

**Development of Party Systems after a Dictatorship: Voting Patterns and
Ideological Shaping in Spain**

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Abstract

The Spanish party system after Francoism has been the subject of discussion of several academics and previous research. The purpose of this work is to approach this topic more deeply from a new perspective by paying attention to the shaping of ideology and voting patterns regionally and through time. This research has been structured into three main chapters. Firstly, a historical review of politics and key facts before the dictatorship has been carried out. Secondly, socioeconomic factors and voting patterns during the Second Republic have been analysed in detail. Thirdly, by focusing on insights acquired from previous chapters, several models of voting patterns and ideological shaping have been carried out from 1978 to 1994 at a national and regional level. The final conclusions show that (1) voting patterns and ideological identities after the dictatorship were still strongly influenced by lifelong social cleavages, (2) both voting patterns and ideological identities varied regionally, (3) preferences towards a democratic or authoritarian regimen did not affect voting and ideology after the dictatorship and (4) Francoism as a set of ideals still played an important role in defining voting patterns during the democratic era.

List of Contents

Abstract	1
List of Contents	2
List of Tables.....	3
List of Figures	3
List of Abbreviations.....	4
Introduction	6
Research Objectives	7
Methodology and Structure	7
CHAPTER 1. Historical Review	8
1.1 Social and Political Context of the 19th Century.....	8
1.2 Beginning of the 20th Century	11
1.3 Second Republic of Spain and Civil War	19
1.4 The Radicalisation in the Second Republic.....	29
CHAPTER 2. Socio-economic factors and voting patterns during the Second Republic	35
2.1 Class cleavage in Spain	35
2.2 Party System and Vote by Region in 1931	44
2.3 Party System and Vote by Region in 1933	48
2.4 Party System and Vote by Region in 1936	50
2.5 Discussion.....	53
CHAPTER 3. Spanish Party System and Voting Patterns after the Dictatorship (1978-1994).....	55
3.1 Ideological Positions of Spaniards in 1978.....	56
3.2 Ideological Positions of Parties and Voting Patterns in 1978	58
3.3 Voting patterns in Madrid, Andalusia and Castile 1978.....	62
3.4 Voting Patterns in the Basque Country 1981.....	66
3.5 Voting Patterns in Catalonia 1983.....	71
3.4 Voting Patterns regarding Monarchy, Territory and Sociological Francoism	77
3.4.1 Voting Patterns in 1985.....	80
3.4.2 Sociological Francoism, monarchy endorsement and voting patterns in 1994.....	85
3.5 Discussion.....	91
Overall Conclusions	93
Acknowledgements.....	95
Appendix 1. CIS 1157.....	95
Appendix 2. CIS 1276.....	96
Appendix 3. CIS 1527.....	96
Appendix 4. CIS 1441.....	97
Appendix 5. CIS 2084.....	98
References.....	99

List of Tables

Table 1. CNT Members by Population and Region in 1930 and 1931.....	38
Table 2. Vote Share (%) by Region and Total Nationally in the General Elections of 1931.....	45
Table 3. Vote Share (%) by Region and Total Nationally in the General Elections of 1933.....	49
Table 4. Vote Share (%) by Region and Total Nationally in the General Elections of 1936.....	52
Table 5. Ideological Self-Placement in 1978.....	57
Table 6. Table 6. Ideological Placement of Political Parties (%) in 1978.....	58
Table 7. Voting Patterns in 1978.....	60
Table 8. Distribution of Vote (%) by Occupational Group in 1978.....	61
Table 9. Voting Patterns by Region in 1978.....	64
Table 10. Voting Patterns in the Basque Country. Year 1981.....	68
Table 11. Voting Patterns in Catalonia. Year 1983.....	73
Table 12. Ideological Self-Placement in 1985.....	80
Table 13. Voting Patterns in 1985.....	81
Table 14. % Satisfaction with Francoism and the Democratic Transition in 1994.....	86
Table 15. Level of Satisfaction with Francoism and the Democratic Transition.....	87
Table 16. Voting Patterns in 1994.....	89

List of Figures

Figure 1. Sectors of Economic Activity 1877-1991.....	36
Figure 2. CNT Members in 1931 and 1936 by Region.....	37
Figure 3. Number of Strikes: Timeline 1905-1936.....	42
Figure 4. Vote share (%) in the General Elections of 1931 (first round).....	44
Figure 5. Vote share (%) in the General Elections of 1936 (first round).....	51
Figure 6. Distribution of Ideology and Income by Region in 1978.....	65

List of Abbreviations

AP	People's Alliance (Alianza Popular)
AR	Republican Action (Acción Republicana)
CEDA	Spanish Confederation of Autonomous Right-wing Groups (Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas)
CIS	Sociological Research Centre (Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas)
CIU	Convergence and Union (Convergència i Unió)
CNCA	National Confederation Catholic-Agrarian (Confederación Nacional Católico Agraria)
CNT	National Confederation of Labour (Confederación Nacional del Trabajo)
DLR\PRP	Liberal Republican Right (Derecha Liberal Republicana) Progesist Republican Party (Partido Republicano Progresista)
DR	Galician Right (Dereita Galleguista)
EAE-ANV	Basque Nationalist Action (Eusko Abertzale Ekintza-Acción Nacionalista Vasca)
EE	Basque Left (Euskadiko Ezkerra)
ELA-STV	Basque Workers' Solidarity (Eusko Langileen Alkartasuna-Soliraridad de Obreros Vascos)
ERC	Republican Left of Catalonia (Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya)
FAI	Iberian Anarchist Federation (Federación Anarquista Ibérica)
FE	Spanish Falange (Falange Española)
FE de las JONS	Spanish Falange of the Unions of the National-Syndicalist Offensive (Falange Española de las Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional Sindicalista)
FET y de las JONS	Traditionalist Spanish Falange and Unions of the National-Syndicalist Offensive (Falange Española Tradicionalista y de las Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional Sindicalista)
FNTT	National Federation of Land Workers (Federación Nacional de Trabajadores de la Tierra)
HB	Popular Unity (Herri Batasuna)
IR	Republican Left (Izquierda Republicana)
IU	Unite Left (Izquierda Unida)
JCAH	Castilian Unions of Hispanic Action (Juntas Castellanas de Acción Hispánica)
JONS	Unions of the National-Syndicalist Offensive (Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional-Sindicalista)
JONS	Unions of the National-Syndicalist Offensive (Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional-Sindicalista)

ORGA	Autonomous Galician Republican Organization (Organización Republicana Galega Autónoma)
PAE	Spanish Agrarian Party (Partido Agrario Español)
PCE	Communist Party of Spain (Partido Comunista de España)
PG	Galicianist Party (Partido Galleguista)
PNV	Basque Nationalist Party (Partido Nacionalista Vasco)
PP	People's Party (Partido Popular)
PRR	Radical Republican Party (Partido Republicano Radical)
PRRS	Radical Socialist Republican Party (Partido Republicano Radical Socialista)
PSOE	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Español)
PSP	Social People's Party (Partido Social Popular)
PURA	Party of Autonomist Republican Union (Partido de Unión Republicana Autonomista)
RE	Spanish Renovation (Renovación Española)
UCD/CDS	Union of the Democratic Centre (Unión de Centro Democrático)/ Democratic and Social Centre (Centro Democrático y Social)
UGT	General Union of Workers (Unión General de Trabajadores)
UP	Patriotic Union (Unión Patriótica)
UR	Republican Union (Unión Republicana)
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
UV	Valencian Union (Unió Valencianista)

Introduction

The academic discussion about the evolution of the party systems after authoritarian regimes is considerable and diverse. This interest is understandable not only because of the wide range of countries that underwent regime changes during the past century, but also because it happens in current century. Outstanding examples are the new democracies that emerged from the losing side of the Second World War, the regimen changes of Latin America during the middle of the 20th century or the current democracy processes in the Arab world.

Several questions have emerged from the observation of such processes. Among the most relevant, the continuity issue (see Cotta, 1994), closely related to the "freezing" hypothesis of Lipset and Rokkan (1967), and the eventual effect of the dictatorship on the new party system stand out. The continuity issue poses the question of whether the new party system emerges with equivalent features to the previous one, similar to the "freezing" hypothesis since it assumes that the new party system is based on similar social cleavages over time. Moreover, the influence of the dictatorship states that the authoritarian regime affects post-dictatorship political alignments either on voting patterns, ideological identities or, even, the political parties.

Although both ideas could seem mutually incompatible, they are not, since they are conceptually congruent. According to new explanations about the freezing hypothesis (Karvonen et al., 2000: pp. 24-25), the freezing of political alignments does not mean that old political alignments are really frozen, but that there is steadiness in such political alignments over time. Likewise, the influence of a dictatorship cannot affect the nature of the pre-dictatorship political alignments; by contrast, it can involve and reinforce previous alignments during and after the dictatorship. Consequently, the influence of the dictatorship does not necessarily imply a change in the nature of cleavages, but it can affect their structure or relevance.

Previous research has stated that political alignments and the party system undergo variations when they are institutionalised after an authoritarian regime. Such changes are, in some cases, a result of the reshaping of the party systems (see Cotta, 1994: 40) or the way in which cleavages are structured in East-Central Europe (see Bértoa, 2014).

However, perhaps the most feasible influence of a dictatorship on a new party system is that it can affect the social preferences towards a democratic or an authoritarian regime. As some

academics have pointed out (Tironi and Agüero, 1999; Alvarez and Katz, 2009), some evidences illustrate that the dictatorship in Chile affected the preferences towards a democracy, which influenced voting patterns during the democratic era.

As it can be seen, a post-dictatorship party system might not be completely unrelated to its authoritarian past. The post-dictatorship Spanish party system, purpose of this research, may bear a certain likeness to previous ones. Nonetheless, as previous research has revealed, there are substantial differences among cases depending on location or time, among other variables.

For example, the Spanish case is fairly different from some European cases, such as Germany and Italy, but it is quite related to Greece and Portugal. Their differences lie in the way they achieved democratisation. Whilst the German and Italian democracies come from a war defeat, the Spanish democracy is a result of an internal process (Cotta, 1994:11).

Moreover, the First and Second Republic were the last democratic governments before the failed military coup and the successive civil war that set up the Spanish dictatorship. Some of the parties which obtained parliamentary seats in 1936 also received a significant vote share in the new democratic elections of 1977. The natural democratic process and the survival of these parties for over forty years, unlike in Italy and Germany, facilitates the analysis of the possible influence of the dictatorship on reshaping of political alignments irrespective of further considerations.

Research Objectives

The purpose of this research is to analyse the development of post-dictatorship political alignments concerning voting patterns and ideological shaping during the Spanish democratic period from 1978 to 1994. The main objectives are (1) to reveal whether key variables and social cleavages after the dictatorship still defined voting patterns in democracy, (2) to show if there are remarkable differences in voting patterns and ideological identities by region or through time and (3) to study whether there was, or not, any kind of influence of the dictatorship on political alignments after the end of Francoism.

Methodology and Structure

The methodology of this research is based on three study methods.

Firstly, in chapter 1, a historical review from the end of the 19th century to the beginning of the Spanish Civil War in 1936 has been carried out. The main purpose was to highlight the most relevant political facts and the social and economic context from a spatial and temporal perspective. By highlighting such points, they can be used to determine the key variables of analysis and to test the continuity of political alignments in post-dictatorship democracy.

Secondly, in chapter 2, descriptive socio-economic data over several years has been studied, as well as the vote distributions during the Second Republic by region and nationally. The objective was to identify relevant insights of socio-economic factors and eventual variations of voting by region or by year.

Finally, in chapter 3, it has been carried out several models of voting patterns and ideological shaping regarding the insights arising from previous chapters, with the purpose of accomplishing the research objectives. Concretely, the data used for this research come from surveys from the *Centro de Estudios Sociológicos* (CIS: Sociological Research Centre) of 1978, 1981 in the Basque Country, 1983 in Catalonia, 1985 and 1994. For defining voting patterns, multinomial logit models of alternatives have been used. For defining ideological identities, multiple linear regressions on scalar axis of ideology have been used.

