Archaeological Landscapes of Conflict in Twelfth-Century Gwynedd

By

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Archaeological Landscapes of Conflict in Twelfth-Century Gwynedd

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(Signature)……J.Veninger……………………………………………………………. 
Abstract

Conflict or battlefield archaeology has been steadily gaining traction within British archaeology since the 1990s. Methods of inquiry unique to conflict archaeology, allied to a growing body of theory, have enabled archaeologists to define and reconstruct events of past conflict, illuminating a distinctive component of the human experience.

This thesis applies the theories and methods of conflict archaeology to investigate Anglo-Welsh conflict landscapes of the twelfth century. It aims to explore patterns of Welsh resistance to Anglo-Norman military campaigns through the analysis of documents, landscapes and archaeological sites. Events of armed conflict explored archaeologically using battlefield archaeology methods, present a unique opportunity to undo biases inherent in traditional military history approaches. Unfortunately the amorphous and at times ephemeral nature of medieval conflicts has generally discouraged their archaeological investigation. The study seeks to address this by the application of a holistic conflict archaeology methodology, refined for medieval conflicts.

This research specifically focuses on the often overlooked conflicts associated with the reign of Owain ap Gruffudd, (better known as Owain Gwynedd) from 1137–1170, particularly the conflict events connected to King Henry II’s 1157 campaign along the North coast of Gwynedd, and the 1165 campaign in the Berwyn Mountains. A significant part of this is accomplished by successfully utilizing devices of military terrain analysis, spatially represented via GIS (Geographical Information System) technology, to reconstruct archaeological landscapes of conflict. Using these approaches, the thesis presents new understandings of both specific events and the broader conflict landscapes associated with Welsh resistance to the Anglo-Norman conquest.
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Abbreviations

AC

Annales Cambriae, Harleian 3859; PRO E. 164/1; Cottonian Domitian, A 1; Exeter Cathedral Library MS. 3514 and MS Exchequer DB Neath, PRO E. 164/1. (c. 1298). Translated by: P. M. Remfry (2007). Castle Studies Research and Publishing.

Annales Cestrienses


Brakelond


BS


Brut Pen. 20


Brut RBH

**Chronicles Gervase**

**Chronicles R.T.**

**Chronicles W.N.**

**Cronica**

**Journey**

**Description**

**LGC**
Introduction

In 1095 William Rufus led an army into Wales; this royally sponsored campaign was preceded by earlier conflicts between the Anglo-Norman marcher barons and the Welsh, with the first documented incident taking place on the banks of the River Rhymi in 1070. These Anglo-Norman incursions into native Wales marked the beginning of a legacy of conflict that would define medieval Wales until the conclusion of the Edwardian Conquest in 1283. This prolonged era of conflict triggered elements of social change, the legacies of which endured to contribute to the conceptualization of modern identities.

The study of the Anglo-Norman conquest of Wales has traditionally been restricted to the realm of the historian and military historian alike, and has yet to be explored from a conflict archaeology perspective. Anglo-Norman biases and over-simplifications of the Welsh experience in past scholarly literature, coupled with a dearth of archaeological investigation, have led to the absence of a Welsh narrative from the Anglo-Norman Conquest. These deficiencies are addressed by this research, which at a fundamental level, aims to demonstrate the Welsh reaction to the attempted and failed Anglo-Norman conquest of the Welsh Principality of Gwynedd in the mid-twelfth century, through analysing the archaeological signatures of Welsh and Anglo-Norman battlefields, by contextualizing them within their broader conflict landscape. This research will specifically focus on the often overlooked conflicts associated with the reigns of Owain ap Gruffudd, better known as Owain Gwynedd (1137-1170) and King Henry II (1154-1189), concentrating on the 1157 Coastal Campaign and the 1165 Berwyn Mountain Campaign. The goal of this research is to expand knowledge of these specific campaigns and the broader conflict landscapes associated with the Anglo-Norman conquest and Welsh resistance, and place them within a wider historical and cultural context.

The ephemeral nature of most medieval conflicts in Great Britain and in particular, Wales, has generally discouraged their archaeological investigation. To date, the majority of battlefield surveys in Britain centre on the recovery and interpretation of portable military material culture, acquired through traditional archaeological survey methods and techniques. However, this type of
investigation and survey is rarely practical or possible for these ephemeral medieval conflicts. These conflicts need to be approached and understood from a larger and holistic conflict landscape methodology. Currently no precedent exists in Great Britain for a methodological primer as a tool for deciphering medieval conflicts. This study addresses this deficiency by refining traditional battlefield archaeology methods for medieval conflicts, placing an emphasis on the importance of the reconstruction of the wider archaeological landscape. This results in a holistic analysis of discrete conflict events and the wider conflict landscape in which they took place. This unique method of approach to medieval conflicts and the mid-twelfth-century campaigns of Owain Gwynedd and Henry II in particular, presents a unique opportunity to address biases and assess the veracity of historical accounts past and present, by contextualizing the Welsh experience within an archaeological conflict landscape paradigm, leading to the addition of a native Welsh narrative to the archaeological record.
Chapter One – Literature Review

Introduction

What follows is a review of past and current scholarly literature in the archaeological and historical fields and topics of study intrinsic to the research presented in this thesis. Specifically considered are: 1) an overview of conflict archaeology as an evolving discipline within a broader archaeological and heritage management dialogue; 2) the archaeology of castles in Great Britain, with particular emphasis on castles in the landscape agenda and the role of castles in the medieval marches of Wales; 3) Welsh early-medieval archaeology, giving consideration to the preceding archaeological periods to contextualize the research data presented, particularly in regards to archaeological evidence for contested and fortified landscapes; and 4) Anglo-Norman and Welsh studies, as they apply to the archaeological context of the region and research period of focus. The topic of landscape archaeology, essential to all of these research aspects, is considered within these areas, which is more appropriate than discussing it discretely, apart from a brief overview below. What will not be included within the literature review are the medieval chronicles and manuscripts, as these are treated as written artefacts within the archaeological dataset. Also, previous scholarly literature for the 1157 and 1165 campaign case studies is presented separately within the historiography sections of the case study chapters. Patterns of medieval Welsh and Anglo-Norman warfare are also considered separately in Chapter Three. This literature review will discuss the evolution and current state of knowledge within each field, while addressing any inadequacies or areas that could benefit from further academic enquiry and how the application of a conflict archaeology paradigm can address gaps within the archaeological and historical records.

Landscape Archaeology and Conflict

Landscape, in its most rudimentary form, can be defined as how people perceive the physical landscape, whether natural or built. The advancement of landscape studies has been hampered by an underdevelopment of theoretical
criteria, resulting in varied attitudes and perceptions of landscape studies within the archaeological community (Johnson 2007: 2, 201). In conflict landscapes there is an element of both the processual and post-processual classifications of landscape. The post-processualist defines the archaeology of landscape as the study of how people thought about the landscape, rather than how the landscape determined where they settled or the natural resources it provided, the processual perspective (Adderley and Mills 2014). The post-processual landscape epistemology has been undervalued in conflict archaeology, particularly in the archaeology of battlefields which rely heavily on the natural features and resources in their reconstruction of battlefield events and tend to dismiss landscape analysis that could highlight ‘the life history of place’ (Ashmore 2002:1179; Thomas 2001; Carman and Carman 2006). For example, the term landscape can be defined and exemplified in a number of ways. Knapp and Ashmore (1999) in *Archaeologies of Landscape: Contemporary Perspectives*, underline the difficulties of defining exactly what landscape is in the archaeological setting. Landscape has cultural implications and meaning as well as natural connotations. There are also thematic concepts within landscape studies: ‘landscape as memory, landscape as identity, landscape as social order, and landscape as transformation’ (ibid: 13). The application of these thematic concepts of landscape to conflict archaeology would undoubtedly enhance our understanding and interpretation of landscapes of conflict.

**Conflict Archaeology**

*An overview*

The systematic archaeological investigation of armed conflict is a relatively recent development of the late 1980s and early 1990s, the last decade has witnessed its growth in popularity at an exponential rate (Scott, Babits and Haecker 2009:1). Events of armed conflict explored archaeologically using battlefield archaeology methods, present a unique opportunity to undo biases inherent in traditional military history approaches. According to Freeman and Pollard, champions of conflict archaeology in the UK, an archaeological approach to conflict can: ‘explain actions (individual and corporate) and
reactions to a range of experiences which, for better or worse, define us as humans: that is our propensity to use violence to resolve situations. How humans behave when placed in those situations and how we interpret and preserve such experiences in [their] aftermath’ (Freeman and Pollard 2001: 1). The study of landscape, both cultural and physical is therefore essential to the pursuit of conflict archaeology (Freeman 2001: 7; Hill and Wileman 2002: 215; Foard 2009:136).

Conflict archaeology provides archaeologists with the methodological tools with which to reconstruct the progress of a battle, assess the veracity of historical accounts and fill in gaps within the historical record. An integral part of this process is to place the battlefield and related sites in a broader cultural and conflict landscape to better understand, interpret and identify events and sites. ‘This is particularly important with respect to areas of study where the historical record is often incomplete, confusing, and biased. Battlefield archaeology seeks to move beyond a simple reconstruction of the battlefield events towards a more dynamic interpretation of the battlefield’ (McBride et al. 2011: 77). A key aspect of this analysis is the reconstruction of the historic landscape and battlefield terrain associated with the battle to identify natural and cultural features present in the battlefield space and determine how they were exploited by the combatants (Carman and Carman 2009: 42; Loechl et al. 2009; McBride et al. 2011: 77). Such surveys also aim to address how the conflict events analysed contributed to social change, especially since ‘such conflicts are symptomatic of underlying societal stresses and their conclusions typically mark the beginning of significant processes of change’ (Geier et al. 2011: vii).

A note on terminology, while ‘conflict archaeology’ is the internationally accepted term to describe this field of study, given that both the leading conference and journal publication are titled ‘Fields of Conflict’, there exist other terms. In the USA ‘battlefield archaeology’ is often used, and the terms ‘combat archaeology’, ‘military archaeology’ and ‘battle archaeology’ are also used although not as prevalent as ‘conflict’ or ‘battlefield’ (Carman 2014: 10-13). In academic literature battlefield archaeology is often used in reference to method and survey specific pursuits of the field, while conflict archaeology is more holistic and covers all aspects of the field, including theoretical aims and
objectives (ibid: 42). Therefore, for the purposes of this thesis, the term battlefield archaeology will only be used when discussing methodological issues, in all other instances the term conflict archaeology will be applied.

John Carman, one of the leading experts of conflict archaeology, particularly in regards to the impact of landscape phenomena in the selection of battlescapes, has lately turned his attention to defining a research agenda for conflict archaeology as it moves out of its infancy into an established field of study. In his recent publication, *Archaeologies of Conflict* (2014), Carman has identified three temporal divisions within conflict archaeology, these are the study of prehistoric, historic and modern conflict; each of these contain distinctive qualities specific to their temporal period (Carman 2014). Studies of prehistoric conflict are predominantly concerned with determining the origins of conflict and defining warfare in the prehistoric world. Consequently, prehistorians engage in the philosophical debate surrounding the nature and capacity for human violence (ibid: 38-40). The archaeology of modern conflict is primarily concerned with issues of preservation and heritage management, much of which is focused on the battlefields of the First and Second World Wars (ibid: 16, 63). Historic conflict, what Carman terms ‘battlefield archaeology’ is concerned primarily with the identification and study of sites where conflict took place, and the archaeological signature of those events (ibid: 41-2).

Carman and others, including Scott, Babits and Haecker, have criticized battlefield archaeology for being slow to expand beyond its methodological pursuits, with many investigations having little or no theoretical orientation (Scott, Babits and Haecker 2009: 1). ‘In part, it is because both the underlying purpose of battlefield archaeology and the underlying theory go unquestioned’ (Carman 2014: 45). Behaviourism is the predominant theoretical application for conflict archaeology, generally personified via group or individual actions on the battlefield and through social structural change resulting from warfare (Scott, Babits and Haecker 2009). Other aspects such as phenomenological approaches to the ritualistic location of battles on the landscape have been explored by Carman and Carman (2006) in the ‘Bloody Meadows Project’, which involves systematically comparing the landscape setting of multiple battles, from varying periods and cultures.
The development of conflict archaeology has by and large been a North American innovation. The nineteenth-century Battle of Little Bighorn (also known as ‘Custer’s last stand’ 1876), (Scott et al. 1989) and the eighteenth-century battlefields of Monmouth, New Jersey (American War of Independence, 1778), (Sivilich 2007) are two classic examples that demonstrate the ability of battlefield archaeology to define cultural meaning from the spatial distribution of military material culture. The battlefield survey method, pioneered by Scott, involved reconstructing the historic landscape and systematically surveying the battlefield using metal detectors to identify and record battle related artefacts in situ, leading to a dynamic-pattern analysis and reconstruction of battle events (Scott et al. 1989).

The archaeological study of battlefields in Britain gained momentum in the late 1990s and early 2000s, looking to the American model for guidance (Freeman 2001: 3; Carman 2014: 1; Foard 2012: 14). However, as Freeman points out, there is plenty of room for growth and improvement in battlefield archaeology in Britain particularly considering ‘that archaeologists (in Europe) have been slow to appreciate the potential of studying battlefields’ (Freeman 2001: 2). Since the first Fields of Conflict conference (Glasgow 2000) this has slowly been changing. These developments can be seen in the publication of journals such as the ‘Journal of Conflict Archaeology’ (founded in 2005), the addition of battlefield archaeology course concentrations in some British universities, the creation of the UK Battlefield Resource Centre (created by the Battlefields Trust) and the inception of a battlefield designation and preservation guide by Historic England and Historic Scotland.

Despite these improvements there are still several challenges facing the continued study of conflict archaeology in Britain. Most notably these include the discrepancy of preference for post-medieval battlefields, the lack of a multi-disciplinary approach to conflict sites, the absence of a fully developed survey methodology, and limiting criteria for battlefield recognition and preservation as currently outlined by the British heritage community (Foard 2009: 134-154, Freeman 2001: 5). Compounding these problems for medieval conflicts is the focus on the recovery of portable military material culture, which is emphasized in the battlefield designation guides (English Heritage 2012). The ephemeral
nature of medieval conflict tends to yield an amorphous battle-related artefact scatter (Carman 2014: 50). This is in direct contrast to the well-established artefact scatters and battlefield 'signatures' for the post-medieval period, for example, lead shot depositions from English Civil War sites leading to projectile and ballistics reconstructions of battlefield events (see for example the Battle of Edgehill in Foard 2012). The value of the landscape, particularly in terms of how it was exploited in a military context, which requires a historic conflict landscape reconstruction, is often overlooked as a vital interpretative tool (Foard 2009). This study seeks to address this by using the landscape as an artefact of conflict though the reconstruction of the historic conflict landscape and via the unique application of military terrain analysis to determine the locations of the sites of conflict, how the terrain was exploited by the combatants, how this determined the outcome of the battle and larger conflict event and how this is indicative of patterns of social change resulting from these conflicts. In a broader sense this research will contribute to the understanding of the archaeological ‘signature’ of medieval British conflicts, something that is currently poorly understood (Deegan and Foard 2008: 267).

The significance of the landscape in conflict archaeology

Foard, a notable conflict archaeologist in Britain, has advocated the importance of the landscape in battlefield analysis, stating that the ‘investigation of the historic terrain is necessary not simply to place events in the landscape and to define the extent of the battlefield: it is also needed for better understanding of the battle itself’ (Foard and Morris 2012: 109). Without its inclusion within a battlefield research agenda many events of conflict are often misinterpreted, as are the contextual inferences from any battle-related artefacts scatters. This was perhaps best exemplified in the case of Bosworth (1485 in Leicestershire), a key battle event from the War of the Roses (1455-1487) which was incorrectly located on the modern landscape as the historic battle terrain had not been sufficiently considered (Foard 2009: 137, Foard and Morris 2012). At the English Civil War (1642-1651) Battle of Edgehill (1642, Warwickshire), ‘traditional military accounts placed troops in a particular relation to one another that made no sense of the material recovered by metal detector survey.
Historic terrain reconstruction allowed the identification of areas unsuited to particular types of troop formations typical for the period…and thus caused researchers to rethink the dispositions’ (Carman 2014: 50). Similarly, at the Battle of Marston Moor (1644, Yorkshire) the misidentification of a sunken road as being contemporary with the battle altered the interpretation of the battle (Carman 2014: 44). The recognition of these errors has increased awareness of the importance of historic military terrain reconstruction in British battlefield studies; however, these surveys tend focus only on the reconstruction of battle events and do not include a standardized or systematic method for military terrain analysis.

The obstacle of how to systematically interpret the military significance of the terrain once reconstructed, has be surmounted by the American Battlefield Protection Program (herein ABPP). The ABPP, a division of the federal agency of the National Park Service (herein NPS) was established in 1996 to encourage the documentation, preservation and public awareness of American battlefields. The NPS ABPP has developed a multi-disciplinary methodological approach to research, document and map battlefields that has proven to be highly successful (this method is considered in detail in the Methodology chapter see page 50; ABPP 2007; McBride et al. 2011). These methods, originally developed for American Civil War battlefields, were later applied to many American War of Independence battlefield sites. Recently, they have also been successfully applied to the on-going project, ‘Battlefields of the Pequot War’ – an early seventeenth century (1636-1638) conflict between the English settlers in the colony of Connecticut and the Pequot Native American tribe. The seventeenth-century battlefields of the Pequot War presented a unique challenge for conflict archaeologists to research, survey, document, and delineate battlefield boundaries given the biased and fragmentary nature of seventeenth- century primary sources, the alteration of the historic landscape and the low density and low frequency of artefacts associated with seventeenth-century battlefields in North America. Despite these challenges, the methods, which notably included the pioneer use of military terrain analysis to locate the sites of battles, were successful in documenting the Pequot War. Furthermore, the results produced from the systematic application these battlefield archaeology methods and techniques, reshaped and challenged the accepted
interpretation of the Pequot War. The outcomes of this battlefield survey also reinstated the Pequot as powerful and competent adversaries – whose capabilities had previously been diminished by historic narratives and modern publications alike. The ‘Battlefields of the Pequot War’ project offers unique parallels when compared to the twelfth-century campaigns of Owain Gwynedd and Henry II, given that in both instances the exact locations of the battles were not precisely known, the primary sources were fragmentary and that contemporary literature for both Pequots and Welsh diminished their capabilities as formidable military adversaries.

*Medieval conflict archaeology in Great Britain and the methodological conundrum*

What seems to lie at the heart of the problem in battlefield studies in the UK is the lack of sufficient critical mass to be able to build, enhance, and sustain a coherent methodology and body of expertise. The problem is compounded by the fact that effective integration of the techniques of different disciplines is essential to the battlefield studies, not just in the reconstruction of the historic terrain but in all its other aspects. This remains the most important challenge for the current development of battlefield studies in the UK. What is required is a secure cross-disciplinary base in both an academic and a professional context, and an adequate level of work in battlefield research and conservation to sustain it (Foard 2009: 137-138).

The challenges cited in the above statement by Foard are resoundingly echoed in the absence of battlefield archaeology, as a methodological tool, from archaeological endeavours relating to the Anglo-Norman conquest of Britain, and particularly of Wales. While this is unfortunate it is not surprising, as this absence is apparent throughout the medieval conflict archaeology of the British Isles. There are some notable exceptions to this, namely the analysis of well documented large scale and pivotal events of conflict like the Battle of Fulford (1066; Jones 2006) and events or series of events dating to the later Middle Ages, such as the War of the Roses (1455-1487; Fiorato *et al.* 2000; Sutherland 2009; Broadman 1994). The challenge of studying medieval conflicts is compounded by the heritage communities’ application of a post-medieval definition of ‘battle’ (English Heritage 2012), which does not give sufficient consideration to other types of armed engagements such as skirmishes or
raids, unless these smaller actions were directly attached, temporally and spatially, to a larger battle event.

In their noteworthy publication *The Archaeology of English Battlefields, Conflict in the Pre-Industrial Landscape* (2012), Foard and Morris critique the limitations of the heritage communities’ battlefield designations. Currently, the heritage community (notably Historic England) defines a battle as ‘an action involving wholly or largely military forces, present on each side in numbers totalling c. 1000 or more, and normally deployed in formal battle array’ (Foard and Morris 2012: 6). This constraining definition and intentional slight of so-called lesser actions stands to negatively impact our holistic comprehension of wider landscapes of conflict. Additionally, it does not take into consideration variations in cultural and temporal definitions of warfare or battle. Inherent to these constraints are the foreseeable difficulties in raising awareness for the preservation of these unique landscapes (Foard 2009; Freeman 2001). The particularism that exists in this approach to battlefields is not conducive to the consideration and inclusion of other cultural aspects of conflict that extend beyond the battle event to effect social structural change.

These designations of battlefields further limit our understanding of conflict by placing the primary emphasis on the archaeological survey of military material culture. Material culture has an important role to play in the documentation and interpretation of discrete battlefield events. In fact military material culture documented in situ can lead to the temporal and spatial sequencing of discrete actions, producing a comprehensive order of battle that has been successful in documenting the actions of distinct individuals (Scott *et al*. 1989; McBride *et al*. 2011). The ability of the battlefield archaeologist to document these events to this degree of detail is also dependent on the level of site preservation and the reliability and availability of accurate and multiple primary sources (Geier *et al*. 2011: 83).

It is the potential for this degree of detail, possible with the archaeology of large-scale well preserved and documented battle events, which has understandably created a propensity for this type of battlefield survey while inadvertently diminishing the importance for the archaeological consideration of other types of armed conflict. Though lacking in notoriety, the events associated with small-scale warfare – the sieges, ambushes and skirmishes
that are endemic to the Anglo-Norman and Welsh conflicts (Morillo 1994: 136) – have the potential to contribute to our understanding of past conflict particularly when examined via a landscape archaeology lens.

The unique and versatile applications of battlefield archaeology, considered in the previous section and discussed at length in the Methodology Chapter, are employed in the following study to define the conflict landscapes of the Welsh and Anglo-Norman armed conflicts associated with the 1157 Coastal Campaign and the 1165 Berwyn Mountain Campaign. This method of approach to Welsh archaeology, during the period of Anglo-Norman conquest, has the unique ability to document the physical and cultural reactions to the Anglo-Norman incursion into Wales; without being subjected to the traditional biases that currently permeate this period of history. For instance: the adaptation of military tactics is often evident in both the exploitation of the landscape and in the material culture distribution of battle-related artefacts. Although military forces often had access to the same weapons technology, it was the tactics they employed that were unique as a result of compensating for the challenges presented by the opposing force. The ability to trace these tactical adaptations and compensations can contribute to the current understanding of Welsh and Anglo-Norman battle tactics. A conflict archaeology approach also provides a resolution to the current theoretical challenges being experienced in the applications of agency and landscape theory in medieval Welsh archaeology (see section on Welsh archaeology below). Landscape –cultural and physical – is an inescapable attribute of conflict archaeology, while the ability to document individual or group actions in a battle restores individual agency to Welsh medieval archaeology.

**Castles in the Landscape Agenda**

Castles are the most enduring and visible evidence for the legacy of conflict in Wales and the marches during the Anglo-Norman Conquest. These include the initial earth and timber motte and bailey or ringwork castles, which in many cases were later replaced by masonry castles. In terms of the research presented in this thesis, castles are an important component for the historic conflict landscape reconstruction. Castles served as spatial indicators for
territorial control in a contested landscape and defined the ever fluctuating frontier border. Additionally, the adoption of castle building technology by the Welsh, as early as 1116 at Cymer Castell (castell is the Welsh spelling of castle) in Merioneth, is indicative of the socio-political and military adaptations that occurred as a result of the Anglo-Norman Conquest (Kenyon 1996: 126). Although castles did not play a direct role in the 1157 and 1165 campaign case studies that are considered in this research (with the possible exception of Hen Blas Castle), their social and military functions and their presence on the landscape are important contextual components in the reconstruction of the landscape of conflict in twelfth-century Gwynedd. McGuire and Villalpando, when contrasting the evolution in different styles of warfare of indigenous cultures in Sonora region of Mexico, concluded that the presence or absence of fortifications and their functionality is indicative of the evolution of different ways of war that were responding to specific pressures, such as an increased intensity of warfare (McGuire and Villalpando 2015: 432). This has important cross-cultural parallels for the adoption of built fortifications, such as castles, by the Welsh in response to the increased intensity of conflict instigated by the Anglo-Norman Conquest efforts.

Academic research and development encompassing the history and archaeology of castles has been pursued since the nineteenth century (Armitage 1912; Higham and Barker 1992: 17). Historically, medieval castles were regarded solely as architectural entities for military defence. Until recently, archaeologists remained relatively unaware of how castles functioned on an economic, social or aesthetic level (Liddiard 2000b: 1). However, this was not the only shortcoming of castle archaeology. There was a trend in castle studies of description rather than explanation (Gerrard 2003), meaning that sites were only described in terms of their architectural features and their ability to serve as successful military structures. Buildings, including castles, have also been interpreted for what is expected opposed to what is really there (Dixon and Marshall 1993: 431). Compounding these issues were the types of excavations being carried out. Many castle excavations were short term and done on a small scale. Excavations were also carried out for reasons of renovation, emergency repairs, and public display. The nature of these interventions does not provide the researcher with ample means or time to devote to quality
analysis. While some excavations are surprisingly rich in their yield of information, many remain obscure and unpublished (Gerrard 2003: 119, Creighton and Higham 2004). It was not until the 1990s with the advent of landscape studies that the castle came to be considered for its significance in the landscape setting. This prompted a reconsideration of castles in terms of their social form and function. This post-processual critique to the traditional analysis has proven to be a valuable means of interpretation, and has enhanced the way we study castles by creating a multi-dimensional framework within which they can be understood (Austin 1982; Creighton 2002; Liddiard 2003).

Evolution of Castle and Landscape Archaeology
As stated above, the rejection of the one dimensional military interpretation of castles was the critique of landscape archaeologists. Castles, like most areas of study in archaeology, have multi-faceted meanings and need to be approached accordingly. In their critique, landscape archaeologists were not suggesting that castles did not serve any military purpose; only that this was not their sole reason for existence. There were instances, before the application of landscape studies, in which castles were considered as entities distinct from defensive structures: this being when they were described as places of residence. However, most of the evidence for this was based on courtly literature and art, which does not provide solid ground for the construction of theories or the development of methodology (Austin 1984: 72-3). ‘Both aspects [(military and courtly life)] of [this] study, divorce the castle from its society, its economy and fundamentally from its landscape, both original and contemporary’ (ibid). Austin encouraged medieval archaeologists to take farms, villages and castles out of their isolation and begin placing them in the landscape (ibid). This has been done for the purposes of the research presented in this thesis, by placing castles within the wider conflict landscape.

Although landscape archaeologists did not ignore the defensive aspects of castles, there was a tendency to diminish their military role. The extreme of this viewpoint is best demonstrated by Liddiard, a prominent castle and landscape archaeologist. Liddiard believed that his ‘recent studies have shown
that castles [during the eleventh though thirteenth centuries] were only of minor military importance, even in frontier areas that were exposed to invasion such as the English/Scottish border’ (Liddiard 2003: 8). According to the data amassed, Liddiard concluded that castles were not laid siege to, or attacked often enough to justify their existence as predominantly military structures. However, there are castles included in his study area that did endure attack. Unfortunately, Liddiard did not provide the means for quantifying how few or how many attacks a castle would have had to been subjected to in order to make it militarily significant, or militarily null and void. He also neglected to consider that the lack of assault does not equal the lack of intent to attack, and therefore, the necessity of the fortification, particularly in unstable and contested locations such as the marches of Wales and Scotland.

Another approach Liddiard takes is to suggest that we can better understand the non-military form and function of castles if we take into account that the political organisation of medieval society was based on lordship, not nationalism. Once this is accepted we can study castles as ‘manor houses’ and ‘estate centres’ continuing from a pre-Norman conquest tradition (ibid: 5). As further evidence for castles as non-military entities, Liddiard points to the geographical location of castles highlighting the trend of Norman castles, such as Castle Acre in Norfolk, being located on false crests (Liddiard 2000b: 49-50). This location adds to the castle’s prominence in the landscape but would not provide a practical defensible location, bringing forward another point that ‘is easily overlooked, [which] is that ‘display’ is no less ‘functional” (ibid: 7). Therefore, a castle’s prominent location in the landscape can serve for representing power and prestige, and it adds an element of theatricality to how the castle would have been perceived and/or approached in the landscape.

This brings us to the next notable trend that emerged from castles in the landscape agenda, which is the consideration of how castles were connected to the landscape as visual emblems of status and lordship (Creighton and Higham 2004: 5). This development in castle archaeology focused on the social reasons for the defensible architectural features of castles. In a case study Johnson reconsidered the accepted interpretation of Bodiam Castle, historically regarded as an epitomic example of a defensive structure, drawing on the pioneering work of Coulson (1991). Johnson proposed that Bodiam would not
have been functional as a defence. He believes that the militarily imposing appearance of the castle was a façade created for a psychological impact rather than out of a concern for defence (Johnson 2013). Bodiam is located in a designed landscape, the ‘combined effect of landscape manipulation and architecture provide a visually stunning journey to the castle’ (Liddiard 2000a: 169). Therefore, if we consider castles as manorial houses, it then becomes possible to view them as icons of power and economic prosperity (Creighton 2002: 88; Creighton 2000; Munby 1985; Lieberman 2010).

Oliver Creighton recommends the idea of castles as centres of redistribution of agricultural surplus; these manorial centres would have had management over a wide range of agricultural resources (Creighton 2002: 177). To maximize the land and natural resources the ‘defensive’ landscape could be transformed for agricultural purposes ‘through levelling of ramparts and mottes’ an example of this can be seen at Sapcote in Leicestershire (ibid: 181). These landscapes of lordship represent ‘a powerful medium with which to demonstrate command of resources – ultimately the basis of lordly authority’ (Liddiard 2000b: 65). These landscapes would have presented a ‘flamboyant’ display of the lord’s power involved in altering landscapes such as the addition of fish ponds, deer parks, and mills. The importance of standing out in the landscape would have been achieved, according to Liddiard not only architecturally, but through the alteration of the landscape. This is not to say that the castle would not stand out in the landscape as an architectural feature, only that this was not the only way in which it would have stood apart from its surroundings adding to the aesthetic value of the landscape. (ibid: 64).

The culmination of research on castles in the landscape agenda has demonstrated that valuable knowledge can be obtained from a socio-cultural landscape approach to castle archaeology. This medium of approach has taken castles out of their static roles as defensive structures and given them a new depth and significance of meaning. However, in doing so researchers should be vigilant not to dismiss the military and defensive nature of many castle complexes. This is an especially important consideration for castles located in frontier and border regions, such as the Welsh Marches. The next step forward for castles in their landscape context, particularly for those in frontier and border regions, is a careful and methodological consideration of
their impact on identity and a socialized approach to their military features. These impacts can be accounted for in a number of ways, including monument reuse, access to resources, control of mobility, alterations in patterns of land-use, and specific to this thesis, evidence of conflict. (Some of these concepts are discussed in the following timber castle section). Archaeologists need to apply the thematic concepts within landscape studies: ‘landscape as memory, landscape as identity, landscape as social order, and landscape as transformation’ (Knapp and Ashmore 1999: 13) to the military uses of castles. It can be argued that these concepts are incredibly apparent in areas classified as frontiers or borders, such as the Welsh Marches, areas where there are communities in conflict.

**Timber Castles in Wales**

Another significant development in castle archaeology has been the recognition of the importance of timber castles. Previously, timber castles had been ignored in favour of their more visually apparent and impressive masonry descendants. An example of this can be seen in the 1981 thesis by C.F. Suppe, *Military Institutions on the Welsh Marches: Shropshire, 1066-1300*, in which he fails to take timber motte and bailey and ringwork castles into consideration as the initial principal fortification type. Compounding this lack of recognition is the problem of poor preservation (Higham and Barker 1992: 17, 348). Timber castles, numerous throughout the Welsh Marches, were the dominant form of castle constructed in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, and therefore merit consideration as they are the type of castle that was extant during the historical period considered by this thesis. ‘In Wales we may ascribe to the period 1066-1200 some 242 mottes, 77 castle-ringworks […compared to] 27 far less surely-established stone castles’ (Spurgeon 1991: 157).

The uses of timber castles – according to Higham and Barker in their seminal publication *Timber Castles* – were varied. ‘Timber castles could be permanent or occasional residences, long-term fortifications or temporary campaign and siege bases, and could also be the means by which territory was colonized’ (Higham and Barker 1992: 349). Although more susceptible to fire than their stone brethren, timber castles could be erected at a faster and
cheaper rate. However, the speed with which timber castle were constructed has often been exaggerated as an activity that could be completed in a matter of days or weeks, when the reality is they took months, if not longer to complete (ibid).

There is a lack of consensus surrounding the effectiveness of timber castles, particularly in the Welsh Marches. Spurgeon (‘Mottes and Moated Sites’ in *The Archaeology of Clwyd*) suggests that their ineffectiveness against the Welsh was responsible for their replacement with stone castles. However, the progression to masonry castles is not necessarily a sign of failure in the timber design. As previously stated by Higham and Barker, speed was a consideration when constructing castles in hostile territory. In which case, the construction of masonry castles – either as new constructions or replacements of timber fortifications – can be viewed as the natural progression of colonization, occurring once a territory had been subdued. After all, the marcher lords established ‘power by building castles, exacting tribute and hostages and encouraging settlement by English, French and Flemish migrants’ (Brown 2004: 100; Richardson 2001). Lieberman believes that timber castles served as ‘ad hoc arrangements, to be abandoned once further conquests had been completed’ (Lieberman 2010:138). Caution is needed here as early timber castles in the Welsh Marches are poorly understood as few have been excavated using modern archaeological methods. To this point the evolution of castle use and the embodied symbolism in the lordly occupation of these sites is unclear, as the function of pre-Norman Welsh fortifications and lordly centres is poorly understood. During the Anglo-Norman conquest of Ireland, native Irish fortifications were used ‘only in the context of feuding and succession disputes. They did not use them as strategic weapons in the defence of their territories against larger and more powerful aggressors’, mirroring earlier pre-Norman uses of defences (O’Conor 1998: 98). The adoption to a more formal system of defence (castles), from a tribal and pastoral system (retreat into the mountains), is unique in the Welsh trajectory of a social military adaptation, when compared to other regions, such as the Irish response to the Anglo-Normans (see page 84 in Chapter Three for a more detailed discussion on the Welsh adoption of castle technology).
Timber castles were accompanied by one of two forms of earthwork fortifications: the motte and bailey, and the ringwork. ‘The steep mound, or motte, the centrepiece of a castle, could be up to ten metres high, and was normally surrounded by a cut ditch. On top of the motte and itself surrounded by a palisade was generally a timber tower…’, a ringwork was a motte and bailey without the motte (Brown 2004: 101; Kenyon 1990: 5). The bailey consisted of an outer defended enclosure adjacent to the base of the motte. Sometimes the natural terrain was used in the construction of the motte, for instance ‘the motte of Sycharth Castle, Denbighshire, stands on a glacial mound. Excavation revealed that a cairn of stones had been collected, and then covered with the soil and turf removed when the limits of the motte ditch were marked out (Hague and Warhurst 1966; Kenyon 1990: 10). Both types of timber fortifications were used in Wales, although some regions, such as Clwyd, do not have any known example of ringworks. There is some debate amongst archaeologists as to the agency that led to the establishment of one type of fortification in favour of the other. Kenyon postulates that the ringwork, which he describes as a ‘motte and bailey without the motte’ would have been a more economical option, which may have been used in areas that were already inhabited (Kenyon 1990: 5). Jack Spurgeon argues that it was personal preference that explains the type of fortification used. He puts forward the hypothesis that there were no ringworks in Clwyd because there were no ringworks in the adjacent marcher lordship of Chester, indicating a personal preference of the earls of Chester (Spurgeon 1991: 157).

Whether temporary frontier fortifications or permanent administrative centres, the duality of castles is not to be underestimated. Similarly, the architectural fabric of castles should not be a determinant of their value. Timber castles played a decisive role in the conquest of the Welsh Marches (Brown 2004: 101). Anglo-Norman ‘[v]ictory was converted into conquest and domination by the construction of castles…the castle was infinitely adaptable. It could be a centre of defence or attack, domination and colonization or retreat’, however this was ‘an equation which also worked in reverse. ‘The destruction or occupation of Anglo-Norman castles by the Welsh, or the building of Welsh castles, ‘represented Anglo-Norman defeat and Welsh recovery’ (Davies 1987: 89).
Timber castles provide a unique opportunity to consider the social implications of military structures, discussed at the conclusion of the previous section. It can be argued that in Great Britain, timber castles were the personification of military structures as their construction was a consequence of the Norman Conquest. For example, in discussing the importance of the castle as a tool of conquest, Gillingham states that ‘In William [the Conqueror’s] camp there were men who believed that, no matter how brave its soldiers, a land without castles was virtually indefensible’ (1999: 73). Yet, within these castles are the inherent socio-cultural implications connected with the necessity of their construction. This duality of castles is explained in the following excerpt from Lieberman’s (2010) publication *The Medieval March of Wales, the Creation and Perception of a Frontier* where he discusses cultural perception of the boundary between Shropshire and Powys:

However short-lived the practical military purpose of castles may often have been, there can be no doubt that on the level of perceptions, at least, the evidence of the castles provides a very useful way of determining the existence and extent of a distinctive area on the Shropshire – Powys frontier… Castles always had a psychological impact […] the military element of that impact was, at times, illusory. Yet where the making of a separate identity in the minds of contemporaries is concerned castles, which were retained primarily as residence or as administrative centres, and even ruined castles, could be just as evocative of frontier warfare as occupied and garrisoned ones. After all, they stood as monuments to border conflicts which must have remained in living memory, even when they were not directly experienced […] The castle played a substantial role in creating and reaffirming the character of the March as a land of war, both in practice and, more persistently, in perception. (Lieberman 2010:142).

An example of this is brilliantly documented in Higham’s and Barker’s publication *Hen Domen Montgomery, A Timber Castle on the English-Welsh Border*. In this field report, Higham and Barker specifically consider the importance the pre-existing Welsh cultural and physical landscape had in determining the location of the Anglo-Norman timber castles. For example at Hem Domen, Higham and Barker found evidence of a possible palisade or enclosure predating the construction of the Norman castle (Higham and Barker 2000: 25). This was not an isolated instance; the Anglo-Norman reuse of Welsh centres of power seems commonplace as it would have been a highly visible
form of social control and restructuring of power (Davies 1987: 255). Degannwy and Rhuddlan Castles were superimposed on top of early medieval *llysoedd* (plural of *llys*), native Welsh lordly residences and administrative centres (Longley 1997: 41; Quinnell *et. al.* 1994: 213). It has been argued that during the Anglo-Norman Conquest in Wales, ‘castles had a psychological function, and were a physical embodiment of subjugation’ (Brown 2004: 101). There are parallels of this in Ireland as well, for example the reuse of a pre-existing promontory fort by the Anglo-Normans at Baginbun c. 1170 (Co. Wexford; O’Conor 2003: 30). These castles were also strategically placed, for example, Hen Domen restricted mobility by controlling the access to an important ford on the River Severn at Rhydwhyman, effectively controlling ‘traffic’ between Wales and England (Higham and Barker 2000: 151).

Several Welsh *llysoedd* had their defences enhanced with the addition of a motte, evidence for this can be seen at Castells/Llysoedd Edeirnion, Prysor and Crogan (NPRN 306598; 308964; 306558; Johnstone 1995). However, it is unclear due to the lack of systematic excavation, whether the motte was added to a pre-existing *llys* site, or whether the motte and *llys* were contemporary constructions. Furthermore it is difficult to determine whether these additions were Welsh in their construction. It is equally possible that the mottes were of Anglo-Norman construction, which in the course of the shifting territorial control of the conquest were reposed by the Welsh and converted into *llysoedd*. For further discussion on the *llys* see the Study Area Chapter (page 139). In terms of monument reuse, it was not uncommon for the Welsh to site their castles within earlier defensive structures, such as hillforts, or the already mentioned *llysoedd*. For instance Dinas Bran and Dinas Emrys (both in Gwynedd) were Iron Age hillforts later reused for the Welsh built castles by the same names. It is interesting then, that later Welsh masonry castles were often constructed on rocky summits, the layout of the castle shadowing the natural contours of the craggy terrain, such as at Castell y Bere constructed c. 1221 by Llywelyn the Great, in Merioneth (Butler 2010: 27, 31).

In future research on timber castles in the Anglo-Norman and Welsh frontier, it would be interesting to further explore both Spurgeon’s hypothesis that motte and bailey versus ringwork was a sign of personal preference and Kenyon’s, that ringwork castles were constructed in areas of pre-existing
settlement. Perhaps the best way forward being to consider the location of these timber fortifications in the natural landscape – defensible terrain – compared to the cultural landscape – native Welsh monument, settlement and even fortification reuse. In addition it would be interesting to conduct a survey to ascertain why the Welsh are making decisions to capture and keep some castles, but burn and destroy others. Were these decisions merely an unpredictable outcome of battle, or were there other factors at work. Moreover, were the Welsh only reusing Anglo-Norman castles that were located in similar geophysical conditions to their own fortifications. A cultural response to the Anglo-Norman colonization attempts of Wales can be traced and understood by the methodological application of castle archaeology as translated through the lens of landscape studies. Finally, how did this built frontier of timber and later, masonry castles, impact the Welsh response to the Anglo-Norman conquest. While the highly fortified frontier was meant to discourage conflict, strongly defended frontiers can also be seen to encourage conflict (Hill and Wileman 2002: 98).

The Archaeology of Early Medieval Wales, including a brief overview of Iron Age and Roman periods

Early medieval Welsh archaeology and to some extent medieval archaeology in the period following the Anglo-Norman Conquest, is dominated by a lack of data (Rowley 2001; Edwards and Lane 1988; Edwards 1991; Bezant 2009; Grossman 1996). Compounding this challenge is the non-native Welsh bias of both the history and archaeology of Wales, fostering a tendency towards the academic over-simplification of the Welsh experience. Bezant, in her thesis Medieval Welsh Settlement and Territory, reviews the current scholastic perception of Wales:

We know all there is to know about Wales; we know where all the castles and churches are, the rest was an ‘empty’, ‘tribal’ landscape, an attitude that is perhaps supported by a lack of fresh approaches to existing data. This thesis seeks to challenge these notions, to reject the limiting ‘celto-nostalgic’ narrative that has driven Wales for so long and to introduce a sophisticated medieval landscape that paralleled the trajectory of the rest of medieval Europe (Bezant 2009: 8)
While Bezant does concede that this limiting perception and narrow academic dialogue are slowly evolving; native Wales is still suffering from a deficiency of archaeological data, which is needed to rectify the discrepancies and biases of past academic scholarship (Bezant 2009; Davies 1990: 4). In some instances the prejudice in favour of an Anglo-Norman narrative is so striking, that it evokes parallels to the historical description and study of indigenous cultures in post-colonial countries such as the USA and Australia. This unsavoury parallel does unfortunately have merit, especially when the political climate, which was often a driving force of interpretation, is considered. ‘Wales remains significantly invisible, obscured by historical and ongoing processes of cultural imperialism carried out by a highly centralized and dominant British (English) government’ (Grossman 1996:2). Thus the Dark Ages of Wales remain dark, and while there is a relative abundance of academic enquiry following the Anglo-Norman Conquest, the majority of this research surrounds the Anglo-Norman incursion into Wales, rarely giving consideration to the native Welsh elements. Even the *ilysoedd*, Welsh lordly residences and administrative centres, which in many cases are well documented on the landscape, are nevertheless poorly understood.

The one exception to this is the study of Iron Age hillforts, which critics of the Anglo-Norman bias have explained as: unavoidable since hillforts are highly visible features on the Welsh landscape (Edwards 1991). Yet, ‘[t]he ‘Anglo-centricity’ of British cultural studies, particularly the exclusion of Welsh and Scottish perspectives, is often as [cultural studies scholar] Turner notes, ‘without acknowledgement or apology’” (in Grossman 1996: 2). What follows is an analysis of the existing archaeological record covering the Iron Age, Roman occupation and early medieval period (the Dark Ages). The Anglo-Norman conquest will be considered within the next section, Anglo-Norman and Welsh studies, as the majority of the evidence from this period is more historically than archaeologically based, the exception being castle studies, discussed in the previous section.
Iron Age and Roman Wales

Although the Iron Age (c. 750 BC-43 AD) and the following Roman occupation of Wales (c.43 AD-410AD) are eras well outside this study's period of focus, it is worth diverging into them briefly in order to add continuity and contextualization to the development of archaeology in Wales up to the period of Anglo-Norman conquest. This period is also important to discuss as the location of hillforts and later, Roman settlements, are indicators for early boundaries between Wales and England, and individual Welsh kingdoms (Rowley 2001:9). Additionally, these features were on occasion reused during the early medieval period and later, including the twelfth century, when two Iron Age hillforts were repurposed during the 1165 Berwyn Mountain Campaign. For these reasons Hillforts and Roman forts are included and spatially represented in the historic conflict landscape reconstruction within the 1157 and 1165 campaign core areas.

Hillforts are the primary focus of archaeological inquiry during the Iron Age in Wales. Hillforts, not unlike the castles of the eleventh and twelfth centuries ‘enabled local potentates or communities to control access to territory, farmland, trade and natural resources, and to display their presence […] Power and control of the landscape were the watchwords of the day’ (Brown 2004: 68). Hillforts were not only created as emblems of display and control, they ‘also served an important defensive role […] evidence of burning and destruction during their history indicate that life in hillforts could be turbulent’ (Gale 1991: 89). We can assume that there must have been settlements outside of hillforts, in lowland areas that would have been more suitable to agriculture. ‘Much work remains to be done on the identification and investigations of early settlement’ (Rowley 2001: 37; Gale 1991). Interestingly, Rowley has speculated that the location of the hillforts is indicative of a built frontier, suggesting that the march of Wales has been disputed territory since the Iron Age (2001: 9). The Clwydian Mountains of Gwynedd have no less than six substantial Iron Age hillforts (Brown 2004: 68), whether these were constructed on tribal frontiers is difficult to establish, as further research is needed. Nonetheless, this region encompasses the much later contested medieval frontier between Gwynedd and Anglo-Norman England.

The Roman conquest of Wales was a protracted event (Jenkins 2007: 22). Unlike in England and south-eastern Wales, the Roman influence in north
Wales was to a lesser extent, where the native population never truly became Romanised. In north Wales the Roman presence was primarily regarded as an occupation. This inferior influence, when compared to England and southern extremities of Wales, can be traced historically, archaeologically and linguistically – as evidenced by the preserved Welsh native language and absence of Roman place-names (Rowley 2001: 51, 63). Roman towns and villas, when they did occur in Wales, were on the fringes of the Welsh borders and the majority of there were in southern Wales, where some areas achieved civitas (citizen) status (Brown 2004). Northern Wales was never significantly developed during the Roman period, except for mining activities (i.e. lead and silver). This may have been due in part to the inability of the land to yield ample sustenance (ibid: 88-9).

However, the northern parts of Wales were subjected to military rule. The predominant buildings of Roman construction in this region were the forts or outposts associated with mining activities, as well as the Roman roads that transverse the region. This should not be taken to mean that there were no Roman settlements, merely that they were more scattered, and poorly documented when compared to similar sites in southern Wales or England. For example the hut enclosure site of Din Lligwy near Moelfre on Anglesey, was excavated in 1904 and was shown to be a Romano-British settlement (GAT 2132). In some instances the Romans reused earlier Welsh hillforts, such as Caer Drewyn near Corwen (which was also used as a Welsh encampment during the 1165 Berwyn Mountain Campaign; Rowley 2001: 50; CPAT 101810). There were no documented instances of town building, or widespread Roman improvement to pre-existing native Welsh settlements. However, Chester bordering the modern Welsh county of Flintshire was a major Roman town (Brown 2004: 88-89; Blockley 1991; Lloyd 1912: 89; Rowley 2001: 55). It also seems likely that the Romans sought to subdue the Welsh populace in a pre-emptive effort to protect the Romanized province of Britain, a trend that continues with the Anglo-Norman incursion into Wales. Furthermore, much of the archaeological evidence from this period focuses on determining Roman presence or absence, ignoring the Welsh reaction to the Roman occupation.
Early Medieval Wales (c. 410-1066)

A problem within early medieval Welsh archaeology, historically and currently, is that distinctive settlement types and diagnostic artefacts dating to this period have yet to be positively identified (Edwards and Lane 1988: 3). Instead, archaeologists have to rely on Carbon-14 or archaeomagnetic dating of hearths, as there are no diagnostic typologies with which to clearly distinguish prehistoric versus early medieval. In addition, archaeologists are not actively looking for these settlements, which are usually discovered by accident via cultural resource management projects. Furthermore, these settlements were constructed from perishable materials, leaving little to no visibility on the existing landscape. For these reasons it was decided not to include settlements within the conflict landscape reconstruction, as it would have resulted in a skewed representation, particularly since settlements during the eleventh and twelfth centuries are also poorly documented.

Welsh early medieval settlement studies have been negatively impacted by the now antiquated and insufficient three-stage theory of social and economic development. The three stages (originally validated by Darwinist theory) were hunting, pastoralism and cultivation. Societies that did not advance to cultivation – Wales in the early medieval and medieval periods was a predominantly pastoral-based economy – were regarded to be in arrested development. Despite the three stage theory’s inadequacies ‘the original bias imparted by [the three stage theory] to the study of early social organisation in Wales has been retained’ (Jones 1961: 112). Thus, early scholarly literature on social and settlement systems of earlier medieval Wales defined the Welsh as tribal and scattered. Glanville Jones has critiqued earlier views that ‘portrayed the tribal Welsh as living in ‘homesteads scattered about the countryside’; it was thought that these homesteads were artificially grouped together for purposes of tribute or legal jurisdiction (Jones 1961: 111). Jones’s work has shown that early medieval and medieval Wales comprised of a complex social landscape that was on parallel with European society in the Middle Ages, essentially that ‘of a servile majority tied to the land, performing labour service to support the noble minority’ (Davies 2004: 16; Jones 1961). However, Jones’s work is not without issue; Seaman criticizes Jones’s model as being too static and overly reliant on medieval and late medieval Welsh texts, leading to
an inaccurate portrayal of early medieval Welsh social systems and settlement patterns. Seaman replaces this with a framework that ‘emphasizes the limitations and transient nature of early medieval power structures’ (Seaman 2012: 164). Seaman also suggests that further archaeological investigation is needed to advance our understanding of this period of Welsh history.

In 1934 C.W. Phillips published an excavation report of work done at Pant y Saer on Anglesey. In this report he identified what came to be known as VCP ware (very coarse pottery). He believed that VCP ware was representative of early medieval pottery as it was found in the same hut structure as an early medieval penannular brooch. This assumption, that VCP ware was diagnostic of early medieval sites went unquestioned until the 1960s. In 1985 E. Morris ‘identified VCP beyond reasonable doubt, as the crude clay containers into which salt was packed prior to transportation during the Iron Age’ (ibid: 2). To date there has been no documentation of a conclusively diagnostic early medieval assemblage; Dinas Powys being the only site to come close (ibid).

Instead, the majority of evidence from this period comes from surviving early medieval texts. However, even this medium of approach yields hazy results at best. ‘It is only in the ecclesiastical archaeology that we are able to detect the native population with any feeling of confidence; their inscribed stones, their graves, their monasteries, and some of their religious sculpture’ (Edwards 1991: 141). Evidence of early medieval Welsh secular settlement is even more obscure. ‘Outside of [medieval] major urban sites, the few deserted villages and the atypical moated sites, the anticipated [early medieval] farm or hamlet has escaped recognition’ (Manley 1991: 97). Textual evidence, such as The Law of Hywel Dda (Jenkins 2000), and the Llandaff Charters (Davies 1978) provide a clearer, though not complete, understanding of native Welsh society from the early medieval period, than any extant material cultural remains.

This fragmentary evidence is frustratingly even more ambiguous in north-eastern Wales. In fact, tangible evidence of settlements cannot be recognized prior to the arrival of early medieval English communities in this border region, this evidence being based on place-name analysis (Owen 1994). However, at this point it is difficult to create a distinction between the two cultures. In fact, sections Flintshire and Denbighshire are recorded within Domesday Book as
part of the English county of Cheshire, suggesting a dominant earlier medieval English presence. However, Domesday Book also documents many villas (parishes) within this border region as being laid waste to by Welsh raids, meaning that although this landscape was influenced by the early medieval English, the Welsh within this border region were still culturally distinct, albeit less perceptible in the archaeological record (Edwards 1991: 129; Brown 2004).

This territorial distinction between Wales and England is apparent in what are perhaps the most recognizable archaeological features from the early medieval marches: Offa’s and Wat’s Dykes. These early English dykes, constructed by the Kingdom of Merica in the eighth century (although some debate surrounds the exact dates), represent the first formal and highly visible establishment of a boundary between England and Wales (Williams 2009: 34). The Brut y Tywysogyon claims that Offa’s Dyke was constructed in reaction to a particularly brutal attack the Mercians suffered at the hands of the Welsh in c. 787 (Hill and Wileman 2002: 120). Yet the actual function of the dyke is not entirely known, it has been debated that it was used as a boundary marker, to control trade, or as a military feature to defend the frontier (ibid: 120-2; Fox 1955). The significance of this boundary is not to be under-estimated. Although the border fluctuated, the dykes came to be used as a national and county boundary in the sixteenth century (Higham and Barker 2000: 148). Offa’s Dyke is still roughly the boundary between England and Wales today, and in some regions, particularly in its central stretches, it is the boundary exactly (Rowley 2001: 78). It has been argued by Rowley that ‘at the time of the Norman Conquest there was no finite border between the Saxons and the Welsh [despite the existence of Wat’s and Offa’s Dykes]. Before the Normans arrived the Borderland had been politically unsettled, local border skirmishes were common, and on a larger scale the region was coveted by both the Anglo-Saxons and the Welsh’ (ibid: 89). While endemic warfare may explain the absence of a ‘finite border’, it is important to consider that the Welsh perception of border was not a finite concept, but was more fluid and abstract in its definition (Turvey 2002: 3; Davies 1990: 17; also see further discussion on pages 76 and 86).

What remains to be seen is whether a systematic landscape-based approach to Welsh archaeology can have an impact on these obscure periods
of Welsh history. The goal being to establish settlements and artefact typologies during these periods that are diagnostically Welsh and then evaluating them via a landscape archaeology agenda. Perhaps this issue could be solved by the application of the current theoretical pursuit in historical archaeology, individual agency. ‘There is a problem however. This [theoretical approach] does not lend itself well to landscape analysis and change over time, and medieval landscapes in particular remain behind current new theoretical approaches’ (Bezant 2009:9). Bezant is also sceptical of the ability to understand the evolution of social processes based on the actions of an individual, she suggests that human agency manifested by modifications to the landscape, is more visible when approached via family or community agency (ibid). What is required is the application of an appropriate method that can contextualize the Welsh experience within landscape and agency theory. The following research presented in this thesis overcomes this challenge with the adoption and application of a conflict archaeology methodology paradigm.

**Welsh and Anglo-Norman Studies c.1060-1277**

As previously stated, much of the documentary evidence for native Wales during the eleventh and twelfth centuries is corrupted by an Anglo-Norman bias, which is deeply rooted in the original narratives and histories from this period. ‘[T]here is a tendency for most historical material to stem from the conquerors rather than the conquered, and of course there is the problem of assessing the veracity of documents, which may have been the result of propaganda, wishful-thinking, or downright lying’ (Hill and Wileman 2002: 16). This is unfortunate given that borderlands and frontiers represent unique areas of cultural inquiry (Grossman 1996:4; Hill and Wileman 2002).

The Anglo-Norman Conquest of Wales was a tumultuous event that took over two hundred years to accomplish, following the arrival of the Normans in Britain in 1066, until the death of Llywelyn ap Gruffudd (Prince of Wales) in 1282 bringing a close to the tumultuous Edwardian conquest of Wales (1277-1283). In fact, it can be argued that the consolidation was not complete until the Acts of Union in 1536 (Rowley 2001: 73). It is commonly accepted that Norman interest in Wales stemmed from a desire to stabilize the border region between
Wales and England, thus protecting their newly acquired English assets, while recognizing the 'potential for further expansion beyond established borders' (Richardson 2001: 9; Kenyon 1996; Brown 2004; Rowley 2001; Turvey 2002; Black 2000; Davies, 1987). Furthermore, the Normans perceived that 'a united Wales may have been able to threaten the whole of western England' (Richardson 2001: 32-33). However, the Welsh, perhaps motivated by the common cause of self-preservation, did unify for periods, during the eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Turvey states that: 'Wales was united less by idealism, much less the anachronism of nationalism, than by conquest and coercion from within' (2002: 3; Rowley 2001). However, this unification 'never reached a national scale, since Norman kings could always find allies among Welsh princes' (Dodd 1979: 22). The resulting semi-unified front of Welsh resistance coupled with the physically challenging terrain, were directly responsible for the impairment of Anglo-Norman efforts over the course of two centuries.

Outside of the Welsh patterns of kinship and kingship documented by the contemporary historians of the eleventh and twelfth centuries we know very little of Welsh culture during this period. There are few contemporaneous literary references to settlements (such as those found in Gerald of Wales' Description of Wales, writing at the close of the twelfth century) but, 'in the dearth of datable [archaeological] remains it is hard to be positive about housing…[and these few examples are] victims to the agricultural advance, and generally survive only where the land it too poor to be worth clearing' (Dodd 1979: 21).

Anglo-Norman castles remain the primary focus of archaeological investigation during this period (Dodd 1979). There has been little academic consideration given to native Welsh fortifications and it is unknown whether fortified centres even existed (outside of a few examples of fortified farmsteads and llys), prior to the arrival of the Anglo-Normans when the Welsh adopted the Norman technology of castles (Edwards 1991: 141). Apart from these fortifications the Welsh relied on the inaccessibility of their mountainous landscape for protection, often seeking refuge in the mountains of Snowdonia when threatened (Davies 2004).
Conclusion

Previous Anglo-Norman and Welsh archaeological and historical studies have failed to provide a collective perspective of the Welsh experience during the twelfth century and earlier periods, stretching back to the Iron Age. This shortcoming has been compounded by the lack of datable physical evidence, making it difficult for archaeologists to improve the current state of knowledge. The pervasive Anglo-Norman biases have also effected the progression of native Welsh studies. The absence of Welsh agency from this period of history results from the elusive state of the Welsh archaeological record during the eleventh and twelfth centuries and from the Anglo-Norman biases of contemporary and historical scholars. As previously stated the theoretical framework of some historical archaeologist – landscape and agency – has encountered difficulty in its deployment during this period, due to the fragmentary nature of the existing evidence. Additionally, a large part of this difficulty results from the absence of a solid methodology with which to address and resolve these challenges. The methods particular to conflict archaeology can integrate the theoretical objectives of landscape and agency in historical archaeology, generating a comprehensive cultural and societal native Welsh context. These methods are outlined in the following Methodology Chapter.
Introduction

The ephemeral nature of medieval conflicts in Britain and in particular, Wales, has generally discouraged archaeological investigation. To date, the majority of battlefield surveys in Britain, are late medieval or post-medieval in date, and centre on the recovery and interpretation of portable military material culture, acquired through traditional archaeological survey methods and techniques (Foard 2009; Pollard and Banks 2007; Carman 2014). However, this type of investigation and survey is rarely practical or possible for these ephemeral medieval conflicts. These conflicts need to be approached and understood from a larger and holistic conflict landscape methodology. Currently no precedent exists in Great Britain for a methodological primer as a tool for deciphering medieval conflicts. This deficiency is addressed in the following research methodology which introduces and implements an original medieval conflict archaeology methodology, built upon and adapted from traditional battlefield archaeology methods. This methodology stands to benefit not only general archaeological practices involved in medieval conflict investigation, but would be particularly important to the rescue archaeology and cultural resource management communities. The following chapter provides a detailed explanation of the medieval conflict archaeology method used in this research, as well as general research methodology including the strategy for data collection and analysis along with a detailed technological overview of the spatial analysis employed for the conflict landscape interpretation and reconstruction.

Conflict archaeology, methods and goals

The goal of conflict archaeology is to place individual events of conflict, such as battles, within a broader historical and cultural context resulting in a dynamic battlefield and conflict landscape reconstruction (McBride et al. 2011). In doing so attributes of social change triggered by conflict can be understood by shedding new light on the complexity of cultures in conflict, such as the inter-
Welsh and Anglo-Norman colonial relationships. Careful and consistent application of the following conflict archaeology methodology results in various new insights and interpretations that challenge long held notions about the political and military scope of the Anglo-Norman conquest of Wales, including the complexity of Welsh political, social and military institutions and the goals and objectives of the Welsh and Anglo-Normans during the period of conquest. This predominantly consists of their respective abilities to adjust military tactics and technology to compensate for the opposing force and the sophistication involved in planning, preparation and execution of armed assaults, particularly the exploitation of the physical and cultural landscapes.

The following methodology has been adopted and adapted from the battlefield archaeology guidelines of the National Park Service American Battlefield Protection Program, the Battlefields of the Pequot War – the first NPS ABPP project to successfully use reverse KOCOA (see discussion below) and the Battle of Little Bighorn – the project from which battlefield archaeology emerged as a legitimate field of inquiry (ABPP 2007, McBride et al. 2011, and Scott et al. 1989). Although the conflict events considered in this research are European, not American in origin, the American guidelines are not culture specific; as such they can be applied cross-culturally. Additionally, they are not bound by temporal restraints or by the size, force composition or subjective historical importance of the engagement. There are noteworthy examples of British battlefield methodology particularly that which has been outlined by Foard and Morris (2012: xiii), but as these are adopted from the American model, and since by Foard’s admission that there is ‘much to be learnt from the experience in the USA’ (2012a: 14), the original American methodology model has been used as the methodological primer for this research.

The criteria for identification and recognition laid out in the Battlefields Designation Selection Guide by English Heritage (now Historic England; 2012) was not used as a methodological reference as it does not recognize smaller scale events of conflict, such as the siege, raid and skirmish. Additionally, this guide is focused on battlefield preservation for sites of ‘national historic importance’ that changed the course of British history; an emphasis is also put on the recovery of portable military material culture, as such the guide does not give due consideration to the landscape as an artefact of conflict, further
complicating this is marked preference for post-medieval conflict (English Heritage 2012: 5; Carman 2014: 16; Foard 2009: 134). As of yet there is no battlefield preservation component within Cadw (the Welsh heritage body), the inclusion of such a scheme was put forward in 2011 (see: http://gov.wales/consultations/cultureandsport/battlefields/?lang=en). Based on proposed legislation it seems that the Welsh Government was prepared to adopt a more holistic interpretation of the battlefield which would have made the case studies considered in this research eligible for nomination to the register. Unfortunately, the proposal was scrapped as the preliminary archaeological survey was unable to sufficiently identify many of the battles nominated for investigation and preservation (personal communication with J. Berry at Cadw, April 2015). The inability to successfully identify these battles was due to the lack of an appropriate research methodology. A further discussion on heritage bodies and their role in battlefield identification and preservation can be found in Chapter Eleven (page 421).

Some researchers, including Carman (2014) have astutely criticized the insularism of conflict archaeology, insofar as there is as yet no wide reaching international dialogue of conflict archaeologists. Although the Fields of Conflict conference (initiated in 2000) encourages such a dialogue, ‘most studies tend to operate at the national level: Americans study sites where Americans fought, British study sites where British soldiers fought’, etc. (Carman 2014: 16). This lack of communication between archaeologists is further impaired by the rigid insularism of the different types of conflict archaeology (prehistoric, historic and modern) and the presence/absence of a multi-disciplinary approach; heritage management criteria of battlefields which is different for Wales, England, Scotland; and professional sectors such as academic or cultural resource management. ‘The consequence is a field dominated by historical considerations generally ignoring the potentiality of other fields’ (Carman 2014: 16). This research project seeks to respond to these critiques by drawing on knowledge from both the American and British experience in conflict archaeology pursuits; professional and academic experience; and experience with different conflicts (new world and medieval).
The Method

The following section is a detailed description of the method used in this research. Each of the five components (listed below) are considered at length, giving particular consideration to KOCOA, and the delineation of conflict terrain boundaries. The data collection strategy, notably the GIS components, are considered discretely in the next chapter section (see page 57).

The methodological components are as follows:

1) An analysis of primary sources to construct a timeline of battlefield or conflict events with anticipated archaeological signatures.
2) Conduct a desk and field-based archaeological landscape survey to locate, define and evaluate the integrity of conflict sites.
3) Reconstruct the historic built landscape by conducting a desk-based archaeological landscape survey that locates, defines and evaluates the integrity of these sites. This includes the incorporation of the results from step 2 (see above); these sites are then represented spatially using ArcGIS mapping technology.
4) Evaluation of the military significance of the physical and cultural landscape by conducting a military terrain analysis survey using ‘reverse’ and regular KOCOA techniques and visibility analysis.
5) Integration of conflict terrain (that incorporates the results of KOCOA and visibility analysis, step 4 above), as well as historical and archaeological data into ArcGIS software to reconstruct conflict events across time and space.

Apart from the application of ‘reverse’ KOCOA, which will be explained below, the methodology outlined above is not unique as it is used by many conflict archaeologists working on battlefield sites, particularly ABPP sites in the USA.

