Contesting Security and the Binding Effect in the US and the UK Discourse and Policy of “War on Terror”: A Theoretical and Empirical Exploration through a Dialogical-Relational Framework

Submitted by Tatevik Mnatsakanyan

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Abstract

Post-structuralist IR has often treated foreign policy/security discourses and their effects on policy through a “representational model”, i.e. how one dominant representation makes possible particular policy outcomes. However, in a longitudinal analysis, where the concern with “outcome” is already about continuity/change, this model is restricting and must be replaced by a model integrating multiple voices and contestations, and looking for non-linear mechanisms of long-term constraints. Thus, the purpose of this thesis is, first, to develop a theoretical-analytical framework suitable for an explicit interest in contestations and tracing constraints; and second, in an illustrative-explorative study, to apply such relational-dialogical framework to “war on terror” in the US and the UK (2001-2012). Bakhtinian Dialogism occupies an important status in the framework; therefore, a broader aim is to demonstrate how a “dialogical turn” inspired by the philosophy of Mikhail Bakhtin and his circle would enrich debate. Developments of the past decade – increased anti-war critique, change of governments in the US and the UK, and protracted withdrawal – provide new grounds for a longitudinal inquiry into “war on terror”. Moving beyond the question how “war on terror” was initially constructed and legitimised, scholarly attention must focus on a longitudinal inquiry into why “war on terror” endured. In this respect, the formidable deconstructions of official discourses by anti-war critique have received marginal attention in IR. The empirical part explores how critical discourses have contested the official narratives; how the latter have engaged with them as well as with moderate deliberative critique, and to what effect for continuity/change, to understand whether and how successive governments in the US and the UK have been discursively constrained (bound) in their attempts to change policy. Without claiming to be a comprehensive explanation, it locates and interprets patterns and logics within the discursive exchanges, delineating potential routes contributing to constraints and hence continuation. Thus, on the one hand, destabilising critique was shattering the foundations of the official “war on terror” narratives without fully re-inscribing the dislocated space with new imaginings, thus inviting official representatives to reclaim such space. On the other hand, deliberative voices were pushing for the realisation of the promises inherent in the official discourse, demanding “winning” the (albeit “mistaken”) war, thus inviting for continued engagement.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1. Rationale and Purpose of the Thesis

In the past few decades, intellectual influences drawn from the structuralist speech-act theory of Austin and Searle, on the one hand, and post-structuralist discourse philosophy, in particular of Foucault, Derrida, Barthes, Kristeva and Butler, on the other, have precipitated the "linguistic turn" in the discipline of International Relations (IR). As a result, critical studies on security have re-conceived of foreign/security policy as inextricably linked to discursive constructions of identity as difference; sovereignty as performativity, where "sovereign nation-states are ... subjects in process and ...are the ontological effects of practices which are performatively enacted"; security as a performatory act; and security as a social construction where identity and policy, as well as the material and the ideational are conceived to be in a mutually constitutive relationship. Official security discourses in general, and discourses of "war on terror" in particular, have been explored and analysed as intimately linked with constructions of state/national identities. Thus, theorising the relationship between identity, state and foreign/security policy, Campbell has noted that foreign policy is especially apposite to perform the function of drawing Self-Other distinctions, as a "privileged discourse of danger" that performatively reproduces the very subject as a sovereign state (e.g. the US); while Ashley and Campbell have dubbed foreign policy "a specific sort of

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5 Critical Discourse Analysis of Fairclough and others applied to studies on security, e.g. by Richard Jackson on "war on terror". Jackson, Richard, ‘Culture, identity and hegemony: Continuity and (the lack of) change in US counterterrorism policy from Bush to Obama’, International Politics, 48 (2011), 390–411.
boundary-producing political performance’. In addition, Hansen has noted the inseparability of foreign policy discourse and national identity. On “war on terror”, Croft has explored how the US official narrative has drawn on national identity narratives, and in turn been reproduced in various cultural and religious sites; while Jackson has demonstrated how Otherisation built into the US official narrative on 9/11 has been built on and also reproduced a certain US identity.

On the other hand, however, the past decade has seen formidable, if often overlooked, deconstructions and destabilisations of official security discourses based on Otherisation, or of ‘privileged discourse[s] of danger’, by voices of anti-war movements, critical media and other agents, specifically around “war on terror”. Exemplary are e.g. what some have dubbed cumulatively as “war for oil” discourses. These, as well as other alternative narratives destabilising the official “war on terror” discourses have mostly received only marginal attention in IR studies, often in dismissive terms, or else referred to in order to show how they have been subsumed by the hegemonic discourse, thus suggesting that they have not had much effect on the policy and practice of “war on terror”. Concentrating primarily on hegemonic/dominant discourses is a broader tendency in post-structuralist IR with regards to foreign/security discourses, and will be discussed later (but see, e.g., Campbell himself admitting the limitation of his seminal work to be the bracketing off of dominant discourses from discourses of dissent and resistance).

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7 Campbell (1998: 62), quoting Richard Ashley, ‘Foreign Policy as Political Performance’, International Studies Notes, 13 (1987), 51. Furthermore, Neumann has argued and demonstrated how ordering of the Self (the European self, in his case) has historically been one way of organising politics. Thus, drawing on Chantal Mouffe’s elaboration of “politics” as the practice seeking to organize human coexistence by establishing a certain order in a permanently antagonistic field of “the political”, Neumann concludes his empirical study by positing that ‘the ordering of self as “Western” and other as “Eastern” in European identity formation is one way of organising European politics’. Neumann (1999: 210).


9 Croft, Stuart, Culture, Crisis and America’s War on Terror (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

10 Richard Jackson, Writing the War on Terror: Language, Politics and Counter-Terrorism (Manchester and NY: Manchester University Press, 2005).


12 Jackson (2005).

13 See, e.g. Jackson claiming there has not been much critique. Ibid.

14 Ibid.

In addition, post-structuralist IR and Security Studies have often treated foreign policy/security discourses and their effects on policy and practice through what I shall call the “representational model”, i.e. accounts of how one dominant representation (of a “threat”, “event”, “problem”) points to a particular course of action rather than another (foreign/security policies and practices), and thereby how such representations ‘make…possible’ such policies and practices. For instance, as per Campbell, the Bosnia intervention initially did not take place because US identity was not articulated in lines of a defence of multiculturalism. Similarly, the invasion of Kuwait was framed as a violation of the norm of sovereignty, thereby making intervention possible. Hansen’s more recent work on Bosnia, although pointing to a more complex model, and acknowledging the limitations of more simple representational models, nonetheless retains, even if in a more nuanced form, the basic logic behind such accounts. Specifically in relation to “war on terror”, a similar argument has now become most familiar in academic as well as public critical discourse, namely that the securitizing “war” narrative of 9/11 led to, or “made possible”, the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, something which an alternative possible “crime” narrative could not have done.

Indeed, the term “representational model” is an uneasy one, given post-structuralists’ broader normative-political aim of deconstructing and critiquing dominant representations. However, it aims to capture the loosely causal logic behind most claims pertaining to the political and policy effects ascribed to dominant security representations in such studies.

The representational model has some merits if employed to explore initial legitimation discourses of security policies, e.g. in the immediate post-9/11 period. However, in a longitudinal perspective, i.e. in an analysis concerned with the longer life of such discourses and continued (re)legitimations, where

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18 Campbell (1996).
21 But even then, there is a lot of scope for critique. See, e.g., critique by Laffey, who in a historical-materialist account primarily interested in the role of sedimented institutions and material factors such as oil, shows how such a ‘performative model’ leaves out ‘multiple logics that constitute the social’. Laffey, Mark, ‘Locating identity: performativity, foreign policy and state action’, *Review of International Studies*, 26 (2000), 429.
the outcome is already about continuity and/or change, this model is highly restricting. Together with the tendency to over-concentrate on the official discourses alone and hence overlook or at times outright dismiss the significance of discourses of critique and resistance, it risks reducing relational and non-linear discursive processes that have led to policy outcomes (continuity or change being such outcome) to a linear and synchronic relationship between one (characteristically, the dominant) narrative and certain foreign policy/security practices. Instead, especially to explore the longer term dynamics of a security discourse, we must bring together discourses of official representatives and those of dissent and critique into one empirical analysis that would explore how a) they have related to one another over the years by variously responding to one another and to external developments, and b) how they have produced policy and practice outcomes relationally.

Thus, the broader theoretical interest of this project revolves around an attempt to gain a deeper and empirically more supported understanding of the role of certain semiotic mechanisms in the explanation of “the longer life of” securitization discourses (where the term “securitization” is used in the broader sense of on-going security constructions and legitimations of policy).

Indeed, the endurance and the protracted involvement of the US and the UK especially in Afghanistan and Iraq, despite the potentially subversive anti-war critique that has characterised the political and public landscape in both countries over the years, begs the broader question about the causes behind such endurance. In other words, moving beyond the question how “war on terror” was initially constructed and legitimised through discourse, it is overdue that scholarly attention must now focus on a longitudinal inquiry and seek to understand why the “war on terror” endured.22

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22 One of the few studies concerned with such endurance is Jeffrey Michaels’ recent study, which, however, locates the discussion in the narrow field of Strategic and War Studies; and in a typical rational choice and Realist account. Offering a historical account of the evolution, use and abuse of a few key terms (e.g. “surge”) used by the US military leadership and bureaucracy, politicians and the media, he argues that policy was affected by a certain ‘entrapment’ into the initially ‘inappropriate’ or misconceived use and subsequent institutionalisation of these terms. While the concept of ‘the discourse trap’, or its mechanisms, is not theorised and conceptualised in much depth, the author’s account of such ‘entrapment’ implicitly qualifies it as a certain dysfunction of realist politics and the disruption of the otherwise normal rational choice model. Michaels, Jeffrey, The Discourse Trap and the US Military: From the War on Terror to the Surge (New York: Palgrave, MacMillan, 2013), pp. 5-6. Another exception is Richard Jackson’s article to be engaged with later. See, Jackson (2011).
The empirical part of this thesis is initially asking such a “why” question (which can also be framed as another type of “how” question, i.e. a causal-constitutive “how” question). However, such a “why” question is highly complex and would require a multi-causal analysis for a comprehensive answer: among other potential causes for the endurance of “war on terror”, such multi-causal analysis, would necessarily include the close scholarly examination of some of the claims behind the very same popular anti-war discourses of “war for oil”, whereby the reasons for the initiation and therefore continuation of the involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq is tightly linked to the material economic interests in preserving control over Middle East oil reserves. It would also involve examination of the claims about the vested interests of the “military-industrial complex” benefiting from continued intervention. Just as discursive exchanges, detached from materially-embedded reasons for action, cannot fully explain the endurance of the “war”, mono-causal materialist explanations would be reductionist.

Integral to any such quest to understand endurance, i.e. continuity or lack of change, is the concept of “constraints”. It often implicitly or explicitly underlies constructivist/post-structuralist studies inquiring into substantive cases of continuity and/or (lack of) change. Relatedly, such studies also make implicit claims about certain causal mechanisms underlying processes of constraints.23 Thus, the very notion of hegemonic discourses itself is about constraints. However, the interest in the existing discourse-analytical literature has largely been on how hegemonic discourses constrain, i.e. delimit the power of, *subjugated actors* in what is possible to say and do, rather than looking for relationally produced and non-linear mechanisms of long-term constraints on actors (such as successors in government) who might be politically representing an inherited official discourse but striving (rhetorically or through policy action) for certain change. As the literature review will show, substantive studies on “war on terror” fall short of explicitly conceptualising discursive constraints and accounting for them as part of the *mechanisms* leading to the claimed outcomes; and often only allude to the implicit mechanisms of such constraints through vague and under-conceptualised metaphors. Examples of the latter are

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23 See, e.g., Jackson (2011).
claims about the official discourse turning into ‘self-fulfilling prophecies’;24 ‘push[ing] and pull[ing] everyone toward world constructions that match the wordings’;25 or “war on terror” ‘tak[ing] on a life of its own’.26

Most closely, the issue of constraints and hence of continuity and (lack) of change is addressed in Jackson’s more recent piece on “war on terror”27 claiming that the Obama administration has been constrained by earlier (Bush) discourse. However, as I will demonstrate in the literature review, Jackson effectively sees such constraints mainly coming from the political and commercial elites deliberately pushing for the continuation of policy to serve their material vested interests. Furthermore, Jackson suggests that such constraints are present only because the institutionalisation and preservation of vested interests is reliant on “threat”, in fact any major threat, and that in case of an invention of a new threat to replace “terrorism”, change of policy would be possible, without much constraint from the earlier “war on terror” narrative.28 Thus, in Jackson’s account, the “war on terror” is primarily seen as the effect of ‘a set of bureaucratic material interests’;29 and in the absence of exploring other mechanisms, such material interests must be behind the purported constraints and hence the continuity and the lack of change. While adopting the ‘dialectical co-constitution of the language and the material practices’,30 this conclusion closes off an inquiry into more specific mechanisms and semiotic dynamics within the given phenomenon, in particular, by leaving out any potential encounters of the hegemonic discourse with the discourses of dissent and critique, as well as political deliberation, and their relationally produced potential role in the continuity and (lack) of change.

Thus, overall, as the literature review in chapter 2 demonstrates in more detail, we may sum up three main areas of limitations in post-positivist discourse-analytical treatments of the “war on terror” discourse, but also more broadly of security discourses in post-structuralist IR: a) the overconcentration on the

26 Jackson (2005: 3).
27 Jackson (2011).
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid., 395.
30 Ibid., 393.
hegemonic/dominant discourses alone, i.e. in relative, if not complete, isolation from the competing discourses of dissent and critique, and hence the lack of relational longitudinal analysis of “war on terror” discourses and their effects on policy continuation or change; b) the limitations of the representational model; and c) insufficient conceptualising and empirical tracing of mechanisms of “constraints” specifically in the discursive domain of contestations in relation to “war on terror”.

Drawing on these, I will argue that if we are concerned with the contestation and struggle present in the political field over constitution of dominant security discourses, then the representational model must give way/be enhanced by a model that looks at multiple voices and tensions, and at potentially less linear mechanisms and outcomes in the longer term, and especially after an initial legitimation has been achieved. On the other hand, if we are talking about security policies and practices having been ‘made possible’ by certain dominant/hegemonic security narratives, then we are effectively dealing with certain implicit causation. I will later argue that a more explicit discussion of causation is important because the idea of “cause” is already implicit in most post-structuralist or “thick constructivist” empirical studies in IR and Security Studies: these inquiries seek to delineate effects, and at times mechanisms, of discursive and identity dynamics on foreign/security policy, while at the same time the theoretical concept of “causation” is eschewed. We would benefit from more explicitly admitting to the presence of “cause” defined in non-Humean, non-essentialised and non-generalisable terms; and exploring causal mechanisms that go beyond how hegemonic/dominant security narratives “make possible” certain policies and instead look for mechanisms how such policy outcomes become possible non-linearly, as a result of the agonistic struggles and contestations, no matter how unequal, present in the given security realm. This would incorporate discourses striving to domination, those variously destabilising them, and how these respond to each other and change as a result.

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Purpose of the thesis: Drawing on these limitations, the purpose of this thesis has been, first, the development of a theoretical and analytical framework that would be more suitable for a study explicitly interested in contestations and in tracing outcomes (continuity and change being such outcome) relationally (Part I of the thesis); and second, applying this framework to conduct an empirical study into the long-term evolution of discourses around the “war on terror” in the US and the UK in over a decade (2001-2012) (Part II of the thesis). The empirical research revolves around a working hypothesis on a possible binding effect that has contributed to the protraction and endurance of the “war on terror”, to be articulated in a moment. Without claiming to be a comprehensive multi-causal explanation for the overall phenomenon of a prolonged “war on terror”, the empirical study attempts to locate and interpret some patterns and logics within the discursive exchanges and contestations around the “war on terror” specifically focusing on tensions between the official narratives and narratives of dissent and destabilisation, in order to delineate some potential routes contributing to constraints and hence continuation of policy.

In addition, as it will become clearer in a moment, Bakhtinian Dialogism occupies an important status in the development of such framework; therefore, another, broader, aim of the thesis is to bring Dialogism, the discourse philosophy of Mikhail Bakhtin and his circle, into the theoretical and substantive debates on foreign and security discourse in IR and Security Studies, and demonstrate how the debate would be enriched by a certain “dialogical turn” in theorising and analysing more explicitly discursive contestations and their effects on policy and practices of security.

It must be emphasised, that the theoretical part of this thesis raises and touches upon larger and broader range of themes and issues than the empirical part has sought or been able to explore and address. Partly, this was due to the need to introduce the thought of Bakhtin and his circle in detail, potentially to audiences with little familiarity with it;33 and partly because the framework has sought to develop insights that would go beyond the empirical focus on “war on terror.

33 As we shall see, Bakhtinian Dialogism has received only marginal attention in IR, with the exception of Guillaume’s work, and still remains an unfamiliar domain to most IR scholars. See Guillaume, Xavier (2002), ‘Reflexivity and Subjectivity: A Dialogical Perspective for and on International Relations Theory’, Qualitative Social Research, 3, 1-26; as well as Guillaume (2011). Also, see Guillaume, Xavier (2010), ‘Bakhtin: From Substance to Process’, in Moore, C. and Farrands, C. (eds.) International Relations Theory and Philosophy: Interpretive Dialogues (Oxford: Routledge).
terror” and could potentially animate discussion about foreign/security discourses and practices specifically in Western late-modern contexts in light of the emphasis on relationality and dialogicity and of contesting/negotiating security.

1.2. The Hypothesis

Locating the socio-historical situatedness of foreign/security discourses in the broader societal tensions and changes of the late modern age, and attempting to understand the implications of such late modern field, I variously draw on sociological and philosophical insights, especially those offered by Giddens and Beck in relation to “reflexive modernization” and “risk society”, respectively; as well as by Dillon on the politics of security as part of the Western metaphysical tradition built on a will to certitude. As a result, I will argue that official foreign/security policy finds itself torn between the conflicting needs to satisfy the will to certitude, and the need to deal with the repercussions of ever more complex global uncertainties of the late modern age. As a future-orientated discourse of progress – of ‘imagining’ a collective “future” as progress, as a movement in time towards something better, it represents a tension between the need to continue projecting the promise of progress of the Enlightenment and the assurance of certainty, on the one hand, and the need to engage variously with the plurality of other voices destabilising such a project. This tension, in turn, reflects a more specific paradox of late modernity in relation to security. On the one hand, the state is still bound up in the Modernist promise of combating evil and hence strives for maximum monology and singularity for state identity based on security narratives; on the other hand, it is in great tension with the late modern self-reflexive society, as well as post-modernist deconstructive tendencies: it cannot achieve its task without engaging with/responding to the heteroglot discursive field characterised by publics that


are increasingly more critical and self-reflexive,\(^{37}\) as well as more deconstructive of discourses of danger built on defilement as the basis for national identity.

These theoretical insights already position us differently when it comes to the question of continuity and/or change and the endurance of “war on terror”. In other words, I am interested in the latter question within such context of, and in relation to, such a potential tension and inherent contradictions of the late modern age. This means that we must explore relations and struggles among competing agents and how these are resolved if at all, rather than focusing on one specific (characteristically the dominant/hegemonic) narrative resulting in a particular policy, or the continuation/change thereof.

The developments in the later post-9/11 years – increased anti-war critique both domestically and internationally; the change of governments in the US and the UK; attempts to tone down rhetoric illustrated by the move to discard the use of the term “war on terror”, Obama’s pledge to close the Guantanamo Bay prison; and finally protracted execution of withdrawal plans – provide new grounds for an inquiry into the discursive and policy dynamics of “war on terror”, in particular with regards to the issue of continuity/change. Thus, these developments beg for questions such as how the official discourses in both the US and the UK have evolved reacting to major challenges, specifically domestic challenges offered by critical voices; how they have transformed throughout the years, and what implications this has had on policy continuation or change. In terms of the protracted rhetoric and policy, they also point to the question: what have the mechanisms of constraints, if any, been among various stages of the dominant official narratives on the one hand, and between the official narratives and narratives of critique variously undermining and destabilising them, on the other.

One such possible constraint could be coming from the dynamic around negotiating national identity as inextricable to negotiating security in the contemporary late modern Western liberal-democratic context. More specifically, if the official narratives of 9/11 and hence of “war on terror” have

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been intimately linked to narrating a national Self and (re)producing an official version of national identity, then it is only pertinent to ask how the voices of dissent and critique have destabilised such identity narratives along with deconstructing and destabilising the official narrative giving meaning to 9/11 and the subsequent raison d'être behind the policies and practices within the remit of “war on terror”. In other words, have the discourses of dissent and critique, whether intentionally or as an epiphenomenon, also dismantled and subverted dominant national identity narratives in the US and the UK? Have these amounted to “dislocations”, i.e. ‘the process by which the contingency of discursive structures is made visible…[it] shatters already existing identities and literally induces an identity crisis for the subject’? If yes, then to what effect: how have the official representatives in turn reacted and responded to such dismantling and potential dislocations?

The working and at this stage tentatively articulated hypothesis behind this thesis states:

In contemporary Western democratic states, where state/national identity construction, as well as critique and accountability, are inextricable parts of negotiating security, official foreign/security discourses closely built on and re-constituting national identity narratives, beyond the initial point of legitimising policy such as war or intervention (intended effect), in the longer term may become discursively and politically binding on the initiators and/or their successors (unintended/ epiphenomenal effect), i.e. may have the potential effect of constraining change, or protracting policy, even in case of an attempted/declared intention to the contrary.

Applied to the case of “war on terror”, the hypothesis suggests the broader research question behind the empirical study: How, i.e. through what socio-semiotic mechanisms, did the hypothetical binding, if at all, take place in case of the US and the UK involvements in “war on terror”? Thus, it asks whether successive governments in the US and the UK have been constrained in their attempts to change policy direction and the official narratives of security and national identity underlying earlier discourses of legitimization; and whether any logics and patterns internal to the contestations and importantly encounters with

the destabilising narratives of the critique have had any potential role to play in such constraints.

The empirical exploration of this hypothesis, as well as the limitations of the existing literature identified above, necessitated a theoretical inquiry into enhanced ways of approaching discourses and making a number of theoretical and methodological correctives, which eventually pointed to a revised framework. Especially, the concern with relationality and contestation, presented me with a particular challenge: theoretical and analytical models concerned with discourse are largely insufficiently equipped to such a task; or where contestations are explicitly theorised at the macro-theoretical level, such as in Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory, they are not reflected in a subsequent micro-theory of the utterance, and a model where the actual application of discourse analysis is conducted by focusing on just such relational exchanges specifically when contesting security.

To address this challenge, on the one hand, I selectively draw on Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory, and its later re-articulation by David Howarth, where contestations are explicitly theorised, and selectively utilise certain analytical categories such as “dislocation” and “nodal points”. On the other hand, I introduce Dialogism, the highly relational discourse philosophy of the 20th century Russian thinker Mikhail Bakhtin and his circle, in order to develop an explicitly relational theory of the utterance through the “dialogical speech-act” which is conceived as inextricable to contestations and social struggles. As a result, and by variously drawing on Michael Dillon’s political philosophy on security; and on the sociological insights of Ulrich Becks and Anthony Giddens on the status of critique in the late modern society, I develop a “relational-dialogical” framework for specifically analysing foreign/security discourses.

Thus, the development of such framework became the emergent aim of the thesis, along with the aim of enhancing the empirical understanding of the continuation of “war on terror”.

The framework allows going beyond the moment of initial legitimisation of security in moments of major events and inquiring into the longer dynamics, i.e. what happens after such legitimisation. But more importantly, it provides conceptual tools for inquiring into how security discourses are contested, negotiated and change over time, producing outcomes (including continuity and
change) *relational*ly, i.e. out of the tensions and struggles *between* discourses of official representatives, those of deliberation and political oversight, and those of public dissent and critique.

As this requires lengthy exploration and theory development, I will leave the exposition of the framework to the chapters that follow in Part I. Here, however, a brief introduction about the novelty and usefulness of Bakhtin’s thought is due.

### 1.3. Bakhtin in the New Framework

There has been considerable interest in the thought of Russian philosopher Mikhail Bakhtin and his circle (including Voloshinov and Medvedev),\(^39\) and the theory of Dialogism in the arts, humanities,\(^40\) but only very nascent and at times only tangential interest in IR.\(^41\) With the exception of Guillaume’s work,\(^42\) Bakhtin and his circle have featured in IR studies very often as little more than a footnote, despite their thought having indirectly illuminated some key substantive claims and directions (on “identity/alterity” and “intertextuality”; and recently “context” in securitization theory). Guillaume, perhaps the first to develop a fully Bakhtin-inspired dialogical approach is primarily interested in and has explored the usefulness of Dialogism in reconceiving the identity/alterity nexus: he has compellingly shown that rather than spatial/territorialised and fixed, this nexus must be understood as a process which is subject to ‘trans-actions’ among actors representing differing identities.

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\(^39\) Several earlier writings initially published under the name of either Medvedev or Voloshinov, have subsequently been claimed and recognised, in Russia as well as in the West, as belonging to Bakhtin. The authorship of some work is still disputed by some; however, it is clear that all three were a close circle and had developed a similar theoretical approach, elements of which reappear and consistently develop in most of the writings. Therefore, the issue of authorship will be resolved here in favour of referring to all the works as by Bakhtin, also indicating, the published name, where appropriate.


\(^41\) Guillaume (2002); Guillaume (2010), Guillaume (2011). To a less extent, see Der Derian, James (1993) ‘Fathers (and sons), Mother Courage (and her children), and the Dog (and the beef), in Global Voices: Dialogues in International Relations, James Rosenau (ed.) (Westview); and Neumann, I. B. (1996) ‘Self and Other in International Relations’, *European Journal of International Relations*, 2(2), 139-74, to be discussed in chapter 2.

He shows how national identities are formed dialogically, in answer to and in constant trans-actions with one another (e.g. between Japan and the US).\textsuperscript{43} However, the usefulness of Bakhtin for conceptualising a post-Austinean, more intersubjective speech-act, and more broadly a discourse theory more suitable for a relational discourse analysis concerned with contestations internally, of competing representations negotiating a certain identity within a community, has largely been missed.

Through the development of the new framework, I hope to bring Bakhtinian Dialogism out of such mostly “footnote” status, and along with Guillaume’s work, re-introduce it to IR. I seek to show a) its relevance for re-conceiving of a more dialogical-relational theory of speech-act/utterance; and thereby provide a micro-level theorisation of the speech-act most suited for the concern with contestations and relationality; and b) its potential for enriching theoretical and empirical discussion in IR on negotiating foreign/security policy, through a focus on “answerability”, as well as his concept of the “chronotopic” (time-space) narrative representations.

In Bakhtinian thought, “dialogue” is primarily an ontological category: rather than formal systematic integrity as in structuralism, or discontinuity and contingency as in Western post-structuralism,\textsuperscript{44} for Bakhtin the key principle in discourse and society is “dialogue”. As a meta-category, or in the broader sense of the term as synonymous with the term “relation”, dialogue runs through various layers of reality, including between the material/physical and the social, thus incorporating the discursive and the non-/extra-discursive; while in the narrower sense of the term, dialogue is a philosophically-realist ontology of the utterance or speech-act, where utterances must be studied not individually, but \textit{relationally} in a sociologically informed approach. Bakhtin calls such approach ‘translinguistics’,\textsuperscript{45} where discourse and its generative causal effects can be known only when not losing sight of the social-situatedness of the processes

\textsuperscript{43} See, Guillaume (2002); also see Guillaume (2010).
\textsuperscript{44} Henceforth, I shall refer to post-structural thought influenced by the Parisian school of post-structuralist philosophers, particularly, Derrida, Foucault, and Barthes, as “Western post-structuralists”, in order to distinguish Bakhtin and his circle as thinkers who anticipated some of the elements of critique of structuralisms and more broadly positivist science already in the 1930. However, the term is not used to construct a strict Western/Eastern dichotomy: as we shall see later, there are important convergences and influences between the two, but I will argue that there are also important differences.
\textsuperscript{45} This is Todorov’s translation of Bakhtin’s Russian choice for ‘metalinguisitica’, in order to avoid possible confusion. Tzvetan Todorov, \textit{Mikhail Bakhtin: The Dialogical Principle} (Manchester University Press, 1984), p. 24.
under inquiry, and only as scrutinised ‘on interindividual territory’, i.e. between socially organised individuals.\textsuperscript{46} The utterance becomes part of the broader societal struggles in the given historical epoch, as part of specific behavioural genres of communication and their given (and changeable) functions in the specific societal struggles. Therefore, what we should be studying is exactly such \textit{relationality} of these interactions.

As conceived through Bakhtin’s philosophy of the act, and his concept of “answerability”, an utterance becomes a “deed” upon the world, an “answer” to the world, and takes on the function of resisting, initiating or negotiating change, by employing both monologising and dialogising forces, responding to and in tensions with others’ such deeds upon the world in an unequal social field of contestation. Thus, an utterance is caught up in an agitated field of past, present and future (anticipated) utterances, located in the realm of social performativity, and registering social differences.

As we shall see in the overview in chapter 2, Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory is ‘predicated on the ultimate impossibility of societal closure’, which in turn is ‘a condition that makes articulatory practices and political agency possible’.\textsuperscript{47} Even if impossible in ontological terms, for political agents, ‘the idea of closure and fullness still functions as an (impossible) ideal’.\textsuperscript{48} This idea of impossibility of closure of any discursive structure is compatible with the Bakhtinian category of monologising discourse as a constant but never-fully-achievable attempt to bring the societal field to closure, to circumscribe heteroglossia, to singularise meaning. However, through Bakhtin such ideal of fixation and closure can never be attempted without a dialogical engagement with others’ meanings/utterances, including meanings attempting dislocations to be circumscribed and excluded, but also meanings to be positively engaged with. For Bakhtin, the agony to act and to mean, which does not necessarily lead to antagonisms of opposing projects (of identity through difference), is inescapably “answerable” to the other, and even in the most monological (hegemonising) practices, compels to construct meanings \textit{through} and \textit{with} others’ meanings. Such “addressivity/answerability” also suggests that any potentially dislocatory practices, such as anti-war discourses, or discourses of

\textsuperscript{47} Howarth and Stavrakakis (2000: 15).
\textsuperscript{48} Ibid., 8.
radical political critique in various social loci (social movements; alternative press, and e-media, etc.), as well as discourses of more moderate political critique and deliberations (e.g. in parliaments and other political fora), especially in the late modern context, become part of negotiating/contesting security. Specifically, translated into the familiar vocabulary of securitization theory, and built on the Bakhtinian concept of “answerability” as the premise for any utterance, the dialogical-relational model suggests that security performatives or speech-acts are not merely “accepted” or “rejected” by audiences, but are variously responded to, generating a plethora of other performatives, which feeds back into the dialogical process, creating new tensions and new discursive realities to which the initial security “performer” in turn becomes answerable. In this light then, audiences are in turn speakers-performers, and vice versa: official representatives become audiences for the multiplicity of participants in negotiating foreign/security policy – political peers, dissident rivals (social movements, NGOs), agents in the media, intellectuals, etc. This suggests that we should explore the multiplicity of security contesting, rather than securitizing, speech-acts.

Hence, any foreign/security policy outcomes (constrained or slowed down change being one such outcome), and the mechanism behind such outcome, can become known only when the relationality of all these “doings” of various performativities is assessed. In a relational and longitudinal focus, foreign/security policy argumentation should be seen at a higher level of spatio-temporal dialogical relationship: thus, hypothetically, the foreign/security discourse on “war on terror” involves dialogical relationships and hence possible mechanisms running between the official voices and oppositional/alternative voices, and the multiple voices in the broader discursive realm (including relationships forged through destabilising, deliberative and silencing performatives). These span horizontally across space, i.e. across these various voices at one temporal point; as well as semiotic relations vertically and temporally, i.e. among meanings constructed and disseminated at a present (or a given) moment in time and meanings constructed in past utterances.

Thus, the relational-dialogical framework suggests that foreign/security discourse – at any point being at the intersection of conflicting forces and torn between the needs of a balancing act, and therefore constantly changing while

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49 Balzacq (2011: 2).
being constrained – cannot be located and studied in any clear-cut “narrative” or representation bracketed off from other competing narratives/representations. Moreover, policy cannot be deduced as the result of any straightforwardly identifiable narrative or representation that has produced or made possible the said policy bracketed off from other competing narratives.

As I will demonstrate throughout chapter 3, Bakhtin’s conception of discourse and society is best read as philosophically realist, albeit consonant with some key insights and categories advanced by Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory. I will show how these two sources of insights are not entirely antithetical and are in fact complimentary, especially in relation to Howarth’s newer, most recent re-development of post-structuralism subscribing to ‘minimal realism’ and ‘radical materialism’. In this sense, my meta-theoretical approach is that it is possible to draw on certain ontological insights on discourse/society from post-structuralist theories, without remaining indebted to their broader epistemological assumptions, while at the same time being philosophically realist in my epistemology and in my ontological take on causation and semiotic mechanisms.

1.4. The Scope of the Empirical Research, Chapter Outline and Findings

It must be emphasised that to proceed with the emergent aim to develop such a framework, which is laid out in Part I of the thesis, I had to somewhat limit the empirical scope of this project. Thus, the empirical study in Part II serves as an illustration of how the Bakhtinian-inspired relational-dialogical framework developed in Part I may be applied, and aims at elucidating what further questions may arise from it, both theoretically, and in terms of the substantive understanding of “war on terror”. Hence, the “war on terror” is not taken as a case study that claims to produce comprehensive and exhaustive answers to the raised empirical issues, and fully defend and account for the hypothesis

51 This is similar to the approach by Critical Discourse Analysis of Chouliaraki and Fairclough, who hold that it is possible to draw selectively on some post-structuralist categories, ‘partially assimilating them’, without subscribing to the latter’s broader ontological and epistemological commitments. Chouliaraki, Lilie and Norman Fairclough, Discourse in Late Modernity: Rethinking Critical Discourse Analysis (Edinburg: Edinburg University Press, 1999), p. 120.
underlying it. Rather, the study is used ‘as a medium for continued theoretical and methodological discussions’. What I have called the “binding hypothesis” only serves as an ongoing working hypothesis through which this illustrative analysis can take place, and through which we may ask more and further theoretical and substantive questions about the “war on terror” contestations; and more generally about contesting “security” and about continuity and change.

Thus, the empirical part of this thesis has a modest goal, and along with hoping to shed some new light on understanding some possible dynamics behind the continuation of “war on terror”, it mainly aims to generate new theoretical as well as empirical questions for this and other cases, without claiming to be a comprehensive ‘multi-causal explanation’ for the overall phenomenon of a prolonged “war on terror”.

With a pre-9/11 background exploration spanning at least a decade, for the actual analysis I focus on “war on terror” contestations in the US and the UK, roughly from September 2001 to 2012. While some comparative reflection becomes possible, this is a parallel, rather than a comparative study on the two countries. A comparison in the strictest sense would not have been possible, as the contestations and polices in the two countries have been interlinked and at times co-dependent. However, a parallel examination allows for a broader scope to explore variations.

In order to be able to explore relationality and trace possible mechanisms of binding, I start with mapping the early construction of the official “war on terror” narratives in the US and the UK respectively, in the initial years following 9/11, to serve as a heuristic device, as an initial departure point, from where to trace and map various supportive and challenging voices. I identify and analyse data selected from official public utterances spanning approximately from 11 September 2001 to end of 2005 (covering the early and early-intermediate periods). These are statements, primarily presidential or prime-ministerial speeches and other public pronouncements and documents, at important historic junctures, and specifically those that have potentially attracted the largest audiences (e.g. through prime-time televised presidential addresses).

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53 Ibid., 246.
54 In this regard, compare Hansen’s suggestion to start with the official narrative as an analytical point of departure. Hansen (2006: 60).
For a full list of selected texts, see Appendix A. I then turn to a systematic analysis of destabilising/dislocatory and deliberative critique in the intermediate stage, i.e. 2003-2007. The data are drawn from the articulations found in the mass media, critical politicians’ speeches, pronouncements and written texts, as well as those of anti-war activists. For the selection of texts, I concentrate on momentous events, such as the revelations about the Dodgy Iraq Dossier in February 2003; Bush-Blair deliberations, and parliamentary debates ahead of the Iraq war; intensified mass anti-war demonstrations across the world in January to March 2003, etc., as part of the events to which contesting voices were reacting and responding. The texts are selected from public pronouncements of active or former politicians (including in parliamentary debates); the media, and anti-war social movements (for a full list of all selected texts in this category, see Appendix B). Furthermore, I turn to locating how official discourse has reacted and responded to such destabilising and deliberative challenges through restorative performatives, or silencing. These are most salient and therefore more observable in actual performative exchanges, e.g. parliamentary debates, election campaigns, question and answer sessions in press conferences, etc.55 Concentrating on the same intermediate period of 2003-2007, I trace and analyse patterns of various ways in which the respective governments have responded to destabilising and deliberative critique. Finally, to further trace the effects of the dialogical process over more specific policy areas of “war on terror” and thus zoom into potentially binding mechanisms, I take a closer look at one specific “within-case case”, already in the late period (2008-2012), namely the failed case of President Obama to fulfil his pledge to close down the Guantánamo Bay prison.

In relation to this final part of the analysis, it must be noted, that ideally such a specific case analysis in the US could have been accompanied by a similar case drawn from the UK. A more extensive case study drawn from the UK on protracted involvement in Afghanistan is underway and could not be accommodated in this thesis: given the space and resource restrictions, as well as the fact that this thesis had to conduct an extensive theory development task in the first part, I have chosen to limit the analysis of the later stage through a “within-case case” only drawn from the US developments. Nonetheless, as regards the aim of the empirical part, i.e. the demonstration of the applicability

55 These are presented as part of Appendix A.
of the dialogical-relational framework, the analysis of the intermediate period in both countries provides ample material. On the other hand, while the working hypothesis about potential discursive constraints on policy change is more salient in the late-period US case study with regards to Obama’s Guantanamo pledge, potential evidence to support it is shown to be emerging from the analysis of broader contestations over “war on terror” both in the US and the UK also in the intermediate period.

The thesis proceeds as follows.

In Part I, Chapter 2 critically reviews and deconstructs the key themes that have emerged in structuralist but mostly post-structuralist discourse philosophies and their IR applications; as well as more specifically the discourse-analytical literature on “war on terror”. Building on it then, I defend the case for a new discourse-analytical framework for inquiring into security, by presenting several interrelated theoretical and analytical puzzles on relationality, contestation and performativity. Chapter 3 introduces Bakhtinian Dialogism as a philosophically-realist alternative discourse theory, and develops a Bakhtin-inspired and realist-constructivist vision of a dialogical speech-act. Finally, chapter 4 translates such discourse theory into a dialogical-relational framework, developed for analysing foreign/security policy and the consequences of contesting security Western democratic states, in the age of late modernity.

In Part II, chapter 5 reconstructs the early post-9/11 (2001-2003) official narratives in the US and the UK initially bracketed off from competing voices, as a departure point upon which the relationality of various competing voices could be configured. Chapter 6 traces and identifies major patterns of how the official discourse encountered dissenting voices starting from the early period, and concentrating on the intermediate period (2003-2007) as the period of intensified critique. Chapter 7 explores how both governments, especially in the intermediate period of heightened critique ahead of and following the Iraq invasion, engaged and responded to various probings about the initial justifications to go to war in Iraq, and the accusations of having lied to their publics; and demands for explanations for the lack of results they claimed the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq would deliver. In doing so, it traces patterns, logics and potential outcomes/implications of such relational answerability. Chapter 8
turns to the intermediate-to-late period (2007-2012), to examine the “within-case case” of Obama’s failed efforts to close down the Guantánamo Bay detention centre, to explore whether and how he was constrained by the earlier “war on terror” discourse and the present contestations. Finally, Chapter 9 offers conclusions, a re-examination of the hypothesis already in light of the empirical findings, poses several theoretical and empirical questions arising out of the research, and reflections on the broader implications of the research and future directions.

The empirical analysis yielded interesting and at times unanticipated findings: on the one hand, destabilising critique was shattering the foundations of the official narratives and the national identity narratives attached to them, without fully re-inscribing the dislocated space with new normative imaginings, thereby inviting for official representatives to restore and re-claim such space. This failure was all the more paradoxical, given the subversive intent and the broader critical-emancipatory quest of “war on terror” critics, especially of anti-war movements. The destabilising counter-narrative propositions of various anti-war and critical discourses did achieve certain dislocation of the hegemonic “war on terror” discourse; but their discursive strategies attempting to “suture” the dislocated structure were largely non-conducive to the emergence of a new imaginary. On the other hand, events and developments on the ground (e.g. failure to find weapons of mass destruction (WMDs)) as well as at home (e.g. revelations about the “Dodgy Dossier”), were constantly affecting the dialogical space, and through the voices of radical critique but also of moderate or deliberative critique, putting pressure on the official narratives. In particular, by constantly looking for inherent (in)consistencies and probing the official representatives against such developments, deliberative critique was, whether intentionally or unintentionally, demanding the realisation of the “promise” inherent in the official narrative, demanding “winning” a war that many of them had branded as “ill-conceived”, if not outright “illegal and immoral”. Thereby, they were inviting for further legitimations for continued engagement, and were thus greatly constraining the official representatives, and helping reify the dominant discourse. In the case of Obama’s failed efforts to close down the Guantánamo Bay detention centre, it was found that his performative attempts to project a “new approach” to counter-terrorism and to legitimise his pledge to
close the Guantánamo prison contained a certain *semiotic dissonance*. The latter was resulting from the irreconcilable semiotic elements between the earlier “terrorism as war” frame upon which Obama was rhetorically but also legally still relying, and his performative attempts to project a “new approach” to counter-terrorism, including his attempts to re-inscribe “freedom” as “rule of law” that must extend to the terror suspects, *without* much shift/re-inscription of the “threat/evil” node. The political and civil society opposition to the closure of the prison was quick to appropriate this semiotic dissonance and galvanize further anti-closure action, thereby potentially constraining the Obama Administration in its liberty to fulfil the promise of closing the prison.

1.5. Intended Contributions

The thesis hopes to make two main important contributions. First, the proposed relational-dialogical framework hopes to animate further debate and thus offer a contribution in the field of discourse theory and analysis applied in IR that goes beyond tracing the policy effects of the dominant security representations. It offers a *relational* discourse analysis exploring the dialogicity of voices in contestation and struggle, rather than analysing the dominant narrative in isolation and claiming causal outcomes from it. In order to achieve such relational analysis, through the Bakhtinian philosophy of the act and of utterance conceived as answerability, the framework offers a re-conceptualisation of the speech-act and develops a dialogical theory of the utterance. Analytically, this allows incorporating the relational analysis of multiple “security-contesting” speech-acts, and hence accommodating a much broader range of actors, actions and practices,\(^{56}\) than the traditional representational model, and studying the effects (including continuation and/or change, as well as potential constraints or binding) as arising *out of the relationality* of various narratives and performances produced in various social loci – government, oppositional parties, the media, alternative media, and social movements.

\(^{56}\) See these as part of a critical-realist causal complex. Patomaki, Heikki, *After International Relations: Critical Realism and the (Re)construction of World Politics* (London and New York: Routledge, 2002).
Second, the empirical analysis hopes to contribute to an enhanced understanding of the relational dynamics behind contesting “war on terror” and the effects of that on policy continuation/change.

In addition, my broader aim and hence contribution in this thesis has been not only to show how my current inquiry would benefit from a Bakhtinian Dialogical vision of discourse, but also through the latter to demonstrate how Western discourse-analytical approaches dominating IR studies could find a better ally in Bakhtin’s thought, and would benefit from a certain “dialogical turn”. I hope my effort, along with Guillaume, re-introducing the thought of Bakhtin and his circle directly and hopefully in less mediated fashion will bring Bakhtinian Dialogism out of a mostly “footnote”, or intermediated, status it currently occupies in IR, and show its relevance for enriching theoretical and empirical discussion.
PART ONE

Chapter 2: From the Linguistic Turn in IR to Discourse-Analytical Studies on “War on Terror”: The Case for a New Discourse-Analytical Framework

2.1. Introduction

The post-structuralist tradition in IR and Security Studies has concerned itself with deconstructing dominant security representations argued to be participating in the performative reproduction of the state and the nation. In such what Laffey calls ‘performative accounts’, “[s]tate action,… is accounted for by reference to representational practices that must be redeployed in order to reproduce and secure a particular mode of subjectivity’. In so doing, post-structuralists’ most prominent endeavour in IR has been to ‘consider the manifest political consequences of adopting one mode of representation over another’ (emphasis added), and how a particular narrative representation of identity has “made possible” the legitimation and adoption of one policy over another.

Unavoidably risking some generalisation and simplification, I have called this a “representational model”, to reflect the (even if unrecognised) loosely causal logic behind most of such accounts, whereby a given dominant representation is argued to result in, or ‘make…possible’ a particular course of action (foreign/security policies and practices) rather than another. These accounts mostly pose “how-possible” questions, i.e. how (through what rhetorical strategies and articulatory practices) certain dominant representations are constructed. They claim that such “how” questions are superior to the positivistic “why” questions and distinguish “constitutive logic” from “causal” logic. However, in asking such “how” questions, many post-structuralist

58 Laffey (2000: 433). Laffey’s own concern with this model is from a historical-materialist stance, is that multiple social logics, including socioeconomic relations, are left out of the model. See ibid., p 442.
accounts concerned with security and foreign policy, have made claims not just about how representations constitute identities, but inextricably how they have resulted in policy and action, in other words claims about policy effects, which go beyond “how” questions.

This trend is also broadly manifest in the securitization theory of the Copenhagen School,\(^62\) which theorises outcomes of security discourses through focusing on dominant constructions of threats and how they, if successful with audiences, produce the corresponding policy/action of extraordinary measures to guarding the referent object of security from the given “threat”.

Several critics have focused on the limitations of this model. Thus, from a historical-materialist perspective, Laffey has critiqued it for reducing multiple social logics, including the capitalist logic (of e.g. oil in the Middle East) to mere signification.\(^63\) More broadly concerned with the “epistemic fallacy” at work in the denial of causation in the post-structuralist tradition, Banta has asked: if such analysts ‘claim to be interested in showing the impact that certain discourses have…[t]hen why not propose discourse as a causal element of the social world, however difficult this may be to show?’ (emphasis added).\(^64\)

Sympathetic to both of these critiques, my concern is more with the tendency of the representational model to make the dominant (official/elite) representations the primary focus and to ascribe an effect (a policy outcome) to such dominant representations without accounting for the ways how they have been challenged and potentially destabilised by competing alternative representations. As Laffey notes, in the representational model, subjectivity, despite being, contingent in these accounts appears to be ‘endlessly reproduced’: indeed, ‘[r]efERENCE to “struggles” and “efforts”… is only a gesture: they are neither excavated nor theorize[d]’.\(^65\) I will argue later, that this risks overlooking effects of security policy and practice, and especially their longer term continuity and/or change, which may have been brought about out of tensions, and potentially through the non-linear and unintended outcome of the relationality and contestation among competing agents and representations.


\(^{63}\) Laffey (2000)


\(^{65}\) Ibid., 440.
Rather than interested in how a (dominant) representation is reproduced and purportedly produces or “makes possible” policy outcomes in itself, I am interested in the relationality of social and political attempts of meaning production and performativity among various competing agents in such a realm; as well as relationality among various meaning systems (or particular narratives) temporally (historically over time) and spatially (co-existing and contesting at a point in time); and how policy effects are produced out of such contestations. Most importantly, I am interested in such relationality in order to understand continuation and therefore constraints in the longer term on change of security policy/practice not in terms of hegemonic discourses constraining change by dint of being hegemonic (as the currently prevalent representational model often suggests), but how such constraints arise, once again, non-linearly out of contestations and struggles among multiple agents’ performative attempts and out of the “encounters” among their conflicting/competing or else reinforcing/complementing representations, even if in some instances the effect may still be the reinstatement of the dominant discourse.

This chapter has two aims and proceeds in two steps. First, I introduce and critically review the legacy of the post-structuralist tradition and its implications for studies interested in security/foreign policy, more generally, and on discourse-analytical studies of “war on terror”, more specifically. I show how the above-mentioned representational model has developed out of themes and developments from within the linguistic philosophies of the past century and their inherently political intellectual ethos. At the same time, the review is necessary in order to introduce themes, specific categories and terminologies within the broader debates, which will be necessary in the later engagement in the subsequent chapters. Second, based on such critical review, I then present a number of theoretical and analytical concerns and puzzles which must be addressed and thus build the case for the usefulness of Bakhtinian Dialogism and of a new dialogical-relational framework, that hopes to go beyond the representational model of analysing security discourses and their impacts on policy/practice.

While the field of themes in post-structuralist thought is vast and there are considerable differences among thinkers and scholars variously labelled as post-structuralists, I limit the overview of the broader post-structuralist tradition
themes that have more direct implications for critiquing the representational model and for defending the case for a dialogical-relational framework: namely, the interrelated themes of “relationality”, “contestations” and “performativity”. In reviewing these themes, I prepare the ground for identifying certain areas of limitations to be addressed later. I engage more closely with Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory, as this is most explicitly theorising contestations, and will have an important status in the development of the framework.

This critical review then turns to the discourse-analytical studies specifically on “war on terror” within the IR discipline more narrowly, but also within other disciplines such as linguistic studies. Again, rather than provide anything resembling a comprehensive literature review on “war on terror”, this review is selective and limited: it reveals and assesses implicit and explicit engagement with the interrelated themes of “contestation”; “relationality”, “performativity”, and “constraints”.

Finally, already based on the above overviews, I propose five interrelated theoretical and analytical concerns that have animated my project, and through them defend the case for a new discourse-analytical framework. This prepares the ground for the next two chapters (chapter 3 and chapter 4), where I show how a new discourse-analytical framework inspired by my reading of Bakhtinian Dialogism and combined with some of the categories drawn from Laclau and Mouffe and their reworking by Howarth, offers solutions to some (but not all) of these concerns, while the hypothesis and the empirical study explore the others.

Section 2.2 reviews the broader post-structuralist tradition and its implications on IR studies on security/foreign policy, whereas section 2.3 offers a critical literature review on “war on terror”. Section 2.4 builds the case for the new framework; which is followed by a brief conclusion in section 2.5.

2.2. The Philosophical Beginnings and Post-Structuralist IR: Identity, Representation and Foreign/Security Policy

Post-structuralist discourse theories have critically engaged with, while at the same time drawn upon, structural linguistics. Structuralism in linguistics, inaugurated by the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure, became the driving force behind what came to be known as the “linguistic turn” in social sciences
during the twentieth century. In Saussure’s synchronic systems of language, each linguistic unit (phoneme, word, etc.) is only meaningful in difference to another unit in a strictly self-contained system of relations. Thus, a signifier (the linguistic sign) and a signified (what it denotes) are fixed only in relation to other signifiers and signifieds in a particular language. In this relational and differential conception of language, ‘it is the structure itself that determines the significance, meaning and function of the individual elements of a system’.66 Language in his understanding is a ‘system of differences without positive terms’, where ‘the value of each term results solely from the simultaneous presence of the others’.67

Expanding Saussure’s linguistic theory, various thinkers have ‘assum[ed] that there is a clear analogy between language and social relationships’.68 Thus, developing a structural analysis of anthropological phenomena, Lévi-Strauss claimed that social relations in “primitive” societies can be treated as if they were linguistic structures and that it is possible to uncover a generalisable underlying structure of relationships for all societies by reaching for ‘correlations and equivalences amongst seemingly disparate symbolic phenomena, just as it is possible to locate common grammatical structures amongst different languages’.69 On the other hand, Lacan claimed that human unconscious is ‘structured like a language’;70 and that in general, social phenomena can be ‘understood as self-contained, self-regulated and self-transforming entities, [where]…the structure itself … determines the significance, meaning and function of the individual elements of a system’.71

Indeed, as the deconstructive critique of structuralism has noted, such classical structuralist models present a number of problems: ‘stressing the way social systems determine social meaning, it runs the risk of replacing the humanism of existing approaches with a new form of essentialism based on the primacy of a static and complete structure’.72 It resembles atomistic

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72 Ibid., 27-28.
structuralism, where language is taken to be ‘a product, rather than a process of production’. In addition, as Howarth further notes, it leaves out the account of subjectivity and social agency in bringing about change.

The speech-act theory of John Austin, further developed by Searle, was one breakthrough from Saussurean structural linguistics in that they noticed and theorised a fundamental truth about communication, namely that meaning is not located within a closed linguistic system of differences but is in fact productive, created via performance of a social act. Austin’s theory was greatly influenced by Wittgenstein’s idea of ‘language games’. Rather than seeking to identify fixed meanings in words, Wittgenstein is focusing on ‘the various functions [words] are capable of performing’ (emphasis added). In his How to Do Things with Words, Austin takes up this idea of functions to develop a theory of performatives: any proposition, along with a locutionary meaning (linguistic meaning in the traditional sense), also possesses illocutionary force—the potential of ‘doing something’ in saying things, and perlocutionary force—the effect of the illocution on the audience. Searle went beyond Austin’s cataloguing stage and provided a theoretical framework which showed how language creates institutions and, in his constitutive theory, how utterances have word-to-world consequences. This becomes possible owing to the constitutive rules, which have the basic form ‘X counts as Y in context C’.

Thus, Searle’s main hypothesis is that ‘speech-acts are acts characteristically performed by uttering expressions in accordance with certain constitutive rules’ (emphasis added). Characteristically, this conception of speech-acts is highly

73 See Dreyfus, H. and P. Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics (Brighton: Harvester, 1982).
74 Howarth (2000: 30).
75 Ibid., 28.
76 Austin (1975).
80 Austin (1975).
81 Ibid. Initially, Austin had distinguished between performatives and constatives, the former denoting doing things in saying something (e.g. marrying someone by uttering the words “I hereby declare you man and wife” by a priest in a church), and the latter to denote utterances that do not immediately perform such social functions. However, later he admitted that all utterances in real speech are performative. Ibid., 33.
83 E.g. lifting your finger counts as making a bid in the context of an auction. Ibid., p. 6.
84 Ibid., 7.
rule-bound, where the *a priori* acceptance of certain conditions by a community of speakers/society is necessary for the success of a given act.

These conditions, as well as what Austin had earlier termed as “felicity conditions”, are taken as distinguishable in a structure of socio-discursive relations, which have already stabilised into institutions: the accepted conventions, and not the intentions of the speaker, are the key to making an utterance performative. However, such structuralist accounts of speech-act seem to take a static and synchronic socio-linguistic field as a point of departure for analysis, where it is not quite clear how the “rules” themselves are being constituted or changed over time, or how speech-acts may have variable meanings even within the same institutionalised rule-system. Thus, while critically engaging with Saussure, the Austinean/Searlean speech-act theory remained within the confines of structuralism.

Nonetheless, its applications vary, often entwined with post-structuralist influences but retaining the performative logic of speech-act theory. Thus, most prominently in IR, the Copenhagen School of securitization theory has drawn upon speech-act theory to build a framework based on the idea of performativity (i.e. the productive power of the speech-act event bringing about a certain reality), at the same time drawing on post-structuralist influences to be engaged with later. According to this framework, security is a speech-act: '[b]y saying it, something is done'. Namely, it is an act that elevates a certain issue to the level of ‘existential threat’, thereby legitimising extraordinary measures to deal with such threat and thus justifying the suspension of normal politics. However, the Copenhagen School’s concern with the security as a speech-act has developed a limiting ‘default …focus on the political leaders of states and their designations of threat’. This has been criticised by McDonald, but also by Hansen who has exposed the ways in which the focus on speech-acts of elites

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85 Thus, if the conventions are not present, the intentions of the speaker will not succeed, and vice versa – if the conventions are there, the performative act will be successful, regardless of the intentions.
86 Howarth (2000) also considers them as structuralist.
89 Ibid.
and the powerful has contributed to the silencing of women and those who are unable to perform security speech-acts and hence successful securitizations.\footnote{90}{Hansen, Lene, ‘The Little Mermaid’s Silent Security Dilemma and the Absence of Gender in the Copenhagen School’, \textit{Millennium: Journal of International Studies}, 29 (2000), 285-306.}

Furthermore, Copenhagen School’s performative approach has been criticised by Balzacq who develops his own more advanced, and philosophically realist securitization theory. Balzacq has called the Copenhagen School theory the ‘philosophical’ version of securitization theory, which conceives of language as having ‘a “social magic” power …[where] the conditions of possibility of threats are internal to the act of saying “security”’.\footnote{91}{Balzacq (2011: 1).} Balzacq also calls this an ‘internalist view’, which ‘overstates the intrinsic power of a rule-governed use of concepts’.\footnote{92}{Ibid., 13.} He then contrasts this with the more intersubjective ‘externalist’ view developed by him as a corrective striving to ‘connect security utterances to a context’.\footnote{93}{Ibid.} In addition, others, such as McDonald, have critiqued the Copenhagen School by posing a dilemma to choose between ‘either the performative effects of the speech-act or the inter-subjective nature of security’.\footnote{94}{McDonald suggests that the Copenhagen School will have to make such an either/or choice, in order to be able to incorporate the audiences into the framework. McDonald (2008: 573).} However, such dilemma assumes that “speech-act” cannot be intersubjective, and can only be conceived through the traditional Austinean framework and the rigid self-referential application of the Copenhagen School. I shall later show that through Bakhtin, we can reconceive a different speech-act.

In contrast to Austin and Searle, post-structuralists embarked on deconstructing Saussure’s thinking based on dichotomies such as signifier vs. signified, synchronic language (\textit{langue}) vs. diachronic language (\textit{parole} or speech), and society vs. individual, embedded in a more general critique of binary oppositions in the Western logocentric tradition. Rather than denote a certain positive objectivity existing outside the signifier and outside the mind of the subject using language as Saussurean linguistics suggested, for Derrida, the signified itself is de-centred, and ‘never absolutely present outside a system of differences …[which] extends the domain and play of signification indefinitely’.\footnote{95}{Derrida, Jacques, \textit{Writing and Difference} (London: Routledge, 1978), p. 280.} Thus, critically engaging with Saussure’s principles of language, Derrida puts forward a new system of concepts such as the \textit{instituted trace} or
trace structure, différance, iterability.\textsuperscript{96} Iterability, i.e. the simultaneous repeatability and alterability of signs, allows the instituted trace – the constituent unit of language, ‘the “minimal remainder” of meaning which enables [signs] to be recognized as the “same” signs in different contexts’\textsuperscript{97} – to produce meaning through différance.\textsuperscript{98} The concept of différance itself accounts for the active production of language and discourse, through the process where ‘meaning is produced both by the interplay of different traces and by the necessary deferment of some possibilities not actualized or signified by the play of traces’.\textsuperscript{99} This conception of discourse points to the ‘historicity and contingency of identity formation, as every affirmation of identity is also premised on the active deferring of certain possibilities’.\textsuperscript{100} On the other hand, iterability suggests an impossibility of a completely closed system of discourse, as ‘each repetition or moment of inscription is necessarily subject to the distorting effects of context’.\textsuperscript{101} This primarily sets Derrida against structuralism.

Moreover, critiquing Saussure’s objectivism assuming that the sign and the human mind are fully constituted entities, Derrida deconstructs Saussurean privileging of langue (oral speech) over parole (writing), where speech is superior as being closer to the living utterance to human reason, and writing is inferior as that which only reproduces, represents and may distort speech. By reversing this relationship, Derrida shows how the element in the binary designated as “inferior”, i.e. writing, is in fact necessary for speech: ‘if language is to work as a system of signs…then the latter must be able to function across different contexts…be “cited” or “grafted” into different … [contexts] which enables their recognition’.\textsuperscript{102} But this also means that signs ‘are always marked by and vulnerable to the different contexts within which they function…and thus be altered by their repetition’.\textsuperscript{103} Hence, the idea of iterability attempts to capture ‘the interlinking of identity and difference’ (of the sign), which are in a relationship of ‘contingent synthesis’.\textsuperscript{104}

\textsuperscript{97} Howarth (2000: 39-40).
\textsuperscript{99} Howarth (2000: 41).
\textsuperscript{100} Ibid., 42.
\textsuperscript{101} Ibid, 43-44.
\textsuperscript{102} Howarth (2013: 54).
\textsuperscript{103} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{104} Ibid.
Famously, Derrida has been criticised for a “textualization” which is ‘unable to get hold of the local material density and power of ideas as historical actuality’, by Said;\(^{105}\) for reducing ‘discursive practices’ to ‘textual traces’, by Foucault;\(^{106}\) for reducing the social and the political to mere texts and arguments requiring continuous deconstruction, by Habermas;\(^{107}\) and for ‘reintroduc[ing] determinism and essentialism’ through a view of language as ‘a reified semiotic code’, where ‘meanings arise not from the way that agents use words but from the relations of difference among semantic units’.\(^{108}\) Indeed, Howarth calls the latter criticism by Bevir as ‘cursory and dismissive’,\(^{109}\) and takes great pains to defend and strengthen the post-structuralist position by developing his own version of it, through ‘minimal realism’ and ‘radical materialism’ as the basis of his ontological and epistemological commitments.\(^{110}\) I shall return to this at a later point. Nonetheless, Derrida’s deconstruction of structuralism remains embedded in the premise that signifiers/meanings and hence identities are unavoidably caught up in relations of difference.\(^{111}\)

Within IR, Derrida’s deconstructive approach has had a profound resonance and resulted in work exposing the inherent contingency of dominant representations, by showing how ‘the poles of oppositions which it privileges and the “realities” it thereby makes basic or original can be reversed and displaced, thereby producing other “truths”…indicating that these are imposed readings that could have been different’.\(^{112}\) Thus, deconstructive studies where foreign/security policy is reconceived as inextricably linked to discursive constructions of identity as difference, have exposed the relationship between the (national/state) Self vis-à-vis the Other (usually constructed as inferior/evil) which brings the very identity of the nation/state into existence.\(^{113}\) In turn,

\(^{109}\) Howarth (2013: 2).
\(^{110}\) Ibid., 10-13.
\(^{111}\) Even Howarth, in his rearticulations, eventually goes back to reduce everything to ‘a swarm of differences’. Howarth (2013: 11).
identity, rather than pre-social, is always constituted through language, therefore is performative, i.e. ‘constituted by the very “expressions” that are said to be its results’. In addition, Derridean influences have also resulted in work deconstructing Realism’s core assumptions based on binaries such as ‘rational man and the irrationality of the international’; and the deconstruction of the binary in Hedley Bull’s thought where the “international order” is dependent on the principles of the domestic, in what Edkins and Zehfuss call a ‘domestication of the international’.

However, while concerned with the intellectual and for them inherently political act of such deconstruction and thereby denaturalising and rendering the “common-sense” contingent, such studies have often acknowledged but not integrated in one model the study of similar deconstructive or critical-denaturalising performances and practices in alternative dissident/resistance discourses immediately participating in the production and contestation of a given representation and how these, relationally with the dominant representation have produced policy outcomes (with some exception to be engaged with in a moment).

On the other hand, Derridean “infinite play of differences” has prompted a certain appropriation of the concept of “intertextuality” initially introduced by Julia Kristeva in turn influenced by Bakhtinian Dialogism. As we shall see at a later point, normatively they have engaged with the concept “intertextuality” to refer to an anti-hegemonic pluralising force that disrupts any singularity and must be celebrated akin to deconstruction; whereas analytically, they have used the concept to trace associations among distinct discourses. The latter, i.e. tracing of associations among distinct discourses (e.g. the discourse of “war” and that of “sports”) is the predominant use of “intertextuality” in IR, typified by the seminal anthology International/Intertextual Relations, edited by der Derian and Shapiro. Later in chapter 3, I shall assess what was lost in translation and transition when Bakhtinian Dialogism was appropriated into intertextuality in

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117 Der Derian and Shapiro (1989).
Western post-structuralist thought, as well as how the revised reading of it helps us to reconceive of speech-act as dialogical.

In the securitization theory, the Derridean logic of deconstruction and theorising of identity as difference is manifest in the way how the study of security becomes the study of the designation of threat.\(^\text{118}\) As McDonald notes, this is based ‘on a commitment to the idea that security is constituted in \textit{oppositional terms}: by designating that which it is not or that from which it needs preservation or protection… consistent also with the oppositional conception of identity in the securitization framework, wherein who we are is determined by the designation of (threatening) others’.\(^\text{119}\) As he concludes then, the framework suggests, that ‘we can learn all we need to know about the construction of security through studying the issues that are represented as existential threats’.\(^\text{120}\)

Echoing this, but more generally, the IR application of some of the Derridean ideas, specifically the notion of Self/Other in terms of identity/difference risks rendering identity and hence security as analysable primality in relation to the Other conceived in inferior terms. Specifically in relation to foreign/security policy discourses, it has been claimed that since the construction of “threat” becomes existentially necessary for the “self” to transcend the fear of the certainty of death,\(^\text{121}\) individuals have given away their authority to define threat to the rulers: constructing identity through security discourses about a radically threatening “Other” that must be countered for the protection of the national self is a function of the state.\(^\text{122}\) While this role becomes institutionalised and defining of the state, – the argument goes – practicing “security”, and derivatively narrating “threat”, becomes ‘an ontological necessity for the state’,\(^\text{123}\) since ending the practices of representation through

\(^{118}\) McDonald (2008: 577).
\(^{119}\) Ibid., 578.
\(^{120}\) Ibid.
\(^{121}\) These explorations draw on Nietzsche’s idea that individuals constantly seek ‘an impossible security from the most radical “other” of life, the terror of death which... triggers a futile cycle of collective identities seeking security from alien others’. See Der Derian (1995: 32-33). One manifestation becomes the desire for certainty and what Nietzsche calls ‘the causal instinct’, and ‘the drive to find causal links to explain phenomena, and thus gain comfort, liberation and relief’. See quoted in ibid., p. 34.
\(^{122}\) Hansen (2006: 34). In this relation, Campbell argues, that “[d]anger (death, in its ultimate form) might... be thought of as the new god for the modern world of states... because it replicates the logic of Christendom’s evangelism of fear...the state project of security replicates the church project of salvation”. Campbell (1998: 50).
\(^{123}\) Hansen (2006: 34).
discourses of threat would mean exposing the state’s ‘lack of prediscursive foundations’.

However, based on such theorising of the relationship between identity, state and foreign/security policy, these explorations have concerned themselves with one predominant role of foreign/security policy discourse – that of boundary-making through otherisation. Thus, Campbell has noted that foreign policy is especially apposite to perform the function of drawing Self-Other distinctions, as a ‘privileged discourse of danger for the state that participates in an ongoing and more general “evangelism of fear”’. Hence, Ashley and more famously Campbell have dubbed foreign policy ‘a specific sort of boundary-producing political performance’.

Thus, these theorisations have mostly been limited to a pre-occupation with “otherising” processes in identity construction, i.e. ‘the act by which difference is constituted as an inferior other’, and consequently to the ‘boundary-producing’ function of foreign policy. While illuminating at the time of their emergence, now they have become almost a default model when analysing identities and conflict through critical approaches and specifically through discourse analysis. Ascribing otherising processes to foreign/security policy as the condition of possibility for state identity and in turn as its function cannot and should not exhaust foreign/security policy discourse analysis for two reasons: it is historically/empirically subject to challenge; and it is analytically insufficient, especially in case of a relational and longitudinal analysis. Thus, ‘undivided’ practices and discourses have been side-lined not only by politicians throughout history, but also in the past century or so by academics reproducing and reinforcing essentialist otherising discourses. Even deconstructionist post-structuralist academics pre-occupied with the study of foreign/security

\[^{124}\text{Campbell (1998: 12).}\]
\[^{125}\text{Campbell (1996: 167).}\]
\[^{126}\text{Campbell (1998: 62), quoting Richard Ashley, ‘Foreign Policy as Political Performance’, International Studies Notes, 13 (1987), 51. Furthermore, Neumann has argued and demonstrated how ordering of the Self (the European self, in his case) has historically been one way of organising politics. Neumann (1999: 210).}\]
\[^{127}\text{Guillaume (2011: 22).}\]
\[^{128}\text{Campbell (1998).}\]
\[^{129}\text{I.e. in the height of the Cold War and borne out of a concern with the East-West rivalries. See, Hansen (2012: 99).}\]
\[^{130}\text{In his recent study The Undivided Past, historian David Cannandine conducts an excursion spanning nearly two millennia into European and Middle Eastern history to demonstrate how historically not just difference and boundary-making, but equally transcending of differences and accommodating and tolerating Otherness have helped organise politics and society. David Cannandine, The Undivided Past: History Beyond our Difference (London: Penguin Books, 2013).}\]
discourses predominantly based on otherising risk a certain form of essentialism and reification.\footnote{E.g., despite his disclaimers to the contrary, Campbell essentializes otherisation as the nearly inescapable condition of identity and foreign policy. See Campbell (1996: 167); also see Campbell (1998: 3; 92), where he speaks of 'the indispensability of interpretation to the determination of a threat'; and where he states that 'given that difference is requisite to identity, danger is inherent to that relationship'.}

Such pre-occupation is also analytically limiting. Indeed, post-structuralist IR itself has been quick to point out the limitations of an analysis of foreign policy primarily or solely preoccupied with otherisation. Thus, Neumann has warned against monolithic conceptions of the Other as a necessity for foreign policy, and noted the risk of reification in such analysis;\footnote{Neumann (1999).} whereas the Copenhagen School has drawn attention to more nuanced forms of othering, such as the European Other being constituted in relation to its own past, rather than to an external enemy Other.\footnote{See Ole Wæver, ‘European Security Identities’ Journal of Common Market Studies, 34 (1996), 103-132. Also, see Hansen (2006: 37-41).} Nonetheless, these explorations still often concentrate on narratives of identity in terms of otherisation. As Guillaume highlights, there is a tendency of conceptual and analytical ‘conflation of othering…and a larger process linking identity with alterity’.\footnote{Guillaume (2011: 22; 28).} He then potently demonstrates, that ‘by focusing on a specific mechanism, othering, participating in a specific figuration of alterity, generally inversion, this literature has avoided, or refused to conceptualize, other mechanisms and figurations’.\footnote{Ibid., 22.}

Another major philosophical influence in IR and Security Studies is the thought of Michel Foucault. For Foucault, the category of discourse refers to historically specific systems of meaning, which are intrinsically political concrete systems of social relations and practices. In his earlier, “archaeological” accounts, discourses as autonomous systems of rules constitute objects, concepts, subjects and strategies: ‘they are a violence which we do to things, … or a practice which we impose on them’.\footnote{Foucault, Michel, Archeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language, trans. A. Am. Sheridan Smith (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972), p. 229.} Later, in his “genealogical” accounts, Foucault settles for a different conception, where ‘discourses are tactical elements or blocks operating in the field of force relations’,\footnote{Foucault (1979: 101-2).} and where
'discourses are the [strategic] means for different forces to advance their interests and projects, while also providing points of resistance for counter-strategies to develop.'\textsuperscript{138} Here, discourses are understood \textit{in relation} to broader processes of spread of “bio-power” and “the will to truth”.\textsuperscript{139} The latter understanding raises important questions about agency-structure, about relationality of various subjects, and about the possibility of contestations/resistance and transformation. Indeed, if the formation of discourses ‘is an act of radical institution which involves the construction of antagonisms and the drawing of political frontiers’, then the exercise of power is central in the construction of discourses and structuring of the \textit{relations} between different social agents.\textsuperscript{140} Importantly, in Foucault’s views on the power/knowledge nexus, resistance and contestation and the suppression of ‘subjugated knowledges’ is integral to the emergence of ‘regimes of truth’, ‘subjugated knowledges’ being ‘a whole set of knowledges that have been disqualified as inadequate to their task or insufficiently elaborated: naive knowledges, located low down on the hierarchy, beneath the required level of cognition or scientificity’.\textsuperscript{141} However, Foucault heavily focuses on discourses and practices of suppression. Hence, he has been critiqued for reifying power, since in his theory, ‘every form of negation or resistance may eventually feed or be absorbed by the system of power it contests’\textsuperscript{142} In his later work, and particularly in a later interview, Foucault amends his arguably reifying conception of power leaving scope for resistance and contestation, by arguing that any exercise of power presupposes resistance: ‘in the relations of power, there is necessarily the possibility of resistance, for if there were no possibility of resistance – of violent resistance, of escape, of ruse, of strategies that reverse the situation – there would be no relations of power’.\textsuperscript{143} In addition, in \textit{The History of Sexuality}, Foucault reveals a highly non-

\textsuperscript{138} Howarth (2000: 49).
\textsuperscript{139} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{140} Howarth (2000: 10).
\textsuperscript{143} Foucault, Michel, 'The Ethics of Care for the Self as a Practice of Freedom', in Berbauer, J. and D. Rasmussen (eds), \textit{The Final Foucault} (Massachusetts: MIT Press), 12, as quoted in Howarth (2013: 192).
linear relationship between domination, resistance and transformation through his critique of the ‘repressive hypothesis’.  

