know each other. Here, you don’t know who lives next door…In Turkey, you share everything, ask everything, but in this country, never’ (LP301A5). Here, the interviewee alludes to differences in cultural norms and community relationships.

Research on Turkish migration to Berlin relates a similar, if more concrete, difference in perceptions of space. Turkish families found it difficult to adjust to the legal requirements for minimum square meters per person as the regulation was based on German perceptions of space. Mandel (1996, 148-149) notes that it was not uncommon for a family of seven, including multiple generations, to live in two rooms, folding and stowing beds during the day, leading to confusion and embarrassment as they realise they were being ‘morally’ and ‘legally’ sanctioned for what they considered to be ‘normal’ behaviour.

Beyond the concrete differences in space management, parents observed that the London context allowed for anonymity even while standing next to someone. One notices this in particular while riding the underground in London. You may be tight against the next person, but s/he is reading the newspaper or a book, even in such close quarters. As Sennett (2002, 43) notes, this
anonymity occurs as one enters a crowd in which people cannot be categorised; their anonymity allows you to drop your own mental set of ‘ready social relations’. This is possibly even more the case as a person who immigrates to a city like London or Berlin, where the context, too, does not fit neatly into a preconceived category. This is evidenced in that the same woman who made the statements about feeling separated from her neighbours recognised the freedom that this context offered her. This awareness came through in the following dialogue, which ensued when I asked the group about what kinds of things helped them to feel more comfortable in the UK:

LP301A5: When I first came, I felt comfortable, free, no one asks you where you come from, which religion you are

LP301A3: a new life

LP301A5: Free life in this country; you don’t have to be careful about [what] you’re wearing, you’re saying.


LP301A5: Especially at Ramadan time, in this country, everyone is free to do what they can [want to] do.

From this dialogue, I gathered that the women in the room shared the experience of discrimination in Turkey. Another mother’s comments reiterate the sense of more political and personal freedom. When she was asked about what she likes about the UK, she said:

Freedom, I have choices, also you can study, and it doesn’t matter how old you are; there are also social rights, social security; they do care about women’s rights and look after and care about the children. In general, starting from pregnancy, there are regular checks, leaflets, and giving birth is free here, not in Turkey. You don’t have to be rich to give birth (LP301B).

In her comments, she expresses an appreciation for the system that provides basic training for people, no matter their socio-economic background. She emphasises that she is free to study, no matter how old she is.

When I spoke with her, it was her first visit to the community centre. She explained that she came to the community centre only for her child’s sake. She described herself as a ‘bit of a lone sheep; I never went to the community centres, always doing something or travelling…but my child is six and started asking about who she is and where she comes from and what do we believe, so I want to give her ideas, an identity, and I can’t teach her…My child is British, Turkish-British, and I’m here to give her that identity’ (LP301B).
Here, the mother expresses the hope for her child to develop a hybrid or hyphenated identity. She wants her to know where she comes from, and what to believe, although she (the mother) has never visited one of these centres before. The community centres, along with their pragmatic function to serve the community and provide advice and support for their clients, were established to see to the needs, particularly the educational needs, of future generations so as to retain a sense of cultural identity (Küçükcan 2004). This parent, in particular, was drawing on this function of the community centre.

As mentioned before, the community centres hosted many activities associated with the culture of the ethnic group(s) they serve. They offer music and dance classes, particularly in the Kurdish centre in London, along with training in musical instruments and even language lessons. Beyond this, they might offer religious instruction.

One young teen described to me how she comes on Fridays: ‘They have musical instruments, and they listen to music’ (LL42). Other centres provide language lessons in mother-tongue instruction or offer a place for people of faith to come together. One girl in Berlin explained that she goes to Islamic school once a week (ES154).

A London pupil explained that at school they ‘teach about all religions, and then, you come here [religious community centre] to learn about your own thing’ (LL301B1). He did not perceive it so much as a tension as much as school was where you learned about the broader subject, and then, your family and community taught the specifics of your own religion.

While many of the community centres serve people well beyond the boundaries of culture or ethnicity that they were established to support, the parent who offered the previous comments observed that the people in the community were not always promoting tolerance and acceptance, particularly in getting involved in transnational politics.

My father is Kurdish, and my mother is Kurdish-Turkish, but they never really discussed it. They didn’t want to put too much identity on them because my father was working for the government [in Turkey]; he didn’t want to put himself in the fray. I don’t know if he was a hero or naïve, but I find here people are too much in the fray. I think everyone should have harmony and peace; it shouldn’t always be me and you, just we (LP301B).

The feelings of intolerance were not confined to transnational politics, however. Several people I spoke with observed internal pressure to behave in keeping with certain social norms. A woman who has extensive experience in assisting in immigration cases and who is an immigrant herself described the experience of her community in the broader context of British society as well as her own place in it. She saw the place of immigrants in society as a kind of ‘abuse’ (LT1810). Employers can take advantage of them, and they have no choice but to accept it.
They might be given unliveable housing situations, and they have no recourse because of language issues. However, she also felt the pressure of her own community in a foreign context.

The social and cultural norms from within the Turkish and Kurdish community affected her particularly as an independent woman who lived alone. She attracted the attention of men and women in negative ways. Men tended to think that she was easy and would invite themselves to her house. Likewise, women saw her as a threat because of her independence. ‘They think I am easy because I live alone’, she said (LT1810). With such strict rules within the community, she felt isolated, and yet, she maintained her place as a teacher and advocate within that community.

A freelance film-maker reaffirmed these internal rules that can be stricter or more rigid in the transnational spaces than in the country of origin. He described how, when he was making a film, one girl in the Turkish-Kurdish community played the part of a girl who had slept with a man. After the film was released, many people within the community would not speak with her, effectively ostracising her from their company, although she had not done anything in reality (EE822). A university student also acknowledged that in her experience of living in London and Istanbul, things like virginity were viewed differently:

Sexual relationships are not allowed…They have a sexual relationship with a person, which is not allowed, and so they get married, and if they hide that and then get married to someone else, then they have to get surgery, but this is not the case in Istanbul; boys there said they wouldn’t mind marrying someone who is not a virgin, but people here are totally the opposite (LL712).

Even as immigrants from Turkey are finding more inroads into politics and professional life, family is still a highly valued institution. Thus, marriage is still perceived as a significant institution for socialisation (Küçükcan 2004). As my informants described, single individuals are under considerable pressure to get married and to avoid situations that could damage their reputations. Affirmed by research into the role of forced marriages across several ethnic groups, Kurdish respondents indicated that gender discrimination occurred in their community, exhibited through control, forced marriage, and domestic violence. Other participants in the same study (not from the Kurdish community) observed that young women might be particularly subject to pressure to marry if they acted ‘outside’ of any of the social norms of their family or community (Chantler, Gangoli, and Hester 2009, 604). It could be argued that these actions are an attempt to protect what some scholars see as an extension of the contractual representations of politics in the roles of men and women, thereby ensuring both the physical and political reproduction of the community (Makes 1996, 24).

In keeping with this argument, the increased strictness may also have to do with a perceived threat of cultural contamination in the country of settlement. In this space, parents may sense a deeper and more urgent need to transmit traditional values. Yet, in reality, this has developed
into an emergent identity construction, where values are increasingly based on the local setting and not exclusively on the country of origin (Küçükcan 2004). The threat of ‘moral contamination’ is not limited to contexts of immigration, however. Another researcher referenced a similar mindset among pious Muslims in Lebanon, who viewed practices, such as shaking hands with the opposite sex, as a sign of moral decay. Although the researcher did not find the same level of strictness in the country of settlement (Belgium), there were those who nonetheless maintained a reluctance to shake hands, though there were also those who contested this trend and adapted in various ways to their current cultural context (Fadil 2009, 443).

In Germany, too, sexuality, particularly of migrant women, is a topic of heated debate in media and politics. Muslim migrant women in popular discourse are considered to be veiled and oppressed in their sexuality (Ehrkamp 2010). Even as political citizenship is expanding to include formal access for migrants, the boundaries of exclusion centre on other aspects of difference, including issues related to gender and culture. Nations are entwined with powerful constructions of gender (McClintock 1993, 61; see Chapter 2). In some cases, going abroad may lead to a kind of escape from social and cultural norms, where, as one woman commented: ‘stones were just stones instead of signifiers of history’ (quoted in Yuval-Davis and Stoetzler 2002, 339). Yet, in the context of minority communities, rigorously patrolled boundaries of culture and politics are entwined with particular norms of gender relations.

These were highlighted by a number of teachers, particularly in Berlin. One teacher observed:

A very typical challenge of this school of this district is that we have a problem with the female pupils, that the parents have very many reservations, that they are not to participate on class trips, not to participate on excursion days [Wandertage] That is, well, for religious reasons, cultural reasons, and then, there is a challenge and difficulties. On the other hand, these female students are at the moment especially good students, very diligent, because they often stand in front of the choice [stand at the crossroads] of either getting good marks or being taken early from school and have to pursue a totally different course… (EL55, Author’s translation).

Another teacher remarked:

The Arab families are more strict in terms of religion [than the Turkish ones]… I know that the Arab girls have a lot of difficulty to get away from home: to take part in physical education, to go on class trips—they are stricter… One sees that the so-called ‘headscarf girls’, the ones who have the headscarf, are often the better students. They are a lot more hard-working, those who have stricter homes. That is our impression…This is all not empirical… (EL154, Author’s translation).

Both comments highlight the restrictions on the movements of young people, particularly females by their parents. Restrictions such as these can be found among Muslim immigrants to Canada, for example, where restrained interaction of young women with young men is apparent
through spacial divisions and separate social activities (Qureshi 1996, 52). While taking a somewhat different form than the controls noted in the British context, the source of the issue seems to be similar. These experiences of restrictions perpetuate the physical and political boundary of the nation as embodied in women. In this way, they are both the ‘symbol’ of the nation as well as ‘excluded’ from it (Yuval-Davis and Stoetzer 2002, 340). In other words, even as they represent the nation (as discussed in more detail in previous chapters), they experience marginalisation from it. As these comments show, this plays into the experience of minority youth who are female, exhibiting the intersectionality of their position as it relates to the local, national, international, and transnational levels.

However, the teachers’ comments allude to a second point that should be highlighted as it indicates an attempt to negotiate belonging and incorporation through a locally run but state-organised institution. Beyond the restrictions, both teachers remark on the exceptional diligence of those who are often restricted. A possible explanation may be found in the British context. Modood (2010) notes that for young Asians, Islam is ‘appealed’ to as a motivation to improve oneself through education. For girls, in particular, it is used to negotiate educational and career opportunities with their parents. Even when young women negotiate these opportunities with their family, obstacles may exist in the society to which they are supposed to integrate.