As stated above, much of this research methodology, including ‘reverse’ KOCOA was adopted by the author from her previous work with Dr. Kevin McBride on the ABPP grant (GA-2255-09-011) documenting the Battlefields of the Pequot War (1637; McBride et al. 2011). What makes this thesis unique is the application of this methodology to a medieval conflict, the inclusion of an in-depth reconstruction of the contemporary historic landscape, and a consideration of how cultural features impacted conflict decisions and outcomes. Cultural landscape reconstruction is a challenge for medieval conflicts and medieval Welsh archaeology, as the historic cultural landscape is poorly documented.

Inherent Military Probability (herein IMP) is a technique employed by military historians and conflict archaeologists alike. IMP allows the researcher...
'with a detailed knowledge of the military practices of the period […] to explore a problem on a historic battlefield by considering what a modern soldier might do in the same context' (Foard 2009: 141). The military historian Burne (1955) was the first to be credited with using IMP, in this instance to better understand the Battle of Crecy (c. 1346). Other military historians including Keegan were soon to adopt this technique (1976: 33-34). However, there exists a great deal of subjectivity in this type of analysis, even with a detailed military knowledge base. For this reason IMP should not be applied in isolation, but should only serve to provide further contextualization for more concrete evidence produced using tools such as KOCOA (see discussion below), which is in essence an objective toolset that can be used to further define aspects of IMP.

The United States military has developed a process for evaluating the military significance of a battlefield denoted by the acronym KOCOA (Key and Decisive Terrain, Observation and Fields of Fire, Cover and Concealment, Obstacles, Avenues of Approach and Retreat). This technique had been adopted by NPS ABPP and is a requirement for all ABPP projects. KOCOA analysis uses defining features – aspects of the landscape that are mentioned in battlefield accounts and present in the visible landscape (ABPP 2007). Defining features may be natural (streams, ravines, hills) or cultural (castles, route-ways, settlements) and are assessed and evaluated to determine their effect on the process and outcome of battles. Critical defining features are mapped using GPS and GIS technologies. An explanation of these defining features is detailed in Table 1 below.

Generally KOCOA is used to better delineate and define features of a known battlefield to assist in the analysis and reconstruction of discrete battlefield events. Reverse KOCOA uses the elements of KOCOA to identify potential battlefield locations, in events where the site of the engagement is not precisely known. Once this is achieved, KOCOA is then applied in the traditional mode. Essentially this is a landscape archaeology approach to defining conflicts. This approach is unique in that it utilizes a military terrain analysis lens to reconstruct historic landscapes of conflict. In the realm of medieval conflicts this methodology has promising implications, as it provides archaeologists with a tangible way forward for better defining and understanding medieval conflicts that is not dependent on the recovery of portable military
material culture. ‘The key aspect of this analysis is the reconstruction of the historic landscape and battlefield terrain associated with the battle to identify natural and cultural features present in the battlefield space and determine how they were used by the combatants’ (McBride et al. 2011: 77; Carman and Carman 2009: 42). Identity and group agency can be extrapolated and explained by the effect the variables presented in KOCOA had on the outcome of conflict events. The potential of these insights and explanations is increased by considering the proximity of cultural landmarks and monuments within the key terrain element.

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<tr>
<th>Battlefield Element</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Examples</th>
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<td>Key Terrain</td>
<td>A portion of the battlefield, possession of which gives an advantage to the possessor.</td>
<td>High ground, castle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observation &amp; Fields of Fire/Assault</td>
<td>Points on the landscape that allow observation of enemy activity that is not necessarily key terrain; offers opportunity to observe an area, acquire targets; and allows for an affective line of fire.</td>
<td>High ground, line of site</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cover &amp; Concealment</td>
<td>Landforms or landscape elements that provide protection from assault and conceal troop positions from observation.</td>
<td>Ravines, cliff-face, walls, woodlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obstacles</td>
<td>Landscape elements that affect troop movements.</td>
<td>Rivers, marshes, ravines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avenues of Approach &amp; Retreat</td>
<td>Corridors used to transport troops between the core battle area and outer logistical areas.</td>
<td>Roads, paths, steam beds</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: KOCOA elements (after McBride et al. 2011:78)

*Establishing boundaries*

In order to reconstruct and interpret both individual battlefield events and broader landscapes of conflict, it is necessary to first establish conflict area boundaries. The steps involved in determining and documenting boundaries include incorporating: physical features (such as terrain types, topography and
eco-facts), cultural features (such as roads, churches, earthworks and castles), and artefact distributions where applicable (such as arrow heads, armour fragments, and other military material culture) into a scaled base map using geographic information systems (GIS). This process establishes the location and extent of the conflict area and the degree of site preservation. There are three boundary types applied to conflict archaeology investigations. These are the study area, the core area(s) and the area(s) of integrity (ABPP 2007). These boundaries are supported by historical and archaeological evidence such as: historical documents or narratives; military terrain analysis and archaeological survey. This evidence must clearly demonstrate that the boundaries encompass and consist of legitimate historic resources contemporary with the conflict landscape (McBride et al. 2011: 11).

As defined by the National Park Service American Battlefield Protection Program, a study area encompasses the tactical context, visual setting and historical extent of a conflict landscape often bounded by a series of connected events. Core areas are where particular engagements or actions took place, as such there can be multiple core areas within a study area. Finally, areas of integrity ‘delineate those portions of a historic [conflict] landscape that still convey a sense of the historic scene and contain material remains (artifacts and features) that were associated with the conflict’ (McBride et al. 2011: 18-19 after ABPP 2007). The physical and built landscape, either associated with or directly involved in the conflict, can also be considered a material remain of a conflict event (Carman and Carman 2006; 2009).

This consideration is part of what makes this research unique, as it does not rely on portable military material culture to produce a dynamic-pattern (see last section) conflict event interpretation. Identifying the landscape as a military artefact is an innovative approach to medieval conflicts. Others, such as Carman and Carman, have used landscapes as conflict artefacts, but they have not integrated or contextualized them within a holistic understanding of conflict events (Carman and Carman 2006; 2009). The unique approach to conflicts presented by this research demonstrates that this is possible by the precise application of method, to access, define and contextualize ephemeral medieval conflicts. The product of this analysis is an archaeological narrative that
illuminates the societal changes and behavioural patterns that resulted from the conflict events considered.

**Study Area Boundaries**

![Study Area Boundaries](image)

Figure 1: Study Area Boundaries

For the purposes of this research the study area encompasses the historical extant of twelfth-century Gwynedd, as well as portions of the bordering marcher territories of Cheshire and Shropshire and northern Powys, a neighbouring Welsh principality (see Figure 1 above). This large area represents the historical extent of the conflict landscape and is further contextualized and discussed in the Chronology and Study Area chapters. Although this boundary exceeds the historically conceived borders of Gwynedd, the medieval frontiers between Gwynedd, the other Welsh principalities and the marcher territories was in a state of constant flux. Additionally, the Welsh perceived borders as a fluid entity (Davies 1990); therefore a larger area was considered.
The core areas are the portions of the cultural landscape that were directly involved in the conflict event. For the 1157 Coastal Campaign, core areas include the regions encompassing the Anglo-Norman route of march from Chester towards Basingwerk, the location of the Battle of Coleshill, and the Welsh encampment at Basingwerk. Essentially this includes the entire modern Welsh county of Flintshire and northern portions of Denbighshire. The other core area for the 1157 campaign is the Isle of Anglesey where the Anglo-Normans pillaged several churches and where the battle of Moelfre took place. For the 1165 Berwyn Mountain Campaign the core area encompass the vicinity of the Battle of Crogen, including the Anglo-Norman route of march from Oswestry to the modern day community of Chirk, and the region surrounding Chirk where the Battle of Crogen was fought. This core area also includes the Anglo-Norman route of advance into the Berwyn Mountains. The core area also encompasses the landscape surrounding the Welsh and Anglo-Norman encampments at Corwen and Cerrig Gwynion and the Ffordd y Saeson, the
route-way that connected the two encampments (see Figure 2 above). These core areas are discussed in the 1157 and 1165 Case Study chapters.

**Areas of integrity boundaries**

As battlefield excavation was beyond the scope of this research, areas of integrity are instead solely defined by portions of the preserved historic landscape and built features which can be assessed by military terrain analysis. These areas of integrity include the immediate landscape of a conflict event. The primary areas of integrity considered by this research are: the Battle of Coleshill for the 1157 campaign and the Battle of Crogen for the 1165 campaign (see Figures 3 and 4 below). The conflict landscape analysis of the core areas and areas of integrity can be found in the 1157 and 1165 Campaign Case Study chapters and the Military Terrain Analysis chapter (chapters 6-10).

Figure 3: 1157 Coastal Campaign, Battle of Coleshill, Area of Integrity
Figure 4: 1165 Berwyn Mountain Campaign, Battle of Crogan, Area of Integrity

Data collection strategy

The following section is a discussion of the data collection strategy employed for all the steps of the methodology outlined above. This discussion serves only to provide an overview of the data types used and how the data was collected. A detailed discussion of this data can be found in the Chronology, Study Area and Case Study chapters (chapters 4-9).

Chronology

The first step in the creation of a conflict chronology and an event timeline for the case studies considered was a detailed analysis of all relevant medieval sources. These include the manuscripts, chronicles, and government records contemporary or near contemporary (within a century) to the conflict events considered. The information in these sources was used to create a detailed conflict chronology which will later be augmented by other archaeological and historical entities contemporary with the 1157 and 1165 campaigns. The
chronology produced contextualizes the written evidence for the conflict events considered by placing them within a wider conflict chronology. As such conflict events and events relating to conflict, including the signing of treaties, payment of homage, etc.; are also included within the chronology.

The following is a list of the foremost sources consulted. For ecclesiastical chronicles these most notably include: the three distinct versions of the Brut y Tywysogyon (or Chronicle of Princes, c. 682-1282), the Annales Cambriae (c. 1298), the Chronicle of Jocelin of Brakelond (c. 1190) and the Annales Cestrienses: Chronicle of the Abbey of S. Werbug, at Chester (c.1132-1297). These ecclesiastical histories are invaluable documents as they provide contemporaneous details of events contextualized within a wider history. The government documents consulted include: The Chronicles of the Reigns of Stephen, Henry II and Richard I, both the William of Newburgh and Robert of Torigni versions (c. 1198 and 1186 respectively) and the Pipe Rolls from the reign of Henry II. There are no surviving Welsh government documents from this period that reference the campaigns apart from the letters from Owain Gwynedd to Louis VII of France, soliciting his assistance (in Pryce 2005) Also of great import are the historical works of Gerald of Wales, The Journey Through Wales and The Description of Wales (c. 1188).

The details of the events documented in these sources were then compared to create a working conflict chronology, the veracity of these accounts are later determined and enhanced by the incorporation of the archaeology and military history data, including the military terrain analysis. Another component of the literature analysis for both primary and secondary sources was a thorough historiographical investigation for each key source. In some instances, due to the obscurity of the author(s) or place of publication this was not possible. A historiographical survey is an invaluable tool as it highlights any potential discrepancies or biases in the accounts, ancient or modern.

Archaeological built environment survey
The next step of the research involved carrying out a conflict landscape survey to reconstruct the historic built landscape within which the conflict events took place. This entails steps two and three of the methodology listed above.
Following the establishment of the conflict boundaries, as detailed above, an archaeological field observation survey was conducted to identify contemporary built features on the historic conflict landscape. This includes all cultural features present on the landscape that were either directly or indirectly involved in the conflict events considered, or communicated a sense of a broader conflict landscape.

The site types included in the historic landscape reconstruction are: battle sites, castles (including features that could possibly be castles but are currently unverified), *lysoedd*, churches, route-ways, Iron Age hillforts, Roman forts, Wat’s Dyke and Offa’s Dyke. Although not contemporary to the twelfth century, the Iron Age hillforts and Roman forts were included within the landscape reconstruction as they are indicative of a legacy of conflict and there is a tradition of medieval reuse. For example, two hillforts were refortified to serve as Welsh and Anglo-Norman encampments in the 1165 Berwyn Mountain Campaign. Wat’s and Offa’s dykes, both early medieval features, were included for the same reasons. Battle sites, identified as battle features on the GIS maps, include: actual sites of battle, supposed sites of battle – produced either by erroneous battlefield interpretations or by guesswork on the part of the Ordnance Survey – locations of battle suggested by place-name evidence and battle locations within areas of integrity that pre-date the campaign events, such as the 1150 Battle of Coleshill. Also included are the sites of the Welsh and Anglo-Norman encampments. Settlements were not included as Welsh settlements from this period are poorly understood. Recent research efforts are slowly improving our understandings of these settlements (Bezant 2009), but documentation of comprehensive settlement distributions are currently incomplete, as such any attempt to represent known settlements would render an inaccurate portrayal.

Conflict specific sites dating from 1066-1272 (the period of Anglo-Norman Conquest up to but not including the Edwardian conquest), namely battles and sieges as illuminated in the conflict chronology, are considered in the Study Area chapter. The archaeology and history of sites contemporary with the 1157 and 1165 campaigns are discussed in the individual 1157 and 1165 Case Study chapters. The primary data sources used for this analysis were: historic environment records, archaeological site reports and secondary
data from more general archaeological and historical volumes. Historic environment records (HER) were compiled from the National Monument Records (NMR) listed by Historic England for sites located in the marcher counties of Cheshire and Shropshire. HERs for Wales were assembled from the Royal Commission of Ancient and Historic Monuments of Wales (RCAHMW). Also consulted were HERs from the Clwyd-Powys Archaeological Trust (CPAT) and the Gwynedd Archaeological Trust (GAT). The data assessed from these sources was then represented spatially on GIS maps. For the Study Area chapter, which does not include a spatial analysis component, these are displayed using Google Earth. The data features for the Case Study and Military Terrain Analysis chapters were integrated into ArcGIS mapping technology. Spatial analysis was not conducted for the siege and battle sites discussed in this the Study Area chapter as their inclusion in this research is to provide contextualization for the wider conflict landscape.

Military terrain survey and incorporation into GIS

Following the historical and archaeological analysis, in-field site surveys were carried out at the established areas of integrity. The purpose of these visits was to conduct landscape surveys to better contextualize the KOCOA analysis instead of relying solely on GIS technology and desk-based survey. A significant part of the field survey involved collecting georeferenced points on the landscape for use in visibility analysis. The site locations used for the military terrain analysis quite simply relies on an accurate spatial location of the site itself (e.g. the motte of a caste) and all associated KOCOA elements. Once the KOCOA elements have been established (step four of the methodology and discussed in the 1157 and 1165 Case Study chapters as well as in the Military Terrain Analysis chapter) they are spatially integrated into GIS software where spatial analyses such as viewsheds can be accomplished. These sites and their associated landscape components were entered into ArcGIS using either the geospatial coordinates provided by the HERs or from geospatial reference points collected by the author.

Due to the difficult nature of the terrain and the large extent of the survey areas a traditional GPS unit was not used, instead and perhaps rather
unconventionally, a portable satellite navigation unit (Sat. Nav.) was used. Although generally used as an aid for vehicle or pedestrian navigation, Sat. Navs. can also provide coordinates for any given point on the physical landscape. Accuracy was not an issue as in series of accuracy tests, conducted against known georeferenced points, the Sat. Nav. was in most case accurate within one metre. Additionally when in the field collecting visibility analysis points, the points’ coordinates were routinely checked against known locations such as landmark features on Ordnance Survey maps. As another means to safeguard against any inaccuracies, points were only chosen for which a variant radius of two metres would not impact the quality of the visibility analysis, for example points were never collected from the edge of a precipice.

**Spatial analysis method and mechanics**

The following section is a detailed discussion regarding the mechanics and method of visibility analysis as it is applied to a military terrain analysis paradigm. Such an in-depth discussion is needed as visibility analysis is a large component of this research. There exists no standardized methodology for the application of visibility analyses to archaeological research, the applications of such analyses are project dependent and determined. The use of GIS software, particularly in regards to visibility analysis, was not a common practice in archaeology until the late 1990s early 2000s (Gillings and Wheatley 2001; Fisher 1992; 1996). Therefore, this discussion of visibility analysis revolves around the capabilities and constraints present in its mechanics.

ArcGIS (ArcMap) version 10.0 was the GIS software used in this analysis. The DEM or digital elevation model used in the creation of a base-map for this research was downloaded from the Digimap academic mapping database operated by the University of Edinburgh (http://digimap.edina.ac.uk/digimap/home). Simply put, a base-map is a map that contains geospatially referenced topography to which other features, including topographic contours, sites and visibility analysis are later additions represented using ArcGIS technology.

The results of any given visibility analysis can be altered and adjusted by a number of variables. In particular these are: the location of the observer
point; the height above the surface of the observation point; the quantity and quality of observation points for any given site; the indeterminate types and extents of past vegetation; the limits of discernible human sight and the quality of the DEM. In technological terms, ‘a viewshed identifies the cells in an input raster than can be seen from one or more observation locations’ (ArcGIS n.d.). Essentially in a DEM, represented within a GIS software program, a viewshed is created by calculating the visible terrain 360º from any given observer point location. Each viewshed contains x, y and z coordinates. The x axis is the horizon and the vertical y axis defines the surface elevations (ArcGIS n.d.). The z-value is the observer height above the surface of the observation point, the default value of z is one metre above the surface. The default z-value can be adjusted by adding an OFFSET A feature class to the observation point attribute table.

Visibility Limits and Constraints
The default vertical angle limit in a viewshed calculation is between 90º and -90º, with the horizontal plane equal to 0º (ArcGIS n.d.). This allows for a visibility analysis which affords the observational context of looking up and down, as well as straight ahead. If not restricted, the field of view determined by the viewshed analysis extends until the curvature of the earth inhibits the line of sight. In most cases this extends well beyond the range of human vision. The ability of the human eye to identify and perceive objects (trees, people, castles, etc.) decreases over distance, generally items that take up less than five percent of the central field of view horizontally and less than ten percent vertically are difficult to perceive. The point at which this happens is dependent on the size of the object (Environmental Resources Management Australia 2009: 1-7). Additionally, the distance to the horizon is also a factor in determining the range of visibility. The distance to the horizon increases in direct correlation to an increase in elevation, this distance can be determined using the following equation (NOAA online resource):

\[
\text{Distance to horizon} = 1.312 \times \sqrt{\text{height in feet}}
\]

Therefore the distance to the horizon, on level terrain, for a person standing 1.6 metres tall would be 4.8 kilometres. At an elevation of 50 metres the horizon
would be at a distance of 27 kilometres. Given the size of Henry II’s army particularly for the 1165 campaign, it is possible that they could have been perceived by the Welsh at great distance, particularly if they were being observed by look-outs posted at elevation. The ability to recognize an object at distance is dependent upon a number of factors: the size of the object, the distance of the object from the observer, observation elevation, atmospheric conditions, quality and contrast of light, angle of observation and obstacles (such as trees and other natural or cultural features) preventing clear observation.

The parameters for determining recognizable visibility are vague at best. It is a topic that has been debated by architects, artists, urban-planners and more recently archaeologists (Fisher 1992; 1996; McManama-Kearin 2013; Higuchi 1983; Blumenfeld 1953). Archaeologists are the late-comers to this debate and as such no equations exist for determining visibility limits. For example, at various elevations what is the distance at which a person, a castle, or an army is perceptible and recognizable by the viewer? Higuchi and Blumenfeld have provided equations for discernibility over distance, however, since their research was targeted at urban planning and perception (Blumenfeld 1953) and the perception of landscape features, notably trees (Higuchi 1983), it can only be loosely applied to an archaeological context. They suggest a group of qualitative values that separate short (immediate), middle and long distance views.

Short distance is defined as being able to clearly recognize distinguishing traits of the object, therefore, this is the distance at which you can see and easily recognize an individual you know. Middle distance is the distance at which you can still identify features of the individual, but not clearly. Long distance is the point at which you can still perceive the object and recognize it for what it is (a person), but you cannot distinguish any features. Higuchi defines the value that separates short from middle distance (on a horizontal plane with a steady gaze of one degree) as sixty times the size of the object. Therefore adopting the 1.6 m height parameter for people used in this study, the middle distance range would be 96 metres (1.6m x 60 = 96m). The long distance visibility value is 1,100 times the size of the object, therefore, the furthest distance at which a person could be perceived on a flat surface is 1.76
kilometres (1.6m x 1100 = 1.76 km), (Higuchi 1983: 14-17). Blumenfeld conducted similar visibility studies in urban environments and concluded that the maximum distance at which a person can be perceived is 1.25 kilometres, half a kilometre less than the distance estimated in Higuchi’s equation (Blumenfeld 1953: 36). It should be noted that these equations only factor for the size of the object in terms of height not width, and they only factor values for object visibility on flat terrain. This is why GIS generated viewshed models are invaluable as they can define terrain visibility for multiple angles and distances.

Inherent challenges and solutions for DEMs and Viewsheds

Viewsheds are determined by a calculated series of equations operating under the Boolean principle. Essentially the software applies binary coding to DEMs; cells in view equal one and cells out of view equal zero. The resultant binary viewshed is sensitive to the accuracy of the digital recordings of the DEM; any errors result in elevation inaccuracies and in turn, spatial representation errors (Fisher 1996: 1298; Wechsler online resource n.d.). Simply put DEM errors occur in the process of converting the topography of the earth to a digital medium. Most DEM errors are reported using root-mean squared error. The root-mean squared error (RMSE) calculates a statistical average by taking the square root of a data set. To determine RMSE a set of known survey points on the Earth’s surface are compared to the corresponding set of points in the DEM. The degree of uncertainty for a given DEM is difficult to quantify and more research is needed before an equation can be adopted to systematically and universally rectify these errors (Wechsler online resource). Essentially it is important to remember that digital elevation models are models, not truths.

These elevation inaccuracies, present in most DEMs, will affect the accuracy of viewsheds. Fisher, notable for his contributions to GIS technology and visibility studies, demonstrated that viewsheds are not a precise Boolean phenomenon (Fisher 1992: 351). That is to say that there exists a degree of ‘grey’ within the identification of DEM cells as positive or negative for visibility. Fisher compensated for this by developing a series of algorithms that could be inserted into the DEM and viewshed equations. The resultant viewsheds produce what Fisher terms a ‘fuzzy viewshed', which takes into consideration
the so-called grey zones which may or may not fall within the limits of visibility. The point of Fisher’s work was to create more accurate visibility models that compensated for the embedded errors within GIS software programs.

DEMVs and viewshed analysis are relevant and useful techniques for examining and understanding landscapes even with the caveat that they are not perfect systems. While there are algorithms and equations that attempt to solve for these imperfections, these in themselves are not devoid of uncertainties. For this reason, the DEM and viewsheds presented in this research are retained in their original state and the possibility of inaccuracies is taken into account in the analysis of these models. Additionally, the presence of these embedded errors contributes to the conservative visibility hypothesis outlined below.

Visibility Analysis Research Methodology

In order to conduct accurate military terrain analysis a series of viewsheds must first be calculated. It is important that there are multiple viewsheds computed for each major terrain feature or key site, for example, for Hen Blas Castle from the 1157 Coastal Campaign, multiple viewsheds were calculated from the motte, the bailey and their immediate vicinities. Visibility analysis is considered to be more accurate when ‘rather than reporting on whether many targets can be seen from a single viewshed point…the visibility of a single target or viewpoint from many viewing points is determined’ (Fisher 1996: 1298). It is important to visit each of these sites and collect GPS reference points that can be entered into GIS software as observer points. Collecting this data in the field is invaluable as it enables the researcher to select superior observer points compared to those selected by analysis using DEMs alone. Multiple observer points are essential, particularly at larger sites where combatants were stationary, such as a castle or encampment. Viewsheds calculated for the multiple points at one site can then be combined to produce a comprehensive viewshed of that area. The exception is route-ways, where instead multiple points are collected on a linear trajectory. Additionally, it is important to make field visits to cross-reference the national grid references provided by the RCAHWMW and other heritage bodies against the actual location of the monument. This is particularly vital for castles where the grid reference is
normally for the southwest corner of the bailey and not the motte. In instances where this was found to be the case an observer point was collected for the motte.

For the purposes of this study an OFFSET A value\(^1\) of 1.6 metres was used for the height of the observation points in calculating all viewsheds to represent the average height of a person. This height was calibrated based on Gillings’ and Wheatley’s suggested optimum adult height between 1.6 and 1.75 metres (2003: 13). The lower end of the scale was favoured as this would produce obtainable visibility models for essentially any individual, not only those from the taller portion of the population. Similarly a conservative five metres was added to the 1.6 metre human height when calculating a viewshed from a timber castle keep.

No timber castle towers survive in Britain and it is difficult to estimate height from post-hole stains alone. Beresford (1987), Higham and Barker (1992) have theorised that surviving timber bell towers from medieval churches may represent the best comparative examples for the height of timber keeps. Higham and Barker suggest that the only major difference between bell towers and castle keeps would have been in the roof construction, bell towers having an angled pyramid shaped roof while timber keeps would have been flat to allow for accessibility and visibility for defensive purposes (Higham and Barker 1992: 245). Most of these surviving church towers are in Scandinavia, the best example in Britain is that of Romney Marsh in Kent which is around 7.5 metres high (Beresford 1987: 105-6). Given the sometimes hasty nature of the construction (such as at Hen Blas Castle) and the repeated destruction and reconstruction of many of the castles that fall within the study area, a conservative timber keep height was assigned. It should be noted that the five metre tower height is in addition to the surviving height of the motte, which are in many cases eroded.

Producing conservative viewsheds, which is particularly important in instances with unknown variables, serves three main purposes: first it serves to control the plausible limits of visibility. Secondly, the establishment of the

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\(^1\) Note the default z value of one metre is negated by the addition of an OFFSET A value.
visibility limits assists in identifying probable key military terrain features with a higher degree of confidence than those identified by a more liberal application of viewshed constraint components. Lastly, conservative viewshed models compensate for visibility constraints such as tree cover. In effect by adopting conservative parameters for unknown variables such as observer and building height, other unknown variables that constrict visibility and cannot be controlled or predicted, such as past vegetation cover and atmospheric conditions, can be moderated by conservatively valuing other viewshed variables. As will be reviewed in the following chapters, much of the terrain associated with both the 1157 and 1165 campaigns was forested. It should be noted that in medieval England a forest often referred to an area of protected royal land, woodlands could be a component of a forest, but a forest could also contain large areas of open land (Jørgensen 2010: 114). For the purposes of this research the term forest should be read synonymous to woodland. There were areas with sparse tree cover, such as the coastal plain in northeast Wales, which was immediately adjacent to the coastal Roman road of the 1157 campaign, the forest being restricted to the upland locations to the west. Also, the vegetation on Henry’s route of march across the Berwyn Mountains in 1165 on the Ffordd y Saeson was mainly dominated by upland scrub, such as heather and gorse.

There exist inherent difficulties in attempting to ascertain the exact location and density of past vegetation. Recently McManama-Kearin (2013), in her viewshed research of Anglo-Norman castles in Ireland, concluded that data available from both LiDAR and paleobotanical records was still insufficient to reliably reconstruct historic vegetation patterns to use in visibility analysis (2013: 10). This is mainly because LiDAR only represents current vegetation, and paleobotanical records cannot provide the level of detail required for dependable visibility analysis. McManama-Kearin instead adopted the following technique: due to the hypothetical nature of attempting to reconstruct past vegetation ‘…it seemed the best course to remove the question of foliage completely. While to some, this may be seen to represent a draw-back, in reality, dismissing the question of vegetation only enhances the maximum potential of visibility’ (2013: 10). This is a valuable method and it is certainly functional for defining maximum visibility. Given the innate difficulties discussed above, the only realistic way forward for visibility analysis of archaeological landscapes is to
embrace McManama-Kearin’s technique. Place-name evidence and historic landscape descriptions in contemporary literature such as *The Journey through Wales* (1188), *Domesday Book* (1086) and other chronicles, have been scrutinised to compensate for the vegetation variability. For example, Gerald of Wales when recounting the 1157 Battle of Coleshill indicates that the area was wooded, for example: ‘on our right we passed the forest of Coleshill… [a] densely wooded pass’ (*Journey* Book II Ch.10: 196). Information such as this will be taken into account by underestimating the degree of visibility presented by the viewshed data. Essentially the full extent of visibility, indicated by the viewshed, will be interpreted with caution, given the potential for vegetation constraints. In a military context these variables do not diminish the value of visibility analysis in defining key features of military terrain or site identification as they produce sound models for determining how the landscape was viewed by the combatants. Additionally the reconstruction of these conflict events is not dependent on viewsheds alone which are only one aspect of the military terrain analysis employed; many elements of KOCOA are not dependent on viewsheds.

**Methodology results – conflict pattern analyses**

Following collection and analysis all of the data types discussed above the data are then synthesised to create a battlefield or conflict pattern analysis. It is from these analyses that behaviour and significant patterns of social change can be accessed. These patterns of social change have theoretical implications for conflict archaeology and are considered in further detail in the Medieval Warfare and Conclusion chapters (Chapters 3 and 12).

There are two types of battlefield pattern analyses that can be used in battlefield surveys; these are gross-pattern analysis and dynamic-pattern analysis. Gross-pattern analysis is a more traditionalist approach to battlefield interpretation and reconstruction that relies primarily on historical narratives, which in some instances are enhanced by oral histories and random or unprovenienced collections of battle related material culture (McBride *et al.* 2011) Essentially, gross-patterning is a military history approach to battlefield interpretation and reconstruction. In this research this is derived from
considerations of the primary historical narratives presented in the Conflict Chronology chapter and the reconstruction of the broader conflict landscape presented in the Study Area and Case Study chapters. Dynamic-pattern analysis (developed by Scott, Fox et al. 1989) builds upon the data resulting from gross-patterning and ‘interprets and reconstructs battlefields by integrating discrete battlefield events and their archaeological signatures into a cohesive spatial and temporal sequence’ (McBride et al. 2011: 79; Scott et al. 1989: 146-147). By using both of these analyses the spatial and temporal dimensions of a conflict event can then be more clearly defined.

Traditionally, gross patterns ‘are defined as the spatial aspects of unit behaviour’ (McBride et al. 2011: 80) while dynamic patterns are defined by attributes of battlefield behaviour, such as portable military material culture. In battlefield surveys for which a portable artifactual component was present, these provenienced battle-related artefacts were used to sequence individual behaviour patterns across time and space (Scott et al. 1989: 148). Conventionally this type of analysis has relied on analytical techniques surrounding firearm signature analysis (ibid). It is reasonable to assume that a similar analytical technique could be developed for medieval projectiles. This is something that would be considered in any future research.

While the ability of the dynamic-pattern approach to assess the actions of individuals in a single moment of time is archaeologically significant and rare, it is not the only noteworthy product of this type of analysis. In terms of this research, this is shown in the combined ability of the military terrain analysis and visibility analysis to highlight how the landscape, as a military artefact and unique archaeological signature, was perceived and exploited by the combatants. Through this group behaviours on the battlefield can be accessed as well as their broader implications for patterns of social change. A gross-pattern analysis is presented in the Case Study chapters whereas the dynamic-pattern analysis is considered in the Military Terrain Analysis chapter.
Remote Sensing

Although beyond the scope of this study, the following is a brief review of the remote sensing techniques available and often used to inform the excavation of conflict sites. These most notably include: metal detector survey; LiDAR; and electrical resistivity survey. These techniques are not necessary to document the medieval conflicts considered by this study, however, it would be remiss to not devote a brief dialogue to their function within the wider realm of conflict archaeology pursuits.

While a negative stigma is sometimes attached to metal detectors, particularly as the tool of the renegade collector, when employed responsibly, systematically and by a trained detectorist, they are in reality a superlative tool for locating military related material culture in an archaeological context. ‘A metal detector is a remote sensing device designed to locate subsurface metallic items based on the differential electrical conductivity of metallic objects’ (McBride et al. 2011: 94). Different manufactures of metal detector have varying discrimination capabilities for differentiating metals, such as iron, copper or lead, enabling archaeologist to target specific types of material culture such as lead musket balls or iron arrowheads. Given that ferrous materials are susceptible to corrosion, access to the appropriate conservation tools is a necessity for both the identification and preservation of any ferrous material culture. Often ferrous artefacts when excavated are in such a severe state of corrosion that radiography is necessary in order to positively identify the object. Cuprous and lead alloys (such as brass or pewter) tend to preserve well in situ, although the degree of preservation is affected by other factors such as soil chemistry and the degree of soil saturation (Foord and Morris 2012).

Traditional archaeological survey and excavation methods are often unsuccessful when used to explore a battle site, this is due to the unique artefact scatter pattern produced by armed engagements. Preliminary excavation techniques, such as test pitting at regular intervals on a grid, has been shown to be ineffective at such sites as the majority of military related material culture will go undetected (McBride et al. 2011; Carman 2014). Additionally, traditional survey methods can be very intrusive, whereas the remote sensing capabilities of metal detectors are minimally invasive, an
important consideration particularly when surveying residential property (McBride et al. 2011; ABPP 2007).

In a traditional battlefield archaeology survey, metal detectors are used both to locate metallic military material culture and to delineate battlefield site boundaries (Foard and Morris 2012). Once this inventory phase has been accomplished traditional archaeological excavation strategies can be employed. Test pits and trenches are often opened in areas with a high density of battle related metallic artefacts. Other features, battle-related or otherwise, such as earthworks are also surveyed, any other archaeological features or sites identified during the initial survey are also recorded to document pre and post-battlefield cultural activity. The deposition of metallic artefacts that are not battle associated, such as nails, discarded farming equipment and domestic refuse, can impede metal detector sampling strategy, particularly if the landscape has been subjected to intensive modern cultivation. Depending on the degree of non-battle-related activity and the resulting ‘background noise’ picked up by the metal detectors, the sampling strategy can be altered by adjusting the metal detectors to discriminate for non-ferrous objects. In doing so battle-related material culture, such as brass lace chapes and buckles, or pewter horse accoutrements can be used to define areas of battle activity. The use of experienced metal detectorists is also vital, as they can often discriminate between hand-wrought iron and machine made iron. Although hand-wrought iron was certainly manufactured well beyond the medieval period, the ability to eliminate modern iron objects from the metal detector survey can be a useful tool (McBride et al. 2011). Additionally, most quality metal detectors (and detectorists) can discriminate object depth, providing another effective means for discerning potential battle related material culture from more recent metallic deposits. However, this method of discrimination is only effective at locations that have not been ploughed, given that both battlefields associated with this research are in agricultural fields that have been ploughed in the past, object depth would not be a useful discrimination factor in a sampling strategy, but could be useful consideration in a survey of the encampments.

There are other forms of remote sensing which can be useful in battlefield surveys, such as LiDAR and electrical resistivity. The success of these types of surveys and the quality of the data retrieved is dependent on the
level of site preservation. LiDAR (light detection and ranging) is a remote sensing system that uses lasers to create accurate three-dimensional representations of the Earth’s surface that penetrate vegetation (NOAA 2015: online resource). In archaeology this has useful applications, particularly for delineating and locating earthworks. LiDAR was consulted in the initial phase of this research, however, no additional earthwork features were identified than those already established either on Ordnance Survey maps or by previous archaeological surveys. Areas where LiDAR data could have been of great use, the Welsh encampments at Basingwerk and Pen y Bryn y Castell, were too altered by modern development for any earthwork features to be detected via LiDAR.

Another means of remote sensing, electrical resistivity metres, use an electrical current which is passed through conductors, the more conductive a soil is the lesser the electrical resistance. For example, features such as burned areas, filled ditches, or palisades and palisade trenches have a different soil composition from the surrounding soils and often contain more organic material particularly from rotting or burned posts. These features retain more moisture making them more conductive and therefore, less resistant to electrical current (McBride et al. 2011: 99).

Case study – the current state of conflict archaeology in Wales

In 2009 Cadw undertook a pilot project to document Welsh Battlefields for future study, including archaeological excavation. Border Archaeology was commissioned to conduct a preliminary site assessment of several battlefield sites including the 1157 Battle of Coleshill. The objectives of this assessment were: to examine primary and secondary documentary sources, collate information of each site and the historic terrain and to produce an assessment of the historical significance of each site. (Border Archaeology 2009: 4) A report was provided in November 2009 for the work undertaken that ranked sites for archaeological feasibility, in terms of the potential for the recovery of battlefield related military material culture. Coleshill was not favoured by the report’s authors for further archaeological inquiry, in part because of the uncertainty surrounding the actual location of the battlefield and the sites associated with
the battlefield. They also concluded that the ‘potential for the survival of buried archaeological remains relating to the battlefield in this particular area appears to be limited’, given the intensive development that has occurred on the Coleshill Battlefield (ibid: 63). The authors of this study were relying on the 1960 Ordnance Survey Map location of the battle, which the research presented in this thesis, will show to be inaccurate. Unfortunately, the authors, who used traditional archaeological survey methods, may have arrived at a different conclusion if they had applied a conflict archaeology methodology, such as the one presented in this chapter.

Similar to the 2009 pilot project, a preliminary archaeological survey of historic Welsh battlefields was undertaken by Cadw between 2012 and 2014, to establish their viability for nomination to a proposed ‘Historic Register of Welsh Battlefields’ (Cadw 2011). Again, due to the absence of conflict archaeology methods, the majority of these sites were consequently determined inappropriate for listing on a register, as they were thought not to have significant potential to yield portable military material culture. Regrettably, the plan to instate a Welsh battlefield register was cancelled in the Spring of 2015 (Cadw personal communication; April 2015).

Conclusion
The research presented in this study seeks to address the inadequacies in current archaeological surveys of medieval battlefields and provide a way forward for the study of Welsh battlefields. This is accomplished by the adoption of the holistic conflict archaeology methodology outlined in this chapter, embracing what is essentially a landscape archaeology approach to conflict. The consistent application of this methodology to medieval Welsh conflicts results in a gross and dynamic pattern battlefield analysis (presented in Chapters 6-10), that uses the conflict landscape as an artefact for the contextualization and reconstruction of medieval Welsh conflicts.
‘It is a truth universally acknowledged that warfare was central to medieval society. The power and authority of kings rested largely on their ability to wage war successfully […] Yet exactly what medieval warfare was can be difficult to define’ (Nicholson 2004: 1).

Introduction

Welsh warfare, and to some extent Anglo-Norman warfare, have generally been studied in isolation of a larger medieval European context, leading to many misconceptions about the reality of warfare in these cultures. This chapter addresses these misconceptions through the reassessment of earlier research to provide a holistic and realistic portrait of medieval warfare, as it pertained to twelfth-century Welsh and Anglo-Norman conflicts. Understanding Welsh and Anglo-Norman military tactics and technology as well as the culture of warfare is vital in order to contextualize individual conflict events and actions within the wider conflict landscape. For the past century historians have published countless volumes contrasting the differences between the Welsh and the
Anglo-Normans, most notably highlighting political, military and ecclesiastical variations (Lloyd 1912; King 1965; Edwards 1967; Dodd 1979; Turvey 2012; Kenyon 1996). What are less common are discussions that also include the similarities between the Welsh and the Anglo-Normans, and contextualize both cultures in a wider Western European milieu, particularly in regards to warfare (Latimer 1989; Davies 1990; Davies 2004; Moore 2007).

This chapter is divided into the following sections: an overview of Welsh and Anglo-Norman warfare and military tactics in their wider social context; a discussion of military culture regarding underlying political and military ethos; and an overview of twelfth-century military technology and military material culture. This chapter does not consider the technological capabilities of the weapon types discussed, as this is beyond the scope of this research. However, future work, including battlefield excavation, would include an analysis of these capabilities in order to enhance the dynamic-pattern analysis (reviewed in Chapter Two), in which battlefield behaviours of individuals could be sequenced. Finally, by way of a conclusion, is the presentation of a theoretical framework for conflict archaeology as a means to synthesize the social aspects of warfare, particularly the effects of conflict on social structural change defined within a wider conflict archaeology and sociology of warfare milieu.

**Western European Warfare, Myth and Reality**

The mid-twelfth-century campaigns of Henry II against the Welsh have not been considered within the wider context of medieval warfare. Past and present, historians have often dismissed Welsh military tactics and technology as tribal and primitive, in reference to their preference for raiding and guerrilla style warfare (Davies 2004: 2-3; Kenyon 1996: 126). This conception was in no small part propagated by Gerald of Wales’ depiction of the Welshman as a ‘noble savage.’ For example, he states that soldiers went barefoot (see Figure 5 above) and that they did not employ a code of chivalry, which has led more often than not to the idea of Welshmen as barbarians (*Description* Book I Ch. 8: 234; *Expugnatio Hibernica* in Verbruggen 1997: 204; Davies 2004: 4; Suppe 1994: 209). In comparison, their Anglo-Norman opponents are often portrayed...
as being on the cutting-edge of European military tactics and weapons technology (Nelson 1966: 12, 115). At the forefront of this mistaken superiority was the Anglo-Normans’ supposed preference for the deployment of infantry and cavalry in formal battle array in set battles. While it must be conceded that the Welsh had a penchant for raids and ambushes, and that the Anglo-Normans did on occasion give their opponents formal battle, these tactical preferences are nonetheless over-simplified and incorrect. This misunderstanding of Welsh and Anglo-Norman warfare in the mid-twelfth-century results from the static approach through which these conflicts have been studied and explained. The lack of a holistic approach is something that conflict archaeology seeks to address. As has been iterated in the preceding Methodology chapter, conflict or battlefield archaeology embraces a multi-disciplinary approach that most commonly includes the fields of archaeology, history and military history. Depending on the conflict often cultural anthropology (including ethnography), forensics and osteology are included. Unfortunately, such innovative multi-disciplinary approaches are often absent from history and military history. The inability to embrace this cross-disciplinary approach will frustrate and stunt the growth and ability of conflict studies. Foard has addressed this problem in British conflict studies stating that: ‘the effective integration of the techniques of different disciplines is essential to battlefield studies, not just in the reconstruction of the historic terrain but in all its other aspects. This remains the most important challenge for the current development of battlefield studies in the U.K.’ (Foard 2009:138).

In his study, *Welsh Military Institutions*, S. Davies highlights that ‘Perceptions of the differences between Welsh (and also Irish and Scottish) warfare and the practice of war in other parts of Europe, notably England and France, have been exaggerated, as has the impact of technological changes’ (2004: 85). There exist several common misconceptions about Anglo-Norman and Welsh warfare, and more widely, medieval western European warfare practices. These include: the preference for pitched battle, the superiority of the cavalry, and that battles were necessary to win a war. Historians such as F. Suppe (1994), D.J.C. King (1965), J.E. Lloyd (1912), J.R. Kenyon (1996), Gerald of Wales and others have stated that the Welsh tended to avoid pitched battle whenever possible, insinuating that the Anglo-Normans preferred method
of warfare was the large-scale pitched battle. The reality was quite the opposite, in medieval Europe the most common forms of war were the raid and the siege (Gillingham 1999: 67-8). This is what the military historian Contamine refers to as the guerre guerroyante, essentially a warfare strategy dominated by raids, pillaging, ambushes and sieges (1984: 219). This is not to say that pitched battle did not have an important role to play, but it was not the norm. The noted military historian Verbruggen states that aside from where battles were forced, in connection with a siege, or in the case of the 1157 and 1165 campaigns, by an ambush, ‘battles were fought only when both sides wanted to, and thought they had a chance of winning. Most campaigns took place without any battles at all…’ (1997: 329). Indeed it is now widely accepted by the medieval military history community that the ‘principal strategy of medieval commanders was to lay waste to the countryside’ (Palmer 1998: 256; Strickland 1996). In a British context this can be easily evidenced in the more than 2,000 wasted manors and the 1,000 square miles of ‘ruined’ countryside as recorded in Domesday Book (Palmer 1998: 257), a large proportion of this waste was located in the Welsh Marches. However, it should be noted that wastes as recorded in Domesday were not always the result of military devastation; waste could also mean uninhabited or uncultivated areas, regions with minimal population and limited resources, or areas that did not contribute taxes (Palliser 1993). The military tactics of raids and pillaging used by the Anglo-Normans is further evidenced by Strickland in the pervasive looting of churches by soldiers, including knights, which is surprising given the code of chivalry they were thought to have upheld (1996: 81-3). The Brutus and Gerald of Wales document that the Anglo-Norman army of Henry II pillaged churches in both the 1157 and 1165 campaigns in north Wales.
Cavalry

The mountainous and by turns marshy landscape of Wales made the use of the Anglo-Norman cavalry impractical. Brown claims that the cavalry initially had the most success in coastal lowlands of Northeast Wales (2004: 101). However, this seems rather implausible given the swampy nature of these lowlands which are riddled with deep and narrow ravines. Gerald of Wales in the Journey Through Wales writes that he was uneasy when passing through this region of Wales on horse because of the marshy nature of the terrain which was fraught with quicksands (Journey Book II Ch. 10: 196). Many military historians overlook the fact that the Welsh were also skilled at fighting from horseback, and under the right circumstances engaged in mounted battle, although they preferred to dismount to fight. This tradition evolved in Wales independent of the Normans and was present before the conquest (Davies 2004: 145-176). Some military historians also mistakenly assume that ‘it was...
from the English and Normans that the Welsh learnt the use of arms and how to fight on horse’ (Kenyon 1996: 126). Despite the presence of mounted warriors on both sides, cavalry was generally absent from post-conquest Welsh campaigns. It could be argued that the impracticality of the cavalry in Wales led the Anglo-Normans to increasingly put more stock in the infantry, which had always comprised the majority of Welsh forces (Davies 2004: 177).

**The Rise of the Infantry**

Although cavalry could be deployed with devastating effects at engagements such as the Battle of Hastings, the infantry also had an equally if not more important role to play in Norman armies (Bennet 1998: 311). In fact some, including Bennet, Strickland and Hardy (2011), argue that it was the strategic use of missile weapons in certain contexts, such as the crossbow at Hastings (a weapon which seemingly was not prevalent in Britain prior to the Norman Conquest) that had the ultimate ability to determine campaign success (Bennet 1998: 316, Strickland and Hardy 2011: 67). As Bennet states: the ‘cavalry, no matter how well-equipped or motivated, could make no impression upon foot soldiers who kept their formation...without missile men to break it up, enabling the horsemen to force their way into the breaches’ (Bennet 1998: 311 and 316).

According to Strickland and Hardy in *The Great War Bow* (2011), the Norman army of the eleventh-century adhered to the earlier Frankish custom of mounted warriors, whereas the Anglo-Scandinavians traditionally fought on foot. Despite their victory at Hastings the Normans suffered heavy losses, largely due to the difficulty in breaking the Anglo-Saxon infantry lines using the Norman cavalry.

The aftermath of this was the steady increase in the use of archers by the Anglo-Norman military; such archers were ubiquitous by the time of the Stephen I (c. 1135), particularly after they were used to great effect in the Battle of the Standard (1138). Additionally mounted knights began to embrace the tactic of dismounting for battle (Strickland and Hardy 2011: 70-73).

The reign of Henry II saw an increased emphasis on the importance and use of the infantry (Morillo 1994: 181), no small part of which was due to the proliferation of siege warfare, in which infantry played an integral role. The manpower limits of the knightly feudal classes meant that commanders had to
increasingly turn to mercenaries (Mallet 1999: 213; Beeler 1966: see Chapter Ten). A large part of Henry II’s army for the 1165 Berwyn Mountain campaign was comprised of mercenaries both from the British Isles and the Continent. It can also be argued that Henry II came to embrace the importance of the infantry from his military experiences in Wales, particularly the use of lightly armoured infantry which allowed for increased agility in the difficult Welsh terrain (Moore 2007: 76). In doing so the Anglo-Normans were adapting their tactics to more successfully engage in a Welsh theatre of war.

Battle Seeking, battle avoiding and the Vegetian art of war
Perhaps the most surprising feature of medieval warfare was that large-scale pitched battles were the exception not the norm (Contamine 1984: 219). Their prevalence in texts is the product of a cultural fascination, past and present, with this type of engagement, which seemingly attracts more attention than the small scale raids and sieges that defined so much of medieval warfare. Undoubtedly, this is why campaigns such as the ones included in this research, have so far failed to capture the imagination of scholars and the public alike. To be fair, the lack of detailed accounts from battle absent campaigns in medieval literature does make reconstructing an accurate historical narrative of these events challenging for modern historians. A challenge that this research shows can be surmounted by the precise application of a conflict archaeology methodology.

Although most modern military historians now agree that pitched battles were rare in the Middle Ages, their theories differ as to why. To this there are two main schools of thought: the Vegetian and the Non-Vegetian models. De Re Militari (Concerning Military Matters) was a Roman treatise on the art of warfare written by Vegetius in the fourth century A.D. One of the most copied texts of the Middle Ages, it was still being taught in military academies through the nineteenth century (Rogers 2002: 2). According to Rogers in his article ‘The Vegetian ‘Science of Warfare’ in the Middle Ages’, Vegetius states that battle was an enterprise fraught with risk, many of which could be considered unnecessary as ‘more certain victories could be won by attacking an enemy’s logistics’ (2-3). The implication here is that Vegetian strategy favoured pillaging,
raiding and sieges as the preferred warfare tactics (Morillo 2002: 24). According to Gillingham, pitched battles when fought were often decisive, particularly in frontier zones (1999: 70); however, campaigns that took place in frontiers, such as the Marches of Wales, Scotland and Saxony were relatively battle free (Verbruggen 1997: 329). Gillingham and Strickland theorise that medieval commanders, including Henry II, trained in the Vegetian art of warfare, avoided battle as ‘victories provided only limited gains, [whereas] battlefield defeats could be utterly disastrous’ (Rogers 2002: 5).

Rogers disagrees with this paradigm and instead suggests that the reason there were comparatively few battles in the Middle Ages was not because commanders were afraid of them, but because the circumstances of medieval warfare required both sides to ascent to battle in order for an engagement to take place. The ability to successfully avoid large-scale pitched battles continued until the gunpowder revolution (late sixteenth/early seventeenth centuries), when the advent of firearm technology no longer required both factions to ‘agree’ to battle for battle to occur. Prior to this if only one side sought battle, then a battle usually would not take place. Often where a defender had sufficient defences whether built or natural they could successfully avoid battle and be victorious. This was a particularly effective tactic in conflicts that centred on disputed control of territory, which accounts for the majority of Anglo-Norman and Welsh armed conflict in the twelfth century. Additionally, the lack of battle did not determine campaign or commander success, Henry II ‘never fought a single general action [(meaning great battle)] in his long reign, though he was described by the contemporary poet Jordan Fantosme as the greatest conqueror since Charlemagne’ (Rogers 2002: 2). The actions fought during the Battle of Coleshill and the Battle of Crogen are clearly being dismissed as minor engagements, if anything it should instead be suggested that the only battles that Henry fought in, during his entire military career were during the 1157 and 1165 campaigns (Hosler 2004: 62). To this point Rogers fails to note that an ambush could force battle and did not require both factions to ‘agree’ to a battle.

Morillo challenges the assumption that all medieval warfare was Vegetian. He points out that Vegetian strategy is a socially and culturally constructed system, and therefore only functions in societies that meet the pre-
requisites for which Vegetian strategy was fashioned – namely, a system of built defences such as forts or castles and a sedentary agricultural society (2002: 23-29): Wales it could be argued, prior to the construction of native Welsh built castles (the first documented instance of which was in c. 1116 with Cymer Castle in Merioneth (Kenyon 2009: 26)), lacked the necessary built strongholds from which to successfully defend its territory. The traditional Welsh administrative centres, the llysoedd in use during the early medieval and medieval periods, were only lightly defended. Llysoedd were elite settlements surrounded by a wooden palisade often built on top of a low earthen or stone embankment (Johnstone and Riley 1995; Earwood and Townsend n.d.). Sometimes these were built within earlier Iron Age hillforts or Roman forts, in these instances the defences of the earlier fortifications were modified to allow for a smaller enclosure (Earwood and Townsend n.d.). A more detailed discussion on the llys is included in the Study Area chapter (see page 139).

Morillo defines non-Vegetian strategy as armed conflict where the objective is not directly about control of territory; instead it is about ‘prestige, hierarchy, or elimination of rivals. Indirectly, such norms and rules could make possession of territory contingent not upon occupation protected by fortification but upon legal or moral title conferred by some central authority’ (2002: 31). Vegetian strategy had no role to play in polities such as medieval Gwynedd, that had established rules and laws that governed armed conflict (Morillo 2002: 31). Additionally, Vegetian strategy requires a sedentary political elite that did not have the option of fleeing or seeking refuge from an invading force, Wales had no such geopolitical context in the mid-twelfth century, and the seeking of refuge in the mountains of Snowdonia was a common practice in both pre and post-conquest Gwynedd. When threatened they would gather their herds and valuables and shelter in the mountains (Verbruggen 1997: 117; Davies 2004). Clarification is needed regarding fleeing or seeking refuge as non-Vegetian and using natural defenses to avoid battle, a Vegetian tactic. The difference is that fleeing and seeking refuge did not prevent an enemy advance whereas natural defenses could be used to stop an enemy incursion. This non-Vegetian tactic initially proved effective in defying Anglo-Norman conquest attempts, as in order to subdue or conquer a population, that population must first be present. The Anglo-Normans compensated by building castles to stake a territorial claim,
something the Welsh were quick to adopt. It can be argued that the establishment of the castle and in turn the onset of siege warfare forced the Welsh into adopting a more Vegetian style of waging war. The non-Vegetian tactic of retreating to a place of refuge had proved an effective tactic against rival Welsh principalities, as they waged war with the same cultural and social principles. By establishing castles, no matter how impermanent the actual structure might be, the Welsh had to adapt their philosophical and applied tactics to counter the Anglo-Norman aggression.

By the mid-twelfth-century castle building had become a prolific enterprise in the Marches of Wales. Apart from a few notable excavations, including Hen Domen in Montgomeryshire (Higham and Barker 2000) and Rhuddlan in Denbighshire (Quinnell et al. 1994), many of these early earth and timber castles are still poorly understood. Undoubtedly some of these castles, like Hen Domen, were prominent and permanent administrative and defensive centres, while others may have served a more impermanent function, constructed as campaign works and in use for only a short period of time (Higham and Barker 1992: 349). Further archaeological investigation and excavation is needed to determine the design and function of the marcher constructions extant during the 1157 and 1165 campaigns. It has been argued that castles in Wales did not have the ability to control the conflict landscape in totality until the construction of the large masonry castles by Edward I in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries (Spurgeon 1991: 175). Lieberman’s assertion was that earth and timber castles were temporary constructions, either to be abandoned or improved depending on the success of conquest (Lieberman 2010: 138). In other words castles were used to stake a territorial claim on a contested landscape; these claims were not permanent and often fluctuated between opponents. Only after a frontier-zone became more secure could a castle be capable of adopting more traditional roles with any permanence. Given Lieberman’s premise of impermanence, for at least some of the pre-Edwardian marcher castles, it could be argued that warfare waged by early marcher lords (essentially before the construction of masonry castles) was non-Vegetian to an extent. However, as the campaigns included in this research are royal not marcher, this concept will have to be a topic for future research. What is certain, as stated above, is that the arrival of the castle
caused the Welsh to adopt a more Vegetian style of warfare. Both the 1157 and 1165 campaigns embraced Vegetian principles.

Military Culture

Much of Welsh culture and their social-political organisation remains an enigma, particularly when compared to the relative detail with which we have come to understand the Anglo-Saxon, Norman and Anglo-Norman societies. As has been discussed in the literature review, often what little scholarly research there is of pre-Norman and Norman Wales has been distorted by a modern Anglo-Norman bias. Some scholars such as Bezant have sought to rectify this bias and ‘reject the limiting 'celto-nostalgic' narrative that [has] driven Wales for so long and to introduce a sophisticated medieval landscape that paralleled the trajectory of the rest of medieval Europe’ (Bezant 2009: 8). Most of what we know, particularly of the pre-Norman era, is drawn from few surviving ecclesiastical and administrative doctrines as well as from Welsh poetry. W. Davies has contributed extensively to our understanding of early medieval and medieval Welsh social systems by meticulously analysing all relevant medieval texts, particularly the Liber Landavensis which records transactions carried out in South Wales between the sixth and eleventh centuries (1978: 2-6). However, she recognizes that there are innate discrepancies and corruptions in these texts and stresses the value of archaeology in furthering our understanding of medieval Wales (1990: 4). Davies is one of the few historians who have sought to understand Welsh social systems within their own geo-political context, outside of the Anglo-Norman world. It is important to view medieval Wales not as a kingdom torn apart by war into smaller principalities, but as a collection of independent principalities that were sometimes united by war. In other words the concept of an undivided territorial Wales is modern and it should not be applied in a medieval context. For example, many scholars seem to share Turvey’s outlook that:
The rulers of these various kingdoms were selfishly engaged in their own, almost endless political and military competition. Rulers and kingdoms vied with each other for supremacy, pursuing objectives that were, for the most part, instinctual. Arguably, it is not until the thirteenth century that there developed any real sense of a ‘Wales’, a Cymric nation of linguistically and culturally like-minded people who shared a common heritage (2002:3).

Additionally, Gillingham claims that the Welsh and the Irish lost territory to the Normans because they were politically disunited and because the Anglo-Normans could out-produce them in weapons because of their iron industry (1999: 84). Turvey’s and Gillingham’s theory that the eventual Welsh downfall was caused by inter-Welsh disunity is in some respects a self-fulfilling prophecy that provides a convenient and simple explanation of the subjugation of the Celtic population at the hands of the Anglo-Normans. One can pontificate endlessly on the virtues of unification, yet as this is solely hypothetical researchers should turn their attention to treating each individual principality or kingdom independently.

W. Davies asserts that for the Welsh the sphere of rule or gwlad was an abstract concept which was not determined by set territorial boundaries or groups of people; rather it was ‘the changeable, expandable, contractible sphere of any ruler's power’ (Davies 1990: 17), an ideology that supports non-Platonic warfare in a pre-Norman context. This variability was intensified by the absence of primogeniture in Wales. This often meant that the death of a Welsh prince would lead to a period of political turmoil, hallmarked by the intense fighting between brothers. ‘Consequently, the twin elements of territorial fluidity and political fragility predominated, so that political unity was invariable, transient and ephemeral, achieved by military might alone’ (Turvey 2002: 3). This explains the constant inter-Welsh warfare both within the same political dynasties and between opposing Welsh kingdoms, which more often than not had blood ties and therefore, an ancestral claim (Turvey 2002: 30).

Wales lacked sovereignty, apart from a few exceptions including the reigns of Gruffudd ap Llywelyn (d. 1063) and Llywelyn ap Gruffudd (d. 1282) both of whom successfully united and governed Wales. Even the relative political security of prosperous principalities such as Gwynedd and Deheubarth could not necessarily be defined as sovereign entities, as the Welsh concept of
political power was fluid, leading to the wider distribution of this type of power (Davies 1990: 23). Warren summarizes Welsh government succinctly stating that the Welsh principalities had no centralized government because their social systems did not require it, political security was instead derived from social institutions and tribal and kin-based relationships which allowed Welsh leaders to engage in political *laissez-faire* (Warren 1973: 151-2). Interestingly, it was not until the early twelfth century that the *cyfran*, the custom of partible inheritance, which had traditionally been applied to lordship, was applied to land (Jones 1961: 128-9). This adaptation may have been a direct result of the Anglo-Norman conquest which forced the Welsh to embrace an Anglo-Norman ideology of land ownership.

A pointed contrast between Welsh and Anglo-Norman military culture was in how each perceived terms of peace, homage and fealty. While the Welsh embraced a system of clientship, they did not have an institution of vassalage (Davies 1990: 23). Clientship in Wales was based on a relationship of mutual support, however, client relationships were not permanent and arrangements were often 'short-termed and flexible.' Perhaps most important for the context of this research, was that client relationships were not territorialized and clients retained 'freedom of action, presumably some legal capacity, and clearly some independent military power, clientship, then, was largely to do with the patterns of mutual support among a military aristocracy' (Davies 1990: 22-24). This explains why Owain and other Welsh princes willingly agreed to do homage to Henry II at the 1163 Council of Woodstock and also why they did not hesitate to dismiss the arrangement in 1165 (Moore 2007: 77).

The composition of Welsh and Anglo-Norman forces were very similar. For the Welsh this was comprised of the *teulu* and the *llu*. The *teulu* were the household troops, a group of warrior elite that in times of conflict or battle would lead the *llu*, who were the general fighting forces made up of the lay population who were required to serve in the army when called upon, not dissimilar from the Anglo-Saxon *fyrd* (Davies 2004). Similarly, the Anglo-Norman kings had their *familia*, their household military comprised of knights. The *familia* was important to the Anglo-Norman military system as it gave a 'professional disciplined core to their armies' (Davies 2004: 15; Morillo 1994: 184),
particularly in instances when levies were raised and mercenaries were recruited. Carr has argued that the Welsh *llu* evolved in response to the Anglo-Norman threat for which a force larger than the *teulu* was needed to counter Anglo-Norman invasions. However, as Davies points out Carr’s claim is unsubstantiated, and although there is little known about the use of the *llu* in a pre-Norman context the conclusion should not necessarily be made that it developed as a consequence of the Conquest (see Davies 2004: 52). As has already been stated, Henry II came to realise the importance of the infantry, possibly as a product of his campaigns in Wales. The increased importance of the infantry to the Anglo-Normans paralleled the increased reliance on mercenaries to supplement army size. The Welsh were also known to have used mercenaries; Gruffudd ap Cynan largely relied on a mercenary Irish army when campaigning to reclaim Gwynedd (*LGC*). Mercenaries were therefore probably included within the *llu*. The Welsh *llu* is traditionally believed to have been comprised of freemen supported by bondmen who were obliged to provide supplies such as packhorses and food, although it is also possible that the bondmen did take part in the fighting, even though the Welsh law stipulated that they were only to serve on military campaigns in a support capacity (Davies 2004: 74). The prevalence and persistence of the Welsh and Anglo-Norman conflicts may have provided the appropriate environment for bondmen to gain status within Welsh society due to their military role.

**Arms and Armour Technology**

In an effort to provide material culture contextualization for the events of conflict considered by this research the following is an overview of the types of arms, armour and other military related equipment that was prevalent in the mid-twelfth century. Unfortunately, there is little in the way of datable artifactual evidence surviving from this period. The examples that do exist are generally either lacking provenience or are ceremonial examples from the nobility on display at institutions such as the Tower of London or the Royal Armouries in Leeds. Although these are fine specimens they are of little use in providing a comparable collection of the types of arms and equipment the common soldier
used, and thereby the type of portable military material culture that could be excavated from battle sites.

Figure 7: example of other twelfth-century arms and accoutrements, all objects are from the Portable Antiquities Scheme's online database http://finds.org.uk/database, clockwise from upper left:
- Copper alloy sword scabbard chape, unique ID LVPL – 95A9D6 from Mollington, Cheshire.
- Copper alloy dagger hilt/guard, unique ID LVPL-2A8C62 from Old Colwyn, Conwy.
- Cast copper alloy flail, unique ID LVPL-8F1BE0, found in Flintshire, shape and decoration similar to those found in Denmark and the Baltic.
- Iron axe head, unique ID CPAT-21C020 found near Ellesmere, Wrexham. Not military in its manufacture it could have been used as a weapon by untrained soldiers, men who were levied to serve in the army. (This image has been removed by the author of this thesis for copyright reasons).

Weapons from this period fall into two broad categories: hand-held and missile. Hand-held weapons, quite simply weapons which are used at close quarters or on occasion could be thrown (daggers, spears) broadly include: swords, daggers, spears, maces, flails and axes (see Figure 7 above; Oakeshott 1960). Missile weapons include bow and arrow technology as well as siege weapons such as traction trebuchets and ballista; these are not included here as none of the campaigns considered in this research included sieges. The types of projectile weapons technology in use during the mid-twelfth century includes: crossbows, long-bows, common bows and throwing spears or javelins. Many of these weapons could also have had other utilities and are likely to have been used by the men who were levied into the armies, particularly in instances when soldiers lacked training or where weapon supply
was scare. For instance a wood-cutter may use his axe, a swine-heard his spear, a hunter his bow. Interestingly bows proved such deadly weapons, particularly due to their ability to pierce armour, that they were banned by the 1139 Lateran Council (a papal decree), although few if any took heed of this ban (Gillingham 1999: 72). As has been discussed in the previous section, bow weapons were of particular importance in any Anglo-Norman army. Therefore, it is extremely likely that Henry II’s forces in the Welsh campaigns contained a section of bowmen. While the Anglo-Normans could have used any of these weapons the Welsh selection seems somewhat more limited. The Welsh laws list three groups of weaponry suitable for war: the sword and knife, the spear and shield and the bow and arrow (Suppe 1994: 6). Gerald of Wales also documents regional variations, stating that the men of Gwent preferred the bow and arrow while the North Welsh favoured the spear. This should not be read as the south only used the bow while the north only used the spear, merely that these were preferences within a more diverse weapons assemblage (Strickland and Hardy 2011: 40-44). Gerald describes the spears used by the North Welsh as follows:

They use very long spears in this area. Just as the bow is the chief weapon in South Wales, so here in Gwynedd they prefer the spear. A cuirass of chain-mail offers no resistance to one of these lances when it is thrown a short distance as a javelin (Journey Book II Ch. 6: 182).

