IDENTITY AND FOREIGN POLICY-MAKING:
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF
SELF-OTHER PERCEPTIONS IN EU AND RUSSIAN
PEACE-MAKING TOWARDS THE PALESTINIAN
STATEHOOD, 2000-2012

“An Analysis of the Role of Identity in the Process of
Peace-Making in the Middle East"

Submitted by Malath Abed Elraheem Ouda Alagha to the University of Exeter as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Politics in July 2014

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I certify that all material in this thesis which is not my own work has been identified and that no material has previously been submitted and approved for the award of a degree by this or any other University.

Signature: …..Malath Alagha……..23/07/2014........................................
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ABSTRACT

This thesis seeks to answer the following question: How and to what extent does identity and Self-Other perception influence the foreign policy of the EU and Russia toward the establishment of a sovereign and viable Palestinian State?

The thesis scrutinises the assumption that identity and Self-perception as well as perception of ‘otherness’ play a vital role in defining foreign policy-making, with policy toward the Middle East being no exception. The investigation focuses on how the EU’s and Russia’s desire to reinforce their ‘global actorness’ on the international stage informs their involvement in the Middle East peace process. This assumption brings into the analysis the dynamic of constructivism in the shaping of foreign policy. Through a constructivist approach, the thesis attempts to explore how Self-Other perception informs foreign policy-making, specifically by the EU and Russia, in relation to Palestinian statehood. Thus the thesis problematises existing views about the role of established IR schools in understanding foreign policy-making (namely, in terms of peace-making). The study seeks to deepen our understanding of the role of identity and Self-Other perception in EU and Russian foreign policy-making by going beyond conventional understanding of foreign policy-making that are fixated on ‘power’, with special reference to the question of Palestinian statehood.

In this vein, I advance the argument that, contrary to the old assumptions of schools such as realism and liberalism, there is a role played by identity and ideas that needs to be assessed in the context of EU and Russian peace-making in the Middle East. The thesis tests these assumptions using a qualitative methodology to investigate the making of foreign policy by the EU and Russia. Discourse analysis is the main method employed to interpret the role of identity and Self-Other perceptions. This is done through a study of discourse made up of official documents and statements as well as interviews with diplomats with current and past involvement in the formulation of EU and Russian foreign policy.
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>MEPP</td>
<td>the Middle East Peace Process</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>the European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RUSSIA</td>
<td>the Russian Federation</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nation Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNGA</td>
<td>United Nation General Assembly</td>
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<tr>
<td>PA</td>
<td>The Palestinian Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>the North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLO</td>
<td>Palestinian Liberalization Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IHEC</td>
<td>Independent High Electoral Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENP</td>
<td>European Neighbourhood Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC/EU</td>
<td>European Community/European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WWII</td>
<td>the Second World War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR-CFSP</td>
<td>Higher Representative for the Common Foreign and Security policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>the Common Foreign and Security policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPC</td>
<td>European Political Co-operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>Commonwealth of Independent states</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOPS</td>
<td>the Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEAS</td>
<td>the European External Action Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEE</td>
<td>Central and Eastern Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapon of Mass Destruction</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISESCO</td>
<td>the Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCC</td>
<td>the Gulf Cooperation Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>Duma</td>
<td>the Russian legislative lower house</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU EUPOL COPPS</td>
<td>the European Union mission for the Palestinian territories’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU EU BAM Rafah</td>
<td>European Union Border Assistance Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIM</td>
<td>Temporary International Mechanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NUG</td>
<td>Palestinian National Unity Government</td>
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INTRODUCTION

*Learning does not mean to fill a barrel, but to ignite a flame.*

(Heraclitus, sixth century BC)

In the making of foreign policy in the Middle East, no issue has drawn as many political initiatives and as much academic attention as the Palestinian issue. Although the Palestinian problem emerged around 100 years ago, the land of Palestine, as a result of its geographic, religious, and symbolic relevance, has been at the heart of international politics between global powers for hundreds of years. The political discourse of the conflict has focused on many issues, including the religious, the historical, the ethnic, and the cultural. The discourse of the conflict is not solely a Palestinian-Israeli matter. Within the context of the conflict, regional and international dimensions have a strong presence. Certainly, the Middle East, by its geographical proximity and political, economic, religious and cultural ties, occupies a high position in the foreign policy-making agenda of global actors, and especially those of the region’s close neighbours the EU and Russia. That is, the EU and Russia could not keep themselves out of the process of the evolution of the political settlement of the Middle East. In the last decade, the establishment of the Palestinian state has become a permanent priority in world politics and has widely dominated foreign policy-making towards the Middle East peace process (MEPP). The fact is that the Palestinians have yearned for an independent viable state of their own for generations. Thus, the more than century-long continuous conflict over historical Palestine, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, continues with no end in sight.

Two decades after the Oslo Accords that represented an attempt to pave the way for a peace settlement of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and more than a decade after the creation of the Quartet as a collective will of global actors in making peace in the Middle East, the current Palestinian UN bid for statehood highlights the failure of global actors to realise Palestinian statehood. This failure has drawn a bold line under peace efforts made by these global actors toward the Middle East Peace Process. In fact, a peace settlement in the Middle East has been influenced by multifaceted contexts that deeply inform this process. Despite wide-spread international support for a Palestinian state, especially by the nearby region’s global powers- the EU and Russia, a lasting and comprehensive peace settlement seems to be far out of reach. When the time came to declare a Palestinian state,
any genuine effort faded due to the failure to put any pressure on Israel to realise this objective.

Thus, this failure stands as one of the most remarkable issues in foreign policy-making by global actors towards the region. Inquiring into the reasons for the failure to reach a peace settlement once more is as topical as ever. In fact, the EU’s and Russia’s foreign policy-making has been contradictory with divergent perceptions of the peace process and its parties. At the core of this investigation are three assumptions. First, the construction of the international identities of the EU and Russia highly informs their policies towards an active and effective involvement in the MEPP which reflects underlying internal developments at contextual levels. Second, this involvement is defined by their perception of the Middle East within multifaceted contexts, reflecting certain content changes and shifts in international identity construction, as well as the consideration and institutionalisation of this international identity as external expectations and aspirations of global actorness. Third, the perception of the conflict as chronic and intractable has become a characteristic on which peace-making is played out, as well as the perception of Israelis in contrast to the Palestinians deeply defines their activeness and effectiveness in Palestinian state-building.

My approach to EU and Russian involvement in the MEPP is derived from the constructivist scholarship in foreign policy-making which recognises the existence of an ideational structure in informing this involvement. The international identities of the EU and Russia are an important part of these ideational structures in their foreign policy-making towards the MEPP. This thesis understands the international identities of the EU and Russia as constructs which are reflected in internal developments and expectations about the ‘Self’. Where the EU and Russian involvement in the MEPP is high and active, it cannot be reduced to rational action and must be understood as part of a foreign policy that shapes and is shaped by ideational structures about the Self, and their place and mission in the world. Thus, the thesis assumes that the international identities of the EU and Russia are constructed within different contextual levels, not ‘natural’ as realism assumes, and that it is relational, dynamic and established in relation to a series of internal and external developments.

The seven chapters that make up this thesis offer a deep analysis and investigation of the role of identity and Self-Other perception in the EU and Russian foreign policy-making
towards Palestinian statehood. These chapters present a framework for a better understanding and analysis of the impact of identity and Self-Other perception on peace-making in the Middle East. The failure to establish a Palestinian state after two bids at the United Nations is an empirical illustration of this approach. The EU’s and Russia’s foreign policy is not about peace *per se*, rather it is about preserving a mechanism to facilitate easy access to Middle East politics and bilateral relations.

1.1 The Importance of the Study

The question of identity and Self-Other perception in defining the foreign policy-making of the EU and Russia towards the Middle East conflict is rarely discussed. My own research has confirmed that there are very few scholarly publications on this topic. This makes the current inquiry imperative and compelling. Moreover, the EU and Russia as global actors involved in in the Middle East peace process are seldom discussed in relation to identity and Self-Other perception. Thus, the importance of this study is embedded in the understanding that identity matters in interpreting the behaviour of big power players in designing foreign policy in regions where conflict remains unresolved, such as in the Middle East, where the Israeli-Palestinian issue dominates international relations inside and outside the region.

I argue that the constructivist approach is useful for analysing the role played by identity and Self-Other perception in shaping foreign policy vis-à-vis this conflict. This study advances arguments based on constructivist assumptions not used in the more established IR schools, such as realism. The significance of this study also lies in the opportunity that a look through a constructivist lens offers to deepen our understanding of conflict in the Middle East. From this angle, the study addresses the shortfall of studies using identity and Self-Other perception in interpreting the nature of conflict in the Middle East. This shortage is notable in most academic studies discussing Middle East political phenomena.

1.2 Aims and Objectives of the Research

In following the Palestinian–Israeli conflict it is clear that Palestinian statehood is not purely a Palestinian–Israeli matter. For many decades, and especially since the Madrid Conference in 1991, the question of the Palestinian state has been at the centre of international relations concerning the Middle East. Indeed, the question of the establishment of a Palestinian state is extremely dominated by global power politics. Thus, the foreign policy of the EU and Russia is enormously relevant to the question of
Palestinian statehood. The main objective of this study is therefore to problematise the foreign policy-making of the EU and Russia as it concerns the Palestinian state. I intend to investigate the matter from a constructivist perspective rather than a realist and liberal one.

This study takes as its starting point two observations. First, from a neo-realist perspective, as Nizar Messari argues, if the state were not to exist, the security of its citizens would not be guaranteed. Hence, states seek power to guarantee their citizens’ security.\(^1\) Thus, the establishment of the Palestinian state, as Mushtaq H. Khan argues, is perceived as a threat to Israel.\(^2\) However, the security of Israel is guaranteed by most global powers. Many EU leaders like Sarkozy, Merkel, and Berlusconi, assert their commitments to guarantee Israeli security. Furthermore, the PLO leadership accepted a de-militarised state within the 1967 borders.\(^3\) Hence, the assumption that the Palestinian state would be defined by a security agenda is not reasonable.

Second, from a liberal perspective, the formation of a Palestinian state is vital to the promotion of stability and prosperity in the Middle East. In this regard, Hillel Frisch and Menachem Hofnung argue that the massive international financial aid from donor states and major international financial institutions to the Palestinian authority is intended to support and encourage peace efforts to end the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. That is, the liberal perspective on the Palestinian state is based on political and economic assumptions that promoting democracy, civil society, and economic growth is conducive to achieving a peace settlement.\(^4\) In April 2011, the UN said that the Palestinian Authority was ready to run an independent state.\(^5\) This matter was also discussed in the context of the idea of a greater Middle East.\(^6\) In 2002, the Arab League summit formally endorsed the initiative of

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\(^3\) The Palestinian leadership especially Yasser Arafat and Mahmoud Abbas, and even Hamas leaders Sheikh Ahmad Yasein, Khalid Meshal or Ismail Hanya, expressed their acceptance of establishing a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders (the West Bank and Gaza Strip).
\(^6\) For more information see Rand Corporation. Rand Palestinian State Study Team, Building a Successful Palestinian State (Rand, 2005).
a two-state solution as a desired end for peace and prosperity in the Middle East. Practically, and in theory, the road to the establishment of a Palestinian state, from the liberal perspective, is paved and ready to exist. Thus, the second observation is that the liberal perspective does not explain the question of why the Palestinian state has not been established.

Thus, the objective of this thesis is twofold. The first purpose is to focus on the central puzzle, which is: How the discourse of Palestinian statehood by the EU and Russia can be understood? This is specifically in order to understand why the EU and Russia support the establishment of a Palestinian state in their general discourse, but do not support it in action. The puzzle I attempt to examine and explore in this thesis is at the centre of EU and Russian foreign policy-making towards the Middle East peace process (MEPP). In principle, and directly, establishing a Palestinian state is a strategic priority for both the EU’s and Russia’s foreign policy towards the Middle East conflict. Indirectly, the EU and Russia do not seem to be ready to take serious steps and pressure Israel to comply with regard to the UNSCRs and stop its aggressive policies against the Palestinians which they might perceive in different contexts, through the different prisms of EU and Russian identities. It aims to understand and analyse the set of internal developments and the ideational bases of identity which shape Self-perception in the case of both EU and Russian foreign policy-making, in parallel. This is partly in order to gain a greater understanding of the social elements behind the ineffectiveness of international efforts to support the establishment of a Palestinian state. It is also motivated by the need within the field of international relations for greater emphasis on interpreting and seeking to understand the role of key social elements such as identity and Self-Other perception in influencing peace-making processes in the Middle East.

The second objective is to argue that conventional assumptions – based on theories of power, security and interdependence – have failed to explain adequately why the Palestinian state has not been established. That is, the thesis does not accept realist and liberal assumptions that foreign policy towards the Middle East conflict is always informed by the security agenda (realist paradigm), or is simply shaped by the quest for interdependence (liberal paradigm). And so, the study frames its analysis of EU and Russian foreign policy discourse within a constructivist approach.
1.3 Problematic and Key Questions

Over decades, Palestinians have struggled for a viable and independent state. The establishment of a Palestinian state has largely been defined by the foreign policy of the major global actors. It is under these auspices that the Middle East peace process has been defined. On 23 September 2011, Mr. Mahmoud Abbas, the chairman of the Palestinian Authority and the Palestinian Liberation Organization, submitted the Palestinian application for full UN membership to H.E. Mr. Ban Ki-moon, Secretary-General of the United Nations. Mr. Abbas summed up this matter in his speech at the United Nations:

‘I come before you today from the Holy Land … to speak on behalf of the Palestinian people in the homeland and in the Diaspora, to say, after 63 years of suffering of an ongoing Nakba: Enough. It is time for the Palestinian people to gain their freedom and independence. The time has come to end the suffering and the plight of millions of Palestine refugees in the homeland and the Diaspora, to end their displacement and to realize their rights, some of them forced to take refuge more than once in different places of the world’. Mahmoud Abbas, 2011 7

Despite a long history of diplomatic initiatives, from 1917 when Palestine fell under British rule, an independent and viable Palestinian state still seems unachievable. After the formation of the League of Nations, Palestine was placed under a British mandate.8 In 1923, Palestine was recognized by the League of Nations as an ‘A’ mandate. Technically it was to be administered like a trust by Britain until ready for self-government9, but the Palestinian right to self-government was ignored.10 This led to the extension of the

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7 Mahmoud Abbas, speech in the 66th Session of the UN General Assembly, 2011
10 The fate of Palestinians cannot be understood isolated from the political developments at the beginning of the twentieth century. After the Ottoman defeat in the first World war, the question of Palestine has always been associated with big political questions in the international scene. The victorious powers, particularly Britain and France, redrew the political map of the Arab Middle East. The new political map of the Arab Middle East was endorsed by the newly established League of Nations. The League of Nations designed a mandate system. According to this system, Palestine was annexed to the British political and military sphere. The mandate meant that the Palestinians would gain an independent state. But before independence, Palestinians needed the British to prepare them for self-government. The crucial matter of the British mandate on Palestine was the commitment to create the Jewish national homeland in Palestine. The British promise for the Jews which was known as the “Balfour Declaration” was added to the British mandate on Palestine. British policy in Palestine worked to pave the way for creating a homeland for the Jews. The British authorities adopted political, economic and demographic policies, aiming to facilitate the creation of a
conflict, which was both political and military. The conflict developed into a number of wars, including the 1948 war (Nakba), the 1956 war, the Six Days War in 1967, the October War in 1973, and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, and two intifadas – the first in 1987 and the second (Al-Aqsa Intifadah) in 2000. Efforts to resolve the conflict have produced a number of peace initiatives and UN resolutions, such as General Assembly Resolutions 181 and 194 and Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.  

In the course of Palestinian history, statehood has been the primary objective. Indeed, it is a major motif in Palestinian political leaders’ political discourse and military activism. Most Palestinian leaders, such as Haj Amin Al-Husayni, Ahmed Al-Shugari, Yasser Arafat, Ahmed Yassin, Ismail Haniya, Khalid Mishal, George Habash, Naïf Hwatmah, and Mahmoud Abbas have agreed on the Palestinian right to statehood. On this long route,
there have been many Palestinian Peace initiatives. Yasser Arafat addressed the UN General Assembly in 1974 and assured the world of the Palestinians’ commitment to peace, famously declaring: “Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand”. In 1988, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) adopted the Palestinian peace programme and declared an independent Palestinian state. This gesture, however, and its symbolism, was no more than an emotional act used to justify the PLO’s recognition of UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338.

In 1993, the PLO signed the Declaration of Principles (known as the Oslo Accords) as a first practical step towards Palestinian statehood. The declaration set an interim period of five years as a framework for reaching an agreement on final matters in the lead-up to the establishment of a Palestinian state. Under the Clinton administration, a Camp David
The failure of the Camp David summit in the summer of 2000 produced and still produces scholarly debate about why it failed. Scholarship is diversified over the three parties of the summit: the Palestinian, Israeli and American. For Akram Hanieh, a member of Palestinian delegation, Camp David summit was not a convention in which the different parties could reach agreement. Hanieh shows that there were serious differences between the Palestinians and Israelis especially on two issues relating to the final status: refugees and Jerusalem. And the Americans adopted the Israeli position especially on Jerusalem. Akram Hanieh discusses the Palestinian vision of what went wrong and who is to blame for the failure of the Camp David summit. For more information see A. Hanieh, 'The Camp David Papers', ibid. 30/2 (2001), 75-97. Dennis Ross, the US envoy for the Middle East, ascribed the failure of Camp David summit to the mistrust between the Palestinians and Israelis. According to Ross, Barak, the Israeli prime minister at the time, paved the way for this mistrust when he failed to fulfil several commitments previously made by Israel. Ross mentions that there were deep gaps between the Palestinians and the Israelis over the permanent status issues which are the core of the Palestinian state. Ross argues that the status of Jerusalem was the key question of contention between the Palestinians and Israelis. From his side, Barak offered unprecedented concessions in relation to Jerusalem. For more information about what went wrong and who is to blame for the failure of the Camp David summit, see D. Ross, The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005).

For Shomo Bin Ami, a member of the Israeli delegation, Barak was interested in peace with Syria rather than with the Palestinians. For Barak, achieving peace with Syria was strategically important. After Barak had exhausted the Syrian channel, he turned to the Palestinians. Bin Ami argues that Barak came from a military background and went to Camp David to make peace. Yet Barak was ready for war should peace prove to be unattainable. Barak was out of tune with his Cabinet on the Syrian issue. They advised him to focus on the Palestinians. Bin Ami argues that the Palestinians showed flexibility on the question of territory. But they moved the issue on Jerusalem to “the very centre of negotiation” in order to put the entire onus for the success or failure of the summit onto Israelis. Bin Ami considered that the failure of Camp David was a mark of defeat for the peace camp in Israel for many years to come. For more information about the official Israeli vision of the failure of Camp David, see S. Ben-Ami, Scars of War, Wounds of Peace: The Israeli-Arab Tragedy (Oxford University Press, USA, 2006). Ben-Ami, S. (2006). Scars of War, Wounds of Peace: the Israeli-Arab Tragedy, Oxford University Press, USA. P. 240-84.

The Israeli Labour government came to power in 1992. It signed the Oslo Accord in 1993. This government had two different views on approaching the conflict with Arabs: For Peres, the Israeli foreign minister, negotiation was a strategy to achieve peace between Arabs and Israelis. For Rabin, the prime minister, negotiation was a tactic which aimed to play the Arabs off one against another so that Israel could make fewer concessions to the Arabs. For more information about these two visions, see A. Shlaim, ‘The Oslo Accord’, Journal of Palestine Studies, (1994), 24-40.

For Asad Ghanem, the Oslo Accords from the Israeli perspective were ‘significant breakthrough and they provoked protests from the right-wing and religious opposition’. The Rabin government at that time
87% of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.\textsuperscript{21} Even Sharon in turn offered a state on 40% of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.\textsuperscript{22} In 2009, the current Israeli prime minister, Netanyahu responded to Obama’s speech in Cairo and agreed with the two-state solution. In the Israeli discourse there is an acceptance of the idea of negotiation an Palestinian statehood.\textsuperscript{23} So, why then is Palestinian statehood still unachievable?

In the course of the last decade, especially after the second Palestinian intifadah, which erupted in 2000, the major powers seemed to determine the course of peace-making between Palestinians and Israelis. In May 2002, the Quartet was established as an official sponsor of the peace process.\textsuperscript{24} The discourse of Palestinian statehood has dominated perceived Oslo as a practical manifestation of its promise to make peace with the Palestinians, against the backdrop of the Intifadah in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Moreover, Israel noted the increase of international support to find a solution to the Middle East conflict, especially from the United States and the majority of European governments. Ghanem argues that the changes in the international system after the collapse of the Soviet Union led to a new global balance of power in favour of the US which entailed to find a settlement to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The Israeli government intended to eschew international pressures which meant they would not accept a Palestinian state. See A. Gānim, 	extit{Palestinian Politics after Arafat: A Failed National Movement} (Indiana University Press, 2010).p. 13-15.

\textsuperscript{21} Ben-Ami, 	extit{Scars of War, Wounds of Peace: The Israeli-Arab Tragedy}.p. 250

\textsuperscript{22} For Virginia Tilly, Sharon’s proposal for a Palestinian state built on his lifelong goal to destroy the Palestinian national movement and all dimensions of two-state solution. To do so, Sharon created the Wall in the West Bank to seal Israel off from security pressures and to force Palestinian emigration and political aspiration towards Jordan and the rest of the Arab world. Tilly argues that Sharon intended to push the Palestinians to find suitable lives and political fulfilment through citizenship in Jordan. Sharon intended to make the Palestinian state unviable economically and politically in the 1967-borders. The Sharon proposal for a Palestinian state is part of a strategy called “soft transfer”. The proposal was intended to work against the spectre of a bi-national state. By implementing the Wall, the West Bank became separated enclaves like a set of Palestinian islands in an Israeli sea. The proposal was designed to respond to Israeli security fears and the demographic dilemma. For more information about the Sharon proposal for a Palestinian state see V. Tilley, 	extit{The One-State Solution: A Breakthrough for Peace in the Israeli-Palestinian Deadlock} (University of Michigan Press, 2005).pages 3-7 & 73-75.

\textsuperscript{23} Shlomo Ben Ami, a member of the Israeli delegation at the Camp David summit, states that the Declaration of Principle (DOP) established a mechanism for the negotiations to solve the permanent status issues in order to establish a Palestinian state. He states that it is crucial to note that no prior pledge or commitment was made by Israel as an outcome of the negotiations. Most of the Israeli leaders agreed to negotiate with the Palestinians, but this did not mean that they accepted the Palestinian state. Shlomo Bin Ami states that Shimon Peres, the godfather in 1990 of a philosophy of a new Middle East and a Nobel Peace Prize winner, opposed the idea of an independent Palestinian state. Shamir, the Israeli Prime Minister 1988-92, saw Palestinian independence and statehood as the main problems for Israel. Netanyahu’s view was that negotiations with the Palestinians would not lead to more than a Palestinian state on 40 per cent of the 1967-borders. Accordingly, when the Israeli leaders’ agreed to negotiate it did not mean that they were agreeing to a Palestinian state. See Ben-Ami, 	extit{Scars of War, Wounds of Peace: The Israeli-Arab Tragedy}.pages 150, 194, 212 & 218.

\textsuperscript{24} The Quartet was established in 2002 and is composed of the USA, the EU, the UN and Russia. Urfan Khaliq argues that the Quartet was established with two key objectives: to help to broker a solution to the situation in the Middle East and, in the mean time, to allow the partners to take collective action in response to events on the ground. The Quartet presented a Roadmap to Peace between the Palestinians and Israelis. The Roadmap was designed in three phases; phase I: stop violence, normalise Palestinian life, and build Palestinian institutions (to May 2003), phase II: transition (June 2003-December 2003), and phase III:
Middle East-related foreign policy-making by global actors – especially the Quartet’s members. The two-state solution became the salient discourse of the peace process between the Palestinian and Israeli sides. On many occasions, the leaders of global powers expressed their support for the two-state solution through different discourses. Thus, the issue of the creation of a Palestinian state, according to UN Security Council Resolution 242, has been at the core of an international consensus on the question. Anne Le More argues that the issue of Palestinian statehood reveals a paradox, which is ‘that although at the declaratory level there has been a growing acceptance of the two-state solution, the feasibility of its materialization dramatically decreased as the decade unfolded’.25 The question of a Palestinian state has been high on the international agenda. Many international leaders have made speeches that support the Palestinian State. The Palestinian leadership has responded to this:

‘We meet at a time when a great achievement of history is within reach, the creation of a peaceful, democratic Palestinian state’.26 President George W. Bush, 2005.

‘For more than sixty years they have endured the pain of dislocation. Many wait in refugee camps in the West Bank, Gaza, and neighboring lands for a life of peace and security that they have never been able to lead. They endure the daily humiliations – large and small – that come with occupation. So let there be no doubt: the situation for the Palestinian people is intolerable. America will not turn our backs on the legitimate Palestinian aspiration for dignity, opportunity, and a state of their own’.27 Obama Speech in Cairo May 07, 2009.

The American discourse about the peace process in the Middle East is very clear in its support for the establishment of a Palestinian state. The need for a Palestinian state as a starting point for a final and comprehensive peace in the Middle East has been repeated in both the Bush and Obama administrations. Russian arguments about the need to establish a Palestinian state are also very clear in the discourse of both Putin and Medvedev. In permanent status agreement and an end of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (2004-2005). Therefore, the ultimate objective of the Quartet is to implement the ‘Roadmap’ to peace which will lead to the establishment of a Palestinian state as a final and comprehensive settlement of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict by 2005. See U. Khaliq, Ethical Dimensions of the Foreign Policy of the European Union: A Legal Appraisal (Cambridge University Press, 2008b), p 283-87


26 President George W. Bush welcoming President of the Palestinian National Authority Mahmoud Abbas to the White House, May 26, 2005.

27 Barack Obama, Speech in Cairo, May 07, 2009
welcoming the President of the Palestinian National Authority, Mahmoud Abbas, who visited the Kremlin in 2008, Dmitry Medvedev, the then Russian president (2008-12), stated that:

‘Russia was one of the first countries to recognise the State of Palestine in 1989. This was followed by the opening of a fully-fledged embassy of the State of Palestine in Moscow, and since then we have been developing cooperation and coordination between our countries’.  

Dmitry Medvedev, December 22, 2008

In the press release following his visit to Ramallah on 26 June 2012, the Russian President, Vladimir Putin (President 2000 – 2008 and 2012 – present), said:

‘For Russia there is no problem in recognising an independent Palestinian state. This was done 25 years ago by the Soviet Union, and Russia, as we know, is the Soviet Union’s successor and its position on this matter has not changed’. Vladimir Putin, 2012

Moreover, the idea of a Palestinian state as the solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict has long dominated EU foreign policy. Both Javier Solana and Catharine Ashton, the former and current EU foreign policy chiefs, state that:

‘It would accept the Palestinian state as a full member of the U.N., and set a calendar for implementation. It would mandate the resolution of other remaining territorial disputes and legitimise the end of claims’. Javier Solana 2009.

‘Our aim is a viable State of Palestine in the West Bank including East Jerusalem and the Gaza strip, on the basis of the 1967 lines’. Catherine Ashton statement at the League of Arab States, Cairo, 15 March 2010

According to the discourse of global powers, Palestinian statehood is central to foreign policy-making vis-à-vis the Middle East, but at the same time it is unreachable. Thus, the establishment of Palestinian statehood, as central to the conflict in the Middle East, remains a puzzle in global actors’ foreign policy-making. This brings us to the specific

28 Dmitry Medvedev, December 22, 2008  
29 Vladimir Putin, 2012  
31 Catherine Ashton’s statement at the League of Arab States, Cairo, 15 March 2010.
aspect of the puzzle under investigation in this thesis: the question of Palestinian statehood in the discourse of major global actors.

Two assumptions inform this thesis. The first is that major western powers, as shown above, are not opposed to Palestinian statehood. On the contrary, there is plenty of evidence from foreign policy statements, such as those from the EU and Russia, which indicates a change in the declaratory policy of major powers towards Palestinian statehood. To reach a peace settlement, there are many issues that must be resolved. In the case of Palestinian refugees, Michael Dumper points to the Israeli perspective on this question, that is, resolving the Palestinian refugees issue in line with UN resolutions ‘presents an existential risk to Israel’. 47

The EU does not support the Palestinian right of return according to Resolution 194 of the UN General Assembly. It asserts that the issues of Palestinian refugees ‘must be solved through negotiation between the parties of the conflict’. 32 The EU does not accept Hamas’s authority, despite the fact that it came to power through free and fair democratic parliamentary elections in 2006. In addition to this, the EU and Russia have taken part in imposing the Quartet’s conditions on Hamas. Plus, the EU and Russia rarely seem to put real pressure on Israel to stop the building of settlements in Jerusalem.

Hence, one must ask the question: why do the major powers not then support in action the establishment of a Palestinian state? This leads me to my second assumption: major powers that accept Palestinian statehood in principle do not seem to be ready either to accept actual key conditions or elements that are central to the creation of a Palestinian state or to question the Israeli position. As a result, problematic issues such as the siege of Arafat, reforming Palestinian public institutions, and rejecting Hamas as a peace partner are ignored. This thesis is therefore framed in such a way as to investigate how identity and Self-Other perception play a role in defining the notion of Palestinian statehood in EU and Russian foreign policy-making.

For Alexander Wendt:

‘The framing of problems and research strategies should be question-driven rather than method-driven, and if we are not interested in identity- and interest-formation, we may find the assumptions of a rationalist discourse perfectly reasonable’.  

Accordingly, the study has adopted a main research question as well as a set of sub-questions that drive and guide the thesis. Thus, the questions are framed in a way that favours a constructivist approach to explore the effects of identity and Self-Other perception in foreign policy-making. The principle problematic of this research can be highlighted through the following principle research question: How and to what extent do identity and Self-Other perception shape EU and Russian foreign policy-making in the Middle East, concerning their policy towards the establishment of a sovereign and viable Palestinian state?

The aim of the question above is to explore identity in two ways, which combine to make up the full spectrum of how identity is formulated: perception is twofold. Otherness is perceived through ways in which Self-perception is cultivated. Here what is important is the ideational basis of identity. The set of norms, values and ideas that construct one's identity are the same when it comes to viewing 'otherness'. Edward Said in his well-known work, *Orientalism*, gives an insight into how the 'Occident' views the 'Orient'. His work is important in opening new areas of inquiry into Self-Other perception and definition. His critique of ‘Orientalism’ as a prism through which 'otherness' is produced according to the norms, ideas and values of the Occident feeds, to an extent, into the inquiry being attempted in this thesis. Said is perhaps more interested in discourse than in the construction of reality, and he concludes that generalisations about the ‘Orient’ are no more than constructs informed by the bias of the 'Occident'. The discussion he opens up is linked to the constructivist approach's emphasis on ideas and identity in the 'construction' of the world around us.  

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1.4 **Key Questions:**

The sub-questions informing the thesis are formulated to correspond to the themes mentioned above. The sub-questions are the following:

1- The first question focuses on the construction of the international identity of the EU and Russia. It poses this question: how have internal developments that occurred in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union inform the Self-perception of Actorness of the EU and Russia? What kind of capabilities has influenced the EU’s and Russia’s perception of actorness and to what extent does these capabilities define their foreign policy-making? And how is this emerged Self-perception of actorness reflected in perceiving the Middle East?

2- The second theme focuses on the perception of the Middle East as an opportunity. The question here is: how do the EU and Russia perceive the Middle East? And how do they portray their interrelations and interconnections with the Middle East as ‘Otherness’? How do they perceive the importance and challenges of the Middle East and how does this perception inform their perception of a peaceful settlement of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict?

3- The third question focuses on the promotion of the EU’s and Russia’s role in the establishment of Palestinian statehood. The question that drives the discussion here is: how have the EU and Russia developed their involvement in the Middle East peace process? What are the main contexts that inform the establishment of the Palestinian statehood? How do the EU and Russia react to essential events in the making of Palestinian statehood? Why did the Russians vote in favour of the Palestinian bid at the UNGA while the EU-as-an-actor did not?

When it comes to the establishment of a Palestinian state, the EU and Russia have major roles to play. Therefore, the emphasis in this thesis on EU and Russian foreign policy-making represents a two-sided case study. Through the examination of the foreign policy of the EU and Russia, I want to explore the role that identity and Self-Other perception play in the success or failure of peace-making and of progress, or lack of progress, towards the establishment of a Palestinian state. The refocus of the research through this case study of the EU and Russia represents an attempt to deepen the investigation of the question of the role of identity and Self-Other perception in foreign policy-making. In this investigation, I will have a close look at EU and Russian discourses towards Palestinian
statehood through exploring the possibility that the meaning given by ‘text’ may vary according to the ‘context’ and the ‘targeted group’. In examining this issue, the thesis aims to discover how deep the role of identity and Self-Other perception is in EU and Russian policies towards the conflict, as well as how the EU and Russia have adapted to the changes in the Palestinian political map – namely the rise of Hamas. This allows for an evaluation of to what extent EU and Russian foreign policy is supportive and constructive to a viable and independent Palestinian state. My interest in the investigation is twofold: First, I am interested in how to re-interpret the absence of a viable and independent Palestinian state. Second, I seek to understand how the foreign policy of global powers/actors towards Palestinian statehood is based on Self-Other perception.

This is at the core of the problematic I seek to explore in my thesis. It is through an exploration of the perceptions that the EU and Russia have on the aforementioned questions that I attempt to explore the obstacles that may help to explain the intractable nature of Palestinian statehood.

1.5 Structure of the Thesis
This thesis consists of seven chapters. Chapter one is an introduction to EU and Russian foreign policy towards the Middle East Peace Process. The thesis introduces academic research in terms of its importance and objectives and defines the chief problematic and outlines the key questions that the thesis is attempting to answer. Chapter two provides a theoretical and methodological framework. I theorise upon EU and Russia foreign policy towards the Middle East peace process by employing constructivism, owing to its emphasis on ideas and identity and Self-Other perception. This relates to my analytical agenda, which seeks to go beyond the conventional understanding of foreign-policy which emphasise the role of ’power’ to the exclusion of other important dimensions. Lastly, in designing my methodology, I define qualitative research as a method of enquiry and techniques of data collection of primary information. Also, I use discourse analysis in ways that help answer the key questions informing my thesis. Chapter three is a critical review of the field of scholarship in foreign policy-making by the EU and Russia in general and towards the Middle East in particular. In this chapter I review the main characteristics of EU-Russian foreign policy through outlining the roots and schools that theorise upon and analyse this important area. I further review scholarships relevant to how the EU and Russia are developing their international identities in the context of being
global actors in world politics. The emphasis of this review is on the approaches of EU and Russian foreign policy-making and on features of EU collective identity, as well as their perception of the Middle East and the issue of establishing a viable and independent Palestinian state. Chapter four contextualises the EU’s and Russia’s identity–building and Self-perception of actorness. In this chapter I argue that constructing an international identity for the EU and Russia lies at the heart of internal developments that inform the making of their foreign policy. Constructing this international identity is an external expectation to meet internal developments. I argue that the increased desire of the EU to play an active role in world politics is a response to the massive enlargement of its size and economy that took place in the post-Cold War era. Meanwhile, Russia attempts to reassert its international position as a global actor and restore the former Soviet influence in world politics, perceived as the guarantor to healing its internal disarray and turmoil. Highlighting the differences in this process of identity-building between the EU and Russia in key contexts such as principles and values, and soft, economic and military power, I explain how this emergent Self-perception of actorness informs and defines the making of their foreign policy. This leads to an understanding of how the Middle East is perceived and to what extent it informs the Middle East peace process from the viewpoint of EU and Russia foreign policy.

Chapter five contextualises the promotion of the EU’s and Russia’s role in Middle Eastern politics and the peace process. I argue that the Middle East is perceived as a region of multi-layered interests and challenges. It takes its importance from its geostrategic position in terms of security and strategic stability, economic and technological cooperation and trade relations, energy provider and stabiliser, and historical, cultural and religious ties. I argue that this perception of the Middle East informs the EU and Russia peace-making towards establishing Palestinian statehood. Chapter six is an analytical discussion on promoting the EU’s and Russia’s role in peace-making towards the establishment of a Palestinian state. In this chapter, I argue that EU and Russian involvement in peace-making is informed by their Self-perception of actorness and their perception of the Middle East. It developed in conjunction with the construction of their international identity in the post-Cold War era. The argument is that the EU’s and Russia’s involvement in peace-making in the Middle East is a quest to meet internal developments and problems and is viewed as a mechanism or channel for easy access to the region. The EU and Russia view this involvement as an objective that provides a useful
instrument for pursuing European and Russian objectives and interests in the Middle East which they are eager to continue with or without reaching a peace settlement. **Chapter seven** contains the findings and a constructivist reflection about EU-Russian perceptions of peace-making. In this chapter the analysis seeks to situate the question of the role of identity and Self-other perception in foreign policy-making by the EU and Russia within a comparative context. Thus, the discussion must examine the similarities and contradictions in the field of foreign policy-making in both camps. Both have been engaged in finding a solution to the conflict from the earliest time, but the question of the Palestinian state is still intractable. The comparison focuses on how the EU’s and Russia’s present place on the international stage works in relation to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. In the **Conclusion**, I summarise the findings of this thesis. Accordingly, I address my findings about this central puzzle to show how the thesis contributes to scholarship by framing the question in an approach differing from those guided by realist and liberal perspectives. I also present the limitations and obstacles that I faced in this study and suggest directions and questions that arise from this work to be explored further in future studies.
CHAPTER TWO
THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

Focus

This chapter is going to frame the theory and the methodology that the thesis seeks to employ in investigating the role of identity and Self-Other perception in define making of foreign policy towards the Middle East peace process by the EU and Russia. The focus of analysis is twofold. Firstly, a theoretical framework is developed by exploring constructivism given its relevance to my thesis owing to its emphasis on ideas and identity. This relates to my analytical agenda, which seeks to go beyond conventional understandings of foreign-policy emphasising the role of ‘power’ to the exclusion of other important dimensions. Secondly, in designing my methodology, I look at how I shall use discourse analysis in ways that help answer the key questions informing my thesis.

2.1 Theorising EU and Russian foreign policy towards the Middle East peace process (MEPP)

‘We need theories to make sense of the blizzard of information that bombards us daily. Even policy makers who are contemptuous of “theory” must rely on their own (often unstated) ideas about how the world works in order to decide what to do. . . . Everyone uses theories—whether he or she knows it or not’.

Stephen M. Walt, political scientist

This section seeks to frame how identity and Self-Other perception influence foreign policy-making by the EU and Russia towards Palestinian statehood. In so doing, the thesis seeks to interpret the role of identity and Self-Other perception and how they might be theorized as a part of the EU and Russia’s foreign policy, especially in treating high profile issues such as the question of Palestinian statehood. The theory that this thesis employs aims to work as a map that makes the puzzle of the thesis intelligible. The puzzle, as identified in the introduction, concerns the discourses of Palestinian statehood by the EU and Russia. Thus, the theory that should be used is one that can provide a better

understanding of the conundrum of Palestinian statehood and analysis of multiple beliefs and ideas that shape or influence identity and Self-Other perception of the EU and Russia.

**Framing identity and self-other perception**

For David Campbell ‘identity is an inescapable dimension of being, and nobody could be without it’.  

He defines the constitution of identity that is ‘achieved through the inscription of boundaries which serve to demarcate an 'inside' from an 'outside,' a 'Self from an 'Other,' a 'domestic' from a 'foreign'’.  

For William Connolly ‘An identity is established in relation to a series of differences that have become socially recognized’.  

Hence, if there is a difference, identity plays a role in it. Therefore, identity is formulated in two ways: perception of Self and Other in the context of differences. Otherness is perceived through ways in which Self-perception is cultivated. In this regard, William Connolly asserts that ‘Identity requires difference in order to be, and it converts difference into otherness in order to secure its own self-certainty’.  

Hence, difference generates an identity, which in turn, is formulated into Self and Other, which affects the course of interrelations. Moreover, Herrmann and Shannon point to Self-Other perception as having a role to play in foreign policy-making. They state that ‘perceptions of the situation define which rules, duties, and obligations are relevant’.

In this context, we can see how the Russian perception of the Self in terms of differences generates identity. Similarly, the establishment of the EU demonstrates that there is perception of the Self in terms of differences which surely generate an identity. However, between the Europeans and Russians on the one hand and the Palestinians and Israelis on the other, we cannot disregard the reality of difference, thereby; identity exists somewhere and has a role to play in the course of interrelations. Here what are important are the contexts (historical, cultural, economic, etc.) which within the identities of the EU and Russia are constructed. That is, how the EU and Russia perceive the Palestinians in comparison with the Israelis and what are the norms, values, interests and ideas that are

39 Ibid, P xiv  
formulated in the context of their interrelations. This understanding of the differences in the identities of the EU and Russia on one side and the Palestinians and Israelis on the other, leads to opening ‘new avenues’ for understanding foreign policy-making of global powers/actors towards the Middle East. This thesis highlights and emphasises the influence of identity and Self-Other perception in the process of foreign policy-making as a substantial link between the four parties, namely: the EU, Russia, Palestinians, and Israelis. Therefore, in the Middle East as in the case of the EU and Russia, identity dominates their foreign policy-making, particularly towards the question of establishing a Palestinian state, which has deep roots in their historical role in the Middle East. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict is defined by many factors and beliefs that have influenced its course. Thus identity and Self-Other perception cannot be ignored in understanding this long history of the conflict.

**Approaches to study foreign policy-making**

Throughout world politics and different historical periods, there have been many theories of foreign policy-making. That variety indicates the search for more than one framework to account for a number of assumptions that explains and investigates political phenomena, and to assert that much work has been done in enriching academic research on foreign policy-making. A majority of the work in the field of Middle East conflict recognises that there is a requirement for an unconventional theory of foreign policy-making to be considered and to open up different ways of thinking and understanding the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

Studying foreign policy-making varies among three predominant approaches: the policy approach, the historical approach, and the social science approach.\(^\text{41}\) The policy approach emphasises the study of policies in the ‘present and near future’ in order to evaluate and adjust the process of policy-making through providing recommendations.\(^\text{42}\) The historical approach uses the chronology of historical events and their narrative – such as, for example, diplomatic history. The historical approach tends to emphasise a ‘historical understanding of foreign policy, attempting to recapture the specifics of the time.’


\(^{42}\) Ibid. p7.
approach aims to show awareness of factors that influenced foreign policy. It depends heavily on primary source documentation (government documents, private papers), and produces ‘well-written narratives for a scholarly and more general audience’. The social science approach, according to Jerel A. Rosati and James M. Scott, tends to be ‘concerned with explaining more limited facets of foreign policy in order to identify basic patterns’. This approach represents an attempt to ‘understand these patterns through the use of concepts and the development of theory’, making use of ‘more systematic research tools for collecting and analysing information’.

The policy approach uses several analytical methods for understanding foreign policy processes which explain and interpret states’ behaviour and policies in the international arena. The famous one is the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF), which was developed by Sabatier (1988) and Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) to provide a causal theory of the policy processes. The ACF was developed to ‘provide a coherent understanding of the major factors and processes affecting the overall policy process’. Thus, the framework is an approach to ‘illuminate coalition conduct and policy change in issues that are categorised by a high level of political conflict’. Hence this approach is more useful to study domestic policy decision-making that foreign policy-making.

Other models classified under the policy approach are: the rationality or rational choice which is defined as a ‘consistent, value-maximizing choice within specified constraints’. Rational choice is based on a number of premises that inform foreign policy-making such as clarified and prioritised or ranked goals, which rank outcomes according to the ‘degree of satisfaction of achieving these goals and objectives’, identified alternatives; that identify alternatives and their consequences, and maximised utility, that provides

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43 Ibid. p7.
44 Ibid.p7
50 Mintz and Derouen, Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making. p57.
the greatest amount of net benefits.\textsuperscript{51} Thus rational decision-makers choose between alternatives that provide the consequence which is most preferred.\textsuperscript{52}

The governmental or bureaucratic model,\textsuperscript{53} according to G. Alison, views actions of a government as political resultants. It assumes that the making of foreign policy is a result of bargaining and interaction amongst various actors in several governmental agencies, not the result of calculated decisions by the heads of state. The model centers on the decentralisation of foreign policy – making which ‘represents decentralised processes that involve various actors in various agencies’.\textsuperscript{54} It emphasises multiple organisations and bureaucracies rather than a single actor,\textsuperscript{55} in which decisions emerge from political struggle and bargaining between groups,\textsuperscript{56} therefore, the outcome is a compromise.\textsuperscript{57} The Expected Utility Theory (EUT) assumes that foreign policy-makers choose between risky options by comparing their expected utility values. It posits that decision makers ‘attempt to maximize expected utility in their choices between risky options’.\textsuperscript{58} Prospect Theory is a social psychological framework for foreign policy-making in a state of uncertainty and risk. It assumes that ‘avoiding loss is more important than securing gain’.\textsuperscript{59} The implication of prospect theory in foreign policy-making is that leaders ‘take risks to initiate bold new foreign policy directions’.\textsuperscript{60}

Most of these policy approach models understand the actors’ identities to be ahistorical and uniform. The aforementioned models see the actors’ identities as a given and to be taken for granted. Taking actors’ identities for granted and as unproblematic undermines the key problematic of this study. The thesis sees the actor’s identity as malleable, multiple and unstable which needs reaffirmation and reconstruction in view of a changeable world. Lacking an account of how identity is constructed and how it influences foreign policy-

\textsuperscript{51} Allison, \textit{Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis}.
\textsuperscript{52} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{53} Graham Alison call this model governmental politics model, while Mintz and DeRouen call it bureaucratic model.
\textsuperscript{54} Mintz and Derouen, \textit{Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making}. p71.
\textsuperscript{55} Ibid. p71.
\textsuperscript{57} Mintz and Derouen, \textit{Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making}. p72.
\textsuperscript{58} Ibid. p61.
\textsuperscript{59} Ibid. p75.
making, the models of the policy approach are unable to problematise the discourse of the EU and Russia towards establishing a Palestinian state and why it is still an intractable.

The Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) is one of the frameworks that apply to the explanation of domestic as to foreign policy choice.\textsuperscript{61} It bases its premise upon the argument that ‘all that occurs between nations and across nations is grounded in human decision-makers’ acting singly or in groups’.\textsuperscript{62} The approach builds on learning form a social science perspective about human decision-making. Therefore, it does not assume that policymakers act in ‘classical rational fashion’.\textsuperscript{63} Thus, it is good on breaking apart the monolithic view of the nation-state as a unitary actor, by focusing on units that are comprised within the state. It is characterized by an ‘actor-specific focus’.\textsuperscript{64} FPA assumes that the personal characteristics of leaders, including discourse, problem representation, creativity and learning, advisory processes, bureaucratic politics, legislative politics, societal groups, domestic political imperatives, and so on are all as relevant to country and region experts as much as to FPA analysts.\textsuperscript{65}

FPA assumes that the source of much of a state’s behaviour and most change in foreign policies is driven by human beings, acting individually or collectively, which is a very common assumption. It grounds its theorising of foreign policy-making on the behaviour and thought of human beings. Obviously, all theories of foreign policy-making ground their assumptions in human beings’ thinking and acting. The FPA approach looks for sources of change and diversity of foreign policy decision-making within a given state’s system. However, its main weakness is that it fails to consider the factors and contexts that shape or construct the international identity of the states and global actors. It focuses on the people and unites that comprise the states but does not investigate how that identity is constructed and to what extent it influences the making of foreign policy. I am not in favour of adopting this approach because, according to Steve Smith, it attempts to understand foreign policy by focusing on treating states ‘as members of a class of

\textsuperscript{64} Hudson, 'Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations', (p1.
\textsuperscript{65} Hudson and Vore, 'Foreign Policy Analysis Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow', (p228.
phenomena’, and by focusing on the decision-making process in order to produce an explanation, it seeks to generalise about the sources and nature of a state’s behaviour.\(^{66}\)

The refocus of this thesis through the analysis of the role of identity and Self-Other perception in foreign policy-making is an attempt to eschew conventional tendencies of the study of foreign policy-making in the course of the Middle East conflict. The driving forces of the Middle East conflict are not only fixed on power and economic interests. The additional factors driving forces are diverse, and identity and Self-Other perception play a vital role. Foreign policy has neither fixed assumptions, nor does it have a specific approach in studying politics towards the Middle conflict. Foreign policy is a policy-making process in which “actions and ideas (are) designed by policy makers of an international actor (rather than state actor) to promote a change in the attitudes of other actors or in the environment.”\(^{67}\) Thus, the EU and Russia cannot make their foreign policy outside of temporal and spatial contexts. Hence, foreign policy is a result of these temporal and spatial contexts in which identity and Self–Other perception are shaped. The following is a debate within social science theories in the realm foreign policy-making

**Schools of Russia’s foreign policy**

In the Russian academic literature there are three different approaches or schools of Russia’s foreign policy-making that dominate current discussions and arguments about the role of Russia in world politics. These approaches might enrich my argument on the role of identity and Self-perception in the Russia’s foreign policy-making. The approaches differ according to their degrees of openness in relation to the west, and to their tactics in achieving Russian national interests and foreign policy objectives. Shireen Hunter and her colleagues refer to these three schools as: the Euro-Atlanticists, Eurasianists and Neo-Eurasianists. The divisions between the three schools are built on the integration between the demotic primacy and external environment. In other words, these divisions are based on Russia’s identity and Self-perception which is entwined with Russia’s place and mission in the world, as will be made clear below.