One of the Berlin students mentioned her struggle as she wears a headscarf but would like to be a teacher. Although she is an excellent and articulate student, she will not be permitted to fill this position in Germany. ‘I want to study [go to university]…I would like to study something in the political field…I would like to be a school teacher, but with the headscarf, this is a bit difficult, so I would like to study medicine but I don’t like that as much’ (ES154, Author’s translation). The issues surrounding the headscarf in schools are not confined to Berlin or even Germany. They have far-reaching implications, affecting state and school policy around Europe and even shaping policy on other continents. Debates over the headscarf’s purpose, what it represents and in what form, where it should be permitted and not, human rights, and security threats are all entwined in this multi-level contestation of belonging. For some recent discussions related to this issue, see Benhabib 2010, Carol and Koopmans 2013, Grillo and Shah 2012, Kuppinger 2013). A full discussion of this topic will not be included here, in part because of the enormity of this subject. However, it is important to mention as it is yet another example of local, intersecting identities that shape interstate policy and are transmitted internationally.

Along with gender relations, food has become a cultural boundary as well. The fear of moral contamination through eating haram [forbidden] meat has led to the emphasis on eating only halal meat (Mandel 1996, 151). In Kreuzberg, not a few shops explicitly state on signs that they serve or sell only halal meat. A number of students mentioned the place of halal food in their experience of growing up in Berlin.
One pupil described how she was born in Berlin and has seven siblings: ‘We make German food, but of course, with halal meat, Chinese food, Indian food...’ (ES154, Author’s translation).

Another group of two girls remarked that they like Italian food including pizza, lasagna, and spaghetti, and one continued ‘and yes, of course, traditional foods, like from my mother—I don’t know how to say it, Weinblätter [stuffed grape leaves] with rice’ (ES362). Her peer added, after prompting: ‘I also like German food, but it’s depends because we’re Muslim, so if it’s halal meat, I eat it’ (ES361). Her friend explained that there are markets where one can buy halal meat (ES362). In Turkey, such dietary regulations are mostly unconscious, but now in the diaspora, they have come to the fore (Mandel 1996). As with other aspects of boundary maintenance, they become more prominent and protected in contexts of insecurity, threat, and change.

The boundaries are not only between the society in the country of settlement and minority communities, however. As mentioned before, there is immense variety within groups that can sometimes be the basis for friction and even violence. Great diversity exists between Muslim minority groups as well as within them (Küçükcan 2004, 245). For example, Vertovec (2007, 1035) posits that The Muslim community in London is ‘probably’ the most diverse anywhere in the world outside of Mecca. The Turkish and Kurdish communities in London may practice religion more strictly in the first generation, and yet, with a particular national and historical background, this practice of Islam should not be subsumed under one heading with their South Asian counterparts. This is perhaps more evident among second generation Turkish youth. Even as many young people still hold to the basic beliefs of Islam, religion is increasingly becoming a ‘symbolic attachment’ (Küçükcan 2004, 250). For Kurds from Turkey, some research shows that there is not a strong connection with religion, although they say they are Muslims (Wahlbeck 1998, 224). This may be partially related to the Alevi affiliation of many Kurds in North London, who do not have mosques.

Being a symbolic attachment does not necessarily reduce its salience and may even heighten it as a feature of identity. For example, a London university student recalls that in her secondary school, the biggest fights were within ethnic groups.

I had a fight with a Sunni girl once. She would always say things behind my back, and we had a fight in the music lesson. The other girl got into trouble, but I was a good student compared to her, so I only got two weeks expulsion [suspension]...I wasn’t the only case. The fights were within groups, Turkish-Turkish, Bangladeshi-Bangladeshi (LL712).

The student who offered her observations was Alevi. From her experience, the ethnic lines are not the fault lines of division, but rather, the divisions within the ethnic or religious groups seemed to cause the most friction.
She explained further: ‘The interesting thing at secondary school was that girls would invite boys from the same background. There was generally a division when Sunni boys came; they would be for Sunni girls’ (LL712). This was an example of the conception of background as both cultural and religious. She went on to say: ‘An Alevi girl would never consider a Sunni boy. My father warned me “Do not date a Turk”. These boys will make you be covered’ (LL712). This impression came from a relative who lived in Germany and married a Sunni: ‘Around us, we don’t have good examples of Sunni-Alevi marriages working out because at some point, they conflict’ (LL712).

In Berlin, a teacher described a somewhat similar occasion of tension among pupils at her school:

There seems to be something in progress which I find rather disquieting: that girls and boys who do not ‘behave’ are put under pressure by those who live strictly according to the rules of Islam. By ‘behave’ I mean that they might not fast during Ramadan. That problem came up in my class in connection with a boy who caused a lot of friction. His father is from Lebanon, and a Turkish girl, who belongs to the Alevi religion, complained about his behaviour when she did not fast during Ramadan. I don’t know how much bickering goes on which we teachers do not notice (EL316).

The perception of social constraints to conform to religious or more strict social norms even in public spaces is confirmed by research conducted in Duisburg-Marxloh. Young Turkish women felt particular pressure from Sunni communities in neighbourhood spaces, affecting their choices of clothing and whether or not they wore a headscarf. This effectively extended the ‘Islamic space’ into the ‘communal space’, creating social pressures also for religious minorities (Ehrkamp 2007, 22). A student in London offered that the perpetuation of things like social norms and insulated community structures might have something to do with numbers. When discussing other integration experiences, he speculated that ‘if there aren’t really many Turkish people – not together in a community like here – they wouldn’t seem like they are from the same culture that much’ (LL301B2). In other words, people might experience more freedom to express the variety of identities in contexts where there are not the pressures from a community to which they are supposed to belong. For a relatively young pupil, this is an astute observation of the discourse of cultural proximity and the role of numbers in integration processes.

A teacher in Berlin echoed the comment by saying:

For me, integration becomes difficult when too many people from another culture live together and can thus separate themselves from the host culture to some extent. I cannot suggest a way out of this, however. Years ago, politicians tried to keep new arrivals from settling in those districts where many of their compatriots already lived. Naturally, new arrivals are happy to live near others from their home countries. Probably, one just has to wait for a few generations. Those who can, i.e. who have made it, will leave the districts where many people of
immigrant background live, which are usually rather run-down ones. In that way, the massing together of people from a different culture will decrease and some of the problems caused by that massing together will evaporate (EL316).

In France, as far back as the 1970s, cultural distance was thought to make it difficult for immigrants to assimilate, while at the same time, their distance was heralded as a sign of an open democracy. The idea of cultural proximity, where European immigrants will ‘naturally’ find it easier to integrate than their non-European counterparts, has been prevalent in popular thinking for many years. The logic of cultural proximity was translated into a ‘threshold of tolerance’, which designated percentages of immigrants that could be in a given area (school, hospital, etc) without the breakdown of social cohesion (Silverman 1992). In Berlin, a similar limit was imposed on areas where many immigrants lived, e.g. Wedding and Kreuzberg. For this reason, immigrants had to resort to living under false registrations in flats outside of these areas, while actually residing within them (Mandel 1996).

In spite of these internal tensions, students tend to base their friendship on a variety of factors. Drawing us back to the content of Chapter 5, location and surroundings play a large role in this process as well as who attends their school. In both London and Berlin, however, there were some who based their friendships on similarity in background and some who mentioned sharing common interests.

One student at the London college explained that friendship is based on ‘common interest, for example, you might like the same subject compared to that person, they might like that subject, or a common interest in sports, that’s what keeps a lot of people together’ (LL143B2).

In contrast, his classmate said that she thinks friendships are based on background: ‘I would say similar background because when you can relate to some of the problems that your friends are going through, it’s easier because you know that they’re always gonna be there for you, and they’re always gonna understand’ (LL143B4). The class in general felt that it was not ethnicity that mattered but more culture and background and things in common.

One student in the class offered:

I think that like with my friends, like I have a mixture of friends, and it’s not about what like what background, it’s just about their personality, so if we have like the same personality, and they’re outgoing and they’re fun then it doesn’t really matter to me, but if they’re gonna keep themselves to themselves and they’re gonna wanna be with their ethnicity and their race, then that’s their choice, but there’s some people that are more outgoing than others that are willing to mix [with] the other backgrounds and other ethnicities, and I don’t really think that if there was more other diverse race here, that it would change because it just comes down to personality at the end of the day (LL143B4).
This comment came after the teacher asked about who they tended to be friends with and how they spent their time. She draws attention to the individual’s reaction and interest in being outgoing, focusing on a willingness to mix beyond ethnic or racial divisions.

A student in Berlin echoed her emphasis on personality and interests: ‘We have lots of things in common, mostly in terms of interests, or our disposition, and I don’t know…’ (ES204B2, Author’s translation).

Another student said: ‘I think at first it is the same interesting interests, for example, a Serie[s] or soap opera on TV, or when we are in class and have sports, for example, playing together and so we learn [get to know] each other and so we get [become] friends’ (ES204C1).

While their comments make reference to particular social or spacial divisions, they also imply a kind of independence from these divisions by highlighting the role of the individual, whether through interests or personality. In a way, such comments seek to minimise the role of the social in shaping experiences and choices. This mode of thinking, popular in liberal cosmopolitanism, indicates the freedom to choose all ‘identifications’, and thus, freedom from social determinants. However, it does not take into account the role of ascription or discrimination in the process of identity formation (Calhoun and Brubaker 2003, 536).

Other students in Berlin put more emphasis on the role of their common background, i.e. having parents who are not from Germany. ‘I would also say that we have in common that our parents aren’t really German. I would say it’s the biggest reason, most important’ (ES106A1).

This statement highlights research that was discussed in Chapter 5, regarding the boundaries in Germany being based upon whether one is German or not German. These kinds of comments bring to the fore the need to contextualise aspects of ethnic identification or even the most basic ascriptions of belonging (whether ascribed by oneself or others). Lyon (1997), for example, describes the changing usage of terms, signifiers, and geographies among South Asians in a town in northern England. Their comments were contingent on contextual factors, incorporating and excluding, shifting according to the situation.

Another student’s comments add more complexity to the situation. ‘Well for me, for instance, I’m Turkish, so it’s really easy for me to find friends because we have a lot of Turkish people here, but for me it’s no problem if my friends are not Turkish. I just have one close Turkish friend and the others are Lebanese, German, and Polish, so what connects us is maybe that we are all from different countries, yeah, interests and hobbies’ (ES106A2).

This comment has multiple threads. On the one hand, the student points out the role of ethnicity in general, saying that he would have no problem finding friends because of the high concentra-
tion of people of Turkish descent in this area of Berlin. At the same time, his own experience is much more varied, crossing ethnic boundaries to include, not only people of Middle Eastern background, but also other pupils of European, even German, descent. In the last moment, he seems to raise their common interests as a uniting feature.