Thus, Foucault shows how forced articulations about sexual practices (forced church confessions and later, psychoanalytical confessions), which were aimed at controlling populations in the Victorian era, eventually resulted in the accumulation of a large body of discourse about the very practices to be controlled, and culminated in having just the opposite effect of empowering the segments of population to be repressed. This may be viewed as an interesting instance of reverse/unintended effects of discursive practices, where a form of repression itself has produced a new discourse of resistance. Thus, Foucault’s critique of the repressive hypothesis points towards a less reified conception of “power” and “domination”. Nonetheless, still in the work of Foucault and later scholars drawing on him, and on post-structuralist thought more generally, there is a tendency empirically to focus predominantly on discourses of subjugation, and draw conclusions about their overarching role in reproducing subjectivity and hence in case of security, state action and practices; without engaging in a relational understanding of various contesting discourses of domination and dissent, and the relationally and often non-linearly produced outcomes of such contestations.

Such Foucauldian influence, coupled with the Derridean deconstructive ethos, has created the tendency in post-structuralist IR and Security Studies of over-concentrating on discourses of elites/domination, while leaving out the study of dissent and political voices contesting and potentially destabilising them, and the issue of how these two realms relate to each other. Thus, notably, seminal post-structuralist work on security, such as David Campbell’s *Writing Security*, while braking new grounds and offering an undoubtedly insightful contribution to our understanding of security discourses and practices, is predominantly about how the official and dominant US foreign policy discourses and practices have ‘written and re-written’ the dominant identity “America”.

This seminal book, according to the admittance of the author himself, focuses only on the official narrative of US foreign policy:

One …limitation needs to be noted. Any exhaustive account of identity, particularly one indebted to Foucault, would require a thorough discussion of the resistance to the scripting of identity proffered by those with greater access to social resources. Crudely put, one would have to consider the full range of popular resistances to

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elite practices ... I have restricted the argument ... to the representational practices of those acting in official capacities (emphases added).\textsuperscript{146}

Generally, while some work has juxtaposed the study of dominant discourses or “truth” about a situation ... to events and issues that this “truth” fails to acknowledge or address"; and others have focused on “subjugated knowledges” to show that alternative accounts are possible and have created conditions of resistance to dominant discourses, this has still been done primarily as a continuation of the Derridean deconstruction, i.e. in order ‘to render ambiguous predominant interpretations of state practices’, or to show how the subjugated knowledges have been excluded or silences.\textsuperscript{147} The trend in IR has largely continued;\textsuperscript{148} with some exceptions to be engaged with in a moment.

More specifically (but not solely traceable to the Foucauldian influences), in securitization theory, Wæver’s argument that ‘security is articulated only from a specific place, in an institutional voice, by elites’\textsuperscript{149} has been critiqued by McDonald for over-concentrating on elite discourses: ‘[s]uch a focus serves to marginalize the experiences and articulations of the powerless in global politics, presenting them at best as part of an audience that can collectively consent to or contest securitizing moves, and at worst as passive recipients of elite discourses’.\textsuperscript{150} In this relation, Hansen has famously criticised the Copenhagen School framework for participating in silencing of women and the voiceless unable to “speak” security. In addition, McDonald has argued that ‘the focus only on dominant voices and their designation of security and threat is normatively problematic, contributing to the silencing of marginal voices and ignoring the ways in which such actors have attempted precisely to contest these security constructions’.\textsuperscript{151} Indeed, McDonald, just as Hansen, has a normative concern by suggesting that ‘the [state/elite] discursive positioning of threat…neglects … the question of how particular voices within political communities are empowered or marginalized in speaking security’.\textsuperscript{152} This echoes the broader emancipatory commitment of the Welsh school of critical security studies, that ‘focusing on the marginalized and “voiceless” points to the

\textsuperscript{146} Ibid., x-xi.
\textsuperscript{147} Milleken (1999: 243).
\textsuperscript{148} McDonnnald (2008).
\textsuperscript{149} Wæver (1995: 57).
\textsuperscript{150} McDonald (2008: 574).
\textsuperscript{151} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{152} Ibid., 580.
ways in which potentially exclusionary, statist and militaristic security discourses can be challenged and replaced’.\textsuperscript{153}

However, beyond such normative-emancipatory quest, contesting representations of threat and security, in particular including major voices destabilising the official narratives, have rarely been studied for sake of understanding their relational dynamic and implications for explaining effects on policy. “Relationality” in most post-structuralist accounts is referred to in terms of a ‘relational view of identity’, i.e. identity as difference, as ‘always given through reference to something it is not’.\textsuperscript{154}

One exception is Lene Hansen’s \textit{Security as Practice}, which builds a framework through which foreign policy can be studied by ‘examining patterns of reproduction and contestation across official discourse, political oppositional parties and media discourses, as well as more popular forms of writing’.\textsuperscript{155} However, she contends that if a discourse has achieved a ‘hegemonic status’ (a decision the researcher must make in advance), then it is acceptable to study the hegemonic discourse (which would most probably be the official foreign/security policy discourse) in isolation.\textsuperscript{156} In one of the proposed three models, model 2 (model 1 focusing on official discourses), she proposes studying parliamentary debates and discourses of political opposition parties and the media contesting the official discourse; however, through these, the goal is to analyse ‘the hegemony of the official discourse’, i.e. to ‘facilitate the analysis of the discursive and political hegemony a governmental position enjoys’.\textsuperscript{157} In addition, while she acknowledges that some extended research models (model 3) may choose to study ‘marginal political discourses’, ‘social movements’, ‘resistance’ and ‘dissent’;\textsuperscript{158} she presents this as a choice of an analytical model a researcher may make. Hansen’s own case study on Western responses to the Bosnian war considers competing representations (the ‘basic discourses’ of Bosnian war as “ancient Balkan hatred” vs. as “genocide”) in order to understand which one of these representations gained dominance and

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{153} Ibid., 575.  \\
\textsuperscript{154} Hansen (2006: 6).  \\
\textsuperscript{155} Ibid., 8.  \\
\textsuperscript{156} Ibid., 51.  \\
\textsuperscript{157} Ibid., 54.  \\
\textsuperscript{158} Ibid., 56-7.  \\
\end{flushleft}
therefore which policy following from such narratives was eventually adopted by the US and the UK in their response to the war.  

Partially building on some of the post-structuralist insights, but also critiquing them for relativism and for ‘reduc[ing] the whole of social life to discourse’, Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) has offered influential alternatives. While there are various versions of CDA frameworks, the one developed by linguists such as Fairclough and his associates is perhaps the most prominent in social sciences. Ascribing to the critical realist ontology conceiving of the social as an open system, they see discourse and its effects as philosophically “real”. They further theorise that ‘[t]he various dimensions and levels of life – including physical, chemical, biological, economic, social, psychological, semiological (and linguistic) – have their own distinctive structures, which have distinctive generative effects on events via their particular mechanisms’. However, they further note that since ‘[t]he relationships between mechanisms are stratified…there are no straightforward ways for science to establish the nature of individual mechanisms by analysing events’. Embracing Giddens’ theory of structuration and drawing on Harvey’s ‘dialectics of discourse’, CDA envisages a dialectical relationship between ‘semiosis…[and] other (non-semiotic) elements of social life,…[where] non-semiotic elements are “internalised”…in semiosis and vice versa’. Discourses and narratives, then, have ‘non-discursive effects’, as they help modify the institutional materiality of economic, political and other systems. Chouliaraki and Fairclough call this

159 Ibid.
161 Ibid.
162 Ibid., 23. As it will become clear later, my own approach to be developed below broadly converges with some aspects of CDA, in particular in relation to similar philosophically realist ontological commitments with regards to conceiving of discourse and its generative mechanisms as “real”.
163 Ibid., 19.
164 Ibid., 19-20.
166 Fairclough (2005: 66). The term “semiosis” is used by Fairclough to denote discourse in the abstract, and distinguish it from “discourses” as instances of narratives.
167 Ibid., 56.
approach a ‘constructivist structuralist’ account of the social: it is ‘structuralist in that it is oriented to relational systems, which constitute relative permanences within practices; … [and it is] constructivist in that it is concerned to explicate how these systems are produced and transformed in social action’.\(^{168}\)

Thus, CDA of Fairclough and others has developed a social ontology that theoretically builds on a ‘relational logic’ where ‘the social field [is] seen as a system of relations’.\(^{169}\) Faiclough dubs this approach as “dialectical-relational”, where by “relational” he is drawing analytical attention to the dialectical relationship between “semiosis” (his preferred term for “discourse” in the broader sense) and ‘[other] elements of the social process’: ‘the nature of this relationship varies …[and] requires CDA to be integrated within frameworks for transdisciplinary research’.\(^{170}\)

However, another “relationality” in which I am primarily interested within this study, i.e. the relationality among various voices and hence contestations, is not explicitly theorised and integrated in the framework. Therefore, such CDA applications often analyse a limited number of texts isolated from social contestations, and often draw broader conclusions from such limited number of texts (often representing the dominant discourse). While effects in CDA are indeed conceived as relational and dialectical (mainly with regards to the ideational-material within the social), competing representations and their relationality are often not fully and explicitly integrated into the analysis.\(^{171}\)

In the most recent re-articulation of his revised version of post-structuralist theory, in Poststructuralism and After, David Howarth makes a robust attempt to redevelop key theoretical themes such as agency and structure, power, domination and identity, in order to expose a more coherent theory and transcend some of the limitations or omissions pointed out by the critics of post-structuralism.\(^{172}\) He does so primarily by building on Laclau and Mouffe's

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\(^{168}\) Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999: 32).

\(^{169}\) Ibid.


\(^{171}\) See, e.g. the analysis and the authors’ own acknowledgment of the limitation of analysing just one text/image, while ‘making assumptions about the wider social process’. Ibid., pp. 10-16. This is also noticeable in Dunmire’s study about US foreign policy discourse; and in Jackson’s study on “war on terror”, both to be reviewed in the next section. See Dunmire (2011); Jackson (2005).

\(^{172}\) Howarth (2013).
conception of discourse and society, which warrants a closer inspection, due to
its more explicit theorisation of contestations and a relational focus on
discourse.

2.2.1. Relationality and Contestation in Laclau and Mouffe's Discourse Theory

Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory widens the subject matter of discourse
theory ‘to include all social practices such that discourses and discursive
practices are synonymous with systems of social relations’. Arguing against
structural approaches seeking to fix the meaning of social processes in a
system of relations, where the “structural totality” is presented as having an
essentiality and a positivity of its own, Ernesto Laclau still maintains the
structuralist insight of the ‘relational character of any identity’, but at the same
time rejects the ‘ fixation of those identities in a system’. Hence, in proclaiming
the impossibility of fixing meaning and, consequently, the ‘impossibility of
society’, Laclau understands the social as ‘the infinite play of differences’, in
other words as discourse, where the concept of discourse comes to include
linguistic, as well as non-linguistic practices.

By building on Gramsci’s understanding of “hegemony” as ‘a general
political logic involving the construction of the new “common sense”…that can
structure an emergent “historic bloc”’, Laclau and Mouffe deconstruct the
essentialist assumptions (specifically on class) of Gramscian theory, and offer a
more radical understanding of hegemony. Hence, in Laclau and Mouffe’s
theory and in the version of discourse theory drawing on them as advanced by
Howarth, ‘hegemonic practices are an exemplary form of political activity that
involves the articulation of different identities and subjectivities into a common
project, while hegemonic formations are the outcomes of these projects’
endeavours to create new forms of social order from a variety of dispersed or
dislocated elements’.

Meanings in the theory of Laclau and Mouffe are primarily historical and
contingent. Moreover, ‘reality’ constituted through such historical meanings is ‘in

173 Howarth (2000: 8).
174 Laclau, Ernesto, New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time (London and New York:
Verso, 1990), p. 90.
175 Ibid.
177 Ibid., 14.
a perpetual state of flux—of movement, change and instability’. Thus, social structures are inherently ambiguous, incomplete and contingent, where the relations between elements, both in language narrowly defined, and in social reality, are historically constructed and not fixed. However, importantly, in Laclau and Mouffe’s theory, such contingency presupposes and creates conditions for a process they term ‘dislocatory’ practices. As Howarth and Stavrakakis explain, ‘dislocation’ is ‘the process by which the contingency of discursive structures is made visible…[it] shatters already existing identities and literally induces an identity crisis for the subject’. In other words, dislocation induces a certain crisis of meaning for the hegemonic structure.

Furthermore, Laclau emphasises how the ‘lack’ of meaning revealed by such dislocation also creates a need for re-articulation: dislocations ‘stimulate new discursive constructions, which attempt to suture the dislocated structure’. Such rearticulations may or may not come to form new hegemonic formations. In turn, hegemonic formations are formed around nodal points ‘underpinning social orders’, “nodal points” being privileged discursive constructions which ‘partially fix meaning’. Nodal points knit together different “elements” into what they call a “signifying chain”. Thus, for instance, ‘in communist ideology… a number of pre-existing and available signifiers (‘democracy’, ‘state’, ‘freedom’ and so forth) acquire a new meaning… [D]ue to the intervention of… nodal point [“communism”], these elements are transformed… Democracy acquires the meaning of ‘real’ democracy, as opposed to ‘bourgeois’ democracy, freedom acquires an economic connotation, the role and function of the state is transformed’.

Laclau also proposes the concept of ‘empty signifiers’ empty signifiers as privileged nodal points over which the discursive struggles and contestations revolve: ‘nodal points like ‘God’, ‘Nation’, ‘Party’, or ‘Class’ are not characterised

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179 Howarth (2000).
182 Ibid., 13-14.
by a supreme density of meaning, but rather by a certain emptying of their contents, which facilitates their structural role of unifying a discursive terrain’.188

In an attempt to understand why certain discourses are more successful in hegemonising a field of discursivity than others, Laclau distinguishes between myths and social imaginaries.189 Both emerge as a result of a structural dislocation; however, with varying results. Thus, myths attempt to suture the dislocated space by constructing ‘new spaces of representation’,190 which will form ‘a new objectivity by means of the rearticulation of the dislocated elements’.191 The function of myths, in turn, through this “new objectivity”, is to address a variety of social demands and dislocations. The degree to which the latter is accomplished will decide whether a “myth” transforms into an “imaginary”: ‘when a myth has proved to be successful in neutralising social dislocations and incorporating a great number of social demands, then we can say that the myth has been transformed to an imaginary’.192

Thus, it becomes clear that Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of discourse is embedded in the idea of social contestations. While in Gramscian theory, ideology is a battlefield, where in a ‘struggle for meaning ... one [class] group is able to make another group share its specific goals, beliefs or world views to create a collective will’;193 in Mouffe’s interpretation of Gramsci, ideological struggle is ‘a process of disarticulation-rearticulation... a perpetual process of transformation’.194 Hence, in Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory, society is characterised by hegemonic struggles and contestation over fixing of meanings.195 Moreover, and most importantly for my current review, in Laclau and Mouffe’s conception of “hegemony”, dissent and resistance are in fact constitutive of/defining of hegemony itself: “hegemony” – rather than

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189 Laclau (1990: 61).
191 Laclau (1990: 61).
192 Howarth and Stavrakakis (2000: 15). Laclau refers to the Christian Millennium, the Enlightenment and positivism’s conception of progress as such social imaginaries, or what he also calls ‘a horizon’ or ‘absolute limit which structures a field of intelligibility’. See Laclau (1990: 67).
195 See Laclau and Mouffe (1985); and Laclau (1996).
constituting the ‘centre of the social and hence its essence’ – is ‘a type of political relation… [which] cannot be conceived as an irradiation of effects from a privileged point’ (emphasis added). Consequently, a practice can be defined as hegemonic only when there is the possibility of subversion, of ‘confrontation with antagonistic articulatory practices’. In such a relationship, agents, albeit at varying degrees, are engaged in attempts of partial fixation of meanings, whether these are part of hegemonic practices, or subversions thereof. This point, i.e. hegemony inextricably linked with the possibility of subversion, will be important in my later articulation of the need to study speech-act and performativity by integrating such relationality between hegemonic discourses and discourses of subversion and dissent.

Laclau and Mouffe develop more explicit categories such as “antagonism” and “agonism” to conceptualise modes and outcomes of such inherently political relations of contestation. Thus, they explain “antagonism” as follows: ‘the presence of [an] “Other” prevents me from being totally myself … Insofar as there is antagonism, I cannot be a full presence for myself. But nor is the force that antagonizes me such a presence … antagonism constitutes the limits of every objectivity, which is revealed as partial and precarious objectification… and [which language] attempt[s] to fix’. Thus, antagonisms ‘constitute the limits of society, the latter’s impossibility of fully constituting itself’. Nonetheless, the hegemonic practices attempting such fixation constitute the field of the political.

Later, Mouffe introduced the distinction between “antagonism” and “agonism”, where ‘[a]ntagonism is struggle between enemies, while agonism is struggle between adversaries…[Hence] the aim of democratic politics is to transform antagonism into agonism’ (emphases in the original). Thus, Mouffe contends that ‘far from jeopardizing democracy, agonistic confrontation is in fact its very condition of existence’. Thus, whereas in case of antagonism the focus was on contesting identity caught up in the exclusionary logic of ‘blockage of identity’, here in case of “agonism” the focus is on a normative political

196 Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 139; 141).
197 Ibid., 135.
198 Ibid., 125.
199 Ibid.
201 Ibid., 103.
quest of a radical democracy where ‘agonistic pluralism’ is deemed as a positive political normative quest.203

Thus, overall, based on Laclau and Mouffe’s theory, Howarth and his colleagues define discourse in their own version of post-structuralism known as the Essex School, as follows:

We take discourse or discourses to refer to systems of meaningful practices that form the identities of subjects and object. ...Moreover, discourses are contingent and historical constructions, which are always vulnerable to those political forces excluded in their production, as well as the dislocatory effects of events beyond their control.204

In this conception then, contestations and relationality are indeed at the forefront. Nonetheless, as I demonstrate below, such theoretical concern with contestations and relationality of discursive processes has received an inadequate explicit engagement in IR and particularly in substantive discourse-analytical studies on security, specifically on “war on terror”.

I now turn to a brief review of discourse-analytical literature specifically on “war on terror” to reveal some limitations; followed by offering a series of theoretical puzzles drawn from the theory review above and the literature review below, that will help build the case for a new discourse-analytical framework.

2.3. Critical Review of Discourse-Analytical Studies on “War on Terror”

Social-scientific literature on “war on terror” is voluminous. Therefore, rather than provide anything resembling a comprehensive literature review, this review is selective and limited to those studies which are typically illustrative of the major trends on “war on terror” scholarly work, and which are relevant to the main theoretical and discourse-analytical concerns raised and addressed in my theoretical critique above and in the subsequent chapters of this thesis. In other words, I scan the literature to reveal and assess any implicit and explicit manifestation of the representational model or any other major trends critiqued above in relation to the themes of “contestation”; “relationality”, and “performativity”, as well as to look at the notion of “constraints” as prompted by my empirical focus built around the binding hypothesis. Therefore, this review is

203 Mouffe (2000).
204 Howarth et al. (2000: 3-4).
necessarily brief, aiming to be illustrative, rather than a comprehensive account of otherwise insightful contributions of the authors mentioned.

In addressing post-positivist discourse-analytical treatments of the “war on terror”, I pinpoint three interrelated areas of limitations. These are broadly, a) the limitations of what I have already explored and called the “representational model”; subsequently, b) the overconcentration on the hegemonic/dominant discourses alone, i.e. in relative if not complete isolation from the competing discourses of dissent and critique, and hence the lack of relational longitudinal analysis of “war on terror” discourses and their effects on policy continuation or change; as well as c) insufficient conceptualising and empirical tracing of mechanisms of “constraints” in relation to “war on terror”. I take these in turn, in respective subsections. To note, rather than review each author separately and comprehensively before turning to the next, I rather engage with the critique thematically, and therefore address the authors by continuously returning to their work at respective subsections.

2.3.1. Limitations of the Representational Model in “War on Terror” Literature

As explored above, post-structuralist IR and Security Studies has often treated security discourses and their effects through what I have called the “representational model”, i.e. accounts of how one dominant representation (of a “threat”, “event”, “problem”) is claimed to be resulting in a particular course of action rather than another (foreign/security policies and practices), and thereby how such representations ‘make…possible’ such policies and practices. Here, I shall briefly review some prominent sources particularly on “war on terror” and point to some limitations of this model in understanding the relational and longer term dynamic of continuity and change around it.

Thus, in a review chapter on critical approaches to security, Fierke proposes an argument on “war on terror” that has now become most familiar in academic as well as public critical discourse, namely that the securitizing “war” narrative of 9/11 led to, or “made possible”, the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, something which an alternative possible “crime” narrative could not have done. Fierke’s suggestion qualifying the official “9/11” representation as “making

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206 Ibid., 105.
“[invasion] possible” is broadly representative of most constructivist/post-structuralist accounts.

Along these lines, and echoing David Campbell’s seminal title Writing Security, Jackson presents an account of “war on terror” in his book Writing the War on Terror,207 where language is the main explanation how ‘societies as America and Britain…could in the space of less than two years actively support…destructive military assaults on two of the world’s poorest countries’.208 Just as Campbell choosing to concentrate only on the official discourse, Jackson demonstrates how 9/11 was given meaning by being described as an “act of war”; and further demonstrates how terrorism being rhetorically constructed as posing a catastrophic threat to the American “way of life”, ‘a defensive war seems like a purely rational and reasonable response’.209 Typical of the representational model, this account focuses on otherisation processes establishing ‘boundary markers between “them” and “us”’,210 and how these allow or “make possible” the given policies. In addition, it is mostly a synchronic analysis of the moment of legitimisation, rather than what happened in the longer term, after such legitimisation.

Similarly, although in a more multifaceted focus, Stuart Croft’s book Culture, Crisis and America’s War on Terror explores ‘how constructing language in particular ways leads to particular outcomes’.211 Croft sheds new light on an important dimension of “war on terror” discourse, by arguing that studying representations through official rhetoric alone is not sufficient, and representations present in American religious sites and in popular culture must equally be part of the analysis, as they, together with the official discourse, have co-constituted “war on terror”. Overall, Croft’s is a more layered representational model in terms of sources/loci explored, and also in terms of cultural and social contextualisation through a historical and genealogical study. Thus, Croft’s analysis is especially important in its tracing of the role of “crisis” in the American society as the core of the nation’s narrative of birth, at ‘the heart of America’s contemporary ‘culture wars’”; as well as the role of “rupture” and “evil” in the Evangelical discourse which he argues to have hugely influenced the

207 Jackson (2005).
208 Ibid., 181.
209 Ibid., 9.
210 Ibid., 5.
official rhetoric and its cultural reproductions and amplifications. Rather than merely focusing on otherisation which is ascribed a generally boundary-making role through constructions of an “evil Other”, Croft traces the roots of the discourses about “end of time” and “evil” in American Evangelism.

Nonetheless, the account is limited: posing only “how-possible” questions – the privileged mode of enquiry for those ascribing to constitutive logic – i.e. through what rhetorical strategies, etc. certain dominant representations are constructed and make policy/practice possible, Croft makes claims which require more than “how-possible” questions. Particularly, it is not clear, whether the representation is used to legitimate a policy change, or whether it produces, i.e. causes the change.

More explicit about the latter issue is Tim Luke in ‘Developing a New Speech for Global Security’, by suggesting that political rhetoric ‘extrudes elements of “what is” out of what it refers to’. Thus, he explains: ‘speech writing often writes what will be… what such changes should be, [and thereby]…often cause parallel events and processes to come into effect, which tests, in turn, what they should or should not be’ (emphasis added). For instance, the rhetorical construction of the “axis of evil”, once in place, ‘now requires very specific forms of completion, definition, and execution in American policy’. In Luke’s account, representations are constructs, which when successfully entered into a Bourdieuan “habitus”, ‘push and pull everyone towards world constructions that match the wordings that have been tested by rhetoric in diplomatic discourse’ (emphasis added). He further explains that ‘[s]hared speech bolsters the symbolic order of society to the extent that its terms are, first, systematic and coherent as discursive frameworks, and, second, consistent and agreeable with objective conditions in the institutional structures of society’. It is clear from the above, that Luke’s representational model almost explicitly recognises causation and is, even if vaguely, suggestive of causal mechanisms. In a global focus, Luke looks at how certain representations in “war on terror” discourse – particularly, “terrorists as new kind of enemy” and “axis of evil” – bring about a new global politics, [leaving] behind

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212 See Doty (1993).
214 Ibid., 24.
215 Ibid.
216 Ibid., 25.
217 Ibid.
both the Cold War, and the post-Cold War era, and push[ing] ahead into a new security environment’ (emphasis added).\textsuperscript{218} However, this is still a representational model suggestive of a linear and self-fulfilling causal effect of representations over policy. It concentrates on “how” questions, mostly through a focus on otherisation processes; and is only concerned with a synchronic analysis of the \textit{moment} of legitimation, and only the immediate aftermath of socialisation and institutionalisation that secures the dominance of the given representation, rather than with any long-term dynamics of continuity and constraints.

Another global outlook, this time with a focus on the \textit{international} discourse of terrorism is offered by Eva Herschinger’s \textit{Constructing Global Enemies}.\textsuperscript{219} With an innovative take on the neo-Gramscian concept of “hegemony” inspired by Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory, and a more explicit concern with productive power, she traces what she calls ‘productive hegemonic strategies’,\textsuperscript{220} i.e. discursive strategies underlying the ‘production and persistence of hegemonic forms of international order’.\textsuperscript{221} She still aims to answer the characteristic “how” question, albeit in a more nuanced and theoretically sophisticated manner, where in particular she explores the ways ‘how a common Other is construed and how a collective Self is established…in varying degrees of otherness’.\textsuperscript{222} In a post-structuralist framework, by ‘denying the existence of an extra-discursive realm’, she argues that ‘policies like the “war on terror” and the “war on drugs” are based on specific discursive representations of the security problem they want to address and on specific constructions of identities, of Self and Other’.\textsuperscript{223} Thus, she concludes, that the absence of a legally and globally binding definition of “terrorism” allows the use of the label “terrorism” as ‘a permanently available authorization and legitimation to attack…[one’s] own occasional enemies’.\textsuperscript{224}

Another study adopting the representational model is worth mentioning due to a new dimension (that of narrative temporality) it adds to the understanding of “how” the “war on terror” discourse was constructed and

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{218} Ibid., 31. \\
\textsuperscript{219} Herschinger (2011). \\
\textsuperscript{220} Ibid., 105. \\
\textsuperscript{221} Ibid., 6. \\
\textsuperscript{222} Ibid., 7. \\
\textsuperscript{223} Ibid., 15. \\
\textsuperscript{224} Ibid., 135.
\end{flushleft}
gained dominance. Dunmire’s book-length study *Projecting the Future through Political Discourse*\(^{225}\) traces constructions of “future” in the Bush Doctrine, i.e. ‘how [the “future”] is articulated, projected and made present’ (emphasis added).\(^{226}\) Drawing on Critical Discourse Analysis and particularly Fairclough, she locates the Bush Doctrine in the context of ‘new imperialism’ and the ‘neo-liberal political project’ aimed at creating and maintaining a new economic and political order.\(^{227}\) This project is enabled by a type of discourse that constitutes a certain future and then designates policies that will get us the imagined future, while presenting this future as how the world actually is, i.e. as an inevitability.\(^{228}\) She notes that “war on terror” discourse is particularly future-based as it tries to fill in society’s sense of future security undermined by terrorism.\(^{229}\)

However, while illuminating of certain narrative-representational structures and hence being valuable insights in their own right, the latter observations seem to point to a certain *effect on outcomes* of policy and practice by virtue of being ‘endowed with the performative power to bring into being the very reality it claims to describe’.\(^{230}\) Despite her careful disclaimer against charges of determinism by admitting that ‘a particular image of the future...[does not necessarily] lead to its realization’,\(^{231}\) nonetheless Dunmire’s work seems to conceive of the “makes possible” part of the representational model, or else the implicit causation, only in terms of rhetoric bringing about a ‘self-fulfilling prophesy’. Aiming to ‘denaturalize’\(^{232}\) such constructions, she again asks the typical “how” question (i.e. through what rhetorical means and linguistic tropes), this time with an explicit critical focus on elite manipulation: ‘how representations of the future that serve particular social and political interests are naturalized, rendered as depictions of an unavoidable’.\(^{233}\) Even when part of the study examines the Doctrine ‘diachronically, demonstrating the

\(^{225}\) Dunmire (2011).
\(^{226}\) Ibid., 1.
\(^{227}\) Ibid., 6.
\(^{229}\) Dunmire (2011: 7).
\(^{231}\) Dunmire (2011: 52).
\(^{232}\) Ibid., 15.
\(^{233}\) Ibid., 19.
paradigmatic choices and linguistic transformations that occur within and across each text’s historical and political contexts’, it remains confined to “how” questions limited to the rhetorical functions of representations.

2.3.2. Contestations: Lack of Dissent, and the Absence of Relationality

As already suggested, most literature on “war on terror” is limited to analysing the dominant or hegemonic narrative, and lacks a relational dimension to it that would analyse alternative representations as part of contestations. In fact, some explicitly, and given their critical-emancipatory goal, quite surprisingly, deny the existence of any significant dissent or major alternative narratives of 9/11 and “war on terror”.

Thus, Jackson’s above-discussed study mentions ‘contestation’ only in the passing, and stresses ‘very little deviation from the central discursive formations or the primary narratives’. Instead of engaging with any existing competing representations of 9/11 and hence challenges to the dominant “war on terror” narrative, his reference to ‘contestations’ serves only to highlight how the dominant construction ‘negates alternative readings’ (emphasis added).

Henceforth, any treatment of alternative narratives, as well as their silencing, is limited to assertions such as this: ‘officials have constructed a particular reading or interpretation which serves a purposeful political agenda while simultaneously closing off other possible readings’. Through another loose descriptive term, he speaks of ‘muting dissent’, but fails conceptualising what this muting involves. Moreover, while ‘muting dissent’ assumes there was dissent, he does not acknowledge this, and in fact explicitly denies the very existence of dissent, thereby missing the opportunity to account for their interaction with the dominant discourse and understanding how these relationally produced outcomes. Interestingly, he then gives an account as to how the dominant discourse ‘rectified’ its own ‘internal contradictions’ in order to ‘maintain coherence’, describing this process detached from counter-discourses and challenges by critics.

236 Ibid., 54.
237 Ibid., 57.
238 Ibid., 113.
239 See esp. ibid., 161.
240 Ibid., 156.
Croft’s model of crisis cycle allows more scope for treating alternative representations: drawing on a crisis model developed by Colin Hay, Croft describes how after a crisis event, ‘a decisive intervention’ wins in a ‘discursive competition between narratives’ and sets the meta-narrative—the common sense.\(^{241}\) In contrast with Jackson, and in a welcomed change, Croft’s *Culture, Crisis* explicitly recognises the presence of ‘widespread…and dramatic’ resistance in America, especially in the run up and following the Iraq invasion in 2003.\(^{242}\) However, even if the author carefully records acts of resistance by anti-war movements especially in cultural sites through song, novel, film, etc., he does not map how the narrative performativity of the alternative discourses relationally encountered the dominant narrative. Instead, in a lengthy, even if otherwise insightful and valuable description, he puts a heavy emphasis on how the dominant narrative continued to be re-reproduced and co-produced by the media, popular culture and Evangelical discourses, and how eventually it managed to prevail. Thus, his conclusion is that “no war for oil” as the major counter-narrative did not succeed in becoming the ‘new decisive intervention’, something which the crisis cycle requires for a dominant discourse to subside, the reason behind such failure being the deep embeddedness of the dominant discourse in social institutions.\(^{243}\)

As Jackson, Croft refers to the existence of dissent *only in order* to show its *failure* and the continued success of the dominant discourse, rather than how dissent was performatively produced and put pressure on the dominant discourse, and how in turn the latter had to respond and accommodate elements of the critique. He concludes that the anti-war discourse had ‘relatively little impact upon the mainstream’;\(^{244}\) and that the “war on terror” continued to be re-/co-produced through three channels – party politics during the 2004 elections, the media and the experts. He metaphorically refers to this phase as the ‘[dominant] discourse stri[ing] back’;\(^{245}\) however, the metaphor is not conceptualised as a certain mechanism and is at times unclear. While “striking back” implies action/process as well as certain relationality, it is not defined or


\(^{242}\) Croft (2006: 172).

\(^{243}\) Ibid., 13: 187.

\(^{244}\) Ibid., 216.

\(^{245}\) Chapter 6 is entitled ‘The Discourse Strikes Back’, and the metaphor appears numerous times throughout the chapter. Ibid., 214- 64.
explored as such. Indeed, in a concluding summary of the crisis cycle model, Croft refers to a certain ‘adaptation’ which leads to ‘stabilisation’ of the dominant discourse in the subsequent phase of the cycle, after the anti-war discourse had failed. However, he does not empirically demonstrate how this adaptation occurs relationally with the alternative discourses and major sites of critique.

Similarly, Dunmire’s study concentrates on the dominant constructions of the “future” through looking at the Bush doctrine alone. While acknowledging ‘texts as site of struggle and contestation’, and that ‘[e]very text is produced out of dialogue’, she mentions these as little more than disclaimers, by letting the idea of “alternatives” to feature only as something against which the dominant discourse is successful. Thus, dominant images are deliberate attempts to manage the contestation and struggle that a truly open conception of the future entails…they serve to prefigure...the future in such a way as to limit and undermine alternative figurations’ (emphasis added). Although she does make a reference to ‘competing futures’, but only to narrative constructions of such “futures” used as a rhetorical trope within the dominant narrative, i.e. the presentation of several “futures” in order to persuade the audiences why the official “future” is the only tenable and positive one. Thus, despite references to “contestations”, she presents the dominant representation of the “future” in the official discourse as something monolithic and monological.

In some relative contrast, a certain relational view involving contestations is provided by Hodges’ book The “War on Terror”: Discourse and Intertextuality. Although still answering a “how” question, i.e. how narratives are constructed, he does this longitudinally over a period between 2001 and 2008, and integrating data from three different domains – presidential speeches, media discourse, and focus group interviews with college students. Nonetheless, the bulk of the data and analysis is still focused on presidential speeches and how these construct the dominant narrative, and although he engages with the other two domains, this is done primarily to show how the

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246 Ibid., 274-75.
249 Dunmire (2011: 19).
250 See ibid., p. 100.
dominant, i.e. official narrative is ‘recontextualized’ across these settings. While he stresses that recontextualization may include challenges to the dominant discourse, the author remains primarily interested in a few isolated contesting terms alone, rather than how counter-narratives develop and relate to the official narrative and in turn how (with some exception) the official narrative responds to these. For instance, he explores how actors use tactics to contest the label “war on terror” by ‘mark[ing] the phrase with the adjective so-called so that it becomes the “so-called war on terror”’, which according to him, ‘underscore[s] the role of individual agency in resisting the uncritical acceptance of contested labels’. Hodges refers to ‘counter-narratives’ only in the limited sense of Obama’s election discourse of 2008 offering a counter-narrative to Bush discourse, while ‘subversion’ is conceived only through parody, and that again in very limited terms, in relation to a few key phrases. While he is right that the repeated use of parodic phrases in the media and in the public ‘seriously challenges the previously established social meanings’, such analysis of only certain phrases in isolation, and the dominant discourse being subverted only through parody, is not sufficient to capture the full scale and importance of dissenting voices and the emergent counter-narratives; neither how the dominant discourse reacts and responds to such counter-narratives. In this relation, i.e. how the dominant discourse responds, Hodges does examine an interesting case, that of the competing representations of “Vietnam”, and how under pressure from negative associations of the legacy of Vietnam with “war on terror”, Bush appropriates the Vietnam analogy by shifting its meaning: ‘Bush brings Vietnam into the fold of the Narrative in this speech. Rather than a separate war viewed as a “quagmire,” Bush’s Vietnam provides lessons on how to remain steadfast in an ideological struggle against the modern equivalent of the Communists of the Cold War. Nonetheless, this analysis is once again limited, as it explores just one example of only one relational performative,

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252 Ibid., 13. For example, he analyses how sound bites and talking points from the official narrative are reacted to by the media and reproduced, thus, ‘further solidify[ing] the larger narrative’ (p. 16), and shows how such ‘recontextualization…is requisite for the existence of the Narrative as a macro-level discourse’. Ibid., pp. 16; 85.
253 Ibid., p. 100.
254 Ibid., p. 107.
255 For example, Hodges notes how terms such as “weapons of mass destruction” were parodied as “weapons of mass distraction”, “weapons of mass deception”, and “weapons of misdirection”. Ibid., 13.
256 Ibid., p. 110.
257 Ibid., p. 139-40.
namely “appropriation”. Thus, for Hodges, contestation is reduced to mere ‘recontextualisations’.

2.3.3. Continuity, (Lack of) Change and Implicit Conceptions of “Constraint”

The concept of discursive constraints is integral to understanding continuity and change. It often implicitly underlies constructivist studies inquiring into substantive cases of continuity and/or (lack of) change. Relatedly, such studies also make implicit claims about certain causal mechanisms underlying processes of constraints. Thus, the very notion of hegemonic discourses itself is about constraints. However, the interest is mostly on how hegemonic discourses constrain, i.e. delimit the power of, subjugated actors in what is possible to say and do, rather than looking for more complex, relationally produced and non-linear mechanisms of long-term constraints on actors (such as successors in government) who might be politically representing an inherited official discourse but striving (rhetorically or through policy action) for certain change. Substantive studies on “war on terror” fall short of explicitly conceptualising discursive constraints and accounting for them as part of the mechanisms leading to the claimed outcomes; and often only allude to the implicit mechanisms of such constraints through vague and under-conceptualised metaphors.

Thus, characteristically, Dunmire speaks of the ‘self-fulfilling prophecies’ of projections of the “future”;258 while Luke makes a more explicit proposition: “[s]peech writing” …produces “speech writs”…[whereas] the speech wrights’ in government often work towards rewriting the world to fit their words or fulfil their writs’.259 While this purports to account for how speech writing, or official security discourse more broadly, aims at ‘drawing and redrawing the characteristics of the world’s geopolitical terrain’,260 and how once established and integrated into the habitus, such ‘writs’ then ‘push and pull everyone toward world constructions that match the wordings’,261 it seems to account for constraints as dominance of dominant representations by virtue of their dominance.

258 Dunmire (2011: 43).
260 Ibid.
261 Ibid., 25.
Furthermore, similar to Dunmire’s ‘self-fulfilling prophesy’, Jackson in *Writing the War on Terrorism*, speaks of “war on terror” discourse and practice in vague and non-analytical terms as having ‘taken on a life of its own’. Noting that ‘any administration would find it extremely difficult to unmake or alter [it]’, he predicts that ‘the “war on terrorism” is going to be with us for a long time to come’. Adopting the ontology inherent in Critical Discourse Analysis in general about the mutual constitutiveness ‘between texts and societal practices’, he falls short of accounting for mechanisms of how continuity results, and how, i.e. through what mechanisms, actors (e.g. the US administrations that would follow Bush) were constrained by earlier discourse.

Indeed, in his more recent article, Jackson offers such an account about the constraining force the earlier dominant discourse and practices had over the Obama administration. This view claims that the Obama administration has been constrained by earlier (Bush) discourse, where Jackson effectively sees such constraints mainly coming from the alleged ‘deliberate’ institutionalisation of “war on terror” into the society, economy, as well as in the culture and identity.

Attempting to tease out how Jackson might be conceiving of the constraints implicit to his argument, we are effectively left with the political and commercial elites *deliberately* pushing for the continuation of policy to serve their material vested interests. Moreover, he stresses that ‘the Bush administration in particular was linked by key personnel to oil interests and sections of the military-industrial complex’ (emphasis added), and therefore concludes, it was unsurprising that the Bush administration would choose to reproduce the “war” narrative, in line with the earlier narratives of ‘first war on terror’ in the Reagan era. Furthermore, Jackson suggests that the above-mentioned constraints are present only because the institutionalization and preservation of vested interests is reliant on ‘threat’, in fact *any* major threat, and that in case of an invention of a new ‘threat’ to replace ‘terrorism’, change of policy would be possible, *without much constraint* from the earlier “war on terror” narrative: ‘policy change would not necessarily be impeded by

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263 Jackson (2005: 3).
264 Ibid.
265 Ibid., 24.
266 Jackson (2011).
267 Ibid., 394.
bureaucratic interests, so long as the change involved finding a replacement threat to “terrorism”. Jackson continuously alludes to certain groups, political or commercial, with vested interests lobbying for continuation of the war, and the now-already common-sense popular cultural perceptions allowing a fertile ground for such a practice. Thus, in Jackson’s understanding, material interest seems to be the main cause of adoption of narrative, while the persistent pursuance of such interest, including by manipulation and coercion, to be the main mechanism constraining policy and preventing change.

Thus, in this account by Jackson, the “war on terror” is primarily seen as the effect of ‘a set of bureaucratic material interests’; and in the absence of exploring other mechanisms, such material interests in Jackson’s argument must be behind the purported constraints and hence the continuity and the lack of change. This is due to adopting the analytical safe haven of claiming ‘dialectical co-constitution of the language and the material practices’, which closes off an inquiry into more specific mechanisms and semeiotic dynamics within the given phenomenon. In particular, this account is, once again, based on the official and dominant representation, and does not integrate alternative voices, i.e. discourses of dissent and critique.

Overall, this literature review reveals a number of gaps in discourse-analytical studies on “war on terror”. Through their otherwise important and insightful critique of the positivist and mainstream IR accounts for their failure to trace and account for how ideas are formed, transformed and produce power relations, thick constructivists and post-structuralists have over-concentrated on such “how” questions, i.e. how (through what linguistic and rhetorical means certain representation have been constructed). In doing so, they have often made claims that go beyond such how questions and point toward, albeit unacknowledged, causal mechanisms. Having eschewed the open acceptance and theorising of causal mechanisms, they have tended to describe certain outcomes through often under-theorised and vague metaphorical descriptions, whereby e.g. dominant “war on terror” representations have “brought about” things they purport to describe; “made possible” security policies and practices they designate as necessary; or where the “war on terror” has become a “self-
fulfilling prophecy”. Relatedly, while focusing predominantly on hegemonic or dominant discourses produced by political elites, and on how these have been reproduced in various sites and become sedimented in various institutions, these accounts, perhaps unwittingly but ironically for their otherwise critical intent, have often overlooked discourses of dissent and critique and how these have variously destabilised the official narratives.

As we saw, voices of dissent have either remained unaccounted for, or wherever they are mentioned, they are meant to show how the official discourse kept them in marginalised positions. The latter suggests then, that these voices virtually had, or could have had, little if any causal efficacy over outcomes of change or constraints thereof.

It must be noted that voices of dissent in relative isolation have been studied in other disciplines and in studies where such discourses are the substantive interest, such as studies on social movements, etc. However, the concern in this critical review was with discourse-analytical work on “war on terror” within IR and Security Studies specifically (whether implicitly or explicitly) inquiring into the effects of discourse on security policy and practice, and into continuity/change or constraints thereof. Therefore, rather than literature where discourses of dissent may have be analysed in relative bracketing from the official encounters, the focus of the review in this section has been the lack of an analytical model and substantive research into “war on terror” that would integrate both the official (and potentially hegemonic/dominant) discourses and discourses of dissent and critique, and would aim to trace how they encounter one another, and how political effects potentially arise out of such contestations.

2.4. Critical Concerns on Contestation, Constraint and Security

In this section, I briefly propose five interrelated theoretical and analytical concerns and puzzles directly deriving from the above overviews, which have animated my project. Through them, I defend the case for a new discourse-analytical framework. I shall later, in the next two chapters, show how a new discourse-analytical framework inspired by my reading of Bakhtinian Dialogism and combined with some categories from Laclau and Mouffe’s thought, offers

solutions to some (but not all) of these concerns; while the hypothesis and the empirical study explore the others.

2.4.1. Contesting Security

As demonstrated in the overview above, although implicit to most of the post-structuralist thinking, “contestations” have most explicitly been articulated in Laclau and Mouffe’s conception of discourse. To remind, in Laclau and Mouffe’s conception of “hegemony”, dissent and resistance are defining of hegemony itself, as hegemony is said to be present only when there is the possibility of subversion, of ‘confrontation with antagonistic articulatory practices’.271

Ironically, despite similar implicit or explicit claims underlying most post-structuralist theorising, substantive post-structuralist scholarship specifically in IR and Security Studies has been preoccupied primarily with the “hegemonic discourses” or discourses of domination isolated from discourses of dissent, resistance and critique. As mentioned above, this has been noted by Milleken,272 as well as McDonald;273 but, the trend has predominantly continued, with some exceptions, such as Hansen’s work engaged with above. With regards to “war on terror”, we saw this in the literature review section above.

However, the challenge is not only to study these discourses of dissent and critique in yet another relative bracketing. Nor is it to juxtapose the study of the latter with the study of dominant/hegemonic representations to expose the latter’s ambiguity or to test their stability. Rather, in view of the critique of the representational model, the challenge is to inquire into the relationality among performative attempts in the official discourses vis-à-vis those in the discourses contesting them, and attempt to understand how the effect or outcomes for security policy and practice are produced out of such relationality. Thus, we need to inquire into relationally and longitudinally produced outcomes, often resulting from unintended causal dynamics. To do this, rather than focus on securitizing speech-acts, or else certain dominant security representations, we must inquire into multiple, diffused and dialogical security-contesting speech-acts, producing outcomes relationally.

271 Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 139; 135).
273 McDonald (2008: 574; 575).
Understanding the relationship *between* discourses of domination and those contesting such discourses is especially pertinent in a late modern democratic setting, where it may be argued that political and cultural critique and dissent itself has become a civic institution. I return to these themes later in chapter 3, where building on Beck’s and Giddens’ sociological theories, and on Dillon’s political thought on security, I present the case how analysing discourses of dissent and critique must be indispensable from any engagement with the official security discourses in the context of the late modern democratic scene.

2.4.2. Reconceiving Speech-Act and Performativity

The very ‘primacy of political concepts and logics such as hegemony, antagonisms and dislocation’ in Laclau and Mouffe’s theory at macro-level theorising must, on a micro-theoretical level, necessitate a *relational* understanding of day-to-day discursive exchanges among agents, and a corresponding empirical discourse analysis through a focus on contestations. To do this, the analysis must ground the actual empirics of the discourse analysis on a relational understanding of discourse, while at the micro-analytical level, it must develop a particularly relational understanding of the “utterance” or the speech-act, upon which techniques of analysis are based. In other words, we need a *relational discourse analysis* that is equipped to look at contestations in micro-level analyses of discursive exchanges.

The question is, *how much has the conception of contestations and relationally conceived at the level of macro-theory of discourse and society been translated into a micro-level conceptualisation of the utterance (or the speech-act) as being embedded in such contestations; and then how much has this been translated into actual substantive discourse-analytical research analysing discursive exchanges? Do we study performativity and their effect on policy relationally?* A review of the “war on terror” literature and, more broadly, IR literature on “writing/speaking” security, including securitization theory, showed that this is most often *not* the case.

Indeed, to analyse multiplicity of security-*contesting*, rather than securitizing speech-acts or else dominant security representations, in a study

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going beyond the moment of legitimation, we need a theory of performativity that is relational-dialogical, where speaking/doing security is placed in a tense environment of *contestations*. Hence, speech-act itself needs to be re-conceptualized through a more sociological and non-self-referential understanding, transcending the limitations of the ‘philosophical’ speech-act approach in conventional securitization theory. I shall later show how Bakhtin’s complex philosophy of discourse, as an alternative theory of speech-act, through his philosophy of the act, and concepts “answerability”, “chronotope”, and “intertextuality” (the latter revisited as closer to its Bakhtinian origins), helps shed new light on the utterance, overcoming some of the limitations of both traditional and more sociological securitization theories, on the one hand, and becomes compatible with Laclau and Mouffe’s political discourse theory on several dimensions, on the other; while at the same time offering a number of correctives to post-structuralist theorising. Particularly, through Bakhtin, we are able to re-conceive speech-act as dialogical, while theorising performativity in terms of constituting reality as only an *attempt* and *process* caught up in tense relations of contestations and agonistic struggles with other such attempts.

2.4.3. Discourse as Causal-constitutive?

As already suggested, the received knowledge in the social sciences distinguishes between “causal” and “constitutive” logics, whereby the latter ‘opposes causal explanations of social phenomena’. According to such distinction, ‘ideas, rules, norms, discourses, theories...do not “push or pull” but rather “make/define/constitute something”’. In a dichotomous manner, then, post-positivistic discourse analysis is said to be concerned with ‘interpreting the meanings and self-understandings of actions, *rather than pinpointing their causal mechanisms*’ (emphases added). However, on the other hand, inherent to the representational model critiqued above is an even if unacknowledged and non-Humean causal logic, about how particular representations (of a “threat”, “event”, “problem”) make possible a particular course of action rather than another (foreign/security policies and practices).

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275 Balzacq (2011).
If we are talking about security policies and practices having been ‘made possible’\textsuperscript{279} by certain dominant/hegemonic security narratives, then we are effectively dealing with certain implicit causation. It would be beneficial to term these accounts explicitly as “causal” so that we could more openly and effectively contest and probe their analytical validity and explanatory value. The idea of “cause” is already implicit in most post-structuralist studies in IR: these inquiries seek to delineate \textit{effects}, and at times \textit{mechanisms}, of discursive and identity dynamics on foreign/security policy, while at the same time eschewing the theoretical concept of “causation”.

The post-structuralist commitment to a “non-causal” explanation is, indeed, linked with their partly political rejection of generalisable explanations and fixed narratives of “truth claims”. They conceive of it as antithetical to their fundamental ‘commitment to the structural incompletion of all identity, objects and systems’,\textsuperscript{280} and with their emphasis on “contingency” as the defining characteristic of any social structure. However, the puzzle here for me is: \textit{should this commitment to contingency and incompleteness, and non-generalisable explanations necessarily preclude us from theorising causation?} Why should “cause” be the Human cause, or the “transcendental cause”, which Derrida rejects as one of the ‘transcendental signifieds’ to be deconstructed together with “God”, etc.?\textsuperscript{281} Some IR post-structuralists have recently made moves towards more openly talking about the place of causation in their ontology.\textsuperscript{282} Nonetheless, most post-structuralist IR still takes the affirmation of the Humean

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{279} Fierke (2007: 105).
\item \textsuperscript{280} Howarth (2013: 12).
\item \textsuperscript{281} Ibid, p. 11. Indeed, as Gofas and Hay argue, ‘the commensurability and incommensurability of causal and constitutive logics depends on one’s understanding of causation’. Moreover, the distinction between the two “logics” must ultimately be rejected: ‘the incommensurability thesis between causal and constitutive logics is only credible in the context of a narrow, Humean, conception of causation’. Gofas, Andreas and Colin Hay, ‘Varieties of Ideational Explanation’, in Andreas Gofas and Colin Hay (eds.), The Role of Ideas in Political Analysis: A Portrait of Contemporary Debates (Routledge, 2010), pp. 6; 16.
\item Also, see Kurki (2008: 136; 81).
\item \textsuperscript{282} Thus, the later Campbell admitted the possibility of an alternative concept of causation.
\end{itemize}

narrow understanding of “cause” and hence exclusion of “causation” from their accounts as one medium of establishing disciplinary allegiances. For example, Hansen in her seminal *Security as Practice*, while taking issue with the simpler versions of representational accounts which, according to her, ‘assume a quasi-causal link between representations and policy’, ends up altogether eschewing the idea of “causation” as something incompatible with the post-structuralist understanding of the relationship between identity and policy. Thus, implicitly re-affirming “cause” as Humean/positivistic, she thereby differentiates her approach from essentialism/positivistic studies, or those engaged in ‘causal epistemology’.

If we are concerned with the contestation and struggle present in the political field over constitution of dominant security discourses, then the representational model must give way/be enhanced by a model that looks at multiple voices and tensions, and at potentially less linear mechanisms and outcomes. To do this, we would benefit from more explicitly admitting to the presence of “cause” defined in non-Humean, non-essentialised and non-generalisable terms. We should explore causal mechanisms that go beyond how hegemonic/dominant security narratives “make possible” certain policies and instead look for mechanisms how such policy outcomes become possible non-linearly, as a result of the agonistic struggles and contestations, no matter how unequal, present in the given security realm. This would incorporate discourses striving to domination, those variously destabilising them, and how these respond to each other and change as a result. The final outcome is then more conceived in terms of the non-linear and often unintended outcomes of these tensions.

2.4.4. Discursive Constraints on Policy Change?

Related to the issue of causation is the concern with “constraints” and their effects on policy. As already suggested, the concept of discursive constraints implicitly underlies post-structuralist IR studies inquiring into substantive cases of continuity and/or (lack of) change. However, most literature is about enabling, rather than constraining properties of discourse: thus, the representational model, where certain representations are claimed to make possible certain

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284 Ibid., esp., 1-4.
policy outcomes are about such enablement. Indeed, the notion of “hegemony” itself is about constraints. In this relation, Chouliaraki and Fairclough see constraints in terms of ‘reproductions’;\(^{285}\) and therefore ‘contingency as structurally constrained’;\(^{286}\) while Laclau and Mouffe emphasise constraints as a function of subject positions. In substantive studies too, the interest is mostly on how hegemonic discourses constrain \textit{subjugated actors} in what is possible to say and do, rather than looking for more complex, relationally produced and non-linear mechanisms of long-term constraints, where the representatives or proponents of the hegemonic discourse (e.g. ruling elite) themselves become constrained in relation to policy change as a result of long-term and non-linear mechanisms.

As the literature review demonstrated, substantive studies in IR, and particularly those on “war on terror”, not only fall short of explicitly conceptualising discursive constraints and accounting for them as part of the \textit{mechanisms} leading to the claimed outcomes, but often, again, tend to account for constraints in linear terms as solely or mostly hegemonic discourses constraining subjugated actors. An interest in non-linear constraint where the official government policy options become circumscribed due to processes of contestation is present in the binding hypothesis underlying the empirical work in this thesis.

2.4.5. Philosophically Realist?

\textit{To be able to openly admit, theorise and analyse “causation” as part of our concern with discursive struggles and contestation and their effect on security policy and practices, is it necessary to have a philosophically realist conception of discourse?} Indeed, this is a meta-theoretical question, and I shall not try to resolve it fully in this thesis (to remind, the purpose of this thesis is not a meta-theoretical contribution). Nonetheless, I shall show how my reading of Bakhtin’s Dialogism is in terms of a philosophically realist conception of discourse, and also that, especially given David Howarth’s most recent re-articulation of his version of post-structuralism as embedded in “minimal realism”, this move is not that antithetical to the main post-structuralist premises (of contingency and non-fixity) as it may initially appear to be.

\(^{285}\) Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999: 121).
\(^{286}\) Ibid., p. 162.
Building on Laclau and Mouffe, Howarth articulates a social ontology where ‘the subject is thrown into incomplete structures of social relations, which are marked by an irreducible negativity that can never be fully displaced or transcended’. Howarth qualifies this ontology as ‘consistent with a minimal realism that acknowledges the existence of the objects and processes that we think about, though our practices of reflection are never external to the lifeworlds into which we are thrown’. In other words, he describes this approach as ‘radical materialism, in which our conceptual and discursive forms can never exhaust the materiality of objects’ (emphasis added).

Hence, in principle this version of post-structuralism is not antithetical to a philosophically realist ontology. However, Laclau and Mouffe, as well as Howarth draw a different epistemological conclusion from it. Thus, rather than contest the fact that physical objects have a “real existence” outside discourse, they deny that objects have ‘extra-discursive’ meaning. Indeed, they are right in claiming that the understanding of everything is achieved through giving things meaning via linguistic (written or oral speech) and non-linguistic (e.g. images, structuring of public spaces, hierarchies, practices, etc.) means. However, from here it cannot logically follow that meaning-seeking and meaning-production are all that count in social reality. The ‘materiality of objects’ which, as Howarth puts, the discursive can ‘never exhaust’, can exert consequences on social realities without them being given meaning, or before they have been brought into the realm of the conceptual and the discursive. On the other hand, Howarth’s contention that the discursive can never fully “exhaust” the materiality external to mind leads him to the epistemological conclusion (and the ‘epistemic fallacy’) that, therefore, we can never fully “know” such external reality. As Banta notes, ‘Epistemological trepidation pushes [poststructuralist discourse theory], despite acknowledgement of a real world, into anti-realism — defined as acknowledgement of a real and knowledge-independent world but rejection of any meaningful independence of it from our minds’.

288 Ibid.
289 Ibid.
While it is compelling that we can never fully exhaust reality through giving meaning to it, the ontological claim from within Howarth’s “radical materialism” or “minimal realism” is undermined if in social-scientific (scholarly) discourse we are unable to meaningfully contest its effects and consequences on social and political life. In this relation, Wight and Patomaki caution:

If discourses construct the objects to which the discourses refer, then the discourse itself can never be wrong about the existence of its objects, in any meaningful or methodologically interesting way. Nor can an alternative discourse possibly critique another discourse, since the objects of a given discourse exist if the discourse says they exist. External criticism of the existential claims of discourses seems impossible.293

Equally, however, we should be cautious of the fallacy of a somewhat opposite nature that may limit inquiry. Indeed, as Wight notes, ‘to hold out the prospect of social explanation by conceptual and/or semiotic mechanisms does not [or need not] represent an attempt to decouple these systems from material factors. What it does mean is that conceptual and/or semiotic systems can, potentially at least, play a role in social explanation’.294

Indeed, Howarth’s reservations with regards to critical realism are intimately linked with his strong articulation of contingency and incompleteness of structures. Thus, while in critical realism, e.g. per Bhaskar, “things” have intrinsic properties, Howarth contrasts this with the post-structuralist claim that things are contingent, historical and fragile.295 However, why should “contingency” be ontologically and analytically counter to the “real”? On the other hand, the “real” does not have to mean that all things are external to actors’ thoughts and actions. Bhaskar acknowledges this: ‘social structures and systems – unlike natural structures – do not exist independently of the activities they govern, nor are they simply external to the agents’ conceptions of what they are doing; they are woven into the practices, actions and ideas of agents’.296 It will later be shown that in Bakhtinian Dialogism, things are indeed contingent, historical and fragile; however this does not preclude them from being “real”. Indeed, “things”, including “discourses”, do not have intrinsic, fixed and essential properties, but they and their effects are no less real.

296 Ibid., p. 142, referring to Bhaskar’s comment.
The hypothesis and the related research question posited from the outset of this research necessitate analysing contestations and negotiations around the foreign/security discourses of “war on terror”, in a quest to trace forces constraining change and their mechanisms of actualisation. This pointed me toward the need for a discourse theory and analysis that is relational, rather than limited to that of a purported hegemonic discourse or else dissident discourses in isolation. In addition, the conceptual and empirical concern arising from the binding hypothesis necessitates a discourse-theoretical framework that can accommodate conceptualising and analysing “causation”.

The critical overviews in this chapter demonstrated that currently dominant discourse-theoretical approaches applied in constructivist and post-structuralist IR are inadequate for dealing with causal-constitutive “how”, or in other words “why” questions that go beyond the moment of legitimation and look into longitudinal dynamics of security policy continuation/change and therefore constraints. The dominant representational model critiqued herein has some merits if employed to explore initial legitimation discourses of security policies, e.g. in the immediate post-9/11 period. However, in a longitudinal perspective, i.e. in an analysis concerned with the longer life of such discourses and continued (re)legitimations, where the outcome is already about continuity and/or change, this model is highly restricting. Together with the tendency to over-concentrate on the official discourses alone and hence overlook or at times outright dismiss the significance of discourses of critique and resistance, it risks reducing relational and non-linear discursive processes that have led to policy outcomes (continuity or change being such outcome) to a linear and synchronic relationship between one (characteristically, the dominant) narrative and certain foreign policy/security practices.

To analyse multiplicity of security-contesting speech-acts, rather than securitising speech-acts, in a study that goes beyond the moment of securitisation/legitimation and is concerned with unintended longer-term effects of performativity on policy, we need a theory of discourse that is relational-dialogical, able to incorporate contestations, but also philosophically realist in order to look for effects of such contestations (in the case of the current research, continuity and change) as relationally produced. Thus, especially to
explore the longer term dynamics of a security discourse, we must bring together discourses of official representatives and those of dissent and critique into one empirical analysis that would explore how a) they have related to one another over the years by variously responding to one another and to external developments, and b) how they have produced policy and practice outcomes (i.e. continuity/change) relationally.

But more specifically, the need for a new framework also arises out of a concern to develop a consistent micro-theorising of the utterance where speech-act is reconceptualised as dialogical and relational, born out of and responding to an agitated field of struggle, in order to match the macro-theoretical emphasis on contestations. This is where Bakhtinian Dialogism will be shown to be indispensable.

In the next two chapters, I develop a discourse-theoretical framework to respond to these concerns.
Chapter 3: Towards a Discourse Theory through Bakhtinian Dialogism

3.1. Introduction

In search of a discourse philosophy that views discourse as relational, context-specific, causally efficacious, as well as one which is free from some of the limitations of the currently dominant Western post-structuralist discourse theories identified above, I turn to the thought of the 20th century Russian philosopher Mikhail Bakhtin and his circle which includes Voloshinov and Medvedev.

Bakhtinian Dialogism is a unique theory of language and society, which has so far remained at the margins of Western discourse-analytical studies, especially within IR.

There has been considerable recent interest in the thought of Russian philosopher Mikhail Bakhtin and his theory of Dialogism in the arts and some social sciences; but only very nascent and at times only tangential interest in IR. Notable exceptions are Guillaumé’s application of Bakhtinian thought; where he is interested in Bakhtin’s master concept “dialogue” in terms of the identity/alterity nexus conceived in processual terms, and to a lesser extent, der Derian, as well as Neumann, who calls the Bakhtinian influence on the Western post-structuralist tradition the ‘Eastern excursion’. Otherwise, Bakhtin has featured in IR studies very often as little more than a footnote, or else intermediated through the application of certain thinkers or approaches that have in turn drawn on Bakhtin or on people influenced by him. We shall see later in chapter 2, how this is the case when it comes to the concept of “intertextuality” in IR; but also it has been the case, as Guillaumé notes, in relation to the huge influence Todorov’s seminal work on “self-other” has had in IR, whereas Bakhtin’s thought, who lies at the heart of Todorov’s work, has

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297 For a wide-ranging collection of essays, see Gardiner (2003).
298 See, Guillaumé (2002); as well as Guillaumé (2011). Also, for an overview of Bakhtin in IR, see Guillaumé (2010).
299 Der Derian, James. ‘Fathers (and sons), Mother Courage (and her children), and the Dog (and the beef), in Der Derian, James, James Rosenau and Steve Smith (eds.) Global Voices: Dialogues in International Relations (Westview, 1993).
300 Neumann (1996).
reached IR only intermediated, through what Guillaume calls, the ‘Todorov link’.301

Apart from such post-structuralist appropriations or applications mostly concerned with identity/difference, the thought of Bakhtin and his circle (which also includes Voloshinov), finds a “footnote” appearance in Security Studies in Balzacq’s critique and rearticulations of the Copenhagen School’s securitization theory. Thus, reconceptualising the “context” of securitization, he makes a mere footnote to Bakhtin’s ‘socio-temporal embeddedness of the utterance’ and a cursory reference to ‘dialogical struggles’ (Balzacq 2011: 29, 41), while falling short of exploring Bakhtin’s thought and incorporating such “struggles” into his conceptualization of the “context”.302

In addition, Bakhtin and Voloshinov receive some, at times again intermediated attention in Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) which in turn is often applied in IR. Thus, to build a ‘dialectical theory of language’303 as the basis for a philosophically realist social ontology, CDA of Chouliaraki and Fairclough partly draws on Voloshinov, and on human geographer Harvey’s dialectics, which in turn partly draws on Voloshinov.304 On the other hand, CDA marries this social ontology with Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL) for their method and technique of conducting text analysis; SFL in turn often making some references to Bakhtin and Voloshinov.305

Thus, overall, the thought of Bakhtin and his circle, with the exception of Guillaume’s recent work cited above, has occupied little more than a “footnote” or an intermediated status in IR, despite their thought having illuminated some key substantive claims and directions (on “identity/alterity” and “intertextuality”; and recently “context” in securitization theory). The usefulness of Bakhtin for conceptualising a post-Austinean, more intersubjective speech-act, and more broadly a discourse theory more suitable for a relational discourse analysis concerned with contestations, has largely been missed. Therefore, I seek to bring Bakhtinian Dialogism out of such “footnote” status, and show a) its relevance and potential for re-conceiving of a more dialogical-relational theory

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301 Guillaume (2010).
303 Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999: 46).
of speech-act/utterance; and b) its potential for enriching theoretical and empirical discussion in discourse-analytical approaches in IR.

Bakhtin’s employment of the term “dialogue” is different from George Herbert Mead’s dialogue as ‘similarity of response that allows common play and eventually a rule-governed game of self and society’; from that of Alfred Schutz, for whom ‘dialogue works towards commonality and unification of the world’, or from Jurgen Habermas for whom ‘dialogue works towards consensus, agreement and the unity of reasoned understanding’. In Bakhtin’s theory, “dialogue” is primarily an ontological, as well as a normative category: the key principle in discourse and society is “dialogue” as a meta-relation, rather than formal systematic integrity (structuralism), or discontinuity and contingency (Western post-structuralism). In the narrow sense of the term, dialogism means that utterances must be studied not individually, but relationally in a sociologically informed approach, which Bakhtin calls ‘translinguistics’. In a broader sense, dialogue is a meta-category, a type of relation that runs through various layers of reality, including between the material and the social.

My reading of Bakhtinian Dialogism, rather than an alternative or “better” post-structuralism as posited by some, reveals a philosophically realist alternative theory of discourse and society, which is nonetheless compatible with Laclau and Mouffe’s and Howarth’s explicit theorisation of contestations and resistance and inextricable from hegemony. My conception of discourse, through my reading of Bakhtin, then, is philosophically realist, albeit consonant with many of the Laclau and Mouffean categories. On the one hand, it reflects a tension, an uneasy relationship with both; on the other hand, and more optimistically, it may be the basis to attempt to bridge them, especially in relation to Howarth’s newer, most recent re-development of post-structuralism,

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subscribing to ‘minimal realism’ and ‘radical materialism’. In this sense, my meta-theoretical approach is that it is possible to draw on certain ontological insights on discourse/society from post-structuralist theories, without remaining indebted to their broader epistemological assumptions, while at the same time being philosophically realist in my epistemology and in my ontological take on causation and semiotic mechanisms.

Bakhtinian Dialogism offers a theory of discourse and society that, with further development/re-working, is better suited for inquiring into political argumentation, primarily because it has a relational view of meaning (re)production and change, as well as of social interaction and structures. Bakhtinian dialogism transcends some of post-structuralism's weaknesses and incompatibilities with a philosophical-realist social ontology. By introducing some key categories of Bakhtinian thought, I demonstrate why a philosophically realist (rather than an alternative post-structuralist) reading of Bakhtin's thought is closer to the original (less mediated) Bakhtin.

The aim has not been to conduct a comprehensive reading and all-out re-appraisal of Bakhtin's oeuvre. It is, instead, to extract that which is necessary for forming a discourse theory and subsequent analytical approach well-equipped to accommodate an inquiry into specifically the type of discourses I am interested in, namely foreign/security discourses. I conclude that Bakhtin's alternative critique of (Saussurean) structuralism and more broadly of Positivism has important parallels with the critical-realist critique of the latter: it is able to comprehend an "outside" to discourse through its concepts of dan and zadan; it seeks a relational understanding of a layered world, focusing in the meantime, on the relations, rather than the already constituted relata of such world; it conceives of forces in discourse and society as real mechanisms, and even in a critique of Humean causation, attempts an alternative conception of causation.

Discourse and its generative effects in Bakhtinian thought can be known only when not losing sight of the social-situatedness of the processes under inquiry. Such social-situatedness is important in reconceiving of speech-act as dialogical, which I develop in section 3.3. Through a critique of the most

prominent theory of utterance in Western thought and in IR – that of Austean/Searlean speech-act theory, I show how the dialogical speech-act is diachronic (rather than synchronic and dependent on static structures of established conventions), able to break through the very constraints which structuralist speech-act theory imposes on it. Through Bakhtin’s concepts of addressivity and answerability originating in his philosophy of the act, we are able to see that a speech-act, as any social act, is primarily a response to the world, and more specifically a response to a multiplicity of other utterances in the past, present and future (temporally), and across the spectrum of other voices in the society (spatially).

Such chronotopic (time-space) situatedness of the utterance is further explored through intertextuality, in Section 3.4. I explore how Bakhtinian dialogism has inspired the concept of “intertextuality” lying at the heart of Western post-structuralism; and how heeding to a closer and less mediated reading of it will help further develop a theory of the dialogical utterance closer to Bakhtin and as an alternative speech-act theory. In particular, I argue that intertextuality as understood closer to its roots of Bakhtinian dialogism, rather than as often read and (mis)-applied in IR through Western appropriations, is the infrastructure for meaning-making, and thus cannot be overlooked in discourse analysis. I then engage with some categories from Laclau and Mouffe’s theory such as “nodal points”, and also introduce others such as “hyperlinks”, and “surplus illocutions”, to help enhance the theory of dialogical speech-act and thus further adapt it for analysing foreign policy/security contestations.

3.2. Bakhtinian Dialogism as an Opportunity

Western post-structuralism embarked on a critique of the Saussurean vision for its ‘essentialism based on the primacy of a static and complete structure’ and for resembling atomistic structuralism where language is taken to be a product, rather than a process of production. However, as already suggested, while seeking to transcend such essentialism and theorise contingency and openness

of structures, Western post-structuralism has ended up in anti-realism and another form of essentialism.\textsuperscript{318}

In contrast to Western post-structuralist critique of Saussurean structuralism, early 20\textsuperscript{th} century Russian philosopher Mikhail Bakhtin offered an alternative critique of Saussure, and more broadly of positivism. In 1920s, when the consolidation of post-revolutionary Soviet Russia was still to come and experimentation with ideas was still permitted, Russian Dialogists, in particular Mikhail Bakhtin, embarked on the critique of Saussurean linguistics, well before the French philosophical tradition came to the fore, and the term “post-structuralism” was coined in the West.\textsuperscript{319} In contrast with Western post-structuralists, the Bakhtin circle managed to critique the Saussurean essentialist and atomistic vision of discourse and society through an entirely different route, that of “dialogism”, and without a resort to anti-realism and indeterminism: instead, Bakhtin criticises Saussurean structural linguistics for abstracting signifiers from social interaction, and consequently brings the social back in as the reality of discourse.

Thus, Bakhtin’s dialogism engages with self/other, individual/society, signifier/signified, language/speech, etc., however not to deconstruct and subvert them as binary oppositions, neither to resolve them in a Hegelian-Marxian dialectics of synthesis. Instead, he and his circle seek to understand their relations as real and, in a broader project of explaining continuity and change in a society, to unpack the social mechanisms in which they are implicated. However, such continuity and unity is free from the structuralist rigidity and determinism: structures are not closed systems with internal relations, but, as we shall see, are open. In addition, they are contingent because of plurality of meanings and the dialogical (centrifugal) force in discourse that ensures such plurality.

