

**Agencification and Quangocratisation of
Cultural Organisations in the U.K. and South
Korea: Theory and Policy**

**(Case Studies of Tate Modern and
the National Museum of Modern and Contemporary Art)**

Submitted by Chang Sung Jung to the University of Exeter as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Politics, September 2014.

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Abstract

This research focuses on agencification and quangocratisation (AQ) through a comparison of the experiences of South Korea and the UK. Although a number of studies of AQ have been produced recently, these reforms remain inadequately understood. Since AQ involves the structural disaggregation of administrative units from existing departments, executive agencies and quangos have distinct characteristics which are quite different from ordinary core departments. There are a number of factors which influence these changes; and this thesis explores nine existing theories which are available to explain these phenomena.

Case studies are presented of Tate Modern in the UK and the National Museum of Modern and Contemporary Art (MMCA), which are carefully analysed to examine the validity of those nine arguments. Although cultural agencies, which show some unique features, have become increasingly an essential part of the national economy, they have scarcely been researched from the viewpoint of public policy. This thesis endeavours to explore distinctive characteristics of this policy area; and moreover, it examines the diverse variables which have an impact on policy formation and its results through the process of comparison of arguments.

The major tasks of this thesis are to investigate the applicability of the nine arguments and to weigh their merits. As a corollary of this comprehensiveness, it examines the whole public sectors of both countries, in order to show the broader picture and to understand the processes of changes and their backgrounds. More profoundly, similarities and differences between both countries are compared from both macro and micro perspectives. At the same time, the results of AQ are analysed through the comparison of outputs or outcomes before and after these changes, with a view to exploring whether their rationales are appropriate. Furthermore, it also examines the institutional constraints which influence not only the change of agencies but also their performances. Besides which, it seeks to find strategies for overcoming these constraints.

This thesis adopts systematic and comprehensive approaches regarding basic concepts and data. It draws on theories of comparative research, the scope of the public sector, the classification and analysis of agencies and quangos, and theories underlying the detailed components of each argument and epistemological assumptions. Therefore, it suggests various aspects which enable us to broaden our understanding of the changes within the public sector; and to generate practical understanding to inform real world reform.

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Abbreviations

ACGB	Arts Council of Great Britain
ACUD	Act on the Collection and Use of Donations
AEOEA	Act on the Establishment and Operation of Executive Agencies
AI	Affiliated Institution
AIL	Acceptance in Lieu
AMPI	Act on the Management of Public Institution
AQ	Agencification and Quangocratisation
ALBs	Arm's Length Bodies
BAI	Board of Audit and Inspection
BEA	British Executive Agency
BSC	Balanced Score Cards
CE	Chief Executive
CPI	Corruption Perception Index
CRGA	Constitutional Reform and Governance Act
CSD	Civil Service Department
CSR	Comprehensive Spending Review
DCMS	Department for Culture Media and Sport
DES	Department of Education and Science
DNH	Department for National Heritage
DQGLs	Delegated implementing Quasi-Governmental Institutions
DSC	Defense Security Command
EAOC	Executive Agencies Operation Committee
EAORB	Executive Agency Operation Review Board
ECSTC	Education Culture Sports and Tourism Committee
EGO	Extra Governmental Organisation
EPB	Economic Planning Board
EYF	End Year Flexibility
FMI	Financial Management Initiative
FQGLs	Fund managing Quasi-Governmental Institutions
FTE	Full Time Equivalent
GMGO	Guidance on the Management of Government Organization
GOA	Government Organisation Act
GSAD	Global Statistical Analysis Design
GSGD	Generally Similar Group Design
GSM	Gwacheon Science Museum
GSS	Government Statistical Service
HI	Historical Institutionalism
IAls	Independent Administration Institutions
IMD	International Institute for Management Development
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ITU	International Telecommunication Union

JNAOA	Japanese National Administrative Organization Act
JUG	Joined-Up Government
KEA	Korean Executive Agency
KFRI	Korea Forest Research Institute
MbO	Management by Objectives
MCST	Ministry of Culture Sports and Tourism
MCT	Ministry of Culture and Tourism
MDSD	Most Different System Design
MGA	Ministry of Government Administration
MGA 1992	Museum and Gallery Act 1992
MLAC	Museums, Libraries and Archives Council
MMCA	National Museum of Modern and Contemporary Art
MNAs	Members of the National Assembly
MoCA	National Museum of Contemporary Art
MoD	Ministry of Defence
MoGAHA	Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs * The MoGAHA changed into the MoPAS in 2008 and the MoSPA in 2013.
MoMA	Museum of Modern Art (New York)
MoSF	Ministry of Strategy and Finance
MoPAS	Ministry of Public Administration and Security
MoSPA	Ministry of Security and Public Administration
MPs	Members of Parliament
MPB	Ministry of Planning and Budget
MPEs	Market-type Public Enterprises
MSSD	Most Similar System Design
NACC	National Art Conservation Centre
NAO	National Audit Office
NCSA	National Civil Service Act
NDPB	Non-Departmental Public Bodies
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NGTGA1954	National Gallery and Tate Gallery Act 1954
NFRDI	National Fisheries Research and Development Institute
NMD	Non-Ministerial Departments
NPIs	Not Classified Public Institutions
NPM	New Public Management
NPO	Non-Profit Organisation
OAL	Office of Arts and Libraries
OCPS	Open Competitive Position System
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
ONS	Office for National Statistics
OPSR	Office of Public Services Reform
OCPS	Open Competitive Position System
PASC	Public Administration Select Committee

PBO	Performance Based Organization
PCGID	Presidential Committee on Government Innovation and Decentralisation
PDOSR	Presidential Decree on the Organisational Structure and Responsibility
PFI	Private Finance Initiative
PGO	Para-Government Organisation
PIs	Public Institutions
PPBS	Planning Programming and Budgeting System
PRP	Performance-related Ray
PSA	Property Services Agency
PTC	Presidential Transition Committee
RBGR	Review Board for Government Reorganization
RCI	Rational Choice Institutionalism
QMPEs	Quasi-Market –type Public Enterprises
Quango	Quasi Autonomous Non-Governmental Organization
SAPBs	Semi-autonomous Public Bodies
SCS	Senior Civil Service
SeMA	Seoul Museum of Art
SFSD	Structural-Functional System Design
SLAA	Special Local Administration Agency
SMG	Science Museum Group
SNA	System of National Accounts
SNU	Seoul National University
SOA	Special Operating Agency
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SoRP	Statement of Recommended Practice
TQM	Total Quality Management
TUC	Trade Union Congress
UNPAN	United Nations Public Administration Network
VfM	Value for Money
YBAs	Young British Artists

Acknowledgements

Korean Fast Streamers who pass the Higher Civil Service Examination are likely to have studied economics, politics, public policy and public administration at an advanced level for at least three years. However, it has been said that it is quite difficult for practitioners to bridge the gap between theories and practices, since their jobs, in reality, are somewhat different from what they have learned. Luckily, I have experienced diverse missions: local finance; training of civil servants; budget allocation; personnel management; organisation planning; and a personal secretary to the Minister. I have been thus given an opportunity to grapple with these issues in terms of basic theories. Moreover, some among the Prime Ministers and Ministers, to whom I had to report, were often former professors. In particular, for the sake of the MoPAS (MoGAHA) I published a series of manuals and guides for *Performance Indicators*, *Tax expenditures*, *Policy advisors*, *Organisation management*, *Quangocratisation*, *Presidential Transition Committee* and others. The greater part of this thesis is based on those experiences. Yet I feared that possibly, as a civil servant, I might be too absorbed in official government documents and practical perspectives. Hence, in order to overcome this concern, I have read more than two thousand books, most of which I still possess. During the process of research, I have maintained the most important principle for me; that only when I have actually read material would I add it to the bibliography. My major interests were, in particular, political institutions in European countries, their civil service systems, political history and philosophy. In this thesis, numerous tables and figures, over which I have spent significant time, are used and almost all of them have been searched, analysed and developed by myself, and so cannot be found in other sources.

This thesis deals with comparative case studies, diverse arguments, and cultural administration but I, personally, would not recommend researching these subject to others, because the amount of study needed to be completed within four years is considerable. Yet, during the research, the classic books of Christopher Hood, Guy B. Peters and Christopher Pollitt were truly helpful. Whenever I faced serious difficulties, their books showed me the way. In addition, the books of other scholars such as Geert Bouckaert, Tom Christensen, Patrick Dunleavy, Matthew Flinders, Yeon-Seob Ha, Colin Hay, Michael Hill, Brian Hogwood, Patricia Ingraham, Yong-duck Jung, Donald Kettl, Laurence Lynn, Jr., Terry Moe, M. Jae Moon, Edward Page, Hal Rainey, R.A.W. Rhodes, David Richards, Martin Smith, Colin Talbot, Sandra van Thiel and Jon Pierre, gave substantial help. Unsurprisingly, for a thesis of this scope, my debts are too numerous to adequately acknowledge all the help in this small space. Thus I am, uncomfortably, obliged to be somewhat selective in my expressions of gratitude.

However, above all else, I have to confess that I owe the critical part of this thesis to Stephen Wilks who persistently encouraged and patiently waited for me for four years. His not only sharp but also warm comments have been the foundation of this thesis. Other

anonymous interviewees have also helped to enrich the thesis. Andrew Massey provided some essential documents, and Oliver James and Claire Dunlop offered helpful remarks at its earlier stage. Eric Bransden helped me through our discussions and books readings; without his help this thesis would have been quite difficult to finalise. I also gratefully acknowledge financial support for twenty-two months from Korean government and sincere concerns from Jooha Lee, Jaehyuk Pan, and many other friends and colleagues. Finally, words cannot express my gratitude to my family: consistent encouraging remarks from our parents have always spurred me to do better: Jaewon and Seungyun, who never complained when I bought home mountains of books, and taught me more than books and articles ever could, deserve all my thanks.

Chapter 1. Introduction

1-1. The Background of the Research

Over the past few decades a pandemic or even a 'quasi-religious' fervour (Hood, 2007: 7) of public sector reform has swept throughout the world. In the U.K., since Margaret Thatcher triggered tremendous reforms of the public sector (Theakston, 1995: 114-116), New Labour tried to maintain the pace of change (Richards, 2008: 48-53). Recently, David Cameron has tried to follow in some of Mrs. Thatcher's footsteps (Evans, 2010: 325) to grapple with the economic recession and debt crisis after the U.S. subprime market crashed (Kregel, 2008: 7). His rhetoric of the 'Big Society' is based upon the premise that the public sector should be reduced, as shown in the government's *Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR) 2010* (Dorey, 2014: 185, 199; Burnham and Horton, 2013: 3, 8, 43). Meanwhile, in the U.S., Osborne and Gaebler (1992; Rainey, 1998a: 148-149; Kettl, 1998: 7) argued for a reinvention of government based upon principles such as competition, decentralising authority and 'catalysing all sectors' (Greenwood et al., 2002: 8; Aberbach and Rockman, 2000: 134). As a corollary of this mass uptake of the New Public Management (NPM) around the world, managerialism concepts such as efficiency, value for money (VFM), performance and customer orientation became the aim of a myriad of governments (Barzelay, 1992: 8-9; Peters and Pierre, 2012: 8-9; Homburg et al., 2007: 1).

As far as South Korea (hereafter Korea) is concerned, since the *civilian government* of 1993 launched the liquidation of its authoritarian military bureaucracy, Kim Dae-jung's administration of 1998 initiated reform in earnest, in response to the shock of the financial crisis in 1997 (Oh, 1999: 223; Kim, 2005a: 77; Jung, 2014: 140-142). Since that time, Korea has witnessed substantial *structural* reform and *internal* change in the public sector over the past twenty years. Roh Mu-hyun's administration of 2003 stressed *innovation* of operation instead of structural reform and it followed that a decentralisation of authority, balanced development between regions, empowerment and performance evaluation were considered to be the best value (PCGID, 2007: 19-23; Roh and Lee, 2010: 336-337). However, president Roh was criticised for pursuing big government, stirring up continuous controversy over the ideal government size (see section 7-3). This could be one example of possible contradiction between reform principles where the pursuit of *competent and*

effective government might not accomplish the successful cutback management or *economy* principles at the same time (Park, 2008b: 190-191). By contrast, the Lee Myung-bak administration of 2008 and the Park Geun-hye administration of 2013 announced their '*practical government*' and '*Government 3.0*' programmes¹ as the central catchphrase of their terms in office, placing priority on 'escape from departmentalism' and combining functionally related departments². These administrations have also tried to incorporate or quangocratise departmental bodies and reform executive agencies to promote a market economy through deregulation and government reorganisation. In particular, the *Act on the Establishment and Operation of Executive Agencies* (AEOEA) was revised in 2011 to expand the range of the executive agency (NAPASC, 2010; NAOroK, 2011a; see section 7-5-2) and as a result, it was expected that there would be a big change in the executive agency system which was considered to be somewhat stagnant. In addition, the bill for incorporation or quangocratisation of Seoul National University (SNU), which had been debated for over 15 years, was passed in the National Assembly in December, 2010 (NAoRoK, 2010; section 8-1-1). While SNU had been operated by national civil servants and had paid its professors lower salaries than those in private universities, from 2012, it was able to employ education experts from the private sector and rewarded more competent professors with higher pay. It was expected that through these innovations, SNU would improve its own competitiveness. In fact, SNU which is considered to be one of the best universities in Korea, ranked 109th in the world in 2011, but now its quangocratisation has produced an expectation that it might possibly gain world-class university status in the near future.³

In the academic community, these reforms throughout the world are often understood as an effort to overcome traditional bureaucracy. The welfare state bureaucracy which was the 'backbone' of developed countries (Flinders, 1999a:

¹ While the previous administrations pursued efficiency inside government (Government 1.0) with a relatively limited release of information and participation (Government 2.0), the Government 3.0 programme is said to endeavour to accomplish the provision of more accumulated *big data* and a more enhanced service delivery tailored closely to the needs of the public (NIA, 2013: 13; MoSPA, 2013a: 1-2). This programme emphasises the augmented disclosure and sharing of information, communication and co-operation, as compared to the 'innovation' programmes of the previous administration (Cha, 2007: 68-72).

² This 'giantism' (Pyper, 1995: 52) might have violated the old administrative proverb 'span of control' (Peters, 2010:145; Gulick, 1937: 7), but research results show that to some extent the number of ministries is inversely proportional to government efficiency (see Klimek et al., 2008: 3939).

³ It ranked 59th in 2013 and 44th in 2014 (<http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/world-university-rankings>). Korea has followed the example of Japanese national universities' quangocratisation in 2004. However, unlike Japanese example where 87 national universities were incorporated at the same time, in Korea 41 national universities are expected to be quangocratised gradually. If all 41 national universities are incorporated, the identities of 26,537 employees will be changed from civil servants to public servants (see Table 7-6).

2) has been continuously challenged by anti-bureaucratic and managerial perspectives. Some commentators argue that bureaucracy which is the most important apparatus of public administration (Farnham and Horton, 1999: 26), seemed to show its own demise (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992: 15-16; Pinchot et al., 1996: 46-52). As a result, the classical terminology *public administration* was replaced by *public management* in the 1980s⁴ (Rhodes, 1991: 533; Massey, 2003: 12-16; Lynn, 2006: 8-13 and 2012: 18-19; Greener, 2009: 59), and some have argued that 'there is a further shift' into *governance* (Ferlie et al., 2007: 1). Although the starting point in which *public management* was in fashion is somewhat equivocal (Lynn, 2007: 27), it has had a significant influence over the public sector. For example, Max Weber's ideal definition of bureaucracy such as rule-boundness, principle of hierarchy, lifelong career prospects, written files and meritocracy (1946; Jenkins and Page, 2004a: xiv-xv; Dowding, 1995: 9; Pollitt, 2003a: 33-34 and 2013a: 112) are now substituted for managerial paradigms such as flexibility, decentralisation and private professionals.

However, it looks unlikely that bureaucracy will disappear in the near future (Milward and Rainey, 1988: 25; Aucoin, 2004: 688; Peters and Pierre, 2012: 7-8; du Gay, 2013: 290). In fact, as the NPM has not only challenged but also strengthened bureaucracy (Kettl, 2005: 42-44), correctional principles such as empowering and emphasising performance have been developed inside government to supplement traditional bureaucracy. With those changes, *structural* alternatives to classical bureaucracy have been designed in the Westminster countries (ibid: 40).⁵ The establishment of new executive agencies and quasi autonomous non-governmental bodies (quangos), or the transformation of existing departmental organisations into them, is another policy fashion among the OECD countries (section 3-2-1-1). Yet since bureaucracy has also existed in the *private* sector (especially in the Korean and Japanese entrepreneurial tradition), changing the structure of unresponsive, costly and inefficient public bureaucracy into business-like organisation does not mean that it is totally beyond the boundary of bureaucracy. For example, Meier and Hill (2007: 55) questioned whether, in reality, government bureaucracies could be totally replaced with private sector organisations whose accountability is more difficult to maintain. Even though both *internal* and *structural* transformations of classical bureaucracy involve considerable changes in its traditional characteristics, these reforms could still be evaluated

⁴ For example, see Burnham and Horton (2013:1).

⁵ Kettl argued that reform around the world might be divided into two broad models (Kettl, 2005: 9-40) *Westminster* reforms which have focused on transformation of structure; and *American-style* reform, focused on the reform of operations (Kettl et al., 1996: 11-21).

as simply some adaptations within the bureaucracy (section 8-3-3). These modified theories of bureaucracy are derived from a variety of approaches rather than just one theory. In other words, different diagnoses of the main cause of the problems in public bureaucracy have generated different solutions regarding the rectification of bureaucracy (Peters, 2010: 328). This thesis focuses on the causes, pros and cons of internal and structural reforms which are intended to improve performance and are suggested as possible cures for the 'pathology of bureaucracy' (Hogwood and Peters, 1985: 38-62; Figure 3-3). Specifically it is concerned with the creation of agencies and of quangos in processes that in this thesis are termed 'agencification' and 'quangocratisation'.

1-2. The Purpose and Questions of the Research

As Rousseau suggested, the purpose of this research is to contribute to both theoretical areas and practical fields (cited in Dunleavy, 2003: 44; Burnham et al., 2004: 4). In particular, this study focuses on comparative research between Korea and the U.K. with regard to agencification and quangocratisation. In practice, there have been some missing links in the study of the public sector.

Theoretically this research will be helpful in solving the following problems:

Firstly, despite several previous reforms in Korea, the background and motivations of these reforms suffer from a lack of research. While the NPM has become the current policy fashion in many countries across the world, in Korea, the term NPM has been seldom used for the following reasons. In the first place, only selected aspects of the NPM rather than the complete concept were introduced and applied (Jung, 2003a: 329; footnotes 6 and 85). In addition, as the theories introduced in Korea were a mixture of American and Westminster ideas, they are short of overall consistency and have received little academic attention. In the second place, traditional public administration theories rather than managerial skills are recognised as more important in the Korean government and academia (Oh, 2012a: Chapter 5). In Korea, few materials have been published under the term 'public management'. Korean public administration, which originated in the U.S, emphasised *the crisis of its own identity* (Ostrom, 2008: 15-19; Davis, 1996: 53; Golembiewski, 1977: 5) and has pursued its own path excluding *business or private* management factors. During the period of the economic boom before 1998, there were few incentives to introduce NPM ideas to the Korean government, since even without a new reform strategy stable economic growth was expected and people generally trusted the competence of the government. Furthermore, even after the

economic crisis in 1998, the Korean government prefers the American term '*reinventing government*' to the NPM of the Westminster countries⁶ (Henry, 2003: 179-184; Denhardt and Denhardt, 2006: 403-405).

Secondly, studies about the 'executive agency' have become stagnant in Korea. In the earlier stage of institutional introduction from 1999 until 2005, it was a popular topic for scholars and practitioners (Ryu, 1999; Kim, 1999a; Kim, 1999b, 2000b and 2004h; Kang, 2000; Kim et al., 2001; Lee, 2004g; Nam, 2002; Park et al., 2003a and b; Park, 2000 and 2001; Seo, 2002h). Since then, however, research in this field has not been so attractive, with the exception of some research projects performed by the Ministry of Public Administration and Security (hereafter MoPAS), which is responsible for the creation and operation of executive agencies (MoGAHA, 2007c; KAOS, 2008b; KAPS, 2011). Thirdly, the field of incorporation or quangocratisation in Korea has never been studied before, and only after 2008 did it begin to be discussed by a few scholars (Park, 2008a and d; Lim, 2008a and b; Ryu, 2008a and b).⁷ Yet the Korean government still has suffered from a lack of theoretical underpinning of the reform.

Fourthly, as is the case in other countries few studies concerning overall public sector bodies have been performed.⁸ As shown in the data analysis of OECD countries (OECD, 2002: 9), each state has different institutions and contexts, which makes it difficult to analyse public bodies in a systematic way. However, since organisational forms and managerial methods have a certain relationship with each other, abandoning a coherent approach about organisational forms might mean giving up efficient management (section 3-1-2; Ball and Peters, 2000: 65). Moreover, under the ongoing debates and scepticism about the sphere of government, without lucid elucidation, unnecessary controversy could undermine public trust in government (section 3-2-1-2). The tools for comparison with other countries are also needed. This would enable each government to precisely identify its current state of play and explore the desirable direction with regard to the operation of organisations and management for the future. Fifthly, in the U.K. it is necessary to clarify the

⁶ Traditionally, the contents of public administration have been quite different between the U.K. and the U.S. (Thomas, 1978: 131-134) Although the civil service system in Korea, as can be seen in Chapter 5, is closer to that in the U.K. than the American equivalent, Korean comparative studies have been leaning toward American cases. At the same time, the ideas of the NPM are not so popular in the U.S. that even a leading American scholar on this area, Kettl, does not include these concept and contents in his popular book (Kettl and Fesler, 2009 and Kettl, 2012; See also Berkley and Rouse, 2003). In the same way, major Korean textbooks regarding public administration are just mentioning the NPM as a part of reinventing government theories (footnote 85).

⁷ As Pollitt et al. (2001: 276) argue, scholars are likely to prefer 'theoretically more exciting examples of privatisation' than AQ.

⁸ For exceptions, see OECD (2002) and van Thiel et al. (2012).

terminology in relation to the public sector bodies such as 'quangos'. Most commentators commonly say that an accurate definition of quangos has not yet been reached (section 2-1-2). In the first place, therefore, existing terms which are frequently used by scholars to analyse organisations need to be sorted out. Sixthly, although there are various theories about agencification and quangocratisation, the explanation of their causes is somewhat sporadic, partial and just hypothetical (Hinds et al., 2005: 292; Pollitt et al., 2001: 278). Thus a pertinent elucidation of *actual* cause is difficult to make. Finally, when it comes to agencification, the U.K government is known as a pioneer. While Korea followed the U.K.'s model, in reality it has still not been studied to see whether there are glaring differences concerning operating agencies between Korea and the U.K. Through the comparison of experiences, it might be possible to develop the theory of 'policy transfer' or 'lesson drawing' (sections 8-3 and 8-4).

This research also might be helpful from a *practical* perspective.

Firstly, this study will help the Korean government to systematically manage its public sector organisations. Countries such as Korea and Japan, which manage government organisations in a centralised way, need advanced methods of management for the following reasons. In the first place, in Korea, more *unified* and *systematic* tools of management are required for central control over whole organisations (section 5-1-3). There have been numerous reforms which were carried out by the government in a centralised way for the past few decades and these tendencies are also expected to be continued at least in the near future (footnotes 609 and 618). In this regard, more modernised and advanced methods are essential. In the second place, since having a centralised control system tends to gain intensified attention from the media and scholars, it is necessary to construct a theory that could attract public support. For example, in the process of some quangocratisations, the Korean government confronted strong opposition and was in trouble owing to a lack of theoretical support (section 7-3); thus the Korean government intentionally had to hold the academic seminars to mobilise support.

Secondly, since 1945 the Korean government *per se* has tried to vitalise its society and the private sector (Appendix 2-2). At that time, the government had to directly create and provide social infrastructures such as cultural bodies and medical institutions to lead to the development of the private sector. However, times have considerably changed and a range of commentators argued that its public sector needs to be arranged in a more systematic and efficient way (PTC, 2008).

Thirdly, in a time of economic crisis, the anti-quango debate would heat up *de novo* (section 3-2-1-2). With regard to the current economic downturn, the British Coalition government has capitalised on austerity throughout the public sector and announced a cull of numerous quangos (Dorey, 2014: 185; Wilks, 2014: 7). Yet prior to these policies there are some practical considerations: Are maintaining or creating quangos necessary?; If they are essential, what type of accountability structure is useful for them?; Does the government know the actual number of quangos?; and what kinds of quangos are needed for specific measures and which kinds are unnecessary?

Finally, arts administration and policy, unlike arts history, aesthetics and recently arts management, have scarcely been researched, notwithstanding their growing importance. One of the aims of this thesis is to analyse and compare the policies of both countries and to help policy makers enhance existing policies.

To attain the purposes as stated above the main questions of this thesis are as follows:

. What are the differences between the U.K. and Korea vis-à-vis the range, forms and the classifications of public bodies? What could be the criteria for such a classification?

. The dissertation will go on to consider which factors could influence the form of government organisations, and among those factors, what are the causes of agencification and quangocratisation. Why has agencification seemed to become so popular over the past 20 years or so? Are agencification and quangocratisation intrinsically different? What are the relative advantages of each alternative?

. Which public areas are different between the U.K. and Korea? Why are the experiences of Korea and the U.K different? What factors should be considered when researchers draw lessons from British cases? In particular, in terms of arts administration, what are the distinct features of both countries' arts policies? What are the key elements of arts policy process regarding agencification and quangocratisation in both countries?

. In the actual process of operating organisations, what are the main differences between these countries? How are these countries different in institutional backgrounds and contexts? To what extent are the ways of operating public bodies and their performances different?

. Why should Korea look to the U.K. as an example? What strategies are needed for that?

1-3. Methodology of the Research

Gilbert (1993: 18) points out that the three major elements in social research are: the construction of theory; the collection of data; and the design of methods for gathering data. In the process of research, methodology is far from being less important than theory building, in that the former has a significant effect on the latter. However, relatively few analyses of methodology *per se*, such as concept, classification and weighing the merits, have been conducted,⁹ although comparative study and case study have been the most influential research methods in political science over the past few decades (George and Bennett, 2005: Chapter 1). Besides which, the concepts of comparative study and case study are so overlapped in many studies that these equivocal viewpoints might lead to an unsystematic analysis of them. The investigation into comparative study and case study below is a *sine quo non* in order to propose the direction of the research, and to clarify the features of the thesis.

1-3-1. Theories about comparative study and case study

Comparative study

Concept Since theories in the social sciences proceeds mostly through comparisons (Peters 1990: 3), comparison is regarded as the very essence of the scientific method (Brans 2007: 269). Ragin even argues that ‘thinking without comparison is unthinkable’ (1987: 1). Through comparison, political life can be theorised as a general proposition, and the assessment of the validity of our analysis of political phenomena can be carried out (Hopkin 2010: 289). Nevertheless, systematic comparisons are relatively few and far between (Peters, 1990). Although Wiarda (2007: 25) contends that the ‘laboratory’ of comparative politics is the world’s political system, according to other scholars (for example, Page, 1995: 125; Hopkin, 2010: 286) ‘controlled experiment’ is impractical in political science, especially when it deals with large-scale events that drastically affect many people (Almond et al., 2008: 28).

Wiarda (2007: 4, 20) defines comparative study as the systematic approach in which it seeks to ‘explain both similarities and differences’ among political

⁹ One of the reasons for this scarcity is that there have been relatively few texts which analysed research methods in political science in the U.K. (Burnham et al., 2004: 1). Meanwhile, in the U.S., the qualitative method, relatively speaking, is regarded as more unscientific than the quantitative method. However, many researchers concur with the idea that ‘the differences between the qualitative and quantitative traditions are only stylistic and are methodologically unimportant’ (King et al., 1994: 4; Riccucci, 2010: 108-109).

systems, to explore 'patterns, processes, and regularities'. In their influential research, Przeworski and Teune (1970: 9) argue that the purpose of comparative study is to 'develop concepts and generalisations at a level between what is true of all societies, and what is true of one society at one point in time and space'.

In addition, most *comparativists* (for example, Peters, 1998a: 10; Burnham et al., 2004: 59; Lim, 2006: 24) maintain that one-shot or single-country case studies should be considered as comparative study,¹⁰ since comparativists implicitly compare their chosen case to their own country or to a theoretical ideal-type case (Ragin, 1987: 4; Flinders, 2001: 380). From this point of view, more studies which are not taken as comparative study, could be classified and evaluated by a comparative methodology.

Changing trends Although comparative study can be traced back to Aristotle (Wiarda, 2007: 17), according to Heady (1979: 10), intensive comparative analysis did not begin until after the end of World War II. The direction of comparative studies in the 1950s and 1960s can be divided into two major groups. In the first place, comparative studies on developing countries were mainly conducted by American scholars (Dunsire, 1973a: 134). One of the important purposes of aid to less developed countries was transfer of knowledge in order to convert them to the American-style of government (Guess, 1997: 536; Heady, 1979: 16); to use assistance as the levers for social and economic development; and finally to build a solid democratic system against the U.S.S.R. during the cold war (Chang, 2007: 63). The hallmarks of these studies were that researchers regarded the U.S. as the standard by which other countries should be evaluated (Lim, 2006: 32); and that bureaucracy was an analysis tool by which a checklist was made to compare the main structural and functional features of different administrative systems (Brans, 2007: 274).

Meanwhile, in Western Europe, there were a few studies on the U.K., France and Germany, but they were limited to formal approaches (Wiarda, 2007: 17). They solely focused on the description of a particular political system without detailed analyses (Page, 1995: 130) and were keen on what would be the best framework of government (Heady, 1997: 575). Yet they

¹⁰ However, Sartori (1994:19) is quite sceptical of the contention that single-case studies can be comparative.

suffered from a lack of comparative design and from being too heavily dependent on equivocal notions of political culture (footnote 48; Brans 2007: 270). In addition, Peters (1998a: 9) suggested a reason why few comparative studies were conducted according to Weberian assumptions, that is, where the civil service is not involved in politics (but in the 'mere execution of the laws'), and thus there was little to compare.

However, as Riggs predicted, comparative study has become 'the masterfield of public administration rather than a subfield of that' (1976: 645) and has distinct features different from the 1950s and 1960s as follows: Firstly, the rapid spread of information and major policy diffusing institutions such as the OECD, World Bank and IMF (Brans, 2007: 271) make it possible to compare and classify different countries.

Secondly, many comparative studies focus on specific issues such as the problems of measuring the size of government and public sector reform (Derlien, 1992: 297). Thirdly, not only political systems but also multiple analysis tools such as historical context, actors and institution are used (Peters, 1998a: 8). Last but not least, the increasing interdependence of nations (Heady, 1997:3; Rifkin, 2004: 181-182; Castells, 1996: 66) allows different countries to pursue policy transfer to solve the problems with an existing state, and to research other countries' cases (Evans, 2004 and 2010; section 8-3)

Types Peters (1998a: 10) categorises comparative studies into five basic types.¹¹ However, criteria for their classification are not 'mutually exclusive', thus one object could be involved in more than two categories at the same time, and those types could not explain precisely the characteristics of comparative studies. Comparative studies can be categorised by various criteria, and these classification allow researchers to clarify the features and scope of their studies (Brans, 2012: 512-513). Yet few former studies of these classifications have been conducted, although the clarification of their approach is essential in order to identify the process and outcomes of each comparative method. The following classifications (Table 1-1) are an attempt to solve these problems.

Firstly, according to whether a researcher uses a 'time frame' or not, comparative methods are divided into two types. The *cross-national study* is for

¹¹ The five types are single country studies, process and institution studies, typology formation, regional statistical analysis and global statistical studies.

comparing several countries, or specific institutions at a certain point in time. By contrast, the *cross-time study*, which is also called the *longitudinal study*, is for comparing a single or a few countries over a relatively long period of time. Logically speaking, a cross-time study of a specific country has the same structure of following the *most similar system designs* (Lim 2006: 24), because it compares the same dependent variables, except time.

Table 1-1: Criteria and classification of comparative methods

Criteria	Classification
Time frame (Adapted from Peters 1990:3-8)	Cross-national (Snapshot approach, Wiarda 2007: 24), Cross-time (Within-case comparison, Lim 2006: 24)
The level and object of analysis (Adapted from Hague and Harrop 2007: 8)	Institution-centred State-centred Process-centred (Peters 1998a: 10) Political actors-centred
The purpose of Analysis	Typology formation (Peters 1998a: 10) Theory building or verifying a hypothesis Explanation of the present state or future prediction
The number of test subjects	Small N (Case-oriented) Large N (Variable-oriented, Ragin 1994: 300)
Research design method (Adapted from Przeworski and Teune 1970: 31)	Most Similar System designs (MSS design) Most Different System designs (MDS design) Generally Similar Group designs (GSG design) Global Statistical Analysis designs (GSA design) Structural-Functional System design (SFS design)

Secondly, based on the level and object of analysis, a comparative study falls into one of four categories: *institution-centred*, *state-centred*, *process-centred* and *political actors-centred*. The level of analysis is, in general terms, divided into *structure* and *agency* (Hay, 2002: 89). Although *rationalists* assert that their theoretical concepts could travel to all parts of the globe, as Landman properly pointed out (2003: 44), few comparative researches are conducted to meet their needs. Rather, when it comes to the level of comparative studies, *institutions* and *states* play pivotal roles (Hague and Harrop, 2007: 8). Meanwhile, some comparative studies such as social revolution (Skocpol, 1979) focus on political *process* rather than actors (Peters, 1998a: 10).

Thirdly, depending on the purpose of analysis, comparative studies might also be classified into three types: *typology formation*; *theory building or verifying a hypothesis*; and *explanation of the present state or future prediction* (Appendix 3).

Fourthly, according to the number of test subjects, comparative researches are classified into two types: comparing many countries is commonly referred to as '*large-N*' comparison, while comparing few countries is '*small-N*' comparison (Landman, 2003: 24).¹² There are various names, depending on the researchers: the former is paralleled to the *variable-oriented approach* of Ragin's categorisation and the latter to the *case-oriented approach* (1987: 34-40); the former is identical to a *statistical analysis* and the latter to a *focused comparison* (Hague and Harrop, 2007: 89). The major advantages of the Large-N approach are: statistical control to rule out rival explanations; extensive coverage of countries, and the ability to make strong inferences (Landman 2003: 26). Yet there are some distinctive weaknesses. First of all, collecting relevant data on the individual countries of the world can be laborious and time-consuming (ibid: 27-28). Besides, concepts from each political context can affect the validity of the measurements (Appendix 3). For this reason, Hopkin (2010: 296) argues that in political science, the qualitative approach, which enables researchers to intensively study specific countries, is more important than the quantitative approach which has serious drawbacks such as limited data, data reliability and careless conceptualisation.

Fifthly, there are five basic comparative research methods, depending on research design: *the most similar system (MSS) designs*, *the most different system (MDS) designs*, *generally similar group (GSG) designs*, *global statistical analysis (GSA) designs*, and *structural-functional system (SFS) designs*. In most cases, comparative study aims to compare individual states. However, since the number of countries on earth is limited to under 200, random selection is difficult. In addition, as it is an uphill task to comprise a treatment group and a control group, dealing with extraneous variables, which are caused by factors outside the research being examined, is next to impossible. The basic strategies for solving these problems are the MSS designs and the MDS designs. In the MSS designs, the researcher takes a range of countries that appear to be similar in as many ways as possible, in order to hold most variables as 'constants' and thus control for 'concomitant variation' (Przeworski and Teune, 1970: 32; Peters, 1998a: 38; Lim 2006: 34). On the contrary, the logic of the MDS designs, which are to compare two or more systems that are different in almost every respect except the variables under examination, are the reverse of the MDS designs (Przeworski and Teune, 1970: 3; Mahler, 1992:

¹² 'N' means the number of countries.

7; Peters, 1998a: 39). The MSS design draws from Mill's 'method of difference' while the MDS design equates to Mill's 'method of agreement' (Ragin, 1987: 34; Hopkin, 2010: 291-294).¹³

Most scholars suggest only two types – the MSS designs and the MDS designs – as the basic forms of comparative explanation (For example, Hopkin, 2010: 291 and Burnham et al., 2004: 62). Yet in reality, numerous comparative studies are beyond these two categories. As far as a comparison of a few countries is concerned, the MSS design and the MDS design strategies are helpful (Landman, 2003: 29), but regarding a *Large N* approach, it can be possible to compare similar countries within homogeneous groups (for example, Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011), or specific groups which have experienced similar situations or processes (for example, van Thiel et al., 2009). This method is similar to the MSS designs, but it does not adopt a strict methodology. Thus we can call this approach *GSG designs*. In addition, statistical comparison of special variables might be targeted in more countries (for example, Peters, 1988; Castles, 1998) and this could be called *GSA designs*. Finally, there are some *SFS designs*, which observe each country from a political system's point of view and focus on a description of an individual country's characteristics such as political culture, institutions and policy-making process. However, these approaches are inclined to be criticised, because they are usually deficient in analysis on causal relationships between variables.

Case study¹⁴

Concept According to Yin (2003: 13), a case study is 'an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon with its real-life context' and 'examines the operation of causal mechanisms in individual cases in detail' (George and Bennet, 2005: 21). Case studies have three characteristics which are based on: a specific issue or concern; a delimited geographic space; and a certain period of time (Lim, 2006: 45). Case studies have been a frequently adopted research strategy in political science, business and even in economics (Yin, 2003: 1; George and Bennet, 2005: 9), and could be associated with not

¹³ In reality, Przeworski and Teune (1970), who initially suggested the idea of the MSS design and the MDS design, did not mention Mill's method (1952: 425-447). Yet logically the structure of those designs coincides with those of Mill (Lim, 2006: 34).

¹⁴ As a large number of comparative studies are conducted in the form of a case study, the concept of case study is often confused with that of comparative study (for example, see Peters, 1998a: 5; Ragin 1987, 34-49). Yet comparative study and case study are different in many ways, such as scope and types; thus researchers should distinguish the former from the latter.

only specific countries, but also with subnational units such as political regimes and institutions.

Trends and Types As earlier case studies focused on just describing a unique event, one of the traditional prejudices about case studies is that they are just 'stories' and do not provide guidelines for generalisations (Blondel, 1981: 67; Yin, 1989: 10). By contrast, most contemporary scholars agree that case studies, as with experiments, permit analytical generalisations (Rhodes, 1997b: 20). Moreover, some argue that case studies can be applied to both qualitative and quantitative research (Yin, 1989: 14; George and Bennet, 2005: 6). However, given that, in essence, case studies are in-depth and focused study, they are closer to qualitative methods than to quantitative methods; and closer to few-countries comparison rather than to many-countries comparison.

Regarding the types of case studies¹⁵, Ragin (1992: 9), one of the leading scholars, suggests a 'conceptual map for case studies', using two key variables: 'whether they are seen as involving empirical units or theoretical constructs' and 'whether these, in turn, are understood as general or specific.' Yet this classification has several problems. For a start, the first dichotomy is about epistemology rather than criterion. Given that some empirical units such as 'world systems' exist only being after theoretically defined, it is not clear in some cases whether they should be involved in the first quadrant or the third quadrant.

Secondly, the second dichotomy also adopts a relative criterion. Once some cases are found, then they become regarded as objects. For example, according to this classification, it is difficult to decide whether 'governance' should be involved in the first quadrant or the second quadrant. Besides which, the fourth quadrant is too equivocal to include a proper case. More importantly, this classification cannot cover some cases; process and change¹⁶ such as agencification, and functional outcomes such as performance. Alternative classification is shown as table 1-2. In this new classification, two dichotomies

¹⁵ Concerning the types of case studies (Gerring, 2008: 647 and 2009: 91; Hakim, 1987: 65-72), Lijphart (1971: 692) provides 6 types: atheoretical case studies; interpretative case studies; hypothesis-generating case studies; theory-confirming case studies; theory-infirming case studies and deviant case studies. Meanwhile, Hague and Harrop (2007: 91) suggest 5 types: representative case studies; prototypical case studies; deviant case studies; archetypal case studies and critical case studies.


¹⁶ See, Zuckerman (1997: 296-298).

are mutually exclusive and can cover more cases which are associated with process and outcomes.

Table 1-2: Ragin’s conceptual map and alternative typology

	Specific	General
empirical units	1. Cases are found (e.g. World systems)	2. Cases are objects (e.g. Formal organisation)
theoretical constructs	3. Cases are made (e.g. Modern tyranny)	4. Cases are Conventions (e.g. Industrial Societies)

Source: adapted from Ragin (1992: 9)



Source: prepared by the author

1-3-2. Combination of methods: a comparative case study

This research adopts a comparative case study method to analyse agencification and quangocratisation in Korea and the U.K. A comparative study and a case study respectively have their own pros and cons;¹⁷ thus the combination of these allows, if coordinated well, to make up for their demerits. Firstly, since the one-shot case study is ‘the one-group post-test-only design’ (Cook and Campbell, 1979: 96), this method neither could guarantee the validity of causal inference from the research (Namkoong, 2008: 240), nor could secure one’s ability to generalise the result of the research. However, a comparative case study, in which a single case study is combined with cases from other countries, could reduce the threat to internal and external validity (Appendix 3). At the same time, if a case study is joined with a comparative study, it can enrich the quality of the comparative method by an in-depth approach and the benefit of multiple sources. Moreover, if a comparative case study method conforms to the category suggested earlier in this chapter (section 1-3-1) it would fall into a category of cross-national, small N, institution-centred and process-centred design (Table 1-1).

¹⁷ For the merits and demerits of comparative studies and case studies, see Appendices 3 and 4.

In addition, the comparison of Korea and the U.K. government systems in this thesis is basically based on the MDS design, which could alleviate the problem of selection bias. From the perspective of the MSS design, no matter how similar two or more systems may seem to be,¹⁸ it is quite hard not only to identify all the relevant factors that can cause differences among them (Przeworski and Teune, 1970: 28; Peters, 1998a: 39), but also to establish which differences have causal importance (Lim, 2006: 38). These could explain why the MDS design is preferable (Hopkin, 2010: 292). Furthermore, the MDS design is quite helpful to ascertain a particular change such as a revolution or an economic miracle (Landman, 2003: 30). In particular, Korea, along with Japan, could be considered as a representative country of East Asia (Appendix2: Figure 2); thus its comparison with the public sector in the U.K. which can be representative of Commonwealth countries, makes public sector reform theory more generalisable.

The exploration of a policy transfer perspective is another reason for a comparative case study of Korea and the U.K. The Korean government launched its public sector reform from the late 1990s, drawing on the U.K. model. Since one of the ultimate aims of this thesis is to elicit some implications for the Korean policy, through it we can examine whether the Korean public reform is a worthwhile *policy transfer* or an unsuccessful *policy band-wagoning*' (Ikenberry, 1990: 103) and we can also suggest the possible future directions of the Korean public reform policy.

Meanwhile, the background of the introduction of the public sector reform is different between Korea and the U.K. Even within Commonwealth countries, the timing and contextual variations of the introduction of the NPM is dissimilar to each other. However, solving the *travelling problem* and establishing the equivalence of theoretical concepts and indicators are essential prerequisites in comparative case studies (Appendix 3). Therefore, in this thesis, examination of the context and historical change of the institution will be carefully carried out (Smith, 1999: 96); moreover, in order to avoid a biased perspective which is applicable to only a particular time, an analysis of trajectory will be conducted. From a methodological point of view, comparison of a country's past and present is not only '*the one group pre-test post-test design*' which is one of the *quasi-experimental designs* (Cook and Campbell, 1979: 109-111), but also a *cross-time study*.

Since social phenomena are a mixture of economy, sociology, history and institutionalism, an interdisciplinary approach is necessary in order to enhance

¹⁸ For example, see the cases of the Scandinavian countries (Arter, 1999: 17-18; Hansen, 2011: 126).

the quality of the explanation (Castles, 1998: 4). In later chapters, various statistics will be used as much as possible, to bolster the evidence. However, since full integration of the qualitative and quantitative methods is virtually unworkable (Hall and Hall, 1996: 45), the qualitative method will be mainly used with the complement of a quantitative approach.

1-3-3. Choice of cases

Regarding the selection of research objects of the thesis, public bodies common to both countries have been selected in order to acquire meaningful results; moreover, the most similar institutions among them have been chosen. While the research largely employs the MDS framework between quite different countries to provide an extension of the analysis, the choice of the most similar institutions between the two countries makes it possible to enhance comparability (Sartori, 1994: 14) and to draw out the common causality between them.

Vis-à-vis the number of cases, since the case study method generally takes a considerable time, it is not easy to increase their number (Flinders, 2001: 380). Even though an increased number of cases logically make it possible to add explainable variables, they also tend to make it difficult to analyse multiple causality (Appendix 3); moreover, it is hard to develop a plausible explanation, due to the increased coverage. Therefore, this research adopts a small-N rather than a large-N approach.

In this thesis, national museums which show the characteristics of representativeness and comparability have been chosen. First of all, they epitomise agencification and quangocratisation of each country. Van Thiel et al. suggest five types of public sector functions in terms of the tasks that the institutions carry out (2009: 23).¹⁹ Among those, museums are supposed to represent the *education and information* category and are also considered to epitomise the field of culture.²⁰ In addition, both countries have popular national museums which share several commonalities as a cultural institution (section 6-1), while showing some distinct differences. As can be seen in Chapter 5, the

¹⁹ The five categories are: security, payments, registration, education and information, and care-taking. As far as the category of payments is concerned, unlike the U.K., most employees in Korea are civil servants. At the same time, the workforces of the care-taking category are based on the National Health Insurance (NHI) approach which is somewhat different to the National Health Service (NHS) approach of the U.K.

²⁰ The examples of case studies already analysed regarding quangos and executive agencies are: 'prisons, meteorology, forestry and social security' (Pollitt et al., 2004; Pollitt, 2006: 27-30); 'prisons and universities' (Hood et al., 2004); and 'public enterprises' (Wright, 1994; OECD 2001).

scope and size of executive agencies in both countries is so dissimilar that just a few cases are comparable in terms of its operation and performances. Furthermore, the cultural agencies have not been researched or compared in depth, especially in terms of their organisational structure, so that this analysis will help later studies. Last but not least, the National Museum of Contemporary Art (MoCA) in Korea has recently been experiencing significant changes and thus the detailed examination of this case might inform other studies (Chapter 8).

Table 1-3: Selection of cases

	Cultural bodies
Korea	National Museum of Modern and Contemporary Art*
U.K.	Tate Modern**

* It was part of a ministerial department, but changed into an executive agency; and it is currently in the process of quangocratisation.

** The origin of Tate Modern was the Tate Gallery which was a civil service organisation until it was quangocratised.

1-3-4. Variables of comparison

Focusing on key variables allows researchers to clarify their comparison by having an over-view of the whole framework as well as the use of common criteria between cases. As shown in table 1-7, a wide variety of variables is suggested by numerous commentators.

Table 1-4: Major variables for analysis

Commentators	Major variables (or subfields)
Peters (1990)	Personnel(public employees), Organisations, Behaviour, Power
Derlien (1992), Ingraham et al (2000: 244)	Organisations, Budget, Decision-making, Personnel
Pierre (1995)	Internal dynamics, Politico-administrative relations, Relations between public administration and civil society
Adapted from Chandler (2000)	Political culture, Constitutional Framework, Civil Service, Financing, Co-ordinating, Managing, Accountability
Verhoest et al. (2010)	Autonomy, Control (accountability), Internal management
Ashworth et al. (2010)	Planning, Leadership, HRM, Innovation, Collaboration, Organisational Learning

The variables provided by Peters (1990) and Pierre (1995) are comprehensive and useful when comparing cases at a state-level, but not so suitable for the comparison at an institution-level. Since the comparison of every details of variable are almost impossible, in this thesis diverse variables are, for the benefit of comparison, grouped into four sets.

- . *Context*: The trajectories of institutions;
- . *The form of organisation*: Organisation structures and their changes;
- . *The causes of change*: Nine arguments;
- . *The Results of changes and institutional constraints*: Law, Budget, Personnel, Governance structure, Autonomy and Control.

1-3-5. Data collection

It is indisputable that no convincing conclusion can be drawn from unreliable data; thus, credible data collection has the highest priority. In this regard, two basic principles are maintained in the thesis. Firstly, a triangulation of data sources is secured.²¹ To deal with the issues in a trustworthy way, it is necessary to gather as much material and as various contexts as possible (King et al., 1994: 24). This also might ensure reliability, which guarantees that by applying the same steps in the same way the same outcome will be always generated (Flinders, 2001: 378). To secure replicability (King et al., 1994: 26), the research presents a sufficient number of details so that succeeding scholars will be able to evaluate the procedures and the information used.

There are two kinds of *analysis units* and they are distinguished from each other. The first one is the 'observational unit' which is used in data gathering (Przeworski and Teune, 1970: 8, 49-50), and the other is the 'explanatory unit' which is adopted to account for the pattern of the results obtained.²² In the thesis, the observational units are the individual executive agency, quango and their sub-units, whilst the explanatory unit is mainly the public sector (section 5-2). Since the main concerns of the research are the transition from the ministerial department into the executive agency and change from the

²¹ Yin (2003: 85) suggests six sources of evidence: documentation; archival records; interviews; direct observation, participant observation and physical artefacts. In addition, survey and secondary data can be added (See Namkoong, 2008: 511-516).

²² Przeworski and Teune (1970: 8, 49-50) use a different term from Ragin; the former is 'levels of observation' and the latter is 'levels of analyses'.

executive agency into quango, the explanatory unit focuses on the changes of each case within the public sector.

With regard to the methods of data collection, the validity, reliability and cost of gathering information as well as the features of the research object, might be considered (Namkoong, 2008: 511).²³ In general terms, secondary data are the most easily available sources in the case of executive agencies and quangos. However, they have a relatively low degree of *reliability*, albeit its *validity* is the other way round; thus they need to be supplemented by methods such as interviews or surveys.

In Korea, the author as a civil servant was, for three years, in charge of agencification and quangocratisation which targeted various institutions. In pursuit of this, he drafted policy proposals, tried to mediate the interests of stakeholders, and generated the draft bills for quangocratisation in order to put the initial plan into practice. In particular, as its concept was being introduced for the first time, the author, as a practitioner, contributed to various articles,²⁴ trying to communicate with academia while leading some government research projects outsourced to some scholars (for example, KAOS, 2008a, 2009 and 2010a). In addition, he was also, as a chief senior deputy director, responsible for the overall structure and functions of government organisations, and thus could take advantage of exploring the whole picture of the public sector and using precise figures. More importantly, in the decision-making process of agencification and quangocratisation, the author carried out several focus group interviews for each case and recorded them in detail. The analysis of the Korean cases is conducted with the help of this involvement. However, where judgments are made and conclusions drawn the author has sought to substantiate personal insights with independent evidence. The thesis and conclusions are evidence based and do not rely on personal experience.

1-4. The Structure of the Thesis

This thesis consists of nine chapters. Chapter 1 deals with methodology, in which, in particular, it sheds new light on existing comparative study theories

²³ Typical methods of data collections are: participant observation (Burnham et al., 2004: 221), survey (Hall and Hall, 1996: 97, Kidder, 1981: 58), secondary data (Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996: 303), and focus group interviews (Burnham et al., 2004: 205).

²⁴ For example, see Park (2008a) and Ryu (2008a).

and case study methodologies. Chapters 2 researches diverse types of agencification and quangocratisation (hereafter AQ). Since the notion and scope of quangos are unclear, the sphere and content of public bodies are explored first, in order to find the boundary and demarcation of quangos. In addition, various terminologies which are used in both countries are also investigated for the benefit of comparison. Moreover, it suggests diverse processes of AQ and compares differences and similarities between executive agencies and quangos.

In Chapter 3, multifarious theories and arguments for AQ, which are often mentioned by a myriad of commentators, are analysed in depth, with a view to providing theoretical backgrounds before exploring cases. Especially, it extensively studies various aspects of arguments vis-à-vis their core concepts and a number of arguments from different commentators. During the process of analysis, nine arguments regarding AQ are grouped into three sets of three: initial deciding factors, convergent and divergent pressures. Meanwhile, Chapter 4 deals with the purpose and the results of AQ, not only in order to properly investigate multiple and diversely construable notions which are needed for successive chapters, but also to understand the trade-off relationships between reform targets.

Chapter 5 has a systematic look at what are the institutional constraints and differences between both countries, which significantly influence the process of AQ. Furthermore, it also analyses the bigger picture of the reform of the public sector, which is important in order to understand recent changes. Then Chapters 6 and 7, in a parallel way, intensively research the cases of the Tate Galleries and the National Museum of Modern and Contemporary Art, regarding their causes, using the nine arguments, and reform results.

Chapter 8 compares the causes of AQ analysed in Chapters 6 and 7 in a more detailed and theoretical way. It endeavours not only to compare the arguments but also to find why they are so different. Then it also looks into the policy-making process and policy transfer of AQ and their institutional constraints, in order to take a closer look at what are the obstacles of AQ in Korea and what could be the possible strategies for it.

Finally, the last chapter summarises this research and suggests some implications for further research in the future.

Chapter 2. The Scope and Types of Agencification and Quangocratisation

As this research focuses on the changes from ministerial departments to executive agencies (agencification) and from executive agencies to quangos (quangocratisation), it seems to be logical to explore the meaning of those changes first. In this chapter, the scope and forms of the public sector in both countries are dealt with at the beginning, in order to establish the equivalence of the cases compared vis-à-vis their positions within the public sector (Appendix 3). The different uses of terminology in each country then are examined; and finally various types of agencification and quangocratisation are analysed to show the complexity of those changes and to pin down the types which are investigated in Chapters 6, 7 and 8.

2-1. The Scope, Forms and Classification of Public Bodies

2-1-1. Scope and forms: classification

Many commentators have the opinion that the spectrum of the public sector is difficult to decide (Holland and Fallon, 1978: 6; Doig, 1979: 311; Hood, 1982: 55 and 1991b: 170; Schick, 2002: 34-35; Flinders, 2008: 1; van Thiel et al., 2012: 416). Weir and Hall (1994: 6) argued that 'there is neither a satisfactory nor universally agreed definition of quangos' and Hogwood (1995: 31) added 'any attempt to define quangos by listing distinguishing characteristics will break down, since some of these characteristics will not apply to some quangos.' Regardless of this sceptical viewpoint, in order to compare different countries, it is necessary to confirm certain criteria as well as range and terminology (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2003: 14-15), for the following reasons:

Firstly, each country uses *a different classification system*; in some countries, a specific area is classified as one category, but in other countries it might be grouped under a different heading. For example, when it comes to advisory bodies, in Korea they are called 'committees' which are classified as closer organisations to parent departments and are considered as being different from quangos, while in the U.K. they have been regarded as a part of NDPBs (*Non-Departmental Public Bodies*; quangos). Secondly, there are some cases that albeit the general classification criteria is similar or the same, the *name of the classification* is different, which can lead to significant confusion. For example, whilst in the U.K. the term 'executive NDPBs' is used, the Korean government employs the term '*public institutions*'. Thus, for someone who does not carry out careful examination in this area, it is quite difficult to determine the nature of other countries' public bodies relying only on

the name of the taxonomy. Thirdly, while *the name of an institution* and the function which it performs might be similar between countries, it could still be regarded as being a different category, which often causes statistical misunderstanding in relation to any comparison of public bodies between countries (Figure 5-2). For example, in Korea, the *Korea Post* is part of a government department (section 8-1-1-5)²⁵, whilst in the U.K., the Royal Mail was classified as one of the public corporations.

Finally, due to differences in the criteria for classification, *the range* which can be covered might vary from country to country. For example, some classification might consider related *local bodies* as quangos while another might not consider them as quangos (Figure 2-1).

The U.K.

With regard to the scope of public bodies in the U.K., although it was previously surveyed in the 1970s (Johnson, 1979: 379; Cole, 2006: 338; Scott, 1995: 148-153), the first systematic approach was performed by Pliatzky (Barker 1982: 6; Wilson, 1995: 4; Greenwood et al., 2002: 154). Since then, some commentators have tried to develop a more precise classification of public bodies. These former studies which described the type of public bodies in different ways are investigated in Table 2-1.

Table 2-1: Scope and criteria in the classification of public bodies (the UK)

	Forms	Criteria *terminology
Cmnd 7797 (1980: para 1)	Three types: Executive NDPBs, Advisory NDPBs, Tribunals (including prison boards of visitors)	*NDPBs (non-governmental public bodies)
Hood (1988: 8)	Nine basic types (trichotomy of territorial base and legal base)	Legal Base (core government, independent, private), Territorial Base (transnational, nationwide, local) * Para-government
Dunleavy (1989: 259)	Five types: departments, directly controlled agencies, agencies staffed by civil servants, agencies directly controlled by ministers (but not civil servants), other public bodies	Staffed by civil servants, Directly controlled by ministries * Central state

²⁵ As far as the Post Office is concerned, amongst 30 OECD countries, it is operated, only in Korea and the U.S., by civil servants, while Germany and the Netherlands privatised the Post Office (KISDI, 2007: 29). In the U.K., it was changed into a statutory corporation, the *General Post Office* in 1969 (Lucio, 1993: 23) and was renamed as Royal Mail in 2002 (but privatised later).

Weir & Hall (1994: 9)	Executive NDPBs, NHS bodies, Non-recognised EGOs (grant-maintained schools, registered housing association etc.)	* EGOs: Extra-government organisations
Hogwood (1995: 33)	EGOs + other NDPBs + Departments + Next Step Agencies * organisational map of formal status and function	Appointment, funding, staff status, existence of board, bodies delivering on behalf of government
Dynes & Walker (1995: 9-14)	Seven types: the core of the state, inner ring (Next step agencies), the peripheral state (NDPB), the new state (including local governance), the European State, the regional state, the miscellaneous state (Bank of England, Metropolitan police)	* the new British State
Flinders & McConnell (1998: 19)	Almost the same as Hogwood	Controls by ministers, Degree of publicness
Gill (2002: 30)	Six types: ministerial departments, department agencies, public law administrations, governmental enterprises, non-governmental private law bodies, not elsewhere classified	Primary criteria: direct control by government, Secondary criteria : legal form, governance
Flinders (2008: 108)	Nine types: core executive, ministerial departments, non-ministerial departments, executive agencies, special health authorities, executive NDPBs, public corporations, central bank institutions, public private partnership	Degree of delegation * delegated governance (The Russian Doll Model)
Farrugia & O'Connell (2009: 11)	Eight Types: [NDPBs] + Executive agencies, non-ministerial departments (NMDs), Public corporations (PCs), Special Health authorities, Others	* Semi-Autonomous Public Bodies (SAPBs)
Gash et al. (2010: 14-22)	Eleven Types : [Ferrugia & O'Connell] + Independent Statutory Bodies, Parliamentary bodies, Central Bank	Core departments, Executive agencies, Departmental sponsored bodies, Independent public interest bodies, Constitutional bodies * Arm's length bodies (ALBs)

For a start, Pliatzky (Cmnd 7797, 1980) performed a comprehensive study which classified and initially organised some controversial areas concerning quangos, and systematically simplified their sphere (Barker, 1982: 230).

However, at first glance, it seems that there was a hidden political intention. After Thatcher came to power, it was inevitable to start a 'great quango hunt', but she, in reality, found that a reduction in their numbers was quite a difficult mission to achieve. Instead, there was a possibility that advisory bodies might be included in the cull, since they were relatively easy to remove (Figure 5-21). Weir and Hall (1994: 8) argued that albeit the government, since 1979, flatly claimed to have sharply reduced the number of NDPBs, an actual decrease in executive NDPBs was much smaller (Dommert et al., 2014: 5). As Hood (1979b: 9-10) observes, each institution counted has a tremendous difference in size and importance. Weir and Hall (1994: 7) argued that Pliatzky considered the different kinds of purpose and power of public bodies to be identical. In addition, he overlooked the nationalised industries.

Hood and Schuppert (1988: 8; 1991b: 166-169) broadened the concept of the quango to include *local and international quasi government*, thus providing the broadest perspective so far; besides which, he attempted to systematically analyse quangos with clear criteria such as *legal types* and *territorial bases*. However, his classification range seems to be too wide to show the concrete characteristics of quangos.

Meanwhile, Dunleavy (1989: 259) properly argued that there are some organisations not staffed by civil servants (such as the army), which play an important role, because they are still directly controlled by ministers. Yet it looks as if he just focused on *the central state*, not on other public bodies.

Weir and Hall's critical analysis (1994: 9) significantly affected the subsequent studies of other scholars. They covered nationalised industries and local authorities which were susceptible to being ignored, and succeeded in drawing interest towards the quangos. However, the number of several bodies such as the registered housing association was so inflated, given their marginal status, that the public might be misled by such numbers (Greenwood, 2002: 156). Meanwhile, although Hogwood acknowledged the achievements of Weir and Hall, he added the advisory NDPBs which Weir and Hall had intentionally excluded, and expanded his scope to cover public corporations, presenting a wider picture and contributing to the expansion of understanding about the scope of quangos (1995: 33).

Dynes and Walker (1995: 9-14) organised the various dimensions of the authorities with great care, but it seems that it offered merely a directory for the public rather than providing an academic approach. By contrast, Flinders and McConnel added the classification criteria to the previous approach of Hogwood, allowing for a systematic analysis of quangos. The two kinds of criteria which they used (1999: 18-21) are: *degree of control by ministers*, whose coverage includes terms of reference, definition of outcomes, political salience, expert knowledge, appointment/dismissal and terms of funding; *degree of publicness*, which involves indicators such as public supply, government creation, power of continuation, appointment of boards, funding, accountability, and *de facto* public power and public purpose.

Flinders developed the discussion ten years after the former study, analysing quangos in terms of governance (2008: 108). Each nine layers of his *Russian Doll model* means the degree to which the authority of each individual layer is delegated 'beyond the direct control of politicians and public officials' (2008: 1), but he maintained that the central part of the government still functions as a 'hub'. In the form of the Russian Doll model, Flinders classified the bodies in accordance with the degree of delegation, which provided a systematic analysis, and argued that delegation might take place within seven layers (nine layers, if we include the core executive and ministerial departments); however, the relationship between the layers is not clear. His model argued that bodies of an inner layer might delegate some of their authority to the outer layers, but component bodies of layer 3 (Special Health Authorities) and layer 4 (Executive NDPBs) are quite diverse in terms of the type and range of decision-making as well as their authority. Therefore, to make the model clearer, variables and evidence that could explain the degree of delegation need to be added.

After Flinders' argument, succeeding studies such as Farrugia and O'Connell (2009), and Gash et al. (2010) of the scope of public bodies, take by and large a similar approach. However, Gash et al. extended the scope to parliamentary bodies and suggested five new categories: *constitutional bodies* which are accountable to Parliament; *independent public interest bodies* which could set their own strategy within the statutory frame work; *departmental*

sponsored bodies whose boards are subject to dismissal for poor performance; *executive agencies* which are still constitutionally part of the department; and *core departments* (2010: 14-22). In this classification system, it seems reasonable to exclude advisory committees, which operate without their own staff or budget. However, advisory experts still have a significant role within the government, thus the approach of Gash et al. might be limited. As with the Korean classification, it might be desirable to rule out advisory committees from the NDPB category and to manage them separately.

Korea

In Korea, research into the public sector has begun relatively recently, only after the second millennium. Even though there have been some rudimentary studies in previous years, since then, interest regarding it within the academic community has grown, especially after the restructuring of central government.

Table 2-2: Scope and criteria (Korean case)

	Forms	Criteria *terminology
Choi (1993: 211)	Four types: pure government sector, quasi-government sector, quasi-private sector, pure private sector	Civil servants, Public functions
Kim (2002: 11-18)	Four types: para-statal agency, government enterprise, public corporation, cooperative federation and association	Bureaucratic or entrepreneurial, Public or commercial
Ahn, Jung and Han (2007: 127)	Three types: traditional governmental sector, quasi-governmental sector in the narrow sense, quasi-governmental sector in the broad sense	Not applicable
Kwak (2009: 60)	Five types: Governmental sector, Public institution, NGO, NPO, profit organisation	Function, Law
Act on the Management of Public Institution (AMPI) (2007)	5 types: market-type public enterprise, semi market-type public enterprise, contracting-out-type semi-governmental institution, fund-managing-type semi-governmental institution, non-classified public institution	Commercial, Scale of assets, Functions

Source: translated by the author

In Korea, since public bodies are established and based on the AMPI, classification is mainly dependent on its guidelines. However, under this classification, it is difficult to embrace the blind spots, such as the Bank of Korea, the Financial Supervisory Service and the Korean Broadcasting System, which are not covered by the AMPI. In addition, while *civil servants*, including the executive agency and the advisory committees, are managed by the MoSPA (Ministry of Security and Public Administration),²⁶ *public institutions* are controlled by the MoSF (Ministry of Strategy and Finance). As a result, each system is completely separated. Therefore, all in all, they lack a comprehensive perspective.

Concluding Remarks

It seems to be essential to consider several important points in order to analyse the public sectors in both countries more clearly:

Firstly, each country has a different context, such as the relationship between state and society, and their statutory standing. It is relatively easy for the U.K. to create various forms of independent public bodies due to their *uncodified-law-based* characteristics (Rohr, 2002: 27; sections 5-1-1 and 6-5-2-1). By contrast, the U.S. and other *common law based* governments, which traditionally have had small public sectors, have developed a *contractual relationship* with the private sector (Ahn et al., 2007: 142). Meanwhile, in those nations with *continental legal systems* such as Germany and Korea, as the systems of public law and private law are strictly separated, the legal basis is relatively important.

Secondly, as joint-productions and partnerships of government and the private sector have increased, the possibility of so called '*collaborative governance*' or '*public-private partnership* (PPP)' has rapidly grown (Linder, 2000: 25-31). Meanwhile, in the U.K., the development of non-profit organisations, such as charities, allow the function, which is traditionally performed by the government, to become transferred to private bodies (Billis, 2010a:4). In contrast to this, the strong role of the state has been conventionally stressed in Korea. Therefore, bodies which were initially launched as non-profit or voluntary, have failed to secure financial independence or unique form of professionalism (Ahn et al., 2007: 130) and there are some cases where they have ended up as the '*voluntary failures*' (Salamon, 1987: 29).

²⁶ The MoPAS changed into the MoSPA in 2013.


Thirdly, the causes of quangocratisation, in general terms, need to be distinguished from their criteria for classification. It might be seen that the rationales for having quangos such as the nature of the tasks, the degree of closeness to the private sector, or administrative tradition, might be considered as a classification standard. Yet this thought is problematically confusing the causes with their results. In fact, public bodies that are created for a particular cause might have certain characteristics as a result, whilst, in some cases, the nature of these bodies could be a deciding factor in their classification. The reasons for establishing quangos will be explained in Chapter 3.

Fourthly, while nobody seems to dispute that *pure departments* which consist solely of civil servants should be a part of the public sector, most commentators would not involve *the judiciary and the legislature* area. In spite of this low profile, they need to be included in the public sector. Meanwhile, it is open to dispute whether NGOs (non-governmental organisations) as well as public enterprises need to be included within the scope of quangos. For some commentators, not only local but also international institutions, which are beyond the nationwide level, need to be dealt with as with other domestic quangos.

On account of these different viewpoints, this area could be considered as a 'grey area'. As each country has its own context, this *grey area* might be classified as either the public sector or the private sector, depending on the criteria: In the first place, notwithstanding the term '*public*', one of the main objectives of *public enterprises* is largely pursuing short-term profits. Thus, they are mainly dominated by the principles of the market and they could be privatised relatively without difficulty. Even it is quite possible to turn public administrators overnight into private 'managers' (Greenwood et al., 2002: 8; Hood, 1982: 54). Meanwhile, *NGOs (Non-Governmental Organisations)* and *NPOs (Non-Profit Organisations)* literally do not seek for *profit*, the pursuit of which is the main feature of the market; thus, market principles are less applied to them (Salamon, 1999: 8-9). Yet '*non-profit*' does not necessarily mean '*public*', because they might seek after the interests of a particular class, business or community, even when they receive financial support from the government (Salamon, 1995: 54; Park, 2008c: 70-72; Kim, 2005b: 218). In general terms, if an NGO actually benefitted the full range of people, then it could be regarded as a *public* organisation which represents the public interest (Stillman, 2000: 474). In addition, *local quangos* and *international quangos* are worth considering. In many cases, despite their importance, they are out of central government's control and it is almost impossible to elicit exact statistics about them. In theory, they are undoubtedly a part of the public sector, like domestic quangos; however, in reality, the principles which are applied to national quangos are quite difficult to be deployed for international quangos.

Finally, for a systematic comparative approach, it would be helpful to examine the spectrum of the maximum and minimum scope of the public sector (Flinders and McConnel, 1999: 17). As shown in Figure 2-1, the minimum definition for the public sector involves just *pure government* and *national quangos*. On the contrary, a maximum definition includes *public enterprises* and the *judicial branch*, as well as *local authorities*. In terms of control, including legal or financial measures, the *pure government* area is mostly centralised within the executive branch. By contrast, the *judicial branch* and *purely private sectors* enjoy independent autonomy from the executive branch.

Figure 2-1: Public sectors between minimum level and maximum level²⁷



Source: adjusted from Hood and Schuppert (1988: 8), Hogwood (1995: 35); Flinders and McConnel (1999: 19); Bozeman (2004: 95); Judge (2005: 138-139); Flinders (2008: 5); Kwak (2009:60); Salamon (2002:5); Nye (2002: 4) and Wilks (2014:5)

In relation to the spectrum of the public sector, a phased approach might be useful. For a start, it is necessary to divide the whole sector into several groups by using the primary criteria; and then within each range we could rethink the secondary criteria. The most basic and *primary standard* is *identity of employees*; that is, whether they are civil servants or not, is the first thing to be

²⁷ For an actual statistics regarding the public sectors of Korea and the U.K., see Chapter 5.

decided. In the *pure government area*, a *secondary standard* is whether they belong to the core department or not. Meanwhile, in the *quango area*, a secondary standard might be based on the territory of public bodies, such as '*local*' or '*international*'. The last standard could be their function such as '*executive*' or '*advisory*'. As shown in Figure 2-1, the minimum area of quangos is limited to the national level, while the maximum level of that might be extended to international quangos.

These classifications might not be absolute, and in most cases there will be exceptions. However, if we did not make principles owing to such exceptions, it could result in persistent confusion and unwanted side effects (HC 537, 2010a: para 1). For the sake of analytical clarity this thesis deals with the organisations in the UK and Korea which are included in the 'executive agency' and 'executive quango' boxes in Figure 2-1.

2-1-2. Terminology

Since the contextual relativity of the meaning might be a serious impediment to the study (Mayer, 1989: 68), researchers must make sure that the same terms from different countries mean the same things in any study (Peters, 1998a: 80; Bouckaert and Peters, 2004: 23). If some institutions carry out the same function in a different context, then they are said to be functionally equivalent (Landman, 2003: 44).

Terminologies vis-à-vis the public sector can be considered as having two types. The first describes the comprehensive range of public bodies such as quangos, NDPBs, PGOs and EGOs, and the second is analytical and about governance which explains structure and process of the public bodies such as distributed governance, unbundled governance, delegated governance and the hollowing-out state.

The U.K.

Quangos Some commentators say that 'the origins of quangos are confused' (For example, HC 209-I, 1999: XV; Bourckaert and Peters, 2004: 26-27), but, in general terms, the origin of quangos in the U.K can be traced to the 19th century (Holland, 1981: 10-11; Greve et al., 1999: 130). Meanwhile, the term quango is largely known to have originated in the U.S. in the 1960s (Hague et al., 1975: 2, Barker 1982: 219). In the U.S., the focus of the meaning was on '*non-governmental*' and the private sector (Ahn et al., 2007: 142), but after being introduced in the U.K., its focus has changed. Some researchers have even altered its meaning to '*quasi-autonomous national government*' (Barker, 1982: 222). As it has been used in its most comprehensive sense, the

parliament and the media now tend to use this terminology in preference to NDPBs (HC 209, 1999; HC 367, 2001; HC 537, 2010a). It sometimes means all the public sectors except the departments themselves. In 1999, the Public Administration Select Committee (hereafter PASC) requested an annual 'map' of quangos to be published (HC 209, 1999) and in 2001 it made its own 'mapping'. Its definition of quangos is as follows (HC 367, 2001: para 5):

For our purposes, we have defined as quangos all bodies responsible for developing, managing or delivering public services or policies, or for performing public functions, under governing bodies with a plural membership of wholly or largely appointed or self-appointing persons.

NDPBs Previously the government had used the term '*fringe bodies*' (CSD, 1978 cited in Chester, 1979: 51) and the Pliatzky report (Cmnd 7797, 1980: para 1) introduced the term *NDPBs* for the first time. The reason why the word 'non-departmental' was chosen was that the expression 'non-governmental' was not proper to explain the range of public bodies. Since every quango is still under the significant influence of the government, the term *quango* which includes '*non-governmental*' was thought to be inappropriate (Doig, 1979: 311). However, the coverage of NDPBs are still too inclusive and they have been created too often; moreover, their legal status, organisation, funding and degree of autonomy are too varied (Turpin and Tomkins, 2007: 412). From the view-point of the British government, only *official* NDPBs are genuine quangos (HC 367, 2001: para 4; Gay, 1996: 6). In addition, the title of an annual government report is '*public bodies*' which are equally regarded as NDPBs (Cabinet Office, 2009: 5).²⁸

PGOs Hood and Schuppert (1988: 1; Grant, 1994: 177) broadened the concept of existing quangos and used the term '*para-government organisations (PGOs)*'. He coined the term to avoid any special political nuances, and he widened the scope of quangos to include *local* organisations and *transnational* bodies.

EGOs Weir and Hall (1994: 6; Weir, 1995: 129) argued that the term NDPBs is 'at once too precise and too wide', because some bodies which were previously classified as quangos could not be included after the Pliatzky era. Instead, they employed the term '*extra governmental organisations (EGOs)*'. They cover 'the accountability of all explicitly executive bodies of a semi-autonomous nature which effectively act as agencies for central government,

²⁸ Given that appointments to NDPB Boards are normally made by ministers of sponsor departments, NDPBs are clearly a part of government.

and carry out government policies' (1994: 8). Thus, they excluded advisory NDPBs, but included NHS bodies and non-recognised EGOs such as grant-maintained schools (Plummer, 1994: 2-3).

Governance The term '*governance*' is as difficult to define as the term '*quangos*', or may even be a more confusing term which seems to have too many meanings to be useful (Rhodes, 1997b: 15; Hult et al., 1990: 42-48). It is an umbrella concept which involves such various phenomena as policy networks, the New Public Management and public-private partnerships (Pierre and Peters, 2000: 14; Meier et al., 2006: 14; Rhodes, 1997b: 47; Bevir, 2009: 12; Rhodes, 2011: 21; Bevir, 2011). Rhodes argues that governance has features such as shared characteristics, interdependence between organisations, continuing interactions between network members, and a significant degree of autonomy (1997b: 53). However, the features of governance can be divided into two more basic categories: a *structural* and a *procedural* aspect (Pierre and Peters, 2000: 14). When mentioning governance in relation to quangos, the term '*distributed* governance' (OECD, 2002: 9), '*unbundled* governance' (Pollitt and Talbot, 2004: 320) and '*delegated* governance' (Flinders 2008: 2) are often used.²⁹ It seems that the terms '*unbundled*' and '*distributed*' focus on *structural* features. In other words, they show the framework, as opposed to the '*centralised*' model. On the contrary, the term '*delegated*' emphasises aspects of *process* which indicates some kind of *depoliticisation* (Flinders, 2008: 235).

State There are terms such as '*appointed* state' (Skelcher, 1998a: 38) and '*hollowed-out* state' (Rhodes, 1997a: 198; 2008: 53; 2011: 22) to describe the phenomena related to quangos. Skelcher (1998a:2) argued that the '*appointed*' sectors of government have been significantly increased. He emphasised *patronage*, which stems from the innate characteristics of quangos (Weir and Hall, 1994: 16; Skelcher, 1998b: 42; Wright, 1999: 198; Davies, 1982: 171). Meanwhile, the '*hollowed-out*' state is derived from decentralisation, Europeanisation and privatisation, the loss of government functions and control through the discretion of civil servants by the NPM (Rhodes 1997b: 53; 2011: 23); and it causes problems such as the fragmentation of service delivery, erosion of co-ordination and accountability, and the lack of new control methods (Rhodes, 1997b: 100). To solve these problems, arguments such as joined-up government or holistic government have been developed (6, 2004; Hood, 2006a; Kavanagh et al., 2001; Pollitt, 2003b).


²⁹ *Multi-level* governance is the concept for a slightly different dimension. While *delegated* governance emphasised the horizontal delegation and interdependence, *Multi-level* governance focused on the vertical delegation such as the relationship between the EU and other countries (Flinders 2008: 40).

Korea

Executive agencies If the Korean *executive agency* is literally translated into English, its name would be ‘operating agency with accountability’. The reason why the Korean translation and the English term are different is that Korean practitioners at the time tried to find the most appropriate term³⁰. While the old official Korean term usually tended to coin a similar term to the Japanese one, in this case the government has consciously used a different terminology from Japan.

Public enterprises and Public institutions In Korea, the category equivalent to NDPBs in the U.K. excluding advisory NDPBs, is known by the term ‘*public enterprises*’ or ‘*state-owned enterprises*’, which are popular among the public. As the term ‘*quangos*’, in the U.K., has been used to equivocally refer to public bodies, the term *public enterprises* in Korea has been conventionally called in the public minds to contain all kinds of public bodies except government departments. Thus, ordinary Korean people generally consider *public enterprise* to be uncontrolled and inefficient bodies (Lee, 2007a: 32-34). Officially, however, public enterprises are only a part of ‘Public Institutions’. As the British government has used the term ‘NDPBs’ to eliminate the negative connotation of ‘quangos’, the Korean government has used the term ‘*public institutions*’ rather than ‘*public enterprises*’ since 2007.

Table 2-3: Public institutions in Korea (see Figure 7-1)



Source: adjusted from Lee (2007j: 168-169)

³⁰ See Flinders (2008: 4) to examine the names of semi-autonomous bodies of other countries, equivalent to the British ‘executive agency’.

The third sector The 'third sector' is the term which is frequently used in Korea, often being mixed with the concepts from Japan and the U.S (Billis, 2010b: 57; Koppell, 2003: 2). In the U.S the 'first sector' means the public sector and the 'second sector' refers to the private sector, while third sector means those bodies which are not involved in either sector. Therefore, in the American context, the original meaning of third sector covers voluntary areas such as NGOs. However, in Japan, it means the corporations in which public and private companies jointly invest capital.

(Special purpose public interest) corporations, incorporation and corporatisation
This form of corporation exists in both the private and the public sector (Kim, 2005b: 46). As private companies are established as a corporation, public enterprises are also a kind of corporation. A *corporation*, whose legal status is a '*body corporate*', the opposite of *natural person*, has an independent legal personality and can carry out legal acts on its own.

Public interest corporations or *government corporations* (Stiglitz, 2000: 206), as opposed to the concept of a private corporation, cover *philanthropic institutions* and *religious bodies* as well as *public enterprises*. Meanwhile, in Korea, when governmental bodies are changed into public institutions, the term '*incorporation*' is used instead of '*public enterprisation*' or '*public institutionisation*'. The term '*incorporation*' was used in earnest from 2008. Regarding the reason for coining the term, at that time when public enterprise was also the target of public sector reform, and their '*marketisation*' was strongly opposed by the people, an unfavorable situation had to be carefully considered.³¹ Thus, the politically negative terms '*marketisation*' or '*public enterprisation*' were not adopted (section 7-3-2).³²

Meanwhile, the term '*corporatisation*' is used in different ways among many countries (Polidano, 2001: 48). Firstly, in China, the term '*corporatisation*' usually means the process in which state-owned-enterprises are changed into shareholding companies (Zhu, 1998: 2). Secondly, in the Canadian context, '*corporatisation*' means 'the process of converting line departments of the government to entities such as executive agencies, governmental corporations and contract agencies' (Laurin and Vinding 2006: 120; Bozec and Breten 2003: 28). Thirdly, in the U.S.A. and Australia, '*corporatization*' is defined as 'efforts to make state-owned enterprise operate as if they were a private firm to put state firms on a level playing field with private firms' by removing barriers to

³¹There was an awareness at the time that political language or frame is quite important (; and presumably, these ideas came from Wittgenstein and Saussure (Harris, 1988: 27-30)). For example, George W. Bush used 'tax relief' instead of 'tax cut' (Lakoff, 2008: 235-236; Emanuel and Reed, 2006: 16). In the same vein, the term '*denationalisation*' might be used instead of '*privatisation*' during the Thatcher period.

³² For economic meaning of corporatisation, see Stiglitz (2000: 206).

entry, subsidies and special privileges (Shirley, 1999: 155; Teo, 2002: 90). Lastly, in the Japanese context, 'corporatisation' is used to make institutions legally separated from the government (Yamamoto, 2004b: 153; OECD, 1995: 157). The last point of view is the same as the Korean case, but the term 'corporatisation' is so differently used among the various countries that it seems the term 'incorporation'³³ or 'quangocratisation' might be more desirable when carrying out the research.

National bodies In the U.K., '*national*' bodies such as the *National* History Museum and the *National* Health Service mean bodies which are established not in *local* units, but in *nationwide* units, thus the term does not necessarily mean ownership by the state (see footnote 426). By contrast, in Korea, the term '*national*' bodies, largely means that bodies are established by the government and their employees are civil servants.

Concluding Remarks

This review of research and terminology reveals a complex, ambiguous area of study where terms have to be used with care and consistency. For the benefit of comparison, it will be helpful to use the same terminology for the main concepts rather than to consciously use a different terminology. There are at least three common terms which can be shared between the two different countries:

Public Sector The term '*public sector*' is the broadest concept with regard to public bodies. Although the '*public sector*' is the most commonly used terminology among different countries, making a distinction between public and private is so difficult that sometimes concepts such as quasi-public, quasi-private or third sector are used. The term '*public sector*' is useful when used as a contrasting concept to the private sector, especially when it comes to collating and analysing statistics. However, as mentioned earlier, someone who wants to use the term public sector must make explicit whether the 'grey area' is included or not. In other words, it is more correct to state which concept is used between the minimum and maximum of the public sector.

Arm's length Bodies As the term '*quangos*' is such a popular term, it is hard to abandon it; 'old names never die' (Kim, 2003a: 46; Lee, 2007a: 3).³⁴

³³ Yet Lane uses the term *incorporation* in a different way. He argues that it is 'the process which transforms a public organization into a joint-stock company' (2000b: 311).

³⁴ Another problem regarding this research is that using the term ALB-isation rather than quangocratisation seems rather preposterous. Thus in this research, the terms quango and quangocratisation are used.

Moreover, its dominant use around the world makes it difficult to choose other terms. However, since the name includes '*non-governmental-organisations*' within it, it sounds ironical to use this term for governmental bodies.³⁵ Instead, the more flexible term, 'arm's length bodies' (here after ALBs) can be deployed (footnote, 237), not only because it has been used so widely from academia to the mass media, but because it contains two different meanings. The term emphasises that some public bodies are segregated, or hived-off from central government (Pollitt 2009: 249), but it also underlines the possibility of governmental intervention, remaining at a distance, but still within the reach of a government's guiding hand.

Distributed governance As far as the '*governance*' of public bodies is concerned, the term '*distributed governance*' has been the most popular term in academic circles across the world since OECD research was conducted (2002: 9). It allows researchers to relieve the burden of creating a new terminology; moreover, it is a relatively neutral concept which has no ideological or political direction. Thus, when using '*governance*' in relation to quangos, it seems desirable to employ the term '*distributed governance*'.

2-2. The Types of Agencification and Quangocratisation


2-2-1. A variety of AQ types

Public sector reforms often include the change from established organisations into agencies and quangos, and the creation of new public bodies. In general terms, both agencies and quangos tend to be considered to have been detached from their former direct control from government in order to acquire a certain degree of autonomy. Similarly, the process of agencification or quangocratisation might be regarded as virtually identical. Now that the term agencification or quangocratisation has been used to explain one of the characteristics of the NPM, AQ seem to have been a rather simple and homogeneous process (Pollitt et al., 2001: 275; Talbot, 2004a: 6). However, contrary to researchers' expectations, the processes of AQ do not form a single pattern. Figure 2-5³⁶ shows a number of ways in which AQ is put into practice, and the implications of this figure are as follows:

³⁵ Furthermore, the term 'quangos' contains a negative connotation that they are too big and have not been managed well (Hogwood, 1995: 29; Flinders et al., 2014: 3).

³⁶ In the same vein as this Figure, Lægveid et al. try to analyse the Norwegian public sector (2010: 35).

Figure 2-2: Diverse processes of agencification and quangocratisation³⁷



Source: prepared by the author

Firstly, in many cases, an organisation might be *created* as a type of executive agency or executive quango *ab initio*, while an existing organisation would be *changed* into an executive agency or quango. In other words, a function or an organisation, which involves publicness but has not been performed or arranged by the government or the private sector, could be newly generated in the form of an agency or quango. In particular, the types of *advisory* quangos have been increasingly created. When a researcher focuses on an NPM style reform, agencification in the study is usually likely to refer to *Agencification Type-I* in Figure 2-2 rather than *Type-III*; that is to say, other various types of agencification could possibly be ignored. Each different type of AQ would, however, have quite a different kind of change process, since a specific type of change has its own cause, level of difficulty, frequency and procedure. For example, *Agencification and Quangocratisation Type-V* is relatively easier than other types of AQ,³⁸ in that they scarcely tend to influence established organisations or make a change in vested interests of the career civil service.

³⁷ This figure deals with structural change of organisations; thus it excludes contracting-out, which is also an important issue of the NPM. Meanwhile, MacCarthaigh deals with the process of de-agencification, which includes nationalisation, transfer of function, secession, absorption, split, merge, replacement, transfer from and into a sub-national unit, abolition and privatisation (2010: 8).

³⁸ *Agencification and Quangocratisation Types-V* are secession from existing quangos and thus they are easier than Types-I and III.

Secondly, there is an asymmetry between the *hiving-off* and *hiving-in* processes in Figure 2-2 (Kim, 2000b: 39). In general terms, hiving-off from government is easier than returning an agency or a quango back to a ministerial department; in other words, virtual irreversibility might exist. That is largely because of public disenchantment and distrust in relation to long-lasting governmental growth over the past few decades (section 3-2-1-2; Appendix 2-figure 4). However, when large-scale agencification had taken place through radical changes, some agencies could be returned to government departments; even though the returning process might be much harder than the other way round (Figure 5-17a).³⁹ Furthermore, the external impact of an economic boom or a depression brings out different aspects of quangocratisation. For example, during times of economic upturn, there might be *the creation of new quangos* (*Quangocratisation Type- III*), while the established executive agencies might also be *converted into quangos* during the recession (*Quangocratisation Type- I*). Therefore, these phenomena might allow a researcher to draw an inference that an economic situation could not have an impact on the number of quangos (van Thiel, 2004a: 183 and 2012a), but this interpretation might need great caution considering that there are different kinds of quangocratisation. Meanwhile, if *advisory* bodies are regarded as a type of quango, as is the case in the UK; then a great decrease in the number of quangos would take place, depending on the policy of the incumbent government, owing to less resistance from stakeholders as compared with *executive* quangos (Figure 5-21).

This asymmetry has an important implication. If a particular regime focused on an intensive *structural* reform, the next regime would confront it with a limitation in the use of reform tools:⁴⁰ thus the need for a different kind of reform paradigm.

Thirdly, agencification, quangocratisation and privatisation rarely tend to proceed in sequence. To put it differently, agencification is not the prerequisite stage for quangocratisation (Figure 9-1). When it comes to a radical reform, a departmental unit could directly become an organisation in the private sector. This radical change might plausibly mean that the existing governmental unit had carried out less-public tasks, or the notion of public interest in society had changed rapidly⁴¹ (sections 7-4-1-1 and 8-1-1-1).

³⁹ For example, in the UK, many parts of departments had been changed into executive agencies and only a few of them regained their former departmental status.

⁴⁰ For example, see James and van Thiel (2011: 222).

⁴¹ For example, in the 1980s New Right political theory emphasises '*the enabling state*'; the state should ensure that public services are *delivered*, rather than directly *producing* them (Deakin and Walsh, 1996:

2-2-2. Differences and similarities between executive agencies and quangos

In many cases, the missions of executive agencies and quangos are so similar that it is difficult to tell whether a specific body should be created as a type of quango or as an agency.⁴² However, even though a clear demarcation is hard to find, there are several differences between them as follows (sections 7-2 and 9-2-1):

Firstly, executive agencies are more closely linked to *the centre* of line government departments than quangos in terms of tasks and policies (Pollitt et al., 2001: 275-276). Therefore executive agency-type organisations seem more to stress the smooth flow between policy-making and implementation, while quangos assign a much greater importance to the autonomy of their operation. In other words, when government wants to provide services directly, it tends to keep an organisation as an agency-type body. By contrast, in the case of indirect control rather than direct intervention, quangos are favoured. At the same time, in so far as potential competitors exist within the market, the supervision by the apparatus of market competition might be applied to quango-type bodies.

Secondly, agencies and quangos are based on quite different statutory standings. Usually quangos are legally *sui generis* from ministerial government and, in some countries, based on private law (James and van Thiel, 2011: 210-213). In addition, the employees of agencies are civil servants, in contrast to the quasi-civil servants or public servants of quangos. Thus, the rules and accountabilities, which the staff should abide by and be subordinate to, vary considerably in different organisation types and the provisions of each country's law.⁴³

Thirdly, in general terms, many agencies are directly funded by government, while quangos receive relatively less money from government (MoPAS, 2008b). Executive agencies are owned by their parent department,

33). This change means that the notion of the welfare state was transformed into the *enabling state* (Gilbert and Gilbert, 1990: xii). However, in case service provision in the private sector is not smooth or efficient, the state should still keep the role of scrutinising and enforcing private behaviour; that is to say, a 'regulatory state' (Bartle and Wilks, 2002: 123-124, and see also Doern and Wilks, 1998: 4-7).

⁴² As far as *advisory* NDPBs in the UK are concerned, they need to be excluded from NDPBs category, in a sense that *advisory* NDPBs rarely share common characteristics with *executive* quangos.


⁴³ The distance between agencies and quangos is different from country to country. In particular, if quangos have to follow a general private law rather than their own legal standing, the differences between agencies and quangos are much greater.

but quangos have their own individual ownership; thus retaining substantial autonomy in financial operation, as compared with agencies (Wintrobe, 1997: 443).

These differences have made commentators express different opinions about AQ (for example, Pliatzky, 1992: 2). If the differences between agencies and quangos are much wider, it might be comparatively less open to dispute as to which mechanism is more desirable. However, basically the gaps between them are related to their extent rather than their essence. The *locus classicus* is said to be the Japanese *independent administration institutions* (IAs). These are divided into two groups; *specific IAs* are organisation staffed by civil servants, while *unspecific IAs* are comprised of public servants (section 5-1-2).

Figure 2-3 clearly shows the differences which are mentioned above. Figure 2-1 focuses on the degrees of *publicness* and *control*, while Figure 2-3 examines the major public sector organisations in terms of their employees, chief executives, legal basis and financial independence.

Figure 2-3: Four major variables for classification



Source: loosely based on and developed from ideas of Billis (2010b, 55); OECD (2002: 17); Flinders (2008: 109); and van Thiel (2012b: 18).

However, despite this explicit appearance outlined in Figure 2-3, in practice, finding the distinction between executive agencies and quangos is quite difficult in many countries. In the first place, since their legal foundations are significantly diverse from country to country (Pollitt, et al., 2001: 273-274), the distinction explored above might not be useful in some countries. In addition, in reality, the application of classification criteria shown in Figure 2-3 might not be as simple as our expectations, because each state has its own unique politico-administrative system. In this regard, some commentators do not distinguish between executive agencies and quangos (Talbot, 2004a: 6). Furthermore, their nomenclature and terminology, as well as classification, are so diverse around the world that it is far from easy to differentiate between them without extensive exploration (Flinders, 2008: 4). More profoundly, their missions and tasks are comparative and relative rather than absolute (see Figure 9-1).

Meanwhile, agencies and quangos share several common features as follows: Firstly, both institutions are still carrying out *public* missions. From the viewpoint of public interest, most of them are responsible for guarantee of social equity and fairness, or for maintaining national identity and symbolic significance. From an economic point of view, they both provide public goods or merit goods; and are under the control of government in order to solve the problem of market failure and monopolistic service provision. In any case, they are still regarded by the public as being difficult to privatise at the time.

Secondly, both bodies are hived-off from the parent department to promote efficiency and enhance autonomy (*Type-I* in Figure 2-2; James and van Thiel, 2011: 221; Skelcher et al., 2013a; 4). In some countries, where a big government has been blamed for *crowding out* private investment and for difficulties of control (Aucoin, 2011: 31-37), parts of the ministerial departments have been continuously the object of reform; that is to say, some functions tend to be taken out of a parent department and made into executive agencies and quangos. Particularly, the managerial reform process after AQ is quite similar. For example, a new top management is adopted and performance targets are set up; moreover new working techniques are adopted and new training is carried out (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011: 16).

Thirdly, both have to follow government rules, orders and practices without disruption. In addition, they all ultimately have accountability to the parent government and parliament to a greater or lesser degree.

To conclude, since pressures to AQ occur in a similar way in terms of incompetence and inefficiency, they might be dealt with using a similar analysis.⁴⁴ They both, *inter alia*, tend to be affected by changes of standpoint regarding the relationships between the public sector and the private sector. Moreover merits and disadvantages after AQ might arise in a similar manner.⁴⁵

2-2-3. Examples of AQ types

The examples of a conceptual map which were suggested in Figure 2-2 are shown in Table 2-4. These imply that, in reality, the types of AQ appear in various forms.

Table 2-4: Examples of AQ⁴⁶ (years of establishment)

	Korea	UK
Agencification Type-I * Department ⇒ Executive Agency (EA)	Korea Forest Research Institute (2001) Intellectual Property Office (2006) MoCA (2006) * Appendix 13	Patent Office (1990) Valuation Office (1992) * Figure 8-3
Agencification Type-II * Quango ⇒ EA	-	Teaching Agency (2012) Legal Services Commission (2012)
Agencification Type-III * Creation of function	Gwacheon National Science Museum (2009)	National Fraud Authority (2008) Asset Protection Agency (2010)
Agencification Type-V * separation from existing EA	The Seoul Branch (the MoCA) (2013)	JCHMR (the Met Office) (2000)
Quangocratisation Type-I * EA ⇒ Quango	National Medical Center (2010) Foundation of Agri, Tech, Commercialisation & Transfer (FACT) (2009), Driver's License Agency (2011) * Table 7-7	Office of communication (2003) Marine management organisation (2010) Forensic Science Service (2005)
Quangocratisation Type-II * Department ⇒ Quango	Seoul National University Hospital (1978) Korea Railroad Corporation (2005)	The Tate Gallery (1972) Capital for Enterprise Limited (2008) * Tables 6-5 and 6-6
Quangocratisation Type-III * Creation of function	Game Rating Board (2006) North Korean Refugees Foundation (2010) Korea Institute For Robot Industry Advancement (2010)	Infrastructure Planning Commission (2009) Tenant Services Authority (2008) Legal Services Board (2009)
Quangocratisation Type-IV * the private sector ⇒ Quango	-	Leaning and Skills Council (2000)
Quangocratisation Type-V * separation from existing Quango	Hangaram Museum (Seoul Arts Center) (1990)	Tate Modern (Tate Galleries) * section 6-2

Source: derived from webpages of each institution and partly adapted from Jenkins et al. (2011: 33) and Hogwood (1993:7)

⁴⁴ Clearly, the motives of stakeholders, political traditions and procedures of an individual country, and their historical paths could be varied from country to country (see Chapters 3, 6, 7 and 8).