Similarly, another student in Berlin expressed the diversity of her friendships.

My friends are from Arabic and Turkish background, and also from Asia, like Vietnam, and also German…basically from everywhere, it doesn’t have to do with background but the personality…Similar opinions, it doesn’t matter what heritage one has, maybe one has the same experiences, same experiences, same thoughts, …or maybe has the same goals or religion; this is also very important (ES154, Author’s translation).

At first glance, this comment appears to echo the student from London who based friendships on personalities. This student, however, seems to be highlighting something slightly different, that is, experiences, opinions, and beliefs, including religious beliefs. This is further affirmed by her perception of who she would consider to be her community. ‘definitely not the German one, and also not the Turkish one. I believe, it’s my circle of friends, and Muslim brethren…’ (ES154, Author’s translation). In this way, she describes both her diversity of friends but that there is some aspect that makes her feel connected to a certain group, defined by beliefs. A student in Leyton echoed this detachment from a certain ethnicity or nationality by saying that his community extends to other Muslims, even on a worldwide basis (LL143A3).

The following comments from two Albanian girls bring together the multifaceted nature of their friendships as based on location, both local and transnational, cutting across ethnic boundaries, and yet, sometimes coinciding with them.

ES361: In my case, I know my best friend here at school, she’s Albanian too, and I think we immediately felt a connection. I have other friends, too, but she my closest. And I also see her in Macedonia, I also see her there, she’s always with me, so I feel very connected to her.

ES362: For me, it’s we have the same interesting, interests, that’s why we can talk a lot about the same things we like, but in the school, because I know like all my friends, I get to know them in this school.

Through all of these comments, there is evidence that a tension in experience exists between bounded cultures and fluid interactions. These are a reality in the everyday lives of minority youth who are placed at the nexus of these experiences. The very essence of the communities can be conceived as multiple in nature (Hall 2002, 25). Even so, they are placed in a geographical location, reflecting the role of location and space as it continues to shape interactions across the levels of analysis. Most importantly, the multiple, uneven, and non-exclusive aspects of identity come through in their comments (Çağlar 2002, 180). In so saying, I mean to highlight
that an affiliation with a group of people, for example, an ethnic or cultural community, does not rule out the basis of friendships being common interests or even a common experience at school.

Beginning with some perspectives on the role of social norms in ethnically bounded communities, this section aimed to show how diverse the influences are that shape the friendships of young people in Berlin and London. No singular situation is the same, and the experiences and decision-making basis of each student relies on a varied set of intersecting claims that, together, shape an individual’s multi-layered identity. Inevitably, the perceptions of others play into this experience. The next section will discuss how the role of media and language exhibit the same tension between fluidity and rigidity, change and continuity.

7.2. Media: Communication and International Exposure

Nationalism of the past has emphasised language communities and their ‘cultural products’ as natural across Europe (Çağlar 1997, 171). Indeed, language is one of the conventional ‘ethnic markers’ that is used to distinguish a group (whether from within or from without) (Sunier 2004, 147). In the past, linguistic policies with aggressively assimilationist undertones led to widespread incorporation of linguistic minorities to the point that they might only be distinguishable by their surname. In the new climate of multiculturalism, linguistic assimilation and integration can no longer be assumed (Kymlicka and Patten 2003, 5). As McPake and Tinsley (2007) note, language rights are closely linked to other fundamental human rights such as ‘the right to full personal development, the right to good quality education, the right to participate in society but also the duty of becoming a responsible citizen’. For minorities, language is a key skill for integration and social competence in a new country (Sunier 2004, 147). Thus, there is often a palpable tension between cultural politics and providing minorities with equal opportunities and outcomes in national language policies in education (and in citizenship regulations more generally).

Communication technology has risen to fill out the transnational market. Small newspapers, magazines, and television programming have met the entertainment and information needs of these groups (Karim 1998). Using satellite transmissions and cross-border ranges, communities are able to share resources on a global scale. For example, Çağlar (2002, 181) notes that, around the turn of the century, roughly 70 percent of Turks in Germany had a satellite dish to receive several channels from Turkey in addition to about 85 percent who receive the Turkish state broadcasting channel. However, such technology changes interactions on a local scale. For example, one author describes how images of the first Intifada were controlled in order to send multiple poignant messages to a global audience (Hammes 2004, 108-109). The images of armed Israeli soldiers facing Palestinian teenagers throwing rocks travelled across the globe almost instantaneously, shaping international opinion on both the state and popular levels. Simi-
larly, Devji (2005, 88), in his book, *Landscapes of the Jihad*, points out the use of media and images to reinforce the cause and purpose of Al-Qaeda and the jihad. These examples show how international experiences are no longer only the realm of diplomats and state officials. Media expansion raises questions concerning language competency and funding. Moreover, Britain and Germany cannot see their practices as separate or even distant from inter-religious tensions in the Middle East or South Asia (Lewis 1997, 126).

With increasing media outlets, exposure, and interaction, young people find themselves at a crossroads of the local and international. A number of students acknowledged the use of the internet, watching TV, and listening to music as part of their free-time activities. The internet, television, books, music, and newspapers are all consumed in a language, chosen by the person. At the same time, teachers commented very consistently that their students had difficulty in expressing themselves and articulating their points clearly, particularly in Germany. Yet, language acts as the means by which information is transmitted, interpreted, and applied. As I conducted the interviews, particularly in Berlin, it became more and more interesting to see how media and language shaped their everyday activities, their communication with the world beyond Berlin (particularly in the use of English), and how young people grow into the role of mediators or interpreters from a very young age.

In the beginning of the interviews, students described some of their free-time activities, but later on, they distinguished between the languages and origins of the music and films that they watched. For example, one said: ‘I sooner watch Turkish films’ along with MTV but not German soap operas (ES204B2, Author’s translation). This tendency was confirmed by other pupils as they said that they read newspapers in German but watch Turkish television (ES451 and ES452). Another pupil explained that she doesn’t read newspapers in Turkish, only German as well as TV, though she does listen to Turkish or Arabic music sometimes (ES154, Author’s translation).

Another two students commented:

ES246A2: …newspapers or internet pages are most in German.

ES246A1: We understand German better than English and also better than Arabic, my mother language, and that’s why we often go on German sites.

From these comments, there appears to be a subtle trend of German as the language of choice for most written material, but for TV, there is clearly more variety. Likewise, the following comments start to unpack some of their music consumption habits and how this fits into both linguistic consumption as well as cultural exchanges and information-gathering strategies about other societies. Research into the media consumption of young Turks in Germany found that the
language of preference was not defined by one factor alone. Rather, dimensions including demograghic variables (gender, age, citizenship, length of stay) in addition to individual language skills, and political interest fed into different strategies and needs for different information, forming different patterns of media consumption (Trebbe 2007, 174).

The students express great diversity in terms of the languages they listen to:

ES246A2: music, sometimes in English, most often, the most cases is in English, other songs in our languages, Bosnian or Arabic or German.

ES246A1: Sometimes but a very few songs in France [French].

In the first statement, the pupil refers to ‘our’ languages, including German. While it does appear last in the queue, it is clearly among the languages that he feels belong to him, whereas English is placed separately. This reaffirms the presence of German in their lives as a lived reality and facet of their identity.

Another group of two boys described their TV and music consumption (Author’s translation). In the process, they also give us a hint of how they perceive themselves in comparison to other local contexts that they know from and through this kind of media.

ES1661: With me, everything is in German except MTV which is in English but with German subtitles.

ES1662: For me it is also in German; my parents watch in another language.

ES1661: [I like] different kinds of music, hip hop, R&B, and such, but I like to listen mostly to American music, I like it more than German—

ES1662: German is so—they try to imitate America. America is ‘gangster’

ES1661: They say ‘ghetto, ghetto’, but there isn’t a ghetto here. In America, it’s different—.

Although they prefer German for television and even reading, they both feel strongly against listening to German music. The dislike does not seem to stem from just the sound as is the case in other situations, but they feel it is an imitation of American music and an American cultural context that does not ring true. Although Chapter 5 discussed certain parallels between this area of Berlin and the ghettoisation process that takes place in other countries, they do not see their situation as at all comparable.

Another group elaborates on this theme with more ideas as to why there is such a preference for American music or music of their ethnic background above German music:
ES106A1: American I mostly I listen to American music, R&B, hip hop, this type of music like Beyoncé, Timberlake, this young generation singers, and of course, Turkish music, and a bit Arabic, just a bit, I don’t like German music so much, it sounds a bit strange to me, but I think the best music is American

ES106A2: They are the most popular. I must say I like nearly the same taste, music taste

ES106A1: I think because it’s presented in the world, because it’s so international, the artists, everyone knows for example Michael Jackson and so if maybe from different country the singers would be also presented in the world then maybe we would want to listen to them I think… I think it’s really sad that the music today is how can I say, they aren’t using so many instruments at this time, it’s just ‘technical (supplied by friend)’, house music, techno, and I would prefer listening to more instruments, and the voices of the singers are really changing, like robots, and things like that, and I really don’t like the texts because they’re really rude, I like the beat, but I really don’t like listening to those texts, black rap, it’s too hard.

ES106A2: I think you can’t deny that hip hop or r and b, all these kinds of music, that they are changing, are really changing the music of the earlier times, but it’s also the truth that music brings people together for example people of other countries or other religion, so I would say music is really a media that connects people and that’s what I really like.

In this dialogue, one student identifies saturation of the music market by American music as one of the reasons why people listen to it so much. She even ponders the thought that if another music industry had such a place, people would listen to that. In this sense, the popularity and promotion of certain music forms reproduce their popularity in other contexts, geographically distant from their origin. Research on media consumption of minority youth in Switzerland proposed that these trends transcend ethnic identities on a global scale, creating identities associated with ‘hip hop’ or ‘heavy metal’ culture (Bonfadelli et al 2007, 148). These, in turn, connect youth to a global identity that relates to certain media symbols.

At the same time as they like to listen to them, they have their concerns. They do not enjoy the changes in music composition, where it is done mainly on a computer without the use of real instruments, affecting the sound and authenticity of the music. They also express a distaste for the lyrics but admit that they still like the rhythm.