CHAPTER 1. Historical Review

1.1 Social and Political Context of the 19th Century

The middle of the 19th Century allowed the emergence of new parties representative of the social junctures of the liberal era. The democratic periods were short and did not succeed in establishing a consolidated political system and in finding a real democratic game. The *Sexenio Democrático* (democratic six-year term), from 1868 to 1874, was the most relevant period in which the ideological currents of the century were consolidated as principal axes of the following political stage. In 1873, the parliamentary monarchy ended due to the abdication of Amadeo I and led to the proclamation of the short-lived First Republic of Spain. After one year marked by political instability owing to the struggles between republican centralists and federalists, internal riots and the Ten Years' War (Toro, 1997), the Republic was overthrown by a military government. The military power established and supported a two-party system called Bourbon Restoration, created to reinforce the monarchy and political stability.

This era was marked by continuous fights among royalist and republican parties, religious issues and the development of capitalism and the labour movement (Monlleó, 2001). Although the social context was extremely varied, the Spanish party system remained as a two-party system after the collapse of the First Republic in 1874. This period is known as the Bourbon Restoration and was characterised by the alternation of the Liberal party and the Conservative party in power, erasing a past of military governments and revolutions.

Ideologically, these two political parties supported liberal and royalist positions committed to maintaining the *status quo* but differing on conservative and progressive issues, in such manner that the Spanish party system did not completely reflect the social reality. While the alternating system stabilised Spain for a relatively long time, the agreement between liberals and conservatives provided a scenario in which political change was almost irrelevant. The political game between the Conservative and the Liberal party was based mainly on disagreements about state policies and the improvement of social rights. Their common goal was the strengthening of the Bourbon monarchy and the monopolisation of the political power (Lacomba, 1993; Boyd, 2003).

However, there were various social issues that were not represented by the abovementioned political parties and they would later arise in the form of riots, revolutions and military coups. The monarchy-republic cleavage that promoted the attempt to establish a long-life republic in 1873 was an important feature of the Spanish society of that time. But the social conflict was not only between republicans and royalists; the liberal alliance, formed by the Conservative and the Liberal parties, had also been fighting over the century against the supporters of Carlos V and his heirs to the Spanish throne. The confrontation peaked three times (in 1833, 1846 and 1872), when the Carlist Wars started in regions such as Catalonia, Aragon and the Basque Country.

The Carlist movement represented the opposition to the liberal ideas of the French Revolution. Its main goal was to return to the Former Regime defeating the Bourbon monarchy and the liberal system. Even though the Carlist movement supported conservative positions, it was a mass movement. The three axes of its ideology were based on extreme Catholicism, Carlist monarchy and the defence of the local *Fueros*¹ of specific regions of Spain, combined with a

¹ The *fueros* were special laws and concessions granted to particular regions of Spain by the King or the State authority during the middle ages and onwards. Due to the crisis of the Ancient Regime and the

patriotic nationalism. The Carlist movement and its political branch, known as *Comuni3n Tradicionalista*, were a relevant political actor in subsequent years and before the Spanish Civil War of 1936. It was an important piece in the course of the alliances and disputes among the different political forces due to its power and capacity of mobilisation.

The popular nature of this movement highlights important elements of the Spanish society and its configuration. Several academics have turned their attention to its character as a mass movement and its causes. One of the arguments is that the common people saw the liberal reforms as contrary to their interest, especially the land reform, and massively joined the riots against the liberal system (Boyd, 2003). Another argument refers to cultural reasons and the birth of the modern nationalism in Catalonia, the Basque Country, Navarra and Aragon, where the movement had the largest number of supporters (Gerard, 2014). According to these ideas, the mass element of the Carlist movement had its origin in a class conflict or in reasons related to the emerging nationalism, rather than in conservative reasons such as religion or monarchy issues.

Although the Carlist movement had the ability to mobilise the social masses, it is doubtful that it was a real class struggle, as the Marxist literature defines it (Chodakiewicz & Radzilowski, 2003). More likely, the social mobilisation of the Carlist movement was based on cultural and social issues rather than on materialistic reasons. However, the Carlist Wars affected the Spanish economy significantly, preventing the normal development of nation-building processes as happened in other European countries, such as Italy or France, during the 19th century. Hence, the economic slowdown caused by the Carlist Wars could have delayed the formation of a typical liberal system in Spain (Coller, 2004).

The struggle of the Carlist movement for returning to the local *Fueros* was only one of the ways in which the problem of the Spanish territorial division arose. Other forms of territorial disputes emerged mixed with new ideologies. Cantonalism is a remarkable example of how territorial tensions were combined with anarchism, the labour movement or the federalist republicans during the short-lived Spanish First Republic. Cantonalism pursued the objective of obtaining wider territorial powers and, in some cases, the total independence of local entities and districts

establishment of a centralised liberal system in Spain at the beginning of the 19th century, new tensions arose between the followers of the centralised constitutionalism and the supporters of the old confederate monarchy (Alli-Aranguren, 1998). The royal dynasty issue also caused the split of the supporters of the Ancient Regime and the liberal system in followers of Carlos V and the Bourbon dynasty respectively, which laid the basis for the birth of Carlism (Alli-Aranguren, 1998: 56).

(López, 1992). There were armed insurrections in regions such as Cartagena and Salamanca, where new councils were formed to constitute independent governments of the Spanish First Republic.

Nonetheless, the territorial cleavage also affected the Republican ideas by causing internal divisions (León & Porras, 2014). Two big groups of republicans, centralists and federalists, emerged both in government and in society. These political and social junctures caused military repression and a continuous change between monarchy, dictatorship and a republican form of government.

The Spanish class cleavage began in the developed industry of Catalonia at the same time as the outbreak of the First Carlist War between 1830 and 1840. The first Spanish trade unions were weak organizations in which the workers cooperated occasionally. These workers' organizations were created around several class currents and they evolved into more complex ideologies, which resulted in a wide range of trade unions and political organizations. It was not until the founding of the First International in Spain during the second half of the 19th century that the workers movement became an important actor in the political game. The First International laid the groundwork for the birth of a strengthened Spanish labour movement thanks to the relative union of socialist, communist and anarchist sectors under the same flag.

Perhaps the fact that best represented the reinforcement of the Spanish labour movement was the founding of the *Partido Socialista Obrero Español* (PSOE; Spanish Socialist Workers' Party) and its trade union, called *Unión General de Trabajadores* (UGT; General Union of Workers), in 1879 and 1888 respectively. This party and its related trade union still exist nowadays as the most relevant party and trade union of the left-wing sector in Spain and as the representation of the workers' interests and their labour rights. The PSOE was originally founded as a Marxist party committed to defending the workers' general interest and to introducing socialist means of production. Its performance was fairly irrelevant during the 19th century due to the limited industrialisation of the Spanish economy, what made it extremely difficult to reach its ideological aims through a well-consolidated worker base (Aguiar, 2006: 5).

1.2 Beginning of the 20th Century

At the beginning of the 20th century, the Liberal and Conservative parties were forced to share the political spectrum with new political parties due to the rise of the labour movement and the birth of modern nationalism in regions such as the Basque Country and Catalonia (Anguera,

2001). The social and political context of the last century enabled the emergence of the *Unión Republicana* (UR; Republican Union) and the Carlist movement in the Spanish party system. Although, initially, these new parties lacked a big vote share compared with the Conservative and Liberal parties, it marked a breaking point in the previous two-party system committed to maintaining the *status quo* and the Bourbon monarchy.

The first Republican pact took place in 1893 as an electoral alliance between the Centralist, Federalist and Progressive parties in the spirit of accelerating the process of establishing a Republic in Spain (Pabón, 1999). The success of the Republican alliance was notorious compared to previous national elections. The electoral alliance obtained 47 parliamentary seats in 1893; however, its life was short. The inability of the Republican alliance to establish a Republic by legal or insurrectional means resulted in its collapse in 1894 (Suarez, 2006). Nonetheless, the attempts to found a solid Republican alliance did not finish with the end of the electoral alliance in 1893. Another alliance was formed in 1900 and, finally, in 1903 the *Union Republicana* (UR) was constituted as a formal political party.

Although the republican parties cooperated several times in electoral alliances or, even, formed party mergers, their internal divisions were constant. The republican Spain of that era had a large number of unitary, centralist and federalist parties. As happened in the last century, the issue of the territorial form of Spain was their main point of disagreement, causing the republican parties to be divided into various ideologies. Even since the end of the 19th century, the more federalist republican currents joined the rising nationalism of the Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia (Beramendi, 2000).

At the beginning of the 20th century, nationalism took a real political shape as can be seen from the founding in 1901 of the *Lliga Regionalista* and the *Partido Nacionalista Vasco* (PNV; Nationalist Basque Party) in 1895. Unlike the previous nationalist parties (republican and labour parties), both the *Lliga Regionalista* and the PNV were conservative parties with a marked nationalist character. The *Lliga Regionalista* was a liberal and royalist party which had an important voice in the Spanish Senate during the first decades of the century (Molas, 2003), albeit the expanding labour movement and the left-wing nationalism undermined its power as head of the Catalan nationalism over time.

The founding of the PNV was the other relevant fact of the century. As it is the case with the PSOE, the PNV is a political party which still exists nowadays as an important piece of Spanish

politics and as the biggest representative of the Basque nationalism. The primary roots of the PNV were based on Catholic morality and the nationalism of the Basque Country (de Pablo, 2000). Initially, the ideology of the PNV was very close to the Carlist ideas and it could be considered an evolution of it in the Basque Country. Its founder, Sabino Arana, was an old member of the Basque Carlist movement and, consequently, the traditionalist element of Carlism has been an important part of the ideological manifesto of the PNV during its evolution. Particularly, the social morality of Catholicism and the idea of a Basque race and blood were taken to build the ideological pillars of the PNV. Nevertheless, Basque Carlism (which had a large number of supporters in the Basque regions of Álava and Guipúzcoa) and the PNV started to quarrel a few years later due to disagreements about territorial issues. Whilst Basque Carlism believed in the return to the *Fueros* inside a national and royalist Spain, the PNV's idea about the Basque Country aimed to establish a territory independent from Spain (Blinkhorn, 2008). The projects of the PNV for the Basque Country left aside the defence of the Ancient Regime, an idea supported by Carlism, and supported the idea of a federal organization of the Basque Country and a democratic government (Hobsbawm, 2012).

At the same time as the founding of the PNV, the labour movement, represented by the PSOE and its trade union UGT, also gained support in the industrialised parts of the Basque Country. In the Basque Country, the development of the mining and metalworking industry since the Industrial Revolution resulted in labour migration flows on a large scale from the rest of Spain. Native workers from the Basque country had to live with workers from Castile and border regions. This caused a division in the political structure of workers. The Basque workers were employed in small factories and firms, whilst non-native workers were grouped in large factories (Kasmir, 1996).

Hence, political membership was divided as well. The unskilled workers from non-Basque origin were more likely to sympathise with the PSOE and the UGT or other trade unions. On the contrary, the PNV attracted Basque unskilled and skilled workers from small factories and companies. The PNV was also linked to a trade union called *Eusko Langileen Alkartasuna-Solidaridad de Obreros Vascos* (ELA-STV; Basque Workers' Solidarity) formed in 1911. Unlike the PSOE and the UGT, the ELA-STV rejected the class rhetoric considering it anti-Christian and anti-Basque, consequently the syndical struggle focused on uniting the workers base to employers by extolling the Basque nationalism (Heiberg, 1989). Even today, the ELA-STV survives as the largest trade union in the Basque Country, although currently it does not formally belong to any political party.

As the case of the Basque Country showed, during the beginning of the 20th century new political forces and heirs to previous times are present in the Spanish political arena. The political actors formed as a result of the consolidation of the labour movement were, likely, the new players in the old political context of Spain and their relevance was notorious in the wake of the subsequent events. In contrast to preceding ideologies, the labour movement and its ideological branches, such as the communist, socialist and anarchist currents, were not completely formed inside the social context of Spain. That is, the labour movement was influenced and organized partially by the international ideas of thinkers such as Karl Marx and Mijaíl Bakunin (Aguiar, 2006). However, that did not imply that class ideology later merged with the particular features of the Spanish society or that political alliances existed between new class groups and old political actors.

