The Dialectic of the Holy:

Paul Tillich's Idea of Judaism within the History of Religion

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Abstract

The topic of Tillich and Judaism has received relatively little scholarly treatment. This is despite the importance of Jews and Judaism for Tillich, which is established by numerous biographical details, including the reason for his opposition to the Nazi government and ensuing emigration to the United States in 1933 (Introduction and Chapter 1).

Tillich's ecumenical activities are acknowledged, but Tillich's dialectical theological method is analyzed to determine how it could have justified his pro-Jewish stance. This refers to his consistent attacks on anti-Semitism, and after World War II, numerous lectures on the structural similarities between Judaism and Christianity, not to mention lifetime relationships with secular and religious Jews (Chapters 1 and 2).

Tillich has a dialectical understanding of reality, influenced by F. W. J. Schelling, and this influences every major aspect of his theology. Select primary sources are analyzed to assess the evolution of Tillich's idea of Judaism through his dialectical, theological and inclusive history of religion (Chapters 3 through 6). 'Jewish prophetism', highlighting the critical and existential dimensions of Judaism, emerged as the most characteristic expression, significantly, after World War I, as Tillich rejected the religious nationalism of his early adulthood. After World War II and the Holocaust, Tillich's 'dialectic of the Holy' expressed the fullness of the divine reality as the permanent polar tension between the priestly/mystical/vertical/'Is', and
the prophetic/critical/horizontal/’Ought’. This polar tension is found in his ontology, Christology, and history of religion. The importance of Jewish prophetism, rooted in historic Judaism, would have made it difficult for Tillich to eliminate the Jewish roots of Christianity, compared to the so-called ‘German Christians’ prevalent in Weimar and Nazi Germany.

Chapter 7 concludes with a criticism and defence of Tillich’s method. Tillich’s idea of Judaism is inadequate for interfaith dialogue, because it fails to address the fullness of Judaism’s own self-understandings, and is limited to the prophetic aspect. However, the prophetic aspect ensures that the critical and existential aspects of any religion endure in a transformation to a more adequate expression of the divine. Tillich’s ‘religion of the concrete spirit’ not only preserves the importance of Jewish prophetism, but opens the door to dialogue with non-theistic religions, such as Buddhism.
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Abbreviations and Note on the Text

In this dissertation the following acronyms and abbreviations have been used:


BNAPTS Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society


GEC German Evangelical Church


Harvard Archives Harvard University Archives, Cambridge, Mass. The Tillich collection is archived under bMS 649

NRVS  New Revised Standard Version

Religious Situation  Paul Tillich, *The Religious Situation*, trans. and
                  preface H. Richard Niebuhr (New York: Meridian
                  Books and Living Age Books; London: Thames &
                  Hudson, 1956)

RSV  Revised Standard Version

Schelling, GW  Manfred Schröter, ed., *Gesammelte Werke*, by F. W.

                 10 and Part II, vols. 1–4 (Stuttgart und Augsburg: J.
                 M. Cotta Verlag, 1856–1861)

                    & Row, 1977), trans. Franklin Sherman from the
                    German *Die sozialistische Entscheidung*, as
                    published in GW vol. II, *Frühe Schriften zum
                    Religiösen Sozialismus*

ST  Paul Tillich, *Systematic Theology*, 3 volumes
      (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951, 1957,
      1963)

The footnotes employ the short title referencing system whereby a bibliographical
citation provides full publication details at first mention and a shortened form
thereafter.
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Introduction

The Fundamental Importance of Judaism for Tillich

In April of 1933, soon after Adolf Hitler came to power, Paul Tillich was suspended from his position as chair of the philosophy department at the University of Frankfurt for speaking out against Nazi intimidation of leftist students, and for being a 'well known religious socialist'.\(^1\) Tillich was one of over 1,600 German academics that were either fired or suspended for being Jews and/or critics of the Nazi regime.\(^2\) In May he was initially instructed by the Ministry of Education to remain in Germany until a final decision was made on his case.\(^3\) In August of that year, Union


\(^2\) On 7 April 1933 the newly empowered National Socialist government passed the Reich Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service (the 'Civil Service law'), which, among other things, prohibited non-Aryans from being employed in the civil service. Jews and the descendants of Jews were targeted in particular, although veterans of World War I and direct relatives of World War I veterans killed in action were sometimes excepted. See Wolfgang Gerlach, *And the Witnesses were Silent: The Confessing Church and the Persecution of the Jews*, trans. and ed. Victoria J. Barnett (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2000), 17–18. This provision, from paragraph 3 of the Civil Service law, became known as the contested 'Aryan paragraph'. See Larry L. Rasmussen, editor's introduction to *Dietrich Bonhoeffer: Works*, vol. XII, *Berlin: 1932–1933*, trans. Isabel Best and David Higgins (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2009), 11. The German Evangelical Church attempted to adopt a similar provision in church law, in adherence to the Nazi government's policy of 'synchronization', or *Gleichschaltung*, in which all dimensions of German life and culture were to be legally subject to Nazi ideology. See Gerlach, *Witnesses were Silent*, glossary, 288.

\(^3\) Wilhelm and Marion Pauck, *Paul Tillich: His Life and Thought*, (New York: Harper & Row, 1976), 132–136. The facts surrounding this are somewhat confusing, although the Paucks provide the most detailed account in English, which is partly based on personal interviews with Tillich. One confusing detail concerns which government bureau was in charge of Tillich's case, as it is either referred to as
Theological Seminary in New York, through Reinhold Niebuhr, offered him a position. However, being a loyal German, Tillich hesitated, and traveled around Germany seeking advice and counsel as to whether he should leave the country. In October of 1933, as the situation in Germany deteriorated, Tillich was summoned by a high official at the Ministry of Education in Berlin, the new Nazi secretary of education,\(^4\) who wanted to offer Tillich the chair of Theology at the University of Berlin, in exchange for retracting *The Socialist Decision*. In a 1959 interview for *Time* magazine, Tillich recalls that this interview became the pivotal moment when he decided to leave Germany and seek political asylum in the United States: ‘For a full hour, we discussed the Old Testament and the importance to Christianity of the Jewish tradition. At the end of the hour I knew it was over.’\(^5\) Adolf Lowe also relates that in this interview, the Nazi official also asked Tillich to retract *The Socialist Decision*,\(^6\) in return for the prestigious chair of Theology at the University of Berlin. Tillich reportedly laughed in his face.\(^7\) The Nazi official recommended that Tillich leave Germany for his own safety, for two years,\(^8\) but that he expected things to

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\(^4\) According to Tillich’s second wife, Hannah Tillich, as recounted in *From Time to Time* (New York: Stein & Day, 1973). Hannah recalls that after the meeting, Tillich told her he posed two questions to the minister of education: ‘What about the Jews?’ and ‘How will you deal with modern culture?’ (154–155).

\(^5\) This incident is recounted in the feature article ‘A Theology for Protestants’, *Time*, 16 March 1959, 48.

\(^6\) For publication details see Note on the Text above. The original German edition was published by Alfred Protte of Potsdam in 1933.

\(^7\) Related by John R. Stumme in the introduction to *Socialist Decision*, xxiv.

\(^8\) Hannah Tillich, *From Time to Time*, 155.
ultimately improve so that Tillich could return. After agonizing over this, Tillich
decided to emigrate. Aside from concern for his personal safety, this pivotal interview
reveals what was most important to Tillich, what he found non-negotiable about the
Nazi regime, and the importance of the Old Testament and Judaism to Christian
theology. It is revealing that Tillich refers to this incident in the manner that he does,
since he was 73 and was being interviewed by the widely read *Time* magazine. His
emigration to America at age 47 was pivotal in the sense that he went on to have
another life, indeed a very successful one, but only after a very challenging
beginning. However, he maintained his conviction that Judaism was vitally important
for Christian theology, and that Nazism and all forms of anti-Semitism must be
opposed. In fact, Tillich’s choice to defy Nazi manipulation in 1933 was the first of
several instances in which he displayed these convictions, which began when Hitler
came to power, and continued throughout his life, emerging at critical times and
places. Two additional examples in which Tillich voluntarily took a stand to combat
anti-Semitism underscore this.

On 21 November 1938, just over five years after the promulgation of the first
racial laws that caused Tillich to be relieved of his position at the University of
Frankfurt, Tillich made a speech in Madison Square Garden to an overflow crowd,
and with major press coverage, titled, ‘The Meaning of Anti-Semitism’.⁹ In this

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⁹ Oddly, in the Pauck’s biography of Tillich, this event is only referred to as ‘a Protestant gathering
protesting Hitler’s persecution of the Jews’, although it acknowledges that Tillich broke his self-
imposed silence on public statements of a political nature since he had not yet obtained US
citizenship. Pauck and Pauck, *Tillich*, 196–197, note 3. On the same day at Madison Square Garden,
a mass rally protesting against the Nazis and *Kristallnacht* was staged by church, labour, literary and
instance, Tillich clearly linked the Nazi attack on Judaism to an attack on Christianity: `Few words are required to prove that the struggle for the eradication of Judaism is, in its profoundest meaning, a struggle to eradicate Christianity.' In addition, in the same speech, Tillich called for unity between Christians and Jews on the basis of a common prophetic religion, and urged solidarity with Jews and opposition to Nazism. Because of his political views, Tillich had been fired from his university position and effectively forced to leave Germany in 1933. It appears that upon arriving in America, Tillich had intended to keep his political views private, since he was a German national in an era of rising tension between the two countries. He was not yet an American citizen. However, upon learning of the Kristallnacht pogrom of November 9–10 November 1938, in which German government paramilitary groups killed 91 Jews, arrested 30,000 who were sent to concentration camps, razed over 1,000 synagogues and destroyed thousands of Jewish businesses and homes, Tillich became so indignant that he felt compelled to make a speech before over civic leaders from New York City, at which seventeen speeches were given, including one by Tillich. This event was one of many in America that exhibited the harshest condemnation of Nazism, and it was covered by major media outlets, including the New York Times and the radio station WHOM. The Times headline ran, '20,000 Jam Garden in Reich Protest. Varied Groups Hear Pleas to “Smash Nazism” to End its Persecutions ...', and the story reported, 'amid the variety' of the seventeen speakers, the unifying feature was the 'vigor of the addresses and of the responses of the audience'. I draw here from Michael Berkowitz’s essay ‘Kristallnacht in Context: Jewish War Veterans in America and Britain and the Crisis of German Jewry’, in American Religious Responses to Kristallnacht, ed. Maria Mazzenga (Houndsmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 69–70 notes 67, 82.


20,000 people, with newspaper and radio coverage. Later, Tillich became an American citizen, on 4 March 1940, fully embracing America as his new home.

Three and a half years later, on 31 March 1942, a speech drafted by Tillich in German titled 'The Question of the Jewish People', was broadcast into Germany. This was the first of 112 weekly speeches authored in secret by Tillich and delivered from March 1942 to May 1944, as part of the US government's Voice of America series. In this speech, Tillich affirms several propositions that form the core of his understanding of the relationship between Judaism and Christianity: the Christian religion was 'prepared in the womb of Jewish history'; that Jesus was of Jewish lineage; that the Old Testament is part of the Christian Bible; that the Protestant Reformation was carried out in the spirit of Paul, who was a Jew; that both Christians and Jews draw from the same law, prophets and Psalms; and that Christians cannot renounce the same religious roots out of which a religious Jew lives. It appears that the Office of War Information gave Tillich considerable flexibility in preparing the

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13 The Paucks say that in discussions and debates, Tillich typically remained very restrained and objective, taking seriously criticisms of his views. However, they cite several examples of Tillich being enraged at the Nazis and everything they stood for (Tillich, 127–131).

14 Ibid., 197.


16 Stone and Weaver, Against the Third Reich, 1.

17 Ibid.

18 The Voice of America was part of the Radio Program Bureau of the Office of War Information (OWI). It was forbidden to use falsehood in its efforts. The Voice of America should be distinguished from 'psychological warfare', as administered by the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), which was mandated to engage in subversive activities. Stone and Weaver, Against the Third Reich, 1– 2.

19 Tillich, written speech entitled 'The Question of the Jewish People', 31 March 1942, cited in Stone and Weaver, Against the Third Reich, 13.
content of this initial speech, and even for the entire series, since the content unmistakably reflects his unique thoughts. The speeches ultimately aim to persuade Germans in Germany to oppose Hitler, but they do not exhibit the features of crude ‘war propaganda’; in fact, he was asked by the Office of War Information to speak the truth as he knew it.\textsuperscript{20} Therefore, it is very revealing that Tillich chose this topic for his first speech, because it was central to his thought, intellectually and existentially.\textsuperscript{21} According to Stone and Weaver:

the historic identity of the Jewish people had a significant place in Tillich’s theology, as well as in his philosophy of history. Theologically, the Jews are the inspiration for his notion of the Protestant principle, that element of perpetual critique that stands against the ever-present threats of idolatry and absolutism. Historically, Jewish prophetism is the vehicle for his argument of the dominance of time over space as the necessary prerequisite for the existence of justice.\textsuperscript{22}

These themes will be discussed in greater detail in this chapter, and in Chapters

\textsuperscript{20} Stone and Weaver in their introduction to \textit{Against the Third Reich} discuss the distinction between ‘propaganda studies’, which focuses on the truth or falsehood of media messages, and ‘communication studies’, which concentrates on the reception of media messages by its hearers. In this context, they assert that Tillich understood the ‘ambiguity’ of his situation. While Tillich would have refrained from doing what the Nazis did, he understood the importance and effectiveness of mass media in a modern, technological society. Stone and Weaver, \textit{Against the Third Reich}, 2. See also Matthew L. Weaver, \textit{Religious Internationalism: War and Peace in the Thought of Paul Tillich} (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 2010), 144–145 and notes 1–5.

\textsuperscript{21} Stone and Weaver, \textit{Against the Third Reich}, 7. See also Ronald H. Stone, \textit{Paul Tillich’s Radical Social Thought} (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1980), 102.

\textsuperscript{22} Stone and Weaver, \textit{Against the Third Reich}, 7.
Four, Five and Six of this dissertation.

Tillich’s critique of Nazism, his understanding of Judaism, the relationship of Judaism to Christianity, and his understanding of the Old Testament, are all interrelated. The Tillich scholars I will discuss in this chapter, Glenn David Earley, Ronald H. Stone and Matthew Lon Weaver, have each made major contributions to our understanding of Tillich and Judaism, and I refer to their work in key parts of this dissertation. Taken together, these three scholars present a well-rounded profile of Tillich’s relation to Judaism, and in the cases of Stone and Weaver, this is done in the context of other topics. They all agree that Tillich has a theological understanding of Judaism as a prophetic movement, which he developed during the 1920s and 1930s, during his deep involvement with Religious Socialism. This theological understanding of Judaism is distinct from Judaism as a historical and social phenomenon.

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24 As for the Old Testament, Tillich is quite clear about the importance of the prophetic tradition, but he has left no explicit treatment of the Old Testament. Due to his philosophical exegesis and use of ontology, he does not present an explicit doctrine of Scripture, but discusses its role in the context of other topics. For Tillich’s understanding of the relationship between ontology and the Bible, see Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), referred to hereafter as BRSUR. For two rare and penetrating analyses of Tillich’s hermeneutical principles, see John Charles Cooper, The ‘Spiritual Presence’ in the Theology of Paul Tillich: Tillich’s Use of St Paul (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1997). Also, see Courtney S. Wilder, ‘Existentialism and Exegesis: Being and the Bible in Bultmann and Tillich’, dissertation, University of Chicago, June 2008.
I will discuss in later chapters that Tillich deliberately singled out the prophetic feature of Judaism to play an essential role in his theological history of religions. As Earley says, it is 'Tillich's idea of Judaism'. My analysis will focus on this, and not on Tillich's friendships with individual Jews, or how he might have specific Jewish communities in his day. These points are thoroughly discussed in Earley's dissertation.

Earley, Stone and Weaver all agree that Tillich adopted a key metaphor for understanding Judaism, the Jews as 'the people of time'. This led Tillich to a related idea, that the 'Jewish spirit' provides a permanent critique of Christianity. Earley takes this to another level by arguing that Tillich effectively equates his concept of Jewish spirit with Tillich's more famous 'Protestant principle', the critical principle he uses to identify idolatry and absolutism. All three scholars agree on the sources, especially the importance of Tillich's 1933 The Socialist Decision, and what I shall call Tillich's 'occasional lectures', some of which remain unpublished and are housed in the Harvard archives. They all agree that Tillich was unique among Christian

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25 In the concluding chapter of his dissertation, Earley refers to this repeatedly, and it becomes an object of criticism. For example, he observes, '1) that Tillich's idea of Judaism is just that, and not a phenomenological description of Judaism and 2) that Tillich apparently never learned what Judaism's own questions are, but assumed that he knew what they were, thus violating his own method of correlation'. Earley Dissertation, 392–393.

26 Stone refers to these archives in Tillich's Radical Social Thought as 'H.A.', with only a title attached. This was in 1981. Much later, in 2010, in his book Religious Internationalism: War and Peace in the Thought of Paul Tillich, Weaver designates the archives with the abbreviation, 'PTAH', and includes a box and document number as well. In September of 2012 a major reorganization of the archives was completed, with the addition of 100 boxes of correspondence from friends, colleagues, institutions and dignitaries. This collection consists of penned and typed multiple-stage drafts of sermons, addresses, papers and articles, including drafts of Tillich's major publications, class notes and lecture notes from
theologians in his relatively early defense of the Jews, in 1932 and 1933, well before *Kristallnacht* and the full operation of the concentration camps. They all agree that his understanding of Judaism was flawed, in the sense that it was an intellectual construct used as a means to serve Christianity, as opposed to a concrete, living religion. Finally, they all discuss the importance of the thought of F. W. J. Schelling (1775–1854) for Tillich, although none of them see any significant relationship between Tillich’s view of Schelling and Tillich’s view of Judaism.

Despite the significant contributions of these three authors, none has fully explained how Tillich grounded his pro-Jewish views within his theology. Earley makes a profound observation about the similarity in Tillich’s mind between the ‘spirit of Jewish propheticism’ and the Protestant principle, yet he does not see any influence of Schelling’s dialectical history of religion, or how that relates to Tillich’s ontology. Stone, who was the first scholar to provide a biographical analysis of Tillich and Judaism, was also probably the first to connect Tillich’s adoption of religious socialism and his prophetic view of Judaism. This has correctly remained the consensus view. Stone’s work was also foundational for both Earley and Weaver; Stone was Weaver’s dissertation advisor at Pittsburgh Theological Seminary. Earley was inspired by Stone, as will be discussed below. Weaver is the first to make an association between Judaism and Christianity in his discussion of Tillich’s treatment

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his theology courses, photographs of Tillich with friends and family, and as a World War I chaplain, and numerous personal items. The collection spans the period from 1894 to 1974, and is housed in 242 boxes. The complete inventory of the collection, called a ‘finding aid,’ can be found at http://oasis.lib.harvard.edu/oasis/deliver/~div00649 [accessed 25/07/2013]. Each item begins with the catalogue number bMS 649, followed by the individual box and item number. Most of the ‘occasional lectures’ discussed in Chapter 6 are found in this archive.
of Schelling's construction of the history of religions, but he mentions it almost in passing and does not elaborate as to whether it has wider significance or not. Additionally, Weaver's work is the most recent and his bibliographic information is the most reliable.

The question I hope to answer is, 'Why was Tillich pro-Jewish?' Tillich was pro-Jewish in three ways: (i) he consistently criticized anti-Semitism; (ii) he believed that Christianity could not be severed from its historical Jewish roots, as the German Christians believed, which will be discussed in the next chapter; (iii) related to this, he believed that genius of Judaism within the history of religion was its 'prophetic spirit', and that prophetic spirit was needed to serve as a perpetual critique of Christianity, lest Christianity lapse into paganism; and (iv) in a less robust manner, and late in his career, Tillich argued that living Jewish communities were essential to the maintenance of this prophetic spirit. This dissertation will focus on Tillich's theological method and on how Tillich's 'idea of Judaism', a term taken from Glenn Earley, functioned within that method. Tillich's relationship to specific Jews and Jewish communities has been treated elsewhere, particularly in the Earley Dissertation.

In the primary source analyses in Chapters 3 through 6 below, the answers will be sought in Tillich's dialectical history of religion, which was the vehicle to preserve continuity between Judaism and Christianity. On the one hand, this continues to relegate Judaism to the status of an idea or a theological construct. In that sense, it has limited value for current interfaith dialogue between Christianity
and Judaism. On the other hand, as I hope to demonstrate within this dissertation, it provides theoretical support as Tillich attempts to ground a relatively favourable view of Judaism under intense anti-Semitic conditions. Given Tillich's historical context, it was of substantial value. The following chapter will be devoted to summarizing the works of Earley, Stone and Weaver – the 'literature review' of relevant prior works on this topic.
Chapter 1

Prior Treatments of Tillich and Judaism: Earley, Stone and Weaver

1.1 The Earley Dissertation: Tillich’s ‘Protestant principle’ and the ‘spirit of Jewish prophetism’

The importance of Judaism in the theology of Paul Tillich has not been widely treated in the scholarly literature. There has never been a book published on the subject, but there has been one nearly comprehensive work on the topic, Glenn David Earley’s 1983 doctoral dissertation at Temple University, titled ‘An Everlasting Conversation: Judaism in the Life and Thought of Paul Tillich’. As a graduate student at Temple, Earley became passionately interested in the Holocaust, its historical causes, its theological implications for the credibility of Christianity, and the role of Judaism in Christian theology. When at Temple, Earley was inspired by a lecture on Tillich and religious socialism by Ronald Stone, then a professor at Pittsburgh Theological Seminary. Earley correctly identified Stone’s 1981 book, Paul Tillich’s Radical Social Thought, as the only extant sustained treatment of Tillich and Judaism, leading Earley to explore a dissertation on Tillich and Judaism. Earley discovered that Tillich

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1 Earley passed away in December 2002 at age 48, nearly twenty years after he completed the dissertation. Serving as the coordinator of interreligious relations for the National Conference of Community and Justice, he taught over a hundred thousand students in the San Francisco area about the Holocaust and related topics. Despite its solid scholarship and unique topic, the Earley Dissertation was never published. The only major area of Tillich’s relation to Judaism, the Old Testament and Anti-Semitism that the Earley Dissertation does not discuss is Tillich’s friendship and extensive correspondence with the German Lutheran theologian, Emanuel Hirsch (1886[1888?]–1972). This important topic has been extensively analyzed in A. James Reimer’s book, The Emanuel Hirsch and Paul Tillich Debate: A Study in the Political Ramifications of Theology, Toronto Studies in Theology 42 (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 1989).
had written several occasional pieces directly or indirectly on this topic, supporting his observation that there was a ‘lacuna’ in the Tillich scholarship on Tillich and Judaism. He subsequently studied for two years in Germany, at Heidelberg and Marburg, the latter being the site of the Marburg Tillich Archive.

The Earley Dissertation succeeds admirably in all that it sets out to do, in over 400 pages. First, it attempts to be comprehensive in its assessment of all the known sources. Earley analyzes all of the occasional papers, most of which are still unpublished, found in the Marburg archive and the Harvard archive. For example, not only does Earley unearth and analyze the 1952 Berlin lectures ‘The Jewish Question: A Christian and a German Problem’ (I will refer to them as the ‘Judenfrage lectures’), he translates them into English and places this translation into an appendix, which I will use as the basis for my analysis in Chapter 5 of this dissertation. Second, he identifies and analyzes writings by Jewish authors on Tillich’s relation to Judaism, Bernard Martin and Albert Friedlander, who acknowledge Tillich’s anti-Nazism and his relatively favourable view of Judaism.

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Third, he discusses each of Tillich’s relationships with Jews, including religious Jews such as Martin Buber, and Adolf Löwe, the economist and philosopher who also emigrated and taught at the New School for Social Research in New York. He also discussed Tillich’s relationships to secular Jews, in the 1920s as part of a discussion group called the ‘Kairos Circle’,⁵ and in 1930s, most notably the members of the Frankfurt School.⁶ As part of this exercise, Earley personally interviewed Adolf Löwe, who possessed a unique and first-hand understanding of Tillich’s view of Judaism.

Fourth, he explores the role of Judaism and the Protestant principle to Tillich’s overall theology. Earley argues that Tillich’s theology has three ‘leitmotifs’ running through it: (i) the categories of space and time; (ii) the definition of the Jews as the ‘people of time’; and (iii) the belief that it is the mission of the Jews as the ‘people of time’ to prevent Christianity from reverting to paganism.⁷ Taken together, Earley summarized the three leitmotifs in the formula: the Jews are the people of time who, in the name of the God of exclusive monotheism and justice, fight the polytheistic gods of space – such as paganism, idolatry and nationalism—as long as these demonic forces exist, until the eschaton.

These leitmotifs point to the structural similarities between them, and the centrality of each for Tillich’s theology. This critical insight is also the basis for Earley’s ‘deep’ criticism of Tillich’s understanding of Judaism, and his understanding of the relationship between Christianity and Judaism. I will argue that this structural

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⁵ Earley Dissertation, 40–41.
⁶ Ibid., 61–65.
⁷ Ibid., 23–24.
similarity provides a basis for Tillich to maintain an important measure of continuity between Judaism and Christianity, which is important for my overall thesis. Earley's exposition and analysis of this topic is so extensive and space will not permit a summary of all of his arguments, but I will focus on the two that are most relevant to my topic. The first section will discuss Tillich's use of Schelling, providing support for my later conclusion in Chapter 3 of this dissertation, that Earley's analysis of Schelling has a missing element, especially because of his neglect of the 1910 Dissertation. Second, I will explore Earley's analysis of the formal similarity between Jewish prophetism and the Protestant principle, focusing on chapter 4 of the Earley Dissertation, especially the discussion of the history of revelation. Earley observes that for Tillich, there is a structural similarity, or 'inner relation', between Judaism and Christianity. Earley believes this is a weakness for a number of reasons, including that it violates Tillich's own 'method of correlation' because it idealizes Judaism, imposes a Lutheran Christian framework upon Judaism and does not permit Jews or Jewish communities speak for themselves.\(^8\) I concede that Earley's criticisms are largely valid from an interfaith standpoint. However, given Tillich's historical context, I believe that the way Tillich grounds the continuity of Judaism and Christianity, in his view of God and the history of religion, is profound. The structural similarity of Judaism and Christianity is grounded in Tillich's understanding of reality itself.

1.1.1 Tillich's Dissertations on Schelling: Judaism as Guilt-Consciousness Makes it Inferior to Christianity

\(^8\) Ibid., 378–412.
Earley’s introductory chapter explains the importance of Judaism for Tillich, summarizes the prior scholarship on the topic, discusses the methodology to be employed, and supports the thesis to be explored.\(^9\) Chapter 2, a biographical sketch spanning Tillich’s entire life, identifies nearly all of the major aspects of Tillich’s relationship to Jews and Judaism, including Tillich’s understanding of anti-Judaism and anti-Semitism, in chronological order. This chapter is divided into four parts: (i) Tillich’s early years in Germany, 1886–1919; (ii) his years as a religious socialist in Germany, 1919–1933;\(^{10}\) (iii) the middle years in America, 1933–1952; and (iv) Tillich’s later years in America, 1953–1965. In each of these sections, Earley analyzes any evidence pointing to these topics, and assesses how it contributes to his overall thesis, as described above. For example, in the first section on Tillich’s early years in Germany, Earley argues that the only evidence of Tillich’s relationship to Jews and/or Judaism that we have for this period is based on two later observations made by Tillich about his childhood. First, in his unpublished essay from the early 1940s, ‘Protestantism and Anti-Semitism’,\(^{11}\) Tillich recalls that

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\(^9\) Ibid., 1–28.

\(^{10}\) Earley argues that this understanding of Judaism by Tillich began in the early 1920s, in the context of the Kairos Circle in Berlin (1919–1925) and the development of Tillich’s idea of religious socialism. He further argues that while these fundamental concepts of the Jews as the people of time and Judaism as essentially prophetic went through several changes in emphasis, they remained fundamentally the same for the remainder of his life: ‘There is no evidence to support a claim that a shift in Tillich’s understanding of Judaism occurred before 1919. There is ample evidence to date this shift in the early 1920s’ when a gradual process began, beginning in 1921 when Tillich joined the Kairos Circle and culminating in 1933 with the release of The Socialist Decision.’ Earley Dissertation, 39–40.

\(^{11}\) ‘Protestantism and Anti-Semitism’, Harvard Archive, bMS 649/762 (7). Earley does not define political anti-Semitism here.
theological anti-Judaism was taken for granted at his house, and that political anti-Semiticism was 'taken seriously', although not accepted.\textsuperscript{12} Second, in the 1952 Berlin lectures on Germany, Christianity, Judaism and anti-Semitism (which I later refer to as the \textit{Judenfrage} lectures), Tillich recalls the deep impression that theologically anti-Jewish teachings made upon him, so that anything Jewish seemed 'sinister', and that every Jew had a hand in the crucifixion of Christ.\textsuperscript{13} Earley acknowledges that this mindset was not unique to Tillich, given the time and place of his upbringing.

The next discussion of Tillich's early years, a brief two page section, is devoted entirely to several paragraphs in Tillich's 1912 dissertation on Schelling, 'Mysticism and Guilt-Consciousness in Schelling's Philosophical Development'. This is the only substantive discussion of Schelling in Earley's entire dissertation.\textsuperscript{14} Earley believes that the references to Judaism in the 1912 Dissertation are highly abstract, reveal nothing about any personal relationships Tillich may have had with Jews at the time, and only indirectly tell us about what Tillich thought about Judaism, since the references to Judaism occur within an exposition of Schelling.\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{12} Earley Dissertation, 34–35.
\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., 35.
\textsuperscript{14} There is at least one other miscellaneous reference to Schelling. In chapter 3, Earley discusses Tillich's 'Protestant Principle' as the basis for his theological categories, and writes a subsection on Tillich's view of religion and culture. Here he cites Tillich's view of expressionist art as an example of something that is not explicitly religious, it is implicitly religious to the degree that it is 'transparent' to the 'Unconditional'. Earley writes: 'The horror, which Schelling had said "dwell in the depths of every living creature ... seizes us from the work of the Expressionist painters".' Cited from 'On the Idea of a Theology of Culture', in Paul Tillich, \textit{What is Religion?} (London: HarperCollins, 1973), 169. Earley Dissertation, 155–156.
\textsuperscript{15} Earley Dissertation, 36.
Earley struggles to interpret exactly what Tillich is saying about Judaism in the Schelling dissertations, but the following observations can be reasonably made: (i) paganism and Judaism are opposed, but had a common starting point in bondage to God’s wrath; (ii) paganism is understood as mysticism, in which the individual and God are united, in the ‘principle of identity’; (iii) Judaism is characterized by guilt-consciousness, which emphasizes the separation of the individual from God, due to sin; (iv) whereas paganism is unable to transcend its bondage to a wrathful God, Judaism is able to transcend the bondage through obedience to ‘the law’ (presumably the Law of Moses), although Judaism cannot move beyond guilt-consciousness; (v) therefore, paganism fails because it cannot transcend bondage to God’s wrath, and (vi) Judaism fails because it cannot transcend a permanent state of guilt-consciousness.\(^{16}\)

For Schelling, as described by Tillich, the limitations of paganism and Judaism are ‘conquered’ by Christianity, in ‘The Victory of Grace over Contradiction’.\(^{17}\) In Christ, the principle of wrath is conquered, and ‘God is completely victorious over the contradiction, by affirming it completely, by subjecting himself to it’.\(^{18}\) With respect to the history of religions, which is treated in detail in the 1910 Dissertation but not discussed by Earley, Christianity is the synthesis in which the contradictions of paganism (wrath) and Judaism (law) are conquered in the ‘victory of grace’.\(^{19}\) Despite the difficulties within this interpretation, meaning that Judaism for Tillich

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\(^{16}\) Ibid., 36–37.

\(^{17}\) Ibid., 37. Cited from the 1912 Dissertation, 124.


\(^{19}\) Earley Dissertation, 37.
lacks fundamental theological integrity, the main point Earley is trying to make is that Judaism is inferior to Christianity because Judaism is not able to progress beyond the inherent contradiction of 'guilt-consciousness', whereas Christianity permits this contradiction to be resolved because of Christ's suffering: 'God is completely victorious over the contradiction, by affirming it completely, by subjecting himself to it.'\textsuperscript{20} In Chapter 3 of this dissertation, which analyzes Tillich's two dissertations on Schelling, I will comment on why this 'resolution' of the contradiction is important. In Chapters Five and Six of this dissertation, Tillich becomes more tentative about Christianity as the end point of all religious development, and that Judaism increases in stature and permanence, in relation to Christianity.

For Earley's understanding of Tillich, the emphasis on Judaism as fundamentally characterized as guilt-consciousness demonstrates that Judaism is inferior to Christianity, although Earley says that it is not clear to what degree Tillich personally agreed with it. In Chapter Three of this dissertation, I will explore how Tillich appropriates Schelling's dialectical history of religion, and Judaism's essential role in that scheme. In that analysis, I assume that Tillich's appropriation of Schelling does include Tillich's beliefs about Judaism within the history of religion.

1.1.2 The Spirit of Jewish Prophetism as the 'Mirror Image' of The Protestant Principle

In his Introduction, Earley presents three theses that will be developed throughout

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid.
his dissertation. First, Tillich’s interpretation of Lutheran theology is key to understanding all aspects of Tillich’s theology, including his understanding of Judaism. The second thesis is twofold. On the one hand, some aspects of Lutheran theology that Tillich used to govern his view of Judaism, in particular the critical ‘Protestant principle’, helped Tillich to move beyond traditionally negative Christian views of Judaism, with one example being Tillich’s view of Jewish prophetism. On the other hand, Tillich’s ‘Lutheran lens’, which he used to interpret Judaism prevented him from understanding Judaism sympathetically. For Earley, this is especially true of Tillich’s concept of the Jews as ‘the people of time’, and his understanding of Jewish law as ‘heteronomous’ and therefore negative. Earley’s third thesis is that specific events in Tillich’s life, such as his conversion to religious socialism, his opposition to Nazism, his friendships with religious and secular Jews, his membership in the American Christian Palestine Committee, and his 1963 trip to Israel, informed both his view of Judaism, which changed in response to these events, and also his view of the relationship between Judaism and Christianity.

Earley’s extensive analysis of his three theses demonstrates that Tillich’s conceptual framework dictates his view of Judaism. In his final chapter, ‘Conclusion and Critique’, he lists his conclusions about the importance of the ‘Protestant principle’ to Tillich’s theological system: (i) the Protestant principle was key for Tillich

\footnote{Ibid., 25.}
\footnote{Ibid.}
\footnote{Ibid., 25–26.}
\footnote{It is outside the scope of this paper to explore the various ways in which Earley justifies his arguments, although I believe that they are valid.}
in maintaining the proper distinction between the absolute and the finite, which was necessary to avoid idolatry; (ii) the ‘Protestant principle’ permeated Tillich’s entire theological system, including his doctrines of revelation, God, Christology, ecclesiology, and eschatology; (iii) because of the centrality of the ‘Protestant principle’, it became the key to Tillich’s theological system; (iv) Tillich’s ‘idea’ of Judaism is integrally related to, and even logically entailed by, his system, and not derived from an historic interpretation of Judaism; and (v) the Protestant principle is key to understanding Tillich’s theology, his idea of Judaism, and the ‘place’ of Judaism in his theological system.\textsuperscript{25}

Earley devotes all of chapter 4 (‘The Protestant Principle’) to Tillich’s Protestant principle, and its fundamental relationship to the five main organizing concepts of Tillich’s systematic theology, the doctrines of revelation, God, Christology, ecclesiology, and eschatology, as discussed in volume I of Tillich’s \textit{Systematic Theology}.\textsuperscript{26} It is within the second section on the doctrine of God (4.B.2) titled, ‘Typology of the History of Religion’, where Earley most closely associates the Protestant principle with ‘prophetism’. There are two assumptions driving this, according to Earley’s interpretation of Tillich. First, within any doctrine of God, or within any expression of religious experience, there is an ‘inescapable tension’ between the ‘ultimate’ (or absolute) and the ‘concrete’, with the former associated with monotheism and the latter associated with polytheism.\textsuperscript{27} This tension

\textsuperscript{25} Earley Dissertation, 382.
\textsuperscript{26} \textit{Systematic Theology} is a three-volume work.
\textsuperscript{27} Earley Dissertation, 203–204. Earley provides a helpful summary of this topic in relation to Tillich’s doctrine of God: ‘In his doctrine of God, Tillich defined God as the ultimate which concerns human
necessarily strives for some form of resolution, specifically in the form of ‘balance’ between monotheism and polytheism, which would result in an ‘exclusive, trinitarian monotheism’. In Chapter 6, I will explore the essential role of Judaism within Tillich’s theological history of religion, as found in Tillich’s Systematic Theology and certain occasional lectures. In Chapters 3 through 6 I will exploit the notions of ‘striving’ and ‘balance’, showing how Tillich’s dialectical history of religion has certain patterns. I will then show that Tillich’s dialectical history of religion also possesses a fundamental rationality, with Judaism playing a fundamental role in that scheme.

Second, somewhat contrary to the terminology employed, for Tillich ‘exclusive monotheism’ is the only form of monotheism that avoids demonic idolatry, in which that which is finite is worshipped as ultimate or absolute. According to Earley’s understanding of Tillich, both polytheism and ‘mystical monotheism’ (no example provided) must be transcended because both have idolatrous tendencies. On the other hand, exclusive monotheism, which finds its first and paradigmatic expression

beings unconditionally. Because objects of human concern must be concrete, there exists, Tillich thought, a tension between the concrete and the ultimate in the religious experience of the “Holy”. Tillich thought that this tension explained the problem in every doctrine of God and the dynamics of the history of religions, namely, the conflict between polytheism and monotheism. The demonic tendencies inherent in polytheism were overcome only with the emergence of exclusive monotheism in Hebrew prophecy, for the concrete God of Israel became ultimate without becoming demonic by standing for the principle of universal justice. In Tillich’s view, the emergence of prophetic, exclusive monotheism was a “direct preparation” for and, indeed, a part of the “final” revelation. But exclusive monotheism tended to overemphasize the ultimate “otherness” of God, thus threatening to eradicate God’s concreteness. For Tillich, the answer to this problem was the “concrete”, Trinitarian monotheism of Christianity, which preserved the dialectic of concreteness and ultimacy in the doctrine of God’ (228–229).

28 Ibid., 203–204.

29 Ibid., 205.
in the God of Israel, the patriarchs and Exodus, can avoid idolatry by positing a God that is simultaneously concrete, ultimate, and universal, yet not demonic.\textsuperscript{30} Further, the unique attribute that enables a god to be simultaneously concrete, universal and absolute, without being demonic, is the principle of justice.\textsuperscript{31} The God of Israel is a ‘jealous’ God, in that no other claims to divinity are to be tolerated, although this God must also be a just God, otherwise he would be just another ‘nationalistic or tribalistic god alongside others’.\textsuperscript{32} Earley argues that, ‘in the final analysis, the ‘Protestant principle’, prophetic principle and the principle of justice are virtually identical’.\textsuperscript{33} Earley quotes Tillich in this regard:

The Protestant principle is the restatement of the prophetic principle as an attack against a self-absolutizing and, consequently, demonically distorted church. Both prophets and reformers announced the radical implications of exclusive monotheism.\textsuperscript{34}

Earley concludes that it is Tillich’s application of the Protestant principle, to

\textsuperscript{30} Earley quotes Tillich: ‘Monotheism is able to resist polytheism radically only in the form of exclusive monotheism, which is created by the elevation of a concrete god to ultimacy and universality without the loss of his concreteness and without the assertion of a demonic claim.’ \textit{ST I}, 227. Earley Dissertation, 205.

\textsuperscript{31} Earley Dissertation, 205–206. Tillich does not elaborate here what is meant by justice, although he discusses this extensively elsewhere.

\textsuperscript{32} Ibid., 206.

\textsuperscript{33} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{34} \textit{ST I}, 227. Cf. Earley Dissertation, 227. In chapter 7, the concluding chapter, Earley underscores this point: (i) the Protestant principle would have been impossible without the prophetic principle; and (ii) Tillich’s ‘idea of Judaism’ and his ‘idea of the Protestant principle’ are really two sides of the same coin. Earley Dissertation, 391–392.
Christianity and his own theological system, which is contradictory. Specifically, Tillich used the cross, as the quintessential symbol of the Protestant principle, to justify making Christianity absolute, as opposed to using the cross as a symbol to make any and all forms of religious expression subject to criticism and revision. My analysis of volume I of Tillich’s Systematic Theology concurs with much of Earley’s analysis. However, as will be seen Chapters Six and Seven of this dissertation, I ultimately have a more favourable view of Tillich’s dialectical history of religion, because it is ‘inclusive’, such that an essential continuity could be maintained between Judaism and Christianity. Earley’s criticism will be revisited in the final chapter, and Tillich’s view of Judaism will be assessed from a current perspective.

In addition to the Earley Dissertation, two of the most illuminating discussions of Tillich’s understanding of Judaism to date are provided in the context of his view of religious socialism and his view of war and peace, the former in Ronald L. Stone’s Paul Tillich’s Radical Social Thought, and the latter in Matthew Lon Weaver’s Religious Internationalism: War and Peace in the Thought of Paul Tillich. Both of these books have titles that appear specialized, suggesting that each focuses on one aspect of Tillich’s thought. However, each book actually presents material that is of fundamental importance to an understanding of Tillich, and both books are similar insofar as they have a biographical dimension. This is entirely appropriate since Tillich himself cast his own life and thought as fundamentally biographical, as

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exemplified in his 1936 biography, *On the Boundary*.\(^{36}\) This biographical aspect also works well with the developmental analysis of Tillich’s writings that I will employ in this dissertation, which will be discussed at the end of this chapter. While each book in its own right is worthy of an extended treatment, I will limit this analysis to the discussions of Tillich’s views of Schelling, Judaism, and anti-Semitism. Both books, taken together with the Earley Dissertation, tell us most of what is important about Tillich’s understanding of Judaism and its relationship to individual Jews. However, none fully explains the methodological basis for Tillich’s pro-Jewish position.

1.2 Ronald H. Stone’s *Paul Tillich’s Radical Social Thought*

Stone’s *Radical* is an important contribution to Tillich scholarship, because of its deft combination of biographical detail with key themes in Tillich’s thought, in addition to its identification of key archival materials. Stone focuses on Tillich’s post-World War I adoption of religious socialism, and how this influenced Tillich for the remainder of his life. In addition to mining the Wilhelm and Marion Pauck biography of Tillich for background information, Stone also delves into the Harvard archives, including several of the occasional lectures by Tillich on Judaism and anti-Semitism. There are four relevant sections of Stone’s *Radical* that I want to summarize: (i) chapter two on Friedrich Schelling; (ii) a section entitled ‘The Spirit of Judaism’ within chapter 8, on *The Socialist Decision*; (iii) a section entitled ‘Anti-Semitism’ within chapter ten on World War II, and (iv) a section entitled ‘Anti-Semitism and Zionism’ in the final

chapter (12) entitled ‘Fulfillment’.

Stone’s brief but incisive analyses of Tillich’s views of Schelling, Judaism and anti-Semitism display a developmental view which makes the following observations: (i) the thought of Schelling had an enduring importance for Tillich’s conceptual framework, but before World War I Tillich failed to appropriate Schelling’s understanding of human freedom for political purposes; (ii) Tillich’s experience of the horrors of World War I represented a fundamental turning point in his life, as he experienced the manipulation of the working classes by an alliance of ruling elites, comprised of the Kaiser, the churches, the military and leaders of industry, causing him to embrace religious socialism after World War I; (iii) the importance of Tillich’s 1933 book *The Socialist Decision*, because of its characterization of Judaism as a prophetic religion of the ‘people of time’, whose prophetic spirit must be used to critique any form of idolatrous religion, especially religious nationalism; (iv) during and after World War II and the Holocaust, Tillich came to distinct understandings of Catholicism and Protestantism, and the role of each in causing and preventing anti-Semitism; and (v) Tillich never fully abandoned his view of the Jewish people as the ‘people of time’, although he had to qualify it in order to support the creation of the State of Israel in 1948. These biographical elements and themes are all common to Earley’s, Stone’s and Weaver’s understandings of Tillich and Judaism, as a developmental framework.

1.2.1 Friedrich Schelling
Stone begins by underscoring the importance of Schelling for the thought of Tillich, by Tillich's own acknowledgment, both in his lectures on the history of Christian thought,\textsuperscript{37} and in the introduction to the Gesammelte Werke.\textsuperscript{38} In response to what he believed to be the limitations of the ethical emphasis of Ritschl's theology, Tillich looked to Schelling to obtain an adequate, post-Kantian metaphysical framework. However, Stone observes that while there were substantial, even revolutionary implications to Schelling's early philosophy of freedom, Tillich did not appropriate these insights, and focused on metaphysics instead.\textsuperscript{39} This is one of several places where Stone observes that Tillich in his early years was politically naïve,\textsuperscript{40} which was to change in the light of Tillich's experiences of serving as a military chaplain in World War I. After determining the importance of Schelling for Tillich, Stone discusses Tillich's two dissertations on Schelling.

\textsuperscript{37} Paul Tillich, A History of Christian Thought: From its Judaic and Hellenistic Origins to Existentialism, ed. Carl E. Braaten (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1967), 438. This is the passage about Tillich finding the complete works of Schelling at a second-hand bookstore in Berlin and buying them on credit. I will quote the passage in its entirety in Chapter 2 below. Cited by Stone, Radical Social Thought, 24.

\textsuperscript{38} GW IX, cited Stone, Radical Social Thought, 158 note 2.

\textsuperscript{39} Stone writes: 'The early hopes of Schelling, Hölderlin and Hegel that a change in consciousness would produce political change, seem not to be reflected in Tillich's work on the philosophy of the later, more apolitical Schelling' (Radical Social Thought, 23). In this regard, Stone cites Franz Gabriel Nauen, Revolution, Idealism and Human Freedom: Schelling, Hölderlin and Hegel and the Crisis of Early German Idealism, International Archives for the History of Ideas 45 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), 23.

\textsuperscript{40} 'What is absent from the dissertations is any significant indication of the direction of his social philosophy. He is still politically naïve. The problem of the state as the integrator of religion, culture, economics and politics had not yet appeared' (Stone, Radical Social Thought, 30).
1.2.2 The 1910 Dissertation

The first dissertation is titled ‘The Construction of the History of Religion in Schelling’s Positive Philosophy: Its Presuppositions and Principles’, and was submitted in 1910 for Tillich’s doctorate in philosophy at the University of Breslau. Acknowledging that the 1910 Dissertation is ‘breathtaking in scope’, Stone discusses each of the dissertation’s three parts. In the first part on Schelling’s doctrine of the ‘potencies’ and its implications for the history of religions, Stone makes the following observations: (i) potencies underlie all of reality, and self-realization is manifested in God, the world and human history, with an ontological substratum common to each; (ii) the potencies represent the trinitarian structure of God, with contingency and divine freedom being the occasion for the creation of humanity, and humanity’s estrangement from God; (iii) the history of humanity is a

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41 This thesis was published under the same title, in translation and with an introduction and notes by Victor David Nuovo (Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell University Press, 1974); hereafter cited as 1910 Dissertation.

42 Stone, Radical Social Thought, 25.

43 ‘The potencies represent the process of self-realization whether that be in God, the world or humanity and posit the underlying identity with distinctions of all three. The unity of the nature of God, the world, and humanity reveals traces of Jacob Böhme’s theosophical thought and its roots in medieval alchemy.’ In addition, ‘The intuition of the potencies in being is based upon the reality necessary to produce the free spirit in humanity. The first potency is the lack of being, and the second is fullness of being. In the first potency that which will be is purely potential, in the second it is purely act. Both of the potencies are incomplete. The third potency is a combination of the first two in subject and object and is free to be’ (ibid., 26).

44 ‘The potencies represent the trinitarian structure of God. Tillich’s God as eternal is being itself, but being itself is free to contradict itself, and this is done in the positing, through will, of the world. Humanity as spirit is free from the world like God and is God’s link to the world and ultimately to Himself. The positing of the world is the act of the unconscious ground, or the Fall. Humanity also posits itself outside of God in freedom and is consequently estranged from the fullness of God’s being
'history of religious confusion', although the eventual unfolding of human history will result in restoration of the estranged cosmos to eternal being;\(^{45}\) and (iv) all religious experience, including that of the many non-Christian religions, is meaningful for Christian theology. One implication of this view of the history of religions is that there is a movement toward rationality, which is discussed in section II.A.V. of the 1910 Dissertation, 'The Rational Process'. However, Stone does not say anything about the emergence of, or significance of, Judaism within the history of religions.

The second part of the 1910 Dissertation is devoted to the significance of the history of religion from pre-history to the emergence of the Christian church. Stone initially makes the important observation that Tillich in his early years maintained the importance of non-Christian religions for Christian theology.\(^{46}\) Stone says nothing about the role of Judaism here, although there is a section titled 'Judaism and Mohammedanism'.\(^{47}\) In addition, in the closing sections of the history of religion material, II.B.2 and II.B.3, 'The Work of Christ' and 'The Development of the Church', respectively, Stone identifies the 'distinctive seeds' of Tillich's Christology as the measure of all true religion including Christianity.\(^{48}\) Specifically, 'In Christ, the 'spiritual personality' of God is revealed',\(^{49}\) which is expressed in self-sacrifice for the

\(^{45}\) He goes on to say that the philosophical basis for Tillich's *Systematic Theology*, with its triadic structure of God, Christ and Spirit, past, present and future, is already present in the 1910 Dissertation (ibid., 26–27).

\(^{46}\) Ibid., 27.


\(^{48}\) Stone, *Radical Social Thought*, 27.

\(^{49}\) Ibid.
sake of freedom. In Chapter 3 of this dissertation, I will explore the role that Judaism plays within this dialectical framework.

In part III, Stone describes how Tillich used Schelling to move beyond Kant’s reduction of religion to ethics, beyond the Kantian subject–object framework, laying the foundation for Schleiermacher’s ‘feeling of unconditional dependence’. Stone ends his discussion of the 1910 Dissertation by saying how Tillich defended Schelling against the charge of ‘creating a new mythology’ by showing that Schelling asserted the historical factuality of Christ.

1.2.3 The 1912 Dissertation

The second dissertation is titled ‘Mysticism and Guilt-Consciousness in Schelling’s Philosophical Development’, and was submitted for the licentiate in theology at the University of Halle. Tillich attempts to demonstrate that Schelling had resolved the persistent conflict in the history of religions between ‘the mystic’s intuition of unity with God and the moralist’s judgment of human opposition to God’. Stone observes that the backdrop to this problem for Tillich is the attack by the neo-Kantians on the

50 Ibid.
51 Ibid., 28.
52 Ibid.
53 This thesis was published under the same title, in translation and with an introduction and notes by Victor David Nuovo (Lewisburg, PA: Buckness University Press, 1974); hereafter cited as 1912 Dissertation. While it appears that the Tillich wrote the 1910 Dissertation before the 1912 Dissertation, the Paucks say that Tillich began the 1912 Dissertation as early as 1908 in Lichtenrade, a rural town near Berlin that possessed great natural beauty, helping him appreciate Schelling’s nature mysticism, and had completed it by 1910, but that he did not receive the degree in that year.
54 Stone, Radical Social Thought, 28.
mysticism of German theology represented by Jacob Böhme, Luther, and Schelling, with Tillich attempting to ground mysticism in a metaphysical system that could endure the moralism of Albrecht Ritschl and his followers.\textsuperscript{55} Stone argues that for Tillich, human estrangement from identity with the divine, through freedom and the rebellion of the ego, is what drives various forms of guilt-consciousness throughout the history of religion.\textsuperscript{56} In a clear reference to Christianity, the conflict is resolved by 'grace', by the God who assumed selfhood, and annulled himself through suffering, and thereby overcame the contradiction of existence.\textsuperscript{57}

Stone's summaries of the two dissertations are brief, yet deeply insightful, despite the complexity of each. However, he does not say anything about Judaism, or how it relates to Christianity, in either dissertation. I will show in Chapter 3 of this dissertation, that there is a discussion of Judaism in both dissertations, and that what Tillich says about it reveals something important about his early understanding of Judaism within the history or religion, and its relationship to Christianity.

1.2.4 The Spirit of Judaism

The first significant reference to Judaism in Stone's \textit{Radical} is in chapter 8, his discussion of Tillich's 1933 \textit{The Socialist Decision}, which Stone believes to be

\textsuperscript{55} Ibid., 29.

\textsuperscript{56} 'The actual history of religions is influenced by that estrangement as the sway of guilt-consciousness is acknowledged. There is identity ideally, and identity is realized in Schelling's philosophy of nature, in his mysticism, and in his esthetic intuition; but in actual existence--the realm of freedom--the rebellion of the ego leads to an estrangement that determines the way people organize their religious life under conditions of morality and guilt' (ibid.).

\textsuperscript{57} Ibid.
Tillich's most mature, sustained work on political philosophy. Stone observes that Tillich's youthful enthusiasm for the November 1918 revolution had been tempered by the intervening years, including the complex struggles of the democratic Weimar Republic. Nevertheless, due to the ever-strengthening twin threats of western industrial capitalism and Nazism, Tillich believed that socialism must be reformed, in order to provide a humane alternative for a rapidly disintegrating Europe. Stone summarizes this new socialist alternative as 'the inheritor of a prophetic criticism that gives way to neither resignation nor utopia, but that unites its social planning with symbols of expectation to transform society'. 58 This is followed by a summary of Tillich's critique of Nazism, which exposes its mythical (as in contrived) historical origins, 59 its flawed social scientific and scientific bases, 60 and its idolatry by making race, leader, party and space holy. 61 This is followed by Stone's section 'The Spirit of Judaism', which describes how the prophetic dimension of Judaism was 'inevitably an "eternal adversary of (Nazi) political romanticism"'. 62 In sum, political romanticism is a countermovement against the prophetic dimension in religion and the humanistic dimension in culture, and Judaism shared with Protestantism and (Enlightenment)

58 Ibid., 75.
59 'A nationalistic German tradition could not endure because there was no national tradition. The tradition of Germany was sectionalism, and if there were any national tradition, it would be fighting among various sectional traditions' (ibid., 76).
60 'Return to the soil was not economically feasible, but it attracted some political supporters. Return to one blood was anthropological nonsense, but it built on the anti-Semitism that had been developing in Germany ... there were no theorists worthy of respect in the National Socialist movement. He [Tillich] attacked their piecemeal use of Nietzsche, arguing that Nietzsche proved that anti-Semitism and nationalism were contemptible' (ibid.).
61 Ibid., 77.
62 Ibid.
humanism the essential rejection of primitive myths of origin. These topics will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4 of this dissertation, in my analysis of Tillich’s *The Socialist Decision*.

1.2.5 Anti-Semitism

The second significant mention of Judaism occurs within a section on anti-Semitism within chapter ten, which discusses Tillich’s projects during World War II, while he was living and teaching in the US These projects included a series of three addresses to the Federal Council of Churches’ Commission on a Just and Durable Peace, and his service as chairman of the Council for a Democratic Germany, a group of anti-Nazi German refugees. With respect to anti-Semitism, Tillich’s expertise was widely recognized and he was asked to put his skills to use for the Allied war effort, with the first example being the 31 March 1942 *Voice of America* speech discussed above. Stone cites a number of key themes in the address: (i) the religion of Protestant Christians is of Jewish origin, (ii) the Christian God is of Jewish descent, (iii) the Old Testament is part of the Christian Bible, (iv) the Protestant Reformation was founded in the same spirit of the Jewish Paul, (v) Christians cannot surrender their Jewish origins without giving up their Christianity, (vi) Judaism witnesses to the God of time, opposing the gods of space, (vii) the importance of the prophetic role of the Jewish people against idolatry, and (viii) the belief that the failure of the German people to defend the Jews was not only inhumane, but utter

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63 Ibid., 78.
64 Appropriately titled ‘Christian Basis of a Just and Durable Peace’ (ibid., 106).
65 Ibid., 107.
blasphemy and opposition to God.\textsuperscript{66}

In the early 1940s, probably at the request of US government officials, Tillich also prepared what appear to have been two papers for a non-theologically educated audience.\textsuperscript{67} Each was twenty-one pages long, with one being titled ‘Catholicism and Anti-Judaism’ and the other titled ‘Protestantism and Anti-Semitism’.\textsuperscript{68} Stone’s discussion of the first paper, ‘Catholicism and Anti-Judaism’, makes the following points: (i) one must distinguish between historical anti-Judaism and racial anti-Semitism, since the former was the theological stance of the ancient Christian church, and the latter a nineteenth-century invention; (ii) anti-Judaism can be found in the New Testament writings, the church fathers, and in some official church decisions, most notably Innocent III’s simultaneous rejection of Judaism and protection of the Jews; (iii) the Roman Catholic enforcement of anti-Judaism and rejection of religious toleration could create the conditions of racial anti-Semitism, but the framework of Catholic thought could also combat racial anti-Semitism; (iv) Tillich summarized his argument in the following manner: ‘Seclusion and protection: This is the Catholic attitude of Anti-Judaism. Eradication: This is the Fascist attitude of Anti-Semitism.’\textsuperscript{69}

The second paper, ‘Protestantism and Anti-Semitism’, represents Tillich’s reflection on and analysis of official Protestant statements on this topic in America,

\textsuperscript{66} Ibid., 102.
\textsuperscript{67} Ibid., 103.
\textsuperscript{68} Ibid., note 11, 166. These documents have subsequently been cataloged in the Harvard Paul Tillich Archives as bMS 649/62(6) and bMS 649/62(7), respectively.
\textsuperscript{69} Ibid., 103.
as collected by M. Porter.\textsuperscript{70} Stone makes the following points about this paper: (i) Tillich observed that the churches cited condemned anti-Semitism, but the most profound statement, by the Greater New York Federation of Churches, noted ‘the inner tendency of Christians to practice ‘the sin of anti-Semitism’”; (iv) Christendom, as a religious–political entity, nurtured anti-Judaism, and that while ‘sectarian’ Protestant churches, while preaching religious toleration, were not immune from anti-Judaism because of the Christian scriptures; (v) Tillich admitted to having anti-Jewish tendencies, especially during Holy Week, but that in his household anti-Semitism had been rejected; (vi) Tillich fostered vigorous dialogue with Jews about theological issues, encouraged cooperation in the struggle for justice, permitted Christians to assist alienated Jews to adopt Christianity, and affirmed the necessity of preserving Judaism to prevent Christianity from relapsing into paganism; (vii) Tillich warned that if Christianity became too weakened by toleration, anti-Semitic paganism could arise in the US, as it had in Germany.\textsuperscript{71} While Stone’s discussion has focused on the specific issues of anti-Semitism and anti-Judaism, he concludes by acknowledging how Tillich never looked at these issues in theory only, but always in relation to their social and political implications. In the footnotes, Stone lists a representative sampling of the titles of the \textit{Voice of America} addresses, and concludes that the talks ‘reflect the complete social philosophy of the thinker’.\textsuperscript{72}

\textbf{1.2.6 Anti-Semitism and Zionism}

\textsuperscript{70} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{71} Ibid., 104.
\textsuperscript{72} Ibid., 105.
The third significant discussion of Tillich and Judaism occurs in the final chapter, which is the second chapter that discusses Tillich's post World War II and Cold War projects. Two major historical events had occurred since Tillich penned the two papers, on Catholicism and anti-Judaism and on Protestantism and anti-Semitism in the mid 1940s: the full disclosure of the Holocaust and the formation of the State of Israel in 1948. Stone discusses two sets of documents, with the first being a series of four 1952 Berlin lectures titled 'The Jewish Question: A Christian and German Problem', which responds to the Holocaust. I will refer to these as here and in later references as the 'Judenfrage lectures', and will analyze them in greater detail in Chapter 5 of this dissertation.

While there were actually four lectures and an introduction, Stone does not discuss them as distinct pieces, but as a single work. Stone's presentation identifies the following observations, arguments and conclusions by Tillich: (i) as a Christian problem, with respect to the Holocaust, there were five types of guilt, ranging from direct responsibility, applicable to relatively few persons, to a more generalized cultural and social participation, applicable to all Germans, with 'destructive psychological consequences', (ii) drawing upon his two papers prepared during World War II referred to above, Tillich argued that while the Christian churches' official positions were better described as anti-Judaism, Christianity must bear responsibility for fostering anti-Semitism; (iii) Tillich makes seven recommendations for how the Christian churches can purge themselves of anti-Semitism, including emphasizing use of the Old Testament, abandoning active evangelization of Jews

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73 'Catholicism and Anti-Judaism' and 'Protestantism and Anti-Semitism'.
and accepting 'Jewry' as representing a prophetic critique of Christianity; (iv) as a German problem, Tillich noted similarities between Jews and Germans, such as a sense of being chosen, and experiencing 'intense inner struggles' involving self-rejection and 'anxious self-affirmation', and being adaptive to other cultures, culminating in 'both strong attraction and extreme repulsion', (v) regarding economic and sociological explanations of anti-Semitism, Tillich observed that flawed biological and anthropological theories from the late nineteenth century played into the hands of totalitarian regimes to de-humanize Jews; (vi) in response to these mass psychoses expressed in the German people, Germans would have to undergo 'collective (psycho) analysis', to refrain from stereotyping Jews, to deal with their own sense of inferiority and resulting arrogance, and to reintegrate Germany into humanistic culture.\textsuperscript{74}

The second document is Tillich's reflection on the creation of the State of Israel in 1948, which was a major challenge to his theoretical framework. Stone notes that for much of Tillich's life the Jews had been a dispersed people without their own space, the 'people of time'.\textsuperscript{75} Stone notes that after Israel became a state, Tillich joined the American Palestine Committee to promote understanding for Israel in the US, and made a speech before the Christian-Jewish Colloquy on Israel's Rebirth in the Middle East, titled 'My Changing Thoughts on Zionism'.\textsuperscript{76} Stone makes

\textsuperscript{74} Stone, Radical Social Thought, 147–148.
\textsuperscript{75} Ibid., 149.
\textsuperscript{76} Ibid., and 170–171 note 45. Tillich's speech was delivered in Chicago, Illinois, on 21 January 1959, as part of the Christian–Jewish Colloquy on 'Israel's Rebirth in the Middle East'; in typed form with
the following points about Tillich’s position: (i) European Jewry’s attempt at assimilation was a failure because the Jews had been nearly exterminated in the Holocaust, thus legitimizing the idea of a Jewish homeland; (ii) the legitimacy of the State of Israel was not derived from the idea of Jews taking possession of the Promised Land, supported by ‘apocalyptic arguments’; (iii) rather, Israel was a contemporary political reality that participated in the historical ambiguities of justice and injustice; and (iv) as a practical strategy, Israel must accept finite borders and accept the limitations of relative (not absolute) security.\footnote{Stone, \textit{Radical Social Thought}, 149.}

\section*{1.3 Matthew Lon Weaver’s \textit{Religious Internationalism: War and Peace in the Thought of Paul Tillich}}

Weaver’s recent book is \textit{a tour de force} of Tillich scholarship, due to its broad themes, deep archival work, encyclopedic grasp of Tillich’s writings and meticulous documentation, with the latter two features particularly evident in the introduction. Like Stone’s \textit{Radical}, Weaver’s \textit{War and Peace} develops its themes in tandem with a biographical presentation of Tillich’s life and thought. After an introductory chapter explaining key Tillich concepts such as ‘theology of culture’,\footnote{This is a fundamental concept for Tillich. He says: ‘As religion is the substance of culture, so culture is the form of religion’ (Tillich, \textit{On the Boundary}, 69–70). A short definition of Tillich’s ‘theology of culture’ by James Luther Adams is the practice of interpreting all spheres of cultural life through the lens of religion. Weaver, \textit{War and Peace}, 12–13, citing Adam’s \textit{Paul Tillich’s Philosophy of Culture, Science and Religion} (New York: Harper & Row, 1965).} and ‘religious
socialism', Weaver proceeds chronologically. He starts with the pre-World War I Tillich as a 'pious nationalist', and then follows with the following compelling chapters: Tillich as a religious socialist theologian of culture; Tillich as forced intellectual emigre; Tillich addressing a German audience through his *Voice of America* speeches during World War II; Tillich addressing his American audience during World War II; Tillich responding to the 'historical vacuum' during the Cold War; and a concluding chapter on Tillich as a 'religious internationalist'. Religious internationalism is a term Weaver has coined to distinguish Tillich's position from the idolatry of religious nationalism, which characterized Wilhelmine Germany, and attained its most destructive form in German Nazism. It is a rich concept, reflecting Tillich's deep and flexible theoretical framework, capable of addressing perpetual

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79 Weaver provides a characterization of Tillich's concept of religious socialism that is the basis for his philosophy of history: 'Religious Socialism posed a way for religion to influence social outlook that avoided overemphasizing either human essence (and thereby losing human existence) or human existence (losing humanity's essential nature). The way of religious socialism kept essence and existence in tension. Religious socialism maintained belief in the downfall of—and estrangement embodied within—the bourgeois period, the rise of a collectivist period, and the religious understanding of this collectivist period. Religious socialist anthropology distinguished human being from God (infinite freedom) and nature (finite necessity): “The structure of man is the structure of ‘finite freedom’.” Thus, utopianism is false: 'The perfect never appears', however, 'Man is able to act without Utopianism because he is able to realize the infinite meaning of a creative act to which he gives his finite existence.' Weaver, *War and Peace*, 191–192. This material quoted by Weaver is from three Tillich primary sources: (i) 'Trends in Religious Thought that Affect Social Outlook', in *Religion and the World Order*, ed. F. E. Johnson. (New York: Harper, 1944), 17–19; (ii) 'Estrangement and Reconciliation in Modern Thought (Presidential address to the American Theological Society, April 14, 1944)', *Review of Religion* 9/1 (November 1944): 14; (iii) 'Man and Society in Religious Socialism' (paper presented to the Philosophy Group at the 'Week of Work', National Council on Religion in Higher Education), *Christianity and Society* 8/4 (Fall 1943): 10.
problems, such as idolatry, nationalism, ideology and injustice. Like Stone, Weaver also has a distinct section on Schelling and devotes three subsections of chapters to Judaism, referred to as ‘the Jewish people’. As in the above treatment of Stone’s *Radical*, I will discuss all four sections, in addition to several other references to Schelling, in Weaver’s *War and Peace*.

1.3.1 Tillich as Pious Nationalist before World War I: Schelling and the Construction of the History of Religions (Chapter 1)

Weaver’s brief discussion of Schelling in this section focuses entirely on the 1910 Dissertation regarding the history of religions. It begins with a fine summary of the dialectic of the potencies, as the interrelation of those principles expresses the divine life of God, humanity, history and all of reality, in a Trinitarian manner. The first potency is the non-rational principle of self-assertion and naked desire, characterized by expansion and subjectivity, representing freedom and potential being, and corresponding to God the Father. The second potency is the rational principle of love, selflessness and reason, characterized by contraction and objectivity, representing necessity and actual being, and corresponding to Christ as the second

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80 ‘The specific ethics of religious internationalism can be placed within the general framework of Tillich’s ethics by rooting the “religious” part in humanity’s essential nature, the agape principle, wisdom and grace-eros, and then by anchoring the “internationalism” part in courageous decision, grace-borne confrontation of brokenness, and constructive and well-timed agape love ... The constructive work of religious internationalism involves the dialectically dynamic boundary perspective, the promulgation of an agapeic-kairotic ethics, and the concrete manifestation of love and justice’ (Weaver, *War and Peace*, 277).

81 Ibid., 32.
person of the Trinity. The third potency transcends the subjectivity and objectivity of the first two potencies, seeks to mediate and unify them, represents being as it ‘ought to be’, and corresponds to the Holy Spirit.

The dialectic of the potencies also applies to the history of religion, although Weaver’s considerable skill does not fully delineate the distinctive expressions of each potency in this regard. Each temporal period, or potency, moves along an evolutionary path, and it appears that there are changes within each temporal period. Weaver identifies the first potency as ‘prehistoric polytheism’, which was characterized by mythological expression and ‘natural religion’, with the diversity of religious expressions implying some sort of estrangement, although it is not clear whether there was a primal monotheism or not. The emergence of the second potency, apparently expressed in monotheism, appears to have involved a ‘return’ of ‘estranged existence to unity with God’, with the highest expressions in the ‘revealed religions’ of Judaism and Christianity. It is notable that Weaver observes that Judaism and Christianity are linked together in the second potency, and not opposed to one another, for both are revealed religions. Christianity, represented by the second principle (or potency) of selflessness, ‘conquered’ the selfishness of the first principle (or potency), setting the stage for the emergence of the third principle, ‘philosophical religion’, which Weaver does not discuss. I will discuss Tillich’s

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82 Ibid.
83 Ibid., 33.
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid., 33–34.
representation of Schelling’s dialectical construction of the history of religions in
greater detail in Chapter 3 of this dissertation.

Weaver concludes this brief but important section with three observations,
reminding us that this dialectic occurs within all of reality, within the inner life of God,
within humanity, within nature and within the unfolding of human history. First, while
God is able to maintain a balance among the potencies within the inner life of the
divine, humanity has demonstrated its inability to keep the potencies in balance.\textsuperscript{87}
Second, Weaver underscores that Tillich’s appropriation of Schelling’s dialectic of
the potencies demonstrates that for Tillich power was at the heart of all reality.\textsuperscript{88}
Third, Weaver makes a distinctive point that as early as 1910, Tillich attributed
meaning to non-Christian religions, which is something that much later played an
important role in Tillich’s thought.\textsuperscript{89} For our purposes, although Judaism and
Christianity are linked in the discussion of the second potency, there is no additional
discussion about the relationship between them, or concerning how the dialectical
history of religion enables continuity between Judaism and Christianity.

1.3.2 Other References to Schelling and Tillich’s Social Critique

\textsuperscript{87} Weaver also refers to Tillich’s concept of balance in his discussion of religious internationalism
below. See section 1.3.5.
\textsuperscript{88} Ibid., 34.
\textsuperscript{89} Weaver acknowledges that Tillich’s assessment of non-Christian religions in the 1910 Dissertation
is admittedly flawed, and points to Tillich’s 1963 book \textit{Christianity and the Encounter of the World
Religions} (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963). Reportedly, this work is more of a model for
interfaith understanding, insofar as other religions serve as correctives to Christianity. Weaver, \textit{War
and Peace}, 34–35.
Weaver does not explicitly identify anything of significance regarding Judaism in Tillich’s appropriation of Schelling, except the above reference to how Judaism and Christianity are paired in the second potency. However, he does argue that in his early years Tillich failed to fully appreciate Schelling’s understanding of freedom, and by default appropriated Schelling to support religious nationalism, a point noted earlier by Stone. First, in Weaver’s discussion of Tillich’s early sermons, during the period 1914–1919, he cites Erdmann Sturm as arguing that Tillich’s battlefield sermons (or Feldpredigten) reflected ‘the war theology of the national-conservative Protestantism of that time’, which was undergirded by German pietism and romanticism, as expressed in the works of Jacob Böhme, Goethe and Schelling. Second, Weaver argues that Tillich’s World War I chaplaincy sermons implicitly reflect the influence of Martin Luther and Schelling: ‘Luther’s interpretation of the scriptural mandates and Schelling’s interpretation of the ontological structure of reality as the interplay of powers and potencies is the structure upon which Tillich could base his participation in the war, submitting to the will of the German Empire.’

In the context of an analysis of Luther’s 1523 treatise, Temporal Authority: To What Extent it Should be Obeyed, Weaver argues that Luther’s presumption of the divine legitimacy of civil government (theoretically, even a bad government), led Tillich to believe that the German Empire was acting, in Schelling’s terms, as the second

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90 Stone, Radical Social Thought, 23.
92 Weaver, War and Peace, 57.
potency, that of selfless love and justice, ‘against the irrationally expansive forces attacking it from east and west’.\textsuperscript{94} Weaver concludes this point by saying that Tillich’s proclamation of a ‘deep spiritual connection between soldier and Fatherland seems to support Sturm’s argument that German idealism fed a mystical patriotism among Germans’.\textsuperscript{95} This is a unique and profound observation about Tillich’s use of Schelling, and begs additional explication. Third, in his extended critique of Tillich in the conclusion of War and Peace, Weaver underscores that while the early Tillich drew extensively upon Schelling, Tillich failed to appropriate Schelling to critique religious nationalism: ‘Schelling taught him that humanity’s moral sensibility should be broadened to something closer to “the greatness of the divine”, yet Tillich’s ethical framework remained imprisoned in the provincial, not yet liberated through transcendence.\textsuperscript{96}

1.3.3 Tillich as Forced Emigré Interprets Interwar Germany and Europe: The Future Relationship with the Jewish People (Chapter 3)

In this brief section, Weaver recalls Tillich’s relationships with Jewish intellectuals comprising the Kairos Circle in the 1920s, his defense of Jewish students at the University of Frankfurt during Hitler’s rise to power in 1932–1933, and his appropriation of Marx in his analysis of ‘Jewish prophetism’ in The Socialist Decision.\textsuperscript{97} These influences all informed Tillich’s assessment of the future prospects

\textsuperscript{94} Weaver, War and Peace, 60.
\textsuperscript{95} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{96} Ibid., 284.
\textsuperscript{97} Ibid., 118.
of the Jewish people, which were expressed publicly in a speech given at Madison Square Garden in November of 1938, which was subsequently published in a journal titled *Radical Religion*, under the title ‘The Meaning of Anti-Semitism’.\(^{98}\) Weaver notes that in this speech Tillich addresses three groups in the audience, all with an eye to recovering the ‘true Germany’. To the Germans, he admonished that the destruction of Jewish lives and homes results in the destruction of the German soul.\(^{99}\) To the Christians, he proclaimed that the Nazis were opposed to God, the same God of Abraham, the prophets, Paul, Augustine and Luther.\(^{100}\) To the Jews, he sought to inspire ‘a new community of peoples’, transcending religious differences, and refraining from seeking revenge.\(^{101}\)

1.3.4 Tillich’s Message to his Audience in the United States: Philosophy of History and the Jewish People (Chapter 5)

This discussion is the third subsection of a discussion of Tillich’s philosophy of history, with the first section discussing Tillich’s conceptual framework of religious socialism as the expression ‘finite freedom’, the second section discussing cultural disintegration, and the third section discussing the Jewish people. Weaver’s discussion of the Jewish people involves six articles, beginning with Tillich’s two

\(^{98}\) ‘The Meaning of Anti-Semitism’ appeared in *Radical Religion* 4/1 (Winter 1938): 34–36. Weaver, *War and Peace*, 118. Weaver fails to mention that the occasion of the rally and speeches was to protest the November 1938 *Kristallnacht* pogrom.