Bakhtin is able to conceive of meaning as plural, (re)produced and changed in an open and changeable system.\textsuperscript{320} Meanings for Bakhtin are not produced through the ‘always-absent differential trace’ that structures the Derridean field, but through the social significance of the utterance, ‘as an intervention in … [and in] a relation to specific historical and ideological

\textsuperscript{318} Wight (2006: 136-37).
\textsuperscript{319} For an introduction, see Morris, Pam (ed.), The Bakhtin Reader: Selected Writings Bakhtin, Medvedev, Voloshinov (London: Arnold, 1994).
\textsuperscript{320} See e.g. Patomaki (2002); Wight (2006).
conditions’ (emphasis in the original). The historical and the collective are implicated in each individual utterance, and therefore the utterance ‘belongs to a higher level of structure, than that identified by Saussure’. The work of the Bakhtin circle, written mostly in the Soviet Russia of 1920-30s, largely predated the emergence of Western post-structuralist theory, but received a belated reception in the West. This was due to the fact that some of their work went into publication decades after being written due to censorship and controversy around them within the Soviet Union, and were translated into English with even further delay. Thus, necessarily, they were received and read in the West within the context of, and through, continental post-structuralism. Bakhtin was appropriated by Western post-structuralists according to their own image.

Indeed, Dialogism and Western post-structuralism shared common antecedents, particularly critical engagement with Saussurean linguistics. However, there are fundamental differences that have been lost in various Western appropriations of Bakhtin, mostly in claiming him as parallel to Western post-structuralism. Fortunately, there is an emerging trend, specifically in literary critique and cultural studies, where these misappropriations are revealed and critiqued as the legacy of the Western ‘Bakhtin industry’. For example Zavala finds 'disturbing appropriations and misreadings', where Bakhtin is presented as a post-modernist theorist of negation, while remaining silent on his thought as primarily a social – and we may add – relational, theory of discourse.

Bakhtin’s circle charged structuralism for the inability to account for some most fundamental aspects of language, namely ‘its active creative capacity and the always evaluative nature of meaning’. By contrast to Saussure, Bakhtin posited that text has meaning only when actualised in a specific utterance, in what Bakhtin often calls ‘the living utterance’: ‘verbal interaction is the basic

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323 Ibid.
324 Most contributors in Gardiner (2003) make such points.
325 Zavala, Iris M., ‘Bakhtin versus the Postmodern’, in Gardiner (2003: 142). Another important misappropriation of Bakhtin’s thought is argued to be in the Marxian lines. See, e.g. Morson, where Bakhtin is claimed not to be a Marxist, as conventionally interpreted in the Anglo-American world. Morson concludes that in his broader project of critiquing positivism, for Bakhtin, Marxism was another ‘theoretism’. Morson, Gary S., ‘Bakhtin and the Present Moment’, in Gardiner (2003: 222-226).
Hence, the ontologically real, and therefore the subject of analysis must be the interactions of speaking social beings, whose utterances must be studied not individually, but relationally in a sociologically informed approach, which he calls ‘translinguistics’. Primarily, this means that if ‘signs can arise only on interindividual territory’, i.e. between at least two individuals who are ‘organized socially’ (emphases in the original), and given that speech exchanges ‘operate in extremely close connection with the conditions of the social situation in which they occur’, including the historical epoch, the social group and the specific behavioural genres of communication and their given (and changeable) functions in the specific societal struggles, what we should be studying is exactly such sociality of these interactions.

In advocating ‘a different type of science’ on discourse, Bakhtin draws similarities with the natural sciences, but also points out the differences by bringing into sharp focus the ‘double hermeneutic’ nature of what he calls ‘humanistic disciplines’, i.e. the task of social sciences to make sense of how social actors make sense of reality: ‘[t]houghts upon thoughts, experience of experience, discourse upon discourses, texts bearing upon texts. Therein lies the fundamental particularity of our (humanistic) disciplines by opposition to the natural sciences, although there, too, there are no absolute or impossible boundaries’.

Bakhtin’s conception of discourse as relational is predicated on his philosophy of self and other: otherness is the very condition of possibility for consciousness, however not in the sense of otherness as difference, i.e. constituted in an internal relation of difference (as in Western post-structuralism), but otherness as a medium to negotiate the self through a synergetic relationship: the “self” is essentially constituted in polyphony, through encounters with, and as an answer to, a multitude of other “selves” in the

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327 Voloshinov (1986: 94).
329 This is Todorov’s translation of Bakhtin’s Russian choice for ‘metalinguisitica’, in order to avoid possible confusion. Todorov (1984).
332 Patomaki (2002).
spoken voices of others. Inspired by the theories of relativity in physics predominant in his time, Bakhtin understands existence as “dialogue”: existence is an event, but it is an event that is shared: “[b]eing is a simultaneity: it is always co-being,” and therefore life by its very nature is dialogical. Such dialogical relationships are present in exchanges at all levels – between organisms in ecosystems, words (and other units) in language, people in society, as well as between social and material structures.

Dialogism, then, rejects the atomistic view of semiotic and social structures. In his critique of Formalism in literary studies, Bakhtin attacks the attempts to ‘try to find the whole in the part: …[to] represent as the structure of the whole the structure of the part… isolate[d] abstractly’. Instead, he goes on to argue, that the structural whole is constituted through relations. In such higher level of structure, dialogue-as-a-relation operates not just among social agents, and across texts and meanings, but also ‘within a complexly structured and layered world’. Unlike Western post-structuralists, for whom, ‘the relations of difference are purely linguistically derived, and prior to, and constitutive of, the relata’ in Bakhtin’s conception of language and society, we see a ‘structure as social relations’ (rather than ‘structure as relations of difference’): ‘relations must be understood as relations linking together not [only] social positions and roles, but the various planes of social activity…allow[ing] us to concentrate our attention on the important structure (relations) between the material and ideational aspects of social life’. As one level of such relations among two planes (in no way the only two planes in reality), Bakhtin speaks of the dialogical sign as the contact point, as the relation that characterises an encounter ‘between the [biological] organism and the outside world’. Moreover, ‘consciousness itself can arise and become a viable fact only in the

336 The Russian word sobytie has the most common meaning of “event”, but at the same time that of “co-being”, if broken down.
341 Ibid., 175.
342 Voloshinov (1986: 26).
material embodiment of signs’. Thus, we may claim that in Bakhtin’s vision, the linguistic sign is another form of materiality that is a means to *negotiate* the relationship between the biological organism and the outer world.

In such relational character of systems of meaning, social processes and materiality, Bakhtin [Voloshinov] explores the relationship between material and ideological forces, and the inapplicability of narrowly Humean idea of causation to envisage such a relationship. Thus, in a critique of Marx’s account of the material origins of ideology, and in an attempt to establish the status of discourse in the relationship between base and superstructure, writing in 1929, he probes:

> If what is meant by causality is mechanical causality (as causality has been and still is understood and defined by the positivistic representatives of natural scientific thought), then this answer [that the basis causally determines ideology] would be essentially incorrect...The range of application for the categories of mechanical causality is extremely narrow... As regards the fundamental problems of historical materialism and of the study of ideologies altogether, the applicability of so inert a category as that of mechanical causality is simply out of the question.  

While the status of Marxism in Bakhtin’s thought is disputed, it is clear from this engagement, that Bakhtin envisions a more flexible and complex alternative understanding of generative causation, running through his work.

In contrast with the post-structuralist preoccupation with rupture, discontinuity and fragmentation, Bakhtin’s conception of discourse and society presents to us ‘a complex of continua’, and ‘posits implicitly a *unity of process* and a *continuity of effect*’. Thus, for Bakhtin, ‘[a]ny utterance, no matter how weighty and complete in and of itself, is only a moment in the continuous *process of verbal communication*. But that continuous verbal communication is, in turn, itself only a moment in the continuous, all-inclusive, generative process of a given social collective.’ Therefore, it is impossible to study utterances ‘isolated from the historical stream of [other] utterances and social processes’. Thus, for Bakhtin, in a complex of continua,

> [t]here is the continuum of discursive practices, from those of everyday life to those of the formal institutions of societies – church and state, the scientific disciplines and sophisticated cultural practices. These occur within the continuum of the dialogic process which may be characterized as monologising centripetal

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343 Ibid., 11-12.
346 Voloshinov (1986: 95).
347 Ibid., 96.
microstates within an open centrifugal macrostate. This in turn implies a continuum of history.\textsuperscript{348}

Such interlocked relations of continua imply a “layered world”, where structures are stratified and contexts are interpenetrated.\textsuperscript{349} Bakhtin’s “dialogism” is a type of relation running through all the layers. Informed and inspired by the recent advances in sciences of his time, especially of relativity in physics and quantum theory, Bakhtin’s layered world comprised ‘the linkage of matter-energy, entropy, and information that enchains conceptually the physical, biological and cultural spheres’.\textsuperscript{350} Thus, Bakhtin presents to us primarily as a materialist, who sees discourse itself as part of, or another form of, materiality; on the other hand discourse is an intervention into other layers of the material world by the human subject, who is in a constant dialogical quest to “negotiate” her way through such stratified world.

Meanings in Bakhtinian theory are produced through, and in turn play a role in producing, social effects out of the complex relationship between two forces operating in discourse – forces of fixation and finalisation, i.e. monologising, centripetal forces, and forces of pluralisation, i.e. dialogising, centrifugal forces. The monological is a force in discourse, which strives for singularity, for a closed system, for an imposed word. In discourse, it is the attempted fixation and singularity of meaning, the fixation of signifier and signified in an attempt not to allow space to question such transcendental significeds as “God”, “justice”, “law”, “the truth”.\textsuperscript{351} It is a force, which is constantly present, at varying degrees, a force, which creates ‘the authoritative word’, including religious, political, moral discourse, as well as the acknowledged scientific truth: ‘we encounter it with its authority already fused to it... [as] located in a distanced zone... the word of the fathers... already acknowledged in the past. It is a prior discourse’.\textsuperscript{352}

In order to achieve such impact of prior-ness and authority fused with political power, and reach us ‘as a compact and indivisible mass’, an authoritative discourse is at pains to ‘permit no play with the context framing it,
no play with its borders, no gradual and flexible transitions’. However, as Bakhtin warns us, while monologising forces are constantly present in language and in society, there is never a completely monological discourse: dialogical forces are constitutive of all discursive interaction. While in the earlier use of the term as explained above, dialogicity was the meta-category of Bakhtin’s thought denoting a meta-relation present in all discursive and social interaction, here in this narrower use of the term, dialogicity denotes centrifugal forces in discourse that strive to prevent any closure, any singularity by pluralising and subverting such tendencies; but also, where dialogical (relational) dependency of utterance upon other utterances becomes a resource for meaning-production. We shall later see how even the most monologising authoritative discourse striving for hegemony has to rely on the dialogical forces in discourse.

Therefore, monological/dialogical discourse, just as many of Bakhtin’s other concepts appearing in pairs (e.g., ‘self/other’), should not be viewed as just another binary opposition, but rather as asymmetric dualism, as a relation. Neither should the relationship be taken to be dialectical in the Hegelian sense. Hence, in the relation between the monological and dialogical forces (both ontologically real forces in discourse), “monologue” and singularising discourse has a different ontological status from the dialogue: it is never complete; it does not exist as a final achievement, but is rather always an unrealised attempt.

As we saw in chapter 2, while Laclau and Mouffe’s theory is ‘predicated on the ultimate impossibility of societal closure’, this very same impossibility is ‘a condition that makes articulatory practices and political agency possible’. Even if impossible in ontological terms, for political agents, ‘the idea of closure and fullness still functions as an (impossible) ideal’. This idea of impossibility of closure of any discursive structure is compatible with the Bakhtinian category of monologising discourse as a constant but never-fully-achievable attempt to bring the societal field to closure, to circumscribe heteroglossia, to singularise

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353 Ibid., 343.
354 Indeed, Hegelian dialectics for Bakhtin is itself a manifestation of monologism, and thus is the very opposite of dialogue, with its closure, abstractness, and assurance of history’s outcome. Bakhtin warns against such misinterpretation, by mocking the language of Hegelian dialectics in a parody of thesis-antithesis-synthesis: “[d]ialectics was born of dialogue so as to return again to dialogue on a higher level’, quoted in Pechey, Graham, ‘Boundaries versus Binaries: Bakhtin In/Against the History of Ideas’, in Gardiner (2003: 245). Also see Morson (2003: 225).
356 Ibid., p. 8.
meaning. However, the corrective through Bakhtin is that such ideal of fixation and closure can never be attempted without a dialogical engagement with others’ meanings/utterances, including meanings to be circumscribed and excluded but also meanings to be positively engaged with.

The pluralising effect of dialogical forces preventing any closure of the discursive field is explored by Bakhtin through the practice of carnival and the idea of the “carnivalesque”. The ancient practice of carnival has acted against the official ideologies and discourses of religion and state power by temporarily suspending, if not reversing, the existing social hierarchies of the time and celebrating the unofficial dimensions of social life. 357 In fact, it has been noticed that Bakhtin’s own work ‘championing the heteroglossia (many-voicedness) of the “folk” against the imposed authority of monoglossia’ was itself a disguised criticism of the ruthless state centralisation of Stalinist Russia. 358 This function, which Bakhtin calls the ‘carnivalesque’, beyond the medieval carnival proper, has evolved in the modern polyphonic novel. The latter (for Bakhtin epitomised by Dostoyevsky’s novels) allows for no individual discourse standing objectively above any other: it represents in a condensed form the multiplicity of societal voices and tensions, each voice responding to and calling to the others. 359 Bakhtin’s theory of the novel is not about the novel as a literary form: the novel happens to be one instantiation where dialogicity and “carnival” find most salient expression in the historical period and in the societies he was interested in. His concern was, rather, in the function of the novel, the function of ‘carnival displacement’. 360 This ‘carnivalesque’ function was performed by the carnival proper in the public squares and the markets of medieval Europe; then by the novel through the ‘private spaces of its readers’, during the Enlightenment; and finally has been dispersed into a fragmented variety of leftist cultural forms in the informational and post-industrial age, 361 as well as in the actions and discourses of social/dissident movements.

Through his interest in the novel as a socio-anthropological phenomenon, Bakhtin conceives of plurality and hence openness of meaning systems and of structures as inescapable: forces of fixation and finalisation are

359 Ibid., 23.
361 Ibid.
constantly in a complex relationship with the reality of openness. This allows Bakhtin to conceive of the contingency and plurality of meaning; however, unlike Derrida or Laclau and Mouffe, Bakhtin does not take such plurality and openness to mean ‘indeterminacy’ and hence ‘impossibility’ of meaning, and of society. Unlike deconstruction, Bakhtin sees the carnival not as an infinite anti-hegemonic quest in itself, but rather as ‘an affirmation of the possibility of alternative relations’.362 By locating plurality and openness in the “real” of the relationality of society, imagining emancipation becomes possible, precisely because of the ‘unfinalisability’ of meaning and openness of social structures. Hence, as Rutland notes, whereas Western post-modernism ‘reveals an apparent hollowness of the present… Bakhtinianism finds not hollowness, but inexhaustible plenitude, endless possibility, an open program’.363

In such a conception of structure, contingency and openness are in a complex relationship with systematicity: society and history are being shaped and changed by both centrifugal and centripetal forces. Thus, openness of systems represents possibilities for change and freedom: ‘[n]othing conclusive has yet taken place in the world, the ultimate word of the world and about the world has not yet been spoken, the world is open and free, everything is still in the future and will always be in the future’.364 The carnival is a ‘feast of time, the feast of becoming, change and renewal’.365 As Zavala notes, carnival spirit introduces relativity and ambiguity, in order to suspend social hierarchies and values, thus generating new viewpoints, open towards the “different” with respect to official codification…Bakhtin’s positive and progressive carnival familiarization would be difficult to reconcile with subversion and dissent without a future collective project, or with an “estrangement” of a dominant and totalizing style.366

Thus, through carnival and dialogising, Bakhtin means the possibility of transforming society not merely through deconstruction, but through opening the space for imagining new alternatives, which in turn will inescapably mean new monologising. In contrast with Derridean deconstruction, where ‘all traces

of meaning lead to paradox, absence and doubt', carnivalesque heteroglossia is located in the realm of social performance, and registers real social differences, taking on the function of resisting or negotiating change in an unequal field of power and access. In turn, and crucially, “power” for Bakhtin is not reified: ’it is a matter of ratios of dominance and resistance, of monologic contest and resolution within the encompassing ongoing dialogic process, situated within and between subjects, individual and collective’. Hence, the Bakhtinian theory is able to conceive of discourse as transformative, as part of counter-hegemonic struggles filled with possibility of alternatives.

As part of such struggles, attempts to closure are never just antagonistic and exclusionary. As we saw earlier, in Laclau and Mouffe’s theory, there is a primary “lack”, which antagonistic (opposed) political projects seek to fill through ‘hegemonic practices’ attempting ‘to construct and stabilise the nodal points that form the basis of concrete social orders by articulating as many available elements – floating signifiers – as possible’. In contrast, for Bakhtin, it is not a lack but a presence of multitude of dialogical relations, where the agony to act and to mean does not necessarily lead to antagonisms of opposing projects (of identity through difference), but where the inescapable “addressivity/answerability” to the other – even in the most monological (hegemonising) practices – compels to construct meanings through and with others’ meanings. Relatedly, “exclusion” central in post-structuralist thought is seen in a different light. As we saw earlier, in the Laclau and Mouffean conception, the ‘intrinsically political’ is conceived through ‘the construction of antagonisms and the drawing of political frontiers between “insiders” and “outsiders”’, where contestations and relationality among agents and meanings is conceived primarily in terms of exclusions, i.e. exclusionary relations. In Bakhtinian theory, relationality and contestation is not conceived solely in terms of exclusions, because of the dialogical nature of meaning production: fixation

368 Ibid. On the difference between Deconstruction and Bakhtinian Dialogism, White further maintains: ‘Deconstruction is a compromised, idealist carnival so obsessed with rooting out metaphysical error, that it remains enmeshed – if only by dependent negation – upon metaphysics itself… and as such it is monological and monologising…Bakhtin reveals the naïve complicity Deconstruction may have with social control and domination, and the consequent role that dialogic resistance must play to disrupt this’. See White (2003: 127-31).
370 Ibid.
or singularity of meaning is only an attempt (as it indeed is in post-structuralist accounts), but it unavoidably has to be conducted via others’ meanings.

This emphasis on attempt caught up in a struggle is crucial in relation to conceptualising an alternative – dialogical – understanding of speech-act, and hence performativity, to which I now turn.

3.3. Introducing the Dialogical Speech-act

Language is not a neutral medium that passes freely and easily into the private property of the speaker’s intentions: it is populated – overpopulated – with the intentions of others. Expropriating it, forcing it to submit to one’s own intentions and accents, is a difficult and complicated process.371

To take us a step closer to having a discourse-analytical framework best suited for inquiring into political argumentation and in particular security discourses and their effects on policy, we need to zoom into and get closer to the utterance, to understand how it operates and produces effects. For this purpose, I turn to critiquing the most prominent theory of utterance in Western thought and in IR – that of Austinean/Searlean speech-act theory. Through such a critique, I reconceive of speech-act as dialogical in the Bakhtinian sense. Although not termed as such, Bakhtin’s coherent and complex philosophy of language is itself a theory of speech-act, or of alternative performativity. Speech-act theory critiqued and re-conceived though Bakhtinian Dialogism becomes the basis for my vision of approaching political argumentation.

To remind, as we have seen in the overview of chapter 2, Austin’s speech-act theory372 develops a theory of performatives, where any proposition, along with a *locutionary* meaning (linguistic meaning in the traditional sense), also possesses *illocutionary force*—the potential of ‘doing something’ in saying things, and *perlocutionary force* – the effect of the illocution on the audience.373 Initially, Austin had distinguished between performatives and constatives, the former denoting doing things in saying something (e.g. marrying someone by uttering the words “I hereby declare you man and wife” by a priest in a church), and the latter to denote utterances that do not immediately perform such social

372 See Austin (1975).
373 Ibid.
functions. However, later he admitted that all utterances in real speech are performative. Austin’s famous example is as follows: by uttering “There is a bull in the field” in a certain situation, the speaker performs the illocutionary act of “warning” someone in the field, rather than describing a scene. The perlocutionary intent of this utterance would be “persuading the person in the field to leave”. If the utterance is taken by the audience as the illocution suggests, i.e. as a warning, then the illocutionary act is said to have been ‘felicitous’, i.e. successful, while if the speaker achieves in actuality preventing the audience from entering the field, then the perlocutionary act has been successful, as well.  

Searle went beyond Austin’s cataloguing stage and provided a theoretical framework which showed how language creates institutions and, in his constitutive theory, how utterances have word-to-world consequences. In this highly rule-bound conception, ‘speech-acts are acts characteristically performed by uttering expressions in accordance with certain constitutive rules’ (emphasis added). Thus, the a priori acceptance of certain conditions by a community of speakers/society is necessary for the success of a given act, in a structure of socio-discursive relations that have already stabilised into institutions.

In the Austinean-Searlean speech-act, the accepted conventions, and not the intentions of the speaker, are the key to making an utterance performative: if the conventions are not present, the intentions of the speaker will not succeed, and vice versa – if the conventions are there, the performative act will be successful, regardless of the intentions. However, such structuralist accounts of speech-act seem to take a static and synchronic socio-linguistic field as a point of departure for analysis. Importantly, they build on a conception of structure as internal relations. It is not quite clear how the “rules” themselves are being constituted or change over time, or how speech-acts may have variable meanings even within the same institutionalised rule-system. Nor is it clear how the dynamics of the relationship between speaker and receiver

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\(^{374}\) Ibid., 33.
\(^{375}\) Ibid.
\(^{376}\) Smith (2003: 27).
\(^{377}\) Ibid., 7.
\(^{378}\) Wight (2006)
evolves, and importantly how power relations created through the constitutive rules may produce undesirable/unintended results.

By contrast, Bakhtin’s *dialogical* conception of language and society and his concepts such as *answerability/addressivity* and the *chronotope*, as well as the concept of *intertextuality* (not a term used by Bakhtin, but revisited and re-read as closer to its Bakhtinian origins) help shed new light on the utterance and allow reconceiving speech-act theory. According to Bakhtin, the nature of discourse cannot yield itself to sufficient investigation/understanding through the structuralist approach. As already mentioned above, he maintains that text has meaning only when actualised in what Bakhtin variously refers to as ‘utterance’, ‘living utterance’, ‘speech performance’, or simply as the ‘word’. However, unlike Austin, Bakhtin does not see such a performance of speech as the result of established social conventions in a closed system of relations, neither in the ‘readability’ of written text beyond the sender’s initial intentionality in infinite possibilities as per Derrida. Bakhtin himself acknowledges the possibility of the production of unanticipated meanings, and that the same text may actualise different meanings given specific contexts and life situations. However, as we shall see in a moment, he demonstrates this through an analysis of the mechanisms at work primarily between socially organised *intending* beings.

To understand this, it is important to understand his concept of *addressivity/answerability*. This concept reveals how Bakhtin’s philosophy of the utterance is predicated primarily on his philosophy of the act, which emerges in one of his early writings, *Towards a Philosophy of the Act*, written in 1919-21, and continues developing throughout his oeuvre. The latter will help us pay closer attention to, and conceptualise the “act” part of the “speech-act”, before we can turn to understanding the utterance or speech.

Thus, according to Bakhtin’s vision, any act, including a linguistic act, or a speech-act one performs constitutes an *answer* to the world. It is worth quoting Bakhtin at length:

379 Bakhtin (1981). The term “*slovo*” in Russian denotes both a linguistic unit, and “speech” in action.
381 Morris (1994).
382 Bakhtin uses both terms interchangeably.
Life can be consciously comprehended only in concrete answerability... only as an ongoing event and not as Being qua given....

The world in which an act or deed actually proceeds, in which it is actually accomplished, is a unitary and unique world, that is experienced concretely: it is a world that is seen, heard, touched and thought, a world permeated in its entirety with the emotional-volitional tones of the affirmed validity of values. The unitary uniqueness of this world (its emotional-volitional, heavy, compellent uniqueness, and not its uniqueness with respect to content/sense) is guaranteed for actuality by the acknowledgement of my unique participation in that world, by my non-alibi in it. ...my participation transforms every manifestation of myself (feeling, desire, mood, thought) into my own actively answerable deed.

This world is given to me, from my unique place in Being...For my participative, act-performing consciousness, this world, as an architectonic whole, is arranged around me as around that sole centre from which my deed issues or comes forth: I come upon this world, inasmuch as I come forth or issue from within myself in my performed act or deed of seeing, of thinking, of practical doing (emphases in the original).384

Thus, Being, or existence, is given to a human subject as an insurgence of messages to which one must respond by making sense, by producing meaning and by acting.385 This, i.e. always responding to the world, is the inescapable state of the human condition, as only by responding to the world can one give meaning to his/her existence; in other words, one has “no alibi in existence”. This response is in the form of another utterance as deed, another act such as an artistic representation,386 and so on. Bakhtin notes, that even inertia, or inaction, is a form of response.387

Consequently, as Voloshinov [Bakhtin] notes, ‘any utterance, as act or deed upon this world, makes response to something and is calculated to be responded to in turn. It is but one link in a continuous chain of speech performances”.388 Thus, not only speech is a form of act, but also making meaning out of it and crucially answering it is another act; and these are in inseparable relationship. However, such addressivity is not a totally structured response to stimuli in a set of pre-determined/pre-accepted signs and their meanings. Neither is it a volatile act, where meanings of statements and social actions and situations are floating in virtually infinite possibilities. Rather, addressivity/answerability means that any utterance as an act is directed (addressed) towards a specific listener, potentially in a novel (rule-breaking)

384 Ibid., 56-57. 
385 Holquist (1990: 46). 
387 Ibid. 
way and therefore anticipates a certain future answer, but also that any utterance is “answerable” to a variety of other utterances (potential and actual) circulating in the society at large spatially, as well as uttered in the past and possible in the future, temporally.

In Bakhtin’s own formulation, ‘every word is directed toward an answer and cannot escape the profound influence of the answering word that it anticipates’.389 This, as Bakhtin suggests repeatedly, is an active and intentional act of the speaker. Thus, he continues:

The word in living conversation is directly, blatantly, oriented toward a future answer-word: it provokes an answer, anticipates it and structures itself in the answer’s direction. Forming itself in an atmosphere of the already spoken, the word is at the same time determined by that which has not yet been said but which is needed and in fact anticipated by the answering word. Such is the situation of any living dialogue (emphasis added).390

Importantly, in such addressivity, the social as the “real” of the interaction is at the forefront: ‘[t]he word is oriented towards an addressee, towards who that addressee might be…There can be no such thing as an abstract addressee…Even though we sometimes have pretentions to experiencing and saying things urbi et orbi, actually, of course, we envision this “world at large” through the prism of the concrete social milieu surrounding us’ (emphases in the original).391 Hence, an utterance is never a completely free act of choice: rather, ‘every aspect of it is a give-and-take between the local need of a particular speaker to communicate a specific meaning, and the global requirements of language as a generalizing system’.392 Therefore, not only an intentional speaker is negotiating her way through the world that pre-dates her and is given to her by using sedimented structures of language as well as previous utterances, but also negotiates with such sedimented structures of language to make it serve the given social purpose to mean and the personal purpose of the subject to respond to the world, hence potentially to aim to change it along the way.

In turn, such a conception of speech as an act upon the world is closely related to Bakhtin’s distinction between дан (“dan”, i.e. the given) and задан (“zadan”, i.e. the created or conceived);393 and sheds new light on the

390 Ibid.
391 Voloshinov (1986: 85).
392 Holquist (1990: 60).
393 These are influenced by the Kantian categories, reworked by Neo-Kantian Herman Cohen, for whom, the “given” is what we wake up to, versus the “created/conceived”, which is “what is posited by me as a task”. Emerson (2000: 219).
controversial problematic of the status of the discursive vis-à-vis non-/extra-discursive. Unlike the neo-Kantian insistence that '[t]he world is not given, but conceived', Bakhtin does not accept extreme idealism. For Bakhtin, we encounter the world of givens upon which we act with a string of responsive acts: the zadan then becomes our response to the dan. As we shall see in the next chapter, this is consonant with Archer’s morphogenetic approach to agent and structure, where the two are temporally separable: material and social realities to which we respond pre-date us, are prior to us as individual actors.

At this point it already becomes clear that Bakhtin is able to comprehend an “outside” to discourse as well as temporal separability, i.e. an autonomous materiality that is given to us and upon which we act, and a social reality as an amalgam of multitude of others’ responses to the world, including those already stratified into institutions and power structures, which again presents to us as given before we have initiated a responsive act upon it. Moreover, via Bakhtin’s philosophy of the act and dialogism, and consistent with critical realism, we are able to conceive of practices as ‘those actions and social relations in the transitive realm of a particular object which are, themselves, partly determined by but not reducible to, the structures and mechanisms’.

Within such a philosophy of existence, where what we may call “drive to mean and to act upon the world” is actualised only through and in relation to a multiplicity of others with no alibi in Being, any event, including a speech event, comes to be a constant exchange. As Holquist, a prominent Bakhtin critic, explains,

Before it means any specific thing, an utterance expresses the general condition of each speaker’s addressivity, the situation of not only being preceded by a language system that is “always already there”, but preceded as well by all existence, making it necessary for me to answer for the particular place I occupy…. An utterance… is a broader phenomenon. It takes place between speakers, and is therefore drenched in social factors.

As a result of such ‘in-between-ness’, then, meaning becomes the effect of the relationship among utterances in a chain of responsiveness. Thus,

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396 Joseph and Roberts (2004: 2).
397 Holquist (1990: 60-61).
398 Ibid., 60.
discourse, which is the cumulative of such actualised meanings, can only be understood as an interactive communication, as relationships.

In this light then, we can make a distinction between two interrelated levels of dialogicity immediately participating in the speech-act: a) dialogical relations among speaking actors horizontally (i.e. across space) as well as vertically (i.e., across time, through engagement with actors in the past, as well as anticipated actors in the future), and b) dialogical relations among various semiotic units, once again horizontally and vertically.

In such relationship, the speech-act context, then, is not just the immediate setting and the social/institutional positionality of speakers. The context is also constituted by past utterances – upon which the utterance can but rely to produce desired meaning, to which it is also answerable, and by which it can be constrained – as well as, crucially, by future possible/anticipated utterances. Thus, Bakhtin explains: ‘[t]he word, directed toward its object, enters a dialogically agitated and tension-filled environment of alien words, value judgements and accents, weaves in and out of complex interrelationships, merges with some, recoils from others, intersects with yet a third group’.  

While the significance of this temporal situatedness of utterances in a chain of past, present and future utterances will be further explored through Bakhtin’s concept of chronotope (time-space) in a moment, it must be noted here that such responsive utterance has important implications for re-evaluating “intentions” in relation to speech-act. I already established that in a dialogical vision, a speech-act can actualise only through a relationship between at least two social beings, between a self and an other in a responsive interaction and in actual socially organised situations. Let us break down this relationship in a simplified model – the relationship between two social beings, but having in mind the broader societal communicative process.

Several issues arise. First is the status of the speaker, particularly in relation to the intentions as a performer of the speech-act. In relation to intentions, in his dialogical vision, Bakhtin posits: ‘[t]he word in language is half someone else’s. It becomes “one’s own” only when the speaker populates it with his own intentions...Prior to this moment of appropriation, the word... [only] exists in other people’s mouths, in other people’s contexts, serving other

people’s intentions’. Thus, in Bakhtin’s understanding, it is not the fixed conventions, but instead the intentions of the speaker that are the key to making an utterance performative. Even when it is Derrida’s written text that has the ‘breaking force’ to mean something in the ‘absence of the sender’, i.e. irrespective of the sender’s initial (and perhaps long-forgotten) intentions, still this text for Bakhtin is caught up in the dialogicity of the ‘living utterance’, where it is still the intentions of the given receiver (who is always simultaneously also speaker) that appropriate the text by responding to/addressing the present social needs, in turn in order to produce a certain effect and response. Thus, Bakhtin suggests that the speaker – having an intention to “mean”, an intention to produce effect and invite a response through utilising others’ word, through populating them with his/her own intentions – is endowed with agency. This is an essential part of any conscious utterance. By appropriating others’ speech, the speaker is able to at least attempt to change the context of the given speech, as well as relatively fixed conventions guiding the given exchange.

Let us now turn to the second side in the complex relationship between the speaker and the listener. For Bakhtin, the listener of a particular utterance participates in the meaning creation, and thus possesses agency of his/her own. However, this participation is neither merely through the act of deciphering the constative signifiance of the utterance against the backdrop of a mastered linguistic system (as per Saussurean linguistics), nor simply through the decoding of the performative meaning (or the illocution) in the system of established social conventions (as per Austin and Searle). Rather, the listener engages in an inherently dialogical interactive relationship with the speaker and the speaker’s utterance, which may potentially change the very conventions and create new meanings together with the speaker. As Voloshinov [Bakhtin] notes, the attempts of an active listener at understanding an utterance amount ‘not... to recognising the form used, but rather to understanding it in a particular, concrete context..., i.e. it amounts to understanding its novelty and not to recognising its identity’ (emphasis added). Acknowledging this and being able to trace this is important in understanding change over time brought about by discursive exchanges.

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401 Ibid., 293.
403 Voloshinov (1986: 68).
Hence, crucially, in dialogism, intentions do not refer to a direct correlation between an inner plan and an outer act oriented towards a specific goal. Nonetheless, ‘while full adequacy is unattainable, it is always present as that which is to be achieved’.\(^{404}\) Since all acts are connected to the acts of the others, intentions are always caught up in tensions in an agitated field of struggle: thus, for Bakhtin, the utterance ‘is populated – overpopulated – with the intentions of others. Expropriating it, forcing it to submit to one’s own intentions and accents, is a difficult and complicated process’.\(^{405}\) Hence, in Dialogism, intentions are ‘positional and interlocative’,\(^{406}\) i.e. intentions are always positioned in relation to others’ intentions in the same space, as well as positioned in time, and in tension with own and others’ – actual or anticipated – intentions in the past, as well as the future.

Thus, Bakhtin’s vision affirms the production of new/changed conventions/contexts and hence meanings as the result of an active involvement of the interlocutors. Indeed, the speakers cannot fully anticipate how and where the utterance spoken by them will end up in the process, but certainly, they do pursue their own intentions of meaning production. Similarly, the receivers of the utterance cannot by themselves, detached from the dialogic process of discourse within the society at large, create new meanings or conventions for such meanings, but they certainly do actively participate in their own process of understanding and through it, of meaning creation. This is where – in the borderline between interlocutors, and in the process of delivering and understanding – change of meaning becomes possible. Bakhtin explains: ‘an active understanding, one that assimilates the word under consideration into a new conceptual system, that of the one striving to understand, establishes a series of complex interrelationships, consonances and dissonances with the word and enriches it with new elements’.\(^{407}\) Moreover, the speaker in fact relies on such perceptive adaptability for the realisation of meaning; such active understanding is often actively sought by the speaker in the first place – in virtually all discourse except for the most monological, and fully authoritative (and for Bakhtin, utopian) one. For, even in the attempted singularising

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\(^{404}\) Bakhtin (1993: 31).

\(^{405}\) Bakhtin (1981: 293-94).

\(^{406}\) Holquist (1990: 155).

monological discourse, the speaker needs to get the message through by engaging with the ‘world of the listener’:

It is precisely such an understanding that the speaker counts on. Therefore, his orientation toward the listener is an orientation toward a specific conceptual horizon, toward the specific world of the listener; it introduces totally new elements [from the listener’s world] into his discourse...; he enters into dialogical relationship with certain aspects of this system. The speaker breaks through the alien conceptual horizon of the listener, constructs his own utterance on alien territory, against his, the listener's apperceptive background.\footnote{Ibid.}

Here, understanding Bakhtin’s other, intimately linked, concept of chronotope is important. Chronotope (from the Greek χρόνος - time and τόπος - space) – a term borrowed by Bakhtin from the advances in physics in his time – is the spatio-temporal matrix in which an utterance operates. Since Being in Dialogism is conceived as co-being,\footnote{Bakhtin would consistently use the term событие бытия, i.e. literally “co-being of being”, instead of the terms “existence” or “being” common in philosophical debates.} and a human being as a project (act-deed, referring to the deed of always having to make a judgement and acting to respond to the world), then the place of a human being, the act, as well as the utterance in such existence, is best understood not only in space, but also in time.\footnote{Holquist (1990: 152).} However, chronotope does not refer merely to space and time, but rather to time-space, where time is the fourth dimension of space, and where time can only be known and perceived by the acting social being through enacting or giving meaning to a change in space. In this relation, chronotope is never merely temporal and spatial, but also axiological, as it always has value attached to it: it is always constituted coupled with a value,\footnote{Ibid, 152; 154.} since enacting change is always normative.

Conversely, an act, including a speech-act, can be known and evaluated by the change that it enacts, or attempts to enact, in such a time-space. This is doubly important for our understanding of the speech-act: a) an utterance is itself an attempt to bring about change of some sorts in the given time-space, in the given world of ‘actual chronotopes of our world’,\footnote{Bakhtin (1981: 253).} i.e. the matrix of space and the historical time where the relatively fixed social institutions, and structures pre-dating the actor are located; but also b) an utterance itself forms
and communicates/negotiates representations, which have their own ‘created/created
cronotopes’ (emphasis in original).\footnote{Ibid.}

Bakhtin thus regarded the utterance as a ‘mediating marker with whose help the root meanings of spatial categories are carried over into temporal relationships’.\footnote{Ibid., 251.} Bakhtin explores the concept of chronotope through his categorisation of different literary genres in different epochs. Exploring this at some length is important, since literary genres for Bakhtin had important social functions and the prevalence of each in a society at a certain historical period was symptomatic of broader social relations.

Thus, he posits that the structure of the Greek Romance exhibits a chronotope of ‘random contingency’,\footnote{Ibid., 92.} where ‘events have no consequences…initiative everywhere belongs exclusively to chance…[and where] an individual can be nothing other than completely \textit{passive}, completely \textit{unchanging}’ (emphasis in original).\footnote{Ibid., 105.} In other words, the characters have no agency of their own, and there is no causation. In addition, there is a ‘\textit{technical, abstract connection between space and time} [due to] the \textit{reversibility of moments in a temporal sequence, and due to interchangeability in space}’ (emphasis in original).\footnote{Ibid., 100.} In this chronotope, moving through time is like moving through space.

A different chronotope is found in another ancient genre, the ‘adventure novel of the everyday life’ (ancient mysteries, folk-tales, and now still present in contemporary ‘literature proper’), which explores metamorphosis and transformation, especially human transformation, and identity: ‘[m]etamorphosis serves as the basis for a method of portraying the whole of an individual’s life in its more important moments of crisis: for showing how an individual becomes other than what he was’.\footnote{Ibid., 115.} This is done through images of crisis and rebirth. It does not depict events in the ‘biographical time’, but ‘only the exceptiona, utterly \textit{unusual} moments of a man’s life…[which] \textit{shape the definitive image of the man, his essence, as well as the nature of his entire subsequent life}’ (emphases in the original).\footnote{Ibid., 116.} Here the primary initiative belongs to the hero,
and the course of an individual’s life is fused with his/her actual spatial course or road, to become the ‘path of his life’. \(^{420}\)

The third type of chronotope Bakhtin examines is that of the ancient biography and autobiography. Read out and discussed in public squares of Ancient Greece (the agora), rather than shared as literary texts, the important thing about these was ‘not only, and not so much, their internal chronotope (that is the time-space of their represented life) as it [was] rather and pre-eminently, that exterior real-life chronotope in which the representation of one’s own or someone else’s life is realized’. \(^{421}\) The public square itself, where these texts were heard, perceived and responded to, constitutes the real-life chronotope. As Bakhtin explains:

> [T]he square in earlier (ancient) times itself constituted a state (and more – it constituted the entire state apparatus, with all its official organs), it was the highest court, the whole of science, the whole of art, the entire people participated in it. It was a remarkable chronotope, in which all the most elevated categories from that of the state to that of revealed truth, were realized concretely and truly incarnated, made visible and given a face. And in this concrete and as it were all-encompassing chronotope, the laying bare and examination of a citizen’s whole life was accomplished, and received its public and civic stamp of approval. \(^{422}\)

Thus, the public square was the public site, where all the different voices in society mixed and clashed, and where meanings, representations and evaluations were being negotiated in a highly answerable dialogicity. In our time, the ancient more material space of the agora may be said to have expanded to become the abstracted space of the public domain fragmented in multiple physical sites such as the parliamentary and other political forums, the internet, printed and broadcast mass media, as well as the artistic and literary space, including the alternative spaces for marginalised voices. In this broader use of “chronotope”, following Bakhtin, I will mean a time-space matrix of broader ‘all-encompassing’ public contestations, located horizontally, i.e. at the

\(^{420}\) In this uniquely novelistic chronotope, ‘space becomes more concrete and saturated with a time that is more substantial: space is filled with real, living meaning and forms a crucial relationship with the hero and his fate.’ However, in this chronotope, the everyday world – that which lies outside the extraordinary “path of life” of the hero – is still static and has no “becoming”. The everyday time is not parallel to and not fused with the basic axis of the hero’s path. In Bakhtin’s own words: ‘[the everyday time] does reveal social heterogeneity. Social contradictions have not yet become apparent in this heterogeneity, but the situation is fraught with them. If such contradictions were to surface, than the world would start to move, it would be shoved into the future, time would receive a fullness and a historicity. But this process was not brought to completion in ancient times’. Ibid., 120; 129.

\(^{421}\) Ibid. 132.

\(^{422}\) Ibid.
present, as well as importantly (and something which cannot be overstated), vertically, i.e. in the past and future.

Thus, we may say, that in a double-hermeneutic analysis, chronotope as a category can be used at two levels. On one level, it is a hermeneutical device (for the author/speaker) structuring a representation and a narrative and hence an analytical tool (for the student of these narratives) to unpack such a structuring. I shall call these narrative chronotope, i.e. “stories” about time-space relations present in any narrative. The representational (i.e. narrative) chronotopes become an essential part of any narrative. Indeed, any story, including a political legitimation “story” about a crisis and required action narrates a certain chronotope condensing the time-space relationship of main agents and events. The differing properties of competing chronotopes can be revealing of how these representations interact with, and aim to enact on, the actual time-space in which they are being performed or (re)circulated.

On the other level, the chronotope is ‘a means for studying the relation between any text and its times, and thus as a fundamental tool for a broader social and historical analysis’\(^4\). I will call this usage real-life chronotope, to refer to the fact how any utterance, including the utterances forming the narrative chronotopes, are thrown into time-space relationships with other utterances from the past and future, as well as spatially at present, and therefore, thrown into an agitated field of struggle, answerability and dialogue. The latter becomes clearer when exploring how Bakhtinian Dialogism has been appropriated into the concept of “intertextuality” in Western Post-structural thinking: exploring this concept closer to its Bakhtinian origin will help further develop a theory of dialogical utterance closer as an alternative speech-act theory.

3.4. Intertextuality and Speech-Act

The living utterance, having taken meaning and shape at a particular historical moment in a socially specific environment, cannot fail to brush up against thousands of living dialogic threads, woven by socio-ideological consciousness around the given object of an utterance, it cannot fail to become an active participant in social dialogue. After all, an utterance arises out of this dialogue as a continuation of it and as a rejoinder to it.\(^4\)

\(^4\) Holquist (1990: 113).
In the Western post-structuralist tradition, the concept of “intertextuality” can be traced to Julia Kristeva, a Parisian school post-structuralist philosopher and psychoanalyst, who introduced Bakhtin’s thought to the West in 1960s-70s and who inaugurated the term “intertextuality”. To further evaluate the dialogical speech-act as an alternative to existing speech-act theories, it is necessary to explore the concept of intertextuality as promoted by Kristeva, and advanced by Barthes and others. First, I briefly assess what was lost in translation and transition when dialogism was at times reduced into intertextuality in Western post-structuralist thought, as well as how the revised reading of it helps us to reconceive of speech-act as dialogical. Intertextuality, away from the reading and applications in some IR literature drawing on Western appropriations of the concept, and read closer to its roots of Bakhtinian dialogism, must be understood as the very infrastructure for meaning-making. Departing from such an understanding, and to help enhance the theory of dialogical speech-act, I then introduce the new categories of “hypertextuality”, and “surplus illocutions”, as well as reflect on how Laclau and Mouffe’s category of “nodal points”, as well as conception “agonism” and “antagonism” complement and enhance the dialogical theory of the utterance, compatible with a contestation-based macro-theory of discourse.

Julia Kristeva, of the Parisian Tel Quel group of post-structuralists, most known for her pshycho-linguistic theory, introduced Bakhtin’s theory to the Western theoretical discourse. Kristeva’s reading of Bakhtin is in the following quote:

[...]Any text is constructed as a mosaic of quotations; any text is the absorption and transformation of another... The word as minimal textual unit thus turns out to occupy the status of mediator, linking structural models to cultural (historical) environment, as well as that of regulator, controlling mutations from diachronic to synchrony, i.e. to literary structure. The word is spatialized: through the very notion of status, it functions in three dimensions (subjects-addressee-context) as a set of dialogical, semic elements or as a set of ambivalent elements.425

Just as Bakhtin defines the status of an utterance horizontally, as well as vertically, for Kristeva intertextuality must be understood at two dimensions: horizontally, it is the three-way relationship between speaker-audience-context, and at the same time, vertically, it is the complex web of relations a given text establishes with other texts, whether through explicit references, or implicit links

and associations. Both of these types of relation take place within the Bakhtinian “real-life” chronotope, i.e. time-space nexus. An intertext, then, is a sphere where meaning is derived through a complex interrelationship between texts. Hence, indeed, it may be said that there is no text without other texts, and no theory of textuality without a theory of intertextuality.426

This must be read closer to Bakhtin, as emphasising a relational vision of meaning production, rather than one where meaning becomes the reader’s free-play. However, in a very Barthesian style of the “death of the author”, Kriesteva has often been interpreted as saying that there is no end to the text’s significance, the latter being mere product of each particular reading, and hence, no clear ‘inside’ and ‘outside’.427

Barthes has taken up the concept of intertextuality (albeit without much acknowledgement of Bakhtin) often in ways that are at odds with the original Bakhtinian philosophy. As already shown, Bakhtinian plurality of meaning is not identical with the infinite play of signifiers and disruption and discontinuity, as Barthes’ dramatic ‘death of the author’428 and the promotion of the reader to the forefront of analysis suggests.429 In Barthes’ ‘theory of reading’,430 the reader is the creator of text and the ‘inter-text is just that: the impossibility of life outside the infinite text’.431 Barthes, indeed, is right on the account of noticing the link with already existent meanings: ‘the text….is a multidimensional space in which a variety of writings, none of them original, blend and clash’.432 However, at odds with the original Bakhtin, he goes on to claim that the author has the sole role of a compiler of pre-existing possibilities, to be given meaning to in various ways by the reader, rather than being the controller of how these meanings can be created.433

427 Ibid., 69.
429 In Barthes’ vision, the reader of the (literary) text is free to draw ‘pleasure’ by engaging in a play with the plurality of meaning, a play that ‘is outside the adult world of responsibility and authority’ with its attendant patriarchal institutions, including the author’. Such ‘writerly (scriptible) text seems to be the ideal for Barthes – text which is reversible, open to interpretation, where the readers create (write) meanings as they read; whereas the ‘readerly (lisible) text or the classic text, is restrictive, making the reader a mere consumer, rather than a producer. See, Barthes, Roland, S/Z (London: Jonathan Cape, 1975); also see Orr, Mary, Intertextuality: Debates and Contexts (Cambridge: Polity, 2003), p. 34, in reference to Barthes.
431 Barthes as quoted in ibid. (as Orr’s translation).
433 Ibid.
As a result of such appropriations, eventually, from a Bakhtinian *social* dialogism, we end up in a Barthesian and Derridean “intertextuality” reduced to ‘a play of signifiers … [which] disrupt[s] and infinitely defer[s] the meaning of each signifier’. While for Barthes and Derrida, meaning occurs because of the play of signifiers, for Bakhtin, as we have seen, meaning is produced due to the historically situated and socially organised actors engaging in meaning production *in order to* respond to the world – through utilising prior meanings to serve such purpose, to negotiate their way in the material and social world of their own time. Thus, through the Western appropriation of Bakhtin, the social situatedness of the Bakhtinian dialogic utterance has been lost in translation/transition. Preoccupied with deconstruction, Barthes and others have, as Orr puts it, fixated on the ‘all-inclusive middle of the intertextuality’, i.e. on the written and (often literary) text and the infinitely open reading experience of it, losing sight of the Bakhtinian “living utterance”, the real-life speech-act and its consequences. What we must bring back to focus then is the “*inter-*” of intertextuality, i.e. the social relationality of discourse. Important for us here is how problematic the *implications* of the current Western post-structuralist use and reproductions of “intertextuality” can be: on the one hand, it is used to refer to a de-centring, anti-hegemonic pluralising force that disrupts any singularity and must be celebrated akin to deconstruction; on the other, it is an analytical device that traces associations among texts in infinite possibilities but in a closed system of linguistic relations.

The implications of appropriating Bakhtinian Dialogism into post-structuralist “intertextuality” are important in their IR applications. Just as Kristeva was the medium via whom Bakhtin entered Parisian and then Western intellectual discourse, Barthes was the medium to introduce intertextuality to Anglo-American scholarship. It was largely from Barthes that intertextuality

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434 Ibid., 66.
436 In this respect, Foucault is closer to Bakhtin. Allen (2000: 92).
437 In this respect, Orr claims that not only Bakhtin, but also Kristeva herself has been misappropriated: for Kristeva, text is productivity and redistribution, and intertextuality is a permutation of texts, but one allowing for the socio-historical. On the other hand, other critics have charged Kristeva herself for misappropriating Bakhtin so much so that the all-important element of his thought, i.e. ‘the social’ of the living utterance is lost. See, ibid., 26-28.
438 In the 1980s, Barthes’ work, largely based on Kristeva, was immediately available in English translation, when Kristeva’s own work from the 1960s was only belatedly and often partially translated and published in English. Thus, obviously, in the 1980s, when she was published, her ideas were already sounding ‘very similar to those of the already familiar Barthes and Derrida’. Orr (2003: 21-22).
reached the social sciences, notably through the oft-quoted line ‘intertextuality is a “mosaic of quotations”’\textsuperscript{439} – often leading to overgeneralised and imprecise reappraisal of Kristeva and of Bakhtin. Still further distancing seems to have resulted from yet one more level of mediation, when the concept has reached the discipline of International Relations, mostly influenced by the works of Barthes.\textsuperscript{440}

One of the first major contributions applying intertextuality was the collection of essays entitled \textit{International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics}, edited by der Derian and Shapiro.\textsuperscript{441} Another, more recent, application of intertextuality is the study of the official discourse around the Bosnian War by Lene Hansen.\textsuperscript{442} These applications have produced some compelling analyses and valuable results on important IR topics in their own right, and it is not the place here to offer a substantial critique of these works. However, it is important to engage with their at times reductionist use of “intertextuality”. Thus, some of these works only loosely utilise the concepts of dialogue and intertextuality, at times at the expense of conceptual reduction, while others make use of the two concepts as intermediated by other authors and conflated with other concepts. As a result, some of them leave out an exploration of these concepts as originally developed by Bakhtin. Thus, e.g. Shapiro uses the concept to enhance the post-structuralist practice of modelling the world as language in a ‘structure as relations of difference’ model,\textsuperscript{443} and hence looks at “international relations” (the practice) as a text. This for Shapiro means that we must ‘inquire into the style of its scripting, to reveal the way it has been mediated by historically specific scripts governing the interpretations through which it has emerged’.\textsuperscript{444} What he does then is a sketch of broad ‘Postmodern readings of world politics’ in the spirit of the Derridean deconstruction: intertextuality is defined more broadly, in an almost Derridean sense of everything being textual. This type of appropriation of intertextuality,

\textsuperscript{439} Kristeva (1991: 37).
\textsuperscript{440} For a partly gender-based criticism of how Kristeva has often been side-lined by commentators of intertextuality in favour of quoting and crediting Barthes instead, see Orr (2003: 20-59).
\textsuperscript{441} Der Derian and Shapiro (1989).
\textsuperscript{442} Hansen (2006).
\textsuperscript{443} Wight (2006: 133).
\textsuperscript{444} Shapiro, Machael, ‘Textualizing Global Politics,’ in Der Derian and Shapiro (1989: 12).
i.e. slippage into Derridean deconstruction is present in a number of other contributions,\textsuperscript{445} where Bakhtin’s original vision of dialogism is lost.

In another essay, Shapiro represents another trend characteristic of Western post-structuralist IR appropriations of the concept of intertextuality: he looks at the relations between the discourse of war on the one hand, and that of sports on the other, and ends up with the ‘sport’ metaphor in war and security policy as pointing to an analogous thinking.\textsuperscript{446} This is, in fact, Kristeva’s ‘permutation of one signifying system into another’ \textit{taken to the minimum}, i.e. just between two distinct discourses. A similar appropriating “intertextuality” as merely the interpenetration of two distinct discourses or themes is also present in Bradley Klein’s essay on the relation between pornography and the discourse of war,\textsuperscript{447} where he traces how pornographic discourse, specifically phallocentrism, becomes a sort of military strategy.\textsuperscript{448} Similarly, Der Derian focuses on the intertext between spy literature and academic discourse in IR;\textsuperscript{449} while Lene Hansen’s analysis of the foreign policy discourse around the Bosnian conflict applies the concept of intertextuality primarily between the genres of official foreign policy statements on the one hand, and other genres on the other, and focuses on identifying implicit or explicit ‘references’ policy makers make to other text, such as travel writing and memoirs.\textsuperscript{450} In addition, in Hansen’s intertextual analysis, it is the researcher who decides what other text the official text is referring to, through genealogical analysis or tracing of associations.\textsuperscript{451}

Thus, in these appropriations, “intertextuality” (and by extension the original Bakhtinian “dialogue”) has been taken to mean influences between two or more distinguishable discourses/genres, or else associated with other

\textsuperscript{445} Thus, Ashley does engage with Bakhtin’s concept of monologism, albeit only to refer to the discourse of modernity as monological, and how post-structuralism is instead, a dialogising force, destabilizing the modernist theories’ narratives. However, he seems to see the relationship between the two as quite dichotomous and hence not at all in line with Bakhtin. He then embarks on a re-reading of Waltz’s two seminal works ‘with an eye to intertextuality’, as he notes. But then he goes on to deconstruct, as per Derrida, Waltz’s Man/War hierarchy, and to reverse this hierarchy. Ashley, Richard, ‘Living on Border Lines: Man, Poststructuralism and War’, in Der Derian and Shapiro (1989: 185). Also, see Elshtain, Jean B., ‘Freud’s Discourse of War/Politics’, in Der Derian and Shapiro (1989).

\textsuperscript{446} Shapiro (1989: 69).


\textsuperscript{448} Ibid., 99.

\textsuperscript{449} Der Derian, James ‘Spy versus Spy: The Intertextual Power of International Intrigue’, in Der Derian and Shapiro (1989).


\textsuperscript{451} Ibid., p. 12.
concepts such as deconstruction. Instead, intertextuality conceived closer to Bakhtinian dialogism is neither association between clearly distinguishable thematic discourses, nor deconstructive practice of infinite fragmentation. Rather, it is a complex web of relations among various utterances, both across space and across time. It is part of answerability inherent in the performative act, always referring to another’s speech. If the Bakhtinian chronotope is brought back into a conception of intertextuality, then what had become a synchronic play of signifiers in Western “intertextuality” will give way to a diachronic vision, where the Bakhtinian emphasis on social communication is reinstated at the same time. Here we would once again be able to conceive of utterance as an act, as acting upon the world, or as a way of what I had called earlier, negotiating with the world. This would mean that the outsidedness of the text is acknowledged; the world cannot simply be modelled on language; and structures, however contingent, cease to be systems of closed relations.

Moreover, closer to Bakhtin, intertextuality may be argued to be the very infrastructure of meaning making, rather than a certain property of some texts; the infrastructure through which both dialogical and monological forces may be manifested. Even the most authoritative discourse, in its drive for singularity and elimination of otherness (i.e. other voices in the society), ironically, has to bring in heteroglot voices of others (from the society’s present and past) into the discourse to construct a narrative. Hence, monologising has to be done by relying on dialogical principles, and exercising intertextuality. Intertextuality closer to its Bakhtinian roots is the ontological property of all discursive communication.

Intertextuality closer to Bakhtin presents to us as intimately linked with the mechanisms of human cognition. This is clearly demonstrated in the contemporary concept and practice of electronic hyperlinks. Thus, it has been acknowledged that Bakhtin’s conception of discourse has anticipated the electronic hypertext known to us today. More broadly, parallels between the internet and the concept of ‘intertextuality as tissue of texts’ have been noted.

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452 Bruce notes the synchronic nature of “intertextuality” and to bring Bakhtinian chronotope back, offers rather the concept of “interdiscursivity” as more diachronic. However, I will stick to the term intertextuality, with revisions to allow reconceiving of it. Donal Bruce, De l’intertextualité à l’interdiscursivité: histoire d’une double émergence (Toronto: Editions Paratexte, 1985), cited in Orr (2003: 41-42).

(and most often credited to Barthes).\textsuperscript{454} However, such discussions are overwhelmed with the idea that the internet and more specifically the hypertext or electronic hypertextual books have de-centred the text, and hence overthrown monopoly on meaning and power: by subverting the hierarchical status of the main and secondary texts and hence the authoritative order of reading, they allow for multiple entry points for the reader, as well as multiple and heterogeneous reading routes to take at one’s choice.\textsuperscript{455} The omnipresence of electronic hypertexts in our days, and the fact that any text (through blocks of texts acting as links that can be activated by the reader) can potentially be linked to any other text in the ‘docuverse’\textsuperscript{456} has been claimed to be the very incarnation and confirmation of post-modern theories, i.e. what Barthes and Derrida had been at pains to demonstrate,\textsuperscript{457} and as epitomising Barthes’ ‘writerly’ text.\textsuperscript{458} The post-modernist fascination with the concept has focused around the supposedly anti-hegemonising potential of such reader practice and information exchange that results in infinite fragmentation and pluralisation of meaning preventing any closure. As a result, the hypertext has been claimed to be more ‘democratic’, than conventional information exchange.\textsuperscript{459} However, the fascination with the purported anti-hegemonising potential of hypertext ignores the fact that it can also increase singularisation of meaning.

Indeed, as we have seen, any monologising/singularising authoritative discourse has to rely on intertextual means of meaning production. To understand this, we must view hypertextuality not as a unique characteristic of the post-modern text revealed by modern technologies, but as a principle of human cognition in general. The human mind works ‘by association’: having one idea ‘in its grasp, …[the mind] snaps instantly to the next that is suggested by the association of thoughts, in accordance with some intricate web of trails.

\textsuperscript{454} See Orr (2003: 49).
\textsuperscript{455} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{456} A term given by Nelson – the IT inventor of hypertext – to denote the universe of documents in the world wide web. Landow (1997: 25).
\textsuperscript{457} See Orr (2003: 49).
\textsuperscript{458} Landow (1997: 5).
\textsuperscript{459} See, e.g. Landow (1997: 281). However, this disregards the fact that the new electronic media and the possibility of electronically supported hypertextual reading can also create increased information “noise” (overload) and hence less democratic participation (a hypothesis that cannot be developed, and is not the concern, here).
carried by the cells of the brain’. The development of the IT technologies has in fact followed the properties of human cognition. The text is always virtual in the sense of being connected to a web of other texts: the mind follows a similar process as that physically allowed by a hyperlinked text. Moreover, we have seen through Bakhtinian addressivity and chronotope, that meaning is produced only in relations among socially situated “living utterances”; i.e. utterances as deeds, as response to, and addressing and anticipating, other utterances in the past, present and future. Thus, utterance is inherently intertextual, the threads through which it is “woven” being the intertextual links it establishes with other utterances through intentions of the speaker and/or the interpretations of the listener.

This brings us back to the issue of the interrelationship between the speaker and listener, and the issue of intentionality. What makes the utterance intertextual is not only the speaker’s intentions when ‘appropriating’ the word of ‘an other’, but also other people’s intentions, and hence potential meanings, past and present, being transposed through such appropriations. Thus, the utterance being inherently dialogical/intertextual and chronotopic, operates through the activation of latent or more salient, potential or actual links and associations with other utterances, in other similar or dissimilar social situations, with other peoples’ intentions, speaking to other people’s ‘inner world’, appropriating them or making them serve the given utterance’s present purpose to respond to and negotiate with the world. Hence, rather than confirming Barthesian ‘death of the author’ and his version of intertextuality (i.e. as property of the ‘writery text’), the success of the hyperlinked electronic media confirms Bakhtinian dialogism as the meta-principle for all communication.

In such connectivity of texts and utterances, two additional (secondary) categories, namely “nodal points” and what I call “surplus illocutions”, are useful, especially for my empirical analysis. Indeed, potentially any word, or else any utterance, and even whole segments of texts can act as hyperlinks, i.e.

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461 Albeit with limited capacity, books (especially those with annotations, indexes, internal and external references) have been operating in a similar way to electronic hypertexts. As Landow notes, printed texts themselves were once the technological innovation, i.e. the new information technologies of their own time. Landow (1997: 26).

462 Holquist (1990: 24-25).

463 Ibid.
activate dialogical associations with other texts, other utterances. However, in any narrative discourse such as political communicative discourse, some such words or segments of texts are intentionally invoked by the speaker to achieve certain illocutionary and perlocutionary effect, organised around the intended chronotope of the given narrative.

Being indispensable to the narrative’s broader intended speech-act effect, some such signifiers become identifiable nodes upon which the narrative structurally hinges. In Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory, “hegemonic formations” or certain stabilised systems of meaning are formed around *nodal points*, underpinning social orders,464 ‘nodal points’ being privileged discursive constructions which ‘partially fix meaning’.465 For instance, in communist ideology, ‘a number of pre-existing and available signifiers…acquire a new meaning…Democracy [becomes] “real” democracy, as opposed to “bourgeois” democracy, freedom acquires an economic connotation…In other words, their meaning is partially fixed by reference to the nodal point “communism”’.466 The concept of ‘empty signifiers’ proposed by Laclau467 is often used by Laclau and Mouffe interchangeably with ‘nodal points’:468 a political discourse strives for the (im)possible ideal of bringing the social field to closure through empty signifiers that function as nodal points, where the emptiness of the nodal point is the condition of possibility for hegemonic success.469 With all their emptied content, nodal points such as “God”, “Nation”, “Party”, or “Class”, in this view, are capable of concealing ambiguities by fixing floating signifiers, and thus unify a discursive terrain.470 Indeed, certain signifiers become the loci of political contestation and competing attempts of fixation and suture and in this sense are empty of closed and essentially fixed meanings and thereby do not point to singular signifieds. Nonetheless, through the dialogical speech-act conception, each actual individual articulation, each speech-act around a nodal point cannot be “empty” at least if we think of the articulation as a deed with an illocutionary and perlocutionary intention.

464 Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 142).
465 Ibid., 113.
466 Ibid. 102, in reference to Žižek.
467 Laclau (1996).
468 Howarth and Stavrakakis (2000: 8).
469 Ibid., 9.
It may be argued that empty signifiers would achieve partial fixation precisely because they, e.g. “communism” in Soviet ideological discourse, are (to borrow a term from a translated Bakhtin) ‘overpopulated’ with signification, are a sort of a conglomerate of meanings/narratives clustered together condensing a certain narrative chronotope of the ideology, as well as relationally interacting with the real time-space of the given utterance. In other words, “communism” served as a specific (for the time of initiation, a novel) meeting point between various narratives (such as those of “democracy”, “state”, “freedom”) intertextuality forging different relationships in the Soviet ideological discourse, than they would in other discourses. As Kristeva notes in relation to her notion of intertextuality, ‘every text is from the outset under the jurisdiction of other discourses which impose a universe on it.’

In this sense, then, in order to realise such “jurisdiction” and transform the perception of existing narratives, the nodal points themselves need to be carriers of a wealth of semantic possibilities representative of the given discursive formation, in order to be able to project specified meanings onto the surrounding signifiers in the existing narratives that they seek to re-define and re-cluster/reorganise into new intertextual relationships and thus make them part of the given narrative.

Thus, I will use the category of “nodal points” as borrowed from Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory, i.e. as privileged signifiers which ‘partially fix meaning’; however, modified through Dialogism and my conception of the dialogical speech-act. Thus, nodal points are certain master signifiers – the main organising nodes of a narrative – overpopulated with signification, serving as a specific meeting point between various other narratives in space and time, via the active (re)production of intertextual relations in intentional performative actions. Among them, master nodal points will be used to denote those key signifiers upon which the whole edifice of the given discourse structurally hinges. Master nodal points condense certain semantic fixations representative of the given discursive formation, and thus project specified meanings onto the surrounding signifiers in the existing narratives that they seek to re-define and re-cluster/reorganise into new intertextual relationships.

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472 Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 113).
While some of these intertextual links would be intentionally produced to re-enforce the position of the nodal points, and activated through mental processes similar to hyperlinks in electronic media, many other spatial and temporal intertextual links would be activated by the receivers themselves not quite in the ways intended by the speaker of the given narrative, but activated by the listener as their particular “answer” to the narrative in relation to their own inner world and their perception of the time-space they are located in. To put this in the speech-act framework, some of these plural links are necessarily activated by intention of the speaker to perform the desired speech-act laden with a specific illocutionary meaning, and possibly achieve the desired perlocution. But many other such potential intertextual links may unintentionally be released by the speaker through the speech-act as surplus illocutionary force, which may be activated by certain groups of receivers. Such surplus (or unintended) illocutionary force may potentially create possibilities for unintended perlocutions, when various groups in the audience act upon the discourse in varying ways.

Thus, to allow for a better vocabulary for theorising the dialogical speech-act, as well as for the empirical analysis, I will use the term “surplus illocutions” to denote those hyperlinked associations of meaning activated by the listener that had in all likelihood not been intended or anticipated by the performer of the utterance, and that are used by the audience to navigate through a different semiotic route than suggested by the narrative.

This brings us back to the significance of specifically technological electronic hypertexts and the internet in general. These have certainly also brought in a qualitative change that cannot be underestimated in relation to political discourses. Thus, they have not only expedited advanced reading and writing modes, but have also changed the way politicians construct speeches and official narratives, in some important way transforming the profession of the speech-writer or political spin-doctor, who has to locate the given official text in the metatext of the electronic media, anticipating an ever-increasing number of responses. In addition, hypertexts have also changed the way we respond to those narratives – through probing, checking, challenging, trivializing, often twisting, (mis)quoting, and (mis)appropriating, or else reinforcing, etc. Due to such intertextual nature of meaning production, and the discourse escaping
intentionality through surplus illocutions, unintended consequences and emergent/generative causation becomes possible.

As we shall see in the next chapter on specifically foreign/security discourses, the dialogical nature of discourse, in the socio-political context of late-modern democracies, rather than merely pluralise or fragment in order to subvert hierarchies (as per the post-modernist preoccupation), produces contradictory effects: increased reflexivity and hence increased critique, probing, and dissent to hegemonising narratives; but also increased monologisation and silencing of such dissent, increased possibilities for responding to destabilising voices and restoring undermined narratives; as well as increased possibilities for non-linear constraints on official discourses.

3.5. Conclusions: Performativity and Contestation through the Dialogical Speech-Act

In their project of critiquing structuralist thought, Western post-structuralist discourse theories have landed in a sort of ‘anti-realism’ and ‘indeterminate determinism’, and while critiquing essentialism, have risked submitting to another form of essentialism. My aim in this chapter has been to introduce Bakhtinian Dialogism freed from its Western re-appropriations and as a philosophically-realist alternative discourse theory, and with some revisions and additions, to develop a Bakhtin-inspired and realist-constructivist vision of a dialogical speech-act, as an alternative to the traditional Austinean speech-act theory.

Thus, the Bakhtinian dialogical utterance is different from the Austinean/Searlean speech-act in important ways, but so it is from Western post-structuralist understandings: it presents itself in all its dialogical complexity, where interlocutors are endowed with agency; where their interactive relationship results in the utterance as a deed, as active, and as productive. The latter is always an attempt to respond to and to resolve a situation. It is an attempt to bring a social situation embedded in a particular historical time-space to ‘an evaluative conclusion (for the moment at least) or extends action into the future’, but where also utterance is itself a situation. In any discourse other than purely authorial and authoritarian one taken to the extreme (which, as per

474 Holquist (1990: 63).
Bakhtin, is utopian), speech-act is in an unavoidable, inescapable relationship to an other, to an outside, to another context.\footnote{Carroll (2003: 154).} Here the utterance, depending on its social situatedness, may perform functions including those of breaking through the very constraints which structuralist speech-act theory names as conventions and as conditions of possibility for the successful (“felicitous” speech-act). In the dialogically-enhanced conception of speech-act, the Austinean “illocution” as the intended doing-in-saying is re-conceived as only an ideal, an individual attempt: it is never fully achieved without an agonistic struggle, a tension, or a ‘resistance put up by language against intention’.\footnote{White (2003: 116).} Relatedly, meaning is produced relationally, only when entered into a complex “dialogical” relationship with other utterances, and may and does potentially transcend individual intentionality. Different from Austin’s speech-act, Bakhtin’s notion of the dialogical utterance is highly relational: it is a social act which is a response to the reality of the world and to the reality of multiplicity of other utterances within which it is embedded, spatially and temporally. Only in such a relationship to other utterances does speech-act become possible; or to borrow Skinner’s helpful postulate that speech-act is ‘a fact about language’.\footnote{Skinner, Quentin, \textit{Visions of Politics: Volume I, Regarding Method} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 106.}

Thus, in a Bakhtinian-inspired speech-act theory, “agony”, i.e. agonistic struggle for meaning is not necessarily and solely antagonistic and exclusionary: it is agonistic (but not always antagonistic) engagement with the other agents involved, to be able to mean, to fix meaning, through (rather than at the expense of the exclusion of) the other agents. While, as we saw above, for Mouffe, “agonism” is a normative concept, for Bakhtin, agonistic relations are part of the ontology of the utterance, of a performative act where the illocutionary move, i.e. to do something in saying something, as well as the perlocution, doing something by saying something, is caught up in an agitated field of others’ such attempts to do things through the utterance. Through Bakhtin then, performativity, the basis of discourse-analytical work specifically on security in IR and Security Studies, must be reconceived as an attempt in an agonistic struggle to constitute something, often with and through others’ such attempts, rather than the outcome of such constitution, through the exclusion of others.
Relatedly and more broadly, though Bakhtin, we are able to re-evaluate the problematics of agency, the act, and performativity in the post-structuralist approaches reviewed in chapter 2. Thus, Laclau’s conception of political subjectivity is ‘concern[ed] with the way in which social actors act… [and how] the actions of subjects emerge because of the contingency of those discursive structures through which a subject obtains its identity’. Here, the field of identity is always already antagonised; and since structures are always contingent, they are always subject to dislocation. In relation to agency, for Laclau and Mouffe, ‘it is the “failure” of the structure [after dislocation]… that “compels” the subject to act, to assert anew its subjectivity’. For Bakhtin, however, the subject has “no alibi” from acting, i.e. it is constantly “compelled” to act. Any monological engagement and dialogising attempt is an act, but so is conforming or inertia. The difference is important in terms of the potential for relationally produce political outcomes.

This is important especially when reconceiving of “speech-act”, as it allows redefining individual speech-acts as exercise of agency; while performativity as an attempt that is always in tensions and struggles with others’ such attempts. Thus, Howarth notes that post-structuralists conceptualise agency as ‘the (differentially distributed) capacity [of actors] to make a difference in the world’, however, ‘without [these actors] knowing quite what [they] are doing’. Similarly, Foucault has argued that actors ‘don’t know what they do does’. However, then Howarth contrasts this with the critical-realist understanding, where, more specifically in Bhaskar’s transformational model of human agency, ‘human beings have consciousness, intentionality and rationality’. While the overall conceptions of agency in each are different, these two particular observations are not incompatible or mutually exclusive. Through his philosophy of the act and the concept of “answerability”, Bakhtin allows us to conceive of the individual agents in terms intentionality; whereas the collective outcomes in terms of unintended consequences.

482 Ibid.
483 Ibid.
To have a relational speech act theory, we need to integrate the two levels, i.e. conceive of the speech-act as closer to the individual intentionality, while of the collective performative effects, in terms of often unintended and non-linear consequences.