After the labour movement organized its political action in the PSOE and the UGT, new ideological trends appeared from anarcho-syndicalist and anarcho-socialist sectors of the movement. At the end of 1910, the *Confederación Nacional del Trabajo* (CNT; National Confederation of Labour) was founded in Barcelona with the aim of consolidating the divided anarcho-syndicalism of Spain in a unique organization. Together with the UGT, the CNT is the largest syndical organization of contemporary Spain. While it is true that the CNT grew rapidly due to the incorporation of the anarchist labour movement in it, the purest ideological anarchism did not fit into the syndical ideas of the trade union (Porter, 2012). These discrepancies encouraged the formation, in 1927, of another anarchist organization devoid of the marked syndical element of the CNT called *Federación Anarquista Ibérica* (FAI; Iberian Anarchist Federation). Even though the FAI and the CNT had different responsibilities due to their decentralised organization, they behaved as a single entity in most of the main decisions against their opposition groups until the end of the Spanish Civil War.

The ideological currents that appeared in the previous century took form in well-structured political parties and organizations and, gradually, were institutionalised in Spanish society. These organizations established partnerships and agreements eventually depending on the social and political circumstances. As has already been seen, in the first decades of the 20th century the old conservative, progressive and republican parties shared the political arena with political parties and organizations that emerged from the labour movement and the modern nationalism. Those relations of competition and cooperation within and among parties were shaping the factions that would ally during the Second Republic of Spain and during the course of the civil war.

A pertinent example of that is the electoral alliance between the PSOE and republican parties that took place in 1909. Even though this electoral alliance was the first long-term agreement between the PSOE and the republicans, there had already been some unproductive alliances between them at the end of the 19th century. According to Santiago Castillo (1990), the reasons behind the failing of the previous agreements were the disunity within the republicans with regard to objectives and political programme, the natural opposition of socialism to liberal parties, the struggle for the electorate, as well as personal discrepancies among their party leaders. Nevertheless, the alliance with the republican parties resulted in a substantial electoral victory of the PSOE-Republicans union, where they obtained a considerable number of councillors and increased the number of members in their trade union, the UGT.

However, the alliance with the republican parties resulted in a change of ideology regarding social class and territorial issues. The bourgeoisie-worker cleavage turned into a republic-monarchy division in which the class cleavage acquired a new sense within republican ideas and turned the PSOE into "another republican party" (Aguiar, 2006). This implied that the dogmatic statements of the international class struggle became a disagreement point between the traditional elite, represented by the monarchy and its supporters, and the social basis. Furthermore, the PSOE also had to cope with the territorial issue and had to define its position with regard to the situation of Catalonia and the Basque Country. Within the socialist ideals, the regional problem was more a bourgeois ambition than a central issue for the proletariat (Aguiar, 2006). Anyway, since the vast majority of the workers were present in the industrialised regions of Catalonia and the Basque Country, the PSOE adopted a common position with the republican ideas considering those regions as oppressed by the monarchy and proposing a "Republican Confederation of Iberian Nationalities" (Aguiar, 2006: 6).

The ideological change of the PSOE within the particular features of Spain and its distancing from the more theoretical ideals of Marxism also affected the internal unity of the party. As Juan Andrade (1979) stated, the beginning of the First World War marked the start of a debate about the position the party should adopt regarding the conflict. The PSOE was divided into followers of the international current and supporters of the allies, including the founder of the party, Pablo Iglesias, and his political allies. Whilst the main representatives of the PSOE supported the allied countries in the war, another sector of the party saw the war as an imperialist conflict far removed from the internationalism of the working class and its struggle. The Socialist Youth of

Madrid were the only ones associated to the Zimmerwald Conference², where some sectors of socialism agreed that the war was not part of the labour movement.

The Russian Revolution and, particularly, the founding of the Third International by the soviet government, also caused internal rifts within the party. The PSOE had been widely supporting the Second International since its formation in 1889 but the establishment of the Third International collided with the previous agreements. The Second International had typically had a large range of ideological trends, from the social democratic current to the purely Marxist, while the emerging Third International was constituted to implement the Marxist ideals as the Russian Revolution had begun to encourage. The social democratic leaders of the PSOE were opposed to accepting the lead of the USSR and the implementation of the claims of the Third International in Spain. However, the success of the Russian Revolution and the formation of the Third International increased the number of supporters of the labour movement (Andrade, 1979). The committee of the Socialist Youth was renewed by young workers and intellectuals encouraged to follow the doctrine of the Third International. This resulted in a lack of understanding between old leaders of the PSOE and its youth branch. In the National Congress of 1919 the difference of votes for the acceptance of the Third International versus the Second International was minimal, albeit the new International was finally accepted. Nonetheless, the disagreement among partisans of both Internationals were constant, resulting in the split of the Socialist Youth and the PSOE. The *Partido Comunista de España* (PCE; Communist Party of Spain) is founded in 1920 by leaders of the Socialist Youth and with the international support of the USSR.

In addition to the infighting of parties during the first years of the century, other political tensions had been growing between the Army and the political sphere. In 1923, the Army and Primo de Rivera, Captain General of Catalonia, acting as leader, seized power in a military coup. As some academics have pointed out (Ben-Ami, 1977; Casassas, 1983; Calleja, 2005), the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera was an attempt to the end the liberal system and to implement state policies to overcome the old and new political problems of the country. The military coup put an end to the weakened two-party system of the Restoration and encouraged the removal

² The Zimmerwald conferences were held in 1915 and 1916 by representatives of different European countries. In the second conference the topics discussed were: the struggle to end the war, the attitude of the proletariat on the peace issue, agitation and propaganda, parliamentary activity, mass struggle and the convocation of the International Socialist Bureau (see, Lenin, 1964: 7). The Zimmerwald conferences launched a renewed Marxist internationalism that took shape in the Third International (see also, Lenin, 1964: 7).

of the traditional Liberal and Conservative parties from political power. The aim of the dictatorship was to regenerate Spanish politics from top to bottom and vice versa. To achieve this, the dictatorship cooperated with the most relevant political actors of the social context.

Particularly interesting are the links between the PSOE and the UGT and the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera, together with the approval by the PSOE of some policies implemented by the government. The support of the PSOE and the UGT in some social issues was due to the plan of the dictatorship to remove *caciquismo*³ from the political structure of the country, as well as to promote a social peace between different social actors. Unlike what happened with the CNT, outlawed by the dictatorship, the UGT was allowed to keep on performing its syndical activity.

However, the real support of the dictatorship came from business associations, farmer groups, economic lobbies, the Church and parties such as the *Partido Social Popular* (PSP; Social People's Party), of catholic and right-wing tendency (Casassas, 1983: 30). These groups saw the dictatorship as guarantor of the economic stability, the *status quo* and their interests, which were threatened, especially, by new movements such as anarcho-syndicalism and communism. Furthermore, the other main pillar of the dictatorship on which the stability of the support of government rested was the monarchy and the support of King Alfonso XIII. As the aforementioned lobby groups, King Alfonso XIII also saw the dictatorship as the only chance to perpetuate the monarchy in the face of the crisis of the two-party system, which would cause the loss of support of the liberal system and the victory of the coup (Juliá, 1999).

However, the dictatorship also had to cope with formal enemies and political opposition groups not satisfied with its policies and performance. The territorial policies of the dictatorship, inspired by the personalistic ideals of Primo de Rivera about the "Fatherland", were marked by a stronger centralist contrary to peripheral claims that had been developed over the last decades (Ben-Ami, 1977: 67). The dictatorship stifled the regionalist and pro-independence groups of the Basque Country and Catalonia and their political activity was forbidden.

Moreover, the extreme left-wing parties and groups, such as the PCE or the anarchist trade union CNT, were repressed, thus interrupting their growth (Rey, 2006) and putting a stop to the

³ *Caciquismo* is understood as the political network of electoral clientelism developed in Spain during the Restoration. *Caciquismo* was stronger in local and rural areas compared to urban centres (Valera et al., 2001). Moreover, *caciquismo* was often linked to rural economic power represented by landowners, who established clientelism networks with the peasantry (Moreno-Luzón, 2007). (See also, Guerrero, 1998).

number of strikes during the course of the dictatorship (Elorza, 1974). This situation favoured the economic groups by establishing what the dictatorship called "social peace". However, as has already been mentioned, the social stability was also achieved through negotiations between syndical socialism sectors and the dictatorship. The pacts and cooperation between the UGT, as well as the leaders of the PSOE⁴, and the government provided a way to communicate workers' claims to the State. The other big enemy of the regime was *caciquismo* and its power on political life, society and the administration of the State. To the ideology of the dictatorship, *caciquismo* represented the first of the social ills which had to be eradicated (Rey, 2006: 34). To this effect, Primo de Rivera replaced the mayors and senior officials of the public and local administration of the State, thus putting an end to the old links between the old liberal system and local corruption.

Even though Primo de Rivera initially declared that the dictatorship was to last only for a short period until insuring political stability and the restoration of a strengthened democracy, the dictatorship lasted seven years without achieving a democratic restoration. Right from the beginning, the dictatorship had tried to implement a mass movement drawing inspiration from the Italian fascism of Mussolini. To that end, Primo de Rivera supported the formation of a party which would promote the acceptance of the dictatorship based on a "national mass movement" and on civil and social cooperation (Ben-Ami, 1977: 68). The resulting party was called *Unión Patriótica* (UP; Patriotic Union), of Catholic and royalist ideology. The UP was constituted as the only-party in the political arena. According to the original plans of Primo de Rivera, the UP should ensure a democratic restoration but, over time, the party turned into an anti-liberal and anti-constitutional party. The UP did not get the support of the masses and the social bases as was initially planned.

The "national mass movement" accomplished by Italian fascism was not possible in Spain. Primo de Rivera and King Alfonso XIII had focused on the Italian fascist movement as a model to be implemented in Spain (Casassas, 1983). The cooperation between Mussolini and the Italian king Victor Emmanuel III ensured the survival of the monarchy over the threat of Marxism and the new social movements of the era. Both Primo de Rivera and King Alfonso XIII relied on the success of the Italians to cope with the problems of their country. But Primo de Rivera did not completely adopt the structure and ideals of Italian fascism. As Leandro Alvarez Rey points out

⁴ E.g., the cooperation of Largo Caballero, General Secretary of the UGT, in the Council of State for the representation of chiefs and workers (See, Andrés-Gallego, 1977).

by mentioning previous scholars' findings (2006: 30), the Spanish dictatorship was rather an authoritarian regime with some fascist features than a pure fascist system.

The lack of social support made a dent in the sustainability of the dictatorship. The support of the dictatorship by the military and the monarchy had been decreasing over the years. The supporters of the dictatorship were only small political and social sectors with strong right-wing ideals (Rey, 2006: 44). Additionally, the dictatorship had also lost the ability to cooperate with other political actors, as was the case with the socialist opposition in previous years. All of this resulted in the resignation of Primo de Rivera and the fall of the dictatorship in 1930, giving way to a short-lived government formed to restore democracy, which ended one year later as a result of the founding of the Second Republic of Spain.

1.3 Second Republic of Spain and Civil War

With the beginning of the Second Republic, the foregoing political and social conflicts were defining the future frame of the Spanish political system. As José Ramón Montero Gibert stated (1983: 103), in the Second Republic of Spain coexisted four main conflicts: the political system issue, with a polarisation of republicans against royalists; the territorial issue about a centralised or decentralised Spain; the class struggle between workers and the bourgeoisie and the religious issues among religion supporters and secularists. Even though these conflicts are not strictly interrelated, some axes of struggles, such as the religious issues (Gibert, 1983: 104), interacted and overlapped largely with other cleavages.

After the fall of the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera and the weakening of its following regime, King Alfonso XIII tried to restore the previous democratic system through an interim government formed by royalist sectors and personalities from the old Liberal and Conservative parties. This transitional government held local elections in 1931, which resulted in a landslide victory of the electoral alliances between republicans and socialists in urban centres. By contrast, the royalist parties obtained the majority of municipal governments in rural areas.