Interestingly the soldier on the right of the illustration shown in Figure 5 of the Welsh soldiers from the Littere Wallie seems to be holding a sax. The sax was a popular weapon in use from the Iron Age through the Viking period, the scramasax used by the Anglo-Saxons and the Franks was similar to the sax in that only one side had an edge, but it was shorter in length, similar to a knife (Oakeshott 1960: 148). Admittedly there are not a plethora of examples for Welsh medieval weaponry, yet manuscripts make no reference to the sax as a weapon used by the Welsh. Its depiction in the Littere Wallie is all the more intriguing considering that it dates from c. 1282-1292, it is possible that the illustrator, most likely not Welsh, was attempted to demean the military capabilities of the Welsh, particularly given that the Wales fell to Edward I in 1282, following the death of Llywelyn ap Gruffudd.
The sword of the eleventh and twelfth centuries was a cutting not a
thrusting weapon and would not have been able to pierce chainmail, the armour
of the period, by thrusting (Stickland 1996: 170). Instead, weaknesses would
have been looked for at the neckline and other places not protected by armour.
Only the military elite would have been able to afford mail, the manufacture of
which was extremely expensive and time consuming (Martin 1968: 27).
Chainmail from this period most regularly consisted of a knee length mail shirt
(see Figure 9 below), in rare cases this assemble was sometimes enhanced by
mail leggings and mittens. S. Davies claims that in Wales chainmail was only
worn by an elite few, padded leather coats were the most prevalent type of
armour (Davies 2004: 145). This was probably true of the Anglo-Norman
soldiers as well, although even this type of armour could be costly, particularly
for the poor levied to serve in the army. This probably meant that with the
exception of the familia and the teulu the majority of the army, except perhaps
for mercenaries, had little or no armour.
A problem of identification and conservation:

In 1996, Jessop published an updated medieval arrowhead typology, this typology addressed deficiencies in Perkins’ entries on arrowheads in the Museum of London’s medieval catalogue. Perkin’s catalogue, published in 1940 was the only reference for arrowheads prior to Jessop. By his own admission, Perkins conceded that some of the arrowhead types included in his catalogue may not be medieval in date, this is due to the poor provenience of archaeological finds from the early twentieth century ( Jessop 1996: 192) Jessop’s typology draws upon more recent archaeological evidence, and includes more typological divisions based on functionality. An improvement on the Museum of London’s catalogue, Jessop’s typology is still limited by a lack of datable archaeology evidence. This typology would benefit from the collection of additional samples with secure provenience. The absence of material results from a preservation and conservation issue that is addressed below. Figure ten below displays all of the known arrowhead categories that could have been used in the twelfth century. In some instances different types had a long lifespan of use, sometimes spanning four centuries. Others, such as MP 6, which had a military only purpose, were used more specifically in the mid-twelfth century.
Figure 10: Twelfth-century arrowhead types after Jessop 'Fig. 1 The new arrowhead typology' (1996: 194, this image has been removed by the author of this thesis for copyright reasons).

Oakshott in *The Archaeology of Weapons* (1960), states that there is a problem of finding swords with datable contexts. Additionally, medieval sword typologies are difficult in themselves. The absence of a datable typology is evident in objects listed by the Portable Antiquities Scheme, often dated within a 400 year range. A rendering of a mid-twelfth-century sword, a late twelfth-century sword associated with the Battle of Fornham (1171) and a twelfth-century sword from Denmark can be seen above in Figure 8. The twelfth to fourteenth century saw a huge variation of detail, yet most of these different types were in use over two centuries, making dating difficult. A solution to these challenges could be found in increased battlefield surveys, using the survey methods of battlefield archaeology as outlined in the Methodology chapter. Although as Halpin states, given the difficulty in dating, even swords found on the sites of documented battlefields cannot always be positively associated with the battle (1986: 185).
The absence of definitive typologies and archaeological examples is compounded by issues of poor in situ preservation. Most of the assemblage of medieval arms and armour are made from ferrous materials that are subject to severe corrosion causing them to be unrecognizable for what they are when excavated. This can lead to objects being discarded as ‘undistinguishable rust’, which is unfortunate, particularly since there are conservation methods that can overcome the poor preservation state of ferrous artefacts leading to positive identifications. Unfortunately these methods, including radiography, air abrasion and treatment in tannic phosphorus solutions, are time consuming, costly and often beyond the research capabilities for many archaeological units. As the majority of artefacts excavated from battlefields are metallic, often ferrous, any research excavations would need access to appropriate conservation facilities to identify potential battle related material culture.

**Battlefield Burials**

Apart from the archaeological significant discovery of the mass grave at Towton (from the War of the Roses, Battle of Towton1461) in 1996, there are few other confirmed examples of battle dead from medieval battles in Britain (Knüsel 2014: 264). The difficulty in locating mass graves from battlefields has been noted by Foard who has stated that even though ‘such graves are notoriously difficult to locate and, although they can provide dramatic evidence of the nature of the action, may be relatively limited in what they can tell about the distribution of the action’ (Foard 2009: 143). Military historian Burne, noted for popularizing the application of ‘inherent military probability’, has suggested that the main concentration of burials would be at the point where the main engagement began. However, the Towton mass grave was located more than a mile from the main engagement location (ibid). Interestingly, ‘archaeological investigation at Towton has shown that concentrations of medieval arrowheads can point to areas of body decomposition or burial’ (Sutherland and Richardson 2009: 170). In some cases mass graves have survived as earthworks, an example of this was visible at the 1138 battle at Northallerton prior to levelling cultivation in 1839. Another example is the mass grave (preserved as an earthen mound), from the 1361 Battle of Wisby in Sweden excavated in the early twentieth
The earthen mound appearance and the use of arrowheads in locating burials have important implications for locating the battle dead from the Battle of Coleshill and the Battle of Crogen. Both battle sites are associated with unidentified tumuli and place-name evidence at Crogen suggests that the mass grave was located on or near the site of the battle at *Adwry’r Beddau*, or the gap of the graves. Further discussion of these features can be found in the 1157 and 1165 Case Study chapters. Acknowledgment needs to be made here that the possibility of cremation following a battle was a possibility. During the Crusades ‘William of Malmesbury reported that the Crusaders heaped up the bodies of the Turks and ‘evaporated them by means of fire’ for the pragmatic reason that ‘putrefying the open air, they should pour contagion on the flagging atmosphere’ (Daniell 2005: 97). Given that both the 1157 and 1165 campaigns took place in summer, cremation may have been favoured for similar reasons, although this would have been out of sync with medieval Christian burial practices.

**Battlefield locations – evidence for a ritual conflict landscape**

The following is a brief discussion of the rational or ritual of battle location. Carman and Carman have suggested the existence of a ritualized landscape of warfare, and although evidence of this may be present for other cultures and regions, there is not a large enough body of evidence to draw any similar conclusions for the conflicts of medieval Wales (Carman and Carman 2006). Nonetheless, in the process of assembling a conflict chronology for medieval Wales, certain patterns begin to emerge (see the following Conflict Chronology chapter). Of particular note were the sheer amount of Welsh conflicts (both inter-Welsh, and Welsh and Anglo-Norman), that took place near rivers. In some instances this seems to be because rivers often coincided with territorial boundaries. In other cases sometimes a battle was fought near the location of an important ford or crossing, the possession of which controlled local mobility. Conversely rivers have also been shown to be a favoured location for medieval peace talks and other diplomatic negotiations (Dalton 2005: 13). Higham has also theorised on traditional battlefields, citing a location near Clyst Honiton, north of Exeter, that was used on multiple occasions as a medieval battleground.
Higham also references a standing stone cross that may have once been in evidence in the vicinity of the aforementioned battleground (ibid). This may have important implications for the Battles of Coleshill (1150 and 1157), which incidentally, were located near a standing stone cross, Atiscross (now vanished; CPAT, Flint, online resource).

A theoretical framework for conflict archaeology and the sociology of warfare

This chapter has demonstrated that warfare practices in twelfth-century Gwynedd and England were more similar than previously supposed; the reasons for these similarities have several theoretical implications. The following discussion of these theoretical implications, as they pertain to this chapter, serves to introduce the theoretical applications of conflict archaeology and to contextualize these applications within the military history aspects discussed above. A detailed discussion regarding the broader theoretical significances of this research, particularly once the data from the military terrain analysis has been synthesised, can be found in the conclusion section of the Military Terrain Analysis chapter.

Behaviourism is the predominant theoretical application for conflict archaeology; for this there are two modes of approach, these are seen in the agentic behaviours of the combatants, as individual and group agents on the battlefield, and through the social structural change of entire social systems resulting from warfare (Scott, Babits and Haecker 2009). These modes are cyclical in nature as one directly impacts the other. For example, the Welsh adopted the Vegetian style of warfare; this was in response to the pressures from the social phenomena of prolonged conflict with the Anglo-Normans, which effected social structural change on the Welsh social system of warfare. This in turn affected the individual and group behaviour in the battlefield. Conversely, the behaviour (actions / tactics) of Welsh soldiers in the battlefield, in terms of their preference for lightly armoured infantry (over cavalry) to compensate for the difficulties of their native terrain, led the Anglo-Normans to adopt similar tactics or behaviours so that they would not be out-maneuvered by the Welsh in combat. This led to the pronounced importance of the infantry in Anglo-Norman
military organisation. Indicators of these behavioural adaptations can be discerned by the application of the conflict archaeology methods outlined in the previous chapter, particularly via gross and dynamic-pattern analyses. Additionally, these sociological implications can be contextualized though the study of emergent and variant social patterns (such as those discussed above) present in societies involved in conflict events. In the past conflict archaeology has not been a prerequisite for this type of study; however, its inclusion in such analyses has the potential to yield a more comprehensive interpretation.

Theoretical applications for conflict archaeology an overview

Conflict archaeology is predominantly a methodology driven subject still in its infancy and the establishment of a theoretical framework is currently an ongoing formative process. In the past, many battlefield archaeology publications tended to focus on the description, not the explanation of battlefield events. (Scott, Babits and Haecker 2009:1). This is changing as battlefield archaeologists strive to move beyond the static reconstruction of battlefield events to explain the battlefield behaviour of the combatants. In the edited volumes of Fields of Conflict, Battlefield Archaeology from the Roman Empire to the Korean War (2009) Scott, Babits and Haecker state that ‘battlefields are archaeological documents of past behaviour. Battlefield are no less an expression of behaviour, albeit a violent one, than are architectural elements’ (431). Carman and Carman (2006 and 2009) propose that these behaviours can be divined through the cultural conflict landscape, that by ‘gaining a feeling for the place as a place, and a focus on how one moves through it in a performance – one can perhaps gain a particular sense of what a particular historic battlefield represents in terms of experience and meaning.’ (2006: 25). Carman and Carman seek to achieve this via a phenomenological approach to landscape that compares multiple conflict landscapes in multiple time periods to identify underlying ritualistic patterns in battlefield selection. Their study, however, does not take into account the analysis of military terrain or other disciplinary components of conflict studies. Pollard and Banks critique the Carmans’ approach to conflict landscapes stating that, ‘it is in danger of presenting a somewhat normative view of these landscapes or at least the
battlefields they present’ (2007: viii). Landscapes of conflict are important battlefield artefacts that must be contextualized within other conflict study considerations, such as military history, underlying cultural ethos and military terrain analysis of the conflict landscape; only then can behaviour be determined. Additionally, warfare as ritual and warfare for secular (political) purposes are not mutually exclusive concepts (Arkush and Stanish 2005: 10). This extends to fortifications which can have symbolic potency as well as practical military uses (McGuire and Villalpando 2015: 432).

Different to conflict archaeology, warfare archaeology, which began gaining traction within the archaeology community in the 1990s, established a theoretical framework which evolved in part from the metaphysical considerations of the sociology of warfare, yet warfare archaeology is somewhat lacking method and is primarily concerned with warfare in prehistoric cultures (Gilchrist 2003: 1-2; Carman 2014: 38). The sociology of warfare is a complex subject and an in-depth discussion of the sociological implications of the ongoing conflict between the Welsh and Anglo-Normans is beyond the scope of this research. Its inclusion in the following discussion is considered insofar as it relates to potential for conflict archaeology to illuminate the evolution of social structures due to the consequences of conflict, a concept that will be explored further in the discussion and conclusion of the Military Terrain Analysis chapter and the Conclusion chapter. The introduction of this theoretical criterion has the capacity to further advance the study of conflict archaeology. ‘Warfare was a formative influence on the civilization and the social structures of the European middle ages’ (Keen 1999: preface), the ability of warfare to exact social structural change on a society has resounding ramifications for a theoretical framework for conflict archaeology and further contextualizes and lends pertinence to the subject.

Bossen states that warfare as a social practice has three primary aspects: first ‘it is always embedded in webs of meaning and interpretation’; second, it requires specialised knowledge and training such as tactics and weapons technology; and third, it requires organisation and strategy (2006: 91). As a process war can change social configurations, the military can expand into other networks of power, war may result in forceful integration and subjugation of conquered societies, and finally in societies where warfare is frequent, its
reoccurrence may foster social change (Bossen 2006: 96). ‘War is, in other words, a central ingredient to social reproduction and change... particularly when war is understood as a social phenomenon’ (Vankilde 2003: 127-128).

Given the topics covered in this chapter it can be argued that the Anglo-Norman and Welsh conflicts of the twelfth century had widespread ramifications not only on the societies as war (both directly and indirectly) but on the practice of warfare itself. These resulting social adaptations are reviewed below.

The social change experienced by the Anglo-Normans as a result of conflict with the Welsh is less pronounced, than those experienced by the Welsh, as there was no direct effect on the Anglo-Norman social ethos of systems outside the military. Within the military the most notable changes were in field tactics, predominantly with the increased importance of the infantry and the conversion to lightly armed troops to increase mobility in the difficult Welsh terrain. The growing reliance on the infantry and in turn mercenaries could be argued as leading to the decline of the dependence on the knight and knightly cavalry centred warfare. The rise of the infantry led to the proliferation of the professional soldier, archers in particular that were used to such a devastating effect in later conflicts such as the Hundred Years War (Keegan 1976). The rise of the professional soldier could be argued as the formation of a new social class.

**Conclusion**

For the Welsh, the adaptation to the Vegetian style of warfare is a marker of social change. Prior to the Anglo-Norman conquest, the Welsh embraced a non-Vegetian form of warfare, governed by its own rules and laws. The non-Vegetian style of Welsh warfare was a reflection of Welsh social systems in which the idea of governance, land ownership and territorial boundaries was fluid and changeable. In order to protect their territory against the Anglo-Norman insurgence, they had to adopt the Vegetian style of warfare which notably included the building of castles. The reconfiguration of their warfare practices led to a reconfiguration of other social systems as well, for example by building castles the Welsh were establishing secure bases that meant retreat into the mountains diminished as a relevant tactic. This led to the establishment
of a sedentary polity which undoubtedly had trickle down effects on Welsh society at large. The social flexibility of the Welsh to adopt new social norms and military tactics contributed to their overall campaign success and allowed them to preserve Welsh independence until the late thirteenth century. The matters discussed in this chapter have shown that despite their different cultural backgrounds the Welsh and Anglo-Norman engaged in warfare using similar strategies. These tactics will be discussed in further detail in the Military Terrain Analysis chapter.
Chapter Four – Welsh and Anglo-Norman Conflict Chronology, 1000-1272

Introduction

Written primary sources are vital to the archaeological documentation, interpretation and reconstruction of conflict events. In addition to contextualizing historical conflict, a thorough assessment of the historical records documenting these engagements is often the first step in identifying fields of conflict. Comprehension of historical manuscripts enables conflict archaeologists to reconstruct a spatial and temporal distribution of battlefield and other conflict events. A sequencing of these conflict actions can be achieved by compiling a timeline, or chronology, of conflict events based on historical accounts. ‘The quality of the historical data […] has a direct bearing on the specific questions that can be addressed and the extent to which the available archaeological record can be meaningfully and accurately interpreted’ (Geier et al. 2011: 83). The resulting historical conflict record chronology can then be used to develop and test hypotheses of individual and group actions and objectives which can then, in turn, be tested against the archaeological record (McBride et al. 2011: 79). This chronology will then be utilized to detect key events; patterns of resistance; evolution and interconnectivity of multiple events and adaptations in military tactics and technology. It is also possible to ascertain the veracity of historical accounts by comparing how the same events were recorded in different sources. The construction of a conflict chronology also provides a blueprint for interpreting political motivations and relationships, via a conflict or battlefield archaeology lens. An understanding of the events recorded within these historical documents is a crucial first step contributing to the accurate spatial and contextual representations and reconstructions of discrete conflict events on the landscape, and the archaeological potential therein.

What follows is a concise chronology of major inter-Welsh; Welsh and English; Welsh and Irish; and Welsh and Anglo-Norman conflicts in Wales and the marcher counties (Herefordshire, Shropshire and Cheshire) between 1000-1272. These dates were selected as they provide a contextualizing margin for the main research period of focus 1157-1165, encompassing the 1157 Coastal
Campaign and the 1165 Berwyn Mountain Campaign. A larger margin of consideration exists prior to these events, as it is necessary to understand both inter-Welsh conflict and Welsh conflict with other cultures, in addition to previous Welsh and Anglo-Norman conflict. The occurrence of underlying themes as evident within the manuscripts’ narratives – particularly in regard to military tactics, and patterns of power including socio-political and military-political organisation – are highlighted within the chronology.

Chronology Overview

For the purposes of this research conflict has been divided into two categories: major and minor. There is a degree of subjectivity present in the definitions of major and minor conflict. Major conflicts, such as the 1165 Battle of Crogen between the combined forces of North Wales and King Henry II, are defined as those for which the outcome significantly altered the status quo. Minor conflicts, such as the 1155 land dispute between Owain Gwynedd and Rhys ap Gruffudd of Deheubarth, are defined as those which exacerbated the current condition, but not irrevocably. Only major events will be considered within the chronology; minor events, particularly those which are not closely related to major events will not be included in the conflict chronology. Consideration is also given to events of un-armed conflict, unlike the archaeological distributions produced by armed engagements, the signature of un-armed conflict is difficult to trace in the archaeological record. Nonetheless, these conflicts – preserved in the historical record, generally in the form of correspondences and legal proceedings (such as the correspondence between Owain Gwynedd and King Louis VII) – contextualize the socio-political climate and highlight proceedings that escalated various situations to those of armed conflict.

Although this research is primarily concerned with the conflicts generated as a consequence of the Norman incursion into Wales, it is important to also consider pre-Norman Welsh conflict in order to contextualize how the Welsh responded to the Anglo-Norman Conquest and colonization, and in order to understand any adaptations in Welsh military tactics. Therefore, the year 1000 was arbitrarily selected as a starting date in an effort to understand the
development of both inter-Welsh conflict, and Welsh conflict with foreign forces. The chronology ends in 1272, with the onset of the Edwardian Conquest which resulted in the dissolution of Wales under native Welsh rule.

The Manuscripts

Despite the antiquity of the mid-twelfth-century campaigns considered in this research, there exists a plethora of contemporary written sources that provide detailed documentation for both the 1157 and 1165 campaign case studies and the broader historical conflict chronology spanning the years 1000-1272. There are two principal manuscripts that were consulted for the construction of the conflict chronology presented in this chapter: *The Brut y Tywysogyon* or ‘The Chronicle of Princes’ (Peniarth MS 20 version, edited and translated by T. Jones) and *The Life of Gruffudd ap Cynan* (edited and translated by P. Russell). Other valuable sources such as: *The Annales Cambriae*, *The Journey through Wales and the Description of Wales* and *The Chronicles of the Reigns of Stephen, Henry II and Richard I* (the William of Newburgh, Robert of Torigni and Gervase of Canterbury versions), among others, were referenced specifically for the 1157 and 1165 campaigns, these campaign specific chronologies are presented within the respective 1157 and 1165 Case Study Overview chapters (chapters six and eight).

There are four chronicles that span the time period of the conflict chronology; these are the *Annales Cambriae*, *The Brut y Tywysogyon* (abbreviated as *Brut*) which includes the *Peniarth MS 20*, the *Red Book of Hergest* and the *Brenhinedd y Saesson*. The *Annales Cambriae* and the two versions of the *Brut* were thought to have been compiled from a series of lost Latin manuscripts, originating from St David’s Monastery (Pembrokeshire; Remfry 2007). The *Peniarth MS 20* version of the *Brut* and the *Annales Cambriae* are the most complete and accurate of the four chronicles (Jones 1952). Their histories are for the most part congruent, thus only the documentations within the *Brut Peniarth MS 20* were used in this chronology. Any discrepancies between the other versions of the *Brut* and the *Annales Cambriae* are highlighted in the campaign specific chronologies, referenced above. The conflict events documented in *The Life of Gruffudd ap Cynan* are
also considered within the chronology as they provide detailed accounts of pre-Norman and early-Norman conflict specifically between Gwynedd and England during the reign of Gruffudd ap Cynan c. 1081-1137. In places modern literature has been consulted to provide further contextualization of key events included in the chronology. Similarly, the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle is referenced in events of pre-Conquest significance to add further depth to the chronology, but on the whole, English or Anglo-Saxon and Anglo-Norman chronicles were not used alongside the Welsh chronicles referenced in this chronology. Many of the English and early Anglo-Norman chronicles are inconsistent, incomplete or non-existent in their documentation of Welsh events, this is particularly true for events in which they were not directly involved. Documentation of early Conquest era conflict is poor and it is not until the reign of Henry II that the quality and quantity of documentation of Welsh and Anglo-Norman interaction improves.

Many of the manuscripts referenced above, particularly the Brut y Tywysogyon, have been summarized and paraphrased in a plethora of modern publications, perhaps the most popular being J.E. Lloyd’s seminal publication: A History of Wales from the Earliest Times to the Edwardian Conquest (1912). This source is regularly referenced by the heritage community, (particularly in Coflein, the heritage database of registered monuments for the Royal Commission of the Ancient and Historical Monuments of Wales), in lieu of the original manuscripts. Despite the scholarship that is present in such works, it is nonetheless vital to refer to the original documents in an effort to circumvent textual interpolation.

The Peniarth MS 20 version of the Brut spans the seventh (682) - fourteenth centuries (1332, the other versions terminate in 1282) and includes accounts of events whose detail is rarely matched in other contemporary sources. Yet it is not without issue. There are several different surviving Welsh and English translations of the original Latin source, which has been lost. Moreover, there are few modern English translations available for these manuscripts and most of these are problematic as the translator in many instances has heavily interpolated the original Welsh text. The translation by Jones (1952) is by far the most accurate as it is a verbatim translation of the text that cites the particular manuscript being translated. Unlike Jones, earlier
translations were often compiled as a composite ‘Brut’, which pulled from several different manuscripts while neglecting to cite the manuscript source in the English translation (Jones 1952: xxxi). These composite translations are also problematic as the dates cited are often incorrect, even in the Peniarth MS 20 the dates are sometimes unclear, as the Brut generally cites dates with a range of two to three years.

Figure 11: Page 166 from The Brut y Tywysogion Peniarth MS 20, image from the National Library of Wales. (This image has been removed by the author of this thesis for copyright reasons).

It is clear that The Brut y Tywysogion was compiled at a monastic institution in Wales, probably the Cistercian abbey of Strata Florida and ‘it is probable that he [the compiler] wrote the original Latin chronicle towards the end of the thirteenth century, possibly fairly soon after the year 1282’ (Jones 1952: xxxviii), which is the year that Llywelyn ap Gruffudd died and Wales fell to Edward I. The section of the Peniarth manuscript that extended to 1332 was a
later addition. The chronicler would have obtained his sources from the annals housed in the monastic libraries of Wales. It is possible to detect when the chronicler has shifted sources, as there are sections of the text where the style of narration shifts abruptly. For example, different sections of the manuscript hint at sympathies for different parties – Norman versus Welsh – or favouring Gwynedd over Powys at times and the reverse at others. For instance, at the conclusion of the 1157 battle of Tal y Moelfre on the Isle of Anglesey between the forces of Owain Gwynedd and Henry II, the Anglo-Normans, who lost, were documented as being cowardly in the Brut, ‘For on the following day there was a battle between them [the Anglo-Normans, recorded here as French] and the men of Anglesey; and the French, according to their usual custom, fled’ (Brut Pen. 20: 59-60). Conversely the account of the siege and battle of Painscastle is sympathetic to the Normans (Brut Pen. 20: 79-80). This shift in sentiment is significant to the research being pursued, as these sympathies represent possible biases in the representation of historic events. This is why the different sources detailing the 1157 and 1165 campaigns are meticulously compared.

*The Life of Gruffudd ap Cynan* is a narrative of the acts of the king (or prince) of Gwynedd Gruffudd ap Cynan (d. 1137), a key figure in the early Welsh resistance to the Anglo-Norman Conquest. This manuscript is the only surviving biography of a medieval Welsh prince, probably written by a cleric at the end of the twelfth century, originally a Latin text for which only the later Welsh and English translations survive (Parry n.d.: online resource). Consequently, caution should be exercised when consulting this text as it was written more than a century after Gruffudd’s death and because it has been translated multiple times from a lost original. This narrative does not list dates for specific events, making it necessary to infer a timeframe by comparing events that are also documented in other sources. Unlike *The Brut y Tywysogyon* which chronicles a medieval history of Wales in entirety, *The Life of Gruffudd ap Cynan* is concerned only with the events surrounding Gruffudd and consequently provides a very concise history of Gwynedd during Gruffudd’s life. As a result, the tone of the narrative remains constant throughout. Furthermore, the amount of detail in the events documented in *The Life of Gruffudd ap Cynan* (herein LGC) rivals those of *The Brut y Tywysogyon*, as such it is possible to both enhance the understanding of conflict events in
Gwynedd, while ascertaining the veracity of these events by comparing the two sources. For example the series of battles fought between Gruffudd ap Cynan and William Rufus, then later Henry I and the earls of Chester, provoked by the successful reclamation of Gwynedd by Gruffudd and his expansion into parts of Powys and Chester is documented in both the *Brut* and the *LGC*. However, these events when portrayed in the *LGC* convey a degree of detail specific to Gwynedd where these events unfolded, while the same events documented in the *Brut* are conveyed in a more generalized manner.

Figure 12: Map of Medieval Welsh Territories (after Map 1. Territorial divisions of twelfth and thirteenth-century Wales in Pryce 2005, this image has been removed by the author of this thesis for copyright reasons).
Conflict Chronology

The Normans, usually referred to as the French in The Brut y Tywysogyon, did not engage in armed conflict in Wales until 1070 (Brut Pen. 20: 16). Although the Anglo-Norman conquest of Wales was a combined English and Norman effort, in this chronology the term Norman will be used in favour of Anglo-Norman when summarizing events in the manuscripts, as this more closely resonates with the ‘French’ to which The Brut y Tywysogyon refers. Unlike the Brut the Life of Gruffudd ap Cynan differentiates between French and English on several occasions (when describing Anglo-Norman events) and in one instance uses Normans in place of French (LGC: 69). It is unclear why this distinction in ethnicity was made on this one occasion, perhaps it is the result of a translation error. Another distinction in terminology is to be made in referring to Welsh rulers as kings, princes or lords; and the use of kingdoms or principalities to describe distinct territorial regions. Essentially king and kingdom were used in the Brut pre-Conquest whereas the Normans applied the term prince and lord and therefore, principality and lordship, in deference to Welsh fealty (in theory if not application) to the Norman kings. Prior to the Norman Conquest there were eight distinct territorial divisions within Wales (see map above in Figure 12). Gwynedd in the north, Deheubarth in the southwest and Powys in the east were the three most powerful kingdoms. At the height of their power these kingdoms incorporated most of Wales; Gwynedd included regions 1 and 2 on the map above, Deheubarth 5, 6 and 7, and Powys 3 and 4.

Except for the pre-Conquest period (1000-1066), the chronology has been grouped into series, organised by the reign of Norman monarchs. Although this research is seeking to avoid the Anglo-Norman centrism that is prevalent in current academic dialogues, in this instance an Anglo-Norman political chronology is favoured solely for organisational purposes. This is because a Welsh political chronology over the two centuries discussed is fragmented, ephemeral and diverse, as it includes multiple distinct Welsh kingdoms or principalities. However, it should be noted that the reigns of Anglo-Norman monarchs hold cultural significance as each Norman king approached the conquest of Wales differently, which in turn exacted a different Welsh response.
A note on minor conflict events – slaying and ravaging

The Brut and other chronicles are saturated with instances of inter-Welsh conflicts. These disputes resulting from territorial and political ambitions – were a trend that continued well into the thirteenth century – and were materialized in a variety of ways. These most notably include slaying, maiming, ravaging and battle. Slaying was when a Welsh nobleman was essentially murdered. These deeds could be solitary acts of political violence, insofar as they are not always outwardly connected with a larger conflict event such as a battle. In the Brut these events are mentioned in passing, often in ten words or less, for example: in 1018, ‘Llwelyn ap Siesyll slew Aeddan ap Blegywryd and his four sons’ (Brut Pen. 20: 12). Given that Wales embraced a system of partible inheritance (treftaeth), not primogeniture; it is likely that these acts of violence were the result of succession disputes (Chrimes 1969: 3; Turvey 2002: 30). Gerald of Wales highlights the dangers of partible inheritance from which ‘[q]uarrels and lawsuits result, murders and arson, not to mention frequent fraticides’ (Description Book II Ch. 4: 261) Maiming served a similar purpose, for example the castration or blinding of a rival’s heirs made them unfit as leaders, eliminating potential competitors. For example: in c. 1152 ‘Owain ap Gruffudd [(Owain Gwynedd)] caused Cunedda ap Cadwallon, his nephew, his brother’s son, to be castrated and his eyes to be gouged out of his head’ (Brut Pen. 20: 58). Ravaging was an important element of not only Welsh warfare, but medieval warfare in general. As defined by S. Davies, ravaging involved weakening the enemy forces while strengthening one’s own forces. This often involved the taking of enemy provisions (anything from food to weapons), a scorched-earth tactic that did not necessarily lead to direct confrontation in the form of a full-scale battle, although skirmishes were common on ravaging campaigns (Davies 2004: 90-91). For example: ‘[i]n that year [1096] Uchdryd ab Edwin and Hywel ap Goronwy and many other leaders and the war-band of Cadwgan ap Bleddyn went to the castle of Pembroke and despoiled it completely, and ravaged the land; and they returned home with vast spoil’ (Brut Pen. 20: 20).
The Irish Connection

Given that the Irish contributed to several of the early battles reviewed below, it is worthwhile to briefly mention their involvement in Wales during the first half of the eleventh century. There existed a connection between the kingdoms of Wales and the kingdoms of Ireland, particularly during the tenth and early eleventh centuries and predominantly in North Wales and in the southwest in Dyfed. This was probably due in part to the early medieval Irish-Norse settlements in these areas of Wales (Edwards 1997: 1; Silvester 1969: 104). Marriage between the Welsh and the Irish was not uncommon, Gruffudd ap Cynan’s mother was of Irish-Norse descent and Gruffudd spent a great deal of his youth in Ireland (while in exile). Evidence for these connections also exist archaeologically, for example: the unusual platform bailey at Norman Rhuddlan is superimposed on the pre-Norman Welsh centre of Rhuddlan and resonates with the platform raths in Ireland (Quinnell et al. 1994: 213; Edwards 1999: 14).

In a conflict context the Irish were often commissioned by the Welsh and later the Anglo-Normans for their ships, such as during the Battle of the River Tywi summarized below and as part of the 1165 Berwyn Mountain Campaign (Brut Pen. 20: 64-65). While it has been suggested that the ‘Welsh, English, Normans, Irish and Norse - built and used warships of the type perfected by the Vikings’ (Lewis 1996:65), the continued use of the Irish fleet may suggest that they were at the forefront of maritime technology in this region, or that they simply had access to more ships. In addition to the use of their fleet, the Irish also participated in several pre-Norman inter-Welsh battles. Whether this involvement was in a mercenary capacity like with the fleet or rooted in other obligations, perhaps those of family, is difficult to determine from the manuscripts. On a different note, many similarities have been drawn between the Anglo-Norman conquest of Wales and the conquest of Ireland c. 1169 (Duffy 2007; Gillingham 1999: 84; Vebruggen 1997: 204). While these similarities have been explored historically there has been no investigation into this conquest, when compared with that in Wales or otherwise, from an archaeological conflict landscape perspective. The potential of such an investigation presents an intriguing avenue for future research, particularly
given that the first wave of Anglo-Norman conquest in Ireland was under the leadership of Henry II.

**Welsh conflict 1000-1069**

The period stretching from 1000-1069 is primarily distinguished by events of inter-Welsh conflict, many of these were in connection with Gruffudd ap Llywelyn’s conquest of Wales and his rise to power as king of Wales in c. 1055. Apart from this there were several notable battles between the Irish and the Welsh and the English and the Welsh. Prominent battle events spanning the years 1000-1069 include the battles of Abergwili in Carmarthenshire (c. 1022), Rhyd y Groes in Montgomeryshire (c. 1039), Pencadair in Carmarthenshire (c. 1041), Pwlldyfach in Carmarthenshire (c. 1042), the Battle of the River Tywi in Carmarthenshire (c. 1042) and the sacking of Hereford (c. 1056). The Battle of Abergwili was fought between the Welsh of Gwynedd and Deheubarth and the Irish usurper Rhain which concluded in a victory for the Welsh. In c. 1022 Rhain attempted to usurp the throne of Deheubarth claiming he was a son of Maredudd ab Owain who had been king of Deheubarth d. 999. Against him came Llywelyn ap Seisyll, the legitimate king of Deheubarth and Gwynedd, and he defeated Rhain in battle at the mouth of the River Gwili (Brut Pen. 20: 12). The Battle of Pwlldyfach (c. 1042), was fought against raiders probably from Ireland and ‘Hywel defeated the Gentiles who were ravaging Dyfed’ (Brut Pen. 20: 13). At other points in the Brut ‘gentile’ seems to refer specifically to the Irish or the Irish and Norse from Dublin, whether this was in reference to tribal units or to the people of Ireland as heathens is uncertain, given the context it could be interpreted both ways. It is unlikely that gentile was in reference to Vikings or Norsemen not from Ireland as they are referred to as ‘Germans’ in the Brut. For example in c. 1055 ‘Magnus, son of Harold, king of Germany, ravaged the kingdom of England with the help and chieftainship of Gruffudd ap Llywelyn, king of the Britons’ (Brut Pen. 20: 14). The Harold referenced is Harold Hardrada of Norway, the same Harold that would attempt to claim the English throne in 1066 at the Battle of Fulford.

The remainder of this period is hallmarked by the conflicts that defined Gruffudd ap Llywelyn’s rise to power as king of Wales (1055-1063). Given that
these conflicts and their consequences set the stage for the Norman Conquest of Wales, they are discussed in more detail than events covered in other periods of this chronology. The Battle of Rhyd y Groes was one of the more significant battles from this period. In c. 1039 Gruffudd ap Llywelyn was campaigning to assert his authority in Wales. The English weary of his progress in Wales and along the English border assembled a force to check his advance. Gruffudd ap Llywelyn ‘had his first battle [against the English] at Rhyd y Groes on the Severn, and there he prevailed’ (Brut Pen. 20: 13). Around the same time a dynastic feud erupted between Gruffudd ap Llywelyn and Hywel ab Edwin over Deheubarth. Hywel was the legitimate ruler, but Gruffudd ap Llywelyn had a claim as well – partly because he had seized and taken Hywel’s wife as his own following the Battle of Pencadair (c. 1041), fought between Hwyl and Gruffudd (ibid) – but mainly because his father, Llywelyn ap Seisyll had been king of Gwynedd and Deheubarth. The matter was finally decided at the Battle of the River Tywi (c. 1044). ‘Hywel ab Edwin gathered a fleet of the gentiles of Ireland with the intention of ravaging the whole kingdom. And Gruffudd ap Llywelyn encountered him; and there was a mighty battle and many of the host of the foreigners and of his own host were slain at the mouth of the River Tywi’ (Brut Pen. 20: 14). Following the successful annexation of Deheubarth, Gruffudd was established as the leader of a unified Wales in 1055.

Around the same time, Ælfgar son of Leofric earl of Merica, disgruntled at his treatment by earl Godwine and King Edward the Confessor over a land dispute and a seemingly unfounded accusation of treason, was bent on retaliation. To affect his retribution he sought the assistance of his Welsh neighbour Gruffudd ap Llywelyn (Lloyd 1912: 364). Gruffudd readily accepted an alliance with Ælfgar. Mercia and Wales shared a long history of mutual animosity the effects of which are still visible in the extant portions of Wat’s and Offa’s dykes. No doubt Gruffudd was eager to seize an opportunity to enter into a more peaceful relationship with Merica, in addition to providing him with a powerful ally against the English; it would guarantee peace along much of the Welsh and English border and create a buffer between Wales and the rest of England. In fact Wales was essentially inaccessible to the English, particularly after Ælfgar inherited the earldom upon his father’s death in 1057. Their close alliance, reinforced by the marriage of Gruffudd to Ælfgar’s daughter, endured
until the death of Ælfgar in c. 1062, which witnessed the disintegration of the Welsh-Mercian alliance (Lloyd 1913: 364-365; Davies and Davies 2012: 46-52).

In 1056 Gruffudd and Ælfgar along with mercenaries from Ireland, embarked on a devastating campaign in Hereford, during which the town itself was burned and laid to ruin. It is thought that Hereford was targeted as it would ‘shake to its foundations the Norman settlement at Hereford’ (Lloyd 1912: 364-5). These Normans had been invited by Edward the Confessor who was himself half Norman through his mother. The English and presumably Norman forces, seeing as they were commanded by the Norman earl Ralph, met a violent end as ‘Gruffudd pursued them to within the walls of Hereford, and there he massacred them and destroyed the walls and burned the town’ (Brut Pen. 20: 14). The English were quick to attempt retribution against the Welsh, however each of their endeavours proved ineffective (Brut Pen. 20: 14-15). Weary of Gruffudd’s ever increasing strength, King Edward and his earls soon negotiated a peace agreement with him. The terms of the agreement were not recorded in any detail apart from the most important aspect documented in the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle which states: Gruffudd ‘swore oaths that he would be a loyal and undeceiving under-king to King Edward’ (Swanton 1996: 186) – ‘it was this claim to over-lordship which the Norman kings inherited’ a decade later (Davies 1987: 27).

The Hereford Campaign was important for a number of reasons. From a tactical standpoint it demonstrates the Welsh ability to successfully plan and execute a campaign against a foreign threat to discourage any future incursions into Welsh territory. This is particularly relevant given that this was the first time that the Welsh encountered the Normans in combat, albeit in a pre-Conquest context. Moreover, the Welsh forces are described as well ordered (Brut Pen. 20: 14), a description that counters other contemporary descriptions of the Welsh as barbarians in their combat tactics (Davies 2004:5-6). The Battle of Hereford endorses the Welsh as a sophisticated, effective and dangerous military power. Along with the Battle of Rhyd y Groes, the Hereford Campaign also establishes a tradition of conflict in the borderlands between Wales and England. The establishment of Gruffudd as an under-king to the English has important implications for the legitimacy of the Norman Conquest of Wales and future suzerainty agreements between the Welsh and Normans.
Anglo-Norman and Welsh relations during the reigns of William the Conqueror and William Rufus 1066-1099

In 1063 Gruffudd ap Llywelyn was slain by the treachery of his own men (Brut Pen. 20: 15), Wales was no longer unified and descended into chaos as succession battles erupted throughout the individual principalities. When the Normans arrived in Wales in 1068 there was no centralized power, and battles for hegemony were still being fought in most of the principalities, the Normans simply became another group of contenders in the struggle for power. Apart from Williams’s expedition to Chester in 1070, when he ordered Chester Castle built, and his pilgrimage to St David’s Monastery in 1081 (Davies 1987: 26-33; Brut Pen. 20: 17), there was no large-scale Norman royal involvement in Wales until c. 1095 by William Rufus. Instead William the Conqueror entrusted the Welsh borders to his earls.

The first battle documented in the Brut between the Normans and the Welsh was a battle fought on the banks of the River Rhymni (Rhymney) in southeast Wales in c. 1070, when Caradog ap Gruffudd ap Rhydderch, assisted by the Normans, slew Maredudd ab Owain (Brut Pen. 20: 16). The allying of forces is a theme that presents itself frequently during the Norman incursion – both the Welsh seeking Norman allies, and the Normans seeking out Welsh allies; both trends are present in the 1157 Coastal Campaign. While the Welsh attempted to use the Norman presence to gain the upper hand in their on-going inter-Welsh power struggles, the Normans sought to divide and conquer by taking advantage of inter-Welsh conflict (Beeler 1966: 203; Richardson 2001: 23-33). In doing so the Normans also hoped to establish a client relationship with the Welsh, in which the Welsh would recognize them as their overlords and perform homage. The attempt to establish clientship more often than not failed, as the Welsh socio-political structure embraced a different and much more fluid institution of clientship than their Anglo-Norman adversaries (Davies 1990: 23; Lewis 1996: 72). In this case Caradog ap Gruffudd ap Rhydderch sought out the Normans to assist him in destroying a rival to power in south Wales (Davies 2004: 120). Similarly, Gruffudd ap Cynan sought assistance from the marcher earls in his quest to take Gwynedd back from Powys (LGC: 61). Many historians have argued that it was the subsequent allying of forces and the resulting enhanced disunity of the Welsh that was ultimately responsible for the

The ensuing two decades (1070-1090) are marked by Norman ravaging of Wales, Ceredigion and Dyfed in particular (Brut Pen. 20: 16), and the continued inter-Welsh conflicts that defined the pre-Norman era. Some of the more notable inter-Welsh battles fought over the control of the various principalities include: the Battle of Camddwr c. 1075, the battle of Bron yr Erw c. 1075, the Battle of Gwenytwl c. 1077, and the Battle of Pwllgwdig c. 1078, (Brut Pen. 20: 16-17). As mentioned above, these conflicts resulted from the power vacuum created by the death of Gruffudd ap Llywelyn. In c.1081 Gruffudd ap Cyan sailed from Ireland in a bid to reclaim Gwynedd from Trahearn of Powys. He sailed from Ireland with a force of ‘thirty ships full of Irish and Viking soldiers ploughing a furrow across the deep sea he returned to his native soil, and he seized the port of Abermenai, where he found Trahearn ruling’ (LGC: 67). Trahearn fled from Anglesey enabling Gruffudd to reclaim the isle, it would take more than two decades to return the rest of Gwynedd to his control.

In 1091 the Normans achieved dominion over Ceredigion and Dyfed; they maintained this control with a series of newly constructed castles. Between 1091 and 1093 the Normans are recorded as having ‘seized all the lands of the Britons’ (Brut Pen. 20: 19). However, following their initial success in Wales, while William Rufus was absent in Normandy, ‘the Britons, being unable to bear the tyranny and injustice of the French, threw off the rule of the French’ (Brut Pen. 20: 19). The Welsh then proceeded to destroy all the castles of Gwynedd, Ceredigion and Dyfed (except for Pembroke and Rhyd y Gors in Carmarthen). The Normans retaliated and the battle of Coedysbys was fought in Gwynedd in which the forces of Cadwgan ap Bleddyn were victorious and ‘drove them [the Normans] to flight, inflicting great slaughter upon them’ (Brut Pen. 20: 19). Upon his return from Normandy William Rufus attempted further retaliation against the Welsh. In the autumn of 1095 William Rufus ‘moved a host against the Britons, but they sought a defence in their woods and their wilderness, and he [Rufus] returned home empty-handed and having gained naught’ (Brut Pen. 20: 19-20). It is unclear from the text where in Wales Rufus had intended to strike. Gower, Cydweli and Ystrad Tywi had been ravaged and laid to waste prior to Rufus’s unsuccessful campaign.
Avoiding armed conflict by seeking refuge or shelter within the natural defences of the remote wilderness, particularly the mountains was a common Welsh defensive tactic. ‘Mountains were the natural allies of the Scots and Welsh, who were able to withdraw into inaccessible places with their livestock and most valuable possessions, and wait for the invaders to retreat’ (Verbruggen 1997: 320). The Irish embraced a similar tactics, using the difficult nature of the terrain to their advantage (O’Conor 1998: 98-101). The use of the natural terrain as a defence and the refusal to meet the opponent in armed combat are two important trends of medieval Welsh and Anglo-Norman warfare, particularly in regards to Vegetian and non-Vegetian warfare, which are discussed at length in the Welsh and Anglo-Norman Medieval Warfare chapter. The Welsh sought refuge in the wilderness for a second time when William Rufus attempts another, also unsuccessful campaign in c. 1097. Apparently the Normans were reluctant to pursue the Welsh into this wilderness (Brut Pen. 20: 20). Whether this was because they feared ambush, or were unfamiliar with the terrain, or lacked the appropriate arms and equipment for a wilderness campaign is uncertain, but deserves further inquiry. One possibility is that Rufus was leading a ravaging campaign – particularly since ravaging events incited by the Normans took place surrounding these two events – and the Welsh could have successfully countered his aim by gathering their goods and retreating to where they knew the Normans would be reluctant to follow.

In between Rufus’ two unsuccessful campaigns, there were two other notable campaigns (date range 1094-1096), the first was a Norman incursion into Gwent (south-eastern Wales), with the purpose of raiding and pillaging the countryside, they were stopped and defeated by the Welsh the Battle of Celli Tarfawg and the Battle of Aberllech. Rufus does not appear to have been involved in these campaigns; they were probably organised by the marcher barons. The other campaign was the destruction of Pembroke Castle and the ravaging of the surrounding countryside by the war-bands of Uchdryd ab Edwin, Hywel ap Goronwy and Cadwgan ap Bleddyn. Although the Brut records that the Normans ‘gained naught [and] they returned home empty-handed’ from their campaign in Gwent (Brut Pen. 20: 20), the actual degree of the Welsh success is unclear as the Brut goes on to state that the castles and garrisons remained intact (ibid). It is unclear if the chronicler is referring to all of the extant castles in
Gwent, or only the ones that were in the vicinity of the named battle engagements. As the precise location of the battle of Celli Tarfawg and Aberllech are not known it is difficult to determine which castle may have been nearby. In the case of Celli Tarfawg and Aberllech (area of the battles not the castles), the Welsh appear to have surprised Norman forces that were out ravaging, thus, it would appear that the Normans’ control of Wales at this point in time did not extend far beyond the bounds of their castles. Additionally these events highlight that the Normans also used raiding and ravaging as a warfare tactic. Following this, the Normans achieved notable success in their incursion into Gwynedd when in c. 1098; led by Hugh earl of Shrewsbury, they moved to attack Anglesey. Gruffudd ap Cynan sought out and gained the assistance of the Irish (Gruffudd had previously lived as an exile in Ireland). However, the Normans turned Gruffudd’s Irish allies against him by promising them a greater reward. Through this treachery the Island of Anglesey was easily taken by the Normans and Gruffudd ap Cynan was forced to flee (LGC: 81; Brut Pen. 20: 20-21). King Magnus of Norway was also involved in this event. He sought to take advantage of the power struggle between the Normans and the Welsh and claim Anglesey for himself and in turn ‘conquer all the island of Britain’ (Brut Pen. 20: 21). Magnus fought the Normans from the sea and for reasons that are not revealed in the Brut withdrew his ships leaving Anglesey to the Normans; today this engagement is known as the Battle of the Menai Straits.

Anglo-Norman and Welsh relations during the reign of Henry I, 1100-1135
The reign of Henry I, (1100-1135) was defined by a series of alliances and formal agreements between the king and various Welsh princes. Both the Crown and the Welsh gained a great deal by entering into these pacts, such as, by recognizing Henry as king, a Welsh prince was expected to swear fealty to him and recognize him as his overlord. In return for this recognition, which provided Henry with a legitimate claim in Wales, the king could officially proclaim that particular prince or lord as the legitimate ruler of a specific region. Although diplomatic in their creation, these pacts in many instances had a short life span and did not prevent armed conflict from erupting. However, there were now legal ramifications (sometimes manipulated) for these actions, which in
some instances led to the imprisonment of Welsh princes such as Iorwerth ap Bleddyn at Shrewsbury (Brut Pen. 20: 26). The differences between the Welsh and Anglo-Norman systems of clientship and fealty often arose in misunderstandings in their interpretations that frequently erupted in conflict.

The Life of Gruffudd ap Cynan effectively documents the incentives and consequences for Welsh rulers in entering into political arrangements with the Anglo-Norman kings. It has been argued that Gruffudd ap Cynan ‘came to prominence as a client of Henry I’ (Lewis 1996: 72), in c. 1110 Gruffudd ap Cynan travelled to the court of Henry I to make peace, and ‘he gained from him a living, favour, friendship and recognition of his many possessions’ (LGC: 85). Once this took place, people from the Cantref of Rhos east of the Conwy River, (a cantref is a Welsh territorial administrative subdivision, these are shown in the map above in Figure 12), which was under the jurisdiction of earl Hugh of Chester, began to move to Gwynedd. Hugh became enraged that the people of Rhos had left and taken their possessions into Gwynedd without asking his permission. In addition to taking his subjects (even though it was not by force), Hugh also accuses Gruffudd ap Cynan of having seized his territory (ibid). Although Rhos was traditionally part of Gwynedd, Gruffudd ap Cynan had lost much of his kingdom to the marcher lords and other Welsh lords during his exile in Ireland.

King Henry responded to Gruffudd’s actions by assembling a large force in 1114 which included the southern Welsh and the Scots, to go against Gwynedd, and more importantly Powys, the most powerful Welsh kingdom at this point in time – this was Henry’s first campaign into Wales (Lloyd 1912: 421). Henry took his forces to Tomen y Mur or Mur Castell (originally a Roman fort west of Snowdonia near the modern town of Porthmadog) and Gruffudd assembled his own force and gathered his people (who were seeking refuge) in the mountains of Snowdonia, no battles were fought and terms of peace were rapidly agreed upon. While encamped at Tomen y Mur, Henry I decided against advancing to where Gruffudd was in Snowdonia ‘fearing that he might fall into the hands of Gruffudd as he descended out of the mountain tops into the valleys’ (LGC: 87, Brut Pen. 20: 37-38). Neither of the manuscripts detail the terms of the peace agreement(s), therefore it is unclear whether Gruffudd was allocated Rhos, however, Rhos was within the territorial bounds of
Gwynedd, whether by conquest or allocation, by the reign of Owain Gwynedd c. 1137 (Gruffudd’s son).

Around 1115 Gruffudd ap Rhys of Deheubarth (the large kingdom in south-western Wales, at times encompassing all of Dyfed, Ystrad Tywi and Ceredigion), who had been living in exile in Ireland since the death of his father Rhys ap Tewdwr Mawr (apparently at the hands of the Normans), returned to Wales. Following his arrival in Wales he sought out the help of Gruffudd ap Cynan who welcomed him and provided him and his brother with shelter on Anglesey (Brut Pen. 20: 38-40). However, soon after this Gruffudd ap Cynan at the request of King Henry and in exchange for royal favours (which are not specified in the manuscripts), was asked to capture Rhys ap Gruffudd, dead or alive, but the latter managed to flee safety and seek asylum at the church of Aberdaron (on the Llyn peninsula), from there he returned to Ystrad Tywi in Deheubarth (ibid). Evidently Henry feared Welsh unification and an uprising in Deheubarth, suggesting that the Norman hold there was tenuous at best. It can also be inferred that Henry was keen to promote inter-Welsh conflict, in an effort to prevent the Welsh kingdoms unifying against the Normans. Such efforts did not amount to much, as fifty years later all of native Wales banded together under Owain Gwynedd against Henry II during the Berwyn Mountain campaign and again under Llywelyn ap Iorwerth (Llywelyn the Great, Gruffudd ap Cynan’s great grandson) who ruled a unified native Wales (1216-1240). Such actions, on the behalf of both Henry I and Gruffudd ap Cynan highlight the necessity for self-preservation and the ruthless measures taken to ensure safety and success.

Following Gruffudd ap Cynan’s unsuccessful attempt to hand Gruffudd ap Rhys over to Henry, Gruffudd ap Rhys did what Henry had feared; he gathered men and began a series of attacks against the Normans and the Flemish (who were brought as colonists to southern Wales by the Normans, (Beeler 1969: 219; Brown 2004:100). While the outcome and effect of these initial attacks is unclear, Rhys proceeded to embark on a castle burning campaign. Immediately following his restoration to Deheubarth c. 1116, Rhys destroyed and severely damaged seven castles. These include the castles of Aberth, Llandovery, Swansea, Carmarthen, Gower, Blaen-porth (including the town) and Ralf. In reaction to the assault on Aberth, Llandovery and Swansea
castle, the Normans gathered their Welsh allies and charged them to protect the king’s castle at Carmarthen in turns and ‘the French asked each of those [Welsh chieftains] if they were true to King Henry. And they all answered that they were. And the French said, ‘If it is so, as you say, in order that what you profess in your words may be shewn by your deed, each one of you, as it falls to his lot, must keep the king’s castle at Carmarthen’ (Brut Pen. 20: 40-46). The men entrusted to hold the castle, for two weeks a piece, were: Owain ap Caradog (Powys), Rhydderch and Maredudd ap Rhydderch ap Caradog (possibly of Dyfed or Gwent). While the castle was under the guardianship of Owain ap Caradog, Gruffydd ap Rhys besieged the castle at night. Owain’s forces fled and Owain himself was killed. This test to prove Welsh loyalty to Henry presents yet another instance of the Normans successfully encouraging inter-Welsh conflict. It was a cunning manoeuvre, as it provided the Normans with the manpower with which to oppose Gruffydd ap Rhys, without having had to employ or risk any casualties to Norman forces, unfortunately for the Normans it did not prevent Rhys from capturing Carmarthen Castle.

In c. 1121 there arose conflict between Henry and the men of Powys, marking the second and final royal campaign into Wales under the leadership of Henry I. Upon discovering that the king was moving against Powys with a large force, the men of Powys, under Maredudd ap Bleddyn and the sons of Cadwgan ap Bleddyn, Einion, Madog and Morgan, sought assistance from Gruffydd ap Cynan of Gwynedd. They ‘…ask[ed] him whether he would unite with them against the king […] But he had made peace with the king, and he informed them that, if they fled near his bounds, he would come against them and would despoil them’ (Brut Pen. 20: 47-48). As Gruffydd ap Cynan refused to help, the men of Powys proceeded against the king alone. At an unspecified location they were able to use the physical landscape to their advantage and ambush the king. ‘And Maredudd sent young men to way-lay the king, to a certain counter-slope the way along which he was coming, in order to engage him with bows and arrows and then cause confusion among his host with missiles’ (Brut Pen. 20: 47-48). During this ambush the king himself was nearly killed with an arrow. Maredudd and the sons of Cadwgan then came to terms of peace with the king, under terms of heavy tribute (Brut Pen. 20: 47-48). The Welsh forces of Owain Gwynedd used a similar terrain tactic, also to their
success, when they ambushed Henry II at Coleshill (see Chapters Six and Seven).

Anglo-Norman and Welsh relations during the reign of Stephen, 1135-1154
The Welsh were quick to take advantage of the succession dispute and civil war following the death of Henry I in 1135. Throughout the anarchy that defined Stephen’s reign Wales was generally ignored by the Crown (Davies 1987: 47). During the Anarchy many of marcher barons took up the cause of the Empress Matilda against Stephen. Some of the marcher lords, such as Earl Ranulf of Chester formed alliances with the Welsh who in turn provided troops at the decisive Battle of Lincoln in 1141 (ibid). However, not all marcher and Welsh relationships were amicable during this period. Taking advantage of the marcher barons’ distraction, notable Welsh leaders from north and south Wales combined their forces against the Normans, they included the sons of Gruffudd ap Cynan (who died in 1137), Gruffudd ap Rhys, Hywel ap Maredudd (Powys) and Madog ab Idnerth (Maelienydd in the middle marches). Following an unrelenting castle campaign in Ceredigion c. 1136, in which many of the regions castles, including Aberystwyth were burned, they directed their unified force toward Cardigan but were opposed by the Norman forces that had assembled to counter the Welsh insurgence. They were met by Stephen (the constable), Robert fitz Martin and the sons of Gerald and William fitz Odo in open battle on the banks of the River Dyfi (Dovey), which marks the border between Gwynedd and Ceredigion. The total number of troops on both sides was estimated to be around 8000 and following a fierce battle, during which the Normans and their Flemish allies lost 3000 men, they were defeated (Brut Pen. 20: 51-52).

Although this battle event is un-named and its location not precisely known, it is clear from the large number of combatants involved, most likely exaggerated to demonstrate the scale of the battle, that this was a major event. The Brut does not go into detail describing why the battle was fought or what was accomplished by the Welsh victory apart from gaining ‘a great abundance of captives and spoils and costly raiment and fair armour’ (ibid). One can infer that the main intent of this campaign was to throw off the Norman yoke, Ceredigion was probably targeted as it was an area, along with Glamorgan, Brycheiniog
(Brecknockshire) and Dyfed that were the first to come under the control of the Normans following the initial wave on conquest. Although unlike the other territories, Ceredigion was not controlled by the Normans to the same degree, making it an appealing target (Beeler 1966: 217).

Another significant battle fought during this period was the battle of Coleshill in 1150 when ‘Madog ap Maredudd, king of Powys, thought with the help of Ranulf, earl of Chester, to rise up against Owain’ (Brut Pen. 20: 57). Owain Gwynedd had steadily been encroaching on Powysian and Anglo-Norman territory. Even going so far as to build a castle at Tomen y Faerdre or Tomen y Rhodwydd (there is some debate over which castle was built by Owain) in northern Powys in 1149 after capturing Mold Castle in 1146 while the garrison was absent engaging in the Battle of Wich with Powys. The 1150 conflict did little to stop Owain’s expansion as ‘after the host of [Maredudd’s] supporters had been slain at Coleshill they fled’ (ibid). The 1157 Battle of Coleshill was adjacent to the 1150 location which brings to question the idea of traditional battlefield locations, as reviewed in Chapter Three (see page 95).

It is possible that with the death of Henry, the Welsh princes felt that their oaths were void and they were at liberty to form new alliances, although the nature of Welsh clientship would not have required such circumstances to exit an agreement. There was a slight increase in the amount of inter-Welsh slayings following Henry’s death, perhaps suggesting that there was a power vacuum in Wales until Stephen was able to establish himself. Conversely, the lapse in Norman interference during this time may have allowed the Welsh to return to ‘business as usual’, in so far as they were at liberty to resume border disputes within native Wales. The reduced Norman presence also enabled the Welsh to organise and strengthen their defences against the Normans, namely with the construction of castles. During the period of Stephen’s reign, the Brut documents that the Welsh were capturing and reusing Norman castles in addition to their earlier practice of burning and destroying them. (Brut Pen. 20: 55-57). The first documentation of a Welsh built castle was actually in 1116 for Cymer Castle in Merioneth (Gwynedd; Kenyon 2009: 26), however, it was during Stephen’s reign that Welsh castle building grew in popularity. Tomen y Rhodwydd or Tomen y Faerdre (also known as lâl Castle) was built by Owain Gwynedd in 1149, as was Llanrhystad by Cadwaladr (Owain’s brother) and
Oswestry Castle, originally of Norman construction, was rebuilt by Madog ap Maredudd of Powys. The conclusion drawn is that the Welsh experienced a temporary respite from Norman interference in Wales, this afforded them the ability to more effectively defend themselves – particularly by the building of new castles and their establishment in conquered Norman castles – prior to the campaigns of Henry II. The Welsh were quick to realise that the adoption of castle building technology was necessary to counter the Norman threat.

Anglo-Norman and Welsh relations during the reign of Henry II, 1154-1189
The reign of Henry II saw the reinstatement of royal interest in Wales and is marked by a series of major campaigns and battles that are indicative of the escalation in tensions between the Welsh and the Normans. Henry II led a total of three campaigns into Wales; the 1157 campaign targeted at Gwynedd and 1165 campaign targeted at Gwynedd, Deheubarth and Powys, are the focus of the case studies in this research and as such a more detailed conflict chronology will be provided in the 1157 and 1165 Case Study chapters. The other campaign led by Henry II was against Rhys ap Gruffudd (Deheubarth) in 1163, this was a bloodless venture as no battles were fought.

Prior to the 1157 conflict, Owain Gwynedd had been expanding the borders of his kingdom south-east into northern Powys and east into the marcher territory of Cheshire, particularly the Cantref of Tegeingl (which traditionally had been part of the ancestral kingdom of Gwynedd (Quinnell et al. 1994: 214-216; Domesday 263a/R/7). In 1157 to stop this expansion Henry II led an army into Chester intent on subduing Gwynedd. The Welsh of Gwynedd led by Owain Gwynedd moved their host to Basingwerk which they fortified, intent on blocking the Norman advance into Gwynedd. Henry II advanced up the coastal Roman road toward the Welsh encampment, while at the same time a fleet set sail from Chester to Anglesey. At an unspecified distance from Basingwerk Henry split his army into two contingents, one was to proceed down the Roman road, the other was to cut inland through the forest to circumvent Owain’s position and take his rear by surprise. The Welsh seemingly anticipated such a manoeuvre as a detachment of Owain’s army, led by his sons Dafydd and Cynan, was stationed in the forest in advance of Basingwerk,
'And there Cynan and Dafydd, sons of Owain, encountered him, and there they gave him a hard battle' (Brut Pen. 20: 59-60). Following this Owain retreats to a place referred to as Tal Llwyn Pynna and Henry to Rhuddlan to await news of the fate of a naval contingent he had sent to Anglesey. Meanwhile at Rhuddlan the Normans endured a series of raids by the Welsh before learning that the Anglesey expedition had been an utter disaster with heavy casualties suffered by the Normans at the Battle of Tal Moelfre (ibid; Clancy 2003: 127 and 136). Peace terms were then established between Owain and Henry, in exchange for Owain’s withdrawal from Tegeingl and recognition of Henry as his overlord (officiated at the 1163 Council of Woodstock, see page 244), Henry would leave Gwynedd in peace, meaning no further Norman conquest would be attempted within Gwynedd.

The following year Rhys ap Gruffudd burned all the castles in Ceredigion in what he regarded as retribution against a broken alliance with Henry. Previously Rhys had unwillingly entered into a peace with the king; but, when Roger Earl of Clare and Walter Clifford pillaged Rhys’s land the king was indifferent to the injustice against Rhys. In 1159, taking advantage of Henry’s absence while abroad in France, Rhys burned all the castles in Dyfed. In 1163 Henry gathered a massive force to retaliate. Rhys then gathered his men to the mountain of Cefn Rhestr Main, and as the Normans and their allies were reluctant to pursue Rhys into the mountains they instead offered him a truce, ‘And he accepted it, and gave his men leave to go to their own land’ (Brut Pen. 20: 61). Similar to Owain Gwynedd, Rhys was also required to surrender hostages to Henry and recognize him as his overlord as part of the peace terms, also officiated at the same Council of Woodstock. The terms of this new relationship with Henry were not observed for long by either Rhys ap Gruffudd or Owain Gwynedd. Rhys entered into conflict with the marcher lords almost immediately after the Woodstock agreement and Gwynedd followed suit in 1165 when his son Dafydd led raids on Cantref of Tegeingl once again.

In the summer of 1165 Henry II embarked on a campaign of massive proportions, the purpose – to ‘annihilate all Welshmen’ (Brut Pen. 20: 63-64). The king left his base at Oswestry and turned his army west into Wales, along the Ceiriog river valley. In this valley at the ancient border between Wales and England – Offa’s Dyke – a contingent of Welsh who were stationed in advance
of the main force (led by Owain Gwynedd) encamped at Corwen, ambushed Henry’s forces as they attempted to negotiated passage through a gap in the dyke. This event is now referred to at the Battle of Crogan. Having recovered from the ambush, the king’s army then advanced into the Berwyn Mountains towards the Welsh encampment at Corwen, but bad weather and lack of supplies forced him to retreat to England in defeat. After this Henry attempted no further campaigns into Wales, Gwynedd had preserved its independence and would not see another royal campaign for more than forty years (1210 King John) and would retain its independence until 1282.

Following Crogan a power struggle ensued between the Welsh and the marcher barons over the control of castles, including the castles of Cilgerran, Caerinion, Rhuddlan and Hen Blas, which were taken by the Welsh (*Brut Pen. 20*: 64-65). Despite Henry’s efforts, by the end of his reign (d. 1189) the Welsh, predominantly Gwynedd, had managed to reclaim their territory as the Normans receded in the wake of Welsh success. The exercise in Welsh cooperation during the 1165 Campaign would be repeated again in the thirteenth century when native Wales was united under Llywelyn ap Iorwerth and later Llywelyn ap Gruffudd.

**Anglo-Norman and Welsh relations during the reigns of Richard I, 1189-1199 and John, 1199-1216**

The reign of Henry II’s son Richard I (1189-1199) saw no royal involvement in Wales, as Richard’s concerns were centred on the Third Crusade. The majority of conflicts that occurred in these years were confined to inter-Welsh conflicts and the continuing struggle for control of castles between the Welsh and the marcher lords. The one notable exception is the siege and battle of Painscastle (Powys). In 1198 the Welsh princes (un-named in the *Brut*), united under Gwenwynwyn, prince of Powys and laid siege to Painscastle for three weeks. The Anglo-Normans mustered a relief force and successfully ended the siege and defeated the Welsh (*Brut Pen. 20*: 79-80). The narrative style for Painscastle bears further comment as the author refers to the Anglo-Normans as the Saxons; additionally the tone of the account is decisively pro-Saxon. For example the account of the battle concludes with: ‘And the Saxons, being
unable to suffer that, as God showed thereafter, fell upon the Welsh and immediately drove them to flight and slew untold numbers of them like sheep... And so the Saxons returned joyfully to their land, enriched with the spoils of the Welsh' (ibid). This is curious as generally the Anglo-Normans are referred to in the Brut as the French and later the English, the term Saxon evokes an earlier pre-Norman period. Additionally, most of the accounts, while perhaps not always overtly pro-Welsh, are rarely so blatantly pro-English/French/Saxon. The chroniclers of the Brut were Welsh monks, perhaps this particular entry was by an individual of Anglo-Norman heritage and sentimentality. One could even theorise that he was descended from a pre-Conquest marcher family, thus the use of the word Saxon. These interesting introspections aside, the most important element to glean from this change in narrative style is that the accuracy of the events recorded in the Brut, (or any other medieval manuscripts), must be interpreted carefully, since they clearly were subjected to the biases of the authors.