The final comment highlights how the student sees music as a prominent feature of intercultural communication. This is evident in the North American context, where hip hop culture is a site for social knowledge and encouraging academic (and I would add, political) literacy (Morrell and Duncan-Andrade 2002). The texts can be critiqued, analysed, contextualised, and so on, offering an opportunity to connect teachers and students.
The role of hip hop in international relations is most apparent in international efforts to use musical forms to foster dialogue. One such example is the European Commission’s project, *Diversidad*, ‘promoting dialogue and exchange through European urban culture’. The project is coordinated by the European Music Office and included participants from Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Romania, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Using digital media and urban art forms ranging from hip-hop to graffiti workshops, the project gathered and disseminated young people’s view of the Other in hopes of promoting European citizenship.\(^{16}\)

The saturation of the music market with American artists has made English a popular and available language. Students identified English as the most practical language for music releases, though it is hard to say if the use of English on a global scale pre-dated the popularity of English-language music. One student discussed it like this when talking about even the use of languages in music: ‘It’s mainly English, but English is the language of the world, so it’s also a reason why it is always in English’ (ES106A2).

When I prompted the group about the prevalent use of English even in the annual Eurovision song contest, one said: ‘They think it’s better if they speak in English because it seems more modern maybe and everyone understands what they say, but I also think that it’s better if you sing in your own language’ (ES106A1).

In contrast to concerns over language competence, some students use media to actively improve their language skills. One girl of Turkish background said: ‘I prefer to watch Turkish Serien [series] they are really better. I really try to watch the news in English sometimes, for example, the BBC, and I understand very much’ in addition to other soap operas in German (ES204B1, Author’s translation).

This student is explicitly using news broadcasts and other media to improve listening comprehension, particularly for English. The next students also use English programmes to improve their language skills.

ES106C1: yes, i always watch MTV, like talk shows or something like that [without subtitles].

ES106C1: I use song words to improve my English.

ES106C2: When I was in kindergarten, I learned to speak German from watching TV.

\(^{16}\) More information about this project can be found at: http://ec.europa.eu/culture/our-programmes-and-actions/7-flagship-eu-projects_en.htm.
What this dialogue does not explain is that both girls moved to Germany when they were children, making English at least their third language. They are both Albanian but from different countries of origin. Knowing at least three languages is not uncommon for many Berlin students, however, since they might have spoken another language at home and not been exposed to German on a daily basis until entering Kindergarten. Another student had a similar level of linguistic competence, explaining that she speaks five languages at this time, ‘but it gets one all confused because when I grasp the Turkish, I lose the German grammar; it is difficult to be able to speak Arabic, then Turkish, then Kurdish, and then, the school languages…’ (ES154, Author’s translation/paraphrased).

While I was not able to interview the same number of youth concentrated in a single school in London, in one class, only five out of eleven spoke another language at home, and out of these, some spoke both English and that other language. However, similar language-learning strategies were employed by parents with whom I spoke.

One parent now living in London described how she built her language skills long before she came. ‘My father was a teacher, and my mum was a housewife. I had a happy childhood. I always wanted to learn English. I learned English songs’ (LP301B). Now, many years after moving to the UK, she still reads newspapers in both English and Turkish.

Similarly, a university student explained how she worked to gain equal fluency in English and Turkish. ‘It’s very hard to express myself in English and Turkish equally, so I learned Turkish so that I could do the academic side…I don’t want to be criticised as being a migrant and then coming back [to Turkey] (LL712). She was very conscious of language as demarcating her status in England and Turkey. She even risked taking more time at university to strengthen her Turkish language skills. Later in the interview, she continued on the topic by saying:

I’ve subscribed to National Geographic for five years; my reading is mixed. In fact, I try to read both languages [English and Turkish] of the same book for a few years to get both languages at the same level, and when I went to Istanbul, no one knew that I was from Europe except from my clothes. I don’t have an accent; most people here say ‘erm’ [even when they speak Turkish]. People here that are younger speak different English as well, a dialect; I was always called a posh girl because I always tried to speak standard’ (LL712). She notes how this affected her relationships. ‘It raised difficulty when I met my friends; they would say’ You were [always] like that, but it’s worse now. I don’t have close friendships with many Turkish people; I find it difficult to communicate with them. We have a different way of looking at life. They seem a bit naïve, not aware, all they know is something they heard of (LL712).

Her constant effort to gain equal fluency and expression in both Turkish and English has erected a noticeable barrier between her and the rest of the community in London. Yet, as she notes, it has helped her to fit more neatly into Turkish society, as she says, only recognisable by her
clothes, not her accent. Likewise, her English was very ‘standardised’ with very little accent or use of slang in her vocabulary. Her determination was perhaps shaped by the experience of her father. She explained that for her father, arriving in the UK was a big shock in the sense of the strong reading culture.

I never see my father read; he never reads the newspaper. He noticed that when he came to Britain: people are always reading, and it’s very hard for a rural Turkish person to read. He said that you ‘cannot survive in this country, if we don’t teach our kids to do this; these people are cultured, and we’re not’. He felt the clash (LL712).

In spite of the great diversity of languages among the students and the immense capacity for intercultural learning, advanced fluency is not as easy to obtain in multiple languages. In many cases, pupils have a working knowledge of the national language and mother tongue, but because of the lack of exposure, the teachers have to put in extra effort to help them understand texts. In Germany, this challenge is not only the responsibility of the pupils and their families but dates back to the beginning of the guest-worker period. In the beginning of the guest-worker phase, the emphasis of language instruction was on return migration. Given the implied temporary condition of the guest-workers’ stay, German language acquisition did not seem urgent (Entzinger and Biezeveld 2003, 34).

Most measures that were taken emphasised preparation of pupils to return to their home country after the work period of their parents ended (Faas 2007, 46; Faas 2008, 110). As family reunification expanded the foreign communities in Germany, the German education system began to see that extra measures may be required to help the children of immigrants to integrate. In the 1980s and 1990s, native language instruction with the objective of return migration ceased for the most part and was exchanged in favour of the multiculturalist approach (Bauböck 2002, 181).

For teachers in the Berlin school, language competence was raised as a key concern for their students. Some teachers suggested that the longer period spent in primary school in Berlin is disadvantaging their pupils. The head of the Berlin school described how they tried to get pupils starting after fifth grade, as is customary in many regions of Germany. This would allow them to have more years to help with their German and progress towards the Abitur at the end of Gymnasium (EL76B). However, it may be a bit of a Catch-22, since students without the requisite language skills in primary school will not receive a recommendation for Gymnasium, and a shorter time at this level may limit this possibility even more.

Beyond the school, however, language competency and ethno-linguistic boundaries have risen to the fore of integration discussions on the national and EU levels in the context of increasing concerns regarding the development of parallel communities and the drive to foster civic en-
gagement in the past decade or so, (Entzinger and Biezeveld 2003, 20). For newcomers who try to acquire language skills, the path is not always smooth. When I visited an English class at a community centre in London, I was surprised to be thanked by one of the members of the class even before we began. She said that if it were her, she would stay at home (LP1810). This statement was not meant rudely but in a grateful manner. The teacher confirmed: ‘It is very nice for them because they don’t have a lot of contact with native English speakers’ (LT1810). This particular group had a very low level of English at the time, but came to these classes because they were free. I also volunteered in classes that were offered during the week at minimal cost to participants, one pound per class. These classes are perhaps their only way to learn English, but they are still experiencing a degree of exclusion from the greater society.

Similarly, I interviewed a teacher of German for immigrant women in southern Germany. Since Chancellor Merkel initiated a National Integration Plan, it has become mandatory to participate in a certain number of hours of German language instruction.

The German-language teacher described how the people she works with, all women, use German because it is the language that they have in common. ‘They talk German with each other because it’s the language they have in common; they are from many countries’ (BE216).

Even mandatory language classes are not the full solution to the problem, though. She went on to explain that once they have finished their course, they often do not have exposure to native German speakers.

It’s kind of sad that once they have completed the course, they’ve taken the exam and passed it, some of them don’t have much opportunity to use their German; some families can be very restrictive. Turkish families can be like that, too; the daughter-in-law comes from Turkey and is more modern, and the family says ‘You don’t need to learn German’, and then, they stay home in the family (BE216).

In this quotation, there is the particular viewpoint of the experience of women who are trying to learn German. Their experience is not to be generalised across the board, but her comments highlight the similarities between the community centre language classes, where women still remain somewhat isolated in their ethnic communities, at least in some cases, alongside the women in Germany who might mingle more across ethnic boundaries but are still isolated from German society at large.

Throughout the discussion of social norms and language usage, we can observe the tension between fluidity and rigidity in the experiences of minority youth. Even as they are exposed on a global scale to media trends and can communicate in several languages, the emphasis on fluency and competence in the language of the country of settlement remains. At the same time, these exposures bring to light the intersection of the levels of the transnational cross-cutting the local
setting and forming emergent and complex identification processes. Now, let us turn to the way that these complex interactions are accommodated and received in educational spaces. In the school, in particular, the formalised state structure intersects with the already-discussed fluidity and continuity and is compelled to respond to these changes.

7.3. **Formal Cultural Exposures**

In Chapter 3, the discussion of state policies and imagined boundaries set the stage for the role of education, geography, and citizenship in young people’s lives. As introduced in previous chapters, education is established with the intention of transmitting a particular approach or set of values to a future generation. While this is true of state-run institutions, it is also applicable to community centres. The final portion of this chapter will focus primarily on the role of the school in its accommodation of cultural exposures. The first section will be mainly dedicated to the projects and classroom incorporation of diversity, where the second section will emphasise the relationship of the teachers and students with these issues. In the space of the school, the place of culture is doubly complex. Not only is there the expression of the response to state policies but there is the direct intersection with state policies. Cultural interactions, both boundaries and bridges, are amplified in this forge of identity. In the following sections, we will explore the comments that illustrate the interaction of transnational, national, and local influences on the experiences of minority youth.

In order to gather a more well-rounded perspective of what students are experiencing in schools, I asked the parents about the school’s activities, particularly any activities that involve elements of intercultural dialogue. In addition to swimming, drama, and other educational activities, parents in London told me about many cultural activities of the school.

LP301A1: My children’s school is very multicultural

LP301A4: They study everything

LP301A5: They do all different cultures. They have international day where they teach about all different cultures.

LP301A1: Now they are try to teach Alevi in schools as well as part of the Religious Education

LP301A1: They have it now in religious lessons in Germany.

Another parent reaffirmed the sensitivity to religious obligations, saying: ‘When it is Ramadan, they do recognise cultures; the British are quite tolerant; they recognise Eid [a Muslim holiday], you can eat or not eat pork’ (LP301B). Here the parent begins to describe some of the accom-
modation present in British schools. She extends the institutional accommodation to the entire system in saying that the ‘British are quite tolerant’.

Another parent explained that the school helps her child to meet people from other cultures through ‘social life. Moreover, her child’s school affects her interaction with other mothers. ‘I get to know mothers, parents, birthday parties, they have parties; they want to communicate with you; there are lots of cultures in her school’ (LP301B). This quote in particular illustrates how she is invited to participate in extracurricular activities through her child’s involvement at school.