The first elections of the Second Republic, held in 1931, months after the local elections, also resulted in a victory of the republican ideals led by the coalition between the socialist, represented by the PSOE and the *Partido Republicano Radical* (PRR; Radical Republican Party), contrary to other parties such as the *Partido Republicano Radical Socialista* (PRRS; Radical Socialist Republican Party), the newly founded *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya* (ERC; Republican Left of Catalonia), the *Acción Republicana* (AR; Republican Action) and the *Derecha*

Liberal Republicana (DLR; Liberal Republican Right). All these political parties, with the exception of the PSOE, were new republican organizations established in the last years of the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera. It is worth noting the weakness of purely right-wing parties in the first elections of the Republic; it will not be until the second elections when a proper right-wing current starts to appear.

However, the majority of the political parties of the Second Republic had a marked reformist character, either on the republic-monarchy cleavage or on other conservative positions such as the religious issues. For example, the PRR was a political party of Catholic-left tendency, but the reformist elements, such as its republican character, affected its union with more secular republican parties such as the PSOE and the AR of Manuel Azaña. This caused government instability in the first term of the Republic, known as "reformist biennium". Manuel Azaña was elected prime minister thanks to the support of the socialists and the PRR; nevertheless, the PRR's support to the government of Azaña and the socialists was decreasing. At the end of 1931, its leader, Alejandro Lerroux, left the government of the union of republicans and socialists. The PRR adopted a central position and became closer to right-wing parties in the course of the Republic.

Another relevant actor was the ERC, founded in 1931, which obtained approximately 32 seats for Catalonia in the general elections of 1931. As Linz stated (1967: 258), Catalonia was mainly anarchist and supporter of the CNT, what explains why several anarchist votes (despite its anti-liberal ideology) ended up in the ERC candidacies. The emergence of the ERC was a setback for the *Lliga Regionalista* because the Catalan territorial issue was divided into two parties that contended for the power. The most conservative parties at the beginning of the Second Republic were only the DRL, later renamed as *Partido Republicano Progresista* (PRP; Republican Progressive Party), and the PRR which, despite of its reformist character in the progressive spirit of the Second Republic, kept conservative positions, especially on religious issues, as was shown by the split of both DRL/PRP and PRR and the socialists and the more progressive republicans, AR, in the first years of the Republic. The work of Fernández (1999) analyses the real bases and support of the DRL/PRP, establishing that most supporters came from the middle and skilled social classes (Fernández, 1999: 165). Even if it is true that the DRL/PRP also had support from the lower classes, according to Fernández, these sectors were influenced by the still existing *caciquismo*, which encouraged the peasantry to give their vote to a political party related to the interest of the "caciques" (Fernández, 1999: 166).

These patterns of vote are correlated with the political and economic structure of *caciquismo*. Rural Spain was formed by small and medium landowners, who formed the economic fabric of farming areas. This economic power also influenced the political power. Commonly, the landlords held the political power of the area by influencing the peasantry that worked for them. This way of political control led the political ideology of rural areas towards a conservative and right-wing way of thinking (Romero, 2000; de Pablo, 1990; Gómez, 1993) that considered the new movements, such as socialism, to be opposed to their economic interest and social ideas. As has been already seen, *caciquismo* was also linked to the old two-party system of the royalist Restoration, represented by the Liberal and Conservative parties. With the establishment of the Second Republic, both the previous party system and *caciquismo* finally came to an end due to the actions of the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera against them and to the rise of new political forces such as socialism and republicanism (Juliá, 1996). However, the conservative and right-wing groups heirs to *caciquismo* and the prior political structure were focusing on new forces and parties during the Second Republic. The landlords joined forces with agrarianism⁵ to create associations and political parties such as the *Partido Agrario Español* (Agrarian Spanish Party) and the *Confederación Nacional Católico-Agraria* (CNCA; National Catholic-Agrarian Confederation). One of the most relevant formations which emerged due to this reshaping was the *Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas* (CEDA; Spanish Confederation of Autonomous Right-wing Groups) which was joined by most agrarian-conservative groups over the course of the Second Republic.

Despite the inclusion of sectors from previous parties and ideological groups, the CEDA was a new element in the Spanish political arena. The ideological roots of the CEDA have been compared frequently to the Christian Democratic Party, to a clerical-fascist party or to a mix between them (see Linz, 1967: 245). Its ideology has been discussed largely by several authors (e.g. Linz, 1967; Gibert, 1983; Rey, 1993; Jackson, 2012) determining as common idea that its main ideological axes rested on Catholic ideals rather than a pure Catholic fascism, as later emerges due to the birth of the *Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional-Sindicalista* (JONS; Unions of the

⁵ Although some sectors of agrarianism and the conservative right-wing joined forces, agrarianism took different forms along the Spanish ideological spectrum. As Jiménez-Sánchez (1987: 215) states, during the 20s and 30s of the 20th century Spanish agrarianism was characterised, generally, by (1) the consideration of agriculture as a "key element of production", (2) "the happiness of the homeland", (3) the disregard of the policies carried out previously (3) and (4) the opposition to the "*cacique*". Moreover, agrarianism ranged from technical ideals, socialism and collectivism (understood in this case as anarchism) to social-Catholic and fascist ideologies (Cuadrado, 2006: 21). Nonetheless, according to Cuadrado (2006: 24), agrarianism was mainly conservative due to the mobilisation of the peasantry to defend their interests influenced by the Church and the landowners.

National-Syndicalist Offensive) and the *Falange Española* (FE; Spanish Falange), which formed the National Catholic Movement of Franco's dictatorship. If it is true that the CEDA was formed around Catholic ideals, the other key points of view that existed in the Spanish society caused disagreements in some occasions. Firstly, the monarchy or republic issue arose when the CEDA won the second elections of the Republic in 1933 together with the PRR, the *Partido Agrario Español* (PAE; Spanish Agrarian Party) and the *Renovación Española* (RE; Spanish Restoration), with a marked royalist character.

This victory gave way to a right-wing government of republican, confessional and royalist political parties. To understand this alliance and why sometimes they represented opposite interests, as was later the case due to the establishment of the alliance called *Frente Popular* among left-wing parties, it is important to take into account the social context and events of the first government of the Second Republic.

Firstly, turning to the agrarian problem, the rural world became a main issue for policies pursued by the Republic. As Jiménez-Sánchez (1987) points out, the agrarian vote was not only for the right-wing ideologies; in the southwest of Spain the vote was socialist, the small landowners of Castile and Navarra voted for right-wing parties, and the centrist parties obtained the rural vote in regions with medium landowners (Jiménez-Sánchez, 1987: 225). Consequently, the agrarian issue and the Agrarian Reform Law became a political matter due to the heterogeneity of the Spanish peasants and landowners (Jiménez-Sánchez, 1987: 225). This caused a standstill of the negotiations to define a common agrarian law until its final implementation in 1933. It is at the end of the first government of socialists and republicans when the rural world was divided into two because of the failure of the agrarian policies. In the words of Jiménez-Sánchez (1987: 226), the combination of factors created two trends in the countryside: (1) the radicalisation of the peasantry in the southwest, the increase of strikes, the anarcho-syndicalist uprisings in 1933, the invasions of lands and the violent social conflicts, the rebelliousness of local syndicalism, (2) the increase of conservatism in Castile, Navarra and another regions of small and medium landowners. One fifth of the Spanish peasantry in the 2500 rural municipalities of Castile and Aragon gave their vote in the local elections to the CEDA candidacies.

Secondly, another crucial point was the religion and the relationship within the State and society. The Republican Constitution of 1931 established the secularism of the State and the separation between Church and State. It was the first time in the Spanish constitutionalism that the State was declared secular. The republican reforms affected the previous social and political

status of the Catholic Church and jeopardised the power of the Church in Spain. As Lago (2013: 28) states, the Republic ended the national-Catholic model financed during previous years, tried to limit the power of the regular clergy that had become the spearhead of Catholicism in the last decades and, as it had happened with new republics, it could have triggered acts of violence against church representatives.

The government of socialists and republicans, led by Manuel Azaña, implemented several policies that were contrary to previous church rights. The secularisation of cemeteries, the decrease of government funding for the clergy, the reform of the educational policies and, most importantly, the suppression of religious orders such as the Jesuits, which had become the scapegoats for anticlerical measures in Catholic countries (Jackson, 2012: 59), are some examples which caused political tensions to increase. All these factors encouraged the formation of a political option able to cope with the policies contrary to the interest of Catholicism, which took form in the CEDA (Lagos, 2013).

The military reform carried out by the government also caused tensions between the supporters of the Republic and the supporters of the previous regime. The strategic policy of the first government of republicans and socialists regarding the army forces was to force its members to take an oath of allegiance to the Second Republic or to be retired with an allowance and, in some cases, to be removed from power positions in the military. These policies, along with the increase of the religious reforms, were regarded as anti-patriot policies and were considered to be against the concept of Spain by large sections of the population and by many political factions (Jackson, 2012: 480). The attempt of the government of the Republic to hand over military power to the civil and political world only caused a rift with some influential sectors of the army (Jackson, 2012).

Nationalism was the cause of the political discrepancies among the different political tendencies regarding the territorial model of the State. The development of regionalism during the previous century and the strengthening of political nationalism encouraged the political forces of that era to take action on it. According to Beramendi (2003: 12-16), the political ideologies had the following stance on the territorial issue: (1) right-wing and extreme right-wing parties opposed any process of decentralisation, which they saw as a fragmentation of the country, only the traditionalists defended their peculiar territorial model; (2) republicanism, for its part, was divided in two ideas: unitarism, overall, centralism of the PRR and (3) republican-conservative groups and regional republicans believed on a new autonomic model.

However, as Beramendi states (2003: 13), the idea of territorial model supported by the republicans was very limited, as the final outcome of the Republican Constitution (an integral State) illustrated. The PSOE's position was similar to that of the regional republicans, although its ideology had changed since previous years because, during the Republic, the PSOE did not have a clear position in favour of federalism. The PCE, in accordance with its ideological stance, rejected the Republic because of its bourgeois qualities and supported the revolution but, although its ideological programme was influenced by the Leninist principle of self-determination of nations, its political power in the development of the new political system was negligible. In contrast, the anarchists had influence but their beliefs against the political power caused them not to engage in the constituent process of the Second Republic (Beramendi, 2003: 14). The rejection of the bourgeois nationalism and the defence of an anarchist federalism from a top down perspective caused the main anarchist organization of Spain, the CNT, to decline to defend the proclamation of the Republic of Catalonia in 1931⁶ since the CNT considered itself "a universal and Spanish political party" (Beramendi, 2003: 15).

The main nationalist currents of the Second Republic remarkable by their political importance were in Galicia, Catalonia, the Basque Country and, to a lesser extent, in Navarra, where they were strongly related to the Basque nationalism and their historical ties.

Galician nationalism, unlike Basque and Catalan nationalism, lacked outreach in the Galician society, what caused, as well, a lack of influence and it was only due to the consolidation of the *Partido Galleguista* (PG; Galician Party) that it achieved a relevant prominence (Antuña-Souto, 2000: 419). Although Galician nationalism was young compared to its Catalan and Basque counterparts, the establishment of the Second Republic and the new Constitution that allowed the statutes of autonomy helped it grow rapidly (Antuña-Souto, 2000: 428). Galician nationalism was single-heartedly integrated in a federalist position at the start of the Second Republic (Beramendi, 2003: 15) but in successive years, partly owing to its multi-ideological composition, the PG split into a right-wing sector that will constitute the *Dereita Galleguista* (DR; Galician Right) and a left-wing sector that will join the republican and left-wing parties (united under the *Frente Popular*) since they were the main supporters of the federal model (Antuña-Souto, 2000).

⁶ The Republic of Catalonia was an informal stance of the first president of the Catalan government, Francesc Macià, after the regional elections of 1931 in which his party, the ERC, obtained the greatest number of votes. After negotiations with representatives of the interim government of the Second Republic, it was agreed that the name for the government of Catalonia formed after the new statute of autonomy would be *Generalitat* instead of republic (see Soldevilla, 1977).