Conflicts in Wales during the first decade of King John’s reign were defined once again by inter-Welsh conflict and struggle over castle rights, although, the last six years of his reign were characterised by an escalation in conflict between the Crown and Llywelyn ap Iorwerth also known as Llywelyn the Great (ap Fawr), prince of Gwynedd, that eventually led to the creation of the Principality of Wales in 1216 (Black 2000:53). In 1201 John noting Llywelyn’s rise to power in Gwynedd recognized him as the ruler of Gwynedd and in a treaty gave Llywelyn leave to exercise Welsh rule and Welsh laws, so long as those were applied within the territorial bounds laid out in the treaty (Davies 1987: 239). The relationship between Gwynedd and England was further strengthened when in 1205 Llywelyn married Joan, John’s natural daughter and accompanied John on his campaigns in Scotland in 1209 (ibid: 239-241). The nature of their friendship was so strong that John overlooked Llywelyn’s transgressions when he invaded and claimed southern Powys, given that Llywelyn promised John homage (Lloyd 1912: 621-2; Brut Pen. 20: 81). The events that led to conflict between Llywelyn and John are unclear, it has been suggested that Llywelyn took advantage of the King’s absence in Ireland in 1210 and attempted to encroach on marcher territory (Lloyd 1912: 631). Evidently these conquest attempts were not successful as the earl of Chester
moved against him the same year and advanced as far as Holywell where he built a castle (Treffynnon), then to Degannwy to rebuild the castle that Llywelyn had destroyed, presumably to prevent the Anglo-Normans from claiming it (Davies 1987: 241; Lloyd 1912: 632). Upon his return from Ireland in 1211, John embarked on a campaign against Llywelyn advancing from Chester to Degannwy. In response Llywelyn implemented a scorched earth tactic and withdrew with his people into the refuge of the wilderness of Snowdonia. While at Degannwy John’s ‘host suffered lack of food to such an extent that an egg was sold for a penny-halfpenny; and they found the flesh of their horses as good as the best dishes’ (Brut Pen. 20: 85). Unable to feed his army, John retreated from Degannwy back to England (ibid; Davies 2004: 107). Undeterred John embarked on another campaign against Gwynedd in August, ‘and with him a host that was greater and fiercer’ (Brut Pen. 20: 85). John learned quickly from his failed attempt months earlier and this time he brought enough supplies with him for his troops to reach the heart of Gwynedd, destroying everything he encountered on his route of march and building castles as he went. Threatened by John with the destruction of Bangor, Llywelyn was defeated and forced to accept humiliating peace terms, in which he lost all of his territory east of the River Conwy (Davies 2004: 108; Davies 1987: 241; Lloyd 1912: 636).

Llywelyn’s defeat proved but a momentary setback as John’s hold on Wales became tenuous as a result of the discord that arose between him and the leading men of England and Wales (the marcher barons), which eventually led to the signing of the Magna Carta in 1215. In the same year significant territory within Wales was yielded to the Welsh without resistance (Brut Pen. 20: 89-92). During this period Llywelyn, with the assistance of other Welsh lords, led a successful series of campaigns throughout the whole of Wales. Later that year Rhys Ieuanc ap Gruffudd and Maelgwn ap Rhys subdued Dyfed and burned and captured all the castles therein. Following this Llywelyn, ‘by counsel of all the princes of Wales along with him, led a host, by their common counsel against Carmarthen. And by the fifth day the castle was surrendered to them and they razed it to the ground’ (Brut Pen. 20: 89-92). Other castles then fell in succession and Carmarthen was successfully subdued. This fluctuation in the control of castles provides further evidence for the important role castles could play in determining the success of both the Anglo-Norman Conquest and
Welsh resistance. By 1216 Llywelyn had brought most of Wales under his control, his march on Swansea in December 1215 signalled the end, at least momentarily, of the Anglo-Norman occupation and conquest of Wales, apart from small regions of Gower and Monmouthshire that remained under marcher baron control (Davies 1987: 242-243). The terms of Llywelyn’s control over Wales were officially laid out in the Treaty of Worcester in 1218. The creation of the native Welsh principality ushered in a new era of both stability and conflict in Wales.

Anglo-Norman and Welsh relations during the reign of Henry III, 1216-1272
Not unlike the Welsh Campaigns of Henry II, the campaigns of his grandson Henry III are also often overlooked and merit further scholarship. Welsh and Anglo-Norman relations during the reign of Henry III set the stage for the Edwardian conquest, as it ushered in a new era of royal policy towards Wales, bringing an end to the status quo of previous Anglo-Norman engagement. This shift in policy can be credited to the creation of the Principality of Wales as recognized by the early administration of Henry III, when the terms Treaty of Worcester came into fruition in 1218. As such the relationship between Wales and England was different than that which defined the previous 150 years; although armed conflict was not obsolete, matters of dispute tended to be negotiated on paper rather than on the battlefield (Davies 2004: 111).

While the Treaty of Worcester did mark a distinct improvement in diplomatic relations between Wales and England it did not actually give Llywelyn ap Iorwerth the rite of continued supremacy in Wales, he was provisionally granted the position of overlord in Wales, on the condition that he and the other powerful Welsh lords recognized the suzerainty of Henry III. Much of the content of the treaty was conditional and temporary, but it provided Llywelyn a platform with which to continue his unification of Wales, and place himself in the position of sole ruler (Davies 1987: 242). R.R. Davies has stated that ‘The years 1218-40 may readily be characterised as a period of relative quiescence’, Llywelyn was keen to preserve the settlement he received in the Treaty of Worcester, as such he sought to promote and maintain a friendly relationship with Henry III (Davies 1987: 297). The ‘quiescence’ of the period
is debatable, as Llywelyn was pushing to extend the boundaries of native Wales and to ensure his dominion within Wales through the coercion of his fellow Welsh lords and princes (Lloyd 1912). If anything the described period of ‘quiescence’ may mark the desire of both England and Wales to solve their issues with diplomacy rather than by engaging in armed conflict.

The early years of Henry’s reign saw little royal involvement in Wales, part of this was due to the young age of the king – he was only nine when he became king – additionally the first few years of his reign were preoccupied with settling the dissension kindled by John both in England and on the continent. In fact, the Crown was initially eager to pacify Llywelyn, to ‘give England time to recover from the wounds of civil war’ (Lloyd 1912: 654). As a gesture of goodwill Llywelyn was given the stewardship of Cardigan and Carmarthen Castles to maintain until the king came of age (ibid: 653). There were three minor campaigns during Llywelyn’s reign, these generally involved territorial qualms with marcher barons who sought to regain the territories they had lost while engrossed with the uprisings during the latter part of John’s reign. These eventually escalated to a point Henry was obliged to become involved. In c. 1223 the earl of Pembroke, William Marshall ‘brought a large fleet and a multitude of knights and foot-soldiers from Ireland to Deheubarth…he moved his mighty host to Cardigan; and forthwith the castle was surrendered to him. On the Wednesday following he went to Carmarthen; and there too the castle was surrendered to him forthwith’ (Brut Pen. 20: 99). William Marshall was unhappy that the Crown had given Llywelyn the castles of Cardigan and Carmarthen (normally in the earl of Pembroke’s jurisdiction) to Llywelyn to keep until the king came of age. William was punished by Henry for his actions, and was required by the ‘king to make reparation for what wrongs he had done, and to receive reparation from the prince for what wrongs had been done to him too’ (Brut Pen. 20: 100). Llywelyn and William were unable to come to a peaceful arrangement and as a result of escalating tensions the king, having proclaimed himself of age in 1227, moved a host against Llywelyn in c. 1228. A series of skirmishes were fought in mid-Wales, most likely near a place called Ceri, this shot-lived campaign was a failure and Henry was compelled to arrange terms of peace between England and Llywelyn in which Llywelyn received a large sum of money and land (Brut Pen. 20: 101). In c. 1231, in a continued effort to
dissuade Llywelyn’s expansionist campaigns, Henry sent the ‘royal army [to] Painscastle for almost two months witnessing…the erection of one new castle while Llywelyn destroyed ten others’ (Davies 1987: 298).

Following the death of Llywelyn in 1240 the rule of the Principality was contested amongst his sons; this led to a period of instability and the eventual collapse of the unified Principality. This period of chaos ensued until 1250 when Llywelyn ap Gruffudd, Llywelyn ap Iorwerth’s grandson, began to successfully reunify Wales, eventually establishing himself as the ruler of the restored Principality. Henry III was a shrewd politician and took advantage of the Welsh political disarray following Llywelyn ap Iorwerth’s death, to reclaim previously conquered territory that had been lost to Llywelyn and to reassert himself as the overlord of the Welsh Principality. This period of instability witnessed an English presence in Wales that had not been seen since the early conquests of Henry I, these however proved to be short-lived accomplishments after Llywelyn ap Gruffudd asserted himself as the sole ruler of Gwynedd, following a battlefield victory against his brother and cousins, ending the succession dispute in 1255. Other Welsh leaders who had been disposed of their territory following the wave of English conquest turned to Gwynedd and Llywelyn ap Gruffudd for guidance. Under the astute military leadership of Llywelyn ap Gruffudd, the English were purged from Wales, with most of Wales being returned to native Welsh rule by 1257 (Davies 1987: 309-10). In 1267 the Treaty of Montgomery acknowledged ‘Llywelyn’s right to bear the title Prince of Wales, which was now confirmed to him and to his heirs’ as was his position of overlord to the other Welsh rulers (Lloyd 1912: 740). Although the terms of the treaty still required that Llywelyn ap Gruffudd recognize Henry III as his overlord, this was a significant moment as the English Crown confirmed leadership of Wales to the Welsh, and established Gwynedd as the ruling family of Wales.

Llywelyn ap Gruffudd’s disobedience when he repeatedly ignored Edward I’s summons of homage, following his ascension to the throne in 1272, provoked Edward to brutal retaliation. Like many Welsh rulers before him, Llywelyn ap Gruffudd disregarded the suzerainty of the English monarchy. As has been discussed in the Medieval Warfare chapter, this was in part due to the cultural differences in the nature of Welsh versus English clientship. Yet, it is
unlikely that this was the only reason that the Welsh repeatedly disregarded and in effect dismissed the Anglo-Normans as their overlords, although it probably fuelled the discontent. The long history of this repeated disregard (beginning with Gruffudd ap Llywelyn in the mid-eleventh century) suggests that the Welsh princes were wilfully disobeying the English monarchy as they did not want to be in a dependent client relationship with England, they desired native Welsh rule without foreign interference. The nature of the Welsh and Anglo-Norman relationship changed dramatically with the on-set of the Edwardian Conquest in c. 1273-1283. The campaigns of Edward I were exhaustive in terms of the size of troop deployment, the scale of the castles constructed and perhaps most significantly with the dramatic increase in investment of time and financial resources. The untimely death of Llywelyn ap Gruffudd at the Battle of Cilmeri near Builth Wells in central Wales in 1282 (Davies 1987: 279) left Wales unable to rally against Edward and the principality fell to Anglo-Norman dominion in perpetuity. Other uprisings were attempted such as the failed revolt led by Owain Glyndŵr from 1400-1401, but Wales would never again know the independence it had fought for and won from the Anglo-Normans during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.

Conclusion

The chronology of major conflict events that have been summarized spanning the period 1000-1272, highlighted important trends and developments in the conflicts surrounding the Welsh resistance to the Norman incursion into Wales. These include: the importance of castles in the attempt to both dominate and preserve Welsh territories; the political finesse of the Normans that made it possible for them to exploit inter-Welsh conflict to their advantage; and the effective Welsh use of the landscape in military situations, particularly their use of wooded terrain and the proximity of many major battle events to rivers. It is clear from this chronology that a precedent had been established which recognized Gwynedd as the strength of native Wales, this trend began in the eleventh century with Gruffudd ap Llywelyn and was echoed during the 1165 Berwyn Mountain Campaign when Wales rallied under the leadership of Owain Gwynedd and again under the leadership of Llywelyn ap Iorwerth and Llywelyn
ap Gruffudd in the thirteenth century. As the power of Gwynedd increased the amount of inter-Welsh conflict slowly decreased, although conflict over succession still remained as the Welsh did not embrace primogeniture. The patterns of conflict that have been highlighted in this chronology will now be contextualized archaeologically and represented spatially within their broader conflict landscapes.
Chapter Five – Study Area, archaeological conflict landscape reconstruction

Introduction

In order to contextualize discrete events of conflict, it is necessary to reconstruct the broader conflict landscapes within which these events took place. For the purposes of this research, this will be done by identifying and briefly discussing all sites of conflict that fall within the study area (as described in the Methodology Chapter) of medieval Gwynedd and the bordering marches counties of Cheshire and Shropshire, spanning 1066-1272. The temporal selection of 1066-1272 is bounded by the arrival of Normans in Britain, to the Edwardian conquest of Wales. The Edwardian conquest is excluded as those efforts were tactically and politically distinct from the Anglo-Norman conquest of the two preceding centuries. The prolonged and direct involvement of King Edward against the principality of Wales resulted in a different pattern of conflict. The caveat to this temporal parameter is the inclusion of Welsh castles that were captured or destroyed as a result of the Edwardian Conquest. These events are included as they lend further contextualization to the significance of the castle in the conquest of Wales. Earlier events are not considered as the evidence is not sufficient for spatial representation. Additionally, events that were documented in the manuscripts, such as those described in the Chronology Chapter, are only included in the following conflict landscape reconstruction if they can be spatially located with reasonable confidence. Therefore, many of the battles recounted in the conflict chronology cannot, at present, be represented spatially. The method presented by this study was applied to address such inadequacies as shall be demonstrated in the following chapters.

This documentation will highlight patterns and trends of conflict within the study area which will consequently assist in the contextualization of the wider sphere of conflict within which the 1157 and 1165 campaigns took place. The documentation will focus predominantly on castles involved in events of armed conflict, as they are more perceptible on the landscape than battlefields which are often not associated with any built features and whose locations rely heavily
on place-name evidence. The principal sources consulted for this documentation were the Historic Environment Records (herein HER) from the National Monument Records (herein NMR) for sites in England – accessed through the NMR online database *Pastscape*. HERs for sites in Wales were accessed through the Royal Commission of Ancient and Historical Monuments of Wales’ (herein RCAHMW) online database *Coflein*, which uses a unique reference number identified as a NPRN (national preservation record number). Additional HERs were consulted from the Clwyd-Powys and the Gwynedd Archaeological Trusts (herein CPAT and GAT). David Cathcart King’s seminal work *Castellarium Anglicanum* (1983) was integral in the identification of castle sites and when applicable primary sources, such as the *Brut y Tywysogyon* or *The Life of Gruffudd ap Cynan*, have also been evidenced. Independent archaeological reports and other scholarly research were not consulted at this stage as the data present in the HERs and the manuscripts is sufficient for reconstructing the broader conflict landscape setting in which the 1157 and 1165 campaigns took place. Additional sources, such as excavation reports, were consulted for sites within the core areas and areas of integrity; these are reviewed within the Campaign Case Study chapters. What follows is a brief survey of all conflict related sites that fall within the study area of the medieval principality of Gwynedd and the neighbouring marcher counties. For the purposes of this survey, only sites with evidence of armed conflict will be discussed. Sites that do not have evidence of armed conflict but are still important to the general discussion (castles with no documented evidence of armed conflict and *llysoedd*) are spatially represented in the following Case Study chapters ( chapters seven and nine). Figures 34 and 35 on pages 167 and 168 of this chapter document all battlefields and castles with episodes of armed conflict.
Defining the Study Area

Figure 13: Map of eleventh-century Wales, from Map 1. Wales and its Borders in the Eleventh century (Davies 1987: 5), note the medieval Welsh kingdom of Deheubarth historically comprises Ceredigion and Dyfed. (This image has been removed by the author of this thesis for copyright reasons).

Ideally the geographical boundaries of the study area would be delineated exclusively by historical political boundaries, however, the territorial boundaries of the medieval polity of Gwynedd and indeed most medieval Welsh principalities, were in a state of perpetual flux (Davies 1990). This type of instability is endemic to frontier zones and can be credited for the fluctuating boundaries of Gwynedd with its Anglo-Norman marcher neighbours of Cheshire and Shropshire, and with other Welsh polities such as Powys and Deheubarth (see Figure 13 above). Therefore, the study area will be defined using a combination of political, geographical and other features. The ancestral kingdom of Gwynedd approximately encompassed the area west of the Rivers
Dee and Dyfi and included the Isle of Anglesey (Davies 2007). This area roughly encompasses the historic Welsh counties of the Isle of Anglesey, Caernarfonshire, Denbighshire, Flintshire and Merioneth (see Figure 14 below), or the modern Welsh counties of the Anglesey, Conwy, Denbighshire, Flintshire, Gwynedd and Wrexham. At certain points, such as during the reigns of Llywelyn ap Iorwerth and Llywelyn ap Gruffudd during the thirteenth century, Gwynedd’s political control extended much further south encompassing most of Wales. These areas will not be considered as they comprise a landscape of conflict separate from that of the ancestral kingdom of Gwynedd and are beyond the scope of the twelfth-century campaigns considered by this research.

Cheshire and Shropshire are the two English counties that fall within the study area, as these were the marcher counties of the earldom of Cheshire and Shrewsbury, which abutted medieval Gwynedd. Only the western half of Cheshire will be included within the study area, and only the north-western quadrant of Shropshire will be incorporated into the study area. This is roughly the area north of the River Severn at Shrewsbury. The reason for this intentional exclusion of the eastern extremities of these counties is that they are politically separate from the border-zone with Wales and do not contain sites or areas that were involved in conflicts with Gwynedd or Wales. Southern Shropshire is excluded because it shared a border with medieval Powys which represents a separate and discrete landscape of conflict from Gwynedd.
Site Typologies

Castles

The castle is arguably the most durable testament to the culturally contested border zones that define the eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth-century Anglo-Norman conquest of Wales (Lieberman 2010: 126). The construction, location and control of castles were key determinates in the control of power and the resulting success of respective parties to dominate, preserve or expand Gwynedd or Anglo-Norman territories. This is evident in the sheer quantity of castles constructed, both by the Anglo-Normans and the Welsh and the number of sieges or battles that were fought to gain control of those castles and the territory they commanded. The density of castle distribution per county was recorded by King in Castellarium Anglicanum (1983), the table below lists the castle density for the counties (using historic county designations as listing in King) included within the study area. Not all castles within the study area were involved in events of armed conflict, but nonetheless, they and their besieged neighbours need to be holistically interpreted and contextualized within a wider archaeological landscape of conflict.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>County</th>
<th>Castle Density</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anglesey (1)</td>
<td>1 castle to 92 square miles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caernarfonshire (31)</td>
<td>1 castle to 35.6 square miles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheshire (65)</td>
<td>1 castle to 44.1 square miles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denbighshire (102)</td>
<td>1 castle to 44.6 square miles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flintshire (151)</td>
<td>1 castle to 13.5 square miles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merioneth (275)</td>
<td>1 castle to 34.7 square miles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shropshire (419)</td>
<td>1 castle to 12 square miles</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Castle Densities in Gwynedd and the marches, after King (1983).

The density of castle distributions in northern Wales is strikingly less than other areas. For example, Monmouthshire in southern Wales has a density of 1 castle to 9.58 square miles (King 1983: 280). According to King this is because the northern extremities of Wales were the stronghold of the independent Principality of Gwynedd (King 1983: 31). Additionally, the contested zone in Gwynedd was predominantly restricted to Flintshire.

**Battlefields**

For the purposes of the following study area survey, a battlefield, exclusive of castle conflicts such as sieges, is considered to be any event of pre-meditated armed conflict between two opposing forces regardless of size and organisational qualities. This designation moves beyond the heritage communities’ application of a post-medieval definition of battle (English Heritage 2012) which does not give sufficient consideration to other types of armed engagements such as skirmishes or raids, unless these smaller actions were directly attached, temporally and spatially, to a larger battle event. The heritage community currently defines a battle as ‘an action involving wholly or largely military forces, present on each side in numbers totalling c. 1000 or more, and normally deployed in formal battle array’ (Foard and Morris 2012: 6). This constraining definition and intentional slight of so-called lesser actions negatively impacts the holistic comprehension of the landscapes of conflict.
particular to the Anglo-Norman conquest of Wales. The battles represented within the study area include inter-Welsh as well as Welsh and Anglo-Norman battles.

**Llysoedd**

Although rarely the site of armed conflict, the *llys* as a centre of Welsh power needs to be included within the broader conflict landscape, and while not spatially represented within the following study area maps (apart from Figure 16 below), known *llysoedd* are spatially displayed within the core areas of the 1157 and 1165 campaign case studies. The following discussion is a brief overview of the geopolitical divisions and centres of power within native medieval Wales as they existed at the time of the Anglo-Norman Conquest. This is an important consideration as shifts in control and displays of power can be defined by both the location of *llysoedd* and their enhancement or replacement by castles.

![Figure 15: The great hall at Llys Rhosyr, a thirteenth-century llys on Anglesey (photo by the author).](image)

Administrative divisions in medieval Wales were comprised of: the *cantref* (equivalent of the English 'hundred'); the *commote* (there were two or three *commotes* per *cantref*); the *trefi* or township; and the *maenolydd* or manor (Davies 2004: 16; Seaman 2012). 'Within each *commote* there existed one township which contained the commotal centre or llys, these townships are often referred to as *maerdrefi*' (Johnstone 1995: 9). A *llys* was a 'defended settlement consisting of a collection of buildings which housed the lord's family, workers, soldiers, craftsmen and their families. The largest building was a
wooden hall [...] Other buildings included workshops, kitchens, storerooms and stables. The whole complex would be surrounded by a wooden palisade or fence often built on top of an earthen or stone bank' (see Figure 15 above; Earwood and Townsend n.d.:1). On occasion Iron Age or Roman forts were repurposed as a *llys*, an example of this can be seen at the Iron Age hillfort of Caer Drewyn, which as already noted in the Literature Review, was also reused by the Romans during their occupation of North Wales. Additionally, there are instances of Anglo-Norman mottes being repurposed by Welsh princes as *llysoedd*, for example during the mid-twelfth century Madog ap Maredudd of Powys reclaimed the territory surrounding Roft Motte and converted it into a *llys* (see Figure 16 below). Roft motte was probably constructed c. 1086 by Osbern Fitztesso (Johnstone 1995: 6). The site was damaged in 1140, probably in connection with Madog’s re-conquest suggesting that Anglo-Norman structures were destroyed prior to the construction of the *llys*. Interestingly, Roft motte was superimposed on an Iron Age hillfort, the embankments were refortified for use as a bailey (CPAT: 101298). It is unclear whether an earlier *llys* structure also existed prior to the construction of the Anglo-Norman motte and bailey castle.
Figure 16: Extant *llysoedd* and *llysoedd* in use during the mid-twelfth century. Only Aberffraw, Arlechwedd, Whitford wood, Llysfaín, Roft, Edeirnion and Crogan are included within the core areas of the campaign case studies. The inclusions of the other *llysoedd* in this map are meant to contextualize the wider distribution of known *llysoedd* in the twelfth century. Degannwy and Rhuddlan were also believed to have been constructed on top of *llysoedd*, these *llysoedd* were not included on this map as no discrete remains of either supposed *llys* have been documented.

In the 1990s the Gwynedd Archaeological Trust undertook a project that investigated *llysoedd* and *maerdrefi* (plural of *llys* and *maerdref*) in medieval Gwynedd. This survey confirmed no less than ten mottes associated with a *maerdref* on mainland Gwynedd. Only five *maerdrefi* on the mainland were without a motte; currently there is no evidence of mottes being associated with *maerdrefi* on Anglesey, an enigma that requires further archaeological investigation (Johnstone 1995: 7). An earlier survey by the Gwynedd Archaeological Trust established the basic pattern of one motte per *commote*, a similar pattern was also confirmed to the south in Ceredigion (*ibid*: 6). Interestingly, later thirteenth-century Welsh built masonry castles appear to be situated away from commotal centres, it seems that these later constructions were instead associated with the *ffridd* or *vaccary*, a *demesne* cattle farm or pasture (*ibid*: 9). Johnstone draws parallels between the function of the *llys* to that of the castle stating that: ‘in simple terms a castle is no more than a
strongly defended residence with administrative functions. A *llys* could be a defended or non-defended residence with administrative functions’ (Johnstone 1995: 6). Archaeologists have been hesitant to consider this similarity, due to uncertainty over the quality and presence of *llys* fortifications (*ibid*; Longley 1997: 53).

As highlighted in the Literature Review, the construction chronology of these mottes in connection with *maedrefi* is unknown, as is whether they were erected by the Welsh or Anglo-Normans. Nonetheless, the alteration of typical *llys* construction is a product of the conflict generated by the Anglo-Norman incursion into Wales. This is regardless of whether it was a Welsh reaction to the conquest that required additional fortification for their administrative centres, or a visible demonstration of Anglo-Norman power restructuring with a motte in each *commote* as a symbol of conquest. Additionally, in order to characterise *llys* fortifications it is necessary to contextualize them within the appropriate theatre of war, for instance the function of inter-Welsh warfare prior to the Anglo-Norman conquest differed from armed engagements during the conquest. A further discussion of this can be found in the preceding chapter on Welsh and Anglo-Norman Warfare. As little archaeological work has been done it is difficult to spatially document known *llysoedd* that were extant in the mid-twelfth century, this is particularly challenging in Flintshire and regions of Denbighshire that were heavily contested since the early medieval period, with territorial control continually fluctuating between the English and the Welsh in Gwynedd. The *llysoedd* represented above in Figure 16 and below in Tables 3 and 4, are *llysoedd* documented as in use during the mid-twelfth century by the historic environmental records, or *llysoedd* of an earlier foundation whose location could have impacted the campaigns considered by this research. For example Whitford Wood and Llysfain (CPAT: 89612; 58206), are considered to be early medieval *llysoedd* and are in close proximity to the 1157 Coastal Campaign Battle of Coleshill core area. However, as no archaeological survey was conducted at either of these *llysoedd* it is possible that they could have been in use during the mid-twelfth century. This dearth of evidence is pervasive for *llysoedd* throughout the twelfth century; therefore the *llysoedd* included in the charts below are not a comprehensive representation as further
archaeological evidence is needed. Due to this absence of evidence *ilysoedd* will not be discussed in the following regional consideration of sites.

**Study area statistics**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Site Type</th>
<th>Anglesey</th>
<th>Caernarfonshire</th>
<th>Denbighshire</th>
<th>Flintshire</th>
<th>Merioneth</th>
<th>Cheshire</th>
<th>Shropshire</th>
<th>Total for study area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Battlefield</strong></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>16</td>
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<td>19</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total no. of sites per county</strong></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Study Area Statistics 1066-1272.

There are 156 conflict related monuments, (castles, battlefields and *ilysoedd*) included within the study area (see Table 3 above, and Figure 17 and Table 4). Only castles with evidence of conflict and battle sites will be included in the following overview, Table 3 above enumerates all castles within the temporal bounds of the study area. For organisational purposes these sites will be divided by counties, (using historic counties for Welsh sites as this is often how they are presented in scholarly literature), and then chronologically by type, battlefield or castle. When possible these sites will also be contextualized by political reign.
There are 22 battlefields, 7 known *llysoedd* (these only include the confirmed *llysoedd* that fall within the campaign core areas) and 127 known castles within the study area (possible or unconfirmed castles were not included, although consideration is given to them in the Case Study chapters). Approximately 35% of these sites, 59 in total, have evidence of armed conflict.

The Anglo-Norman marcher counties of Cheshire and Shropshire contain a total of 55 castle sites, out of which 12 contain evidence of conflict (approximately 22%). This is in comparison with Gwynedd, which has a total of 73 castle sites out of which 26 have evidence of conflict (approximately 35%, for further detail see Table 4 below). Out of the 127 castle sites 30 are Welsh built. The number of Welsh built castles is possibly higher as the builders/commissioners for some castles are unknown, this is particularly true for those that are poorly documented. Of the 30 known Welsh built castles, 28 are located within modern Wales and two are in present-day Shropshire, thirteen of the Welsh built castles have evidence of armed conflict. Almost one-third of the castles within the study area have evidence of conflict while approximately twenty-five percent were Welsh built; the majority of the castles with documented episodes of conflict were those of Anglo-Norman construction, only one-third of Welsh built castles have evidence of conflict.
Table 4: Castle distributions by county, Welsh built and evidence of conflict.

### Table 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Castle Type</th>
<th>Anglesey</th>
<th>Caernarfon-shire</th>
<th>Denbigh-shire</th>
<th>Flintshire</th>
<th>Merioneth</th>
<th>Chester</th>
<th>Shropshire</th>
<th>Total in Study Area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Castles</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>19</td>
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<tr>
<td>Castles with evidence of armed conflict</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentages of castles with armed conflict</td>
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<td>30</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentages of Welsh built castles</td>
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<td>19</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welsh built with evidence of armed conflict</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Anglesey

Figure 18: Anglesey (red dot = battlefields, blue diamond= castles with conflict). Google Earth 7.0 (2013). North Wales, Anglesey, 53°17’00.31”N 4°21’00.70”W, eye alt. 103.62km, Clouds data layer. [Accessed 02/19/2013] Available from: http://code.google.com/apis/earth.
Battlefields

The battle of Abermenai (NPRN 404304) was fought between the Welsh forces of Gruffudd ap Cynan of Gwynedd and Trahearn ap Caradog of Powys sometime in 1076 or 1077. Trahearn ap Caradog was from the Powysian dynasty that had usurped the kingdom of Gwynedd from the Aberffraw dynasty (from which Gruffudd ap Cynan was descended) of Gwynedd in 1005. Gruffudd was fighting to reclaim his birth-right.

In the 1098 the battle of the Menai Straits (NPRN 404305) was a prolonged and complex series of battles, possibly including a maritime or naval component, fought between the forces of Hugh d’Avranches, first earl of Chester with his ally Hugh of Montgomery, second earl of Shropshire against the Welsh of Anglesey. King Magnus of Norway was also involved in one of the battles. ‘A year after that, the French a third time moved hosts against the men of Gwynedd, with two earls as their leaders, namely Hugh, earl of Shrewsbury, and another [Hugh of Chester] along with him. And they made for the island of Anglesey. And the men of Gwynedd, as was their custom, retreated to the strongest and wildest places they had’ (Brut Pen. 20: 20-21). It is clear from this statement that there were two previous conflict events between the marcher earls and Gwynedd. It is not known when or where these earlier conflicts were fought.

In 1157 the battle of Tal y Moelfre was fought between the forces of King Henry II and Owain Gwynedd with an outcome that was favourable for the Welsh (NPRN: 404314). This battle was part of a larger series of battles fought in 1157 between Owain Gwynedd and King Henry II, the other battles took place in Flintshire where the forces of Gwynedd experienced additional victories. A more detailed description of the Battle of Moelfre can be found in the 1157 Coastal Campaign Case Study Chapter (see page 202) The following three battles are unsubstantiated, insofar as their location and veracity of the event are unconfirmed. The battle of Rhos y Gad, 1170, was an inter-Welsh conflict; Menai Bridge in 1195 and the battle of Coedaneu in the early thirteenth century, involved the Welsh against an unidentified force (NPRN: 404314, 404316 and 404481).
Castles

There is only one out of the six extant castles on the Isle of Anglesey that has evidence of conflict, this is the Castell Aberlleiniog (see Figure 19 below). It was a motte and bailey constructed by Hugh d’Avranches, earl of Chester in 1088. In 1094 the castle was successfully besieged by Gruffudd ap Cynan, abolishing the brief Anglo-Norman conquest of Anglesey (NPRN: 58448). The castle was repurposed during the English Civil War (1642-1651) and the masonry remains visible today date to the seventeenth century (GAT: 2570). It should be noted that the evidence for other pre-Edwardian castles on Anglesey is thin and further archaeological investigation is needed.

Figure 19: View of Castell Aberlleiniog, from RCAHMW: DI2009_1411 (C.531476) NPRN: 58448, © Crown copyright: Royal Commission on the Ancient and Historical Monuments of Wales.
Battlefields

The battle of Bron-yr-erw in 1075 was fought between Gruffudd ap Cynan and Trahaearn ap Caradog of Powys (the usurper of Gwynedd). The battle ended unsuccessfully for Gruffudd and he was forced to flee back to Ireland in exile, unable on this occasion to reclaim Gwynedd (NPRN: 404388; Brut Pen. 20: 16). In 1194 Llywelyn ap Iorwerth (Llywelyn the Great) won an important victory near Aberconwy (NPRN: 404453 and Llyod 1912: 589), which preceded his victory in Anglesey at the battle of Menai Bridge in 1195 (see Figure 18 above).

The next conflict evident documented in Caernarfonshire is the battle of Bryn Derwin in 1255, between Llywelyn ap Gruffudd (Llywelyn the Last) and his brothers Owain and Dafydd, which resulted in Llywelyn’s triumph and established him as the sole ruler of Gwynedd (NPRN: 402322; Lloyd 1912:
The only other battle documented in Caernarfonshire is the unsubstantiated battle of Snowdonia, supposed to have taken place in 1063 (NPRN: 405355). While this battle falls slightly outside the study area time period of 1066-1272, it was included as it demonstrates the mountainous conditions in which inter-Welsh battles could take place.

**Castles**

Degannwy Castle was built by Robert of Rhuddlan sometime during the late eleventh century. This castle endured a series of sieges in: 1120, 1213, 1241 and 1263 as it fluctuated between Welsh and Anglo-Norman control. In 1263 it was methodically destroyed by Llywelyn ab Gruffudd. Interestingly Degannwy Castle was built on the site of a sixth-century *maerdref* which was destroyed by the Saxons in 812 (NPRN: 95282; King 1983: 34). Dolbadarn Castle was built by Llywelyn ap Iorwerth (the Great) in the early thirteenth century as one in a chain of castles to guard the mountain passes of Snowdonia. The other castles built for this purpose were Dolwyddelan Castle also in Caernarfonshire and Castell y Bere in Merioneth. Dolbadarn Castle was situated on the prominent medieval route through Wales, formerly a Roman road; it fell to King Edward I in 1282 (NPRN: 93541). Dolwyddelan Castle was constructed approximately around the same date Dolbadarn (see Figure 21 below) and it also fell to Edward I in 1282 following the defeat of Llywelyn ap Gruffudd. It is believed the Dolwyddelan Castle was built to replace the earlier nearby castle, Tomen Castle, constructed in the late twelfth century (NPRN: 95299). Criccieth Castle was built by Llywelyn ap Iorwerth in the 1230s, it was successfully besieged by Edward I in 1283 (NPRN: 95281). Edward made additions to Criccieth including a gatehouse; the castle was destroyed in 1404 during Owain Glyndŵr’s rebellion (King 1983: 33).
Denbighshire

Battlefields
The bloody battle of Maes Maen Cymro fought in 1118 demonstrates how the Welsh exploited the Anglo-Norman presence to their benefit against their Welsh enemies. Although this battle did not directly involve Gwynedd it took place
near their border. The battle was fought over a border dispute between the lord of the cantref of Dyffryn Clwyd and the lord of the cantref of Rhos (see map in Figure 13 of the Chronology chapter). Four-hundred warriors were conscripted from Powys to come to the aid of Rhos, while the Earl of Chester (Hugh II) sent men to assist Dyffryn Clwyd. Although the cantref Rhos and their Powysian allied forces were victorious, this victory was of short duration as the leader of this expedition, Hywel ap Ithel died soon after from wounds received in battle (Lloyd 1912: 465-6). ‘And Hywel was wounded in the battle, and on the fortieth day after coming home he died. Maredudd and the sons of Cadwgan, although they had won the victory, did not dare to take possession of the land because of the French, but they returned home’ (Brut Pen. 20: 46-47). However, as neither Powys nor Chester had enough man-power to hold Dyffryn Clwyd, it was cunningly absorbed into Gwynedd by Gruffudd ap Cynan (NPRN: 404828).

In 1132 there was a battle event at Wadice (near Llangollen) between Cadwallon, a son of Gruffudd ap Cynan, and Cadwgan ap Gronw ab Owain of Powys: ‘In that year Cadwallon ap Gruffudd ap Cynan was slain in Nanheudwy by Cadwgan ap Goronwy and Einion ab Owain, his first-cousins’ (Brut Pen. 20: 50). Apparently this was done in order to avenge the death of their father (NPRN: 404833); it should be noted that the site of this battle is unverified. In 1165 King Henry II ‘came to Oswestry thinking to annihilate all Welshman. And against him came Owain and Caewaladr, sons of Gruffudd ap Cynan, and all the host of Gwynedd with them...’ (Brut Pen. 20: 63-64). The battle of Crogen (also sometimes referred to as the Battle of Glyn Ceiriog) was a momentous encounter between the forces of King Henry II and the combined forces of Gwynedd, Deheubarth and Powys. As the events surrounding this engagement are included within the 1165 Berwyn Mountain Campaign case study they will be considered in depth in the 1165 Case Study and Military Terrain Analysis chapters.
Castles
There are five castle sites within Denbighshire that were involved in events of armed conflict. Erddig was a large and powerful marcher motte and bailey castle which is sometimes referred to historically as Wrexham or Wristlesham Castle (King 1983: 103; NPRN: 307144). It is possible that Erddig was superimposed over an earlier and more modest earth and timber construction, possibly the castle of Bromfield which was burned in 1140 and is now considered to be a vanished castle. It is not clear whether the castle was burned by accident or intentionally to clear the site for the construction of Erddig (King 1983: 103, 105). However, the Annales Cestrienses which document the event also record the burning of Chester on the same occasion (Annales Cestrienses: yr.1140). In all likelihood these events were a result of the hostilities between King Stephen and the earl of Chester during the Anarchy (Davies 1987: 46-7). Although this episode did not directly involve the Welsh, it demonstrates how the hostilities between the marcher lords and King Stephen distracted the Anglo-Normans, allowing the Welsh the reclaim territory that had been lost during the first wave of Anglo-Norman conquest without any notable opposition.
Following his annexation of the northern Powysian commote of lâl in 1149, Owain constructed a castle, referred to in the Brut as lâl Castle (Brut Pen. 20: 57). The timber castles of Tomen y Rhodwydd and Tomen y Faerdre, have both been suggested as lâl. Rhodwydd was a motte and bailey, whereas Faerdre seems to have only had a motte (CPAT 100888, 100932; King 1983: 104; Pratt 1979). Both King and Pratt favour Tomen y Rhodwydd (near the modern community of Llandegla) as lâl, Pratt believes that Rhodwydd was stationed more appropriately to control access ‘into the Vale of Clwyd…and the passage of the upper Alun valley towards Mold’ (Pratt 1979: 130). Iâl was relinquished by Owain in 1157 as part of the peace terms between him and Henry II following the conclusion of the 1157 Coastal Campaign. Shortly afterwards the castle was destroyed by Iorwerth Goch ap Maredudd of Powys (NPRN: 94737; CPAT: 100888, 100932; King 1983: 104; Pratt 1979). Interestingly the Pipe Rolls record the restoration of Iâl Castle by King John in 1212, probably in connection with his failed campaign in Gwynedd in 1211, in an attempt to prevent any further expansion of Gwynedd (see Chronology Chapter; King 1983: 104). Pratt believes the lâl referred to in the Pipe Rolls in connection with King John’s rebuild was Tomen y Faerdre instead of Tomen y Rhodwydd, although his reason for this is not entirely clear, Pratt believes that Faerdre was a new construction by John, whereas King believes that Faerdre was in existence at the time of Domesday (Pratt 1979: 132; King 1983: 104). Further investigation and archaeological excavation is needed to verify the foundation location of Owain’s lâl.

Castell Dinas Bran, situated on top of the remains of an Iron Age hillfort, had a lifespan of only seven years (NPRN: 307064). Built in 1270 by north Powys it was destroyed by its own garrison in 1277 to ensure that it did not fall into the hands of Edward I (Davies 1987: 333; King 1983: 103). The construction of Denbigh Castle by the English in 1282 was hindered and damaged by the brief Welsh revolt in 1294 following the Edwardian Conquest (NPRN: 95209). Although not within the temporal bounds of the study area spatial representation, Denbigh was included as it is suggestive of continued instability along the traditional contested zone between Gwynedd and England. Castell y Waun (NPRN: 307013), located near the Crogen battlefield may have
been involved in the battle, however, as this is difficult to determine it is not included on the map above.

Figure 24: view of Castell Dinas Bran with the remains of the Iron Age earthworks in the centre ground and the town of Llangollen and the Dee river valley to the centre left (photo by the author).

Flintshire

Figure 25: Flintshire, Google Earth 7.0 (2013) North Wales, Flintshire, 53°12′02.21″N 3°06′49.45″W, eye alt. 128.03km, Clouds data layer. [Accessed 02/19/2013] Available from: http://code.google.com/apis/earth.
Battlefields
There are five battlefield events documented within Flintshire, four of these were concentrated in the mid-twelfth century, the remaining battle of Pant y Terfyn is unsubstantiated and consequently not precisely dated, but is believed to have taken place in the eleventh century. This is based on finds evidence from the Clwyd Powys Archaeological Trust's records of a metal detector survey conducted at this location which did not yield any conclusive evidence (NPRN: 404840; CPAT: 17410). However, the metallic artefacts uncovered from the survey were considered to be too corroded for identification and were seemingly not subjected to any conservation techniques to assist in identification (Wayne 1992: 4,5). In 1146 a force from Powys crossed the River Dee and began to ravage the cantref of Maelor Saesneg, they were challenged by the forces of Robert of Mold and defeated at the battle of Wich (NPRN: 404862 and Lloyd 1912: 491).

In 1150 the Welsh forces of Gwynedd under the command of Owain Gwynedd and a force from Powys, reinforced with a contingent of Anglo-Norman allies met in the field at Coleshill. The purpose of this campaign against Owain was to check the expansion of Gwynedd, into Powys and Cheshire. ‘In that year Madog ap Maredudd, king of Powys, thought with the help of Ranulf, earl of Chester, to rise up against Owain. And after the host of his supporters had been slain at Coleshill they fled’ (Brut Pen. 20: 57; NPRN: 404847). The 1157 Battle of Coleshill, fought in connection with the 1157 Coastal Campaign, was fought near the location of the 1150 event. As the 1157 battle is one of the case studies considered, it will be discussed in detail in the following Case Study and Military Terrain Analysis chapters.

Castles
There are eleven castles with documented events of armed conflict in Flintshire, almost double the amount of any other county within the study area. This is because the disputed border-zone between Wales and England was further west than the modern boundary between Flintshire and Cheshire. This is also why there were considerably fewer Anglo-Norman marcher castles in western Cheshire than in the western districts of Shropshire or Herefordshire.
Rhuddlan Castle's earth and timber predecessor now known as Twt Hill, was constructed in 1073 by Robert of Rhuddlan seemingly on top of an earlier Welsh centre, it was replaced by an Edwardian masonry castle in 1277 (see Figure 26 below). This castle endured a series of attacks sieges by the Welsh in 1075, 1167 and again in 1213 (King 1983: 154). In 1075 Gruffudd ap Cynan led an assault of Rhuddlan Castle where he 'laid waste and burnt everything taking home extremely rich spoils. Many of their [Rhuddlan's] armoured and helmeted cavalry fell from their horses and perished in the battle, and many of the infantry too; and barely a few of the Gauls safely retreated to the tower unharmed' (LGC: 63). According to this account from The Life of Gruffudd ap Cynan, the Welsh did not successfully capture the castle, although it is apparent that some damage was inflicted. In 1167 'Owain and Cadwaladr, princes of Gwynedd, and Rhys from Deheubarth, gathered together with their hosts to attack the castle of Rhuddlan. And they besieged it for three months; and after taking the castle and destroying it, and burning it, and after they had won the victory, they returned again joyfully to their lands' (Brut Pen 20: 64-65). Finally in 1213 Llywelyn the Great took permanent possession of Rhuddlan Castle (NPRN: 157156 and Brut Pen 20: 87-88), this is the same year that he took possession of Degannwy Castle in Caernarfonshire (see above), a castle that had also been originally constructed by Robert of Rhuddlan. The final episode of conflict to occur at Rhuddlan was in 1282 when the Edwardian edifice was unsuccessfully attacked by the Welsh (NPRN: 92914).
Mold Castle was constructed sometime prior to 1146 (NPRN: 307119) when it was successfully besieged and taken by Gwynedd. This was accomplished *in lieu* of Owain’s conquest of the marcher territory that abutted the north-eastern frontier of Gwynedd. For ‘neither the nature of the place nor its strength nor its forces could defend it from being burnt and completely destroyed; and many of the garrison were slain and others captured and imprisoned’ (Brut Pen. 20: 54-55). Presumably Mold Castle was rebuilt as it was besieged again in 1199, 1245 and 1256 (King 1983: 154). Similar to the situation described above between the marcher lords and Stephen, Owain took advantage of the struggle between Powys and Robert of Mold. While Powys and the Anglo-Normans were engaged in the Battle of Wich (NPRN: 94737).

Coleshill Castle, also known as Hen Blas was built in 1157 and was captured by the Welsh in 1166 (NPRN: 307131; *Brut Pen. 20*: 64); further
discussion of the castle and its role in the 1157 Battle of Coleshill can be found in the 1157 Case Study chapter and the Military Terrain Analysis chapter. Prestatyn Castle was built prior to 1167, when it was destroyed by the Welsh, during the same campaign that targeted Rhuddlan and Hen Blas (Coleshill; NPRN: 92922 and King 1983: 154; Brut RBH: 149). Holywell Castle was probably constructed sometime during the middle of the twelfth century. This castle is also identified as the possible site of Basingwerk Castle, now vanished. Similar to Prestatyn, Rhuddlan and Basingwerk were successfully besieged by the Welsh in 1166 (NPRN: 300557 and King 1983: 155; Brut Pen. 20: 64). Basingwerk is recorded as the site where the forces of Owain Gwynedd encamped prior to the battle of Coleshill with Henry II in 1157. Henry II also fortified a castle at Basingwerk at the conclusion of the 1157 campaign (Annales Cestrienses yr.1157; AC, B text: 87).

It should be noted that there is some confusion over the location and naming of Hen Blas (or Coleshill Castle) and Basingwerk Castle. As there are no visible remains of a castle within the modern boundaries of Basingwerk it is possible that Basingwerk is in reality Hen Blas, particularly since they were constructed in the same year, 1157. Therefore, Hen Blas and Basingwerk are rather confusingly referred to interchangeably. King has suggested that Basingwerk is most likely Bryn Castell, a tumulus of undetermined origin east of Hen Blas, however, his reasons for this are unclear and unverified (King 1983: 153). Further discussion of this can be found in both the 1157 Case Study chapter and the Military Terrain Analysis chapter.

Hawarden Castle was an earth and timber motte and bailey constructed sometime prior to the thirteenth century when it was converted into a masonry castle in 1297, (see Figure 27 below). It was besieged in 1205, 1282 and 1294. In 1205 it was besieged by the Welsh unsuccessfully as the castle garrison was relieved by English royal forces (NPRN: 95095 and King 1983: 153). Hawarden wood has been connected with a battle events the 1157 campaign and will be discussed further in Chapters Six and Seven (Brut Pen. 20: 59-60).
Dyserth Castle, built in 1241 by King Henry III is thought to have been built on the site of a prehistoric hillfort; it was attacked by the Welsh in 1245 and destroyed by Llywelyn ap Gruffudd in 1263 following a blockade and siege. There is a poor level of preservation at this site, as Dyserth Castle was quarried in the early twentieth century (NPRN: 92974; CPAT: 102060).

Ewloe Castle was built by Llywelyn ap Gruffudd in 1257, following his seizure of most of present day Flintshire from England. The castle was possibly built on the site of Ilys dating to the eleventh or twelfth centuries, although this claim has yet to be substantiated (Davies-Cook 1891). The castle was successfully besieged and destroyed by King Edward I in 1277 following the refusal of Llywelyn ap Gruffudd to do homage to newly crowned King Edward I in 1272 (NPRN: 94447 and King 1983: 132). Flint Castle was constructed in 1277 by Edward I and was used as a base of operation for the Edwardian conquest of Wales. Flint Castle was the first in what would become a ring of masonry castles constructed by Edward in Gwynedd. It was unsuccessfully besieged by Dafydd ap Gruffudd (brother to Llywelyn ap Gruffudd) in 1282 (NPRN: 94448 and King 1983:152). Caergwrle Castle was the last Welsh masonry to be built. It was constructed in 1278 by Dafydd ap Gruffudd and was abandoned to the English in 1282, presumably following the death of Llywelyn ap Gruffudd (NPRN: 95099 and King 1983: 151).
Merioneth

Figure 28: Merioneth. Google Earth 7.0 (2013) North Wales, Merioneth, 52°48'34.08"N 3°52'59.57"W, eye alt. 128.03km, Clouds data layer. [Accessed 02/19/2013]

Battlefields

There are only three battlefields documented within the historical boundaries of Merioneth; of these only one is relevant to the Anglo-Norman and Welsh theatre of war. The Battle in Dyffryn Glyncul also known as Gwaeterw or the ‘Bloody Acre’, was between Gruffudd ap Cynan and Trahaearn ap Caradog in 1075 (NPRN: 404928). This battle was one in a series of attempts, fought over the course of six years as Gruffudd sought to reclaim Gwynedd from Powys. Gruffudd was successful in this particular instance and ultimately regained control of Gwynedd in 1081 (LGC: 63). In 1094 ‘the French brought a host to Gwynedd; and against them came Cadwgan ap Bleddyn, and he defeated them and drove them to flight, inflicting great slaughter upon them. And that battle was in Coedysbys’ (Brut Pen. 20: 19). In 1216 there was a battle between King John and Ffouike Fitzwarren at the alleged battle site of Llynor near Llandrillo. Although an intra-English conflict it is possible that one or both sides could have received Welsh assistance (NPRN: 404924).
Castles
Cymer, the first Welsh built castle, constructed by Uchdryd ap Edwin in 1116 was destroyed in the same year (NPRN: 93825). ‘For Cadwgan ap Bleddyn [at that time an ally of King Henry I] had given Meirionnydd and Cyfeiliog to Uchdryd on this condition: that he should be a true inseparable friend to him and his sons and a helper against all opposition that might come upon them. He [Uchdryd], however, was opposed to Cadwgan and his sons’ (Brut Pen. 20: 40-46). It is unclear whether Uchdryd ap Edwin had allied himself with Gwynedd and Gruffudd ap Cynan. Castell Cynfal, another Welsh built castle, was destroyed as a result of an intra-Gwynedd conflict in 1147 and had probably only been constructed several years previous to its destruction.

‘[S]trife was begotten between the sons of Owain, Hywel and Cynan, and Cadwaladr, their uncle. And then Hywel, from the one direction, and Cynan, from the other came together to Merionnydd… they turned their army towards the castle of Cynfael, which Cadwaladr had built [...] Hywel and Cynan [...] took the castle by force’ (Brut. Pen 20: 55-56).

Castle Tomen y Bala was built by the Welsh and may be an associated defensive feature of the ily of the Penllyn commote. It is unclear when it was originally constructed but it was taken by the English in 1202 and remained in use through the thirteenth century (NPRN: 303419). Castell y Bere (see Figure 29 below) was a masonry castle constructed by Llywelyn the Great in 1221 to protect the southern boundaries of Gwynedd; it was captured by the English in 1283. In 1294 the Welsh unsuccessfully attempted to retake the castle (NPRN: 93719 and King 1983: 276).
Cheshire

Figure 30: Cheshire (note: Stockport Castle not shown as exact location is unknown (King 1983: 67-71). Google Earth 7.0 (2013) Marcher Counties, Cheshire, 53°11’22.50”N 2°44’55.10”W, eye alt. 173.14km, Clouds data layer. [Accessed 02/19/2013]

Castles

Chester Castle was commissioned in 1070 by William the Conqueror. Throughout its prolonged history it served as an operations base for multiple Anglo-Norman monarchs and marcher earls in their campaigns into Wales. It
was not directly involved, insofar as it was not besieged, in any events of armed conflict against the Welsh. The only exception to this was its involvement in inter-English conflict, the Barons’ Rebellion in 1265, but it is unclear if the English had any Welsh allies at this particular event (NMR: SJ46NW44). Beeston Castle (see Figure 31 below), was built in the 1220s by Ranulf de Blundeville, the sixth earl of Chester. It was captured by Prince Edward in 1265, also probably in connection to the Baron’s Rebellion. Again it is unclear whether there was any Welsh involvement in this action (NMR: SJ55NW3 and King 1983: 65).

Figure 31: Beeston Castle, from NMR SJ55NW3. (This image has been removed by the author of this thesis for copyright reasons).

The following group of castles do not appear to be scheduled monuments as no national monument record was found to exist. Dunham Massey, Stockport and Ullenswood Castles are documented in King’s *Castellarium Anglicanum* where they are sourced to *The Chronicles of the Reigns of Henry II and Richard I* by the chronicler Benedict of Peterborough. They were involved in the revolt of 1173-1174, when the sons of Henry II and their supporters rebelled against him. It is unclear whether any Welsh lords or princes were included in this group of supporters (King 1983: 67-71).
Shropshire

Figure 32: Shropshire (note: the ‘Capture of Shrewsbury’ is the same location as the siege of Shrewsbury Castle). Google Earth 7.0 (2013) Marcher Counties, Shropshire, 52°50'16.37"N 2°52'35.67"W, eye alt. 129.68km, Clouds data layer. [Accessed 02/19/2013]

Battlefields
In 1215 ‘the men of the North from the one side rose up against him [(King John)], and the Welsh from the other side….And Llywelyn ap Iorwerth, Prince of Gwynedd, and the Welsh made for Shrewsbury; and the town and castle were surrendered to them without resistance’ (Brut Pen. 20: 89-92). The capture of the town of Shrewsbury, including the castle (described in further detail below) was not a battle in the traditional sense as they were both surrendered ‘without resistance.’ The ease with which Llywelyn ap Iorwerth and his Welsh allies were able to capture Shrewsbury, seat of the earldom of Shrewsbury, speaks to the strength of a united Wales.

Castles
In connection with the conflict described above, Shrewsbury Castle was commissioned by William the Conqueror and built by Robert de Montgomery, the first earl of Shrewsbury, sometime during the last quarter of the eleventh century. It was besieged on two separate occasions prior to 1215 when it was successfully taken by Llywelyn ap Iorwerth, once in 1102 and again in 1138. The 1108 siege was in lieu of a conflict between the barons and Henry I. It was
besieged by King Stephen in 1138 in connection to the civil war between Stephen and Matilda (NMR: SJ41SE45 and King 1983: 430). Oswestry Castle was built sometime prior to 1086 when it is recorded as Luvre Castle in *Domesday*. It was captured by Madog ap Maredudd, Prince of Powys in 1149 and then rebuilt as a masonry castle; it was destroyed by King John in 1216 (NMR: SJ22NE1; King 1983: 427 and *Brut Pen. 20*: 57). Oswestry Castle was used as a military base by Henry II before setting out on the 1165 Berwyn Mountain Campaign.

Figure 33: Shrawardine Castle, from NMR SJ41NW5. (This image has been removed by the author of this thesis for copyright reasons).

Shrawardine Castle, a shell keep situated on a motte including three baileys, was constructed by the order of King Henry I some time during the first quarter of the twelfth century (see Figure 33 above). It was destroyed by Llywelyn ap Iorwerth in 1215 as part of the campaign against Shrewsbury (NMR: SJ41NW5 and King 1983: 429). Whittington Castle was built by the Anglo-Normans as an earth and timber motte and bailey in 1138; it was converted into a masonry castle in 1221. In 1223 it was captured by Llywelyn ap Iorwerth but was later restored to English control by King Henry III (NMR: SJ33SW7; King 1983: 432). Ruyton Castle, of an unknown construction date, was destroyed by Llywelyn ap Iorwerth in 1212 (NMR: SJ32SE6). Similar to Ruyton, the castle of Belan Bank is of an unknown construction date. It was captured by the Welsh in 1223, probably by Llywelyn ap Iorwerth. It was not destroyed but was out of use by 1249 (NMR: SJ32SW2 and King 1983: 425). Hodnet Castle near Marchamely may have been built as a siege-work in 1223. It is also possible that there was an existing motte at Hodent that was modified
into a siege work in response to renewed warfare with the Welsh (NMR: SJ52NE8).

Conclusions

The conflict landscape reconstruction of Gwynedd, Cheshire and Shropshire from the period of 1066-1272 has highlighted the significant role of castles in determining the success or failure of Anglo-Norman conquest attempts and Welsh resistance efforts. A clustering of castles is evident in the frontier zones both along the borders between Gwynedd, Cheshire and Shropshire, and along the coast. Although less complete of a representation (due to the difficulty in determining their location), battles also occurred within highly contested frontier zones. Welsh verse Anglo-Norman battles took place on the periphery of these frontiers, such as at Coleshill, Crogen and Wich; while inter-Welsh conflict took place along commotal boundaries (see Figures 12 and 13). Additionally, as has been discussed in the chapter on Welsh and Anglo-Norman warfare, the Welsh adoption of castle building technology is indicative an adaptation to a Vegetian style of warfare. By the mid-twelfth century, Owain Gwynedd was using castles in a similar manner to the Anglo-Normans; to secure his claim to the land he had conquered (e.g. Tomen y Rhodwydd). The prolific use of the castle as a symbol and scion of conquest and security presents a visual pattern of conquest and resistance that was epitomized by the systematic destruction of Welsh built castles during the Edwardian Conquest.
Figure 34: All battlefield sites in study area. Google Earth 7.0 (2013). North Wales, All Study Area Battlefields, 52°58’41.24"N 3°27’09.06"W, eye alt. 175.32km, Clouds data layer. [Accessed 02/19/2013] Available from: http://code.google.com/apis/earth.
Figure 35: All castle sites with evidence of armed conflict in study area. Google Earth 7.0 (2013). North Wales, All Study Area Castles, 52°58'41.24"N 3°27'09.06"W, eye alt. 175.32km, Clouds data layer. [Accessed 02/19/2013] Available from: http://code.google.com/apis/earth.
Chapter Six – Introduction and Overview of the 1157 Coastal Campaign

Most deeply does the deep pain of his taking away pierce me,
   A cruel one in claiming his right in a fierce attack
   Whenever red blood flowed,
   A torrent upon a spear at the ready.

The sword of the one who was ardent in versecraft was ready
   On the day of battle by Chester strand,
   One swift to anger, a shield in a hundred battles,
   A hero, a splendid hero, a foremost slayer in battle.
Excerpt from the twelfth-century poem An elegy for Bleddyn Fardd: Cynddelw sang it
   (in Gruffydd 2003: 57).

Introduction

Henry II ascended to the English throne in December of 1154 and by 1157 he had organised a military campaign against Gwynedd. Henry II’s active involvement in Wales, initiated by the 1157 Coastal Campaign, hallmarked an era of renewed royal interest in Wales that had not been seen since the reign of his grandfather, Henry I (d. 1135). The purpose of this campaign was to check Gwynedd’s eastwards expansion and in doing so, neutralize them as a threat to the Anglo-Norman marcher territories and the neighbouring Welsh principality of Powys. The wider goal of this assault was to continue the conquest efforts of Henry I, in an attempt to subdue and conquer the Welsh. Gwynedd’s response to Henry II’s 1157 and 1165 campaigns is unique as it demonstrates how the Welsh, and Gwynedd in particular, successfully adjusted their military tactics to compensate for the Anglo-Norman threat (see the Welsh and Anglo-Norman Medieval Warfare chapter). The successful application of these tactical innovations established a new precedent and pattern of Welsh resistance to the Anglo-Norman Conquest. These behavioural shifts are documented and discussed in detail in the Military Terrain Analysis chapter.

As reviewed in the Welsh and Anglo-Norman Medieval Warfare chapter, battle was a rare event in medieval conflicts (see page 81) and usually only took place either by force, such as in a siege, or ‘when both sides wanted to, and thought they had a chance of winning’ (Verbruggen 1997: 329). The Battle of Coleshill is one of these rare exceptions, when the Welsh forces led by Dafydd and Cynan, the sons of Owain Gwynedd, ambushed Henry’s troops, forcing them into battle (Brut Pen. 20: 59-60). The Battle of Coleshill was one of two
battles that took place during the 1157 Coastal Campaign; the other was the Battle of Moelfre which took place on the Isle of Anglesey. Due to a dearth of evidence for the Battle of Moelfre, it will not be subjected to spatial analysis and its inclusion within the 1157 campaign discussion is limited to the conflict landscape reconstruction of the 1157 campaign core area in the next chapter. The following is a summary of the source material and a synopsis of the 1157 Coastal Campaign. This historical overview provides a platform for the gross-pattern analysis presented in the next chapter. A significant proportion of this discussion is given to the historiography of the Battle of Coleshill; this is due to inaccuracies in antiquarian publications that have led to the identification of an unsubstantiated battle event at Ewloe in connection with the 1157 campaign.

**Source Material**

*Previous Academic Inquiry*

Academics past and present have shown an undeniable favouritism for the era of Edwardian Conquest in Wales at the close of the thirteenth century, much of this focus can be credited to the popularity of the study of Edwardian castles in Wales (Gravett 2012; Butler 2010; Longley 2010; Prestwich 2010; Prestwich 1988; Morris 1901; Chrimes 1969; Lloyd 1917). Thus, the grandeur associated with events of the Edwardian Conquest, most notably the castles that were its outcome, has overshadowed the Anglo-Norman conquest of Wales during the twelfth century. However, the twelfth century has not been ignored in entirety by the academic community. The events that transpired during Henry II’s 1157 campaign into Gwynedd have been analysed by a handful of historians, notably J.E. Lloyd (1912), D.C. King (1965), J.G. Edwards (1967) and J.D. Hosler (2004). These events have not been subjected to any prior archaeological investigation.

King’s and Hosler’s research centres on the military abilities of Henry II, both concluding that he was more adept than the chroniclers recording events indicate. Edwards attempts to ascertain more accurately the location of Owain’s encampment at Basingwerk and the location of the battle. In an attempt to rectify the discrepancy in the manuscripts that list the site of the battle either in Hawarden Wood or Coleshill (see historiography section below),
Edwards essentially averages the distance putting the site of the battle somewhere between Hawarden and Coleshill (1967: 262). Lloyd summarises the events that transpired in 1157 with his usual flair, and while his narrative provides a solid overview of events, it is too full of artistic licence to use as a reference. Additionally, Lloyd’s translations of the Latin manuscripts are less accurate than those by Jones (1952). Unfortunately, many scholars and heritage bodies have relied heavily on Lloyd’s translations and interpolations – even though many of these manuscripts now have proper translations – propagating further errors and inhibiting scholarly advancement. The over-reliance on Lloyd has been noted by other scholars such as W. Davies who, although predominantly discussing pre-Conquest Wales states: ‘most aspects of most [manuscript] interpretations are arguable. For that very reason Sir John Lloyd’s interpretation of early Welsh political development, which has dominated all consideration of pre and post-Norman Conquest politics since the early twentieth century, needs questioning’ (1990:4).

**Manuscripts**

The 1157 campaign timeline, to follow in the next chapter, is predominantly derived from five principal twelfth-century sources. The most detailed accounts are found in the Peniarth 20 and the Red Book of Hergest versions of the Brut y Tywysogion, the Brehinedd y Saesson, Annales Cambriae (B and C texts) and the William of Newburgh version of The Chronicles of the Reigns of Stephen, Henry II and Richard I. The Journey Through Wales (by Gerald of Wales), Annales Cestrienses, Chronica Rogeri de Hoveden, Chronica de Mailros, Chronicles of the Reigns of Stephen, Henry II and Richard I (the Robert of Torigni version), the Great Roll of the Pipe (Pipe Roll Series), The Historical Works of Gervase of Canterbury and The Chronicle of Jocelin of Brakelond were also consulted. The Annales Cambriae, Brut y Tywysogion Peniarth 20 version and Brut y Tywysogion Red Book of Hergest version manuscripts are all believed to have been derived from one original lost Latin text which could be used for justification to not compare or consult all three. However, there are ‘specific comments within the texts of the Bruts which do not appear in any version [A, B, C texts] of the Annales Cambriae. This in turn suggests that the
Annales and the Bruts used separate texts for their narratives, although their similarities would suggest that these texts themselves originated from an original St David’s chronicle’ (Remfry 2007: 2). Therefore, for the purposes of this research they have been treated as three distinct texts.

**Campaign Overview and Historical Context**

*Historical Context*

Wales was largely ignored by the English Crown during the civil war resulting from the ‘Anarchy’ that consumed King Stephen’s reign (1135-1154). This enabled the Welsh to strengthen their borders and reclaim territory lost to the English during the reign of Henry I. Many Welsh princes also capitalized on the power vacuum created during the Anarchy in the Welsh Marches, expanding their territories to the east into the highly contested frontier zone (Davies 1987: 45-7; Crouch 1994). The reclamation and expansion of territory led to competition and created friction between neighbouring Welsh principalities, which in some cases led to armed conflict, such as the 1150 Battle of Coleshill (discussed below).