Some of the students pointed to Religious Education, a formal subject in British schools, as a school activity that helps them to learn about other cultures and religions in school (LL301A1 and LL301A2). Others added that history introduced them to other cultures as well (LL301B1). Here we see the link to cultural difference and history being recognised as a part of another subject in school.

In Berlin, when I asked how they learn about other cultures at school, most students said that cultural exposure occurred on an everyday basis. For example, one said: ‘I like to be here at this school with so many different cultures; I think it’s very nice, and well, you also know something for your life. I think you learn a lot about different people, and that’s it’ (ES246A1).

One student answered my question by referring to some of the specific projects that the school does. ‘We had a project about anti-Semitism, but I think this was the only thing that we did about the Jews…We do something about Christendom and about Islam, but otherwise, we don’t have any—well, our school is such that not many projects are initiated’ (ES204B3, Author’s translation).

Another student elaborated on the way that culture is incorporated into the music subject but admitted that it is not in all the lessons consistently:

We have a lot of projects for example, last year, we had a project in music, there we sing Turkish songs with another school, and it was very cool because I’ve never sings a Turkish song, and it was nice to get to know another language, but it’s for instance not always in the lessons (ES362).

Another pupil’s response was more expansive. ‘I think culture is a topic of every subject. In French, we talk about culture, English, in German, I think maybe sometimes’ (ES204C2). This pupil saw that cultural exposure was incorporated into almost every subject, particularly foreign language classes. This is similar to the French model in terms of religious education. Religion, as a separate subject is not taught; nor is religious expression allowed in the school. However,
culture and religion are discussed throughout other subjects, such as philosophy and history (Mannitz 2004a, 91).

Along the same lines, when I asked another group about the discussion of culture in school, they responded:

ES106B1: I think in some subjects, we are talking about culture, for example in English, in German, in French, and we get to know the English culture in English lesson, the French culture in the French lesson, but also in our free time, we get to know our culture, for example, this was a Turkish and Arab people, and the culture of them is similar, that’s why there aren’t many differences.

ES106B2: Yeah, I think so too, but there are also some subjects in grade seven, special subject in our school, in German we do ‘culture lesson’. It’s first in grade seven; it’s connected to the geography, and in grade eight, it’s connected with the music subject, but I also think we learn about it in other subjects, for example, in English, it’s all our subject for the semester is on national and cultural identities; we learned a lot about that.

From this discussion, the themes of culture and intercultural dialogue are evidently incorporated into other topics including geography and music, not to mention the exposure to the cultures around them in Neukölln.

Beyond the day to day activities of the classroom, the school participated in exchanges and projects with other schools in the city and even internationally. They also travelled on class trips around the country and to other countries.

One student recounted:

Here, there was an exchange programme once or twice, some out of Ghent, And then we went to them, and some from Russia came to us, in our families, so to say, they were with us for a week and then the next time we went to them to learn about the language and culture (ES1661, Author’s translation).

Another explained: ‘We have some friends who are from England because we had a trip last year for two years, we had a project here at school, a community project, and the school from Denmark and England come to Berlin, and this way, we have a contact to them’ (ES362).

These examples show how the school engages the students extensively to meet people, not only from other cultures who live in that area of Berlin, but actively seeks to introduce and exchange with other countries and regions. The final student described how she has maintained contact with some of these people online, thus mobilising new means of communication and media on her behalf.
Another student commented: ‘There is cooperation with other schools…some come from Zehe-
rendorf-Marzahn [in Berlin] and get to know us, and travelling, we go to France, for example,
also, and also we have Ethics lesson’ (ES154, Author’s translation). She describes the school
exchanges and also how the subject of Ethics introduces them to different perspectives.

When asked about cultural accommodation in school, two students said:

ES2241: No, we do not [do] something [anything] about other cultures, but Ethik
[Ethics], there we talk about other cultures

ES2242: And that’s very interesting because if someone says something about
him, somebody stand up and cry [shouts]; it [reacts], and then there’s discussion.

The multicultural competency and complex intercultural exchange of these context have a pro-
found influence on the German and British states in practical and personal ways through the
presence of teachers. The students observed how the variety of cultural backgrounds at the
school was generally accepted and even, in some cases, embraced. Yet, the experience is not
universal. Some feel that prejudice against minorities remains, in some cases, or if not prej-
dice, then, misunderstanding. Alongside fluid identities and cultural exposure already discussed,
certain boundaries were observed and expressed by both students and staff in the schools where
I conducted interviews.

I will begin by pointing out a marked difference between the two schools in terms of the diver-
sity present among London teachers in contrast to an all-German teaching staff in the Berlin
school. Some potential reasons for this lack of diversity may be drawn from other educational
context. In Canada, for example, research notes that, even with increasing diversity among the
students and the population in general, diversity among the teachers has not followed suit. Part
of the problem seems to be what can be described as a leaky pipeline, where students tend to
drop out at certain points along the way from primary to post-secondary education. In Canada,
this seems to particularly affect those of African or Aboriginal background, as they are over-
represented in basic level courses and under-represented in advanced or university-bound levels
(Ryan, Pollock, and Antonelli 2009).

This is not specific to Canada, however. Research conducted in the late 1980s in Los Angeles
reported discrepancies and gaps between primary and secondary educational achievement in
basic literacy (Patthey-Chavez 1993, 36). Without these skills and basic ‘socialisation’ in prepa-
ration for high school, many pupils end up simply dropping out. Similarly, because of the selec-
tive education structure in Germany, there is an extremely high attrition rate at the end of the
first or second year, where pupils transfer out of Gymnasium.
As one teacher at the Berlin school stated: ‘We have many pupils going to Gymnasium here, but they are not really suited to it...but often, the pupils are overwhelmed here at the school’ (EL154, Author’s translation). As discussed in Chapter 4, this system appears to disadvantage certain ethnic groups. yet, while the selective structure has its shortcomings, it may provide an alternative to dropping out altogether as in the US case.

The research shows, however, that this is not the only obstacle to diversity among educators, at least in Canada. A 2006 report commissioned by the Ontario College of Teachers found that only one out of five internationally educated teachers (the majority of whom are non-White) was able to find a job, and even in these cases, it may not be a regular or full-time job (Ryan, Pollock, and Antonelli 2009, 604). Whether educated within Canada or newly immigrated, the selectivity in the teacher workforce seems to systematically privilege a certain skin colour along with being born and raised in Canada.

In the UK, this finding is confirmed by what David Gillborn (2005) refers to as the white supremacist underpinnings of education policy. Mainly focusing on education policy in England, he argues that the ‘routine privileging’ of white interests is more dangerous than small neo-Nazi groups (Gillborn 2005, 485). This seems to hold true, even in the face of recruitment schemes specifically aimed at drawing more male teachers (particularly for primary school) and more ethnically diverse teachers overall. According to Carrington and Skelton (2003), the implication of this policy, which began with the 1997 government, is to confront the disaffection from school of working class, Afro-Caribbean males. While this assessment and the implications of such policies must be critically analysed, research from the North American context, e.g. the Ehrenberg et al (1995) study, suggests that minority group teachers are more likely to challenge personal and institutional racism (Quirocho and Rios 2000, 509). As Ross (2001) states: ‘Good teachers are reflective...but none of us can recognise all the culturally and socially determined mores that we carry’.

A final factor is the role of the headscarf. Already mentioned in this chapter in terms of limiting a Berlin students’ career interest in being a teacher, it undoubtedly bars the profession from numerous others. It highlights the complicated and often contradictory policies of states to protect citizens’ rights but also a particular cultural framework (Sauer 2009). This is particularly salient as teachers in Germany are public servants and represent the state, thus illustrating again the maintenance of cultural boundaries along ethnicised and gendered lines (Benhabib 2010).

Even without ethnic diversity among the teachers in Berlin, however, the pupils generally perceived their teachers as open and supportive of diversity, personally interested in understanding more about their pupils’ backgrounds. One Berlin pupil remarked that teachers do have some choice as to where they work, and if they really had a problem with this area of Berlin, they
could choose not to work there: ‘Teachers here in Neukölln, they have the opportunity to go to Zehlendorf or to another, maybe another Bezirk [district], so I think it’s interesting for our teachers to get to know other cultures’ (ES204C2).

Yet, not all of the students were so convinced. When asked if she thought the teachers were happy to have so many cultures in the school, a student responded this way:

I don’t know; we mostly think that they give preference to the German pupils, not all; this is normal maybe, but I think there are some that support and have culture classes, but others are sad that the Germans are fewer; we have problems with them…They say ‘foreigners…they are not as good as Germans’, but definitely not; we are just as good or better (ES154, Author’s translation).

Here, she exhibits the defensive nature of the comparison; she argues that the minority are as good or better than their German peers. When another pupil was asked if she thought teachers were happy to be in a multicultural school, she said:

Well, I think the teachers that we have now in our school are happy with the situation, but there were also some teachers who in my opinion didn’t like it. You could see it because they treated you different from like maybe German students, and you could really feel it, but now I think we have a lot of young teachers, and they are more open-minded (ES106A1).

She related that the other teachers who seemed to favour German students had either left or retired and were ‘really old’. The following dialogue shows how the teachers might enjoy the exposure, but it is not without its challenges for them, both practically and indirectly.

ES362: I think yes because we all get to know another culture and another traditional, but sometimes, I think it’s hard for them because when you have a lot of other cultures and languages together, it’s hard for them to—there can be a lot of problems. But I thinking our school, it isn’t a problem because we all understand each other, and it’s a good atmosphere

ES361: Yeah, I think I agree with her, I think that this is for some teachers, it is a problem, I think.

ES362: yes, because of our German language

ES361: yes and sometimes you hear some stupid answers like, I can tell you one: there was our physics teacher asked us about where does the sunlight come from or I don’t know what, and we answered, it was Allah, so it was our God, and she said no, don’t give me this answer, but it was just a joke, but she reacted really aggressive, don’t come with this stupid answer…It was just a joke but I think she took it seriously, and it was an overreaction.

Along the same lines, in a group of girls, the following conversation ensued (Author’s translation):
ES204B2: It varies; some are happy that we all live together, but others are so that they see us as not fully integrated. They always go back to this, integration, and one feels really shut out,

ES204B3: Some Germans don’t accept us, that we live here for many years

ES204B1: We are integrated, but we cannot fully forget that we, that our families came from Turkey…I think we are already integrated, but—

ES204B2: They (the teachers) see that we want to achieve something, want to have chances as foreigners, and many Germans don’t have that [motivation] at all.

These comments delve deeper into the experience of the students who feel that, even though they are there, speak German, and live their lives in Germany, they receive different treatment that makes them feel excluded. Interestingly, one student says that they are already integrated and work harder, with more ambition, than their German peers. Later in the conversation, they described a situation where they felt the teacher did not understand the diversity within their culture.