The Catalan case was, by far, the first sign of the emergence of a formal nationalism in Spain. In the early years of the 20th century, Catalan regionalism developed into nationalism and the change of national sense of the Catalan bourgeoisie laid the ideological basis and provided the necessary resources for the birth and the social growth of the Catalan nation in the strict sense of the term (Beramendi, 2003: 7). However, the historical evolution of Catalan nationalism did not follow a common path during its development. The *Lliga Regionalista* formed from the first regionalist parties had a marked conservative character, as well as a social sector highly differentiated since several of its senators belonged to the industry and the bourgeoisie (Mola, 2003). As has already been stated, the rapid growth of the Catalan industry caused the rise of the labour movement and divided the society of Catalonia in different ideological trends which converged in different political parties. This caused the Catalan nationalism to also be divided with regard to different issues unrelated to the territorial problem. The clearest example is the weakness of the *Lliga Regionalista* at the beginning of the Second Republic in favour of the nationalists and leftists represented by the ERC. According to Beramendi (2003: 8), the loss of hegemony by the *Lliga Regionalista* at the dawn of the Second Republic was due to (1) the indispensable collaboration of the *Lliga Regionalista* and the central government for coping with the labour movement, (2) the radicalisation of the Catalan nationalism caused by the repression during the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera and (3) the mistake of supporting the continuity of the monarchy in 1930, resulting in the Catalan nationalism shifting towards the left.

Even though the *Lliga Regionalista* and the conservative nationalism had lost power, the nationalist left was divided into separatists, confederalists, federalists and the supporters of the autonomy model (Beramendi, 2003: 16). In the regional elections held in 1931, the ERC won in Catalonia to the detriment of the political parties of national scope and the royalists. After the announcement of the Republic of Catalonia by the newly formed Catalan government and the agreement with the central government about the future of the territorial model and the responsibilities of the Catalan government (see note 6), the interim government of the Second Republic reached stability to consolidate the new regime thanks to the support of most of the political forces, including the major part of the ERC, which preferred the consolidation of the Republic to the radical defence of the Catalan nationalism (Beramendi, 2003: 18).

In the Basque country, during the first few days of the Republic, the process of creating a statute of autonomy began at the initiative of the PNV and with the support of the right-wing party *Comuni3n Tradicionalista*. This alliance between the PNV and the *Comuni3n Tradicionalista* was born in the local elections. In words of Beramendi (2003: 26), this alliance happened as a result of the traditional and anti-democratic ideals of the PNV, as opposed to the other main coalition

of republicans, socialists and *Eusko Abertzale Ekintza-Acción Nacionalista Vasca* (EAE-ANV; Basque Nationalist Action)⁷, which polarized the Basque society. The original idea was to create a common statute for the three regions of the Basque Country: Álava, Vizcaya and Guipúzcoa, as well as Navarra. Initially, this project known as *Estatuto de Estella* had the support of the vast majority of Basque councils and from Navarra, formed mainly by right-wing parties and the *Comunión Tradicionalista* (De Pablo, 1988: 42). This statute, that unified the Basque regions and Navarra, fulfilled the nationalism aspirations of integrating the future region into the Republic as an independent identity with its own competencies.

However, the final approval of this statute by the Republican Courts was hampered by some of its items, especially the religious issue. The amended Statute of Autonomy of 1931 for the Basque Country and Navarra, besides self-functions of governing, included strong competencies in religious matters and future arrangements with the Vatican. After the endorsement of the Republican Constitution of secular nature, the Parliament rejected the Basque and Navarra Statute and forced it to comply with the constitutional framework. The PNV and their Carlist allies rejected the new Republican Constitution because it established an integral state and a secular state (Beramendi, 2003: 30). According to De Pablo (2000), the PNV was not completely integrated in the Spanish Party System during the Second Republic, which was also the case with this party during the Restoration. The PNV was not willing to support a project for Spain that was irrelevant to its nationalistic hopes and not even positive in other matters, such as the religious issue (De Pablo, 2000: 87).

Religion was the main cause for the disengagement of the PNV and the Spanish right-wing parties from the Spanish Parliament and the rejection of the Republican Constitution. The PNV had an ambivalent position concerning its political alliances. After the defeat of the Basque and Navarra Statute in 1931, the PNV tried to target its political discourse and actions to achieve the Basque independence or autonomy. This political position was gradually distancing itself from right-wing political parties and approaching a central position (De Pablo, 2000: 88). Concerning the asturian miners' strike of 1934, the PNV supported the republican government of centre-right whilst, during the last republican government and in the last years before the Spanish Civil

⁷ The EAE-ANV was formed by the progressive ideological currents of the PNV against the conservative and religious spirit of the political party (see Granja-Saiz, 2002).

War, it supported the left-wing government and the *Frente Popular* in order to bring the Basque Statute to fruition⁸ (De Pablo, 2000: 89).

Likewise, the PNV also changed its policy of alliances with Catalan political parties. Due to the aforementioned political shift from right to left-wing, the PNV went from being close to the *Lliga Regionalista* to approach the ERC, although it never felt completely identified with neither of them, only with the *Unió Democràtica de Catalunya* (De Pablo, 2000: 89). On the contrary, the EAE-ANV was involved in the administration of the Republic. Unlike the PNV, the EAE-ANV was always a loyal ally of the Republican parties. The EAE-ANV joined the republican-socialist coalitions in 1931 and was part of the *Frente Popular* in 1936. The PNV and the EAE-ANV had different ideas regarding the Basque independence process. According to De la Granja-Saiz (2008: 605), the aim of the EAE-ANV was to achieve a Basque independence in the long run rather than in the immediate future. As De Pablo (2000: 89) states, this was also the goal of the PNV, but with the difference that the ideals of the PNV did not match the Republican ideologies.

The autonomic trends did not only exist in regions such as Catalonia, Galicia, the Basque Country and Navarra. At the beginning of the Second Republic, several efforts toward the independence or autonomy emerged in places such as Valencia, Aragon, Andalusia and the Balearic Islands.

In Valencia, during the first days of the Republic, the main regional ideologies and parties formed alliances with republicans or royalists. The right-wing and conservative political party was the *Unió Valencianista* (UV; Valencian Union). By contrast, the *Agrupació Valencianista Republicana* had emerged in the preceding months as a regional party ideologically close to the ERC (Beramendi, 2003: 23). As happened in Catalonia, the UV formed an alliance with the royal parties whilst the *Agrupació Valencianista Republicana* formed an alliance with the republicans in the local elections of 1931. Nonetheless, they were not the only representatives of Valencian regionalism. The *Partido de Unión Republicana Autonomista* (PURA; Party of Autonomist Republican Union) was the main representative of the autonomism of Valencia. Even though the PURA was the spearhead of the regional wishes of Valencia, political corruption scandals and the progressive change to right-wing weakened the political party during the Second Republic (Beramendi, 2003). In 1934, the PURA split forming the *Esquerra Valencianista*, of left-wing

⁸ It was not until the beginning of the Spanish Civil War in 1936 when the Basque Statute of Autonomy was adopted. Previously, different reasons, such as the disagreements between the nationalist parties and the national right-wing parties, had caused the stalling of the process.

ideals. Later, other splits from the PURA led to the founding of the *Acción Nacionalista Valenciana*, of religious nature, as was the case of the PNV in the Basque Country (Beramendi, 2003: 64). All these factors resulted in the establishment of two political trends in Valencia: the left-wing, formed by the *Esquerra Valenciana*, the *Agrupació Valencianista Republicana* (socialists as well as republicans), and the PURA formed by the *Acción Nacionalista Valenciana* and the CEDA (Beramendi, 2003: 48-65). Finally, the political scandals led to the disappearance of the PURA from the political arena at the end of the Second Republic before the regionalist forces reached a consensus to draft a statute of autonomy and to implement it.

Similarly to the Valencian case, the efforts to successfully implement the autonomic process were stalled in Andalusia, the Balearic Islands and Aragon. In Andalusia and Aragon, the misgivings about the future of the autonomy as well as the indifference of some local councils and political forces led the process to failure. In the Balearic Islands, the division of the regionalist political parties in right and left-wing, along with the limited social support of the autonomy, caused the regional political forces to merge with the main national right-wing and leftist parties (Beramendi, 2003: 50).

Moreover, the emergence of the peripheral autonomies was a directly strengthened Spanish nationalism and the opposition of some regions, such as Castile or Madrid. Especially, the strong territorial aspirations of Catalonia resulted in the emergence of an important anti-catalanism in Castile (Beramendi, 2003: 31). The CEDA and the royalists, who had a considerable presence in Castile, adopted a middle political position regarding the autonomies issue, what helped them attract votes from the conservative sectors of Castile and from regional right-wing parties in Valencia and Aragon (Beramendi, 2003: 51). The political position in relation to the central territorial issue of the CEDA would be reinforced due to the victory of the right-wing and conservative parties in the general elections of 1933.

Even so, some right-wing parties such as the *Lliga* or the *Comunió Tradicionalista* entered the parliament in a stronger position. In addition, the PNV became the main political force of the Basque Country compared to the leftist parties. The governing coalition between the CEDA and the PRR was the main rival against the peripheral nationalism, both of left and right-wing. During the second government of the Spanish Republic, as has already been mentioned, there existed political tensions amongst the central government, caused by the proclamation of the Republic of Catalonia and the rejection of the Basque statute of autonomy. As Beramendi (2003: 55-58) stated, the territorial issue made a dent in the union amongst the conservative parties, what

bridged the gap between the left and the PNV or the PG and the *Frente Popular* at the beginning of the Civil War. Similarly, it also caused the loss of social support for the political parties that cooperated with the central government, as was the case of the *Lliga* on the proclamation of the Republic of Catalonia.

1.4 The Radicalisation in the Second Republic

At the dawn of the Second Republic, the royalist, conservative and right-wing political parties (except those from Catalonia, the Basque Country or Navarra) had not consolidated an organisation for coping with the rise of the left-wing political parties. As has already been stated, over time, the CEDA brought together the old Catholic and conservative sectors from the royalists or the agrarians, among others. Nonetheless, the CEDA was not the only party defending those ideals. Other parties and political organisations emerged to defend specifically those interests, as the royalist *Renovación Española*, or to adopt extreme positions, as the *Falange Española*.

Spanish fascism, as happened with communism, was a minor force compared to the political parties which existed in the political arena of that time (Linz, 1967: 251-254). Likewise, Spanish fascism presented particular features that distinguished it from the fascism of Central Europe. These differences with Central European fascism were mainly based on the patriotic traditionalism, particularly strong in the middle class of Castile and among the northern peasantry (Payne, 1985: 29). By way of example, from the point of view of Payne (1985: 29), Carlism was the best example of this patriotic traditionalism in which their ideals were based on defending the ancient power of the Catholic Church and a non-constitutional monarchy at odds with modern patriotism, which pursued the achievement of new glories for the country.

The roots of Spanish national syndicalism developed at the same time in Madrid and Castile. Before the fall of the monarchy in 1931, Ramiro Ledesma Ramos founded a paper called *La Conquista del Estado* in Madrid inspired by Italian and German fascism. For its part, Onésimo Redondo Ortega created the *Juntas Castellanas de Actuación Hispánica* (JCAH; Castilian Unions of Hispanic Action) also inspired by German National Socialism but keeping the Catholic thought as key point of its political ideology (Payne, 1985: 30). These two new groups of national syndicalism lacked relevant social support during their first months of life. Although the national syndicalism of Ledesma and the JCAH of Redondo greatly differed on the Catholic issue, both were nationalist and anti-Marxist revolutionaries (Payne, 1985: 31). The economic hardship of

the group of Madrid and the isolation of the national syndicalists of Castile contributed to the merge of both groups in 1931 by founding the JONS (Payne, 1985: 31).