\(^{99}\) Weaver, *War and Peace*, 118.

\(^{100}\) Ibid., 118–119.

\(^{101}\) Ibid., 119.
essays written in the early 1940s, titled ‘Catholicism and Anti-Judaism’\(^{102}\) (‘Catholicism’) and ‘Protestantism and Anti-Semitism’\(^{103}\) (‘Protestantism’). Of these only the first, second and third articles are relevant to my theme.\(^{104}\) Weaver states that during the early 1940s, Tillich was asked by the US government to write about the relationship between both Catholicism and Protestantism and the Jewish Question.\(^{105}\) In the article about Catholicism, Weaver notes the following points made by Tillich: (i) due to the exclusivity of Judaism and Catholicism, it is inevitable that they would have come into conflict; (ii) the New Testament maintained anti-Jewish ideas and sentiments; (iii) the early Church Fathers simultaneously fostered a posture of both rejection and protection; (iv) it was possible to fight Catholic anti-Semitism, rooted in racial prejudice, by using the Bible, but it was much more difficult to fight religious anti-Judaism, using the same texts.\(^{106}\) In the article about Protestantism, Weaver notes the following points made by Tillich: (i) Lutheranism was deficient in that it had no political ethic; (ii) the Protestant ‘sectarian’ churches, presumably those that refrained from government service and also received no government support, maintained that all people possessed a divine ‘inner light’, and

\(^{102}\) ‘Catholicism and Anti-Judaism’, Harvard Tillich archives, bMS 649/62(6).

\(^{103}\) ‘Protestantism and Anti-Semitism’, Harvard Tillich archives, bMS 649/62(7).


\(^{105}\) Weaver, *War and Peace*, 198. This assertion confirms what Stone tentatively suggests; Stone, *Radical Social Thought*, 103.

\(^{106}\) Weaver, *War and Peace*, 198–199.
this became the basis for religious toleration pertaining to all expressions; (iii) however, if these churches became secularized, with no religious grounding for the non-rational, then dangerous and irrational, anti-Semitic ideologies could take hold, as in Nazism.  

The third work Weaver discusses is Tillich's 1942 article titled, 'Faith' in the Jewish–Christian Tradition', whose main point is the parallel between the faith of prophetic Judaism and faith as rediscovered by Luther and Reformation Protestantism. For Luther, faith transcends reason and is paradoxical, as it accepts 'the transcendent order which contradicts the order to which we belong ... Faith is the triumphant paradox of life.' For prophetic Judaism, God's ways are deeper than the power relations we observe in history, as God 'reverses the imminent order of possibilities. The acceptance and confidence in this transcendent order is faith.'

1.3.5 Weaver's Critique of Tillich's Ethics of War and Peace: The Jewish People – Time and Space (Chapter 7)

Weaver devotes the final chapter to both a construction of Tillich’s ethic of war and peace and a critique of the same. The section on the Jewish people appears in the second section, the critique. Weaver begins his critique by acknowledging the

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107 Ibid., 199.
108 Christendom (New York) 7/4 (Autumn 1942): 518–526; cited hereafter as, Tillich, ‘Faith’. Weaver, War and Peace, 199. This may be the same article as the undated, handwritten article, ‘The Concept of Faith in the Jewish–Christian Tradition'; Harvard Tillich archives, bMS 649/46(3).
109 Weaver, War and Peace, 199.
110 The italics are Tillich’s, from 'Faith', 520–521. Cited in Weaver, War and Peace, 199.
importance of the Holocaust for Tillich, as a Christian, as a German, and as an existentialist thinker committed to the importance of history.\textsuperscript{111} Weaver identifies Tillich’s concept of the Jewish people as ‘the people of time’ as the central concept of Tillich’s normative understanding of Judaism. Weaver argues that because Tillich limits his understanding of Judaism to this one central metaphor, he risks doing unintended injustice to Jews and also limits the potential universal implications of his own thought. Weaver gives three examples of the former, the risk of doing unintended injustice to the Jews, and one example of the latter, limiting the universal implications of Tillich’s thought.

Weaver first observes that Tillich used the idea of the ‘people of time’ as a central concept in his 1933 \textit{The Socialist Decision}, so that Jewish prophetism could oppose ‘parochial … entrenched, exclusivist cultural chauvinism’, but he argues that if this is the only metaphor used, it ‘traps a human group within a metaphor’.\textsuperscript{112} Second, in the 1952 \textit{Judenfrage} lectures, Weaver recalls that Tillich made significant comparisons between German people and Jewish people, including that each experienced a ‘reform’ movement, the prophetic movement for the latter and the Protestant Reformation for the former.\textsuperscript{113} However, Tillich said that Germans differ from Jews in that they have difficulty integrating ‘foreign’ elements, seemingly to provide some basis for the German anti-Semitic racism that was necessary to carry out the Holocaust. However, in so doing, Tillich failed to see, or at least appreciate,

\textsuperscript{111} Weaver, \textit{War and Peace}, 296.
\textsuperscript{112} Ibid., 297.
\textsuperscript{113} Ibid.
how he called into question the ‘German-ness’ of Jews that lived in Germany.\textsuperscript{114} Aside from the egregiousness of this reasoning, Weaver astutely concludes that Tillich perpetuates the ‘myth of the failure of the Jews to assimilate’\textsuperscript{115} Third, also in the \textit{Judenfrage} lectures, Weaver observes that Tillich’s view of the Jewish people as the prophetic people of time places unrealistically high expectations on Jews as individuals, and later on Israel as a nation – there is no room for the Jewish people to be simply a people and a nation.\textsuperscript{116} Even when Tillich admitted to the legitimacy of the State of Israel, it was by way of concession to those Jews not ready to assume their historical, prophetic role.\textsuperscript{117}

Regarding limiting Tillich’s universality, Weaver argues that once Tillich’s view of the Jewish question is rid of the space/time preoccupation, Tillich’s real contribution to international relations and cultural thought can be seen. In particular, Weaver refers to Tillich’s call for ‘dialectical balance’ between alternatives, ‘between old ‘truths’ and new possibilities, between status quo and innovation, and between cultural institutions and the demand for justice’, although Weaver warns that minorities can be exploited during the process of dialectical balancing.\textsuperscript{118} Weaver concludes that Tillich’s framework is adaptable enough for a nation-state to protect its vulnerable minorities, even fostering their ability to possess ‘meaning giving

\textsuperscript{114} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{115} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{116} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{117} Ibid. Ron Stone, in his analysis of Tillich’s ‘My Changing Thoughts on Zionism’, argues that Tillich changed his position on the State of Israel to let it exist in the historical ambiguities of justice and injustice.
\textsuperscript{118} Weaver, \textit{War and Peace}, 298.
substance', which are non-confessional principles for individual and social life, such as the affirmation of the inherent dignity of all things. 

1.4 Conclusion

Thus far I have accomplished two things. First, citing vivid personal examples from Tillich’s life indicates that Judaism, and by implication the twin phenomena of anti-Semitism and anti-Judaism, were deeply important to him, on a personal level. In 1933, it was over these issues that Tillich finally parted ways with his home country, an agonizing decision for someone who drank deeply of German high culture. In 1938, he broke a five year self-imposed moratorium on public political speech, in response to the Kristallnacht pogrom, making a plea to Germans in America and abroad to reject anti-Semitism. In 1942, when given considerable flexibility by the US government to secretly address his former German countrymen, Tillich underscored the importance of these issues by first addressing ‘the Jewish Question’. Tillich laboured his entire life, even after he became an American citizen, to foster a humanistic, post-World War II German culture, and this was the salient issue for him to address. Even though Tillich never dedicated a book to this topic, he discusses Judaism in numerous works in the post-World War II period. In addition, Judaism maintains a pivotal role within Tillich’s theological history of religion, throughout his career. Second, I have identified and summarized the key written works that have

119 Ibid.
120 Ibid., 288–289. Weaver enumerates fifteen ‘non-confessional’ principles derived from fifteen ‘Protestant Principles’. 
discussed these themes to date, authored by Glenn Earley, Ron Stone and Lon Weaver. These works agree on the basic outlines of Tillich’s thought with respect to Judaism, each makes a unique contribution to the topic, and taken together they present most of the important features of Tillich’s understanding of Judaism. In addition, I argue that Earley’s unique observation of Tillich’s close association of the spirit of Jewish prophetism with the Protestant principle deeply grounds Tillich’s view of Judaism within Tillich’s conceptual framework.

The method I will use will possess two features. First, primary sources will be analyzed in Chapters 3 through 6. Prior to that, in Chapter 2 of this dissertation, the importance of dialectic in Tillich’s thought will be established. In addition, I will suggest that Tillich’s view of the relationship between Judaism and Christianity is important within the historical context of the 1930s and 1940s, because of how it compares with the phenomenon of Aryan Christianity. In Chapter 3, I will first discuss the importance of the thought of Schelling for Tillich, and then follow with an analysis of Tillich’s 1910 Dissertation and his 1912 Dissertation, paying particular attention to how Schelling’s dialectic of the potencies functions within each, and how this dialectic affects the role or function of Judaism. I will take the same approach in Chapters 4, 5, and 6, respectively, by analyzing The Religious Situation, The Socialist Decision, the 1952 Berlin Judenfrage lectures, and eight other shorter lectures from the 1940s and 1950s; the latter I will refer to as the ‘occasional lectures’. In all of these primary sources, except for The Religious Situation, Tillich employs a peculiar history of religion as the vehicle for the unfolding of a theologically laden historical dialectic. The hypothesis I will test for each primary
source is that the dialectical history of religions enables Tillich to maintain a significant measure of continuity between Judaism and Christianity.

The second feature of my method is that it is chronological and developmental. The two Schelling dissertations were written before World War I, *The Religious Situation* was written in the 1920s, *The Socialist Decision* in 1933, the *Judenfrage* lectures in 1952 and seven out of eight occasional lectures in the post-World War II and post-Holocaust era, from the late 1940s through the early 1960s. The manner in which Tillich understands the history of religion and Judaism changes over time, with the most important shift occurring in the wake of World War I, after which Tillich embraces Religious Socialism and begins to emphasize the prophetic dimension of Judaism. This shift has been noted by Earley, Stone and Weaver, and others. I will explore whether another shift occurs after the Holocaust, and yet another after Tillich visits Japan, and dwells more on the influence of non-western religions. My method is similar to that of Earley, Stone and Weaver, because it is a chronological and thematic analysis of primary sources. I agree with many of their conclusions, and to some degree depend upon their presentation of historical events. My analysis differs from theirs because I am exploring more deeply several important themes that they do not touch upon, or only discuss briefly. My thematic and chronological treatment of primary sources would place this genre as an instance of historical theology. The primary question as to how Tillich grounded his pro-Jewish position from a theoretical standpoint is primarily a question of historical theology. The immediate implication of the findings, that Tillich’s theological history of religion made it difficult for him to be anti-Jewish, or anti-Semitic, provides an
important insight into Tillich's thought as a mid-century Protestant theologian. Finally, Tillich's understanding of 'the Holy' maintains a perpetual polar relationship between Is and Ought, mysticism and prophetism, vertical and horizontal. Taken together, these paired polarities represent the relationship between Christianity and Judaism, which will remain in tension until the eschaton. At times it appears that Tillich is espousing a religion of 'Judeo-Christianity', which would combine these polarities in perfect balance. He argues in *The Systematic Theology*, and in the occasional lectures, that there is a structural similarity between the two religions and that one cannot exist authentically without the other, and that this is rooted in the nature of God. As Earley notes, this a highly 'idealized' understanding of the two religions, and that is the chief limitation of Tillich's view for contemporary interfaith relations. At the same time, this prevented Tillich from lapsing into the excesses of anti-Semitism, which has left a lasting legacy for the Christian church to honestly assess.

Among other things, I will suggest that the continuity maintained by Tillich between Christianity and Judaism illustrates one way in which German philosophy played a constructive role in Christian-Jewish relations during a time of intense anti-Semitism. Some have observed that German idealism (or essentialism) espoused a dialectic that resulted in the triumph of Christianity over Judaism, arguably the conclusion of Hegel.\(^{121}\) Alternatively, then Tillich's existentialism results in a dialectic that possesses greater uncertainty and tentativeness in terms of the historical process. One conclusion to draw from this is that German idealism does not necessarily lead to anti-Semitism, as there are many factors that came together to

\(^{121}\) This will be discussed in Chapter 7.
cause the German Protestant church, specifically the German Evangelical Church, to take a generally supportive stand towards Hitler and the German government in the 1930s. In Chapter 7, a more negative view of German idealism will be presented, with Tillich serving as one exception to an anti-Jewish rule.
Chapter 2

The Importance of Dialectic for Tillich, and the Contrast with Aryan Christianity

The driving force of this dissertation is the attempt to answer the question why Tillich's theology was pro-Jewish, meaning three things: (i) that Tillich was opposed to anti-Semitism; (ii) that he argued for the permanent importance of Judaism for Christian theology; and (iii) late in his career, and in a more muted fashion, Tillich believed that living, contemporary Jewish communities were essential to Christianity. In Chapters 3 through 6, relevant primary sources will be analyzed that span Tillich's entire career, from 1910 through 1965. In these primary sources, Tillich's idea of Judaism develops over time, and informs his understanding of Christianity in profound ways. However, prior to engaging in the analysis of the primary sources, it is essential to accomplish two things. First, the importance of dialectic to the structure of Tillich's thought must be demonstrated, which will occur in sections 1, 2 and 3 of this chapter. Ultimately it will be shown that Tillich's dialectical history of religion is the framework through which he maintains a significant amount of continuity between Judaism and Christianity. Near the end of his career, Tillich refers to his view as an 'inclusive' history of religions. The second goal of this chapter is to provide a sharp contrast to Tillich's inclusive history of religions, by comparing it to a phenomenon called 'Aryan Christianity', which was prevalent in Nazi Germany and employs a 'racialized' understanding of the history of religions. This will be discussed in section 4 of this chapter.
Tillich employs two forms of dialectic that influence his understanding of the relationship between Judaism and Christianity. The first kind is a ‘historical dialectic of progression’, in which religions emerge, conflict with one another, and become transformed by this conflict. Tillich always employs this kind of dialectic when he discusses the history of religion, and he consistently argues that historic Judaism contributes essential elements to the emergence of Christianity. Taken by itself, this understanding of the history of religion is not unique, and is compatible with the historic Christian faith, meaning that Judaism was the unique foundation of Christianity. The second kind of dialectic is an ‘ontological dialectic of balance’, in which there is a reciprocal, mutual relation between two phenomena, with neither one being annihilated in the conflict, with each possessing a fundamental integrity which may contribute to the creation of a new unity. In some instances, a permanent balance of two principles held in tension is viewed by Tillich as the optimal relation; in others, this balance itself is thought of as a new unity. It is difficult to say exactly whether and how these two forms of dialectic are interrelated, since at times they appear to merge into one. My tentative thesis is that the historical dialectic of progression is ultimately subordinated to the ontological dialectic of balance, based upon the cumulative findings of the primary source analyses in chapters 3 through 6 of this dissertation.

2.1 Tillich’s Dialectical Method
This section will illustrate the pervasive presence of dialectical relationships within Tillich’s thought, according to several essays by notable Tillich scholars. These
essays exhibit the scholarly interest in the topic. One essay by James Luther Adams\(^1\) on the types of dialectic present in Tillich’s theology, will receive special treatment. The Adams essay will permit me to introduce the two types of dialectic, referred to above, that will be used to interpret the Tillich primary sources discussed in this dissertation.

When the first volume of Tillich’s *Systematic Theology* appeared in 1951, much commentary was generated concerning Tillich’s distinctive theological method, the ‘method of correlation’. Tillich’s method of correlation proceeds by raising questions about the human condition, which is the domain of philosophy, and answering those questions, which is the domain of theology. In addition to this question and answer format, there are numerous other dynamic features to Tillich’s thought, which occur in the form of polarities, contradictions, antinomies, and creative unities and syntheses. These provide Tillich tremendous flexibility, but can also be confusing. In 1952, an important collection of essays appeared in response to *ST I*,\(^2\) with notable contributors such as the process theologian Charles Hartshorne,\(^3\) Columbia’s intellectual historian John Herman Randall, Jr.,\(^4\) philosopher of religion Nels Ferré, economist, *kairos* circle member and long term friend of Tillich, Eduard Heimann,\(^5\) Reinhold Niebuhr,\(^6\) in addition to major Tillich scholars Langdon

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2. Kegley and Bretall’s *Theology of Paul Tillich* cited in the previous note.
Gilkey\(^7\) and James Luther Adams.\(^8\) In many of the essays, attention was drawn to the dialectical structure of Tillich's thought. Langdon Gilkey, in the keynote essay, observes how pervasive the various contrasts are and also how they enabled Tillich to pursue his theology of culture:

Tillich loved polarities and saw almost everything in their terms; that is, in terms of opposites in vast and precarious tension that potentially (and necessarily) form a creative unity … The scope and tensive unity of his thought is such that it has the capacity to make contact with, to ‘touch’, and to relate itself to almost every sort of position in a variety of areas. In this sense, he continually mediates all over the place, and for this reason he interests and stimulates so many different thinkers in so many areas.\(^9\)

John Herman Randall, Jr., observes that for Tillich, reason is finite, self-contradictory and ambiguous, ‘under the conditions of existence’, and that Tillich employs three ‘polarities’ that give rise to ‘conflicts’, which generate ‘quests’ for resolution.\(^10\) For example, there is a polarity between static and dynamic elements in reason, which gives rise to a conflict between absolutism and relativism, which leads to a search for ‘the concrete-absolute’.\(^11\) In explicating Tillich’s view of ‘knowledge’, Randall also observes that a ‘balance’ between two polarities is the optimal situation.

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\(^11\) Ibid.
Randall notes that knowledge for Tillich, especially knowledge as ‘understanding’, is a balance of union and detachment.\textsuperscript{12}

The most comprehensive essay that discusses the dialectical structure of Tillich’s thought is James Luther Adams’ ‘Tillich’s Interpretation of History’. According to Adams, Tillich exhibits the importance of dialectic in two ways: (i) by underscoring the importance of the philosophy of history as the most pressing problem of our period; and (ii) by arguing that the dialectical method can be the only basis for a prophetic and Protestant philosophy of history.\textsuperscript{13} Adams observes that many of these ideas took shape for Tillich during his religious socialist period, in the 1920s and 1930s, and that it was Tillich’s critique of the demonic powers in history, both secular and ecclesiastical, that drove him to develop his philosophy of history.\textsuperscript{14} For this reason, Adams would agree with Ron Stone that Tillich’s adoption of religious socialism after World War I was the most important turning point in Tillich’s career, as mentioned in Chapter 1 above.

Adams identifies four levels of dialectic in Tillich’s thought: logical, ontological, historical and religious. Each level involves the other three, and each level maintains features of identity and contrast.\textsuperscript{15} While it is not clear how each level always involves the other three, it will be evident below in my analysis that the religious and ontological levels of dialectic have a historical dimension. For Adams, Tillich’s \textit{logical}

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{12} Ibid., 179–180.
\item\textsuperscript{13} Adams, ‘History’, 330–331.
\item\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., 350.
\item\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., 332–333.
\end{itemize}
dialectic has two aspects. First, it is expressed in the process of inquiry, of testing, affirmation and negation, designed to discover empirical truth.\textsuperscript{16} The second aspect is that this inquiry and testing can also uncover a deeper level, penetrating to something’s essence, or being.\textsuperscript{17} This level applies to all areas of inquiry, including the natural sciences, and is fundamental to all life: ‘In a dialectical description one element of a concept drives another. Taken in this sense, dialectics determine all life-processes and must be applied in biology, psychology, and sociology. The description of tensions in living organisms, neurotic conflicts, and class struggles is dialectical. Life itself is dialectical.’\textsuperscript{18} This dynamic and comprehensive understanding of reality will be seen in Chapter 3, which explores the influence of F. W. J. Schelling on Tillich.

According to Adams, Tillich’s historical dialectic refers to the process whereby ‘the configurations of social existence’ drive beyond themselves to a new relationship of identity and contrast, in perpetually recurring syntheses and disruptions.\textsuperscript{19} Adams compares Tillich to Augustine and Clement of Alexandria in promoting ‘the great synthesis between the Old Testament of Yahweh and the Parmenidean idea of

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., 333.
\textsuperscript{17} ‘To see the limits of existence is to see beyond existence to its essential ground. Dialectic should penetrate to the depth, “the ousia”, the “essence” of things, that which gives them the power of being ... This is their truth, the “really real”’ (ibid., 336–337). Tillich citation is from ST I, 101. In addition, ‘Dialectical thinking is rational, not paradoxical. Dialectic is not reflective, in so far as it does not reflect like a mirror the realities with which it deals. It does not look at them merely from the outside. It enters them, so to speak, and participates in their inner tensions. The tensions may appear first in contrasting concepts, but they must be followed down to their roots in the deeper levels of reality’ (ST II, 90).
\textsuperscript{18} ST II, 90.
\textsuperscript{19} Adams, ‘History’, 333.
being’. Similarly he claims that, like Augustine, Tillich sought the ‘communion of Jerusalem and Athens’. This level of dialectic applies most directly to Tillich’s understanding of the history of religion, which is not a merely historical description, but a deeply theological enterprise.

For Adams, Tillich’s religious dialectic refers to the identities and contrasts within humanity itself, and between humanity and the infinite. More specifically, this encompasses Tillich’s understandings of finite and infinite, the divine and the demonic, kairos and logos, and relationship between autonomy, heteronomy and theonomy. For Adams, Tillich’s ontological dialectic embodies a ‘metaphysics of history that rests upon a metaphysics of being’, that is deeply influenced by Schelling’s existential, anti-Hegelian dialectic, and is expressed in polarities and contrasts that pervade the Systematic Theology. Adams identifies views of God from the history of theology that inform Tillich’s ontology: Luther’s distinction between God’s wrath and God’s love; Jakob Böhme’s triad of ‘ground’, ‘abyss’ and the ‘God beyond God’; and Schelling’s triadic formula of ‘being’, ‘non-being’ and ‘supra-

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20 Ibid., 349. Adams does not give a citation for Clement.
21 Ibid. Adams does not give a citation for Augustine.
22 Unlike Karl Barth, who provides extensive footnotes in his theological writings, Tillich seldom provides direct citations to specific works of theologians and philosophers. He is extremely eclectic, and borrows freely from the entire western philosophical and theological traditions, using them for his own distinctive views. This makes his unacknowledged usage less egregious.
24 Ibid., 349.
25 Ibid., 350. In the discussion of Tillich’s 1961 Bampton lectures later in this chapter, it will be shown that Tillich had a negative view of Hegel’s dialectic as applied to the history of religion.
For Adams, these all inform Tillich’s understanding of creation, estrangement and reconciliation, and come together especially in Tillich’s Christology and his concept of the New Being. Tillich’s derivation of a philosophy of history from ontology bears strong similarities to Schelling’s dialectic of the potencies, which deeply informed Schelling’s own theological understanding of history. This relation of history to ontology informs Tillich’s view of the relationship between Judaism and Christianity.

2.2 The Dialectical Structure of Tillich’s Systematic Theology

This section on the dialectical structure of the Systematic Theology is intended to demonstrate the importance of dialectical method in Tillich’s magnum opus, which is Tillich’s most comprehensive work; it will be left to Chapter 6 of this dissertation to demonstrate how the two types of dialectic manifest themselves in that work. Tillich begins the Introduction to his Systematic Theology (ST) with the assertion that Christian theology must satisfy two needs of the church, the statement of the truth of the Christian message, and the interpretation of this truth for every generation. From the very beginning of the Systematic Theology, Tillich creates a polar relationship between ‘timeless’ Christian truth, and time-bound expressions of that

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26 Ibid.
27 Ibid. ‘If applied symbolically to the divine life, God as a living God must be described in dialectical statements. He has the character of all life, namely, to go beyond himself and to return to himself. This is expressed in the Trinitarian symbols ... Trinitarian thinking is dialectical and rational, not paradoxical’ (ST II, 90–91).
28 ST I, 3.
truth to address a particular situation.

Theology moves back and forth between two poles, the eternal truth of its foundation and the temporal situation in which the eternal truth must be received. Not many theological systems have been able to balance these two demands perfectly. Most of them either sacrifice elements of the truth or are not able to speak to the situation. Some of them combine both shortcomings. Afraid of missing the eternal truth, they identify it with some previous theological work, with traditional concepts and solutions, and try to impose these on a new, different situation. They confuse eternal truth with a temporal expression of this truth. This is evident in European theological orthodoxy, which in America is known as fundamentalism.²⁹

Right from the start, Tillich’s theology addresses a permanent polarity, which ideally is addressed by ‘balance’. The entire three-volume Systematic Theology is an extended exercise of seeking an appropriate balance between numerous polarities, the most comprehensive being that of ‘essence’ and ‘existence’. For Tillich, to the extent that an appropriate balance is maintained between essence and existence, then a new creative unity is established, in the drive towards essentialization. The drive toward essentialization is the focus of parts IV and V, comprising Volume Three of the Systematic Theology. For Tillich, this is where existential questions raised by the ambiguities of existence and history are answered in discussions of, respectively, the Spirit and the Kingdom of God.

²⁹ Ibid., 3.
For Tillich, his systematic theology proceeds by the ‘method of correlation’: (i) the human situation is analyzed and ‘existential’ questions are drawn out of an analysis of culture; and (ii) Christian theology attempts to answer those questions through its symbols.\(^{30}\) Tillich’s *Systematic Theology* has five parts,\(^{31}\) with each of the five parts asking a unique existential question, or set of related questions. Within each part, an answer is also provided, using a Christian symbol, which is derived from the sources, medium and norm of Christian theology.\(^{32}\) The questions are generated by the experience of ‘self-contradiction’ or ‘estrangement’,\(^{33}\) with Tillich frequently using the phrase ‘under the conditions of existence’ in his detailed phenomenological descriptions. For Tillich, the presence of contradiction and/or estrangement clearly implies an *ideal* state, meaning a normative posture toward the world. This exemplifies Tillich’s fundamental distinction between ‘essence’, what *ought* to be, the realm of salvation and ‘existence’, what *is*, the realm of creation.

In each of the five parts of the system which are derived from the structure of existence in correlation with the structure of the Christian message, the two sections are correlated in the following ways. In so far as man’s existence has

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\(^{30}\) Ibid., 62.

\(^{31}\) In Tillich’s introduction to the first volume of the *Systematic Theology*, pages 66–67, he introduces the following order of the five parts. Part I: ‘Being and God’; part II: ‘Existence and Christ’; part III: ‘Life and the Spirit’; part IV: ‘Reason and Revelation’; and part V, ‘History and the Kingdom of God’. In the main text of the work, ‘Reason and Revelation’ is actually part I, and ‘Being and God’ is part II, ‘Existence and Christ’ is part III, ‘Life and the Spirit’ is Part IV, and part V is ‘History and the Kingdom of God’. Volume I contains parts I and II; volume II contains part III; and volume III contains parts IV and V.

\(^{32}\) *ST I*, 34–52.

\(^{33}\) Ibid., 66.
the character of self-contradiction or estrangement, a double consideration is
demanded, one side dealing with man as he essentially is (and ought to be)
and the other dealing with what he is in his self-estranged existence (and
should not be). These correspond to the Christian distinction between the
realm of creation and the realm of salvation.\textsuperscript{34}

As seen in the \textit{Judenfrage} lectures and elsewhere in the primary sources to be
analyzed, the 'Is/Ought' polarity is fundamentally important to Tillich's theological
understanding of Judaism.

Part I of the system, titled 'Reason and Revelation', analyzes human
rationality, its relation to the rational structure of reality, and elicits questions implied
in human finitude, self-estrangement and the ambiguities of reason. According to
Tillich, these questions find their answers in 'revelation'.\textsuperscript{35} Part II, titled 'Being and
God', analyzes the relation of human finitude, and finitude in general, to the essential
nature of reality. According to Tillich, this analysis gives rise to questions that can
only be answered by the Christian symbol 'God'.\textsuperscript{36} Part III, titled 'Existence and the
Christ', analyzes human 'existential self-estrangement', which implies questions that
can only be answered by the Christian symbol of 'the Christ'.\textsuperscript{37} Part IV, titled 'Life and
the Spirit', analyzes humanity as living, as expressing the power of actual being
within the ambiguities and distortions of existence. For Tillich, this phenomenon of

\textsuperscript{34} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{35} Ibid., covered in \textit{ST I}, 71–159.
humanity as living generates existential questions that can only be answered by the Christian symbol of ‘the Spirit’. Part V, titled ‘History and the Kingdom of God’, analyzes the historical existence of humanity, in conjunction with history in general, giving rise to questions implied in the ambiguities of history. According to Tillich, these questions can only be answered by the Christian symbol ‘Kingdom of God’.

2.3 The Two Types of Dialectic Traced Through Primary Source Analysis

In Chapter 3 of this dissertation, which will analyze Tillich’s 1910 and 1912 Dissertations on Schelling, the historical dialectic of progression will predominate. Tillich employs Schelling’s ‘dialectic of the potencies’ as a fundamental framework to interpret reality. There is an organic quality that causes the participants in the dialectic to make enduring contributions to the next stage in the dialectic. For example, in the 1910 Dissertation, only Judaism provides the key concepts that enabled the shift from the particular to the universal. Tillich consistently comes to this conclusion in any discussion of the history of religion. Therefore, he would not have subscribed to ‘Aryan Christianity’, as proposed by some German intellectuals in the 1930s and 1940s. This phenomenon will be discussed at the end of this chapter.

In Chapter 4, especially in the discussion of The Socialist Decision, both the historical dialectic of progression and the ontological dialectic of balance are present. Similar to the 1910 Dissertation, Tillich understands the history of religion as the

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realm of contradictions and transformations, in which Jewish prophetism emerges to resolve the contradictions inherent in pagan polytheism. Tillich identifies Jewish prophetism as the first historical manifestation of justice, giving rise to the maxim ‘justice is the true power of being’. In addition, in *The Socialist Decision*, Tillich introduces the polarity between space and time, which is one instance of the ontological dialectic of balance. ‘Time’ is granted ethical and theological significance, and becomes associated with prophetism, while ‘space’ becomes associated with idolatry. This polarity will assume other aspects in Tillich’s *Judenfrage* lectures.

In Chapter 5, which analyzes Tillich’s *Judenfrage* lectures, three sets of polarities are employed, the poles of Is/Ought, priestly/prophetic, and space/time. These are the most notable examples of the ontological dialectic of balance in all of Tillich’s works. Unlike the historical dialectic of the 1910 and 1912 Dissertations and *The Socialist Decision*, in which human history expresses the forward movement of contradictions and transformations, the aforementioned three polarities must be kept ‘in balance’, otherwise a distortion will occur regarding any relatedness to the divine. When these poles are kept in the appropriate tension, ‘in balance’ so to speak, then the divine is manifest more transparently. This is Tillich’s ‘dialectic of the Holy’.

Chapter 6 will complete the primary source analysis by discussing Tillich’s *magnum opus*, the *Systematic Theology*, and eight occasional lectures that directly discuss the relationship between Judaism and Christianity. In Tillich’s *Systematic Theology*, especially in volume I (*ST I*), the most detailed presentation of the history of religion is found, in which both the historical dialectical of progression, and the
ontological dialectic of balance are present. As in the prior sources analyzed, historic Judaism served as a foundation for Christianity, despite periodic ‘life or death struggles’ to save the Old Testament. In addition, it will be shown that the unfolding of Tillich’s history of religion is *rational*, in the sense that the history of religion is driving toward an optimal balance between the particular and the universal. For Tillich, this optimal relation is paradigmatically expressed in the Christian Logos, in the event of Jesus as the Christ.

In Chapter 6 there will also be a discussion of eight occasional lectures, mostly from the 1950s and 1960s. In each lecture, Tillich observes that there are one or more ‘structural similarities’ between Judaism and Christianity, which provide the basis for continuity between the two religions. In one of the later lectures, Tillich reflects more directly on his dialectical method than in any of his previous works. Tillich observes that his dialectical history of religion is ‘inclusive’ insofar as it preserves elements of prior religions, as they are transformed into new religions. This observation about inclusivity is occasioned by Tillich’s attempt to integrate Buddhism into his historical, revelatory scheme. However, I think it can also be applied retrospectively to his ongoing attempts to maintain continuity between Judaism and Christianity.

**2.4 Aryan Christianity and the Racialized History of Religions**

This section intends to give some perspective to Tillich’s inclusive history of religion by contrasting it with a racialized form of the history of religion, which provided the
basis for ‘Aryan Christianity’. Aryan Christianity is another name for the more widely used term ‘German Christianity' in the historiography of the period. The term 'Deutsche Christen' ('German Christians') refers to a movement within German Protestantism aligned towards the anti-Semitic and Führerprinzip ideological principles of Nazism with the goal to align German Protestantism as a whole towards those principles. I will use the term ‘Aryan' instead to more closely align with Susannah Heschel’s book, to be discussed in some detail below. According to Gerlach, the new National Socialist government employed a policy of ‘synchronization’ (or in German Gleichschaltung), in which all dimensions of German life and culture were to be legally subject to Nazi ideology (Witnesses were Silent, glossary, 288). According to Klaus Scholder, it is important to underscore that in the spring and summer of 1933, in the wake of the Civil Service law, many in the German Evangelical Church (GEC) voluntarily sought to reflect and submit to the racist social policies of the Reich. At the first Reich church conference in April of 1933, supporters of Hitler within the GEC, who became known as ‘German Christians', supported the creation of a single Reich Church, the election of a single Reich Bishop, and the dismissal of all pastors of ‘alien blood', and unconditional political and social collaboration with the new Reich. Hitler appointed Ludwig Müller to the task of creating an Evangelical German Reich Church, with Müller overseeing the adoption of a single Constitution of the German Evangelical Church on 11 July 1933, which was ratified by the Reich Law of 14 July 1933. Among other things, the Constitution required national church elections, which were held on 23 July 1933 and resulted in overwhelming German Christian majorities throughout the GEC. Further, the GEC held its first national synod at Wittenberg beginning on 27 September 1933. At that time, Ludwig Müller was elected first Reich Bishop of the GEC. Cf. Klaus Scholder, A Requiem for Hitler and Other Perspectives on the German Church Struggle (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 1989), 100. Some may object to the term ‘Christianity' being modified by ‘Aryan', due to its divergence from much of historic, Nicene Christianity. Since this aspect of the dissertation is historical and descriptive, and not constructive, the term is appropriate given that German Christians thought of themselves as Christians.

A variety of sources cited in Wikipedia determine the Protestant population in Germany in January 1933 to be 45 million, out of a total population of 65 million. Out of those 45 million, the vast majority were members of the state-supported ‘German Evangelical Church', which mostly included Lutheran
common to Aryan Christians were that Jesus of Nazareth was not a Jew but an ‘Aryan Galilean’ who opposed Judaism, and that Judaism was a degenerate form of religion whose influence must be eradicated from the church and culture.

Aryan Christianity provides an important contrast to Tillich’s views in two ways. First, the remarkable claims made by Aryan Christian scholars illustrate the depth of intellectual, moral and theological failure within the church and academy. Therefore, any supersessionist tendencies of Tillich are benign by comparison.\footnote{The topic of Tillich and supersessionism will be discussed in Chapter 7 below.} Second, and more importantly, the proponents of Aryan Christianity employed a history of religions framework that has some similarities with Tillich’s. However, Tillich and the Aryan Christians came to opposite conclusions concerning the role of Judaism within the history of religion. As shown below, through a racialized view of history and the disciplines of church history and biblical studies, Aryan Christians sought to discover a distinct ‘German religious consciousness’ which was antithetical to historic and modern-day Judaism. Tillich, on the other hand, argued that the religious consciousness that most fully expressed the divine included a permanent prophetic element, rooted in historic Judaism. In addition, as will be seen in the analysis of Tillich’s \textit{Judenfrage} lectures in Chapter 5 of this dissertation, Tillich has an entirely different reading of the spiritual history of Germany. Aryan Christians

\footnote{and Reformed Protestant Christians. The remaining Protestant Christians in Germany at that time, the ‘free church’ Protestants, were estimated to be only 150,000. Cf. ‘Confessing Church, demographics’, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Confessing\_Church [accessed 05/10/2013]. The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum website roughly confirms these numbers, citing a total population for Germany in 1933 as 60 million, with 40 million Protestants, 20 million Catholics, and 505,000 Jews. www.ushmm.org [accessed 20/01/2014].}
believed that Germany had a heroic history that was culminating in threats from 'degenerate' Jews, who represented the forces of secular humanism.\textsuperscript{43} Tillich, however, believed that Germany and the Jews both experienced prophetic reform movements, but by the mid twentieth century had rejected the benefits of those movements for very different reasons and with different results. This will be discussed in Chapter 5 of this dissertation, in the analysis of the \textit{Judenfrage} lectures.

Over the past twenty-five years, there have been numerous publications in the United States that have shed new light on the role of the Christian churches in the Holocaust, including books by Robert Ericksen,\textsuperscript{44} Doris Bergen\textsuperscript{45} and Richard Steigmann-Gall.\textsuperscript{46} It is outside the scope of this dissertation to provide a detailed overview of changes in the historiography surrounding this issue, but the overall thrust is that the Christian churches in Germany, especially the state supported Protestant church, either failed to oppose Nazi anti-Semitism at crucial points, or were actively complicit in undermining the status of the Jews, contributing to their de-humanization and near-exterrmination.\textsuperscript{47} These works, among others, complicate, or

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{43} Susannah Heschel writes that by 1943, 'The Jew had come to represent not only Judaism, but monotheism, Western civilization, critical rationalism and humanism, and the destruction of the German people' \textit{The Aryan Jesus: Christian Theologians and the Bible in Nazi Germany} (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 285.
  \item \textsuperscript{44} Robert P. Ericksen and Susannah Heschel, \textit{Betrayal: German Churches and the Holocaust} (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1999).
  \item \textsuperscript{47} In addition to the works by Bergen, Ericksen and Steigmann-Gall, the failure of the Confessing Church is described at length in Gerlach's \textit{And the Witnesses were Silent}.
\end{itemize}
even refute, the narrative that the established Protestant Christian churches were primarily victims of Nazi persecution and were therefore unable to help the Jews.

2.4.1 Heschel’s Aryan Jesus and the Influence of Aryan Christianity

The following discussion of Aryan Christianity will be based on Susannah Heschel’s *The Aryan Jesus: Christian Theologians and the Bible in Nazi Germany*. Heschel’s book adds a remarkable new dimension to the already grim story of the relationship of German Protestant Christians to National Socialism, as she breaks new ground by analyzing the *Institute for the Study and Eradication of Jewish Influence on German Church Life* (the ‘Institute’).\(^{48}\) The Institute was opened in May of 1939 at the historic Wartburg castle, which was ‘resonant with Lutheran and nationalist significance’.\(^{49}\) The Institute’s goals were both theological and political, to create a de-judaized church, using revisionist biblical and liturgical materials, to establish that Jesus was never Jewish, that he fought against Judaism, and that he was also a victim of it.\(^{50}\) For Heschel, the cumulative effect of propagating racist ideology was devastating to the status of the Jews: ‘Eradication of the Jews did not have to be proclaimed in order to be known as the goal.’\(^{51}\)

Heschel’s analysis seeks to expose two myths that she observes have circulated during the post-World War II era. For Heschel, the first myth is that the

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\(^{48}\) In German, *Institut zur Erforschung und Beseitigung des jüdischen Einflusses auf das deutsche kirchliche Leben*, Heschel, *Aryan Jesus*, 1.

\(^{49}\) Ibid.

\(^{50}\) Ibid.

\(^{51}\) Ibid., 284.
German Evangelical Church was actively persecuted by the Nazis because it defended the historic, Protestant Christian faith of the Reformation confessions. As will be shown below, some members of the GEC, particularly members of the Institute and the faculty of the University of Jena, engaged in a systematic revision of Christian history and biblical interpretation, using anti-Semitic, racializing principles. Far from attacking Nazism, this actually supported it. For Heschel, the second myth is that the GEC was guilty of only promulgating theological anti-Judaism, and not pseudo-scientific, racist anti-Semitism. In this context, theological anti-Judaism fostered the view that all forms of Judaism were legalistic, preoccupied only with externalities and ritual, and devoid of true spirituality, which was delivered by Jesus and later the Christian faith. Heschel demonstrates that certain members of the GEC fostered both types of thought that were antagonistic to Judaism, with scientific racism being the product of modern theological revisionism.

Heschel’s book consists of an introduction, six chapters and a conclusion, which will be briefly summarized here. It is a remarkable book, the fruit of extensive archival research, and it is impossible to do it justice here. After presenting the summary, particular attention will be paid to the way in which Aryan Christianity was based upon a racialized view of the history of religions. The introduction includes a rich discussion of Christianity and race, including an important contention that the fundamental relationship between body and soul at the heart of much modern racist discourse is a mirror of the body-soul dilemma at the heart of Christian metaphysics.\footnote{Ibid., 22–23.} Chapter 1, titled, ‘Draining Jesus of Jewishness’, explores numerous
ways in which the German academic establishment collectively engaged in multi-disciplinary revisionism to establish that Jesus of Nazareth was not Jewish. In contrast to historic Christian theology, which saw Jesus as a Jew prefigured by the Old Testament, the members of the Institute transformed him into an anti-Semite and proto-Nazi.\textsuperscript{53} This will be explored in more detail below. Chapter 2 provides an institutional history from the founding of the Institute in 1939 to the peak of its influence in 1942. Here Heschel describes the numerous ways in which its members, who were either established scholars in German universities or other government officials, disseminated the arguments that Judaism was a degenerate, violent religion, and that Christianity was essentially an Aryan, Germanic religion.\textsuperscript{54} Chapter 3 demonstrates that this was done through conferences, working groups, scholarly and popular publications, the most important of which were church materials, including a de-judaized New Testament, hymnal and catechism.\textsuperscript{55}

In Chapter 4, Heschel introduces the leading scholars affiliated with the Institute, especially Walter Grundmann (1906–1974), its first director, and later Stasi-

\textsuperscript{53} According to Heschel, this argument was based on arguments that were well established long before the founding of the Institute in 1939: 'These included racial theory, as it emerged in Europe during the nineteenth century, with theories about languages and religions as manifestations of race; historicist distinctions between Jesus’s teachings and those of first-century Judaism, presented by New Testament scholars; claims that Jesus’s religious teachings originated in Hellenism, Buddhism, Hinduism, or Iranian culture—anything but Judaism; and assertions about the Gentile population of the Galilee in the centuries leading up to Jesus’s day, given academic credence by Assyriologists. Among scholars as well as populist writers, the bases for such arguments were weak if not nonexistent, sources were read tendentiously or taken out of context, and solid data was replaced by fantasy' (ibid., 27).

\textsuperscript{54} Ibid., 104–105.

\textsuperscript{55} Ibid., 104 and 106–165.
informant. Heschel demonstrates how their careers were launched or propelled forward because of the support they received from the Institute, both financially, and as a forum to disseminate racialized and theologically anti-Jewish ideas within the churches and among the laity. In addition, Heschel observes that their racism was limited to targeting Jews, and did not extend to other targets of the Nazi regime, such as the handicapped, people of color, Roma ('gypsies'), which might have curried more favour with the Nazi regime. This leads Heschel to conclude that German Christians, who all espoused theological anti-Judaism, were drawn to Nazism by its anti-Semitism.

Chapter 5 focuses on the faculty of theology at the University of Jena, which since the early nineteenth century had been a center of progressive theological scholarship. According to Heschel, the theology students at Jena were enthusiastic supporters of the Nazis, as much or more than those studying the natural sciences and social sciences. Chapter 6 explores the post-World War II legacy of the Institute and the post-World War II careers of its members. Heschel laments how the latter typically did not suffer significant marginalization due to the

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56 Ibid., 255–259. Grundmann’s advisor was Gerhard Kittel. Kittel was Professor of New Testament at the University of Tübingen in the 1920s and 1930s. Between 1932 and 1938 the first three volumes of his edited Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament were published, with volumes VI through X completed under different editorship. This was later translated into English as the Theological Dictionary of the New Testament (TDNT), 10 vols. (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1964). According to Heschel, TDNT remains a major reference work, but has become notorious for its denigrating descriptions of early Judaism. Heschel, Aryan Jesus, 186 note 97.


58 Ibid., 200.


60 Heschel, Aryan Jesus, 205.
anti-Semitic activities, but often flourished due to their ‘expertise’ regarding Judaism.\textsuperscript{61}

2.4.2 Theological Revisionism and Curriculum Reform

According to Heschel, the Aryan Christian belief that Jesus was not Jewish but a non-Jewish ‘Galilean’ was supported by several assumptions that came out of the History of Religions school,\textsuperscript{62} and can be linked to several major figures within biblical studies and theology during the first half of the twentieth century. Heschel observes in general that members of the History of Religions school rejected the authority of church doctrines, and examined them as products of specific cultural and religious contexts of their era.\textsuperscript{63} Heschel explores the methodological assumptions that were employed by the History of Religions school, two of which were shared by

\textsuperscript{61} ‘Reinstatement of professors with training in Judaism, even the most notorious Nazi propagandists, was particularly easy because they were among the few left in postwar Germany with expertise in rabbinic texts, thus camouflaging their Nazi activities. Both universities and churches refused to consider antisemitic propaganda, such as that fomented by the German Christian movement, as a basis for disciplinary action’ (ibid., 277).

\textsuperscript{62} The term ‘history of religion(s)’ has been and will be used frequently in this paper. It can be understood as the study of the role of world religions from a historical and comparative perspective. However, there is also the ‘History of Religions school’, known primarily as the Religionsgeschichtlicheschule, whose main theoretician, Ernst Troeltsch, sought to interpret Jesus and early Christianity by referring to the beliefs and practices of late Hellenism, which was a syncretistic mixture of late Judaism, oriental eschatology, the Greek mysteries, Gnosticism and Stoicism. See James C. Livingston, Modern Christian Thought: From the Enlightenment to Vatican II (New York: Macmillan, 1971), 304. The analytical framework of the history of religions will recur in the primary source analysis in Chapters 3 through 6 of this paper, with Chapter 6 providing the most detailed discussion, as it analyzes Tillich’s methodological use of the history of religion and the history of revelation in volume I of his Systematic Theology.

\textsuperscript{63} Heschel, Aryan Jesus, 58.
Tillich, at least in part. The first shared assumption is that the New Testament record cannot be taken at face value in terms of historical reliability. For example, if the New Testament record of Jesus’s claims about himself are not historically reliable, then key Christological titles lacked a firm historical basis. The second assumption is that key Christian ideas did not derive from Judaism but were rooted in a number of religions that existed in the Hellenistic world. Chapter 6 of this dissertation will show that Tillich partly shared this latter assumption, meaning that Tillich believed certain Christological titles did have some non-Jewish roots. However, Tillich did not use this as a justification to totally sever Christianity from its manifestly Jewish roots.

The first example given by Heschel is about William Wrede, professor of New Testament at the University of Breslau. According to Heschel, Wrede argued that the messianic claims about Jesus were theological constructs of the gospel authors, and not reliable evidence for Jesus’s own beliefs about himself.64 This had the effect of making a sharp distinction between the faith of Jesus and that of the gospel authors. For Heschel, another important claim of the History of Religions school was that Jesus was not the messiah anticipated in the Jewish scriptures. Wilhelm Bousset, professor of New Testament at the University of Göttingen, argued that the title ‘son of man’ was not a formal title within Judaism and rather came from a syncretistic Hellenistic context, which was influenced by Indian, Persian and Greek cultures.65

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64 Ibid., 58. Cited by Heschel from Wrede’s Das Messiasgeheimnis in den Evangelien; no page cited.
65 Heschel, Aryan Jesus, 59. This syncretistic Hellenistic context provides the raw material for much of Schelling’s history of religion, as appropriated by Tillich, which will be discussed in Chapter 3. It will be seen that, even at this relatively early stage of Tillich’s intellectual formation, he does not draw anti-Jewish conclusions.
According to Heschel, a third example is that Jesus's identity as a non-Jewish Galilean was put forth by Walter Bauer, also a professor of New Testament at Göttingen, who argued that Judea and Galilee possessed very distinct political, cultural and religious identities, and that Jesus understood himself to be a 'heavenly son of man', a concept taken from the Hellenistic world, and not a Jewish messiah.\textsuperscript{66} The opposition between Jerusalem and Galilee was further developed by proponents of two kinds of eschatology, a 'Jewish eschatology' seeking a Messiah, and a 'Gentile eschatology' seeking a son of man. This was supported by Rudolf Otto and Ernst Lohmeyer.\textsuperscript{67} The analysis of Tillich's history of religion and history of revelation, to be found in Chapter 6 of this dissertation, shows that some of these ideas need not lead necessarily to anti-Jewish or anti-Semitic conclusions.

In chapter 5 of Aryan Jesus, Heschel explores the 'Nazification of the curriculum', which was based on the 'principle of dejudaization', the imperative to purge the Christian church, and ultimately the surrounding culture, of all Jewish influence.\textsuperscript{68} This included an attempt, not entirely successful, to revise the theology curriculum in all of Germany’s universities so that it would never be taught that Christianity had Jewish roots. Relevant to this discussion was an April 1938 memo prepared by Heinz Eisenhuth, Institute member and dean of the theological faculty at

\textsuperscript{66} Ibid., 60. Heschel refers to Walter Bauer's article 'Jesus der Galiläer', 16–34.


\textsuperscript{68} Heschel, Aryan Jesus, 225–232.
Jena.\textsuperscript{69} The memo was addressed to a national conference in Halle, recommending a thorough reform of theological education using a racialized understanding of the various subfields of theology: (i) the professorship in Old Testament would be replaced by a chair in the ‘History of Religions of the Near East’, in which religions of the Orient would be examined, seeking Semitic influence; (ii) New Testament would be replaced by the ‘Study of the Gospels and the Origins of Christianity’, and Jesus would be studied in the context of his religious and ‘volkish’ environment; (iii) Church History would be the history of Germanic piety, and the religions of the East would be examined to identify their ‘Aryan religious element’; and (iv) Systematic Theology would reflect on how the gospel would influence a pious German life; Heschel correctly observes that present-day experience would be the hermeneutical key to truth.\textsuperscript{70} While this proposal for curriculum reform was not fully implemented in all German universities, it is illustrates the fundamental way in which a racialized history of religions could influence the academic establishment.

\textbf{2.5 Conclusion}

In Chapter 1 of this dissertation the importance of Judaism for Tillich was established through several important biographical events, and the prior treatments of Tillich and Judaism have not reached the root of why Tillich was pro-Jewish, in the sense referred to at the start of this chapter. The first goal of this chapter was to

\textsuperscript{69} Ibid., 217–219.

\textsuperscript{70} Ibid., 226–227; the original memorandum cited is Heinz Eisenhuth’s ‘Denkschrift zu den Fragen der Studienreform und Fakultätsreform der theologischen Fakultäten’ (UAB Akten der Ev. theol. Fakultät, vol. 35) – ibid., 227 note 94.
demonstrate the importance of dialectic for Tillich, since it deeply informs his understanding of the history of religion, which is the vehicle for understanding the relationship between Judaism and Christianity. The second goal of this chapter was to introduce the phenomenon of Aryan Christianity, in order to highlight the sharp contrast between Tillich’s use of the history of religions with that of the Aryan Christians. The next chapter will explore how Tillich appropriates the thought of F. W. J. Schelling, in particular his framework of the history of religions.
Chapter 3

Schelling’s Cosmic Dialectic and the Foundational Role of Judaism

This chapter intends to demonstrate that Schelling’s cosmic dialectical framework confers an inextricable relationship between Judaism and Christianity, such that Tillich could not have conceived of Christianity apart from Judaism. While the dialectical framework dictates that Judaism fails to provide an adequate redemptive path for humanity’s reconciliation to God, it provides a unique foundation for the final revelation of God in Christianity. Within Schelling’s scheme as interpreted by Tillich, there is a discernible progression from ancient paganism to Judaism to Christianity in the form of a dialectical history of religion. This historical dialectic manifests periodic contradictions, which seek resolution in new forms. In Tillich’s adaptation of Schelling, Judaism is the unique basis for Christianity, unlike the Aryan Christianity discussed in the previous chapter. However, Judaism is also ultimately inadequate to enable a full relationship with the divine.

As will be seen below, in the 1912 Dissertation, Tillich’s adaptation of Schelling presents a history of religion in which Christianity follows after Judaism with a superior form of revelation. In addition, according to Tillich’s adaptation of Schelling, Christianity also resolves the contradiction raised by the Mosaic law within Judaism through the ‘victory of grace’. In both the 1910 and 1912 Dissertations, the dialectical history of religion manifests a progression from Judaism to Christianity, but there is not a genuine or even incipient reciprocity. Therefore, for Tillich’s adaptation of Schelling, while Christianity is superior to Judaism, it would have been
impossible for him to purge Christianity of its Jewish roots. The following analysis will
demonstrate that Tillich’s understanding of Judaism at this early point in his career
was shaped primarily by an idealist form of the history of religion.

In later works, especially after World War I, Tillich’s understanding of Judaism
becomes influenced by socialism in the 1930s, and after the Holocaust, by sociology
and psychology, additionally, although the dialectical history of religion remains the
framework within which these other influences appear. However, in the following
explicit treatment of Judaism in his 1910 Dissertation on Schelling, Tillich introduces
the concepts of ‘particularity’ and ‘universality’ with respect to the history of
revelation. These ideas are pivotal for Tillich’s understanding of the relationship
between Judaism and Christianity in his early works, and in a significantly modified
way, do not fade away but recur in volume I of his Systematic Theology.

3.1 The Importance of Schelling for Tillich

It is difficult to fully appreciate Tillich’s thought without understanding the influence of
Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling (1775–1854). Throughout his career, Tillich
remarked on the significance of Schelling for his own thought. For example, in
Tillich’s 1936 autobiography, On the Boundary,¹ in the chapter titled ‘Between
Theology and Philosophy’, he recalls how he had voraciously read classical German
philosophy, especially Kant and Fichte, and later Schelling. His interest in Schelling
was stirred by both a predisposition (‘inner affinity’) towards the relationship between

¹ Tillich, On the Boundary, 46–47.
nature, mysticism and history, and unexpectedly finding the complete works of Schelling in a used bookstore, what he came to refer to as the ‘the accident of a bargain purchase’.\(^2\) In addition, in a 1954 lecture in Stuttgart on the hundredth anniversary of Schelling’s death, Tillich stated: ‘Never have I forgotten my dependence upon Schelling in the development of my own thought. At all times, even in a land of half-foreign culture, his basic ideas have been a help to me in the most varied fields. My work on the problems of systematic theology would have been unthinkable without him.’\(^3\) In the foreword to volume 1 of Tillich’s 1959 collected works, he writes: ‘The influence of my Schelling studies on the whole of my further development is very strong.’\(^4\) And finally, when he had completed the third volume of

\(^2\) Ibid., 47. Tillich’s biographers, Wilhelm and Marion Pauck, report that Tillich purchased the set of Schelling’s works impulsively, wanting to know more about the history of philosophy, and that his romance with Schelling determined his entire philosophical point of view. *Tillich*, 16. Also, in Tillich’s lectures on the history of Christian thought, at the beginning of a discussion of Schelling’s critique of Hegel, he relates how originally obtained Schelling’s works: ‘I recall the unforgettable moment when by chance I came into possession of the very rare first edition of the collected works of Schelling in a bookstore on my way to the University of Berlin. I had no money, but I bought it anyway, and this spending of nonexistent money was probably more important than all the other nonexistent or sometimes existing money that I have spent. For what I learned from Schelling became determinative of my own philosophical development.’ Tillich, *History of Christian Thought*, 438.


\(^4\) Tillich adds: ‘Decisive confirmation of my own evaluation of Schelling came to me, for the first time, when I encountered Nietzsche and the philosophy of life, and, next, when I became involved in the philosophy of art and existentialism. Both movements are, to a great extent, dependent upon Schelling. The specific topic of the present work on Schelling has also proved its continuing significance. Even today, the problems of mysticism and guilt-consciousness play a decisive role within the traditional theological task and in the encounter of Christianity with Asiatic religions.’ GW I, foreword, cited by Victor Nuovo, translator of Tillich’s 1912 Dissertation on Schelling, Introduction, 9.
his *Systematic Theology* in 1963, Tillich remarked that Schelling was the teacher and he was merely the student.⁵ Therefore, the importance of Schelling remained with Tillich throughout his entire life.

I have adopted the view of Russell Re Manning, who argues that while it is difficult to separate the views of Schelling and Tillich in Tillich’s works, especially in the two Schelling dissertations, it is the fact of their interpenetration that is important.⁶ As Re Manning notes, ‘to a large extent Tillich simply incorporates Schelling’s later metaphysics and ontology into his own, such that it is often difficult, especially in the Schelling dissertations, to know for sure where Schelling finishes and Tillich begins … The point here is that Tillich makes Schelling’s thought his own – he absorbs it as the subterranean foundations of his own thought’.⁷ Therefore, where Schelling refers to Judaism, as quoted by Tillich in his two Schelling dissertations, it can be reasonably inferred that Tillich has the same understanding of Judaism. This understanding is fragmentary, and there is no intention on Tillich’s part before World War I to develop a ‘theology of Judaism’. However, there are aspects that will emerge and recur in his later works, and are therefore important. Due to the absorption of Schelling by Tillich, at times I will refer to Tillich’s use of Schelling as ‘Tillich’s adaptation of Schelling’, or ‘Tillich’s Schelling’.⁸

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⁵ Pauck and Pauck, *Tillich*, 236.
⁷ Ibid., 59 note 4.
⁸ A convention borrowed from Re Manning (ibid., 78–79 note 63).
3.1.1 Schelling's Context, Sources and Main Ideas

Schelling’s philosophical project is cosmic in scope, and it has so many facets and layers that it is nearly incomprehensible to the uninitiated. In order to facilitate the exposition of each of Tillich’s two dissertations on Schelling, a brief summary of the main features of Schelling’s philosophy of religion will be provided here. This summary is based on an essay by Thomas F. O’Meara,\(^9\) which is the most concise and yet nuanced account that I have encountered. The following five aspects will be highlighted, so that when Tillich’s two dissertations on Schelling are explored, the argument should be easier to follow: (i) Schelling’s complex cultural context and the influences on his work; (ii) the ‘science’ of the phenomenology of religion; (iii) the doctrine of the potencies; (iv) his understanding of creation and ‘the Fall’; and (v) his understanding of history and mythology. Hopefully, it will become clear that both of Tillich’s dissertations, in different ways, go to the heart of Schelling’s philosophy of religion.

*Cultural Context*

Schelling was a polymath, reading widely in all of the humanities and natural philosophy, which led Xavier Tilliette to observe, ‘Nothing of any importance in the literature, in German, French, or English, escaped him.’\(^10\) The late eighteenth and

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early nineteenth centuries experienced a significant reaction to the mechanistic world view brought on by the Enlightenment, and natural philosophy had become vitalist, organic, hylozoic (that one of the properties of matter is life), developmental, and even evolutionary.\textsuperscript{11} O'Meara identifies the following influences on Schelling: (i) organism and polarity from the Brownian philosophy of medicine; (ii) process from the works of H. Kielmeyer; (iii) the relation of speculative physics as applied to the doctrine of God, from Jacob Böhme, Saint-Martin, Jacob Tauler and Meister Eckhart; (iv) the integration of Böhme's theology with the experimental sciences of electricity, chemistry and magnetism from Franz von Baader; (v) theology of mythology from F. Creuzer and J. Gorres, who introduced Oriental mythology to the West; and (vi) philosophy and biblical criticism from J.G. Herder, Gottfried Hermann, K.P. Moritz, C.G. Heyne and J.G. Eichorn.\textsuperscript{12} O'Meara also notes that Schelling had an extensive knowledge of the Bible, and had close ties with Romantic theologians, both Catholic and Protestant.

\textit{Theogony: The Science of the Phenomenology of Religion}

Not all commentators on Schelling agree, but a persuasive case can be made that most of Schelling's writings ultimately attempted to resolve issues that were fundamentally religious,\textsuperscript{13} engaging in the discipline of 'theogony', or \textit{theo-genesis}, literally meaning the 'origin of the gods'. The object of the science of religion is the life of the Absolute being realized in the human spirit and world history, and

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{11} O'Meara, 'Schelling's Philosophy', 218.
  \item \textsuperscript{12} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{13} As will be noted below, Re Manning takes this position against Andrew Bowie and others.
\end{itemize}
Schelling’s treatises are typically referred to as ‘philosophies of myth and revelation’ and ‘philosophies of religion’.\textsuperscript{14} For Schelling, the Absolute becomes fully realized, or fully itself, through ‘tension’ and ‘process’, and the empirical record of that process \textit{before} Christ is called ‘myth’, and \textit{after} Christ is called ‘revelation’\textsuperscript{15} According to O’Meara, Schelling is always and simultaneously describing three things (underscoring mine):

(1) \textit{the life of God}, as God through his active potencies exoterically\textsuperscript{16} becomes fully himself; (2) \textit{the vital historical line of finite being} (other than God but not utterly discrete from him), which has its own realization but which nevertheless bears inwardly the realization of God; (3) \textit{the history of human consciousness}, both collective and individual, which is bringing to unity nature and spirit in art, in religion, and their finest expression, philosophy.\textsuperscript{17}

This succinctly encapsulates the complex and multi-dimensional aspect of Schelling’s thought, and provides a nice segue to his doctrine of the potencies.

\textit{The Doctrine of the Potencies}

\textsuperscript{14} O’Meara, ‘Schelling’s Philosophy’, 219.

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid. As I will show in my analysis of Tillich’s dissertations on Schelling, Judaism manifests both mythological and revelatory elements, and therefore serves as a necessary transitional stage from paganism to Christianity. This periodization of myth and revelation is found in the 1910 Dissertation, part II.A and B. See Section 3.2.2 below.

\textsuperscript{16} ‘Exoterically’ carries the sense of ‘external to God’.

\textsuperscript{17} O’Meara, ‘Schelling’s Philosophy’, 218–219. I want to underscore two things. First, in the second activity of the historical development of finite being, finite being has its own dialectical realization, independent of God, but there remains an internal relation to the inner life of God. Second, in the third activity, the development of human consciousness, this can be seen as anticipating Tillich’s important concept of ‘theology of culture’.
Schelling's system can be characterized as organic, developmental, linear and even parabolic: 'Expansion flows out from the beginning and returns with the spoils of realization: the self-realization of God as an outward motion and a return.'\(^{18}\) For Schelling, there is a 'ground of all being' that is a power of willing, so to speak, that is the source of all reality, and is inherently forward oriented, sets in motion a cosmic process of realization.\(^{19}\) The process of realization assumes both the two poles of the real-ideal dialectic, and also three movements: 'can', 'must' and 'ought'.\(^{20}\) The term 'potencies' appears to have come from Schelling's speculative physics; they are not concepts, but 'vital fields', 'transcendental horizons of all being', 'a striving ready to leap to fulfillment', and they function as mediators between the Absolute and the universe, between the divine will and history.\(^{21}\) In addition, they are 'the deeper meaning of the Christian Trinity', through whom the God of monotheism becomes worldwide, historical and therefore trinitarian.\(^{22}\)

\(^{16}\) Ibid., 220.

\(^{19}\) Ibid., 220–221.

\(^{20}\) 'These three aspects of the active essence (Wesen) of primal ground can also be expressed in terms of the subject–object schema: Sein-können ('potential to being') is the subject; the object is reines Sein ('pure being'); the subject returned through objectivity is reines Sein nun ('pure being now'). The final stage—bogotten into factual existence—represents the union of the ideal and the real (Schelling, Philosophy of Revelation, SW XIII, 273ff.). In the twelfth lecture of the Philosophy of Revelation these powers are called 'Potenzen' (ibid., 221).

\(^{21}\) Ibid.

\(^{22}\) Ibid. In addition, the translator of Tillich's 1912 Dissertation, Victor Nuovo, at page 177 note xxvi cites a passage from Schelling's Philosophy of Revelation, SW XIV, 66, observing that Homousia, the communion of the Father and the Son in the Holy Spirit, is the goal of history: 'The idea of the trinity passes through three moments: it must proceed from tautousia, where only the Father is the dominating ousia—where the Father comprehends all; it must proceed from tautousia through heteroousia, which lasts as long as there is tension [between the potencies] until the final
Creation and the Fall

The dialectical relationship of the potencies, or powers, is also expressed in the creation of the physical world. They are active within the inner life of God, ‘esoterically’, and are also projected outwardly, or ‘exoterically’: ‘The world is part of the personal objectification of God. The polarity of freedom and necessity, of subject and object, is the bridge to the production of the world which is both free and necessary.’\textsuperscript{23} The act of creation is accomplished not out of any necessity or incompleteness, but out of God’s boundless freedom, in a movement from unity and identity, to manifoldness and diversity: ‘in this passage through differentiation, the totality of the divine being is neither increased nor diminished, for the All has simply moved from one “form of existence” to another.’\textsuperscript{24}

The Fall is something distinct from the emanation of Plotinus,\textsuperscript{25} the causality of Aristotle, or the assertion free will or moral failure, but whose effects are the limitations experienced by creation and humanity as a result of their separation from God, as the Fall brings about a fundamental change between God and humanity:

The Fall, then, is not a fall from an original and perfect freedom through a sin, but a creation into concrete existence so that greater freedom can be

\textsuperscript{23} O’Meara, ‘Schelling’s Philosophy’, 221. O’Meara parenthetically cites Philosophy of Revelation, SW XIII,13:257.

\textsuperscript{24} O’Meara, ‘Schelling’s Philosophy’, 222.

\textsuperscript{25} Re Manning has a different view that Schelling’s understanding of history is similar to the neo-Platonic process of exitus et reditus. End of Culture, 89.
attained. For the universe the Fall means separateness and limitation … The positing of the world alienates it from God. In the Fall of the world, the Son, the world’s potency, also falls. The Father is no longer completely Father; the Son will regain serenity in a future, deeper subjectivity. Mirroring the Godhead, creation cannot resolve this tension unless creation becomes spirit, unless the real becomes the ideal.\textsuperscript{26}

The above quote also introduces ‘the Son’ as the instrument of reconciliation of creation to the Father, a theme that will be revisited in the exposition of the revelatory process in the 1910 Dissertation.

\textit{History and Mythology}

History is primarily a record of the spiritual development of the human race, with culturally specific ‘myths’ expressing a relative degree of divine consciousness in concrete form. All myths have some revelatory content, reflecting the degree of intimacy with, or alienation from, the divine: ‘The world of gods arises in the human mind spontaneously, born of a necessity imposed by the original relationship.’\textsuperscript{27} Myths, like language and social structure, are a disclosure of the unfolding of the divine and its relationship with humanity.\textsuperscript{28} The philosophy of mythology is the first part of the philosophy of revelation, with Schelling’s analysis of select religions from Egypt, India, China and Greece each having a role in a comprehensive dialectical,

\textsuperscript{26} O’Meara, ‘Schelling’s Philosophy’, 223–224.
\textsuperscript{27} Ibid., 224–225. The quote is from Philosophy of Mythology, 11:197.
\textsuperscript{28} O’Meara, ‘Schelling’s Philosophy’, 224. I have changed O’Meara’s ‘the becoming God’ to ‘the unfolding of the divine’.

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triadic, process. The succession of mythological expressions unfolds with necessity, driven by God, although it experiences temporary setbacks: ‘Mythology comes into being through a process which is necessary; its origin is lost in a realm before history. Consciousness may resist the process in certain particulars, but it cannot impede, much less reverse the whole.’ God leads the human race through various stages, none of which are fully false, to higher truth, with successive epochs leading to greater insight and freedom.

3.1.2 Tillich’s Appropriation of Schelling

The prior section demonstrated that Schelling provided the ‘deep structure’ of Tillich’s conceptual framework. There is a second, more specific way, in which Schelling is fundamentally important for Tillich. Schelling is both foundational for, and critical of, German Idealism. Schelling, along with Fichte and Hegel, responded to Kant’s critical philosophy, which threatened the very possibility of metaphysics, with theology being the most vulnerable of all disciplines. In the wake of Kant’s three critiques, especially the first, The Critique of Pure Reason, theology was vexed by the problem of the possibility of transcendent, non-empirical knowledge: Could the knowing subject rationally demonstrate anything beyond itself, or was it trapped in ‘a

29 Ibid. This attempt to comprehend the world’s religions into a dialectical structure is the task of Tillich’s 1910 Dissertation.


31 O’Meara, ‘Schelling’s Philosophy’, 225.

32 Re Manning, End of Culture, 77. Also, in the translator’s introduction to Tillich’s 1910 Dissertation, Nuovo observes: ‘The abiding deep structure of Tillich’s thought is the system of the potencies. Wherever one looks in Tillich’s works he will encounter them’ (23).
prison of finitude'? \footnote{Later in his career Tillich refers to this epistemological problem as 'the prison of finitude', specifically in the context of discussing the importance of Kant and the problems raised for theology by the Enlightenment. Tillich, \textit{History of Christian Thought}, 363.} \footnote{Re Manning refers to the Kantian problem as 'the dissolution of thought and being' (\textit{End of Culture}, 63).} \footnote{Re Manning presents these developments in greater detail as 'Schelling's dilemma'. The two horns of the dilemma that needed to be transcended to preserve the integrity of theology were 'Spinozist dogmatism ... the empty mysticism of pure being', and the transcendental philosophy as developed by Fichte, 'the empty mysticism of pure thought' (ibid., 63–65).} At the risk of oversimplification, especially with respect to the possibility of the self knowing a transcendent reality, \footnote{Re Manning consistently supports the view that Schelling's later thought, especially post-1809, was inherently theological. He engages in a running debate, primarily with Andrew Bowie, especially in \textit{Schelling and Modern Philosophy. An Introduction} (London: Routledge, 1993); \textit{End of Culture}, 78 note 62 and 83–84 note 80. Also, O'Meara opens 'Schelling's Philosophy' with the claim: 'Religion was a theme that was never far from Schelling's philosophy' (216).} there were three theological responses to Kant. One alternative was that God became effectively identified with the world, as in the materialism and pantheism of Spinoza. Another alternative was that God remained in the purely intellectual realm, as in the idealism of Fichte and Hegel. A third alternative emerged, with the intention of transcending these two alternatives, \footnote{Later in his career Tillich refers to this epistemological problem as 'the prison of finitude', specifically in the context of discussing the importance of Kant and the problems raised for theology by the Enlightenment. Tillich, \textit{History of Christian Thought}, 363.} expressed in Schelling's 'philosophical religion'. This view holds that the starting point of all philosophical reflection is the prior union of thought and being, \textit{within God}, with the implication that philosophical reflection is inherently religious, or theological. \footnote{Re Manning refers to the Kantian problem as 'the dissolution of thought and being' (\textit{End of Culture}, 63).} \footnote{Re Manning presents these developments in greater detail as 'Schelling's dilemma'. The two horns of the dilemma that needed to be transcended to preserve the integrity of theology were 'Spinozist dogmatism ... the empty mysticism of pure being', and the transcendental philosophy as developed by Fichte, 'the empty mysticism of pure thought' (ibid., 63–65).} \footnote{Re Manning consistently supports the view that Schelling's later thought, especially post-1809, was inherently theological. He engages in a running debate, primarily with Andrew Bowie, especially in \textit{Schelling and Modern Philosophy. An Introduction} (London: Routledge, 1993); \textit{End of Culture}, 78 note 62 and 83–84 note 80. Also, O'Meara opens 'Schelling's Philosophy' with the claim: 'Religion was a theme that was never far from Schelling's philosophy' (216).}

As Tillich and other commentators on Schelling have observed, Schelling underwent one or more phases in his intellectual development. The simplest periodization of Schelling's development would be to locate a major turning point in
1809, with the publication of his *On Human Freedom*. This key work represents the emergence of Schelling's 'positive philosophy', which is contrasted to his earlier 'negative philosophy'. Schelling's earlier period was devoted to an analysis of 'identity', as he was in dialogue with the speculative thought of German Idealism. His later period, from *On Human Freedom* and after, was devoted to an analysis of 'existence', looking forward to the concerns of 'existentialism'. O'Hanlon summarizes the distinction this way: 'the earlier period was the period of a static, Hellenic, beauty-centered romanticism; the later period, the period of late romanticism, fascinated and frustrated before the reality of evil and the dark abyss of existence, struggling for some explanation of the whence and the why of creatureliness and evil'. In *On Human Freedom*, and after 1809, Schelling posited 'the Will' as the ultimate epistemological principle, as a way to avoid the pantheism of Spinoza and

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37 In the 1912 Dissertation, Tillich observes that some commentators have divided Schelling’s career into as many as seven distinct periods. Tillich prefers to see more of an 'inner' continuity throughout Schelling’s works, although he thinks some kind of 'turning' point occurred prior to *On Human Freedom*, which 'cast all problems in a new light'. And this continuity is expressed as dialectical 'necessity', in which the method is extremely important for how the resolution to a problem occurs: ‘However, the transition is not external but dialectical. It is not the interruption, but the completion in a grand style of what was begun. This above all must become clear, and especially for the present problem, everything depends upon the examination of this continuity. Hence the first period has been treated in such detail. I have been obliged to demonstrate at every point the dialectical necessity for the transition to the second period. Then it was possible to treat the solution with relative brevity’ (1912 Dissertation, 24–25). For the purpose of this argument, which is to explore Schelling’s influence on Tillich, as opposed to analyzing Schelling as such, the two-phase understanding of Schelling is adequate, before and after *On Human Freedom*.