The Euro-Atlanticism School states that the first goal of Russia’s foreign policy is to ‘create an external environment that would enable it to become a democratic, market-oriented and civilized nation’. 68 For them Euro-Atlanticism is a western orientation in Russian foreign policy. They assert that Euro-Atlanticists believe in ‘the need to integrate Russia into the civilized world and that it must embrace Western culture in its totality’. 69

On the external level, it introduces Russia as a “civilizer” in Central Asian republics. Accordingly, Russia should be a “bridge” between Central Asia and the West, and an agent of civilisation in collaboration with the West. In the same way, Yannis Stivachtis states that the Euro-Atlanticists ‘favour closer ties to the US and Europe’. 70 Moreover, Lajos F. Szászdi states that Euro-Atlanticism upholds the notion of Russia continuing as a ‘normal power’, and renounced the ‘idea of superpower’. At the same time, it does not accept the US’s Self-proclaimed role as the centre of a unipolar world order, preferring to support the formation of a multipolar international system. 71 Thus, Euro-Atlanticists see Russia as a part of western civilization and believe that it should give up its aspiration of a superpower in the post-Cold War era. Shireen Hunter and her colleagues criticise Euro-Atlanticists of having an unrealistic expectation of solving Russia’s problems, especially their political and cultural problems. They view the Russian-western partnership as naïve and idealistic, beside the fact that Euro-Atlanticist policy is too concessionary towards the West and hence is unequal. 72

the Eurasianism 73 doctrine in Russian foreign policy premises a geographical dimension (Eurasia) and the ethno-fusion of Slavic and Turko-Muslim peoples of Russia, and it rejects the view that Russia is on the periphery of Europe. 74 For Frederick Matern, the

68 Hunter, Thomas, and Melikishvili, Islam in Russia: The Politics of Identity and Security.p292
69 Ibid.p293
71 L.F. Szászdi, Russian Civil-Military Relations and the Origins of the Second Chechen War (Univ Pr of Amer, 2008).p10
72 Hunter, Thomas, and Melikishvili, Islam in Russia: The Politics of Identity and Security.p294
73 According to Marlene Laruelle, the term means ‘Russia and its margins occupy a dual or median position between Europe and Asia, that their specific traits have to do with their culture being a ‘mix’ born of the fusion of Slavic and Turko-Muslim people, and that Russia should specifically highlight its Asian features’. Also, according to her, the roots of Eurasianism started with the Slavophiles who surfaced in the 19th century. Eurasianism stand for a number of things such as a romantic philosophy of empire, based on theories of ethnogenesis that were elaborated by the Orientalist Lev N Gumilev, the fascistic geopolitics of the fashionable theorist Aleksander Dugan. See Laruelle, M. and Gabowitsch, M. (2008), Russian Eurasianism: an ideology of empire (Woodrow Wilson Centre Press), p 1-12.
74 M. Laruelle and M. Gabowitsch, Russian Eurasianism: An Ideology of Empire (Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2008).p1
Eurasianists ‘believed in a strong State’, and they ‘put more emphasis on culture’ which is ‘combined with the Eurasianist political geography’, which was translated by elites and policy makers into a ‘programmatic political philosophy’ covering many aspects like the economy, foreign policy, etc. These premises were developed and adopted to be a new feature of Russia’s foreign policy called a new or Neo-Eurasianism. Marlene Laruelle refers to Neo-Eurasianism as ‘the most conservative ideology’ that was emerged in the post-Soviet era. According to her, ‘it maintains that Russia must unlearn Europe and reject the imperialism of European identity’. Marlene Laruelle criticises the Eurasianist School in terms of historical and contemporary currents of thought that are often difficult to identify. Also, the term Eurasianism is beset with numerous ambiguities, paradoxes, and contradictions, while it calls for a better recognition of national minorities, especially Muslims, or plans for the constitution of a Russo-Turkish axis that would rival the EU as a magnet for Europe’s Eastern margins.

The Neo-Eurasianist doctrine has been used more and more often to comment on Russian foreign policy with Putin is coming to power, according to Marlene Laruelle. She argues that Eurasianism became attractive to whoever was questioning Russia’s place between Europe and Asia. Since Putin’s advant to power in 2000, Marlene Laruelle has observed many references to Neo-Eurasianism in Putin’s foreign policy such as : Putin’s speech at the Asian Summit in Brunei in November 2001, where he said: ‘Russia has always felt herself to be a Eurasian country’. However, she argues that there is a doubt whether such aspects of Russian foreign policy truly represent the Eurasianist doctrine. At the same time, she points to Neo-Eurasianism as ‘often equated with foreign policy discourse or the new Russian patriotic ideology’. In the same way, Irina Isakova asserts that Russia has demonstrated strength in upgrading its position in the international theatre. She states that the Neo-Eurasianists support agreements with China, India, Japan

76 Laruelle and Gabowitsch, Russian Eurasianism: An Ideology of Empire. p1
77 Lajos F. Szászdi introduces two forms of Neo-Eurasianism: Moderate or pragmatic Neo-Eurasianists and radical or dogmatic Neo-Eurasianists. He states that the differences are according to their degree of moderation or extremism, and to their approaches on how to achieve Russian national goals and policy objectives. See Szászdi, L.F. (2008), Russian civil-military relations and the origins of the second Chechen war (Univ Pr of Amer) page 9.
78 Laruelle and Gabowitsch, Russian Eurasianism: An Ideology of Empire.p7
79 Ibid.p7
80 Ibid.p13
and increased co-operation with the Commonwealth Independent States, Iran and the Middle East, expanding Russia’s geo-strategic space.  

For Shireen Hunter and her colleagues, new or Neo-Eurasianism is not the same as traditional or classical Eurasianism. They mention that ‘the new Eurasianist school is essentially inspired by the ‘realist theory’ of international relations and a desire to retain Russia’s great-power status’. Furthermore, they state that Neo-Eurasianists are not anti-West, and favour a more balanced foreign policy that also encompasses relations with China, other Pacific countries, the central Asia republics, Muslim countries and South Africa. However, Irina Isakova points out that Neo-Eurasianism ‘carries strong anti-American perceptions’. This means that Self-Other perception has an influence on the Neo-Eurasianist perspectives of Russian foreign policy.

**Approaches to EU foreign policy-making**

For Fraser Cameron, scholars in the political sciences ‘find it difficult to pin a theoretical label on the EU’. Similarly, Karen Smith argues that there is no single theory applicable to EU foreign policy because ‘different conceptual approaches will be appropriate for different theoretical questions and illuminate a different set of empirical facts’. Although there are an enormous number of studies on EU foreign policy, they rarely subject it to the same theory or approach. When the literature of the studies of EU foreign policy was surveyed, it was found that many theorists and scholars consider it a puzzle. In this regard, Karen Smith refers to ‘neorealism; neoliberal institutionalism, intergovernmentalism, constructivism; and neo-functionalism’ as approaches to the same study. Whereas Mark Pollack refers to: realism, intergovernmentalism, liberal intergovernmentalism, and rational-choice institutionalism as a characteristic set of approaches to the study of the

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83 Ibid.p296
84 Isakova, *Russian Governance in the Twenty-First Century: Geo-Strategy, Geopolitics and Governance*.p15
85 Cameron, *An Introduction to European Foreign Policy*.p19
These approaches should ‘provide a useful starting-point for generating explanations of EU foreign policymaking’. However, Fraser Cameron argues that the traditional confrontation in foreign policy theory is ‘between the realist school and the liberal-institutionalist school’. These approaches might provide more understanding to the thesis’s scope.

Realism is described as one of the oldest theories in political theory and one which has claimed a large space for its arguments. It offers assumptions or principals that suggest a way of dealing with the state on the external level. It assumes that states seek to maximise power accumulation and defend their national interests (Morgenthau, 1946), puts emphasis on the imperative of survival (Mearsheimer, 1994), and focuses on imperative security needs (Waltz, 1988). Power, security, and national interests are central to the realist understanding of foreign policy-making. According to Waltz’s perspective (neorealism), the state is the dominant actor in an international system; therefore, the state’s foreign policies are driven by the desire to maximise its material capabilities in an anarchic

90 Cameron, An Introduction to European Foreign Policy. p19
world. Thus, the natural position of the state in the international system is ‘a state of war’. Subsequently, the state’s behaviour at an external level is driven by the desire to maximise its material capabilities and maintain its security conditions in order to survive. Because of this, Henry Kissinger points to the level of mistrust among states. This lack of trust leads states to define their alliances according to ‘self-interested’ behaviour. In this regard, Alexander Wendt argues that neorealists believe that ‘Anarchies are necessarily “self-help” systems, systems in which both central authority and collective security are absent’. The neorealist debate, according to Wendt, has been based on commitment to “rationalism”. In contrast, rational choice is treating ‘identities of agents as exogenously given and focus on how the behaviour of agents generates outcomes’. Therefore, Realism addresses identity and Self-Other perception in a narrow concept. For Karl K. Schonberg, states have only ‘one essential identity’ that centres on ‘sovereign, Self-interested, competitors for power view of the role of identity in world politics’. Hence, realism places an emphasis on the “Self” that is primarily defined in the context of national interests, power and security.

Furthermore, realism reflects a broader emphasis on otherness. Realism assumes that states exist in an ‘anarchic international system’. That is, states treat other states on the basis of antagonist or foe. Thus, there is a realist equation that is set on Self-interest in contrast with the other. In this regard, Andrei Tsygankov and Pavel Tsygankov argue that realists tend to perceive other states as ‘threatening and recommend that they [states] Self-prepare to defend its security’.

The EU is not a nation state; therefore traditional realists do not generally pay attention to the EU as a global actor. In connection to this, Karen Smith points out many obstacles that EU foreign policy is limited by in relation to the realist approach. She argues that the realists place an emphasis on these limits and international bodies of the EU ‘cannot

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98 Waltz, ‘Theories of International Politics’, (p. 102).
100 Schonberg, Constructing 21st Century U.S. Foreign Policy: Identity, Ideology, and America’s World Role in a New Era.p3
103 Ibid.p8
overcome these limits’. Thus, in the realist perspective, the EU cannot play a vital role as a global power in world politics until it becomes a kind of Westphalian federation with a central government. Jan Zielonka argues that the enlargement of the EU resembles “a neo-medieval empire”. In this realist view of the process of enlargement of the EU, Zielonka poses a model of ‘concentric circles’ for the EU in which the states as political units “operate in a system without a clear power centre and hierarchy”. That is, ‘multilevel and multicentred governance will be the norms’. The model is a guarantee for strengthening European identity, where this identity ‘will be blurred and fragile with no truly European demos’.

However, John Van Oudenaren argues for a view of the enlarged EU from a neorealist perspective in which the Treaty of Lisbon ended five years of political uncertainty in the EU in order to play a vital role as a capable and coherent global actor on the international stage. From a neorealist perspective, Van Oudenaren states four outstanding premises which shape the development of the EU as a global actor on the international stage. First, the context of the redistribution of global power that most likely will continue, and the emergence of global political, economic and military multipolarity, will affect how the EU defines its national interests. Thus, the EU needs to fashion a politic to define its interests and think about relations with other powers beyond the crude containment of power and the reaffirmation of western solidarity. Second, how the EU will deal with the economic crisis and the high level of spending on international aid. Third, how the European institutions function in practice, namely the European Council and a de facto EU foreign minister (the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy) and finally its relationship with the US. These four will all factors influence the future of the EU as a global actor in world politics.

Liberalism is a complex and multifaceted theory which rarely, if ever, exists in a pure form. In the international realm, the theory seeks to address the possibility of enhancing

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106 Ibid.p. 1.
108 Ibid.p. 15-41
109 Liberalism is described as one of the main schools in world politics, are which has taken and still takes a large space of discussion and argument. Hobson classifies liberalism into five basic variants and situates
cooperation and peace, and to achieve the desired end of global welfare.\footnote{111} It assumes that states are socially-adaptive and have high international agential power. That is, the international realm is redefined as a realm of possibility and interdependence, which enables states to maximise global welfare and create a peaceful, cooperative and orderly world.\footnote{112} Thus, interdependence, cooperation and peace are central to the liberal understanding of foreign policy-making. Like realism, liberalism considers states as ‘the dominant actors in the international system and defines security in “Self-interested” terms’.\footnote{113} According to Michael Doyle, liberalism has been seen as a counter to realism in that ‘liberal states do not go to war with one another’ and states can observe and have respect for one another’s individual freedom.\footnote{114} Thus, the natural position of the state in an international system is a state of peace.

Subsequently, there is a trusting behaviour between states based on a set of principles, values and institutions which work to achieve the desired end, namely, peace and global welfare. According to Wendt, liberalism is based on a commitment to the ‘rationalist model which treats identities and interests as exogenously given and constant’.\footnote{115} Thereby, them within two categories: individual-centric liberalism, comprising classical liberalism, new liberalism and functionalism; and state-centric liberalism which comprise English school rationalism and neoliberal institutionalism. Hobson refers to three fundamental traits that define the rational essence of the liberal theory of the state. The first is the theory of the socially-adaptive state in which states have to meet the economic and social needs of individuals. The second trait is related to the international agential power of states, in that the international realm is redefined as a realm of possibility, which enables states to maximise welfare and create peace. The last trait is limited to appropriate institutions that can achieve the desired end of global welfare and peace. However, liberalism assumes that inappropriate domestic and international institutions lead to diminishing welfare and peace. With respect to international agential power as a main assumption of the rational essence of liberal theory, liberalism proscribes the ability of states to make foreign policy free of international constraints that lead to the desired end of global welfare and creates peace. For more information see J.M. Hobson, The State and International Relations (Cambridge Univ Pr, 2000).p 64-66

\footnote{111} According to Andrew Moravcsik, classical liberalism in international relations theory can be distinguished into strands as follows: republican liberalism that focuses on liberal democracies, pluralist liberalism which emphasises the misdistribution of social power or the existence of deep social cleavages which create incentives for international conflict, commercial liberalism which asserts that economic interdependence leads to creating incentives for global welfare, peace and cooperation, and regulatory liberalism which claim that international law and institutions promote international accommodation. For more information see A. Moravcsik, \textit{Liberal International Relations Theory: A Social Scientific Assessment} (Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 2001). .
\footnote{112} Hobson, The State and International Relations.p 65.
\footnote{115} A. Wendt, \textit{Social Theory of International Politics} (Cambridge University Press, 1999).p. 44.
Liberalists do not deny the role of Self that is based on a set of principles and values, but they place more emphasis on interdependence and institutions to achieve the desired ends.

Anne Le More’s study highlights the ‘aid for peace’ strategy as a liberal instrument in supporting the Middle East peace process and Palestinian state building. One conclusion of this study was that the failure of the aid strategy ‘reflects the limitations of the incrementalist approach underpinning the Oslo process which did not tackle the main political issues to the conflict directly and did not link the 'peace process' to a clear set of political objectives’. 116

_institutionalism_ as a theory was developed in the study of domestic institutions, and then grew until it ‘constituted sources of inspiration in international relation theory’. 117 It assumes that ‘when states can jointly benefit from cooperation, governments attempt to construct such institutions’. 118 Hence, institutionalists foresee that institutions are working to reduce obstacles, decrease transaction costs, increase information exchange, establish bridges of cooperation between states and facilitate the processes of exchange. 119 For James March and Johan Olsen, theories of political institutions portray political decision-making primarily as ‘a process for developing a sense of purpose, direction, identity and belonging’. 120 Thus, Institutionalists point out that these institutions have an ‘independent effect on member states’ subsequent negotiating behaviour and policy choices’. 121 Hence, institutionalism as a theory in foreign policy focuses on how institutions interact and how this affects the political behaviour of states or international society. In other words, it builds its assumptions on increased cooperation between states.

In the case of the EU, Ben Rosamond argues that the EU is ‘heavily institutionalized’. 122 In the same vein, Mark A. Pollack argues that the EU is the most institutionalised

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119 Ibid.p. 42.
120 J.G. March and J.P. Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics (Free Pr, 1989).p6
121 Ibid.p6
international organization in the world. However, Hall and Taylor label three subspecies of institutionalism: historical, rational choice and sociological institutionalism. For Dowding, rational choice institutionalism has revolutionised the study of the EU by bringing formal techniques to study the nature of the power relationship between the complex principal set of institutional actors. Rational choice institutionalism posits that ‘human beings are self-seeking and behave rationally and strategically’. The supporters of this approach to the study of the EU believe that it is ‘able to build knowledge in a systematic way’. Thus, the multi-institutional character of the EU makes this theory attractive to the many scholars who study it from an institutional perspective. The institutional perspective of the EU does not deny the influence of identity, but it places high emphasis on rationalism in the making of foreign policy.

New rational choice institutionalism, known as the new institutionalism, proceeds from the proposition that ‘institutions matter as shapers of and influence upon actors’ behaviour rather than as mere expressions of political culture’. Normative institutionalism as a strand of new institutionalism portrays member states of the EU as ‘thinly-socialized actors with quasi-autonomous preferences’, and the member states are committed to ‘ensuring the Union’s political viability’ and pursue their foreign policy preference within an ‘institutionalized setting’. According to this theory, EU foreign policy is a compromise of states’ preferences. In the liberal institutionalist vision, foreign policy is based on a multilateral system, which is ‘the universe of multilateral organizations, international law, and multilateral principles, norms and politics’. It is worth saying that institutionalism with all its strands elevates rationalism in policy decision-making and focuses on the role of institutions in shaping and influencing EU behaviour in world

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126 Cini, European Union Politics, p. 123.
politics. To put it another way, it emphasises the role of institutions in determining EU foreign policy-making.

**Intergovernmentalism**, in the case of the EU, refers to the role of national governments as the primary actors in the integration process. According to Thomas Risse-Kappen, the intergovernmentalist approach sees EU–member states as ‘the principle agents driving or preventing progress in the European co-operation’.\(^{131}\) In other words, intergovernmentalism considers that the governments of the EU’s 28 members are the main actors in determining EU foreign policy-making. In this approach to the EU, national governments ‘endorse their interests in a broader system’.\(^{132}\) In other words, the intergovernmental approach assumes a convergence of governmental preference and interests between the EU’s 28 states in making domestic and foreign policies. At the same time it recognises the importance of institutionalisation of the EU’s agents in order to reach a global actorness of the EU. The criticisms of this approach are related to the egotism of member states in negotiating their interests and preferences and their ineffectiveness in dealing with crisis.\(^{133}\) The leaders of member states have to meet periodically to discuss new treaties and this has resulted in crises, and decisions subject to states’ preference and interests or to inter-state bargains.

**Neo-functionalism** developed within the framework of the main theory functionalism, which is a theory of international co-operation that deals with ‘specific transnational problems such as health or the environment’.\(^{134}\) Also, the theory is based on the hope of widening co-operation among nation states that will lead to a weakening of the territorial and legal sovereignty of nation-states\(^{135}\). In the case of the EU, neo-functionalism emerged, according to Fraser Cameron, as a response to the need to increase co-operation between European states. It is associated with the work of Ernst Haas. For A. Stone Sweet and W. Sandholtz, Haas ascribes European integration to three main factors: ‘The

\(^{133}\) Wong, *The Europeanization of French Foreign Policy: France and the EU in East Asia*.p4
\(^{134}\) Cameron, *An Introduction to European Foreign Policy*.p20
\(^{135}\) Ibid.p20
relationship between global interdependence, political choice, and the development of supranational institutions'.

However, Fraser Cameron argues that Haas acknowledges that co-operation in the European Union is easier to achieve in light of ‘its history and shared democratic values’. Thus it assumes that ‘the spill-over effect of co-operation would lead to a growing sense of European identity’. Jeffrey T. Checkel and Peter J. Katzenstein state that ‘identity played a minor role in Haas’s theory’, also that the theory ruled out ‘any deeper changes of identity’. Thomas Risse-Kappen states that neofunctionalism emphasises ‘an incremental and gradual process of political change’, and argues that this change is basically driven by what he called ‘the logic of functional self-sustaining processes’ which, according to him, responds to ‘external constraints and opportunities as well as internal developments’. Thus, neofunctionalism assumes that European integration leads to the construction of European identity, but does not explain if identity has any influence upon the European decision-making process on an external level.

Constructivism as an approach to the study of the EU is ‘trendy’, but it came to EU studies relatively ‘late’. It was introduced by Nicholas Onuf emphasises the socially constructed character of international relations. Constructivism has been developed by a number of scholars throughout the last three decades or so. However, most of the literature on the role of identity and Self-Other perception in foreign policy dates from after the

137 Cameron, An Introduction to European Foreign Policy, p20
138 Ibid, p20
141 The constructivist approach in studying foreign policy making is used by many scholars to explain and interpret patterns and processes of foreign policy – making. Richard Jackson and Matt McDonald use the constructivist perspective to understand how the ‘war on terror’ emerged as the dominant US foreign policy discourse after the events of 9/11. In their study, they argue that a constructivist approach provides a productive and informative analytical lens to explain and understand the making of American foreign policy after 9/11. They suggest that a focus on ideational factors characteristic of a constructivist approach to international relations- narrative framing, identity, norms, contestation and negotiation, among others-provides particularly important insights into the emergence and institutionalisation of the ‘war on terror’ in the US context. See I. Parmar, New Directions in US Foreign Policy (Taylor & Francis, 2009). p. 19.
144 R.H. Jackson and G. Sørensen, Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches (Oxford University Press, USA, 2007).
collapse of the Soviet Union or the end of the Cold War. The end of the Cold War represented a sharp shift towards constructivism in the scholarship of International Relations. In this regard Katzenstein and his colleagues describe this moment as ‘the sinking of the Titanic’ and refer to the second half of the 1990s in which North American scholarship ‘was preoccupied with the issue of whether variants of realism or liberalism offered a superior way for explaining the world’. According to Fraser Cameron, constructivism in international relations ‘emphasizes the social dimension of world politics’ and that co-operation among states is high and cannot be ‘reduced to rational action or a system of institutional constraints’, as well as holding that state interaction must be understood as ‘a pattern of action that shapes and is shaped by identities over time’. The search for collective identity and what type of global actoress the EU can play and what place and mission the EU has on the international stage, are questions which stimulate constructivist debate over studies of EU foreign policy. The year 1999 is considered by Pollack as a turning point in constructivist studies of the EU. Constructivism as an approach in international relations, according to Fraser Cameron, places ‘emphasis on the social dimension of the world politics’ and co-operation among states is high and cannot be ‘reduced to rational action or a system of institutional constraints’. State interaction must also be understood as a ‘a pattern of action that shapes and is shaped by identities over time’. In studying the EU, Rey Koslowski argues that constructivism which focuses on ‘political practice, intersubjective meaning and informal norms’ could be used to develop an approach to understanding the EU as a federal polity on the international scene.

146 F. Cameron, An Introduction to European Foreign Policy (Taylor & Francis, 2007).p20
148 Pollack, Theorizing the European Union: International Organization, Domestic Polity, or Experiment in New Governance?”. (p. 365.
149 Cameron, An Introduction to European Foreign Policy.p20
Theories range from those which consider that the state conducts foreign policy in order to maximise its material capabilities, to ones that place emphasis on cooperation and interdependence in order to reach peace and global stability, to ones which foresee institutions establish bridges of cooperation between states and facilitate the processes of exchange, to ones which consider a convergence of governmental preference and interests essential to foreign policy-making, to ones which consider foreign policy of the state as a response to its identity. In foreign policy, neorealists ascribe interaction between states to anarchy, while liberals attribute interaction to order.

It is reasonable to expect foreign policy theories to be helpful in interpreting the behaviour of the EU and Russia towards Palestinian statehood. Much in the EU and Russia’s foreign policies in the Middle East revolves around international cooperation, economic interdependence, accumulating power capabilities, national interests, security cooperation and perceptions that are at the heart of the aforementioned theories. These theories suggest different ways of understanding the foreign policy of the EU and Russia towards establishing Palestinian statehood which provides a base upon which to examine the foreign policies of the EU and Russia towards the Middle East peace process, because the nature of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict offers a greater scope for understanding the process of foreign policy-making by global powers/actors. Thus, through a constructivist approach this thesis aims to investigate how Self-Other perception informs foreign policy-making, specifically by the EU and Russia, in relation to Palestinian statehood.

2.2. A Constructivist School as an Analytical Frame to Foreign Policy-making

The constructivist theory is have used to study the discourses of the EU and Russia in the context of the Middle East peace process. Using constructivist theory does not mean that other theories are unhelpful or wrongheaded. In regards to the EU’s and Russia’s global actorness, I will argue that those political entities are objects in the realm of foreign policy-making, as ‘global actors’ in the international milieu. According to Brian White, the

151 Ruben Wong discusses two approaches when looking at practical foreign policy-making of the EU. The state-centric approach that focuses on the foreign policy of individual member states as ‘utility-maximizing, selfish and purposive actors’, and the European-idealist approach which ‘treats European foreign policy as a given or already exists, and has a consistent personality that makes an impact on world politics, and is taken seriously by other actors’. In addition, the European-idealist approach also downplays the realist emphasis on ‘state power and national interests’ and privileges instead of ‘the role of supranational European
model concentrates on the impact of the EU as a global actor in world politics. Therefore, the approach is to study the EU is the ‘the EU-as-actor’. This model was chosen to investigate European discourse towards establishing a Palestinian state because of its limitations. Brian White states two limitations to the model which are: ‘the focus is on outcomes rather than processes’ and whether ‘the EU can be appropriately analysed and evaluated as a single actor’. Thus, the thesis seeks to investigate the outcomes of the EU’s foreign policy towards the issue of a Palestinian state and considers the EU as a single actor in world politics. In connection to this, Anastasia Chebakova points out the constructivist accounts for the EU’s global actorness. She assumes that the EU is ‘a new kind of multi-faced, multi-perspectival construct, which by acting globally changes meanings and perceptions of foreign policy and presents a new type of international actorness’. Russia on the other hand, is a federation and considers itself the legitimate successor to the former Soviet Union and seeks to restore its international polarity. In this regard, Tsygankov points to domestic perception and debates of international identity as factors which dominate the process of Russian foreign policy-making.

Identity is “central” to the constructivist approach in explaining and interpreting patterns and processes of foreign policy by states, non-state actors and other polities. For Richard Jackson and Matt McDonald, ‘the role of identity is the focal point of competition over action: attempts to justify or consent particular policy preferences’. From a constructivist perspective, analysing the role of identity in foreign policy-making starts with the question: ‘how (do) international actors see and define themselves, other actors, and the environment in which they interact’. That is, ‘Self-Other’ perception by global institutions in building a common ‘European identity’ and a ‘distinctive moral presence in world politics’. Accordingly, the European idealist portrays the EU as a ‘civilian power which is a kind of soft power’. For more information see R.Y. Wong, The Europeanization of French Foreign Policy (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).

152 White et al., *Contemporary European Foreign Policy*.p17
153 The discussion on how scholars conceived the EU: as a global actor or as a superpower or superstate, and whether it is an international presence or an international identity, are presented in the literature review chapter.
154 Ibid.p17-18
157 Parmar, *New Directions in US Foreign Policy*.p20
158 Ibid.p20
actors plays a vital role in determining their foreign policy towards high profile issues like the question of establishing Palestinian statehood. Christopher Hill asserts this constructivist dimension by saying: ‘effective foreign policy rests upon a shared sense of national identity, of a nation-state’s “place in the world”, its friends and enemies, its interests and aspirations’.  

Alexander Wendt asserts two basic tenets of constructivism. The first is that ‘the structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces’. Secondly, that ‘the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature’. According to Wendt, the identities of states or actors are constructed by shared ideas, beliefs, and values. He further argues that “foreign policy behaviour is often determined primarily by domestic politics”. Wendt emphasises the importance of understanding foreign policy-making in the international milieu through a lens that centralises the role of identity which is constructed by shared ideas. Thus, the focus is directed at the socially constructed character of foreign policy-making in which shared ideas, beliefs, values, norms and knowledge are guiding actors. In other words, constructivism is a theoretical approach which is interested in how shared ideas, beliefs, norms, and values define the internal structure that construct the states’ identities and Self-Other perception which affect the making of their foreign policies.

Furthermore, Richard Jackson and Matt McDonald state three assumptions of the constructivist approach. First, constructivists view ‘the world as socially constructed’ which means that ‘the perceptions, identities and interests of individuals and groups are socially and culturally constructed, rather than existing outside of or prior to society’. Second, constructivists hold that ‘agents and structures in world politics are mutually constitutive’ which means that ‘agents constitute structures through their beliefs, actions and interactions, while structures constitute agents by helping to shape their identities and interests’. Third, ‘constructivists view ideational factors – representation, identities, beliefs, perceptions and norms – as central to the dynamics and processes of world politics’.

162 Ibid.p 2.
163 Parmar, *New Directions in US Foreign Policy*.p20
For Gabriel Gorodetsky, Russia sees itself as a great power with special geopolitical and geocultural features and these premises govern Russian foreign policy. Russia seeks to reintroduce ‘imperial and Soviet symbols and restore enduring national interests and great-power status’ as an attempt to ‘refurbish its national identity’. Therefore, he sees the challenge in establishing a new Russian identity as bearing directly on its foreign policy. However, the idea of establishing the EU is the way to create an international identity. For Federiga Bindi and Irina Angelescu, the EU seeks to become a ‘powerful international actor without becoming a superstate in the processes’.

Subsequently, constructivist assumptions should provide a better understanding of how the perceptions and identities of the EU and Russia were constructed in the course of their relations with the Middle East conflict. In this respect, it is important to know what sources and bases they draw upon for deriving their identity and Self-Other perception; and in which explanatory traditions and ideas they ground their discourses in addressing Palestinian statehood.

*Strengths of constructivism*

The constructivist approach is especially effective in studying the role of identity and Self-Other perception in foreign policy-making. Identity and the Self-Other perception of actors are constructed through discourse. This is based on language as a system of social communication. This leads to a greater depth of understanding of the meaning between text and context in the course of studying foreign policy-making. In connection with this view, Jeffrey Checkel argues that constructivism, by exploring issues of identity, has ‘succeeded in broadening the theoretical contours of international relations and leads to new and meaningful interpretation of international politics’. The second strength of constructivism is due attention to process, and thus to social construction as an element in any social process.

These strengths make constructivism an appropriate approach to theorising about foreign policy-making by the EU and Russia towards Palestinian statehood. It offers an alternative understanding of the neorealist and liberal central assumptions of state interaction on the international level, including: the meaning of security and the anarchic nature of international relations and interdependent relations between states. Constructivism emphasises the social aspect of interaction between states which is influenced by shared ideas, values, beliefs and norms. Therefore, the foreign policies of the EU and Russia towards the issue of establishing Palestinian statehood are influenced by perceptions of the Self as well as perception of the otherness rather than being restricted to a security agenda, or accumulating material capabilities, or reaching a desired end of peace and global welfare, which is a wider approach.

**Weaknesses of constructivism**

As Robert Jervis argues constructivism is not free from weaknesses. He suggests that constructivism fails to express ‘how norms are formed, how identities are shaped’ and criticises constructivism on the grounds that it does not tell ‘anything about the expected content of foreign policies or international relations’. In the same argument, Zehfuss challenges Wendt’s perspective of identity formation and international relations that are not naturally given but constructed by shared ideas. She wonders why the question of ‘how either the actors or the ideas about Self and Other get constituted in the first place is not part of the account’. In her view, Wendt misconceptualises identity construction. Zehfuss argues that identity is a complex notion and constructivism cannot encompass it. Michael Smith adds that constructivism ‘neglects to explain how collective goals are made to persist over time and thus influence future behaviour’. Using a constructivist approach assumes that there is a relationship between identity and foreign policy-making, which is influenced by ideational basis of identities. Therefore, in this view, the EU and Russia redefine their foreign policies according to their ideational structure in the course of the MEPP.

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171 M.E. Smith, 'Institutionalization, Policy Adaptation and European Foreign Policy Cooperation', ibid.10/1 (2004b), 95-136.p96
An approach to investigate the role of identity in building global actorness

This thesis argues that the EU and Russia are “global actors” in world politics. ‘The EU’ here refers to a political entity that represents the EU 28 member states, and its foreign policy ‘that referring to EU co-ordination of its political relations with the outside world’. To investigate the process of achieving global actorness, the thesis will use the model of Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler. This model assumes that global actorness is based upon three factors: presence, opportunities and capability: Presence, conceptualises the relationship between internal developments and external expectations beyond borders, while capability refers to the internal context of external objectives which enable or constrain actorness. It is about the capacity of foreign policy instruments to respond to viable opportunities to play a global role; opportunity denotes factors within the external environment which accommodate the desire of actorness. The thesis will demonstrate that these factors are very clearly present in the discourse of both the EU and Russia.

Through employing this approach, the thesis contends that the making of foreign policy by global powers becomes meaningful and better to understand in process of constructing the Self as a global actor. In a changing world constructing or reinventing a sense of global actorness and differentiating the Self from Others gives meaning to the making of foreign policies by global actors. The adopted model of identity and Self-Other perception emphasise the temporal nature of global actorness and points to the fact that constructing and maintaining an international identity is open to re-negotiation, but also limited by the influence of internal and external developments. It is central to the constructivist approach which is the understanding of identity’s construction within internal and external contexts. This construction of identity imbues with contest over building capabilities of global actorness.

172 B. White et al., Contemporary European Foreign Policy (Sage, 2004). p1
2.3 Qualitative Methodology: Initial Observations

This thesis uses qualitative research which is a method which social scientists agree meets with increasing acceptance.\textsuperscript{174} Qualitative research is one of three approaches to enquiry: qualitative, quantitative and mixed, in which the scholar usually makes knowledge claims built primarily on ‘constructivist perspectives or advocacy/participatory perspectives or both’.\textsuperscript{175} Thus, a qualitative approach has strengths that support the thesis’ argument especially in the nature of analysis/interpretation and output.\textsuperscript{176} For Dawn Snape and Liz Spencer, the aims of qualitative research are directed at:

‘Providing an in-depth and interpreted understanding of the social world of research participants by learning about their social and material circumstances, their experiences, perspectives and histories’.\textsuperscript{177}

Therefore, qualitative research is well-suited for this thesis. It enables an in-depth and interpreted understanding rather than a general analysis of the EU and Russia’s foreign policy-making in the context of the peace process in the Middle East. However, qualitative research provides a number of methods that address the research question of this thesis.

For Jane Ritchie:

‘A major feature of qualitative methods is their facility to describe and display phenomena as experienced by the study population, in fine-tuned detail and in the study participants’ own terms’.\textsuperscript{178}

Thus, qualitative methods are essential to the study of social and political phenomena. This thesis assumes that there is a difference of style and substance in the EU and Russia’s

\textsuperscript{174} U. Flick, E. Von Kardorff, and I. Steinke, \textit{A Companion to Qualitative Research} (Sage Publications Ltd, 2004).p3
\textsuperscript{176} According to Dawn Snape and Liz Spencer, qualitative research has many strengths such as: viewing social life in terms of processes rather than in static terms and providing a holistic perspective within explained contexts, adopting a flexible research strategy and conducting naturalistic inquiry in the real-world rather than inexperimetal or manipulated settings, using methods of data generation which are flexible and sensitive to the social context in which the data are produced, respecting the uniqueness of each case as well as conducting cross-case analysis and developing explanations at the level of meaning rather than cause, and producing detailed descriptions and 'rounded understandings' which are based on, or offer an interpretation of, the perspectives of the participants in the social setting and mapping meanings, processes and contexts. For more information see, J. Ritchie and J. Lewis, \textit{Qualitative Research Practice: A Guide for Social Science Students and Researchers} (Sage, 2003).p4. Also, Jane Ritchie points out, “Because qualitative research seeks to capture emergent concepts and is not overly predetermined in coverage, the potential for original or creative thoughts or suggestions is high”. Ibid p. 30.
\textsuperscript{177} Ibid.p 3
\textsuperscript{178} Ibid.p27
foreign policy-making toward the Middle East peace process. Qualitative research provides methods that facilitate the process of description and display these phenomena as experienced by former and current diplomats (e.g. those from the EU and Russia involved in the making of the peace process in the Middle East). The study of the role of identity and Self-Other perception is suited to qualitative methodology. As Jane Ritchie notes:

‘Because of its facility to examine subjects in depth, qualitative research provides a unique tool for studying what lies behind, or underpins, a decision, attitude, behavior or other phenomena’. 179

Furthermore, qualitative research has functions of social investigation. Jane Ritchie states four functions of qualitative research: contextual, explanatory, evaluative and generative. 180 These functions shed light on how identity and Self-Other perception influence the making of foreign policy and make sense of the efficiency of qualitative research in ways that others cannot. Also, these functions enable the researcher to formulate findings that give better answers to research questions which deal with the social construction of foreign policy, and the meaning and the context of their construction.

**Qualitative Research versus Quantitative Research**

Researchers use either qualitative, quantitative or a mixed method approach in their scholarship. Qualitative and quantitative approaches have some overlap. However, for W. Laurence Neuman:

‘Qualitative and quantitative research differs in many ways, but they complement each other, as well. All social researchers systematically collect and analyze empirical data and carefully examine the patterns in them to understand and explain social life’. 181

The distinction between qualitative and quantitative is “not too sharp” as David Sliverman and Amir Marnasti argue. W. Laurence Neuman states three differences between qualitative and quantitative research: first, the nature of data; qualitative data are in the form of ‘words and images from documents, observations, and transcript’, while

179 Ibid.p28
180 According to Jane Ritchie, these functions are defined in various ways, depending on the purpose of the classification. She identifies these classifications as follows: (1) Contextual - describing the form or nature of what exists, (2) Explanatory - examining the reasons for, or associations between, what exists, (3) Evaluative - appraising the effectiveness of what exists, and (4) Generative - aiding the development of theories, strategies or actions. For more information see J. Ritchie and J. Lewis, *Qualitative Research Practice: A Guide for Social Science Students and Researchers* (Sage, 2003).p27
quantitative data are in the form of ‘numbers from precise measurement’. Second, that qualitative and quantitative researchers have different objective in Qualitative ‘analysis proceeds by extracting themes and generalizations from evidence and organizes data to present a coherent, consistent picture’, while in quantitative research objective ‘analysis proceeds using statistics tables, or charts and discussing how what they show related to hypothesis’. Third, both often hold different assumptions about social life; in qualitative research ‘procedures are particular and replication is very rare’, while in quantitative research ‘procedures are standard and replication is assumed’. However, qualitative and quantitative research can be, according to Udo Kelle and Christian Erzberger, integrated into two different concepts. Quantitative methodologists frequently speak of a ‘phase-model’, while qualitative methodologists speak of ‘triangulation’.

Collecting Qualitative Data

The academic investigation of this thesis uses methodological techniques based on primary and secondary research methods in order to establish how the main research question of this thesis is to be researched.

Primary research methods generally employ observation (Peter Foster) and asking questions (Michael Wilson and Roger Sapsford). This approach according to Michael Wilson and Roger Sapsford, uses ‘interview and questionnaire’ as primary methods of data collection. However, Glenn A. Bowen points out, ‘documents’ are also part of data collection methods. He defines ‘documents’ in a variety of forms.

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182 Ibid. p 85
183 According to to Udo Kelle and Christian Erzberger, the phase-model approach means that, “qualitative methods would be used to generate hypotheses and quantitative methods for hypothesis testing”, while the triangulation approach means that, “the union of qualitative and quantitative methods would shed light on the same object from direct perspectives and in different ways, thereby giving more comprehensive and valid picture”. For more information see Flick, Von Kardorff, and Steinke, A Companion to Qualitative Research, p 172-4

186 These forms, according to Glenn A. Bowen, include ‘advertisements; agendas, attendance registers, and minutes of meetings; manuals; background papers; books and brochures; diaries and journals; event programs (i.e., printed outlines); letters and memoranda; maps and charts; newspapers (clippings/articles); press releases; program proposals, application forms, and summaries; radio and television program scripts; organisational or institutional reports; survey data; and various public records. Scrapbooks and photo albums
Secondary research methods, on the other hand, involve information and data which have been already published. There are a variety of sources accessible for secondary research methods, such as: ‘research books, research reports, journal articles, articles reproduced online, scientific debates, and analyses of historical events’. These secondary sources present their own perspectives and interpretations of other scholars of this thesis’s related themes. These will provide a wide knowledge and background material providing the research framework and context of the making of foreign policy by EU and Russia towards the Middle East peace process.

In qualitative research, most scholars and writers emphasise the importance of primary or naturally occurring data in their research and interviews in a natural setting. This thesis employs interviews and documents as a primary method of collecting qualitative data. This research employs methodological approaches based on the following research methods:

*Interviews as a Technique of Data Collection:*

Interviews have a strong claim to being probably ‘the most widely used method in qualitative research’. There are many types of interview, but according to Catherine Dawson, there are three common types: ‘unstructured’, semi-structured and structured interviews’. Since this thesis aims to reach a holistic understanding of identity influence on foreign policy-making, unstructured or in-depth interviews are used as the major technique of data collection. As Carolyn Mears explains:

‘In-depth interviews are conversations with a purpose, namely, to sit with another and learn what that particular individual can share about a topic, to discover and record what that person has experienced and what he or she thinks and feels about it’.

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188 Ritchie and Lewis, *Qualitative Research Practice: A Guide for Social Science Students and Researchers*.p36
189 Unstructured interviews or in-depth interviews are sometimes called life history interviews.
Thus, conducting in-depth interviews takes the form of a ‘conversation’ in which the interviewee represents his beliefs and experience about the research topic. In the context of this research, the objective of using in-depth interview is to gain first-hand information in relation to the thesis’ themes. However, there is sufficient information about how identity and Self-Other perception influence EU and Russia foreign policy towards Palestinian statehood. Hence, the use of in-depth interviews to gain first-hand information is justifiable.

_Documents as a Technique of Data Collection:_

Documents or documentary sources constitute a major source of gathering information. Glenn A. Bowen (2009) and Ruth Finnegan (2006) state a variety of types and forms of this technique of data collection. For Glenn A. Bowen:

‘Documents provide background and context, additional questions to be asked, supplementary data, a means of tracking change and development, and verification of findings from other data sources. Moreover, documents may be the most effective means of gathering data when events can no longer be observed or when informants have forgotten the details’.  

A vast range of written and non-written documents will contribute greatly in enhancing discussions in this thesis. Written and non-written material on EU and Russian foreign policy from media outlets, newspapers and websites as well as special documents related to the Middle East peace process underpin the theses arguments.

Many considerations are to be taken into account when using documentary sources. They include the use of sources appropriate to "the research topic, awareness of any twisting of the principles, the researcher will select, and a reasonable interpretation of the meaning conveyed by the sources".  

Thus, the main research methods used for this thesis are interviews and document analysis, utilising first-hand information gathered from interviews, substantive books, journal and magazine articles, official reports and documents, statements and the results of research studies conducted by a range of different centres, institutions and organisations. A number of considerations will be taken into account when using documentary sources, including reflections on the general and particular situations forming the context of the research.

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192 Bowen, 'Document Analysis as a Qualitative Research Method', (p 30-31)
Multi-methods/triangulation as a technique of Data Collection:

In this thesis, multi-methods/triangulation uses multi-methods of qualitative data collection including primary and secondary sources as well as a combination of documents and interviews in data collection techniques. For Jane Lewis and Jane Ritchie:

‘Triangulation assumes that the use of different sources of information will help both to confirm and to improve the clarity or precision, of a research finding’.

Thus, triangulation is a powerful solution to the problem of intrinsic bias that comes from a single data source or method, which undermines the validity and credibility of findings because of the weaknesses of any single method. Triangulation has strategies for reducing systematic bias in the data. Triangulation in this study allows exploring, interpreting, and understanding the role of identity and Self-Other perception in foreign policy-making by employing multi-methods of data collection. Triangulation as a strategy will work to strengthen findings and enrich interpretations of EU-Russian foreign policy. Furthermore, triangulation will be used as a way to strengthen the credibility of the thesis’ findings by comparing the foreign policies of the EU and Russia in the Middle East peace process.

2.4. Discourse Analysis as an Analytical Qualitative Method:

Qualitative research is conducted by many analytical methods. Discourse analysis is one of these methods, one that has gained increasing prominence in qualitative research in the past decade. In the field of international relations, discourse analysis has gained attractiveness as an analytical qualitative method in constructivist theory. Hence, this study uses discourse analysis, which is different from critical discourse analysis, as a

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194 According to "Catherine Dawson, 2009: 20" triangulation is a method of "combining both qualitative and quantitative research ", but according to "Jane Ritchie" "triangulation involves the use of different methods and sources to check the integrity of, or extent, inferences drawn from the data". See Ritchie and Lewis, Qualitative Research Practice: A Guide for Social Science Students and Researchers, p. 43.

195 Ibid.p275

196 For more information see Noaks, L. and Wincup, E. (2004), Criminological Research: Understanding Qualitative Methods (Sage), p 8-11


199 Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is a type of discourse analytical research that focuses on studying the way social power abuse, dominance, and inequality are enacted, reproduced, and resisted by text and talk in the social and political context. In other word, it has become the general label for a special approach to the
main analytical qualitative method. This thesis uses discourse not as a linguistic concept, but, as Michel Foucault argues, as a language and practice. The choice of using discourse analysis as the analytical qualitative method for interpreting and understanding the role of identity and Self-Other perception reflects how the making of foreign policy is perceived through socially constructed process:

‘All actors display their individuality, their self –otherwise, every professional in a specific field would have to act in the same way due to their position in the field and their acquired symbolic capital. Hence, the identity, the self of the actor influences the performance as well’.

Accordingly, identity and Self-Other perception of actors are perceived in terms of discourse. Discourse presents how actors display their ‘Self’ and how they perceive the ‘other’. Discourse is the use of spoken and written language. It is based on language as a system of social communication. James Gee says ‘we use language to get recognized as taking on a certain identity or role, that is, to build an identity here and now’.

In world study of text and talk, CDA is an interdisciplinary approach that differs in theory, methodology and types of research issues. Methodologically, CDA entails working in a transdisciplinary way through dialogue with other disciplines and theories which address social change. Namely, any method in discourse studies, any theory in humanities and social science could be used. CDA has emerged from critical linguistics which view language as a ‘form of social practice’, and explore how text and talk could be biased towards particular ethnicity, ideology, or sexism. It can be used to study a wide range of socio-political phenomena such as ethnic racism, sectarianism, sexism, immigration, colonialism, inequality, social injustice and any other phenomena politically and socially motivated. For this reason, CDA is not a paradigm in discourse research which any methodological and theoretical approach could be used and be appropriate as long as it is able to address these social and political problems; therefore, it is not a school, a field, or sub-discipline of discourse analysis. However, CDA has been developed within a wide spectrum of critical studies in social science, humanities, sociology, psychology, mass communication, and political science. Also, it pays attention to all levels and dimensions of discourse such as grammar, style, speech, acts, pragmatic strategies, etc. and other semiotic dimensions such as pictures, films, sound, music, gestures, etc. For more information see T. Van Dijk, ‘Discourse and Power: Contributions to Critical Discourse Studies’, Houndsmills: Palgrave MacMillan. http://psasir.upm.edu.my/5646, (2008). T.A. Van Dijk, Racism and Discourse in Spain and Latin America (14: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2005). N. Fairclough, ‘A Dialectical-Relational Approach to Critical Discourse Analysis in Social Research’, Methods of critical discourse analysis, 2 (2009), 162-86. N. Fairclough, Critical Discourse Analysis and the Marketization of Public Discourse: The Universities’, Discourse & Society, 4/2 (1993), 133-68. And N. Fairclough, ‘Discourse, Social Theory, and Social Research: The Discourse Ofwelfare Reform’, Journal of sociolinguistics, 4/2 (2000), 163-95.

Stuart Hall introduces a thorough discussion of Michel Foucault’s discursive approach. For Hall, Foucault studied discourse as a system of representation. The term discourse is used as a linguistic concept which in a broad sense is anything spoken or written. Foucault was particularly interested in knowledge of human beings and power that affect humans. He noted that there were rules and practices which produced meaningful statements and regulated discourse in different historical periods. For Foucault, discourse is a set of statements which provide a language for talking about- a way of presenting the knowledge about a particular topic at a particular historical moment. For more information see S. Hall, ‘Foucault: Power, Knowledge and Discourse’, Discourse theory and practice: A reader, 72 (2001), 81.

Ibid.p. 72


politics, language plays a crucial role in every political action and there are interconnections between language and power.\(^{204}\) To put it more simply, language between states is foreign policy. Discourse analysis, according to James Gee, is about the study of the use of language.\(^{205}\) That is, in terms of saying (informing), doing (action), and being (identity).\(^{206}\) Scholars use discourse analysis as a way of introducing critical thinking to the way the relationship between text and context is accounted for. The main benefit of this is to allow a better understanding of the meaning of discourse, spoken or written, in context. Meaning is not simply a crucial mixture of words and things: meaning develops in context-dependent use.\(^{207}\) Therefore, meaning draws through context. What counts in the use of discourse analysis is the stress placed on textual meaning but in relation to context. In this regard, Chilton and Schäffner say that ‘a text will be political if its context includes participants who are politicians’.\(^{208}\) In other words, as a qualitative method, discourse analysis is useful as a way to rework the relationship between text and context, confirming the significance of text only as a meaning or a construct to be understood within a context. There is no meaning outside context.

**Discourse structures:**

For Foucault, discourse analysis is: ‘a group of statements which provide a language for talking about ...a particular topic at a particular historical moment’.\(^{209}\) In this explanation, Foucault refers to the use of discourse analysis in terms of meaning -- what is sayable or thinkable about a particular topic, object or process, in general. Discourse analysis is thus applicable to both written and non-written language, which form discourse. Thus, there are layers in this methodological method: the materials (written and non-written discourse/text), the manner of talk or written words, the course of talk and given structure, and the analyses and interpretations of text by the scholar. Hence, discourse analysis assumes that language used in discourse is always thinkable and arguable, making sense

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\(^{205}\) Andrea Mayr has provided an approach by linking language, power and institutions. In his argument, he assumes that institutions are shaped by discourse which in turn is influenced by institutions. Institutions’ power and politics are frequently exercised through the discourse of their members. For more information see A. Mayr, *Language and Power: An Introduction to Institutional Discourse* (Continuum, 2008).

\(^{206}\) Gee, *An Introduction to Discourse Analysis: Theory and Method*.


through the different ways scholars use it in their analyses. In scientific theses it is assumed that many of the used constructs in discourse and speech are ‘inner essences’. That is to say, identity and Self-Other perceptions exist somewhere within text and context.

Discourse analysis in this thesis will be used as the main methods in interpreting the role played by identity and Self-Other perceptions in foreign policy-making. Discourse analysis is considered an interdisciplinary field that involves examining how particular structures are linked to meaning in conventionalised ways. In general, testing the making of foreign policy by using realist, structuralist, liberal or Marxist paradigms is deeply assessed. But, looking at EU and Russian discourses and statements will reveal a different political conduct towards the Middle East conflict. The realist or structuralist or Marxist approaches are not sufficient to interpret these differences in the discourse of EU and Russia. Identity and Self-Other perception constitute the buzzwords that dominate major work in the constructivist school in foreign policy-making.\(^\text{210}\) Thus, the constructivist approach is more suitable to use as a way to analyse the role of identity and Self-Other perception in the conduct of foreign policy.

\textit{The concept of discourse in foreign policy}  

For Ole Wæver foreign policy can be explained and elucidated by ‘structures of meaning’.\(^\text{211}\) Therefore, foreign policy takes place within a framework of meaning in which identity and Self-perception as well as perception of otherness are arguably the most prominent influential factors. Henrik Larsen argues that ‘the framework of meaning within which foreign policy takes place is seen as the basis of the way in which interests and goals are constructed’.\(^\text{212}\) Foreign policy is considered as political statements of interests and goals for a country or agent. For Wæver discourse is ‘a system that regulates the formation of statements’.\(^\text{213}\) Discourse here is statements of written or non-written language.