However, in the mid-Republican era, a new national-syndicalist force with features of Italian fascism arose in Spain. This new force was the *Falange Española*, which had as its leader the son of the dictator Primo de Rivera, José Antonio Primo de Rivera. Although the FE was a fascist party and José Antonio Primo de Rivera himself used the typical fascist discourse to define his political ideas (see Payne, 1985: 59-61), he brought back the defence of the monarchy to the FE ideology as a way of honouring his father against the Republican forces (Linz, 1967: 254). The FE grew rapidly as a result of the leadership of José Antonio Primo de Rivera, who attracted supporters from conservative, royalist and right-wing sectors (Payne, 1985: 54). In 1934, the FE and the JONS started talks for a merge, which crystallised forming the *Falange Española de las JONS* (FE de las JONS).

As has been mentioned, the right-wing political spectrum in the new Spanish Republic was composed by the emerging National-Syndicalist forces, the royalist *Renovación Española* and the CEDA.

Although the abovementioned political forces cooperated in the last days of the Republic and during the Spanish Civil War, they had disagreements about several ideological issues. The FE de las JONS, under the leadership of José Antonio Primo de Rivera, was defining its political positions on the most relevant issues during the course of the Republic. It should be noted that its economic position was based on an economic reform that the party itself called revolutionary. This economic reform intended to include both the agrarian reform and the nationalisation of bank credit, among others (Payne, 1985: 98). This revolutionary character, by contrast, were not in line with the conservative and bourgeois mind of the CEDA. The social and economic revolution resulted in some contacts between the FE de las JONS and the most moderate sectors of the CNT in order to state a vague declaration of principles on these issues (Payne, 1985: 103-104).

The discrepancies among the CEDA and the FE de las JONS were evident during the second government of the Republic by the conservative coalition between the CEDA and the PRR. According to Payne (1985: 104), the conservative government was as harsh with the left-wing extremism as with the FE de las JONS. The conservative government usually shut down its propaganda media and its local branches due to the violent events caused by the party. Even

though the FE de las JONS shared some points of view with the government on conservative positions, such as patriotic nationalism or cultural traditionalism, on the economic and social fields it was as radical, as well as anti-bourgeois and anti-liberal, as the socialists and anarchists (Payne, 1985: 59-67). In 1933, José Antonio Primo de Rivera was elected representative in the Spanish Congress. During his tenure, he criticised the conservative government of the CEDA and the PRR because of the political corruption scandals and its failure to carry out a proper agrarian reform. In addition to the criticism against the main conservative parties, the lack of support to the monarchy and its idea about the separation of Church and State⁹ caused the loss of support from conservative sectors (Linz, 1967: 255). The FE de las JONS was persecuted by almost all the main political forces of the Republic, irrespective of their political ideology. By the end of the Republic, the FE de las JONS was forced to make contact with the Carlists and the Army but these contacts did not yield the expected outcome (Linz, 1967: 255). With the advent of the Civil War, the FE de las JONS and the political branch of Carlism, the *Comunión Tradicionalista*, would be integrated into the National Movement¹⁰ of Franco. This new force would be the only party in the one-party state during the dictatorship, called *Falange Española Tradicionalista y de las Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional Sindicalista* (FET de las JONS).

According to Linz (1967: 251-257), the fascists of the FE de las JONS as well as the communists of the PCE were two minority forces in Spain that lacked a mass appeal compared to other political parties as the CEDA, the PSOE or the CNT. Firstly, the strong tradition of anarcho-syndicalism widely attracted the working class bases at the expense of fascists and communists. Secondly, the CEDA and the PSOE attracted, respectively, more antirevolutionary and religious sectors or reform supporters on most moderate positions than the FE de las JONS and the PCE. The modest bases of the PCE came mainly from underprivileged farmers of underprivileged regions (Linz, 1967: 256). Furthermore, the trade union branch of the PSOE organised under its leadership the majority of the remaining underprivileged farmers and kept in the party the middle-class intellectuals, who might otherwise have joined the PCE, as a result of its reformist political program (Linz, 1967: 257). It should be highlighted, as well, that another important fact

⁹ The FE de las JONS defined in its political statement the strong link between Spain and the Catholic dogma but it stated that the State and the Church must be separate to avoid interference of the Church in State matters (see Diaz-Plaja: 1972).

¹⁰ The National Movement was the set of ideals, institutions and social organisations established by Francoism to rule and lead the society. The National Movement organised the Spanish society and the structure of the State according to the political ideology of the dictatorship (see Sueiro & Díaz-Nosty, 1978).

that could have influenced the patterns of vote in the Second Republic was women's right to vote. The female vote was finally approved during the first left-wing government of the Republic. Nonetheless, it had not gained the full support of the left-wing parties. According to some academics (Durán y Laguna, 2007; Morant et al., 2006), the main reason behind this behaviour was the fear of the left-wing parties of the influence of the Church on women, which could benefit conservative parties.

During the first left-wing governments of the Republic, the positions between right and left were becoming gradually polarised. In the second general elections of the Republic of 1933, the right-wing parties led by the CEDA obtained an important victory. A new government formed by the CEDA and the PRR was established, thus putting a stop to the previous reformist period and starting a conservative period. At the same time, most of the main left-wing parties, such as the PSOE, were excluded from any chance of governing. It is during this time when the PSOE gives up a moderate position and tends to radicalise its political ideals. It has been discussed (Vera, 1982: 179-185) that the radicalisation of the PSOE was initially owing to the rise of fascism in countries such as Germany and Austria during those years and that the emergence of Spanish fascism encouraged the PSOE to take action in order not to lose the worker bases. Similarly, another reason is related to the fact that the CNT was the first contender of the PSOE for leading Spanish unionism and that it was gaining ground to the socialist UGT. However, according to Vera (1982: 195), the PSOE complied with the existing legal framework when it organised worker strikes before it was excluded from the government. Therefore, it was the reliance on the reforms of the first government of the Republic that eased the revolutionary policies of the PSOE. Moreover, according to Vera (1982), it was the loss of the government and the rupture with reform policies what caused the radicalisation of the PSOE, increasing the tensions between right and left.

The tensions between right-wing and left-wing political forces peaked in 1934, when a revolution encouraged by the left-wing parties broke out against the right-wing government. As has already been mentioned and as Avilés (2008: 131) discusses in his work, several reasons have been given to explain the socialist uprising. It has been stated that it was a strategy to defend itself against fascism and the rise of the conservative CEDA. Moreover, it has also been suggested that the real aim was to seize power for different reasons, including the unrest of the workers, the socialist radicalisation going back to its origins or the salvation of the Republic (Avilés, 2008: 131-135).

All over Spain there were riots and strikes. Although most of them were stifled by the government, in Asturias and Catalonia there were important confrontations. According to Kustrín (2013), in 1934 there existed two distinct revolutionary processes: the socialist riots and the revolution of Catalonia. The socialist revolution took different shapes depending on the power or political position of the socialist organisations, which were highly decentralised. As Kustrín (2013: 22) and Avilés (2008: 137) point out, the political position of the PSOE ranged from the most radical left-wing, led by the head of the PSOE and the socialist youth, to the centrist sectors of the PSOE on the other side. Whilst the leader of the PSOE, Largo Caballero, and the socialist youth upheld the social revolution, the moderate socialists adopted the strike as its strategy. The UGT, the CNT and the PCE formed an alliance to mobilise the workers and the peasantry.

In the south of Spain, the uprising did not have a significant effect, in words of Kustrín (2013: 24), owing to the predominance of the peasantry, which had been repressed as a result of a rural strike carried out a few months before. Furthermore, in Navarra and Castile, the revolution did not become a threat for the government either. Navarra had a strong Carlist tradition that stopped the mobilisation of worker and peasant bases. Likewise, in Castile, the CEDA had the greatest support among the population. Only in the north of Castile, where the mining industry was stronger, were there remarkable riots against the government (Kustrín, 2013: 24). In the Basque Country, the uprising took mainly the form of peaceful strikes, although there were some riots located in areas with steel and mining industry. In Madrid, the revolutionary efforts were also unfruitful, even though it was a long strike which affected the normal functioning of the capital (Kustrín, 2013: 26).

On the other hand, in Asturias, unlike in the rest of Spain, the initial riots became a genuine revolution. The uprising lasted two weeks and it was supported by wide sectors of the miners, united in an alliance between the UGT and the CNT, among others. The revolution of Asturias snatched the control of Asturias from the Republican government. Finally, the control of Asturias was recovered through the military intervention of troops from Morocco.

In Catalonia, the revolutionary process took a particular form due to the combination of the nationalist movement with the workers' revolt (Kustrín, 2013: 23). As happened in 1931, the Catalan government led by the ERC announced the establishment of a Catalan Republic within a Federal Republic. According to Kustrín (2013: 24), the Catalan uprising of 1934 was not an attempt to achieve independence; unlike the proclamation of 1931, this new insurrection looked

for a total rupture with the conservative government and the establishment of a provisional government of the Republic in Catalonia. Nonetheless, the riots were relevant, as happened in Asturias, and they were readily repressed by government troops one day later.

According to Linz (1967: 263), the relevance of the class conflict in the cities, as well as in the countryside and within Catalonia and the Basque Country, pushed Spain to a class-based party system in which, unlike other countries, the regional conflicts added further strength to the class and ideological cleavages. Similarly, the cleavage between clerical and anticlerical forced the bourgeois left to ally with the proletarian left and forced the fascists to ally with the clerical and conservative right against the revolutionary left (Linz, 1967: 264).

The general elections of 1936 divided the party system in two main forces: the PSOE and the CEDA. The most moderate Republican forces also got relevant representation, as well as the ERC and the PCE, which obtained more seats compared to previous elections. The union among the PSOE, the Republican forces, the ERC and the PCE in the *Frente Popular* resulted in a left-wing government, whilst the opposition was formed by the CEDA, the royalists, the agrarians, the *Lliga Catalana* and minor forces such as the Carlists and the fascists. The assassination of the monarchist leader, Calvo Sotelo, by the end of 1936 increased the tensions between these alliances.

After the unsuccessful coup attempt in July of 1936 and the beginning of the Civil War, these political alliances were organised on both sides of the war. The army, led by Franco, kept the right-wing coalition united despite its differences while, on the other side, in the Republican block there were also great ideological differences among anarcho-syndicalists, who rejected the bourgeois democracy, socialists and communists (Linz, 1967: 264). On both sides there was disunity, the greater part of the Republican alliance was formed by the *Frente Popular* and the anarcho-syndicalists. The PNV also reluctantly supported the Republican alliance in order to control its territory, although there was dissent among its governing body due to its conservative ideals (De Pablo, 2003). In words of Nuñez-Seixas (2007: 561), in 1936, the peripheral nationalism had to choose between motherland, class position and religion. In Catalonia and Galicia, the social landscape was similar. The right-wing nationalists of Catalonia were fearful of the anarchists or communist and the social revolution. In most circumstances, the nationalist parties, due to their territorial aspirations, would override their conservative ideals and they would support the Republic.

On the other side, the political divisions were also remarkable. According to Linz (1978), the dictatorship of Franco was presented authoritarian features rather than being a totalitarian regime. The role of Franco was to act as mediator and authoritarian leader among the diverse ideological trends of the insurgent forces that would later be part of the State (Sueiro & Díaz-Nosty, 1978). Similarly to the disunity between fascists and traditionalists, these differences were present among monarchists and liberal conservatives, as well as among all groups. One year later, Franco forced the union between the Carlists and the FE de las JONS, which would form the FET de las JONS, the only party in the one-party state. This merge was contrived and compelled by Franco due to the need to control a single party, despite the ideological divisions that existed between the Carlist traditionalists and fascists. In words of Casanova (2007), the dictatorship of Franco based its ideological foundations on conservative Catholicism and fascism, which would give rise to *Franquismo*.

CHAPTER 2. Socio-economic factors and voting patterns during the Second Republic

2.1 Class cleavage in Spain

As it has been pointed out previously, the Spanish class cleavage began to crystallise into a political movement towards the middle of the 20th century. The anarcho-syndicalism, led by the CNT and the FAI and, later on, the socialism led by the UGT and other branches related to the PSOE, would be the main structures of trade union mobilisation nationally. Nonetheless, the development of Spanish trade unionism was strongly linked to the Spanish social and economic structure.