39 Re Manning discusses this extensively. For example: 'Schelling's achievement is to have brought Spinoza's static ontology to life through the affirmation of identity through excess. In this way, he is able to designate the principle of the absolute, in which the prior identity of thought and being can be

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the rarified idealism of pure thought found in Hegel. In a sense, Schelling became ‘the oldest of the young-Hegelians’, and arguably a ‘proto-existentialist’. At the end of Tillich’s 1954 lecture on the 100th anniversary of Schelling’s death, in defense of the importance of revelation, Tillich acknowledges Schelling’s prescience into the way that ‘the problems of existence’ would bear down upon the twentieth century:

It is the task of the theologian to answer the questions of human existence and its conflicts with the essentially human [dem essentiall Menschlichen]. But he can do that only on the basis of revelation, revelation of the power of being which overcomes the conflict of essence and existence, and which must be encountered in history. Schelling knew that; but he was too much heir [sic] of the idealistic tradition to have drawn the consequences. He forgot the character of encounter [den Begegungscharakter] of revelation, which he himself had demanded. This was felt by his contemporaries; and this we see even more clearly than they. But we can also see better than they could have seen it something else, namely that Schelling anticipated in his late

found, as the living reality of God, whose primary characteristic is not being, but will” (End of Culture, 73). And: ‘For Tillich, Schelling’s understanding of the absolute as the prior coincidence of thought and being is his decisive philosophical achievement … For Schelling, following Fichte, the unconditioned (or absolute) can be found in freedom and hence the will. Tillich claims that for Schelling, “the will has been raised to an ultimate principle. “To will means … to act absolutely.” “Spirit is an original act of will”’ (79). Cf. 1910 Dissertation, 43, quoting Schelling in SW I/1 149ff. and SW I/1 395.

40 Re Manning states that this is a quote from Manfred Frank, but the lengthy footnote does not give a citation from any works by Frank. End of Culture, 97 note 139.

41 This phrase is awkward. It might be more easily rendered, ‘But we can also see better than they could have something else’; the German reads, ‘Aber wir sehen auch das andere, besser, als sie es
philosophy the problem of our time, the problem of human existence in a
world in which human existence is most severely threatened. This we
remember; and we are happy about him, in spite of his and our failure. For out
of the awareness of failure is born ultimate courage, the courage to affirm
being.\textsuperscript{42}

The theological dimension of German Idealism employed an evolutionary view
of history to interpret the role of various world religions in deriving increasingly more
sophisticated forms, with the goal of substantiating Christianity as the highest form. It
is during this period that ‘the history of religion’ (i.e. the relation of non-Christian
religions to Christianity) became important for Christian theology,\textsuperscript{43} and it is in this
simplified sense that I am characterizing Tillich’s understanding of Judaism in the
subsequent discussion. My term ‘history of religion’ as used here should not be
confused with ‘\textit{die Religionsgeschichtlicheschule}’ (or ‘the history of religions school’) 
associated with Ernst Troeltsch in the twentieth century, although Troeltsch was also
influential on Tillich.\textsuperscript{44} However, as will be noted in Chapter 6 of this dissertation, late
in his career, Tillich clearly acknowledges his indebtedness to Troeltsch and the
\textit{religionsgeschichtliche Schule}.

Tillich wrote two dissertations on Schelling. The first is titled ‘The Construction


\textsuperscript{43} See Wilfred Cantwell Smith, \textit{The Meaning and End of Religion} (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1991) for a vivid and influential treatment of this topic.

\textsuperscript{44} Re Manning provides a significant discussion of this in the first chapter of \textit{End of Culture}.
of the History of Religion in Schelling's Positive Philosophy: Its Presuppositions and Principles', which was submitted in 1910 for his doctorate in philosophy at the University of Breslau. The second is titled 'Mysticism and Guilt-Consciousness in Schelling's Philosophical Development',\textsuperscript{45} which was submitted for the licentiate in theology at the University of Halle. In the introduction to the 1910 Dissertation, Tillich argues that while Schelling was in a sense the teacher of Hegel and Schleiermacher, the latter two became the objects of extensive scholarly commentary, while Schelling regrettably fell into neglect.\textsuperscript{46} In the simplest terms, in the 1910 Dissertation, Tillich appropriates Schelling for philosophical purposes, and then in the 1912 Dissertation, Tillich appropriates Schelling for theological purposes, with philosophy providing a necessary foundation for theology. However, there is considerable overlap between philosophy and theology in Schelling, as Tillich observes that idealism possesses an essentially religious dimension ('self-consciousness'), expressed in Schelling's concept of 'philosophical religion'. Tillich writes in his Introduction to the 1910

\textsuperscript{45} The two dissertations are referred to as 1910 Dissertation and 1912 Dissertation respectively. While it appears that Tillich wrote the 1910 Dissertation before the 1912 Dissertation, the Paucks say that he began the 1912 Dissertation as early as 1908 in Lichtenrade, a rural town near Berlin that possessed great natural beauty, helping him appreciate Schelling's nature mysticism, and had completed it by 1910. The details of the submission of each dissertation are not entirely clear. For example, in describing the events of 1910, the Paucks write: 'For this and other reasons which remain obscure—perhaps through a connection his father made for him—Tillich submitted this second piece of writing on Schelling to the University of Breslau. It was entitled, "The Conception of the History of Religions in Schelling's Positive Philosophy: Its Presuppositions and Principles".' In addition, they also write: 'A little over a year later, on 16 December 1911, Tillich took the final examination for the degree of Licentiate of Theology. He had submitted his original dissertation on Schelling to the University of Halle, entitled, as noted earlier, "Mysticism and Guilt-Consciousness in Schelling's Philosophical Development".' Pauck and Pauck, \textit{Tillich}, 33–35.

\textsuperscript{46} 1910 Dissertation, 39–41.
Dissertation:

Idealism is not only a scientific movement, it is above all a religious movement. Theologians or philosophers may reject joining philosophy and theology in a unified and systematic world view. Nevertheless, they cannot avoid considering the Idealist Movement from the standpoint of the history of religion as an expression of Christian religious life. Idealism itself makes this claim, and therefore must be appreciated as such, at least in a purely historical sense. The religious self-consciousness of Idealism is characteristically expressed in Schelling’s concept of ‘philosophical religion’.  

Unlike most analyses of Schelling’s influence on Tillich, I will discuss each dissertation separately, since each has a distinct argument, and each makes a distinct contribution to this topic. The 1910 Dissertation presents Judaism within the vast sweep of the history of religion, and it serves as a transitional phase from historically and culturally particular mythological, pagan religions, to the universal and revelatory religion of Christianity. In the 1910 Dissertation, there is a historical dialectic of progression, in which there is a progression from Judaism to Christianity. The 1912 Dissertation assumes a similar transitional place of Judaism within the history of religion, but employs a deeply Kantian framework that seeks to resolve ‘antinomies’, with Judaism being put in dialectical opposition to paganism. In the 1912 Dissertation, Christianity not only comes after Judaism with a more adequate expression of divine revelation, it also resolves the contradiction posed by Judaism

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47 Ibid., 40–41.
within the dialectical history of religion. As Tillich's history of religion develops over time, he will become more tentative about the ability of Christianity to maintain its definitive position as the 'resolver of contradictions', and Judaism will increase in stature, to where it has permanent and not only transitional role, in a permanent reciprocal relation to Christianity. In both dissertations, Judaism receives a different emphasis, but plays an essential preparatory role for Christianity. I have identified nine works that discuss the relationship between Schelling and Tillich.\(^{48}\) Only three, O'Hanlon (1958), Zeitlow (1961) and Re Manning (2005), discuss in any detail the function of the history of religion in Tillich's theology, and those contributions will be cited below. None of these three discusses Judaism itself in any significant way, let alone its function in the history of religion, or how it serves as a foundation for Tillich's understanding of Christianity.

3.1.3 Schelling's Works on the Positive Philosophy

Tillich's analyses of Schelling draw heavily upon three of Schelling's works,\(^ {49}\) all of


\(^{49}\) The first complete edition of Schelling's collected works was published by his son, F. K. A. Schelling, between 1856 and 1858, in two parts of ten and four volumes, respectively. This edition is called the Sämtliche Werke, and is here identified as Schelling, SW I and II followed by the volume number. I viewed this edition at the Watkinson Library, Trinity College, Hartford, Connecticut, in March of 2012, to verify the volume titles. Since there was no further edition of Schelling's collected works until 1927, it appears that Tillich used this edition in the 1910 and 1912 dissertations. However, in the English translations by Victor David Nuovo, the extensive parenthetical references to Schelling by Tillich use volume numbers 1 through 14. It appears that Nuovo used the 14 volume collection edited
which are considered part of the later Schelling, and instances of his ‘positive
philosophy’: volume 7, *Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human
Freedom* (‘On Human Freedom’),\(^50\) volumes 11 and 12, *Historical-Critical
Introduction to the Philosophy of Mythology* (‘Philosophy of Mythology’),\(^51\) and
volumes 13 and 14, *Philosophy of Revelation*.\(^52\) Tillich quotes Schelling liberally and
at length, displaying in intimate knowledge of Schelling’s work, underscoring the
difficulty of separating Schelling’s views from Tillich’s.

While *On Human Freedom* was published in 1809, Schelling’s expansive
treatment of the history of religion was contained in his *Philosophy of Mythology* and

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\(^{50}\) Parenthetically cited as Schelling, *GW*, vol. 7, under the title, *Philosophische Untersuchungen über
das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit und die damit zusammenhängenden Gegenstände*. This has
been published in English as *Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom*, trans.
with an introduction and notes by Jeff Love and Johannes Schmidt, Contemporary Continental
Freedom*.

\(^{51}\) Parenthetically cited as Schelling, *GW*, vols. 11 and 12, under the title, *Einleitung in die Philosophie
der Mythologie*. Excerpts of Lectures 1 through 10 have been published in English as *Historical-
Critical Introduction to the Philosophy of Mythology*, trans. Mason Richey and Markus Zisselberger,
foreword by Jason Wirth, Contemporary Continental Philosophy series (Albany, NY: SUNY Press,
2007); hereafter, Schelling, *Philosophy of Mythology*.

\(^{52}\) Parenthetically cited as Schelling, *GW*, vols. 13 and 14, under the title *Philosophie der
Offenbarung*. Excerpts have been published in English as *The Grounding of Positive Philosophy: The
Berlin Lectures*, trans. with an introduction and notes by Bruce Matthews, Contemporary Continental

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Philosophy of Revelation. The latter two works are compilations of student notes and Schelling’s papers from lectures he delivered at the University of Berlin, beginning in 1841. Schelling had been appointed as Prussian ‘privy councilor’ and member of the Berlin Academy, upon which he was requested to deliver lectures in the university. These were published after Schelling’s death in 1854, by his son, F.K.A. Schelling, in 1856, 1857 and 1858. The lectures were attended by numerous major nineteenth-century intellectuals, including Søren Kierkegaard, Friedrich Engels, Mikhail Bakunin, Arnold Ruge and Jacob Burckhardt, who at times provided stinging negative commentary. It is possible that Tillich was unaware of these criticisms, because he does not mention them, nor does he offer a defense of Schelling against them. Tillich appears to have some reservations about the factual details of Schelling’s history of mythology, as will be discussed below. However, Tillich did wholeheartedly

54 According to Kierkegaard, ‘Schelling talks the most insufferable nonsense ... His whole doctrine of the potencies betrays the highest degree of impotence’ (letter to his brother, Peter Christian, February 1842). Historical introduction, The Concept of Irony, with Continual Reference to Socrates, and Notes on Schelling’s Berlin Lectures, ed. and trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), xxii–xxiii. According to Burckhardt, ‘I attended his lectures a couple of times as an outsider during the most turgid of dogmatic discussions, and explained it all to myself as follows: Schelling is a Gnostic in the proper sense of the word, like Basilides. Hence all that is sinister, monstrous, formless in this part of his doctrine [sic]. I thought that at any moment some monstrous Asiatic God on twelve legs would come waddling in and with twelve arms take six hats off six heads. Little by little even the Berlin students will not be able to put up with his frightening half-nonsensical, intuitional, contemplational form of expression. It is awful to have to listen to long historical explanations and discussions of the destiny of Messias, epically drawn out, complicated and entirely formless. Anyone who can love Schelling’s Christ must have a large heart.’ See Thomas Albert Howard, Religion and the Rise of Historicism: W. M. L. de Wette, Jacob Burckhardt, and the Theological Origins of Nineteenth-Century Historical Consciousness (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 145.
appropriate Schelling’s doctrine of the potencies as a means to respond to Kant’s antinomies, regarding epistemology, ethics and aesthetics, all in a defense of a theological interpretation of culture.

3.2 The 1910 Dissertation: Judaism as the Unique Foundation for Christianity
In his introduction to the 1910 Dissertation, Tillich says that his task is to present the construction of the history of religion as the focal point of Schelling’s positive philosophy.\(^{56}\) Interpreting this summary statement is a good place to begin the analysis. Schelling’s positive philosophy is characterized by the epistemological priority of God as the basis of all human knowledge, enabling a response to the problems posed by Kantian critical philosophy and serving as a basis of Tillich’s theological interpretation of culture. It does this in three ways: (i) it provides a way to transcend the self-world (subject–object) dichotomy; (ii) it serves as the basis of human freedom; and (iii) it enables, and even entails, a theological interpretation of reality. As for the construction of the history of religion, human history is the story of estrangement from God, followed by the longing for reconciliation with God. Human history is the history of religion, culminating in the emergence of Christianity, which is both the most rational and the most revelatory expression of religious culture, and thus far the only religion in which full reconciliation to God, or ‘consciousness of God’, can be achieved. The term ‘construction’ is meaningful, because the analysis is quasi-chronological, and is punctuated by a-historical themes, with an eye to

\(^{56}\) 1910 Dissertation, 41.
giving theological meaning to the diversity of religions and cultures present in human history. For Tillich, German Idealism is the best expression of this historical, philosophical and religious phenomenon, especially Schelling’s ‘philosophical religion’:

emerging from the philosophy of religion influenced by Kant, an idealistic system of the history of religion has appeared in both the theological and philosophical camps … Idealism is not only a scientific movement, it is above all a religious movement. Theologians or philosophers may reject joining theology and philosophy in a unified and systematic world view. Nevertheless, they cannot avoid considering the Idealist Movement from the standpoint of the history of religion as an expression of Christian religious life. Idealism itself makes this claim, and therefore must be appreciated as such, at least in a purely historical sense. The religious self-consciousness of Idealism is characteristically expressed in Schelling’s concept of ‘philosophical religion’.  

The 1910 Dissertation is written in three parts: part I discusses the epistemological and metaphysical principles governing all of reality, the ‘doctrine of the potencies’; part II discusses the history of religion in two main phases, mythology and revelation; and part III discusses the concept of ‘philosophical religion’. In order to understand the role of Judaism in the 1910 Dissertation, I will focus on the first two parts. In part I, the key concept of ‘contradiction’ is introduced, which is a driving

56 Ibid., 40–41. The use of German Idealism here is done in full awareness that Schelling’s later, positive philosophy has an ‘existential’ orientation, which is critical of the ‘essentialist’ aspects of German Idealism.
force in Schelling’s dialectic. In part II, the history of religion is summarized, which has a dialectical structure. The dialectic moves in a quasi-chronological fashion, starting with a timeless, ‘pre-history’ within God, followed by the creation of the world of ideas, followed by an estrangement or emanation of nature and humanity from God, within the realm of human history and culture. This is followed by humanity’s attempt at reconciliation with God, first, through the mythological process, and then through the revelatory process. It is difficult to follow the logic of how Schelling justifies each transition from one historical period to another, and just how one religion becomes transformed by its relation to another dialectical participant. Therefore, my discussion will be largely expository.

During the ‘pre-history’, humanity experienced communion with God, or complete God consciousness, but as the result of the exercise of freedom, humanity became estranged from God, which is manifested in linguistic, cultural and religious fragmentation, around the world. This exhibited a movement from timeless being to temporal becoming, from unity and identity, to manifoldness and diversity (see above section in this chapter, ‘Creation and Fall’). This was the beginning of the mythological process, which is not devoid of rationality. The religions discussed in this process are considered polytheistic, but they are also examples of ‘relative monotheism’. Relative monotheism is best exemplified by the period in ancient Israel’s history during which it was commanded to worship one God, but it was understood that there were ‘other Gods’ that competed with the God of Abraham. The mythological process came to an end, and rational religions emerged in the Near East, with Judaism serving as a bridge between mythological, polytheistic
religions, and revelatory, monotheistic religions. As I will discuss later, it is this final period of the history of religion, the emergence of revelation, which most clearly expresses the role of Judaism as a foundational preparatory stage for Christianity in the dialectical history of religion.

3.2.1 The Doctrine of the Potencies and the Importance of Contradiction within the Dialectical Process

Part I discusses the epistemological and metaphysical foundations for Schelling’s dialectical view of reality, focusing on the three ‘potencies’, which are principles that characterize possibility, drive, contradiction, transformation and reconciliation, within God, nature, humanity and history.\(^{57}\) According to Tillich, Schelling’s three potencies are subject, object and spirit. In the most simple terms, subject is ‘what can be’, or pure potency;\(^{58}\) object is ‘what must be’, or pure act; and spirit is ‘what ought to be’, or the goal. With respect to God, they also have a Trinitarian association. ‘Subject’ corresponds to the Father, the God of desire and wrath; ‘object’ corresponds to Christ, the God of love; and ‘spirit’ corresponds to the Holy Spirit, the God of hope.\(^{59}\)

\(^{57}\) Ibid., 50–54.

\(^{58}\) Tillich points out that in On Human Freedom, Schelling introduces the theme of ‘the irrational moment within the absolute’, a “potency” for self-contradiction. According to Tillich, this sense of possibility is the origin of the term ‘potency’ as used by Schelling. This irrational event is the cause of the creation of the physical world and humanity, and ultimately results in the creation of human history. 1910 Dissertation, 48.

\(^{59}\) Nuovo, translator’s introduction, 1910 Dissertation, 16–17. O’Hanlon adds the aspect of time to this: ‘The Can-be, Must-be and Should-be correspond to past, present and future. These are distinct and yet simultaneous “times”; and it is only in this way that God’s eternity can be reconciled with his entrance into time’ (Influences, 99). There are also Christological and heresiological analogies: (1)
In the conflict between subject and object, neither is completely annihilated, and each potency makes an enduring contribution to spirit, in teleological fashion, according to its success or failure in the struggle. Tillich’s Schelling believes that the optimal relationship between the first two potencies is one of ‘equilibrium’, but this is seldom, if ever, achieved, and it is the enduring presence of tension, conflict, contradiction, and attempted resolution that drives history forward and that exhibits the dynamic nature of reality. Before ‘the Fall’, the polarities within God were in harmony, with ‘one-sidedness’ creating a distortion that seeks resolution by a harmonious relationship between the two poles. The terms ‘one-sided’ and ‘one sidedness’ are used more frequently in the 1912 Dissertation, but they do appear notably, if infrequently, in the 1910 Dissertation. I intend to demonstrate below that, while Judaism is followed by a more adequate Christianity, Judaism permanently influences Christianity through a progressive religious-historical dialectic. Therefore, Tillich could not have conceived of Christianity apart from Judaism as in Aryan Christianity.

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Being in its primordial, subjective unity (‘Tautousie’) is compared to Sabellianism; (2) Being in its objective, determined existence (‘Heterousie’) is compared to Arianism; and (3) the eventual, reconciled union of subjective identity and objective diversity can be expressed as ‘Homousie’, which appears to be analogous to the Nicene, or perhaps even Chalcedonian, understanding of God. Harold Zeitlow, The Living God: The Existential Systems of F.W.J. Schelling and Paul Tillich (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961), 15. Also, see note 22 above for Nuovo’s citation from Schelling’s Philosophy of Revelation, regarding the analogy between the potencies and the Trinity, as quoted in 1912 Dissertation, 177 note xxvi.

60 See 1910 Dissertation, 45, 46 (twice) and 49 for uses of ‘equilibrium’.

61 For example, in Tillich’s summary of Schelling’s second potency, Schelling is cited as saying that deism is vacuous, moralistic and one-sided, because it lacks the potency of subjectivity, the ‘power of procreation’, meaning the power of ‘going forth from itself and becoming unlike itself’. Ibid., 53; cf. Schelling GW 12:41.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to present these principles in great detail. In part I, the most important theme is that contradiction emerges within God, with additional contradictions replicated in the realm of nature and human history. It is the presence of contradiction within human history, especially between the first and second potencies, that seeks resolution in the history of religion: ‘Schelling portrays the struggle of both potencies in the world process and the gradual conquest and transfiguration of the first by the second by means of the categories of the philosophy of nature …’\textsuperscript{62} While somewhat cryptic, this suggests the cosmic importance of the conflict between the first and second potency, and also the analogy with the natural process. Freedom within God became the ground for differentiation within God, and therefore the positing of something that was 'not God', specifically, the world of ideas, nature and humanity: ‘But this ground is the irrational will, the principle of subjectivity, whose contradiction of the principle of objectivity, of the will to love, is the condition of particularity, of selfhood and creaturehood. For by means of contradiction, the world process, whose task is to reconcile that which contradicts, gets underway.’\textsuperscript{63} Whereas the first differentiation within God occurred, effectively, in a pre-temporal realm, sometimes expressed as God having two wills,\textsuperscript{64}

\textsuperscript{62} 1910 Dissertation, 48–49.
\textsuperscript{63} Ibid., 55.
\textsuperscript{64} ‘When Schelling found himself forced to the conclusion that there was an irrational element within the Absolute itself, the second main period of his development was opened, the period beginning in 1809 with his Doctrine of Freedom. The acceptance of an irrational “moment” in the Absolute turned the stress, which had been diverted, at the start of Plato’s influence, toward the universal, strongly back to the will as a principle. An examination of the dual nature of the will itself indicated a solution to the problem. The will itself had a “power” to contradict itself. The freedom which the Absolute gave to the Ideas was this power to be not-at-one with itself ... There can be no genuine freedom without the
history became the arena for the reconciliation of estranged reality back to God. Tillich concludes part I by saying that ‘a new process is necessary to restore to the potencies their “lordship over being”; that process is history’. This dialectical process will inform the analysis of each of Tillich’s dissertations on Schelling.

3.2.2 The History of Religion and the Emergence of the Religious Consciousness

The Mythological Process, Paganism and Rationality: A Feast for the Learned Poor

Part II of the 1910 Dissertation, called ‘The History of Religion’, employs the dialectic of the potencies in a development of the history of religion. It has two sections, A, titled, ‘Mythology’, and B, titled ‘Revelation’. The discussion of section A on mythology begins by recapitulating the account of the Fall, discussed above, which occurs in ‘absolute prehistoric time’. Tillich’s Schelling develops six key features of the phenomenon of history. First, history is the realm of estrangement away from God and reconciliation back to God. Immediacy with God was lost through the Fall, and through the mediation of history, humanity will return to a consciousness of the

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"power" of setting self against itself. The conclusion (notes Tillich) is that there must be an irrational self-contradiction in the Absolute’ (O'Hanlon, Influence; 35–36).

65 1910 Dissertation, 76.

66 This is a critical concept in Schelling’s philosophy of history. In part I, on the doctrine of the potencies, Tillich underscores this: ‘The qualitative notion of time that emerges in the concept of “eternal becoming” is a foundation stone for Schelling’s system, especially of his philosophy of history’ (1910 Dissertation, 58).

67 Re Manning says this is reminiscent of the neo-Platonic process of exitus et reditus. End of Culture, 89.
divine. Second, human history is the history of religion, so all cultures and religions, to one degree or another, manifest aspects of a consciousness of the divine. All mythology has some revelatory content. Third, every history manifests a duality of principles, generating a conflict that seeks resolution. Fourth, human history after ‘the Fall’ was controlled by the first potency (God the Father), with humanity mired in a state of ‘total unconsciousness’. Fifth, in a confusing but very important move for this historical dialectic of progression, the religious culture manifest in this state of unconsciousness is characterized simultaneously as ‘polytheism’, ‘original monotheism’, and ‘relative monotheism’. This period can be thought of as the time when the first potency ruled, a period of ‘utter unconsciousness’ (of God) ... not a monotheism which consciously excluded other gods, but a simple unawareness of the possibility of other gods’. As will be seen later, Christianity is referred to as ‘absolute monotheism’. Without debating the merits of this terminology, it is clear

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68 Tillich begins part A with this summary statement: ‘History is essentially the history of religion. This assumption follows directly from Schelling’s anthropology. Human consciousness is substantially God-realizing consciousness. Immediacy is lost on account of the Fall. Through the mediation of history, a conscious realization of God will take place. History is the process in which consciousness becomes indirectly what it was directly, namely, religious in the absolute sense. Everywhere, the cultural process has its roots in the religious, and in its completion returns to it. Even the cultural process can be viewed from the standpoint of the history of religion.’ This underscores the importance of religion as the basis of a theology of culture. 1910 Dissertation, 77.

69 Regarding the duality of principles, Tillich says: ‘It is necessary to assume a prehistorical condition because every history, at the very least, presupposes a duality of principles that contend with each other. However, on account of the Fall, consciousness has come under control of the first potency, which seized it and, what is more, keeps it for the present in a condition analogous to that total unconsciousness which prevailed before the beginning of the natural process’ (1910 Dissertation, 78).

70 O’Hanlon, Influence, 60.

71 Tillich explains: ‘An original, but relative monotheism can be ascribed to mankind, for the possibility of another God had not yet appeared to consciousness, although in fact it was already there. This
that original/relative monotheism is ‘one-sided’, demanding resolution with greater
equilibrium. Tillich quotes from Schelling’s *Philosophy of Mythology* (11:139):

‘Polytheism was ordained for mankind, not in order to destroy the true One, but the
one-sided One, that is, in order to destroy a merely relative monotheism.’

62 Sixth, the second potency (God the Son, or Logos) is engaged in a perpetual struggle to bring
God-consciousness to humanity. In the beginning of the section on revelation,
which will be developed later, Tillich provides an excellent summary passage that
underscores the cosmic role of the second potency, the original harmony present
‘before the Fall’, the emergence of the natural world as something external to God,
and the goal of reuniting estranged being to God:

Throughout the world-historical process the second potency is active: the
elevation of the first potency is the starting point of the process, the realization
of the third potency is the goal, but activity belongs only to the second. Just as
it is necessary to distinguish in the concept of God between nature in God and
the divine Self, so it is also necessary to distinguish between logos as cosmic
potency and logos as personality within God. To be sure, at the conclusion of
the original natural process both aspects of the logos were in perfect
harmony, for God was realized in the unity of the potencies. But on account of

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monotheism lacked comprehensiveness; it was a monotheism mythologically conceived. It was “in
fact a genuine polytheism, because it had not abolished the possibility of other gods” (11:127)” (1910
Dissertation, 78).

62 Ibid.

63 With respect to the perpetual struggle of the second potency against the first, Tillich writes: ‘there is
an incessant struggle of the second, forward driving potency against the first that resists it, a struggle
that will not end until the third potency is fully realized’ (ibid.).
the Fall and the separation of the potencies, nature has come to exist outside
God, and in this externality the second potency has also come to dwell. At the
same time, the second potency pursues God-estranged being in order to unite
with it and to lead it back to God. In this process, the logos, according to its
nature, operates as cosmic potency.\footnote{Ibid., 102–103.}

Part II stands out from the rest of the 1910 Dissertation in that its subject
matter contains a dizzying array of mythological gods and goddesses, with the most
dramatic, even lurid, references being to blood sacrifices, orgies, cult prostitution,
castration, and bisexual gods.\footnote{These references occur in his discussion of Persian, Babylonian and Arabian religions, which represent the second epoch in the dialectical sequence of the mythological process. The first epoch was the emergence of astral religion, referred to as ‘Uranos worship’. The first epoch, or movement in the dialectic, ‘holds it ground’, as the second potency is unable to overcome it. According to Tillich’s Schelling, when the second epoch, or potency, attempts to make the first potency the basis for itself, the second potency becomes, in mythological terms, the ‘mother’ of the first potency. In the mythological process, the male Uranos is transformed into the female Uranos. Tillich cites Schelling: ‘When something becomes matter for another higher reality, it becomes, for mythological consciousness, its mother. Every genuine change in mythology occurs when the god changes into a woman, when he becomes the mother of the god who is to come.’ SW 12:193. This principle governs the mythological meaning attributed to cult prostitution, castration, bisexual gods and the Old Testament prohibitions regarding men dressed as women and the reverse. SW 12:249, 251. 1910 Dissertation, 81–82.} The mythological process begins, so to speak, ‘in
the stars’, with the ‘astral’ (astrological) religion of Uranos, and it ends in the Greek
mystery religions, in the Mediterranean, although some mythological elements
endure in the religions of revelation that emerge, but only in the ancient Near East.
The religions of revelation are Judaism, Christianity and Islam. Despite the
seemingly incoherent sequence of mythological creatures and events, Schelling is
attempting to mine the vast history of world religions for signs of divine presence and activity, or ‘consciousness of God’, with meaning for each participant assigned by its role in the dialectical structure. It is the determination of these various roles that leads Tillich to describe Schelling’s analysis as a ‘process’ (‘the mythological process’ and ‘the rational process’) and not just a chronology, and to use the term ‘construction’.

The emergence of mythology itself was caused by the action of the second potency against the first, disturbing the pre-historic unity of mankind,\(^7\)\(^6\) dissolving into a variety of nations, tribes and races, each with a distinct mythology.\(^7\)\(^7\) According to Tillich’s adaptation of Schelling, ‘mythology is characterized by a longing for, and tragic inability to attain, the original identity of the divine’.\(^7\)\(^8\) Tillich’s adaptation of Schelling imagines that the emergence of the consciousness of God, in mythological form, could potentially arise from anywhere in human history and culture: ‘However the mythological process is not confined to the primary bearers of its development. With every advance there is a common vibration in the entire consciousness of mankind, whose traces can be found everywhere among races that either represent

\(^7\)\(^6\) Prehistoric time came to an end as soon as the second potency began to have an effect upon consciousness in order to break the predominance of the first. Then came the time of transition, which was fulfilled “by that tremendous vibration of human feeling and knowledge that produced the images of the folk-gods” (13:380) … ’ (1910 Dissertation, 78–79).

\(^7\)\(^7\) ‘... corresponding to the religious confusion that was just beginning, there was a dissolution of the unity of mankind into nations, tribes and races. Nothing can separate a race or a nation from another except mythology, which defines the inmost essence of the spirit. (11:94)’. This dissolution of the original unity of the human race was expressed mythologically in the Genesis story of the Tower of Babel (Gen. 11:1–9). 1910 Dissertation, 79.

\(^7\)\(^8\) Re Manning, *End of Culture*, 93: ‘There is a lamentation for the lost god throughout the whole of mythology. Longing follows him and calls him back’; cf. SW II/2 273.
a higher stage of the mythological process or among those who do not participate in the principal development of history.\textsuperscript{79}

What did Tillich think of this? Did he really believe in the history of religion as constructed by Schelling, as if it were empirically true in every detail? This is not likely, but Tillich viewed Schelling’s analysis as a means to an end,\textsuperscript{80} the end of providing a basis for the concept of ‘philosophical religion’ that is developed in part III of the 1910 Dissertation. Tillich acknowledges that many, if not all, of the empirical details of Schelling’s analysis of the mythological process have been overturned by modern research, although there is ‘an abundance of ingenious and profound observations upon which … many learned poor could feast’.\textsuperscript{81}

\textsuperscript{79} 1910 Dissertation, 79. Nevertheless, when the mythological process yields to the revelatory process, revelatory religions emerge in the Near East, initially in Judaism.

\textsuperscript{80} At the beginning of a section titled ‘Gods and Idols’, Tillich writes: ‘Obviously the construction of the history of religion given here comprehends only a fraction of the religions that actually exist. But for a systematic construction, this is of no consequence. What matters here is the process by which the spiritual potency becomes predominant in consciousness. In principle, it is enough if it has been realized at one point in history. Only the quality of the outcome is valid here. As in nature, so also in history, God’s way goes from the broad to the narrow. Moreover, it should be noted that his construction confines itself to the Near East and the Mediterranean region (with the sole exception of India, whose special position within the history of mythology is most comparable to Christianity). The nations of these regions and their culture are entirely interlaced with the history of Israel, and together they flow into the Hellenistic culture of the Roman Empire. Therefore an external economy is attained here that puts the concept of the ‘fullness of time’ in a new light: when Christianity enters the world, its way is prepared in a positive sense not only by the religious history of Israel, but also by the history of paganism.’ Ibid., 93.

\textsuperscript{81} The comment about ‘the learned poor’ is attributed to Otto Pfeiderer (d. 1908), professor at the Universities of Jena and Berlin. Cf. Wikipedia, ‘Otto Pfeiderer’ [accessed 03/25/2012]. I do not know what Tillich meant by this, so am left to speculate that he believed Schelling’s history of religion, from a purely factual standpoint, to be a ‘poor man’s history of religion’. Tillich, 1910 Dissertation, part II,
In addition to the transition to history and emergence of mythology described above, the remaining topics of part II include: (i) a detailed exposition of the mythological process, covering the transition to history in astrological religion, through various epochs including (not exhaustively), Persia, Phoenicia, Egypt, India, and concluding with the Greek mystery religions; (ii) a discussion of opposing 'submythological' and 'antimythological' religions of China, Zoroastrianism, and Buddhism, with each of these religions withdrawing from the mythological process; and (iii) a non-chronological discussion of 'the rational process', which sets up the following discussion of revelation, in section B, of part II. Due to the limits of space, I will not discuss the sequence of contradiction and attempted resolution in the remaining parts of the mythological process, but will explore the emergence of rational religion, as a necessary precursor to the emergence of revelation. Following that, I will discuss the role of Judaism as a bridge connecting the phenomena of mythological, rational religion, and revelatory religion. Judaism served as the only means by which the revelatory impulses buried in estranged humanity could

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165–166 note 1. O'Hanlon concurs that Tillich believed that the empirical features of religions as held by Schelling were problematic. O'Hanlon, Influences, 62.

82 According to O'Hanlon, the Chinese avoided the mythological process by transferring the struggle of the potencies from the religious sphere to the political sphere; Zoroastrianism ('Parsiism'), Hinduism and Buddhism withdrew into 'pantheism', which also suffers from the limitations of reason, as did the Greek mystery religions. O'Hanlon, Influence, 64.

83 O'Hanlon discerns three 'epochs', with Uranos representing the first epoch, Urania the second epoch, and Egyptian mythology as the third epoch. These all embody the first potency, which is then resisted by Indian mythology, which fails in its resistance. Then Greek mythology emerges, representing the third potency or spirit: 'The Greek mythology contains all the elements of the mythological process in complete harmony: in it the third potency is realized' (ibid., 62–63). While this is not entirely clear, O'Hanlon's Influence is the only sustained interpretation I have found of the construction of the history of religions according to Tillich's Schelling.
ultimately become manifest in a universal manner.

*The Catastrophe of the Rational Process and the Emergence of Revelation*

At the end of Tillich’s discussion of part II, A. Mythology, which I have significantly condensed, he appends a four page transitional discussion titled ‘The Rational Process’. This section serves as a bridge between the lengthy, expansive and dramatic analysis of mythology, and a more restrained presentation of the religions of revelation in section B, titled ‘Revelation’. However, following the dialectical pattern characterized above, the mythological period, or process, does not simply end to let another process begin, it ends in a ‘catastrophe’.\(^{84}\) It is not entirely clear why Tillich uses such a graphic term, although at a minimum it seems that mythology had exhausted its own internal resources, and that it had reached its own internal limitations.\(^{85}\) Below it will be shown that mythological characteristics continue, in both rational and revelatory religion. Therefore, it seems odd to say that the mythological period ended in a catastrophe, if what is meant by this that there would be no

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\(^{85}\) In addition, as I will demonstrate below, in the unfolding of rational religion, the ego and/or rational self experiences an existential crisis triggered by the demands and restrictions imposed by civil society, and seeks refuge in mystical, yet rational, contemplation. Tillich’s Schelling refers to this as the experience of ‘the curse of the law’. I am not sure if this would explain the use of the term ‘catastrophe’.
continuity with the next stage of the mythological process.

Despite the somewhat elusive nature of the ‘catastrophe’, at least five features emerge in this section about the rational process. First, Tillich is making a transition from talking about God ‘from above’, my shorthand for the mythological process, to talking about God ‘from below’, my shorthand for the talking about the divine from a worldly perspective, in particular the invention of culture,\(^{86}\) how the divine presence is manifest in human institutions. Tillich writes:

The ambiguity of the outcome of the philosophy of nature, of man as a natural being, leads to the assumption of the Fall, and with it, a new process in human consciousness, the cultural process. According to this construction, the cultural process is nothing but the mythological process viewed from a specific standpoint. Whereas the mythological process is the history of God-consciousness, the rational process is the history of world-consciousness.\(^{87}\)

In addition, these two ‘histories of consciousness’ are internally related, and this is important for the third point below.\(^{88}\)

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\(^{86}\) Re Manning, *End of Culture*, 93.

\(^{87}\) 1910 Dissertation, 98. Also cited from Re Manning, *End of Culture*, 93.

\(^{88}\) But since the potencies that are effective in the world process are the same as those that dominate religious consciousness, a perfect correlation takes place between them. All progress toward the attainment of freedom from the real potency is at the same time progress in the conscious attitude toward nature and human society, and *vice versa* (1910 Dissertation, 98). Nuovo observes that this is an early example of Tillich’s method of correlation: ‘Tillich’s method of correlation is based upon this relationship between religion and philosophy, between the mythological and the rational process’ (ibid., 177, translator’s note xxi).
Second, the presupposition of the rational process is not only that there is a rational self that inhabits the natural and social world, but that such a rational self necessarily exists in community, among other rational selves. It is the inescapable reality of interrelationships and limitations that ushers in the ‘demand’ of ‘the law’, or moral obligation, similar to Kant’s categorical imperative, and also the importance of the state in enforcing limits on autonomous selves.\(^{89}\)

Third, in a difficult logical move, the state, despite its oppressive tendencies, at the same time could provide an environment for a free individual to emerge, whose status could be elevated even above the state itself. And this emergence of the individual created a basis for universality that would transcend nations and cultures. There is a parallel relation between the realization of the self in the mythological process, and realization of the self within the cultural process, here ‘the state’. Recalling the internal relation of the two ‘histories of consciousness’ referred to in the first feature above, Tillich writes: ‘Under the protection of the power of the state, a conscious, free, and spiritual attitude toward the natural potencies develops in inner correlation with the progress of mythology. It gives rise to values that raise the individual above the state.’\(^{90}\) Tillich’s adaptation of Schelling argues that in three historical instances, Oriental despotism, Greek democracy, and Roman monarchy,

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\(^{89}\) ‘Demand enters consciousness whenever the intelligible order reacts against the state of absolute unreason by means of the moral law. The demand proves that the goal of the rational process is not the individual, but ideal or universal man, that is, the living unity of a harmoniously graded multitude to which not the individual but the whole fully corresponds (11:529). Empirically, this law imposes itself by force’ (1910 Dissertation, 99).

\(^{90}\) Ibid., 100.
the goal was to exemplify ‘the restoration of ideal humanity’\textsuperscript{91}. Further, this elevation of the individual to universal status, inevitably sought to break through the barriers of national culture.\textsuperscript{92} In the analysis of revelation that appears below, the importance of universality will become more apparent.

Fourth, in a pivotal move, Tillich’s adaptation of Schelling argues that the rational self experiences an existential crisis of sorts, a ‘turning point’, by becoming aware of its departure from God, by fearing the impersonality and even harshness of the moral law, and by experiencing a worthlessness to its own existence.\textsuperscript{93} This is the experience of ‘the curse of the law’.\textsuperscript{94} The response of the ego is to turn inward, to become contemplative, and even to diminish or annul its agency to regain union with God.\textsuperscript{95} This is achieved in three successive stages, starting with mystical piety,

\textsuperscript{91} Tillich cites Schelling, 11:541ff. 1910 Dissertation, 100.
\textsuperscript{92} ‘Thus this construction of the rational process cannot remain at a standstill; it progresses toward an inward and individual relationship to the law that breaks through the barriers of national culture.’ And, quoting Schelling (11:553), ‘No one becomes the property of the state, but everyone belongs unconditionally to the moral law.’ 1910 Dissertation, 100.
\textsuperscript{93} Tillich again quotes from vol. 11 of Schelling, the Philosophy of Mythology: ‘But now it can be clearly seen “what happened to the ego when it escaped from God … Its initial and natural attitude is hatred and rebelliousness toward the law … For, being universal and impersonal, the law cannot avoid being harsh … Whoever wills to be himself shall see himself subject to the universal” (11:554).’ In addition, ‘Thus, there can be no joy, and the ego, completely discouraged, begins “to realize the nothingness and the worthlessness of his entire existence” (11:556).’ 1910 Dissertation, 100.
\textsuperscript{94} 1910 Dissertation, 100.
\textsuperscript{95} “With this step from the active to the contemplative life, the ego also comes over to the side of God. Without knowing God it seeks a godly life in this ungodly world. And because this quest takes place in conjunction with the abandonment of selfhood, the ego regains its connection with God, for on account of its selfhood it had become separated from God” (11:556).’ 1910 Dissertation, 100.
progressing through aesthetic intuition, and arriving at intellectual intuition. This is a peculiar move, if we understand ‘reason’ in a purely secular, rationalist sense, but it follows naturally assuming Schelling’s ‘Christianized’ understanding of reason.

Fifth, true freedom cannot be realized through coercion by the state, but by the cultivation of religion, within culture and within community, that posits a god that is above reason and that can only be apprehended by mystical intuition. Both mythology (natural religion) and rational religion lead up to, but fall short of, reconciliation with the personal God. Tillich concludes the long and difficult section on the mythological process by pointing to the necessity of a religion that worships a personal God as the only means of salvation, establishing a foundation for Judaism, Islam and Christianity as religions of revelation.

The ego finds its salvation only when it possesses God in actuality, and when it is united (reconciled) to him, that is, when it is united to him by means of religion, that is, by means of a voluntary, spiritual, personal religion that brings the old world in its entirety to an end (11:567). The catastrophe of the rational process is the true end of paganism.

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96 1910 Dissertation, 101. According to O’Hanlon, these three stages of rational, mystical contemplation correspond to: (i) a piety of feeling, the Kant–Fichte period; (ii) aesthetic intuition, the opposition of Kant and Fichte; and (iii) intellectual intuition, the Philosophy of Identity. O’Hanlon, Influences, 91.
97 ‘... the ego desires a God ‘who is outside of and above reason, to whom is possible what is impossible to reason, who is equal to the law, that is, a God who can set one free from the law’ (11:566f.). 1910 Dissertation, 102.
98 O’Hanlon, Influences, 88.
However, revelation does not mean full reconciliation. The goal of the following section is to explain how Judaism exhibits mythological and rational elements, and also elements of revelation. This enabled Judaism to lead the way toward, but not to finally express, this ‘voluntary, spiritual and personal religion’, which would ultimately be expressed in Christianity.

3.2.3 Tillich’s Analysis of Judaism

The Pagan Principle as the Basis for Revelation

Everything said up to now has tried to establish a framework so that one can have a sense for how the worldview of Tillich’s Schelling unfolds, its starting point, its tensions, and its driving forces, and how these provide a context for the role of Judaism. Section B, 'Revelation', has two sections, the first on Judaism and Islam ('Mohammedanism'), which are the first instances of religions of revelation, and a second part on Christianity, the culmination of the revelatory process. This discussion will focus on the analysis of Judaism and Islam, with the goal of demonstrating how Judaism (primarily) embodies the features of mythology, but also of revelation, and therefore paves the way for Christianity, which manifests the fullness of ‘God consciousness’. Therefore, this revelatory framework ascribed to by Tillich’s appropriation of Schelling is progressive, insofar as Christianity more adequately conveys the fullness of revelation versus Judaism. However, Tillich’s adaptation of Schelling also concludes that Christianity cannot be severed from its Jewish roots, over against the Aryan Christians, as seen in Chapter 2 of this
dissertation. In addition, the shift in the relationship of the universal to the particular in Jewish prophetism, to be discussed below, bears some resemblance to Tillich’s doctrine of the Logos, which will be discussed in Chapter 6 of this dissertation in the analysis of Tillich’s Systematic Theology. In Chapter 6 it will be shown that Tillich’s doctrine of the Logos provides the basis for a reciprocal relationship between Judaism and Christianity, in addition to a progressive relationship, exemplifying, respectively, the historical dialectic of progression and the ontological dialectic of balance.

My analysis has three parts, with the first two parts analyzing Tillich’s explicit discussion of Judaism, occurring on pages 102 through 107 of the 1910 Dissertation, titled ‘Judaism and Mohammedanism’.\textsuperscript{100} The third part discusses the remaining two somewhat incidental references to Judaism, which also generally support continuity between Judaism and Christianity.

Revelation, as understood by Tillich’s adaptation of Schelling, has four characteristics, and vividly exhibits the dialectical structure of the history of religion: (i) it is a process; (ii) it is mediated by the operation of the second potency, or the logos; (iii) it is grounded in the ‘natural’ manifestations of mythology; and (iv) it finally emerges in the paradoxical transformation of the particular into the universal. Judaism is the initial embodiment of revelatory religion. It passes through three historical stages, with the first being the Abrahamic/Mosaic stage, and the second being the stage of Prophetism. Both stages exhibit mythological and revelatory

\textsuperscript{100} The structure contains five numbered paragraphs, as if the paragraphs were distinct theses.
characteristics. However, the relationship between the mythological and revelatory shifts from the first stage to the second stage, based upon the change in the relation between the universal and particular. In the Abrahamic/Mosaic stage, the mythological substance is considered universal, and the revelatory form is particular, as will be discussed in more detail below. In the second stage of Prophetism, the transformation of the particular into the universal begins, although elements of particularity remain. In the third stage of ‘normative Judaism’,\textsuperscript{101} the mythological element appears to be rejected entirely, and the transformation of the particular into the universal is completed.

First, revelation is a process that requires tension, and is not an immediate eruption of a ‘supernatural’ power that has no continuity with human history and culture: ‘revelation cannot immediately dissolve a tension that once been posited, it can only do so through a process’ (14:145).\textsuperscript{102} This anticipates Tillich’s mature understanding of revelation as articulated in volume I of his \textit{Systematic Theology}.\textsuperscript{103} In part I, II.A.7, ‘The History of Revelation’ of \textit{ST I}, Tillich provides the fullest discussion of his understanding of the relationship between the Old Testament and the New Testament. He cites several ways in which the Old Testament records historical events and provides the symbols for the final revelation of the Christ event in the New Testament. Therefore, the Old Testament is uniquely and inseparably related to the New Testament and the final revelation in Jesus as the Christ. An

\textsuperscript{101} It is not clear what Tillich means by this, but the context suggests an idealized form of Judaism. He later uses the term ‘prophetic universalism’.

\textsuperscript{102} 1910 Dissertation, 105.

\textsuperscript{103} \textit{ST I}, 141–143.
essential aspect of this is the process of reception, rejection and transformation of pagan and/or Old Testament symbols into revelation. The main example is the appropriation by the ancient Christian church of the Suffering Servant of ‘Second Isaiah’, as a unique preparation for the later paradox of the Cross. This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6 of this dissertation.

Second, revelation is mediated by the second potency, as a personal being:

Throughout the world-historical process the second potency is active: the elevation of the first potency is the starting-point of the process, the realization of the third potency is the goal, but activity belongs only to the second … the second potency pursues God-estranged being in order to unite with it and to lead it back to God. In this process, the logos, according to its nature, operates as cosmic potency … .Revelation is the term for the action of God as personality, or since it is the logos who acts, it is the term for the action of the logos as personality within God.\textsuperscript{104}

Third, revelation is always grounded in mythology, or the natural expressions of religion; this is the ‘pagan principle’: ‘Revelation occurs in this way: through the mediation of the second potency, the true God reveals himself to consciousness, which posits God in substance. God reveals himself within this substance. Therefore, this substantial, natural content of original consciousness always remains the basis and medium of revelation.’\textsuperscript{105} This principle is exhibited in the history of religion in the

\textsuperscript{104} 1910 Dissertation, 102–103.
\textsuperscript{105} Ibid., 104.
initially parallel developments of paganism, implied as pre-Israelite and pre-Christian religions, and the Israelite religion. The parallel ends with paganism exhausting itself in the 'catastrophe of the rational process', as discussed above. Tillich clearly articulates this parallel structure between the history of Israel, as found in the Old Testament, and the rest of human history, or paganism. He makes an important but muted reference to the universality of paganism, whose importance becomes evident in the fourth feature of revelation, which will be discussed below:

'There is a twofold history of the mediating potency; there is, as it were, a historia sacra and a historia profana of its action' (14:119). The Old Testament contains the historia sacra. Whereas it is the task of the historia profana to set forth the universality of the potencies, it is the task of the historia sacra to reveal their unity. The former is secular for it is based on a natural process that is external to God. The latter is sacred for it is based on a supernatural process within God. The former presupposes the separation of the potencies outside God, the latter, the unity of personality within God.\footnote{Ibid., 103.}

Tillich further develops the pagan principle by giving examples from the history of Israel as expressed in the Old Testament, and by appealing to the distinction between 'pagan substance' and 'revelational form'. The main example is the Genesis account of God's command for Abraham to sacrifice Isaac. The pagan substance is the practice of human sacrifice, which Tillich specifically says has a parallel in ancient Phoenicia, but also occurred elsewhere in the ancient world. The
revelational form is the intervention of the angel of 'the Lord' (Elohim), with the specific name being the distinguishing characteristic of divinity:

A typical example of how the pagan principle, which is the basis of Judaism and which gives it reality, is governed by revelation and becomes potential through it, is the story of the sacrifice of Isaac. Elohim commands Abraham to sacrifice his son, as Kronos commanded the Phoenicians. To Abraham, this command has complete reality. But the angel of Jehovah prevents him from carrying it out. Jehovah, whom the angel manifests, is a definite and distinct God. In contrast to that nameless God of prehistory who is substance, he has a name, that is, a form (11:163). All the biblical narratives in which Elohim reveals his name Jehovah belong here ... In particular, pagan substance and revelational form are traceable in the statutes and ordinances of Mosaic religion [Mosaismus].

Note the distinction between substance, the 'nameless God of prehistory', and form, the God who has a name, Jehovah, or Elohim. At this mythological stage, substance is universal, meaning that the practice of human sacrifice was common in the ancient world. The particular, revelatory element is the God with a name, a personal God. Tillich provides additional examples, including the significance of circumcision as a mitigation of the 'cult of castration'; and the ark of the covenant and tabernacle corresponding to Egyptian prototypes. Tillich's adaptation of Schelling concludes

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107 Ibid., 104–105.
108 Ibid., 105. Tillich quotes Schelling SW 14:134 and 14:135, respectively, regarding these two phenomena.
that the pagan substance is fundamental to revelation: ‘Mosaic religion is inconceivable if one does not perceive within it the reality of paganism on the one hand, and actual revelation on the other (14:145)’; and ‘The secret of the formation and the structure of the Old Testament is based, for the most part, upon the necessity to cherish and preserve this pagan substance (14:125).’"\textsuperscript{109}

\textit{Revelation as the Transformation of the Particular into the Universal}

The fourth characteristic of revelation, the transformation of the particular into the universal, occurs in two stages, beginning with Prophetism, and becoming completed in prophetic universalism, the stage of ‘normative Judaism’. The foregoing discussion understands mythology to be common to all humanity, and therefore, universal. This relation of universal mythology and particular revelation \textit{begins} a reversal in the second stage of Judaism, or Prophetism. This reversal is \textit{completed} in the third, or ‘normative’, stage of Judaism, which appears to be a phenomenon that Tillich calls ‘prophetic universalism’.\textsuperscript{110} Tillich’s analysis of Prophetism makes two observations, which are both included in the fourth section of ‘B. Revelation: Judaism and Mohammedanism’. First, just as paganism reached self-consciousness in the Greek mystery religions, Judaism reached self-consciousness in Prophetism.\textsuperscript{111} According to the dialectic of the history of religions presented thus far, the relationship between paganism and Judaism manifests the tension between the

\textsuperscript{108} 1910 Dissertation, 105.
\textsuperscript{110} The term ‘prophetic universalism’ appears only once as far as I can tell, in the discussion of Prophetism. \textit{Ibid.}, 106.
\textsuperscript{111} \textit{Ibid.}, 105.
first and second potencies, with Judaism possessing sufficient revelational form to
begin the transformation into the third potency. Second, in a manifestation of Spirit,
the third potency, Prophetism began to transcend the cultural limitations and
superstitions of the Mosaic law, but some elements of the Mosaic law were permitted
to remain. The following is the core of Tillich’s description of Prophetism:

Spirit, the potency of the future, speaks already in the prophets of Israel and
leads beyond the law, without, however, annulling it for the present. To be
sure, ‘that superstitious customs like those prescribed in the Mosaic
ceremonial law’ should somehow continue to develop during the age of the
Kings of Israel was made impossible by the prophets (11:174n). But just as
little was the importance of such customs for that present disputed. Prophetic
universalism is supposed to be explained in the same way. For the present it
let the boundaries of the chosen race remain.\(^\text{112}\)

This passage underscores the idea that revelation is a process, since the remnants
of the Mosaic law were permitted to remain. It also suggests that God’s revelation to
the people of Israel would be limited to them for a season, and that revelation would
ultimately be expanded beyond ethnic and national boundaries. This, therefore,
describes the transition from the second stage of Judaism, Prophetism, to the third
stage, ‘normative Judaism’. It is reasonable to assume that normative Judaism is
also what Tillich refers to as ‘prophetic universalism’.

Up to this point, the framework developed by Tillich’s adaptation of Schelling

\(^{\text{112}}\) Ibid., 105–106.
is fairly coherent, insofar as it enables one to discern how Judaism functions within the theologically charged history of religions. At the final stage of the emergence of revelation, Prophetism, which is particular to the people of Israel, is transformed into prophetic universalism. However, there is one step in Tillich’s reasoning that is unclear. While it is clear that the goal is a religious form of universality that transcends ethnic and national boundaries, the mechanism appears to be something called the ‘purely cosmic’ element or powers, which were present in both paganism and Judaism. These appear to be some kind of revelatory core, or perhaps the activity of the second potency, that failed to propel paganism past the Greek mysteries, but endured in Judaism. While it is also clear that Tillich refers to a critical ‘paradox’, it is not clear just what the elements of this paradox are, and just how it emerges from the framework that has been established, and just how it relates to normative Judaism.\footnote{In ST I, 141–143 there is a discussion of the paradox of revelation as initially expressed in Second Isaiah, and later in the Cross of Christ.} The following is the full reference to normative Judaism, occurring after the discussion of Prophetism, and before a final illustration of revelatory religion in Islam:

The mythological element was the foundation of the post-prophetic development of Judaism. For the Jews it became the mantle of the supernatural, and thereby holiness itself. Therefore, it was very difficult for the Jews ‘to free themselves from their ritual law, and from that purely cosmic element peculiar to it’ (14:149). In paganism, the purely cosmic powers became impotent in themselves through the metaphysical process. In
Judaism, as the substrate of revelation, they held the power of the antitheological principle. The result was a paradox: the power of the mythological principle enjoyed its final triumph in the antimythological religion of revelation (11:150 sic).\textsuperscript{114}

Unfortunately, Tillich’s descriptions of both ‘Prophetism’ and ‘prophetic universalism’ are fragmentary, especially in relation to the relative importance they will later assume in The Socialist Decision. However, this does not detract from the clear transitional role of Judaism, in the movement from paganism to Christianity, exemplifying the historical dialectic of progression.

Tillich’s characterization of Islam (‘Mohammedanism’) is much more vivid, although it is cast in a very negative light. According to Tillich, Islam is a ‘supreme’ instance of an ‘antimythological religion of revelation’. This is mainly because of Islam’s monotheism, which serves as a dialectical antidote to both polytheistic paganism, and incipient polytheism within Christianity, presumably due to its Trinitarian theology.

5) The assertion that the mythological principle enjoyed its final triumph in the antimythological religion of revelation is supremely applicable to that world-historical after-effect of Judaism in Mohammedanism. The awesome successes of Mohammed can only be explained as due to ‘a prodigious force rising again from the past ... which burst forth destroying and laying waste the tradition and culture that by that time had evolved’ (11:167). Just at the

\textsuperscript{114} Ibid., 106.
moment when Christianity, which not only excluded polytheism as Judaism had done, but also assimilated it, had completely overcome ‘the austere one-sided unity of original monotheism, the ancient, primordial religion arose once again – irrationally and fanatically – with the force of necessity’ 11:167). Mohammed set the austere, impassive god of prehistory not only against the polydaemonism prevailing among his clansmen, but above all against the apparent polytheism of Christianity. ‘Like the Rechabites, Mohammed even forbade his followers to take wine’ (11:168).\footnote{Ibid., 106–107.}

Nevertheless, according to Tillich's Schelling, Islam falls short of the fullness of revelatory religion, which must not only be voluntaristic, but also spiritual and personal. While Tillich perceived Islam to be highly voluntaristic, he also perceived it to be impersonal and legalistic. Due to its strikingly negative tone, this characterization of Islam appears to have been appended to this section simply to account for Islam's overwhelming and undeniable historical presence, and not for its inherent theological value. Islam is mentioned, but it also seems to 'withdraw' from the dialectical process,\footnote{Above, in the section titled 'The Mythological Process', Buddhism, Zoroastrianism and Hinduism 'withdrew' from the dialectical process, for various reasons.} by making no enduring theological contribution, despite its deep historical and cross-cultural presence.

\textit{Ancillary References to Judaism in the 1910 Dissertation}

The analysis in the preceding two parts, 4.A. and 4.B., represents Tillich's core discussion of Judaism, and was taken from the section on Revelation, titled 'Judaism
and Mohammedanism. In that section, Judaism was described as a historical and theological phenomenon, which had three chronological periods, and served as a bridge from mythology and paganism to the fullness of revelatory religion, specifically Christianity. In the section immediately following in the 1910 Dissertation, titled ‘Christianity’, the discussion of revelation begins with paganism and Judaism being paired together, with both having a rational dimension that fails, and yet both paving the way for revelation: ‘Paganism and Judaism both pointed beyond themselves by prophesying a perfect religion of the future; and both ended in a catastrophe that realized the negative moment of the prophecy and made the positive moment an urgent demand.’ Titilch finds that Judaism is ultimately inadequate since it experiences a catastrophe of reason, but it serves as a unique precursor to Christianity. While it is not clear how paganism prophesied ‘a perfect religion of the future’, this understanding of Judaism is in harmony with the preceding discussion.

In addition to the above citation, there are two remaining references to Judaism that occur in part III of the 1910 Dissertation, on philosophical religion. Part III analyzes in greater detail the concepts of ‘history’ and ‘religion’ as they relate to the history of religion. The penultimate reference to Judaism occurs at the beginning of a section on revealed and philosophical religion: ‘The concept of revelation has a comprehensive significance for Schelling. It includes Judaism and Christianity within itself, and signifies the supernatural efficacy of the second potency

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in contrast to its natural efficacy in paganism.\textsuperscript{119} This reference supports the thesis that Judaism is essentially related to Christianity. The final reference to Judaism occurs in a section that distinguishes between historical philosophy and the philosophy of history, and is more neutral as it relates to my thesis. However, it provides a helpful summary of how paganism, Judaism and Christianity each contribute to the full realization of God-consciousness, within the framework of a dialectical history of religion:

Historical philosophy is the domain of freedom, will and act, which, in the final analysis, is religion. The subject of historical philosophy is divine history whose nucleus is the history of religion. Its task is to interpret actual religion. It is concerned with the great acts of freedom that found the divine-human relationship, namely, creation, fall and redemption. It treats the latter in a three-fold sense: extrinsic redemption in paganism, mediated redemption in Judaism, intrinsic, unmediated redemption in Christianity.\textsuperscript{120}

The 1910 Dissertation has been treated in great detail, receiving more exposition and analysis that I will provide for the 1912 Dissertation. This is despite the relatively low level of importance that Tillich appears to have assigned to it.\textsuperscript{121} In

\textsuperscript{119} 1910 Dissertation, 135. Part III.1.4. 'Revealed and Philosophical Religion'.

\textsuperscript{120} 1910 Dissertation, 148.

\textsuperscript{121} Nuovo, in the introduction to the 1912 Dissertation, observes that Tillich relied upon the 1912 Dissertation to interpret Schelling in his three key works on Schelling: (i) the essay titled, 'Existential Philosophy: Its Historical Meaning', in \textit{Theology of Culture} (New York, 1964); (ii) the Stuttgart lecture to commemorate the 100th anniversary of Schelling's death, 'Schelling und die Anfänge des existentialistischen Protestes', in \textit{Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung} 9 (1955; and (iii)
the 1912 Dissertation, Tillich develops an argument about the emergence of revelation in paganism, Judaism and Christianity by a phenomenological analysis of human experience, which will be articulated as the contradiction between 'mysticism' and 'guilt-consciousness'.

The discussion of Judaism receives even less treatment, in terms of pages, than in the 1910 Dissertation, because Tillich made reference to his 1910 Dissertation by way of footnotes, rather than repeating his arguments. However, by developing the argument in the 1912 Dissertation about human experience in far greater depth, in response to Kant, it also may have enabled Tillich to dispense with the empirically questionable details that pervade Schelling’s extensive history of religion, the 'abundance of ingenious and profound observations upon which ... many learned poor could feast'. As will be discussed below, the 1912 Dissertation is largely a response to Kant’s three critiques. For Tillich, this would have provided an unquestionably respectable foundation for his project of seeking a synthesis to resolve what he believed to be a universally experienced contradiction in human religious experience.

3.3 The 1912 Dissertation: Judaism as the Dialectical Opponent of Paganism and the Source of Christianity

In the 1910 Dissertation, Tillich provided an extensive analysis of the history of

\[Perspectives on 19th and 20th Century Protestant Theology (New York, 1967), 141–152. 1912 Dissertation, 10 and note 2.\]

\[122\] Two pages and two extended footnotes, versus five pages in the 1910 Dissertation.

\[123\] See note 81 above.
religion, followed by a relatively brief religious and theological application. In the 1912 Dissertation, the emphasis is reversed, with most of the analysis devoted to the problems posed by Kant, with a shorter concluding section devoted to their resolution within the history of religion. In both dissertations, Judaism receives a relatively brief analysis, although the history of religion is the common vehicle for the manifestation of revelation. According to Tillich's appropriation of Schelling, Judaism provides a unique foundation for Christianity, like the 1910 Dissertation. In addition, Christianity also resolves the contradiction inherent in Judaism.

The structure of Tillich's thought is deeply indebted to Kant, and Tillich throughout his career responds in one way or another to Kant. In the 1912 Dissertation, Tillich responds to Kant's three Critiques, with a particular 'antinomy' characteristic of each, \(^{124}\) and also situates his work within the context of the entirety of western philosophy. According to the translator Nuovo, 'Tillich suggests in his introduction and in the early sections of the work that the true significance of the outcome of Schelling's philosophical development can be grasped only when it is viewed within an ever-widening circle that comprehends, first, classical German philosophy beginning with Kant, then modern philosophy since Descartes and Spinoza, and finally western philosophy since Parmenides.'\(^{125}\)

The 1912 Dissertation also has three parts. Part I, called the 'Historical-

\(^{124}\) In the first critique, *The Critique of Pure Reason*, there is an antinomy between 'Consciousness in General' and the 'Thing Itself'. In the second critique, *The Critique of Practical Reason*, there is an antinomy between 'Moral World Order' and 'Radical Evil'. In the third critique, *The Critique of Judgment*, there is an antinomy between 'Organic' and 'Inorganic'. 1912 Dissertation, 33–44.

\(^{125}\) Nuovo, translator's introduction, 1912 Dissertation, 10.
Dialectical Foundation of the Problem’, provides the theoretical basis for the problem by demonstrating the recurring contradiction between the experience of oneness with God and the experience of alienation from God. The opening sentence of the 1912 Dissertation summarizes the recurring problem of the contradiction between truth and morality as applied to religion. Tillich observes that there are two fundamental, common religious experiences. The first is the union between the individual and the divine, explained philosophically as ‘identity’, and religiously as ‘mysticism’. The second impulse is fear of the holy, explained philosophically as the contradiction between self-interest and obligation, and religiously as ‘guilt-consciousness’.  

Mysticism and guilt-consciousness, the feeling of unity with the absolute and consciousness of opposition to God, the principle of the identity of the absolute and individual spirit and the experience of contradiction between Holy Lord and sinful creature: this is the antinomy for whose solution religious thought in the Church in every age has struggled and must continually struggle.  

Tillich follows this with a discussion of pre-Kantian philosophy, which is followed by a discussion of Kant’s three Critiques referred to above.

Part II discusses the variety of ways that mysticism and identity function within the earlier Schelling, in his speculative (‘negative’) philosophy, and the limitations of

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126 ‘The holy and exalted God of Israel, whose look is like a consuming fire, before whom no man can stand (cf. Isaiah 6)’ (1912 Dissertation, 27–28).
127 Ibid., 27.
ethical concepts to comprehend and resolve the original contradiction between truth and morality. Tillich concludes part II by showing that one pole of the original contradiction, ‘guilt consciousness’, cannot possibly resolve the contradiction, especially if it is expressed solely in intellectual terms. This sets the stage for a fuller development of theological concepts in part III.

In part III of the 1912 Dissertation, Tillich discusses Schelling’s attempt to synthesize mysticism and guilt-consciousness in his later period, where he develops his ‘positive’ philosophy, also known as his philosophy of freedom. There are two main sections, with the first discussing several overtly theological concepts, such as sin, guilt, wrath, and grace, called ‘The Solution in Principle’. In the second section, called ‘The Religio-Historical Solution’, Tillich revisits Schelling’s views on history and religion, including the role of Judaism. Similar to the treatment of Judaism in the 1910 Dissertation, here Judaism plays a transitional role from paganism, characterized by its mythological elements, to Christianity, characterized by its revelatory elements. Like the 1910 Dissertation, there is a section devoted to the construction of the history of religion, beginning with a discussion of mythology, and ending with a discussion of revelation, and the discussion of mythology ends with a treatment of the catastrophe of mysticism and the rational process. However, paganism is cast in a somewhat more negative light, with an emphasis on its appeal to a capricious, divinized nature. Paganism is in ‘bondage to God’ as ‘grievous sacrifices are made to assuage the consciousness of guilt’, which for Tillich’s

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128 Paganism, entirely under the sway of the first potency, is understood as consciousness of God, but of a wrathful God. ‘This bond of obligation to God is so acutely felt that it calls forth the most terrible
adaptation of Schelling is an instance of heightened contradiction that calls for a forward movement in the dialectic of the potencies. Also, like the 1910 Dissertation, the rational process ends in the failure of the moral law to usher in genuine obedience, and leads to a mystical turning inward, ending in intellectual intuition.\textsuperscript{129} For Tillich, whereas mythology is ‘under the sway of contradiction’,\textsuperscript{130} Judaism is the first historical instance of an attempt to resolve this contradiction through its revelatory elements, and therefore paves the way for Christianity, in a progression from inadequacy to an adequate way to express revelation. The penultimate section of the 1912 Dissertation, titled ‘The Struggle of the Law against the Contradiction: Judaism’, contains the only explicit discussion of Judaism in the entire dissertation, and is less than two full pages. Like the 1910 Dissertation, there is a comparison of paganism and Judaism, although here the differences between them are emphasized. Paganism failed by coming to its logical conclusion in mysticism, one pole of the dialectic, and Judaism failed by coming to its logical conclusion in guilt-consciousness, the other pole of the dialectic. This happens in two ways.

First, whereas paganism evolves in a purely naturalistic dialectic of the sacrifices. Human consciousness would inevitably be destroyed if it were to remain under the sway of this potency of divine displeasure’ (ibid., 118).

\textsuperscript{129} The further development of this transition from mythology to culture is “rational philosophy”, in which the rational process, that is, the dialectical history of the consciousness of culture is constructed parallel to the mythological process. The starting point of this construction is the struggle of the legal and political community against the free will of the individual … But the state is not the result of an external [mechanical] activity; it is necessary for the inner struggle of the selfhood of the moral law … The individual abandons the selfhood that separates himself from God and tries to reach God through mystical union with the absolute’ (ibid., 121).

\textsuperscript{130} Ibid., 118.
potencies, Judaism experiences a revelatory confrontation of the divine self against nature, through the call of Abraham and the giving of the law to Moses.\textsuperscript{131} This was seen in the 1910 Dissertation in the first of three periods experienced by Judaism, the Abrahamic/Mosaic period. Second, while paganism subsumes the individual in a mystical union with divinized nature, Judaism cultivates individual spirituality, in relation to a transcendent God and in response to the Mosaic law:

Whereas in paganism God proved to be the absolute, that which comprehends all the potencies and is their spiritual bond, in Judaism he manifests himself as the culmination of abstract, individual spirituality. God is the All-one. Paganism demonstrates his totality and therefore his identity with every individual, that is, in mysticism. Judaism shows his unity, his separateness from every individual, namely, guilt-consciousness.\textsuperscript{132}

In the 1910 Dissertation, there was more continuity between paganism and Judaism, with Judaism ‘emerging’ as an expression of the second potency and contributing to Spirit because of its universal, revelatory elements. In the 1912 Dissertation, paganism and Judaism are pushed to two contradictory poles, for both ‘go to ruin’ on

\textsuperscript{131} ‘In paganism, the potencies develop in a natural, necessary process; in Judaism the divine self enters into antithesis with the natural principle. Jewish consciousness is also substantially mythological, that is, it is subject to the principle of wrath. But this principle is not overcome in the inner life of consciousness, so that finally aesthetic and intellectual culture might emerge; rather the divine will opposes it and tries to give it a divine form. Here will opposes will, and there is no identity to make the mystical relation possible. God is the lawgiver’ (ibid., 123).

\textsuperscript{132} Ibid., 123.
'one-sidedness',\textsuperscript{133} reflecting the spirit of the Kantian antinomy.

Similar to the 1910 Dissertation, Judaism embodies a tension between the universal and the particular. In the 1912 Dissertation, Judaism emerges as a paradoxical expression of 'pagan forms of religious practice', like the command for Abraham to sacrifice Isaac in the 1910 Dissertation, which is the particular aspect. In the 1912 Dissertation, the universal aspect is 'normative legislation, according to revelation', similar to commands given by the personal God named Elohim, in the 1910 Dissertation.\textsuperscript{134} Therefore, "Judaism" in a strict sense emerges with its ethnicizing forms of worship joined to its absolutely anti-ethnic consciousness of election. Hence the paradoxical result that the pagan principle of union with nature enjoys its last triumph in the religion of ethical monotheism.\textsuperscript{135} According to Tillich's adaptation of Schelling, pagan mysticism has inherent limitations, and it is the externality of the Law of Moses, that provides the basis for revelation.