The foreign policies of the EU and Russia are statements that represent their stands and position particularly towards Palestinian statehood. Hence, these foreign policy practices on the international stage take place with a meaning in which interests and goals are

contrasted. For Hall, ‘all social practices entail meaning and meaning shape and influence what we do –our conduct- all practices have a discursive aspect’. Thus, foreign policy discourses of the EU and Russia have a meaning and this meaning is construed. This thesis assumes that identity and Self-Other perception shape the meaning of the foreign policies of the EU and Russia and influence their stands and position on Palestinian statehood.

Discourse analysis in the study of the EU and Russia foreign policy

The European Union is commonly thought of as an economic project, but the making of the EU is to be considered as a political polity. That is, interests and goals are constructed within its international identity. This is clear through its foreign policy discourse which places emphasis on the place and mission of the EU in world politics. The study of EU foreign policy, according to Henrik Larsen, ‘lends itself well to an analysis of discourse’. Larsen concludes that there is ‘wide scope for drawing on discourse analysis for analysing European foreign policy’. In the same vein, Raphael Bossong argues that ‘EU political discourse is an important factor in explaining developments in EU foreign policy and identity’. Moreover, Ole Wæver applies discourse analysis as a foreign policy theory which can explain and predict European foreign policy.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia started searching for its international identity through emphasising its status as the legal successor of the Soviet Union. This means that the interests and goals of Russia as a super power are grounded in its foreign policy discourse. For Leif Christian Jensen and Pål Wilter Skedsmo, discourse analysis plays a crucial part in understanding Russian foreign policy discourse because it is ‘an intergraded theoretical and methodological approach’ to interpret the framework of official discourse of Russian foreign policy. It grasps how the Russian approach to its place and

216 Ibid.p. 78.
218 Wæver, 'Identity, Communities and Foreign Policy'. (p. 20.
mission on the international stage is framed by the Russian government. Guillaume Colin argues that the use of discourse analysis illustrates ‘integration between grounding in the imaginaire and the political struggle’\textsuperscript{220} for Russia in world politics. Moreover, Oleksii Polegkyi argues that the use of discourse analysis provides understanding of how Russia seeks to restore its global centre of power through striving to preserve its influence in the world. Russia seeks to exploit its geopolitical position, economic capabilities and its membership of the Security Council, the potential of its soft power, to enhance its external space. In other world, Russia is striving to widen the so-called “Russian world”.

Within a constructivist frame, discourse analysis as an analytical method can be used to provide better understanding and appropriate interpretation of foreign policies of the EU and Russia towards Middle East peace-making. Identity and Self-Other perception can be analysed and their influences on foreign policy making by the EU and Russia towards a specific issue, Palestinian statehood, can be explored. To explore the powerful model of discourse analysis, the thesis will assume that the difficulties encountered by the EU and Russia in peace-making towards the Palestinian state was grounded in their identities and Self-perception as well as their perception of otherness and the view of the conflict from different metaphorical perceptions. Identity and Self-Other perception reside in the text and context; at many political events and occasions, the EU and Russia have expressed many statements and action plans which outlined their foreign policy towards the Middle East conflict in general and towards Palestinian statehood in particular. Hence, this thesis will explore identity and Self-Other perception in statements and action plans, and analyse how these factors influenced the process of foreign policy-making towards the conflict.

**The use of discourse analysis in foreign policy making by the EU and Russia:**

Analysing the foreign policy discourse of the EU and Russia is based on identity and Self-Other perception as societal themes. That is, a discursive framework of meaning of European and Russian society which is framed within a social and political context. By assuming that, discourse analysis will be used as the key methodological method to interpret the discourse (written and unwritten) of the EU and Russia towards the Palestinian state. Relying on written materials (primary data collected from the political statements, speeches, archives documents, newspaper interviews, political manifestos,

\textsuperscript{220} G. Colin, 'Russian Foreign Policy Discourse During the Kosovo Crisis: Internal Struggles and the Political Imaginaire', Centre d'études et de recherches internationales Sciences Po, (2004), p. 5.
historical texts for founding figures) and interviews with academic scholars and former and current diplomats and officials, I explore the role played by identity and Self-Other perception in foreign policy-making by the EU and Russia. The focus here is on discourses that reflect how the Palestinian state is perceived. Discourse analysis will be used to display how the EU and Russia see themselves on the international stage when they call for establishing a Palestinian state. It will be used also to present how they view the Palestinian state when the question of their actorness in the Middle East is taken into consideration. And how is the other perceived in the peace equation? Namely, how are the Palestinians perceived in contrast to the Israelis? I will analyse the EU and Russian discourse on Hamas and how it perceived as a potential peace partner by both the EU and Russia. What are the differences between the EU and Russia in their Self-perception when dealing with Hamas? In sum, discourse analysis will be used to interpret the text (written and unwritten) in order to allow a better understanding of the meaning of the EU and Russian discourse towards Palestinian statehood. It will help to explore how this structure of meaning is constructed by the influence of identity and Self-Other perception of the EU and Russia. In other words, discourse analysis will help in understanding how discourse regulates the political statements and actions (e.g. diplomatic actions, financial and economic support, agreements, etc.) of the EU and Russia towards the Palestinian state which I argue is constructed by identity and Self-perception as well as by perception of the otherness. Hence, I will analyse the materials (primary collected data), in the course of speeches, statements, and given structure, and how they have been interpreted by scholars of related texts.

2.5. Conclusion
This chapter focuses on the problem that informs this thesis as well as it reflecting on the theory and methodology that frame the study. The thesis problematises the question of establishing a Palestinian state from a different track in foreign policy-making by the EU and Russia. It considers the discourse of Palestinian statehood the key puzzle in the EU’s and Russia’s foreign policies. The thesis seeks to investigate how issues of identity and Self-Other perceptions play a key role in foreign policy-making in the EU and Russia, particularly with regard to the question of Palestinian statehood.

The thesis draws on approaches in social science which address facets of foreign policy. Based on a constructivist approach, it theorises the elements of social interaction that are
influenced by foreign policy-making; these elements have a profound effect on the making of foreign policy. It aims to interpret and understand the role of identity and Self-Other perception. It uses this approach to provide a better understanding of the conundrum of Palestinian statehood and analysis of the social elements such as beliefs and ideas that shape or influence identity and Self-Other perception of the EU and Russia. The elements which I study in this thesis are identity and Self-Other perception which influence and affect the process of foreign policy-making of the EU and Russia. I examine how the role of identity and Self-Other perception influence foreign policy making in the EU and Russia, especially with regards to the issue of establishing a Palestinian state.

This chapter also discusses other approaches used by scholars to interpret foreign policy-making of the EU and Russia. The Neorealist approach has little to say about the core puzzle of establishing a Palestinian state. It attributes interaction between states to anarchy. It is fixed on power and security. Neoliberals also narrow the issue of establishing a Palestinian state, arguing for interaction between the Israelis and Palestinians. The support of the global powers to the question, they add, comes from a door of cooperation which can achieve the desired end, peace and global welfare. Both approaches rest on a rational choice in processing the issue of Palestinian statehood. A rational choice has little to say about the EU and Russian foreign policy in relation to the Middle East peace process. A rational choice is premised on a neorealist perspective and upon a security agenda. It is also premised on a neoliberal perspective which calls for interdependence between states.

Whatever the context of the EU and Russia foreign policies towards the Middle East, issues of identity and Self-Other perception play a central role in the making of these policies. Despite this ubiquitous role for identity and Self-Other perception, few scholars to date have theorised these social elements in the case of the establishment of a Palestinian state. I address this gap by using the constructivist approach that highlights the role of identity and Self-Other perception in the Middle East process.

However, the thesis also employs a qualitative enquiry in answering the research questions through two data collection techniques. Interviews will be conducted with officials who are part of the policy decision-making circles and practices; these interviews are designed to use primary information. I will also interview officials who contributed to the EU and Russia foreign policy-making processes. Primary data collection enables me to assess the validity and credibility of the given information.
Secondly, I carry out a document analysis of obtained official documents, statements, and specialist publications. This allows for investigating beliefs and perceptions of policy decision-makers in both the EU and Russia who were part of the foreign policy-making process.

I will use discourse analysis as an analytical qualitative method to analyse the collected data and information. Discourse analysis will be used to explore the role of identity and Self-Other perception in foreign policy-making: the materials (discourse/text), the manner of speech, course of the talk and given structure. To explore the power of this analytical method, I will assume that the ineffectiveness of the EU and Russia foreign policy towards Palestinian statehood lies in how they portray themselves as well as how they perceive others. These perceptions are found in the texts and contexts of statements and action plans that outline the EU and Russian foreign policy towards Palestinian statehood.
CHAPTER THREE
FOREIGN POLICY-MAKING:
A CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE FIELD OF SCHOLARSHIP

Focus
The focus of the review in this chapter is twofold. Firstly, I shall review the main characteristics of Russian foreign policy. To this end, I shall outline the roots of how identity and Self-Other perception influence the course of foreign policy-making towards the Middle East in general and towards the issue of establishing the Palestinian state in particular. Secondly, I shall review the main characteristics of the EU’s foreign policy and how the EU is developing its international identity in the context of a global actor in world politics. The emphasis of this review is on features of EU collective identity as well as its perception of the Middle East and the issue of establishing a viable and independent Palestinian state. In this chapter, I shall look at how I can widen the base of information and knowledge of foreign policy in ways that help in addressing the problematic informing this study.

3.1 Understanding the Russian Foreign Policy

The roots of Russian foreign policy come from historic mutual relations with successive empires. The end of the Cold War and the emergence of the Russian Federation resulted in a rethinking of Russian foreign policy. According to Bobo Lo, the search for identity and a sense of purpose in the new Russia’s foreign policy ‘is one of the four weakness areas that faced Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union’. The end of the Cold War resulted in a new international environment, in which Russia had to struggle to secure its place. Bobo Lo states that ‘identity and self-perception became issues about Russia’s place in the post-Cold War international environment’. Identity and Self-perception became critical issues in planning for a new concept of Russia’s foreign policy in the post-Soviet era.

222 Ibid. p10
Russian Foreign Policy and the Legacy of the Soviet Union

Shireen Hunter and her colleagues discuss the evolution of Russia’s foreign policy perspectives in the post-Soviet era and state that ‘Russia is the legal successor state of the Soviet Union, but clearly is not the Soviet Union’s geographical successor’. In this regard, Ludmilla Selezneva points out that Russia in the post-Soviet era has ‘no imperial status’ and it ‘began to formulate a completely new outlook on foreign policy’. Thus, the legacy of the Soviet Union is very clear in the new Russia’s foreign policy. Ludmilla Selezneva argues that the new Russia’s foreign policy is ‘a mixture of the liberal ideology of those who wish to westernize, and the ideology of a Great Russian Statehood, but with a clear domination of the latter’. Russian state identity in the post-Soviet era still kept some of these truths; Bobo Lo in this regard states that ‘Events in the post-Soviet decade undermined many of these ‘truths’, but did not destroy them’. Moreover, he argues that ‘Russian foreign policy is still based on the assumptions that; Russia had been, was and would always be a ‘great power’, and a transcontinental entity: neither exclusively Slavic, European nor Asian, but Eurasian and global’. Furthermore, Lo makes the point that Russia’s foreign policy is, in the most generous understanding of the term, ‘universalist’ – inclusive, multifaceted, and flexible as to means.

The role of leadership in the Russian foreign policy-making:

In the historical legacy of Russia, charismatic leadership has played a central role in formulating Russian foreign policy. Bobo Lo argues that Putin benefited from the state

224 R. Fawn, Realignments in Russian Foreign Policy (Routledge, 2003). p9
225 Ibid.p12
226 Lo, Vladimir Putin and the Evolution of Russian Foreign Policy, p.13
227 Bobo Lo points out that Russia’s president Vladimir Putin is ‘one of the most remarkable phenomenon’ who had emerged to ‘become one of the most talked-about figures in world politics’, and is ‘the face of Russian foreign policy at home and abroad’. Bobo Lo argues that Russia’s foreign policy is not isolated from the influence of Russia’s president, in which he is not an isolated, freak phenomenon. According to Lo, Putin is a product of many factors that affected his personality and political thought. These factors lie in Putin’s surrounding environment, his beliefs and tenets that have been shaped by direct personal experience and upbringing, by the enormous transformations in Russian society and by his predecessors’ successes and failures in domestic and foreign policy. For Bobo Lo, Putin is ‘a man of his time’, ‘remains an enigma’ and his genesis ‘lies in the duality of his inheritance’. Putin managed to develop a consensual vision of national identity which has supported and upgraded Russia’s international position. Also, Putin has managed his personal attitude to introduce himself as charismatic leader. In relation to state ideology, Lo states that Putin embraces a ‘pragmatic policy’ that glosses over all contradictions. Lo describes this policy as ‘one-size-fits-all’. See Lo, B. (2003), Vladimir Putin and the evolution of Russian foreign policy (Wiley-Blackwell).p 1-29.
of anarchy in the late Gorbachev and Yeltsin period that opened the discussion and debate about Russian national identity and the Western experience of the importance of economic foundation as a prerequisite of military power and international influence. This dichotomy gave Putin an opportunity to ‘embrace virtually every conceivable type of national identity, but in flexible and undogmatic fashion’. Thus, Putin’s foreign policy seemed to be pro-European. Lo refers to the arguments by commentators that the principle feature of Russian foreign policy during the first round of Putin’s presidency was ‘Eurocentrism’, in contrast to the ‘America-centrism’ of Yeltsin’s period. On the same lines, Ludmilla Selezneva asserts that Putin’s foreign policy was characterised by ‘pragmatism’ since ‘Putin himself declared the policy of non-isolationist’ and this policy has been ‘predominantly European-oriented’. Dmitri Trenin shares the same argument of a Eurocentric approach in Putin’s foreign policy. Putin in his first presidential term was trying to readjust Russian foreign policy in a European form and to move away from the Americans.

According to Bobo Lo, Putin tried to secure ‘valuable support from liberals at home and in the West’ and, at the same time, ‘concluded friendship and cooperation agreements with China, North Korea, and India, and increased Russia’s involvement in the Asian-Pacific’. Thus, Putin during his presidency has been working on the reorientation of Russian foreign policy to resume its international identity as a global power. According to Lo, Putin tried to ensure ‘a plausible concordance between ambitious self-perceptions and uncomfortable realities’ and at the same time has been ‘careful to apply identity according to context and moment’. This means that, Russian is working to reconstruct its international identity in the context of world politics.

228 Lo, Vladimir Putin and the Evolution of Russian Foreign Policy.p17
229 The Eurocentric approach in Russia’s foreign policy is characterised by many policies such as: partnership in the fight against terrorism, agreement to the establishment of US military bases in Central Asia, accepting American military involvement in Georgia, flexibility in Russian-NATO relations. For more information see Ludmilla Selezneva is essay titled Post-Soviet Russian Foreign Policy: Between Doctrine and Pragmatism in the textbook Realignments in Russian Foreign Policy, editor, Rick Fawn, p 22-26.
230 Lo, Vladimir Putin and the Evolution of Russian Foreign Policy.p17
231 Fawn, Realignments in Russian Foreign Policy.p15-18
232 Gorodetsky, Russia between East and West: Russian Foreign Policy on the Threshold of the Twenty-First Century.p35
233 Lo, Vladimir Putin and the Evolution of Russian Foreign Policy.p17-18
234 Ibid.p. 15-17.
3.2 Identity and Self-Other Perceptions in Russian Foreign Policy-Making

Historically, the clash of Self-perceptions in Russia’s political class led to a dichotomy in Russia’s place and mission in the world. This dichotomy ended with the advent of communist rule in favour of notions of a communist ‘world revolution’.\textsuperscript{235} By the end of the Cold War, the debate over Russia’s place and mission increased among the political class. Bobo Lo states that, ‘Identity and self-perception became issues about Russia’s place in the post-Cold War international environment’.\textsuperscript{236} While Gabriel Gorodetsky sees that the challenge in establishing new Russia’s identity ‘bears directly on its foreign policy’.\textsuperscript{237} Russia sees itself as a great power with special geopolitical and geocultural features. These basic facts govern Russian foreign policy according to Gabriel Gorodetsky. Hence Gabriel Gorodetsky sees Russia as seeking to reintroduce ‘imperial and Soviet symbols and restore enduring national interests and great-power status’ in an attempt to ‘refurbish its national identity’. Also, he considers the attempt to reformulate a new Russian national identity to be ‘a sine qua non for a definition of Russia’s role in the New World Order’.\textsuperscript{238} In the same way, Bobo Lo asserts that ‘civilizational location’ and ‘Russian place and mission in the post-Cold War world’ were and still are the two key issues in conceptions of Russian identity. Thus, identity and Self-Other perception that lean on civilizational location and the Russian place and mission in the world are central to Russian foreign policy-making.

\textit{Civilizational location}

The civilizational dimension in Russian foreign policy refers to the Self-perception in the competition with others in the international arena. According to Bobo Lo, this dimension

\textsuperscript{235} Bobo Lo states that, since Peter the great, the clash of self-perceptions among the political class had debated ‘Russia’s place and mission in the world. This debate centred on whether Russia should look to develop its position in the world on the basis of its own or with assistance of western expertise. This clash of self-perceptions led to emergence of very different ideas about Russia’s civilizational location. Between those who stressed the ‘uniqueness’ of the Russian situation (Slavophiles) and those who identified Russia as an inalienable part of a common European civilization (Westernizers). This conflict ended with the advent of communist rule which identified Russian self –perceptions with a global dimension derived from notions of a communist ‘world revolution’. This universalism became increasingly less ideological and more nationalistic in the course of the 20th century. See Lo, B. (2003), Vladimir Putin and the evolution of Russian foreign policy (Wiley-Blackwell), p10-12.

\textsuperscript{236} Lo, Vladimir Putin and the Evolution of Russian Foreign Policy.p10

\textsuperscript{237} Gorodetsky, Russia between East and West: Russian Foreign Policy on the Threshold of the Twenty-First Century.px

\textsuperscript{238} Ibid.pxii-xv
plays an important role in foreign policy-making in the post-Soviet era, where it ‘acted to fuel already powerful animosities over policy’. Peter Shearman states that Russia’s elites, as a part of the new civilizational competition with the west, came to refer to the term ‘sovereign democracy versus western liberal democracy’. According to Peter Shearman, Russia, under Putin’s leadership, ‘moved away from the liberal democratic model of development’ and adopted its own model of democracy. One of the basic objectives of the foreign policy concept, issued by Medvedev in 2008, is ‘creating an objective perception of Russia in the world as a democratic state with an independent foreign policy’. This objective is directed against the dominating position of western civilization and Russia claimed to be a “sovereign democracy” in order to be: ‘respected abroad, an alternative value centre, as it were, as opposed to Western democratic Messianism’.

Thus, the reconstruction of Russian state identity on the world scene is a particular question for Russian foreign policy decision-makers. The Russian foreign policy schools differ in their view of the civilizational location of Russia. While Euro-Atlanticists see Russia as not standing too far apart from the Western civilization, Eurasianists and Neo-Eurasianists place emphasis on Russian culture and geography and reject the view that Russia is on the periphery of Europe and maintain that Russia must unlearn Europe. The post-Soviet era witnessed a change of two visions of Russian civilizational location, while Yeltsin’s period was characterized by a vision of ‘integration and strategic partnership with the West’, Putin’s period was characterized by a greater emphasis on the uniqueness of Russian culture, geography, and its civilizational dimension.

Russia’s place and mission in the world

Russia has a unique location between Europe and Asia, as it forms a bridge between the two continents. Eurasianism, as one of the main Russia’s foreign policy schools, is the most relevant school in this dimension. According to Jeffrey Mankoff, Eurasianism

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241 Ibid. p. 32.
242 Tsygankov, Russia's Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity, p. 5.
means ‘Russia’s fundamental identity is linked to its geographical position’. 243 In this regard, Russia focuses its foreign policy on ‘competing with the west’ 244 and sees the west as ‘a direct geopolitical competitor to Russia, much as it was during the days of the Cold War’. 245 This distinct quotation influenced Russia’s foreign policy makers and thinkers as well as the intellectual elite. 246 The debates on Russia’s place and mission in the world reveal how deep the thinking of the Self and Other lie in the making of Russian foreign policy. Studying and taking into consideration these geopolitical and ideational factors present a better understanding of the course of Russian foreign policy. These factors place an emphasis on the context of the practice of Russian behaviour on an external level and how these factors construct Russian state identity. Russia’s state identity is constructed within the frame and context of its perception of the Self as well as perception of Others.

Russian Self-perception has deep roots in Russian history where Russia looks to itself as a great power and the successor of deep-rooted empires. Thus, Russian perception of otherness is based on a set of these historical and ideational factors that, without a doubt, influence the making of Russian foreign policy. The following is a brief survey of literature concerning Russian perception of other related actors and fields dealt with in the thesis.

Perception of the EU

Russian concerns about EU enlargement led them to establish a new foreign policy concept which held that ‘the EU’s emerging military-political dimension should become an object of particular attention’. 247 These concerns are reflected in Russia’s Medium-term Strategy (2000–2010). The strategy calls for a ‘strategic partnership between Russia and the EU and states that this partnership can ‘achieve a pan-European system of collective security based on equality without dividing lines’. 248 The EU as a rising global actor in world politics has, especially with the process of enlargement that included former Soviet

244 Laruelle and Gabowitsch, Russian Eurasianism: An Ideology of Empire.p204
245 Mankoff, Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great Power Politics.p66
246 Matern, 'The Discourse of Civilization in the Works of Russia’s New Eurasianists: Lev Gumilev and Alexander Panarin’. (247 Gorodetsky, Russia between East and West: Russian Foreign Policy on the Threshold of the Twenty-First Century.p64
248 Ibid.p63
Union republics and the growth of NATO power capabilities and membership, profound effects on Russian foreign policy-making towards it. Margot Light, John Löwenhardt and Stephen White argue that the EU’s policy of membership is ‘separating Europe into insiders and outsiders’²⁴⁹ thereby affecting the non-member countries that were considered ‘outside’ the European forum. The policy has had an effect on the ways in which non-member states ‘perceive themselves and their environment’.²⁵⁰ The argument of Margot Light, John Löwenhardt and Stephen White show that Self-Other perception has a profound role in influencing the making of foreign policy between Russia and the EU. In other words, there is an identity existing between the layers of the process of decision-making that has influenced their mutual foreign policy-making between the EU and Russia.

Both the rise of the EU as a global power and the expansion of the NATO alliance to include some of towards the former Soviet republics has affected Russian perception of the EU. The NATO exclusion of Russia has profound effects on the domestic and foreign policies of Russia.²⁵¹ The NATO policy enhances a Russian Self-Other perception which has a ‘negative attitude towards the expansion of NATO’.²⁵² The NATO unitary actions in Kosovo and Serbia enhanced the negative attitudes in Russian -EU relations also. The Russian elites saw the new NATO strategic doctrine in 2000 as a threat which undermined Russian security. In other words, NATO’s exclusion of Russia and the accession of new members from former Soviet republics (NATO’s military doctrine) have been perceived by Russia as a strategic threat to its national security. This strategic step confirmed the fundamentalist nationalist view in relation to Europe and the USA where ‘NATO and the USA were widely seen as synonymous’.²⁵³ Marcel de Haas argues that it was Russia’s disappointment over cooperation with the EU and NATO’s alliance strategy that resulted in ‘a turning point in threat perception’.²⁵⁴ In response, Haas argues, Putin in 2000 signed a revised version of the foreign policy concept, in which Russia placed an emphasis on its Self-perception as “a great power” and

²⁴⁹ Ibid.p56
²⁵⁰ Ibid.p56
²⁵¹ Ibid.p59
²⁵² Ibid.p59
²⁵³ Ibid.p60
its high priority was a ‘political, military and economic cooperation and integration’ within the former Soviet republics, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

Perception of the USA

In the Russian foreign policy schools there are difference views on the relations with the USA. The Euro-Atlantic school emphasises the importance of close ties and relations with the USA. Jeffrey Mankoff states that ‘Atlanticists look toward the United States as a strategic partner’, but at the same time they look on it as ‘a model for the role that a restored Russia can play in the world’. In this Euro-Atlanticist view there is also a Self-perception that is nostalgic towards its past as great power. However, Neo-Eurasianists see the American presence in Central Asia as a new ‘geopolitical situation’ that forms a critical threat as it is seen as pricking ‘Russia’s soft underbelly’. According to this school, the USA is seen as a source of threats and as putting Russia on the defensive. The Russian foreign policy concept which was signed by Putin in 2000 placed an emphasis on the need for Russia to strengthen its influence in international politics to restore its position as a great power.

The USA’s policy, such as the enlargement of NATO’s membership among former Soviet republics, USA/NATO unitary intervention in Kosovo and Serbia, the USA’s withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and the planned US missile shield in Poland, has enhanced Russia’s negative attitudes towards the USA in the post-Cold War era. In this regard, Roger Kanet asserts that Russia adopted a foreign policy concept in 2008, in which ‘the Putin–Medvedev leadership has more and more concentrated on the hazards to Russia presented by foreign enemies, of which the ‘United States is virtually always listed first’. These military steps supported the Eurasianists’ and Neo-Eurasianists’ views on Russia foreign policy-making and reinforced the Russian Self-perception as in contrast with the USA and the perception of the USA as a source of threats to Russia national interests. In connection with this, Roger Kanet states that Russia’s leadership, especially Putin, has ‘turned to the Cold War past in order to develop a strong sense of national

255 Ibid.p16
257 Isakova, Russian Governance in the Twenty-First Century: Geo-Strategy, Geopolitics and Governance.p98
258 Ibid.p98
259 Kanet, Russian Foreign Policy in the 21st Century.p211
identity’. Thus, Russian foreign policy towards the USA is not free from Russian Self-perception that is based on how Russia perceives itself in world politics. Russian decision-makers have a belief in their differences from Americans which shapes and reconstructs Russian state identity. The new Russian state identity is shaped by and shapes a set of principles and values that support the desired objective of Russia to restore its global position as a superpower.

3.3 Russian foreign policy towards the Middle East

The geographical link between Europe and Asia is one of the main premises of Neo-Eurasianism. Irina Isakova describes Neo-Eurasianism as a ‘geo-strategic model’ and states that ‘the political supporters of this approach have no political preferences towards potential allies’. According to this premise, Russia sees itself as ‘bridge state’ especially with resources-rich central Asia and rich Middle East countries. Thus, the Middle East is in the vital sphere of Russia. According to Irina Isakova, Russia is a ‘continental shortcut’ from Northern Europe to the Middle East and the Mediterranean, thus Russia works to upgrade its influence and expand its geo-strategic space. Also, she states that Neo-Eurasianism calls for ‘re-establishing relations with former allies and friends in the Middle East’ and classifies this foreign policy as ‘pragmatism’. In the same vein, Roland Dannreuther argues that Russian foreign policy towards the Middle East from a geopolitical perspective has two major elements. The first is geographical propinquity that governs ‘the degree of national interest in the region on its southern borders’. In this context, Middle East countries like Iran, Turkey, and Iraq are more important and the rest of the Arab world is less important to Moscow. The second is the strategic importance of the Middle East which is in the scope of the strategic interests of Russia. Furthermore, Marlene Laruelle argues that Russia competes with the USA in the Middle East and its foreign policy is at eye level with the United States, therefore she rejects it as an expression of a Eurasianist perspective in Russian foreign policy-making towards the Middle East. Moreover, Robert O. Freedman argues that Russia decided to formulate a new strategy that can enhance Russia’s image in the Middle East and counter US influence.

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260 Ibid.p.17
261 Isakova, Russian Governance in the Twenty-First Century: Geo-Strategy, Geopolitics and Governance.p.17
262 Ibid.p.16
by exploiting its weakened position due to the negative image resulting from the American war on Iraq and Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{265}

\textit{Russia’s role in the Palestinian Israeli conflict}

Since Security Council Resolution 242 in 1967, the two state solution for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict had become a peace project for all actors in the international community. According to Ben Soetendorp, the Soviet Union adopted the two-state solution for one overall objective, that is, to prevent a Pax Americana.\textsuperscript{266} Breslauer argues that the Soviet Union did not rank the solution highly on the list of foreign policy priorities; it wanted to be a part of any Middle East peace settlement. Russia as the legal successor of the Soviet Union sought to reactivate its relations with Middle Eastern countries. In terms of the position of Palestinian statehood, Russia adopted the same position as the Soviet Union had taken. During the Yeltsin period, Russia had been passive towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. When Putin came to the power in 2000, the significance of the Middle East peace process increased.\textsuperscript{267} The Russian presidential diplomacy that Putin led in the Middle East, especially to Egypt, Israel, and the Palestinian Authority, was an attempt to search for a role and to ‘balance relations with both the Arabs and Israel’.\textsuperscript{268}

Russian-Israeli relations cannot be omitted in the context of studying Russian-Palestinian relations. Ilya Bourtman states that Russian-Israeli relations became more significant than in the Soviet era and that Putin had ‘done more than any other Russian leader to improve the economic and strategic ties with Israel’.\textsuperscript{269} For Roland Dannreuther, there is a difference between Russia and the former Soviet Union in how they perceive Israel. In the period of the Soviet Union, Israel was perceived from an ideological perspective as ‘the Zionist and imperialist enemy’, while Russia has shed this ideological perspective and is now ‘wholly driven by pragmatic interests and geopolitics’. Moreover, the mass emigrations of Russian Jews has ‘mellowed Russian perceptions of Israel’ and driven

\textsuperscript{265} R.O. Freedman, ‘Russia, Israel and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: The Putin Years’, \textit{Middle East Policy}, 17/3 (2010), 51-63. p. 53-54
\textsuperscript{266} B. Soetendorp, \textit{The Dynamics of Israeli-Palestinian Relations: Theory, History, and Cases} (Palgrave MacMillan, 2007). p150
\textsuperscript{267} Cited in Carter, \textit{The Middle East’s Relations with Asia and Russia}.
\textsuperscript{268} A. Kreutz, \textit{Russia in the Middle East: Friend or Foe?} (Praeger Security International, 2007). p. 15
Russia to build a substantial ‘domestic political force’ which has led to the improvement in Israeli-Russian relations.\textsuperscript{270}

Unlike the other Quartet members, Russia does not consider Hamas as a terrorist organisation.\textsuperscript{271} The Hamas victory in the 2006 election is one of the developments that changed regional dynamics. For Kreutz, Russians viewed this victory as ‘an American political setback’.\textsuperscript{272} Putin characterised the American setback by considering Hamas’ victory as a ‘heavy blow’ to the US-led peace making in the Middle East and as a proof of the need for a ‘multilateral approach’ to the Middle East peace process.\textsuperscript{273} However, Kreutz argues that by engaging Hamas with Iran and Syria, Russia wants to ‘uphold its image as an honest powerbroker and to maintain good relations with all players in the Greater Middle East’.\textsuperscript{274} However, the Russian perception of Hamas led to ‘a break in the Quartet’s façade of unity’.\textsuperscript{275} Similarly, Robert O. Freedman argues that the Russian invitation to Hamas undermined the Quartet’s conditions\textsuperscript{276} that were imposed on Hamas. Russia considered these conditions as ‘unrealistic’ at that time.\textsuperscript{277} The Russian perception of Hamas is different from the EU and this can be ascribed to Russian Self-perception in contrast with other global powers.

### 3.4 Understanding EU Foreign Policy

Over the last two decades the EU has become an economic and political weight that has extended its effectiveness in world politics. EU foreign policy has generated strong discussion and debate among researchers and policy-decision-makers around its place and mission in the international arena. This section reviews some literature about the role of identity in the EU foreign policy. The literature used in this review relates to the EU as a political entity that represents the EU-28 member states and the concept of EU foreign

\textsuperscript{270} Cited in Carter, \textit{The Middle East’s Relations with Asia and Russia} p. 23.
\textsuperscript{272} Kreutz, \textit{Russia in the Middle East: Friend or Foe}? p. 15.
\textsuperscript{273} Ibid. p. 76.
\textsuperscript{274} Ibid. p. 32.
\textsuperscript{275} Donaldson and Nogee, \textit{The Foreign Policy of Russia: Changing Systems, Enduring Interests}.
\textsuperscript{276} The Quartet imposed three conditions on Hamas to accept its legitimacy by the international community: the recognition of Israel, the denunciation of violence against Israel, and acceptance of all existing agreements.
\textsuperscript{277} Freedman, ‘Russia, Israel and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: The Putin Years’, (p. 57.)
policy refers to ‘EU co-ordination of its political relations with the outside world’.  
When scholars study and discuss EU foreign policy, various questions arise. Since the EU is a confederation of 28 independent states: Is there a EU foreign policy? Is the EU considered as a global actor? Is the EU a superpower or a superstate? 
In answer to the first question, there are two arguments: for Federiga Bindi and Jeremy Shapiro, the EU is ‘neither a nation-state nor an intergovernmental organisation’, so it remains a ‘peculiar institution’. In relation to the foreign policy goals and objectives of the EU, Federiga Bindi and Jeremy Shapiro assert that ‘the EU as a collective does not know what its foreign policy goals are’. More than that, Gisela Mueller-Brandeck-Bocquet points out that EU certainly does not play a ‘significant role in the world politics’. Additionally, Federiga Bindi and Jeremy Shapiro state that the EU foreign policy has ‘evolved as a patchwork and ugly amalgam of different issue areas that were thrown together with little thought to overall strategy’.

Thus, EU foreign policy faces a number of obstacles that affect its effectiveness in international affairs. For Karen Smith, the member states ‘can act autonomously’ in the international arena and they can also ‘seek to protect their vital interests and block decisions that contravene them’. In addition, Smith criticises the effectiveness of EU foreign policy, where the member states ‘have not created collective capabilities to match the expectations of coherent, effective international behaviour’. In the same way, Federiga Bindi and Jeremy Shapiro criticise EU effectiveness by referring to problems facing EU foreign policy towards the outside. For them, ‘consensus among the EU partners, lack of institutional coherence and the multiple actors representing the EU abroad’ are key obstacles to the effectiveness of the EU foreign policy. Similarly, Gisela Mueller-Brandeck-Bocquet ascribes the state of effectiveness to ‘national egoism, distinctly divergent foreign policy interests of the individual members, inefficient decision-

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278 White et al., Contemporary European Foreign Policy.p1
284 Ibid.p4
making system’. However, in a less sharp view, Michael Smith sees EU foreign policy representing a ‘least likely’ case not only in EU affairs but in international relations more generally.

Reuben Wong, on the contrary, considers EU foreign policy as being based on the notion of foreign policy as ‘actions and ideas designed by policy makers of an international actor (rather than a state actor) to promote a change in the attitudes of other actors or in the environment’. In this argument the EU is defined as ‘a significant international actor which not only makes foreign policy, but also exerts a significant influence on world politics’. Thus, EU foreign policy, according to Ruben Wong’s argument, is much wider than the narrow conventional notions that are based on the state-centred view of international relations.

In response to the second inquiry, there are two views of the role of the EU as a global actor in world politics: Fraser Cameron, Ole Elgström and Michael Smith, and Sonia Lucarelli argue that the EU is increasingly; ‘presented as an international actor with a principled behaviour in foreign policy’; it is ‘unique in the set-up and character of goals and values’; and has become ‘widely recognised as playing an important role in many different policy areas’. Karen Smith in contrast, sees that the EU has become ‘increasingly an important international actor’, but it has an ‘ineffective’ role in world politics and its foreign policy has ‘little influence on third countries or international relation in general’. However, she argues that the EU has an ambiguous mission in the world that has ‘no EU values or interests because there is no policy from which such value and interests can arise’.

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287 Smith, ‘Institutionalization, Policy Adaptation and European Foreign Policy Cooperation’, (p96
288 Wong, The Europeanization of French Foreign Policy: France and the EU in East Asia.p2
289 Ibid.p2
290 S. Lucarelli and I. Manners, Values and Principles in European Union Foreign Policy (37: Taylor & Francis, 2006).p2
292 Cameron, An Introduction to European Foreign Policy.p21
293 Smith, European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World.p1-3
294 Ibid.p1-3
To return to whether the EU is a superpower or a superstate, Fraser Cameron argues that the EU is clearly ‘not a military superpower like the US’ but it could be an ‘economic superpower’, as ‘much of the EU’s power derives from its economic strength’. Federiga Bindi and Irina Angelescu states that ‘the EU wants to become a powerful international actor without becoming a superstate in the process’. However, Kolinda Grabar-Kitarovic argues that the enlargement of the EU in 2004 and 2007 led to the strengthening of ‘the role of the EU on the global scene’, but it remains ‘a soft power at the best’. Hence, the EU has become increasingly an important global actor in terms of its economic strength.

3.5 Identity and Self-Other Perception in EU Foreign Policy

The EU as a political phenomenon, has attracted many scholars in foreign policy studies. The question that is asked is: Why do the EU’s 28 member states need to join together in a united entity? Is it a matter of identity or economic interests? In my reading of literature on European identity and foreign policy, I found that EU identity is still problematic and is not identified on both internal and external levels. The matter of EU identity is a tricky issue and has attracted considerable attention from many scholars. Larsen argues that because the EU is ‘not presented as a sovereign’ entity, ‘the terms like [identity or genuine identity] are frequently used in relation to the EU’s international actorness’. The relationship between EU foreign policy and its identity has been discussed by many scholars. Christopher Hill and William Wallace argue that ‘the European Community rests upon a relatively weak sense of shared history and identity’ and they ascribe the ineffectiveness of EU foreign policy in world politics to this weakness of identity and collective action. In the same vein, Karen Smith argues that the EU is not a community which expresses a collective identity and common interests and, ‘until the EU becomes such a community, it will never be able to formulate and implement effective, legitimate

295 Cameron, An Introduction to European Foreign Policy.p5
296 Bindi, The Foreign Policy of the European Union: Assessing Europe's Role in the World.p1
299 Hill, The Actors in Europe's Foreign Policy.p8
foreign policy’. Hence, Karen Smith poses the identity as a precondition to realising an effective foreign policy.

However, Christopher Hill and William Wallace do not deny the possibility of constructing a European identity. They link the weaknesses of EU identity to ‘the diverse historical experiences of the EU member states, and the lack of ‘the influence over education’ which member states had themselves used to ‘strengthen communal identities’. But at the same time they recognise that the process of ‘forging of identity takes time’ and they indicate that the enlargement of the EU might ‘help(s) to foster a sense of shared identity’. However, Ian Manners and Richard Whitman argue that the EU has cultivated an international identity which is ‘valid for the analysis of the EU as an actor in the international system’.

This international identity is demonstrated by many EU foreign policy discourses in which are embedded some of the following notable features:

*The Civilizational dimension in EU foreign policy:*

Values and principles, as Sonia Lucarelli argues, should guide EU foreign policy. She quotes from the Laeken Declaration that ‘Europe as the continent of human values, the Magna Carta, the Bill of Rights, the French Revolution …. Europe needs to shoulder its responsibilities in the governance of globalisation’. In the same way, Federiga Bindi and Jeremy Shapiro assert that the promotion of democracy, and issues of human and civil rights are ‘at the very heart of the EU foreign policy discourse’. Moreover, Karen Smith states five objectives of EU foreign policy which set a civilizational dimension for the EU in world politics, namely, the promotion of human rights, democracy, good governance and prevention of violent conflicts are ‘key elements of EU international identity’, and these objectives are a ‘step forward towards a more effective assertion of EU international identity’. This set of aspects of the civilizational dimension in EU foreign policy paved the way for greater influence of the EU as a global actor in world politics. Thus, when the

300 Smith, European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World.p4
301 Hill, The Actors in Europe’s Foreign Policy.p8
302 Ibid.p9
304 Lucarelli and Manners, Values and Principles in European Union Foreign Policy.p3
305 Bindi, The Foreign Policy of the European Union: Assessing Europe’s Role in the World.p346
EU presents itself in the context of civilizational aspects that means there is a Self-perception of the EU upon which it is acting in world politics.

The EU’s mission and place in the world

With the wide enlargement in the last decade, the EU has come to play a significant role on the international stage. The place and mission of the EU has emerged as a vital matter. For Fraser Cameron, the EU has a mission in the world that represents a commitment towards ‘democratic institutions, liberal values, human rights and regional stability’. In the same vein, Sonia Lucarelli argues that the EU derived its mission and place in world politics from ‘its history and its historically-developed and formed values and principles, and an [ethics of responsibility] towards others’.

However, Stefania Panebianco points out that in 2001 the European Commission portrayed the EU role in world politics as a global actor with ‘political and moral weight’, but recently (2009) has replaced the ethical dimension of the EU’s foreign policy by ‘a more pragmatic vision of the EU’s global role’. Similarly, Christopher Hill argues that the EU-member states broadly subscribe to the notion of an ‘ethical foreign policy’, but the war in Iraq revealed the tension between ‘the two kinds of ethics imagined in Europe: the right of intervention and pacific methods of conflict resolution’. In this regard, the matter of whether the EU is a civilian power or a military power is still arguable and attracts many scholars. The notion of ‘civilian power Europe’ was coined by François Duchène. This notion dominated the debate on the role of the EU in world politics for several decades. Jan Orbie argues that the EU presented itself as a global actor on the international stage and ‘the prevailing European discourse is constructing the EU as a civilian power’. Accordingly, the EU seeks to expand principles and values and act as a peace and democracy stabilizer in the international milieu. Romano Prodi, in 2000, said ‘We must aim to become a global civil power at the service of sustainable global

307 Cameron, An Introduction to European Foreign Policy.p95
308 Lucarelli and Manners, Values and Principles in European Union Foreign Policy.p3
309 Bindi, The Foreign Policy of the European Union: Assessing Europe’s Role in the World.p183
313 Ibid.p. 123.
The above argument indicates how the EU perceives its international actorness on the international stage and how the EU international identity was constructed in the context of its mission and place in world politics.

The EU’s Relations with Russia

The enlargement of the EU reached 28 states, creating a supranational entity with the largest state bordering with Russia. For Fraser Cameron, Russia has a numerous status so it ‘required a special relationship with the EU’. EU foreign policy towards Russia is determined by the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), and the ENP’s main financial instrument, the ENPI. According to Steven Blockmans, Russia has ‘a strategic position in the EU foreign policy’ and it is a ‘major factor in the EU’s security and prosperity, the third trading partner, and a major supplier of energy products’. These factors represent key axes in EU-Russian relations.

Meanwhile, identity and Self-Other perceptions have a considerable presence in EU-Russia relations. She agrees with Blockmans about the strategic partnership between the EU and Russia. Lara Piccardo refers to the ‘Partnership and Cooperation Agreement’ which was signed in 1994 as ‘the cornerstone’ of EU and Russia’s relations. But Russia did not renew this agreement which expired in 2007. For Lara Piccardo this means that ‘the Russian political elite have instead returned to a ‘bipolar logic’, looking at the West as a competitor or an enemy but not as an ally’. Also, Steven Blockmans points to Russia’s desire to pursue ‘enhanced bilateralism’ as a better means for developing ‘the EU-Russia

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315 Cameron, An Introduction to European Foreign Policy, p.117
316 Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) are key instruments of EU foreign policy reinforcing the EU’s international identity and presence in world politics. A Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Russia is one of these instruments of EU foreign policy enhancing mutual relations between the two. According to Steven Blockmans, the aims of this partnership are to; provide an appropriate framework for political dialogue, support the efforts of partner states to strengthen their democracies and develop their economies through cooperation. see Blockmans, S. (2008), EU-Russia Relations Through the Prism of the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, European Foreign Affairs Review, 13 (2), 167. P175
317 According to Steven Blockmans financial assistance is one of the EU foreign policy tools used to support its policies towards and in neighbouring countries. Ibid. p177
318 S. Blockmans, EU-Russia Relations through the Prism of the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, European Foreign Affairs Review, 13/2 (2008), 167. P167
320 Ibid.p.124
relations’. In this matter, the role of Russian Self-perception and the EU perception of Russia are highly present in this equation.

Furthermore, Fraser Cameron considers that Russia’s ruling system tends to be ‘authoritarian’ and this situation ‘pose(s) a problem for the EU, which is seeking to develop a values-based foreign policy’. However, in 2004, the EU launched the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) to reinforce relations with neighbouring countries. According to Steven Blockmans, Russia ‘excluded itself from the ENP’. He suggests that Russia did so because ‘the EU had tried to apply it to Russia in the same manner as to any other neighbouring country’. This meant that Russia’s Self-perception as a political heavyweight or great power affected its relations with the EU and also that the EU’s perception of Russia as being like any neighbouring country, drove Russia to exclude itself from the ENP. In relation to this view, Steven Blockmans asserts that Russia has favoured the development of its strategic relations with the EU, ‘based on a relationship between equals’. Between both, the EU and Russia, identity and Self-Other perception have a considerable role to play in their foreign policy.

The EU’s Relations with the USA

The USA and Europe relationship have been international allies since 1945. According to Christopher Hill and William Wallace, the western European states rebuilt their foreign policy during the period of reconstruction after 1945 on ‘the basis of a compromise between sovereignty and integration’ accepting ‘American protection and leadership for their defence’. In this regard, Fraser Cameron argues that ‘The US is the most important partner of the EU and often shares a similar analysis of threats but then takes different views on how to counter such threats’. In the same way, Andrew Moravcsik asserts that the conventional wisdom that transatlantic relations are in bad shape and disarray, is ‘100 per-cent incorrect’.

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321 Blockmans, ‘EU-Russia Relations through the Prism of the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument’. (p175
322 Cameron, An Introduction to European Foreign Policy.p117
323 Blockmans, ‘EU-Russia Relations through the Prism of the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument’, (p175
324 Ibid.p175
325 Hill, The Actors in Europe's Foreign Policy.p10
326 Cameron, An Introduction to European Foreign Policy.p90
327 Bindi, The Foreign Policy of the European Union: Assessing Europe's Role in the World.p203
However, EU-USA relations are based on many shared civilizational dimensions that are enforced through mutual co-operation. The issues of promoting peace and stability, democracy and development, and respect for human rights and individual liberty are at the core of the EU-USA partnership.\textsuperscript{329} Notwithstanding, there is a Self-Other perception of the EU vis-a-vis the USA. In this regard, Fraser Cameron mentions Javier Solana’s view of this perception which is ‘a confrontation between the religious vision of world affairs in the White House and the secular vision of the Europeans’.\textsuperscript{330} However, the EU puts an emphasis on the desire to be conceived from abroad as a ‘civilian power’, by using ‘economic and diplomatic instruments’ in world politics. For Ole Elgström and Michael Smith, this Self-perception is ‘a feature that has been asserted to distinguish the EU from the US’.

\textbf{3.6 EU foreign policy towards the Middle East}

The Middle East occupies considerable attention from the EU for a number of resources, the most significant of which is the geographical interlock. Promoting change in the wider Middle East is one of the agendas that led to ‘a growing divergence between America’s perceptions and European perceptions’.\textsuperscript{332} In relation to this, Fraser Cameron states that ‘the US talked of a ‘war on terrorism’; Europeans talked of ‘a fight against terrorism’.\textsuperscript{333} In 2004, the Palestinian Authority and Israel were considered as part of the European Neighbourhood policy that the EU launched in 2004 to cover a number of countries near the EU. The policy is ‘supposed to be based on common values and interests including Democracy’.\textsuperscript{334} In this regard, Fraser Cameron states that the EU is ‘committed to help bring more democracy to the Middle East’.\textsuperscript{335} The EU adopted the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership to reinforce its strategic relations with Middle Eastern countries along with the

\textsuperscript{328} These issues are committed by the EU and the USA in a number of declarations, for instance; the 1990 Transatlantic Declaration, the New Transatlantic Agenda in 1995, and the Transatlantic Economic Partnership (TEP) in 1998. In addition, the USA is a strategic partner of the EU, while there are many agreements that strengthen the co-operation between them like the Transatlantic Economic Partnership, the World Trade Organisation, the Transatlantic Business Dialogue, the Transatlantic Legislators Dialogue, the Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue, the Transatlantic Environmental Dialogue, the G7/8, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. See Cameron, An Introduction to European Foreign Policy. P 92-5
\textsuperscript{329} Cameron, An Introduction to European Foreign Policy.p92-3
\textsuperscript{330} Ibid.p96
\textsuperscript{331} Elstrom and Smith, The European Union's Roles in International Politics: Concepts and Analysis.p4
\textsuperscript{332} Cameron, An Introduction to European Foreign Policy.p91-2
\textsuperscript{333} Ibid.p95
\textsuperscript{334} Ibid.p109
\textsuperscript{335} Ibid.p115
European Neighbourhood Policy. For Stefania Panebianco, the policies are working as ‘two complementary wings’ of EU initiatives towards the Middle East. Thereby, Panebianco argues that the EU’s relations with Middle Eastern states are identified according to ‘different priorities, goals, and instruments’. The core shared assumption of the two policies lies in ‘integration’. Stefania Panebianco argues that the integration of the Middle East countries in the EU internal market will produce a ‘spillover effect of radical structural reforms’ in different aspects (legislative, administrative, and institutional) which will be conducive to ‘greater political and democratic change’. Hence, Panebianco states that the EU acts as a ‘soft power whose international action follows the logic of utility’. Accordingly, EU-Middle East relations are presently concentrated more on security interests and needs than on ideas, principles, and values.  

\[EU\] foreign policy towards the Palestinian issue

The geographical and strategic ties between the EU and the Middle East entail active involvement of the EU in the Middle East conflict in general, and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in particular. For Ben Soetendorp, the EU has a strategic interest to ‘play a central role in the Arab-Israeli peace process’, and it also uses its financial aid to the Palestinians to make ‘itself clearly visible in the peace process’. The establishment of the Quartet on the Middle East gave ‘the EU the ability to create a more effective presence in the Middle East’. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict has a growing strategic meaning for global powers; therefore, the EU has increasingly aspired to become ‘an actor in the conflict’.  

EU-Israeli relations cannot be omitted in understanding the European discourse towards Palestinian statehood. Officially, EC/EU involvement in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict started as a ‘response to the 1973 war’. EU-Israeli relations were designed according to “the EU-Israel Action Plan” of 2004 as a part of the European Neighbourhood Policy.

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338 Ibid.p283
340 Ibid.p. 106.
Accordingly, Israel has ‘the most developed relations with the EU’. Raffaella A. Del Sarto argues that the strategic ties between Israel and the EU are not only relevant to the Action Plan but also that they are relevant to ‘the EU’s evolving foreign policy ambitions in the Middle East’. For Alfred Tovias, Israel is much closer to the EU ‘not only geographically but also politically, culturally and economically’.