Related to this is the issue of agency more broadly. Post-structuralists emphasise the ‘pre_existence of a discursive structure into which human beings are thrown into’. Broadly, this is consonant with Bakhtinian Dialogism. However, post-structuralism draws attention to this in order to show how human beings ‘become subjects’; ‘the subject is effectively “decentred”, as it is attached to a set of significant differences that position it in certain ways…the subject is marked by “the other”…[It] is effectively divided from itself, as it is mediated and forced to communicate by a signifying system over which it does not exert full control’. While the subject is still thrown into a discursive structure that predates it and over which it cannot exert full control, the focus, through Bakhtin’s philosophy of the act, and his concept of “answerability”, is on how, in an agonistic struggle, the agent intervenes and responds to what they are thrown into. While not fully antithetical to Howarth’s and Laclau and Mouffe’s conception, this explicit focus allows for a more agency-oriented approach, where agents are making intentional attempts, and allows for more focus on the struggles and contestations which in themselves must be about such intentional attempts. Hence, such emphasis is more suitable for a concern with contestations, and for a relational speech-act conception.

More specifically in relation to the application of the Austinean speech-act theory in securitisation theory, the dialogical conception of speech-act alleviates some of the issues raised by critics. Thus, it allows for a more sociological and less self-referential understanding of the utterance and its effects, thus transcending what Balzacq has called the ‘philosophical’ (or internalist) version of speech-act approach prevalent in conventional (Copenhagen School) securitisation theory. As we saw earlier, the latter has been critiqued for ascribing a ‘social magic’ power to language, bringing into life the very threats the security speech-act names. Reconceived through Dialogism, we avoid

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486 Ibid., 158: 183.
487 Ibid., 159.
488 Balzacq (2011: 1).
the unnecessary dilemma to choose between ‘either the performative effects of
the speech-act or the inter-subjective nature of security’, since such dilemma
assumes that “speech-act” cannot be intersubjective: through Bakhtin, we have
speech-act that is always intersubjective. Similarly, the dialogical vision narrows
the unnecessary “internalist”/“externalist” divide between the different versions
of speech-act approaches, whereby the ‘externalist view’ proposed by Balzacq
is a corrective that ‘connect[s] security utterances to a context’. In the
dialogical speech-act theory, an utterance is always performed, becomes
meaningful and causally efficacious within a highly relational, tension-filled and
agitated context of doings and answerability, and as the basic ontological
realism of Bakhtinian philosophy suggests, always in relation to the external
reality of other people’s intentions and utterance, other people’s doings and
“deeds upon the world”, and deeply situated in the socio-political structures and
institutions, as well as affected by and affecting material developments. Thus,
the dialogical speech-act vision also allows acknowledging and bringing into the
picture multiple audiences who are also simultaneously participating in the
dialogical process and are therefore also speakers.

While it is true, that the Austinean speech-act theory has emerged from
structural linguistics, if reworked through Mikhail Bakhtin’s Dialogism and
intertextuality as closer to Bakhtin, it can transcend both structuralist and
Western post-structuralist limitations and offer better insight into the dynamics
of discourse. Bakhtin’s dialogical conception of language and society and his
concepts such as the chronotope, and answerability/addressivity helped shed new light on the dialogical speech-act. Speech-act as re-conceived in light of
Bakhtinian philosophy, as well as the broader discourse-theoretical framework
advanced in this chapter becomes the basis for my vision of approaching
political argumentation, and in the next chapter will be shown to be indispensable particularly for understanding foreign policy/security discourses.

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489 McDonald (2008: 573). McDonald suggests that the Copenhagen School will have to make
such an either/or choice, in order to be able to incorporate the audiences into the framework.
490 Balzacq (2011: 13).
Chapter 4: A Dialogical-Relational Framework for Analysing Foreign/Security Discourse

4.1. Introduction

Building on the discussion in the previous chapters, this chapter concerns itself with the more immediate question of how contemporary Western foreign/security policy discourse must be conceived and studied. In particular, having in mind the contention made earlier that we must be attentive to the process and the relational dynamics of negotiating foreign policy/security, rather than the purportedly dominant representation alone, here I attempt to translate the dialogical conception of discourse and society – inspired by Bakhtinian thought into a discourse-analytical approach specifically developed for understanding foreign/security policy processes. It re-evaluates how specifically foreign/security discourses must be studied in a relational analysis interested in understanding unintended consequences of dialogical interactions and particularly the mechanisms of constraints in the broader dynamics of continuity and change.

It must be reminded that just as in case of the critical review in chapter 2, and the introduction of the Bakhtinian thought and the development of the dialogical speech-act in chapter 3, the development of the framework in this chapter takes a broader aim and touches upon more theoretical and analytical issues than the empirical research in Part II of this thesis has aimed or been able to address or apply in a more limited illustrative study.

I start by arguing for the usefulness of ‘temporal separability’ between agent and structure drawn from Archer’s morphogenetic approach,\(^{491}\) when tackling the thorny question of the relationship between the discursive and the non-/extra-discursive realms: consonant with Archer’s approach, the Bakhtinian conception of utterance and philosophy of the act envisages a prior-ness of structures upon which any actor’s “deed upon the world” unfolds. I then propose the category of “supra-discursive” as the realm of social and semiotic structures which have previously been constituted but at a given point in time pre-date particular agents. Temporal separability between the discursive and non-/supra-discursive, as well as between agent and structure, helps enhance the understanding how actors engage in dialogical encounters not only by

\(^{491}\) Archer (1995).
responding to each other’s utterances synchronically, but also importantly by responding to non-/supra-discursive events and developments surrounding the issue of concern and others’ responses to these, diachronically. Thus, even if cumulatively contingent, open and changeable, to each individual actor caught up in contestation, whether in government or broader society, the supra-discursive realm appears prior to their “deed” upon the world, i.e. to their answerability at each point in time.

I then explore the socio-historical context in which foreign/security discourses of Western democracies operate by drawing on philosophical insights and revisiting them through Bakhtinian conceptions of discourse and society. I do this here, before the empirical study for two reasons. On the one hand, a certain prior knowledge of the context is unavoidable for any empirical work doing discourse analysis: the researcher may have certain prior ontological assumptions implicit to his/her interpretation of various articulations, and making these explicit is an imperative for a critical analyst. On the other hand, a certain understanding of the broader social context is an imperative due to the very nature of the Bakhtinian-inspired dialogical speech-act. As we have seen, the dialogical utterance is borne out of, and operates within, a certain socio-historical context. Moreover, in this conception, a speaker, or more generally an actor, is constantly negotiating her way through a world that predates her, including through sedimented social structures, as well as the material world; but also is negotiating with such sedimented structures and material world as part of her “deed upon the world”, i.e. as a response to the world. Therefore, for a researcher to be able to interpret utterances and how they relate to one another in a highly answerable environment, certain, even if tentative, understanding of the broader context is unavoidable.

I locate the socio-historical situatedness of foreign/security discourses in the broader societal tensions and changes of the late modern age, and attempt to understand the implications of such late modern field by locating the contemporary social functions of foreign/security discourse, i.e. the roles played by the process of negotiating foreign/security policy through discourses that, rather than merely communicative or deliberative, reflect the conditions under which society and politics become organised, reproduced and transformed.

The adjective “late modern” (rather than “post-modern”) is used to refer broadly to the age of post-industrial economy and its implications including
advances in technology, information revolution, and importantly greater reflexivity, whereby ‘social practices are constantly examined and reformed in the light of incoming information about those very practices, thus constitutively altering their character.’ Instead, the adjective “post-modern” more narrowly refers to the cultural, political and intellectual tendencies within the age of late modernity that adopt, or else indirectly lead to, fragmentation and deconstruction of metanarratives and practices, as a form of critique or as part of the answerability, i.e. the Bakhtinian “deed upon the world”.

Foreign/security policy discourse may be seen as a future-orientated discourse of progress – of ‘imagining’ a collective “future” as progress, as a movement in time towards something better – caught up in the legacy of the Enlightenment drive for “mastery of nature”, and the late modern ‘risk society’s’ preoccupation with control and safety. To develop these themes, I variously draw on sociological insights, especially those offered by Giddens and Becks in relation to “reflexive modernization” and “risk society”, respectively; as well as by Dillon on the politics of security as part of the Western metaphysical tradition built on a will to certitude. In particular, official foreign/security policy discourse finds itself torn between the conflicting needs to satisfy the will to certitude, and the need to deal with the repercussions of ever more complex global uncertainties of the late modern age. Further reflecting on Giddens’ “reflexive modernization”, and in light of Bakhtinian Dialogism, I emphasise the imperative to study official discourses relationally, as inextricably linked with voices of fragmentation, destabilisation, deconstruction, or else alternative reconstructive discourses offering certitude and control.

The latter proposition is intimately linked with the need to reconceptualise the status of audiences and speakers. In contrast with securitisation theory interested in the “success” and “failure” of a securitising move and therefore of the “receptiveness” of audiences to such moves, I show that in the dialogical-relational model, the conventional speaker-audience distinction collapses, as audience is in turn speaker-performer, and vice versa. This is so because, utterances being ‘positional and interlocative’, performances are not merely

492 Giddens (1990: 38).
495 Dillon (1996).
496 Holquist (1990: 155).
“accepted” or “rejected”, but are variously responded to. These responses generate a plethora of other performances, which feed back into the dialogical process.

In a further step, I search for certain indexical indicators through which relationality among voices and continuity/change can be traced, and propose these to be the interaction of competing narrative-normative chronotopes; and the relationship among three types of relational performances: destabilising performances, deliberative performances, and silencing performances. As representational time-space matrices of narratives, narrative-normative chronotopes in foreign/security discourses mark representations of continuity, rupture, and aspirations for the future of an “imagined” nation, as well as that of an “imagined” world. Therefore, foreign/security articulations must be studied in a web of exchanges where convergent or divergent multiple chronotopes are represented and negotiated among various actors. Also, the differing properties of such chronotopes can be revealing of how these representations interact with, and aim to enact on, the actual time-space in which they are being performed or (re)circulated. On the other hand, the analytical attention to what I call “relational performances” aims to understand the positionality of utterances in relation to or effected by other utterances’ positional force. Such positionality also reflects how discursive power circulates in a field of contestation, the focus being on how power is exercised upon someone else’s utterance.

The chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 explores the context and implications of the late modern age and how this can be theorised in a framework specifically concerned with foreign/security discourses. The implications of this theorisation for the empirical study are reflected upon in section 4.3; whereas the concluding section 4.4 makes some further inferences from the overall chapter.

4.2. Dialogical-Relational Framework for Foreign/Security Discourse

Foreign/security policy discourse may be seen as a specific “genre” in the Bakhtinian sense of the term. Utterances gain meaning only as exchanges realised through “genres”: while utterances may be individual, genres for
Bakhtin are collective and historical and hence a higher level of structure. Thus, rather than merely defined by style and form, a genre, e.g. the genre of the novel for Bakhtin, was an anthropological-historical phenomenon. In the Bakhtinian sense of the term then, a certain genre is borne out of the social and performs certain social tasks, and importantly, is (re)constituted in active and constant social struggles of the given time (recall the discussion of “real-life chronotope” in chapter 3). Moreover, genres are also society’s modes and milieu of conceptualising time and space in specific ways; therefore each genre has its own (narrative) chronotope.

In this section, I argue that when studying foreign/security discourse as a genre, we must consider:

1) The relationship of the discursive to the non-discursive and supra-discursive, more specifically understanding the dependence and responsiveness of foreign/security discourses to constantly changing daily realities (to the “real-life chronotope”), i.e. events happening in the world, and to the multiplicity of others’ responses to these events.

2) The discursive and supra-discursive realms with implications for the historically and culturally specific social functions of foreign/security discourses (such as identity construction through “imagining the nation”, and interlinked with this, the construction of the narrative (and normative) chronotope, borne out of the socio-historical situatedness of foreign/security discourses);

3) The distinctiveness of actors (audiences-speakers) at home and abroad in the given socio-historical context, and their implications for the dialogical process.

Each following subsection takes these issues in turn.

4.2.1. Temporal Separability, and the Discursive vis-à-vis the Non-/Supra-Discursive

It was pointed out above, that in the dialogical conception of speech-act and more broadly in light of the Bakhtinian philosophy of the act, a speaker, or more generally an actor, is constantly negotiating her way through a world that predates her, including through sedimented social structures, as well as the

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material world; but also is negotiating with such sedimented structures and material world as part of her “deed upon the world”, i.e. as a response to the world, and hence potentially aims to change it along the way. Such Bakhtinian vision resonates with and proposes a similar understanding as Margaret Archer’s morphogenetic approach to the agent and structure problematic.\footnote{Archer (1995).} Thus, in Archer’s vision too, agent and structure are temporally separable: ‘structure necessarily pre-dates the action(s) leading to its reproduction and transformation’.\footnote{Ibid., 15.} By introducing the dimension of “time” into the picture, she critiques Giddens’ structurationist resolution to the agent/structure problem, whereby there is duality and mutual constitutiveness of structure and agency.\footnote{See especially Archer (1995: 33-135).} Archer shows that structuration theory ‘resists untangling structure and action, excepts by the bracketing exercise…[and therefore] cannot recognize that structure and agency work on different time intervals’\footnote{Ibid., 89.}.

Archer finds that endorsing “mutual constitutiveness” of agent and structure ‘preclude examination of their interplay, of the effects of one upon the other’.\footnote{Ibid., 14.} In contrast, by introducing the dimension of “time” into the picture, Archer shows how the morphogenetic approach allows conceptualising and analysing ‘the interplay between structure and agency over time and space’ (emphases added).\footnote{Ibid., 90.} She views structural properties that pre-date a certain actor/action as ‘emergent or aggregate consequences of past actions…[which] exert a causal influence upon subsequent interactions…by shaping the situations in which later “generations” of actors find themselves’.\footnote{Ibid., 66.} As she warns, then, ‘temporal separability is never to challenge the activity-dependence of structures’,\footnote{Ibid., 15.} it is rather to challenge how we view the sequencing of such activity and how much, therefore, we are ready to acknowledge the possibility of untangling the causal relationship and understanding potential mechanisms behind such relationship.

A similar resolution assuming a mutual constitutiveness, or rather, inseparability between the discursive and the non-/extra-discursive realms is one of the common approaches in discourse analysis. Thus, the school of

\footnote{Archer (1995).}
Critical Discourse Analysis, embracing Giddens’ theory of structuration and drawing on Harvey’s ‘dialectics of discourse’,\textsuperscript{507} where the relationship between discursive and non-discursive elements of social life has a cyclical character, envisages a dialectical relationship between ‘semiosis…[and] other (non-semiotic) elements of social life,…[where] non-semiotic elements are “internalised”…in semiosis and vice versa’.\textsuperscript{508} Discourses and narratives, then, have ‘non-discursive effects’, as they help modify the institutional materiality of economic, political and other systems.\textsuperscript{509} Thus, in this conception of discourse, while the social is not reduced to discourse, it is still ‘co-constituted’ by discourses (narratives, imaginaries).\textsuperscript{510}

However, by declaring the discursive and the non-discursive as “mutually constitutive”, processes and outcomes that are not or cannot be explained, run the risk of being explained away by the conceptual safe haven of “mutual constitutiveness”. Thus, importantly for our discussion, in trying to assert a non-causal relationship between identity and foreign policy, Hansen notes, that ‘[i]t is...impossible to define identity as a variable that is causally separate from foreign policy or to measure its explanatory value in competition with non-discursive material factors’\textsuperscript{511}. While she apparently uses the terms “variable”, “causally” and “measurable” in the narrow positivist sense and therefore comfortably rejects them, through it an important disservice is done to understanding the relationship between identity and other (including material, but also other sedimented social) factors affecting foreign policy outcomes. A rejection of a causal link between identity and foreign policy by Hansen, as well as by other post-structuralists, is predicated on the logic that there is no identity prior to foreign policy,\textsuperscript{512} as ‘they are simultaneously (discursive) foundation and product’.\textsuperscript{513} However, this contention leaves out of the picture the temporal distribution of foreign policy discourse and the role of actors, in this case, official foreign policy makers, who once in office, are faced with the reality of the identity of the given nation, including already dominant otherisation narratives.

\textsuperscript{507}Harvey (1996).
\textsuperscript{508}Fairclough (2005: 66). The term “semiosis” is used by Fairclough to denote discourse in the abstract, and distinguish it from “discourses” as instances of narratives.
\textsuperscript{509}Ibid., 56.
\textsuperscript{510}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{511}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{512}This also ignores identities other than in “national identity” in the strictest state-bound context: strong identities have proven to be constructed and sustained in peoples without states and hence without formal foreign policies.
\textsuperscript{513}Hansen (2006: 21).
(as a sedimented discursive/ideational structure). The latter have indeed been previously discursively created also, but not only, via previous official foreign policy-making and performance. However, these identities are prior in time to the particular agents’ being granted authority to influence them, or in the Bakhtinian idiom, to “act upon the world”, whether by changing or re-producing them.

Thus, to avoid the limitations of the “mutual constitutiveness” approach, we must acknowledge the usefulness of the temporal separability for the problematic of the discursive vis-à-vis non-/extra-discursive, as better suited for understanding the relationship between actors negotiating foreign/security policy and policy outcomes, and hence mechanisms of continuity or change. Such approach does not challenge the previous discursive constitutiveness of structures, but acknowledges that to actors these present as pre-dating their response, their act, or their “deed upon the world”.

By introducing the dimension of “time”, for the purposes of the current framework and for analytical clarity, I adopt the following conceptualisation. First, the discursive encompasses the narrower semiotic relations of meanings and of actors at a present moment in time, or at a moment isolated for analysis. Second, although the material is not restricted to brute facts alone, the non-discursive is conceived as comprising the brute material facts, such as geography, natural disasters, absence or presence of natural resources, etc. Calling these “non-discursive” does not mean they cannot or are not variously and contradictorily given meaning by social actors: it rather means that they exist independently of these meanings at any given moment; and these meanings given to them are not the only way through which brute facts can “matter”. Finally, the term supra-discursive is used to denote the multiplicity of social and semiotic structures, which in the given temporal point in time of analysis have already been reified or are already emerging. This does not mean that they themselves have not previously been constituted through socio-discursive interactions: it rather means that they are already “out there” and have acquired a certain “materiality” of their own, and thus at the given moment

515 Indeed, e.g. raw material resources can be reduced as an effect of such social meanings and consequent actions of extracting and consuming, but at any fixed moment in time, they are brute materialities.
516 For example, a tsunami can cause collapse of life-sustaining structures and change the socio-economic dynamics in a region even before it has been given meaning.
in time *pre-date* the actors involved, as well as the actions in the narrower discursive negotiation over an issue. Hence, I make the choice of the prefix “supra”, rather than “extra”, to denote dependence of this realm on the discursive, however also to denote a prior emergence in relation to the present moment and hence a different status for the narrowly discursive processes, as well as for the analysis of these processes. For instance, the institution of the state, the capitalist world economy, international institutions, etc., as well as parliamentary democracy as an institution allowing deliberations over security in certain way rather than other, would all fall into this category. So would semiotic structures, such as presently dominant national identity narratives, global norm discourses, or past and often already historicised narratives of previous foreign/security policies, e.g. over the East-West Cold War rivalry, against which a current discursive contestation over, e.g., Russia-the West relations may take place today. In other words, current actors encounter the *prior*-ness of these (both social and semiotic) structures.

4.2.2. Foreign/Security Policy in the Age of Late Modernity

To understand the supra-discursive field, where the discursive contestations over foreign/security policies take place, involves exploring its socio-historical context. Even if cumulatively contingent, open and changeable, to each individual actor caught up in contestation, whether in government or broader society, the supra-discursive realm appears prior to their “deed” upon the world, i.e. to their answerability at each point in time. The emphasis on the socio-historical context and the “priorness” of material, social and semiotic structures for actors is importantly related to the Bakhtinian emphasis on the social situatedness of the living utterance, i.e. in the contention that any utterance gains meaning and may be causally efficacious only relationally with other utterances and importantly only as a moment in the broader societal and social dynamics and epochal changes. In this light then, for us the socio-historical situatedness means the implications of the present age and the broader societal tensions and changes of the age on foreign/security discourses in Western democracies. Thus, we will see that the reality of late modernity, the historically congealed forms of “imagining” nationhood and statehood have such priorness, and even if constituted through discourse, are out there to be dealt with by actors variously contesting foreign/security policy.
As we saw in the critical review in chapter 2, implicitly ascribing a certain social functionality to foreign/security policy discourses, indeed, runs through the work of post-structuralist IR concerned with national security and identity building. Most prominently, Ashley and more famously Campbell have dubbed foreign policy ‘a specific sort of boundary-producing political performance’. However, as we saw, these theorisations have mostly been limited to a pre-occupation with “otherising” processes in identity construction, i.e. ‘the act by which difference is constituted as an inferior other’, and consequently to the ‘boundary-producing’ function of foreign policy.

The social functions of foreign/security policy discourse are not, and analytically cannot be reduced to identity construction through mere otherising practices, although otherising discourses may indeed form an important part of such identity construction in the given cultural and political context of late modern foreign/security policy. Rather, the latter should be considered within the broader socio-political context shaping contemporary Western foreign/security discourse and policy.

Drawing on recent sociological and philosophical insights, I propose a tentative insight to be further explored through the empirical study: foreign/security policy discourse in late modern Western societies may be seen as a predominantly future-orientated discourse of progress. Indeed, the legacy of the Enlightenment age lives on in foreign/security discourses in the form of “imagining” a collective “future” as progress, as a movement in time towards something better, thus promising rational planning, managing and controlling this future. On the one hand, this may be seen as the late modern extension of Enlightenment’s drive for “mastery of nature”, aimed ‘at liberating men from fear and establishing their sovereignty’. On the other hand, it may be seen as part of late modern ‘risk society’s’ preoccupation with control and safety. As Giddens explains, Ulrich Beck’s concept of “risk society” describes “a society...”

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519 Campbell (1998).
520 Here, I refer to Benedict Anderson’s concept of ‘imagined communities’, whereby a nation is ‘an imagined political community’. This does not mean to claim that a nation is not real, or that its constitution is volatile. It rather means that individuals of a community have no other form of coming to contact with the totality of their community, other than by imagining it through storytelling. Anderson (2006: 7).
where we increasingly live on a high technological frontier which absolutely no one completely understands and which generates a diversity of possible futures. He goes on to explain the origin of the term “risk”, with important implications:

Life in the Middle Ages was hazardous; but there was no notion of risk and there doesn’t seem in fact to be a notion of risk in any traditional culture. The reason for this is that dangers are experienced as given. Either they come from God, or they come simply from a world which one takes for granted. The idea of risk is bound up with the aspiration to control and particularly with the idea of controlling the future... The idea of “risk society” might suggest a world which has become more hazardous, but this is not necessarily so. Rather, it is a society increasingly preoccupied with the future (and also with safety), which generates the notion of risk... The word refers to a world which we are both exploring and seeking to normalise and control (emphases added).

By extension, contemporary Western liberal democracies’ promise of planning, managing and controlling the national “future” through foreign/security policy is dependent on, and responding to, the primal angst of death, more generally, and the “risk society’s” fear of immediate, perceived or real, risks to their livelihoods and to their unhindered participation in the late modern system, more specifically. Examples of inducing such fear are terrorism, immigration, obstruction to flow of resources, such as oil/gas, etc.

Giddens, drawing on Beck, further distinguishes between ‘external risk’ and ‘manufactured risk’. External risks, prevalent in the industrial (early modern) age, ‘happen[ed] regularly enough and often enough in a whole population of people to be broadly predictable, and so insurable’ – through the private insurance company, or through public insurance by the welfare state. By contrast, what Giddens calls ‘manufactured risk’ (the term not used to indicate fabrication or falseness) ‘is risk created by the very progression of human development, especially by the progression of science and technology’. He further explains: ‘[m]anufactured risk refers to new risk environments for which history provides us with very little previous experience.

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523 Giddens (1999: 3).
524 Ibid.
525 Here, I reflect Heidegger’s distinction between “fear” and “angst”, whereby fear is a state-of-mind directed at something specific in the world, whereas angst is a mood about the world as a whole, the search to secure ourselves from our own unavoidable mortality. John Tietz, An Outline and Study Guide to Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time (Humanities Online, 2001), https://ssl.humanities-online.de/download/Tietz_Heidegger_ccl.pdf
527 Ibid.
528 Ibid.
We often don’t really know what the risks are, let alone how to calculate them accurately in terms of probability tables’.\textsuperscript{529}

In this regard, foreign/security policy may be seen as caught up in an anxiety to (re)claim the role of providing insurance – as an extension of the industrial welfare state – from global uncertainties often narrated as “external risks”,\textsuperscript{530} when the reality of “manufactured risks” is constantly undermining the claim to such capacity of the state. For foreign/security policy, “manufactured risks” would importantly also include risks coming from global events and situations potentially caused or exacerbated by the previous foreign/security policies of the very same state under scrutiny. For example, at the moment of writing (June 2014), the British officials and public are debating whether the recent military success of ISIS, an al-Qaeda affiliated force, in taking control of large parts of Iraq, and the subsequent civil war have been causally related to the 2003 UK and US war in Iraq. Stances and reactions in this debate interestingly illustrate both the anxiety and the lack of capacity of the state to provide any insurance against such risk. Thus, presented with the unpredictability of the further development of an event and the incalculability of its effects, the official stance may distance itself by presenting the risk as “external” (e.g. by distancing itself from culpability), and give assurances of manageability and control when confronted with the reverberations of the given event for national “interest” or “responsibility”.\textsuperscript{531}

This may be seen as the manifestation of the intrinsic dependability of “security” to “knowledge” and “certitude”, or as Dillon puts it, ‘the alliance of security and knowledge, so characteristic of modern (inter)national politics’.\textsuperscript{532}

Drawing on Nietzsche and the ‘connection between the will to know and the will

\textsuperscript{529} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{530} Indeed, opposite trends can be discerned also in the official discourses of the past few years: especially in financial crisis and post-crisis years, there is increasingly more representation of “global uncertainty” and therefore of “unpredictability”. Nonetheless, these are sparingly juxtaposed with the still dominant discourses of control, solution and promises of progress. In another study, it would be interesting to compare and trace how discourses of “certainty and control” configure with discourses of “uncertainty and unpredictability”.


\textsuperscript{532} Dillon (1996: 17).
to secure’, Dillon draws our attention to, and problematises, ‘security as knowledge (certainty); security’s reliance upon knowledge (surveillance); security’s astonishing production of knowledge in response to its will to know (calculability); and the claim of knowledge which gives security its licence to render all aspects of life transparent’ (totality). More broadly, Dillon links modern security to the tradition of Western metaphysical thought of looking for certitude and securing “truth” itself, and the late modern technologised tradition of turning “truth” into “correctness” and continuing to provide for “certitude” by making everything calculable. In simple terms, this is the dominant mode of doing politics. However, this official anxiety to practice and satisfy/provide for what may be called the “will to certitude” is taking place at the backdrop of ever-expanding manufactured risks which ‘create few direct lines…, only a plurality of “future scenarios”’. In this relation, the function of the official foreign/security discourse and policy is also the containment/disciplining of this plurality of possible future scenarios derived from complexity and contingency, whilst it provides for certitude, predictability and manageability. More broadly then, foreign/security discourse is the organised social practice of selectively circumscribing uncertainty. Just as the function of the ego is to misrecognise ‘the impossibility of fullness [through] the illusion of closure’, the function of the modern state is ‘to exterminate ambivalence: ‘to define precisely – and to eliminate everything that could not or would not be precisely defined’.

Such discourse of progress and promise of a better future, in the contemporary West, especially the US and the UK, is best manifested in the liberal promise of containing “evil”, and of a democratised and hence more peaceful world, resting on an almost blind ‘faith in technology’, as well as faith in expert knowledge, that promises ‘technical fixes’ for every problem. Thus, what Campbell refers to as the ‘responsibility for combating evil’ and the

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533 Ibid.
534 Ibid, see esp. chapter 1, 12-35.
subsequent temptation of otherising\textsuperscript{540} may be seen as only part of the much larger ‘modernist requirements of order and stability’\textsuperscript{541} Also, as a manifestation of the will to certitude, it indicates what Giddens would have referred to as the as-yet-unrealised possibility of opening up to a new form of politics that would admit the limitations of addressing contemporary global (mostly, manufactured) risks through the limited prism of external risk and linear (old) modernisation.\textsuperscript{542}

Foreign/security policy discourse is best placed to tell stories of emancipation\textsuperscript{543} and progress to national collectives: while such stories are constituted through multiple channels, including art, literature, film, the academia, economic practices, etc., foreign/security policy discourse is in a special position to offer official and unified stories of imagining of the nation by locating the latter temporally and spatially in the global arena. Moreover, an official discourse requiring closure and singularity in order to circumscribe the uncertainty of a complex world and provide certitude and assurance for external and manufactured risks, the neo-liberal story of “promise” of a fix for every problem and of universal progress can be argued to be the meta-narrative foundation for a contemporary Western democratic foreign/security policy.

However, the implications of what Giddens calls ‘reflexive modernization’ are especially important for a relational and dialogical approach. Thus,

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\text{[R]eflexive modernisation implies coming to terms with the limits and contradictions of the modern order. These are obvious in new domains of politics associated with various sorts of social movements... Second-phase modernisation - modernisation as reflexive modernisation - ...offers many possibilities for positive political engagement. ...[if] brought more directly [i.e. through party politics] into the political arena}.\textsuperscript{544}
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Therefore, we must also consider processes opposite to, and undermining, the official foreign/security policy tendency to satisfy the will to certitude, or else attempting alternative ways of satisfying such certitude. Thus, while ‘the prophets of neo-liberalism [have been]... ‘rejoic[ing] in the security and progress promised by the age of Enlightenment’,\textsuperscript{545} intellectuals, cultural and literary figures, as well as civil activists have been expressing discontent and disbelief

\textsuperscript{540} Campbell (1996: 163).
\textsuperscript{541} Campbell (1998: 81).
\textsuperscript{542} Giddens (1999: 6-8).
\textsuperscript{544} Giddens (1999: 6).
\textsuperscript{545} Lacy (2005: 9-10).
towards the Enlightenment meta-narrative, as well as pessimism as to how much disaster and problems caused by the drive for progress can be fixed by the same technological advances that have caused them. In this light, then, as well as in light of the above critique of the post-structuralist pre-occupation with otherising, indispensable from analysing the heteroglot field of negotiating foreign policy and security, a study of foreign/security policy discourse must be attentive not only to conflicting alternative otherisations and less-/non-otherising voices, but also importantly to voices that are critiquing and deconstructing the very otherising narratives, as well as more broadly the dominant practices of satisfying certitude through claiming control and manageability.

In these opposite trends, we are witnessing Bakhtinian centripetal and centrifugal (monological and dialogical) forces at play. On the one hand, we have the continual and persistent hegemonisation of the neo-liberal narrative of promise, facilitated by modern advances, including through what has been termed as ‘imagology’, as well as through an ‘aestheticisation of politics’. On the other hand, however, images and information are now ‘deterritorialised’ due to the proliferation and diversification of their producers. The latter has been recognised as having created a ‘system leakage’, and an ‘excess of information’: ‘[e]xcess in both the sense that information society circulates excessive images, information and ideas (pictures of torture in Abu Graib, beheadings on the internet,...[etc.]) but also excess in terms of the images/information/capital that exceed the ability of the organs of the state to control and manage’. This excess, as Lacy notes, ‘leads to strategies of re-territorialisation to attempt to contain [it], ... strategies that attempt to (re)code

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546 “Imagology” is novelist Milan Kundera’s term used in his Immortality to describe a reality that has come to replace the age of ideology, and is adopted by Lacy (2005: 1). Also see Der Derian’s various writing.
547 Thus, through mass produced artefacts and products, we as consumers have been ‘seduce[d]...into desiring the collective identities provided by the state, the goods on offer in the market place and the projects for delivering us from the state of emergency offered by the military-scientific-complex...We learn to desire that which limits our freedom, limits our possibilities for living a less insecure existence’. Lacy (2005: 5).
548 Thus, as Lacy notes, anyone can produce and circulate images, which is itself the effect of the neoliberal project of deterritorialised society which depends on a deterritorialised flow of bodies, goods, money, information and ideas. Ibid., 9.
549 Deleuze, as quoted in ibid.
contemporary economic and military developments as the route to freedom and enlightenment (emphases added).\textsuperscript{551}

In this light then, the official foreign/security discourse of a contemporary liberal-democratic state may be seen as representing a tension between the need to continue projecting the promise of progress of the Enlightenment and the assurance of certainty, on the one hand, and the need to engage variously with the plurality of other voices, on the other. The latter may be voices destabilizing such a project, or variously expressing discontent/disbelief meant to altogether abandon any metanarrative of progress, or else to offer alternative solutions to the task of re-territorialisation. In other words, on the one hand, the official narrative is attempting to re-territorialise and recode this excess (including but not only, into simple monologising formulae such as “us/them, either/or”); and on the other hand, such re-territorialisation or recoding cannot be tenable without dialogically being answerable to and addressing the multiplicity of other voices.

This tension, in turn, reflects a more specific paradox of late modernity in relation to security. On the one hand, the state is still bound up in the Modernist promise of combating evil and hence strives for maximum monology and singularity for state identity based on security narratives; on the other hand, it is in great tension with the late modern self-reflexive society, as well as post-modernist deconstructive tendencies: it cannot achieve its task without engaging with/responding to the heteroglot discursive field characterised by publics that are increasingly more critical and self-reflexive,\textsuperscript{552} as well as more deconstructive of discourses of danger built on defilement as the basis for national identity.

Understanding such late modern heteroglot discursive field, in light of Giddens’ “reflexive modernization” requires also acknowledging the effect of second-order discursive-interpretive practices – including the practice of social scientists, as well as of public intellectuals more broadly – on first-order practices of social actors.\textsuperscript{553} Thus, Giddens has noted: ‘[t]he discourse of sociology, and the concepts, theories and findings of the other social sciences

\textsuperscript{551} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{552} See for example, Beck, on self-critical society; Lash on self-reflexivity of agency, as well as Giddens on subjects having learned to think sociologically. Beck (1996); S. Lash, ‘Reflexivity and its doubles: structure, aesthetics, community’, in Beck et.al. (1994); Giddens (1990).
\textsuperscript{553} Delanty, Gerard, Social Science: Beyond Realism and Constructivism (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1997).
continually “circulate in and out” of what it is that they are about. In so doing, they reflexively restructure their subject matter which itself has learned to think sociologically’ (emphasis added). In a more Bakhtinian vision, we may say that these concepts, theories and findings enter into a dialogical relationship with the voices competing in the political field, i.e. enter into, and potentially affect, the agora, the public sphere. One striking example is illuminating: symbolized by major texts, for example, Edward Said’s ground-breaking Orientalism, the critique of otherisation, has become an unavoidable part of contesting security. Indeed, often the first task of a critical voice in a Western society has become to demystify self-other dichotomies, and deconstruct binaries, to which the official representative is answerable in a more complex relationship. Thus, intellectual practices deconstructing otherising have not only made simple official re-territorialisations more difficult, but have penetrated and changed the dialogical sphere of contesting foreign policy and security.

Furthermore, foreign/security discourse is unavoidably built on and performs the task of contesting, (re)producing or transforming major global normative structures, negotiating global norms -- “imagining” global politics in dialogue and tension with home and global others’ foreign/security discourses and practices, thus attempting to organise international politics through structuring global interaction. For example, and primarily, at a time when the status of states is more forcefully being challenged by social actors such as transnational social movements, as well as importantly by the very same social scientists and intellectuals claiming such change, foreign/security policy discourse is the primary site where resisting change by reinstating and asserting “sovereignty” as the organising institution of the international takes place. In order to sustain itself, the historically specific institution of sovereignty needs to be constantly performed, and as Campbell has noted, primarily through foreign/security policy discourses and practices. However, importantly and once again, this is done through resisting opposite forces, and in dialogue with other such foreign/security discourses on the global arena. In other words, again, this is not, and cannot, be a monological endeavour, as the

554 Giddens (1990: 43).
555 Cf. Neumann, who brings the example of Said’s Orientalism, to demonstrate that a single text in itself can and has arguably transformed thinking. Neumann (1999).
official discourse has to engage, and in the Mouffean sense, is in agonism with pluralising, fragmenting and alternative voices within the society and globally – whether through accommodation, intertextual readjustment, silencing, or some other form of engagement.

In light of the above discussion, then, and in light of the critique of the representational model in chapter 2, it must be acknowledged that – at any point being at the intersection of conflicting forces and torn between the needs of a balancing act, and therefore constantly changing while being constrained – foreign/security discourse cannot be located and studied in any clear-cut “narrative” fixed in time, and moreover, policy cannot be deduced as the result of any straightforwardly identifiable narrative or representation that has in a linear manner produced or made possible the said policy. However, before I further discuss the implications of the above discussion for empirical work, I now briefly turn to conceptualising audiences in the above-presented context of late modernity and in light of Bakhtinian answerability.

4.2.3. Answerability and Audiences-Turned-Speakers

The attention to socio-historical situatedness of foreign/security policy discourse necessitates revisiting the concept of audiences and their place in negotiating security. Indeed, knowledge society, excess of information, as well as the tensions and conflicting forces discussed above constitute the audiences of foreign/security discourse, and define the heteroglot field where voices competing for primacy in negotiating security interact, clash, challenge, accommodate or silence one another. Not engaging with this would undermine the understanding of the dialogicity of foreign/security policy, and its implications for policy continuity or change.

Distinct from the conceptualisations of audiences offered by securitization theory and some of their advanced/later re-articulations, as well as their critique, I will argue that the distinction between speaker (security actor) and audience (receiver) often collapses, and needs a re-evaluation, in light of the dialogical-relational model advanced above. I will also argue that in the presence of multiplicity of “audiences” – home/international, various segments within these – the Copenhagen School adoption of Austinean speech-act theory is not adequate, as no foreign/security speech-act can have one illocutionary force or one unified and pre-defined audience. (To remind, by foreign/security
speech-act I do not mean one specific and all-defining speech-act of securitisation that brings about a threat: instead, potentially any articulation in the dialogical process of negotiating security is a speech-act).

In his evaluation of securitization theories, Balzacq notes different conceptions of audiences in what he distinguishes as the ‘philosophical’ vs. ‘sociological’ securitization theories.\textsuperscript{558} Thus, while in the philosophical view, the audience is ‘a formal – given – category, which is often poised in a receptive mode’, in the sociological view, it ‘is not necessarily a fully constituted entity…but an emergent category’.\textsuperscript{559} Thus, critiquing the philosophical view, a number of scholars have argued for ‘disaggregating the audience, as different audiences are receptive to different kinds of arguments, and have distinct types of power’,\textsuperscript{560} as well as for recognising the diversity of audiences (popular, elite, technocratic and scientific) and hence the ‘variability of securitizing moves’.\textsuperscript{561} Nonetheless, these critics still see the audiences as (even if varied) receivers, rather than part of a relational interaction, even when calling for an intersubjective view.\textsuperscript{562} The reason for this is that their primary aim in exploring audiences is to establish whether the ‘securitizing move’ has been a success or a failure, whether it has been ‘accepted or rejected’.\textsuperscript{563} To recall the conception of the dialogical speech-act advanced in chapter 2, intentions are always caught up in tensions in an agitated field of struggle: they are ‘positional and interlocative’,\textsuperscript{564} i.e. always positioned in relation to others’ intentions in the same space, as well as positioned in time, and in tension with own and others’ – actual or anticipated – intentions in the past, as well as the future. Hence, in the dialogical-relational model interested in various speech-acts, rather than particular securitizing moves, performances are not merely “accepted” or “rejected” by audiences, but are variously responded to, generating a plethora of other performances, other speech-acts. The latter feed back into the

\textsuperscript{558} Balzacq (2011: 2).
\textsuperscript{559} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{560} Ibid., 7.
\textsuperscript{561} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{562} E.g., calling for an intersubjective view of audiences, where the audiences have emotions, ideals and values to which the securitizing actor must refer, nonetheless Balzacq is concerned with whether the audiences are ‘ripe for persuasion’, or not. In addition, the historical example to illustrate this is taken from centuries ago, which is not adequate for evaluating today’s audiences. Even when accepting that securitizing actors and audiences are often ‘blurred’, Balzacq is referring to blurring through practices (e.g. of professionals enacting policy through various formal tools), rather than to negotiating meanings. Balzacq (2011: 14-15).
\textsuperscript{563} Ibid., 8.
\textsuperscript{564} Holquist (1990: 155).
dialogical process, creating new tensions and new discursive realities, to which
the initial security “performer” in turn becomes answerable and is forced to
respond. In this light then, the conventional speaker-audience distinction
collapses, as audience is in turn speaker-performer, and vice versa.

Indeed, my interest is not in individual securitizing moves and their
“success/failure” at a point in time, but rather in the processes of
foreign/security discourses and their dynamics over time. Also, to reiterate, my
primary concern and theoretical and empirical interest is not in the point of
emergence of a (purportedly) dominant discourse, but rather in what comes
after such emergence. Rather than “success/failure”, what I am interested in is
the outcome of further discursive interactions around a certain discursive
formation, as well as continuity/change, slowed down/constrained change being
such outcome. I purport, that such outcomes are not necessarily linearly
dependent on one specific and intentional act or “move”, but rather emerge as
an unintended and often unanticipated consequence of dialogical contestations.
Hence, I am interested in audiences in order to better understand the dialogical
process, and its implications for constraints, continuity and change.

Considering the above, I understand audiences and their relational role
in the speech performances of foreign/security discourse as follows. In light of
the dialogical speech-act and Bakhtinian answerability, we must acknowledge
multiple segments of audiences intended by one and the same utterance, as
well as those not intended/anticipated by the utterer. This is particularly salient
in case of official foreign policy discourse: given the spread of communication
technologies and almost unrestricted access to publicly available information,
utterances may disseminate into the discursive domain without the initiators
being in immediate control as to what specific audience they reach and what
illocution they transmit. Recalling the discussion of hypertextuality of
contemporary communication in chapter 2, it may be argued that a
foreign/security performance – by official articulators as well as various
audience-speakers – is potentially linked up to the ‘docuverse’\textsuperscript{565} of today’s
information sphere, producing a non-linear foreign/security policy text, i.e.
having multiple entry points and multiple routes of activation/progression. By
“docuverse”, I mean a hyperlinked semiotic sphere not necessarily technically
located in the internet.

\textsuperscript{565} Landow (1997: 25).
The foreign/security policy utterance, being inescapably hypertextually linked to the “docuverse” of other utterances, increases the possibility for scrutiny, critique and probing of foreign/security claims by various audience-speakers. This potentially makes the locating of an official utterance in the metatext of the public domain, and making responsive performances answering past and future related utterances the imperative of the profession of official foreign/security speech writers and key official foreign/security policy interlocutors. In turn, it hypothetically increases the multiplicity of tasks and intended illocutions simultaneously attached to certain foreign policy speeches, statements, and other public texts.

In these dialogical relations, multiplicity of foreign/security policy speakers-audiences and audiences-speakers variously participate – political peers (in parliament within own party and across parties; in government, etc.); dissident rivals (social movements, NGOs); agents in the media (including in the mainstream, and traditional forms, as well as the alternative e-media, such as blogs, etc.); intellectuals (including through both narrowly scholarly work, as well as through public-intellectual involvement); as well as various segments in the broader public distinguished by class, race/origin, religion, etc., through lay rationalisations. Even when methodologically it is near-impossible to trace every utterance in this web of responsive exchanges and locate their specific multiple intended and unintended illocutions, the utterances they might be answering to, and eventually the effects of these on policy outcomes, we must acknowledge and be attentive to the reality of audiences-turned-into-speakers, i.e. the relational character of performativity and the resultant non-linear and complex routes that produce outcomes out of dialogic relations.

Furthermore, recalling Bakhtinian philosophy of the act and answerability, actors not only respond to each other’s utterances in a synchronic and static closed field, but also crucially respond to changing non-discursive and supra-discursive realities and others’ responses to these, in a diachronic open system. Following a conceptual distinction already made in chapter 2 between “real-life chronotope” and “narrative (representational) chronotope”, here we must consider the dependence and responsiveness of foreign/security discourses to constantly changing daily realities, i.e. to the events happening in the world, and to the multiplicity of others’ responses to these events. Indeed, foreign/security policy discourse constantly “encounters” and is put pressure on/challenged, or
else facilitated by, the changing daily realities, including those potentially produced or facilitated as a result of the implementation of the earlier policies legitimised through the given narrative. These events and developments, as they enter the public domain through the news, alternative discourses, etc., need to be engaged with, responded to, incorporated in the official and alternative narratives, or the narratives may need to be amended. For instance, we must consider how the revelations about prisoner tortures in Abu Ghraib and Guantánamo, or how material changes and developments on the ground in Afghanistan and Iraq have affected the course of the contestation and deliberations at home. Considering this will help better capture the relationship of the discursive to the non-discursive and supra-discursive, as it seeks to understand how foreign/security discourses respond to events, as well as others’ interpretations of those events, happening in real time, and how the real-life chronotope acts as a constant challenge to the narrative (representational) chronotope embedded in the discourse, where the nation’s identity – past, present, and future – is inscribed.

4.3. Analytical Tools for the Dialogical-Relational Model

In order to apply the above theoretical framework and its implications for data selection to an empirical study interested in a dialogical-relational analysis, we need a certain discourse-analytical model specifically for this project to guide through a study that relationally traces how narrative structures interact and change. For this purpose, I look for certain indexical indicators through which relationality among voices and continuity/change can be traced. Thus, this section turns to the question of identifying heuristic models for an empirical analysis to help us trace the dialogical interactions of all these voices in the socio-historical context laid out above, and thus deduce longer term patterns and mechanisms. These are proposed to be a) interaction of competing narrative-normative chronotopes; and b) the relationship among relational performatives such as destabilising performative, deliberative performatives, and silencing performatives, the latter not being an exhaustive list. I will take these in turn.
4.3.1. Narrative-Normative Chronotopes

As already suggested, contemporary Western foreign/security policy discourses are constituted through conceptions and transmissions of social temporality. In order to trace such temporalities in the official narratives, as well as, relationally, in the alternative/counter-narratives, and come closer to locating the implications of such relational temporalities on contesting security, I adopt and develop the Bakhtinian concept of the *chronotope*, which has already been discussed at length in chapter 3 as part of conceptualising dialogical speech-act, as well as referred to above in this chapter in relation to “real-life chronotope”. To remind, in chapter 3 I proposed, that the Bakhtinian category of “chronotope” can be used at two levels: as a hermeneutical device tracing the structuring of a representation and a narrative, on the one hand, and as ‘a means for studying the relation between any text and its times’, 566 i.e. the “real-life chronotope”, on the other. I referred to the latter in the previous section; whereas here I am concerned with assessing how the former, i.e. the narrative (representational) chronotope may be a useful analytical tool for unpacking narrative structures in a dialogical analysis.

Just as for Bakhtin chronotopes structure representations and are ‘the organizing centers for the fundamental narrative events of the novel’, 567 the significance of narrative chronotopes in foreign/security discourses is that they mark representations of continuity, rupture, and aspirations for the future of an “imagined” nation as well as that of an “imagined” world.

Indeed, the theme of temporality is integral to discussions of identity. As Onuf reminds, ‘[t]he speaking self is a fully social self only as a *storied self*: telling is the means to compensate for the experience of memories often being fragmented, inconsistent and distorted, a means to bring order ‘by forming encounters into episodes, and the sequence of events into a plot – a sequence of relations’. 568 Story-telling is a means to bring order ‘by forming encounters into *episodes*, and the sequence of events into a *plot* – a sequence of relations’, and a means to manage memory through the ‘construction of a

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566 Holquist (1990: 113).
coherent past and the projection of a plausible future. In a similar vein, social psychologists remind that for collectives, ‘historical imagination does not just stretch backwards to the past, but also forwards to the future’. In other words, individuals in a community constructed as a nation imagine themselves through a narrative where they are moving together in time. This, according to Anderson, allows them to satisfy their concern with immortality: we are linked to people (i.e. “heroes”) who died before us, therefore share their glory; and we will be part of those generations to come after us, thereby ensuring our immortality.

Exploring this gaze backwards as well as forwards in the continuum of time may be illuminating in understanding the dialogically constructed national identity through official foreign/security policy discourse. However, in light of the discussion in the previous section, I am not merely interested in this temporal construction of social time as it may supposedly be found in an official or dominant narrative monologically produced, coherent and fixed in time; but rather in how, relationally, various temporalities and “imaginings” of national “pasts”, “presents” and “futures” relate, respond to and change or constrain one another over time. Moreover, I am interested in how narrative chronotopes project and contest “imaginings” of global politics and global “futures” and hence the nation’s place in it, through normative/axiological constructions.

It may be suggested that the tension between monologising and dialogising forces is present in the chronotopicity of foreign/security policy discourse: on the one hand, by tradition and genre, foreign/security policy articulations gravitate towards a chronotope similar to one identified by Bakhtin in the epic genre, that of the ‘absolute past’. Even in a democratic society, official foreign policy discourse may be said to have the monologising characteristics of the authoritative discourse described by Bakhtin, namely the ‘epic style’. In a constant quest for simplification and certitude, official foreign policy discourse requires consistent monologising, often through the creation and re-creation of the authoritative voice of the “father”, of a certain stability of

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569 Ibid., 92-93.
573 Ibid.
meaning, of certain permanence, which strives to acquire a dominant status. Thus, Bakhtin describes:

The world of the epic is the national heroic past: it is a world of “beginnings” and “peak times” in the national history… a world of “firsts” and “bests”… the represented world… stands on an utterly different and inaccessible time-and-value plane, separated by epic distance. The space between them is filled with national tradition… The absolute past is a specifically evaluating (hierarchical) category. In the epic world view, “beginning”, “first”, “founder”, “ancestor”, “that which occurred earlier” and so forth are not merely temporal categories but valorized temporal categories, and valorized to an extreme degree (emphasis in the original).

However, this monologising chronotope, potentially in varying degrees present in different foreign/security discourses, is in great tension with dialogising forces – other chronotopes, such as the transformational one, where multiple routes to transformation are competing. In these, the “future” may be represented as a transcendence of the “past”, or the epic “past” itself is re-interpreted/re-coded through new events in the present, constantly open to challenge and subversion. Even when re-inscribing the “epic” chronotope, interlocutors participating in negotiating foreign/security policy are bound up in this web of competing alternative chronotopes and have to dialogically engage with them. Moreover, they are under pressure from the developments/changes in the non-discursive and supra-discursive realms to which they have to respond.

Thus, foreign/security policy discourse is a field where the epic identity of the nation – represented as remaining the same in spite of challenges and threats to its existence – encounters constant challenges and pressures from present-time normative structures, heteroglot voices of the internal others, as well as external developments that demand narrative adjustments or reinterpretations, and material (and often urgent) responses. Hence, they may selectively and opportunistically employ the “transformational” chronotope, where the nation transforms into a “better” version of itself, whether by a re-evaluation of the “past” (e.g. the US discourse is often organised around re-evaluating and challenging each other on grounds of whose interpretation of the Founding Fathers’ texts is more accurate and hence guiding), or by a rejection

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574 It is probable that the epic tale historically unifying communities through identity constructions, and often called upon by leaders at crises times, e.g. in battle cries, has been the prototype of today’s foreign/security policy speeches. While to establish this, perhaps, a full genealogical study is required, it is still hard to miss that some of today’s foreign/security policy articulations echo epic tale elements by constructing a “past” of forefathers as a Golden age that needs to be returned to.

of a certain historical moment in the “past” (as contemporary Germany with regards to its Nazi past).

Thus, foreign policy discourse is necessarily located at the intersection of the epic past of the forefathers in building identity, as well as the world of the present, and the projection of competing “futures”. Moreover, it is necessarily axiologically charged and hence normative, since time-space representations cannot escape being value-laden. Thus, narrative “pasts” are often marked with great degree of emotional charge, and “futures” are marked by normative promises and prescriptions, whereas the “present” may be said to be representing the modernist ideal situation of knowledge, evaluation and control/action. Furthermore, relating this to the socio-historical situatedness of foreign/security discourses of contemporary Western democracies, and the implications of the late modern society discussed above, we may suggest that such discourse is always torn between the need for certainty and future-orientedness (with a strong element of a promise of “managing” and “controlling” the “future”, even in times of great uncertainly), and therefore, projecting a linear sense of time-space of “progress”, on the one hand, and the need to be answerable to destabilising and deconstructive voices (who inhabit starkly different chronotopes, or shatter the sense of chronotope itself), on the other.

Such narrative chronotopes must be seen as embedded in the Bakhtinian agonistic environment of tension and struggle, and in the Laclau and Mouffean vision of agents’ constant attempts towards fixation of meaning and suture of the social field through constructions of “myths” and “imaginaries”, despite the ontological impossibility of final fixation and closure. Hence, chronotope may be said to be a medium – one of the semiotic/symbolic means of sense making – for myths, where myths seek to ‘repair the dislocations…’,\textsuperscript{576} and construct new imaginaries that would hegemonise the field of contestation.

Hence, a framework seeking to understand the relationality of various competing constructions of identity set in narratives of national beginning, and aspirations, incorporates the study of these competing chronotopes and how they put pressure on, respond to and change or constrain one another over time. On the other hand, it would involve tracing how the multiplicity of voices react to the developments and changes in the non-supra-discursive realm

\textsuperscript{576} Howarth (2013: 163).
through reproductions and/or modifications of various narrative chronotopes, and how they project possible “futures” as a way of negotiating their way through the material changes, and through the competing interpretations of those changes.

Indeed, the real-life chronotope acts as a constant challenge to the representational narrative chronotope embedded in the discourse, where the nation’s identity – “past”, “present”, and “future” – is inscribed. The present of the real-life chronotope is a challenge to the “past” and importantly the “future” of the nation. Hence, in order to evaluate how narrative-normative chronotopes compete and affect actual policies and their continuation or change, and thus enact material consequences, we must be attentive to how these narrative-normative chronotopes respond to external material changes, as well as how they project possible “futures” as a way of response, as a way of negotiating their way through the material changes and the competing interpretations of those changes.

4.3.2. Relational Performatives

Narratives, and therefore narrative-normative chronotopes, are constructed and reproduced, as well as challenged through specific speech-acts – a multiplicity of competing and responding performative acts. While all performatives acquire meaning relationally, here I introduce the category “relational performatives” to indicate analytical attention to the broader positionality of the utterance in relation to, in response to, in reaction to, or else effected by, other utterances’ positional force. Such positionality also reflects how discursive power circulates in a field of contestation: to extend the Austinian idiom, here the focus is not only on “how to do things with words”, i.e. how to do something in or by saying something, but rather on “how to do things to others’ words”, i.e. what power is exercised upon someone else’s utterance.

For the narrower purpose of the empirical part of this project, I isolate and in the empirical work will be tracing the following main relational performative processes: destabilising performatives, deliberative performatives, and silencing performatives. However, it must be noted, that this is not an exhaustive list of all potential types of relational performatives participating in contesting security; but rather reflects a specific narrower focus for this particular research
interested in how official narratives of “war on terror” striving for hegemony have been variously engaged with by competing voices.

As the transitive verb form in each of these terms prompts, each of these is a form of performative that is relationally dependent on other, often starkly different or resisting performatives; as well as strives for, or at least has the potential to, exercise power and enact change in the relational field. Therefore, I have been attentive to how much effort destabilising performatives have made to fill in the semiotic space opened up as a result of a dislocatory practice with new narrative constructions, particularly with new narrative-normative chronotopes of alternative national imaginings.

As pointed out in the theoretical discussion above, while Laclau and Mouffian categories such as “dislocation”, “myth” and “imaginary” provide the macro-conceptualisation of the broader logics of potential contestation over security, speech-act reconceived through Dialogism, and therefore the emergent category of “relational performatives”, serves as the micro-conceptualisation of specific exchanges of competing articulations to be studied.

4.3.2.1. Destabilising vis-à-vis Deliberative Performances

Destabilising performatives attempt to fundamentally subvert another performative, or more broadly a narrative, by putting pressure on the core macro-propositions such narrative explicitly or implicitly relies on, and potentially dislodging the main nodal points on which the targeted narrative is built. This can be done by mere deconstructive performances, “deconstruction” being narrowly conceived as the Derridean exposure of the instability of a narrative by laying bare its reliance on the hierarchy of binary oppositions (for example, critique preoccupied with demystifying the Other a foreign/security policy discourse might be reliant on). However, apart from, and also beyond such deconstruction, to assess the potential effects of destabilising performances in a dialogical field, it is useful to turn to Ernesto Laclau’s concept

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577 Indeed, these three cannot be exhaustive of all relational performatives. These are the ones I identify and conceptualise in advance; however, I isolate one more category of relational performatives, namely restoratives, in the process of the empirical study.

of ‘dislocation’, as it is closely related to social and political processes. To remind, for Laclau, dislocation is ‘the process by which the contingency of discursive structures is made visible’, through ‘decentr[ing]’ them and potentially ‘induc[ing]’ an identity crisis for the subject. Employing this insight in light of my dialogical-relational approach, I conceive of destabilising performances as performative acts that by their intent, or else, by their effect, decentre the key nodal points upon which the related narrative hinges, shattering the narrative-normative chronotope of a foreign/security discourse.

However, beyond deconstruction, as we have seen, dislocation presupposes an opened-up space that needs to be replaced by a competing new discourse. Thus, Laclau emphasises that the denaturalisation of certain meanings brought by dislocation also creates a need for re-articulation: dislocations ‘stimulate new discursive constructions, which attempt to suture the dislocated structure’. Therefore, while assessing a destabilising performance in the empirical analysis, we must be attentive to how much effort there was to fill in the semiotic space opened up as a result of a dislocatory practice with new narrative constructions; in other words, whether and to what effect counter/alternative narratives of foreign/security policy have attempted their own “suture” of the discursive space, as well as allowed for alternative and competing such attempts.

Furthermore, in the attempt to understand why certain discourses are more successful in hegemonising a discursive field than others, Laclau distinguishes between myths and social imaginaries. Both emerge as a result of a structural dislocation; however, with varying results. Thus, myths attempt to suture the dislocated space by constructing ‘new spaces of representation’, which will form ‘a new objectivity by means of the rearticulation of the dislocated elements’. The function of myths, in turn, through this “new objectivity”, is to address a variety of social demands and dislocations. The degree to which the latter is accomplished will decide whether

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581 Ibid.
582 Ibid., 13-14.
583 Laclau (1990: 61).
585 Laclau (1990: 61).
a “myth” transforms into an “imaginary”:586 ‘when a myth has proved to be successful in neutralising social dislocations and incorporating a great number of social demands, then we can say that the myth has been transformed to an imaginary’.587 In this light, we must be open to the possibility of an assessment as to whether and to what extent a potential alternative myth has transformed into a new imaginary through the replacement or transformation of the dominant narrative chronotope with a new normative chronotopicity and imaginary for the nation and the state.

In contrast to destabilising performatives, what I call deliberative performatives probe and put pressure on others’ performatives – and by extension, on another narrative – predominantly not by an attempted subversion or dislocation. While in Aristotelian rhetoric, the term “deliberative” denotes a performance aiming to persuade an audience to take or not take an action,588 here I use it to describe performances that challenge the official and dominant narrative, only by partly refuting the earlier deliberative efforts behind the latter, and/or by demanding the fulfilment of the “promises” inherent in earlier persuasive deliberative performances that have been at the basis of earlier legitimation. Unlike destabilising performances, deliberative performances largely operate from within the same or similar paradigm upon which the target narrative is built, and therefore, do not attempt to dislodge its key nodal points, but rather probe and demand accountability for their re-substantiation. Importantly, such performances occur not only in narrowly political argumentation, such as in parliamentary or election debates, but may be part of broader discursive contestations, such as exchanges in the mass media, discourses of civil groups, public-intellectual as well as narrowly academic discourse. However, the analytical attention must be not merely on a purported reproduction and reification of the dominant discourse through performances that operate from within the dominant paradigm, but on how they otherwise relate to/act upon/put pressure on the dominant narrative, how they relate to destabilising

586 Ibid., 67.
587 Howarth and Stavrakakis (2000: 15). Laclau refers to the Christian Millennium, the Enlightenment and positivism’s conception of progress as such social imaginaries, or what he also calls ‘a horizon’ or ‘absolute limit which structures a field of intelligibility’. See Laclau (1990: 67).
performances, and how they are in turn being responded to by the representatives of the target narrative. Thus, we must seek to trace how these deliberative probings effect responsive performances from the target interlocutors of the dominant discourse, but also how these configure with destabilising performances and in turn with the responsive reactions induced by both.

4.3.2.2. Silencing Performances

One such responsive reaction induced by destabilising or deliberative performances may be silencing performances. In a relational and process-oriented conceptualisation, I conceive of silencing as dialogical performativity: this conceptualisation seeks to understand specifically active discursive silencing, i.e. silencing through utterance. If we are to understand how speech renders others’ speech less meaningful, and in turn how speech is uttered but fails to perform the functions it intends to, then we must tackle not only an ontology of how meaning, and with it social action, is made through speech-act, but also how such meaning is un-made, and consequently social action made to fail, through a speech-act. A dialogically enhanced conception of speech-act reconceived through Mikhail Bakhtin’s Dialogism, combined with a critical examination of Langton and Hornsby’s ‘illocutionary silencing’ argument (to be discussed in a moment), will allow for theorising discursive silencing.

To recall, for Bakhtin, utterance is always performed ‘in a linguistic environment saturated with, and overlaid by, the intentions of others…. struggling to achieve its intention amidst a throng of other alien words’.\(^{589}\) Therefore, I re-conceived of the Austinean “illocution” (as the intended doing-in-saying) only as an ideal, an individual attempt: it is never fully achieved without an agonistic struggle, a tension, or a ‘resistance put up by language against intention’.\(^{590}\) Relatedly, as we have seen, meaning is produced relationally, only when entered into a complex “dialogical” relationship with other utterances, and relies on intertextuality for meaning production.

In such an agonistic but at the same time intertextual conception of speech-act then, speech may be uttered but be rendered silent, i.e. failing to perform its intended/attempted illocution; and conversely speech may be

\(^{589}\) White (2003: 116).

\(^{590}\) Ibid.
uttered intentionally to render others’ speech silent, as well as indirectly, beyond intentionality, result in such silencing. In other words, silencing as a dialogical speech-act is a particular attempt of rendering others’ performative attempts of meaning-fixation unsuccessful, of curtailment of others' performative power. This preliminary definition of silencing must be combined with a particular treatment of silencing, often dubbed as ‘illocutionary silencing’ advanced in legal philosophy,\(^{591}\) whereby not only an illocutionary act may be silenced, i.e. not be allowed to communicate an intended meaning and hence perform the intended action, but also an illocutionary act may serve to silence, by creating conditions under which someone else’s speech ‘misfires’ as a result of ‘illocutionary disablement’.\(^{592}\) Silencing then could be said to be present when actors – whether intentionally or cumulatively in effect – interfere into the process of meaning making/dissemination and perception between certain speakers and their audiences.

However, such a conceptualisation must be taken a step further: if speech-acts as dialogical in settings interesting to us are performed through activation of certain intertextuality and narrative building in an active interrelationship with various public audiences-speakers as well as competing public actors, then illocutionary silencing must be conceived as the active performative disablement of some such performative capacities, whereby some attempts of intertextually producing security meanings and narratives are undermined, by attempting to render these attempted meanings muted or non-perceivable for the intended audiences, as a result of what may be called an intertextual disablement. Thus, “non-recognition” in this case is aimed to be achieved through the performative constitution of specific conditions under which others’ illocutionary force – meaning production through activation of


\(^{592}\) Langton investigates feminist claims of restrictions of women’s opportunities for free speech based on Mackinnon’s “pornography silences women” argument, and demonstrates how it is possible to silence by letting someone speak and yet ‘stop that speech from counting as …the action it was intended to be’. Langton, Rae, ‘Speech-acts and Unspeakable Acts’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 22 (1993), 299; 314-15; Mackinnon, C., Feminism Unmodified (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1987). In similar lines, Hornsby thus suggests that '[a] group that is said to be 'silenced'... is one whose members may be thought of as incapacitated as fully successful doers of some illocutionary acts': Hornsby, J., ‘Illocution and Its Significance', in Tsohatzidis, S., (ed.), Foundations of Speech-act Theory: Philosophical and Linguistic Perspectives (London and New York: Routledge, 1994), p. 200.
certain intertextuality, rather than other – is meant to be muted for potential politically significant audiences. More active modes of silencing occur when counter-arguments are being performatively deprived of their illocutionary power by demoralising them, reducing their legitimacy through, for instance, actively linking certain views and positions to “disloyalty to the nation”, “cowardice”, “being soft on terrorists”, etc. In this relation, silencing may be seen as the performative attempt of exclusion from negotiating foreign/security policy, by a certain internal otherisation creating “us”/“them” boundaries within the society.

However, again, what is important is not silencing practices in isolation, but rather their relationality with other performative practices, such as destabilising and deliberative performances.

4.4. Methodological Implications for the Empirical Study

As the critical overview in chapter 2 demonstrated, inherent to the predominant representational model of studying foreign/security policy was a certain methodological choice involving the researcher identifying a certain representation (of a an event, threat, etc.) and variously tracing them in the official discourse and their reproductions in order to point to a certain policy option arising from such representations. This assumes that the researcher must make a certain “knowledge” decision in advance, or what Hansen calls, identify ‘basic discourses’ to be traced. In her case on Bosnia, she identifies the two main competing representations as being “Balkans discourse” vs. the “genocide discourse”, before embarking on a study to trace how they competing in corresponding policy discourses, as well as how they are intertextually built on previous texts such as travel writing. For instance, if I was to follow such a research methodology in my case on “war on terror”, I would have identified the “Vietnam” representation in the Bush discourse and perhaps an antithetical one, then trace them in actual speech. Such a methodology assumes and in turn establishes a certain ontology whereby it is certain identifiable images (for Hansen, preferably a smaller number) around specific themes that compete or contest, rather than agents competing by mobilising a variety of images and representations. It also rests a lot of interpretive responsibility on the researcher

to locate these and make decisions about which ones are key to a certain contestation.

Instead, as set out in theoretical discussion and the framework laid out above, being interested in various “doings” and performative attempts contesting security, I refrain from structuring the study around themes or representations, but rather around questioning my date on what one performative act is doing to another relationally and dialogically, variously mobilising representations and narrative constructions.

Hence, in light of the discussion on the socio-political context of late modernity, and the dialogical-relational framework, in the empirical part, I ask of the data a set of questions. These should not be confused with research questions: they serve to help tease out patterns, in order to answer the broader research questions.\footnote{To remind, the research question supplementing the hypothesis is how, i.e. through what socio-semiotic mechanisms, the hypothetical binding, if at all, took place in case of the US and the UK involvements in Afghanistan and Iraq.}

1) How and to what extent have official foreign/security narratives strived to circumscribe uncertainty and deliver fixity and the promise of “security”? 
2) How and to what effect have the official narratives been challenged? In turn how and to what extent have they dialogically engaged with, been destabilised, have accommodated, or changed as a result of such critique? 
3) Have the destabilising voices themselves strived for and constructed alternative singularising narratives taking on the task of circumscribing uncertainly and effecting closure and unity of purpose necessary for “imaged communities”; and if yes, in what relationship with official voices; and to what effect? If not, then have they attempted to subvert the very paradigm of security built on fixity and certainty? 
4) How have these contesting voices responded to each other (the discursive realm), as well as to the developments and changes in the supra-discursive and non-discursive realms (e.g. on-the-ground developments also produced by the very policies and security practices)?

Considering the dynamic and reciprocal, rather than static and univocal, relationship between speaker-turned-audience and audience-turned-speaker, the process of negotiations and deliberations are traced in parliaments through
party-political contestations, key government statements and the reactions around them in parliament, and in the mass media, as well as in the discourses of various civil groups such as anti-war social movements, etc. In other words, returning to Bakhtin, we must look at the “public square” of today, the metaphorical agora, i.e. the public space where multiplicity of voices collide and interact. In this regard, especially dissident/anti-war deconstructions and other sources of attempted destabilisations are inexorably part of the analysis. Such concern is not merely an attention to the broader context, but is indispensable to understanding and evaluating the official discourse: evaluating the key speech-act illocutions present in such discourse would be impossible, if this multiplicity of voices and their dialogical interaction was not the basis for the selection as well as the analysis of articulations.

The dialogical approach necessitates several methodological choices not only in the stage of analysing, but also in that of selecting data. Randomised data selection will not do, as it will be against the very rationale of dialogism. Rather, the latter necessitates a special selective approach sensitive to and following the ontological claims about answerability and intertextuality, where, rather than following a clear-cut protocol of selection followed by analysis, initial selection is constantly replenished by further selections that are necessitated by the analysis itself. Thus, this may be simplified into several steps:

1) Selecting of “basic texts”, i.e. public utterances disseminated at key historical junctures before and after a major development;\footnote{This is similar to Hansen’s suggestion about key events. Hansen (2006: 32).}

2) Through an initial analysis of these basic texts, identifying what past texts and broader discourses they might be referring to and intertextually building on (retrospective dialogicity), and therefore make a selection of those texts;

3) Locating what these basic texts might be dialogically responding to, e.g. to others’ performative utterances in the present and immediate past, as well as to external events and developments and others’ performative responses to these (spatial dialogicity); and

4) Locating what these basic texts are anticipating, and consequently responding to pre-emptively (prospective dialogicity); and finally e) re-analysing the process as a dialogical interaction, even when there is no direct physical and explicit exchange among the actors and texts.
The indexical indicators identified above then help relationally trace how narrative structures interact and change. Thus, first, the narrative-normative chronotope in competing narratives is identified through asking questions about the modality of articulations (i.e. constructions syntactically based on “ought”/“must”/“should” or otherwise referencing obligation and responsibility, especially when these are interlinked with constructions of national and global identities, and the identities of certain referent objects (such as “terrorists”, “the Iraqi people/women”, etc.). These constructions are by definition future-oriented, and their “futureness” is an analytical focus, in attempting to map competing national and/or global “imaginings”. Often the representations of such competing “futures” will only be intertextually activated through hyperlinks to the historical past.

In relation to relational performances, my primary focus is identifying and coding certain speech-acts in texts, rather than certain themes and representations: I identify and qualitatively code speech-acts not merely according to “what they are doing in saying something” (e.g. “justifying an intervention”), but also and importantly according to what they are doing to other’s capacity to do things with words. In other words, based on the discursive dynamics, the interlocutors’ relative social positionality, as well as the broader developments of the moment, I attempt to deduce what the speakers are doing with what they are saying in a dialogical exchange, e.g. shifting meanings, neutralising, creating new descriptions, challenging, accommodating, etc.; whether they are e.g. answering criticism A voiced by the alternative voice B in a recent context of C (e.g. after the development D), or delimiting/killing off B’s illocutionary potential’, i.e. attempting to silence). Identifying these positional-relational performances – rather than merely the themes, or what a speech-act is doing by constructing a certain representation – is imperative, if we are to understand each utterance’s role in the argumentation process.

To achieve this, the coding of each relational speech-act is done putting it into its socio-historical context: each speech/statement is located broadly in the political and cultural context in which it was written and distributed, and more specifically in the context of the surrounding events, place, time, setting.

\footnote{The qualitative coding software NVivo has been used in this project to assisting coordinating and coding large textual data.}
situated activities, as well as other argumentation around it (both supportive and challenging). Following this logic, the textual units ascribed a speech-act function and coded vary. Thus, first, I view the whole of a formal utterance event, for example the full text of a speech/statement, or a press release, in its entirety, as performing a speech-act by its very distribution, in full. Second, the constitutive elements of each such full text, such as sentences, or even parts of sentences, are in turn coded as speech-acts, if any such intentionality is located, as actions in response to specific events/developments/utterances, and in turn producing/creating new contexts themselves for further utterances. Thus, each foreign/security policy public text, as well as its constitutive parts is seen as potentially performative, and is analysed in an attempt to understand what functions it is trying to perform, and how this relates to the bigger realm of the contestation. Moreover, the same textual unit is coded having multiple potential illocutions, e.g. one as silencing, and another one as narrative weaving/re-affirming, or else another one as dislocating while at the same time potentially constructing a new imaginary. Finally, in addition to these intended illocutions, a certain speech-act, as suggested, once released into the discursive domain, will carry with it potential unintended or surplus illocutionary force. These are identified and coded, based on reactive utterances in answer to such speech-acts.