Two footnotes appended to Tillich's analysis support the general thesis that Judaism plays a unique preparatory role in the emergence of Christianity. In footnote number 51 to this section, Tillich says that paganism and Judaism have a common starting point, in that each is bound to God through God's wrath.\textsuperscript{136} Paganism 'loses

\textsuperscript{133} 'Judaism goes to ruin on this one-sidedness, just as paganism does on the other side' (ibid).

\textsuperscript{134} The full quote reads: 'That is to say, because the pagan substance of consciousness and the corresponding pagan forms of religious practice have not been overcome by an inner process, but rather have been formed by normative legislation, according to revelation, that is ethically and personally, these forms gain the splendor of holiness and godliness, which is valid only for the will that comes to expression in them' (ibid.).

\textsuperscript{135} Ibid., 123–124.

\textsuperscript{136} Ibid., 142 note 51.
itself' in this bond, the mystical union of the individual with divinized nature, although Judaism resists this bond, 'creates a real solution' through a personal relationship to God in obedience to Mosaic law, but stalls at that stage as 'guilt-consciousness remains the characteristic form of Jewish piety'.\textsuperscript{137} This is similar to the 1910 Dissertation, insofar as paganism and Judaism have a common starting point. However, the characterization of paganism as being in 'bondage' to a wrathful god is a different emphasis, and it helps to heighten the distinction between paganism and Judaism.

At the same time, in footnote 50, it is this personal relationship with God through the law that anticipates Christianity, enabling Tillich to pair Judaism with Christianity:

\begin{quote}
It might have been possible to treat Judaism together with paganism, inasmuch as in Judaism also the contradiction has not yet been overcome. On the other hand, it cannot be maintained that the contradiction prevails there. It was resisted, and in every act of obedience to the law it was overcome. But above all – and this is decisive for Schelling – in Judaism, God confronts the contradiction through revelation, i.e., personally, so that in this connection (which is the more important one) Judaism and Christianity belong together.\textsuperscript{138}
\end{quote}

This understanding of revelation is very similar to the 1910 Dissertation, in that the

\begin{footnotes}
\item[137] Ibid.
\item[138] Ibid., 142 note 50.
\end{footnotes}
Giving of the law of Moses in Judaism by a personal god, a particular revelatory element was introduced. However, unlike the 1910 Dissertation, it appears that the law itself, or obedience to the law, somehow serves to transcend the contradiction between mysticism and guilt-consciousness, without the additional steps of Prophetism and prophetic universalism. In the 1910 Dissertation Tillich made a distinction between historical forms of Judaism (Abrahamic/Mosaic and prophetic) that were unable to fully transcend their pagan roots, and ‘normative Judaism’, which manifests the universality of revelation. He makes no such distinction in the 1912 Dissertation. Judaism is more one-dimensional, as it occupies one pole of a dialectical relationship with paganism, and yet still provides a necessary foundation for Christianity.

Tillich concludes the penultimate section of the 1912 Dissertation, that which explicitly discusses Judaism, by anticipating the distinct revelatory character of Christianity:

In the fullness of time mysticism in its perfect form was crushed under the burden of the moral demand and of divine wrath in paganism, and guilt-consciousness was obscured by the highest, namely, religious elevation of the principle of selfhood in Judaism, but just then, in the pagan mysteries and in the messianic expectations of the Jews, the true God was prophesied.  

The foregoing analysis concludes the first phase of the discussion of Tillich’s dialectical framework. The scope of Schelling’s worldview is vast and deep and

139 Ibid., 124.
multi-dimensional, and Tillich drinks deeply of it. As for Judaism, it makes a brief appearance, but serves as an indispensable foundation for Christianity. All of this occurred before World War I, before Tillich’s participation in the collapse of European culture, before the collapse of the German alliance of cross, crown and sword, and before his political awakening that would permanently shape his theology from the 1920s until the end of his life. This will be the subject of the next chapter.
Chapter 4

Jewish Prophetism Provides a Unique Dialectical and Ontological Basis for Justice

Chapter 3 has demonstrated how Judaism as understood by Tillich’s appropriation of Schelling was heavily influenced by the history of religion, and how this enabled Tillich to maintain a significant level of continuity between Judaism and Christianity. Tillich’s view of the history of religion confers a specific role upon Judaism, that of an essential dialectical participant in the emergence of Christianity from the mythological consciousness of humanity. This theological history of religion culminated in the establishment of Christianity as the most rational and fullest revelation of the divine, and that revelation was funneled through the ancient Near East, and specifically through Judaism. What gave Judaism its revelatory capacity was its ability to employ historically and culturally specific elements, such as the giving of the Law to Moses, and the witness of the prophets to a wayward Israel, and transform them into universal symbols.

For Tillich, in the two Schelling dissertations, Judaism does not provide a fully adequate path for human redemption, as does Christianity, but it does provide a unique foundation for Christianity. In the two Schelling dissertations, the relationship between Judaism and Christianity is characterized by a historical dialectic of progression. Therefore, this dialectic confers a position of relative inadequacy upon Judaism in relation to Christianity. In the remaining primary source analyses of this dissertation, another type of dialectical relation between Judaism and Christianity will
emerge, an ontological dialectic of balance.

Before World War I, it is not clear whether Tillich believed that Judaism retained any permanent theological value, or whether it could disappear off the world stage and remain just a historical relic, as the Aryan Christians would have preferred. Based upon Tillich's relatively brief presentation of Judaism in the two Schelling dissertations, it is possible that in this early stage of his theological development, that Tillich could have dispensed with Judaism, seeing it only as a historically necessary, transitional stage to Christianity. It may have been enough that the giving of the law to Moses, the call of Abraham, and the prophetic witness of the Old Testament were recorded in the Old Testament, and that the written record was adequate to provide the foundational ideas for Christianity. In the third section of this chapter, I will analyze Tillich's *The Socialist Decision*, which demonstrates Judaism possesses a permanent validity, derived from its prophetic dimension. This prophetic aspect, typically referred to by Tillich as Jewish prophetism, must persist as a critical principle against idolatry, especially for the benefit of Christianity.

In this chapter two main works of Tillich will be analyzed, since they each have an explicit discussion of Judaism, and they each have a dialectical structure. The first book is Tillich's 1925 work, *The Religious Situation of the Present*. This book's discussion of Judaism contains 'evidence' that must be assessed in 'testing'

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1 *The Religious Situation* was originally published in 1925 in Germany, under the title, *Die religiöse Lage der Gegenwart* (The Religious Situation of the Present). It was translated into English and reprinted in America in 1956, under the title, *The Religious Situation*, accompanied by a preface from translator H. Richard Niebuhr. This exposition and analysis will use the 1956 translation.
my hypothesis that when Tillich explicitly discusses Judaism, it plays a vital role in his worldview and is inextricably related to Christianity. Unlike Tillich’s use of Judaism in the two Schelling dissertations and in The Socialist Decision, the role of Judaism in The Religious Situation is relatively minor. However, Tillich’s analysis anticipates key aspects of Judaism that will be discussed in The Socialist Decision, providing an important contrast.

The Religious Situation highlights the spirit of capitalism as the main problem of German society in the mid 1920s. For Tillich, the problem of capitalism will endure well into the 1930s and it will be joined by the problem of Nazism.\(^2\) Tillich’s response to both capitalism and Nazism/political romanticism will be the subject of The Socialist Decision. The exposition and analysis of The Socialist Decision will more clearly support the presence of the two forms of dialectic. First, Judaism serves as a unique basis for Christianity, exhibiting a historical dialectic of progression between the two religions. Second, Judaism assumes a critical, prophetic role in relation to Christianity, contributing one side to the ontological dialectic of balance.

The primary thesis of this chapter is that in The Socialist Decision, Tillich’s dialectical reasoning enables him to attribute permanent validity to Judaism, in the form of Jewish prophetism. In The Socialist Decision, Tillich places the prophetic dimension of Judaism in primary opposition to nationalistic German religion, as found in Nazism. Jewish prophetism plays an essential role in Tillich’s distinctive view of

\(^2\) Tillich’s explicit object of criticism in The Socialist Decision is something called ‘political romanticism’, which will be discussed in greater detail later in this chapter. For Tillich, Nazism is one instance of political romanticism.
socialism, which has a critical and constructive program to transform society along humanistic and eschatological lines. References to Jewish prophetism are pervasive throughout *The Socialist Decision*; the notion is deeply embedded in its dialectical structure, and considerable effort will be made to explain the theoretical basis of his argument from its starting point. In *The Socialist Decision*, Tillich's dialectical reasoning enables him to derive the 'ought' of justice from the 'is' of being, and to posit the maxim, 'justice is the true power of being'. The unique and indispensable foundation of this maxim is Jewish prophetism.

The secondary thesis of this chapter is that Tillich's concept of Jewish prophetism responds uniquely to the dual problems of capitalism and German National Socialism. Whereas the problem of capitalism endured into the 1930s, the problem of Nazism had emerged as a major threat to German society in the Weimar period. The concept of 'belief-ful realism', which possessed priestly and prophetic aspects, was thought by Tillich to adequately criticize the spirit of capitalism, as he understood it in the 1920s. Due to the limitations of belief-ful realism, to be discussed below, Tillich develops the concept of Jewish prophetism to respond to religious nationalism, of which Nazism is one instance. For Tillich, Jewish prophetism provides an effective response to religious nationalism and Nazism because it provides a much 'deeper' critique than belief-ful realism. Jewish prophetism, as understood by Tillich, has deep ontological roots, enabling it to transform political
romanticism ‘on the basis of its own presuppositions’. This will be most vividly demonstrated in *The Socialist Decision*, where Tillich derives the maxim ‘justice is the true power of being’.

### 4.1 World War I and Religious Socialism

In a 1989 essay exploring Tillich’s understanding of the relationship between Lutheran Protestantism and Marxism, Ron Stone succinctly summarizes Tillich’s service as an army chaplain in World War I:

Tillich left his boyhood home of dreaming innocence, his pastoral work in Berlin, and his patriarchal home with everything in place to go to war. He had his Ph.D. in theology, he was married, his family represented the learned German clergy. His father had served as a chaplain to the Emperor on a trip to Jerusalem. It was a world of patriarchal capitalism, with empire and Lutheranism in a symbiotic relationship. He went to war in a siege of patriotism and without clear political convictions ... By the end of the war he had suffered nervous collapses repeatedly, he had helped bury the cream of the German officer corps, his wife had become pregnant by his friend, and the

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3 In *The Religious Situation*, Tillich observes that the churches can respond in one of three ways to the spirit of capitalism: (i) rejection; (ii) surrender and accommodation; and (iii) transformation on the basis of its own presuppositions(182).

empire had been defeated and thrown into revolution.⁵

By the summer of 1918, Tillich became deeply disillusioned, admitting in personal letters that on the battlefield there was deep economic class division between the officers and the enlisted men, and at home, the wealthy industrialists (‘war profiteers’) were relatively insulated from the effects of war, unlike the masses of impoverished workers in Berlin.⁶ He attributed these gross injustices to nationalism and the curse ‘that its absolute pursuit had brought upon mankind’.⁷ Finally, in September of 1919, Tillich acknowledged in a circular to his friends that he had learned to see the World War as ‘an inevitable consequence of a special social order and special ideas linked with it’.⁸ Tillich had finally abandoned his war theology,⁹ and adopted religious socialism. Simply put, Tillich ‘wanted a new order of society born of Christianity and socialism, in which the destructive powers of capitalism would be undone’.¹⁰

This is a very important phase in Tillich’s life, and it has rightly benefited from

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⁵ Ibid., 394.
⁸ Ibid.
⁹ See Sturm, Holy Love, for the numerous ways in which Tillich adapted his battlefield sermons to support the German imperial army.
¹⁰ Pauck and Pauck, Tillich, 69.
a significant amount of scholarly treatment. This section of Chapter 3 intends only to briefly document Tillich's identity as a religious socialist, providing a context for analyses of *The Religious Situation*, and *The Socialist Decision*. It is outside the scope of this paper to comprehensively discuss the German political situation during the Weimar period, Tillich's extensive relationships with socialists, Marxists and social progressives, or his appropriation of Marxist theory. For our purposes, Tillich's identity as a socialist can be summarized by four well-known involvements.

First, in the spring of 1919, Tillich delivered a lecture with a translated title of 'Christianity and Socialism' at a meeting of the Independent Socialist Party, which caused him to be reprimanded by the Protestant Consistory of Brandenburg.

Second, in 1920 in Berlin Tillich joined a discussion group that was known as the 'kairos circle', which met to discuss potential opportunities for a new social order, along socialist lines. This group was comprised of no more than a dozen individuals, including Protestants like Tillich, secular and believing Jews, academics and professionals. The group disbanded in 1925, as several members obtained

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13 Ron Stone argues that Tillich's lifelong 'dialogue' with Marxism began as early as a December 1913 debate with Karl Liebknecht, who later organized the German Communist Party, citing Stumme, *Socialism in a Theological Perspective*, 55; cf. Stone, 'Tillich-Boundary', 399.

14 According to the Paucks (ibid., 70–71), the main members were as follows: (i) Gunther Dehn, Protestant minister, a pacifist who later taught at the University of Halle and who was later dismissed.
positions in other German cities, although Tillich had left in 1924 for a theology position at the University of Marburg. Third, Tillich became associated with the Institut für Sozialforschung (the ‘Institute’), an independently funded, interdisciplinary ‘think tank’ located on the campus of the University of Frankfurt-am-Main. Tillich was never employed by the Institute, and he was already a full professor of philosophy at Frankfurt. Yet, Tillich’s close proximity to the Institute, his interest in socialism, and his prior relationships with Adolf Löwe and Karl Mennicke, naturally led him to associate with the members of the Institute. The Institute’s main researchers, in Germany in the 1930s, were Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, Erich Fromm, Leo Lowenthal, Walter Benjamin and Friedrich Pollock, all of whom were devoted to the teachings of Marx, and their applicability to the transformation of

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from his university position in April 1933, along with Tillich, in the wake of the Reform of the Civil Service Act; (ii) Karl Mennicke, a Protestant minister; (iii) Adolf Löwe, a ‘believing, non-Orthodox Jew’, professor of economics, and lifelong friend of Tillich; (iv) Eduard Heimann, an economist and also a lifelong friend of Tillich; (v) Alexander Rüstow, a Protestant economist and historian; (vi) Arnold Wolfers, a Protestant lawyer who later became director of the Berlin Institute of Politics.

15 Ibid., 74, 288.

16 Tillich, Adolf Löwe and Karl Mennicke are not typically mentioned in histories of the Frankfurt School, but there was some connection. ‘Tillich was a close friend of Horkheimer, Lowenthal and Pollock, belonging with them to a regular discussion group that included Karl Mannheim, Kurt Riezler, Adolf Löwe and Karl Mennicke. The Kränzchen, as it was called—an old-fashioned word meaning both a small garland and an intimate gathering—was to continue in New York for several years, after most of its members were forced to emigrate.’ Martin Jay, The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute for Social Research, 1923–1950 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 24–25. I think some of the confusion can be cleared up by stating that neither Tillich nor Löwe nor Heimann were ever paid from the endowment by the Institute.
society. Tillich's relationship with the Institute has been treated elsewhere,\textsuperscript{17} but one brief example of the connection is that he was advisor for Theodor Adorno's Habilitationsschrift, Kierkegaard: Construction of the Aesthetic.\textsuperscript{18} In March of 1933, the Nazi government closed the Institute, its members emigrated, most of them ending up in New York City. Some comprised the faculty of the 'University in Exile', which was established at New York City's New School for Social Research, to accommodate the large number of high profile intellectual émigrés from Europe.

The fourth example of Tillich's identity as a socialist was his involvement in the publication of two socialist journals. The first was Blätter für den Religiösen Sozialismus ('Pages for Religious Socialism'), published from 1920 until 1927, with Karl Mennicke as head publisher.\textsuperscript{19} This time period roughly corresponded to the gatherings of the 'kairos circle'. The second journal, titled Neue Blätter für den Sozialismus ('New Pages for Socialism'), was published from 1930 to 1933, roughly corresponding to the operation of the Institut in Frankfurt, and was edited by August Rathmann, Eduard Heimann, and Paul Tillich.\textsuperscript{20} The distinction between 'religious socialism', and 'socialism', as expressed in the titles to these journals, will be discussed below. For now, it will suffice to say that Tillich has a very broad understanding of 'religion', which assumes that all aspects of culture have a theological dimension.

\textsuperscript{17} The most recent treatment is a doctoral dissertation by Bryan Lee Wagoner, entitled 'The Subject of Emancipation: Critique, Reason and Religion in the Thought of Theodor W. Adorno, Max Horkheimer and Paul Tillich' Harvard University, December 2011.
\textsuperscript{18} Jay, Dialectical Imagination, 66.
\textsuperscript{19} Socialist Decision, 163, foreword note 6.
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid.
4.1.1 Other Tillich Essays on Related Topics

In addition to *The Religious Situation* and *The Socialist Decision*, Tillich wrote several articles in the 1920s and 1930s on related topics, and three of them have been translated into English and are widely available in the collection of essays, titled *Political Expectation*.\(^{21}\) These essays provide additional background for the concept of ‘prophetism’,\(^{22}\) a concept that will be explored in greater detail later in the analysis of *The Socialist Decision*. However, there is no discussion of Judaism, and therefore no discussion of Judaism as having any temporary or enduring theological value. Therefore, these essays will not be systematically analyzed.

In addition, a very important work by Tillich, *The Interpretation of History*\(^{23}\) (‘*Interpretation*’) will not be analyzed, also because it does not have a distinct discussion of Judaism. *Interpretation* is a compilation of seven individual essays,


\(^{22}\) For example, prophetic criticism is ‘existential’, and it ‘stands beyond life’, favouring neither metaphysical pessimism or optimism. Tillich, ‘Protestantism as a Critical and Creative Principle’, 11–12.

\(^{23}\) Tillich’s *Interpretation of History* (1936) has several sources, all essays in German, dating from 1926 to 1933. They are, in chronological order: (i) *Kirche und Kultur*, aus: *Sammlung Gemeinverständlicher Vorträge* (Tübingen: Verlag S.C.B. Mohr, 1924); (ii) *Christologie und Geschichtsdeutung*, aus: *Religiöse Verwirklichung* (Berlin: Furche-Verlag, 1929); (iii) *Eschatologie und Geschichte*, aus: *Religiöse Verwirklichung* (Berlin: Furche-Verlag, 1929); (iv) *Das Problem der Macht, Versuch einer philosophischen Grundlegung*, aus: *Neue Blätter für den Sozialismus*, 2 jahr, 4 parts (Potsdam: Alfred Protte Verlag, 1931); (v) *Die beiden Wurzeln des politischer Denkens* (Potsdam: Alfred Protte Verlag, 1933). These works are listed on the acknowledgments page of *On The Boundary/The Interpretation of History*, trans. Rasetzki and Talmey.
written as early as 1924, through the fateful year of emigration, 1933. It is one of Tillich’s most expansive and incisive works, and can serve as an interpretive key to his later works, including his Systematic Theology. In Interpretation, Tillich introduces key concepts such as ‘kairos’, ‘the demonic’ and the Cross as the center of history. Also, Interpretation discusses numerous key terms and concepts that will be covered in the subsequent analysis of The Socialist Decision. These topics are, in order of appearance in Interpretation: Jewish prophecy (104), the two ‘demonics’ of nationalism and capitalism (120), socialism, idealism and ideology (179), Marx (181–182), power and Nazism (199–200), consciousness and the emergence of the ‘demand’ (206–208), tension and circularity in history (243–246), and the Jews as the ‘people of time’, the importance of monotheism, and ‘time’ versus ‘space’ (263–264). Therefore, where necessary, reference will be made to Interpretation, to help clarify terms used in The Religious Situation and The Socialist Decision.

4.2 The 1920s: The Religious Situation

In this brief but important work, Tillich develops his theology of culture by introducing a broad, non-institutional understanding of ‘religion’ and ‘religious’, and applies them to the contemporary situation of the 1920s. The book has a dialectical structure, like the two Schelling dissertations, and The Socialist Decision. However, in The Religious Situation the placement of Tillich’s discussion of Judaism and its content does not directly support my thesis that the dialectical structure assigns a particular importance to Judaism. Instead, Judaism plays a minor role. In The Religious Situation, Tillich engages in a critique of bourgeois capitalist society, in particular the
combination of free market economics, for Tillich a ‘war of all against all’, and the application of reductionist scientific methods to human society. These initially combined in the nineteenth century to create a European culture dominated by ‘bourgeois capitalism’ or ‘the capitalist spirit’. The capitalist spirit peaked in influence before the outbreak of World War I, and in Tillich’s opinion – which was widely shared – its foundations were shaken by ‘war and revolution’, in particular World War I, the Russian Revolution, the revolution in Germany after the November 1918 armistice, and the abdication of Kaiser Wilhelm II. According to Tillich, the capitalist spirit is truly ‘anti-religious’, because of its reductionist view of human nature, its promotion of ‘self-sufficiency’, and ability to diminish ‘self-transcendence’. The reductionist view of human nature is fostered by what I will call an ‘economic atomism’, in which individuals are primarily self-interested creatures whose interrelations are governed by the laws of supply and demand, and competition, in which the victor necessarily triumphs at the expense of others.

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24 Religious Situation, 43–53.

25 For Tillich, ‘Capitalist society, even according to the definition of the concept, is a human group analyzable after the fashion of natural science into pure individuals—the atoms of society—which are held together by economic purposes and needs—the natural laws of capitalist society’ (ibid., 43; see also 111 in relation to ‘the mass’).

26 The capitalist spirit is dominated by three characteristics: (i) mathematical natural science—pursues the goal of demonstrating that reality is governed wholly by its own laws and is rationally intelligible, and keeps skepticism at a distance; ii) technique—world-ruling technique with its will to conquer space, time and nature and to make ‘the earth a well-furnished dwelling for man’; (iii) capitalist economy—seeks to provide the greatest possible number of men with the greatest possible amount of economic goods, which seeks to arouse and to satisfy ever-increasing demands without raising the question as to the meaning of the process (ibid., 47). According to Tillich, capitalism started out with an emancipatory program, but degenerated in the following manner: ‘It did not turn away from this which
The original German title of this work is *Die religiöse Lage der Gegenwart*, or *The Religious Situation of the Present*. The book's title captures the essence of the book, as each main word provides a key to the overall argument. First, by 'religious', or 'religion', Tillich means that which is oriented toward transcendence, that which is infinite. He writes: ""religion" deals with the relation of man to the eternal".27 What makes anything 'religious' is the degree to which it is oriented to that which is infinite and transcendent, as opposed to finite and inward-looking. Something does not need to be explicitly religious, in the sense of affiliated with organized religion of church, or theological, to be religious.28 Tillich wants to make clear that any aspect of culture can be a vehicle of transcendence, such as art, and be religious in the broad sense that he is proposing. He says that 'human religion is not the only phenomenon which bears witness to the ultimate and in some periods is not even the most important of the witnesses or the most effective in expression and symbolism'.29 Second, for Tillich, 'situation' refers to those factors that influence society, but which may not be

was its eternal meaning until emancipated personality engaging in the conflicts of capitalist economy had been filled with unlimited desire for economic power and until free competition had forced upon almost all social groups an unbounded striving after profits and so the war of all against all. Only after this had happened did liberal economy with the technique which supported it become the most powerful symbol of a self-seeking, time-fettered existence. Then it became for many, particularly for the masses, which were oppressed as a result of the conflict, not only a profane but also a demonic and anti-divine symbol' (ibid., 49–50).

27 Ibid., 35.

26 Later, in the foreword to *The Socialist Decision*, Tillich says that he dropped the term 'religious' as a qualifier to 'socialism' because it confused religious persons and socialists alike. 'By avoiding the name "religious socialism", which has been challenged (with good reason) from the religious as well as the socialist side, and which moreover has given rise to constant confusion, it is possible to express more clearly our actual position' (xxxvi).

29 *Religious Situation*, 37.
visible, on the surface.\textsuperscript{30} They are ‘hidden’, and must be drawn out, or ‘penetrated’,\textsuperscript{31} through analysis.

Third, the ‘present’ is not merely a chronological moment, but an attitude or posture that is informed by a perspective which comes from ‘the past’, and the vitality and drive that is given by looking toward the future, toward a goal with ‘unconditioned meaning’.\textsuperscript{32} In addition, the analysis of the religious situation of any present, must identify the dialectic of ‘self-sufficiency’ and ‘self-transcendence’. For Tillich, self-sufficiency can be expressed as ‘turning toward the self’,\textsuperscript{33} or being identified by mere ‘form’, as opposed to content, or being oriented towards anything that is finite, as opposed to that which is infinite. For Tillich, self-transcendence can be expressed as ‘openness to the eternal’, or being identified with ‘content’, and ‘openness to the eternal’.\textsuperscript{34} This dialectical structure is inherent in the very nature of time, as time is inherently not self-sufficient.\textsuperscript{35} In this context, time is not mere chronology, but it has the inherent quality of transcending itself, by interruptions or

\textsuperscript{30} ‘A religious situation is always at the same time the situation of a society. But the term situation seems to mean something which is established, at rest and constant, a basic fact which lies at a deeper level than do all the visible tendencies, something which is invisible to those who live within it but which is, for that reason, all the more effective’ (ibid., 40).
\textsuperscript{31} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{32} Ibid., 33–35.
\textsuperscript{33} Ibid., 39.
\textsuperscript{34} Ibid., 38–39.
\textsuperscript{35} ‘Every period of time, since it is time, is self-sufficient in its forms, in its existential content, in its vital tendencies; yet it is not possible for any time to be self-sufficient. Because it is time there is something within it which drives it beyond itself at every moment, not toward the future, which would be only a new time with the same impossibility of being self-sufficient, but toward something which is no longer time’ (ibid., 37–38).
‘catastrophes’. For Tillich, these catastrophes are times of opportunity, of great creative possibility.\textsuperscript{36} He writes: ‘The real miracle of time and of every present is not only that it can transcend itself but that as a result of unpredictable catastrophes it must transcend itself ever and again. That is one aspect of the religious situation of every present, that is, in relation to the eternal.’\textsuperscript{37} Therefore, according to the theoretical principles Tillich has laid out, to understand the religious situation of any present one must identify and analyze those societal and cultural phenomena that either encourage or detract from, orientation toward the infinite, and the goal of seeking unconditioned meaning.

This confirms Tillich’s emphasis on the importance of culture, and is one instance of a permanent theme in Tillich’s thought, the interrelationship of politics and theology. In parts I and II of \textit{The Religious Situation}, Tillich tries to establish two things: first, that the relation of time to eternity is present in all spheres of life; and second, under the secularizing capitalist spirit, leadership was pushed away from the churches into the cultural sphere. A fundamental premise to his overall argument is

\textsuperscript{36} The fact that it is impossible for existence to rest content with itself and its forms is revealed best of all in the profound, catastrophic movements in reality where that which is \textit{really creative} is at work. For the real creations of every time speak of something that is not time. And the most profound revelations of existence testify to something that is not existence’ (ibid., 38). In the 1910 Dissertation, Tillich used the term ‘catastrophe’ in several key areas, but never explained its creative significance there.

\textsuperscript{37} Ibid. This association of time, creativity and opportunity is developed in a nearly contemporaneous work, \textit{The Interpretation of History}. Nowhere in \textit{The Religious Situation} does Tillich employ the concept of \textit{kairos}, which he discusses in great detail in the 1936 work, \textit{The Interpretation of History}.
that 'the most important religious movements are developing outside of religion'.

In parts I and II, Tillich analyzes to what extent each major sphere of culture, science, metaphysics, art, politics and ethics, has the capacity to awaken an openness to transcendence, within his current context. Due to limitations of space, his findings concerning each sphere cannot be fully summarized. However, each aspect of culture possesses features that support and hinder the spirit of capitalism. What is important for Tillich is how any aspect of culture can respond to the current religious situation, since the foundations supporting the spirit of capitalism, and bourgeois capitalist culture, have been shaken to their core. For our purposes, two related concepts will be highlighted here, because they will inform Tillich’s ultimate conclusion in Part Three, concerning the role of Protestant theology as a potential force to lead a cultural transformation: religious socialism and ‘belief-ful realism’.

Tillich introduces the concepts of religious socialism and belief-ful realism in part II, titled ‘The Present Situation in Politics and Ethics’, with both concepts appearing in the discussion of politics. The section on politics is divided into two parts, with the first discussing economics and sociology, and the second discussing the nation and the state. For Tillich, capitalist society is dominated by economic activity, which was the result of ‘emancipation of economic activity from control by a

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38 Religious Situation, 157. The full quote reads: ‘If our two presuppositions are correct, that the relation of time to eternity is effective in all spheres of spiritual life and that under the rule of the capitalist spirit leadership devolves entirely upon the cultural sphere, then the most important part of our task has been accomplished; the fundamental answer to questions about the religious situation of our time has been given. It is highly characteristic of our period that it is possible to give this answer without touching upon the specifically religious sphere. The most important religious movements are developing outside of religion.’
superior social power'. While economic activity as such does not express self-sufficient finitude, autonomous economic activity, with no limits on profits, the accumulation of capital, or the creation of desire for material goods, creates an environment utterly conducive to self-sufficient finitude. The emancipation of economic activity results in a 'bondage to time', in which there is no time left for that which is eternal: 'The goad of unlimited desire does not allow the spirit time for anything which does not serve time itself. It drives the spirit about within the inescapable and unending cycle of the finite.' Any successful opposition to this perpetual cycle of the finite must be able to 'break' the cycle.

4.2.1 Religious Socialism

For Tillich, the original socialist political form, as expressed by Marx in the nineteenth century, possessed an eschatological dimension, a 'transcendent element', an 'eschatological tension' and a 'dynamic hopefulness'. These ideas are similar to those used later in the humanistic and eschatological socialism sought in The Socialist Decision, although there is no grounding in Jewish prophetism. Tillich believes that the German socialism of his time failed to manifest these characteristics. Instead, he argues that the more radical communists and Marxists

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39 Ibid., 105.
40 Ibid.
41 This is a curious phrase, especially in light of Tillich’s development of ‘bondage to the powers of origin’, especially the bondage to space, in The Socialist Decision, and the corresponding elevation of ‘time’ as being correlated with the prophetic spirit.
42 Ibid., 109.
43 Ibid., 112.
succeeded in providing an alternative world view, by addressing all the theoretical problems of the capitalist spirit, such as the reductionist view of human nature, the class struggle, and the economic atomism referred to above. In fact, the spirit of capitalism exploited the 'inner contradiction' of German socialism:

It was a great victory of the capitalist spirit, however, perhaps the greatest victory that it has won, when it took captive the strongest of the movements directed against it. The ultimately transcendent goal of socialism was made finite and temporal in its actual definition of ends. It looked to a point in time when that which is the negation of all time – the eternal – was to be realized. The necessary result of this inner contradiction was that socialism should become disillusioned, should begin to make compromises, to adopt the doctrine of progress and to become bourgeois in its temper.

According to Tillich, German socialism adopted a purely temporal goal, and forfeited its eschatological orientation. However, Tillich's normative view of socialism is

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44 The 'radicals' Tillich specifically names include Landauer, Georg Lukacs, French syndicalism, Russia's Bakunin, influences of the German youth movement, and Berlin's Karl Mennicke. He says: 'All of these movements seek to interpret socialism as a part of a comprehensive spiritual movement, to make it an organic part of the whole anti-capitalist attitude and to eliminate all capitalistic elements from it. They reject the naive absoluteness of the socialist party, as expressed by both leaders and the masses. They struggle for a new definition of the theoretical basis and the practical end of the movement. Hence they deal with the problems of community, of the attitude toward things, with the questions about human needs, about the formation of classes, with the problem of the masses in its economic and religious aspects, with the problem of property, the meaning of the liberal definition of the economic laws and with other similar questions. Their criticism of socialism is often radical, more radical and profound, indeed, than that which is exercised by capitalism; yet it is a criticism which is at the same time an affirmation of the socialist struggle' (ibid., 114–115).

‘religious’, in the broad sense of religious described above, penetrating the
theological aspects of culture. However, he will conclude that, in theory, a form of
Protestant theology that unites priestly and prophetic elements could provide a basis
for the transformation of society.

4.2.2 Belief-ful Realism

In addition, Tillich argued that Germany needed to adopt a posture of ‘belief-ful
realism’, which takes seriously both the specific historical context, which is
permeated by the spirit of capitalism, and yet maintains a hopeful orientation towards
the eternal, to avoid the extremes of romanticism and utopianism. These features
will recur in The Socialist Decision, but will be enhanced by the influence of Jewish
prophetism.

In part III, Tillich discusses to what extent explicitly religious movements have
the resources to transform the spirit of capitalism. Tillich analyzes the following
traditional, historical forms of religion: Roman Catholicism, Orthodoxy (‘Greek
Catholicism’), confessional and liberal Protestantism, and liberal, orthodox and
Zionist forms of Judaism. He concludes that each institutional form has one or more

46 ‘Religious socialism is shaken by the doubt which arises out of the question which is most
fundamental and most difficult for it, How is it possible from the standpoint of religion or the eternal to
reach any decisions which are applicable to the world of time? … It above all others raises the
demand for that which we have designated belief-ful realism, that is an unconditioned acceptance of
the serious importance of our concrete situation in time and of the situation of time in general in the
presence of eternity; such an attitude contains the negation of every kind of romanticism and
utopianism but it includes the hope of a social and economic life in which the spirit of capitalism—the
symbol of self-sufficient finitude—has been overcome’ (ibid., 116).
aspects that run counter to the spirit of capitalism, and that each form, taken by itself, does not have adequate power to lead a transformation of society. His analysis assumes that there are three possible responses by the churches to the spirit of capitalism: (i) they can reject the capitalist spirit; (ii) they can surrender to it; or (iii) they can overcome it on the basis of its own presuppositions.\(^{47}\) He concludes that all three forms of response could in theory be provided by the Catholic and Protestant churches, although Catholicism tends toward rejection, and Protestantism tends toward accommodation.\(^{48}\)

For Tillich, the spirit of capitalism could be effectively countered by a union of ‘priestly’ and ‘prophetic’ elements in Protestant theology. The priestly element is best expressed in Rudolf Otto’s *The Idea of the Holy*, in which revelation transcends the Kantian subject–object dichotomy, recognizing the ‘ecstatic, form-destroying character of religion with its divine and demonic aspects’.\(^{49}\) For Tillich, the prophetic element is best expressed in Karl Barth’s *Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans*, since ‘This theology lets the judgment of the unconditionally transcendent God fall upon every attempt of culture or religion to claim value before him’.\(^{50}\) The two must create a union of ‘belief-ful realism’, which Tillich believes could lead a cultural transformation.\(^{51}\) However, Tillich concludes that this could only happen if its

\(^{47}\) Ibid., 182.

\(^{48}\) Ibid.

\(^{49}\) Ibid., 215.

\(^{50}\) Ibid., 217–218.

\(^{51}\) ‘At all events abundant and strong life is moving in the Protestant theology of our time. There is apparent in it the will to break through futile antitheses within the bourgeois situation. The decisive turn if it is to take place anywhere in Protestantism may be expected in theology’ (Ibid., 218).
proponents assume that knowledge has a participatory dimension, which anticipates the posture of *The Socialist Decision*:

One thing however must be remembered in connection with all of these observations: they can have meaning only for those who are themselves engaged in the movement and for them they are not only meaningful but also full of responsibility. Such men are not permitted to stand aloof as non-participating observers, but it is demanded of them that they think and speak about the religious situation of the present with unconditioned, active responsibility.\(^{52}\)

\[4.2.3 \textit{Judaism: An Ally to Capitalism}\]

Tillich's analysis of Judaism occurs as a brief (just under three pages) transitional section between his discussion of Catholicism and Protestantism. It is revealing for what it says, and what it does not say. In *The Religious Situation*, Tillich makes three observations about Judaism: (i) it is a diverse religious phenomenon having liberal/humanistic, orthodox, and Zionist expressions; (ii) the prophetic aspect is mentioned briefly as a positive aspect of Jewish mystical Zionism, but it is not seen as a resource to counter the spirit of capitalism; and (iii) the liberal/humanistic Jewish communities have been so successful in helping to create capitalist society that they will not take place in a transformation of society, should it occur at all. At this point, in the mid 1920s, Tillich is not optimistic that any of the expressions of *institutional*

\(^{52}\) Ibid., 219.
religion could lead an anti-capitalist transformation of society. However, Tillich believes that Protestant theology, if it assumed the right combination of priestly and prophetic elements, could serve as a theoretical basis for the transformation of society. Tillich refers to this combination of priestly and prophetic as 'belief-ful realism'. In The Religious Situation, written in the 1920s, belief-ful realism is intended to critique the problem of self-sufficient finitude, which is manifest in the spirit of capitalism. By the 1930s, in his critique of German socialism, Jewish propheticism will have replaced belief-ful realism as the basis for the critique of capitalism and the transformation of society.

Tillich's overall summation of Judaism refers to the liberal/humanistic expression. He concludes that liberal Judaism has structural similarities with Protestantism and also with the capitalist spirit, generally rendering it ineffective to lead a cultural transformation:

The close connection between religion and morality, the high evaluation of personality, the devaluation of the sacramental sphere, the secularization of nature, the exaltation of the law, religiously inspired intra-worldly activity - all this is present in Judaism as in Protestantism and in capitalist society. It is common to all three not only because they are related types but also as a result of the historical influence of Judaism on the rise of capitalist society.53

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53 Ibid., 189. In addition, 'In many ways therefore there is evidence that in Judaism there is reaction—not without backslidings—against the spirit of capitalistic society. But the revolt encounters difficulties because of the close interrelation of large circles of Jews with the capitalist system and its exclusively commercial type of life' (191).
Here Tillich introduces the concept of ‘type’, which he appears to have been adopted from Max Weber.\textsuperscript{54} Tillich does not elaborate on what a ‘type’ is, but the context indicates that it refers to structural similarities between phenomena that are being analyzed, and the structural similarities are enumerated above, e.g. the close connection between religion and morality. In this context, the two phenomena being compared are liberal/humanistic Judaism and Protestantism. A more sophisticated concept Tillich calls the ‘typology of the history of religion’ appears in Tillich’s Systematic Theology and some of his occasional lectures, which will be discussed in Chapters 6 and 7 below. There is very little scholarly commentary on Tillich’s concept of ‘type’, but Ron Stone thinks it enabled Tillich to discuss traditionally religious concepts in harmony with Marxist thought, or at least prevent religion from being reducible to, or subordinate to, ‘the substructure of society’\textsuperscript{55}

Tillich concludes that liberal, humanistic Judaism could not pose an effective intellectual critique, let alone provide the cultural resources to overcome the spirit of

\textsuperscript{54} Stone makes this observation in ‘Tillich–Boundary’, 395: ‘Max Weber haunts the socialist writing of Paul Tillich. Basic concepts are taken over, utilized, and usually not acknowledged. I want to suggest that the importance of this is that Tillich had integrated Max Weber into his socialism by an early date (1926) ... The central concept of The Religious Situation is “The Capitalist Spirit”. It does not differ from Weber’s “The Spirit of Capitalism”. The explanation of the use of the term makes use of Weber’s ideal type methodology. Tillich writes: “It is rather a symbol for an ultimate, fundamental attitude toward the world.” Tillich, Religious Situation, Author’s Preface, 27.’ Other than these comments by Stone, I have been unable to locate any scholarly commentary on Max Weber and the use of ‘types’ in Tillich’s thought. This includes the discussion of the influence of Weber on Tillich (and Adorno and Horkheimer) as recently presented by Wagoner, in his dissertation, Emancipation.

\textsuperscript{55} According to Stone, ‘The utilization of Weber’s method to describe Marxist ideas began to transform Marxism. Religion could never be only a byproduct of the substructure of society’ (‘Tillich–Boundary’, 397).
capitalism 'on the basis of its own presuppositions', the third potential response by the churches. This ineffectiveness was due to the structural similarities noted above. Tillich concluded that too many Jews 'readily and easily abandoned their religious heritage and transferred their loyalty to capitalist society'.\(^{56}\) Despite this negative appraisal, Tillich remarks, 'Yet the spirit of ancient prophecy continues to be effective even in religiously liberal circles.'\(^{57}\) Tillich is referring to Jewish Marxists, whose attempts failed to triumph over the spirit of bourgeois society, since they neglected 'the religious heritage',\(^{58}\) meaning the prophetic dimension of Judaism.

Tillich’s assessment of orthodox Judaism recognizes 'valuable religious resources', which he does not enumerate, and concludes that it does not have a significant effect on the present religious situation.\(^{59}\) Tillich’s recognizes that Zionism has a mystical and prophetic dimension, but does not elaborate on the importance of the prophetic dimension. He observes that Zionism embodies a 'peculiar mixture' of national and religious motives, and draws upon a past ideal, that seeks 'a return to the original unity of religious prophecy and national existence'.\(^{60}\) Tillich does not say when this ideal occurred, but it probably refers to the prophetic critique of the monarchy, before division and conquest destroyed Israel's national existence.\(^{61}\) For Tillich, Zionism poses a threat because it might become a secular ideology, losing its

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\(^{56}\) *Religious Situation*, 189.

\(^{57}\) Ibid.

\(^{58}\) Ibid., 190.

\(^{59}\) Ibid.

\(^{60}\) Ibid.

\(^{61}\) This also differs from 'normative Judaism' as discussed in the 1910 Dissertation; see chapter 2, pages 36–40.
universality, messianism and world-unifying mission. For Tillich, the finest expression of Zionism is Martin Buber's 'mystical Zionism', which is to 'become a powerful symbol and emanative force for the rest of the world'. However, Tillich concludes that even this expression must maintain a prophetic dimension: 'Buber's presentation of Jewish mysticism … belong(s) to the whole mystical movement against the spirit of capitalism. But this Jewish mysticism is always connected with the prophetic element of hope of the consummation.' Tillich concludes that while Judaism has features that run counter to the capitalist spirit, the critical mass of Jews are too beholden to the commercial enterprise to lead a cultural transformation, as noted above.

In this work, Judaism plays a relatively minor role, for two reasons. First, the focus of The Religious Situation is on the religious importance, in Tillich's expanded sense of 'religious', of the cultural elements such as science, art, politics and ethics, as opposed to explicit or institutional religion. Therefore, none of the institutional religions discussed possess all of the features necessary to overcome the capitalist

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63 Ibid., 191. The most succinct presentation of Tillich's view of Buber is the essay 'An Evaluation of Martin Buber: Protestant and Jewish Thought', chapter 14 in Tillich's Theology of Culture, ed. Robert C. Kimball (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972), 188–199. (This chapter was revised by Tillich from an earlier essay, which appeared in Commentary 5/6 (June 1948).) In this essay, Tillich comments on the three ways in which Buber's thought is significant for Protestant theology: (i) his existential interpretation of prophetic religion; (ii) his rediscovery of mysticism as an element within prophetic religion; and (iii) his understanding of the relation between prophetic religion and culture, particularly in the social and political realms (188).
64 Religious Situation, 191.
spirit, 'on the basis of its own presuppositions', as stated above.\textsuperscript{65} Second, as described above, Tillich believes that the theology of Protestantism, despite its deep 'inner contradiction', possesses characteristics that could be cultivated, to lead a cultural transformation. Tillich wrote this in 1925, before German National Socialism had control of the political situation in Germany. For Tillich, in the 1920s, the critical features of Protestantism could still be considered potentially transformative of culture, in 'the present religious situation'. Belief-ful realism, with its attention to social context and its eschatological posture, could provide a meaningful response to the spirit of capitalism. However, by 1933, Tillich needed to enlist the ontological depth of Jewish prophetism, to respond to the seductive capacity of 'the powers of origin'.

4.3 The 1930s: The Socialist Decision

\textit{Banned, Burned and Bombed}

When one first looks at Tillich's \textit{The Socialist Decision}, it is not obvious why the Nazis would ban it. It is a highly theoretical work since it discusses concepts that are associated with Marxist political theory, such as the bourgeoisie, the proletariat, socialism, capitalism, and historical and dialectical materialism. Communism is denounced, Hitler is never named directly, and the term \textit{Führer} appears five times, four times in a purely descriptive capacity. The most inflammatory comment is an oblique reference to Hitler within an analysis of the socialist view of human nature.

\textsuperscript{65} Again, ibid., 182. For Tillich, the only enduring way to overcome something is on the basis of its own presuppositions.
about halfway through the book. Tillich observes that the German socialism of the Weimar period is unduly influenced by the bourgeois view of human nature, which valorizes harmony, fails to account for the limits of rationality, the inevitability of conflict, and the recurring economic crises brought on by the competitiveness of capitalism and wars caused by nationalism and imperialism. For Tillich, in the context of Weimar Germany in the early 1930s, socialism had failed to raise up powerful and charismatic leaders, and at the same time has permitted ‘a personality with trivial power of being’ to ‘become the symbol and Führer of revolutionary political romanticism’, presumably referring to Hitler and German National Socialism. Nevertheless, this book, just as Hitler came to power, was immediately banned, and it was consigned to the flames in the Frankfurt book burnings of May 1933. Tillich’s biographers, the Paucks, do not say whether the book was banned because Nazi censors found objectionable content in it, as in its favourable treatment of Judaism, or simply because Tillich wrote it, who had already publicly opposed the Nazis. However, Tillich’s unwillingness to retract it caused an irreconcilable rift between him and the German government. Tillich was quite proud of this work, and his Jewish friend Adolf Löwe remarked that it was Tillich’s ‘most Jewish book’. In addition, during World War II, the warehouse of Alfred Protte, who had published many works on socialist political theory, including the journal Neue

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66 Socialist Decision, 74. The Socialist Decision was completed in late 1932 and it was released for sale in early 1933, so the book’s contents were finalized prior to Hitler being elected chancellor in January 1933; see www.open.edu/openlearn/history-the-arts/history/hitlers-rise-and-fall-timeline [accessed 11/08/2013].

67 Pauck and Pauck, Tillich, 132.

68 24 May 1972 interview with Adolf Lowe; Socialist Decision, editor’s introduction, xxv.
Blätter für Sozialismus, was bombed by the Allies, destroying many copies of Tillich’s book.\(^{69}\)

The immediate context of The Socialist Decision is Tillich’s critique of German socialism in the early 1930s. On the one hand, according to Tillich, German socialism tried to disassociate itself from revolutionary forms of communism, which were atheistic. As a result, in Tillich’s opinion, German socialism lost its eschatological dimension. On the other hand, also according to Tillich, German socialism assumed fundamental characteristics of bourgeois capitalism, and was unable to liberate the proletariat. For Tillich, this meant that German socialism lost its humanistic dimension. Tillich’s distinctive view of socialism, which has humanistic and eschatological aspects, draws upon the Jewish prophetic tradition. For Tillich, the humanistic element contrasts favourably to the reductionist view of humanity embedded in unrestrained capitalism, and in the bourgeois worldview, which was first discussed above in The Religious Situation. But this is also distinct from scientific Marxism, which is materialist in two senses. The first sense of materialism means that changes in material, economic conditions are the drivers of history, from Marx, which Tillich agrees with. The other sense of materialism is the atomistic, atheistic kind, in which the human person is reduced to a crude set of needs and drives, characteristic of the later, scientific Marx.\(^{70}\) This reductionist view of human

\(^{69}\) Stone, ‘Tillich–Boundary’, 397. Stone does not say whether the bombing of the German publisher Alfred Protec was intentional, or just collateral damage.

\(^{70}\) For Tillich, both scientific Marxism and the bourgeois principle assume that human behaviour is reducible to a pain/pleasure, stimulus response form of ‘drive psychology’. For Marxism, ‘as the suffering of the increasingly proletarianized masses became even greater and greater, a pain-reaction
nature was also seen in the ‘spirit of capitalism’, which was the object of Tillich’s critique in *The Religious Situation*. For Tillich, the human person is a complex combination of needs and drives, with ‘vital, aesthetic and erotic elements’. For Tillich, the eschatological element has the twofold function of criticizing unjust existing power structures, and also providing the drive for change, in the form of expectation.

*Plan of the argument*

In *The Socialist Decision*, the prophetic dimension of Judaism plays two essential roles, one critical, and the other constructive. This analysis begins by describing how, within the history of religion, Judaism confronted the myths attached to soil, blood and social group, ‘the powers of origin’. This is the critical role of Jewish prophetism. In *The Socialist Decision*, Tillich uses the following terms interchangeably for Jewish prophetism: ‘the Jewish spirit’, ‘the spirit of Judaism’, ‘Jewish prophetism’, ‘prophetism’ and ‘the prophetic tradition’. Tillich states clearly that Judaism as a historical reality is not to be equated to these. For example, Judaism under the heirs of the Davidic monarchy began to exhibit features of

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would result that would touch off the revolution’. For the bourgeoisie, ‘Also completely primitive and removed from reality was the notion, derived from the liberal belief in harmony, that after the victory of the revolution, a universal and uniform satisfaction of human needs would prevail’ (*Socialist Decision*, 133).

71 ‘Even such basic needs as hunger and thirst are inwardly complex. Apart from extreme cases of direst need which press one beyond the limits of human consciousness, the need for food and clothing and the like is also infinitely differentiated and determined by vital, aesthetic, and erotic elements, whose reciprocal effect causes radical changes even in the spheres of the most primitive need-satisfaction’ (ibid., 136).

72 ‘Of course, prophetism and Judaism cannot simply be equated’ (ibid., 22).
religious nationalism, which then led to generations of prophetic critique. However, the Old Testament prophets provide a necessary historical reference point for Jewish prophethood.

In this analysis of *The Socialist Decision*, Judaism and its related concepts are treated in three sections, following an introductory section on the dialectical structure, analytical framework, and key terms. The first discussion will focus on part I, chapter 2, 'The Break with the Myth of Origin in Judaism', and will contrast how Judaism confronted each of the mythical powers of origin in a critical capacity. This section underscores the continuing importance of the history of religion for Tillich. The second and third parts of this analysis will be from part III, where Tillich attempts to resolve the inner tension of the proletarian situation through the principle of socialism. This is the constructive role of Jewish prophethood. In part III, chapter 5, 'The Socialist Principle and its Roots', Tillich lays out the themes of 'demand', 'promise', and 'expectation', acknowledging that each has its roots in Jewish prophethood, and that each plays an essential constructive role in his particular view of socialism. In this section, Tillich explicitly draws an analogy between Jewish prophethood and socialism. Finally, in part III, chapter 7, 'The Resolution of Socialism's Inner Conflict through the Unfolding of the Socialist Principle', Tillich completes his constructive project by outlining the specific elements of the socialist principle, which are directly and indirectly derived from Jewish prophethood. The discussion of this section will explore two elements that explicitly draw upon Jewish prophethood, the transformation of nationalism to a universal humanity, and economic globalization. In *The Socialist Decision*, Jewish prophethood is deeply embedded in
the dialectical structure of Tillich's argument, and the critique of the bourgeois principle and political romanticism could not have been formulated without it. Also, Jewish prophetism has an ontological basis that is deeper than belief-ful realism. In The Socialist Decision, Tillich coins the maxim 'justice is the true power of being', which has its unique foundation in Jewish prophetism. This maxim responds to the 'unconditional demand' of justice. For Tillich, this unique ontological basis and derivation of justice is the only appropriate response to the 'powers of the myth of origin' as posed by political romanticism, the proxy for Nazism.

Dialectical Structure

Tillich's The Socialist Decision is written in three parts,\textsuperscript{73} with an introduction, and the structure of the work is dialectical. The introduction is where key terms are introduced, including 'being', 'consciousness', and 'principle', which will each be discussed below. Part I introduces the principle of 'political romanticism', which possesses an inherent contradiction, and will not represent a normative position for Tillich. Political romanticism will remain at one 'pole' of the dialectic, so to speak, but it helps to frame the argument by introducing key terms such as the 'powers of origin', which play an important role in Tillich's distinctive view of socialism. The powers of origin are not eliminated, but rather transformed, by prophetic expectation, which has its foundation in Jewish prophetism.

Part II develops two themes. The first is the principle of bourgeois society, the

\textsuperscript{73} Part I is 'Political Romanticism, Its Principle, and its Contradiction'; part II is 'The Principle of Bourgeois Society and the Inner Conflict of Socialism'; part III is 'The Principle of Socialism and the Solution of its Inner Conflict'.

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dominant social and economic phenomenon present in Weimar Germany, which is deeply informed by the spirit of capitalism, which preoccupied Tillich in The Religious Situation. Tillich regarded bourgeois society as dominated by a post-Enlightenment rationalism that broke the primitive bonds of origin, and permitted the subjection of human nature to scientific and economic materialism. He believed bourgeois society was based upon a reductionist anthropology, in which persons acted strictly in accordance with a simple pain/pleasure principle, and the arena of work, trade and economics was a ‘war of all against all’. He felt this placed the working class, the proletariat, at a structural disadvantage from which it could not be liberated, as long as the assumptions of bourgeois capitalism remained operative. The second theme Tillich describes is specifically how the bourgeois principle creates tensions within aspects of Weimar German socialism that beg resolution. Therefore, this second part of the dialectical structure expresses an 'inner drive' that seeks a resolution. Part III discusses how the inner tensions manifest in Weimar German socialism could be resolved in the ‘principle of socialism’, which derives its key concepts from Jewish prophetism.

*Key Terms*

The key concept for Tillich common to all three parts of The Socialist Decision is the concept of ‘principle’, which he introduces in order to characterize the specificity, fullness, dynamism and inner drive of historical, social and cultural phenomena. This stands in sharp contrast to the ‘type’, which was limited to a comparison of structural
similarities, as discussed in The Religious Situation. First, Tillich contrasts this with the limitations of the a-historical Platonic concept of 'essence', which derives from the ancient natural sciences. In its place, Tillich proposes a concept that appropriately reflects the historical and teleological complexity of the phenomenon being analyzed, the 'principle'. He provides two definitions of principle, and one example. The first characterizes a principle as a dynamic concept that 'contains the possibility of making understandable new and unexpected realizations of a historical origin'. The second definition is: 'A principle is the power of a historical reality, grasped in concepts'. In order to proceed with the analysis, I will take the liberty of creating a single, functional definition that captures the spirit of both: A principle must achieve three things when being used to analyze any historical, social, cultural or political phenomenon: (i) it must reflect its diversity and particularity; (ii) it must

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74 Stone, who was cited earlier in the discussion of 'types', seems to think that for Tillich, types and principles are effectively the same thing, but notes that principles emphasize the 'spirit' of a movement, and also its 'existential' or 'decision' character of a movement. He writes: 'Principal [sic] was a way to avoid the endless empirical particularities and to refer to dynamics of a movement or to its spirit. It also emphasized the decision or existentialist character of identifying a group with its central powerful idea. So with the term principal he can carry forward the typological, descriptive-critical work of The Socialist Decision' ('Tillich–Boundary', 396). These features of 'spirit', existentialist character and central powerful idea could be applied to Tillich's 'typology of the history of religion', which will be discussed in Chapters 6 and 7.

75 Tillich elaborates: 'the logic of essence is inadequate in the face of historical realities. The "essence of a historical phenomenon" is an empty abstraction from which the living power of history has been expelled. Nevertheless, we cannot dispense with summarizing characterizations when we are dealing with a coherent movement. It is not enough to refer to historical continuity, since some selection must be made out of the infinite abundance of continuously linked events. Therefore, we must seek another method of historical characterization' (Socialist Decision, 9).

76 Ibid.

77 Ibid., 10.
capture its power, inner drive, potentiality, teleology, and the potential for transformation; and (iii) it is something that must be apprehended by participation. The participatory aspect of the principle of socialism is what occasions the title of the book, *The Socialist Decision*. For Tillich, one cannot at the same time be politically engaged, and remain ‘a spectator to the spirit’. The breadth and depth of the concept of principle grants Tillich considerable flexibility in his analysis. As a result, each principle, political romanticism, the bourgeois principle, and the socialist principle, is treated somewhat differently, according to the contribution of each to an understanding of the proper transformation of socialism.

*Framework for Political Analysis*

As with all of Tillich’s works, he begins with a statement of principles and presuppositions. A thorough presentation is necessary to appreciate the nuances of the dialectical structure, and the derivation of Jewish prophetism from Tillich’s anthropology and ontology, grounding the maxim, ‘justice is the true power of being’. Tillich begins by stating that all political thought and action rests on the duality of human nature and the two roots of political thought. Human nature, in all times and places, is comprised of ‘being’ and ‘consciousness’. Being refers to the bodily aspect of human existence, which is subject to the cycle of birth, growth and development, and death, and is something humankind shares with all living beings. On the other hand, consciousness is distinctive to human beings, and refers to their individual and collective reflective capacity, and their ability to ascribe *meaning* to being, which is

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78 Ibid., 7.
the cycle of birth, growth and development, and death.\textsuperscript{79} This anthropological duality is not unique to Tillich, but is common within twentieth-century Continental philosophy and has its roots in ancient Greek philosophy.

In addition, for Tillich, there are two roots of political thought. The first is the ‘origin’ and the second is the ‘demand’. In Interpretation, Tillich elaborates that the origin is perpetually generating, and therefore existence is always bound to it, to some degree.\textsuperscript{80} At the same time, existence seeks to separate itself from the origin, through the process of individuation, and through the expression of freedom. Therefore, the relationship of existence to the origin is one of tension between bondage to the origin, sometimes referred to as ‘necessity’, and freedom.\textsuperscript{81}

According to Tillich, all societies seek to understand their origin, as their beliefs, practices and institutions answer the question, ‘Whence?’ (Woher?), which

\textsuperscript{79} ‘Man finds himself in existence; he finds himself as he finds his environment established for him. To find oneself in existence means that one does not originate from oneself, that one has an origin outside of oneself, or to use the expressive word of Martin Heidegger “Geworfenheit”: “being thrown” into the world. From this situation follows the human question, “Whence?” It does not appear as a philosophical question until very late. It was always asked, however, and its first answer is given in mythology and sets a standard for the whole future’ (Tillich, Interpretation of History, 206).

\textsuperscript{80} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{81} ‘The origin is creative. Creation produces something new, which did not exist and which, after being produced, represents something independent and singular. Our life has this tension between dependence upon the origin that has produced us and the independence of it through individuality and freedom. The origin does not leave us free from itself, since it is not past only but present every moment. It gives us existence again and again; it reproduces us and holds us fast through its omnipresence’ (ibid., 206; emphasis mine).
Tillich refers to as the ‘myth of origin’.\textsuperscript{82} There was a detailed discussion of mythology in the 1910 Dissertation, although there was not a discussion of freedom as transcending the myths of origin, providing no basis for political thought at this stage. Tillich believes that the combined results of myth research, depth psychology, sociology and ontology, are instrumental to discover ‘primordial’ human experiences:

The myth of origin envisions the beginning of humankind in elemental, superhuman figures of various kinds. Common to them all is the fact that they are expressions of the human tie to father and mother, and that by the power of this tie they want to hold consciousness fast, not allowing it to escape from their dominion.\textsuperscript{83}

These universal phenomena, also described by Tillich as the ‘consciousness’ of a society, yield a wide variety of mythological expressions across human history and cultures, as discussed in Tillich’s dissertations on Schelling. While the content of these mythological expressions varies, they all have in common the attempt to understand the natural cycle of birth, growth and development, and death.

According to Tillich, ‘powers of origin’ are ‘envisioned in myth’ and ‘represented in cult’.\textsuperscript{84} He claims that there are three powers of origin that are relevant to political activity, soil, blood and the social group. According to Tillich, soil

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\item \textsuperscript{82} Tillich elaborates: ‘Every myth is a myth of origin, that is, an answer to the question about the “Whence” of existence and an expression of dependence on the origin and on its power’ (Socialist Decision, 3–4).
\item \textsuperscript{83} Ibid., 13.
\item \textsuperscript{84} Ibid.
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is the most universally present, and the most powerful: ‘It generates life from itself, supports and nourishes it, and then takes it back into itself again. It holds everything under the spell of the cycle of birth and death. The deities of the soil are the holiest; they are the last to let the consciousness go free.’\textsuperscript{85} The second power of origin, blood, develops out of the soil, but through the struggle of selection and breeding, results in the distinction of ‘noble’ and ‘common’ types of people. The noble type accretes to itself all kinds of heroic features, which justify its social dominance.\textsuperscript{86}

The third power of origin, the social group, is the only one of the three that Tillich refers back to the symbolic mother and father. While Tillich is not entirely clear on this point, it appears that a social group can be governed by either a ‘matriarchal principle’, or a ‘patriarchal principle’.\textsuperscript{87} Matriarchal cultures derive their identity to a greater degree from the powers of soil and blood, meaning leadership is given to those who have noble traits, and a vitality which may be distinctive to each culture. On the other hand, patriarchal cultures derive their identity from the primal ancestor, a ‘father figure’, and leadership is passed from father to son. For Tillich, there is a ‘primordial demand’, \textit{found only in patriarchal cultures}, that creates the possibility of

\textsuperscript{85} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{86} ‘Concepts such as “noble blood”, “noble race” and “noble lineage” appear. Noble origin is divine origin, in the sense of special election … the unity of youth and form is the highest symbol of animal power … [this] is expressed in heroic ecstasy in which life and death, courage and melancholy, are one. “Noble” means being consecrated to death, the return to the origin; not, however, out of mere resignation or obedience to duty, but ecstatically. Social dominance, the ruling power of the noble race, follows directly from this power of being’ (ibid., 14–15).

\textsuperscript{87} ‘Principle’ is my term, which is not related to the technical term ‘principle’ introduced above. I simply mean to say that, according to Tillich, a society can be governed by mythological characteristics attributed to either women or men.
progress over against tradition. This appears to be the mythological source of the 'unconditional demand', found in Jewish prophetism: 'Liberation from the origin becomes real only when a break with the social group can also be demanded, i.e., in prophetism.' Just how the 'demand' first presents itself is not entirely clear, but is explained by the awareness of an 'other', creating an 'I'/Thou' relationship, which was also discussed in the 1910 Dissertation, and also in Interpretation. The mysterious emergence of this 'demand', that makes possible an 'I-Thou' relationship, is fundamental to both kinds of dialectic in Tillich's history of religion, the historical dialectic of progression, and the ontological dialectic of balance.

According to Tillich, when a culture fails to transcend this natural cycle,
beyond what ‘is’, it remains in bondage to the powers of origin.\textsuperscript{90} This is the attempt by that culture ‘to hold consciousness fast’, referred to above. He concludes, with emphasis, ‘The consciousness oriented to the myth of origin is the root of all conservative and romantic thought in politics’.\textsuperscript{91} With its emphasis on ‘soil’ (territory) and ‘blood’ (racial purity), and the ‘social group’ (the Nazi party), German National Socialism is the boldest and most ominous expression of political romanticism, which tries to restore the broken myth of origin, broken by Enlightenment rationalism and the spirit of capitalism. Nazism creates myths about the German people having a unified, ancient racial lineage that is being threatened by modernity. For Tillich, a culture that manifests political romanticism takes the first step towards political thought, but fails to look beyond itself, to a ‘Thou’. If a society remains bound to the powers of origin, or ‘what is’, and never asks the question of ‘what ought to be?’, or experiences\textsuperscript{92} the ‘demand’ referred to above, then that society cannot fulfill the second aspect of true political thought. To be truly political, a society or culture must respond to the ‘unconditional demand’. Therefore, a society cannot be both: (i) ‘romantic’, or bound to the myth of origin, to what is; and (ii) ‘political’, or transcending the origin by being oriented toward what ought to be. This is the inherent contradiction of political romanticism.

\textsuperscript{90} Tillich elaborates: ‘The origin embodies the law of cyclical motion: whatever proceeds from it must return to it. Wherever the origin is in control, nothing new can happen’ (Socialist Decision, 16).

\textsuperscript{91} Ibid., 4.

\textsuperscript{92} Tillich uses the erfahren five times in this discussion (erfährt, erfahren), which was translated as ‘experience’ by Franklin Sherman. The verb erfahren could also be rendered ‘to find out’, or ‘to learn’; however, the adjective erfahren is rendered ‘experienced’; cf. Concise Oxford–Duden German Dictionary, 893. The ‘demand’ also ‘confronts us’ (über ... steht) unconditionally. When confronted, a culture may obey, or disobey, the unconditional demand.
The second root of political thought arises if a society transcends the cycle of being and becoming, and attempts to answer not simply ‘what is?’, but ‘what ought to be?’ (‘Whither?’ or Wozu?).\textsuperscript{93} This ‘ought’ does not occur as a continuation or derivation from what ‘is’, but is ‘experienced’ as an ‘unconditional demand’ that ‘confronts’ humanity.\textsuperscript{94} When this occurs, the myth of origin, which is equated with the realm of necessity, is ‘broken’, and human freedom enters human history, initiating human history. When the demand is experienced, Tillich concludes, again with emphasis: ‘The breaking of the myth of origin by the unconditional demand is the root of liberal, democratic and socialist thought in politics’.\textsuperscript{95} For Tillich, all cultures dominated by Enlightenment rationalism have experienced a ‘break’ away from their ancient founding myths of origin, with two common responses. The first and most common response is that of bourgeois capitalism,\textsuperscript{96} which gained momentum in the nineteenth century, but was dealt severe shocks by World War I and the ensuing worldwide economic crisis, as Tillich described in The Religious Situation. Bourgeois capitalism is threatened by the other response, that of revolutionary political romanticism, which seeks to rekindle the ancient powers of

\textsuperscript{93} Socialist Decision, 4.

\textsuperscript{94} Ibid. But Tillich says that the demand arises from the ‘ambiguity of the origin’. In the 1910 Dissertation, Tillich’s discusses the emergence of the demand of the moral law in the section on the limits of rational religion and the emergence of revelation, which is summarized in Chapter 2 above.

\textsuperscript{95} Socialist Decision, 5.

\textsuperscript{96} The conflict of the proletarian situation is rooted in the fact that, on the one hand, the proletariat must draw the consequences of the bourgeois principle, while, on the other hand, it stands in opposition to the bourgeois principle. It must, therefore, overcome the bourgeois principle by means of the bourgeois principle! This is an inescapable conflict, because proletarian existence is the consistent expression of the bourgeois principle. Objectification, depersonalization, and separation from the origin find undisguised expression in the proletariat’ (ibid., 97).
origin. For Tillich, the threat in his immediate context was German National
Socialism. In the words of Ron Stone, the choice for Germany, if it did not embrace
humanistic socialism, then it would suffer the chaos of capitalism, or the barbarism of
National Socialism.⁹⁷

*Justice is the True Power of Being*

For Tillich, every culture's *true nature*, the ‘fulfillment of its origin’, can only occur if it
reflects and acts upon the question, ‘What *ought* to be?’, which is the ‘unconditional
demand’. Only when a culture responds to the unconditional demand of answering
‘what ought to be?’, it then becomes aware of its ‘true origin’, and can begin the
process of true political activity.⁹⁸ It is only in community that the demand can be
posed and received, meaning that the demand can only come from outside of one
community, posed by another community. This is similar to what Tillich argued in his
analysis of rational religion in his 1910 Dissertation on Schelling. When a demand is

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⁹⁷ Ron Stone, ‘Scenes from Paul Tillich and Reinhold Niebuhr’, *BNAPTS* 38/2 (Spring 2012): 15. A
different view of Tillich's posture towards Nazism in *The Socialist Decision* is offered by Reimer in
*Hirsch–Tillich Debate*. Reimer argues that Tillich was ambivalent about Nazism because it offered a
critique of the Enlightenment, which would have agreed with Tillich's understanding of a humanistic
form of socialism. In addition, Reimer observes that there was great uncertainty and fluidity during
1932 and 1933, and it was difficult to pin down where every political party stood. Finally, Reimer
demonstrates that there were significant formal similarities between Tillich's political theology, and

⁹⁸ ‘The questions “Whence?” and “Whither?” do not belong to different worlds. And yet, the demand is
something unconditionally new over against the origin. This indicates that the origin is ambiguous.
There is a split in it between the true and actual origin. *The actual origin is not the origin in truth.* It is
not the fulfillment of what is intended for humanity from the origin. The fulfillment of the origin lies
rather in what confronts us as a demand, as an ought. The “Whence” of humanity finds its fulfillment
in the “Whither.” Tillich goes so far as to say that the origin is ‘ambiguous’, and when a culture
recognizes this ambiguity, it entertains normative questions. *Socialist Decision*, 5.
received by one individual from another individual, an 'I' - 'Thou' relationship is created.\textsuperscript{99} When the 'I' and the 'Thou' are granted equal dignity, \textit{justice} is manifested.\textsuperscript{100}

Tillich employs a distinction between 'mere being' and 'true being', in order to establish a definition of 'justice'. This distinction elaborates on the aforementioned discussion of being and consciousness, the duality of human nature. Mere being is 'impotent'\textsuperscript{101} since it is associated with the failure to transcend the limitations of the myth of origin and the bondage to the actual origin.\textsuperscript{102} On the other hand, true being has 'power', insofar is it is associated with the breaking of the myth of origin through human freedom, and the recognition of the true origin by embracing the equal dignity of the 'Thou'. Power is associated with the inner drive, or fulfillment of something's

\textsuperscript{99} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{100} ‘The content of the demand is therefore that the "thou" be accorded the same dignity as the "I"; this is the dignity of being free, of being the bearer of the fulfillment implied in the origin. This recognition of the equal dignity of the “Thou” and the “I” is justice. The demand that separates from the ambiguous origin is the demand of justice’ (Ibid., 6).

\textsuperscript{101} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{102} In other sections of \textit{The Socialist Decision}, Tillich employs the concept of 'ideology', which can be defined as something that conceals an oppressive power structure. For example, in part II, 171 note 6, he writes: 'The bourgeoisie conceals the class struggle ... it wages from above by means of ideology'. Also: 'All these things have been interpreted, and opposed, as ideology—i.e., as the \textit{false consciousness} the bourgeoisie has concerning itself' (56). More comprehensively: 'Socialism faces a challenge at the level of fundamental theory ... it is most important to clarify the polemical significance that the concept of ideology had for Marx, a matter that must not be forgotten when one employs this concept to probe the relationship of being and consciousness ... a false consciousness can only appear in a society if a true consciousness is also present, namely a consciousness that is united with the new being ... A false consciousness is nothing other than the willful self-affirmation of old social structures that are being threatened and destroyed by new ones' (116–117). Tillich's use of ideology is discussed thoroughly in Donnelly, \textit{Socialist Emigré}, 27–62.
'true being'.

In a culture which is governed by 'the unbroken myth of origin', Tillich says there is perpetual struggle and destruction, 'the rising and perishing of forces that pay one another the penalty and compensation for their injustice according to the ordinance of time', quoting Anaximander.\textsuperscript{103} For Tillich, the emergence of the demand of justice makes it possible for culture to transcend the 'tragic cycle of existence', and to realize its true fulfillment as a culture:

The unconditional demand transcends this tragic cycle of existence. It confronts the power and impotence of being with justice, arising from the demand. And yet, the contrast is not absolute, for the ought is the fulfillment of the is. \textit{Justice is the true power of being}. In it, the intention of the origin is fulfilled ... \textit{Only when the myth of origin is broken and its ambiguity disclosed may it enter into political thinking}.\textsuperscript{104}

For Tillich, Jewish prophethood is the paradigmatic example of how a culture can transcend what 'is', and seek what 'ought to be', and definitively manifest justice. Therefore, Jewish prophethood plays an indispensable role in human history, politics and theology.

\textsuperscript{103} \textit{Socialist Decision}, 6. On page 4, Tillich quotes Anaximander: 'It is necessary that things should pass away into that from which they are born.' Cited from Werner Jaeger's \textit{Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture}, trans. Gilbert Highet (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1945), vol. I, 159.