⁴⁵ However, to examine the differences of the merits and demerits of AQ, see later chapters.

⁴⁶ The example of Agencification Type-IV (the private sector ⇒ EA) is hard to find in both countries.

2-3. Concluding Remarks

As discussed earlier (Figure 2-3), the types of AQ are varied and it is misleading to deal with them as homogeneous phenomena in the same category. A closer analysis of these processes of change shows that they need to be explored in more detailed ways.

Firstly, different institutions which experienced different change procedures have different characteristics, so that they often could not be analysed within the same framework (Chapters 6 and 7). Secondly, as can be seen in Chapters 3 and 5, diverse variables which might influence the changes of organisational forms are different from country to country; and these are required to be considered. Finally, despite this huge variety, some common trends exist between them.

This chapter provides a foundation for later analysis by providing conceptual clarity regarding the initially bewildering variety of types of public bodies in both countries, and the processes through which they have been created. The concepts are applied and developed in the following chapters and their utility is demonstrated through the comparative case studies.


In addition, the two cases in this thesis adopt a process-centred approach (Table 1-2) and are mainly about quangocratisation types-II and V in the U.K. (Chapter 6); agencification types-I and V, and quangocratisation type-I in Korea (Chapter 7). However, agencification type-I in the U.K. is also explored in comparison with the Korean case in Chapters 7 and 8.

Chapter 3. The Causes of Agencification and Quangocratisation

Before examining the cases, nine arguments regarding AQ are carefully dealt with in this chapter, since the application of theories is significantly dependent upon the understanding of them. Indeed, there are a myriad of theories explaining the rise of the NPM and agencification. Some commentators argue that there has been convergence towards the NPM model (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992: 325-328; Hughes, 2003: 51; Kettl, 2005: 3), while others claim that convergence might be spurious or misleading (Flynn and Strehl, 1996: 4; Pollitt, 2002: 276; Lynn, 2006: 168). The opponents of convergence believe that actual implementations of individual countries' public sector reforms consist of various elements in very different ways, even though labels of public sector reform are similar in many countries (Pollitt, 2011: 15). They thus argue that if convergence exists, it is only a matter of the symbolic use of the label at a rhetorical level rather than operational convergence in practice (Pollitt, 2001: 945; Pollitt et al., 2007: 198).

In reality, the contemporary world is comprised of a great variety of institutions, actors and complex issues.⁴⁷ However, existing theories tend to remain in specific situations applied to particular countries. For this reason, each explanation of many existing models of worldwide reform might seem to be conflicting or partial. By contrast, this thesis aims to expand the scope of analysis and to suggest a comprehensive framework in order to increase the coverage of explanation and to find implications related to policy learning.

Figure 3-1: Arguments - Initial status and divergent and convergent reform pressure



⁴⁷ Thus, some researchers argue that 'there is no one single best-agency model that can be uniformly applied across countries' (van Thiel, Verhoest, Bouckaert and Lægheid, 2012: 414).

The arguments summarised in Figure 3-1 lie at the core of this thesis. They are based on the proposition that there are at least three dimensions to investigate; the *initial status of the traditional government structure* might change into the reformed state through both *isomorphic* and *divergent* factors.

This model is different from established theories for the following reasons. Firstly, while *the initial status of the traditional government structure*, before which major modern public sector reform has not taken place, has not caught the researcher's close attention, Figure 2-1 has some implications about why particular prerequisites of a specific country's public sector reform are different from others in relation to the choice of reform tools. Even though agencification and quangocratisation are a part of a series of change, most explanations consider the original state as exogenously given; thus they have stressed only the process and the result of alteration. In other words, existing analyses presume that new systems or reforms are needed only because new functions are necessary at a specific moment (Silberman, 1993: 46). However, in many cases, one of the most important reasons for public sector reform is the inherent problem of its original status.

Secondly, this model supposes that directions of change are two-way rather than one-way; thus, not only an *isomorphic* aspect, but also a *divergent* dimension of reform directions are examined, in order to compare the degree of similarities and diversities in public sector reform among countries. For example, this model will be helpful to understand why Anglo-Saxon countries have actively taken NPM reform elements, while most continental European countries have embraced only a few of them. Even though isomorphic pressures are likely to make public sector reforms across the countries identical, divergent pressures inside, such as domestic politics and historical context, tend to transform and even obstruct those centripetal forces.

Thirdly, in this model, three of *the isomorphic factors* in Figure 2-1 share the same characteristics, in that they could exert pressure for an individual country to adopt the prevailing trend around the world. However, they might be categorised into two groups in light of discretion; *the optional* and *compulsory* elements. Meanwhile, *internal divergent factors* are divided into three groups: *domestic politics* and the extent to which different countries adopt *depoliticisation*; *procedural factors* which might accomplish and modify the original plan; and *structural and historical* constraints.

Fourthly, this model stresses a variety of related factors that interact with each other. The pattern of interaction depends on place, institutions, influential factors of a given time, and trajectories. In a particular state, specific variables might be emphasised in a short period of time, while in the longer term the emphasis might move on to other variables (section 8-3-3). Moreover, the emphasis could also vary from place to place, even within the same state.

However, all these factors cannot be covered by one single variable 'culture',⁴⁸ which is all-encompassing but, in reality, very ambiguous. Instead, multiple-factors should be considered at the same time. For example, a political scandal or a national disaster could be the starting point or the turning point of a specific reform. To sum up, change in the traditional government structure is driven by various factors and the interplay of different variables allows the state to converge or diverge from that of other countries.

3-1. Initial Status: Deciding Factors of *Traditional* Government Structure

As mentioned earlier, the understanding of the original status, after which public sector reform is carried through, is essential in order to explain the results of that reform. Nevertheless, few examinations have been carried out in the public management area. It is obvious that multi-faceted angles of analysis about traditional government structure are crucial in order to ascertain the determinants of this kind of organisational structure, and to explore where public sector reform has begun.

3-1-1. Argument⁴⁹ 1-1: The basic nature of goods and services

Argument 1-1 postulates that the basic nature of goods and services is the main determinant of government organisations (sections 6-4-1-1, 7-4-1-1 and 8-1-1-1). Typically, an analysis of the inherent nature of goods and services focuses on '*whether government should provide specific goods or not*' rather than '*which form of public bodies should be provided for specific services*'.⁵⁰ This is largely because the characteristics of goods have been dealt with mainly in terms of market failure (Walsh, 1995: 6-12; Weimer and Vining, 1999: 132; Baldwin et al., 2012: 15-21). In addition to the cause of governmental intervention, this section focuses on the relationship between goods provided by government and the structure of overall public bodies. As Savas argues,

⁴⁸ The spectrum of culture is quite broad (Schedler and Proeller, 2007: 6, 19-21; Bouckaert, 2007: 31). It might be *the mode of living*, including *the collective programming of the mind* (Hofstede, 2001: 9), behaviours, practices; history and *tradition* (Bevir and Rhodes, 2003: 33-35; Painter and Peters, 2010: 6-8); *socialisation mechanism* (Marsh et al., 2001: 14); *civilization* (Huntington, 1996: 41); *civic culture* (Almond and Verba, 1963: 7-9); *identity* (Lane, 2005b: 3); ethnicity; religion; language; attitudes, values, rituals, practices and symbols (Pollitt, 2003a: 40; Hofstede, 1991: 9) and even *institutions* such as rules, norms and conventions (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 940, Pollitt, 2003a: 164-165). Furthermore, in some cases, politico-administrative features, such as state structure, minister-mandarin relations and budget flexibility, are regarded as parts of culture (Beuselinck et al., 2007: 86-89; Verhoest, 2011: 48-50). Even the term culture is often used to mean institutions *per se* (for example, see Peters 1997: 78), while anthropologist Douglas distinguished between *culture* and *institutions* (1982: Chapter 9; 1986 Chapter 5; Wildavsky, 1987: 284; Lane, 2005b: 29; Hood, 1998: 9; Thompson et al., 1999: 2-6). Thus, in this article, instead of the term 'culture', specific and narrower concepts are used. See footnote 167 and Appendix 2, footnote 14).

⁴⁹ The *arguments* in this thesis could not be proved in a strict experimental way; therefore, unlike Evans (2004: 215-223), DiMaggio and Powell (1991: 74-77) and van Thiel (2001: 58-75) who adopt the term *hypotheses*, this thesis deploys the term *arguments* in order to contribute to an overall understanding of AQ.

⁵⁰ For example, see Downs (1967: 32-35), Miller (1992: chapters 1-3), Lane (2000: 23-25), Parsons (1995: 10-12) and (Hill, 2009: 95-97).

'the nature of good determines the conditions needed to supply it.' (2000: 45). In other words, in many countries, the form and structure of governmental service provision methods are often dependent on the *types of goods* provided by public bodies.

The starting point of this argument is a traditional question; whether or not government should provide specific goods and services. The traditional market theory, based on *laissez-faire*, has emphasised the invisible hand, in which the roles of the state should be minimised (Gamble, 1990b: 127-137). However, when the market cannot fulfil its missions, it is necessary for government to intervene to mend those failures (Knott and Hammond, 2012: 181-182). *Public goods* and *externalities* are explained as primary classic examples of market failure (Gruber, 2011: 122; Hardin, 1993: 18-19; Muller 1997a: 25). As *pure public goods*⁵¹ have the characteristics of *non-rival* consumption⁵² and *non-excludability* (Musgrave and Musgrave, 1984: 48-49; Stiglitz, 2000: 128-129; Lane, 2000b: 24-25; Hardin, 1997: 27), unlike *private goods* (*individual goods*, Savas, 2000: 50-56), these goods and services are provided by the state to solve the problem of insufficient supply (Hillman 2003: 73). Meanwhile, in the case of *common pool goods*,⁵³ these could be provided by an area which is neither market nor government (Ostrom and Walker, 1997: 35). In addition, when *unintended results* (externalities), information failure and incomplete markets are generated, government might try to intervene to fix these issues (Stiglitz, 2000: 78). At the same time, *quasi-public goods* (Kim, 1992: 228), which are also called *merit goods*⁵⁴ (Musgrave and Musgrave, 1984: 78-79; Lane, 2000b: 31-32; Stiglitz, 2000: 86-89), such as education, medical care and health facilities, which are supplied through the market in some countries, could also be provided by the government based on each state's circumstances.

It is undeniable that some goods with a specific nature should be provided by the public sector; however, in this case, it is necessary to explore which organisational type is the most successful: firstly, there is a strong tendency that less controversial *pure public goods*, such as national defence, which have been traditionally supplied by the state, need to be directly provided by a ministerial department.⁵⁵ Yet, some commentators argue that there might be, if any, few pure public goods and they could change over time (Savas, 2000: 58-59).

⁵¹ Public goods are sometimes called the *collective goods* (Savas 2000: 51-57, 91-92) and *social goods* (Musgrave and Musgrave 1984).

⁵² This feature is also called *jointness* (Lane, 2000b: 24).

⁵³ These goods cause so-called '*the tragedy of the commons*' problem (Hardin, 1968: 1243; Coleman, 1990: 20; Ostrom, 1990:2; Lane, 2000b: 25-26; Reich 2000: 507; Roe, 1994: 37).


⁵⁴ They are sometimes called *worthy goods* (Savas, 2000: 57-60).

⁵⁵ However, over the last few decades, in several countries, non-combat logistical support such as building bases, delivering supplies and providing food services have been outsourced (Korean Delegation to the OECD, 2005: 4), and in the U.S, private military companies have waged *de facto* war (Stanger, 2009: 86-89; Bozeman, 2007: 29-33; Sandel, 2010: 89-90).

Secondly, if particular units are responsible for the creation of rules and procedures, such as development strategy and planning, management of government resources, or setting rules, rather than the direct provision of goods, then they take the form of ministerial departments rather than agencies or quangos. Thirdly, *toll goods* (*club goods*, Buchanan, 1965: 1) could be the next addressable issues. Toll goods have a *non-rival* nature of consumption, but users can be excluded from consumption in cases when they cannot pay. In general terms, *utility goods*, such as bridges and satellite televisions, could fall into this category. Although due to the nature of *natural monopoly* or *economy of scale* they are often provided by the state, usually the organisational types of provision are public enterprises or quangos owing to their entrepreneurial characteristics; however, some countries, the U.K., for example, privatised this area (Clifton et al., 2003: 49-50). Yet developing countries or newly independent countries neither have sufficient social infra-structure nor an advanced private sector, and so utility goods are often provided by public enterprises or even directly by ministerial departments.

Finally, as far as *merit goods* are concerned, they tend to be supplied by the quasi-public sector which is less noticeable and controversial than departmental bodies or agencies. This is largely because most media and scholars have such different political points of view about merit goods (Lane, 1985: 25) that these might cause serious social debate.

Figure 3-2: Types of goods and services, and public bodies⁵⁶



Source: prepared by the author

⁵⁶ In this figure, the scope of *merit goods* might be expanded or contracted, depending on the state of play of individual countries.

The '*public goods*' theory mentioned above, which explains the form of public bodies by the nature of their goods, has a fairly clear logic and has played a significant role in constituting the public sector. Yet, several factors to consider still remain: firstly, the distinction criteria between these goods are not clearly distinguishable. In particular, the dividing line between public goods and merit goods is relative rather than absolute.

Secondly, with the passage of time, public goods could be altered into other goods (Malkin and Wildavsky, 1991; Self, 2000: 89-91, 110). Merit goods, in particular, are changeable, depending on major social perceptions about them. Finally, in many countries, goods which were previously provided by institutions within the public sector have been privatised; not because the nature of goods changed, but partly because the rules and principles about the goods were altered (Lodge and Wegrich, 2012a: 24). To sum up, since the nature of goods varies according to the context and time, it is difficult to explain the form of government only by means of the characteristics of goods.

3-1-2. Argument 1-2: The nature of functions and tasks

Argument 1-2 considers the tasks and functions of organisations as the primary determinant of their types (sections 6-4-1-1, 7-4-1-1 and 8-1-1-2). One of the traditional approaches of the organisational type of government is Gulick's classical management science (1937 and 2003: 15-30; Self, 1972: 55; Pursley and Snortland, 1980: 108-117, March and Simon, 1993: 50-51; Peters 2010: 139; Christensen and Lægveid; 2010: 257). Gulick argued that organisations at the national level are based on four kinds of criteria: *main purpose*; *process*; *clientele*; and *place*. If we can see the whole picture of government, *organisations by purpose* are the most prevalent⁵⁷ and other modes of organisation are complementary (Simon, 1953: 32). For example, police and health services require dispersion by *place or area*, while the *organisation by process* principle is used at sub-ministerial levels (Peters, 2010: 155-157).⁵⁸ However, the *organisation by purpose* principle seems to be based on a functionalist description (Blondel, 1982: 23; Hall, 1986: 6). The elucidation in which a specific organisation was created in order to carry out

⁵⁷ Nevertheless, Peters argues that this criterion of organisation is not always clearly distinguishable from others; for example, it is not apparent whether the Ministry of Agriculture is organised on the basis of *its major purpose* or *its clientele group* (2010: 151). However, his example is misleading, in that in addition to farmers, there are many stakeholders within agriculture, such as food deliverers, sellers and consumers. In this regard, the Ministry of Agriculture is organised, mainly based on its purpose rather than its clientele group; whereas the Veteran's Administration which intensively deals with the matter of the veteran is organised by its clientele (Gulick, 1937: 25). For more on this, see Gortner et al. (1997: 98-99)

⁵⁸ An organisation created on the basis of *process* deals with special skills such as law, while an organisation established on the basis of the *place* at which the service is performed, is arranged for territorial or colonial government (Gulick, 1937: 23-27); however, both have relatively less to do with AQ.

particular function could be a justificatory theory rather than an explanatory theory, in that there are different viewpoints regarding its function and chances are that function would be generated *de novo* for organisation creation (Crozier, 1964: 294; Pollitt, 1984: 171). More seriously, this perspective could not explain why an institution should be constituted in a department type rather than in an agency or quango type.

Meanwhile, Mintzberg (1979)⁵⁹ and Rainey (2009) only emphasise the factors that affect internal structure in a single organisation, rather than mentioning determinants of an overall government structure. Rainey does briefly point out that 'task' could influence the organisational structure (2009: 212-213), while it is a meaningful concept for Hood (1978a: 36-40) to uncover the forces affecting the organisational form of public bodies.⁶⁰ Hood argued that 'tasks' could be the variables that might explain the reason why specific organisations exist in the form of quangos. He claims that business-type activities, tasks requiring flexibility and discretion, and routine activities will tend to be hived off from central departments to non-departmental bodies. In this regard, tasks of the public sector could be largely divided into two groups: *policy-formation* tasks and *executive* tasks. Policy-formation tasks (Dunn, 1994: 16-17) involve decision-making process such as agenda setting, forecasting, policy adoption and the establishment of strategy rather than the direct provision of service; in addition, those include the allocation of *shared resources* such as budget and personnel, in order to smoothly operate overall government. By contrast, executive tasks cover front-line delivery tasks, routines tasks, information technology services for customers and policy monitoring (Greer, 1994: 40). In general terms, organisations which are responsible for policy-formation tasks can maintain traditional government structure, whilst units which are charged with basic operational tasks seem to have been changed into executive agencies and quangos in some countries over the past few years.

The perceived reasons for this decoupling are as follows: firstly, the organisation which performs a specific task might be more efficient outside government rather than under a bureaucratic standard operating procedure (SOP) (van Thiel 2004a: 193; Wilson, 1989a: 133; Moran et al., 2008: 14).⁶¹ For example, it needs more time to use professional skills under the influence

⁵⁹ See also Bozeman (1979: 113-125).

⁶⁰ According to Rose, *the principal resources* of government organisations are laws, taxes and employees. The role of organisation is to combine these resources of government into '*programmes*' as outputs (1984: 17 -19). Tasks could be considered to be the combination of these programmes and policies. Meanwhile, Hood argues that each policy area is difficult to divide up into strictly exclusive divisions (1976: 55).

⁶¹ According to Dunleavy (1976: 11), 'the structure of government organisation may be directly influenced by demand inputs, in particular by their quantitative level'. This argument is broadly linked to the 'overload approach' or 'excess demand' model, which is based on the 'functional requirements' perspective (Pollitt, 1984: 170-172).

of a time-consuming formal process inside a ministerial department; besides which, it is more difficult to recruit specialists through bureaucratic generalist-oriented procedures. Secondly, routine activities and consumer-oriented tasks are predictable for the users, and need speedy implementation close at hand. Thus, tight bureaucratic controls over executive agencies and quangos are relatively less necessary than in parent departments. Thirdly, business-type tasks could be provided by competition through the market; thus, bureaucratic monitoring is replaced by market pressures (Greer, 1994: 41). In particular, accountability vis-à-vis professional expertise might be more efficiently acquired by market competition, given that it is cost-ineffective to have another monitoring unit within government.

However, not all public sector bodies carry out business and routine activities, and some ministerial departments still might conduct executive tasks, despite several practitioners' *per contra* claim. Moreover, in reality, the task of the decoupling policy formation from implementation is not a simple one. Firstly, the demarcation between policy formation and execution is frequently hard to find. The mission of executive units is not always limited to implementation tasks; that is, it often includes guidelines to their own actions or the establishment of goals, which might have strategic features.

Secondly, even if the dividing line between them is distinguishable, usually they are so strongly connected that, in some instances, it might be inefficient to divorce them from each other.

Finally, when executive units are separated from a ministerial department, the problem of co-operation among sub-units might come to the fore. In this regard, in some countries, especially after NPM reform, governance and networks have become debated issues (Rhodes, 1994; Weller et al., 1997; Bardach, 1998; Gray, 2000; 6 et al., 2002; Osborne, 2010; Rhodes, 2011a).

3-1-3. Argument 1-3: Contextual constraints on an individual state: ad-hoc basis creation

Argument 1-3 supposes that the historical development route of the organisation is the critical factor regarding its form within the private sector (sections 6-4-1-1, 7-4-1-1 and 8-1-1-3). Logically speaking, the principles for the *creation* of public bodies are determined by economic reasons or basic operational tasks, as pointed out above. However, the context and the development route at the time also make a meaningful difference in the types of public bodies as follows: Firstly, a state cannot be formed in a short period of time (Pollitt, 2002: 277). Some states already settled in their territories may be

almost the same at present as they were a couple of hundred years ago, before modern economic and organisational theories were established; and thus they may have gradually developed a modern constitutional system (Doig, 1979: 315; Greenleaf, 1983: 38). On the contrary, other states have comparatively recently accomplished a newly independent state through revolution or liberation (Elgie, 2012: 276). In general terms, the latter had less opportunity to develop a social infra-structure, so that the state has more power over its society and the size of the public sector is relatively bigger than that in developed countries (Richards and Smith, 2002: 41). However, in France, the public sector still has a significant influence over society, although it is one of the former cases (Rouban, 1995: 39 and 2008: 222; Elgie, 2003: 76-77; Chatenet, 1956: 164; Suleiman, 1984: 128; Stevens, 2003: 123-125). In the U.K., the public sector has steadily formed along with developments such as industrialisation and democratisation and with the variation in the major paradigm (Hood 1978a: 32; Richards and Smith, 2002: 49-55). Equally, most developed countries have built their states over the long haul; thus, few coherent theories about national organisation tend to be applied to them. By contrast, countries which have experienced a colonial period are liable to follow the institutions of their former ruler. For example, the Norwegian and the Korean public sectors have a relatively similar structure to that of the Swedish and the Japanese public sectors respectively (Christensen and Læg Reid, 2008: 100).

Secondly, in some countries, limited time and manpower have led to failure in establishing the proper role of the public sector, even though, in theory, a newly independent state may seemingly have the opportunity to design the overall public sector by using economic principles or basic operational tasks at the same time. However, at the early stage of nation building, less developed countries, in practice, suffer from a shortage of skilled manpower which could mould the relationship between the state and society in a more coherent way.

Thirdly, the quantity of economic and legal resources available could affect the size and form of the public sector (Pollitt, 2002: 277). In times of economic upturn, generally, the number of quangos tends to increase (Type-III in Figure 2-2), given that the public sector as well as the private sector expands and public opinion about such enlargement is not particularly sceptical at the time.

Last but not least, the shape of the public sector is considerably influenced by the interactions of stakeholders such as politicians, bureaucrats and interest groups (section 3-2-1-3). Each stakeholder has a different perspective about the role of the public sector, and their power and competences are multifarious.

Organisational and procedural arrangements are not neutral, so not surprisingly, the more powerful stakeholders in that particular time and space have exercised more control over the public sector (Seidman, 1998: 12-13).

3-2. The Convergent and Divergent Pressures of AQ

A myriad of commentators argue that public sector reforms in different countries are becoming more similar, while some researchers have focused on divergence or differentiation of reform (Lane, 2009: 161-163; Lynn, 2006: 167-168). The *convergence or isomorphism of reform* can be explained mainly by fashions of universal theory, economic crisis and the opportunistic attitude of political actors. By contrast, domestic politics, path-dependence and diversities of decision-making process contribute to *divergence or centrifugal forces of reform*.

By and large, isomorphic theories tend to focus on external impacts, while divergent theories are apt to emphasise internal dynamics. However, rational choice theories, which place the emphasis on universal human behaviour, assert that selfish actors make the real world similar (Hindmoor, 2006: 1-4; Eriksson, 2011: 190-191). If a researcher examines only a specific group of countries or an individual state, agencification or quangocratisation would be explained by using only one side of the theory; however, an overall explanation having wide generalisability might be extremely restricted (Appendix 3).

3-2-1. External Centripetal forces (Argument 2-1 ~ 2-3)

3-2-1-1. Argument 2-1: Optional elements - Theories and policy fashions

This argument believes that theories or policy fashions could provoke the isomorphism or homogenisation of AQ in two ways. The first mechanism of institutional isomorphic change is the *normative* pressure (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991: 66-71; Brunsson and Olsen, 1993: 10).⁶² The sharing of organisational principles and form among professional managers might allow types of public sectors of individual states to be similar to each other. The second mechanism is the *mimetic* processes. Since the goals of an organisation are ambiguous or relationships between means and ends are uncertain, an organisation tends to copy any other organisation which is perceived to be successful, in order to deal with uncertainty or to enhance its organisational legitimacy. In addition, globalisation makes these two pressures more powerful and speedy. Even

⁶² In their influential article, DiMaggio and Powell suggest three mechanisms: *coercive*; *mimetic*; and *normative isomorphism* (1983: 150). The *coercive* mechanism is dealt with in other part of this thesis, for the benefit of analysis (See argument 2-2).

though the causes of globalisation are open to dispute (Giddens, 1998: 28-29; Chang, 2007: 21-31),⁶³ admittedly, most commentators agree on the present rapid expansion of globalisation (Rodrik, 1997: 7-9).

However, since theories or policy fashions are still nothing more than a conceptual framework, for an individual state, whether this could be introduced as a policy is not coercive (section 8-3).⁶⁴ In this regard, theories might fall into *optional* elements.

Sociological institutionalism or organisational institutionalism Diverse new institutionalism theories suggest a variety of definition regarding institution (Cairney, 2011: 75; Goodin, 1996: 2-20). Among them, according to *sociological* institutionalists,⁶⁵ *institution*, in general terms, means *constraints* which could influence actors and the interactions between them; and, under its restrictions, individual behaviours and interactions tend to form meaningful patterns which have stability and regularities⁶⁶ (Peters, 2005: 158; Lowndes, 2010: 63). Sociological institutionalism, which is often called *organisational* institutionalism, focuses on organisational similarity and cognitive influence (Katzenstein, 1997: 14; Jepperson, 1991: 145; Reich, 2000: 508-509). In particular, from a sociological institutionalists' viewpoint, an *institution* is not a physical entity, but a social order at the cognitive, cultural and symbolic level; and institutionalisation is the process in which a particular social order and cultural patterns are taken for granted (Ha, 2003: 112).

Sociological institutionalists believe that certain organisational forms and structures, such as bureaucracy, have been similarly introduced across the world, since the public accept an institution without doubt owing to the *cognitive influence* of the environment (Scott, 1995b: 35, 164 and 1998: 117; Pierson, 2004: 110; Hill, 2009: 71). However, in academic circles, prior to this model, there have already been several arguments which focused on the

⁶³ Historically speaking, this is not the first globalisation (Goldblatt et al, 1999:176, Rodrik 2011: 3); however, arguably at least in its present form, it is the most far-reaching driving force towards worldwide change (Hill, 2009: 47, 124-125).

⁶⁴ Yet some commentators argue that history simply reflects prevailing world-view (Englemann, 2003: 14) and a state which suffers from economic crisis cannot resist the pressure of the World Bank or the IMF (International Monetary Fund) which would mostly suggest a neo-liberal prescription (Chang, 2007: 32; Evans, 2004: 30).

⁶⁵ With regard to the classification of institutionalism, Hall and Taylor (1996:936) suggest three schools of thought, each of which calls itself a new institutionalism: *historical* institutionalism, *rational choice* institutionalism, and *sociological* institutionalism. However, Reich adds the Neo-Weberian state model (2000: 510-511) to these three types, while Peters adds (2005) four other types: *normative* institutionalism, *empirical* institutionalism, the institution of *interest representation* and *international* institutionalism. Concerning *normative institutionalism*, it emphasises norms and rules rather than organisational forms (March and Olsen, 1989: 22, Olsen, 2010b:23), and it is the roots of the new institutionalism (Peters, 2005: 25).

⁶⁶ The term '*institutions*' could cover human arrangements from morality to the establishment of constitutions (Reinert, 2008: 221), but, for institutionalists, it has more to do with '*systematic patterns of shared expectations*' (Chang and Evans, 2005: 99).

similarity and the cognitive dimension of policy types and organisational forms.⁶⁷ Hood suggests one possible argument, which is called 'fashion theory'; that there have been 'long swings' between moods of convergence and moods of divergence, and that the patterns of public bodies have been determined by predominant public opinion rather than by the actual problems in reality (Hood, 1978: 35). From this point of view, the types of public bodies are dependent on trends and timing of policy fashions.

Meanwhile, when it comes to explaining the similarity of modern organisations, sociological institutionalists put the accent on *meanings* and *symbols*. Meyer and Rowan observes that institutionalised products, such as techniques and policy functions, are powerful myths, and many organisations adopt them ceremonially (1977: 340; 1991: 41). These *myths* and *ceremonies* 'legitimate' organisations externally, rather than in terms of efficiency, and make the structure and form of each organisation similar; otherwise individual organisations might be quite different from one another in order to deal with their tasks effectively. For example, vis-à-vis the explanation for the rise of bureaucracy, improved markets and increasing technological complexities, which have been regarded as the prerequisites of bureaucracy, emerged *after* the advent of bureaucracy, rather than before it. In other words, the expansion of bureaucracy was not because it was an efficient mechanism with which to solve growing new challenges, but because the environments outside the organisations took it as a *rationalised* system. Since social and cultural surroundings have pursued *rationalisation*, which is the essence of the isomorphic pressure, they chose bureaucracy. In other words, this symbolic feature of rationalisation contributed to the spread of bureaucracy (Meyer, 1994: 32-53). In this vein, Tolbert and Zucker argue that a certain type of agent *per se* creates legitimacy (1982: 30), and a social evaluation of organisations is likely to be based not on organisational performance, but on *organisational structure* (Brunsson, 1989: 3). In addition, DiMaggio and Powell add that, through isomorphism, an organisation could increase its legitimacy and the chances of survival (1983: 151).

An advantage of sociological institutionalism is that it could show a cognitive process of policy learning of AQ. For example, increasingly influential international fora, such as the OECD Public Management Committee or the United Nations Public Administration Network (UNPAN), or

⁶⁷ Different commentators use different labels. For example, 'policy boom' (Dunleavy), 'lesson drawing' (Rose, 1993: 95; James and Lodge 2003: 179; Hill, 2009: 181), 'policy transfer' (Dolowitz, 2000: 9; Evans, 2004: 1; Ladi, 2005: 56), 'learning from second-hand experience' (Barzelay, 2007: 522), 'transplantation' (De Jong et al., 2002:2), 'policy diffusion' (Lane, 2009: 162), 'benchmarking' (Pollitt, 2010: 91), and 'policy learning' (Dunlop and Radaelli, 2011). For more on this, see Chapter 8 (footnote 577).

epistemic communities (Dunlop, 2009: 290) have pointed out that most of the developed countries were choosing roughly the same direction of public management (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011: 9); thus, for some politicians, the idea of globally accepted management techniques is intuitively inviting and they do not want to be left behind (van Thiel et al., 2007: 196).

However, there are several limitations in sociological institutionalism (Ha, 2003: 123-126): firstly, neither specific behaviours nor actors are found in its theoretical framework, and conflicts of interests seldom exist. Since sociological institutionalism rarely contains the concept for power and political phenomenon within it, it cannot explain the possibility that a certain individual or group manipulates or formulates social values in order to pursue their private interests. Secondly, if the isomorphic pressure is so powerful, all organisations in the world would have the same organisational form and structure (James and van Thiel, 2011: 216). The processes of convergence, however, are varied depending on particular local circumstances. Finally, it can explain only the diffusion of successfully institutionalised organisational structure, but might not explore the change of institution and de-institutionalisation (DiMaggio, 1988: 12; Koelble, 1995: 235).⁶⁸

In conclusion, to enhance the quality of explanation, the policy fashion theory need boosters such as an economic crisis, the intentions of bureaucrats and politicians, or other internal divergent factors.

Neo-liberalism and Neo-conservatism (the New Right)⁶⁹ Even though the direct theoretical background of AQ seems to be the NPM, the intrinsic idea behind AQ and the NPM might be neo-liberalism (Boston, 2011: 18-21). Reforms are largely related to deeper currents, such as macro-economic changes, technological developments and ideological shifts (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011: 11).

Neo-liberalism is often considered to be a synonym for neo-conservatism. On the one hand, the term *Neo-conservatism* is the combination of *economic individualism* and conservative tradition (Krugman, 2007: 115-116; Giddens, 1998: 6). In the nineteenth century, the conservatism of trade protectionists was in conflict with economic liberalism (Chang, 2007: 49-57), but from the mid twentieth century, both ideas combined and have formed neo-conservatism

⁶⁸ Furthermore, James et al. argue that, in reality, its elucidation is difficult to test (2011: 216).

⁶⁹ In the 1980s, many conservative parties and groups around the world such as the Thatcherite conservatives, which won the election, were called the New Right, and they followed neo-liberal and neo-conservative ideas (Richards and Smith, 2002: 101-102).

(Lakoff, 2004: 15).⁷⁰ Therefore, according to neo-conservatism, politically conservative values such as family ties and moral authority are highly stressed, combining with market fundamentalism.⁷¹ On the other hand, the term *neo-liberalism* puts more weight on the potential cure-all features of the market, although usually it has been regarded as a synonym for neo-conservatism or the New Right. Liberalism in the nineteenth century put the emphasis only on the efficiency of the invisible hand of market forces, whereas neo-liberalism adds the *morality* of the market (Lim, 1994). In other words, the classical theory of economics has expanded its territory to politics. A variety of commentators suggest a different point of view as to why neo-liberalism has been the dominant value system around the world (Reich 2007: 50-51). However, from a theoretical perspective, the Chicago school, the Austrian School and libertarians are considered to have mainly contributed to the popularity of market fundamentalism.⁷² Friedman (1981), the founder of the Chicago school of economics, argues that the freedom of exchange in the market also enhanced political freedom (Reinert, 2008: 271-272). Stigler (1971: 3) adds that regulation is detrimental not only to economy, but also to politics (Moe, 1997: 462; Hood, 1994: 24).⁷³ Hayek (1944) and von Mises (1944) of the Austrian school argues that no central planning is attainable (Chang, 2003: 31), and the market is efficient even in an imperfectly competitive situation (Lim, 1994). In addition, the new contractarianism of a libertarian such as Nozick's contention (1974: 23) in which he has endorsed a minimal state and philosophically has supported neo-liberalism (Held, 1989: 160; Parsons, 1995: 47; Chang, 2003: 26; Sandel 2010: 62). Unlike classical mercantilism, neo-liberalism has contributed quite directly to globalising forces (Giddens, 1998: 14), and it is difficult to dismiss the claim that neo-liberalism might seem to have triumphed across the world (Giddens, 2000: 65-66).⁷⁴

However, several criticisms about market fundamentalism have been raised. Firstly, not surprisingly, the market might be inefficient (Lindblom, 2002:

⁷⁰ Since conservatism is the 'system of ideas employed to justify any established social order,' (Huntington, 1957: 455), it adopted economic liberalism in order to minimise increasing state intervention and to maintain its economic leading status around the world. However, some commentators argue that market-fundamentalism and conservatism are in tension and quite unstable (Giddens, 1998: 14-15, King, 1987: 24-25).

⁷¹ King observes, in the US, the term 'new right' is more closely associated with moral rather than economic arguments, as compared with the UK, but still there are sufficient similarities between British and American usage (1987: 1, Richards and Smith, 2002: 94).

⁷² Since rational choice institutionalism, as with neo-liberalism, has its roots in economical methodology, some scholars argue that it is another supportive theory for neo-liberalism (Chang, 2003: 28).

⁷³ He defines state intervention to the market as a regulation, and asserts that regulation generates tremendous social costs (1971: 10).

⁷⁴ Required conditions for a particular species to survive are 'longevity, fecundity, copying-fidelity' (Dawkins 1989: 18). Similarly, when a theory has these conditions, it would be in an advantageous position for survival of the fittest in terms of policy fashion.

147-165). It has its own built-in defects such as externalities, uncertainty of information and additional transaction costs; moreover, it might give rise to macroeconomic dysfunctions such as recessions and high unemployment rates. Secondly, if the market is efficient, it still has significant ethical problems, such as inequality, within it (Stiglitz, 2012: 89; Piketty, 2014: 432). Pareto optimality of a specific market hardly, if ever, means that its income distribution is equitable (Self, 2000: 124). For example, privatisations of utilities in the 1980s, based on neo-liberalism, result in reducing the provision of services for a considerable number of low income consumers (Richards and Smith, 2002: 114-116). In addition, socially sensitive issues, such as selling kidneys and pregnancy for payment (Sandel, 2010: 72, 91), could not be dealt with by the market; thus, no market is free from moral issues. Thirdly, more recently, neo-liberalism has become deeply problematic regarding globalisation and global free trade (MacEwan, 2001: 31). The emphasis on the neo-liberal idea of a developed world, such as the Washington Consensus, against developing countries, has provoked trade fundamentalism and the deprivation of any opportunity to catch up with them (Reinert, 2008: 173-177; Plant, 2009: 263-264; Rodrik, 2011: 164-173).⁷⁵ Rapid expansion of the neo-liberalism idea to the financial market could make the global economy increasingly unstable (Chang, 2010: 231, Rajan, 2010: 5-6).

As far as the service provision types of the public sector are concerned, neo-liberalists press for marketisation and a reduction in the size of the public sector; and thus they are encouraging the privatisation of all possible services. If privatisation is difficult, then AQ are recommended. From this point of view, the starting point for consideration is quite opposite to the perspective in Figure 2-1 (Cm 914: para 2.6; footnotes 405 and 530). Neo-liberalists start with the market and consider privatisation as the best alternative, while the careful approach in Figure 2-1 explores the possibilities of AQ first. Meanwhile, market fundamentalists assume that if complete marketisation in the public sector is hard to come by, then a contestable market, in which *market entry* and *exit* is unlimited, would be the next best plan for the public sector (Baumol et al., 1982: 329-332 and 1986; Mulgan, 1994: 55; Vining et al., 2007: 222).⁷⁶

The NPM and Neo-Weberian Governance Recent public sector reforms, which are underway in many countries, have common characteristics. The 'New Public Management' is the label applied to this set of innovative reforms. Since its key feature is the infusion of some market principles into the political world, neo-liberalism and rational choice institutionalism are often regarded as its

⁷⁵ The strategy for developed countries is known as 'kicking-away-the-ladder' (Chang, 2002: 4-5).

⁷⁶ However, free exit means that there would be no sunk cost; therefore, Baumol's contestable market model is rather idealistic (Lee, 2008a).

theoretical background (Greer, 1994: 13-17, Massey and Pyper, 2005: 36-37). At the same time, Hood (2011b: 213) suggests a background to the introduction of the NPM as follows:

The reason for coining the neologism 'New Public Management' at that time was that a term was needed to characterize a new (or at least recycled) set of doctrines of how to manage the state which combined Burnham-style managerialism with economic rationalism As a sign of those times it is worth recalling that the late Sir Peter Kemp (the senior civil servant then responsible for the UK government's executive agency programme) refused to use the word 'administration' at all to describe the work of executive government, insisting on the term 'management' instead.

The upsurge of the NPM might be ascribed to the factors such as the slowing down or the reverse of government growth, the shift toward quasi-privatisation, the development of information technology (IT), post-Fordism, and focused international agenda in terms of public management (Hood, 1991a: 4 and 2011b: 199; Richards and Smith, 2002: 31-36). However, a market-oriented approach has been at the heart of the NPM. In the first place, the NPM assumes self-interested human activities similar to the market. Secondly, in NPM theory, the public sector gives its place to the market on the ground of confidence in market mechanisms. In other words, the NPM uses market-type organisations to deliver public services. Finally, it aggressively emphasises a business-like managerial method, authority devolution and empowerment.⁷⁷ Especially, with the help of IT, many new managerial methods have been introduced.⁷⁸ The last point, however, might not be the exclusive ingredient of the NPM, since it can be seen as simply streamlining management, which is a universal phenomenon in the contemporary world (Pollitt et al., 2001: 275).

The analyses of NPM components are often involved in considering the operational principles of executive agencies and quangos. Therefore, in this thesis, a clear concept of the NPM is essential. Yet the NPM, like a chameleon, continuously alters its appearance, depending on the local context (van Thiel et al., 2007: 199) and a range of perspectives might be perceived according to a variety of commentators, as shown in the Table 3-1.

⁷⁷ The NPM contains two internally inconsistent assumptions. On the one hand, it is based on a low-trust approach and emphasises the control of opportunistic agents. On the other hand, it stresses the devolution and empowerment (Peters, 1998c: 89-91; Pollitt, 2002a: 32; Pollitt and Dan, 2011: 5).

⁷⁸ Certain scholars focus on the role of IT, and argue that the vastly improved capacities for data processing and rapid communication make it possible to introduce the new type of governance (Figure 8-9). For example, Dunleavy et al. suggests *digital era governance* (2006: 224). However, other commentators argue that IT still cannot sort out the problems of competing and divergent values, although it may help decision-makers to get a clearer picture of the options (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011: 184; Hood and Margetts, 2010: 134). For example, van Thiel et al. observe that IT is not neutral and it can reinforce or reproduce existing structures and interests (2007: 198). Similarly, Homburg argues that many versions of e-government depend on the particular context in which a given e-technology is introduced with specific purposes (2008: 1-4).

Table 3-1: Components of the NPM

<p>Hood (1991, 1994) James (2002: 62) Osborne and McLaughlin (2002:9) Massey and Pyper (2005: 36)</p>	<p>Seven components: Active discretionary control of organisation; Explicit standards and measurement of performance; Greater emphasis on output controls; Disaggregation of units in the public sector; Greater competition; Private-sector styles of management practice; and Parsimony in resource use</p>
<p>Kettle (2005: 18)</p>	<p>Six components: Customer service; Operating autonomy; Output measurement; Human resources; Information technology; and Privatization</p>
<p>Homburg, Pollitt, and van Thiel (2007: 4-5); Pollitt (2003: 27-28 and 2013a: 115)</p>	<p>Seven components: Lean and highly decentralized structures; The use of divisional structures; A wide spread emphasis on contracts; A much wider than hither to deployment of market-type mechanisms (MTMs); More attention for management skills; A shift from inputs toward outputs; and A shift towards more measurement and quantification</p>
<p>Dunleavy, Margetts, Bastow and Tinkler (2008: 97-100)</p>	<p>Three components: <i>Disaggregation</i> (purchaser-provider separation; <i>agencification</i>; decoupling policy systems; growth of quasi-government agencies; separation of micro-local agencies; chunking up privatized industries; corporatization and strong single organisation management; de-professionalism; competition by comparison; improved performance measurement; and league tables of agency performance); <i>Competition</i> (quasi-markets; voucher schemes; outsourcing; compulsory market testing; intra-government contracting; public/private sectoral polarisation; product market liberalisation; de-regulation; consumer-tagged financing, user control); and <i>Incentivization</i> (re-specifying property rights; 'light touch' regulation; capital market involvement in projects; privatising asset ownership; anti-rent-seeking measures; performance-related pay; the Private Finance Initiative (PFI); unified rate of return and discounting; development of charging technologies; valuing public sector equality; mandatory efficiency dividends)</p>
<p>Lane (2009: 159-160)</p>	<p>Four components: Privatisation; Contracting out and in: tendering/bidding; Executive agencies; and Public-private partnership</p>
<p>Richards and Smith (2009: 104)</p>	<p>Eight components: Introduction markets and quasi-markets into the public sector; Flexible organisations; Decentralisation and disaggregation; Incentives mechanisms; A focus on efficiency, Management by results; The use of new technology; and an increased role for audit</p>
<p>Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011: 10)</p>	<p>Two-level phenomenon; <i>at the higher level</i>, business concepts, techniques, and values; <i>at a more mundane level</i>, emphasis on performance, flat and disaggregated organisational forms, substitution of contracts for hierarchical relations, market-type mechanisms including competitive tendering and public sector league tables, emphasis on treating service users as customers</p>
<p>Christensen and Lægveid (2011: 3-4)</p>	<p>Three types of reform: Structural devolution; Management models ('let the managers manage' and 'make the managers manage' model) (Ferlie and Geraghty, 2007: 431); Performance management and cost-cutting</p>

Surprisingly, the NPM, in the beginning, did not provide a theoretical background to initial reforms (Pollitt, 2002: 274; Hood and Peters, 2004: 268); instead, after some reforms took place, several models have been introduced to explain the existing reforms of Anglo-Saxon countries. The starting point of NPM reforms can be traced back to the early 1980s, but the term NPM has been used from the early 1990s (Hood, 1989: 347 and 1991a; Christensen and Lægreid, 2011: 1). For this reason, the explanations of commentators are varied, depending on both countries and times; the NPM is a rather loose term and is not a coherent set of ideas and tools (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011: 10).

Therefore the NPM does not contain every element which various researchers have suggested. In this regard, the following questions could be raised: firstly, is the NPM a universal theory or a limited phenomenon which might be applied to particular countries? Secondly, to what extent are the NPM elements needed to be regarded as the NPM itself? (Lane, 2005a: 6-8) To answer the first question, the second question has to be dealt with beforehand. In fact, this question involves the definition of the NPM. To use an analogy, in order for something to be considered as apple juice, what proportion of apple does it need? In other words, provided that only a part of the NPM is introduced, can it be thought to be the complete NPM? If the NPM concerns renewal of managerialism or the introduction of advanced private managerial skills in a broad way, then it can include more reforms around the world (Figure 3-3). However, for some commentators, the emphasis on managerialism in the public sector is not a new trend (Lynn, 2006: 178-179),⁷⁹ and thus it might be sufficient to call them modernisation⁸⁰ rather than introduce a neologism (Brunsson and Olsen, 1993: 16-17). At the same time, if researchers only focus on market-type elements such as competition and privatisation, rather than general managerialism, then the NPM concepts might be applied in a much narrower way (Lane 2009: 160).⁸¹

In reality, the degrees of acceptance of the NPM are different from country to country; the NPM-intensive group would include New Zealand, Australia and the UK (Aberbach and Rockman, 2000: 139), while the low NPM


⁷⁹ In particular, the gurus of generic management have used a similar approach to the NPM (Smith and Licari, 2006: 142). For example, see Peters and Waterman (1982: Chapters 6 and 9; Aucoin, 1990: 117) and Ferlie and Geraghty (2007: 432). For more on this, see Bolman and Deal (1984:2)

⁸⁰ Caiden refers these trends as debureaucratization (1991b, 78-81; see also Eisenstadt, 1959: 312 and Olsen, 2010a: 177); and indeed, many countries have performed various public sector reforms without the NPM notion.

⁸¹ Lane (2009: 159-160) argued that the NPM idea arrived at the same time as state modernisation (such as de-concentration, decentralisation, performance measures, incentive strategies, and deregulation and incorporation), thus these two trends may be confused. He thinks, however, that many public sector reforms are not inspired by the NPM and it is important to distinguish between state modernisation in general and the NPM framework in particular.

group would involve Germany and Japan (Hood, 1994: 133; Kim, 2000a: 25). All the leading NPM countries are mainly Anglophone (Pollitt et al., 2001: 278). However, there were still basic differences between the Westminster model and the American style: the Westminster reforms were more fundamental; in contrast, the American-style reform was 'broader but organic' (Kettl, 2005: 40). Meanwhile, many other continental Europe and developing countries adopted several components of the NPM. For example, the Nordic countries emphasised a strong state and active citizenship, while marketing governments such as the UK sold off all non-essential state tasks and functions (van Thiel et al., 2007: 199). In addition, in the countries with strong Napoleonic traditions such as France, Italy and Spain, NPM ideas have been regarded as 'Anglo-Saxon ideas' and they embraced other types of reforms (Kickert, 2007: 27-33). In Germany, the federal administration has developed into a number of highly differentiated agencies and non-departmental bodies, while these changes and adaptations have very little to do with the NPM (Bach and Jann, 2010: 443).

Figure 3-3: Concentration of NPM components



Source: loosely based on Table 3-1

In terms of the organisational types of the public sector, the NPM provoked, in some countries, a reduction in the size of traditional governmental bodies through agencification and streamlining of the management in

governmental corporations.⁸² However, in a broad sense, structural change strategy is, arguably, not the essential part of the NPM.

For some researchers, NPM seems to have been over-exaggerated, especially by the early academic enthusiasts, special management consultants, and individuals who have occupied key positions in the main international agencies such as the OECD and the World Bank (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011: 12-15). Therefore, even though the NPM has been a far-reaching idea and has inspired many reforms in many countries, there have been different opinions as to whether it has been the only kind of reform that is going on (section 8-3-3). According to this perspective, in continental European countries, neo-Weberian Governance model⁸³ seems to be rather appropriate, while NPM concepts could be applied to mainly Anglo-Saxon countries.⁸⁴ NPM ideas seem to be an apparent abandonment of some of the traditional Weberian features such as rule-bound administration, the notion of lifetime careers and fixed pay for service (Hood, 1994: 133). By contrast, the neo-Weberian Governance perspective still maintains Weber's ideas regarding bureaucracy such as the role of the state as the main facilitator of solutions to new problems, the role of representative democracy and administrative law, and the preservation of the idea of public service (Hill, 2009: 21; Richards and Smith, 2002: 26); while it also introduces 'new' components such as citizen's needs, supplementation of the role of representative democracy, a greater orientation towards the achievement of results, and a professionalisation of the public service (Lynn, 2008: 26; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011: 118-119). To put it briefly, neo-Weberian Governance might try to secure more responsiveness to citizens, more openness and efficiency, and more professionalism 'through a disciplined hierarchy of impartial officials' (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011: 23). While Drechsler considers the neo-Weberian governance model as post-NPM (2009: 13), Pollitt and Bouckaert do not emphasise a clash between the NPM and the neo-Weberian Governance (2011: 122). In addition, they suggest two groups of neo-Weberian Governance: on the one hand, the Nordic countries and the Netherlands emphasise legitimacy and accountability; on the other hand, France, Spain, Portugal and federal Germany place the emphasis on flexibility

⁸² See Chapters 6, 7 and 8.

⁸³ Pollitt and Bouckaert use the term neo-Weberian 'state' model, but in practice, its usage can be confused with other neo-Weberian *state* models below. Both are different from each other regarding the relationship between society and state. Therefore, neo-Weberian 'Governance' seems to be the more accurate terminology. For more on the concept for 'state', see Hay (1996: 12-13)

⁸⁴ The term 'Neo-Weberian' has been used in the literature of political science since at least 1970 (Lynn, 2008: 19-20; Perrow, 1972: 145). Nordlinger (1988) consider neo-Weberian State as 'state-centred', in contrast to 'society-centred' (Skocpol, 1985: 4); and Brown observes that it followed Weber's *comparative historical method*, 'instead of reifying Weber's *ideal type*' (1978: 367). Contrary to this state model, Pollitt and Bouckaert still implicitly utilise Weber's ideal type and assume a networked, associated relationship with society.

and professionalism (ibid, 198). However, if researchers follow the broad sense of the NPM, it could still be explained as a kind of managerial reform.

Meanwhile, in Korea, administrative reforms and the NPM have been analysed from the perspective of American *reinventing government*, focusing on market-type and managerial-type changes (Aberbach and Rockman, 2000: 134; Jung, 2003a: 429; Oh, 2012a: 145).⁸⁵

3-2-1-2. Argument 2-2: Coercive elements - economic crises and cutback management

Argument 2-2 claims that an economic crisis and cutback management led to the change of government organisations. In terms of the changes of public sector bodies, one of the most intuitively appealing explanations is the influence of economic crisis (Richards and Smith, 2002: 83-84; Gray and Jenkins, 1995: 39). When a government suffers from financial crisis, it should consider three alternatives: a reduction in expenditure, an increase in tax revenue or a fiscal stimulus through deficit financing (Wilks, 2010: 93; Rose, 1985: 103). However, at a time of financial difficulty, automatic tax increases is hard to imagine and tax-raising may lead to reduced investment confidence and a worsening economy (Wildavsky and Caiden, 1997: 283-297). Therefore, unless a government has sound finance, it might, mostly, choose the spending cuts alternative,⁸⁶ and this could result in changes in the public sector. The reform pressures provoked by an economic crisis tend to be comparatively more *compulsory* than *optional* pressures such as globally popular theories.

Theories about big government The premise behind fiscal consolidation and downsizing of government is that the existing government is wasteful (Castles, 2007: 2). The claims that government is squandering resources might provide the keys to solve the problems; if we find causes of waste in big government, these could shed light on prescriptions to rectify that government illness. Arguments about big government could be categorised into two groups: *fiscal dimensions* and *workforce dimensions*. Yet, when fiscal consolidation takes place, both programs and staff numbers would be concurrently reduced; thus

⁸⁵ Since Korea, in its development process, was given considerable economic aid from the U.S., its administration and academic community have been significantly influenced by those in the U.S. (Common, 2001: 82; Jung, 2014: Chapter 2). Meanwhile, public administration studies in the U.S. are, in general terms, so American-centric (for example, see Hill, 2013: 168) that even some influential scholars equate the NPM with Osborne and Gaebler's argument in 1992 (Henry, 2003: 179-184; Milakovich and Gorden, 2007: 474-475; O'Toole and Meier, 2011: 102, 134). Therefore, some Korean commentators have discussed just 10 proverbs for Reinventing Government until the late 1990s (Lee et al., 2012: 152-155), when they referred to the characteristics of the NPM.

⁸⁶ However, the current economic situation of the UK makes its financial and political view in serious tension. The fiscal answer is to make large cuts, while the political answer is to keep their popularity (KCTI, 2011b).

fiscal and workforce dimensions are closely related to each other. Various theories have been suggested, but very few frameworks deal with both financial and organisational aspects at the same time.⁸⁷ In the first place, the financial dimensions are as follows:

Firstly, some theories focus on *inefficiency* within a government system. In order to discover the reason why given inputs cannot be transformed into predetermined outputs, Leibenstein (1966: 407) suggested several reasons, such as incomplete labour contracts, and put the accent on X-efficiency which emphasises management technology such as organisational improvements, increased worker motivation, and better management practice (Foster, 1976: 171). Wolf (1997: 126-127; Lane, 2000a: 72-73; Hood, 1987: 148) adds non-pricing efficiencies such as Schumpeterian efficiency, best-practice efficiency, and argues that public sector bodies lack in these efficiencies and often lead to redundant and increasing costs of products. He hypothesised that non-market failures of government will occur owing to: the substitution of the goals of public officials for what the consumer wants; and the disjunction between costs and revenues; and derived externalities (1979: 23, 1997: 65-82; Dollery, 2009: 21-29).⁸⁸

Secondly, some researchers emphasise the characteristics of *public expenditure* (Holsey et al., 1997: 567-571; Rose and Peters, 1978: 6). The most intuitive explanations might be inflation, population growth, and defence expenditure (Savas 2000: 22). In addition, there are various approaches which try to examine the features of the demand side of public services. They include, for example, a relative change of input prices (Baumol, 1967), income (Wagner 1883, cited in Lybeck 1988: 30), preference (North, 1985 cited in Holsey et al., 1997: 569), and the displacement effect (Peacock and Wiseman 1961, cited in Rose 1984: 52).

Thirdly, for other scholars, the *process of services provision* has been the main focus of big government issues. Conceivably, however, the key factor might be *the inertia of established commitments* (Rose, 1984: 48). New programs tend to emerge quickly, but old ones disappear slowly. Several commentators also mention this financial accumulated phenomenon as the *bureaucratic overload or overburdened theory* (O'Connor, 1973; Offe, 1993a: 67; Self, 2000: 101; Hay, 2007: 110-113; Richards and Smith, 2002: 88). Lastly, some place the emphasis on the changes of service demands of the society and the people (Rose 1984; Savas 2000: 22-27). From this standpoint, increasing service demands such as demographic changes, rectifying societal

⁸⁷ Regarding both a political and an apolitical approach, see Holsey et al. (1997: 567-585).

⁸⁸ These perspectives include theories focused on the rational choice of actors. Selfish actors, arguably, try to maximise their interests, and lead to inefficiency of government (See Argument 1-3).

ills, risk aversion, cultural uplift, fiscal illusion, and technical change (Lybeck 1988: 30; Lee, Johnson and Joyce, 2004: 30-31) are the main reasons for government growth.

Meanwhile, *the workforce* dimensions could be elaborated as follows: firstly, the expenditure of government is comprised of *operating* costs and *programme* costs,⁸⁹ and the expansion of these often entails an increase in related workforces and organisations in a different way; the former might be a more direct source of bureaucratic growth. Secondly, it is expected that the increase rate of quangos might be higher than that of the government alone, since controls over ministerial departments are likely to be relatively more intensive than those over non-ministerial bodies (Hood, 1978: 31-32). Thirdly, bureaucrats ceaselessly introduce new ideas and make new tasks which prove their *raison d'être* to the public. At the same time, the classical theory of Parkinson's law tried to show the reason why an official wants to multiply his subordinates regardless of the quantity of the work (Parkinson 1957: 5). Savas argues that a great deal of civil servants are absorbed in problem-finding and detecting social ills, thus provoking the overstaffing problem (2000: 34). Finally, in many developing countries, government tends to run almost everything in order to find a short cut to development. At this stage, the private sector is often outgunned by the public sector and the increasing government elite within it. However, even when their economy improves and produces changes in social structure (Rose 1984: 39), welfare services such as social care and education would still make the public sector bigger.

Pressure to austerity At a time of economic crisis, a more stringent control of overloaded public expenditures and workforces has been one of the most frequent powerful motives for public management reform (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011: 191). Wright noted a kind of policy paradox; that most radical reform programmes appear to have been introduced in countries with the most efficient administrations (1997: 9). However, this phenomenon could be relatively easy to explain; that is, reforms of some developed countries, such as the New Zealand reforms of 1984-90, were inevitably structural and radical owing to a pressing economic crisis (Aberbach and Rockman, 2000: 137). For example, the recent global economic recession has confronted many governments with a new era of austerity and the pressures for reform have become even more intense than before.

There are at least five strategies for cutback management (Sarant, 1978: 3; Hood and Wright, 1981: 203; Wilks, 2010: 97; Dunsire and Hood, 1989: 192-

⁸⁹ Operating costs involve compensation of employees, including wages and salaries and social contributions, use of goods and services, consumption of fixed capital, interest, while programme costs involve subsidies, grants and social benefits (IMF, 2001: 63; SNA, 2009: 442; Dziobek et al., 2011: 8).

197): *full re-definition* of all programmes, centralised *priority setting*, '*equal misery*' which means reducing the budget of every department by the same ratio, '*efficiency savings*' which means doing more with less, and *freezing*.⁹⁰ Among these options, which alternative is the most appropriate depends on the situation, such as the degree of crisis, the political dynamics, the resistance of stakeholders, and the responsiveness of the public. However, in general terms, the first one is the most difficult, while the last one is relatively the easiest in terms of political and administrative feasibility.⁹¹ In addition, all five approaches, in reality, could be mixed with each other.

When it comes to the target of spending cuts in hard times, a decrease in operating expenditure, rather than in capital expenditure or investment expenditure might be preferable. In other words, downsizing the workforce and some of the organisations is a helpful way to decrease payrolls costs. At the same time, a reduction in the size of the public sector is needed not only for practical necessity, but also for symbolic reasons which appeal to the public; thus it has relatively cohesive features in its nature. In many countries, since the 1980s, the increase in the number of civil servants tends to be perceived as an increase in uncontrollable expenditures rather than a human resource investment.

However, this measure hardly seems to chime in well with the traditional Keynesian idea, in which downsizing might deteriorate the employment rate and thus counter-cyclical measures are preferable in terms of economic fluctuation during a recession. In addition, there is the rare possibility of having success by cutting staff, where the labour market of public servants is not so flexible that downsizing could not have a more immediate impact on the business cycle (MoPAS, 2010f; Figures 6-1 and 7-8). In other words, only a few posts in the public sector might be concurrently reduced. Therefore downsizing in hard times could be rather paradoxical, even though it might be taken for granted in the name of sharing the pain or providing a possible cure for big government. There have been a myriad of studies about the growth and the reduction in the public sector, but little research has been carried out on the effect of these changes. There are several features which need to be explored in terms of structural changes caused by a tighter control of the public sector:

⁹⁰ At first sight, freezing might not seem to be one of the ways to cutback management; however, considering the inflation rate and rising prices, it has been, politically, the most practical way of bringing about a parsimony of using limited resources.

⁹¹ However, in reality, efficiency savings might be more difficult than equal misery, since efficiency savings are easier said than done and the results are often not enough to correct large fiscal imbalances. Since the effects of efficiency saving and privatisation are only marginal to balance fiscal overload, they might remain as a mere *placebo* policy (Rose, 1984: 225).

Firstly, since an economic crisis would usually take place with pressing urgency, the government's countermeasures tend to be immediately taken (Hood, 1983: 6). In other words, few government economic measures taken in hard times are preplanned; thus they are likely to be impromptu actions. That means, in practice, the chances are that the gap between planning and implementation is wide. Moreover, there might be possible gaps and even some trade-off between short-term and long-term goals (Pandey, 2010: 568).

Secondly, unlike business process re-engineering in the private sector, public sector reforms are a completely political process; thus, in the process of reform, large-scale resistance by public employees and political capture would often take place. That is to say, 'muddling through' is unavoidable (Lindblom, 1959: 80 and 1979: 517; Parsons, 2005: 284). As Wildavsky (1980) mentioned, in terms of political feasibility, political addition is easier than political subtraction, and according to the incrementalist model of March and Simon (1993: 194), only when political dissatisfaction is big enough, would any reform occur (Rose 1984: 50). To put it differently, if the demand of the public is higher than the resistance of the public employees, then a reform would take place. Not surprisingly, public employees are able to handle environmental shocks and are very good at protecting their top priorities through a range of tactics (Meier and O'Toole, 2009: 500; Jonathan and Jay, 1987: 17). In sum, even though a sense of crisis might make it easier to consider radical changes, fiscal consolidation makes reform more difficult because of those who object to reform.

Thirdly, to get tangible and immediate results, the first target of reduction might be the irregular workforce, who are often female, and are workers who do repetitive jobs, rather than highly trained staff. Therefore, the staff of *arm's length bodies* rather than the people of ministerial departments tend to be easily affected by cutback management (Wilks, 2010: 94). A unit, which has been examined for its possibility of becoming a quango beforehand, might easily be affected by spending cuts, while an equal misery strategy, in a broad way, is expected to be adopted by the overall departments.

However, this model of economic crisis has several limitations as follows:

Firstly, a financial crisis could be one of the reasons for governmental reorganisation and rearrangement to take place, but, like any other arguments, it is *per se* neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for public sector reform. On the one hand, downsizing might not be the sole countermeasure to deal with an economic downturn. There are other options: as mentioned earlier, efficiency saving, freezing or a fiscal stimuli. In practice, a reduction in the number of public servants could inevitably result in a decline of service quality or even a decrease in service provision, since downsizing of front-line delivery

units, which are directly responsible for public service, tends to be considered first. Despite the opportunity for making a drastic decrease in the public sector, the severe cutting of staff numbers in a crisis might cause an undermining of the stability of the labour market and lead to questions about its legitimacy. Therefore a government should fully consider its labour market characteristics when it comes to reducing staff. Meanwhile, some countries, such as in the second term of the Blair administration in the UK, reduced and reorganised their public sectors even during the boom years of 1995-2007; during this period, the drive for greater economy and efficiency has spread to more and more countries (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011: 7, 26). In addition, a pressing financial crisis was dealt with solely by cutback management, but without any fundamental system reforms (Ibid: 27).

Secondly, the logic of squeezing the public sector, which might be expected to deal with the problem of an economic crisis, is difficult to apply in the real world because of a limited knowledge regarding the true size of the public sector (Light, 2008: 236). It is far from easy to answer the question 'how big is big' (Rose 1984: 20). In practice, the size of government could be measured in tangible and readily available ways by looking at government finance and counting the number of staff. However, other important factors such as government regulation, the shadow workforce and quasi-tax are usually invisible and immeasurable (Light, 1999: 6-8). Thus an objective decision and accurate diagnosis of the real size of government scarcely seems to be possible. On this account, in addition to the economic crisis factor, other arguments such as political logic, public opinion and global *dernier cri* theory should be finally considered at the same time, in order to understand the actual causes of administrative reform.

3-2-1-3. Argument 2-3: The motive of the rational actor

Argument 2-3 assumes that the selfishness of political actors is the main reason for AQ. Treating the preferences of actors as a variable in public sector reform could, on the one hand, promote isomorphism of reforms, and on the other hand, increase differentiation among them. Arguments that this variable leads to a convergence of reforms have a set of premises. In the first place, the motives of rational bureaucrats or politicians do not differ from country to country over time (North, 1990: 19). Secondly, their motive is primarily self-interested (Downs, 1957: 282; Hindmoor, 2006: 2, 4; Eriksson, 2011: 17-23).⁹² Finally, their motive is dependent on a single major component rather than on multiple causes (Hall, 1997: 179-180; Pierson, 2004: 109). When these

⁹² However, there are many criticisms about these arguments. For example, see Elster (1990: 45-46; Englemann, 2003: 3-6; Self, 2000: 189; Koehler and Rainey, 2008: 34-49; Moynihan, 2008: 254-263).

requirements are not satisfied, the motives of actors might lead to quite different results rather than to a homogenisation of reforms. However, the viewpoint which raises the issue of actors as a major variable in order to analyse reforms, mainly comes from the theorists of rational choice, so this thesis assumes that the variables of actors bring about the convergence of reform.

Meanwhile, the pursuit of private interests might be analysed from the various actors' perspective. Therefore, first of all, some general points of rational choice theory will be examined and then, in particular, the presumption that bureaucrats and politicians are in pursuit of AQ will be also explored in the following subsections.

Rational choice institutionalism⁹³ Among the new institutional approaches, *rational choice institutionalism* (hereafter RCI) embraces methodological individualism and the *Homo economicus* hypothesis, which are both traditional methods of classical economics (Bozeman, 2007: 22). For this reason, RCI is closely connected with the neo-liberalism theory and the NPM (Boston, 2011: 25-27).⁹⁴ However, there are considerable differences even within the RCI camp (Pollitt, 2004a: 325).

Jung observes that the transaction theory and the principal-agent model are two of the major RCI approaches (2002: 3). Yet in addition to this, the rent-seeking models of the Virginia School are also branches of RCI, given that they assume that bureaucrats and politicians are selfish opportunistic actors.⁹⁵ In the first place, the Virginia school maintains that the rent-seeking attitudes of actors lead to a decrease in the optimal production level, thus creating a *social deadweight cost* and unfair wealth transfer. Moreover, there are lobbying costs for rent-seeking, and some opportunity costs (Wildavsky, 1980: 170) which occur when actors have participated in rent-seeking but have failed to get it (Tollison, 1997: 506-511, Mueller, 1997a: 229-235).⁹⁶ The second type of RCI is the transaction costs approach (Douma and Schreuder, 2002: 147-165).⁹⁷ Transaction costs refer to the total costs which are needed for searching and

⁹³ Rational choice theory is often called the *public choice* theory (Tullock et al., 2000: 3). Some classical theories considered that the state pursues only the public interest or reflects the interest of society (Lynn, 1996: 52-54), but the public choice theory considers that actors within the state, such as politicians, bureaucrats and interest groups, calculate the consequence of alternative *choices* and make strategic political *choices* and exchanges (Pollitt, 2004a: 324). In addition, by using economic methods, the decision-making process of *the public*, not only in the market but also in the non-market, could be investigated.

⁹⁴ King suggests that the two types of the New Right are market fundamentalism and the public choice theory (1987: 70-109).

⁹⁵ Peters adds a 'game-theoretic version of institutions' to these approaches (Peters, 2005: 57).

⁹⁶ Rational choice theorists believe that rent-seeking is carried out not only by bureaucrats and politicians but also by interest groups (Moe, 1997: 462-463), and thus resulting in (Tollison, 1997: 513-517) inefficiency of the state.

⁹⁷ Eggertsson argues that neo-classical economics plus transaction costs model equate with RCI (1990:14).

confirming a counterpart, and signing and keeping contracts (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992: 29-34). According to this approach, transaction costs might have a significant effect on resources allocation and organisational forms of government, and an efficient institutional design of transaction costs is the key factor needed to reduce costs and increase the possibility of sustainable development.

When it comes to the structure of governmental bodies, a sizable unit might enjoy the benefit of resources recurrence and redeployment, which enables transaction costs to be lowered (Williamson, 1989: 150-152; Scott, 1998: 155-158). Therefore, in some cases, in order to reduce transaction costs, using established government bureaucracies rather than creating a new quango, might be a better choice (Williamson, 1975: 25 and 2005: 498).⁹⁸ For example, the monitoring cost itself is one of the transaction costs, and the observation of governmental units is relatively easier than that of quangos; thus a form of governmental department might be preferable.

Meanwhile, the transaction costs theory has several glaring weaknesses as follows: first of all, the notion of transaction costs is somewhat equivocal. Theoretically, clear outlines of economical boundary and usage might be expected, but unlike other economic terms related to costs, the concept of transaction costs is quite arbitrary, depending on the political situation and contextual conditions (Greve, 2008: 40). For example, monitoring could be efficiently performed by the invisible hand of market competition, so that some of the existing organisations within the government, in contrast to above example, should be changed into quangos, which are closer to a market mechanism (Boston, 2011: 29). These blurred characteristics of transaction costs make it difficult to measure the real size of the related costs. Sometimes it is hard to identify even whether transaction costs exist or not. More importantly, this approach is based on a functionalist perspective. Williamson argues that a specific governance structure has appeared in order to lower transaction costs, but cannot explain through which process such governance has been generated.

The third type of RCI is the principal-agent approach. Asymmetric information between principal and agent lead to an *adverse selection*, which means the principal chooses an inappropriate agent (Banks and Weingast, 1992: 509-521), and a *moral hazard* which denotes that agents behave in an opportunistic manner by using information to their advantage. (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992: 149, 167; Einhardt, 1989: 59; Miller, 2005: 205-206; Douma and

⁹⁸ Yet the practitioner's theory (Argument 2-1) shows a different opinion as to transaction costs (Pollitt, 2004a: 331).

Schreuder, 2002: 54-62) In order to decrease adverse selection and moral hazard, there are some measures that could be deployed: an *incentive system* re-design, by which the aim of the agents might correspond to that of the principal; *enhanced monitoring* of the agents; *competition* among the agents; and increased *information sharing* between the agents and the principal (Dunlop and James, 2007: 404; Lynn, 1987: 231-234). The strengths of this perspective are its re-affirmation of the importance of information within the organisation (Lane, 2009), and a rectification of a naïve approach to bureaucrats (Chang, 2003: 32). As far as the role of government is concerned, the principal-agent theory does not directly request the reduction in the size of government. However, if someone argues that private sector bodies are more helpful in grappling with the problem of asymmetric information; this perspective might be the logical one for producing a contraction of government. But, on the contrary, some commentators argue that the principal-agent problem is not the unique feature of the public sector (Moe, 1984: 759-765),⁹⁹ and this theory only suggests the need for diverse approaches which are common to the public and the private sectors, in order to enhance their managerial efficiency.

Rational bureaucrats In relation to the motives of bureaucrats, various commentators suggest different ideas,¹⁰⁰ unlike a tendency that they largely agree with the profit maximising inclination of entrepreneurs and the vote maximising behaviour of politicians.

Firstly, some researchers assume that bureaucrats pursue budgetary power and more attractive tasks and thus civil servants try to expand the budget of government and to change the structure of government. A typical example of this perspective is the *budget maximising* model (Niskanen, 1973: 22-27) and the *bureau-shaping* model (Dunleavy, 1985, 1986 and 1991: 207; Jung, 2001: 489, Kim and Jung, 2002: 16; Wallis and Dollery, 2001; James and van Thiel, 2011: 215-216). Even though the earlier model of the budget maximising theory has made researchers become aware of the significant role of the budget, Niskanen's model has several weaknesses (Dunleavy, 1991: 174-209): the first point is that the total increase in the budget might not be related to the benefits of individual bureaucrats, since public sector salaries are largely controlled on a uniform basis. In the second place, rational bureaucrats might pursue values other than the budget, such as their own personal

⁹⁹ There is also a *multiple principals*' problem (Miller, 2005: 211-212; Pollitt, 2003a: 142; Horn, 1995: 135).

¹⁰⁰ Pluralism postulates that bureaucracy reflects the interests of society as it is, while neo-pluralism emphasises the role of politicians and civil society in order to counterbalance professionalised bureaucrats. Meanwhile, the perspectives of elitism are divided into two groups: some argue that power elites (entrepreneur elites) govern public bureaucracy; and others believe that specialist technocrats, who have irreplaceable hard knowledge, determine state policies (Smith, 1993: 195-196). Regarding the Neo-Weberian state theory, see the earlier subsection.

convenience. In addition, for some units such as policy formulation and regulation bodies, the budget might not be necessarily important an ingredient, and even for the people at the top, the expansion of the budget might only bring them extra work. Meanwhile, the bureau-shaping model gives a relatively compelling elucidation in terms of the disaggregation of the public sector. Dunleavy argues that what matters for the senior bureaucrats, as 'bureau-shapers', is the *core* budget (Dunleavy, 1991: 182, 202),¹⁰¹ and their true self-interest lies in aiming for higher-status work and a super control position, safely distancing themselves from routine front-line management and supervisory responsibilities (James, 2003: 153). From this perspective, once 'executive' units have been separated from policy units, the executive units will, in turn, split into 'supervision' and 'operational' units. Dunleavy's theory is a detailed and advanced model, as compared to the budget maximising theory (Hood, 1994: 136; Dowding, 1995: 82-83), but this perspective overemphasises the discretion of senior bureaucrats. If the pressure of agencification is quite strong, even senior bureaucrats would have no choice but to follow reform forces; and even though some of them have autonomy, it is quite limited to only a very small minority of top-level bureaucrats. In addition, this perspective in its present form might not be true of some countries, such as Korea, in which the control of organisations is centralised to a specific department and an individual ministry could enjoy a very limited level of autonomy. Furthermore, the idea and context of this perspective is somewhat 'Brito-centric', just as the budget-maximising model is too US-specific (Pollitt, 2004a: 325), and so it might not be applicable even to other Anglo-Saxon countries.¹⁰² For example, in the 1980s, the Australian and Canadian bureaucrats objected to the separation of delivery agencies from policy agencies (Graham and Roberts, 2004: 152). More importantly, this model cannot explain why the senior bureaucrats in so many OECD countries apparently acted 'irrationally' under certain institutional inertia for so long and why old model was not replaced far earlier (Hood, 1994: 137; Pollitt, 1984: 171; Dowding, 1995: 85).

Secondly, some commentators argue that bureaucrats want more subordinates and subdivisions or quangos, regardless of their tasks and function (Parkinson 1957:5). For example, if some social problems occur, initially bureaucrats tend to check over the possibility of an increase in their staff, subunits and budgets, even when the creation of a new organisation is not necessarily needed. Once new organisations are created, they tend to find new

¹⁰¹ The core budget means what each agency spends on itself, rather than the parts of its budget which it hands on to other agencies or clients (Dowding, 1995: 86-89; James, 2003: 153).

¹⁰² However, several researchers have tried to develop the bureau-shaping model. For example, see Wallis and drollery (2001) and Dollery and Hamburger (1996) (James, 2003: 153).

missions in order to survive, and their employees generate spin-off tasks such as directions and reports.¹⁰³ Meanwhile, state bureaucracy could be seen as a kind of map of political power in society, since a more powerful ministry might supposedly have more agencies and quangos.¹⁰⁴

Thirdly, another viewpoint concerning the motive of bureaucrats is that their basic interests, as state managers (Block, 1980: 229), are in the maintenance of their posts or their promotion. Bureaucrats should try to increase their legitimacy in order to keep their positions (Brunsson, 2007: 25-27). When government succeeds in enhancing their legitimacy, this success leads to their good reputation (Majone, 2001: 109) and has a significant effect on other parts of the government; and thus they try to mobilise the trust and support of the people. Moreover, the establishment of legitimacy could be the entry barrier for other political competitors (Soh, 1996: 280).¹⁰⁵ From the bureaucrats' perspective, legitimacy is related to gaining performance and reputation. For this reason, some top-level bureaucrats might try to introduce an AQ policy in order to acquire good performance and reputation.

Finally, bureaucrats might be motivated by the relationship of politicians and entrepreneurs. In many countries, permanent civil servants are separated from politicians, but once a new regime comes to power and launches a brand new policy such as AQ, then most bureaucrats are likely to be amenable to a new direction (Pollitt, 1984: 170). Meanwhile, in general terms, the relationships between entrepreneurs and bureaucrats depend on the specific characteristics of voters, pressure from civil society, and the level of economic development.

Rational politicians (and political parties)¹⁰⁶ The ultimate target of politicians is vote maximising and winning the next election, so their aim is relatively more clear than bureaucrats. In relation to AQ, politicians are expected to choose the executive agencies and quangos that maximise the opportunities to increase their electoral support (van Thiel et al., 2007: 199; Marcussen, 2011: 321).

¹⁰³ Interestingly, during the period of organisational expansion, front-line delivery units and managerial staff tend to increase at the same time; while during the period of contraction, chances are that front-line delivery units would be removed first. That is largely because operational units have comparatively weaker forces than managerial forces against the reform.

¹⁰⁴ Oh (2007: 128-131) suggests the size of line and staff units as an *organisational resource index* when it comes to measuring the power of the central department. However, one of the most important ingredients of departmental power is the number of its agencies and quangos, since having more quangos means exerting more policy options and discretion.

¹⁰⁵ In an authoritarian regime, the control of bureaucrats is seemingly easier but not executed well (Riggs, 1993: 202), whereas in a democratic system, the bureaucratic pursuit of private interest is controlled by an institutionalised system but is still dependent on other institutional constraints.

¹⁰⁶ In general terms, politicians might be regarded as consisting of three types: *trustees* who are the representatives of public interests and who use their discretion on behalf of the public; *delegates* who try to achieve the interests of their constituents; and *politicos*, who act as both, depending on the situation (Jilson, 2009: 237; Wise, 2007: 223; Figure 8-5).

The patterns of politicians as vote-maximisers in terms of AQ are as follows: Firstly, a party tends to reflect any other party's election commitment and tries to make a vote winning package in order to mobilise more support from the voters (Riker, 1962; Stratmann, 1997: 334)¹⁰⁷. Therefore, a policy which was pursued only by a conservative party in the past is also apt to be adopted by a progressive party (Wildavsky, 1985: 249-255). For example, in some countries, a NPM policy is introduced not only by the conservative parties, but also by the progressive parties (Pollitt, 2003a: 36).¹⁰⁸ Van Thiel argues that the benefits of risk aversion and patronage towards interest groups make most politicians from left to right prefer quangos, even though some of them might have a different political ideology (2004: 183). Moreover, politicians might periodically suggest new policies, including institutional changes and a fiscal stimulus which would meet the expectations of public opinion during the campaign (Mueller 1997a: 277). For example, it might plausibly be argued that the establishment of a new quango for enhancing the welfare of the people, or the privatisation of the public sector for the contraction of government, periodically takes place. In addition, politicians might use the *by-passing* or *outflanking* strategy (Hood, 1978: 38 and 40-45). In order to evade or hide unpopular policies, which would lead to the loss of their supporters, and create politically exhaustive and sensitive debate, they might prefer quangos to a ministerial department in which policy directions would be directly exposed to the media (Self, 2000: 189). However, since the creation of new quangos might be a high-profile event, generally, an established quango could be deployed to serve these purposes; thus this could lead to an increase in the budget of a specific quango. At the same time, when the government focuses on a special task, it might be dealt with separately by means of the creation of a new quango owing to the importance of that mission.

Secondly, another characteristic of politicians, in terms of their private interests, is their activism. Politicians in power usually want to show tangible results in a short period of time by using a different policy from that of the former government (Pollitt, 1984: 170; Majone, 2001: 106; Pierson, 2004: 112-114); then they could tell the people that they won the election because of an essential difference from the previous regime. In this regard, reorganisation of the government machine can easily present a new look to the public (Weaver and Rockman, 1993; Christensen and Lægheid, 2011:5).¹⁰⁹ Furthermore, if this

¹⁰⁷ For example, see Wright (2003: 75), and Richards and Smith (2002: 240).

¹⁰⁸ Aucoin argued that distrust and a lack of confidence in the public service are major determinants of the NPM design (2011: 34-37).

¹⁰⁹ Hood argues that there is perhaps a '*machinery of government illusion*' which is comparable to the '*fiscal illusion*' (1978a: 43). People plausibly would regard any machinery of government changes as substantive reforms.

change is a *dernier cri* theory or a global policy, the mobilisation of support from the media and the public is relatively easier (Sahlin-Andersson et al., 2002: 17; thus this policy might be adopted the moment the new administration seizes power. In reality, AQ has become one of the most politically favoured answers to a range of global challenges. In several countries it has become a key element in many election pledges (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011: 9). However, in this case, the chances are that politicians are interested in policy formulation and selection, but scarcely care about the implementation of that policy (Brunsson, 2009: 95). Even when the implementation is successful, it might not be helpful for the next election (van Thiel, 2004a: 181).¹¹⁰ For example, few politicians are responsible for the performance of quango creation, so that there is a growing concern over the failure of predictions of future events regarding policy alternatives. In addition, generally, sufficient time and consideration for quango creation might be necessary, but this new policy often tends to be published only after the internal decision-making process of a line department.

Thirdly, some commentators argue that another important motive of politicians concerning AQ is patronage, through which politicians could offer a reward for any political support (Peters and Pierre, 2004: 6). For example, there is a strong possibility that politicians might appoint political friends as quango board members (footnote 644). In many countries, the civil service bureaucracy has been depoliticised, and their control by means of merit appointment and promotion has become more common. However, outside *pure government* (Figure 2-1), ministers still exercise substantial patronage (Wright 1995: 9-11, Skelcher, 1998a: 90-95). In particular, committees and advisory boards from which politicians seek counsel, including political points of view, need relatively few professional skills for the administrative process; thus politicians have a strong tendency to deploy their political supporters. For this reason, in Korea, the press often raises '*republic of committee*' issues which are similar to the British '*patronage state*' problem (Hood, 1980: 253).

Finally, politicians might use AQ as the way in which government can hide its true size (Dommett and Flinders, 2014: 7). At the start of a new regime, radical policies such as *direct* privatisation might be favoured in order to tackle the problem of big government (Brunsson, 2007: 112-113). Yet the strong resistance of bureaucratic partners might result in a change of direction to milder policies such as *indirect* AQ. Since the media, academia and the public require a reduction in the size of government, a 'numbers game' over civil

¹¹⁰ Majone argues that, in democratic countries, the policies of the existing government could be changed by regular elections; and thus a '*democracy property rights* are ill-defined' *prima facie* case (2001: 201, see also Moe, 1990: 227 and 1995: 144). In similar vein, Pierson also observes *the problem of actor discontinuity* (2004: 120-121).

service staffing levels might take place in this situation (Hood, 1978: 42 and 1982: 52). However, a decrease in the number of civil servants does not necessarily mean a real contraction of government, in that, in reality, it is no more than an internal rearrangement within the public sector. In the broader picture, the total budget and staff of the public sector has remained the same or has even increased, but the downsizing of the civil servants could create the illusion of smallness (Light, 1999: 2); but that is statistical cosmetics. Moreover, AQ may also be a convenient way in which controversial debates vis-à-vis bureaucratic civil service rules and pay and pension levels, may be avoided; thus, once politicians adopt this strategy, 'concealing the true size of government' could be used as an *ad infinitum* tactic.

3-2-2. Internal centrifugal forces (Argument 3-1 ~ 3-3)

If external pressures are merely considered, each country would show the same results regarding its administrative reforms. However, internal centrifugal forces, in the first place, make the speed of the individual reform process decelerate, stagnate or even accelerate. In the second place, internal variations allow each government to take only a part of the prevailing worldwide reform prescriptions, far from the whole of them. More importantly, the specific conditions of a country lead to the partial or complete change of the originally intended reform contents (Caiden, 1969: 168-183). These internal divergent pressures include domestic political factors, procedural factors, and historical factors.

3-2-2-1. Argument 3-1: Domestic politics - Degrees of depoliticisation

Argument 3-1 relates AQ to depoliticisation trends. During the process of introducing a particular policy, not only normative, coercive, mimetic pressure and the actions of actors, but also domestic politics might play a significant role (Massey and Pyper, 2005: 39; Lodge 2002: 48-49). Public opinions about politics, politicians' perceptions of them, and all the rules involved enable each country to produce its unique political situation.¹¹¹ The degree and direction of an individual country's depoliticisation makes its level of reform different from all other countries. Burnham defines depoliticisation as:

the process of placing at one remove the political character of decision-making (2001: 128)

¹¹¹ Flinders observes that depoliticisation is connected to the history of the state, the structure of the state, and concerns regarding accountability and patronage; thus, basically, his basic idea is seemingly similar to that of historical institutionalism (Flinders, 2008: 236).

Meanwhile, Flinders and Buller develop the concept of depoliticisation as follows:¹¹²

the range of tools, mechanisms and institutions through which politicians can attempt to move to an indirect governing relationship and/or seek to persuade the demos that they can no longer be reasonably held responsible for a certain issue, policy field or specific decision (2006: 295-296).

From this perspective, two characteristics are distinctive. Firstly, through depoliticisation, the nature of the issues involved tend to become 'less political' rather than apolitical, thus it might be more accurately described as 'arena shifting'. Secondly, politicians on their own decide what functions should be 'depoliticised' (Flinders and Buller 2006: 295-296). Even when politicians' roles are downgraded,¹¹³ they voluntarily try to depoliticise and repoliticise in order to eliminate conflict and social division (Flinders 2008: 238-239).¹¹⁴

According to Flinders, depoliticisation strategies are needed in order to reduce partisanship; to foster a reasoned debate; to avoid guilt by association; to improve public understanding; to foster stability; to prioritise delivery; to strengthen leadership and long-term capacity; to increase market confidence regarding the credibility of policy making; to increase strategic capacity; and to inject expertise (Flinders, 2008: 240, 2010: 266 and 2011: 144-145; Wilks, 2007:444-448).

Meanwhile, regarding depoliticisation, there are three different tactics. It could be elaborated in terms of the reorganisation of the public sector. Firstly, the *institutional tactic* focuses on structures such as privatisation and the creation of quangos. With this tactic, depoliticisation results in the changed relationship between political control and managerial autonomy (Wilks, 2007: 446). Secondly, *rule-based tactics* would lead to the change of the decision-making process.¹¹⁵ Thirdly, *preference-shaping tactics* such as neo-liberalism (Buller and Flinders, 2006: 299; Flinders, 2008: 250) might be used by national politicians as a tool for making the image of international trends, such as globalisation, and be deployed as a non-negotiable external economic pressure, in order to enjoy some degree of domestic policy flexibility (Flinders 2008: 257; Brunsson and Olsen, 1993: 9).

¹¹² They criticise Burns' notion of politicisation as being similar to *discretion* (Buller and Flinders, 2005: 528).


¹¹³ According to Marcussen (2011: 322), distrust in politicians or political disenchantment (Stoker, 2006 and 2010: 56) might lead to depoliticisation or scientisation (James and van Thiel, 2011; Habermas, 1971).

¹¹⁴ The factors responsible for depoliticisation could be divided into two groups: the *demand-side* and the *supply-side* (Hay, 2007: 54-59). Explanatory variables of the demand-side are a diminution in the public sense of civic and political obligation, post-material values, and the enfranchisement of younger and atomistic voters. By contrast, the supply-side of the depoliticisation process consists of three challenges: demotion from *the governmental sphere* to the *public sphere*; demotion from the public sphere to the *private sphere*; and demotion from the private sphere to the *realm of necessity* (ibid: 80).

¹¹⁵ The second tactics are rather similar to the notion of *institution* in historical institutionalism (See Argument 3-3), and preference-shaping tactics involve the third dimension of power which was argued by Lukes (See Argument 3-2).

The depoliticisation perspective could be evaluated as follows: firstly, any reduction in the politicians' and senior bureaucrats' own field possibly means, alternatively, an expansion of the domains of the market, or citizens and professionals (see Figure 3-4).¹¹⁶ Therefore, it covers marketisation and also includes increases in the participation of citizens (Dunrose et al., 2009: 212), professionals or advisory groups. In so doing, it could broaden the boundary of the existing market-based theory and the political decentralisation approach (Pollitt, 2007a: 354); and furthermore, it allows researchers to employ a systematic analysis.

Figure 3-4: Depoliticisation process¹¹⁷



Secondly, through the expansion of the depoliticisation concept, this analysis tries to include far-reaching change of the predominant rule, preference or ideology. Thirdly, the proactive and positive rather than the passive role of politicians is emphasised. From this perspective, politicians *per se*, unlike the RCI approach, are in pursuit of public interest such as the elimination of conflicts; thus it is rather close to *normative* theory (Pollitt, 2003a:16-17; footnote 517).

However, it has a weakness in that it could not explain the boundaries of core political tasks (Flinders, 2010: 266); and moreover could not suggest the reason why politicians seek for depoliticisation in spite of the contraction of their own authority.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁶ Politicians and bureaucrats together constitute an elite group. However, in the British context, the civil servants are under the tight control of the politicians, even though they have often been criticised for a lack of flexibility and a rule-bound nature, as seen in the popular TV series 'Yes Minister' (Lynn and Jay, 1987; Kingdom, 2014: 18).

¹¹⁷ At the same time, as shown in Figure 5-5, the separation between politicians and bureaucrats might be emphasised, depending on the views of the commentators.

¹¹⁸ From this viewpoint, politicians intentionally adopt depoliticisation during the process of policy formation, notwithstanding their political interests. Therefore, it contains a self-contradictory factor. In contrast to the perspectives of RCI (Figure 8-5), politicians on their own think that political intervention is not desirable.

3-2-2-2. Argument 3-2: Procedural factors: the policy making process

Argument 3-2 considers the cause of AQ from a viewpoint of policy-making process. Each country has its own unique policy process such as *agenda-setting*, *policy formulation* and *implementation*. Without paying close attention to political structures and processes (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011: 4), it is difficult to understand the established contexts (see Figures 8-6 and 8-7). In terms of the cause of AQ, there are, at least, two addressable dimensions in the policy process. One thing is an answer as to who might take the lead in introducing a specific AQ policy; and another is an answer as to why AQ agenda has been adopted only in particular countries, while it has not been introduced in others. The former is related to the issue of the *policy leading group* in agenda setting; and the latter is involved in the *determinants of agenda adopting*.

Policy leading groups The ways of working of policy leading group are different from country to country (Immergut, 1992: 63-68) and these might have a different effect on its process of AQ. There are at least three basic perspectives about policy leading groups and the way in which a policy spearheading the community produces a particular agenda (Cobb, Ross and Ross, 1976: 128-137; SNU, 2001; Howlett et al., 2003: 132-134): *outside initiative model*; *mobilisation model*; and *inside access model*.¹¹⁹

Firstly, in comparatively advanced and pluralist countries where the *outside initiative* model is likely to appear more frequently, political power and leverage are diffused to various groups; and the deciding factors of interest groups' power are their strength of interest articulation, vote power, group size, the coherence of groups, and social incentives (Truman, 1951: 115-129; Bentley, 1949: 447-459; Olson, 1971:53-65). In this case, policy makers and the state are supposed to be almost a vacuum¹²⁰ within which interest groups could enjoy the art of 'muddling through' and policy making is the result of negotiation and compromise (Dahl, 1963: 325; Smith, 2009: 55; Lindblom, 1959: 81; Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987:56). However, the traditional pluralist idea could not be wholly applied even to the U.S. and the U.K. which have often

¹¹⁹ In addition to these perspectives, there are the Marxist theory, in which state action is restricted and determined by economic structure, other variants of structuralism, and economic determinism such as neo-liberalism (Hill, 2009: 40-51); however, determinism might fall into isomorphic factors of reform rather than divergent factors.

¹²⁰ There are three kinds of perspectives about state organisation in pluralism (Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987: 43-49): American pluralists of the 1950s considered the state as a passive *weathervane* or *mirror* through which inputs are processed; pluralists who often have functionalist assumptions argue for the *neutral state* model in which state managers follow the public interest; and the *broker state model* which interprets a public policy as the aggregation of diverse interests including the non-altruistic preferences of the state manager (Schneider et al., 1997: 14).

been regarded as one of the most democratic countries in the world (Dunleavy, 1982: 184-185; Jones, 1984: 61; Marsh, 2002: 22-26). The second and third models about policy leading groups are linked to elitism.¹²¹ In those states where elites have an overwhelming influence, public policies reflect the preferences of the elite rather than the interests of the public (Ham and Hill, 1993: 31; Dryzek and Dunleavy, 2009: 72-73).¹²² There are two ways in which the elite develop policies: in the *mobilisation model*, political leaders initiate a policy which is in need of public support for its implementation; and in the *inside access model*, a policy proposal arises from influential groups with special access to the decision-makers, but excludes the participation of the public (Cobb, Ross and Ross, 1976: 128-137). In the mobilisation model, *policy formulation* might happen in a more analytical way; and this model is likely to appear frequently in hierarchical societies such as Korea in the 1970s. The countries where economic development has come before political development tend to choose the *inside access model*. While these three types could be found in most regimes at the same time (Howlett et al., 2003: 135), the question of which type would be more properly applied depends on location and context. In the liberal pluralist countries as compared with hierarchical regimes, since the public and the media might be more concerned with autonomous bodies such as quangos, AQ seems to be relatively easy to be analysed.

Determinants of agenda confirmation In the ideal-type models of rational policy-making, a policy has several stages in its process (Lasswell, 1956 cited in deLeon, 1999: 20; Hogwood and Gunn, 1984: 44-49, Dunn, 1994: 16-17; Howlett, 2011: 18-19).¹²³ However, as with the claims of many other commentators (Lindblom, 1980: 4-5, Parsons, 1995: 79-81; Hill, 2009: 141; Dorey, 2005: 6), it is just a heuristic and prescriptive device; and thus it might

¹²¹ There are different views about who are the real elite: the *classical elitism* of Mosca and Michels (Etzioni-Halevy, 1985: 14-13); *democratic elitism* of Max Weber and Joseph Schumpeter (Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987: 141, Cudworth and McGovern, 2007: 75-81); *state-centred Neo-Weberian theory* (Smith, 2009: 61); *radical elitism* or power elite theory of C. Wright Mills (Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987: 144, Etzioni-Halevy, 1985: 54); and the *professionalised government* approach of Neo-pluralism (Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987: 300).

¹²² This is the process of non-decision making (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970; Crenson, 1971: 179; Cobb and Elder, 1977: 9-11; Jones, 1984: 61-62, Parsons 1995: 134-141, Hill, 2009: 31-33; Page, 2008: 220-221). Bachrach and Baratz observe that the decision-making process tends to just focus on the safe issues of dominant elites, while keeping latent or manifestly challenging issues off the agenda (1962: 948, 1963: 632, 1970: 7, 42-43). According to Cobb and Ross, agenda denial might take place by opposing groups such as public officials and affected groups (1997: 17-18). Meanwhile Lukes argues that there is a third dimension of power which shapes people's preferences so that it hinders the revelation or the concealment of existing conflicts (Lukes, 1974: 24; Hill, 1993: 50-53, Ham and Hill, 1993: 70-71; Parsons, 1995: 142-143; Smith, 2009: 35-38).