Owain ap Gruffudd, better known as Owain Gwynedd came to power in Gwynedd in 1137, following the death of his father, Gruffudd ap Cynan. He spent the first two decades of his reign strengthening his kingdom and expanding its borders to the east. Due to the turbulence caused by the anarchy, the first twenty years of his reign was relatively free from Anglo-Norman intervention. Powys, Gwynedd’s Welsh neighbour to the east and southeast, was attempting to expand their territory into the same region of the Welsh Marches as Gwynedd, the commote of Tegeingl (see Figure 12). In 1146 the Anglo-Norman contingent at Mold challenged the Powsian conquest of the marcher territory of Maelor Saesneg at the Battle of Wich near Whitchurch (*Brut Pen. 20*: 54-5; NPRN 404862). Owain Gwynedd, taking advantage of their distraction successfully besieged and claimed Mold Castle. In doing so he was able to securely establish himself in this contested region, and in one shrewd manoeuvre was able to abolish Anglo-Norman control of the area and annex part of northern Powys to Gwynedd’s dominion. To further secure his annexation of Mold and northern Powys, Owain built the timber motte castle of
lâl (popularly identified with either Tomen y Rhodwydd or Tomen y Faerdre) in 1149 (*Brut Pen.* 20: 57). In the meantime Oswestry Castle, an early Anglo-Norman construction appearing in *Domesday* (Suppe 1984), was taken by Madog ap Maredudd either in 1147 or 1148 (*ibid*), Oswestry did not stay under Welsh control for long, as it was used by Henry II as an operations base prior to setting out on the 1165 campaign (see Chapters Eight and Nine on the Berwyn Mountain Campaign). Owain’s conquest of northern Powys did not go unchallenged, in 1150 Madog ap Maredudd of Powys contested Owain Gwynedd’s claim to northern Powys at the Battle of Coleshill. ‘In that year Madog ap Maredudd, king of Powys, thought with the help of Ranulf, earl of Chester, to rise up against Owain. And after the host of his supporters had been slain at Coleshill they fled’ (*ibid*). The allied Welsh and Anglo-Norman contingent from Powys and Chester were unable to subdue Owain in battle, and his claim to the region remained unchallenged until Henry II’s Coastal Campaign against Gwynedd in 1157 (*ibid*).

**Campaign Overview**

Prior to 1157 discord arose between Owain Gwynedd and his brother Cadwaladr in which ‘Owain had ejected his brother Cadwaladr’ and proclaimed himself the sole ruler of Gwynedd (King 1965: 369). As discussed in the earlier chapters on Medieval Warfare and Chronology, the Welsh system of partible inheritance meant that kingdoms were frequently divided amongst siblings. Due to this, conflict between siblings was common, as they sought to reclaim the land that had belonged to their father. Cadwaladr, disgruntled by the loss of his territory, reportedly sought the assistance of King Henry II. Undoubtedly Henry was delighted with Cadwaladr’s request, ‘since its fulfilment would involve a division of Owain’s authority and a legitimate reason to invade Gwynedd (*ibid*).

However, given that Owain had already seized marcher territory, namely the *cantref* of Tegeingl (which incorporates all of the territories displayed below in Figure 36), as well as the Powysian *commote* of lâl it was unlikely that Henry needed any further excuse to wage war against Gwynedd.
In 1157 Henry II gathered a large force near Chester, some of the manuscripts indicate that Madog ap Maredudd of Powys assisted the king on this expedition, as at this point Powys was allied with England (Brut Pen. 20: 59-60). From Chester, Henry led his troops up the coastal Roman road to where Owain Gwynedd and his Welsh forces were encamped at Basingwerk. At an undisclosed distance from Basingwerk Henry divided his forces into two contingents. One group continued along the coastal road while the other turned aside into the forest (coed or coet in the Brut) with the intention of looping around in order to assault the Welsh forces from the front and rear (ibid).

Unfortunately for Henry, Owain anticipated this manoeuvre and had strategically stationed his sons, Cynan and Dafydd, in an attempt to prevent any such advance. At a disputed location in the woods between Hawarden and Basingwerk, Cynan and Dafydd led a force that ambushed Henry in the woods with devastating effects to the Anglo-Norman troops, who suffered heavy casualties. Although that ambush proved damaging for the Anglo-Norman contingent they were able to regroup and continue to where the bulk of Owain’s
force remained encamped at Basingwerk. Aware that he was about to be surrounded, Owain retreated to a place of refuge referred to in some of the sources as Tâl- Llyn Pynna or Cil Owain. Henry did not pursue Owain; instead he gathered his divided force and continued to Rhuddlan. While encamped at Rhuddlan the king endured a series of raids by the Welsh forces (*ibid*; BS: 159; RBH: 135; AC: 87).

At the same time these events were transpiring a naval contingent sent by Henry was arriving at Anglesey, the heartland of Gwynedd. The order of battle on Anglesey is less certain; however it is clear that after pillaging several of the island’s churches the Anglo-Normans were met in battle by the men of Anglesey and were driven back to sea in a crushing defeat. Due to the prolonged impasse at Rhuddlan and the defeat on Anglesey, Henry and Owain entered into negotiations and arrived at a settlement whereby Henry would leave Gwynedd in exchange for Welsh hostages and the return of the territory that Owain had acquired in Powys and the marches (*ibid*). Traditionally historians have regarded the conclusion to these events as a crushing defeat for Owain Gwynedd. The analysis that follows challenges these assumptions and seeks to reinstate a native Welsh narrative, via an archaeological conflict landscape analysis, into what has become an oversimplified conflict account clouded by an Anglo-Norman bias in modern scholarship (Warren 1973; Hosler 2004; Duffy 2007).

**Historiography of the Battle of Coleshill**

Currently there exist two traditions for the location of the 1157 battle event, referred to in this study as the Battle of Coleshill. This distinction is supported by manuscripts referenced above and by three manuscripts in particular that identify Coleshill by name as the site of the battle: *The Journey Through Wales* (Book II Ch. 7: 189, Book II Ch. 10: 196), the *Annales Cestrienses* (yr. 1157) and *The Chronicle of Jocelin of Brakelond* (110). This location is also archaeologically confirmed using the conflict archaeology methods of military terrain and spatial analysis; the results from these analyses are described in the Military Terrain Analysis chapter. Conversely, the Battle of *Coed Eulo* (or Ewloe Wood, presently located in Wepre Wood Park) has been popularized by local
historical societies and the press as the location of the 1157 battle event. This misidentification is the result of earlier erroneous antiquarian research. This error needs to be addressed, particularly given the extensive commemoration and press that Coed Eulo has undeservedly received (for example: BBC News 2008; Fflint Through the Ages n.d.; Green 2012; North Wales Post 2008).

The other manuscripts do not agree on a named location for the battle. Jones’s 1952 English translation of *Peniarth 20* version of the *Brut* names the wood of Hawarden (Brut Pen. 20; 59-60), whereas the *Red Book of Hergest* merely states that the battle transpired in a ‘wild wood’ (*RBH*: 135). The original Welsh word for Hawarden as documented in the *Brut* has been transliterated in different ways, depending on which translation of the *Peniarth 20* is consulted. The 1860 translation by J.W. Ithel states *Koet Kennadlaoc*, however, since there is no ‘k’ in the medieval Welsh alphabet this was probably a poor English transliteration of a ‘c’ or more likely a ‘p.’ Owen, in *Place Names of East Flintshire*, states that the earliest reference to this wood is documented in Owain Gwynedd’s successful ambush of Henry II’s troops in 1157 as recorded in the *Brut y Tywysogion* as “koet pennardlaoc’, ‘the wood of Penarlâg’ (Hawarden)” (1994: 169).

A reliable translation of the *Bruts* did not exist until the mid- twentieth century, therefore, historians if they were able, could attempt to translate the manuscripts themselves, or more often than not, they relied on other translations, most notably those of David Powel. In 1589 Powel published a tome entitled *Historie of Cambria*. This was the first monograph to be published on the history of Wales and it soon became a primary reference source for generations of historians to follow. Powel’s publication was arguably the authority on Welsh history until J.E. Lloyd’s volumes were published in 1912. While Powel did draw upon the medieval manuscripts for his monograph, his translation of them was rough and he admittedly enhanced them with records and accounts from his peers. Many of the assertions in these insertions were later proven unfounded and devoid of any historical accuracy by J.E. Lloyd (Jenkins 2009).

Despite this, Powel’s account of the 1157 campaign has endured through the centuries and survives in academic publications to this day. There are two primary discrepancies, involving the 1157 campaign, which originate in Powel’s
account and are later recycled in academic literature of the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The first is that the ambush led by Owain’s sons, Cyan and Dafydd, took place at Coed Eulo (Ewloe Wood). Following this account Powel’s manuscript provides an indented quote which he cites to W. Parnus *lib. 2 cap. 5*. This excerpt claims that the battle took place ‘in a strait at Counsylth’ which is translated as Coleshill (Powel 1589:150-151). This excerpt contradicts Powel’s earlier claim of the battle having taken place at *Coed Eulo*. Many later historians have interpreted Powel’s allusion to two places as two separate armed engagements. The first at Coed Eulo followed by Coleshill, this is a surprising conclusion given that all of the manuscripts clearly reference only one engagement. Powel does not clearly cite his reference or evidence for *Coed Eulo*, a flaw that J.E. Lloyd highlights, suggesting that it may be based on an inference on Powel’s part (Lloyd 1912: 497). Yet, it was from this unfounded inference that future generations of historians would locate the 1157 ambush.

The transcendence of Powel’s account into modern publications is perhaps most apparent when looking at consecutive publications of Gerald of Wales’, the *Journey Through Wales*. In 1806 *Journey* was published by R.C. Hoare as *The Itinerary of Archbishop Baldwin through Wales*. This version quotes Powel’s account verbatim, which is referenced as ‘the Welsh Chronicle’, (credited to Powel), to provide the reader with a more in-depth synopsis of the event, than the brief account provided by Gerald of Wales (1806: 159-161). Wright’s 1863 publication of *Journey* was included within *The Historical Works of Giraldus Cambrensis*. Again the entirety of Powel’s account is included, however, unlike the 1806 version which included Powel’s narrative in the body of the text, the 1863 publication allocates Powel’s version to a footnote. Currently, in the most widely circulated translation of *Journey* (by Thorpe first published in 1978), Powel’s account is not mentioned by name. Nevertheless it is still present; in a footnote, Thorpe explains to the reader that the Battle of Coleshill named by Gerald of Wales is in actuality the Battle of Coed Eulo.

In 1778 in a *Tour in Wales*, Pennant cites Powel when discussing the battle of Coed Eulo. Pennant has interpreted Powel’s indented quote describing the Battle of Coleshill as a secondary engagement following *Coed Eulo* (1778: 85). In the nineteenth century other historians such as Cathrall (*The History of North Wales* 1828) and Lewis (*A Topographical Dictionary of
Wales 1849) followed suit. Similar descriptions were echoed in works by: Nichols (1872), Edwards (1914) and Louis (1854). The legacy of the so-called ‘Battle of Coed Eulo’ is preserved today by a faded placard at the alleged location of the battle near the ruins of Ewloe Castle in Wepre Park. Additionally, recent news articles detailing the events of the battle, and identifying it as Coed Eulo, can be found in local and national media outlets, a selection of which are referenced above.

Figure 37: Placard describing the Battle of Ewloe (Coed Eulo; photo by author).

Place-name analysis
Although the location of a battle during 1157 at Coed Eulo has been shown to be an error originating with Powel, which was later transmitted to generations of historians, it is nonetheless important to consider the possibility of Coed Eulo as a battle site. This will be done archaeological in the Military Terrain Analysis chapter, whereas place-name analysis is evidenced in the following discussion.

Coed Eulo, is the name of the forest (coed is the Welsh word for forest or woods) that surrounds the Ewloe region. The name was first recorded in 1337, preserved in Harleian MSS 4484 and again in the Recognizance Rolls in 1390, prior to this the woods surrounding Ewloe were included in and called the forest
of Hawarden (Owen 1994: 174). Although not documented until 1337, presumably the name came into use following the construction of Ewloe Castle around 1256 by Llywelyn the Great (Davies-Cooke 1890: 3). As previously mentioned, the Brut Peniarth 20 names the forest of Hawarden as the location of the ambush, while the Journey Through Wales, the Annales Cestrienses and the Chronicle of Jocelin of Brakelond specify the location further as Coleshill, which historically was included within the forest of Hawarden. There appears to be no direct reference to Ewloe (in any of its variations i.e. Iollo, Eulo, etc.) in the Domesday Book and instead it is included within the manor of Hawarden (Penarlag in Welsh or Haordine in early English) in the hundred of Atiscross (Domesday 263c/R/21, 268d/FD9/1; Tait 1925: 17). The Coed Eulo that Pennant refers to is in actuality a small remnant of the great forest of Tegeingl, described by G. Owen in his 1613 publication The Description of Pembrokeshire. In terms of the later naming of the wood there appears to exists a preference amongst the Anglo-Normans to call the wood Ewloe, while the Welsh prefer the older name of Penarlag (Owen 1994). Additionally Domesday Book only surveys the territory in Northeast Wales from Chester to Rhuddlan, essentially the territory that Robert of Rhuddlan conquered in the immediate years post the 1066 Norman Conquest. Unlike Ewloe, Coleshill is documented in Domesday as Coleselt (Cwnsyllt in Welsh; Domesday 268d/FD3/2 Tait 1925: 17). Interestingly, there is no mention of woods at Coleshill, indicating that there were pockets of open land within the great forest of Penarlag. The actual size of the great forest of Penarlag as recorded in Domesday was approximately ten by three leagues\(^2\) or 55 x 17 kilometres (Domesday 268d/FD3/2, 268d/FD9/1; Davies 1987: 141; Williams and Martin 1992: 719-740). The hundred of Atiscros is named after an ancient stone cross that stood within the vicinity of the modern town of Flint, this cross was probably a prominent landmark and perhaps even a meeting place (CPAT n.d. (a); Lloyd 1912: 386).

It is clear from the place-name analysis that the great forest of northeast Wales went by a plethora of names, depending on both date and culture (Welsh, English, Anglo-Norman). Perhaps one of the most intriguing references

\(^2\) 1 league = approximately 5.5 kilometres.
to this forest is in the now lost place-name of Swerdewod, meaning the ‘dark wood’. This could be in allusion to a part of the forest that abutted Montem Altum (Mold), but from the available medieval documentary evidence it seems more likely that this was a part of the forest close to the Wirral (Owen 1994: 154). The reference to Swerdewod is found in the Calendar of Ancient Petitions Relating to Wales in reference to Edward I’s expedition into Flintshire.

[The King] enclosed a great part of the manor that is to say, Ewlawe, Kelynges and a great part of the wood of Swerdwode… The King hath commanded to cut the Passes of Swerdwode but there came forth the people of Wryhale and of all Cestresire that all the people might go to this same wood of Swerdwode and they took fuel and they cut throughout and everywhere at their will. And thus they waste this wood and cut it, beside the passes and not at all in the pass (in Owen 1994: 154).

Originally Pennardlaawc (later Hawarden) was the name of a large area that included a settlement, a church and some form of fortification or enclosure, perhaps a cattle enclosure as the second half of the name Pennardlaawc is most likely derived from alaawg or alaog, meaning cattle, or ‘rich in cattle’ if the ‘og’ suffix is added. The first part of the name pennardd is Welsh for height or high land. The original settlement of Pennardlawwc or Penarlag was conquered by the Mercians, sometime prior to the arrival of the Normans, and came to be known as Haordine, it is from this name that the modern name Hawarden evolved (Owen 1994: 62-3). Place-name evidence suggests that a considerable area of the landscape west and south of Haordine continued to be referred to as Pennardlaawc. Additionally, and perhaps most derisive in terms of locating the battle the koet pennardlaoc referred to in Brut Peniarth 20, is that this region seems to correspond with the portion of the great forest of Tegeingl that was at elevation and west of the Hawarden settlement (ibid).

This, coupled with the reference to Coleshill in the sources mentioned above, would seemingly focus the location of the battle within the commote of Coleshill and within the portion of the forest that was at elevation. Gerald of Wales alludes to this landscape feature when describing the battle location as occurring at a ‘narrow wooded pass near Coleshill’ (Journey Book II Ch. 7: 189), given the place-name analysis and landscape history reconstruction, it seems clear that Gerard of Wales is in fact naming the koet pennardaoc of the Bruts, which was the portion of the great forest of Tegeingl between Chester and
Rhuddlan located on a ridgeline within the commote of Coleshill. It is also unsurprising that Edward I ordered the woodland within the ‘passes’ cleared (see quote above), particularly given the ambush Henry II had sustained in such a landscape more than one hundred years previous.

Although multiple sources document the forest as dark, dense and wild there were evidently pockets of cleared or open land within the forest. Domesday Book makes no reference to woodland within the commote of Coleshill (Domesday 268d/FD2/6; Tait 1925: 10-87). Additionally, the 1150 battle of Coleshill between Owain Gwynedd and Powys allied with the earl of Chester seems to have been an open-field engagement (Brut Pen. 20: 57).

This would suggest that although possibly in close proximity to one another, the 1150 and 1157 battles of Coleshill took place in different locations, a probability that is reflected by RCAHMW and the OS Map series (further discussion of this can be found in the Military Terrain Analysis chapter). It must also be noted that despite the numerous historic references, it is impossible to ascertain the exact degree to which northeast Wales was afforested in the mid-twelfth century. The descriptions found within these sources are useful insofar as they provide an outline for reconstructing the historic landscape. Given the above textual and place-name evidence it seems highly unlikely that a battle transpired within Ewloe Wood at the location commemorated in the plaque above (see Figure 37). Instead the evidence suggests that the battle transpired in a wooded location at elevation within the commote of Coleshill. Military terrain analysis will be used to further ascertain the location of the battle.

**Campaign Legacy**

Following the failure of the amphibious assault on Anglesey (the Battle of Moelfre), and due to the losses he had suffered at Coleshill, Henry was forced to seek peace terms with Owain. In return for being left in peace, Owain agreed to relinquish Tegeingl and lâl. Cadwaladr’s lands were returned as well (ACB text: 87). Owain also agreed to pay homage to Henry, indicating that he had entered into a client-kingdom relationship with Henry (a further discussion of the homage which was performed at Woodstock can be found in Chapter Eight, page 244). However, the nature of Welsh clientship, as established by Davies
(1990), would suggest that this would not have been regarded as a binding relationship by Owain, and would not have represented defeat. The outcome of the 1157 Coastal Campaign enabled Gwynedd to endure as an independent native Welsh kingdom. However, the peace of 1157 did not last, in 1165 Owain once again sought to extend the limits of his kingdom, this coupled with similar acts by other Welsh principalities led to the 1165 Berwyn Mountain Campaign and the Battle of Crogen.
Chapter Seven – Case Study One, the 1157 Coastal Campaign

Introduction

What follows is a consideration of the actions and events encompassing the core area of the 1157 Coastal Campaign and the associated archaeological landscapes of conflict, resulting in a gross-pattern analysis. This analysis will be discussed in three principal sections: 1) a timeline of conflict events as evidenced in the medieval manuscripts and represented spatially on maps created using GIS technology; 2) a consideration of the archaeological aspects of the events and key sites; and 3) an introduction to the military terrain analysis in which the historical and archaeological attributes of the key conflict events are synthesised. A more in depth discussion of the spatial analysis data, in which the historical and archaeological data from both campaign case studies is synthesised to form a dynamic conflict event reconstruction, can be found in the following Military Terrain Analysis Chapter.

Case study site types

The following is a description of the types of archaeological sites that will be considered in the in the conflict landscape reconstruction and analysis of the 1157 and 1165 campaign core areas. Ten types of sites were investigated in order to reconstruct the historic landscape of conflict. These sites, documented archaeologically in the Historic Environment and National Monument Records, and discussed in the manuscripts, are represented spatially using ArcGIS technology. The following table (Table 5) lists and describes site types.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Site Type</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Battle site</td>
<td>The site of the battle, this category also includes associated military sites, such as encampments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Castles</td>
<td>Known castles that were extant during the period of conflict covered in the case study, i.e. 1157.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possible Castles</td>
<td>Includes castle type features that are extant on the current landscape and vanished castles documented historically and/or in historic surveys but are now gone.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Llys</td>
<td>Welsh elite centres, often associated with palace structures and small settlements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Churches</td>
<td>Only churches which could have been directly impacted by the conflict events are included.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>Primarily roads, Roman and medieval. Also included are bridges and landmarks (i.e. ancient trees).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iron Age Hillforts</td>
<td>Hillforts were included in the survey area as they offer potential vantage points and places of refuge.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roman Fort</td>
<td>Roman forts were included in the survey area for the same reason as Iron Age hillforts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wat’s Dyke</td>
<td>Wat’s Dyke was included due to its proximity to the case study. As a past military feature it had the potential to be exploited by the combatants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offa’s Dyke</td>
<td>Offa’s Dyke was included for the same reason as Wat’s Dyke.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: Case study archaeological site types.

Settlements were not included as Welsh settlements from this period are still poorly understood and poorly documented in the archaeological record (see Literature Review page 36 for further detail). All castles that were extant by the middle of the twelfth century, regardless of whether they were directly involved in the conflicts being analysed, are documented spatially. The construction of these castles was the product of conflict, therefore, by documenting them spatially the broader conflict landscape in which the 1157 Coastal Campaign and 1165 Berwyn Mountain Campaign took place, can be contextualized. Also to be noted under the site type ‘probable castle’ is the distinction between vanished and possible castles. Vanished castles are those for which solid
documentary evidence exists, but the actual built feature is no longer extant. Possible castles are those which have the appearance of a motte but have yet to be positively identified as a castle.

Iron Age and Roman forts proximal to both case studies were included as not only do they evidence a tradition of conflict in this region, but as defensible features they had the potential to be exploited by the combatants. Additionally, the reuse of past military features offers an intriguing insight into medieval military tactics. Offa’s and Wat’s Dyke were included in the study area for the same reasons. These dykes were constructed by the early medieval kingdom of Mercia as a demarcation line or barrier between the Welsh and the English frontier (Hill 1991: 142; Williams 2009: 35). They are yet another testament that this region of Wales has been highly contested since antiquity.

Only roads for which an original element is known or visible are documented spatially, no attempt was made to ‘connect-the-dots’ as this could lead to inaccurate routes. The same is true for the sections of Wat’s and Offa’s Dykes that no longer survive. Although all of the sites represented in the twelfth-century landscape of conflict are relevant to the conflict events being discussed, only those which were directly involved with either the 1157 Coastal Campaign or the 1165 Berwyn Mountain Campaign will be discussed in detail. British National Grid references for these sites, as well as sites reviewed in the study area, can be found in appendix two.

1157 Coastal Campaign timeline

The following battlefield timeline is derived from the principal twelfth-century sources available for this campaign. These are the: Annales Cambriae (B and C texts), Brut y Tywysogion Peniarth 20 manuscript, Brut y Tywysogion Red Book of Hergest manuscript, Brenhinedd y Saesson, The Journey Through Wales (by Gerald of Wales), Annales Cestrienses, Chronica Rogeri de Hoveden, Chronica de Mailros, Chronicles of the Reigns of Stephen, Henry II and Richard I (William of Newburgh and Robert of Torigni versions), the Great Roll of the Pipe and the Chronicle of Jocelin of Brakelond. The most detailed accounts are found in are both versions of the Brut y Tywysogion, the

Part 1, The Encampments

Figure 38: The Welsh and Anglo-Norman encampments from the 1157 Coastal Campaign (A = Welsh, B = Anglo-Normans).
**Manuscript Sources:** *The Brut y Tywysogyon* (Peniarth 20 and Red Book of Hergest versions), *Annales Cambriae* (B and C texts), *Brenhinedd y Saesson*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action:</th>
<th>Location:</th>
<th>Participants:</th>
<th>Event Overview:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Setting up / fortifying encampments</td>
<td>Basingwerk (Welsh) camp A, The 'plains of Chester' (Anglo-Normans) camp B.</td>
<td>Welsh under Owain Gwynedd, Anglo-Normans under Henry II</td>
<td>The Welsh fortify their position at Basingwerk where their army is encamped. Henry II gathers his forces at an undisclosed army encampment in the 'plains of Chester' before embarking on his expedition into Wales.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Key Sites/terrain:** Basingwerk (general area), Basingwerk Castle, level ground around Chester (plains)

**Associated Sites:** Roman road and Wat’s Dyke (near Basingwerk); Chester Castle and Roman road near Chester.

Table 6: 1157 campaign encampment timeline

![Figure 39: Basingwerk encampment area.](image-url)
The Brut y Tywysogyon Peniarth 20 version records that in 1157 ‘Henry king of England, led a mighty host to Chester, in order to subdue Gwynedd. And there he pitched a camp. And Owain, prince of Gwynedd, after summoning to him his sons and his leading men, and gathering together a mighty host, encamped at Basingwerk. And he raised a ditch [(dychauel)] there to give battle to the king’ (Brut Pen. 20: 59). Although no place-name is given for the encampment of Henry’s forces, the Red Book of Hergest and the Annales Cambriae add that it was in ‘the open land of Chester’ or ‘open plain of Chester (Brut RBH: 135; AC, B text: 87). The Brenhinedd y Saesson indicates that ‘King Henry led his host as far as the marsh of Chester, and there he pitched his tents’ (BS: 159). It is possible that ‘marsh’ was mistranslated and instead it meant to be march, as in the border between Cheshire and Wales, which would be a more logical setting for a military encampment than a marshland.

All of the sources agree that the location of Owain Gwynedd’s encampment was at Basingwerk. Basingwerk is located in the present town of Greenfield in the parish of Holywell, although in the twelfth century it is likely that Basingwerk encompassed the surrounding area and may have been included within the commote of Coleshill (Lloyd 1917: 17). The medieval sources also concur that Owain had defences raised at Basingwerk. The Red Book of Hergest indicates that multiple ‘ditches [were] raised with the intention of giving open battle to the king’ (Brut RBH: 135). While the Brenhinedd y Saesson elaborates further stating that ‘a site for a castle was measured and huge dykes raised’ (BS: 159), although this is unlikely given that none of the other manuscripts make reference to a castle, and the Bruts in particular were fastidious in their documentation of castles, Welsh or Anglo-Norman. As the exact location of the Basingwerk encampment is not precisely known its representation in Figures 38 and 39 above is an approximation, based on place-name evidence and the strategic locations of the turning point in the coastal Roman road and the terminus of Wat’s Dyke. Similarly the inclusion of a Basingwerk Castle in the Basingwerk encampment vicinity is based on the approximations of the HER (CPAT: 102369). There is no physical evidence that indicates the presence of a castle at that location, nevertheless given the confusion over the location of Basingwerk Castle (see page 158 and 208), the HER location has been represented spatially.
Part 2, The Anglo-Norman March from Chester

**Manuscript Sources:** *The Brut y Tywysogyon* (Peniarth 20 and Red Book of Hergest versions), *Annales Cambriae* (B and C texts), *Brenhinedd y Saesson*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action:</th>
<th>Location:</th>
<th>Participants:</th>
<th>Event Overview:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anglo-Norman march from Chester into Wales (prior to point of division of forces)</td>
<td>Northwest Cheshire and northeast Wales (Flintshire)</td>
<td>Anglo-Norman army.</td>
<td>The route of march the Anglo-Norman forces follow from their encampment in Chester up to the point where the forces separate into two contingents.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Key Sites/terrain:** Coastal Roman road from Chester northwest through Wales to Basingwerk where it turns west into Gwynedd’s heartland.

**Associated Sites:** Alford Castle, Pullford Castle, Dunham Massey Castle, Connahs Hey Mound (castle), Hawarden Motte, Trueman’s Hill Motte, Ewloe Castle, Bryn y Cwn Motte, Shotwick Castle

Table 7: 1157 campaign timeline for the Anglo-Norman route of march from Chester.

Figure 40: Anglo-Norman route of march from Chester.

189
Manuscript Sources: The Brut y Tywysogyon (Peniarth 20 and Red Book of Hergest versions), Annales Cambriae (B and C texts), Brenhinedd y Saessson, Journey Through Wales, Chronicles of Jocelin of Brakelond.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action:</th>
<th>Location:</th>
<th>Participants:</th>
<th>Event Overview:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anglo-Norman route of march through woods (after division of forces)</td>
<td>West of the Roman road, possibly anywhere between Hawarden and Coleshill.</td>
<td>Anglo-Norman army.</td>
<td>The point and route of march where the divided Anglo-Norman contingent led by Henry II turns into the woods.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key Sites/terrain: Coastal Roman, forests of Hawarden, forests of Coleshill, Wat’s Dyke.

Associated Sites: Connahs Hey Mound (castle), Hawarden Motte, Trueman’s Hill Motte, Ewloe Castle, Bryn y Cwn Motte, Tyddyn Castle, Mold Castle, Castell Halkyn, Castell Rosesmor.

Table 8: 1157 campaign timeline for the Anglo-Norman route of march from Chester detailing possible turn-off points into the woods.

![1157 Coastal Campaign - Anglo-Norman Route of March with Possible Turn-off Points into the Woods](image)

Figure 41: Anglo-Norman possible turn-off points into the woods.
There is some dispute between the sources regarding Henry’s progress from Chester into Gwynedd. The following are relevant excerpts from the four primary manuscripts describing Henry’s advance into Gwynedd. Given that these descriptions are important for locating the Battle of Coleshill and determining the order of battle, an excerpt of the relevant section of each manuscript is presented below.

And when the king heard that, he divided his host and sent many knights and barons beyond number together with a strong multitude along the shore towards the place where Owain was. And the king himself unperturbed, and armed forces most ready to fight along with him, advanced through the wood that was between them and the place where Owain was (Brut RBH: 135).

And when the king heard that, he sent his host and many earls and barons beyond number, and with them a strong force fully equipped, along the shore towards the place which Owain was holding. And the king and an innumerable armed host, fearless and ready for battle, came through the wood which was between them, which was called the wood of Hawarden (Brut Pen. 20: 59).

This I have often heard, the king with diligence acted cunningly, he pressed on up the seashore road to Owain’s entrenchment; but before he reached it he turned aside (AC, B Text: 87).

And after the king had heard that, he sent leaders, earls and barons thither [to Basingwerk], and a great host with them (BS: 159)

The Red Book of Hergest clearly states that Henry divided his forces into two contingents. One division proceeded to advance along the coastal road to Owain’s position at Basingwerk, whist the division led by the king came through a wood. Similar to the Red Book of Hergest, the Peniarth 20 although less clear about the division of forces, indicates that Henry led his forces through a wood, which is named as the wood of Hawarden (see place-name analysis section in the preceding chapter). The Annales Cambriae also state that Henry turned off the coastal road. It does not elaborate where between Chester and Basingwerk this point was, or whether it was his entire force or a contingent that left the road. Unlike the three previous manuscripts the Brenhinedd y Saesson is less specific and seemingly indicates that Henry’s forces progressed en masse along the coastal road towards Basingwerk. The four possible turn-off points represented above in Figure 41 were determined using place-name evidence,
as suggested in the manuscripts, and the physical terrain descriptions in the *Journey Through Wales* and the *Chronicles of Jocelin of Brakelond*, which refer to a narrow-wooded pass (see excerpts below).

**Part 3, The Battle**


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action:</th>
<th>Location:</th>
<th>Participants:</th>
<th>Event Overview:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The battle.</td>
<td>Two main possibilities: the wood of Hawarden or the woods near Coleshill.</td>
<td>Section of Anglo-Norman army led by Henry II, Welsh army led by Owain Gwynedd’s sons Cynan and Dafydd.</td>
<td>The contingent of the Anglo-Norman army led by Henry II were ambushed by Welsh forces whilst attempting to trek through the forest in an effort to circumnavigate Owain’s position at Basingwerk.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Key Sites/terrain:** Battle of Coleshill 1157 location (according to the RCAHMW), Battle of Coleshill 1150 location (according to the RCAHMW), Bryn Dychwelwch (supposed hill of retreat according to RCAHMW), forests and ravines near Hawarden, forests and ravines near Coleshill, Wat’s Dyke.

**Associated Sites:** Connahs Hey Mound (castle), Hawarden Motte, Trueman’s Hill Motte, Ewloe Castle, Bryn y Cwn Motte, Tyddyn Castle, Mold Castle, Castell Halkyn, Castell Rosesmor, Basingwerk Encampment/castle, Moel Ffagnallt hillfort, Moel Y Gaer Rhosesmor hillfort.

Table 9: 1157 campaign timeline for the battle.
Figure 42: the two possible locations for the wooded battle, upper = Coleshill, lower = Ewloe.

As reviewed in the previous chapter, the location and the history of the Battle of Coleshill is highly contested, with the popular assessment being that main battle action took place near Ewloe, the so-called Battle of Coed Eulo. Although the modern academic and heritage communities make no reference to this erroneous event, there exist uncertainties regarding the location of the Battle of Coleshill. The Clwyd Powys Archaeological Trust attributes the current battlefield location to a 1960 Ordnance Survey map (see Figure 43 below), but they concede that the battlefield could be located elsewhere within the Coleshill vicinity (CPAT: 100320). It is curious that the 1960 Ordnance Survey locates the battlefield at some distance from the actual Coleshill (a geographic feature named Coleshill), where the 1150 battle (reviewed in the previous chapter) between Gwynedd and Powys was fought. The 1150 battle location is not indicated on the Ordnance Survey maps, but was instead roughly located in the Coleshill vicinity. The 1157 location, determined by the Ordnance Survey is now beneath the site of an industrial park. Further consideration of the location of these battlefields can be found in the Military Terrain Analysis chapter. The
following manuscript excerpts detail the varying accounts regarding the location and the actions of the battle.

Figure 43: 1960 OS Map indicating the location of the 1157 Battle of Coleshill. (contains OS data © crown copyright and database right 1960).

And Cynan and Dafydd, sons of Owain, encountered him in the wild wood and gave the king a severe battle. And after many of the king’s men had been slain, it was with difficulty that he escaped back to the plain (Brut RBH: 135).

And there Cynan and Dafydd, sons of Owain, encountered him, and there they gave him a hard battle. And after many of his men had been slain he escaped to the open country (Brut Pen. 20: 59).

Cynan and Dafydd, with those guarding against this, gave a sharp battle, and many of the king’s men were killed, those who pressed on evading death (AC, B Text: 87).

And against them came Dafydd ab Owain and he pursued them as far as the strand of Chester, slaughtering them murderously (BS: 159).

In our own times Henry II, king of the English, led an army into Gwynedd. He was defeated in battle in a narrow wooded pass near Coleshill, that is the hill of coal (Journey, Book II Ch. 7: 189).

On our right we passed the forest of Coleshill, the hill of coal. It was there in our own time that Henry II, king of the English, was badly mauled when he made his first assault on Wales. In his youthful ardour and rash enthusiasm he was unwise enough to push on through this densely
wooded pass, to the great detriment of his men, quite a few of whom were killed (Journey, Book II Ch. 10: 196).

Henry [Essex], in the course of the Welsh war, in the difficult pass of Coleshill, had treacherously cast down the standard of the lord king, and proclaimed his death in a loud voice (Brakelond: 110).

A battle royal fought at Coleshill, in which Eustace (Fitz-John, fourth baron of Halton), the constable (of Cheshire) perished with many of his comrades (Annales Cestrienses: yr. 1157).

Therefore the king, advancing through much wrestling with the nature and the bad quality of the places, had an unfortunate beginnings of the business. For part of the army, while advancing too incautiously through forested and wet places, was caught out by an ambush of enemies lurking close by the road [...] thinking that the king [...] had fallen in death with the rest, and announcing his fall to the ranks still arriving and hastening to the narrows, incited not a small part of the army, having been terrified by the enormity of the rumour, to flee weakly. Therefore when the king, flying rather swiftly to the disordered army, had cheered them with his own appearance [...] drew themselves up more cautiously facing the enemy's ambush (Chronicles W.N.: 107).

Of the eight manuscripts referenced only the Annales Cestrienses, The Journey Through Wales and The Chronicle of Jocelin of Brakelond specifically mention Coleshill in connection with the site of the battle. Gerald of Wales in the Journey Through Wales, although identifying the geographical Coleshill specifically, as the 'hill of coal', states that the battle did not happen at this location but near it in a 'narrow wooded pass'. The other manuscripts, apart from the Brut Pen. 20 which names the location of the battle as Hawarden wood, indicate that it took place in an unspecified wooded area. It is also clear from the various manuscripts that Henry’s forces suffered severe casualties. The fighting was so fierce and the casualties so great that in the confusion of battle the king was feared dead. ‘Indeed those who escaped the danger, thinking that the king...had fallen in death with the rest, and announcing his fall to the ranks still arriving and hastening towards the narrows, incited not a small part of the army, having been terrified by the enormity of the rumour, to flee weakly’ (Chronicles W.N.: 107). In terms of the location of the battle, the Chronicles also indicate that it was close to a road, it is unclear whether this was the extant Roman road or another track-way. Regardless, this would
indicate that Henry’s forces were not too far from their turnoff point before they were ambushed.

Part 4a, the Retreat of the Anglo-Norman Forces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Manuscript Sources:</strong> The Brut y Tywysogyon (Red Book of Hergest versions) and the Brenhinedd y Saesson.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Action:</strong> The retreat of the Anglo-Norman forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Location:</strong> A plain/flat area, possibly the ‘strand’ of Chester.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Participants:</strong> Section of Anglo-Norman army led by Henry II.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Event Overview:</strong> Following the ambush in the woods, Henry retreats to what is indicated as an open area to regroup his forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Key Sites/terrain:</strong> The shoreline northeast from the site of the battle possibly extending southeast to the mouth of the River Dee. Bryn Dychwelwch.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Associated Sites:</strong> Bryn y Cwn Motte, Hen Blas Castle</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10: 1157 Campaign timeline for the retreat of the Anglo-Norman forces.

The manuscripts are vague about the order of events directly following the battle, only the Red Book of Hergest and the Brenhinedd y Saesson give any indication as to the location of Henry’s movements after the battle. ‘And after many of the king’s men had been slain, it was with difficulty that he escaped back to the plain’ (Brut RBH: 135). The Brenhinedd y Saesson indicates that Owain’s sons pursued Henry’s forces all the way to the ‘strand of Chester’ (BS: 159), possibly the coastal plain referred to earlier from which Henry’s forces encamped prior to setting out on the campaign. Alternatively, this could also be in reference to the coastal plain that stretches from the River Dee estuary at Chester northwest towards Prestatyn. Following the retreat from the wooded ambush Henry regroups his forces before resuming his advance towards Basingwerk.
Part 4b, the Welsh Retreat and Anglo-Norman repositioning at Rhuddlan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Manuscript Sources:</strong></th>
<th>The Brut y Tywysogion (Peniarth 20 and Red Book of Hergest versions), Annales Cambriae (B text), Brenhinedd y Saesson.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Action:</strong></td>
<td>The Welsh Retreat and Anglo-Norman repositioning at Rhuddlan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Location:</strong></td>
<td>The routes of march for both armies to their new positions, Rhuddlan, Tâl-Llwyn Pina and possibly Cil Owain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Participants:</strong></td>
<td>The Welsh and Anglo-Norman armies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Event Overview:</strong></td>
<td>Owain moves his forces to a new and presumably more defensible location in order to undermine Henry’s attempt to surround him at Basingwerk. Henry reassembles the two halves of his army and moves them to Rhuddlan.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Key Sites/terrain:</strong></th>
<th>Rhuddlan Castle (Twt Hill), Tâl-Llwyn Pina, Cil Owain, Bryn Dychwelwch, Basingwerk, Roman Road.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Associated Sites:</strong></td>
<td>Other roads and track-ways, Whitford Wood Palace, Moel y Gaer Bodfari hillfort, Prestatyn Castle, The Mount (the Peel) Castle, Dinorben hillfort, Castell Cawr hillfort.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 11: 1157 Campaign timeline for the Welsh retreat and Anglo-Norman repositioning at Rhuddlan.
Figure 44: repositioning of the Welsh and Anglo-Norman forces following the Battle of Coleshill. Yellow = Welsh, Red = Anglo-Norman. There lines are not meant to represent the direction of travel and are not representative of the actual route of advance.

Although the Welsh ambush in the woods inflicted many casualties on Henry’s forces, it did not weaken his army sufficiently to prevent them from advancing further into Gwynedd. Once Owain became aware that his position at Basingwerk could be compromised he chose to remove his army to what was presumably a more protected position at Tâl Llwyn Pynna/Pennant or Cil Owain, depending on the manuscript (Brut Pen 20: 56; Brut RBH: 135). ‘Owain heard that the king himself was threatening his rear, while he faced the bulk of the king’s army, so he abandoned his entrenchment and fell back to a safe place. Then the king collected his forces into one army and advanced to Rhuddlan where he marked out a castle’ (AC, B text: 87). It is evident from these accounts that Henry, despite being weakened by the ambush still intended to surround the Welsh position at Basingwerk. Owain, avoided open field confrontation with the Anglo-Norman forces by removing his army to a place of refuge; Henry then regrouped his troops and advanced to Rhuddlan.
**Part 5, Welsh Raids on Rhuddlan**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Manuscript Sources:</strong></th>
<th>The Brut y Tywysogyon (Peniarth 20 and Red Book of Hergest versions), Brenhinedd y Saesson.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Action:</strong></td>
<td>Welsh raids on Henry’s encampment at Rhuddlan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Location:</strong></td>
<td>Rhuddlan and Tâl-Lwyn Pina (possibly Cil Owain) and the avenue of approach between them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Participants:</strong></td>
<td>The Welsh and Anglo-Norman armies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Event Overview:</strong></td>
<td>Welsh raiding parties harass Henry’s army where they are encamped at Rhuddlan.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Key Sites/terrain:** Rhuddlan Castle (Twt Hill), Tâl-Llwyn Pina, Cil Owain,

**Associated Sites:** Other roads and track-ways, Whitford Wood Palace, Moel y Gaer Bodfari hillfort, Dinorben hillfort, Castell Cawr hillfort, Prestatyn Castle, the Mount (the Peel) Castle.

Table 12: 1157 Campaign timeline of the Welsh raids on the Anglo-Normans at Rhuddlan.

![Figure 45: Vicinity of Welsh raids on Rhuddlan.](image-url)
Only three of the manuscripts allude to the harassment of the Anglo-Norman army by the Welsh while encamped at Rhuddlan (Brut Pen. 20: 59; Brut RBH: 135; BS: 159). Although the location of Owain's refuge at Cil Owain (Tâl Llwyn Pynna) is unknown, the ability to coordinate raids on Rhuddlan would seemingly indicate that it was not at a great distance from Rhuddlan. From Tâl Llwyn Pynna Owain's troops 'harassed the king both by day and by night. ‘And Madog ap Maredudd, lord of Powys, chose for himself his place between the king and Owain, where he might have the first encounter [with Owain]' (Brut Pen. 20: 59). Given the description in the Brut Pen. 20 manuscript it would seem that this harassment was of some duration as it was occurring simultaneously with the assault on the Isle of Anglesey. Intriguingly this action is one of the only instances, in any of the manuscripts that makes a reference to the involvement of Madog ap Maredudd, Prince of Powys, in this conflict as an ally of King Henry.
**Part 6, the Anglo-Norman Assault on the Isle of Anglesey**


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Participants</th>
<th>Event Overview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anglo-Norman amphibious assault on the Isle of Anglesey, pillaging of churches and battle with the men of Anglesey</td>
<td>Isle of Anglesey, particularly the churches of St Mary’s, St Peter’s and St Tyfrydog, as well as an undisclosed battle location, probably near the sea.</td>
<td>Anglo-Norman sailors and soldiers and the ‘men of Anglesey’.</td>
<td>Simultaneously to the events transpiring in northeast Wales, Henry orders a fleet to Anglesey to subdue the island and weaken Owain’s seat of power. The Anglo-Norman soldiers ransack a few of the island’s churches and the next day face severe battle with the men of Anglesey in which they are defeated.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Key Sites/terrain:** Navigable bays and inlets around the island, sand beaches suitable for beaching ships, St Mary’s, St Peter’s, St Tyfrydog.

**Associated Sites:** Aberffraw Llys, Aberlleiniog Castle.

Table 13: 1157 Campaign timeline of the assault on Anglesey.
Henry was a shrewd campaign planner. In an effort to assure his success in Gwynedd he sent a fleet to Anglesey, the heartland of Gwynedd and Owain Gwynedd’s seat of power at Aberffraw Llys (Turvey 2002: 26). The objective was to subdue the population there, no doubt intending to take advantage of the absence of Gwynedd’s leaders. Despite this, Henry’s landing party, after ravaging several of the island’s churches encountered a sharp resistance from the men of Anglesey, led by Owain’s younger son Hywel, which resulted in their total defeat (Journey, Book II Ch. 7: 189; Brut Pen. 20: 59). ‘For on the following day a battle took place between them and the men of Anglesey and in that battle the French fled, according to their usual custom, after many of them had been slain and others had been captured and others had been drowned. And it was with great difficulty that a few of them escaped to the ships’ (Brut RBH: 135, 137).

The Anglesey campaign can be split into two main events: the arrival of the fleet and the pillaging of the churches of St Mary, St Peter and St Tyfrydog; followed by the sea-side battle between the men of Anglesey and the Anglo-
Norman sailors and soldiers. According to the manuscripts this was harsh battle in which the Anglo-Norman contingent suffered severe casualties including Henry II’s uncle, also named Henry, the son of King Henry I. (AC, B Text: 87; Journey Book II Ch. 7: 189) The location of the Battle on Anglesey is debatable; the majority of the primary sources do not reference the location of the battle by name except to state that it was on Anglesey. The Brenhinedd y Saesson claims that Henry’s ships went to Abermenai, a location along the Menai Strait that separates the mainland from Anglesey, and incidentally where a battle was fought in c. 1076 (Figure 18 in the Study Area chapter, page 145; BS:159). Interestingly there are two contemporary poems that describe the battle, one was written by Owain’s son Hywel, who as his poem would suggest, participated in the battle, which he references as being on Menai’s shore. The other poem, by court poet Gwgalchmai ap Meilyr alludes to both Moelfre and Menai, as is revealed in the excerpts of both poems displayed below. Lloyd, referencing Gwgalchmai’s poem, concludes that the battle took place near the present day village of Moelfre (Lloyd 1912: 499). However, Gwgalchmai states Tâl Moelfre, tâl is the Welsh word for ‘front’ or ‘end’ (Davies, B. 2001: 87), which may indicate a position that was not in Moelfre, but nearby. Gwgalchmai also alludes to Menai, making it difficult to determine the exact location of the battle.

When red flame reddened, it flamed to the heavens,
Home offered no refuge.
Easy to see its bright burning,
The white fortress on Menai’s shore.

Host on bloodstained host, shudder on dreadful shudder,
And at Tâl Moelfre a thousand war-cries;
Shaft on flashing shaft, spears upon spear,
Thrust on wrathful thrust, drowning on drowning,
and no ebb in Menai from the floodtide of bleeding,
And the stain of men’s blood in the brine.
**Part 7, Campaign Conclusion and Terms of Peace**

**Manuscript Sources:** *The Brut y Tywysogion* (Peniarth 20 and Red Book of Hergest versions), *Annales Cambriae* (B text), *Brenhinedd y Saesson*, *Annales Cestrienses*, *Chronicles of the Reigns of Stephen, Henry II and Richard I*, *William of Newburgh version*, *Annales Cestrienses*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action:</th>
<th>Location:</th>
<th>Participants:</th>
<th>Event Overview:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Campaign Conclusion and terms of peace.</td>
<td>Unknown.</td>
<td>Owain Gwynedd and Henry II.</td>
<td>Terms of peace are agreed between Owain and Henry. Owain is required to relinquish his border territories of Tegeingl and the land annexed from Powys (in addition to returning his brother Cadwaladr’s lands) in return for Henry withdrawing his troops.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Key Sites/terrain:** Rhuddlan (Twt Hill) Castle, Basingwerk Castle, Tomen y Faerdre Castle, Tomen y Rhodwydd.

**Associated Sites:** Border castles including: Ewloe, Trueman’s Hill Motte, Hawarden Motte, Connahs Hey Mound, Mold, Tyddyn, Hen Blas, Bryn y Cwn Motte, Castell Halkyn, Castell Rhosesmor, Chester Street Mound.

Table 14: 1157 Campaign timeline for the conclusion of the campaign.
The majority of the manuscripts are vague about the events culminating in the cessation of hostilities. For this the *Chronicles of William Newburgh* are the most illuminating. Owain was required to relinquish certain castles and territory in the border region of Tegeingl (or Englefield in English) and the land he had annexed from northern Powys. ‘When, in return for gaining the favour of such a great leader, and having surrendered certain fortifications of their territory they stood before the king with hostages as guarantees’ (*Chronicles W.N.:* 107). Owain was also obliged to pay homage to Henry in recognition of him as his overlord (see section on Woodstock, page 244). Essentially, in geographic terms he renounced his claim on all land east of the Clwyd river valley and south of and including the Powysian *commote* of Iâl (Yale), along with the castle of Iâl (with Tomen y Rhodwydd or Tomen y Faerdre), which Madog ap Maredudd of Powys then destroyed (*Brut Pen.* 20: 60; *Brut RBH:* 137; *BS:* 159). He was also required to send hostages to the English court as a gesture of good faith. In return Henry abandoned his campaign and withdrew his troops.
from Gwynedd after fortifying castles at Rhuddlan and Basingwerk (*Annales Cestrienses*: yr.1157; *AC, B* text: 87).

**Site Archaeology and History**

The archaeological analysis that follows comprises of an examination of the historic environment records or HERs (from the Clwyd-Powys and Gwynedd Archaeological Trusts, herein CPAT and GAT), National Preservation Records or NPRNs (from the Royal Commission of Ancient and Historic Monuments of Wales, herein RCAHMW) and National Monument Records or NMRs from Historic England, for each key site associated with the seven campaign events discussed in the previous section. In some instances the veracity of these reports are questionable as they are sourcing data from antiquarian literature and often quote Lloyd’s 1912 monograph, problems with which have been discussed in the previous chapter.

When possible any data from previous archaeological inquiry including excavation reports will be incorporated into the discussion. However, this type of data is limited as the majority of these sites have never been excavated. Additionally, many sites have never received any academic attention apart from initial HER ‘scheduled monument’ surveys. This lack of evidence highlights current inadequacies in the medieval Welsh archaeological record. Although a detailed analysis of each site within the campaign case study core areas (reviewed below) is beyond the scope of this research; contextualizing these sites within their conflict landscape setting is a step towards increasing awareness of these often poorly understood medieval sites. Each of the key sites will also be analysed for their military features, utilizing the military terrain device KOCOA and viewshed analysis, which is included in the Military Terrain Analysis chapter.
Part 1, the Encampments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action:</th>
<th>Setting up / fortifying encampments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Key Sites/terrain:</td>
<td>Basingwerk (general area), Hen Blas Castle, level ground around Chester (plains)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associated Sites:</td>
<td>Roman road and Wat’s Dyke (near Basingwerk); Chester Castle and Roman road near Chester.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 15: 1157 Campaign key sites and key terrain for the encampments.

The Welsh encampment at Basingwerk:

Basingwerk, located near the present-day communities of Greenfield and Holywell, is situated on a plateau above the River Dee estuary. Most notable for the ruins of Basingwerk Abbey founded by the earl of Chester, Hugh Ranulf in 1131, and moved to its present location in 1157 when it became a Cistercian house (Davies 1987: 46; NPRN 35649, CPAT 102397). It was near here where Owain’s forces encamped and fortified their position against the Anglo-Norman army. Although the ruins of the abbey are still extant, the surrounding area has been heavily impacted by industry, including a battery factory adjacent to the Abbey.

Figure 48: View of Basingwerk Abbey to the east (photo by the author).
In 1796, Thomas Pennant in his survey of *The History of the Parishes of Whiteford and Holywell* indicated that earthwork fortifications, perhaps part of Wat’s Dyke, or a fortlet associated with where the dyke terminates, could be seen ‘in the foundation of a wall on the edge of the ditch, and on the road side, near the turnpike gate, opposite to the ruins of the abbey’ (Pennant 1796: 192). Pennant believes that this fortification was raised to protect the abbey and it is unclear from his description whether he is referring to a castle, a linear earthwork or both. Conversely, the fortifications that were in evidence near the abbey in the late eighteenth century, could have been associated with the entrenchment excavated to protect Owain’s position at Basingwerk (*AC, B text*: 87), during the 1157 campaign. It is also possible that Pennant’s feature could be the castle referred to in the *Brenhinedd y Saesson*, or the fortification raised by Henry at the conclusion of the campaign, which has since been referred to as Basingwerk Castle (*BS*: 159; *Annales Cestrienses*: yr. 1157). However, as will be discussed below, there is some contention surrounding the location of Basingwerk Castle, which was destroyed in 1166 by Owain, along with Rhuddlan and Prestatyn Castles in 1167 (*Brut Pen.* 20: 64-65).

*Hen Blas and Basingwerk Castles*

Although the name, Basingwerk Castle, suggests that the castle was within the modern bounds of Basingwerk, this was probably not the case. As has been suggested by Lloyd and others (A.J. Taylor in Leach 1960 and H. Taylor in 1883), Basingwerk referred to a larger region than the confines of the Abbey (Lloyd 1917: 17). The uncertainty and confusion of place-names for this region endured until the Edwardian Conquest. In 1277 Edward arrived with a large host near the present-day town of Flint where he set to building Flint Castle. Exchequer records, detailing the cost of the castle, document Edward’s base of operations while he was in Flint interchangeably as ‘the camp near Hawarden [and] the camp near Basingwerk’ (E 101/350/25; E 101/3/19 in Taylor 1883: 309). Lloyd suggests that the reference to Basingwerk was ‘merely a loose indication of the king’s whereabouts by mention of a well-known site’ (Lloyd 1917: 17). Indeed, the lack of nameable locations, both in 1157 and 1277 may be indicative to a sparsely populated or ‘wasted’ landscape as referenced in
Domesday (see discussion of Domesday wastes page 78 in the Welsh and Anglo-Norman Warfare chapter). This would not be surprising given that the region of Tegeingl had been a highly contested frontier zone dating back to the early medieval period, as evidenced by the construction of Wat’s Dyke, which was probably constructed by King Æthelbald of Merica in the mid-eighth century (Rowley 2001: 79). The position of a chain of Iron Age hillforts on the summits of the Clwydian range (which form a natural western boundary of Tegeingl), may be suggestive of an earlier contested frontier (see Figure 47 above and discussion of hillforts below and in the Literature Review page). Interestingly the name Flint, in reference to the town and the region was not used until after the construction of the castle there by Edward I in 1277. Thereafter the region was referred to as Flint (Unknown 1950; Lloyd 1917: 19). Given this, is it probable that Basingwerk Castle was in fact located near Flint. This has important implications not only for the location and chronology of the castle, but also for the location of the battle of Coleshill, which according to the Brut Pen. 20, took place in the wood of Hawarden (Brut Pen. 20: 59). If Hawarden and Basingwerk were used interchangeably in 1277 to indicate the region that now surrounds Flint, it is likely that these place-names could have been used similarly in 1157.

Basingwerk Castle has been suggested to be one in the same with Holywell and Bryn Castell (King 1983: 153-155). Although Holywell Castle is in close proximity to Basingwerk Abbey; RCAHMW have identified it with Castel Treffynnanw probably built in 1210 (NPRN: 300557). Bryn Castell, which is King’s favoured location for Basingwerk, is a tumulus of unconfirmed origin, located a short distance to the east of Hen Blas Castle (see Figure 49 below; King 1983: 153). CPAT suggest that although the Ordnance Survey indicates that this feature is a barrow, that ‘its size and profile may suggest a motte rather than a barrow, but [it is] difficult to be sure’ (CPAT: 100338). Another possibility is that this is the site of a mass grave from the Battle of Coleshill, although this is equally difficult to confirm without actual excavation. Hen Blas Castle, located nearby, is another possibility for Basingwerk.
Hen Blas Castle, also known as Coleshill Castle, was excavated in 1957 by G.B. Leach. Initially constructed as a timber motte and bailey timber castle it is located on an 80 metres rise directly adjacent to a steep ravine. Leach records ‘[Hen Blas as being] situated in a thick wood at the confluence of two streams which have scoured out ravines to a depth of 53 ft. at their junction’ (Leach 1957: 1). The initial assessment by RCAHMW in 1910 determined that the motte was hastily constructed for defensive reasons, probably in connection with the Battle of Coleshill (Leach 1957: 2). Leach discredits this assumption asserting that the site received more intense planning; however his excavations were unable to provide conclusive proof of the phasing or quality of construction. Although a foundation date is not known for the timber motte and bailey, RCAHMW and CPAT both cite an 1157 date, this corresponds with Leach’s assessment that the castle was the original Basingwerk, which according to the Annales Cestirenses was constructed by Henry II in 1157 (Annales Cestrienses: yr. 1157; NPRN: 307131; CPAT: 100339).

Excavations did not yield any datable material from the early timber castle phase, and the majority of material culture is associated with the mid-
fourteenth-century domestic phase of Hen Blas manor (Hen Blas is translated as the old mansion or manor). Additionally the dimensions of the site were difficult to determine as they have been heavily impacted by agricultural activities. An excavation trench bisecting the motte revealed a layer of charcoal ‘which varied from 1 in. to 4in. in thickness, spread evenly throughout the ditch section…The charcoal extended from the northern end of the ditch for 16ft., and there is little doubt that it had been formed by the burning of timber’ (Leach 1957: 8). This burning event of the original motte features seems to correspond with the capture and destruction of Basingwerk Castle in 1166 by Owain Gwynedd in connection with his re-conquest of the region, following Henry II’s permanent withdrawal from Wales, due to the disastrous outcome of his 1165 Berwyn Mountain Campaign (Brut Pen. 20: 65).

Figure 50: Plan of Hen Blas (Leach 1960:14).
Anglo-Norman encampment

The precise location of the Anglo-Norman encampment near Chester is difficult to determine as it is not recorded as being associated with any built features. The only notable landscape feature indicated in the manuscripts is that it was in a plain or flat area. Lewis in *A Topographical dictionary of Wales* suggests that Henry’s forces encamped at Saltney marsh near Chester (Lewis 1849: online resource). It is probable that Lewis was referencing the description in the *Brehinedd y Saesson* of the encampment being located in a marsh (*ibid*: 159). As referenced above this may have been a mistranslation of march or border. Regardless, in light of the evidence available, it is currently not possible to precisely locate the site of the Anglo-Norman encampment.

Part 2, The Anglo-Norman Route of March from Chester

**Action:**

Anglo-Norman route march from Chester into Wales.

**Key Sites/terrain:** Coastal Roman road from Chester northwest through Wales to Basingwerk where it turns west into Gwynedd’s heartland.

**Associated Sites:** Alford Castle, Pulford Castle, Dunham Massey Castle, Connahe Hey Mound (castle), Hawarden Motte, Trueman’s Hill Motte, Ewloe Castle, Bryn y Cwn Motte, Mold Castle, Shotwick Castle

Table 16: 1157 Campaign key sites and key terrain for the Anglo-Norman route of march from Chester.

**Route-ways**

The networks of roads constructed during the Roman occupation of Wales were still in use during the medieval period (Lewis 1996: 66). Sections of the coastal Roman road in northeast Wales remain today in the form of modern roads, particularly the A548 and the aptly named Roman Road west of St Asaph (see below in Figure 51 and 52). Wat’s Dyke, in addition to its reuse or refortification by Owain at the Basingwerk encampment, it may also have been used as a route-way by the Welsh to and from Coleshill. It may also have been the path Henry had intended to follow in order to circumvent Owain’s forces. Today the dyke exists in varying degrees of preservation from Wrexham to Greenfield.
(near Basingwerk) where it terminates. The function of Wat’s Dyke in the 1157 Campaign will be discussed in detail in the Military Terrain Analysis chapter.

Figure 51: View of Roman Road to the east, near St Asaph (photo the by author).

Figure 52: Extant route-ways, the major Roman roads include the northern and southern-most route-ways displayed.
Castles along the route of advance

A series of castles border the Roman road from Chester to Basingwerk, where the road turns west and heads inland. The exact date for many of these castles (listed in the associated sites above) is unknown, making it difficult to ascertain whether these castles were garrisoned during the 1157 expedition, and if they were it is equally difficult to determine if they were garrisoned by the Welsh or the Anglo-Normans. This particularly applies for Hawarden Motte, Trueman’s Hill Motte, Connahs Hey Mound, and Ewloe Castle. What is certain is that for Henry’s forces these castles either represented a useful resource – if they were vacant or controlled by the Anglo-Normans – and conversely they represented a potential obstacle if they were garrisoned by the Welsh. In this last instance, this would have had a role in determining where Henry split his forces to take half inland through the woods. These castles could have been used by the Welsh as lookout points, to monitor the progression of Henry’s army into Wales enabling them to prepare for and select the location of the ambush. Alford, Pullford, Dunham Massey and Shotwick castles (NMR SJ57NW9, SJ35NE1, SJ78NW7 and SJ37SW6 respectively) are on the English side of the border. Given their location it is unlikely that they played any key role in the 1157 campaign unless Henry utilised them as scouting lookouts or places of refuge, should he be forced to retreat in their direction.

Connahs Hey Mound, Trueman’s Hill Motte and Hawarden Motte are spread over a distance of less than 2 kilometres from each other. Connahs Hey Mound is the easternmost of these fortifications and the only one for which there is no surviving evidence, although this motte was documented by Pennant (1778; CPAT 100167). Hawarden Motte was the original timber motte and bailey fortification underlying the present masonry castle. It was built in the eleventh century by Hugh earl of Chester and was rebuilt as a masonry castle in the late thirteenth century (King 1983: 153; CPAT 100164). The base diameter of the motte measures 21 metres with a height of 9 metres (RCAHMW file no. ANC/1102). It is located at an elevation of approximately 60 metres and is at a distance of 2 kilometres from the Roman road. There is a steep ravine located to the immediate northwest and southeast of the motte. Hawarden Castle has never been excavated.
Although little is known about Trueman’s Hill Motte, the 1987 RCAHMW monuments record states that ‘tradition says that is was raised as a fortification to prevent Henry II from advancing into Wales’ (Cadw File no. ANC/1101). This is an intriguing notion, particularly given its proximity to Hawarden Motte, less than one kilometre to the northwest. It can be speculated that at the time of the 1157 campaign the division between Wales and England, or more accurately Gwynedd and England was somewhere in the Hawarden region. If Hawarden Motte was still controlled by the Anglo-Normans in 1157 then it is possible that Trueman’s Hill Motte was built by Gwynedd as a frontier castle on their side of the border. However, Hawarden was attacked several times in the thirteenth century (King 1983: 153). This could suggest that Trueman’s was in fact a siege castle, particularly given its proximity to Hawarden. Trueman’s Hill Motte was partially excavated in 1820 by Rev. Stanley but no finds were reported (CPAT 100157). The motte has a base diameter of approximately 33 metres and a height of 3.4-7.1 metres (NPRN 307153).

The masonry castle of Ewloe was built by Llywelyn ap Gruffudd in 1257. It is thought that this was built on the site of an earlier fortification, possibly built by Owain Gwynedd, as evidenced in the irregular plan of the masonry castle (NPRN 94447; Davies-Cook 1891: 2). Ewloe castle is situated on a narrow
ridge approximately 100 metres above sea level. Wepre Brook flows through a steep ravine directly north of the castle. It is located 1.25 kilometres southwest of the Roman road and approximately 3 kilometres northwest of Trueman’s Hill Motte. Although it is highly unlikely that a castle existed here in 1157, the surrounding landscape is nevertheless important to consider given that this was the supposed location of the so-called Battle of Coed Eulo or Ewloe Wood.

Figure 54: Ewloe Castle, above: aerial photo detailing the ravine and the surviving Ewloe Wood, RCAHMW: 96/CS/1655 (C.60288) NPRN: 94447, © Crown copyright: Royal Commission on the Ancient and Historical Monuments of Wales; right: masonry remains of the thirteenth-century Welsh castle (photo by the author).

Similar to Ewloe and Hawarden, Bryn y Cwn Motte is situated above a river valley, although unlike Ewloe it is not associated with a ravine or narrow pass and for this reason it has been dismissed as a potential location for the Battle of Coleshill. Bryn y Cwn is approximately 60 metres above sea level and 1.4 kilometres from the Roman road and approximately 2 kilometres from
Coleshill. Nothing is known about the origins of this fortification and it has never been excavated. An earthwork survey carried out by Cadw documents the dimensions of the motte as follows. The base of the motte is 58.2 metres in diameter, the summit is 14 metres in diameter and the height is 8 metres. ‘There are three banks and ditches to the south of the motte, and a natural slope to the north renders any further fortification unnecessary. There is no evidence of a bailey’ (CPAT 100346).

**Part 3, the Battle**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Action:</strong></th>
<th>The Battle</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Key Sites/terrain:</strong></td>
<td>Battle of Coleshill 1157 location (according to the RCAHMW), Battle of Coleshill 1150 location (according to the RCAHMW), Bryn Dychwelwch (supposed hill of retreat according to RCAHMW), forests and ravines near Hawarden, forests and ravines near Coleshill, Wat's Dyke.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Associated Sites:</strong></td>
<td>Connahs Hey Mound (castle), Hawarden Motte, Trueman's Hill Motte, Ewloe Castle, Bryn y Cwn Motte, Tyddyn Castle, Mold Castle, Castell Halkyn, Castell Rhosesmor, Basingwerk Encampment/castle, Moel Ffagnallt hillfort, Moel Y Gaer Rhosesmor hillfort.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 17: 1157 Campaign key sites and key terrain for the Battle of Coleshill.
Given that a detailed analysis of the data resulting from the military terrain analysis of the Battle of Coleshill is discussed at length in the Military Terrain Analysis chapter, the following is merely an overview and introduction to the sites considered. The location of the Battle of Coleshill both the 1150 and 1157 events, as indicated by RCAHMW and situated on the OS maps (only the 1157 battle in included in the OS maps, see Figure 43 above) is not accurate. The placement of the battlefields at these locations are based solely on place-name analysis of the ridge west of Flint named Coleshill, therefore, any of the ‘adjoining fields in the modern township of Coleshill Fechan would suit the required conditions’ (NPRN 402325).