\textsuperscript{104} \textit{Socialist Decision}, 6.
4.3.1 The Contradictions of Polytheism, or ‘Might Makes Right’

Tillich’s view of the history of religion, myth research and depth psychology, initially developed in the 1910 Dissertation, continued to inform his worldview into the 1930s. This is evident by the importance he assigns to the powers of origin, which were discussed above. In the 1910 and 1912 Dissertations, Tillich acknowledges that before the emergence of Judaism there were rational elements in Greek religion, which endured and later influenced Christianity. The Socialist Decision has a simplified view of the history of religion, and Tillich’s characterization of pre-Jewish and pre-Christian religion is less favourable. Jewish monotheism is contrasted with everything else that came before it, which were polytheistic religions. For Tillich, polytheism manifested two types of contradiction, which only Jewish monotheism could resolve. The first contradiction stemmed from the fact that numerous localized deities cannot coexist with one another, since every deity has a tendency to transcend its local origin, potentially creating a conflict with other deities.105 Tillich underscores that each of these deities retains its localized identity, or attachment to ‘the soil’, one of the powers of origin. This is critical for understanding how the second type of contradiction works, and causes polytheistic societies to experience persistent conflict. In a difficult logical maneuver, Tillich argues that these polytheistic cultures have an impulse towards unification into one nation, what he calls ‘mythical-

105 ‘The myth of origin necessarily takes a polytheistic form ... The creative powers of origin press beyond the original point of emergence. They want to subject to themselves other powers of origin and to enlarge their space. They make a universal claim; their ultimate goal is to encompass all of space ... And one’s particular god becomes the god of the whole world, without ceasing to be a particular god’ (ibid., 18).
political imperialism',\textsuperscript{106} but the attachment to the soil is too strong, and any temporary unity deteriorates into factionalism.\textsuperscript{107} Despite the questionable empirical validity of this argument, it makes sense in light of Nazism's ideology of German racial unity, when Germany, historically, was anything but homogeneous.\textsuperscript{108} Tillich concludes that if a culture remains oriented solely toward the soil, it remains bound to what is: 'There can be no "ought" on the basis of unbroken being and sacred space ... This means, practically, that might makes right.'\textsuperscript{109} In the following discussion of Tillich's understanding of the Exile, it will be shown how Jewish prophetism explicitly countered the myth of origin, and the attachment to space.\textsuperscript{110}

### 4.3.2 The Exile and the Elevation of Time over Space

In the 1910 Dissertation, the two definitive contributions from the Old Testament to the process of revelation were the giving of the Mosaic Law and Prophetism. As discussed in Chapter 2, the Mosaic Law possessed pagan substance expressed in revelational form, and it was this dual nature that provided a basis for Prophetism to effect the transformation of particular revelation into universal revelation. However,

\textsuperscript{106} Ibid., 19.
\textsuperscript{107} 'The original attachment to the soil ... is stronger than any all-embracing unity ... Polarization and demonic divisiveness have the last word on soil that is space-bound' (ibid.).
\textsuperscript{108} 'The attempt to create a unity bound to origin by means of the old-Germanic heritage is completely hopeless, since as soon as the Germanic people appeared on the scene of history, they were grasped by the major streams of tradition already in existence and deprived of their original structure. To be sure, the Germanic substance was at work in the adoption and reformulation of these traditions; but there is no such thing as an original Germanic, and hence national, tradition, and such cannot be created' (ibid., 34).
\textsuperscript{109} Ibid., 19.
\textsuperscript{110} Ibid., 20.
no reference was made to the Exile, or, more generally, to the destruction of idolatrous aspects of Judaism, to preserve God’s people.\textsuperscript{111} In The Socialist Decision, there is no discussion of revelation per se, because the purpose of The Socialist Decision is to promote a political program that will have a humanistic and eschatological form of socialism. For Tillich, this means the creation of political institutions and culture that enable human flourishing, a true ‘humanism’, as opposed to the reductionist anthropologies of bourgeois capitalism and scientific Marxism. In addition, in the 1910 and 1912 Dissertations, there is no discussion of ‘space’ as being problematic from a theological, political or ethical standpoint, nor ‘time’ being correspondingly elevated. In The Socialist Decision, Tillich presents for the first time, in any detail, the problematic nature of ‘space’, in terms of bondage to the myth of origin, and the metaphysical importance of ‘time’ as something that breaks the ancient, never ending cycle of birth, development and death.\textsuperscript{112}

Tillich’s understanding of the Exile, presented here for the first time, is fundamentally important for his distinctive view of a humanistic, prophetic understanding of socialism. According to Tillich, God saved his people by destroying their idolatrous relationship to the promised land, the priesthood and Temple cult,

\textsuperscript{111} It was noted that later in Tillich’s writings, in volume I of his Systematic Theology, pages 141–143, reference is made to the Suffering Servant in Second Isaiah as being an example of preparation for the paradoxical concept of the Cross.

\textsuperscript{112} In Interpretation of History, Tillich acknowledges that the Jews became ‘the people of time’, but the point is not developed in any significant way: ‘For polytheism corresponds with the category “beside” of spaces, just as monotheism with the category “toward” of time and its one direction. So prophecy simultaneously struggled for time against space and for monotheism against polytheism; and so the Jewish people became the people of time, necessarily provoking the attacks of all people who are bound to space and consciously or unconsciously defy the meaning of history’ (263–264).
and the monarchy, which together constituted Israel's distinctive identity as the chosen people of God.

On the basis of a powerful social myth of origin, Jewish prophetism radicalized the social imperative to the point of freeing itself from the bond of origin. God is free from the soil, the sacred land, not because he has conquered foreign lands, but precisely because he has led foreign conquerors into his own land in order to punish the 'people of his inheritance' and to subject them to an unconditional demand.\textsuperscript{113} The bond of origin between God and his people is broken if the bond of the law is broken by the people. Thus the myth of origin is shattered – and this is the world-historical mission of Jewish prophetism.\textsuperscript{114}

This destruction was punishment for the failure to maintain justice, as described earlier, as the equality of 'I' and 'Thou'. For Tillich, the nation of Israel failed to maintain equality toward strangers in their midst: 'The claim of belonging to the people avails nothing in the face of the unconditional demand, on account of which the alien can be held in equal, indeed, in higher esteem.'\textsuperscript{115}

The simultaneous destruction of the monarchy and the preservation of the descendants of Israel in exile signified for Tillich, in theological terms, two things concerning time. First, it signified the theological independence of time, in which

\textsuperscript{113} This is similar to the 'threat of extinction' referred to by Tillich in ST I, 141–143. This is also referred to in Chapter 2 above.

\textsuperscript{114} Socialist Decision, 20.

\textsuperscript{115} Ibid.
something 'new' can emerge: 'the independent character of time is recognized; it means the elevation of time over space. Time acquires a direction; it moves toward something that did not exist but will exist and, once it is attained, will not be lost again'.\textsuperscript{116} This also means that the pagan mythological cycle of birth and death can be definitively transcended. Second, the notion of 'expectation' is introduced, which will be discussed in more detail below, which introduces a teleological, eschatological and dynamic aspect to time: 'The expectation of a 'new heaven and a new earth' signifies the expectation of a reality that is not subject to the structure of being ... The new being is intrinsically unontological. It cannot be derived from the original state. It goes beyond the origin into a second phase, so to speak, the phase of the new in history. Thereby the origin itself appears in altered guise.'\textsuperscript{117} This idea is difficult insofar as it suggests that 'the new' has no basis in the structure of being, in that 'it cannot be derived from the original state'. Yet, there must be some continuity between the 'structure of being' and 'the new', if 'the origin itself appears in an altered guise'. Despite any difficulties, Tillich is trying to describe the process of transforming 'what is' into 'what ought to be'.

4.3.3 Prophetic Transformation of the Powers of Origin

For Tillich, an additional implication of the Exile is that the 'new' transforms the origin, in order that the origin can transcend its orientation to space and become temporally oriented, toward 'the new'. Memory of the origin is not eliminated, but this

\textsuperscript{116} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{117} Ibid.
is the risk with Enlightenment rationalism, and even the heirs of the Jewish Enlightenment. ¹¹⁸ Tillich uses the doctrine of creation as an example of what he means by transformation:

the origin … receives the character of a beginning. In the myth of origin there is no temporal beginning; existent things forever emanate from the origin and return to it. Being is not the beginning of existing things, but rather their constant root. Prophetism transforms the origin into the beginning of the historical process: the creation, which itself is pictured symbolically as an historical act. ¹¹⁹

For Tillich, the concept of creation has been transformed from a process of eternal generation, similar to Neo-Platonism or some forms of Gnosticism, to a single event, which is depicted as historical, through the use of symbols. Therefore, history as a linear, teleological process, is created, and the cycle of birth and death is transcended. Something truly 'new' becomes possible.

¹¹⁸ Tillich acknowledges that some forms of Judaism, such as rationalist forms in western Europe, had a secularizing effect: 'Now it is the tragedy of Judaism that its historical fate not only broke the hegemony of the powers of origin, but also frequently dissolved them altogether, insofar as no new ties to the soil were created in their place (though this did come to pass in east-European Judaism). This negative element, the critical dissolution of the myth of origin instead of its prophetic transformation, gives to anti-Semitism and political romanticism an apparent justification for resisting this tendency' (ibid., 22).

¹¹⁹ Ibid., 20–21. The aspects of continuity and discontinuity in prophetism will be discussed again below, in the fifth section regarding the symbol of expectation. Specifically, this means the transcendence and immanence of prophetic eschatological expectation, and its analogue in socialism.
4.3.4 Jewish Prophetism and the ‘Jewish Problem’ of Nationalism

Tillich concludes his analysis of how his distinctive view of Judaism,\textsuperscript{120} or Jewish prophetism, can solve two problems, the problem of rationalism, and the problem of lapsing back into bondage to the origin. According to Tillich, both Christianity and Judaism are vulnerable to each extreme. Historically, in the second century CE, Christianity was confronted with the related heresies of gnosticism and Marcionism, which, among other things, rejected the use of the Old Testament, allegedly because of its capricious, vengeful God. In Tillich’s terms, these anti-Jewish forces were problematic because they were bound to the myth of origin.\textsuperscript{121} For Tillich, the Christian church struggled to save itself by making ‘the spirit of Judaism its own’, by affirming the fundamental importance of creation and the Old Testament.\textsuperscript{122} While Christianity managed to solve that problem, in a historical sense, Tillich believes that there are two ongoing threats from the powers of origin. The first is from ‘the priesthood’, with its rituals and ancient forms of worship, which could lead to

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{120} Tillich underscores that Judaism and prophetism cannot be equated: ‘Old Testament prophetism is the persistent struggle of the “spirit of Judaism” with the realities of Jewish national life. For the actual life of the Jewish nation, like the actual life of every nation, is by nature pagan. Hence, we see the foolishness of certain nationalistic demands that the Old Testament be dismissed as an expression of alien identity’ (ibid., 22).
\item \textsuperscript{121} Ibid., 21.
\item \textsuperscript{122} ‘Christianity, through severe struggles, made the spirit of Judaism its own foundation. It took over the Old Testament, the idea of creation, and other historical concepts, and defended them against attempts to reinterpret the Christian event according to the myth of origin. In these struggles Christianity came to the very edge of extinction as an independent religion. At last, however, it won out and affirmed the Old Testament as its indispensable basis’ (ibid.). For Tillich, the Old Testament writings are ‘a continuous testimony to the struggle of prophetic Judaism against pagan, national Judaism. For this reason, and solely for this reason, the Old Testament is a book for humanity—because in it the particular, the bondage to space and blood and nationalism, are seen as things to be fought against’ (ibid., 22).
\end{itemize}
idolatry. The second potential threat is any Christian group that seeks to re-attach itself to the powers of origin, after it had originally transcended them. Tillich does not name his target here. However, this would characterize the German Evangelical Church (‘GEC’), whose predecessors led the Protestant Reformation. In the mid 1930s, the GEC was not critical of Nazism, and at times supported it, as discussed in Chapter 2 of this dissertation.

For Tillich, Judaism is also vulnerable to the twin threats of rationalism and bondage to the origin. Above it was noted that the Jewish Enlightenment caused a complete break from the powers of origin, explaining anti-Semitism, in a highly qualified way. For Tillich, the other problem is Jewish nationalism, which was seen at the height of the monarchy, as reported in the Old Testament, and is also seen in the Zionist movement of Tillich’s day. For Tillich, Jewish nationalism is the distinctly ‘Jewish problem’, because of the iconic historical and theological status of the promised land and monarchy for Jewish identity. The only solution for this is to consistently reject the ‘bondage to space’, as paradigmatically expressed in Jewish prophetism:

123 Tillich probably means ‘Roman Catholic’ priesthood, since he regularly uses the concepts of ‘Catholic substance’, referring to sacramental and traditional aspects of religion, and ‘Protestant principle’, referring to the critical and reformist aspects of religion.
124 The Socialist Decision was written before the GEC elections in the summer of 1933, in which the so-called ‘German Christians’ won substantial victories and a Reich-bishop (‘Reichsbischof’) with Nazi sympathies, Ludwig Müller, was selected. See Klaus Scholder, The Churches and the Third Reich, vol. I, Preliminary History and the Time of Illusions 1918–1934 (London: SCM Press, 1987), 219–549, ‘The Churches in the Year of the Seizure of Power’. Also, technically speaking, the Confessing Church, which never formally broke away from the GEC, did oppose Hitler, although it did not exist when The Socialist Decision was written.
The ‘Jewish problem’ can only be solved by a decisive affirmation of the prophetic attack on the dominion of the myth of origin and all thinking bound to space. Only in this way can the pagan element in the Christian peoples and the negatively critical element in Judaism simultaneously be overcome. A secessio Judaica\textsuperscript{125}, on the other hand, would mean a relapse into the barbarism and demonry of an existence totally bound to space.\textsuperscript{126}

For Tillich, both Judaism and Christianity must always embody ‘the Jewish spirit’, to avoid persistently encroaching pagan tendencies:

it remains the function of the Jewish spirit to raise the prophetic protest, both in Judaism and Christianity, against every new attempt to revive such bondage to the myth of origin, and to help time, the unconditional demand, and the ‘Whither’ to be victorious over space, mere being, and the ‘Whence’.

The spirit of Judaism is the necessary and eternal enemy of political romanticism. Anti-Semitism is an essential element in political romanticism. Christianity, however, by virtue of its principle, belongs radically and unambiguously on the side of Judaism in this conflict.\textsuperscript{127}

This underscores the permanent theological validity of Jewish propheticism.

Therefore, this dialectical framework presents a reciprocal relationship between Judaism and Christianity, exhibiting an ontological dialectic of balance. This is in addition to a highly developed understanding of the emergence of Jewish propheticism

\textsuperscript{125} Meaning a Jewish secession or withdrawal. Translator: Franklin Sherman.

\textsuperscript{126} Socialist Decision, 22–23.

\textsuperscript{127} Ibid., 21–22.
within the history of religion, through a historical dialectic of progression.

4.4 The Symbol of Expectation as the Basis for the Socialist Principle
The preceding exposition of Jewish prophetism demonstrates its critique of political romanticism. This critique identified three aspects of Jewish prophetism that will be carried forward into Tillich's normative understanding of socialism: monotheism (versus polytheism), time (versus space) and the power of the origin (versus bondage to the origin). The preceding analysis illuminated the deficiencies of political romanticism, bondage to the origin, the critique of Jewish nationalism, and pagan Christian National Socialism. However, the positive application of Jewish prophetism must now be developed. In part III, chapter 5 of The Socialist Decision, Tillich initiates his constructive proposal, through a multi-dimensional 'symbol', the symbol of expectation. Three things will be discussed. First, there are the three elements of the socialist principle, which Tillich uses as the basis to draw an analogy between socialism and the prophetic tradition. Second, prophetic expectation reflects the interpenetration of promise and demand, with the demand providing the basis for justice. This expression of equality and justice enables Tillich to call this a 'true humanism.' Third, the socialist principle incorporates a creative tension between prophetic and rational elements, which drives the transformation of symbols pointing to a future reality.

First, the socialist principle is grounded in the interaction of three elements: (i) an affirmation of the power of origin, a presupposition of political romanticism; (ii) an
affirmation of the unconditional demand, also a presupposition of political
romanticism; and (iii) a rejection of ‘the metaphysical core’ of the bourgeois principle,
the belief in harmony.\textsuperscript{128} Tillich’s distinctive view of socialism readily incorporates the
first and second element, but the third element, the belief in harmony, is pivotal.
According to Tillich, if harmony becomes the basis for society, then the relationship
to the powers of origin is severed. Tillich says this is what happened with bourgeois
capitalist society, drawing upon Enlightenment rationalism, causing capitalist society
to utterly distance itself from the powers of origin. Alternatively, if harmony is
rejected, then the relationship to the powers of origin can be retained, but they must
be transformed, lest society become bound to them once again. Tillich summarizes
the relationship this way: ‘\textit{Socialism lifts up the symbol of expectation against the
myth of origin and against the belief in harmony. It has elements of both, but it
transcends both.}\textsuperscript{129}’

By introducing the term ‘symbol’ in this context, Tillich is enabling an analogy
to be drawn between the prophetic tradition and socialism:

By combining the three elements of the socialist principle in the symbol of
expectation, the socialist movement is brought into explicit relationship with
the prophetic tradition. For in the prophets, i.e. in the historical movement in
which the second root of human existence was grasped in a radical manner,
these three elements are likewise united: the bond of origin, expressed in the

\textsuperscript{128} Ibid., 100–101.
\textsuperscript{129} Ibid., 101.
form of patriarchal religion, the breaking of the bond of origin by the unconditional demand; and the fulfillment of the origin not in a present interpreted in terms of harmony, but in a promised future. This means that the socialist principle, so far as substance is concerned, is prophetic.

Second, Tillich’s distinctive view of socialism reflects an ‘interpenetration of demand and promise’. This relationship is an outgrowth of the tension between ‘what will come to pass’, which is not dependent upon human activity, and ‘what ought to come to pass’, which is dependent upon human activity, and is rooted in the prophetic tradition. The demand possesses features rooted in the Jewish prophetic tradition, and helps provide the basis for a humanistic socialism, as opposed to a reductionist, scientific socialism. For Tillich, ‘the demand’ was also present in the mythological, that is, pre-Jewish stage, where it merely presented the possibility of transcending the origin (the ‘ambiguity of the origin’). In addition, he says that the prophetic and socialist ‘demand’ subjects all aspects of culture, every power, ‘both high and low’, to the standards of equality and justice. In a more difficult move, Tillich argues that this demand for equality serves to elevate, uniquely

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130 In part III of The Socialist Decision, chapter 7, section 5, ‘Eros and Purpose in the Life of the Community’, Tillich’s view of socialism includes the ‘emancipation of women’, which rejects ‘male patriarchalism’ (ibid., 152).

131 Ibid., 101.

132 Ibid., 104.

133 ‘This tension corresponds precisely to the prophetic character of socialism, since the prophet is simultaneously one who demands and one who promises’ (ibid.).

134 See Note 98 above.

135 Ibid., 105.
in the history of religion, the status of ‘lowliness’.\footnote{\textsuperscript{136}}

Third, the socialist principle incorporates a creative tension between prophetic expectation and rational expectation, which results in a ‘fundamental openness’ and a ‘living expectation’. This tension trades on a juxtaposition of immanence and transcendence, and what is knowable and what is incalculable. For Tillich, rational expectation is ‘immanent’, meaning that it looks for something ‘other’, meaning that which \textit{ought to be}, but at the same time within the realm of experience (no concrete example given). Also, prophetic expectation is something ‘transcendent’, meaning that it points to a ‘new creation’, something ‘wholly other’.\footnote{\textsuperscript{137}} Using the example of prophetic eschatological expectation, Tillich observes that the ‘coming order of things’ presupposes a total transformation of the present, even a ‘suspension of the laws of nature’, although the language used necessarily derives from everyday experience.\footnote{\textsuperscript{138}} However, the prophetic and rational are not opposed, in the sense that one must be eliminated in favour of the other, but that \textit{both} must be maintained, in tension, not opposition. For Tillich, this gives socialism more than a humanistic character, but also an eschatological dimension. Tillich argues that true socialism presupposes a radical transformation of society, meaning a transformation of human

\footnote{\textsuperscript{136}} ‘The inescapability of the demand, a demand that is addressed to everyone, makes all persons equal. That which one has, the fullness of one’s being, with its luminous power, becomes insignificant in the presence of the unconditionality of the demand. Thereby the extraordinary possibility arises that human being may be fulfilled through the severest diminution of being. Hence the value that the prophetic and Christian viewpoint places on lowliness’ (ibid.).

\footnote{\textsuperscript{137}} Ibid., 110.

\footnote{\textsuperscript{138}} Ibid., 110–111. In summary: ‘Prophetic expectation acknowledges factors in human life that are in principle incomprehensible; rational expectation, only factors that have not been comprehended’ (110).
nature and the laws of society.\textsuperscript{139}

From a practical standpoint, this involves the hard work of planning and legislation, aimed towards the goal of a just society, coupled with the understanding that there will be contingencies that may, or may not, be favourable to socialism:

in the background [there is] a sense of transcendent destiny, and in the foreground historicoanalytical research and history-shaping policy. Neither inhibits the other. Even the most rigorously rational analysis contains within itself (not outside itself) an element that is inaccessible to it, not because it is too complex but because it cannot become the subject of analysis. And even the strongest prophetic belief in providence never refrained from analyzing the historical situation in detail.\textsuperscript{140}

\textbf{4.5 Prophetism, Internationalism and Economic Globalization}

In part III, chapter 7, ‘The Resolution of Socialism’s Inner Conflict through the Unfolding of the Socialist Principle’, Tillich completes his constructive project by demonstrating how the elements of the socialist principle, taken from Jewish prophetism, are essential to his particular view of socialism. In chapter 7, Tillich presents the specific elements of his distinctive view of socialism, which include: the classless society (130–131); a new view of human nature which integrates humanistic Marxism and Freudian psychoanalysis, enabling a richer and more

\textsuperscript{139} Ibid., 111.

\textsuperscript{140} Ibid., 111–112.
complex understanding of human drives and needs (133–136); a new view of power that seeks justice and requires consent (138–140); the creation of a universal socialist culture through the development of appropriate symbols (147–150); a new view of the nation that frees particular nations from bondage to the origin by subjecting them to the prophetic demand (151–152); a new view of economic planning which ranks the satisfaction of material needs according social value, to be administered by a central authority (153–155); a new view of work and labour that enables work to serve people, and for the meaning of work to coincide with the meaning of life (157–158); and, a new orientation of economics to promote international trade, to oppose imperialist nationalism (or ‘autarky’), and to place the largest economic assets, such as agricultural land, heavy industry and banking, in the hands of central planners (156–160).

Each of these new understandings could be tied back to Jewish prophetism, at least indirectly, in light of the latter’s humanistic orientation, and overt attention to justice understood as equality. For our purposes, those aspects that Tillich directly attributes to Jewish prophetism will be discussed, completing the exposition and analysis of The Socialist Decision. In chapter 7, section 5, ‘Eros and Purpose in the Life of the Community’, Tillich’s view of Jewish prophetism serves directly as the basis for the transformation of two aspects of his distinctive view of socialism: the movements from nationalism to universal humanity and imperialist economic independence (‘autarky’) to economic globalization.
4.5.1 The Transformation of Nationalism

Tillich’s desire to transform nationalism is in direct response to ‘reactionary forces, which have taken possession of the family and the national community’.\textsuperscript{141} This most likely refers to German National Socialism, a form of political romanticism. At the same time, he acknowledges the legitimacy of nationhood, which is consistent with his understanding that the ‘powers of origin’ are not in themselves destructive, but can become objects of idolatry and the basis for oppression. Tillich is arguing that nationhood can be co-opted for unjust purposes, but that it does have a ‘genuine use’.\textsuperscript{142} For Tillich, the prophetic critique is twofold. First, it acknowledges the importance of the origin, insofar as prophets are always identified with a particular people. Second, prophetism reminds its particular people of origin that they do not exist only for themselves, but for a larger purpose.

Soil, blood, tradition, the social group – all the powers of origin are combined in the nation. The prophetic tradition thus relates to a people neither in such a way as to confirm it in its immediate self-awareness (as the ‘false prophets’ do), nor to dissolve it for the sake of an immediate transition to a universal

\textsuperscript{141} Ibid., 150. He further says that socialism must ‘decisively and courageously unveil the bourgeois perversion of the nationalist idea, revealing that the spirit of patriotism is being used to justify and defend class domination at home and economic imperialism abroad’. This observation points to Tillich’s assessment of the opportunistic nature of bourgeois capitalism, which defends the reactionary Nazi policies.

\textsuperscript{142} ‘Even at present a considerable portion, if not the greatest portion, of the self-destructive nationalism of the European peoples can be traced back to such sources. \textit{But it is here, too, that only what once had a genuine use can be misused.} The idea of the nation cannot be destroyed by pointing to its perversion. The idea of the nation has energies deriving from the origin, and therefore has a claim to fulfillment—meaning not uncritical support, but also not destruction. Soil, blood, tradition, the social group—all the powers of origin are combined in the nation’ (ibid., 151).
humanity (as bourgeois cosmopolitanism does). It seeks rather at once to judge and to support the nation. The prophetic is always addressed to all humanity, but it always proceeds from amongst a people, exhibiting thereby the unity of origin and goal that is typical of it.\footnote{Ibid.}

For Tillich, socialism affirms the true purpose of a nation more profoundly than nationalism can.\footnote{Ibid.} He states the prophetic critique another way, since it intends to free the nations from bondage to the powers of origin:

Nationalism can provide the nation with an empire, but it cannot so relate it to the course of history as to free it from the cycle of birth and death. Socialism performs a service for Christian peoples which the churches have relinquished, if not formally, then actually, among many of its groups and leaders: It frees nations from the law of death by subjecting them to the prophetic demand. Therefore prophetism alone truly serves the nation. It is the legitimate representative of the idea of the nation. And what is true for prophetism is also true for socialism.\footnote{Ibid., 152.}

\subsection*{4.5.2 The Transformation of ‘Autarky’ and the Elevation of Time}

For Tillich, the goal of socialist economics is twofold.\footnote{Ibid., 159. Tillich acknowledges the assistance he received from his economist friend, Adolf Löwe, in writing section 6 of chapter 7, ‘Nature and Planning in the Economic Order’. Tillich also refers to an...}

\footnotetext[143]{Ibid.}
\footnotetext[144]{Ibid.}
\footnotetext[145]{Ibid., 152.}
\footnotetext[146]{Ibid., 159. Tillich acknowledges the assistance he received from his economist friend, Adolf Löwe, in writing section 6 of chapter 7, ‘Nature and Planning in the Economic Order’. Tillich also refers to an...}
unification of world economic space', in opposition to 'autarky', which refers to an individual nation seeking to achieve economic independence. The second goal is to ensure 'the rational utilization of the earth's virtually unlimited productive capacity in the service of humanity as a whole'. The problem facing socialist economics, the 'inner tension' reflected in the bourgeois principle referred to above, is that German socialism had to align itself with economic liberalism against 'the restraints on economic rationality'. (It is not clear why Tillich says this, since 'economic rationality' usually means the dictates of the free market, something Tillich and socialism would aver. It could mean some kind of restrictions on capitalism imposed by the German National Socialists.) In addition, according to Tillich, German socialism also needed to affirm central planning against the instability and recurring crises brought on by capitalism.

Tillich's transformation of economics draws upon Jewish prophetism in two ways, picking up on threads sown earlier. The first thread is the elevation of time over space, a theme first seen in Tillich's critique of political romanticism in part I, and his understanding of the Exile. In this critique, the cyclical view of time is expressed as bondage to the powers of origin, and as the inability to transcend what is. In Tillich's constructive response, this view of time is meant to reflect what ought to be. The specific problem occurs, according to Tillich, when a nation seeks economic independence and self-sufficiency, and 'absolutizes' itself, effectively

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essay of Löwe's, 'Der Sinn der Weltwirtschaftskrise', *Neue Blätter für den Sozialismus* 2 (1931) (ibid., part III, 177 note 33)

147 Ibid., 159.
148 Ibid., 153.
sacralizing its geographic territory.\textsuperscript{149} The solution, according to Tillich, is to prohibit granting any \textit{absolute} status to any geographic space: 'An \textit{autarky of the national economy implies, in keeping with the myth of origin, tying production to a limited space, for the sake of the absolute sovereignty of this space}. But no one space is sovereign.'\textsuperscript{150}

The second thread is the extension of equality to 'the alien', a cornerstone principle of Mosaic law, and the foundation of justice. The ethical and theological imperative experienced simply by the presence of 'the other', first expressed in the 1910 Dissertation, and discussed above in \textit{The Socialist Decision}, reappears in the culmination of this work. Tillich extends this to justify the internationalization of trade.

International trade and exchange, of its own force, prevails over the economic independence of places bound to the origin. It is a path-breaker for the trans-spatial unity of humankind, for a common orientation to the forward movement of time. Hence the prophetic position affirms the international horizon also with regard to economic exchange. Prophetism protects the 'alien' in the name of the same unconditional demand that compatriots and foreigners,

\textsuperscript{149} In Tillich's discussion of the bourgeois principle in part II of \textit{The Socialist Decision} (55–56), he equates autarky, imperialism and bourgeois nationalism: 'The powers inherent in the idea of the nation, which are very closely related to the myth of origin, are utilized in the struggle for the interests of the national bourgeois economic groups. Domestically, opposition to the domination of these groups is condemned as unpatriotic. Internationally, the economic struggle against them is interpreted as a struggle against the nation. Thus the bourgeoisie, with the help of the idea of the nation, succeeds in overcoming its political opponents at home, in enlisting in its service the prebourgeois forces that are still bound to the origin, and in reducing competition in the world market, either by political suppression of the competing nations or by barring their products (imperialism or autarky).'
\textsuperscript{150} Ibid., 158.
one's own and other peoples, all confront: the demand of justice.\textsuperscript{151}

4.6 Conclusion
In two important works, Tillich has sought to address political and cultural problems with a theology that has political and cultural dimensions. Both \textit{The Religious Situation} and \textit{The Socialist Decision} are examples of Tillich's trademark 'theology of culture', which acknowledges that there is a theological dimension to all aspects of culture, not only the explicitly religious, institutional forms. In \textit{The Religious Situation}, the problem is the pervasive spirit of capitalism, with its reductionist anthropology and free market economics. For Tillich, the partial response, not the solution per se, is belief-ful realism. Tillich did not use belief-ful realism as a full-blown program to transform society, unlike the principle of socialism. In \textit{The Religious Situation} he only briefly discusses the priestly (Rudolf Otto) and prophetic (Karl Barth) aspects of Protestant theology, but ideally this union will be rooted firmly in its historical context, and also uphold an eschatological perspective. In \textit{The Religious Situation}, belief-ful realism is expressed primarily as a critical concept, and does not provide a more fully developed constructive view of the transformation of society, unlike the socialist principle.\textsuperscript{152} In \textit{The Socialist Decision}, according to Tillich, the problem is the

\textsuperscript{151} Ibid., 159.

\textsuperscript{152} Stone, in comparing Tillich's unacknowledged use of Max Weber in both \textit{The Religious Situation} and in \textit{The Socialist Decision}, says that in the former, Tillich intentionally did not put forth a fully constructive project: 'Still, \textit{The Religious Situation} is basically an analysis of the way things are and from whence they have come and does not show the goals or the power of transformation' ('Tillich--Boundary', 396).
ambivalence of German socialism, with the twin risks of Germany lapsing into either the chaos brought on by capitalism, or the barbarism feared by embracing National Socialism. The solution, according to Tillich, would be for German socialism to adopt a properly humanistic and eschatological view of socialism, in order to transform society. According to Tillich, Jewish prophetism uniquely provides the foundation for this distinctive view of socialism.

Each of the main aspects of Tillich’s distinctive view of socialism are firmly rooted in the Jewish prophetic tradition. What had changed from the 1920s to the 1930s was the emergence of a new and ominous threat, German National Socialism, the paradigmatic example of Tillich’s political romanticism. My supposition is that Tillich marshaled the resources of Jewish prophetism because they more effectively responded to the problem of ‘bondage to the myths of origin’, as expressed in political romanticism. This can be seen particularly in the derivation of the ‘ought’ of justice, in the experience of the unconditional demand, and in the maxim of ‘justice is the true power of being’. The appeals to ontology and power are ‘deep’ criticisms, that belief-ful realism did not provide, at least as expressed in the 1920s. As for the problem of capitalism, Jewish prophetism exhibited several key characteristics – like the impetus for economic globalization based upon recognition of ‘the alien’ – that could address the reductionism of capitalism more effectively than belief-ful realism.

Further, Tillich’s derivation of the maxim ‘justice is the power of true being’ was rooted in his distinctive view of the dialectical history of religion. This means that
only a culture that is governed by a patriarchal principle could foster the conditions for a 'primeval demand', which is the unique basis for the unconditional demand of justice. For Tillich, Jewish prophetism was the unique and original expression of this concept of justice. Also, for the first time in Tillich's various analyses of Judaism, he proposes that Judaism assume a permanent, critical/prophetic role in relation to Christianity. This became the basis for what would later be a fully reciprocal relation between Judaism and Christianity, which will presented in Chapter 5 of this dissertation, an ontological dialectic of balance.

In the next chapter, Tillich will enlist the help of social psychology to inform his view of Judaism, in response to the horrors of the Holocaust. The historical dialectic of progression remains a steady foundation of Tillich's framework, but the ontological dialectic of balance will be underscored.
Chapter 5

The *Judenfrage* Lectures: The Dialectic of the Holy and the Permanent Theological Importance of Judaism

In March of 1952, less than ten years after the end of World War II and the full revelation of the horrors of the Holocaust, the directors of the Deutsche Hochschule für Politik (the *Hochschule*) invited Tillich to give a series of lectures with the suggested topic, ‘the Jewish question – a Christian and a German problem’.¹ These will be referred to as the ‘*Judenfrage* lectures’. The occasion for these lectures is remarkable. The directors were very concerned that their students, who were too young to participate in the genocide, did not fully appreciate the importance of the Holocaust, by trivializing it through ignorance and denial, as it was not *their* problem.² Two of the directors of the *Hochschule* wrote to Tillich stating why they thought he would be the best person to address this topic:

> We do not know many people who would be able to do this thoroughly enough; in any case, you would be able to, and you would surely do us in Berlin in general and our students in particular a very great favor. I [Fränkel] know from our common work in New York, how intensively you have dealt for years not only with the problem as an ethical-philosophical problem but as a

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¹ Earley Dissertation, 84.
² Ibid., 84–85.
current political problem ...⁴

The term ‘the Jewish question’ is not really a question, but it is a phrase that gained currency in the mid eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries to describe the implications of Jewish emancipation in a period of rising nationalism. Karl Marx wrote an essay in 1843 titled, ‘On the Jewish Question’,⁵ which quite likely caused the professors at the Hochschule and Tillich to frame the issue in this way. Jewish people for centuries in Europe were subject to different laws within European countries, unlike other citizens. The term was then co-opted by the Nazis to say that for centuries the status of the Jews had been a perpetual problem in Christian Europe.⁶ Further, as Gavin Langmuir points out, there are few words in western history and culture, from the Middle Ages to the present, that have elicited such a strong emotional response as the word ‘Jew’.⁷ For a complex variety of reasons, Jews periodically rose to heights in Christian society, and also periodically suffered the most intense forms of persecution. In these lectures, Tillich attempts to show the historical, theological, psychological and sociological causes of anti-Semitism in Christian Germany, and sketches a path to reconciliation. Tillich’s biographers report that these lectures were the only lectures that Tillich gave in Berlin after World War II

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⁵ See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jewish_question [accessed 05/02/2013].
that were not well received, although they do not say why.\textsuperscript{7}

The \textit{Judenfrage} lectures, given seven years after the end of World War II in the summer of 1952, represent an early attempt by a Christian theologian to address the traumatic events of the Holocaust, and their theological implications. More specifically for Tillich, they represent the culmination of years of reflection on the problem of anti-Semitism, in relation to Germany and Christianity. In response to world-historical events, Tillich's understanding of Judaism changed, along with his interpretation of history. Prior to World War I, Tillich's view of Judaism was shaped by Schelling's history of religion. Tillich's appropriation of Schelling assigned an essential role to Judaism in the development of revelation. As seen in Tillich's 1910 Dissertation, Judaism transformed culturally specific and pagan practices into universally valid expressions of the divine, in three stages. In light of World War I, Tillich experienced a 'political turn', which was discussed in Chapter 1. By the 1930s, Tillich combined elements of humanistic Marxism, the message of the Old Testament prophets (Jewish prophetism), and an eschatological vision for a new social order, to formulate religious socialism. As discussed in Chapter 4, Jewish prophetism possessed an important metaphysical basis, as expressed in the dictum, 'justice is the true power of being'. In addition, Tillich's \textit{The Socialist Decision} also introduced the metaphysical importance of time, to oppose the idolatry of nationalism, to foster an expectant, eschatological posture, and to provide the conceptual basis for something truly 'new' in history.

\textsuperscript{7} Pauck and Pauck, \textit{Tillich}, 217.
After the additional trauma of World War II and the Holocaust, it seems that Tillich was again driven to look elsewhere for answers, beyond political structures, deeper into the human person, into the ‘psyche’. Tillich’s affinity for psychoanalysis is well-documented, although he was never formally trained in that discipline. In the *Judenfrage* lectures, he applies psychology and sociology to the problems of anti-Judaism and anti-Semitism, adding more methodological tools to address a complex problem. For example, in the second lecture Tillich applies new ideas such as ‘anxiety’, and ‘insecurity’ to the older concepts of ‘space’ and ‘time’, as first analyzed in *The Socialist Decision*. For Tillich, these psychological and sociological categories are deeply illuminating, and provide the basis for his theological interpretation of the Jewish problem. In the third lecture, Tillich will combine in new ways, the concepts of space and time, Is and Ought, priestly and prophetic, culminating in a multi-disciplinary, dialectical and theological concept referred to as ‘the Holy’.

The *Judenfrage* lectures are comprised of five parts, an introduction and four lectures. The introduction presents ‘the Jewish question’, and distinguishes how it relates to Jews, Germans and Christians. The presenting problem is the ambiguity of these classifications, which causes Tillich to adopt a wide array of analytical tools.

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8 A recent discussion of the role of psychology in Tillich’s soteriology is chapter 3 of Wilder’s dissertation ‘Existentialism and Exegesis’, which is titled ‘Salvation as Healing: Psychoanalysis, Existentialism, and Soteriology in Tillich’.

9 Tillich describes the second lecture as being mainly a sociological and social-psychological analysis. *Judenfrage* lectures, 455. Langmuir concludes that historical research needs to be informed by the social sciences, and that the study of anti-Semitism must appropriate the insights of social psychology, and he wagers that the history of the Jews will be better served as the influence of the social sciences on history increases. *Definition of Antisemitism*, 22–41.
The first lecture introduces the concepts of ‘anti-Judaism’ and ‘anti-Semitism’, through a historical analysis of western Christianity and the witness of the New Testament. The second lecture introduces psychological and sociological categories, and concludes that Germans and Jews have similar structural ‘corporate personalities’, which exhibit a unique relation of mutual attraction and repulsion. In this chapter Tillich introduces the metaphor of the ‘mirror’ of Jewish prophetism, which is to be perpetually held up to Christianity. The argument climaxes in the third lecture, in which Tillich argues that the sociological and psychological categories fundamentally assume a theological dimension. In this lecture, Tillich draws upon his understandings of Judaism in the 1910 Schelling Dissertation and The Socialist Decision, and he introduces the concept of ‘the Holy’, echoing Rudolf Otto,\(^{10}\) and given a characteristically Tillich-ian emphasis. In the fourth lecture, Tillich applies the theological concepts presented in the third lecture, to Jews, Germans and Christians, in an attempt to provide a path to reconciliation.\(^{11}\)

5.1 Existential Participation

Tillich believes that if any progress can be made within Germany and Christianity

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\(^{11}\) The only extended analysis of the Judenfrage lectures is by their first translator into English, Glenn David Earley, in ‘Paul Tillich and Judaism: An Analysis of ‘The Jewish Question – A Christian and a German Problem’ (Earley, Judenfrage lectures). Earley’s analysis reflects his criticisms of Tillich’s view of Judaism, advanced in the Earley Dissertation, discussed in Chapter 1 above.
with respect to Jews and Judaism, it must be based upon something more than intellectual understanding. Similar to his reasoning in *The Socialist Decision*, there must be existential participation. Tillich applies the concept of existential participation to himself, as part of his statement of method, and gives three reasons why these lectures are fundamentally important to him. First, Tillich has participated in Jewish/Christian dialogue for decades, and he sees this as a vital aspect of his calling as a Christian theologian: ‘It has been my destiny to participate in the questions which will be considered in these lectures. As a Christian theologian, I have participated in Jewish/Christian discussions for decades and have experienced the entire burden of the problems which are moving theological thinking today, as in the beginning of the Christian era.’

This has two implications. The first implication is that the problems surrounding the relationship between Judaism and Christianity in antiquity recur in the modern period. Tillich’s chief example, which he first discussed in *The Socialist Decision*, is the threat to Christianity by pagan syncretism, in the form of religious nationalism, which must be subject to the critique of Jewish prophetism. The second implication is that these problems are not peripheral, but central to Christian theology, and that they represent universally human problems.

The second reason is that Tillich is a German by birth, so he is inevitably related to whatever is concluded about the role of Germans, and Germany, in resolving these problems.

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12 *Judenfrage* lectures, 420–421. The full quote is illustrative: ‘It has been my destiny to participate in the questions which will be considered in these lectures. As a Christian theologian, I have participated in Jewish/Christian discussions for decades and have experienced the entire burden of the problems which are moving theological thinking today, as in the beginning of the Christian era. I am not speaking of the many follies which occur in these debates, but of the questions which concern human beings unconditionally as human beings, and with which I have wrestled along with my Jewish dialogue partners.’
problems. The third reason why these lectures are important to Tillich is that some of his closest friends over the years have been Jews.\textsuperscript{13} This we know from his participation in the ‘\textit{kairos circle}’, and his associations with the Frankfurt School. These reasons combine to lead Tillich to address the question of guilt, to be discussed below.

5.2 Ambiguity, Guilt and Multi-Disciplinary Method

Tillich begins the first of five parts, the Introduction, by declaring the ambiguity of the terms ‘Jew’, ‘Judaism’, ‘Christian’ and ‘German’.\textsuperscript{14} He asserts the term ‘Jewish-question’ is ambiguous, since Judaism could have a sociological function as a minority, a religious function as a sacramental society, and/or a sociological function as an ethnic group, or ‘race’.\textsuperscript{15} Tillich also claims that the relationship between the religious and sociological functions is significant, and unresolved.\textsuperscript{16} In addition, Tillich describes the ambiguity of the term ‘Christian’, which has historical, institutional,

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., 421.

\textsuperscript{14} For Tillich, ambiguity plays a major role in the third volume of his \textit{Systematic Theology}, but in this instance it simply refers to the confusion that can result from one word carrying more than one sense, or meaning.

\textsuperscript{15} Tillich acknowledges the problematic concept of race: ‘Do we speak of Judaism as a religious reality or race? If there was such a thing as the Jewish race (which I do not believe, just as little as I believe there is an Aryan race), the question would be: Is our theme a problem of race or is the Jewish question a matter of something special, that is, a race that is something more than a race? Does ‘Jew’ mean a representative of one of the great eleven religions which have universal character or do we speak of the Jew as a preparer of Christianity?’ (ibid., 418–419).

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid.
denominational, and sociological associations. Finally, the term 'German' is also ambiguous, although Tillich highlights two specific senses, one having to do with 'the German character', and the other relating to German history. Tillich asks whether there is something about the German character which is inherently antagonistic to Judaism, or whether there was some historical event, or catastrophe, that created a unique relationship between Jews and Germans. To maintain maximum flexibility, Tillich assures the listener that none of the senses referred to for each of the three concepts will be excluded.

Tillich proceeds to describe five types of guilt for the Holocaust, which have religious, sociological, psychological and legal aspects. When taken together, all Germans are implicated, even Tillich, in one or more ways. This layered phenomenon of guilt underscores the complexity of the problem, and enables Tillich to use a wide array of arguments as he attempts to answer the question of the Jewish problem for Christians and Germans. The first type of guilt is identified by direct responsibility, to those who participated in the immediate cause of an event. Tillich does not give examples, but he probably means those Germans who directly engaged in the process of identifying, imprisoning and executing Jews – Nazi government officials, prison guards, members of the security agencies and military. This kind of guilt cannot be attributed to the German people as a whole, but only to limited groups and individuals. The second type of guilt implicates all Germans,

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17 Ibid., 419–420.
18 Ibid., 420.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid., 422.
including émigrés such as Tillich, the guilt of ‘a lack of the practice of responsibility’.\textsuperscript{21} Tillich extends this guilt back into the 1920s, inferring that the German people should have suspected the Nazis genocidal plans even then. Tillich faults himself and all other Germans for not opposing Nazi barbarism early on, preventing them from gaining popularity and strength.\textsuperscript{22} He even says that what happened was ‘inevitable’, not in a deterministic sense of being unavoidable, but because Germans were not strong enough to resist.\textsuperscript{23}

The third sense of guilt is the repression of knowledge, which is only attributable to those in Germany after 1933, the year that Hitler came to power. This sense of guilt assumes a strong psychological dimension; it is the guilt of ‘knowing and yet not knowing’, a complex combination of intuitive understanding combined

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{22} ‘Every German is guilty in this sense … Why? Because in the years in which the reign of those who perpetrated these crimes was prepared, we were not strong enough to hinder them, nor willing to sacrifice, even if we protested and thereby became émigrés or sacrifices. Since the middle of the twenties, we suspected what would come. I often told my friends what I saw, as in a vision, the German cities in ruins’ (ibid.). The Paucks recount that this ‘vision’ came to Tillich in 1931: ‘In 1931 he had a dream which was an uncanny premonition of the consequences of a National Socialist victory for Germany. In Kampen, that summer, he and his friends had spent the night drinking wine, talking, dreaming out loud, reciting poetry, all on the theme of imminent doom. As they emerged from the cottage where they had gathered, at four in the morning, to watch the sunrise over the dunes, they were startled to hear Tillich say, “You will all see sheep grazing on the Potsdamer Platz one day.” He had had in fact a dream in which he saw grass growing and sheep grazing on that busiest square in the center of Berlin. Fifteen years later, after the Allied invasion and the bombing of Berlin, he was excited and shaken to see that his dream had come true. A photograph in a New York newspaper showed sheep cropping grass in the Potsdamer Platz’ (interview with Paul Tillich. Pauck and Pauck, \textit{Tillich}, 124–125).

\textsuperscript{23} \textit{Judenfrage} lectures, 422–423.
with denial.\textsuperscript{24} This sense of guilt assumes a complex combination of conscious and unconscious motives, self-deception and denial, and ‘mirror imagery’.\textsuperscript{25} These factors make it a particularly fertile concept, which Tillich will exploit later in the second lecture. The fourth sense of guilt is similar to the third, because it contains an element of self-deception. This is the guilt of forgetting, not in the sense of literally not remembering what happened to the Jews, but the sense of not permitting that historical reality to shape one’s actions in the present or future.\textsuperscript{26} Here Tillich appeals to Max Scheler’s concept of ‘remorse’, which is not a sentimental feeling of pain over something that happened in the past, but has a decisive ethical dimension: ‘remorse is the expulsion of something false from the household of the soul’.\textsuperscript{27} For Tillich, the third and fourth senses of guilt are related because they both have a partially unconscious cause, which confers a tragic dimension upon them.\textsuperscript{28}

The fifth sense of guilt employs a moral calculus of weighing the suffering of

\textsuperscript{24} ‘This is a deep psychological problem, for it is a matter neither of conscious acts, nor of completely unconscious acts, but of acts which hang somewhere between conscious and unconscious. One knew what happened and yet did not know. I believe all who tell me that they did not know, and yet I believe no one, for I know that one knew enough to repress knowledge which one did not want to know. This is guilt which poses difficult psychological and ethical problems … Who is able, even if he or she is only a little sensitive, to look at himself or herself in the mirror? One looks away from one’s own image in the mirror’ (ibid., 423–424).

\textsuperscript{25} The metaphor of the mirror will recur at the end of the second lecture, in a fundamental way.

\textsuperscript{26} Judenfrage lectures, 424. Earley observes that the third and fourth types of guilt are directed to the past and to the future, respectively. Earley, Judenfrage essay, 217.

\textsuperscript{27} ‘To what extent is this expulsion taking place and to what extent has it taken place? Everything depends on whether those elements, which led to the anti-semitic madness, are expelled from the soul, not forgotten, repressed, or hidden, but recognized and banned under the pain of remorse’ (Judenfrage lectures, 424).

\textsuperscript{28} Ibid.
Germans experienced during and after World War II, and uses that as an offset against the guilt of assuming full responsibility for the Holocaust. Tillich expresses the mind-set of some Germans this way: 'We have acted badly, but we have suffered correspondingly. The others have suffered through us, but now we have suffered through them and are even.'\textsuperscript{29} For Tillich, this represents the justice of proportionality, which is important in any understanding of justice, but is inadequate to address the culpability of Germans for the Holocaust.\textsuperscript{30} Instead, Tillich favours a form of justice that accomplishes two things: it (i) recognizes that an objective standard ('the right') has been violated; and (ii) fosters reconciliation of that which is separated, God from humanity, and persons and groups from one another.\textsuperscript{31} For Tillich, the biblical idea of justice requires recognition of the wrong and eradication of its causes.\textsuperscript{32} The addition of reconciliation to the concept of justice is a significant addition from the concept of equality expressed in \textit{The Socialist Decision}. Tillich closes his analysis of guilt with a fundamental question that will inform the remainder of the \textit{Judenfrage} lectures: 'The true question is: Is reconciliation possible and what is necessary so that reconciliation becomes real?'\textsuperscript{33} Tillich develops the complexity of the problem in the first three lectures, and then makes recommendations to

\textsuperscript{29} ibid., 425.

\textsuperscript{30} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{31} 'But there is another definition of the concept of justice. It does not deny the proportional element but goes beyond it. I am thinking of the Old and New Testament concept of justice in which the violation of the right and the consciousness connected therewith are recognized. But that is not the last word' (ibid.).

\textsuperscript{32} \textit{Judenfrage} lectures, 426. This is a new sense of the biblical idea of justice. Prior to this, it had been based on the equality of persons, as in an authentic I–Thou relationship (477).

\textsuperscript{33} Ibid., 426.
achieve reconciliation in the fourth lecture.

5.3 First Lecture: Anti-Judaism and Anti-Semitism

The first lecture draws upon two unpublished papers that were prepared at the request of the American government in the early 1940s, as Tillich was asked to write on the relationship of Catholicism and Protestantism to the Jewish question. Due to the limitations of space, these two papers will not be systematically discussed, but they will be cited where applicable. This lecture can be divided into six sections: (i) the distinction between anti-Judaism and anti-Semitism; (ii) an assessment of the New Testament witness, as the ‘completion’ of the Old Testament, not ‘anti-Judaism’; (iii) an historical overview of western Christianity, focusing on the emergence of anti-Judaism, as occasioned by the encounter of Christianity with ‘paganism’; (iv) a discussion of the ‘deicide’ charge, and the pervasiveness of theological anti-Judaism in the western church; (v) the question of ‘mission’ to the Jews; and (vi) an assessment of the Christian churches under Hitler. There are two salient ideas that dominate this section. The first is that ‘anti-Judaism’, to be defined

34 Weaver, War and Peace, 198. Weaver simply refers to the American government, and I suggest that it was the Office of War Information because that was the agency that asked Tillich to create the texts for the Voice of America broadcasts referred to in Chapter 1 above, and analyzed in Stone and Weaver, Against the Third Reich. Both papers are found in the Paul Tillich Archive of the Harvard–Andover Library at Harvard Divinity School. In 2012 the Tillich Archive was reorganized and recatalogued, with new document numbers being assigned. Here the old document number and new document number will be cited, in that order. The old document number is often accompanied by the abbreviation PTAH, which was created by Erdmann Sturm. The first paper is titled ‘Catholicism and Anti-Judaism’, PTAH 416:009 / bMS649/62 (6). The second paper is titled ‘Protestantism and Anti-Semitism’, PTAH 416:010 / bMS649/62 (7).
below by Tillich, emerges at any point when the Christian church encounters non-Christian (i.e. ‘pagan’) culture: ‘Anti-Judaism originates in the instant in which Christianity comes into the pagan world and must make itself understandable to paganism.’ The second is that anti-Judaism is present at all times in the church, and within Tillich’s early 1950s context, still informs the church’s outlook. Therefore, the Christian church remains guilty of the fourth type of guilt for the Holocaust, the forward-looking kind: ‘Anti-Judaism has occurred in all of church history and represents the tragic guilt of the church.’

5.3.1 Theological Anti-Judaism as the Root of Anti-Semitism

Tillich reports that when he began to research the concept of anti-Semitism, he was compelled to introduce another, more fundamental concept, that of anti-Judaism. According to Tillich, anti-Semitism, the allegedly scientific view that the ‘race’ of Jews was genetically inferior to the Aryan ‘race’, originated in the late nineteenth century. At this time, race-theory became explicit in not only Germany, but England and France, an outgrowth of philosophical naturalism. Tillich allows for a descriptive,

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35 *Judenfrage* lectures, 429. In ‘Protestantism and Anti-Semitism’, Tillich begins the paper with the assertion, ‘The distinction between antisemitism and anti-judaism [sic] is valid for Protestantism as well as for Catholicism’ (1).

36 *Judenfrage* lectures, 428.

37 Ibid., 426–427. According to Cornel West, racism in the western European tradition entered its first phase in the Enlightenment, although it drew upon concepts from Greek antiquity and the Renaissance: ‘To put it crudely, my argument is that the authority of science, undergirded by modern philosophical discourse guided by Greek ocular metaphors and Cartesian notions, promotes and encourages the activities of observing, comparing, measuring and ordering the physical characteristics of human bodies.’ See ‘A Genealogy of Modern Racism’, in *Prophesy Deliverance: An*
biological understanding of ethnic groups, which can be characterized by common physical features, but he refrains from attaching any ethical or religious values to traits that are biologically acquired: ‘But just this was done by the naturalistic race theoreticians of the second half of nineteenth century, leading to the anti-Semitic horrors of the twentieth century.’ For Tillich, anti-Semitism employs a ‘horizontal’, scientific, concept of race. However, anti-Semitism is based on a much earlier, theological, and ‘vertical’ position he calls ‘anti-Judaism’: ‘Christian anti-Judaism is completely different from the horizontal concept of race which was derived from it.

Anti-Judaism has occurred in all of church history and represents the tragic guilt of the church.’ This would suggest that Tillich and Heschel would agree on the causal relation of theological anti-Judaism and anti-Semitism. Theological anti-Judaism will be described in the following two subsections.

5.3.2 The New Testament Witness: Completion, not Negation

According to Tillich, the New Testament witness is not anti-Jewish, but rather expresses the completion of the Old Covenant by the New. According to Tillich, Jesus is not anti-Jewish. He argues that Jesus’ selection of twelve apostles, and the restoration of a twelfth apostle after Judas’ betrayal, symbolizes the continuation of


\[Judenfrage\] lectures, 427–428.

\[Tillich employs a somewhat confusing distinction between ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’ concepts of race, which could also be interpreted to reflect the difference between ‘nature’ and ‘nurture’, respectively. What is clear is that he condemns assigning moral values to physical traits. Ibid.\]
the Jewish tradition, although on a universal, not nationalistic basis.\textsuperscript{40} Tillich also argues that Paul was not anti-Jewish. According to Tillich, Paul wrestled with the status of Judaism throughout his entire ministry, and in Romans 9 through 11 affirms that Judaism will retain an ongoing, prophetic function, even after the coming of Christ:

His theory, which he gives in chapter 9–11 of the Epistle to the Romans, is a thoughtful contribution to the interpretation of history. Judaism has a continuing function, even in the new age. It will not cease to be as long as there is paganism on the earth. It is my conviction, that this is the Christian answer to the Jewish-question in general. In any case, this answer contains nothing anti-Jewish. It is the ‘yes’ and the ‘no’ of Christianity to Judaism in the Christian world.\textsuperscript{41}

\textsuperscript{40} Ibid., 428.

\textsuperscript{41} Ibid., 428–429. Oddly, when Tillich engages in his theological analysis of the Jewish problem in the third lecture, in which he also concludes that Judaism has an enduring value, he does not cite Paul in Romans 9–11 as justification. Earley argues that Tillich incorrectly ‘absolutized’ Romans 11:25: ‘Lest you be wise in your own concern, I want you to understand this mystery, brethren: a hardening has come upon part of Israel, until the full number of the Gentiles come in’ (RSV). He writes: ‘Tillich seemed to regard Paul’s first-century views as an eternally valid blueprint of the relationship between Judaism and Christianity, according to which Judaism’s main function is to be a kind of negative foil to the church, guarding it from pagan tendencies (Romans 11:25). Tillich gave 11:25 undue prominence, ignoring passages in Romans 9–11 in which Paul wrote of the glories of Israel (10:4–5) and the continuing election of Israel as God’s chosen people (11:2). Although he did not change his mind on this, later in his life Tillich moved to a more relativistic position with regard to the Pauline critique of the ‘law’, and and realized that ‘justification by grace apart from the law’ was historically not the center of Paul’s theological concerns, thus moving away from a strictly Lutheran interpretation. After conversations with Markus Barth, Tillich also appreciated that there are other models of the Jewish/Christian relationship in the New Testament other than the one he had emphasized, namely,
This passage underscores Tillich’s belief that Judaism possesses enduring theological value. Yet, Tillich observes a tragic irony attached to Paul’s legacy on this issue, meaning Paul was criticized by Jews as anti-Semitic, and by some Christians as ‘too Jewish’: ‘Paul himself would have been ready, as he writes, to give up the salvation of his soul for the salvation of the Jewish people. For this and other reasons Paul is judged by many anti-Semitic and anti-Jewish Christians as too Jewish, while from the Jewish side no one has been or is more attacked than Paul.’

Tillich does not use this term in this context, but this characterization would render the apostle Paul a ‘theologian of the boundaries’, a term taken from Tillich’s 1936 autobiography, On the Boundary.

5.3.3 Christianity, Paganism and Anti-Judaism

Tillich’s assessment of ‘paganism’ becomes more negative over the course of the works being analyzed in this dissertation. The most positive characterization is in the 1910 Dissertation, where Tillich argues that paganism, or pre-Christian and pre-Israelite religion, was on a parallel track with Israelite religion, but later paganism ‘exhausted itself’ in a ‘catastrophe of the rational process’. This development shows the influence of the dialectic of the potencies. Paganism contributed rationality to Judaism, but it did not have adequate revelatory capacity, due to its cultural

42 Judentfrage lectures, 429.
43 Tillich’s wife Hannah recalls that Tillich was sometimes referred to by his Jewish friends as ‘Paulus among the Jews’. Cited by Stone in Radical, 65.
particularity. Judaism, having both particular and universal elements, became the necessary precursor to Christianity. Therefore, there is an important element of continuity between paganism and Judaism. In the 1912 Dissertation, paganism is in heightened opposition to Judaism, as its dialectical opponent. According to Tillich, paganism represented capricious deities that could not be appeased even by sacrifice, so humanity sought other expressions, lest 'human consciousness … be inevitably destroyed'.\textsuperscript{45} According to Tillich's dialectic, paganism failed to transcend one pole of the dialectic, that of 'mysticism', and Judaism failed to transcend the other pole of the dialectic, 'guilt-consciousness'.

In \textit{The Socialist Decision}, paganism is still understood within a dialectical history of religion. Tillich only refers to 'paganism' three or four times, as his primary object of criticism is political romanticism, but they are deeply interrelated. In the discussion of how Judaism 'breaks' the myth of origin, Jewish monotheism is contrasted with everything else that came before it, which were pagan, polytheistic religions. For Tillich, only Jewish monotheism could resolve the contradictions of polytheism. Tillich's argument hinges on an interpretation of the Babylonian Exile. In the Exile, all the symbols of Israel's election, the monarchy, the temple cult and the promised land, are taken away because they had become idols. However, a righteous remnant endured in exile. For Tillich, it is this destruction of idolators and the merciful sparing of the remnant in exile that is the basis for something 'new', that can provide a basis to transcend the naturalistic, pagan cycle of birth, development, and death.

\textsuperscript{45} 1912 Dissertation, 118.
In the *Judenfrage* lectures, Tillich identifies three key historical instances when the Christian church assumed an anti-Jewish posture, with each instance representing a response to encroaching paganism. The premise of Tillich’s argument is the following: ‘Anti-Judaism originates in the instant in which Christianity comes into the pagan world and must make itself understandable to paganism.’ Only the third example will be discussed, which comes from the Protestant Reformation, because it most successfully illustrates Tillich’s point. According to Tillich, Luther believed that if the Christian Church could be purged of pagan elements, then it would have been possible for Jews to enter the Christian church. According to Tillich, what the Jews found most objectionable were the pagan elements of Roman Catholicism, in particular the ‘demonic monstrosity’ of Catholic sacramentalism. According to Tillich, Luther’s theological presuppositions were similar to the ‘Jewish prophetic consciousness’, as reflected in his condemnation of the Mass. However, Tillich argues that the failure of the Jews to convert to Christianity ran afoul of

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46 *Judenfrage* lectures, 429.

47 The first example is the creation of the ‘Pilate legend’ in Egypt, asserting Pilate’s innocence in the Crucifixion, and the second concerns the segregation of Jews from Christians as a result of the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215. ‘All authoritarian systems are filled with this kind of fear. They feel secure as long as those who recognize their authority are cut off from every other tradition. But as soon as other possibilities appear, the unity of consciousness, and thereby the security of authority, is threatened. The Jews represented another tradition, and on this tradition not only Christianity but also Islam was dependent. That is the background of the segregation laws which were passed by Innocent III and his successors’ (ibid., 429–431).

48 ‘For the Jews, Catholic sacramentalism, including its christological presuppositions, was idolatry and a demonic monstrosity. It was the Mass especially which was the basis of this judgment. Nothing could contradict more the Jewish, prophetic consciousness that the priestly transformation of bread and wine into the body and blood of the incarnate God’ (ibid., 432).

40 Ibid.
Luther’s apocalypticism, leading Luther to pen his infamous tract On the Jews and Their Lies.\textsuperscript{50} Tillich does not cite Luther’s work directly, for it was well known, but he does observe that Luther engaged in ‘angry attacks against the stubbornness of the Jews, from which Christian anti-Judaism gained a foothold also in the churches of the Reformation’.\textsuperscript{51} In addition, this leads Tillich to discuss another important topic, the so-called ‘deicide’ charge: ‘In all Christian churches the Jews of all generations are burdened with the charge of being guilty for the rejection of Jesus.’\textsuperscript{52}

5.3.4 The Deicide Charge: Conscious and Unconscious Anti-Semitism

Tillich observes that during antiquity, the failure of the Jews to convert led to perpetual guilt being assigned to all Jews, at all times and in all places, for the crucifixion of Jesus.\textsuperscript{53} This mind set found its theological justification in Matthew 27:25, where the crowd (of Jews) cries: ‘His blood is on us and on our children’.\textsuperscript{54}

\textsuperscript{50} A standard reading of Luther’s anti-Judaism begins with his initial ‘positive’ assessment of Jews in his 1523 Jesus Christ Was Born a Jew. After twenty years of religious strife, sectarian violence and imperial politics, Luther become bitter that the Jews had not converted, leading him to vent his frustrations in the infamous 1543 pamphlet On the Jews and their Lies. Luther, Renaissance humanism, the Protestant Reformation, anti-Judaism, and anti-Semitism receive a nuanced treatment by Heiko A. Oberman in The Roots of Anti-Semitism in the Age of Renaissance and Reformation, trans. James I. Porter (Philadelphia, PN: Fortress Press, 1984).

\textsuperscript{51} Judenfrage lectures, 433.

\textsuperscript{52} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{54} ‘24 So when Pilate saw that he was gaining nothing, but rather that a riot was beginning, he took
Tillich, having just presented a layered analysis of guilt for the Holocaust, is quick to point out that this form of guilt does not meet any of the five types of real guilt that can be assigned for something. At best, there is indirect responsibility for those alive at the time, and it is absurd to assign guilt for those born after.\textsuperscript{55} Due to the persistence of these ideas, which were fueled by Christian education literature in all churches, Tillich concludes: ‘That is the continuing tragic guilt of the Christian church ... From this often unconscious anti-Judaism of the Christian churches, the conscious antisemitism of the last hundred years has drawn its nourishment.’\textsuperscript{56} This causal connection of anti-Judaism and anti-Semitism is similar to the phenomenon that Heschel described, which was discussed in Chapter 2 of this dissertation.

5.3.5 Mission to the Jews: A Sociological and Psychological Impossibility

Despite Tillich’s indictment of the Christian church’s education materials, and the pervasive presence of unconscious anti-Judaism, he observes that Liberal Protestants and Liberal Jews occasionally work together. He uses the example of how he is periodically asked to speak at synagogues, even in liturgical settings. However, Tillich argues that this is not the solution to the Jewish-Christian problem, and that for Jews and Christians to gather in the name of what they have in common – a lowest common denominator, so to speak – would be ‘unsatisfyingly moralistic’.

\begin{footnotesize}
\item[55] water and washed his hands before the crowd, saying, “I am innocent of this man’s blood; see to it yourselves.” 25 And all the people answered, “His blood is on us and on our children!” 26 Then he released for them Barabbas, and having scourged Jesus, delivered him over to be crucified.’ Matthew 27:24–25, RSV.
\item[56] \textit{Judenfrage} lectures, 433.
\item[56] Ibid., 434.
\end{footnotesize}
akin to solving the problem of the relation of different religions to one another 'by subtraction'.\textsuperscript{57} In practical terms, this problem is brought to the fore in discussions about Christian mission to the Jews. Tillich agrees with other Liberal Protestant ministers – a group that he met with twice a year – that aggressive proselytizing is inappropriate: 'I myself agreed with those theologians who said that an active mission on the part of Christians, which is directed toward believing Jews, is in most cases psychologically and sociologically impossible.'\textsuperscript{58} Instead of such an active mission, Tillich advocates a more passive endeavor, in which Christians could proselytize Jews that were alienated from their own tradition.\textsuperscript{59}

5.3.6 The Churches under Hitler: The Struggle for Life and Death

Tillich closes this lecture with a discussion of the Christian churches under Hitler. In doing so, he raises key ideas that represent his mature understanding of the

\textsuperscript{57} Ibid., 434–435.
\textsuperscript{58} Ibid., 435. In 'Protestantism and Anti-Semitism', Tillich surveys a number of American Protestant statements on anti-Semitism, which deal variously with alleged Jewish guilt for Christ's death and related topics. He observes that 'Sectarian Christianity', the heirs of the Anabaptist tradition in America, was unequivocally against Christian anti-Semitism, because it adhered to 'the basic principle of the divine in the ground of the human soul'. There was a large theological discussion group based in New York City, about which Tillich makes the following observation: 'In a theological discussion group, representing the highest level of American theology, we discussed, a few years ago, the question of Jewish mission; and it was astonishingly [sic] how great the percentage of theologians was who rejected any aggressive mission, partly on the basis of the fact that there is no special denomination to which to come the Jews should be asked [sic], partly on the basis of the belief that the prophetic spirit of Judaism should be preserved apart from the Church as long as the Church is in danger to relapse into paganism. Such an attitude, of course, would undercut not only anti-Semitism but also Christian traditional anti-Judaism [sic]' (9, 11–12).
\textsuperscript{59} Judenfrage lectures, 435.
relationship of Judaism to Christianity, some of which will recur in the remaining three lectures. Tillich’s first observation is that the Christian churches were initially ‘bewildered’ at Hitler’s anti-Semitism, but eventually came to the realization that attacks upon Judaism were always a precursor to attacks on Christianity.⁶⁰ Tillich’s argument proceeds by reviving the analogy between Nazism and ancient Gnosticism, which he first developed in The Socialist Decision, as reviewed in the preceding section, and in Chapter 4 of this dissertation. Tillich boldly asserts that the biggest threat to Christianity in the ancient world was not persecution by Rome, but syncretism with ‘gnostic-syncretistic religions of late antiquity’.⁶¹ In Roman antiquity, the Christian church fought a ‘struggle for life and death’⁶² against paganism, and decisively retained the Old Testament to preserve the historical roots of Christianity. According to Tillich, this was especially important to preserve the witness of the Jewish prophets, who warned against idolatrous religious nationalism.⁶³

According to Tillich, without the Old Testament, the New Testament cannot exist, and to detach Christ from Old Testament prophethood is to render him ‘one pagan mystery god among many’.⁶⁴ Here Tillich clearly draws upon the analogy between gnosticism and Nazism, although he seems to suggest that ancient

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⁶⁰ Ibid., 436.
⁶¹ Ibid. This is a perceptive observation, in light of the anti-Semitic uses of the history of religions as described by Heschel.
⁶² Tillich uses this phrase numerous times in his works – History of Christian Thought, Systematic Theology, The Socialist Decision – and always to describe the conflict between some form of paganism and prophetism or Christianity.
⁶³ Judenfrage lectures, 436.
⁶⁴ Ibid. This is like the Aryan Jesus referred to in Chapter 2 above.
gnosticism was also plagued by religious nationalism, not just a dualistic cosmology that deprecated the material world as evil, and the Old Testament God as evil: 'That is what the gnostic movement was about and what National Socialism was about, as well as all religious nationalism, which is by no means limited to Germany. In order to transform Jesus into a cult-god among others or a national leader and prophet, one must take him out of his connection with Old Testament prophetism, for that prophetism was always a continual struggle against the religious nationalisms of its time.'\textsuperscript{65} This is problematic from a historical point of view, since in the late second century and third century, Christianity was firmly a minority religion. During that period, the later coalescing of church and state under Constantine and Theodosius was something scarcely imaginable.

Tillich concludes this lecture by echoing \textit{The Socialist Decision} on the spirit of prophetic Judaism: 'In the decision against National Socialism the church experiences again what it had experienced in the decision against Gnosticism in the third century: that the spirit of prophetic Judaism is the spirit alone which can guard the church from sinking back into a national religion, that is, to paganism.'\textsuperscript{66} For Tillich, the key aspect of paganism appears to be religious nationalism, although he acknowledges other factors.

\textsuperscript{65} \textit{Judenfrage} lectures, 437.
\textsuperscript{66} Ibid.
5.4 Second Lecture: The Mirror of Jewish Prophetism

In the second lecture Tillich adds two qualitatively new dimensions to his analysis, a psychological and a sociological aspect. Tillich was surprised to learn that, even after the Holocaust, there remained among German Jewish émigrés a deep longing for the Germany which existed before the Nazis came to power, as he would have expected the opposite. Reflecting on the nineteenth century, he was compelled to conclude: ‘It is astonishing how quickly after Emancipation Jews lent to German culture their creative powers and how there occurred, on the basis of a deep affinity, a fruitful reciprocal permeation. It is difficult to find an explanation for this without referring to similarities in the spiritual structure of both cultures.’\(^{68}\) As a result, Tillich devotes most of the lecture responding to the question, ‘Are there structural analogies between the Jewish and German character?’\(^ {69}\) He concludes that there are two, although there are important differences as well as similarities. Tillich observes that the structural similarities of the German and Jewish people, which I am designating ‘corporate personalities’, have caused them to be in a peculiar relationship of attraction and repulsion, suggesting another form of dialectical relationship. Tillich tries to demonstrate that both Germans and Jews are affected by, or exhibit, these social-psychological features, to an equal degree, if not in an identical manner. The main limitation of Tillich’s analysis is that the discussion is shaped more by what Tillich sees as deficiencies in the German corporate personality, than what can be empirically supported by examining Judaism, as it

\(^{67}\) Starting in the Kingdom of Westphalia in 1808.

\(^{68}\) *Judenfrage* lectures, 439. Tillich means, implicitly, ‘German’ and ‘Jewish’ cultures.

\(^{69}\) Ibid. 438–439. The term ‘structural analogies’ recurs in the occasional lectures discussed in Chapter 6 below.
exists in its cultural, geographical and theological diversity. Nevertheless, there is considerable explanatory power.

The lecture can be divided into three parts. The first two parts discuss the two structural analogies, and the third part discusses their social and political implications, with a particular focus on the development of anti-Semitism. The analysis of both structural analogies employs psychological categories. The discussion of the second structural analogy includes an excursus on German history which reflects back to the dictum from *The Socialist Decision*, ‘justice is the true power of being’. In the third part, Tillich takes a sociological approach, in his discussion of anti-Judaism and anti-Semitism, concluding that Jewish prophetism serves as a critical ‘mirror’ to hold against the German corporate personality. While Tillich believes that the two structural analogies are more decisive than the factors discussed in the third part,\textsuperscript{70} the analogy of the mirror is yet another instance of the ongoing importance of the prophetic aspect of Judaism, and the inseparability of Judaism from (German) Christianity.

\textit{5.4.1 The First Structural Analogy: Space, Territorial Insecurity and Anxiety}

The first structural analogy is the metaphysical problem of space. Both the Jews and the German people have experienced a prophetic-reform movement in their history – the Jews with the prophets culminating with the Babylonian exile, and Germany with

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\textsuperscript{70} ‘I believe, however, that the relation of both peoples to each other can be better understood through this analysis than from the causes of which I will next speak and, which though certainly effective, were perhaps not in the final analysis decisive’ (ibid., 448).
the Protestant Reformation. For Tillich, they are similar insofar as both events ended periods of idolatrous nationalism. Both events caused a ‘break’ in the history and national self-consciousness of each, and the fact that much later both in Germany, in the nineteenth century, and for the Jews in 1948, when political unity failed to heal that break.\(^{71}\) For Germany, it created a ‘territorial insecurity’, which sought relief in the deification of space and national self-realization. In this lecture, Tillich appears to assign a different function for the Protestant Reformation than in the first lecture, where it served to critique the paganism of the Roman Catholic sacrifice of the Mass.

In this lecture, according to Tillich, the Reformation caused a delay in the emergence of German nationalism, which occurred in the nineteenth century: ‘The break which the Reformation brought to the German people created a territorial insecurity and the world-historical late arrival of the Germans to territorial self-actualization.’\(^ {72}\) The idea of something ‘insecure’ about the corporate German personality recurs in the second structural analogy below, in the discussion of self-hate and despair.