In relation to the EU involvement in the Middle East peace process through the Quartet, Soetendorp ascribes it to the new function of the High Representative of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the desire to improve ‘the capacity of the EU to speak with one voice’ and to work in world politics as a ‘unified actor’. In addition, he argues that the ‘EU involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process’ reinforces ‘the central position and responsibility of the High Representative in the making of a common European foreign policy’. The EU is searching to reassert its dynamic role in the Middle East process in order to assert itself as a global power on the international stage.

However, the EU view of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is not unified. In this regard, Urfan Khaliq refers to a ‘difference of views among the different EU actors’ and refers to this difference as ‘not surprising’. Also, he refers to another problem related to the EU membership of the Quartet, that is, that the EU has three representatives in the Quartet: ‘the External Relations Commissioner, the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and a representative from the Member State which holds the Presidency at the time’. Accordingly, Urfan Khaliq states that ‘there have been differences of view between the representatives of the Union’.

Furthermore, Soetendorp ascribes the inability of the EU to undertake active participation in the Middle East process to the American wish for ‘no interference’ from the EU and the

342 Ibid. p. 61.
343 Ibid. p. 61.
345 Soetendorp, 'The EU’s Involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process: The Building of a Visible International Identity', (p284
346 Ibid.p294
348 Ibid.p285
349 Ibid.p285
EU being an ‘unacceptable mediator to Israel’. Urfan Khaliq has criticized how the EU ‘tried to align itself with the perspective of the United States’, which led the USA to ‘dominate’ the Palestinian-Israeli peace process. However, ever since the establishment of the Palestinian Authority in 1994, the EU has been one of the largest financial donors towards Palestinian state building. The EU supports the democratic transformation of the Palestinian Authority and sponsored the parliamentary elections in 1996 and 2006. Hamas engaged in the municipal and parliamentary elections that were held in 2005-06, but it was classified by the EU and other states and organisations as a ‘terrorist organisation’. Hence, the overwhelming victory of Hamas in the 2006 Parliamentary elections shocked all concerned parties. Hamas formed and led the tenth Palestinian government. This essential development in the Palestinian political map pushed Hamas to be a key player in the Palestinian landscape. The Quartet, composed of the US, the UN, the EU and Russia, made its political and financial cooperation with the Hamas-led government conditional on Hamas’ recognition of Israel, renunciation of violence and acceptance of all previously signed agreements. Accordingly, the EU stopped sponsoring the Palestinian Authority and boycotted the Hamas-led government. According to Rouba Al-Fattal, the EU policy focused on compelling Hamas to moderate its policies towards Israel and the peace process.

Nathan J. Brown introduced an approach to deal with Hamas, namely, that is “moderation through engagement”. This approach suggests engaging Hamas in the peace talks which could help to in convince Hamas to moderate itself in accordance with the Quartet’s conditions. Carolin Goerzig argues that the Quartet’s conditions were intended ‘as basis or framework for a potential peace process’ and that the three conditions come as ‘a package and inseparable’, thereby forcing Hamas to comply with them, it ‘makes compliance

351 Khaliq, ‘Ethical Dimensions of the Foreign Policy of the European Union—a Legal Appraisal’, (p286
352 J. Austin et al., 'Hamas and the Peace Process Resistance, Rejectionism, Reconciliation?”, (2011).p. 15
354 Ibid.
355 R. Al-Fattal, 'The Foreign Policy of the EU in the Palestinian Territory', (2010).
problematic’. Accordingly, Goerzig argues that the EU’s emphasis upon the Quartet’s conditions as the way to accept Hamas as a peace partner means that the EU is ‘becoming prisoner of its own rhetoric’. Therefore, the EU is chained to its ‘own scope to take action and prevent mutual understanding and progress’. Thus, Goerzig says that the EU could approach the problem from a different angle and it could use “a carrot-and–stick policy” which could engage Hamas to become a part of the peace process.

3.7 Debate over the conventional and modern understanding of foreign policy-making towards the Middle East Conflict

Debates over the Middle East conflict highlight the set of norms, values, interests and beliefs that have both theoretical and practical significance for the study of foreign policy-making in the Middle East. The Middle East is perceived from many perspectives that have practical significance for the study of foreign policy by global powers. Edward Said’s famous work ‘Orientalism’ focuses on ‘the orientalist stereotype’ of the Middle East and how the orientalists have described and imagined the Middle East as a ‘unique oriental cultural entity’. Said explains how the orientalist context shapes the Self-Other perception of the western powers, and highlights the orientalist stereotyped image of the Middle East which has influenced the policy decision-makers for a long period. Dietrich Jung and Morten Valbjørn perceive the Middle East conflict in “the context of cultural diversity”. They refer to the differences in norms, traditions and values that have shaped the identity of the Middle East. Bozeman (1994), and Huntington (1997), portray the Middle East in the context of a unified Islamic entity that has been shaped by the Islamic religion and Arabic traditional cultures. According to Huntington, the Middle East identity is embodied in the primary sources of the Islam, and he puts the relation between the East and the West in ‘the context of clash of civilizations’. 

358 Ibid.p. 29.
359 Ibid.p. 29.
360 Said, Orientalism.
362 A.B. Bozeman, Politics and Culture in International History: From the Ancient near East to the Opening of the Modern Age (Transaction Pub, 1994).
363 For more information see S.P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (Pocket Books, 1997).
Discussions about foreign policy-making towards the Middle East by Arab scholars are not free from ‘power’ and ‘oil-centric analysis and interpretation of global actors who have influence in the Middle East. AbedEl-Atheem Hanafi problematises the role of ‘oil’ in analysing foreign policy-making in the Middle East. He argues that natural resources, especially oil, play a vital role in the making of foreign policy in the Middle East. Ahmad Youssef problematises the use of ‘power’ by the US and its allies in occupying Iraq and its regional and international effects. Most studies that deal with foreign policy-making in the Middle East are characterised by an obsession with power and oil-centric analysis. This obsession that arises in foreign policy studies leads to a cul-de-sac: the hegemony of power-centric and oil-centric understandings of East-West relations that leads to the continuation of armed conflict in the Middle East. The language used is that of violence. Furthermore, political regimes in the Middle East will continue to maintain their political singularity, and in so doing will shape public opinion in favour of prolonging military confrontation. However, it remains to be seen how the ‘Arab Spring’ will change these realities.

The conventional understanding of foreign policy-making towards the Middle East peace process (MEPP) is problematic. There are a huge number of scholars dealing with the conventional assumptions of foreign policy-making towards the Middle East in comparison with a much smaller number dealing with the concept of identity and Self-Other perception. Realist, Marxist, and liberal scholars focus on conventional assumptions to interpret the making of foreign policy by EU and Russia towards the MEPP. Hence, the question of identity and Self-Other perception in foreign policy-making is largely ignored in existing studies about Palestinian statehood.

Roland Dannreuther challenges the conventional assumption that the external factors involved in the MEPP are driven either by neo-realist strategic competition or by the constraining power of domestic lobbies, or by a mixture of both. He argues that approaches based on such assumptions fail to explain adequately the policies adopted not only by the United States, but also by other key external actors who have been historically

365 Ahmad Youssef, Occupation of Iraq and Its Repercussions on the Arab and Regional and International “ Ahttal Al-Iraq Wa Tdacyatoth Carabia’n Wa Eqlymia’n Wa Dowlya’an” (Center for Arab Unity Studies, 2004) 1088.
engaged in the MEPP — the Soviet Union and the European Union. Karl K. Schonberg argues that a realist analysis which focuses on ‘material capabilities and interests alone’ is not sufficient to explain the evolution of global power, especially that of the USA in the 21st century, emphasising the relevance of constructivist approach which ‘acknowledge[s] the role of ideology and identity in the shaping of policy in this era’. 367

Schonberg employs the constructivist approach to explain his argument in which national identity and ideology are critical variables in determining friend and foe, opportunity and threat in the process of foreign policy-making. Ben Soetendorp ascribes the EU involvement in the MEPP to the desire and ambition to realize EU identity in world politics as a global actor, in order ‘to speak with one voice’ and to work as a ‘unified actor’. 368 Moreover, Shibley Telhami and Michael N. Barnett challenge the conventional realist assumptions that international politics holds a monopoly on the state’s interests or homogeneity of state interests. 369 They conduct their research on the foreign relations between Middle Eastern states. Their research has built models based upon the relationship between identity politics and regional politics. Studies that deal with the concept of identity and Self-Other perception in the foreign policy realm is a trend that is likely to continue. 370

Thus, the establishment of a Palestinian state is an issue in foreign policy-making for most global actors having some role in the Middle East conflict. So, the failure to date to establish a Palestinian state brings to analysis the dynamics of theories of foreign policy. Realism, liberalism and constructivism are the common theories used by scholars to analyse and interpret political phenomena in the field of foreign policy towards the Middle East. The framework of this thesis is determined on the basis of a key assumption of the importance of the role played by identity and Self-perception in the process of peace-making by global actors. The thesis takes as its case study the case of EU and Russian foreign policy discourse. Constructivist approach is helpful to use in the analysis and interpretation of EU and Russian foreign policy in light of our emerging awareness of

identity and Self-perceptions as essential elements in defining peace-making. These debates reveal to what extent difference and diversity in identity and Self-Other perception play an important role in defining how Palestinian statehood is perceived and how global powers act towards MEPP. This thesis highlights the role of identity and Self-Other perception in foreign policy-making which is becoming the central argument of this study. Therefore, I shall address identity and Self-Other perception concepts which will be found throughout the thesis.
CHAPTER FOUR
IDENTITY–BUILDING:
THE CONTEXTUALISATION OF THE EU’S AND RUSSIA’S SELF- PERCEPTION OF ACTORNESS

Focus
In this chapter I argue that the construction of an international identity by the EU and Russia lies at the heart of internal developments that inform the making of their foreign policy. To this end, the analysis in this chapter is threefold. Firstly, I explain how the EU and Russia have constructed an international identity in the light of internal developments. The analysis takes into consideration key developments that occurred in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union which influenced the perception of actorness on the international stage. Secondly, I outline key contexts of capabilities in which the EU and Russia intend to assert their presence and visibility as global actors. This is to interpret the guides that define foreign policy-making by both actors. Thirdly, I highlight how this emerged Self-perception of actorness pushes both forward to look for opportunities behind borders. In this regard I explain how “neighbourhood” is perceived in the search for global actorness. This leads to understanding how the Middle East is perceived and to what extent it informs EU and Russian foreign policy, particularly the Middle East peace process.

4.1 The Context of the EU’s and Russia’s Discourse: The Construction of Identity
The surprising collapse of the Soviet Union was an historical moment which affected the course of both global powers and actors. In the aftermath huge changes in the world order have emerged. This collapse formed an historical context for many dramatic power transformations in world politics. Consequently, post-Soviet Russia and the EU have experienced challenges and transformations both internally and externally. Within this historical context, the identities of Russia, the successor to the USSR, and the EU, which played a major role in the Cold War, have come to the fore.
Boris Yeltsin, the first president of the Russian Federation said:

‘The Russian Soviet Federation Socialist Republic has been peacefully replaced by the Russian Federation. The state has changed its legal identity’. Yeltsin 1993

The collapse of the Soviet Union has in many ways brought a new discourse to Russia’s internal developments and external expectations. It brought questions about Self-representation and its significance in the comity of nations. How should post-Soviet Russia present itself on the world scene? How should the identity of the new state reflect Russia’s rich history? In the Yeltsin period, Russia’s state identity became a quandary. There is a rich and diverse history which is mainly based on the legacy of the former Soviet Union and the heritage of Tsarist Russia with their various capabilities in different arenas. At the same time, there are weaknesses, challenges and threats in a multitude of areas which have faced Russia for decades and have now become critical. The breakup of the Soviet Union has shaken Russian society and caused crises on both internal and external levels. Clearly, the collapse has left Russia in an identity crisis. The new state’s identity occupied a substantial amount of space with debates and discussions occurring in most social classes.

Foreign policy-makers and the Russian elite sparred over whether Russia should become a European or a Eurasian power, go westward or eastward and what role Russia should seek to play on the international stage. Clear divisions arose and the planning of Russian foreign policy varied among different streams of the Russian political spectrum. Pogos Akopov describes designing Russian foreign policy during the Yeltsin Period as a war between the pro-western model supporters, the pro-former Soviet Union and the Eurasianists who have influenced Russia’s foreign policy in recent years. In this debate, the legacy of the Soviet Union was perceived in two ways: some saw this legacy as a cause of weakness and undermining of Russian power status on the international stage, looking towards America as ‘the model of future Russia without losing the long-cherished feeling of equality’; while others perceived this stance as a disaster, urging Russia to assert her legitimacy as a

371 T. Borisova and W.B. Simons, The Legal Dimension in Cold-War Interactions: Some Notes from the Field (Brill, 2012).p 127
372 Scholar Interview, ‘Interview with Pogos Akopov, President of Association of Russian Diplomats. ’, (Moscow, 2013i).
373 Ibid. p. 77.
Eurasian power by constructing a new model.\textsuperscript{374} Not surprisingly, the collapse of the Soviet Union has deeply affected Russia’s Self-perception.

The new identity needed to reflect the aspirations of the Russian people and meet their expectations at both internal and external levels. Subsequently, Russia has declared itself the legal successor not only to the former Soviet Union but to pre-revolutionary Russia as well.\textsuperscript{375} This means that post-Soviet Russia is seeking to inherit the entire legacies of both the Soviet Union and Tsarist Russia.\textsuperscript{376} Russia’s discourse places emphasis on this legacy:

‘We have a huge territory, large amounts of natural resources, solid industrial potential, an impressive list of outstanding achievements in science, technology, education and art, a glorious history regarding our army, navy, and nuclear weapons. By using its authority Russian power has played a significant -- and in some periods determinate -- role in events of historic proportions’. Medvedev 2009\textsuperscript{377}

The discourse here presents internal developments in Russia over successive epochs. It stresses the significant role played by Russia in global historical events. Russian Self-perception in light of its history, economy, industry, science and geostrategic position has played a role of Self-identification and construction of identity. Russia is the world’s largest country and is a bridge between two continents. It is part of Europe, East Asia and the Middle East which are among the world’s most important regions.\textsuperscript{378} For centuries, Russia has been a great power.\textsuperscript{379} The experience of empire, in both the former Soviet Union and Tsarist Russia has given Russia a sense of greatness and actoriness in world politics. Russia’s place as an active global player has been assured ever since ‘the building of the empire by Peter the Great’.\textsuperscript{380} The collapse has opened the door to question the new Russia’s place and mission on the international stage.

\textsuperscript{374} Laruelle and Gabowitsch, \textit{Russian Eurasianism: An Ideology of Empire.}
\textsuperscript{377} Dmitri Medvedev, ‘Go, Russia!’, \textit{Kremlin. ru}, 10 (2009a).
Historically, Russian identity developed in the context of being the ‘Third Rome’, through the period of Tsarist Russia\(^{381}\) and then secularised to ‘world revolution’ during the Soviet period.\(^{382}\) Therefore, Russian identity was constructed through a form of ‘exceptionalism’.\(^{383}\) Constructing an identity that can give explicit meaning to internal developments as well as to external expectations on the world stage has been and is an objective.\(^{384}\)

In respect of the EU, Javier Solana says:

‘In Western Europe, the last 50 years have seen spectacular progress: from conflict and disarray to freedom, peace and stability’. Solana 2002 \(^{385}\)

Solana emphasises the significant transformation that has happened in Western Europe over the last 100 years. The move from war to peace and from disarray to stability and prosperity constitutes considerable shifts in EU internal developments. For Ian Manners, the EU was created in ‘a post-war historical environment’.\(^{386}\) This environment is a combination of, on the one side, a spirit of harmony, peace, trust, cooperation and solidarity among the countries of Europe to heal the effects of the Second World War,\(^{387}\)

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\(^{381}\) Dominique Moïsi, 'Dreaming of Europe', *Foreign Policy*, /115 (1999), 44-59, p 47.


\(^{383}\) Ibid.


\(^{387}\) The peace that Europe had lost during the first half of the twentieth century has become the main feature of the EU. Thus, the meaning of the EU as a peace project is visible through the historical context in which the EU found itself: the Second World War and the Cold War. Thus, the EU considers itself as a peace project which aims to end centuries of warfare in Europe. This project resulted from the power of ideas and deeds which could flourish in the absence of warfare. As many scholars argue, the EU is a historical reconciliation between France and Germany and a counterbalance to the USSR’s security threats. For more information see R. Mcallister, *From Ec to EU* (Taylor & Francis, 2013)., N. Tocci, *The EU and Conflict Resolution: Promoting Peace in the Backyard* (ROUTLEDGE CHAPMAN & HALL, 2007). C. Bretherton and J. Vogler, *The European Union as a Global Actor* (Routledge/Carson, 2006). p. 189. F. Bindi and I. Angelescu, *The Foreign Policy of the European Union: Assessing Europe's Role in the World* (Brooking Institution Press, 2012), F. Laursen, *Designing the European Union: From Paris to Lisbon* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).

\(^{388}\) According to many scholars, the EU aims to address the root causes of WWII through protecting human rights, spreading prosperity, building cooperation among the European states and strengthening the solidarity between the European communities. See Laursen, *Designing the European Union: From Paris to Lisbon* and Fraser Cameron, 'The European Union as a Model for Regional Integration', *London: Council on Foreign Relations*, (2010). p. 2.
and, on the other, a common cultural, historical and religious heritage.\textsuperscript{389} The EU’s identity has emerged in the context of peace, cooperation and solidarity with the aim of achieving prosperity for all its member-states.\textsuperscript{390} For Sir Graham Watson at least three elements can be distinguished in EU identity: peace, solidarity and prosperity for its member states.\textsuperscript{391} EU internal developments, in the light of bridging the differences among its member states and reaching collective actions for agreed objectives, has created a sense of actoriness and increased external expectations. Moreover, Solana in his discourse shows a sense of the European ‘Self’ in contrast to Otherness. He says:

‘Beyond Western Europe the past decade has seen tectonic changes in the geopolitical environment: the fall of communism; the dissolution of the Soviet bloc; a transformation of Central and Eastern Europe; the imminent re-unification of Europe; and the development of a new constructive relationship between the Euro-Atlantic Community and Russia’. Solana 2002 \textsuperscript{392}

In this discourse the internal developments in regards to peace, stability and prosperity have a deep impact on perception of the ‘Self in terms of re-unification’ in contrast to the Other in light of fall and dissolution. In other words, the context of the consequences of WWII and the environment of polarisation during the Cold War influenced the construction of the EU’s Self-perception. That means the Solana view of the EU is within a context of competition in the sense of a desire to play a role as a global actor. Solana describes the EU as an ‘attractive pole of stability, democracy and prosperity’.\textsuperscript{393} This is put in the context of internal and external developments that he refers to, as having a ‘meaning’ to the EU as an international player. The discourse here is the question of Self-presenting i.e. asking who we were, what we are and what we want to be. The matter of collective identity as a ‘European’ is inspired by the EU discourse of Self-perception. It has helped Europe to heal from wars and destruction. In addition, this discourse stresses

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item In the aftermath of World War II, the six Western European countries attempted to create and organise both the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), and the European Economic Community (EEC). The treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (1951), the treaty establishing the European Economic Community (1957), the treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (1957) and the treaty establishing the European Union have been called the founding treaties of the present-day EU. They have made it the most institutionalised polity in the world.
\item Scholar Interview, 'Interview with Sir Graham Watson, President of the European Liberal Democrat and Reform Party (Eldr)', (Brussels, 2013b).
\item Solana, "Europe's Place in the World: The Role of the High Representative".
\item Ibid.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
the framework of European peace and cooperation after WWII and during the Cold War, confirming the fact that working together is the only way towards fostering political and social conciliation, reinforcing economic prosperity and maintaining European solidarity. Therefore, the European ‘Self’ has been and is perceived within this context in which external expectations are driven by the sense of actorness.

Furthermore, constructing an international identity appears to be a complex process. The sense of collective identity of the EU member states derives not only from the presence of active institutions and organisations but also from European common values, norms and standards, which the EU sets and develops. While for Russia, the sense of collective identity of its member states stems not only from the constitution and its federal system but also from traditional values such as Russian Orthodox Christianity, a geographical position in the heartland of Eurasia and the ethno-fusion of Slavic and Turko-Muslim people of Russia as well as the legacy of the former Soviet Union and Tsarist heritage. The presentation of ‘Self’ has been reflected in many ways such as returning to the old State’s emblem of a two headed eagle.

The matter of identity can neither be conceived nor fulfilled without taking a full account of the wider historical, political, social, and economic context of the great events of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries in which the EU and Russia find themselves. Notably, the EU and Russia have coincided in their emergence and in the process of constructing a new identity on the international stage. While the EU strives to construct a sense of global actorness, Russia struggles to secure the former USSR a place in world politics. The EU’s and Russia’s discourse of identity and Self-Other perception both have a history of challenges and struggle to overcome the past’s problems. While Russia’s discourse focuses on recovering from weaknesses resulting from the collapse of the Soviet Union, the EU emphasises the strengthening of its collective identity and the enhancement of its enlargement. Whereas the EU seeks influence in central and Eastern European countries, Russia faces many problems especially in terms of geographic territory and

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394 Putin has said “Without the values at the core of Christianity and other world religions, without moral norms that have been shaped over millennia, people will inevitably lose their human dignity,” See Vladimir Putin’s Speech at the Valdai Club’s Plenary Meeting . http://valdaiclub.com/valdai_club/62642.html accessed on 03/11/2013.
395 Laruelle and Gabowitsch, Russian Eurasianism: An Ideology of Empire.
geostrategic sphere. Hence, the collapse of the USSR has pushed both the EU and Russia into a soul-searching process.

**Between soul-searching and Self-reinvention: seeking a role on the international stage**

The fall of both the Berlin Wall (1989) and the Soviet Union (1991) paved the way for a genuine opportunity for the EU to enlarge itself by recruiting the countries of central and Eastern Europe. The phrase ‘soul-searching’ has been used by the French political scientist Dominique Moisi to describe the EU quest for identity during this period.\(^{397}\) The changes in the USSR gave the EU an opportunity to create a new geopolitical landscape. Western Europe seized this opportunity to maximise its status as a “net exporter of stability”.\(^{398}\) However, the EU emphasises common normative values and principles that ensure that Europe is bound together by these basic values.\(^{399}\) This includes the normative foundations upon which the international identity of the EU has been constructed alongside the institutional framework which member states have established. Ian Manners identified five ‘core’ norms which comprise ‘the acquis communautaire and acquis politique’: peace, liberty, and democracy, the rule of law and respect of human rights\(^ {400}\) which have become the main features of the EU’s international identity. In this context, the EU is interested in the idea of naming itself as a civilian or normative power.\(^ {401}\)

Russia, in its turn, has been engaging in a process of Self-reinvention in order to introduce a new identity. Russia is very keen to reinvent itself as a strong and great power on the world scene. In the last 10 years of Soviet life, massive weaknesses in different areas appeared. In the years following the breakup, Russia’s power capabilities steadily declined. Therefore, Russia’s ‘Self’’s perception was viewed within the context of the country’s weakness and decline. This formed the context for decision-making. Regaining Russia’s past greatness became a key question, but it was perceived in different ways. The mainstream Democratic Russian Movement came to strongly influence Yeltsin’s foreign

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397 Moisi, 'Dreaming of Europe', (p 45.
398 Solana, ”Europe's Place in the World: The Role of the High Representative”.
399 Ibid.
400 Ian Manners goes into great detail as to how the EU has developed over the past 50 years. Additionally, he identifies the five core norms in great detail, interprets leaders’ declarations and preambles, founding principles and articles of treaties. For more details see Manners, 'Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?', (p. 242-4.
policy at its inception.\textsuperscript{402} The clash between Russia’s power status and its foreign policy-making became acute in the post-Soviet era. A growing dissatisfaction arose with Yeltsin’s foreign policy, especially with his policy towards countries of the Soviet sphere.\textsuperscript{403}

Russian policy-makers and elites long to regain Russia’s past greatness. At the end of the Yeltsin period, Russia had to set a new course in foreign policy. In 2000, Vladimir Putin came to power with the slogan ‘Great Russia’ and ‘Strong Russian Statehood’.\textsuperscript{404} This slogan dominated Russian discourse towards external relations. The discourse focused on securing a ‘great power status’ in world politics and policies designed to affirm Russian influence and dominance in the post-Soviet sphere. Thus, with the advent of Putin to power in 2000, Russian foreign policy has increasingly been guided by what is known politically as the “Putin Doctrine”. The doctrine refers to the priority of recovering for ‘the Russian state the political, economic, and geostrategic assets lost in the Soviet collapse’.\textsuperscript{405} Accordingly, the doctrine puts emphasis on the recovery of the former Soviet Union’s assets and maintaining Russia’s influence and domination in this sphere.

On the eve of the new millennium, the EU succeeded in attracting many Central and Eastern European states. More than 10 countries applied to take up EU membership. It was the largest enlargement of the EU which had ever taken place. For Julie Gilson, identity-building in the context of enlargement is one of driving forces behind the EU’s aspiration of global actorness.\textsuperscript{406} The Self-presentation, in terms of geographical spill-over, economic power, the peace project among long-standing enemies and a unique political and cultural experiment in the projection of values such democracy, freedom and collective solidarity, lie at the heart of EU’s Self-Other perception regarding global actorness in the world. The EU’s discourse makes it extremely clear that it is very important for the EU to be visible in the international sphere and to remain a leader in many international aspects such as the promotion of democracy, and of economic and

\textsuperscript{402}The school based in “Democratic Russia Movement” which is personified in the former Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, First Deputy Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar, and the rather shadowy Gennady Burbulis, former First Deputy Prime Minister and one of Yeltsin’s closest advisors. This group determined Russian foreign policy during the first three years of the Yeltsin period. See Alexei K Pushkov, ‘Letter from Eurasia: Russia and America: The Honeymoon’s Over’, \textit{Foreign Policy}, 93 (1993), 76-90. p. 77-8.

\textsuperscript{403}ibid. p. 77-8.


\textsuperscript{405}Aron, ‘Structure and Context in US-Russian Relations at the Outset of Barack Obama’s Second Term’,

\textsuperscript{406}Julie Gilson, ‘Defining Inter-Regionalism: The Asia-Europe Meeting (Asem)’, \textit{Presentation for the University of Sheffield, School of East Asian Studies}, (2002).
political values. These developments have increasingly posed questions about the EU’s place and mission in world politics. For Alun Jones and Julian Clark, the EU strives to gain meaning, actorness and presence in international affairs. The Laeken Declaration asks:

‘What is Europe's role in this changed world? Does Europe not, now that is finally unified, have a leading role to play in a new world order, that of a powerful both to play a stabilising role worldwide and to point the way ahead for many countries and peoples?’ Laeken Declaration 2001

In striving to be visible, the EU member states committed themselves to a common foreign and security policy by signing and ratifying the Maastricht Treaty in 1993. Since that time serious concerns have emerged in the EU regarding its role in world politics and to what extent it could be a global actor. In the course of these concerns, the position of the Higher Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (HR-CFSP) was created by the signing of Amsterdam Treaty in 1997. This debate has increased gradually and become very critical during the first decade of 21st century. In 2009 the Lisbon Treaty came into force whereupon global actorness became a key goal for the EU.

While the Maastricht Treaty (1993) designed and framed the EU, the Treaty of Lisbon structured EU foreign policy. In the course of the EU’s development, CFSP constitutes

409 The treaty has created the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as one of the three pillar structures of the EU.
410 Brian Crowe, Foreign Minister of Europe (Foreign Policy Centre London, 2005).
412 The Maastricht Treaty laid down the main values and principles that the EU exports through its foreign policy, while the Lisbon Treaty structured EU foreign policy. The two main European Treaties and the
the spotlight searching for an international identity in order to play an external role and present deep insights into its global actorness in world politics. This attempt can be traced back to the European Political Co-operation (EPC)\(^1\) meeting in November 1970; when the six European member states tried to give its internal market a joint and common foreign policy to cover issues of general interest and those of direct concern to Europe. The EPC represents the first framework for a common European policy projected to the outside world. This foreign policy is based on principles and norms rooted in the EU’s perspective. Thus, EU foreign policy takes its shape from the grass-roots of the European community.

Russia, from its side, formulated a foreign policy concept which fits into the broader agenda of Russia’s strategic aspirations and strategically designed guidelines that envisage ‘medium-term’ updates approximately every five years.\(^2\) This is a natural update of Russia’s interpretations of local and international changes since 1993. For Andrew Monaghan there is a ‘strong sense of continuity in the new Foreign Policy Concept’ towards asserting that Russia has the potential to play an active role in world politics.\(^3\) The concept points out:

‘In the past decade Russia has been able to utilize additional possibilities of international cooperation that are opening up as a result of radical transformations in the country; Russia has advanced significantly along the road of integrating in the system of world economic ties; it has joined a number of influential international organizations and institutions. Through its intensive efforts, Russia has managed to strengthen its positions in a number of principal

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\(^1\) European Political Cooperation is the process of information, consultation and common action among the ‘twelve’ member state of the European Community. The origins of this process go back to the 1950s, when cooperation on foreign policy was seen as an integral part of building a new Europe after the Second World War. It aims to maximise EC leverage in world politics through a single coherent European approach. For more information see David Allen, Reinhardt Rummel, and Wolfgang Wessels, European Political Cooperation: Towards a Foreign Policy for Western Europe (Butterworth-Heinemann, 1982).


\(^3\) Ibid. p.3.
Most of the foundation of the new Russian foreign policy was designed by former Soviet experts and leaders. This is very clear in the foreign policy concept with its emphasis on Russia as a great power and ‘as one of the most influential centers of the modern world’. There is little doubt that the new Russia’s foreign policy is a resumption of the Soviet Union’s foreign policy with some amendments according to the new situation. Which is to say that the new Russian foreign policy remains committed to reinforcing Russia’s position internationally while maintaining Russian dominance over the former Soviet sphere is still its top priority.

It focuses on bolstering Russian global actoriness, economic recovery and growth and demonstrating the power ability to pursue its goals at internal and international levels. At the same time, Russia seeks to keep its foreign policy apart from polarisation and focus on realising Russia’s national interests. Putin said that ‘the Cold War is a thing of the past’.

In addition, Sergey Lavrov underlines that Russia’s foreign policy is ‘neither "pro-Western" nor "anti-Western"’. He stresses that it is in the interests of Russia. In the meantime, it taking into account the mutual interests of other states that Russia considers as ‘the guarantee of effectiveness and reliability of such a world order’. In the light of this, Russia’s discourse focuses on building a ‘multipolar system of international relations’.

In a changing world, the quest for actoriness is a continuous process. Therefore, the foreign policies of the EU and Russia are designed to create a favourable external environment

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420 Ibid.
421 Ibid, 'The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation'),
422 Ibid.
with the purpose of reinforcing their internal development and underpinning their peoples’ ambitions. In the case of Russia, Medvedev says:

‘What will be Russia’s place, and hence the place of our descendants, heirs, and future generations, among other nations in the global labour market, in the system of international relations, in global culture? What must we do to steadily improve the quality of life of Russian citizens today and in the future? To allow our society to become richer, freer, more humane and more attractive? So that Russian society can give to those who desire it a better education, an interesting job, a good income, and comfortable environment for both personal life and creative activity?’ Medvedev 2009

The question of Russia’s place is a priority in the making of foreign policy. Medvedev emphasises the need to secure an external environment to sustain Russia’s national interests and underpin the future of Russia in world politics. Russia is paying serious attention to opportunities to enhance its influence. The questioning here is about Russian Self-representation in the context of expectancy about her position on the world scene. However, asserting Russia’s quest for quality of life for her citizens and making Russia a pole of attraction are at the core of its foreign policy-making. In reality, this is questioning the Russia’s “Self” vis-à-vis “Other”. Clearly, Russia increasingly attempts to give a political and strategic direction to its foreign policy. Similarly, the EU is motivated to create a favourable external environment to secure its future. Barroso says:

‘The world is at a turning point. So is Europe. Our action now will determine the vitality of the European model of society for future generations. It will determine how much influence we have in shaping a new world order, how well we use our assets to assert Europe’s interests and values in the age of globalisation…. We face a choice: either we collectively shape the new order, or Europe will become irrelevant’. José Manuel Barroso, 2009

Barroso stresses the need for a united European response at global level in order to determine the future of the EU in world politics. The EU has an opportunity to influence the shaping of the world order. The Self-perception of both the capability plus the opportunity to play such a role informs the Barroso discourse. Soul-searching at a global

423 Medvedev, ‘Go, Russia’
level informs EU discourse on world issues. This discourse on the future of Europe - will it become relevant-versus-irrelevant - demonstrates that the EU has an instinctive desire at its core to be a global actor. It is about the question of representing the “Self”, and about how the “Other” is perceived in the context of expectancy of the EU’s place and mission globally. However, asserting ‘Europe’s interests and values’ is fundamental in constructing the EU’s motivations in foreign policy-making. It defines the EU “Self” vis-à-vis “Other”. Clearly, these interests and values dominate the EU discourse at an external level. The EU cannot easily project values without asserting interests in its foreign policy-making. Thus, it increasingly attempts to give a political and strategic direction to its foreign policy.

The EU’s and Russia’s discourse on their global presence reflects a range of internal capabilities and external expectations which have combined to motivate the EU and Russia to expect a role to play. Also, they are looking for an opportunity to experience their power capabilities. In terms of actorness, a variety of capabilities strengthens and in some cases broadens the success of playing an active role in world politics. The successful exercise of actorness depends on capabilities which can underpin the seeking for an optimal positioning on the international stage. That means that the EU and Russia as ‘political constructs’ involve not solely ‘being’ but also ‘saying and doing’. The context of a changing world at the beginning of the twentieth-first century has encouraged the EU and Russia to enhance their visibility and assert their identities in the world sense.

4.2 The Discourse of Capabilities

The EU discourse in this regard is continuous and derives its incentives from internal capabilities in order to assert its meaning and presence in world politics. Solana says:

‘It is my belief that in this global age a Union of our size, with our interests, history and values, has an obligation to assume its share of responsibilities.

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425 Ronald Dannreuther emphasises the international identity of the EU as a ‘political construct’, which he defines as ‘less than a state and more than a regime’. In this context, Ian Manners argues that the EU transcends the normal style of Westphalian state which has been constructed over 50 years through a series of treaties, policies, criteria and conditions on which it is destined to be a global power. It is a hybrid supranational-intergovernmental polity. Additionally, Ariyoshi Ogawa argues that the EU is no (longer) a confederation and not (yet) a federal state, it is referred to as a political construct sui generis. For more information see R. Dannreuther, European Union Foreign and Security Policy: Towards a Neighbourhood Strategy (Taylor & Francis, 2004). p. 166., Manners, ‘Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’, ( p. 242. and J. Kawata, Comparing Political Corruption and Clientelism (Ashgate Publishing Company, 2006). p. 66.
we are increasingly encouraged to play a fuller part in international affairs’. Javier Solana, 2002

The EU discourse relies on its power capabilities, which is to say, its normative, civilian, economic and stabilising powers, all of which have boosted and furthered the presence of the EU globally. Its emphasis on such capabilities has certainly been remarkable over the past decade. Based on this discourse of capabilities, Solana says that: ‘the question, therefore, is not whether we play a global role, but how we play that role’. To this end, the EU has developed a wide range of institutional bodies and intra-EU coordination policies such as, for instance, the European Neighbourhood Policy. Moreover, the EU’s discourse shows a clear sense of its ability to exercise its capabilities and play an active role in international affairs. Solana articulates that Europe is increasingly encouraged by others ‘to play a fuller part in international affairs’.

Russia presents a completely different story. The Russian lack of capabilities has been acknowledged as causing the collapse of the former Soviet Union and limiting present-day Russian influence in world politics. The last years of the former Soviet Union and the first years of the new Russia were very hard for Russian leaders at many levels, particularly the economic and political. These years are branded on the Russian memory as years of weakness. With Putin coming to power, Russia has been working to rebuild its Self-perception as a great power and to project this image abroad. Foreign policy-making has been shifted to give it a more robust ‘great power status’ position. Putin has also prioritised the reinforcement of economic sectors. He says:

‘The economic weakness of Russia continues to be another serious problem. The growing gap between leading nations and Russia pushes us towards becoming a third world country. The figures of current economic growth should not be any cause for comfort: we continue to live in conditions of progressing economic lag. I would ask you to pay special attention to this’. Vladimir Putin 2000

This acknowledgment of weakness has caused Russia’s foreign policy to take a new turn, focusing on the need to reinforce Russian national capabilities in order to have the wherewithal to be effective internationally. Russian foreign policy-makers want never to return to those years of weakness when Russia ‘seemed to be a dependent of the western

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426 Solana, "Europe's Place in the World: The Role of the High Representative".
427 Ibid.
428 Ibid.
429 Putin, 'Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation.'
powers’. Putin's discourse on Russia's position among the comity of nations was deeply affected by this Self-perception of weakness. Putin points out that only a 'strong or effective' state is able to create conditions for prosperity. Russia’s policy-makers and elite are widely convinced that the roots of Russia's decline in influence lay in weaknesses in the areas of the military, economy and technology. However, for Robert Donaldson and Joseph Nogee, Russia's geography, its experienced population, natural resources and military capabilities - especially its nuclear weapons expertise - are in themselves a ‘guarantee of its on-going status as a great power’.

Putin’s strategy in formulating foreign policy is to concentrate on those capabilities which do the most to generate prosperity and security in order to regain the influence that will enable Russia to play a leading role in world politics. Building and strengthening Russia’s actorness on the international stage is assumed to be a prime shaper of Russian foreign policy. In 2000 a Russian foreign policy in 2000 states that:

‘While the military power still retains significance in relations among states, an ever greater role is being played by economic, political, scientific and technological, ecological, and information factors’.

So, the EU and Russia perceive their ‘Self’ in light of a number of capabilities that underpin their actorness and greatness. This view is based on a number of realities that lie in both the present and the past. Russia’s discourse of capabilities defines priorities in the process of foreign policy-making and performs the task of filling voids perceived in terms of weakness. This discourse is increasingly apparent in Russia’s leaders, where the objective of regaining greatness informs the process of policy-making. Sergey Lavrov stresses that Russia has capabilities which enable it to play an active role in shaping world politics. He says:

‘We now have the resources to participate not only in realizing world policy on most issues, but most important - we have acquired the possibility and capacity to participate in the elaboration of approaches which can later be realized’.

431 Putin, ‘Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation.’
434 Concept, 'The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation) '.
435 Sergey Lavrov, 'Interview with Russian Newspaper', *Rossiiskaya Gazeta*, (2007b)
While Russia’s discourse rests upon three geostrategic imperatives in foreign policy: ‘Russia as a nuclear superpower; Russia as a great power; and Russia as the regional—political, military, and economic—superpower.’ The EU’s discourse rests on four main concepts in foreign policy: the EU as a normative power; the EU as an economic power; the EU as a soft power and the EU as a peacemaker. Ginsberg argues that perceptions of actorness influences actual actorness. For example, this Self-perception of actorness embodies an assumption that should construct a distinctive role for both the EU and Russia in the world arena. These perceptions of actorness constitute contexts in which both the EU and Russia exercise and reinforce their capabilities. Capabilities mean power and power is ‘no longer viewed as monolithic and uni-dimensional, but rather as multidimensional’. Exercising capabilities within a context gives meaning and enhances the presence of an actor. In the making of foreign policy, placing primary emphasis on the capabilities of states is a way of drawing attention to their potential power. Therefore, the EU’s and Russia’s attempts to build international positions by using their capabilities have been driven by Self-perception which can be identified in a number of contexts:

**Values and Principles as Context for an International Identity**

“I have a passion for Europe. It is far more than just a market – its achievements inspire pride, its potential rouses the imagination. It is a Community of values, founded on human dignity, freedom, equality, and solidarity.... Moving ahead in this way, Europe can promote its values and interests not only in her immediate neighbourhood. Europe can become a true partner in leadership on the global scale.” José Manuel Barroso, 2009

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437 See Manners, ‘Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’, (.
442 Ibid. p 180.
443 Barroso, 'Political Guidelines for the Next Commission', ( p 12.
The context of normative power constitutes the main reference for EU foreign policy actions. The EU emphasises the projection of European norms and values to create a widening reach of European geo-politic links to its neighbourhood.\textsuperscript{444} The projection of these values and principles asserts the collective identity of the EU which can be seen as an outcome of these elements. Hence, European norms and values play a role in the discursive construction of the EU’s international identity.\textsuperscript{445} The EU can be considered an ‘imagined community’ with a ‘normative basis for collective identity’.\textsuperscript{446} Understanding this historical narrative in the context of the enlargement process is crucial for understanding the EU’s contemporary foreign policy.

Accordingly, the EU has placed human rights, the promotion of democracy and the spreading of good governance at the heart of its foreign policy both in its geographical neighbourhood and in the world in general. To show its commitment to these principles, the EU, since 2009, has published an annual report called EU Action on Human Rights and Democracy in the World. Furthermore, the EU has set out a number of instruments, initiatives and action plans in non-EU countries which demonstrate a serious commitment to human rights and democracy\textsuperscript{447} while the Council of the EU has adopted eight ‘Guidelines’ that represent a strong political expression of the EU priorities in this field. In addition the EU created the position of an EU Special Representative for Human Rights whose mandate began in September 2012. The position aims to enhance the effectiveness and visibility of the EU’s human rights policy.

In contrast, Russia considers itself a civilized power but not a civilian or normative power despite considering itself a ‘natural member of the European family’.\textsuperscript{448} At the same time, however, it insists on its differences from Western Europe. Russia does not, for example, perceive itself as a defender of European values. It cannot compete with the EU on this

\textsuperscript{444}Jones and Clark, 'Europeanisation and Discourse Building: The European Commission, European Narratives and European Neighbourhood Policy,' (p 546
\textsuperscript{447}The Council of the EU adopted the eight ‘Guidelines’. Also, the EU adopted a number of instruments for the promotion of human rights and democracy. For more information see Commission, 'Report on EU Action on Human Rights and Democracy in the World', p 17-33.
\textsuperscript{448}Vladimir Putin, 'Russia – EU Partnership Crucial for United, Prosperous Europe ', RIA NOVOSTI, 2006.
ground. Its leaders have referred to “Russia’s sovereign democracy” which is ‘not much different from democratic practices of the Western countries’. \(^{449}\) In the meantime, Russia also emphasises its Christian values and traditions. It has tried to promote old values that are associated with its Tsarist heritage, especially values and norms stemming from Orthodox Christianity and traditional Russian culture. In February 2008, a documentary film entitled ‘The Destruction of the Empire: a Byzantine Lesson’, was aired by the Russian state TV channel. The film was repeated and followed by 45-minutes of discussion and debate which came to the conclusion that Russia ‘could exist only as an Orthodox empire’. \(^{450}\) That is Russia in the light of norms and values which highlight Orthodox values. For Andrei Piontkovsky, ‘Russia’s next civilizational clash will be rooted in religion and culture’. \(^{451}\) The constitution defines Russia as a secular state with Islam, Judaism and Buddhism as traditional religions alongside Orthodox Christianity.

**Economic Capability as Context**

When it comes to the concept of power, economic capability is one of the most significant factors in terms of foreign economic relations. The ability to act on the international stage depends very much on economic capability.

‘Our size and interests dictate that we play a central role in the world. Consider this fact: the European Union accounts for almost 30 per cent of the gross world product. In comparative economic terms this makes us equivalent to the United States or to the rest of the world, excluding Japan. Moreover, we are the most important trading partner in the world, with substantial economic links to every other region’. Javier Solana, 2002 \(^{452}\)

The EU discourse focuses on the economic capabilities of its member states and how it has become one of the largest economies in the world. It emphasises the EU as a single market with member-states, a major world trading power with sustainable economic development, and, in terms of goods and services, its GDP is (in 2012) bigger than the US.

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\(^{450}\) The Economist, 'Russia and Its History: A Byzantine Sermon', *the Economist*, (Feb. 2008).

\(^{451}\) Andrei Piontkovsky, 'East or West? Russia's Identity Crisis in Foreign Policy', (2010), p vi

economy. In the last two decades, the EU has achieved an unprecedented level of economic, financial, legal and political integration. This deep-rooted integration has underpinned its role as an international actor simultaneously leading it to become an economic giant. This power has encouraged the EU to punch above its weight on the international stage.

The exertion of great influence in world politics has been confirmed by many EU political leaders. In addition to Barros’ views, Catherine Ashton, in addressing the European Parliament before her formal appointment as a Higher Representative, emphasised that the EU should do more to ‘punch its weight politically’. We find the EU present at G8 and G20, along with the biggest economic blocs, pursuing a competitive economic policy with the likes of Russia and China. The EU puts considerable emphasis on partnership with economic groups such as Asian and other economic forums. This feature has been discussed by diverse scholars who conclude that this practice has enabled the EU to gain considerable meaning and presence in the domain of economic power.

Russia during the late Soviet and Yeltsin periods had no significant economic advantages to compare with economic giants such as the US, the EU and China. Since the coming of Putin, Russia has prioritised the enhancement of its economy. The foreign policy concept in 2000 states that:

‘The main priority in the foreign policy of the Russian Federation in international economic relations is to promote the development of the national economy, which, in conditions of globalization, is unthinkable without broad

454 Michele Knodt, Understanding the European Union's External Relations (29: Routledge, 2003). P. 1
455 In its strategy paper entitled: Wider Europe—Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours (2003), the EU emphasised the reality of its economic power and how it could change the shape of its political and economic relations with others in the world. The paper stated that “An enlarged Union of 25 countries, with a combined population of more than 450 million and GDP of almost 10000 billion, will fundamentally increase the political, geographic and economic weight of the EU on the European continent.” This paper arose from an exchange of views between Chris Patten and Javier Solana sent as a joint letter to the Council of the EU. See Commission, ‘Wider Europe—Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with Our Eastern and Southern Neighbours’, (and Chris Patten, ‘Joint Letter on Wider Europe by Commissioner Chris Patten and High Representative Solana, 08.08. 2002’. See online: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/0130163334_001_en.pdf (last access: 06.04. 2008), (2002).
integration of Russia in the system of world economic ties’. 458

Under Putin’s leadership, Russia’s foreign policy has focused on enhancing and reinforcing its economic capabilities to compete with other economic powers and enhance its ability to play a global role in designing and drawing-up world politics. Lavrov stresses that Russia’s foreign policy has been drawn up to ‘create favourable external conditions for the economic development of the country and improvement of the life of the Russian citizens’. 459 Russian foreign policy is balanced between the quest for regaining greatness and the need to realise the prosperity of Russian citizens. Russia is striving to achieve prosperity for her citizens along with stable economic growth which can prevent a relative collapse such as happened to the Soviet Union.

Accordingly, Russia has become a member of the Group of Eight. It justifies this membership in light of the speed of its ‘integration into the world economy and the creation of favourable external conditions for the economic and social development’. 460 For Russia, G8 is an opportunity to realise Russian interests and to promote Russian approaches to a number of priority global problems such as ‘international energy security’. 461 In addition, in 2009, Russia participated in establishing BRICS, as an international forum, to encourage commercial, economic, political and cultural cooperation between China, Brazil, India and South Africa. 462

Military Power as Context

Russia, contrary to the EU, clearly sees its economic development and its ‘greatness’ as very much associated with its military muscle. Putin says:

‘We will not be able to strengthen our international standing, develop our economy and democratic institutions, unless we are able to protect Russia’. 463

The military-industrial sector is one which Russia prioritises in terms of support and development. Putin frequently encourages the global audience to focus on Russia’s position

458 Concept, 'The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation',
459 Lavrov, 'Interview with German Magazine.'
461 Ibid.
462 See http://www.bricsforum.org/, accessed on 01/12/2013.
in world politics as a nuclear superpower. Russia’s Self-perception is that being a nuclear superpower in the context of nuclear military power gives Russia a rightful place in the comity of nations. Putin often underlines the importance of respecting a strong Russia. Medvedev has also emphasised the significance of Russia’s military power. He has said that Russia ‘will be well-armed. Well enough so that it does not occur to anyone to threaten us or our allies’. Military capabilities play an important role in Russia’s foreign policy and her international relations. Russia is keen to frame its international relations in the context of its military capabilities.

On the other side, the EU, under the European Security and Defence Policy, has designed its unified military structure, but, at the same time, it emphasises its strategic partnership with NATO in which most of its member states are members. Thus, European Security and Defence Identity were run under NATO which has been serving its security and defence purposes. The EU discourse of capabilities in this context focuses on the EU-NATO cooperation in crisis management. In 2003, the EU launched its first-ever peacekeeping mission in Macedonia, Operation Concordia. Since then, the EU has increased its military presence through launching some 30 peace missions and operations inside Europe and beyond. In contrast to Russia, the EU stresses the normative purposes of its military capabilities in spreading peace and conflict prevention.

Soft Power as Context

‘We act. Supporting the forces of hope. Fighting the causes of worry. And very concretely so. With means and money. The European Union is the world’s largest donor of development aid and a major donor of climate finance for the poorest nations’. Herman Van Rompuy, 2011. The EU has presented itself as a perceived successful master of ‘Soft Power’. At European level, the EU has succeeded in implementing a swift and smooth transformation in Central and Eastern Europe. The discourse in this regard focuses on

464 Medvedev, ‘Go, Russia!’,
enlargement as the clearest empirical success of its so-called soft power.\textsuperscript{468} Moreover, in the Balkans the EU’s efforts have been perceived as proof of its soft power\textsuperscript{469} since it managed to overcome acute political polarisation among the key players in that troubled region. That policy has built a kind of acceptable rules of the game among the key players by using soft power.

At world level, the perception of soft power has been enhanced by the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty which states that ‘supporting developing countries’ efforts to eradicate poverty is the primary objective of development policy and a priority for EU external action in support of the EU’s interests for a stable and prosperous world.\textsuperscript{470} Accordingly, the EU has become the largest donor of development aid and climate finance. EuropeAid has delivered aid through programs and projects in about 19 themes across the world.\textsuperscript{471} It delivers aid through a set of financial instruments that ensure EU effectiveness at external level.\textsuperscript{472} Moreover, the EU is represented through 139 EU delegations and offices around the world as well as running 10 civilian missions in conflict zones. These delegations and civilian missions underpin the EU presence and reinforce its influence globally.