In a traditional speech-act analysis, more complicated would have been the issue of locating perlocutions, i.e. the meanings as actually perceived by audiences and acted upon as a result of a successful illocution. Epistemologically, perlocutions cannot possibly become fully known from discourse analysis alone, and would best be coupled with surveys on public perceptions (the broader audiences) as well as agents more immediately politically participating in negotiating foreign/security policy (speakers-turned-audiences and audiences-turned-speakers, in e.g. parliamentary debates, election campaigns, exchanges with dissident social movements and other civil society groups). However, given that the focus here in this study is primarily on relational performatives, there are cues present which would serve as basis to reliably derive the perlocutions of such performatives; for instance those

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598 The latter would have been an enormous task, beyond the time and resources of this project, and also practically hard to do in case of a longitudinal study, where surveying the public for reactions and perceptions about long-past utterances would not be much effective.
coming from the very reactions of certain civil society groups through the
construction of their discourse, as well as through their actions (e.g. protests), if
any, in response to certain official utterances, as well as in the very responses
of competing political agents answering, e.g., potentially destabilising or
dislocatory, or else deliberative performances. These, at times integrated with
existing polls and surveys, are sufficient grounds to locate the perlocutions of, if
not every single speech-act, then at least of those that have had highest public
salience and reverberation.

To locate silencing practices, the focus is on certain speech-acts which,
by their very illocution, acquire a certain defining semantic status within the
official narrative and thus close off possibilities for alternatives; or speech-acts
with illocutions which directly attempt to rid the alternative voices of their
illocutionary power by reducing their credibility or discrediting their rational or
moral position/starting point.

I attempt to trace possible mechanisms of binding by following a certain model
as an initial guide (modified and readjusted in the course of the study). Thus, I
start with mapping the early construction of the official “war on terror” narratives
in the US and the UK respectively, in the initial years following 9/11. This is not
a representational analysis that claims an explanation or an explication by
tracing how a specific narrative representation “made possible” a certain policy
(see the critical literature review in chapter one). Instead, as a heuristic device,
it serves an initial departure point, from where various supportive and
alternative/challenging voices are traced and their dialogical relations outlined.
To locate and re-construct the narrative-normative chronotopes inherent in the
US and UK official discourses of “war on terror” in the first few years after 9/11, I
identify and analyse data selected from official public utterances spanning
approximately from 11 September 2001 to end of 2005 (covering the early, and
early-intermediate periods). These are statements, speeches and other texts
produced at public appearances, primarily by the president/prime-minister, but
also by other high ranking officials at important historic junctures, and
specifically those that have potentially attracted the largest audiences (e.g.
through prime-time televised presidential addresses). For a full list of selected
texts, see Appendix A.
I then turn to a systematic analysis of destabilising/dislocatory and deliberative critique in the “intermediate stage”, i.e. 2003-2007. The data are drawn from the articulations found in the mass media, critical politicians’ speeches, pronouncements and written texts, as well as those of anti-war activists. For selection of texts, I concentrate on momentous events, such as the revelations about the Dodgy Iraq Dossier in February 2003; Bush-Blair deliberations, and parliamentary debates ahead of the Iraq war; intensified mass anti-war demonstrations across the world in January to March 2003, etc., as part of the non-discursive and supra-discursive events to which the contesting voices must respond. They also become moments which show how the real-life chronotope becomes a challenge to the representational, i.e. narrative-normative chronotope. The texts are selected from public pronouncements of active or former politicians; the media, and social movements such as anti-war movements, or civic groups. For more detail, see chapter five and for a full list of all texts in this category, see Appendix B.

Furthermore, I turn to locating how official discourse has reacted and responded to such destabilising and deliberative challenges through restorative performances, or silencing. These are most salient and therefore more observable in actual performative exchanges involving settings, where several discursive practices react and respond each other, e.g. parliamentary debates, election campaigns, question and answer sessions in press conferences, etc. Concentrating on the same intermediate period of 2003-2007, I trace how destabilising and deliberative critique have differently invited, or helped create discursive space for, restorative performances by the proponents of the official “war on terror” narrative; and to analyse patterns of the various ways the respective governments have responded to such critique; taking a closer look at specifically silencing practices as part of such restoratives. To trace how and to what effect contesting narrative-normative chronotopes relate and respond to one another, I attempt to locate the axiological modality of utterances (e.g. what “ought/should/must be done” in relation to an event or development, pointing to responsibilities and promises), as well as explicit or implicit references to the past and constructions of the “future”.

Finally, to further trace the effects of the dialogical process over more specific policy areas of “war on terror”, I take a closer look at a specific “within-

599 A list of these data sources is presented as part of Appendix A.
case case”, already in the late period (2008-2012), namely the case of President Obama’s failure to close down the Guantánamo Bay prison. Indeed, ideally such a specific case analysis in the US could have been accompanied by a similar case drawn from the UK. However, given the space and resource restrictions, as well as the fact that this thesis had to conduct an extensive theory development task in the first part, I have chosen to limit the analysis of the later stage through a “within-case case” only drawn from the US developments. Nonetheless, as regards the aim of the empirical part, i.e. the demonstration of the applicability of the dialogical-relational framework, the analysis of the intermediate period in both countries provides ample material. On the other hand, while the working hypothesis about potential discursive constraints on policy change is more salient in the late-period US case study with regards to Obama’s Guantánamo pledge, potential evidence to support it is shown to be emerging from the analysis of broader contestations over “war on terror” both in the US and the UK also in the intermediate period.

4.5. Conclusion

I started this chapter by arguing in favour of a ‘temporal separability’ of agent and structure, and relatedly a distinction between the discursive, the non-discursive and the supra-discursive realms. The supra-discursive encompasses social and semiotic structures, which in the given temporal point in time are already emerging or else have already been reified or sedimented into institutions, and therefore at the given moment in time pre-date the actors involved, as well as the actions in the narrower discursive negotiation over an issue.

I then situating foreign/security discourses of Western democratic states in the supra-discursive field of late modernity with important implications for identifying the social functions of such discourses; for reconceiving of actors (audiences-speakers) in a dialogical exchange; and for theorising binding. As the world becomes more complex and unpredictable in the late modern age, Western ‘risk societies’ become ‘increasingly preoccupied with the future (and with safety), seeking to control contingency: the promise of planning,

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601 Giddens (1999: 3).
managing and controlling the national “future” through foreign/security policy becomes dependent on, and responding to, not just the primal angst of death more generally, but “risk society’s” fear of immediate, perceived or real risks to their livelihoods and to their unhindered participation in the late modern system, more specifically. Here we witness an official anxiety to (re)claim the role of providing insurance from global “external risks”, when the reality of “manufactured risks” is constantly undermining the claim to such capacity of the state. This anxiety to practice and satisfy the “will to certitude” necessitates the containment/disciplining of the plurality of possible future scenarios resultant from ever expanding manufactured risks, thus making circumscribing uncertainly the broader function of foreign/security discourse. Thus, I suggested that foreign/security policy discourse is a future-oriented discourse of control and progress caught up in the paradox of reconciling the will to certitude with the repercussions of ever more complex global uncertainties of the late modern age.

Against this backdrop, I then considered the implications of Giddens’ ‘reflexive modernization’. The official foreign/security discourse represents a tension between the need to continue projecting the promise of progress and certitude of the Enlightenment, and the need to engage variously with the plurality of other voices destabilizing such a project, or variously expressing discontent or disbelief: in the information age and age of reflexive society, it simply cannot achieve its task without engaging with/responding, and in Bakhtinian terms being answerable to, the heteroglot discursive field comprised of the voices of social movements, alternative media, academic and public intellectuals, as well as voices of those more immediately in the narrower political field. Consequently, the study of foreign/security discourse has no choice but to engage closely and relationally with these voices indispensable to the dialogic process of negotiating foreign policy and security.

The relational character of and tensions in this heteroglot field also made a re-conceptualisation of “audiences” an imperative. Rather than mere (even if inter-subjectively conceived) “receivers”, in the dialogical view, audiences turn into speakers and vice versa, since performances are variously responded to, generating a plethora of other performances. Furthermore, considering the presence of multiple segments of audiences intended by one and the same utterance, as well as those not intended/anticipated by the utterer, and given
the spread of communication technologies and almost unrestricted access to publicly available information, the foreign/security policy utterance becomes inescapably hypertextually linked to the “docuverse” of other utterances. I suggested that this increases the possibility for scrutiny, critique and probing of foreign/security claims by various audience-speakers, which in turn makes responsive performances answering such critique and probing, as well as responding to changing non-discursive and supra-discursive realities and others’ responses to these an imperative for foreign/security policy interlocutor.

Furthermore, in order to understand how such interactions and contestations – of actors and narratives – causally produce outcomes, we must seek to integrate this with an analysis of a) major challenges to key narratives and performative moves, importantly including the destabilising performances to the dominant foreign/security policy narratives, as well as the performative demands for accountability in case of the official narrative; and b) the conditions of possibility presented by the supra-discursive realm – i.e. institutions and channels through which major challenges and negotiations can be performed – as well as the effects of the developments emanating from the non-discursive field on the dynamics of contestations at home. Only having treated all this as an interdependent reality can we hope to come close to understanding causal effects of foreign/security discourse on policy and continuation and/or change thereof. This is sought through the proposed analytical tools, namely competing narrative-normative chronotopes, and relational performatives such as destabilising, deliberative and silencing performatives, tracing the diversity and tensions in the field of negotiating foreign/security policy. Any outcome (constrained or slowed-down change being one such outcome), and the mechanism behind such outcome, can only be known, when the relationality of all these “doings” of positional performatives is assessed through an empirical study, to which I now turn in Part two of this thesis.
PART TWO

Chapter 5: Pre-9/11 Discursive Foundations, and the Chronotopicity of Early Post-9/11 Official “War on Terror” Discourses in the US and the UK

5.1. Introduction

The present chapter primarily concerns itself with the task of locating and reconstructing the narrative-normative chronotopes inherent in the US and UK official discourses of “war on terror” in the first few years after 9/11 (roughly 2001-2005). This is the first step in the empirical analysis, which, following the dialogical-relational framework developed in Part One, locates competing narrative-normative chronotopes; and relational performatives, as indexical indicators through which relationality among voices and mechanisms of continuity/change can be traced at a later stage. While relational performatives will be analysed at length in the subsequent two chapters, this chapter focuses on the narrative structures of the official discourses only, temporarily bracketing off other voices, largely as a heuristic exercise which can serve as a departure point, a platform, upon which the relationality of various competing voices can later be configured. It also demonstrates how actors attempt to construct a desired closure and singularity through the official foreign/security narrative and thus monologise the field; and brings out any major similarities and differences between the US and the UK discourses.

Each of these official narratives is, indeed, deeply embedded in cultural-historical pre-conditions in each of the countries, in other words in the social and semiotic structures pre-dating agents, to which they must respond. Therefore, in order to be able to perform such an exercise of reconstructing the chronotopic structure of the official “war on terror” narratives, a certain genealogical inquiry\textsuperscript{602} tracing the pre-9/11 preconditions of these discourses is imperative. Hence, the purpose of this chapter is two-fold: first, on the one hand, to trace the pre-9/11 foundations of the Bush doctrine of “pre-

\textsuperscript{602} The term “genealogy” here is used in the sense of tracing the origins, or the pre-history of the given discourses; however it does not indicate a strict application of any specific theoretical approach, such as primarily, that developed by Foucault (see, e.g. Rabinow (1984).
emption/prevention”, rhetorically presented as “recast” by the events of 9/11; and on the other hand, to explore how the Blair Doctrine of International Community adopted in 1999 shaped and constrained the post-9/11 Blair discourse on “war on terror”; and second, to analyse and map the narrative-normative chronotopes inherent in the discourses of Bush and Blair, respectively, already in the post-9/11 period.

The first of these tasks is performed in lieu of a conventional historical review. The omission of the history of the “war on terror” itself is justified by it being a recent development extensively covered in academic and non-academic literature, as well as by the intent to avoid repetition: some key developments are discussed later, along with the data analysis itself.

With regards to the US official discourse, I trace the transition from the discourse of “containment” with regards to Iraq dominant in 1990s, to one of “intervention” and unilateral “pre-emption/prevention”, which became the cornerstone of the Bush Doctrine after 9/11. Contrary to mainstream analysis, as well as the stance of the official narrative itself, through the analysis of primary sources, I show, that the post-9/11 US national security policy and discourse, rather than “recast” by 9/11, were in fact building on the security discourses of the post-Cold War period emerging in 1990s. In addition, I contend that instead of being a case of “obfuscation” of the pre-9/11 intertextual links of the “war on terror” discourse, at least for some segment of audience, the discourse in fact relied on the very activation of the intertextual links with the older discourses. In contrast, the Blair discourse constructed a less ruptured narrative, and relied on explicit intertextual links with the New Labour discourse of late 1990s. I demonstrate how the legitimation of Britain’s involvement in the “war on terror” intertextually relied on such pre-9/11 discourse, and how eventually the promise of “internationalism/multilateralism” morphed into a discourse that supported its opposite – unilateral intervention, along with the US, into Iraq.

In tracing the spatio-temporal semiotic structure of the official narratives, I identify the Chronotope of Cyclical Triumph prevalent in the US official post-9/11 narrative. In contrast, in the UK, the prevalent chronotope is that of Agent of Change. While Cyclical Triumph constructs a “future” for America, which is the return of the ideal “past”, where absolute “triumph” over a transcendental,

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603 Dunmire (2011).
teleological and un-caused “evil” is written as a historical fact in the future (i.e. assured, certain and unavoidable); through the Chronotope of Agent of Change Britain’s “future” is depicted as dependent on the agency of the nation in the “present” to make a choice of identity and a global role. This role – intertextually linked with Churchill’s metaphor of Britain as a “bridge”, and Blair’s Britain playing a ‘pivotal role’ in ‘re-ordering’ the world – is that of a moral and pragmatic leader for transforming national and global politics that adapts to the changing realities of globalisation; “evil” being partly caused by such changing realities. Thus, the chronotope is transformative, both for the nation and the international community, rather than cyclical.

Section 5.2 explores the pre-9/11 political and discursive foundations of the Bush and Blair discourses on “war on terror”; while section 5.3 investigates the narrative-normative chronotopes of the early post-9/11 official discourses on “war on terror” in the US and the UK.

5.2. The Pre-9/11 Discursive Foundations of “War on Terror” and “Rupture” vis-à-vis “Continuity” in Early Post-9/11 Narratives

There is a great temptation, or even a genre-specific requirement, to start accounts of the “war on terror” with a specific temporal point, that of 9/11, and to portray it as a moment of rupture from which a crisis and subsequent reactions have followed. This form of writing is found in most mainstream coverage (whether academic or non-academic), as well as in some otherwise critical accounts. It replicates, and at the same time stabilises, the writing of “war on terror” in the official discourse following the attacks, where 9/11 appears in ‘temporal discontinuity’ with any previous American/Western actions and global developments that have led to the build-up of the events on 9/11. Moreover, such writing of 9/11 presents the decisions around “war on terror”, as well as the adoption/revision of home institutions and regulations to sustain it, as necessitated and hence as “recast” by 9/11.

In this section, I trace the discursive foundations of the “war on terror” official narrative in the per-9/11 foreign policy developments in the US and the UK. Towards this end, rather than offering a historical overview of the period under investigation, namely the post-9/11 decade, I, rather, offer a pre-historical overview of some of the political developments and discursive trends that comprised some of the conditions of possibility for the post-9/11 foreign policy official discourses in the US and the UK. These are covered in subsections 5.2.1 and 5.2.1, respectively.

5.2.1. The Early Discursive Foundations of the Bush Doctrine

The Bush Doctrine is often presented by mainstream analysis, as well as by the official narrative, as having been “shaped” by 9/11. Instead of a conventional historical review, in this section I trace the pre-9/11 foundations of the US “war on terror” discourse, by demonstrating the contrary, along with authors such as Ketter and Mitchell, Dunmire, and Lazar and Lazar. Through some primary sources, I trace the foundations, or at least the conditions of possibility of the Bush Doctrine and the subsequent “war on terror” discourse to the post-Cold War period in 1990s.

The links between the Bush Doctrine and the early post-Cold war discourse can be traced back to early 1990s. Thus, in 1992, the so-called Wolfowitz Doctrine, i.e. the draft of the Defense Planning Guidance for 1994–99 by U.S. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Paul Wolfowitz, leaked into the New York Times. According to the newspaper, the document built the case for a one-superpower world order, where the United States ‘must sufficiently account for the interests of the advanced industrial nations to discourage them from challenging our leadership or seeking to overturn the established political and economic order.’ The draft document suggested, that the US strategy

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609 Dunmire (2011).
612 Ibid. The quote is from the draft Defense Planning Guidance of February 18, 1992, later released by Department of Defence. Available in the original (with highlights on the leaked
‘must now refocus on precluding the emergence of any potential global competitor’. In addition, it entitled the US the right to use unilateral pre-emptive military force to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, in countries including Iraq and North Korea. The New York Times went on to comment that the draft was ‘conspicuously devoid of references to collective action through the United Nations, which provided the mandate for the allied assault on Iraqi forces in Kuwait and which may soon be asked to provide a new mandate to force President Saddam Hussein to comply with his cease-fire obligations’, and dubbed it as ‘the clearest rejection to date of collective internationalism’. 

The draft’s originality was never substantiated by the Pentagon at the time, but even the final document released about a month later, which according to some had been revised and amended in response to the public controversy sparked by the leak, preserved the main tenets, particularly, that ‘the U.S. must retain ability to defend critical interests unilaterally’. 

Later, the authors of those guidelines, Paul Wolfowitz and Dick Cheney, became the founders of what was to become the neo-conservative think-tank Project for a New American Century (PNAC) and throughout the 90s, during the Democrat Clinton presidency, continuously influenced policy and strategy. Thus, in late 1990s, PNAC significantly influenced the growing view in the US that the Iraqi regime cannot be contained any longer. In January 1998, a Letter to President Clinton on Iraq signed by Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz and other neoconservatives was sent to President Clinton, pointing to the erosion of the policy of containment and the continuing danger posed by Saddam Hussein. The suggested solution was a new strategy aimed ‘at the removal of Saddam Hussein’s regime from power’. In the meantime, to make such an aim practicable, the letter pressed for a clear doctrinal shift in US global policy away

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613 Ibid.  
614 Ibid.  
615 Tyler (1992).  
616 Ibid.  
617 The draft document was declassified only in 2007.  
from institutionalism and collective defence, to unilateral action: '[w]e believe the U.S. has the authority under existing UN resolutions to take the necessary steps, including military steps, to protect our vital interests in the Gulf. In any case, American policy cannot continue to be crippled by a misguided insistence on unanimity in the UN Security Council' (emphasis added).\(^619\) In February 1998, a larger group of Neoconservatives led by Rumsfeld and Walfowitz addressed another letter to President Clinton. Once again warning, that sanctions were insufficient in dealing with Saddam, this letter called instead for a ‘broad-based insurrection’ to be led by the Iraqi National Congress.\(^620\)

In response to the first letter, Clinton appeared to be reluctant to openly communicate any clear-cut doctrinal shift and in the State of the Union Address, at least declaratively, remained within the framework of multilateralism and acting with the United Nations. However, at a closer look, he did suggest the need ‘to write international rules of the road for the 21st century protecting those who join the family of nations and isolating those who do not.’\(^621\) Part of this (re)writing, as I will demonstrate, was the doctrinal shift to unilateralism and “pre-emption”/“prevention”. Importantly, he also speaks of the need to ‘combat an unholy axis of new threats from terrorists, international criminals and drug traffickers’,\(^622\) and already the links between terrorists and WMDs, as well as terrorists and Saddam, start taking root.

Indeed, this address could be seen as a partial but nonetheless important submission to the Neoconservatives’ demands; perhaps an intended performative act preparing the discursive grounds for a possible toppling of Saddam. However, Clinton’s response to the second Open letter was more concrete action – signing of the Iraqi Liberation Act of 1998 passed by the Congress, calling for a regime change in Iraq: ‘[i]t should be the policy of the United States to support efforts to remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq and to promote the emergence of a democratic

\(^619\) Ibid.
\(^620\) This was an umbrella opposition group formed in 1992 with the help of the US, bringing together Kurdish militias, Shi’ite Islamist groups and other opposition parties. See Freedman, Lawrence ‘War in Iraq: Selling the Threat’, Survival, 46 (2004), 7-50.
\(^622\) Ibid.
government to replace that regime’ (emphasis added).\textsuperscript{623} Indeed, the Act suggested assistance to ‘Iraqi democratic opposition organizations’\textsuperscript{624} to promote internally generated, rather than externally and militarily imposed regime change. However, given Clinton Administration’s endorsement of Operation Desert Fox only a month later, this difference may have escaped broader public, as “regime change” as a legitimate foreign policy aim was already discursively taking root.

Moreover, and importantly, the fact that the Act was later to be cited in the October 2002 Iraq Resolution authorising military force, and also referred to many times by President Bush, shows that the performative resonance created around the Act was being used as an \textit{intertextual resource} activating earlier performative acts to further legitimise and normalise military intervention. This contention is contrary to e.g. Dunmire’s analysis, who argues that the post-9/11 official “war on terror” discourse took all pains to obfuscate any links with pre-9/11 security discourse and policy.\textsuperscript{625} While she carefully records and analyses such links between the post-Cold War US security discourse and the post/9-11 security strategy, and defines them as ‘intertextual links’, she then goes on to argue and demonstrate how these links were ‘hidden’ from the public through the construction of the post-9/11 “rupture” narrative, whereby “threats” to the US, and therefore strategy were recast by 9/11. Along with Keller and Mitchel, she contends that such obfuscation helped create ‘mass amnesia’ about the origins of the post-9/11 security strategy.\textsuperscript{626} However, such a take on “intertextuality” is conceptually confusing. If we are to remain faithful to its Bakhtinian origins in \textit{Dialogism}: intertextuality works through (re)\textit{activation} of meanings spatially and temporally; it is the very infrastructure for meaning making, and therefore cannot be “hidden”.\textsuperscript{627} Conceptually then, if the genealogical foundations of the post/9/11 discourses were being concealed through the “war on terror” narrative, the links then did not constitute “intertextuality”. However, this is not a purely conceptual issue, or one of terminology: rather than evidence of “obfuscating” the pre-9/11 foundations of

\begin{footnotes}
\item[624] Ibid.
\item[625] Dunmire (2011), esp. chapter 5.
\item[626] Ibid., 133, quoting Keller and Mitchel (2002: 5).
\item[627] For further detail, see the literature review in chapter 1.
\end{footnotes}
the “war on terror” narrative, the “rupture” narrative was indicative of the need to appeal variously to different segments of audiences. This will become clearer in a moment.

Returning to Clinton’s discourse, before a full-fledged normalisation of “preemption” could take place, the official discourse had to remain partly within the confines of the then dominant and ontologically prior narrative (that of “containment” with regards to Iraq), and to a certain extent be “answerable” to the internal rationale of that narrative. Thus, e.g. despite being a full-fledged invasion striking not only facilities allegedly linked to the production and storage of weapons, but also government command-and-control facilities, Operation Desert Fox, ‘was only advertised as helping “degrade” Iraq’s WMD capabilities...[and] largely justified in terms of reinforcing the policy of containment’.\textsuperscript{628} This was not surprising: given that the discourse of pre-emption/prevention was still nascent and in-the-making, the official rhetoric remained within the still-dominant discourse of the time, namely that of ‘containment’; hence, the policy had to be justified via this particular narrative.

Nonetheless, the neoconservative campaign to topple Saddam in late 1990s was having a strong influence on public opinion: reportedly, before the Operation Desert Fox, 70% (against 25%) of the American population supported the idea that force must be used to topple Saddam, rather than continue to act within the UN framework.\textsuperscript{629} Indeed, such public opinion statistics in itself is no empirical ground to conclude that this was the effect of the above-described discursive processes. However, this might be evidence of leading Neoconservatives’ influence on foreign policy, and Clinton’s performative moves in the State of the Union and later: the proposition that “containment was not working”, as well as the nascent discursive constructions of the links “Saddam-terrorism” and “Saddam-WMDs”, were already taking hold in the public.

Most importantly, it may be argued that the efforts to forge such links, as well as the legitimation of unilateral efforts to topple the Iraqi regime were present in the pre-9/11 period of George W. Bush’s discourse, namely during his election campaign and the period immediately after his coming to power in 2000. This view is contrary to most accounts holding that ‘[n]either Iraq nor

\textsuperscript{628} Freedman (2004: 13).
terrorism were [sic.] in the 2000 presidential campaign. Moreover, it is against interpretations such as ‘everything George W. Bush and Dick Cheney said during the campaign indicated that they thought Bill Clinton had used the military too much in his foreign policy, not too little. They outlined a stance of maintaining the policy of containment while being more selective about the use of force.’ Similarly, it is opposite prevailing views that ‘Bush presidency settled in its first year into what began to look like a new isolationism.’

Indeed, at a pre-election debate with Democratic candidate Al Gore, Bush states: ‘I would be very careful about using our troops as nation builders. I believe the role of the military is to fight and win war...I believe we are overextended in too many places.’ However, to interpret a statement such as this one as a call for less use of force is misleading, since it retrospectively and intertextually gains a new illocution, in the face of another more direct Bush statement at the next debate: ‘I don’t think our troops ought to be used for what’s called nation-building. I think our troops ought to be used to help overthrow a dictator...when it’s in our best interests’ (emphasis added).

Moreover, in a June 2001 Testimony to the Senate detailing the discussions underway towards the upcoming Quadrennial Defense Review, Defence Secretary Rumsfeld warned: ‘[a] policy of intentional vulnerability by the Western nations could give rogue states the power to hold our people hostage to nuclear blackmail – in an effort to prevent us from projecting force to stop aggression’ (emphasis added). This speech-act seems to be aimed at silencing internationalism/multilateralism promoting discourses, whether potential or actual, arguing against the pre-emption/prevention doctrine. The phrase ‘a policy of intentional vulnerability’ is an allusion to such advocates,

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631 Ibid.
while ‘projecting force to stop aggression’ is clearly a euphemism for unilateral preventative military action.

One further statement demonstrating the early construction of the discursive grounds for the doctrinal shift to a pre-emptive/preventative strategy follows: ‘[s]o if we are to extend this period of peace and prosperity, we need to prepare now for the new and different threats we will face in the decades ahead – not wait until they fully emerge’ (emphasis added). Finally, after several statements (re)constructing the threats from rogue states able to use WMDs against America, as well as alluding to Iraq as potentially one of them, Rumsfeld concludes: ‘[t]he U.S. must be able to impose terms on an adversary that assure regional peace and stability – including, if necessary, the occupation of an adversary’s territory and change of its regime…[and] decisively defeat an adversary at the time, place and manner of our choosing’.

Strikingly, all of the above pre-9/11 propositions in Rumsfeld’s Testimony, if only with slight re-formulations, entered the Quadrennial Security Review (QSR) adopted on 30 September 2001, as well as the National Security Strategy (NSS) issued by President Bush in September 2002, both often presented in literature, as well as by officials themselves, as having been “recast” by the 9/11 events. Thus, far from being recast by 9/11, the main tenets of these strategic documents had already been largely formulated before 9/11.

Moreover, it is not accidental, that Rumsfeld’s above proposition about “acting before threats fully emerge”, in strikingly similar syntax and vocabulary, but more importantly in similar illocution, is repeated in these documents, and is continuously echoed in George W. Bush’s key speeches legitimising the Iraq war. Thus, in his Axis of Evil speech in January 2002, one more time linking the possibility of WMDs passing onto terrorists by Iraq, Bush invokes the same premise of “not-wait-until-threats-fully-emerge”, in other words the pre-emption/prevention doctrine: ‘I will not wait on events, while dangers gather. I will not stand by, as peril draws closer and closer’. Similarly, the same year at the West Point graduation speech, Bush declares: ‘[w]e cannot defend

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636 Ibid.
637 Ibid., 10:12.
America and our friends by hoping for the best....If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long'. And in his perhaps most popular line, in a 7 October 2002 speech, Bush urges: ‘America must not ignore the threat gathering against us. Facing clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait for the final proof – the smoking gun – that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud’. If Dunmire’s above-mentioned thesis were correct, namely if any links with the earlier security discourse were being discursively obfuscated and concealed in the post-9/11 “rupture” narrative, then these propositions and constructions would not have found their place in the post-9/11 speeches and documents, often appearing verbatim, or in strikingly similar locutions.

The apparent paradox, however, can be resolved if we recall the plurality of audiences an official security discourse addresses and dialogically engages with, as discussed in chapter 3. Thus, in the post-9/11 environment, the Bush Administration, was appealing to at least two segments of the American audiences: a) the Conservative political elite and broader Conservative publics, who – either having been involved in decision-making or having been politically active – were expecting a certain continuity and consistency with the emergent post-Cold war security discourse of pre-emption/prevention; and b) those segments of the audiences who either had previously contested that earlier emergent discourse, or else had been politically less active and would have little memory of these earlier constructions. Drawing on earlier policy documents and speeches and encouraging activation of intertextual links with the newly emergent post-Cold War discourse of “pre-emption/prevention” was addressed to the former, i.e. served the need to meet the expectations of the conservative elite and publics who had internalised the newly emergent post-Cold war security discourse; whereas the “rupture” narrative was addressed to the latter, i.e. served the need to legitimate the new security doctrine among these latter segments – through silencing dissent and through creating a powerful crisis narrative for the broader public. Bush’s plea to his colleagues to construct the 2002 National Security Strategy ‘in plain English, not in academic

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jargon...[which] the boys in Lubbock ought to be able to read', 642 demonstrates such specific targeting of the conservative segments in audiences for the “rupture” narrative officially sealed in the Strategy document.

Indeed, in contrast, for the broader public especially in the US, the presence of such earlier constructions was being mostly overwritten by the official post-9/11 constructions of a narrative claiming the preemption approach to be a “shift” of doctrine that happened due to 9/11, and as Leon Fuerth, national security adviser to Vice President Al Gore, commented, would become ‘a demarcation point as stark as B.C. and A.D in U.S. foreign policy’. 643 Indeed, in the 9/11 environment of an “unprecedented crisis”, 644 it was rhetorically much more effective, for securitization purposes, to construct a “rupture” narrative whereby the “threats” and therefore strategy were claimed to have been “recast” by 9/11, thus necessitating exceptional measures.

Indeed, the pre- and post-9/11 discursive dynamics that produced the US official “war on terror” narrative must be read in the broader context of tensions and debates about America’s role in the world and foreign policy since the end of World War II. On the one hand, as Tucker argues, there has been a tension between the roles of “an Empire” and “a Republic”; 645 and on the other hand, there has been a tension between realist and liberal foreign policy schools of thought among practitioners. 646 Through a liberal-internationalist post-war policy, America had become an “empire” creating and maintaining the international order through its key institution-building role. 647 In this context, the neo-conservative pressures on the Clinton Administration and subsequently on Bush Junior may be seen as part of the anxiety to reclaim such imperial role. In the context of the intervention in the Frist Gulf War, Bush Senior had proclaimed America’s post-Cold War role to be that of ‘forg[ing] for ourselves and for future generations a new world order’, 648 where diverse nations are drawn together in common cause, to achieve the universal aspirations of mankind: peace and

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642 Quoted in Keller and Mitchell (2006: 5).
646 Litwak (2002).
647 Ibid.
security, freedom and the rule of law’ (emphasis added).\textsuperscript{649} Thereby, he had answered the question ‘Do we want to remain a superpower?’ with ‘a resounding “yes”;\textsuperscript{650} and if Tucker’s definition of “empire” (‘hav[ing] as its purpose the creation and maintenance of [international] order\textsuperscript{651}’) is correct, he had also confirmed America’s continued imperial ambition.

In this light then, when in the aftermath of 9/11, President Bush proclaimed his two of the most (in)famous phrases ‘you are either with us or against us’, and ‘Axis of Evil’, rather than constructing a rupture narrative, he was in fact drawing on continuities and relying on the activation of intertextual links with the pre-9/11 debates and official articulations around national identity and foreign policy, at least for an important segment of American and global audiences. Thus, ‘you are either with us or against us’ gained a new significance as the “logical” continuation of the American post-World War II ‘empire by invitation’\textsuperscript{652} and post-Cold War promise of “a new world order”; whereas “Axis of Evil” drew clear parallels with the Cold War era characterisation of the Soviet bloc as the “evil empire”, thereby affirming America’s “right” to define the contours of the global security field.

5.2.2. The Blair Doctrine, and its post-9/11 Revisions

While the British post-9/11 official discourse had many parallels with the US, it constructed a less starkly ruptured narrative, and one with more explicit intertextual links with the earlier New Labour discourse. Along with the narrative of “evil” and the articulation of a “new security environment” brought about by 9/11 echoing the Bush’s narrative, in Britain, Blair’s government took pains to emphasise continuity with the promised principles of “internationalism/multilateralism”, “ethical policy” and “new interventionism” set out in the pre-9/11 New Labour discourse. This sub-section traces the dynamics how the legitimation of Britain’s involvement in the “war on terror” intertextually

\textsuperscript{651} Tucker (1968), cited in Litwak (2002: 78).
\textsuperscript{652} ‘Empire by invitation’ is a term offered by historian Geir Lundestad, to describe the consensual basis of the US-led Western system as part of the post-world War II international order. Litwak (2002: 78).
relied on such pre-9/11 discourse, and also how eventually the promise of “internationalism/multilateralism” would morph into a discourse that supported its opposite – unilateral intervention, along with the US, into Iraq.

Yet in the 1997 Election Manifesto, within the framework of its “new approach” to foreign policy, New Labour had promised ‘embracing the interdependence of the modern world, working towards multilateral rather than unilateral solutions to international problems’, 653 as well as making ‘the protection and promotion of human rights a central part of...[UK] foreign policy’. 654 This was further developed in Robin Cook’s Mission Statement as Foreign Secretary, after Labour electoral victory:

Britain also has a national interest in the promotion of our values and confidence in our identity. That is why the fourth goal of our foreign policy is to secure the respect of other nations for Britain’s contribution to keeping the peace of the world and promoting democracy around the world. ...Our foreign policy must have an ethical dimension and must support the demands of other peoples for the democratic rights on which we insist for ourselves (emphases added). 655

Here, the much lauded New Labour’s “ethical dimension” in foreign policy was already defined in terms of an obligation, a specific obligation to support democratisation, which in turn promised ‘to secure the respect of other nations’. Furthermore, Cook once again reinstated that ‘[t]he Labour Government will put human rights at the heart of our foreign policy’. 656

The latter commitment was formalised on April 22 1999, in the midst of the Kosovo war, when already Prime Minister Tony Blair justified intervention by the international community in the affairs of other nations. This was done partly in the logic of what was to become the “Responsibility to Protect” principle and partly in the rationale of self-interest newly-defined. Thus, in his speech ‘The Doctrine of International Community’, Blair stressed that ‘[a]cts of genocide can never be a purely internal matter’, while holding that ‘[m]any of our domestic

656 Ibid.
problems are caused on the other side of the world... Conflict in the Balkans causes more refugees in Germany and here in the US'.

By the end of the Kosovo conflict, "intervention" was affirmed with more confidence than ever as ‘the morally right thing to do’ for the UK, and as a newly-emerging principle and obligation for the international community at large, whereby the principle of national sovereignty would not be privileged and would be forfeited, if the given state had abused their own people. Nonetheless, in contrast to the trends in the US, in the UK the Blair Doctrine retained a strong commitment to internationalism, and “intervention” as a foreign policy principle was generally deemed as a multilateral, rather than a unilateral endeavour: ‘[a]ny new rules [of when to intervene] however will only work if we have reformed international institutions with which to apply them’.

Indeed, the Blair doctrine must be viewed within the broader context of the on-going debates about Britain’s post-imperial role in the world and hence of national identity since the end of World War II; particularly in the context of the contestation over the competing discourses of “exceptionalism” and “decline”.

While the narrative of “decline” is about Britain’s loss of great-power status, epitomised by US Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s 1962 remark that ‘Great Britain has lost an empire and has not yet found a role’, the narrative of “exceptionalism” is traceable to Winston Churchill’s 1948 symbolic image of Britain being exceptionally and uniquely positioned at the heart of the ‘three circles’ of ‘the British Commonwealth and Empire,…the English-speaking world …[and] United Europe’. Britain, in this image, has ‘the opportunity of joining them all [three circles] together’. Importantly, as part of this “exceptionalism”, Churchill also advanced the idea that Britain must define its quest in such uniting mission looking beyond immediate self-interest and have a benevolent...

659 Blair (22 April 1999).
663 Ibid.
contribution in the world,\textsuperscript{664} and that Britain ‘hold[s] the key to opening a safe and happy future to humanity’.\textsuperscript{665} In this context then, Blair’s embracing of a new assertive role in the world was a manifestation of the broader post-war British ‘reluctance to relinquish some elements of great-power status’.\textsuperscript{666}

In setting out his doctrine of “exceptionalism”, Blair assigned Britain the privileged role of a “bridge” between the US and Europe, with a heavy emphasis on the US-UK special relationship: “[o]ur aim should be to deepen our relationship with the US at all levels. We are the bridge between the US and Europe. Let us use it. When Britain and America work together on the international scene, there is little we can’t achieve.”\textsuperscript{667} British and American “exceptionalisms” were thus interlinked, and Britain’s mission to be a ‘force for good in the world’ proclaimed by Cook was to be accomplished in close partnership with the US. Moreover, Blair declared an end to a long search for identity and role, and assigned a ‘pivotal power’ role to the UK, which could make a vital difference in world affairs:

I believe that search can now end. We have got over our Imperial past – and the withdrawal symptoms. No longer do we want to be taken seriously just for our history, but for what we are and what we will become. We have a new role. Not to look back and try to re-create ourselves as the pre-eminent superpower of 1900, nor to pretend to be the Greeks to the Americans’ Romans. It is to use the strengths of our history to build our future not as a super power but as a pivotal power, as a power that is at the crux of the alliances and international politics which shape the world and its future. Engaged, open, dynamic, a partner and, where possible, a leader in ideas and in influence, that is where Britain must be. But – and here is the choice – if we want this role, we have to reject creeping isolationism and an outdated view that a nation is only “independent” if it stands aloof (emphases added).\textsuperscript{668}

Thus, on the one hand placing the UK within Churchill’s “three circles”, at the same time Blair reinforced the special role secured for the US in Britain’s relations. Not only Britain’s interests and goals were ‘viewed...through a transatlantic lens’,\textsuperscript{669} but also, as the last lines in the quote demonstrate, Britain’s “exceptionalism” was deemed operable only with the US.

\begin{footnotes}
\item[664] Harvey (2011: 5).
\item[665] Churchill (1950), quoted in Harvey (2011: 5).
\item[666] Harvey (2011: 5).
\item[669] Harvey (2011: 7).
\end{footnotes}
After 9/11, when the UK participation in the Afghanistan war was given a high moral purpose from the outset, and when the protection of the innocent was emphasised as a key theme in preparations for a “just war” fought for British values, the narrative was easy to construct and take hold in the public, as most of the underlying premises were echoing the discourse around the Blair Doctrine in the pre-9/11 years. While the US legal justification for the Operation Enduring Freedom revolved around the UN Charter premise of self-defence, the Blair government largely reached out to the British public a) by numerous references to “morality” and the ‘absolute determination to see justice done’, not least because of an obligation to defend “British values”; b) by strong emphasis on the “humanitarian side” of the war, e.g. through references to the ‘humanitarian coalition to help the people of Afghanistan’; as well as c) repeated reminders of the war being waged by a ‘coalition of nations’ supporting the US and the UK: ‘[w]hat we have encountered is an unprecedented level of solidarity and commitment to work together against terrorism. This is a commitment that spans all continents, cultures and religions...We have already made good progress in taking forward an international agenda...We act with world opinion behind us’.

All of these performative acts, for their illocutionary success, required and in fact were relying on the semiotic repository introduced via the Blair Doctrine before 9/11, and were now satisfying the main premises of the Doctrine. The last of these, i.e. the emphasis on a “coalition of nations”, even if partly, was satisfying the “internationalism/multilateralism” principle, giving the impression of an internationalist foreign policy.

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670 Security Council Resolutions 1368 (2001) and 1373 (2001), both adopted following 9/11 in September 2001, in the preamble referred to terrorism as a threat to international peace and security and recognised ‘the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence in accordance with the [UN] Charter’. However, as some have argued, the operative parts of the resolutions do not refer to ‘armed attack’ under Article 51 of the Charter. Therefore, Gray notes, the Operation Enduring Freedom (the formal US name for the war in Afghanistan) had ‘no express UN basis beyond the initial reference to self-defence in Security Council Resolutions 1368 (2001) and 1373 (2001)’. Christine D. Gray, *International Law and the Use of Force* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 199: 206.
672 Ibid.
673 Ibid.
674 As Gray notes, the US too may have capitalised on the fact of the coalition and the number of countries supporting the Operation Enduring Freedom, allowing it to argue the war in Afghanistan is part of a multilateral effort – a ‘Coalition against Terror’ – rather than a unilateral one. Moreover, she contends that the US Security Council Resolutions 1510 (2003) and 1659 (2006) calling on the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to cooperate closely with
However, more controversial was the legality of the Iraq war, over which an intensive multilateralism-vs.-unilateralism debate emerged in the UK. In the midst of hugely divided public opinion and mass outcries against a possible British involvement, the Blair Government went to great length using every possible influence and channel to take the war through the UN-approved route and to persuade the US to follow suit. Thus, as some analysts acknowledge, British pressure played a key role in reinforcing the views of the “doves” within the [Bush] Administration – views that held sway throughout 2002 and eventually triggered the passing of UNSCR 1441...[and] the UK Government left no stone unturned in its public campaign to build support – both domestically and globally – for a new UN resolution demanding the immediate and untrammelled return of a strengthened weapons inspectorate to Iraq.  

This anxiety to achieve multilateralism can be explained, at least partly, by the constraints emanating from the narrative of the New Labour foreign policy that emerged in late 1990s, and the need to remain discursively “answerable” to one of its main tenets, that of “internationalism”. However, in parallel, the British official narrative was constructing Saddam’s regime as continuously undermining the UN credibility by non-compliance, and hence as a threat to the very principle of internationalism. This construction (coupled with the “strong evidence-based” construction of the regime as a direct security threat to the Western world via the September Iraq Dossier) already contained the semiotic possibilities allowing a break-away from the constraints of the de facto enactment of the principle of “internationalism/multilateralism”, without having to abandon it as a New Labour ideal. In the early months of 2003, Blair government was already moving away from pressures on a renewed inspectorate and making the case for a threat or use of military force:

If we fail to back our words with deeds, we follow one of the most catastrophic precedents in history. ... If the Security Council were to demonstrate that it was incapable of tackling the new threats of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism, it would risk doing as much damage to the UN as that suffered by the League of Nations when it failed to face up to the challenges of the 1930s.

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While the principle of “internationalism/multilateralism” was being morphed, the “pre-emption/prevention” basis for British involvement in the Iraq war was much easier to harmonise with and make appear as naturally flowing from the earlier narrative of the Blair Doctrine, namely the narrative of an “ethical” foreign policy of obligation of “doing good in the world”. Thus, in his speech of March 2002 at the Foreign Policy Centre, British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw called for a ‘diplomacy of foresight’, firmly putting this in the context of New Labour’s foreign policy vision already affirmed in 1999, where ‘values and interests merge... the spread of our values makes us safer’. Now the pursuance of “our values” abroad extends to treating their violations (such as human rights abuses) as an early warning for ‘future troubles’. Therefore, ‘[w]e have to have the vision to act before threats arise’. In addition, the latter statement especially echoes the illocution, if not the exact syntax, of many a Bush statement about “not-waiting-until-threats-fully-arise”, which themselves in turn reverberate the pre-9/11 neo-Conservative discourses of pre-emption.

Hence, it may be claimed that the early New Labour discourse of “intervention” had created the preconditions for the official narrative of the 2003 Iraq war legitimising military intervention without the approval of the UN, despite the controversies and hugely divided public opinion.

Overall, in the UK, there was less of a “rupture” narrative, and more an endeavour to demonstrate continuity with the pre-9/11 Blair Doctrine of ethical foreign policy and of multinational involvement including through intervention. For perlocutionary success, Blair’s post-9/11 discourse intertextually relied on speech-acts that bore resonance to already familiar concepts and propositions. As discursive constructions such as those around “obligation to intervene”, and “moral duty to help democratise” enter the broader public domain, over time they may lose their semiotic link to source/authorship and even initial context, but retain resonance or at least familiarity for most people in the discursive field.

Despite the explored differences in the two countries, the discourse of “intervention” – more pre-emptive and unilateral in one case, and more

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679 Blair (22 April 1999).
680 Straw (25 March 2002).
681 Ibid.
multilateral in the other – had started taking root and entering the dialogical semiotic field well before 9/11, both in the US and the UK, and became important points of dialogicity both for the official discourses and the discourses of dissent in the post-9/11 period. Before exploring this dialogical field of contestation in the proceeding chapters, I now turn to a schematic mapping of the official “war on terror” discourses in the US and the UK in the early post-9/11 period, roughly between 2001 and 2005.

5.3. Weaving the Official “War on Terror” Narrative: Narrative-Normative Chronotopes

In chapter 4, I identified narrative-normative chronotopes to be one of the indexical indicators of relationality among voices. To remind, Bakhtinian chronotope is the time-space matrix upon which a narrative is structured and towards which all other elements of the narrative gravitate. To recall, the significance of narrative chronotopes in foreign/security discourses is that they mark representations of continuity, rupture, and aspirations for the future of an “imagined” nation, as well as that of an “imagined” global politics. Hence, the narrative chronotope of the foreign/security discourse is necessarily normative-axiological. Re-constructing the narrative-normative chronotope of the early official “war on terror” discourses in the US and the UK helps unpack the narrative structure of these discourses, not only allowing a certain level of comparison between the two, but also, in the subsequent chapters, allowing tracing changing characteristics of the respective narratives in the later stages, as well as mapping the dialogical interactions among various competing voices.

The discussion in this section is not a representational analysis that claims an explanation or an explication logically following from the dominant representation, i.e. tracing how a specific narrative representation “made possible” a certain policy. Indeed, as posited earlier, the analysis of the representational chronotopes of each narrative does not, in and of itself, constitute an explanation of policy, or of continuity or change thereof: the latter result only from the relations between the opposite forces and powers inherent in the multiple voices and in the balancing act of the official representatives. Neither does this section offer a comprehensive account of all the themes and

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rhetorical strategies inherent in these early official narratives. Instead, necessarily simplified, it serves as a heuristic device and an analytical departure point to start a dialogical analysis of various voices and trace how these relate and produce effect.

The data are selected from official public utterances on “war on terror” spanning approximately from 11 September 2001 to end of 2005, represented by statements, speeches and other texts produced at public appearances, primarily by the president/prime-minister, but also by other high ranking officials. This is the period, when the “war on terror” discourse gains a dominant status within a short span of time following 9/11, as well as when the official narrative, following substantial challenges, re-enforces itself, approximately from the run-up to the Iraq war at the end of 2002 and the reactions to the immediate aftermath of the invasion, till about the end 2005. I have selected official articulations at important historic junctures, and specifically those that have potentially attracted the largest audiences (e.g. through prime-time televised presidential addresses), and have had the most reverberation. 683

Both in the US and the UK, the weaving of the official narrative of “war on terror” started only hours after the 9/11 strikes. Thus, in President Bush’s Remarks at Barksdale Air Force Base, with the very opening lines, the 9/11 attacks were framed as an attack ‘on freedom’, and the fight that was unavoidably to ensue was firmly placed to be a fight to regain this freedom:

*Freedom* itself was attacked this morning by a *faceless coward*. And *freedom will be defended* (emphases added). 684

In Britain, in solidarity with the US, Prime Minister Tony Blair, cancelled his scheduled speech at the Trade Union Conference, and instead announced:

This mass terrorism is the *new evil* in our world today. It is perpetrated by fanatics who are utterly indifferent to the sanctity of human life and *we, the democracies of this world, are going to have to come together to fight it together and eradicate this evil completely from our world* (emphases added). 685

In the meantime, especially in the US, the construction of a causation-free narrative of terrorism quickly followed. On the one hand, terrorism was

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683 See Appendix A, for a full list of data.
presented as an ultimate “evil” that was in a temporal continuity with other challenges in the American past: in fact, the terrorists were ‘the heirs of all the murderous ideologies of the 20th century...fascism, Nazism, and totalitarianism’,\textsuperscript{686} and therefore, the continuation of the “evil” America had been destined to fight in the past. On the other hand, and by contrast, the 9/11 events were constructed as being in a temporal discontinuity with the American foreign policies and its involvements specifically in the Middle East. As a result, ‘9/11 quickly took on an exceptional ahistoricity’.\textsuperscript{687}

In these brief openings, we already witness two important \textit{structural aspects} of the official narratives in each country: a) the positioning of the signifiers “freedom” and “evil” as the two key \textit{nodal points}, or what I will call “master nodal points”; and b) the construction of the \textit{chronotopic building block} of “future” as part of the narrative-normative chronotope of the foreign/security discourse.

I identify “evil” and “freedom” as the two structuring master nodal points, based on two criteria. First, these are signifiers with the highest possible \textit{level of abstraction}: “evil” is a higher abstraction than “terrorism”, since not only the latter can be derived from the former, but also a host of other signifiers can be organised around the former. Thus, for example, not only “terrorism”, but also “states that harbour terrorists”, as well as “anyone against us”, including, by extension, the “unpatriotic”/“un-American” critics of the official stance, can be constructed reliant on meanings projected from the master nodal point “evil”. In case of “freedom”, such derivative nodal points would be “[our] civilization”, “what we stand for” (i.e. “our values”), “our global mission”, “better life for women in Afghanistan/Iraq”, etc. Second, these are signifiers that have been fixed in the official discourse as \textit{essentially non-contestable, unquestionable}, naturalised realities in relation to which the speaker occupies the highest moral ground, and in relation to which every other signifier in the narrative must be re-cast. Hence they are the semiotic focal points – the ultimate fixation points – upon which the monologising attempts are made, or towards which striving of closure is oriented, and in relation to which normative signifiers such as

\begin{itemize}
\end{itemize}
“responsibility”, “interests”, “morality” etc. become fixed. Therefore, “freedom” and “evil” are abstractions that have to be engaged with and hence extend to the counter-narratives and discourses of dissent in a dialogical interaction; not least as points of subversion, of questioning the “unquestionable” and of repopulating them with new signification. It is not surprising then, that suppression of dissent and silencing of critique, as the subsequent chapters will show, have been performed via discursive techniques reliant on these particular nodal points.

The two master nodal points of “evil” and “freedom”, in isolation, offer only a spatial indexing of semiotic relations in the narrative, and therefore do not yet reveal the full structure and particularly the normative-axiological properties of the narratives: the latter are unpacked only when combined with the analysis of the temporality of the narrative, and combined in a complete time-space matrix. Thus, I identify chronotopic building blocks, i.e. narrative propositions pertaining to the temporalities running through the narrative-normative chronotope: “past” (e.g., references to “our historical past”), “present” (e.g., “who we are/where we stand today and what we must do today”), and “future” (the imagined state of the nation in a constructed future). Moreover, entwined in these temporal propositions are propositions telling about outcomes, e.g. stories of “triumph” or “failure”, which may be constructed in all three temporal points and at their intersection. The normativity of the narrative chronotope is teased out of the relationship among the three chronotopic building blocks and the outcome constructions.

I now turn to more closely exploring the two different chronotopes within the early official “war on terror” narratives of the US and the UK, respectively.

5.3.1. Imagining the Nation: “Cyclical Triumph” vis-à-vis “Agent of Change”

Simultaneous with framing 9/11 as an attack on America and as ‘despicable acts of war’, and with performative unifying of America as ‘one Nation under God’ fighting against “evil”, in the days and weeks following 9/11, President Bush went on to present the audiences with a subjunctive “future” for the nation.

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688 Also, note that these two criteria help us avoid identifying nodal points based on themes occurring in discourse, which could potentially be any signifier around which a political contestation revolves, and instead allows concentrating on signifiers having certain identifiable structural and structuring characteristics, which can potentially have consequences for the overall dynamics of the contestation.
imagined through a “triumph” of “freedom”, which in turn would ensure a successful realisation of American identity. Thus, most references to the nation’s “future” were accompanied with reassurance of “triumph”. The following are only a few out of numerous examples:

This battle will take time and resolve, but make no mistake about it, we will win (emphasis added).689

This will be a monumental struggle of good versus evil, but good will prevail (emphasis added).690

Tonight we are a country awakened to danger and called to defend freedom. Our grief has turned to anger, and anger to resolution. Whether we bring our enemies to justice, or bring justice to our enemies, justice will be done (emphasis added).691

Here we witness an assurance of history’s repetitive course in favour of America’s triumph, which is indicative of what I will call the Chronotope of Cyclical Triumph. This chronotope prevalent in the American official narrative emerges more clearly already in the other, most important public appearance on the day of 9/11, the Presidential Address to the Nation.692 In this speech, where the label “war against terrorism” is heard for the first time in this context, President Bush performs several, simultaneous and often overlapping, speech-acts. Cumulatively, these construct a certain temporality for the national identity rationale. Thus, through this speech, Bush performs the following:

a) Announces “freedom” itself to be ‘under attack’ where “freedom” is the master nodal point organising the derivative nodes “our nation”, “our way of life”, “our mission in the world”, etc. “Freedom” thus becomes the condition of possibility for the nation who is ontologically dependent on it;

b) Historicises the situation: ‘America has stood down enemies before…’, which bears the illocution that “the American nation has prevailed and triumphed in the past”;

c) Constructs a “present”, where despite the catastrophe, America is still triumphant, even in the immediate present, even amidst disaster: ‘These

690 Ibid.
acts of mass murder were intended to frighten our nation into chaos and retreat. But they have failed. Our country is strong; d) Constructs a “future” with a high degree of certitude, where “freedom” prevails again, and where winning the “war against terrorism” is an unmistakable certainty: ‘And no one will keep that light [of freedom] from shining’ as ‘we stand together to win the war against terrorism’. 693

This speech is illustrative of the broader structural peculiarities, namely the relationships among the chronotopic building blocks “past”, “present” and “future”, where imagining the “future” of the nation is dependent on the nodal point “freedom” and the macro-narrative building block “triumph”.

In cases of both the US and the UK, the analysis shows that most of the performative constructions of “future” are co-occurring with the constructions of “triumph” as the necessary condition for the national identity. However, this trend is more salient in case of the US: the narrative, having been reliant for its resources on references to the historical (mostly triumphant) “past” of the nation, now links the successful realisation of the identity with the coming-into-life of a very specific and exclusionary type of “future”. In this “future”, “triumph” over the specifically articulated threat becomes a necessity for the nation to imagine itself, i.e. becomes an ontological necessity for the “we” identity. Furthermore, in case of the US, “evil” in the “past” and the “present” is constructed as absolute, teleological and non-causal (i.e. unrelated to US past or present actions); and therefore, “triumph” in the “past” and in the “future” is pictured as absolute and teleological. Below are three more excerpts from Bush’s speeches, the first of which most starkly illustrates the teleological conception of “evil” and past and future “triumphs”:

We’re confident... that history has an author who fills time and eternity with his purpose. We know that evil is real, but good will prevail against it.694 The advance of human freedom -- the great achievement of our time, and the great hope of every time -- now depends on us. Our nation, this generation will lift a dark threat of violence from our people and our future. We will rally the world to this cause by our efforts, by our courage. We will not tire, we will not falter, and we will not fail.695

Fancying these [democratic] ideals is the mission that created our nation. It is the honorable achievement of our fathers. Now it is the urgent requirement of our

693 All excerpts are from the same speech. Ibid.
nation’s security...the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements ...with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world...We go forward with complete confidence in the eventual triumph of freedom (all emphases added).

The trend of absolutism and certainty of “triumph” evolves, and faced with increasingly more challenging counter-narratives, its rhetorical means diversify. Thus, for instance, while in most cases, a construction of “evil” is followed by a construction of “triumph” in the “future”, especially in later years, the order is sometimes reversed: a past historical event involving a major threat is narrated as a triumph, and followed by the construction of the present threat in a temporal continuum. This, too, demonstrates the cyclical rationale of the chronotope. Here is an illustrative example from Bush’s second inaugural address:

For half a century, America defended our own freedom by standing watch on distant borders. After the shipwreck of communism came years of relative quiet, years of repose, years of sabbatical. And then there came a day of fire.

While there is no direct construction of the triumphant “future” as yet, such ordering has the powerful illocution of “this evil is as certain to be triumphed over as the one in the past”, thus making it a historical fact in the future.

Increasingly, the “future” is also constructed via what might be called a negative imagining, i.e. the invocation of a “failure” in ‘our fight for freedom’ – and therefore failure in the realisation of the national identity – if certain course of action is not adopted today, in the “present”. An early example is found in Bush’s First UN speech:

We act to defend ourselves...and deliver our children from a future of fear ....Upon these commitments depend all peace and progress...the cost of inaction is far greater. The only alternative to victory is a nightmare world where every city is a potential killing field (emphasis added).

Here, a subjunctive future is first constructed via negative imagining of a plight (‘future of fear’, ‘nightmare world’) that is deemed undesirable, and is juxtaposed with the construction of a “triumph” in the “future”, if the suggested actions are taken in the “present”. Notably, Bush used such a construction to rationalise his now notorious choice in perhaps the most (in)famous of his

697 Ibid.
698 Bush (10 November 2001).
statements, namely the 2002 State of the Union, dubbed the “Axis of Evil” speech:

States like these [North Korea, Iran, Iraq], and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be catastrophic (emphases added).  

Moreover, it appears that this type of negative imaginings is used more often when the stakes of the intended legitimation and possibility for critique are higher. Thus, a case in point is Bush’s 7 October 2002 Cincinnati speech, where, ahead of the crucial Congressional vote on the resolution granting authority to go to war, Bush comprehensively builds the case for Iraq. This speech is densely built on such constructions of negative imagining, which are then refuted by an invocation of a positive imagining. Thus, the two become structurally dependent:

[§1] Failure to act would embolden other tyrants, allow terrorists access to new weapons and new resources, and make blackmail a permanent feature of world events. The United Nations would betray the purpose of its founding, and prove irrelevant to the problems of our time. And through its inaction, the United States would resign itself to a future of fear.

[§2] That is not the America I know. That is not the America I serve. We refuse to live in fear. [Applause] ...Now, as before, we will secure our nation, protect our freedom, and help others to find freedom of their own (emphases added).

Achieved via what I call “if”-conditionality statements, this subjunctive “failure” in the “future” has the function of reinforcing the impossibility of imagining the American identity in any alternative circumstances. “If”-conditionality statements are certain type of warnings, based on a false dichotomy, one option of which leads to a definite, a priori constructed “failure” that must be avoided at all costs. In case of Bush’s narrative, such subjunctive future presents a bleak prospect, “in case if we do not take action”, i.e. if Americans do not adopt the one and only suggested route of action to counter the “threat” of terrorism: their very identity as a “free” nation will be in jeopardy. Moreover, §2 in the above quote is starkly illustrative of the Chronotope of Cyclical Triumph: especially through the speech-act ‘This is not the America I know’, intertextually linked and hence encouraged to be read with the previous and proceeding statements on past and therefore future historic triumphs, America is static, has transcendental

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700 Bush (7 October 2002).
identity, and hence the certitude of cyclical return.\textsuperscript{701} Figure 1 illustrates the Chronotope of Cyclical Triumph prevalent in the US official narrative.

Interestingly, negative imaginings of the “future” accompanying a reaffirmation of “triumph” as the only alternative occur more often from late 2002 onwards, and amount to a more salient trend from late 2003 to 2005. This is the same period when increased pressure is put on the official narrative in both the British and American societies, due to the controversy around the Iraq invasion, as well as due to meanings emanating from external sources such as the bin Laden videos and the reports on rising death tolls. The latter were putting pressure on even otherwise supportive news outlets to ‘deviat[e] from the supportive mode of coverage and generat[e] a challenge to the coalition perspective’.\textsuperscript{702}

![Figure 1: The Chronotope of Cyclical Triumph in US official narrative](image)

It will be argued later, that this was not a coincidental trend: the representatives of the official narrative were forced to engage in indirect performative actions silencing alternative voices, simultaneous with (re)constructing and reinforcing their narrative.

\textsuperscript{701} This is also consistent with Campbell’s observation about ‘the history of America [being] de-historicized’ as the spatial has been privileged over the temporal, ‘giv[ing] history the quality of an eternal present’. Campbell (1998: 132).

\textsuperscript{702} Robinson, Piers, Peter Goddard, Katy Parry and Craig Murray, with Taylor, Philip M., Pockets of Resistance: British News Media, war and theory in the 2003 invasion of Iraq (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2010), p. 112.
In the UK, from the very beginning, the modality of the imperative to go to war, and relatedly the chronotopicity of the narrative, was different to that of the US:

...and we, the democracies of this world, *are going to have to come together* to fight it [terrorism] together and eradicate this evil completely from our world (emphasis added).

Here, in contrast with Bush’s assured modality of ‘we will/ ‘we must’, Blair starts in a ‘we are going to have to’ modality, and constructs the British involvement in the “war on terror” more as a moral choice, a responsibility, from which “we” could have refrained, but which “we” are *obliged* to take up, given who “we” are – a freedom-loving nation who also strives to be a leader of the ‘democracies of the world’ and an *agent of change in the international society*. In contrast with the American Chronotope of Cyclical Triumph, I will call this *Agent of Change Chronotope*. In this chronotope of the British narrative, there is less certainty about the natural and repetitive flow of history, and “triumph” is more conditional upon “our efforts” to unite in a multilateral endeavour. Moreover, whereas in case of the US, the responsibility to combat “evil” is transcendental, perpetual and the outcome repetitive; in case of the UK, the responsibility is borne out of global changes and is dependent on the UK choice to take on a pivotal role in the world, to perform the chosen path of an agent of change: it is a responsibility to “international society” deemed as a multilateral project, where interests and values must merge. Indeed, this is consistent with Blair’s 1999 Doctrine of International Community, the image of Britain as a “bridge” joining the Churchillian “three circles” and as a “source for good”. Blair further states:

They [families of the British victims of 9/11] don’t want revenge. They want something better in memory of their loved ones.... [they want] lasting good: destruction of the machinery of terrorism wherever it is found; hope amongst all nations of a new beginning where we seek to resolve differences in a calm and ordered way; greater understanding between nations and between faiths; and above all justice and prosperity for the poor and dispossessed, so that people everywhere can see the chance of a better future through the hard work and creative power of the free citizen, not the violence and savagery of the fanatic (emphasis added).

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703 Blair (11 September 2001).
704 Indeed, he gradually paves the way for a more assured “must” modality, when in his 2 October speech, announces: ‘Just a choice: defeat it or be defeated by it. And defeat it we must’.
These lines are constructing a certain “future” of the British nation that is closely linked with “change” and a better “future” for the international society at large. While “evil” (‘savagery of fanatics’) is still constructed in a non-causal fashion, the “future” – of the international society and of Britain as a leading nation in it – is conceived not in the absolute terms of triumph over a teleological “evil”, but with a heavy emphasis on the mode of fighting that “evil” – a multilateral dialogue among nations that would ‘resolve differences in a calm and ordered way’ and achieve ‘greater understanding between nations and between faiths’. Thus, the speech aims at constructing not merely an image of a united nation, but a united international society within which Britain is a pivotal participant, echoing the “pivotal role” narrative of British identity affirmed through the Blair Doctrine, discussed earlier.

Nonetheless, with all the differences with the US, Blair, too, goes on to construct a “future” of the nation that is dependent on “triumph”, in other words where the nation cannot imagine itself without such specifically defined and fixed “triumph”. Thus, illustrious are the following excerpts from Blair’s Texas speech of April, 2002:

[§1] Britain is immensely proud of the part our forces have played [in recent interventions] and with the results.

[§2]... My basic argument is that in today’s interdependent world, we need an integrated approach, a doctrine of international community as I put it before, based on the values we believe in... When we defend our countries as you [the Americans] did after September 11, we aren’t just defending territory. We are defending what our nations believe in: freedom, democracy, justice, tolerance and respect towards others.

[§3]... That is the only route I know to a stable world based on prosperity and justice for all, where freedom liberates the lives of every citizen in every corner of the globe.

[§4]...We will get there (emphases added).

These statements – scattered throughout the speech but subtly interlinked – construct a very specific type of British national identity, one that fights for “freedom” to triumph over threats to “freedom” anywhere in the world, but also one who does so as an “agent of change” in a new age, where Britain is actively

706 Ibid.
707 It must be noted, that in the British official public discourse, constructions of a “triumphant” “future” are more subtle in style and syntax, and often dispersed across paragraphs or spanning the whole speech, rather than straightforwardly set out in concise sentences or paragraphs.
involved as a ‘force for good’ (note the intertextual activation of the Kosovo intervention narrative in §1). The identity is dependent on such “triumph” to realise its “agent of change” role. The last line closing the speech, ‘We will get there’, albeit not in the battle-cry style of Bush’s ‘we will prevail’, is nonetheless part of a construction of a triumphant “future” for the nation through designating a certain “future” as the only route for the realisation of the nation’s identity the way it had been fixed. Moreover, as already illustrated, in Britain’s case these constructions are often linked to, or themselves constitute, “future” of the international society, rather than immediately that of Britain.

Similar to the American discourse, the British official discourse is characterised by intense If-conditionality constructions based on negative imaginings of the “future”. However, these are less densely embedded in the overall structure of speeches; and they often construct the “future” of the “international society”, or the “future” of other (in this case, Iraqi) people, rather than immediately that of Britain. In addition, the negative imagining is often not accompanied by a positive alternative of a “triumph”. Thus, Tony Blair in his monthly press conference in January 2003 states:

[§1] My fear is that we wake up one day and we find either that one of these dictatorial states has used weapons of mass destruction - and Iraq has done so in the past - and we get sucked into a conflict, with all the devastation that would cause; or alternatively these weapons, which are being traded right round the world at the moment, fall into the hands of these terrorist groups, these fanatics who will stop at absolutely nothing to cause death and destruction on a mass scale.

[§2]…Now I simply say to you, it is a matter of time unless we act and take a stand before terrorism and weapons of mass destruction come together, and I regard them as two sides of the same coin (emphasis added).709

Note how, in contrast to the US narrative, through §2, Blair more subtly urges the audience to make their own “choice” to be “agents of change” in history to avert the depicted dire future plight. In later chapters, it is demonstrated how, characteristically, many of these negative imaginings are built dialogically on utilising actual, or anticipated, critique and counter-narratives, to render the latter as the route to “failure”.

Similar to the American discourse, in the early British discourse, the “past” is mostly portrayed as a source of pride in combating past evils such as fascism and communism and as testimony for future victory over the new evil of

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terrorism. However, in contrast with the US, here the “past” is not always one-dimensional: rarely but nonetheless visibly, the “past” is also a source of failure and faltering of Western values and principles, and therefore calls for change. Thus, Jack Straw, addressing The Foreign Policy Centre at the launch of the Report ‘Re-Ordering the World’, recollected:

In the 1980s, many in the West, guided by the principle that “my enemy’s enemy is my friend”, saw Saddam as a useful ally against the threat of revolutionary radicalism from Iran under the Ayatollahs. The abuse of human rights in Iraq told a different story. …It would be too easy for us to say today what our predecessors should have done to spare us these problems…The far harder challenge for us is to face the difficult choices before us now, stand up to bullies like Saddam, and not leave these problems to the next generation to sort out (emphases added).

Here not only the “past” is a source of regret and remorse, but also “evil” is not totally causally de-linked from past Western actions.

Moreover, in the British discourse, future “triumph” is conceived not in terms of securing the return of what “we” already had, i.e. “freedom” and “security” and “triumph” of “our [transcendental] values”, but creating a “future” both for the nation and the international society which is newly conceived, and which requires reforming and transforming the “present”. Thus, speaking in Glasgow at the time of unprecedented anti-war rallies in London and around the world ahead of the Iraq invasion, Blair gives a clear illustration of such transformative character of the narrative-normative chronotope inherent in the British discourses:

We will never retreat into isolationism that would leave Britain weak, marginalised, ridiculed. This is a time when our character is being tested. Our conviction shows us the way. Social justice; solidarity; opportunity for all. The belief that we are a community of people, and a community of nations. Stronger together achieving more together than we can alone. British values. Labour values. Values worth fighting for. Values to inspire our journey of change. Values to sustain us for the great challenges ahead. Values to drive us as we create the Britain that we promised and the Britain that today our world needs (emphases added).

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711 Straw (25 March 2002).
Figure 2 illustrates the Agent of Change chronotope present in the British official narrative. I will illustrate the characteristics of the chronotope presented in the figure above, by quoting at length from Blair’s contribution to the report ‘Re-Ordering the World’, publish by The Foreign Policy Centre, a think-tank founded in 1998 under Blair’s patronage. The presented excepts are representative of the constructions reoccurring in Blair’s discourse elsewhere in more public settings, and are chosen due to their condensed and summative form:

[§1] Such military and security action [as the success in Afghanistan] needs to be backed with political change that tackles the conditions under which terrorism and international organised crime flourish or are tolerated. The dragon’s teeth are planted in the fertile soil of wrongs unrighted, of disputes left to fester for years or even decades, of failed states, of poverty and deprivation.

[§2] In today’s interdependent world, there can be no secure future for any of us unless we manage globalisation with greater justice...We are all internationalists now. And so, against the background of military action and fast-moving events, a broader shift is emerging. The power of community is reasserting itself. And this must be the greater memorial to the dead of September 11 – not simply the punishment of those responsible, but a new international mood of hope and understanding, and above all, justice and prosperity for the poor and dispossessed.

[§3] I believe we will succeed only if we start to develop a doctrine of international community based on the principle of enlightened self-interest – on the recognition that self-interest and our mutual interests are today inextricably woven together.

[§4] It is a recognition which will transform domestic as well as international politics, because globalisation shrinks the distance between domestic and
international issues. ...To spread them and to make the whole world more stable, we need a new international framework to agree and enforce international rules. In the wake of World War II, we developed an impressive series of international institutions to cope with the strains of rebuilding a devastated world: Bretton Woods, the United Nations, NATO, and the EU. To survive and remain useful today, they will have to adapt.

[§5] I realise why people protest against globalisation. It is easy to feel powerless, overwhelmed, as if we were pushed to and fro by forces far beyond our control. But whether we like it or not, globalisation is a fact...The issue is not how to stop globalisation. That is in any case futile: as the Chinese proverb has it, “no hand can block out the sun”. The issue is rather how we use the power of community to bring the benefits of globalisation to all (emphasis added).

Thus, except §1 illustrates how “evil” in the British discourse, rather than an absolute teleological repetitive phenomenon, is causally linked to instability and imbalances brought about by past and present politics in the age of globalisation. Therefore, to fight it, we need to ‘manage’ the effects of globalisation itself for the greater good and justice (excerpt §2). This “managing”, in turn, is only deemed feasible through a new ‘internationalist’ global politics (excerpts §2 and §3); one which is ready to adapt to new realities (both nationally and through global institutions) and thus transform itself (excerpt §4).

Indeed, Bair’s discourse is firmly embedded in his pre-9/11 discourse of the International Community, in turn conceived in the context of “globalisation”, “new era”, and the imperative of a “new ethical politics for Britain”. In this context, in the above contribution to the pamphlet ‘Re-Ordering the World’, as in his other statements, it is interesting to observe that “globalisation” is conceived as a phenomenon as natural as ‘the sun’ itself, which cannot be averted or rejected (excerpt §5). Nonetheless, in a modernist ethos, its power can be harnessed like a natural force, for the benefit of humankind.

Table 2 below illustrates the two different chronotopes present in the US and the UK official narratives, in a more summative and comparative manner.

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US: Cyclical Triumph | UK: Agent of Change

**“Past”**
- Triumphs: Repetitive
- “Past” triumphs are repetitive: World Wars; Cold War;
  international player (e.g. Kosovo); Imperial past toned down
- Failures/faltering: e.g. Saddam as an ally in the 1980s

**“Present”**
- “Evil” covalent with “past” “evils”
- Challenge of “evil” only one stage in the cycle of triumphs
- We are the same -- perpetually triumphant
- The present challenges are due to changed circumstances (globalization, interdependence)
- Challenges to our allies and international society;
- We are faced with an obligation and moral choice to be triumphant again: We and the world must change to adapt

**“Future”**
- Assured return of triumph: triumph – a historical fact in the future
- Freedom will prevail; we will prevail
- Triumph less given: we will triumph if we wish to stay “agents of change”

**Axiology**
- Teleological—divine righteousness
- Pragmatic/progressive and integral – i.e. integrating value and interests, including interests of others

Table 2: Comparative Summary of the US Chronotope of Cyclical Triumph vis-à-vis the British Chronotope of Agent of Change.