For the Jews, the similarity with the Germans is that they, since the Babylonian Exile, have remained the ‘people of time’, in a prolonged diaspora. This theme of the Jews as the people of time was first introduced in Tillich’s *Interpretation of History*, but became fully developed in *The Socialist Decision*, as discussed in Chapter 4. In the latter work, Jewish monotheism and prophetism serve to critique pagan polytheism and the idolatry of religious nationalism, which in Tillich’s Weimar context were embodied in Nazi Germany. In this lecture, despite the discussion of

\(^{71}\) Ibid., 440: ‘In both cases, the national self-actualization has never succeeded in healing the break.’

\(^{72}\) Ibid.
space as a metaphysical problem, and consequently ‘time’ as some kind of metaphysical solution, there is no discussion of justice, as an outgrowth of this analysis of space and time. In the next (third) lecture, Tillich will revisit the concept of justice, as part of a theological interpretation of history.

5.4.2 The Second Structural Analogy: The Psychic Split, Despair, Mutual Attraction and Repulsion

The second structural analogy is the ‘psychic split’ between self-hate and self-aggrandizement, or an inflated sense of importance, which Tillich calls ‘over self-valuation’, or ‘(false) vocation consciousness’. With respect to self-hate, Tillich says that Germans are ruthlessly critical of themselves and of their own people, well beyond a healthy, self-correcting criticism: ‘The great Germans who have exerted this critique have not done it in the hope to change the German character; rather, their critique had the character of despair’. Here Tillich does not say who the great Germans are, but further on he refers to Nietzsche and Goethe. As for Jews, Tillich says that the Judaism of his time possessed a strong strain of anti-Semitism, ‘even with the most intelligently and analytically trained Jews’, exemplified in Karl Marx’s essay, ‘On the Jewish Question’.

German History, False Vocation-Consciousness, and the Split between Power and

\[73\] Ibid., 440–442.
\[74\] Ibid., 441.
\[75\] See 446.
\[76\] Ibid., 441.
Being

For Tillich, the other pole of the psychic split is a sense of being set apart, a feeling of ‘vocation consciousness’, something that all peoples have, but which is more pronounced in Germans and Jews. Tillich’s application of the idea of vocation-consciousness to Germans contains a brief but revealing historical analysis, which echoes his analysis of being, power and justice in The Socialist Decision, but with a different emphasis. According to Tillich, the history of Germany’s vocation-consciousness has two periods, with the first period manifesting a genuine vocation-consciousness, and the second period devoid of it. The first period is the Middle Ages, when Germanic peoples maintained ‘the consciousness of being the national center of unified Christianity’, under the German emperors. Tillich does not develop this idea here, but in History of Christian Thought, he discusses how the German feudal kings were willing to submit to a council of bishops, in opposition to the centralized power of the Holy Roman Emperor, or in opposition to the Roman Pope. For Tillich, this first phase was not characterized by German nationalism,

77 Ibid., 442.
78 Ibid., 441–442.
79 Ibid., 443.
80 In the History of Christian Thought he acknowledges that Germanic political influence went through different phases, none of which approximated the nationalism of the Wilhelmine Reich of the nineteenth century. The first phase was during the late Roman Empire, during the time of Augustine, ‘when the Roman Empire, and later the Germanic-Romanic kingdoms, were realms of non-Christian power’ (150). However, according to Tillich, during the Middle Ages the Germanic kings resisted the Catholic bishops’ newly found political power, which ultimately led to the conflict between Pope Gregory VII and Emperor Henry IV (151). A third phase occurs later, in the time of William of Ockham, placing the Germanic kings on the side of ‘conciliarism’, in which a council of bishops is the ultimate authority of the church, versus the authority the Pope and Holy Roman Emperor (153).
and he does not condemn it for being nationalistic or pagan.

The second period is the modern period, during which Germany either manifested raw power, which was not informed by a true sense of calling, or the opposite problem of having a sense of being set apart, but lacking power. Tillich first alludes to the Second Reich, beginning under Bismarck in the late nineteenth century, and ending under Kaiser Wilhelm II at the end of World War I, a period dominated by ‘Realpolitik’, which exposed the ugliness and brutality of nationalistic power-politics.\(^1\) Tillich believes this was one of the causes of World War I. This was followed by the political ‘vacuum’ of the Weimar Republic, which Tillich previously criticized in the 1920s and 1930s as ambivalent and powerless. The failure of both regimes was the inability to manifest both power and vocation-consciousness at the same time:

> When power and vocation-consciousness are combined, power ceases to be brutal power. There exists a unity which goes back to the deepest roots of Being, to the unity of Being and value in the Ground of Being itself. Where this unity is lost, there occurs on the one hand self-contempt and on the other, the brutal, unideological Will-to-Power.\(^2\)

Where the unity of being and power is lost, the result is either self-contempt, as described above, or brutality.

Tillich’s normative position, in which there is a ‘unity of Being and value’, is

\(^1\) *Judenfrage* lectures, 443.
\(^2\) Ibid.
reminiscent of the dialectical balance that he sought in his maxim, 'justice is the true power of being', which was prominently displayed in The Socialist Decision. Tillich's concept of justice from the Weimar period, in which the 'ought' of equality is derived from the 'is' of being, drew upon certain elements of the collective unconscious as it unfolded in the history of religion, especially in the Jewish people of the ancient Near East. In the third lecture, discussed below, Tillich links this concept of justice to a deeper, overtly theological understanding of reality. This unity of being and value represents a dialectical balance, and is an instance of the ontological dialectic of balance.

Above I observed that Tillich's analysis of these 'corporate types', of Germans and Jews, is influenced more by the psychological and sociological peculiarities of Weimar and Nazi Germany, and less so by what could have been empirically determined by analyzing real communities of Jews. This is evident in the imbalance that Tillich employs in this phase of his analysis. Tillich has a lot to say about Germans and despair. He says this is rooted in their 'yearning for the foreign', in which Germans willingly forfeit their identity when they encounter what they perceive to be a superior culture, whether it is ancient Greece, or Renaissance Italy, or even other modern European cultures.\footnote{‘Despair is the expression of an insurmountable split. Out of this despair comes the wish to be rid of oneself. One of the most harmless and most curious forms of this wish to be rid of oneself is the yearning for the foreign. This we find in Germans more than any other well-known people. We all know of the yearning of Germans in the classical period for Greece, of the always alive yearning for Italy, the wish to do the same as the French or English, and the hope for Russia and Asia. As soon as the yearning is fulfilled and the German settles with one of these peoples, he blends in with them more quickly than would a representative of any other people’ (ibid., 444).} For Tillich, this is the manifestation of 'a secret
wish of the Germans to negate themselves as Germans.\textsuperscript{84} In addition, Tillich's use of corporate types as analytical categories is similar to his use of types elsewhere in this dissertation.

\textit{The Inner Split and Despair}

In an attempt to keep the comparison between Germans and Jews going, Tillich proceeds to claim that Jews also manifest a kind of self-negation, in particular their ability to adapt to any situation.\textsuperscript{85} He does not elaborate, but he probably means that Jews can be found around the world, in many cultures, in \textit{diaspora}. However, instead of praising Jews for their resilience, he argues that 'the deepest root of this adaptability is a lack of self-affirmation'.\textsuperscript{86} Tillich gives several examples, the most important and most convincing of which are Christian theologians of Jewish origin. According to Tillich, they are more critical of Judaism than any Christian would be:

\begin{quote}
After their conversion to Christianity, they are more radical in their critique of Judaism than any Christian theologian. They negate that from which they came. Often they are of the greatest value for Christian theologians, because they see things which the theologian who was born as a Christian does not see. They, themselves, however, are in a bind: they must repress something in themselves and become for that reason fanatical. Here too we find analogies between Jewish and German existence. In both cases, self-
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{84} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{85} Ibid., 445.
\textsuperscript{86} Ibid.
negation searches for ways to realize itself.\textsuperscript{87}

Tillich may be remiss in not acknowledging the resiliency of Jews worldwide. But he is correct about the hyper-critical posture of Jewish converts to Christianity that become theologians, as more than one convert became an aggressive interlocutor in high profile disputations between Christians and Jews in the Middle Ages.\textsuperscript{88}

Tillich concludes this section by observing that this 'prophetic break', which both peoples have experienced in their collective, ethnic, national self-actualization, has not only psychological consequences, which have just been discussed, but sociological consequences, to be discussed below. According to Tillich, Germans and Jews are unique because they have experienced this prophetic break. For those national groups that have not experienced it, their leaders come from 'the substance of the people'.\textsuperscript{89} The sociological consequences derive from a 'gap' between great individuals and the ordinary masses. Tillich observes, 'In Germany the great have

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\textsuperscript{87} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{88} In the Middle Ages it was not uncommon for Christians to have Jewish converts serve as interlocutors in theological disputations with Jews. Three prominent examples are Nicholas Donin at the Paris Disputation of 1240, Pablo Christiani at the Barcelona Disputation of 1263, and Hieronymus de Santa Fe at the Tortosa Disputation of 1413–1414. The literature on this is vast, but a useful introduction is Hyam Maccoby's \textit{Judaism on Trial: Jewish–Christian Disputations in the Middle Ages} (London: Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 1996). Another example, from the Reformation period in Germany, is Anthonius Margaritha's \textit{The Entire Jewish Faith} of 1530. According to R. Po-chia Hsia, this work, written by the son of Rabbi Jacob Margolis of Regensburg (who was consulted by the German humanist Johannes Reuchlin concerning the \textit{Kabbalah}), became an 'encyclopedia of Judaism' for Germans of the early sixteenth century, and it intended to 'expose' the 'false beliefs' of the Jews. See Hsia's \textit{The Myth of Ritual Murder: Jews and Magic in Reformation Germany} (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1988), 148–151.

\textsuperscript{89} \textit{Judenfrage} lectures, 446.
always been lonely’, as ‘the masses have never understood them as the expression of their own consciousness’.\textsuperscript{90} For Tillich, this gap between the great and the masses causes the masses to remain ‘unformed’, making them vulnerable to other influences, especially Nazism.\textsuperscript{91} For Tillich, the Jewish people express something similar, in the prophetic personality, which is ‘the individual carrier of the prophetic spirit and of the highest cultural form’.\textsuperscript{92} Similar to what Tillich argued in \textit{The Socialist Decision}, the prophetic spirit is that which seeks to promote justice, especially the equality of persons. According to Tillich, ‘the average Jew’ never measures up to the prophetic ideal, and in fact ‘The entire history of the Jewish people shows that it is impossible to make a whole people serve the ideal of the prophetic message’.\textsuperscript{93} Tillich concludes this phase of his argument, the presentation of the two structural analogies between the German and Jewish corporate personalities, by asserting that Germans and Jews ‘lead to both the strongest attraction and the strongest repulsion\textsuperscript{94}.

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{90} Ibid. Tillich elaborates: ‘Hence the despair of so many great Germans, as well as the inclination of the great bearers of culture in Germany to seclude themselves and set themselves over against the average. I am thinking, for example, of all the German classicists, above all of Goethe, of the revolutionary groups of the middle of the nineteenth century, and of the despair of the prophetic spirits of the nineteenth century, for example, Nietzsche. If, however, the leading individuals are not symbolic for what is happening in the masses, and if they do not represent what the unconscious wishes of the average people, then the masses themselves remain unformed.’

\textsuperscript{91} Tillich comments on other European cultures, such as the ‘gentleman-ideal’ in England, the ‘citizen-ideal’ in France, and the ideal of human rights in America. In Germany, there were several relationship types, including the ‘bureaucrat-ideal’, the ‘officer-ideal’, but they each failed to bridge the gap the between the leaders and the masses, and to express the consciousness of the masses. Ibid., 446–447.

\textsuperscript{92} Ibid., 448.

\textsuperscript{93} Ibid.
\end{flushleft}
[between the two peoples].

5.4.3 Typological Thinking, Objectification, Dehumanization and the ‘Mirror’

In the final section of the second lecture, despite the fact that Tillich believes it is of lesser importance, he discusses how religious (theological) anti-Judaism causes political anti-Judaism, with the latter laying the foundation for political anti-Semitism. Tillich discussed the factors causing religious anti-Judaism in the first lecture (the New Testament, patristic and medieval background), and here he deepens his historical analysis by introducing a distinction between ‘diversionary’ anti-Judaism and ‘systematic’ anti-Semitism. Diversionary anti-Judaism was practiced throughout pre-modern Europe, which was expressed in periodic, opportunistic persecutions of Jews, ‘to divert criticism from the ruling classes onto a minority’.

Systematic anti-Semitism is a later development, based upon two fundamental factors. The first factor is the creation of stereotypes, which have an illogical and a pseudo-scientific basis. By the nineteenth century, Tillich observes that pseudo-scientific theories of biology and race came together, which were used in a ‘dilettantish and distorted way for political ends’, by totalitarian dictatorships, which were needed to create an ‘absolute enemy’. For Tillich, the creation of ‘stereotypes’ assigned guilt to a group because of its very identity, with absolutely no

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64 Ibid.
65 Ibid., 450.
66 Ibid.
assessment of personal responsibility of any kind. For Tillich, this phenomenon is a logical absurdity, and it demonstrates the abandonment of ‘universal reason’, and the related predilection to objectify and dehumanize persons, a hallmark of modern industrial society:

In the Middle Ages, one accused a collective which existed as such, the Ghetto, in most cases unjustly, but yet still with a semblance of reason. Today one accuses a type, not a collective or an individual. This is connected with the naturalistic dehumanization of persons and with the progressive objectification of the personal in industrial society.

In the above passage, Tillich picks up a thread from The Religious Situation and The Socialist Decision, the reductionist anthropology implicit in modern capitalist society. For Tillich, the problem has not gone away, since he originally diagnosed it in the 1920s and 1930s. Therefore, he deepens his analysis with psychological and sociological considerations. The addition of psychological and sociological analyses is Tillich’s way of acknowledging the depth and complexity of the problem of anti-

\[97\] Ibid., 451.

\[98\] Tillich continues to describe the ‘exterminationist logic’ (my phrase) of stereotyping: ‘The absurdity of the whole thing becomes especially clear when an antisemite meets an actual Jew. The actual Jew is always viewed as the exception to the rule. In the encounter with the real Jew, the stereotype breaks down, since it cannot be verified. The antisemite, however, wants it to be true, and therefore views the individual Jew as the exception. This typological thinking is unhistorical, for it does not recognize that personalities are subject to historical transformation. Typological thinking cannot believe that the type which it attacks can change; therefore it must be exterminated’ (ibid., 451–452). However, despite a certain a-historical character, Jewish providence is not a stereotype. In addition, this ‘typological thinking’ seems to have no relation to the ‘types’ referred to by Stone, who believed that Tillich borrowed this concept from Max Weber, as discussed in Chapter 4 above.
Semitism.

According to Tillich, anti-Semitic stereotyping received additional legitimacy from its appeal to pseudo-science, especially by appealing to a form of biological determinism. Tillich observes that anti-Semites persist in the dogma that ‘the Jew’ is a type’, despite the evidence provided by depth psychology that acquired characteristics are not inherited, but are the result of specific sociological conditions. 99 This effectively dehumanizes Jews: ‘A type stands against history, nature, and personality; the inherited stands against the acquired. But when type is given priority over history, the human being is no longer valued as a human being.’ 100

Tillich concludes the third part of this lecture by circling back to psychological categories, particularly the concept of ‘anxiety’, as manifested by Germans. According to Tillich, anti-Semites create anxiety by appealing to the concept of ‘the unwelcome alien’, meaning something that cannot be incorporated into the whole. 101 Tillich extends this reasoning to the phenomenon of German anxiety over ‘the alien’ and the phenomenon of anti-Semitism. Germans are attracted to the external alien, but threatened by the internal alien, in this case the Jews:

We have seen that the Germans like that which is alien, in part because they want to get rid of themselves and lose themselves in the alien. But the alien which they have among them they cannot tolerate because it wrenches them

99 Ibid., 452.
100 Ibid.
101 Tillich says that there are welcome and unwelcome aliens. Ibid., 453.
from the certainty of their self-affirmation and because this self-affirmation is so weak that it cannot bring anything alien into itself. From this comes a feeling of anxiety … Perhaps one can say: for the German self-consciousness, the Jew is too close to be considered a welcome alien and not close enough to be experienced as one of their own.\(^{102}\)

Tillich ends the lecture by observing that anti-Semitism, as a social psychological phenomenon, is an expression of the German corporate personality's self-loathing. In developing this, Tillich introduces the image of the mirror: antisemitism creates in ideality and reality that against which it fights. Indeed, it must create it, since it cannot find it in reality. The antisemite … is terrified by the mirror which the Jew holds before him. There are moments – when we look at ourselves in the mirror – in which we have a dislike, indeed a loathing, of ourselves. The mirror tells what we are for others who look at us. In many remarks of the Jewish bearers of culture there is something which for Germans is a mirror.\(^{103}\) The German knows that the mirror says the truth, but cannot bear the image, and therefore reacts against those who hold it before him.\(^{104}\)

Tillich says that the particular kind of mirror that Judaism holds up to the German

\(^{102}\) Ibid.

\(^{103}\) Marion Pauck translates this sentence as: ‘In many utterances of cultured Jews, there is something that the Germans regard as a ‘mirror’. ‘Die Judenfrage – ein christliches und ein deutsches Problem, by Paul Tillich, trans. Marion Pauck, BNAPTS 30/3 (Summer 2004): 14.

\(^{104}\) Judenfrage lectures, 454.
people is the prophetic tradition,\textsuperscript{105} something that he initially developed twenty years ago in \textit{The Socialist Decision}, which serves as a segue into the theological discussion in the third lecture.

5.5 Third Lecture: The Dialectic of the Holy and Judaism as a Perpetual ‘Thorn in the Flesh’

Tillich’s argument climaxes in the third lecture. All of the categories that have emerged concerning Judaism, theological anti-Judaism, and anti-Semitism are found here, in their most mature form, with the exception of his treatment of Zionism.\textsuperscript{106} In this brief lecture, Tillich analyzes the Jewish question from a theological standpoint. For Tillich, it is ultimately ‘a religious (i.e. theological) problem’, since the ‘prophetic break’ in the histories of both Jews and Germans necessarily leads beyond sociological and social-psychological analyses, into a theological analysis.\textsuperscript{107} This logical move is not entirely clear. Yet, it seems that the ‘prophetic break’ can only be explained by ‘the new’, which was first understood by Tillich in relation to the Exile, one of the pivotal theological concepts for Tillich’s appropriation of the history of religion. In \textit{The Socialist Decision}, this was expressed as eschatological expectation.\textsuperscript{108} After raising the issue of the prophetic break, Tillich initiates his analysis by asking the question, ‘why could there be such a history?’, questioning

\textsuperscript{105} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{106} Tillich’s address, ‘My Changing Thoughts on Zionism’, was given in 1959.
\textsuperscript{107} \textit{Judenfrage} lectures, 455.
how the theological problem arose in the first place.\textsuperscript{109}

5.5.1 ‘The Holy’ as the Foundation of Reality

Tillich begins his answer by positing ‘the Holy’ as the starting point for any theological analysis. Echoing Rudolf Otto, Tillich introduced his idea of the Holy in a major work in the first volume of the Systematic Theology, in 1951, a year before the Judenfrage lectures were delivered.\textsuperscript{110} The Systematic Theology will be discussed in Chapter 6 of this dissertation. For Tillich in the Judenfrage lectures, the Holy is something that ‘concerns us unconditionally’, which possesses ‘the ground and meaning of our Being’, is not limited by time or space, has an irresistible quality, and presents to us ‘an unconditional demand’, similar to what was described in Chapter 4.\textsuperscript{111} In addition, the Holy has two sides, or poles, which exist in perpetual tension, the priestly and the prophetic, a clear instance of the ontological dialectic of balance. The priestly side manifests ‘that which is, that which is present, as what grasps us,

\textsuperscript{109} Tillich asks two related questions: ‘For though it is possible to apply all the well-known sociological categories to the history of the Jewish people, after this history is given, a more deeply penetrating discussion of the question “why could there be such a history?”, is still needed. Surely a group such as the Jews – once they are there and have survived through a 3,000 year history – can be used as a mechanism of diversion. Judaism can be typologically caricatured, and psychological conflicts can originate within it. But the decisive question is: how does it come about that such a group is there? We have spoken of Christian anti-Judaism which runs from the New Testament through all of Church history. But there is no satisfactory explanation for this fundamental fact. Christianity also fought against other minorities. In no case, however, did something originate which would be at all comparable to Christian anti-Judaism.’ Judenfrage lectures, 455–456.


\textsuperscript{111} Judenfrage lectures, 456. This language is used elsewhere by Tillich to characterize God, as in ST I, 155–157.
as what precedes all acting and thinking'.\footnote{Judenfrage lectures, 456. In terms of the ‘is–ought’ polarity, this can be assigned to the ‘is’.
\footnote{Judenfrage lectures, 457. In terms of the ‘is–ought’ polarity, this can be assigned to the ‘ought’.
\footnote{See Chapter 4, 171–181.
\footnote{Judenfrage lectures, 457.
\footnote{Ibid.
\footnote{Ibid., 457–458.}}}} The prophetic side is never completed, always demands, requires perfection and promises fulfillment.\footnote{See Chapter 4, 171–181.} These poles are similar to what was discussed in Chapter 4, in the analysis of the dictum, ‘justice is the true power of being’.\footnote{Judenfrage lectures, 457.} According to Tillich, the tension between the two poles is the framework that undergirds all of reality:

The Holy contains within itself the tension between that which is and that which should be, a tension which reaches to the deepest roots of being. This tension of both elements in the Holy has a polar character. One pole conditions the other. As soon as this reciprocal dependence is called into question conflicts originate ... The ‘is’ and the ‘ought’ struggle with each other. To be sure, this struggle can never lead to a total separation, since the sphere of the Holy would itself cease to be if one of the poles would completely disappear.\footnote{Ibid.}

Tillich completes this subsection by underscoring that if the priestly dimension obscures the prophetic, then the sacramental becomes magic, and if the prophetic dimension obscures the priestly, then legalism results.\footnote{Ibid.} For the Holy to be present, neither pole is obliterated. Therefore, only if both poles are in some way effective is the Holy real.\footnote{Ibid., 457–458.} For Tillich, this polarity fundamentally determines the relationship
between Judaism and Christianity, and the relationship of both to Germany.\footnote{Ibid., 458.}

5.5.2 The Continuity of Priestly and Prophetic through the Covenant

Prior to Tillich’s application of his metaphysical framework to the patterns of Abraham and Amos, he engages in a deeper analysis of the ontological polarities of priestly/prophetic and space/time, in order to show how they can be applicable to the historical phenomenon of the church. For Tillich, the priestly dimension of the Holy is ‘sacramental’, in the sense of being ‘consecrated’, referring to that which ‘concerns us unconditionally’.\footnote{Ibid., 458–459.} The latter phrase is a characteristically Tillich-ian expression of the human relation to the divine. In language reminiscent of The Socialist Decision, for Tillich, the priestly side of the Holy has three main features: (i) it is the generative aspect of reality, as ‘the mother precedes the child’,\footnote{Ibid., 458. The matriarchal analogy is also cited in Socialist Decision, 15, and in the 1910 Dissertation, 81–82.} (ii) it is dependent upon tradition and authority;\footnote{‘The sacramental type of religion is dependent upon tradition, through which the material substance is passed on from generation to generation. One is born into this tradition, into this substance, and the priestly bearers of this tradition are the mediators of the Holy for everyone who belongs to this tradition. This gives authority to the bearers of substance of such a religious group. Priestly authority is the authority of those in whom the Holy is at the same time substantially embodied’ (Judenfrage lectures, 459; emphases mine).} and (iii) it exhibits a hierarchical structure, and therefore levels of authority.\footnote{‘There are levels of authority in the Holy; the bearers of religious authority are hierarchically organized. There are levels of holiness: the sacramental power of the higher levels is greater than the lower, quite apart from the personal quality of the bearer’ (ibid.).} For Tillich, the perfect concrete illustration of such a
sacramental system is the Roman Catholic church, although he underscores that such a system does not lack the prophetic ‘demand’, which is mediated through the hierarchy, from within.\textsuperscript{123}

The prophetic pole issues the ‘demand’ from outside the system, but an important element of continuity remains, as the prophet criticizes the system, but \textit{in the name of the system itself}. ‘The prophet does not criticize from the outside as the enlightener, but rather from within as the representative of the will of God against the fixed priestly sacramental system.’\textsuperscript{124} The essence of the prophetic critique is objecting to what conflicts with the unconditional demand, when that is done in the name of the Holy.\textsuperscript{125} Using the language of ‘substance’ emphasized above, the prophetic seeks to establish a ‘reformed sacramental piety’:

\begin{quote}
It does not belong to the essence of prophetism to negate priestly piety. For indeed the prophet comes out of the sacramental substance of the church, and from the prophetic message, if it is successful, follows a reformed sacramental piety.\textsuperscript{126}
\end{quote}

If the sacramental elevates itself to an absolute and therefore idolatrous status, then it can be negated by the prophet.\textsuperscript{127} Otherwise, there is an essential continuity between the priestly and the prophetic, and this is due to God’s covenantal

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{123}‘But in the sacramental system the demand moves within the system. It can never be directed against the system as such’ (ibid.).
\textsuperscript{124}Ibid., 460.
\textsuperscript{125}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{126}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{127}Ibid., 461.
\end{footnotes}
relationship with humanity:

The prophet criticizes all who want to hide themselves behind the sacramental taboo. And yet even here the presence of the Holy is not obliterated. The prophet raises his or her demand not on the basis of an abstract moral law, but rather on the basis of the covenant which God made with his people or on the basis of the events on which the church is founded.\(^\text{128}\)

As will be shown below, this aspect of the covenantal relationship between God and humanity is what enabled the Jews to survive the Exile, and to remain the people of God. The idea of covenant is a new addition to Tillich’s understanding of the Exile.\(^\text{129}\)

5.5.3 Sacramental Space: Polytheism, Imperialism and Sacral Injustice

According to Tillich, each polar dimension of the Holy, the priestly and the prophetic, is uniquely related to space and time.\(^\text{130}\) In a section linking the discussion of the priestly and prophetic to the covenant, and the discussions of Abraham and Amos, is a discussion of polytheism and sacral injustice. Tillich initially draws upon what he

\(^\text{128}\) Ibid.

\(^\text{129}\) In the 1910 Dissertation there is no discussion of the Exile and no discussion of the Old Testament prophets warning of Israel’s destruction. Prophetism is a transitional period from the particularity of Israel to the universality of revelation. Also in the 1910 Dissertation, particularity and universality are not assigned any political implications. In The Socialist Decision, Tillich’s interpretation of the Exile dominates his understanding of prophetism, because it provides the basis for something truly ‘new’, generated from ‘the origin.’ Here he is thinking of a new social order built upon religious humanistic principles, with an eschatological posture. While something is destroyed something new appears, as God’s people are subject to the ‘unconditional demand.’ Also in The Socialist Decision, Tillich’s view of Jewish prophetism acknowledges the potential problem of Jewish religious nationalism (22–23).

\(^\text{130}\) Judenfrage lectures, 461
said about polytheism in *The Socialist Decision*,\(^{131}\) that each localized deity possesses a universalizing impulse, which inevitably causes conflict. Tillich elaborates on this considerably, noting that such a 'political imperialism' has three additional features, including: (i) the paradoxical combination of absolute power and the limits of a particular geographic space; (ii) the passion and impetus behind will-to-power; and (iii) the 'full weight of economic interests'.\(^{132}\) However, such a drive for absolute power by the different gods results in earthly conflict: 'From this structure results the conflicts of the gods and with it the conflicts of the empires and their mutual destruction.'\(^{133}\) In addition, this drive for absolute power, combined with divine sanction, is the basis for all social and political injustice:

> From this primeval polytheistic conflict comes the justification of social and political injustice. Sacral injustice is the background of all other injustice, for it provides injustice with a religious consecration. This holds as well for oppression of one nation or race by another, which places itself at the top of the polytheistic world-order. That is the world against which the prophets had to fight and against which the prophetic spirit in all ages must fight.\(^{134}\)

Any idolatry tied to space, as expressed in the spirit of polytheism, can be fully offset by the monotheism and prophetism of Abraham and Amos, to be discussed below.


\(^{132}\) *Judenfrage* lectures, 463.

\(^{133}\) Ibid.

\(^{134}\) Ibid., 464.
5.5.4 Prophetic Time: Abraham and the Pattern of Exodus, Exile and Diaspora

Thus far, Tillich has developed the metaphysical foundations for his theological interpretation of history, which is indispensable for understanding the phenomenon of theological anti-Judaism, and the later permutations of political and racial/scientific anti-Semitism. In addition, these metaphysical foundations are then illustrated by Tillich's use of two biblical characters, the patriarch Abraham and the prophet Amos. Up until this point in Tillich's career, 1952, Tillich has had very little to say about Abraham. In the 1910 Dissertation, Tillich interprets God's command for Abraham to sacrifice Isaac as the paradigm for pagan substance and revelational form, with pagan substance referring to the practice of human sacrifice, and revelational form referring to the personal God, Elohim. However, there is no other mention of Abraham, nor a discussion of the metaphysical problem of space. In addition, with the exception of two references in The Systematic Theology, one of which will be discussed in Chapter 5 below, Abraham is not mentioned in the other major works that are discussed in this dissertation.

Tillich elaborates upon the prophetic dimension of the Holy ('Ought'), and observes that the future is the decisive mode of apprehending time. This recalls the importance of maintaining an eschatological orientation, as discussed in The Socialist Decision. Tillich makes three theological observations about Abraham. First, his call by God is the foundational example of breaking away from the

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135 In ST III, 310, 'The Bearers of History', Tillich discusses the concept of vocation-consciousness, which clearly corresponds to the idea of vocation-consciousness discussed above. The other reference to Abraham is incidental, occurring in ST II, 159.

136 Judenfrage lectures, 464.
limitations of space, and moving towards a new kind of space, the undetermined 'space of the future': 'There is no story more characteristic of this situation than the story of the call of Abraham. Here is found, in classical symbols, all that we have said about the struggle between time and space. Abraham was called out of the space-boundedness in which he stood, out of the social, cultural, and religious conditions which gave him his existence.'\textsuperscript{137} Second, the experience which Abraham's call symbolizes has been repeated in Israel's history, in the pattern of Exodus, Exile and diaspora, resulting in a perpetual inhabitation of 'an insecure guest-space', which can be taken away at any time.\textsuperscript{138} According to Tillich, this means the Jewish people were transformed from 'being bound to space to being imprisoned in time'.\textsuperscript{139}

Third, this spatial insecurity and transience has a threefold consequence. The first two are based on Abraham's example, and the third is based on the example of Amos, to be discussed after Abraham. The first consequence is that true history is linear, and non-repeatable, meaning that the future is always 'open', the realm of 'the new'.\textsuperscript{140} Just as Tillich previously made reference to a new kind of space, a space of

\textsuperscript{137} \textit{Judenfrage} lectures, 464–465. 'He was called from space into time ... This does not mean that space as space is negated. Indeed he is supposed to go to the land which God will show him. But this space of the future is left undetermined. It is a space of the future, and the future is the mode of time, its decisive mode.' For Tillich, the future is the mode of decision (465).

\textsuperscript{138} Ibid., 465.

\textsuperscript{139} Ibid., 465–466.

\textsuperscript{140} 'History goes toward something, something undetermined, something new, something other than that which one comes. History does not repeat itself. In it the new is created. Therefore historical time is not reversible. Physical time is reversible, but not historical time' (ibid., 466). This is in direct
the future, here he refers to a new sense of time, historical time versus physical time. Whereas physical time is mere chronology, historical time is imbued with theological meaning.

Therefore history is always the history of the struggle against the demands of the gods of space, and the people who represent time against space are necessarily the enemy of all space-bound nationalisms and imperialism. There was already a Roman anti-Judaism before there was a Christian anti-Judaism.\textsuperscript{141}

Three observations can me made here. First, this understanding of history as the vehicle for ‘the new’, as opposed to mere chronology, was clearly seen in Tillich’s discussion of Judaism ‘breaking’ the myth of origin, found in \textit{The Socialist Decision}, and discussed in Chapter 4. This distinction between chronology and a theological interpretation of time is also a major theme of Tillich’s \textit{Interpretation of History}. Second, the comment about Roman anti-Judaism points to another Tillich-ian distinction between ‘monotheism’ and ‘polytheism’. This is the second consequence of the transformation of the Jewish people from space bound to time bound. Third, given Tillich’s distinction of polytheism and monotheism, and the metaphysical importance of space and time for each, anti-Judaism is perennial problem. This is because the temptation to deify space, in the form of religious nationalism, is a perennial problem.

\textsuperscript{141} Ibid.
Contrary to what might be implied from this analysis thus far, that anti-Judaism is unique to Christian antiquity, Tillich observes that Roman anti-Judaism existed first. According to Tillich, the Roman empire permitted the worship of many gods, including gods deriving from conquered lands of the empire, but insisted that those gods be subordinated to the supreme god of the empire, the emperor. Since the Jews refused to worship the emperor, they were deemed to be politically subversive:

In the Roman pantheon the gods of all spaces were gathered together but subordinated to the god of Roman space. And the Romans felt that the Jews attacked the space of the empire through the God of time, whom they served. The imperial space was not for the Jews the ultimate and unconditional that it was for the Romans and what they required it to be for their subject peoples.\(^\text{142}\)

This observation about pagan imperial Rome carries a different emphasis from the concept of ‘mythical-political imperialism’, first discussed in *The Socialist Decision*. The latter posits that polytheistic cultures inevitably experience conflict because the individual gods each have a universalizing impulse, discussed above in Chapter 4.\(^\text{143}\) Here Tillich says that polytheism ultimately means subjection to the gods of space, and monotheism ultimately means subjection the gods of time. Therefore, an ostensibly monotheistic religion can assume a polytheistic posture:

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\(^{142}\) Ibid.

\(^{143}\) Chapter 3, 37. Mythical-political imperialism is discussed in Tillich, *Socialist Decision*, 19.
Rather, polytheism is subjection to gods of space, and monotheism is subjection to the God of time. As long as the Jewish God stands against other national gods as a Jewish national god, he is a space-bound polytheistic god as all the others, even if it is only one. Only when the narrow association of Yahweh to his people was cut through by prophetic critique, did the God of Israel become the God of monotheism. He became the God of monotheism when he became the God of time.  

5.5.5 Amos: The Broken Covenant, Exile and the Righteous Remnant

The third consequence of spatial insecurity and transience is that it provides a basis for universality, which is an essential feature of justice, over against cultural and ethnic particularity. Whereas for Tillich nationalistic religion was ‘space bound’ because of its national or ethnic exclusivity, to be free of those limitations was to be ‘time bound’, and universal. For Tillich, national or ethnic boundaries prevented the establishment of justice. Contrariwise, he claims, ‘The universality of the God of time is the universality of the God of justice.’  

Whereas the figure of Abraham symbolized for Tillich the virtue of breaking away from space bound idolatry, Amos underscores the importance of the Exile, and the possibility of a remnant of God’s people enduring the loss of their sacred space. For Tillich, Amos was important in five ways: (i) he was the first prophet to warn Israel of its destruction for breaking ‘the covenant’, presumably the Mosaic law,

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144 *Judenfrage* lectures, 467.
145 Ibid.
which was the basis for divine justice; (ii) this forced a break between the divine and
a national/ethnic boundary, which had devolved into the idolatry of space; (iii) the
priestly cult was deprived of any automatic, unquestioned revelatory power, with the
office of the prophet becoming the vehicle for God’s revelation, another expression
of the shift of revelatory capacity from space to time; (iv) the shift from space to time
was an expression of true monotheism, described above as subjection to the God of
time; and (v) the destruction of God’s people was not a nullification of the covenant,
because a righteous remnant was preserved as a testimony to God’s faithfulness.

It was one of the greatest moments in the history of humanity when Amos, the
first of the great prophets, threatened Israel with destruction and severed the
connection between God and the space with which he was associated … The
God of whom Amos speaks declares that every summons to election and
priestly cult is in vain when justice is destroyed. The message of Amos, which
was taken up by all the prophets, was the hour of the birth of genuine
monotheism … The God of monotheism stands against every sacrally
consecrated injustice. He negates all sacrally grounded privileges; he places
the bearers of the Holy under the ‘ought’, under judgment and under the
promise which reaches into the future. He is the God of history and time.\(^{146}\)

According to Tillich, the history of Judaism illustrates a balance of the two
poles of space and time, the dialectic of the Holy, as the proper basis to convey
revelation:

\(^{146}\) Ibid., 467–468.
On the one side stands the closing of the covenant, the election of Israel, the presence of God in Israel, the gift of the Law, and the intimate connection between land and people. On the other side stands the breaking of the covenant by Israel, the split between God and the people, the judgment and the rejection. There is always a remnant which remains obedient to the God of time and carries forth the function of Israel to be the people of time. For this reason, Judaism remains for all time a thorn in the flesh of all deification of space, all nationalism, and all imperialism.\textsuperscript{147}

Two important themes are present in this passage. First, it illustrates the ontological dialectic of balance between space and time as constitutive of the Holy. Second, the image of Judaism enduring as a perpetual ‘thorn in the flesh’, against all space-bound idolatry, underscores the permanent theological importance of Judaism for Tillich.

5.5.6 The Cross and the Prophetic Spirit in Christianity

Tillich completes this lecture by applying his dialectical analysis of the Holy to Christianity. He makes three points about Christianity: (i) the Cross critiques all absolutes and idolatry; (ii) Christianity exists not only within a tension between the sacramental and priestly, like Judaism, it also exists in tension between the ‘already’ and the ‘not yet’; and (iii) the history of Christianity yields repeated examples of prophetic reactions against sacramental hierarchy. First, Tillich begins by observing

\textsuperscript{147} Ibid., 468.
that Christianity had a prophetic origin in John the Baptist, and that early Christians sought universality and justice by transcending the ethnic and national boundaries of Judaism.\textsuperscript{148} However, Tillich warns that the belief that the Messiah had already come could lead to a new idolatry of space.\textsuperscript{149} Second, Tillich counters by asserting that the Cross should be the permanent critique for Christians against all space-bound idolatry, occupying the optimal relation between space and time, priestly and prophetic expressions: ‘Neither the mountain of Sinai or Zion but Golgotha is the middle space for Christian thinking. What happened on this mountain around the year 30 … determined the whole future. In this event the Holy has appeared, achieving presence and sacramental reality.’\textsuperscript{150}

Third, Tillich’s interpretation of the history of Christianity hinges on the prophetic critique of idolatrous sacramental tendencies. He begins with a general observation that the prophetic often emerged within sects, were often persecuted by the existing churches and the state, but ultimately expressed what the prophets had begun: ‘they kept the Holy as a living demand and directed the new toward the future.’\textsuperscript{151} For Tillich, the Protestant Reformation is the model for prophetic critique within Christianity, and this provides the inspiration for Tillich’s ‘Protestant principle’, which was introduced in Chapter 1 as one of Tillich’s key organizing principles. For Tillich, the Protestant principle, like the Cross, calls every absolute into question, and

\textsuperscript{148} Ibid., 468–469.
\textsuperscript{149} Ibid., 469.
\textsuperscript{150} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{151} Ibid., 471.
bears a resemblance to prophetic Judaism:152

The Protestant principle is the prophetic principle, namely, the negation of every attempt of something infinite to take God’s place through sacramental consecration … .Thus there exists a close relationship between Protestantism and Judaism. Luther believed, therefore, that it was possible, on the basis of the community of the prophetic protest, to take Judaism into the Protestant movement. Thus he was deeply disappointed when this did not happen.153

For Tillich, the prophetic spirit could exist within ostensibly secular movements, as long as the target of critique was some form of absolutism and idolatry.154

Specifically, this includes the Enlightenment critique of the tyranny of the churches,

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152 Earley points out that Jewish prophesism and the Protestant principle are effectively the same thing, as discussed in Chapter 1 above.

153 Judenfrage lectures, 471–472. According to Tillich, ‘The Protestant principle (which is a manifestation of the prophetic Spirit) is not restricted to the churches of the Reformation or to any other church; it transcends every particular church, being an expression of the Spiritual Community. It has been betrayed by every church, including the churches of the Reformation, but it is also effective in every church as the power which prevents profanization and demonization from destroying the Christian churches completely. It alone is not enough; it needs the “Catholic substance” (ST III, 245). Catholic Substance is the dialectical partner of the Protestant Principle, which is not tied to Roman Catholicism, but expresses the sacramental aspects of religion, and relates to the “is” in the “is—ought polarity’. Tillich also describes it as the ‘concrete embodiment of the Spiritual Presence’ (ST III, 245).

154 ‘There are prophetic and quasi-prophetic movements not only in the religious sphere but in the cultural as well … The sects of the Reformation period are the fathers of many modern revolutions and behind these sects stand the sects of the Middle Ages, early Christianity, and Jewish prophetism. This holds for revolutions which use anti-Christian and anti-religious slogans. They were driven to this position by the fact that the sacramental churches were bound to the ruling groups and gave political injustice sacramental consecration. In spite of their secular, anti-religious character, and the total perversions to which some of the revolutionary movements have been led, the prophetic spirit was originally effective in them’ (Judenfrage lectures, 472).
the eighteenth-century bourgeois revolution, and the anti-bourgeois revolutions of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, which all had their inspiration in the Protestant Reformation, which ultimately had its roots in Jewish prophethood.\footnote{Ibid.}

Tillich concludes this lecture by claiming that the dialectical relationship of the priestly and sacramental is fundamental to the diagnosis and solution to the Jewish problem.\footnote{Ibid.} He further argues that this dialectical relationship provides an appropriate framework to understand the related problems of Zionism, Judaism and national self-actualization, the relationship of Judaism to Christianity, and the ongoing importance of Judaism as a critical, prophetic force: 'Its function is to keep awake the spirit of prophethood, against itself, against national groups, and against the Christian churches when they fall into bondage to space. The Jews are and must remain the people of time.'\footnote{Ibid., 473.}

5.6 Fourth Lecture and Conclusion: Theological Answers and the Search for Reconciliation

The fourth lecture seeks to answer the opening question of the Jewish problem as it relates to the German people and Christians, through the theological insights presented in the third lecture. Tillich provides specific recommendations to provide a basis for reconciliation. He achieves this in three parts, in consecutive discussions of Judaism, the German people and Christianity. He initially observes that the

\footnote{Ibid.}
\footnote{Ibid.}
\footnote{Ibid., 473.}
traditional sociological categories are inadequate to describe Judaism, and Judaism occupies a unique position within Christendom.\textsuperscript{158} On the one hand, Judaism is a religious community, but on the other hand it is a national entity.\textsuperscript{159} Echoing the language of the prophet Hosea 1:9, Tillich argues that the Jews are both ‘a people and not a people’,\textsuperscript{160} in whom ‘history has expressed its mystery’.\textsuperscript{161} For Tillich, the ability of the Jews to endure despite not having a dedicated geographical space, a homeland, underscores the importance of their survival in diaspora.\textsuperscript{162} Tillich employs the idea introduced in the third lecture, that territorial insecurity and diaspora existence for Judaism is theologically vital, as it avoids the idolatry of space: ‘Seen in terms of space, Judaism lives necessarily in dispersion … for which diaspora is a genuine destiny’.\textsuperscript{163} For Tillich, the difficult tension of a diaspora existence entails preserving religious distinctiveness, but in the context of geographical transience, always living potentially on the run. This tension can be eliminated in two ways. The first way is by assimilation, which involves giving up religious community and distinctiveness, which ‘founded’ in Europe, but arguably was having some success in America.\textsuperscript{164}

\textsuperscript{158} Ibid., 474.
\textsuperscript{159} Ibid., 474–475.
\textsuperscript{160} Ibid., 475.
\textsuperscript{161} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{162} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{163} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{164} Tillich grants a qualified legitimacy to assimilation: ‘In assimilation one avoids the condition of the diaspora by giving up that side of Jewish existence according to which it is a people. One identifies oneself with the alien space in which one lives, not only geographically, sociologically, and culturally. The giving up of the ethnic-elements does not necessarily mean giving up the religious elements of
The other alternative is Zionism, in which religious distinctiveness can be maintained through obtaining a religiously dedicated geographical space. Tillich specifically refers to the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine. Tillich observes, on the one hand, that this can lead to the end of the sociological problem of territorial insecurity and the psychological problem of despair. On the other hand, this brings back all of the problems that go with religious nationalism, which were the target of prophetic critique by the Old Testament prophets, which Tillich describes as the problem of theocracy. For Tillich, 'Every attempt to identify a nation with the Kingdom of God must run aground (scheitern). This was the problem with which all the leading men of the Old Testament wrestled.' Tillich ends his application of theological concepts as applied to Judaism in an inconclusive, open-ended manner. Here Tillich condemns religious nationalism, as he has consistently since 1933 in The Socialist Decision. However, he wonders whether the State of Israel can

\[\text{Judaism. One can assimilate without becoming a Christian. I am thinking of certain groups in American Judaism, in particular the liberals. Here an astonishingly extensive cultural assimilation has taken place, without the corresponding groups giving up their particular religious existence. The religious element is not destroyed through assimilation in a Christian culture. However, where assimilation succeeds, the meaning of the diaspora has been lost, namely, the special mission which Judaism has in the dispersion. Then the religious particularity is often also lost, and a total immersion in Christian culture takes place'} \text{'}\text{(ibid., 476).}

\[\text{165 Ibid., 477.}

\[\text{Tillich distinguishes between ‘theocracy’ and ‘hierocracy’: ‘Hierocracy is priesthood; theocracy is the lordship of God, executed through laypersons and theologians. A secular state can be theocratic but not hierocratic. It is theocratic when the law of its existence—the laws of family, school and rights—are subjected to fundamental religious law. In a theocracy the will of God is the foundation of the political structure. It is however, quite questionable whether it is possible to build a modern state on a theocratic foundation. The development of Israel up this point doubtless speaks against this possibility'} \text{'}\text{(ibid., 477–478).}

\[\text{167 Ibid., 478.}
generate 'new embodiments of the prophetic spirit, and that from there new impulses will come for Israel and the diaspora'?  

Having reflected upon Judaism, Tillich now turns to the implications of his theological analysis for the German people. He responds to the problems he raised in the second lecture, and recommends that Germans avoid stereotypes, avoid misplaced self-hate and aggression with 'philosemitism', which has the same source as anti-Semitism. For Tillich, the phenomenon of German anti-Semitism cannot be undone simply through education, and having Germans interact with real Jews, although both are necessary. Tillich identifies the fifth type of guilt from the first lecture, in which Germans believed they had suffered enough in the war, as particularly pernicious. Because of the deep-rooted nature of this problem, a solution with equal 'depth' will be needed, Tillich's call for 'collective (psycho) analysis': 'Such a collective analysis would uncover the irrational and perverted structures which lay at the basis of the antisemitism of the most recent period in the history of the German people. I can scarcely believe that without such a collective analysis of the problem that the problem of "Germans and Jews" can be solved.' While Tillich acknowledges that not every German should, or could, undergo such an analysis, it would apply to those who form 'the public consciousness'. The main focus of this

168 'Speaking for this is the fact that this space (the State of Israel) is psychologically and sociologically completely filled with the Jewish spirit. Against this speaks the dangers which are given with the space-boundedness of every nation. History can never be calculated. My question is a question to the future and a hope in the future' (ibid., 480).

169 Ibid., 481-482.

170 Ibid., 484.

171 Ibid., 485.
analysis would be to un-do the psychological problems of ‘over self-valuation’, arrogance, self-hate and inferiority that Germans had suffered from. The end result would be that Germany should re-inculcate the spirit of true German humanism, which it previously embodied during the Reformation, and in other periods, but had been tragically forfeited, especially in northern and northwest Germany. He concludes: ‘The German people can gain an understanding of the prophetic-humanistic character of Judaism only when they themselves take part in the Christian-humanistic character of the West’.

Third, having discussed Judaism and the German people, Tillich makes three recommendations about how his theological ‘solution’ in the third lecture must inform the relationship of Christianity to Judaism. The first recommendation is that Christianity must affirm that the Old Testament is an essential part of its own Scriptures, which serves two functions. The first function requires affirming the God of time, creation, justice, judgment and promise, over against the paganism found in the ancient world. The second function is to relate political forms to religion: ‘The Old Testament, in particular the prophetic message, speaks of peoples, social

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172 Ibid., 485–486.
173 ‘the unity of Christian-humanistic culture is deeply threatened, perhaps more than we know. I am here not so much thinking of the contemporary political constellation as of the events of the German past which have hindered Germany from fully opening itself to Christian humanism. The first event was the failure of the Romans to conquer middle and northern Germany, which would have meant bringing with them the values of Greek–Roman antiquity. The second event ... is the way that north-west Germany turned against Christianity and was converted by force by Charlemagne, and thereby never opened itself to Christian values to the same extent as south and west Germany. Therefore northwest Germany was the best soil for the pagan elements of National Socialism’ (ibid., 487).
174 Ibid.
175 Ibid., 488.
classes, and political forms in relation to the religious message. In the New Testament we find very little about this.\textsuperscript{176} The second recommendation is that the Christian church must fight its own anti-Judaism, part of which involves diagnosing its own legalism. For example, Tillich says that the ostensibly anti-Jewish passages in John’s Gospel need to be interpreted ‘typologically’, meaning that the legalism exhibited by Jesus’ opponents needs to be identified wherever it is found, and that legalism is not the exclusive property of Judaism.\textsuperscript{177} The third recommendation is that Christianity must permit the prophetic dimension of Judaism to serve as a perpetual critique of its own tendencies toward paganism: ‘It belongs to the function of Judaism to hold before Christianity the mirror of its own regression into paganism.’\textsuperscript{178} Here the image of the mirror from the third lecture recurs. According to Tillich, Judaism and Christianity converge in some ways, but ultimately diverge over the question of the Messiah, who for Christians has come in Jesus as the Christ.\textsuperscript{179} This image supports the reciprocal relation of Judaism and Christianity. Tillich

\textsuperscript{176} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{177} ‘The anti-Jewish expressions go all the way back to the latest books of the New Testament and from there comes the anti-Judaism in all periods of church history. In order to fight against this tendency, church instruction should show that in the fourth Gospel individuals always have at the same time a typological-symbolic meaning. The Jews in the fourth Gospel with whom Jesus fights represent a type of piety which occurs in all religions and recurs in Christianity. It is the piety of the law, which claims for itself possession of the absolute truth and in this basis rejects the Christ again and again. If the church said it more clearly, it would have turned the anti-Jewish critique not only against the Jews, but applied it also to itself. And if the church turns anti-Jewish critique against itself, then its anti-Judaism cannot degenerate into antisemitism’ (ibid., 489). This ‘typological-symbolic’ meaning is to be distinguished from the ‘typological thinking’ discussed above, which is stereotyping, and the vehicle for anti-Semitism.

\textsuperscript{178} Ibid., 489–490.

\textsuperscript{179} Ibid., 490.
concludes the *Judenfrage* lectures with the assumption that when Christians and Jews diverge, Christians can no longer argue, but must resort to preaching, to explain that the coming of the Christ has indeed ushered in a new reality.\(^{180}\)

### 5.7 Conclusion

In this chapter I have illustrated how Tillich’s understanding of Judaism was deepened in an attempt to understand the Holocaust. Not all of the logical moves that he makes are easily understood, or are empirically demonstrable, especially the pairing and opposition of the German and Jewish corporate personalities discussed in the second lecture. However, it is clear that the various dialectical structures that he employs are closely related to how Judaism functions in his theological scheme. In particular, in the second lecture Tillich uses the image of the mirror to illustrate that prophetic Judaism must always serve a critical function for Christianity. More emphatically, in the third lecture, Tillich’s analyses of the theological importance of space and time, priestly and prophetic, is and Ought, are applied to the biblical characters Abraham and Amos. Tillich argues that Jewish propheticism, and any truly prophetic spirit, cannot be constrained by the limits of geographical space, or it could lapse into idolatry. In this chapter, Tillich goes beyond the imagery of the mirror, and says that Judaism must remain a permanent ‘thorn in the flesh’ of Christianity. In

\(^{180}\)This Christian answer is not an arguing answer. It is a pointing answer. It is an answer of being. Perhaps the hope is not unjustified that from the Christian Being [namely, Jesus Christ as the New Being] the power will come forth which will break the demon of antisemitism and create a new community between Christianity and Judaism, not only in the German people, but among all peoples’ (ibid., 491).
other words, these dialectical relations ensure continuity between Judaism and Christianity. To sever them would be unthinkable for Tillich, for they must maintain a reciprocal relationship, suggesting an ontological dialectic of balance.

Tillich’s understanding of Judaism is a fundamental component of his understanding of Christian theology. In the next chapter, the goal will be to analyze how the related ideas of Judaism and Jewish prophetism function within Tillich’s three volume *Systematic Theology*, and within eight ‘occasional lectures’ that he delivered in the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s. All of the most important concepts have been introduced, such as the transformation of the particular to the universal within the history of religion (the 1910 Dissertation on Schelling), the metaphysical importance of time, the critique of scientific rationalism, the emergence of eschatological expectation, and possibility of ‘the new’ within history, and justice as the true power of being (*The Socialist Decision*) and the dialectic of the Holy (*Judenfrage* lectures). In the *Systematic Theology*, Tillich’s use of Judaism and Jewish prophetism appear at key points, underscoring the thesis that Tillich believes that Christianity is theologically inseparable from Judaism. In the occasional lectures, Tillich identifies ‘structural similarities’ between Judaism and Christianity, and these enable Tillich to maintain an ‘inclusive’ dialectic of the history of religions.
Chapter 6

Tillich’s Inclusive Dialectic of the History of Religion in the
Systematic Theology and the Occasional Lectures

Chapters 3, 4 and 5 engaged in primary source analysis, in order to develop the core argument of this dissertation. The works discussed in those chapters, the 1910 Dissertation, the 1912 Dissertation, The Religious Situation, The Socialist Decision, and the Judenfrage lectures, have not been analyzed for their interpretation of Judaism, on an individual basis, or taken together. In Chapter 2, two theses were introduced, which relate to Tillich’s understanding of Judaism. The first thesis is that Tillich has a dialectical understanding of reality, and that this enables him to maintain a strong degree of continuity between Judaism and Christianity. The second thesis is that Tillich’s concept of Judaism becomes more complex over time, since it becomes associated with key concepts which emphasise the continuity between Judaism and Christianity. These concepts combine in different ways, ultimately resulting in the two different types of dialectic, the historical dialectic of progression, and the ontological dialectic of balance.

This chapter will engage in the final round of primary source analysis, by examining Tillich’s three volume Systematic Theology (ST I, II and III), and eight ‘occasional lectures’ mainly delivered in the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s, that discuss the relationship between Judaism and Christianity. Tillich’s Systematic Theology was written in three volumes, in five parts, with volume I (ST I) being published in 1951, volume II (ST II) being published in 1957 and volume III (ST III) being published in
1963. As will be discussed below, seven out of the eight occasional lectures were given after World War II, from the late 1940s through 1965. The time periods during which the Systematic Theology was written and during which the occasional lectures were delivered are roughly the same. However, as will be seen in the discussion of lectures seven and eight below, Tillich’s thoughts on these matters develop beyond what he says in the Systematic Theology. In keeping with the developmental analysis of the primary sources begun in Chapter 3 of this dissertation, the Systematic Theology will be analyzed first.

The chapter will initially demonstrate that for Tillich, the history of religion remained a fundamental aspect of his theology until the end of his life. In addition, Tillich’s understanding of the history of religion is profoundly dialectical, employing two kinds of dialectical relation between Judaism and Christianity, the historical dialectic of progression, and the ontological dialectic of balance. The concepts that provide the basis for this are found in the Systematic Theology, but the specific applications with respect to the relationship between Christianity and Judaism are found in the occasional lectures.

After this introduction, section 2 will analyze four key sections found in the three volumes of the Systematic Theology, where the relationship between Judaism and Christianity is discussed. In each of these sections, Tillich develops his view of the history of religion in considerable detail, clarifying and expanding upon the 1910 Dissertation. In each instance, Judaism and Christianity are inextricably related, and three of the four sections are governed by one or more vivid themes or metaphors. In
ST I, Tillich presents his typological method, which is fundamental to understand how his theory of revelation relates to his history of religion. In this context, Tillich's paradoxical understanding of the Exile in the Old Testament provides a unique foundation for the paradox of the Cross found in the New Testament, and both provide the basis for Tillich's critique of idolatry. In ST I, both the historical dialectic of progression and the ontological dialectic of balance are developed in considerable detail. In ST II, Tillich's Christology is grounded in the historical background of the Old Testament, and was saved from Gnosticism by a 'life and death struggle'. In ST III, Tillich's understanding of the Kingdom of God is based upon the transition from immaturity to maturity, with the Old Testament again playing an indispensable role.

The second part of the chapter will analyze Tillich's eight 'occasional lectures' that explicitly discuss the relationship between Judaism and Christianity. In the first six lectures, Tillich explores several structural similarities between his idea of Judaism and his ideal of Christianity. For Tillich, these structural similarities demonstrate that there is a strong degree of continuity between the two religions. In the final two lectures, Tillich elaborates on the importance of the history of religion for his theology, underscoring how his inclusive dialectic functions. I will conclude with a brief summary and preview the main issues to be addressed in the final chapter.

6.1 Judaism and Dialectic in Systematic Theology

6.1.1 Volume I: Typology, Rational Quest and Paradox

In volume I of the Systematic Theology (ST I), there are two sections that directly
discuss the relationship between Judaism and Christianity. The first section is I.II.B.7., ‘The History of Revelation’. The second section is II.II.A.2, 'Typological Considerations', which relates to the history of religion. Because the latter section on typology provides key concepts employed in the former section on revelation, the section on typology will be discussed first. The discussion of both sections will highlight how Tillich expands upon themes that are employed in his earlier works, in particular how dialectic functions in Tillich’s history of religion.

*The History of Religion and the History of Revelation: Typological Method*

For Tillich, the idea of God, or ‘the ultimate’, can only become actual through that which is concrete, preliminary and transitory, which occurs only within the realm of history.¹ Tillich argues that historical understanding must be achieved through ‘typological analysis’,² which involves an analysis of the relationship between ‘the typical’, or ideal structures, and ‘special’ events through which they are expressed.³ Tillich believes that this method is appropriate for understanding and analyzing the history of religion for two reasons. First, it enables analogies to be drawn between one religion and another, to determine how each participates in universal preparatory

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¹ ST I, 218.

² Thus far, Tillich’s understanding of ‘typology’ has been quite simplistic. For example, in the *Judenfrage* lectures he calls the stereotyping of Jews ‘typological’ thinking, which led to their objectification and dehumanization. See Chapter 4 above, and *Judenfrage* lectures, 451–453. However, Tillich’s view becomes increasingly complex in the *Systematic Theology*, and in the occasional lectures, which are also analyzed in this chapter.

³ ‘Historical understanding oscillates between the intuition of the special and the analysis of the typical. The special cannot be described without reference to the type. The type is unreal without the special event in which it appears. Typology cannot replace historiography; historiography cannot describe anything without typology’ (ST I, 219).
revelation. For Tillich, universal preparatory revelation refers to the foundational symbols, categories, forms and religious experiences without which the final revelation could never be understood.\(^4\) For Tillich, the final revelation is the event of the reception of Jesus as the Christ, which is based on a variety of foundational symbols, which are mostly found in the Old Testament and historic Judaism, as will be seen later on in this chapter. The history of revelation assumes a period of ‘preparation’ and a period of ‘reception’, with universal preparatory revelation being logically and chronologically prior to the period in which revelation is ‘received’. For Tillich, the paradigmatic sense of ‘universal(ity)’ is seen in the doctrine of the Logos becoming flesh in the event of Jesus as the Christ, which is the simultaneous manifestation of concreteness and universality.\(^5\)

\(^4\) ST I, 139.

\(^5\) For Tillich, ‘universal’ appears to carry the two senses of ‘always and everywhere’ and something that pervades all of reality (ST I, 16). Other uses of ‘universal’ in the Systematic Theology support this claim. First, Tillich says that the story of Pentecost has five elements, the fifth of which is its universality. This is expressed in ‘the missionary drive of those grasped by the Spiritual Presence’: It was impossible that they should not give the message of what had happened to them to everybody, because the New Being would not be the New Being were not mankind as a whole and even the universe itself included in it. In light of the element of universality in the story of Pentecost we must say that there is no Spiritual Community without openness to all individuals, groups, and things and the drive to take them into itself (ST III, 151–152). Second, in Tillich’s analysis of the ambiguities of religion within the Spiritual Presence, he argues that the churches are paradoxical in three ways, the third of which is the paradox of universality. For Tillich, the churches exhibit ‘extensive’ universality, which is implied in Jesus as the bearer of the New Being, which is valid for all nations, social groups, races, tribes and cultures (ST III, 171). Third, in Tillich’s discussion of the uniqueness and universality of the appearance of Jesus as the Christ, his fundamental question is, in what way does the unique event of Jesus as the Christ have universal significance for every human being and, indirectly, for the universe? (ST II, 150–151). Fourth, in Tillich’s discussion of the historical and non-historical expectations of the New Being, he argues that the quest for the New Being is universal, appearing in
The second reason Tillich uses typological analysis is that it can determine how each religion compares to 'the final revelation', which is the appearance and reception of Jesus as the Christ. This occurs by using 'typical structures' common to each religion, and comparing them to the final revelation. Tillich would say that Judaism, Christianity and Islam have similar, typical structures, insofar as they are each monotheistic. However, each has its own unique cultural and historical form, which makes them identifiable as Judaism, Christianity and Islam. Tillich argues that to over-emphasize a religion's uniqueness is to prevent any meaningful comparison between different religions:

Theological interpretations of the history of religion often are misguided by the unique picture which every religion presents – a picture which can easily be criticized in light of final revelation. The criticism is much more difficult and much more serious if the typical structures within the unique form of a non-Christian historical religion are elaborated and compared with the typical structures appearing in Christianity as a historical religion. This is the only fair and methodologically adequate way of dealing systematically with the history of religion.

For Tillich, the final step would be to compare each religion to the 'criterion of the
final revelation.\textsuperscript{6} How the final revelation fits into Tillich’s history of revelation will be seen in greater detail below in Parts B and C.

\textit{The Dialectical History of Religion as the Rational Quest for Balance}

The main theme of this section is that the tension \textit{within the idea of God} between the concrete and the absolute is also manifested within the history of religion, especially in the tension between polytheism and monotheism. For Tillich, the religious consciousness within human history is expressed in polytheistic forms, which have absolute features, but are predominantly concrete. The religious consciousness is also expressed in monotheistic forms, which have concrete features, but are predominantly absolute. For Tillich, the history of religion has a dialectical structure, and certain historical religious expressions possess their own inner dynamic, or impulse to change and/or transform themselves. To use an example from Tillich’s \textit{The Socialist Decision}, polytheistic religions possess an absolutist tendency, which causes them to come into conflict with other religions, and with other social phenomena, such as political forms. For Tillich in \textit{The Socialist Decision}, what prevents endless conflict is the implementation of justice, understood as the equality of persons, as a limitation on raw expressions of power. The pivotal role of justice, which was initially and uniquely found in Judaism, will be seen again in the following analysis of \textit{The Systematic Theology}.

Tillich uses the metaphor of ‘quest’, reminiscent of the method of correlation, in which the questions of existence are raised, and answers are sought, depending

\textsuperscript{6} Ibid.
on what form ultimate concern takes. Specifically, for Tillich, the historical progression moves in this sequence: (i) ‘polytheism’ confronts two forms of monotheism, ‘monarchical monotheism’ and ‘mystical monotheism’, to create ‘exclusive monotheism’; (ii) exclusive monotheism is uniquely based upon certain aspects of Judaism; and (iii) exclusive monotheism is transformed into ‘trinitarian monotheism’ through the appearance of various mediating figures that foreshadow the Christian Logos. In this way, Judaism is not only the historical predecessor of Christianity, but by its own ‘inner logic’ it serves as the unique basis for Christianity. This sequence will be discussed in greater detail below in Section iii.

For Tillich, this inner logic is driven by the quest for an optimal relationship between the ‘absolutely universal’ and the ‘absolutely concrete’. For Tillich, the optimal balance between the absolutely concrete and the absolutely universal is the Christian Logos, or ‘the Word made flesh’. For Tillich, this tension seeks resolution in the optimal balance of trinitarian monotheism:

The general outline of the typological analysis of the history of religion follows from the tension of the elements in the idea of God. The concreteness of man’s ultimate concern drives him toward polytheistic structures; the reaction of the absolute element against these drives him toward monotheistic structures; and the need for a balance between the concrete and the absolute drives him toward Trinitarian structures.  

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9 Ibid., 218 – 235.
10 Ibid., 221.
The above passage indicates that Tillich’s view of the history of religion can be traced to his conception of the divine.

A key element here is the notion of ‘balance’, implying that there is an optimal contribution from each pole to a third, new entity, a unity of the two poles. In this instance, the two poles are polytheism and monotheism, with the optimal contribution from polytheism being ‘concreteness’ and the optimal contribution from monotheism being ‘the absolute’, or ‘the ultimate’. In this context, ‘absolute’ is another way of expressing ‘ultimate concern’, which is the only proper object of worship, since to worship anything preliminary would be idolatry. For Tillich, concreteness is generally that which is preliminary and transitory, and is manifest in human history.\(^\text{11}\) It is also that quality which is associated with a ‘personal God’.\(^\text{12}\) For Tillich, polytheism is not a quantitative concept, but a qualitative concept. The main problem with polytheism is not that it represents a ‘plurality of gods’, but that each instance lacks a ‘uniting and transcending ultimate’.\(^\text{13}\) What is implied in Tillich’s scheme is that an ‘optimal contribution’ (my term) from the history of polytheism and from the history of monotheism, should endure in the manifestation of a new, third, divine expression, trinitarian monotheism. This is the paradigmatic instance of the ontological dialectic of balance, because the optimal relationship itself is thought of a ‘new unity’, the

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\(^{11}\) ‘The ultimate can become actual only through the concrete, through that which is preliminary and transitory. This is the reason why the idea of God has a history, and why this history is the basic element in the history of religion, simultaneously determining it and being determined by it’ (ibid., 218).

\(^{12}\) Ibid., 223.

\(^{13}\) Ibid., 222. This problem was noted in Tillich’s analysis of polytheism in *Socialist Decision*, 18–19, discussed in Chapter 4 above.
teleological goal of the rational striving of the participants in the dialectic.

The Dialectical Progression from Polytheism to Trinitarian Monotheism

Due to space limitations, the full development of trinitarian monotheism will not be traced, but the essential enduring aspects of polytheism and monotheism channeled through Judaism will be summarized. For Tillich, there are two types of monotheism that contribute to exclusive monotheism. The first is ‘monarchic monotheism’, which occupies a ‘boundary line’ between monotheism and polytheism, in that a ‘god-monarch’ rules over a hierarchy of inferior gods and god-like beings.¹⁴ Tillich uses the biblical image of ‘the Lord of Hosts’, as found in the Old Testament and Christian liturgy, as an example of a heavenly monarch who rules over heavenly beings, angels and spirits.¹⁵ The enduring element in this is the concept of a being that has sovereignty over all. The second type is ‘mystical monotheism’, in which all beings, and any distinctions, are swallowed up in ‘the divine ground and abyss from which they come and in which they disappear’.¹⁶ However, according to Tillich, the quest for concreteness can never be completely eradicated, with one example being polytheism in India: ‘Yet even this most radical negation of the concrete element in the idea of God is not able to suppress the quest for concreteness.’¹⁷ Therefore, for Tillich, one aspect of mystical monotheism survives to make an enduring contribution to exclusive monotheism, the quest for concreteness.

In order to accommodate the ineradicable quest for concreteness by the

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¹⁴ ST I, 226.
¹⁵ Ibid., 226.
¹⁶ Ibid.
¹⁷ Ibid.
human religious consciousness, Tillich argues that a third form of monotheism emerged in history, 'exclusive monotheism'. According to Tillich, this form of monotheism posits a god that is ultimate and universal, a god who is not demonic, destructive or idolatrous, and yet is concrete and personal. These are features that became manifest in the Christian Logos, in perfect balance. Tillich says this form of monotheism emerged uniquely with Judaism, and he emphasizes that certain unprecedented elements emerged for the first time: 'Such a possibility contradicts every expectation which can be derived from the history of religion. It is the result of an astounding constellation of objective and subjective factors in Israel, especially in the prophetic line of religion.' Therefore, for Tillich, the God of Israel has two characteristics that are not only new to the history of religion, but they also inform the enduring possibility of exclusive monotheism, which in turn is the only basis for trinitarian monotheism. First, the God of Israel is concrete, the one who led his people out of Egypt, the 'God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob'. Second, this God is absolute, who judges the other gods of the nations, and who is a 'jealous God' that cannot permit any competing divine claim. However, the absolute and jealous God does not become the object of idolatry because this God is the God of justice, who requires the keeping of the Ten Commandments, and relates to Israel through a covenant:

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16 Ibid., 227.
19 'Theologically speaking, exclusive monotheism belongs to the final revelation, for it is a direct preparation' (ibid.).
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
Yahweh does not claim universality in the name of a particular quality or in the name of his nation and its particular qualities. His claim is not imperialistic, for it is made in the name of that principle which implies ultimacy and universality – the principle of justice. The relation of the God of Israel to his nation is based on a covenant. The covenant demands justice, namely, the keeping of the Commandments, and it threatens the violation of justice and destruction ... He proves his universality by destroying his nation in the name of principles which are valid for all nations – the principles of justice. This undercuts the basis of polytheism.\textsuperscript{22}

This understanding of justice is similar to what was expressed in The Socialist Decision and the Judenfrage lectures. For Tillich, exclusive monotheism needs an expression of ‘the concrete element in humanity’s ultimate concern’, and this provides the basis for the trinitarian problem.\textsuperscript{23} How this occurs will be explained below, but Tillich is clear that exclusive monotheism was first expressed in Judaism, and that it provided the only historical basis for Christianity.

The progression beyond exclusive monotheism to trinitarian monotheism is bridged by the idea of God as ‘living’: ‘It is an attempt to speak of the living God, the God in whom the ultimate and concrete are united.'\textsuperscript{24} For Tillich, trinitarian monotheism, like polytheism, is not concerned with quantity, but with a qualitative characterization of God: ‘The trinitarian problem is the problem of the unity between

\textsuperscript{22} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid., 228.
\textsuperscript{24} Ibid.
ultimacy and concreteness in the living God. Trinitarian monotheism is concrete
monotheism, the affirmation of the living God.\footnote{Ibid.} Each type of monotheism,
monarchic, mystical and exclusive, yields implicit or explicit answers to the quest for
a unity of ultimacy and concreteness.\footnote{Ibid.} According to Tillich, monarchic monotheism,
with its hierarchy of divinities as found in the mystery cults of late antiquity,
anticipated trinitarian thinking through the suffering and death of a divine figure,
demonstrating that this divine figure fully participated in human destiny.\footnote{Ibid.}
Mystical monotheism, in a different way, anticipated trinitarian thinking. Tillich uses the
example of the distinction between the god Brahma and the Brahman principle,
arguing that this is analogous to Origen’s ‘Logos theology’, which sought to clarify
the ambiguous ontological standing of the pre-existent Christ.\footnote{Ibid., 229.}

According to Tillich, exclusive monotheism gives rise to the trinitarian problem
because of the conflict between ‘abstract transcendence’ and the irrepressible
demand for concreteness. Tillich says that abstract transcendence is expressed in
any \textit{absolute} divine command, which appears to override, overwhelm or nullify any
recipient of the command, because of the absolute power of the divinity.\footnote{Ibid.} Using a
peculiar turn of phrase, Tillich describes the ineradicable quest for concreteness as a

\footnote{In exclusive monotheism an abstract transcendence of the divine develops. It is not the
transcendence of the infinite abyss in which everything concrete disappears, as in mystical
monotheism; rather it is the transcendence of the absolute command which emptied all concrete
manifestations of the divine’ (ibid.).}
personal 'demand': 'But since the concrete element demands its rights, mediating powers of a threefold character appear and posit the trinitarian problem.'\textsuperscript{30} To resolve this conflict between the overpowering absolute divine command, and the ineradicable 'demand' for concreteness, three levels of mediating beings are posited, a hierarchy with a pure divinity at the 'top' and a divine-human figure at the 'bottom', consonant with the Christian Trinity and Incarnation. The mediating powers with a threefold character are:

The first group of these mediators is made up of hypostasized divine qualities, like Wisdom, Word, Glory. The second group is the angels, the divine messengers who represent special functions. The third is the divine-human figure through which God works the fulfillment of history, the Messiah. In all these the God who had become absolutely transcendent and unapproachable now becomes concrete in time and space.\textsuperscript{31}

Tillich concludes that there is a Christian solution to the optimal relation, or balance, between the concrete and the absolute. This balance is found in the paradox that the Messiah, the mediator between God and man, is identical with a historical, individual, personal life, who carries the name of Jesus of Nazareth.\textsuperscript{32} But this balance could not exist without the contribution of exclusive monotheism, which was originally expressed in Judaism.