In comparison, Russia has tried to revive the USSR approach by focusing on Culture and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs).\textsuperscript{473} From the Russian perspective, Culture and

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item\textsuperscript{468} Heather Grabbe, 'Europeanization Goes East: Power and Uncertainty in the EU Accession Process', \textit{The politics of Europeanization}, 27 (2003), 303-29.
\item\textsuperscript{469} Othon Anastasakis, 'Europeanization of the Balkans, The', \textit{Brown J. World Aff.}, 12 (2005), 77.
\item\textsuperscript{471} Such themes have included “children and youth, civil society and local authorities, culture, democracy, economic support, education, employment, social protection, energy, environment, fighting hunger, gender, quality, governance, health, human rights, infrastructure and transport, migration, millennium development goals, rural and agricultural development and security and conflict”. See \url{http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/index_en.htm} , accessed on 20/08/2013.
\item\textsuperscript{472} This set of financial instruments varies between geographic instruments (such as the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), the European Development Fund (EDF), and the Development Co-operation Instrument (DCI), and thematic instruments (such as the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), the Nuclear Safety Co-operation Instrument (NSCI), the environment and sustainable management of natural resources including energy, non-state actors and local authorities in development, food security, migration and asylum, investing in people, EU food facility, the instrument for stability and restructuring of sugar production. See \url{http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/index_en.htm}, accessed on 20/08/2013.
\item\textsuperscript{473} In 1975, the former Soviet Union operated 108 societies, associations and institutions associated with culture and friendship relations, and established contact with 7500 organisations and workers associations in
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Art are very important elements in constructing an international identity. Andrei Kokoshin argues that it is impossible for Russia to be a great power without ‘a cultural civilizational identity’.\(^{474}\) At its periphery, Russia has developed a network of relations with the Commonwealth of Independent states (CIS). This is based on an ‘infrastructure of ideas, institutions, networks and media outlets’.\(^{475}\) It has financed many NGOs and think-tanks that engage in activities which serve and enhance Russia’s influence within the CIS.\(^{476}\)

In 2000 Russia’s foreign policy concept pointed to the promotion of a positive perception of Russia as a key objective, therefore, the 2007 Russian foreign policy survey increasingly referenced Soft Power in the discussion on the need to diversify Russia’s foreign policy network in terms of cooperation in Culture, Science, parliamentary diplomacy and the international activity of civil society institutions.\(^{477}\) Thus, Russia focuses on Culture and NGOs as elements of Soft Power.\(^{478}\) The survey relied heavily on cultural initiatives and NGOs as instruments of Russia’s foreign policy\(^{479}\) so the discourse focussed primarily on Culture and Art. Putin stressed the need for culture in reinforcing Russia’s international relations:

“Russia has a great cultural heritage, recognized both in the West and the East. But we have yet to make a serious investment in our culture and its promotion around the world. The surge in global interest in ideas and culture, sparked by the merger of societies and economies in the global information network, provides new opportunities for Russia, with its proven talent for creating cultural objects. Russia has a chance not only to preserve its culture but to use it as a powerful force for progress in international markets.” V. Putin\(^{480}\)

Putin is increasingly interested in using soft instruments and smooth policies to construct interrelated contexts to underpin Russia’s influence in the world. In 2003, Russia celebrated the 300th anniversary of St. Petersburg. Putin considered this event as a sign

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476 Ibid.

477 Russia, ‘A Survey of Russian Federation Foreign Policy’

478 Russia, ‘A Survey of Russian Federation Foreign Policy’


that Russia ‘has risen from its knees and is being born anew’. In furtherance of this policy, Russia was an assiduous host at large international cultural events in order to change and construct a new Russian image. Besides Putin, Sergay Lavrov, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, is an advocate of using Culture, Art and NGOs as instruments to underpin Russian diplomacy. For Paul de Quincey, Russian Director of the British Council, culture is one of the main elements which can play a role in underpinning ‘diplomacy and business ties by making it easier to take advantage of opportunities’. In tune with this idea, Russia has established or renewed a number of cultural centres, NGOs and media outlets to enhance Russia’s positive image around the world; some of these bodies are the Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society (IOPS), Russia Today (RT) and the voice of Russia (RUVR).

The EU seeks to play a role as a peace-maker in many conflict zones. Peace is at the core of the EU discourse on both the internal and the external levels. The Nice Council Meeting states that:

‘…the European Union will be able to carry out the full range of Petersberg tasks as defined in the Treaty on European Union: humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking’.

This is how the EU manifests its international identity as a peace protector, encourager and creator. The EU Self-perception of peacemaking rests on its long history as a peace project and rich experience of engagement in mediation and dialogue processes. This perception has been developed and promoted as a part of the EU security strategy, in other words, the perception of peace has been built on the foundation of ‘prevention engagement or preventive policy’. This implies that peace policies create better environments in terms of security, trade and economy. The strategy states that ‘preventive engagement can avoid more serious problems in the future’. Accordingly, the EU has endorsed many policies that came under the foundation of prevention engagement.

482 Paul De Quincey, ‘The Role of Culture in International Relations’, accessed 21/11/2013
484 There are many issues that the EU has found itself forced to take action as a global player: the war in the Balkans, the war in Kosovo and supporting the Central and Eastern European countries in their democratic evolution or transformation. See Simon W Duke and Aurélie Courtier, EU Peacebuilding: Concepts, Players and Instruments (Centre for the Law of EU External Relations (CLEER), 2009).
Solana in 2006 said that ‘if you don’t like preventive wars, you must develop preventive policies’. In this context, the EU sees its peace, prosperity and stability lie in a secure environment within and outside its borders. This view has been adopted within the European security strategy in which the promotion of human rights, democracy, spreading good governance, underpinning social and political reform, supporting transparency standards, fighting both corruption and the abuse of power and establishing the rule of law are the best means of strengthening the international order.

On the other hand, the Lisbon Treaty has enhanced the EU’s capacity in peace-building, mediation and prevention of conflict. Within this context, peacemaking has become one of the key features of EU foreign policy. The EU established a program for the prevention of violent conflicts, adopted a concept to strengthen EU mediation and dialogue capacities, launched the Instrument for Stability (IfS) in 2007, and created a conflict prevention, a peace building and a mediation instruments division within the European External Action Service (EEAS) to support its mediation capacity. Moreover, the EU has currently (2012) ten Special Representatives (EUSPs) in different conflict zones and troubled regions. This feature gained special recognition when the EU won the 2012 Nobel Peace Prize. In order to embody the perception of actorness, the EU seeks to be involved in a variety of activities around the world. Solana seems to hold a strong belief that ‘being on the ground has helped the European Union to play a greater political role, including in preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution’.

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Russia has a different approach to peace-making and conflict resolution. No doubt Russia is eager to enhance its image in the world as a peacemaker, but only under United Nation Security Council (UNSC) authority. It insists that the use of force on the world scene ‘should be possible only when authorised by the UN Security Council’. In Russia’s 2000’s foreign policy concept, strong emphasis was placed on peacemaking under the UN umbrella. It states that:

‘Russia regards international peacemaking as an effective instrument for resolving armed conflicts, and calls for the strengthening of its legal foundation in strict accordance with the principles in the U.N. Charter…. The need for and degree of such participation shall be measured against the national interests and international commitments of our country. Russia proceeds from the premise that only the U.N. Security Council has the authority to sanction use of force for the purpose of achieving peace’.492

In this discourse, peace-making is limited to Russian national interests. Russia perceives its participation in peacekeeping missions as an objective that ‘would strengthen the case for demands, corresponding to Russian interests’. It has taken part in about 15 peace-keeping missions under the UN umbrella. Russia sees the UN as ‘a universal forum endowed with a unique legitimacy’. As a permanent member of this forum, Russia is very keen to activate its participation in UN activities that would realise its ‘national interests’. In light of this quest, Russia has defined her diplomatic mission to the UN as to:

‘Ensure our weighty representation in the bodies determining UN policies in questions of management, budgetary planning, financing, procurement activities and so on’. 497

Russia places more focus on participating in UN activities which enable it to influence world processes and to secure its power status. This discourse on peace-making is aware of benefits that could be gained through such activities. The discourse emphasises the viability of considerable potential for Russia to play a role in such multilateral efforts.

With the coming of Putin to power, Russia is asserting its global actorness by using its

491 Russia, ‘A Survey of Russian Federation Foreign Policy.’
492 Concept, The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation) ,
493 Russia, ‘A Survey of Russian Federation Foreign Policy.’
494 Vladimir Putin, ‘Interview with Bbc Television and Radio Company ,
495 Russia, ‘A Survey of Russian Federation Foreign Policy.’
496 Ibid.
497 Ibid.
permanent membership at the UNSC. From 2000 to 2012, Russia used its veto in the Security Council eight times. Putin seeks to re-brand Russia as a superior country so we find Russia using its permanent membership of the UN Security Council as a counter force to US domination there. It sees itself as an ‘independent’ global actor on a par with the US and China. Putin has shown this desire to maintain and reinforce Russia’s place among the comity of nations. At the Munich Conference (2007), he condemned the US building of a unipolar system which from his perspective undermined ‘world security’.498

4.3 An Opportunity between “Neighbourhood” and “Multi-victor” Policy: Wider Political and Geostrategic Vision

For both the EU and Russia, looking for opportunities to increase influence, first in their immediate environs and then extending it to other spheres, is a key object to accommodate nominated actorness. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, both the new Russia and the EU sought opportunities to underpin their influence. While the EU sought to spillover towards Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), Russia established the Commonwealth Independent States (CIS). The EU seized this opportunity and succeeded in attracting most of the CEE states to join its club, whereas Russia succeeded in maintaining and restoring the former Soviet Union influence in the Caucasus and central Asian countries. Identity and Self-Other perception played a vital role in these movements of attraction and recentralisation. The EU perceived the Central and Eastern European states as a natural geostrategic sphere with which they shared many things in common while these states perceived themselves as European in terms of geography, a shared history and a need for stability, security and prosperity which they saw as linked to the EU. In comparison, Russia has portrayed the former Soviet republics as a natural and historical geostrategic sphere to accommodate its desire for regional actorness. For that reason, Russia adopted the ‘Near Abroad’ policy to enhance their influence and reaffirm its regional actorness and dominance.

The coming of Putin to power brought a new dimension to Russia’s foreign policy. Russia has begun to play ‘an entirely different role’ which is determined by ‘the multivector character of Russian foreign policy’.499 Russia’s foreign policy is diversified and oriented

498 Daği Zeynep, ‘Russia: Back to the Middle East?’, ( p 123.
499Igor Ivanov, 'Russia in Asia and Asia in Russia '',
towards ‘a balanced development of relations with the countries of the West and East, and North and South’. It focuses on building Russia’s capabilities by integration in the world economic and political system. It centres on creating an external environment that underpins and enhances Russia’s ability to diversify its international relations.

According to the 2007 Russian foreign policy survey, ‘multilateral diplomacy’ is the key method of governing Russia’s international relations ‘at global and regional level’. This method has implications for foreign policy-making. Accordingly, Robert H. Donaldson and Joseph L. Nogee, argue that Russia ‘has pursued balance-of-power’ which imply measures taken by Russia to enhance its power by ‘whatever means are available’. The Survey points out a number of premises that guide Russia’s international relations, namely, that Russia’s foreign policy proceeds from Russian national interests that constitute vital requirements for Russia and its citizens, that the firmness of Russia’s international position hinges on its internal strength and that the security of Russia cannot be isolated from its security and stability in a global and regional context. Based on these premises Russia is looking for opportunities to reinforce its global actorness. The Survey states that:

‘The qualitatively new situation in international relations creates favorable opportunities for our intellectual leadership in a number of areas of world politics. In other words, it is about Russia’s active participation not only in carrying out the international agenda, but also in shaping it’.

The discourse shows that changes in international relations have created opportunities for Russia to lead and be a key player in shaping world politics. It builds on the belief that Russia’s stability, security and prosperity, based on its active role on the international stage, helps to create a favourable external environment.

The EU responded to the prospect of decisions on enlargement taken in 2002. The European Council invited the Commissioner Christopher Patten and the Higher Representative Javier Solana to work on ideas related to neighbouring countries. The joint memo by Patten and Solana to the Council drew attention to the geostrategic dimension in

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500 Sergey Lavrov, ‘Interview with Al-Ahram Newspaper’.
501 Ivanov, ‘Russia in Asia and Asia in Russia’.
502 Russia, ‘A Survey of Russian Federation Foreign Policy.’
504 Russia, ‘A Survey of Russian Federation Foreign Policy.’
the EU’s external relations with its geographical proximity. The memo introduced the concept of a ‘Wider Europe’ as a framework of EU relations with neighbouring countries. The discourse of a ‘Wider Europe’ points to different domains. These include the EU presence in geographical context which needs actions to be taken\(^{505}\), an opportunity offered by enlargement to achieve the EU’s interests and objectives and the capability of the EU for developing a new range of policies towards its neighbouring countries, which is a discourse of actorness. Moreover, the communication states that:

‘Over the coming decade and beyond, the Union’s capacity to provide security, stability and sustainable development to its citizens will no longer be distinguishable from its interest in close cooperation with the neighbours…. The neighboring countries are the EU’s essential partners: to increase our mutual production, economic growth and external trade, to create an enlarged area of political stability and functioning rule of law, and to foster the mutual exchange of human capital, ideas, knowledge and culture’. EU Commission, 2003\(^{506}\)

This Self-perception, proved by opinion polls in 2006 and 2007, show that EU citizens tend to have a positive perception of relations with neighbouring countries.\(^{507}\) Thus, EU Self-presentation in its policies towards its neighbours shows the EU’s centralist tendency even as the discourse shows the ‘centrality’ of the EU as a source of action which falls into identity-oriented policies.\(^{508}\) Hence, the EU discourse in dealing with its neighbours is characterised by the desire of actorness in its geographical sphere as a part of identity construction. Within this discourse, the EU has launched ‘the Neighbourhood Policy’

\(^{505}\) In its communication ‘Wider Europe-Neighborhood: a new framework for relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbors’, March 2003, the Commission presented its vision of enlargement. The vision falls into Bretherton and Vogler’s three categories of the construction of actorness. The communication focuses on: the new geographical sphere as a presence when it states that: ‘Enlargement gives new impetus to the effort of drawing closer to the 385 million inhabitants of the countries who will find themselves on the external land and sea border, namely Russia, the Western NIS [New Independent States: Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus] and the Southern Mediterranean’; an opportunity when it points out that ‘the Union should take the opportunity offered by enlargement to enhance relations with its neighbours on the basis of shared values’; and capability with ‘for developing a new range of policies towards these countries, defined overall goals and principles and identified possible incentives’. See Commission, ‘Wider Europe–Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with Our Eastern and Southern Neighbours’, ( p 2 &3.

\(^{506}\) Ibid.


\(^{508}\) The EU discourse towards neighboring countries uses a number of words that refer to the meaning of ‘centrality’ such as ‘the EU must act, the EU has a duty. ….’. See document COM(2003) 104, p3.
and set up various financial instruments and a number of action plans. These action plans are bilateral which entails an agreement between the EU and its partner countries. Every action plan sets out an economic and political agenda with selected priorities. Action plans constitute a reform agenda within the context of the EU’s vision underlies the Self-Other perception.

In the context of reinforcing their actorness, both the EU and Russia increased their focus on the Middle East and Mediterranean Sea as a geostrategic nerve centre of world politics. Historically, the Sea has witnessed many wars among many powers all attempting to control this geostrategic region. Seven EU member-states are part of the Mediterranean coastline while Russia has sea borders with two countries in the Middle East, Turkey and Iran. More than this simple fact of geography, both the EU and Russia have deep historical, cultural and economic bonds with this region. Thus, the Middle East poses an opportunity for Russia and the EU to enhance their actorness and influence on the world scene.

4.4 Conclusion

In this chapter I argue that the EU’s and Russia’s construction of an international identity is affected by a number of internal and external developments. These developments influence the making of foreign policy by both actors. I focus on understanding the construction of the EU’s and Russia’s international identity in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Within this wide context, I discuss how the EU strives to construct a new international position, and the post-Soviet Russia struggles to secure the former international position of the USSR. Through the discussion, I find that playing an active role in world politics is motivated by the experience of actorness that is rooted in history, and the desire to overcome the past. On the Russian side, the internal developments arising from the breakup of the USSR, have influenced Russia’s construction of a new international identity. Russia emphasises the recovery of its economy, strengthening its territorial integrity, and securing its internal security. Overcoming the weaknesses and securing its position as a legal successor to the former Soviet Union have driven its foreign policy-making on the international stage. On the EU side, the building of EU global

509 The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), which was launched in 2004, has been developed to create a “ring of friends surrounding the Union and its closest European neighbours, from Morocco to Russia and the Black Sea”. It aims to promote stability, security, prosperity and well-being within and beyond the new borders of the EU.
actorness has been influenced by the historical transformations that have happened in Europe over the last 60 years: from destructive world war to the Union as a reconciliation and peace project. These developments have created a sense of actorness that has been influenced by internal developments.

Based on these roots of Self-perception, I have contextualised the perception of actorness of the EU and Russia which is based on a variety of capabilities that are reflected in the design of foreign policies by both. The EU discourse of capabilities relies on its normative, civilian, economic and stabilising powers that constitute domains within the EU which can boost and further its visibility and presence on the international stage. The emerged Self-perception through these contexts lies at the heart of EU foreign policy-making. Russia focuses on its position as the legal successor of the former Soviet Union, military capabilities, gas and oil assets and permanent membership at UNSC. Accordingly, both actors have developed strategies and policies to enhance their influence and underpin their actorness in world politics. The EU has developed a wide range of institutional and intra-EU coordination policies such as HR-CFSP and ENP. With Putin coming to power, Russia’s foreign policy placed a major emphasis on securing actorness status in world politics by increasing the focus on restoring the influence and dominance of the former Soviet spheres which became known as the ‘Putin Doctrine’. It focuses on restoring Russia’s position as one of the most influential centres in the world. Accordingly, the constructed Self-perception plays a major role in defining the process of peace-making towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
CHAPTER FIVE
PERCEPTION OF THE MIDDLE EAST IN CONTEXTS:
PROMOTING THE EU’S AND RUSSIA’S ROLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

Focus
The argument in this chapter is threefold. Firstly, it focuses on the importance of the Middle East from EU and Russian perspectives as well as changes that affected their perception and the region as well. Secondly, it contextualises the EU’s and Russia’s perceptions of the Middle East concentrating on four areas: security and strategic stability, economic and technological cooperation and trade relations, energy provider and stabiliser, and historical, cultural and religious ties. The emphasis here is on the perception of Otherness constructed within different contexts which possess the most employable capabilities that assert actorness. The third part is a comparative analysis of these contexts in relation to internal developments and external expectations. This chapter looks at how the importance and challenges of the Middle East are perceived that help widen understanding of the policy-making of the EU and Russia towards a peace settlement.

5.1 The Middle East as an Opportunity: The Importance and Challenges for the EU and Russia
How is the Self-Other perception revealed in the interpretations of the Middle East as an opportunity? In this regard, readings of changes in the world order and of the rise of new global actors are subject to Self-Other perception. During the first decade of the new Millennium many events affected the course of Middle East politics. The failure of the Camp David II summit between the Palestinians and Israelis, and the eruption of the second Intifadah in 2000, the events of 9/11, the results of the so-called “War On Terrorism” and the following events such as the war on Afghanistan and Iraq, the removal of Sadam from power, America’s troubles in both countries, the crisis of capitalism in 2008 and the rise of new global economic actors such China, India, Brazil and South Africa as well as the “Arab Spring”, have affected the course of policy-making in this region.
These changes and fluctuations have caused fluidity in the making of Middle East politics, which has posed a challenge to all international players but especially to the US. The US has faced serious challenges in attempting to maintain its influence in the Middle East. These challenges created an opportunity for old international players to take up their previous roles in the region. The discourse of the EU and Russia has come to this reality with added emphasis on the necessity of seizing this opportunity. Barroso, the President of the European Commission, said:

‘The world is at a turning point. So is Europe. Our action now will determine the vitality of the European model of society for future generations’.

Lavrov, the Russian Foreign Minister, in turn, has focused on the need for Russia to seize this opportunity. He said:

‘Today the world is changing rapidly…. This opens a new “window of opportunity” for developing international relations’.

The EU and Russia perceive these changes in world politics as an opportunity which should be seized to secure their visibility and influence. In their view the US is declining especially in an important region like the Middle East. Thus, both want to enhance and underpin their global actorness in the Middle East.

EU involvement in the Middle East can be traced back to the European Political Cooperation (EPC) which agreed on a collective action in the Middle East conflict. With the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, the EU gradually increased its involvement in Middle Eastern politics. The Barcelona Declaration at the 1995 Euro-Mediterranean Conference constituted a focal point comprising the normative bases upon which European foreign policy is formulated. It places prime emphasis on political, security, economic, financial,

511 Barroso, ‘Political Guidelines for the Next Commission’, (512 Sergey Lavrov, ‘International Relations in a Turbulence Zone: Where Are the Points of Support’, Russia’s Diplomatic Yearbook, (2011). (513 For three decades following the creation of Israel in 1948, the Middle East witnessed many wars between Israel and Arab states in which the Middle East remained outside the European Community’s primary scope of interest. Europe had left the area to US influence. During this period EC member states emphasised internal European relations and enlarge the EU towards Western European countries and created the Western European Union and then took in the central and eastern European states especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
social, cultural and human affairs partnerships.\textsuperscript{514} This involvement has developed to reflect EU Self-perception through the course of enlargement.

The massive enlargement at the onset of the 21\textsuperscript{st} century had powerful effects on the EU discourse on the Middle East.\textsuperscript{515} In preparing for the biggest enlargement, in 2004, new geostrategic dimension emerged and, consequently, the EU discourse began to address its place and mission in this new sphere. For Steven Everts, the Middle East is ‘not only a priority but also a test case’ in the light of the EU’s growing foreign policy ambitions.\textsuperscript{516}

Thus, perception of the Middle East is largely influenced by European self-perception in terms of prosperity, security and stability on the one hand and how the EU perceives its place and mission on the world scene on the other. In this regard, the EU designed the ‘European Neighbourhood Policy’ (ENP) on the basis of which the EU has extended its influence in the Middle East.

The ENP constitutes a new strategy of widening the EU influence in the countries around Europe, especially the Middle Eastern ones. For Alun Jones ‘the “making” of a “Mediterranean region” is an actor-centred, open-ended process through which the Europeanization of space is sought’.\textsuperscript{517} \textsuperscript{518} Thus, EU capability in terms of its normative, political and economic power on the one hand and potential opportunities on the other, plays a role in the Middle East and informs its foreign policy. The ENP reveals the EU’s

\textsuperscript{514} The Barcelona Declaration (The Euro-Mediterranean initiative) was congruent with the Maastricht Treaty (1992) in which European values and principles were declared. The Declaration was not about aid development, but aimed to reinforce and accelerate the Euro-Mediterranean relations in the course of partnership. In the preamble, the Declaration expresses “the will to give their future relations a new dimension, based on comprehensive cooperation and solidarity”. The Euro-Mediterranean initiative addresses Mediterranean countries in terms of trade and economic interests, political and social reform, and security threats. In addition, it places an emphasis on aid instruments to reach a peace settlement between Palestinians and Israelis. Inside this equation, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict poses a high level of challenge to the EU. It states the support of “the realization of a just, comprehensive and lasting peace settlement in the Middle East”. See R Grupp, ‘The Barcelona Declaration of Research Principles’. (Retrieved, 2011).

\textsuperscript{515} This European discourse towards the ME has been generated by three main European institutions: the European Commission, the Council of the EU and the European Parliament. All of these institutions certainly played a role in shaping and implementing this policy in an integrated process among them. The document released by these institutions provides close insights about the real motivations for the Middle East peace process.

\textsuperscript{516} Steven Everts, The EU and the Middle East: A Call for Action (Centre for European Reform London, 2003). p 1.


\textsuperscript{518} A number of scholars call the EU policy which projects the European norms, values and standards towards outside countries in its periphery and beyond, “Europeanization”. 

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attempt to create privileged forms of close relationships with its neighbours, irrespective of what their historical relation had been.

This discourse has been translated into a massive presence on economic, security and normative terms. It can also be seen as a response to expectations and aspirations of being under the EU umbrella and anticipation of both member states and citizens to meet global challenges in today’s world. Mainly, the policy is about making Euro-Mediterranean borders work better in responding to EU member states’ citizens’ concerns for security, stability and prosperity.  

From Russia’s side, an important shift took place in the whole of Russia’s foreign policy, particularly in the Middle East, reflecting the Self-Other perception newly born in the post-Soviet era. The perception of the Middle East changed visibly from Yeltsin to Putin. During the Yeltsin period, the role of the new Russia in the Middle East was marginalised due to internal instability, and political and economic transformation. Roland Dannreuther, however, argues that, at the beginning of the Yeltsin period, Self-perception in terms of economic and strategic weakness on the world scene forced Russia to articulate a policy which would be thoroughly differentiated from traditional Soviet policy towards the Middle East. Dannreuther points out that Russian interests lie more in ‘cooperation than confrontation with the West’. The Self-perception that emerged in that period led to the absence of Russia as a global actor in the Middle East process.

In 1996, when Primakov became foreign minister, Russia started to construct a more visible presence in this region. He succeeded in establishing a ‘policy of balances’. Russia has consistently seen itself as a global actor on the international stage with the right to have a significance role in the region. Thus, the shift in Russia’s foreign policy towards

522 Ibid. p 347.
523 Ibid. p 347.
more engagement in the Middle East started with the need to reinforce its influential status on the international stage as an active global actor. This engagement increased with Putin’s coming to power.

Russia has increasingly looked for an active role in Middle East politics aiming to reassert Russian influence in the region. Russia nowadays puts emphasis on balancing its policy towards all parties. It re-designates friends and foes in the Middle East. In this process, the new Russia goes beyond the “communist” perception of the different parties to the conflict. For Leon Aron, Russia has increased its visibility in the Middle East on the basis of ‘the cultivation and protection of former Soviet client’. That is, Russia wants to secure and develop what the Soviet Union used to enjoy in the Middle East, much, if not most of which is, according to Aron, ‘as counterbalance of the United States’. In the same way, Rand group argues that Russia’s foreign policy towards the Middle East was driven by a belief that Russia, as a “great power”, ‘should play a role in such an important region’. Which is to say that Russia wants to translate its past relations and historical ties with the Middle Eastern countries into a real influence that enhances its position as a global actor.

Therefore, to both Russia and the EU, partnership with Middle Eastern countries is strategic, and the choice, as stated by Solana, Barroso, Putin and Lavrov among others, is not whether to have strategic relations with the Middle East, but simply what form those relations might take. The importance of the region influenced the discourse of the EU and Russia and forced them to rethink and revisit their framework and approaches to the region. Lavrov underlines the importance of the Middle East and asserts that Russia ‘never departed from this strategic area’ considering it as a ‘vector of Russian foreign policy’

525 Aron, ‘Structure and Context in US-Russian Relations at the Outset of Barack Obama’s Second Term’, (p. 3.
526 Ibid. p. 3.
527 Olga Oliker et al., Russian Foreign Policy: Sources and Implications (Rand Corporation, 2009). p. 113.
528 Russia is working to reinforce its relationships with the Middle East countries to maintain its influence in such an important region. Russia sees itself as the successor to the Soviet Union and its legacy in the Middle East. Thus, Russia maintains good relations with a number of Middle Eastern countries such as Iran, and Syria, with Russia being the only considerable broker between the West and both countries. In the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Russia preserve good links with both parties. Even in the Palestinian camp, Russia maintains good relations with both main Palestinian factions, Fatah and Hamas. Therefore, Russia is very keen to focus on building and ensuring its great-power status in the region. See Oliker et al., Russian Foreign Policy: Sources and Implications. p. 113-15.
while witnessing an appreciable increment in ‘the most diverse fields’. In contrast, the EU position has been elaborated as part of ‘wider Europe framework’ in which their Self-perception as a global actor is predicated on the premise that ‘if you don’t like preventive wars, you must develop preventive policies’. For Solana, the region of the Mediterranean is an area of ‘major importance and opportunity for Europe’.

Russia has revised its policy towards the Middle East which is framed within the geostrategic direction in which its involvement as an actor is ‘an indispensable component and an important tool for ensuring the national interests of Russia’. Thus, it could be argued that, the developments in Self-perception of the EU and Russia during the last decade have influenced their perception of the Middle East, which has become an even more geostrategic space of concern in different contexts. These contexts largely depend on how the Middle East is perceived in terms of Otherness by both Russia and the EU.

5.2 Perception of the Middle East: Contexts of Importance and Challenges

‘With the Mediterranean Arab countries, Europe has a partnership which covers political and security dialogue, economic relations, including the creation a free trade area, and social and human relations ... The main objective of the EU in its relations with the Arab World is to promote prosperity, peace and stability, thereby not only contributing to the welfare and security of the region, but also to its own security. Problems of terrorism and WMD originating there have a direct impact in Europe. In this context, the solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict is essential. There will be little chance of dealing fully with other problems in the Middle East until this conflict is resolved; such a resolution is therefore a strategic priority for the EU’. R. Prodi, J. Solana and C. Patten, 2003.

530 Solana, ‘Mediating Today's Conflicts for Tomorrow's Peace’.
‘Russia has historically strong ties with the region. Russian-Israeli relations in the political, economic, cultural and humanitarian spheres are dynamic. Our relations with the Arab world are wide-ranging in politics, economics, military-technical cooperation and cultural ties. And our contacts after the war in Iraq attest that the authority of Russia in the region is strengthening significantly. Many Middle East states expect that partnership with Russia, like partnership with other leading players, will eliminate the current ‘disbalance’ in the Middle East’.  

Through this discourse the Middle East has been perceived as a region of multi-layered interests and challenges: an area of interrelated economic relations, especially in trade and energy, an area of intersecting historical relations in terms of religion and civilization, an area of insecurity where threats of what so-called “terrorism” originate, as well as an area of instability with rather undemocratic and authoritarian regimes. For the EU, security, stability, energy and economic and trade relations are essential contexts in its relations with the Middle Eastern states, while Russia has extended these contexts to include religious ties and technology and military cooperation. Accordingly, the EU and Russia have redefined and re-contextualised the importance and challenges of the Middle Eastern region both in common and in different contexts in light of their perception of ‘Other’ which are mainly based on internal developments and external expectations. In other words, the Middle East is perceived as a vital sphere in two ways: Self-perception in the light of internal developments in the fields of prosperity, security and stability; and perception of the ‘Other’ in the light of external expectations in matters that enhance and underpin their actorness. These matters can be identified in a number of contexts:

**Context: Security and Strategic Stability**

Strategic concerns that relate to security and stability have played a salient role in the construction of EU and Russian foreign policy in the Middle East. The war in the North Caucus region, especially in Chechnya and Dagestan, and then 9/11 and the US-

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535 The problem of North Caucasus is perceived by Russia as a problem of identity and desire which has turned into one of secession. South Caucasus is very diverse and Salfist groups are the most active in claim in secession. Saudi Arabia is perceived as the main sources of fighters and the sponsor of war in this region. Therefore Russia pursues an official and public diplomacy to change its image in the Islamic world. This
declared “war on terrorism” have weighed heavily on Russian and EU perceptions of the Middle East. In the post 9/11 period, European and Russian discourse on security issues increasingly emphasised partnership against the so-called “war on terror”. In this context, the EU and Russia are similar in that they both perceive the Middle East as a source of threats and insecurity which have a direct effect on their territory. For Prodi, J. Solana and C. Patten, threats of terrorism and WMD originating in the Middle East have a direct effect in Europe. The Middle East, in which the EU and Russia interact in their own strategic interests, is perceived as an area of increasing insecurity and instability. Even Russia is much concerned about neighbouring countries’ security which could directly affect Russian internal security and could cause political instability and social unrest. Rikard Bengtsson argues that security matters play a major role in constructing the EU discourse towards neighbouring countries. So, in such areas of concern, perception of the Other defines the boundaries clearly on the two banks of the Mediterranean. This has been emphasised by the Barcelona Declaration and the European Security Strategy which focus on the security partnership between Europe and the Mediterranean countries.

The Declaration states that ‘all participants pledge to promote and strengthen security by all means at their disposal’. Similarly, the European Security Strategy in 2001 re-identifies the Middle East within this context. In the whole picture, mounting instability and insecurity due to a number of reasons such as increased levels of poverty, corruption, social injustice and autocratic governance, the failure of the Camp David II peace conference, the eruption of the second Palestinian Intifada, and the rise of non-state actors

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537 R. Prodi, 'Strengthening EU’s Relations with the Arab World'.
538 In approaching security matters in neighbouring countries, Rikard Bengtsson argues that the EU conceives itself as the motor of European security and built its Self–perception on the objective that increasing its neighbour’s prosperity, stability, and security lead directly to increasing its own and by helping its neighbours, it helps itself. See Rikard Bengtsson, ‘Constructing Interfaces: The Neighbourhood Discourse in EU External Policy’, European Integration, 30/5 (2008), 597-616.
have contributed to influence the EU’s perception of the Middle East. The discourse perceives the region as an area of political instability, authoritarian regimes, and humiliation of human dignity, the abuse of human rights and the absence of transparency and the rule of law.\textsuperscript{540} Within this context, the EU’s Self-perception as a normative power informs the design and implementation of policies that address these matters.

The Russian Foreign Policy Survey in 2007 refers to the Middle East as a ‘zone of destabilization’ within which, what it called, ‘ideas of Islamic fundamentalism’, have spread.\textsuperscript{541} Igor Khrestin and John Elliott argue that Chechnya is the single issue that most shapes Putin's thinking about the Middle East.\textsuperscript{542} In this context of stability and security, the Middle East is informed by the perception of the Self and Other. The Muslim population is estimated to be 15-20 million in the EU\textsuperscript{543} and about 20 million in Russia.\textsuperscript{544} The sectarian conflict in the Balkans which has led to NATO military intervention against the former Yugoslavia heavily affected Europe. Thus, the EU is much concerned about interrelations, especially in terms of security, with the Middle East countries which have directly affected the EU’s internal security and could create political instability and social unrest. In contrast, the wars in the North Caucasus seriously shook Russia leading to bloody conflict.\textsuperscript{545}

The Soviet experience in Afghanistan and Russia’s experience in the North Caucasus, created a sensitive and very worrying atmosphere, highlighting trans-border security problems that interconnect with cultural and religious relations with the Middle East. Russia’s National Security Strategy 2020 considers that social stability and ethnic and denominational harmony are essential to guarantee Russian national security.\textsuperscript{546} In this

\textsuperscript{541} Federation, ‘A Survey of Russian Federation Foreign Policy
\textsuperscript{542} Igor Khrestin and John Elliott, 'Russia and the Middle East', \textit{Middle East Quarterly}, VOLUME XIV: NUMBER 1 (Winter 2007), pp. 21-27.
regard, Russia aims to keep the North Caucasus and other Islamic republics in the Federation from becoming ‘an anti-Russian cause célèbre’ in the Middle East the way Afghanistan did in the 1980’s. Russia is worried about the connections between the Jihadist movements especially in the Caucasus area and their counterparts in the Middle Eastern countries. Security concerns and their spin-off are a top priority in Russian foreign policy-making. So Russia is working to undermine what is perceived as the sources of its security problems by focusing on terminating the support and cutting the links with state and non-state actors in the Middle East.

In relation to this, Russia encourages its state-Muslim institutions to participate in activities in the Middle East that could contribute towards softening tension and enhancing rapprochement with moderate Islamists in the Middle Eastern countries. Accordingly, the Russian Council of Muftis conducts dialogue with ‘moderate Islamists in the Middle East’. Russian policy focuses on minimising tension with Muslims inside and outside Russia. This policy is designed to undercut the growth of extremism and to undermine the possibility of providing a secure shelter to those groups from the Middle East that are considered a security threat to Russia. Also, Putin announced a turnaround in Russian policy towards the Islamic world when said that ‘Russia is a Muslim country as well’. For Shamil Sultanov, security is one of the driving forces behind Russia’s Middle East policy forcing it to seek a rapprochement with the Islamic world. Russia aims to remove the tension that increased with the first and second Chechnya wars and to create a network for lobbying, manipulating and harmonising interests in the Middle East. Practically, Russia has become an observer member of the Organization of the Islamic Conference

547 Mark Katz, 'Moscow and the Middle East: Repeat Performance?', Russia in Global Affairs, /003 (2012), 144-53.
548 Scholar Interview, 'Interview with Alexei Fenenko, Lead Researcher, the Institute for International Security Studies, Ras', (Moscow, 2013h).
549 Ibid.
550 Scholar Interview, 'Interview with Shamil Sultanov, President of the Center for Strategic Studies- Russia-the Islamic World ', (Moscow, 2013g).
551 Scholar Interview, 'Interview with Rushan Abayasov, Deputy Chairman, Head of Adminstartion, Russia Muftis Council', (Moscow, 2013f).
552 Interview, 'Interview with Alexei Fenenko, Lead Researcher, the Institute for International Security Studies, Ras'.
553 Rinat Mukhametov, 'Russian Muslims and Foreign Policy', Russia in Global Affairs, /003 (2012), 110-20.
554 Interview, 'Interview with Shamil Sultanov, President of the Center for Strategic Studies- Russia-the Islamic World '.
(now the Organization of Islamic Cooperation), and the Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (ISESCO). Also, Russia welcomed Hamas leaders to Moscow.

**Context: Economic and Technological Cooperation and Trade Relations**

The geostrategic position of the Middle East, linking Europe, Asia and Africa, give it an importance in world politics. This importance attracts most global actors to share benefits through playing an active role in this vibrant region. It is perceived as a highway and vibrant centre of world trade. It is not common for economic powers such as the EU and Russia to ignore this fact. In their discourse, both the EU and Russia have placed an emphasis on the importance of the Middle East as an opportunity in economic and trade terms. Russia’s main priority is the development of its national economy which, of course, must be integrated into the world economy, therefore, its foreign policy is designed to minimise any risks related to this.\(^555\) Russia intends to widen its capabilities by integrating with neighbouring economies. Removing obstacles that would burden the Russian economy and obstruct its growth and development is an important motivator behind Russian involvement in the Middle East.\(^556\)

Against this background, Sergey Demidenko argues that the Middle East is perceived as offering an opportunity to strengthen and raise the capabilities of Russia’s economy.\(^557\) According to this discourse, the priorities in the region are defined as ‘to restore and strengthen its position, particularly economic ones’.\(^558\) This view was confirmed by the 2007 Russian Foreign Policy Survey in which Russian involvement in the Middle East ‘appears to be an indispensable component and an important tool for ensuring the national interests of Russia’.\(^559\) The Survey recommended that the state ‘step up economic and energy diplomacy’ and embody Russian influence by creating financial and industrial structures to promote economic collaboration.\(^560\) Thus, Russia sees the Middle East as key to building its actorness through reinforcement of economic, technological, and military

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\(^555\) Concept, 'The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation'.
\(^556\) Scholar Interview, 'Interview with Vectoria Panova , Specialist in Russia Foreign Policy', (Moscow: Moscow State Institute of International Relations (UNIVERSITY) OF the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2013e).
\(^557\) Scholar Interview, 'Interview with Sergey Demidenko', in Higher School Of Economics (ed.), (Moscow, 2013d).
\(^558\) Concept, 'The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation'.
\(^559\) Federation, 'A Survey of Russian Federation Foreign Policy'.
\(^560\) Ibid.
ties. Putin has paid close attention to the Middle East as a foreign policy vector ever since the second term of his presidency. He extended Russia’s interests to enhance economic, technological and military ties with the Middle Eastern countries. Russia’s policy towards this vector is to establish qualitative ties in order to meet internal needs for security and prosperity. In 2005, Putin made the first historic visit to Israel, the Palestinian Authority and Egypt. In 2007, he made the first visit by a Russian President to Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates and Iran.  

For a long time Russia has been ‘the world’s second largest arms supplier’ to the Middle East, second only to the USA. And the Middle East is the second largest arms market for Russia with 14.2 percent. While Self –perception as an economic power affects the course of Russia’s policy towards the Middle East, military power, one of the main strengths which it inherited from the Soviet Union, plays an extra role in this policy. Keeping and developing such military capabilities, especially high-tech weaponry, needs new markets. Russian cooperation with Iran on nuclear and missile programmes is a part of this policy. In his official visit to Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE, Putin offered cooperation in high-tech weaponry. In this regard, Mikhail Margelov, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the upper house of the Russian parliament, points to Russia’s interest in winning a Saudi order for tanks. This demonstrates the change in Russian policy towards the arms market from the former Soviet Union when it sold arms only to anti-Western countries. Current Russian policy is about increasing its exports to as many customers as possible.

However, the contradiction is that Russia is an importer of Israeli weaponry. Russia is interested in technological cooperation with Israel, especially in unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). In 2010, Russia and Israel signed the first-ever military cooperation agreement, a framework to facilitate the signing of new contracts between the two countries. Russia’s perception in the field of high-technology compared with other technology actors such as the US, China, and Japan, is to recognise the existing gap. Being a pioneer country in this field, Russia needs to cooperate with others in order to keep up with the current technology. Therefore, the Russian President made the first official visit to Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, offering high-tech weaponry to these countries.

562 Natalya Kalinina, ‘Militarization of the Middle East: Russia's Role’, (Moscow: The Russian Center for Policy Studies 2013).
563 Ibid.
564 Eke, ‘Putin in First Saudi State Visit’.
566 Kalinina, ‘Militarization of the Middle East: Russia's Role’.
sector motivates Russia to strenuous efforts to search for opportunities in other states for two reasons: to enter new markets in order to facilitate growth and boost high-tech industries and to establish a stable channel to exchange experience to promote development in high-tech industries, especially with Israel. Cooperation with Israel has been seen as a solution for Russian weakness in this sector. In contrast, the EU perceived the area as a promised market for information and communications technology. From 1999 to 2007, it funded the Euro-Mediterranean Information Society project (EUMEDIS) that aimed to promote information and communication technologies.

The discourse on the EU’s policy in the Mediterranean and Middle Eastern countries is to project trade relations and economic integration as a recognised objective. The Wider Europe initiative states that ‘regional trade and integration is a recognized objective’. In the EU’s view, the creation of a large Mediterranean market has positive effects, such as stability and prosperity, for both the European and Southern Mediterranean peoples. The EU’s Self-perception as an economic union at its inception and since has proven accurate as it becomes one of the world’s biggest economies playing a significant role in designing and carrying out its foreign relations. Over the coming years, the IMF estimates that about ‘90 % of the world demand will be generated outside the EU’. Thus, opening up more market opportunities is a key priority in the EU’s foreign policy. The EU discourse on relations with neighbours places high a priority on establishing and maintaining close economic cooperation and partnership.

The Middle East and North African countries as a group are one of the EU largest trade partners and constitute a considerable opportunity for productivity growth, that which

increases trade openness is crucial to improve economic growth in a durable manner and
growth needs to be largely export-driven through sustainability and sufficient demand.\textsuperscript{573}
Building and strengthening economic ties with the Mediterranean countries started in
Barcelona with the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.\textsuperscript{574} This interest in enhancing and
increasing economic ties continued under the European Neighborhood Policy and the
Union for the Mediterranean. The main focus towards this region centres on economic
relations which includes free trade areas, preferential trade agreements, and easy access to
energy resources.\textsuperscript{575} This has been implemented through bilateral association agreements
and then action-plans under the ENP. For this purpose, the EU concluded association
agreements with the majority of countries in the southern and eastern Mediterranean.
These bilateral agreements work as a framework and a basis for the gradual liberalisation
of trade movement across the Mediterranean Sea and set out the conditions for economic,
social and cultural cooperation. The aim is to provide a free trade area for the
Mediterranean in which the EU is the main player.\textsuperscript{576} In addition, the EU discourse focuses
on cooperation in the transport sectors that can underpin closer relations and improved
market access. The ENP states that “Generating more trade and tourism between the Union
and its neighbors, requires efficient, multimodal and sustainable transport systems”.\textsuperscript{577}
Between 2010 and 2012, the Mediterranean countries together represented 8.6\% of EU
external trade.\textsuperscript{578} In line with this, the EU, in 2007, signed a free trade agreement with the
countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The GCC is the fifth largest export
market of the EU.\textsuperscript{579}

\textbf{Context: Energy Provider and Stabilizer}

For Mary Tétreault, the Middle East region is the geographic “center of gravity” of the
world’s fossil fuels.\textsuperscript{580} In addition, the Mediterranean Sea is perceived as an ‘oil and gas

\textsuperscript{573} L. Söderling, \textit{Is the Middle East and North Africa Region Achieving Its Trade Potential?}
\textit{(INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, 2005), p 3.}
\textsuperscript{574} For more information see Bernard Hoekman and Simeon Djankov, 'The European Union's Mediterranean
\textsuperscript{575} Söderling, \textit{Is the Middle East and North Africa Region Achieving Its Trade Potential? p3-4.}
\textsuperscript{576} European Commission, 'Euro-Mediterranean Partnership', <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-
regions/regions/euro-mediterranean-partnership/>, accessed 25/01/2014
\textsuperscript{578} Commission, 'Euro-Mediterranean Partnership'.
\textsuperscript{579} European External Action Service, 'EU Relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council (Gcc)',
\textsuperscript{580} Mary Ann Tétreault, 'The Political Economy of Middle Eastern Oil', \textit{Understanding the Contemporary
Middle East/Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, (2008), 255-79.}
transit region’. It is perceived as a highway of the global energy trade. Countries of the Eastern part of the Mediterranean such as Turkey, Syria, and Egypt, are at the crossroads of the world’s energy trade. The existing and planned web of pipelines that carries hydrocarbon resources from east to west and from south to north increases the geopolitical and strategic importance of this region. Turkey and Egypt are at the crossroads of the world’s energy trade thus giving an importance to Syria and Palestine-Israel as well. However, according to the MEDPRO Energy Reference Scenario, hydrocarbon production will increase in the South and East Mediterranean region and the largest part of this increase will occur primarily in Syria, Egypt, Libya and Algeria. Hence, the Levant Basin is estimated to be one of the world’s largest hydrocarbon resources. This MEDPRO scenario estimates the growth in oil production from 249 Mtoe in 2009 to 318 Mtoe in 2030 and natural gas from 150 Mtoe in 2009 to 294 Mtoe in 2030. If these estimates are confirmed, the MEDPRO Scenario suspects that this area could become ‘a world-class hydrocarbon province’. Considering only this potential increase in oil and gas production in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean region, the Middle East remains a great opportunity for both the supply and marketing of energy.

EU discourse acknowledges the Middle East’s and North Africa’s importance in the context of energy. The ENP states that:

‘The European Union is the world’s largest energy (oil and gas) importer and the second largest consumer and is surrounded by the world’s most important reserves of oil and natural gas (Russia, the Caspian basin, the Middle East and North Africa). It will increasingly depend on imports, from its current level of 50% to 70% by 2030, on present projections. Neighbouring countries play a vital role in the security of the EU’s energy supply’.  

In this discourse, the perception of the Middle East is based on the EU being the world’s largest energy importer. The European demand for cheap gas pushes it towards looking for opportunities in neighboring markets. The argument is that the Middle East is perceived as an opportunity for energy providers and the need to escape from heavy dependence on


\footnotesize{582 Ibid.}

\footnotesize{583 Ibid. p iv.}

\footnotesize{584 Ibid. p 10.}

\footnotesize{585 Commission, 'European Neighbourhood Policy: Strategy Paper', ( p 17.)}
Russian gas and oil. The oil and gas discoveries in the Levant Basin are one of many geopolitical and strategic interests that force the EU to participate actively in the making of Middle East politics.

Rather, this matter is perceived as a threefold opportunity: firstly, to diversify European providers of oil and gas. Europe is one of the largest customers of natural gas and its overwhelming dependence on Russia gas is a serious matter that concerns the EU.\textsuperscript{586} For Sir Graham Watson the overdependence on Russian gas and Gulf oil is a threat to the EU’s energy security.\textsuperscript{587} Thus easy access to accessible sources of energy is an advantage and could ‘free the EU from overdependence on Russian Gas’,\textsuperscript{588} especially since Cyprus as a member of the EU, has the right of access to this field. Secondly, disputes and unwise management of exploitation’s rights could lead to further destabilising of the region. The division of Cyprus, the dispute between the two parts, and the desire of Turkey to play a role in this area as well as the dispute between Lebanon and Israel could aggravate instability and insecurity in this nerve of the world’s trade movement. Thirdly, hesitation to play an active role in this area would create an opportunity to regional and global players such as Turkey and Russia to take the lead.

Therefore, the EU is interested in playing a major role to secure more energy independence through enhancing its political and economic existence in the Levant Basin. For Sir Graham Watson developing EU policy in this region is very important as an alternative to the EU’s dependency on Russian Gas.\textsuperscript{589} Similarly, Patrick Nopens argues that the EU should actively be involved in reassuring that energy reserves in this area are ‘managed in such a way as to supplement a Third Energy Corridor’.\textsuperscript{590} In this regard, through Cyprus and Greece, the EU strengthens its cooperation with Israel, which is one of the major regional players in the Basin. Thus, military cooperation between Greece and Israel has

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\textsuperscript{586} See Ariel Cohen, 'Europe’s Strategic Dependence on Russian Energy', \textit{The Heritage Foundation, Backgrounder}, 2083 (2007).
\textsuperscript{587} Interview, 'Interview with Sir Graham Watson, President of the European Liberal Democrat and Reform Party (Eldr)'.
\textsuperscript{589} Interview, 'Interview with Sir Graham Watson, President of the European Liberal Democrat and Reform Party (Eldr)'.
\textsuperscript{590} Nopens, 'Geopolitical Shifts in the Eastern Mediterranean', (p3).
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The continuity of oil and gas flows and price stability are significant matters for EU stability and prosperity.

In contrast, Russia sees itself as the biggest gas producer, therefore it uses energy as a foreign policy tool to defend its national interests and enhance its influence around the world. Reflecting on the above views of the importance of the Mediterranean, Russia considers itself as the ‘energy hub’ of natural gas flows from Eurasia, especially countries such as Turkey and Syria. Precisely the politics in the Middle East have a bearing on Russia internal developments. Based on its perspective as the largest producer of gas, Russia has improved its relations with the Middle East in order to stabilise oil and gas prices which occupy a high priority on an internal level. Victoria Panova points out that oil and gas prices in 1996-1999 and 2003 saved Russia from collapse twice. Therefore Russia is resolved to enhance its influence in the Middle East. Russia’s policy aims are to secure Russia’s share of the oil and gas market.

Russia has long looked for opportunities in the oil and gas industries and the construction of gas and oil pipeline networks in the region. In 2004 Russia entered the Saudi fuel market when its biggest integrated oil company, Lukoil Holdings, was awarded the right to explore and produce natural gas in one of the world’s largest oil fields. It is also interested in a pipeline linking Nigeria with Libya across the Sahara. Russia proposed establishing a ‘gas consortium’ with other gas producers with a view of dominating the global gas market. This matter was discussed during Putin’s visit to Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE and Iran in 2007.