ES204B3: there are also some [Germans, teachers] who are lovely and kind but in the back of their minds, inside, they still think ‘foreigners’…There are also always these prejudices, I’ve noticed. Last time, we have a lesson in the computer room, and we were allowed to look at YouTube…and there was a woman with a short dress, and next to her sat a German, and he was shocked, you know, ‘is that allowed with you all?’ He always had these prejudices that we’re not really modernised, that we’re always a little behind, like the women aren’t allowed to do anything

ES204B2: In Arabic countries, this is still so [that women have their heads covered] that they don’t have as many rights, but Turkey is already developed and is already modernised—

ES204B2 And there women are allowed to do a lot.

These comments highlight the balancing act of hybrid identities and the potential for marginalisation under such circumstances along with students’ perceptions of various countries and cultures. They also recognise the homogenising process implicit in the exclusion that they experience. This marginalisation was found in other research, conducted in London and Stuttgart where minority youth experience marginal identities in both cultures of reference (Faas 2009, 306). In so saying, they perceive that they are considered ‘foreign’ in Germany, while being ‘German’ in Turkey. Rather than feeling a sense of belonging to one or the other, they feel a constant change and tension in their surroundings.

A pupil put it this way:
For me, the biggest challenge is not really the stuff like discrimination or racism. It’s more personal. When I’m at school, I see all these, how can I say, these Western style of living, and it’s sometimes very difficult to keep also your traditional environment or combine the two…It’s really difficult to combine these western lifestyle and my traditions from my home country, but I guess you are used to it (ES106A2).

This student divides the two experiences into ‘Western’ and ‘traditional’, feeling a tension between the two. In one sense, however, she replicates the discourse that her parents’ lifestyle is of tradition and ‘Western’ is somehow opposed to the traditional. Yet, in reality, the German context incorporates a good deal of tradition, involving religious holidays and cultural symbols into its civil culture (see Chapter 2).

The head of the school in Berlin commented that many pupils sit between stools (as the direct translation from German would say), or in other words, they have a foot in both worlds. Some say very openly that they would like to have the home of their grandparents, but for others, it is more complicated. In her opinion, it is much easier when a pupil chooses one stool or the other ‘because [otherwise] they sit between the two, German with Turkish or Arab background so to come to terms with it is the objective’ (EL76B, Author’s translation). She tries to explain this to the pupils. This comment again brings to the fore the idea of distinctive boundaries and clear-cut choices, where the reality is underlined with many tensions as we explored in the first half of this chapter.

Though possibly unnoticed by the students, the presence of Muslim pupils has shaped how teachers plan their exams and schedule other school activities, affecting their environment in very concrete ways. This was not an immediate or formal decision, but as the teachers observed that a majority of their students might be missing on a Muslim holiday, they began to consider the Islamic calendar when planning the year. One teacher who has lived the majority of his life in Berlin and who has taught at this school for almost 30 years explained:

When it is Ramadan and the students are hungry and not well-rested because they eat at night, then it is something that no one would be interested in Zehlendorf. Then, one must also take exams, but one tries then not to plan sports-days during this time, when the children are definitely somewhat weakened during the day. Here, we have also made mistakes, right. We have planned tests on Muslim holidays, since we didn’t have any idea, and then, we suddenly realised ‘No one is here’. And then, we began to think about it. ‘We could have also done this a week earlier or later’, but we didn’t think of it. So, and this is what one has learned in the last few years: You look at the Islamic calendar…This is not like Christmas, which is always on December 25, but rather, they are always changing, these holidays… (EL315B, Author’s translation).

17 Zehlendorf is another district of Berlin where few minorities from the Middle East reside. It is home to ethnically German remigrants, however.
The teacher explains the progression of the way that Muslim students have shaped the manner in which teachers plan the activities of the school year. He plainly acknowledges that this awareness was not instinctive but came from trial and error, showing the extent to which students can influence the functioning of the education system. Moreover, it demonstrates the willingness of the teachers, as representatives of the state, to adjust their plans according to the students’ needs, though the same teacher later comments that, even so, this is a German secondary school, not in that it represents German nationality, but in that it is located in Germany, and the students need to be equipped for their future.

His comments and the response of the staff in general reflect an approach to education that goes beyond what Nieto (2000, 180) calls ‘window dressing’, e.g. adding a unit on world festivals or singing a song in another language. Rather, it hints at an atmosphere where the values, attitudes, and beliefs of the teachers respected the students’ background and were willing to accommodate it. This is not to say that the environment was perfect, but that attempts to understand and engage in negotiations of deadlines shows a certain awareness and flexibility. The comment regarding the situation of the school in a German context articulates an important aspect of cosmopolitanism, that is, even with the presence multiple identities and fluid allegiances, these are embedded in a cultural context (Hall 2002, 26). This is not to say that the cultural context is fixed, but there is an orientation – not neat or bounded – that provides the backdrop, institutionally and socially, for other activities. Out of this context, for example, different versions of claims-making develop (see Chapter 2) and various approaches to diversity, based on the civil society in a particular political culture (Schiffauer 1997, 147). Nonetheless, the school is not independent from transnational and international occurrences.

The transnational and international levels are brought into local schools when conflicts, taking place thousands of miles away, are acted out in corridors and classrooms. The role of images and modern communications technology can have a catalysing effect, not to mention personal connections to distant disputes. The Kurdish nationalist movement is no exception. Technology facilitates the rapid dissemination of information, protests, and responses on a worldwide scale, contributing to a sense of ethnic consciousness and a politicised ethnic identity (Romano 2002, 128). Likewise, the Eritrean diaspora play an active role in the new state, debating history and identity, mobilising support for protests, funding, and government influence via the internet (Bernal 2006, 161). Even at a distance, they are constructing a sense of community, contributing to new forms of citizenship. As an even more recent example of the use of modern technology in communication and political change, one need only look to the revolutions of the Arab Spring 2011. This is not to say that revolutions did not occur before the increase in modern technology, but to say that these media outlets are being harnessed to spread ideas on a broader scale, using tools like Facebook instead of paper publications to call for change (Anderson
In the midst of such global changes, the teachers at local schools in other countries and even continents have to respond to current events with little training and few tools to know where to start.

When discussing their teachers, two pupils observed:

ES106B2: There are some problems sometimes, and some teachers don’t know how to deal with the problems…There are some conflicts between Jewish people and Arabic people, and some young people don’t really know about the history, and they just say something that they heard in TV or something. Then, teachers say ‘oh my God, you can’t say something like that’…I think it depends on the situation. Sometimes, when children lived here for second or third generation, it’s just what they hear from the TV or from their parents, but also sometimes, it’s something that they know because they, for example, lived in, I don’t know, Lebanon, and had to come to Germany because there was war, so those are just bad experiences but also just what they hear from TV.

ES106B1: And we have to be careful about the things we get from the TV because sometimes the media is exaggerating and they are not always the right information, that’s why we have to be careful.

Another student mentioned these conflicts and said that these conflicts, like Turkish and Kurdish, are learned from their parents. ‘They learn about European history in school and US history but not Turkish or Arab or Israeli; if one studied that in the school, there would perhaps be less prejudices’ (ES154, Author’s translation).

This student identifies that the perspectives learned from parents or from media are not adequate to give the students a way to think through the conflicts and develop informed and well-rounded opinions. In her opinion, the emphasis on European history is not sufficient to give the students the necessary tools to understand situations that are geographically farther from home but politically and culturally much closer.

A London student confirmed the need for more reliable sources of information in raising young people’s awareness, based on her observations of the Turkish community: ‘Knowledge is based on what their father said or what so-and-so said, not on what they read’ (LL712).

From these final comments on the way that international issues permeate the local setting, it shows the role of new technologies, media, and information-gathering strategies used by young people. Their parents inform them based on particular news sources, transmitted in particular languages to a particular audience. Likewise, they consume certain cultural products based on certain linguistic preferences or interests. Yet, they generally express an interest in learning how to be more objective and become equipped to work through these situations in their school contexts.
Conclusion

Young people in Berlin and London live at an intersection point of media, changing cultural contexts, and an enormous variety of pressures, influences, and choices. From social norms, reinforced in the transnational space, to the place of culture in education, they participate in the uneven processes of information flows, an immense variety of ideas, and shifting perceptions of belonging. In London, one can find a blurring of ethnic boundaries in some situations, such as the community centre, where Turkish, Kurdish, and Turkish-Cypriot mingle on a regular basis. Friendships in both cities also reflect this blurring of boundaries. This is compounded by diverse media consumption and the use of multiple languages. At the same time, pupils in both cities comment on the existence of social and cultural norms that demarcate group boundaries in terms of religious practices (e.g. halal food) and the relations between men and women. Educational spaces, too, exhibit the influence of increasing cultural diversity and transnational linkages, which bring into question the structure, curriculum, and even the attitudes and demographic make-up of the teaching staff.

In this light, emergent identities appear to exemplify cosmopolitan understandings that incorporate geography, politics, and other aspects of globalisation, as disconnected geographies and overlapping identities intersect in the spaces of Berlin and London. These, in turn, reflect back into the national and transnational spaces through media usage and the influence of young people on education. Moreover, the movement of people has profoundly shaped state institutions from the bottom up. Changes in religious education, debates over uniforms and allowance of religious symbols in schools have all come to the fore on local, state, and international levels.

The goal of this chapter was to explore and problematise the concept of intercultural dialogue by looking at everyday interactions of culture for young people in Berlin and London. It challenges the conception of culture as static and bounded, making the idea of intercultural dialogue one that must also be questioned as it implies a notion of difference and belonging based on bounded cultural identities. For IR and Political Science more broadly, it indicates a need to go beyond policies that reify boundaries between us and them, looking at the extensive blurring that takes place in the lives of young people. Finally, it highlights the link between local schools and violent conflict as students express a desire to learn about these conflicts in a well-rounded way.
Research on immigration and integration has mushroomed in the fields of anthropology, sociology, political economy, and even comparative politics, contributing to the development of research clusters on migration, diaspora, and refugee studies. At the same time, the field of International Relations has left these issues largely uninvestigated, although it has increasingly become a topic of international importance and policy convergence among EU member states, affecting politics on an international level. No longer an issue to be confined to domestic politics, this thesis aimed to use a levels-of-analysis approach to understand how young people perceive citizenship and intercultural dialogue. These questions are not only important to the understanding of transnational connections but indicate a need to expand the IR field to re-conceptualise state-centric models of citizenship and culture. Through a comparison of young people’s views in Germany and the UK, I found that, in spite of their different histories and immigration experiences, the relationship of minority youth to citizenship and intercultural dialogue has more in common than not. The main contributing factors to their experience and perceptions appeared to be notions of belonging ingrained in each national imaginary in the context of changing global trends of communication and transportation.