¹²³ For example, according to Hogwood and Gunn (1984: 4), there are a number of stages for the policy analysis framework: issue search, issue filtration, issue definition (Rochefort and Cobb, 1994; Dunlop, 2007; Knill and Tosun, 2012: 98-99), forecasting, setting priorities, options analysis, policy implementation and evaluation (Jenkins, 1978: 17; Kraft and Furlong, 2013: 86).

give a false picture of the real world. Equally, the *agenda building* might not be a comprehensive and rational process (Kingdon, 2003: 19).¹²⁴ Yet from a comparative perspective, this *policy stagist* approach is still useful in that it offers a framework and helps to examine the possible related constituents for a comparison.

In this regard, whether the AQ agenda, which still remains a *systemic agenda*, could be turned into an *institutional agenda* or a *decision agenda*¹²⁵ depends on the following factors (Dorey, 2014: 11-12).

Firstly, a politico-administrative system has a considerable effect on agenda confirmation (Weaver and Rockman, 1993: 7-8; Chapter 5).¹²⁶ The national politico-administrative system of a specific country might help or impede reforms, thus the adoptability of a specific policy depends on the following ingredients: the degree of executive power; whether it is a two-party system or a multi-party system, majoritarian or proportional representation, a federal or unitary government, and unicameralism or bicameralism; the relationship between the executive and the legislative branch; the form of interest group activity; constitutional rigidity or flexibility, and judicial review (Lijphart, 1999: 21-27, 34-41; Hill, 2009: 83). In addition to Lijphart's claim, legal tradition plays an important role in agenda building. For example, Kickert observes how the legal traditions in countries such as France and Italy have influenced the lack of the NPM (2007: 48), while a majoritarian centralised system, such as the UK (Wright, 2003: 12; Aucoin, 2011: 38-39), allows specific NPM strategies, which are discouraged in more decentralised systems (van Thiel et al., 2007: 201).

Secondly, policy types could affect agenda building. Lowi puts forward an influential classification based on their types of coercion and types of politics (1972: 300; Parsons, 1995: 132, Birkland, 2001: 135-141; Hill, 2009: 139): they are *distributive*, *constituent*, *regulative*, and *redistributive* policies. According to Lowi, setting up a new agency might be a kind of the *constituent* policy.

¹²⁴ Thus, Kingdon adopts a revised version of the *garbage can* model (Kingdon, 2003: 84-89, Cohen et al., 1972; Cairney, 2011: 232; Aberbach and Christensen, 2001: 404). However, Kingdon's approach is restricted to unpredictable and unstable situations where many participants are involved (Hill, 2009: 169-170; footnote 563).

¹²⁵ In the first place, in a society, all ideas could possibly be brought up within the *agenda universe* (Birkland, 2001: 107-108), but more or less acceptable ideas, in a political sense, might become '*systemic agendas*' (Peters, 2004: 47-51); only some of them are likely to become '*institutional agendas*' which are seriously considered by the decision makers; but even fewer of them reach the '*decision agenda*', which are about to be acted upon by governmental units (Cobb and Elder, 1977: 85-87; Birkland, 2001: 107-109; Parsons, 1995: 128; Hogwood, 1987: 47-49).

¹²⁶ Some researchers label this argument as 'empirical institutionalism' (Judge, 2005: 18-19; Peters, 2005: 87-91; Lowndes, 2010: 65).

However, a new agency could also carry out a regulatory and redistributive policy; thus the characteristic of the agency matters. Meanwhile, Wilson¹²⁷ suggests that if *the benefits* of a special agenda are distributed among many people and *the costs* are concentrated among very few people, this would rarely be adopted as a decision agenda (Wilson, 1973 and 1989a: 75-89; Birkland, 2001: 142-145); at the same time, when the benefits are concentrated and the costs are diffused, it can lead to political capture (Moe, 1997: 463).

Thirdly, political events such as elections could be an important agenda-triggering device. Cobb and Elder suggest internal triggers, such as natural catastrophes and technological changes, and external triggers, such as an act of war (Cobb and Elder, 1977: 84; Parsons 1995: 127; Birkland, 2006: 3); while Kingdon puts forward focusing-events such as crises and political symbols (2003: 94-97). However, these two perspectives overlook other important political events such as scandals, illegal activity against humanity, and bribery, which might stir up a great societal interest and concern (Birkland, 1997: 3). The strength of social perceptions about an agenda might serve as another indicator which reflects the adoptability of that agenda.

3-2-2-3. Argument 3-3: Historical institutionalism and path dependence

Argument 3-3 relates AQ to historical institutionalism (hereafter HI). HI is a branch of the new institutionalism, and claims that the AQ process of a particular country is shaped by its historical peculiarities; thus, unlike the other two institutionalists' views, HI places more emphasis on the heterogeneity of public sector reform among countries rather than on commonality (Gains, 2004a: 53). According to Hall's notion (1986: 7-19, 1992: 96-97, Hall and Taylor, 1996: 938; Thelen and Steinmo, 1992: 2), institutions are formal, and informal rules such as routines, norms and conventions and procedures embedded in the organisational structure. They, at an *overarching level*, are 'the basic organisational structures' of the state and society; *at a middle level*, features which 'affect the distribution of power among social groups' such as the nature of social organisation and the relationship among segments of capital; and *in the narrower sense*, the 'standard operating procedures, regulations and routines' of public agencies. However, its notion is too inclusive (Hill, 2009: 80; section 8-1-1-9).

¹²⁷ Wilson's model is similar to Olson's logic. Olson observed that the 'latent group' is too big and has lots of free-riders, *ipso facto*, rare collective goods can be created by them (1971: 50).

From the HI's perspective, history is not a simple past, but a historical causality which means that an event, a policy choice, or an institution in the past has a continual influence over the present and the future (Peters, 2005: 71); that is, it has inertia.¹²⁸ While the old institutionalism focused on formal structure and the legal system (Ha, 2003: 25; Peters 2005: 7; Lane and Ersson, 2000: 31-34),¹²⁹ HI focuses on individual preference, strategies, action, and the change of interaction patterns *within institutional contexts*. For historical institutionalists, since political actors are not just objects, but are also agents of history, the dialectic of meaningful actions and structural determinants has a particular importance (March and Olsen, 1984: 738; Skocpol 1984:4; Thelen and Steinmo, 1992: 10).

The main features of HI are as follows (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 938-942, Ha, 2003: 46-60; Peters, 2005: 76-81; Cairney, 2011: 76-79): Firstly, choice at a particular earlier point in time makes a *path dependence* which takes on a life of its own and persistently constrains present and future choices (Lecours, 2005: 9; Sewell, 1996: 262). The timing and sequence of events, as a historical process, could highly influence a series of state policies¹³⁰; thus once a state 'has started down a track, the cost of reversal is very high' (Levi, 1997: 28). Each step along a specific path might generate results which make that path more inflexible for the next round (Pierson, 2000: 253).¹³¹ Ikenberry argues that any institution that has been previously formulated creates a privileged position for a particular individual or group, and those beneficiaries try to maintain that existing institution; moreover, even when conditions change, they will still make every effort to retain its vested rights (1988: 223-224). In addition, if a new institution produces benefits for most people, the costs for change and the uncertainties for the future will force the government to maintain that institution.

Secondly, historical institutionalists have been attentive to the asymmetries of power relationship, and the process in which some social groups win while others lose, as developed 'in response to the group conflicts theories and

¹²⁸ According to Ikenberry, 'past historical circumstance' or 'the shadow of the past weighs on what is possible and what is perceived to be desirable at specific moments' (1988: 226).

¹²⁹ While traditional institutionalists focus only on formal rules, new institutionalists also emphasise the role of informal conventions (Judge, 2005: 4-5; Lowndes, 2010: 62-71).

¹³⁰ An institution, which is established at '*t*' point in time, might restrict a choice and a direction of change at '*t+1*' point in time; thus the institution is a dependent variable at '*t*' point in time, while an independent variable at '*t+1*' point in time (Ikenberry, 1988: 225; Ha, 2003: 57).

¹³¹ In a similar vein, Pierson explains one of the key factors of path-dependence; *increasing returns* (Pierson, 2000: 252-253). The path might be unpredictable, inflexible and, in the long-run, the consequences of path dependence may generate lower outcomes than an existing alternative would have done (Arthur, 1994: 112-113).

structural-functionalism' (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 937, 941). In order to analyse the interests of actors and their power relationship, the importance of 'historically generated context' has been stressed (Immergut, 1998: 22).

Last but not least, HI emphasises the unintended consequences and inefficiencies created by established institutions; and, in a similar vein, stresses the contingencies and external impacts (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 942; Immergut, 1998: 23). Institutions are usually not flexible and adaptive, so they rarely show incremental change; while institutional changes are generally brought about by historical turning points or crucial historical junctures (Ikenberry, 1988: 233-235; Krasner, 1984: 225). To put it differently, since institutional change takes place relatively abruptly and episodically, HI postulates that institutions are stable for a long period of time but are periodically punctuated by critical junctures; namely *punctuated equilibrium* (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992: 15, Parsons, 1995: 203).

However, HI has faced several criticisms as follows:

Firstly, few HI researchers have developed 'a sophisticated understanding of exactly how institutions affect behaviour' and have specified 'the precise causal chain' through which an institution affects behaviour (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 950). As a result, it is equivocal whether individual intention or institutional constraints shape particular consequences (Koelble, 1995: 239). Although HI has contributed to explaining structural conditions elaborately, it has a weakness in that it could not provide micro-foundations of behaviour.¹³² In this regard, Hay and Wincott argue that HI is likely to have a latent structuralism (1998: 952; Hall and Taylor, 1998: 959; footnote 545), despite Thelen and Steinmo's claim that HI might be a bridge between structure and agency (1992: 10).

Secondly, few historical constraints explain what is possible, while they provide guidance regarding what is not possible (Ikenberry, 1988: 242; Mahoney and Thelen, 2010: 7). In particular, HI can create the impression that particular institutions are the only variables, and 'no other outcomes are

¹³² However, in order to correct the structuralist approach, the role of *ideas* has been given greater weight (Immergut, 1998: 17). According to Campbell (2002: 21), increasing numbers of scholars have been interested in 'how behaviour is driven by *ideas* rather than by self-interest' (section 8-1-1-9). Ideas, which mean an individual world-view, normative belief and viewpoint about causation, enable actors to make a specific decision through interpretation and self-reflection (Hall, 1997: 183; Hall and Taylor, 1998: 961-962; Immergut, 1998: 18; Hay, 2006: 58; Schmidt, 2006: 114-116; Cairney, 2011: 85, 220). Hall's usage of *ideas* is similar to Bourdieu's theory in that he explores how the institutional rules of games, which is a similar concept to Bourdieu's *field*, are closely related to ideas, which is a similar notion to Bourdieu's *habitus* (Hall, 1993: 289 and 1997; Béland, 2005: 42). *Habitus* is 'the shared mode of perception, judgement, and behavioural dispositions of a category of people, particularly of a class' (Bourdieu, 1986b: Garner, 2000: 374; Deux, 2000).

possible given institutional constraints', thus leading to institutional determinism (Thelen and Steinmo 1992:14).¹³³ This model explains everything, so that it might say 'institutions shape politics'; but institutions explain nothing when they break down, so 'politics shape institutions' (ibid: 15, 32; Hill, 2009: 80).

Thirdly, the punctuated equilibrium metaphor obstructs a more detailed insight into the gradual change of institutions.¹³⁴ Yet recently, leading historical institutionalists have developed a set of ideas about institutional changes (Streeck and Thelen, 2005: 9; Mahoney and Thelen, 2010: 15-16). There are at least four possible types of institutional change (Pollitt, 2008: 46; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2009: 17-18): The first pattern is the classic incrementalist model (Lindblom, 1959: 81 and 1979: 517-518) in which *gradual changes* in process lead to only predictable reproduction by adaptation *within path* (Rose et al., 1994: 224). The second pattern denotes *gradual* but fundamental change *beyond path*. Meanwhile, in the third type, the process of change appears to *be abrupt*,¹³⁵ but rapidly *returns to previous path* in a short period of time. The final type of change occurs in a *sudden and radical way beyond path*, and this is also called punctuation or critical juncture.¹³⁶ In particular, the third and last patterns are helpful to explain the institutional changes in developing countries.

From the HI's perspective, the AQ of each country might have its own story (Christensen and Lægreid, 2011: 6); therefore, any generalisation of AQ around the world is impossible since HI lacks universally applicable concepts (ibid: 12; Ha, 2003: 61). In this regard, RCI criticises HI as atheoretical and is just storytelling.

To conclude, the nine arguments explored above contain considerably diverse theoretical elements in them and explain the cause of AQ in a quite multifarious way. Each argument is applied to the real cases of the Tate galleries and the MMCA in Chapters 6 and 7, and is compared and analysed in Chapter 8.

¹³³ Yet scholars of HI often observe that actions are *shaped* rather than *determined* by an institution. Therefore, from their perspective, an institution is not the determinant of actions, but a constraint of them (Ha, 2003: 40).

¹³⁴ If an institution is composed of one single factor, only external impacts can change it. However, an institution at a particular time is comprised of heterogeneous factors which have been formed over time; namely, the *intercurrence* of the institution. An institution could change by itself, owing to the rupture and conflicts of these constituents within it (Orren & Skowronek, 1996: 111-146; Streeck and Thelen, 2005: 9-11; Hill, 2009: 79).

¹³⁵ A sudden decision-making happens because a *policy window*, which means 'an opportunity for advocates of proposals to push their pet solutions' (Kingdon, 2003: 165), briefly opens then closes (Hill, 2009: 156). Meanwhile, if an abrupt decision-making is based on a populist idea (Stoker, 2006: 133-137), it might supposedly return to previous policy after a change of government.

¹³⁶ Another version of policy change types are presented by Hacker (2005: 48-49). He argues that if both *the barriers to internal change* and *the environmental status-quo pressures* are high, a policy under those conditions might be experience *policy drift*; while if the conditions are the other way round, the policy could be *replaced* (See also Pierson, 2004: 81, 92, 156; Streeck and Thelen, 2005: 31; Hill, 2009: 39).

Chapter 4. The Purpose and Results of Agencification and Quangocratisation

Every public sector reform has its own multiple goals to grapple with the problems of existing organisations (Bovaird and Löffler, 2009: 16-21; James et al., 2012: 61). These goals are said to be the possible motive of public sector reform in the face of official announcements of the government (van Thiel, 2004b: 169),¹³⁷ but underneath, the causes of reform might be considerably diverse, as discussed in Chapter 3. In addition, the results of any reform might be quite different from the originally intended outcomes, or the official goals at the outset (Hood et al., 2010: 12-13). As a corollary of the unexpectedness of reform results and the detachment between causes and effects, the consequences of AQ need to be analysed apart from the causes. In other words, the legitimacy of AQ could be drawn from the *ex post* performance and results of reform as well as the *ex ante* motives. Furthermore, a multifaceted assessment of reform could have more appropriate implications for future reform directions.

As shown in Figure 3-3, NPM reforms are divided into two groups: *structural* and *managerial* mechanisms which include market-type and technical mechanisms. Among the *structural* reorganisation of the NPM which do not, in theory, necessarily precede *managerial* reform, are agencification and quangocratisation. It might, however, plausibly be argued that once structural reform takes place, there is a growing possibility that managerial change follows, which is not always the case (Kaufman, 1981: 184). Therefore, organisations that have experienced AQ might face mounting pressure to improve their managerial skills as compared to organisations which have not gone through structural change. With this in mind, in most cases, the assessment of NPM reform could be applied to that of AQ.

This chapter is rather theoretical but also an integral part of this thesis. Firstly, later chapters compare the cases of both countries, and thus needs the equivalent method for measurement and terms for comparison (section 1-3-1). However, both Korea and the U.K. have traditionally developed a similar concept from different perspectives. For example, in Korea, the concept of 'accountability' is not popular in academic circle and the media, and more familiar terms are 'control' and 'autonomy'; thus it needs explanation (sections 7-5-3 and 8-4; Johnson, 1982: 211; Mulgan, 2003: 19). Secondly, in many cases, the concepts regarding outcomes or results are so comprehensive that a similar content which is addressed in different materials might be interpreted in

¹³⁷ Yet in general terms, the government's official announcement is so practical that, for some commentators, it might not be considered to be a real cause for AQ (van Thiel, 2004b: 175).

a quite different way, depending on the expansion or contraction of the concepts; thus the scope of a specific notion needs to be clarified (Bouckaert and Peters, 2004: 29).

4-1. Related Multifaceted Concepts

To avoid considering the same phenomena of reform across the world as being quite different ones owing to the use of confusing terms, building clear concepts for analysis is very important, especially in comparative research. A series of terms, such as accountability, decentralisation and performance improvement, which are often used for an analysis, have usually multifarious ingredients which are surprisingly opaque. One of the reasons for this ambiguity comes from their comprehensiveness; that is, these are words with diverse meanings (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 1995: 3), so that they give a different sense depending on the scope of an analysis and its context. More importantly, these are often used through a symbolic mechanism at a rhetorical level (Fischer, 2003: 169-170; Stone, 2002: 137-138). These are somewhat loose terms and hurrah-words, against which few people would object, being often employed by politicians and bureaucrats in order to give the public a politically positive meaning; thus sometimes they are more or less obscure even to those who initiate the reforms. In other words, these terms could give different meanings to different stakeholders in different situations.

Accountability The concept of *accountability* undoubtedly lies at the heart of good governance (Massey and Pyper, 2005: 151), but it has also been a rhetorical device, as with transparency and equity, which is a loosely and elusively defined political desideratum, and nobody can 'have enough of it' (Bovens, 2007: 182-183; Verhoest et al, 2010: 25; Bovens et al., 2014:2). Although the etymology of accountability in government is related to financial accounting (Gregory, 2007a: 340), today, the concept of this term is used in numerous ways; and various commentators suggest its multifaceted aspects (Flinders, 2001: 20). The following questions are key issues vis-à-vis accountability: *who* is accountable *to whom* (*accountor and accountee*, Pollitt, 2003a: 89; Kettl, 2012: 8; Steets, 2010: 18-30); *for what*, *through which mechanisms* (Pyper, 1996: 2-3; Wilks, 2008: 130); and *to what extent* (Massey and Pyper, 2005: 153).¹³⁸ Each question is closely connected with the others, so that a study concerning accountability should cover these issues first.

¹³⁸ Verschuere et al. also suggest three types of accountability concerning 'when' (2006: 269-271): *ex ante*; *ex nunc*; and *ex post* accountability (Dubnick and Frederickson, 2011: xvii).

Various dimensions of accountability are as follows (Behn, 2001: 59): firstly, *public managers* including civil servants and ministers are responsible for diverse issues *to varied accountees: organisational or internal* accountability to hierarchical superiors (Gregory, 2007a: 341); *political* or *parliamentary* accountability to elected representatives (Greenwood et al., 1993: 25, 273; Smith, 2007: 21); *legal* accountability to courts (Steets, 2010: 24; O'Donnell, 1996: 82), *administrative* or *bureaucratic* accountability to auditors and inspectors (Bovens, 2007: 187-188); *professional* accountability to professional peers (Pollitt, 2003a: 93; Gormley, et al., 2012: 12); and *consumerist* or *service quality* accountability to particular consumers or client groups (McConnell, 1996: 14-36; Flinders, 2001: 21; Burnham and Pyper, 2008: 183).¹³⁹

Secondly, *accountors* are *collectively* or *individually* accountable (Ellis, 1989: 49-56; Bovens, 2007: 190-191) *through a wide array of mechanisms*, including annual reports, Parliamentary Questions, debates, select committees, standing committees, ombudsmen, administrative tribunals, external auditors, the courts, and inquiries of various types (Pyper, 1995: 120-135; Greenwood et al., 2002: 236-243; Burnham and Pyper, 2008: 171-181).

Thirdly, the layers of accountability, that is to say, the extent to which the *accountors* assume responsibility, are composed of at least three strata: *answerability* or *explanatory* accountability which means providing answers to external questions; *amendatory* accountability or remedial actions which are related to correcting behaviour or procedures; and *sanctions* or culpability which include disciplinary actions such as dismissal or demotion (Massey and Pyper, 2005: 153; Bovens, 1998: 87-88).¹⁴⁰ In addition to these objective accountabilities, some commentators argue the importance of *subjective* responsibility on the *moral* dimensions (Gregory, 2007a: 342).¹⁴¹ In contrast to the Weberian bureaucracy which has focused on formal legality, this perspective emphasises an ethical obligation on the individual to decide and act honestly, openly and impartially.

In conclusion, the concept of accountability has been expanded to involve almost the whole values of public administration (Mulgan, 2011: 95). However, the notion of accountability in the Whitehall model has been

¹³⁹ In this connection, see later comments on 'performance' (see also 'accountability for results', Steets, 2010, 25-26; footnote 642).

¹⁴⁰ This type of accountability covers proactive performance improvement accountability as well as passive sanctions after a failure.

¹⁴¹ For some commentators, this concept is related to 'process accountability' which means procedural fairness (Kettl, 2012: 16).

considered to be relatively important as compared to other liberal democracies, mainly because of its unique ministerial responsibility mechanism and rhetoric (the Haldane Report, 1918: para 31; Aucoin, 1995: 223-235; Höpfl, 2011: 33; section 5-1-2).

Decentralisation The notion of *decentralisation* has been tremendously fashionable in recent decades (Pollitt, 2009: 249), but it is still questionable whether various countries use this term with the same meaning (Aucoin, 1997: 177-178; Pollitt, 2007a: 371). Its central idea derived from Latin roots, meaning 'away from the centre' (Macmahon, 1961: 15, quoted in Pollitt, 2009: 250). In practice, however, decentralisation is one of the most confusing topics in organisation theory (Mintzberg, 1979: 181); thus its meaning has been extensively examined by a number of researchers (For example, Pollitt et al., 1998: 5).

For a precise understanding, when the term *decentralisation* is adopted, its meaning needs to be identified from among the following usages. Firstly, when it comes to the contents of the decentralised authority, in a broad sense, it could be devolved from the central political level to other elected politicians by *political* decentralisation (Bresser-Pereira, 2004: 214); while by *administrative* decentralisation the authority is decentralised from top bureaucrats to appointed managers and administrators (Pollitt et al., 1998: 7); and by *legislative* decentralisation the legislation powers are transferred from a state institution to regional or local bodies (Kim, 2001b; Leeke et al., 2003: 7; Wilson and Game, 2006: 158-159).

Secondly, decentralisation is divided into internal and external decentralisation depending on whether the power is transferred to an inside or outside organisation. *Internal* decentralisation takes place within a specific organisation, while the authority might be taken over to another separate established organisation through *external* decentralisation (Pollitt et al., 1998: 8-9). This distinction is closely related to the first category above: *political* decentralisation often occurs between two separate organisations and *administrative* decentralisation does frequently occur within an organisation. However, the delegation of administrative authority from parent ministries to legally detached quangos is still *external* decentralisation (Quangocratisation Types-I and II in Figure 2-2).

Thirdly, the process of transferring power from the central government takes place at different territorial levels (Bresser-Pereira, 2004: 214): to territorial bodies of central government such as the Government Offices for the

Regions in the U.K. (Leeke et al., 2003: 7) and the Special Local Administrative Agencies in Korea (MoGAHA, 2005: 187); to local governments such as the Seoul Metropolitan Government in Korea; to regional governments such as the Scottish Parliament and Executive in the UK (Leyland, 2007: 189); and to each state government of federal state¹⁴² (Wilson, 2000: 35; Lane and Ersson, 2000: 79-83). Especially, in the U.K., the term *devolution* is employed to explain the power transfer from central government to sub-national units (Rhodes et al., 2003: 5; Pilkington, 2000: 29; Jeffery, 2010: 385; Keating, 2010: 423; Leach et al., 2011: 289).

Finally,¹⁴³ Mintzberg suggests other types of decentralisation: *vertical* decentralisation and *horizontal* decentralisation (1979: 186).¹⁴⁴ For some organisations, their authority might be delegated to other horizontal groups such as professional experts, external analysts, on the basis of specialisation and cooperation, while horizontally centralised organisations retain 'all executive authority'.

In sum, the term decentralisation contains numerous meanings such as indirect control, multi-form structure and the delegation of decision-making authority (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992: 250-254; Rhodes et al., 2003: 4-5). Yet its meaning, emphasis and application might be different depending on contextual variations (Fleurke and Hulst, 2006: 53); moreover, it could not be a panacea (Jung et al., 2007: 233-235; Pyper, 2011: 65-70; Thoenig, 2011: 184-189) and decentralisation is probably just 'the current turn of a wheel of fashion' (Hood and Jackson, 1991: 18; Dahlström et al., 2011, 15-18).

Autonomy As with the two concepts mentioned earlier, the notion of *autonomy* might reflect different aspects depending on the context (Bouckaert and Peters, 2004: 23; Christensen and Lægreid, 2006: 13; Verhoest et al, 2010: 18). In general terms, autonomy refers to an exemption or a decrease in supervision and control over the decision-making process (Christensen, 2001: 120; Verhoest et al., 2004: 104-105; Yesilkagit and van Thiel, 2008: 137-138; Painter et al., 2010: 111-112). This notion, particularly, is closely related to the concept of decentralisation and accountability (sections 6-5-3, 7-5-3 and 8-2). On the one hand, among the products of *decentralisation* are autonomy,

¹⁴² For more on this, see Heun (2011: 51), Sbragia (2008: 239-242), Church (2004: 154-162), McRoberts (1993: 150-155), and Rhodes et al. (2003: 6).

¹⁴³ Besides which, *competitive* decentralisation and *non-competitive* decentralisation might be mentioned (Pollitt et al., 1998: 7-8).

¹⁴⁴ This horizontal and vertical approach is not a new taxonomy; Gulick (1937 and 2003: 15-17) already suggested *horizontal* and *vertical* specialisation dimensions (Painter et al., 2010: 112).

flexibility and innovation, whose benefits, on the whole, seem to be the same as those of decentralisation (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992: 252-253). On the other hand, a counterweight of autonomy is *control* (Verhoest et al, 2010: 250-253; Skelcher et al., 2013b: 8) which is germane to *accountability*, although these two are more or less different in detail (Mulgan, 2003: 18-20; Verschuere et al., 2006: 271; Lægreid and Verhoest, 2010: 5). The types of autonomy, therefore, are similar to those of decentralisation and accountability; they might be categorised based on criteria such as *from whom*, *for what*, *through which mechanism* and *to what extent*. The first two are about the *contents* of autonomy and the second two are related to the *level* of autonomy. Firstly, the contents of autonomy might be divided into four types: *personnel* autonomy; *financial* autonomy; *legal* autonomy (sections 6-5-2 and 7-5-2); and *policy* autonomy (Christensen, 2001: 121 -125; Verhoest et al, 2010: 19-24). Strictly speaking, however, personnel and policy autonomy are closely linked to financial issues.¹⁴⁵ Secondly, some organisations could enjoy more autonomy through radical *structural* detachment (OECD, 2002; 17; James and van Thiel, 2011: 211), while others could still acquire improved autonomy from the previous controlled centre through *de facto operational* delegation without structural autonomy (Verhoest et al, 2010: 18). AQ falls into the first category.

Complete autonomy or controls are virtually impossible and where the balance between them lies might be decided by the trajectories and characteristics of each individual country (section 8-4). In the U.K., as mentioned earlier, accountability or political control issues have been traditionally considered important partly owing to its unique constitutional features such as the accountability chain of the traditional Whitehall model (Judge, 1993: 135), uncodified constitution (Wright, 2003: 17-18) and the emphasis on budget savings (Burnham and Pyper, 2008: 2). By contrast, in countries such as the U.S. (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992) where business-like management techniques have been emphasised, or Korea (Oh, 2012a: 349-352 and 379-381) where the problems of political and bureaucratic control have come to the fore, or Scandinavian countries (Burnham and Pyper, 2008: 2) where the 'transfer of power to local governments and user boards' was highlighted, there is a tendency to emphasise the need for increasing autonomy (Verhoest et al, 2010).

Performance evaluation and improvement Performance management in government has been popular since the rise of the NPM in the 1980s (Koh,

¹⁴⁵ Yet enhancement of managerial autonomy might not necessarily mean an increase in financial autonomy (Bouckaert and Peters, 2004: 27; sections 6-5-2-4 and 7-5-2-4).

2008: 37), but this is not a new idea in the public sector.¹⁴⁶ For example, there were the works of the first Hoover Commission in the U.S. (Bouckaert et al., 2009: 152).¹⁴⁷ In spite of its long history and its pivotal role in public sector reform, however, the notion of *performance* in the public sector is multifaceted and mixed (Bovaird, 1996: 147; Lee, 2009a: 45; Van Dooren et al., 2010: 2-7).

Firstly, regarding 'whose' performance should be evaluated, Talbot, a leading scholar suggests three dimensions (2007: 494-495): *organisational* performance (Bovaird and Gregory, 1996: 255-268; Hood et al., 2004; Boyne et al., 2007); *policy* performance such as housing reforms (Boyne et al., 2003: 83-117);¹⁴⁸ and *individual* performance.¹⁴⁹ Furthermore, even though the performance of a specific organisation is almost excellent, it does not mean that there is an overall improvement of government performance; thus *systemic performance of central government* as well as *the performance of individual organisations* is also essential in order to ascertain the impacts of reforms (James, 2003: 88-124; section 5-1-3).

Secondly, concerning the criteria for performance evaluation, three concepts, which are, *economy*, *efficiency* and *effectiveness* (the *three Es*¹⁵⁰), have been popular among a myriad of commentators (Dunleavy and Carrera, 2013: 8).¹⁵¹ After the introduction of these increasingly sophisticated concepts, public managers have put more accents on operational management, allocations of resources, and longer term social impacts, while in the past, only the control over inputs or quantity, such as staff and money, had mainly been contemplated. Especially, effectiveness deals with a more fundamental and a longer range of expected results which are often called *outcomes*. However, *outcomes* are difficult to measure (Wilson, 1989a: 159, 163; Talbot, 2004a:

¹⁴⁶ Talbot argues that 'the discussions of the performance of government have existed as long as government itself' and even autocratic rulers have often tried to 'justify their rule by showing how it is beneficial' to people (2007: 491).

¹⁴⁷ Another classic example is PPBS (Planning Programming and Budgeting System) (Hilton and Joyce, 2007: 248; Bouckaert et al., 2009: 152). Evaluation was fashionable during the 1960s and 1970s, but over the past four decades, it has developed in a more systematic and professional way (Pollitt, 2003a: 120-121; Ingraham and Moynihan, 2001: 310). This is largely because of the accumulation and convenient access of data through digitalisation; the pressure of performance evaluation due to the continuous comparison with the private sector and international league tables (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011: 8, 140-141); and development of related institutions such as performance-related pay.

¹⁴⁸ Regarding the purposes of policy performance, evaluation could be divided into three groups: a *summative* evaluation; a *formative* evaluation; and an *ex ante* evaluation (Patton and Sawicki, 1993: 368; Pollitt, 2003a: 121-122; footnote 138).

¹⁴⁹ For more on this, see Shafritz et al. (1992: 489-491); Nigro and Nigro (2000: 121-123); and Latham et al. (2009: 364-365).

¹⁵⁰ *Economy* refers to savings in input such as budget and workforces. *Efficiency* is the ratio between inputs and *outputs*, whereas *effectiveness* is the degree to which the final *outcomes* result from the outputs (Pollitt, 1990a: 20 and 2003a: 123; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004: 106; Pollitt and Summa, 1999: 10). Meanwhile, *cost-effectiveness* is 'outcome divided by cost' (Bouckaert et al., 2009: 155; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011: 133).

¹⁵¹ For example, see Bouckaert et al. (2009: 154-155), and Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011: 133-134).

16),¹⁵² owing partly to an ambiguity of goals (Chun and Rainey, 2007: 93-98; Rainey, 2010: 235) and the problems of attribution and time lags (Ashworth et al., 2010: 3-4; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011: 144). In addition, *economy* and *efficiency* are leaning toward economic criteria, so that they hardly evaluate other important values such as *customer satisfaction*, *equity*, *overall impacts* and *procedural correctness* (Pollitt, 2003a: 123). For example, an analysis of customer satisfaction¹⁵³ in the quality of services,¹⁵⁴ undertaken before and after a specific reform, could offer important evidence for the improvement in public services (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 1995; sections 6-5-1 and 7-5-1). Moreover, other values which could not be provided in the private sector (Talbot, 2007: 501) such as transparency could also be suitable criteria for performance appraisal in the public sector. At the same time, while economy and efficiency could be indicators for a relatively short period of time, longer term indicators for the organisational capacity building or competence development such as *leadership* and *organisational learning* might also be relevant criteria for performance improvement (Petrovsky, 2010: 82-90; Downe, 2010: 188-193).

To conclude, the emphasis on performance evaluation in the public sector has moved over time in accordance with 'the dominant understanding' of its elements (Bouckaert et al., 2009: 152),¹⁵⁵ technological evolution (van Dooren et al., 2010: 48-49), and the concept of accountability and autonomy.¹⁵⁶ Since performance management in the public sector is intrinsically different from that of the private sector (Rainey and Chun, 2007: 93-94), the studies of performance improvement have been mainly focused on the theory and method for measuring performance (For example, see Talbot, 2010); thus, performance management has been developed in a professional way over the past few decades (Pollitt, 2003a: 121). However, it is still uncertain how many performance measurements have been conducted and to what extent they could be possible in the public sector.¹⁵⁷ Therefore, the fact that the evaluation

¹⁵² In this connection, Pollitt raises the problems of *observability* and *standardisability* (Pollitt, 2003a: 162).

¹⁵³ Customer satisfaction, in the broader picture, might be covered within the *effectiveness* category. However, in this case, effectiveness could include too diverse values all together; thus, *subjective* feelings such as *satisfaction* and *trust* (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011: 145) should be placed into different categories.

¹⁵⁴ The notion of *quality* also could not be easily determined (Gaster, 1995: 2). TQM (Total Quality Management), which was popular during the 1970s and 1990s (Cohen et al., 1995: 126-133; Carr and Littman, 1993; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 1995: 4-5), suggests diverse kinds of quality in service provisions: reliability, responsiveness, competence, access, courtesy, communication, security, understanding the customer, and appearance (Morgan and Murgatroyed, 1994: 8-13; Pyper, 1995: 103-113).

¹⁵⁵ Van Dooren et al. argue that in the twentieth century, at least, there have been eight performance movements (2010: 45). However, despite the development of more improved models, all performance movements were political in that they all have served for an existing power at that time (ibid: 38-50).

¹⁵⁶ The issue on performance *for whom*, is related to the notion of *accountability*. For example, Kettl suggests the notion of 'program accountability' (2012, 16; see also Steets, 2010: 25). Meanwhile, it is also often believed that *autonomy* and *empowerment* enable the organisation to accomplish enhanced performance (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992: 252-253; section 8-3-3).


¹⁵⁷ For more on this, see Appendix 5.

of performance management itself within government has rarely been carried out, paradoxically, shows how difficult performance measurement is (James, 2003: 12, 92; Appendix 5).

4-2. Various Levels of Reform Objectives and Unintended Results

Even a single public policy has multiple objectives and each objective might have diverse implications; moreover, the results of any reform might turn out to be even more complex than expected. In a perfect world, reform results would be the same as their initial policy objective, but in practice, unforeseen or underestimated repercussions might happen (6, 2010: 53). Moreover, these numerous objectives and results might connect with each other; sometimes they might create synergies and, on the contrary, might often generate trade-offs (Hood and Peters, 2004: 269; section 8-3-3). Therefore, in order to assess the influence of reform, the links among diverse impacts need to be systematically analysed.

Figure 4-1: Conceptual map of various levels and trade-offs in AQ



Source: loosely based on and developed from Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011, Chapter7); Painter (2002: 214) and Margetts et al. (2010)

In this regard, Figure 4-1 shows that the results of public sector reform could be observed from diverse angles and phases (Toonen, 2012: 571). Some results such as decentralisation, introduction to managerial techniques

and depoliticisation, tend to cover multiple elements, so that these comprehensive notions need to be considered at a different level (Parsons, 1995: 181-183). In contrast to these *political rhetoric concepts* at a higher rhetorical level, narrower concepts at a lower level could be divided into *procedural concepts* and *performance indicators*. Each group is differentiated from others in respect to ripple effects, methods for measurement and procedures to implement objectives.

Firstly, at a higher level, some concepts such as *decentralisation* and *depoliticisation* are politically deployed as rhetorical devices (section 8-3-3). Objectives and performances at this symbolic level, which are generally considered by politicians and the public to be a desirable direction of reform in the contemporary world,¹⁵⁸ involve macro levels of paradigm and mind-set (Peters and Nispen, 1998: 3-4; Howlett, 2011: 36).¹⁵⁹ However, these concepts mainly reflect popular fashion which focuses on the emotional persuasion of the electorates, so that it is far from easy to show the specific results of reform. For example, an objective '*decentralisation*' which is intrinsically based on the idea that 'small is beautiful' (Pollitt et al., 1998: 28-31; Hood and Jackson, 1991: 18) has swept through the world for decades and it might be easily employed as a political catchphrase;¹⁶⁰ however, the concrete meaning of this objective is hard to capture and it has limitations in its ability to provide direct 'evidence' (Hood, 1998: 175-177).

The first level of concepts is linked to lower-level *procedural concepts* such as autonomy, flexibility and transparency. These objectives could give a more detailed image of public sector reform, but still might not be the ultimate targets. They might seem to be proper goals, not because they provide direct results but because they could lead to positive outcomes through their instrumental procedures (Linder and Peters, 1998: 33-45; Bagchus, 1998: 65). Therefore, along with the first stage, concepts of this phase include political symbolism and a multiplicity of definition.¹⁶¹

Finally, the desired outcomes of public sector reform are measured by using the concepts of the third phase. In this phase, improvement of

¹⁵⁸ This kind of rhetoric depends on 'soft data and soft logic', which are selectively chosen and appeal to a persuasive example (Hood and Jackson, 1991: 17; Fischer, 2003: 169-170).

¹⁵⁹ For example, see Savoie (1994: 87-115).

¹⁶⁰ For example, see Yamamoto (2004b: 172-173).

¹⁶¹ For example, regarding *transparency* see Hood (2006b: 19-20 and 2010: 995), Erkkilä (2012: 226-228) and Peters (2001: 152-153).

performance is shown through more detailed information (Pollitt, 1990b: 174), as performance indicators could give specific figures by number.

None of these three stages of good objectives of reform, however, could always guarantee positive outcomes. As shown in Figure 4-1, there are numerous negative prospects of reform, such as deteriorated equity and reduced political accountability, which are not officially promulgated (Pollitt, 2003a: 45-49). For a balanced analysis, simultaneous consideration of contradictory aspects is an indispensable requirement (Simon, 1953: 35-44).

In conclusion, there are some serious obstacles to evaluation, such as political sensitivity, the lack of key data and hindsight bias (Appendix 5). Furthermore, perspectives on reform have incessantly changed; once one viewpoint wins over competing rival perspectives, then they might be treated as 'outdated ideas' later (Hood and Jackson, 1991: 17-19, Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011: 183-186). It means, conversely, that researchers have to consider the potential weaknesses of the prevailing thoughts of the contemporary world (Simon, 1953: 36; Figure 8-8). In addition, since diverse reform objectives and performances could not be considered in the same category and dimension, the impact analysis of any specific reform needs a careful examination of the definition of terms and casual chains.

4-3. Concluding Remarks

As far as the study of administrative reform is concerned, over the last few decades the analysis of performance or outcomes has been considered as one of the most essential parts (Pollitt and Summa, 1999: 1-2; van Dooren et al., 2010: 4-5; Bouckaert and Halligan, 2008: 1-2; Talbot, 2010: 1-2); thus, despite all the difficulties mentioned earlier, the performance assessment should not be underestimated for the following reasons (Pollitt, 2003a: 119).

Firstly, the most basic purpose of performance assessment for any specific organisation is to decide whether it accomplished its initial targets and to give feedback with a view to enhancing its operation.¹⁶² In most cases,

¹⁶² On the one hand, the programme could be measured in order to check its workability (summative evaluation), on the other hand it might be examined for the purpose of improving its implementation (formative evaluation) (Pollitt, 2003a: 121-122).

administrative reform tends to be carried out in order to improve performance, so that the poor outputs or outcomes after AQ might be regarded as a failure of the reform. In this case, this poor result might lead to a new change; or to put it differently, performance could directly be the starting point for alteration of the existing institution (section 8-3-1). In principle, therefore, performance assessment is a basic tool to bring about future institutional change (section 7-6). Conversely, successful performance could strengthen the foundation for the sustainability of the established institution (section 6-6). In short, enduring performance improvements would be the most basic underpinning of institutional maintenance.

Secondly, in spite of having the same term such as 'executive agency' or having the same legal status of the organisation on the surface, the contents of its policy might be totally different (section 7-2); thus operational performances such as autonomy and accountability structure need to be evaluated (sections 6-5-2 and 7-5-2). Furthermore, since there is usually a huge gap between the announcement of the government about a new policy and its implementation (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011: 13), the difference between the policy *discussed*, the policy *decided* and the policy *executed* has to be investigated in order to understand what the real purpose of the reform policy is or which is the most influential factor in it (Figure 8-6).

Thirdly, performance assessment is also important when it comes to a pilot test and a policy transfer. In general terms performance appraisal is necessary at the stage of implementation rather than at the stage of policy adoption or introduction. However, in the case of a pilot programme, its performance will have an impact on its large-scale application. For a country which wants to adopt other countries' policies, the performance or results of that policy is, at least in theory, critical (Figure 8-7).¹⁶³ In addition, when a new policy such as AQ is introduced from other countries, the policy designers should consider *related institutions* such as recruitment methods and performance-related pay (PRP) (Pollitt, 2004a, 333; section 8-4). The analysis of the performance of an AQ policy, therefore, enables one to examine not only its detailed components but also diverse institutions linked to it.

¹⁶³ For example, see an analysis of the CfPS on British Next Steps programme (1997; footnote 431). However, the commentators who place great value on the cognitive pressure, political symbolism, ideology or popularity are more important than the real outcomes of the policy.

Finally, performance evaluation is quite a good tool for making a comparison. For example, similar organisations in two countries, which share the common motivation for the introduction of an AQ policy, might show different performances because of their own institutional, political or economic situations (section 8-2). This could make researchers and practitioners identify the different conditions for the specific policy occurring in each country and have some implications for other future policies in those countries.

The discussion in this chapter provides greater clarity in employing the concepts of accountability, autonomy and performance to provide a greater appreciation of the complexity which they embody. This enables later chapters to compare the claims made for these wider benefits with what appears to be happening in the case studies and through the reform process. It also alerts us to the likelihood on unintended consequences. Overall later chapters are able to present a more sophisticated appreciation of performance outcomes and to draw conclusions about the causes of improved or deteriorating performances.

The comparisons of the results of AQ in Tate Modern and the MMCA carried out in the later chapters (sections 6-5 and 7-5), concern the performance (sections 6-5 and 7-5), which are comprised of *internal* and *external* influences of AQ. Internal influences are largely connected to ‘*accountability, decentralisation and autonomy*’ examined above, while external influences are mainly related to ‘*performance evaluation and improvement*’. As each organisation has its own unique performance indicators which reflect its distinctive missions, so arts museums equally have their own *external* missions (section 6-1); and the most representative targets among them are the number of annual visitors and the visitors’ satisfaction level (sections 6-5-1 and 7-5-1).¹⁶⁴ At the same time, there are managerial or *internal* influences of AQ: the changes in organisational efficiency, autonomy and accountability structure (sections 6-5-3 and 7-5-3), which have a significant impact, in particular in the longer term, on external targets (section 7-5 and 8-2).

¹⁶⁴ Attendance figures are a kind of short-term *output*, while the improvement of overall understanding and participation of the people regarding artistic activities, is a longer-term *outcome* (section 6-1).

Chapter 5. Contexts and the Wider Picture

Chapter 5 is logically linked to the earlier chapters. Firstly, as mentioned in Chapter 1, this thesis adopts the MDS design for a comparative study. In other words, it assumes that Korea and the U.K. have their own unique politico-administrative and socio-economic contexts and government structures; while they still have some similarities in their public sector reform policies. In this chapter, those differences and similarities are explored in order to evade ‘the danger of comparing apples and pears’ (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2003: 13).

Secondly, in order to analyse the detailed causes and consequences of public sector reform, it is essential to illustrate several macroscopic variables (Rhodes, 1997b: 3) which could affect these organisational forms within their wider political contexts.¹⁶⁵ In general terms, these descriptions might not be falsifiable (Popper, 1959: 86; Cook and Campbell, 1979: 20); but these make our understanding of public bodies more coherent (Gamble, 1990a: 405). The conjunction of mechanisms and contexts enable us to produce useful outcomes. To put it differently, a deeper understanding of complicated and diverse ‘reform language’ is possible solely by the study of contexts (Pollitt, 2003a: 152 and 2012: 44).¹⁶⁶ In this sense, this chapter provides not only the backgrounds for case studies, but also critical explanatory factors in terms of institutional constraints (sections 8-4 and 8-5).

Meanwhile, as discussed in Chapter 3 (footnote 48), the problem of culture could be discussed in relation to contexts. When it comes to a comparative study, structural, *cultural* and functional elements are important (Pollitt et al., 2004: 40). Yet in practice, ‘*culture*’ is reckoned to be difficult to grasp easily and to use a precise comparison. At the same time, *all* variables might be explained in terms of culture. Thus, the term culture will not be used below,¹⁶⁷ but the essential part of cultural elements, such as executive-legislative relations (*administrative* culture: Bouckaert, 2007: 31) and relationships between political executives and civil servants (*organisational* culture: Beuselinck et al., 2007: 85-89), will be dealt with in subsequent sections.

Thirdly, the broader picture of the public sector, which is analysed in Figures 2-1 and 2-3, is deployed in order to ascertain the locus where both countries’ AQ take place.

¹⁶⁵ See Chapters 6, 7 and 8.

¹⁶⁶ See also Chapter 4, and Lodge and Wegrich (2012b: 3)

¹⁶⁷ There are several criticisms about the ‘*culture makes all the difference*’ theory’ (Douglas, 1982: 185; Chang, 2007: 187-197; Landes, 2000: 2): firstly, it is not easy to clearly define cultures (footnote 48; Bauman, 1973: 1); secondly, broad cultural categories such as ‘Confucianism’ or ‘the Common Wealth’ are too crude to be analytically meaningful, and a country is too big a cultural unit to generalise; thirdly, culture is the result as well as the cause of public reform. Moreover, in some countries, culture changes far more quickly than the culturists assume (Appendix 2: footnote 14).

At the same time, this chapter is essential to the analyses of Chapters 6, 7 and 8, where the cases of both countries are profoundly examined. In particular, since the *argument 2 and 3 groups* mainly focus on *political actors, institutions and policy processes* (section 8-1-3), the role of the contexts which consistently influence them during the process of these comparative case studies, is crucial for their understanding.

5-1. Politico-administrative Systems in Korea and the U.K.¹⁶⁸

5-1-1. Executive-legislative relations

Each country has developed a specific system based on its circumstances. In general terms, the constitutional governance structures are divided into *presidential systems* and *parliamentary systems* regarding the relationships between the executive branch and the legislature branch (Lijphart, 1992: 1; Gallagher et al., 2011: 24-42).¹⁶⁹ Typical characteristics of parliamentarism and presidentialism, as shown in Table 5-1, are quite different. Since Korea and the U.K. employ the presidential and parliamentary system respectively, this elucidation gives a basic framework for an understanding of the background and the differences of the decision making process which could be the influential factors in public sector reform.

Table 5-1: Parliamentarism and presidentialism

Parliamentary government (the U.K.)	Presidential government (Korea)
The executive is divided into two parts: the head of the government (a prime minister or a chancellor ¹⁷⁰) and the head of state (a monarch or a president). The head of state appoints the head of government.	The head of the government is the head of state, who is elected by the people for a definite term.
The Prime Minister virtually nominates other ministers.	The president appoints heads of departments who are his subordinates.
The government is a collective body and the Prime Minister is merely <i>primus inter pares</i> .	The president is sole executive.
Most Ministers are members of one of the Houses of Parliament and there is a fusion of the executive and legislative powers.	Ministers are usually not members of the Assembly and there is no fusion of the executive and legislative branches.
The government is politically responsible to the Parliament but indirectly responsible to the electorate. ¹⁷¹	The executive branch is directly responsible to the electorate.

Source: adapted from Bagehot (1872); Kelsen (1949); Verney (1959 and 1992); Linz (1994); Riggs (1994); Lijphart (1994); Finer et al. (1995) and Helms (2005)

¹⁶⁸ For socio-economic contexts, see Appendix 2.

¹⁶⁹ There are several local variations such as a *semi-presidential* regime. See Duverger (1980: 166) and Elgie (1999: 5-13 and 2001a: 12).

¹⁷⁰ For example, see German case (Saalfeld, 2000: 51-60; Wollmann, 2000: 3-4; Schmidt, 2003: 26-40; Goetz, 2003: 18-19; Heun, 2011: 86-87).

¹⁷¹ In theory, the cabinet is dependent on 'the confidence of parliament', but in reality, the cabinet is supported by and composed of the members of majority party (Lijphart, 1999: 11-12); thus the cabinet has the dominant position.

Unlike a pure *presidential system* such as the U.S., Korea, however, has some parliamentary characteristics. It embraces, first of all, a prime minister rather than a vice president (Kim, 2011b: 134).¹⁷² The Prime Minister in Korea could direct all the ministries ‘under the order of the President’ (Constitution of the Republic of Korea, Article 86; Government Organisation Act (GOA), Article 16). Some other features, such as an allowance for a National Assembly member to be a minister and the right for the executive branch to introduce a bill, are also similar to parliamentarism. In addition to this, Korea adopts a *unicameral* National Assembly system, which makes decision-making in government less time-consuming. Moreover, unlike the U.S., Korea maintains a single-term five-year presidency which imposes significant restrictions on longer-term policy making (Ham, 2009: 223). For this reason, over the past few years, some commentators have argued that the presidential system should be changed for a dual executive system or a parliamentary system.¹⁷³

Meanwhile, the constitutional governance structures, alternatively, could be divided into the *consensus model* and the *Westminster model* (or *majoritarian model*) of Commonwealth countries (Lijphart, 1999: 9-47; Lane and Ersson, 2000: 215-220) *vis-à-vis* the ‘executives-parties dimension’ and the ‘federal-unitary dimension’ (Lijphart, 1999: 3-4). This explanation is useful for analysing the influence of actors such as interest groups (or pressure groups) and politicians in a political system. Both Korea and the U.K. fall into the *majoritarian* model in the light of ‘concentration of executive power in one-party and bare-majority cabinets’ (ibid: 10-11) with a few exceptions of coalition cabinet experiences.¹⁷⁴

The degree of a parliament’s influence on the policy of the cabinet In Britain, the cabinet is responsible to the Parliament ‘in a collective way’ (Judge, 1993: 141; Grant, 1994: 191; Elgie, 1995: 41) and theoretically the Parliament is supreme over the Cabinet. For example, the rejection of a major bill means insufficient confidence in the cabinet (Berlinski et al., 2012: 26). In addition, the Prime Minister is just ‘*primus inter pares*’. However, the power of the Prime Minister in the U.K. is so much more than ‘first among equals’ that some commentators argue that the British government is under an ‘elective dictatorship’ or a ‘command premiership’ (Hailsham, 1978: 127; Jenkins, 1995: 243; Wright,

¹⁷² In this regard, the Korean government is sometimes classified as a semi-presidential regime which means ‘a popularly elected fixed-term president exists alongside a prime minister and cabinet who are responsible to parliament’ (Elgie, 1999: 14). However, in Korea, unlike the dual executive system of France (Knapp and Wright, 2001: 82-86; Stevens, 2003: 69-71; Elgie 2003: 95-103), the power of the Prime Minister is relatively limited (NAoRoK, 2009: 26; Elgie, 2001b:11-15).

¹⁷³ For example, see Park (2004a), NAoRoK (2009), Hong (2010) and Jung (2011).

¹⁷⁴ This phenomenon is germane to the *two-party* system, in contrast to a cabinet of a *multiparty* system which is often a coalition government and in which power tends to be much less concentrated in one party (Müller and Størm, 2000: 1).

2003: 26; Heffernan and Webb, 2005: 28; Leyland, 2007: 117-118).¹⁷⁵ Meanwhile, in Korea, the President has a substantive right to nominate ministers, which might lead to a minister's complete loyalty to the President (Kim, 1994: 48; Cho, 1996: 88). Similarly, ministers in the U.K. are virtually chosen by the Prime Minister (Barberis, 2000: 21), but in most cases they are members of parliament who are directly elected (Leyland and Anthony, 2008: 24; Berlinski et al., 2012: 37).

In the Korean system, the National Assembly and the administration are separated from each other since the principle of '*division (rather than fusion) of power*' is in force (Finer, 1961: 693). Attacks on ministers from the National Assembly at the higher level can be easily seen; even the ruling party would often criticise ministers for political purposes (Oh, 2004: 173-177).

Legislative procedure There is, in the U.K., no single codified constitution (Leyland and Anthony, 2005: 17).¹⁷⁶ Constitutional values are set out in other constitutional sources such as statute laws and the common law (Barnett, 2002: 17; Leyland, 2007: 20-24). Whilst in most countries with a written constitution, any amendment of the constitution needs distinctive conditions for its approval, as compared to the usual legislation process, constitutional legislation in the U.K. has no special status and does not need any separate procedure (Wright, 2003: 24). Thus, if Whitehall and the Parliament agree with a specific reform, a constitutional radical change would be made relatively easily (Elgie, 1995: 28-29).¹⁷⁷ At the same time, as a member of the European Union, domestic constitutional subject matters are significantly affected by European laws (Wright, 2003: 25).¹⁷⁸ Since the U.K. had traditionally maintained a centralised government style, an analysis on its relationships with the EU or the devolution of regional government needed a new approach, such as multi-level governance (Bache and Flinders, 2004). In addition to this, as executive agencies are detached from their parent department, the role of central government has been so weakened and fragmented that the notion of '*hollowing out* of the state' has often been employed (Rhodes, 1994: 149; Pyper, 2011: 55).¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁵ However, in general terms, this situation tends to be preceded by particular conditions such as 'a huge majority' and 'a personal authority' (Wright, 2003: 58).

¹⁷⁶ Other examples which do not have a codified constitution are Israel and New Zealand (Wright, 2003: 17).

¹⁷⁷ For example, see the devolution of power to Scotland and Wales, and the removal of hereditary peers from the House of Lords (Rogers and Walters, 2006: 433; Parry, 2003: 102; Leach et al., 2011: chapter 16).

¹⁷⁸ To take a particular example, the Human Rights Act (1998) incorporated from the European Convention on Human Rights into British domestic law (Finlay, 2003: 138).

¹⁷⁹ Foster and Plowden use the 'hollow state' (1996; Gray 2000b: 294-295; Hogwood, 1997: 714) and Weller et al. adopt the 'hollow crown' (1997). However, Holiday argues that the evidence of this thesis is hard to find (2000: 175).

In Korea, the constitution stipulates the fundamental principles and roles concerning the President, the executive branch and the National Assembly. The requirements for an amendment of the constitution are quite difficult as compared to those for ordinary laws (Cho, 1996: 46);¹⁸⁰ thus a reform, in practice, could rarely include a modification of a constitutional matter. In addition, the GOA states the basic function and structure of each department. When the creation of new department or an exchange of functions between departments takes place, they become a matter for legislation beyond the *Presidential Decree* which evades the control of the National Assembly and is similar to the British statutory instrument (Page, 2001: 20 and 2012: 18-22; Cho, 1996: 49; Park, 2004c: 244-246; Leyland and Anthony, 2012: 88).¹⁸¹

In the U.K. system of government, the most important types of law are *public bills* which have a significant effect on the entire state, and these are introduced mainly by the cabinet and are called *Government Bills* (Parpworth, 2010: 206-212; Wilson, 1976: 183; Leyland 2007: 99-104). As with the British executive branch, the Korean government has the right to submit a bill; however, a member of the National Assembly (MNA) has more autonomy to propose it (Jung and Kim, 2005: 61; Seo and Park, 2009: 92). Besides which, British backbench MPs have been restricted in submitting legislation on their own initiative (Leyland, 2007: 104-105),¹⁸² while there is no regulation for MNAs of proposing bills in Korea, where the introduction of more bills is considered to be a sign of better personal performance (Moh, 2012a).¹⁸³ In some instances, as the Korean cabinet wants to evade any time-consuming process and the whole associated rigmarole, or even to hide its real intention to submit one, a bill might be introduced in disguise in the name of its legislators (Seo and Park, 2009: 108). When the ruling party is the majority party, relatively speaking, a bill submitted by the cabinet does not matter either in Korea or the U.K. Under a presidential system however the ruling party often loses its majority, which creates a *divided government* where the president and the ruling party of the parliament is under the control of a different party (Jang, 2001: 11).¹⁸⁴ In Korea, the *Standing Committees* for a specific field has a particular importance as the

¹⁸⁰ It requires a national referendum (Constitution of the Republic of Korea, Article 130).

¹⁸¹ By contrast, a change in the machinery of government in the U.K. is possible through a *Written Statement* by the Prime Minister (Leyland, 2007: 126-127). For example, see Prime Minister's Office statement on Office of Government Commerce in 15th, Jun, 2010.

¹⁸² Without doubt, the U.K. as with the U.S. is one of the most pluralist states and its interest groups are influential (Lijphart, 1999: 177). However, the leverage of British interest groups on individual legislators has been rather limited (Etheridge and Handelman, 2008: 361) and circuitous (Peters, 1998b: 79). Moreover, Smith argues that the notion of Whitehall pluralism is somewhat uncertain (1995:21-23).

¹⁸³ From 2008(May) to 2012(May), on average, 3,478 bills are annually submitted to the Korean National Assembly (Moh, 2012a). By contrast, in the U.K. during session 2009-10, 113 bills were put before the Parliament but only 36 bills have been granted Royal assent to become law (www.parliament.uk, 2012).

¹⁸⁴ In general terms, a presidential system separates the executive from the assembly and has multiple veto points which make any new legislation comparatively difficult. By contrast, theoretically, in a classic parliamentary model, if the opposition comes to power, it could immediately reinstate the previous state (Moe and Caldwell, 1994: 177; Lim, 2002: 209; Jang, 2002: 110; Park, 2007a: 73-74). For this reason, Wright argues that the 'British system of alternating strong governments' has had a problem of policy discontinuity (2003: 61).

first gate to the legislation (Lee, 2002a: 382).¹⁸⁵ Even when the ruling party keeps its majority, the situation of the Standing Committees is often the other way round, which leads to a failure in passing the first stage (Ga, 2009: 90-92). Furthermore, owing to intrinsic constraints such as time and political capacity, bills which are emphasised in the current government frequently have difficulties in a plenary session.¹⁸⁶

Stability of a policy Once elected, the Korean president can establish a settled regime for five years unless he or she is impeached. Yet if we look more closely, there are some distinct features to be seen throughout these five years: firstly, as the constitution denies anyone from serving consecutive terms as president, he or she is tormented by being a lame duck at the end of the term (Lee, 2011a: 64-65; Appendix 32). During the period just before the presidential inauguration,¹⁸⁷ the power of the next president is strongest and thus allows him or her to implement any contested policy such as the reduction in civil service posts and the merging of departments. However, in the later stages of the regime, policies once considered stable often fall into a precarious state.

Secondly, in Korea *both* the president and most members of the National Assembly are directly elected by the people, so they are both regarded as having legitimacy (Kang, 2002: 77). However, a more recently elected person might be seen to have a more recently granted legitimacy and be considered to be a closer reflection of public opinion at the time.¹⁸⁸ Thus, even though being a member of the same party, a recently elected member may not be willing to listen to the president and this is likely to create another kind of ‘*blame game*’ (Hood, 2011a: 18) between them.

5-1-2. Civil service system

The scope and the structure of the civil service The scope and the number of civil servants tend to be issues of high priority in public sector reform; and AQ are often interpreted in this vein. However, given that each country adopts a

¹⁸⁵ In the U.S., the terms ‘*iron triangle*’ or ‘*sub-governments*’ have been traditionally used to explain the relationships among interest groups, government departments and congressional committees (Yishai, 1992: 92; Sabatier et al., 1999: 119; Birkland, 2001: 94-98). Although, the heads of congressional committees have lost much of their power, in a particular sector, they are still influential, especially when they are connected to a policy community or to issue networks (Hecl, 1978: 102; Richardson and Jordan, 1979: 74; Richards and Smith, 2002: 21-24; Hague and Harrop, 2010: 233-234). In addition, the procedural aspects of the committees in the presidential system are not negligible.

¹⁸⁶ Only 54.7 per cent among submitted bills had been reviewed for four years (2008 - 2012); however, the rates of the review on government bills (77.6%) are higher than on legislator’s bills (Moh, 2012a: footnote 17).

¹⁸⁷ After a presidential election, the *Presidential Transition Committee (PTC)* has been in operation for 67 or 68 days by the time of the inauguration. Unlike the U.K. (Brazier, 1997: 45; Richards, 2008: 73), there is no shadow cabinet within the Korean opposition party; thus the role of this committee is relatively important (MoGAHA, 2007b: 7, 69).


¹⁸⁸ One of the explanations offered regarding this phenomenon is about the different term of office from the president. A member of the National Assembly can be in office for four years without limitations in their re-election (Kim, 2007a: 155; Ryu, 2011: 97-98). In Korea, therefore, a revolt of backbench legislators frequently takes place.

different notion and the coverage of civil servants, a comparative study using the term civil servants requires great caution (Farnham et al., 2005: 56-57; Massey, 2011: 3-4). Although there are detailed differences in the scope of the civil service in both countries, major addressable issues are as follows:

Firstly, in contrast to the U.K. (Tomlin Commission (1931) and the Priestley Commission (1955) quoted in CSD, 1970:11; Pyper, 1995: 1), the employees of the judicial branch and the legislative branch in Korea are traditionally included within the civil service. Few Koreans doubt that their staff should be considered to be in the same category as the executive branch (Kim, 2006a: 60). Despite the strict separation of powers, principles of personnel management such as pay and other benefits are applied in the same way. Without consideration of this aspect, the first step to compare the size of Korean and British civil servants would be problematic.¹⁸⁹

Secondly, in Korea, a *Minister* who is the head of a ministerial department and a *Vice-minister* are included in the civil service category (Kim, 2010a: 459; Kim, 2006a: 101), while in the U.K., holders of political offices such as the *Secretary of State* and junior ministers are not in the civil service (Pyper, 1995: 1). As of 2010 (November) in the U.K., the total number of ministers was 122, 23 of whom were Cabinet ministers and 99 of whom were junior ministers (HC 530, 2011: ev61; Berlinski, 2012: 30-32); while the number of Ministerial and Vice-ministerial posts in Korea are 28 and 92 respectively (MoPAS, 2010c).

Figure 5-1: Comparisons of numbers in the civil service (central government)



* The data are FTE (full time equivalent) figures and include teachers, police, the *Korea Post* and senior civil service; however, these exclude civil servants of local government, the judicial branch, the legislative branch and the military service.

** The data exclude the Northern Ireland civil service, but include the employees of the security and intelligence services, and Jobcentre Plus (See Figure 5-2).


Source: Compiled from data in Civil service statistics 1970 – 2009 (CSD, 1970-81; Treasury, 1982-94; GSS, 1995-2000; Cabinet Office, 2001-03 and ONS, 2006-09), Civil Service Annual Report (2004-2005), Public sector employment 2005 - 2011 Q4 (ONS), MoPAS 2010, MoPAS 2012(<https://org.mopas.go.kr/>), and Statistics Korea 2012 (www.index.go.kr).

¹⁸⁹ For example, see Kim (2006a: 80).

Thirdly, employees of local government in Korea are regarded as civil servants. Before the profound change in the autonomy of local government in 1995, local authorities, including the head of local government, had been directly managed by the central government. Owing to this administrative tradition in Korea, in contrast to the U.K. (Burnham and Pyper, 2008: 205), inter-governmental staff transfers are taken for granted.¹⁹⁰ Figure 5-1 shows the changes in the number of both countries' civil servants, excluding local authorities.¹⁹¹ Since 1992, the number of national Korean civil servants has outnumbered that of British civil servants.


Fourthly, as shown in Figure 5-2, the most influential constituents of the Korean civil service are the police and education authorities (around 75%). In addition, unlike the U.K. (Hood, 1979a: 16), *the Korea Post* (post office) is directly operated by the state. On the country, British local government, the police authorities, health and education services, in contrast to other European civil service systems, are not classified as a part of the civil service (OECD, 2010: 31). If the police and education authorities are set aside in the Korean civil service, then the size of the civil service is less than half that of the British civil service.

Figure 5-2: Functions and number of the civil service
(a) Korea(2011)



Source: Compiled from data in MoPAS 2012(<https://org.mopas.go.kr>)

(b) U.K.(2011)*



Source: Compiled from data in Public sector employment (ONS, 2011 Q4)


* The data are FTE figures and exclude the Northern Ireland civil service

¹⁹⁰ In 2009, there were 150 official transfers between national and local careers (MoPAS, 2010d: 45).

¹⁹¹ See also Burnham and Horton (2013: 18-19).

The gap in these figures also emanated from a variety of factors. In contrast to Korea, the Security and Intelligence Services such as MI5, MI6 and GCHQ are included in official government statistics (Dunleavy, 1990: 117; Seo, 2005: 148; ONS, 2011).¹⁹² In addition to this statistical difference, the functions of governmental bodies have a significant influence on their size and structure. Considerably more civil servants in the U.K. are in charge of the task of *employment support and unemployment benefits* than those in Korea (MoPAS, 2009e). Owing to its hugely important functions and size, in practice, Jobcentre Plus in the U.K. has brought about many publicly debated issues and policies (Burnham and Pyper, 2008: 153-154, 216),¹⁹³ while comparatively speaking, the Korean Employment Centre has not come to the fore.¹⁹⁴ It is also worth noticing that the number of employees in HM Revenue and Customs in the U.K. are almost three times larger than the sum of the Korean National Tax Service and the Customs Service.¹⁹⁵

Figure 5-3: Hierarchical structure of the civil service



Source: Data from MoPAS Statistics 2011

Source: Data from Public sector employment 2011 Q4

* The data exclude police and education authorities

Finally, in terms of the hierarchical structures of the civil service, as shown in Figure 5-3, the ratio of the senior management level (Grade 5 and above) in Korea is 13.7 per cent, while the equivalent level in the U.K. is 8.3 per cent (Grade 7 and above; see Page, 2003: 653 and Page and Jenkins, 2005:

¹⁹² Statistically and legally, military careers and the National Intelligence Service (NIS) are not categorised as part of the civil service in Korea.

¹⁹³ For example, see Domokos (2011).

¹⁹⁴ As of 2009 (March), only 2,795 Korean civil servants were working in the *Employment Support Center*.

¹⁹⁵ It is partly because of 'the working family tax credits' introduced during the New Labour government, despite the merger between HM Customs & Excise and the Inland Revenue in 2005 which led to saving about 3,000 posts (Burnham and Pyper, 2008: 21).

19).¹⁹⁶ This is mainly because the British central government has more front-line delivery units and executive tasks such as employment support and collecting taxes; thus, for a detailed analysis, the cases of each individual body need to be carefully explored and compared.

The relationships between ministers and the civil service One of the most differential features of the two countries is the top structure of the ministerial departments.¹⁹⁷ Ministerial posts within one department in the U.K. are on average four or five (Greenwood et al., 2002: 72),¹⁹⁸ whereas a Korean department has only one Minister.¹⁹⁹ In addition, each British department has one Permanent Secretary (Norton, 2010: 406-410) who is the topmost British civil servant position within the department (Barberis, 1996: xv; Rhodes, 2011b); whilst in Korea several big departments have two *vice-ministers* and others have only one,²⁰⁰ most of whom are appointed from among the members of the Senior Civil Service.²⁰¹ In some instances, a Korean *Vice Minister* might carry out a similar role to that of junior ministers in the U.K. where a minister delegates the power to make decisions; however in general terms, they play only a complementary role to the minister (Cho, 1996: 168). In this regard, the role of a Korean *Vice Minister* is closer to that of a *Permanent Secretary* in the U.K.²⁰² In addition, departmental tasks of the British government are allocated and at the same time concentrated on the collective ministerial team; while a Korean Minister has exclusive power to make any important decision. Meanwhile, both of the two countries adopt the non-ministerial department (NMD) system.²⁰³ In the U.K., the head of the NMD is not a politician and enjoys considerable autonomy, whilst the head of the Korean NMD is a part of the *Political Service*²⁰⁴ and (Kim, 2006a: 101) might be loosely overseen by a relevant Minister when creating important policies (GOA 2013, Article 7).

¹⁹⁶ At the same time, salaries for top civil servants in Korea are much smaller than those not only in European countries but also in some Asian countries such as Japan and Hong Kong (Hood et al., 1994: 27 and 2003: 24; Brans et al., 2012: 12-13).

¹⁹⁷ Dowding and Dumont suggest three important factors with regard to the selection of ministers: constitutional constraints; party political constraints; and strategic issues (2009: 5-15). The issue dealt with in this section is mainly about constitutional constraints. For more on this, see Bouckaert and Peters (2004: 30).

¹⁹⁸ Typically, these include one Secretary of State, and two or three junior ministers (*minister of state* and *parliamentary under-secretaries of state*) (Theakston, 1987: 43; Greenwood et al., 2002: 72-73).

¹⁹⁹ As of 2012 (October), there are 16 Ministers within the State Council where major policy issues, including legislation, are dealt with (Constitution, Article 89). Other Ministerial posts (12) are mainly the heads of standing executive committees such as the *Labour Relations Commission* (Labour Relations Commission Act).

²⁰⁰ Among 16 ministries, seven of them have two Vice Ministers.

²⁰¹ During the period from 1993 to 2003 almost 80% of Vice Ministers were appointed among civil servants (Min, 2003: 245).

²⁰² However, Korean *Vice Minister* posts fall into the Political Service, thus unlike a British permanent secretary (Rhodes, 2011: 56), their posts are influenced by the change of a major party.

²⁰³ As of 2012, there are 18 *Cheongs* (most of them called Agency, Office or Administration) which are equivalent to British 21 NMDs (MoPAS, 2010a; Cabinet Office, 2012c).


²⁰⁴ The head of a *Cheong* is considered to be of the vice-ministerial class.

With these characteristics at the highest level in mind, the relationships between ministers and civil servants could be examined as follows:


Firstly, the previous or present career of a minister has an effect on the relationships between that minister and the civil servants. Since most British ministers are appointed from among the MPs of a major party or a Coalition,²⁰⁵ the use of multifarious human resources might be limited (Wright, 2003: 85) as compared to Korea.²⁰⁶ Ministers in Korea are selected from various sources such as the civil service, academia and the legal professions, as shown in Figure 5-4.²⁰⁷ Especially, around a third of those are previous bureaucrats.²⁰⁸ Korean ministers, who come from among government officials, know well about the situation inside the department, which might enable them to communicate smoothly with their subordinates. At the same time, these ministers often tend to be relatively insensitive to the reform pressures of political circles (Ahn, 2001a:33).

Figure 5-4: Previous careers and terms of office of ministers

(a) Previous careers of Ministers in Korea (1993-2003)



(b) Average ministerial tenure in months (1979-2010, three departments)



²⁰⁵ As of 2010 (November), 98 of the 122 ministers sit in the House of Commons and the number of MPs of the Coalition government is 362 (Jones et al., 2010: A7; Yong, 2012: 27); thus 26.9% of major parties' MPs are appointed as ministers (Yong, 2012: 42; Waller, 2012: 72).

²⁰⁶ In the Labour party, an incoming Prime Minister has traditionally chosen existing shadow ministers as new cabinet members, while this tendency is weaker with the Conservatives; thus all government posts have been announced within several days of the outset of government (Berlinski et al., 2009: 60-65; Hazell and Yong, 2012: 233). In addition, it could be said that one of the most important criteria for a new minister is loyalty to the party (Wright, 2003: 86). Meanwhile, in Korea, another important criterion is integrity in that appointment of a new minister is confirmed through an official *hearing* and with strict scrutiny of the National Assembly, especially by the opposition parties.

²⁰⁷ Appointment criteria for ministers in Korea are reputation, patronage, coalition, regional representation and performance and retention of the same viewpoint regarding specific policies; and their appointments are decided through the leadership of the President (Min, 2006: 62; Min and Lee, 2007: 34-36). Unlike France (Stevens, 2003: 110), ministers appointed from the National Assembly can maintain their membership.

²⁰⁸ Other countries, where the ratio of having previous occupations as civil servants prior to becoming ministers is high, are the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway and France (Thiebault, 1991: 27).

Secondly, the length of a ministerial term of office makes a difference in the relationship between a minister and the mandarins. In Korea, the tenure of a minister is shorter than that of a British minister (Lee, 2002b: 530; Lee and Min, 2010: 50; Sedgemore, 1980: 80; Berlinski et al., 2009: 64-69). The second chart of Figure 5-4 analyses and compares the case of three comparable departments.²⁰⁹ The Korean ministerial term in these three departments is on average a third of the British case. Despite the long span of ministers in office as compared to Korea, British governments have still been accused of having their quick ministerial turnover (Cleary and Reeves, 2009: 4; Berlinski et al., 2007: 258).²¹⁰ In this connection, continuity of a policy is often in question (Lee and Min, 2002: 60).²¹¹ For example, a minister might pursue headline-grabbing but ill-considered issues without co-operation with other ministers and use ministerial posts as stepping stones to build up a great reputation in the short-term (Headey, 1974: 99; Riddell, 1993: 210; Ahn, 2001a: 41);²¹² and thus this might lead to destructive departmentalism. Ironically, some ministers might evade certain thorny problems in order to extend their tenure (Cleary and Reeves, 2009: 5-6). At the same time in Korea, senior civil servants at the highest level, whose future depends on their current regime, might seek complacency or politicisation for longer-term survival (Ahn, 2001b: 17-19), whilst in the U.K., owing to the concern about the mandarins of Whitehall who tend to stay in their departments longer, the short length of ministerial tenure has raised the issue of accountability (Cleary and Reeves, 2009: 7-8).²¹³

Thirdly, the most striking feature of the relationships between ministers and civil servants in the Whitehall model involve the issue of accountability. Traditionally, in the U.K., civil servants are responsible to departmental superiors and ministers but not to Parliament and the public, which allows mandarins to remain 'faceless'; while ministers are accountable to Parliament (Pilkington, 1999: 46-48; Burnham and Pyper, 2008: 39-40).²¹⁴ This tradition,

²⁰⁹ In Korea, from 1948 to 2002, a total of 649 ministers were appointed (Lee and Min, 2002: 60-61), while in the U.K., there were only a total of 226 cabinet ministers during the period from 1945 to 1997 (excluding 1,021 junior ministers) (Berlinski et al., 2007: 250-252). However, over time, each regime in both countries has had distinctive features such as the experience of the military regime and changes in the number of departments; moreover, the characteristics of individual departments have also been quite different. In this regard, any comparison of the total average of ministerial tenure in both countries from 1945 to 1997 might be somewhat pointless.

²¹⁰ However, according to Blondel (1985: 85-89), Bakema (1991: 75), Frogner (1991: 123) and Lijphart (1984: 269), the average duration of British ministers in office (from 1945 to 1984) is near the middle among Western Europe countries.

²¹¹ On the contrary, Alderman advocates a rapid turnover in order to maintain 'the right balance of ability, experience and representation' of various opinions (1995: 508).

²¹² Headey argues that the relationships between ministers and their officials depend on the personal characteristics and the roles of ministers (1975: 66-82).

²¹³ In Korea, however, there is an empirical study showing that short ministerial tenure did not influence departmental policies such as the budget and other bills (Kim, 2001: 25-26).

²¹⁴ However, this model is criticised for not reflecting reality. Civil servants, in practice, could not remain faceless in that they might sometimes be individually dismissed owing to policy failure; and moreover, ministers often tend not to be influenced by the faults of their subordinates (Burnham and Pyper, 2008: 39-40).

however, has changed over several decades and accountability has continuously been a central issue as compared with Korea. There are several reasons for this trend. First of all, the traditional notion of civil servants in the U.K. has been relatively closer to that of the Weberian idea which considers civil servants as neutral instruments of delivery (Weber, 1978: 351-352; Page, 1985: 16; Campbell and Wilson, 1995: 17; Greenwood, 2000: 63; Allen, 2004: 148; Rouban, 2007: 207; Barberis, 2011: 15-17). In this context, some commentators believe that the 'incorrupt and esteemed' British civil service could still be retained as a reliable apparatus (Tonge, 1999: 89; Putnam, 1975: 116-117; Dunleavy, 2006: 326). On the contrary, some people raise a question about the credibility of bureaucrats and thus the need for a new structure of accountability. In the second place, the accountability debate is germane to British constitutional convention. As with many other liberal democracies, the U.K. adopts a *merit system* other than a *spoils* or *patronage system* and the principle that civil servants should not be influenced by the incoming government tends to be maintained relatively well. For this reason, there is an argument that the *de facto* ruling class of the state is the mandarins (Kellner et al., 1980: 19). Furthermore, the lack of a formalised statute about accountability makes its issue more complicated (Barberis, 1996: 19); while in countries using the continental legal system where a formal rule regarding accountability is established, this might not be listed among the key issues. Meanwhile, in Korea, civil servants cannot be anonymous. For example, it is quite natural for civil servants to appear and debate on TV using their real names. This is partly because the number of ministers and vice-ministers is much smaller than that in the U.K. In addition to this, legally speaking, civil servants are able to attend and answer questions not only about financial but also general issues at the National Assembly.

Finally, in the U.K., the role of special advisers to the Prime Minister and ministers are relatively important (Kavanagh et al., 1999: 346-356; Waller, 2012: 79-80), while in Korea their role is somewhat restricted. The role of ministerial advisers in Korea is mainly concerned with communications between the departments and the National assembly.²¹⁵

The emphasis on generalists The U.K. government has traditionally placed more emphasis on the role of generalists or 'all-rounders' than specialists (Mackenzie and Grove, 1957: 59; Ridley, 1968: 14; Fry, 1985: 10-12; Drewry and Butcher, 1991: 46; Barnett, 2002: 101). Unlike the specialists who stay longer in one specific position, generalists periodically followed their career pathways up departmental ladders. Especially, Fast Streamers who are

²¹⁵ As of 2010, the number of special advisers in Korea was 33 (politician 18, policy experts and others 15: MoPAS, 2010d), while in the U.K., their total number was 68 (No.10, 22 and departments, 46: Gay, 2010:13).

recruited as a senior class move through different departments up the career ladder route (Rhodes, 2011b; 117-119; Page and Jenkins, 2005: 39-40). Meanwhile, the Korean civil service shows a different type of generalist practice. Firstly, most civil servants are obliged to work within one department. Although inter-departmental staff transfers and temporary secondment to other ministries sometimes occurs, most officials stay within a particular department.²¹⁶ Secondly, the generalist principle applies to all career civil servants, including middle and lower level officials. Most civil servants are recruited at the same time through a *national open competitive entrance examination*,²¹⁷ thus when a specific post becomes vacant, it will mostly be filled by a person within the department (Kim, 2006a: 120). Thirdly, the generalist principle applies also to the transfer between the parent department and the executive agencies. In other words, a civil servant who works in a parent department could move into its affiliated institutions and return after a year of work (section 7-2).

Norms and attitudes of civil servants The norms of the civil service have a significant influence over the general behaviour patterns of bureaucrats. In the U.K., since the introduction of open competition in 1870, among the key norms traditionally regarded as essential are secrecy, restrictions on non-official business and avoidance of political activities (Kelsall, 1955, 59; Gladden, 1967: 150-166; Jones, 1975: 55; Denman, 2002: 247). Until the Civil Service Management Code of 1996²¹⁸ introduced official standards (Barberis, 1998: 111; Gay, 2006: 3; O'Toole, 2006: 162), unwritten and informal rules governed the moral standards of the civil service (Theakston, 1995: 180-181). However, in 2010 a statutory basis for the management of the civil service was articulated in the *Constitutional Reform and Governance Act* (CRGA) (Parry, 2011: 348). According to this act, civil servants must conduct their duties with integrity, honesty, objectivity and impartiality.²¹⁹ Meanwhile in Korea since 1949, the *National Civil Service Act* (NCSA) and its delegated legislation stipulate the rules of the civil service such as obedience to line superiors, impartiality, secrecy, integrity and the prohibition of political (NCSA 1949: Part 4). As compared with the U.K., three legal principles are distinctive.

²¹⁶ As far as the open competitive position system is concerned, 20 per cent of the *Senior Civil Service* (SCS) posts are open to applicants from the private sector or other departments (Kim, 2006a: 132; footnote 467).


²¹⁷ In 2009, in total 4,084 posts were recruited (excluding 17,305 police and teachers) in the Korean central government and among them 3,291 posts were filled through open-competitive entrance examination (347 posts for 5th grade, 600 for 7th grade, 2,344 for 9th grade) (MoPAS, 2010e). Meanwhile, in 2009, 629 candidates acquired Fast Stream posts in the U.K. (Cabinet Office, 2013: 21).

²¹⁸ Before this Code, there was the *Armstrong memorandum* (Cabinet Office, 1996: 113; Daintith and Page 1999: 95), but it focused on 'internal lines of accountability' to a minister rather than the public (Pyper, 1995: 154-155).

²¹⁹ By contrast, special advisers could perform their duties without objectivity or impartiality (CRGA 2010: section 8); while in Korea ministerial advisers should follow the same rules as others in the civil service.

Firstly, as with the case of Singapore, officials above grade 4 should declare all their property annually (Kim, 2006a: 331-339). Secondly, former civil servants whose inside information might be sought by private companies²²⁰ should not seek new careers related to their previous job for two years (Act on the Ethics of the Civil Service). This might prevent the ‘revolving door’ syndrome (Pyper, 1995: 87-88), but it has often been criticised for violating the freedom of job selection and for obstructing a healthy exchange of human resources between the private and the public sector. Thirdly, as with the U.K. (Drewry and Butcher, 1991: 191-192; Burnham and Pyper, 2008: 75), a collective action by civil servants is very restricted in Korea,²²¹ and even more, the trade union of civil servants cannot join those of the private sector such as the TUC (Trade Union Congress) in the U.K.

Figure 5-5: Types of politicisation in the civil service: political control or bureaucrats’ involvement²²²



Source: prepared by the author

Politicisation also makes a difference in civil servants’ ethics in both countries. As shown in Figure 5-5, in order to avoid the danger of using a vague notion, two dimensions of politicisation could be explored in advance (Sausman and Locke, 2004: 102; Peters and Pierre, 2004: 2-9).²²³ Firstly, one dimension of politicisation (Type I) is an increase in political control over the bureaucracy (Hojnacki, 1996: 140; Rouban, 2007: 202). At the basic level of this dimension, it includes the selection and promotion of partisan loyalists in the civil service or the appointment of outsiders (Woodhouse, 2013: 82).²²⁴ Unlike the U.S. government (Gallagher et al., 2011: 170; Page, 2012: 7), Korea and the U.K. have not adopted a highly politicised system of appointments for

²²⁰ For example, these include regulation, tax collection, accreditation and surveillance.

²²¹ In Korea, not till 2006 did the trade union of civil servants gain legal status.

²²² See also Figure 3-4. Interestingly, in the academic researches, depoliticisation, until now, is not a precise opposite word for politicisation.

²²³ As with other complex concepts, that of politicisation has expanded over time (Rouban, 2007: 199; Greenwood, 2000: 73).

²²⁴ This also includes the change of performance criteria for the selection and promotion into politically favoured criteria.

senior bureaucrats (Sausman and Locke, 2004: 102).²²⁵ However, during the Thatcher years many top civil servants left office through politicisation or personalisation (Page, 1985: 20; Richards, 1997: 91, 159; Pilkington, 1999: 50; Rhodes, 1997b: 90-91; Tonge, 1999: 90) and in Korea at times, the movement of senior civil servants to less important posts has been accused of being under the influence of a leading politician. Moreover, in both countries a large number of partisan loyalists are parachuted into posts in ALBs (Skelcher, 1998a: 2). The next stage of politicisation in liberal democracies happens when politicians take control over policy-making and implementation. Career civil servants are professional and neutral, but are often considered as not being politically responsive to their political leadership (Hojnacki, 1996: 137; Plowden, 1998: 93). In this regard, special advisers and a policy unit have played a significant role in policy making in the U.K. (Greenwood, 2000: 65-66), while in Korea, the *Office of President* and its senior secretaries have conducted similar roles. At the last phase, politicisation could be the politician's efforts to provoke a change in attitude and structure of the civil service in favour of them (Peters and Pierre, 2004: 5-6; Rouban, 2007: 204; van der Meer et al., 2007: 42). In a similar vein, increasingly civil servants in the U.K. have been named and blamed despite the previous Whitehall tradition of facelessness (Theakston, 2000: 47-52; Greenwood, 2000: 70; Osborne, 2007: 134-137; Savoie, 2013: 136).

The second dimension of politicisation (Type II) is that civil servants tend to become involved in areas which have formerly been regarded as 'political' (Brunsson, 2009: 81). However, the meaning of 'political' is too diverse (Hay, 2007: 61), so that politicisation type II, taken as a whole, might be interpreted in a more detailed way such as preference, participation, and the pursuit of particular interests. Although civil servants of both countries are, in some degree, political in that they should make draft parliamentary speeches and replies to parliamentary questions (Campbell and Wilson, 1995: 22), at some point the activities of civil servants might stray outside the boundary of neutrality thus not allowing a bureaucrat to give honest advice (Landers, 1999: 124).²²⁶ Meanwhile, preference to a particular party or policy in liberal democracies usually results from the reaction to politicisation type I; and thus type II could also be explained in accordance with the norms of both countries as pointed out above.

²²⁵ Since every country has some level of political involvement in personnel matters (Greenwood, 2000: 70), the notion of politicisation varies in the extent to which the public of any specific country will accept.

²²⁶ In some countries such as France, civil servants could be an influential political force, because they account for almost one-third of the voters (if their family are included) (Rouban, 2007: 200-206). Meanwhile, Hojnacki argues that to pursue particular interests against public values is a kind of politicisation (1996: 140). The consequences of politicisation type II are unfairness, inefficiency and the impairment of accountability (Peters and Pierre, 2004: 8-9).

5-1-3. Methods for organisation management and government efficiency

When it comes to explaining the organisation structure and public sector reforms of both countries, an analysis of the managerial system of the civil service is critical.

Centralised management of organisation and personnel administration

Organisational management is, in general terms, considered to be the essential part of a constitutional system.

Korea is characterised by a *centralised* management, so that each ministry, with few exceptions, needs the approval of the MoSPA for almost all organisational changes - even when they require an increase in just one post. The reason for the centralised management in Korea is as follows:

Firstly, open competition in the recruitment of bureaucrats has a very long tradition in Korea since the first state examination conducted in 958 (Ha, 1993: 73; MoGAHA, 1998: 35-36; Woo-Cumings, 1995: 436; Chang, 2007: 190-191), and therefore objectivity and consistency in recruiting bureaucrats has particular significance in the minds of most Koreans. In this context, annual *national open-competitive examinations* for grades 5, 7 and 9 have been carried out respectively with objective principles equally applied to all applicants, taking care to eliminate prejudice and corruption. In order to maintain this nationwide standardised recruitment, having central control over its procedure is inevitable (Fry, 1995: 139). This concurrent way of recruitment, moreover, is in accordance with the generalist tradition.²²⁷ Meanwhile, in the U.K., not to mention personnel management power, even pay and conditions related to pay, were delegated to individual departments from 1996 (Horton, 1996: 108-109; Burnham and Pyper, 2008: 216).

Secondly, Korea, as with Germany and Japan, has the *continental legal system*, and has a tradition of emphasising '*Rechtsstaat*' (Horton, 2011: 43; Akizuki, 2010: 205). Once recruited by law, civil servants are expected to stay in their jobs until retirement, which is secured by '*the career civil servants*' provision in the Constitution (Article 7) and the NCSA (Article 2).²²⁸ Thus, consistent and centralised control measures regarding managerial skills and ethics for public servants are important in order to implement public policies in a fair and impartial way.

²²⁷ When, therefore, there are vacant posts, most of them will be filled by other staff within a department rather than by recruitment of new blood from outside.

²²⁸ Meanwhile, in the U.K. the tradition of '*jobs for life*' (Kelsall, 1955: 178; Gladden, 1967: 41-42) or a *career bureaucracy* within which 'an official can expect to have the possibility of reaching the most senior positions within it' (Mosher, 1982: 151-156; Ridley, 1983: 179; Page, 1985: 15) is considered to have gradually abolished (Greer, 1994: 102; Barberis, 1997: 3; Ridley, 2000: 31) and greater flexibility has been favored (Horton et al., 2000: 317). For example, in 1993, half of the Fast Streamers left the office by the age of 40 and in 2004-5, 375 members of the Senior Civil Service left the civil service, of whom 234 were forced or encouraged to leave (Barlow et al., 1996: 107).

Thirdly, Korea has a generally strong presidential system of government; and in contrast to the U.S. it has not adopted a federal system. Thus, in government management, quick, effective and centralised reaction is preferred to mediation in different areas of sub-national government.

Fourthly, as with Germany and Japan, most Korean civil servants of the central government have to receive the same training after recruitment; and *standardisation* of the process is important in order to secure recruitment and promotion by merit and to develop a consistent level of competence of the staff.

Finally, even though the organisation management is closely linked to personnel and budget systems, unlike many other western countries, Korea has not adopted a *total running costs system* (lump budget system). Instead, it operates a system that emphasises tighter control rather than providing autonomy within a total budget (Lee et al., 2012); it merely adopts a limited level of the *Total Payroll Costs* system (footnote 492). However, since the payroll is a part of running expense (regular expenditure), the autonomy of each organisation is attainable only when the full-scale *total running costs* system is adopted (OECD, 1997). Meanwhile, the U.K has a *running cost* system (Seo, 2005: 455; Parry, 2011: 357) which was introduced when the previous *staffing ceiling* was abolished in 1991 (Thain and Wright, 1995: 381-383; Garrett, 1980: 118, 148; Chapman, 1997a: 88-89; Horton, 1999: 152). Under the running cost system, each ministry has autonomy to manage all expenses, including payrolls, within the limit of the total budget.


In reality, each state has *sui generis staff organisations* or *ministries* such as personnel and budget units or departments to provide 'uniform professional practices' across the government (Peters, 2010: 144);²²⁹ but, in comparison with other countries, the U.K has a relatively weak co-ordination system and most budget conflicts are decided by the Treasury (Self, 1972: 128). At the same time, the concept of *core executive*, which includes the Prime Minister, the Treasury and the Cabinet Office,²³⁰ has been used to explain the complex web of networks within Whitehall (Dunleavy and Rhodes, 1990: 3; Barberis, 2000: 32; Turpin et al., 2007: 397-398). The relationships among departments in the U.K. tend to be decided by the personalities of the prime ministers and the specific context at the time (Dunleavy, 1990: 102-110; Weller, 1991: 143 and 2003: 719-720), but in general terms, departmental relationships in Korea is more horizontal as compared to the U.K. when considering the power of the Treasury (Hennessy 2000: 477-481; Heffernan, 2003: 360).

²²⁹ Central management of *the civil service* in the U.K., relatively weak though it might be, has been conducted by the Treasury and the Cabinet Office (Fry, 1985: 72-73; Drewry and Butcher, 1991: 93; Burnham and Pyper, 2008: 9).

²³⁰ Other co-ordinating departments such as the law officers and the intelligence services might be included in core executive, according to an argument which emphasises a 'network approach' (Rhodes, 1995: 12; Smith, 1993; Burch and Holliday, 1996: 2 and 2004: 20).

Government efficiency One of the most significant triggers of government reform, restructuring and reduction in the size of government is an increase in government efficiency. The evaluation of that, however, is relatively difficult (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011: 140), so that the world competitiveness index of the International Institute for Management Development (IMD) has often been used to compare the level of government efficiency among different countries (Wilks, 2013: 162; KCTI, 2010b: 40-41). According to this index, the competitiveness of a country depends on sub-indices such as economic performance, government efficiency, business efficiency and infrastructure (IMD, 2011).²³¹ As shown in Figure 5-6, the overall competitiveness ranking of Korea is on an increasing trend, while that of the U.K is remaining at around 20th and, by and large, being higher than Korea. At the same time, the rankings of both countries' government efficiency²³² level have on the whole shown a lower level than their overall rankings. If we take a closer look at it, the components of the government efficiency index of 2010 reveal a sharp contrast in *adaptability of the government policy* (Korea 12th, UK 38th) and *labour market flexibility* (Korea 35th, UK 9th).²³³

Figure 5-6: Government efficiency of IMD



Source: compiled from data in IMD 2002 - 2011

Some commentators argue that NPM will be replaced by *digital era governance* to overcome the limits of *disaggregation, competition* and *incentivisation* through *reintegration, needs-bases holism* and *digitization changes* (Dunleavy et al., 2006: 97 and 224-229; Table 3-1). In this perspective, the e-government level of each country is an important factor for the evaluation of government performance. As shown in Figure 5-7, Korea has


²³¹ There are some criticisms about this index. First of all, the sub-indices of this index are not mutually exclusive. For example, economic performance might be a result of other indices such as government efficiency. In addition, most sub-indices are linked to the notion of 'free trade' (PCNC, 2008; Hood et al., 2008: 306-307; Pollitt, 2010: 97-101).

²³² As far as the index of IMD is concerned, the meaning of *efficiency* is different from an academic concept in politics (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011: 141) and thus it bears less relation to inputs and outcomes.

²³³ Other sub-indices of government efficiency in 2010 are as follows: *transparency* (Korea 27th, UK 38th); *bribing and corruption* (Korea 29th, UK 19th); *Bureaucracy* (Korea 32nd, UK 38th); and *Competition legislation* (Korea 30th, UK 27th).

taken first place for the e-government index of UN since 2010, while the U.K came in third in 2012 (UN, 2012: 126).²³⁴ However, this index cannot show the whole picture of government efficiency or transparency as compared to the IMD index. The development of technology might enhance two-way communication, convenience and access to information (Snellen, 2007: 404-412; Choi, 2010a: 491; Flynn, 2012: 145-146), but at the moment it also leads to a myth of e-government or to an overemphasis on better governance (Homburg, 2008: 94-103; Vries, 2010: 5; Figure 8-9).

Figure 5-7: E-government development index (20-50 club*, 2012)



* Seven countries (Adolino and Blake, 2011:6; Appendix 2, Figure 2)
Source: compiled from UN (2012: 126)

5-1-4. Change of the ruling party

Understandably, whether the ruling party is progressive or conservative could have a significant impact on the overall direction of government management. In general terms, a conservative party tends to emphasise the role of the market and the reduction in the government's sphere of influence. In contrast to this, a progressive party such as Labour is apt to underline the expansion of welfare benefits and the improvement of the quality of service for social minorities (Baradat, 2006: 36-38; Lakoff, 2004: 13; section 3-2-1-1). Yet notwithstanding this assumption, in practice, each party is inclined to accept some conflicting ideas in the process of *policy agenda setting* and *implementation*, due to various considerations such as an economic crisis or public protest (Hood, 1996a: 274-276). As agencification and quangocratisation are relatively recent phenomena, the influence of the ruling parties discussed in the following are limited only to the period *after* the 1970s.