\textit{The History of Revelation, Preparation and the Prophetic Struggle}

\textsuperscript{30} Ibid.; emphasis mine.
\textsuperscript{31} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{32} Ibid., 229–230.
In the preceding section, Tillich’s history of religion demonstrates that the religion of Judaism, as presented in the Old Testament, manifests a combination of absoluteness and concreteness that provided a unique basis for the final revelation in Jesus as the Christ. The God of the Old Testament is absolute, the one, ‘jealous’ God, who is also the God of justice. At the same time, the God of the Old Testament is concrete, historically and culturally specific, and personal. These two factors unite in ‘the living God’, and this bridges the historical transition from exclusive monotheism to trinitarian monotheism. For Tillich, the history of religion is interpreted theologically, taking a selection of empirical facts, and discerning a unique combination of symbols serving as the basis for the ‘final revelation’. This section provides the conceptual framework for understanding the inextricable relationship between the Old Testament/Judaism and the New Testament/Christianity, in the history of revelation.

For Tillich, the appearance and reception of Jesus as the Christ is the final revelation.\textsuperscript{33} Tillich underscores that this complex historical and theological process is not an isolated event, and it is divided into two periods.\textsuperscript{34} The first is the period of

\textsuperscript{33}‘Christianity claims to be based on the revelation in Jesus as the Christ as the final revelation’ (ibid., 132). ‘The final revelation, like every revelation, occurs in a correlation of ecstasy and miracle. The revelatory event is Jesus as the Christ ... Jesus as the Christ, the miracle of the final revelation, and the church, receiving him as the Christ or the final revelation, belong to each other. The Christ is not the Christ without the church, and the church is not the church without the Christ. The final revelation, like every revelation, is correlative’ (ibid., 136–137).

\textsuperscript{34}‘The final revelation of Jesus as the Christ divides the history of revelation into a period of preparation and a period of reception. In addition, the event of the final revelation establishes itself as the center, aim and origin of the revelatory events which occur in the period of preparation and the period of reception’ (ibid., 138).
‘preparation’, which starts with the beginnings of religious consciousness in ancient paganism, and includes the emergence of monotheistic and prophetic Judaism, as discussed above in the history of religion. The second is the period of ‘reception’, which is effectively the history of the Christian church. This discussion will focus on the period of preparation, because that is the period that involves the relationship between Judaism and the Old Testament, and Christianity and the New Testament.

According to Tillich, the period of preparation must include two things: (i) the element of expectation or anticipation, and (ii) prior revelations, which had become distorted. Therefore, the final revelation had a ‘revelatory history’:

It [i.e. the final revelation] could not have occurred without having been expected, and it could not have been expected if it had not been preceded by other revelations which had become distorted. It would not have been the final revelation if it had not been received as such, and it would lose its character as final revelation if it were not able to make itself available to every group in every place. The history of the preparation and reception of the final revelation can be called the ‘history of revelation’.35

Two issues emerge here to help drive the discussion forward. First, according to Tillich there were other, preceding revelations that became distorted. For Tillich, ‘universal revelation’ contributed the symbols, categories, forms and religious experiences without which the final revelation could never be understood, as ‘the biblical terminology is full of words whose meaning would be strange if there had

35 Ibid., 137.
been no preceding revelations in Judaism as well as in paganism'. This parallels the observation above in the preceding section that Judaism made an essential contribution to the emergence of exclusive monotheism. Second, the final revelation, by definition, must become ‘available to every group in every place’, having the quality of universality.

The period of preparation involves a three-phase process that Tillich characterizes as ‘the prophetic struggle’, which is the purification of the religious consciousness. Tillich uses as many as four three-phase constructs to describe essentially the same process. The first phase is the priestly function, which tries to ‘keep alive the power of the original revelation’ by enabling new individuals and groups to enter into the revelatory situation. This process risks idolatry, which would be a confusion between the medium and content of revelation. This idolatrous impulse, or ‘distorted sacramentalism’, is opposed by the second, critical phase, which appears in prophetic form, and is decisive for the development of universal revelation. Like the first phase, the critical phase appears in all phases of history, whether it is Old Testament prophetism, Christian monasticism, the Protestant

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36 Ibid., 139.
37 Ibid., 143.
38 (i) conservation, criticism, anticipation (ibid., 139ff.); (ii) reception, development, transformation (143); (iii) acceptance, rejection, transformation (143); and (iv) reception, rejection and transformation (143). These all appear to be ways to describe ‘the prophetic struggle’.
39 Ibid., 140.
40 Ibid., 141.
41 The critical phase also has rational and mystical forms, but the prophetic form is most important here. Ibid., 140–141. In addition, Tillich argues, ‘The prophetic attack on distorted sacramentalism is decisive for the development of universal revelation’ (ibid., 141).
Reformation, evangelical radicalism, or even movements in Islam and Zoroastrianism. For Tillich, however, the common feature to each critical phase is the *concrete* foundation of their attack on the dominant sacramental system, through ‘the judgment of the divine law’.

Tillich does not give an example here, but his terminology suggests that the Mosaic Law would be the prototype. The third phase, of anticipation, is not described generically, but is illustrated solely by the uniqueness of the prophets of Israel, which for Tillich extends from Moses to John the Baptist.

This will be discussed in more detail in the next section, C.

What kind of dialectic is this? While Tillich’s history of religion is utterly pervaded by tensions, polarities and movement, he seldom reflects on the features of the dialectic itself. It is something that he assumes, and has done so since the Schelling dissertations. Yet in Tillich’s discussion of the prophetic struggle of reception, rejection and transformation there are traces of spatial imagery, with reference to ‘sides’:

Reception, rejection and transformation – that is the movement from the side of the Old Testament toward universal revelation, and from the side of the New Testament toward the universal revelation *and* the Old Testament. The dynamics of the history of revelation exclude the mechanistic-supernatural

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42 Ibid.
43 ‘They subject the concrete mediums of revelation and the concrete sacramental symbols and priestly systems to the divine judgment of the divine law, to that which ought to be because it is the law of God’ (ibid., 142).
44 Ibid.
theories of revelation.\footnote{Ibid., 143.}

This is the only spatial language describing the poles of the dialectic up to this point in this survey of Tillich’s works, and it is not elaborated upon. The spatial language may just be a way of making logical distinctions, as in ‘taking one side of an argument’, so to speak, but the indication of a polar relation is unmistakable. Below it will be seen that Tillich employs the concept of ‘the center of history’, but this does not characterize the relationship of the poles, and does not effect whether the optimal relationship between the poles is one of balance, or movement beyond a contradiction to a new unity. Only in the Bampton Lectures,\footnote{Published in Paul Tillich, \textit{Christianity and the Encounter of World Religions}, Fortress Texts in Modern Theology, foreword by Krister Stendahl (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1994), 34–35.} to be discussed later in this chapter, will Tillich describe his dialectical history of religion in spatial terms.

\textit{The Old Testament and Revelation: The Paradox of Propheticism and the Paradox of the Cross}

Volume I, part I, II.A.7, ‘The History of Revelation’, contains the clearest and most comprehensive articulation of the relationship between the Old and New Testament in the entire Systematic Theology. In four respects, the Old Testament prophetic revelation cannot be severed from the final revelation of Jesus as the Christ. In all four instances, a progression or advancement from Judaism to Christianity is evident. However, Judaism is not denigrated, but has a profound influence on its successor religion, Christianity. First, the Old Testament prophetic tradition, which extends from Moses to John the Baptist, is uniquely and inseparably related to the
final revelation in Jesus as the Christ in the New Testament because it is 'the direct concrete preparation' for the final revelation in the event of Jesus as the Christ.\footnote{ST I, 141.} While there are other forms of prophetic criticism in other religions, such as in Islam or in the Greek mystery religions, they bear no direct relation to the final revelation of Jesus as the Christ. The Old Testament prophetic revelation is concrete, in the sense that it is historically and culturally specific. It was in the lands of present-day Palestine and Israel that the prophets spoke, and it was in these same lands that the Christ event occurred. This historical and cultural uniqueness is the primary reason that the Old Testament prophetic tradition is inseparable from the revelation of Jesus as the Christ.

Second, the Old Testament prophetic revelation informs New Testament revelation through a threefold process of prophetic struggle, in this case the process of reception, rejection and transformation.\footnote{Ibid., 143. Referred to above as 'the prophetic struggle'.} Here and in other places (see ST II, 89-90), Tillich shows the influence of Schelling's view of the history of religion, as displayed in the 1910 Dissertation. This analyzes Christianity as emerging from a complex historical and cultural context that included late Judaism, Oriental eschatology, and Greek mystery religions.\footnote{Unlike the Aryan Christians discussed in Chapter 2 of this dissertation, Tillich does not take the concepts from this milieu and move in an anti-Jewish or anti-Semitic direction.} Specifically, Tillich says that the early church extracted criteria from Second Isaiah and applied them to Jesus of Nazareth, as the Christ. There are two personal figures in Second Isaiah, chapters 40 through
55. One is the ‘Servant of the Lord’, who brings justice to the nations, as in 42:1-4.\textsuperscript{50} The other is the ‘Suffering Servant’, who ‘was wounded for our transgressions’,\textsuperscript{51} found in Isaiah 53:3-5. According to Tillich, both the establishment of justice by the Servant of the Lord, and the redemptive power of suffering by the Suffering Servant, were both attributed to Jesus of Nazareth, as ‘the Christ’.

When the early church accepted Jesus as the Christ, it was guided by criteria such as those given by Second Isaiah. Without a group of people who were indoctrinated by the paradoxes of Jewish prophetism, the paradox of the Cross could not have been understood and accepted. It is, therefore, not surprising that those who separated the New from the Old Testament – from early gnosticism to recent nazism – lost the christological paradox, the center of the New Testament … they denounced the religion of the Old Testament as one of the lower forms of paganism … But this is a complete misunderstanding.\textsuperscript{52}

Third, the Suffering Servant is one aspect of the ‘paradox of Jewish prophetism’ referred to above, which serves as a unique preparation for the later paradox of the Cross. Tillich acknowledges that the Old Testament is full of Jewish nationalism, which is one reason it was denounced by the Nazis. However, he argues that the election of Israel by God is not an expression of national arrogance,

\textsuperscript{50} Is. 42:1–4 NRSV.
\textsuperscript{51} Is. 53:3 NRSV
\textsuperscript{52} ST I, 142.
because election carries with it the permanent threat of destruction. For Tillich, in a paradoxical way, the threat of destruction is what prevents any nation, ethnic group or individual from becoming ultimate or idolatrous and preserves the covenant of election. This understanding of election and Exile is similar to what Tillich says in *The Socialist Decision* and in the *Judenfrage* lectures. In the following passage, we can see how Tillich ties the paradox of Old Testament prophetism to the paradox of the Cross, as referred to above:

> Election and destruction are bound together so that no finite being, group, or individual may consider himself as more than a medium of the mystery of being. If, however, a group or single individuals endure this tension, their destruction is their fulfillment. This is the meaning of the prophetic promise which transcends the prophetic threat.

This is what Tillich means by the paradox of Old Testament prophetism serving as concrete preparation for Jesus as the Christ. For Tillich, the suffering servant as applied to Jesus as the Christ is the most radical *transformation* of the Messiah symbol.

Fourth, it is the final revelation in Jesus as the Christ that confirms the authenticity of the Old Testament prophetic revelation, selecting it from other forms.

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53 Ibid., 142–143.
55 *Judenfrage* lectures, 465, 467–468.
56 ST I, 143.
57 ST II, 111.
of universal, yet non-concrete forms of prophetic revelation.\textsuperscript{58} This would explain what Tillich means when he says that it is 'impossible and absurd to interpret the Old Testament not as the concrete and unique preparation of the final revelation but as a document of the final revelation itself, as a kind of anticipated New Testament'.\textsuperscript{59} For Tillich, the absurdity would be to conclude that the Suffering Servant figure as portrayed in Isaiah 53 is to be identified with Jesus of Nazareth, in the sense of 'Jesus is what Isaiah 53 is really referring to'. Yet, it is the balance of absolute concreteness and absolute universality in the Logos made flesh in Jesus as the Christ that provides the criteria for selecting which religions provide an essential basis for the final revelation. Also, it is this balance of absolute concreteness and absolute universality that represents the logical culmination of the rational quest of the religious consciousness.

6.1.2 Volume II: The Life and Death Struggle to Save the Old Testament

The inextricable relationship between the Old and New Testaments is also reflected in Tillich’s Christology, particularly in volume II, III.1.E.4. ‘The Symbol of ‘Christ’, Its Historical and Transhistorical Meaning’. In this analysis, Tillich again engages in a historical and theological analysis of religious symbols. Tillich’s view of how historical, religious symbols are appropriated and transformed is similar to his views in Volume I, as discussed above. This is similar to Tillich’s understanding of the history of revelation, since there is a dialectic of progression from Judaism to

\textsuperscript{58} STI, 143.

\textsuperscript{59} Ibid.
Christianity, with Judaism exercising a profound influence on Christianity. In this section, there is another example of how the history of religion exhibits rationality. Specifically, this will be found in the optimal balance between, or mutual affirmation of, the ‘historical type’ and ‘transhistorical type’ of the expectation of the New Being. For Tillich, the New Being is that reality in which the self-estrangement of our existence is overcome, what Paul calls the ‘new creation’, which is found in ‘Jesus the Christ’.  

For Tillich, the symbol Messiah, which refers to a king who conquers enemies and ushers in peace and justice, has an origin that transcends both Judaism and Christianity: ‘When Christianity used this symbol for what it believed to be the central event in history, it accepted – as the religion of the Old Testament had done before – a large amount of symbolic material from the social organization of the Semitic and Egyptian world, especially from the political institution of kingship’.  

This suggests the initial form of universality, meaning the symbols can be found ‘always and everywhere’, although in different historical forms. The next phase of the development of the symbol Messiah occurs with the addition of mythological attributes that characterize a cosmic redeemer who transforms historical existence. Here the second sense of universality emerges. This transition from a primarily political figure of a conquering king, within a culturally and historically specific setting, to that of a cosmic redeemer has cross-cultural origins, and therefore universality, in both senses of ‘always and everywhere’, and ‘cosmic’. In addition, despite the

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60 Ibid., 49.
61 ST II, 88.
62 ST II, 88.
accretion of mythological traits attributed to a cosmic redeemer, these messiah figures are still rooted in history in so far as they serve particular peoples, giving meaning to their origins, predicaments and destinies. Despite the shared methodological assumption with the Aryan Christians, Tillich comes to opposite conclusions concerning Judaism and its relation to Christianity.

For Tillich, the ‘strictly historical’ dimension of the Messiah symbol possessed three benefits. First, it could be applied to groups, ethnicities, and social classes, such as the proletariat, and nations, such as the remnant of Israel.\(^63\) Second, the symbol Messiah could be combined with other redeemer or cosmic figures, such as the ‘Servant of Jahweh’, the ‘Son of Man’, or the ‘Man from Above’.\(^64\) Third, and for Tillich the most important, was that the ‘historical type of the expectation of the New Being’ could encompass the ‘non-historical type (of the expectation of the New Being)’\(^65\). Tillich’s assumption here is that any non-historical religion is intrinsically unable to manifest the features, and corresponding benefits, of a historical religion, as ‘the non-historical is unable to embrace the historical type’.\(^66\)

For Tillich, the quest for the New Being is universal, appearing in all religions although in different historical forms, because the ambiguous conquest of the human

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\(^63\) Ibid., 88–89.
\(^64\) Ibid., 89.
\(^65\) Ibid.
\(^66\) ‘Christianity must show—and has always tried to show—that the historical type of the expectation of the New Being embraces itself and the non-historical type, while the non-historical is unable to embrace the historical’ (ibid.).
predicament is also universal, appearing always and everywhere.\textsuperscript{67} For Tillich, there are cultural variations to the quest for the New Being. Yet, there are two main types of ‘quest for the New Being’ that exist in polar relation, partly in conflict and partly in unity, the historical and non-historical.\textsuperscript{68} No religion is ‘purely’ historical or non-historical, but they can be ‘predominantly’ historical or non-historical. In predominantly \textit{non-historical religions}, the New Being is expected in a vertical direction,\textsuperscript{69} as they are unable to create anything ‘new’, exhibiting a circular view of history. For Tillich, most polytheistic religions, ‘Brahmanism’, Buddhism and antimystical classical Greek humanism are predominantly non-historical.\textsuperscript{70} This is clearly similar to Schelling’s view of the history of religion as found in the 1910 Dissertation, and also the ‘myth of origin’, political romanticism and polytheism as discussed in \textit{The Socialist Decision}. Predominantly non-historical religions are able to illuminate or enlighten individuals, but they are unable to transform groups, communities, and entire societies: ‘A group, whether a family or mankind as a whole, does not participate in the effects of the New Being. The misery of mankind in history is not to be changed, but individuals may transcend the whole sphere of existence ... This is the root of the difference in the East and West in the feeling for life.’\textsuperscript{71}

For Tillich, predominantly \textit{historical religions} are Zoroastrianism, Judaism, Christianity, Islam and some forms of modern humanism, the latter in secularized

\textsuperscript{67} Ibid., 86.
\textsuperscript{68} Ibid., 86–87.
\textsuperscript{69} This is the opposite of what Tillich says about a predominantly historical religion, as stated below.
\textsuperscript{70} Ibid., 87.
\textsuperscript{71} Ibid.
form. In contrast to predominantly non-historical religions, predominantly historical religions, ‘expect the New Being’ in a horizontal direction, meaning that salvation can be attained in the realm of history. This also means that the ‘whole of reality’, including nature and the physical world, is deemed ‘good’, and worthy of redemption. The transformation of all reality occurs through a historical process in a unique, unrepeatable and irreversible process, mediated through groups, such as families, nations or the church. According to Tillich, the ‘decisive event’ for Christianity, the appearance of Jesus as the Christ who is the bearer of the New Being, occurs at the center of history, giving history a ‘center’. This is an important assumption for the next step in his use of the history of religion.

Tillich observes that Christianity employed the conceptual tools provided by late, post-exilic, Judaism in order to be universally valid, uniting the ‘horizontal’ (historical) and ‘vertical’ (transhistorical) expectations of the New Being. The Messiah was attributed cosmic significance, the law was declared to have eternal validity, and divine Wisdom, a divine being equal with God, was determined to be the one who both creates and brings creation to its consummation. As the ‘the eschatological consciousness’ (the horizontal/historical dimension) began to fade with the delay of the Parousia, Paul’s Christ mysticism enabled the transhistorical

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72 Ibid.
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid., 89.
type to enter Christianity. At the same time, Gnosticism, which negated the Old Testament, entered the picture, threatening the historical element:

Under these circumstances it is not astonishing that the horizontal line, derived from the Old Testament, was in danger of annihilation by the vertical line, derived from Hellenism ... In this situation Christianity was forced into a life-and-death struggle to preserve the Old Testament within the church, the historical type of the expectation of the New Being. The church made this decision and saved the historical character of Christianity.

For Tillich, therefore, the historical type of the expectation of the New Being and the transhistorical type of the expectation of the New Being both need to be affirmed, without sacrificing one for the other. For Tillich, this mutual affirmation is the result of a rational, historical dialectic. Tillich concludes that the church must defend the historical basis for Christianity in all periods, without sacrificing its universality.

6.1.3 Volume III: History and the Kingdom of God. The Movement from Immaturity to Maturity through the Purification of the Religious Consciousness

In section V.II.A.2. of volume III, ‘The Central Manifestation of the Kingdom of God in

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78 ST II, 89–90. Tillich also refers to the 'life or death struggle' numerous times in his writings. For example, in *BRSUR* the Church's 'life or death struggle' against the Gnostics maintains 'the Old Testament as its own presupposition' (35).
80 ST II, 90.
History', the prophetic witness of the Old Testament once again underscores its foundational relationship to the New Testament. Tillich observes that there is a clear distinction between the Jewish and Christian interpretations of history, since Judaism remains in a mode of continual prophetic and apocalyptic expectation (the 'Ought'), while Christianity has experienced a degree of 'inner-historical' fulfillment (the 'Is').

Whereas the center of history for Judaism is the Exodus, the center of history for Christianity is the appearance of Jesus as the Christ. This movement to the center of history is a complex process, one that assumes an organic relationship between the Old and the New Testaments.

For Tillich, the concept of 'the center of history' is a metaphor for that moment in history 'before which everything is preparation', and 'after which everything is reception'. It is both the criterion and source of the saving power of history, and is therefore a fundamental component of Tillich's doctrine of revelation. It is not a chronological center, and there is no progress beyond the center. History does not move in an equal rhythm but is a dynamic force with its ups and downs. There is a progressive dimension to the movement of history, but it is not inevitable. Using a metaphor reminiscent of that used by Clement of Alexandria, for Tillich the only

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81 ST III, 368.
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid., 368–369.
84 Ibid., 364.
85 Ibid., 365.
86 Ibid., 371.
87 J. N. D. Kelly, *Early Christian Doctrine*, rev. edn (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1978), 179. For Clement, Adam as a historical individual and as representative of all humanity was born into an
progressive dimension of history is the movement from immaturity to maturity, which involves the purification of the religious consciousness.\textsuperscript{88} The immature stage belongs to the universal history of religion, prior to its transformation by prophetic criticism.\textsuperscript{89}

This maturing process is working in all history, but a particular development was necessary in order to prepare for Him in whom the final revelation would occur. This is the function of the development of which the Old Testament is the document. The Old Testament manifestations of the Kingdom of God produced the direct preconditions for its final manifestations in the Christ \ldots And every missionary activity, inside and outside Christian culture, must follow the Old Testament's purification of the religious consciousness. Without the Old Testament, Christianity relapses into the immaturities of the universal history of religion – including the history of the Jewish religion (which was the main object of criticism and purification by the Old Testament prophets).\textsuperscript{90}

Three additional observations can be made about this passage. First, as with the prior passages on revelation and Christology, the Old Testament plays an essential, preparatory role. Second, the process of maturing is best exemplified by the prophetic critique and transformation of religion. For Tillich, similar transformations could occur within other religions in other cultures that participate in

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{88} ST III, 365.}
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{89} Ibid.}
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{90} Ibid}
the New Being, both before and after the Christ event, referred to as the 'transtemporal presence of the Christ in every period'. This process of critique and transformation is an outworking of the rational, historical dialectic. Third, there is also a distinction between 'the Jewish religion' and the Old Testament prophetic consciousness. For Tillich, the purely historical expression of Judaism, with instances of legalism and nationalism, must be challenged and purified by the prophetic dimension. Tillich has consistently maintained a distinction between 'empirical Judaism', and 'Jewish prophethood', the latter being the precursor to the Protestant principle.

6.2 Structural Similarities within the Occasional Lectures

Thus far, six works have been analyzed, the 1910 Dissertation, the 1912 Dissertation, *The Religious Situation*, *The Socialist Decision*, the *Judenfrage* lectures, and the *Systematic Theology*. Four out of the six works, the two Schelling dissertations, *The Religious Situation*, and *The Socialist Decision*, have short but distinct sections dedicated to the meaning of Judaism. Five out of the six works, the latter four plus the *Systematic Theology*, have a dialectical structure. The sixth work analyzed, the *Judenfrage* lectures, does not have a dialectical structure, but discusses in considerable detail the roots of anti-Semitism and anti-Judaism within Christian history and thought, and relates directly to our two theses, as discussed above. In terms of length, all six works are comparable to a short book or longer.

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91 Ibid., 390, cited by Thomas in *Tillich*, 170.
However, these are not the only written works on Tillich’s view of Judaism and its relation to Christianity, or the topics of anti-Semitism and anti-Judaism. For example, in Chapter 4 it was noted that two lectures written in the early 1940s provided the background for the Judenfrage lectures, ‘Catholicism and Anti-Judaism’ and ‘Protestantism and Anti-Semitism’. During the post World War II period of the 1940s and 1950s, Tillich wrote or drafted several more lectures on these topics. While he never wrote a systematic analysis of Judaism, its relationship to Christianity, anti-Semitism and anti-Judaism (other than the Judenfrage lectures), he committed enough to print to enable an analysis and summary of his views on these topics. It is outside the scope of this dissertation to analyze each of these pieces, but eight lectures emerge as directly related to this dissertation: (i) ‘The Religious Relation Between Christianity and Judaism in the

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92 Tillich, Harvard Archives, bMS 649/62(6).
93 Tillich, Harvard Archives, bMS 649/62(7).
Future',\textsuperscript{95} (ii) 'Is There a Judeo-Christian Religion?', from 1947,\textsuperscript{96} (iii) 'The Relevance of Judaism and Christianity in the Face of the Secular Systems of Life';\textsuperscript{97} (iv) 'The Concept of Faith in the Jewish-Christian Tradition';\textsuperscript{98} (v) 'Jewish Influences on Contemporary Christian Theology',\textsuperscript{99} (vi) 'The Search for Truth and Unity in the Judaic-Christian Tradition';\textsuperscript{100} (vii) the four-part 1961 Bampton lectures at Columbia University, 'Christianity and the Encounter of World Religions', and (viii) the final lecture Tillich gave ten days before he died in October of 1965, 'The Significance of the History of religion for the Systematic Theologian'.\textsuperscript{101} These will be discussed in the order just presented, highlighting themes common to the prior works analyzed. Each lecture presents one or more structural similarities between Judaism and Christianity, underscoring the inseparability of the two from one another. These structural similarities solidify the continuity between Judaism and Christianity, which has already been established by the historical dialectic of progression, and the

\textsuperscript{95} Handwritten and typescript; undated. Tillich, Harvard Archive, bMS 649/62(8) – Tillich, 'Future'.
\textsuperscript{96} Handwritten and typescript. Presented at the Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 10 December 1947; Tillich, Harvard Archive, bMS 649/81(5) – Tillich, 'Judeo-Christian'.
\textsuperscript{97} Handwritten and undated. Tillich, Harvard Archive, bMS 649/45(3) – Tillich, 'Relevance'.
\textsuperscript{98} Handwritten and undated. Tillich, Harvard Archive, bMS 649/46(3) – Tillich, 'Faith'.
\textsuperscript{99} Transcript of a lecture given as one of the Milton Steinberg Lectures in Jewish Theology at the Park Avenue Synagogue in New York City, published in Cross Currents 2/3 (1952): 35–42 – Tillich, 'Jewish Influences'.
\textsuperscript{100} Handwritten lecture delivered at Cooper Union University, New York, February 15, 1955. Tillich, Harvard Archive, bMS 649/45(3) – Tillich, 'Search'.
\textsuperscript{101} The Fortress Press edition of Tillich, Encounter has added an appendix to the Bampton lectures, with Tillich's final public lecture, 'The Significance of the History of religion for the Systematic Theologian'. Editor Stendahl notes that this lecture was recorded on tape, was delivered from ten pages of carefully outlined notes, and was transcribed and edited by Jerald C. Brauer in its final form. The Brauer edition, which was reprinted in the Fortress volume, first appeared in Brauer's The Future of Religions (New York: Harper & Row, 1966.). This will be noted as Tillich, 'Significance'.

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ontological dialectic of balance. In addition, lectures five, seven and eight underscore the theological importance of the history of religion for Tillich, and the essential role of Jewish prophethood within this framework.

6.2.1 Lectures 1 through 6

'Future' is a typed, undated set of lecture notes, with no indication of the intended audience or occasion for its delivery. There is no mention of the Holocaust or the founding of the State of Israel; Tillich only says that 'The Jews were called a nation and still are often called so'. Based upon this, it is probable that 'Future' is early, pre-World War II, unlike the other six lectures discussed here, although the dating of 'Future' is not ultimately relevant for this argument. Tillich's conclusion is that Christianity and Judaism will ultimately be reconciled in the eschaton, 'above history', in a meeting of the Church and Synagogue.

Tillich's argument seeks to show how Judaism and Christianity can achieve rapprochement, but he understands that the full realization of this can only be an eschatological event, which will be described at the end of this summary. In order to arrive at such a conclusion, Tillich's argument proceeds in four steps, with three and four to be treated in greater detail than one and two. The first step is Tillich's method,

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102 Tillich, 'Future', 1.
103 Oddly, Tillich uses the term 'approachement', which I have taken the liberty of rendering 'rapprochement', because the former is not an English word. This may be one of Tillich's 'Germanisms', which were more prevalent in his early years in America, while he was still learning English. This also suggests an early dating. However, as late as the 1950s, twenty years after Tillich arrived in America, Niebuhr was still helping Tillich convey his complex thoughts in English.
which is difficult to understand, except that it involves understanding the
‘predetermined structure’ of the phenomena being analyzed, in this case Judaism
and Christianity, for which there is ‘an overwhelming amount of predetermining
facts’. At a minimum, Tillich means that both religions have long histories, and
deep social, religious and intellectual dimensions, that cannot be changed, and are
distinctive to each religion. These structures provide the basis for analyzing each
religion, to determine whether one can be reconciled to the other.

Tillich’s second step in the process of rapprochement involves ruling out what
would be impossible to expect or achieve. For Tillich, it would be impossible to
‘merge’ traditional Judaism into ecclesiastical Christianity because Christianity must
possess ‘the Jewish spirit’ (the prophetic spirit, reminiscent of The Socialist
Decision), and this Jewish spirit can only be maintained if there are real, believing
Jews as examples. Tillich further argues that second-generation Jewish Christians
lose the special prophetic quality and if they try to regain it, inhabit ‘a dying sect’.

105 ‘2. The element of future is decisive. Future is determined by the past, by the ‘Gewesene’ which
makes the ‘Wesen’ the nature of an historical group. But future also has its chances. And those make
the future who grasp the chances, the small gaps between the predetermined structure of an
historical period. 3. We are set here to look out for such gaps into which we may penetrate to
transform the predetermined structure. But this is only possible if we know and acknowledge the
overwhelming amount of predetermining facts. 4. Following this method I first want to say what is
impossible and should not be attempted and where the gaps lie’ (ibid.).
106 ‘3. It has been said that Christianity has lost a good deal when in the early Church the Jewish-
Christians ceased to exist. I would agree with this, because of the irreplaceable function of the Jewish
spirit. But, obviously, this spirit can be effective only if it comes from Jews whose existence as Jews
must be presupposed’ (ibid., 2).
107 Ibid.
The latter observation is an odd one. If Tillich means that Christianity is incapable of incorporating a prophetic dimension, he goes on to say just the opposite in his next point. In any case, Tillich’s vision of rapprochement accepts ongoing institutional continuity for both religions.

The third and fourth steps involve how each religion can contribute to the rapprochement, in its most distinctive way, Judaism through its ‘prophetic vocation’ and Christianity through ‘mysticism’. These two moves most clearly interrelate to what Tillich says about Judaism and Christianity in other parts of this dissertation. With respect to Judaism, Tillich clearly acknowledges that it has always had a mystical element, which was suppressed by orthodox legalism, and that Christianity has always had a prophetic tradition, but this had been suppressed by priestly sacramentalism. For Tillich, the prophetic vocation of Judaism is ‘To represent the holy which ought to be against the holy which is’, without entirely eliminating ‘that which is’. Tillich’s understanding of the prophetic is very similar to what was found in The Socialist Decision and the Judenfrage lectures: it is ‘absolute command’, related to time, dynamic, directed (not circular), anti-hierarchical and continually suspicious of established religion. In addition, Tillich employs the horizontal/vertical polarity that he also used in the Systematic Theology. For Tillich, Judaism always emphasizes the horizontal aspect of expectation of the

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110 Ibid.
111 Ibid.
coming Kingdom of God, the ‘not yet’, while Christianity always emphasizes the
‘transcendent ‘already”, the vertical dimension of faith in which fulfillment has
occurred.\textsuperscript{113} Next Tillich completes the third step, how Judaism must express its
prophetic vocation. For Tillich, Christianity must resist the temptation of ‘deification’,
or merging the divine into the human, and this can be achieved by retaining the Old
Testament and observing the prophetic witness of living Jews.\textsuperscript{114} He quotes a
passage from Franz Rosenzweig’s \textit{Star of Redemption}:\textsuperscript{115}

‘Therefore it is consistent from the Christian point of view if Paul asserts the
existence of Jews right up until the end – up to the moment in which the
plenty of the nations has entered the Church and the son has returned his
reign to the father – If the Christian had not the Jew in his back, he would
wherever he is, get lost.’ To this I fully agree.\textsuperscript{116}

The fourth step providing the basis for rapprochement involves the Christian
contribution of a specific form of Christ-mysticism to the process, which Tillich does
not describe other than to affirm that ‘Christian theology has elevated Jesus as the

\textsuperscript{113} Tillich, ‘Future’, 4.
\textsuperscript{114} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{115} There is very little that has been written about Rosenzweig’s influence on Tillich, and it would be a
valuable area of enquiry. I have tried, unsuccessfully, to obtain a copy of a paper written by Ann Marie
Reijnen, which was delivered at the American Academy of Religion in November of 2011, titled, ‘Das
Neue Denken in Franz Rosenzweig and Paul Tillich. The “Star of Redemption” as a Jewish–Christian
Theology of Correlation’.
\textsuperscript{116} Tillich, ‘Future’, 4.
Christ into the Divine transcendence'.\textsuperscript{117} What Tillich wants to underscore here is that Christianity drew upon elements of Hellenistic Judaism, particularly the mystical dimension that posit two elements in God. One element in God manifests the attributes of being knowable, good, just, wise and merciful – this is the God of the Bible.\textsuperscript{118} For Tillich, the other element is the ‘hidden God’, who ‘remains eternally unknowable in the depth of his own self’.\textsuperscript{119} Tillich observes that this aspect of God comes from Jewish Kabbalistic mysticism, which influenced Jakob Boehme, the heterodox Lutheran mystic, Martin Buber, and the ‘philosophy of life’, all of which had an influence on Tillich.\textsuperscript{120} Tillich observes that this resurgence in interest in mysticism and the philosophy of life stemmed from both a Jewish and Christian ‘antinaturalistic mystical rebirth of religion’ during the first quarter of the twentieth century.\textsuperscript{121}

Tillich concludes with his vision of rapprochement, which does not require the dissolution of the distinctive, institutional manifestations of either religion. Specifically, Church and Synagogue are not to be eliminated, but the two religions must meet at both points, the prophetic and the mystical, ‘above’ their respective historical expressions. This is the ‘eschatological event’ in Tillich’s mind:

\textsuperscript{117} Ibid. If we look to what Tillich says in the \textit{Systematic Theology}, this refers to the vertical, transhistorical dimension of the Christian Logos, relating to what has already been fulfilled. See above II.2, ‘The Old Testament and Christology’. \textit{ST II}, 89.
\textsuperscript{118} Tillich, ‘Future’, 4.
\textsuperscript{120} Tillich, ‘Future’, 4–5.
\textsuperscript{121} Ibid., 5.
Prophetism and mystical transcendence ... not destruction of Synagogue or Church. But meeting at the two points above them not below them. Whether the unity of these two points sometimes will be a new reality itself is a matter of eschatological expectation. I myself believe that it presupposes the really eschatological situation in which there is no more temple but God himself dwells amongst them.\(^{122}\)

In addition to once again demonstrating the inseparability of Judaism from Christianity, the 'meeting point above the historical differences in the *eschaton*', (my paraphrase) points to 'something new', in the future, but that new thing draws upon essential elements of the two traditions. For my purposes, it is clear that Judaism is not eradicated but contributes its prophetic spirit that is an integral part of the new eschatological fellowship of those who participate in the New Being.

*Lecture 2: Mutual Tribute and the Legitimacy of the Hyphen*

Tillich opens his lecture 'Judeo-Christian' by observing that Christians in every age ask whether 'the hyphen' in Judeo-Christian is justified, suggesting that there is significant continuity between the two religions.\(^{123}\) Tillich begins his analysis by asking four questions, which seek to determine the degree of 'structural continuity' between Judaism and Christianity, with my emphasis in italics: (i) Is there a *unique series* of events which is considered *revelatory* by both Jews and Christians?; (ii) Is adherence to this common revelation *still visible* in both groups, in spite of the fact

\(^{122}\) Ibid.

\(^{123}\) Tillich, 'Judeo-Christian', 1.
that a special event\textsuperscript{124} has produced contradictory interpretations concerning the event itself, and implicitly of all events leading to it?\textsuperscript{125} (iii) Are the common elements in both groups so strong that when compared to other religions, Judaism and Christianity seem to ‘belong to each other’? and (iv) Is it meaningful to say that Christianity is a Jewish or that Judaism is a Christian heresy?\textsuperscript{126} Tillich answers ‘yes’ to each of these questions, but he does not develop his answers in detail. He appears content to let these questions provide a context for his argument. He initially focuses on the three common elements of each faith, then notes their irreconcilable differences. He concludes by presuming that the historically divisive issues would not strike non-western adherents as significant.

The remainder of the lecture has two parts. The first part identifies three ways in which Christianity has maintained continuity with Judaism: (i) exclusive monotheism; (ii) the one, ‘jealous’ God of justice; and (iii) the interpretation of history as a linear, irreversible historical process that maintains a tension between the ‘inner-historical element’, characteristic of Judaism, and the ‘transhistorical element’, characteristic of Christianity. The second part of the lecture acknowledges how each tradition diverged, and how they each understand themselves to be irreconcilable to

\textsuperscript{124} The event of the appearance and reception of Jesus as the Christ, the final revelation for Christianity.

\textsuperscript{125} This is a fascinating observation that Tillich unfortunately does not develop. Does he mean that Christians and Jews have different theological interpretations of the creation account in Genesis? Tillich explicitly says ‘contradictory’. If so, it is not obvious why. While the giving of the Law to Moses and the Exodus can have different meanings each tradition, they also have a common element. As for the Prophets, it is difficult to see how they could have radically different meaning for Judaism and Christianity, unless the role of Israel is a purely earthly, ‘landed’ one.

\textsuperscript{126} Tillich, ‘Judeo-Christian’, 1–2.
the other. Tillich argues that Judaism and Christianity have an identical structure, and identical content in most points, except in two areas that keep them apart. He concludes, however, that to an outward observer, especially from the vantage point of a non-theistic, non-western religion, the idea of a Judeo-Christian tradition could be readily affirmed.

The first common element is exclusive monotheism, which is distinctive because it simultaneously affirms the historical concreteness and the absoluteness of God.\textsuperscript{127} For Jews, this God was revealed to Moses, and for Christians, to Jesus. The second common element is the jealous God of justice.\textsuperscript{128} For Tillich, God’s jealousy is a function of monotheism, as it is a guard against idolatry. However, what keeps this jealous God from being arbitrary or capricious is the demand of justice, which is universal in the sense that even elected Israel is subject to it. Similar to the elected status of Israel discussed above, from \textit{ST I}, 142–143, which prefigured the paradox of the Cross, the potential for an elect nation or ethnicity to become tribal is negated by the threat of destruction, in Israel’s case if it violates the Mosaic law. This association of justice, election and destruction is an important notion for Tillich. It was first seen in \textit{The Socialist Decision}, then also appeared in the \textit{Judenfrage} lectures, and also appeared in the \textit{Systematic Theology}.\textsuperscript{129} It is also the foundation for Tillich’s understanding of the Cross. In addition, for Tillich, justice is not mere

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{127} Ibid., 2–3.
\item \textsuperscript{128} In \textit{ST I}, 227, Tillich includes the idea of the jealous God of justice within the concept of exclusive monotheism.
\item \textsuperscript{129} Tillich, \textit{Socialist Decision}, 20; \textit{Judenfrage} lectures, 467–468; \textit{ST I}, 142–143, 227.
\end{enumerate}
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legality, but *tsedeqah*,\(^{130}\) which expresses the whole being of God and humanity, in
interrelationship.\(^{131}\) It is wholistic and is also unconditional in character. Tillich
observes that this raises a theological problem common to both Judaism and
Christianity, that of the relation between the divine gifts and promises to human
activity.\(^{132}\)

The third common element is the view of history. For Judaism and
Christianity, this is a unique, irreversible process, which has an 'end' in two senses,
that of goal (*telos*) and finish.\(^{133}\) The common view of history also maintains two
fundamental themes of eschatology, ultimate judgment and ultimate fulfillment,
leading Tillich to quip that the hyphen is undoubtedly justified.\(^{134}\) Tillich also observes
that history for both religions has a beginning, the 'suprahistorical' event of creation
and fall, and a 'center'. For Tillich, the center of history gives meaning to the
beginning and to the end, and must be borne by a historical representative, which
could be a nation (Israel), group, or individual (Jesus).\(^{135}\) These factors provide the

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\(^{130}\) The transcription of the lecture refers to 'Zedeqnah', which is not a Hebrew word, related to justice.
I chose to insert the transliteration *tsedeqah* because it closely matches Tillich's holistic view of
justice. *Young's Analytical Concordance to the Bible* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1983), 559
provides numerous citations, including Gen. 18:19; Deut. 33:21; Is. 9:7, 56:1, 59:9, 59:14 and Ez.
45:9.

\(^{131}\) 'Justice, *tsedeqah*, is not legality, but is the whole of righteous being and acting of God and
towards God, and towards God as well as towards men. Christian theology never obscured the
unconditional demand of righteousness in the relation between God and man' (Tillich, *Judeo-
Christian*, 4).

\(^{132}\) Ibid.

\(^{133}\) Ibid., 4.

\(^{134}\) Ibid.

\(^{135}\) Ibid.
basis for history as the ‘history of salvation’, whether salvation is achieved in an earthly future, as in Jewish prophetism and the Protestant social gospel, or ‘beyond time’, as in Jewish apocalypticism and conservative Christianity. According to Tillich, both religions experience a persistent tension between the ‘inner-historical’ (horizontal) and ‘transhistorical’ (vertical) elements.

The aforementioned three structural similarities between Judaism and Christianity do not introduce new material into the discussion, but Tillich’s attempt to resolve the divergence of the two traditions is ingenious. Tillich’s first clever move is to observe that both religions, in light of their irreconcilable differences, nevertheless pay each other ‘mutual tribute’. Tillich assumes that the single, most important, non-negotiable difference between the two religions is that Jews do not accept the core belief for Christians that Jesus is the Messiah, and therefore that the Messiah has come. As a result, Jews believe that the Mosaic Law remains valid until the Messiah comes, while Christians believe that Jesus fulfilled the Law. Jews do not

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136 Ibid., 5.
137 Ibid. Tillich uses the terms ‘horizontal’ and ‘vertical’ in his discussion of Christology, where he argues that Christianity used tools taken from late, post-exilic Judaism, to unite the horizontal and vertical expectations of the New Being. ST II, 89.
138 For Tillich, who presumes that Jews believe in a Messiah that will appear as some kind of individual, Jews therefore are still waiting for the Messiah, and will be in a continuous state of ‘expectation’ until he comes. The mode of expectation is like the notion of ‘decision’, which was first seen in any detail in Tillich’s The Socialist Decision, as that work has an eschatological dimension.
139 Christianity asserts that Jesus of Nazareth is the expected Christ, Judaism rejects this claim and expects the Messiah in an indefinite future at the end of history. Judaism, on the other hand, claims that the torah [sic], the teaching of God, as given through Moses, is valid through all history, a claim which is rejected by Christianity in the doctrine that Christ is the end of the law (Tillich, ‘Judeo-Christian’, 6).
believe that the Messiah has come because the world has not fundamentally changed, that the ‘new eon’ has not arrived.\textsuperscript{140} For Tillich, this caused the church to posit a second coming of the Messiah, when all things would be made right. This move is what Tillich refers to as Christians ‘paying tribute’ to the Jews by taking seriously their concern: ‘The early Christians took this so seriously that they answered with the doctrine of the second coming of Christ. The end delays, the world is not changed, the Christians are living between the times: the Christ has come; but he must come again.’\textsuperscript{141}

While the first tribute makes sense, Tillich stretches the historical facts to say the Jews paid tribute to the Christians, in a ‘counter-tribute’, although it is clever rhetorical device. He means that the Mosaic Law has aspects of the Christian Logos: (i) that it was ‘a gift before it was a command’, and (ii) that it was eternal, pre-existent and post existent.\textsuperscript{142} Tillich knows that the Jews assigned those qualities to the Law well before there were any Christians, well before the appearance of Jesus. The implied empirical claim, ‘the Jews assigned eternal and universal qualities to the Mosaic Law as a response to Christians’, is demonstrably false. However, it serves the rhetorical purpose of reminding us of the similarities between the Christian Logos and the Mosaic Law: both are believed by their respective faith-adherents to be pre-existent and eternal.

\textsuperscript{140} For Tillich, this is an argument that first century Christians paid attention to and more Christians should pay attention to now (ibid.).
\textsuperscript{141} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{142} Ibid.
Tillich acknowledges that there are two non-negotiable differences between Judaism and Christianity, the permanent validity of the Law, and the nature of the new eon (whether or not ‘the Messiah has come’). Tillich responds that Christianity attempted to transform each. Regarding the ongoing validity of the Law, Tillich observes that there was a shift from the ‘conditioned universalism’ of Judaism to the ‘unconditioned universalism’ of Christianity.\(^{143}\) According to Tillich, the Mosaic Law originally given only to Israel was ‘authoritarian’, and was prophesied by Jeremiah and Joel to be replaced by the Spirit of God to be available to all.\(^{144}\) This reasoning was quite prevalent, even dominant, through much of western Christian history, and it highlights Tillich’s mis-characterization of the Law as a legalistic burden, something he later reconsidered.\(^{145}\) Tillich’s response was not for Christianity to eliminate the Law, but to reappropriate those elements of the law that can be universally applied.\(^{146}\)

Regarding the new eon, Tillich argues that this doctrine was transformed by

\(^{143}\) Ibid., 7.

\(^{144}\) Ibid.

\(^{145}\) By 1952, Tillich modified his understanding of Jewish law, acknowledging that it was a blessing to the Jewish people, and not merely a burden. It is not clear how he arrived at this, except perhaps by repeated criticism by Jews and others who refrained from the Christian caricature of the Jewish law as a legalistic burden. For example, in Lecture 6, to be discussed below, Tillich talks about Jewish law as a divine gift. Tillich, ‘Significance’, 41.

\(^{146}\) ‘... the privilege of those who have first received the law is abolished, and the nationally and historically conditioned elements of it have lost their validity. The [sic] enter the new eon: only communion is needed with the Spiritual power which has brought it, Jesus the Christ and his assembly the Church. But the law is not abolished. Those elements in it which are independent of the Jewish national vocation are restated and actualized in the new eon. This is the first point of a basic transformation of the Jewish tradition’ (Tillich, ‘Judeo-Christian’, 7).
shifting the emphasis from the external, public world to the inner, spiritual world of the Church, and the individual believer. Tillich says that the Cross is a model of transformation. He reasons that by Jesus' earthly, 'external', worldly defeat, he became the means of an 'internal' victory, through a change of heart.\(^{147}\) This can be emulated by any person or any group, although Tillich acknowledges that the possibilities of social transformation are partial and never without elements of defeat.\(^ {148}\) For the Jews, this is impossible to accept because the kingdom of God has not appeared visibly, and this difference cannot be underestimated.\(^ {149}\)

Tillich's second clever move occurs when he steps out of the monotheistic, exclusivist, teleological, Jewish-Christian structure, and presumes that members of other religions would find these differences relatively minor. He concludes, rhetorically:

But if somebody who has been shaped and nourished by the Hindu or the Buddhist or the Confucian or the Greek tradition would hear all I have said and would know much more about it than I could say – would he not be astonished about the identity in structure in all, and the identity in content in most points, and would he not, if he compared all this with his own tradition, answer the question: Is there a Jewish-Christian tradition, with an unhesitating

\(^{147}\) 'If Jesus can be the Christ in spite or more exactly through his defeat, it is not the change of the world which makes the eon new, but the change of heart of those who, though defeated externally, are victorious internally' (ibid.).

\(^{148}\) Ibid., 8.

\(^{149}\) Ibid.
and unambiguous Yes? I think he would.\footnote{150}

This strategy displays, on Tillich's part, an overwhelming ecumenical impulse, by identifying common ground and looking for ways to transcend, not dismiss, real differences.\footnote{151}

\textit{Lecture 3: Creation and Freedom Contrast with Secularism and Non-Western Religions}

This set of lecture notes is undated and only says that it was prepared in response to the request of a committee.\footnote{152} 'Relevance' is also the most difficult to read, and there are more cross-offs by Tillich than usual. Tillich's overall argument is that Judaism and Christianity have in common the concept of 'creatureliness', which has the following features: (i) it indicates limitations and finitude; (ii) it denotes goodness; (iii) it denotes freedom, such that an individual can turn against itself; and (iv) the idea of freedom leads to the ideas of history, meaning and fulfillment.\footnote{153} More so than in other lectures, Tillich underscores these ideas not only to respond to a reductionist or secularist worldview, but also to compete against non-western religions. Tillich makes one point that is relevant for this analysis. Judaism and Christianity have

\footnote{150} Ibid.
\footnote{151} This lecture was later published, in nearly identical form, in \textit{Judaism} 1 (April 1952): 106--109. Tillich's article was responded to by Bernard Heller's 'About the Judeo-Christian Tradition: Some Comments on Paul Tillich's Article', \textit{Judaism} 1 (July 1952): 257--261. Heller incisively describes what Tillich sees as non-essential differences as vital, especially if wider cultural and anthropological perspectives are employed: He says: 'Shadings and nuances, in beliefs as in colors, are no small matter' (261).
\footnote{152} Tillich, 'Relevance', 1.
\footnote{153} Ibid., 5--8.
diverged historically, but they maintain common principles, with the most important being that of the concept of creation.\textsuperscript{154} The doctrine of creation critiques reductionist secularism because it attributes goodness and significance to human life. Creation also critiques a non-western view of humanity and the divine by keeping humanity ontologically distinct.\textsuperscript{155}

Lecture 4: ‘Faith’ as the Triumphant Paradox of Life

Tillich’s ‘The Concept of Faith in the Jewish-Christian Tradition’ is a typed, undated article based on an address given in New York to ‘a theological-psychoanalytic discussion group’, which Tillich says involved a twofold task.\textsuperscript{156} Tillich’s first task is to demonstrate that there are common features to the concept of faith in the Old and New Testaments, specifically the meaning of Prophetism, and classical Christianity, respectively.\textsuperscript{157} The second task is to show that the correct view of biblical faith, as found on both Testaments, has been distorted in Church history, through intellectualism and moralism. Tillich concludes by showing how the Protestant Reformers sought to rehabilitate the biblical view of faith by employing the concept of ‘paradox’, which guards against the intellectualistic and moralistic distortions. For my purposes, both the Old Testament and New Testament manifest faith as paradoxical, exhibiting another way in which Judaism and Christianity possess a structural similarity.

\textsuperscript{154} Ibid., 3–5.
\textsuperscript{155} Ibid., 3, 11.
\textsuperscript{156} Tillich’s ‘Faith’ has a one-paragraph preface that was written by Tillich himself.
\textsuperscript{157} Tillich, ‘Faith’, preface.
Tillich gives four examples of paradoxical faith in the Old Testament. The first example exhibits a unity of numinous awe and confidence, which is the basis for a covenantal relationship. In Exodus 20:19,158 Tillich argues that Moses and the people of God are confronted with God’s holiness and power, and yet are encouraged not to be afraid: ‘But this confidence contradicts all probabilities, all visible events and calculations based on them. It is “paradoxical” in the strict sense of the Greek word: “Against opinion”.159 Second, Tillich cites the call of Abraham in Genesis 15:6, ‘He believed God, and he reckoned it to him as righteousness’, in which Abraham believed that God would make his descendants to be a great nation, although he was old and his wife was barren.160 Third, Tillich quotes a passage from Isaiah (but does not cite it), ‘If ye will not believe surely ye will not be established’, to warn the people to turn away from earthly, transitory power, and to obey eternal, meaningful and creative power.161 Here Tillich introduces the theme of ‘turning around’, which he will return to several times in his analysis of the Old and New Testaments.

Isaiah demands the paradoxical faith in an ultimate meaning of history against all immanent standards of meaning and power. The transcendent order of God’s acting turns around the immanent order of human possibilities. The

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158 ‘... and they said unto Moses: Speak then with us, and we will hear, but let not God speak with us, lest we die. And Moses said unto the people: Fear not! For God is come to prove you and that his fear may go before you that ye sin not’ (ibid., 2). Tillich incorrectly cites this passage as Genesis 20:19. Rather, it comes from Exodus 20:19.
160 Ibid., 3.
161 Ibid.
acceptance of and confidence in this transcendent order is faith. This is the idea of faith in Prophetism and classical Christianity.\textsuperscript{162}

Fourth, Tillich pairs the 'suffering servant' of second Isaiah with Job, adding the notion of 'waiting upon Yahweh' in the hope that he will deliver his people from protracted suffering.\textsuperscript{163} Tillich concludes his assessment of the Old Testament concept of faith by observing that the 'turning around', or transformation of a present reality by God, extends beyond individuals, and nations to the world: 'The faith in the resurrection of the martyrs and then of all righteous is not a rational conclusion from the nature of man but it is the acceptance of the transcendent Divine order which turns around the immanent order of finiteness, death and sin, in history as well as in individual life.'\textsuperscript{164}

For Tillich, paradoxical faith, the faith of 'turning around', is consistently found in the New Testament, in the Gospels, in Paul and in Hebrews. In the synoptic Gospels, Tillich observes that Jesus' first words are taken directly from the prophetic idea of faith: "'The time is fulfilled and the Kingdom of God is at hand. Repent ye and believe in the Gospel.' Repent ye, that is, change your mind, leave the order of finiteness and sin, and receive the transcendent order which has become present in him who is the Kingdom of God. This new order turns everything around.'\textsuperscript{165} According to Tillich, the Greek word for 'faith', \textit{pistis}, is not a theoretical assent, but

\textsuperscript{162} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{163} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{164} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{165} Ibid., 4.
'the acceptance of the paradoxical judgment of God which calls the sinner just while he is still a sinner ... the acceptance of the divine act which contradicts all Jewish and Greek expectations about the nature of God's acting. The Jews expect power and the Greeks wisdom, but God acts through the weakness and foolishness of the Cross.'\textsuperscript{166} For Tillich, Paul adds to the idea of faith as 'turning around' with the notion of 'being convinced': 'Faith is not an emotional act, artificially created by ourselves, and it is not an intellectual act which takes uncertain things for certain but it is an internal readiness which is given and not produced.'\textsuperscript{167} This claim refers back to Tillich's prefatory claim that biblical faith must not lapse into moralistic (a/k/a emotional) or intellectualistic distortions. Tillich concludes his survey of the biblical idea of faith by arguing that Hebrews 11 sums up the different elements of faith: "Now faith is the assurance of things hoped for, a conviction of things not seen." Things not seen, "this is the transcendent order, to be accepted in faithfulness conviction" "things hoped for" this is the paradoxical acting of God in the individual life and in history generally to be accepted in faithfulness.

Lecture 5: The Permanent Importance of Jewish Ethical Monotheism for Protestantism

Unlike some of the handwritten and undated lectures discussed in this section, 'Jewish Influences' possesses a welcome degree of clarity. Tillich delivered this lecture as part of an endowed lecture series at a mid-town New York City synagogue in the early 1950s. The transcript was published in 1952, the same year that he

\textsuperscript{166} Tillich is referring to 1 Cor. 1:18ff.; ibid., 5.
\textsuperscript{167} Ibid.
delivered the *Judenfrage* lectures in Berlin. Tillich’s opening remarks to his Jewish audience display deep respect on his part towards Judaism, referring to his long standing dialogue with Jewish friends: ‘I gladly accepted this invitation because for several decades I have been conducting a never ending conversation with some of my Jewish friends about the relation of their brand of Judaism to my brand of Protestantism’.¹⁶⁸ Two things stand out in this passage. First, the phrase ‘never ending conversation’ suggests a mutuality and interdependence that characterizes Tillich’s understanding of the relationship between Christianity and Judaism.¹⁶⁹ Second, Tillich does not refer to himself as a Christian, but as maintaining a particular form of Christianity, ‘my brand of Protestantism’. In the other lectures discussed in this section, Tillich typically refers to Christianity, and not Protestantism, per se. In the following discussion, it will become evident just why Tillich is this specific. In addition, Tillich says that this conversation, actually this ‘living disputation’, arguably pre-dates the emergence of Christianity, in that it is rooted in the structure of reality: ‘For it [this living disputation] is much older than we are; it is as old as Christianity and in some respects older than that. And it cannot cease before the end of history. It is one of those conflicts which is rooted in human existence itself, in the deepest levels of man’s nature.’¹⁷⁰ The latter passage supports the observation made earlier in the section on dialectic that Tillich’s view of

¹⁶⁸ Tillich, ‘Jewish Significance’, 35.
¹⁶⁹ The Earley Dissertation that was discussed in Chapter 1 uses a passage from Tillich’s ‘My Changing Thoughts on Zionism’ which contains the phrase ‘everlasting conversation’: ‘It is ... an everlasting conversation [between Jews and Christians] which I have experienced and which I recommend ... for this mutual give and take [between Christian and Jew], I believe that as long as there is Christianity the conversation should go on’ (7).
¹⁷⁰ Tillich, ‘Jewish Influences’, 35.
the relationship between Judaism and Christianity has roots in his ontology.

Tillich's lecture is divided into two sections, with the first section devoted to historical considerations, which are more descriptive in nature. In this section, Tillich describes how recent developments in the disciplines of archaeology, biblical (textual) criticism and church history have contributed toward spiritually deeper forms of Judaism and Christianity. This would be in contrast to a variety of distortions from doctrinal intellectualism and legalistic moralism, which applies to both religions, and can both lead to secularization. The second section is devoted to systematic considerations, which are normative in nature, and this analysis will focus on that section.

In section two of 'Jewish Influences', Tillich identifies two themes derived from Judaism that should inform Protestant theology, with the first being Martin Buber's concept of 'I and Thou' as applied to the relationship between God and humanity, and to human relationships.\footnote{Some of these ideas about Buber and his contribution to Protestant Christianity were discussed by Tillich in the article 'An Evaluation of Martin Buber: Protestant and Jewish Thought', Commentary 5/6 (June 1948). See Tillich, Theology of Culture, ed. Kimball, 188–199.} The 'I-Thou' formulation is intended to restore personhood and subjectivity to both participants of the I-Thou relationship, in response to intellectual and empirical reductionism, brought on by theological orthodoxy, in the case of God, and scientific, capitalist economics, in the case of humanity.\footnote{It is a reaction against the tendency of industrial society in which we are living to transform everything into an object, 'It', Buber says. Men become things, living beings become mechanisms ... The I–Thou relation, the person-to-person encounter is lost. God himself becomes a moral ideal or a}
because it liberates religion, in this case Judaism and Protestantism, from the permanent danger of objectifying God.\textsuperscript{173}

The second theme derived from Judaism is the influence of ‘ethical monotheism’, which has two important, related features, universality and justice. Similar to other works cited here, Tillich’s view of Old Testament justice incorporates universality, because of the permanent threat of destruction that is part of God’s covenant with Israel:

The monotheism of the Old Testament is not a monotheism of number, but of quality; it does not say that one God is better than many. Why should it be? But Jewish monotheism says that the God of Israel is the God of the world, because he is the God of justice. This alone makes him universal. The God of ethical monotheism is both the exclusive and the universal God, and he is exclusive because he is universal, because he represents justice even against his own nation.\textsuperscript{174}

Tillich introduces an important element into ethical monotheism that goes beyond his understanding of justice, referred to above, which is consistently

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{173} Ibid., 39. For Tillich, orthodoxy lacks spiritual power, because ‘God is in the bondage of his own self-manifestation’. Alternatively, liberalism lacks ‘cognitive honesty’, because God became ‘more and more the symbolic representation for everything which is good in man’; ‘The existentialist approach is like a breaking of the prophetic Spirit into the arid fields of this kind of a moralistic religion that claimed to be intellectually respectable’ (ibid.).
\item \textsuperscript{174} Ibid., 40.
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portrayed in his writings since the 1930s in *The Socialist Decision*. For Tillich, every living religion maintains two dimensions: (i) a ‘sacramental’ element characterized as ‘giving presence’, the ‘Is’ aspect of the Holy, and (ii) an ‘ethical’ element, characterized by ‘commanding transcendence’, or the ‘Ought’ aspect of the Holy. If one of the two elements is lost, then the religion dies off. However, in a living religion, one element usually ‘prevails’, but does not eliminate the other element.\(^{175}\)

This means that a living religion will be characterized as having more sacramental features, or more ethical features. In Tillich’s view, Judaism is characteristically ethical, because it is still waiting for the Messiah, in a constant mode of expectation: ‘Judaism is the religion of expectation. Although the holy is present, the divine promise is not fulfilled. The Messianic age has not yet appeared, the Messiah is still to come. All sacramental activities have an element of anticipation ...’\(^{176}\)

Christianity, on the other hand, is characteristically sacramental, because the Messiah has already come: ‘In Christianity the decisive event *has* occurred. The Messiah has appeared in an historical person. The holy is present in its abundance. The coming eon has already started. This changes the balance between the sacramental and the ethical.’\(^{177}\) This expresses the ‘Is’ dimension of the Holy. By virtue of its ethical orientation, Judaism remains a permanent critical partner of Christianity:

The permanent problem in all religions is the balance between the

\(^{175}\) Ibid.

\(^{176}\) Ibid., 41.

\(^{177}\) Ibid.
sacramental and the ethical element. And it is obvious that in Judaism the balance falls more on the ethical, in Christianity more on the sacramental side. Therefore Judaism is a permanent ethical corrective of sacramental Christianity. And this is the main significance of Judaism for Protestant theology.\textsuperscript{178}

Tillich entertains the natural question, why does Christianity need Judaism if Christianity has the prophetic message of the Old Testament? Tillich acknowledges that this ought to be sufficient, but in reality self-criticism becomes intertwined with self-justification, and that the critical aspect must be supported externally.\textsuperscript{179} He points to his experience within Germany in the Weimar period, when German Protestantism failed to protect the Jews, and the first real critique of Nazism came from religious socialists. And it was not only the legacy of the Old Testament prophets that led to this, but Tillich underscores the importance of contemporary Judaism in this regard: ‘I cannot imagine that the religious socialist movements in which I myself participated could have developed without a continuous direct and indirect influence of the prophetic and critical spirit in contemporary Judaism.’\textsuperscript{180} Therefore, for Tillich, it is the general awakening of the prophetic spirit in the Protestant churches that is the most important fruit of the contemporary reception of Jewish elements by Protestant theology.\textsuperscript{181}

\textsuperscript{178} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{179} Ibid., 42.
\textsuperscript{180} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{181} Ibid.
Lecture 6: The Independent Criterion within Biblical Literature

This set of lecture notes is handwritten, and is more fragmentary than the other lecture notes, except for 'Relevant'. Chronologically and logically this lecture is partially a response to lecture number four, 'Faith', discussed above. Tillich acknowledges that an unnamed 'excellent Jewish writer' criticized his article 'Faith', by not fully appreciating the divergence of Christianity from Judaism, therefore undermining 'the hyphen'. In this lecture, Tillich tries to transcend the irreconcilable aspects of Judaism and Christianity, which he has discussed elsewhere. Rather, he takes a different approach, in an attempt to subject both religions to an independent criterion, which is based on two claims. First, he argues that there is something called the 'biblical literature', which both Judaism and Christianity are subject to. By 'biblical literature', Tillich means the Old Testament, which is authoritative for Judaism, and the combined Old and New Testaments, which is authoritative for Christians. Tillich makes an argument that echoes his conclusion in 'Faith', discussed above, that Judaism and Christianity, despite their professed differences, have fundamental similarities when viewed from the perspective of non-western religions. He argues that the biblical literature has a unity that transcends both religions: 'There is a unity in comparison with all other religions. But there is neither a common tradition, nor is it specifically Jewish or specifically Christian, but it is the unity of its biblical literature, whose greatness is that it is the judge of both, Judaism

\[182\] Tillich's use of the term 'biblical literature' is similar to his use of 'biblical religion', which he discusses in detail in BRSUR. There he analyzes the ontological basis of biblical religion, with this ontological basis serving as the foundation of both Judaism and Christianity.

\[183\] Tillich does not use the term 'Hebrew scriptures'.
and Christianity.\textsuperscript{184}

Second, Tillich argues that the biblical literature has a consistent, unified concept of truth that is not theoretical, but ‘existential’. Tillich contrasts the Old Testament view of truth, or trust in the covenant promises of God, with the Greek philosophical concept of \textit{aletheia}, which involves a hidden reality that becomes revealed.\textsuperscript{185} Those who adhere to the covenant promises are united in this truth, as ‘There is no school searching for theoretical truth but there is a congregation of those who have received the promises of the covenant’.\textsuperscript{186} In the New Testament, Tillich argues that the governing concept of truth is different from the Greek philosophical and Jewish concepts, with truth as ‘true being’. Tillich acknowledges that the Greek term \textit{aletheia} is used, for example in John’s Gospel, but he says this does not fully encompass the New Testament understanding of truth.\textsuperscript{187} Instead, he argues that the Christ as the Logos manifests true being, because of his universality and concreteness. Christ as Logos is the ‘principle of universal truth’, because ‘he illuminates every human being’.\textsuperscript{188} In addition, Christ as the Logos is concrete, who became concrete in the man Jesus and who established the historically concrete

\textsuperscript{184} Tillich, ‘Search’, 2.
\textsuperscript{185} ‘The truth of the Old Testament is not ontological truth but ethical truth. It is the “truth of Jahweh”, namely the fact that he will keep his promises. The quality of God which is called truth, in Hebrew, “emeth” (compare amen) lasting, unchangeable, solid in his trustworthiness. This is far removed from \textit{aletheia}. No hidden level of reality is revealed, but the consistency of the hidden will of God is seen’ (ibid., 7).
\textsuperscript{186} Ibid., 8.
\textsuperscript{187} Ibid., 9.
\textsuperscript{188} Ibid.
institution of the Church. Finally, this concept of truth also is related to unity, since ‘Everyone who belongs to this group participates in the truth, which he is. This expression I am the truth contains an idea of truth which is different from both Jewish and Greek. Truth is true being. This leads to the phrase doing the truth.’

Tillich concludes the lecture by arguing that both Judaism and Christianity have deviated from this independent criterion of truth. According to Tillich, in a rather muted argument, Judaism has made the interpretation of the Mosaic law into a ‘doctrinal development’, in which the search for truth became the search for the meaning and implications of the law. For Tillich, Christianity deviated from the existential concept of truth by succumbing to ‘doctrinal authoritarianism’, in which truth was understood as pure doctrine based on the Bible and interpreted by the creeds and theologians. Tillich concludes by arguing that a real unity is impossible due to these historical developments, as each religion has lost the core existential truth, so any unity lacks a foundation or ‘inner necessity’. Nevertheless, for my purposes, the unity within the biblical literature, as an independent criterion, suggests another important structural similarity between Judaism and Christianity.

6.2.2 Lectures 7 and 8: The Inclusive Dialectic and the Religion of the Concrete

Spirit

\(^{189}\) Ibid.
\(^{190}\) Ibid.
\(^{191}\) Ibid., 12.
\(^{192}\) Ibid., 13.
\(^{193}\) Ibid., 13–14.
Lecture 7: The Christian Encounter with Non-Christian Religions

In the Foreword to ‘Encounter’ (the Bampton Lectures) editor Krister Stendahl observes that Tillich believed that he should start his theological work ‘all over again’, even though he was nearing the completion of the third volume of the Systematic Theology, which was published in 1963.\(^1\) Tillich visited Japan in 1960, and his first-hand encounter with Buddhism, as prototypical of non-western religions, had profoundly influenced how he understood the relation of religion to secular society, and this influence was expressed in the Bampton Lectures of 1961. Tillich’s primary goal, in both the Systematic Theology and the Bampton Lectures, was to provide a theological response to secular culture. However, in the Bampton Lectures, Tillich adds a new dimension to his thought, the increasingly significant exchange between the historical religions, to provide ‘a common front against the invading forces of secularism’.\(^2\) For Tillich, since the Enlightenment, secularism generated ‘quasi-religions’, which are cultural and political movements that are objects of ultimate concern, which is in keeping with Tillich’s theological interpretation culture.\(^3\) For Tillich, the present situation is characterized by the encounter of the world religions,

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\(^1\) Tillich, Encounter, foreword, vii.

\(^2\) Krister Stendahl in ibid., vii–viii culls these quotes from Tillich’s preface to ST III.

\(^3\) Tillich’s expansive concept of ‘religion’ in Encounter is similar to that used in The Religious Situation: “Religion is the state of being grasped by an ultimate concern, a concern which qualifies all other concerns as preliminary and which itself contains the answer to the question of the meaning of our life. Therefore this concern is unconditionally serious and shows a willingness to sacrifice any finite concern which is in conflict with it. The predominant religious name for the content of such concern is God—a god or gods. In nontheistic religions divine qualities are ascribed to a sacred object or an all-pervading power or a highest principle such as the Brahma or the One. In secular quasi-religions the ultimate concern is directed towards objects like nation, science, a particular form or stage of society, or a highest ideal of humanity, which are then considered divine’ (Encounter, 3).
both western and the quasi-religions brought on by modernity.\textsuperscript{197} In ‘Encounter’, the quasi-religions discussed are liberal humanism, nationalism, socialism, Fascism (the radicalized form of nationalism) and Communism (the radicalized form of socialism). The Bampton Lectures, here also referred to as ‘Encounter’, are comprised of four separate lectures: (i) the encounter of religions and quasi-religions with the present situation; (ii) the principles that Christianity uses to judge non-Christian religions; (iii) a Christian-Buddhist conversation; and (iv) how Christianity judges itself in light of its encounter with the world religions.

This dissertation is primarily concerned with how Tillich’s view of the history of religion portrays Judaism, in addition to how Judaism and Christianity are related. Therefore, my discussion will be limited to how these ideas are addressed in ‘Encounter’. They are dealt with in the first Bampton lecture, in Tillich’s discussion of something he calls ‘Christian universalism’, to be discussed below. In addition, somewhat unexpectedly, in the third Bampton lecture on the Christian-Buddhist conversation, Tillich makes an important comment about his typological method, referred to in prior chapters and in the Systematic Theology, and how this relates to his use of dialectic in the history of religion.

\textit{Christian Universalism, Justice and Conditional Exclusiveness}

For Tillich, Christianity has related to other religions historically with a posture of ‘indefiniteness’, characterized by openness and mutual influence, especially within antiquity and in the modern period. During the middle ages, this relative openness in the West was interrupted by a long period of exclusivism because of the rise of

\textsuperscript{197} Ibid., 4.
Islam, the first truly international competitor to Christianity. For Tillich, Christianity historically permitted itself to be influenced by other religions that it came into contact with. Therefore, in the present situation Christianity should maintain a posture of relative openness in its encounters with other religions and quasi-religions. Tillich’s historical framework employs ‘a dialectical union of rejection and acceptance’ between Christianity and the other religions, which often involves tension and uncertainty. Tillich’s historical analysis applies this mixture of rejection and acceptance in the following periods: (i) the Old Testament in the religion of Israel versus paganism; (ii) the ministry of Jesus, especially in the story of the Good Samaritan and John’s story of the Samaritan woman (in John 4); (iii) in Paul’s polemic against ‘the legalism of Christianized Jews and against the libertinism of

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198 According to Tillich, in the ancient world Christianity initially experienced major conflict only internally. This is far from conclusive, given the complexities surrounding the Apologists in the pre-Nicene period and the transition from Christianity under Diocletian to Christianity under Constantine. However, with the Muslim invasions beginning in the seventh century, Christianity became defensive and exclusive, which led to anti-Judaism: ‘The first outside encounter took place with the rise of Islam, a new and passionate faith, fanatically carried over the known world, invading, subjecting, and reducing eastern Christianity and threatening all Christendom ... The victorious wars of the Islamic tribes and nations forced Christianity to become aware of itself as one religion confronted with another against which it had to defend itself. According to the law that defence narrows down the defender, Christianity at this point became radically exclusive. The Crusades were the expression of this new self-consciousness ... The irrational character of the crusading spirit was confirmed by the fact that the narrowed self-consciousness, created by the encounter of Christianity with Islam, produced also a changed self-consciousness with respect to the Jews ... But after the shock of the encounter with Islam the Church became conscious of Judaism as another religion and anti-Judaism became fanatical. Only after this was it possible for governments to use the Jews as political scapegoats to cover up their own political and economic failures, and only since the end of the nineteenth century did religious anti-Judaism become racial anti-Semitism, which was — and still is — one of the many ingredients in the radicalized nationalistic quasi-religion’ (ibid., 23–25).

199 Ibid., 19.
Christianized pagans;\textsuperscript{200} (iv) the universal presence of the Logos as described by many Church Fathers;\textsuperscript{201} (v) the return of this mediating position with Nicholas of Cusa in the Renaissance (after the long period of reaction to the threat from Islam), and Christian humanism under Erasmus, and into the Enlightenment.\textsuperscript{202}

Tillich’s portrayal of the history of Christianity as the dialectic of acceptance and rejection illustrates his fascination with dialectical structures, and his use of typological analysis puts general features above every empirical detail. However, for the purposes of this argument, Tillich’s portrayal of the Old Testament and its relation to paganism contains a critical detail. Tillich underscores the importance of justice, as rooted in the Hebrew prophets, as the condition by which all subsequent expressions of religion have enduring value. Similar to the \textit{Judenfrage} lectures, Tillich identifies the prophet Amos as the starting point of the universality of justice, insofar as the chosen people of Israel became subject to a divine standard that

\textsuperscript{200} Ibid., 21.