The thesis began with an introduction to the main research questions, methodology, and disciplinary orientation of the methods and purposes of this research. Chapter 2 presented the theoretical background, highlighting the role of the national imaginary in developing cultural identity and citizenship policies. In response to the presence of large-scale immigration in the context of multiculturalism, states embarked on a process of response and reaction that set them on a course of path dependency as they implemented various national versions of pluralist and assimilationist policies. However, these policies have not succeeded in meeting the goals of equality of opportunity and outcome. In fact, many politicians across Europe have declared that multiculturalism has failed. However, this may be as much due to the way that multiculturalism was conceived as it is a result of how such policies were implemented.

Chapter 3 then introduced the national immigration contexts in Germany and the UK. While clearly distinct, there are also similar patterns of tension. Both countries experienced postwar migration. For the UK, this came predominately from former colonies and the Commonwealth, while Germany’s immigration was from countries that had signed bilateral worker-exchange agreements in the late 1950s and early 1960s. These policies and initial introduction established the foundations of the relationship, including settlement patterns and integration policies (or lack thereof). Both countries exhibit the tension between universalism and particularism in their
approaches to inclusion, laying the boundaries of social interaction. In recent years, both countries have converged to align more closely with the trend of protecting and monitoring borders as well as patrolling the entry and stay of immigrants and asylum-seekers. Across the board, immigration policies showed a trend in keeping with Alejandro Colas’ comments on the subject of national sovereignty:

...the history of modern sovereignty appears as a far more contested, unstable and indeed unfinished process than is often acknowledged...[where the] seemingly homogenous identity of the nation-state is recurrently contested and negotiated through both socioeconomic flows associated to the globalisation of capitalism and the political struggles for recognition and inclusion (Colas 2003, 113).

The fourth chapter shifted the focus from the state and local level to that of the international or transnational level. It introduced some of the driving trends, such as economic competitiveness, social cohesion, and the protection of human rights that have shaped policy from the supranational to the local level. In both Germany and the UK, these trends were apparent in EU policy and also in the structure and approach to education systems.

The final three chapters analysed the empirical data gathered in the process of conducting this research. Chapter 5 centred on the role of location, untangling the intersections of multi-scalar spaces in the lives of minority youth. It found that, while these spaces can be defined geographically, they are often representative of numerous other contested factors that play into a sense of belonging.

Chapters 6 and 7 delved deeper into these notions of belonging by looking at citizenship and cultural interactions in young people’s lives. All in all, these three themes contributed to illustrate the nexus of the transnational and local space as not being mutually exclusive or separate (Ehrkamp 2005, 346). Rather, they complement each other in the interactions and engagement of minority youth. At this point, I will now re-visit the initial research objective and research questions to conclude this study.

8.1. Findings

At the beginning of this piece, I stated the primary research question as: How are citizenship and intercultural dialogue expressed, perceived, and accommodated among minority youth. Using a levels-of-analysis approach in the context of a constructivist methodology oriented to International Relations, I hypothesised that the research would show the porous, intersecting, and overlapping function and perception of these levels in young people’s lives. The structure of the thesis is based upon the underlying questions, which were:

- How do minority youth engage with different spheres/scale/spaces of belonging;
• How do young people’s perceptions of citizenship shape their relationship with the local, state, international, and transnational levels;

• How do cultural exposures and accommodation reinforce or challenge notions of intercultural dialogue;

• And what are the implications of these findings for IR?

Chapter 5 focused on the first question, showing the intersections and multi-territoriality in young people's lives. It explored how spaces of interaction may coincide with politically demarcated boundaries from city districts to state borders. However, the spaces may also cross-cut these boundaries, dividing city boroughs and even subdividing neighbourhoods. These divisions were apparent in the way that students discussed perceptions of ethnicity (e.g. visibility and belonging) as well as socio-economic divisions.

In Germany, comments regarding visibility were more prevalent, but as noted in the chapter’s conclusion, this may be a result of interviews with mainly Turkish and Kurdish young people in the UK, who are generally considered to be part of an invisible minority. At the same time as young people referred to local levels, however, their interactions indicated connections to distant places. This drew my attention to the international and transnational connection, highlighting the relationship with a distant city above and beyond another neighbourhood within the city where they live.

The next two chapters examined citizenship and intercultural dialogue, responding to the second and third research questions. Chapter 6 explored why young people might or might not take the citizenship of the country in which they live, ranging from a rational analysis of the situation to a sense of civic belonging. In general, the comments about citizenship differed somewhat in the German and British contexts, since many of the British youth whom I interviewed did not have a choice of whether or not to take British citizenship. Across the board, however, the comments about citizenship as a tool to guarantee moral equality or promote engagement expressed a much gloomier prognosis. Many felt that it was a step but did not really change the way that they were perceived or accepted on a broader scale.

Finally, what I call the ‘valuisation process’ shaped the way that young people perceived their situation and felt themselves to be perceived by the state. This process denotes a perception of worth based on the passport one holds or as part of the naturalisation process. Hints of these policies are evident in the state-defined controls of immigration as based on economic needs. They have been further developed, however, in terms of skills-based immigration regulations, even to the point of a citizenship test that could be called an intelligence test. Most of all, however, it denotes an international hierarchy that is replicated on the Eu and national level, and
even local levels. Non-EU citizens are often not allowed dual citizenship, and they cannot travel freely within the EU, leading to a sense of exclusion.

Chapter 7 highlighted the simultaneous blurring and reinforcement of cultural boundaries at the local, national, and international levels. It showed how young people are living at the intersection point between rigid social norms and globalised flows of information and ideas. At the same time as some social norms are reinforced within the community, cross-cultural friendships and school activities lead to an awareness well beyond the confines of the neighbourhood. Young people’s media consumption, in particular, demonstrates the capacity for immense and diverse awareness alongside its own challenges to obtain fluency. The accommodation of culture in educational spaces paralleled and encompassed this tension as young people engage in activities to learn about other contexts. Yet, at the same time, they experience mixed responses from their teachers and tensions at school as global conflicts are played out in the corridors.

In light of these findings, even terminology such as ‘hybrid’ or ‘hyphenated’ identity did not seem adequate to capture the experience of variety and uneven exposures that characterise the experiences of many young people. In contrast to top-down policies of multiculturalism and even intercultural dialogue, these exhibit intersecting identities that resist categorisation. As such, I would term the identities of minority youth as highly cosmopolitan in the complementary transnational and local spaces, contributing to the sense of interconnected geographies and multi-cited linkages.

As can be seen from the overviews of the chapter topics and findings, the experiences and perceptions of young people in Berlin and London have more in common than separates them. This is not to say that the country contexts are the same or that these findings could be generalised to other cities or even other city districts. It is merely to show that, with respect to conceptions of citizenship and cultural exposures, Berlin and London youth share similar perceptions and understandings of their position. In each case, the more prevalent perception of citizenship reiterated exclusion based on nationalist notions of insider and outsider (discussed in Chapter 2) and the increased connection and overlap of cultural awareness in the context of global trends.

As to the final research question, these findings contribute to the field of IR in two distinct ways. First, it contributes theoretically by expanding the discipline to explore occurrences and interactions in local spaces that are important to the IR field, such as immigration. This is particularly relevant in the context of globalisation and the reconfiguration of territories, identities, and international actors. Both Berlin and London participate on the international stage, and it is crucial to maintain the vitality of the discipline by reconfiguring the emphasis from a focus on interstate relations to processes of interaction that encompass local and transnational activities.
This is all the more apparent in the face of the EU’s eastward expansion and changing relations in the Mediterranean.

Second and related, this work shows the relevance of immigration in an international context. It cannot remain the subject of Comparative Politics as it informs regional and international policy-making. Moreover, this work takes into account the situation of minority youth as actors on the international stage, affecting local institutions (e.g. schools) and shows the international engagement of youth through exchanges, internet usage, and travel. Beyond the young professional traveling for business or the use of internet for formalised activities (whether political or otherwise), young people are increasingly exposed to communications technology from a very young age. They participate in social networking sites, watch YouTube, and interact in international chat rooms. In this way, they contribute to the flow of ideas. Taking these trends into consideration would further refine the understanding of the IR discipline to accommodate changing international terrains.

As a whole, this research indicates a need to reconceptualise citizenship and intercultural dialogue as they are addressed and investigated in policy-making and analysis on the international scale. Traditionally, they assume state-centricity and static cultures, even if these are not explicitly stated. The perceptions of young people highlight the need to approach these ideas with an awareness of on-the-ground understandings of how these policies are shaping local and international interaction as globalisation, increasing mobility, and the heightened complexity of international and transnational spaces bring citizenship and intercultural dialogue into the realm of the IR discipline.

Finally, I would like to readdress the levels-of-analysis approach. This work drew on a generally geographically based understanding of the levels of analysis, but in the first chapter, I hypothesised that this work would reveal the changing and contested nature of these levels as they are not simply geographically defined but intersect with multiple spheres of belonging and interaction. In so saying, they become multi-dimensional spaces that can contribute to the conceptualisation of the levels-of-analysis approach in IR. Rather than focusing solely on geography as an extension of the state-centric approach, this work shows the potential to use other levels, based upon notions such as visibility and invisibility or family structures. In and of themselves, these are not new aspects to the Social Sciences, but in the context of typical IR research questions, they are rarely addressed, leaving the formulation of state policy to a very thin understanding of the international space.
8.2. **Further Research recommendations**

As with most research, when the final findings are explored, there are as many questions as answers. At least two potential directions could be pursued: either further qualitative work or more quantitative research.

In terms of qualitative work, it would be useful to spend more time speaking with the parents in more detail to explore how their perceptions of citizenship and culture might shape their children’s perceptions. However, it was a challenge, particularly in the German context, to reach parents in the first place. Another aspect would be to examine the function of teachers, since they clearly shape the interaction of young people in significant ways. They also participate or offer critique to the national curriculum in how they conduct their classes. In particular, this research showed examples of their localised authority to schedule exams and arrange school activities in keeping with their students’ needs or the pressures of the community.

It would also be very important to conduct similar research in other kinds of neighbourhoods and schools in both contexts to find out if these findings were unique or part of a broader experience across Berlin and London. For example, one could investigate notions of visibility and invisibility for different groups of young people in both cases. Other research might expand this project to involve more extensive investigation into other citizenship contexts such as the United States, where a different model is in place. Alternatively, newer countries of immigration (e.g. Italy or Spain) might be included to see if the immigration context has a particular effect on the interaction of young people.