In Korea, the military regime held power at the end of 1960s and they set economic development as a top priority, through scapegoating democracy, until the *civilian government* of 1993 (Roh and Lee, 2010: 333). During the period between 1993 and 1998 when the economy boomed dramatically, the right

²³⁴ Meanwhile, as of 2011, Korea was also ranked first in the information and communications technology (ICT) level surveyed by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), whilst the UK comes in ninth (ITU, 2012: 21).

wing government was in power until the left wing party took over after the Asian financial crisis. In the early days, to overcome the economic downturn, the left-wing administration cut back the government organisations and manpower, but throughout the period from 1998 to 2008 the number of civil servants increased. Yet with an emphasis on government reform and *innovation*, major management techniques from the private sector were introduced into the public sector. In contrast to the former administration, the right wing party since 2008 has re-emphasised small government.

In the U.K., from the 1950s to the late-1970s, the Conservatives and the Labour Party came to power in alternate elections. For 19 years (after 1979 until 1997), however, the Conservative Party succeeded in seizing and keeping power. After that, the Labour government came back to power with the alternative branding term ‘New Labour’, after which the Conservatives (in coalition with the Liberal Democrats) returned to government in 2010.

Figure 5-8: Changes of ruling parties



As shown in Figure 5-8, throughout the given period, the ideological nature of the British and the Korean ruling parties have been almost similar (Kim, 2011a: 168). This could arguably mean that the viewpoint of both governments about the role of government and the policy would largely match from 1970s to 2010s.


5-2. A wider Picture of Executive Agencies and Quangos in Korea and the U.K.

Before moving on to particular cases, a broader view of the landscape is required in order to understand the contexts and the environments of AQ.

5-2-1. Total numbers

There is no exclusive sphere for an executive agency or a quango (van Thiel et al., 2009; section 9-2-1). However, for a comparison, both the scope and the specific portion of the public sector need to be ascertained in advance.

Figure 5-9: Ratio of the private sector and the public sector (employees, thousands)
(a) Korea(2007) **(b) U.K.(2007)**




Source: extracted from MoPAS 2007a, Statistics Korea 2007

Source: Public sector employment 2007, Civil service statistics 2007

As shown in Figure 5-9, the total number of employees (economically active population) in the U.K. is larger than that of Korea by 5,772 thousands in 2007. The size of the U.K. private sector is still bigger than that of Korea by 2,443 thousands, while the portion of SNA regarded as the public sector *per se* is much larger than that of Korea by 10.13%.²³⁵ This figure is compatible with government expenditure per capita in Figure 2 (d) in Appendix 2.

Figure 5-10: Constituents of the public sector (2007, employees, thousand)



Source: extracted from MoPAS 2007a, Statistics Korea 2007

Source: Public sector employment 2007, Civil service statistics 2007

Figure 5-10 analyses the constituents of the public sector in detail.²³⁶ In the U.K., a large portion of the public sector is the National Health Service (NHS)

²³⁵ The System of National Accounts (SNA) is the sum of general government and nonfinancial public corporations; and has been used as a standard for international comparison by UN and IMF (IMF, 2001: 63; SNA, 2009).


²³⁶ Some data from after 2007 in Korea are not available. In addition, *compulsory military service* in Korea is excluded in this chart in that soldiers who are doing their compulsory military service do not receive a normal salary.

and the education authorities, while in Korea, local and education authorities account for 46.3% of the public sector. Since local authorities and teachers in Korea are included in the civil service category, Koreans tend to consider that their government has somewhat outgrown its size.

Figure 5-11 and 5-12 compare the area of ALBs in detail.²³⁷ Since each body has different size of staff, if we counted only the number of bodies, it could not show an exact comparison. The second charts of Figure 5-11 and 5-12 analyse the number of staff in the public sector and we can see that these charts show a somewhat different portion as compared with the first figures of each chart.


Figure 5-11: Analysis of ALBs area (Korea, 2012)²³⁸

(a) number



Source: compiled from ALIO (<http://alio.go.kr>)

(b) number of staff



Source: compiled from ALIO (<http://alio.go.kr>)

Research institutes account for the largest portion in the number of bodies (27%). However, in practice as far as the number of staff is concerned, Market-type public enterprises (MPE) and Quasi-market-type public enterprises (QMPE) are much larger than the research area. This pattern is closely linked to the size of expenditure. Meanwhile, in Korea, hospitals of national universities fall into the category of *Public Institution*.²³⁹


²³⁷ As mentioned before, the selection of organisation types such as *NDPBs* and *Public Institutions* in both countries is somewhat random. In addition, in Korea the concept of *Public Institution* includes *Public Enterprises*. Therefore in order to compare similar groups with common criteria, this thesis analyses the scope of ALBs (section 2-1-2).

²³⁸ Some institutions such as the Korea International Trade Association (KITA), the *Korea Broadcasting System* (KBS) and the Bank of Korea are statistically not included in this category owing to the AMPI.

²³⁹ Seven hospitals, including the National Police Hospital, remain in the category of the civil service, while most hospitals in Korea are privately owned.


Figure 5-12: Analysis of ALBs' area (U.K, 2008)

(a) number



Source: compiled from Public Bodies2008, Farrugia et al. (2009)


(b) number of staff




Source: compiled from Public Bodies2008, Farrugia et al. (2009)

As shown in Figure 5-12, in the U.K., the total number of public corporations accounts for only 7 per cent,²⁴⁰ but in reality, employees of this area amount to more than half of the public bodies. This is largely because of Royal Mail Holdings plc.²⁴¹ Interestingly, the large number of museums in the U.K., as compared with Korea, is operated by the government.

Figure 5-13: Analysis of area: executive agencies



Source: compiled from MoPAS 2010



Source: analysed from Civil service statistics 2010 (Cabinet Office)

Meanwhile, the areas of executive agencies are shown in Figure 5-13. In Korea, the portion taken up by research bodies and hospitals is relatively larger

²⁴⁰ This figure does not include the advisory NDPBs category. For statistical reasons, fund management bodies, unlike the Korean case of Figure 5-11, are included in the 'Promotion and Support' category.

²⁴¹ In Korea, most employees working in the *Korea Post* are civil servants (Figure 5-2 and footnote 25).


than the British case, while in the U.K., the portion of social order and regulatory bodies is comparatively larger.

5-2-2. Institutional changes in agencies and quangos of Korea and the U.K.

Although the trajectories of executive agencies and quangos in both countries will be examined in Chapters 6 and 7 in a detailed way, in order to understand the overall direction of governmental bodies, it is worthwhile, in this section, to give a *tour d'horizon* of each state's public bodies.

Korea After the Asian economic crisis, *the executive agency* idea was introduced in 1998 and a basic law was made in 2000, assigning ten bodies to be the new executive agency (*Introduction phase*). As shown in Figure 5-14, from 2000 to 2004, 13 bodies were added, while performance evaluation was introduced and maintained (*Pilot operation phase*). The number continued to increase sharply up to the present number of 39 institutions (after it peaked in 2007 with 47), and a *total payroll costs system* was partly introduced (*Complementary phase*).

Figure 5-14: Changes in Korean executive agencies (2000-2011)²⁴²




Quangos in Korea might be primarily analysed from the legal point of view. After the liberation from Japanese occupation in 1945, there was a sharp economic development and during that period, each department was able to establish new institutions almost arbitrarily (*Ministerial management phase*). Then basic laws for effective management such as the *Government-investing-institution Management Act of 1973* and the *Government-affiliated-institution Management Act of 2004* were introduced (Table 2-3), based on the nature of the public bodies (*Central government management phase*). However, since

²⁴² In Korea, the management of the military executive agencies, unlike the U.K. (Hogwood, 1993: 8), are separately conducted by the Ministry of National Defense and their statistics are not open to the public. For this reason, statistics about military executive agencies are not included in these figures.

2007, both laws was integrated into the *AMPI* (Act on the Management of Public Institution) in which public institutions are managed by the government as a whole (*Integrated management phase*).

In 2008, the Lee Myung-Bak administration announced its plan for the 'Modernisation of Public Institutions', which included the privatisation of 27 bodies. However, as of 2012 (September) as compared with 2007, mainly *the Not Classified Public Institutions* (NPIs) were merged and reduced by that plan;²⁴³ and, instead, 16 bodies were newly created (Figure 5-15).

Figure 5-15: Changes in Public Institutions in Korea (2007 and 2012)




Source: analysed from ALIO 2012, MoPAS 2008

* Market-type public enterprises: MPEs; Quasi-market-type public enterprise: QMPEs; Fund managing quasi-governmental institutions: FQGI; Delegated implementing quasi-governmental institutions: DQGI; and Not classified public institutions: NPIs.

U.K. Executive agencies in the U.K. have been established and developed through the *Prior option analysis* (1989), the *Fraser Report* (1991), the *Trosa Report* (OPSS, 1994) and the *Massey Report* (1995b) since the *Next Step Report* was published in 1988 (Theakston, 1995: 131-135). When the Conservative party was in power, especially between 1990 and 1997, many executive agencies were newly established (Theakston, 1999b: 27). By 1997, numerous privatisation and contracting-out were conducted (*Introduction and diffusion phase*). Finally, after the Labour government came to power in 1997, the internal operational efficiency rather than the expansion of existing systems became its main interest (*Efficient management phase*).

²⁴³ The total number of *Public institutions* has been decreased from 298 to 288, but this is largely because several bodies are statistically excluded for the reason of privatisation which is in progress and seems to be difficult to accomplish in the near future.


Figure 5-16: Changes in British UK executive agencies: numbers (from 1988 to 2012)²⁴⁴



Source: compiled from civil service statistics 1988-2010, Public sector employment 2011 Q4, 2012 Q1

In 1998, the U.K. government concluded that an executive agency system had already been successfully settled (Cm 4273; Seo, 2005: 432; Cabinet Office, 2006b: 2), but after that there have still been significant changes (Figure 5-16). Especially, many military executive agencies have been merged and quangocratised; and the Coalition government has tried to reform several executive agencies.

Figure 5-17: Changes in UK executive agencies: area (from 1988 to 2012)



Source: compiled and analysed from civil service statistics 1988-2010, Public sector employment 2011 Q4, 2012 Q1


Figure 5-17 shows that the proportion of executive agencies' staff numbers was at its peak in 1997, but has decreased from then on. Jobcentre Plus lost its position as an executive agency and merged into its parent department, so that Figures 5-16 and 5-17 show there is a drastic decrease in the portion of executive agencies and their welfare area in the civil service.

²⁴⁴ Next steps lines such as HM Revenue and Customs, and executive agencies of regional governments are excluded in these figures.


Figure 5-18 analysed the sphere of executive agencies in terms of their function. The type and staff numbers of executive agencies are quite diverse (Pyper, 1995: 4). The first chart shows the number of executive agencies and the second analyses the number of their employees. We can ascertain that the areas of maintenance, administrative support and regulation have been relatively stable, while many changes have been made in the areas of military and welfare functions.

Figure 5-18: Changes in relative percentages

(a) the relative percentages of each area within executive agencies: numbers of agencies




(b) the relative percentages of each area within executive agencies: numbers of staff




Source: compiled and analysed from civil service statistics 1988-2010, Public sector employment 2011 Q4, 2012 Q1

Meanwhile, the change route of quangos is rather different from that of executive agencies.

Figure 5-19: Changes in numbers of UK NDPBs
(a) Numbers



(b) Expenditure*



Source: compiled from public bodies 1997 – 2012

* *Adjusted Expenditures* are expressed in 1979/80 prices. Inflation rates are based on <http://safalra.com>

As the Fulton Report in 1968 recommended 'hiving off', several bodies have been separated from central government (Parris, 1969: 307; Pyper, 1995:


54). However, under the influence of the 1978 election, an anti-quango breeze had begun to blow (*Recognition phase*). The Conservative government which won the election, established a new concept of quangos, namely the NDPBs (Cmnd 7797, 1980), and reduced the number of quangos through so-called a quangocide or quango-culling (*Decrease phase*).

As shown in Figure 5-19, in the mid-1980s their number increased again. Although the Labour government had been expected to reform these quangos (Flinders, 1999b: 35), it did not do so (*Stagnation phase*). The sizes of expenditure between 1979 and 2003, which are adjusted by the inflation rate, remain overall at similar levels (Figure 5-19b). Meanwhile, the current Coalition government which came to power in 2010 is trying to undertake a major overhaul of quangos, but the problem is that, as Hood argues (1981: 120), quangos are too useful to be eliminated by politicians.


An analysis on the total numbers of quangos requires a careful approach. Unlike Korea, in the U.K., advisory NDPBs are included in the categories of quangos; thus leading to, as some commentators point out, statistical illusion.

Figure 5-20: Numbers of advisory ALBs and changes in numbers of UK executive NDPBs²⁴⁵

(a) numbers of advisory bodies in the UK and Korea*



(b) numbers of executive NDPBs and their total staff (UK)**



*Source: compiled from Public bodies 1997 – 2009 (Cabinet Office), Kim and Kim 2002, MoPAS 2010

**Source: compiled from public bodies 1997 – 2009 (Cabinet Office)


The first graph of Figure 5-20 compares the number of advisory bodies in both countries, while the second graph shows the changes of executive NDPBs

²⁴⁵ The total number of NDPBs suddenly decreased in 2002 merely because of a statistical reason. Since 2002 onwards, NDPBs of Scotland and Northern Ireland have been excluded in this figure (James et al., 2012:59; Flinders et al., 2014: 11).

over three decades in the U.K. As some commentators noted, the total number of *bodies* has been diminished (Massey, 1995a: para 2.1.7), but the total number of *employees* has been relatively static since 1984.

Since 2010, the Coalition government has tried to reduce quangos, along with other austerity programmes (HM Government, 2010: 16, 24, 31; HC 537, 2010a: paras 3, 8; Rutter et al., 2012: 13; Flinders et al., 2014: 14-15; Dommett and Flinders, 2014: 11). In October 2010, the Cabinet Office announced that 901 public bodies had been investigated and that 192 would be abolished (Cabinet Office, 2010; HC 537b: w14).²⁴⁶ However, the interim results of the reform in process in December 2011 showed limited success in accomplishing its initial plan. As shown in Figure 5-21, among 310 targets of abolition and merger, only 151 results were reported (Cabinet Office, 2011) and 53 per cent of them failed. Moreover, among 70 successful results, 54 per cent fell into advisory NDPBs which have smaller staff numbers and budgets thus showing less resistance (NAO, 2012: 21).²⁴⁷

Figure 5-21: Results of public bodies' reform (the Coalition government: 2010-2011)



5-2-3. Concluding Remarks

A dual context has been presented in this chapter dealing first with the political system and, to a limited extent, the economic context (Appendix 2); and

²⁴⁶ In addition, 118 bodies would be merged into 57.

²⁴⁷ According to Maude (2013), as of December 2012, 114 quangos have been closed among the original goal of 204 abolitions. Moreover, almost 150 bodies have been merged into around 70.

secondly with an analysis of the range of agencies and quangos in the two countries. As regards the political and economic context, it is clear that the causes of AQ are closely linked to the context of an individual state. The changes of the ruling parties and the relationships between the executive and legislative branch have more to do with the viability of government policies, while economic conditions seem to be connected to the selection of policy instruments. In addition, the rapid turnover of ministers leads to inconsistency in policies; and the generalist tradition might work as an institutional constraint. Moreover, the structure and the norms of the civil service might create the gap between policy formation and implementation. Both countries have career civil services which produce personnel constraints on the creation of agencies and quangos, although these constraints are more acute in Korea with a stronger legal base and career loyalty to the core civil service.

With reference to the range of agencies and quangos, the picture confirms the problems reviewed in chapter 2. The boundaries of the public sector are rather equivocal, so that even the government could not find the precise demarcation between executive agencies and quangos. In some instances, the numbers of the public sector tend to be manipulated in order to produce favourable statistics. For example, the frequent change of criteria for classification provokes the concealment of the real numbers of public bodies. In addition, the re-naming and alternation fever of quangos produces difficulties in tracing the changes in their development route, so that proper concern and control by the public and the media are apt to be undermined (Hood, 1991b: 184). Nonetheless, we see a picture of enthusiastic creation of agencies and quangos in the UK followed by a growing degree of skepticism in recent years. In Korea the AQ has been very much more gradual and cautious and there may still be potential for further initiatives.

In Chapters 6 and 7, during the exploration of the causes and results of AQ, the analysis of these wider contexts is broadly applied. In particular, in Chapter 8, the influences of these institutional contexts and constraints are dealt with in a comprehensive way.

Chapter 6. Case Study of Tate Modern

This chapter examines the case of Tate Modern, as outlined in section 1-3-3. Before the main analysis, it explores the distinctive features of arts administration in order to enhance the understating of its unique process and consideration and this research returns to these at various points in Chapters 6, 7 and 8. The chapter goes on to explore the history and facilities of the Tate Galleries and then analyses their organisational form and implications. From section 6-4-1, the diverse arguments which were investigated in Chapter 3 from a theoretical perspective, are applied to the case of the Tate Galleries' quangocratisation. Finally, as discussed in Chapter 4, the external outputs of quangocratisation and its managerial and internal results are examined. During this analysis, institutional contexts and constraints which were dealt with in Chapter 5 are also considered.

6-1. Specific Characteristics of Visual Arts Administration

Visual arts administration²⁴⁸ and policy served by the government have unique characteristics as compared with other public services (Pick, 1986: 152-163).²⁴⁹ These distinctive features indubitably influence the method and the scope of the analysis on arts administration (Chong, 2010: 2-26). On account of this unique nature, there are relatively limited research findings in arts administration fields in comparison with those of other social sciences.²⁵⁰ In order to examine national art museums in Korea and the U.K., therefore, these characteristics are required to be explored first as follows:

Firstly, *stakeholders* related to visual arts administration are rather distinguishable from those of other parts of the government (Cummings et al., 1987b: 10; Mclean, 1997: 68-71). The most direct stakeholders of an arts policy are artists and usually they are thought to show interests different from

²⁴⁸ Visual arts administration is a part of cultural administration. Cultural administration is, in general terms, comprised of heritage conservation, film, libraries, literature, copyrights, visual arts, performing arts, public broadcasting, media, PR and religion (Selwood, 2001; Taylor, 1997: 458; MCST: 2011: 3).

²⁴⁹ Different societies have varied understandings about the concepts of the arts (Gray, 2000a: 1-2). Traditionally, only *fine arts* by academicians such as paintings and sculptures have been regarded as pure or high arts (Gray, 1992: 10-11), but the scope of the visual arts has been consistently expanded to diverse human creativities such as dance, video arts and performing arts (Alexander, 2003: 3-5; Pooke and Newall, 2008: 5).

²⁵⁰ Regarding the fields of arts study, *history* (for example, Hauser 1989a and b; Bennett, 1995) and *aesthetics* (for example, Bourdieu, 1993 and 1997) are more frequently researched area than *arts management*.

others (Pick, 1986: 162; Hudson, 2004: 86-91). Most of them consider arts policies in an artistic perspective rather than in a commercial one (McClean, 1997: 3).²⁵¹ In general terms, visual arts administration is the field in which the market point of view penetrates relatively less than others. Meanwhile, the people who are responsible for arts policy need a different kind of expertise and professionalism (Donellan, 2013: 233-54; IA3). Since the understanding of the arts is dependent upon not only business and a logical basis but also some historical and emotional approaches, only people who have devoted their life to the arts tend to be regarded as having this speciality. When it comes to museum administration, its most integral parts are the collections and exhibitions (Chong, 2010: 159; IA1; IB1); and experts who have engaged in this area for a long time could be directly involved in an arts programme. Finally, the people who are largely targeted as service beneficiaries are the art enthusiasts group (Merriman, 1989: 152-155; ICOM, 1992: 139; Marstine, 2006: 26). As far as arts policy is concerned, ostensibly the general public is aimed at as the final customer (Chong, 2010: 116); a closer look at the process of the service, however, reveals the notable problem of the arts-divide (Black, 2012: 28).

Secondly, in terms of *arts organisation*, the number of staff in an arts-agency is comparatively fewer than that in other institutions. The power and size of an administrative group such as finance and personnel management units in one specific arts organisation might not be dominant as compared with direct programme providers such as curators. Especially, museum organisations prefer relatively long-term prepared projects provided by a few organisers rather than a transient programme generated by massive participants. In addition, related industries such as the publishing industry find it hard to accomplish large-scale success owing to having a finite number of customers. Meanwhile, a smaller size of group, in general terms, enables its employees to integrate with much less effort (Knill and Tosun, 2012: 20-21).

Thirdly, public arts organisations have the *mixed characteristics* of the public sector and the private sector. Unlike organisations of the private sector,

²⁵¹ However, since the 1980s, the arts have been required to take a more market-oriented approach (Wu, 2002: 47). Firstly, many recent museums need to raise funds to collect works of art and extend their buildings (Marstine, 2006: 11). Secondly, for huge museums, marketing and explicit missions have become increasingly important for their survival (Ames, 2004: 18-19). Thirdly, a recent trend reveals the close relationship and collaboration between the arts and business (Chong, 2010: 127-130; Janes, 1999: 11-12; Tobelem, 2007: 298-301; Appleyard, 1989: 310).

their goals are rather ambiguous and their services are often non-competitive. The private sector has its own definite goal, the pursuit of profit, while the public sector tends to aim at relatively loose targets. Arts administration goes even further and has more abstract objectives; that is, the promotion and boost of the arts (Beer, 1994: 38; IB5). These goal ambiguities make the setting and assessment of targets harder. Moreover, artistic production is basically based on individual creativity, so that the support of the government could not guarantee short-term results. In addition, as shown in Table 6-1, recent trends in museums have changed (Mclean, 1997: 9-10). For example, as the mainstream of contemporary arts pursues surreal and symbolic arts, which are difficult to understand for ordinary people, such as abstract art (Blazwick and Morris, 2000: 32) or conceptual art (Wilson and Lack, 2008: 9, 52-53), understanding, education and communication to the public has become more important in arts administration (Mclean, 1997: 113; Chong, 2010: 19; Yang, 2002 and 2005). Particularly, since the national museums are in charge of an artistic policy as well as exhibitions and displays, additional goals such as the exchange of knowledge and taste formation become an increasingly critical part of their work.²⁵² At the same time, most popular museums are non-competitive (Mclean, 1997: 71-71; Chong, 2010: 116-117). In general terms, big art museums within a popular metropolis such as London or Paris are so closely connected to tourism that they might not be easily threatened by refurbishment pressure from outside.

Table 6-1: Characteristics of traditional and reformed museum

Traditional museum	Reformed museum
Ethnocentric	Multicultural
Inwardly driven good intentions	Community based social responsibility
Collection driven one-way communication	Audience focused two-way communication
Keeper of knowledge, Limited representation	Exchange of knowledge, Broad representation
Focused on past	Relevant and forward looking
Top-down management, Emphasis on authority	Bottom-up management, Emphasis on multiple-viewpoint

Source: Hooper-Greenhill (2004: 559-571), Anderson (2004:2), Crooke (2007: 42), Stam (2005: 62-65)

Interestingly, public arts organisations are closely linked to the private sector. Works of art created by popular artists could be collected by both an

²⁵² A number of books on the arts policy, on this account, pay close attention to how to expand their visitors through 'taste shaping' efforts such as communication and education (Chong, 2009: 19 and 116).

individual and by government agencies. As with public art museums, private museums, or even an individual, also possess a myriad of historic works of art, which have significant social value (Chong, 2010: 34). Moreover, considerable donations of works of art from the private sector are essential elements for the improvement of museums.

Finally, the artistic policies of both developed and underdeveloped countries are hugely disproportionate (MCST, 2012a: 229 and 2011: 198). On the one hand, developing countries do not have enough capital to invest in cultural policies and institutions which are not high priority. On the other hand, since culture has been accumulated over a long period (Spalding, 1998: 9), current developed countries which have maintained their traditions for a long time without colonial exploitation are in an advantageous position. In addition, the general viewpoint on culture *per se* might be leaning toward the experiences of developed countries (Mignolo, 1995: 325; Hurston, 2004: 216).

6-2. History and Facilities

6-2-1. The Tate Galleries

Since Tate Modern is one of the Tate gallery group and its history has been closely related to Tate Britain, a brief examination of this group is useful for making an analysis. The Tate group consists of a federation of four major art museums and shares their collections (Searing, 2004: 15): that is, Tate Britain, Tate Liverpool, Tate St Ives and Tate Modern. The National Gallery of British Art, which became commonly known as the Tate Art Gallery or the Tate Gallery²⁵³ named after its first benefactor Henry Tate who had laid the foundations for the collection, was opened in 1897 at the site of the former Millbank Prison (Minihan, 1977: 155; Freeman, 2006: 336).²⁵⁴ The idea of a National Gallery of British Art was originally suggested in the 1820s. However, tangible results were ignited by Henry Tate, who was an industrialist and major collector of nineteenth-century Victorian art; he donated his own collection to the National Gallery in 1889 (Spalding 1998: 11-13; Alexander et al., 2005: 60-62). However, at that time, there was not enough space within the National Gallery; thus he offered extra funds for the construction of a new building which was opened in 1897. It had displayed various works by British artists from other collections dating back to 1790, as well as Henry Tate's bequest, including

²⁵³ In 1932, the gallery introduced the popularly known name, the Tate Gallery as its official brand.

²⁵⁴ Interestingly, it was designed to reflect Jeremy Bentham's idea, the Panopticon (Tate Trustees, 1986: 40-41; Spalding, 1998: 16).

around 250 works of British artists in eight rooms. Initially, the gallery collected only modern British art; that is, Victorian era paintings.

The new National Gallery of British Art was directed by the National Gallery at Trafalgar Square and did not receive regular funds from the Treasury until 1946 (Minihan, 1977: 181-183). After its opening, the Tate Gallery has experienced several building extensions over the years. During the earlier years of the gallery the Duveen family, Charles Clore and Henry Courtauld had also contributed the extension which made the gallery double its original size, including the addition of seven rooms which were built to display the Turner Bequest. In 1915, Hugh Lane's bequest enabled the gallery to expand its collection to include *foreign* art; and thus, since then, it has been responsible not only for the national collection of British art from 1500 to the present day, but also an *international* collection of modern and contemporary art. After the Tate Gallery had its own separate Board of Trustees subordinate to the National Gallery Board in 1917 (Minihan, 1977: 156), more concern for the affairs of the Tate Gallery *per se* could be given (Spalding 1998: 42).

Since the *National Gallery and Tate Gallery Act 1954* (NGTGA 1954) came into force in 1955, the Tate Gallery has been legally and financially independent from the control of the National Gallery (NGTGA 1954: section 1; Spalding, 1998: 122). During the 1950s and 1960s, the Arts Council of Great Britain²⁵⁵ and the Tate Gallery organised a diverse temporary exhibition programme. The legal separation and independence from the National Gallery allowed the Tate Gallery to expand its exhibition space. In 1979, it extended its north-east corner with funding from a Japanese bank and took over an adjacent building and opened an auditorium and the new Clore Gallery in 1987 to display the Turner bequest (Tate Trustees, 1982: 16; Hewison, 1995: 288; Craig-Martin, 2000: 13). The Tate Liverpool, in 1988, was founded as an outpost in north England to display varied works of modern art, not only from the Tate collection but also from some temporary exhibitions (Tate Trustees, 1986: 21-24; Spalding, 1998: 222-227; Searing, 2004: 16; Chong, 2010: 150). This 'Tate of the North' is situated in a redesigned warehouse on Liverpool's waterfront (Hewison, 1995: 283).

In 1992, the National Gallery and Tate Gallery Act was replaced by the *Museums and Galleries Act 1992* (MGA 1992) which required the gallery to establish a *corporate* board of trustees (MGA 1992: section 1(1)(b); Forder, 1994: 132). In 1993, the Tate St Ives was created in a Cornish town to exhibit

²⁵⁵ The Arts Council of Great Britain (ACGB) was established in 1946, and the first Chairman was John Maynard Keynes (Pick, 1980: 10-15; Hewison, 1995: 43; Gray, 2000a: 41; Yong, 2011: 51). Under the influence of Keynes and Goodman on the government, the council could acquire sufficient government funds and establish a network of arts across the nation (Hewison, 1986: 230-234; Alexander et al., 2005: 65-66). In 1994, ACGB was split up into three regionalised Arts Councils (Gray, 2000a: 65-66).

‘modern’ and ‘contemporary’ works by particular artists of the St Ives area (Spalding, 1998: 261-265). It was funded by the Henry Moor Foundation and donations from the local community. The gallery has welcomed an average of 0.24 million visitors a year and has been evaluated as a great success.

In line with the launch of Tate Modern in 2000, the four galleries were renamed: Tate Britain, Tate Liverpool, Tate St Ives and Tate Modern. The major part of the Tate Gallery became Tate Britain which displays *British* art from 1500 to the present day.²⁵⁶ In order to boost British contemporary art, Tate Britain began in 1984 to award an annual Turner Prize to British visual artists and has had huge success (Button, 2005: 15-18).²⁵⁷ Although Tate Liverpool has a smaller scale than Tate Modern, it has grown into the largest gallery of contemporary art outside London, and even hosted the Turner Prize in 2007, and was named *European Capital of Culture* in 2008.

Table 6-2: Four Tate galleries

	Establishment	Number of Staffs	Yearly visitors (2011)
Tate Britain	1897	40 (2013)	1,488,358
Tate Modern	2000	45 (2013)	4,886,769
Tate Liverpool	1988	76 (2007)	585,019
Tate St Ives	1993	39 (2007)	209,265

Source: Searing (2004:15-17); www.alva.org.uk; reference.data.gov.uk/gov-structure/organogram

Today the Tate galleries have around 70,000 national and international collections of artworks and a number of new buildings and development projects are planned to expand the galleries (Pooke, 2011: 60; Tate Trustees, 2012: 64).²⁵⁸

6-2-2. Tate Modern

After addressing the need for a modern foreign gallery by the Curzon Committee in 1912 (Taylor, 1999: 133; Spalding, 1998: 39), the Tate Gallery was given the task of collecting international twentieth-century art (Nittve, 2000: 10). In 2000, Tate Modern opened and has displayed international modern and contemporary art collections dating from 1900 until the present day. Even though Tate Liverpool and Tate St Ives were additionally created in the 1980s and 1990s, neither of these could effectively share the burden of the original Tate Gallery whose collection has significantly expanded. Therefore the Tate Trustees, in 1992, decided to separate *twentieth century* and *international*

²⁵⁶ The main rooms of Tate Britain have exhibited the permanent collection of historic and contemporary British artists such as J.M.W. Turner, which are subject to rotation.

²⁵⁷ The Turner Prize has featured four artists under the age of fifty, selected by a jury chaired by the director of Tate Britain.

²⁵⁸ Recently, Tate Britain has announced a £45 million gallery makeover scheme.

elements from the original gallery and create a new art museum in the Bankside area of central London (Spalding, 1998: 275-280).²⁵⁹ The Millennium Commission funded a £50 million Lottery grant in order to convert the former Bankside Power Station (Wu, 2002: 138; Dewdney et al., 2012: 42), which had not been used since 1981 but was chosen as the new gallery site in 1994 (Craig-Martin, 2000: 14-15; Donnellan, 2013: 18-20), into an additional landmark for London. The proposal of Swiss architects Herzog and de Meuron, which suggested the maintenance of the original appearance of the iconic power station, was selected as the plan for conversion in 1995 (Sabbagh, 2000: 5-7).²⁶⁰ The original power station consisted of a single central chimney, a huge turbine hall and the boiler house, and the new design plan announced the preservation of its overall steel framework and brickwork of the original power station, although it tried to functionally transform the interior arrangement. For the purchase of the site, the Tate Trustees received a £12 million grant from the English Partnerships regeneration agency (Haines-Cooke, 2009: 60). The turbine hall changed into one of the entrance and exhibition areas, and the boiler house became a part of the gallery. As Tate Modern has attracted more visitors than originally expected, in 2009, the Tate Trustees began a new project²⁶¹ with a view to expanding its gallery space; the old oil tanks, which had not been used, and a ten-storey tower which is being built above the tanks will be dedicated to new galleries.²⁶² In addition, the western block will be reconstructed as a large gallery space and some access routes which include a new bridge connecting the main building and the new tower (Tate Trustees, 2012: 64; IA5)

6-2-3. Facilities of Tate Modern²⁶³

Tate Modern currently has seven floors. Levels zero to four are used as exhibition spaces, although the main displays are concentrated in four broad groups on levels two to four. These four collection groups are arranged in accordance with different subjects²⁶⁴ and each part takes up half of a whole

²⁵⁹ However, it has also exhibited a series of popular modern *British* art.

²⁶⁰ One of the important reasons why the power station was chosen was its huge size (Craig-Martin, 2000: 14-15).

²⁶¹ In 2007, Tate Modern received a 50m pound grant from the government and 215 million pounds from the private sector, as the part of the Olympic regeneration scheme (Heine-Cooke, 2009: 60).

²⁶² These works are also being carried out by Herzog & de Meuron and are scheduled to open in 2016. The tower will display video art and photography.

²⁶³ This section does not cover other three galleries.

²⁶⁴ The four themes are as follows: History/Memory/Society, Nude/Action/Body, Landscape/Matter/Environment, and Still Life/Object/Real Life. Most arts collections, for example the works of the Museum of Modern Art (MoMA), have been exhibited in chronological order, but Tate Modern tried from a different angle when the gallery opened (Blazwick and Morris: 2000: 35-39; Chong, 2010: 103). However, the first

floor. Each space periodically reallocates diverse works, which the Tate collection permanently retains, without losing the overall consistency of its four themes (Chong, 2010: 149-151).

On level zero, there are the main entrance, the Turbine Hall, the Tanks and the main shop. The Turbine Hall had been used for the electricity generators and thus has a huge space for display (Costello, 2003: 182-184; Pooke, 2011: 60). Between October and March, it has usually been occupied with commissioned works of contemporary artists such as Louise Bourgeois (from May to November in 2000), Ai Weiwei (from October 2010 to April 2011), which were called The Unilever Series, named after its corporate sponsor (Tate Trustees, 2002: 34 and 2012: 41; footnote 488).²⁶⁵ However, as an occasional exhibition, it also has been used to display short events such as Damien Hirst's work.²⁶⁶ The former three large underground oil tanks, which are called *the Tanks*, are currently converted into video art and live programme spaces where live art and events are planned to be permanently displayed. The main shop provides exclusive gift products and a wide range of books on modern art. The Clore Learning Centre which is located on the north side of the building on level one is allocated to visiting educational institutions.

On level one, the river entrance is linked to the Millennium Bridge, connecting to St Paul's Cathedral in the City of London. A seminar room and the Starr Auditorium on level one host various programmes of events and films. The Project Space by the river entrance exhibits the outcome of a curatorial partnership between Tate Modern and other international art organisations for three or four months.

As in January 2013, main four collection display spaces are *Poetry and Dream* on level two, *Transformed Visions* on level three, *Structure and Clarity*, and *Energy and Process* on level four. The room of *Poetry and Dream* focuses on the works of surrealists, such as Giorgio de Chirico and Francis Bacon, and unconsciousness. The south wing of level three is dedicated to the works of artists, such as Germaine Richter, who were absorbed in the expressive abstraction trends after the Second World War. On the section of *Structure and Clarity*, the development of abstract art since the earth 20th century is displayed.

rehang at Tate Modern which opened in May 2006 tried to avoid the thematic groupings but to focus on pivotal moments of twentieth-century art (Lee, 2009d: 43).

²⁶⁵ Unilever contributed total 4.4 million pounds of sponsorship during the period from 2000 to 2012, including for renewal works 2.2 million pounds from 2008 (Harris, 2012; footnote 488).

²⁶⁶ From April to June in 2012, the work called *For the Love of God* was on display in the Turbine Hall.

This contains the works of constructionism, minimalism and cubism artists such as Bridget Riley and Henri Matisse. Finally, the room of Energy and Process focuses upon the works of the radical art movement of the 1960s and 1970s which create works by using raw materials. Between the two wings on level four, a small section called 'Setting the Scene' is located to display theatrical or fictional works by contemporary artists.

Meanwhile, the two wings of level two and three are dedicated to major temporary exhibitions which run for around three or four months.²⁶⁷ These exhibitions usually charge an entry fee and have a dedicated mini-shop selling goods related to the displays. In addition, small exhibition rooms could be occasionally created and reallocated between the wings on levels zero to four in order to display temporary projects.

Table 6-3: Museums and art galleries existing as executive NDPBs* (Aug, 2007)

Department	Museum	Staff	Income £000	Expenditure £000
DCMS	Royal Armouries	180	10,886	11,945
	British Museum	1,034	74,447	64,875
	National Gallery	455	40,696	29,075
	Sir John Soane's Museum	25	2,291	1,704
	National Museums Liverpool	584	21,821	21,138
	Victoria and Albert Museum	987	87,654	62,619
	National Portrait Gallery	218	16,610	13,982
	National Museum of Science and Industry**	800	61,745	71,414
	Natural History Museum	904	83,408	66,312
	Horniman Public Museum	131	5,780	6070
	Tate	1,175	125,953	95,096
	Wallace Collection	101	6,665	6,478
	Geffrye Museum	54	5,050	2,692
	Imperial War Museum	650	25,452	44,094
	National Maritime Museum	400	25,578	22,920
Museum of London Group***	423	28,902	26,539	
Museum of Science and Industry, Manchester**	106	7,598	8,107	
MoD	Royal Naval Museum****	39	2,287	2,212
	Royal Marines Museum ****	23	1,467	1,409
	National Army Museum	85	6,247	6,425
	Royal Naval Submarine Museum ****	27	972	1,189
	Royal Air Force Museum	182	10,359	10,476

Source: compiled from Farrugia and O'Connell (2009)

* The National Galleries of Scotland and National Museums of Scotland (including six sub-museums) have not counted in NDPBs statistics (Cabinet Office, 2007 and 2008), even though they are guaranteed by statute (National Heritage Act 1985, Part I, III).

** These became part of the Science Museum Group (SMG Annual Report and Accounts, 2011-12: 7).

*** Until April 2008, the DCMS had been responsible for this, but its remit transferred to the Greater London Authority.

**** In 2009, these museums were integrated into a single body; the *National Museum of the Royal Navy*.

²⁶⁷ For example, as of December 2012, the south wings of levels three and four are used to stage the exhibitions of the works of Jackson Pollock and William Klein respectively.

6-3. The Form of the Organisation: Executive NDPB

As shown in Table 6-3, the organisational form of the present Tate Gallery is an *executive NDPB*, along with other national museums and galleries in the U.K. As of 2007, the total number of NDPBs is 827 and among those there are 203 executive NDPBs, accounting for around a quarter (25.1%, Cabinet Office, 2007: 8-9). However, since *advisory NDPBs* rarely have their own staff, employees of executive NDPBs account for 99.5% of whole NDPBs (ibid: 5; Farrugia et al., 2009: 17-50). Meanwhile, only 6.97% of employees of executive NDPBs work for cultural artistic institutions and among those, the staff of the Tate Gallery account for 15.4%, as shown in Table 6-3 (Farrugia et al., 2009: 25-29).

Popular museums and galleries, however, also exist in a form other than NDPBs, as shown in Table 6-4. There are several museums in the U.K. which are ranked in the world's top hundred,²⁶⁸ although their sizes are much smaller than NDPBs.²⁶⁹ Therefore, in order to analyse Tate Modern, a comparison with other forms of museums needs to be considered.

Table 6-4: Other forms of museums and art galleries

	Global visitors ranking			Yearly visitors (2011)	Location
	2009	2010	2011		
Saatchi Gallery	34	30	43	1,190,062	London
Kelvingrove Art Gallery	27	43	52	981,061	Glasgow
Royal Academy of Arts	32	46	63	890,008	London
Serpentine Gallery	63	68	66	825,837	London
Ashmolean Museum	-	44	71	752,000	Oxford
Gallery of Modern Art	88	-	89	536,916	Glasgow
Birmingham Museum	-	69	92	590,163	Birmingham
Bristol City Museum	80	-	-	564,504	Bristol

Source: compiled from The Art Newspaper (2010-2012)

As a type of executive NDPBs, the Tate Gallery, as with other national museums, could be analysed in terms of change, although these tend to have been relatively less influenced by environmental pressure, as compared with other executive NDPBs. Before the huge upheavals of quangos in 2010, there was no change in galleries and museums between 2007 and 2009 despite, as a whole, a 13.3 per cent alteration in NDPBs in 2008 and a 21.2 per cent alteration in 2009 (analysed from the Cabinet Office, 2007, 2008 and 2009). Moreover, they were not even included in the quango cull list in 2010 (Cabinet

²⁶⁸ Museums could be classified by their collections: *general* museums; *archaeology* museums; *history* museums; *ethnography* museums; *geology* museums; *industrial* museums; *military* museums; *science* museums; and *art* museums (Ambrose and Paine, 2006: 7; Karp, 1992: 2).

²⁶⁹ For example, see Pooke (2011: 27) as to the Saatchi Gallery.

Office, 2010).²⁷⁰ However, from a longer-term perspective, there is a growing trend for quango museums to integrate and differentiate themselves. For example, the Tate Gallery which came from the National Gallery, divided into Tate Liverpool and Tate St Ives, and finally was split into Tate Britain and Tate Modern (Alexander et al., 2005: 60-62).

The reasons for this differentiation are generally threefold. Firstly, museums create their branches in a local area with a view to making more people enjoy cultural life. Secondly, galleries which carry out overly diverse functions need to separate some part of their tasks to a new institution (Sabagh, 2000: 3).²⁷¹ Thirdly, a part of a national museum could be abolished or privatised when the maintenance of that body by the public sector is inappropriate or highly inefficient.

Meanwhile, national museums could be integrated or be grouped with a view to accomplishing economies of scale or scope (Connolly and Munro, 1999: 486-487).²⁷² For managerial efficiency, an integrated agency might reduce an overlapping workforce and share an operational division such as financial unit. Furthermore, a parent department could reduce its effort by dealing with one integrated body rather than negotiating with several bodies. An integrated agency,²⁷³ in particular, could build a multi-year budget plan and relatively easily invest increased expenditure in a specific fiscal year by concentrating on a special programme; and thus it might be advantageous in a long-term arts investment. In addition, strong networks between sub-museums allow them to enhance exhibitions and displays through exchanges of programmes.

6-4. A Comparison of the Arguments

The establishment process of Tate Modern as an executive NDPB could be analysed in relation to the causes of quangocratisation in Chapter 3. The creation process of a quango depends on its type of AQ as suggested in Figure 2-2. The processes of AQ are largely divided into two groups: the first groups were directly created as quangos (Quangocratisation type-III); and the second groups were set up as government departments but changed into quangos later (Quangocratisation types-I and II). The former groups generally relate to argument group 1 and the latter are concerned with argument groups 2 and 3.

²⁷⁰ Around forty years ago, in the reports of Pliatzky (Cmnd 7797, 1980) and Holland (1980), they were reviewed but the conclusion was for the maintenance of their organisational status.

²⁷¹ For example, the British Library and its Board were separated from the British Museum under the British Library Act 1972 (Section 1-3). In the case of the Tate Gallery, it hung only 25 per cent of its collection before the creation of Tate Modern, owing to the lack of space (Forder, 1994: 143).

²⁷² For example, see the cases of the SMG or National Museums of the Royal Navy (Cabinet Office, 2012d).

²⁷³ Merged museums are regarded as a single NDPB which receives Grants in Aid from the parent department on behalf of the sub-museums.

The Tate Gallery, which is the origin of Tate Modern, were excluded from the civil service only after 1972, and Tate Modern was founded as an NDPB *ab initio*. The quangocratisation of Tate Modern could thus be explored at two different critical junctures.

6-4-1. Arguments for the establishment and change of the Tate Gallery

The original Tate Gallery was altered into a different type of organisation later. It was part of the National Gallery and the civil service in 1897, but changed in 1972. Regarding the creation and change of the Tate Gallery, the argument about quangocratisation in Chapter 3 could be analysed in this chapter as follows.

6-4-1-1. Deciding factors of traditional government structures *Argument group 1* (1-1 to 1-3) try to attribute the cause of creation and quangocratisation to specific features and background of the museums.

Argument 1-1 considers the basic nature of goods and services as the primary determinant of its organisation type (see section 3-1-1). The works of art produced by an individual are intrinsically, *private goods* in the market. One person's consumption could detract from another person's consumption, as their consumption of the good would require a marginal cost (Stiglitz, 2000: 128-129); and the purchase of goods is impossible if not affordable. However, when these works of art acquire reputation, creating public values, they could be altered into *toll goods* which require utility charges. As with the case of public bridges, they have the characteristics of non-rival consumption, but might be excluded from consumption by entrance fees. Furthermore, those could become public goods finally, if they are freely displayed in public places (Gray, 1992: 13 and 2000: 23). To sum up, works of art have the features of *merit goods* (Chong, 2010: 34; Figure 3-2),²⁷⁴ so that the degree of state development and the recognition of the public could decide the nature of the goods. With this in mind, the following might be considered.

Firstly, the state tends to decide the nature of goods and services in consideration of the levels of public needs. According to Maslow, basic human needs organise themselves in 'a hierarchy of relative prepotency' (Maslow, 1987: 15-31).²⁷⁵ Only after *physiological needs* and *safety needs* have been

²⁷⁴ In addition, societies could remember their past by means of museums (Urry, 1996: 61-63; Bouquet, 2004: 195).

²⁷⁵ The basic human needs might be analysed from the perspective of tourism. The *physiological needs* mainly concerns famous restaurants. The *safety needs* are related to popular tourist attractions and in safe developed countries. The *belongness and love needs* have to do with a group tour, and the *esteem*

satisfied, the next levels of esteem or self-actualisation needs might emerge. From Maslow's perspective, developing countries should provide relatively lower levels of basic human needs first, but in developed countries, higher levels of needs such as cultural needs should be given by the state (Hewison, 1994: 429).²⁷⁶ If we observe works of art in a more detailed way, the preservation of *heritage of the past* is commonly important both in developed and developing countries by virtue of seeking for their national identities; however, the boost of the *contemporary* arts might be one of the prime missions of the state, as with welfare targets, only in more advanced societies (Hillman-Chartrand et al., 1989: 54-55).²⁷⁷

Secondly, as a type of merit goods, the ability of the cultural goods' producer is crucial (ibid, 46-47). If an artist of a specific work is not prominent or does not have potential value, the work remains private goods. On the contrary, when it is the other way round, the work could attain public goods status. In addition, the nature of works of art depends on their openness to the public (Connolly and Munro, 1999: 36, 384 and 407). If a rich person privately owns a work of art, then it will remain as a private good as other unpopular goods, no matter how famous it may be. By contrast, if it displays in a public museum, its characteristics will be altered into a public good.

Thirdly, contemporary arts would be under-produced or under-consumed without the intervention of the state (Chong, 2010: 34). In the light of supply, a favourable art market could encourage artists to produce new works of art creatively and incessantly. At the same time, continuous demand for such purchasing of works, as well as an educational system for cultivating imaginative artists is necessary. The creation of new contemporary art museums by the state, in this context, leads to the longstanding motivation of artists, dealing with the *problem of undersupply* or *public goods with positive externalities* (Bailey, 1995: 34-35; Stiglitz, 2000: 129; Leach, 2004: 213-214). Finally, an art museum could strategically be established in a depressed local area mainly for the purpose of development. For example, new museums in Liverpool and Glasgow contributed to a re-vitalisation of the regional economy, as with the case of Tate Modern (McClean, 1997: 34; Hewison, 1995: 282-283).

needs are connected to luxury shopping. Finally, the *self-actualization* needs are related to volunteerism or a cultural art gallery tour.

²⁷⁶ In advanced societies, the higher achievements of human creativity could be more easily generated (Gray, 1992: 13).

²⁷⁷ Contemporary arts are one of the integral parts of developed countries. Firstly, these could be one indicator which shows the competency of the state. These not only are an essential source of tourism, but also reflect the potential development level of the state. Secondly, the arts might be a primary policy method to integrate the people through cultural identity and national prestige (Hewison, 1994: 419). For more on this, see Pick (1986:152-164)

The origin of the Tate Gallery came from the bequest of an individual collection rather than from the consideration of the basic nature of art goods (section 6-2-1), but the government also played an important role in deciding on the construction of a new building (Fyfe, 2000: 140-147). In addition, this museum, as with other public museums, has maintained the free entrance-charge policy from the beginning and continued even after quangocratisation in 1972. In this regard, it could be said that it partly contains elements of public goods. However, in essence it is a kind of club goods; that is, users could be excluded from consumption despite its non-rival nature of consumption (Figure 3-2). In conclusion, the characteristic of the Tate Galleries could be properly explained by the existence of a *merit good*. Yet according to this theory, it is still uncertain that which type of organisations are needed when the government is involved.

Argument 1-2 supposes that the tasks and functions of museums have an influence on a particular type of organisation (see section 3-1-2). From this point of view, routine activities or executive tasks are required to be delegated to affiliated agencies and quangos, and only primary functions such as policy-formation should be maintained in the sponsor departments. For example, this approach suggests the following (Massey, 1997: 45):

.... the work is of **an executive character** which does not require Ministers to take responsibility for its day to day management...the work is **more effectively carried out by a single-purpose** organisation.... (Cmnd 7797, 1980: para 14, emphasis added)

However, this argument cannot articulate the differences among countries. Most OECD countries have a department responsible for their arts policy within the government; but it depends on the situation of each individual country whether the government directly operates art museums or not. Notwithstanding its operational nature, the Tate Gallery was directly run by the government at the outset, rather than by a quango. Yet for the last few decades, independence from the state has been more emphasised (OECD, 2001).²⁷⁸ By contrast, in Korea the first chosen form of the MoCA was as an affiliated institution (section 7-2) and its function was separated from policy tasks *ab initio*.

Moreover, the change of organisational types of national museums from direct government control to indirect quangos is difficult to explain by this

²⁷⁸ Being compared with the French case, the British galleries adopt a more market-oriented approach (Lumley, 1988: 10-11; IA4).

argument. In the U.K., the museums and galleries which began as government organisations have increased their size. For example, the British museum, the first national museum in the world (Burcaw, 1997: 26; Wilson, 2002: 11; Alexander et al., 2005: 58), began with 162 staff in 1753 (Gladden, 1967: 10-1 chart), but in 1965, its employees extended to around 1,000 (Bolton, 2008: 332-334). As shown in Table 6-5, as of 1971, the total number of employees, who were civil servants, in national museums was 3,315.

Table 6-5: Number of civil servants in national museums* (1966-1972)

	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972
British museum	1,143	1,311	1,459	1,477	1,528	1,605	-
British Museum (Natural History)	536	561	560	576	588	591	-
Imperial War Museum	113	134	133	143	148	163	-
London Museum	66	65	70	70	68	74	-
National Gallery	166	166	175	181	190	197	-
National Maritime Museum	122	128	144	148	147	161	-
National Portrait Gallery	48	50	50	49	53	59	-
Tate Gallery	135	133	147	160	162	184	-
Wallace Collection	64	62	66	65	66	65	-
National Galleries of Scotland	79	78	77	80	86	87	-
National Museums of Antiquities of Scotland	122	128	125	126	124	129	-
Total	2,594	2,816	3,006	3,075	3,160	3,315	-

* The totals exclude casual or seasonal staff, and part-time employees are counted as half-units.

Source: extracted from Civil Service Statistics 1975 (23-26)

From this approach, the organisational type of the Tate Gallery at present is a quango, owing to its functional reason (Gray, 1994: 150).²⁷⁹ However, in 1972 without an explicit change of its function, the staff of the Tate Gallery ceased to be counted as civil servants (CSD, 1975: 26). Meanwhile, the Science Museum²⁸⁰ and the Victoria & Albert Museum, which are similarly a part of the national museums, remained intact until April 1984 when they were accorded Trustee Status and thus were no longer included in the civil servants count (Hewison 1995: 268; Morris, 2010: 8; Anthony, 2010: 109-110), as shown in Table 6-6 (HM Treasury, 1985:17).²⁸¹ These museums had been part of the Department of Education and Science (DES); and only after 1972 had its statistics been shown separately (CSD, 1971: 17-20, 1972: 14 and 1975: 26), unlike other museums such as the National Gallery and the Tate Gallery which had continuously been considered as small independent departments.

²⁷⁹ See also Cmnd 7797 (1968: para 14) and Cmnd 4506 (1970: para 8-10).

²⁸⁰ The Science Museum originates from the South Kensington Museum which was created after the Great Exhibition in 1851 (Taylor, 1999: 100). It has had the status of a non-departmental public body since 1984, being managed at arm's length from the DCMS (SMG Annual Report and Accounts 2011-12: 26).

²⁸¹ The new Boards were established under the National Heritage Act 1983 (Alexander et al., 2005: 61).

Table 6-6: Number of civil servants in national science museums* (1972-1985)

	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
Victoria & Albert Museum	630	653	638	656	691	682	615	600	613	620	618	604	-
Science Museum	414	412	411	445	525	523	473	465	482	484	477	472	-
Royal Scottish museum	160	167	166	173	180	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Source: extracted from Civil Service Statistics 1985

In addition, argument 1-2 also has a weakness in that it cannot tell the differences of organisational type between quangos and executive agencies. One possibility is that there was no concept of an executive agency in the 1970s even when the hiving-off from government was a new trend. The criteria for determining organisational type between executive agencies and quangos are the functional tasks of these organisations, which are, unfortunately, relative and ambiguous rather than absolute. It is hard, therefore, for this argument to proffer tangible distinctions as to which part of the public sector should be maintained under direct government control.

Argument 1-3 focuses on the historical development route of national museums (see section 3-1-3). It assumes that the establishment of national museums is a unique phenomenon of specific countries rather than a universal procedure for every government. Since the U.K is not a newly independent country, its cultural institutions have not been formed all at once (Pick, 1988: 139; Flinders, 2008: 63). In order to investigate whether British cases are historically special or not, it is helpful to make some longitudinal and cross-national comparisons. Firstly, the Tate Gallery was founded in 1897 when other *national* museums in the U.K had also been established over a similar period, as shown in Table 6-7. Popular British national museums and galleries had been steadily created over the mid-1800s and early 1900s (Ford, 1992a, b and c; Spalding, 1998: 10; Coombes, 2004: 232-234).

Table 6-7: Years of establishment of National Museums in the U.K.

Year	Museum	Year	Museum
1414	Royal Armouries	1914	Geffrye Museum
1753	British Museum	1917	Imperial War Museum
1824	National Gallery	1900	Wallace Collection
1837	Sir John Soane's Museum	1934	National Maritime Museum
1851	National Museums Liverpool	1964	Museum of London Group
1852	Victoria and Albert Museum	1969	Museum of Science and Industry (Manchester)
1856	National Portrait Gallery	1911	Royal Naval Museum
1857	National Museum of Science and Industry	1958	Royal Marines Museum
1881	Natural History Museum	1960	National Army Museum
1890	Horniman Public Museum	1963	Royal Naval Submarine Museum
1897	Tate	1972	Royal Air Force Museum

Source: extracted from Hewison (1995:31); Donnellan (2013:14) and each museum's webpages

Secondly, other public and private museums in the U.K. and museums in European countries which rank in the world's top 100 for having the most visitors, as shown in Table 6-8, had also had a similar trend of creation over the period of the mid-1800s and early 1900s, with a few exceptions such as some contemporary art museums.

Table 6-8: Years of establishment of other museums*

Other art museums in the U.K.		Art museums in Europe		
Year	Museum	Year	Museum	Nation
1678	Ashmolean Museum	1563	Galleria dell'Accademia	Italy
1768	Royal Academy of Arts	1764	State Hermitage Museum	Russia
1823	City Museum and Art Gallery	1765	Galleria degli Uffizi	Italy
1864	Birmingham Museum and Art Gallery	1793	Louvre	France
1901	Kelvingrove Art Gallery	1819	Museo Nacional del Prado	Spain
1970	Serpentine Gallery	1856	State Tretyakov Gallery	Russia
1985	Saatchi Gallery	1870	Museum of Fine Arts (Boston)	U.S.
1996	Gallery of Modern Art	1870	Metropolitan Museum of Art	U.S.
		1879	Art Institute of Chicago	U.S.
		1880	Art Gallery of New South Wales	Australia

* World's top 100 museums in terms of visitors as of 2011

Source: cited from Art Newspaper (2012) and each museum's webpages

Museums and galleries since the 1800s have begun to flourish for the following reasons (Cummings et al., 1987b: 3-4; Abt, 2006: 124-129). The first point is that accumulated wealth in an age of Empire expansion and nationalisation enabled the state to build new museums (Prösler, 1996: 31-35). In particular, European countries and the U.S. contributed to the formation of modern museums (Fuller, 1992: 162-164; Fisher, 2004: 438-440). As of 2011, eight museums of the top 10 and fifty one of the top 100 are concentrated in just five countries, namely France, Italy, Germany, the U.S. and the U.K.²⁸² These countries, in general terms, set up the varied museums with the plentiful support of their royal families and their governments (Siegel, 2008: 6). In the second place, since the 1800s a myriad of artists and the public have jointly tried to promote art and educate the people (Minihan, 1977: 154; Hauser, 1989a: 148-152; Fyfe, 1996: 225; Gray, 2000: 37; Steer, 2001: 12; Siegel, 2008: 79; McClellan, 2008: 29-32). In this respect, the academies of Italy, the U.S. and the U.K. tended to have their own affiliated museums. Lastly, a sizable volume of private collections has been bequeathed by merchants and royal families after their death (Cummings and Katz, 1989: 6; Hooper-Greenhill, 1992: 167; Preziosi, 2004: 75; Freeman, 2006: 336). In addition, since the preservation and maintenance of the works of art, as well as inheritance tax, needs significant money, many descendants gave up ownership and donated them to the government.

The separation of Tate Modern in 2000 also happened on an ad-hoc basis. In 1991 the Audit Report recommended the creation of a new temporary

²⁸² The figures are analysed from Art Newspaper (2012).

exhibition space for the Tate Gallery in London in order to solve the problem of its outgrown collection (Donnellan, 2013: 18). However, in 1994 the plan was changed and the establishment of a permanent exhibition site was pursued (Brooke, 1994: 2).

Argument 1-3 focuses on the background of the formation of modern museums, which adopts a historical approach. It might describe historical facts in detail during the course of museum development, but has limits when attempting to pin down the reasons why a specific type of organisation is appropriate for any museum; and it is a theory about *formation* rather than *change*. It cannot, therefore, explain why the Tate Gallery changed into a quango in 1972.

6-4-1-2. External centripetal forces *Argument group 2* explore the common elements of quangocratisation across the world. From this perspective, AQ phenomena arose globally for similar reasons.


Argument 2-1 ascribes the cause of AQ to the trend of a policy fashion, a cognitive influence and a worldwide theory (Chong, 2010: 102-105; see section 3-2-1-1). It supposes that the experience of one successful country's policy, or the best practice, might have an influence on other countries' policies. However, this argument is relatively inappropriate to explain cases of a leading country in relation to public sector reform. The cases of governments which would follow the lessons of some leading countries' policies might be explainable by this argument, but the government which introduced the specific policy first could not logically be an applicable object of this policy fashion theory. In this regard, this argument is rather limited as an elucidation of the quangocratisation of British national museums.²⁸³ However, there is a possibility that the quangocratisation policy in the U.K. might be influenced by American private art museums, of which eleven were ranked in the world's top 100 for having the most visitors. For example, successful museums such as the Metropolitan Museum of Art, the National Gallery of Art, the Museum of Modern Art, the Art Institute of Chicago and the Museum of Fine Arts Boston, were privately established in 1870, 1937, 1929, 1879 and 1870 respectively (Mulcahy, 1987: 311; Cummings and Katz, 1989: 10; Abt, 2006: 130-131). However, there is no evidence to support this possibility. Meanwhile, Neo-liberalism or the NPM could not provide an elucidation for quangocratisation in the early 1970s, just because both theories were still not the prevailing thought at that time (Burnham and Horton: 2013: 14).²⁸⁴

²⁸³ Swedish museums (Kleberg, 1987: 176), however, might be considered as precedents which have been operated by public sector organisations (Fulton Report: Para 189).

²⁸⁴ For example, see Parker (2009).

Arguments 2-2 assumes that an economic crisis led to the reduction in civil servants in British national museums (see section 3-2-1-2). As shown in Figure 6-1, the annual GDP growth rate and the civil servants growth rate have a statistically significant correlation,²⁸⁵ even though the civil service figures have reflected the figures for three earlier years of GDP growth rate. However, before the quangocratisation of the Tate Gallery in 1972, the economic situation from 1968 to 1970 was relatively not so bad as to decrease civil servants strategically.²⁸⁶

Figure 6-1: Economic growth rate and civil servants growth rate (from 1968 to 2011)



Source: extracted and analysed from <http://databank.worldbank.org>, Civil Service Statistics 1970-2011

Meanwhile, one big economic shock persistently tends to influence the size of the civil service. The efforts of the Thatcher government to cut down on manpower figures since 1979 had an effect on the quangocratisation of the science museums in 1984 (Hewison, 1995: 267). At the same time, the reform of quangos from 2010 stemmed from an economic recession in the U.K since 2008 (HM Government, 2010; Conservatives, 2010). However, this argument still cannot explain both the quangocratisation of 1972 and 1984 with equal clarity.²⁸⁷

Argument 2-3 relates quangocratisation to the selfishness of political actors such as bureaucrats and politicians (see section 3-2-1-3). This theory believes that bureaucrats are liable to privately seek rent or budget maximisation, or to

²⁸⁵ Annual GDP Growth Rate in a specific year (for example, in 1968) and Annual Civil Servants Growth Rate *three years later* (for example, in 1971) have a Pierson positive correlation of 0.507, which is significant at the 0.01 level (Pearson correlation = 0.507, Sig (2-tailed) = 0.001, N=41). Interestingly, there are no statistically significant correlations between *one year* gap variables or *two year* gap variables; this means that the economic situation of the state might not be immediately reflected in the size of the civil service.

²⁸⁶ Even though the British economy was still in decline at that time (Dorey, 1995: 68; Pollitt, 1984: 48), before the first oil shock in 1973, its weakness had not become apparent. Meanwhile, in the early 1970s, there was criticism that public funds for the arts were poorly managed (Donellan, 2013: 112).

²⁸⁷ Although the economic crisis in the 1970s had an impact on the arts policy, the status of the Tate Gallery within the government was not directly influenced by this (Donnellan, 2013: 112-113).

expand their affiliated agencies (Hewison, 1994: 423; Froyen, 2005: 405; Page, 2012: 15-17). In this connection the bureau-shaping model assumes that bureaucrats prefer core missions to tedious routine businesses. The Fulton report in 1968 adopted a similar approach to Dunleavy's assumption, but the need for quangocratisation was raised in terms of efficiency (Cmnd 3638: paragraph 147 and 188). Since Lord Fulton was not one of the original higher civil servants and quangocratisation in 1972 might have been affected by his report,²⁸⁸ quangocratisation in the early 1970s might be analysed, in a more relevant way, from the perspective of efficiency rather than from the political will of bureaucrats. Meanwhile, the separation of Tate Modern in 2000 might be seen in terms of the strategy of bureaucrats to expand their empire, but in this case also, the idea of new museums came mainly from art circles and the Tate Gallery itself (Donellan, 2013: 18).

From this perspective, rational politicians also try to be re-elected or to maximise the vote of their constituents. Before the quangocratisation in 1972, Labour won the general elections in 1964, but the Conservatives returned to power in 1970 (Hennessy, 2000: 286-356). Important documents about administrative reform were made in 1968 and in 1970 when the next general elections would not take place soon, thus emphasising the differentiation from²⁸⁹ the last government rather than maximising the immediate vote. The quangocratisation of science museums in 1984, soon after the 1983 election triumph, could be seen in a similar vein. One of the purposes of this quangocratisation was to get the support from voters by slimming down central government, but the ostensible reduction in the civil service did not mean an automatic contraction of the public sector itself. In practice, the figures were not counted as the civil service still remained as public sector employees. In this regard, this reduction in civil servants by quangocratisation might be considered as a typical example of the numbers game (Hood, 1982: 52; Pyper, 1995: 47).²⁹⁰ Meanwhile, the establishment of Tate Modern in 2000 after New Labour's victory in 1997 was decided before the general election (Forder, 1994: 143; Spalding, 1998: 287-288), thus it is rather unreasonable to connect the creation of Tate Modern with the strategy of politicians.

²⁸⁸ According to Pyper (1995: 54), only three organisations were directly influenced by the Fulton Report. However, given the situation at that time, quangocratisation in 1972 might supposedly have something to do with the Report in 1968 (Cmnd 7797, 1980: para 63).

²⁸⁹ The Fulton Report (Cmnd 3638) and the Reorganisation of Central Government (Cmnd 4506) report were published in 1968 and 1970 respectively (Theakston, 1996: 89).

²⁹⁰ For example, the National Galleries of Scotland and the National Museums of Antiquities of Scotland are not included in the manpower count from 1972, but the new Royal Scottish Museum was established in 1972 (staff numbers of this museum in 1972 were 160).

6-4-2. The uniqueness of the creation of Tate Modern: Internal centrifugal forces

Argument group 3 (3-1 to 3-3), unlike *groups 1 and 2*, is concerned more with the wide variations in the causes of AQ among countries. This group, therefore, tries to explain the reason why specific countries quangocratised some areas of the public sector while others did not; and why particular agencies in one country quangocratised while others did not. *Argument groups 1 and 2* examine the driving forces of quangocratisation, whereas *group 3* also considers factors related to resistance or alteration factors of the reform. In sum, for the purpose of investigating the causes of AQ, the claims of *argument group 3* concurrently need to be explored.

Argument 3-1 thinks of quangocratisation as a model which relates to a trend of depoliticisation (see section 3-2-2-1). From this perspective, depoliticisation is an effective institutional tactic which enables a quango to acquire managerial efficiency, such as the delegation of personnel functions (Gray, 2000: 15; Chapman, 2004: 75) and to avoid the direct involvement of government in specific decisions by means of hiving-off (Gray, 1994: 124). This process of depoliticisation was reflected in the Fulton report as follows:

... there are areas of Civil Service work that should be '**hived off**' from the central government machine and entrusted to autonomous public boards or corporations. It has been put to us that **accountable management** is most effectively introduced when an activity is separately **established outside** any government department, and that this solution should be adopted for many **executive activities**, especially the provision of services to the community... There are also non-commercial activities in the public sector that are similarly organised, for example, the Atomic Energy Authority²⁹¹ (1968: paragraph 188, emphasis added).

For art museums such as the Tate Gallery, as far as political uncertainty and credibility are concerned, the need for a separation from their core departments is, in general terms, weaker than those of regulatory agencies and quasi-judicial bodies (Gilardi, 2008: 53). Yet from the viewpoint of efficiency, politicians are likely to concentrate on alleged incompetence and to suggest political solutions rather than to produce effective alternatives (Efficiency Unit, 1988; para 9), so that their disaggregation or quangocratisation could be justified in this regard. However, this explanation is still limited in a sense that the change in 1972 had taken place for a statistical purpose. Moreover, in the depoliticisation argument, efficiency and accountability are two sides of the same coin (Flinders, 2008: 240). It could show the spread of the notion of efficiency, while it might have difficulty in grappling with the problem of accountability (Dunsire, 1973b: 45; Radcliffe, 1991: 66). Yet regarding the

²⁹¹ The Atomic Energy Authority is an *Executive NDPB* which was established in 1954 based on the Atomic Energy Authority Act.

quangocratisation of the Tate Gallery in 1972, there was no official record about the efficiency and accountability debate. In addition, the notion and speed of depoliticisation of an individual country largely depends on governmental structure and the relationship between autonomy and accountability. Even within one society the phenomena of quangocratisation might take place in different ways in different periods. Yet the quangocratisation of national museums in 1972 and its equivalent in the science museums in 1984 took place in an identical way at the same time (Tables 6-5 and 6-6). To conclude, in the case of the British national art museums, the successful results of their quangocratisation since 1972 might partly come from depoliticisation, but this, in reality, was not an intended cause of quangocratisation *per se*.

Argument 3-2 focuses on the analysis of *policy process* in government (see section 3-2-2-2).²⁹² In the first place, when it comes to a policy-leading group, quangocratisation in 1972 was close to the *mobilisation* model by an elite group. Therefore, its cause and policy process were not disclosed outside the government and thus it is difficult to analyse. The change in 1972 was mentioned neither in the book of Spalding (1998) nor in the thesis of Donnellan (2013) which analysed the history of the Tate Gallery in a detailed way. By contrast, the creation of Tate Modern in 2000 had been incrementally and openly carried out since agenda-setting in 1991 and received considerable publicity. Since a new system of public funding was managed and distributed by the National Lottery Commission and the Millennium Commission, the creation of Tate Modern, as with other capital project programmes,²⁹³ attracted wide publicity (Millennium Commission, 1995: 6; HC 578, 2000: paras 4 and 7; Donnellan, 2013: 18-20; National Lottery etc. Act 1993: section 42).²⁹⁴

In the second place, in terms of the determinants of agenda confirmation, the relationship between the legislative branch and the executive branch was critical for the purpose of developing an institutional agenda into a decision agenda. For example, when the Superannuation Act of 1972 was amended with a view to dealing with the pensions of the new public servants, who were formerly civil servants (Schedule 1), co-ordination with Parliament was inevitable. Finally, this type of policy is a *constituent policy* which is relatively easy to adopt, while there was a possibility that the employees of the museums might be resistant to the policy, owing to the deprivation of their civil servant

²⁹² For example, see Gray (2000a: 27-29).

²⁹³ See Footnote 345.

²⁹⁴ Meanwhile, the quango cull policy in 2010, which did not influence the Tate Galleries, was possible on account of the change of government. The Conservative party had pledged to abolishing a considerable number of quangos to save money even before the general election in 2005 (Macleavy and Gay; 2005: 36).

status.²⁹⁵ Meanwhile, it does not seem that there was a specific *political scandal* which would be an agenda-triggering device in relation to the Tate Gallery during the period of the early 1970s and during the past few years before 2000 when Tate Modern was separated from the Tate Gallery.

In conclusion, in theory, an argument related to this policy process might well reveal the stages, procedures and elements of a quangocratisation policy in the British context, but in practice, it has a limitation in pinning down the starting point of the policy, especially when the policy process is veiled in a high level of secrecy or indifference.

For adherents of **Argument 3-3**, the quangocratisation of museums could be seen in terms of path dependence (see section 3-2-2-3). The national museums of Table 6-7, established in the past as such, have maintained their organisational type over the long haul. In that process, formal and informal institutions such as rules and strategies play a significant role in the choice of future direction. Additionally, a range of museums has been nationalised or created under the direct control of the state, following in the footsteps of the British Museum. Besides which, from this historical institutionalism's perspective, quangocratisation in 1972 and 1984, which was an abrupt change of the path, could be explained. In the early 1970s national museums stood at a critical juncture which led to a radical way beyond the path. After the Fulton Report in 1968, the modernisation of the civil service and hiving-off became a big-trend (Wilson, 1971: 539). As a result, in 1972, not only a fair number of national museums but also the National Libraries of Scotland, the Fine Art Commission and the Royal Commission on Historical Monuments were excluded from the civil service category (CSD, 1972: 16). Meanwhile, the economic crisis in the 1970s also broke down the equilibrium, or the inertia of a government policy on the civil service, and provoked the contraction of government and quangocratisation in 1984. From this perspective, the rebuilt path after the punctuation will remain until the next big change, and thus Tate Modern was created as an NDPB rather than as a part of the civil service or the private sector. In this perspective, national museums before 1972 had produced unintended consequences, such as bureaucratisation of curators and inflexibility, but had been maintained until the path-breaking quangocratisation.

This argument, however, has limitations on explaining a factor which caused sudden similar changes in other countries nearly contemporaneously. In other words, in this argument, the fact that a new type of organisation in one specific country could emerge in other different countries around the same period is underplayed. Moreover, this argument could not make clear when the

²⁹⁵ The employees of the Tate Gallery had a high level of expertise, as compared with other departmental bodies. One of the reasons why there were few resistances to quangocratisation in 1972 resulted from this speciality and professionalism which would secure their position even after quangocratisation.

path of national museums might be formed and changed. Finally, its approach is so situational that it could not be developed further. For example, it could not answer whether national museums, as with the case of railways and electricity, might privatise in the future or not.

6-4-3. Concluding Remarks

In relation to the creation and changes of the Tate gallery and Tate Modern, important events took place in the years 1897, 1972 and 2000.²⁹⁶ It was created in 1897 as part of the National Gallery, which was also a part of the civil service, but has been excluded from the direct control of government since 1972. Now that Tate Modern was established as a quango from the outset, its quangocratisation type falls into category V in Figure 2-2.²⁹⁷ However, its prototype was the quangocratisation in 1972, which falls into type II. An analysis of the quangocratisation in 1972 is of importance because it has continuously had an influence on the organisational type of national museums since then.

There are several historical facts before and after the quangocratisation in 1972 that need to be examined. Firstly, before 1972, there were few, if any, interests in the organisational type of national museums among academia and practitioners. Although eleven national museums were dealt with as small independent departments at the time, the Fulton Report in 1968 and the Government Reorganisation Report in 1970 never mentioned the task or functions of the national museums, nor did they draw the scholars' appropriate attention (Cmnd 3638 and 4506; Robson, 1956; Campbell, 1965). In addition, despite its exclusion from the civil service, there was no record of this phenomenon in the Tate Biennial Reports (Tate Trustees, 1972 and 1974). More surprisingly, neither did the book which tells the detailed official history of the Tate Gallery point out the fact (Spalding, 1998). Secondly, these national museums which stayed out of the public eye were abruptly ruled out from civil service statistics in 1972. One possibility is that this phenomenon might be the implementation of the hiving-off principle of the Fulton Report, as discussed in argument 3-1. However, in practice, national museums had never been a major policy issue since 1968 (Radcliffe, 1991: 65-70; Hennessy, 1989: 195-208; Theakston, 1995: 94-110; Lowe, 2011: 182-190). In this regard, a change in 1972 did not seem to take place directly in terms of the hiving-off principle, but seemed to happen in terms of the statistical control of civil service manpower, as the new Civil Service Department was created in 1968 (Clarke, 1971: 59-61 and 80). Thirdly, in spite of statistical change, since 1972 the administration

²⁹⁶ Besides which, there are several critical points when some important changes took place. For example, the years 1917, 1954, 1988 and 1992 have a special meaning in the development of the Tate Gallery (section 6-2).

²⁹⁷ For the causes of this separation, see former section 6-2-2.

and management of national museums had relatively not undergone a huge transformation until the *MGA 1992* replaced the former one. National museums, as with other public bodies, underwent an incremental change with the passage of time. For example, the level of the budget and staff of the Tate Gallery between 1970 and 1976 were broadly held flat (section 6-5-2-4).

With these facts in mind, in conclusion, the British case of the Tate Gallery could be best analysed in terms of path dependence. Since national museums had not traditionally caught politicians' attention, the Tate Gallery remained intact within the civil service. In 1972, however, in order to meet the needs of managing staff numbers, it was statistically excluded from the civil service without a significant change. In the meantime, a better way to enhance its management had not been examined for a long time until the government paid closer attention to its cultural policy and tried to make national museums more effective in 1992.²⁹⁸

6-5. Performance and Results of Quangocratisation

For the purpose of investigating whether specific quangocratisation was successful in accomplishing intended purposes, the performance and the accountability structure of that quango needs to be analysed considering the following factors. Firstly, as discussed in Chapter 4, the notion of the performance has to be defined first. In this thesis, as far as the scope of performance evaluation is concerned, the *organisational* dimension will be mainly discussed, and in terms of the criteria for performance *outcomes*, rather than economy, will be examined, given the characteristics of the arts policy where, in general terms, abstract aims are more emphasised. Secondly, when the performances of Tate Modern are explored, two different timings could be considered; that is the years 1972 and 2000. When the Tate Gallery was quangocratised in 1972, it was conducting the functions of the present Tate Modern and Tate Britain simultaneously. However, in this thesis, contemporary art museums in Korea and the U.K. are dealt with, so that Tate Modern since 2000 is the main objective of the analysis. When the comparison of before and after quangocratisation is difficult, as analysed in Appendices 3 and 5, national museums in other countries or other governmental organisations are examined in a complementary way. Thirdly, in order to deal with the performance of Tate Modern, its official objectives, which show the *raison d'être* of the body, should be examined first. Although the Tate Annual report suggests seven principal

²⁹⁸ In 1992, after John Major won the election, he wanted to emphasise 'the quality of life' and thus differentiate his cultural policy from his predecessors (Hewison, 1995: 297; Alexander et al., 2005: 85-86). Furthermore, this change in 1992, on the whole, could be ascribed to the preference of the main political actors such as the Secretary of State, David Mellor, who wanted to assume 'control of policy area that was to his tastes' (Hewison, 1994: 423; Gray, 2000a: 114-115).

aims, in a broad way they could be compressed as follows: the conservation and extension of the collections and facilities, presentation of an innovative exhibition and education programme, efficient management, increase in the communication and development of new audiences, and an improved understanding of British and Modern art (Tate Gallery, 2012: 3).


6-5-1. Outputs and outcomes

The most tangible and direct objectives of museums are, not unnaturally, the increase in attendance figures and the enhancement of visitor satisfaction, in that the final target of an art policy is the general public.²⁹⁹ The Tate Annual report articulates this aspect; it suggests that ‘to extend programmes and the experiences offered to visitors’ should be one of its three key goals.³⁰⁰

As shown in Figure 6-2, overall visitor figures have been continuously increased since the creation of Tate Modern in 2000. Figure 6-2 (a) illuminates that the total visitor numbers of the Tate group is dependent on Tate Modern; the Pierson correlation figure is 0.926.³⁰¹ Meanwhile, attendance figures of Tate Britain had been relatively flat until a significant increase in 1987 when the new Clore Gallery was open (Figure 6-2 (b)).


Figure 6-2: Numbers of annual visitors to the Tate Galleries³⁰²

(a) Comparison between total visitors and Tate Modern visitors (2002-2011, thousands)



Source: compiled from Tate Report (2002-2012)

(b) Visitors to the Tate Britain (1965-2012)



Source: compiled from Tate Report (1967-2012)

²⁹⁹ For some commentators, this visitor-focused approach does not seem to be desirable (Hooper-Greenhill, 1988: 216-220).

³⁰⁰ Theoretically, if a government effectively develops an art policy, economic externalities such as an increase in tourism and job opportunities might be gained incidentally (Chong, 2010: 34). In this context, New Labour emphasised the effect of the creative industry on the national economy (Alexander et al., 2005: 87; Pooke, 2011: 51-52). In practice, however, more practical and economic objectives are tourism and job opportunities, given that governments usually are more interested in the expansion of museum building than the purchase of works of art. It is estimated that Tate Modern contributed direct economic benefits to London of around £70 million each year and created 2,400 new jobs since 2000 (Tate Trustees, 2003).

³⁰¹ Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed, n=10).

³⁰² During the year 2005-2006 visitors temporarily decreased owing to terrorism in London in 2005.

Table 6-9 shows that Tate Modern has remained between the world's top third and top fifth in terms of attendance figures (Smith, 2005: 17). The average visitor numbers of the last 5 years is around 5 million, which equates to 58.8 per cent of that of the Louvre, but is still almost the same level of two other top museums. Given that it is a relatively newly established museum, it is thought to have had a great success.³⁰³ Meanwhile, as of April 2011, the U.K. retains four popular museums out of the world's top ten and sixteen out of the world's top 100 (analysed from *The Art Newspaper*, 2012), which shows that British museums, on the whole, are gaining ground in visitor attendance.

Table 6-9: International ranking of museum visitors (2007-2011)³⁰⁴

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Visitors (average, million)
Louvre (Paris)	1	1	1	1	1	8.5
British Museum (London)	4	2	2	2	3	5.6
Metropolitan Museum of Art (New York)	5	5	3	3	2	5.1
Tate Modern (London)	3	4	5	4	5	5.0
National Gallery (London)	8	7	4	5	4	4.7
National Gallery of Art (Washington)	6	3	6	6	6	4.7
Centre Pompidou (Paris)	2	12	7	8	8	3.7
Musée d'Orsay (Paris)	9	9	8	10	10	3.1
National Museum of Korea (Seoul)	-	-	10	9	9	3.0
Museum of Modern Art (New York)	15	10	11	7	13	2.7
Victoria and Albert Museum (London)	12	17	15	12	14	2.4

Source: extracted from www.theartnewspaper.com (2008-2012)

In addition, according to Table 6-10, Tate Modern came in third in 2011, as compared with other domestic tourist attractions, which demonstrates its status within the U.K. A closer look at Table 6-10 reveals that the top eight museums are located in London; one of the most important factors in museums attendance figures is the physical accessibility to the site (Pearce, 2011: 3-5).

Table 6-10: Museums' ranking in British domestic tourist attractions

	2009	2010	2011	Visitors (2011, thousands)
British Museum	1	1	1	5,849
National Gallery	2	3	2	5,253
Tate Modern	3	2	3	4,887
Natural History Museum	4	4	4	4,873
Science Museum	5	5	5	2,918
Victoria and Albert Museum	8	6	6	2,789
National Portrait Gallery	9	10	9	1,880
Tate Britain	11	11	13	1,488
Tate Liverpool	37	34	41	585
Tate St Ives	81	80	91	209

Source: compiled from <http://www.alva.org.uk>

³⁰³ The radical development of contemporary art began in Paris (Nittve, 2000: 10), but now Tate Modern is reckoned to be at the centre of contemporary art. One of the reasons for this phenomenon might be attributed to its free entrance-charge policy (Heinich, 1988: 200-203; Haines-Cooke, 2009: 60).

³⁰⁴ The attendance figures of worldwide museums from *The Art Newspaper* have been announced since 2007.

Figure 6-3 displays the characteristics of Tate Modern visitors. According to this, as of 2004, repeat visitors' percentage of total visitors is 53.3 and as of 2011, the ratio of overseas visitors among total attendance is 51 per cent.³⁰⁵

Figure 6-3: Ratios of specific groups in visitors (2000-2011, %)



Source: compiled from Tate Annual Report (2000-2012)

The ratio of repeat visitors reflects not only its competitive advantage over other museums but also its superior physical accessibility for London citizens (ICOM, 1992: 148-149). Meanwhile, overseas attendance figures for Tate Modern tend to be generally influenced by the whole number of overseas visitors to the U.K. and London.³⁰⁶ Data over the past ten years demonstrate that the attendance figures of Tate Modern are correlated with total overseas visitor numbers (analysed from World Bank and Annual Tate Reports 2002-2010).³⁰⁷ In particular, Tate Modern is located near St Paul's Cathedral and the London Eye, so that it might seem to be more attractive to tourists (Massey, 2000: 27).³⁰⁸

More interestingly, the special exhibition attendance figures of the world's top 200³⁰⁹ from 2003 to 2011, in which Tate Modern ranked thirteen times (The Art Newspaper, 2004-2012), shows particular characteristics of this museum. Unlike history museums such as the Louvre and the British Museum where the proportion of special exhibitions is relatively smaller (Duncan and Wallach, 2004: 59-64),³¹⁰ but for the contemporary art museums, special exhibitions are critical in order to show recent trends in art. Tate Modern,

³⁰⁵ Some of these data are so limited that data about repeat visitors after 2004 and overseas visitors before 2007 are not available.

³⁰⁶ In 2010, the overseas visitor number of each country is as follows: France 77.1 million, U.S. 59.8 million, Italy 43.6 million, U.K. 28.3 million, Germany 26.9 million, Korea 8.8 million and Japan 8.6 million (World Bank, International Tourism, Number of arrivals: Appendix 31).

³⁰⁷ Pearson correlation figure of this is 0.671 (2-tailed, n=9), which is significant at the 0.05 level. See Appendix 30.


³⁰⁸ Average visitors of St Paul's Cathedral and London Eye from 2000 to 2008 are 767 thousands and 3,750 thousands respectively (<http://www.stpauls.co.uk> and <http://www.londoneye.com>; Moore, 2005: 31).

³⁰⁹ The special exhibition attendance figures are different from the whole visitor numbers to museums.

³¹⁰ The Louvre, the British Museum and the National Gallery have experienced a comparatively small number of Top 200 exhibitions; 23 times, 11 times and 22 times respectively from 2003 to 2011. On the one hand, their permanent exhibitions are so popular that they could maintain huge attendance figures. On the other hand, regardless of their poor special exhibitions planning, it could remain at the top level just owing to the perception of the public.

however, has not been popular for its special exhibitions, as compared with the Pompidou Centre and the Museum of Modern Art (MoMA).³¹¹ That is largely because Tate Modern tends to prefer the introduction of new trends or contemporary works with a potential value to the display of well-known and popular artists such as Pablo Picasso and Van Gogh (ICOM, 1992: 170-172).

Figure 6-4: Educational function to children



Source: compiled from Tate Annual Report (2000-2012)

One of the other main objectives of national museums is education for the people (Mclean, 1997: 113; Serota, 2005: 5; Snow, 2005: 14). Figure 6-4 (a) shows the percentage of children under 16 among visitors (Travers, 2005: 26). The educational function of museums for the children has been traditionally emphasised (Markham, 1938: 114), so that the proportion of children among total visitors has been generally constant; however, direct educational programmes for the children have been fluctuating, depending on yearly plans.

The level of visitor satisfaction is no less important than attendance figures (Wright, 1989: 119-120). As shown in Figure 6-5, visitor satisfaction levels have been incrementally improved since 2000 (Mclean, 1997: 120).³¹²

Figure 6-5: Visitors satisfaction levels of Tate Modern



Source: compiled from Tate Annual Report (2000-2012)

In sum, varied outcomes suggest that the establishment of the new Tate Modern as an NDPB was in general terms successful.

³¹¹ The frequencies of success of the Pompidou Centre and the MoMA are 43 times and 69 times respectively.

³¹² In most cases, however, visitor satisfaction levels are so dependent on evaluators, contents and criteria, that it is difficult to use this indicator for the purpose of comparison between different bodies.

6-5-2. Managerial structure

The performance of Tate Modern could be analysed not only in terms of external outcomes which we discussed earlier, but also from an internal and managerial perspective which includes legal standing, governance, leadership, organisation structure, personnel management and budget. These factors are closely connected with the contexts of Chapter 5.

6-5-2-1. Legal standing Most executive NDPBs could mainly be created under a specific Act of Parliament, unlike executive agencies within departments.³¹³ National museums also have their own legal standings.³¹⁴ These robust statutory footings make the status of bodies more stable and consistent, while making the change of managerial structure inflexible.

The *National Gallery* was established in 1824 and its own Trustees and Director were appointed by the Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury (*National Gallery Act, 1854: para I*). Although the *National Gallery of British Art* (the Tate Gallery) was founded in 1897, it was still an offshoot of the National Gallery; thus directly administered and controlled by the Board of Trustees of the National Gallery until 1917. Even after a separate Board of Trustees for the Tate Gallery was founded by *Treasury Minute* in 1917 (Fyfe, 1996: 222), Director of the Trustees of the National Gallery maintained the responsibility for the financial affairs and all works of art of the Tate Gallery. However, the *NGTGA 1954* enabled the transfer of mission for the Tate Gallery collection from National Gallery Trustees to Tate Gallery Trustees and thus made the Tate Gallery legally independent from the National Gallery (Section 1 and 2). A new *Treasury Minute* in 1955 stipulated the scope of its collection and the responsibility for its management of the Gallery in detail. This Act was repealed by the *MGA 1992*,³¹⁵ which gave the Tate Gallery Board 'corporate' status (Forder, 1994: 131-132). In accordance with Section 9(4) and 9(5) of this act, annual reports should be made in a form which is directed by the Secretary of State for DCMS with the consent of the Treasury. The name of the Tate gallery has been re-branded as *Tate* since 2000 when Tate Modern was detached from Tate Britain.³¹⁶

³¹³ The Founding statute of Executive NDPBs might be an Act of Parliament, the Company Acts, an Order in Council, or a Royal Charter (Cm 7797: Para 11; Massey, 1995a: Para 2.1.3). For example, the National Portrait Gallery and the Wallace collection were established by *Treasury Minutes* in 1856 and 1897 respectively.


³¹⁴ The legal status of the Victoria and Albert Museum, the Science Museum, the Armouries and the Armed Forces Museum are based on the *National Heritage Act 1983* (footnote 281).

³¹⁵ The Act received Royal Assent on March 1992 before the general election in April (footnote 298).

³¹⁶ However, the name of the corporate body, the Board of Trustees of the *Tate Gallery*, is maintained (Tate Accounts, 2002).

The *Charities Act 1960* (Second schedule) and the *Charities Act 1993* added the Tate Gallery to the list of exempt charities³¹⁷ under which it does not need to register with the Charity Commission, but still maintained full charitable status.³¹⁸ Because of this legal position, the Tate Gallery is directly accountable to and is monitored by the DCMS rather than by the Charity Commission. In addition, the employees of the Tate are recruited under broadly the same conditions as the permanent civil service (Wilson, 1989b: 60), for pension purposes, by the *Superannuation Acts 1972* (Schedule 1).

Figure 6-6: Governance structure of the Tate Gallery Board



Source: compiled from <http://tate.org.uk>

6-5-2-2. Governance and leadership As shown in Figure 6-6 and 6-8, the governance structure of Tate Modern could be explored from two different perspectives.

First and foremost, Tate is governed by its Board of Trustees which is a kind of a ‘*body corporate*’. The Tate Gallery has already had its own Board since 1917, but only after 1954 has it enjoyed an independent status. Meanwhile, it has been regarded as a legal entity since 1992 and could make external decisions with its own responsibility.³¹⁹ In the U.K., each department

³¹⁷ It also includes the Royal Botanic Gardens, the British Museum, the Natural History Museum, the National Gallery, the National Portrait Gallery, the Wallace Collection, the Imperial War Museum, the National Maritime Museum and the Science Museum Group (*Charities Act 1993*, Schedule 2).

³¹⁸ Therefore, the Tate can receive gift aid or donations, but does not need to charge Inheritance Tax and Capital Gains Tax on these, even though it does not have a registered charity number (Tate Annual Accounts, 2012).

³¹⁹ Before the *MGA 1992*, the trustees of the gallery were ‘personally’ liable to make a contract (Forder, 1994: 131-132). However, after the Act, the Board of Trustees, as the legal entity, can hold both civil and criminal liability.

within the civil service system is operated by a Ministerial Executive Board (Jones et al., 2007: 514-518). These Boards, however, are just an internal consultative group with the aim of coordinating the opinions within the department and can be distinguished from the body corporate of the Tate Gallery which has external declaration powers. The general functions of the Board of Trustees are described in Section 2 of the MGA 1992. The Board is allowed to delegate its power to sub-committees which help to advise the Board on specific issues. The members of the sub-committees comprise both Trustees and non-Trustees, although each committee contains at least one Trustee (MGA 1992: Schedule 2, para 4(4); Forder, 1994: 135).³²⁰

The Tate Gallery Board which is comprised of fourteen members³²¹ decides basic policy goals and, along with senior Tate staff, proposes the strategic direction. In addition, the Board not only oversees the performance against objectives but also determines on major acquisitions and the allocation of resources. This collegial decision-making body differs from monocratic leadership (Baylis, 1989: 11-13 and 124-125). One of the advantages of this collegial leadership is the deployment of diverse experiences and expertise, which could lead to reasonable decision making. In addition, a wide range of the participation of varied professionals, who might show different interests, not only brings about increased support, but also allows the organisation to acquire democratic aims through the extensive opportunity of involvement ('t Hart, 1994: 8; Handy, 1999: 151-153). In contrast to these benefits, a delay in decision making tends to emanate from having a number of participants, which, however, might also provoke some buck passing. Moreover, there is a continuing concern over having a few powerful Trustees who could sway the others when Board members do not have sufficient autonomy and professionalism. In this case, the Board will be retained as window dressing and the Board members might be regarded as just 'rubber stamps' (McDaniel and Thorn, 1994: 37-42; Lee and Choi, 2008: 578; Handy, 1999: 162-163).

In reality, a closer analysis of the members of the Tate Board since 1960 reveals³²² that in the 1970s and 1980s, a combined share of artists and other prominent figures accounted for a large portion and the Board was not operated in a tighter way, as compared to other commercial Boards.³²³ In terms of

³²⁰ For example, there are the Tate Modern Council, Collection Committee, Audit Committee, Remuneration Committee and Ethics Committee (www.tate.org.uk).

³²¹ In 2008, Tate expanded the number of Board members from twelve to fourteen, thirteen of which are appointed by the Prime Minister, while one of Tate's Trustees is a member of the National Gallery Board of Trustees (Forder, 1994: 135).

³²² This analysis is based on sixty seven members who retired after 1960, but excludes the incumbents and the National Gallery Liaison Trustees. See Appendix 23.

³²³ The portion of artists was 46.9 per cent (15 among 32) in the 1970s and 1980s, and has decreased to 31.4 per cent (11 among 35) since 1990.

quangocratisation, after the exclusion of the civil service in 1972, there were few significant changes, so that it could rarely have had an influence on the operation of the Board. At the same time, after the acquisition of corporate status in 1992, the ratio of businessmen and journalists amongst Board members has increased and the administration of the Board has become more proactive (see Appendix 23).³²⁴ As the notion of efficiency has been emphasised, strategic objectives such as streamlining of management, fundraising through a close link with entrepreneurs and the maximisation of advertising have been underlined (Wu, 2001: 108-111; Roche and Whitehead, 2005: xxi). As far as the term of office is concerned,³²⁵ the average tenure of Board members was 7.7 years in the 1970s and 1980s, whilst 6.5 years since the 1990s (Spalding 1998: 311; Tate Report 1967-2012).³²⁶

Table 6-11: Keepers or Directors of the Tate Gallery

Name	Terms of office	Tenure (Year)
Charles Holroyd	1897–1906	10
D.S. MacColl	1906–1911	6
Charles Aitken	1911–1930	20
J.B. Manson	1930–1938	9
John Rothenstein	1938–1964	27
Norman Reid	1964–1979	16
Alan Bowness	1980–1988	9
Nicholas Serota	1988–2012	25
Average tenure		15.25

Source: extracted from The Tate Webpage

The director, who manages the day-to-day operations of the Tate Gallery, also plays a pivotal role in the administration of Tate Modern. The director is appointed by the Board,³²⁷ with the approval of the Prime Minister, as set out in the *MGA 1992* (Schedule 2, para 3(1)), and is accountable to the Board of Trustees (Forder, 1994: 135). As shown in Table 6-11, the average tenure of directors is almost fifteen years which is quite longer than the heads of normal departmental agencies. In general terms, the long tenure of the director allows the gallery to establish longer-term development projects, makes the organisation stable and has a particular strength in building external networks.³²⁸

³²⁴ The Board elects the Chairman from among its own members and at least three members of the Board must be practising artists (*MGA 1992*). In 1987, the number of artist trustees was reduced from four to three (Wu, 2002: 101).

³²⁵ The maximum term of appointment is five years, although members are usually expected to be re-appointed for a second term of office (Forder, 1994: 135; Wu, 2002: 101). When it comes to artists, they do not have a tendency to be re-appointed.

³²⁶ The term of office changed from seven years to five years.

³²⁷ Sir Nicholas Serota, who became the Director in 1988, was appointed by the Civil Service Commission, while Sir Alan Bowness was appointed by the Treasury (Donellan, 2013: 18).