The site of the 1157 Battle of Coleshill as indicated on the OS Maps has been heavily impacted by industrial development over the last 50 years. The 1960 OS Map above shows the landscape surrounding Coleshill prior to heavy industrialization. The most recent OS Map shows a much altered landscape with the 1157 Battle of Coleshill now being located beneath a series of warehouses. No explanation is given by RCAHMW or CPAT regarding the...
reason for the location of the 1150 Battle of Coleshill (between Owain
Gwynedd, Madog ap Maredudd and the earl of Chester), therefore it is inferred
that its location is also the product of place-name inference (NPRN 404847).
Neither is any reason given to why there are two different locations for the
Battles of Coleshill. The plausibility of these two sites, as identified by
RCAHMW and the OS Maps, as the actual location of the battlefield(s), will be
considered in further detail in the spatial analysis section of the chapter.

Figure 56: View of the supposed 1150 Coleshill Battlefield, north-eastern aspect (photo by the
author).

**Battle associated sites**

Bryn Dychwelwch, loosely translated as the ‘hill of retreat’ by CPAT is thought
to be the location where, either Henry’s army or the Welsh contingent led by
Owain’s sons, retreated following the battle. There is no documentary evidence
that supports this place-name. The feasibility of this hill as an avenue of retreat
will be considered in the Military Terrain Analysis chapter.
There are two Iron Age hillforts that could have been exploited by Owain’s forces in the events leading up to the battle. These are Moel Ffagnallt and Moel Y Gaer Rhosesmor (CPAT 101758 and 100296; see Figure 42). These hillforts are close enough to the proposed location(s) of battle to have been used as lookout points to observe the movement of Henry’s troops as they made their way to Basingwerk. Additionally, the contingent of the Welsh army led by Cynan and Dafydd could have been stationed at one of these forts, as besides from being probable points of good visibility they also offered a degree of protection in the form of any earthwork fortifications still extant from the Iron Age. This is not implausible as many of these earthwork fortifications survive well today. It would also not have taken much time or energy to enhance any fortifications that were there.
Part 4, the Welsh Retreat and Anglo-Norman repositioning at Rhuddlan

(Note: Part 4a, the Anglo-Norman retreat will not be discussed in this section as the sites associated with this event have already been reviewed also the sites included Part 5, the Welsh raids on Rhuddlan will not be included in this section as they are reviewed in the following section).

**Action:** The Welsh Retreat and Anglo-Norman repositioning at Rhuddlan.

**Key Sites/terrain:** Rhuddlan Castle (Twt Hill), Tâl-Llwyn Pina, Cil Owain, Bryn Dychwelwch, Basingwerk, Roman Road.

**Associated Sites:** Other roads and track-ways, Whitford Wood Palace, Moel y Gaer Bodfari hillfort, Prestatyn Castle, The Mount (the Peel) Castle, Dinorben hillfort, Castell Cawr hillfort.

Table 18: 1157 Campaign key sites and key terrain for the Welsh retreat and Anglo-Norman repositioning at Rhuddlan.

![Figure 59: map detailing possible locations of Welsh retreat.](image)

The route of Welsh retreat/advance and the place to which the Welsh forces repositioned to harass Henry at Rhuddlan, are difficult to conceptualize insofar
as the place-names listed in the manuscripts of Tâl-Llwyn Pina (or Pennant) and Cil Owain are not existent in any place-names or built features. Roughly translated Tâl-Llwyn Pina, (Davies, B. 2001) is the scrubby area at the head of the stream. Cil Owain is translated as Owain’s place or Owain’s refuge. Neither of these translations are useful as they could describe countless locations in northeast Wales. For this reason several sites within the area have been considered as the potential locations for Owain’s place of refuge. These are the early medieval llys Whitford Wood Palace, the Mount Castle (sometimes called the Peel), and Prestatyn Castle, as well as Dinorben, Castell Cawr and Moel y Gaer Bodfari hillforts. The location of Cil Owain on the map is a result of a description provided by Thomas Pennant, suggesting that Cil Owain was near the community of St Asaph (Pennant 1796), there is no other evidence to suggest that this was indeed the location. It is likely that the place of Owain’s refuge was located in the vicinity of Rhuddlan, to enable him to harass the Anglo-Normans (Brut RBH: 135). Therefore, distance to Rhuddlan will be considered in the following site analysis.

The early medieval llys of Whitford Wood Palace is located 4.5 kilometres northwest of Basingwerk, 4.5 kilometres from the Roman road and approximately 10 kilometres northwest from Coleshill. Rhuddlan Castle is located just shy of 13 kilometres to the west of Whitford Wood Palace. The location of this llys was documented by Pennant in 1796 and there are no visible surface remains there today (CPAT 89612; Pennant 1796). As there are no longer any visible remains it is difficult to know whether this site would have had any fortifications with which it was associated. If Owain was aware of this llys it is unlikely he would have retreated there unless it had some defensive capabilities.

Prestatyn Castle is a low motte surviving to a height of 0.9 metres and approximately 20 metres in diameter. Excavations conducted in 1913 concluded that it is eleventh-century in origin. Unfortunately, the author of this excavation is unknown, and the report, cited by both RCAHMW and CPAT, was not retrievable. The current location of any material culture from this excavation is also unknown. (NPRN 92922; CPAT 102226). One of the most interesting features of this site is the stream named the Nant, which runs to the south of the castle. It is possible that this could be the stream referred to in the place-name
Tâl-Llwyn Pennant. The word for stream in Welsh is *nant* (Davies, B. 2001). There are many streams named *nant* throughout Wales, however, the one that flows by Prestatyn Castle seems to be the only one so named in this part of Wales. Even though excavations in 1913 concluded that the site dates from the eleventh century there has been some debate surrounding this date. It is possible that they castle was not constructed until the twelfth century, possibly by Owain Gwynedd (RCAHMW file no. 1921). Prestatyn Castle is situated 7.2 kilometres east of Rhuddlan and only 1 kilometre from the sea.

![Figure 60: Plan of Prestatyn Castle, Cadw: ANC/1921/1 (C.51383) NPRN: 92922, from the collections of the National Monuments Record of Wales: © Crown copyright: Cadw.](image)

Little is known about the mound referred to interchangeably as The Mount or The Peel which resembles a castle motte and is thought to be medieval in date. It measures 30 metres square and has a height of 1.2 metres (NPRN: 303516). It is situated 1.2 kilometres south of the coast and approximated 3 kilometres north of the Roman road. It is possible that Owain chose to remove his army to this castle as its location 7.8 kilometres west of
Rhuddlan and close to the Roman road would have made it possible for him to have prevented Henry from advancing further into Gwynedd. Additionally, the proximity of The Mount to the sea could have made it possible (depending on visibility) for Owain to monitor any Anglo-Norman naval movement. The same could also be said for Prestatyn Castle.

Figure 61: Location of the Ffordd y Ffrainc or the French Road.

Apart from the Roman road there is one other road in the region that could have been used to convey Henry’s troops to Rhuddlan Castle. This is the Ffordd y Ffrainc, or the French Road linking Rhuddlan to Dyserth, 4.5 kilometres to the east. This road was removed in the nineteenth century and the dot on the map above indicates the only location in which this road survives (NPRN: 23584). It is unknown whether this road continued any further to the west or east or whether is connected to the Roman road at any point. If it was extant at the time of the 1157 campaign it could have provided Henry’s troops with an easy march to Rhuddlan.
Dinorben, Castell Cawr and Moel y Gaer Bodfari hillforts could have been favoured as places of retreat by Owain due to their pre-existing defensive nature. Also, given the elevation of these sites it stands to reason that they would have provided Owain with good vantage points from which to monitor Henry’s position.

Anglo-Norman position at Rhuddlan
Rhuddlan Castle is perhaps one of the best known castles in north Wales. It was originally constructed in 1073 by Robert of Rhuddlan shortly following the initial wave of Anglo-Norman Conquest in the eleventh century (CPAT 102027). However, the castle associated with the conflicts of the eleventh and twelfth centuries was not the masonry castle shown below, it was instead a motte and bailey timber castle, known today as Twt Hill (little hill), located a short distance to the south of the current masonry castle which was built in 1277 (see Figures 63-65 below). The motte survives to a height of 11 metres and was formed by enhancing an existing natural hill; the bailey is located to the north of the motte. Although Twt Hill has never been excavated, the defences surrounding the town of Rhuddlan were excavated by Quinnell, Blockley and Berridge from 1969-1973. Their results, based primarily on radio carbon dating, indicate that Rhuddlan may have been the location of the short-lived Saxon burgh (fortified
town) of Cledemutha, in the tenth century (Quinnell et al. 1994: 209). Clearly, Rhuddlan had been located within a contested frontier zone since the early medieval period. Additionally, Quinnell suggests that Twt Hill was probably the location of the pre-Norman llys, as evidenced by ‘the unusual platform bailey’ (ibid: 213)

Figure 63: Plan of Twt Hill, Cadw: ANC/1955/1 (C.51404) NPRN: 157156, from the collections of the National Monuments Record of Wales: © Crown copyright: Cadw.

Figure 64: Twt Hill (photo by the author).
Part 6, the Anglo-Norman Assault on the Isle of Anglesey

**Action:** Anglo-Norman amphibious assault on the Isle of Anglesey, pillaging of churches and battle with the men of Anglesey.

**Key Sites/terrain:** Navigable bays and inlets around the island, sand beaches suitable for beaching ships, St Mary’s, St Peter’s, St Tyfrydog.

**Associated Sites:** Aberffraw Llys, Aberlleiniog Castle.

Table 19: 1157 Campaign key sites and key terrain for the Anglo-Norman assault on Anglesey.

The exact location of the amphibious assault and the battle that ensued on Anglesey are difficult to determine, the favoured locations are in the vicinities of the village of Moelfre or the Menai Straits. At Moelfre there are navigable bays and sandy/shingle beaches that could have enabled the safe mooring or beaching of the ships; additionally, Moelfre is near two of the churches raided by the Anglo-Normans, St Mary’s and St Tyfrydog’s (see Figure 46). It is also far enough removed from Aberffraw Llys (Owain Gwynedd’s court) and Aberlleiniog Castle to avoid immediate detection. However, there are many other locations around the island that meet the necessary prerequisites of a
navigable and sheltered bay and access to the land from a sand or shingle beach.

Three churches are referenced as having been pillaged by the Anglo-Normans on Anglesey, these are St Mary’s, St Peter’s and St Tyfrydog’s (BS: 159; Journey Book II Ch. 7: 189). There are two ecclesiastical features on Anglesey bearing the name St Mary, as the foundation of neither is known it is difficult to say which of these sites, or possibly both, were raided by the Anglo-Normans. The record for St Mary’s Cross is vague but is seems to have been in reference to a feature in the churchyard of an un-named church. The cross has been dated to the eleventh century (GAT 3615). St Mary’s Church is a multiphase building, the earliest datable features are from the fifteenth century, but it is possible that the church had an earlier foundation. St Mary’s church is located 9.5 kilometres from the sea and St Mary’s cross is at a distance of 1.5 kilometres from the sea. These distances have been included because it is the possible distance the Anglo-Norman raiders would have had to travel to and from their ships, if they were moored near Moelfre.

St Peter’s Church is located in southwest corner of Anglesey, approximately 6 kilometres from Aberffraw Llys and 2 kilometres from the sea. This church may have been built in the twelfth century; this church was restored in the mid-nineteenth century (GAT 2623). The earliest datable aspects of St Tyfrydog’s are recorded as being from the fifteenth century (GAT 2096);
however, as it was mentioned so prominently by Gerald of Wales, it is possible that it had a much earlier foundation date (*Journey*, Book II Ch. 7: 189).

*Part 7, Campaign Conclusion and Terms of Peace*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Action:</strong> Campaign Conclusion and terms of peace.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Key Sites/terrain:</strong> Rhuddlan (Twt Hill) Castle, Basingwerk Castle, Tomen y Faerdre Castle, Tomen y Rhodwydd.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Associated Sites:</strong> Border castles including: Ewloe, Trueman’s Hill Motte, Hawarden Motte, Connahs Hey Mound, Mold, Tyddyn, Hen Blas, Bryn y Cwn Motte, Castell Halkyn, Castell Rhosesmor, Chester Street Mound.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 20: 1157 Campaign key sites and key terrain for the campaign conclusion and terms of peace.

The majority of the sites associated with this event have already been considered for their archaeological features in their connection to an earlier event. Chester Street Mound (CPAT 100323) while proximate to earlier events it has not been included in the dialogue as it is fairly certain that this is not actually a castle. It is much more likely that it is a feature associated with the Roman road, possibly a mile-castle, the same is true for Cae Mount (CPAT 12708). However, in the event that future survey showed these features to be
castles, they would have likely been included within the group of castles that Owain was required to surrender when he relinquished his claim to Tegeingl.

Iâl Castle was built by Owain in 1149 in connection with his annexation of northern Powys, it was then destroyed by Iorwerth Goch ap Maredudd of Powys at the conclusion of the 1157 campaign, when Owain was required to hand over this territory as part of the peace settlement with Henry. \textit{(Brut Pen. 20: 57; AC B text: 87)}. As reviewed earlier, there is some debate over the location of Iâl Castle and both Tomen y Faerdre and Tomen y Rhodwydd have been suggested (see page 153 in the Study Area chapter). Tomen y Faerdre is a motte measuring 54-58 metres in diameter with a surviving height of 7 metres. Tomen y Rhodwydd was a timber motte and bailey castle. The motte measures 38-42 metres in diameter at its base with a height of 4.9-8 metres. The bailey is southwest of the motte and measures 57-46 metres (Pratt 1979; CPAT 100932; NPRN: 94737). Although Iâl was destroyed by Madog in 1157 it was rebuilt by King John in 1212 (NPRN 306839 and CPAT 100888).

![Aerial photograph of Tomen y Faerdre Castle, RCAHMW: AP_2006_0737 (C.859218) NPRN: 306839, @ Crown copyright: Royal Commission on the Ancient and Historical Monuments of Wales.](image)
**Spatial Analysis and Synthesis**

The following section is a synthesis of the two preceding sections, the campaign timeline as evidenced in the primary documentary sources and the archaeology of the key sites involved in the 1157 campaign. This synthesis is guided by the military terrain analysis of each event. The spatial analysis presented below represents only the preliminary data of the total military terrain analysis conducted for this campaign. The Military Terrain Analysis chapter contains an in-depth consideration of the spatial analysis for this campaign and the 1165 Berwyn Mountain Campaign. The following analysis considers the KOCA (see descriptive table below in Table 20) features of two key campaign events: the encampments and the coastal march into Wales, giving to consideration to terrain features that match Gerald of Wales’ battle location descriptions (the most detailed of all the manuscripts): ‘a narrow wooded pass near Coleshill’ and ‘densely wooded pass’ (*Journey Book II Ch. 7*: 189, 196). Both are accompanied by viewshed models. The retreat after the battle of Coleshill; the raids on Rhuddlan; the amphibious assault on Anglesey, and the peace settlement and campaign conclusion will not be considered, as they are secondary to the campaign narrative. The Battle of Coleshill and the supposed Battle of Ewloe Wood are not considered within this section as they will receive an in-depth KOCA and reverse KOCA analysis in the following chapter; the KOCA analysis included here provides a preliminary overview, as such no viewsheds for Coleshill or Ewloe are included in the following section.
The encampment at Basingwerk

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KOCOA Analysis for: Basingwerk Encampment</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Battlefield Element</strong></td>
<td><strong>Terrain Feature</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Key Terrain</strong></td>
<td>Site of Encampment on or near present location of Basingwerk Abbey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Observation and Fields of Fire/Assault</strong></td>
<td>Wat’s Dyke, surrounding castles and hillforts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cover and Concealment</strong></td>
<td>Wat’s Dyke</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Obstacles</strong></td>
<td>Sea (cutting off a poss. route of retreat)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Avenues of Approach and Retreat</strong></td>
<td>Roman Road</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 21: 1157 Campaign KOCOA analysis for the encampments.

![1157 Coastal Campaign - Viewshed from the Basingwerk Encampment](image)

Figure 69: viewshed from the Welsh encampment at Basingwerk.
The position of Owain’s encampment at Basingwerk and its proximity to both the Roman road and Wat’s Dyke was not coincidental. Many scholars are surprised by Owain’s decision to leave the safety of the mountains, stating that this deviates from normal Welsh military tactics, essentially of hiding in the mountain forests and attacking invaders with guerrilla style ambushes (King 1965; Davies 2004). However, Owain decided to come forward and meet Henry’s army. Whether he ever intended to enter into open battle with the Anglo-Norman army is another matter, as the planned ambush in the woods and the withdrawal of his troops when they were directly threatened by Henry’s forces could suggest otherwise. It can also be argued that Owain’s position on or near Wat’s Dyke was selected as Wat’s Dyke represented a traditional, albeit contested, boundary between Wales and England.

The site of Basingwerk was shrewdly chosen by Owain. Essentially located on the Roman road, it is at the point in the road where it turns west, inland from the coast into the heart of Gwynedd. Undoubtedly Owain anticipated that Henry and his troops would advance along the coastal Roman road from Chester. By entrenching his forces at Basingwerk Owain was checking Henry’s ability to progress further into Gwynedd. Additionally, by choosing Basingwerk instead of another location deep in the heartland of Gwynedd Owain was preventing Henry’s land based contingent from entering Gwynedd, instead he brought the fight to the area that was contested. As previously mentioned, Owain’s position at Basingwerk seems to have taken advantage of pre-existing earthworks from Wat’s Dyke, this would have limited the amount of time and energy the Welsh would have had to expend constructing fortifications. Clearly Owain was also familiar with the surrounding terrain given the proximity of Basingwerk to the site of the 1150 Battle of Coleshill. Given this it can be conjectured that Owain would have been inclined to station himself on or near a battlefield that he had previously been able to dominate.

The site of Basingwerk afforded superior visibility as can be seen in the viewshed above (Figure 69). Numerous stretches of the Roman road can be seen all the way to Chester, making it possible for Owain to monitor Henry’s advance into Wales. Most importantly, by choosing Basingwerk as the Welsh
position, Owain controlled the theatre of war and set the tone of the campaign by forcing Henry to come to him.

*The Anglo-Norman march and turn-off point into the woods*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KOCOA Analysis for: The Anglo-Norman March</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Battlefield Element</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Key Terrain</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Observation and Fields of Fire/Assault</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cover and Concealment</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Obstacles</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Avenues of Approach and Retreat</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 22: 1157 Campaign KOCOA analysis for the Anglo-Norman route of march.

The downplaying of Welsh military capability by Anglo-Norman chroniclers, to the detriment of our comprehension of past events, is a theme that runs throughout this research. What is surprising is that the authors of the twelfth century also did Henry II a similar disservice, in regards to what became his catastrophic decision to lead half of his forces off the Roman road and into the dense Welsh forest where they were ambushed and nearly decimated by Welsh forces led by Owain’s sons. Gerald of Wales states that ‘in his youthful ardour and rash enthusiasm he was unwise enough to push on through this densely wooded pass’ (*Journey Book II Ch. 10*: 196). This assumption by scholars past and present, that Henry led his troops blindly into Wales is naïve. Although Henry was young, he would not have been without military advisers on this campaign; the omission of the Anglo-Norman military strategy, from the primary sources, has led to the oversimplification of events, as has been highlighted by King’s and Hosler’s research (1965; 2004).

Henry would have undoubtedly have realised that dividing his troops and leading one half of them through the Welsh wilderness in hope of circumnavigating and surrounding Owain’s position at Basingwerk was a risk laden endeavour. This was in all probability a calculated risk, and Henry must have felt confident that he could reach the Welsh at Basingwerk via the route he had chosen through the woods, while leaving the other force to advance northwest along the Roman road. Moving a force of a few thousand men
through the dense forests of northeast Wales would have been laden with
difficulties and dangers. The exact numbers of troops deployed during the
campaign are not known, although these were probably in the thousands as the
Robert Torigni version of *The Chronicles of the Reigns of Stephen, Henry II and
Richard I* states that ‘King Henry prepared a very great expedition, in such a
way that two out of three soldiers out of the whole of England were preparing’
(*Chronicles R.T*: 193).

Hawarden Wood, one of the favoured ‘turn-off’ points described in the
*Brut* (*Brut Pen. 20*: 59), in the region of Ewloe and Hawarden, was
approximately 15 kilometres from Owain’s encampment at Basingwerk. Given
inherent military probability (see page 50 in Methodology chapter), it seems
improbable that Henry would have subjected his men to a long and arduous trek
through the Welsh forest. Wat’s Dyke parallels the Roman coastal road all the
way to Basingwerk where it terminates. If Henry turned half his troops off the
Roman road near Coleshill instead of Hawarden, he would have been a mere 3
kilometres from Wat’s Dyke (versus the distance of 8 kilometres between
Hawarden/Ewloe and Wat’s Dyke) which he could have used to convey his
forces toward Basingwerk. It is uncertain what condition the dyke would have
been in nearly four hundred years after its construction, but as much of it is still
extant today it is probable that it was better preserved in the twelfth century.
Regardless of the condition of the dyke, it would have provided Henry’s forces a
defensible route of march through the forest. In addition, viewshed analysis of
this particular stretch of the dyke shows that the terrain to the north was largely
visible. This would have made it difficult for the Welsh to ambush the Anglo-
Norman forces, if they had reached the dyke.

The viewsheds from Coleshill vicinity, the other described ‘turn-off’
location, show that the visibility from the Roman road incrementally decreased
when progressing northward (see Figures 70-73). The fourth viewshed below
(Viewshed from Roman road near Coleshill, Figure 73) is from a point on the
Roman road nearest to Coleshill near Hen Blas, the potential battle site. The
William of Newburgh version of the *Chronicles of the Reigns of Stephen, Henry
II and Richard I* indicated that the ambush happened close to the Roman road
(*Chronicles WN*: 107). From this point a stretch of Wat’s Dyke, 2 kilometres to
the west is visible. Assuming that Wat’s Dyke was Henry’s target, this point on
the road represents the most likely ‘turn-off’ point that would have led Henry into the probable area of the Welsh ambush. This would have taken Henry’s troops through a narrow wooded pass that corresponds with a narrow ravine which terminates at Hen Blas or Basingwerk Castle. As previously discussed it is unlikely that the castle was extant during the 1157 campaign. Henry may have chosen this location to build Basingwerk Castle following the conclusion of the campaign as a means of fortifying and staking a claim to the area where he had been attacked.

Figure 70: Viewshed from the coastal Roman road adjacent to Hawarden Castle. (Note: the level area to the northeast roughly outlined in orange, is the tidal estuary of the Dee which is covered by water at high tide and is also impassable at low tide, for this reason only visibility points on land were considered in the analysis).
Figure 71: Viewshed from the Roman road south of Bryn y Cwn Motte.

Figure 72: Viewshed from the Roman road north of Bryn y Cwn Motte.
Concluding Remarks

This chapter has given due consideration to the historical and archaeological evidence of key events and sites associated with the 1157 Coastal Campaign. The spatial representation of these sites and events made it possible to synthesize a probable battle narrative that indicates the region surrounding Hen Blas Castle as the probable location of the Battle of Coleshill. The resultant gross-pattern analysis along with preliminary military terrain analysis, utilizing KOCOA, has highlighted key features and terrain elements to be explored in depth in the Military Terrain Analysis chapter. By placing the events, associated sites and terrain features of the 1157 Coastal Campaign into a broader cultural and conflict landscape, key elements became apparent that allowed for the identification of probable battlefield locations. These locations will receive an in-depth military terrain analysis, using elements of regular and reverse KOCOA in the Military Terrain Analysis chapter.
Introduction

In the summer of 1165 Henry II organised a campaign whose purpose was to subdue the Welsh in totality. This campaign came to fruition as a result of the stalemate from the 1157 campaign against Gwynedd and in response to the escalating Welsh raids – including the raids by Owain Gwynedd’s son Dafydd – in the frontier zone of Tegeingl, the disputed region of northeast Wales where the majority of the 1157 campaign was centred (see Figure 12; Brut Pen. 20: 64-5). Wales united under the leadership of Owain Gwynedd, allied with Rhys ap Gruffudd (the Lord Rhys) of Deheubarth, the powerful southern Welsh principality, along with various minor princes from Powys (eastern and central Wales), amassed a large force at Corwen to prevent Henry II’s advance into Wales and protect Welsh independence.

The importance and magnitude of this conflict is not to be underestimated; the Anglo-Norman force that threatened Wales in 1165 did not have an equal in manpower or expense until the campaigns of Edward I during the last quarter of the thirteenth century (Latimer 1989). The occasion of the Welsh principalities uniting to stand against the threat from England would set a precedent for consensual unification, under the reigns of Llywelyn ap Iorwerth.

Figure 74: View of the Ffordd y Saeson – The English Road, looking west toward Corwen over the Berwyn Mountains (photo by the author).
(c. 1216-1240) and Llywelyn ap Gruffudd (c. 1250-1282). The outcome of the Berwyn Mountain campaign was so economically and psychologically damaging to Henry II – and in turn the Angevin Empire – that Henry abandoned his efforts in Wales in entirety turning his attentions instead to Ireland and ‘the Continent, leaving the marcher barons to cope as best they could in the face of the Welsh revanche’ (Duffy 2007: 137). There would not be another royal sponsored campaign or conquest attempted of Wales for nearly fifty years, until the failed campaigns of King John in the early thirteenth century. The following is a summary of the source material and a synopsis of the 1165 Berwyn Mountain Campaign. This historical overview provides a platform for the archaeological analysis presented in the next chapter.

**Source Material**

*Previous Academic Inquiry*

Similar to the 1157 Coastal Campaign discussed in the previous chapters, there are few modern analyses of the 1165 Berwyn Mountain Campaign. Instead the legacies of the events, particularly the Battle of Crogen, are preserved in what amounts to an oral tradition, bordering between history and legend. The most notable and complete modern scholarship is Latimer’s 1989 article ‘Henry II’s Campaign against the Welsh in 1165’ published in *The Welsh History Review*. Additionally R.R. Davies devotes several paragraphs to the campaign in his publication *The Age of Conquest, Wales 1063-1415* (1987). Both authors provide a thorough historical analysis of the chain of events culminating in the armed conflict and include a brief examination of the actual events of the campaign. Curiously the military historian S. Davies’ 2004 publication, *Welsh Military Institutions 633-1283*, which contextualizes multiple Welsh campaigns in terms of their role in the evolution of the Welsh military ethos, only mentions the 1165 campaign in passing.

Apart from J.E. Lloyd’s monograph, *A History of Wales from the Earliest Times to the Edwardian Conquest* (1912) highlighted in previous chapters, further scholarship relating to the Berwyn Mountain campaign can be found in several eighteenth and nineteenth-century antiquarian volumes. These include: *A Memoir of Chirk Castle from Original Manuscripts* (unknown author 1859),
Cambro-Briton, An Excursion through North Wales Volume 3 (unknown author 1822), Annals and Antiquities from the Counties and County families of Wales (Nicholas 1872), A Tour in Wales (Pennant 1778), The History of North Wales Volume II (Cathrall 1828) and A History of Chirk Castle and Chirkland with a chapter on Offa’s Dyke (Mahler 1912). The importance of these publications lies in their description of the landscape. Although the region in which the events of the Berwyn Mountain Campaign took place remains rather rural, there have been both industrial and natural alterations to the landscape. The description of these landscapes as they appeared in the eighteenth, nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when contrasted against the original accounts of the campaign from the medieval manuscripts, allows for a more complete reconstruction of the historic landscape.

Manuscripts
The 1165 campaign timeline, to follow in the next chapter, is predominantly derived from five principal twelfth-century sources. These are the: Annales Cambriae (B and C texts), Brut y Tywysogyon Peniarth 20 manuscript, Brut y Tywysogyon Red Book of Hergest manuscript, Brenhinedd y Saesson, and The Journey Through Wales (by Gerald of Wales). Additionally the Annales Cestrienses, Chronica Rogeri de Hoveden, Chronica de Mailros, Chronicles of the Reigns of Stephen, Henry II and Richard I the William of Newburgh and Robert of Torigni versions, the Great Roll of the Pipe (Pipe Roll Series) and The Historical Works of Gervase of Canterbury were also consulted.

Historiography of the Battle of Crogen
As was noted in the introduction the 1157 campaign, Powel's Historie of Cambria (1589), although fraught with historical inaccuracies and literary ‘slights of hand’, was and to some extent still is one of the most referenced volumes on medieval Welsh history. However, much of its appearance in modern day publications, scholastic or otherwise, can be attributed to the absence of source criticisms, as will be evidenced in the discussion below. Indeed, a large amount of the information concerning the Battle of Crogen, as it is presented in brochures, information placards and even a short film produced in 2011 (all
sponsored by the Wrexham County Council), is derived from this 1589 publication. An in-depth consideration of the historiography of this publication is due as it was the first source to name Crogan as the location of the battle that happened between Henry II and the Welsh forces in the woods of the Ceiriog Valley. It is because of this that the battle to this day is called the Battle of Crogan, yet none of the twelfth-century or other medieval manuscripts make any mention of Crogan. Apart from Lloyd’s 1912 publication, all of the other early histories mentioned above rely on Powel’s narration in their interpretations of the Berwyn Mountain Campaign.

Powel claimed that the information presented in his book was largely sourced from original Welsh manuscripts. The primary manuscript being an unnamed piece of work that Powel attributes to the twelfth-century Welsh cleric, Caradoc of Llancarfan. That Caradoc was an actual person seems probable, as he was mentioned in Geoffrey of Monmouth’s Historia Regnum Britanniae as a contemporary writer (Tatlock 1938: 140). Caradoc of Llancarfan is most commonly associated with being the author of two Arthurian texts, The Life of Gildas and the Life of St Cadog. It is unclear why Powel thought the manuscript he was referencing was a product of Caradoc, a mystery that more modern analysis has not been able to solve. It is evident that the actual source that Powel is using for the majority of the Historie of Cambria is in fact the Brut y Tywysogyon (ibid: 151). Although it is possible that Caradoc as Powel claims, ‘collected the succession and actes of the Brytish Princes after Cadwalder’ (Powel 1589: ix) perhaps as the original compiler of the original Brut, (the one that is now the lost Latin original) and possibly the author of sections of the Brut, yet, it is unlikely that his name would go unrecorded in the annals as the master of such an important task (Tatlock 1938). Regardless of Caradoc’s involvement or the origin of Powel’s manuscript, Powel indicates that Caradoc’s narrative ends in 1156, nine years before the Berwyn Mountain Campaign. It is not clear where Powel was sourcing his material from for post-1156 events. Based on comparisons to other medieval manuscripts, it seems that Powel was using a combination of the manuscripts, mentioned in the previous section, which he enhanced with the inclusion of his own version of events. It is evident that an over-reliance on historical sources, such as Powel’s, can lead to an inaccurate
understanding of events, which is why they need to be contextualized within a wider archaeological conflict landscape.

**Campaign Overview and Historical Context**

*Historical Context*

Gwynedd’s relationship with England and Henry II during the eight years between the conclusion of the 1157 Coastal Campaign to the outset of the 1165 Berwyn Mountain Campaign was predominantly peaceful. As part of the terms for peace, Owain Gwynedd yielded his claim to the frontier zone of Tegeingl at the conclusion of the 1157 Coastal Campaign. He also relinquished the *commote* of lâl (or Yale) back to Powys, and with it lâl Castle. In the ensuing years Owain was preoccupied with extending and securing his borders with his Welsh neighbours and essentially ignored the English frontier. However, the peace between Gwynedd and England would not last, as early in 1165 Owain’s son Dafydd launched a series of successful raids on Tegeingl and threatened the security of the castles in that region, namely Rhuddlan and Basingwerk (Lloyd 1912: 515). Henry went to North Wales in the spring of 1165 and spent only three days at Rhuddlan, probably to confer with the marcher earls there on how to best strengthen the defences of Tegeingl against further Welsh raids (*Brut Pen. 20*: 63). Yet, it was not Dafydd’s actions alone that provoked Henry to amass a campaign; it was in reality a culmination of complex political and social circumstances.

In 1160 Madog ap Maredudd, the predominant Powysian prince died depriving Henry of a formidable Welsh ally; Maredudd had assisted Henry in his 1157 campaign against Gwynedd. Following Maredudd’s death Powys fell into a state of chaos as the principality was broken up and distributed to Maredudd’s heirs, in accordance with the Welsh system of partible inheritance (Turvey 2002: 30). In 1163 Henry moved against Rhys ap Gruffudd³ prince of Deheubarth to quell the conflict between Rhys and the marcher lords. Rhys

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³ Interestingly the three main principalities in Wales were connected by blood ties. Owain Gwynedd was Rhys ap Gruffudd’s uncle and Madog ap Maredudd was Rhys’s father-in-law.
was captured and in return for his release he surrendered to Henry, ending what was an essentially bloodless campaign (Latimer 1989: 525).

Following the settlement between Henry and Rhys, in 1163 the major Welsh princes including Owain Gwynedd, as part of the peace terms from the 1157 conflict, did homage to Henry II at Woodstock. Woodstock (Oxfordshire) was an important royal centre, more commonly associated with the much later Blenheim Palace; it has a long history and has been connected to Anglo-Saxon Monarchs such as Alfred the Great (d. 899; Brookes 1820). Henry I established a hunting lodge at Woodstock which was later elaborated into a palace by Henry II (ibid; Salzman and Page 1990); that the 1163 homage was held at such an important and historical location demonstrates the significance of the event. Although the exact terms of the homage are unknown, it has been speculated that it changed ‘the nature of English suzerainty’ over the Welsh to one of stringent vassalage in place of the previous, more malleable client relationship (ibid: 524). The precedent for this client relationship dates back to the mid-eleventh century as part of the peace terms between Gruffudd ap Llywelyn and Edward the Confessor (see page 113 in Chronology chapter for further detail). It was this altered relationship that historians such as Latimer and Davies (1989: 52; 1987: 52) point to as the ‘tipping-point’ for renewed Welsh armed aggression against England.

When Henry II returned to England from an expedition in Normandy in early 1164 he found Wales in a state of open rebellion. Latimer acknowledges that the source of renewed Welsh aggression was probably more complex than resentment over a new political relationship with the English Crown. He points to the deaths of members of Rhys’s family at the hands of the marcher earls and Rhys’s obligation to avenge the deaths as a more rational reason for the renewed conflict (Latimer 1989: 526). Lloyd, on the other hand, suggests that death of Rhys’s kin at the hands of the marcher barons was only used by Rhys as an excuse to renew hostilities against the Anglo-Normans (Lloyd 1912: 514). Regardless of Rhys’s motives, there are seemingly no similar motivations for Gwynedd’s renewed campaigning in their frontier with England. However, careful examination of Domesday Book shows that Edward the Confessor gave all the land in northeast Wales ‘that lies beyond the river called Dee’ to Gruffudd ap Llywelyn, following a dispute with Edward this land was then taken from
Gruffudd ap Llywelyn and instead given to the Bishop of Chester (*Domesday* 263a/R/7). This region ‘beyond the Dee’ essentially comprises all of Tegeingl and establishes a precedent for it having been included within Gwynedd’s dominion.

Previous academic inquiry into the 1165 Berwyn Mountain Campaign has overlooked the societal motivations and functionality of the Welsh body politic. To this point it should be noted that Welsh perceptions of territory and attitudes towards client relationships differed greatly from that of the Anglo-Normans. For example, the Welsh gwlad or sphere of rule ‘is not so much ‘country’, ‘territory’, ‘political unit’, a ‘piece of ground and its people’ but rather the changeable, expandable, contractible sphere of any ruler’s power [therefore,] we should see the arrangements as short-term and flexible in a world of fluid and changing relationships’ (Davies 1990: 17, 23). Given this it is possible that Owain or Rhys would not have regarded their actions as being in direct violation of the homage settlement at Woodstock, particularly as Henry was only indirectly the target of their raids, which were primarily directed against at the marcher earls.

*Campaign Overview*

Undoubtedly Henry was exasperated by the renewed conflict in the Welsh Marches following the 1163 settlement, which was meant to bring peace and the subjugation of the Welsh principalities. In 1164 Henry held a council at Northampton and began preparations for a campaign against the Welsh (Latimer 1989: 531). Unlike the 1157 Coastal Campaign which was targeted solely at Gwynedd, the 1165 campaign’s objective was the submission and subjugation of all Wales. Whether this was Henry’s original objective is unclear, but it may have quickly became that once he realised that all of Wales had united against him. The scope of this operation was so immense that it understandable why the medieval chronicles state that his intent was to annihilate all Welshmen (*Brut Pen.* 20: 63). A large army was raised from England and abroad; the use of mercenaries was common practice in the medieval world (Nicholson 2004: 49). An exact number of troops are not known, though it was probably in the tens of thousands, based on the massive
amount of funds raised for the hiring of mercenaries and for food and supplies, as is evidenced in the *Pipe Rolls* (*Pipe Roll Series* 1164-1165 in Latimer 1989: 545).

Henry gathered his forces first at Shrewsbury, where he met with his bishops in July of 1165; at the conclusion of the *colloquium* he moved his troops to Oswestry (Latimer 1989: 534). It is unclear why he did this, it may have been that Oswestry was the planned destination for his troops to perform a final muster before setting off for Wales. Alternatively, he may have received intelligence that the Welsh forces were gathered at Corwen, possibly on the natural escarpment known as Pen y Bryn y Castell or on the prehistoric hillfort Caer Drewyn. Oswestry is significantly closer to Corwen and would, therefore, make a more suitable Anglo-Norman base of operations prior to marching on Wales. In August, after having waited to see if the Welsh would make the first foray, Henry decided to take his army into Wales. His route of march took him northwest to what is now the parish of Chirk in the modern county of Wrexham (originally within in bounds of Denbighshire), from there he turned his forces west where he planned to march along the Ceiriog valley, following the Ceiriog River into the heartland of north Wales.

At the ancient border between England and Wales, demarked by Offa’s Dyke, Henry was faced with his first obstacle. He encountered dense woodland in the Ceiriog river valley, probably in the vicinity of Offa’s Dyke, which in itself was an obstacle for the army. Well aware of the danger that forests could conceal, providing the perfect environment to camouflage an ambushing force, Henry ordered the wood to be cut down. Evidently he had learned from his experience in the Welsh ambush of the 1157 Coastal Campaign, which took place in a heavily wooded ravine, not too different from the environment in which he now found himself (*Brut Pen. 20*: 63).

Henry’s fears were realised when a contingent of Welsh forces stationed in advance of the encampment at Corwen ambushed Henry’s army as they were at work cutting down trees. The fighting was fierce and there were many casualties on both sides (*Brut RBH*: 147). This ambush was the event that is now referred to as the Battle of Crogen. Although weakened Henry was not deterred for he continued to advance along the Ceiriog valley up onto the Berwyn Mountains where he set up an encampment (*Brut Pen. 20*: 63). Once
there he may have reused the defences of the Iron Age hillfort Cerrig Gwynion for his encampment, and there he waited, for neither side seemed inclined to make the first move. While in this holding-pattern Gerald of Wales states that some of Henry’s troops occupied themselves with pillaging and burning several of the local churches and villages (Journey Book II Ch. 12: 202). In the end Henry’s indecision on whether to continue his advance on the Welsh was settled when bad weather descended over the Berwyns (Brut RBH: 147). The unseasonable wet and cold conditions took its toll on his men, faced with the possibility of starvation as supplies began to run low or were damaged by the wet weather. Frustrated and infuriated Henry retreated to England. In a final effort he went to Chester in an attempt to enlist an Irish mercenary fleet, perhaps hoping to launch an assault on the Welsh from the sea. As it was, the numbers of ships were insufficient and he turned away from Wales once and for all (Brut Pen. 20: 64).

Campaign Legacy

In total Henry II was responsible for three large-scale military expeditions into Wales: the Coastal Campaign in 1157; the campaign against Rhys in 1163; and the Berwyn Mountain Campaign of 1165. The first campaign resulted in what amounts to a stalemate, as although Owain Gwynedd was required to relinquish his claim on the frontier territory of Tegeingl he had not lost any of his original or ancestral territory to the Anglo-Normans and Henry had not gained any ground in the heartland of Gwynedd. The second campaign against Rhys ap Gruffudd of Deheubarth was short-lived and essentially bloodless as Henry gained a rapid victory upon the capture of Rhys. However, this victory was short-lived as Rhys renewed hostilities against the Anglo-Normans less than a year later. Henry had hoped that the homage of the Welsh princes at Woodstock in 1163 would secure stability in Wales now that the Welsh princes were his vassals. Any peace that resulted from this arrangement was fleeting and Henry was provoked to organise the 1165 campaign. The defeat he suffered from this venture coupled with his inability to penetrate the Welsh heartland in this campaign or in any prior endeavours, permanently deterred him from any future military ventures in Wales. For the remainder of his reign (d. 1189) Wales was
largely ignored by Henry, instead he turned his attention to conquest and colonization of Ireland, which proved to be a more rewarding pursuit than his failed conquest attempts of Wales.

Despite his victory, Owain was concerned that Henry would soon lead another campaign into Wales. In an effort to enhance the security of Wales, Owain sought out and formed an alliance with Louis VII, the king of France. These communications are evidenced in a series of three surviving letters between Owain and Louis. Although undated, it seems that Owain established diplomatic contact in the early 1160s, sometime before the Berwyn Mountain Campaign, and after performing homage at Woodstock in 1163 (Pryce 1998: 1-2). ‘As far as is known, this was an unprecedented move by a native Welsh ruler’ (ibid). Henry II was involved in ongoing hostilities with Louis throughout his reign, given this; it was natural for Owain to seek out Henry’s powerful enemy for support. It is clear that Louis responded to Owain, and possibly even gave him advice regarding Henry. In a letter written by Owain to Louis, shortly after the 1165 Campaign, Owain refers to Louis as his ‘adviser’ and entreats him to enter into a war with Henry. The contents of this letter candidly display the rawness of the hostilities between England and Wales. The following except effectively sets the tone for the analysis of the 1165 Berwyn Mountain Campaign in the next chapter:

[Henry may] come against us again after next Easter. On that account I vigorously entreat your clemency that you will inform me […] whether you are resolved to wage war against him, so that in that war I may both serve you by harming him according to your advice and take vengeance for the war he waged against me (Pryce 1998: 7).
Chapter Nine – Case Study Two, the 1165 Berwyn Mountain Campaign

Introduction

What follows is a consideration of the actions and events encompassing the core area of the 1165 Berwyn Mountain Campaign and the associated archaeological landscapes of conflict, resulting in a gross-pattern analysis. This analysis like the 1157 Coastal Campaign will be discussed in three principal sections: 1) a timeline of conflict events as evidenced in the medieval manuscripts and represented spatially on maps created using GIS technology, 2) a consideration of the archaeological aspects of the events and key sites, 3) an introduction to the military terrain analysis in which the historical and archaeological attributes of the key conflict events are synthesised. A more in depth discussion of the spatial analysis data, in which the historical and archaeological data from both campaign case studies is synthesised to form a dynamic conflict event reconstruction, can be found in the following Military Terrain Analysis chapter.

1165 Berwyn Mountain Campaign timeline

The following battlefield timeline is derived from the available medieval manuscripts that document this campaign. The most detailed accounts are found in are both versions of the Brut y Tywysogyon, and in the Brehinedd y Saesson. Unlike the 1157 campaign, the Annales Cambriae (B and C texts), and the Chronicles of the Reigns of Stephen, Henry II and Richard I (William of Newburgh and Robert of Torigni versions), do not record the events of the 1165 campaign in as much detail. Other chronicles that were referenced include: The Journey Through Wales (by Gerald of Wales), Annales Cestrienses, Chronica Rogeri de Hoveden, Chronica de Mailros, and The Historical Works of Gervase of Canterbury. The following narrative of the campaign timeline is predominantly Anglo-Norman centric. This is not the product of any bias; rather, the impetus behind the majority of the campaign actions were Anglo-Norman driven. Unlike the 1157 Coastal Campaign, the Welsh involvement in
the 1165 campaign, apart from the Battle of Crogen, was liminal and reactive in nature.

Part 1, The Encampments

Figure 75: 1165 Campaign, map of Welsh and Anglo-Norman Encampments, A = Welsh, B= Anglo-Norman.
**Manuscript Sources:** *The Brut y Tywysogyon* (Peniarth 20 and Red Book of Hergest versions), *Brenhinedd y Saesson*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Action:</strong> Establishing / fortifying encampments</th>
<th><strong>Location:</strong></th>
<th><strong>Participants:</strong> Welsh under Owain Gwynedd, Anglo-Normans under Henry II</th>
<th><strong>Event Overview:</strong> The rulers of all Wales with their armies gather at Corwen where they establish their position to prevent Henry’s advancement and set up an encampment. Henry brings his army as Oswestry where they set up an encampment.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Location:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Participants:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Event Overview:</strong></td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camp A: Corwen (Welsh)</td>
<td>Welsh under Owain Gwynedd, Anglo-Normans under Henry II</td>
<td>The rulers of all Wales with their armies gather at Corwen where they establish their position to prevent Henry’s advancement and set up an encampment. Henry brings his army as Oswestry where they set up an encampment.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camp B: Oswestry (Anglo-Normans)</td>
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**Key Sites/terrain:** Oswestry Castle and the immediate surrounding area, Pen y Bryn y Castell, Caer Drewyn, Castell Edeirnion and Llys Edeirnion (Castell and Llys Edeirnion occupy the same site).

**Associated Sites:** Roman Road commencing from Corwen and heading due west.

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Following a short lived excursion to Rhuddlan in the spring of 1165, Henry returned to the Welsh frontier in August, this time in Shropshire and brought with him ‘a host beyond number of the picked warriors of England and Normandy and Flanders and Gascony and Anjou and all the North [of England] and Scotland. And he came to Oswestry, thinking to annihilate all Welshmen’ (*Brut Pen.* 20: 63). As enumerated in the previous chapter, Henry probably decided to use the castle of Oswestry as his base of operations as it was closer to where the Welsh were encamped and located more directly along the route of march. This was in contrast to Shrewsbury, the larger town where he had held a *colloquium* with his bishops several days prior.

Owain Gwynedd and his Welsh allies ‘all steadfastly united together came into [the *commote*] of Edeirnion, and they encamped at Corwen’ (*pebyllu* is the medieval welsh word used in the *Bruts* meaning encampment; *Brut RBH*: 145). Owain and his Welsh allies probably chose this location to counter Henry’s advance into Wales as Corwen was situated at the head of a Roman road. This road was the only route-way that provided access from central...
Wales west through one of the few mountain passes of Snowdonia to the coast and Anglesey, the heartland of Gwynedd. Henry I had successfully invaded Wales, Powys specifically, using this route in 1118 (Brut Pen. 20: 47-8), undoubtedly this was where Henry II received his inspiration to attempt the same forty-seven years later. The Brenhinedd y Saesson in addition indicates that the Welsh built a castle at Corwen (167), this could be in reference to the construction of an actual castle, field fortifications and fortifications for the encampment. Potentially this could include the enhanced fortification of Llys Edeirnion with the addition of a motte, located approximately three kilometres west of Corwen, as well as the hillfort Caer Drewyn located on the outskirts of Corwen or the natural escarpment known as Pen y Bryn y Castell which has been suggested as the site of the Welsh encampment (further detail of these sites can be found in the following section on site archaeology and history).

Part 2, The Anglo-Norman March from Oswestry

Figure 76: Map of Anglo-Norman route of march from Oswestry to the Ceiriog river valley.
**Manuscript Sources:** The Brut y Tywysogyon (Peniarth 20 and Red Book of Hergest versions), Brenhinedd y Saesson

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<tr>
<th>Action:</th>
<th>Location:</th>
<th>Participants:</th>
<th>Event Overview:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anglo-Norman march from Oswestry into Wales</td>
<td>Northwest Shropshire and Eastern Wrexham near Chirk and the Ceiriog River</td>
<td>Anglo-Norman army.</td>
<td>The route of march the Anglo-Norman forces follow from their encampment in Oswestry up to the point where they halt to cut down trees and are ambushed by the Welsh.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Key Sites/terrain:** Level terrain between Oswestry and Chirk, route-ways between these two locations are not well documented, Offa’s Dyke, Ceiriog River and valley, either Dyffryn Ceiriog or Aberceiriog.

**Associated Sites:** Castell y Waun and Chirk Bank Motte

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<th>Table 24: 1165 Campaign timeline for the Anglo-Norman route of march from Oswestry to the Ceiriog river valley.</th>
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Weary with waiting for the Welsh to make the first move, Henry advanced his troops north along the English and Welsh border from Oswestry to the Ceiriog river valley near the present day community of Chirk. Once at Chirk, the entrance of the Ceiriog river valley, Henry turned his army west along the banks of the Ceiriog River. The manuscripts illuminate little about the actual march into Wales stating only that Henry ‘moved his host into the wood of Dyffryn Ceiriog, and had the wood cut down and felled to the ground’ (Brut RBH: 145, 147). Interestingly the Brenhinedd y Saesson names the location where Henry ordered to the trees to be cut down at Aberceiriog (167). Dyffryn is the Welsh word for valley, therefore Dyffryn Ceiriog translates as the Ceiriog Valley (which is approximately sixteen kilometres long), whereas the Welsh word aber is commonly translated as either the mouth of a river or the confluence of two rivers (Davies, B. 2001). The Ceiriog River flows into the River Dee approximately two kilometres northeast of Chirk.
Part 3, The Battle of Crogen, ambush in the woods of the Ceiriog Valley

Figure 77: Map of the supposed location of the Battle of Crogen. The dark blue dashed line indicates the approximate extent of Offa’s Dyke, the solid blue line indicates the approximate course of the Ceiriog River. Note: The location of the Battle of Crogen is based on a national grid reference provided by the Clwyd Powys Archaeological Trust, it is an approximation only.
**Manuscript Sources:** *The Brut y Tywysogyon (Peniarth 20 and Red Book of Hergest versions), Brenhinedd y Saesson and Chronica Rogeri de Hoveden*

| Action: The battle. | Location: Most likely somewhere in the Ceiriog river valley, the popular location being the fields in the area surrounding Crogen Wladys and Crogen Iddon near Chirk Castle. | Participants: Welsh soldiers stationed in advance of the main contingent at Corwen. The Anglo-Norman army. | Event Overview: Henry halts the advance into Wales to cut down trees to make a path through a dense section of forest along the Ceiriog. Welsh soldiers stationed in advance, probably as lookouts and a blocking force, decide to take advantage of the momentary disarray of the Anglo-Norman army and ambush them while they are at work cutting down trees. There are heavy casualties on both sides. |

| Key Sites/terrain: Crogen battlefield, Ceiriog river valley, Offa’s Dyke, Adwy’r Beddau |

| Associated Sites: Chirk Bank Motte and Castell y Waun, more for their vicinity to Crogen than actual involvement in the battle. St Mary’s Church of Chirk should be included for similar reasons, although it is not clear if it had been founded by 1165. |

Table 25: 1165 Campaign timeline for the Battle of Crogen.

Rather than find an alternative route Henry ordered the woods blocking his advance through the Ceiriog Valley to be cut down, clearly he was determined to follow his planned route of march (*Brut Pen. 20*: 63-4). The woods presented two possible challenges, the first was that they were too dense and had to be cut down to make way for Henry’s forces and supply train. The second is that they could have provided concealment for Welsh combatants and Henry was acting out of vigilance when he ordered them to be cut down. As previously discussed, Henry would have been wary to pass through such an environment after he nearly lost his life in a similar situation in the narrow wooded pass...
where his forces were ambushed by the sons of Owain Gwynedd during the 1157 campaign.

Henry’s actions were not unfounded as despite his best efforts to avoid such an encounter, the Welsh troops that were stationed in the vicinity, probably on the ridgelines paralleling the valley, ambushed Henry’s forces while they were preoccupied cutting down trees. ‘And there a few picked Welshmen, who knew not how to suffer defeat, manfully encountered him in the absence of their leaders. And many of the doughtiest fell on both sides’ (Brut RBH: 147), including many of Henry’s nobles (Chronica Rogeri de Hoveden: 217-20). The dead were buried nearby, probably in the ditch of Offa’s at a place known locally as Adwy’r Beddau or the ‘pass/gap of the graves’ (Nicholas 1872: 405, Pennant 1778: 268, Powel 1584: 187). Whether this is based on place-name evidence or from an actual mound is not known. Today there is no evidence for either. Although the field-names near Chirk Castle (c. 1310), Crogen Wladys and Crogen Iddon are traditionally the favoured location of the battle, further archaeological investigation is necessary and will be discussed in the next section.
Part 4, The Advancement of the Anglo-Norman Army into the Berwyn Mountains

**Manuscript Sources:** The Brut y Tywysogyon (Red Book of Hergest versions), Brenhinedd y Saesson. Annales Cambriae (B and C texts), and The Journey Through Wales.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action:</th>
<th>Location:</th>
<th>Participants:</th>
<th>Event Overview:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The advancement of the Anglo-Norman forces into the Berwyn Mountains and their establishment of an encampment.</td>
<td>The route of march along the Ceiriog River into the Berwyn Mountains near Llanarmon Dyffryn Ceiriog and the English Road across the mountains, including the encampment possibly at Cerrig Gwynion hillfort.</td>
<td>The Anglo-Norman army.</td>
<td>Following the ambush in the woods, Henry continues his route of march into North-Central Wales. He took his forces onto the Berwyn Mountains where he established an encampment.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Key Sites/terrain:** The Ceiriog river valley, Ffordd y Saeson (English Road), Cerrig Gwynion hillfort, Pont Rhyd y Gad bridge, St Garmon’s Church

**Associated Sites** Additional possible medieval route-ways, probably part of the Ffordd y Saeson.

Table 26: 1165 Campaign timeline for the advancement of the Anglo-Norman army into the Berwyn Mountains.

Despite the losses he suffered from the Welsh ambush, Henry was not deterred from his objective and pushed his army onwards into the Berwyn Mountains and there he ‘pitched a camp’ (AC, B text), where he ‘stayed for a few days’ (Brut Pen. 20: 63). The same actions are just as sparsely echoed in the Red Book of Hergest version of the Brut and in the Brenhinedd y Saesson. Due to the lack of historical information it is difficult to ascertain the route of march the Anglo-Normans took from Crogen to the Berwyn Mountains. In place of written evidence it is necessary to turn to place-name analysis to complete the event timeline. If Henry indeed continued to follow the Ceiriog river valley into the Berwyn Mountains, his troops would have undoubtedly found it difficult. The
valley narrows rapidly and in places between Crogen and Llanarmon Dyffryn Ceiriog; where the river turns to the northwest, the valley is little more than a narrow gorge.

There is a local tradition that Henry and his forces crossed the Ceiriog River to access the Ffordd y Saeson (ffordd is welsh for road or route) at the Pont Rhyd y Gad bridge (pont is the welsh word for bridge; Jones and Jones 1989: 27), although in the mid-twelfth century the crossing may have been little more than a ford. The suggestion that Henry had to cross the river in order to access the Berwyn Mountains and the Ffordd y Saeson indicates that he would have taken the upland route south of the Ceiriog River from Crogen, perhaps following a Welsh line of retreat after the battle (these possible avenues of approach are detailed below in Figure 96).

Once in the Berwyn Mountains Henry halted his troops and set up an encampment. Again local tradition, as documented by the Clwyd Powys Archaeological Trust, states that Henry’s forces occupied the Iron Age hillfort of Cerrig Gwynion, on the 470 metre summit of Mynydd Bach, one kilometre northwest of the present day village of Llanarmon Dyffryn Ceiriog (CPAT 59549). Henry deliberated on his next course of action while his troops rested and recuperated. Gerald of Wales indicates that during their stay in the Berwyns, ‘leaders of the English army had burnt down certain Welsh churches with their villages and churchyards’ (Journey Book II Ch. 12: 202). St Garmon’s church in the village of Llanarmon Dyffryn Ceiriog could have been one of the churches that the Anglo-Normans burnt, particularly since it was located at the easy distance of one kilometre from their encampment. As was discussed in the chapter on warfare, the looting of churches was common practice amongst Anglo-Norman knights and soldiers (Strickland 1996: 81-3).
Part 5, The Anglo-Norman Retreat back to England

**Manuscript Sources:** The Brut y Tywysogyon (Red Book of Hergest versions), Brenhinedd y Saesson. Annales Cambriae (B and C texts), The Journey Through Wales, Chronica Rogeri de Hoveden, Chronica de Mailros and the William of Newburgh version of The Chronicles of the Reigns of Stephen, Henry II and Richard I,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action:</th>
<th>Location:</th>
<th>Participants:</th>
<th>Event Overview:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anglo-Norman retreat to Chester</td>
<td>Route of march from encampment in the Berwyn Mountains to Chester</td>
<td>The Anglo-Norman army.</td>
<td>Due to extreme weather conditions the Anglo-Norman army is forced to turn back to England in defeat.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Key Sites/terrain:** The Ceiriog river valley, Ffordd y Saeson (English Road), Cerrig Gwynion hillfort, Pont Rhyd y Gad bridge.

**Associated Sites** Additional possible medieval route-ways, probably part of the Ffordd y Saeson, the port of Chester.

Table 27: 1165 Campaign timeline for the Anglo-Norman retreat back to England.

Henry’s indecision on his next course of action while encamped in the Berwyn Mountains was ultimately what cost him the campaign; ‘after he had stayed there [in the Berwyns] a few days, he was oppressed by a mighty tempest of wind and exceeding great torrents of rain’ (Brut RBH: 147). This, coupled with a lack of supplies and the difficulty of the terrain, prompted him to withdraw ‘his tents and his host to the open land of the flats of England’ (Brut RBH: 147; Chronicles W.N.: 145). Gerald of Wales is more poetic in his description of the events, claiming that the Anglo-Normans had incurred the wrath of God by burning churches and were punished with the storms (Journey Book II Ch. 12: 202).

Clearly the king was enraged by the situation he found himself in ‘and in anger toward the Welsh he caused the hostages, whom he already had in prison, to be blinded, namely, the two sons of King Owain, Cadwallon and Cynwrig and Maredudd, sons of Rhys, and many of the others’ (BS: 167). The Chronica Rogeri de Hoveden and the Chronica de Mailros also indicates that the ‘noses and ears of the girls’ were cut off to do ‘justice’ against the Welsh.
(217-220; 79). Henry undoubtedly felt justified in maiming all twenty-two Welsh hostages (AC, C text: 90-91), probably given to him as a symbol of good faith at the homage of 1163. After this was done Henry ‘decided in council to come as far as Chester, and there he repaired the castle [(presumably Chester Castle)] until there should come to him a fleet from Dublin and from Ireland’ (BS: 167). Given this it would seem that Henry thought to attempt an amphibious assault on Wales after his overland campaign had failed. To his dismay the number of ships that arrived were not sufficient to transport his forces and he was left with no further options but to return to England in defeat (Brut Pen. 20: 64).

**Site Archaeology and History**

The archaeological analysis that follows comprises of an examination of the historic environment records or HERs (from the Clwyd-Powys and Gwynedd Archaeological Trusts), National Preservation Records (from the Royal Commission of Ancient and Historic Monuments of Wales) and National Monument Records from Historic England, for each key site associated with the five campaign events discussed in the previous section. In some instances the veracity of these reports are questionable as they are sourcing data from antiquarian literature, which is true in particular for the Battle of Crogen and the Ffordd y Saeson.

When possible any data from previous archaeological inquiry including excavation reports will be incorporated into the discussion. However, this type of data is limited as the majority of these sites have never been excavated. Additionally, many sites have never received any academic attention apart from initial HER ‘scheduled monument’ surveys. This lack of evidence highlights current inadequacies in the medieval Welsh archaeological record. Although a detailed analysis of each site within the campaign case study core areas (reviewed below) is beyond the scope of this research; contextualizing these sites within their conflict landscape setting is a step towards increasing awareness of these often poorly understood medieval sites. Each of the key sites or key actions will also be analysed for their military features, utilizing the military terrain device KOCOA and viewshed analysis which is included in the
following chapter section on spatial analysis. For an explanation of the types of archaeological sites included in the historic landscape reconstructions table five.

Part 1, The Encampments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action:</th>
<th>Establishing / fortifying encampments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Key Sites/terrain:</td>
<td>Oswestry Castle and the immediate surrounding area, Pen y Bryn y Castell, Caer Drewyn, Castell Edeirnion and Llys Edeirnion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associated Sites:</td>
<td>Roman Road commencing from Corwen and heading due west.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 28: 1165 Campaign key sites and key terrain for the encampments.

Oswestry Castle

Figure 78: View of Oswestry Castle mound (centre), masonry remains of castle and view toward Wales (bottom right; photos by the author).

Although Oswestry Castle is mentioned in passing by a number of publications, little of note is actually said. Portions of the motte were excavated in 1988 which determined that the keep was rectangular and therefore, not a shell keep as previously thought. Apart from this the excavations predominantly revealed evidence of occupation in the post-medieval period from the seventeenth century onwards (NMR: SJ22NE1; HER: 00332). Oswestry was an early foundation and was recorded as Luvre (c. 1086) in the Domesday Book. Originally a timber motte and bailey construction, Oswestry was traditionally
held by the sheriffs of Shropshire (Suppe 1984: 64). In 1149, during the confusion of the civil war of King Stephen’s reign, the Castle was taken and rebuilt by Prince Madog ap Maredudd of Powys and later retaken by the Anglo-Normans sometime prior to 1160 (King 1983: 427). It is unclear when it was converted into a masonry castle, but is thought to have occurred sometime during the early years of Henry II’s reign (Suppe 1984: 64). ‘The Pipe Roll for 1162-63 also shows expenditure on supplies sent into Wales and on the garrisoning of the border castles, including the considerable force of 310 sergeants at Oswestry’ (Latimer 1989: 530; Suppe 1984: 68).

Pen y Bryn y Castell
The medieval manuscripts name the Welsh encampment as being at Corwen. It is unlikely that they set up their camp next to the settlement as it is located in a vulnerable valley alongside the River Dee. Two sites in the vicinity have been suggested by antiquarians and by Denbighshire County Council as the location of the Welsh encampment, these are Pen y Bryn y Castell and Caer Drewyn hillfort.

Figure 79: Ordnance Survey map of Corwen and vicinity, the town of Corwen is circled, the supposed location of Pen y Bryn y Castell is shown with a red arrow, Caer Drewyn hillfort with a dark blue arrow (contains OS data © crown copyright and database right 2015).
Cathrall states that the ‘place of encampment is pointed out at some distance above the church southward, and there are still visible the remains of a rampart of earth, and marks of the sites of numerous tents from thence to the village of Cynwyd’ (1828: 262). Although he does not term Pen y Bryn y Castell by name, the area that Cathrall refers to is on historic versions of the Ordnance Survey maps indicated as Pen y Bryn. The ‘Castell’ was probably added later in reference to the alleged earthworks. In the 1870 edition of the Ordnance Survey the area is disrupted by what appears to be a series of hillocks but probably indicates bracken as the same symbol is found on other parts of the map that are culturally unaffiliated (see below in Figure 80). The 1890 edition shows a similar set of markings.

![Figure 80: 1870 Ordnance Survey map zoomed to the location of Pen y Bryn](image)

In 1998 an archaeological survey was conducted at Pen y Bryn by Cambrian Archaeology Projects on behalf of the Forest Enterprise Welsh Heritage Assets project. The survey determined that there were no cultural features in the vicinity; as a result the area became a conifer plantation. Unfortunately, Cambrian Archaeology made a significant historical error. They associated Pen y Bryn with a battle between Owain Glyndŵr and Edward I
(Cambrian Archaeology 1998). Despite the connection between Corwen and Owain Glyndŵr, the town was a Welsh stronghold during Glyndŵr’s uprising, no battles took place between Glyndŵr or any English monarch in Corwen. Specifically not with Edward I, who had been dead for fifty years before Glyndŵr’s birth. It is unfortunate that this site was not subjected to a more thorough survey using battlefield archaeology techniques. Regrettably the conifer plantation was recently logged (which included using machinery to uproot the trees) severely damaging the viability of any future archaeological investigations (see Figure 81 below).

![Figure 81: The aftermath of logging on Pen y Bryn y Castell (photo by the author 20/04/2014).](image)

**Caer Drewyn**

An information board sponsored by the Denbighshire County Council, the town of Corwen and the Forestry Commission among others, states that in 1157 Owain Gwynedd occupied the Iron Age hillfort Caer Drewyn while Henry II was encamped in the Berwyn Mountains (see Figure 82 below).
Despite the blunder in the date, which should state 1165, this is a reasonable possibility. The reuse of prehistoric hillforts was not a foreign concept to the Welsh in the medieval era (see page 35 in the Literature Review). For example, Castell Dinas Bran was within an Iron Age hillfort (CPAT: 101173). The only academic reference which alludes to the reuse of Caer Drewyn in 1165 is Gardner’s article on Caer Drewyn in the 1922 edition of *Archaeologia Cambrensis*. Gardner remarks that ‘it has been said that Owen Gwynedd fortified himself here in A.D. 1164 [65], but he was probably a better strategist than to have occupied such an undesirable position for his army’ (1922: 117). Viewshed analysis of the site in the following section will show that Gardner’s assertions are not unfounded. The 1958 ‘Bala-Report’ also from *Archaeologia Cambrensis* concludes that ‘there is no archaeological evidence to support the tradition that Owain Gwynedd refortified the site in 1164’ (1958: 136). Despite this it cannot be ruled out as a possibility, which will be discussed at further length in the next section on military terrain analysis. The univallate hillfort is roughly circular in its layout with two entrances, one in the north-eastern corner and the other on the western face with complex outworks. It measures 192 metres north to south and 215 metres east to west (NPRN: 95431, Gardner 1922: 113).
Castell Edeirnion

In 1160 the Pipe Rolls record a castle at Edeirnion, called Dernio which has since been identified with Rûg Castle, in the County of Merioneth, located a few kilometres west of Corwen in a wide valley (Renn 1968: 304-5). The castle is situated adjacent to the Roman road that cuts west from Corwen to cross Snowdonia (Gardner 1961: 3). The motte, now located on private land within the modern estate of Rhug (which is now home to an American Bison ranch), is 3.7-5 metres high and is 10-12 metres across at the summit (NPRN: 306598, Salter 1997: 87). Rûg is associated with a medieval mansion probably a llys, given that there are several other examples in Merioneth of an unfortified residence, usually a llys, being associated with a motte, such as Castell Prysor (NPRN: 306598; see discussion on page 34 and 139). Excavation of the motte by Gardner in 1922 showed that it was built on top of a Bronze Age barrow; no Bronze Age artefacts were uncovered during excavations apart from burned bones, believed to be contemporary with the Bronze Age tumulus (Gardner 1961: 3; CPAT: 100806, King 1983: 276). Seven bone draughtsman gaming pieces (commonly used in the game draughts or checkers) and a quernstone were found dating to the medieval occupation of the site, unfortunately the photographs of these artefacts are of poor quality and as such are not represented (see Gardner 1961, plate IV.2). Precise dates were not provided for these items, however, checkers was not a popular European game until the
twelfth century, suggesting that the medieval sequence excavated dates to this period at the earliest (Westerveld 2009: xxv).