In terms of quantitative research, it would be useful to survey a larger number of pupils in both countries and in different regions in order to verify some of the findings, particularly concerning citizenship and/or social/cultural norms. Such research could also be used to determine the particular experiences of mixed neighbourhoods and if these circumstances are replicated in other large city contexts in Germany and the UK. This kind of research might draw on models such as those put forward by Banks (2006) and his work on biethnicity and multiethnicity for African-Americans in suburban white neighbourhoods. Needless to say, the possibilities are numerous and the potential for investigation, promising.

Overall, this research aimed to introduce a new and relatively unexplored aspect of immigration in the discipline of IR. While many of the findings of this chapter would benefit from further exploration through other methods and research questions, it is clear that perceptions of citizenship and intercultural dialogue exemplify a shifting and fluid experience of belonging and cultural boundary maintenance in the face of globalisation. Moreover, they contribute to IR through the suggestion of new research issues, facilitating a broadening of the field’s scope. In the face of terrorist threats, concerns of security, ethnic conflict, and the changing nature of
warfare, different foci of interactions must be incorporated into the IR discipline in order to respond to changing times.
Appendix A: Interview Schedules

Teacher Interview Schedule

1. How long have you worked here [in the school]?
2. Have you always lived in this city?
3. What do you teach?
4. What are the biggest challenges of working in a school in this district?
5. Does the school do anything in particular to support pupils with a minority background?
6. How is the contact with parents?
7. Is it difficult to talk with parents, and does this change depending on the pupil’s background?
8. What are the biggest challenges for the students?
9. Why don't more pupils make it to higher levels of education?
10. What does citizenship mean to you?
11. Is it talked about at school? How?
12. In your training to be a teacher, did you have any discussion about cultural diversity in your education?
13. What has been most helpful to you in working with pupils of minority background?
14. If you could focus on one area to help pupils to be more successful, what would it be?

Student Interview Schedule

1. Have you always lived in Germany/the UK
2. What kinds of foods do you like to eat?
3. What kinds of things do you do in your free time?
4. Where do you know your close friends from?
5. Are you friends with people from other cultures, neighbourhoods, religions, or countries?
6. What connects you to your friends?
7. Do you think about people of your culture in other countries? If so, do you think their experience is different from yours?
8. What kind of contact do you have with the international community (e.g. newspapers, TV in other languages, politics)?
9. Do your teachers seem to be happy to have pupils from other cultures (or languages, countries, religions) in their classes?
10. What kinds of activities help you to learn about other cultures at school?
11. What do you think of when you hear citizenship?
12. What kinds of things do you learn about citizenship in school?
13. Who would you call your community?
14. Do you play an active role in your community?
15. How does your school help you to feel a part of society?
Parent Interview Schedule

1. How many years have you lived in the UK/Germany?
2. Where did you or your parents come from?
3. Why did you come to the UK/Germany?
4. Do you miss your past life?
5. What kinds of foods do you like to cook?
6. Where do you buy most of your food (e.g. English supermarket, Turkish shop, etc)?
7. What things do you like about the UK/Germany (e.g. political freedom, cultural freedom, food, weather, access to education)?
8. What kinds of things helped you to feel more comfortable in the UK/Germany?
9. What kinds of activities do you do with your child’s school?
10. Do they have any cultural activities at their school?
11. Do you think that schools help you and your children to meet people from other cultural backgrounds?
12. In what ways do schools help your children to meet people from other cultures?
13. How do schools help you to meet people from other cultures?
14. What about teachers: How do they seem to think about other cultures?
15. What are the biggest obstacles to speaking with teachers?
16. What do you think of when you hear the word citizenship?
17. Do you have contact with the international community (e.g. newspapers, TV)?
18. Do you know people in other countries besides Turkey (or other sending country)?
Appendix B: Lists of Interviews

Explanation of interview code names

**Interview prefixes**
BE = German informant
BP = German parent
EE = British informant
EL = Berlin teacher
ES = Berlin pupil
LL = London pupil
LP = London parent
LT = London teacher

**Interview numbers**
Each interview partner was given a series of numbers (and sometimes letters) to identify them consistently. The first two to four numbers refer to the date on which they were interviewed. If there were more than one individual or group interview on the same day, all members of that group received a letter as well, e.g. A, B, C, or D. If there was only one interview on that date, no letter was given. If there is a number after the letter, it identifies them as a person in a group.

For example, a code name such as ‘ES189A2’ would refer to a Berlin pupil, interviewed on the 18 September, the first interview of the day, in a group of at least two pupils.

Similarly, if the code used is ‘ES1892’, it would refer to a Berlin pupil, interviewed on the 18 September, in a group of at least two with no other pupil interviews on that date.

In some rare cases, interview partners were assigned arbitrary numbers, not associated with a date. In these cases, the number is used consistently and with a prefix to identify their basic role in the data-gathering process.

**Note on tables**
The reader may notice that some of the tables are missing some information. This occurred as some participants did not offer details on their nationality or length of stay in the UK or Germany. As the interviewer, I was not to press for these details if not offered; particularly in Germany, I was only allowed to use data that was given voluntarily through indirect questioning. I chose to take the same approach of allowing the participants to offer whatever information they chose.
Table 1: Interviews with Students, London

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Age/Grade</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Time in host country (* if born there)</th>
<th>Description of ethnicity/nationality</th>
<th>Generation</th>
<th>Language of interview</th>
<th>Date of interview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>LL299</td>
<td>University student</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>15+</td>
<td>Kurdish</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>29/09/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>LL121</td>
<td>University student</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>15+</td>
<td>Kurdish</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>01/12/2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>LL712</td>
<td>University student</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>15+</td>
<td>Kurdish</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>07/12/2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>LL301A 1</td>
<td>Public secondary school</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>*14</td>
<td>Kurdish</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>30/01/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>LL301A 2</td>
<td>Public secondary school</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>*15</td>
<td>Kurdish</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>30/01/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>LL301B 1</td>
<td>Public secondary school</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>*15</td>
<td>Kurdish</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>30/01/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>LL301B 2</td>
<td>Public secondary school</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>*14</td>
<td>Kurdish</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>30/01/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>LL301C</td>
<td>College</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>15+</td>
<td>Kurdish</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>30/01/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>LL301D</td>
<td>State school in Turkey</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>1 month</td>
<td>Turkish, just moved to London</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>30/01/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>LL143A 1</td>
<td>College</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>*15+</td>
<td>Afro-Caribbean</td>
<td>2 or later</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>14/03/2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>LL143A 2</td>
<td>College</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>*15+</td>
<td>Afro-Caribbean</td>
<td>2 or later</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>14/03/2011</td>
</tr>
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<td>8</td>
<td>LL143A 3</td>
<td>College</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>*14+</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>14/03/2011</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>LL143B 1</td>
<td>College</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>*15+</td>
<td>Afro-Caribbean</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>14/03/2011</td>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
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<td>College</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>*15+</td>
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<td>14/03/2011</td>
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<td>F</td>
<td>*15+</td>
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<td>14/03/2011</td>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>LL143B 4</td>
<td>College</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>*15+</td>
<td>Afro-Caribbean</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>14/03/2011</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>LL42</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>F</td>
<td></td>
<td>Born in Turkey, Kurdish</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>04/02/2010</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Table 2: Interviews with Students, Berlin

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Code name</th>
<th>Age/Grade</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Time in host country (in years; *=born there)</th>
<th>Description of ethnicity/nationality</th>
<th>Language of interview</th>
<th>Date of interview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>ES204C</td>
<td>Tenth grade</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>*15 +</td>
<td>Turkish descent had Turkish passport, now have German pass</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>20/04/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>ES204C</td>
<td>Tenth grade</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>*15 +</td>
<td>From Egypt, now with German passport</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>20/04/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>ES204D</td>
<td>Tenth grade</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>*15 +</td>
<td>German passport, Turkish descent</td>
<td>English/German</td>
<td>20/04/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>ES204D</td>
<td>Tenth grade</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>*15 +</td>
<td>Turkish descent</td>
<td>English/German</td>
<td>20/04/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>ES204B</td>
<td>Advanced course</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>*15 +</td>
<td>Turkish descent</td>
<td>English/German</td>
<td>20/04/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>ES204B</td>
<td>Advanced course</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>*15 +</td>
<td>Turkish descent</td>
<td>English/German</td>
<td>20/04/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>ES204B</td>
<td>Advanced course</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>*15 +</td>
<td>Turkish descent</td>
<td>English/German</td>
<td>20/04/2010</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>ES154</td>
<td>4th semester of advanced course</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>*15 +</td>
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<td>German</td>
<td>15/04/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>ES1661</td>
<td>Tenth grade</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>*15 +</td>
<td>German passport with Lebanese background</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Tenth grade</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>*15 +</td>
<td>German with Turkish background</td>
<td>German</td>
<td>16/06/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>ES106C</td>
<td>Advanced course</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>10</td>
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### Table 4: Interviews with Teachers

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### Table 5: Miscellaneous Interviews

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<td>EE23</td>
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<td>London</td>
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<td>EE1410</td>
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Glossary of German Terms and Abbreviations

**Abitur**: degree from the academic track (Gymnasium) track

**CDU (Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands)**: the Christian Democratic Union, the conservative party in Germany, closely related to the CSU (which is mainly in Bavaria).

**Ethik**: a class designed to include study of all major world religions to replace denominational religious instruction for students who do not wish to attend those classes

**Europa-Schule**: bilingual and bicultural school where German is taught with a combination of nine other languages

**Gesamtschule (Gesamtschulen)**: the German version of the comprehensive school, which exists in explicitly integrated (integriert) or cooperative (kooperativ) forms

**Grundgesetz**: Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany

**Grundschule**: primary school, lasting 4-6 years depending on the region

**Gymnasium (Gymnasien)**: the academic-track school in the German education system

**Hauptschulabschluss**: degree from the Hauptschule track

**Hauptschule**: practical branch of the German education system

**Islamkonferenz**: Islamic conference, called by the Interior Minister under the Grand Coalition to discuss the needs of the diverse Muslim community in Germany

**Kein Einwanderungsland**: term used to describe Germany as ‘not a country of immigration’

**KMK (Kultusministerkonferenz)**: the Standing Conference of Länder Ministries of Education and Cultural Affairs

**Länder**: term used to refer to the sixteen regions or states that make up the federal structure of Germany

**Leitkultur**: the German ‘guiding’ culture’ or monolithic culture, to which immigrants should conform, mostly referred to in conservative rhetoric

**Migrationshintergrund**: A term to refer to people who were (a) born abroad, (b) who possess (solely) non-German citizenship, (c) were naturalised or (d) have at least one parent who was or still is a foreign national or who immigrated to Germany.

**NIP**: National Integration Plan

**Realschule**: intermediate level school

**SPD (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands)**: the main liberal party in Germany
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