³²⁸ However, it also has a risk of running out of steam.

If we focus on the current Director, Nicholas Serota, who has been the director of the Tate Gallery since 1988 (Craig-Martin, 2000: 13)³²⁹ and who experienced the critical change of 1992 and 2000, his case has some implications in terms of leadership and quangocratisation. He is often considered to have strengthened the basis for the development of the Tate Gallery, as compared to its pre-quangocratisation period. Since he had a plentiful experience of fundraising as a CEO before, he created a *Development* department for the purpose of raising money professionally (Wu, 2002: 103, 136-137; Alexander et al., 2005: 83-84; Lee, 2006b: 187-188). Moreover, he has contributed to the significant physical extension of the building (Pooke, 2011: 60). However, these were possible not only because of his robust leadership, but also because of a favourable situation; the quangocratisation of the Tate Gallery had built a foundation for this strengthened leadership.

Meanwhile, the strong personality of Serota has also influenced the strategic directions of the Tate Gallery. It is debatable whether a leader should weave his or her way through the challenges (Porter, 2006)³³⁰ or should just acclimatise to the situation (Mintzberg, 2004: 10; Chong, 2010: 149-153). His role as a topmost curator of the Tate Gallery has to do with the former perspective (Oxlade, 2008: 105). Serota has been an ardent supporter of YBAs (Young British Artists), which might have a high potential for development (Farthing, 2010: 556-557; IA2), and he consistently maintains the idea of 'taste shaping of the public' for which the national collections play an essential role (Waddell, 2000: 167; Serota, 2003: 52; Chong, 2005: 93-94). This point of view has attracted huge media attention and also has provoked critical controversy (ICOM, 1992: 170).

6-5-2-3. Organisation structure and Personnel management The organisational structure has also influenced the performance of the Tate Gallery. In particular, quangocratisation of the Tate Gallery has brought about several changes in the operation of the gallery.

Firstly, quangocratisation enables the organisation to bring in a professional workforce, in contrast to the generalist tradition of departmental organisation. The recruitment process might be improved by the removal of bureaucratic procedures and be specialised so that it would select highly trained workers.³³¹ In addition, a gallery could build a high performance culture where

³²⁹ He took over the position from Sir Alan Bowness who first designed the Turner Prize in 1984 and was successful in cultivating artists and gallery marketing (Spalding, 1998: 203, 227; Pooke, 2011: 46).

³³⁰ Understandably, the level and content of the leadership is different from country to country (Hofstede, 2007: 239-244; Rhodes and t' Hart, 2014: 11).

³³¹ Meanwhile, in the civil service, a large portion of responsibility for recruitment was also delegated to each department after the 1982 and the 1991 Civil Service Order in Council (Pyper, 1995: 30).

its staff are rewarded and recognised for their performance and ability, and thus the skilled employees would remain longer in the gallery.³³²

Figure 6-7: Structure Charts of the Tate Gallery

(A) As of April, 1971-72³³³



Source: Compiled from The Tate Trustees 1970-72 (216-217)

(B) As of April, 1991-92



Source: Compiled from Tate Trustees 1990-92 (86-89)

In reality, the comparison of organisational structures between 1972 and 1982 shows that there were few changes in the traditional function and composition of the Tate Gallery, while the overall number of staff had increased from 42 to 65.³³⁴ However, as shown in Figure 6-7, the number of staff had risen considerably to 250 by 1992.³³⁵ In particular, the employees for collection and conservation, which are the fundamental functions of a gallery, increased the most to 110 and other parts such as education and communication also grew significantly.³³⁶

³³² The number of permanent posts of the Tate Gallery in 1972 was 75, while that of temporary posts was 109 (total 184); thus was up 59.2 per cent. By contrast, the portion of temporary posts in the whole civil service was 10.4 per cent (52,035 employees amongst 499,690 non-industrial staff) (Civil Service Statistics, 1975).

³³³ Tate Report 1972 contained the list of the gallery staff, but it was quite fewer than the number of civil service statistics. It seems that Tate Reports from 1972 to 1982 had not contained the list of temporary posts.


³³⁴ A sizable number of staff remained in the gallery during the period between 1972 and 1982. At the same time, the portion of collection and conservation in 1972 was 40.5 per cent in comparison to that of 1982, which was 46.2 per cent, while the administration part accounted for 40.5 per cent and 32.3 per cent respectively, and the ratio of education and communication was 19 per cent and 21.5 per cent respectively. According to Spalding (1998:168), particularly the function of conservation strengthened during that period.

³³⁵ It does not include the workforces of Liverpool, for the benefit of comparison.

³³⁶ The portions of collection and conservation, administration, and education and communication in 1992 were 44 per cent, 30.8 per cent, and 25.2 per cent respectively.

For the sake of comparison, once the case of 2012 is examined, as shown in Figure 6-8, we can find considerable changes. Above all, the total size of three branches is bigger than that of the Tate Britain which was the origin of the gallery. Owing to the differentiation of functions, the size of Tate Britain is smaller than that of the Tate Gallery in 1972 and that of Tate Modern in 2012. In addition, there were as many as 126 curators in the gallery in 2006, so that this improvement of the professionalism in the gallery corresponds to the needs of the public and art circles. As far as Tate Modern is concerned, Figure 6-8 (b) shows that the portion of staff in exhibition and education is relatively high.

Figure 6-8: Organisational structures of the Tate Gallery and Tate Modern



Source: Extracted from Tate Trustees (2002-2004, 2004-2006)

Source: Extracted from <http://www.tate.org.uk>,
The Board of Trustees of the Tate Gallery 2011-12 (17)
<http://reference.data.gov.uk/gov-structure/organogram>

Secondly, as shown in Figure 6-8, the Tate Gallery pursues the separation of *cooperate* and *operational* tasks.³³⁷ During the period of the 1970s and 1980s, the organisation of the gallery was comparatively simple and varied tasks were mixed together; there were little need to differentiate its functions. On the contrary, the 2012 structure chart of the Tate Gallery reveals a sharp contrast. The administrative units of Tate Modern and Tate Britain are cooperatively managed by its Deputy Director and the Chief Operating Officer with shared responsibilities. Since both branches are located in central London, their organisations are based on *functional departmental structure* principles, while the Tate Liverpool and the Tate St Ives were created on the principles of

³³⁷ Since 2007, the Tate Gallery has publicised only the list of senior staff; thus data after 2007 are not available (<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk>).

³³⁸ According to Mintzberg (1979: 24), '*operating core*' and '*support staff*' are different in their function and structure.

self-contained departmental structure (Robey and Sales, 1994: 183-193).³³⁹ Furthermore, the restaurants of the Tate Gallery are outsourced, whilst in 1972 the employees of the restaurant were directly administered by the gallery (Tate Trustees, 1972: 47). After gaining a legal personality, it could separate its inessential elements from the exhibition parts and set up a private company to conduct market-type activities in the private sector.³⁴⁰ Meanwhile, there is a possibility that *cooperate services* such as the Human Resources and Information Services have been overly swollen, given that the managerial structures would influence the direction of the arts organisations (Chong, 2010: 160). The administrative units themselves tend to concentrate on management activities, so that, in general terms, there is a concern that these functions might grow to an uncontrollable level. For example, in 1992 the Administration Director was also the Deputy Director and his or her functions were relatively limited (Tate Trustees, 1992), but at present the remit of the Deputy Director is so sizable that the manpower under his control outnumbers the exhibition and collection parts.

Thirdly, the organisation structures since the early 1990s have usually been decided by the changes of senior staff (Tate Trustees, 2008: 60). For example, once a director of a specific unit resigned then that unit tended to be merged into another unit, while another director of a different unit who had long experience of dealing with administrative tasks would be liable to extend his business area.³⁴¹ This pattern of organisation management, on the one hand, is so flexible that organisational structures could be dynamically adjusted to the environment depending on the leadership, competence and experience of a highly skilled individual. On the other hand, however, whether the personal failure of a specific member of staff could be 'institutionally' corrected or not is, to some extent, open to dispute. Moreover, a powerful director might sway the Tate Board vis-à-vis the administrative issues.

Finally, quangocratisation has rarely changed the structure of remuneration and pay levels of the employees.³⁴² A comparison with the employees of another public sector, such as the staff of the DCMS, which is the sponsor department of the Tate Gallery, demonstrates that quangocratisation could not have a significant effect on the pay structure, as shown in Figure 6-9.³⁴³

³³⁹ On the whole, however, the Tate as a single organisation still shares its collections without barriers.


³⁴⁰ Tate Board has the power to create one or more companies which carry out inessential parts of the museum such as sales and the production of souvenirs (*MGA 1992*; Section 3). The advantages of this separation are a reduction in staff costs, a focus on integral function and an avoidance of business risks (Folder, 1994: 140).

³⁴¹ For example, current Deputy Director has extended his territory of organisation and tasks since 1988.


³⁴² Tate Board employs its own staff and pays remuneration with the consent of the Treasury (*MGA 1992*; Schedule 2, paras 3(4) and (5)).

³⁴³ According to Massey (1995a: Para 2.3.4), many NDPB officials thought that their system was based on the old style civil service pay and grade system.

Figure 6-9: Pay level of the Tate Gallery (As of March, 2013)
(a) Tate Gallery



(b) Department of Culture, Media, Sport



Source: compiled from <http://reference.data.gov.uk/gov-structure/organogram>

6-5-2-4. Budget In order to examine the performance of quangocratisation, the budget of the Tate Gallery needs to be analysed in terms of its *income* and *expenditure* over the past forty five years.


The *income* structure of the budget, first of all, is as follows. Firstly, the sizes of the purchasing fund between 1970 and 1992, which are adjusted by the inflation rate, remain overall at average levels,³⁴⁴ although on the surface it does look as if they have considerably increased over the period of the past 45

³⁴⁴ Similarly, the expenditure of AC slightly increased in the 1980s (Gray, 2000a: 109).

years, as shown in Figure 6-10 (a) and 6-11 (b). One of the main reasons for this budget freeze comes from the attitude of the Treasury which is apt to follow the previous year's budget. For example, despite the relatively robust economic growth, the grant-in-aid for collection purchase had been frozen during the period from 1970 to 1974, which partly meant that the Tate Gallery was not in the arena in which the Treasury was interested. Unlike private museums, quango museums could secure stable grant-in-aid, while this does not mean that quangocratisation could influence the government support vis-à-vis grant-in-aid for collection purchase. Yet in contrast to collection purchase, the building of the gallery has been extended since the 1990s by means of irregular special government support.³⁴⁵

Figure 6-10: Changes of income level

(a) Grant-in-aid for collection purchase (Tate Gallery, 1966-92)^{346*} **(b) Components of income (Tate Modern, 2004-12)³⁴⁷**



Source: compiled from Tate Trustees (1967-92), Tate Annual Accounts (2004-12)

* Adjusted Purchasing Funds are expressed in 1991/92 prices. Inflation rates are based on <http://safalra.com>.

Secondly, the sum of income has been fluctuating depending on the level of sponsorship, as shown in Figure 6-10 (b). This trend might make it difficult for the gallery to make a long-term plan (Tate Trustees, 2010). For example, if there were, in the market, a specific work of art, which could be expected to be


³⁴⁵ The Millennium Commission significantly contributed to the creation and extension of Tate Modern. It was one of the independent NDPBs whose Chair was the Secretary of State for the DCMS and received the National Lottery funds which commenced in 1994 (Hewison, 1994: 422; Gray, 2000a: 119-121; Wu, 2002: 277-278). The Commission also awarded £1.4 million to Tate Modern in 2003 in order to enhance the riverside entrance. However, income from the National Lottery ceased in August 2001, while the distribution of project grant funding continued until the Commission was abolished in 2006. Meanwhile, a building extension project might be supported not only by government grant-in-aid but by funding a wide range of organisations. In this connection, the gallery has ambitious plans for the *Tate Modern Project* and the *National Art Collections Centre*.

³⁴⁶ Data about the size of purchasing funds from grant-in-aid after 1993 are not available.

³⁴⁷ The power to charge for admission was guaranteed by the *MGA 1992*. However, the National Gallery and Tate Gallery traditionally has not charged entrance fees, unlike the Victoria and Albert Museum which had charged admission until 2001 when the new government policy was adopted (Smith, 2005: 18). One of the reasons for this is that when Turner bequeathed all his works to the state, he attached a condition that they should be displayed freely (Forder, 1994: 138). Meanwhile, in the case of special exhibitions, admission is not usually free of charge.

purchased by the Tate Gallery, the gallery might not buy it because of the budget limit. The gallery, therefore, would need to fund-raise as best it could, just in case there were problems working against its plan, not only for a building extension implementation but also for purchasing works of art. It does not seem that quangocratisation leads directly to an increase in donation activities, but in practical terms it does make it easier for the gallery to fund-raise from the various board members and corporate sponsors.³⁴⁸

Figure 6-11: Changes of self-generated income level



Source: compiled from Tate Trustees (1990-1998), Tate Annual Accounts (2000-2012), <http://safalra.com>

Thirdly, regarding the components of income, the portion of government support among the total income has been relatively reduced, whilst the gallery mainly had been reliant on grant-in-aid until the early 1970s. According to Figure 6-11, as of April 2012 around 60% of the income has been raised from non-governmental sources. From the beginning the Tate Gallery has been greatly affected by diverse benefactors (Fyfe, 1996: 214-215), but the central source of its budget during the period from 1960s to 1980s had mostly come from the government. Therefore once there was a decrease in grant-in-aid, then that was a serious setback for the gallery (Tate Trustees, 1988: 10; Spalding, 1998: 208). This trend has made a turn since 1995 when the ratio of non-governmental funds overtook grant-in-aid³⁴⁹ with the help of corporate sponsors, individual donors, and three connected charities.³⁵⁰ However, in any

³⁴⁸ The attractive central location of Tate Modern is one of the reasons for increasing corporate sponsorship (Wu, 2002: 141; Alexander, 2005: 84). At the same time, leading art galleries and collections in the U.K., including the British Museum and the Tate Galleries, have gradually become dependent upon corporate sponsors such as BP (Pooke, 2011: 29-32). Galleries' aiming high with fundraising targets after quangocratisation as well as the encouragement of the Thatcher government, contribute to this phenomenon (Wu, 2002: 57). In 1980 there was little corporate sponsorship (Tate Trustees, 1982: 11), while there were 68 corporate sponsorships in 2012 (2012: 68). Regarding the merits and demerits of corporate sponsorship, see ICOM (1992: 29-33).

³⁴⁹ There are also considerable cases of donated works of art (For example, see Blazwick and Wilson, 2000: 238-239). Meanwhile, the purchase of works of art is treated as capital expenditure, but the policy of including works of art as assets only came into practice from April 2001.


³⁵⁰ Tate also has several connected charities such as Tate Members, the Tate Foundation and the American Patrons of Tate Trustees (Tate Trustees, 2012: 68). Since the late 1950s, the Friends of the

case, the support from government might be still an important stepping stone on the path to enhanced fundraising aims (Massey, 1995a: para 2.3.8).


Meanwhile, the *expenditure* of the Tate Gallery, which is juxtaposed with the income structure, consists of capital expenditure and operating expenditure. *Operating expenditure* is comprised of the money used for everyday business processes, while *capital expenditure* is composed of the money invested in or spent on assets, buildings and works of art.

Figure 6-12: Changes of Operating Expenditure and Capital Expenditure


(a) Total Operating Expenditure




(b) The components of Operating Expenditure



(c) Total Capital Expenditure



(d) The components of Capital Expenditure



Source: extracted and analysed from Tate Annual Report (2000-2012) ³⁵¹

As far as operating expenditure is concerned, as shown in Figure 6-12 (a), it has been gradually increasing and taking up a larger portion of the whole expenditure. The ratio of the running costs to the total expenditure in 1972 was 23.4 per cent (Tate Trustees, 1970-72: 231), while the equivalent was 51.9 per cent in 1992 (Tate Trustees, 1990-92: 79); it was 68.4 per cent in 2002 and 63.5

Tate Gallery had contributed to purchase sizable major works of art (Tate Trustees, 1996: 83; Mclean, 1997: 176).

³⁵¹ In 2008, d’Offay donated the highest-ever level of 725 contemporary and post-war works of art to the major public galleries including the Tate Gallery (Pooke, 2011: 26).

per cent in 2012. These changes are largely because of a huge increase in the costs of the *public programmes*. According to Figure 6-12 (b), the biggest component of the operating expenditure is the cost of the public programmes, in contrast to the equivalent in the 1970s when the largest portion was taken up by *staff salary and wages*. The increase in costs related to the public programmes, unlike *uncontrollable expenditure* which needs relatively constant amounts of money every year, reflects the overall enhancement of exhibitions and displays which are, of course, the most essential part of the gallery. Increased fundraising, as mentioned earlier, also seems to be helpful for creating fruitful projects.

In terms of capital expenditure, its size is considerably irregular particularly due to the fluctuation of donations. The donation of works of art, as well as donated money which could partly be spent on the purchase of other works of art and investment, is the main factors generating this irregularity. The portion of purchasing expenditure within the total expenditure was 39 per cent in 1972 (Tate Trustees, 1970-72: 227-231), while the equivalent was 11.2 per cent in 1992 (Tate Trustees, 1990-92: 79); it was 12.3 per cent in 2003³⁵² and 6.0 per cent in 2012. This shows that an overall increase in budget does not necessarily lead to the purchasing of works of art. A donation is mostly dependent on a benefactor's personal will; thus it is not directly linked to quangocratisation. However, the museum's level of development and the degree of reasonably efficient management after quangocratisation might have had an effect on sponsorships.

6-5-3. Autonomy and control: institutional constraints

In order to explore the impacts generated by quangocratisation, the changes in the autonomy and control structures of the organisation also need to be examined. These are just internal changes but they could have an indirect influence on organisational performances (section 4-3). Moreover, these demonstrate how properly quangos respond to stakeholders.

As discussed in Chapter 4, autonomy, control and accountability are inseparable from each other (section 4-1), and their relationships are likely to be decided by the control processes and mechanisms of each state. As an executive NDPB, Tate Modern is monitored by varied organisations and the objectives of monitoring could be divided into two groups: monitoring the operation of the Tate Gallery itself and monitoring the Board of Trustees.

³⁵² The data in 2002 is not available.

The Tate Gallery itself is being monitored in at least five different ways. Firstly, there is a basic framework for internal accountability procedures. This chain of accountability is comprised of the sub-units of Tate Modern and the Director's Group, which assist and are responsible to the Tate Director who is accountable to the Tate Board and the DCMS for the general management of the gallery (Forder, 1994: 139; *MGA 1992*: Section 2(7), Flinders, 2008: 53); and the Tate Board which not only is responsible for the running of the gallery but also appoints the Director for a period of seven years. Unlike ordinary departmental organisations, the Tate Gallery retains more autonomy but is controlled by the Tate Board which has sub-committees to administer overall management of the Tate Gallery (Figure 6-6). Meanwhile, the Tate Gallery is officially monitored by two key documents; the *Funding Agreement*, and the *Management Statement and Financial Memorandum*, which outline the relationship between the Tate Gallery and the DCMS (DCMS, 2010: 5),³⁵³ while until the mid-1990s NDPBs had rarely clarified their responsibilities to sponsor departments in an official form (Massey, 1995a: para 1.1.4; Massey, 1997: 24).³⁵⁴ These official documents are presented in the exchange for annual funding which has been received from the state through the DCMS since 1998³⁵⁵ when the Department for National Heritage was abolished. Each national museum has to suggest annual targets for the following year and to evaluate the levels of attainment for the previous year, but the numbers of targets and the type of objectives have constantly changed; thus making it difficult to control through performances³⁵⁶ (Chong, 2010: 53-58). For example, there were twenty targets set for the Tate Gallery in 2004 (Tate Gallery, 2004: 8); seven in 2006 (Tate Gallery, 2006: 5); and eighteen in 2012 (Tate Gallery, 2012:13).³⁵⁷

³⁵³ The contents and forms of these *Agreement* and *Memorandum* were quite different from each other in the beginning and thus the comparison and overall management were difficult (Massey, 1995b: Para 2.2.4, for example, see DCMS, 2011). HM Treasury, however, currently gives a detailed guideline (HM Treasury, 2007b: 177-192).

³⁵⁴ According to Massey:

There is a recognition of the need for each NDPB to prepare a 'Management Statement', broadly analogous to an agency's Framework Document (1995a: para 1.1.4)

³⁵⁵ Since 1970, there have been significant changes in government departments related to the Tate Gallery (Ridley, 1987: 233). These could be one of the factors that illustrate the movement of emphasis on the government cultural policy. In 1972, staff of the *Royal Fine Art Commission* and the *Standing Commission on Museums and Galleries* ceased to be counted as civil servants, as with the Tate Gallery (CSD, 1975: 25). The *Department of Education and Science* (DES) had had responsibilities for the arts, but from September 1979 the *Office of Arts and Libraries* (OAL) had taken over responsibilities for the arts and libraries from the Department until its functions and staff returned to the DES in April 1981 (HM Treasury, 1982: 10). However, in July 1983 the OAL became independent again and remained a semi-detached unit of government (HM Treasury, 1984: 12; Gray, 2000a: 113), whose staff numbers were 46 in 1984 and 60 in 1990 (HM Treasury, 1990: 23). In July 1992, the *Department of National Heritage* (DNH) was created (Taylor, 1997: 443; Gray, 2000a: 59; Ravenscroft, 1994: 96) and staffed by personnel on transfer from varied departments such as OAL and the Department for Education (HM Treasury, 1993: 29) in order to proffer a coordinated framework (Gray, 2000a: 114). As with the OAL, the DNH continued funding national museums and galleries (NAO, 1993: 6; Gray, 1994: 135, 139). In July 1997, New Labour rebranded the DNH as the *Department for Culture, Media and Sport* (DCMS) for symbolic reasons (Gray, 2000a: 115-117).

³⁵⁶ See Appendix 5.

³⁵⁷ More importantly, the targets have been changed irregularly and unpredictably (Cm 4658, 2000: 12). For an NDPB, it is hard to introduce measurable performance indicators. In addition, the setting of 'challenging performance' is an essential part of performance management, but it is rather difficult to

Secondly, in addition to the sponsor department, other departments are involved in securing accountability of the Tate Gallery. The Cabinet office is engaged in the management of overall public bodies in relation to their number and operation,³⁵⁸ whilst HM Treasury is concerned with the efficient use of its budget; and the Office for National Statistics (ONS) is involved with the statistics.³⁵⁹ In particular, with regard to uniform financial management across the NDPBs, a Treasury manual, *Managing Public Money*, generally provides advice on a comprehensive range of issues relating to financial management and accountability (HM Treasury, 2007b: 6).³⁶⁰ The Director of the Tate Gallery is the Accounting Officer, and is responsible for the internal and external auditors' assessment.³⁶¹ However, accountability in this sense could not commonly be extended to the overall responsibility for administration and is just limited to finance.³⁶²

Thirdly, the Tate Gallery is accountable to Parliament through an annual report by virtue of a statutory duty. Before April 1986, the Tate Gallery was funded by direct vote from Parliament (Forder, 1994: 148); however, this control was assuaged and instead, a financial report system was strengthened. An annual report is presented to the Secretary of State for DCMS first and is delivered to Parliament, including Select Committees, next. In formal terms, Parliament still retains financial and constitutional accountability, but in practice its involvement in the Tate Gallery is quite limited (Spalding, 1998).

Fourthly, in addition to these main responsibilities, the Tate Gallery should also follow the guideline of the *Museums, Libraries and Archives Council* (MLAC).³⁶³ The Tate Gallery was accredited to the MLAC and thus is eligible for *Acceptance in Lieu* (AIL) acquisitions (Bailey, 2006; SCST, 2006).³⁶⁴ Finally,

expect an NDPB to spontaneously accept demanding targets with a higher level of difficulties (Massey, 1995a: Para 2.6.1; MoGAHA, 2004; Chong, 2010: 54-55).

³⁵⁸ As an executive NDPB the Tate Gallery has to carry out regular reviews at least every five years, which assess fundamental issues such as its current status and the need for the agency, in compliance with the Cabinet Office guidance on their conduct (Cmnd 7797, 1980; Massey, 1995a; Cabinet Office, 2012b).

³⁵⁹ The Pliatzky Report in the early 1980s discussed the need for securing accountability of NDPBs which had been administered just by each department and thus was not regarded as uniform or efficient (Cmnd 7797, 1980: paras 74-82). After this report, the Cabinet Office and the Treasury published varying forms of guideline. For example, see *Non-Departmental Public Bodies – A Guide for Departments* (1981 and 1992; Cabinet Office and HM Treasury, 1992).

³⁶⁰ The former ethical guide, *Government Accounting*, was generally replaced by *Managing Public Money* in 2007 (HM Treasury, 2007a: 70). These manuals have been regarded as a kind of instruction rather than just a guide (Chapman, 1997a: 98).

³⁶¹ Usually the internal auditor of the Tate Gallery is a private accounting company such as RSM Tenon, and the external auditor is the National Audit Office (NAO) with subsidiary private company auditors (Tate Gallery, 2012: 23). The accounts should be reported in line with the *Statement of Recommended Practice* (the SoRP) and in accordance with the *Accounts Direction*.

³⁶² In addition to audited financial statements, a biennial (until 2006) or annual review has been published and since 2004 acquisition prices of works of art have also been declared.

³⁶³ However, in 2011, after the abolition of MLAC, which was a NDPB of the DCMS, its functions were transferred to the Arts Council England (Arts Council England, 2011).

³⁶⁴ Under the AIL system, inheritance tax debts of individuals, who possess pre-eminent works of art, can be written off in exchange of providing public access, which allows museums to display those works at no cost (Alexander et al., 2005: 77-78; MCST, 2011: 186-187; Inheritance Tax Act 1984: section 230).

as is the case in other public organisations, the Tate Gallery has a duty to provide proper information to the public and the media. It has declared on-line a monthly list of all transactions above 25,000 pounds. Moreover, once there are public requests for information, it should respond promptly, in line with the *Freedom of Information Act*.

In conclusion, as far as accountability after quangocratisation is concerned, the autonomy of the gallery from the sponsor department was considerably improved in comparison with the civil servant organisations. For example, 1972 witnessed serious opposition to the Conservative Government for its policy of having the Tate Gallery charge an entrance fee (Tate Trustees, 1974; Kirby, 1988: 91). At the same time, this example reveals there is a potential for conflict between the sponsor department and the Tate Board. In particular, in this case, a Tate Director would be in trouble; he or she is appointed by the Board but is still expected to conform to the government policy (Massey, 1995a: para 2.7.6; Forder, 1994: 135). In terms of the financial control of the Treasury, the procedures of control are somewhat similar to those of ordinary departmental organisations, but the strength of control tends to be, to some extent, assuaged. For the Tate Gallery, when it comes to the management of its assets, the acquisition of legal personality status in 1992 was a more meaningful event than the exclusion from the civil service in 1972. After *MGA 1992*, the Tate Gallery could manage its assets on its own without the approval of the Property Services Agency (PSA); and the procedure to get a fund from the government was streamlined, even though it could no longer have 'Crown Immunity from certain regulations' (Spalding, 1998: 235-236; Forder, 1994: 138-139, 147). Lastly, quangocratisation usually leads to an increased autonomy from Parliament.

Meanwhile, managing the autonomy and control of the Board of Trustees after quangocratisation has also become considerably important. Since the Board has the responsibility for overseeing overall activities and direction, with reference to the framework agreed by the DCMS, its control is at the heart of the accountability issue in the Tate Gallery.

Firstly, the Prime Minister and the DCMS are involved in the appointment of trustees.³⁶⁵ As discussed earlier, however, existing members of the Board will scarcely be influenced by a change of government; thus the responsiveness to a specific regime might not be secured. In general terms, given the characteristics of cultural bodies, political responsiveness is not relatively important for the Tate Gallery; there, in this right, is just a little viability of direct control by sponsor department.

³⁶⁵ In 1998, the Labour government published a white paper *Quango - Opening the Doors*, which called for a more active role for parliamentary select committees (Cabinet Office, 1998; Knox, 1999: 319; Flinders, 2004: 887, 899; Gay, 2005: 26).

Secondly, as individual Board members, Trustees should be aware of their wider ethical responsibilities. Trustees, as with other public servants, should follow the Seven Principles of Public Life set out by the Committee on Standards in Public Life (Nolan Committee, 1994). They should observe the highest standards of impartiality and objectivity concerning their missions.³⁶⁶ Particularly when there are private interests conflicting with their responsibilities as Trustees, they have to officially declare those interests. For the sake of guaranteeing reliable stewardship of public funds, resources should be allocated with probity and without partisan purposes.

Thirdly, control by the Charity Commission³⁶⁷ has to do with the personal and legal responsibilities of the Trustees. Under *the Charities Act 1993*, the Tate Gallery is an *exempt charity*, accountable directly to the government rather than to the Charity Commission, but the Board members as a sort of charity trustees are still expected to observe the broad responsibilities. The Charity Commission could provide official consultation concerning ethical issues. Furthermore, when there is a violation of their obligations under the Civil Service Management Code or the *CRGA*, the Charity Commission could officially investigate the Tate Gallery.³⁶⁸

Fourthly, as a method of ensuring internal control, there is an ethical Sub Committee. It consists of Trustees and non-trustee members and could carry out a review concerning ethical issues which are raised by a Director of Tate or any of the Trustees; in addition, it could give advice concerning conflict of interests.

To conclude, the control over the Board of Trustees is one of the difficult issues that followed quangocratisation. The big trends of quangocratisation show that control over quangos has been strengthened over the time (Gay, 2005). However, despite subsequent criticisms, quangos enjoy considerable autonomy from central government; the strengths of efficiency and independence are the key reasons for their existence. On the whole, criticisms have been expressed during the process of seeking clarification on these ambiguous issues which the government has not traditionally been involved in.

At the same time, as far as quango reform is concerned, there are several points that still need to be discussed. Firstly, intensifying control over quangos might make the distinction between quangos and executive agencies blurred; thus it is hard to explain the reason for their concurrent existence (section 9-2-1). In addition, quango reform has generally accepted the Next

³⁶⁶ The Government published *Guidance on Codes of Practice for Board Members of Public Bodies* in 1997. Executive NDPBs could introduce their own codes based on this guidance.

³⁶⁷ The Charity Commission was first established by the Charitable Trusts Act 1853, and currently is a kind of non-ministerial department.

³⁶⁸ For example, see Alberge (2006) and Pooke (2011: 20-21). In 2006, the Charity Commission examined the Tate Gallery over the management of conflicts of interests regarding the purchase of a work of art which is made by a serving Artist Trustee.

Steps principles of agencies (Cabinet Office and HM treasury, 1992: para 4.2), but for some NDPBs the introduction of these principles demonstrates an 'unwelcome intrusion' of their sponsor department into their daily affairs (Massey, 1995a: paras 2.1.9 and 2.2.13).

Secondly, every quango has different levels of accountability and thus the methods of dealing with accountability should be differentiated depending on the situation of each body; but it is easier said than done. Furthermore, the political contexts which individual quangos face vary from one to another (Massey, 1995a: para 2.1.8). In particular, it is difficult for cultural bodies to use the same accountability standards as business organisations, because of the limitation in creating those explicit performance indicators which are easily found in profit-based business organisations. Inevitably, the extent and degree of performance indicators need to be multifarious depending on the characteristics of each quango. In this regard, it is very hard for the Cabinet Office and the Treasury to utilise a standardised form across all quangos for their evaluation. In practical terms, however, for the benefit of convenience they use a uniform document; and this might lead to a sort of formalism.

Thirdly, diverse institutions are involved in the task of securing accountability, but such an overlapping accountability structure might unexpectedly harbour a blind spot. At the same time, one or two major monitoring departments might suffer some limitation when attempting to take efficient oversight of the numerous quangos all at once.

6-6. Conclusion

Tate Modern has had great success as compared with other national and private museums around the world (Holden, 2005: 37; Travers: 2005: 23; Smith, 2005: 17-21; Figure 6-2(b) and Table 6-10). There have been increasingly huge numbers of visitors to Tate Modern, which has also lead to the substantial rise of its brand awareness and thus has created a virtuous circle. Other valuable objectives have also been accomplished in a comparatively smooth way. For example, Tate Modern has been successful in creating new trends such as the YBAs. Besides this, in relation to organisational management, it has maintained operational success in recruiting and retaining professional staff and creating an effective marketing strategy (Grognet, 2004: 176-179). Moreover, the increase in non-governmental funding allows the gallery to purchase of works of art constantly, which is one of the crucial elements for sustainable development. Last but not least, the continuous extension of its size seems to be contributing to a rosy future.

It needs a little more exploration, however, to see whether this success has come from quangocratisation or not. The advantages of quangocratisation discussed earlier might be largely categorised into two broad arenas: flexibility

in organisational management and autonomy in financial operation (see Chapter4). On the one hand, the exclusion from the civil service in 1972 enhanced the foundation to expand its staff numbers. For developed countries, it is rather difficult to invest hard-earned taxpayers' money in civil service organisations on a large scale (Clarke, 1971: 107). This is largely because the entire payroll costs are directly funded by the government, thus attracting more public attention and receiving stricter control. However after quangocratisation the staff numbers of the gallery attracted less public notice and thus it could be persistently increased. For example, in 1971, the staff numbers for the Tate Gallery and the Treasury were 184 and 1,060 respectively (CSD, 1975: 22-23), but in 2012, the equivalents were 760 and 1,040 (ONS, 2012). On the other hand, despite the measures taken in 1972, the Tate Board had not immediately gained a legal personality, but it could properly perform its financial functions after 1992 when the gallery, in practical terms, acquired a financially independent status. In sum, the Tate Gallery benefitted from quangocratisation particularly in terms of its growth and extended public service quality; the current Tate has more organisational and financial autonomy than in its pre-quangocratisation era and could mobilise more sponsorship, based on those flexibilities.

Meanwhile, the huge success of the Tate Gallery also stems from continuous changes and differentiation. In particular, the creation of Tate Modern opened up a new horizon of exhibitions and displays. Actually, Tate Modern has been 'the most ambitious cultural infrastructure project of the last decade' (Pooke, 2011: 59). However, as for its sustainable development, the Tate Gallery is also facing several challenges ahead. First of all, it still needs continuous differentiation in terms of organisation. With the increase in the number of works of art retained, there is a possibility that Tate Modern might be divided into two art museums. In addition, a more balanced approach between that of a 'taste shaping' and a 'taste pursuing' policy is required. The *taste formation* which could be rather estranged from the public makes it difficult, in the long term, for the gallery to evolve into a more popular museum such as the National Gallery. At the same time, transparency and morality in relation to purchasing works of art should be firmly guaranteed (Ambrose and Paine, 2006: 15-16).³⁶⁹ More profoundly, as a type of executive NDPBs, it should create the best practice which other quangos need to follow, especially for the purpose of removing the overall negative images associated with quangos.

The next chapter explores the causes and the results of AQ of the MMCA in Korea, and Chapter 8, especially in sections 8-2, 8-4 and 8-5, deals with the meaning and implications of both cases.

³⁶⁹ It has been a longstanding problem in the operation of the gallery. Even during the period of the 1890s, there were criticisms about a private network between artists and the gallery (Fyfe, 2000: 138-139). In 1976, there was another example where the Tate Gallery was ethically criticised in relation to purchasing specific works of art, *Equivalent VIII* (see footnote 368).

Chapter 7. Case Study of the National Museum of Modern and Contemporary Art (MMCA, MoCA)³⁷⁰

The distinctive characteristics of visual arts administration which were discussed at the beginning of Chapter 6 could also apply to the MMCA. However, its history and background are considerably dissimilar to the Tate Galleries. This chapter presents a detailed case study of the National Museum of Modern and Contemporary Art in Korea (MMCA) and sets it in the context of the Korean experience of delegated administration. The chapter follows the same structure as chapter 6 on the Tate Galleries and therefore provides a basis upon which to undertake a comparative analysis.

7-1. History and Facilities

7-1-1. History

The MoCA (National Museum of Contemporary Art) was founded in 1969 and was situated within Gyeongbok-gung (palace) near the city hall of Seoul and the presidential residence, the Blue House. It was situated in a comparatively good location, but did use the small old exhibition hall (MoCA, 1996) and other existing premises. After deciding on its establishment, it did not take long to create its statutory standing, a *Presidential Decree on the Organisational Structure and Responsibility (PDOSR) of the MoCA*, since it was created as part of a government department, which was directly controlled by its minister (Jung, 2003b; Yong, 2011: 65). There was no budget allocated for purchasing works of art until the end of 1971 (Jang, 2009: 90)³⁷¹ and the museum could not perform the essential function of collecting (ibid: 87, 92-93); thus it just gave priority to putting on special exhibitions (Lee, 1998: 204-206). In reality, it began in order to support *the National Art Competition* (MoCA, 1996: 50; Jung, 2003b; Yang, 2004a: 6) rather than to function as a typical art museum. The insufficiency of its staff was another feature of the MoCA in the era of Gyeongbok-gung. There were only administrative employees who dealt with the day-to-day chores. In sum, it was a museum only in the most rudimentary form (Jang, 2009: 89).

³⁷⁰ From 2013, the MI (Museum Identity) of the MoCA has changed to the MMCA (National Museum of Modern and Contemporary Art). The museum claimed that it had covered *contemporary* and *modern* art at the outset (MoCA, 1996: 41) and it had collected works of art in the first half of the twentieth century (Lee, 2013b); although its collections overlapped with the *National Museum of Korea* where some *modern* Japanese and Korean works of art have been collected since its inception (Noh, 2011). For the MoCA, it was a rather exceptional case for a national art museum to begin as a *contemporary* art museum without experiencing a *modern* art museum stage (Choi, 2000).

³⁷¹ The number of the works of art collected before moving to Deoksugung was 142 including 97 donations.

In 1973, the MoCA moved to Seokjojeon in the Deoksu-gung (palaces)³⁷² which was located 1.4 km away from the previous location. Its movement actually had more to do with operational matters than the development of the MoCA. Yet the number of its exhibition rooms expanded from four to ten and thus could display more of its collections. During the period when it was situated in Deoksu-gung, there was no professional curator within it; and thus the types of special exhibitions were mainly individual invitational or group exhibitions (Jang, 2009: 104). The responsibility for social education had not yet come to the fore (Cho, 2009b: 153-154; Jang, 2009: 126); but its collection had rapidly expanded since 1982 in order to fill the future display rooms, as the government announced the establishment of a new building in 1981 (Jang, 2009: 99).

The new gallery in Gwacheon which opened just a month before the 1986 Seoul Asian Games (ibid: 107), has internationally comparable-sized facilities and an outdoor sculpture park. Gwacheon was a new administrative city, enlarged in the 1980s,³⁷³ and it contains not only the Government Complex Buildings but also a big public theme park, Seoul Grand Park. However, since it is not near in the city centre, it does not have an ideal location. In spite of this unfavourable geographical condition, it has improved the performance of its original function of collection and conservation, now that it could recruit professional curators and conservators. In addition, it has enhanced the modern function of an art museum through education and increased communication (Yang, 2004a: 17; Han, 2007: 20; Jang, 2009: 127).

After the creation of the new building in Gwacheon, Seokjojeon in Deoksu-gung had been managed as part of another central department, the Office of Cultural Heritage. In 1998, however, its west wing was restored as an art museum which is an affiliated institution of the MoCA (Choi, 2000).³⁷⁴ As a *modern* art museum, its primary missions are specified mainly in modern art history, research, education, collecting and putting on exhibitions (Jang, 2009: 125).

One of the most conspicuous changes in the MMCA was the establishment of the Seoul branch in November 2013. The suggestion that the Defense Security Command (DSC), which had been located near Gyeongbok-gung, should be moved to a suburb of Seoul had been maintained since the

³⁷² The East Wing of Seokjojeon, whose style is similar to the British Museum, was designed and built by English people, Harding and Lovell in 1909. Previously, it had been used for various purposes such as a State Guest House, a Palace for the Emperor and a museum; while the West Wing of the building was built as an art museum in 1938 (Jang, 2009: 94-95; Oh, 2012b).

³⁷³ In a similar vein, under a scheme of a *balanced development between the regions*, from 2011 to 2013 most governmental departments had moved to Sejong City, 130 km from the centre of Seoul.

³⁷⁴ Regarding the use of the East Wing, this had been a controversial issue for a long time. Some stakeholders have suggested that it should be used as just one of the heritages which could reflect upon modern history, whilst others have contended that it should be deployed as a *modern* art museum which had a rather weak foundation in Korea (Noh, 2005 and 2011).

1990s (Lee, 2004d). The MCT (Ministry of Culture and Tourism), the former directors of the MoCA and art circles had claimed that the transfer of the MoCA to that place was a desideratum (Kim, 2002; Lim, 2004; Lee, 2003b, 2004b and 2005b). Before 2008, the transfer of the DSC was decided and another military hospital in the vicinity was abolished as well; thus there were big debates about the usage of those estates (Chung, 2008; Ham, 2008; Chun, 2010). Finally, President Lee accepted the request of the artistic community and the creation of a new branch, instead of the transfer of the MoCA, was announced to the various art circles at the new year ceremony in early 2009 (Lee, 2009b; Kang, 2009a; Park, 2013a). The architect was chosen through a design competition and work was commenced in 2010 to create a partially re-modelled building. The total cost for the new museum was around 137 million pounds (Yoon, 2009; Park, 2013a) and it took forty months to finish (Park, 2013a), although an unexpected procrastination in 2012, caused by a fire, raised the problem of an inappropriately shortened construction period (Cho, 2012a).

In addition to the Seoul branch, at the time of writing, the MMCA is in the process of establishing the National Art Conservation Centre (NACC) in which a previous tobacco factory has been remodelled and will cost around 22.1 million pounds (Shin, 2013).³⁷⁵ The construction covering 23,700 m² consists of two buildings and will play a pivotal role not only in preserving collections and state-owned works of art, but also in strengthening the conservation capacity of the curators and providing more opportunities for local people to join in the cultural activities (Lee, 2012a; Shin, 2013; Park, 2012a; MMCA, 2013a: 230-231).

7-1-2. Facilities

The main museum of the MMCA is the Gwacheon Gallery and there are at least three other galleries, including the NACC which is under construction (Shin, 2012). Instead of the NACC, Table 7-1 includes two Art Studios which provide the workshops and accommodation for foreign and domestic artists in order to promote global artistic networks and to provide a productive working environment for artists (MMCA, 2013b: 92-97; Jang, 2009: 131).

Table 7-1: Three galleries and two studios of the MMCA

	Establishment	Size (m²)
Gwacheon	1986 (1969)	37,500
Deoksugung	1998	3,428
Seoul	2013	52,125
Two Art Studios (Changdong, Goyang)	2002, 2004	3,897

Source: MMCA (2013a:16-19, 217, 243-244; 2014: 2), Yang (2004a: 10-12), KCTI (2009: 463-466); Kim (2008b: 324)

³⁷⁵ The construction is expected to be completed in 2016 (MMCA, 2014: 32).

Gwacheon Museum The museum in Gwacheon, situated in the middle of Mount Makgye and near the Gwacheon reservoir and the Seoul Grand Park, was designed by the architect Kim Tai-Soo who created it in the shape of a traditional Korean castle together with a signal fire (Jang, 2009: 108; Kim, 2006b: 28). The building is comprised of a three-storey east wing and a two-storey west wing. At the centre of the building there is a spiral ramp, called the Ramp Core, which links every display space. In it Paik Nam-June's well-known media installation *The More the Better* with its 1,003 TV monitors is permanently displayed and has been an iconic work of the museum (Lee, 2012b). In the basement level, there are the conservation centre, lecture hall and room, and some seminar rooms (Jang, 2009: 109).

It has two circular galleries on the first and second floors. The Circular Gallery One on the first floor, located next to the Ramp Core,³⁷⁶ is dedicated to the contemporary international collections. Besides the Circular Gallery One there are three other Galleries on the first floor. The main principle for displays on the first floor is to use the left side for sculptures and the right side for paintings (ibid: 109), although this has been changed from time to time based on the curators' decision. Galleries One and Two have been used for temporary special exhibitions such as the *Artists of the Year* and the *Youthful Seeking* which are annually displayed (Jung, 2012b; Song, 2013). On the left side of the Gallery One, there is the Children's Gallery which, from 2012, is also known as the Edu-Studio (Seo, 2012). The Children's Gallery was first installed in the Circular Gallery Two on the second floor in 1995 (Ryu, 2010b), but it was expanded and moved to the first floor in 2010 (Hwang, 2010b). Near the Circular Gallery there is a route to the open air Sculpture Park. One of the unique features of the MMCA is the huge Outdoor Sculpture Park, which even world-class museums such as the Tate, the MoMA and the Pompidou Centre do not possess (Lee, 2009d: 44). In addition to these, some other facilities such as the Art Library, Art Shop and Cafeteria are located on the first floor.

Galleries Three and Four are situated on the second floor and, as with Galleries Five and Six on the third floor, have usually been used for the Korean contemporary art collections such as contemporary sculpture, traditional painting and the photograph collections (Jang, 2009: 122). However, after MMCA Seoul opened in 2013, the Gwacheon branch has chosen a different strategy (Shin, 2013). It decided to focus on crafts, architecture and design; thus the Circular Gallery Two, Gallery four and other two permanent galleries on the third floor have been developed to display these kinds of works (Lee, 2013j).

³⁷⁶ Some other works of art have been on display at the Ramp Core and in the Main Hall. For example, from September 2013 to May 2014, a famous work of David Hockney, *Bigger Trees Near Water*, a part of the Tate collection, has been displayed (Hwang, 2013).

Deoksugung Museum Since the Deoksugung *modern* Art Museum is located within a historical place in the vicinity of Seoul city hall, it has a huge potential in terms of attracting foreign tourists. Yet it is unable to enlarge its display spaces as it is a part of the Palace, even though some of its *modern* collections enjoy considerable popularity in Korean modern art history (Yoon, 2009).

This Gallery has three floors which consist of four main galleries on the second and the third floors, and one storage room on the first floor. The four galleries have usually been used for special exhibitions or the display of collections. For example, it held the Cartier's Jewel collection in 2008, which was controversial because of its commercialism (Lee, 2008c), and Masterpieces of Modern Korean Painting (from October 2013 to March 2014). After the opening of the Seoul Gallery, it has tried to focus on the establishment of cultural identity and the rediscovery of *modern* art (MMCA, 2014: 21, 23; Shin, 2013).

MMCA Seoul³⁷⁷ The brand new Seoul branch has a third-basement level and three storeys of display space. The building's floor size is larger than that of the Gwacheon Gallery, which is as big as seven football fields (Shin, 2010a; Kim, 2013c; MMCA, 2014: 2). The second and the third basement levels are used as car parks and the first basement level and the first floor are the spaces for the main exhibitions and displays. There are six *Madangs*, the traditional Korean name for a multi-purpose living space, and the Gallery Madang and the Museum Madang, *inter alia*, are dedicated to sculpture, installation works of art and performing art. A part of the Seoul MMCC on the second floor is concerned with the heritage of the Office of Royal Family Affairs (Jongchinbu) (Do, 2013; Kim, 2013c).

A sizable volume of the Seoul branches are occupied with contemporary international trends in the arts such as multi-media, field installations and live art (Yoon, 2009). On the first basement level, as with the MoMA, the Pompidou Centre and *the Tanks* and *the Unilever Series* of Tate Modern, there are some places for new experimental visual art, such as the 3D theatre, the multi-project hall, the Seoul Box and the media lab (Booz&co: 2010: 44; Ryu, 2014; Lee, 2013g). Some displays are closely arranged within one topic. For example, the *Aleph Project* (from December 2013 to March 2014) tried to use the Gallery Seven (Oh, 2013c), the media lab and the multi-project hall at the same time in order to embody and illustrate Complexity Systems, encouraging joined-up works among curators, artists, engineers, scientists and architects (Lee, 2013k). In addition to this, some field-installation projects could be displayed through the Seoul Box and the main hall. For example, the world famous work of Choe U-Ram's *Opertus Lunula Umbra* and Seo Do-Ho's field installation was set up

³⁷⁷ For more on this, see <http://www.mmca.go.kr/eng/>.


on the first floor at a special exhibition of the opening (Oh, 2013a; Kim, 2013c; Lee, 2013k). The Gallery One to the Gallery Six on the first floor and the first basement level are dedicated to other forms of contemporary art such as live art, conceptual art and abstract art. In order to enhance ordinary people's understanding of surreal and symbolic arts, there are several lecture rooms, a seminar room and the Library Madang on the second and third floors.

In addition, large portions of the new branch, in common with Tate Modern and the Pompidou Centre, are designed for the convenience of visitors. The Food Court, cafeteria, Museum shop, book café, up-market restaurant, as with the Palais de Tokyo, and membership lounge are available from the first to the third floor (Oh, 2013b; Booz&co, 2010: 79-80). In particular, the gallery created the MMCA Promotion Foundation, which is similar to Tate Enterprises in terms of having a separate legal personality, in order to manage a profitable business and to prepare for quangocratisation in the near future (Park, 2013e; Booz&co, 2010: 86).

7-2. The Form of the Organisation: Executive Agency

The MMCA is one of Affiliated Institutions (AIs) and is, at the same time, one of Korean Executive Agencies (KEAs). It is also one of the institutions in the process of quangocratisation. As the Korean government adopts a quite different government organisational classification system from that of the U.K., it is essential to first analyse the structure of the government organisation, in order to accurately understand the contexts influencing the MMCA.

Figure 7-1: Classification of the public organisations in Korea* (see Table 2-3)³⁷⁸



* This is a simplified model which does not include Special Local Administration Agencies (SLAAs), the police and public teachers. SLAAs are local branches of Central Administration Agencies (GOA 2013, Article 4; and see Figure 5-2).


³⁷⁸ Unlike Figure 1-1, Figure 7-1 excludes NPOs and local authorities. For Korean Public Institutions, see Chapter 2.

As shown in Figure 7-1, in common with the Japanese government structure, the Korean central government is mainly divided into two branches: core departments and AIs. Since most KEAs belong to AIs,³⁷⁹ the distinctive features of these AIs need to be analysed.

Firstly, unlike their parent departments, AIs are supposed to perform operational tasks. They are divided into six groups: experiment and research, education and training, culture, medical care, manufacture, and advisory bodies (GOA 2013, article 4).³⁸⁰ According to Figure 7-2(a), as of January 2011, the proportion of AIs in terms of staff numbers, ostensibly seems to be just 3.5 per cent of the central civil service. If teachers and the police, however, are excluded, the proportion of AIs among the total of 126,777 staff is 16.7 per cent (Figure 7-2(b)); thus the potential area of KEAs might amount to this figure. At the same time, the ratio of KEAs among the total of 126,777 staff is 6.5 per cent, whilst the proportion of KEAs among AIs amounts to 20.6%.

Figure 7-2: Proportion of Affiliated Institutions in Korea (as of January, 2011)

a) percentage of AIs among *Central Government* (total 613,672) **b) percentage of AIs among the *Core Civil Service* (total 126,772) (excluding teachers and police)**



Source: Compiled from data in MoPAS 2011 (<https://org.mopas.go.kr>)

Secondly, the AIs are still under the control of the Ministers of the parent departments; having the duty of immediate response to the Minister; and following the guidelines for inter-organisational transfers of staff, unified promotion system and departmental budget ceilings guidelines which set constraints on a new programme where a large sum of money could deeply influence the role of the head of AIs.

Thirdly, most AIs are, however, in a sense alienated from the parent department. Ministers and members of the National Assembly are, in general

³⁷⁹ Meanwhile, the Korean Intellectual Properties of the KEAs, unlike the UK Intellectual Property Office, is not one of the AIs, but NMDs (Cheong). In addition, the Regional Statistics Offices, the Regional Maritime Affairs and the Port Administrations are a part of SLLAs.


³⁸⁰ This classification is largely based on the functions of AIs, but in some cases, the type of AIs is not clearly distinguishable.

terms, less interested in operational tasks in respect of their political insensitivity, while most employees are comparatively free from heavy workloads.

Figure 7-3: Proportion of cultural agencies among AIs

(a) Number of institution (Affiliated institution)

(b) Staff number



Source: Compiled from data in MoPAS 2011 (<https://org.mopas.go.kr>)

As shown in Figure 7-3(a), the portion of cultural agencies,³⁸¹ including the MMCA, among AIs is 19 per cent in terms of the number of bodies, whereas it is 9 per cent in terms of staff number (Figure 7-3(b)). At the same time, the ratio of KEAs among cultural agencies amounts to 19.9 per cent. Although KEAs fall into the same category as other AIs, they have more flexibility, as shown in Table 7-2.

Table 7-2: Major differences of Affiliated Institutions and Executive Agencies in Korea

	Affiliated Institutions (AIs)	Executive Agencies(KEAs)
Legal basis	Government Organization Act (GOA)	The Act on the Establishment and Operation of Executive Agencies (AEOEA)
Legal base of sub units	Presidential Decree on the GOA	Written in internal regulations
Recruitment of the Head	Appointed within the civil service	Chief Executive(CE): (mainly) Contracted from outside
Staff appointments and transfers within its body	Minister	CE
Scope of the contracted	Maximum 20% of subunit directors	Maximum 30% of all positions
Performance-related-pay principles	By government guidance	By ministerial regulation
Revenue came from its sales	Not expendable, belong to National Account	Expandable for the agency under the condition of government guidance
Transferring budget to overspending elsewhere within the agency	On a very limited basis	Rather in a deregulated way
Carrying forward (End Year Flexibility)	In case of running costs within a maximum 5% of budget	In case of running costs within a maximum 20% of budget

Sources: extensively adapted from Kim (2000b: 222), Han (2006: 154), Lee and Moon (2010: 432), MoPAS (2010b:7) and KAPS (2011: 29-30); KCTI, 2009 (241-243)

³⁸¹ The cultural agencies category includes theatres, architectural heritages (palaces) and various kinds of museums such as general museums and science museums. However, from the statistical point of view, several factors need to be considered. Firstly, the criteria for classification are used just in the MoSPA; thus it can be changeable depending on time and the person in charge. Secondly, this yardstick which was revised in 1981 is rather out of date (GOA 2013, Article 4). Thirdly, science museums are definitely a kind of museum, but in this classification they fall into the education and training area. Lastly, this classification excludes small-sized secondary or auxiliary bodies such as the Deoksugung museum and the MMCA Seoul branch.

British executive agencies (BEAs), in common with KEAs, are different from traditional bureaucracies.³⁸² They have been moving away from the day-to-day control of the Ministers and they can make a business-like³⁸³ programme with more financial and personnel flexibilities under a clearly defined performance contract (OPSR, 2002: 10; HM Treasury, 2007b: 173; Smullen, 2004: 191; Farnham and Horton, 2000: 317; Taylor, 2001: 179).³⁸⁴ In addition, the chief executives of the executive agencies could be recruited from the private sector and the promotion of their employees is dependent on their contracts³⁸⁵ and performances, rather than on seniority (James, 2003: 20).

Notwithstanding these general common features, however, there are several differences between KEAs and BEAs. Firstly, in the U.K., BEAs are, understandably, regarded as 'settled down as' an inevitable part of the structure of the Whitehall landscape in terms of their size and its development route (Jenkins et al., 2011: 31). Executive agencies therefore are a 'default delivery option' in the U.K. (Cm 8044, 2011: para 102),³⁸⁶ while in Korea KEAs are not a dominant option. Korea still does not have a relatively big governmental and welfare expenditure as compared to the U.K.,³⁸⁷ and the size of the institution outside its core departments within the civil service is smaller than that of the U.K. (section 5-1-2). As the scope of auxiliary bodies in the U.K. is broader, they have greater possibility for continuing change or development; whereas in Korea, politicians and the public have been less attentive to the way in which KEAs operate. In this connection, Korea has a comparatively small number of politically sensitive KEAs and AIs; therefore, the chances are much less that the accountability issues in relation to the chief executives of KEAs could be problematic. On the contrary, in the U.K. several cases with reference to executive agencies has been controversial (Pollitt, 2009: 256; Jenkins et al., 2011: 18-24). In addition, when it comes to agencification in the U.K., the size of the agencies was not considered important,³⁸⁸ so that BEAs are quite varied in their size (Jenkins, 2008: 118; OPSR, 2002:9-10).³⁸⁹ These structural imbalances among agencies have influenced the relationship between BEAs

³⁸² Talbot suggests three features of agencies which includes not only civil servants but also some public servants: 'structural disaggregation, performance contracting, and generally single delivery function' (2004a: 6-8; Talbot et al., 2000: 11).

³⁸³ The Cabinet office had continuously tried to expand business like principles (Cm 3164, 1995: ii).

³⁸⁴ The Trading Fund had more flexibility than other executive agencies (James, 2003: 20).

³⁸⁵ It is an internal contract, so that there was, unlike private contracts, no legal responsibility for the contents (James, 2003:5).

³⁸⁶ For example, see Jenkins et al. (2011: 22-23).

³⁸⁷ See Appendix 2 (Figure 2).

³⁸⁸ According to one of the official government documents (Goldsworthy, 1991: 25), 'Size is neither a barrier nor an indicator of suitability for Agency Status'.

³⁸⁹ For example, the Wilton Park Conference and the Debt Management Office have fewer than 50 staff (OPSR, 2002: 9). Not unreasonably, the ranks and salaries of agency chief executives vary in proportion to the size of their BEAs (Hogwood, 1993: 6).

and ministers (Gains, 1999: 73; Massey, 1995b: paras 3.2.5 and 4.1.1; Talbot, 2004a: 10). At the same time, the average staff number in BEAs is larger than that of KEAs. In 2012 when the number of BEAs was at its lowest, the average staff number in BEAs was 2,358,³⁹⁰ while that of KEAs was 262 at the end of 2011.

Secondly, since the Korean government has an additional formal organisational category, AIs (GOA 1948, article 5),³⁹¹ this extra type has had an influence on agencification. In general terms, only when a candidate is expected to make a distinct difference in its operation from existing AIs, it might then become an executive agency. By contrast, in the U.K., there has been no category similar to AIs except BEAs. Furthermore, a fair number of organisations such as the Prison Service and the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency (DVLA) had already been separate units with a 'specific set of management freedoms' within departments before agencification (Davies and Willman, 1991: 5; Hogwood, 1993:6; Pyper, 1995: 54; Talbot, 2004a: 11; Burnham and Pyper, 2008: 127-128). Notwithstanding this, these bodies have considered to create a different kind of management and accountability framework through agencification (James, 2003: 59-60).³⁹²

Thirdly, vis-à-vis the types of executive agencies, KEAs are systematically and legally classified into several groups, as shown in Table 7-3, and each group has its own guiding principles to follow, while the classification of BEAs mainly arises from statistical needs. Until 2010, KEAs were divided into two groups: Administrative KEAs which operated within *general accounts*, and Entrepreneurial KEAs which had more flexibility within *special accounts*. As it was argued that this classification, however, had shown only limited expandability, in 2011 the criteria were changed as shown in Table 7-3(b).³⁹³

Table 7-3: Classification of Executive Agencies in Korea

(a) From 2004 to 2010

Entrepreneurial Hospital agencies
Entrepreneurial Business agencies
Administrative Statistics agencies
Administrative Research agencies
Administrative Business agencies

(b) After January, 2011

Survey and Quality Management agencies
Research agencies
Cultural agencies
Hospital agencies
Education and Training agencies
Facility Maintenance agencies
Others

Sources: KAPS (2011: 21-23), Lee and Moon (2010: 432) and Kim (2010e: 8-14)

³⁹⁰ At the same time, in 1998 when the number of BEAs was at its peak, the average was 2,840.

³⁹¹ The Japanese '*Facilities*' category is of a similar organisation type as the Korean AIs (Japanese National Administrative Organization Act (JNAOA), Article 8-2).

³⁹² According to James (2003: 60), the proportion of *nominal* agencification, which does not create a new management and accountability framework, was almost 16 per cent.

³⁹³ It took almost one year for this to come to the fore from the time it began to be discussed within the MoPAS.

Meanwhile, the Fraser Report, in the U.K. (Table 7-4(a)), first developed typology and suggested four broad groups, but they were not adopted as an official taxonomy (Hogwood, 1993: 9-10). The Next Steps Review in 1995, for the first time, used the categories shown in Table 7-4(b), although BEAs were, for the sake of providing rough information, just 'indexed' as groups which operated 'in broadly same area or in the same way'.³⁹⁴

Table 7-4: Classification of Executive Agencies in the U.K.

(a) Fraser Report (1991: 22-25)

Mainstream policy agencies
Statutory and regulatory agencies
Specialist skills providing agencies
Other peripheral agencies

(b) Next Steps Review 1995(Cm 3164, IV; OPSR, 2002: 10)

Agencies providing services to the public
Agencies providing services to departments
Research Establishments
Agencies which undertake regulatory functions

Finally, the allocation of employees except chief executives between KEAs and their parent departments is mainly decided by *generalist* principles (section 5-1-2). In the U.K. it has been emphasised that transfers between executive agencies and sponsor departments are necessary (Efficiency Unit, 1988: paras 34, 35; Fraser Report, 1991: para 2.15; Trosa Report, 1994; para 77; Massey Report, 1995b: para 2.24); but in Korea more frequent transfers have happened and most career civil service posts have been filled with new successors within one or two years (Hwang, 2009). In addition, in the U.K. a transfer of employees into BEAs might delay their promotions (James, 2003: 140); in the same way, in Korea the postings to KEAs are regarded as a new job for the recently promoted employees, and seniors who need to move up the career ladder route, do not want to work for executive agencies (Lee, 2004b). This characteristic might work as an institutional constraint which makes it difficult to bring about a real change (sections 7-5-2-3 and 8-4).

7-3. Quangocratisation of the MMCA³⁹⁵

The Quangocratisation of the MMCA has been tried since the new administration came to power in 2008. A plausible ground for the quangocratisation of several bodies such as the Rural Development Administration had not been directly enunciated by the Presidential Transition Committee (PTC). Instead, indirect rationales for this change were suggested: the invigoration of the private sector; the media's considerable criticisms of the former regime's organisational expansion; and the need for a new direction

³⁹⁴ Regarding the difficulties of categorising agencies, see Gains (1999: 41-44). She argues that 'functional typology' has a limitation in showing the dynamic features of diverse BEAs (Gains, 2004a: 55).

³⁹⁵ For the total number and scope of quangos, see section 5-2.

(PTC, 2008: 1, 5 and 25). The MMCA, however, was not included in the initial announcement of the PTC in January 2008³⁹⁶ and was designated by the MoPAS as a candidate for quangocratisation in April 2008.

For the proper understanding of quangocratisation in Korea, it is essential first to explore the overall quangocratisation trajectory and policies.

7-3-1. Trajectory

Although the quangocratisation policy in Korea began in earnest in 2008, as shown in Table 7-5, the former governments also tried to change direct governmental tasks into indirect missions performed by quangos including state-owned enterprises. According to Figure 2-2, this quangocratisation falls into quangocratisation type-II. Quangocratisations in the past were mainly just an individual transition that was carried out in a specific department, while quangocratisation in 2008 was introduced at the central government level.

Table 7-5: Major quangocratisations in Korea

(Year)	Before quangocratisation	After changes
1978	Affiliated institution of Seoul National University	Seoul National University Hospital (legally separated corporation)
1981	A part of Ministry of Telecommunication and Postal Service	The Korea Telecom Authority (legally separated corporation, privatised in 2002)
1987	The Office of Monopolies (Korean NMD, Cheong)	The Korea Monopoly Corporation (Korea Tobacco and Ginseng Corporation)
1997	Affiliated institution of Gangneung National University	Gangneung National University Dental Hospital (legally separated corporation)
1998	Affiliated institution of the Ministry of Education	Korea Institute for Curriculum and Evaluation (Korean NDPB)
2000	The Office of National Job Security (Affiliated institution of the Ministry of Labour)	Function was transferred to Human Resources Development Service of Korea (Korean NDPB) (separated in 2006)
2005	National Railroad Administration (Korean NMD, Cheong)	The Korean Railway (Market-type public enterprises)

Source: derived from MoGAHA (1998), Ryu (2008a: 17) and MoPAS (2012e) and developed by each body's webpage

7-3-2. Talk, decision and implementation

The original plan announced by the PTC in early 2008 aimed at quangocratising five bodies,³⁹⁷ but the PTC succeeded in just one

³⁹⁶ The PTC declared that the Rural Development Administration, the National Fisheries Research and Development Institute (NFRDI), the Korea Forest Research Institute (KFRI) would be changed into government-funded research institutes which is one of the types of *Public Institution* (Table 2-3), in order to promote high-tech development and an increase in income for local farmers and fishermen (PTC, 2008: 20; MoPAS, 2008e: 24-25 and see Chapter 2).

quangocratisation by the time of the new president's inauguration, in spite of some larger-scale central government reorganisation.³⁹⁸

The plan for the transfer of government organisation to the private sector³⁹⁹ was reviewed and the new strategy was established in April 2008.⁴⁰⁰ The MoPAS reflected a *government philosophy* of the new regime that central governmental functions were oversized and unnecessarily monopolistic⁴⁰¹ (Ryu, 2008a: 6-10; MoPAS, 2008e: 20); and suggested a continuous streamlining and reduction in central government (MoPAS, 2008a).⁴⁰² The function of outside core departments was divided into thirteen categories and among them several hospitals, cultural agencies, research institutions, national universities and the Korea Post were designated as candidates for quangocratisation.⁴⁰³

Table 7-6: Prioritised candidates for quangocratisation⁴⁰⁴ (*: executive agencies)

	Numbers of staff (as of April,2008)
National Medical Center*	710
National Police Hospital*	586
MoCA (MMCA)*	100
National Theater of Korea*	89
Defense Media Agency *	162
KTV (Government Broadcasting Service)*	112
National Science Meseum *	74
Rural Development Administration	2141
NFRDI *	633
KFRI *	307
41 National Universities	26,537
Korea Post (Headquarters)	31,653

Source: MoPAS (2008a, b and f), Kim and Oh (2012: 304-305)

It was an ambitious plan in that the total staff number of quangocratisation candidates amounted to 22 per cent of AIs (MoPAS, 2008b). The criteria for the designation of quangocratisation candidates were generally based on the flow diagram of Figure 7-4, which was influenced by the earlier cases in the U.K. and Canada (Efficiency Unit, 1993: 6; TBS, 1998).⁴⁰⁵ Based

³⁹⁷ Five bodies were the NFRDI, the KFRI, the Rural Development Administration, the *Korea Post* Headquarters, and the Driver's License Agency (PTC, 2008: 39-40).

³⁹⁸ Five departments and six Korean NMD equivalents were abolished (MoPAS, 2008e: 32) and the author was the senior operational staff who was responsible for the revision of the GOA (ibid: 156).

³⁹⁹ The new administration preferred the term '*the transfer of a government organisation to the private sector*', in order to give the public an impression that it pursued '*smaller government*'. However, its actual meaning was marketisation and the term was later changed into incorporation or quangocratisation (section 2-1-2; footnote 412).

⁴⁰⁰ The MoPAS briefed the President in its 2008 business plan.

⁴⁰¹ The media and academic circles had persistently criticised the Roh Mu-Hyun administration vis-à-vis its size (MoPAS, 2008e: 190-192; Kim, 2008c: 42-45); thus the opposition party at that time presented a manifesto commitment to reduce the size of government (Grand National Party, 2007: 208-212).

⁴⁰² See section 5-1-3.

⁴⁰³ Meanwhile, the functions which were not high priority for quangocratisation were facilities, education and training, quasi-judicial, inspection and administration support (MoPAS, 2008a).


⁴⁰⁴ The Driver's License Agency in Korea, which was the equivalent to the Driving Standards Agency in the U.K. (Yoon, 2001: 240), was quangocratised by the decision of the PTC in 2009.

⁴⁰⁵ As with Korea, Canada adopted a cautious approach which carried out a public interest test, a role of government test, a partnership test, an efficiency test and an affordability test (TBS, 1998: para 3.2). In the case of the U.K., from the start of the Next Steps programme, five alternative options had been reviewed: 'abolition of a function, privatisation, contracting, agencification, or leaving it within the core

on these criteria, all AIs were examined and the prioritised candidates were selected, as shown in Table 7-6.

Yet in the process of choosing the candidates, several problems were detected. First of all, some of the candidates were the same institutions which had been designated by the PTC in a fairly short period of time. In addition, the candidates for quangocratisation were more influential and unmanageable bodies than the agencified bodies; thus it was believed that the targets then were possibly unattainable.⁴⁰⁶ Furthermore, most candidates in reality were previously agencified organisations (MoPAS, 2009d), so that the employees of executive agencies cast doubt on the *raison d'être* of the executive agency system.

Figure 7-4 : Flow diagram for the reorganisation of governmental functions⁴⁰⁷



Source: translated by the author from MPB (1999b: 38-39); MoGAHA (2003b: 6); Park (2007h: 3); MoPAS (2008a); Park (2008d: 40); and Ryu (2008a: 12)

The MoPAS tried to persuade the target department and candidates through meetings with senior bureaucrats; it held several external seminars in


department' (Cm914: para 2.6; HC410: para 13; Goldsworthy, 1991: 22; Pyper, 1995: 75). Since then almost the same criteria were applied, but a much refined 'Prior Options test' procedure was formalised later (Cm 1730: 11; Efficiency Unit, 1993: 6; Cm 2340: 9; Burnham and Pyper, 2008: 135).

⁴⁰⁶ The Vice Minister and the Assistant Minister for organisation in the MoPAS were replaced simultaneously at the end of 2008, partially owing to the slow compliance of candidates to the quangocratisation policy.

⁴⁰⁷ The draft of this flow diagram was made by the author at that time.

order to get a cross-sectional consensus; had frequent meetings with professionals and stakeholders from related areas; and tried to strengthen its capacity to convey the message to the media (MoPAS, 2008g).⁴⁰⁸ More importantly, there was a meaningful trial to objectively examine the conditions for quangocratisation of each candidate. In Figure 7-5, the plus (+) components were analysed as being helpful to quangocratisation, while the minus (-) factors were considered to be obstacles (MoPAS, 2008c and d). As construed in the case of the National Medical Centre, some candidates such as the MoCA and the national universities had more impetus than impediments.

Figure 7-5: Analysis on the conditions for quangocratisation⁴⁰⁹



Source: translated by the author from MoPAS (2011b: 24)

Finally, however, the *talk* at the stage of seeking alternatives in the MoPAS did not reach final decision-making at a whole-government level, with the same content as the initial consideration. Each candidate deployed different strategies in order to deal with the pressure of quangocratisation. First and most notably, the National Medical Centre positively and actively agreed to quangocratisation and made its own draft legislation (Figure 7-5). Meanwhile,

⁴⁰⁸ There were, particularly, special efforts made to gather evidence and to spread the word through government-funded research (KAOS, 2008a; Chun et al., 2008; Lim and Park, 2008; KAOS, 2010a; Park, 2008k; Lim, 2008b; KAPS21, 2009; Kwon, 2008b; Kim and Oh, 2012; and KAPS21, 2009).

⁴⁰⁹ This analysis had six components. Firstly, on *stakeholders*, it noted the opinion and attitudes of trade unions, customers, professionals and NGOs toward quangocratisation. Secondly, regarding *precedents*, it showed the comparable and similar cases from the past, the private sector and from other countries (Figure 8-7). Thirdly, *external environments* revealed the attitudes of politicians, the media and the public. Fourthly, *the volition* of the candidates was demonstrated through the voluntary efforts and the will of the chief executive of those candidates and their parent ministry. Fifthly, *finance* in this figure meant the transition costs (the costs of reform: Flinders et al., 2014: 16) and the possibility of savings after quangocratisation. Finally, *efficiency* showed as a possibility through the expansion of autonomy; the securing of accountability; the quality of the service provided; the attraction of outstanding workforce; and the maintenance of publicness. Weighted values of each factor were respectively 0~±20 points, 0~+30 points, 0~±30 points, 0~±10 points, 0~±10points, and 0~±30 (MoPAS, 2008c). This job was mainly performed by the author at that time.

large-scale organisation such as the *Korea Post* and 41 national universities used delaying tactics. Contrary to this, candidates with little political support, tried to make their own reform plans to evade quangocratisation. At the extreme, the National Police Hospital, the Science Museum, the National Theatre of Korea and the MoCA showed fierce objection toward the quangocratisation movement (MoPAS, 2008b); the transition to quangos in Korea has proceeded slowly. There are several reasons for these delays, as follows (MoPAS, 2009h).

Firstly, the quangocratisation policy carried out by the MoPAS in mid-2008 had few methods to make the candidates comply. The bill for quangocratisation in Korea, as discussed in section 5-1-1, should be made by the parent department of each candidate, or the member of the National Assembly, not by the MoPAS. Since most sponsoring departments proved reluctant to progress quangocratisation bills,⁴¹⁰ the MoPAS needed to negotiate and encourage each department one by one. Furthermore, even though, in most cases, the prerequisites for quangocratisation were financial issues, it was rather difficult to make the Ministry of Strategy and Finance (MoSF) join in the negotiation.⁴¹¹ Owing to the absence of bargaining power, several meetings proceeded without productive results. For this reason, with all the efforts of the MoPAS, as shown in Table 7-7, the schedule of quangocratisation was completely dependent on counterpart departments.

Table 7-7: Implementation of quangocratisation

	Status as of the end of 2013
National Medical Centre	Public institution (quangocratised in 2010)
National Police Hospital	-
MoCA (MMCA)	Bills were submitted (in November 2010 and December 2012)
National Theatre of Korea	-
Defence Media Agency	-
KTV	-
Rural Development Administration	Partial quangocratisation: Foundations of Agriculture Technology, commercialization and transfer (launched in September 2009)
NFRDI	Partial quangocratisation: Korea Fisheries Resources Agency (launched in October 2010)
KFRI	Partial quangocratisation: Korea Forestry Promotion Institute (launched in January 2012)
41 National Universities	Quangocratisation of Seoul National University (launched in 2011)
Korea Post Headquarters	-

Source: MoPAS (2009f, 2011b: 13 and 2012d), Kim and Oh (2012: 304-305), CSTBC (2011), ECSTC (2013)

Secondly, compliance to the quangocratisation policy, by nature, was hard to secure without the support of superior bodies such as the Office of the Prime Minister, the Office of the President or the PTC. After the inauguration of

⁴¹⁰ However, see figure 7-5.

⁴¹¹ Just one exception was the case of the Gwacheon Science Museum (GSM). The MoSF was concerned about the new creation of a regional science museum which would increase the burden of the state, so that only in this case, it proactively agreed to quangocratisation of the GSM.

the President in 2008, the MoPAS could not mobilise any support from top-level bodies, although it had expected that a commitment from the top-level could accelerate the project's legitimacy and authority, which would add significant momentum to its progress. This is partially because of the massive *candlelight protests* in 2008 caused by beef imports from the U.S. The nation-wide public demonstrations against this specific government policy were so huge that even the whole legitimacy of the government was questioned and other policies were influenced by them.⁴¹² Therefore even the Office of the President had lost its impetus to proceed with the initial energy associated with the launch of a new project at that time (Appendix 32). The momentum for change soon evaporated, and the reform plans withered before they had a chance to deliver the required results. Thirdly, the diverse interests of stakeholders added to the difficulties. Each stakeholder had its own reason for objecting to quangocratisation. For example, parent departments were concerned about the personnel inflexibilities and a reduction in senior posts, while the employees of those candidates worried about the loss of a lifetime of secure tenure (section 5-1-2). In addition, certain customer groups were concerned over a possible decrease in existing service quality (Hwang, 2009; Shin, 2010a).

To conclude, the differences of the countermeasures and the political power of each candidate had an effect on their strategies for watering down (Figure 7-5). The Gwacheon Science Museum and the KTV tried to capitalise on their political connections with top-level politicians,⁴¹³ while the Rural Development Administration, the NFRDI and the KFRI tried to substitute only a partial quangocratisation for a wholesale change, as shown in Table 7-7 (MoPAS, 2008g).

7-3-3. Quangocratisation of the MoCA (MMCA)

According to the analysis of Figure 7-5, the MoCA has several advantageous conditions for quangocratisation. It has precedents such as the case of the Tate and it is expected that it could enhance its autonomy and service quality by quangocratisation. However, there was a serious protest by the trade unions and stakeholders; and more importantly, quangocratisation of the MoCA had not acquired the support of the politicians or the media. At the first stage of bargaining, the MoCA expressed a concern about

⁴¹² Initially, the PTC, instead of using the term *incorporation*, used '*the transfer to the private sector*' which gave a negative connotation and could be regarded as the abandoning of state duties. After that, the term was changed into *incorporation*, but this still had only a limited ability to persuade stakeholders (footnote 399).

⁴¹³ For example, despite its very lowest viewing figures the KTV tried to persuade the Blue House not to agree to its quangocratisation, suggesting that it had been important for the government of the day in terms of public relations (Kim, 2010d).

commercialisation and a decrease in publicness after quangocratisation (Seo, 2011: 140; Shim, 2012: 145-148). Yet after a long debate, it changed its direction in late 2008 and requested several prerequisites in exchange for quangocratisation, such as the maintenance of government funds, a guarantee of employees' posts and a decisive expansion of investment for its facilities,⁴¹⁴ but these requests were rather unrealistic under the budget constraints, from the perspective of the MoSF. Yet as mentioned earlier (section 7-1-1), the announcement of the president, in early 2009, that a new branch in Seoul would be established, had radically changed the situation and the MoSF put forward a positive reaction. The MoCA and the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism (MCST) began to research cases of quangocratisation in the past and abroad, and submitted the bill to the National Assembly in November 2010 (Cho, 2010a; Kim, 2010e). The bill, however, was pigeon-holed and abolished at the end of the 18th National Assembly; but after the general election in 2012 a new bill was introduced in December and is now under review (section 8-4).

7-4. A Comparison of the Arguments

The analysis of the causes of change in the MMCA is rather different from that of Tate Modern in Chapter 6, as follows:

Firstly, since the MMCA in Korea underwent an agencification process, this change could well be compared, in this chapter, to agencification experiences in the U.K., while the previous chapter dealt only with the quangocratisation of the Tate. The Tate could not experience the agencification fever since 1988 on account of its earlier quangocratisation in 1972. Although the quangocratisation of the MMCA has not been actualised at the time of writing, the former and existing administrations have persistently pursued the change; thus the MMCA provides an opportunity not only to compare two types of change simultaneously, but also to compare British and Korean AQ at the same time. Secondly, on the one hand, the causes of agencification and quangocratisation are not always easy to disentangle; on the other hand, the same argument might not explain agencification and quangocratisation in the same way. Therefore, the explanation of the causes of agencification and quangocratisation will be kept separate in this chapter as much as possible. Finally, since the process to test these arguments, is in some cases akin to Chapter 6, those similar points which have already been addressed are just summarised here, but the differences are highlighted.

⁴¹⁴ The MoCA asked for the establishment of a Seoul branch and local branches; the creation of a conservation centre and an information archive; and international level collections, which amounted to around 338 million pounds.

7-4-1. Arguments for the establishment and change of the MoCA

The main focus on the analysis of the MoCA below is its agencification in 2006 and the attempt to carry out quangocratisation since 2008. As the main factors, however, behind the initial creation of the MoCA, in common with the case of the Tate, might have had a continuous influence on the change of its characteristics later. An exploration of the arguments concerning the MoCA outlined in Chapter 3 therefore needs to begin with its establishment in 1969 (argument group 1: argument 1-1 to 1-3).

7-4-1-1. Deciding factors of traditional government structure

Argument 1-1 contends that the forms of the public sector organisations are dependent upon the nature of goods and services (section 3-1-1). As discussed in an earlier chapter, art museums have the characteristics of merit goods (Figure 3-2; section 6-4-1-1).

In reality, however, there is a possibility that this analysis is too simplified to show the complicated features of *merit goods*. Even though a special good believed to be a merit good in any particular country may exist, it is not likely that all similar types of goods in that nation could be entirely supplied by the government. For example, works of art are relatively narrow and similar kind of goods, but as shown Table 7-8, their exhibitions are provided by varied *institutions* such as the government, local authorities, quangos and private enterprises.

Table 7-8: Contemporary art museums of the public sector and the private sector in Korea

(): number of the facilities

	Governmental museum⁴¹⁵ (1)	Local public museums (35)	Quango museums (3)⁴¹⁶	Private museums (121)
Examples	MMCA	Seoul Museum of Art (SeMA)	Hangaram, Arko Art centre	Leeum Samsung Museum of Art

Source: MCST (2010: 189), MoCA (2007: 282-283) and www.index.go.kr

It is hard, therefore, to imagine that all works of art are merit goods. To put it differently, they are so varied that only specific kinds of works of art could be merit goods and be conserved in a public museum.⁴¹⁷ For example, there is, in general, a greater possibility that archaeology museums would be managed

⁴¹⁵ As of the end of 1012, the number of governmental museums, which are directly managed by civil servants in Korea, is six, including contemporary art museums and science museums.

⁴¹⁶ The Hangaram Museum opened in 1990 as part of the Seoul Art Centre, which is one of the most popular cultural quangos in Korea. Meanwhile, the Arko Museum was established in 1974 as an exhibition support facility. Both museums are small scale and focus on temporary special exhibitions.


⁴¹⁷ See the first part of Chapter 6 (specific characteristics of visual arts).

by the public sector because of their political symbolism and the difficulty of conservation. By contrast, most contemporary art has a lesser possibility of being bought for the nation except when the cultural sector or tourism has priority at the state level. In this regard, the establishment of the MoCA meant that now contemporary art in Korea has become a part of its merit goods.

At the same time, one of the important issues of this argument is to find *who* could decide the nature of *goods* and the change of *goods* or *who* has an influence on their entry and exit. At this point political actors are considered as being the most influential variable. For pluralists, merit goods are the result of the reflection of numerous groups' interests; whilst for the elitist, senior bureaucrats or politicians decide on the types of supply of goods.

In addition, from this point of view, a distinction between agencification and quangocratisation is possible through the concept of merit goods. Quangocratisation Types I (conversion of existing agencies) and II (conversion of existing department units) in Figure 2-2 stem from a decrease in the elements of merit good. For example, as discussed in Chapter 6, British national museums have experienced this process, and the quangocratisation of the MMCA in Korea might be explained as the results from a reduced public consensus about its merit good status.

Yet in spite of its simplicity and explicitly, this argument has difficulty in explaining large-scale change. Figures 5-16 and 7-10 clearly show that huge agencification in a short period of time was not necessarily carried out just by the basic nature of goods. As shown in Figure 7-6 in Japan, as with the case of agencification in the U.K., quangocratisation as well as agencification was taken forward on a large scale in a fairly short period of time, so that this phenomenon leaves little room for an explanation of the role of individual merit good.



Source: IAM (2002), Kitazawa (2005) and MIC (2005-2013)

⁴¹⁸ Japanese IAIs tend to be explained in relation to agencification (Yamamoto, 2003: 17-21, 2004a: 216-221, 2006: 36-38, 2008, 27-29), but non-specific IAIs need to be analysed in terms of quangocratisation. Being similar to specific IAIs, the type of the Louvre and the Pompidou in France is *Établissement Public* and their employees are civil servants (OECD, 2001: 41-43, 71; Shin, 2010b: 205-213).

By contrast, as shown in Figure 7-11, agencification in Korea has gradually taken place and an explanation of the nature of specific goods in general is more persuasive than those in the U.K. and Japan. However, in Korea a plan for quangocratisation of the MoCA has been carried out only two years after its agencification. In this respect, an elucidation by means of merit good would not be cogent. On the contrary, quangocratisation of the Tate had taken place over a longer term and, not unnaturally, it could be regarded as a longstanding value change in *merit good*.

Argument 1-2 claims that the tasks and functions of art museums play a significant role in deciding the type of an organisation (section 3-1-2). As examined earlier (section 7-2), the Korean government *ab initio* separated the function of Als from core departments⁴¹⁹ and cultural agencies fell into Als, since their missions are not direct policy tasks.

Meanwhile, BEAs are functionally segregated from parent departments long after their establishment, which is not always the case though.⁴²⁰ This structural disaggregation logic had been considered by the British government only after the Fulton report (Morrison, 1959: 248; Hogwood, 1993:2; Flinders et al., 2014: 6) and the Next Steps programme accepted it at the state level (Davies and Willman, 1991: 4). The main reason for the separation was to focus more on service delivery which had been underplayed by the government (Massey, 1995b: Para 4.2.4). To be more concrete, the departures from the classic bureaucratic control were expected to be more efficient, flexible, autonomous and advantageous for deploying business-like methods and performance management (Flynn et al., 1988: 440). When it comes to cultural agencies, however, they were moved away from their parent departments before agencification, and in the U.K., even before official quangocratisation their operation was rather distinguished from other government organisations.

The MoCA was agencified from Als which were already distanced from their parent departments; thus it is rather difficult to say, unlike the case of the U.K., that the direct reason for agencification was a simple separation between executive works and policy works. Instead, it was considered that all executive bodies should not be regarded as carrying out the same type of operational work, and some day-to-day works might be more efficient if they were more distanced from the core government. In practice, there are several proposed reasons for the agencification of the MoCA, such as the autonomy in personnel and organisational management (Lee, 2006c and 2006d), the strengthened authority of the chief executive (Noh, 2004a), the introduction of business-like operations (RBGR, 1998: 363) and the enhancement of performance (MPB,

⁴¹⁹ Unlike the Korean and British cases, in Sweden the separation of autonomous bodies stemmed from historical reasons, namely the constraint on central power (Jacobsson and Sundström, 2007: 4; Pierre, 2004: 203-204).

⁴²⁰ See Figure 2-2, agencification type-III and IV.

1999: 280).⁴²¹ Similarly, several grounds for quangocratisation were adduced (Lee et al., 2010: 5; EXSTC, 2013: 7-10), such as efficient customer service (Hwang, 2009), strengthened professionalism (Sun, 2007; Kim, 2009c; KAPS21, 2009: 22), the slimming-down of core government (PTC, 2008: 6), more autonomy on personnel issues (Shin, 2010a) and the removal of the influences from the MCST (Lee, 2011b).

This structural disaggregation logic is so intuitively appealing that many governments are likely to prefer to adopt it and it was one of the major trends of the NPM in the 1980s and 1990s (Aucoin, 1998: 315-316). The patterns of this decoupling however were different from country to country. In the U.K., hiving-off was carried out through the form of grand scale agencification, while in New Zealand existing quango functions were re-classified as Crown Entities (Boston et al., 1996: 64).⁴²² Japanese *Facilities* and Public corporations became IAs, whereas in Korea and Canada only a small part of the traditional department and AIs was separated as Special Operating Agencies (SOAs) and KEAs (Kim, 2000b: 54, 210).

Yet there is a fundamental problem with this basic principle that policy works and operational works are separable (Flynn et al., 1988: 441; Lane, 2000a: 27-28; Ingraham, 1992: 5). For example, the British Efficiency Unit suggested the symbolic number '95 per cent' which represented the number of civil servants who worked in the delivery of government services (Efficiency Unit, 1988: para 3; Jenkins, 2008: 76) and emphasised, by using this figure, the importance of the clarification between policy and management (Massey, 1995b: para 4.2.5). This figure also seems to have brought about an obsessive mission that the government should change most of them into efficient executive agencies (HC 410: para 7; McDonald, 1992: 56; Pyper, 1995: 73), since it was expected that the distinction between policy and executive work was not that difficult, 'when dealt with pragmatically, case by case' (Goldsworthy, 1991: 25). It was realised later, however, that this distinction was too simple and executive agencies could carry out policy works in some instances (Massey, 1995b: para 3.3.13; OPSR, 2002: 10).

In reality, several BEAs have recently been brought back within the main department,⁴²³ which was contradictory to argument 1-2. In Korea, in particular, the MoCA was given *museum policy* tasks, which include public, local and even private museums, from the MCT in 2005 and it was agencified in 2006 (Jang, 2009: 131).⁴²⁴

⁴²¹ The grounds for agencification were comparatively fewer than for quangocratisation. One of the reasons for this is that the outpouring of conflict in agencification was relatively smaller than that of quangocratisation.

⁴²² Crown Entities in New Zealand were introduced in 1992 and especially the *Museum of New Zealand Te Papa Tongarewa* is one of them (Boston et al., 1996: 62 and 64).


⁴²³ See Jenkins (2011: 33-35) and Seo (2005: 109) for several de-agencification examples.

⁴²⁴ In 2008, museum policy function was brought back to the MCST (Jang, 2009: 131; MoCA, 2008b: 19).

Argument 1-3 maintains that the process of historical development of any specific country has made a difference in its AQ.

In Korea, cultural agencies were rather created concurrently in the 1960s, unlike the British case (Table 6-7). Figure 7-7(a) gives year by year information for the number of AIs and cultural agencies created since 1945 and the second Figure shows the number of PIs (quangos) established year by year.⁴²⁵

Figure 7-7 Years of establishment of Affiliated Institutions and Public Institutions in Korea
(a) the number of AIs and cultural agencies **(b) the number of PIs**



Source: compiled and analysed from MoGAHA (1998), MoPAS (2011a; 2012e; 2012c), ALIO and official webpages of AIs

From 1948 to 1960, small numbers of AIs and PIs had been established, but in the 1960s, when economic modernisation through industrialisation was emphasised (Hwang, 2010a: 230-233), a quite noticeable number of AIs and cultural agencies were created. AIs and PIs have been increased drastically since the middle 1980s, while the establishment of new cultural AIs has stagnated.

Table 7-9 Total numbers of national art museums⁴²⁶

U.K.	18
Korea	1
Japan	5
France	14
U.S.	9

Source: adapted from KCTI (2009: 51)

Table 7-9 shows the number of national art museums in several countries. When it comes to national art museums, Korea has still a meagre basis as compared to that of other developed countries,⁴²⁷ although there has been meaningful progress in cultural agencies in the 1960s.

⁴²⁵ Korean PIs include public corporations (see Chapter 2).

⁴²⁶ The meaning of 'national' is different from country to country (section 2-1-2). For other countries, the numbers of national art museums are Greece 3; the Netherlands 4; Spain 22; Sweden 1 and Portugal 1.

⁴²⁷ Yet from a statistical point of view, if the Deoksugung and the Seoul branch of the MMCA are counted separately, the total number of national art museums would be three. In addition, this table does not cover quango museums in Korea, whose names do not include the word 'national' (See Table 7-8).

The cultural arena in developing countries is usually not a high priority in comparison with economic issues, as discussed in sections 6-1 and 6-4-1-1.⁴²⁸ In particular, contemporary art, as compared to traditional art, has less to do with national identity, and furthermore it needs considerable investments and efforts to boost the area as well as dealing with the challenging issues of collection and conservation. Table 7-10 shows that the overall development in art museums in Korea was a rather recent one. 92 (57.5 per cent) art museums among a total of 160 were established after 2000 (MCST, 2012a: 191).⁴²⁹

Table 7-10. Years of establishment of public and private art museums in Korea (total numbers)

	Private art museums	Public art museums
1960s		1 (national)
1970s	2	
1980s	7	3 (local)
1990s	31	8 (local)
After 2000	68	21 (local)

Source: compiled from the MCST (2012a: 191)

In this respect, the establishment of the MoCA in 1969 was unusually early, given the development of the state. The military regime of the time tried to acquire legitimacy (Fuchs, 2009: 165) and to strengthen its propaganda (Pick, 1986: 154); thus it might have placed a priority on the cultural agencies. Although the Korean government had indirectly encouraged the public sector institutions such as the Bank of Korea to purchase works of art since the 1950s (Bang, 2013; Kim, 2005c), direct investment in earnest was made only after President Park promised the creation of a series of cultural agencies in 1966 (Jang, 2009: 86; IB2). However, the MoCA at the time was established just in order to manage the *National Art Competition*, which was held yearly by the government (Jung, 2003b). The creation of the museum did not take even a month from the decision for its establishment (Jang, 2009: 87), and even the opening ceremony of the MoCA in 1969 was not properly reported by any daily newspaper (Jung, 2003b). Since the National Art Competition was closely related to political powers and propaganda purposes, a large number of artists resisted it (Lee, 2004c; Lee, 2004e). For this reason, the MoCA could not adequately collect and exhibit diverse works of art for several years from its outset.

In addition, the construction of the Gwacheon MoCA, in particular, with its outdoor sculpture park, in the 1980s was personally decided all of a sudden by President Cheon, who was commanding the military regime at that time, prior to the 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games (Choi,

⁴²⁸ See the basic human needs theory (Maslow, 1987: 15-31; section 6-4-1-1).

⁴²⁹ Generally, in Korea, various cultural agencies such as libraries and other kinds of museums have still been continuously expanded through government capital expenditure investment (KCTI, 2011a: 40-41). For example, the government supported as much as 30 per cent of the total construction cost of local art museums from 1999 in order to accomplish its target that any city should have at least one museum.

2000; Jang, 2009: 107). Since its creation was confirmed unexpectedly, it was difficult to find the right place for such a huge building with an outdoor park within Seoul; thus the Mayor of Seoul and the Minister of Culture and Public Relations debated extensively about the location of new museum (Lee, 2005c; Sohn, 2003a). After a heated dispute, the location was confirmed in 1982 to be around the edge of Gwacheon, where a new government-planned city was being constructed (Sohn, 2003b).

In sum, in order to understand the creation of cultural agencies in a specific country, it is necessary to research the historical contexts as well as the political decision-making process and the level of economic development.

7-4-1-2. External centripetal forces These arguments focus on the reasons why the MoCA was agencified, or would be quangocratised, similar to the experiences of other countries.

Argument 2-1 supposes that the AQ of the MoCA was influenced by international cognitive pressures such as policy fashion, cognitive forces or NPM theories (section 3-2-1-1). In the late 1990s, the parallel development of the economy and democracy was a *cause celebre* for the state, and just after the IMF bail-out in 1998 a range of neo-liberalism ideas was introduced (RBGR, 1998: 315-316). What was unique about Korean reforms after 1998 is the fact that it was the first time that a left-wing party had come to power (Figure 5-8). This reveals that despite the possible ideological conflicts, the top priority at the time was given to economic recovery and thus reinventing the government or the NPM seemed to be the most reliable methods at the time (RBGR, 1998: 4-5; MPB, 1999b: 16-19; Kim, 2003b: 40). Korea joined the OECD in 1996 and there were several volumes of governmental studies about the OECD reforms that were carried out (MGA, 1997a; IC2). A book, *inter alia*, published by the Ministry of Government Administration (MGA) (1997b), conducted an in-depth examination of the reforms of Anglophone-countries such as the U.K., New Zealand, Australia, Canada and the U.S., which had a significant impact on the subsequent reforms in Korea (MPB, 1999b: 276).

In Table 7-11 some examples which were introduced since the middle 1990s illustrate the reform trend in Korea. In general terms, agencification also is considered as a part of this trend (BAI, 2004: 40).

Table 7-11. Examples of reform ideas introduced in Korea

Management by Objectives (MbO)	1994
Performance-related Pay (PRP)	1994
Government Performance Evaluation	1998
Performance-based Budgeting	1999
Citizen's Charter	1999
Executive Agency	2000
Balanced Score Card (BSC)	2005

Source: Kim (2006:206); BAI (2005: 40); Lee and Moon (2010: 434-435); Koh (2008: 159 -168) and MPB (1999b: 266)

International organisations such as the World Bank and the IMF, as well as the OECD, have played a central role in expanding these fashionable ideas developed in advanced countries, into the developing countries (OECD, 1995: 12; OECD, 2002; Jenkins, 2008: 162-163 and 2011: 13).⁴³⁰ Particularly, a myriad of countries have been influenced by the policies of the OECD which has tried to expand *good governance* around the world (Pal, 2012: 203).