Furthermore, Russia is very keen on having a share in the natural gas in the Levant Basin. Gazprom and other giant private companies are making concerted efforts to establish a strategic commercial edge in developing gas production in this area. The reserves of oil and gas in the Levant Basin make it an attractive geopolitical and economic prospect for

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593 Interview, 'Interview with Vectoria Panova , Specialist in Russia Foreign Policy'.
594 News, 'Putin Visits Saudi Arabia'.
Russia. Accordingly, Russia and Lebanon, in October 2013, signed a memorandum of understanding on cooperation in the energy field. In the same way, Russia has shown a strong interest in investing in Cypriot energy which became evident during the 2013 Cypriot financial crisis. In addition, it has signed operator agreements with Israeli gas companies.

However, Medvedev, in his official visit to Syria in 2009, demonstrated Russia’s determination to take part in promising projects in the field of oil refineries and gas network pipeline construction.596 In 2011, a $10 billion deal was signed by Syria, Iraq and Iran to carry natural gas from Iran’s huge gas field in the South Pars to Iraq and Syria and eventually on to the European market.597 To protect its interests, Russia reinstated its military presence in the Middle East with an announcement of the reestablishment of the squadron in the Mediterranean which it had dissolved 20 years ago. It is clear that Russia intends to enhance its military presence in the region in order to underpin its political leverage and enhance its actorness.598

**Context: Historical, Cultural and Religious Ties**

The perception of the Middle East in this context has emerged in the course of civilizational place and mission which is based on values and principles that rely on history, culture and religion. For Russia, placing a greater emphasis on its own uniqueness is an objective of its foreign policy.599 Promoting a positive image of Russia in the world through popularising the Russian language, culture and education is one of the main objectives indicated in the Russian Foreign Policy Concept 2000.600 Putin stresses the importance of Russian culture and education. He said ‘we must work to expand Russia's educational and cultural presence in the world’.601 It is seen as one of the soft-power instruments in building Russia’s identity.602 Putin emphasises the need to expand Russian

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600 Concept, 'The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation') ;
602 Gabriel Gorodetsky, Russia between East and West: Russian Foreign Policy on the Threshold of the Twenty-First Century (Routledge, 2003b).
culture, especially in Russian-speaking communities or countries previously linked or interested in her culture and educational sciences. Accordingly, the Middle East is perceived as a target to promote Russia’s image and enhance its ties with Russian-speaking communities. In this regard, many countries in the Middle East have such communities which are linked to the Russian education system and sciences. More than 100,000 families in the Arab world are related to families in Russia. In addition, the Russian-speaking community in Israel is the third-largest such community in the world. Syria and other countries such as Iraq and Egypt have been linked for some time to Russian culture and education by virtue of their close relations with the former Soviet Union. Similarly, Russia has opened many centres of science and culture in such cities as Beirut, Cairo, Alexandria, Damascus, Tel Aviv, and Bethlehem.

In contrast, the Wider Europe Initiative has set up a new vision for the next two decades during which the EU intends to reflect the development of closer and more coherent relations with its neighbours. This vision is based, among other things, on ‘intensified political and cultural relations’ between the EU and its neighbours. In this regard, the EU is interested in building up a ‘cultural interchange’ that facilitates common interests with its neighbours. Cultural interchange and cooperation is perceived, among other things, as a promoter which creates a ‘positive image’ of the EU in the neighbourhood which serves to underpin its actorness. It provides ‘foundations for, inter alia, deeper political relations, enhanced cooperation on justice and security issues, environmental improvement and governance’. Thus, the EU sees there is an importance in enhancing the dialogue between cultures and free exchange of ideas between cultures, religions and traditions. With this in mind, the EU between 1998 and 2013 funded the Euromed Heritage

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606 Ibid. p 11.
607 Ibid. p 12.
608 Ibid. p 12.
projects which emphasised the added values of common cultural heritage for dialogue and mutual understanding.\footnote{See EU Neighbourhood Info Centre, 'Previous Projects', <http://www.enpi-info.eu/mainmed.php?id_type=2&id=644>, accessed 28/01/2014.}

The EU is interested in international public relations that serve to enhance its image to its neighbours. The discourse focuses on the Middle East countries as a public sphere where it is interested in improving its image through enhancing the ‘mutual understanding of each other’s cultures, history, attitudes and values, and to eliminate distorted perceptions’.\footnote{Commission, 'European Neighbourhood Policy: Strategy Paper', (p 19.} For this purpose, the EU focuses on the promotion of ‘cultural, educational and more general societal links’.\footnote{Ibid. p 19.} Many of the Euromed projects designed to realize these objectives such as EuroMed Youth, FEMISE-Socio-economic research, Media and culture for development in the Southern Mediterranean region, EU Partnership for Peace – EUPfP, Erasmus Mundus – External cooperation window, MEDA-ETE - Education and Training for Employment (2004-07), etc.

Furthermore, historically and religiously, the Levant, and especially Jerusalem, is full of religious symbolism for the three Abrahamic religions. The EU and Russia yearn to boost their leverage in the holy places and enhance their spiritual connection with the land of Christ. In the post-Soviet era, communist ideas are no longer accepted as a social drive on an internal level, therefore, Moscow finds that Christian Orthodox values stemming from Tsarist times are a solution for a social vacuum. The Russian Church succeeded in introducing religious instruction in public schools and restoring its properties inside and outside Russia.\footnote{Irina Papkova, 'The Orthodox Church and Russian Politics', (2011).} The increase in the Church’s influence in public life and state policy has brought the Middle East strongly to the front. In this context, Russia perceives the Middle East as a multi-layered opportunity: firstly, to enhance the internal social contract, secondly, to reinforce its actoriness in terms of representing Orthodox Christians around the world, and thirdly, to boost its influence in the region and spread Russian culture. During the Byzantium Empire the church was in the service of the state as a social drive.\footnote{Dmitry Pospielovsky, \textit{The Orthodox Church in the History of Russia} (St. Vladimir's Seminary Press Crestwood, NY, 1998).} That is, principled values were in the service of the state not vice versa. The decline of the
former Soviet Union, as many Russian academics argue, is due to its becoming so devoted to communist values and no longer relying on economic strengths as the engine that once made the Soviet Union a great power.

In 2008, Kirill I become the Orthodox Patriarch of Moscow and All Rus. Kirill I has managed to reshape Church-state relations in a way that is considered as a ‘veritable revolution’.614 This is seen in Putin’s speech at the Valdai Club in which he centres on Orthodox Christianity as an indispensable value to Russian society.615 Historically and religiously, the Levant is linked to the Third Rome myth.616 The Levant runs deeply into the history of both the Soviet Union and Tsarist Russia.617 In 1882, Tsarist Russia established the Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society (IOPS) to serve Russian policy objectives.618 Following the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, it was attached to the Russian Academy of Science under the name of the Russian Palestine Society.619 In 1992, its old name and former position were restored with the purpose of ‘supporting Orthodoxy in the Holy Land (including Syria and Lebanon)’.620 The revived IOPS became very active in the patronage of the Christian presence and situation in the Middle East, especially under the leadership of the former Russian Prime Minister Sergey Stepashin. Thus, Russia heightens its place in the Orthodox world especially in the region, as well as in its former republics and Eastern European countries. In other words, Russia’s policy serves to improve its ability to operate as a soft power and give her the opportunity to intervene as a defender of the rights of Orthodox minorities across the Middle East and even in the whole world. In addition, its increased visibility as a defender of Orthodox Christianity serves to spread Christian values inside Russia which are seen as a solution to demographic problems that Russia is very apprehensive about.

617 This started in the middle of the nineteenth century when there was competition between Great Britain, France and Russia to gain influence in the Levant. These imperial powers at that time claimed a religious representative of holy Christian places in Jerusalem. Tsarist Russia established the Orthodox Mission in Jerusalem in 1858.
619 Ibid.
In contrast, although most of the states in Europe are secular, nevertheless they are linked spiritually to Palestine where most of the old Christian holy places are. But the EU would like to represent itself as a defender of European values and norms rather than to play the game of defending Christianity. Historically, a number of the EU countries had close historical and cultural ties with some of the Middle East countries. Thus, the Middle East and other Mediterranean countries are perceived as an arena to project democracy, human rights, good governance, rule of law and transparency. The projection of these principles and values are perceived as a solution to a number of multifaceted problems that threaten European security and stability. For this purpose, the EU created the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) which served as the legal basis for these activities, covering the period from 2000-06. This initiative was replaced by the European Instrument for Democracy & Human Rights (EIDHR) from 2007-13.

5.3 EU-Russian Actorness in Middle Eastern Politics: Comparative Analysis

What is the meaning of these contexts in a comparative way? How are they related to internal developments and external expectations? The above contexts show how the Middle East is interconnected and interrelated with EU and Russia polities, as well as what kind of opportunities exist for them. It is perceived in multi-layered contexts. Mainly, its geostrategic position and indissoluble interactions present its importance which makes it hard for the EU and Russia to be isolated from being involved in policy-making in this region. That is, this importance is perceived as an opportunity through internal lenses that have direct or indirect effects on internal developments and also meets external expectations that relate to the contexts in which the Self is constructed.

In the context of economic and trade relations, the EU and Russia are similar in perceiving the importance of the Middle East and the Mediterranean Sea, but with different perspectives according to their internal developments. Reinforcing their regional actorness in the Middle East in terms of economic and trade relations is perceived as a strategic objective in order to maintain their prosperity, stability and security. In this regard, EU and Russian foreign policies are designed to ensure the sustainability of growth productivity, but Russia, additionally, intends to integrate into the world economy. Both have built their external expectations on their Self-perception as an economic power. That is, playing an active role in this geostrategic region is perceived as a dual opportunity: paving and enhancing an economic and trading environment that reinforces productivity
growth which is a profound base for a strong economy, prosperity and stability on the internal level, and regional actorness in this region serving as a driving force to further political and economic global actorness.

However, for Russia, improving its economic influence in the Middle East is perceived as a vector to maintain its territorial unity and prevent any potential disintegration. While for the EU, it is based, on the one hand, on the vision that ‘a strong economy and internal cohesion will strengthen the Union's ability to project its influence in the world’ and, on the other, it is perceived as a driving force to boost political unity among its member states. Russia wants to avoid a repeat of the decline of the Soviet Union caused by giving up its economic strengths in favour of communist ideology. The EU realises the fact that its attraction among its member states proceeds from its economic strengths as an engine of European prosperity and stability.

In the context of energy, this importance is also viewed from different perspectives: Russia is the largest gas producer while the EU is the largest gas importer in the world. Thus, the question of energy is naturally perceived according to their internal situations. Based on the reality that Russia is the biggest gas provider to Europe; the EU finds in the potential increase of gas and oil production in the Levant an opportunity to escape from overdependence on Russian gas, diversify its sources of energy, prevent any destabilisation due to disputes on the rights of exploitation and maximise unsolicited intervention by regional and other global actors. Russia, in turn, strives to keep its dominance in the gas market and secure its prices. Not only are gas and oil revenues the main sources of the state budget but a price increase has have twice saved Russia from collapse. In other words, Russia considers the Middle East as a geopolitical and strategic area especially in terms of being an energy hub which helps Russia to maintain its interests and protect its assets.

In the context of security and stability, both the EU and Russia are similar in their perceptions of the Middle East. That is, the region is a source of security threats and the area’s instability can easily spill-over directly or indirectly causing destabilisation, social unrest and ethnic clashes in areas such as the Caucasus and the Balkans. The readings from

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the US experience in Iraq came to the conclusion that ‘military efforts may lead to further political and military destabilization’.\textsuperscript{623} Thus, the EU’s and Russia’s strategy focuses on a multilateral policy by different means. Russia focuses on rapprochement with the Islamic world while the EU emphasises the promotion of its principles and values. For Russia, improving its image and rapprochement with the Islamic world is perceived as a twofold opportunity: to contribute in drying up the sources of violence in the South Caucasus and secure the integrity of Russian territory from any growth in secession claims, and to reinforce Russia’s political, economic and trade ties with the Middle Eastern countries that serve its desire of actorness. In contrast, for the EU, the promotion of European normative values and principles is perceived as an opportunity, on the one hand, to undermine the root causes of insecurity and instability. These undemocratic regimes and the absence of good governance and rule of law have been seen as a source of regional instability and causes of violence. Thus, the projection of European normative principles and values is an opportunity to minimise these threats and increase its ability as a soft power. And, on the other hand, it leads to paving the road for close economic and trade relations. That is, they are similar in perceiving the Middle East, but different in their policies.

In the context of history, culture and religion the Middle East is perceived differently. Russia finds in it an opportunity to meet internal developments and encounter national problems. Therefore, Russia focuses more on building cultural and educational relations and even religious ties with the Middle Eastern countries. In the region Russia has an image that needs to be refurbished and Russian-speaking communities necessitate continued ties. Thus, Russia uses culture and education to boost its image and build a connection with Russia-speaking communities in this area. On religious ties, Russia’s policy towards the Middle East is built on the view that the Orthodox Church and Russia Muftis Council have religious links to holy places with positive effects on internal and external levels. The role of the Church is perceived as twofold: to utilise Orthodox principles and values as a social drive on the internal level, and utilise church leverage among Orthodox Christians around the world to enhance its soft power. In addition, Russia is keen to restore the role of Tsarist Russia in representing Orthodox Christianity and to defend its minorities in the Middle East. The role of the Mufti Council is perceived as

enhancing the internal social fabric, boosting Russia’s image and minimising any opposition and hostility towards its activities in the Islamic world.

On the EU side, the Middle East is perceived as an arena to build a positive image and enhance its capabilities as a civilian and normative power. The heritage and cultural ties between the two banks of the Mediterranean are indissoluble. In addition there is a strong educational relationship that links the two banks. Unlike Russia, the EU has a strong cultural and education interchange with the Middle East. It has implemented and designed many programs to reinforce its soft power in the region. Thus, the EU focuses on the projection of European principles and values which are perceived as a solution to the many problems and challenges facing the region.

Through these contexts, the Middle East forms a multifaceted opportunity that runs deeply into a geopolitical-economic perspective. Thus, policy-making of the EU and Russia towards the Middle East works to utilise their unique capabilities, and increase their influence in this region in order to possess the most employable powers which assert and underpin their global actorness on the world scene. That is, global actorness is a core objective in both EU and Russian foreign policy-making towards this region, which is not a given. This actorness is to meet the main core functions of polity-existence: security, stability and prosperity. Thus, increased involvement in the Middle East peace process is a priority as long as it serves these objectives. It proceeds from the idea that having a role in the peace process will guarantee an major seat in the making of Middle East politics. In fact, the prevailing perception of global actors is that an active role in mediating a peace settlement gives an opportunity to establish political and economic circumstances which will serve as a catalyst for facilitating deals for numerous persistent matters. Thus, the EU’s and Russia’s involvement is to draw the line and reserve its seat in policy-making that will secure and maintain their interests in the above contexts. In other words, their involvement in finding a settlement to the conflict is not only about peace per se, but it is an opportunity, where their interests in other contexts will be significantly enhanced.
5.4 Conclusion

In this chapter I argue that the involvement of the EU and Russia in MEPP takes its importance primarily from the significance of the Middle East. That is, the perception of the Middle East as geostrategic nerve and the cross-roads of world trade informs the making of foreign policy by the EU and Russia. The discussion focuses on how the Middle East is perceived in the context of building an international identity by the EU and Russia. This emphasises the Middle East as an opportunity to enhance their influence and assert their actorness on the world scene. Further I explain how their involvement in MEPP is defined by the perception of the Middle East in wider contexts through the ways in which the Self-perception of the EU and Russia is cultivated. Through the arguments and discussion in this Chapter I find that the MEPP works as an important channel that paves the way and creates a favourable environment for the EU’s and Russia’s access to the Middle East to exercise actorness which enhances their influence in this region.

For Russia, a visible and effective presence in the MEPP is a priority as it provides a way to access the Middle East which is seen as a vital arena. Restoring its former influence in this region by reinforcing its presence in the MEPP became a priority with Primakov which gained more importance with the advent of Putin, especially during his second term in office. This is to counter internal problems regarding economic weaknesses, security concerns, territorial stability, and social cohesion. The Russian presence in the MEPP focuses more on removing obstacles that would burden the Russian economy and prevent economic interchange with the Middle East, undermine the security threats that might originate from the region, maintain its energy assets through preventing other countries from any ventures in oil and gas prices, boost the Russian cultural and educational presence and improve the Russian image.

For the EU, an active role and visible presence is a strategic priority. This is to introduce itself as an active global player and assert itself as a representative of the European community and exercise its actorness in different contexts such as acting as a normative, soft and economic power. From the EU perspective, the importance of the Mediterranean and the Middle East lies at heart of European history and its geographical proximity. The EU aspires to assert itself as an alternative to both the US and Russia based on geostrategic interconnections with the region. Also, the Middle East represents a new arena after Central and Eastern Europe to exercise its capabilities in terms of the projection of
democracy, peace-making, exporting stability and security through sustainable development policies.

On other hand, the EU focuses on major economic and trade interests in the fields of energy, establishing free trade areas and creating the Mediterranean market. This was formed within the Wider Europe Initiative, designed under the ENP through association agreements and implemented then by action-plans. The Wider Europe Initiative set up a new vision that reflects the desire for building closer relations and intensifies political, economic and cultural bonds with Middle Eastern countries in order to reinforce its regional influence and underpin its global actorness. This perception inspired the EU to be actively involved in the MEPP as a key channel to the region. It is this perception of the Middle East that is cultivated in the contexts of the Self-perception of the EU and Russia and informs the involvement in MEPP rather than making peace per se.
CHAPTER SIX

PROMOTING THE EU’S AND RUSSIA’S ROLE IN THE MEPP AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PALESTINIAN STATEHOOD

Focus

The argument in this chapter is threefold. Firstly, it focuses on the development of the EU’s and Russia’s involvement in the Middle East peace process and how this involvement developed in conjunction with their Self-perception of actorness. The emphasis here is on the MEPP as a ‘channel’ to enhance presence and visibility in the region. Secondly, it contextualises the EU’s and Russia’s perceptions of establishing Palestinian statehood concentrating on four areas: (a) the context of international law and United Nation resolutions; (b) the context of cooperating for security and stability; (c) the context of relations with Israel; and (d) the context of peace-making and state-building. The emphasis is laid here on how the perception of ‘actorness’ is reflected in adopting positions and implementing policies. In so doing, the analysis looks at these four aspects that define the establishment of Palestinian statehood by the EU and Russia and examines the extent to which they use the MEPP as a channel to enhance their influence and maintain their ‘actorness’ in the region. Thirdly, the chapter discusses a number of essential events in the making of Palestinian statehood, highlighting the differences between the EU and Russia on the grounds of Self-Other perception. By understanding the way the EU and Russia perceive and deal with the main issue, we can learn a great deal about the policy-making processes employed by the EU and Russia towards the anticipated Palestinian state.

6.1 Peace-Making and Actorness: EU and Russian Perceptions of the Conflict and Peace Settlement

The rise of the EU’s actorness as a result of European enlargement and spill-over towards Central and Eastern Europe, which has become a new centre of economic growth and an exporter of stability and security, has driven it to look for an active role in this process. The emphasis on the EU as a normative, soft and economic power, has increasingly created a tendency to seek resolutions to existing conflicts and to regulate crisis situations according to their geographical proximity, and is consistent with its desire for actorness. The EU discourse towards a peace settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, particularly
between Palestinians and Israelis, shows its centrality and importance. For Solana, playing a full and active role in this conflict’s peace-making is a matter of ‘presence and visibility’ of the EU. This involvement is an important matter if one is to be an ‘effective global actor’ and to be heard ‘on every continent’. The EU makes it clear that it should take full advantage of opportunities in the region more assertively to promote its interests and values. It perceives itself as an actor in mediation ‘based on its own experience as a peace project’ and its normative values.

In contrast, Russia’s role as a legal successor of the former Soviet Union has driven it to try to restore its position as a global actor on the international stage. The Russian discourse on peace-making in the conflict primarily reflects its ambitions to restore its previous influence in the region. Alexander Saltanov, the former Deputy Foreign Minister and Putin’s special envoy to the MEPP, said that the Russian role is an elimination of ‘dis-balance’. Similarly, Lavrov refers to Russia’s involvement in this process as a ‘correction of the regional architecture towards equilibrium’. He emphasises that Russia’s noticeable presence in the Middle East ‘should be viewed’ as serving to restore the former Soviet influence in the region and to stress its actorness. To A. Kreutz, Russian involvement works as one of the main channels of Russia’s influence in the Middle East. This approach to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict started with and was reinforced by the appointment of Yevgeny Primakov as Foreign Minister in 1996. Robert O. Freedman argues that reserving an advanced position in this process of peace-making is a low-cost area to underscore Russia’s commitment to cooperation with other global actors, especially the US. In his book, Russian Crossroads: Toward The New Millennium, Primakov

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624 Solana at a plenary meeting of the European Parliament referred to Parliament’s request that the EU be more present, be more visible. See Javier Solana, ‘Debate on the Middle East: Plenary Meeting at the European Parliament’, (STRASBOURG, 2002c).
626 Javier Solana, 'Message from Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the CFSP', (Brussels, 2009).
630 Lavrov, 'Interview with Al-Watan Al-Arabi Weekly Newspaper.'
631 Ibid.
632 Kreutz, *Russia in the Middle East: Friend or Foe?* p 68.
633 Ibid. p 68.
stresses that Russian co-sponsorship in the peace process, ever since the Madrid Conference (1991), has allowed Russia to open or renew its channels with most of the regional and global actors on the basis of cooperation of mutual interests. Furthermore, A. Kreutz argues that the preservation of the mechanism that provides smooth and easy access to the Middle East is no less important than reaching a comprehensive peace agreement.

This perception of the MEPP is based on the perception of the Middle East as a whole. The EU and Russia recognise the importance and viability of the Middle East in asserting their global actorness and its direct and indirect effects on their stability, security and prosperity. Their involvement in finding a solution to the Middle East conflict has evolved in line with their internal developments and the desire to assert their influence in the region.

**The Development of EU Involvement in the Middle East Peace Process**

The EU’s engagement in the MEPP has developed in correlation with the development of its collective identity and as a response to internal problems. The Venice Declaration, the first official EC/EU recognition of ‘the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people’, was adopted after the Euro-Arab Dialogue launched in the course of the oil embargo in the aftermath of the 1973 War. This position was adopted as a response to the need to work collectively to deal with matters that affected all of the EC member states at that time. The EC/EU’s actorness on the international stage started and developed with its involvement in the Middle East conflict. For Steven Everts, the EU’s common position on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, which was set out in the Venice Declaration (1980), was

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636 Kreutz, *Russia in the Middle East: Friend or Foe?* p68.


639 The EU/EC discourse in the Venice Declaration paid attention to the growing tensions in the Middle East that constitute a serious danger and rendered a peace settlement more necessary and pressing than ever. The discourse in this declaration has been focusing on a ‘special role’ for the EU/EC to play which has been described as an ‘obligation’ within the context of ‘traditional ties and common interests’. The EU/EC base a declaration on the United Nation Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) 242 and 338. These two UNSCRs constitute the ground for a “two state solution”. On the bases thus set out, the EU official position on the Palestinian Israeli conflict in this Declaration called for: the right of existence for all states in the region and recognition of the legitimate right of the Palestinian people to self-determination. The Declaration emphasised on self-determination, for the Palestinian people and “land for peace” as key principles on which a lasting, just and comprehensive peace settlement for the conflict should be accomplished. See Council, ‘Venice European Council Declaration’
the first significant change of the posture of self-denial in foreign policy. The Declaration was the EU’s first step towards a more unified official position on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict which was even then seen as one of the most intractable international conflicts. More interestingly, the internal development of the enlargement process that was embodied in the signing of the Treaty on the European Union (1992) was accompanied by further involvement in the peace settlement. The EU sponsored the Madrid Conference (1991) and had appointed an EU Special Representative (EUSR) for the Middle East process ever since 1996. The EU, then, increased its involvement in the process gradually.

The signing of the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 introduced the post of Higher Representative for Common Security and Foreign Policy that entered into force in 1999. In accordance with these developments, the EU, during the German Presidency, issued the Berlin Declaration (1999) which ‘proclaimed the landmark decision to support a Palestinian state’. This Declaration was initiated in respect to the Palestinian quest to issue a unilateral declaration of independence at the end of an interim period according to the Oslo Accords. The Declaration was a package of measures developed in cooperation with the USA to avert a Palestinian declaration of independence by providing substantial financial aid to the PA.

Further, the EU, on its way to 2004’s enlargement, prioritised reaching a solution for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in the context of a ‘wider Europe’ framework. Reaching a settlement was seen as essential for a better chance of dealing with other problems that had a more direct effect on Europe. The success of Solana in sharing the drawing up of the Mitchell Report and setting up ‘the necessary confidence-building measures’ at the Taba.

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641 Ibid. p 17.
644 Ibid.
645 Commission, 'Wider Europe–Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with Our Eastern and Southern Neighbours'. (
negotiations between the Palestinians and Israelis,\footnote{These two documents constitute the basis for the Road Map that was adopted by the Quartet in 2003. See Everts, \textit{The EU and the Middle East: A Call for Action}.} identified the increasing influence of the EU political profile in policy-making in the Middle East.\footnote{Ibid. p 23.} This brought the EU up to the Quartet’s membership. Reaching a peace settlement has been central to EU involvement in Middle East politics. The EU’s major interest in a peace settlement is to reach stability in the region and to eliminate the reasons behind conflict and violence.\footnote{Ibid.} Furthermore, the EU’s own experience in reconciliation and peace-making in Western Europe and realignments in Central and Eastern Europe, has stimulated the EU to play a role in peace-making in the Middle East. EU success in strengthening the European cooperation and solidarity process compelled the EU to focus on surrounding countries. Therefore, the EU discourse towards the conflict has shifted as its Self-Other perception has changed.

The substantial European enlargement at the inception of the new millennium represented a new era for the EU. The merged size of their economic power encouraged the EU leaders to transfer it to a political weight. The Middle East is a geostrategic area and vibrant domain for the EU that can exercise its actorness and develop existing economic and trade ties that support its Self-oriented policy towards an attractive polity for further spill-over. In this regard, the EU’s role in the peace-making in the Middle East conflict is perceived as a vital opportunity to reinforce its influence in the region.

Russian engagement took place during the Cold War. It acquired its importance from contrasting with Western materialism in general and the Soviet-American confrontation in particular.\footnote{Kreutz, \textit{Russia in the Middle East: Friend or Foe?} p 45.} This Soviet perception of the conflict underscored by Primakov that Soviet policy took the Arab-Israeli conflict on ‘ideological tones’.\footnote{Primakov, \textit{Russian Crossroads: Toward the New Millennium}. p 190.} The Soviet support for Palestinians started with the decline of Soviet influence in the Middle East after the 1967 War and especially, with the death of Nasser, the Egyptian president, in 1970. With the coming to power of Sadat in Egypt, Soviet influence began to decline. Thus, the Soviet involvement in the Palestinian question was an attempt to preserve its influence in this region. In this regard, Yevgeny Primakov said that the Soviet link with Fatah was
perceived as an option to ‘boost Moscow’s influence in the region, including the planned new state, no matter what form it took’. This support increased within the context of the public mood that was against western-backing of Israel in the 1973 War. As a result, a Palestinian embassy opened in Moscow and the PLO, backed by the Soviet Union, attained observer status at the UN General Assembly in 1974. In reaction to the American-led Camp David Accords in 1978, the Soviets recognised the PLO as the “sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people” and President Leonid Brezhnev adopted an official position which declared that full liberation is the only road to establish a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders. Consequently, the Soviet Union was one of the first countries that recognised the Palestinian Declaration of Independence which was proclaimed in Algeria in 1988.

These ideological overtones in the perception of the conflict declined in the late years of the Soviet Union. That is, post-Soviet Russia abandoned its former ideological dimension in its foreign policy towards the conflict. Andrej Kreutz ascribes this retreat during the post-Soviet period up to 2005 to: strong American-Russian relations, the Russian focus on internal problems rather than strengthening its relations with the Arab World, and the increasing importance of its relations with Israel. This was reflected through minimal Russian involvement in peace-making during the Yeltsin period. Russian foreign policy under Andrei Kozyrev was labelled as pro-western. This policy mirrored the dramatic change in Russia’s strengths and self-confidence, and accepted the US and

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654 The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Comment on the Adoption of the Resolution «Status of Palestine in the Un» by the Un General Assembly’. in Mfa Press Department (ed.), (Moscow, 2012).
656 Kreutz, *Russia in the Middle East: Friend or Foe?* p 52.
657 This foreign policy was a reflection of internal developments that heavily affected Russian Self-Other perception. During the Yeltsin period, Russia witnessed many political, social and economic changes. The transition to a market economy and a democratic system were the main challenges that faced Russia. Achieving a transition democracy and consistent economic growth was a difficult mission under this sudden transition from a one-party regime to political pluralism and from central planning to a market-based economy. This transition led to political and economic turmoil that affected the living standards of the Russian people. For more information about Russian internal reforms and resultant problems see Simon Pirani, *Change in Putin's Russia: Power, Money and People* (Pluto Pr, 2010), p 32–84. and Padma Desai, *Conversations on Russia: Reform from Yeltsin to Putin*, OUP Catalogue, (2006).
Israeli positions on the peace settlement.\textsuperscript{658} This appeared at the Madrid Peace Conference (1991) when Russia accepted the exclusion of the PLO and Palestinians from East Jerusalem and the diaspora from representation.\textsuperscript{659} Moreover, the Russian Foreign Policy concept that Yeltsin signed in 1992 did not mention Palestinian rights or the Israeli occupation.\textsuperscript{660} For Pogos Akopov, Russian elites and diplomats criticised this policy which exacerbated Russia’s internal problems. He argues that withdrawal from the Middle East peace process under the Kozyrev policy was led to an increase in the decline of Russia’s position in the world. The Kozyrev policy perceived as a gesture of the apparent bankruptcy of the Euro-Atlanticist school in meeting external expectations of Russian elites.\textsuperscript{661}

The coming of Primakov to the Foreign Ministry in 1996 was a sign of a significant change in Russian foreign policy.\textsuperscript{662} Primakov tried to restore Russia’s position in the Middle East through renewing its co-sponsorship of the peace settlement. This change was a response to many internal problems: the state was very weak due to an unsuccessful war in Chechnya, and was close to bankruptcy and incapable of collecting taxes; the change in the political map, especially in the Russian legislative lower house (Duma) which moved further to Eurasianist, Neo-Euransianist and Communist schools which advocated a major role for Russia by a balanced and independent foreign policy, and the appearance of interest groups (Oligarchs) and quasi-independent actors within the government, such as the energy companies, especially Lukoil and Gasprom.\textsuperscript{663} This change revealed the division in the ruling class in Russia, especially the dispute with the Yeltsin line in conducting Russia’s foreign relations. The emergence and re-rise of state and non-state actors that saw further involvement in Middle Eastern politics, especially in peace-mediating, was in favour of Russia’s short and long term interests.\textsuperscript{664} Primakov observed that Russia’s role was at a minimal level and he intended to increase it.\textsuperscript{665} For Oleg

\textsuperscript{658} Kreutz, \textit{Russia in the Middle East: Friend or Foe?} p 52-4.
\textsuperscript{659} Ibid. p 54.
\textsuperscript{660} Ibid. p 54.
\textsuperscript{661} Interview, 'Interview with Pogos Akopov, President of Association of Russian Diplomats.'
\textsuperscript{662} Yevgeny Primakov in known in the Russian political class as Yeltsin’s ambassador to the Duma and an Arabist or “a friend of Saddam Hussein’s” and “an old-school apparatchik. See Primakov, \textit{Russian Crossroads: Toward the New Millennium}, p 122.
\textsuperscript{663} See Pirani, \textit{Change in Putin's Russia: Power, Money and People}, p32-43. and Freedman, \textit{Primakov's Foreign Policy: Russia and the Middle East},
\textsuperscript{664} Kreutz, \textit{Russia in the Middle East: Friend or Foe?}
\textsuperscript{665} Ibid.
Peresypkin, the appointment of Primakov was an attempt to revive Russian influence in the Middle East through playing a role in peace mediating. But he admitted that internal developments such as political, social and economic turmoil and the invasion of Chechnya limited and restrained Russia’s ability to play a role as a peace broker.

Primakov, during his meeting with Arafat in Ramallah in 1997, promised that ‘Russia would recognize a Palestinian state as soon as it was proclaimed’. In 1998, Arafat visited Moscow and met with the new Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov who assured him that Russia’s position on a Palestinian independent state was unchanged. But Russia’s internal situation deteriorated during 1998. The financial crisis and the second Chechnya war led to a further weakness in Russia’s capabilities at both internal and external levels. In 1999, removing Primakov and then Yeltsin from power were gestures of many shifts and changes in the Russian political system which affected Russian foreign policy-making. This influenced Russia’s position in supporting the Palestinian intention to proclaim an independent state. Arafat was intending to proclaim an independent state at the end of the interim period on May 4, 1999. For this purpose, Arafat arrived in Moscow to discover the Russian position on this issue and met with Ivanov who expressed Russia’s ‘strong support for the inalienable right of the Palestinian people’, but he urged Arafat to ‘postpone the proclamation of Palestinian independence’. Practically, most of Russia’s efforts in peace making went to stopping Arafat from continuing his plan to proclaim an independent Palestinian state on September 13, 2000. Accordingly, Russia welcomed the decision taken by the Executive Council of the PLO to postpone the declaration of Palestinian independence.

When Putin became Prime Minister (1999), he celebrated ‘Palestinian Solidarity Day’ in Moscow by playing host to the visiting Arafat. For Andrej Kreutz, Putin needed to show his support and sympathy for the Palestinians and to present himself as a peacemaker

666 Scholar Interview, ‘Interview with Oleg Peresypkin, Former Soviet Diplomat, Diplomatic Academy’, (Moscow, 2013a).
667 Ibid.
668 Kreutz, Russia in the Middle East: Friend or Foe? p 63.
669 Ibid. p 64.
670 Ibid. p 66.
671 Ibid. p69.
673 Kreutz, Russia in the Middle East: Friend or Foe? p66.
to the West and Muslim World which was useful to overcome internal problems, especially his war on Chechnya. Also, to divert international attention from his war on Chechnya and to assure Russia international status, Moscow proposed to hold a new Middle Eastern summit, which however failed to materialise. Putin coming to power represented a new era for Russia. Putin represented a new generation of the ruling class and a new relationship between money and power in Russia. These kinds of relations directed his foreign policy choices. The Chechen wars, the financial crisis, economic integration in the world economy and facing the expansion of NATO served as bases to build an active and effective foreign policy. The Middle East is a vital sphere for Russia where it can assert its actorness and possess economic and financial means that support its Self-oriented policy. In this regard, the Russian role in the peace settlement was perceived as a vital opportunity to reassert Russia’s influence in the Middle East. Accordingly, Putin, at the beginning of his first term of presidency, accepted Arafat’s invitation to visit Palestine, but he conditioned it to suitable circumstances. Therefore, this visit did not happened during Arafat’s lifetime.

In essence, the EU’s and Russia’s involvement in peace-making in the Middle East is a quest to meet internal problems and is viewed as a mechanism for easy access to the region. The EU views that a strategic partnership with ‘key players in the world provide a useful instrument for pursuing European objectives and interests’. The involvement is about preserving this mechanism with or without reaching a peace settlement.

More Process than Peace-making: EU-Russian Perception of the Conflict

The Palestinian-Israeli conflict is one of the longest-running and most continuous and longstanding conflicts in the contemporary world. In the Russian discourse, the conflict is perceived as intractable and chronic. More than that, the Russian Foreign Policy

674 Ibid. p66.
675 Ibid. p66.
678 Kreutz, Russia in the Middle East: Friend or Foe? p67.
Survey identifies the unsettledness of the Arab-Israeli conflict as ‘the roots of the problems’ in the Middle East.\textsuperscript{682} While in the EU discourse, it is viewed as intractable and a major challenge, but claim that finding a solution is ‘a strategic priority for Europe’.\textsuperscript{683}

This perception of the conflict has been emphasised by the nature of the peace process itself which the Oslo Accords laid down. The Oslo Accords, as Orde F. Kittrie argues, are an open-ended gradual negotiation process and designed from the approach of ‘constructive ambiguity’.\textsuperscript{684} This view appears in the EU and Russian discourse on conflict resolution in the emphasis on ‘negotiation’ as the only way to reach a peace settlement.\textsuperscript{685} This fact has been reaffirmed by a series of Independent Task Force reports on reforming the Palestinian Authority.\textsuperscript{686} The failure of the Camp David summit (2000) under the patronage of the US came to the conclusion that collective active efforts were preferred to reach a peace settlement. This has made room to accommodate EU and Russian efforts and to develop a sharper political profile and increase their presence in the process.

Both the EU and Russia emphasise the finding of a solution through a collective format. Solana has emphasised that solving Middle Eastern problems, especially the conflict between the Palestinians and Israelis, should be based on collective efforts.\textsuperscript{687} Similarly, Lavrov stresses collective efforts in approaching a solution to the conflict, which Russia primarily preferred.\textsuperscript{688} This mirrors EU and Russian perceptions of the conflict. In this case, the Quartet as a mediator of collective action for a peace settlement is an opportunity for cooperation and coordination to prevent clashes between the most interested global

\textsuperscript{682} Federation, 'A Survey of Russian Federation Foreign Policy'.
\textsuperscript{683} Commission, 'A Secure Europe in a Better World', ( p. 8.
\textsuperscript{685} See Solana, 'Mediating Today's Conflicts for Tomorrow's Peace', & Saltanov, 'Interview with the Newspaper Vremya Novostei under the Title "Russia Is in Favor of Lifting the Sanctions against Iraq"'.
\textsuperscript{688} Lavrov, 'Interview with Al-Watan Al-Arabi Weekly Newspaper.'
actors in this region. Solana has put the active role of the EU in the Quartet in the context of more presence and more visibility. EU membership in the Quartet has helped in asserting its international identity as a peace-maker. For Russia, membership is a kind of prestige that preserves its actorness in world politics and underpins its presence in Middle East politics.

6.2 The Contexts of the EU and Russia Positions on the Establishment of a Palestinian State

Within the Quartet framework, the Russian discourse towards a peace settlement changed from Primakov to Putin. Primakov insisted on the Madrid Principle, land for peace and Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, while Putin was more pragmatic, looking for a settlement on ‘the basis of the coexistence of two states, Israel and Palestine, living in peace and security’. Accordingly, the establishment of a Palestinian state is no longer a matter of dispute and challenge between most global actors. The creation of “an independent, democratic, viable Palestinian state living side by side with Israel and its neighbours” became a clear objective of the Middle East Quartet. But, it is rather challenging when it comes to final status issues that are linked to the negotiation table such as borders, Jerusalem, refugees, settlements and security matters. The Self-Other perceptions play a role in informing EU and Russian foreign policy-making on these issues. This is clearly obvious in interpreting and analyzing the EU’s and Russia’s position on most of the major events that have happened in the course of the peace process. The meaning of the EU’s and Russia’s foreign policy cannot be better understood without elaborating their positions in a number of contexts. Hence, the EU’s and Russia’s positions on the peace settlement have been elaborated in a series of contexts that inform and restrict their foreign policies. These contexts are those in which the EU and Russia have had to act constituting policy setting and, at the same time, limitations that inform their policy towards a peace settlement.

689 Solana, 'Debate on the Middle East: Plenary Meeting at the European Parliament'.
The Context of International Law and United Nation Resolutions

International law and the UNGA and SC resolutions constitute the legal bases upon which the EU and Russia formulated their official positions regarding a peace settlement. They were framed particularly in the context of USCR 242 and 338 and the Geneva Convention. The discourse of the EU and Russia emphasise a two-state solution with an independent, democratic, viable Palestinian state. During the Yeltsin period Russia stressed UN and international law as a framework to reach a peace settlement. Primakov, in 1996, insisted on the ‘land for peace’ principle which is an interpretation of the UNSCR 242 and 338 was approved by the Madrid Peace Conference (1991). When he met Netanyahu in 1996, Primakov insisted on this formula “Land for peace” as a departure point for a peaceful settlement. This is, according to Victoria Panova, because Russia in the post-Soviet era, was anxious to preserve a greater stake as a permanent member of the Security Council and maintain a role to play in the process of peace-making which gave it further privilege in the Middle East politics. Primakov insisted on this framework because it had been used to underpin Russia’s position as a stakeholder in the peace-making process. Under Putin, one of the main objectives of Russian foreign policy is emphasis on an active and effective role as a permanent SC member. The Russian discourse emphasises the role of the UN as the main centre for ‘regulating international relations’ and it opposes any attempt to belittle this role in world politics. The UN umbrella provides Russia with a large playground in world politics that can serve to enhance its influence.

The cooperation between the EU and the UN has progressed significantly since the establishment of CFSP and increased when the EU paid more attention to the construction of its normative powers. The UN umbrella serves the EU central objectives as a

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691 Resolution 242 constituted the main foundation on which most of the international positions emerged towards the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The resolution has been framed in three main categories: inadmissibility of using force for achieving political goals, reaffirmation of the right for all states to live in peace and security, reaffirmation of a just settlement of conflict’s issues.

692 Kreutz, Russia in the Middle East: Friend or Foe? p 60.

693 Ibid. p 60.

694 Interview, 'Interview with Victoria Panova, Specialist in Russia Foreign Policy'.

695 Concept, 'The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation'.

696 In 1974, the UN granted the European community a significant observer status in the General Assembly, without the right to vote. EU foreign policy and the universal mission of the UN share three major themes, the conflict in the world, promoting human rights and democracy, and support the world economic prosperity. According to Philippe Adriaenssens the Treaties of Maastricht (1993) and Amsterdam (1999) provided tools that lead to “ever more overlapping agendas” between the EU and UN, and have been
normative power in the field of human rights, democracy, rule of law and good governance. However, the EU utilised international law and the UNSCRs regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to bridge the gap of its member states’ position on the conflict and came up with a unified position on its mediation role. That is, the EU uses international law and the UNSCRs to underpin a unified European foreign policy that represents the EU as a whole.

Although the EU’s and Russia’s positions on establishing a Palestinian state are based on UNSCRs and the Geneva Convention, most final status issues are left to the negotiation table. That is, the discourse is based on, but in practice is not restricted to international law and UN resolutions. All issues in this process of peace-making are subject to negotiation and negotiation only. This context is used to take a position on many issues regarding the Palestinian-Israeli conflict such as the Apartheid Separation Wall and the Hamas-led government.

The Context of Cooperation for Security and Stability

Internal concerns regarding security and stability is one of the main wider contexts that inform the EU and Russian perception of the Middle East. The question of establishing a Palestinian state, in this context, is perceived as a strategic objective that reinforces and underpins the security environment of both Russia and the EU. For Russia, support for the establishment of a Palestinian state was perceived as an opportunity that helped to enhance the security environment that Russia faced during the second half of the nineties and the first decade of the new millennium. Being a key player in this question, Russia, had a hand in this security arrangement. Medvedev emphasised that Russian security in large part lies in the Middle East. Also, Russia’s National Security Strategy referred to the conflict as one of the main elements that had a negative influence on security environment of Russia. Thus, the enforcement of security and ensuring Russian territorial integrity is one of the main objectives that informs Russia’s policy towards an active involvement in

fabricated in a wide range of collaborative fields. See Philippe Adriaenssens, 'Rapprochement between the EU and the UN: History and Balance of Intersecting Political Cultures', European Foreign Affairs Review, 13/1 (2008), 53-72, p54, 56, 63 &70.

697 See Solana, 'Mediating Today's Conflicts for Tomorrow's Peace'. & Saltanov, 'Interview with the Newspaper Vremya Novostei under the Title "Russia Is in Favor of Lifting the Sanctions against Iraq"'.

698 Russian Presidency, 'Results of the Visit to the Middle East : Dmitry Medvedev Answered Journalists’ Questions on the Outcome of His Visit to Jordan and Palestine.', (Amman, 2009b).

the peace process. Chechnya and Dagestan in the South Caucasus are considered to be security vulnerabilities that are easily influenced by the conflict in the Middle East. Russia is in favour of making a peace that underpins and harmonises with its own internal security environment.

Russia participated in the Berlin Conference in Support of Palestinian Civil Security which struggled to find ways to defuse security problems and support the PA in strengthening civil security forces and the rule of law in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Lavrov stated that security is a ‘substantial, integral element of the rise of Palestinian statehood’ and is an obligation of the PA under the Roadmap. He stressed that ‘ensuring the security of Israel’ is a major aim of Russian efforts. In addition, Putin stresses the idea that Israel is home to around one million or more former Soviet and Russian citizens. He wants to ‘see them live in peace and security’. In this respect, Russia has participated in providing special training to hundreds of Palestinian security officers. Also, Russia provided two civilian helicopters and fifty BTR-70 armoured personnel carriers although Israel refused to hand them over to the PA. Russia is eager to participate in the security arrangement in the area which leads it to reinforce its security capabilities and enhance its security sphere which is very important for its internal security and stability.

The EU discourse, in parallel, dedicates a large section of its peace process policy to security matters. The Security Strategy Paper that was presented in 2003 considers finding a resolution for the Palestinian–Israeli conflict a ‘strategic priority for Europe’. Obviously, it stresses that ‘the EU must remain engaged and ready to commit resources to the problem until it is solved’. Javier Solana said that ‘we need a Palestinian Authority that is more able and more determined to serve its population and the security of all’.

702 Russian Presidency, 'Meeting with Prime Minister of Israel Binyamin Netanyahu', (2012).
703 Affairs, 'Transcript of Remarks by Sergey Lavrov at the Berlin Conference in Support of Palestinian Civil Security and the Rule of Law'.
704 Ibid.
706 Ibid. p 8.
707
Furthermore, the EU’s plan to build a ‘common zone of peace, security and prosperity’ will not be possible ‘unless a just and lasting settlement of the conflict is in place’.

Moreover, EU policy focuses on ensuring Israeli security through the search for its own. This is clearly the case when the EU directly links the idea of establishing a Palestinian State with the security of Israel. The discourse strongly emphasises the idea that a democratic and viable Palestinian state is a guarantee for Israeli security. This explicitly clarifies the declaration of Berlin European Council in 1999, in which the EU considers ‘the creation of a democratic, viable and peaceful sovereign Palestinian state [...] would be the best guarantee of Israel’s security’. That security informs the perspective that works towards the establishment of a Palestinian state. Hence, the EU discourse is full of these meanings that prioritise Israel and its security needs. In the joint paper entitled ‘State Building for Peace in the Middle East: an EU Action Strategy’, Solana and Ferrero-Waldner state that “only an independent, democratic and viable Palestinian state can be a reliable neighbour for Israel.”

According to this context, the EU has engaged to work on active plans that underpin this perspective. The discourse of security has been transferred to more actual mechanisms under the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The ENP has set up an action plan that outlines the commitments of partner countries. The EU-Palestinian Authority action sets out priority objectives to be achieved and attaches particular importance to strengthening the fight against terrorism and incitement to violence and cooperating in the fight against racism and xenophobia, in particular anti-Semitism and Islamophobia. Indeed, in 2005, the EU set up ‘the European Union mission for the Palestinian territories’ (EUPOL COPPS) which implements its mandate in the context of objectives of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. Its purpose is to support the establishment of ‘modern and democratic police forces’ in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

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711 On 14 November 2005, the European Council established the EU Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS) under the EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The council mention that the setting up of ‘the European Union Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories’ (EUPOL COPPS) was based on the EU as a member of the Quartet on Middle East as a peace mediator and its
In addition, the EU agreed to play a role in the security agreement between Israel and the Palestinian Authority on the Rafah Crossing Point in 2005. In return, the EU has established a European Union Border Assistance Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point (EU BAM Rafah). Therefore, the decision on the establishment of EU BAM Rafah has taken into consideration the security implications of the opening of the Rafah crossing point which will implement its mandate in the context of a situation which poses threats to the objectives of the Common Foreign and Security Policy as set out in Article 11 of the Treaty. In her opening statement at the 2008 annual meeting of the donor coordination group for the Palestinian people, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, Commissioner for External Relations, points out ‘mutual reinforcement between the Palestinian security efforts and increased Israeli trust’ and the Palestinian security plan can have immediate and visible impact.

Within this context, EU and Russian efforts in the process of peace-making are bonded to security concerns, and the reinforcement of the security environment is a priority. The establishment of a Palestinian state is conditioned to be ‘the best guarantee of Israel’s security’. This context informed EU and Russian policy-making, to varying degrees, such as Arafat’s siege, the reform of Palestinian institutions, the Hamas-led government and the Gaza blockade.

Commitment to assist and facilitate the implementation of “the Road Map” for peace. And the mission will implement its mandate in the context of ‘a situation which poses a threat to law and order, the security and safety of individuals, and to the stability of the area and which could harm the objectives of the Common Foreign and Security Policy as set out in Article 11 of the Treaty’. For more information see European Council, ‘Council Joint Action on the European Union Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories’, (Brussels: Official Journal of the European Union, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2005/l_300/l_30020051117en00650069.pdf accessed online on 02/09/2013


The Context of EU and Russian Relations with Israel

Employing EU and Russian perception of Israelis is very important in interpreting their positions of establishing a Palestinian state. Jews have been perceived in a mixed view of sympathy and victimhood following the WWII tragedy. Laura Jeffery and Matei Candea argue that ‘victimhood establishes a space for a specific kind of politics’, an example of which is the Stockholm Declaration of 2000 which instituted Holocaust Memorial Day signed by most EU member states. In 2005, the European Parliament adopted a resolution in remembrance of the Holocaust, Anti-Semitism and Racism, holding an official annual ceremony for the remembrance of Holocaust victims. For the first time victimhood was considered as part of the EU discourse towards Israel. The speeches (delivered in the Knesset by Presidents of the EU Parliament, Lord Plumb of Coleshill (1989), Nicole Fontaine (2000), Hans-Gert Pöttering (2007), and Jerzy Buzek (2011), and addresses (by the EU member state leaders such as Federal Chancellor of Germany, Angela Merkel (2008), the President of France, Nicolas Sarkozy (2008), President of Hungary, Laszlo Solyom (2008), and the Prime Minister of Italy Silvio Berlusconi (2010) showed the EU sympathy and solidarity with Israelis.