Indeed, the British Chronotope of Agent of Change cannot be viewed totally isolated from the US chronotope, on the one hand due to speakers attempting to preserve certain consistency and harmony with the latter, as well as the intertextual links the audiences must have drawn (whether intended by the speakers or not) between the British and American narratives, in the context of the “special relationship” and US-UK allied effort. Indeed, the texts reveal a certain level of tension present within the British official narrative: for instance, its constructions “evil” and “freedom” often resonate with the absolute and teleological constructions present in the American narrative, while at the same time being temporally arranged in a manner that reveals a starkly different axiological direction for the nation and the world. In this regard, the British chronotope reveals a higher level of complexity, which must be borne in mind when analysing the contestation of competing voices, especially major critique and challenges to the official narrative.

5.4. **Conclusion**

This first empirical chapter had two primary goals: contextualising the post-9/11 official “war on terror” discourses by locating them within, and tracing their
origins with, the pre-9/11 security discourses of “intervention” and “pre-emption/prevention” emerging in the US and the UK in 1990s; as well as reconstructing the main structural characteristics of the official post-9/11 narratives in each country by teasing out the respective narrative-normative chronotopes.

The contextualisation revealed that a discourse of legitimate “intervention” – more pre-emptive and unilateral in the US and more multilateral in the UK, was emerging in both countries already in the post-Cold War period in 1990s. However, in the US, the post-9/11 official discourse constructed an emphatically ruptured narrative rhetorically delinking the emergent Bush Doctrine from pre-9/11 policies and discourses. This rupture narrative was, perhaps, intended for the broader publics, resonating with culturally embedded Evangelical discourses of “rupture”, and “second coming”. On the other hand, the discourse relied on the intertextual reading of its main tenets as a continuation of emergent discourses of intervention influencing policy by the Clinton Administration and reflected, albeit in nascent form, Bush’s pre-9-11 discourses of election campaign and early presidency. In contrast, the UK narrative was less ruptured, and more explicitly endeavouring to invite an intertextual reading through the lens of the New Labour discourse of late 1990s, particularly emphasising continuity with the Blair Doctrine of International Community.

Then, I turned to a systematic investigation of the structure of early post-9/11 discourses. While in both countries, I deduced the spatial structuring of the narratives around the master nodal points of “evil/threat” and “freedom”, the temporality and with it the full time-space matrix of the narratives was possible to deduce only through a chronotopic analysis. To remind, in the Bakhtinian “chronotope”, time can only be perceived through giving meaning to a change in space. In this regard, by tracing how constructions of “evil” and “freedom” were spatially organised in each of the narratives and how “change” was inflicted upon them in the “past”, “present”, and “future”, it became possible to locate how each of the nations was imagined. Thus, the American official discourse presented the audiences with a Chronotope of Cyclical Triumph, where the “present” was only one stage in the cycle of triumphs; “evil” was covalent with “evils” in the “past”, America was the same – perpetually triumphant; while the

“future” was presented as the certain return of triumph, as historical fact in the “future”, where “freedom” prevails and therefore “we” prevail. “Freedom” in turn was constructed as an absolute value in jeopardy due to absolute, teleological and un-caused “evil”. In contrast, in the British Chronotope of Agent of Change, the “past” was also a source of faltering; present challenges brought about by the “evil” of terrorism were threatening not merely the nation but importantly the international society; “evil” itself was partly due to changing circumstances (globalisation, interdependence); thereby requiring amendment of national and global norms, practices and institutions. Britain was imagined as having a pivotal role in making such change possible – a moral obligation and moral choice to be triumphant again. Thus, while the normative-axiological vector of the American chronotope is cyclical, teleological and therefore self-righteous, that of the British chronotope is transformative (for national and global politics), reliant on a choice to embrace a new role and identity for Britain (“we will triumph if we wish to stay agents of change”), and therefore allows more scope for the collective agency of the nation in determining the course of history in the future.

Indeed, these are only representational chronotopes, i.e. they only show how time-space, and therefore normativity, was organized in the official representations of 9/11 and subsequently of “war on terror”. They do not necessarily show whether and to what extent the chronotopes were actually internalised by audiences, neither how policy was actually enacted. Rather, they represent the attempted monological closure through constructing an absolute ‘prior discourse’\textsuperscript{715} in a narrative of national imagining, which will gain any explanatory significance only when analysed dialogically, in relation with competing voices. Indeed, to recall the discussion in chapters 3 and 4, the representational chronotope must be juxtaposed with what Bakhtin called the “real-life” chronotope – the multiplicity of voices competing in the modern day “agora”. Moreover, the real-life chronotope would also involve daily changes and developments – be these on the ground where the given policies were enacted (e.g. increased casualties in Afghanistan, Iraq; failure of nation-building; killing of bin Laden, etc.), or political-economic developments at home (elections, financial crisis, etc.). While exploring the former, i.e. contestations among various voices at home, we must be alert to and integrate the latter, i.e.\textsuperscript{715} Bakhtin (1981: 342).
actual material and social changes that constantly affect and change the contestation, in order to observe how the narrative representational chronotope encounters the “real-life” chronotope. Tracing such encounters becomes possible through the analysis of competing voices, more particularly voices of dissent and major critique putting pressure on the official discourse, and the latter’s response to such pressures, to which I now turn in the next two chapters.
Chapter 6: Challenges to the Dominant Discourse, and the Making and Un-making of National Identity

6.1. Introduction

In the previous chapter, I reconstructed the main structural characteristics of the official post-9/11 narratives in the US and the UK, by teasing out the respective narrative-normative chronotope of Cyclical Triumph in the US, and that of Agent of Change in the UK. For heuristic purposes, I bracketed this discussion off from the dialogicity of competing voices. In order to start mapping such dialogicity in this and the next chapter, this chapter now turns to employing the second analytical tool identified in chapter 4 as part of the devices for a relational model of analysis, namely relational performatives. To remind, rather than concerned with the restricted illocutionary force of an utterance as traditionally conceived in speech-act theory, the term “relational performatives” draws analytical attention to the much broader positionality of the utterance in relation to other utterances’ positional force. This means that the focus is not only on “how to do things with words” (the traditional Austinean idiom), but rather on “how to do things to others’ words”, i.e. what power is exercised upon someone else’s utterance.

Hence, in order to allow me to assess the longer-term effects of the interactions of the official voices with those of dissent in the later chapters, the aim of this chapter is to identify major patterns of how dissenting voices have variously challenged and undermined the official narrative structure presented in the previous chapter, and specifically how the narrative-normative chronotopes of the alternative voices have encountered the official chronotopes, dislocated and, if at all, replaced such chronotopes by imagining “the nation” and “security” anew. Such dislocations have been achieved through relational performatives as conceptualised above. Therefore, analytically, the discussion in this chapter revolves, and is structurally organised, around two distinct categories of critique observable in “war on terror” contestations, namely destabilising vis-à-vis deliberative critique: whereas destabilising critique attempts to fundamentally subvert the official “war on terror” narrative, by dislodging its master nodal points and the chronotopic building blocks; deliberative critique challenges the dominant narrative only by partly refuting the earlier deliberative efforts behind the latter, and/or by demanding the fulfilment
of the promises inherent in the official narrative. However, empirically and as to its theoretical implications, the chapter is interested in two interrelated questions: first, how and to what effect critique “speaks to”, i.e. enters into a dialogical encounter with, the official narratives, be it through questioning, or else unwittingly reproducing, the premises of such narratives; and second, by variously dislocating the official narrative, including importantly, the official narrative-normative chronotope, whether and to what extent critiquing voices fill in/re-inscribe, or attempt their own ‘suture’\textsuperscript{716} of the opened-up space, i.e. whether they replace the dislocated narrative by a new narrative-normative chronotope able to image “the nation” and “security” in new ways.

The chapter starts with a context-setting overview of the discourses of early dissent. It delineates major trends produced by dissenting voices emergent in the very early stage of the post-9/11 period, namely from September 2001 to roughly the end of 2002. The aim of this brief overview section is to prepare the context for a systematic analysis of counter-narratives in the “intermediate stage”, i.e. 2003-2007, by showing that challenges to the official “war on terror” discourse were present already in the immediate post-9/11 periods, roughly the first two years after 9/11, and to deduce broader trends of counter-discourses already nascent in this stage. Thus, the discourse of early dissent was largely structured around revelatory articulations, exposing the constructed nature of “evil/threat”; the purported real motives of Bush and Blair policies, namely oil control in the Middle East, and/or the Western military-industrial complex. This was done by reference to past historical facts and present realities that had been silenced in the public domain. As a result, the chronotopic integrity of the official narratives was being disturbed: rather than a source of pride and moral triumphs, the “past” was a source of shame; whereas the “future”, rather than a triumph of “freedom” and “justice for all”, was a looming disaster for “freedom” and for global justice, if the present policies were not averted.

Having established the context of nascent trends, I then turn to the core of the discussion, i.e. present findings of the analysis of a corpus of primary source data, drawn from the articulations found in the mass media, critical politicians’ speeches, pronouncements and written texts, as well as those of anti-war activists, in the intermediate period.

\textsuperscript{716} Howarth and Stavrakakis (2000: 13-14).
The analysis yields interesting and at times unanticipated findings. Thus, a consistent trend develops in case of deliberative critique, largely practiced by acting politicians and moderately critical mainstream media: their propositions hinge on the same master nodal points as the narrative being critiqued, i.e. the official narrative, despite expressing discontent with the initial conditions of legitimation, e.g. the legal basis of the Iraq war, or with the progress of the war. In addition, such deliberative critique consistently demands for “success” and “victory” for a war that had paradoxically, in many of their own articulations, been branded as “ill-conceived”, if not outright “illegal and immoral”.

In contrast, destabilising counter-narratives undermine the macro-propositions of the official narratives by dislodging the master nodal points of “evil” and “freedom”, upon which the official narrative was hinging. Thus, often the very nodal signification of “evil” is being displaced by constructions of a different “threat” to “our freedom”, i.e. the threat of being undermined as a “nation”, if “we” go to war without limits and if “we” continue to practice repression. In the US, the Bush administration itself, by its policies that are “unjust, immoral and illegitimate”, becomes a “threat” to the realisation of the American identity anchored on “freedom”.

In addition, and most importantly, destabilising counter-narratives represent a major challenge to the narrative-normative chronotope of the official narratives, namely of the Chronotope of Cyclical Triumph in the US, and the Chronotope of Agent of Change in the UK. Simultaneous with undermining the official legitimation of the war, they also destabilise the national identity narrative built into the dominant security narrative, specifically by dislodging the national “past”, “present” and “future”, and the outcome signifiers “success” and “triumph”. Characteristically, the “future” is constructed in negative terms of “failure”, constituting subversion without the construction of an alternative positive “we” identity. In such destabilising critique, the “virtuous past” of the official chronotopes is dislodged and replaced with an alternative shameful “past”, where Britain and America are depicted as historically having been indifferent to loss of human life, oppression, and other nations’ democratic aspirations, and where they have been motivated by hubris and material self-interest. I demonstrate that such articulations constructing a negatively imagined “past” without offering an alternative, positively imagined “past” and “future”, end up producing a deficient chronotope inducing a deficit of “future”.

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Section 6.2 presents an overview of the early dissent in the immediate post-9/11 environment. Sections 6.3 and 6.4, the core of this chapter, present the findings of the systematic data analysis of critique in the intermediate period, namely roughly 2003-2007. Section 6.3 concerns itself with distinguishing two main types of critique – destabilising and deliberative counter-narratives – and examines the major ways through which they undermine and/or reproduce the official narrative; whereas section 6.4 more specifically concerns itself with examining how these critical voices affect the narrative-normative chronotope of the official discourse, and whether and how they replace the latter with an alternative chronotope and hence alternative ways of imagining “security” for the nation. The concluding section reflects on the implications of the revealed trends for the broader contestations.

6.2. Early Dissent: Emergent Trends in the Immediate Aftermath of 9/11

As early as on the day of the 9/11 attacks, narratives potentially undermining of the official line of explanation for the events were offered to the public by certain mass media, pundits, well-known political commentators, as well as public intellectuals. Key literature on the “war on terror” discourse contends that in these early days, ‘alternative and critical voices...[were] rarely heard in the political arena in America’. Moreover, it gives accounts of the role of the media as something uniform and unanimously reproducing the official narrative. This generalised treatment overlooks alternative narratives that found their place in the media more so in the UK, but also and importantly in the US, including in some otherwise “mainstream” media. Indeed, it is important to note the disproportionately larger space government-supporting news coverage and analysis occupied, at the expense of critical stories. Nevertheless, these figures in themselves do not justify treating the media as uniformly government-supporting. The analysis of whatever little criticism or dissent there was in the alternative/leftist media, as well as in some otherwise mainstream media, together with dissent among discourses of public intellectuals and anti-war

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717 See, e.g., Jackson (2005: 164).
718 As Jackson himself draws attention to, only 10% of the TV, magazine and newspaper coverage was critical of the administration’s policy; furthermore, 75% of the coverage overwhelmingly relied on government sources for information and was lacking analysis or opinion. Ibid.
movements disseminated by other means, is important: these critical/alternative discourses have not only played a significant role in the very way the hegemonic narrative has formed, as well as changed over the years, but also have an important relevance to the formation of later dissent especially ahead of the Iraq war in 2003, which is more acknowledged by commentators and scholars.

This section has only a limited purpose. It aims to show that challenges to the official “war on terror” discourse were emerging already in the immediate post-9/11 periods – the first two years after 9/11, which I will refer to as the “early stage”; and to deduce broad trends of counter-discourses already nascent in this stage, and thus prepare the context for a more systematic analysis of counter-narratives in the “intermediate stage”, i.e. 2003-2007. To map this early period of dissent, I have traced early counter-narratives and deduced major trends in early dissent through an analysis of over 30 texts critical of “war on terror” written and disseminated by prominent American and British journalists, political commentator, public speakers, as well as public intellectuals variously disseminated through national newspapers, and/or as book chapters in critical anthologies; in addition to texts by key public intellectuals such as Slavoj Žižek, Noam Chomsky; as well as salient articulations by anti-war social movements, such as ANSWER in the US, and Stop the War Coalition in the UK, and civil groups such as 9/11 Families for Peaceful Tomorrows.

Some of these critical texts are compiled in Beyond September 11, An Anthology of Dissent, edited by Phil Scraton, where the contributions are authored by prominent commentators and public intellectuals such as Noam Chomsky, Robert Fisk, John Pigler and Naomi Klein, among others. Many of the contributions had originally been published in national media and alternative e-sources. These texts were authored by well-known critics and published in nation-wide media of broad readership, as well as re-produced through re-printing in other media, especially in the internet, some of them multiple times in various blogs and leftist websites. To remind, the purpose of this particular section is limited, namely only to provide a broad sketch of the dissenting

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720 Such as The New Statesman, The Nation, and Counterpunch.org in the US, and The Guardian and The Independent, in the UK.
narratives in the very early period immediately after 9/11, and to prepare the context for a more systematic analysis of dissent and critique in the later periods, in the next two sections.

To start with, early dissent in general was characterised by a revelatory ethos. Thus, only weeks after 9/11, John Pigler, a well-known broadcaster and writer, undermines the official discourse by mostly pointing to forgotten or ignored facts destabilising of the main propositions structuring the official narrative – how Colin Powell had been touring and preparing for the war in Afghanistan even before 9/11; how the link between 9/11 and Iraq had been deliberately forged – and constructs an alternative identity of the “West” that is practicing a “geopolitical fascism” and where the concepts of “failed states”, “rogue states” and “humanitarian intervention” are concocted by ‘factory scholars’ to serve the dominant power.  

The exposure/revelation-style narrative continues, when The Guardian columnist Madeleine Bunting undermines the British official discourse, by presenting the war in Afghanistan as ‘one of the biggest humanitarian disasters in recent decades’; and by announcing Blair’s promised ‘three-pronged strategy – the military, the diplomatic and the humanitarian’ to be a ‘sham’. She further predicts ‘the looming US involvement in other counties, particularly in Iraq.

In addition, Phil Scraton directly points to the ‘constructed’ nature of both the threat and the claimed ‘moral’ response. Thus, he states: ‘constructing and popularising a “war on terror”, derived in defining, then occupying the moral high ground [by Blair], misrepresented the complexity of competing interests and material struggles’. More strikingly, Pilger entirely subverts the cause-and-effect offered in the official discourses by stating that ““liberal realism”...[has] misrepresented imperialism as “crisis management”, rather than the cause of the crisis’.

723 Ibid., 34.
Moreover, for the philosophically advanced audiences, philosopher and public intellectual Slavoj Žižek embarked on not only destabilising key nodal points in the official narrative, but also on an all-rounded de-construction of its main propositions. Thus, he effectively deconstructed what I have categorised as the master nodal points of “evil” and “freedom” upon which the official narrative-normative chronotope of “war on terror” was hinging: ‘all the main terms we use to designate the present conflict – “war on terrorism”, “democracy and freedom”, “human rights”, and so on – are false terms, mystifying our perception of the situation instead of allowing us to think it’. As a result, Žižek calls on everyone to think beyond simple binary oppositions of Self and Other.

As part of such expository, historicising as well as de-mystifying/de-constructive functions, others too, attempted to destabilise the key nodal points on which the official narrative was structurally hinging. Thus, e.g. in relation to Bush’s initiatives of aid to Afghanistan in form of airdrops of food packs, Bunting observes: ‘[i]t may reassure the American people of their noble fight, but the reality of this grubby, vengeful war is beginning to become apparent’. This performative action puts pressure on and attempts to disqualify the signifier “noble fight”, which is a derivative of the master nodal point “freedom” in the official narrative.

In a similar vein, Paul Foot destabilises the nodal point “democracy”, another key derivative of the master nodal point “freedom” in the official narrative. Thus, lamenting the lack of any substantive parliamentary debate over the war in Afghanistan, he portrays the British House of Commons as ‘a pathetic apology for parliamentary democracy’. The informed audience, indeed, reads this critique in dialogue with (i.e. intertextually linked with) and as an answer to Blair’s rhetoric of the time, where Britain has the moral mission of giving people around the world ‘the chance for a better future....as free citizens to enjoy the democratic freedoms “we” enjoy at home. In such a

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727 Ibid., p. 2.
730 Blair (2 October, 2001).
reading then, the structuring nodal point of “freedom” in the official narrative is undermined.

Perhaps most importantly, some of these critical voices urged audiences to consider how different modes of explanations for the causes of 9/11 would have bearing on the chosen course of action as a response. Thus, directly undermining the official narrative that had left no space for alternatives to war, Paul Foot pointed to some suggestions of alternative policies that would, according to him, rectify consequences of the Western actions over decades: ‘Stop subsidizing the government of Israel. Stop appeasing the war criminal Sharon...Stop bombing Iraq...Stop cuddling up to feudal and sexist dictatorships... stop siding with the rich of the world against the poor’. These alternative calls for action aimed to delegitimise the official response, namely that of “war on terror”.

Similar calls were emanating also from the placards and speeches of the anti-war movement protesters, both in the US and the UK. Here, the new electronic technologies had provided the activists with a powerful tool to trespass the channels of traditional mass media and directly disseminate their own, alternative narratives, and reach broader audiences. Converging around the common cause of ‘stop the war’, they variously attempted to destabilise the official narrative. Thus, in the US, the Act Now to Stop War and End Racism (ANSWER) Coalition, an umbrella organisation comprised of anti-globalisation and anti-war movements formed in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, demanded that ‘the U.S. government should share responsibility for pursuing imperialist policies that helped create the historical conditions within which these attacks were inspired, planned, and carried out’. They claimed that ‘the people in the United States were subject to a carefully orchestrated round the clock campaign to create a war fever’, and in the first major post-9/11 demonstration held in Washington on 29 September 2001, chanted: ‘Destroy imperialism, not

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732 Gillan, Kevin, Jenny Pickerill and Frank Webster, Anti-War Activism: New Media and Protest in the Information Age (Palgrave: Macmillan, 2008), p. 41.
733 Ibid., 73.
Afghanistan’, and ‘War is not the answer, Islam is not the problem’. Similar discourse emanated from the *Stop the War Coalition* in the UK.

Finally, challenges to the official discourse also came from some civil groups, most notably individuals and groups of families of the victims of 9/11 against a “war” response to the tragedy. In such oppositional discourse, the manipulative side of government policy was being depicted. Thus, writing to Bush days after the bombings in Afghanistan had begun, one family states: ‘[i]t makes us feel our government is using our son’s memory for justification to cause suffering for other sons and parents in other lands’. Other letters to newspapers and public statements followed, culminating in a trip by several of the family members to Kabul to see at first hand and communicate to the people at home the sheer volume of civilian casualties. The resultant counter-narrative denied ‘that war and violence [were] effective in achieving the supposed goal of making Americans safe,...that the victims of violence or terrorism want or require revenge to right their wrongs...[and] that Americans are somehow more worthy than other human beings’. Discursively, these messages had a powerful additional destabilising potential, due to the source of the challenge being the very same subjects on whose name the war had been justified – the victims/their families, and derivatively “our nation” at large. As anti-war family members of the victims later organised themselves into social groups and movements (such as the 9/11 Families for Peaceful Tomorrows), such destabilising efforts became more tangible.

While examples are numerous, the ones given suffice to illustrate the emerging distinct pattern: in this early period, the dissent to the official discourse on 9/11 and the “war on terror” was largely structured around performative actions that were revelatory in nature, exposing the constructed nature of the threat and the ensuing justifications. This was being achieved by laying bare past historical facts and present realities that had been silenced or left ignored in the public domain. These performative efforts’ overarching speech-act intention was that of unmasking/exposing the purported real motivations behind the given foreign policies, where the official threat...
construction and policy justifications were presented as having an instrumental purpose – to serve oil control in the Middle East, and/or the Western military-industrial complex. Most of these efforts also exposed and recognised a causal link between the US/UK past actions in the world and 9/11, as well as warned about more resentment and fanaticism to come as a result of the “war on terror”.

As a result, the chronotopic integrity of the official narratives was disturbed: the “past” was not any more a source of mere pride and moral victories, but rather a locus of shame, as the cause of present grievances; whereas the “future” was not that of a triumph of “freedom” and a place of justice for all, but rather a looming disaster for “freedom” and for global justice, if the present policies were not averted. In addition, some of these narratives effectively undermined the highly dichotomised official narratives, by deconstructing key binaries such as Self and Other. Through such destabilising discourse, the narratives of early dissent also attempted to put pressure on and subvert key nodal points upon which the edifice of the official narrative was hinging. As the next section demonstrates, this latter trend was to become increasingly more significant for the overall discursive dynamics in the years to come.

I now turn to a systematic analysis and appraisal of the different types of counter-narratives in the mid- to late post-9/11 period in the next two sections. While this section was about the emergent stage and surveyed only very early dissent in big brush strokes, the next two sections are about more stabilising discourses of dissent, which the official narrative was increasingly unable to escape and had to be answerable to. Also, while this section was just on dissenting media and civil society; challenges to the official narrative, especially in the mid- to later stage, increasingly came also from within the political circles, including oppositional parties and from within the ruling parties.

6.3. Destabilising vis-à-vis Deliberative Performatives

By mid-2003, the initial official enthusiasm caused by rapid military success in Iraq quickly waning, amidst mounting criticism both in the US and the UK about the justifications to go to war, as a result of the lack of any evidence of weapons of mass destruction found on the ground. This was compounded by rising military death tolls, decreased international readiness to commit troops to post-
war reconstruction, reports about public resistance against the “liberators” in Iraq, and growing public fears at home that this might turn into another Vietnam as a result of a lingering war, growing casualties and no clear exit strategy.\footnote{Coates, David and Joel Krieger (2004: 2-3).}

Criticism further intensified as in October 2003 the interim Iraq Survey Group report suggested that ‘[d]espite evidence of Saddam’s continued ambition to acquire nuclear weapons, to date we have not uncovered evidence that Iraq undertook significant post-1998 steps to actually build nuclear weapons or produce fissile material’,\footnote{Statement by David Kay on the Interim Progress Report on the Activities of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) Before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Defense, and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (2 October, 2003), at \url{https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/2003/david_kay_10022003.html}, accessed 04/01/2013.} neither did they find stocks of any other types of WMDs. Indeed, Kay warned that these were not final findings;\footnote{Ibid.} nonetheless public discontent was growing, as the critical press was breeding suspicions that no such weapons had existed prior to the invasion. In the UK, the public outcry grew even bigger, over the scandal around the BBC’s claim that the Blair Government had ‘sexed up’ the September 2002 dossier, and over the subsequent Hutton inquiry. The situation grew more problematic, when the final Iraq Survey Group report of September 2004 confirmed that in the pre-war period ‘[d]istant technical analysts mistakenly identified evidence and drew incorrect conclusions’, although it did also emphasise the problem that ‘observers may have [had] evidence before them and not recognize[d] it because of unfamiliarity with the subject’.\footnote{Charles Duelfer, ‘Transmittal Message’, presenting the final Iraq Survey Group report (Duelfer Report), Baghdad (23 September 2004), at \url{https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/iraq_wmd_2004/transmittal.html}, accessed 04/01/2013.}

Thus, overall, the circulation of counter-narratives or practices challenging the dominant narrative of “war on terror” significantly intensified and expanded in both the US and the UK, ahead of the Iraq war, namely towards the end of 2002; and reached several momentous peaks, among others, following revelations about the Dodgy Iraq Dossier in February 2003;\footnote{Revelations were made in the press that the latest dossier ‘Iraq: Its Infrastructure of Concealment, Deception and Intimidation’, released on 3 February 2003 by Blair’s Office and allegedly based on ‘intelligence material’, was largely plagiarised from published academic articles.} Hans Blix’s January 2003 report to the UN, which found no “smoking gun” in Iraq.\footnote{Hans Brix, Executive Chairman, UNMOVIC, ‘Notes for Briefing the Security Council’ (9 January 2003), at \url{http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/bx9jan.htm}, accessed 10/10/2012.}

These events and developments are part of what I had referred to as the “real-life chronotope” per Bakhtin: these are the non-discursive and supra-discursive events to which the contesting voices must respond in the sense of the Bakhtinian “deed upon the world”. They also become moments which show how the real-life chronotope becomes a challenge to the representational, i.e. narrative-normative chronotope. The period encompassing these events, i.e. roughly 2002 to 2007, is the approximate time-period to concentrate on in this section, while the mentioned events are the moments of intensified critique I zoom into and make selection of texts from. It must be noted, that despite each of these events having originated in either the US or the UK, they all reverberated across the Atlantic and attracted mass coverage and reaction in both societies. However, the selection is not limited to these events: important dates in the political calendar, such as annual State of the Union speeches; salient political events, such as resignations in the context of the “war on terror” (e.g., Clare Short in May 2003, in the UK); the US Presidential election
campaign of 2004; as well as the release of key strategic documents or statements (such as the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, in the US in November 2005) all constitute important moments of interest for selection and analysis, as moments of increased public saliency of contestations over the issue and of possibility for change.

Challenges to the official discourse of “war on terror” in the US and the UK came from three main sources: political circles (including active or former politicians); the media (both traditional mass media, and new media such as e-magazines and blogs), and social movements. Indeed, each of these sources required selection appropriate for the type. Thus, the selection of texts representing the discourse of politicians and former government/military officials was based on salient public appearances; notably outspoken critique including in the media, and/or texts accompanying politically significant actions, such as e.g. resignations, or collective political actions such as letters/appeals, as well as articulations voiced during parliamentary debates or question and answer (Q&A) sessions ahead of, during or after a momentous event. The media texts were selected based on the most salient coverage around the time of the major turning points identified in the introduction above. In the UK, I have selected texts from major national newspapers such as The Independent, The Guardian, The Telegraph, to cover the mainstream range of the political spectrum; The Mirror because of its overt anti-war stance taken during the major demonstrations of February 2003;749 as well as radical alternative media such as the pacifist magazine Peace News. In the US, printed press has fewer readerships, and there is no national newspaper.750 However, I have looked at The Los Angeles Times, New York Times, and Washington Post, as the most widely circulated mainstream newspapers; as well as the radical alternative e-publications Counterpunch.org, and AntiWar.com. The rationale behind the shortlisting of the media sources has been to cover both mainstream and alternative, especially radical/leftist publications and e-sources. In case of mainstream media, I concentrate on editorial and opinion articles, rather than those reporting news. Given the sheer volume of potential coverage of issues related to “war on terror” in these publications, the data collection and analysis,

749 Murray, Andrew and Lindsey German, Stop the War: The story of Britain’s biggest mass movement (London: Bookmarks, 2005).
750 Ibid.
even within the shortlisted sources, could not have been a comprehensive and detailed endeavour: that would have constituted a project of media research in its own right. Instead, I have zoomed into periods of the momentous events identified above, and made only a limited selection of texts, which on and around the dates of those events, represent publicly salient critical voices.

Furthermore, I have looked at major anti-war movements’ discourses, particularly those of Stop the War Coalition (StWC) in the UK, and Act Now to Stop War and End Racism (ANSWER), in the US. These are umbrella organizations for anti-war movements aiming at global reach through organising of the biggest anti-war demonstrations in history of the UK and the US, respectively. In case of StWC, I have looked at the collection of speeches, images and articulations produced during and after the demonstrations by key activists and their supporters, collected and documented by the leaders of the organisation in the book Stop the War: The Story of Britain’s Biggest Mass Movement.⁷⁵¹ In case of ANSWER, I look at their key mission statements and public appeals found in their websites and elsewhere.⁷⁵²

Texts from the various sources identified above display a large variation of style and purpose, depending on the subject positions occupied by the speakers, as well as differing communication targets and resources at hand. However, a certain pattern emerges. Thus, what I have called destabilising performatives in the theoretical discussion in chapter 3, are indispensable to destabilising counter-narratives (I will also refer to these broadly as “destabilising critique”). These are attempts to fundamentally subvert the official “war on terror” narrative, by putting pressure on and potentially dislodging the master nodal points and the chronotopic building blocks on which the official narrative is built, as identified in the previous chapter. For instance, the “no war for oil” narrative⁷⁵³ is largely comprised of such counter-propositions effectively dislocating the official narrative that “we are at war to protect our nation from WMDs and to liberate the Iraqi people”, by replacing it with the narrative that

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⁷⁵¹ Ibid.
⁷⁵² For a list of selected texts, see Appendix B.
⁷⁵³ This counter-narrative is not based on a unitary source or group of agents, but is rather a broad narrative found in a variety of anti-war sources and discursive expressions. Most main anti-war movements, the Stop the War Coalition among them, incorporate this narrative. E.g., this is apparent (albeit not described as such) in accounts of anti-war movements in Seppälä, Tiina, Globalizing Resistance against War (London, New York: Routledge, 2012), pp. 73, 77, 81.
“this is a manipulative selfish war for oil”. In this relation, we must again recall the discussion of Laclau’s concept of ‘dislocation’. In the dialogical-relational model, dislocatory performatives are performative acts that, by their intent, or else, by their effect, decentre the key nodal points upon which the related narrative hinges, disturbing the narrative-normative chronotope of a foreign/security discourse. We shall later see what potential effects such dislocation may have.

In contrast, deliberative performatives, indispensable to deliberative counter-narratives (or what I also refer to as “deliberative critique”), are not predominantly subversive of the dominant narrative. To remind, deliberative performatives challenge the dominant narrative only by partly refuting the earlier deliberative efforts behind the latter, and/or by demanding the realisation of the promises indispensable to the earlier persuasive deliberative performatives.

It must be noted, that these relatively distinct types of counter-propositions can variously configure in a given narrative or pronouncement. Indeed, a lot of critique was destabilising when it came to specifically the Iraq war, but more deliberative in relation to the broader “war on terror” narrative. In fact, how these configure and which type tends to dominate within a given source, will be important when looking at their effects in the longer term.

6.3.1. Destabilising “Evil” and “Freedom”

In May 2005, a July 2002 Downing Street Memo (the so-called “smoking gun memo”) from a secret meeting of British government officials and intelligence leaked into the The Sunday Times, and revealed that ‘the intelligence and facts were being fixed [by the U.S.] around the policy’ of removing Saddam Hussein from power. In the US, this sparked a number of efforts at various levels to impeach Bush on the grounds of having lied to the Congress when acquiring authorisation for war. Thus, on 5 May, Congressman John Conyers and 88 other Democrats from the House of Representatives sent a letter to President Bush demanding an explanation: the revelations in the memo, they demanded, ‘raise troubling new questions regarding the legal justifications for

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the war as well as the integrity of your own Administration’. Facing White House silence, Conyers and others launched a major campaign collecting signatures from the public demanding a reply to the letter. Sen. Conyers’ discursive effort in the initial letter could have potentially been subversive of the official Iraq war narrative. However, it avoided direct destabilising of the main nodal points of the official narrative, or dispositioning it with an alternative one. Perhaps therefore, although the letter became one of the main conduits for public demand for accountability from Bush, it largely failed to build a powerful alternative discourse.

A discursively more powerful call for impeachment came from Paul Craig Roberts, former editor and columnist of the Wall Street Journal, and a former Assistant Secretary of the Treasury in the Reagan Administration – a former Conservative turned to radical politics – whose ruthless criticism of the war in Iraq reverberated through the reproduction of his numerous articles in many alternative media. His propositions echo similar counter-narratives circulating in the public domain, especially in the critical e-sources such as Counterpunch.org and AntiWar.com, and in this sense may be said to be representative (a snapshot) of this broader picture.

In his first in the series of “impeachment” articles entitled ‘America’s Reputation in Tatters’, Roberts states:

George W. Bush and his gang of neocon warmongers have destroyed America’s reputation. It is likely to stay destroyed, because at this point the only way to restore America’s reputation would be to impeach and convict President Bush for intentionally deceiving Congress and the American people in order to start a war of aggression against a country that posed no threat to the US. America can redeem itself only by holding Bush accountable (emphases added).

This passage not only destabilises the macro-proposition of the official narrative, namely that “Iraq posed a major threat”, but also in contrast to the previous example, does this by disturbing the key nodal point on which the official narrative was hinging, that of “evil”. Thus, the very nodal signification of “threat” is being displaced by an invocation of a different “American people”: while in the Bush narrative, “the American people” required the “mission to

spread democracy and liberate the Iraqi people” for the successful realisation of its identity, even if that meant going to war in a foreign country, Robert’s counter-narrative proposition alludes to an “American people” which does not and must not go to war ‘against a country that pose[d] no [immediate/physical] threat’ to it.\(^758\) Thus, the nodal point “the American people” is being re-populated with new intertextuality, around which the discourses of “honesty/moral disposition”, “democratic accountability”, “non-aggression towards other nations” and even “reputation/image” are being re-clustered, thereby muting the discourses of “democratisation” and “liberation” as alternative intertextuality increasingly activated by the Bush rhetoric during the same period.

Similar constructions are found also in other counter-narrative articulations. Thus, in June 2002, the ‘Statement of Conscience’ of the anti-war movement Not in Our Names, states:

> Let it not be said that people in the United States did nothing when their government declared a war without limit and instituted stark new measures of repression. ...we call on all Americans to resist the war and repression that has been loosed on the world by the Bush administration. It is unjust, immoral, and illegitimate (emphases added).\(^759\)

Here, the nodal point “our nation” expressed in the references ‘the people in the United States’ and ‘all Americans’ is still anchored on the master nodal point “freedom”; however, a “freedom” that is facing a different “threat/evil” – that of being undermined if “we” ‘go to war without limit’ and if “we” continue to practice ‘repression’. Moreover, the Bush administration itself becomes a “threat” to the realisation of the American identity anchored on “freedom”, by his policies that are ‘unjust, immoral and illegitimate’.\(^760\)

Thus, not only the “American people” is being re-constituted, but also the nodal point “evil” the way it had been fixed by the Bush narrative is being dislodged, interfered by new significations given to the temporality of the nation’s identity. As demonstrated earlier, the “future” of the nation in Bush’s narrative was constructed as densely interlinked with the condition of “triumph” over the “threat” of terrorism, a condition without which the nation would

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\(^758\) Ibid.

\(^759\) ‘Not in Our Name: Statement of Conscience’, in ‘We Won’t Deny Our Conscience: Prominent Americans have issued this statement on the war on terror’, Guardian (June 14 2002), available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/jun/14/usa.internationaleducationnews1, accessed 19/09/2012.

\(^760\) Ibid.
effectively fail ‘to prevail’.\textsuperscript{761} In contrast, Robert’s destabilising counter-narrative passage quoted above dislodges the chronotope of the Bush narrative, constructing a different successful “future” for the “nation” – a future where the nation would fulfil its identity, only if the people took action to ‘redeem’ America now in the present. In this new “if”-conditionality of identity, the negative imagining, i.e. the non-fulfilment of the condition leaves the nation in a demeaning prospect, which gives a modified signification to the nodal point “threat”.

In a less extreme manner, in the UK, in the run up to the Iraq war and amidst increasing criticism, many individual politicians, as well as some mass media outlets, expressed views, where the master nodal points of the British official narrative were being put pressure on. Thus, in her resignation statement to the Parliament, former Secretary for International Development Clare Short states:

I believe it is duty of all responsible political leaders ...to focus on reuniting the international community in order to support the people of Iraq in rebuilding their country, to re-establish the authority of the UN and to heal the bitter divisions that preceded the war. I am sorry to say that the UK Government is not doing this. It is supporting the US in trying to bully the Security Council into a resolution that gives the coalition the power to establish an Iraqi Government and control the use of oil for reconstruction with only a minor role for the UN (emphasis added).\textsuperscript{762}

This speech-act not only supports the key proposition behind the counter-narrative “war for oil”, but also destabilises the proposition integral to the British official narrative that the UN route had been favoured.

In the same lines of the debate over multilateralism vs. unilateralism dominant in the UK at the time, Robin Cook explains his resignation\textsuperscript{763} on the eve of the parliamentary debate and vote on Iraq: after spotting several logical and factual inconsistencies in the official UK and US narratives, he states:

[O]ur credibility [is not] helped by the appearance that our partners in Washington are less interested in disarmament than they are in regime change in Iraq. That explains why any evidence that inspections may be showing progress is greeted in Washington not with satisfaction but with consternation: it reduces the case for war (emphases added).\textsuperscript{764}

\textsuperscript{761} Source -- various Bush post-9/11 speeches: note how most of Bush’s speeches and public statements end with a closing triumphant phrase ‘We will prevail’.
\textsuperscript{763} Former Foreign Secretary Robin Cook resigned from his post of Leader of the House of Commons, over the legality of the Iraq war, on 17\textsuperscript{th} March, 2003.
This proposition destabilises the master nodal point “threat”, by suggesting that the US and Britain were pursuing a war for material or hubris-driven purposes, rather than one against “a clear and present danger”.

Some of the key debates and critique in the UK at the run-up to the war in Iraq are encapsulated in a Guardian editorial ‘Speak for the Nation’, written on the eve of Prime Minister Blair’s crucial visit to Washington, where, it was believed, the final decision on Iraq was to be made. Commenting on Blair’s visit, the piece states:

This crisis is not primarily about Iraqi weapons of mass death…It is not primarily about fighting terrorism, despite the alleged links between Iraq and al-Qaida. But terrorists, our far deadlier foe, will doubtless make of it a new casus belli. For some sceptics, it is about oil, about dreams of American empire and a remade Middle East of Pentagon protectorates…This war is not primarily about democracy or freedom, much as the Iraqi people deserve both. And it will most certainly not deliver justice for all. It is, fundamentally, about the wilful exercise of unrestrained global power, unfazed by considerations of international law, the principles of collective UN security, and the consequences for every man (emphasis added).

This passage encapsulates many layers of critique present in the UK at the time: unilateralism vs. multilateralism; though not directly ascribing to the “war for oil” narrative, it demystifies the official narrative and exposes the government as willing to wage a war driven by hubris, thereby undermining both the nodal point of “threat”, as well as that of “freedom”, and instead, alludes to a new “threat” posed by ‘unrestrained global power’.

At times, a destabilising counter-narrative may diametrically reverse the official threat narrative. Thus, in his article ‘What is Bush’s Agenda in Iraq?’ Paul Roberts boldly claims:

His [Bush’s] PATRIOT Act alone has done more damage to Americans’ freedom than Osama bin Laden (emphases added).

In this complete displacement of Bush’s narrative, the reversal of causal relationships constructs a new threat narrative: here, the PATRIOT Act is the “threat” to “American values and way of life” and hence to “American people’s” identity, rather than the medium to protect it from the “threat” emanating from

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765 During the 31 January visit, Bush and Blair agree to give the weapons inspection process six more weeks.
terrorism. An example of a much more extreme and dramatic subversion is in Roberts’ following statement:

Many readers write to me that Bush and his neocon crazies are Israel’s patsies. An equally good case can be made that Bush and his crazy neocons are Osama bin Laden’s agents.768

However, interestingly, as we shall see in the next chapter, such almost preposterous-sounding subversions, as well as the diametrical reversal of the official narrative, may result in much less “answerability” and hence less dialogical engagement by proponents of the official narrative. This may especially be true of the discourses of radical and extravagant style, as indeed, most of Paul Robert’s critique is, apparent in titles/statements such as ‘Get Ready for WWIII’,769 ‘the Bush administration will bring about Armageddon’,770 and more recently, ‘Is the War on Terror a Hoax?’771, and ‘You are Voting for Your Own Extinction’.772 By their mere extremeness, these counter-narrative propositions may often undermine their own credibility.

6.3.2. Deliberating on a “Mistaken” War

In contrast to the above examples, Nancy Pelosi, Majority Leader (D-CA) of the House of Representatives at the time, delivered a speech on the House floor in June 2005, which was more representative of what I have classified as deliberative counter-narrative propositions. The speech ‘This War in Iraq Is a Grotesque Mistake’773 was in support of her proposed amendment to the defence appropriations bill, requiring the President to submit a report to Congress detailing a strategy for success in Iraq and timetables for withdrawal. The highlight of the speech, also one which became a headline catchphrase and was most reproduced in the mass media, was:

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770 Ibid.
772 Ibid.
This is a war that each passing day confirms what I have said before and I will say again. *This war in Iraq is a grotesque mistake; it is not making America safer,* and the American people know it (emphases added).\(^{774}\)

This might appear to be a destabilising counter-narrative proposition for the Iraq war narrative. However, it fails to follow up the undermining of the official narrative and fails to construct a narrative as to *why* the war has been a “mistake” and *why* America is in more danger, except for pointing to an increased danger to the troops on the ground due to an unsuccessful mission. Moreover, in a hyperlinked field of past and present performances, at least to some of the audiences, and especially given the commentary and analyses in the media, this speech must have invoked (intertextually activated) Pelosi’s other famous speech – one delivered on 2 October 2002, calling for a No vote to resolution 45 authorizing military force against Iraq.\(^{775}\) Back then, she built a typical deliberative counter-narrative, based on macro-propositions drawn from the official “war on terror” narrative. Thus, she re-affirmed:

> *The clear and present danger* that our country faces is terrorism.....For the past 13 months, we have stood shoulder-to-shoulder with President Bush to *remove the threat of terrorism posed by Al Qaeda. Our work is not done.* Osama Bin Laden, Mullah Omar and other Al Qaeda terrorist leaders have not been accounted for. *We have unfinished business.*...

> *in the war on terrorism* (emphases added).\(^{776}\)

These statements reinstate and fortify the nodal points “threat”, “terrorism” and “our nation” in the same way as these had been fixed in the dominant official narrative. They do not suggest any, even intertextually probable, activation of alternative/modified significations to these nodal points, let alone directly destabilise them. More specifically, in relation to going into Iraq itself, Pelosi affirms, and again re-articulates the threat construction of the official narrative, *despite* being against the war. Moreover, despite the highlight statement of the speech claiming that the war had been ‘a grotesque mistake’ and despite her 2002 protest against the war, Pelosi, in a logically fallacious manner, goes on to demand that ‘we must have been better prepared for the war’:

> *When we went into this war, it was a war of choice, a pre-emptive war....in a war of choice, you have an increased responsibility to be prepared and to have a plan for* 

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774 Ibid.
776 Ibid.
what happens, in this case, after the fall of Baghdad. We were not prepared with such a plan.\footnote{Ibid.}

Furthermore, broadly typical of the trend, Pelosi, in an expressly critical articulation countering the given policy, still builds on constructions of the “future” the way it had been fixed by the dominant narrative, and thus unwittingly presses for the fulfilment of the promises built into the official narrative. Thus, Pelosi states:

Mr. Murtha, leading the House Democrats on this issue said, "We must energize. We must turn on the lights. We must have reconstruction in Iraq". And because of the lack of planning, the reconstruction is taking much longer, is much more costly, and security is making it almost impossible. You can't go forward with the social services unless you have a secure Iraq, and you can't have it be secure and bring our troops home unless you turn over that security responsibility to the Iraqis.\footnote{Pelosi (20 June 2005).}

She goes on to demand a timetable for withdrawal from a ‘mistaken’ war, but at the same time, constructs a specific “future”, where the promises of “security” and “freedom” for the Iraqis – and by extension for the Americans – inherent in the official narrative must be fulfilled before the withdrawal can be deemed legitimate, and thereby reaffirms the official chronotope.

Similarly, in her ‘Letter to Constituents on Iraq Policy’ disseminated ahead of President Bush’s speech and release of the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, Senator Hilary Clinton states:

\[\text{§1}\] In October 2002, I voted for the resolution to authorize the Administration to use force in Iraq. I voted for it on the basis of the evidence presented by the Administration, assurances they gave that they would first seek to resolve the issue of weapons of mass destruction peacefully through United Nations sponsored inspections…\text{Their assurances turned out to be empty ones… And the “evidence” of weapons of mass destruction and links to al Qaeda turned out to be false.}

\[\text{§2}\] ...It is time for the President to stop serving up platitudes and present us with a plan for finishing this war with success and honor – not a rigid timetable that terrorists can exploit, but a public plan for winning and concluding the war.

\[\text{§3}\]…America has a big job to do now. We must set reasonable goals to finish what we started and successfully turn over Iraqi security to Iraqis…We must repair the damage done to our reputation…And we must continue to fight terrorism wherever it exists…We have to continue the fight against terrorism and make sure we apply America’s best values and effective strategies in making our world and country a better and safer place. We have to do what is right and smart in the war against terrorists and pursuit of democracy and security. That means repudiating torture which undermines America’s values. That means reforming intelligence and its use by decision makers. That means rejecting the Administration’s doctrine of...
...preemptive war and their preference to going it alone rather than building real international support (all emphases added).\textsuperscript{779}

Despite the apparently critical stance, this is a deliberative, rather than destabilising performance, as rather than dislodge, throughout §3, Clinton reproduces and re-enforces the official narrative’s master nodal points of “freedom” and “threat/evil”. Unless these are fixed in alternative ways, their use will, in the broader public perceptions at least, hypertextually link the given performative action with the official, dominant narrative. Such hypertextuality will activate and re-enforce the meanings of these nodal points as and the way they had been fixed in the dominant narrative, and therefore activate the full normative chronotopicity of such narrative. In other words, as hyperlinks, these nodal points may re-activate the whole narrative of the dominant discourse for the audience. Therefore, despite her apparent demand for a possible early withdrawal, and despite her regrets for having voted for the authorisation of the war in Iraq in 2002 (§1 and §2), Clinton reifies the official narrative by failing to displace the master nodal points of “evil” and “freedom” with new signification. Moreover, despite her clear stance that she would not have voted for an invasion, had the facts known today been available to her back in 2002, thereby confirming that the war had been a “mistake”, Clinton demands not just an exit plan, but an exit plan that would ensure ‘finishing this war with success and honor—...for winning...the war’ (emphasis added).\textsuperscript{780}

Both practices, i.e. hinging an otherwise critical narrative on the same master nodal points as the narrative critiqued; as well as demanding for “success” and “victory” for a war that had been “ill-conceived” if not out-right “illegal and immoral”, develop into consistent trends in case of deliberative counter-narrative propositions. Indeed, by relying on uniting nodal points for their own, otherwise critical counter-narratives, active politicians may be trying to mitigate political risk involved in fundamentally undermining a dominant security discourse and with it a national identity discourse. Thus, hinging their narratives on the same master nodal points as the official narrative, and thereby choosing to remain partially within the reified discursive formation, these critics may hope to increase the perlocutionary effect of their utterances. In addition,


\textsuperscript{780} Ibid.
they may be trying to counter-silence those silencing efforts by the official circles that attempt to stigmatise any critique of the war as “non-patriotic” or as being “not concerned about our nation’s interests/security”. However, by reaffirming these uniting nodal points, moderate critics not only fortify the narrative the critique is addressed to by affirming the legitimacy of its master nodal points, but also, as we shall see in the next chapter, at the same time and perhaps unwittingly, open up dialogical routes for the addressee to engage in restorative performatives to answer the points of divergence, on which accountability is demanded (e.g., “plan to victory”, in the above case), and thereby further stabilise the dominant narrative.

In Britain, the overwhelming discontent at the prospect of an Iraq war at the end of 2002 and beginning of 2003 triggered claims of the government’s ‘contempt of democracy…[and an overall] “democratic crisis” stemming from the fact that the views of the majority of citizens were very different from the views of those in power’. This in turn led some to adopt a responsive “contempt” towards the democratic/parliamentary politics, as they pointed to the difficulty for many citizens to vote when both major parties supported the war, and when no substantive space for debate was provided in the Parliament. In this context, there was more discursive subversion of the official narrative’s nodal point “freedom” by critics, who at the same time were attempting to draw attention to the demise of democratic accountability at home. This larger debate is condensed in the following passage from a 30th January 2003 Guardian editorial:

Right now, this war is wrong because it weakens the very democracy for which we are summoned to fight. If democracy’s good health were the arbiter, Mr Blair would not be currently blocking out the roaring surge of opposition in Britain and around the globe. There would be a free, prior parliamentary vote on any proposal to send troops into combat.

In destabilising the official narrative’s nodal point “freedom”, this bares the

781 See, e.g. a March 2003 YouGov Poll, according to which 65% of Britons do not “trust Government ministers to tell the truth about Saddam Hussein and international terrorism”, and a further 65% believed If the UN does NOT back the use of force against Iraq, and Britain should not go to war if the UN does not back the use of force. YouGov, ‘Survey Results, Iraq’ (6-7 March 2003), available at http://cdn.yougov.com/today_uk_import/YG-Archives-Ira-itnTM-AttitudesWarraq-030308.pdf, accessed 11/10/2012.
782 Murray and German (2005: 177).
783 Seppälä (2012: 78).
illocution that “Britain cannot be an advocate of democracy in the world, if
democracy is not functioning at home”. However, it does not directly undermine
moral grounds for using force to spread democracy if there were a
parliamentary vote, therefore still qualifies as a deliberative rather than
destabilising critique.

Furthermore, similar to the articulations demanding for the realisation of the
promises of a “mistaken” war cited in case of the US, in the UK, various
statements by the then leader of the Liberal-Democratic party Charles Kennedy
offer examples. Thus, during the Parliamentary debate following Blair’s
presentation of the so-called “45-minute dossier”, despite his apparent in-
principle dissent to a regime change, Kennedy goes on to ask whether certain
conditions (and not merely the UN authorisation, but post-regime rehabilitation)
are being met before – quite paradoxically—such a regime change can be
deemed legitimate. Thus, he asks:

§1] Those of us who have never subscribed to British unilateralism are not about
to sign up to American unilateralism now, either.

§2] What we must be clear about...is the notion of regime change, which is ill-
defined, and remains so today. It would set a dangerous precedent in international
affairs.

§3] We have to be clear about the possible consequences of a regime change.
What will the reaction be in the rest of the Arab world? If Saddam’s regime falls,
what kind of government system is envisaged as a replacement?...The Prime
Minister, quite rightly...was able to point to the mobilisation of forces in
Afghanistan, which could lead to an alternative, more acceptable Government
there. Is there the capacity or potential for a similar mobilisation to take place
within Iraq?...If we were not to walk away following the toppling of Saddam, who
would provide the necessary presence to police and create the ongoing stability in
Iraq that would be essential because of the shell-shocked nature of that
country?...Should we not instead be talking about the longer-term need for a
rehabilitation strategy for Iraq, not least for its innocent, oppressed people with
whom none of us has any argument whatever? (emphases added)785

Thus, despite express critique of the given policy of a possible unilateral action
without the UN authorisation and a subsequent regime change (§1 and §2),
Kennedy continues to deliberate on the realisation of the very same policy (§3).

Such performative efforts may make certain political sense for individual
actors (such as the desire to achieve if not the aversion of the war, then at least
a more humane intervention). Individual agents’ intentionality to bring about

785 House of Commons Debate on Iraq (24 September 2002), available at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200102/cmhansrd/vo020924/debtext/20924-01.htm,
accessed 19/09/2012.
certain change in the limited political situation they find themselves is apparent. However, cumulatively, as it will be argued and demonstrated in the next chapter, such individual intentionality and performative practices may have unintended consequences for the longer-term discursive and hence political dynamics, due to unanticipated mechanisms that their actions set in motion. Thus, I contend that part of such mechanisms is that these deliberative speech-acts carry the additional illocution, whether consciously intended or not, of inviting the interlocutor to restorative discursive performatives, i.e. performatives that effectively counter the purported critique by re-affirming the nodal points constructed in the official narrative, as well as by accommodating and neutralising some of the critical propositions offered by deliberative critique.


As is implicit to the discussion in the previous section, both destabilising and deliberative counter-narratives, albeit variously, engage with, or affect, the narrative-normative chronotope of the official narratives, namely of the Chronotope of Cyclical Triumph in the US, and the Chronotope of Agent of Change in the UK (see chapter 4). However, while the emphasis in the previous section was on demonstrating the distinction between two types of counter-narratives, i.e. destabilising as opposed to deliberative counter-narratives, and that in relation to how they challenge the official narrative, here in this section, the focus shifts to a more immediate investigation as to what alternative chronotopes the critical voices constructed and how these encountered (clashed and competed) with the official, i.e. the dominant, chronotope of “war on terror”. In doing so, this section is more immediately concerned with competing national identity discourses, and the temporality of “imagining the nation” in alternative ways. To be consistent with the normative focus of the official chronotope, I will specifically enquire into potential constructions of alternative “futures” for the US/UK “nation” and/or the “world/international community”, in the representations of critique.

It was found that deliberative critique largely engages in the construction of “subjunctive futures” in a corrective manner, only by partially destabilising the
official national identity narrative. Thus, in her ‘Letter to Constituents’ – writing on the eve of the publication of the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq of November 2005 and the subsequent speech by Bush – Hilary Clinton states:

We must deny terrorists the prize they are now seeking in Iraq. We must repair the damage done to our reputation. We must reform our intelligence system so we never go to war on false premises again. We must repair the breach with the Muslim world. And we must continue to fight terrorism wherever it exists.\textsuperscript{786}

Here, the “subjunctive future” will be bleak “if we do not take certain [suggested] actions”. However, the “future” of the nation is still imagined largely as it is constructed in the official narrative, thus reproducing the chronotope of that narrative, without critiquing/questioning it.

A slightly different situation is observed in a New York Times critical editorial reaction to Bush’s 28 June 2005 speech.\textsuperscript{787} Interestingly, the opening statement – ‘President Bush told the nation last night that the war in Iraq was difficult but winnable. Only the first is clearly true’ – in effect destabilises “triumph”, the outcome macro-narrative building block key to Bush’s narrative-normative chronotope, thus leaving “future” hinged on “failure” rather than “triumph”. Nevertheless, the piece goes on to demand:

We had hoped that he would seize the moment to tell the nation how he will define victory, and to give Americans a specific sense of how he intends to reach that goal...the nation was wondering whether American sacrifices could actually produce a stable and democratic Iraq (emphases added).\textsuperscript{788}

Here, the ‘the nation’ and ‘democratic Iraq’ both hinge on and thus help reproduce the master nodal point of “freedom” as in the official narrative. Despite the apparent critique of the mission’s performance in Iraq and scepticism towards its success, this statement re-inscribes the achievement of the promise of ‘a stable and democratic Iraq’ as the duty of the “nation”, and thus imagines the “future” conditioned on the same premises as the official narrative’s prescription of “future”.

In contrast, simultaneous with undermining the official legitimation of the war, destabilising counter-narrative propositions tend to undermine the national identity narrative built into the dominant security narrative. Thus, characteristically, ahead of the Iraq war, in its Statement of Conscience, the

\textsuperscript{786} Clinton (November 29 2005).
\textsuperscript{788} Ibid.
The government now openly prepares to wage all-out war on Iraq – a country which has no connection to the horror of September 11. What kind of world will this become if the US government has a blank check to drop commandos, assassins, and bombs wherever it wants (emphasis added)?

Here, the official American identity narrative of “a benevolent nation with a noble mission in the world liberating the underprivileged and spreading freedom” is displaced by an alternative image, where “America” presents itself as “an over-ambitious bully in the world”. In other words, the nodal points “freedom” as well as “evil” are being dislodged, simultaneous with undermining the chronotopic building block of “future” and the outcome signifier “triumph” as they had been fixed in the official narrative. The subjunctive “future” is now linked to “failure” (i.e. failure of the purpose set out in the official narrative), rather than “triumph”. Importantly, the nodal point “freedom” (i.e., “the spreading of freedom as the paramount American mission”), is destabilised without offering a new and competing fixation for it.

In a similar vein, a Guardian editorial already quoted earlier, states:

This war is not primarily about democracy or freedom...it will most certainly not deliver justice for all.... Iraq will form an awesome precedent for what Gerhard Schröder calls the “law of the jungle”. Iraq is just the beginning (emphasis added).

In addition to undermining the nodal points “evil/threat” and “freedom”, this speech-act pictures a certain “future” (of the international community, but interlinked to it, also that of Britain), where the prospect of “triumph” of “freedom” and “justice” is not attained, and where “failure” is more certain. Characteristically for such critique, the “future” is constructed in negative terms, i.e. “what bleak prospect we are facing if we let Bush and Blair go ahead”; but do not construct an alternative positive “future”. Thus, such challenges to the dominant national identity narrative constitute subversion without the construction of an alternative positive “we” identity that could have been a new source for national pride.

This failure to construct a positive “future” is often done by simultaneously undermining the “past” as a source of victories and inspiration as it is fixed in the official narrative. Thus, for example, Stop the War selectively

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789 Not in Our Name (14 June, 2002).
draws on oft-forgotten facts from the past few decades of British and American involvement in the Middle East to unmask the “truth” about oil, imperialism and military-industrial complex as the real motives behind the “war on terror”. In doing so, it builds a narrative of global politics and British foreign policy heavily relying on past historical facts that would potentially incite disillusion and shame, rather than national pride sustained in the official narrative, in other words, undermines the “past” as a source of national victories and pride, upon which the official narrative-normative chronotope relies. Thus, for instance, in enumerating ‘a few things which are not widely known about Iraq’, the authors claim:

The first recorded use of chemical weapons against a civilian population was the bombing of mutinous Iraqi villages by the RAZF in 1920s, an event commended by Churchill. Here, indeed, the invocation of this purportedly forgotten historical event is meant to hypertextually activate the official representations of Saddam’s use of chemical weapons against own civilians, and to effectively undermine the perlocutionary effect of such a claim as a justification for a “humanitarian” war. However, more crucially, the invocation of “Churchill” in this statement intertextually links with, and thus undermines, the narratives of British triumph in the World War II and through it the British national pride often associated with the character of Churchill himself. In their version of a selective engagement with the historical “past” to imagine the nation, these critics destroy positive associations with one’s “past”, associations that would induce positive emotions of pride and belongingness, and instead construct negatively charged ones. In a similar vein, consider the following statement by Stop the War Coalition:

[§1] The Halabja outrage met with the most muted response from Washington and London...Saddam and his dictatorship were still seen as a pillar of stability in the Middle East, not to mention a very lucrative business partner (for weapons, in particular).

[§2]...Saddam’s reincarnation as the new “Hitler” was not caused by his massacre, his aggression against Iraq, his continuing oppression of all Iraqi democrats....The tipping point was his decision to invade Kuwait

[§3]...The US and Britain, unwilling to see Iraq seize control of so much of the world’s oil...acted to restore their sort of order in the region...a project made easier by the fact that the invasion [of Kuwait] had been a fairly unambiguous breach of international law.

791 Murray and German (2005).
792 Ibid., 31.
793 Ibid., 32.
Saddam was, however, left in power after his rapid defeat in Kuwait, since the US preferred a dictatorship in Iraq to any alternative scenario—a democracy which might inspire the overturning of pro-US regimes elsewhere...the “new Hitler” was held to be a safer bet than rule by the Iraqi people themselves.\footnote{Ibid., 34-35.}

This passage is an “answer” to, and aims to destabilise, one of the recurring propositions in the official narrative, namely that portraying Saddam as “a tyrant from which his own people must be liberated”, and the oft-heard references to his massacre of Kurds in 1988 and oppression of own people. It dislodges and displaces the “virtuous past” of the official British and American chronotopes, with an alternative “past”, where Britain and America are depicted as historically having been indifferent to loss of human life (§1, §2); oppression (§2) and aspirations of democracy (§4) and been, rather, motivated by the immoral urges for ‘lucrative business [of weapons]’ (§1) and oil (§3); and have in fact ‘preferred a dictatorship in Iraq’ over a possible democracy and a ‘rule by the Iraqi people’ (§4). In addition, it exposes the opportunistic use of labels such as “new Hitler” for Saddam, not only to point out the hypocrisy of such labelling in the context of the exposed facts, but also intertextually linking this with another usage of the same label during the Suez Crisis of 1956, alluding to the latter as a shameful page of lowly motives of oil and imperialism in British history that is morally covalent with the present involvement in Iraq. Cumulatively, these speech-acts dislocate Blaire’s narrative of “pivotal power Britain” that makes a vital difference in the world as “a force for good” by “spreading democracy and better life for all”.

Furthermore, often such dislocatory articulations directly undermine the nodal point of “values” as it was fixed in the official narrative, without effectively offering a commensurate discourse of alternative “values” upon which an alternative positive identity and foreign/security discourse could hinge. Thus, a \textit{Peace News} editorial entitled ‘Still Time to Abolish War’ is illustrative, and needs to be quoted at length:

\begin{quote}
[§1] With the re-election of George W and the seeming immovable presence of Tony Blair, the bizarre notion of a “values” based political system has become further entrenched. But what kind of “values” are they talking about? Values that state that while abortion is evil it is OK to drop bombs on kids in Fallujah, values which allow arms sales to Iraq while persecuting refugees escaping war zones.
\end{quote}
The "values" concept – like "humanitarian intervention" is yet another smokescreen developed by the men in suits to try to explain away their atrocities.

It’s established beyond doubt that the major powers don’t give a damn about ordinary people, indeed those major powers have knowingly added to all our misery and suffering through arms sales, the encouragement of punitive macro-economic policies and all the little nasty things they do to keep themselves in power at our expense.

...The global superpowers are not just attacking “others” - they are attacking and feeding off all of us.

...The modern “humanitarian interventions” and the long established “Just War” theory have been disastrous for humankind...If we allow for military interventions and the “just” war, then we allow for...the continuation of an essentially patriarchal and vicious institution (all emphases added).

While the node “values” as it had been fixed in the US and UK official narratives is being powerfully deconstructed and dislodged by emotively charged rhetorical tropes (marked in italics) throughout §§1-4, overall constituting 619 words, i.e. roughly three quarters of a brief article; it offers no alternative narrative of “values” and a “future” imagined anew, apart from broad references to their pacifist philosophy on non-violence, in as little as 110 words, as below:

The pacifist case is simple: no killing, no arming, no militarisation under any circumstances, for any cause. Instead, we need to invest -- economically, culturally, personally, collectively, educationally -- in the nonviolent, creative resolution of all conflicts. This doesn't mean no-one will ever get hurt. But if we had been given a tenth of the financial and organisational resources so far spent on occupying bombing Iraq, we could not have done anywhere near as badly as the “coalition” has done. Even if we'd just dropped the money from the air -- at least the Iraqi “insurgents” would have been distracted for several weeks rummaging in the sand for bank notes.

My observation about disproportionality is not related to whether or not the pacifist movement, which Peace News represents, or any other anti-war movement, has alternative “values” and alternative imaginary of a future society. Such contention would have required a different type of study, and an extended project in its own right. Rather, my contention is about how much they are able to engage in performative action that communicates such alternative representations to the broader public. While, indeed, the ideological foundations of pacifist discourse are normative and are about imagining alternative politics and society, the analysed data point to the trend, that publicly communicated

795 ‘Still time to abolish war’, Peace News editorial, Issue 2457 (Dec 2003-Feb 2004), at http://peacenews.info/node/5608/editorial-still-time-abolish-war, accessed 19/07/2013. A note at the end of the article states that this was a copy from the first issue of Peace News in 1999 on Kosovo, and that only the name Kosovo has been replaced by Iraq, to make a point.

796 Ibid.
critique of “war on terror”, such as the one above, is disproportionately devoted
to deconstruction and dislocation, rather than to constructing a new foundational
narrative that would allow imaging a different “future”.

Another similar editorial, written at the time of the Iraq invasion in 2003,
does the same, i.e. offers an emotively charged extended deconstruction of the
official narrative, and then at the end offers only a bullet-point list of alternative
goals and actions ‘to deal with’ Saddam’s Iraq.\textsuperscript{797} Again, it fails to build an
\textit{alternative narrative chronotope} drawing on an alternative positive “past” in
order to build a new “future”, which would be commensurate with the official
discourse, as well as commensurate and proportionate with the rhetorical value
and performative power of their own deconstructive effort offered in the same
piece and elsewhere.

As it will further be demonstrated in a moment, in the absence of a
positively imagined alternative “future”, such negatively constructed “past”
produces a narrative lacking a full normative chronotope where the spatiality, as
well as the temporality of the narrative, i.e. the master nodal points as well as
constructions of “outcomes” (“success”/ “failure”) in the “past”, “present” and
“future”, are imagined anew. Paradoxically, despite the subversive intent and
the broader critical-emancipatory normative quest of anti-war movements, and
“war on terror” critics, the analysis of the data of voices dissenting “war on terror” in the specified time frame reveals a huge gap/disproportionality between
the performative efforts aimed at destabilising and dislodging the official
narrative and those aimed at filling in the dislocated/opened up ambivalent
space by constructing an alternative positive “past” upon which to draw as a
symbolic capital, and an alternative positive “future”. This disproportionality is
manifest both in quantity, i.e. as per the volume of articulations, and in quality,
i.e. how any (albeit limited) references to the “future” are constructed.

Indeed, it must be recognised that implicit in any anti-war discourse is the
construction, whether overtly or covertly, of alternative “values” the nation has
nurtured in the “past”, subsequently of alternative normativity to the “future” it
must aspire to, and thereby an alternative “imagining” of a nation. For instance,
the demand voiced by the movement \textit{Not in Our Name}, through the very motto
inherent in its name already articulates a different “we” identity, based on an

\textsuperscript{797} No note of apology, \textit{Peace News}, Issue 2450 (March-May 2003), at
alternative value-system to the one embedded in the officially-promoted national identity narrative: a nation that must not wage war on false foundations and for imperial hubris. Others distance the “true” nation from the official narrative and construct an alternative national identity more directly and explicitly. Thus, in a speech fiercely condemning the Abu Ghraib tortures and demanding the resignations of top Bush administration officials, Al Gore, the former Democratic Vice-President and a staunch critic of Bush’s Iraq policies, structurally builds his narrative on selectively drawing on alternative sets of symbolic capital from America’s past in order to construct an alternative positive American identity:

[§1]...it is important to focus specifically on what happened in the Abu Ghraib prison, and ask whether or not those actions were representative of who we are as Americans? Obviously the quick answer is no, but unfortunately it’s more complicated than that. There is good and evil in every person… Our founders were insightful students of human nature. They feared the abuse of power because they understood that every human being has not only “better angels” in his nature, but also an innate vulnerability to temptation - especially the temptation to abuse power over others. Our founders understood full well that a system of checks and balances is needed in our constitution.

[§2]...And what makes the United States special in the history of nations is our commitment to the rule of law and our carefully constructed system of checks and balances. Our natural distrust of concentrated power and our devotion to openness and democracy are what have lead us as a people to consistently choose good over evil in our collective aspirations more than the people of any other nation (emphases added).

Here, not only the master nodal point of “evil” the way it had been fixed in the official narrative (as always located in the enemy Other) is being dislodged and then re-articulated as possibly located in the Self as much as in the Other (§1), but also this newly fixed reality is linked with an alternative set of American values (§2). Thus, the other master nodal point of the official narrative, namely that of “freedom” as being under threat by an absolute external Other, and defending that absolute teleological “freedom”, as well as “spreading of freedoms to other nations” at all costs as the ultimate value, is displaced by constructions of a different American identity, where “freedom” is threatened by an internal “evil” inherent in “us” – the evil of ‘concentrated power’ that may...

798 Remarks by Al Gore’, speech delivered to the liberal MoveOn.org political action committee (26 May 2004), available at http://www.moveon.org/pac/gore-rumsfeld-transcript.html, accessed 07/07/2012. In the speech, which was covered extensively in the media, Gore demanded the resignation of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, his deputies Paul Wolfowitz, Douglas Feith and his intelligence chief Stephen Cambone; as well as of National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, and CIA Director George Tenet.
799 Ibid.
result from undermining ‘[our] carefully constructed system of checks and balances’. However, and importantly, this re-articulation of the “past” and the “present” is still not completed by the construction of an alternative positive “future”. It seems that the alternative positive values suggested are only there to serve the purpose of reinforcing the sense of “failure” of the nation in the “present”, at the hands of the current administration:

What a terrible irony that our country, which was founded by refugees seeking religious freedom – coming to America to escape domineering leaders who tried to get them to renounce their religion – would now be responsible for this kind of abuse.

Moreover, the “future” is only envisioned either in terms of near-certain catastrophe, “if” the suggested route (of having senior Bush stuff resign, and electing John Kerry) is not taken (§1 in the quote below); or only in vague terms such as ‘getting our muddied good name back’, “if” it is (§2):

[§1] And the worst still lies ahead…We are looking into the abyss. 

[§2]…Our nation’s best interest lies in having a new president who can turn a new page, sweep clean with a new broom, …with the ability to make a fresh assessment of exactly what our nation’s strategic position is as of the time the reigns of power are finally wrested from the group of incompetents that created this catastrophe.

Overall, although Al Gore does distance his “America” from the deeds of the administration by invoking a different set of positive values, he does not build an alternative narrative of a positive “future” for the nation. Therefore, dialogically read with the constructions of “past”, “present” and “triumphant future” present in the official chronotope, this critique still produces the (even if unintended) illocution that “our nation has failed”. Thus, it produces a deficient chronotope which is largely “future”-less (apart from the negative “future” of catastrophe and failure), thus potentially inducing a deficit of “future” among the listener.

This is not an isolated case. While constructing bleak “futures” of “failure” “if” their suggested course of action is not followed, most destabilising counter-narrative propositions, in contrast to the official narratives, fail to off-set that effect with the construction of an alternative positive “future”, where the meaning of “triumph” as fixed by the official narratives would gain new fixation though an alternative meaning-production. The unfulfilling “futures” they
construct cannot be the basis for any national identity as a unifying force and a reference point of self-identification for the majority of people. Moreover, and to repeat a point made above, these voices do not take on the role of circumscribing uncertainty in a new way and perform the late modern imperative of controlling risk, but neither do they subvert such meta-narrative as a the foundation of negotiating security in the late modern age.

6.5. Conclusion

In the overview of the very early post-9/11 dissent, I teased out some early patterns already emergent in the US and the UK. Overall, most of these counter-narratives were revelatory in nature, the principal speech-act intentions being a) to unmask/expose the purported real motivations behind the foreign policies; b) to challenge the official “temporal rupture” story by recognising a causal link between the US/UK past actions and 9/11; and c) to undermine the highly dichotomised official narratives, by deconstructing key binaries such as Self and Other, and to upset the narrative-normative chronotope of the official narrative. In addition, some attempted subverting key nodal points upon which the official narrative was structurally dependent. This latter trend was to become increasingly more significant for the overall discursive dynamics in the years to come.