Meanwhile, when introducing the agencification idea, practitioners in the Korean government had especially referred to the British examples (MPB, 1999b: 275, 280). However, unlike the American government's overly positive initial expectations that PBOs would produce significant efficiency savings, as with BEAs, in a short period of time,⁴³¹ (Gore, 1996: 118; Osborne, 1997: 97; Osborne and Plastrik, 1997: 30; CfPS, 1997:5; Graham and Roberts, 2004: 150), the Korean government took a careful approach and a neutral view about agencification (MGA, 1997b: 326-327; MPB, 1999b: 276-278). In particular, with regard to the agencification of the MoCA in 2006, it was chosen as a new candidate for KEAs in 2003 by the MCT, the MoGAHA and the PCGID (Presidential Committee on Government Innovation and Decentralisation) (MoGAHA, 2003b: 9). However, the Korean government could not directly resort to the British case since the national museums in the U.K. had already been quangocratised in the 1970s and 1980s. In addition, there was no record that the agencification of the MoCA was influenced by Japanese examples, although in 2001 five Japanese art museums were converted as specific IAs (Lee, 2008: 51). It seems that the Korean government investigated many foreign cases, using their *criteria* for agencification; but in practice did not want to copy these foreign agencified examples, as it were.

By contrast, during the process of quangocratisation of the MoCA, varied foreign museums were examined (Kang, 2008: 6-7). As shown in Figure 7-5 (footnote 409), the existence of foreign precedents, or similar cases, was regarded as one of the primary considerations when the Korean government reviewed the candidates for quangocratisation in 2008. For example, the Korea Post, the MoCA and the National Theatre of Korea were analysed and compared with many foreign quangocratised cases. Particularly, the Japanese national art museums, the British National Gallery and the Tate were intensively explored when it came to the quangocratisation of the MoCA (MoPAS, 2008h; section 8-3).


⁴³⁰ Among the OECD countries, the U.K. was more active in exporting their ideas to other countries (James, 2003: 147; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011: 11).

⁴³¹ However, there was no mention of BEAs in the previous version of the National Performance Review (Gore, 1993) or in the book of Osborne and Gaebler (1992).

Argument 2-2 assumes that the AQ processes are closely linked to the economic crisis of an individual country (section 3-2-1-2).

As far as the broader picture, which reveals the relationship between the economic situation and the staff size of government, is concerned, there were statistically significant correlations between the annual GDP growth and the annual civil servants growth rate three years later, as with the case of the U.K. (Figure 6-1).⁴³² Figure 7-8 shows that the number of civil servants was reduced around four times after the major economic crises in 1973, 1979, 1998 and 2008. In particular, the left-wing government in 1998, in spite of its ideological contradiction, did not guarantee job security for the public or the private sector employees from large scale redundancy, owing to the pressing economic calamity after 1997. It could be said therefore that the economic crisis might directly influence the reduction in civil servants.

Figure 7-8: Economic growth rate and civil servants growth rate (from 1966 to 2011)



Source: extracted and analysed from <http://databank.worldbank.org>, Korean Civil Service Statistics 1966-2011


There are several methods to decrease the size of the civil service: abolishment of the function, outsourcing, quangocratisation or *public enterprisation* (section 2-1-2).⁴³³ For example, the internal rearrangement within the public sector of *National Railroad Administration* staff from the civil service to a public corporation in 2005 led to a huge reduction in the number of civil servants (footnote 434), whereas an enormous reduction in civil servants in 1998 and 1999 was not just a staff transfer. In contrast to these measures, agencification within government was far from reducing the size of the civil service, but was linked to the potential expenditure savings, which was not the main purpose of agencification in Korea. Meanwhile, quangocratisation efforts

⁴³² Annual GDP Growth Rate in a specific year (for example, in 1964) and the Annual Civil Servants Growth Rate **three years later** (for example, in 1966) have a Pearson correlation of 0.400, which is a significant correlation. (Pearson correlation = 0.400, Sig (2-tailed) = 0.006, N=46). For the British case, see Figure 6-1.

⁴³³ Transition from specific IAs to non-specific IAs in Japan stemmed from an intentional reduction in the civil service (Lee, 2008e: 70). Furthermore, Japanese IAs had a legal duty to cut administrative costs by 3 per cent a year for five years (MoCA, 2008c: 137; Kang, 2008: 6).

since 2008 had something to do with the downsizing of the civil service as well as the reinvigoration of the private sector. One apparatus of the institutional equipment which seems to be closely related to quangocratisation in Korea is the *Presidential Decree on Gross Number of the Central Civil Service* which put a ceiling of 293,982⁴³⁴ on overall figure for the number of the civil service (excluding teachers and some others) since 1998, a measure similar to earlier Japanese legislation.⁴³⁵ Given that the number of the civil service staff has continuously been increasing, as shown in Figure 7-9, enduring quangocratisation of the civil service is necessary to reduce its 'official' numbers for a symbolic reason, although that might not be the main objective of the quangocratisation policy in Korea.

Figure 7-9: Changes in the gross number of the civil service (Presidential Decree)



Source: compiled and analysed from MoPAS (2010e)

Argument 2-3 postulates that AQ has universally taken place around the world largely due to the efforts of self-seeking political actors (section 3-2-1-3). In this connection, commentators have different opinions as to who were the leading political actors of the British Next Steps programmes. For example, Marsh et al. suggest that politicians played an important role in agencification (2001: 56).⁴³⁶ Politicians, however, did not seem to proactively lead the reform. The reform plan was announced only after the general election in 1987⁴³⁷ and it

⁴³⁴ This gross number includes the police but not teachers (Figure 5-2). Since its enactment in 1998, just after the economic crisis, it has not changed and, owing to the persistent increase in police numbers, MoGAHA (MoPAS, MoSPA) have tried to reduce other kinds of civil servants. For example, 20,056 employees were transferred to another public sector (the public enterprisation of the Korean National Railroad Administration).

⁴³⁵ Since 1969 the Japanese government has put a ceiling on their civil service staff numbers by the *Act on the Number of Government Organization*.

⁴³⁶ Marsh et al. argue that there was a power struggle behind the Next Steps reform (2001: 57). In pursuit of the next Cabinet Secretary position after Robert Armstrong (Theakston, 1999a: 220), Peter Middleton at the Treasury and his boss Nigel Lawson objected to any opinion about the Next Steps programme in order to check would-be successor Robin Butler. Zifcak insists that the Treasury, which has been the traditional rival of the Cabinet Office (Burnham and Pyper, 2008: 9), objected to agencification in order not to lose its existing expenditure control over other ministries (1994: 82-84), while Lawson maintains that there was a possibility that agencification might lead to the problem of parliamentary accountability and efficient usage of expenditure (Flynn et al., 1988: 440; Flynn et al., 1990: 160; Lawson, 1992: 392; Hennessy, 1995: 131).

⁴³⁷ The Ibbs Report had already been made long before the general election, but it was not promulgated until February 1988 (McDonald, 1992: 29; Theakston, 1995: 132), although it 'apparently had Margaret's enthusiastic support' (Lawson, 1992: 391).

was believed to be because of its 'radical nature' (Goldsworthy, 1991: 8; Davies and Willman, 1991: 10; Hennessy, 1989: 618-622). It could not be said therefore that politicians deployed the agencification policy as a short-term vote maximising strategy. Instead, it was carried out as the extension of its reform tradition since 1979. Since the Next Steps programme was a rather *internal* administrative change and thus was not expected to attract an enthusiastic support from the public. For politicians, it was more important to emphasise the reform *per se* and to glamorise its generic concept (Gains, 2004a: 58-59).

By contrast, several commentators believe that bureaucrats played a crucial role in agencification (James, 2003: 43-44). The bureaucrats-led model is often identified with the principal agent approach (Moe, 1984: 755-756; Jensen and Meckling, 1976: 309). Yet with regard to agencification, agents could be managed well just through performance-related pay without structural decoupling. Furthermore, since structural disaggregation might add to the problem with moral hazard and reverse selection, a principal-agent theory does not seem to be the most appropriate model for the explanation of AQ.⁴³⁸

Another important RCI model is the bureau-shaping model, whose idea is similar to a part of the Ibbs Report.

... most civil servants are very conscious that senior management is dominated by people whose skills are in policy formulation and who have relatively little experience of managing or working where services are actually being delivered. ... *'the golden route to the top is through policy not through management'* (Efficiency Unit, 1988: para 4, emphasis added).

James suggests that even though official government reports emphasised public interests as a main reason for agencification (2003: 9-10, 23), in reality bureaucrats pursue individual career benefits and increased policy work by means of the reform (ibid: 42, 48-49). Meanwhile, before the Next Steps initiative it was said that an attempt to make ministers focus on management through the FMI (Financial management Initiative) had failed, and thus the Ibbs Report tried to emphasise the importance of management (Haddon: 2012: 15). Instead of this, bureaucrats deploy this rationale to maximise their interests.

However, instead of giving up policy work to concentrate on management, senior officials passed on operational activity to executive agencies as a 'bureaushaping' strategy to concentrate on policy work (James, 2003: 10, emphasis added).

⁴³⁸ On the contrary, in New Zealand it has been said that the reform was introduced in order to prevent opportunistic civil servants from abusing informational advantage, which is the perspective of the principal-agent theory (Molander, Nilsson and Schick, 2002: 121; Massey, 1995d: 144). Yet opportunistic agents are not the unique problem of civil servants with operative tasks (section 3-2-1-3).

In this perspective, the agencies with less *core* budget (but with more *programme* budget) tend to be hived-off (Dowding, 1995: 87-89; James, 2003: 36). Yet this perspective has not only theoretical weaknesses (see Chapter 3), but also empirical limitations in explaining British agencification (Gains, 1999: 39). Firstly, the initial *leading group* of the reform then could not use the bureau-shaping strategy (James, 2003: 128). The policy leading group consisted of a small number of Next Steps staff and most of them were not career civil servants (Theakston, 1995: 132; Jenkins, 2008: 61; Haddon, 2012: 16). Secondly, in the process of agencification, senior civil servants in departments did not have much leeway to choose candidates for BEAs. In the early period of agencification, departments were asked to identify tasks which were appropriate to become BEAs (HC 410, 1989: paras 12-17; Goldsworthy, 1991: 9; Cabinet Office, 2006b: para 4; Gains, 2004a: 59), but later there was no alternative for senior civil servants since most parts of departments were chosen as BEAs (OPSR, 2002: 10).⁴³⁹ In addition, a Project Manager who was backed by the Prime Minister had such strong power that each department did not have enough discretion to choose its own strategy (Davies and Willman, 1991: 13).

Meanwhile, Korea seems to partly have more plausible conditions for the bureau-shaping model. Firstly, bureaucrats institutionally have a considerable autonomy, since Korea adopts a bottom-up reporting system which, in practice, enables even junior civil servants to outline important government policies, and thus to make all the detailed differences (Cho, 1996: 188: IC1; Page and Jenkins, 2005: 10), as with the Japanese system (Kikuchi, 2010, 219; James, 2003: 149). Secondly, since the expansion of KEAs in Korea acquired relatively little support from politicians, Korean bureaucrats could enjoy more autonomy than those in the U.K.

However, in the early stage of agencification each department has relatively little discretion to take measures against the pressure from the Ministry of Planning and Budget (MPB) and the MoGAHA, in common with the British case (Kim, 200b: 221-222); therefore it was rather difficult for bureaucrats to make a bureau-shaping strategy or to distinguish between *core budget* and *programme budget*. Furthermore, most bureaucrats, including senior and middle posts, in candidate bodies and their parent departments objected to agencification, due to strengthened performance control and to bringing in outsiders for chief executive posts.⁴⁴⁰ As far as the MoCA is

⁴³⁹ Project Manager Peter Kemp at the time openly expressed the hope that three quarters of the Civil Service would be working in BEAs within ten years (Goldsworthy, 1991: 36).

⁴⁴⁰ At the same time, for civil servants, quangocratisation could also lead to the contraction of posts, the weakening of their influence over auxiliary bodies and the withering of the parent department's power.

concerned, it was not senior bureaucrats but a chief executive recruited from outside government that supported agencification. Besides which, unlike the basic assumption of the bureau-shaping strategy (James, 2003: 128-129: IC2), bureaucrats pursued varied interests apart from their private interests. For example, the Korean National Research Institute of Cultural Heritage (NRICH) voluntarily requested agencification in order to increase its autonomy despite other disadvantages.

In terms of quangocratisation, RCI assumes that politicians and bureaucrats tend to pursue different interests, depending on the quangocratisation type (Figure 2-2). The transition from existing bodies to quangos (types-I and II) is a useful method of averting potential risks or hiding the real size of government, while the creation of new quangos (type-III) allows them to expand patronage (section 3-2-1-3).⁴⁴¹ In addition, there might be a different kind of motivation that influenced the quangocratisation of the MoCA. Since the minister, as a politician, wants to leave meaningful footprints during his term of office, the quangocratisation of the MoCA, as well as its expansion, might be considered as a political asset for his next career, if it turned out to be a significant contribution to its success (Oh, 2008b).

7-4-2. The uniqueness of the creation of the MoCA: internal centrifugal forces

Argument group 3 focus more on differences among AQ causes. First of all, **Argument 3-1** ascribes the cause of AQ to the depoliticisation trends of each country (section 3-2-2-1). In this perspective, AQ is a form of depoliticisation. There are two main concepts of depoliticisation: the shift of the issue arena (Figure 3-4) and the disconnection between politicians and bureaucrats (Figure 5-5). These types and the degrees of depoliticisation are considerably different, depending on the political situation of any individual state. Figures 7-10 and 7-11 show there are quite noticeable differences in the pace and size of agencification among the U.K., Korea and Japan. Understandably, the speed of spread and the types of quangocratisation among these countries are even more complicated.


Since the results of depoliticisation are so varied, it could be questioned whether depoliticisation is the real cause of agencification. For example, one of

⁴⁴¹ For example, the Japanese *Amakudari* is a typical example (Suleiman, 2003: 202). Other countries such as Sweden (Pierre, 2004: 204), Korea (Kim, 2007b: 15) and the U.K. (Skelcher, 1998a: 15) have the same problem (the so-called 'democratic deficit', Hunt, 1995: 26).


the main purposes of depoliticisation is the acquisition of autonomy from the absurd interventions of politicians and senior bureaucrats, but in practice one of the critical reasons for agencification in the U.K. is the political indifference to operational tasks, not a fear of severe intervention (Efficiency Unit, 1988: para4; Massey, 1995b: para 3.1.2).

Figure 7-10: Pace of expansion of BEAs

a) the number of BEAs created year by year




b) the number of BEAs staff added year by year⁴⁴²




Source: extracted and analysed from OPSR (2002: 50-55) and James 2003 (57-58)

Figure 7-11: Number of KEAs and IAIs created year by year in Korea and Japan

a) Korea



b) Japan



Source: extracted and analysed from KAPS (2011: 22-25), Moon and Lee (2010: 42) and Kitazawa (2005: 24-25)

Another question is whether depoliticisation first took place in an arena in which a more urgent detachment from politicians and senior bureaucrats was needed. In reality, agencification was not carried out for depoliticisation, but merely that relatively depoliticised institutions were agencified first. The Prime Minister announced twelve candidates for agencification in February 1988 (HC 410: 22-23),⁴⁴³ but among them just three executive agencies were created first: the Vehicle Inspectorate, Companies House and the Queen Elizabeth II

⁴⁴² Major changes in staff numbers were caused by the inclusion of the Employment Service (32,300 staff in 1990), the Benefits Agency (68,480 staff in 1991) and HM Prisons (41,940 staff in 1993).

⁴⁴³ As of May 1989, 5 BEAs were created and 32 bodies had been designated as candidates (HC 410: para 11).

Conference Centre, which had already enjoyed comparatively more autonomy⁴⁴⁴ from their parent departments. After the successful operation of these pilot agencies,⁴⁴⁵ the scope of BEAs was expanded.

Meanwhile, agencification in Korea has been gradual and one of the reasons for this was the AIs. AIs are officially separated and somewhat depoliticised from their parent departments and the issues, raised in the Ibbs Report in the U.K. (1988: paras 3, 4, 7 and 10), were, comparatively speaking, not problematic in Korea. In addition, when the introduction of agencification was discussed, the focus was placed on performance improvement. Moreover, the detailed information about other countries' agencification had been analysed, so that the Korean government was more cautious about radical change (MPB, 1999: 280; MGA, 1997b: Chapter 5).⁴⁴⁶

In particular, the agencification of the MoCA was not said to be directly motivated by depoliticisation but, as an art museum, the MoCA needed more autonomy from its parent department.⁴⁴⁷ As we can see in Figures 3-4 and 5-5, broadly the elites of the state include not only politicians but senior bureaucrats; thus more managerial freedom from these state elites could be interpreted as a kind of depoliticisation. Meanwhile, not surprisingly, there is a serious question about the scope of depoliticisation (section 3-2-1-2). Yet if the concept of depoliticisation in a broad sense is adopted, the quangocratisation of the MoCA might generally mean that operational autonomy could be secured in more depoliticised way.

For supporters of **Argument 3-2**, AQ of the MoCA could be analysed from a policy-making process perspective (section 3-2-2-2). Firstly, as far as policy leading group is concerned, in general terms, the administrative reform within government, including AQ, is apt to be a *mobilisation model* or an *inside access* model by elite groups, since it is just a managerial reform and the participation of outsiders is limited. In particular, British agencification was led by the Efficiency Unit which consisted of just a small number of staff (Burch and

⁴⁴⁴ In this regard, Arguments 1-1 and 1-2 show well that some goods and tasks would have priority in an agencification policy because of their basic nature.

⁴⁴⁵ The Ibbs Report recommended a radical change before the impetus for the reform would disappear (1988: paras 37 and 41). However, according to Jenkins, pilot operations were needed in order to check 'how the agency concept worked in practice' (Jenkins, 2011: 12). On the contrary, Goldsworthy maintains that the first established agencies were not a pilot exercise (1991: 21), in order to show that the direction of the reform was quite solid.

⁴⁴⁶ In order to introduce agencification in Korea, a formal Act (AEOEA) was required; but the candidates for agencification were stipulated in a Presidential Decree. Therefore, there were no serious legal constraints, unlike the cases of German and Japan which have a stronger *Rechtsstaat* tradition (Pollitt, 2007c: 18).

⁴⁴⁷ See subsection 6-1 in Chapter 6.

Holliday, 1996: 230; Jenkins, 2008: 61), while Korean agencification was introduced first by the RBGR (Review Board for Government Reorganization) in early 1998. Meanwhile, the British quango reform in 2010 was led by the Cabinet Office; whilst in Korea, the new quangocratisation policy was raised by the PTC in 2008.⁴⁴⁸ Particularly, in reference to the MoCA, AQ processes were mainly led by the Organisation Management Bureau within the MoGAHA (MoPAS).⁴⁴⁹ Since the policy-leading group was an internal organisation, there was a greater possibility that the AQ process was influenced by *internal* politics, which could not be detectable outside the government. For example, the MoCA was not one of the candidates for KEAs in 1999 (MPB, 1999b: 47; MoGAHA, 1999: 4), but was chosen as a new candidate in September 2003. In 2003, the new administration and the PCGID set the expansion of KEAs as one of the key government objectives and the MoCA was selected as one of the thirteen new candidates (MoGAHA, 2003b: 9). However, it is not clear why the MoCA was especially chosen among the cultural agencies, while the National Museum of Korea, the National Library of Korea and the National Folk Museum were excluded.

Secondly, with regard to the determinants of agenda confirmation, the U.K. has a politico-administrative system which is more favourable to AQ than that of Korea (section 5-1-1). The British unwritten constitution enables the government to adopt a radical change such as comprehensive agencification. In addition, a fusion of the executive and legislative powers generally allows for even controversial legislation such as the Public Bodies Act 2011 to be comparatively easily introduced. On the contrary, the constraints on a wholesale change in Korea is legally somewhat stricter; and if there is a contrasting view about the policy priority for a specific issue between the executive and the legislative branch, it is more difficult to effect a compromise. Meanwhile, a policy type could also influence the agenda confirmation process. In general terms, internal reorganisation or a change in organisational forms are a kind of *constituent policies* which usually have few external participants. Yet vis-à-vis the changes in the MoCA, many stakeholders have been involved in agencification in 2006 and the quangocratisation movement since 2008 (Lee, 2004). Now that there has been a significant resistance to performance control and some concern about commercialisation and privatisation from artists and

⁴⁴⁸ The PTC was institutionally introduced by an Act in 2003.

⁴⁴⁹ AQ policy in Korea is, in general terms, not a kind of '*high politics*', but '*everyday politics*' which do not attract support for party politicians (Page, 2001: 178-179; footnote 7). However, see section 8-1-1-8.

art circles, stakeholders such as the Korean Fine Arts Association were first strongly combined in order to object to AQ (Lee, 2005b). During the process of resistance, some of the employees of the MoCA even tried to mobilise demonstrations of stakeholders (Park, 2004b; Lee, 2004a).

Argument 3-3 relates AQ to the path dependence. From HI's point of view, in general terms the existing path is unlikely to be easily changed (section 3-2-2-3). Nonetheless, during the process of British agencification, a certain type of path breaking took place, as suggested in the Ibbs Report (Efficiency Unit, 1988: paras 13, 37, 38 and 41). The first path vis-à-vis agencification in Britain is the rules on governmental organisation structure, which was tremendously changed by a new type of governmental body; executive agencies. In reality, varied factors are said to have contributed to this radical change. First of all, the Prime Minister's strong espousal of agencification (Hogwood, 1993: 4) and the significant role of the Project Manager were the most critical impetus for the change (Efficiency Unit, 1988: para 41; Goldsworthy, 1991: 10). Furthermore, as far as British agencification was concerned, there was no founding statute or basic agencification law, except the Government Trading Act 1990 (Hogwood, 1993: 5), setting out the purpose, function and responsibility of this vital branch of the state (Pollitt, 2007c: 18; Hogwood, 1993: 10). In addition, there was relatively little resistance to the reform within the government, since it was basically based on a survey by various civil servants and the notion of the reform was 'straightforward, readily understood like the best tune' (Goldsworthy, 1991: 7-8). Besides which, proactive public relations fuelled the speed of change (ibid: 34).

The second noteworthy path is the operational rules for executive agencies. After the huge agencification movement, various personnel management tools, such as recruitment, promotion and pay, were delegated to BEAs for operational flexibility, which meant a departure from the traditional Whitehall model (McDonald, 1992: 47-49; HC 410: paras 35, 36, 40, 41; Cm 2627: paras 2.19-2.25; Cm 2748: para 3.15; OPSR, 2002: 43-45; Burnham and Pyper, 2008: 38-39). However, the viewpoint of the Prime Minister and the government about accountability revealed that the existing concept for the traditional arrangement for accountability was an intrinsic constraint to the reform (Gains, 1999: 61-63). More interestingly, the institutional path varied from department to department and from agency to agency (Gains, 2004a: 55, 71). In particular, quangos have been managed by and large, based on each of

the sponsoring department's policy, so that the overall paths of quangos are even more difficult to analyse.

By contrast, overall Korean agencification showed a less drastic change. The existence of the AIs made the differentiation from the new agencies so challenging that the scope of agencification was limited. In order to distinguish the KEAs from the AIs, the prerequisites for agencification candidates were narrowed down to those bodies which could be operated in terms of the principles of 'competitiveness' (MoPAS, 2010b; NAPASC, 2010: 6); thus the possible candidates were intrinsically restricted to the small part of AIs.⁴⁵⁰ Moreover, although any radical reform, not unreasonably, needs a special *promotion and support framework*, Korean agencification was carried out by the 'existing' Organisation Bureau in the MoPAS, as with other ordinary organisational management matters, without a Project Manager or support at the top. Therefore, the MoPAS needed the spontaneous co-operation of the parent departments during the process of agencification, but each department remained cautious and defensive.

At the same time, when it comes to the agencification of the MoCA, the path in terms of *organisational structure* has changed within a fairly short period of time. The institutional path of the MoCA, which tends to maintain its existing organisational structure, as with other AIs, had worked, but could be overcome with the new support at the top. After the Roh administration took office, it launched the very influential PCGID in order to take forward some key government objectives, including the expansion of agencification. On the one hand, it was so powerful that it could surmount institutional barriers. On the other hand, from the perspective of the MoCA, it failed to mobilise sufficient political support to resist agencification. More profoundly, as the chief executive of the MoCA at the time was sympathetic to agencification, this *window of opportunity* could be created (Kingdon, 2003: 165; Hill, 2013: 168-172; Richards and Smith, 2002: 75; Cairney, 2011: 232; Dorey, 2014: 18; Miller and McTavish: 2014: 43). In spite of this structural change, however, *operational rules* for KEAs were still not enough for enhancing their performance. For this reason, quangocratisation of the MoCA is believed to have changed its institutional constraints, especially the operational rules of the game (sections 2-2-2, 7-3 and 8-4).

⁴⁵⁰ The Board of Audit and Inspection raised an issue that some KEAs did not meet the prerequisites for agencification, such as financial independence and operational competitiveness (BAI, 2004).

7-4-3. Concluding Remarks

AQ of the MoCA (MMCA) could be explained from various perspectives, as discussed earlier. These arguments are, on the one hand, the causes of AQ; while on the other hand, they could be the reasons for the delay of quangocratisation in Korea. Since the attempt to quangocratise the MoCA, unlike the successful transition from AIs to KEAs, has not borne fruit yet, the difficulties in quangocratising the MoCA could also be explained by these arguments.

Firstly, with regard to the *arguments group 1*, the notion of *merit good* is different from stakeholder to stakeholder, so that it was difficult to draw out a consensus on the degree and scope of change in it (Bozeman, 2007: 91-92). Furthermore, the ambiguity of the concept of *operational tasks* also makes it difficult to define its extent; thus a candidate, such as the MoCA, that was chosen as having more of an executive function than other AIs, feels the quangocratisation process is rather unfair. In addition, a unique development trajectory of the national art museum in Korea makes it more challenging to predict the future of the quangocratisation of the MoCA.

Secondly, in terms of *argument group 2*, policy sweeping through the world though it may be, it has been to a certain degree adopted in a cautious and phased way in Korea. At the same time, in relation to the economic crisis in 2008, the Korean government recovered its economy relatively fast, so that the economic depression had not been a long-term pressure for organisational structure change. More importantly, no powerful actor group which could push its private interests through has been formed.

Finally, *vis-à-vis argument group 3*, for several stakeholders, depoliticisation of the MoCA has been expected to accelerate managerialism and commercialism, and there has also been a growing concern that future government funding might be reduced and be privatised more easily than other governmental organisations if the economic situation would worsen. From the public policy process perspective, the agenda of quangocratisation of the MoCA was given only a weak political underpinning, so that it was more or less difficult to get firm support from the legislative branch. Lastly, the structural path of the MoCA that secured its function of carrying out state-funded tasks has gained an inertia that is hard to change.

In conclusion, AQ of the MoCA could be viewed in various ways, which illuminates the fact that the arguments related to the causes of AQ have not just one or two dimensions, but are more multi-faceted (sections 8-1-2 and 8-1-3).


7-5. Performances and Results of Agencification

The contemporary art museums have been internationally communicating with each other and sharing their experiences very frequently; thus their internal and external objectives tend to be broadly similar. The Tate and the MMCA, *inter alia*, are iconic *national* contemporary art museums in the U.K. and Korea; thus their missions which are externally presented show little difference (section 6-5).⁴⁵¹

7-5-1. Outputs and outcomes

The most emblematic and comparable performance indicator is the annual visitor figures. The number of annual visitors to the MoCA in 2011 was 1.01 million, which was around a fifth of Tate Modern. As shown in Figure 7-12, attendance figures were at their peak between 2000 and 2001 (Kim, 2002), but they gradually decreased⁴⁵² until 2006 when the MoCA was agencified (Lee, 2010e). Yet after that point the overall visitor figures have incrementally increased.

Figure 7-12: Numbers of annual visitors to the MMCA (1986-2011; thousands)⁴⁵³



Source: extracted and analysed from MMCA (2013a: 239; MoCA: 2011a: 170)

The abrupt increase since 2008 mostly stemmed from the free entrance-charge policy (Lee, 2010d; Lee, 2013d; Donga, 2008). Figure 7-12 shows that total visitor attendances have increased, despite a drastic decrease in paid admissions since 2008 (Figure 7-13).⁴⁵⁴ At the same time, a large portion of

⁴⁵¹ The main objectives of the MMCA are displays and exhibitions, collection and conservation, investigation and research, publication, international communication, education, cultural events, the enhancement of the rights to enjoy art, and the support of art-creation activities (MMCA, 2014: 20-38).


⁴⁵² This was partially because of the establishment of numerous private museums in Seoul since 2000 (Table 7-10; Lee, 2010b), and partly because of the statistical reason that outdoor park visitors are excluded from the total visitor numbers (Kim, 2008d).

⁴⁵³ These figures include visitors to the Deoksugung Branch in Seoul (CSTBC, 2011: 8; ECSTC, 2013: 9; MMCA, 2013a: 239) whose attendance figure was around 310,000 in 2011. Meanwhile, the number of visitors to the brand new Seoul branch, whose target of annual visitor attendance is two million (Kim, 2009a; Park, 2013a), was 140,000 for fifty days after its opening in 2013 (MMCA, 2014: 4).

⁴⁵⁴ As with British national museums, its permanent collection displays have been free of charge since May 2008, while the temporary special exhibitions have been charged.

visitor attendance derives from the pupils who attended a class as a part of school visits (MCST, 2012b: 36-37; MMCA, 2013a: 240; Lee, 2010f), while the ratio of overseas attendance has been quite low. For example, the proportion of overseas visitors to the MoCA in 2012 was just 1.9 per cent,⁴⁵⁵ which shows it has not played a significant role as a foreign tourist attraction.

Figure 7-13: Portion of paid admissions (1986-2011)



Source: extracted and analysed from MoCA Annual Report (2004-2011)

As shown in Table 7-12, the MoCA came in 49th in 2011 and 39th in 2012 in the international ranking of annual visitor figures, whilst the National Museum of Korea, whose features are similar to the British Museum, has been mostly in the top ten since 2009.

Table 7-12: International ranking of museum visitors (2009-2012)

	2009	2010	2011	2012
National Museum of Korea	10	9	9	12
Gyeongju National Museum	-	22	27	35
Gongju National Museum	-	91	-	-
National Folk Museum of Korea	-	-	16	15
National Museum of Contemporary Art	-	-	49	39
Gwangju National Museum	-	-	-	100

Source: extracted and analysed from the Art Newspaper (2010:24; 2011: 24; 2012: 35, 36; 2013: 15, 29)

Meanwhile, the overall competitiveness of international museums in both countries could be compared, as shown in Table 7-13. In 2012, five Korean museums were in the top hundred in annual visitor attendance ranking, while the U.K. had fourteen museums in this ranking. One of the reasons for these conspicuous successes stems from the free entrance-charge policy in both countries, given that France which is overwhelmingly the most overseas tourist-attracting country,⁴⁵⁶ had only seven in the ranking. By contrast, before the 2008 free entrance-charge policy, the MoCA has quite fallen behind the National Art Centre in Tokyo, which came in 15th in 2008 and 80th in 2011, in terms of visitor attendance.

⁴⁵⁵ Among the 1.28 million visitors in 2012, overseas attendance was only 24,121 (MCST, tour.go.kr). In particular, among the 0.77 million visitors to the Gwacheon branch, only 0.57 per cent was overseas visitors (MMCA, 2013a: 240).

⁴⁵⁶ See <http://data.worldbank.org> (Appendix 31).

There are several reasons for having a smaller number of visitors to the MoCA, in comparison with Tate Modern. Firstly, the main gallery of the MoCA is not situated in a good location for access from Seoul. Unlike Tate Modern which is located in the centre of London and therefore has a geographical advantage, the MoCA is housed 23 km away from Gyeongbok Palace in the centre of Seoul, which has 4.5 million yearly visitors.⁴⁵⁷ A similar case in the U.K. might prove the importance of geographical location; the annual visitor attendance of St Paul's Cathedral is almost twice that of Windsor Castle (ISPAL, 2009: 5).⁴⁵⁸

Table 7-13: A comparison of annual visitors in 2012 (thousands)

a) Korea

12	National Museum of Korea	3,128
15	National Folk Museum of Korea	2,640
35	Gyeongju National Museum	1,378
39	National Museum of Contemporary Art	1,284
100	Gwangju National Museum ⁴⁵⁹	645

b) U.K.

3	British Museum	5,575
4	Tate Modern	5,304
5	National Gallery	5,163
11	Victoria & Albert Museum	3,231
18	National Portrait Gallery	2,096
20	National Museum of Scotland	1,893
23	National Galleries of Scotland	1,604
26	Tate Britain	1,536
33	Saatchi Gallery	1,413
44	Royal Academy of Arts	1,202
57	Kelvingrove Art Gallery and Museum	1,037
61	Riverside Museum	1,008
74	Ashmolean Museum	846
83	Birmingham Museum & Art Gallery	764

Source: extracted and analysed from the Art Newspaper (2013: 15, 29)

Secondly, unlike the Pompidou Centre, the MoMA and Tate Modern, which have a range of museums in their vicinity (Yang, 2004a: 116-118; IB3), for the MoCA, it is rather difficult to create a synergy. There are a racecourse and a theme park near the museum, but the tastes of their visitors are quite differentiated from those of the MoCA (Hankook, 2003; Yang, 2004a: 24). In addition, it is located 4 km away from an underground station, while the Gwacheon Science Museum established in 2008 is near a station (PSRI, 2011: 47-49). Furthermore, it suffers from a lack of parking space (Lee, 2008b; Yang, 2004a: 21-22). Thirdly, owing to poor support, there are still only a relatively limited number of Korean contemporary artists who are famous around the world (Farthing, 2010), which might account for people visiting the contemporary art museums less frequently (Noh, 2004a; Wang, 2011a; Jang,

⁴⁵⁷ Among the 4.5 million visitors to Gyeongbok Palace in 2012, the overseas attendance figure was 1.4 million (www.tour.go.kr).

⁴⁵⁸ In 2007, the yearly number of charged visitors to St Paul's Cathedral was 1.62 million, while that of Windsor Castle was 0.99 million (ISPAL, 2009: 5).

⁴⁵⁹ The Gwangju National Museum has held a contemporary art Biennale since 1995 which has attracted many visitors. In particular, the artistic director of the 2014 Gwangju Biennale is Jessica Morgan, one of the curators of Tate Modern (Michalska, 2014).

2012b; IB4). Last but not least, as many commentators have noted, it has been afflicted by a shortage of curators and professionals, and by the bureaucratic organisational structure of the museum.⁴⁶⁰

In terms of a comparison with other Korean art museums, it has attracted relatively little preference from people, although its size is bigger than other art museums in Korea (Lee, 2009c). As shown in Table 7-14, the most popular art museum in 2012 was the privately-owned Samsung Leeum museum (Cho, 2012b; Wang, 2011a).⁴⁶¹ Although around three quarters of the total art museums in Korea are in the private sector (Min, 2012), among the top twenty most popular ones, just half of them are privately-owned and six of them are related to conglomerates.⁴⁶²

Table 7-14: Top four popularly preferred art museums in Korea.

	2010	2011	2012
Leeum	3	2	1
Hangaram Art Museum	2	3	2
Seoul Museum of Art (SeMA)	1	1	3
MoCA (MMCA)	4	4	4

Source: extracted KAPAA (2012)

In particular, the SeMA, in Table 7-14, is a public art museum and has a greater visitor attendance than the MMCA,⁴⁶³ which is near the Seoul city hall. However, it has been so dependent on blockbuster exhibitions that the art circles have pointed out its noticeable absence of the basic functions of a public museum (Noh, 2004b; Lee, 2010c; Lee, 2012c).

As far as visitor satisfaction is concerned, the level of the MMCA is broadly lower than other cultural agencies, as shown in Figure 7-14. Particularly, its satisfaction level is rather behind other visual art agencies such as the Science Museums and the National Theatre of Korea.


⁴⁶⁰ See later section.

⁴⁶¹ The Leeum Museum opened in October 2004. The Director is Hong Ra-Hee, a world famous collector and the wife of the head of the Samsung Group (Wang, 2011a; Noh, 2007a). It has not publicised information regarding its collections, budget or other operational contents; thus being criticised as having possibly created a secret fund or some tax evasion (Wang, 2011a; Choi, 2007; Noh, 2007a; Park, 2013b).

⁴⁶² The six museums are the Leeum Museum, the Plato, the Daerim Museum, the Art Sungjae Centre, the Keumho Museum and the Sunggok Museum (Kim, 1995; Choi, 2007; Cho, 2009a; Wang, 2011b). However, even when there is no art museum within their business group, conglomerates prefer to purchase plenty of works of art, because they see them as an investment (Koh, 2012; Wang, 2013).

⁴⁶³ For the SeMA, there were 1.6 million and 1.3 million visitors respectively in 2011 and 2012 (tour.go.kr), but these have not been reflected in the statistics of the *Art Newspaper*. In particular, more than half a million people visited the museum to see the special exhibitions of Vincent van Gogh, Auguste Renoir and Marc Chagall (Pyun, 2003; Moon, 2005; Lee, 2013c).


Figure 7-14: Visitors satisfaction levels of cultural KEAs in 2012



Source: compiled from data in MoPAS (2012f: 369-469)

Figure 7-15 shows the visitor satisfaction levels since agencification in 2006. Apart from 2012 when a different measuring system was used, in 2007 and 2008 the level deteriorated despite agencification. This was partly because of several special exhibitions, which were mainly carried out by the Director at that time and which did not gain the support of the media or the public (Moon, 2005; Noh, 2007b).

Figure 7-15: Visitor satisfaction levels of the MoCA⁴⁶⁴



Source: compiled from data in MoCA (2008: 112-114), MCT (2008: 53), MCST (2010:27 and 2012a: 23), MoPAS (2008i: 706; 2009b; 2011c:588; 2012f: 448), MoSPA (2013b)

7-5-2. Managerial Structure

7-5-2-1. Legal standing The MMCA, as with other governmental bodies, is created and operated, intrinsically based on the GOA. Yet also, as a part of KEAs, it is particularly subject first to the AEOEA, which is a kind of *Special*

⁴⁶⁴ Since 2012 all KEAs have used the same criteria which are rather different from the former individual measurement (MoPAS, 2012f: 447).

Legislation (Private Bill, Parpworth, 2010: 212). The AEOEA came into force in 1999 and its delegated legislation, *the Presidential Decree on the AEOEA*, stipulates the names of KEAs. In practice, KEAs are operated mainly pursuant to *the Annual Guidance* of the MoSPA (before 2013, MoPAS or MoGAHA), which has to be issued only after sufficient prior consultation with the MoSF. This guidance includes not only the managerial principles such as personnel management and the *Total Payroll Costs*, but also the evaluation of the performance of KEAs (MoPAS, 2012a).⁴⁶⁵

In addition, the employees of the MMCA are civil servants, so that they should abide by the duties of the NCSA. In particular, unlike front-line delivery civil servants such as postmen, they do not have the right of collective action (section 5-1-2; Kim, 2006a: 233-244). Furthermore, all full-time employees of the MMCA are paid pursuant to the *Presidential Decree on Civil Service Remuneration*, since Korea broadly maintains a universal pay system.⁴⁶⁶ In contrast, the quangocratisation of the MMCA needs a private bill for its establishment. After quangocratisation, it will not be subject to the GOA anymore and should comply with the AMPI and the Presidential Decree on the AMPI, which is under the remit of the MoSF.

7-5-2-2. Governance and leadership As a part of governmental organisations, the MMCA does not have a Board of Trustees or a *body corporate*, unlike Tate Modern (section 6-5-2-2). However, the Executive Agency Operation Review Board (EAORB), which is established under the remit of its parent department, could internally give advice to the MMCA about its operations (MoPAS, 2012a: 17-18), but only on a very limited basis and as a token gesture.

The Director of the MMCA has been appointed on a three year contract (MoPAS, 2012a: 8-9) since 2000 when the Open Competitive Position System (OCPS) and the fixed term contract system first came into force (Kim, 2006a: 132-133; Maekyung, 2000; Kim, 2008e).⁴⁶⁷ The fixed term could be extended to five years, but it is not possible for a Director to work beyond that period (Lee and Park, 2010: 105; Han, 2009; MoPAS, 2012a).

⁴⁶⁵ Other organisations, different from KEAs, have to be subject to the annual Guidance on the Management of Government Organisation (GMGO) which is signed off by the Prime Minister (MoSPA, 2013c). The draft of the GMGO in 2009 and 2010 was made by the author.

⁴⁶⁶ There are several exceptions for a universal pay system, such as the contracted civil service (Kim, 2006a: 102, 111) and performance-related pay (OECD, 2005: 137-138).

⁴⁶⁷ The OCPS principle has also been applied to other Senior Civil Service posts, which amount to twenty per cent of the total Senior Civil Service. As of August 2010, the proportion of people from outside government is 17 per cent (MoPAS, 2010e: 21).

Table 7-15: Directors of the MoCA (MMCA)

Name	Term of office	Tenure (month)
Kim, Im-Ryong	1969.09- 1970.09	12
Cho, Sung-Kil	1970.09- 1971.07	10
Park, Sang-Yeol	1971.08- 1972.02	7
Jang, Sang-Kyu	1972.02- 1973.03	13
Park, Ho-Jun	1973.03- 1973.12	9
Sohn, Suk-Ju	1973.12- 1977	49
Yoon, Chi-Oh	1977.12- 1980.10	46
Yoon, Tak	1980.10- 1981.07	10
Lee, Kyung-Sung	1981.08- 1983.10	27
Kim, Se-Jung	1983.11- 1986.06	32
Lee, Kyung-Sung	1986.07- 1992.05	70
Lim, Young-Bang	1992.05- 1997.07	62
Choi, Man-Rin	1997.07- 1999.07	24
Oh, Gwang-Su	1999.09- 2003.08	48
Kim, Yoon-Su	2003.09- 2008.11	62
Bae, Soon-Hun	2009.02.23- 2011.10	20
Jung, Hyung-Min	2012.2~	
Average tenure		31.3

Source: Jang, 2009: 132; MoCA (2011a; 2012a) and MMCA (2013a10)

Table 7-15 shows the former and present Directors and their terms of office. The first eight Directors came from the civil service, while the ninth, the first person to come from outside government, was an art critic (Jung, 2009a; Kwon, 2008a; Park, 2010b). Among eight people chosen from outside government, only two, including the present Director, have had experience of running art museums (Shin, 2013), while others were mainly appointed from art or academic circles (Yunhap, 1997; Lim, 2008c).⁴⁶⁸ When it comes to the appointment to the Director, there are several noteworthy features. Firstly, their terms of office have been relatively short; the average tenure of the 16 directors is around 31.3 months.⁴⁶⁹ During the 1980s and 1990s, the directors were directly appointed by the President and maintained their jobs until dismissal. Yet after the introduction of the fixed term contracts, their tenure has been rather limited and a long-term plan such as co-operation with overseas art museums has become quite difficult to attain (Kwon, 2008a).

Secondly, the appointment to a Director could sometimes be influenced by ideology or politics (Kyung, 2010). For example, one Director, who was appointed in 2003 after the administration at that time had declared that a change of vested cultural power was indispensable (Choi, 2003; Huh, 2003a and b), was described by the media as a left-wing artist (Pyun, 2003; Lee,

⁴⁶⁸ The chief executives of KEAs are mostly appointed from within government. As of 2011, among the 122 former heads of KEAs only 15 per cent were people from outside government (MoPAS, 2012b: 15-16), while for BEAs, as of 2003, around 20 % came from the private sector (James, 2003: 72 and 78).

⁴⁶⁹ The average tenure of eight civil servants is 19.5 months, while that of the others is 43.1 months.

2003a). Furthermore, after his first fixed term, he was reappointed and this led to significant criticism from the opposition party (Park, 2005; Pyun, 2006). This political patronage also resulted in persistent questioning by the media about his capability. Problems with personnel conflicts within the MoCA were frequently reported by the media (Koh, 2006; Cho, 2006a and b; Kim, 2006c; Lee, 2006c) and the uncompromising decision regarding the display and purchasing of works of art led to a decrease in both visitor numbers and satisfaction levels (Lee, 2005a; Moon, 2005; Noh, 2007b). The opposition party, which came to power in 2008, dismissed around 20 heads of auxiliary bodies, including the MoCA, whose terms had not finished (Ha and Park, 2008).⁴⁷⁰ The new administration's logic was that people who were politically appointed⁴⁷¹ had to be removed immediately, but this attempt to dismiss the people who had the right to maintain their officially contracted term, was also regarded as being political (Oh, 2012c).

Thirdly, the influence of a Director on the art world was thought to be relatively limited, although the MMCA is the only national art museum in Korea (Kim, 2009d). According to a series of public surveys, the most powerful figure in Korean art circles has been the Director of the Leeum Museum, whilst the Director of the MoCA has only ranked in the top ten (Lee, 2009c; Cho, 2010b and 2012b; KAPAA, 2012).⁴⁷² In particular, the Director, appointed in 2009 after a political scandal, was a fairly high-profile figure who had built his career as a former Minister and was the CEO of a big enterprise, but was not an art manager. Before and after his inauguration, he had many media interviews and these were a good opportunity for the MoCA to gain more recognition from the public (Kim, 2008e; Kim, 2009d). Despite his productive achievements in a fairly short period of time and his contribution to the creation of the Seoul branch (Lee, 2011b; Lee, 2013h), he was not favoured by the art circles because of his commercialism and poor artistic career (Hwang, 2009; Lee, 2010b; Kim, 2009b; Cho, 2010b; Lee, 2013f).⁴⁷³

⁴⁷⁰ In reality, the reason for his dismissal was the violation of his contract (Noh, 2008), but the Supreme Court later ruled that his dismissal was illegal (Kim, 2010b and c; Jang, 2010). The result of this political scandal was similar to the British case of Derek Lewis (Lewis, 1997), although its background was somewhat different.


⁴⁷¹ The Director was ostensibly appointed by the OCPS, but the President, in practice, plays a significant role (Park, 2011b).

⁴⁷² Meanwhile, according to the power rankings of the contemporary art world (artreview.com), Sir Nicholas Serota of the Tate and Glenn Lowry of the MoMA have remained within the top ten since 2002, while the international collector Charles Saatchi, who was quite powerful in the early 2000s, has lost power since 2009.

⁴⁷³ He suddenly resigned four months before the end of his term (Hwang, 2011).

7-5-2-3. Organisation structure and Personnel management The MoCA began with only a small number of staff in 1969, as shown in Figure 7-16a. In 1972, the number of staff dealing with the administrative day-to-day works was thirteen, while the employees who focused on display were three. This suggested that it was an abnormal organisation for an art museum and was just a supporting part of the state apparatus, which was only concentrating on the National Art Competition (Jung, 2003b; Jang, 2009: 97).⁴⁷⁴ In general terms, before the opening of the Gwacheon gallery, its organisation structure was very simple and could not *per se* conduct professional functions such as art collections and displays.

Figure 7-16a: Structure Charts of the MoCA (1969-2006)




Source: MoGAHA (1998); www.law.go.kr; Kang (2007: 382-403) and Jang (2009: 88-115)

Its staff numbers were increased drastically in 1986 when the new building in Gwacheon was established, but still an inexperienced administrative director was in charge of the collection and exhibition departments (Jang, 2009: 113). This meant that administrative tasks were still the most crucial elements of the museum, and the art museum was regarded simply as a kind of office which could be governed by generalist civil servants (Jang, 2005: 38).

⁴⁷⁴ The Research Unit was first created in 1972, but until 1978 there had been neither a head of that unit nor any curator; thus no results were produced (Jung, 2003b; Jang, 2009: 97).


Figure 7-16b: Structure Charts of the MoCA (2012)



Source: PSRI (2012: 14); MoPAS (2012e) and MMCA (2013a: 11)

Figures 7-16a and b show that the sub-units of the MoCA had become more specialised over the 1990s and the 2000s.⁴⁷⁵ In particular, the most basic functions of an art museum, namely collecting, conserving and curating, had been constantly enhanced and strengthened. In 2006, after its agencification, the MoCA could constitute its own organisation structure without the approval of the MoPAS, so that under the Curatorial Director two teams were created and the conservation department became independent from the administrative Director (Jang, 2009: 114).⁴⁷⁶ In addition, the quality of art education for visitors was improved (Cho, 2009b: 157-158).

Figure 7-17: Changes of staff numbers⁴⁷⁷



Source: www.law.go.kr (PDOSR of the MoCA from 1969 to 2011)

Notwithstanding the agencification, the staff numbers seem to have stagnated since 2006, because the MoPAS still maintained the power to set *the ceiling on the number of permanent posts* (section 5-1-3)⁴⁷⁸ As shown in Figure 7-17, there were some staff cutbacks in 1993 and 1999, but after

⁴⁷⁵ In late 2013, one administrative director and four teams were created in order to manage the Seoul gallery (MMCA, 2014: 2-4). Yet only 37 *special fixed-term employees*, who could work within at most five years, were newly recruited, since the required condition of quangocratisation was not yet accomplished.

⁴⁷⁶ In relation to the impact of agencification, some commentators argue that the power of the chief executive was strengthened, but the autonomy of the curators had deteriorated (Jung, 2009b; Park, 2008e).

⁴⁷⁷ These numbers show just *the ceiling on permanent posts* which was approved by the MoSPA, but does not include seconded workers or contracted part-time workers such as cleaners and guards (Choi, 2000).

⁴⁷⁸ For this reason, the MMCA has a plan to significantly increase its number of staff after its quangocratisation (ECSTC, 2013: 8).

agencification the ceiling was recovered immediately (KAPS21, 2009: 21). This was one of the reasons why the chief executive and the parent department at that time agreed to the idea of agencification (Noh, 2004a; Lee, 2006c) despite the stiff resistance of employees and the art circles (Park, 2004b; Lee, 2006d).

When it comes to the proportion of curators, they constitute a relatively small portion of the MMCA (ECSTC, 2013).⁴⁷⁹ The former Directors have commonly expressed a hope that the number of curators should be increased (Hankook, 2003; Noh, 2004b; Kim, 2009d), but in reality it has increased only slightly.⁴⁸⁰ Meanwhile, most of the staff except curators, as generalists (section 5-1-2), tend to be transferred to the parent department within two years (Lee, 2004b; IC2). Furthermore, skilled curators who have at least three years of experience, are likely to move to other institutions (Lee, 2004b; Hwang, 2009; IB4)⁴⁸¹ and therefore the MMCA has difficulty in accumulating sufficient professional expertise (Kim, 2009d).

Meanwhile the remuneration and pay levels of the MMCA staff, including the Director and other fixed-term employees, are similar to that of generalist civil servants. The Director is considered to be at the second level of the SCS, formerly known as Grade Two; therefore it does not seem to be a sufficiently high level to attract a renowned candidate as the Director.⁴⁸²

7-5-2-4. Budget Unlike the Tate, the budget of the MMCA had been completely dependent on grant-in-aid until 2012 and thus its income and expenditure levels have overall corresponded to that of grant-in-aid. Figure 7-18 shows the changes in grant-in-aid from 1986 to 2011.⁴⁸³ There are two striking features to be noted regarding the income structure of the budget. Firstly, the level of the grant-in-aid in 2011, which is adjusted in the light of the inflation rate, was surprisingly similar to that in 1987 and average levels between 1986 and 2011. The reason for the unusually higher level of grant-in-aid between 2005 and 2008 stemmed from its responsibility for *museum policy*

⁴⁷⁹ The portion of curators in the MMCA is relatively smaller than that of other museums in Korea. Its curators account for only 12.4% of a total of 145 staff including contracted workers, while the proportion of curators in private museums is on average 27.1% (MCST, 2011: 229). Japan also has a rather higher proportion of curators than that of Korea (MoPAS, 2008j), although those curators have been complaining about the increase in administrative tasks after quangocratisation (MoCA, 2008c: 138). Besides which, the ratios of curators in the Tate and the MoMA are much higher than that of the MMCA (ECSTC, 2013: 7; Lee, 2009d: 36; Lee, 2009e: 141).

⁴⁸⁰ The first fifteen curators were recruited in 1986 (Jang, 2009: 111) and this number has remained unchanged (Jang, 2005: 37, 41). When there was a need for organisational rearrangement, most changes were focused only on generalist civil servants (ECSTC, 2013: 7).


⁴⁸¹ Most curators had been changed from being career civil servants into *fixed-term employees (civil servants)* since the mid-2000s (Oh, 2010).

⁴⁸² The overall remuneration and pay levels of the *Open Competitive Positions* amount to only 104.7 per cent of the average generalist civil servants (MoPAS, 2012e: 21). At the same time, there were noticeable cases in which the former Ministers of other departments were recruited to be the Director of the Science Museum and the MoCA, where they assumed the responsibility to report to their vice ministers.

⁴⁸³ This figure excludes the capital expenditure for the construction cost of the Seoul gallery.

tasks,⁴⁸⁴ as mentioned earlier (MoCA, 2008b: 19). For other years, the budget seemed to have been drawn up, following the previous year's amount (Wildavsky, 1964: 15; Shafritz et al., 2008: 66).

Figure 7-18: Changes in grant-in-aid (£, thousand: 1 pound = 1,800 won)




Source: extracted and analysed from MoCA Annual Report (2004-2012)

* Grant-in-aids are adjusted to the inflation rate and expressed in 2010 prices which are based on <http://kosis.kr>

Secondly, unlike the national museums in the U.K., the U.S.A. and France, the income of the MMCA is funded entirely by the Exchequer (PSRI, 2012: 33; Kang, 2008: 7-8; Lee, 2012d). Korea has a stricter rule that all the money acquired by an asset financed by public money should, in principle, be paid straight into the national Exchequer (Act on the Exchequer, article 17 and 53; Lee, 2010d; HM Treasury, 2007b: 57, 176); therefore there was no similar institution such as British Trading Funds within Korean departmental bodies. The one exception, merely, is that the income from admission fees, as shown in Figure 7-19, could be used for immediate expenditure only to a limited extent (MoCA, 2008b: 19; ECSTC, 2013: 8).⁴⁸⁵ Since direct receipt of cash from the private sector is almost impossible, a special exhibition sponsored by the private companies has been the usual type of indirect support (Jang, 2013; IB4).

Figure 7-19: Changes in income from admission fees (1pound=1,800won)



*Adjusted Purchasing Funds are expressed in 2010 prices


Source: extracted and analysed from MMCA (2013a: 242); <http://kosis.kr>

⁴⁸⁴ These include the grant-in-aid for the establishment of local public museums and support for the registered private museums.

⁴⁸⁵ The average admission fee to the public museums is 60 per cent of that to the private museums (MCST, 2011a: 203; Lee, 2013d).

In terms of expenditure, the costs for works of art have been smaller than that of other world-class museums (Figure 7-20). In order to attract more visitors, it is essential to house some iconic masterpieces by great artists, which are quite expensive;⁴⁸⁶ but the average annual expenditure for purchasing and conserving works of art between 2004 and 2012 was just 3.2 million pounds which was clearly smaller than several private museums or overseas museums.

Figure 7-20: Changes in operating expenditure⁴⁸⁷



Source: extracted and analysed from MoCA (2005b: 15; 2007b: 85; 2008b: 85; 2009a: 19; 2010a: 19; 2011a: 22-23; 2012a: 22) and MMCA (2013a: 23)

The other way to collect works of art is through donation, but it is commonly said that the institutions for direct contribution, such as tax incentives, have not been guaranteed yet, unlike in other developed countries (Kim, 2012a; Lee, 2012d; Lee, 2013e; Schuster, 1989: 32). As shown in Figure 7-21, the proportion of donated works of art is 16.8 percent of the total collections on average over nine years.⁴⁸⁸ As a result, the number and quality of the collections are supposed to have fallen behind its global competitors (Lee, 2013e; Kwak, 2013a).⁴⁸⁹


⁴⁸⁶ The level of costs for works of art precludes purchasing world famous works of great artists such as Pablo Picasso or Paul Cézanne (Frey, 2003: 51; Lee, 2004a; Lee, 2012d). By contrast, the average purchased works of art between 2004 and 2012 by Tate Modern was 8.7 million pounds and, the average donated works of art in the same period was 19.0 million pound (see Figure 6-12).

⁴⁸⁷ The purchasing costs increased considerably in 1986 and 1994 respectively, since then the MoCA could purchase some international works of art (Jang, 2009: 116-118). However, most significantly, the budget for purchased works of art has increased twice since 2003 (Lim, 2005: 24; Jang, 2009: 127).

⁴⁸⁸ The *Act on the Collection and Use of Donations* (ACUD) prohibits the government and local authorities from actively encouraging donations from the private sector (ACUD: article 5; Park, 2013c; Kwak, 2013b). Furthermore, the tax incentives for benefactors have been continuously criticised as not being sufficient (Kwak, 2013a). Meanwhile, the MMCA was sponsored by private companies for around 1.5 million pounds in 2013. In particular, Hyundai Motor Company is expected to contribute 7 million pounds to the MMCA from 2013 to 2023 (MMCA, 2014: 12); not for direct 'purchase' of works of art, but for indirect sponsoring for the special exhibition and for investing in potential artists. On the contrary, in the case of Tate Modern, Hyundai is also supposed to contribute not only to the *Turbine Hall exhibition*, but also to 'purchase' works of artists such as Baik Nam-Jun, from 2015 to 2025 (Lee, 2014; Park, 2014).

⁴⁸⁹ The number of collections in the MMCA is around seven thousand (MCST, 2011: 206) which is only 4.7 percent of the MoMA and 10 per cent of the Pompidou Centre (Lee, 2013e; Park, 2013c and 2012b).

Figure 7-21: Changes in numbers of new works of art⁴⁹⁰



Source: MoCA (2004a: 76-77; 2005a: 24, 2007b: 7, 2008b: 32, 2009a: 24; 2010a: 22; 2011a: 27; 2012a: 24) and MMCA (2013a: 26)

7-5-3. Autonomy and control: institutional constraints

Autonomy and control are two sides of the same coin, as discussed in Chapter 4. Yet comparatively speaking, in Korea, more emphasis had traditionally been placed on the control side at least until 1998 (Kim, 1993: 18; RBGR, 1998: 315-321). After the economic catastrophe in 1998, the Korean government adopted a new approach: the control-centric departments such as the Ministry of Finance and Economy (MFE) and the MGA had to delegate their authority to other departments and AIs, in order to avoid the overloaded control of traditional government and to enhance their performances (RBGR, 1998: 22; MPB, 1999b: 39). In this respect, KEAs were given a new kind of autonomy as shown in Table 7-2.⁴⁹¹

At the same time, autonomy and control of the KEAs could be analysed from the perspective of the relationship between the MMCA and other major actors. Firstly, the MoPAS, whose remit is to manage the institution of the KEAs and to control the staff numbers of each department (section 5-1-3), could influence the operation of the MMCA. As a part of the KEAs, the MMCA could recruit *Special Fixed-term Employees* within its *Total Payroll Costs* constraints (MoPAS, 2009a: 4-8; MoPAS, 2012a: 43), but this flexibility could be deployed only in quite a limited way (KIPA, 2010: 68-71, 77-79).⁴⁹² In addition to the task of designating a new KEA and publishing a yearly guidance, the most significant mission of the MoSPA (MoPAS), regarding KEAs, is presenting a yearly performance league table. For example, the MoCA ranked

⁴⁹⁰ Among its collection, the portion of donations amounts to 44.3 per cent, but, unlike other world-class museums, most of them (94.4 percent) were donated by artists themselves and their families (Kwak, 2013a; Lim, 2005: 20), not by collectors.

⁴⁹¹ BEAs are agencified in order to be given more autonomy from their parent departments, as discussed earlier, but in the Netherlands *agentschappen* have been established partly from politicians' concern about reduced control (van Thiel and Pollitt, 2007: 53-55).

⁴⁹² The *Total Payroll Costs* in Korea has been managed in a somewhat narrow way (section 5-1-3), as compared with the *Total Running Costs* in the U.K., in that the applicable scope of costs is just limited to *personnel salary* costs and their equivalents, and could be used only when a reduction in special costs takes place *on purpose* (KIPA, 2010: 13-21, 31-36).

41st among 46 KEAs in 2008 when it had been a candidate for quangocratisation. The *performance of its unique business*, which was evaluated by itself then, was nothing more than average, but its *managerial capacity*, appraised by the MoPAS, remained around the bottom level.

Secondly, even after its agencification, the MMCA has still maintained its accountability to the sponsor department, the MCST.⁴⁹³ Most importantly, the MCST has the leeway to determine the requirements for the Director and, in reality, it also could finally decide on a new Director from among the candidates (IC3).⁴⁹⁴ As with other AIs and most KEAs, the MMCA is geographically separated from its parent department and is not subject to daily intervention from the Minister. Yet the parent department awards a contract to the Director for achieving performance targets (MoPAS, 2012a: 9, 14) and the MMCA has to report its business plan to the MCST under its Director's instructions (ibid: 15).⁴⁹⁵ In particular, owing to the department's budget ceiling which ties down not only the core department but also AIs and KEAs at the same time, the MMCA could be seriously influenced by the MCST (IB5); but in general terms the interests of the parent department are quite different from the MMCA (Lee, 2004a; Noh, 2004b). Furthermore, it is even more difficult to increase the budget of the MMCA, through the reduction in other bodies' expenditure.

Thirdly, the MoSF, as with the Treasury in the U.K.,⁴⁹⁶ could directly have an effect on the size of the budget of the MMCA. In this connection, the stagnation of its growth in collections, as shown in Figures 7-20 and 7-21, is said mainly to derive from the lower priority of the MoSF on the MMCA. The long-term business plan of the MMCA, *inter alia*, is inclined to be completely dependent on the decision of the MoSF. The annual programme appraisal of the MoSF is undoubtedly a crucial element in determining the next year's budget, but the most important decision for the MMCA has been made by the politically motivated policy. For example, after the announcement of the President in January 2009, the MoSF, which had previously been reluctant to support the creation of a new building, immediately made a plan for taking it forward.

⁴⁹³ See Massey for the role of sponsor departments of BEAs in the U.K. (1995d: paras 2.12, 2.13 and 2.23).

⁴⁹⁴ A new Director is recruited through the OCPS and the *Advisory Board for the Selection* involves this procedure (MoPAS, 2012a: 6-7). However, sometimes this might be just a token gesture and the final decision tends to be made by the MCST which reflects the opinion of the Office of the President (Jung, 2009a).

⁴⁹⁵ The *framework documents* of BEAs stipulate detailed accountabilities and a varied relationship with other bodies (Cabinet Office, 2006b: 11-19), although their original forms were very simple (HC 410: 28-36; Greer, 1992: 89-90). By contrast, the operation of KEAs is mainly dependent upon *contracts* between the Chief Executives and sponsor departments; and the Korean *framework document* mainly deals with *operational rules* which are related to the management of organisation, personnel and budget (MoPAS, 2012a: 13).

⁴⁹⁶ See Goldsworthy (1991: 26-27), Davies and Willman (1991: 43), James (2003: 142), and Bouckaert and Peters (2004: 23).

Fourthly, the BAI (Board of Audit and Inspection) and the National Assembly carry out regular reviews on the MMCA through periodic inspections and investigations. The BAI not only undertakes an audit of the accounts, but also inspects the legality of the activities of the MMCA. For example, during the regular inspection in 2007, it requested the MoCA to review the purchasing process of a specific work of art (Kim, 2008f).⁴⁹⁷ The National Assembly has the right to adjust the size of the budget and to annually inspect the general policy of the MMCA. For example, in 2012 it investigated the cause of a fire during the construction of the Seoul gallery (Park, 2013d). Meanwhile, the political abuse of *regular parliamentary inspection* in 2011 prompted the resignations of the Director at that time (Hwang, 2011; Lee, 2013f).

In sum, after agencification, the MoCA, in common with other KEAs, has been more autonomous in terms of its operation, but due to the Korean administrative tradition, the central *control over its performance* by a league table was rather strengthened. Whilst in the U.K., after massive agencification, there have been enduring efforts to develop the BEA system (CfPS, 1997: 13; OPSR: 57-59),⁴⁹⁸ the additional reform for KEAs has been rather retarded. During the earlier period, the KEA was supported by unique incentives which make them more autonomous and performance-oriented, but gradually the government expanded these tools at state level;⁴⁹⁹ thus the advantages of agencification have withered somewhat. For this reason, some commentators even argued for the abolition of the KEA system (Kim, 2012b: 99-100). In order to overcome this limitation, there was a big change in 2011 and 2012 (MoPAS 2012b; NAPASC, 2010), but the KEA still has difficulty with its expansion.⁵⁰⁰

7-6. Conclusion

The agencification of the MoCA was caused and influenced by varied factors. Among them, the government particularly proposed practical reasons such as economic efficiency and performance improvement (MPB, 1999b: 274). During the process of policy formation it referred to the examples of other countries; but besides this, there were many other aspects that, directly or indirectly, were reflected in the agencification of the MoCA (section 7-4). More importantly, the introduction of agencification was not just institutional copying.

⁴⁹⁷ In 2005, the issue of legality concerning the purchasing process of a work by Marcel Duchamp was raised, which was later used politically as a means of dismissing the Director at that time (Hankyung, 2008; Lee, 2008f).

⁴⁹⁸ For example, the Citizen's Charter (Cm 1599), Market Testing (Efficiency Unit, 1993), Benchmarking (OECD, 1997; CfPS, 1997: 31) and Public Service Agreements (PSAs) were introduced (OPSR, 2002: 57-58). Yet Jenkins contends that increasingly complicated guidance made BEAs less flexible (2011: 14).

⁴⁹⁹ For example, Performance Agreement (Lee, 2006a: 179) and Total Payroll Costs (MoPAS, 2010b) were introduced at whole-government level in 2006 and 2007 respectively.

⁵⁰⁰ For example, the National Sejong Library which was newly established in 2013 was expected to be agencified, but owing to severe objections, it has remained as an ordinary AI (Kim, 2013a).

The Korean government approach *ab initio* was very cautious and selective, but the agencification of the MoCA was determined in a somewhat unprecedented way. In this connection, the process of agencification needs to be explored from more than one angle. In particular, initial triggers, existing paths and negotiation between political actors should be examined simultaneously.

The results of the agencification of the MoCA were not that successful (section 7-5). The visitor attendance decreased after agencification (Kim, 2008d), and its overall operational performance between 2006 and 2009, as discussed earlier, deteriorated somewhat. This means that there might be several factors to be considered vis-à-vis a *policy transfer*. The deeply ingrained institutional constraints, as well as politico-administrative backgrounds and economic development, might be still quite influential even after agencification and quangocratisation.

Several problems with the MMCA as a KEA are as follows (MoPAS, 2011b: 4). Firstly, the organisational structure is still bureaucratic, so that this hierarchical control resulted in a poor performance and slow responsiveness (Kim and Oh, 2012: 274; Kim, 2008c, 250; Lee et al., 2013: 2-3). Secondly, it needs more professional staff,⁵⁰¹ as the function and size of the MMCA has expanded; but its leeway to recruit some useful new blood is still limited (Kim and Oh, 2012: 275; Moon and Lee, 2010: 51).⁵⁰² In addition, fixed term contracts, and universal remuneration and pay structure obstruct the attraction of competent curators. Thirdly, the increase in autonomy of the MMCA significantly depends on the relationship with its parent department and the current Minister (Kim and Oh, 2012: 276; Moon and Lee, 2010: 41). Finally, the Director of the MMCA, who needs a longer term of office owing to the characteristics of arts administration, could stay in office only for a maximum of five years, while the heads of *public institutions* could maintain their careers for more than five years through performance improvement (AMPI, article 28).

For these reasons, the quangocratisation of the MMCA is being pursued at the time of writing. Recent Directors have openly announced, on the assumption that it will be quangocratised in the near future, that the MMCA will pursue the examples of the best practices of other overseas museums such as the collection policy of the Guggenheim Museum (Nocut, 2006; Kim 2009g; Lee 2011d) and the business model of Tate Modern (Kwak, 2013b; Lee 2012g; Jung, 2012a; Booz&co, 2010: 26; KCTI, 2009; Travers, 2005:27).

⁵⁰¹ A research institute insists that its proper staff numbers are 188 for the Gwacheon gallery and 126 for the Seoul branch (PSRI, 2012: 116).

⁵⁰² For example, when the Seoul gallery opened in 2013, the MMCA asked for 85 staff for the MoSPA (Lim, 2013), only to acquire less than half of that request (Ryu, 2013).

Chapter 8. Testing the Arguments about Institutional Change

As outlined in Chapter 1, this thesis adopts a *comparative case study* approach (section 1-3-2). Adding a *comparative* perspective and suggesting comparable data from other cultural agencies alleviates the weakness of internal and external validity, as compared with the *one-group post-test-only* case (Appendix 3), although it explores just two cases. The two case studies analysed in Chapters 6 and 7 have several specific merits as follows.

Firstly, the MMCA is an exceptional case which could be simultaneously analysed in terms of agencification (Agencification Type-I in Figure 2-2) and quangocratisation (Quangocratisation Type-I). The Tate Gallery is also an unusual case which changed its status from being part of the civil service to being a quango (Quangocratisation Type-II). Furthermore, the creation of the MMCA Seoul branch and Tate Modern is a kind of partial AQ (Quangocratisation Type-V and Agencification Type-V), even though they were not fully independent from their parent galleries. As shown in Tables 7-6 and 7-7, the original intention to quangocratise some agencies, was partly put into practise in Korea; only three agencies including the MMCA were considered as being fully quangocratised. In addition, as explored in Chapters 6 and 7, these two cases not only cover complicated changes but also illustrate the dynamics of AQ policies. As such, they are also exemplary cases that allow diverse arguments to be examined through them.

Secondly, these two cases deal with cultural agencies which have somewhat different characteristics from a typical bureaucratic administration.⁵⁰³ Since cultural agencies in the U.K. and Korea share several features, as discussed in section 6-1, these cases might be considered as *GSG design* in Table 1-1; and thus contributing to the enhancement of external validity of the thesis. Moreover, cultural administration has developed relatively recently, in earnest, as a part of major government policies,⁵⁰⁴ in terms of international competitiveness as well as cultural identity. However, little research into cultural administration has been conducted, so that the analysis of Tate Modern

⁵⁰³ See van Thiel et al. (2009: 24) for other relatively less bureaucratic areas such as universities and broadcasting.

⁵⁰⁴ The creation of the *departmental*-level cultural organisation, whose *main* policy area was culture, took place only before and after the 1960s. In France, the *Ministere d'Etat charge des affaires culturelles* was first created in 1959 (Looseley, 1995: 33; KCTI, 2011a: 120-122; Elgie, 2003: 77). Meanwhile, the DNH in the U.K. was established in 1992 (Gray, 2000a: 59), whereas the Ministry of Culture and Public Information in Korea was created in 1969 (MoPAS, 2008e: 10-11).

and the MMCA helps to expand the knowledge we have about this distinctive sector (van Thiel, Pollitt and Homburg, 2007: 203).

Thirdly, these two cases are valuable for developing research into policy transfer. The overall agencification in Korea and the quangocratisation of the MMCA are good examples of policy transfer from the U.K. Although the creation of the MMCA Seoul branch was not a direct copy of the creation of Tate Modern branch, it also benefited from a careful reference of the *separation and expansion of the gallery* policy of the Tate (Yang, 2004a: 56-58). Most importantly, they are both appropriate cases which are comparable with each other. As examined in Chapter 5, only a few areas in the public sector are overlapping between the U.K. and Korea (Figures 5-11, 12 and 13).⁵⁰⁵ Furthermore, the case of the MMCA not only represents the various aspects of the KEAs,⁵⁰⁶ but is also worth exploring in that it is in the process of quangocratisation, unlike other Korean national museums. In addition, if the quangocratisation of the MMCA is successful in the near future, then this case would result in a series of structural changes in other Korean national museums.

Finally, since politico-administrative and socio-economic contexts and the overall public sector structure have influenced the AQ of the MMCA and Tate Modern, these case studies are helpful for understanding the administrative features of each country which remain out of the public eye. In particular, cultural agencies, in general terms, have a unique development route; thus the analysis of the contexts and their trajectories is useful for our understanding of both countries' government system.

This chapter begins with revisiting the arguments outlined in Chapter 3 and applied in Chapters 6 and 7, with a view to examining them in the broader picture and testing them against the case studies. Some assumptions of the arguments were considered during the process of exploring the cases, but they were not dealt with in the earlier chapters in order to concentrate on cases *per se*, and thus their implication and synthesis needs to be brought together in this chapter.⁵⁰⁷ Later sections deal with questions of policy transfer and the chapter is rounded off with some conclusions on institutional change.

⁵⁰⁵ The other overlapping area is the *research* sector (Figure 5-11, 12 and 13), but this would not be a suitable case for showing the dynamics of AQ policy.

⁵⁰⁶ However, the most successful case among KEAs is KFRI which had taken first place in the yearly KEA league table from 2001 to 2008.

⁵⁰⁷ This approach is, in particular, necessary to solve the problem of small N case studies with external validity (Appendices 3 and 4).

8-1. The Arguments for AQ

8-1-1. Analysis on each argument

8-1-1-1. Argument 1-1 As explored in Chapter 3, argument 1-1 is one of the most appealing explanations for government service provision (section 3-1-1), since it uses the sophisticated tool of mainstream economics (Pollitt, 2004a: 329). However, the term *public good* in politics is liable to be abused, without the strict theoretical conditions on the basic nature of goods in Figure 3-2, owing to its value added political interpretation. At the same time, regarding AQ of cultural agencies, an argument of *merit goods* discussed in Chapters 6 and 7 maintains that it is intrinsically based on the reflection of social value, and could easily cover the reason for AQ; but its foundations are weak and thus it has a problem with suggesting a detailed causal link. First of all, the assumption that goods and services which contain more elements of *merit good* are *directly* provided by the government and those with less *merit good* features are indirectly given by other public sectors, is quite relative from place to place, time to time and area to area. Table 7-9, for example, shows that the same *goods*, such as the meteorological service, the mint service, public procurement, prison and forestry agencies in the U.K., Korea and Japan, could be supplied by different forms of organisation.⁵⁰⁸

Table 8-1 Examples of merit goods and executive bodies in the U.K., Korea and Japan

	U.K.	Korea	Japan
Meteorological Service	EA (trading fund since 1996)	Korean NMD (Cheong)	Japanese NMD (Chou)
Public procurement Service	EA	Korean NMD (Cheong)	undertaken in a decentralised way
Mint Service	Government owned company (formerly EA, trading fund)	Quasi-market type public institution	Specific IAI (part of the Civil Service)
Prison Service	Mainly EA, partly privatised prison	SLAAs (part of the Civil Service)	Facilities (part of the central civil service)
Forestry Research Service	NDPB	EA (part of the Civil Service)	Unspecific IAI

Source: Pollitt et al (2001:282-283), Pollitt (2003:16 and 23), James (2003: 158-163), Seo (2005: 107-109), MoPAS (2010c), Cabinet Office 2012c and official websites of each body

In addition, a critical element of *merit good* is a consensus of the people and the policy makers regarding governmental supply, but the type of goods could be changed without such a consensus.⁵⁰⁹ For example, from the viewpoint of the public, the good, which they have not been concerned with, is

⁵⁰⁸ Japan and Korea have quite different institutional structures, although they are neighbouring countries located either side of the East Sea, as with the case of England and Belgium (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2009: 10-11).

⁵⁰⁹ There are several different opinions vis-à-vis who or what decides the size of the public sector. Burnham and Horton suggest the role of *political actors* (2013: 2); Rosen and Gayer consider that *technology* plays a pivotal role in the decision of public goods (2008); while Pugh contends that *organisational context* matters (Pugh, 2007: 34).

not a *merit good* yet, but in practice politicians could designate it as a *merit good* owing to its symbolism. In this case, the existence of a merit good is clearly dependent upon the decisions of the *main* political actors.

As far as Tate Modern and the MMCA are concerned, this theory could *ex post* show why the state intervened in the creation of the MoCA, but cannot *ex ante* explain which organisation structure is most desirable for art museums. From the standpoint of the consumers of the arts administration, so far as the admission is free, it makes no difference whether a type of organisation is a department, an executive agency or an NDPB. As such, this theory needs to be developed more to cover specific goods such as cultural goods, beyond a mere generalised explanation. More importantly, the weakest point of this argument is that there are plenty of governmental tasks which could not be included using this theory. The government produces not only goods and services, but also creates *the rules of the game* and the institutions which are the foundations for service provision. For example, it could be said that in Korea and Japan, the direct governmental service provision of art museums was changed into other forms of supply by making new institutional rules, not by a change in the basic nature of goods.⁵¹⁰ Thus it seems that this overly generalised economic approach does not provide a clear guide or explanation for organisational structure.

8-1-1-2. Argument 1-2 This argument is a kind of practitioner's theory that structural changes have been conducted solely in order to enhance the efficiency of the government (section 3-1-2; Bolman and Deal, 1984: 31; Smullen, 2004: 190; van Thiel, 2004b: 169; MPB, 1999b: 274-275). Most official government papers, interviews with civil servants and the media seem to hold fast to this approach, since it sounds intuitively persuasive (Jackson, 2001: 48). There are at least two basic assumptions behind this approach: the governmental function could *be clearly divided into policy and operational tasks*; and the decoupling of these functions is necessary to *increase its efficiency* (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992: 35; Gray and Jenkins, 1995: 41; Meier, 1993: 5).

First of all, an idea regarding the *detachability* of the policy tasks and the executive tasks emanates from a straight forward notion about the taxonomy of governmental tasks. There are three main functions of government: policy management, resource management (POSDCoRB),⁵¹¹ and *programme management* (Allison, 1987: 513). Among these, the last one could be divided

⁵¹⁰ A study of James et al (2011: 9-11) shows that merely a quarter of agencies have survived for twenty years. From the viewpoint of argument 1-1, this could mean that the characteristics of merit goods change very fast, as discussed in Chapter 7.

⁵¹¹ For more on this, see Gulick (1937: 13) and Fry (1989: 85-86).

into several headings: transfer of funds, regulation, advice and policy development, research and information, tribunals and public enquiries, representation, training and education, and *direct service delivery* (Bourckaert and Peters, 2004: 38-43); and the examples of the last one are welfare, health, prison, police, tax, firefighting and *cultural* tasks (MoPAS, 2008a). Again, art museums fall into the *cultural* functions.⁵¹²

This approach supposes that *executive* bodies share similar characteristics, since they have common features such as having clearly defined tasks (Cm 2340, 1993: 8; Cm 2750, 1994: ii). However, there are several criticisms about this perspective: firstly, the various sizes of different bodies show that executive bodies are not homogeneous. The size and structure of an organisation should not be underplayed (Weick, 1969: 24; Donaldson, 1985: 54-67; Jordan and O'Toole, 1995: 12), although Jenkins, one of the authors of the Next Steps Report, supposes that 'the most important factor is not structure or organisation but the task' which is the *raison d'être* of the institution (2011: 22). Secondly, most operational bodies simultaneously carry out a range of executive works, so that in reality most of them are not just *single-function* agencies (Hogwood, 1993: 9; Talbot, 2004a: 9-10), but have very complicated missions. Thirdly, the types of executive functions are also so diverse that they could not be considered as being identical (Wilson, 1994: 39). For example, welfare, health, police or culture might not be regarded as having the same priority in a specific country. Finally, this argument postulates that policy and operational tasks require different techniques. However, since they frequently influence each other or are very closely connected, it is, more often than not, very difficult to separate executive works from policy tasks (OPSR, 2002: 10; Palumbo and Calista, 1990: 10; Hill and Hupe, 2009: 63-64). Furthermore, the role of the executive bodies' counterpart or the policy-maker in the parent departments is often not apparent (Jenkins et al., 2011: 28-29). According to this argument, policy tasks and executive tasks should have been disaggregated at the outset, since they carry out intrinsically different works. However, their historical development is somewhat different from the expectation of this perspective (Henry, 2003: 29-49; Taylor, 1911; Ostrom, 2008: 23-28; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011: 22-25, 118-119, 169-170; Lynn, 2006: 5-8).⁵¹³ Historically speaking, more executive tasks in the past were directly

⁵¹² There are several cultural agencies, other than museums, mentioned in Chapter 6, such as theatres, libraries and broadcasting systems (Heilbrun and Gray, 2001: 7-8; Selwood, 2001: xxxix; MSCT, 2011: 14).

⁵¹³ Understandably, this explanation could neither reflect nor simplify the whole of the government paradigms. It merely shows that there has been a series of changes of thought about executive tasks and the role of the public sector.

conducted by a particular governmental department, but this approach has the weakness in that it could not explain *when* and *why* the government decided to separate policy works and operational tasks. For example, from the standpoint of this argument, it is not clear whether a new technology which enables policymakers to decouple routine tasks from complicated decision-making, was developed all at once or whether top civil servants just put forward a new strategy.

As far as *increased efficiency* is concerned, there are several grounds for it (section 3-1-2).⁵¹⁴ First and most notably, through AQ, executive bodies could have more autonomy and flexibility, marking a departure from bureaucratic control. They could also provide tailor-made services, as they are more closely responsive to customers. In addition, it is easier for them to deploy advanced market techniques. Furthermore, since their performance evaluation tends to become the usual administrative process, the pressure for efficiency gains might be strengthened (Pollitt, 2003a: 37). Finally, their functional specialisation keeps pace with the latest trends. Yet these rationales for increased efficiency have a weak evidential base⁵¹⁵ and just suggest illustrative examples; thus they are likely to be only a kind of anecdotalism (Lynn, 2010: 682; Pollitt et al., 2001: 278; Pollitt, 2000: 183-184). More profoundly, this argument emphasises the spontaneous efforts of devolved agencies to increase their efficiency, but, as considered later in argument 2-3, this approach has a somewhat biased assumption about human motivation.

Regarding the AQ of Tate Modern and the MMCA, this argument could not explain the difference between agencification and quangocratisation, since both EAs and executive NDPBs similarly conducted executive works (OPSR, 2002: 10; Flinders and Skelcher, 2012: 330). The Pliatzky Reports and the Ibbs Report similarly considered a quango and an agency as an '*executive unit*' (Cmnd 7797: para 14; Efficiency Unit, 1988: para 19), so that it did not clearly identify the exact scope of executive works, as examined in Chapter 3, 6 and 7.⁵¹⁶

⁵¹⁴ The explanation of Argument 1-2 is partly similar to Arguments 2-3 and 3-1 (section 3-2-1-2), in that the divorce of operational tasks from policy works might mean the vesting of ownership and the improvement of professionalism (Pollitt et al., 2001: 277).

⁵¹⁵ In general terms, the improvement of efficiency has not been empirically proved (van Thiel, 2000: 184; Boston et al., 1996: 86; Gains, 1999: 43).

⁵¹⁶ For a clear example of cultural agencies, see Table 7-8.

8-1-1-3. Argument 1-3 This approach considers that AQ happened at random; thus it is an *ad-hoc* basis theory (section 3-1-3). To put it differently, the creation of agencies and quangos has been decided case by case over time, being dependent on pragmatism and politics rather than principles (Drewry and Butcher, 1991: 78; Pollitt et al., 2001: 278-279; van Thiel, 2000: 7-12; Boston et al., 1996: 82-85). Among the three deciding factors of the initial status in Figure 3-1, the first two are the *normative* model, while this approach has a rather relatively realistic perspective. Normative theory tries to theoretically suggest desirable prescriptions,⁵¹⁷ while according to this perspective, no meaningful effort to find some kind of universal principles will be successful, since each state has its own quite different context. One of these sceptical points of views is the '*roulette wheel*' model (Hood, 1978: 44-45). This perspective supposes that the pattern of public bodies is absolutely random and *ad hoc* (Gray, 2000a: 58), since the cause of AQ is so complicated that no one can predict the appropriate type that any specific public body will assume. In the same vein, Flinders (2008: 1-8) argues that the form of the British government is evolving in an *ad hoc*, incremental manner, without principled order, and he calls it '*walking without order*.' Decision-making in this model might be similar to the idea of *the garbage can* model of Cohen, March and Olsen in terms of unpredictability and irrationality (Cohen et al., 1972: 2; March and Olsen, 1976: 26 and 1989: 28-29; Cyert and March, 1992: 235; Hood, 1999: 71-72; Hill, 2009: 81; Dorey, 2014: 21-22; footnote 563). In addition, this perspective, seemingly, is similar to the HI's viewpoint, since it stresses the trajectory of reform. However, while historical institutionalists assume a *punctuated equilibrium*⁵¹⁸ which is related to long-term stability and *critical junctures*, this model just postulates incremental changes.⁵¹⁹

In relation to the AQ of Tate Modern and the MMCA, as shown in Chapters 6 and 7, this argument describes well the backgrounds and historical contexts of the creation of each museum. In this regard, this perspective, in practice, is essential to understand the *establishment* of museums. Yet, the *roulette wheel* model and *walking without order* perspectives have certain limitations as follows: firstly, the *walking without order* model cannot explain why some countries have many common features in their public sectors. For example, the former examples of AQ might provide a precedent and an option

⁵¹⁷ 'The *normative* theory' might have two different meanings (Lowndes, 2010: 64-65): on the one hand, it means a theory which *promotes particular norms*; on the other hand, it could be a theory which emphasises *norms and values as explanatory variables*.

⁵¹⁸ See argument 3-3.

⁵¹⁹ Flinders links this *walking without order* perspective to the *depoliticisation* model.

which will influence the range of alternatives considered by later reformers. Secondly, recent modernisation reforms based on specific universal principles are rather useful in order to organise the messy demarcation of the public sector in a relatively clear way, while the *walking without order* perspective does show weakness in this direction. Thirdly, this perspective provides a microscopic view, but its description could be restricted in global comparisons and overall trends.

If a researcher sees a given single country in a long-term perspective, then any theory about reform would appear to be continuously changing; thus, seemingly, there have been no dominant rules over time. According to Richards and Smith (2002: 35), organisational structures in the postmodern state are 'no longer fixed but contingent'. This argument therefore is not only to suggest that contextual constraints are valuable to explain types of public bodies, but also to point out that a single contextual explanation is too deterministic, rather than probabilistic. However, provided that many countries co-vary in a given time in a way that is predictable, we need a theory to explain this phenomenon, as mentioned above. For example, as shown in Figure 7-6, there have been many cases of large-scale change within a short period of time. Therefore, normative models are still crucial; at the same time, whether normative theories have a better explanation than a '*realistic*' theory depends on the situation of each individual country. To sum up, it is helpful for researchers to explore the circumstances through a normative theory *ab initio*, and then contextual constraints might be adopted in a complementary way (Frederickson and Smith, 2003: 3). A choice of organisational options may have a conjunctural element but to view them as 'random' would be misleading.

8-1-1-4. Argument 2-1 This approach emphasises that an international cognitive pressure has played a central role in the isomorphism of AQ (section 3-2-1-1). Given that globalisation is a dominant and irreversible trend (Common, 2001: 10),⁵²⁰ this prospective has been easily taken for granted (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992: 328; Kettl, 2005: 1; Hughes, 2012: 333); however, there are several unclear aspects in it. Firstly, it is not always obvious which parts of the state become similar through cognitive pressure. For example, at the highest level, as examined in Chapter 3, an *ideology* such as Neo-liberalism and NPM could be diffused by normative or mimetic pressure. At the middle level, a *sectoral policy* such as economy, culture or welfare policy might be copied

⁵²⁰ Each state has been more frequently exposed to international organisations and fora and is given pressures from a series of international league tables (Common, 2001: 69; van Thiel, 2004b: 179; Pollitt, 2004a: 337; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011: 6-8).

through cognitive pressure, while, at the lowest level, SOP could become homogeneous. At the same time, a diffusion of a specific ideology does not necessarily mean the copying of a sectoral policy or SOP, although there seems to be a greater possibility for institutional imitations. For example, the introduction of executive agencies has usually been considered as the expansion of NPM ideas as shown in Table 8-2, but in the U.K. there are different opinions about that. Some commentators argue that the idea of BEAs came from the private sector (McDonald, 1992: 48; James, 2003: 51), while some others contend that it was copied from Swedish examples (Fry, 2008: 155; Efficiency Unit, 1991: paras 2.14, 3.14; Bouckaert and Peters, 2004: 35).

Table 8-2: Times of introduction of the executive agency

Sweden	Since 18 th century
The U.K.	1988
Canada (Special Operating Agency, SOA)	1990
Netherlands	1991
U.S (Performance Based Organization, PBO)	1997
Korea	2000
Japan	2001

Source: Peters (1997: 79-80); Kim (2006a:206), BAI (2005: 40), Lee and Moon (2010: 434-435)

The authors of the Ibbotson Report maintain that, owing to time constraints, they directly gathered evidence from selected civil servants rather than from overseas experience or academic experts (McDonald, 1992: 30-31; Jenkins, 2008: 68 and 2011: 15; Haddon, 2012: 16). Yet it was not free from the influence of the Fulton Report (Goldsworthy, 1991: 2; Jenkins, 2008: 85-86; Jenkins, 1994: 142; Painter, 1995: 18) which addressed the Sweden-like decoupling of policy-making from execution (1968: paras 150, 163 and 188-191; Theakston, 1995: 133). Moreover, the main source was the interviews from the civil servants, who had already well recognised the recommendations of the Fulton Report. Therefore it could be said that BEAs reflected upon the Swedish agencies' idea,⁵²¹ but not upon international isomorphism.

Secondly, as discussed in Chapter 3, it is also not apparent exactly who is being influenced by cognitive pressure. For example, more often than not, it is difficult to pin down the most influential actor of a specific policy, as we will see in Figure 8-6. From this perspective, the pressure from *international fora* (Pollitt et al., 2001: 272-273; Minogue, 2001b: 37-38; McCourt, 2001: 122) might be overemphasised, while the role of domestic political actors is underplayed; thus it is still not manifest when and how cognitive pressure works.

⁵²¹ The Programme Manager of the Next Steps, Peter Kemp, visited Sweden in 1988 (McDonald, 1992: 31), just as the authors of the Fulton Report visited Sweden in 1967 (Fulton Report, 1968: 100, 138). However, he argued he just followed an approach that '*Si monumentum requiris, circumspice*' (Kemp, 1994: 48)

With regard to Tate Modern and the MMCA, the *agencification* of museums is related to the trend of the NPM, while their *quangocratisation* is somewhat closer to marketisation. From this perspective, given that both theories have recently been fashionable, a considerable number of museums around the world would have agencified or quangocratised in quite a short period of time. Yet the influence of cognitive pressure partially depends on the situation of the state.⁵²² For example, as mentioned in Chapter 7, in France, the national art museums have been operated by civil servants (Andrault et al., 1987: 19), while in the U.S., the area of art museums traditionally belongs to the private sector (Mulcahy, 1987: 311). In addition, for many countries, selective adoption has been preferred to full scale copying, as discussed in relation to Figure 7-4 and Table 7-8. More importantly, the sources of policy-making are not limited to international policy fashions, but are also influenced by similar experiences from the past, as shown in Figures 7-5 and 8-7. Furthermore, at the stage of institutional introduction, convergence might be emphasised, but its application could be quite different from rhetoric, as shown in Figure 8-6. In short, as discussed further in the section on policy transfer, international cognitive pressures are just one piece of the jigsaw.


8-1-1-5. Argument 2-2 In the case of developed countries, the most plausible argument is the pressure towards austerity, as discussed in section 3-2-1-2 (OECD, 2001: 8; Pollitt et al., 2001: 273, 276).

From this perspective, as shown in Figure 8-1 and Table 8-2, the U.K., the U.S. and Korea responded comparatively early to the economic crisis and took forward agencification. However, Japan began agencification reform quite a long time after its continued economic recession, while Italy, Germany and France, which suffered an economic downturn in the early 1990s, chose a different reform strategy to that of the NPM (Döhler, 2002: 101; Wollmann, 2001: 159-161; Kickert, 2007: 30-33; Bezes and Jeannot, 2013: 9).⁵²³ Therefore an economic slump *per se* is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for agencification (Aberbach and Christensen, 2001: 418). In addition, although one of the major purposes of agencification is, of course, the enhancement of efficiency, this effort might not be sufficient for dealing with a pressing economic crisis.

⁵²² The cognitive convergence approach is similar to that of management gurus. It is either oversimplified or overgeneralised (Lynn, 2006: 167-168; Rainey, 1998b: 213-214). For example, see Rogers (1962: 311-314).

⁵²³ Meanwhile, in Finland, reform began in 1989 when the economy was, relatively speaking, not that bad (Pollitt, 2003a: 36). See Appendix 29 for the economic growth rates.

Figure 8-1: Changes in economic growth rate in 20-50 club* (from 1980 to 2001)



* 20-50 club (seven countries; see Appendix 2, Figure 2)

Source: data compiled and analysed from the World Bank

Meanwhile, as analysed in Figures 6-1 and 7-8, the economic growth rates and the civil servants' growth rates in the U.K. and Korea have a significant correlation, and therefore there is a good possibility that an economic crisis could influence quangocratisation. However, besides quangocratisation, there are other kinds of methods which could reduce the number of civil servants, such as by directly cutting of staff or by leaving posts unfilled.

Finally, from this point of view, even if an economic crisis does, in reality, influence AQ, knowing which of the governmental bodies need to be an executive agency and which need to be an executive NDPB is still uncertain. Yet there is an implication that once an agency is discussed as a candidate for AQ or privatisation, there is a greater possibility of suggesting it as the object of AQ or privatisation when the economy will decline later (Rose, 1993: 155). For example, the quangocratisation of the *Korea Post* has been a recurring issue since 1989 (MoPAS, 2008k: 2).⁵²⁴

⁵²⁴ For more on this, see the case of the British Post Office (Pitt and Smith, 1981: 109-131) and the *Korea Post* (Kwon, 2008b). See footnote 25.

8-1-1-6. Argument 2-3 As analysed in Chapters 6 and 7, the perspective of politicians as vote-maximisers does not seem to be germane to the AQ of art museums in the U.K. and Korea, but there have been several attempts to apply the principal-agent theory to AQ (Greer, 1994: 13-15; Lane, 2005a: 41-44 and 2008: 83-88). The agency theory maintains that *agents* rarely share ownership of organisation (Goldsworthy, 1991: 6; Douma and Schreuder, 2002: 110) and thus the ability to control them is an integral part of organisation management (James, 2003: 52). However, principal-agent problems also are found in the private sector and thus they are not a unique rationale for AQ (section 3-2-1-3); and furthermore, these problems in the public sector might be even more aggravated by AQ, as mentioned in Chapter 7.