Spurgeon suggests that Rûg castle may have been built by Owain Gwynedd in 1165, referencing the castle mentioned in 1165 at Corwen in the Brenhinedd y Saesson (1987: 31). This theory would negate the Pipe Rolls claim that the castle was in existence by 1160. It is possible that the Pipe Rolls were referring not to Rûg as Dernio but Hendom, an alleged site of a motte or prehistoric barrow, which may be no more than a natural mound (NPRN: 406423). Hendom is located 5.5 kilometres east of Corwen in the Dee river valley (see Figure 84 below). It is also possible that Rûg may have a much older Norman foundation, as Domesday ‘records that the Norman earls of Chester and Shrewsbury were in possession of the upper valley of the Dee by 1086’ (Gardner 1961: 5). Additionally, the Life of Gruffudd ap Cynan records that Gruffudd met the marcher earls at ‘Rûg in Edernion’, where he was ‘then treacherously [taken] as a prisoner to Chester’ and held there for twelve years (ibid: 5; LGC: 71). Regardless of whether Owain built Rûg castle, it is possible that Owain Gwynedd used it along with the other Welsh princes during the 1165 campaign. The earlier treachery committed against Gruffudd ap Cynan, Owain Gwynedd’s father, may have bestowed a symbolic quality to the position of the Welsh troops at Rûg, perhaps as a statement of native Welsh solidarity in the reclamation of their native territories. Practically, the position of the Welsh at Rûg, as previously stated, would have halted an Anglo-Norman advance along the Roman Road through Snowdonia. Although the positioning of Rûg does not lend it to any strategic military importance or defensibility, this would not have been necessary since the bulk of the Welsh army was stationed forward, either at Caer Drewyn or Pen y Bryn y Castell. Furthermore, the reference in the Brenhinedd y Saesson to the construction of a castle was probably in connection to the fortifications raised for the Welsh troops on either Pen y Bryn y Castell or Caer Drewyn. The later section on viewsheds will demonstrate the virtues of viewsheds in establishing the defensibility of a site.
Figure 84: Map showing the vicinity of the Welsh encampment near Corwen. X= location of Corwen.

Part 2, The Anglo-Norman March from Oswestry

**Action:**

Establishing / fortifying encampments

**Key Sites/terrain:** Level terrain between Oswestry and Chirk, route-ways between these two locations are not well documented, Offa’s Dyke, Ceiriog River and valley, either Dyffryn Ceiriog or Aberceiriog.

**Associated Sites:** Castell y Waun and Chirk Bank Motte

Table 29: 1165 Campaign key sites and key terrain for the Anglo-Norman march from Oswestry.

There are few relevant or distinct archaeological sites along Henry’s route of march from Oswestry to the Ceiriog Valley. The most notable features are the actual terrain, which will be considered at length in the section on military terrain analysis. Apart from Offa’s Dyke, which is discussed below in the ‘Battle of
Crogen’ section, there are only two archaeological sites of note. These are Castell y Waun and Chirk Bank Motte.

Figure 85: Castell y Waun (photo by the author).

Castell y Waun
Castell y Waun is a motte located in the village of Chirk above the Ceiriog River, less than half a kilometre from the modern English border. A probable early timber castle, there have been no excavations of the motte. Castell y Waun was replaced at the close of the thirteenth century by the formidable masonry fortress of Chirk Castle, located just over three kilometres west of its earth and timber predecessor (King 1983: 103). Antiquarian literature has suggested that Chirk Castle had an earlier castle on the same site as the thirteenth-century masonry castle, this was called Castell Crogen. This assertion is ‘devoid of foundation [as Castell Crogen] was in the parish of Llandderfel, Edeirnion’ (Archaeologia Cambrensis 1935: 328). This is an important distinction and will be discussed in further detail in the following section on the Battle of Crogen.
The motte of Castell y Waun is now an overgrown garden feature of a private residence. There is no trace of a bailey, the motte is 5.7 metres high with a diameter of 30 metres, the diameter of the summit is 22 metres (NPRN: 307013). These castle dimensions are not well reflected in the photograph above in Figure 85, as alterations have taken place to the site since the 1988 plan was drawn; in fact the dimension of the registered area was altered in 1990 as a result of property ‘improvements’. The foundation date of the castle is not precisely known, however Renn suggests that it is mentioned in the Pipe Roll of 1165, although this has yet to be verified (Renn 1968: 143). If Renn’s assertions are correct, Castell y Waun may well have been in existence prior to Henry’s campaign, alternatively it may have been built as a result of the failed campaign, to strengthen defences along the border. In her 1912 publication A History of Chirk Castle and Chirkland, Mahler suggests that Castell y Waun may have had a much earlier foundation. The evidence for this is found in the Anglo-Norman poem The History of Fulk Fitz Warine in the following verse: ‘William Peverel conquered by the sword the land of Morelas as far as the water of Dee…in Ellesmere he made another tower, and on the water of Keyroc (Ceiriog) another’ (Mahler 1912: 4). This could be in reference to Castell y
Waun or Chirk Bank, a motte on the English side of the Ceiriog River, half of a kilometre to the south (both of these sites can be seen above in Figure 77).

**Chirk Bank Motte**

There is little data available about the motte known interchangeably as Chirk Bank and Oaklands Mount (adjacent to the current Oaklands Hall). Similar to Castell y Waun, Chirk Bank has ‘succeeded to the domestic requirements of an adjacent house’ (NMR: SJ23NE1) and is now completely overgrown by mature trees. At its base the motte measures 46 x 26 metres, it has an average height of 3 metres and the summit which has been levelled is 26 x 10 metres. It has been suggested that the situation of Castell y Waun and Chirk Bank on the opposite side of the Ceiriog River were ‘deliberately sited in view of one another, in order to control the movement of people moving along and across the valley, the ancient [and current] border between England and Wales’ *(ibid)*.

If these castles were in existence by the mid-twelfth century, either of them could have been exploited by the Anglo-Norman forces as they made their way into the Ceiriog Valley. Although they do not provide good vantage points, they could have been garrisoned by a contingent of Anglo-Norman troops to ensure that Henry’s line of retreat remained opened.

**Part 3, The Battle of Crogen**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Action:</strong></th>
<th>The ambush in the woods of the Ceiriog Valley.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Key Sites/terrain:</strong></td>
<td>Crogen battlefield, Ceiriog river valley, Offa’s Dyke, Adwy’r Beddau (pass of the graves).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Associated Sites:</strong></td>
<td>Chirk Bank Motte and Castell y Waun, more for their vicinity to Crogen than actual involvement in the battle. St Mary’s Church of Chirk should be included for similar reasons, although it is not clear if it had been founded by 1165.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 30: 1165 Campaign key sites and key terrain for the Battle of Crogen.
Crogen

The Battle of Crogen is not associated with any known built features contemporary to the battle (insofar as they were constructed around the same time as the battle or for the battle; NPRN: 410131). Although some historians claim that a Crogen Castell occupied the current location of Chirk Castle, which is situated adjacent to the battlefield, this has since been shown to be incorrect (Mahler 1912: 19; Pennant 1778: 268; Powel 1584: 186). The manuscripts are vague in their description of the battle location, merely indicating that it took place in the Ceiriog river valley, a feature that stretches for approximately 10 kilometres from its confluence at the River Dee to the town of Glyn Ceiriog, after which the valley narrows considerably, at many places becoming a steep ravine to its source in the Berwyn Mountains, (the total course of the river is approximately 24 kilometres).

As mentioned in the previous chapter in the section on the historiography of the Battle of Crogen, the concept of naming the battle ‘Crogen’ was not introduced until Powel’s publication in 1589, 429 years after the actual battle had taken place. During the reign of Llywelyn ap Iorwerth in the early thirteenth century the rebellious Powsian lord Gwenwynwyn, refused to take an oath of allegiance to Llywelyn. After being threatened by Llywelyn’s army, he
surrendered and took an oath of allegiance. As a gesture of good will he gave to Llywelyn his castle at Crogen (Powel 1589: 186). Powel makes the assumption that this castle was based in the Chirk vicinity given the place-names of Crogen Wladys and Crogen Iddon (see Figure 88 below).

Incidentally Wladys and Iddon both translate as ‘the name of’, therefore, these two place-names can be translated as Crogen’s Place, possibly a medieval farm and homestead belonging to someone named Crogen. The castle referred to by Powel has since been identified with Crogen Castell in the community of Llandderfel; it is documented in the Brut y Tywysogion in connection to the 1202 conflict mentioned above (Brut Pen. 20: 82). Llandderfel is 25 kilometres west of Crogen Wladys and Iddon, along the River Dee. It is thought that Crogen Castell (sometimes spelled Crogan) was a motte associated with a illéys, similar to Rûg Castell (GAT: 3272, NPRN: 306558, Renn 1968: 161). Due to Powel’s error, historians up until the early twentieth century alleged that Chirk Castle had been built on top of an earlier Castell Crogen (Mahler 1912: 19; Pennant 1778: 268). The Battle of Dyffryn Ceiriog has since been known as the Battle of Crogen.

Figure 88: Ordnance Survey Map of Chirk Castle and vicinity, showing the place-name locations of Crogen Wladys and Crogen Iddon. The area inside the red line indicates potential locations for the battle, (contains OS data © crown copyright and database right 2015).
Adwy’r Beddau (Pass/Gap of the Graves) and Offa’s Dyke

Despite Powel’s error in identifying the location of Crogen Castell, it is likely that the Battle of Dyffryn Ceiriog was fought in the vicinity of Crogen Wladys and Crogen Iddon. As can be seen in Figure 88 above, the valley between these location is more level and wider than at other locations along the Ceiriog River. Additionally, both modern and historic (1870) Ordnance Survey maps indicate that there is a 200 metre wide gap in Offa’s Dyke before it crosses the Ceiriog to continue up the opposite southern ridge line. Historians have suggested that it was at this opening where the Anglo-Norman army was ambushed by the Welsh as they attempted to pass through (Lewis 1849; Mahler 1912: 20; Pennant 1778: 268; Powel 1589: 187; Nicholas 1872: 405). Local tradition states that after the battle the dead were ‘buried in the fosse of Offa’s Dyke’, known as Adwy’r Beddau or the ‘Gap of the Graves’ (Nicholas 1872: 405; Pennant 1778: 268; Unknown 1822: 155; Powel 1589: 187). The oak tree pictured above in Figure 87 is said to mark the entrance to the pass of the graves and is called the gates of the dead. Legend has it that this oak, which is believed to be nearly 1200 years old, was spared by Henry’s army as they were cutting down trees, due to its substantial size. It would have been nearly 350 years old in 1165 (BBC News 2010; 2013). The age of the tree suggests that it took root soon after the construction of Offa’s Dyke at the close of the eighth century (Fox 1955). That the oak was allowed to mature suggests that this stretch of Offa’s Dyke may not have been as contested or heavily monitored as other locations given that trees regrew in the vicinity soon after the Dyke’s construction, which would presumably reduce visibility and therefore defensibility.

The rationale for disposing of the dead in a pre-dug ditch is sound, insofar as it makes logistical sense, however, archaeological excavation would need to be conducted to verify this tradition. The area believed to be the location of the mass grave has been severely eroded by the placement of a drainage conduit through this portion of the dyke (see Figure 89 below). An archaeological survey of Offa’s Dyke was undertaken on a small portion to the south of Chirk Castle in 1991 (near the vicinity of the middle photo in Figure 89 below). The reason for this survey was to determine whether the dyke would be
impacted by the installation of a new sewage disposal system for the castle. During the course of excavations it was revealed that a drainage conduit had already been diverted into the dyke in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Arnold 1991). No associated artefacts or other archaeological features of note were documented. Interestingly, none of the historians referenced above make a mention of any earthwork mounds, which are occasionally (when preserved) associated with mass graves from medieval battlefields (see discussion in Welsh and Anglo-Norman Medieval Warfare chapter, page 94).

Figure 89: top: view of potential battle ground immediately to the east of Adwy’r Beddau, middle: Offa’s Dyke south towards the Ceiriog river valley, bottom: Offa’s Dyke at the alleged location of the mass burial, due north of Adwy’r Beddau, (photos by the author).
Part 4, The Advancement of the Anglo-Norman Army into the Berwyn Mountains

**Action:** The advancement of the Anglo-Norman forces into the Berwyn Mountains and their establishment of an encampment.

**Key Sites/terrain:** The Ceiriog river valley, Ffordd y Saeson (English Road), Cerrig Gwynion hillfort, Pont Rhyd y Gad bridge, St Garmon’s Church

**Associated Sites:** Additional possible medieval route-ways, probably part of the Ffordd y Saeson.

Table 31: 1165 Campaign key sites and key terrain for the advancement of the Anglo-Norman army into the Berwyn Mountains.

**Ffordd y Saeson**

The location of the Ffordd y Saeson, or English road, is based primarily on place-name evidence, a modern foot-path is now superimposed on the theoretical route of the Ffordd y Saeson (see Figure 74; Mahler 1912: 25). This medieval route-way is thought to originate at Pen-y Rhewl, the place-name of a farmhouse meaning ‘top of the road, [it is] located near the supposed line of the medieval track-way’ (CPAT: 101582). Local lore states that this was the road Henry II used through the Berwyn Mountains, explaining its etymology (NPRN: 401058, Mahler 1912: 25). It is possible that the road has more ancient origins as it is associated with several prehistoric features, including Cerrig Gwynion hillfort and the cairn pictured below in Figure 90.

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4 Part 5, the Anglo-Norman retreat is not considered separately as the key sites associated with the action are included in part 4.
Figure 90: Cairn located near the Ffordd y Saeson, (photo by the author).

**Pont Rhyd y Gad Bridge**

Similar to the Ffordd y Saeson, the involvement of the Pont Rhyd y Gad (also known as the Pontricket Bridge) is founded on local oral tradition (CPAT: 12239). Jones and Jones in their 1998 historical photographic account of the Ceiriog Valley assert that the Pont Rhyd y Gad Bridge was built at the location ‘where the mercenary army of King Henry II is reputed to have forded the Ceiriog before his disastrous defeat in the Berwyn Mountains’ (Jones and Jones 1998: 27). The actual construction date of the bridge is not known, but it is probably post-medieval in origin.
Cerrig Gwynion

The Iron Age Hillfort of Cerrig Gwynion⁵ is located approximately one kilometre northwest of the village of Llanarmon Dyffryn Ceiriog (see Figure 92 below). Apart from a monument survey undertaken by Cadw there has been no archaeological investigation of the hillfort (NPRN: 306806). In addition there is little mention of the site in any historical volumes; Lewis in The Topographical Dictionary of Wales merely refers to it in passing when discussing the history of the village of Llanarmon Dyffryn Ceiriog (1849). In their photographic account Jones and Jones claim that Cerrig Gwynion was ‘the site where Owain Gwynedd stood and defeated the mercenaries of King Henry II’ (1998: 36, CPAT: 59549). The claim that there was a battle at the hillfort is poorly referenced and must therefore be treated with caution. Mahler claims that an early publication of the journal Archaeologia Cambrensis was the first to suggest that the Anglo-Norman army encamped on Cerrig Gwynion. The volume she cites has been searched but this reference was not found (Mahler 1912: 26). Yet, this suggestion is not unfounded. Cerrig Gwynion is located directly adjacent to the Ffordd y Saeson; the hillfort is in a defensible position

⁵ Cerrig Gwynion is on private land, the author requested access from the owner and was denied on 19/04/2014.
and provides good visibility over the surrounding landscape. Although in a state of decay its defences could have been refortified with comparable ease. At a distance of twelve kilometres from Corwen the Anglo-Norman army would have been within a day's march of the Welsh forces, yet the distance was considerable enough that if desired, armed conflict could be avoided.

Figure 92: above: view toward Cerrig Gwynion (photo by the author), below: aerial photo of Cerrig Gwynion (83-c-0533 CPAT).

The hillfort itself is believed to have Iron Age foundations; it is univallate with two entrances, one to the east and one to the west. On the south facing slope eight circular hut platforms have been documented, these have an
average diameter of 9 metres (CPAT: 100984). The enclosure is an irregular oval in shape and measures 214 metres (east to west) x 130 metres (NPRN: 306806). The landscape surrounding the hillfort remains unaltered apart from several conifer plantations.

**St Garmon’s Church**

Whilst not recorded in the other manuscripts, Gerald of Wales claims that while the Anglo-Norman army was stationed in the Berwyn mountains they burned and pillaged some of the local churches and communities. St Garmon’s church is one kilometre southeast of Cerrig Gwynion hillfort, making it and the village of Llanarmon Dyffryn Ceiriog an easy target. The only other church in the vicinity of the Anglo-Norman encampment would have been St Trillo Church in the village of Llandrillo, 12 kilometres west-southwest from Cerrig Gwynion and 8 kilometres southwest from Corwen. Whether the Anglo-Normans would have ventured as far as Llandrillo is questionable, particularly since they would have been visible to the Welsh at Corwen and at too far a distance from the rest of the Anglo-Norman army to receive assistance in the event that they were attacked. St Garmon’s however presented no such obstacles and would have been perceived as an easy target. The church is reputed to have been founded in the fifth century by St Garmon; there are no remains of this early Christian site or of its medieval successor and the present building dates to the nineteenth century (CPAT n.d. (b)). Within the churchyard is a preaching mound (see Figure 93 below), a feature that is commonly associated with churches dedicated to St. Garmon (CPAT: 101000).
There are other sites not discussed in the preceding sections that are represented spatially within the Berwyn Mountain Campaign core area. While not directly involved in the campaign, they are included in the historic landscape reconstruction as they represent integral components of the broader conflict landscape. However, there is one site that merits a brief overview. Coed Y Gadfa is a site along the Dee river valley, its location is circumstantial of place-name evidence of a farmhouse named Coed Y Gadfa, which is translated as battlefield wood (CPAT: 101586). The battle event responsible for the namesake of this wood is undocumented. Although it is unlikely that this was the site of an armed engagement from the 1165 campaign, it is nevertheless indicative of a frontier landscape with an extensive conflict tradition (see Figure 75).

Synthesis and Spatial Analysis

The following section is a synthesis of the two preceding sections, the campaign timeline as evidenced in the primary documentary sources and the archaeology of the key sites involved in the 1165 campaign. This synthesis is guided by the military terrain analysis of each event. The spatial analysis presented below represents only the preliminary data of the total military terrain analysis conducted for this campaign. The next chapter contains an in-depth
consideration of the spatial analysis for this campaign and the 1157 Coastal Campaign. The following analysis considers the KOCOA features of four key campaign events: the encampments; the march to Wales; the battle; the route of march into the Berwyns and the encampment in the mountains. All four are accompanied by viewshed models. The Anglo-Norman retreat from the Berwyn Mountains will not be considered here, as it is secondary to the campaign narrative. The Battle of Crogen will receive an in-depth KOCOA analysis in the following chapter; the KOCOA analysis included here provides a preliminary overview.

The Encampments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KOCOA Analysis for: Welsh Encampment at Corwen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Battlefield Element</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key Terrain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observation and Fields of Fire/Assault</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cover and Concealment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obstacles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avenues of Approach and Retreat</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 32: 1165 Campaign KOCOA analysis for the encampments.

Within this campaign there are only two certainties for event location, the first being that the Welsh were encamped at Corwen; the other is Henry II’s advancement into the Berwyn Mountains. Operating under these two certainties the other events of this campaign can be spatially inferred and reconstructed.

Oswestry did not offer the Anglo-Normans any tactical advantages other than the proximity of its location to the Ceiriog river valley, thus providing an avenue of approach. The terrain features surrounding Oswestry offer little in the way of natural defences and the visibility from the castle, the highpoint in that region, is poor. These conditions suggest that Henry never intended to use Oswestry as anything more than a staging ground for the expedition into Wales.
Conversely, the Welsh encampment near Corwen was selected for its tactical advantages as their position at Corwen was intended to prevent the Anglo-Norman advancement into Wales, as it was located at the head of the Roman road where it turns west into Snowdonia. This road may well have been Henry’s objective as during the twelfth century it was the only way through Snowdonia to the Welsh strongholds. Corwen itself is situated in the Dee river valley but is surrounded by numerous highpoints including the aforementioned Pen Y Bryn Y Castell and Caer Drewyn.

A series of viewsheds were executed for both of these locations from geo-referenced points collected at diverse locations on the sites (see Methodology chapter page 57 for data point collection strategy). Caer Drewyn despite its location on a prominent knoll is actually located on a false crest, as the actual summit is located half of a kilometre to the east; this in turn limits the visibility to the east. Despite this, Caer Drewyn affords a degree of visibility toward to Ffordd y Saeson, approximately 5 kilometres southeast, which would mean that the Welsh would have been able to anticipate the Anglo-Norman approach. The blind spot to the east could have been overcome by posting lookouts on the eastern summit, although as Henry’s army advanced along the Ceiriog River, the vantage point to the east along the Dee river valley may not have been a primary concern.

Pen y Bryn y Castell possesses a different set of advantages from Caer Drewyn. Unlike Caer Drewyn, which would have been as visible to the Anglo-Norman army from the Ffordd y Saeson as the Ffordd y Saeson was to Welsh encampment on Caer Drewyn, Pen y Bryn y Castell would have been concealed from the Anglo-Normans as they advanced along the English Road towards Corwen. Viewshed analysis indicates that Caer Drewyn and Castell Edeirnion were both visible from Pen y Bryn y Castell, although there was no visibility to the south, the direction of the Anglo-Norman approach (see Figures 94 and 95 below). Interestingly, all three sites: Castell/ Llys Edeirnion (where the Welsh princes may have been stationed), Caer Drewyn and Pen y Bryn y Castell are mutually inter-visible of each other. It is possible that the Welsh army was encamped at both Caer Drewyn and Pen y Bryn y Castell. Caer Drewyn was probably too small in size to accommodate the entire Welsh army, but may have been used as vantage point to monitor the Anglo-Norman
progress through the Berwyn Mountains. The bulk of the army would have been encamped at Pen y Bryn y Castell, which could have easily accommodated the Welsh forces. Additionally, Pen y Bryn y Castell is a more hospitable encampment than Caer Drewyn as it contains a series of springs and streams for fresh water supply. By placing the bulk of the Welsh army at Pen y Bryn y Castell, the Welsh forces would have had the element of surprise if the Anglo-Normans had advanced as far as Corwen.

It is evident that Owain Gwynedd was utilizing similar tactics to those implemented at the Welsh encampment at Basingwerk during the 1157 Coastal Campaign. Specifically, by the selection of a strategic point at which to oppose the Anglo-Norman advancement, Owain effectively had the campaign advantage. By selecting the field of conflict he controlled the engagement.

Figure 94: Viewshed from Caer Drewyn which is indicated with a red arrow.
The Anglo-Norman avenue of approach to Wales from Oswestry

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>KOCOA Analysis for: Anglo-Norman route of march from Oswestry</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Battlefield Element</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Key Terrain</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Observation and Fields of Fire/Assault</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cover and Concealment</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Obstacles</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Avenues of Approach and Retreat</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 33: 1165 Campaign KOCOA analysis for the Anglo-Norman route of march from Oswestry.

Henry II’s decision to advance through Wales via the Ceiriog river valley rather than the Dee river valley is perplexing and must be addressed. The Dee river valley is located approximately 4 kilometres north of the Ceiriog River at Chirk. Unlike the Ceiriog river valley, which is at places little more than a ravine, the
valley along the Dee is wide. Additionally, by following the Dee river valley into Wales Henry would have avoided the difficult upland journey in the Berwyn Mountains. In 1118 Henry I successfully transported his troops along the Dee river valley to the Roman Road at Corwen; although unverified, the Llangollen Bridge is credited as being originally built by Henry I in connection with this campaign (CPAT: 101214; Pennant 1778). Presumably, Henry II would have been aware of his grandfather’s campaign, and the success he achieved by using this route-way through Wales. In light of this it is puzzling why Henry II favoured the Ceiriog Valley and the Berwyn Mountains over the gentle terrain of the Dee river valley. His aversion of the other possible route along the River Tanat, 5 kilometres south of Oswestry, requires little explanation. It is bordered by numerous castles (such as Sycharth, Tomen yr Allt and Tomen Cefnoch) that at this point in history were probably garrisoned by the Welsh, additionally once at the river’s source in the heart of the Berwyn Mountains where the river valley terminates, there is no way across the mountains. Additionally, it is almost double the distance of the other routes (see Figure 96 below).

There are two probable explanations for why Henry favoured the Ceiriog over the Dee. The Welsh would have remembered the route Henry I took through Wales 47 years earlier and they would have anticipated the possibility that Henry II could follow suit. Henry II would also have been aware of this and may have chosen the Ceiriog route in the hope of entering Wales undetected. Yet, given the size of the Anglo-Norman army stealth seems implausible. Regardless, the Welsh were evidently aware of the route via the Ceiriog as they had stationed a small contingent in advance, the same small force that ambushed Henry at Crogen. Secondly, Henry may have chosen to transverse the Berwyn Mountains so that his army would have the advantage of the high ground (this will be elaborated upon in the section on the Berwyn Mountains below). Henry may have been willing to sacrifice the temporary vulnerability along the Ceiriog Valley in order to gain the advantage of the higher ground.
The Battle of Crogen

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KOCOA Analysis for: The Battle of Crogen</th>
<th>Terrain Feature</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Battlefield Element</td>
<td>Terrain Feature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key Terrain</td>
<td>River valley / flood plain of the Ceiriog near Offa’s Dyke at Chirk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observation and Fields of Fire/Assault</td>
<td>Ridgeline to the north and south of the battlefield</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cover and Concealment</td>
<td>Offa’s Dyke, wooded hillsides</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obstacles</td>
<td>Offa’s Dyke, Ceiriog River, wooded terrain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avenues of Approach and Retreat</td>
<td>Gap in Offa’s Dyke, Ceiriog river valley, ridgetops bordering the battlefield</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 34: 1165 Campaign KOCOA analysis for the Battle of Crogen.

By contextualizing the 1165 Campaign, particularly the Battle of Crogen, within a wider conflict landscape that utilizes military terrain analysis it has been possible to define and reconstruct key events associated with this conflict. As previously stated the precise location of the battle was not known. However,
the terrain features in the region of Crogen Iddon and Crogen Wladys, the pass through Offa’s Dyke, along with the local tradition of the mass grave at Adwy’r Beddau, lend support to the theory that the so-called Battle of Crogen did in fact take place in this area. Both the Peniarth 20 and Red Book of Hergest versions of the Brut y Tywysogion state that Henry’s forces were ambushed in the woods of Dyffryn Ceiriog, which is translated as the Ceiriog Valley. The Brenhinedd y Saesson states that this event occurred at Aberceiriog, which is translated as the mount or confluence of the Ceiriog River. The Ceiriog River flows into the Dee only a few kilometres east of Crogen so it is conceivable that the mouth of the Ceiriog could be considered to be located in the Crogen vicinity.

The Welsh would have had excellent visibility of the Anglo-Norman approach along the Ceiriog and of their tree-cutting activities from the ridge-tops on either side of the Ceiriog Valley. As the tree-cutting would indicated, this area was densely wooded, a factor that the viewshed models do not take into account (see discussion on this on page 61 of the Methodology chapter). Nevertheless, the Anglo-Normans would not have been able to see the ridge-tops from their location on the valley floor and the forest would have offered the Welsh forces ample cover and concealment. The ambush could have come from two sides, by Welsh forces stationed on both the north and south ridges. Only archaeological testing using battlefield archaeology methodologies will be able to verify these hypotheses. Viewsheds are not presented in this section as the Battle of Crogen is discussed at length in the following Military Terrain Analysis chapter.
The Berwyn Mountains, Anglo-Norman route of approach and encampment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Battlefield Element</th>
<th>Terrain Feature</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Key Terrain</strong></td>
<td>Ceiriog river valley, Ffordd y Saeson, Cerrig Gwynion Hillfort, river crossings / fords</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Observation and Fields of Fire/Assault</strong></td>
<td>Ridgeline to the north and south of the battlefield progressing west into the Berwyns, Cerrig Gwynion Hillfort</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cover and Concealment</strong></td>
<td>Wooded terrain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Obstacles</strong></td>
<td>Wooded terrain, steep terrain, Ceiriog River</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Avenues of Approach and Retreat</strong></td>
<td>Ffordd y Saeson, ridgelines, Ceiriog River Valley, Offa’s Dyke</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 35: 1165 Campaign KOCOA analysis for the Anglo-Norman route of approach and encampment in the Berwyn Mountains.

After the battle, Henry decided to continue his campaign despite the losses he had sustained at Crogen. Based on the terrain, there are three possible routes that the Anglo-Normans could have taken to reach the Ffordd y Saeson. These are detailed below in Figure 97. The route indicated by the red line follows the Ceiriog River turning north at the Ffordd y Saeson. The purple route moves rapidly upland from Crogen and continues at elevation to the Ffordd y Saeson, it is not unreasonable to conclude that Henry would have wanted to gain high ground as soon as possible, given that staying in the river valley would have left his army vulnerable to additional ambushes. The third option, the route indicated in black, follows the course of Offa’s Dyke to the south where it rapidly gains elevation after crossing the Ceiriog River. Once on level ground the army would have turned west, following the ridgeline to Pont Rhyd y Gad where they would have forded the river before continuing onto the Ffordd y Saeson.

Each of these hypothetical routes poses a series of challenges. The purple route would have probably been forested, lending the same difficulties that caused Henry to order the woodland around Crogen cut down. The route along the Ceiriog River would have been almost impassable at places where the valley transforms into a steep ravine. Indeed the difficulty of the terrain, steep in many places, would have been a challenge for all three potential routes, and particularly for Henry’s supply train. Part of the supply train may
have been abandoned due to the difficulty of the terrain. This would explain why the Anglo-Norman army ran out of supplies so quickly when encamped in the Berwyn Mountains.

The route that parallels Offa’s Dyke is perhaps the more logical choice. Despite the rapid ascent of the Dyke from the south bank of the Ceiriog, once upland the ground levels out making the landscape fairly easy to transverse. The major challenge of this route is at the point of descent to the ford through the Ceiriog, it is doubtful that the wagons in Henry’s supply train would have been able to manage the decent.

Henry’s choice of route may also have been informed by the route of the Welsh retreat from Crogen. It is unlikely that the Anglo-Normans would have tried to pursue them in the aftermath of the battle. What is more likely is that Henry decided to follow them, assuming that, as they were familiar with the area, they would take the path of least resistance back to Corwen.

Figure 97: Possible routes of approach into the Berwyn Mountains and to the Ffordd y Saeson from Crogen. The line of Offa’s Dyke is indicated by the dotted line on the eastern edge of the map, the approximate route of Ffordd y Saeson is represented by the solid pink line and St Garmon’s Church, which may have been pillaged by the Anglo-Normans when encamped at Cerrig Gwlynion is indicated by the red lightning bolt.
Cerrig Gwynion, the alleged location of the Anglo-Norman encampment in the Berwyn Mountains is situated on a commanding location over the Ceiriog River. Similar in size to Caer Drewyn, it is doubtful that Ceirrig Gwynion would have been able to support the entire Anglo-Norman army within its defences. However, the summit on which Cerrig Gwynion is situated, Mynydd Bach, would have been able to accommodate the entire army with ease. Unfortunately, due to the site being located on private land, viewshed analysis could not be conducted as access is needed in order to gather geographically referenced points. Only the southern and western exposures of Mynydd Bach offer Cerrig Gwynion natural defence; the eastern and northern portions of the summit flow out into the level terrain of the Berwyn uplands (see Figure 98 below). From there it is relatively easy to access the Ffordd y Saeson, located 1 kilometre northeast of the hillfort.

Figure 98: View of Cerrig Gwynion from the northeast, looking southwest (photo by the author).

The Ffordd y Saeson is unique in that it affords constant forward visibility, in the direction of Corwen. By this it is meant that at no point would forward (north-westerly) visibility be obscured. From any given observation point along the road there is an average visibility of 2 kilometres, an example of this is shown in the viewshed below in Figure 99. This visibility would make it difficult for the Welsh to ambush the Anglo-Normans and may indicate why Henry II
chose to use the Ffordd y Saeson in favour of the Dee river valley, as the avenue of approach for his 1165 campaign in Wales.

![Figure 99: Viewshed from the Ffordd y Saeson demonstrating the continuous vantage points in the direction of Corwen which is indicated with the pink dotted line, the points from which the viewshed were calculated are underlined.](image)

**Conclusion**

This chapter has given consideration to the historical and archaeological evidence of key events and sites associated with the 1165 Berwyn Mountain Campaign. The spatial representation of these sites and events made it possible to synthesize a battle narrative for key events and locations, such as the Battle of Crogen and the Anglo-Norman march from Crogen into the Berwyn Mountains. The military terrain analysis of the Welsh position at Corwen illuminates the strategic qualities of their position. Similar to the 1157 encampment at Basingwerk, both were chosen to halt the Anglo-Norman advance and allowed the Welsh to set the terms of the engagement by selecting the location. Overall, the resultant gross-pattern analysis along with
preliminary military terrain analysis, utilizing KOCOA, has highlighted key features and terrain elements to be explored in depth in the following chapter using elements of reverse and regular KOCOA.
Introduction

The following section encompasses a comprehensive military terrain analysis for the key sites and events identified in each case study from the previous chapters, the 1157 Battle of Coleshill and the 1165 Battle of Crogen. As previously discussed in the Methodology chapter, military terrain analysis is essentially a methodological tool-set for conducting spatial analysis of a conflict landscape. The battle event analysed for the 1157 Coastal Campaign is the Battle of Coleshill and includes the areas surrounding the Coleshill (Hen Blas) region and the Ewloe region. The historiography of the 1157 case study identified historical errors that led to the misidentification of Ewloe as the popular location of the battle event in 1157, often referred to as the Battle of ‘Coed Eulo’ or Ewloe Wood. The following military terrain analysis will contrast these two possibilities, other prospective battle locations having been addressed and ruled out in the 1157 Case Study chapter, specifically the areas surrounding Hawarden Castle and Bryn Y Cwm Motte. The military terrain analysis illuminates and compares the variables for these two prospective battle sites and explores how the terrain would have been perceived and could have been exploited by the combatants.

Subsidiary events from the 1157 campaign, such as the Anglo-Norman raid on Anglesey and the Welsh raids on Rhuddlan following the battle of Coleshill have not been subjected to military terrain analysis; this is because the historical renderings of the nature of these engagements is too vague to allow for in-depth military terrain analysis. These sites still have survey potential, but due to the scope of this research they have not been considered further than their inclusion in the conflict chronology and the conflict landscape reconstruction. Other battle related events and sites from the 1165 campaign such as: the Anglo-Norman encampment at Cerrig Gwynion, the Anglo-Norman advance along the Ffordd y Saeson (the English road) and the Welsh encampments at Pen y Bryn y Castell, Caer Drewyn and Castell Edeirnion have already been analysed for their spatial relationships in the 1165 Campaign Case Study chapter.
Military terrain analysis toolset review

The battlefield elements as identified by KOCOA (see Table 36 below) and adapted for conflict archaeology are as follows (after Scott and McFeaters 2011: 115; McBride et al. 2011).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Battlefield Element</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Key Terrain and cultural terrain</strong></td>
<td>Any portion of the battlefield, possession of which gives an advantage to the possessor.</td>
<td>High ground, castles (fortifications), trenches and other earthworks, monuments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Observation &amp; Fields of Fire/Assault</strong></td>
<td>Points on the landscape that allow observation of enemy activity that is not necessarily key terrain; offers opportunity to observe an area, acquire targets; and can allow for an effective line of fire.</td>
<td>High ground, line of site, viewshed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cover &amp; Concealment</strong></td>
<td>Landforms or landscape elements that provide protection from assault and enemy fire and conceal troop positions from observation.</td>
<td>Ravines, cliff-face, castle wall, forest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Obstacles</strong></td>
<td>Landscape elements that affect troop movements. These can be natural or manmade features</td>
<td>Rivers, marshes, ravines, earthworks, forest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Avenues of Approach &amp; Retreat</strong></td>
<td>Corridors used to transport troops between the core battle area and outer logistical areas. Again these can be natural or manmade features</td>
<td>Roads, paths, steam beds, navigable waterways</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 36: KOCOA battlefield elements.

An addendum to this standard military terrain protocol is the author’s addition of cultural features, (which for the sake of remaining succinct and consistent have not been included in traditional KOCOA table layout above). These features are considered battlefield elements, as they can contribute to determining the point at which a battle takes place, for example, a boundary marker such as a standing stone cross, or a known centre of political or religious importance. Moreover, they are integral components in the reconstruction and contextualization of a medieval conflict landscape. For these reasons cultural features will be treated as a sub-section within the Key Terrain feature-set of...
KOCOA. The addition of a cultural feature sub-category is a product of the ‘reverse’ KOCOA applied in this study. As reviewed in the Methodology chapter, a significant part of what makes this study unique is its application to a medieval conflict and the inclusion of an in-depth reconstruction of the contemporary historic landscape. As discussed in the Methodology chapter, generally KOCOA is used to better delineate and define features of a known battlefield to assist in the analysis and reconstruction of discrete battlefield events. Reverse KOCOA uses these elements to identify potential battlefield locations, in events where the site of the engagement is not always precisely known, for example the Battle of Coleshill. Once this is achieved, KOCOA is then applied in the traditional mode. ‘Reverse’ KOCOA was applied in the previous Case Study chapters to identify potential battlefield locations and other conflict related sites. What follows now is a combination of the reverse and the traditional application of KOCOA and viewshed analyses of the Battle of Coleshill, including the so-called Battle of Coed Eulo and the Battle of Crogen. The data from the military terrain analysis and the battle narratives from the manuscripts are then synthesised to create an order of battle – a dynamic pattern analysis, a gross-pattern having been presented in the preceding Case Study chapters. The results from this analysis are then discussed in their capacity to reconstruct battlefield events and highlight events of social change as evidenced in the following data. The viewsheds are displayed at the end of this chapter, pages 334-414. The Ewloe or Coed Eulo viewsheds can be found on pages 334-348 (Figures 113-127), Coleshill pages 349-381 (Figures 128-160) and Crogen pages 382-414 (Figures 161-193).
The Battle of Coleshill – the 1157 Coastal Campaign

Figure 100: 1157 Coastal Campaign, Battle of Coleshill core area. This represents the two possibilities for the location of Coleshill, the Ewloe area and Coleshill area.

**Ewloe Castle environs, spatial military analysis**

Ewloe castle was built by Llywelyn ap Gruffudd in 1257. It has been suggested that this masonry castle stands on the site of an earlier earth and timber fortification, as evidenced in the irregular plan of the masonry castle, suggesting the foundations had to compensate for a previous building (CPAT 100050), however, there is no archaeological or documentary evidence to support this claim. Ewloe castle is situated on a narrow ridge approximately 100 metres above sea level. The surrounding environment is dominated by Wepre Wood; it is thought that this woodland represents all that is left of the once great forest of Tegeingl (Owen 1994: 154). Wepre brook flows northeast through a steep ravine directly north of the castle, the castle itself is situated on a narrow rise less than 30 metres south of the confluence of Wepre Brook with a subsidiary stream. Most of the remaining woodland is now enclosed within Wepre Park, a 160 acre parkland maintained by the Flintshire Countryside Service. The landscape is dominated by steep ravines, narrow ridges and cliffy outcrops.
Wepre Wood is approximately 4 kilometres northwest of Hawarden, directly adjacent to the coastal Roman road (based on the present day boundaries of Wepre wood), and approximately 4.5 kilometres east/northeast of Wat’s Dyke. The Ewloe castle area is also located approximately 11 kilometres northwest of Henry’s encampment near Chester and 13.5 kilometres southeast of Owain’s encampment at Basingwerk.

As has been previously discussed, the great forest of Tegeingl covered an immense area of northeast Wales, place-name evidence suggests that it stretched from the marches of Cheshire northwest to the River Clwyd. It is not known precisely how far west this forest stretched, the place-name evidence suggest it encompassed Mold and the immediate area to the west. The Clwydian Mountains appear to have been the natural boundary of the forest, although parts of the forest probably stretched into their lowland terrain (Owen 1994). The coastal plain to the east of the forest was generally open and marshy in places, in the Bruts this is described as ‘open country’ (Brut Pen. 20: 59). The coastal Roman road transects the coastal plain, staying clear of the forest to the west. Despite the ‘wildness’ of the forest recorded by the Bruts, it is probable that there were open pockets within the forest, as evidenced in Domesday Book and the Journey Through Wales (see Chapter Six).
Figure 101: The terrain of the environs surrounding Ewloe Castle and observer points used for viewed analysis.

Key: dotted pink line = coarse of coastal Roman road
large black hash marks = suggested Anglo-Norman avenue of approach
small black dotted line = suggested Welsh avenue of approach
red explosion = supposed site of the so-called battle of Coed Eulo.

**KOCOA Analysis for the so-called Battle of Coed Eulo or Ewloe Wood**

**Key Terrain**
For the battle action the key terrain is fairly straight forward, being the high ground or ridges over the ravine which would have given the advantage to the Welsh, who would have had possession of this terrain feature. The Welsh would have also had control over the avenue of retreat at the south of the ravine where it terminates; this would have ensured their ability to withdraw while blocking that exit from the Anglo-Normans. These terrain features can be viewed in Figure 101 above.

**Observations and fields of fire**
The complex topography surrounding Ewloe castle, yields a varied series of dynamic viewsheds. A total of fourteen observer points were collected including Ewloe Castle. A scale of 1:15,000 has been used for all viewed shed
representations. The following table (Table 37) represents the elevation for each of the observer points; the corresponding distance to the horizon has not been included within this table as all viewsheds for the Ewloe battle site region are restricted to an approximate four kilometres radius, which given the elevation of the observation points is well within the boundaries of sight.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ewloe Observer Points and Viewshed map title</th>
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<td>Fig. 116: Viewshed from Ewloe Observation Point 3</td>
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<td>Fig. 117: Viewshed from Ewloe Observation Point 4</td>
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<td>Fig. 118: Viewshed from Ewloe Observation Point 5</td>
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<td>Fig. 119: Viewshed from Ewloe Observation Point 6</td>
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<td>Fig. 120: Viewshed from Ewloe Observation Point 7</td>
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<td>Fig. 121: Viewshed from Ewloe Observation Point 8</td>
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<td>Fig. 122: Viewshed from Ewloe Observation Point 9, supposed site of battle</td>
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<td>Fig. 127: Viewshed from Ewloe Observation Point 14</td>
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Table 37: Elevations above sea level and viewshed map titles for each Coed Eulo (Ewloe) observation point.

Several trends are present within these viewsheds. The first is that visibility decreases as the depth of the ravine increases, this is true for observer points at both low and high elevations. This terrain feature is clearly represented in Figures 114 and 115, which present greater visibility in the shallow northern section of the ravine, while the viewsheds in Figures 120 and 121 indicate poor visibility in the deeper southern section of the ravine. In addition, viewsheds at lower observer elevations from the northern half of the study area tend to have poor visibility (see Figures 116 and 118), while viewsheds from observer points at higher elevation tend to have a larger degree of visibility (see Figures 117 and 119). The cut-off line for poor or good visibility seems to be around the 30 metre elevation contour. Moreover, visibility from the northern section of the area indicates that the ridgeline would have in many instances been visible from the ravine floor, although part of this would have been obscured by vegetation. All of the viewsheds indicate that the Welsh, on
the ridge at the southern end of the ravine, would have been invisible to the Anglo-Norman army until they were right upon them, arguably the perfect setting for an ambush.

**Cover and Concealment**
The ravine in places would have provided the Anglo-Normans concealment from the Welsh. Cover from projectiles (arrows) could be purchased by taking refuge against any available cliff faces. Additionally large portions of the ridge top (that are not located on the immediate edge) are not visible from the ravine, affording the Welsh concealment from the Anglo-Norman army until they were within attacking range, tree cover would have added to this feature (Figures 118 and 120).

**Obstacles**
The ravine and the ridge line for all of their other positive qualities are also obstacles in themselves. Once in the ravine it would be difficult to gain higher ground due to the steepness of the terrain (see Figure 102 below). Conversely, it would have been equally perilous for the Welsh troops to have descended the steep terrain to the Anglo-Norman army below. There is one exception; the topography in the immediate vicinity of Ewloe Castle is less severe. The Anglo-Norman army would have been at a disadvantage as they would have been engaged in an uphill battle. Meanwhile the Welsh could have exploited the gradual downward slope to their advantage. Other obstacles are minor and include the shallow brooks and streams prevalent in the region.
Avenues of Approach and Retreat

There are only two avenues of approach and retreat for Ewloe. The avenue of approach used by the Anglo-Normans would have been from the Roman road, which abuts the Wepre brook drainage basin. The entrance to the ravine is essentially perpendicular to the Roman road. The avenue of approach into the ravine is broad, approximately 190 metres wide and at an elevation of 15 metres. Advancing 0.75 kilometres into the ravine it narrows dramatically to approximately 18 metres at its most narrow point. At its entrance, it is not apparent that the Wepre brook culvert will progress into a ravine. In fact many parts of its eastern extremities appear hospitable, with flat flood plains (see Figure 4 above). This environment rapidly gives way to cliff faces and steep slopes, these features would not have been immediately visible to the
advancing army as they are obscured both by the limited terrain visibility and tree cover. The manuscripts indicate that Henry had Welsh allies led by Madog ap Maredudd of Powys on this expedition, at least some of the members of the Welsh retinue must have been familiar with the terrain of northeast Wales. As it was Henry’s intention to cut through the Welsh forest, a territory unknown to him, he likely had a Welsh guide. Given this, it is probable that they would have advised Henry of the difficulties of the landscape. This theory will be discussed in further detail in the Ewloe conclusion section below.

The Welsh avenue of approach would probably have been in the vicinity of Ewloe Castle (elevation 85 metres), as mentioned above in the obstacle analysis; this is the only access point to the ravine that did not have precipitous drop-offs. According to the documentary evidence, the Anglo-Normans retreated back the way they came: ‘[a]nd after many of the king’s men had been slain, it was with difficulty that he escaped back to the plain’ (Brut RBH: 135). Following this engagement the Welsh also retreated back towards their encampment at Basingwerk. Apart from the avenue of approach in the immediate vicinity of the battle location, is unclear from the historic landscape reconstruction and military terrain analysis what route-way the Welsh would have used to both advance and retreat. It is possible that they could have been stationed at Mold Castle (6 kilometres southwest of Ewloe), which had been in Gwynedd’s possession since 1146.

Coed Eulo Conclusions
This terrain analysis has highlighted three principal issues with locating the battle at Ewloe. These are in addition to the lack of historical references discussed in earlier chapters. The first is distance; Ewloe is located 13.5 kilometres from the Welsh encampment at Basingwerk and 4.5 kilometres from Wat’s Dyke. Given that Henry’s intent was to cut through the wood to take the Welsh by surprise from their rear, (once their front was engaged by the other half of Henry’s army), he would have been faced with a long and arduous trek through the Welsh forest. Even without the supply train to slow his progress it is unlikely that he would have been able to arrive at Basingwerk in time with the other half of his contingent; this potential tardiness could have had disastrous consequences for the other half of his army, expecting a relieving force. While
the manuscripts and antiquarian literature attributes the calamity that befell Henry’s forces to his inexperience with warfare, this was not the case as he was not as inexperienced as previously assumed (Hosler 2004, King 1965). Although he was young, only 23 at the time of the 1157 campaign he had experience with conflict in France and he was undoubtedly assisted by seasoned military advisers. Even with a Welsh guide, it is unlikely that Henry would have been so imprudent as to attempt this long trek, even with the advantage of Wat’s Dyke as a route-way. Furthermore, many of the manuscripts allude to the fact that once Owain realised that the king intended to surround him, he retreated. ‘And when Owain heard that the king was coming against him from the rear side, and he saw the knights approaching from the other side, and with them a mighty host under arms, he left that place and retreated as far as the place that was called Cil Owain’ (Brut RBH: 135). This indicates that the location of the assault was close enough to Basingwerk for Owain to have received news of the king’s intention, possibly while having the other half of Henry’s army in his sight.

Also of concern is the proposed location of the battle in the ravine. Despite the fact that the Welsh would have had the initial advantage as they careened down the slope into the ravine, once there they would have been as trapped as the Anglo-Normans. They would have either had to fight uphill to retreat or else push through the Anglo-Norman ranks to the road, where the rest of the Anglo-Norman army was located, as they would not have had time to advance far from the ravine entrance. In fact the other half of the army was close enough to hear the commotion from the ambush and they attempted to come to the aid of their king. Given the wording of the manuscripts, it appears that they arrived at the end of the ambush. Unlike their Anglo-Norman counterparts, the Welsh soldiers were lightly armed allowing for increased agility (Davies 2004: 5, 145). This would have certainly given them the advantage during a retreat following an ambush. A Welsh advance into the ravine would have been tantamount to a suicide mission (Davies 2004; Kenyon 1996); it is unlikely that they would have engaged in such a precarious attack. As discussed in the earlier chapter on Welsh and Anglo-Norman Medieval Warfare, Welsh field tactics were cleverly calculated to do the most possible
damage, in a short space of time, in an environment that would minimize the risks to themselves and put their opponents at a pronounced disadvantage.

Alternatively the Anglo-Normans could have advanced up along the ridge rather than the ravine, counting on the vegetation to protect them from the prying eyes of Welsh scouts, the western side having the gentler incline. The Welsh positioned above the southern end of the ravine would have remained invisible to the Anglo-Normans until they advanced beyond an elevation of 80 metres, this is in the vicinity of the comparatively level ground that is directly north of viewshed observation point Ewloe 10 (see Figure 113 and 123).

Nevertheless, given the other deficiencies of evidence from the accounts in the manuscripts and from the military terrain analysis, it is highly unlikely that the battle took place at Coed Eulo.

Coleshill environs, spatial military analysis

Unlike the so-called Battle of ‘Coed Eulo’, there are manuscript references for the Battle of Coleshill. The following are references from contemporary sources that recognize Coleshill by name as the site of the battle.

Gerald of Wales – The Journey Through Wales:
- ‘In our own times Henry II, king of the English, led an army into Gwynedd. He was defeated in battle in a narrow wooded pass near Coleshill, that is the hill of coal’ (Book 2, Chapter 7: 189).
- ‘On our right we passed the forest of Coleshill, the hill of coal. It was there in our own time that Henry II, king of the English, was badly mauled when he made his first assault on Wales’ (Book 2, Chapter 10: 196).

Annales Cestrienses:
- In this year [1157…] a battle royal was fought at Coleshill (21).

The Chronicle of Jocelin of Brakelond (in reference to the arraignment of Henry of Essex):
- Henry [Essex], in the course of the Welsh war, in the difficult pass of Coleshill, had treacherously cast down the standard of the lord king, and proclaimed his death in a loud voice (110).

It is important to note that Gerald while visiting this part of Wales as part of Archbishop Baldwin’s retinue, on a tour to gain support for the Third Crusade, stayed with Prince Dafydd – Owain’s son who along with his brother Cynan, led the ambush on Henry’s troops at Coleshill (Journey Book II Ch. 10: 196). It is
possible that during his stay, Dafydd recounted the events of the ambush to Gerald.

Other chronicles simply state that the battle took place in the woods of Hawarden, the location of which has been addressed in the place-name analysis section of chapter six, as the section of the great forest of Tegeingl located on the ridgeline that stretched west of Hawarden northwest towards Basingwerk and beyond. Gerald states that the pass traversed by Henry’s troops was narrow, the ravine or pass leading to Hen Blas Castle is narrow measuring at its narrowest a mere 10 metres. The William of Newburgh version of The Chronicles of the Reigns of Stephen, Henry II and Richard I further illuminates the landscape setting, stating that the Welsh ‘concealed themselves in the forests, and watched over the narrow passes from the road’, followed by ‘while advancing too incautiously through forested and wet places, [Henry II] was caught out by an ambush of enemies lurking close by the road’ (Chronicles W.N.: 107-8). This environment is also present at Ewloe, which was one of the reasons why the supposed location for the so-called battle of Coed Eulo had to be addressed via military terrain analysis, given its current popularity it could not have been dismissed by historiography alone.

The Chronicles W.N. further describe the battlescape of Wales as a place riddled with ‘unpassable woodland and other difficulties…Moreover it is known to have certain inextricable retreats, so that however dangerous it is for anyone powerful to advance with an army, it would be equally impossible to continue any further within’ (Chronicles W.N.: 107). As The Chronicles W.N. provide this landscape description leading up to the account of the Battle of Coleshill, it is possible that the preceding description is resultant of the account of the battle. Yet, despite the numerous references to the difficult wooded terrain, some of them in connection to the battle, Domesday Book makes no mention of woodland at Coleshill. This suggests that c. 1086 there were no noteworthy woods in the region (Domesday 268d/FD2/6; Tait 1925: 17). Given the lapse of several decades from the Domesday Survey to the battle of Coleshill, it is possible that the environment changed from one of cultivated fields to a more wooded landscape. This is especially probable given the continuous conflict in the region that would have made it difficult to maintain agricultural activities. Given this possibility it remains unlikely that any resultant
new-growth woodland would have been as dense as the main body of the great forest of Tegeingl, sometimes historically referred to as *Swerdewod*, meaning the dark wood. It is equally possible that the landscape existed much in the same way then as it does today. The region of northeast Wales (modern-day Flintshire) that stretches from the border near Chester to the present day community of Greenfield (historically Basingwerk,) is defined by three geophysical features. A flat coastal plain rises fairly rapidly to an average elevation of 280 metres; this ridge line stretches uninterrupted between Chester and Greenfield. The ridge is scarred in numerous locations by a series of ravines created by drainage streams, these ravines tend to be heavily wooded while the remainder of the landscape comprises of undulating fields, cultivated for agricultural purposes.

The Hen Blas ravine is situated approximately 18 kilometres from Chester and 4.5 kilometres from Basingwerk. At its entrance it is 75 metres wide narrowing to a confined ten metres at its terminus, the ravine only stretches for one kilometre. The entrance of the ravine, located approximately 130 metres from the coastal Roman road, is shallow and increases to a maximum depth of 15 metres at its terminus, approximately 27 metres southeast of Hen Blas Castle. Wat’s Dyke is situated 2 kilometres west/southwest of the Roman road and 1 kilometre from Hen Blas Castle. The distance from the Welsh encampment at Basingwerk to Hen Blas, using Wat’s Dyke as a route-way, is 6 kilometres. Also of note is the standing stone cross (now vanished), known as Atiscross or *Croes-ati* in Welsh, it was from this monument that the *Domesday hundred* of Atiscross (in which Coleshill was located) takes its name. Clwyd Powys Archaeological Trust suggests that the cross would have once been a prominent landmark (CPAT n.d. (a)). Place-name research suggests that the cross was probably located in the vicinity of Atis Cross Road in Oakenholt near Flint, approximately 1.5 kilometres southeast of Hen Blas ravine. The existence of the cross is also an indicator that this region was not heavily wooded, given that stone crosses were often erected at locations of high visibility (Carver 2003).

In its present situation, the ravine is situated in a wooded area known as the Coed Ffrith, loosely translated as the enclosure woods, probably in reference to the medieval manor house, fortified with a palisade, which replaced
Hen Blas Castle at the close of the thirteenth century (Leach 1957 and 1960). Through the ravine runs a rivulet, making for marshy environment on the ravine floor. Approximately 700 metres south/southeast of Hen Blas is a wood named Gwaith y Coed, or coal woods (see Figure 103 below). In all likelihood this wood represents the original Coleshill forest, named by Gerald of Wales; given that the fortified manor house at Hen Blas was not constructed until the close of the thirteenth century, it is probable that Coed Ffrith was included in the original Gwaith y Coed.

![Aerial photo showing the location of Coed Ffrith where Hen Blas is located (arrow) and Gwaith y Coed (circle). Google Maps (2014). Gwaith Y Coed (satellite) [online]. [Accessed 30/01/2014]. Available from http://google.co.uk/maps.](image_url)

This partially explains the location of the 1150 Battle of Coleshill by RCAHMW and the Ordinance Survey location of the 1157 Battle of Coleshill (in Figure 6 below). The 1150 battle has been located directly adjacent to Gwaith y Coed, while the 1157 siting is located close to the road, probably in deference to a battle feature described in the manuscripts.
Hen Blas Castle, also known as Coleshill Castle was constructed in 1157 in connection with the campaign (Annales Cestrienses: year 1157). What is unknown is whether the castle was originally constructed by the Welsh in preparation for the campaign, or if it was constructed post-campaign by Henry as a means of enhancing his defences in contested territory, particularly given his defeat at that location. If this was the case, Hen Blas is probably the original site of the much debated Basingwerk Castle. The initial assessment by RCAHMW in 1910 determined that the motte was hastily constructed for defensive reasons, probably in connection with the battle of Coleshill (Leach 1957: 2). This assessment intimates that the castle was built by the Welsh in preparation for war. G.B. Leach, who excavated the site in the 1950s, discredits this assumption asserting that the site received more intense planning; however his excavations were unable to provide conclusive proof of the phasing or quality of construction. It is also conceivable that the initial castle was hastily constructed by the Welsh and then enhanced by Henry II at the close of the 1157 Coastal Campaign when sections of Tegeingl were relinquished to him, per the terms of the peace agreement. Similarly, the construction date of the tumulus, located 350 metres northeast of Hen Blas is unknown (CPAT 100338). It may be a prehistoric feature, or it could also be a
mass grave from the battle. The indeterminate nature of the castle’s and tumulus’ existence at the time of battle will be taken into consideration in the following military terrain analysis.

**KOCOA Analysis for the Battle of Coleshill**

![Coleshill Environ - Terrain and Observation Points](image)

*Figure 105: The terrain of the environs surrounding the Hen Blas ravine and observer points used for viewshed analysis. Note: the battle features indicated with the red stars do not represent the location of the Battle of Coleshill.*

**Key:**
- dotted pink line = course of coastal Roman road
- dotted blue line = course of Wat’s Dyke
- large black hash marks = suggested Anglo-Norman avenue of approach
- small black dotted line = suggested Welsh avenue of approach (2 possibilities)

**Explanation of viewshed points taken**

There are three main areas where observation points were collected in the Coleshill region. These are the areas of the retreat known as Bryn Dychwelwch (translated as the field of retreat), the immediate environment surrounding Hen Blas Castle, and the area to the northeast of Hen Blas centred on the ravine close to the coastal Roman road. A total of 31 viewsheds were compiled for use in the following military terrain analysis (see Table 38 below). A scale of
1:15,000 was used for all viewshed representations unless otherwise noted, producing viewsheds within a range of four kilometres.

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<td>Fig. 130: Coleshill Viewshed Point 2, Bryn Dychwelwch retreat observation point 1</td>
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<td>Fig. 131: Coleshill Viewshed Point 3, Bryn Dychwelwch retreat observation point 2</td>
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<td>Fig. 132: Coleshill Viewshed Point 4, Bryn Dychwelwch retreat observation point 3</td>
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<td>Fig. 133: Coleshill Viewshed Point 5, Wat's Dyke near Hen Blas observation point 1, scale 1:19,000</td>
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<td>Fig. 136: Coleshill Viewshed Point 8, field 250 m west of Hen Blas observation point, scale 1:40,000</td>
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<td>Fig. 139: Coleshill Viewshed Point 11, from Hen Blas observation point 3</td>
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<td>Fig. 140: Coleshill Viewshed Point 12, from Hen Blas observation point 4 (motte), scale 1:15,000</td>
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<td>Fig. 160: Coleshill Environs total area visibility from all observation points in Coleshill region</td>
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Table 38: Elevations above sea level and viewshed map titles for each Coleshill observation point (Hen Blas region).
None of the viewshed distances represented stretch to the horizon; most are within a ten kilometre radial field of view. Contour intervals at five and twenty metres are represented within near distance fields of view, while only twenty metre intervals are present for the far distance fields of view. The land between Hen Blas and the area northeast of Hen Blas is private and restricted with barbed wire fence. In lieu of inaccessibility, inferred observation points were not transposed on the DEM at it was felt that these would undermine the authenticity of the terrain survey. For future research, permission to survey this area would have to be obtained from the landowner. The supposed locations of the 1150 and 1157 battle sites are notated on the map as it is important to reference the current favoured locations in lieu of the locations highlighted by the following military terrain analysis.

**Key Terrain**

Similar to Ewloe Wood, the key terrain feature for Coleshill is straightforward, being the high ground on either side of the ravine which would have been in the control of the Welsh. Also the high ground at the rear of the ravine in the area between Hen Blas and Wat’s Dyke, as this would secure a possible line of retreat for the Welsh and block the Anglo-Norman advance to Wat’s Dyke and in turn Basingwerk (see Figure 105, page 311). As surmised in the previous Case Study chapter, it is likely that when Henry split his forces, in an attempt to surround the Welsh at Basingwerk, he intended to use Wat’s Dyke as a concealed route to the Welsh encampment. Another notable key terrain feature is the false crest located nearly 95 kilometres east of the tumulus denoted by the 60 metre contour line (see Figure 128, page 349).

**Observations and Fields of Fire**

The working premise is that the Welsh approached Coleshill from the northwest, possibly travelling from Basingwerk on Wat’s Dyke. Once at Coleshill they stationed the bulk of their forces at the southern end of Hen Blas ravine, with lookouts and scouting parties posted at other strategic locations around the ravine. The base of the ravine is outside the field of view from most of the observation points positioned around Hen Blas Castle; exceptions are from observation points Hen Blas 1 and Hen Blas 5 (see Figures 137 and 142).
viewshed in Figure 142 is of particular importance as it provides a cone of visibility to the coastal Roman road and given its elevation it is unlikely that tree cover would have prevented visibility to the road. To this point, the tumulus (if it was extant at the time of the battle) could have been a key terrain feature as it provides visibility from Coleshill to the Roman road (see Figure 143). The motte and keep at Hen Blas (if extant during the battle) would have also provided increased visibility (see Figures 140 and 141).

Given the extreme narrowness and dampness of the ravine base, it is more likely that Henry and his forces would have traversed the slope of the ravine, although steep in places particularly at the terminus, the ravine slope at its entrance is gentle by comparison. The grade of the northern side of the ravine is less severe than that of the southern slope. (This terrain element will be considered in further detail in the avenues of approach section to follow). The visibility from the entrance of the ravine is negligible (see Figures 152 and 153) and none of the viewsheds from this area revealed any significant degree of forward visibility, and what visibility there was would have been greatly diminished by tree cover. Conversely, rearward visibility was substantial, which would have allowed Henry to mark the progress of the other half of his army as they continued their advance along the Roman road; this is most pronounced in Figures 148 and 149. None of the viewsheds from Henry’s position at the entrance of the ravine would have afforded the Anglo-Norman Army any visibility of the Welsh position.

Cover and Concealment
The Welsh would have remained concealed from the Anglo-Normans as long as they stayed behind the crest of the ravine ridge and south of the tumulus or upland of the false crest referenced in the key terrain section above (see Figures 145-155). Small portions of these features can be seen in Figures 154 and 155; however as will be discussed below, it is unlikely that Henry’s troops advanced up the southern side of the ravine. As previously stated, it is equally unlikely that the Anglo-Normans were concealed from the Welsh at any point in their advance.
Obstacles

The ravine is in itself the largest terrain obstacle, advancing into its depths would have been perilous as there was no way out from its enclosure, except to scale the steep ravine walls. Any attempt to do so would have opened the Anglo-Normans to Welsh arrow fire without any means of cover. Conversely, it would have been equally difficult for the Welsh to descend into the ravine from this point due to the steep grade of the terrain. It is unlikely that the Welsh would have ambushed the Anglo-Normans in the ravine, as it would have made any avenue of retreat difficult for them as well as the Anglo-Normans. The tumulus (see Figure 106 below), if it was present at the time of the battle could also be considered to be an obstacle, as an army advancing up the north slope of the ravine would have had to circumvent the mound which also limits visibility when approached from any direction at lower elevation.

Figure 106: Tumulus, viewed from the southwest (photo by the author).