The origins of Spanish trade unionism lie in the industrial areas of Spain and specifically in Catalonia, where industry was stronger. From Catalonia, Spanish unionism spreaded to other industrialised regions, such as the Basque Country, and to port regions such as Asturias and Galicia. However, the economic structure of Spain as a whole was not based only on the industrial sector. Regions in southern and central Spain, such as Andalusia or Castile, or in eastern Spain, such as Valencia, based their economic activity on the agricultural and fishing sectors. Consequently, in the Spanish economic activity, despite some northern industrialized regions, the agriculture and fishing sectors were a relevant social group for political and social aims.




Figure 1. Prepared by author based on data from “Población, salud y actividad” in Carreras & Tafunell (2005: 150). The figure represents some of the main sectors of economic activity nationally.

In the beginning of the 20th century, the agricultural and fishing sector represented 66.3% of the economic activity of Spain. The relevance of this sector was decreasing steadily during the following years until the beginning of the Civil War, when it increased slightly. However, at the beginning of the Civil War in 1936 and at its end in 1939, it still represented between 45.5 and a 50.5% of the Spanish economy. It was not until the 1950s and onwards when agriculture and fishing would be rapidly replaced by the growth of other economic sectors, that caused this sector to decline and represent less than 10% of the economic activity in the 1990s.

As can be seen in figure 1, the economic activity linked to industrial sectors, such as manufacturing, represented only 19.2% at the start of the 1930s. A few years after the Civil War, the manufacturing sector had decreased to 15.6% and, after four decades, it stabilised around 20% and 25%. Furthermore, according to data from Carreras & Tafunell (2005: 149), in 1910 the total number of people working in agriculture and fishing amounted to approximately 5 million, and 739,200 people were working in industrial manufacturing. In 1920 and 1930, 4.6 and 4 million people worked in agriculture and fishing whilst 1.1 and 1.6 million people worked in industrial manufacture. Similarly, in 1940, the amount of people working in agriculture and fishing was 4.7 million and 1.3 in the industrial sector. Likewise, the urban population grew from 37.1% in 1930 to 50.7% in 1960 and 70.8% in 2001 (Carreras & Tafunell, 2005: 486).

The agrarian sector was the main economic driving force of labour activity in Spain until the 1970s, when the manufacture and new technology sectors began to overtake the relevance of agriculture. The percentages of economic activity and the amount of labour force involved in each economic sector shows the relevance of agriculture and fishing well into the 20th century compared to industrial activities. Consequently, supremacy of agricultural activities correlates with the population distribution of that era. The rural world, where approximately half of the population lived until 1960s, was also an important area that influenced the political configuration of Spain.

Although the agrarian world was prominent, it was not politically homogeneous. As it has been already stated, almost all the political currents were present in the peasantry and rural world. The rupture with the old "cacique system" (see note 3), as a result of the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera during the 1920s, implied that most of the farmers and rural workers began to self-organise and to join new political forces that were growing rapidly. Unions, such as the CNT and the UGT, started to expand from traditional industrial areas and focused on forming a worker base in the rural world. On the other side, as has been previously described, small and medium landowners of the agrarian world, mostly conservative and heirs of the old system, started to organise in agrarian, conservative and royalist parties, helped by the influence of the Church.

In the early 1930s, trade union presence in the rural world, as well as in industrial areas, was sizable and kept growing over the course of the decade.




Figure 2. Prepared by author based on data from "Elecciones y Política" in Carreras & Tafunell (2005: 1074-1154). * CNT members of the Basque Country are combined with CNT members of Cantabria.

Figure 2 illustrates the number of CNT members in 1931 and 1936 by main regions. There, the decrease in the number of members in Catalonia between 1931 and 1936 can be seen. The main cause may be the split of the CNT into the FAI and other anarcho-syndicalist organizations among revolutionary or moderate positions. Moreover, the number of CNT members in the rest of the regions grew steadily. In the Basque Country, Galicia and Andalusia, the number of members doubled in the majority of cases. Conversely, in Asturias, the number of members of the CNT remained nearly constant over five years, due presumably to the strong presence of other trade unionist forces such as the UGT.

As it can be observed, Catalonia and Andalusia stand out for the number of members compared to other regions such as the Basque Country or Galicia. Nonetheless, this difference could be related to the population of each region or, by contrast, could be due to particular reasons. The following table shows the percentage of CNT members in 1931 by total population in 1930:

	Catalonia	Basque Country	Asturias	Galicia	Andalusia	Madrid
Total Population in 1930	2721000	892000	364000	2230000	4610000	2477000
Total CNT members in 1931	299753	3760	24881	13218	113157	5474
CNT members by population	11.01%	0.42%	6.83%	0.59%	2.45%	0.22%

Table 1. CNT members by population and region in 1930 and 1931. Prepared by author based on data from Carreras & Tafunell (2005: 1074-1154) for number of CNT members in 1931 and Carreras & Tafunell (2005: 486) for total population in 1930.

As can be seen in table 1, in Catalonia, approximately 11.01% of the population belonged to the CNT during 1930 and 1931. This result shows the strong link of Catalonia to the CNT during the first years of the Second Republic. Both the predominance of industry in Catalonia and the great worker base are likely the main causes of the relevant presence of the CNT. Likewise, historically, Catalonia was the first source of syndicalism and from there it spreaded to the rest of Spain. Other trade unions, such as the UGT, also achieved an important presence in Catalonia. Therefore, the results present Catalonia as one of the regions with more capacity for worker mobilisation and with a major anarcho-syndicalist presence. Similarly, historical facts as the support of Catalonia to the *Frente Popular* during the Civil War verify it.

Secondly, the population from Asturias was also a noticeable supporter of the CNT. Around 6.83% of the population was member of the CNT between 1930 and 1931. Similarly to Catalonia, historical facts, such as the Revolution of 1934, reveal the presence of a remarkable trade unionism, either of the socialist UGT or anarcho-syndicalism. By contrast, unlike Catalonia, Asturias did not have a strong industry and most of the worker base came from mining and rural sectors (see Carreras & Tafunell, 2005: 357). Moreover, also unlike Catalonia and the rest of the regions shown in table 1, the number of CNT members was almost steady from 1931 to 1936.

This may be due either to a stronger establishment of the CNT among the population of Asturias before other regions or to the growth of other trade unions such as the UGT.

Andalusia, like Asturias, was not as industrialised as Catalonia and farming, together with other related activities, was the predominant economic sector. Roughly 2.45% of the population of Andalusia belonged to the CNT at the beginning of the 1930s. Nonetheless, the number of CNT members increased from 113157 to 184013 between 1931 and 1936 (Carreras & Tafunell, 2005: 486).

In Madrid and Galicia, almost 0.22% and 0.59% of the population belonged to the CNT respectively. The industry was more relevant in Madrid compared to Galicia, wherein agriculture was the main economic sector but the industrial GVA of Madrid was not comparable to that of Catalonia in that time (see Carreras et al, 2005: 405). As can be observed in figure 2, the growth in CNT members was substantial in both cases. Between 1931 and 1936, the number of CNT members grew from 5474 to 32162 in Madrid and from 13218 to 33209 in Galicia.

Finally, another case worth mentioning is the case of the Basque Country where, despite the historical industrialisation of the region, approximately only 0.42% of the population belonged to the CNT between 1930 and 1931. Even though the number of CNT members almost doubled from 3760 in 1931 to 7683 in 1936, the power of the CNT was irrelevant in the Basque Country. As it has already been pointed out in the historical overview, the establishment of the Basque trade union, called ELA-STV and linked to the PNV, attracted a great amount of workers. Likewise, the UGT also attracted a sizeable worker base to socialism from non-Basque groups. Moreover, the presence of Carlism in the rural world of part of the Basque Country and Navarra could have stopped the spreading of anarcho-syndicalism in the rural community.

Both the growth in CNT members and the percentage of CNT members by total population present significant differences among regions. It can be clearly observed how the early industrialisation influenced the presence of anarcho-syndicalism in Catalonia and the subsequently expansion over the rest of the regions. Likewise, agriculture and mining were other sectors in which the CNT gained relevance, as the cases of Andalusia and Asturias illustrate. Nevertheless, economic factors are not the only explanation for the membership of the CNT. As the cases of the Basque Country or Galicia indicate, peripheral nationalisms and conservative positions of the population opposed to anarcho-syndicalism could have played an important role

for the growth of the CNT in these regions. Similarly, the UGT may also have influenced the power of the CNT in several regions by attracting workers and farmers to socialism.

As it has been mentioned before, the UGT was the other leading trade union and principal competitor of the CNT, the anarchosindicalist forces and the peripheral trade unions. Since its foundation in 1888, it was gaining relevance among the Spanish worker bases to become an important political lobby, as it was demonstrated in the Revolution of 1934 through the mass mobilisation of workers nationally. The UGT was politically linked to the PSOE because of their ideological roots and common founder, Pablo Iglesias. Since its formation and until the end of Franco's dictatorship, the UGT can be considered the trade union branch of the PSOE, united under the same political leadership.

Similarly to the CNT, the UGT was growing rapidly from the industrial areas of Catalonia to the rest of Spain. According to data of membership in the UGT and the PSOE (Carreras et al, 2005: 1138), in 1904, the total amount of members was 55,817, whilst the number of members of the PSOE was 10,500. During the following years until the beginning of the Second Republic, the membership growth of the UGT and the PSOE was erratic. In 1918, the PSOE had 11,241 members and the UGT around 100,000. However, in 1924, the number of members decreased to 8,215 for the PSOE whilst the members of the UGT increased to 210,617. At the end of the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera and the beginning of the Second Republic, between 1930 and 1931, the number of members of the UGT increased sharply to 958,451 and exceeded one million in 1932. The growth of members in the PSOE was not as pronounced as in the UGT, but the party also reached approximately 20,000 members in 1931.

Firstly, the aforementioned data illustrate the power of the UGT in the Second Republic, with more than one million members nationally. The UGT, together with the CNT, which had 612,705 members in 1936 (Carreras & Tafunell, 2005: 1139), were organizations with huge social bases to achieve their aims. It should be noted that, in addition to the CNT and the UGT, there also existed other trade union organizations, such as the FAI, or specialized branches of the main trade unions, such as the National Federation of Land Workers (FNLT; Federación Nacional de Trabajadores de la Tierra), which was part of the UGT. The presence of other trade union organizations and branches increases enormously the number of members linked in some way to unionism.

Another relevant event was the change of government form from the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera to the Second Republic which influenced the membership growth of the UGT as the data show. Even though it has mentioned in the historical overview that the PSOE, including the UGT, had had been in dialogue with the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera, they were not repressed as happened to the CNT. The beginning of the new democratic era, apparently, encouraged people to become members of the UGT.

Also, it is important to point out the remarkable difference of formal members between the PSOE and the UGT. Although it has been mentioned that the PSOE and the UGT shared the membership and political leadership over this period, it can be seen that the UGT had a vast amount of members compared to the PSOE. This result shows that the social base of the PSOE was mainly supported on trade unionism and workers rather than on other social groups.

Turning again to the agrarian issue, the UGT organized its activities in the rural world by the foundation in 1930 of the FNTT. As happened with the UGT, the FNTT grew quickly during the course of the Second Republic by attracting farmers and peasants to its ranks.

The FNTT, of a solely rural and agrarian nature, was able to achieve a notable success among rural groups. All regions were dominantly agrarian-based. Among the four regions analysed from Carreras & Tafunell (2005: 1139), Andalusia and Valencia are the regions where the FNTT had less success. In 1932, 15% of all active farmers in Andalusia and 13.5% in Valencia were members of the FNTT. Furthermore, in Extremadura the percentage of farmers belonging to the FNTT was 24% and 23.5% in Castile the New and Albacete.

As can be seen, the membership of the FNTT in regions with a marked predominance of agrarian activities was high. Like in the most industrialized northern regions, socialist trade unionism also achieved a powerful social base in the agrarian areas of the south of Spain. Socialist unionism in the rural world also played an important role as political force in the foundation of the Second Republic. In the Revolution of 1934, the riots and strikes carried out by the peasantry in those areas under the influence of the PSOE were able to put considerable political pressure on the conservative government of the Republic.