The Russian discourse is different from the western European. For Alexander Saltanov, Russian-Israeli relations are deep in terms of ‘the political, economic, cultural and humanitarian spheres’. Putin, in an interview with Israeli Television Channel One before he made the first visit of a Russian President to Israel, focused on the Soviet Union which was one of the founders of Israel and the sacrifice of 30 million Soviet citizens who were killed during WWII to defeat Nazism and save the world. In his discourse, Putin emphasised the role of the Red Army in the liberation of Auschwitz and the need to preserve ‘the memory of those who died at the hands of the Nazis, and those who fought

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717 Many EU leaders and officials that visited Israel have expressed their sympathy and solidarity with the ‘unparalleled suffering inflicted on the Jewish people’. Hans-Gert Pöttering in 2007 said ‘I pay homage to all the victims of the Shoah’, and Jerzy Buzek in 2011 said ‘The uniqueness of the Shoah is unquestioned’. See their speeches to the Knesset in 2007 and 2011.
718 Saltanov, 'Russia Is in Favor of Lifting the Sanctions against Iraq'.
719 Vladimir Putin, 'Interview with Israeli Television Channel One', (Moscow, 2005a).
Nazism’. In 2012, accordingly, Vladimir Putin took part in a ceremony of unveiling a monument to the Red Army’s victory over Nazi Germany in the city of Netanya. Furthermore, Putin considers Russians and Israelis to be on the front line against fascism and anti-Semitism, which is ‘not a Russian invention’. Putin emphasised the protection of Judaism by Russian Law as one of the traditional Russian religions. That is, Russia shows sympathy to Jews, but takes the Holocaust on its side when dealing with Israelis.

The EU has attempted to avoid the misunderstanding in which it will be perceived as pro-Palestinian and anti-Israeli though the EU seems to be eager to present its neutrality and give an impression of credibility by taking an official position in light of international law. In defending the EU position on the peace settlement, Solana makes clear that ‘we are pro-peace, pro-security, and pro-justice’. Certainly, the EU has vowed to fight anti-Semitism. In the last decade, the EU has been accused, especially by American and Israeli think-tanks and media, of anti-Semitism rising in Europe, which in turn influences EU policy towards the Middle East. Javier Solana addressed this issue at the European Parliament by saying that ‘we will not tolerate anti-Semitism, but neither can we tolerate the insinuation that anti-Semitism drives our policy’. This could imply that the historical relationship between Europe and its Jews still chases EU policy-makers. On the sixty-fifth anniversary of the Holocaust, Catherin Ashton honoured the memory of all victims and said ‘this dark period in European and world history must not be forgotten, denied or repeated’. Thus, the EU discourse always emphasises the reality that the creation of Israel was a European effort to “atone for the sins of the Holocaust”. Thus, in the European mind-set, Israeli Jews are often perceived as victims.

In addition to the geostrategic place of Israel in the Middle East and its role as a regional actor, this perception helped to boost EU-Israel relations which are marked by interdependence and a deep cooperation in the domains of economic, trade, security and science. The Association Agreement between the EU and Israel focuses on the need to

720 Vladimir Putin, 'Opening Address at the Meeting with Israeli Veterans of the Great Patriotic War', (Jerusalem, 2005b).
721 Putin, 'Interview with Israeli Television Channel One'.
722 Ibid.
724 See ibid. p. 5.
725 Catherine Ashton, 'Statement by the High Representative Catherine Ashton on the Holocaust Remembrance Day', (Brussels, 2010).
promote a further integration of the Israeli economy into the European economy, strengthening the political stability in the region, maintaining a dialogue on economic, scientific, cultural and technological matters that is intended to create a ‘new climate for their economic relations and in particular for the development of trade, investment and economic and technological cooperation’. Israel is one of the EU’s leading trade partners in the Mediterranean region and the 25th major trading partner globally. Israel is part of many EU research programmes such as the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Framework Programme for Research and Development, and the navigation satellite program, Galileo. More than ten sub-committees between the EU and Israel have been established to implementing and underpin EU-Israeli cooperation.

To Russia, relations with the Israelis are about finding opportunities. Russian-Israeli relations have been growing stronger under Putin’s presidency especially after Russia ‘ceased to politicise’ the former Soviet and Russian emigrants in Israel. The ideological contradiction has declined and a new bilateral base built on mutual interests. In the context of Russia-Israeli relations, ideology no longer plays a role. For A. Kreutz Israel is perceived by the Russian ruling elite as ‘the most strategic ally in the region’. In addition, this cooperation has been prompted by the Russian speaking community in Israel. Primakov, during his first meeting with Netanyahu as Prime Minister in 1996, came to a point that ‘one could do business with Netanyahu in seeking to settle the conflict’. The importance of Israel to Russia is perceived in terms of: the Russian speaking community in Israel about whom Putin stated that he ‘wanted them to live in peace and security’, geopolitical and strategic calculations in which Israel is viewed as an important regional actor in the Mediterranean Sea, especially regarding the Levant Basin; and high-tech weaponry industries and security cooperation, particularly where

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726 See the Protocol to the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, on the one part, and the State of Israel, of the other part, on Conformity Assessment and Acceptance of Industrial Products.
729 Ibid.
731 Kreutz, Russia in the Middle East: Friend or Foe? p69.
732 Ibid. p69.
733 Primakov, Russian Crossroads: Toward the New Millennium. p197.
Israel has high-tech qualified industries. In addition, Israel has become an important economic partner with Russia and their economic ties have been strengthened since the coming of Putin to power in 2000. Thus, Russia is looking for balanced relations with Israel on the basis of mutual interests.

Furthermore, Israel is perceived as a key channel to the west. A. Kreutz argues that between the Russian elites there is an approach that Russian Jews in Israel could serve as a ‘unique bridge, linking Russia and the West in science and technology’. A study published by the Russian International Affairs Council in 2012 has argued that Israel’s support by the West, especially the US, is ‘on the wane’ and it is ‘becoming more isolated within the international arena’. This view is enhanced by Russia reacting to the changes in the map of regional actors in the Middle East in the context of “the Arab Spring” which affects the geostrategic environment of Israel. The reduction in the US’s ability to ‘define the trends and events in the Middle East further deepens Israel’s isolation’.

Within this context, the EU and Russia are prioritising their relations with the Israelis over those with the Palestinians. Additionally, the context of victimhood paves the way to an extraordinary environment to build a strong relationship between the EU and Israelis. That is, these perceptions of Israel inform EU and Russian foreign policy, though in varying degrees.

The Context of Peace Making and State-Building

The EU is more active and effective than Russia in this context. This can be attributed to Self-perception as a peacemaker and normative actor. That is, playing a role in this context is congruent with its Self-perception as a normative power and meets its aspiration of being a soft power. Russian participation is at a minimal level and emphasises its position as a global actor and preserves its prestige among the major global players. It focuses on the political sponsorship of the project of establishing a Palestinian state through the UN’s institutions and organisations, and supports this project politically and diplomatically on the international stage. The Russian discourse emphasises that Russia has recognised Palestine as an independent state since 1988, enjoying full diplomatic

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735 Kreutz, *Russia in the Middle East: Friend or Foe?* p 71.
737 Ibid. p 16.
relations with Russia\textsuperscript{738} while the EU has only confirmed its intention to support peace-making and state-building by mobilising the Union’s political, economic and financial means.\textsuperscript{739} In other words, the EU has supported the establishment of a Palestinian state on practical terms through associating state-building with institutional settings and strengthening \textit{de facto} state powers on the ground, while Russia supports the Palestinian-state-building in political terms through creating international political legitimacy.

The EU discourse of state-building represents its ambition to shape the peace process from its viewpoint. This includes using instruments that underpin its policy. It also intends to perform its Self-perception as a peacemaker in building infrastructures for peace that can take many shapes. In this context of infrastructure-building for peace, the EU has supported a series of Independent Task Forces to ‘strengthen and reform Palestinian public institutions’ led by the former French Prime Minister, Michel Rocard, in 1999\textsuperscript{740}, 2003, 2004 and 2006.\textsuperscript{741} These task forces remain the most detailed and authoritative guide on the assessment of Palestinian institutions. This assessment is built on the good governance standards which are seen as ‘a necessary condition for peace processes’.\textsuperscript{742} The recommendations of the Independent Force Task report in 1999 along with the peace plan proposed by the Mitchell Commission (30 April 2001) which was supported by Russia,\textsuperscript{743} constituted the bases for the ‘Road Map’ which has been endorsed by the Middle East Quartet.\textsuperscript{744}


\textsuperscript{740} The recommendations of the first report appeared in the Presidency Conclusion of the Stockholm European Council in March 2001. That was when it called upon ‘the Palestinian Authority to adopt without delay’ financial and political reforms.


\textsuperscript{742} See Sayigh, Shikaki, and Rocard, \textit{Strengthening Palestinian Public Institutions.}, p. 11.

\textsuperscript{743} Sergei Blagov, Politics-Russia: Moscow Seeks a Role in Middle East Peace Process’, \textit{Inter Press Service News Agency}, 2001.

\textsuperscript{744} In April 2003, the Quartet adopted the Road Map which sets out the steps towards realising a comprehensive peace settlement. The plan was that an independent, democratic and viable Palestinian state
The Road Map and Palestinian Statehood

The Road Map was the first collective framework calling for the establishment of a Palestinian state as an objective of most global actors in Middle Eastern politics. The EU and Russia, as active members of the Quartet, adopted this question as a priority and a strategic objective. The establishment of a Palestinian state became a political fact at the end of the five years interim period of Palestinian self-government as stipulated in the Oslo Accords that came to an end on May 4, 1999.745 The Berlin Declaration (1999), which immediately followed this period to avoid a Palestinian unilateral declaration of independence, along with Quartet membership represented a deep involvement of the EU in shaping and influencing the peace-making process. The EU, within the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) framework, set out a new framework reinforcing peace-building in ‘preparation for the establishment of an independent and viable Palestinian State’.746 An Action Plan was adopted as a ‘working and guiding tool’ for the implementation of mutual commitments in the course of peace.747 While Russia paid more attention to legalising the nature of the Road Map through drafting resolution 1515 to the UNSC which called for the implementation of the Road Map commitments by the Israelis and Palestinians under the supervision of the Quartet.748 Within this context, EU Self-perception as a normative and soft power informed its policies towards the establishment of a Palestinian state as a peace project in the Middle East. That is to say, that the should have emerged by 2005. Under the Quartet’s pressure, the Palestinian Authority in 2002 adopted ‘a wide-ranging programme of reform’. And in March 2003, the Palestinian Legislative Council endorsed a number of changes and reforms. The revision of the Basic Law to establish the post of prime minister was a major change and financial control over the PA’s public finances was a major reform. See European Commission, ‘Country Report : Palestinian Authority of the West Bank and Gaza Strip’, in Enp (ed.), (Brussels: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/pa_enp_country_report_2004_en.pdf, accessed on 11/09/2013., 2004a). p 6 & 16.

745 Palestinian Self-Government, known as the Palestinian Authority, was founded in accordance with the Oslo Accord 1993. The Accords endorsed the establishment of state institutions including the Palestinian Legislative Council. The Accords call it ‘the elected council (“Council”), was formed to represent the Palestinian People in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in order to lead the negotiations with Israel that were intended to reach a permanent settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Arafat was elected head of the executive branch and other institutions founded to run Palestinian day to day life. For more information see As’ Ad Ghanem, ‘Founding Elections in a Transitional Period: The First Palestinian General Elections’, The Middle East Journal, (1996), 513-28. p 515-8

746 Commission, 'EU/Palestinian Authority Action Plan'. (747) The EU/Palestinian Authority Action Plan stated that the implementation will ‘significantly advance the approximation of Palestinian legislation, norms and standards to those of the European Union’. Correspondingly, the progress report in 2006 pointed out the aspiration of the Palestinian Reform Program which aimed at building the institutions of an independent, democratic and viable Palestinian state through support reforms in areas of democracy, good governance, economic development and trade.

748 Affairs, 'Press Release on Adoption by Un Security Council of Resolution Backing Road Map for Middle East Settlement',
envisioned Palestinian state should be consistent with the principles and values that it is committed to promote. Russia, in turn, is very keen to be perceived as a supporter of Palestinian rights and supports state building and the peace process as a mechanism to facilitate its access to the region.

6.3 The Road to the Establishment of a Palestinian State

The way towards Palestinian statehood during the last decade has been defined by landmark events that came in the course of the above contexts. For the EU and Russia, taking a position on events thrown up by the peace settlement is about seizing opportunities in order to enhance influence and reinforce their actorness.

The Arab League Peace Initiative

Putin welcomed the initiative by addressing the Arab League meeting in Beirut when what is known as the Arab Peace Initiative 2002 which became one of the foundations of the peace settlement was declared. Solana, in turn, welcomed the Initiative and called for an ‘International Conference’ similar to the Madrid Conference in 2003. Russia placed the Initiative on the legal basis of reaching a peace settlement between Israel from one side and Palestinians, Lebanese and Syrians on the other. Solana, likewise, stressed the importance of the Initiative as one of the legal bases for a lasting and just peace and went on to state that there can be no peace without implementing the Initiative.

Russia and the EU have been very keen to implement the Arab League Initiative which comes within UN resolutions and is compatible with the Madrid principle of “land for peace”. The Initiative formed an important bridge to enhance EU and Russian relations with the Arab World. It constituted an opportunity to facilitate further access to the region. Moreover, the Initiative offers a normalisation of relations between the Arab countries and Israel which is viewed as the main foundation for stability and security in the Middle East. But, EU and Russian efforts to implement the Initiative were limited by Israeli’s stance.

The Israeli Government refused to respond to this Initiative and Sharon, at that time, went so far as to imprison Arafat in his headquarters in Ramallah.\footnote{Israel had accused Arafat of responsibility for the second Intifadah and said further, that he was behind the re-establishment of the Fatah armed resistant group called “Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades”. Also, he was accused of giving the green light to resistance movements especially the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) which had assassinated Right-wing Israeli cabinet minister Rehavam Ze'evi in a Jerusalem hotel. See The Telegraph, 'Who's Who in the Middle East Conflict', The Telegraph, 2003.}

The Siege of Arafat and Institutional Reform

Since the Berlin Declaration, the EU has been the leading actor in funding and supervising the process of Palestinian state-building. Based on its Self-perception as a soft normative power, the EU is the leading actor in the Quartet interested in reforming and strengthening Palestinian institutions. EU efforts to reform Palestinian institutions increased after the escalation of the second Intifada into an armed conflict and with the coming to power of Sharon as premier in February 2001.\footnote{The second Palestinian Intifada (Al-Aqsa intifada) erupted after Sharon made a visit to Al-Aqsa Mosque 28 Sep. 2000.} The escalation of the conflict increased the level of insecurity and instability in the region. The reading of this situation appeared in the Seville European Council conclusions (June 2002), in which the EU emphasised ‘security reform, early elections and political and administrative reform’.\footnote{European Council, 'Seville European Council, Presidency Conclusions', (Brussels, 2002).} This reform, particularly in the security sector, became a priority and was seen as essential in the light of the European security strategy which was supposed to provide a secure environment outside EU borders.\footnote{See Commission, 'A Secure Europe in a Better World', (and Solana and Ferrero-Waldner, 'State Building for Peace in the Middle East: An EU Action Strategy', (} Accordingly, the EU, along with the other Quartet members, especially the US, increased its efforts to pressure Arafat to make good his commitment to these reforms.

These efforts came in the context of Israeli accusations of Arafat of the responsibility of the militarisation of the Al-Aqsa intifada and of being behind the weapon-carrying Karin A ship seized by Israeli forces in the Red Sea in January 2002.\footnote{James Bennet, 'Seized Arms Would Have Vastly Extended Arafat Arsenal', New York Times, 2002.} Consequently, Sharon imprisoned Arafat at his headquarters in Ramallah. This action plus the reform of the Palestinian Authority became central to the peace process. Putin had stressed that Arafat is ‘an internationally recognised leader’ and his existence is very necessary as a partner for a peace settlement.\footnote{Kreutz, Russia in the Middle East: Friend or Foe?p73.} In 2003, Moscow was invited by the US to shun Arafat in order to force the Palestinians to replace him, but Russia refused.\footnote{Ibid.p73.} The EU, along with the US,
was focused on reforming the Palestinian Authority. This process of reform conformed to the EU’s views and criteria that were consistent with its normative values and principles. The capacity and efficiency of the PA is limited to the international donor community whose financial assistance has had a ‘major impact on the development of all branches of Palestinian government’. The EU, as the largest donor to the PA, influenced this process of reform. This conditionality mechanism was present in the ENP through applying the reforming Action Plan.\footnote{Sayigh, Shikaki, and Rocard, \textit{Strengthening Palestinian Public Institutions}, p27.}

The agenda on reforming Palestinian public institutions was set out by the Task Force Reports. Arafat undertook significant reforms regarding the signing of the Basic Law and the Judiciary Law, appointing Salam Fayyad as Minister of Finance to place expenditure and revenue under the control of the Ministry of Finance and the creation of the position of Prime Minister\footnote{Michel Rocard, ‘Reforming the Palestinian Authority: An Update’.p6&7.} which was one of the most significant reforms that Arafat undertook. The EU’s view was to shift power to the office of the prime minister in order to marginalise Arafat and to run day-to-day activities, especially in the security sector.\footnote{For more information about to this view see ibid.p12.}

Later, Russia changed its position and shared EU and US views on Arafat and the reformation of the Palestinian Authority. Ivanov, in his visit to Ramallah in July 2003, was asked by Arafat representatives to assist in the ‘restoration of the freedom of movement of Yasser Arafat’. He replied by insisting on the need to ‘end violence and terror’ which ‘make the peace process irreversible’.\footnote{Ibid.}

Mahmoud Abbas came to power as the first Prime Minister of the PA on 19 March 2003.\footnote{Sausan Ghosheh, ‘Arafat Chooses Palestinian Prime Minister’, \textit{CNN}, 2003.} In conjunction to that (on 30 April), the Quartet presented the Road Map for peace.\footnote{The Road Map was based on a speech of former American President Bush on 24 June 2002 in which he called for the establishment of a Palestinian state. See Tanya Reinhart, \textit{The Road Map to Nowhere: Israel/Palestine since 2003} (Verso, 2006).} Phase I of the Road Map addressed ending terror and violence, normalising Palestinian life, and building Palestinian institutions.\footnote{Ibid.} Accordingly, the PA was required
to conduct political reform including running Presidential and Parliamentary elections. Abbas formed the ‘inter-ministerial Reform Committee’ which produced a 100 Day Reform Plan, and made serious efforts to attach security services ‘accountable to the Cabinet’\textsuperscript{768} in order to fulfil the security commitments of the Road Map, but he resigned after less than six months in office.\textsuperscript{769} This was considered a heavy blow to the reform process.\textsuperscript{770} This reform agenda was pursued after the death of Arafat and Abbas came to power as the elected President of the PA on January 2005.

In conjunction with these reforms of Palestinian public institutions, there were attempts to facilitate the negotiation process on final status issues. The Geneva Initiative was one of these attempts that considered a draft agreement. The importance of the Initiative lies in proposing solutions for many of final status issues, especially those of the refugees and Jerusalem.

**The Geneva Initiative**

The EU and Russia gave considerable support to this Initiative in the course of seeking a peace settlement to the conflict. In 2004, Solana considered the Initiative as timely and important, and said that it points in the right direction to facilitate peace negotiations.\textsuperscript{771} For Russia, the initiative could be presumed as ‘an attempt’ to ‘overcome the present dead-end situation in Palestinian-Israeli settlement’ and the ideas and suggestions that the Initiative outlined ‘do not run counter’ to the Road Map which Russia had considered as the ‘sole real program’ for establishing a Palestinian State.\textsuperscript{772} The shadow of the EU and Russia as sponsors existed when Javier Solana and Igor Ivanov met the authors of the Initiative before and after its appearance in public. The support is compatible with Russia’s and the EU’s general objective in finding a solution for the conflict in a collective formula through the cosponsorship of international society.

The initiative is unofficial and outlines a compromise for most of the final status causes that mostly pours into the Israeli interests. And at the same time, the Initiative presented views that served their activeness and actorness in peace mediation and boosted their

\textsuperscript{768} Michel Rocard, ‘Reforming the Palestinian Authority: An Update’.p8.
\textsuperscript{769} Cnn, ‘Palestinian Prime Minister Abbas Resigns’, 2003.
\textsuperscript{770} Michel Rocard, ‘Reforming the Palestinian Authority: An Update’.p8.
\textsuperscript{772} The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Press Release in Relation to Presentation of "Geneva Accord" on Palestinian-Israeli Settlement', (Moscow, 2003a).
image as peacemakers. For Menachem Klein it was a ‘breakthrough’ and has become ‘the principle reference framework’ in the discourse on the conflict and as ‘the principle model of a permanent agreement’ between the Israelis and Palestinians.\textsuperscript{773} In the meantime, it was considered by the EU and Russia as “a valuable contribution” to the negotiation process and was well-suited to related UN resolutions. By and large, it supports and facilitates Russia’s and EU’s efforts to cosponsor a peace settlement.

\textbf{The Apartheid Separation Wall}

The Wall is one of the main elements that have political and security implications in relation to a prospective Palestinian state. The Wall has many consequences in different aspects that concern the EU and Russia. Along with humanitarian, social, health and economic repercussions that are extremely negative, it has deep political implications in terms of legitimising the Israeli settlements in the West Bank, violation of international law and UN-related resolutions and creates \textit{de facto} realities that obstruct peace negotiations.\textsuperscript{774} Peter Lagerquist contextualises the matter of building this Wall as ‘the bantustanisation of the West Bank and any Palestinian state on some 50 percent of the territory’.\textsuperscript{775}

The EU’s and Russia’s discourse on the Apartheid Wall, which was built on occupied land based on international law and UN resolutions,\textsuperscript{776} follows. Russia considered it as a counterproductive step to peace efforts exerted by the Quartet. On October 2003, Russia voted in favour of a resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly to stop the construction of the Separation Wall.\textsuperscript{777} In addition, Russia expressed its regret at the US veto in the Security Council against the condemnation of the Separation Wall. But, practically, it refused the idea of imposing economic sanctions on Israel in order to force it

\textsuperscript{775} Peter Lagerquist, ‘Fencing the Last Sky: Excavating Palestine after Israel’s “Separation Wall”’, (2004),p5.
\textsuperscript{777} Affairs, ‘Press Release on the Adoption by UN General Assembly of a Resolution on the Situation in Palestinian-Israeli Relations’.
to comply with international law and UN resolutions. That is, Russia’s position on this matter was informed by the desire of asserting its actorness.

But in the absence of any real pressure from the EU or Russia, Israel continued building the Wall, laying its logic on the security perspective. Peter Lagerquist argues that because of the lack of any real opposition by the EU and the other sponsors of the Road Map, the Wall’s ‘designs accordingly became bolder’. That is, such matters were subject to relations with the Israelis and their security perspective more than UN resolutions and international law. Meanwhile, the Sharon Government diverted the focus of political and diplomatic efforts towards the so-called “unilateral disengagement plan from Gaza Strip and North West Bank”.

**Disengagement from Gaza and the Palestinian Elections**

The Israeli redeployment from the Gaza Strip has been perceived as a step that could improve the peace process and was hailed by the international community, especially the Quartet members, as a step towards the establishment of a viable Palestinian state. Russia considered it as a step ‘in restoring the peace process’ and it ‘must fit in the Road Map’. Putin in his letter to Abbas considered it as ‘a prologue to implement the Road Map’. Likewise, Solana considered it as an opportunity to ‘restart the implementation of the Road Map’.

In anticipation of this Israeli step, the report of the Task Force on Strengthening Palestinian Public Institutions (2004) stressed the completion of the Palestinian Presidential and parliamentary elections as necessary reforms in order to prevent scenarios of a rapid degeneration or drift that was facing the PA. In addition, pushing ahead towards the conduct of elections perceived a renewing PA legitimacy, capitalised upon

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778 Presidency, ‘Results of the Visit to the Middle East: Dmitry Medvedev Answered Journalists’ Questions on the Outcome of His Visit to Jordan and Palestine.’.
779 Lagerquist, ‘Fencing the Last Sky: Excavating Palestine after Israel's “Separation Wall”’, (p28).
780 See Michel Rocard, ‘Reforming the Palestinian Authority: An Update’ , p10-6.
783 The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘President Vladimir Putin Sent a Message to President of the Palestinian National Authority Mahmoud Abbas, October 18, 2005’, in Mfa Press Department (ed.), (Moscow, 2005a).
Hamas’ popularity into parliamentary seats and were integrated into the political system that would ‘make vigilante violence illegal and make it possible for the new government to collect illegal arms’. And the report called upon the international community actively to encourage and assist the PA reform especially in the conduct of these elections, financial transparency and the rehabilitation of PA security services. Accordingly, in April 2005, James Wolfensohn, the former president of the World Bank, was appointed as the Quartet Especial Envoy for the Israeli disengagement plan from Gaza with the task of supervising the three-year development plan worth a total of US$9 billion.

In September 2005, Israelis forces redeployed from the Gaza Strip. EU policy focused on security arrangements, political and democratic reforms, and financial aid that helped to facilitate this redeployment from the Gaza Strip. In November 2005, the EU agreed to play a third party role between the Israelis and Palestinians in a security arrangement on Rafah Crossing Point and to modernise and democratise the Palestinian security forces.

Accordingly the EU and Russia continued implementing the Road Map, in particular with regard to conducting the Parliamentary elections. After the death of Arafat, and under international community sponsorship, especially the Quartet and particularly the EU, Russia and the US, the Parliamentary elections were conducted on 25th January 2006. Hamas won the Parliamentary election with an overwhelming majority close to 2/3 of the seats (79 of 132).

Consequently, the Quartet on 30 January stated that:

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786 Ibid.p1-2.
787 Ibid.p15-7.
788 See Council, 'Council Joint Action on Establishing a European Union Border Assistance Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point (EU Bam Rafah)'
789 When Abbas issued a decree postponing the Palestinian Parliamentary election from 17 July 2005 to 25 January 2006, Russia ‘regards this decision with understanding’. And Moscow presumes that free and fair elections will constitute an important step towards ‘exerting a positive influence on Palestinian-Israeli settlement’. Russia had sent observers to monitor the Parliamentary elections and they stated that ‘the freedom of the expression of the will of Palestinian voters was ensured’ and the Palestinians demonstrated the ‘ability to advance along the road of creating their own state’. Similarly, the EU election observation mission assured that an open and fairly-contested electoral process had successfully and professionally conducted by independent Palestinian Central Elections Commission. See The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Press Release Regarding Decision by Palestinian National Authority to Postpone Parliamentary Elections', in Mfa Press Department (ed.), (Moscow, 2005b)., The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Statement by Russian Observers Concerning Palestinian Legislative Council Elections', in Mfa Press Department (ed.), (Moscow, 2006c). & European Union Election Observation Mission, 'Palestinian Legislative Council Elections 25 January 2006', (2006).
All members of a future Palestinian government must be committed to nonviolence, recognition of Israel, and acceptance of previous agreements and obligations, including the Roadmap. Accordingly, the development plan was suspended, Wolfensohn resigned and the EU, the largest donor to the PA, along with the US, withheld its donated money to the development plan. Hamas formed a government in March 2006 and the programme did not include the acceptance of Quartet conditions. For the EU it was ‘unacceptable’ and not compatible with ‘European principles’. And for Russia, it does not meet the agreed Quartet conditions. Therefore, a boycott applied to the Hamas-led Government except states that are classified as neutral or anti-western such as Iran and Syria.

Through its victory in the 2006 Parliamentary election, Hamas moved from a non-state to a state actor. Yezid Sayigh argues that the rise of Hamas as a state-actor ‘disbursed $9.5 billions’ of financial aid in support of MEPP. This shift changed the course of peace-making and represented an obstacle to the peace process. The Hamas-led government’s political programme was inconsistent with criteria that were set-up by all global actors involved in the peace-making process. Thus the position taken on a Hamas-led government was not on its democratic legitimacy through fair and free elections, but focused instead upon whether it had international legitimacy through accepting Quartet conditions. In other words, the Hamas-led government is consistent with the European criteria of democracy, but incompatible with other criteria.

In this respect, the Quartet conditions are an embodiment of these criteria of actoriness and fit in the above contexts. Hamas believes in armed resistance to the Israeli occupation which the EU and Russia consider as “terrorist attacks”. Hamas believes that Israel has established itself on occupied Palestinian land and does not recognise Israel as a ‘state’.

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792 Solana states that the programe of Hamas’s government does not give any clear indication to respect the European principles for peace settlement such as eschewing the use of violence as a means of settling the conflict, recognising the State of Israel and observing the agreements signed between the Palestinians and Israel. See Javier Solana, ‘Appearance before the European Parliament About the Middle East Peace Process’, in High Representative For Cfisp (ed.), (Strasbourg, 2006c). p 2.
793 Scholar Interview, ‘Interview with Igor Belyaev, Director of Middle East Peace Process Department and Deputy of the Head of Asia and Africa Department in the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs’, (Moscow, 2013j).
795 The EU’s and Russia’s discourse describes most Palestinian activities in the course of the Al-Aqsa intifada as a “terrorist attacks”.

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Hamas accepts the premise that Palestine exists from the river to the sea and does not accept the 1967 borders as geographical boundaries to the state of Palestine. In this respect, dealing with Hamas is based on how the EU and Russia perceived Hamas behaviour on the ground. Both share the same position on the importance of a UN umbrella and the view of Hamas is that they should accept UNSCRs relating to the conflict especially Resolution 242 and 338. Moreover, the creation of Israel is rooted in the history of Europe and Russia from different perspectives. Therefore, both are committed to secure Israel as a state. In the case of the EU, any rapprochement with Hamas will be interpreted as anti-Semitism due to Nazi treatment of Jews. The matter of the Holocaust in European history informs EU policy in this context.

However, the emergence of Hamas as a state-actor with its own peace-making views and interests which contradict the MEPP, is a new matter which provokes EU concerns regarding its actorness in the region which is the most central to its foreign policy in the Middle East. Solana, at an appearance before the European Parliament in the aftermath of the 2006 Palestinian Parliamentary elections, considered its results as a ‘critical time for the future of the Middle East Peace Process’. In addition, Hamas’ state-actoriness is perceived as a matter that has long-term consequences for European security, stability and prosperity all of which are the vital to the EU.

Moreover, Hamas hcame to power at through door of democracy and legitimate elections, a door opened as part of the political reforms of Palestinian institutions which, according to the European Security Strategy, were designed to ensure the security environment outside European borders and to prevent the collapse of the PA project according to Task Force assessments. Additionally, this door opened to contain Hamas and renew the legitimacy of Palestinian public institutions which were expected to give the EU extra influence in the MEPP and enhance its actorness in the region. But, the coming of Hamas to power was perceived as a gesture that might reduce EU influence by blocking the opportunities to make any progress in the MEPP. However, the success of the Hamas-led government in running day to day activities and pursuing the reform process of the PA,


Solana, ‘Appearance before the European Parliament About the Middle East Peace Process ’.
will probably lead to the promotion of a new model, with different characteristics, that may also undermine the EU actor-ness in the region.

In contrast, Russia played the role of “friend of all”. It agreed to the Quartet conditions, provided $10 million to Abbas’s office and invited a Hamas delegation led by Khalid Masha’al to Moscow. Assuming its actorness lies in the contradictions and differences in Russia’s position on Hamas. The desire to play an active role in this area has been an incentive to adopt a different perspective in dealing with Hamas. Putin in the first-ever official presidential visit to Tel-Aviv and Ramallah (2005), represented the increased focus on Russian involvement in MEPP which coincided with the advent of Hamas to power. For Russia, Hamas constituted a new state-actor which did not belong to any of the global actors. Russia is very keen to present an independent foreign policy in contrast to the EU and the US and at same time to present its commitments to its international obligation towards the MEPP. The Russian discourse on Hamas emphasises that it was democratically elected and is not classified as a terrorist organisation in Russia. That is, Russia does not have any restrictions on dealing with Hamas. Also, Russia had experience in convincing the Fatah to recognise Israel during the 70’s and 80’s. In this regard, Lavrov conveyed to the Hamas delegation the Quartet’s conditions and urged Hamas’ leaders to transform the movement into ‘a political party’ and abandon violence as a ‘means to achieve political aims’. Russia thus plays a role that others cannot.

However, Russia’s perception of the complexity of the conflict and its interconnection with world politics as well as the heavy dependency of the PA on international donors eases its reservations on dealing with Hamas. Hamas has limited opportunities to cross this minefield. In addition, Russia knows very well that the EU and the US will not accept Hamas in power unless it recognises Israel. More than that, Igor Belyaev ascribes Russian

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798 Alexander Saltanov (the former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs), on a meeting with Abbas at Arab summit in Khartoum, stressed that Russia supports ‘Abbas’s line on a peaceful settlement with Israel’ See The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Press Release Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Alexander Saltanov Meets with Head of the Palestinian National Authority Mahmoud Abbas’, in Mfa Press Department (ed.), (Moscow, 2006b).


talks to Hamas to its neutral position on the Chechnya war. That Russia’s relations with Hamas underpin its internal policy of being “anti-separatist and terrorist not Islamists”.

The EU insists on Hamas’ acceptance of the Quartet’s conditions as a prerequisite to Europe’s support. In June 2006, the EU at the request of the Quartet, had developed and put in place a Temporary International Mechanism (TIM) which was designed to bypass Hamas through direct delivery of assistance to Palestinians. Pragmatically, Russia supported this European mechanism. This wide boycott movement created a financial and economic crisis and speeded up chaos that exacerbated armed clashes between the two main leaders, President Abbas and his faction, Fatah, and Prime Minister Haniyya and his faction, Hamas. The emerged incapability of a Hamas-led government let to a Palestinian National Unity Government (NUG) established after the Mecca agreement between the two factions. The Israeli government launched ‘a global campaign of lobbying’ against this NUG. The European position on political communication with Hamas has not changed. In this regard, Michelle Pace and Thomas Diez, argue that despite Abbas insistence that the new NUG had now ‘met the conditions of the Quartet’; the EU response to this NUG was ‘disappointed’. Russia took a different road by calling for the need to deal with the NUG.

The Palestinian Division and the Annapolis Conference

In mid-June 2007, the NUG collapsed and the Palestinian Authority divided into Fatah control of the West Bank and Hamas control of the Gaza Strip. In response, the EU suspended the EU Border Assistance Mission at the Rafah Crossing Point EUBAM and supported the emergency government headed by Salam Fayyad. On 27 June 2007, the
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, visited Ramallah and supported Abbas to ‘remove any obstacles that may hinder the Palestinians from realizing their cherished dream of creating their own state’. Accordingly, the US called for an international peace conference at Annapolis to revive the negotiations in which Abbas and Olmert, the Israeli prime minister, reached a “joint understanding” to continue the bilateral negotiation towards a permanent two–state solution by the end of 2008. Solana hoped to reach this aim but he doubted its success and expected the failure of the US efforts. As expected, the Annapolis conference failed to achieve its objectives. Putin tried to seize this opportunity to push Russia in to the front seat and revived the idea of holding an international conference in Moscow. Lavrov, after the failure of the Annapolis summit in 2007, called for organising an international conference in Moscow in 2008. Despite the decision in favour of holding this conference agreed at the UNSC, despite the Quartet and the Palestinians reiterating their support for this conference, it did not take place, due to Israeli opposition.

Instead, Russia focused on the reconciliation of the two main Palestinian factions become a dominant issue overshadowing the Palestinian landscape. Russia tried to play a bigger role in inter-Palestinian relations and pushed toward reconciliation. Therefore, Mashaal was invited to Moscow in February 2010 and Medvedev met him in Damascus in May of the same year. After signing the Cairo Agreement on Palestinian unity in early May 2011 between most of the Palestinian factions, Russia immediately invited these factions to Moscow hosting a meeting that took place at the Institute of Oriental Studies, of the Russian Academy of Science. Russia tried to play a role in implementing the Cairo Agreement and to provide the practical auspices of inter-Palestinian reconciliation through

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pushing toward the formation of ‘a unified and inclusive Palestinian government of independent technocrats’.\footnote{The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Response by Sergey Vershinin, Director of the Middle East and North Africa Department at the Russian Foreign Ministry, to a Media Question Regarding the Meeting of Palestinian Organizations in Moscow’s Suburbs’, in Mfa Press Department (ed.), (Moscow, 2011a).}

The Palestinian Application for Full UN Membership 2012

On 23 September 2011, President Abbas submitted the Palestinian application for full UN membership to Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, asking the UN to accept the state of Palestine as a full member. This followed a report, in April 2011, by the UN saying that the PA was ready to be run as an independent state.\footnote{Aljazeera, 'UN Says Palestinians Able to Govern Own State'.} Accordingly, the Russian-Palestinian working committee met twice in Moscow to discuss the steps being taken by Palestine for the UN bid in which Russia reaffirmed its strong support for the Palestinian rights for full UN membership.\footnote{The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Press Release on Meeting of Russian-Palestinian Working Committee on the Middle East', in Mfa Press Department (ed.), (Moscow, 2011b).} At the Security Council, Russia supported the Palestinian application to full UN membership and pushed for the recognition of an independent Palestinian State. Unfortunately, the US vetoed this bid at the UNSC. Consequently, the application moved to UNGA applying for the status of a non-voting member state. On 29 November 2012, the UNGA voted in favour of upgrading the Palestinian status to that of a “non-member observer state”. Russia voted in favour and considered it as ‘the important step towards the restoration of historical justice in relation to the Palestinians’.\footnote{Affairs, 'Comment on the Adoption of the Resolution «Status of Palestine in the UN» by the UN General Assembly'.} Despite the fact that Russia emphasised that this vote, in favour of the resolution, came after ‘the affirmation of the Palestinian leadership’ and that this upgrade in Palestinian status at the UN ‘is not directed against Israel, does not seek to isolate it, and that political negotiation course of the solution problem has no alternative’.\footnote{Ibid.} At Russian instigation, this commitment is clearly stated in the UNGA resolution on the observer- status of Palestine.\footnote{United Nation General Assembly, 'General Assembly Votes Overwhelmingly to Accord Palestine ‘Non-Member Observer State’ Status in United Nations', in News and Media Division Department of Public Information (ed.), (New York, 2012).}

Russia’s long history in supporting the Palestinian quest for UN membership had minimised its reservations in sponsoring the Palestinian bid. Indeed the Palestinian
application at the UN was an opportunity for Russia to assert its global actorness which meant that it could show credibility and commitment regarding this matter and, at the same time, take into consideration its relationship with Israel. The fact is that Russia relinquished its ideological motives in support of Palestinian statehood, but did not abandon its motives of global actorness. Supporting Palestinian statehood is critical to Russia for multiple dimensions that should be taken into consideration. It is an external expectation of many internal forces such as parliamentary groups in the Duma and the Orthodox Church. For example, parliamentary groups such as the Refah party consider ‘the defence of the Palestinian people as one of its major goals’. In addition, the Palestinians attract the sympathy of the Russian Orthodox Church leaders which represent one of the main social forces in Russia.

Moreover, the position is about Russian prestige and adopting an independent foreign policy vis-à-vis the Middle East. Russia maintains its global position in world politics, and reinforces its independence by making foreign policies as a rival to the USA. This is about maintaining relations with its clients, and sustaining its image as a veteran actor in the Middle East. Russia is keen on constructing a pole of political attraction among countries of the region. By taking this position on Palestinian statehood, Russia shows its strengths, independence and political muscle, especially in areas where it can be easily done such as the UN in which consequences are not high. It is not about the Palestinians per se, but other countries that perceive Russia as a defender of their interests at the UNSC such as, for instance, Iran.

The EU member states, at the UNGA, were divided in voting on Palestinian status. Catherine Ashton said that the EU supports Palestine in its bid to be a full member at the UN as part of a solution to the conflict by negotiations. This official position taken by Ashton presents that the EU’s perception of Israel informs its policy-making towards a peace solution to the conflict. That is, the EU is keen on the negotiation process in which Israel has the upper hand. This means that Israeli views are highly considered in contrast to Palestinian rights of statehood. The EU played a role in 1999 in postponing the Palestinian declaration of independence by promising financial aid. In 2012, when it came to a

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821 Kreutz, Russia in the Middle East: Friend or Foe? p72.
822 Ibid. p72.
defining moment to declare an independent Palestinian state, the EU failed to adopt a collective position and prove its credibility.

This confirms that the EU is interested in open-ended negotiations that secure its presence on the Middle East scene. It is always a non-stop process of negotiation and negotiation only. In this context, peace-making is closer to being an instrument than a principle. EU mediation has restricted Palestinian choices in the negotiation process which is unbalanced in the light of emerged results during 20 years of this ongoing process. For more than a decade of direct involvement in the MEPP, the EU policy deprived the Palestinians from going into multilateral soft approaches and restricted Palestinian choices in a ‘sole choice-negotiation’. By using its financial aid as a vital foreign policy instrument, the EU is trying to keep the situation frozen and has not allowed any heat in order to prevent any threat to the region’s stability and security which could have a direct effect on its internal situation. That is, the EU is following the “more process than peace” approach, and continues playing the game of ‘constructive ambiguity’ in dealing with the matter of establishing an independent Palestinian state.

The case of the Palestinian bid at the UNGA presents a strong correlation between internal developments and the making of EU foreign policy. The nature of this façade of supporting Palestinian statehood is clearly identified through its perception of the Israelis and the perception of the conflict plays a significant role. The EU failure to adopt a collective position on the Palestinian bid at UNGA underscores the Union’s capability when it comes to a high profile matter such as Palestinian statehood. Despite the fact that the majority of EU member states voted in favour, this failure to maintain a united stance reveals to what extent the perception of the Israelis in contrast to the Palestinians defines the making of EU foreign policy towards a peace settlement. The problem with the failure of the EU to vote collectively on Palestinian statehood is not that there is no collective position on it. It is that there is no agreement on how Palestinian statehood is to be established.

Empirical evidence demonstrates that the aim of the EU’s and Russian involvement in this peace making process is to obtain a role in the making of Middle Eastern politics, thus what the EU and Russia are attempting to achieve is different in their use of instruments, but constant in what it designed for, in particular, the reinforcement of their presence and visibility on the international stage.
6.4 Conclusion

In this chapter I argue that the Middle East peace process is a major channel to display EU and Russian presence and visibility, and reinforce their regional influence. This perception of the MEPP is informed by the Self-perception of actorness and perception of the Middle East in terms of multiple contexts. This has defined instruments and guided foreign policy-making towards Palestinian statehood during recent decades. The discussion focuses on how Self-perception is reflected in adopting policies and positions that are relevant to Palestinian statehood. It emphasises that the making of peace is limited to the umbrella of UNSCRs and international law, securing stability and maintaining security in the region, the perception of Israel and how Israeli views have been taken into account in supporting proposals and initiatives regarding final status issues such as the Arab Initiative and the Geneva Initiative.

Since the failure of the Camp David Summit in 2000, the EU and Russia have been motivated to reinforce their presence and visibility in the peace process. This active involvement in the MEPP is driven by the desire to become global actors in the making of politics in this vital region. The involvement has increased in conjunction with internal developments that emphasise the significant of the Middle East. The EU’s and Russia’s membership of the Quartet constitues an opportunity to increase their presence and visibility as leading global actors in the making of Middle Eastern politics.

After a period of American control of the making of Middle Eastern politics, and, in the aftermath of the dissolution of the USSR, Russia pushed itself to restore its influence in the region by active engagement in the MEPP. In Europe, which emerged through the enlargement process, the EU sought to translate the economic, geographical and demographical size into political weight through playing an active role in the MEPP. The increased desire of the EU and Russia to play a crucial role on the international stage has driven them to become more actively involved in the MEPP which provides a channel that furnishes smooth and easy access to Middle Eastern politics.

This EU and Russian perception of actorness creates limitations to their support and efforts to establish a Palestinian state. These limitations are also defined by the perception of Palestinians in contrast to the Israelis. In this regard, the EU and Russia implemented
policies that reinforced their presence and visibility in the MEPP and adopted stances that are consistent with their principles and values and do not contradict their strategic interests as effective global actors in the region. Many stances and policies that have been adopted by the EU and Russia were on issues that are at the core of establishing Palestinian statehood yet are defined by these limitations. Examples of these issues include the Arab Initiative, the Geneva Initiative, the Apartheid Separation Wall and Sharon’s bilateral disengagement from Gaza.

On the road to establishing a Palestinian state, the EU mobilised its economic and financial means. It focused on reforming Palestinian public institutions which was considered a necessary condition for peace-making, while Russia mobilised its political weight to reinforce international support and put emphasis on sponsoring Palestinian statehood at UN institutions. The Road Map, which was adopted by the Middle East Quartet, prioritised security arrangements and emphasised a wide range of political and administrative reforms, yet failed to establish a Palestinian state. Russia focuses on reserving a seat in this process and asserting its influence and eliminating the unbalance with other global actors in the region.

The question of establishing a Palestinian state (per se) is no longer a matter of dispute and challenges, but these issues do matter when it comes to such things as security arrangements and Hamas as a state-actor. As far as being a normative power, the EU has failed to defend the principles of democracy and human rights. This is because it defends its actoriness and Hamas is perceived as an element that restricts its influence. The EU uses democracy as a foreign policy instrument not as a principle. The EU supported the Parliamentary elections in 2006 which were designed to contain Hamas through capitalising its popularity into parliamentary seats in a council that was controlled by a Fatah majority and functions limited to the Oslo Accords. It is an instrument that was supposed to relax some of the tensions that caused instability and to help create a secure environment that would accelerate EU access to the region and reinforce its presence in the making of the Middle Eastern politics. The matter is not Hamas as an Islamic movement; it is about Hamas as a political construct that is inconsistent with EU global actoriness in the region.

Russia took a pragmatic approach to dealing with Hamas. It plays the game “friend of all”. It supported the Quartet conditions that were imposed upon Hamas and participated in
a Temporary International Mechanism (TIM) which was designed to bypass the Hamas-led government. At the same time, Russia opened a diplomatic channel with Hamas and Medvedev met Mashaal in Damascus. Russia in its relation with Hamas plays on contradictions and tries to exploit the margin that Hamas creates in Middle Eastern politics to reinforce its influence in the region. However, at the UN, the EU failed to translate its presence in the MEPP to actorness at the UNGA where its member states were divided in supporting the Palestinian bid while Russia did support it. For Russia, it is empirical evidence that meets expectations of internal groups and proves credibility in defending its friends and clients in the region. Finally, the EU and Russia focus to benefit from the support of Palestinian statehood in maintaining their image and enhancing their influence in the region that work to underpin their actorness on the world scene.
CHAPTER SEVEN

FINDINGS AND CONSTRUCTIVIST REFLECTIONS

Focus

This chapter sums up the dissertation’s key findings. The principal problematic of this thesis is that identity and Self-Other perception inform policy-making, specifically towards the Israel–Palestine conflict and the establishment of a Palestinian state. The findings are based on a comparative discussion which is presented in three stages: Firstly, how the EU’s and Russia’s Self-perception as global actors informs their foreign policy-making towards the Middle East. Secondly, how the EU and Russian perceptions of the Middle East define their involvement in the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP). Thirdly, how their identity and Self–Other perceptions influence the EU’s and Russia’s positions on the process of establishing a Palestinian state. In principle, Palestinian statehood is a strategic priority for both the EU and Russian efforts at peace-making in the Middle East. Nevertheless, the EU and Russia avoid taking measures necessary to achieve that aim, because such policies would hurt their roles in the region.

7.1 Findings of the Thesis

A key finding that originates from this thesis is that constructivism clearly represents a theory with great heuristic power. In fact, it can be seen how identity and Self-Other perception as basic theoretical principles help to interpret and analyse the discourse of the EU and Russia towards a peace settlement in the Middle East. Similarly, the use of discourse analysis (DA) is primarily based on how DA as a method and a whole research field helps understand power relations, which are a dynamic that changes all the time. The analysis here does not give some kind of invariable ‘truth’. Rather, it is based on evidence taken from official documents, interviews and other texts and through my interpretation of them, which is a process, in which I as analyst hold some kind of dialogue with the collected data. My own interpretation is not the end of the process, the readers of my own analysis through DA become part of this process. I view this to be an advantage that encouraged me use this research method.

Moreover, the fact that is information about the world we live in, including the construction of power relations, takes place within a context. That is another strength that I have found fascinating about DA; meanings have context, and this is what I have tried to stress in my analysis. Through my investigation into the assumption of identity and Self-
Other perception on foreign policy-making, I have come to the conclusion that building or maintaining an international identity through increased presence and visibility is part of a construction process that Self-perception, in contrast to others, as well as the perception of ‘Otherness’, has a powerful influence on making the EU’s and Russia’s foreign policy, especially towards their involvement in the MEPP. That is, the search for a global actorness on the international stage has informed EU and Russian involvement in MEPP. Indeed, they consider the peace process as a key channel that provides a smooth and easy access to many Middle Eastern countries. The significance of the Middle East to EU-Russian strategic interests provides a geostrategic sphere in which to be actors.

EU and Russian foreign policy-making towards Palestinian statehood deserves special attention as it highlights the role of Self-perception and perception of ‘Otherness’ in contrast to Middle Eastern politics. The issue of Palestinian state-building underscores that fact that peace-making, with all of its significance, represents a formidable opportunity to create a presence and then transfer it to actorness in order to fulfil strategic interests, not only through hard power, but also through soft means such as involvement in the MEPP. This is to say that peace-making is also a soft means that can create close relationships which are dynamic in nature and facilitate access to fields of interest. In the Middle Eastern conflict, the construction or reinvention of the Self of the EU and Russia plays a key role in influencing their policy-making. Of additional interest is the fact that the EU and Russia react differently towards the establishment of a Palestinian state as a function of the situation in the Middle East and, moreover, the extent to which Palestinians are perceived in contrast to the Israelis, and vice versa.

In applying the constructivist approach to studying foreign policy-making by the EU and Russia towards the MEPP, in-depth discussion has striven to understand the construction of the Self as a global actor, which is central to both the EU and Russian policy-making. Understanding the construction of the Self through interpreting and analysing the discourse of ‘actorness’ gives explicit indications of the process of foreign policy-making. The Self has a power to make foreign policy although little attention has been devoted to studying its influence on making politics. This study of the EU’s and Russia’s foreign policy-making leads to a number of findings that should assist in refining our understanding with respect to peace-making in the Middle East. First, one should take into consideration internal and external developments that play an important role regarding which type of global actorness has most support on an internal level and how they inform external
expectations in terms of actorness. Secondly, when assessing perceptions of the Other at contextual levels, what are the important findings that actors prefer and how do they define policies and action plans. Both findings bring us to the third, namely that after more than a decade of active involvement in the Israel-Palestine conflict, the EU and Russia (as part of the Quartet) have failed to help realise a Palestinian state.