Avenues of Approach and Retreat

In anticipation of the Anglo-Norman advance from Chester, it is likely that bands of Welsh troops positioned themselves at strategic points in the landscape, like Coleshill, in advance of the Anglo-Normans. There are three possible avenues of approach the Welsh forces could have utilized to get to Coleshill. From Basingwerk they could have advanced down the coastal Roman road, turning aside at Coleshill and positioning themselves in the upward reaches of the Hen
Blas ravine (see Figure 105 on page 311 which details two possible approaches). Essentially this was the same route taken by Henry, the exception being that his forces were arriving from the opposite direction on the Roman road. As already stated the Welsh could have also used Wat’s Dyke. As mentioned in earlier chapters, the dyke would have been well preserved in the mid-twelfth century, given that it is still well preserved in many locations today. The steep incline of the dyke tends to limit the growth of vegetation, thus providing a semi-navigable route-way through the woods. However, given that the Welsh were familiar with this terrain, negotiating it would not have been as arduous for them as it would have been for the Anglo-Normans. Particularly since many Welsh warriors were not encumbered by the heavy armour that was popular with the Anglo-Normans (Davies 2004: 145). The terrain of the immediate battlefield environs would not have been visible from the portion of Wat’s Dyke that is on the immediate approach to Coleshill (see Figures 133 and 134).

After reaching the ravine, it is likely that the Anglo-Normans advanced along one of the ravine slopes, the northern slope being less precipitous than its southern counterpart, in an attempt to reach Wat’s Dyke located only 2 kilometres from the road. Given that the ravine terminates in a dead-end, which is particularly narrow and steep, it is unlikely that Henry would have led his troops into such an environment. Presumably Henry would have had advice from his Powysian Welsh allies, some of whom were undoubtedly familiar with the terrain in northeast Wales, particularly given the 1150 Battle of Coleshill in which Powys was allied with the earl of Chester against Owain Gwynedd.
After the ambush Henry retreated back to the road and reassembled his divided force. The avenue of retreat used by the Welsh is less clear. The field-name Bryn Dychwelwch, to the northwest of Hen Blas, has been loosely translated as the hill of retreat. It is possible that the Welsh cut across this area before retreating north, possibly falling back to Wat’s Dyke. The viewshed analysis from this so-called hill of retreat does not illuminate any key features; however, as the Welsh would have been confident as to position of the Anglo-Norman army on the Roman road, visibility would not have been an essential element of their retreat (see Figures 129-132). It is also possible that Bryn Dychwelwch was a feature of the 1150 Battle of Coleshill. It is unlikely that there were any further route-ways through this region than the ones discussed, as throughout Wales many vanished routes are preserved in place-names, none of these exist in the Coleshill region.

*Coleshill Battle Location and Order of Battle*

The military terrain analysis has yielded two possible battle locations; these are highlighted in Figure 108 below. The following is a description of the order of battle for each theorised location.
Henry II’s army advanced northwest along the coastal Roman road from the Anglo-Norman encampment near Chester. At a short distance of roughly 4.5 kilometres from the Welsh encampment at Basingwerk, Henry divided his forces into two contingents. One was to continue the advance along to road to Basingwerk where they would engage Owain’s forces in open battle, the other half led by Henry would cut inland along Wat’s Dyke to circumvent Owain’s forces and surprise their rear. Acting on the advice of his native Welsh guides and military advisers, Henry’s forces turned aside at the Hen Blas ravine. This narrow wooded ravine would provide passage across Coleshill to Wat’s Dyke, while concealing Anglo-Norman movements from the Welsh at Basingwerk. Due to the obstacles presented by staying in the ravine: confinement, marshes and no clear avenue of retreat, Henry advanced along the north flank of the ravine slope. The Welsh, unknown to the Anglo-Normans were in position at the southern end of the ravine, where they watched the progress of the Anglo-Norman army. The Welsh moved into position as the Anglo-Normans approached the summit of the false crest on the ridge. An attack was launched and the Anglo-Normans, taken by surprise struggled to organise their ranks to counter the Welsh ambush. The other half of the Anglo-Norman army, only a short distance from the ambush site, heard the sounds of battle and rushed to the aid of their king. Once the Welsh saw their enemy being reinforced, they retreated northwest across Bryn Dychwelwch to Basingwerk. The Anglo-Normans who suffered severe casualties were left to assess the damage before regrouping and continuing their advance along the road to Basingwerk.

In the meantime Owain became aware of Henry’s plan to surround him and accordingly he fell back to a safe place at Cil Owain (also known as Tál Lyn Pina). Henry arrived in Basingwerk to find his enemy gone and decided to continue his advance to Rhuddlan Castle where he paused his advance and waited for news of the expedition to Anglesey. While at Rhuddlan the king endured a series of raids from the Welsh. Once Henry learned of the disastrous outcome on Anglesey, he sought to make peace with Owain. Owain was to relinquish the eastern portion of Tegeingl to Anglo-Norman control; in return he would be left alone, ensuring the independence of Gwynedd.
Location B and Coleshill conclusions
The order of battle for Location B is fundamentally the same as Location A; instead of advancing along the north face of the ravine slope they would have used the south slope. Also, the line of Welsh retreat would have either had to circumvent the ravine to continue across Bryn Dychwelwch, or they could have cut a path southwest to Wat’s Dyke. Other differences include: the steeper grade of the southern slope and the false crest on the south side of the ravine ridge is not as dramatic as its northern counterpart. The cumulative viewshed analysis presented above in Figure 108 indicates that sizeable extents on both sides of the ravine would not have been visible to the approaching Anglo-Normans. The tumulus adjacent to Location A, potentially where the battle dead were buried, is a distinguishing feature that would favour Location A as the site of the battle. However, as the nature of the mound is unknown, this can only be theorised. As has been demonstrated, both locations are plausible and for any future research, remote sensing and excavation would be conducted at both locations.
Crogen environs, spatial military analysis

Tensions soon arose between Gwynedd and England after a short period of peace following the 1157 campaign. This fresh wave of tumult was not isolated to Gwynedd, but included the other major kingdoms of Wales, such as Deheubarth and Powys. In an ambitious attempt to master the Welsh once and for all, Henry embarked upon a campaign, the scale of which had never been seen in Wales and would not be seen again until the Edwardian Conquest, more than a century later. Preparations were more than a year in the making and in the summer of 1165 Henry gathered his army at Oswestry. To counter this threat to their independence, the Welsh kingdoms banded together under the leadership of Owain Gwynedd, an unprecedented act in medieval Welsh history (earlier Welsh unification under Gruffudd ap Llywelyn was accomplished through force). The willingness of the Welsh to work together highlights the severity of the situation.

On route from Oswestry to the Welsh encampment at Corwen, Henry encountered an obstacle that halted his army’s advance in the Ceiriog river valley, near the present day community of Chirk (Y Waun in Welsh) in the modern Welsh county of Wrexham (traditionally part of Denbighshire). Dense woodland blocked his advance into Wales; these woods presented a particular challenge for his supply wagons. Henry ordered the woods cut and while distracted with this task the Anglo-Norman army was ambushed by the Welsh, this ambush event was what is now referred to as the Battle of Crogen. The location of the Battle of Crogen is less than 3 kilometres from the modern border between England and Wales. Although the exact line of the border in the twelfth century is less clear, it was probably near if not on Offa’s Dyke, the early medieval boundary constructed by the kingdom of Mercia. Offa’s Dyke, a testament to a contested frontier, intersects the Crogen battlefield. The battlefield itself is located on a flood plain on the northern bank of the Ceiriog River at a 200 metre wide gap in the Dyke where it crosses the Ceiriog and continues up a steep slope south of the river.

The position of the battlefield as represented on the map below in Figure 109 (page 323) is RCAHMW’s battle location. The explanation for this location is that it corresponds with the field-name Crogen Wladys and Crogen Iddon, as
such this is only an approximation of the battlefield location, the actual location will be defined more concretely following the military terrain analysis below. As described in detail in the 1165 Case Study chapter, the concept of calling the battle ‘Crogen’ was not introduced until Powel’s publication in 1589, 429 years after the actual battle had taken place (Powel 1589: 186). Whereas the chronicles record a battle at Dyffryn Ceiriog (Brut Pen 20.: 63, Brut RBH: 145 and 147) or Aber Ceiriog (BS: 167). ‘Dyffryn’ meaning ‘valley’, and ‘aber’ meaning ‘the mouth of a river’, given these landscape descriptions, it is probable that the battle was fought in or near the fields known as ‘Crogen Wladys’ and ‘Crogen Iddon’.

Unlike the Battle of Coleshill discussed above, the terrain environs for the Battle of Crogen are in some ways more simplistic than those of the 1157 conflict landscape. Part of this is due to the fact that the landscape surrounding Crogen, prior to the 1165 engagement, had not been altered by repeated conflict in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, the way that it had been in northeast Flintshire. Additionally, the battlefield was not confined by terrain features such as the ravine at Hen Blas and the battle events were spread out over an area more than three times the size of the Coleshill environs. The cultural landscape of this region was also less cluttered, indicating a rural environment.

The only possible exceptions to this are the two earth and timber castles, Castell y Waun on the Welsh side of the border and Chirk Bank Motte on the English side. The exact foundation date of these castles is unknown, although evidence in the Pipe Rolls indicates that Castell y Waun was in existence in 1165, although whether it was built before or after the campaign is not known. Similar to Hen Blas Castle of the 1157 campaign, it may have been built as a consequence of the failed campaign in 1165, possibly to control mobility between Wales and England (NMR: SJ23NE1). If these castles were in existence by the mid-twelfth they could have been exploited by the Anglo-Norman forces as they made their way into the Ceiriog Valley. For example, they could have been garrisoned by a contingent of Anglo-Norman troops as lookouts and to ensure that Henry’s line of retreat remained opened. The indeterminate nature of the castles’ existence at the time of battle will be taken into consideration in the military terrain analysis.
This region of Wales remains predominantly rural and has not been subjected to the wide-scale industrialization that has impacted the cultural landscape in Flintshire. Since 1165 the landscape encompassing the immediate battle terrain has only been impacted by the addition of a road that parallels the north bank of the Ceiriog River, the construction of a few cottages near the proposed battle location and the construction of Chirk Castle in the fourteenth century, directly north and 100 metres above the battlefield. The alteration that has had the single largest impact to the battlescape was the positioning of a drainage conduit into the ditch of Offa’s Dyke. This has severely eroded the dyke in places and has seemingly washed away the mass grave known as Adwy’r Beddau. Domesday Book did not survey the areas surrounding Crogen, unlike northeast Flintshire which at the time of the survey happened to be part of England, Crogen was securely on the Welsh side of the border, and therefore not assessed. The lack of contemporary and unbiased landscape descriptions make it difficult to determine the degree of past tree cover in the region. Although the chronicles unanimously state that Henry had to halt his advance in order to cut down a wooded area that blocked his progress, they are not specific as to the extent of the vegetation. ‘[Henry] moved his host into the wood of Dyffryn Ceiriog, and he had that wood cut down, and felled to the ground. And there a few picked Welshmen, in the absence of their leaders, manfully and valorously resisted them. And many of the bravest on either side were slain’ (Brut Pen. 20: 63). Several oak trees that pre-date the battle still survive in this region; according to local lore they were spared by Henry’s woodsmen, as in 1165 they were already so large that it would have been too time consuming to cut them down (Wrexham County Council).

In a more general sense the landscape surrounding the Battle of Crogen is defined by the Ceiriog river valley, the foothills of the Berwyn Mountains and the lowlands of England to the east. Incidentally, the demarcation between upland and lowland environments is delineated by Offa’s Dyke. Flood plains, such as the ones along the north bank of the Ceiriog are often cultivated for agricultural purposes due to the richness of their soils. It is possible that these flood plains were cleared and being used for agricultural purposes at the time of the campaign, particularly since arable land was a rare and precious commodity
in the upland environment of Wales. The wooded area blocking passage through Offa’s Dyke is seemingly suggestive of a widely afforested landscape. This may not have been the case. Apart from any vegetation that may have covered the flanking hillsides, the river valley may have been devoid of woods apart from the gap in the dyke. Given that the gap in the dyke would have been a vulnerability for the early medieval defended frontier, a wood may have been allowed to grow in the gap to restrict movement through the dyke. This seems highly probable given that many of the large trees surviving in the area are almost contemporaneous with the construction of the dyke (BBC News online resource: 2008; 2013). The fact that trees were allowed to grow on the dyke shortly after its construction could also be indicative that this region was not regularly maintained or manned in the early middle ages.

**KOCOA Analysis for the Battle of Crogen**

![Figure 109: Battlefield elements and observer points for the Battle of Crogen. Key: dotted blue line = course of Offa’s Dyke. large black hash marks = suggested Anglo-Norman avenue of approach. small black dotted line = suggested Welsh avenues of approach (2 possibilities).](image)
Explanation of viewshed points taken

A total of 20 observation points were established for the Crogen viewshed analysis. These were in addition to the established points of Chirk Bank Motte, Castell y Waun, the RCAHMW location of the Battle of Crogen, and points on Offa’s Dyke recorded by RCAHMW and CPAT. Observer points were established on either side of the Ceiriog River, in the vicinity of Offa’s Dyke where it crosses the river. The area along Offa’s Dyke near Adwy’r Beddau, or the Gap of the Graves, was surveyed more intensively as the results of the reverse KOCOA analysis conducted in the 1165 Case Study Chapter highlighted elements which suggested that terrain features in this vicinity were more conducive for battle. There are three main areas where observation points were collected in the Crogen region. These are Offa’s Dyke, the area surrounding the Gap of the Graves and the field to the northeast of the Gap of the Graves. Areas encompassing the field-names ‘Crogen Wladys’ and ‘Crogen Iddon’ could not be accessed for collecting observation points as they are on private property with no points of public access. The viewsheds produced from these observation points (see Table 39 below) can be found on pages 383-414 (Figures 161-193). The majority of the Crogen viewsheds are represented with a scale of 1:24,000, given that all the observer points are over 100 metres the resultant distance to the horizon would be outside of the 6 kilometre radius present at this scale. Some viewsheds have been represented at the scale of 1:50,000, a visual radius of 12 kilometres, depending on contributing factors, such as atmospheric conditions and contrast of light (as reviewed in the viewshed section of the Methodology chapter) the outer limits of this radius may not have been clearly visible.
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Table 39: Elevations above sea level and viewshed map titles for each Battle of Crogen observation point.
Key Terrain

As has already been demonstrated on multiple occasions, the predominant key terrain feature was the high ground, which like at the other sites considered above, was in possession of the Welsh. For the Battle of Crogen this terrain encompasses the slopes north and south of the Ceiriog River, both rising to an elevation of 400 metres. The other notable key terrain feature is the 200 metre wide gap in Offa’s Dyke. The wagons and carts carrying Henry’s supplies would not have been able to cross the dyke, the gap in the dyke was essential to their continued advance into Wales (see Figure 110). Offa’s Dyke provides a visual demarcation between England and Wales. This is particularly relevant considering the battle took place on the boundary line. The military importance of Offa’s Dyke will be echoed throughout the other military terrain features. A large tree near the northern extremity of the gap in Offa’s Dyke has been labelled as the ‘Gate of the Dead’, due to its shape and proximity to the supposed location of the mass grave in the fosse of the dyke, where it terminates at the base of the northern slope (Lewis 1849, Mahler 1912: 20, Pennant 1778: 268, Powel 1589: 187, Nicholas 1872: 405). The so-called ‘Gap of the Graves’ or Adwy’r Beddau may also be in reference to the actual gap in Offa’s Dyke, as this was the location where so many were slain in the battle. As this burial feature is now vanished, due to the diversion of water into the dyke, the only evidence can be found in early historical and antiquarian literature.

Observations and Fields of Fire

Offa’s Dyke supplied superlative points for observation, particularly from locations on the dyke at elevation (see Figures 176, 177, 179 and 180). Welsh troops and lookouts posted at these locations would have been able to track the progress of the Anglo-Norman army through the Ceiriog river valley. The degree of tree cover can be inferred by the fact that the Anglo-Normans were unable to perceive the Welsh lying in ambush, even though the viewsheds in some locations seem to suggest otherwise. For example, the visibility from both Castell y Waun and Chirk Bank suggests that if these castles existed at the time of the battle, they would have afforded a degree of visibility of the hillsides flanking the gap in Offa’s Dyke (see Figures 182 and 183). However, it is hinted
in the manuscripts that the Welsh force that attacked the Anglo-Normans at Crogen was small. ‘And there came a few of the Welsh, unknown to their leaders, and fought manfully’ (BS: 167), their small number could have been easily disguised. Irrespective of the actual number of the Welsh troops, it is certain that when Henry halted his troops at Offa’s Dyke, he was unaware of the Welsh lying in wait. Once at the gap in Offa’s Dyke the Anglo-Norman army would have had visibility of the immediate landscape, particularly the level ground north of the river. Although the quality of the visibility would have been diminished by the tree cover from the woods that Henry had ordered to be cut down. Sections of the hillside to the south would have also been visible but none of the landscape to the north (see Figures 168,169 and 193).

As has been suggested in the 1165 Case Study Chapter, the Welsh could have been stationed on both the north and south hillsides near Offa’s Dyke, overlooking the Ceiriog Valley. From this position they would have had a clear view of the Anglo-Normans as they advanced along the north bank of the Ceiriog River (see Figures 174-180 and 190). Additionally, the viewshed analysis indicates that there would have been inter-visibility between the two
Welsh positions, potentially allowing them to signal for a coordinated attack (see Figures 162-166 and 178).

Cover and Concealment
The undulating ridges within the north and south slopes would have provided the best cover from the Anglo-Norman army, particularly if they had lookouts posted at Castell y Waun or Chirk Bank (see Figures 182 and 183). Interestingly, these natural furrows correspond with Offa’s Dyke in places, suggesting that large portions of the Dyke would not have been visible to the Anglo-Normans. The fosse of the dyke could also provide concealment, particularly if approaching from the east, in which case it would be impossible to see anyone positioned in the dyke. Although the extent of the forest at Cрогen is unknown, any tree cover would have provided additional concealment for the Welsh. Clearly the Welsh had no difficulties locating the immense Anglo-Norman army with or without tree cover.

Obstacles
The terrain obstacles for the Battle of Cregon are fairly straightforward. Offa’s Dyke and the Ceiriog River were the two main obstacles. The gap in the dyke funnelled the Anglo-Norman troops between the river on the south and the steep slope to the north. Tree cover was also an obstacle as it prevented the passage of Henry’s supply train. Depending on the agility of the Welsh troops, the steepness of the slope may have required a cautious advance; this could also make for a difficult retreat. Any Welsh troops advancing from the south would have had to cross the river in order to reach the Anglo-Norman army. As there were no bridges, it would have been crossed on foot. In its current situation the Ceiriog at this crossing point is shallow, between ankle and knee depth, and could easily be forded. However, water levels fluctuate and it may have been impassable during the battle. In the event that the river could not be forded, it is instead likely that the Welsh approached the Anglo-Norman army from the north slope only.
**Avenues of Approach and Retreat**

The Anglo-Norman army marched north from Oswestry to the Ceiriog river valley, once at the entrance of the valley they turned west, commencing their advance into Wales. The Welsh avenue of approach is less certain. They were stationed near the Ceiriog valley in advance of the main body of the Welsh army at Corwen, in the same manner that the Welsh troops led by Cynan and Dafydd were stationed at Hen Blas. Both were at a point of tactical advantage where a quick ambush could exact great damage to the Anglo-Norman force, weakening their numbers and making it difficult for them to continue their advance. Given the visibility afforded from the slopes on either side of the valley and from positions on Offa’s Dyke in the same vicinities, it is likely that the Welsh (perhaps stationed on both sides of the valley), advanced downhill following the line of the dyke to where the Anglo-Normans were cutting down trees, ambushing them from both sides at the gap in the dyke.

Presumably the Welsh retreated back up the hillsides they had descended from and returned to join the main body of the Welsh army at Corwen. They could also have cut a path of retreat west along the Ceiriog River, using the woods for cover and avoiding the steep ascent uphill. Following the ambush the Anglo-Normans did not retreat, after they had accessed the degree of damage they had sustained, they finished clearing the path through the woods and continued their advance into Wales. Their avenue of approach into the Berwyn Mountains is discussed in detail in the 1165 Case Study chapter.

**Battle of Crogen Location and the Order of Battle**

The Anglo-Norman army entered the Ceiriog river valley in the summer of 1165 intent on subduing the Welsh in totality. Small bands of Welsh troops were stationed forward of the Welsh encampment at Corwen. These bands were probably positioned at the three river valleys that allowed access to this mountainous region; these are from north to south: the Dee, Ceiriog and Tanat. Henry chose the route along the Ceiriog, calculating that the ruralness of the area would offer a degree of protection. At Offa’s Dyke, the ancient border between England and Wales, Henry encountered the first major obstacle of the campaign. His route of march through the gap in Offa’s Dyke, particularly
important for the supply wagons, was blocked by dense woodland. Given the amount of resources and planning that went into this campaign, it is highly unlikely that Henry would not have meticulously prepared for and planned his route of march. Therefore, this particular obstacle may have been anticipated. As stated above it is possible that this woodland blockade only encompassed the area of the gap in the dyke, the surrounding flood plains being cleared and used for agriculture, this suggests that the area to clear would have been relatively narrow.

Figure 111: Proposed location for the Battle of Crogen, indicated by the red ‘explosion.’ The dotted red line indicates the area that would have been targeted for tree clearing by Henry’s forces.

The small Welsh contingent stationed nearby tracked the Anglo-Norman progress into the Ceiriog Valley from their flanking positions on the slopes north and south of the gap in the Dyke. They were charged with leading an ambush to weaken the Anglo-Norman army. Concealed from the Anglo-Normans in the furrows of the slopes and by the fosse of the dyke, they advanced unseen on the Anglo-Norman army below. The Anglo-Norman army would have been distracted by their tree cutting duties as they sought to clear a way through the gap and any troops going through the cleared gap would have been funnelled through a relatively narrow area, separating them from the body of the army.
Given the small size of the Welsh force it is unlikely that they would have attacked the main body of the Anglo-Norman army as they waited to pass through the clearing. Instead they would have focused their efforts on the troops that were passing through the clearing and on any section of the Anglo-Norman army that had passed through the clearing in advance of the rest of Henry’s army (see Figure 111 and 112 below). The duration of the battle is not clear but the manuscripts state that there were heavy losses on both sides. The battle dead may have been buried in the fosse of the dyke to the north of the gap, from an efficiency stand point this would have been the logical choice for a mass grave.

Henry was familiar with Welsh tactics and their penchant for ambushes as experienced at the Battle of Coleshill. He may have even expected an ambush, but given the size of his army he was confident that he could weather the attack. In other words he took a calculated risk. Following the ambush the Welsh band retreated back toward the main body of their army at Corwen, no doubt to alert their leaders of the Anglo-Norman route of approach over the Berwyns. The path through the dyke was cleared and the Anglo-Normans continued their advance into Wales exploiting the relatively open and level upland route along the mountain ridges. Near the present village of Llanarmon-Dyffryn Ceiriog the Anglo-Norman army formed a camp, utilizing the defences of the Iron Age Hillfort, Cerrig Gwynion. While making preparations for the final leg of their advance to where the Welsh army was stationed at Corwen, the weather conditions took a turn for the worse and Henry, with his supplies ruined, was forced to turn back to England in defeat. The outcome of this campaign insured Welsh independence for the next century.

Conclusion

The dynamic-pattern analysis presented in this chapter has demonstrated that military terrain analysis supported by data from visibility analysis can define how the landscape, as a military artefact, was perceived and exploited by the combatants, presenting a unique archaeological signature that illuminates group behaviour and behavioural patterns for the 1157 Battle of Coleshill and the 1165 battle of Crogen. The application of this unique medieval conflict
archaeology methodology to this study has enabled the reconstruction and interpretation of conflict events relating to the 1157 Coastal Campaign and the 1165 Berwyn Mountain Campaign. By integrating these events within a broader archaeological landscape of conflict, distinct archaeological signatures relating to discrete battlefield events became evident. This allowed for the dynamic-pattern analysis of both campaigns leading to the reconstruction of an order of battle for each event. This analysis has enriched the narrative for these important battles and campaigns that challenges previous interpretations and most importantly established a native Welsh dialogue that has long been absent from the Anglo-Norman Conquest of Wales. Additionally, the application of military terrain analysis made it possible to dismiss previously suggested locations for the battle of Coleshill, by establishing where the battle was more likely to have taken place. The military terrain analysis also resulted in a more precise location for the Battle of Crogen.

![Proposed location of Crogen battlefield](photo by the author)

Figure 112: Proposed location of Crogen battlefield (photo by the author).

Behavioural patterns of conflict, particularly for Gwynedd, have also been highlighted. The proximity of both Coleshill and Crogen to Wat’s and Offa’s Dykes, and the importance of the dykes in the battle is suggestive of remembered boundaries and might even indicate a traditional battlefield. By choosing to place his encampment at the terminus of Wat’s Dyke, in the case of the 1157 Campaign, and ambushing Henry’s forces at Offa’s Dyke during the Battle of Crogen, Owain may have been embracing a more concrete interpretation of boundaries, in place of the more abstract and fluid definition.
that applied to the pre-Norman, non-vegetian era of Welsh warfare. The importance and the exploitation of the physical landscape has also been revealed. In both campaigns the Welsh used the natural slope of the terrain to their advantage which allowed for a more effective ambush.

The data presented in this study also indicates that Gwynedd had a unique warfare tradition when compared to other Welsh principalities and conflicts (as outlined in the Chronology chapter). The willingness of the leaders of Gwynedd to engage in battle with their opponents (something that was rare in the Middle Ages) can be traced back to the Battle of Rhyd y Groes (in which the Welsh were led by Gruffudd ap Llywelyn of Gwynedd against Edward the Confessor), and is again echoed in the campaigns of Gruffudd ap Cynan, Llywelyn ap Iorwerth and Llywelyn ap Gruffudd. In the case of both the Battle of Coleshill and the Battle of Crogan, battle was forced on the Anglo-Normans by surprising them in an ambush. This aggressiveness undoubtedly contributed to the stability of Gwynedd (when not assailed by issues arising from partible inheritance) and ultimately assisted to their rise to power and their ability to withstand Anglo-Norman conquest efforts. This organised aggression in response to the Anglo-Norman Conquest is indicative of Welsh alteration in attitudes towards warfare. As has been reviewed in earlier chapters of this study, the Welsh were quick to adopt castle building technology. Welsh built castles or the reuse of captured Anglo-Norman castles became more prevalent towards the middle of the twelfth century. During this period it can be argued that Welsh perceptions of territory and spheres of rule were also adapting from the earlier pre-Norman fluid and abstract definition of territorial boundaries, to a more defined and concrete boundary. This is evident in the use of castles to claim territory, which in turn led to a Vegetian system of defence, in which seeking refuge in the natural fortress of the Welsh mountains was no longer the viable option that it had once been. This shift in behavioural patterns was displayed by Owain Gwynedd in both the 1157 and 1165 campaigns.
Figure 113: Ewloe Castle Environs, observation points used for viewshed analysis.
Figure 114: Viewshed from Ewloe Observation Point 1.
Figure 115: Viewshed from Ewloe Observation Point 2.
Figure 116: Viewshed from Ewloe Observation Point 3.
Figure 117: Viewshed from Ewloe Observation Point 4.
Figure 118: Viewshed from Ewloe Observation Point 5.
Figure 119: Viewshed from Ewloe Observation Point 6.
Figure 120: Viewshed from Ewloe Observation Point 7.
Figure 121: Viewshed from Ewloe Observation Point 8.
Figure 122: Viewshed from Ewloe Observation Point 9, supposed site of battle.
Figure 123: Viewshed from Ewloe Observation Point 10.
Figure 124: Viewshed from Ewloe Observation Point 11.
Figure 125: Viewshed from Ewloe Observation Point 12.
Figure 126: Viewshed from Ewloe Observation Point 13.
Figure 127: Viewshed from Ewloe Observation Point 14.
Figure 128: Coleshill Environ, observation points used for viewshed analysis.
Figure 129: Coleshill Viewshed Point 1, Bryn Dychwelwch retreat.
Coleshill Viewshed Point 2, Retreat Point 1

Figure 130: Coleshill Viewshed Point 2, Bryn Dychwelwch retreat observation point 1.
Figure 131: Coleshill Viewshed Point 3, Bryn Dychwelwch retreat observation point 2.
Figure 132: Coleshill Viewshed Point 4, Bryn Dychwelwch retreat observation point 3.
Figure 133: Coleshill Viewshed Point 5, Wat’s Dyke near Hen Blas observation point 1.
Figure 134: Coleshill Viewshed Point 6, Wat's Dyke near Hen Blas observation point 2.
Figure 135: Coleshill Viewshed Point 7, field 250 m west of Hen Blas observation point, scale 1:15,000.
Figure 136: Coleshill Viewshed Point 8, field 250 m west of Hen Bias observation point, scale 1:40,000.
Figure 137: Coleshill Viewshed Point 9, from Hen Blas observation point 1.
Figure 138: Coleshill Viewshed Point 10, from Hen Blas observation point 2.
Figure 139: Coleshill Viewshed Point 11, from Hen Blas observation point 3.
Figure 140: Coleshill Viewshed Point 12, from Hen Blas observation point 4 (motte), scale 1:15,000.
Figure 141: Coleshill Viewshed Point 13, from Hen Blas observation point 4 (motte), scale 1:40,000.
Figure 142: Coleshill Viewshed Point 14, from Hen Blas observation point 5.
Figure 143: Coleshill Viewshed Point 15, from Hen Blas observation point 6.
Figure 144: Coleshill Viewshed Point 16, from tumulus (burial mound) near Hen Blas observation point.
Figure 145: Coleshill Viewshed Point 17, from ditch near tumulus observation point.
Figure 146: Coleshill Viewshed Point 18, from near Hen Blas observation point 1, scale 1:15,000.
Figure 147: Coleshill Viewshed Point 19, from near Hen Blas observation point 1, scale 1:40,000.
Figure 148: Coleshill Viewshed Point 20, from near Hen Blas observation point 2, scale 1:15,000.
Figure 149: Coleshill Viewshed Point 21, from near Hen Blas observation point 2, scale 1:40,000.
Figure 150: Coleshill Viewshed Point 22, from near ravine observation point, scale 1:15,000.
Figure 151: Coleshill Viewshed Point 23, from near ravine observation point, scale 1:40,000.
Figure 152: Coleshill Viewshed Point 24, from ravine observation point 1.
Figure 153: Coleshill Viewshed Point 25, from ravine observation point 2.
Figure 154: Coleshill Viewshed Point 26, from ravine observation point 3, scale 1:15,000.
Figure 155: Coleshill Viewshed Point 27, from ravine observation point 3, scale 1:40,000.
Figure 156: Coleshill Environs retreat area total visibility.
Figure 157: Coleshill Environs Hen Blas Castle area total visibility.
Figure 158: Coleshill Environ Hen Blas Castle area total visibility (without motte).
Figure 159: Coleshill Environ northeast of Hen Blas area total visibility.
Figure 160: Coleshill Environs total area visibility from all observation points in Coleshill region.
Note: the points of Offa’s Dyke North 0, 1 and 2 starts from point 0 east of Chirk 3 and progress north. The point of Offa’s Dyke South on Ridge, is the most southern point of Offa’s Dyke shown on the map.

Figure 161: Crogen Environs, observation points used for viewshed analysis.
Figure 162: Crogen Viewshed Point 1, from Chirk observation point 1.
Figure 163: Crogen Viewshed Point 2, from Chirk observation point 2.
Figure 164: Crogen Viewshed Point 3, from Chirk observation point 3.
Figure 165: Crogen Viewshed Point 4, from Chirk observation point 4.
Figure 166: Croggen Viewshed Point 5, from Chirk observation point 5.
Figure 167: Crogen Viewshed Point 6, from Adwy'r Beddau observation point 1.
Figure 168: Crogen Viewshed Point 7, from Adwy'r Beddau observation point 2.
Figure 169: Crogen Viewshed Point 8, from Gate of the Dead (oak tree) observation point.
Figure 170: Crogen Viewshed Point 9, from in field south of treeline observation point.
Figure 171: Crogen Viewshed Point 10, from field ridge observation point.
Figure 172: Crogen Viewshed Point 11, from depression in field observation point.
Figure 173: Crogen Viewshed Point 12, from edge of field observation point.
Figure 174: Crogen Viewshed Point 13, from Offa's Dyke near Chirk Castle.
Figure 175: Croggen Viewshed Point 14, from Offa's Dyke observation point 1.
Figure 176: Crogen Viewshed Point 15, from Offa’s Dyke observation point 2, scale 1:24,000.
Crogen Viewshed Point 16, Offa's Dyke 2, scale 1:50,000

Legend
- Observer Points
- Offa's Dyke
- Castle
- Battle Features

Elevation
- Not Visible
- Visible
- Cont100m
- Cont20

Value
- High: 1082.4
- Low: 4

Figure 177: Crogen Viewshed Point 16, from Offa's Dyke observation point 2, scale 1:50,000.
Figure 178: Crogen Viewshed Point 17, from Offa's Dyke observation point 3.
Figure 179: Crogen Viewshed Point 18, from Offa’s Dyke observation point 4, scale 1:24,000.
Figure 180: Crogen Viewshed Point 19, from Offa's Dyke observation point 4, scale 1:40,000.
Figure 181: Crogen Viewshed Point 20, from Battle of Crogen supposed location observation point.
Figure 182: Crogen Viewshed Point 21, from Castell Y Waun observation point.
Figure 183: Crogen Viewshed Point 22, from Chirk Bank observation point.
Figure 184: Crogen Viewshed Point 23, from Offa’s Dyke south on ridge observation point.
Figure 185: Crogen Viewshed Point 24, from Offa’s Dyke north observation point 1, scale 1:24,000.
Figure 186: Crogen Viewshed Point 25, from Offa’s Dyke north observation point 1, scale 1:50,000.
Figure 187: Crogen Viewshed Point 26, from Offa’s Dyke north observation point 2, scale 1:15,000.
Figure 188: Crogen Viewshed Point 27, from Offa’s Dyke north observation point 2, scale 1:50,000.
Figure 189: Crogen Viewshed Point 28, from Offa’s Dyke north observation point 0.
Figure 190: Crogen Environs total visibility from all observation points.
Figure 191: Crogen Environs total visibility from all observation points in field north of Adwy' r Beddau.
Figure 192: Crogen Environ combined viewshed from all Offa's Dyke observation points.
Figure 193: Crogen Environs combined viewshed from all Adwy’r Beddau observation points.
Introduction

The following chapter is a discussion of the medieval and modern campaign legacies of 1157 and 1165. The outcomes of the Battle of Coleshill and the Battle of Crogen had powerful ramifications for future Anglo-Norman and Welsh relations and set Wales on the path to unification – a political strategy that preserved the independence of native Wales until 1282. The legacies of these campaigns also resonate within the modern social consciousness and identities of local communities. The role of the heritage sector in battlefield preservation is important in ensuring the continued commemoration of these events, in terms of battlefield protection, public outreach, education and research. Unfortunately, the current parameters required for battlefield protection are limited and medieval conflicts tend to be overlooked. The following discussion includes an analysis of the current state of battlefield heritage management in Britain and suggests improvements that could be made to more readily allow for the inclusion of medieval conflicts on historic battlefield protection registers.

Campaign legacies and the Edwardian Conquest

Following the Anglo-Norman failure of the 1165 Berwyn Mountain Campaign, Henry II abandoned his efforts in Wales, instead turning his attention to the conquest of Ireland in 1171 (Davies 1987: 53, 88). Much of Wales, and Gwynedd in particular, had managed to secure their independence, reclaim their ancestral territories, and preserve native Welsh rule following the achievements of the 1165 Berwyn Mountain Campaign until the successful conquest of Edward I in 1277, which was finalized by the death of Llywelyn ap Gruffudd in 1282 in a failed rebellion against Edward I at the Battle of Cilmeri (Davies 1987: 279). The ensuing years of independence between the Battle of Crogen and the Edwardian Conquest were not hallmarked by peace. The Welsh kingdoms, although briefly united under the common cause of preserving Welsh independence during the Berwyn Mountain Campaign, returned to their border conflicts with each other and the marcher barons. Following the death of
Owain Gwynedd in 1170, Gwynedd became fragmented, divided amongst his sons. This fragmentation and lack of central leadership shifted the focus of Welsh power to the south and the Lord Rhys (Rhys ap Gruffudd of Deheubarth; Brown 2004: 101). However, the centre of power in Wales soon returned to Gwynedd with the rise of Llywelyn ap Iorwerth (the Great) in 1199. Although the conclusion of Owain's and Henry's campaigns did not herald the end of conflict, it did establish a precedent for native Wales uniting to counter the Anglo-Norman threat. This was demonstrated under the leadership of both Llywelyn ap Iorwerth and Llywelyn ap Gruffudd, both were rulers of a politically united Wales.

The concentrated and momentous efforts of Edward I that eventually led to the successful conquest of Wales are complex and beyond the scope of this research (see Chrimes 1969; Davies 1987; Stephenson 2010; Prestwich 2010). What follows instead is a brief consideration of how the legacy of the 1157 and 1165 campaigns influenced Edward’s policy and campaign strategy in Wales and Flintshire in particular. Like many Welsh rulers before him, Llywelyn ap Gruffudd disregarded the suzerainty of the English monarchs. As has been stated in several instances, this was probably due in part to a social difference in the nature of Welsh versus English clientship, although the continued tradition of disregard is suggestive of the intentional disobedience of the Welsh rulers as they sought to restore self-rule without interference from England. In the summer of 1277, as retribution for Llywelyn’s failure to preform homage, Edward I invaded Wales via Flintshire and established his base near Basingwerk (Lloyd 1917: 17). Llywelyn soon preformed homage, but not long afterwards fell into patterns of open conflict and revolt, similar to actions of Owain Gwynedd and Rhys ap Gruffudd following the 1163 homage at Woodstock (Prestwich 2010).

Edward used his base at Basingwerk both as a campaign headquarters and to oversee the construction of Flint Castle. Included within Edward’s retainers were 320 woodsmen (Taylor 1974: 309). While these woodsmen were probably hired to provide timber for the castle building activities, it is intriguing to speculate that they could have also been used in a military capacity. Edward’s base at Basingwerk was fortified using wood, as it was meant to be only a temporary fortification until Flint Castle was completed.
Undoubtedly the woodcutters also participated in the construction of the temporary fort. Most intriguing however, is a reference in volume four of *Annales Monastici* (as referenced by Morris 1901: 130), stating that Edward was weary of the dangers presented by the dense forest that stretched from Chester to Basingwerk, he therefore ordered a large part of the forest to be cut down, creating a broad road to provide a safe avenue of advance into Wales (*ibid*). Edward was probably aware of the dangers presented by woodlands, namely the Welsh ambush parties they concealed, which had disastrous consequences for his great-grandfather’s efforts both in 1157 and 1165. By removing the woods, Edward eliminated the cover and concealment that the Welsh had used to their tactical advantage during surprise attacks. Edward’s tactical compensations, likely learned from the failings of Henry II’s campaigns, coupled with his unyielding campaign efforts and the untimely death of Llywelyn ap Gruffudd in battle, which left Wales leaderless, all contributed to the successful results of the Edwardian conquest. The castle building campaign that followed the death of Llywelyn was conceived to secure Edward’s hold in North Wales; construction on most of these castles did not begin until after Llywelyn’s death (see Figure 194 below). These Edwardian castles are an enduring testament to the conflicts that pervaded Wales for two centuries and they embody the legacies of those conflicts and the momentous efforts of both the Welsh and the Anglo-Normans in the contested control for Wales.
Figure 194: View of Caernarfon Castle, construction commenced in 1283 (photo by the author).

Memory and Legacy of the 1157 and 1165 campaigns in popular culture

Although the commemoration of the Battle of Coleshill or the Battle of Crogen is not presented on a large scale, such as the Battles of Towton (1461) or Naseby (1645), there does exists a localized tradition of commemoration, particularly for the Battle of Crogen (see Figure 196 below). Unlike Crogen, the Battle of Coleshill is lacking in commemorative markers and material, this is due in part to its location not being previously known. The only commemorative plaque associated with Coleshill, is the deteriorated signboard in Wepre Wood Park (Ewloe wood; see Figure 37, page 178). As has been addressed in Chapter Six, the inaccurate naming and location of this plaque is the result of erroneous claims by antiquarians based on misguided historical research. The more likely location, established by this research for the Battle of Coleshill is the region immediately adjacent to the extant remains of Hen Blas Castle. The only information plaque at this location is a sign post stating that the Prince of Gwynedd, Dafydd ap Llywelyn was born at Hen Blas Castle in c. 1206 (see Figure 194 below).
Wrexham County Council along with the Welsh Government is responsible for a series of placards detailing the events of the Battle of Crogen near the site of the gap of the graves. In 2009 the Wrexham Council unveiled a commemorative plaque that has been affixed to the Castle Mill Bridge over the Ceiriog close to where the Battle of Crogen is thought to have occurred. Additionally, The National Trust (stewards of Chirk Castle) promotes a ‘Battle of Crogen’ self-guided walk (The National Trust, Chirk Castle n.d.: online resource). Most intriguing of all is a short film that was made in 2011 in which re-enactors depict the Battle of Crogen, this film was made for the Wrexham Histories Festival at Glyndŵr University (Ceiriog Pheasant (n.d.): online resource). The tones of all of these commemorative articles convey pro-Welsh sentiments.
On the English side of border the campaign commemoration adopts an entirely different tone, one that is overtly pro-English. An information placard at Oswestry Castle states that ‘Henry II is said to have camped in Oswestry before defeating the Welsh Prince, Llewellyn’ (see Figure 196 above). Clearly this statement is rife with inaccuracies, not only was it Owain not Llywelyn who was Henry’s opponent, but it was Henry, not Owain, who was defeated. It is remarkable that such contention and bias exists to this day over events that transpired nearly 850 years ago. The ability of past conflict – including the memorialized landscapes of conflict – to contribute to the conceptualization and creation modern identity is a powerful argument for the relevance and continuation of the study of the archaeology of conflict and the protection of...
these important sites. The following section is a review of the role of the heritage management sector in the preservation of battlefields, highlighting areas that could benefit from further preservation guidelines and criteria.

**Battlefield management, a review**

The research presented in this study has shown that the archaeological analysis of medieval battlefields is possible, particularly when these battlefields are contextualized within a holistic conflict landscape. Previous to this research, the archaeological consideration of medieval conflict was predominantly constricted to the War of the Roses c. 1455-1485, earlier medieval conflicts were neglected. These unique medieval battlefields are valuable resources that require protection so that their legacy is preserved for future generations. The absence of standardization for battlefields and conflict landscape investigation, as critiqued by Foard (2009), Freeman (2001) and others in the Literature Review and Methodology chapters, is a theme that is echoed in the heritage management of battlefields. Foard and Morris have stated that ‘as with battlefield investigation, we can look to the United States for experience in conservation management’ (2012: 158). What follows is an overview and critique of the battlefield heritage management policies of Historic England (formerly English Heritage), Cadw and the National Park Service American Battlefield Protection Program. Historic Scotland, which has its own battlefield register and preservation agenda, has not been included at length in this discussion as none of the events discussed in this research took place in Scotland. Its inclusion is only insofar as to evidence the climate of battlefield protection in Britain.

Currently, Historic England, Historic Scotland and Cadw lack research objectives within their preservation guidelines. For example, there are no suitable parameters for the identification and documentation of battlefields which are not precisely locatable on a map, but are still of national, or in the case of the conflicts considered in this research, international importance. Battlefield preservation in Britain is currently focused on the protection of well-known and well-documented (archaeologically or historically) battlefields. Additionally, while acknowledgement is given to the important social roles that
battlefields perform – in terms of their memorialization and presence in public consciousness and identity – there is little consideration given to public perspective and interpretation insofar as there are no established parameters for public outreach and education (Carman 2014: 93). These issues are particularly troublesome for archaeological investigation, as without regulations for research methods and objectives, or for survey and excavation, there is no ‘quality control’ for battlefield surveys. In summary, the majority of heritage resources for historic battlefields in Britain are targeted at preservation and protection, not research and interpretation. However, unlike Historic England, Historic Scotland and the charity the Battlefields Trust, which administers the UK Battlefield Resource Centre, has a research agendas attached to their objectives. This includes the preservation, interpretation and presentation of battlefields as historical and educational resources (Battlefields Trust n.d.). However, as of yet no sustainable agenda for battlefield research and education has been implemented at a national level. This makes the goal of conflict archaeology difficult, given that a structured conflict archaeology research methodology is required in order to study these sites.

**Historic England**

In 1995 Historic England was the first heritage body in Britain to establish guidelines for the preservation of historic battlefields. The *Register of Historic Battlefields* includes a list of the 46 registered battlefields in England (current as of 2014) and the *Designation Selection Guide for Battlefields* (English Heritage 2012) outlines the criteria for battlefield designation, selection and preservation in England. While nomination to the register ensures preservation, the types of events eligible for nomination are typically those which were large-scale set-piece battles in which troops were deployed in formal battle array. Smaller scale engagements such as skirmishes or raids tend to be overlooked (*ibid*: 2012: 3). Only events determined to be of historical significance, insofar as they represent turning points in English history, can be considered for the register (*ibid*). This in itself is a fairly subjective criterion and could possibly lead to less well known or equally important smaller scale engagements being overlooked.
Historic England in their *Designation Selection Guide for Battlefields* (2012) list several criteria, after historical significance has been established, that must be present for a historic battlefield to be selected for the register. Most notably these include the secure identity of the battlefield location, topographic integrity and archaeological potential (English Heritage 2012: 5-6). There are several inherent problems within these designations. First is the lack of an established research agenda with which to identify conflicts and establish the battlefield boundaries which Historic England requires for protection nomination. Second, while topographic integrity conveys a sense of the original landscape setting of the battle, it does not necessarily impact battlefield study, which has been demonstrated by the conflict landscape reconstruction method in this research. Third, the focus on the recovery of portable military material culture which Historic England claims has the potential ‘to create archaeological significance as it may allow deployments to be reconstructed’ (English Heritage 2012: 6), underestimates the significance of the conflict landscape. Fourth, ‘While these criteria have proved effective in most respects, they do not necessarily extend to archaeological potential, because there need be no correlation between a battle’s political or military importance and the significance of its archaeological deposits. ‘Some historically minor actions, for instance, may have high quality archaeological potential’ (Foard and Morris 2012: 159).

Unlike Historic England, Historic Scotland allows for archaeological and archaeological landscape potential to determine historical importance (Historic Scotland 2011: 5). The reconstruction of conflict landscapes and military terrain analysis undertaken in connection with specific conflict events has been shown, in this study, to be capable of battlefield reconstruction. Due to site preservation the recovery of military material culture may not always be possible, particularly for smaller scale medieval conflicts. By overlooking the value of the historic landscape, as a tool for battlefield reconstruction and a basis for understanding, many events are not valid for nomination to the *Register of Historic Battlefields*. Given these guidelines it is unsurprising that the majority of the battles of the Register are post-medieval in date.
In 2011 Cadw introduced a proposal for a register of Historic Battlefields in Wales. The contents of this proposal were promising, particularly since they included ‘lesser’ engagements such as skirmishes and raids – which define much of medieval Welsh warfare. Uniquely, as a means to include these more ephemeral, yet equally important conflict events, the proposed registered suggested two categories of battlefield sites for inclusion on the register, tier 1 and tier 2 sites. Tier 1 sites would include battlefields ‘whose boundaries and geographic extent can be defined on a map with confidence’, tier 2 sites are identified as ‘battlefields or parts of battlefields […] that can be confidently located to a specific area, but where the nature of the evidence is not so extensive’ (Cadw 2011: 9). The initial survey of sites to nominate to the register, based on battle sites already listed on the Welsh historic environment record database Coflein, was completed in 2014. According to correspondence with officials in RCAHMW and Cadw, these sites appear to have been surveyed using traditional archaeological survey methods, and were consequently determined inappropriate for listing on a register as they were thought not to have significant potential to yield portable military material culture. Due to this the plan to establish a historic battlefield register in Wales – which would have included important preservation capacities – was scrapped (Cadw personal communication, April 2015). This could have been avoided had the appropriate conflict archaeology methodologies, such as those outlined in this research been used instead of traditional archaeology survey methods which are ineffective in the identification and documentation of sites of conflict.

The American Battlefield Protection Program
While Foard and Morris suggest considering the American model of battlefield conservation management (2012: 158), this model evolved in a markedly different environment, and while it can be consulted, it would not be appropriate to impose similar heritage guidelines in Britain. The most significant difference in battlefield protection in America compared to Britain is that it includes a federally mandated battlefield archaeology survey method, including the identification and excavation of battlefields. Components of this method have
been outlined in the Methodology chapter, most notably KOCOA, a requirement for every federally funded battlefield project (ABPP 2007). America is a nation that is proud of its military legacy to the extreme, it is ‘an integral part of the country’s history and has always been an important part of national identity’ (Loechl et al. 2009: 6). Therefore, the management of America’s historic battlefields has been determined a matter of national importance, which in turn is administrated by the federal government which allocates three million dollars per year for the archaeological survey, interpretation, commemoration and education of America’s historic battlefields (ABPP n.d.). This financial backing has enabled the adoption of an ambitious research agenda which seeks not only to protect and provide public interpretation for documented battlefields, but actively seeks the identification and archaeological survey of lesser known engagements (ibid). The application of the set-piece research methodology by the American Battlefield Protection Program has proven successful and has encouraged the growth of conflict archaeology.

Summary
Historic England, Historic Scotland and Cadw all have similar battlefield designation, selection, and preservation criteria. While both Historic England and Historic Scotland, require that an event must be of national importance in order to be included in their respective inventories, their definition of what constitutes national importance differs. Historic Scotland states that a battlefield is ‘considered to be of national importance either for its association with key historical events or figures; or for the physical remains and/or archaeological potential it contains; or for its landscape context. In addition, it must be possible to define the site on a modern map with a reasonable degree of accuracy’ (Historic Scotland 2011: 5). Unfortunately, Historic England does not include the landscape context or archaeological potential in its definition of national importance. While these battlefield registers and their parameters establish a sustainable means of battlefield preservation, they are limited in terms of their research and educational objectives. Compounding these issues are the different battlefield definitions, designations and preservation criteria of the main heritage networks in Britain. While the conflict history of England, Wales and
Scotland are unique they were not isolated from their neighbours. Given that border warfare, particularly the ongoing conflicts instigated by the Anglo-Norman Conquest attempts of Wales and Scotland, defines many of the conflicts that took place in medieval Britain, a nationally universal battlefield research and preservation agenda is needed.

A problem prevalent in each of the heritage guidelines considered above is in the oversight of the potential for theoretical explanations resulting from the interpretation of the material remains. The current interpretive goal, such as that stated by Historic England, is to reconstruct battlefield actions and troop deployments. This in itself is an admirable goal, however, it is limiting as it neglects to encourage research to surpass battle description, to identify adaptations in social behaviour and expressions of identity, past and present. This problem has been noted in the American sector as well, as ‘investigations have often been conducted as ancillary studies to the preservation, restoration, reconstruction, or interpretation of some military-related site. Many of the investigations had little or no theoretical orientation or explanatory goal above that set by an architect or interpreter’ (Scott, Babits and Haecker 2009: 1). While Scott, Babits and Haecker point out that theoretical objectives are becoming more prevalent in conflict research, it can be argued that they will not be universal until they are also recommended by the heritage sector. The following Conclusion chapter contains a section on suggestions for future research which considers proposed heritage objectives in further detail.
Introduction

The research presented in this study has added an archaeological context to the mid-twelfth-century conflicts between Owain Gwynedd and Henry II. Prior to this these conflicts were poorly understood, particularly in terms of their role in Anglo-Norman and Welsh relations during the twelfth century. This research has shown that the 1157 Coastal Campaign and 1165 Berwyn Mountain Campaign were watershed events, the outcomes of which set the tone for Anglo-Norman and Welsh interactions up until the Edwardian conquest at the close of the thirteenth century. The following discussion highlights the contributions of this research to the understanding of the conflict landscape of mid-twelfth-century Gwynedd and to medieval conflict archaeology in terms of methodological developments. This discussion is preceded by suggestions for possible avenues of continuing research, these are important considerations as they provide a way forward that not only furthers the research presented in this study, it also encourages the archaeological investigation of medieval conflicts in the British Isles and continued advancement for the field of conflict archaeology.

Avenues for future research

The conflict landscape research presented in this thesis is complete. However, there are multiple avenues for continuing research, particularly for the 1157 and 1165 campaigns, as well as comparative studies from other campaigns and other locations of Anglo-Norman conquest, such as Ireland and Scotland. The following section presents an outline for future research.

Remote sensing and excavation

This research has demonstrated that portable military material culture is not necessary in order to assess and document events of medieval conflict, or reconstruct historic landscapes of conflict. This does not mean that portable military material culture has no role in medieval battlefield reconstruction; when
available it is a very effective medium for sequencing battle actions and spatially reconstructing troop positions and movements. Therefore, given the opportunity for future research, a comprehensive remote sensing survey and excavation, predominantly using metal detector survey, would be undertaken at both the Hen Blas location for the 1157 Battle of Coleshill and the 1165 Battle of Crogen. Furthermore, the encampments associated with the 1165 Berwyn Mountain campaign – Cerrig Gwynion, Caer Drewyn and Pen y Bryn y Castell – would also be investigated using remote sensing and excavation in order to improve understanding of medieval military encampments.

Given that many of the sites to be investigated archaeologically are disturbed either by modern development or by cultural activity predating their medieval use, remote sensing methods such as LiDAR or electrical resistivity would not yield useful data. Nonetheless these are invaluable tools that have the potential to contribute to the understanding of other medieval battlefields in Britain. Additionally, apart from Hen Blas Castle, Wat’s Dyke and Offa’s Dyke, all of which have already been subjected to intensive survey, there are no built features associated with the actual armed engagements of Coleshill or Crogen. Given this, metal detector surveying provides the best way forward as a means of remote sensing prior to site excavation. Should such a survey and excavation take place in the future, it would be important to include a preservation and heritage agenda.

**Heritage management and public outreach**

The current publicity and propaganda surrounding these medieval conflicts, particularly the Battle of Crogen, demonstrates that the enduring legacy of these events has the ability to contribute to the conceptualization and creation of modern identities. Given this, any future research agendas would have to include the establishment of sustainable parameters for heritage management, such as connecting with the local community to cultivate interest and encourage heritage stewardship. Educational objectives for cultural heritage management would be included within this strategy. These would include collaborating with local museums to establish suitable collections management, exhibits and displays of battlefield material culture, as well as working alongside
Cadw and local museums to develop guidance material for educators, particularly at the primary and secondary school levels.

Given that Cadw has abandoned their proposed establishment of a register for battlefields in Wales, due to the inability to identify these conflicts archaeologically, it is hoped that the research presented in this thesis and the results from any future research and excavations could be used as a pilot study for Cadw, should they decide to re-evaluate historic battlefields. It would also be hoped that any military material culture resulting from excavation would contribute to the understanding and establishment of a material culture signature, and possibly artefact distribution pattern, for medieval conflicts, something that is currently lacking (Carman 2014: 45).

Promising avenues for the field of conflict archaeology include establishing a medium that would encourage the heritage community, cultural resource management firms and those in the academic sector to work together to improve the guidelines for battlefield recognition and protection. Perhaps this could be accomplished by establishing a consortium or round-table discussion group that would include individuals from all of these vocations. It would also be important that people in these fields of study from other geographic regions within the UK and the world be included, since as has been noted earlier, one of the shortcomings of conflict archaeology is its nationalist insularism (Carman 2014). Such a consortium could also collaborate on standardized battlefield methodologies; the absence of such a system has proven a challenge for identifying and documenting battlefields in Great Britain (Foard 2009: 144). The adoption of a foundational methodology, that could be adapted depending on the conflict, would greatly enhance conflict archaeology investigation in Britain. The abandonment of the Welsh Battlefield Register, due to insufficient surveying parameters, is indicative of the urgency with which such a standardized system for investigating conflicts is needed. The methodology presented in this research would be well suited to such a purpose.

**Comparative studies**

Other avenues of future work particular to the research presented in this thesis, apart from the suggested survey and excavation outlined above, include a
comparative study of other medieval conflicts in Wales, to determine tactical and behavioural attitudes to earlier and later conflicts. For instance, it would be interesting to compare the campaigns of Gruffudd ap Llywelyn’s, such as the battle of Battle of Rhyd y Groes (c. 1039) against the English and the campaigns of Llywelyn ap Gruffudd against Edward I, at the close of the thirteenth century, to the mid-twelfth-century campaigns considered in this thesis. The study of these conflicts, from a conflict landscape perspective, presents a unique opportunity to access the evolution of tactical and political patterns of Welsh resistance to the Anglo-Norman conquest. Also, as previously mentioned, it would be intriguing to compare the conquest of Ireland, to that of Wales under the leadership of Henry II; it would also be interesting to compare similar conflicts in connection with the Anglo-Norman conquest efforts in Scotland. Such a comparative study would contribute to the understanding of the archaeological signature of medieval Welsh conflicts, by contextualizing them within a wider sphere of Norman Conquest.

It would also be interesting to systematically investigate the landscape setting where Welsh battles took place to determine whether any preferential patterns exist. It has already been established that the Welsh, particularly during the eleventh century, preferred battlegrounds that bordered rivers. The selection of a particular landscape for battle could be indicative of a warfare ritual, a concept introduced by Carman and Carman (2001: 276). Furthermore, the idea of a traditional battlefield as considered by Higham (2013) has already been presented in earlier chapters (see page 96). In connection with the 1150 and 1157 Battles of Coleshill, it would be intriguing to conduct a survey of other medieval Welsh battle sites to determine if there exists repetition at other locations.

Concluding remarks
Through the addition of an archaeological dimension to both the particular campaign case studies and the wider archaeological landscapes of conflict in which these campaigns took place, this research has established a precedent that legitimizes and encourages the study of medieval conflict archaeology. Contextualizing the individual conflict events of the Battle of Coleshill and the
Battle of Crogen within a broader conflict landscape setting resulted not only in a dynamic battlefield pattern analysis, but highlighted important attributes of social change triggered by Coleshill and Crogen. This has promising ramifications for the future of archaeological investigation of medieval conflicts in Wales, considering that prior to this work no conflicts in Wales had been analysed via a conflict archaeology agenda. Furthermore, the conflict archaeology methodology, built upon traditional battlefield archaeology method and further developed by the unique addition of a cultural conflict landscape consideration and reverse KOCOA military terrain analysis, has shown to be an effective means for archaeologically assessing medieval conflicts. This research represents the first instance for the application of this method to any medieval conflict; given the successful results, this method stands to make significant contributions to future medieval conflict archaeology investigations.

This study has yielded notable contributions that have expanded the understanding not only for the conflicts of Owain Gwynedd and Henry II, but it has also identified and contextualized ongoing trends of Welsh and Anglo-Norman conflict, and the role of the cultural and physical landscapes in these conflicts. By placing the campaign case studies within the wider context of medieval warfare, and addressing inaccuracies and biases in the historical record and assessing the veracity of historical accounts, it was revealed that the Welsh and Anglo-Normans engaged in armed conflict on an equal tactical and technological basis. The Welsh supremacy in the field during the Battle of Coleshill and the Battle of Crogen was accomplished via the shrewd exploitation of the physical landscape and the manipulation of the cultural conflict landscape. The resistance efforts of Gwynedd to the conquest attempts of Henry II were further improved by the Welsh adoption of the Vegetian style of warfare, which notably included the building and besieging of castles, in response to the Anglo-Norman threat. In doing so the Welsh changed their social-political viewpoint of terrain and territory from the non-Vegetian, fluid, changeable and abstract, to those of a sedentary Vegetian society, with fixed and definite borders. This shift in attitude to territorial tenure can be argued to have facilitated the political and territorial unification of Wales under Llywelyn ap Iorwerth in the early thirteenth century.
The culmination of this research has resulted in the important addition of a native Welsh narrative to the archaeological record. As stated in the opening chapters, one of the challenges facing medieval Welsh archaeology is the absence of Welsh agency from our understanding of the medieval period. This short-coming was a direct result of the obscure state of the Welsh archaeological record during the eleventh and twelfth centuries and from the Anglo-Norman biases of scholars past and present. Landscape and agency – historical archaeological theoretical frameworks – had encountered difficulty in their development, due to the fragmentary nature of the existing evidence. Compounding matters was the lack of a suitable methodology with which to surmount these challenges. The conflict archaeology approach to medieval Welsh conflicts piloted here, particularly in terms of the methodology, has provided a means to successfully address and resolve many of these challenges.

The avenues for future research discussed above, along with the results presented in this thesis, have provided a sustainable way forward that encourages the archaeological investigation of medieval conflicts in Wales and Britain. This research has shown that the implementation of a conflict archaeology agenda for the investigation of the Anglo-Norman conquest of Wales can greatly enhance and contribute to our understanding of this important era of medieval British history. The study of conflict archaeology deepens our awareness of the human propensity to solve problems with violence and the lasting effect that violence has on the formation of social systems and group identity. It is the sincere hope of the author that the continued archaeological study of conflict and its ramifications in the past can discourage its use and lead to conflict resolution in the future.
Appendix One, Enlarged Maps and Viewshed Diagrams

The following is a selection of enlarged maps and viewshed diagrams, these are indicated in the list of figures on page 6.
Figure 1: Study Area Boundaries
Figure 2: Core Area Boundaries
Figure 38: The Welsh and Anglo-Norman encampments from the 1157 Coastal Campaign (A = Welsh, B = Anglo-Normans).
Figure 39: Basingwerk encampment area.
Figure 40: Anglo-Norman route of march from Chester.
Figure 41: Anglo-Norman possible turn-off points into the woods
Figure 42: The two possible locations for the wooded battle, upper = Coleshill, lower = Ewloe
Figure 44: repositioning of the Welsh and Anglo-Norman forces following the Battle of Coleshill. Yellow = Welsh, Red = Anglo-Norman. The lines are not meant to represent the direction of travel and are not representative of the actual route of advance.
Figure 45: Vicinity of Welsh raids on Rhuddlan.
Figure 46: Detail of assault on Anglesey (the Battle of Moelfre) included the churches that were pillaged by the Anglo-Normans.
Figure 47: Map detailing the approximate bounds of territory that Owain had conquered prior to the 1157 Campaign and was obliged to relinquish as part of the peace terms agreed upon with Henry.
Figure 69: viewshed from the Welsh encampment at Basingwerk.
Figure 70: Viewshed from the coastal Roman road adjacent to Hawarden Castle.
Figure 71: Viewshed from the Roman road south of Bryn y Cwn Motte.
Figure 72: Viewshed from the Roman road north of Bryn y Cwn Motte
Figure 73: Viewshed from the Roman Road near Coleshill.
Figure 75: 1165 Campaign, map of Welsh and Anglo-Norman Encampments, A = Welsh, B= Anglo-Norman
Figure 76: Map of Anglo-Norman route of march from Oswestry to the Ceiriog river valley.
Figure 77: Map of the supposed location of the Battle of Crogen. The blue dashed line indicates the approximate extent of Offa’s Dyke, the solid blue line indicates the approximate course of the Ceiriog River. Note: The location of the Battle of Crogen is based on a national grid reference provided by the Clwyd Powys Archaeological Trust, it is an approximation only.
Figure 84: Map showing the vicinity of the Welsh encampment near Corwen. X= location of Corwen.
Figure 94: Viewshed from Caer Drewyn which is indicated with a red arrow.
Figure 95: Viewshed from Pen Y Bryn Y Castell which is indicated with a red arrow.
Figure 96: Map detailing possible avenues of approach into Wales from Oswestry. Yellow: Dee river valley, red: Ceiriog river valley, black: Tanat river valley.
Figure 97: Possible routes of approach into the Berwyn Mountains and to the Ffordd y Saeson from Crogen. The line of Offa’s Dyke is indicated by the dotted line on the eastern edge of the map, the approximate route of Ffordd y Saeson is represented by the solid pink line and St Garmon’s Church, which may have been pillaged by the Anglo-Normans when encamped at Cerrig Gwynion is indicated by the red lightning bolt.
Figure 99: Viewshed from the Ffordd y Saeson demonstrating the continuous vantage points in the direction of Corwen which is indicated with the pink dotted line, the points from which the viewshed were calculated are underlined.
Figure 108: Possible battle locations A and B for the Battle of Coleshill near Hen Blas.
Figure 109: Battlefield elements and observer points for the Battle of Crogen.

Key: dotted blue line = course of Offa’s Dyke
large black hash marks = suggested Anglo-Norman avenue of approach
small black dotted line = suggested Welsh avenues of approach (2 possibilities).
Figure 111: Proposed location for the Battle of Crogen, indicated by the red ‘explosion.’ The dotted red line indicates the area that would have been targeted for tree clearing by Henry’s forces.
Appendix Two – National Grid References

The following table contains a list of British National Grid reference numbers for all sites discussed by this study, including visibility observation points.
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Appendix Three – Medieval Rulers of Gwynedd 1066-1282, 
(after Lloyd 1912: 765-769):

- Bleddyn ap Cynfyn (1063-1075)  
  -Usurper from Powys, receives Gwynedd from the English.

- Trahaearn ap Caradog (1075-1081)  
  -Usurper from Powys.

- Gruffudd ap Cynan (1081-1137)  
  -From the original Aberffraw dynasty of Gwynedd.

- Owain Gwynedd (ap Gruffudd) (1137-1170)

- Maelgwyn ab Owain Gwynedd (1170-1173) Anglesey

- Dafydd ab Owain Gwynedd (1170-1195) in the east.

- Rhodri ab Owain Gwynedd (1170-1190) in the west.

- Llywelyn ap Iorwerth (Llywelyn the Great) (1195-1240)

- Dafydd ap Llywelyn (1240-1246)

- Llywelyn ap Gruffudd (Llywelyn the Last) (1246-1282)
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