The major counter-narratives already in the intermediate period were examined in the subsequent two sections, parallel with a cross-examination of the dominant/official narrative discussed in the previous chapter. By taking the identified master nodal points and macro-narrative building blocks as common points of departure, I observed certain configurations and relationships across the dominant and alternative narratives, which were argued to be potentially politically consequential. Thus, in particular, deliberative counter-propositions challenged the dominant narrative by partly refuting the earlier deliberative efforts behind the latter, or by demanding the fulfilment of the promises inherent in earlier persuasive-deliberative performatives. In doing so, they often relied on uniting nodal points and macro-narrative building block, by reinstating and fortifying the latter the way they had been fixed in the dominant (official) narrative. Moreover, they often re-articulated the threat construction of the
official narrative, despite express critique of a given policy: paradoxically, in politically important settings, such as parliamentary debates or Q&A, or press conferences with key officials, the speakers often went on to deliberate on the conditions for the realisation of the very same policy they had been expressly countering. As the next chapter demonstrates, this potentially has far-reaching consequences for the dynamics of the given foreign/security discourse, since such speech-acts, even if unwittingly, carry the additional illocution, of inviting restorative discursive performatives on the part of those representing the dominant narrative and thus enable the respondent to re-integrate/re-narrativise the critique.

Ironically, destabilising counter-propositions, which put pressure on the core macro-propositions of the dominant narrative and undermine its main nodal points, may potentially have the effect of shifting the balance of performative answerability efforts towards more moderate, i.e. “deliberative” counter-propositions. This may be the case, due to the mere extremeness/radical forms of expression undermining of their own credibility with which many such propositions are characterised.

Another hugely consequential pattern associated with destabilising counter-narrative propositions is that they tend to undermine the narrative-normative chronotope of the official foreign/security discourse and with it, of the official national identity narrative. Importantly for long-term consequences, they do so without the construction of an alternative positive “we” identity that could have been a new source for national pride. Moreover, paradoxically, despite the subversive intent and the broader critical-emancipatory normative quest of anti-war movements and “war on terror” critics, in most cases, the official chronotopic building block of “future” and the outcome building block of “triumph” were dislodged, without the construction of an alternative positive “future”, through which the nation and security could be imagined anew. Thus, there was a huge disproportionality between the destabilising articulatory efforts aimed at dislodging the official narrative, on the one hand, and those aimed at filling-in the opened-up ambivalent space, on the other. Whenever there were constructions of alternative “futures”, these were envisioned in terms of national and global catastrophe, if Bush and Blair governments were left to their own devices. Thereby, these destabilising voices produced a deficient, i.e. largely “future-less”, chronotope that would induce a deficit of “future” among the
listener. Such unfulfilling “futures” cannot be the symbolic basis for an alternative national identity and thereby effectively compete, in commensurate terms, with the official narrative. Indeed, while otherisation through defilement is a historically contingent form of identity construction,\textsuperscript{804} and does not have to be the basis for imagining a “nation”, it may be claimed that constructing a certain “future” cast in positive terms \textit{remains} a requirement for imagining a collective, in this case, a “nation”, unless this very requirement is being challenged. And the analysis shows that these critical voices do not attempt to fundamentally shift the terms of negotiating security, from that intimately interlinked with nationhood and national imaginary to something fundamentally different.

Moreover, such deficient chronotopes fail to accommodate the function of circumscribing uncertainty in new ways and thus perform the late modern imperative of controlling risk, but, again, neither do they subvert such meta-narrative as a the basis for contesting security in the late modern age. Indeed, if we recall Laclau’s distinction between \textit{myths} and social \textit{imaginaries},\textsuperscript{805} myths attempt to suture the dislocated space by constructing ‘new spaces of representation’,\textsuperscript{806} and may transform into a new imaginary, if successful in responding to significant social demands.\textsuperscript{807} In light of this, and drawing on the empirical data, I contend that the destabilising counter-narrative propositions of various anti-war and critical discourses did achieve certain dislocation of the hegemonic “war on terror” discourse; but the way they attempted to “suture” the dislocated structure was largely non-conducive to the emergence of a new imaginary. In other words, they failed to transform the anti-war “myth” into a new imaginary that would incorporate, among other ‘social demands’, the late modern societal need to control and manage risk, and provide for a linear progress.

The next chapter shifts the analytical focus and takes a closer look at the different types of restorative performatives undertaken by the representatives of the official narrative, in a quest to test with further rigour, whether my argument about deliberative counter-propositions potentially inviting for such performatives has empirical grounding, and to understand what, if any, political implications this might have.

\textsuperscript{804} See, e.g., in Guillaume (2011).
\textsuperscript{805} Laclau (1990: 61).
\textsuperscript{806} Howarth and Stavrakakis (2000: 15).
\textsuperscript{807} Ibid..
Chapter 7: Staying Committed? Answerability, Restorative Performatives and Silencing

7.1. Introduction

Amidst the unprecedented mass anti-war demonstrations of January-March 2003, the Bush Administration, as well as the Blair government insisted that the movements would ‘not affect their determination to confront Saddam Hussein and help the Iraqi people’. Tony Blair charged the protesters with favouring the status quo that would have ‘consequences paid in blood’. Indeed, the demonstrations eventually did not affect the decision to go to war in Iraq. However, while it is an overstatement that anti-war movements were ‘the other superpower’ counterbalancing the US, as this chapter on restorative performatives demonstrates, neither was dissent as neglected as the officials in both Washington and London initially claimed it to be.

In the environment of intensified critique in the intermediate period (2003-2007), as explored in the previous chapter, the governments both in the US and the UK were being criticised and held accountable, being demanded explanations for the on-going war in Iraq; as well as for the lack of results they claimed the war had promised but not delivered. In addition, they were being probed about the initial justifications to go to war, and being accused of having lied to their publics. Amidst such pressure, both governments had to go to great length to restore the credibility of the narrative of the Iraq war and that of the “war on terror” in general, and thereby reclaim the credibility of their authority.

As part of such restorative discourse, various techniques of silencing dissenting voices were utilised. The aim of this chapter is thus two-fold: a) building on the analysis of the patterns of critique offered in the previous chapter, to trace how destabilising and deliberative critique each have differently invited, or helped create discursive space for, restorative performatives by the proponents of the

809 Ibid.
810 “The other superpower”, or alternatively, “the second superpower” is a term used by anti-war activists and some commentators to refer to anti-war and global resistance movements as a counter-balance to the US. It was first used by New York Times in relation to the February 2003 anti-Iraq war demonstrations, and has been adopted by activists ever since. Cortsight, David, ‘A Peaceful Superpower: The Movement against War in Iraq’, in Chiba, S. (ed.), Peaceful Movements and Pacifism after 9/11 (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2008), p. 203.
official “war on terror” narrative; and to analyse patterns of the various ways the respective governments have responded to such critique; and b) to take a closer look at specifically silencing practices as an integral part of such restorative performatives.

Thus, part of section 7.2 looks at how the “inviting”, as well as the “non-inviting”, for what I call restorative performatives becomes performatively possible, in light of the dialogical speech-act perspective developed earlier in the theoretical part. Restorative performatives are performative attempts to restore the integrity and stability of a narrative that has been challenged variously by critique. Such narrative “restoration” may be achieved either overtly or more indirectly answering and addressing past and present critique circulating in the broader public realm or confronted with in a more immediate setting such a parliamentary Q&A, or else responding to anticipated such critique. Recalling the discussion of relational performatives in light of Bakhtinian dialogism, restorative performatives are another category (along with disestablishing, deliberative and silencing performatives), where the analytical focus is on “what is done to others’ words” and thereby to the capacity of one’s own word to perform. However, rather than identified and theorised in advance, this category emerged out of the empirical study, thanks to the dialogical-relational approach. The analysis suggests that moderate critique tends to invite more restorative performatives, often shifting the balance away from “responses” to the destabilising/dislocating counter-narrative propositions found in more radical critique.

This claim is further substantiated in the rest of section 7.2, as well as section 7.3, by analysing actual restorative performatives drawn from government officials’ pronouncements. Here the focus shifts from the discourse of the critique and how it “invites” response, to the responsive reactions by those representing, or acting from within, the dominant narrative. I seek to understand the implications of the dynamics of such “invitations” and the ensuing responsive performatives on the reification and endurance of the dominant discourse. I analyse data already from this shifted angle, to further support the key argument of the whole chapter, namely that critique often may have the unintended consequence of reifying the very same hegemonic discourse it had intended to challenge.
Towards this end, section 7.2 introduces various types of restorative performatives and any emerging patterns, while section 7.3 offers an analysis of the role various silencing techniques play in restorative performatives. In particular, the analysis shows that the intermediate period was marked by intensified silencing attempts, as integral part of the restorative performatives. The intended and unintended consequences of both trends, and specifically their implications for the long-term dynamics of the discourse, as well as for the continuity and/or change of policy, are discussed throughout, and re-capped in the concluding section.

7.2. Restoratives in Action: Re-inscribing the “Future”

What I call restorative, or re-integrative narrative propositions (hereafter, restorative performatives, or restoratives) constitute attempts to restore the integrity of, and fortify, a challenged narrative (in this case, the official dominant narrative), whether overtly or more indirectly in response to critique. There may be various semiotic routes through which critique activates the potential for inviting restorative performatives. Thus, for instance, resigning from his post of the Leader of the House of Commons on the eve of the parliamentary debate and vote on Iraq in March 2003, Robin Cook, in a letter to Prime Minister Blair, states:

> You and I have both made the case over the years for an international order based on multilateral decisions through the UN and other forums. In principle I believe it is wrong to embark on military action without broad international support. In practice I believe it is against Britain’s interests to create a precedent for unilateral military action (emphases added).

Cook’s intended illocution in the first sentence may well be to present strong principled grounds for his choice to resign by showing extended commitment to his beliefs, as well as a condemnation of Blair’s non-commitment to the New Labour principle of “multilateralism”. Indeed, in the Austinean terms of ‘doing things with words’, in this sentence, Cook intends to show that their joint commitment to international law and multilateralism was being undermined by Blair’s call for unilateral action, and thus present his own resignation as an act truer to that commitment. However, in addition to this illocutionary meaning, the first sentence has the potential of activating intertextual links with Blair’s own

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811 Cook (17 March 2003).
812 Austin (1975).
articulations over his commitment to multilateralism. Once there is the potential for the receiving side, i.e. the broader audiences, to carry out such intertextual passage, this potential opens up a discursive opportunity for the addressee of the given critique to engage in restorative performatives.

In addition, critique may often be activated only intertextually, on the perception side of the communication, often without apparent locutionary basis. Thus, for instance, at the press conference following President Bush’s speech ‘Struggle for Democracy in Iraq’, on 12 December, 2005, a journalist asks:

Thank you for coming to the city where liberty was born. Central to your policy in Iraq is the role of the Iraqis. We hear widely different tales about how the Iraqis are doing in their own area of defense. Could you give us your perspective on how they’re doing, how well the military is doing, what you feel the capability is to do the task that you want them to do, to include some of the widely different impressions that we hear about (emphasis added).813

Despite the locutionary absence of any direct criticism, the question in this passage hypertextually activates the widespread Democratic criticism of the time about not having achieved the promise of preparing the Iraqis for their own security. These type of performatives indeed transcend individual intentionality of the speaker: whether intended or not, such speech-acts may invite for corrective and restorative performative to the criticisms they are intertextually invoking, rather than any direct criticism they themselves are articulating, and thus provide for one more opportunity for the representative of the official narrative to restoratively “answer” them.

Similarly, in a 31 May 2005 press conference, Bush encounters the following question:

§1 Mr. President, since Iraq’s new government was announced on April 28th, more than 60 Americans and 760 Iraqis have been killed in attacks.

§2 Do you think that the insurgency is gaining strength and becoming more lethal? And do you think that Iraq’s government is up to the job of defeating the -- defeating the insurgents and guaranteeing security (emphases added).814

Again, irrespective of the intentions of the person asking the question,815 for the audiences, the first part of the statement (§1) intertextually links this utterance

815 We might not be able to track down the intentions, affiliations and beliefs of each individual interlocutor (in this case, journalists); but even if we did, I believe this is not what happens in
with the critique present at the time about increased violence in Iraq and a failed mission. Therefore, the subsequent questions (§2) gain the *surplus illocution* of inviting restorative performatives to *those* criticisms. The statement did indeed achieve such perlocution evidenced by the lengthy response given by Bush re-affirming the official narrative.

Moreover, in such multi-speaker settings as press conferences, a question may invite restorative performatives, even when the person asking the question, at least declaratively, seems to *endorse* the dominant narrative. Thus, at the same appearance in Philadelphia, President Bush was asked the following:

Mr. President, I’m...a supporter of yours....Well I have a question for you. *Do you feel that since invading Iraq, the threat of terrorism on U.S. soil has been reduced significantly* (emphasis added)?

Here, despite the declared support for Bush, the person asking the question helped activate intertextual links with certain critical discourses/counter-narratives circulating in the day and in the past, and thus induced meanings constructed in them, specifically that the invasion had increased, rather than decreased terrorist threat on the US. By echoing such criticism, the question posed by the journalist unwittingly and despite the otherwise supportive posture of the speaker, invited restorative action to those very critical propositions. Bush did in fact engage in an extensive restorative performative in this case, which was a response to those critics, whose narratives were intertextually activated by the question. In fact, the performative was a substantial 54 lines long and also allowed him to sum up the conference and make a nice shift to his hitherto ritualised closing line ‘May God bless you all, and may God continue to bless America’.

Finally, consider the following question asked at the 31 May 2005 Bush press conference:

Would you acknowledge that the war did not deter Iran and North Korea from continuing to pursue their program?

Irrespective of the intentions of the journalist, the question contains the surplus illocution that “the war was expected to deter Iran and North Korea” and

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816 Bush (12 December 2005).
817 Ibid.
818 Bush (31 May 2005).
that “such a war would have been legitimate”. Indeed, the journalist is referring to Bush’s earlier legitimation of the war in Iraq, and the strategic rationale behind his narrative of “Axis of Evil”, and might potentially have the intention to challenge or ridicule such a rationale. However, if we shift the angle of the analysis towards the public perceptions and how the broader audiences participate in the meaning creations through these utterances, we may claim that for them such a question speech-act carries the above-suggested surplus illocutions, even if, potentially, the intended illocution had been to critique the very legitimation of such claims. Such public perception, in a retrospective illocutionary reading, would be reinforced and encouraged by the fact that the question did in fact attract and result in a restorative performance from Bush, serving the purpose of re-legitimation.

Similar discursive dynamics is found in types of propositions drawn from moderate critique exemplified in the previous chapter, the overall purpose of which was largely to demonstrate “failure” of the Administration in the mission in “Iraq as promised” and to call for a withdrawal timetable. By demanding ‘benchmarks to measure the war’s progress’, these calls wittingly or unwittingly invited Bush and other officials to engage in restorative performatives constructing a narrative as to “why such a timetable would be a mistake”. They not only invited, but also facilitated such performatives by allowing for discursive efforts that would try and convince that “some progress has been made”, and that “we are not yet fully safe and a lot more needs to be done”. Thereby, they re-enforced the very promise of the official narrative.

Interestingly, even some critique which is apparently less moderate, and has been described in the previous chapter as destabilising counter-narrative propositions, still may release surplus illocutions that could potentially result in re-affirmed elements of the dominant narrative, rather than produce the intended/more apparent effect of dislocating them. Thus, even the staunchest of critics of the official policy, such as the outspoken George Gallaway in the UK, have slipped into releasing the surplus illocution that “continued involvement is necessary, since the promise of Iraq has not been achieved yet”. Thus, during the Parliamentary debate on ‘Defence in the World’ on the day of the 7/7 bombings in London, Gallaway states:

The Secretary of State talked about Iraq—as if Iraq were any kind of success story. I could not believe my ears as he described, in that complacent, orotund manner, progress over 12 months, 18 months or two years. Iraq is going backwards, not forwards. It is impossible for the Secretary of State to say we shall withdraw in any given time frame, because Iraq is getting worse, not better. There are more people being killed in Iraq now than there were before. More military operations are being conducted by the Iraqi resistance than before (emphasis added).\(^{820}\)

Although the intended illocution of this speech-act, judging from the speaker’s earlier articulations, is to continue his critique of the government decision to go to war in the first place, it releases the surplus illocution that withdrawal would be possible only when Iraq were a success, i.e. “got better, and not worse”. The speaker might just as well not have meant the illocution. However, establishing whether he did or not, as in the other similar cases, is not part of the problematic of this research; neither would such intentions, one way or another, change much in terms of the impact, the unintended effect, of the utterance and the relationally produced long-term consequences. As already explored, the surplus illocution, namely what a statement may be taken to mean by the audiences, travels with the speech-act irrespective of/despite, or in addition to, the intended illocution.

The analysis does indeed show that moderate critique, as well articulations of no apparent critical intent which nonetheless intertextually activate narratives of such critique, attracted quantitatively significant restorative performatives. Thus, during the Q&A following the above-mentioned Bush speech, a journalist’s question alluding to the deliberative critique about the performance of Iraqis in the area of their own defence attracted a noteworthy 859 words of restorative performative. In contrast, a question of more destabilising nature, dislodging the nodal point of “evil/threat” in the official Iraq war narrative, resulted in hesitation, perhaps even an attempt to avoid or postpone the question, and once this could not be done, the answer was only a brief one (259 words), and that extremely vague and thinly formulated:

Q. Mr. President, I would like to know why it is that you and others in your administration keep linking 9/11 to the invasion of Iraq when no respected journalist or Middle Eastern expert confirmed that such a link existed.

THE PRESIDENT: What did she --- I missed the question. Sorry. I didn’t --- I beg your pardon, I didn’t hear you. Seriously...

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THE PRESIDENT: Yes --- I appreciate that. 9/11 changed my look on foreign policy. I mean, it said that oceans no longer protect us, that we can’t take threats for granted; that if we see a threat, we’ve got to deal with it. It doesn’t have to be militarily, necessarily, but we got to deal with it. We can’t --- can’t just hope for the best anymore. And so the first decision I made, as you know, was to --- was to deal with the Taliban in Afghanistan because they were harboring terrorists. This is where the terrorists planned and plotted. And the second decision, – which was a very difficult decision for me, by the way, and it’s one that I --- I didn’t take lightly – was that Saddam Hussein was a threat. He is a declared enemy of the United States; he had used weapons of mass destruction; the entire world thought he had weapons of mass destruction....I mean, there was a serious international effort to say to Saddam Hussein, you’re a threat. And the 9/11 attacks extenuated that threat, as far as I --- concerned.821

This response was full of frequent stammering and hesitation in voice (represented by dotted lines); there was very little dialogical response to the critique itself (i.e. why Iraq was linked to 9/11, when there was no clear evidence); unlike responses to deliberative critique, where there was direct engagement with the propositions of the critiquing side.

In a similar vein, George Gallaway’s destabilising critique often articulated in extreme terms, in the above-mentioned Parliamentary debate received restorative performatives mostly of dismissive and/or accusatory nature, intertwined with silencing techniques, not least those of undermining the credibility of the critic. In contrast, more moderate critique, especially characteristically those about withdrawal timetables, received more direct responses, constructively engaging with the points raised by the critics themselves and using the critique as a facilitating discursive resource to achieve a restorative performance. Illustrative is, e.g. the then Defence Minister John Reid’s answer to Lembit Öpik MP, at the 7 July 2005 House of Commons Debate ‘Defence in the World’.

Another example of destabilising critique, e.g. Cindy Sheehan’s various addresses to President Bush, remained largely performatively not recognised. Sheehan was the mother of an army specialist killed in Iraq, and one of the founders of the civil society group Gold Star Families for Peace. She attracted media attention in August 2005, by camping in front of President Bush’s ranch in Texas, demanding a meeting and an explanation for the war in Iraq. Largely covered in the media, soon she became a symbol of the anti-war movement.

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821 Bush (12 December 2005).
Known for her extreme vocabulary, such as calling Bush a ‘maniac’ and a ‘lying bastard’, Cindy’s oft-quoted and most known statement is as follows:

I want him [Bush] to tell me...“just what was the noble cause...[my son] died for?” Was it freedom and democracy? Bullshit! He died for oil. He died to make your friends richer. He died to expand American imperialism in the Middle East (emphases added).

Not only did the questions posed by Cindy Sheen remain performatively unanswered by Bush and his administration, but they were largely drowned in the surmounting defilement of her in the mainstream media, through coverages concentrating on her personal motives, mental health, ideology and family, portraying her as treasonous and unpatriotic and exploiting her son’s death – all of which discredited the source and thus rendered the questions she asked as largely “illegitimate.”

Thus, more radical critique built on destabilising counter-narrative propositions often did not result in attracting a response, despite potentially intending to demand accountability. At a first glance, this contention may seem counter-intuitive, as supposedly these destabilising attempts, being potentially more threatening of the hegemonic project, would have resulted in more defensive responses from the latter’s advocates. However, based on the analysis, I contend, that the outright destruction of the critiqued narrative in the above and similar destabilising statements left very few semiotic resources for the official interlocutor to hinge on for a responsive performance without losing integrity and credibility. Perhaps therefore, especially when the non-/supra-discursive developments accompanying the exchange (e.g. the revelations of no WMDs and the Downing Street memo) left little space for re-legitimation, the targeted officials largely chose to ignore the “invitation” for answerability, and instead concentrated on responding to moderate critique, as these gave ample discursive opportunity. And since deliberative critique, rather than seek to destabilise the official narrative in its entirety, was engaged with questioning its integrity and demanding the fulfilment of promises inherent in it, such answerability in fact further reified the official narrative. This latter effect is

823 Ibid.
analysed in more depth in the next two subsections.

7.2.1. Colonising Critique; and Re-narrativisation/ Deflection

Especially in multi-speaker settings in the Q&A format, deliberative critique inviting for restorative performatives created the opportunities to engage directly with the propositions made in the critique by a re-affirmation of the official stance. Thus, during the exchange between Charles Kennedy and Tony Blair at the Parliamentary debate following Blair’s statement on the “45-minute threat”, Blair made a lengthy restorative performance in response to Kennedy’s questions. He answered in the affirmative to every single concern raised: ‘Iraq’s present capacity, as well as its intent’; whether the House of Commons would be able to debate and vote on the use of force; the need to avoid ‘precipitate action’; not ‘walking away’ after the regime change; and whether the multilateral (UN) route would be followed. Interestingly, the latter question gave Blair the opportunity to first answer in the affirmative, but then use the discursive resource of the nodal point “multilateralism”/“international law” in order to intertextually activate additional meanings attached to the latter, not least through utilising the surplus illocutions of the critic’s own representations, and thus re-integrate, and thereby neutralise, them into the dominant narrative:

Yes, it is very important that we mobilise international opinion through the United Nations. But, as President Bush rightly said to the UN General Assembly, this is a challenge for the United Nations too. Although there are many difficult questions that I have to answer, there is one difficult question that I think everyone has to answer: if the will of the UN continues to be ignored and flouted by Saddam, what then? Unless people have an answer to that question, we cannot really proceed in a way that fully reflects the reality of the situation with which we are dealing (emphasis added). 825

Thus, where Kennedy had utilised the node “international law” to articulate a British/American responsibility not to act unilaterally in using force against Iraq, Blair re-narrativised the node by activating the meaning of Iraqi responsibility towards international law. In doing so, he re-inscribed the meaning of “unilateralism” as a certain US/UK ‘responsibility towards international law’, rather than a violation thereof.

Such de-articulation and then re-articulation of certain meanings drawn from the discourses of critique was a repeated feature of the unilateralism-vs.-multilateralism debate in Britain, which reached a momentum at the immediate

825 House of Commons Debate (24 September 2002).
lead-up to the Iraq war in February-March 2003. Thus, the whole of Tony Blair’s response to Cook’s resignation letter is built on such utilisation of critique as *re-affirming resource* through shifting/re-articulation of the meaning of the key propositions behind the critique. The following is only a brief segment encapsulating what the whole letter was trying to get through:

I have always tried to resolve this crisis through the UN, as you recognise in your letter. But I was always clear that *the UN must be the way of dealing with the issue, not avoiding dealing with it* (emphasis added).\(^\text{826}\)

Another example of shifting of illocutions is from Blair’s 15 February 2003 speech, where he directly addresses the anti-war demonstrators:

Ridding the world of Saddam would be an act of *humanity*. It is leaving him there that is in truth *inhumane*.\(^\text{827}\)

Here, utilising the nodal point “humanity” key to the anti-war discourses, Blair was attempting to undermine its meaning the way it was fixed by them (i.e. as “valuing human life everywhere on equal basis” and “non-interference where there is no clear and immediate threat to Britain”) and shifts it to mean “responsibility to pre-empt/prevent a threat from becoming immanent”, as well as “responsibility to interfere for the security of other peoples”.

Thus, *internalising critique, or utilising critique as narrative building/re-affirming* is a type of restorative performance, where there is a direct or indirect allusion to certain points made by critics, in order to show, through de-articulation and then re-articulation, their erroneousness and thus construct or re-affirm one’s own propositions. More dramatically, this could be called *colonising of critique*. Indeed, in the period under study, critique of “war on terror” and of the Iraq war in particular, was consistently used by the representatives of the official narratives both in the US and the UK, as an additional semiotic resource to neutralise critique via internalising it. This was often achieved via shifting of meanings created in the critique and activating illocutions often diametrically different to those intended by the critic by the same nodal point/proposition. The affective force of such shifting was at times increased by a partial assimilation of narrative, i.e. partial acceptance and use of macro-propositions from the critic’s narrative, followed by “but”-propositions showing their erroneousness.


\(^{827}\) Blair (15 February 2003).
In addition to colonising critique, the official “war on terror” narrative of the intermediate period characteristically responded to critique by re-narrativisation (or deflection). In these restorative performances, the speaker replies to a destabilising question or proposition by deflecting and defaulting back to at least one of the master nodal points of the official narrative, thus refusing to engage with those critical questions or statements outside of the dominant narrative. Re-narrativising often hinges on at least one of the master nodal points of the dominant narrative, “threat/evil” or “freedom”; as well as on chronotopic propositions such as re-affirmation of past, present and future “triumph” of “freedom”, and thus makes them the only loci around which a resolution to the exchange must be sought, away from the issues raised by the question, and the multiplicity of critical voices it might intertextually activate among the listener.

Thus, to illustrate, consider this question and answer exchange between a journalist and President Bush at a 19 December 2005 End of the Year press conference. Amidst heightened critique after the revelations of the “Dodgy Dossier” and the failure to find any WMDs in Iraq, Bush was confronted with an inconvenient question about the misleading intelligence used to legitimate the Iraq war, which he answered by deflection:

Q. [Y]ou’ve carefully separated the intelligence from the decision, saying that it was the right decision to go to war despite the problems with the intelligence, sir. But, with respect, the intelligence helped you build public support for the war. And so I wonder if now, as you look back, if you look at that intelligence and feel that the intelligence and your use of it might bear some responsibility for the current divisions in the country over the war, and what can you do about it?

[$1]$ PRESIDENT: I appreciate that...[H]aving said all that, what we did find after the war was that Saddam Hussein had the desire to --- or the liberation --- Saddam had the desire to reconstitute his weapons programs....America was still his enemy....he was just waiting for the world to turn its head, to look away, in order to reconstitute the programs. He was dangerous then. It’s the right decision to have removed Saddam....[Besides, Iraq is] a part of a broader strategy, to help what I call “lay the foundation of peace,” democracies don’t war; democracies are peaceful countries.

[$2]$...Now, I’ll tell you an amazing story...We had people — first-time voters, or voters in the Iraqi election come in to see me in the Oval...And one person said, how come you’re giving Saddam Hussein a trial? I said, first of all, it’s your government, not ours. She said, he doesn’t deserve a trial; he deserves immediate death for what he did to my people. And it just struck me about how strongly she felt about the need to not have a rule of law, that there needed to be quick retribution, that he didn’t deserve it. And I said to her, don’t you see that the trial, itself, stands in such contrast to the tyrant that that in itself is a victory for freedom.
and a defeat for tyranny – just the trial alone. And it's important that there be rule of law.\textsuperscript{828}

Here in the first part of his answer (§1), the President deflected, i.e. refused to engage directly with the issues raised in the question about abusing public trust by building support for war on misguided premises. In the rest of his lengthy response illustrated by the excerpts in §2, Bush carefully structured his propositions around and through the same master nodal points as the already consolidated official narrative, i.e. “freedom” and “evil”, often by intertextually activating, rather than directly referring to them. Thus, references to ‘first-time [Iraqi] voters’, ‘Iraqi elections’, ‘a trial’, ‘victory of freedom’, and ‘rule of law’ were activating the already-familiar narrative of “liberating Iraq”, and “spreading democracy”, and more broadly, the chronotopicity of the narrative as already indicating a “triumph of freedom” and “prevailing” over the “evil” that Saddam ‘the tyrant’ represented. The once-imagined “future” of the official chronotope aspired as a destination in terms of time as well as space was now being portrayed as achieved, as brought into the present, and thereby the chronotope fulfilled, and America having “prevailed” once again in the cycle of historical triumphs. Thus, by defaulting back to the master nodal points and the chronotopic structure of the official narrative, Bush not only deflected from directly responding to and engaging with the critical question, but also effectively rendered illegitimate any debate outside the official chronotope that had now achieved its “future”: “freedom” and “evil”, as well as the “triumph of democracy” and thereby, by extension, “prevailing” of the “American nation” were now the only loci around which a resolution to any issue raised could be reached.

7.2.2. Reclaiming Positive Belongingness and “Future”

The above example already shows how an attempt to deflect from a discrediting critique leads to re-affirming the existing official narrative and its structural peculiarities of master nodal points and the narrative-normative chronotope. Let us take a closer look at how this made possible reclaiming a positive belongingness for the “nation” and a “future” that is fulfilling, allowing the realisation of an already dominant identity that had not been fully contested by

critique in commensurate terms. To remind, as we saw in the previous chapter, while some dissenting voices do invoke alternative positive values, they often fail to construct an alternative positive “future” commensurate with the official narrative, and thus produce a deficient narrative-normative chronotope. In doing so, they leave the dislocated space (opened up by their own, and others’ destabilising critique) open, i.e. not filled with an alternative signification, which would attempt a new “suture”. Thereby, these critical voices invite the representatives or advocates of the dominant narrative to re-affirm the “future” they had constructed through the official narrative.

Thus, illustratively, in a speech within the context of the 2004 US Presidential election campaign, Bush predominantly aimed at restoring the confidence about the righteousness of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and further legitimised continued involvement, by relying on the reaffirmation, with increased repetitiveness, of the national identity story constructed earlier, and the re-instatement of a certain “triumph” of American values and ideals in a bright “future”:

And we can feel that same unity and pride whenever America acts for good, and the victims of disaster are given hope, and the unjust encounter justice, and the captives are set free. We go forward with complete confidence in the eventual triumph of freedom (emphases added).829

Moreover, in his early 2007 Address to the Nation about the surge of troops in Iraq, Bush responded to anti-surge voices, and those demanding a troop withdrawal from Iraq, by reclaiming the discursive space opened-up by dislocating voices, who had failed to construct an alternative positive “future”, as follows:

The challenge playing out across the broader Middle East...is the decisive ideological struggle of our time. On one side are those who believe in freedom and moderation. On the other side are extremists who kill the innocent, and have declared their intention to destroy our way of life. In the long run, the most realistic way to protect the American people is to provide a hopeful alternative to the hateful ideology of the enemy, by advancing liberty across a troubled region....From Afghanistan to Lebanon to the Palestinian Territories, millions of ordinary people are sick of the violence, and want a future of peace and opportunity for their children. And they are looking at Iraq. They want to know: Will America withdraw and yield the future of that country to the extremists, or will we stand with the Iraqis who have made the choice for freedom (emphases added)?830

830 Bush (10 January 2007).
Here, the performative effort lapses back to the node “freedom” and derivatively, to the macro-narrative building blocks of “triumph” [of “freedom”] as the condition of “success” of the nation in the “future”: it equalises withdrawal of troops with failure of “freedom” and hence of the American identity, just as the negative imagining of the “future” was employed as a discursive device in the earlier narrative constructions analysed in chapter 5. Now this new “if”-conditionality construction about the bleak consequences of withdrawal was being used as a response to critics, as well as narrative building for further-legitimation.

In a similar vein, speaking on the day of the largest mass demonstrations in London against the looming Iraq war on 15 February 2003, Blair reclaimed “Britain-as-promised” in his 1999 Doctrine, as well as in his “war on terror” discourse following 9/11, through the following lines concluding the speech:

> British values. Labour values. Values worth fighting for. Values to inspire our journey of change. Values to sustain us for the great challenges ahead. Values to drive us as we create the Britain that we promised and the Britain that today our world needs (emphases added).[^1]

Such re-claiming of positive distinctiveness for the nation and the re-affirmation of its global role became an indispensable ritual, a necessary condition for the speech to gain its fullness and perform its function as a genre. In a speech where he directly addressed the anti-war demonstrators and thus overtly engaged in a dialogue with them, Blair re-filled with signification the space opened up by the destabilising performances of the anti-war critique, which had produced a deficient chronotope unable to imagine a collective “future” for the “nation” in positive terms.

Moreover, in the US, not only was the positive national identity narrative re-instated in such official pronouncements directly and indirectly answering critique, but also the successful realisation of the nation in the “future” was envisaged through one route only – namely through continued waging of the wars and an eventual triumph conditioned on the global march of “freedom”:

> We live in freedom because every generation has produced patriots willing to serve a cause greater than themselves. Those who serve today are taking their rightful place among the greatest generations that have worn our nation’s uniform. When the history of this period is written, the liberation of Afghanistan and the

[^1]: Blair (15 February 2003).
liberation of Iraq will be remembered as *great turning points in the story of freedom* (emphases added).\(^{832}\) Here, the “war on terror” is overtly portrayed as part of the repetitive cycle of fighting and winning threats to “freedom”.

Thus, these and similar pronouncements re-affirming and re-claiming the positive temporal identity narrative constructed earlier became discursively possible as the result of *the open space* created by the de-articulation, and the subsequent lack of sufficient alternative re-articulation, of the national identity narrative by the critics. Furthermore, together with the need for re-narrativisation (or deflection from uncomfortable questions) explored above, the dislocated space created a good opportunity, which was taken by the respondents, through constructing a response that hinged on the macro-narrative building blocks of “future” and “triumph”.

Restoratives colonising critique and reclaiming the official narrative-normative chronotope, were intertwined with, and often heavily relied on, discursive silencing, whereby critique was stigmatised and dissent was rendered as a “jeopardy to triumph” and hence a threat to the very realisation of the identity of the “nation”. I now turn to exploring how silencing was discursively possible, and to what effect.

7.3. Silencing and the Re-affirmation of “Threat”

Silencing has been far from solely a responsive/restorative strategy, and has been exercised since the very emergence of the official narrative as part of narrative-building. To remind the relational conceptualisation proposed earlier, silencing is an inextricable part of dialogical performativity; and therefore, more broadly, it is part of any communicative exchange. However, in the intermediate period of 2003-2007, in anticipation of, and in response to, heightened critique by “war on terror” dissenting voices, silencing by representatives and proponents of the official discourse intensified and diversified.

The suppression of the alternative voices through a mixture of discursive and non-discursive means began almost from the very first days of the post-9/11 period, when the “hermeneutics of suspicion” exercised by a significant

number of academics, journalists and public figures needed to be vehemently silenced. Many of the means to silence were coercive in nature, i.e. aimed to intimidate by means of formal institutions/regulations and/or physical exclusion;\textsuperscript{833} airtime and press space limitations;\textsuperscript{834} shielding the public from alternative ideas that could potentially incite dissent emanating from external sources, such as bin Laden videos and the Qatar-based Al-Jazeera TV channel.\textsuperscript{835} Illustrations of early discursive, rather than coercive, silencing were pronouncements which were weaving of the official narrative, while at the same time silencing destabilising speech-act attempts. Thus, for example, in his address legitimising the war in Afghanistan in November 2001, President Bush categorically announced that ‘[t]his new enemy seeks to destroy our freedom and impose its views. We value life; the terrorists ruthlessly destroy it’;\textsuperscript{836} and also that ‘[w]e wage a war to save civilization itself’.\textsuperscript{837} Bush thereby effectively delimited the illocutionary potential of those who might question his policy, by indirectly rendering them as “people who do not value life and freedom like us”,

\textsuperscript{833} Thus, the USA PATRIOT Act was passed in October 2001, allowing for the tapping of telephones, interception of emails, investigation of bank accounts, sneak and peek searches, as well as access to library records of individuals. This was backed by coercive language. See, Carruthers, Susan L., \textit{The Media at War}, 2\textsuperscript{nd} edition (Palgrave, MacMillan, 2011), p. 215.
\textsuperscript{834} E.g., in the US, peace groups were refused airtime, even when they were ready to buy it. Jackson (2005: 168). In addition, White House and Pentagon were keeping journalists off the scenes of war. Carruthers (2011: 215-16); Robinson et. al. (2010: 31).
\textsuperscript{835} Ibid., 223.
\textsuperscript{836} Thus, National Security Advisor Rice herself requested the US channels not to air the first bin Laden video released soon after 9/11. In addition, the US government had variously pressured Qatar to silence its ‘anti-American’ broadcasters. In the UK, coercive restriction of space for alternative voices was pursued less vehemently. Especially, a lot of space was provided in October-November for debates about the morality of the daisy cutter bombs. Al-Jazeera was allowed to broadcast in the UK (in difference to a ban in the US), via which the bin Laden full footage was shown across the county, and replayed in part by all main channels. Indeed, soon after, broadcasters were summoned to Downing Street, and were pressurized to censor any further tapes; and the Independent Television Commission started closely monitoring Al-Jazeera and channels re-broadcasting its programs, threatening a ban. Robinson et. al. (2010: 223); Pilger (2002: 24; 121); Joe Murphey, ‘Blair Tells BBC to Censor bin Laden’, \textit{The Telegraph} (14 October 2001), at \url{http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/1359385/Blair-tells-BBC-to-censor-bin-Laden.html}, accessed 28/08/2012; and Sean O’Neil, ‘Al-Jazeera Faces Ban for Inciting Hatred’, \textit{The Telegraph} (5 November 2001), at \url{http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/1361587/Al-Jazeera-TV-faces-ban-for-inciting-hatred.html}, accessed 28/08/2012. However, some still claim that the media coverage in the UK, just as in the US, consistently misrepresented the public disagreement to war, by ‘squeeze[ing] the [poll] figures to fit’, and by ‘routinely cover[ing] demonstrations as if they represent only a small minority of opinion’. David Miller, ‘World Opinion Opposes the Attack on Afghanistan’, Religion-Online, at \url{http://www.religion-online.org/showarticle.asp?title=1772}, accessed 28/08/2012.
\textsuperscript{837} George W. Bush, ‘Address to America before representatives of firemen, law enforcement officers, and postal workers’, Atlanta, GA (8 November 2001), at \url{http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/terrorism/bush911f.html}, accessed 30/08/2012.
and “people who are against civilization itself”. These are examples of the silencing technique of *exclusion via indirect stigmatisation*.

In this section, I focus on how this and other silencing techniques already in the intermediate stage (2005-2007) were used by the representatives of the official narrative, amidst heightened critique, as a crucial part of the restorative performances. I argue and demonstrate, that in contrast with the earlier more overt silencing techniques, such as exclusion via stigmatisation equalising critique with “lack of patriotism”, “betrayal”, or with such highly deplorable practices and ideology as “fascism”; at this intermediate stage of intensified need for restoratives, silencing became not only more subtle and sophisticated in rhetorical techniques, but also more dialogically engaging with the counter-discourses and hence building more semiotic links with the discourses of dissent. Most importantly, I demonstrate how silencing was crucial for the official attempts to re-inscribe the space opened up by dislocatory critique, by re-claiming the official narrative-normative high ground while at the same time, through silencing, curtailing the illocutionary force of the critics to uphold their contesting representations.

7.3.1. Silencing while Restoring

Destabilising critique occasionally acquires public visibility so all-encompassing, that it must be engaged with, or else be left to induce a semiotic crisis. This was the case during the anti-war demonstrations in Washington, New York and London ahead of the Iraq war in 2003 – unprecedented in scale and in intensity of the counter-narratives produced; as well as after the revelations in 2005 that intelligence data had been fixed to allow constructing Saddam as linked to 9/11 and as a major threat to the West and to global security. It would be politically suicidal for the representatives of official discourse to fail engaging with critique of such magnitude shattering the very foundations of the official narrative, and especially to fail re-filling/re-inscribing the dislocated space created as a result of the critique. In an effort to uphold the hegemonic status of the official narrative of “war on terror” and to maintain the credibility of the foreign/security policy, official representatives needed to overwrite alternative such (possible or actual) re-inscriptions. In addition, they needed to re-inscribe the semiotic space opened-up, as we already saw, as a result of dislocations of chronotopic “future”
of the “nation” rendered particularly lacking or under-constructed by destabilising critique. In this subsection, I explore how such re-inscriptions were performed specifically through discursive silencing techniques, as integral part of restorative performatives.

Illustratively, in his Glasgow speech of February 2003, explicitly addressing the unprecedented number of anti-war demonstrators in the streets of London, as well as across the world, Tony Blair opted for a moderate tone towards the demonstrators, in contrast to the earlier harsh official reactions towards the critics of the Afghanistan war and “war on terror” in general. Thus, he stated:

No-one seriously believes he [Saddam] is yet co-operating fully. In all honesty, most people don’t really believe he ever will. So what holds people back? What brings thousands of people out in protests across the world?...It is a right and entirely understandable hatred of war. It is moral purpose, and I respect that.838

This moderate tone was itself a response to mounting discontent in the British society with the self-righteous posture of the government and especially with silencing of dissent by labelling it as “unpatriotic”, “appeasing” or outright equivalent of “fascism”. Specifically, the scandal around Paul Marsden MP and Blair Government Chief Whip Hilary Armstrong839 had been widely publicised in the media, and coupled with increasingly worrying news from Afghanistan about civilian deaths, had added to the public resentment about the war, as well as raised the tolerance threshold for exclusionary labels. Nonetheless, the speech went on to engage in more subtle silencing speech-acts and restorative performances, often directly drawing on anti-war discourse. Thus, clearly responding to the Stop the War Coalition, Blair stated:

[T]here are also consequences of “stop the war”. If I took that advice, and did not insist on disarmament, yes, there would be no war. But there would still be Saddam. Many of the people marching will say they hate Saddam. But the consequences of taking their advice is that he stays in charge of Iraq, ruling the Iraqi people....A country where today, 135 out of every 1000 Iraqi children die before the age of five ... Where in the past 15 years over 150,000 Shia Moslems in Southern Iraq and Moslem Kurds in Northern Iraq have been butchered; with up to four million Iraqis in exile round the world...This isn’t a regime with Weapons of Mass Destruction that is otherwise benign. This is a regime that contravenes every single principle or value anyone of our politics believes in (emphases added).840

In a typical “if”-conditionality statement, he constructed a bleak and unfortunate “future”, which, if not averted, would lie on the conscience of those who

838 Blair (15 February 2003).
839 Marsden had been accused by Armstrong of ‘appeasing Hitler’, for demanding that a war decision be debated and voted in Parliament.
840 Ibid.
opposed his policies. This constitutes discursive silencing through exclusion via indirect stigmatisation, however made more subtle through extending “if”-conditionality statements to cover anti-war demonstrators and critics of the war. Through this technique, by anchoring the narrative on generally socially unquestionable humane norms, the speaker restricts possible dissent by indirectly accusing dissenters of not holding dear the named values:

There will be no march for the victims of Saddam, no protests about the thousands of children that die needlessly every year under his rule, no righteous anger over the torture chambers which if he is left in power, will be left in being.... If there are 500,000 on that march, that is still less than the number of people whose deaths Saddam has been responsible for. If there are one million, that is still less than the number of people who died in the wars he started (emphases added).\textsuperscript{841}

The segments marked in italics (‘children that die needlessly’; ‘torture chambers’, etc.) are all the appalling consequences of inaction that would lie on the conscience of the demonstrators, if Britain refused to go to war to remove Saddam; while references to numbers in the demonstration march of the day were part of the powerful speech-act a) equalising every anti-war or else undecided member of the public with the marching demonstrators who had “betrayed the suffering Iraqi children and people”; and b) constructing a higher moral-normative ground for those who would rather, metaphorically, “march” for the removal of Saddam and hence for the rescuing of the suffering Iraqi people.

Moreover, in an effort to outsource the legitimation of the war, Blair quoted from the email of an Iraqi exile writing to him, but directly addressing the demonstrators:

‘Saddam has murdered more than a million Iraqis over the past 30 years, are you willing to allow him to kill another million Iraqis? ....Why it is now that you deem it appropriate to voice your disillusions with America’s policy in Iraq, when it is right now that the Iraqi people are being given real hope, however slight and however precarious, that they can live in an Iraq that is free of its horrors’ (emphasis added)\textsuperscript{842}

Through such externalising of the source as a silencing technique, the source of information or morale was being claimed to be located outside the speaker, thereby ascribing it higher credibility. As a result, this was effectively delimiting the illocutionary potential of a dissenter, as in such “outsourcing” of legitimation, the targeted dissenter would have to undertake the discursively more difficult task of questioning the external source, whose testimony was in turn often

\textsuperscript{841} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{842} Ibid.
heavily emotive and value-laden, due to direct involvement in the developments (e.g., as a victim).\textsuperscript{843}

Overall, an impressive 50% (i.e., roughly an uninterrupted 1500 words in total) of the text devoted to foreign policy in Blair’s Glasgow speech on the day of the biggest anti-war demonstration constituted restorative performatives heavily reliant on silencing techniques, mostly directly engaging with the anti-war demonstrators.

As for silencing in response to more moderate (deliberative) critique, an illustrative example is the US National Strategy for Victory in Iraq\textsuperscript{844} released in November 2005, as a response to the increased pressure and demand for a withdrawal timetable and a definition of “success” in the Iraq war.\textsuperscript{845} Re-narrativising the Iraq war into the “war on terror”, and reconstructing “victory in Iraq” as “a vital US interest”, the document attempted to silence critique by stating:

\textit{Failure in Iraq will embolden terrorists and expand their reach; success in Iraq will deal them a decisive and crippling blow ... [in case of ‘failure’] Iraq would become a safe haven from which terrorists could plan attacks against America, American interests abroad, and our allies. Middle East reformers would never again fully trust American assurances of support for democracy and human rights in the region – a historic opportunity lost. The resultant tribal and sectarian chaos would have major consequences for American security and interests in the region (emphases added).}\textsuperscript{846}

After re-affirming the nodal point “evil” via the invocation of “terrorists”, this statement indirectly stigmatises those demanding withdrawal as indifferent to the plight and to the democratic aspirations of the Iraqi people, as well as disloyal to the “interests of the nation”, by equalising “withdrawal” with “failure” of both of these future goals. In constructing the “withdrawal = non-pursuance of our interests=failure” narrative, it re-affirms the well-trodden techniques of linking Iraq with terrorism, and the war with the protection of “our interests and our security”. Moreover, the middle sentence (“Middle East reformers would never again...”) silences demands of withdrawal by intertextually linking such demands with a purported undermining/challenging of the key nodal points of

\textsuperscript{843} Another type of such outsourcing of legitimation can be the \textit{agentification of history}, whereby responsibility for the interpretation of events, and therefore for the suggested “correct” action as the only option, is transferred to the personified agent of history, e.g. “history teaches that... “.
\textsuperscript{845} See, e.g., Clinton’s, as well as Pelosi’s speeches and other critique, discussed throughout chapter 5.
\textsuperscript{846} Ibid.
American identity, namely the quest of “spreading democracy and human rights”. Such intertextual linkage aims to silence dissent, as it reduces the illocutionary potential of the critics, making it harder for them to achieve desired perlocution in their own articulations about the necessity of a clear timetable for withdrawal.

Not surprisingly, such engagement – and hence potentially a successful silencing effect – is not only part of the restorative performances by the official representatives as seen above, but also is often present in the discourse of deliberative critique: perhaps as a result of the desire to appear more credible and to increase their chances of reaching more audiences, these critics often choose to re-instate the very same nodal points of the dominant discourse. Thus, part of the reason for the uniting nodal points explored earlier could have been this very silencing or fear/expectation of it. For instance, in her 29 November 2005 ‘Letter to the Constituents’ discussed in the previous chapter, Hilary Clinton, perhaps in anticipation of such silencing, makes performative efforts to re-assure that the Democrats are not in favour of quick withdrawal and that “evil” must indeed be dealt with.\(^{847}\)

Moreover, it is characteristic of moderate critique to create the discursive opportunities for the re-integrative performance that would only fortify the dominant narrative through silencing. Thus, illustratively, in his speech of 12 December 2005 disseminated under the heading “The Struggle for Democracy in Iraq”, President Bush overtly addresses and attempts to silence actual and potential sceptics of progress:

\[
\text{§1] I know some fear the possibility that Iraq could break apart and fall into a civil war. I don't believe these fears are justified. They're not justified so long as we do not abandon the Iraqi people in their hour of need. Encouraging reconciliation and human rights in a society scarred by decades of arbitrary violence and sectarian division is not going to be easy and it's not going to happen overnight.}
\]

\[
\text{§2]...We've done this kind of work before; we must have confidence in our cause. In World War II, the free nations defeated fascism and helped our former adversaries, Germany and Japan, build strong democracies...In the Cold War, free nations defeated communism...}^{848}\]

Here, in §1, the critics were being silenced once again through exclusion via indirect stigmatization. As a result, their demands of a withdrawal or at least a clear timetable and benchmarks for a withdrawal were re-constructed as equal to “abandonment of the Iraqi people”, and thus they were cast as complicit in

\(^{847}\) See analysis of the letter in Chapter 6.

\(^{848}\) Bush (12 December 2005).
the purported civil war that would ensue in such possible “future”. Furthermore, by having historicised the situation earlier in the speech, Iraq was being compared with the nascent United States where success ‘took years of debate and compromise’, as well as with defeating of fascism and communism (throughout §2). In this context, the statement had the illocution that “asking for hasty results or disengagement from Iraq” amounted to not only “depriving Iraq of the certain success that our forefathers secured for us”, but also amounted to choosing to live with evils of such magnitude as fascism and communism.

7.4. Conclusion

In the theoretical discussion in chapter 5, I had referred to a characteristic late modern tension in relation to negotiating foreign/security policy in Western democracies. In light of the empirical analysis in this and the previous chapters, that proposition can be further advanced. Thus, on the one hand, foreign/security official representatives were operating from within the modernist mode of “doing security”, whereby “threats” were defined as external risks to be managed and resolved; responsibility to combat “evil” was reinstated; and where security was inextricably linked with narrating a particular positive “future” for the nation which could not otherwise be fulfilled, and thus the nation – imagined. On the other hand, those responsible for narrating and practicing security found themselves in great tension with the late modern self-reflexive society, who constantly destabilised such traditional narratives, including importantly by pointing to the manufactured nature of the security risks the policies claimed to address. Politically consequential in such self-reflexive voices were the post-modernist deconstructive tendencies which variously attempted to fragment and destabilise the fundamentals of the official security narratives, in case when moderate critique operating from within the dominant paradigm, was only deliberating on the effectiveness of the means and probing the measure of “success”, thus consistently demanding for the realisation of the promises inherent in the official narrative. In such heteroglot field of negotiating security, these voices were reacting and responding to each other, as well as variously acting upon developments on the ground (i.e. in Afghanistan and Iraq) and in the domestic political arena (e.g. revelations about the false premises of

849 Ibid.
the Iraq war; political resignations; anti-war rallies, etc.). These constituted the Bakhtinian “real-life” chronotope; while the various narrations and interpretations of these events in the discourses of dissent amounted to the “real-life” chronotope putting pressure on the narrative-normative, i.e. representational, chronotope of the official discourse, through a) dislodging articulations by destabilising critique; and b) probing/demanding articulations by deliberative critique.

The official representatives could not escape engaging with/responding to such a heteroglot discursive field. This chapter largely demonstrated how such engagement took place in case of the contestations around the “war on terror” in the US and the UK in the intermediate period, roughly 2003-2007.

Thus, tracing semiotic mechanisms through which certain speech-acts performed by critical voices “invited”, or indeed “failed to invite”, restorative performatives, I suggested that moderate critique may result in perhaps unintended, but politically hugely consequential, effects: moderate critique tended to invite more such restorative performatives, often shifting the balance away from responses to the destabilising/dislocating counter-narrative propositions found in more radical critique. Interestingly, even destabilising counter-narrative propositions having the strongest intent of dislodging the dominant narrative still at times released surplus illocutions that resulted in reaffirmed elements of that narrative. Furthermore, the data analysis of actual restorative performatives drawn from government officials’ pronouncements suggested potentially far-reaching implications of the restorative performatives contributing to the reification and endurance of the dominant discourse. It provided more grounds to substantiate the argument put forward earlier, that critique often may have the unintended consequence of reifying the very same dominant discourse it had intended to challenge.

Thus, through internalising/colonising of critique, official representatives consistently utilised anti-war and “war on terror” critique as narrative building/re-affirming resource, by shifting of meanings and activating illocutions often diametrically different to those intended by the critic. Moreover, through circular re-narrativisation/deflection, government officials both in the US and the UK replied to destabilising critique, by resetting the terms of the debate away from the issues raised by the given critique, refusing to recognise the illocutions of the critical questions or statements outside of the dominant narrative. Finally,
the failure of dissenting voices to reconstruct alternative positive “future” commensurate in symbolic force with the “future” constructed in the official narrative, gave ample discursive opportunity for official interlocutors to engage in restorative performatives through *re-claiming positive belongingness and “future” for the nation*. The dislocated space resultant from the dislodging of the official narrative-normative chronotope of foreign/security discourse and national identity became effectively re-inscribed by the representatives of the dominant narrative through re-affirmations of pre-constructed positive belongingness of the nation and *their* version of “future”.

These restorative performances were often intertwined with silencing attempts. Thus, through one of the most prevalent silencing techniques, namely *undermining credibility or moral disposition of the interlocutor*, the official restorative responses rendered critique as less credible morally or logically, thereby reducing or muting the illocutionary effect of their pronouncements. In addition, through *exclusion by indirect stigmatisation*, another most frequently occurring silencing technique, official speakers were anchoring their restorative narrative on either socially unquestionable basic humane norms/values, or ones constructed and reified by the narrative itself; thereby indirectly accusing the actual/potential dissenters of not holding dear the named values. The latter was meant to stigmatis/eclude critical subjects from the dominant “we” identity.

Thus, the consequence of the relational-dialogical “encounter” among the performative acts by official voices and voices of critique was that constructions of “evil” and “threat”, and therefore the need for continuation of war, were largely reaffirmed. However, it is important to stress that this was not hegemony subsuming or co-opting dissent in terms of the Gramsci’s concept of hegemony: while Gramscian and neo-Gramscian “hegemony” is based on consent and creating a “common sense”, the radical critique remained a distinct political and social collectivity systematically resisting and undermining such “common sense”. While the official discourse, through restorative performances was trying to achieve consent, radical critique was *not* subsumed and co-opted by them. Neither was radical critique “bound” or constrained by the official discourse to submit to such co-optation. Rather, they did remain *radical* critique at the given stage, which for lack of a powerful myth to suture the dislocation they had created, together with the deliberative critique asking for accountability, *allowed* the official discourse to reinstate and strengthen itself.
Chapter 8: Binding through the Case of Obama’s Failed Attempts to Close Guantánamo Bay Prison

8.1. Introduction

The analysis of the relational performativity in the intermediate period identified a number of patterns pointing to different routes of the reproduction and reification of the dominant “war on terror” discourses, and thereby pointed to the potentiality and plausibility of discursive constraints precluding or slowing down change in the intermediate period both in the US and the UK. This section seeks to come one step closer in exploring such potentiality by concentrating on one narrow policy/issue area, and hence one specific “within-case case”, already in the late period (2008-2012), in the US, namely President Obama’s pledge to close down the Guantánamo Bay prison and the difficulties he has since faced. In such a quest, a focus on the later period is important, given change of government/administration, and Obama’s expressed political agenda to demonstrate discontinuity from his predecessor. In other words, such focus makes the chosen case study a ‘least likely’ case, and thus constitutes a ‘tough’ test 850 to the hypothesis.

The pledge to close down Guantánamo and hand-over of terror suspects from the military to the judiciary, and thus his attempt to bring the process into the remit of US criminal law has been the defining part of Obama’s election campaign, as well as one of the areas of focus and enhanced public attention in his first term. The case was chosen, given Obama’s pronounced willingness to demonstrate discontinuity with the earlier Bush discourse and practices of “war on terror” in general, begging the question how much Obama has been constrained by the effects of performativity of his predecessor, when attempting to accomplish these promised changes.

However, in this case study, rather than trying to locate patterns and mechanisms similar to the ones identified in the previous chapter (this would have been a selection-confirmation bias), I apply the relational-dialogical framework in an open analysis, interested in identifying patterns of relational

performances and their effects as they pertained to the given case in the new context of the late period.

Obama’s efforts for change required performative moves legitimising the closure and specifically the transferal of the prisoners to be tried “on US soil”, as well as be granted the US constitutional right of habeas corpus. Albeit clear in their intended illocution (i.e. what they were doing in saying it), these performative moves were very restricted in their perlocution (i.e. how successful they were in being received as intended, and how they were actually received by certain segments of public and political audiences). This was due to a certain semiotic dissonance: on the one hand, Obama’s discourse was selectively re-inscribing “freedom” and “American values” via the node “rule of law”; and on the other hand, it continued relying on the earlier master nodal point “threat/evil” constituted through the signifier “terrorist” and on the initial authorisation of use of force and the discourse of “terrorism as war”. This semiotic dissonance is shown to have been successfully appropriated by, and utilised to raise momentum for the discourses of political (primarily Congressional), as well as civil society opposition to the closure of Guantánamo, and thus contributed to constraining the Obama Administration’s policy options.

These findings, only possible through a relational-dialogical analysis, point to an understanding of the resultant outcome of protracted change in relation to Guantánamo policies, that goes deeper than alternative, mostly popular, explanations, such as those claiming mere congressional politicking between Republicans and Democrats precluding change initiated by Obama; or Obama’s lack of political will advanced by civil rights groups and some critical media. Rather than alternative and competing explanation, some of such accounts will be shown to partly rely on a semiotic dynamics, which in itself requires exploring and explaining and which is done here through a dialogical-relational analysis.

Thus, section 8.2 offers a brief analysis of Obama’s “change” discourse in general; whereas sections 8.3 and 8.4 offer a detailed analysis of the case of the failed attempts to close the Guantánamo Bay prison. Finally section 8.5 draws some conclusions from the case study and briefly addresses the question of alternative explanations, to show the advantages of a dialogical-relational analysis for the case.
8.2. “Freedom” as “Rule of Law”

Soon after his inauguration as President in 2009, Barack Obama set out his “new approach” to counterterrorism, through criticism of Bush administration’s practices around “war on terror”. Characteristically, he shunned the term “war on terror”, instead opting for terms such as “overseas counter-insurgency operations”; pledged to close the notorious Guantánamo Bay prison and end the controversial interrogation techniques including torture.

Commitments to such changes were received differently by various critics. John O. Brennan, the President’s Assistant for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, summarised this critique in front of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, when delivering Obama’s ‘New Approach to Safeguarding Americans’:

I have been deeply troubled by the inflammatory rhetoric [of critics]...Some like to claim that the President’s policies somehow represent a wholesale dismantling of counterterrorism policies and practices adopted by his predecessor. Others claim that the President’s policies constitute a wholesale retention of his predecessor’s policies. Well, they can’t both be right. In fact, both are wrong (emphases added). 851

Throughout his statement, on the one hand Brennan was at pains to narrate and “bring into being” a new President who was not to take up the task of “dismantling” foreign/security policies and interlinked with them a national identity already forged through his predecessor’s discourse and practice: ‘dismantling’ of those policies would indeed for most amount to a challenge to identity/national consciousness. On the other hand, he was compelled to refute the blame for complete “continuation”, either, lest the President was cast as lacking credibility as a new leader and unable to keep his earlier promises on changing approach and policy. Wrestling between the two tasks, Obama’s administration went half step forward, demonstrating “change” and a step backwards, reaffirming the main elements of the earlier discourse that had by now become part of the national psyche, and thus demonstrating some continuity.

Notably, as part of his attempts to differentiate himself from his predecessor, and demonstrate commitment to change, Obama performatively

attempted to dislocate and re-fix certain core signifiers in the official discourse of the Bush era. Thus, in his ‘Remarks on National Security’, he stated:

Instead of strategically applying our power and our principles, too often we set those principles aside as luxuries that we could no longer afford…. the decisions that were made over the last eight years established an ad hoc legal approach for fighting terrorism that was neither effective nor sustainable – a framework that failed to rely on our legal traditions and time-tested institutions, and that failed to use our values as a compass (emphasis added).\textsuperscript{852}

While “values”, hinging on the master nodal point “freedom” in the Bush discourse, had been constituted as the target of the “ruthless enemy” (“they hate us for who we are”), and at the same time as something to be extended over other nations and thus “prevail” and “triumph”, here in Obama’s speech-act, America had failed its own “values”, and done disservice to its “freedom” by setting aside “rule of law” as ‘luxuries’. Thus, respect for the “rule of law” now came to the forefront in fixing the meaning of “values”, and “freedom”. In fact, numerous times in this speech, the “freedom” node was re-inscribed through the “rule of law”. This was in contrast to Bush discourse, where the “freedom” node was largely used to justify suspension or suppression of the rule of law under extraordinary circumstances (in other words, to securitise, in the name of “protecting our freedoms”), along with, building the narrative of “spreading our freedoms and values to other peoples around the world”. In this re-inscription, “freedom” as “rule of law” had failed in the “past”, i.e. in Bush era.

Importantly, the reinstatement of the “rule of law” as the core of American values and aspirations for “freedom” became a trademark of Obama’s early discourse. In a discourse otherwise often paying tribute to Bush’s “war on terror” through important narrative continuities, this feature constituted one of the most important narrative differences with the Bush discourse. This, as demonstrated above, became possible by refuting, at least declaratively, that rule of law, as well as respect for civil liberties, must be sacrificed for purposes of national security. John Brennan made this explicit, by stating: “[Obama] rejects the false choice between ensuring our national security and upholding civil liberties. The United States of America has done both for centuries—and must do so again.”\textsuperscript{853}


\textsuperscript{853} Brennan (6 August 2009).
Other important novelties in Obama’s approach were the acknowledgement of the need ‘to address the underlying causes and conditions that fuel so many national security threats, including violent extremism’, at times relating such threats to US former policies and posture in the world; as well as a commitment to ‘take a multidimensional, multi-departmental, multi-national approach’ when tackling these threats.\textsuperscript{854} This was a departure from the Bush era, where 9/11 was presented in a rupture narrative, and in a temporal and causal discontinuity with American policies in the world.

With all these “trademark” differences, the Obama Administration was still operating under the initial Authorization to Use Military Force adopted in the aftermath of 9/11, and despite his refusal to use the term “war on terror”, Obama’s early discourse failed to achieve a significant shift in narrative; one that would re-constitute both master nodal points of “evil” and “freedom” in new ways, as well as displace the normative chronotopicity of the national identity narrative underlying the earlier discourse, and thus offer a viable alternative that could compete with the still predominant identities constructed in the Bush era. Thus, even if he had resented the term “war on terror” from the very beginning, Obama was still frequently referring to “terrorists” in the “war” frame, which meant that every time signifiers such as “9/11”, “terror/terrorist/terrorism” or “war” were uttered, they were hypertextually re-activating the older narrative of “war on terror”. Thus, in his inauguration speech he reminded:

\textit{Our nation is at war, against a far-reaching network of violence and hatred...We will not apologize for our way of life, nor will we waver in its defense, and for those who seek to advance their aims by inducing terror and slaughtering innocents, we say to you now that our spirit is stronger and cannot be broken; you cannot outlast us, and we will defeat you.}\textsuperscript{855}

Here, the statement is structured upon the constructions of “war”, “evil terrorist enemy”, “our freedom” and ultimate triumph in the future (‘we will defeat you’), which amounts to nothing less than a narrative of “war on terror”, thus making his discarding of the term irrelevant and inconsequential. As we shall see in the next section, such hypertextual activation, as well as irreconcilable elements in Obama’s discourse, created a certain \textit{semiotic dissonance}, with political consequences. I take a closer look at the irreconcilable elements within the

\textsuperscript{854} Ibid.
Obama discourse; as well as those between the Obama narrative of counter-terrorism, on the one hand, and the earlier Bush narrative, specifically concentrating on the developments and contestations around Obama’s failed initiative to close the Guantánamo Bay prison, and bring the prosecution of terror suspects within the remit of US law. I then show how this semiotic dissonance had important political implications for the resistance to close Guantánamo: as the “war” analogy was still dominant in Obama’s narrative, the partial or selective introduction of elements of a potentially competing “crime” narrative was facing unrelenting resistance from various public and political segments of audiences and thus constraining change.

8.3. Semiotic Dissonance, and the Failure to Close Guantánamo

Since 2002, terror suspects had been incarcerated and tried at Guantánamo Bay for “war crimes” without the protections of civilian rights, and without the protections designated by international law for prisoners of war. The prison location had been chosen in Cuba for being outside US sovereign territory and thereby preventing the use of US criminal courts. In addition, the detainees were declared as “unlawful enemy combatants” and therefore outside the full protections offered by the Geneva Convention on the treatment of war prisoners. Taking advantage of the Convention, an international legal document designed in the post-World War II environment that was not considering non-state actors as a category of detainees, and also the fact that it was providing protections only for “lawful” combatants, i.e. those who had waged war according to the laws of war inscribed in the very same Geneva Conventions, including refraining from targeting civilians, such designation of Guantánamo detainees as “unlawful” was technically possible. It allowed the US to hold the detainees indefinitely without trial, and also interrogate them – something prohibited by the Conventions.

However, the practice had caused a lot of outcry raised by human rights organisations, as well as public court cases against the Bush Administration. As a result, after the court cases Rasul v. Bush, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the US Supreme Court decided that the Geneva Conventions, and particularly Article 3 requiring fair trial, prohibiting torture and indefinite detention, did apply to all individuals found in conflict; and also that
constitutional habeas corpus protections must apply to them, too.\footnote{Susan Saligson, ‘Guantánamo: The Legal Mess behind the Ethical Mess’, \textit{BU Today} (28 May 2013), at \url{http://www.bu.edu/today/2013/gitmo-the-legal-mess-behind-the-ethical-mess/}, accessed 14/08/2014.} This view was also advanced by key international bodies, such as the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, and the Red Cross. Nonetheless, the practice of the Guantánamo trials was formalised in 2006 by the Bush Administration through the adoption of the Military Commissions Act, which authorised the trial of ‘any alien unlawful enemy combatant’ by military commissions. The Act defined “unlawful enemy combatant” as ‘a person who has engaged in hostilities or who has purposefully and materially supported hostilities against the United States or its co-belligerents who is not a lawful enemy combatant’.\footnote{Military Commissions Act (2006), at \url{www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/PL-109-366.pdf}, accessed 12/08/2013.} In addition, the Act affirmed that these persons did not have the constitutional right to habeas corpus. The legality of the Military Commissions Act was subsequently challenged by the court case of \textit{Boumediene v. Bush}, gaining publicity in 2007-2008, where the Supreme Court held that the Guantánamo detainees had a right to the habeas corpus under the United States Constitution.\footnote{See Linda Greenhouse, ‘Justices, 5-4, Back Detainee Appeals for Guantánamo’, \textit{The New York Times} (13 June 2008), at \url{http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/13/washington/13scotus.html?scp=1&sq=Habeas%20corpus&st=cse&_r=0}, accessed 13/08/2014.}

Within hours of assuming his post in January 2009, and as one of the first moves to fulfil his pre-election pledge, President Obama filed a motion to suspend the existing trials at the Guantánamo military commissions for 120 days,\footnote{See, Andrew Waever, ‘Obama Orders Halt to Guantánamo Tribunals’, \textit{The Guardian} (21 January 2009), at \url{http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jan/21/barack-obama-Guantanamo-bay-tribunals}, accessed 12/07/2013.} to allow reviewing the legal bases of the controversial practice. The motion to suspend the practice so early into his presidency was hailed by human rights organisations as ‘an indication of the sense of urgency [Obama] feels about reversing the destructive course that the previous administration was taking in fighting terrorism’.\footnote{Human Rights First, quoted in ibid.} This was quickly followed, on 22 January 2009, by Obama issuing an Executive Order on the Closure of Guantánamo Detention Facilities within one year, where ‘the prompt and appropriate disposition of the [detainees]…and closure of the facilities’ were presented to be
‘in the interests of the United States and the interests of justice’. The order prohibited any new cases from being referred to a military commission under the Military Commissions Act of 2006. Consistent with his attempt to bring the “rule of law” back into the meaning of what constituted “freedom” as a value for Americans, and responding to years of legal and public controversy around the (un)lawfulness of detaining prisoners at Guantánamo, Obama, through the Executive Order, established that ‘[t]he individuals currently detained at Guantánamo have the constitutional privilege of the writ of habeas corpus’.

As part of the plan to close the prison, it was later decided that some prisoners, notably the suspected architect of 9/11 Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and four associates, would be transferred to the US for trial in federal courts. Thus, the task was effectively being taken away from the military, and more broadly from the executive, and handed over to the judiciary system, as part of the move to bring US counter-terrorism back into the remit of “the rule of law”. Attorney General Eric Holder now shouldering this responsibility, announcing the decision to bring the 9/11 suspects to the US for trial, stated:

For over two hundred years our nation has relied upon a faithful adherence to the rule of law. Once again, we will ask our legal system…to answer that call.

Nonetheless, operating under the initial Authorization to Use Military Force, the Obama Administration retained the right of the Executive branch to detain indefinitely and without charge anyone suspected of harming or planning to harm the US: the Authorization for Use of Military Force against Terrorists passed on 14th September 2001 authorised the President ‘to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons’.

The two moves, namely selectively bringing some of the counter-terrorism practices into the remit of the US rule of law and hand over to the Judiciary on

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862 Ibid.
the one hand, and the continued reliance on the initial authorisation to wage “war” and hence retain the right to exceptional measures that came with securitising the terrorist threat, on the other, were producing a discrepancy that could result in a *semiotic dissonance*, to be seen in a moment.

In May 2009, in a Statement on National Security, Obama announced several important decisions he had made. Thus, he announced a ban on “enhanced interrogation methods” (i.e., “torture”); re-affirmed his determination to close Guantánamo; and announced that the review process assessing all pending cases had resulted in distinguishing five different categories of detainees and five different methods of handling them, as the means making the eventual closure practically possible. In doing so, he once again attempted to re-inscribe “freedom” and hence “American-ness” through “rule of law”. Thus, commenting on his decision to ban “enhanced interrogation methods”, of prosecuting terror suspects, he stated:

I categorically reject the assertion that these are the most effective means of interrogation. What’s more, they undermine the *rule of law*. They alienate us in the world. They serve as a recruitment tool for terrorists…[E]ven under President Bush, there was recognition among members of his own administration – including a Secretary of State, other senior officials, and many in the military and intelligence community – that those who argued for these tactics were on the wrong side of the debate, and the wrong side of history. That’s why we must leave these methods where they belong – in the past. *They are not who we are, and they are not America.*

He did the same when elaborating on some of the categories of Guantánamo detainees:

[§1] First, whenever feasible, we will try those who have violated *American criminal laws* in *federal courts* – courts provided for by the *United States Constitution*. Some have derided our federal courts as incapable of handling the trials of terrorists. They are wrong…

[§2]…The third category of detainees includes those who have been ordered released by the courts…This has nothing to do with my decision to close Guantánamo. It has to do with the *rule of law*. The courts have spoken. They have found that there’s no legitimate reason to hold 21 of the people currently held at Guantánamo. Nineteen of these findings took place before I was sworn into office. I cannot ignore these rulings because as President, I too am *bound by the law*. The United States is a *nation of laws* and so we must abide by these rulings.