For several commentators (Riker, 1990: 177-178), RCI is considered to be one of the most accurate models, since it produces clearer predictions (Pollitt, 2004a: 324); however, there are some general criticisms regarding it (Ha, 2003: 92-96; Green and Shapiro 1994: 5-9).⁵²⁵

Firstly, RCI can scarcely explain where the specific preference structures and interests, which they want to maximise, came from (Evans and Stephens, 1988: 733). Rational choice theorists assume that certain features resulting from rational actors functioning as utility maximisers, such as the revelation of unitary preference and the aggregation of preferences, could be identified and calculated by researchers. However, all the types of preferences could not be identical (Sen, 1977: 337-341) and an aggregation of preferences might not be possible (Arrow, 1950: 329; Pattanaik, 1997: 201-202); more importantly, preferences are not exogenous and institutions could well influence preferences (Rothstein, 1996: 148). Unlike the assumption of the RCI model, if the motives of rational actors are not homogeneous (van Thiel, 2012a: 400),⁵²⁶ as identified in Figure 8-2, they might be one of the substantial centrifugal forces which make the reform directions of individual countries quite different. Furthermore, actors frequently behave for the benefit of other people's interests (Margolis, 1982: 1-2).⁵²⁷

Secondly, RCI overemphasises the abilities of actors in predicting policy alternatives and manipulating the policy process, while ignoring the possibility of


⁵²⁵ Yet in order to make up for these weaknesses, RCI has tried to partly adopt institutional and historical components (Dowding and King, 1995).

⁵²⁶ In addition, the motivation or preference of actors might be changeable over time (Pollitt, 2004a: 325).

⁵²⁷ For example, as argued in argument 3-1, some politicians pursue depoliticisation, although their short-term interests are impaired.

generating unintended consequences (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 952). In addition, there is no pertinent explanation about the institutional process or context, thus it has been criticised as being ahistorical and over-abstract (Lowndes, 1996: 186).⁵²⁸

Figure 8-2: Various motivations for decision making



Source: derived and developed from Pollitt (2003: 135-144); Perry and Wise (1990: 368-369); Perry et al. (2010: 682); Warwick, (1976: 103); Chapman (1993: 162); Marsden (2010); Anderson (2006: 128-136) and Stevenson et al. (1998)

Thirdly, as Moe observes (1990: 215), RCI equates political phenomena with those of the economy, and this could be partly applied to ‘voting’, in which every voter has an equal right to cast one vote. Therefore, its perspective might be useful to explain the compromise and the contract among *equal* individuals, while unequal power relationships are underplayed (Korpi, 2001: 263). Finally, Green and Shapiro argue that RCI is lacking in rigorous empirical analysis, although it has achieved a significant impact on political science at the conceptual level (1994: 5). From this perspective, RCI theories are rarely problem-driven, but rather theory-driven or method-driven; they just try to deal with the set of evidence chosen to identify the rational behaviour of actors in a somewhat de-contextualised way (Green and Shapiro, 1994: 42-45; Pollitt, 2004a: 324,335).

In terms of the cases of Tate Modern and the MMCA, this approach of rational choice by politicians, in general, does not seem to be the main cause of the AQ in the U.K. and Korea. The cultural agencies usually do not involve the critical interests that politicians are in search of; and in systemised democracies

⁵²⁸ Theories which adopt *methodological individualism* (Mueller, 1997b; Schumpeter, 1908) have the same problem.

they are not liable to be dependent upon several private interests. However, there were several examples in which politicians and bureaucrats tried to reflect their interests into the policy process (Pollitt, 2003a: 87-88). In particular, as shown in Figure 8-6, political elites endeavour to secure them through a bargaining process.⁵²⁹ For example, one of the purposes of the Korean agencification in 1999 was to prevent privatisation and to neutralise radical changes (IC1).⁵³⁰ In the U.K., the opposition party did not object to agencification, because it could be an alternative to privatisation (Davies and Willman, 1991: 3; Gains, 1999: 122; Hogwood, 1993: 5).⁵³¹ Another example is bargaining during the process of agencification. Since each department would not voluntarily take forward agencification, there might be a deal arranged between them and the MoSPA which has been trying to expand the scope of KEAs. The MoCA and the National Research Institute of Cultural Properties demanded an increase in their staff numbers in return for their agencification (Noh, 2004). The last example was the negotiations during the Korean quangocratisation process in 2009. As candidates for quangocratisation have opposed the change, there have been diverse kinds of negotiations and some incentives such as finance and tenure for a given period.

In conclusion, this perspective adopted actors as a main variable and its usefulness lies in its ability to predict actors' possible responses. Moreover, it is also useful to analyse its efficiency in terms of its costs (Pollitt, 2004a: 331).⁵³² More importantly, it allows the institutional designers to consider the creation of a workable solution for the agency problems (Pollitt, 2003a: 143).⁵³³

⁵²⁹ Hood and Lodge (2006: 21) mainly consider the bargaining between politicians and bureaucrats, but mandarins are also involved in the bargaining with stakeholders outside government and, more importantly, with other groups of mandarins.

⁵³⁰ In Canada, SOAs were believed to be 'a way of delaying pressure to privatise or as a halfway station to privatisation' (Savoie, 2003: 58). In addition, in the U.S., PBOs were reckoned to be a watering-down method to privatise (Graham and Roberts, 2004: 142). Meanwhile, in the Netherlands, repulsion at privatisation made even agency creation to be referred to as *internal privatisation* (Pollitt, et al., 2001: 285). In a similar vein, agencification in Korea has sometimes been misunderstood as quangocratisation or privatisation (Park, 2010a: 130; Kim and Oh, 2012: 281).

⁵³¹ At the time of agencification, there were some rumours of large-scale privatisation (Goldsworthy, 1991: 15, 17), but the government claims that abolition or privatisation should be considered first before agencification, not the other way round (Cm 914: para 2.6; HC 410, para 13). However, agencification was said to be compatible with privatisation (Goldsworthy, 1991: 18-19; Jordan and O'Toole, 1995: 10) and Heseltine contended that as much privatisation of the agencies as possible should be contemplated (Flynn et al, 1988: 441). In reality, many BEAs were privatised in the mid and late 1990s (James, 2003: 136; Seo, 2005: 107-108). Jenkins argues that these transfers were not intended, but the characteristics of separate organisations with their own budgets allowed these changes to take place easily (2011: 11).

⁵³² AQ, on the one hand, might yield transformation costs and increase deadweight costs, on the other hand, it might decrease x-efficiency and non-pricing costs, although the concept for each cost is rather ambiguous.

⁵³³ In order to solve the agency problems, as examined in Chapter 3, incentives, competition and information sharing strategies might be useful. At the same time, from the perspective that the motivation of civil servants could be intentionally changed, *training* and a *code of ethical principles* are important (Pollitt, 2003a: 144-146).

8-1-1-7. Argument 3-1 The advantages of depoliticisation explored in section 3-2-2-1 are similar to those of argument 1-2. Yet this point of view is somewhat different, as it focuses on the darker side of political intervention in Figure 5-5. For example, the Ibbs Report (1988) presents at least four different drawbacks within the departmental organisations at the time, in terms of depoliticisation. It suggests not only the overloaded ministerial burden (para 7) and the unwieldy huge unitary civil service (para 10), but also the ministerial priority on policy (para 4) and the politically oversensitive senior civil servants (para 6). Argument 3-1 is keener on the latter two and politicisation (Figure 5-5), unlike argument 1-2 which concentrates on the first two. However, in terms of the elimination of absurd and undue intervention of politicians (Flinders, 2011:144), depoliticisation was not the *explicit* purpose of AQ in the U.K. At the same time in Korea, the administrative intervention from politicians is usually limited as analysed in Chapter 5, so that in reality depoliticisation has not been the official purpose of AQ. Furthermore, depoliticisation could increase the autonomy of the institution, but it might simultaneously weaken its accountability. Therefore if the capacity of a depoliticised agency is not sufficient enough, it could not be said that the intended efficiency would be achieved.

Meanwhile, as far as the complexion of depoliticisation is concerned, Figure 8-3 shows several features of the expansion of BEAs. First of all, there was no legislation or blue-print as to which kind of agency should be changed first (Goldsworthy, 1991: 20; McDonald, 1992: 53; Davies and Willman, 1991: 14-15; Hogwood, 1993: 3). In addition to this amorphousness, the expansion of BEAs was maintained despite the diversity of their size and scope. As analysed in Figure 7-10 (a), the expansion was at its peak in 1996, but Figure 8-3 (a) and (b) show that the later proliferation was dependent on *internal type* and *financially net-funded* and *fully-funded* agencies,⁵³⁴ unlike the focus on external type and trading funds in earlier times.⁵³⁵ Finally, although, in the 1997 annual report, the end of the main creation phase was declared (Cabinet Office, 2006b: para 1), there has been a continuous change after that.⁵³⁶

Being similar to BEAs, in Korea, functionally external bodies were agencified first in the earlier stage, as shown in Figure 8-4 (a), but since 2005


⁵³⁴ In the later stage, the expansion of BEAs was mainly dependent on devolved agencies and defence agencies (Cm 3164, 1995: x). For more on this, see Appendix 33.

⁵³⁵ The agencification of Trading Fund Agencies was a kind of *mitigated* or *nominal* change rather than a *pure* change (James, 2003: 60 and 129).

⁵³⁶ The cases of de-agencification could be said to be a kind of re-politicisation.

the expansion of KEAs has been mainly dependent on national hospitals and internal agencies.


Figure 8-3: Expansion of BEAs



Source: extracted and analysed from OPSR (2002: 50-55)

Meanwhile, Japanese agencification shows a different expansion route from the U.K. and Korea, as shown in Figure 8-4 (b). In common with BEAs, Japanese agencification was introduced in a radical way,⁵³⁷ but at the outset, more than half of newly created IAls were research bodies.⁵³⁸ In addition, the increase in the creation of external IAls in 2003 and 2004 was mainly due to the merely legal shift from the existing quangos to quango-type IAls.

Figure 8-4: Expansion route of KEAs and IAls



Source: extracted and analysed from KAPS (2011: 22-25), Moon and Lee (2010: 42) and Kitazawa (2005: 24-25)

All these taken together, in the U.K., Korea and Japan, the relatively depoliticised external and research bodies were agencified first, rather than the

⁵³⁷ In addition, the changes from specific IAls to non-specific IAls since 2006 were also radical (Quangocratisation Type-I in Figure 2-2).

⁵³⁸ Most of them were specific IAls (Agencification Type-I in Figure 2-2), as shown in Figure 7-6.

agencification for depoliticisation which argument 3-1 postulates; and the scope of depoliticisation was expanded only in the later stage.⁵³⁹ For example, although the introduction of agencification in the U.K. has been considered to be radical, the first three BEAs were comparatively independent bodies, as discussed in Chapter 7.⁵⁴⁰

Vis-à-vis the AQ of Tate Modern and the MMCA, the depoliticisation of arts organisations might be considered at first sight as one of the goals taken for granted. However, as discussed in the early section of Chapter 6, a non-political nature is a basic feature of arts-organisations; and thus it is, in most advanced countries, likely to be accomplished to a certain degree, even before the intentional endeavour to acquire it. Furthermore, as discussed with regard to Figure 3-4, the concept and scope of depoliticisation is not distinct or tangible. If its arena is expanded to debureaucratisation or managerialism, then AQ might be regarded as the result of it. However, if its arena is just limited to the exclusion of unfair politicians as shown in Type I in Figure 5-5, privatisation or collaborative governance instead of AQ would be a more appropriate target for it (Jung et al., 2009:1). In sum, depoliticisation may be a by-product of AQ but it did not appear to be a leading motivation.

8-1-1-8. Argument 3-2 Since AQs are part of the government policies, this argument tries to explain them by deploying diverse independent policy variables (section 3-2-2-2).

The most important advantage of this approach is that it shows policy leading groups and the process of agenda confirmation, as explored in Chapter 3. Therefore this perspective endeavours to shed light on *de facto* determinants of policy making behind the scenes. Moreover, since numerous variables are involved in the policy-making process, this argument might have wide variations in its application. For example, this analysis might focus not only on actors, but also on institutional *constraints* and *paths*. It looks like a workable and realistic analysis; however, it also carries risks. First of all, in the case of the *mobilisation model* and the *inside-access* model, and the *constituent policy*, the decision-making processes are not apt to be disclosed, so that it is quite difficult to ascertain the real backgrounds of the policy

⁵³⁹ There are contrasting views about whether AQ resulted in depoliticisation or politicisation (Hood and Peters, 2004: 270-271; Maor, 1999: 13; Figure 5-5).

⁵⁴⁰ The Prime Minister announced twelve candidates for agencification in February 1988 (HC 410: 22-23), but only five BEAs had been established by May 1989 (HC 410: para 11).

(Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996: 355; Evans, 2004: 224; see also Appendix 5). In addition, this argument has the virtue of describing the real world, but it is weak in finding *regularities* or anticipating possible changes. Besides which, policy process in practice is much more complex than a *staged approach* of the advanced and systemised democracies as described in the text books. It includes multiple issues and very complicated relationships with other agendas (Pollitt, 2004a: 325), and it tends to be modish and unscientific (Pollitt et al., 2001: 278). Moreover, political elites are frequently more likely to pursue their craft knowledge, circumstantial evidence and rhetorical power than a detailed analysis (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000: 188; Hood, 1998: 13).

With regard to Tate Modern and the MMCA, this perspective has another implication that is closely related to institutional constraints which are discussed in a later section. The quangocratisation of the Tate Gallery did not grab the limelight at the time, while the agencification and quangocratisation of the MoCA did generate some publicity. One of the reasons for this stemmed from the relationship between the *administrative* and the *legislative* branches, as examined in Chapter 5. In many countries, the development from an institutional agenda to a decision agenda, as discussed in Chapter 3, more often than not, needs to have some legislation. However, in the U.K., many large-scale reforms happened without a legislative vehicle to take change forward, owing to the tradition of an uncodified constitution (Hogwood, 1993: 5).⁵⁴¹ Despite this procedural advantage, the policy draft of Next Steps, which was made in 1987, had not been announced until February 1988, partly because of other big issues such as NHS reform and electricity privatisation (Haddon, 2012: 19; Jordan and O'Toole, 1995: 11). During the process of the agencification of the MoCA, the role of the National Assembly was somewhat limited in its support for the production of a general law about KEAs (AEOEA) rather than the direct designation of KEAs (footnote 449). Contrary to this, quangocratisation of the MMCA has been completely dependent upon the legislators. While the quangos reform in the U.K. from 2010 and 2011 was conducted comparatively without difficulty (Flinders et al., 2014: 15), by virtue of the Westminster model, even under the Coalition government,⁵⁴² the bill for the quangocratisation of the MMCA has had some difficulties in being passed in the National Assembly on account of its lower priority at the time of writing. When it

⁵⁴¹ At the same time, after the initiative was announced there was no full debate in the House of Commons and the Opposition did not endeavour to reverse the reform plan (Hogwood, 1993: 5 and 11).

⁵⁴² The Public Bodies Act 2011 was made to enable ministers to abolish, merge or modify the status of existing quangos, and to provide a mechanism to make further changes to them (Cabinet Office, 2012b: 3).

came to the bill of the quangocratisation of SNU in 2010, the Chief of Staff for the President and the Minister of MoPAS, were SNU professors at that time, and thus it was not difficult for them to encourage the legislators to co-operate with the Government to pass the bill without delay,⁵⁴³ unlike the case of the MMCA. Moreover, the objection of the MCST *ab initio* produced the cohesion of the opposition forces to the quangocratisation of the MMCA and added to the burden of the National Assembly.

To conclude, since this argument, on the whole, focuses on the policy *procedure* or stage, it is not easy to manifest the specific features of substantive policy *contents* such as arts administration and AQ. However, this argument is a kind of vehicle for the application of other theories, although it *per se* is not entirely apposite to theoretically identify the cause of agencification.

8-1-1-9. Argument 3-3 From the viewpoint of this perspective, AQ could not replace all previous ideas and practices, but it has been influenced by the *institutions* and *paths* which were created in the past (section 3-2-2-3). Therefore, the most important concept of this analysis is the *paths* formed by existing *institutions*; but despite their significance, it is hard to apply them to the real world, since they include a range of meanings in the same category of 'institution'⁵⁴⁴ (Pierre et al., 2008: 232; Rothstein, 1996: 146; Hay, 2006: 68; Schmidt, 2006: 116; Cairney, 2011: 74-76),⁵⁴⁵ which might make the analysis of AQ difficult in that it loosely uses the term *institution* (Etzioni, 1988: 27; Gains, 2004a: 54). The term *institution* might be used in a different way as follows (section 3-2-2-3). Firstly, in terms of formality, it could involve not only *formal norms and rules*,⁵⁴⁶ and *customary rules* (Lowndes and Roberts, 2013: 53-69), but also *regularised strategies and plans* which influence decision making and behaviour⁵⁴⁷ (Ostrom, 2007: 23; Hall 1986: 19). Secondly, according to its degree or level, it could be the *basic and abstract direction* or *principle of*

⁵⁴³ The quangocratisation of the SNU had been taken forward in earnest by the Government since 2005 (Chun et al., 2008: 3).

⁵⁴⁴ The reason why this was not discussed in earlier chapters is that when the author first examined it as a theory, its basic idea seemed to be well established (section 3-2-2-3). Yet during the process of applying it to real world policies, he faced the problem that it not only covered significantly different levels of institutions, but it tried to explain institutions that were in themselves quite different (Putnam, 1976: 19). HI is a developing theory and is far from being settled at the moment (Lowndes and Roberts, 2013: 40-45; Scott, 2001: xv and 2014: vii).

⁵⁴⁵ One of the characteristics of HI is that it is rather close to constructivist or discursive theories (Pollitt, 2004a: 321; Schmidt, 2006: 116). Therefore, if its construction or interpretation goes too far, it might neglect all the material interests (Schmidt, 2006: 114) and it could also be too relative to be deployed in other researches.

⁵⁴⁶ These include *procedure laws*, which stipulate the way to change existing rules, as well as *substantive laws*, which contain the practical contents.

⁵⁴⁷ In practice, if the term institution tries to cover regular patterns of behaviour, habits or culture, its concept might be too diluted to have an explanatory value (Rothstein, 1996: 146).

behaviour, or it could also be a very *detailed rule* (Hall, 1992: 96-97). Last but not least, with regard to its contents, it would not only concern itself with *enforced rules*, but also with *organisation structures* or *policy priorities*⁵⁴⁸ (John, 2011: 88). Meanwhile, since the meaning of institution is significantly diverse, its sphere of influence, that is to say the scope of its path, is also divergent (Vergne and Durand, 2010: 738-741; Lowndes and Roberts, 2013: 113-117). Some paths have impact on a myriad of organisations and even on the whole state, while others might only influence a specific organisation (Pollitt, 2013b: 213-214). Institutions could be divided into three categories, as shown in Figure 8-6 (de Jong and Mamadouh, 2002: 22-23): *hard institutions*, *soft institutions* and *consensual institutions*. Hard institutions, such as constitutional arrangements, are rules about higher-level constitutional structure and have an effect on the whole policy system; but are very difficult to revise. By contrast, soft institutions, such as laws, finances, policies and organisations, are rules about lower-level organisation structure and could influence only particular organisations; and are thus relatively easy to change. In addition, consensual institutions, such as socially agreed rules of games, principles and practices, are generated by an implicit consensus of the members of society and are difficult to modify.

This argument mainly concerns the continuation of a pattern or institutional resistance to change rather than a radical alteration of path (Bouckaert and Peters, 2004: 27). At the same time, it tries to involve institutional change through the concept of critical juncture and gradual change as discussed in Chapter 3. However, the concept of the *change of path* is equivocal, in common with the concept of *path*, given that in reality few paths would disappear completely. Therefore, the extent to which a path is broken is unclear. For example, although agencification in the U.K. has been considered as being radical, but even within this policy some parts have been maintained while other paths were broken. In brief, it is difficult to decide whether agencification was a kind of critical juncture or not.⁵⁴⁹

The most distinct advantage of this argument is its ability to emphasise institutional constraints, but the causes of institutional continuity could not be explained only by institution *per se*. Therefore, many institutionalists introduced the concept of *ideas* (footnote 132; Cairney, 2011: 223). However, even though

⁵⁴⁸ Since government *policies* are embodied in laws, budgets or guides, they are, as with other institutions, a kind of the rules of the game.

⁵⁴⁹ For example, on the one hand, the Next Steps programme was a further development of the FMI (Goldsworthy, 1991: 2,7; Hogwood, 1993: 2; Hood, 1996b: 41), on the other hand it could be considered as a quite different level of change.

there are influential *driving forces* and *new ideas*, as shown in Figure 8-6, it is difficult to mobilise actual change without the proactive willingness of *the agents*.⁵⁵⁰ Finally, this approach emphasises the historical aspect and *long lasting* paths, but it is somewhat unclear to decide how much time is needed in order to judge that they are *long* enough. If sudden and radical changes frequently happen, then the notion of *path* is limited as an analytical tool.⁵⁵¹

In reference to the AQ of Tate Modern and the MMCA, the change of government policy is noticeable. As explored earlier, once a government policy is adopted, it could be a continuous path, as with an organisational structure. However, government policy is considerably influenced by a change of government and a sensitive policy has a lesser possibility of continuation. Furthermore, even a popular policy might be inevitably changed after a certain period of time, as a new administration intentionally makes its demerits come to the fore. In addition, an unreasonable policy might return to its previous state after a while (Pollitt, 2008: 46; Mahoney and Thelen, 2010: 15-17). The policy of KEAs' expansion was partly replaced with a quangocratisation policy, which includes the change of the MMCA, after the new administration came to power, as shown in Table 7-6. Contrary to this frequent change, the Tate Gallery had been changed quite a long time after its establishment. From the viewpoint of HI, this might be an example showing that institutional inertia worked, while in reality it was possible partly because of the political actors' indifference to arts administration.

8-1-2. Epistemological and methodological assumptions

The differences in the epistemological and methodological assumptions of a great variety of researchers make it significantly difficult to create a general or grand theory (Pollitt, 2004a: 338; Gerring and Thacker, 2008: 163).⁵⁵² In the first place, there are undeniable differences among researchers about the way they perceive the features of objects (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2009: 170-171; Pollitt, 2013b: 90), although they are rarely presented in an explicit way. For example, Figure 8-5 shows how researchers presuppose the basic nature of actors, when they suggest diverse theories and arguments. Since the starting point, where actors might pursue public interests or private interests, or they


⁵⁵⁰ For the types and concepts of agents, see Scott (2014: 119-128), and Lowndes and Roberts (2013: 104-110).

⁵⁵¹ Furthermore, for some developing countries, the problems stem from an absence of institution rather than from institutional constraints (Pollitt, 2004a: 335; Andrews, 2010: 30-31).

⁵⁵² For *ontological* assumptions, see 't Hart (2014: 218) and Virtanen (2013: 6).

might be mere agents, is profoundly different,⁵⁵³ the results of their analysis will be far from being similar. For example, the RCI perspective is based on a low trust of actors (Pollitt, 2003a: 32), whilst the practitioner's theory or managerialism are grounded on a higher trust of actors. These epistemological differences, in fact, make it impossible to synthesise all the different arguments analysed earlier.⁵⁵⁴

Figure 8-5: Assumptions about actors⁵⁵⁵



Source: partly derived and developed from Page (2012: 2-5); Pollitt (2003: 86-89); Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011: 169); Hood and Lodge (2006: 21); and Jilson (2009: 237)

Furthermore, these epistemological differences tend to result in methodological differences in research designs (Jenkins and Gray, 1983: 178-179). However, both qualitative and quantitative methods are merely means to examine the objects; thus they can be deployed together (Ricucci, 2010: 108-109; Creswell, 2002: 208; Bates, 2009: 184), although they still need to be clear about their epistemological stance. This thesis neither chooses a specific one among various epistemological assumptions nor is a synthesis of them; but tries to show diversity and the differences from numerous angles.

⁵⁵³ Not only researchers, but also the public (du Gay, 2000:3 and 2005: 2), politicians (Plowden, 1994: 103; Pollitt, 2003a: 86; Savoie, 2003: 9; Yamamoto, 2004: 216; Meier, 1993: 3), and bureaucrats (Stevenson, 2013:66-69; Tonge, 1999: 89; Rainey, 1997: 60) have different perceptions about other actors.

⁵⁵⁴ However, it is possible to combine similar epistemological groups (Pollitt, 2004a: 338).

⁵⁵⁵ Understandably, this figure is extremely simplified, so that it cannot reflect the detailed features of each theory.

In addition to this, another important issue from the researchers' viewpoint is the relationships between structure and agents (Ladi, 2005: 9; Marsh and Sharman, 2010: 37-38). There has been a great debate between the structure-focused approach and the agent-focused perspective, but the *structuration* approach has increasingly gained popularity since the 1970s (Giddens, 1976: 120-127 and 1977: 117-134; Bryant and Jary, 1991: 8-15),⁵⁵⁶ although it also has a problem with epistemological conflicts (Giddens: 1984: 2-31 and 1991: 204-205). This thesis also considers the *structuration* perspective, as discussed in a later section, but it does not merely try to synthesise different approaches.

8-1-3. Concluding Remarks

As examined in Chapters 6 and 7, each argument has its own explanatory power, but most of them are only partial and work under several required conditions.⁵⁵⁷ Table 8-3 shows the applicability of each argument examined in Chapters 6 and 7. Each argument answers the list of major research questions below.

Table 8-3: Applicability of arguments regarding quangocratisation of the Tate Gallery and agencification of the MoCA

(B: U.K.; K: Korea)

(○: high applicability; Δ medium applicability, * low applicability, -: not considered)

	H 1-1 (goods)		H 1-2 (tasks)		H 1-3 (ad-hoc)		H 2-1 (fashion)		H 2-2 (crisis)		H 2-3 (RCI)		H 3-1 (depoli-)		H 3-2 (process)		H 3-3 (HI)	
	B	K	B	K	B	K	B	K	B	K	B	K	B	K	B	K	B	K
Q1	Δ	Δ	*	Δ	Δ	○	Δ	○	Δ	○	*	Δ	*	Δ	Δ	○	○	○
Q2	-	Δ	-	*	-	*	-	*	-	*	-	*	-	*	-	Δ	-	Δ
Q3	*	*	*	*	*	*	Δ	○	*	○	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Q4	*	*	*	*	Δ	Δ	*	*	*	*	*	Δ	*	*	*	○	○	Δ
Q5	*	*	*	Δ	*	*	*	*	*	Δ	*	*	*	Δ	Δ	Δ	*	*
Q6	*	*	*	○	*	*	*	*	*	Δ	*	*	*	Δ	Δ	Δ	*	*

* The list of questions for AQ (largely based on Pollitt, 2004a: 329-336)

Q1: Can the argument explain the *reason* for AQ?

Q2: Can the argument *differentiate between* agencification and quangocratisation?

Q3: Why has AQ *spread so fast* and so far?

Q4: Why is there so much *diversity*, within the general trend of AQ?

Q5: Are AQ more *efficient* than some specified alternative?

Q6: Can the argument show the rationale for *autonomy* or separation?

⁵⁵⁶ There has been a great deal of work in various fields claiming that *macro* approaches need *micro* foundations. Not only Simon emphasised this point (1953: 79-109), but also various economists (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 421-422; Romer, 1996: 241-243; Barro, 1993: 17) and institutionalists (Powell and Colyvas, 2008: 279-295; Thornton et al., 2012: 80-83) have developed these ideas.

⁵⁵⁷ Different arguments attempt to answer different questions, thus an analysis without other perspectives might not be sufficient (Pollitt, 2004a: 320).

Table 8-3 has some implications as follows: firstly, in many cases, a series of answers are less explicit than we expected; and moreover, the applicability of each argument depends on specific cases. For the benefit of comparison, the table above excludes British agencification which the Tate has not experienced and Korean quangocratisation which the MMCA has not yet accomplished, but if these are considered together, the results would be more divergent. Each argument could answer only specific questions and there are no omnipotent arguments which could explain other different questions (Pollitt, 2004a: 327). Secondly, if an argument cannot answer Question 1 then it cannot subsequently answer other questions. Therefore, the first question is the most fundamental one which needs to be analysed first. By contrast, even if an argument can answer Question 1 well, it does not always mean that the answer for Questions 4 and 5 would also be positive. Thirdly, the answers for Question 2, *inter alia*, are somewhat thinly evidence-based, as compared to other answers to different questions. This possibly shows that the distinction between agencification and quangocratisation might be rather difficult and even relative (Figure 9-1). Fourthly, Questions 3 and 4 are mutually exclusive. Although *argument group 2* is classified as convergence pressure and *argument group 3* falls into centrifugal force in Chapter 3 (Figure 3-1), in practice, these assumption are not always accepted. Finally, the overall explanatory power of each argument regarding Questions 5 and 6 is not sufficient enough, even though the enhancement of efficiency or governmental function, in general terms, is the main target of the reform. This partly means that the announcement of a new AQ by the government could not easily be justified by existing theories.

Each argument has their own weaknesses, as discussed in an earlier section; thus there is an implication that they need to be considered concurrently (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 957; Pollitt and Dan, 2011: 39-43). In order to see the bigger picture, inserting the missing links and putting the pieces of the puzzle together might be done as follows.

Firstly, since some arguments analyse the same point from different angles, some of them are overlapped while some others could well be combined. According to the maxim of *Occam's razor*, which means that

'Entities are not to be multiplied without necessity' (Russell, 1946: 435),⁵⁵⁸ if possible, the number of variables needs to be reduced. In this connection, nine arguments could be grouped into four sets: triggers, actors, contexts and development routes. In the first place, arguments 2-1 and 2-2 are the triggers group which could influence the structure and the actors. Another group is arguments 2-3 and 3-2 which comparatively emphasise the proactive role of actors. Meanwhile, arguments 1-1, 1-2, 3-1 are loosely based on contingency theory or functionalism (Donaldson, 1996: 59, 2001: 110-118, 2005: 1084 and 2006: 38). The concept of *merit good* in argument 1-1 supposes that the way of governmental service provision has been changed, depending on situation and people's perception. Arguments 1-2 and 3-1 also tend to pay attention to the change and enhancement of government function.⁵⁵⁹ Finally, arguments 1-3 and 3-3 put a primacy on historical development routes and paths.

Secondly, as shown in Figure 8-6, diverse features of AQ could be combined into a basic framework that involves not only triggers but also actors and paths (Brans, 2012: 520-521). First of all, this figure suggests a relatively extensive model which includes the diverse relationships between variables, thus being helpful in gaining a deeper understanding of contexts and trajectories (Peters and Pierre, 2006: 1).⁵⁶⁰ In addition, it provides a comprehensive insight that the causes of a particular public sector reform are more complicated than was expected (Hood, 1978: 45; Lichbach, 1997: 272-274); one simple answer could not explain other countries' experiences, and could also not suggest far-reaching explanatory variables which might help researchers to compare a series of countries (Page and Wright, 2007: 224-225). In addition, this model might enable researchers to take a closer look at the differences among diverse theories. Every theory has its own respectable aspect,⁵⁶¹ but it may be more fruitful to investigate what each could offer to the others rather than to stick to one theory once and for all (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992: 12; McAdam et al., 1997: 151). In this way, a particular theory would disclose its weaknesses, and supplement its logic.


⁵⁵⁸ For more on this, see Acemoglu and Robinson (2006: 16), Jonathan (2011: 352-353) and Russell (1959: 12-13, 62).

⁵⁵⁹ From these points of view, it is relatively not important to identify by whom and when the change of function was decided.

⁵⁶⁰ As Talbot argues (2004a: 7), it is impossible to attain simplicity, generalizability and accuracy at the same time.

⁵⁶¹ As Hood and Dunsire properly observe (1981: 35), 'To point out the usefulness of one tool is not necessarily to deny the usefulness of others.'

Figure 8-6: Basic framework for analysis of structural change



Source: partly derived and developed from Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011: 32-37), Mahoney and Thelen (2010: 15)

At the same time, this framework supposes that multiple causes will happen simultaneously and are thus compatible. For example an economic crisis could be easily combined with other arguments. Meanwhile, the directions of causal relationships and their chronological order might not be settled in one particular way. The specific behaviours of actors, for example, might lead to an economic crisis or a new idea, which could promote public sector reform; while an economic crisis might generate a new theory, and then the major actors would respond and introduce another new reform policy. In addition, the existing path could also actively interact with the diverse pressures of public sector reform.

Thirdly, the basic framework in Figure 8-6 is intrinsically dependent on contextual variations (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011: 23), since different states have different institutional constraints as well as different paths. Furthermore, this framework is more or less based on a *contingency perspective* (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Galbraith, 1977; Scott, 1998: 96; Donaldson, 1985: 161),⁵⁶²

⁵⁶² Pollitt suggests that a myriad of scholars, such as pragmatists, social constructivists, post-modernists, informatics theorists and decision theorists, have taken largely similar positions by maintaining that contextual factors are crucial (2003: 152-156).

which rejects a common set of principles to guide organisational design but rather emphasises adaptation of forms and practices to particular surroundings (Hood 1976: 143; Rainey 2009: 207). Yet it is differentiated from the garbage can model in several respects.⁵⁶³ It emphasises not only the complex political world, but also the roles of political actors and their strategies, the efforts in making rational decision, and institutional constraints. Meanwhile, in general terms, a combination perspective of all the factors involved, such as in Figure 8-6, is so all-encompassing that it involves several problems. Most importantly, the perspectives of the contingency theorists might not meet 'everyone's epistemological taste' (Pollitt, 2007a: 384). In other words, there is a certain chance that it would seem inelegant as a theory and would sometimes even look functionalist and descriptive (Pollitt, 1984: 173-174). Furthermore, Figure 8-6 tries to cover multi-faceted factors, so that the causal relationships of components become very complicated and difficult to explore; thus the possibility of generalisation might be more or less reduced. Yet a theory, which endeavours with a tunnel vision to place great value on a simple causal link, might also lead to outstripping reality. Since Figure 8-6 is not a general theory, but a kind of checklist which focuses on the process of change and various variables which is illustrative but not comprehensive.⁵⁶⁴

Fourthly, as mentioned earlier, divergent and convergent reform pressures suggested in Figure 3-1 are hard to be confirmed as having clear directions, despite their assertive theoretical arguments. An analysis of cultural

⁵⁶³ This framework and the garbage can model, as with the 'three streams' model by Kingdon (2003: 86-87), have taken roughly similar positions by recognising that the policy environment is significantly complicated (Cyert and March, 1992: 232-233) and its contingent nature influences the policy process. However, there are several distinct differences between them. Firstly, the garbage can model overemphasises the messiness and random probabilities of policy process, using an 'organized anarchies' metaphor (Cohen et al., 1972: 1-2; Birkland, 2011: 257-258; Dorey, 2014: 22; Miller and McTavish, 2014: 43). Meanwhile, Kingdon argues that he puts more emphasis on 'organized' than on 'anarchies' (2003: 86) and suggests that randomness and unpredictability could be limited within three streams (2003: 206-207). However, according to Kingdon, three separate streams are joined at critical times and then windows of opportunity are open for only a short period of time (2003:165-166; Birkland, 2011: 178). Hence this perspective is still too fatalistic (Miller and McTavish, 2014: 43) and is overly concerned with unpredictability (Hill, 2013: 168). By contrast, the framework in Figure 8-6, on the one hand, emphasises an ordinary rational policy formation process and incremental elements influenced by existing paths. On the other hand, it adopts contextual elements in a complementary way. Secondly, unlike Kingdon's model, this framework considers only one policy stream. Kingdon argues that there are three independent streams: the problem stream; the political stream and the policy stream (2003: 87; Parsons, 192-194; Zahariadis, 2003: 7-9). However, it seems somewhat unnatural to assume that these streams move separately (Hill, 2013: 195-196). Instead, understandably, they interact with each other within one big stream. Thirdly, this framework places emphasis on the proactive strategies of actors (Baumgartner et al., 1993: 11), while the garbage can model postulates that the role of actors is marginal. In many cases, the windows of opportunity are not passively opened by chance, but are opened by actors' enthusiastic efforts. Finally, Kingdon's model focuses just on agenda-setting, but in reality agenda-setting, options analysis, their selection and the implementation process are all interwoven. Therefore, Figure 8-6 considers not only agenda setting but also the diverse policy process simultaneously.

⁵⁶⁴ This framework, *inter alia*, is specified in AQ in the UK and Korea, and other policies might need to consider different variables. In addition, for a certain country, cultural constraints such as religion could be added as an important variable. For example, see the case of Saudi Arabia (Common, 2013: 23-26).

agencies in AQ shows that the suggested centripetal and centrifugal force group in Figure 3-1 does not move in a coherent way.⁵⁶⁵ For example, Argument 2-3 could show both directions of convergence and differentiation, since its scope of epistemological assumptions about actors in Figure 8-5 and various motivations in Figure 8-2 are considerably different from country to country, and from organisation to organisation. Even a cognitive pressure approach, which is regarded as an evident convergence perspective, does not obviously show which parts of an ideology, policy or organisation structure become commonly similar while other parts become more dissimilar.

Finally, diverse constraints such as contextual and institutional constraints as well as bounded rationality (Gupta, 2011: 63-67; Dorey, 2014: 82-89), financial constraints and the lack of legitimacy, as shown in Figure 8-6, need to be analysed at the same time (Dogan, 1994).

8-2. A Comparison of the Results of the AQ

The later parts of Chapters 6 and 7 examined the results of AQ of Tate Modern and the MMCA, while the first parts researched their causes. The results of AQ in the previous chapters were analysed from the perspective of *external* performances and *organisational* influences, as discussed in Chapter 4 (section 4-3).⁵⁶⁶ In the first place, Tate Modern has shown successful *external* performances (section 6-5-1 and 6-6). In particular, it recorded 5.2 million visitor attendances in the first year, although it originally expected just two million (Smith, 2005: 17). In addition, there have been various positive results after its creation: the synergic influence over the nearby tourist attractions; the paradigmatic reuse of the former power station in relation to city redevelopment; the successful cultivation of professional expertise; significant fund-raising from the private sector; the expansion of its size; and exerting a proactive role as a taste-shaper. By contrast, agencification of the MoCA has received some criticism in terms of visitor numbers and their satisfaction levels, professional expertise, and limited budget expansion (section 7-5). At the same time, as far as the managerial structure and autonomy of organisations *per se* are concerned, the case study of the Tate Galleries shows that increased autonomy and flexibility has provoked the enhancement of external performances. In

⁵⁶⁵ The argument of convergence of the NPM is mainly based on Anglo-phone scholars' influence, their participation in international fora, the rhetoric hype of government announcement and the persistent efforts of reform gurus to create new demands (Lynn, 2006: 105-108; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011: 12-14).

⁵⁶⁶ However, owing to the difficulties of performance evaluation (Appendix 5), some of the longer-term outcomes were not dealt with fully in Chapters 6 and 7.

contrast to this, in spite of a slight enhancement of organisational flexibility after its agencification, this change in the MoCA has not led to an improvement of external performances (section 6-5-3).

In this respect, in Korea, in order to accomplish better results, the examples of arts museums in other countries, including Tate Modern, were reviewed since 2008. Inter alia, unlike the French national art museums which are mainly operated by civil servants and the private art museums in the U.S.A., British art museums, which were managed by public servants, were considered as one of the potential alternatives.

In this connection, two points are worth considering. Firstly, there is a question regarding whether the quangocratisation of museums is always desirable. Given the distinctive characteristics of arts administration (section 6-1), autonomy and empowerment by the structural decoupling from a sponsor department seem to be considered as a prerequisite factor for performance enhancement.⁵⁶⁷ Nonetheless, many cultural agencies in Korea are still directly run by civil servants; and moreover only around 20 per cent of cultural AIs have been designated as KEAs (section 7-2). If the government perceives that the separation of cultural agencies from the policy is the most efficient way, then in most countries they would be run as executive agencies or ALBs; but for some countries they are not operated in such a way (Seo, 2011: 128-129). One of the main reasons for this is that, in some countries, the lower level of economic development and the absence of a strong artistic community in the private sector are critical factors (section 6-4-1-1; Appendix 2). When artistic activities and communities in the private sector are not invigorated enough, the state-led arts policy might be helpful at least to some extent, in that the conservation of historically valuable works of art and the support for talented artists by the government could be carried out in a consistent and sustainable way. In Korea, some commentators in the artistic community still believe that the proactive and promotional role of the government is necessary, especially in terms of financial support (section 7-4-2). Meanwhile, the quangocratisation policy of the MMCA in Korea was partly triggered by its poor performance after agencification, so that this is not an exact case of unreserved policy copying or compulsory policy transplantation, but is a kind of *voluntary* policy transfer, which happened during the rational policy making process (sections 7-6 and 8-3). More importantly, the quangocratisation of the MMCA is expected to have a possibly significant

⁵⁶⁷ In particular, see Arguments 1-2 and 3-1 in Chapter 3.

impact on other cultural agencies, given that it will be the first quangocratisation of a cultural agency in Korea. It could be thus a pilot case and its successful operation after that change might lead to extra structural decoupling of other cultural agencies.

Secondly, agencification of the MoCA, as with quangocratisation, was also a type of structural disaggregation, but its operation in Korea has not been successful. It is not a copy of the agencification of national museums in the U.K. where they were already quangocratised in 1972 and 1984 before the introduction of the Next Steps programme in 1988, but it is an applied adoption of the British executive agency policy, which was considered as a reflection of the Korean local situation. However, some different results from those in the U.K. have been produced after agencification of the MoCA, since its institutional underpinnings were not the same as those in the U.K (section 7-6). In this regard, a careful analysis of institutional contexts and constraints in Korea are needed (sections 8-5 and 8-6). In the same way, quangocratisation of the MMCA is not an elixir for its performance improvement. In addition to its quangocratisation, other related institutional problems should be considered at the same time (sections 8-5 and 9-2-3).

8-3. Rational Policy Making Process and Policy Transfer

Figure 8-6 is useful for analysing the cases of Tate Modern and the MMCA, but numerous variables in this figure could hardly be treated on equal terms (Virtanen, 2013: 5). Since the agencification policy in Korea and the quangocratisation of the MMCA are considered as a kind of policy transfer (Yoon, 2001: 276-283; Chapter 7), we need to take a close look at the AQ policy in terms of policy transfer, without missing the point that policy transfer is just a part of policy making and thus it should not be overemphasised (James and Lodge, 2003: 181-183; Evans, 2004: 3; Kraft and Furlong, 2013: 130). In the first place, the concept and level of policy transfer is so diverse that it needs to be examined in a detailed way.⁵⁶⁸

⁵⁶⁸ Common tries to distinguish between policy *convergence*, policy *diffusion* and policy *transfer* (Common, 2001: 9-19). Policy *convergence* means similar policies occur independently across the world (Bennett, 1991: 215), while policy *diffusion* focuses more on the active dissemination of agents. At the same time policy *transfer* means the 'conscious adoption' from other jurisdictions. Policy transfer is divided into two categories: *voluntary* policy transfer which is an optional decision including emulation and learning (Common, 2001: 15-17; Ladi, 2005: 29); and direct and indirect *coercive* policy transfer which is similar to coercive isomorphism discussed in Chapter 3 (Dolowitz, 1996: 22-31; Common, 2001: 18-19). Dolowitz and Marsh consider *lesson-drawing* as a type of voluntary transfer (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996: 344; Evans, 2010: 17). However, policy lessons could be drawn not only from *other states* but also from *the past* and *the private sector*. In this regard, the categories of policy transfer and lesson-drawing are not mutually exclusive.

8-3-1. Diverse sources of policy making, policy transfer and policy talk

Policy transfer, as shown in Figure 8-7, is one of the alternatives during the rational decision making process. Policymakers⁵⁶⁹ begin to review diverse alternatives, for various reasons⁵⁷⁰ such as new agenda setting pressures from society,⁵⁷¹ policy failures (Meyer et al., 1989: 126; McConnell, 2010; 55-63), cognitive pressures from other countries, new knowledge and technology, scandals, economic crises, and private interests (Page, 2008: 211-212; Hogwood and Peters, 1983: 27; Jones et al., 2005: 234-235).⁵⁷² During the options analysis, in general terms, numerous policy alternatives considered, including not only evidence-based sources (Cm 4310, 1999: 16-17; Evans, 2004: 3) such as *experiences from the past* (Rose, 1993: 77; Olsen and Peters, 1996: 4; Birkland, 2006: 13), *from other countries* (Rose, 1993: 95; Cm 4310, 1999: 16; Cabinet Office, 1999: Para 5.2-3; Page et al., 2007), and *from the private sector* (Redman and Wilkinson, 2005: 5; Halligan, 1996: 87; Peters, 1996b: 122; Ingraham, 1998: 180; Rutter et al., 2012: 38), and *researches* (Derlien, 1996: 171; Nutley et al., 2007: 38-40), but also *loose reasoning or a creative idea*⁵⁷³ of political actors. In particular, experiences from the past,⁵⁷⁴ from other states or the private sector could fall into the lesson-drawing

⁵⁶⁹ Non-elected officeholders as well as non-elected experts (Rose, 1993: 53-56) could be main policy transferors, but political parties, pressure groups, think tanks or epistemic communities (de Montricher, 1996: 258-260; Peters, 1996b: 132-139; Haas, 1992: 2-3; Rose, 1993: 63-64; Ladi, 2005:38; Evans, 2004: 37; Dolowitz, 1996: 15-20) might also play an important role in policy transfer. The ideas of policy transfer are developed through researches, meetings and visits, conferences, publications, international policy communities, or related policy debates (Dolowitz, 1996: 40-44). For example, see Dorey (2014: 231-236).

⁵⁷⁰ The causes of *voluntary policy transfers* are routine policy reviews, dissatisfaction (Rose, 1993: 58-63; Peters, 2001: 144), reputation (Pollitt, 2004a: 331; Gore, 1996: 118-119), new knowledge from international networks (van Thiel, 2004b: 179), cyclical political events (Peters, 2001: 155), conflicts, to legitimate conclusions already reached (Dolowitz, 1996: 23-25) and uncertainty (Haas, 1980: 377). Among these, the last one is related to *mimetic isomorphism* discussed in Chapter 3. Meanwhile the reasons for *direct coercive policy transfer* are the pressure from other governments and super-national institutions (Dolowitz, 1996: 28; Sahlin-Andersson, 2002: 45). These reasons are similar to *coercive isomorphism* discussed in Chapter 3, which takes places owing to the lack of resources. Finally, psychologically driven *indirect coercive transfer* might occur due to functional interdependence, technical change, economic interdependence, perceptions of falling behind (Dolowitz, 1996: 31), competition (Marsh and Sharman, 2010: 34) and internationally agreed principles and norms. Inter alia, the last one is the similar notion of *normative isomorphism* (footnote 62).

⁵⁷¹ Traditional pluralists argue that decision makers review social problems and policy alternatives raised by diverse interest groups. However, there is problem of agenda bottlenecks (Jones et al., 2005: 247)


⁵⁷² Political considerations or vote-maximising strategies are, from time to time, the main reasons for policy transfer. Politicians' aspirations to attract the interest of electorates make them pursue new issues. Politicians generally prefer solutions which are based on general ideas and a simple story (Pollitt, 2003a: 160), so that the *best practices* of other countries and the appealing *stories* of management gurus are good policy sources for them. Proverb-like suggestions from the gurus of generic management tend to be adopted by many politicians around the world (Pollitt, 2003a: 151-152; Jackson, 2001: 13). However, these ideas largely suffer from a lack of evidence (Jackson, 2001: 14-17) and the recommendations from them are too abstract to actualise in reality. Furthermore, they often include conflicting ideas, such as downsizing and improvement of production (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992; Kettl, 1995: 45), thus are not likely to be sustainable (Pollitt, 2003a: 152-153; Ingraham and Jones, 1999: 212; Aberbach, 2000: 132; Aberbach and Rockman, 2000: 148).

⁵⁷³ For example, see the case of the Citizen's Charter by Prime Minister John Major (Burnham and Pyper, 2008: 133; Butcher, 1997).

⁵⁷⁴ In practice, lesson-drawing from inside, namely from the past is, on the whole, easier than borrowing from other countries (Olsen, 1996: 197).

category. Furthermore, lesson-drawing from other countries, *inter alia*, is a voluntary policy transfer, as shown in Figure 8-7. As far as Korean quangocratisation in 2008 was concerned, these three sources of lesson-drawing were all reviewed (Kim and Oh, 2012: 286; Lee et al., 2010: 12-24; Figure 7-5).

Figure 8-7: diverse sources of policy alternatives⁵⁷⁵



Source: prepared by the author

Figure 8-7 broadens the approach to deal with policy transfer and considers it from the perspective of rational decision-making.⁵⁷⁶ It often seems that policymakers want an exact imitation⁵⁷⁷ of other countries' specific experiences (Smullen, 2004: 188, Sahlin-Andersson, 1996: 69), but, in most case, policy transfer is considered as one of the options⁵⁷⁸ during the process of searching alternatives for a solution to their own social problems, rather than

⁵⁷⁵ The meaning of an *evidence-based policy*, which was emphasised by New Labour, is somewhat different from that of academic circles. From the perspective of academics, it means a strictly *research-based policy* (Nutley and Webb, 2004: 16-30; Bogenschneider and Corbett, 2010: 26-43), while practitioners loosely use it as a *carefully designed policy-making* tool (Cm 4310, 1999: 16-17; Cabinet Office, 2000d; Hallsworth et al., 2011: 81).

⁵⁷⁶ Policy transfer could be either a *dependent* variable or an *independent* variable (Marsh and Sharman, 2010: 41). In this section, it is an independent variable, while in a later section it is a dependent variable vis-à-vis in what circumstances policy transfer would more likely be successful.

⁵⁷⁷ Direct imitation or reproduction of another country's policy without careful modification is called *policy coping* (Rose: 1993: 30), *policy band-wagoning* (Leibenstein, 1950: 184), *mimicry* (Marsh and Sharman, 2010: 35) or *policy mimesis* (Massey, 2010: 144).

⁵⁷⁸ Regarding what are transferred, Bennett suggests five things: *policy goals*, *policy content*, *policy instruments*, *policy outcomes* and *policy style* (Bennett, 1991: 218). In addition to these, Dolowitz and Marsh add institutions, ideology, ideas, attitude, concepts and negative lessons (Dolowitz, 1996: 32-35; Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996: 349-350). However, government *policies*, such as laws, budgets or guides, are concrete rather than abstract, so it could be said that only the first three are the real objects of policy transfer.

the pursuit of policy copying⁵⁷⁹ *per se* (Figure 7-5 and footnote 409; Bardach, 2012: 17).

Moreover, policy transfer might occur at different levels. At a *whole-government* level, a broad policy such as an agencification policy could be borrowed, while at a *multilateral department* level, administrative instruments such as a personnel system or a budget system could be chosen from another country; at a *specific department or agency* level, some best practices of other countries could be transferred. For example, the MMCA has endeavoured to follow the business model of Tate Modern, as discussed in Chapter 7.

In addition, as shown in Figure 8-6, even though a successful policy of another country is regarded as being respectable, policy transfer would not always occur as expected (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000: 17-18; Dolowitz, 2013: 61).⁵⁸⁰ For example, the concept of agency is considered as being modern and has become a kind of 'administrative fashion accessory' (Pollitt et al., 2001: 286-287), but, in practice, the application of this notion in many countries was translated and modified during the process of policy-making, in which the attitudes of political actors might influence the degree of translation (Latour, 1996: 119; Sevón, 1996: 23; Smullen, 2004: 189).⁵⁸¹ Therefore, even when policy transfer occurs, there is a great possibility that the initial talk and its implementation might reveal a significant difference (Pollitt, 2003a: 30-32). With regard to AQ, the announcement of each government and its actualisation did show some differences. The basic idea of British agencification was suggested by the Ibbs Report which was based on interviews with civil servants (Goldsworthy, 1991: 4; Jenkins, 2008: 66-75) and, in practice, the impetus for change was so influential that it was far from easy to resist (Gains, 1999: 86-89

⁵⁷⁹ Rose suggests five degrees of policy transfer (1993: 30-31): *copying* (*emulation*, Bennet, 1991: 220) *adaptation* (*learning*, Marsh and Sharman, 2010: 35; *selective borrowing*, de Jong and Mamadouh, 2002: 21), *making a hybrid* (hybridization), *synthesis*, and *inspiration*. Dolowitz (1996: 36-37) and Evans (2010: 8-9) also use similar categories.

⁵⁸⁰ Policy makers usually have a problem with the timing of policies (Gupta, 2011: 67); and moreover, the decision making processes of other countries are rarely disclosed (Olsen, 1996: 197). In addition to this bounded rationality, political actors proactively translated original policies borrowed from other states (Smullen, 2004: 184), which tends to be far beyond mere paraphrasing (Pollitt, 2004a, 330). Furthermore, they frequently try to compromise and bargain with other stakeholders (Pollitt, 2004a: 337). More profoundly, not only *hard*, *soft* and *consensual* institutional constraints influence the lesson-drawing, but also the diverse and complex policy goals of each country makes it difficult to emulate other countries' policies.

⁵⁸¹ Different states and organisations might take different attitudes to policy-making (Hood, 1998: 9; Smullen, 2010: 61). From the culturist perspective, the decision-making in an organisation is dependent on the level of *group decision* and *rule-boundness*. However, these anthropological accounts are rather abstract and intangible. For more on this, see Douglas (1982: 205-208) and, Ellis and Thomson (1997: 2-10), and Ostrom and Ostrom (1997: 87).

and 2004a: 67; Flynn et al, 1990: 166-167; Lewis, 1997: 5; Savoie, 2003: 58). There were other policy options such as a functional development without a structural change or privatisation, but an obsessive mission mentioned in Chapter 7 drove the government into as much agencification as possible. By contrast, the agencification idea in Korea, which was influenced by the cases of OECD countries, including the U.K., was introduced by the civil servants and was officially decided to be adopted by the RBGR in early 1998 (MGA, 1997b; Yoon, 2001: 97-98).⁵⁸² In Korea, agencification was merely one of the policy alternatives (MPB, 1999b: 38) and was implemented on a pilot basis only after detailed management consulting (MoGAHA, 1999). Furthermore, although twenty-five potential candidates were announced in March 1999, only ten bodies were chosen in July 1999 and the extension of agencification, unlike the U.K., was implemented in a limited way (MPB, 1999b: 45, 278), as shown in Figure 7-11.

8-3-2. Policy transfer of AQ in Korea

The agencification policy and the quangocratisation of the MMCA in Korea are examples of policy transfer (Yoon, 2001: 284-300; James, 2003: 147). From the perspectives which are focusing on cognitive pressures, imitation or copying without careful alteration might be emphasised, while a rational policy-making process approach highlights the analytical behaviours of actors (Peters, 1997: 76).⁵⁸³ The latter perspective considers that the Korean policy borrowing from the U.K. happened because agencification was worth adopting and it was expected to be successful. In this regard, there are several points to examine.

Firstly, as far as the introduction stage is concerned, a series of analyses of British agencification had been conducted by the Korean government before its adoption (MGA, 1996, 1997a and 1997b: 291-303). However, the main analysis concentrated on the introduction process and the support system. The motivation to increase efficiency makes political actors adopt a reform policy in spite of their ideologies (Peters, 1997: 85), but in practice they have been relatively less keen on showing the evidence of its efficiency. Meanwhile, at the implementation stage, there were more analytical approaches to policy

⁵⁸² The *Task Force for the Job Analysis* in MGA, which was created in 1995, had investigated diverse innovation strategies such as the Next Steps programme of the U.K. (Yoon, 2001: 97-98).

⁵⁸³ There are at least five approaches to analyse policy transfer: process-centred; practice-based; ideational; comparative; and multi-level approaches (Evans, 2004: 14 and 2010: 11-17). This thesis deals with the first four approaches using diverse arguments.

transfer. Yet the analysis still focused on constitutional constraints rather than policy outcomes,⁵⁸⁴ the reason why the presidential system of the U.S. could not adopt large-scale PBOs was a main concern (MPB, 1999b: 364, 365). In addition, direct staff cutbacks and outsourcing received closer attention from the media, so that the importance of gaining a deeper understanding about BEAs was underplayed. At the same time, when it comes to the agencification of the MoCA, the change was reviewed in terms of practicability rather than desirability (Rose, 1993: 46), so that no meaningful analysis on foreign art museum cases was examined before agencification. On the contrary, when the MoCA was selected as a candidate for quangocratisation, more evidence-based analysis was carried out. The MoPAS and the MCST endeavoured to analyse the performances of other foreign art museums and made a plan to emulate them, as explored in Chapter 7.

Secondly, the policy transfer of agencification should not be regarded as the introduction of a sole institution. Diverse institutions such as financial and personnel systems were related to institutional borrowing. As examined in Chapter 7, there are significant similarities with KEAs and BEAs, but it is also undeniable that they are based on quite different institutional foundations such as managerial structures and autonomy. Therefore, it could be said that during the process of quangocratisation of the MMCA, the Korean government needs to pay more attention to the related institutional foundations of Tate Modern, which are examined in Chapter 6.

Thirdly, there have been few efforts to evaluate the results of policy transfer⁵⁸⁵ or to give feedback to the operation of KEAs. For BEAs, no overall evidence of performance improvement was analysed (Talbot, 2004b: 110), but only some improvements of individual agencies have been illustrated (OPSR, 2002).⁵⁸⁶ One of the most difficult problems with the evaluation of performance improvement is that it is hard to decide whether that improvement came from agencification or from technological advance (Moynihan, 2010; 296; Appendix 5).⁵⁸⁷ However, in Korea, the overall evidence of performance improvement

⁵⁸⁴ This is partly because there were few analyses of the policy outcomes of BEAs even in the U.K.

⁵⁸⁵ It is not easy to find the evidence of efficiency enhancement after policy transfer (Marsh and Sharman, 2010: 45; James and Lodge, 2003: 187-188). Undoubtedly, there were some outcomes, but it is difficult to measure them (Pollitt, 2003a: 40).

⁵⁸⁶ OPSR provided some examples such as Companies House, HM Land Registry, and the UK Passport and Records Agency (OPSR, 2002: 17).

⁵⁸⁷ For example, in Korea, the immigration service and tax service, which are not a part of KEAs, drastically reduced the time needed to process data through IT technology (Cha, 2007: 285-291), which

by agencification has been suggested by the government (MoGAHA, 2007c; KAOS, 2008b; KAPS, 2011; MoPAS, 2010b), which is possible partly because of its distinctive executional nature.⁵⁸⁸ Yet, as a part of government structure, KEAs are relatively unsuccessful, in that their size has remained stagnated, compared to BEAs, as discussed in Chapter 7. At the same time, BEAs have been developed through other supplementary measures, such as the extensive delegation of personnel functions (Gay, 1997: 38); while the Korean government has not carried out a retrospective evaluation of policy transfer but instead, has sought Korean solutions within existing institutional constraints.

After agencification, the MoCA was successful in increasing its staff and being able to enjoy a more flexible organisational structure, but nonetheless, performance indicators were not improved. There was, however, no movement to de-agencify the MMCA, but a further change to quangocratise it has been pursued. It has tried to emulate the form of Tate Modern in order to supplement the lack of institutional support which it could not acquire as a part of KEAs.

8-3-3. Directions of options analysis

As examined earlier, policy transfer is just one option in rational decision making. During the options analysis, dominant *ideas* of political actors could influence the selection of an optimal alternative.

Ideas, which influence the decision-making of political actors, are a particularly critical concept for the HI perspective and there are different points of view about them (John, 1998: 144 and 2012: 122-123; Cairney, 2011: 223).⁵⁸⁹ As shown in Figure 8-6, *ideas* are not only the starting point of policy making and change (Blyth, 2002: 34-45), but are also central independent


was similar to the efficiency gains in the cases of Companies House and the UK Passport agency (OPSR, 2002: 17; Pollitt, 2003a: 77).

⁵⁸⁸ In terms of customer satisfaction, KEAs have shown a gradual increase of 75.1 in 2001, 81.3 in 2006 and 83.6 in 2009. However, other departmental customer services also have enhanced their satisfaction level by 65.5 in 2001, 65.9 in 2006 and 72.4 in 2009 (MoGAHA, 2007c: 2; MoPAS, 2010b: 2). Therefore, in general terms, it could be said that the improvement of customer satisfaction in KEAs was a unique success during the first five years, but since then, other operational bodies were also able to develop these skills.

⁵⁸⁹ The notion of *ideas* is mainly used by *constructivist institutionalism* or *discursive institutionalism* (Hay, 2006: 68; Schmidt, 2008: 304; Peters, 2012: 112) and largely means 'embedded world views' or 'beliefs shared by others' (Cairney, 2011: 224). In particular, Hall uses the concept of *ideas* similarly to Kuhn's paradigm (Kuhn, 1962: 121-123; Hall, 1993: 279; Hay, 2006: 66; Cairney, 2011: 229; John, 2012: 140). Meanwhile, the *interpretive* approach emphasises the notion of *beliefs* and *practices* which are borrowed from Foucault's theory (Bevir and Rhodes, 2003: 17, 22-25; Rhodes, 2011: 3-4; John, 2012: 143-144).

variables which could have a significant effect on the whole process of implementation.⁵⁹⁰ From the viewpoint of policy transfer, the *desirability* of borrowed policy alternatives from other countries could be assessed through their dominant ideas.

Figure 8-8: A conical pendulum model of ideas driving reform



Source: partly derived and developed from Hood and Jackson (1991); Peters (2001: 21); Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011)

Figure 8-8 illustratively suggests four big recent approaches to public sector reform: the *traditional* mechanism, the *managerial* mechanism, the *market-type* mechanism and the *governance* mechanism. Each approach takes a different degree of eight independent variables: customer-orientation, autonomy, performance and incentives, rule-boundness, political accountability, networks, competition and target-setting. Understandably, these are neither mutually exclusive nor jointly exhaustive (Figure 4-1);⁵⁹¹ but selective doctrines which are just parts of Hood and Jackson's 99 doctrines (1991: 34-35).⁵⁹² Furthermore, one variable might be construed in diverse ways, as discussed in Chapter 4.⁵⁹³

Figure 8-8 shows several features which are worthy of discussion. In the first place, there are inevitable trade-off relationships among the independent variables and goals suggested, as shown in Figure 4-1. Since the government

⁵⁹⁰ Ideas could be either independent variables or dependent variables (Cairney, 2011: 221).

⁵⁹¹ The components of each mechanism are very complicated and often contradictory (Pollitt, 2003a: 32), but this figure is useful, in that it shows the overall picture of reform directions.

⁵⁹² According to Hood and Jackson, doctrines are particular 'maxims about how to get organized' (1991: 12-13)

⁵⁹³ For example, see the concept of *governance* (Kooiman, 1993; Rhodes, 1997b: 47-53; Pierre and Peters, 2000: 14-24; Newman, 2001: 12-22; Lynn et al., 2001: 5-9; Bovaird et al., 2009: 6-11; Bevir, 2009: 4-28 and 2011: 2-3; Osborne, 2010: 6-11).

is not able to achieve these goals simultaneously, it needs to seek suitable combinations and directions appropriate to its state of play.⁵⁹⁴ These directions or values, which are necessary for solving particular social problems, are likely to be different from time to time when the government analyses possible options (Pollitt, 2003a: 49-50). Therefore, when a policy transfer is reviewed, these directions should be considered first, in terms of government philosophy.

Secondly, the government-preferred directions not only have been changed over time (Peters, 2001: 118-120; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011: 22),⁵⁹⁵ but they also repeat themselves. In spite of continuous re-labelling, their origin can be traced back to old doctrines (Hood and Jackson, 1991: 127; Lynn, 2006: 4-14). For example, coordination and organisational specialisation have appeared alternately in past administrative reforms (Hood and Jackson, 1991: 114-116; Talbot and Johnson, 2007: 58; Verhoest et al., 2007: 327-333; Elston, 2013: 81). This repetition emanates from a variety of reasons. One possibility is that there might be different detailed meanings and emphasis between present and past doctrines, despite the usage of the same terms such as accountability, performance and customer-orientation.⁵⁹⁶ It might be that these same terms in the past were suggested by some politicians and academics in a pioneering way, rather than being selected by the government in a practical and dominant way.⁵⁹⁷ In addition, new technology might bring old administrative values back in a more modernised way (Pollitt, 2003a: 74). More profoundly, from an anthropological point of view, these irregular returns of old doctrines could be explained by an argument that people often pursue the greener grass on the other side of the fence (Hood, 1998: 11; Peters, 2001: 148-149), so that the adoption of one perspective soon leads to criticism of its demerits. Furthermore, the ambiguous targets of revolving social values and the persistent pressure from *dernier cri*-conscious politicians might add to the difficulty of achieving sustainability (Peters, 2001: 155; Rohr, 1978: 256). At the same time, these cycles would happen in quite a complicated way, so that the pendulum is swinging not in a single plane but in a circular cone (Pollitt, 2004a: 329-336; Behn, 2001: 209).

Last but not least, the layers of the past administrative reforms are not completely superseded by new reforms, so that any change patterns tend to be

⁵⁹⁴ Pollitt and Bouckaert suggest a *toolkit approach* which makes it possible for a particular country or sector to choose proper tools for administrative reforms (2011: 25).


⁵⁹⁵ This change mainly stems from administrative, technical, and political reasons (Peters, 2011: 144-158).

⁵⁹⁶ For example, many ideas of the NPM are not original, but are based on traditional public administration values (Pollitt, 2003a: 101, 109; Lynn, 2006: 105-108; Smullen, 2004: 185).

⁵⁹⁷ For example, the importance of customer service was argued by Dimock in 1936 (126, cited in Pollitt, 2003a: 35), but it was suggested in a pioneering or anticipatory way. In general terms, the 'close to customer' perspective was not that popular until the 1980s. See White (1939); Finer (1946); Marx (1946); Mooney (1947); Waldo (1948); Dimock and Dimock (1953); Peters (1978); Chapman and Greenway (1980); Peters and Waterman (1982); and Shafritz and Hyde (1987).

cumulative or sedimentary (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011: 8-12, 121; Hood and Peters, 2004: 271; Dunleavy et al., 2005: 468). In other words, notwithstanding a new reform, many aspects suggested by the previous reforms still hold good (Pollitt, 2003a: 50). For example, the bureaucracy model was produced in order to deal with previous problems such as arbitrary implementation, corruption, unfairness, the lack of national uniformity, and political patronage (Pollitt, 2013a: 113-115); thus it was expected to increase the legitimacy and trust of the political system (Easton, 1953; Offe, 1993b: 134). In this regard, the ideal type of bureaucracy emphasises rule-based execution, the enhancement of impartiality and predictability, meritocracy and uniform management based on hierarchy (Dowding, 1995: 9; Peters and Wright, 1998: 630-638; Peters, 2001: 4-12). However, as time went by, the obsession with uniformity and rule-orientation led to inefficiency as well as a failure to provide immediate response to environmental change or the voice of customers. Therefore, new approaches such as the NPM, the new public governance, and the neo-Weberian governance model put more emphasis on performance management, flexibility, customer-orientation, participation, competition, transparency and responsive-ness. Yet bureaucratic underpinning has not been totally washed away; the foundations of legitimacy and traditional values such as impartiality, basic rules, and recruitment based on merits, are still important (Goodsell, 1994: 98-101).⁵⁹⁸

Figure 8-9: Possibility of digital era governance



Source: partly derived and developed from Frissen (1998: 35-41); Pollitt (2003: 97-100); Andersen et al. (2012: 210-215); and Fountain (2001: 61)

⁵⁹⁸ Government in every mechanism, in Figure 8-8, equally performs its basic roles for the people. In this regard, each model is not a perfectly new one, but just shows a small modification of the previous *modus operandi* (Lynn, 2006: 8-14). As discussed in Chapter 3, in order to discuss the debureaucratisation phenomena, it should be first clarified as to what are the critical factors of bureaucracy and the extent to which bureaucracy needs to be modified for the sake of debureaucratisation (Heckscher, 1994: 24-28).

There are two more debatable issues which are often lurking beneath the directions in Figure 8-8. First of all, regarding the demarcation between the public sector and the private sector (Perry et al., 1988: 186-190; Rainey, 2009: 64; Lynn, 2006: 6-14; Thompson and Ingraham, 1996: 302; Christensen et al., 2007: 5), some academics and influential politicians argue that they are intrinsically not so different that the same principles could be applied (Taylor, 1911: 7; Heseltine, 1987: 33). In contrast to this, other academics and most bureaucrats contended that both are fundamentally dissimilar in terms of the characteristics of services provided, the operation of organisational management, the behaviours of their actors and the ethics behind the activities (Rainey et al., 1976: 236-240; Rainey, 1992: 125-131; Allison, 1987: 514, 519; Pollitt, 2003e: 10-21; Ranson and Steward, 1994: 261-262).

Secondly, with regard to IT, some assert its overwhelming influence over administrative reforms (Simon, 1976: 282; Zouridis, 1998: 250-254; Dunleavy and Margetts, 2000: 14; Zuurmond, 2012: 177-178; Dunleavy and Carrera, 2013: 278-281), whilst others adopt a more careful perspective (footnote 78; Bannister, 2012: 139). Figure 8-9 analyses the changes which are caused by IT in terms of the levels of participation and management. In spite of the anticipation of IT's rosy future, until the 1990s, the present levels of two variables in Figure 8-9 have still not reached the point which the digital-era governance model suggests they would do (King and Kraemer, 1998: 522 and 2012: 293-294; Margetts, 2012: 454-455).

8-3-4. Concluding remarks

Figure 8-7 has the implication that even during the process of voluntary policy transfer, policymakers contemplate diverse alternatives. However, as far as the MoCA is concerned, the lesson drawing happened in a unique way. With regard to agencification, in Korea, although the introduction of the policy occurred at a whole-government level first, based on international reputation, the selection of the MoCA, as a candidate for the KEA, was not a direct lesson drawing from other countries. The Korean government first considered the viability of the implementation of *agencification*. Therefore, the degree of policy transfer could be analysed as the stage of *adaptation* or *inspiration* (Rose, 1993: 31; footnote 579). At the same time, regarding the *quangocratisation* of the MMCA, it has endeavoured to synthesise the successful examples of other

countries' art museums, as examined in Chapter 7. Hence, the degree of policy transfer might be at the level of *hybridisation* (Dolowitz, 1996: 37). The former is an indirect coercive policy transfer based on cognitive pressure and Korean localisation, while the latter is a voluntary policy transfer or an indirect policy transfer based on dissatisfaction with existing policy or perceptions of falling behind (Peters, 2001: 144; Dolowitz, 1996: 31; footnote 570). However, as analysed in Chapters 6 and 7, both cases show the policymakers' lack of analyses of related institutions which might play a pivotal role in their implementation. Furthermore, whilst the BEAs have continuously developed the related rules of the game such as personnel and financial systems, KEAs, comparatively speaking, could not have enjoyed an equivalent level of institutional flexibility after policy transfer.

Meanwhile, as shown in Figure 8-8, the approaches or beliefs of political actors are important when they undertake a policy options analysis. Yet it is unusual for all the government agencies to contemporaneously pursue a similar approach or direction. Cultural agencies, owing to their distinctive policy goals, need somewhat different considerations. On the one hand, the cultural industry works as a growth engine of the national economy in many advanced countries,⁵⁹⁹ and there are little differences in the management and the operational ethics between public museums and private ones. On the other hand, the national cultural policy plays a significant role in education and taste-shaping as well as in cultivating the best artists. In this sense, performance and customer-orientation seem to be more appropriate directions for the MMCA than the traditional approach, but at the same time, as one of the national art museums, the MMCA still maintains a number of public missions within the Korean context.⁶⁰⁰

Finally, the role of IT regarding art museums is rather limited, although its contribution has gradually increased (Booz&co, 2010: 57-63). With reference to public relations, transparency, marketing and education, it has enhanced the

⁵⁹⁹ The tourism portion of the GDP was different from country to country: in 2006, it was 9.4 % in the U.K.; 3.9% in the U.S.; 4.4% in France; 3.5% in Japan; 2.7 % in Germany; 4.6% in Italy; and 1.5 % in Korea (KCTI, 2010a: 87-88). At the same time, the number of museums per one million people was 28.8 in the U.K.; 61.6 in the U.S.; 19.3 in France; 75.1 in Germany; 36.9 in Japan; and 16.4 in Korea (MCST, 2011a: 188). Meanwhile, in terms of the contemporary art market share around the world, which is based on the purchases of works of art, in 2010, the U.S. took up 38 %; the U.K., 19%; France 3 % and Germany 1% (MCST, 2012a: 229).

⁶⁰⁰ The states where the government exerts a strong influence over its cultural policy are France, Germany and Korea; whilst in the U.K. and the U.S. the power of the non-government sectors are relatively influential (Elgie, 2003: 77; Gray, 1992: 16; KCTI, 2011a: 16-17).

users' convenience through the provision of diverse information.⁶⁰¹ However, its role is complementary to the basic functions such as exhibition and collection, and thus it has not influenced the organisational structure except in the small expansion of IT units.

8-4. Institutional Constraints and Implications

Figure 8-6 sets out this thesis' basic understanding of policy making and implementation process regarding AQ and shows certain institutional constraints as well as diverse sources of decision (Lodge, 2012: 546-555). The policy, which the government *ab initio* aimed to introduce, review and announce, might be modified during the process of decision making and implementation. In that process, not only bargaining and *bounded rationality* but also institutional constraints and capacity,⁶⁰² play a pivotal role, as researched in Chapters 5, 6 and 7 (Kettl, 1994: 186; Immergut, 2008: 557; Andrews, 2010: 22-23; Pollitt, 2006: 28-29; Fukuyama: 2013: 13-16; footnote 622). With reference to AQ, *hard*, *soft* and *consensual* institutional constraints act as hindrances to their smooth operation as well as to their introduction (section 8-1-1-9). The procrastination of the quangocratising the MMCA, the difficulty with full scale agencification in Korea and the unsatisfying operational results of the MoCA could be examined, from an institutional point of view as follows.

Firstly, there are several institutional constraints related to *the quangocratisation of the MMCA*. Quangocratisation needs legislation, so that the relationship between the executive branch and the legislative branch has influenced this process. Although Korea, as with the U.K. (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011: 55), has a majoritarian and centralised system of government, the President cannot dogmatically mobilise the support of the National Assembly (Rockman, 2006: 36). Even when there is not a *divided government*,⁶⁰³ the passage of a contested bill is not easy, despite the majoritarian system (section

⁶⁰¹ For example, see <http://www.tate.org.uk/art/artworks>.

⁶⁰² As shown in Figure 8-6, there are four major factors which influence the rational decision making process: the lack of *legitimacy*, *bounded rationality*, *financial* and *institutional constraints*. These variables are partly overlapped with the analysis of Evans who suggests three elements: cognitive obstacles, environmental obstacles and public opinion (2004: 39 and 2010: 9-10). Meanwhile Dolowitz provides similar variables: policy complexity, a past policy, institutional constraints, political ideology, bureaucratic capabilities, technological capabilities, and economic resources (1996: 44-48).

⁶⁰³ For more on this, see Chapter 5.

5-1-1).⁶⁰⁴ The lack of politicians' interest was another significant aspect of this case. Unlike the British quango reform in 2010, the bill for quangocratising the MMCA, which was submitted by the government, has not attracted the concern of members of the National Assembly in spite of the opening of the Seoul branch in November 2013. If this bill was prioritised, the Office of President as well as the minister and senior civil servants would have proactively endeavoured to persuade the legislators.⁶⁰⁵ However, since 2013 this quangocratisation bill has not had a higher priority than other bills in the Park Administration. In reality, the quangocratisation of the MMCA policy was maintained by the MoSPA, as examined in Chapter 7, but has been given a low priority by the MCST. Furthermore, the timing for submitting the bill was not optimal, as the bill was first introduced in November 2010,⁶⁰⁶ when the President became a lame duck (Appendix 32), and was pigeonholed in May 2012 at the end of the 18th National Assembly. The bill was re-submitted to the 19th National Assembly in December 2012, but that was just before the presidential election; so the new administration was not much concerned about it. Finally, the quangocratisation types, which are suggested in Figure 2-2, add to the difficulty of the legislative process. For example, the quangocratisation bill for the National Institute of Ecology was passed in May 2013 in parallel with its creation (Figure 2-2, Quangocratisation Type-III) (Lee, 2013m; Ryu, 2012; Lee, 2012e), whilst the alteration of the existing governmental body into a quango needs extra efforts on account of the resistance of the stakeholders (Quangocratisation Type-I).

Secondly, some institutional constraints have also worked vis-à-vis *the expansion of KEAs*. In the U.K., the radical adoption of BEAs was possible, owing to support at the top (Hogwood, 1993:4; Knott et al., 1987: 19-22), the role of the Project Manager (Efficiency Unit, 1988: para 41), enthusiastic public relations and no necessity for legislation (Goldsworthy, 1991: 34; Yoon, 2001:

⁶⁰⁴ In particular, the National Assembly Act of 2012 imposes a restriction on sending, without the final consent of the related Standing Committee, the bill up into the National Assembly plenary session by its Chairman, unlike the case of the quangocratisation of SNU in 2010 (The National Assembly Act 2012, Article 5).

⁶⁰⁵ From the beginning of the 19th National Assembly in June 2012 to April 2014, the government submitted 564 bills. Among these, 321 bills were processed, while 243 bills are still pending. As far as the Education Culture Sports and Tourism Committee (ECSTC), which is in charge of MCST, is concerned, 11 bills were processed and 32 bills are still pending at the time of writing (the National Assembly webpage).

⁶⁰⁶ By contrast, the quangocratisation bill for SNU was submitted in December 2009 and was passed in December 2010. Other quangocratisation bills, as suggested in Table 7-7, were passed within one year from their submission.

301-304). By contrast, in Korea, the adoption of the executive agency was not based on a continuing reform philosophy mainly because of a single-term presidency,⁶⁰⁷ unlike the BEA which was built on the foundation of the FMI (Zifcak, 1994: 69). In addition, the role of the MoGAHA was limited, as compared to the British case. Although it has centrally controlled almost all the organisational changes,⁶⁰⁸ other departments could exert their right of choice about the adoption of KEAs at the outset (AEOEA, article 4). More fundamentally, the existing operational constraints such as personnel and financial management have persistently influenced the reputation of KEAs. Therefore, a belief that agencified bodies might still face similar institutional constraints has obstructed the expansion of KEAs. In this regard, the *sedimentation* principle, which was discussed in the previous section, comes into play here. Despite agencification, a large part of the previous bureaucratic rules such as the unified and uniform civil service⁶⁰⁹ and strict financial control was maintained in Korea (Kim, 2000b: 223-234; Hwang, 2009). Limited flexibilities make the departments hesitate to adopt a new structural change.

Thirdly, in terms of *the operation of the MMCA*, some institutional constraints also work as impediments to successful management. In particular, several points could be discussed regarding the autonomy and accountability frameworks within the executive agencies. First of all, KEAs enjoy comparatively little autonomy, while the scope of the BEAs' flexibilities has increased over time (Massey, 1995b: para 4.3.5; OPSR, 2001: 40, 65).⁶¹⁰ In the case of the MMCA, in addition to the inflexibility of the *uniform* civil service, as discussed in Chapter 7, the scope of financial autonomy, such as performance-related pay (PRP) and end year flexibility (EYF)⁶¹¹ is narrower than that of the U.K. (OPSR, 2001: 40-41; Thain and Wright, 1995: 71; Cm 914: para 3.3-3.18; MoPAS, 2012a). Moreover, the constraints on the collection of

⁶⁰⁷ Yet the next administration, which took office in 2003, re-emphasised agencification for a different reason; that is *government innovation* (MoGAHA, 2003b, and see Chapter 7).

⁶⁰⁸ See Chapter 5.

⁶⁰⁹ The characteristics of this are concurrent recruitment, life-long tenure and promotions based on seniority (for more on this, see Chapter 5). The rationales for this traditional system in Korea are nationally coherent implementation; the control of size; firm meritocracy free from controversy; consistent training of employees; and cooperation between generalists. However, these could also lead to numerous problems: an alienation from a local situation; a failure to cultivate specialists; perceptions of falling behind from the private sector; difficulty of securing the best employees; and the possibility of tunnel vision and a silo mentality (Ryu and Lim, 2012: 86-91).

⁶¹⁰ Canada, which adopts a selective agencification policy, as with Korea, vests more autonomy in SOAs than Korea does (Kim, 2000b: 146, 158-162; Savoie, 2003: 57).

⁶¹¹ PRP is used as a complementary tool to assess the basic annual salary (OECD, 2005: 139-140; MoPAS, 2012a: 67-69). EYF is limited to 20 per cent of uncontrollable running costs (MoPAS, 2010b: 7).

donations and purchasing costs have still been maintained after agencification, as shown in Figures 7-20 and 21. On the contrary, performance control by means of a league table is stricter than that of AIs, so that agencified bodies including the MMCA feel serious pressure upon their evaluation (Kim and Oh, 2012: 275; Park, 2007b: 228).⁶¹²

There are two different boards involved in the process of performance appraisal. The Executive Agency Operation Review Board (EAORB) was created within the MCST rather than within the MMCA (MoPAS, 2012a: 17-18).⁶¹³ The main roles of the EAORB are target-setting and self-evaluation, but it focuses more on the evaluation.⁶¹⁴ At the same time, the Executive Agencies Operation Committee (EAOC) was set up within the MoSPA and evaluates the *operational management capacity* which is common to all KEAs (Moon and Lee, 2010: 50; MoPAS, 2012a: 47-58). Besides which, in Korea, the traditional notion of ministerial and parliamentary accountability, which is quite a popular and even controversial issue in the U.K. (HC 410, 1989; paras 46, 52; Efficiency Unit, 1991: para 4.9.7; McDonald, 1992: 35), has not yet come to the fore. Although accountability issues are explicitly stipulated in the law (AEOEA, article 8-2), the most tools for autonomy are given to the head of its parent department, not to the chief executive of KEA. Therefore, only if the relationship between the head of the MCST and the MMCA is smooth and solid,⁶¹⁵ can the autonomy be secured to the full (Kim and Oh, 2012: 270-271; Park, 2007b: 229; Kim, 2009h: 15).

In addition, in the earlier times of its agencification, the head of the MoCA had sufficient power to secure its autonomy, but after the arrival of the new administration in 2008, its authority was limited as examined in Chapter 7. Since the chief executives of the MMCA have come from the private sector,⁶¹⁶ they, in general terms, tend to pursue more change and autonomy; thus there are potential seeds of conflict.

⁶¹² The evaluation of Japanese IAs is conducted in a similar way (Lee, 2008e: 65).

⁶¹³ The MMCA has two advisory boards for its operation and collections (KCTI, 2009: 238).

⁶¹⁴ In the U.K., each BEA could have its own management board, but it is not mandatory (Hogwood, 1993: 8; OPSR, 2002: 26). By contrast, Korean EAORB is established within KEA's parent department, so that it could work like a *ministerial advisory board* in the U.K.

⁶¹⁵ This relationship might also be influenced by some basic characteristics of agencies: that is, its political salience, financial portion, professional expertise, observability of performance and previous path (Pollitt, 2005: 127-128; Figure 9-1).

⁶¹⁶ Overall, KEAs have more proportion of the chief executives came from the private sector than that of BEAs (footnote 467)

8-5. Concluding Remarks: Building Capacities for Change

When a new policy is adopted, the institutional constraints discussed in the previous section should be carefully considered. As far as AQ in Korea is concerned, there are several implications as to how it might be possible to overcome institutional constraints and secure institutional capacities.

Firstly, a *differentiated approach* for different institutional levels is needed, since *hard* institutions and *consensual* institutions are difficult to change. The adoption of a *soft* institution which does not fit in with constitutional arrangements might immediately face the problem of institutional capacity (Polidano, 2001: 53; Painter and Pierre, 2005: 5; Gregory, 2007b: 242; Pollitt, 2004b: 293-294; Clarke and Wood, 2001: 88; Manning, 2001: 305; Minogue, 2001a: 9). Since a higher-level constitutional structure could be modified in the longer-term, a new policy should be designed to focus on soft institutions and to be congruous with existing constitutional constraints.

Secondly, a *comprehensive approach*, which includes change in a series of related institutions, is critical for building institutional capacity. Even though a particular policy *per se* seems possible to be implemented without difficulties, in many cases, it would be successful only when those connected institutions smoothly work together. It is important to stress the point that a policy at *whole-government level*, such as AQ, more often than not requires both the budgetary and organisational supports. In this regard, the level of economic development is also important. Financial constraints tend to be one of the major considerations when a new policy is adopted, in that excessive support costs or control costs could lead to a policy failure.

Finally, a strategic approach, which allows policy makers to mobilise available resources to the hilt, is a *sine quo non* (Rose, 2005: 9). On the one hand, as much authority as possible should be given to the *promotion and support unit*, in order to carry through the new policy. On the other hand, integrating its supporters and persuading its opponents in order to open the *policy window* is equally important (Kingdon, 2003:166-172). In this connection, not only should public relations be explicit, trustworthy and intuitively appealing, but its timing also needs to be opportune (MoPAS, 2008d: 6; Goldsworthy, 1991:7-8).⁶¹⁷

⁶¹⁷ Regarding which information is more efficient, Rose suggests that a single purpose and detailed information is useful (Rose, 1993: 132-134).

When it comes to the expansion of agencification and the quangocratisation of the MMCA, *hard* institutions are difficult to modify, and it is not easy to control the ebb and flow of AQ policy in accordance with a change of government. One of the alternatives is the creation of a new branch, such as the MMCA Seoul branch and Tate Modern, which does not provoke any serious institutional change (AQ Type-V in Figure 2-2).

With regard to the linked institutions, a more careful approach is needed. As examined in section 7-2, agencification is usually accompanied by the change of other related rules such as having a tighter performance evaluation, the delegation of personnel authority and the recruitment of the head through open competition. Yet a change of the basic rules of the game to secure the smooth operation of another institution might cause unexpected results (6, 2010:52-54), although it might be expected to bring about synergic effects. Even the MoGAHA, which was initially introduced as an agencification policy and was in charge of personnel and organisational management for whole departments, was not enthusiastic vis-à-vis the comprehensive delegation of its authority, because that delegation might easily have led to the overall collapse of a uniform⁶¹⁸ and unified⁶¹⁹ system (Chapman, 1997b: 33-35; Painter, 1995: 28). However, lest KEAs should exist in name only or should be difficult to be differentiated from AIs, more delegation is required, as being discussed in the next chapter.

Lastly, in relation to a strategic approach, the efforts of the MoSPA to persuade and convey its message with vigour and commitment were successful, but the timing was not apposite. The submission of the quangocratisation bill to the National Assembly before the inauguration of the new president was not appropriate (IB8), given that the concern of the Office of President is critical. Unless it proactively prioritises the cultural policy and takes the lead in the passage of the quangocratisation bill, its actualisation would be delayed.

⁶¹⁸ As discussed in Chapter 5, the Korean government prefers control-centred management, mainly owing to its small expenditure and employee levels. Therefore, the danger of a failure of delegation was frequently emphasised. For example, see misused cases of the *Total Payroll Costs* (MoPAS, 2010g: 4-5).

⁶¹⁹ In the U.K., some commentators argue that the collapse of the uniform and unified civil service led to the end of Northcote-Trevelyan era and the decline in public interest (Foster, 2005: 212). In addition, this could also be seen from the perspective of joined-up government (JUG). JUG has several advantages such as the removal of unnecessary conflicts between different policies, the synergic effect through the cooperation between different policy areas, the elimination of inefficient waste, and seamless and smooth service delivery (Linden, 1994: 41-43). However, these benefits will not arrive automatically. It might also result in some problems not only with the difficulty of negotiation, but also with an increase in cooperation costs and complexity, the ambiguity of responsibility and a decrease in sustainability (Pollitt, 2003a: 68-71 and 2003b: 35-39).

Chapter 9. Conclusion

This concluding chapter does not attempt to synthesise the findings of earlier chapters; such exercise was largely undertaken in Chapter 8, which brings together the methodological and theoretical approaches outlined in Chapters 1 to 5 and uses them to draw specific and more general conclusions from a cross-fertilisation between the case studies and the theoretical literature. Instead, it picks out the nine key research findings which contribute to our understanding of AQ in Korea and the UK; and which also contribute to an understanding of the distinctive nature of arts administration in the two countries.

The chapter goes on to suggest a series of unique contributions to knowledge which emerge from the thesis. The findings and the contribution elaborate the essential argument of this thesis, which has evolved as research has progressed. On the whole, it has sought to serve the purpose of a better understanding of both the theory and practice of administrative reform by examining changes in detail, by seeking more precise terminology, by applying a pragmatic selection of theoretical insights, and by taking account of relevant contexts.

In the spirit of this research enterprise the conclusion explores the practical dividends which governments might enjoy from a relatively theoretical research project. It makes a series of recommendations for better policy making and administration, initially for both governments, and more specifically for each government respectively. These ideas are advanced with the conviction that academic research in applied areas of public management should yield real gains for governments and for the officials who have the difficult task of delivering successful public services. Finally the conclusion offers some thoughts for further research in these complicated, demanding but immensely important areas of administrative improvement.

9-1. Review of the Research and Distinctive Contributions

9-1-1. Key research findings

Firstly, the scope of the public sector is very broad and each commentator presents a different view (Figure 2-1; Lynn, 2006: 12-14). Even governments do not have an explicit taxonomy or a criterion for classification, so that the sphere of the public sector is noticeably dissimilar between Korea and the U.K (Figure 5-10). However, from the procedural point of view, both

countries similarly use a series of distinct AQ tools (Figure 2-2; Table 2-4). As explored in Chapters 6, 7 and 8, the types of AQ not only influence the potential for change, but also make a difference in the reactions of diverse stakeholders. Therefore, agencification or quangocratisation should not be dealt with as a single or consistent process. In the case studies, the Tate Gallery which was created as a part of the civil service in 1897, as with some other national museums, was changed into a quango in 1972 (Quangocratisation Type-II) and the Tate Modern branch was separated from its parent museum in 2000 (Quangocratisation Type-V). Meanwhile, the MoCA, which was set up in 1969 and significantly expanded in 1986, was altered into an executive agency in 2006 (Agencification Type-I) disaggregated its part into the Seoul branch in 2013 (Agencification Type-V), and, finally, has tried to change its status to a quango since 2008 (Quangocratisation Type-I). Although both countries' changes in their AQ processes look different at first glance, there are several similarities in the preferences and strategies of agencies. In a broad way, they want to expand their size through self-division and aim at being international museums.

Secondly, there are diverse theories concerning the causes of AQ. Although AQ of a specific agency may have happened quite a long time after its creation, path dependency is important and the reason for its establishment bears some relation to the cause of its change. The theories about AQ are differentiated with three arenas and nine arguments (Figure 3-1) and among these, some arguments that are overlapped could well be put together (Section 8-1-3). As far as the theories regarding the creation of agencies and quangos are concerned, there are three approaches: the basic nature of goods theory which is based on an economic perspective; task and function theory; and contextual constraints theory. In particular, existing political economy theories about the basic nature of goods are overly simple, so that the refined model in Figure 3-2 is helpful for future research. The theories regarding the centripetal forces of AQ are comprised of isomorphism, economic crisis and selfish political actors' theory, whilst the theories vis-à-vis their centrifugal forces include de-politicisation, policy making process, and an HI perspective. Yet isomorphic and convergent perspectives are in general overemphasised and the political actors' models, in particular, need more attention, given the divergent motivations for policy-making (Figure 8-2).

Thirdly, as far as politico-administrative systems and socio-economic contexts are concerned, both countries share numerous similarities, although

this research postulates the MDS design (Table 1-1) in terms of geographical locations, historical development routes and political regimes (Section 5-1 and 5-2). Some similarities are the majoritarian, non-federal and centralised political system, the changes of ruling parties, population numbers and the level of e-government. Their levels of government efficiency and national income per capita, inter alia, have become more similar these days. Since the levels of total population and GNI per capita are major conspicuous independent variables for explaining government policy constraints, seven countries of the 20-50 club are frequently compared in this thesis (Appendix 2; Chapters 6 and 7), in order to show the wider picture. The biggest differences of both countries are whether there are codification of constitution, and an integration of the administrative and legislative branches, as well as the previous careers of ministers, the average ministerial tenure, and the size of the civil service and government expenditure (Figure 5-1). These factors have worked as *hard* institutional constraints of government policy, operating especially on AQ in Korea as discussed in Chapter 8. In this sense, the structural change in the British public sector was able to happen in a more radical way, while Korea experienced more modest change (Section 5-2).

Fourthly, cultural policies have unique features which are quite different from other traditional government arenas (Section 6-1). Their goals are imbued with notions of national prestige and intangible artistic achievements. The primary concerns of the stakeholders are artistic and de-materialised rather than economic and business-like; and their attitudes are more enthusiastic. Art organisations are under the influence of expert networks; and their customers, even though they are limited in number, are considerably loyal to artistic activities. Expert staff are available, typically motivated by job satisfaction and there are opportunities for relatively independent organisations to exploit artistic networks. Although there are a significant number of private museums as well as public ones, the roles of national museums in education and cultivating artists and taste formation, have gradually gained importance over time. Developed countries, in general terms, have thus invested more and more resources in arts administration. These characteristics of arts administration have influenced the structures and reform of art organisations in government, as examined in the case of the Tate Gallery and the MMCA.

Fifthly, in reference to the case of the Tate Gallery, its change could be explained by multiple reasons (Section 6-4). Among those, the perspectives

vis-à-vis its development route, economic crisis and the change in the number of civil servants, unique policy process, and HI command more explanatory power. Yet, by and large, quangocratisation of the Tate Gallery happened as a mere administrative change while politicians were not interested in such change. On the contrary, there was more political support for the establishment of Tate Modern. Meanwhile, regarding the results of quangocratisation, the Tate Gallery had shown a gradual growth before the creation of Tate Modern, but after that, its visitor numbers increased drastically. These results come not only from the long-tenured Director's ability to collect financial resources and to lead the shaping of taste, but also from the expansion of its autonomy and professional expertise which its quango status facilitated. At the same time, both the U.K. and Korea have a comparative advantage in their free admissions policy, as compared to other countries such as France and the U.S.

Sixthly, with regard to the case of the MMCA, its creation and change emanated from a variety of factors. In the first place, its establishment stemmed from a historical event rather than the basic nature of goods or tasks of government. During its earlier years, it had been merely a cosmetic display place, but it developed as a colossal national art museum after national events such as the Asian Games and the Olympic Games. Regarding the causes of agencification, the argument about cognitive pressure and economic crisis, and the approach vis-à-vis political actors have an explanatory value (section 8-1-3), while its quangocratisation move could be explained mainly by its missions, economic crisis and the change in numbers of civil servants, and HI. In reference to the results of its agencification, it still suffered from a geographical disadvantage and, furthermore, its increased autonomy was misused by the politically appointed Director. In addition, soft institutional constraints, such as the difficulties of using professional curators and collecting donations, have been the major obstacles to it being developed at an international level. In this regard, quangocratisation of the MMCA would be beneficial and has been pursued since 2008.

Seventhly, various arguments used in this thesis have their own epistemological assumptions as shown in Figure 8-5, and these intrinsic differences make commentators see the same phenomena from different angles. In order to adopt a more neutral and analytic research, processes of change summarised in Figure 8-6 which presents an important comprehensive framework, could be deployed. In this framework, triggers, actors, contexts and

development paths are the four main underpinnings. Driving forces, such as social and cognitive pressure, new knowledge, policy failures, scandals and private interests, make political actors produce a new policy, but this might be changeable during the process of decision-making owing to four major constraints and political bargaining. Therefore, the initial policy talk, in general terms, might be different from the results of decision-making and implementation. In particular, as far as agencification and quangocratisation in Korea are concerned, the first announcements regarding them were cautious but determined; however, its implementation was not only slow, but limited.