\textsuperscript{201} Tillich’s portrayal of the patristic period is consonant with his dialectical method: ‘In early Christianity the judgment of other religions was determined by the idea of the Logos. The Church Fathers emphasized the universal presence of the Logos, the Word, the principle of divine self-manifestation, in all religions and cultures. The Logos is present everywhere, like the seed on the land, and this presence is a preparation for the central appearance of the Logos in a historical person, the Christ. In light of these ideas Augustine could say that the true religion had existed always and was called Christian only after the appearance of the Christ. Accordingly, his dealing with other religions was dialectical as was that of his predecessors. They did not reject them unambiguously and, of course, they did not accept them unambiguously. But in their apologetic writings they acknowledged the preparatory character of these religions and tried to show how their inner dynamics drives them toward questions whose answer is given in the central event on which Christianity is based. They tried to show the convergent lines between the Christian message and the intrinsic quests of pagan religions’ (ibid., 21–22).

\textsuperscript{202} Ibid., 25–27.
existed independently of their king, temple and cult. Also, using the language of the
Systematic Theology, this is the paradigmatic instance of 'exclusive monotheism',
which was noted as a critical transitional stage from polytheism to trinitarian
monotheism, as discussed in ST I, 218–230. It is worth quoting Tillich at some
length:

Since Amos, prophecy threatened Israel, the nation of Jahweh, with
destruction by Jahweh because of its injustice. The covenant between
Jahweh and the nation does not give the nation a claim to Jahweh's
championship; he will turn against them if they violate justice. The exclusive
monotheism of the prophetic religion is not due to the absoluteness of one
particular god as against the others, but it is the universal validity of justice
which produces the exclusive monotheism of the God of justice. This, of
course, implies that justice is a principle which transcends every particular
religion and makes the exclusiveness of any particular religion conditional. It
is this principle of conditional exclusiveness which will guide our further inquiry
into the attitude of Christianity to the world religions.²⁰³

Once again the principle of justice, which is uniquely rooted in the prophets of the
Old Testament, plays an indispensable role in Tillich’s theology.

Christianity and Buddhism: Dynamic Typology and Inclusive Dialectic within the
History of Religion

²⁰³ Ibid., 20.
In the second Bampton lecture, Tillich determined that the foundational revelatory event of Christianity was the manifestation of Jesus as the Christ in the Cross. For Tillich, this enabled Christianity to make judgments about other religions and quasi-religions. In the third Bampton lecture, one of Tillich’s goals is to discuss the encounter of Christianity with ‘one of the greatest, strangest, and at the same time one of the most competitive of the religions proper – Buddhism’.\footnote{Ibid., 34–35.} In this lecture, Tillich does not say anything about the relationship between Christianity and Judaism, but he clearly states what kind of dialectic his history of religion scheme employs, ‘dynamic typology’, which has implications for the relationship of Judaism and Christianity. For Tillich, religions can be classified into ‘types’, which identify the general characteristics of each and articulates how one religion relates to another. For Tillich, this is to help make sense of ‘the seemingly incomprehensible jungle which the history of religion presents to the investigating mind’.\footnote{Ibid., 34.} Types have a ‘static’, spatial character which is what makes each type distinct from other types. They also have a ‘dynamic’ character, an ‘inner drive’, which reflects how types interrelate with one another, and also how one type may be transformed into another.\footnote{Yet types are not necessarily static; there are tensions in every type which drive it beyond itself. Dialectical thought has discovered this and has shown the immense fertility of the dialectical description of tensions in seemingly static structures’ (ibid.).} What follows is the most self-reflective comment by Tillich anywhere describing how his dialectic functions within the history of religion:

The kind of dialectics which, I believe, is most adequate to typological
inquiries is the description of contrasting poles within one structure. A polar relation is a relation of interdependent elements, each of which is necessary for the other one and for the whole, although it is in tension with the opposite element. The tension drives both to conflicts and beyond the conflicts to possible unions of the polar elements. Described in this way, types lose their static rigidity, and the individual things and persons can transcend the type to which they belong without losing their definite character.\textsuperscript{207}

The references ‘contrasting poles within one structure’ and ‘relation of interdependent elements, each of which is necessary for the other’ both conceptually support continuity from one religion to another. These are strong indications of an inclusive dialectic.

For Tillich, this understanding of dialectic is superior to Hegelian dialectics, which pushes ‘into the past that which is dialectically left behind’.\textsuperscript{208} Tillich gives a specific example, that of the relation of Christianity and Buddhism, in Hegel’s view: ‘For example, in the problem of the relation of Christianity to Buddhism, Hegelian dialectics considers Buddhism as an early stage of the religious development which is now totally abandoned by history. It still exists, but the World-Spirit is no longer creatively in it.’\textsuperscript{209} It is outside the scope of this dissertation to address Hegel’s view of the relation of eastern religions to Christianity. Also, while Tillich maintains an inclusive dialectic, his rejection of Hegel does not result in his explicit endorsement

\textsuperscript{207} Ibid., 34–35.
\textsuperscript{208} Ibid., 35.
\textsuperscript{209} Ibid.
of Schelling. However, what is clear is that, in principle, Tillich’s understanding of a dialectical history of religion tends to ‘gather up’ not ‘leave behind’, providing a framework for maintaining continuity between Judaism and Christianity, not to mention continuity between Christianity and other religions.

Tillich never refers to his dialectic as ‘inclusive’, but he does use this term to characterize his view of the history of religion. In the first Bampton lecture (one of four Bampton lectures comprising Lecture Seven, ‘Encounter’), Tillich reflects on the alternating manner by which Christianity accepted and rejected other religions in antiquity. When this posture of acceptance and rejection is applied to the modern encounter of Christianity and the world religions, especially non-western religions, Tillich invokes Jesus’ command in Matthew 5:48: ‘You must be all-inclusive as your heavenly Father is all-inclusive’.  

It appears that Tillich only explicitly described the inner workings of his dialectic, specifically the relation of one pole to another, when Christianity came into contact with non-western religions. Up until this turning point in Tillich’s thought, specifically the integration of non-western religions, his dialectical framework was ever-present, but was seldom the subject of intentional reflection. The above

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Commenting upon early Christianity and its implications for Christianity and the world religions, Tillich says: ‘All these are well-known facts, but it is important to see them in the new light of the present encounter of the world religions, for they show that early Christianity did not consider itself as a radical exclusive, but as the all-inclusive religion in the sense of the saying, “All that is true anywhere in the world belongs to us, the Christians.” And it is significant that the famous words of Jesus, “You, therefore, must be perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect” (which was always an exegetical riddle), would, according to recent research, be better translated, “You must be all-inclusive as your heavenly Father is all-inclusive” (ibid., 22).
reference to 'contrasting poles within one structure' is only the second use of spatial
imagery regarding the poles of the dialectic, with the first reference occurring in ST I,
143, as noted above.

Lecture 8: The History of Religion and 'Religion of the Concrete Spirit'

Right up until ten days before his death from a heart attack in October of 1965, Tillich
was pondering the theological significance of the history of religion. As mentioned
above, in the 1961 Bampton Lectures and just prior to his completion of Volume
Three of the Systematic Theology in 1963, Tillich began to seriously consider the
importance of non-western religions for Christian theology. Tillich's final lecture,
'Significance', establishes a method for integrating all religions, especially non-
western religions, into a theological and revelatory framework. This lecture has three
parts, with the first part establishing the five presuppositions of such a framework: (i)
that revelatory experiences are universally human; (ii) that revelation is received
within the limitations of human finitude; (iii) that there is a revelatory process that is
subject to mystical, prophetic and secular criticism; (iv) that there may be a central
event in the history of religion that is the basis for a concrete theology with universal
significance; and (v) that the sacred is the 'depth' of the secular, in which the former
is the critic and creative ground of the latter.\textsuperscript{211} The second part expresses Tillich's
theology of the history of religion.\textsuperscript{212} This is paradigmatically expressed in something
called the 'religion of the concrete spirit', and is based on Tillich's 'dynamic-
typological approach', both of which will be discussed in greater detail below. The

\textsuperscript{211} Tillich, 'Significance', 64–65.
\textsuperscript{212} Ibid., 67–75.
third part presents Tillich’s ‘method of the history of religion’, which is a five-step procedure for reinterpreting religious phenomena, and applying those reinterpretations to the present cultural situation.\textsuperscript{213} My discussion will focus on the second part, because it demonstrates the importance of the prophetic principle, which is based on historic Judaism, for Tillich’s paradigmatic expression of religion.

Tillich’s theology of the history of religion employs a dynamic-typological approach, which is the fourth time that Tillich has used ‘type’ or ‘typological’ to interpret religious phenomena.\textsuperscript{214} Due to limits of space, Tillich refrained from going into detail on what he meant by typological, except that it is not a progressive scheme, and that it can interpret manifestations of the Holy, whenever and wherever they appear.\textsuperscript{215} Specifically, there are three elements that could unite to comprise the religion of the concrete spirit. The first element of any religion is its sacramental basis, in which the Holy is expressed in the finite.\textsuperscript{216} Against the first element a critical movement emerges, with a mystical dimension, adding depth to sacramental objects and preventing them from being reduced to mere objects, or ‘the

\textsuperscript{213} Ibid., 75–79.
\textsuperscript{214} The first time was in the \textit{Judenfrage} lectures, where typological was explained as the creation of and fostering of stereotypes. The second time was a much more involved understanding in \textit{ST I, II.II.A.2, ‘Typological Considerations’}, which described the process of how typical events are related to special events. The third time is the third Bampton lecture on the conversation between Christianity and Buddhism discussed above in lecture 6.
\textsuperscript{215} ‘My approach is dynamic-typological. There is no progressive development which goes on and on, but there are elements in the experience of the Holy which are always there, if the Holy is experienced. These elements, if they are predominant in one religion, create a particular religious type’ (Tillich, ‘Significance’, 70).
\textsuperscript{216} Ibid., 70–71.
demonization of the sacramental.\textsuperscript{217} Against these two elements, a third element emerges, the prophetic/ethical element, which is based upon Jewish prophetism and maintains the principle of justice:

Here the sacramental is criticized because of demonic consequences like the denial of justice in the name of holiness. This is the whole fight of the Jewish prophets against sacramental religion. In some of the words of Amos and Hosea the fight is carried so far that the whole cult is abrogated. This criticism is decisive for Judaism and is one element of Christianity.\textsuperscript{218}

The observation about the abrogation of the cult is very similar to Tillich's position in The Socialist Decision, the Judenfrage lectures, and in the Bampton Lectures. Each of these posed critiques of Jewish idolatry of temple cult, king and nation, with the threat of destruction being in keeping with God's faithfulness to the covenant. In addition, the foundation of justice has been a consistent theme since The Socialist Decision. For Tillich, to the extent that these three elements of sacramental, mystical and prophetic can occur in a unified form, then the 'religion of the concrete spirit' has been achieved. While Tillich refrains from identifying this with Christianity, he claims that Paul's doctrine of the Spirit is the best expression of this.\textsuperscript{219} For the purposes of this dissertation, the prophetic dimension of Judaism is an essential component of Tillich's highest and best form of religion, the religion of the concrete spirit.

\textsuperscript{217} Ibid., 71.
\textsuperscript{218} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{219} Ibid., 72.
6.3 Conclusion

In Chapters 3, 4 and 5, I laboured to extract and analyze how Judaism functioned within Tillich’s theological history of religion. Especially in Chapter 3, in the discussion of Schelling’s dialectic of the potencies, I strove to draw an analogy between how the potencies enabled continuity within change in ontological terms, and argued that this had implications for Schelling’s, and by implication, Tillich’s history of religion. The dialectical structure of the history of religion is present in various degrees in all of the prior works analyzed. Sometimes the dialectic involves a forward movement of conflicting elements (poles) into a new unity, and sometimes two poles remain in perpetual tension. What the foregoing analysis has demonstrated conclusively is the following: (i) that the history of religion remained fundamentally important for Tillich throughout his entire career; (ii) that Tillich’s history of religion has an inclusive dialectical structure, meaning that conflicting elements make enduring contributions to new creative unities; and (iii) that this inclusive dialectic provides a philosophical and theological basis for Tillich to promote a permanent importance of Judaism, until the eschaton.

In the final chapter, I hope to achieve four things. First, I will provide criticisms of Tillich’s idea of Judaism based on the Earley Dissertation. Second, I will more

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220 In the eighth Lecture, ‘Significance’, Tillich acknowledges his debt to the German ‘History of Religions School’: ‘I am still grateful, looking back on my own formative period of study and the time after it, to what in German is called the religiöngesichtliche Schule, the School of the History of Religions in biblical and church historical studies. These studies opened our eyes and demonstrated the degree to which the biblical tradition participates in the Asia Minor and Mediterranean traditions. I remember the liberating effect of the understanding of universal, human motives in the stories of Genesis or in Hellenistic existentialism and Persian eschatology, as they appeared in the late periods of the Old and New Testament’ (ibid., 68).
closely examine Tillich’s method of dynamic typology, demonstrating that it does not merely represent an ‘abstract’ form of Judaism, but is something much more profound. Third, I will argue that Tillich’s dialectic of the Holy exerts an enduring influence on his theology, even in its non-Christocentric form. Fourth, I will demonstrate that Tillich’s strategy to employ his idea of Judaism for theological purposes is one of many instances in western thought where ‘Judaism’ becomes a proxy for something distinct from historic or contemporary Jewish communities. Using a recent book on the topic, I will show that this practice usually involves casting a negative light on Judaism, and the example used will be certain major figures from German Idealism. By contrast, Tillich’s use of German Idealism results in a more favourable view of Judaism.
Chapter 7

Criticism and Defence of Tillich’s Method

7.1 Introduction
Throughout most of his career and adult life, Tillich cultivated relationships with religious and secular Jews, attacked the problem of anti-Semitism within the church and within society, and sought to articulate a positive understanding of Judaism, especially after World War II and the Holocaust. Chapter 1 demonstrated how he opposed anti-Semitism at critical points in his life, as this was one of the reasons that he emigrated from Germany in 1933. It surveyed prior analyses by Earley, Stone and Weaver of Tillich and Judaism. I concluded that the biographical details were adequately covered, and that there had been substantive analysis of Tillich’s ‘theology of Judaism’, to the extent that he had one. The questions I raised, which had not been directly addressed by Earley, Stone or Weaver, concerned his pro-Jewish stance. What was it about Tillich’s method that enabled him to ultimately see Judaism as a perpetual critical partner of Christianity? Why was he not anti-Jewish and why did he not lapse into the German Christian position, which sought to eliminate the Jewish roots of Christianity? These questions were answered in Chapters 2 through 6 of this dissertation, through a detailed scrutiny of Tillich’s dialectical history of religions.

Chapter 2 established the importance of the dialectical history of religions for Tillich, which served as the analytical framework throughout his career for his
doctrine of revelation. His use of the history of religions directly contrasted with the German Christian, racist and anti-Semitic version. In Chapters 3 through 6, the primary source analyses, the evolution of Tillich’s ‘idea of Judaism’ was analyzed. This involved the transition from Judaism serving as an essential and foundational precursor to Christianity in the Schelling dissertations, to Judaism possessing various types of parity with Christianity, which were expressed in polarities such as Is/Ought, space/time, and mystical/prophetic. In addition, parity was also expressed in several ‘structural similarities’, as discussed in the post-World War II occasional lectures. This dissertation has analyzed a specific aspect of Tillich’s thought, from a developmental and historical point of view. In Chapters 3 through 6, it was thoroughly demonstrated how he maintained that Judaism and Christianity were inextricably related within his dialectical history of religions. This suggests that Tillich’s theology has a strong Judeo-Christian dimension, as opposed to being ‘supersessionist’ in character.¹

In the final chapter of this dissertation, the second section will review one of Earley’s most fundamental criticisms of Tillich, that he reduced the diverse historical and theological phenomenon of Judaism to a few key ideas to fit into his own

¹ Depending upon how one defines the term ‘supersessionism’, Tillich could fall under that category, since there appear to be gradations according to how negatively Judaism is portrayed. For example, Kayko Driedger Hesslein uses that term to describe Tillich’s view in her article ‘The (Dis)Integration of Judaism in Tillich’s Theology of Universal Salvation’, *North American Paul Tillich Society Newsletter* 36/3 (Summer 2010). However, if supersessionism is understood to mean the elimination of any role of Judaism in future divine revelation, then Tillich avoids this on two counts. First, this kind of supersessionism assumes Christian exclusivism, which runs counter to Tillich’s religion of the concrete spirit. Second, it runs counter to Tillich’s enduring reliance on the dialectic of the Holy.
framework. There is considerable merit to this criticism. However, it does not fully appreciate what Tillich was trying to do. This was due in part to Earley’s focus on his view of the Jews as the ‘people of time’, and failure to discuss Tillich’s final lecture, on the religion of the concrete spirit. In the third section of this chapter, in defence of Tillich, his method will be examined more closely, which will reveal that his goal was to construct a theological history of religions. Joseph Kitagawa coined this term to contrast it with the scientific study of religion rooted in the European Enlightenment, and observed that it is a natural outgrowth of Tillich’s ‘theology of culture’. Tillich used this method in order to make meaningful comparisons among Judaism, Christianity and non-Christian religions. He modified his method several times, and he strove to adapt by creating his distinctive view of ‘Judeo-Christianity’, but also sought to find ways to incorporate non-Christian religions such as Buddhism within his inclusive dialectic of the history of religions. While this attempt was not entirely successful, Tillich consistently appealed to his ‘dialectic of the Holy’, even in his final normative construct, the religion of the concrete spirit. Therefore, while Earley concluded that his view of Judaism was ‘utterly worthless’, I argue that it is instructive, and even profound, because it grounds the dialectical parity of Judaism and Christianity within Tillich’s ontology (Is/Ought, the Holy), within his doctrine of revelation (the dialectical history of religions), and within Tillich’s Christology (the unity of absolute concreteness and absolute universality in the Christian Logos).

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3 Ibid., 211.

In the fourth section I will conclude this dissertation with two additional observations about Tillich’s use of Jewish prophetism, in the context of a discussion about David Nirenberg’s recent book, *Anti-Judaism: The Western Tradition*. First, I have shown in detail how Tillich uses Jewish prophetism to refer to the critical principle in any religion; this portrays Judaism as something other than the historic prophets found in the Hebrew scriptures. This practice is not as unusual as it may first appear; Nirenberg shows that it is quite common in western thought. Second, Nirenberg’s survey of thinkers uncovers a pervasive practice of negative associations with the use of ‘Judaism’; Tillich’s use of Jewish prophetism is positive by contrast. Therefore, this section is also a commentary on Tillich’s method, although indirectly.

### 7.2 Earley’s Critique

In the final chapter of his dissertation, Earley summarizes Tillich’s idea of Judaism in the following formula: ‘the Jews are the people of time who, in the name of the God of exclusive monotheism and justice, fight the polytheistic gods of space – such as paganism, idolatry, and nationalism – as long as these demonic forces exist, that is, until the eschaton.’ According to Earley, Tillich’s idea of the Jews as ‘the people of time’ is fundamental not only to his idea of Judaism, but his interpretation of history, his Protestant principle, the structure of Tillich’s *Systematic Theology*, and his

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thought as a whole.\textsuperscript{7} As will be shown below, according to Earley, Tillich’s failure to incorporate the diversity of Judaism within his analysis is rooted in Tillich’s idiosyncratic, distinctively Lutheran reading of Judaism.\textsuperscript{8} Similar to my observations, Earley identifies the structural similarity between Tillich’s concept of Jewish prophetism and his Protestant principle. My analysis of the relevant primary sources in Chapters 3 through 6 of this dissertation arrives at the opposite conclusion. Instead, I have demonstrated that Tillich’s idea of Judaism maintains an essential role in his dialectical history of religions, and its formal similarity to other critical aspects of his thought is a strength, not a weakness.

The heart of Earley’s critique involves two fundamental questions about Tillich’s idea of Judaism. While a response to the second question will be the focus of this analysis, the first question raises some important issues. Earley’s first question asks whether Tillich’s idea of Judaism was consistent with his theological system?\textsuperscript{9} Earley determines that Tillich is substantially consistent, and makes a series of observations that show the fundamental place of Tillich’s idea of Judaism within his theological system: the Jews as the ‘people of time’ was (i) the cornerstone of his system; (ii) fundamental to his interpretation of history, the history of religions, and salvation history; (iii) fundamental to his view of religious socialism, and the ‘prophetic principle’; and (iv) fundamental to the Protestant principle, which Earley

\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{7} Ibid., 388–393.
\textsuperscript{8} Ibid., 382.
\textsuperscript{9} Ibid., 389.

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argues is the organizing principle of the entire *Systematic Theology*.\(^{10}\)

For Earley, these aforementioned observations about the fundamental role of the Jews as the people of time are consistently applied within Tillich's thought. Earley believes that his insight into the topic was Tillich's idea of Judaism and his Protestant principle are really 'two sides of the same coin'.\(^{11}\) Earley's main reservation is that Tillich 'absolutized' Christianity in relation to other religions, including Judaism, and therefore violated his own method of correlation.\(^{12}\) I have determined that Tillich's use of the history of religions throughout his entire career results not in an 'absolutization' of Christianity in relation to Judaism, but in a permanent dialectical, polar relation of mutual interrelation until the *eschaton*. In addition, at the end of his life, Tillich still retained the prophetic principle, as the critical consciousness in his religion of the concrete spirit.

Earley's second question asks whether Tillich's idea of Judaism reaches 'unsatisfactory conclusions' concerning the facts of Jewish history, the experience of Jews, and the consensus of Jewish theology.\(^{13}\) Earley is asking whether Tillich's idea of Judaism is a true representation of Judaism. First, Earley argues that his idea of Judaism is an intellectual construct, something that Tillich abstracted from historic Judaism, and which is far from a 'phenomenological' description of Jewish communities, in all of their diversity.\(^{14}\) Related to this is a second criticism, that Tillich

\(^{10}\) Ibid., 389–391.

\(^{11}\) Ibid., 392.

\(^{12}\) Ibid.

\(^{13}\) Ibid., 389.

\(^{14}\) Ibid., 393.
violates his own method of correlation.\textsuperscript{15} For Earley, Tillich does not investigate Judaism to learn what its own questions, issues and self-understanding are, but imposes his own ideas upon Judaism, especially the idea of the Jews as ‘the people of time’. Earley, and his dissertation adviser Paul van Buren, expressed considerable disdain for Tillich on this point, arguing that he disregarded other important aspects of historic Judaism, such as the law, the covenant, and the promised land.\textsuperscript{16} These observations are important because they indentify why Tillich’s views would be deficient for interfaith dialogue. However, they do not go to the heart of his project, and therefore do not appreciate its historical importance, and perhaps its enduring significance. The fundamental difference between Earley’s interpretation of Tillich and mine is that Earley places more emphasis on Tillich’s Protestant principle as the driver of his system, and I see Tillich’s history of religions as more fundamental.

Tillich knew that historic and contemporary Judaism is ‘more than’ a critical principle historically rooted in the Hebrew prophets. That is why he tried in different ways to derive an appropriate way to analyze historical and religious phenomena, whether it be through ‘particularity and universality’, ‘principles’, ‘structural analogies’, ‘typological analysis’, or ‘dynamic typology’. Yet, Tillich persisted in building his framework to apprehend the ‘spirit’ of religious phenomena. His idea of Judaism, while it does not reflect all of the diverse phenomena of historic or

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., 392–393.

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., 411. With respect to the latter, the promised land, Earley observes that Tillich confuses the concept of ‘space’, which Tillich associates with paganism and idolatry, with the biblical, Jewish concept of ‘place’ (401). Earley refers to Walter Bruggeman’s \textit{The Land} (Philadelphia, PN: Fortress Press, 1977).
contemporary Judaism, does single out the prophetic principle, and locates it within the heart of this theology. As part of Tillich’s typological method, he elevates the prophetic spirit to represent the ‘spirit’ of Judaism, just as he elevates such concepts as ‘mysticism’ and the present fulfillment by the Messiah, to represent the ‘spirit’ Christianity.

In the following section, I will review Tillich’s typological method, which enables the analysis of religious and historical phenomena, for the sake constructing a theological history of religions. After summarizing the relevant concepts, I will argue that Tillich’s method of dynamic typology, instead of being based on ‘generalities’ and ‘abstractions’, attempts to make sense out of the diversity of a historical or religious phenomenon by identifying its ‘spirit’, or inner drive.

7.3 Tillich’s Dynamic Typological Method

In the primary source analyses in Chapters 3 through 6, the dialectical relationship between Tillich’s idea of Judaism and his corresponding idea of Christianity was discussed in detail. Two types of dialectical relationship were identified, one in which Judaism served as an essential foundation for Christianity, in a historical dialectic of progression, and another in which the two religions possessed a relationship of parity, in an ontological dialectic of balance. Both forms of dialectic manifested themselves within Tillich’s theological history of religions, in which the meaning of history can be derived from the manifold character of history. His explanation of his typological method becomes more refined over time. Specifically, his use of
'particularity and universality' in the 1910 Dissertation, his application of 'principle' in *The Socialist Decision*, his use of 'structural analogies' in the *Judenfrage* lectures, and his use of 'typological analysis' in the *Systematic Theology* and, and his final modification to 'dynamic typology' in his two final occasional lectures on the topic, are all ways that Tillich extracts meaning from diverse historical phenomena.\textsuperscript{17} In creating these analytical concepts, he is not being naïve about the diversity of historical phenomena, but astute in seeking ways to manage that diversity and assign relative priority to its elements.

In Chapters 2 through 6 of this dissertation, Tillich’s dialectical method has been explored in considerable detail, in order to discuss the relationship between Christianity and Judaism. In response to Earley’s aforementioned criticism that Tillich is, so to speak, trapped in his own ideas, Tillich’s method will be more closely examined to determine how he seeks to manage the diversity of historical experience by identifying the existential meaning of a particular historical phenomenon. In doing so, the persistent influence of the ‘dialectic of the Holy’ will become apparent, especially in the eighth occasional lecture, ‘Significance’. The first section will show the continuity between the 1910 Dissertation and the *Systematic Theology*, to demonstrate the enduring influence of Schelling’s dialectic of the potencies. The second section will discuss the importance of Tillich’s concept of ‘concreteness’. Not only is this an essential component of his doctrine of the Christian Logos, it is a fundamental aspect of Tillich’s ‘religion of the concrete spirit’.

\textsuperscript{17} In *Interpretation of History*, Tillich tries out the concept of 'phenomenological intuition' (266–289), although this bears no relation to the relationship of Judaism and Christianity, and is outside the scope of this dissertation.
The third section will review the emergence of Tillich's method of dynamic typology, and demonstrate how it becomes the basis for his 'religion of the concrete spirit', which is his final and most mature view of normative religious expression. All three sections show how Tillich's method strives to manage the diversity of historical and religious phenomena, by discerning the individual 'spirit' or inner logic, and their existential significance.

7.3.1 The Enduring Influence of Schelling

In the 1910 Dissertation, Tillich introduces two themes that are fundamental to his understanding of the history of religions. The first theme is that his theological understanding of the history of religions is a 'systematic construction', the goal of which is to understand the process by which the third potency, or 'spirit', becomes predominant in consciousness. It is worth quoting him at some length, because several features will be evident at this early stage, which will recur again in the Systematic Theology and the occasional lectures:

> Obviously the construction of the history of religion given here comprehends only a fraction of the religions that actually exist. But for a systematic construction, this is of no consequence. What matters here is the process by which the spiritual potency becomes predominant in consciousness. In principle, it is enough if it has been realized at one point in history. Only the quality of the outcome is valid here. As in nature, so also in history, God’s way goes from the broad to the narrow. Moreover, it should be noted that his
construction confines itself to the Near East and the Mediterranean region (with the sole exception of India, whose special position within the history of mythology is most comparable to Christianity). The nations of these regions and their culture are entirely interlaced with the history of Israel, and together they flow into the Hellenistic culture of the Roman Empire. Therefore an external economy is attained here that puts the concept of the ‘fullness of time’ in a new light: when Christianity enters the world, its way is prepared in a positive sense not only by the religious history of Israel, but also by the history of paganism.¹⁸

Three things are evident here. First, a ‘systematic construction’ does not encompass every empirical detail, but extracts certain details that explain the process by which the spiritual potency, the third potency of ‘spirit’, ‘becomes predominant in consciousness’, how consciousness of the divine occurs in culture, how God becomes revealed. This is similar to the process of the ‘purification of the religious consciousness’ seen in ST I and ST III, as discussed in Chapter 6. Second, this event – of ‘the spiritual potency becoming predominant in consciousness’ – only has to happen once, meaning that a single, unique event can serve definitively to test all other potential manifestations of the divine. This parallels the emergence of the religious consciousness in the ancient Near East and Hellenistic Greco-Roman context, from which the event of the reception of Jesus as the Christ occurred, the ‘center of history’, as described in ST III, and discussed in Chapter 6 of this dissertation. In the final lecture of Tillich’s career, he fully relativizes and

¹⁸ 1910 Dissertation, 93.
subordinates Christianity, and every other religion, to ‘the religion of the concrete spirit’. Third, both the history of Israel and ‘paganism’ contributed to the development of Christianity, as seen throughout the Systematic Theology. In these ways, there is significant continuity between the 1910 Dissertation and the Systematic Theology.

The second theme as found in Tillich’s analysis of Judaism in the 1910 Dissertation, is the notion of ‘transformation’ from the particular to the universal. As demonstrated in Chapter 3 of this dissertation, which analyzes Tillich’s appropriation of Schelling in the 1910 Dissertation, Judaism underwent three stages. The first stage was the Abrahamic/Mosaic stage that possessed universal, pagan elements, and also particular, proto-Jewish elements. In the second and third phases of Judaism, there is a transition from Prophetism to prophetic universalism, in which some of the elements of the Mosaic Law were permitted to remain, but only insofar as they permitted a universal, non-ethnic application. This analysis by Tillich is one of his earliest examples of ‘transformation’ within the religious-historical and revelatory process. This ‘transformation from particularity to universality’, will be modified into a ‘dialectical relationship between absolute concreteness and absolute universality’ in Tillich’s Systematic Theology, which plays a vital role in his history of revelation, as the Christian Logos.

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19 Ibid., 105–106.
20 Tillich does not define the concept of transformation in the 1910 Dissertation, although its meaning can be discerned from how it functions within the context. However, much later in ST I, he highlights the revelatory aspect of ‘transformation’: “‘Transformation’ does not mean conscious acts whereby religious symbols are changed into philosophical concepts. It means that the openness of being-itself, which is given in the basic religious experience, is the foundation for the philosophical grasp of the structure of being’ (235).
7.3.2 The Importance of Concreteness

Tillich’s typological method can be misunderstood because it elevates a ‘type’ as representative of the ‘spirit’ of a historical or religious phenomenon. It would be a mistake to interpret this as ‘abstracting’ one quality from many qualities, which would result from framing the issue in terms of ‘universal’ and ‘particular’, which are primarily epistemological categories. For Tillich, concreteness does not simply refer to the manifold and diverse aspects of empirical reality, as if it were a purely epistemological category. Concreteness possesses an existential significance: ‘The more concrete a thing is, the more the possible concern about it.’\textsuperscript{21} For Tillich, the paradigmatic instance of concreteness is a personal life, and is the object of the most radical concern, the concern of love, and the specific historical person who expressed this most fully was Jesus of Nazareth, the Christ.\textsuperscript{22} At the same time, as discussed in Chapter 6 above, universality has more than one sense, and in the context of Christology it is associated with ‘the ultimate’, that aspect of the divine that alone is the object of worship. Therefore, for Tillich, the Christological term ‘absolutely concrete’ possesses the sense of that which is worthy to be worshiped, and also refers to a person who expressed the most radical concern of love, Jesus of Nazareth.

For Tillich, the dialectical tension between absolute concreteness and absolute universality is a fundamental aspect of the divine and the distinctive aspect

\textsuperscript{21} ST I, 211.

\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., 16–17 and 211.
of Christian theology: 'Christian theology is the theology in so far as it is based on the tension between the absolutely concrete and the absolutely universal.'\textsuperscript{23} In \textit{ST I}, 'The Meaning of God', he clearly associates the epistemological categories of particularity and universality with the existential and ontological categories of concreteness and the absolute, respectively: 'The ultimacy of the religious concern drives toward universality in value and in meaning; the concreteness of the religious concern drives toward particular meanings and values. The tension is insoluble.'\textsuperscript{24} In addition, for Tillich, to the extent any progress can be discerned in the history of religion draws upon this tension: 'if the theologian speaks of elements of progress in the history of religion, he must refer to those developments in which the contradiction between the ultimate element and the concrete element in the idea of God is fragmentarily overcome.'\textsuperscript{25} In the same section, in his concluding remarks about the emergence of trinitarian monotheism, he posits the term 'dialectical realism', in a yet another way to characterize the relationship between the absolute and the concrete: 'The dialectical method attempts to mirror the movement of reality ... Dialectical realism tries to unite the structural oneness of everything within the absolute with the undecided and unfinished manifoldness of the real. It tries to show that the concrete is present in the depth of the ultimate.'\textsuperscript{26}

\textbf{7.3.3 The Pervasive Influence of the Dialectic of the Holy}

\textsuperscript{23} Ibid., 16.
\textsuperscript{24} Ibid., 214.
\textsuperscript{25} Ibid., 219.
\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., 234–235.
Tillich's mature understanding of historical and theological analysis is expressed in his method of 'dynamic typology', as initially developed in occasional lecture seven, 'Encounter'. This represents a significant modification from the 'typological analysis' employed in ST I and ST III. Tillich then applies dynamic typology in occasional lecture eight, 'Significance'. In both lectures, the influence of Tillich's 'dialectic of the Holy' is apparent.

*Typological Analysis*

As I discussed in Chapter 6, Tillich employs the concept of typology, after sporadic and fragmentary usage in his prior works, in ST I, in a section titled 'Typological Considerations'. In ST I, he tells us how historical understanding is achieved, summarized in the following: 'Historical understanding oscillates between the intuition of the special and the analysis of the typical. The special cannot be described without reference to the type. The type is unreal without the special event in which it appears. Typology cannot replace historiography; historiography cannot describe anything without typology.'

27 For Tillich, historical understanding is a process of determining meaning in history, and the 'intuition of the special' extrapolates meaning from specific events, with the events themselves having an interpretive dimension. It appears that 'oscillation' is a hermeneutical process, similar to the function of a 'principle' which he described in earlier works. In addition, the 'special' and 'typical' are inextricably related. The special, which is the 'spirit', or inner drive of a movement or historical phenomenon, cannot be utterly divorced from

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27 Ibid., 219.
historical particularity, and the special can only have meaning with reference to
historical particularity.

In ST I, Tillich specifically applies typological analysis in constructing his
theological history of religions, in two ways. The first way assesses how a historical
religious phenomenon contributed to ‘universal preparatory revelation’, those
symbols that were foundational to the ‘final revelation’ in the appearance and
reception of Jesus as the Christ.\textsuperscript{28} How he actually employed his method was seen,
for example, in ST I, ‘The History of Revelation’. That section discussed the process
of reception, rejection and transformation, and specific examples of how the symbols
of Messiah and Suffering Servant developed over time.

To fully appreciate what Tillich attempts to achieve in ST I, it is important to
realize that he is saying that Judaism is not simply the historical predecessor to
Christianity, but that the ‘inner logic’ of Jewish prophetism enables it to be the basis
for the final revelation in the appearance and reception of Jesus as the Christ. This
was shown in the movement from polytheism to trinitarian monotheism, as shown in
ST I. He punctuates this discussion with an observation about the inner logic, or
dialectic, of the history of religions, which he understands to be a very complex
historical process. For Tillich, the history of religions excludes the possibility of
immediate, ‘supernatural’ interventions by God: ‘The dynamics of the history of
revelation exclude the mechanistic-supernatural theories of revelation.’\textsuperscript{29} For Tillich,

\textsuperscript{28} For Tillich, universal preparatory revelation refers to the foundational symbols, categories, forms
and religious experiences without which the final revelation could never be understood. Ibid., 139.
\textsuperscript{29} Ibid., 143.
the overarching reason to use this kind of analysis is to avoid the problem of seeing each religion as *sui generis* and therefore incommensurable with other religions. As stated above in Chapter 6, analyzing typological structures is for Tillich the only ‘fair and methodologically adequate way’ to interpret the theological history of religions.\(^30\)

*Dynamic Typology*

After his trip to Japan in 1960, Tillich further refined his understanding of how comparative analysis of religious phenomena can be carried out, and also modified the form or structure of the dialectical history of religions. In his Bampton Lectures of 1961 (referred to as Lecture Seven, ‘Encounter’, within Chapter 6 of this dissertation), he argues that there must be a way to analyze the seemingly disparate facts of the history of religion; to help make sense of ‘the seemingly incomprehensible jungle which the history of religion presents to the investigating mind’.\(^31\) Since the 1930s at least, in *The Interpretation of History* and *The Socialist Decision*, Tillich has wrestled with this problem. He believed that his *Systematic Theology* did not provide adequate criteria to engage non-western religions, specifically Buddhism, and developed the concept of ‘*dynamic* typology’ for the purpose of comparative analysis. As discussed in Chapter 6 of this dissertation, Tillich rejected Hegel’s dialectic of the history of religions in principle because he believed its ‘types’ to be static, and spatially oriented, which caused Buddhism to be ‘totally abandoned by history’.\(^32\) According to Tillich, Hegel’s view is that Buddhism

\(^{30}\) Ibid., 220–221.

\(^{31}\) Tillich, *Encounter*, 34.

\(^{32}\) Ibid., 34–35.
failed to develop and is therefore excluded from contributing to the emergence of absolute Spirit, the most advanced form of religion. This rejection of Buddhism by Hegel violates what Tillich sees as Jesus' mandate to be 'inclusive', according to Matthew 5:48, 'You must be all-inclusive as your heavenly Father is all-inclusive.'

Tillich modifies his method of typological analysis, as previously understood in ST1, in two ways, in opposition to what he understands to be Hegel's use of 'static' types. First, the practice of hermeneutical 'oscillation' between 'intuition of the special' and 'analysis of the typical' is replaced by a clear description of a polar relation between independent elements, 'each of which is necessary for the other and for the whole' (italics mine), with the corresponding tension between the independent elements being assigned a potentially transformative role. Second, instead of the binary distinction of special/typical being assigned dynamic/static features, respectively, Tillich redefines the term 'type' to increase its flexibility within his dialectical framework. In his revised view, 'types' have two features, the first being a 'static' and 'spatial' character that distinguishes one type from another. Second, types have a 'dynamic' aspect, or inner drive, which reflects how types relate to one another, and also characterizes how one type can be transformed into

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33 Ibid., 22.
34 'The kind of dialectics which, I believe, is most adequate to typological inquiries is the description of contrasting poles within one structure. A polar relation is a relation of interdependent elements, each of which is necessary for the other one and for the whole, although it is in tension with the opposite element. The tension drives both to conflicts and beyond the conflicts to possible unions of the polar elements. Described in this way, types lose their static rigidity, and the individual things and persons can transcend the type to which they belong without losing their definite character.' Ibid., 34–35.
35 Ibid., 34.
another. This dynamic quality of types allows individual phenomena, expressed as
types, to exist in creative tension with one another; individual types could persist in a
relation of \textit{mutual interdependence}, 'contrasting poles within one structure'.\footnote{Ibid., 34–35.}

Thus far, Tillich has stressed the importance of creative tension and mutual
interdependence between phenomena, \textit{all within one structure}, all with an eye to
providing a basis for dialogue between Christianity and Buddhism. At this point, he
addresses the critical question concerning the fate of religions that no longer
participate in this dialectical history of religions, but rather 'die off'. His response to
this question contains the kernel of how his understanding of the history of religions
can be applied to any historical or religious phenomenon: not only does a religion
come into conflict with one or more religions, and is either enhanced or diminished
through that conflict, but each religion has an ongoing inner conflict \textit{within itself}.
Therefore, in principle, no religion \textit{must} die off, but if it responds creatively and
critically within any given context, it will endure by providing one or more elements to
the new union resulting from the tension of two prior polar elements:

While specific religions, as well as specific cultures, do grow and die, the
forces which brought them into being, the type-determining elements, belong
to the nature of the holy and with it to the nature of man, and with it to the
nature of the universe and the revelatory self-manifestation of the divine.
Therefore the decisive point in a dialogue between two religions is not the
historically determined, contingent \textit{embodiment} of the typological elements,
but these elements themselves. Under the method of dynamic typology every
dialogue between religions is accompanied by a silent dialogue within the
representatives of each of the participating religions.\textsuperscript{37}

There are two important themes embedded within this passage. The first
sentence resonates with the 'cosmic' dialectic that was employed by Schelling, in
which the dialectic of the potencies is manifest within the divine, within nature, and
within human history, with each unfolding separately and in mutual interpenetration.
In Chapter 3 above, it was noted that Schelling is always and simultaneously
describing three things, the dialectical manifestation of God, the unfolding of 'finite
being', or creation, and the unfolding of human consciousness, in religion,
philosophy and art.\textsuperscript{38} Based on what Tillich said above about his method, this can
definitely be applied to him. This underscores how deeply intertwined his history of
religions is intertwined with his ontology, and by implication, how important Jewish
prophetism is to Tillich's dialectical history of religions.

Second, for Tillich the idea of the 'silent dialogue' could be an extension of
what occurred in the emergence of the Christian Logos. Given the context, he is
most likely referring to the tension occurring within a religious tradition, which could

\textsuperscript{37} Ibid., 35–36.

\textsuperscript{38} (1) the life of God, as God through his active potencies exoterically becomes fully himself; (2) the
vital historical line of finite being (other than God but not utterly discrete from him), which has its own
realization but which nevertheless bears inwardly the realization of God; (3) the history of human
consciousness, both collective and individual, which is bringing to unity nature and spirit in art, in
religion, and their finest expression, philosophy.' Thomas F. O'Meara, "Christianity is the Future of
Paganism": Schelling's Philosophy of Religion', in Leroy S. Souer, ed., Meaning, Truth and God
result in the creation of a new unity. For example, as discussed in Chapter 6 of this dissertation, Tillich viewed polytheism as predominantly concrete with some absolute features, and he viewed monotheism as predominantly absolute with some concrete features. He believed that the perfect balance was achieved between the two poles of monotheism and polytheism, or more specifically, when trinitarian monotheism emerged. For Tillich, this occurred at ‘the right time’, when the Christian Logos became manifest, in the appearance and reception of Jesus as the Christ, the bearer of the New Being.

When Tillich applies this framework to the relationship between Christianity and Buddhism, he is only willing to venture a preliminary statement that Christianity and Buddhism occupy opposite poles within a single polarity, and that each has maintained a sacramental basis, but also moved beyond it, in one of two possible directions.\(^39\) For Tillich, one direction is towards a mystical expression, ‘the experience of the holy as being’, which is predominantly seen in the religions of India.\(^40\) The other possible direction is towards an ethical expression, ‘the experience of the holy as what ought to be’, predominantly seen in the religion of Israel.\(^41\) This is similar to the Is/Ought, mysticism/prophetic, Christianity/Judaism set of polarities that have been discussed in prior chapters of this dissertation, but Tillich is extending how they can be used to encompass non-Christian religions. This is revealing

\(^39\) Tillich cites an example of a Christian theologian arguing for the relative priority of ‘the ethical’ over ‘the mystical’ in a dialogue with a Buddhist priest, and at a minimum the Christian concedes that he struggles with the same tension within his own tradition. *Encounter*, 36–37.

\(^40\) Ibid.

\(^41\) Ibid.
because it shows how he attempts to simultaneously retain his theological dialectic of the history of religions, yet modify its concepts to expand the scope such that it could encompass any religion. Tillich concludes this brief methodological statement by acknowledging that it is a preliminary instance of dialogue between religions, but that it also illustrates the encounter and conflict of elements of ‘the Holy’ within every particular religion.\textsuperscript{42}

To Tillich’s credit, adaptability is laudable, but his method continued to have limitations. James Kitagawa relates an instance where he reached an impasse with a Buddhist, when the Buddhist questioned why Tillich chose as his basic religious categories ‘being rather than non-being, life rather than death’.\textsuperscript{43} Kitagawa observes that Tillich, despite shedding many features of exclusivist Christian monotheism, was still analyzing non-Christian religions on his own terms, increasing the possibility of an impasse in interfaith dialogue.\textsuperscript{44} It is outside the scope of this dissertation to thoroughly analyze the adequacy of Tillich’s framework for interfaith dialogue, but it is clear that he was willing to modify his ideas when he encountered new phenomena that required interpretation. Further, in section 4 of this chapter, I will

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{42} Ibid., 37.
\item \textsuperscript{44} This provides more context on Kitagawa’s observation: ‘Although he [Tillich] abandoned some of his formal categories in his conversations with non-Christian thinkers, he had definite ideas about the universality of religion lying in the depths of concrete religions. Thus, his approach to a dialogue was to compare, on his own terms, the typical structures of a unique form of historic religions with the typical structures appearing in Christianity as a historic religion. Therefore, when a Buddhist asked a prior question, such as why he [Tillich] chose as basic religious categories “being rather than nonbeing, life rather than death”, it was difficult to continue the dialogue.’ ’Encounter’, 211.
\end{itemize}
show that Tillich's strategy of employing a term like Jewish prophetism as a proxy for something else, like a critical consciousness, is a common strategy. This convention often accompanies the denigration of real Jews. However, in Tillich's case, the opposite is true.

Tillich's final public lecture given in 1965, referred to as lecture number eight, 'Significance', continues in the same direction as the Bampton Lectures. 'Significance' possesses three characteristics that relate to the argument of this chapter. First, he maintains a dialectical history of religions as the underlying framework of his comparative analysis of Christianity and non-Christian religions. Second, he employs the principle of justice, as derived from the Hebrew prophets Amos and Hosea, as an essential critical principle within his dialectical framework. Third, his dialectical framework provides criteria that, to the extent they emerge in one phenomenon, will constitute his optimal, non-Christocentric, form of religion, 'the religion of the concrete spirit'. The importance of the principle of justice was discussed in Chapter 6 of this dissertation, contained in the occasional lecture 'Significance'. The following will discuss Tillich's method of the history of religions, the third part of 'Significance'. This will show how he further modifies and applies his dynamic typology to enable dialogue with non-Christian religions, establishing a method for integrating all religions into a theological and revelatory framework.

Tillich's method aims to interpret the 'theological tradition in light of religious phenomena', meaning that he will attempt to explain the significance of non-

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45 Tillich, 'Significance', 75.
Christian religions for his theological history of religions. In doing so, Tillich seeks an alternative to natural theology, which in his opinion could not consistently relate the divine to the structure of the human mind. He also sought an alternative to ‘supernatural theology’, notably offered by classical Protestant orthodoxy, which is inadequate because it fails to address anyone beyond the ‘revelatory circle’, according to Tillich. His alternative is based on the assumption that the inner telos of the history of religions is ‘the religion of the concrete spirit’, which reflects the dialectical unity of the sacramental, mystical and prophetic/ethical elements. This is yet another manifestation of Tillich’s ‘dialectic of the Holy’. This method for deriving the religion of the concrete spirit possesses five steps: (i) the proper attitude of the theologian must be a balance of detachment and objectivity, in creative tension with existential participation; (ii) the determination of the ‘religious question(s)’ within history and culture, or the identification of current experiences of the Holy; (iii) the development of a phenomenology of religion, which captures the symbols, ideas, texts and rituals of current experiences of the Holy; (iv) an analysis of these religious phenomena to understand their interrelatedness to one another, and to traditional forms; and (v) the historian of religions applies the reinterpreted concepts to the present religious and cultural situation. Tillich’s vision is to apply these presuppositions ‘in the context of the history of the human race and into the

46 Ibid., 76–77.
47 Ibid., 76.
48 Ibid., 71–72.
49 Ibid., 77.
experiences of mankind as expressed in the great symbols of religious history'.

Tillich argues that three advantages accrue from this method, the first of which is that religious symbols will be understood in relation to their origin and within their current social matrix. Second, he says that religious symbolism is predominantly anthropological, and to compare insights from different religious traditions, cross-culturally, will provide great insight into the human condition generally. Third, this expression of theology has an 'experiential basis', and that this is what saves theology from abstraction, and provides it with 'depth'. Tillich’s reference to 'depth' here is an extension of the fifth presupposition of his theology of the history of religions, that the sacred is the 'depth' of the secular, meaning that the sacred is both the (i) creative ground of the secular and (ii) the critical judgment of the secular. For Tillich, the 'critical dimension' appears at every key point in his framework.

By the end of his life, Tillich had articulated a highly adaptive form of analysis, as he responded to momentous challenges. The main examples discussed in this dissertation are the Holocaust and the problems of anti-Judaism and anti-Semitism. These led him away from what appears to be Christian exclusivism in the 1910 and 1912 Dissertations, to an emerging view of Judaism and Christianity as equals (a 'Judeo-Christianity'), developed during the decades of the 1930s into the 1960s.

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50 Ibid., 77–78.
51 Ibid., 78.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid., 78–79.
There also appears to be another shift, which occurred after Tillich's visit to Japan in 1960. While Tillich maintains his dialectical structure that is charged with theological meaning, he casts aside any distinctively Christian terminology, in favour of the universally applicable 'religion of the concrete spirit', which retains the dialectic of the Holy.

The flexibility of Tillich's framework is chiefly attributable to two characteristics. The first characteristic is the tension between the universal and the concrete, with the pivotal aspect being the concept of concreteness. For Tillich, the emergence of the concept of concreteness, appears to have supplantled the concept of particularity, which is primarily an epistemological concept. Concreteness, with its existential dimension, is fundamental to his Christology, expressed in the union of the absolutely universal and the absolutely concrete. However, for Tillich, concreteness also reflects the experiential and personal aspect of religion. The second characteristic is the tension between the creative and the critical, which was seen in lecture number seven, 'Encounter'. This is where he described contrasting 'poles', or religious/historical phenomena, within one 'structure', the dialectical history of religions. For Tillich, the critical aspect has its roots in Jewish prophetism. The continued adaptability of his framework appears to hinge on the persistent emphasis on existential and critical aspects.
7.4 The Use and Abuse of Judaism within the Western Tradition

An attentive reader may have noticed the frequency with which the phrase 'role' or 'function' was appended to Judaism, Jewish prophethood or any of the equivalent terms, in the preceding chapters. For example, earlier in this chapter I observed that Tillich's religion of the concrete spirit reflects the dialectical unity of the sacramental/mystical and prophetic/ethical elements. The prophetic/ethical elements possess a specific function within Tillich's dialectical history of religions, which may not be related to specific Jews in a particular time or place. Such a theoretical use of Jewish prophethood might strike us as peculiar. However, according to David Nirenberg's magisterial *Anti-Judaism: The Western Tradition*, this has been a pervasive practice. Nirenberg shows, in many and various ways, that using 'Judaism' to express or describe something else, pre-dated the emergence of Christianity, and has occurred repeatedly into the modern period. After summarizing Nirenberg's argument, I will use his analysis of German Idealism to illustrate the complex ways that negative associations attached to Judaism, and became part of the context inherited by Tillich. It should become evident that Tillich's idea of Judaism, also originating within the context of German Idealism, was positive by contrast.

For Nirenberg, 'Judaism', and its correlate 'anti-Judaism', have been busy playing supporting roles in the unfolding drama of western civilization, first appearing in antiquity, and have made appearances at decisive points into the modern period. Nirenberg uses the metaphors of 'work' and 'working' repeatedly to characterize the
many ways in which ‘Judaism’ and ‘anti-Judaism’ function within the western tradition, quite often apart from reference to specific communities of Jews. In this respect, Nirenberg’s constructs are similar to Tillich’s idea of Judaism and its synonyms, such as Jewish prophetism.

Nirenberg’s argument has three relevant aspects. First, Nirenberg’s ‘Judaism’ does not primarily refer to the specific religion of a specific people, but is rather ‘a category, a set of ideas and attributes with which non-Jews can criticize and make sense of their world’. The correlate of Nirenberg’s ‘Judaism’, is ‘anti-Judaism’, which for him is not simply a negative attitude toward Judaism, but is also a way of critically engaging the world. The terms are not strictly opposites, depending upon how the function of ‘Judaism’ operates within the particular context. For example, if ‘Judaism’ or ‘being Jewish’ has a negative association by being associated with irrationality, then the historic religion of Judaism and its practitioners are impugned. Most of the examples Nirenberg uses work like this.

Second, for Nirenberg, both ‘Judaism’ and ‘anti-Judaism’ reflect ‘habits of thought’ that developed to help us understand our world. For Nirenberg, academic disciplines were influenced, and sometimes transformed by changing senses of ‘Judaism’ – epistemology, which is concerned with the relation between the ‘knowing

54 Since Nirenberg uses both ‘Judaism’ and ‘anti-Judaism’ in a specific sense, when his terms are referred to, each will be presented in quotation marks to distinguish them from more customary senses.
55 Nirenberg, Anti-Judaism, 3.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid., 2.
subject' and the 'known object'; metaphysics, which is concerned with the relation between spirit and matter; hermeneutics, which is concerned with the relation between 'letter' and 'spirit'; and political theory, which is concerned with power relations between rulers and ruled. For Nirenberg, echoing Marx, each of these questions became, in one way or another, 'Jewish questions'.

Third, Nirenberg deliberately refrains from an analysis of anti-Semitism in order to isolate the ideas that helped to make the Holocaust possible. Methodologically, Nirenberg strongly supports the use of intellectual history, while acknowledging its limitations, including the problem of historical causality. This means that he is aware of the potential to incorrectly infer that since a person or group maintains negative perceptions of Jews, they will act in antagonistic ways towards Jews. Nevertheless, at the end of the final chapter, Nirenberg correctly concludes that 'the Holocaust was inconceivable and is unexplainable' without the 'deep history of thought' that he provides, underscoring the importance of the history of ideas to explain these phenomena.

There are undoubtedly many reasons why the extermination of millions of Jews became not only imaginable but implementable in mid-twentieth-century Germany and not in some other place and time. But none of those factors functioned independently of the history sketched in this book. The 'Jewish' terrors that assailed Germany and many of its neighbors in the first half of the

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58 See introduction, 2–5, and chapter 13 of Nirenberg, Anti-Judaism.
59 Ibid., 3.
60 Ibid., 459.
twentieth century were not reflections of reality, or eccentric fantasies imposed on a populace by a powerful propaganda machine … They were rather the product of a history that had encoded the threat of Judaism into some of the basic concepts of Western thought, regenerating that threat in new forms fitting for new periods, and helping far too many citizens of the twentieth century make sense of their world. We will fail to understand these terrors or their effects if we sunder them from what came before.\(^6\)

It is revealing, for example, that the vast majority of associations with Nirenberg's 'Judaism' are negative, and this coheres with the general understanding that there have been periodically virulent strains of theological anti-Judaism and anti-Semitism within western Christianity and society. However, Nirenberg's primary goal is to isolate the many ways in which 'Judaism' functions within the western tradition, allowing him to explore the 'habits of thought' that have made possible antagonism and hostility towards real, living Jews.

One of the first examples Nirenberg uses is from the Apostle Paul's first letter to the Corinthians, where Paul contrasts God's wisdom with human wisdom. According to Nirenberg, Paul's view of human wisdom has two expressions, Jewish and Greek: 'Since in the wisdom of God the world was unable to recognize God through wisdom, it was God's own pleasure to save believers through the folly of the gospel. While the Jews require signs (\textit{semeia}) and the Greeks look for wisdom (\textit{sophia}), we are preaching a crucified Christ: a scandal to the Jews, to the gentiles

\(^6\) Ibid.
foolishness." Nirenberg makes two observations about this. First, Paul’s proclamation about Christ totally transforms what humans can know and how they can know it. Second, this fundamental aspect of human knowledge is understood, in part, with reference to ‘Jews’, although the meaning of the term ‘Jews’ is already becoming extended to something other than ‘real Jews’. In this context, Nirenberg observes that both ‘Jewish signs’ and ‘Greek learning’ represent human arrogance and foolishness, in contrast to God’s wisdom. This is the first of many oppositions between something ‘Jewish’ and something desirable in the western tradition. Due to the limits of space, Nirenberg’s entire book cannot be summarized here, although it is revealing that he analyzes the phenomena of ‘Judaism’ and ‘anti-Judaism’ in thirteen chapters across the vast territory of the following periods: (1) ancient Egypt and the Roman Empire; (2) early Christianity and the formation of the Christian Gospels; (3) the Christian Patristic period through Augustine, including Augustine’s ‘witness doctrine’; (4) the emergence of Islam; (5) medieval Europe; (6) the Roman

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63 Nirenberg, Anti-Judaism, 53–54.
64 Ibid., 54.
65 Augustine’s ‘witness doctrine’ holds that the Jews must be permitted to exist within Christian society, albeit as outcasts, so that their ongoing physical presence and use of their scriptures – the Old Testament for Christians – can ‘testify’ to the fact that Christians did not fabricate the Old Testament prophecies concerning Christ to fit the facts of Jesus’ life and crucifixion. Augustine cites Psalm 59:11 to support this view: ‘Slay them not, but scatter them in your might, lest your people forget your Law.’ Nirenberg argues that this is an example of Augustine’s ‘historical realism’, which sought to retain elements of historical truth in the Old Testament, as opposed to ‘spiritualizing’ it away, like the Manichaeans, Marcionites and docetists; cf. Nirenberg, Anti-Judaism, 130–131. For a detailed analysis of the hermeneutical issues surrounding the witness doctrine, see Paula Fredriksen’s Augustine and the Jews: A Christian Defense of Jews and Judaism (New York: Doubleday, 2008).
Catholic Inquisition and the expulsion of Jews from Spain; (7) the Protestant
Reformation and Martin Luther; (8) Shakespearean England; (9) the importance of
‘Israel’ in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Christian political theory; (10) the
Enlightenment revolt against ‘Judaism’; (11) the revolutionary impulse starting with
the French Revolution; (12) the role of ‘Judaism’ in German Philosophy, including
Fichte, Kant, and Hegel; and (13) the modern period, discussing Marx, the social
sciences and the scientific study of religion.

7.4.1 German Idealism’s ‘New Science of Hating Judaism’

Nirenberg’s argues that the potential for anti-Jewish sentiment was ‘endemic to the
whole project of German Idealism’, based upon the ‘habits of thought’ emanating
from it. His analysis begins with Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s (1762–1814) *Addresses to
the German Nation*, delivered in Berlin in 1807/1808. Nirenberg observes that the
Addresses are similar to numerous earlier ideologies, since they interpret the history
of the world as a war between two forces; in Fichte’s case, love and self-interest.

According to Nirenberg, Fichte contrasts Romantic German virtues to Enlightenment
French vices. For Fichte, the French are just like the Jews, in that both are incapable
of apprehending the depths of reality, and are deceived by appearances. By
contrast, Fichte’s Germans love their soil, tribe and nation, which together have a
divine quality. For Nirenberg, not only do Fichte’s lectures foster negative
perceptions of Judaism, they also exemplify a new ‘critical science’, based upon the

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67 Ibid., 388.
68 Ibid., 389–390.
Enlightenment view of human reason freed from dogma and tradition. According to Nirenberg, this new critical science, the tool of German Idealism, led to an 'entirely new species' of Jew hatred, as initially noticed by Jewish bookseller Saul Ascher in Berlin in 1794.\(^6\)

According to Nirenberg, Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) deepened this anti-Jewish narrative. Kant made possible new understandings of freedom, thereby adding epistemological, metaphysical and ethical dimensions to the construct 'Judaism', through his revolutionary views of human knowledge (epistemology) and human freedom (ethics). For example, in the material world of 'things', Kant moved beyond British empiricism, whose view of human reason was subject to natural laws, making human beings 'slaves of necessity', like Jews.\(^7\) For Nirenberg, Kant's view of reason actively shaped our understanding of the material world, through the categories of space, time, causality and substance, instead of passively receiving sense impressions.\(^8\) Nirenberg points out that this radically limited what can be thought of as 'knowledge', and posited a sharp dichotomy between what can be truly known, 'things-in-themselves', and mere 'appearances'.\(^9\) For Kant, it was erroneous to confuse reality with mere appearances, which was something the Pharisees (i.e. read 'Jews') were guilty of.\(^10\) However, the corresponding benefit, in relation to the British empiricists, is to free the knowing subject so that it may be free to constitute

\(^{6}\) Ibid., 390.
\(^{7}\) Ibid., 391–392.
\(^{8}\) Ibid.
\(^{9}\) Ibid., 392.
\(^{10}\) Ibid., 392–393.
the laws of nature and not simply respond to them.

Nirenberg argues that Kant also sought to free morality from the fear of punishment, by translating the Apostle Paul's distinctions between 'inner' and 'outer' circumcision, and 'hearers and doers of the law', into the secular language of rational philosophy.74 Kant's 'categorical imperative' describes how it is rational to act 'as if' we are subject to a universal moral law, in accordance with reason.75 Nirenberg argues that Kant's 'dualism' between the material world of necessity, and the spiritual world of human freedom, was central to his thought and caused him to associate 'Judaism' with the material, sensible realm of un-freedom.76 For Nirenberg, both Fichte and Kant, as representatives of German Idealism, were latter-day 'Manichaeans' and Marcionite dualists who 'amplified the language of anti-Judaism' to create the new science of hating Judaism.77

7.4.2 Hegel's Incarnational Dialectic

Nirenberg's account of German Idealism peaks with his exposition of the thought of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831), who attempted to transcend the aforementioned dualisms through an 'Incarnational dialectic'. Whereas for Kant and Fichte, 'Judaism' was associated with the material dimension of the matter/spirit dualism, for Hegel, it was the dualisms themselves that were 'Jewish':

74 Ibid., 393.
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid., 394–395. This may have been what led the Nazis much later to portray Jews as purveyors of 'sensuality'.
77 Ibid., 395.
Hegel was like St Augustine, a convert from ‘dualism’ to synthesis. In youth an ardent Kantian, by his early thirties he was convinced that Kant’s ‘ideal does not come to terms with reality … the real remains absolutely opposed’. This opposition, he claimed, was simply a new version of ‘the Jewish principle of opposing thought to reality, reason to sense; this principle involves the rending of life and lifeless connection between God and the world’. This ‘Jewish’ opposition of thought to reality could lead neither to religion nor to philosophy, for the one task of every living religion and true philosophy was to ‘strip off the forms of dualism from its extremes, rendering the opposition in the element of Universality fluid, and bringing it to reconciliation’. Christ had once shown humanity how to achieve this reconciliation through his crucifixion. Now it was Hegel’s calling to do so through his philosophy.\(^7^8\)

According to Nirenberg, it was Hegel’s understanding of the history of religion and his Christology that sought to reconcile and transcend the dualisms inherited from Kant. In exploring these themes, Nirenberg draws mainly upon Hegel’s *The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate* (1799).\(^7^9\) In *Spirit*, Hegel makes several arguments that criticize Kant’s ethics, although the starting point is the history of religion. First,


Hegel interprets the history of revelation as the unfolding of a contest between two peoples, forces or principles (like Fichte and others), in this case Noah and Nimrod. According to Nirenberg’s view of Hegel, Noah represents the Kantians, who rely upon thought and reason, and Nimrod represents the British empiricists, who sought to master nature through physical strength. Second, for Nirenberg, Hegel interprets Abraham’s sojourn out of Ur of Chaldees in Genesis 12 as a rupture with, and alienation from creation, making the Jews slaves to the material world: ‘all the miseries of Israel are rooted in Abraham’s rejection of the world in favour of a ‘sublime’ God’. Third, according to Nirenberg, Hegel’s Jesus differed greatly from Kant’s moralistic Jesus, by calling for ‘fulfillment’ of the law, which could be attained through a synthesis of love and law, subject and object, and universal and particular. Nirenberg summarizes Hegel’s Christological dialectic in this way: ‘(his) philosophy posits as its goal the dialectical overcoming of all oppositions, a process explicitly patterned on the overcoming of the difference between God and man, in the Incarnation and Passion of Jesus Christ. By writing the man-God union across all the fundamental oppositions of religion and philosophy – infinite and finite, love and law, spirit and letter, reason and nature – Hegel seeks to synthesize (technically sublate) all of them in the dialectical movement of the spirit across the ages.’

According to Nirenberg, Hegel’s negative view of ‘Judaism’ lessened to some degree in his 1827 Lectures, by assigning to Judaism a necessary role in the

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80 Nirenberg, Anti-Judaism, 398, citing Hegel, Spirit (no page given).
81 Nirenberg, Anti-Judaism, 399–400.
82 Ibid., 401.
83 Ibid., 402.
dialectical unfolding of Spirit throughout history, rather than alienation from that which is fundamentally human, as in *Spirit*.\(^{84}\) Nevertheless, for Nirenberg, Hegel still wrestled with the issue of why the Jews as a people refused to renounce their faith and ‘exit the stage of history once their assigned moment was over’.\(^{85}\) Despite Hegel’s Christological dialectic, which sought to reconcile all opposites into a higher unity, this did not elevate the status of Judaism within Hegel’s history of religion.

Nirenberg concludes his analysis of German Idealism by observing that this process of attaching this complex set of features to ‘Judaism’ occurred during periods of great social, political and economic upheaval. He is referring to the period from the start of the French Revolution in 1789 to the beginning of World War One in 1914, across ‘the long nineteenth century’.\(^{86}\) According to Nirenberg, during this period of immense change and dislocation, observers typically worried that European culture was becoming ‘more Jewish’, and envisioned a future that involved the overcoming or elimination of whatever form of ‘Judaism’ they feared.\(^{87}\) Nirenberg observes that this confluence of ideas was germinating and taking hold at the same time that the Jewish population of western Europe swelled.\(^{88}\) For Nirenberg, the great irony is that as the numbers of real Jews increased, the various kinds of philosophical roles played by ‘Judaism’ also increased in number, and were typically

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\(^{84}\) Ibid., 403–404.
\(^{85}\) Nirenberg adds: ‘But Judaism after Christ will remain for him a type of necrophilia: a dead man walking, an undigestible remnant expelled from the guts of history’. He appears to be quoting Hegel here, but the note does not cite which of Hegel’s works. Ibid., 404.
\(^{86}\) Ibid., 421.
\(^{87}\) Ibid.
\(^{88}\) Ibid., 422.
negative in tone and/or content.\textsuperscript{89}

The way in which Tillich uses the German Idealist framework results in a more favourable view of Judaism, when contrasted with the brief sketches of Fichte, Kant and Hegel provided above. Fichte, as portrayed by Nirenberg, understood European history as embodying a dualistic conflict between the godless French Enlightenment and divinely inspired German Romanticism, with the Jews being located on the godless side of this divide. Tillich, by contrast, did not interpret history dualistically, but dialectically, with a religious or historical movement enduring to the extent that it possessed critical and creative capacities, with Jewish prophetism being the model of critical capacities.

Kant, as portrayed by Nirenberg, maintained a dualistic epistemological framework, resulting in the distinction between the ‘mere appearances’ and the ‘things-in-themselves’, with (Jewish) Pharisees unable to correctly discern one from the other. Tillich responded to Kant’s epistemology, with his concept of the ‘depth of reason’ in which the subject–object dichotomy is not the starting point of the analysis, but is preceded by a wider view of rationality that has an existential component, and that also raises the question of revelation.\textsuperscript{90} In prior chapters it was shown how Tillich does assign ethical values to the metaphysical concepts of time and space, with Jewish prophetism being associated with time, and idolatry with space. In addition, as portrayed by Nirenberg, Kant’s ethics assumed a dualism

\textsuperscript{89} ‘just when it became most necessary to perceive the differences between real Jews and figures of Judaism, critical thought blurred them once again into one’. Ibid.

\textsuperscript{90} STI, 79–83.
between the material world of necessity, which the Jews were not able to transcend, and the spiritual world of freedom. In contrast, Tillich’s view of freedom is fundamentally different from Kant’s dualism, of freedom and necessity. For Tillich, freedom is not ‘indeterministic contingency’, and it is not opposed to necessity, which thought of as ‘mechanistic determinacy’; rather, ‘Freedom in polarity with destiny is the structural element which makes existence possible because it transcends the essential necessity of being without destroying it.’ For Tillich, this has nothing to do with Jews or Judaism.

As portrayed by Nirenberg, for Hegel it was the dualisms themselves, like thought versus reality, that were Jewish. As described above, Hegel’s Christology sought to ‘sublate’ all of the fundamental oppositions of religion and philosophy – finite and infinite, love and law, spirit and letter, reason and nature. This bears some similarity to Tillich’s doctrine of the Christian logos, which is the dialectical relationship between absolute concreteness and absolute universality. In these ways, both Hegel’s and Tillich’s Christologies seek to be dialectically ‘unitive’, and not divisive. However, as seen above in Nirenberg’s account of Hegel’s history of

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Note: The full passage reads: ‘Man is man because he has freedom, but he has freedom only in polar interdependence with destiny. The term “destiny” is unusual in this context. Ordinarily one speaks of freedom and necessity. However, necessity is a category and not an element. Its contrast is possibility, not freedom. Whenever freedom and necessity are set over against each other, necessity is understood in terms of mechanistic determinacy and freedom is thought of in terms of indeterministic contingency. Neither of these interpretations grasps the structure of being as it is experienced immediately in the one being who has the possibility of experiencing it because he is free, that is, in man. Man experiences the structure of the individual as the bearer of freedom within the larger structures to which the individual structure belongs. Destiny points to this situation in which man finds himself, facing the world to which, at the same time, he belongs.’ ST I, 182–183.
religion, Judaism is deemed to inferior to Christianity. As demonstrated in Chapter 6 of this dissertation, both Tillich’s history of religion and his Christology maintain dialectical parity between Christianity and Judaism, two examples of Tillich’s dialectic of the Holy. With respect to the role of Judaism within Tillich’s history of religion, Tillich’s view portrays Judaism more favourably than Hegel.

7.5 Conclusion
Despite the weighty subject matter, and somewhat complicated arguments, this dissertation has a modest purpose. It seeks to place Tillich’s idea of Judaism in a relatively positive light, especially in contrast to his contemporaries. This was demonstrated in a ‘big-picture’ way in Chapters 2 and 7. In Chapter 2 the contrast was made between German Christians and others who employed history of religions methods to deny the Jewish roots of Christianity, and Tillich’s use of the history of religions. This was suggestive and far from comprehensive. For example, to compare Tillich to any other theologian, whether it be Karl Barth, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, or Emanuel Hirsch, would have been the subject of a separate dissertation, and probably one worth doing. Or, to even make the claim that Tillich, as a Protestant Christian thinker, had a uniquely positive view of Judaism given his context would be assuming too much. There could have been – and probably were – ‘free church’ Protestants from the Anabaptist tradition in Germany that had even more ecumenical views of the relationship between Judaism and Christianity than Tillich. In his article, ‘Protestantism and Antisemitism’, Tillich says that ‘Sectarian Christianity’, meaning the non-state supported churches, were unequivocally the enemy of anti-Semitism
because of their theological assumption that the presence of the divine is found in every human soul, Jew and non-Jew alike.\textsuperscript{92} The same reasoning applies to what can be concluded from this chapter, the contrast between Tillich’s use of German Idealism, and those German Idealists discussed by Nirenberg. More work would have to be done at the primary source level to arrive at something other than my provisional conclusion. The purpose of the contrast with German Christianity in Chapter 2, and Nirenberg’s reading of German Idealism in this chapter, was to put Tillich’s idea of Judaism into perspective, and to shed positive light on his method.

In addition, I think that enough evidence has been provided to support my contention that Tillich’s relatively positive view of Judaism was made possible, at least in part, by his ‘idea of Judaism’, and its synonyms, such as ‘Jewish prophetism’. This issue of causality here is similar to Nirenberg’s claim about intellectual history. To review, Nirenberg said that one cannot assume that since a person or group has negative perceptions of Jews, that he or they will act in an antagonistic manner towards Jews. But the pervasiveness of his evidence about ‘habits of thought’ that portray Jews and Judaism in a negative light clearly makes possible antagonistic behaviour. The same reasoning applies to Tillich’s behaviour towards Jews and Judaism. We cannot say for certain that his theological method was what drove him to make friends with Jews, to lecture in synagogues, promote interfaith understanding, etc. However, his pro-Jewish method, or his appeal to a ‘Judeo-Christian dialectic’ are both revealing, and help to make sense of his ecumenical actions.

\textsuperscript{92} Tillich, ‘Protestantism and Antisemitism’, bMS 649/62 (7), 9–10.
Nevertheless, despite the modesty of this conclusion, Tillich was passionate about the importance of the prophetic dimension of religion, because he understood the human tendency toward idolatry, which is the never-ending temptation to relate to that which is contingent as if it were absolute. This struggle between the prophetic and the idolatrous was one aspect of Tillich’s understanding of history. For Tillich, this struggle will continue until the final consummation. It is this struggle that sheds light on a provocative statement of Tillich’s in the Judenfrage lectures, that can appropriately punctuate this lengthy analysis: ‘Anti-Judaism originates in the instant in which Christianity comes into the pagan world and must make itself understandable to paganism.’\footnote{Judenfrage lectures, 429.}
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