In this statement, through §2, Obama was intertextually relying on critique levelled against Bush in the previous several years condemning his disregard for the US Supreme Court rulings about the unconstitutionality of the practices

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865 Obama (21 May 2009).
866 Ibid.
at Guantánamo. Indeed, Obama was setting himself apart from Bush policies by re-inscribing “rule of law” as “our values” and “freedom” to be protected. Nonetheless, the reference to “terrorists” (who were “at war with us”) in the same statement was causing the unintended hypertextual activation of the whole of earlier Bush narrative, which was in semiotic dissonance with the new discourse of “rule of law”. Thus, “terrorists” was in dissonance with ‘American criminal laws in federal courts – courts provided for by the United States Constitution’ (§1), as well as with ‘rule of law’ (§2).

Similarly, announcing his decision to resume the practice of the military commissions to try some of the existing detainees, Obama stated:

The second category of cases involves detainees who violate the laws of war and are therefore best tried through military commissions. Military commissions have a history in the United States dating back to George Washington and the Revolutionary War. But instead of using the flawed commissions of the last seven years, my administration is bringing our commissions in line with the rule of law. We will no longer permit cruel, inhuman, or degrading interrogation methods. We will give detainees greater latitude in selecting their own counsel, and more protections if they refuse to testify.

Here, the signifier ‘laws of war’ and the indirect analogy ‘Revolutionary War’ presuming that “America was at war” were again in dissonance with ‘the rule of law’ and the granting of ‘greater latitude in selecting their own counsel, and more protections’. Indeed, if these were people who had been at war with America and hated and wished to destroy “our values and freedoms”, how could they benefit from the same rights and privileges those “values and freedoms” provided?

Finally, referring to the fifth category of detainees, Obama stated:

Now, finally, there remains the question of detainees at Guantánamo who cannot be prosecuted yet who pose a clear danger to the American people...[e.g.] people who’ve received extensive explosives training at al Qaeda training camps, or commanded Taliban troops in battle, or expressed their allegiance to Osama bin Laden, or otherwise made it clear that they want to kill Americans. These are people who, in effect, remain at war with the United States.

Having said that, we must recognize that these detention policies cannot be unbounded. They can’t be based simply on what I or the executive branch decide alone. That’s why my administration has begun to reshape the standards that apply to ensure that they are in line with the rule of law. We must have clear, defensible, and lawful standards for those who fall into this category. We must have fair procedures so that we don’t make mistakes.

Through these statements, as well as by granting the right of habeas corpus through his Executive Order earlier that year, Obama was effectively extending

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867 Ibid.
868 Ibid.
the same “freedoms and privileges” as those enjoyed by Americans at home over the terror suspects. While different methods of handling were referring to different categories of detainees, they had one thing in common, namely one way or another, re-inscribing the counter-terrorism narrative as hinging on “the rule of law”. Perhaps, the architects of this new narrative had underestimated or not suspected how much only partial desecuritization of the detainees and the overall partial abdication of the Bush era “war on terror” narrative would create a dissonance with this new narrative nodal point of “rule of law”. Thus, the “freedom” node, that had previously been used only to constitute American exceptionalism, as well as “our way of life” that was the object of hatred for “the evil Other”, was now being re-inscribed in a narrative, where the terror suspects – constituted by Bush as the most vile and dangerous people on the planet – must now benefit individual freedoms and rights ensured for Americans through the “rule of law”. Such re-inscription, which diametrically shifted the relationship between “threat/evil” and “freedom” as they had been fixed in the Bush narrative, constituted a potential semiotic dissonance, i.e. a semiotic contradiction between competing fixations within the same narrative structure. Thus, while these detainees were “at war” with America, for broader audiences it was hard to comprehend why then they should enjoy the same rights as US citizens with whom they were effectively “at war”.

Moreover, for some of the detainees (category 1), the Obama narrative mandated that the constitutional privileges and rights be granted on the American soil itself:

Where demanded by justice and national security, we will seek to transfer some detainees to the same type of facilities in which we hold all manner of dangerous and violent criminals within our borders – namely, highly secure prisons that ensure the public safety…we will try those who have violated American criminal laws in federal courts – courts provided for by the United States Constitution (emphases added).869

Through surplus illocution, and in ways unintended by the speaker, this latter speech-act referring to the Constitution, at least for a segment of the audiences, would intertextually activate the earlier official narrative’s master nodal point of “freedom” (as “our values” that are under attack by the “evil terrorist Other”), and with it would activate the whole chronotopicity of the earlier narrative (“we aspire towards a future where we fulfil our American-ness by triumphing this

869 Ibid.
evil”). Furthermore, the reference to ‘within our borders’ intertextually activated the Bush narrative’s proposition, whereby “freedom” [the way it had been fixed in the dominant narrative] defined what ‘within our borders’ meant: “freedom” was precisely what “evil” had attempted to take away from “us”. Such intertextual activation of the earlier fixations of the master nodal points of “evil” and “freedom”, and the earlier chronotope of assigning ultimate and absolute triumph over a transcendental “evil” would have created a further semiotic dissonance among an audience who had internalised this earlier narrative. As we shall see in the next section, Obama’s re-inscription of “freedom” as involving “constitutional rights”, and “rule of law” benefiting the “terrorist” was unsuccessful, if not outright blasphemous, for those in the audiences for whom “freedom” still belonged only to “us” and “within our the borders”, rather than to “them”, and therefore could not be granted to “them”.

Finally, the following speech-act by Obama is of interest:

Our courts and our juries, our citizens, are tough enough to convict terrorists. The record makes that clear. Ramzi Yousef tried to blow up the World Trade Center. He was convicted in our courts and is serving a life sentence in U.S. prisons. Zacarias Moussaoui has been identified as the 20th 9/11 hijacker. He was convicted in our courts, and he too is serving a life sentence in prison. If we can try those terrorists in our courts and hold them in our prisons, then we can do the same with detainees from Guantánamo (emphasis added).870

The term “Guantánamo” itself had previously been constructed firmly hinging on both the master nodal points of “evil” and “freedom”, i.e. as the place where “evil” (as threat to “freedom”) was being effectively contained. In fact, statements pointing to the fact that more than 400 terrorist suspects had been tried and convicted in US civilian courts since 9/11,871 as evidence that these courts were fit for the purpose of fighting terrorism and that this was not something entirely new, were having little communicative effect when reminded: these trials had not attracted much public visibility in the sense of requiring elite legitimation performatives, in contrast to the case of those detained in Guantánamo, whose possible “transfer” itself and the subsequent “closure” of the prison were directly striking a nerve with parts of audiences (from the general public, as well as acting political and civil society agents, as seen in a moment) who remained constituted by the dominant “war on terror” narrative.

870 Ibid.
Not surprisingly then, a 2009 Gallup poll found that 65% of Americans were opposed to closing the Guantánamo Bay prison and to moving some of those prisoners to the United States; while 74% of Americans were opposed ‘to the idea of moving the prisoners to prisons in their own states if Guantánamo is closed’. Obama’s attempts to construct equivalence between terrorists within Guantánamo’s symbolic borders, and the ones (pre- as well as post-9/11) successfully tried at home were unsuccessful.

On 7 March 2011, President Obama, despite his earlier promises to close Guantánamo Bay, lifted the suspension of trials by military commissions under the Commissions Act of 2006, and signed an executive order that would set into law the practice of holding detainees indefinitely without charge. Defense Secretary Robert Gates subsequently rescinded the suspension of filing new cases to military commissions. Thus, the camp was kept as the primary location, and one outside of the US. This outcome, i.e. the failure to fulfil a landmark election campaign pledge and more importantly an initial executive order, is in part causally traced to certain relational discursive processes involving government (agents in the executive and the judiciary), political opposition and civil society. In such process, the semiotic dissonance described above was appropriated by, and helped raise momentum for, the discourses of political and civil society opposition to the closure. The next section demonstrates how such semiotic dissonance contributed in galvanising further opposition, and thus potentially played a role in constraining the Obama Administration in its liberty to fulfil the promised policy changes.

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8.3. Public and Political Opposition to Closure

In November 2009, the Obama Administration and the judiciary faced a range of protests from across the political spectrum, the media and civil groups against the plans on transferring Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the suspected architect of 9/11, and four other detainees, from Guantánamo into a criminal court in New York for trial. Thus, on 5 December 2009, there was a demonstration in New York, partly organised by a new political-advocacy group *Keep America Safe*. Calling the Attorney General Eric Holder a “traitor” and “communist” for his decision, the protest had a narrative summarised in the following lines in the demonstration speech of Andrew McCarthy, the former Chief Assistant U.S. Attorney: ‘[the General Attorney doesn’t] understand what rule of law has always been in wartime...It’s military commissions. It’s not to wrap our enemies in our Bill of Rights’. Another protestor asked: ‘How can someone who is not an American have any right to our rights? Holder wants to help the terrorists?’

While at the time, this protest was relatively small and did not gain much media attention, the narrative line gained new momentum after the Christmas day failed terrorist act attempted by Abdulmutallab on the passenger plane to Detroit. When the suspect was arrested as a criminal, rather than an “unlawful enemy combatant”, and was allowed to have an attorney, conservative circles, and soon even some Democrats raised a bout of protests in a narrative line similar to the one above. Attorney General Holder’s reminders that what they did was ‘totally consistent with what has happened in every similar case [since 9/11], as every previous terrorist suspect apprehended inside the country had been handled as a civilian criminal’, were illocutionarily unsuccessful. Such failed illocution was causing frustration to Holder and his supporters: they were dismayed at the accusations that Holder had ‘fail[ed] to send Abdulmutallab directly to Guantánamo’, calling such

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875 The advocacy group *Keep America Safe* is claimed to have been supported by the conservative pundit William Kristol and the daughter of former Vice-President Dick Cheney, and has Conservative donors and strategists. Ibid.
877 Ibid.
878 Ibid.
879 Ibid.
880 Quoted in ibid.
881 Ibid.
possible scenario a ‘fantasy’ lacking any legal basis, and pointing to scores of terror suspects tried as criminals in civilian courts in the Bush era. They were expressing shock that such factual truth could be ignored or forgotten. The protesting voices were still advancing the “not-on-our-soil” and “not-the-same-rights” narrative. Now that the official narrative had been constructed in the new terms of the “rule of law” as one of its master nodal points, it was easy for those actors opposing the civilian trials to expose, and perhaps politically manipulate, an inherent discrepancy between the earlier and still vital official proposition that “the terrorist enemy hates us for who we are, and wishes to destroy our freedoms” and the Obama proposition that “these same terrorists can also benefit from some of the same freedoms”.

Similar narratives were present in the articulations of other civil society groups. Thus, along with the argument that trying terror suspects in federal courts would mean granting them all constitutional rights, including transparency of evidence collection, which would jeopardise security, the civil group 9/11 Families for a Safe and Strong America persistently re-produced the nodal points “evil” and “freedom”, whereby the signifier “our soil” fixed as the realm of constitutional freedoms and privileges was in semiotic dissonance with granting such privileges to the ‘evil that had attacked and still hated this very soil’. Furthermore, this was firmly located within the “terrorism as war”, rather than “terrorism as crime” narrative, and therefore posed additional constraints on any political attempt to introduce policy change without first having to dismantle such narrative. This was well demonstrated in the supportive article by Andrew C. McCarthy, legal affairs editor at The National Review, ahead of the campaign meeting organised by Move America Forward (with Gold Star family members, 9/11 family members, and former members of the military on 10 February 2009). The following passage encapsulates the general predominant mood of civil society groups resisting the closure of Guantánamo:

If we didn’t already have Gitmo, we’d have to invent it. There really is a war going on out there … It has never been possible, nor thought possible, to win a war in court....And it bears keeping in mind that the purpose of an American trial is to

882 See Debra Burlingame, Director of 9/11 Families for a Safe and Strong America, Radio Interview (9 February 2009), following her meeting with the President, together with other members of the group, at http://www.911familiesforamerica.org/?p=1147, accessed 12/07/2013.
883 During the event held at the National Press Club in Washington, the anti-terrorist group Move America Forward presented its campaign ad asking President Obama to keep Guantánamo open. The video of the ad is available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-Lhls4KJSAc, accessed on 12/07/13.
force the government to meet a very high burden of proof in a system developed for the benefit of American citizens enjoying the presumption of innocence… A war is fought — meaning that people are killed and prisoners taken — in order to achieve vital national objectives, particularly the protection of American lives… We need the government to prevail, or our lives and the rights we cherish are in jeopardy… Remember, we turned to military justice because the civilian system had shown itself inadequate for the purpose at hand — and the purpose, remember, is not to provide due process for our enemies. The purpose is to secure our citizens by neutralizing as many of our enemies as possible (emphases added). 884

The Attorney General, when announcing the decision about the trial of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and his supporters in New York, had indeed attempted to use the symbolism the signifier “New York” had in the dominant 9/11 narrative, in favour of his own narrative legitimating the transfer. Thus, at the press conference announcing the decision about the location for the trials, he said:

After eight years of delay, those allegedly responsible for the attacks of September the 11th will finally face justice. They will be brought to New York – to New York – to answer for their alleged crimes in a courthouse just blocks away from where the twin towers once stood. 885

Similarly, others pointed to the positive symbolic value of New York as a trial site, thus also trying to hinge the legitimation of the new measure on some old and familiar “war on terror” premises:

By trying them in our federal courts, we demonstrate to the world that the most powerful nation on earth also trusts its judicial system – a system respected around the world. 886

Even New York’s mayor Michael Bloomberg, who was later to withdraw his support for the trials, initially agreed: ‘[i]t is fitting that 9/11 suspects face justice near the World Trade Center site, where so many New Yorkers were murdered’. 887

However, such performative acts were unsuccessful, as performative moves pointing to the semiotic dissonance, now exposed by opponents of the transfer and the closure of Guantánamo, had far greater performative force:

885 Holder (13 November 2012).
887 Mayer (15 February 2010).
they were hinging on a “war” narrative still dominant for the majority, and one which had not been fully dismantled by the Obama narrative.

Eventually, the plan for the transfer was dropped and the suspected architect of 9/11 and his four associates were tried at Guantánamo by military commissions (still on-going at the time of writing). Moreover, the sequence of events that followed can be described as one compromise by the Obama Administration leading to another, and eventually creating institutional and legal barriers that would make the closure of Guantánamo implausible in the near future.

Thus, in December 2010, the House of Representatives approved H.R. 6523 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2011, by a vote of 341 to 48. The Act was prohibiting the use of defence budget on transfer of Guantánamo detainees into the US, any third country, as well as on building any new facilities within the US for the purposes, thus effectively decapacitating the President in carrying out his pledge. The narrative building political resistance to the closure of Guantánamo is manifested in the House Debate on the Act. Most notably, similar to the narrative of the civil groups described above, the most outspoken proponents of the Bill were effectively building a “not-on-our-soil” and “not-the-same-privileges” narrative:

[T]he American people know that the Gitmo detainees – which include terrorist trainees, terrorist financiers, bomb makers, Osama bin Laden’s body guards, terrorist recruiters, and would-be suicide bombers – are not minor offenders by any means…that the battlefield is not limited to our efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq… Those that seek to do us harm should never be transferred to our soil or tried in our Federal court system, where they would essentially be provided the same protections under our Constitution as the very U.S. citizens they would love to kill (emphasis added).888

Similar propositions re-occurred during the debate, built on the master nodal points “evil” and “freedom” the way they had been fixed in the Bush discourse, and capitalising on the inner dissonance between these dominant constructions and Obama’s contention that this “evil” must be granted privileges that belong to the realm of “freedom”.

Such dissonance, indeed, not the sole cause of resistance, was nonetheless making it performatively much easier to resist change initiated by

the new Administration and build public opinion for such resistance, and conversely much harder for the Obama administration to achieve a successful perlocutionary effect through change-initiating speech-acts. Statements by Obama and others in his Administration as well as the judiciary pointing to the benefits of closure and home trials, and pointing to factual evidence from the past in favour of such decisions, were being illocutionarily unsuccessful due to the silencing effect that the exposure of the dissonance was having on such statements. As we saw earlier, one of such facts the supporters of the closure and home trials were in anxiety to communicate was that US civilian courts had successfully tried terrorists before; and another was that anyone detained within the US had always been tried at home. In addition, such illocutionary failure applied to statements about the assessment that such trials would boost America’s international reputation, increase cooperation and thus make America safer, as there was evidence that many countries including Germany, France and the UK, ‘that had refused to cooperate with military commissions at Guantánamo were much more favorably disposed to criminal trials…[and were] willing to provide evidence and witnesses for court prosecutions’.\(^{889}\) Performatives built around these pieces of factual evidence and assessment were being powerfully silenced, i.e. rendered less communicable, illocutionarily and perlocutionarily less successful.

In these circumstances then, the Obama Administration’s move to sign the NDAA into law, rather than determined by non-commitment or lack of political will, was affected by a certain constraining force. The degree of this constraining force is demonstrated by Obama’s overt and strong criticism of some of the implications of the Act, on the one hand, and his compromise and eventual signing of the Act nonetheless. Thus, in his statement following his signing into law of the NDAA 2011, Obama lamented:

Section 1032 [of the Act] represents a dangerous and unprecedented challenge to critical executive branch authority to determine when and where to prosecute Guantánamo detainees, based on the facts and the circumstances of each case and our national security interests. The prosecution of terrorists in Federal court is a powerful tool in our efforts to protect the Nation…Any attempt to deprive the executive branch of that tool undermines our Nation’s counterterrorism efforts and has the potential to harm our national security…Despite my strong objection to these provisions,…I have signed this Act because of the importance of authorizing

\(^{889}\) Mayer (15 February 2010).
appropriations for, among other things, our military activities in 2011 (emphases added).\textsuperscript{890}

This was a very strong statement, indicting the Congress of undermining the traditional separation of power, as well as the effectiveness of the counter-terrorist measures, and thus endangering national security. In other circumstances, this indictment alone by the President might have been sufficient to create a political crisis and spark a public debate about the very legitimacy of the Act, overshadowing other debates. Nonetheless, despite his fundamental objections to its key provisions of the Act, Obama signed it into law, by citing the urgency to approve the overall budget in order not to jeopardise military activities. He cited a similar justification the next year, when signing the NDAA for fiscal year 2012:

I have signed this bill despite having serious reservations with certain provisions that regulate the detention, interrogation, and prosecution of suspected terrorists...[S]ome in Congress continue to insist upon restricting the options available to our counterterrorism professionals and interfering with the very operations that have kept us safe. My Administration has consistently opposed such measures. Ultimately, I decided to sign this bill...because of the critically important services it provides for our forces and their families and the national security programs it authorizes.\textsuperscript{891}

Interestingly, in contradiction to the above harsh criticism, the Administration later found ways to formulate such move of signing the Act in terms of consistency ‘with our [earlier] commitment to protect the American people and uphold our values’, and as ‘steps that broaden our ability to bring terrorists to justice’ (emphasis added).\textsuperscript{892} Even a failed attempt of change had to be justified through at least a certain level of narrative continuity, in order not to risk credibility and political integrity.

The main proposition of the narrative advanced by the opponents of closure, namely “evil must not enter US soil and must not have the same rights and privileges as us”, persisted in the subsequent years, as part of the organised civil and political resistance to Obama’s continued efforts to press for changes ahead of the annual votes on NDAA 2012 and NDAA 2013.

Interestingly, it persisted despite the concerns repetitively expressed by the Attorney General, as well as civil liberty groups, that ‘those unwise and unwarranted restrictions undermine our counterterrorism efforts and could harm our national security’,\(^893\) and that the continued policy at Guantánamo was ‘rife with constitutional and procedural problems and undermines the fundamental American values that have made us a model throughout the world for centuries’.\(^894\)

Indeed, counter-advocacy cannot be overlooked: civil liberty groups, some media outlets, as well as local grass-roots campaigners were persistently pushing against these NDAAs. In fact, some of them, as the latter statement by the American Civil Liberties Union demonstrates, attempted an alternative fixation of the signifiers “American values” and “model democracy”. However, rather than trying to clear away the semiotic dissonance created by the tension between the dominant narrative and Obama’s performative efforts to legitimise a policy change while selectively hinging on the dominant “war” narrative, these advocacy groups predominantly attracted publicity and contributed to an outcry around the feared implications that the ‘detention without trial’ provision of the 2012 NDAA could purportedly have on American citizens.\(^895\) These campaigns have been successful in helping pass resolutions in many US states and municipalities, including against the indefinite detention.\(^896\) Nonetheless, these efforts, however legitimate and justified in their cause, have made the debate predominantly about civil liberties within America, rather than about dismantling the “terrorism as war” narrative and displacing it with an alternative narrative that would have successfully accommodated their own, and President Obama’s declared cause for change.

Eventually, the efforts of civil liberty groups predominantly focusing on


\(^896\) For information and updates on successful such campaigns, see ‘Local and state efforts to repeal or nullify the NDAA’, People’s Campaign for the Constitution, at http://constitutioncampaign.org/campaigns/dueprocess/maps.php, accessed 16/07/2013.
the issue of indefinite detention as unconstitutional for US citizens had overtaken the debate, overshadowing any potent debate about non-US citizens such as the Guantánamo terror suspects. It is little wonder then, that eventually the 2013 NDAA Bill passed by the Congress in December 2012 contained amendments to remove the indefinite detention clause, by affirming the right of habeas corpus and the Constitutional right of due process for American citizens, whereas the Obama administration is still struggling to fight against the provisions prohibiting the use of funds to transfer detainees or build new facilities within the US for trying them. In fact, the provisions were confirmed again in the NDAA for the Fiscal Year 2014.

In this context, Obama’s attempts to try Osama bin Laden’s son-in-law in New York, rather than in Guantánamo, following bin Laden’s killing in May 2011, met a strong condemnation: once again, the main narrative line was that Abu Ghaith must not be treated ‘like a “common criminal” with full rights of the American system’, and instead must be held in Guantánamo. The “not on our soil” narrative had already become an almost organic/natural outgrowth of the earlier dominant official narrative.

8.4. Conclusion

The case study of Obama’s failed attempts to close Guantánamo helped further delineate potential routes of a binding effect. Thus, Obama’s performative attempts to project a “new approach” to counter-terrorism and to legitimise his pledge to close the Guantánamo prison contained a certain semiotic dissonance: while the “freedom” node had previously been fixed as “our way of life that was the object of hatred for the evil Other”, now it was being re-inscribed as “rule of law” that must also extend to the terror suspects. The latter,

897 There are some conflicting interpretations of this Bill, some claiming that it did not eventually remove the ‘indefinite detention’ clause (see, e.g. Bansi Bhat, ‘NDAA 2013 Allows Indefinite Detention Of U.S. Citizens By President’, PolicyMic (8 January 2013), at http://www.policymic.com/articles/22288/ndaa-2013-allows-indefinite-detention-of-u-s-citizens-by-president, accessed 04/09/2013). Nonetheless, the fact of the efforts to demonstrate some change is evidence that this issue about the US citizens had overtaken the debate.


having been constituted by Bush as the most vile and dangerous people on the planet were now to benefit individual freedoms and rights to be granted on the American soil itself. Since this re-inscription was being attempted without much shift/re-inscription of the “threat/evil” node, and still operating from within the earlier “terrorism as war” frame, the move granting them the same rights as US citizens and on the American soil itself was perlocutionarily less successful among certain groups. This was evidenced by their anti-closure discourses.

This semiotic dissonance was appropriated by, and helped galvanise political and civil society opposition to the closure. Thus, crucially, the reasoning behind the opposition to the closure of Guantánamo and transfer of some of the detainees to be tried at home, in simplified terms read as “evil must not enter the US soil”: if these alleged terrorists, including those detained without charge and those possibly innocent, had continuously been constructed as the ultimate “evil”, and the “US soil” as something sacrosanct to be protected at all costs, then this “evil” did not deserve to have the privilege of benefiting from American judiciary system – a higher value reserved for the Americans. Organised political and civil society opposition to the closure operating from within such a narrative launched actions which eventually constrained the Obama Administration in its liberty to fulfil the promised policy change.

These findings, arrived at through a relational-dialogical analysis, provide an understanding of the resultant outcome of protracted change that goes further than alternative, mostly popular, explanations. Thus, one such explanation was advanced by human rights groups claiming Obama’s lack of political will. However, this explanation does not hold to scrutiny as a lot of evidence in Obama’s passing of an Executive Order bypassing the Congress at the very first days of his presidency, his sustained efforts towards closure, as well as his discourse of very strong condemnation of the Congress point to the opposite. The other popular explanation was the “pressure from the Congress” thesis circulating in the media, and also voiced by members of the Obama Administration, as well as constituting Obama’s own official justification for

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his failure to fulfil his pledge. This claim provides only a superficial causal explanation, without unravelling the relational discursive dynamics behind such congressional opposition and purported constraint. In addition, this explanation is very limited, given the initial bi-partisan support for the closure, and the reality of later congressional opposition to Obama’s efforts, itself requiring an explanation. Furthermore, this cannot be an alternative explanation, as congressional deliberations are only part of the causal complex that have produced the final outcome, and are partly incorporated in the dialogical dynamics engaged with above.

One of the very few scholarly explanations interested in constraints and asking why Obama failed to close Guantánamo is offered by Erin Corcoran.\textsuperscript{902} The main argument advanced pertains to the legal and political choices Obama as President has made, miscalculating outcomes, in particular through choosing to sign an Executive Order about the closure, without detailing a course of action and without consulting the Congress first. Corcoran argues that had he instead initiated change by allowing the Congress to legislate the closure, something which he had done in other instances of major policy change (such as in the spheres of economics and health), the outcome would have been much different.\textsuperscript{903} While this explanation does not specifically inquire into the discursive dynamics around the relational field of contestations, it is illuminating as it provides an account of how structural peculiarities of US legislative and executive branches and political tradition, as well as an account of the inner workings of relations, interests and pragmatic motives of political actors, had an impact on the final outcome. However, a causally important but less explored and emphasised part of this account is the acknowledgement that Republicans and later Democrats were affected by, and then were able to communicate an opposition to the closure by capitalising on a certain public resentment of having detainees tried at home. Thus, rather than an alternative and competing explanation, this account is partly reliant on a semiotic dynamics, which in itself needs exploring and being accounted for, and which this case study unravelled, through a dialogical-relational analysis.


\textsuperscript{903} Ibid.
Chapter 9: Conclusions and Implications

9.1. Introduction

In this concluding chapter, having the empirical findings at hand, I wish to reflect back on the theoretical discussion and address the question as to whether and how much the new approach was advantageous in the effort to understand foreign/security negotiations and the particular case of “war on terror” contestations. On the other hand, to remind, the status of the hypothesis underlying the empirical part of this study was that of a working one, which would help explore some patterns and processes in order to re-articulate the hypothesis at the end of the study and delineate further questions for research, rather than to offer exhaustive explanations comprehensively affirming or refuting the hypothesis. Hence, more broadly, the empirical study in Part II of this thesis was to serve only as an illustration of how the Bakhtinian-inspired relational-dialogical framework may be applied, and aimed at elucidating what further questions may arise from it, both theoretical and substantive, in terms of contesting “security” in general and “war on terror” in particular.

Therefore, in this brief chapter, in addition to summarising the main empirical findings, I attempt to re-articulate the hypothesis, and point to further questions that arise out of, rather than are fully answered in, this study. Thus, the summary of findings is provided in section 9.2; while section 9.3 re-articulates the hypothesis and proposes some further reflections and questions arising from the research. I conclude in section 9.4, by outlining the limitations and contributions of this research, as well as pointing towards some future directions for research.

9.2. Main Empirical Findings

Demonstrative of Bakhtinian monologising forces of fixation and finalisation, the official discourses both in the US and the UK in early post-9/11 period were striving to produce an authoritative discourse on terrorism and security as the “final word”, intimately linked with national identity (re)constructions. The spatial structuring of such monologising narratives was around the master nodal points of “evil/threat” and “freedom” in both countries, whereas the temporalities and with them the full time-space matrices of each of the official narratives revealed
distinct narrative-normative chronotopes: change was inflicted upon the spatially organised constructions of “evil” and “freedom” differently in each of the narratives. To remind, chronotopes condense historically and culturally specific conceptions of the collective past, present and future, and hence stories of survival, transformation, renewal or else stasis and repetition. Thus, the official US discourse on “war on terror” was built around the Chronotope of Cyclical Triumph, where the national “present” was only one stage in the cycle of triumphs; America was perpetually triumphant over “evils” covalent across historical time; and where “freedom” as an absolute value was in jeopardy due to absolute, teleological and un-caused “evil”. In contrast, in the British Chronotope of Agent of Change, the “past” was also a source of faltering; “evil” was imagined as partly caused by globalisation and interdependence, thereby calling for changes in national and global norms, practices and institutions, and Britain was imagined as having a pivotal role in making such change possible, allowing more scope for the collective agency of the nation in determining the course of history in the future.

However, monologising discourse, while striving for singularity, for an imposed word, does not exist as a final achievement, but is rather always an un-finalised attempt. Neither can it produce any policy outcomes, isolated from centrifugal, dialogising forces, i.e. forces of pluralisation. Indeed, in light of Bakhtinian Dialogism, society and history are shaped and changed by both centrifugal and centripetal forces, as causal outcomes emerge relationally, through tensions and in the intersection of these opposite forces. Dissenting voices variously challenged and undermined the official narrative structure, particularly attempting to dislocate the narrative-normative chronotope of the official authoritative and monologising discourse. Thus, voices critiquing the official narrative of 9/11 and the subsequent policy of intervention emerged already at the earliest stage, playing expository, historifying and de-mystifying/de-constructive functions, as well as attempting to destabilise the key nodal points on which the official narrative was structurally hinging. Particularly, these were deconstructing the official narratives as imperialist war for oil and hubris, and de-mystifying Self-Other binaries as the vehicle behind the constructed threat and legitimated response. As a result, these voices had already started disturbing the chronotopic integrity of the official narratives: rather than a source of mere pride and moral victories, the national “past” was
constructed as the cause of present grievances, and therefore as a source for shame; whereas the “future”, rather than a triumph of “freedom” and a place of justice for all, was a looming disaster for “freedom” and for global justice, if the present policies were not averted.

These emergent trends of critique became more salient in the intermediate post-9/11 period (2003-2007), especially gaining momentum ahead of and during the Iraq invasion. Two distinct forms of critique were entering into a dialogical encounter with the official discourses and requiring engagement. Thus, deliberative critique, largely practiced by acting politicians and moderately critical mainstream media, was mostly hinging on the same master nodal points as the official narrative, and thus reifying the latter. Moreover, despite expressed discontent with the legal basis of the Iraq war as the initial condition of legitimation, deliberative critique was variously deliberating on the progress of the war and post-war involvement. Ironically, deliberative critique was consistently demanding for “success” and “victory” for a war they had variously branded as “ill-conceived”, or outright “illegal and immoral”, e.g. by demanding not just an exit plan from an otherwise ‘mistaken’ war, but an exit plan that would ensure ‘finishing this war with success and honor —…for winning…the war’ (emphasis added).904

On the other hand, destabilising counter-narratives were dislodging the master nodal points of “evil” and “freedom”, upon which the official narratives were hinging. Often the very nodal signification of “evil” was being displaced by constructions of a different “threat” to the nation, coming from policies that were “unjust, immoral and illegitimate”. Most importantly, destabilising counter-narratives posed a major challenge to the narrative-normative chronotopes of the official narratives. This was shown to have been politically consequential: these critics were destabilising the national identity narrative built into the dominant security narrative, specifically by dislodging the national “past”, “present” and “future”, and the outcome signifiers “success” and “triumph”. Characteristically, the “future” was often being constructed in negative terms of “failure”: in particular, the “virtuous past” of the official chronotopes was being dislodged and replaced with a shameful “past”, depicting Britain and America as historically having been motivated by hubris and material self-interest, and been indifferent to loss of human life, oppression, and other nations’ democratic freedom.

904 Clinton (29 November 2005).
aspirations.

Cumulatively, these destabilising practices constituted subversion \textit{without} the construction of an alternative positive “we” identity through a positively imagined alternative “past” and “future”, and thereby ended up producing a deficient chronotope inducing a \textit{deficit} of “future”. Relatedly, often destabilising critique, having undermined the nodal point of “our values” as it was fixed in the official narrative, failed to offer a commensurate discourse of alternative “values” upon which an alternative national identity and foreign/security discourse could hinge. While, indeed, the ideological foundations of anti-war discourses were normative and are about imagining alternative politics and society, the publicly communicated critique of “war on terror” was disproportionately devoted to deconstruction and dislocation, rather than to constructing a new foundational narrative that would allow imagining a different “future”. Thus, despite the subversive intent and the broader critical-emancipatory normative quest of anti-war movements, and “war on terror” critics, there was disproportionality between the performative efforts aimed at destabilising and dislodging the official narrative and those aimed at re-inscribing/filling-in the dislocated ambivalent space.

In the absence of positive alternatives, the national identity in these destabilising narratives remained hanging in the air. This can be politically consequential: to recall, the function of the modern state is to exterminate ambivalence, and circumscribe uncertainty. Hence, to be politically viable, and be able to compete with the official narrative and the functionality of such narrative for the modern state and nation, any dissenting de-articulation and re-articulation of foreign/security discourse and interlinked with it, of national identity, must, to some extent, take on the function of exterminating ambivalence through the construction of commensurate positive closure and definable symbolic foundation for the nation to imagine itself; or else dislodge the requirement of “circumscribing uncertainty” as the basis for the modern state. The critical voices have largely fallen short of achieving either.

Thus, overall, the destabilising counter-narrative propositions of various anti-war and critical discourses did achieve certain dislocation of the hegemonic “war on terror” discourse; but the way they attempted to ‘suture’ the dislocated
structure was largely non-conducive to the emergence of a new ‘imaginary’. In other words, they failed to transform the anti-war “myth” into a new “imaginary” that would incorporate, the late modern societal need to circumscribe uncertainty in new ways and thus perform the late modern imperative of controlling risk; but neither did they subvert such meta-narrative as a the basis for contesting security. In case of leftist media and anti-war social movements especially, this failure to offer an alternative positive imaginary may be part, if not the result, of the much broader post-modernist tendencies for deconstruction, fragmentation and overall disbelief in meta-narratives, and therefore relinquishing of a search for an alternative foundational discourse for collective identity and for a foreign/security policy newly imagined.

Thus, on the one hand, there were the deconstructive dissident voices, who failed to offer alternative representations, and on the other hand, there were the deliberative voices of the political opposition elite, or those contending to expert status, who were still representing the world through the metanarratives of liberal interventionism, demanding the realisation of the promises inherent in the “war on terror” official discourse, and demanding “winning” the (albeit “mistaken”) war.

Nonetheless, the official narrative could not escape dialogical engagement with such heteroglot field of critique: in the intermediate period, both governments made intensified performative efforts to restore the credibility of the official narratives, and thereby to reclaim the credibility of the official foreign/security narrative. The analysis suggested that moderate critique invited more restorative performances, often shifting the balance away from “responses” to the dislocatory counter-narrative propositions found in more radical critique, and thus opened up dialogical routes for the addressee to engage in restorative performatives on the points of divergence, on which accountability was being demanded. In seeking to understand the implications of the dynamics of such “invitations” and the ensuing responsive performatives on the reification and endurance of the dominant discourse, it was found that, e.g. critique demonstrating “failure” of the Bush Administration in the mission in “Iraq as promised” and calling for a withdrawal timetable, and at the same time

Laclau (1990: 61).
demanding ‘benchmarks to measure the war’s progress’, not only invited, but also facilitated restorative performances by allowing for discursive efforts that would try and convince that “some progress has been made”, and that “we are not yet fully safe and a lot more needs to be done”. Thereby, they re-enforced the very promise of the official narrative. In contrast, destabilising critique, especially those articulated through extreme rhetorical means, tended to receive less dialogical answerability: restorative performances were mostly of dismissive and/or accusatory nature, intertwined with silencing techniques.

In addition, restoration was often achieved through internalising (colonising) critique, i.e. through de-articulation and then re-articulation, showing the erroneousness of critical propositions and using critique as semiotic resource to (re)construct or re-affirm own propositions. Re-narrativisation (or deflection) was another restorative means, where the speaker answered a destabilising question or proposition by deflecting and defaulting back to at least one of the master nodal points of the official narrative, as well as on chronotopic propositions such as re-affirmation of past, present and future “triumph” of “freedom”, and thus making these the only loci around which a resolution to the exchange must be sought, away from the issues raised by the question.

Restorative performances also engaged in a powerful re-inscription of the space opened up as a result of the dislocatory discourses undermining the national identity narrative inherent in the official foreign/security discourses. In the circumstances of the deficient narrative-normative chronotope produced by destabilising critique, representatives or advocates of the dominant narrative found ample performative opportunities to re-affirm the “future” they had constructed through the official narrative. In such attempts to re-inscribe the opened up space, performative silencing became an important part of reclaiming the official narrative-normative chronotope: critique was often stigmatised and dissent was rendered as a “jeopardy to triumph”, and hence a threat to the very realisation of the identity of the “nation”. Thus, by curtailing the illocutionary force of the critics to uphold their contesting representations, the official narrative-normative high ground was re-claimed.

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However, it is important to stress that this was not hegemony “subsuming” or “co-opting” dissent in terms of the Gramscian concept of hegemony: while Gramscian and neo-Gramscian “hegemony” is based on consent and creating a “common sense”, here we saw that the radical critique remained a distinct political and social collectivity systematically resisting and undermining such “common sense”. While the official discourse, through restorative performances was trying to achieve consent, radical critique was not subsumed and co-opted by them. Neither was radical critique “bound” or constrained by the official discourse to submit to such co-optation. Rather, they did remain *radical* critique at the given stage, which for lack of a powerful myth to suture the dislocation they had created, together with the deliberative critique asking for accountability, *allowed* the official discourse to reinstate and strengthen itself.

Thus, these re-affirmations became possible relationally and non-linearly, produced through the interrelation of four processes: a) the late modern reflexive society, coupled with the institution of democratic accountability, increased the requirement to engage with critiquing voices destabilising or variously deliberating on the official discourse and practice of “war on terror”; b) the political anxiety to maintain credibility necessitated variously restoring the integrity of the official narrative built on the traditional security paradigm; c) deliberative critique, constantly looking for inherent (in)consistencies and probing the official representatives against supra-discursive and non-discursive developments (those on the ground, or those politically relevant to the practice of “war on terror”) were demanding the realisation of the “promise” inherent in the official narrative, thereby greatly constraining the official representatives; and d) the destabilising critique were largely shattering the foundations of the official narrative of “war on terror”, the national identity narrative attached to it, as well as more broadly the modernist security paradigm, *without fully re-*inscribing the dislocated space with a new narrative-normative chronotope, especially without imagining an alternative positive collective “future”. This failure created ample discursive and political opportunity for the official representatives to re-claim the opened-up space and with it to reclaim official constructions of “threat”, “evil”, and the nation’s dependence on “triumphing” over such threat as the condition of imagining its “future”.
Overall, the implications of these empirical findings for our discourse-theoretical discussion are that meaning-production does escape intentionally and semiotic relations may produce unintended consequences. Thus, the discourse of most of the radical critique intending a mobilisation and a rupture in the hegemonic discourse ended up having unintended effects such as distancing certain audiences, due to their failure to construct an alternative positive national identity narrative, as well as the effect of shifting the balance of official responsive efforts towards more moderate critique. On the other hand, those engaged with more moderate, deliberative counter-narratives, who most probably intended to construct a genuine critique of some of the premises behind the overall “war on terror” narrative, ended up creating more discursive opportunities for the official interlocutors: through surplus illocutions, their utterances were demanding for more restorative performances from the interlocutors, which in turn may have served to fortify their narrative. In addition, deliberative counter-propositions, having relied on nodal points and chronotopic building blocks that unite them with the dominant narrative, ended up constraining their initiators: the official representatives become constrained by the imperative of the “success” as constructed in the dominant narrative and reproduced in the given critique, and therefore must now pursue its fulfilment.

In a further effort to demonstrate discursive constraints actualised in a specific narrow policy area, I looked at the “within-case case” of Obama’s failed attempts to fulfil his pledge of closing down the Guantánamo Bay prison. Given Obama’s pronounced willingness to demonstrate discontinuity with the earlier Bush discourse and practices of “war on terror” in general, the case constitutes a ‘least likely’ one, and therefore a ‘tough’ test to the hypothesis.

It was shown that Obama’s performative efforts to legitimise the closure and specifically the transferal of the Guantánamo prisoners to be tried “on US soil”, and be granted the US constitutional right of habeas corpus, were very restricted in their perlocutionary success: on the one hand, Obama’s discourse continued hinging on the master nodal point “threat/evil” constituted through the signifier “terrorist” in the earlier Bush discourse, as well as on the initial

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George and Bennett (2005: 9).
authorisation of use of force and hence the discourse of “terrorism as war”; on the other hand, Obama’s discourse was selectively making claims about change of rhetoric and policy, by re-inscribing “freedom” and “American values” via the node “rule of law”. These proved to be irreconcilable semiotic elements – within the Obama discourse, as well as between the Obama narrative of counter-terrorism, on the one hand, and the earlier Bush narrative, on the other. In addition, Obama’s efforts to selectively bring some of the counter-terrorist practices into the remit of the US rule of law and hand over to the judiciary, while at the same time continuing to rely on the initial authorisation to wage “war” and hence retain the right to exceptional measures, was producing a discrepancy that would result in a certain semiotic dissonance: thus, the “freedom” node previously constituting American exceptionalism, as well as “our way of life” that was the object of hatred for “the evil Other”, was now being re-inscribed in ways where the terror suspects must now benefit individual freedoms and rights ensured for Americans through the “rule of law”, thus creating a semiotic contradiction: while these detainees were “at war” with America, for broader audiences it was hard to comprehend why then they should enjoy the same rights as US citizens, as “freedom” was precisely what they had attempted to take away from them.

This semiotic dissonance had important political consequences: it was successfully appropriated by, and helped galvanise political and civil society opposition to the closure of Guantánamo: performative moves pointing to the semiotic dissonance, now exposed by opponents of the closure, had far greater performative force, as they were hinging on a “war” narrative still dominant for the majority, and one which had not been fully dismantled by the Obama narrative. Indeed, the “war” analogy was still dominant in Obama’s narrative, and the partial or selective introduction of elements of a potentially competing “crime” narrative was facing resistance from various public and political segments of audiences. These processes eventually contributed to constraining the Obama Administration’s policy options and its liberty to fulfil the promised policy changes.

An additional contributing factor to the ease with which the opposition to closure appropriated and utilised the semiotic dissonance inherent in Obama’s “change” narrative was the failure by critique to construct an alternative “future” for the nation in the intermediate period (as seen in the previous chapters): the
earlier dominant narrative had not been powerfully re-inscribed with a new commensurate narrative. Thus, when Obama came to power, he was attempting isolated re-inscriptions (such as “rule of law” as the highest value) at the backdrop of a still dominant Bush narrative constituting the majority’s identity. Had the destabilising critique achieved re-inscription of the national identity and an alternative vision of security in a full narrative-normative chronotope with an imagined positive “future” for the nation, Obama’s or indeed any new political leader’s efforts to re-inscribe individual master nodal points such as “evil” and “freedom” would have met less semiotic dissonance among the audiences, and would have had more chances of success.

Thus, through the dialogical-relational framework, the case study was able to reveal certain dialogical-relation processes that may have contributed to the failure of closing the prison, potentially due to a certain constraining mechanism, emerging from a specific relationality of actors, voices, and forces.

9.3. Re-articulated Hypothesis; Further Reflections and Questions

In light of the theoretical exploration and the empirical study, the (still) hypothetical binding effect may be viewed as a relationally produced outcome, and therefore, the suggested constraints on change of policy and the protracted involvements in Afghanistan and Iraq as partly the result of the dialogical logic underlying the encounters among voices of critique, those of deliberation, and those of the official representatives. Rather than mere manipulation by the elite of rhetorical and political means, neither as mere co-option of the radical critique by such elites (co-option in the neo-Gramscian or else in other terms), such endurance of the “war on terror” practice may be located in the domain of relationality, where the discursive strategies of the anti-war critique and their failure to offer new imaginings sutureting the dislocated public space of “security” have played a role. To remind, from the outset of this thesis, I drew attention to the Laclau and Mouffean conception of hegemony intimately linked to resistance and dissent; i.e. ‘a type of political relation’, which cannot be conceived without the possibility of subversion.\footnote{Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 139; 135).}

Therefore, studying such articulations and performative attempts of subversion
must be integral, rather than tangential to, or a matter of choice for, studying any discourse.

As a result, it was showed that, in the dialogical-relational conception of discourse, outcomes (in this case, constraints or the hypothetical binding effect) were deemed as resulting from relations among agents and among semiotic and social systems, and therefore, more often than not, constitute unintended consequences. The focus then was on emergent causal powers, or on the ‘causal efficacy of patterns as emergence’, whereby the concern of the binding hypothesis becomes the emergent powers and properties of structures, including semiotic structures: binding is the unintended consequence of the relationality of various competing representations and their relative force in the given socio-political context and institutional structure, coupled with the effect of material developments around the subject of contestations. Thus, already informed by the study, we may further specify the hypothesis as follows:

Official foreign/security policy discourses have the potential of “binding” (in the sense of constraining change) in contemporary Western societies, where state and national identity construction and mass information dissemination are inextricable parts of negotiating security. Durability is then an emergent property of official foreign/security policy discourses built on national identity narratives.

The study suggested two possible mechanisms of binding:

a) The identities and realities constructed by an official public discourse at an initial stage of a security narrative striving for legitimation, may at a later stage become the basis for certain political and civil groups who have internalised this narrative to exert pressure on official discourse attempting to divert from such narratives and thus slow down change, even when there is political willingness and declared opportunity for certain rhetorical and policy change. This may include demands for the realisation of the promise of a certain “future” for the nation inherent in the narrative-normative chronotope of the official dominant discourse;

b) Working from within the paradigm of the official narrative, and largely operating through the institution of democratic accountability, deliberative critique may create further routes for demanding the realisation of the narrative-normative chronotope advanced by the official legitimation

narratives; as well as become one route through which the real-life chronotope puts pressure on the narrative/normative chronotope of the target narrative.

Indeed, these mechanisms are not essential or deterministic to foreign/security contestations: they may actualise or else remain latent, given multiplicity of other causal factors; and most importantly are historically and culturally specific. Thus, the binding effect was found to be intimately linked with the late modern paradox of foreign/security policy being still caught up in, and dependent on, traditional monologising identity-building and projecting of certitude through the promise of a manageable future, on the one hand, and the unavoidable need to engage dialogically with multiplicity of other (including destabilising and deliberative) voices, on the other. Silencing some of these voices at an early stage may help the narrative-normative chronotope and its “promise” underlying the official legitimation narrative be further internalised, and ironically become a constraint for change at a later stage by inviting for demands for the realisation of the promise of a certain “future” for the nation inherent in such chronotope. In addition, deliberative critique, by constantly probing and weighing the supra-discursive and non-discursive developments against the dominant narrative and looking for inherent consistency, may further reify and prolong the official discourse and policy by inviting for the eventual realisation of the “promise”.

Indeed, these conclusions about the binding effect do not treat causal forces as “separable” and independent.910 As already emphasised before, without claiming to be a comprehensive multi-causal explanation for the overall phenomenon of a prolonged “war on terror”, it nonetheless attempts to integrate much more of such potential explanation into a discourse-analytical model, than traditional discourse analytical accounts would have been able to do, by allowing for a multi-dimensional (multi-actor and multi-textual) analysis, integration of the dimension of time, as well as for bringing in the non-discursive and the supra-discursive into the analysis, even if in the somewhat restricted sense of how changes in these realms constantly feed into/re-fertilise the discursive contestation through actors’ responses to and (re)interpretations of such changes.

Moreover, the binding effect must not be seen deterministically as the property of (or in some way, the necessary outcome of) a dialogical-relationally

conceived foreign/security contestation. Instead, dialogicity may just as well create mechanisms to the opposite effect – of change, of transformation, of breaking from reification. The fact that this study zooms into one effect, that of binding, does not mean that the latter is a necessary or essential effect of dialogically conceived foreign/security policy contestation. Furthermore, Bakhtinian dialogism may in fact create possibility of breaking through the hypothetical binding effect: drawing on ‘multiple potentialities of meaning’, as well as his belief in the social situatedness of the utterance, we may allow for a lot of potential for such breakthroughs, including through contemporary societies learning to ‘think sociologically’, as well as the effect of second-order articulatory practices (including, e.g. this very study) on first order contestations, in helping produce a new ‘imaginary’.

Finally, the binding hypothesis may encounter the issue of generalisability as well as of actualisation. In this regard, it must be reminded that the hypothesis is developed having contemporary Western democratic polity in mind, where democratic accountability is a well-established political institution, and more broadly critique and dissent (in particular to war and intervention) have become a civic institution in their own right, and where the late modern social landscape discussed above is present. But even so, the mechanisms leading to binding are not claimed to be generalisable. Nonetheless, as Wight reminds, something not being generalizable does not mean it is not caused. On the other hand, the potential of binding, given varying circumstances, may remain non-actualised, since ‘mechanisms may interact and counteract each other, and mechanisms can exist without their power being exercised, in which case they are best understood as “potentialities”’.

Far from exhausting the exploration of the possible binding effect, this research animates the need to move beyond the question how “war on terror” was initially constructed and legitimised, and instead, especially in this later stage of developments, to shift the scholarly attention to a longitudinal inquiry that seeks

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912 Giddens (1990: 43).
913 Laclau (1990: 67).
915 Ibid., 290.
to understand why the “war on terror” endured. In this relation, constitutive “how” questions – claimed by constructivists/post-structuralists as superior to supposedly Positivistic “why” questions\textsuperscript{916} -- must be replaced with causal-constitutive “how” questions, which is the same as to say, research must turn to “why” questions, the latter implying a non-Humean understanding of causes and mechanisms.

Importantly, the fact that this research was not and does not claim to be a full explanation about why the “war on terror” endured gives even more reason to start to inquire into such “why” questions; however, with the ethos to bring the understanding of semiotic dynamics and logics into such multi-causal understanding rather than bring the old and well-rehearsed exclusionary divides such as “idealism vs realism”, “the ideational vs the material”, or “causal vs. constitutive logics” back into disciplinary discussions. In a possible development of a foreign policy/security analysis, where semiotic relations, as per critical-realist views, would be acknowledged to have causal efficacy and be and be part of causal mechanisms,\textsuperscript{917} it would be pertinent to integrate the dialogical philosophy of language and the dialogical speech-act theory, as well as the dialogical-relational framework for foreign/security policy contestations, as more suited for such an endeavour.

Subsequently, and especially given the protracted involvement in both Afghanistan and Iraq despite significant criticism and public discontent that has unfolded over the years, the question whether successive governments in the US and the UK have been constrained in their attempts to change policy direction due to certain contestation dynamics is still open for inquiry.

A number of implications as well as further theoretical and empirical questions arise out of the research as follows (more may be pinpointed):

1. To start, the question asked at the beginning of the thesis with regards to radical critique is still open for further exploration: what social and political consequences does the dismantling of a dominant national identity narrative underlying a national security discourse entail? Does such dismantling, especially without a commensurate attempt to provide an alternative suture for the dislocation go without significant effects on continuity and change of

\textsuperscript{916} See, e.g., Doty (1993: 298).
\textsuperscript{917} Wight (2004).
security policy and practice? The research pointed to a certain deficit of constructions of positive “futures” discernible in the narratives of radical critique. Further exploration into this could involve, among others, asking social-psychological questions, and thus call for interdisciplinarity research.

2. Relatedly and on the other hand, how much was the hesitation by radical critique to provide such alternative imaginings linked with the post-modern cultural and intellectual tendencies of deconstruction and fragmentation and overall disbelief in meta-narratives, and therefore relinquishing of a search for an alternative discourse for collective identity and for a foreign/security policy newly imagined?

3. More specifically, in relation to securitisations broadly conceived, how much does subversion without alternative positive re-construction of national “futures” negatively affect attempts of de-securitisation of a threat intimately linked with the identity of the nation in the securitising discourse, and a political struggle against such dominant discourse? Had at least some of the anti-war critique on “war on terror” been able to construct alternative identities based on positive, rather than negative/rejectionist, distinctiveness for the nation, would the cumulative effect of the counter-narratives on “war on terror” have been more significant, perhaps resulting in an ultimate rupture in the discursive field? Coupled with other political factors, could this rupture eventually contribute to the elevation of a counter-narrative to a dominant status?

4. Nonetheless, destabilising anti-Iraq war critique may be argued to have made it politically much harder to legitimise intervention at present. This is illustrated by the case of the failed Motion in the British Parliament submitted by Cameron’s government seeking authorisation to intervene in Syria in August 2013.918 There is further scope for inquiring into the modes and extent of such critique on enhanced accountability, and change in political practices, not least demonstrated by the change in the UK parliamentary tradition, whereby stronger parliamentary oversight, as well as the introduction of seeking parliamentary approval before an intervention have

now become stabilised.\textsuperscript{919}

5. More broadly, it is pertinent to explore how much the destabilising performances systematically aiming to undermine key “war on terror” propositions have added up incrementally to form now an already well-familiar discourse of resistance; and importantly how much they have produced consequences beyond the confines of the “war on terror” contestations in further instances of securitisations.

9.4. Limitations, Contributions and Future Research

It must be acknowledged that the dialogical-relational framework, albeit enhanced and developed to be philosophically-realist, and relational, is still a discursive approach. It does not accommodate the whole of the causal complex that has been behind an outcome (continuity and change being such outcome). In particular, as already made clear, it does not fully accommodate the material realm and its causal effects. Nonetheless, it is a discourse theory that fully acknowledges the outside to discourse; and while not fully accounting for it, conceptualises such “outsideness” and its constant overflow into the dialogical process of contestation through actors’ answerability to supra-discursive and non-discursive changes and developments variously requiring discursive engagement.

The framework does not and cannot account for the full (often publicly inaccessible) decision-making process behind a foreign/security policy (including factors such as bureaucratic inertia, groupthink, etc.), neither for how and how much economic pressures and considerations, as well as multiple overt or covert political lobbying, vested interests and influences domestically and internationally affect such process; therefore cannot and does not claim that the described outcomes, including lingered involvement in “war on terror”, and specifically Obama’s failure to fulfil his pledge to close the Guantanamo prison, were determined solely by a constraining force produced through public contestations and deliberations. However, rather than alternative explanations in their own right, these factors are seen as co-producing the final outcome in a multi-causal complex: the full study and determination of the place of just one

\textsuperscript{919} On the evolution of the norm of parliamentary approval for use of force since Iraq, see Mills (2013).
cause would have required a major multi-level research beyond the scope and capacities of this project. Thus, in relation to the Guantanamo case, the study is not a comprehensive assessment claiming to fully account for the failed change of policy under scrutiny: such comprehensive assessment would be the theme of a lengthy project in its own right and involve the study of a complete causal complex through detailed and voluminous process tracing. Nor does it claim to explain the described outcome as solely determined by the described dynamics of contestation.

Despite such limitations, the proposed dialogical-relational framework has a number of advantages, which lies at the core of the thesis’ main contribution to the field.

Thus, first, as we saw in chapter 2, despite relationality and contestation being implicit to most post-structuralist thought, the predominant concern of discourse-analytical studies has been with hegemonic or dominant discourses alone, where there has been very little immediate/explicit concern with discourses of resistance/dissent and, importantly, their relationship with the dominant discourses. The relational-dialogical framework helped conceptualise outcome as arising in a territory between the official voice and voices of dissent, thus enabling the accommodation of a relational analysis of conflicting performative moves and their causal effects on security policies and practices, allowing reconceiving performativity.

Second, on the other hand, we saw that while indispensable and implicit to all conceptions of discourse and society; contestations have been little problematised in terms of a micro-theory of the utterance and of speech-act and performativity, specifically in IR and Security Studies. Hence, through the Bakhtinian philosophy of the act and of utterance conceived as answerability, the framework was able to offer a re-conceptualisation of the speech-act and developing a dialogical theory of the utterance.

Third, the framework allowed going beyond the moment of legitimation and exploring (even if not fully explaining) the unintended longer-term effects of performativity on policy, by incorporating the relational analysis of multiple “security-contesting” speech-acts, rather than an overarching “securitis ing” speech-act. Hence, it is a model of analysis that allows accommodating a much
broader range of actors, actions and practices, than the traditional representational model, and studying the effects of the *relationality* of various narratives and performatives produced in various social loci (government, oppositional parties, the media, alternative media, and social movements). It also allows explicitly locating such contestations in their socio-historical and epochal context of late modernity.

The fourth, already empirical, contribution of the thesis is the enhanced empirical understanding of the relational dynamics behind contesting “war on terror” and the effects of that on policy continuation/change. Through a dialogical-relational analysis, the study was able to point towards potential relations and processes, and dialogical logics of contestation, which would have otherwise been implausible to discern, if concentrating on the dominant narratives bracketed off from competing discourses. It demonstrated certain constraining force coming from relationally produced semiotic dynamics, which with reasonable plausibility, was claimed to have potentially played a role in the complex of factors bringing about the described policy outcomes. Such patterns were possible to discern only by integrating the study of the official narrative with that of major challenges, importantly including the destabilising performances to the dominant foreign/security policy narratives, as well as the performative demands for accountability in case of the official narrative.

Finally, my broader aim, and hence contribution in this thesis has been not only to show how my current inquiry would benefit from a Bakhtinian Dialogical vision of discourse, but also through the latter to demonstrate how Western discourse-analytical approaches dominating IR studies could find a better ally in Bakhtin’s thought, and would benefit by a certain “dialogical turn”. As explored in Part I, the thought of Bakhtin and his circle, with the exception of Guillaume’s work, has occupied little more than a “footnote” or an intermediated status in IR, despite their thought having indirectly illuminated some key substantive claims and directions. Therefore, I hope my effort re-introducing him directly and hopefully in less mediated fashion will bring Bakhtinian Dialogism out of such “footnote” status, and show its relevance for enriching theoretical and empirical discussion in discourse-analytical approaches in IR.

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920 See these as part of a critical-realist causal complex. Patomaki (2002).
921 See, Guillaume (2002); Guillaume (2010), and Guillaume (2011).
In relation to more empirical work directly derivative of the present thesis, further case studies may be conducted, however, more encompassing of other elements in the potential causal complex, and in detailed process tracing for more conclusive findings as to how certain foreign/security decisions were made and how much they were affected specifically by discursive constraints. Beyond the specific interest of this thesis, namely the constraining potentiality of foreign/security discourses, the dialogical-relational approach has broader applicability: the focus on constraints only happened to be the subject of interest for this particular study. The approach will be equally indispensable for inquiring into the enablin\textsuperscript{g} properties of discursive interactions, especially into how change is produced and how emancipatory practices do and can have an impact. To remind, in the Bakhtinian vision, dialogical interactions are in an open system: different from Derridean “unfinalisabil\textsuperscript{y}”, in Dialogism, “[t]he unfinalizability of speech reflects the ‘open-endedness as possibility’,\textsuperscript{922} i.e. ‘an open program’ for change and emancipation.\textsuperscript{923} While here Dialogism was largely explored as elucidating the ontology of discursive interaction, and with an analytical focus on constraint and continuity, in further research, it would be pertinent to explore dialogism as a normative theory and apply dialogical analysis to understanding how, through what discursive processes, change is initiated and facilitated, i.e. through what mechanisms, the relationality of competing voices implicated in the social struggles of the given historical-cultural and epochal context produces change of meanings, change of “imaginings“ and practices and thus enables social and political change. However, since in Dialogism, monologising and dialogising forces operate in a co-dependent manner, and since unintended consequences ensue in the “inter-individual territory” among speakers/actors and at the juncture of structure and agency, such a focus on change can only be meaningful giving a close consideration to constraining mechanisms.

\textsuperscript{922} Bakhtin (1981: 324).
\textsuperscript{923} Rutland (2003: 106).
Appendix A: List of Data Sources – US and UK Official Pronouncements, Documents, Parliamentary Debates

United States

1998-01-26: Open Letter to the President by a group of Neo-Conservatives (Rumsfeld, Warlowsit et. al.)
1998-01-27: President Clinton, State of the Union Address
2001-06-21: Testimony of U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, Senate Armed Services Committee [on preemptive action]
2001-09-01: President George W. Bush, Address to the Nation
2001-09-11: President George W. Bush, Remarks at Barksdale Air Base
2001-09-12: President George W. Bush, Address following Cabinet Meeting
2001-09-13: President George W. Bush, on National Day of Prayer and Remembrance
2001-09-14: President George W. Bush, Remarks at the National Day of Prayer and Remembrance
2001-09-20: President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress
2001-09-30: Quadrennial Defense Review
2001-10-01: The US PATRIOT Act
2001-10-11: President George W. Bush, Press Conference
2001-10-21: President George W. Bush, Press Conference
2001-11-08: President George W. Bush, Address to America, Atlanta, Ga.
2001-11-10: President George W. Bush, Address at the United Nations
2002-01-29: President George W. Bush State of the Union Address ["Axis of Evil" speech]
2002-05: The US State Department, Patterns of Global Terrorism
2002-06-01: President George W. Bush, Graduation Speech at West Point
2002-06-06: Donald Rumsfeld, Press Conference in NATO
2002-07: The Freedom Promotion Act
2002-07: National Strategy for Homeland Security
2002-09-12: President George W. Bush, Speech at the United Nations
2002-09-21: National Security Strategy
2002-10-01: House of Representatives Session on Iraq
2002-10-02: House of Representatives Debate on Iraq Resolution
2002-10-03: Senate Debate on Iraq
2002-10-07: Remarks by President George W. Bush on Iraq
2002-10-10: Hillary Clinton's Statement on US Senate floor
2003-01-28: President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address
2003-02: National Strategy for Combating Terrorism
2003-02-05: Colin Powell, Remarks at Security Council
2003-03-17: President George W. Bush, Address to the Nation ["ultimatum to Saddam Hussain"]
2003-05-01: President George W. Bush, Remarks from the USS Abraham Lincoln At Sea Off the Coast of San Diego, California ["Mission accomplished"]
2004-01-20: President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address
2004-07-09: President George W. Bush, Remarks at York, Pennsylvania Rally
2004-08-02: President George W. Bush, Remarks on Intelligence Reform and the 9-11 Commission
2004-09-23: Transmittal message, DCI Special Advisor Report on Iraq’s WMDs (Duelfer Report)
2004-09-23: President George W. Bush, Press Conference
2004-11-06: President George W. Bush, Radio address after re-election
2005-01-20: President George W. Bush, Second inaugural speech
2005-02-02: President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address
2005-05-03: President George W. Bush, Press Conference
2005-05-05: Congressman John Conyers and 89 Congressmen, Letter from Congress regarding Downing Street memo
2005-05-27: President George W. Bush, Commencement Address at the US Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland
2005-06-09: President George W. Bush, Remarks on Renewing the PATRIOT Act, Columbus, Ohio
2005-06-20: House Democratic Leader Nancy Pelosi, Statement at the House floor, ‘This War is a Grotesque Mistake’
2005-07-11: President George W. Bush Progress Report in the War on Terror: Address at the FBI Academy, Quantico, Virginia
2005-07-20: President George W. Bush, The Future of the Patriot Act, Baltimore, Maryland
2005-09-14: President George W. Bush, Address at a United Nations Plenary Meeting
2005-10-04: Letter to President Bush from 39 Senators on Iraq
2005-11-29: Senator Hilary Clinton, Letter to the Constituents on Iraq
              Annapolis, Maryland
2005-12-17: President George W. Bush, The Patriot Act & The National Security Agency
              Washington, DC
2005-12-19: President George W. Bush, End of Year Press Conference
2006-01-31: President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address
2006-08-31: President George W. Bush, Address to American Legion National Convention
2006-09-19: President George W. Bush, Address to United Nations General Assembly
2007-01-05: Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid and Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, Letter to President Bush on behalf of Congressional Democrats
2007-01-10: President George W. Bush, Address to Nation ["troop surge to Iraq"]
2007-02-14: President George W. Bush, Speech on the Progress in Afghanistan, War on Terror, American Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC
2007-11-01: President George W. Bush, Speech on Global War on Terror, Heritage Foundation, Washington, DC
2007-11-01: President George W. Bush, Previews on War on Terror Speech
2008-11-05: President Barack Obama, Victory Speech to Supporters after election
2009-01-15: President George W. Bush, Farewell Address to the Nation
2009-01-20: President Barack Obama, Inauguration Speech
2009-02-27: President Barack Obama, Remarks on Responsibly Ending the War in Iraq, Camp Lejeune, North Carolina
2009-05-21: President Barack Obama, Remarks on National Security
2009-06-04: President Barack Obama, Speech on the Middle East, Cairo
2009-08-06: John O. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, Remarks: "A New Approach to Safeguarding Americans", Washington, DC
2009-09-23: President Barack Obama, Speech at the United Nations
2009-12-28: President Barack Obama, Address to the Public on the Attempted Terrorist Attack
2010-01-02: President Barack Obama, Weekly Address [on the Detroit flight]
2010-01-07: President Barack Obama, Remarks on the release of the security review on failed Christmas day attack
2010-01-28: President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address
2011-01-22: President Barack Obama, Remarks on the Way Forward in Afghanistan [on withdrawal from Afghanistan]
2011-01-25: President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address
2011-05-02: President Barack Obama, Remarks on Osama bin Laden
2011-12-31: President Barack Obama, Statement on signing the Defense Authorization Act
2012-01-25: President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address
2012-01-05: President Barack Obama, Remarks on New Pentagon Budget Strategy

**United Kingdom**

2001-09-11: Prime-Minister Tony Blair, Statement at the Trade Union Conference on the 9/11 Attacks
2001-09-20: Prime-Minister Tony Blair, Remarks at Press Conference with President Bush, Washington, DC
2001-10-02: Prime-Minister Tony Blair, Speech at the Labour Party Conference
2001-10-04: Prime-Minister Tony Blair, Speech to Parliament

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2001-10-07: Prime-Minister Tony Blair, Statement after the start of the US and British military strikes on targets in Afghanistan
2002-03-25: Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, Speech at the Third Anniversary of The Foreign Policy Centre, at the launch of the Report ‘Re-Ordering the World: The long-term implications of September 11th’
2002-04-08: Prime-Minister Tony Blair, Speech at College Station, Texas
2002-09-24: Prime-Minister Tony Blair, Statement to Parliament on Iraq
2002-09-24: Prime-Minister Tony Blair, Statement at the House of Commons Debate on Iraq ["45- minutes” claim]
2002-11-04: Prime-Minister Tony Blair, Press Conference ahead of Queen’s Speech
2003-02-11: Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, Address to the International Institute for Strategic Studies
2003-02-15: Blair Glasgow speech -I want to solve the Iraq issue via the United Nations
2003-02-18: Prime-Minister Tony Blair, Press Conference
2003-02-25: Prime-Minister Tony Blair, Statement at the House of Commons Debate on Iraq
2003-03-17: Robin Cook, Resignation Letter to Tony Blair
2003-03-17: Prime-Minister Tony Blair, Response to Robin Cook’s Resignation Letter
2003-03-18: Robin Cook, Resignation Speech in the House of Commons
2003-03-18: House of Commons Debate on Iraq
2003-03-18: Prime-Minister Tony Blair, Statement at the House of Commons Debate on Iraq
2003-03-25: Prime-Minister Tony Blair, Press Conference
2003-04-28: Prime-Minister Tony Blair, Press Conference
2003-05-12: Clare Shorts, International Development Secretary, Resignation Statement
2003-07-18: Prime-Minister Tony Blair, Speech at the US Congress
2004-02-03: House of Commons Debate on Weapons of Mass Destruction and Intelligence
2004-03-04: Prime-Minister Tony Blair, Speech by Prime Minister Tony Blair at Labour's local government, women's and youth conferences, SECC, Glasgow
2004-03-04: Prime-Minister Tony Blair, Speech on terror threat facing the UK and defending the Iraq war
2005-06-07: Joint Press Conference with President Bush and Prime Minister Blair
2005-07-07: House of Commons Debate on Defence in the World
2005-07-26: Prime-Minister Tony Blair, Press Conference
2005-08-05: Prime-Minister Tony Blair, Press Conference
2006-01-26: Defence Secretary John Reid, Statement the House of Commons
2006-01-26: House of Commons Debate on Afghanistan
2006-02-13: Gordon Brown, Speech on Terrorism, to the Royal United Services Institute, London
2006-07-03: House of Commons Debate on British forces in Afghanistan
2006-09-26: Prime-Minister Tony Blair, Speech at Labour Party Conference
2007-11-12: Prime-Minister Gordon Browns, Speech on UK Foreign Policy Priorities, at the Lord Mayor Banquet
2007-11-12: House of Commons Debate on the Queens Speech
2007-12-12: House of Commons Debate on Gordon Brown’s New Framework for Afghanistan
2008-06-16: Des Brown, Secretary of Defence, Statement and Debate at the House of Commons on Afghanistan
2009-07-16: House of Commons Debate on Afghanistan and Pakistan
2009-11-17: David Miliband, Foreign Secretary, Speech on Afghanistan, at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly
2009-11-23: House of Commons Debate on the Queen’s Speech
2010-04-22: Second Televised Election Campaign Debate
2010-05-26: House of Commons Debate on the Queen’s Speech
2010-06-15: Prime-Minister David Cameron's Statement to the House of Commons Debate on Afghanistan
2010-09-28: Ed Miliband, First Speech as Labour leader, to the Party Conference, Manchester
2010-10-19: Prime-Minister David Cameron’s Statement to the House of Commons on the Strategic Defence and Security Review
2011-07-05: House of Commons, Debate on Afghanistan
Appendix B: Data Sources of Critique – Mass Media, Alternative E-Media, Statements and Publications by Social Movements and Social Groups

United States

2001-09-14: Congresswoman Barbara Lee (D-CA), Statement in Opposition to H.J. Res. 64
2001-09-18: Interview with Barbara Lee (D-CA)
2002-03: Not in Our Name movement, Pledge of Resistance
2002-06-14: Not in Our Name movement, Statement of Conscience
2002-10: Senator Barack Obama Statement at the Chicago anti-war rally
2002-10-10: Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi (D-CA), Statement on the House floor opposing the Congressional resolution authorizing military force against Iraq
2003-03-09: Jimmy Carter, ‘Just War -- or a Just War?, New York Times
2003-09-07: Michael Ignatieff, ‘Why Are We In Iraq?; (And Liberia? And Afghanistan?)’, New York Times
2004-01-01: Opinion, 'Between the Years', New York Times
2004-05-26: Remarks by Al Gore
2006-11-16: Senator Nancy Pelosi for Huffington Post, ‘Bringing the War to an End is My Highest Priority’, Huffington Post
United Kingdom

2002-03-07: Brian Reade, ‘Stop Dancing to Bush’s Tune, Tony’, Mirror
2002-09-11: David Aaronovich, ‘Instead of Leadership, We Have been Offered Glib Solutions and Isolationism’, The Independent
2002-12-19: ‘War in Iraq Will Make us Terror Target’, The Mirror
2003-04-07: George Gallaway, ‘My Views are Those of Millions’, The Guardian
2003-04-08: Opinion, ‘Lies Will not Disguise the Ugly face of War’, Mirror
2003-05: Editorial, ‘No Note of Apology’, PeaceNews
2003-09-16: Hugo Young, ‘Under Blair Britain Ceased to Be’, The Guardian
2004-03-08: David Clark, ‘Blair's Vision of a New World Order’, The Guardian
2005-05-03: George Gallaway, ‘These are Blair's Last Days’, The Guardian
2005-06-08: George Gallaway, Interview on Al-Jazeera
2005-06-09: David Clark, ‘This Terror Will Continue Until We Take Arab Grievances Seriously’, The Guardian
2006-07-31: David Clark, ‘How Can Terrorism be Condemned While War Crimes Go Without Rebuke?’, The Guardian
2006-08-25: David Clark, ‘Blair's Foreign Policy is Now a Threat to National Security’, The Guardian
2008-10-09: Max Hastings, ‘Afghanistan is Operation Futility Unless We Talk to the Taliban’, Mail Online
2008-11-15: Robert Fisk, ‘There is No End to the Centuries of Savagery in Afghanistan’, The Independent


2009-11-03: Kim Howels MP, ‘It's Time to Pull Out of Afghanistan and Take the Fight to Bin Laden in Britain’, The Telegraph

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