Eighthly, the idea of the MMCA's structural change was partly borrowed from a British example. Yet this idea of voluntary policy transfer is just one of the diverse policy alternatives, as shown in Figure 8-7; and only a small number of bodies were agencified at the outset. The overall idea regarding KEAs came from BEAs, but during the process of their expansion, agencification of the MoCA was also taken forward, which was different from the quangocratised national museums in the U.K. However, its poor performance led to another policy option, quangocratisation, as the new administration came to power and carried out the quangocratisation policy in 2008 (Tables 7-6 and 7-7). At the same time, the creation of the Seoul branch was similar to that of Tate Modern and, in practice, before its division, the MMCA had already researched the business model of Tate Modern. The Tate galleries have been successful, which was largely because of increased autonomy and earned flexibilities by means of the modification of related rules, compared to pre-quangocratisation era (sections 6-5-3, 6-6 and 8-2). By contrast, agencification of the MMCA has not shown satisfying results, mainly because of institutional constraints (section 8-4).

Finally, when the decision makers analyse and review the diverse policy options, the directions of their ideas are very important (Figure 8-8). However, desirable policy doctrines or purposes have trade-offs and contradictions which cannot be concurrently accomplished (Figure 4-1), so that, in many cases, choosing one direction means yielding other ones. A specific policymakers' favourable direction might change over time and thus the current turn of a wheel of fashion will ebb and flow in whatever way a complicated conical pendulum is swinging. Furthermore, during this oscillating between different doctrines, previously sedimentary ideas and practices will not be completely

replaced. Instead, remaining traces of the old layers will persistently influence the shape of new sediment. Equally, the MMCA adopted a series of managerial doctrines through agencification, but the traditional personnel and financial system worked as institutional constraints. Hence, in order to overcome these constraints and to build institutional capacities, comprehensive and strategic approaches are essential (section 8-5).

9-1-2. Distinctive contributions to knowledge

In terms of methodological, theoretical and empirical perspectives, this research contributes to existing knowledge as follows.

Firstly, this thesis analyses comprehensive data which is difficult to acquire elsewhere,⁶²⁰ especially with regard to Korean language material, translated by the author and available for the first time in English. One of the problems of quantitative approaches is that when using easily assessable data, it might later be proved to be rather biased (Smullen, 2004:188), while qualitative approaches are often criticised for their lack of evidence. Although this analysis is based on small N case study and qualitative methods, it not only uses considerable numerical data which are directly compiled from original data and processed in a specific way that is appropriate to each argument, but it also deploys interviews and a sizeable number of government documents. Previous academic researches and opinions might give different explanations for realities, while government documents and interviews with practitioners might produce distorted information (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011: 13, 29; Pollitt, 2003a: 31); and thus some degree of balance in analysis is very important. In this regard, this research tries to analyse both sides as much as possible.

Secondly, this research defines various terms which is a prerequisite of a comparative study. In many cases, different countries may even use the same term in a different way, so that it covers different meanings. In order to compare two countries, however, not only the acquisition of background knowledge, but also the defining and clarifying of independent and dependent

⁶²⁰ Almost all figures and Tables in this thesis, except Figures 7-4 and 7-5 which were previously created by the author, are original. They have been meticulously created from original data or carefully synthesised from other commentator's opinions. As Jenkins (2011: 14) points out, - even though there may be an important official report, only a few people actually read it. Yet in this research, related documents and materials are extensively analysed and mentioned.

variables are critical. However, some authors intentionally define the terms differently (Virtanen, 2013: 7-8), while others lump together similar concepts under the name of a broader notion (Smullen, 2004: 187-188). By doing this, they might seem to explain more inclusive phenomena, but, in practice, this explanation is so unclear that it cannot be applied to complicated realities. *Per contra*, this thesis endeavours to identify and differentiate technical jargon, such as AQ type, merit goods and other multifaceted concepts (Section 4-1) in order to enhance conceptual clarity.

Thirdly, multifarious theories and arguments are deployed in order to analyse both countries' institutions and their changes. On the one hand, looking at institutions from more than one angle helps us to enhance our understating of their changes and impacts.⁶²¹ On the other hand, the application of various theories to the specific subject makes them even more elaborate and brings practical help beyond the theoretical interests of academics (Pollitt, 2004a: 319). In particular, in spite of diverse theories, there are only a few developments of specific theories with regard to AQ (Bouckaert and Peters, 2004:22, 26-27). By contrast, this thesis utilises various arguments and combinations of theories vis-à-vis AQ which came relatively late to the study, and which establish the futility of searching for one over-arching theory.

Fourthly, this research contributes to the enrichment of cases around the world regarding public sector reform. Existing researches, in general terms, draw on a limited range of examples, in that they are mainly concerned about Anglo-American and European experiences; while this analysis concentrates on the comparison between Korea and the U.K., which will help future researchers to note the uniqueness of the Korean public sector. In particular, this research provides not only detailed information and data about the Korean government, but also specific British equivalents, which is essential for an understanding of other countries. Moreover, a legal approach, which has been insufficiently dealt with in the Anglo-American tradition (Bouckaert and Peters, 2004: 26), is also employed in this thesis, so that it enables us to compare both countries' organisations in a more systematic way.

⁶²¹ In this regard, Pollitt claims that 'It is now 30 years since Gram Allison first published his classic *Essence of Decision*, but we have enjoyed far too few successors to that still-fresh comparison of three competing (but also to some extent complementary) models' (2004a, 339).

Fifthly, institutional contexts⁶²² are carefully dealt with in this thesis. The institutional constraints of public sector reform are said by many commentators to be important (Clarke, 2013: 31; Halligan, 2013: 370; Pollitt and Dan, 2011: 53-54), but each country's specific institutional structure is very difficult to analyse by foreigners, given that not only language fluency but also knowledge about historical and institutional contexts will deeply influence research results (Pollitt, 2004a: 340; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011:13). Therefore researchers should compare only well-documented countries (Jowell, 1998: 174) and, in addition, should only compare governments with similar levels of development (James, 2003:147). Since a comparative study needs considerable information and the accumulation of prior knowledge, this research is based on intensive field work and examines substantial material (Pollitt, 2004a: 327, 339). Besides which, this deals with the strategies for building institutional capacities as well as the institutional constraints.

Sixthly, this analysis focuses on cultural agencies which, despite their growing significance, have not been in the limelight in the study of public policy and administration. There is very little academic writing on the public administration of arts activities and virtually nothing on the management of Korean arts organisations (either in English or in Korean). Meanwhile, in this thesis, not only organisational structures and the diverse factors to consider during the process of policy formation but also the intrinsic nature of the cultural administration are profoundly analysed, being based on various political theories. Furthermore, other related examples of different countries are added at various points in the thesis, in order to show the extended picture. There are a considerable number of books concerning arts administration, but most of them concentrate on the perspectives of statistics and arts management *per se*.⁶²³ In this regard, this thesis contributes to the accumulation of knowledge about arts administration as a part of government policy, in that its organisation, finance, law and autonomy are examined in a detailed way.

⁶²² According to Pollitt and Dan, 'contexts consist of complex assemblies of different elements, including interpersonal relations, organisational cultures, structures and procedures, legal frameworks and the political climate' (2011: 21; Halligan 2013: 357). However, in this thesis, *institutional* contexts mean the institutional constraints suggested in Figure 8-6.

⁶²³ However, there are some important exceptions. See Hewison (1994, 1995 and 2001) and Cummings and Katz (1987a)

Finally, the thesis makes a more specific contribution to our understanding of success and failure factors in the administration of museums which is a representative example of arts administration. In the case of Tate Modern it has been a remarkable success story and suggests good policy and administrative arrangements which have sustainably contributed to its success; while this facilitates a stark contrast to the state of play in Korea. The MMCA has made great strides in the 1980s, but this thesis shows that its potential success is dependent on its possible reform in the near future.


9-2. Suggestions for Each Country

9-2-1. Recommendations for both countries

This research has several implications for both countries as follows. Firstly, both governments need to address the issues of AQ from a whole-government perspective. Although, in many countries, executive agencies and quangos are institutionally separated from each other, there are few carefully designed criteria available for distinction between executive agencies and quangos in theory or in practice (Talbot, 2004a: 6; Figure 7-4). The arguments examined in Chapters 3, 6, 7 and 8, do partially suggest some criteria for drawing a distinction between executive agencies and quangos,⁶²⁴ but, in general terms, arguments 1-1, 3-2 and 3-3, which are quite different, depending on each country's situation, have an explanatory value. In this regard, it could be said that both are not originally dissimilar and that the criteria vary from country to country and from time to time. However, notwithstanding this relativity, still several criteria are required, since both countries have maintained them as being separate institutions. If the same principles are applied to both institutions, there is no need for their separation (Section 2-2). Furthermore, given that in many countries including the U.K. and Korea, the 'rationalisation' of quangos has become a *cause célèbre* owing to their disorder (HC 537, 2010b: w1; van Thiel, 2012a: 399), several criteria for differentiation are necessary for future public sector reform.

⁶²⁴ Interestingly enough, argument 1-2, which seems to be the most attractive explanation to practitioners, is the worst criteria for drawing distinction between executive agencies and quangos (OPSR, 2002: 16; Flinders and Skelcher, 2012: 330). Even ministers might regard them as being identical, in that they function as *operational* bodies (Jenkins, 2011: 23).

Figure 9-1: Criteria for classification



Source: prepared by the author

In the first place, core departments should undertake the tasks which are politically sensitive⁶²⁵ or are ruled by the logic of consequentiality⁶²⁶ or are inward-looking (Pollitt, 2003a: 161-164; Jenkins et al., 2011: 22-26; Rutter et al., 2012: 48-49). At the same time, with regard to the elements that show the characteristics of executive agencies, structural decoupling, standardisability⁶²⁷ and observability of outcomes,⁶²⁸ financial and personnel flexibilities and a performance contract are frequently mentioned (Smullen, 2004: 191; Section 7-2).⁶²⁹ Yet these factors are common with executive NDPBs (Talbot, 2004: 6; Pollitt et al., 2001: 274-275). Rather, the distinctive elements of executive

⁶²⁵ Political salience (Pollitt, 2003a: 163) or sensitiveness (OPSR, 2002: 16) is a rather relative and indeterminate notion. Yet, in general terms, the tasks which are related to the basic *constitutional rights* or which contain a *higher level of expectation* from the public, are politically sensitive.

⁶²⁶ This means that a specific policy is so consequential that its failure could incur safety problems (Pollitt, 2003a: 163-164). It is related to the very basic function of the state. For example, see the case of the Prison Service and the Child Support Agency (Savoie, 2003: 48, 57; Pollitt, 2003a: 92; Gains, 2004b: 548). Yet, notwithstanding this, some radical countries privatised these functions, based on the characteristics of goods, *excludability* (see Section 3-1).

⁶²⁷ The Coalition government suggests *technical activities* as one of the criteria for NDPBs (HC 537, 2010a: para 13).

⁶²⁸ The observability of outputs or outcomes is one of the most basic prerequisites of AQ (Wilson, 1989a, 159-171, 175; Pollitt et al., 2001: 283; Barzelay, 2001: 137). In particular, the most important target of the agency needs to be measurable. However, the focus on several observable targets would only make the agency underplay its core target (Pollitt, 2003a: 46-47); in the Netherlands, after structural disaggregation, the performance of agencies was poorly managed (Pollitt et al., 2001: 285).

⁶²⁹ Because of this features, the activities of executive agencies are usually front-line delivery (Bouckaert and Peters, 2004: 38-39), which might not include the main works of their parent departments (Jenkins, 2011: 30), and might be routine tasks such as dealing with licences and payments (Jenkins, 2011: 25).

agencies civil servants' ethics and greater responsibilities (Jenkins, 2011: 23). Since the employees of executive agencies are civil servants, the possibility of a Minister's direct intervention with their operation is greater; the decision-making process is faster; and the Minister, in the last resort, will bear responsibility if things go wrong⁶³⁰ (Jenkins, 2011: 26; Goldsworthy, 1991: 17). By contrast, quangos, whose tasks contain *publicness* and are therefore difficult to privatise,⁶³¹ are largely following private sector rules (Smullen, 2004: 191) and, at the same time, are still using resources provided by the government. In this regard, they retain an independent legal status (Jenkins, 2011: 17) and their employees are not civil servants; thus flexibilities are emphasised and their parent departments are less responsible for their operation (section 2-2). As examined above (Figure 9-1), there are some overlapping criteria between the core departments and executive agencies, and between executive agencies and quangos. Hence whether a specific body exists as an executive agency or a quango is decided in a relative way (van Thiel et al., 2009: 28), depending on the driving forces for change, institutional constraints, historical development routes and the interaction of political actors (Figure 8-6). This means that classification based on simple criteria or a flow diagram might add to the confusion.⁶³² However, in spite of this difficulty, a basic notion, based on Figure 9-1, is helpful for seeing the broader picture. After the classification, which reflects upon the local situation, the periodical publication of this information in an organised way is indispensable. This should be given to the public, not only in order to trace the changes of an individual quango but also to compare performances among similar types of quangos.

Secondly, a longer-term perspective is needed, as the process of learning does not take place in a short term (Pollitt, 2003a: 109). Even if the ostensible purpose of AQ is declared to be the enhancement of efficiency by the government, politicians and practitioners are less interested in longer term

⁶³⁰ However, some commentators argue that there were few accountability differences between executive agencies and quangos (Flinders and Skelcher, 2012: 330; Talbot, 2004a: 6).

⁶³¹ See Figure 7-4, Sections 2-2 and 3-1.

⁶³² In 2010, the Coalition government announced that three criteria would be used to decide whether the tasks need to be delivered outside or to be conducted by a central department: the *technical* test; the *impartiality* test; and the *facts* test (HC 537, 2010a: Paras 10, 11 and 2010b: w13-w19; Cm 8044, 2011: para 9-10). However, these criteria have been criticised since they are easy to fudge (HC 537, 2010a: para 12) and even a Minister has confessed that it is 'not a precise science' (HC 537, 2010a: para 14). Strictly speaking, by means of the technical test, the Driver & Vehicle Licensing Agency and Companies House, whose functions are technical and marginal to the main work of their departments, need to be quangocratised (Jenkins, 2011: 17). Moreover, the impartiality tests and the facts test are more apposite criteria for regulatory, quasi-judicial and advisory quangos than executive quangos (See Figure 9-1).

performance evaluation (Chapter 4). Yet the outcomes could be, in general terms, examined only several years after the establishment or reorganisation of an agency, so that enduring performance evaluation, despite changes of government, are necessary. It is unreasonable, however, to pursue this long-term performance assessment and to record unreservedly, since it could be accomplished only at the cost of a significant investment of time and resources (Pollitt, 2003a: 89-90). Thus, what is needed is a skilful unit which is exclusively responsible for performance evaluation.

Thirdly, for executive agencies, the efficient usage of the professional expertise of the employees is important. In the first place, the proportion of Chief Executives that comes from the private sector needs to be increased and additional delegations from the parent departments are required (OPSR, 2002: 65). In addition, good communication and inter-unit staff transfers between sponsor departments and executive agencies are essential (Goldsworthy, 1991: 7; Massey, 1995b: para 4.5.2; Barberis, 1995: 109), since executive agencies remain as a part of central government. Furthermore, diverse systematic co-ordination between them is useful, in order to prevent the lack of coherence and inaccurate information (James, 2003: 136-141 and 2004: 89-90; Bouckaert, et al., 2010: 35). More importantly, constant education and training is critical, given that there is considerable criticism that the NPM undermines public values (Pollitt, 2003a: 147; Figure 8-2).⁶³³

Finally, the indiscriminate expansion of quangos needs to be controlled. The most serious problem with quangos in both countries is that it is difficult to know even their exact number (Flinders and Skelcher, 2012: 330; Kwak, 2009: 89), since some quangos are hidden, owing to their ambiguous relationships with their parent departments. One of the simple solutions is that every institution, *whose existence is wholly or partly dependent on governmental supports and thus without them cannot be maintained*, needs to be classified and monitored as a quango. In addition, as argued above, their managerial information should be open to the public through a web-based data system. The size of quangos should be judged in terms of the whole public sector, as examined in Section 5-2. In particular, Quangocratisation Types-III and V in Figure 2-2 should be carefully controlled.

⁶³³ In this regard, the abolition of the National School of Government in March 2012 might lead to a negative ramification such as the loss of institutionalised memory and the weakening of civil servants' capacity.

9-2-2. Recommendations for the UK Government

This thesis has some implications for the UK Government regarding executive agencies and quangos. Firstly, with regard to the BEAs, efficient operation is more important than the expansion of their scope *per se*. In the earlier stage of groundless confidence, maintaining the impetus for change was so overwhelming that the basic principle that only executive tasks would be separated from the policy works, were underplayed (Goldsworthy, 1991: 33; Efficiency Unit, 1988: para16; Hogwood, 1993: 4; Jenkins, 2011: 14-15; OPSR, 2002: 19). Furthermore, as the governmental programme gained momentum, even this basic principle was almost ignored (CfPS, 1997: 16; Jenkins et al., 2011: 13). Therefore, the first agencified group has worked well, while some of the later groups showed significant disruption (Figure 8-3; Jenkins et al., 2011: 13, 16).⁶³⁴ In a similar vein, recently, one of the major BEAs was de-agencified and returned to its parent department.⁶³⁵ Although BEAs are still regarded as a default delivery option (Cm 8044; Jenkins et al., 2011: 15), they need to be reviewed in their entirety (Flinders and Skelcher, 2012: 330), given that some of their tasks are politically sensitive and are not independent from their parent departments (Jenkins et al., 2011: 15-16).

Secondly, the BEAs should be monitored from an overall viewpoint. In this regard, a report which contains the whole picture of the BEAs needs to be produced periodically. After the Next Steps Unit was disbanded in 1999, the report ceased to be published (Jenkins et al., 2011: 20). This might be partly because the BEAs were already settled,⁶³⁶ or these were the products of the previous regime, or their performance had stagnated. In reality, concern about the BEAs in the mass media decreased, so that only a small number of them received attention, unlike in their earlier stage of introduction (Pollitt et al., 2001: 280). However, in order to encourage an enduring focus on improvement, overall and periodical monitoring is essential. For example, the frequent inter-organisation transfers of staff and a comparison of performance indicators among BEAs might be useful. Another important issue is the typology of the

⁶³⁴ See the case of the Child Support Agency and the Passport agency (Jenkins, 2011: 18).

⁶³⁵ The Coalition government removed the Chief Executive of Jobcentre Plus and instead appointed a Chief Operating Officer in 2011 (Jenkins, 2011: 17 and 23).

⁶³⁶ At the earlier stage of agencification, new reforms such as the Citizen's Charter focused on the role of the BEAs because of their comprehensive influences and ripple effects. For example See Cm 2627 (1994) and Cm 3164 (1995).

BEAs. The basic approach of the BEAs in the U.K. is that each agency is different with regard to its structure, operation and the relationship with its sponsor department and thus there could be no single model (Goldsworthy, 1991: 7; OPSS, 1994: para7.22; Massey, 1995b: para2.11). However, the systematic classification of the BEAs is helpful, in order to understand their activities, outcomes and needs; furthermore, it could give a more elaborate and comprehensive information to the public.⁶³⁷ Yet the existing classification of the BEAs is quite simple, given their huge size and scope (Table 7-4), so that a more detailed taxonomy is needed.⁶³⁸ In addition to these, an organisation, which is exclusively responsible for the BEAs and the NDPBs within the Cabinet Office, has to ceaselessly enhance and develop its tools. For the sake of neutrality and professional expertise, it also needs a proper *Board of Trustees*.⁶³⁹

Thirdly, the management of the NDPBs needs to be streamlined. First of all, the separation of advisory NDPBs from the total statistics would be helpful for administering the NDPBs, since the function and staff numbers of the advisory bodies are quite different from the executive ones (Figure 5-20). From the perspective of finance and organisation, executive NDPBs are, in general terms, more meaningful, so that it is rather unreasonable to deal with them with the same degree of priority. In addition, during the period of the quangos cull, the government might resort to as an expedient; that is, the abolition of advisory NDPBs rather than executive ones (Figure 5-21). In the second place, the too frequent alteration of their names, organisational types and structures, amalgamation and separation would make it difficult to monitor NDPBs.⁶⁴⁰ Even though flexibility is a very important notion in contemporary administration (Flinders and Smith, 1999: 210), this does not mean the reorganisation by political consideration without a robust rationale (Pollitt, 1998: 54; Hogwood,

⁶³⁷ For example, see OPSR (2002).

⁶³⁸ At the same time, the '*best practice*' approach which means that the most successful example could apply to other similar cases, needs to be used carefully (van Thiel et al., 2012: 414). The Government often pursues an immediate solution for its institutions through the adoption of several *best practice* examples. In this regard, the use of taxonomy would be useful for the *best practice* approach, in that agencies within a specific group might face similar situations.

⁶³⁹ There are two different perspectives in relation to the creation of an organisation which is exclusively responsible for a specific government activity. Some believe that, notwithstanding the increase in staff costs, the efficiency saving might outweigh the costs. By contrast, others believe that the establishment of a new inefficient organisation might create new regulations and bureaucratic inefficiency (Figure 8-5).

⁶⁴⁰ In many cases, it is difficult to even trace the origin of a specific body. See the case of The Manpower Service Commission (Jenkins, 2011: 25, 35).

1992: 179), but it does mean the ability to improve their situational awareness of customers' requests. In this regard, at least mid-term stability of NDPBs in their own right is essential (Jenkins et al., 2011: 37). In order to control the number of quangos, a quinquennial review was suggested (Massey, 1995a: para.2.1.10; Macleavy and Gay, 2005: 17), but that was not effective; so that some have suggested a new idea for a *sunset clause* which would include a statutory five year limit on executive quangos and on the number of quangos per department (Lewis, 2005: 6; Macleavy and Gay, 2005: 37), which is somewhat similar to the 'One-in, One-out' regulation policy (BIS, 2011: 3). However, this approach might add fuel to the fire of their instability. Instead of this, comprehensive, evidence-based and long-term accumulated reviews need to proceed before there is any kind of quango reform.

Finally, an exclusive information system for NDPBs, such as the *Korean Alio system*,⁶⁴¹ is needed. If this system contains information not only about basic statistics such as their missions, staff number, boards and budget, but also more detailed information such as performance indicators and its changes, it might be helpful in order to compare different NDPBs and to develop future NDPBs' policy than to resort to mere annual reports for each NDPB.

9-2-3. Recommendations for the Korean Government

Firstly, the KEAs need to be developed innovatively and continuously in order to overcome their stagnated status. In particular, unlike the British system of government, the Korean government has a unique structure, in that there are AIs between core departments and KEAs; and thus differentiation between them is the key to the success of the KEAs. In order to achieve this, decisive devolution of financial and personnel authority to KEAs seems to be helpful. More profoundly, excessive control-centred management vis-à-vis total expenditure and employees of the government needs to be modified in the medium and long term, given Korea's economic development level (Nunberg, 2002: 53). Since the welfare state debate in Korea has become heated recently (Ringgen et al., 2011:108-109), the role of the KEAs with regard to increasing service delivery, as with BEAs, needs to be analysed and re-designed.

⁶⁴¹ See <http://www.alio.go.kr/alio/main/main.jsp> (*ALI* public information *In One*).

Alongside this, the concept of the KEAs should be clarified. At their outset, the main criteria for KEAs was 'competition' and 'self-financing', in order to highlight the need for their introduction with a view to dealing with the economic crisis (MoPAS, 2010b: 2). However, this notion gave a wrong impression to the public that KEAs should be fully operated in a business-like way and they were an intermediate stage before privatisation (KAOS, 2010a: 11-19). Therefore, the Korean government adopted a new criterion of 'strengthening the performance management' in 2011 (NAPASC, 2010: 6). Yet there are still considerable concerns that AQ policy in Korea was designed to introduce more business-like arrangements and to increase their marketability (Kim, 2013b; Lee, 2013i). Hence, it is important for the government to emphasise the publicness of KEAs, in order not to be misunderstood.

Secondly, a more systematic approach to the classification of quangos is essential for the somewhat untidy public sector. First of all, the taxonomy of *Public Institutions* needs to be adjusted (Table 2-3). On the one hand, it includes too broad institutions such as public enterprises, administrative supporting agencies, training institutions and cultural bodies. On the other hand, it does not cover various quangos whose existence is significantly dependent on government supports or those whose heads are appointed by government (Kwak, 2009: 89; MoSPA, 2013d).⁶⁴² Moreover, since public institutions are managed by the MoSF, some of their missions overlap with AIs,⁶⁴³ which are administered by the MoSPA. Therefore, it is more efficient to manage similar institutions, whose tasks are in the same category (Figures 5-11 and 5-13), by the same department. In addition, the heads of quangos need to be chosen for their professional expertise rather than by political patronage⁶⁴⁴ or retired civil servants.⁶⁴⁵

Thirdly, quangocratisation is not a panacea for performance enhancement and thus various things should be considered during its process (van Thiel et al., 2012: 419-420). In general terms, the quangocratisation

⁶⁴² Uncontrollable quangos might lead to the problem of political and consumerist accountability as well as administrative accountability (van Thiel et al., 2012: 417; section 4-1).

⁶⁴³ For example, research institutions or cultural agencies (Table 7-8).

⁶⁴⁴ Similarly to Korea, the problem with political patronage in the U.K. is a persistent one. There is a criticism that the 'bonfire of quangos' announced in 2010 was quickly extinguished. 'The Lords are on the boards of quangos. Their friends are on the boards of quangos' (The Times, 23rd June, 2014).

⁶⁴⁵ From March 2013 to April 2014, 153 Chief Executives have been appointed, among them 33.3 per cent are former *civil servants*, 19.6 per cent are *professors* and 11.1 per cent are *former politicians* (www.alio.go.kr; Lee et al., 2014).

(Types-I and IV) of a specific agency might lead to problems regarding the weakening of publicness and accountability, the brain drain, placing priority on short-term performances and profits, and adding difficulty when dealing with national concerns (Kim and Oh, 2012: 289; Park, 2010a: 133-134; Cho, 2010c: 240-241). *Inter alia*, the maintenance of its level of publicness is quite a critical issue (Park, 2004b; Lee, 2012c).⁶⁴⁶ In this regard, the balance between autonomy and accountability has to be carefully designed before this structural change (ECSTC, 2013:25). In addition, unless there is an urgent particular economic crisis, the targets of the reform should be efficiency saving and *service quality* accountability rather than the reduction in public expenditure *per se*. As far as quangocratisation policy in Korea is concerned, one of the practical issues is that the employees of the newly altered quangos have to lose their life-long tenure and generous pension scheme for civil servants; and therefore a carefully designed plan for the change is required (Kang, 2009b; ECSTC, 2013: 27; KAOS, 2010b:15-18; Lee and Oh, 2011). Finally, the *ex post* evaluation of quangocratisation is indispensable for measuring the impact of the policy and, in order to achieve this, an evaluation framework should be designed before its implementation (Cook and Campbell, 1979: 109).⁶⁴⁷

Fourthly, regarding the quangocratisation of the MMCA, the unique features of arts administration need to be considered. In the first place, the quangocratisation bill which is pending in the National Assembly should be passed as soon as possible. The quangocratisation of the MMCA is not only cost-effective (Ryu, 2010a: 3725), but is also important for improving national competitiveness in a relatively short period of time. The innovation of the MMCA, in particular the Seoul branch, could attract many tourists and could also give unquantifiable benefits such as the enhancement of national prestige (Park, 2011a; Moh, 2012b; Yang, 2004a: 27), in a sense that museums have grown exponentially in number, variety and their international visitor numbers over the past few decades (Marstine, 2006: 3). In the longer-term, it could be helpful for cultivating artists and educating the public in a globalised way (Lee, 2008b; Cho, 2011).⁶⁴⁸ As noted above, the quangocratisation of the MMCA is an urgent issue, but along with it, related institutional constraints need to be

⁶⁴⁶ For example, maintaining *universal services* for the socially excluded is one of the main concerns.

⁶⁴⁷ For more on this, see Cook and Campbell (1979: 109-111).

⁶⁴⁸ For example, see the case of Guggenheim's LTA (learning through art) programme (Lee, 2013a) and the Turner Prize of the Tate Gallery.

considered (Section 8-5; KAOS, 2010a: 201, 242-243). First and foremost, the legal tenure of the Director should be prolonged, based on his or her performance, given that artistic projects take a comparatively longer time than other government activities (Kwon, 2008a). The role of curators should be strengthened, in that the key missions of the art museums are exhibition and conservation (Yong, 2011: 153; Kim, 2008b: 300). The number of curators should be increased and their professional expertise needs to be enhanced (Han, 2007; SUIACF, 2011). In addition to these, other institutional constraints regarding financial tools, such as the ACUD and tax incentives for benefactors, need to be modified (Section 7-5; Cho, 2010c: 241-244; Park, 2011a),⁶⁴⁹ lest the MMCA should follow the example of Japan, where it has still been difficult to collect donations from the private companies and the public since the quangocratisation of art museums in 2001 (ECSTC, 2013: 19).

9-3. Suggestions for Future Research

This thesis has tried to shed light on the areas outlined above, but there are still many areas to be examined for future research. The thesis endeavors to provide clarity and to broaden the research base in the area of distributed governance but it has also stressed the complexity and multi-dimensionality of the issues.

Firstly, more detailed comparative approaches toward politicians and bureaucrats are necessary. Politics and political actors, without doubt, matter (Frederickson, 1989: 11; Moe, 1989: 328-329; Ingraham, 1995: 2; Aberbach and Rockman, 2000: 184; Richards, 2003: 41-42; Hird, 2005: 25; Hill and Hupe, 2009: 62; Peters, 2008: 205); however, several important points are missing in the existing literature. In the first place, comparative research about the rules of the game and institutional constraints which influence the policy-making process and the behaviour of politicians and bureaucrats, is scarce, although their overall behaviour or relationship *per se* have been fairly well researched (Aberbach et al., 1981; Peters and Pierre, 2001 and 2004; Page, 2012). In the second place, as shown in Figure 8-2, the motivations and interests of politicians and bureaucrats are diverse and even they might be quite differently

⁶⁴⁹ The ACUD was first legislated in 1951, in order to prevent the state's unfair disruption of property rights.

interpreted depending on the epistemological assumptions of different commentators (Figure 8-5). In this connection, a series of case studies might be helpful to ascertain which motivation is dominant and how a special group of people thinks about politicians and bureaucrats vis-à-vis a specific policy making process. In addition to these, bargaining processes among bureaucrats, as with those between politicians and bureaucrats (Hood and Lodge, 2006), need to be explored in a detailed way. In particular, studies of the bargaining between ordinary departments and the Treasury (and the Cabinet Office)⁶⁵⁰ in each country would be helpful for understanding the institutional changes, constraints and capacities, since they, in general terms, have the power to distribute limited financial and organisational resources (Heclo and Wildavsky, 1974: 77; Thain and Wright, 1995; Chapman, 1997a; Burnham and Pyper, 2008).

Secondly, it is hard to overstate the importance of contexts (Pollitt, 2007b: 233 and 2013b; Franzese, 2009: 67). With regard to case studies, to increase their number is important to avoid a case selection bias, but a more important thing is to analyse institutional contexts and constraints sufficiently. In particular, regarding comparative case study, not only the history of public sector reform, but also the politico-administrative system and socio-economic contexts should be profoundly examined first, in order to understand the cases properly. The analyses on the level of economic development, development route, population numbers, rules, norms and conventions are all important prerequisite factors for case studies. Simple theoretical models and parsimony are over-rated. Parallel to this and related to it, clear definitions of the various terms are important for an efficient and fruitful comparative study, in that such definitions might lead to different research processes and results (Bouckaert and Peters, 2004: 23, 28-29). For example, there are numerous AQ types (Figure 2-2) and these have significantly influenced the cause of their establishment, as discussed earlier. In particular, the organisations which have the same name but perform different functions (and the other way round) should be compared and explored only after a careful analysis of institutional contexts (Bouckaert and Peters, 2004: 31-32).

⁶⁵⁰ In Korea, they are the MoSF and the MoSPA.

Thirdly, more comparative case studies are needed, based on a range of data, although these are quite challenging tasks. On the one hand, a comparison of an individual institution could give a more precise prescription, in that the overall analysis on quangos might not apply to a specific one. On the other hand, the comparisons of various types and functions of quangos in different countries will provide useful standards for their performance evaluation and will have some implications for future policies. Particularly, the comparative cases of countries of an economically similar level of development, which have a similar level of population, might be useful, in that those countries, generally speaking, have a bigger public sector and more differentiated institutions, and often need more considerations before adopting a new policy.

Fourthly, sub-units, which are not separated from their parent departments but still carry out operational tasks or everyday politics (Page, 2001: 179), need to be examined in future research. Especially, analyses of AIs in Korea and newly de-agencified bodies, such as Jobcentre Plus in the U.K., would be useful, in that they might suggest new standards for operational tasks which are different from that of executive agencies (Elston, 2013: 83-84). In practice, it is very difficult to acquire inside information about these organisations, but they are also essential service delivery organisations, as with executive agencies and quangos. In particular, the tools for their autonomy and performance management should be examined, given their significant role within departments and government policies.

Finally, as has been the case with this study, it is valuable to involve researchers with practical experience of administration in research dealing with administrative reform. A practitioner dimension enriches academic research and guards against the development of overly-theoretical and pleasingly elegant theories which do not engage effectively with the often messy realities of securing reform. In this way, as attempted in this thesis, we may be able to employ academic investigation to improve both policy making for reform and the real-world operation of public administration.

Appendices

Appendix 1: List of interviewees

The interviews were conducted according to a *Chatham House Rules* and thus interviewees' comments are not attributed to them by name.

The first set of interviews are coded 'IAx' and were conducted in Tate Modern

code	Date	Title	Organisation
IA1	10/10/2011	curator	Tate Modern
IA2	2/4/2012	curator	Tate Modern
IA3	4/6/2012	curator	Tate Modern
IA4	3/12/2012	curator	Tate Modern
IA5	13/9/2013	curator	Tate Modern

The second set of interviews are coded 'IBx' and were conducted in the MoCA (MMCA)

code	Date	Title	Organisation
IB1	9/8/2011	curator	MoCA
IB2	6/4/2012	senior official	MoCA
IB3	11/5/2012	senior official	MoCA
IB4	6/3/2013	curator	MMCA
IB5	4/11/2013	curator	MMCA

The third set of interviews are coded 'ICx' and were conducted in the MoPAS (MoSPA)

code	Date	Title	Organisation
IC1	4/10/2011	senior official	MoPAS
IC2	3/5/2012	senior official	MoPAS
IC3	8/10/2013	senior official	MoSPA


Appendix 2: Socio-economic contexts in Korea and the U.K.

Socio-economic factors play, directly or indirectly, an important role in public sector reforms, and thus an analysis of them is helpful to explore the origin and process of AQ.

2-1. The levels of economic development

Each country tends to use a different method for the same policy issue depending on its economic development level. For example, an underdeveloped nation has difficulty in devising particular policies such as social care or a security net. Government policies and institutional rules influence the levels of economic development and in turn the economic growth rate makes a difference in each government's capacity to produce a new policy.

Figure 1: GDP per capita, compared over a historical long term period
(Nominal US dollars, as a percentage of US GDP)



Source: extracted and adapted from World bank (<http://data.worldbank.org>) and Moran (2007:66)

Long term trends Korea was known as a typical *developmental state* during the period from the 1960s to 1980s. A coherent *state interventionism* in the market and other domestic and international conditions simultaneously contributed to the rise of Korea to become one of the four Asian Tigers (Caiden, 1991a: ix; Dixon et al., 1993: 7).¹ After the removal of the vestiges of authoritarianism in 1993, the parallel development of the economy

¹ Among the success factors of Korean *compressed economic development* are: **economic conditions** such as high degrees of mercantilism and a strong economic development plan, and successful export drives based on manufacturing prowess; **domestic contexts** such as the low levels of ethnic divergence, a productive educational system, expansion of a meritocracy bureaucracy, a series of anti-corruption movements, a small civil service, relatively high levels of social equality and social mobility as compared with Latin American countries, the cultural revolution of the *Saemaul* Movements, 'little impetus toward the social welfare state', and national cohesion related to the pervasive anti-communism; **international conditions** such as U.S. foreign aid and easy access to the U.S. market resulted from the cold war, effective control of the Economic Planning Board (EPB) over finance and foreign funds, and 'limited penetration by foreign investment' and transnational corporation (Jones and Sakong, 1980: 63; Przeworski, 1991: 140; Kim, 1993: 4-19; Park, 1993: 25-29; Evans, 1995: 52-54; Pempel and Muramatsu: 1995: 23; Woo-Cumings, 1999: 4-20; Pempel, 1999: 137-180; Johnson, 1999: 37-39; Cumings, 1999: 89-91; Chang, 1999: 192-198; Vartiainen, 1999: 225-226; Kil and Moon, 2001: 205-213; Buzo, 2002: 111-119; Steinmo, 2010: 113-124; Rho and Lee, 2010: 332-334; Ringen et al., 2011: 17-41; Chung, 2007: 12-19).


and democracy was one of the most urgent issues in Korea (Ravich, 2000: 91-93); and the economic crisis in 1998 made a turn towards an improvement in the structure of its economy. Meanwhile, the U.K. has witnessed a relative economic decline compared to the U.S., as shown in Figure 1 since the 19th century (Jones et al., 2007: 66-67; Gamble, 1990b: 32).² As shown in Figure 1 and 2a, in the 1960s the economic gap between Korea and the U.K. was surprisingly wider than in recent years. The recent narrowing down of this economic gap means increasing possibilities of using a similar policy instrument in both countries.

Comparisons of economic performance In order to compare the economic performance of both countries, it is helpful to investigate countries of a similar size in terms of economy and population (Jackson, 2009: 32-36). Less populated countries such as Luxembourg, Qatar, Singapore and Hong Kong show different kinds of economic efficiency thus there are some difficulties in comparing them with a large-sized country (Adolino and Blake, 2000 and 2011:6; Liou, 1993: 75). As shown in Figure 5-10, around the world there are only seven countries where the total population is over 50 million and GNI per capita is more than 20 thousand U.S. dollars.

Even though there is still a considerable gap in *nominal* GNI per capita between the U.K. and Korea, the real income level has become closer in terms of purchasing power (Figure 2a). This trend might also show that people having a similar level of economic life would require a similar kind of policy instrument. However, the third and fourth graphs of Figure 2 imply that a gap in government expenditure is not negligible (Figures 2c and d). Government expenditure per capita of the U.K in 2009 is over twice that of Korea (OECD, 2009). Moreover, the ratio of British government expenditure to GDP (51.09 per cent) in 2010 is much bigger than that of the Korean government; and this might suggest that the British government has been more concerned with the quality of life for the public (OECD, 2010).


Figure 2: Comparisons of seven countries (20-50 club: seven countries)

(a) GNI per capita



Source: compiled from World bank (<http://data.worldbank.org>)


(b) Population



Source: compiled from OECD (<http://stats.oecd.org>)


² In this connection, Kavanagh et al. (2006: 128) point out five elements regarding a decline in the U.K.: culture; empire; industry; finance; and institutions. For more on the decline of the Westminster-Whitehall model, see Savoie (2008: 46-53)

(c) General government expenditures per capita
(2009, PPP, US dollars)



Source: compiled from OECD (<http://stats.oecd.org>)

(d) General government expenditures proportion
(2000 and 2010, as a percentage of GDP)



Source: compiled from OECD (<http://stats.oecd.org>)


2-2. Institutional relics of the past

As postulated by historical institutionalists, the specific historical experience of any country could have a consistent effect on its development routes and policy formation. To set aside an application of microscopic analysis to marginal historical development, the consideration of prominent historical experiences is useful for making a comparison.

Experiences of the colonial period, as a coloniser or a colonist The experiences of colonialism, the division of the country and military dictatorships have marked modern Korean history (Cumings, 2005: 185). A very few commentators argue that Japanese colonialism evolved into an effective developmental state (Kohli, 1999: 95), but, as with the cases of other colonists, brutal Japanese exploitation seriously delayed the modernisation of the country (Sohn et al. 1982: 292-293; Buzo, 2002: 34-35). In 1945, Korea was finally liberated from 36 years of Japanese colonisation, but was followed by national division, three years of the U.S. military regime and the Korean War (Hwang, 2010a: 195-202). The outbreak of the war devastated the country even more, but the embrace of the inherited colonial ‘overdeveloped’ governance and sacrosanct anti-communism measures of the military regime made the power of the bureaucrats invincible (Rho and Lee, 2010: 331-333). The democratisation movement since the declaration of political reform in 1987, however, accelerated cleaning up the vestiges of the bureaucratic state (Pempel, 1999: 154). After around two decades of a tide of debureaucratism during the 1980s and the 1990s, the biggest new issue in the Korean government was its own efficiency. Meanwhile, in the U.K., despite its most influential coloniser’s experience and its position as one of the victorious Allies, economic decline during the 1960s and the 1970s owing to the losses in war, the collapse of empire ‘cushion against change’, powerful trade unions, short-termism and institutional weaknesses (Kavanagh et al. 2006: 127- 131) provoked a wave of changes and modernisation, which finally allowed it to gain an international reputation for radical managerial reform (Burnham and Pyper, 2008: 1-3)

The monarchy and Confucianism One of the most striking British features compared with Korea is the monarchy system. The absence of bloody revolution in the U.K. successfully developed parliamentary democracy through the transfer of power from the monarch to the assembly (Verney, 1959: 18-20). The monarchical influence over recent government reform in the U.K. has been rather limited despite its political symbolism. Meanwhile, in Korea, the monarchy was abolished, but Confucianism has often been regarded as one of the twin pillars of Korean culture (Kim and Kim, 1997: 73), along with Buddhism.³ In order to legitimate or analyse the authoritarian developmental state in 1970s, the idea of Confucian ideology or ‘Asian Values’ have sometimes been used (Koo, 1996: 210-216; Woo-Cumings, 1999: 20), but most Koreans recently believe that Confucianism, deep-seated though it may be, scarcely has a tangible influence on government policies (Kim and Lim, 2000: 8-9).⁴

Figure 3: Dimensions of trust in government



Source: prepared by the author

Trust, social capital and corruption A Government enjoying a high level of *trust* is considered to have strong legitimacy (Nye et al., 1997: 276; Barberis, 2003: 193) and thus being in an advantageous position in the next election. In addition, this high trust might

³ The moral values of neo-Confucianism involve: familism, including the principle of filial piety, privileges of older adults and factionalism; emphasis on Confucian rites and virtues, history-consciousness and education; and hierarchy within a web of duties and obligations (Sohn et al., 1982: 149-153; Kim, 1991: 28-37; Cho, 1996: 32-40; Lim, 2000: 291-311; Cumings, 2005: 57-60). At the same time some commentators consider rigid social stratification and ‘an acceptance of conventional society’ as the most distinct features of Confucianism (Allen, 2004: 62-63), but Islam and Indian (or even British) culture also include these elements (Putnam, 1976: 22-26; Cooper, 1979; Fox, 2004). In this regard, the degree of emphasis on social stratification matters.

⁴ As of 2005, the proportion of religious people in Korea is 53.1% and among them are Buddhists 42.9%, Catholic and Protestant Christians 55.1%, and others 2% (Lee, 2010a: 12-13; Tudor, 2012)

finally lead to a high performance level of government.⁵ In this connection, the enhancement of trust in a government has been one of the fundamental targets for advanced democracies.⁶ Yet closely related concepts of trust such as corruption, government effectiveness and social capital have been analysed without an appropriate link (Giddens, 2000: 79). On this account, it has often been argued that an ambiguous notion of trust could rarely give any pertinent evidence of government performance. Figure 3 is designed to grapple with this problem.

First of all, the easiest thing one could conclude about trust in government is that high morality and anti-corruption leads to a decrease in distrust. Ironically, reduced anti-corruption cannot always equate with an increase in trust.⁷ When basic functions such as competence and efficiency of government which the people expected from their government are demonstrated, then one can see the enhancement of trust (Hardin, 1999: 33; MoGAHA, 2003: 69; Rothstein, 2005: 47).⁸

In addition to these logical factors, contextual variations such as the ideological commonality, the degree of empathy to the regime and ethno-cultural diversity might have an important role in creating trust in government (Putnam et al., 2000: 23; Lenard, 2012: 95). An analysis therefore focused on only one dimension has a limitation in explaining trust in any particular government. For example, Rothstein (2011: 25-30 and 46-51) points out several elements such as government efficiency, corruption perception and the rule of law in order to analyse the quality of government. This exploration almost coincides with Figure 3. Meanwhile, institutionalists emphasise the role of social capital in the creation of trust (Putnam, 1993: 167-173; Rothstein, 2005: 48-52).⁹ The concept of social capital is divided into two categories: close-knit and intensive *bonding social capital* (private social capital); and diffusive and extensive *bridging social capital* (public social capital) (Gittel and Vidal,

⁵ Not surprisingly, the OECD and mainstream scholars believe that only an incorrupt government could lead to economic development (Inglehart, 1999: 89). On the contrary, some argue that rare countries among the current developed democracies did adopt a liberal democracy system of government during the period of sustained economic growth (Chang, 2007). In addition to this, some *Asian developing countries* show higher levels of trust in government than Japan and Korea (Park and Lee, 2009: 111)

⁶ Trust could be defined in many ways (Rothstein, 2005: 54-63; Lenard, 2012: 17-35), but according to Hwang and Burgers (1997: 67), it is 'confidence in another's goodwill' as well as 'confidence in the predictability of one's own expectations'.

⁷ A survey by Lee supports this argument (2006: 328-332). According to this survey, Korean people suggest the reasons for having trust in government as efficiency (39%), empathy to the regime (20%), impartiality or transparency (17%), and integrity (5%), while offering reasons for distrust as inconsistency (30%), corruption (26%), inefficiency (16%), and injustice or secrecy (14%).

⁸ Interestingly, this point has a similar logic to Herzberg's theory of motivation (Lee, 2006a: 335). According to Herzberg, what really matters are 'job content' factors, rather than 'job dissatisfying factors' (Berman et al., 2001: 177; Shafritz and Russell, 2005: 276). However, this link between efficiency and trust is not always straightforward (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011: 180-181). For more on asymmetries of distrust and trust, see Cook, Hardin and Levi (2005: 63-66)


⁹ Bourdieu (1986a:242-252) and Putnam (1993) note that social capital has accumulated over the long term; thus their viewpoints are rather similar to that of HI.

1998, 15; Woolcock and Narayan, 2000: 227).¹⁰ According to rational choice institutionalism, bridging social capital has a difficulty in formation on its own right, owing to the *collective action problem* (Warren, 1999: 333; Offe and Fuchs, 2002: 193; Kim, 2004: 86; Hall, 2010: 208).¹¹ In order to accumulate *bridging social capital*, institutionalisation of co-operation between self-interested actors is required accordingly.¹² There is an empirical study which shows that Korea has relatively weak bridging social capital compared to bonding social capital (Lee, 2008d: 933¹³).

The first chart of Figure 4 shows one example of trust in government measured by Edelman (2012).¹⁴ According to this survey, in Korea the media, comparatively speaking, is given more confidence from the public than the government, which is the other way round in the U.K.¹⁵ At the same time, in terms of the ranking of the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) in 2011, the U.K. was 16th, while Korea 43th (Lee and Jung, 2010: 406-411).¹⁶


Figure 4: Trust and corruption

(a) Trust in government and media: 2012



Source: compiled from www.edelman.com

(b) Corruption Perception Index (CPI)



Source: Compiled from Transparency International (1996, 2001, 2006 and 2011)

¹⁰ The logic of this typology is closely linked to Rothstein's 'dimension of interest and moral spheres' (2011: 20) and Wilson's typology of group politics (Wilson, 1989: 75-89; Knill and Tosun, 2012:21).

¹¹ As with the *prisoner's dilemma game* in micro economic theory, the lack of co-operation and rules make actors choose *dominant equilibrium*, which obstructs *Pareto optimal* resources distribution (Choi, 1998: 329; Coleman, 1990: 203-207; Hindmoor, 2006: 108-109)

¹² At the same time, for the smooth flow of communication between actors, networks are important, so that social capital approaches are also interwoven with governance approaches (Choi, 2010b: 4).

¹³ This study analyses that Nordic countries have strong public social capital, while Germany shows low levels in both types of social capital (Lee, 2008d: 933-934).

¹⁴ The results of any measurement depend on analysts, surveyees, timing and methods. For example, Fukuyama (1995:127) notes that Japan enjoys a high level of institutional trust, while in Korea, the private network is more pervasive. However, recent analyses have rejected Fukuyama's analysis (Park and Lee, 2009:123; Bae,2012: 11).

¹⁵ Meanwhile, according to World Values Survey (2005), the level of confidence in the government, civil servants and the press in Korea (45.8%, 63%, and 61.7% respectively) is higher than those in the U.K. (32.9%, 42%, and 12.9% respectively), while the level of confidence in the police is lower (57.9% versus 72.1%) (See also, Inoguchi, 2002: 378; Greer et al., 2011: 29; Kim, 2001a: 267).

¹⁶ The CPI is based on the perception of local residents, foreigners and entrepreneurs other than any real experiences of bribery (Anechiarico and Jacobs, 1996: 14-16; Kim, 2008a:164-169). In reality, the most vulnerable areas in Korea are construction, education and police, which consist of a large part of the civil service (ACRC, 2011)

Appendix 3: Merits and demerits of comparative studies

Strengths Comparative studies have largely four major merits. The first two points are related to the theory itself, while the third and the fourth are connected to the implications of real political life.

Firstly, comparative researches make it possible to verify causal relationship between variables. In scientific methods, researchers assume that every event has its own cause rather than being merely a coincidence (Babbie, 1973: 28). Like natural sciences, one of the most important purposes in social sciences is to provide an analysis on causality. Yet given the improbability of controlling the research environment in political science (Burnham et al., 2004: 60; Castles, 1998: 12), comparative studies are powerful methods which allow for the elimination of rival explanations about specific events (Landman, 2003: 4). A causality of particular events studied in just one country might not be applicable to another country, but comparison among several countries enables researchers to make general propositions.¹⁷ In other words, through comparative studies, researchers can test (verify or falsify) an existing hypothesis or theory; furthermore, they can build a new theory.

Secondly, using more than two variables in comparative studies allows for the formation of typologies (Peters, 1998a: 93). Classification can be a simple dichotomy, or it can be a more complex typology of governmental systems. As classification could simplify the real world, so it makes the world of politics less complex (Sartori, 1970: 1039). More importantly, each comparison provides scholars with another piece of accumulation with which to build a theoretical generalisation (Lim, 2006: 22).

Thirdly, as political scientists generally agree that research in their field should cover essential real-world problems (Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996: 5; George and Bennet, 2005: 263), comparative studies can be valuable tools to serve this purpose. The first objective of comparative politics is describing the political phenomena and events of a specific country or group of countries (Landman, 2003: 5), and contextual description from a comparative perspective allows political scientists to know what other countries are like. Moreover, this process enables comparativists to get a better grasp of their own context (Ragin, 1987: 11); thus, finally, to improve the understanding of their own country *per se* (Dogan and Pelassy, 1990: 8)

Last but not least, comparative studies could be the primary sources of improvement of existing policies and the introduction of new policies. If a specific policy of an individual country is similar to the present or past policies of other countries, through a comparison, government officials may predict the future of an existing policy (Burnham et al., 2004: 70; section 8-3-1) and capitalise on its implications. Making predictions about future policy

¹⁷ Hopkin goes even further by saying that 'If political science is to generate general propositions about political life, there is no alternative to comparison.' (2010: 289)

outcomes based on the generalisation drawn from comparisons between countries, demands great caution (Landman, 2003: 10), in that it is the most difficult stage of comparative politics. Moreover, since other countries' policies might be reviewed as a policy option, the outcomes of comparative studies could be a yardstick to adopt a new policy or a rich source of inspiration for practitioners. From the perspective of the policy making process (Dunn, 1994: 17), *inter alia*, in the stage of *agenda setting* and *comparison of policy alternatives*, comparative researches could be practical tools. For example, the Scandinavian office of Ombudsman, which is designed to protect the public against administrative abuse or inadequacy, has been adopted by many developed countries through those processes (Heady, 1979: 5; Ladi, 2005: 127). International organisations, in similar vein, have asked many developing countries to embrace various reform experiences of developed countries, such as privatisation, as a prerequisite for receiving aid (Peters, 1998a: 1, Chang, 2007: 13).

Avoiding pitfalls Although comparative studies might contribute to bridging the gap between theory and practice (George and Bennet, 2005: 265), there are also some potential pitfalls.

Firstly, for comparative analysis, '*selection bias*' may be the most serious threat to *internal validity*¹⁸ (Peters, 1998a: 51; Collier, 1995: 462; Hague and Harrop, 2007: 95), whilst other frequently mentioned problems such as *maturation*, *regression* (Namkoong, 2008: 175) and *extraneous event* – or *Galton's Problem* (Burnham et al., 2004: 74; Kim and Kang, 2004: 13) which are mainly problematic in laboratory experiments, are relatively marginal. As the essence of much of comparative politics is the intentional selection of countries, rather than random selection (Landman, 2003: 46), selection without cautious reflection may lead either to an overestimation of *spurious variables* that do not exist, or to an underestimation of *confounding variables* that *do* exist (Geddes, 1990: 132). To solve the problem of selection bias, 'most similar system design' or 'most different system design' strategy could be carefully adopted (Brans, 2007: 270). Besides, the choice of countries ought to reflect a substantive knowledge of parallel cases (Landman, 2003: 49).

Secondly, if the inferences of a comparative study cannot be extended beyond the scope of countries in the original analysis, the *external validity* of the study will be significantly decreased. In the first place, '*small N*' or '*too many variables, too few countries*' problems (Sartori, 1994: 16; Lim, 2006: 22; Hague and Harrop, 2007: 95), which means that a researcher has more inferences than implications observed (King et al., 1994: 119), might take place. In other words, if a study has too many unknowns and not enough equations, then finding the value of the unknowns is difficult (Landman, 2003: 41). The strategies of

¹⁸ *Internal validity* is the extent to which independent variables have a causal relationship with a dependent variable, and the precise direction of causality is from independent variables to dependent variable (Cook and Campbell, 1979: 50) in order to rule out rival explanations (Kidder, 1981: 7). On the other hand, *external validity* is the extent to which the research findings can be generalised to and applied to different settings (Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996: 589).

research to minimise these problems are; to increase the number of cases (Lijphart, 1971: 686); to use the most similar system design (Lim, 2006: 38); to complement cases by deploying the results of other researches; and to focus on the key explanatory factors (Landman, 2003: 42). Another potential pitfall is the '*travelling problem*', which means one political setting based on the experience of its own culture might not be meaningful in another setting (Peters, 1998a: 86; Burnham et al., 2004: 70). Although *rationalists* and *structuralists* tend to ignore this problem (Landman, 2003: 44), establishing the equivalence of theoretical concepts and indicators (Mayer, 1989: 57; Dogan and Pelassy, 1990: 37) is critical in order to evade impediments to the cross-contextual validity. Finally, since selecting particular time periods and drawing inferences about longer-term processes is one of the potential threats to *external* validity (Cook and Campbell, 1979: 74), researchers should carefully consider the time limits of their studies.

Thirdly, as some comparative studies are mostly dependent upon secondary analysis (Brans, 2007: 270), these analyses can be arguably unreliable, and not regarded as being based on empirical evidence. Moreover, a researcher might intentionally or unintentionally choose biased data which happen to fit the particular theory being tested (Landman, 2003: 50). Even some scholars, for example Wiarda (2007: 23), argue that global comparisons often include unreliable statistical data. Thus, to deal with this problem, the use of multiple sources can be helpful (Yin, 2003: 98).

Appendix 4: Pros and cons of case studies

In the first place, as case studies allow a focused and in-depth approach, they largely have a strong explanatory power where statistical methods are weak (George and Bennet, 2005: 21). Quantitative analysis might show a strong correlation between independent variables and dependent variables, but it typically does not tell us the exact chain of causal direction (Lim, 2006: 27). Ragin (1987: 27) argues that social phenomena have multiple causes which rarely operate in isolation, and a specific cause might have opposite effects depending on the context. To deal with this complex causality, case studies are usually much better suited for the task. Another advantage of case studies is the increased opportunity to use various sources of evidence (Yin, 1989: 97). As case studies deploy different sources of data to examine the same problem (Finders, 2001: 378), they can enable us to explore the same point from different angles (Hall and Hall, 1996: 44).

The case study approach, however, might have some problems. As with *comparative study*, case selection bias is a major threat to its *internal* validity (Flinders, 2001: 376; Bouckaert and Peter, 2004: 24-26). In addition, since it is difficult to explicitly separate one case from another, identifying scope and conditions of specific cases is a challenging task (George and Bennet, 2005: 25). A lack of representativeness of a case could also lead to a decrease in external validity (Rhodes 2008: 20; Flinders 2001: 378).

Appendix 5: Difficulties in assessing the results of reforms

It goes without saying that examination of the consequences of NPM reforms is important not only in order to know their exact impacts on the public sector but also to weigh the relative advantages of AQ, but unfortunately, few broad-scope researches on the outturn of the public sector reforms have been carried out (Pollitt, 2002: 279; Boyne et al., 2003: 2; James and van Thiel, 2011: 217-220). Before turning in subsequent sections, it is helpful to explore why systematic evidence of causal connections between original reform plans and their impacts is difficult to find, now that this exploration can allow us to speculate on the limit and the extent to which we could examine them (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2003: 12-21).

In the first place, social science has the following *fundamental difficulties* in dealing with social phenomena as compared with natural science (Nutley et al., 2007: 21 and see Chapter 1). Firstly, *multiple causal relationships* in the reform process make it difficult to draw a proper conclusion about whether recent changes have come from planned reform or not (Pollitt, 2002: 280). This is partly because a range of reforms tend to be put in place simultaneously and partly because the environment of reform which is influenced by numerous factors might be continuously changeable over time. For example, as far as a reform in organisational structure with operational changes is concerned, it is quite ambiguous which variables have played a key role in the reform results and which have not (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011: 16-17). Moreover, with the rapid development of ICT, it is rather equivocal as to what extent technology has had an impact on improvements in its own right (Figure 8-9; Draca et al., 2009: 121-122; Dunleavy et al., 2006: 216; Homburg, 2008: 115-117). In addition, contextual variations of each country, such as its constitution, the relationships between politicians and bureaucrats, and party systems, are likely to increase the burden on any analysis (For example, see Lijphart, 1999: 88, 112, 138, and Kriesi et al., 2008: 15). Secondly, various stakeholders might have *different perspectives* on the results of public sector reform (Boyne, 2008: 240). For example, politicians inside the government might try to find positive aspects of a new reform, whereas change gurus outside government who are likely to support government reform in the earlier stage might alter their viewpoint as the reform discloses unintended effects (Pollitt, 2003: 124; Oh, 2008a: 142-145; Park, 2008b: 190-191; Song, 2008: 277-279).¹⁹

Especially, *the acquisition of proper data* and analysis on a related reform is quite limited in the assessment of the consequences of the original plan (James and van Thiel, 2011: 217-218; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2003: 15-17, 118-119). Firstly, few eventual outcomes or *long-term data* have been accumulated (Kettl, 2005: 62).²⁰ For example, research studies on the performance improvement of quangos is mixed and inconsistent (van Thiel, 2004a:

¹⁹ At the same time, the people who are under appraisal might not be co-operative due to their concerns that the results of assessment could negatively influence the existing programme (Pollitt, 2003a: 116).

²⁰ Pollitt and Bouckaert point out that if we searched on the Internet, we could find only some relatively new information on the reform which had been recently introduced; but there would be much less information on its implementation process and any assessment (2011: 13).

195); thus there is a problem of reliability. One of the reasons for this difficulty emanates from the timing of the assessment (Pollitt, 2003: 40, 124). The performance of a reform, in general terms, needs quite a long time to be fully revealed, so that determining when and how to evaluate the performance is far from easy (Boyne, 2008: 243-245). Furthermore, not only a change of government but also the change in the size and shape of organisations add to the difficulties. The critical evaluation of a current government's reform is apt to be 'politically sensitive', while the arrival of a new government may lead to a negative assessment of a previous reform (Pollitt, 2003: 123; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011: 17).²¹ No current government wants to confront unwelcome comments which could affect the next election. For example, the US Congress tends to seek symbolic organisational rearrangements, but their legislators only seek 'ownership of enough turf to make a case for re-election'; thus, they easily lose interest in the operational consequences (Kettl, 2009: 76-85). Secondly, *assessment indicators* before and after a specific reform are often not identical (Collier, 2008: 49-51). For example, most performance indicators were not developed until performance management in the public sector was highlighted (James and van Thiel, 2011: 217). In addition, now that evaluation indicators and their contents have continuously evolved and changed, it is often almost impossible to compare them, despite having 'the same label' (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2003: 15-16; O'Mahony et al., 2008: 128-130; James and van Thiel, 2011: 218).

Thirdly, not only do few policymakers put a high value on feedback and evaluation (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011: 17), but also, for some commentators, the measurement of assessment indicators often leads to questions in terms of *objectivity or representativeness*.²² For example, James *et al.* suggest having diverse indicators regarding service-user orientation, such as 'number of complaints, and levels of maladministration and error', other than customer satisfaction surveys (2012: 65-66). For any government, it is more desirable to show a constant improvement of the service, in the sense that returning to the time before reform 'would not be politically feasible' (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011: 16-17).²³ Since the evaluation of reform is not extensively evaluated inside the government, it is more difficult for outside commentators to acquire proper information on it (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2003: 16).

Finally, *common comparison indicators* which could be shared across different countries are hard to find, since each state has its own trajectory, government structure, key concept of performance indicators and extent of reform (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2003: 12-14; Painter and Peters, 2010: 20; Bouckaert, Peters and Verhoest, 2010: 239-252; Bouckaert 2007: 46-54).

²¹ At the same time, politicians might think that it is somewhat unfair that the present government are criticised because of the results of the previous government's policy (Pollitt, 2003a: 46). Therefore, they might rather choose a new policy rather than risk a poor evaluation of the existing policy (Walker, 2001: 326).

²² If measurable targets are preferred rather than unquantifiable ones (Pollitt, 2003a: 46-48), then there will be a danger of the duality of error (Hammond, 1996: 40-48; Type I and II errors, Neyman and Pearson, 1933: 296, 336).

²³ For this reason, the transitional costs of the reform might not be calculated (Pollitt, 2003a: 38-39).

Furthermore, the targets of public sector reform might have trade-offs and contradictions which cannot be harmoniously reconciled (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011: 187, see section 4-2).

Appendix 6: Changes in numbers of UK NDPBs (Figure 5-20)

	Executive NDPB	Advisory NDPB	Tribunals NDPB	Independent monitoring boards	Total Number	Total
1979	492	1,485	70	120	2,167	2167
1982	450	1,173	64	123	1,810	1810
1983	431	1,074	65	121	1,691	1691
1984	402	1,087	71	121	1,681	1681
1985	399	1,069	65	121	1,654	1654
1986	406	1,062	64	126	1,658	1658
1987	396	1,057	64	126	1,643	1643
1988	390	1,066	65	127	1,648	1648
1989	395	969	64	127	1,555	1555
1990	374	971	66	128	1,539	1539
1991	375	874	64	131	1,444	1444
1992	369	846	66	131	1,412	1412
1993	358	829	68	134	1,389	1389
1994	325	814	71	135	1,345	1345
1995	320	699	73	135	1,227	1227
1996	309	674	75	136	1,194	1194
1997	305	610	75	138	1,128	1128
1998	304	563	69	137	1,073	1073
1999	306	544	69	138	1,057	1057
2000	297	536	61	141	1,035	1035
2001	276	460	149	140	1,025	1025
2002	192	428	36	141	834	797
2003	206	422	33	150	849	811
2004	210	407	34	152	803	803
2005	211	458	42	151	862	862
2006	199	447	41	149	836	836
2007	203	441	34	149	827	827
2008	198	410	33	149	790	790
2009	192	405	19	150	766	766

Source: compiled from public bodies 1997 - 2009

Appendix 7: GDP growth rates and civil servants growth rates in Korea (from 1966 to 2011) (Figure 7-8)

	GDP growth (annual %)	Civil servants growth rate (%)
1964	7.56	
1965	5.19	
1966	12.70	9.10
1967	6.10	8.64
1968	11.70	7.01
1969	14.10	2.66
1970	8.34	4.08

1971	8.24	4.48
1972	4.47	0.78
1973	12.03	-3.21
1974	7.18	2.56
1975	5.95	1.58
1976	10.57	3.49
1977	9.99	3.02
1978	9.30	3.18
1979	6.78	0.01
1980	-1.49	9.08
1981	6.16	7.52
1982	7.33	-4.77
1983	10.77	0.39
1984	8.10	0.74
1985	6.80	1.74
1986	10.62	2.84
1987	11.10	0.43
1988	10.64	3.21
1989	6.74	4.78
1990	9.16	4.62
1991	9.39	2.45
1992	5.88	2.17
1993	6.13	0.58
1994	8.54	-0.17
1995	9.17	-1.58
1996	7.00	0.39
1997	4.65	0.23
1998	-6.85	-1.15
1999	9.49	-1.43
2000	8.49	-0.34
2001	3.97	0.42
2002	7.15	2.62
2003	2.80	3.04
2004	4.62	1.67
2005	3.96	-2.91
2006	5.18	3.18
2007	5.11	2.46
2008	2.30	0.48
2009	0.32	0.32
2010	6.32	0.51
2011	3.63	-0.11

Source: extracted and analysed from <http://databank.worldbank.org>, Korean Civil Service Statistics 1966-2011

Appendix 8: GDP growth rates and civil servants growth rates in the U.K. (from 1968 to 2011)

(Figure 6-1)

	GDP growth (annual %)	Civil servants growth rate (%)
1968	3.98	
1969	2.05	-1.30
1970	6.92	2.49
1971	2.00	0.26
1972	3.63	-0.14
1973	7.31	-1.32
1974	-1.68	0.25
1975	-0.68	-0.07
1976	2.80	7.38
1977	2.36	0.14
1978	3.40	-1.10
1979	2.75	-0.65

1980	-2.18	-3.49
1981	-1.32	-4.55
1982	2.09	-3.39
1983	3.62	-3.06
1984	2.67	-2.06
1985	3.60	-3.72
1986	4.01	0.49
1987	4.56	-2.66
1988	5.03	-2.03
1989	2.28	-1.62
1990	0.78	-1.52
1991	-1.39	2.07
1992	0.15	-1.96
1993	2.22	-2.51
1994	4.28	-4.33
1995	3.04	-4.32
1996	2.88	-3.89
1997	3.31	-2.54
1998	3.51	-0.70
1999	3.17	3.34
2000	4.24	1.53
2001	2.89	1.60
2002	2.43	4.48
2003	3.81	3.24
2004	2.91	1.70
2005	2.77	-1.64
2006	2.60	-1.99
2007	3.63	-3.90
2008	-0.97	-1.34
2009	-3.97	-0.37
2010	1.80	0.43
2011	0.76	-11.54

Source: extracted and analysed from <http://databank.worldbank.org>, Civil Service Statistics 1970-2011

Appendix 9: Changes in British executive agencies: numbers of staff (from 1988 to 2012) (Figures 5-17 and 18)

	administration support	Maintenance, promotion and business	military	regulation	research	Social Order	Welfare
1988	3,205	2,587	0	0	0	0	0
1989	3,377	3,049	0	43	613	0	539
Apr 1990	3,740	9,616	0	8,227	1,860	0	37,394
Apr 1991	4,191	26,739	22,073	8,564	3,148	1,231	111,456
Apr 1992	11,522	29,125	23,861	8,634	4,275	1,271	118,586
1994	10,980	37,660	23,310	9,380	3,710	45,340	131,610
1995	10,270	36,850	29,350	9,810	3,660	55,670	126,260
1996	12,990	35,070	41,180	9,300	2,030	55,000	123,690
1997	9,310	73,170	58,410	9,440	1,830	54,570	119,410
1998	9,850	72,330	54,660	10,310	1,930	55,780	113,190
Apr 1999	8,646	28,242	57,283	10,950	1,960	55,450	108,531
Apr 2000	8,780	27,890	59,850	11,610	2,050	57,080	113,090
Mar 2002	9,990	30,120	41,890	11,230	2,400	61,040	111,980
Mar 2004	10,440	31,130	45,200	15,090	2,410	63,990	106,670
2006	9,340	28,170	7,920	16,500	3,790	80,490	102,600
2007	13,220	28,490	7,470	16,870	3,940	98,170	96,040

2008	12,960	28,390	7,710	16,370	3,850	99,590	93,230
2009	12,970	27,860	6,850	16,010	3,800	100,550	85,570
2010	9,490	25,130	6,910	15,550	3,660	98,910	97,090
Apr 2011	9,130	24,690	6,570	13,700	3,480	98,690	86,480
Dec 2011	8,360	23,770	6,410	12,980	3,200	91,470	240
Apr 2012	8,310	23,200	6,100	12,920	3,210	82,760	240

Source: extracted from civil service statistics 1988-2010, Public sector employment 2011 Q4, 2012 Q1

Appendix 10: Changes in British executive agencies: numbers (from 1988 to 2012) (Figures 5-17 and 18)

	administration support	Maintenance, promotion and business	military	regulation	research	Social Order	Welfare
1988	1	2	0	0	0	0	0
1989	2	4	0	1	2	0	1
Apr 1990	3	8	0	7	4	0	4
Apr 1991	4	17	6	8	6	1	6
Apr 1992	10	23	8	9	9	1	6
1994	11	29	13	12	9	5	9
1995	10	30	17	14	9	6	10
1996	12	32	23	14	4	6	9
1997	9	31	37	14	4	7	8
1998	11	31	38	13	4	7	8
Apr 1999	10	30	35	13	4	7	7
Apr 2000	9	29	36	13	4	6	9
Mar 2002	9	28	29	13	5	9	7
Mar 2004	10	29	25	13	4	9	7
2006	9	23	3	17	5	9	7
2007	10	22	3	17	5	10	7
2008	10	22	3	17	5	10	7
2009	10	21	2	15	4	10	5
2010	10	20	2	13	3	10	4
Apr 2011	10	21	2	11	3	10	3
Dec 2011	9	23	2	12	2	9	1
Apr 2012	9	23	2	12	2	9	1

Source: extracted from civil service statistics 1988-2010, Public sector employment 2011 Q4, 2012 Q1

Appendix 11: Expansion of BEAs: the number of agencies which were newly created (Figure 8-3)

	External	Regulatory	Internal	Research
1988	1	1	0	0
1989	1	1	0	0
1990	9	6	0	1
1991	7	2	2	1
1992	3	2	6	1
1993	8	1	2	0
1994	3	2	2	1
1995	3	2	2	2
1996	8	2	12	2

1997	0	1	7	3
1998	0	0	2	1
1999	0	1	4	0
2000	3	0	2	0
2001	3	0	4	0

Source: extracted and analysed from OPSR (2002: 50-55)

Appendix 12: Expansion of BEAs: the staff numbers of agencies which were newly created (Figure 7-10)

	Numbers of staff
1988	2,790
1989	100
1990	58,055
1991	83,725
1992	3,095
1993	60,675
1994	6,470
1995	16,570
1996	21,111
1997	8,425
1998	3,420
1999	8,950
2000	2,440
2001	14,440

Source: extracted and analysed from OPSR (2002: 50-55)

Appendix 13: List of KEAs (as of 2011) (section 7-2)

National Institute for International Education	74
National Science Museum	74
Gwacheon National Science Museum	80
Defense Media Agency	164
National Forensic Service	325
The National Museum of Contemporary Art	100
KTV (Government Broadcasting Service)	112
National Theater of Korea	96
National Seed Management Office	184
National Fisheries Research and Development Institute	533
Korea National College of Agriculture and Fisheries	82
National Rehabilitation Center	308
National Mokpo Hospital	71
National Seoul Hospital	307
National Gongju Hospitals	131
National Seoul, Naju Hospital	184
National Bugok Hospitals	181
National Chuncheon Hospitals	117
National Masan Hospital	96

National Geographic Information Institute	106
Ulsan Regional Maritime Affairs and Port Office	97
Daesan Regional Maritime Affairs and Port Office	74
Regional Statistics Offices * 5	1,589
Statistical Research Institute	43
National institute of Biological Resources	102
National Police Hospital	586
National Research Institute of Cultural Properties	186
National Institute of Horticultural & Herbal Science	323
National Livestock Research Institute	319
Korea Forest Research Institute	283
National Natural Recreation Forest Office	83
Korea Aviation Meteorological Agency	113
National Maritime Maintenance Workshop	214
Total number of staff	7,337

Source: MoPAS (2012c)

Appendix 14: Expansion of KEAs (Figure 8-4 (a))

	internal	external	research	hospital
2000	2	6	1	1
2001	2	4	5	2
2002	0	0	0	0
2003	0	0	0	0
2004	0	0	0	0
2005	0	0	0	0
2006	11	3	5	7
2007	0	0	2	0
2008	0	1	0	0
2009	0	1	0	0
2010	0	0	0	0
2011	0	1	0	0

Source: extracted and analysed from KAPS (2011: 22-25), Moon and Lee (2010: 42)

Appendix 15: Expansion of IAs (Figure 8-4(b))

	Internal	External (including promotion, transfer)	Research	Regulatory, inspectional
2001	3	15	35	4
2002	0	0	0	2
2003	9	21	2	1
2004	0	10	0	6
2005	0	2	1	2
2006	0	1	0	0
2007	0	1	0	0

Source: extracted and analysed from Kitazawa (2005: 24-25)

Appendix 16: World ranking of museum attendance (2011) (Tables 6-9 and 7-12)

1	8,880,000	Louvre (Paris)
2	6,004,254	Metropolitan Museum of Art (New York)
3	5,848,534	British Museum (London)
4	5,253,216	National Gallery (London)
5	4,802,287	Tate Modern (London)
6	4,392,252	National Gallery of Art (Washington)
7	3,849,577	National Palace Museum (Taipei)
8	3,613,076	Centre Pompidou (Paris)
9	3,239,549	National Museum of Korea (Seoul)
10	3,154,000	Musée D'Orsay (Paris)
11	2,911,767	Museo Nacional del Prado (Madrid)
12	2,879,686	State Hermitage Museum (St Petersburg)
13	2,814,746	Museum of Modern Art (New York)
14	2,789,400	Victoria & Albert Museum (London)
15	2,705,529	Reina Sofía (Madrid)
16	2,355,956	National Folk Museum of Korea (Seoul)
17	2,288,117	Centro Cultural Banco do Brasil (Rio)
18	1,880,104	National Portrait Gallery (London)
19	1,742,970	Galleria degli Uffizi (Florence)
20	1,727,192	Shanghai Museum (Shanghai)
21	1,724,271	Moscow Kremlin Museums (Moscow)
22	1,629,333	Tokyo National Museum (Tokyo)
23	1,600,298	Van Gogh Museum (Amsterdam)
24	1,598,858	Caixa Forum (Madrid)
25	1,500,000	Grand Palais (Paris)
26	1,494,728	National Museum of Scotland (Edinburgh)
27	1,485,580	Gyeongju National Museum (Gyeongju)
28	1,476,505	Tate Britain (London)
29	1,457,028	Musée Quai Branly (Paris)
30	1,440,599	Art Institute of Chicago (Chicago)
31	1,405,398	Museum of Fine Arts (Boston)
32	1,403,524	Palazzo Ducale (Venice)
33	1,368,100	Museum of New Zealand Te Papa (Wellington)
34	1,344,915	State Tretyakov Gallery (Moscow)
35	1,344,112	De Young Museum (San Francisco)
36	1,305,000	Pergamonmuseum (Berlin)
37	1,274,950	Art Gallery of New South Wales (Sydney)
38	1,244,702	Acropolis Museum (Adelaide)
39	1,238,434	Lacma (Los Angeles)
40	1,231,104	Galleria dell'Accademia (Florence)
41	1,200,000	Museo de Bellas Artes (Buenos Aires)
42	1,197,609	Teatre-Museu (Dalí Figueres)
43	1,190,062	Saatchi Gallery (London)
44	1,167,795	Getty Center (Los Angeles)
45	1,155,036	Centro Cultural Banco do Brasil (Brasília)
46	1,107,054	Guggenheim Museum (New York)
47	1,100,000	SAAM (Washington)
48	1,070,390	Museo Thyssen-Bornemisza (Madrid)
49	1,064,112	National Museum of Contemporary Art (Seoul)
50	1,058,114	Centro Cultural Banco do Brasil (São Paulo)
51	1,000,000	Rijksmuseum (Amsterdam)
52	981,061	Kelvingrove Art Gallery and Museum (Glasgow)
53	962,358	Guggenheim (Bilbao)
54	948,345	National Portrait Gallery (Washington)
55	945,210	Freer and Sackler Galleries (Washington)
56	938,405	MNAC (Barcelona)
57	925,574	Scottish National Gallery (Edinburgh)

58	915,290	Musée d'Art Moderne de la Ville/ARC (Paris)
59	912,000	Royal Ontario Museum (Toronto)
60	903,000	Neues Museum (Berlin)
61	895,410	Australian Centre for the Moving Image (Melbourne)
62	894,534	MACBA (Barcelona)
63	890,008	Royal Academy (London)
64	888,633	Belvedere (Vienna)
65	877,692	Queensland Gallery of Modern Art (Brisbane)
66	825,837	Serpentine Gallery (London)
67	815,020	NGV InterNational (Melbourne)
68	814,117	Israel Museum (Jerusalem)
69	782,529	Caixa Forum (Barcelona)
70	768,829	Inhotim (Brumadinho)
71	752,000	Ashmolean Museum (Oxford)
72	732,475	Ian Potter Centre: NGV Australia (Melbourne)
73	723,625	National Gallery of Australia (Canberra)
74	710,828	Montreal Museum of Fine Arts (Montreal)
75	700,408	SFMoMA (San Francisco)
76	700,000	Bundeskunsthalle (Bonn)
77	697,000	Musée de l'Orangerie (Paris)
78	695,116	Museo delle Porcellane (Florence)
79	692,034	Philadelphia Museum of Art (Philadelphia)
80	680,242	National Art Center Tokyo (Tokyo)
81	652,447	Museu Coleção Berardo (Lisbon)
82	646,375	Istanbul Modern (Istanbul)
83	629,057	Louisiana (Humlebaek)
84	627,453	Art Gallery of Ontario (Toronto)
85	624,412	National Gallery of Ireland (Dublin)
86	623,039	Hirshhorn Museum (Washington)
87	613,373	Seattle Art Museum, Downtown (Seattle)
88	609,637	Virginia Museum of Fine Arts (Richmond)
89	608,680	Gallery of Modern Art (Glasgow)
90	593,945	Kunsthistorisches Museum (Vienna)
91	592,231	Huntington Library, Art Collections (San Marino)
92	590,163	Birmingham Museum and Art Gallery (Birmingham)
93	583,412	Tate Liverpool (Liverpool)
94	578,020	Frederik Meijer Sculpture Park (Grand Rapids)
95	574,739	Albertina (Vienna)
96	571,368	Reggia di Caserta (Caserta)
97	570,000	Reggia di Venaria (Reale Venaria)
98	569,583	Gemäldegalerie Alte Meister (Dresden)
99	558,641	Tel Aviv Museum of Art (Tel Aviv)
100	556,500	Art Gallery of South Australia (Adelaide)

Source: the Art Newspaper (2012: 35-36)

Appendix 17: Numbers of annual visitors to the Tate Galleries (Figure 6-2)

	Tate Gallery	Tate Liverpool	St Ives	Modern
1980	1,330,937			
1981	885,168			
1982	1,219,102			
1983	1,270,925			
1984	1,265,605			
1985	980,105			
1986	1,137,070			
1987	1,725,084			
1988	1,581,467	490,942		

1989	1,234,281	687,356		
1990	1,562,431	626,279		
1991	1,816,421	597,258		
1992	1,575,637	550,735		
1993	1,760,091	624,111	132,302	
1994	2,226,399	539,678	181,044	
1995	1,769,662	499,584	164,931	
1996	2,203,001	457,580	167,147	
1997	1,757,735	131,662	174,809	
1998	2,180,665	525,462	161,289	
1999	1,822,427	681,670	122,693	
2000	1,204,127	665,640	132,302	
2001	987,746	626,035	155,638	3,560,296
2002	1,056,241	440,849	166,377	3,055,546
2003	1,106,911	549,441	204,177	3,649,666
2004	1,088,005	586,917	184,192	4,441,225
2005	1,729,692	666,258	180,771	3,902,017
2006	1,597,359	556,976	193,700	4,895,073

Source: compiled from Tate Report (1980-2006)

Appendix 18: Components of capital expenditure (Tate Galleries) (Figure 6-12)

	Purchased works of art	Donated works of art	Other fixed assets
2002-03	7.1	4.2	3.3
2003-04	4	12.8	1.4
2004-05	4.8	4.2	3.7
2005-06	7.4	6	6.1
2006-07	10.9	3.9	7.3
2007-08	5.3	63.1	8.4
2008-09	32.7	64	16.2
2009-10	4.3	9.6	21.8
2010-11	4	4.3	27
2011-12	4.6	3.3	40

Source: extracted and analysed from Tate Annual Report (2000-2012)

Appendix 19: Components of operating expenditure (Tate Galleries) (Figure 6-12)

	2004-5	2005-6	2006-7	2007-8	2008-9	2009-10	2011-12
Public programme	29.6	32.8	36.6	40.9	38.9	37.9	38.7
Trading costs	20.2	21.8	23.3	24.0	26.9	23.8	22.1
Support costs	20.4	22.4	21.7	23.0	15.0	14.8	15.7
Other costs of generating income	3.6	3.2	2.5	2.6	2.8	2.7	3.1
Costs of generating voluntary income	2.0	2.4	3.2	3.4	2.5	1.8	2.2
Other costs	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.8
Governance costs	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.6	0.6
Investment management costs	0.01	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.02

Source: extracted and analysed from Tate Annual Report (2000-2012)

Appendix 20: Grant-in-aid for collection purchase (Tate Gallery, 1966-92) (Figure 6-10)

	Purchasing funds	adjusted
1966-67	102,500	850,000
1970-71	265,000	1,900,000
1971-72	265,000	1,800,000
1972-73	265,000	1,600,000
1973-74	265,000	1,500,000
1974-75	265,000	1,300,000
1975-76	570,000	2,200,000
1976-77	570,000	1,900,000
1977-78	570,000	1,600,000
1980-81	1,888,000	3,700,000
1981-82	1,794,000	3,200,000
1984-85	2,041,000	2,900,000
1985-86	1,815,000	2,500,000
1988-89	1,815,000	2,200,000
1990-91	1,815,000	1,900,000
1991-92	1,815,000	1,815,000

* Adjusted Purchasing Funds are expressed in 1991/92 prices. Inflation rates are based on <http://safalra.com>
Source: compiled from Tate Trustees (1967-92)

Appendix 21: Changes of self-generated income level (Tate Galleries) (Figure 6-11)

	Grant-in-Aid	Self-generated income
2002-03	27.2	37.8
2003-04	29.5	34.2
2004-05	28.6	38.7
2005-06	29.8	42.4
2006-07	30.7	44.9
2007-08	31.7	47.7
2008-09	32.5	53.9
2009-10	33.4	49
2010-11	32.3	51.9
2011-12	32.8	50.3

Source: compiled from Tate Annual Accounts (2002-12)

Appendix 22: Components of income (Tate Modern, 2004-12) (Figure 6-10)

	2004-05	2005-06	2006-07	2007-08	2008-09	2009-10	2010-11	2011-12
Donated works of art	4.2	6.0	3.8	63.1	64	9.6	4.3	3.3
Grant-in-Aid	30.0	31.8	34.1	45.9	54	56	54.7	45.1
Trading income	23.8	25.5	27.5	26.5	29.4	26.7	27	26.7
Other voluntary income	10.6	10.7	14.2	16.9	27	17.6	20.1	20.5
Income from charitable activities	7.1	9.0	7.2	8.3	10.4	7.8	9.9	8.5
Investment income	7.2	7.4	7.7	9.1	8.6	2	1	0.5

Activities for generating funds	5.4	6.6	6.3	5.7	6.2	5.7	4.9	7.6
Other income	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.8

Source: compiled from Tate Annual Accounts (2004-12)

Appendix 23: Members of the Board of Trustees and their tenures (Tate Galleries) (section 6-5-2-2)

Name	Term of office	Tenure (year)
John Piper, CH (NGLT 1968~)	1946-1961, 1968~1974	15
Sir Colin Anderson (Chairman: 1960-1967)	1952~1967	15
Lord Robbins	1953-1959, 1962-1967	13
Ceri Richards	1958-1965	7
Roland Penrose	1959~1966.6	7
Robert Sainsbury (Chairman 1969-1973)	1959~1966.6, 1966.6~1973.6	14
Adrian Stokes	1960-1967	7
Anthony Lousada (Vice-Chairman) Chairman 1967-1969	1962-1969	7
Victor Pasmore	1963~1966.7	3
Andrew Forge	1964~1971.9, 1972.8~1974	9
Dame Barbara Hepworth, DBE	1965~1972.8	7
Herbert Read	1965-1968	3
Geoffrey Jellicoe, CBE, FRIBA	1966.12~1973.12	7
Stewart Mason (TGLT 1971-1973)	1966.6~1973.6	7
Phillip King	1967-1969	2
Edward Power	1968-1975	7
Niall MacDermot, OBE, QC	1969-1976	7
Howard Hodgkin (TGLT 1974~)	1970~1976	6
Sebastian de Ferranti	1971.1~1978	7
Lord Harlech, KCMG	1971.8~1978	7
Colin St John Wilson (NGLT 1977-1980)	1973.12~1980	7
Lord Alan Bullock (Chairman until 3 July 1980)	1973.6~1980	7
Francis Graham-Harrison, CB	1975-1982	7
Paul Huxley	1975-1982	7
Lord Richard Attenborough	1975-1982, 1994.3-1996	9
Lord Hutchinson (Chairman from 4 July 1980, until 9.1984)	1977~1984.9	7
Rita Donagh	1977-1984	7
Peter Palumbo (Lord Palumbo)	1978~1985.11	7
Peter Moores	1978~1985.3	7
Patrick Heron	1980.6~1987	7
Richard Rogers (Chairman 1984-1988)	1981.1~1988	7
Anthony Caro	1982~1989	7
Sir Rex Richards (NGLT 1991-3)	1982-1988, 1991.6~1993	6
The Countess of Airlie CVO	1983.1~1995.1	12
Caryl Hubbard (National Gallery Liason Trustee)	1983.12~1991.5	8
John Golding	1984.5~1991.5	7
David Puttman	1985.12~1992	7
Gilbert de Botton	1985.3~1992.3	7

Sir Mark Weinberg	1985.3~1992.3	7
William Govett	1988.1~1993	5
Paula Ridley (Reappointed 1993)	1988.4~1998	10
Dennis Stevenson (Chairman from 1989)	1988.9~1998	10
Michael Craig-Martin	1989.4~1999	10
Christopher Le Brun	1990.1~1995.1	5
Richard Deacon	1991.5~1996	5
Janet de Botton	1992.3~2002.3	10
David Verey (Reappointed 1997) Chairman	1992.3~2004	12
David Gordon	1993.4~1998	5
Sir Richard Carew Pole	1993.4~2003.4	10
Peter Doig	1995.11~2000	5
Dawn Ades	1995.4~2005.4	10
Bill Woodrow	1996 ~2001.6	5
Sir Christopher Mallaby	1997~2002.11	5
Victoria Barnsley	1998.8~2007.6	9
Jennifer Latto	1998.8~2007.6	9
John Studzinski	1998.8~2007.6	9
Jon Snow	1999~2008.3	9
Gillian Wearing	2000.3~2005.3	5
Chris Ofili	2000~2005.11	5
Julian Opie	2001~2006.10	5
Sir Howard Davies	2002.5~2010.5	8
Paul Myners	2003~2008	5
Helen Alexander	2003~2011	8
Melanie Clore	2004~2008	4
Anish Kapoor	2005.11~2009.11	4
Fiona Rae	2005~2009.3	4
Jeremy Deller	2007.1~2011.1	4

Source: compiled from Tate Trustees (1967-2002), Tate Annual Accounts (2002-12)

Appendix 24: Numbers of annual visitors to the MMCA (1986-2011) (Figure 7-12)

	Charged	Free	Total
1986	82,243	161,687	243,930
1987	171,389	152,047	323,436
1988	182,072	177,546	359,618
1989	174,364	121,311	295,675
1990	159,948	243,869	403,817
1991	169,853	162,347	332,200
1992	224,125	183,850	407,975
1993	383,765	321,041	704,806
1994	349,180	424,919	774,099
1995	280,634	396,316	676,950
1996	297,173	642,335	939,508

1997	285,318	624,554	909,872
1998	334,870	554,074	888,944
1999	500,234	643,695	1,143,929
2000	655,216	723,424	1,378,640
2001	763,352	631,337	1,394,689
2002	508,837	406,398	915,235
2003	501,823	421,909	923,732
2004	336,257	366,532	702,789
2005	395,248	403,809	799,057
2006	347,106	315,854	662,960
2007	522,482	254,357	776,839
2008	368,570	457,562	826,132
2009	320,525	786,683	1,107,208
2010	213,459	801,595	1,015,054
2011	263,741	800,371	1,064,112

Source: extracted and analysed from MMCA (2013a: 239; MoCA: 2011a: 170)

Appendix 25: Changes in income from admission fees (Figure 7-19)

	Pound (1pound =1800won)	Adjusted prices
1986	8,611	24,496
1987	44,111	121,770
1988	66,667	171,764
1989	60,411	147,251
1990	40,558	91,054
1991	43,124	88,549
1992	57,009	110,213
1993	85,695	158,080
1994	80,026	138,917
1995	65,243	108,399
1996	74,809	118,458
1997	91,418	138,607
1998	109,732	154,746
1999	135,597	189,680
2000	156,346	213,873
2001	148,935	195,774
2002	259,315	331,703
2003	245,737	303,664
2004	197,275	235,327
2005	314,185	364,741
2006	419,141	475,918
2007	466,398	516,487
2008	370,482	391,949
2009	439,527	452,519
2010	253,183	253,183

2011	359,966	346,121
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Adjusted Purchasing Funds are expressed in 2010 prices
Source: extracted and analysed from MMCA (2013a: 242); <http://kosis.kr>

Appendix 26: Changes in grant-in-aid (MoCA) (£, thousand: 1 pound = 1,800 won) (Figure 7-18)

	Pound (1pound =1800won)	Adjusted prices
1986	6,007	17,088
1987	3,192	8,813
1988	1,750	4,508
1989	1,687	4,113
1990	1,853	4,159
1991	2,284	4,690
1992	2,596	5,019
1993	2,842	5,243
1994	2,760	4,791
1995	3,129	5,199
1996	3,647	5,775
1997	4,516	6,848
1998	4,057	5,721
1999	4,441	6,213
2000	4,906	6,711
2001	6,797	8,935
2002	9,170	11,730
2003	8,141	10,060
2004	11,857	14,144
2005	11,637	13,509
2006	12,218	13,873
2007	13,197	14,614
2008	13,219	13,985
2009	13,276	13,669
2010	13,557	13,557
2011	9,118	8,768

* Grant-in-aids are adjusted to the inflation rate and expressed in 2010 prices which are based on <http://kosis.kr>

* Excluding Seoul branch

Source: extracted and analysed from MoCA Annual Report (2004-2012)

Appendix 27: Changes in operating expenditure (MoCA) (£, millions: 1 pound = 1,800 won) (Figure 7-20)

	Purchased and conserved works of art	staff cost and fixed cost	Public programme	Facilities
2004	3.062	2.929	1.532	4.334
2005	4.452	3.935	2.350	0.900
2006	4.729	2.774	3.905	0.810
2007	4.451	3.539	3.793	1.146
2008	2.846	3.701	5.403	1.271
2009	2.276	3.781	1.250	2.188
2010	2.272	3.770	2.865	4.650

2011	2.159	3.943	1.875	1.141
2012	2.159	3.923	2.374	1.141

Source: extracted and analysed from MoCA (2005b: 15; 2007b: 85; 2008b: 85; 2009a: 19; 2010a: 19; 2011a: 22-23; 2012a: 22) and MMCA (2013a: 23)


Appendix 28: Changes in staff numbers (MoCA) (Figure 7-17)

	number of staff
1969	8
1970	8
1971	8
1972	20
1973	20
1974	20
1975	20
1976	20
1977	19
1978	20
1979	20
1980	22
1981	29
1982	30
1983	30
1984	30
1985	30
1986	100
1987	100
1988	100
1989	100
1990	99
1991	99
1992	99
1993	97
1994	92
1995	92
1996	91
1997	91
1998	85
1999	84
2000	84
2001	84
2002	89
2003	89
2004	92
2005	92

2006	100
2007	100
2008	100
2009	100
2010	100
2011	100
2012	100
2013	100

Source: www.law.go.kr (Presidential Decree on the Organisation of the MoCA from 1969 to 2011)

Appendix 29: GDP growth rates: Scandinavian countries (1980-2001) (Figure 8-1)



Source: data compiled and analysed from the World Bank (<http://databank.worldbank.org/data/>)

Appendix 30: Correlation between the attendance figures of Tate Modern and total overseas visitor numbers of the U.K. (section 6-5-1)

	Overseas visitor numbers	Attendance figures of Tate Modern
2002	22.307	4,358
2003	22.787	4,226
2004	25.678	4,148
2005	28.039	3,958
2006	30.654	5,235
2007	30.87	5,237
2008	30.142	4,648
2009	28.199	4,788
2010	28.295	5,035

Source: data compiled and analysed from the World Bank (<http://databank.worldbank.org/data/>) and Tate Reports (2002-2010)


Appendix 31: International tourism, number of arrivals (section 7-5-1)

	France	Italy	Japan	Korea	Germany	UK	US
1995	60.033	31.052	3.345	3.753	14.847	21.719	43.49
1996	62.406	32.943	3.837	3.684	15.205	22.936	46.636
1997	66.591	34.692	4.218	3.908	15.837	23.215	47.875

1998	70.109	34.933	4.106	4.25	16.511	23.71	46.377
1999	73.147	36.516	4.438	4.66	17.116	23.341	48.509
2000	77.19	41.181	4.757	5.322	18.983	23.212	51.238
2001	75.202	39.563	4.772	5.147	17.861	20.982	46.927
2002	77.012	39.799	5.239	5.347	17.969	22.307	43.581
2003	75.048	39.604	5.212	4.753	18.399	22.787	41.218
2004	74.433	37.071	6.138	5.818	20.137	25.678	46.086
2005	74.988	36.513	6.728	6.023	21.5	28.039	49.206
2006	77.916	41.058	7.334	6.155	23.569	30.654	50.977
2007	80.853	43.654	8.347	6.448	24.421	30.87	55.979
2008	79.218	42.734	8.351	6.891	24.884	30.142	57.937
2009	76.764	43.239	6.79	7.818	24.22	28.199	54.884
2010	77.148	43.626	8.611	8.798	26.875	28.295	59.791


Source: data compiled and analysed from the World Bank (<http://databank.worldbank.org/data/>)

Appendix 32: Comparison of lame duck rates of Korean presidents (the ratio of negative appraisal of the performance of the current Present) (quarterly surveyed)



Source: data compiled from <http://www.gallup.co.kr/>

Appendix 33: Expansion of devolved BEAs



Source: extracted and analysed from OPSR (2002: 50-55)

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