7.2 The Fundamental Role of the Self as a Driving Force in Foreign Policy-Making

The construction of an international identity is a prime objective in both EU and Russian foreign policy-making which itself is a dialectic between internal developments at various contextual levels and external expectations of reflecting these developments in terms of global actorness. Thus, constructivism provides a framework to understand this process of foreign policy-making as a dynamic- not as a static process, for example, as realism assumes. To the extent that the dynamics of internal developments play a role in the construction of the EU and Russian international identities, it also informs their external actions. That is, the construction of EU’s and Russia’s global actor image reflects the internal developments which play a major part. Changes in the post-Soviet Union era and the strategic reading of the US’ troubles in Iraq and Afghanistan, however, presented external developments that informed the EU’s and Russia’s Self-perception. In the case of Russia, building an international identity after the collapse of the Soviet Union was a reaction to internal developments which informed its place and mission on the world scene.

According to Sergei Karaganov, the main planner of Russia’s foreign policy, seeking further influence is to ‘lie more than ever in internal developments’. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia had a very chaotic period in which constructing the new Russian international identity became a dominant matter among different streams of the Russian political spectrum. Constructivism provides an opportunity to understand how these internal interactions which revolve around Russia’s role in the world ended. Self-perception has a fundamental role as a determinant of actorness in two ways: the perception of the Russian Self in terms of geography as the world’s largest country and also as a bridge between Europe and Asia.

Russia has had a rich experience of empire in terms of legacy and heritage - in both the former Soviet Union and Tsarist Russia - rich natural resources and various capabilities in different arenas; and the dire aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union’s disappearance (e.g., inefficient economy and weaknesses, a technological gap, the threats of disintegration, fragile security and stability invoked by Chechnya and Kirgizia, losing influence in Central and Eastern Europe in favour of the EU and in central Asia in favour of the US), which had a remarkable influence on Russian identity and broadly have informed and defined Russia’s approaches and instruments in the making of its foreign policy. In addition, the reality of Russia being an Orthodox country with an ethno-fusion of Slavic and Turko-Muslim combination is an important element that cannot be ignored and plays an important role in informing Russian foreign policy. Therefore, rebuilding a place and mission in the world and recovering from these weaknesses have been driving forces of Russian foreign policy.

By analysing the discourse of the Russian leadership, especially Putin, it appears that resuming the practice of power at the international level occupied a substantial amount of thinking. Putin came to power with the slogan ‘Great Russia’ and ‘Strong Russia statehood’. In his perception of Russia’s place on the world stage, the collapse of the USSR was ‘a genuine drama’ and ‘a major geopolitical disaster of the century’. 825 Thus, Putin focuses on re-constructing Russia’s global actorness; he has also paid more attention to restoring the strength, influence and position of Russia. This is known as the Putin Doctrine, which prioritises the recovery of Russia’s political, economic, and geostrategic assets lost in the Soviet breakup. 826

In Europe, over recent decades, a number of internal developments have affected the collective identity of the Western European countries, in turn; a sense of international identity constructed as well as the desire to play a global role, has been growing and varies in contextual levels. Thus, constructing an international identity that reflects internal developments and meets external expectations has been the driving force ever since the


826 Aron, 'Structure and Context in US-Russian Relations at the Outset of Barack Obama’s Second Term',
creation of the EU in 1992. In the aftermath of the breakup of the Soviet Bloc, the EU achieved a considerable global actorness by enlarging its membership and spill-over towards Central and Eastern Europe. A new international identity emerged constructed in multifaceted contexts which were rooted in the development of the EU from war to peace and from disarray to being a net exporter of security, stability and prosperity.

The new EU’s Self was built on the idea that working together is the main way towards promoting political and social conciliation, boosting economic prosperity and sustaining European cohesion. This international identity is a combination of sharing common normative values and principles, and a spirit of peace, cooperation and solidarity with the aim of achieving prosperity for all the EU’s member-states.

By applying a constructivist approach, the analysis and interpretation of the EU discourse empirically shows how Self–perception defines actions at external levels. From Self-perception as an economic power and the perception as a normative or civilian power, have informed the EU’s foreign policy-making towards neighbouring countries. For example, findings related to the EU’s search for playing a role as an actor promoting good governance underscores the fact that Self-perception as a normative power leads to creating a foreign policy characterised by a high level of projection of good governance and democracy. Moreover, Self-perception as an economic power is reflected in having become the world’s largest financial donor, which has long characterised EU policy towards its neighbours. The Euro-Med and Wider Europe Initiatives as well as the ENP as a framework, reflect EU internal developments in terms of the emerged Self-perception as a normative and economic power.

Understanding the interaction of internal developments in the case of the EU and Russia, highlights the role they play in constructing their Self-perception. Furthermore, constructing the Self is dynamic and cannot be reduced to a static variable as realism assumes. States and actors make their policies differently towards other states or actors as a function of the situation and what the position of the other is. Moreover, internal developments underscore the reality that constructs capabilities, playing a key role in enhancing their presence in related contexts. In analysing the EU and Russian discourse towards the MEPP, one should keep in mind that increasing their presence is at the heart of building capabilities and searching for a global role.
As discourse of capabilities is one of the key dimensions studied in this thesis, we can say that accumulating capabilities leads to Self-perception forms of actorness. In addressing its perception of actorness, while Russia has acknowledged that its lack of capabilities limits Russian influence in world politics, the EU shows a clear sense of its ability to play an active role in international affairs. Whereas, the EU stresses its power capabilities in the field of projection of normative values, and financial and stabilising powers, Russia is driven to rebuild its capabilities in different contexts that are perceived as significant to its global actorness.

The emphasis here is on enhancing the EU capabilities globally in terms of normative and economic and trade power, and on recovering from Russia’s weaknesses in the context of the economy, technology, military, heavy industry and energy sectors which have increasingly informed Russia’s foreign policy directions towards finding opportunities in a vital region such as the Middle East. The focus on reconstructing Russian global actorness as a successor of the former Soviet Union and restore its influence has become a driving force of Russia’s foreign policy. However, Self-perception played a fundamental role in leading Russia to present its succession to the Soviet Union in terms of strengths not ideology. Russia is trying to reinforce its message of the peaceful re-emergence of the new Russia. This has led Russia to harmonise its own role in the MEPP from polarisation to cooperation with other global actors such as Russian membership of the Quartet.

Here, constructivism provides an opportunity to analyse EU and Russian foreign policy as a dialectic between Self-perception, and internal and external developments. This provides a wide range of understanding and ability to predict the type of their involvement in the MEPP. Also, this enhances our understanding of contradictions that might appear between expectations and realities in the EU and the Russian role in the MEPP. That is an active involvement in the MEPP is subject to its positive and negative repercussions on the EU and Russia’s international position and internal developments.

The EU involvement in the MEPP gradually increased in parallel with its development of the Self of actorness and as a reflection of its internal developments. After the establishment of the EU in 1992, EU involvement in the MEPP increased, resting on its potential to be an international actor. In 1996, the EU increased its presence in the MEPP by appointing Miguel Ángel Moratinos as the first EU special representative. The creation of the post of Special Representative demonstrates the EU capability to play a role in this
process of peace-making. While the post of Special Representative constitutes the spotlight searching to play a bigger role in the MEPP, Quartet membership put the EU on the map of global players. In contrast, Russia has increased its involvement in the MEPP in conjunction with reasserting itself as the successor to the former Soviet Union. In 1996, Primakov revived Russia’s position in the peace process in an attempt to refurbish Soviet influence in the region.

On the other hand, the construction of international identity in the case of the EU and Russia rests on the functional role of situational factors in contrast to other rivals. The European and Russian strategic reading of American troubles in Iraq and Afghanistan reinforced their perception of a high potential to play a global role in Middle Eastern politics. Thus, this Self-perception of the EU and Russia, which was constructed in the light of their internal and external developments, deeply informs their perception of the Middle East as a field of strategic interests and reflects the nature of interconnected and interrelated relationships between the perception of the Self at a contextual level and the perception of Otherness in multilateral contexts that are a function of the situation they perceive.

7.3 The role of Perception of Otherness in Informing Foreign Policy-making

Perception of Otherness is one of the main premises of constructivist theory which varies in kind, most of which inform foreign policy-making. To understand the foreign policy-making of the EU and Russia towards the MEPP, I applied the perception of Otherness beyond the traditional way of defining one’s own Self, namely, not only in terms of differences and similarities. Perception of the Other can be perceived in the course of opportunities or challenges and to what extent it serves EU and Russian interests and in which contexts. Thus, I analysed and interpreted the EU and Russian discourse towards the Middle East and the peace process in a variety of contexts. This helped to explore the reasons and motivations behind their involvement, and to what extent this involvement is important. This to say, that putting the EU’s and Russia’s perception of the Middle East in a variety of contexts helps to understand contextual factors that influence their policy-making as well as shedding light on temporal and spatial contexts in which the EU and Russia assemble their foreign policy, which surely shapes the nature and characteristics of
their involvement in peace-making, and how and what it should be. This to say, that making foreign policy varies and differs in accordance with differences in context.

As was made clear in Chapter Five, the Middle East is perceived by the EU and Russia in multi-faceted contexts. Most of the Chapter Five findings demonstrate that security, stability, energy, military and technology cooperation, economic and trade relations, and historical, cultural and religious ties are essential contexts in EU and Russian relations with the Middle Eastern states, which deeply inform their involvement in the peace process. Thus, there is not only one context that informs their foreign policy-making. In the vein of the EU searching for a place and mission in world politics, the Middle East gains more importance and becomes a geostrategic sphere in which the EU has to foster its visibility and influence. The perception of the Middle East is mixed between opportunities and challenges to its actorness. This perception, in contrast, shows the Self-perception characteristics that are explained in Chapter Four.

The EU’s Self-perception as a net exporter of security and stability in Europe very clearly informs its perception of the Middle East. The European Security Strategy redefines the region as an area of insecurity and instability where threats of so-called “terrorism” originate. This context starkly defines EU policy towards the region; therefore, a projection of democracy and good governance, and of security training and cooperation, and the prevention of WMD proliferation are notable features of EU policy towards many countries in the region. Furthermore, Self-perception as a normative power is reflected in perceiving the region as an area of autocratic governance, humiliation of human dignity, absence of human rights, transiency and the rule of law predominate. Thus, the perception of normative power informs EU policy in focusing on the promotion of democracy and good governance. The association agreement which the EU signed with a number of countries in the region within the framework of the ENP necessitated an action plan which implied an agenda of political, social and economic reforms according to good governance standards.

The geographical proximity and geostrategic position as a highway and vibrant centre of world trade as well as a major source of energy, makes the region one of vital importance, which, in turn, influences the EU’s perception of the Middle East. This importance, in contrast to Self-perception as an economic power, deeply informs the Wider Europe
Initiative in which regional trade and integration within the region is a recognised objective. Thus, opening up new market opportunities in the Middle East has been motivated by this Self-Other perception. In this regard, EU policy focuses on the creation of a large Mediterranean market which includes free trade areas, privileged trade agreements and easy access to energy rescuers that has had positive effects on the EU’s internal stability, security and prosperity. Considering the competitive position of European industries and large economies of scale, EU policy intends to increase the scope of its market over the whole of the Middle East. To this end, the concluded association agreements work on the liberalisation of trade movement and set up new formulas of economic cooperation with most of the region’s countries which first introduced the EU as a global player.

On the other hand, the EU’s Self-perception as an importer of energy and the reality that the Middle East is the geographical centre of gravity of the world’s fossil fuels, makes the Mediterranean Sea a highway for the global energy trade that informs its policy towards the region. Additionally, the discoveries of hydrocarbons in the South and East of the Mediterranean promote EU focus on this region. Europe’s role in Middle Eastern politics developed in the context of the energy crisis that emerged in the course of the 1973 Oil Crisis. Energy is one of the main issues that concerns EU independence. In recent years, the dependence on Russian oil and gas has constituted a major weakness in EU foreign policy-making. The EU’s desire to diversify its energy sources to minimise its dependence on Russia compelled Europe to become more active in Middle Eastern politics. It is worth mentioning that the more active role the EU plays in the Middle East, the more the EU expands to secure additional energy sources.

On the other side, Russia has major interests in the Middle East, interests which are intertwined with its internal developments, particularly those which have substantial effects on their economy and trade, security and prosperity. This interrelation and interconnection has increased gradually over the course of Russia’s attempt to reconstruct its place in world politics. Primakov re-introduced the importance of the peace process as the main channel to assert Russian influence and interests in the region. Lavrov refers to this region as a strategic area in which Russia has ‘growing trade and economic ties’. 827 To

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827 Lavrov, 'Interview with Al-Watan Al-Arabi Weekly Newspaper.'
save and reinforce Russia’s influence, Lavrov stresses a new formula of partnership with numerous countries of the region in diverse fields to broaden Russia’s cooperation with the Middle East. In this regard, the MEPP becomes a key track for Russia to cooperate with the region in the fields of oil and gas, High-Tech, military industries, security and cultural aspects as a means to tackle internal problems and enhance Russia’s global actorness.

To activate the process of further opening up to the Middle East, Putin, during his first eight years in office, visited the Middle East ten times. According to Lavrov, Russia ‘had never had such a high level and intensity of contacts before’. In consistent terms with this process, in 2009, Medvedev toured the Middle East and visited Ramallah, despite the cancellation of his planned visit to Israel. Medvedev considered this visit ‘the first’ that a leader of a major state made. He paid significant attention to creating good relations with all parties in the region in order to launch what he called the ‘mega projects’. He underlined presidential diplomacy to maintain Russian influence, boost its economic ties and strategic partnerships. In his speech at the Arab League in Cairo, he highlighted that any progress which would improve Russian influence and interest in the region must take into consideration the Arab League’s position and its member-states’ views on many issues, especially a peaceful settlement for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

Therefore, the emphasis on Russia’s position in the peace process takes place in the course of striving to enhance its influence and actorness in the region. That is, Russian engagement in the MEPP facilitates the Russian economy to further integrate in the world economy by boosting Russian access to the Middle East economies. In other words, it helps remove the obstacles that burden the Russian economy and obstruct growth. Putin’s policy can be described as a stretch of the Russian role in the peace process. Russia looks forwards to preserving a mechanism that provides easy access to the region, which is seen

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828 Ibid.
829 Affairs, ‘Summary of Remarks by Sergey Lavrov at General Meeting of Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society’.
831 Presidency, ‘Results of the Visit to the Middle East : Dmitry Medvedev Answered Journalists’ Questions on the Outcome of His Visit to Jordan and Palestine.’.
832 Ibid.
833 Ibid.
834 Russian Presidency, 'Speech at Meeting of the Permanent Representatives of the League of Arab States', (Cairo, 2009a).
as vital for its economic modernisation and integration in the world economy, and political and social stability. In this regard, Russia emphasises economic and technological interrelations, building military bases, and increasing its share of the Middle East weaponry market. Indeed, Russia is the world’s second largest arms supplier to the Middle East. In the 2007 presidential tour of the Gulf, Putin attempted to increase cooperation in high-tech weaponry with the Gulf States.  

On the other hand, Russia increased its military cooperation with Israel, and, as a result, the countries signed their first military agreement in 2010.

Furthermore, Russia perceives the Middle East as a key rival in the field of energy. Russia wants to maintain its oil and gas assets and secure its share of the market. This is important for the Russians because their economic capability largely rests upon the status of ‘energy power’. Since 2000, surging oil and gas prices have influenced Russia’s position as a global actor. Gaining a regional presence in the Middle Eastern oil and gas market gives Moscow a large economic club to hit Europeans with, as happened during the gas crises in the winters of 2005–06 and 2008–09. Moreover, the Levant Basin is very rich in natural gas and oil. Thus, Russia increased its geostrategic presence in the Mediterranean, especially in Syria. Considering the potential increase in the oil and gas supply, Russia is very keen to be a regional actor in order to share the benefits or at least save its assets and revenues of oil and gas from depreciation. Also, Russia has an interest in increasing its share in the oil and gas industries. In 2004, Russia entered the Saudi fuel market with a strong interest in building pipeline networks (linking the oil and gas field with the Mediterranean) and Cypriot Energy. Russia has also signed operator agreements and memoranda in the energy sector with Israel and Lebanon.

Moreover, Russian involvement in the MEPP aims to keep the security dialogue with many countries and non-state actors in the region actively open. The geographical, historical and religious interconnections between Islamic states in the Federation and the Middle East are much of concern to and inform Russian policy towards the region. The Russian experience of internal political instability, insecurity and social turmoil in the

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835 Eke, ‘Putin in First Saudi State Visit’.
post-Soviet era has fostered Russia’s perspective of reconstructing Soviet influence in the region through new formulae.

Moreover, historical, cultural and religious bonds with the Middle East, especially the holy places in the Levant, impose an important context of Russian perception of this region. After the collapse of communism as a social drive of the Soviet Union, Russia searched for ways of reviving the Russian social contract and reinforcing the values of the Russian Orthodox Church. The trend is to utilise Orthodox values as a social drive. This perception of the Middle East has been enhanced with the increase of the Church’s leverage in Russian public life. The increased focus on restoring the Tsarist properties in Jerusalem shows the growing importance of Orthodox symbolism in Russian political life and among the ruling class. Russia has increased its support for Russian NGOs, such as the Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society (IOPS), that sponsor Russian activities in the Levant. These activities are run by high profile Russian politicians such as the head of IOPS, Sergei Stepashin, the former Russian Prime Minister and his deputy Mikhail Bogdanov, the Special Presidential Envoy for the Middle East and Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister. Plus, Russian focus on the Middle East has been increasing in the light of the existence of one of the largest Russian-speaking communities in the world, the Russian-speaking community in Israel.

In this vein, the Self-perception of the EU and Russia is reflected in their perception of the Middle East. This understanding of the reflection between the Self and Other is a powerful mechanism for meaning-making, particularly as the EU and Russia are highly involved in peace-making in the Middle East. It is no surprise that the constructivist approach calls for the contextualising perception of the Other, which reflects the construction of an international identity which is the outcome of internal developments of the EU and Russia. Contextualising the perception of the Middle East deserves attention with respect to interconnections and interrelations with the EU and Russia, where the EU’s and Russia’s perceptions of the Middle East significantly influence the way they make their foreign policies. Accordingly, from its entirety it assumes an importance which informs the EU and Russian foreign policy-making towards Palestinian statehood.
7.4 The Self-Other Perception and the Establishment of a Palestinian State

The establishment of a Palestinian state is at the centre of EU and Russian foreign policy as a step towards peace in the Middle East. I have found that identity and Self-Other perception limit EU and Russian efforts to realise this goal. They hold that any action in this regard should be consistent with Israeli concerns, making it a top priority in the EU–Russian diplomacy. This is a matter rooted in European history and which takes a high priority in public opinion towards the Middle East. This ascribes to the perception of Jews as victims. Also Israel constitutes an advance geostrategic base that would not contradict European interests.

In this regard, the EU and Russia took a stance on, and responded to, most of the events towards solving the conflict in order to construct a global actorness self-image. Namely, the perception of actorness constituted the cornerstone in informing EU policy-making in the case of Israel-Palestine. Despite the fear that the EU and Russia responded positively, rhetorically, regarding the proposed Arab League Peace Initiative and the Geneva Initiative for which they provided a regional and Palestinian mandate to both efforts, since it proposed to normalise relations between Israel and the Arab and Islamic countries and pave the way to reach a solution on the final status issues, especially refugees and Jerusalem, the EU and Russia did not take any real action to pressure Israel and push forward towards a final peace settlement.

However, EU policy towards Palestinian state-building focuses on building strong Palestinian security services and the reformation of Palestinian public institutions. This is consistent with the EU’s Self-perception as a normative power and net exporter of security. In contrast, Russia focuses on security training and cooperation. Both actors stress the need to enhance the Palestinian Authority’s (PA) ability to fulfil its commitments regarding Israel, such as security and continuing the negotiation process. When Israel imposed a siege on Arafat at his headquarter in Ramallah, the EU and Russia accepted the Israeli position as an internal Israeli security matter. Moreover, the EU pressured the PA to make political and administrative reforms especially in the security sector. The EU also adopted the Israeli perspective on peace-negotiations by focusing on security as an outcome, rather than as negotiations to finding solutions to the final status issues. Despite the illegality of the Separation Wall, the EU and Russia dealt with it as a de facto reality
that maintains the security of Israel. Also, the EU and Russia shared putting pressure on the PA to conduct presidential and parliamentary elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, which was to renew PA legitimacy to carry out the Road Map objectives in which security commitments were the high priority.

Contrary to the desired aim, Hamas won the Parliamentary elections. Hamas, whose ideology and political thought are inconsistent with the establishment of the PA in maintaining Israeli security and continuing with an open-ended peace process, has played a role in informing the EU response towards the 2006 elections. Moreover they feared that Hamas would constitute a model which might spread to neighbouring countries. The emergence of Hamas as a state-actor in Palestinian politics causes a challenge to the EU, but less of a challenge for Russia. The EU position on Hamas is defined by its perception of the Hamas model as a challenge to European actorness in the region as well as its principles of non-violence resistance against Israel and perception of Israel to which Hamas constitutes a key threat.

Having Hamas at the top of the Palestinian political system contravenes EU actorness and delimits its influence in the region. The rise of Hamas as a state-actor was perceived as a power that limited EU influence according to its nature as a resistance movement against the Israelis, which is incompatible with the European strategy in the region. Russia, to some extent, shares the European view on Hamas, but with less concern due to Hamas’s position on the Chechnya war and its strategy of non-intervention. Additionally, Russia has very good relations with Hamas’s former allies, Syria and Iran. This perception of Hamas by both the EU and Russia led to a boycott of the Hamas-led Government in 2006 and the Palestinian Unity Government which was established after the Mecca Agreement in 2007. Most interestingly, Russia agreed to the Quartet conditions on the Hamas-led Government, and at the same time opened a diplomatic channel with Hamas. This shows Russian willingness to deal with all parties in the Middle East for the sake of its interests and influence in the region.

Moreover, when the moment of reality came and the establishment of a Palestinian state based on international law and UNSCRs needed real acts, the EU was divided. As a result the EU succumbed to Israeli demands. While Russia supported the Palestinian bid at the UNSC/GA, its support was conditional upon the PA abstaining from using Palestinian
membership in the UN against Israel. The EU’s role as a peace-maker actor towards the establishment of a Palestinian state is affected by a number of important challenges, as the EU is seen as a diverse entity which is subject to internal pressures, and its perception of the Palestinians in contrast to the Israelis. The rise of a new non-state actor such as Hamas has complicated the process of peace-making on the ground. On the other hand, the victory of Hamas represents a key weakness of the PA functions and poses a new division in the Palestinian leadership that could obstruct peace-negotiations.

The contexts within which the EU and Russia perceive their Self, highlights the significance of the Middle East, which in turn, informs their involvement in the establishment of a Palestinian state. That is, their involvement in the MEPP takes its importance from the strategic importance of the Middle East itself. For the EU, the Middle East is a ‘test case’ in light of its growing ambitions, thus creating a presence and fostering influence in order to construct a sense of global actorness. The involvement is an opportunity that the EU seeks the Europeanisation of its periphery space through creating privileged forms of close relationships with the Middle Eastern countries. Through playing a role in the MEPP, the EU gets good access to translate its active role into a massive presence on economic, security and normative terms. This is the response to expectations and aspirations of European member-states and citizens under the umbrella of the EU. For Russia, the Middle East is a vital vector with respect to its ambition to reinvent its global actorness. That is, reviving their influence in the Middle East is a recognised objective in order to make Russia one of the most influential centres of the modern world. Thus, the involvement in the MEPP boosts its image in the area, which further expands Russia’s presence to reinforce its position on the international scene. To sum up, it is clear that the EU and Russian foreign policy towards the Middle East peace process is Self-centric, focused on enhancing influence and reinforcing actorness.

By using constructivism, the thesis finds that Russia differs in its perception of the Middle East from the EU. This difference derives from the difference in constructing their international identity and the extent that the Middle East represents significance in terms of opportunities and challenges. As discussed throughout the thesis, the perception of the Middle East has multifaceted distinctive elements whose effects are deeply felt on the involvement of the EU’s and Russia’s efforts towards Palestinian statehood. Since the establishment of post-Soviet Russia, the strategic importance of the Middle East has
always been at the centre of Russian foreign policy. Internal developments towards reinventing Russia’s global actorness and perception of the Middle East pushed forwards into playing an active role in its engagement in the MEPP. In contrast, following the establishment of the EU, the geostrategic significance and intertwined relations with the Middle East have always been at the heart of EU policy towards its neighbours. Perception of the Middle East is the way to increase the EU’s visibility and presence globally deeply informs its involvement in the MEPP. So, constructivism suggests that constructing an international identity as a global actor and perception of the Middle East as vital opportunities and potential challenges inform and define foreign policy-making by the EU and Russia towards their engagement in the MEPP. This to say that, constructivism highlights the role of the Self-Other perception in foreign policy-making.

7.5 Constructivism, Realism and Liberalism: A Critical Discussion of Foreign Policy-making

This thesis has advanced constructivism as a reasonable expectation to help in providing a better understanding and analysis of the EU’s and Russia’s foreign policy towards Palestinian statehood. By stressing the role of identity and Self-Other perception in foreign policy-making, the study provides viable options and means of ‘assessing’ future trends of the EU’s and Russia’s policy towards Palestinian statehood. In this thesis, I have tried to demonstrate that normative and material contexts play a key role in constructing the identity of actors (in both directions) and inform foreign policy-making. This is because these contexts provide a system of meanings that define actors interpreting their capabilities within their environment. The interpretation of the EU’s and Russia’s capabilities pushes them towards building and reinventing a sense of global actorness. This Self-perception (which is a construct) of actors constitutes interests and actions especially in their neighborhood and periphery. Accordingly, the EU’s and Russia’s quest to play a global role drives them to an active engagement in making Middle Eastern politics, especially its core issue, Palestinian statehood.

Realism and liberalism treat the construction of Self-interest and actors’ preferences as externally-determined givens. The Self exists in the three theories that address foreign policy-making but in different ways. While constructivism asserts that the Self is constructed through normative and material structures, realism and liberalism assume that
it existed prior to social interactions. This study underscores that there is a difference between the Self-interest that realism offering, and Self-perception that constructivism premises in playing a role in EU-Russian foreign policy-making. Self-interest in realism builds on ‘human nature’ in which man’s innate lust for power plays the major role in making politics among nations. Morgenthau wrote that ‘man is born to seek power’. In this study I do not claim that this role does not exist. Naturally it exists, but in the case of states it is a ‘construct’ that takes a shape according to the contexts in which it is cultivated. Constructivism does not deal with making foreign policy as a given, it goes behind the scenes to understand the components of the process of its making. This process is open to many changes that influence the construction of Self-perception which in turn, is central to making foreign policy. That is, constructivism deals with the making of foreign policy as a reflection of internal developments which are changeable and not fixed. In the case of the EU and Russia, internal developments, as discussed above, play a key role in informing their foreign policy towards the MEPP. The involvement in the MEPP provides the EU and Russia the opportunity to achieve or maintain the best possible outcomes that serve their global actorness. Realism and liberalism dismiss the role of these internal interactions in informing the making of foreign policy.

Realism places an emphasis on states which seek to maximise power accumulation and defend their national interests. Power, according to Morgenthau, is the desired end for states to achieve. In this thesis, power (as a material in both forms economic and military) is no longer the key objective and has little place in informing the EU’s and Russia’s stance towards Palestinian statehood. While Russia is very keen to refurbish its image as a peace maker and to be perceived as a defender of Christian Orthodox values, the EU, in contrast, is very eager to present itself as a normative and soft power and maintain its actorness as a promoter of democracy and good governance, as well as a net exporter of security, stability and prosperity. The engagement of the EU and Russia in peace-making is a sense of gaining power, but in terms of multilateral capabilities, not only in material ones. That is, power is considered as a construct and is a reflection of their capabilities in multifaceted contexts.

Furthermore, maintaining a sphere of influence by the EU and Russia in the Middle East might be viewed as similar to a realist approach based on regional domination. From a realist perspective, the EU and Russia are global players which compete with each other and struggle with other global powers in the region. In this perspective, maintaining a sphere of influence that rests on human nature informs actions towards peace-making. Whilst from a constructivist perspective, involvement in peace-making is an attempt to construct actionness through building a sphere-of-influence in the Middle East. This is an external expectation for both the EU and Russia, but it is not only to accumulate material power as realists assume. The Wider Europe Initiative seeks to enlarge the European sphere outside Europe’s borders. ENP was designed to build bridges with neighbouring countries as a framework to increase European influence in the Middle East. Alongside Euro-Med, these official documents might be viewed as a realist approach to boost EU influence in the Middle East. But, the EU discourse in these documents is dominated by normative rhetoric that emphasises normative and civilian actionness. Most of the concluded Association Agreements within the framework of the ENP with EU neighbouring countries emphasises the projection of democracy, good governance, transparency, and human rights. Russia, in contrast, is very keen to restore its influence in the region, but bases its approach on cooperation not confrontation. Also, Russia accepted Quartet membership and plays an active role in this forum.

Peace-making is the common channel that both the EU and Russia use, but the mechanism and policies of constructing their spheres of influence are different. In this difference, I find that Self-Other perception plays a role. This role is manifest in their quest for acceptance as equal global actors by other global and regional players in the region. That is, the role is limited and subjected to power of capabilities which are not only military. The role in the peace process is perceived as a proof of both the EU’s and Russia’s rising significance for their constituencies and the presumption of increased influence in Middle Eastern politics. Also, for the EU, it is a proof of accepting the EU’s values as guiding principles that facilitate peace-making in the Middle East. Thus, this role is about accepting the EU and Russia as soft rather than hard powers in the making of the Middle East politics.
However, Waltz argues that the ultimate concern of states is not for power but for security.\footnote{Kenneth N Waltz, 'The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory', \textit{Journal of Interdisciplinary History}, (1988b), 615-28. p 616.} In this study, I have found that security is one of the key concerns, but not the ultimate one that informs EU and Russian foreign policy towards the MEPP. Security in this region is more than vital to Russia’s territorial integrity and internal security in the light of twisted interrelations and criss-cross interactions. Perceiving the Middle East as a threat is not the ultimate motive that drives Russia to engage in the MEPP. Similarly, the EU is very sensitive to security concerns which do play a role in pushing the EU into active involvement in the MEPP. For instance, the EU’s normative zeal is a substantial apparatus in its endeavor to be recognised as a net exporter not only of security, but also of stability, prosperity, democracy and good governance in Europe and beyond her borders. More than that, EU attitudes towards security matters in the Middle East are heavily influenced by its normative Self-perception.

Even the EU attempts to cast its perception of security issues with the Middle Eastern countries as a normative matter that is rooted in both social and political systems. A number of documents, such as the European Security Strategy and the Wider Europe Initiative explicitly advocate security matters from a normative prospective. The EU approach in dealing with security matters which are a result of the Middle Eastern conflict is an explicit linkage to this normative perception of security which is in contrast to the neorealist approach. That is, the EU’s and Russia’s desire to take part in the MEPP, is worthy to deal with security matters but also to restructure their multifaceted relations.

Moreover, both liberal and neoliberal perspectives in foreign policy-making assume increased \textit{interdependence} and \textit{sustainable development} between countries which leads to enhanced cooperation and peace. That is, states seek to achieve the desired end of welfare which is considered a primary concern of states. The EU’s and Russia’s relations with the Middle East are characterised by multifaceted levels between societies and governments. These intertwined relations are embodied in trade and economic partnerships, as well as the energy sector. The EU is eager to be perceived in the Middle East as a more convenient partner than Russia, China or the USA. Russia competes to integrate its economy with the most significant economies of the Middle Eastern countries. The EU also has a strong economic relationship with Israel and the Palestinians are heavily dependent on
international aid, especially from the EU. Israel is one of the EU’s leading trade partners and forms part of many EU research programmes. Relations between Russia and Israel have also reached unprecedented levels of growth, in multifaceted contexts.

This interdependence did not bring the peace and sustainable development which liberalism had assumed it would. Equally it did not decrease the level of conflict. Thus, I can say that interdependence as a construct in most of the vital domains can play a key role in designing and arranging relationships between actors. This means that interdependence is a platform to increase cooperation and mutual benefits, but not the prime motive that informs the EU’s and Russia’s foreign policy towards the Middle East. In contrast, the findings have shown that the EU’s and Russia’s perception of Israel plays a major determinant in establishing a Palestinian state. The EU constructs interdependence in areas that serve its actorness. Also, this EU policy of increasing interdependence predominates as a result of its economic and normative policies towards peace-making. Likewise, prosperity is one of the main features that the EU is eager to stress, and to be perceived as an exporter of it, but it is not the prime objective informing EU foreign policy. The Wider Europe Initiative defines a number of instruments which aim to increase interdependence between the EU and the Middle Eastern countries. The EU has used normative discourse for sustainable development in the Middle East and peace-making in which financial aid has been conditional upon the projection of its normative principles.

7.6 Reflections on the Collected Data

Most of the data that I have analysed presents a kind of reflection of internal developments rather than rationality in foreign policy-making. Primary sources that I collected on the EU’s and Russia’s discourse in making their foreign policies speak as much about Self-constructed forms of actorness which are subject to analysis and interpretation in this thesis. Documents on the EU and Russia that I have used have provided background and contexts that allow one to track changes and the development of constructing their international identity. On the EU side, primary and secondary sources on the formation of the EU’s expectation of being a global normative and economic actor reflect its internal developments rather than a rational choice of foreign policy-makers. Internal developments that occurred in the aftermath of WWII, and the context of enlargement towards Central and Eastern Europe underscore the quest to play an international role as a normative and economic power. European internal developments in the search for a global
role and the extent to which this role will support EU global actorness represents a key determinant of foreign policy-making. On the Russian side, events and interactions in the post-Soviet era underscore how Self-perception has been constructed and what the main determinants are for conducting Russian foreign policy. These primary sources tell the onlooker a considerable amount about the reconstruction of Russia’s international identity and the extent to which recovering from weakness and rebuilding capabilities dominate Russia foreign policy-making.

For triangulation purposes, I have used a variety of primary and secondary sources which contributed greatly in enhancing the discussion of the EU’s and Russia’s foreign policy towards the MEPP. I collected my data from different sources such as speeches, press statements, newspapers, magazines, official documents, interviews, and press releases. My aim has been to try as much as possible to validate my research by verifying the same information, through the use of different sources of data (spoken and written). This triangulation of data is assumed in the social sciences to strengthen the credibility and validity of research findings. Most of the primary sources I have used are responses to problems, challenges and opportunities, whether in internal or external contexts. The EU discourse reflects internal developments over more than sixty years especially after its establishment in 1992, and external expectations and aspirations express these interactions. Thus, collected data on EU foreign policy display interactions based mainly on internal and partly on external contexts and how these developments heavily influenced the construction of the EU’s international identity which, in turn, informs the making of its foreign policy.

Similarly, the Russian discourse reflects interactions and developments that happened in the post-Soviet era. These interactions and developments deeply influenced problems and challenges that faced Russia in this period and which played a key role in reinventing Russia’s international identity. Thus, the data that I collected introduced critical thinking and allowed a better understanding of the meaning of the EU’s and Russia’s foreign policy towards Palestinian statehood. By using this sort of data, it is easy to generate constructivist interpretations about foreign policy-making and the formation of external expectations by the EU and Russia. The major emphasis that I have paid is on interpreting the text within a context. It is worth underlining that it is not the text (speech, official document, interview, etc.) per se that matters, but rather what it means in terms of doing
(actions) that takes place afterwards that assert a kind of actoriness. The discussion has shown that interpretation of Text is attained when all three elements of the mechanism balance (saying, doing, being).

7.7 Future Studies

In academia, researchers, by using the theory of constructivism, can find their niche in studying political phenomena in the foreign policy realm. In this thesis, identity-based factors that have been interpreted and analysed present the strength of constructivism in theorising foreign policy-making by global actors. In line with this research, future researchers could examine foreign policy-making towards final status issues such as borders, refugees, settlements, Jerusalem, Jewishness of Israel, etc. Emphasising how Self-Other perception informs foreign policy-making towards these issues provides deep understanding to finding a solution through the perception of these issues themselves. However, constructivism can also offer a better understanding of the transformation of its position towards the Arab Spring, especially towards Libya, Syria, and Egypt. On the other hand, the findings of this study invite Palestinian researchers and advocates of Palestinian rights to take on the challenge of working to change the perception of the MEPP as an open ended process and a channel to establish a Palestinian state, not a channel to enhance their interests.

Significance of this kind of study

This study has provided evidence that identity and Self-Other perception have the potential to enhance the study of foreign policy-making by global players towards the Middle East. Moreover, I believe that a further potential for ‘cross-fertilisation’ between the realm of foreign policy and other social science areas of study certainly exists. The findings of this thesis should contribute to the constructivist theory of foreign policy-making by global players to improve our understanding of the relationship among constructed identity in a multifaceted contexts of Self-perception and the perception of Otherness, whether in positive or negative ways. I hope that the findings of this research will be able to inform practice and influence foreign policy decision-makers. These findings challenge the realist assumption that nation-states or their policy-makers are the most important actors in understanding international relations and there is a sharp distinction between domestic and
international politics. However, the constructivist approach can work as a meta-theory to explain the formation of the EU’s and Russia’s foreign policy. It can be applied to different assumptions within realist and liberal approaches. It would be naïve to argue that EU’s and Russia’s foreign policy are only informed by power or security. Even if it were possible in terms of some political phenomena to argue from liberal or realist perspectives, the dynamic of Self-Other perception will be present and arguable.

In sum, contemporary constructivist research in investigating the phenomena of relationships between global actors and the Middle East issues is vibrant. Constructivism allows us not only to better understand the role of identity and Self-Other perception in the MEPP, but also to guide analysis and interpretations of other socio-political phenomena involving power relations in this region.

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CONCLUSION

The investigation into the EU’s and Russia’s foreign policy-making towards the creation of a Palestinian state takes its importance from the failure of diplomatic efforts to realise the right of the Palestinian people to a viable and independent state. During the first decade of the 21st century, establishing a Palestinian state, which is the central puzzle of this thesis, has been at the core of the EU’s and Russia’s foreign policy towards the MEPP. To investigate this puzzle, this study was built primarily on the assumption that identity and Self-Other perception play a key role in informing both actors’ policies towards a Palestinian state. By interpreting the EU’s and Russia’s discourse in the course of making foreign policy, I came to the conclusion that the EU’s and Russia’s foreign policy-making is Self-centric and revolves around reinforcing their influence in the Middle East, underpinning their actorness in the world, and improving their image as peace-makers rather than actually making peace. By supporting the establishment of a Palestinian state, the EU succeeded in realising presence and visibility in the region, but failed to defend its principles in promoting democracy, which is at the centre of its normative power, and failed to translate this presence to actorness, especially its failure to support the Palestinian bid at the UNGA. Russia meanwhile succeeded in refurbishing the old Soviet influence in the region, and partly succeeded in displaying credibility through its support for Palestinian statehood at both the UNSC and the UNGA.

In this thesis I argue that these unsuccessful and ineffective diplomatic efforts to establish a Palestinian state can be better understood by taking into consideration the influence of identity and Self-Other perception in the EU’s and Russia’s foreign policy-making. In my discussion I focus, in a comparison, on how Self-perception as a global actor, and perception of Otherness, in the Middle East in general and the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians in particular, has influenced the quest for Palestinian statehood. I argue that the constructivist approach in studying foreign policy-making provides a better understanding of the EU’s and Russia’s foreign policy towards the Middle East. This argument challenges the conventional assumptions that foreign policy-making towards Palestinian statehood are informed by power, security and interdependence. In this process of investigation and exploration I have used discourse analysis as a methodological analytical tool to interpret the EU’s and Russia’s discourse towards the Middle East peace process in general, and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in particular. This method of analysis provides a better interpretation by contextualising the EU and Russian foreign
policies. It utilises the golden base of interpretation that there is no meaning without context. This has explored how the process of saying (informing) gives a meaning and presence of its polity through a series of policies (actions) in order to assert its actorness (identity). In order to investigate the process of achieving global actorness as a prime motive behind the EU’s and Russia’s involvement in the MEPP, I have used the model of Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler.

The linkage between internal developments and external expectations helps us to a better understanding of foreign policy-making. The collapse of the USSR and the breakup of its bloc in Europe and Central Asia constitutes the broad context in which the EU’s and Russia’s Self-perception were constructed and reinvented. The EU and Russia are striving to construct and reinvent their international identities in a series of differences such as principles and values, economic and military capabilities, and soft powers. Building an international identity in these contexts is central to the EU and Russia in order to assert their global actorness in the world arena. In both cases, this international identity is an external expectation to meet internal developments. In the case of the EU, it meets the spill-over of the European community that is designed to secure and maintain the famous trio: European stability, security and prosperity, which are an external expectation to represent the size and economic weight of the Union. Therefore, the EU stresses its civilian nature and emphasises its global actorness in terms of normative values, peacemaking, soft power and economic capabilities. The EU’s attempts to construct this international identity is a reflection of its Self-perception in terms of history, culture and economic weight.

In the case of Russia, the decline in its international position has caused an identity crisis between constructing a new international identity by dependence on the heritage and legacy of the former Soviet Union and Tsarist Russia, or becoming a follower of Western policies. The collapse left post-Soviet Russia with many internal problems such as internal security and stability, a technological gap, a weak economy, guaranteed free trade movements for its goods and services, and protecting Russian assets, especially gas and oil, in the world market. Thus, global actorness was perceived as the guarantor to heal its internal disarray and turmoil. Russian foreign policy is very sensitive to any efforts that might affect its internal security, territorial integrity and economic integration in the world.
economy. Therefore, Russia focuses on reinventing its international position in different contexts such as energy, economics, the military, and culture.

Self-perception is reflected in the formulation of the EU’s and Russia’s foreign policy towards the Middle East in general and the peace settlement in particular. Playing a role in the MEPP is an important ideal for the EU and Russia that tends to reaffirm their actorness in the region. It takes its importance from the perception of the Middle East which can enhance their capabilities and underpin their actorness on the international stage. The Middle East is a geostrategic nerve centre of world politics and is perceived as a vital sphere in different contexts. It has been perceived as a region of multilayered interests and challenges: a region of interrelated economic relations, especially in trade and energy, a region of intersecting historical relations in terms of religion and civilisation, a region of insecurity where threats of so-called “terrorism” originate, as well as a region of instability with rather undemocratic and authoritarian regimes. These interrelations and interconnections have increased the EU’s and Russia’s focus on this region. This strategic importance of the Middle East, its geographical proximity, its interconnected bonds, and interrelated relations are incentives which pushed the EU and Russia to search for an active role in its policy-making. This makes it difficult for the EU and Russia to ignore the MEPP. Such a region, at the crossroads between three continents, with a huge amount of natural resources and energy supplies, as well as the homeland of the three Abrahamic religions, is a vital sphere to create presence and exercise actorness.

The MEPP is an important and key channel to approach the Middle East. That reinforcing influence in the Middle Eastern countries is a chief motive that informs the EU’s and Russia’s involvement in the peace-making process in indelible. That is, active involvement in the MEPP provides easy access to take a role in the policy-making of this vibrant region.

The making of their MEPP foreign policy is largely performed under the effect and influence of Self-perception. The EU finds itself caught between promoting its principles and values to assert itself as a normative power, and guarding its economic interests and acting as an economic power; between being normative and soft and defending its member states’ national interests; and between being a peace-maker and a normative principles promoter, and grantor and guard of its member states security, stability and prosperity.
Meanwhile Russia finds itself seeking to assert its successor to the former Soviet Union, protector of former Soviet clients, balancing policy towards all parties, and counterbalancing other global actors in the Middle East which continue to drive Russian foreign policy towards the Middle East. Therefore, the EU and Russia strongly struggle to play a role in this process. The idea is to seize this channel into the Middle East to increase their influence and to assert Self-determination as actors. The main change on the European and Russian side is to seize the potential decline of American hegemony in this region. To Russia, the core objective of its foreign policy-making is ‘making the federation work’; that is, to maintain its geographical size and strengthen its economic and political muscle. Restoring Russia’s actorness in world politics was the assumption that no other choice would lead Russia to overcome its economic, territorial integrity and security problems. Further, that, being a global actor will make the Russian Federation operate well, which will improve Russia’s ability to boost economic growth, reinforce its internal and external security environment, especially the stand-off against NATO, and to delegitimise movements that call for independence or separation in the North Caucasus. Therefore, the rehabilitation of Soviet influence in the Middle East has been a strategic objective. Putin’s slogan “Great Russia” (2000) needs material resources, political leverage and public drive to make it real. The Middle East as a vector is to improve Russia’s bargaining opportunities in these domains. Longer term, Russia seeks to play a major role in the making of this region’s politics that pour into its interests. The restoration of Soviet influence in the Middle East helped Russia to recover its inefficient economy, bridge the technological gap by increasing its share in the Middle East market and face challenges of fragile security and stability by neutralising religious factors and financial support coming from the region.

To the EU, being a global actor in the region and in the world, makes the Union function better; that is, it helps the EU to burnish its identity by adding a new layer to its institutional construct thus strengthening and confirming its collective identity. This shows its member states how authoritative and influential the Union has become. By playing an active role and constructing good relations with most of the ME countries, the EU tends to assert its political legitimacy at an internal level, and enhance its influence on the world scene. This underpins European solidarity and integration so that member-states may look at themselves as a part of an influential and powerful global actor. Additionally, the ME as a foreign policy field is used as a parcel of external policies that aims to widen and
consolidate the Europeanisation process in Europe. Beyond these aims it is also used to extend the European project outside its borders in terms of influence and a wider European landscape in geographical proximity.

In addition, making the Union function better helps to undermine the ideas of nationalist groups and parties. It helps in strengthening inter-state bonds and lessens the idea of nation-states that lay behind destructive European wars for centuries. As well, the actorness in peace mediation is important through which European citizens fathom their position in world politics and receive the meaning of being together and working collectively on the world stage. To a large degree, actorness in different contexts gives a meaning to internal constituencies and shapes state policy responses and underpins policymakers in gathering a mandate for their policies. The existing high level of cooperation between the EU and US in many areas, as their policies can be regarded as compatible, at the present, the EU introduces itself as an equal strategic partner or even an alternative in the making of Middle East politics. The internal developments in terms of enlargement have increased the level of external presumption in which the member-states expect to play an active role to meet their ambitions.

This perception of the Self as well as the perception of the Middle East has largely informed foreign policy-making towards establishing the Palestinian state. This is reflected by the EU’s and Russia’s focus on reinforcing their influence more than making peace. Through the analysis of EU and Russian discourse security informs the establishment of the Palestinian state. Both actors consider the conflict a breeding ground for extremism. The EU and Russia share the same perception that the long awaited Palestinian state must be consistent with the Israeli perspective of security. This appeared in the EU’s and Russia’s reaction towards the Apartheid Separation Wall and the siege of Arafat. This policy by both actors cannot be separated from their perception of the Middle East in general and their perception of Israel in particular. Their perception of interrelations with Israel, in different contexts, forms a major limitation to the process of establishing a Palestinian state. This security-based perception will continue to inform the EU’s and Russia’s foreign policy towards peace-making between the Palestinians and Israelis.

The EU has increased its presence in the Middle East as a state-builder and an exporter of democracy and good governance that have helped to increase its leverage in the region. It
uses its financial capabilities to implement related polices. These financial aids are conditions to the EU-Palestinian Association Agreement which sets up action plans that represent the EU perspective on making peace between Palestinians and Israelis. This normative-based perception of peace-making has driven the EU to force the PA to conduct institutional reforms. The policy emphasised promoting democracy and institutional reforms to pave the way to Palestinian statehood through preventing scenarios of collapse and escalating into disarray, and undermining the roots of so-called “Palestinian violence” by containing the political and social forces in the political system. This policy brought Hamas to power from the gates of democracy. In this regard, the EU was caught between accepting the result of the democratic process and accepting Hamas although it was classified, by the EU, as a “terrorist organization”. The perception of Hamas, in terms of its political construct in contrast to the perception of Israel and in the light of enhancing EU influence in the region, drove the EU to boycott the Hamas-led government. This means that EU policy towards Palestinian statehood was driven by the desire to reinforce its presence in the Middle East. The EU succeeded in enhancing its presence in peace-making, but failed to translate this presence into actorness. This contradiction between the perception of the Self and the perception of the Israelis in contrast to the Palestinians clearly appeared at the UNGA. The EU failed to vote collectively at the UNGA in favour of upgrading Palestinian status.

By playing a role in the MEPP, Russia succeeded in boosting its presence in Middle Eastern politics and partly restored Soviet influence in this region. Unlike the EU, Russian involvement in the process of state-building focuses on little financial aid, but bigger political support. Russia’s emphasis on preserving a seat in this process is about more that making peace. This is because Russia’s main desire is to refurbish Soviet leverage in the area and enhance its position in making the region’s politics. Russian policy is more pragmatic in dealing with the Palestinian-Israeli conflict that is perceived as a chronic and intractable conflict in the world. Accordingly, Russia is playing the game “friends of all” in its peace mediation, for example, unlike the EU, Russia supported the Quartet conditions and, at the same time, keeps a diplomatic channel open with Hamas. Russia is attempting to exploit the contradictions in the relations between Hamas and other global actors. It is trying to use the space that Hamas makes in Middle Eastern politics to enhance its influence in the region. Mainly, Russia is interested in the region, not in having a relationship with Hamas. Russian historical support for the Palestinians is one of the main
drives that lead it to support and vote at the UNSC and the UNGA in favour of Palestinian statehood. The Russian position at the UNGA is consistent with its commitment towards supporting its clients and friends in the Middle East. In spite of the fact that Russia’s importance in establishing PA’s institutions is slight, it succeeded in showing strong political support for the idea of Palestinian statehood. Regardless of that, Russia took into consideration its relations with Israel when they chose to limit Palestinian status to non-member observer status at the UNGA so as not to be used against Israel.

Finally, the Self-perception of EU and Russian foreign policy as a global player highly informed their foreign policy-making towards a Palestinian state. This is reflected in defining the foreign policy instruments that both actors designate to enhance their influence in the Middle East. Establishing the Palestinian state, as part of the MEPP, takes its importance from the significance of the Middle East. Its strategic importance in terms of economy, energy and trade, and historical, cultural and religious bonds, especially the Levant, largely drive the EU and Russia to become involve actively in the peace process. EU and Russian support for the establishment of an independent and viable Palestinian state is, to large extent, informed by the Self-Other perception of both actors. This has created limitations that define the road map towards Palestinian statehood and make the EU and Russia to prefer process more than peace-making in the region.
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