According to the membership data of the different trade unions, the majority of the regions of Spain had a powerful syndical presence regardless of their economic structure and location, although it is true that the political ideology of unionism in the different regions was influenced sometimes by the particular features of that region. By way of example, in the Basque Country the presence of anarcho-syndicalism was almost irrelevant compared to other areas, such as Catalonia, where anarcho-syndicalism dominated the syndical arena. It has been mentioned that the existence of other particular trade unions or the origins of workers could have affected the prevalence of one trade union or another.

However, national trade unionism was fairly cohesive during the course of the Second Republic and the Civil War. The Revolution of 1934 was formed by anarchosyndicalists, socialists and communists, although the political effort was led by the PSOE and the UGT. Likewise, before the beginning of the Second Republic, the strikes increased as the trade unions grew.



Figure 3. Number of strikes: timeline 1905-1936. Prepared by author based on data from Carreras & Tafunell (2005: 1242).

Figure 3 illustrates how the number of strikes started to increase from 1911 on and how its development is erratic until 1917, when it increases sharply from 306 to 895 strikes in just two years. Certainly, the graphs regarding the number of strikes before 1920 show the instability and the increase of worker mobilisation during this time. Moreover, the intense decrease of the number of strikes due to the establishment of the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera is also remarkable. From 1921 until 1929, the number of strikes decreased from 373 to 96. From 1929, with the advent of the Second Republic, the number rose to 402 strikes in 1931 and it increased even more in 1933, when there were 1,127 strikes. In 1933, as a result of the change of

government, the number of strikes falls again from 1,127 to 181 in 1935, but in 1936 rises to 887 strikes as had occurred previously.

It can be observed how the number of strikes decreases drastically in two periods. During the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera, from 1923 to 1930, and during the change of republican government in 1933. The dictatorship of Primo de Rivera significantly affected the labour movement by repressing it or, as it has been pointed out previously, as a result of the negotiations carried out with the labour forces of the PSOE. Furthermore, by the end of the dictatorship, the number of strikes increased considerably, continuing during the first years of the Second Republic. In 1933, when the change of government takes place, resulting in a conservative government between the PRR and the CEDA, the number of strikes decreased again to the levels of the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera despite the Revolution of 1934. Nonetheless, after the Revolution of 1934 and despite the failure, the trade unions and the related political forces, as the PSOE or the PCE, continued encouraging the labour movement, as the strong growth in strikes until 1936 shows.

It is noticeable that the labour movement begun to grow considerably before the beginning of the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera. Certainly, it rose to high levels in 1919 and was decreasing until the end of the dictatorship. Similarly, it decreases in 1933 until 1935, when it increased sharply again. The data show how the labour movement was fairly active from 1919 and how the political context influenced the performance of the labour movement.

Broadly speaking, the results are clear indicators of the relevance of the labour movement before the Civil War of 1936 and the class cleavage. The trade union membership was relatively active both in industrial regions as in rural areas. Moreover, this support created a powerful social base linked to political organizations and parties for political mobilization, as occurred in the Revolution of 1934. However, the salience of the class cleavage in Spain during this period cannot be considered the main factor responsible for subsequent events. As Linz (1967: 263) indicated, the class cleavage in Spain was combined often with other cleavages, such as the nationalist or the religious cleavage. Several parties joined political forces on the social cleavage that they considered more relevant for their interests, as happened with the PNV by joining the *Frente Popular* against the centralism of the military uprising, or with the *Lliga*, which supported non-Catalan conservative parties against the ERC.

2.2 Party System and Vote by Region in 1931

After the fall of the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera, the Spanish party system emerged as a multi-party system. The two-party system which had ruled Spain during the Restoration until the beginning of the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera had been weakened due to causes previously mentioned. Nonetheless, the new party system changed considerably over the course of the Second Republic. As Linz (1967: 259) states, over time, the initial multi-party system resulted in a polarized conflict in which several political parties and organizations formed the two sides that caused the Civil War.

The first configuration of the party system in 1931 was dominated by republican and left-wing parties. The following pie chart shows the main political parties in the general elections of 1931.




Figure 4. Vote share (%) in the general elections of 1931 (first round). Prepared by author based on data from Carreras & Tafunell (2005: 1099-1100).

Figure 4 shows the vote share of the main political parties in the general elections of 1931. Firstly, the vote share that the PSOE achieved, with a 21.4% of the total share, is remarkable. This result illustrates the increasing power that the PSOE had reached since the beginning of the century and that it is reflected in the results of the general elections of 1931. The second political force was the PRR with a 13.2% of the vote share. As it has already been mentioned, the PRR was essential for the government coalitions that would form in 1931 and 1933 with the socialists and the CEDA respectively. Likewise, the PRR would change its ideology from a centre-left and republican ideology to more conservative ideals in 1933.

Furthermore, the DLR and the PRRS were also republican political parties with 8.9% and 11.8% of the vote share respectively. The DLR was conservative and liberal while the PRRS was a radical,

liberal and left-wing party. Despite of the DLR, the most conservative parties, such as the agrarians, obtained a 3% of the vote share and the right-wing independents reached 1.4% of the vote share. In Catalonia, the ERC obtained 6.7% of the vote share and the *Lliga* 1.8% of the votes. In the Basque Country and Navarre, the PNV had 1.5% of the vote share and the Carlists and traditionalists obtained approximately 1% of the votes. The PCE received 0.8% of the votes.

From a general point of view, the Spanish party system in the first general elections of 1931 was a multi-party system with republican dominance. The economic and social left-wing political parties surpassed other conservative political parties. Left-wing political parties, such as the PSOE and the PRRS, had a considerable amount of the vote share even though the PRR and the DLR were also important political parties of conservative tendencies. The regional political parties also obtained a proportional vote share. The share of ERC compared to the *Lliga* that, as it has been stated, was adversely affected by their support of the monarchy, is remarkable. Moreover, the PNV and the Carlists were marginal political forces with a low share in parliament. Similarly, the agrarian party or the right-wing independents were marginal political forces.

It is important to note that the overview of the party system in a general election may not represent possible territorial differences in vote patterns. This is important for the purpose of this research since the territorial configuration of Spain has been pointed out as relevant in social and economic differences.

	Andalusia	Madrid	Basque Country	Navarre	Castile ^e	Catalonia	Extremadura	National Total
PRR	15.7	-	-	-	11.3	9.4	-	13.2
DLR	11.1	-	-	-	18.6	-	-	8.9
PRRS	-	9	13.8	-	12	7.2	10.8	11.8
PRCon	-	6	-	-	-	-	7.7	8.9
Republic ^a	-	-	-	21.7	-	-	-	0.5
IR	0.7	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.2
PSOE	36.8	38	14.7	7.2	13.5	1	44.7	21.4
PCE	1.8	0.7	2.6	-	-	-	-	0.8
Right ^b	-	-	-	12.8	-	-	-	0.5
Agrarians	0.2	-	-	-	4.3	-	-	1.8
AN	-	6.1	-	-	7.7	-	-	1.9
PNV	-	-	29.8	12.7	-	-	-	1.5
ANV	-	-	5.4	-	-	-	-	0.2
Carlist ^c	-	-	19.3	39.5	-	-	-	1.7
ERC	-	-	-	-	-	53	-	6.7
Lliga	-	-	-	-	-	14	-	1.8

Table 2. Vote share (%) by region and total nationally in the general elections of 1931 (first round).^a Republican are minor republican political parties. ^b Right indep. are independent right-wing candidacies. ^c Carlists are combined with traditionalists and Catholics supporters of *fueros*. ^e Castile corresponds to the current Castile and León. Prepared by author based on available data from Carreras & Tafunell (2005: 1101) and Carreras & Tafunell (2005: 1099-1100) for national votes of the PRR and the DLR.

Table 2 shows the available data of vote share by region and nationwide total in the first round of the general elections of 1931. There are some differences between the total of vote share nationally and the amount of votes obtained by particular political parties in some regions.

The PSOE was one of the political parties which obtained more votes nationally. However, the vote share nationally had a high deviation among regions. In Extremadura, the vote share of the PSOE was 44.7%, while in Catalonia it was only 1%. Similarly, the vote share was 38% in Madrid and 7.2% in Navarre. Likewise, the PSOE obtained 36.8% of the vote share in Andalusia and 13.4% in Castile.

It can be observed that in agrarian regions, such as Andalusia and Extremadura, where the unionism linked to the PSOE had reached a large number of farmers, the support to the PSOE was considerable. Nonetheless, Castile was also an agrarian region where the PSOE did not achieve a similar success to Andalusia and Extremadura. Likewise, Navarre had the same features but the vote share was 7.2%. In such regions, other political forces attracted those votes. In Navarre, it is clear that Carlism got the rural votes from peasantry and obtained 39.5% of the votes. The votes in Castile went to republican and conservative parties, as the vote share of the PRR and the DLR illustrates.

In Catalonia, the PSOE hardly obtained 1% of the votes even though it was where Spanish unionism originated and it was also an industrialized area. Two reasons could be given as main explanation. Firstly, the strong presence of anarcho-syndicalism decreased the importance of socialist unionism and, consequently, the votes for the PSOE. Secondly, the ERC attracted the socialist as well as the nationalist vote. Likely, both reasons are valid to explain the lack of support to the PSOE in Catalonia. The republican and left-wing ideals of the ERC contributed to the party's success in the elections. The ERC obtained 53% of the votes and the *Lliga* only 14%. Other national parties had similar results in Catalonia. The PRR got 9.4% and the PRRS 7.2% of the vote share.

Like Catalonia, the Basque Country is a particular case. The nationalist and regionalist parties, such as the PNV and the Carlists, obtained 29.8% and 19.3% of the vote share respectively. Likewise, the left-wing nationalists, led by the ANV, got 5.4% of the votes. On the other hand, the national political parties attracted a large part of the rest of the votes. The PSOE got 14.7% of the vote share and the PRRS 13.8%. As in Catalonia, the nationalist and regionalist vote was almost half of the electorate but, unlike in Catalonia, within this electorate the vote was mostly

conservative. The PSOE achieved better results than in Catalonia but it did not reach the percentage of Andalusia or Extremadura. The PRRS also achieved a remarkable vote share, above its national results.

In Navarre, the Carlists obtained 39.5% and the PNV 12.7% of the votes. Other right-wing candidacies got 12.8% of the vote share. Republican forces of Navarre got 21.7% of the votes and, as it has been mentioned before, the PSOE obtained 7.2% of the votes in Navarre. Like in the Basque Country, the nationalist and regionalist vote was mainly conservative, while the republican and socialist forces attracted the remaining votes.

In the inner regions of Spain the vote was more similar, although the power of the political forces varied among regions. In Madrid, the PSOE obtained good results, unlike the rest of political parties in which the low number of votes was equally distributed. However, in Castile the socialist vote was as fragmented as for republican and conservative parties such as the PRR and the DLR. The PSOE got 13.5% of the vote share, while the PRR and the DLR obtained 11.3% and 18.6% respectively.

The overview of vote patterns in 1931 shows that the vote varied regionally. It is true that the largest part of the vote was republican and the formal royalist parties were almost non-existent. The vote based on other social cleavages played a relevant role. In inner regions, among the republican parties, the conservative and centrist parties, such as the PRR and the DLR, received remarkable support from the electorate, as the case of Andalusia or Castile illustrates. Socialism, especially in agrarian regions except in Castile, was the biggest political force opposed to them, as occurred in Andalusia and Extremadura.

In Madrid, the PSOE was also the strongest political force, while the rest of the votes were for political forces of large ideological spectrum. However, in Barcelona, another large city, the support to the PSOE was marginal. The nationalist and regionalist parties obtained the majority of the votes, although the ERC greatly surpassed the votes of the *Lliga*. In the Catalan case, the nationalist and left-wing votes were the main voter tendencies. By contrast, in the Basque Country and Navarre the voter tendencies were also nationalist and regionalist, but the votes were mostly conservative (for the PNV and the Carlists), as the limited success of the ANV demonstrates.

2.3 Party System and Vote by Region in 1933

In the next general elections of 1933, the political scene was slightly different. The emergence of the CEDA was the first mass political force opposed to the left-wing parties and some republican parties. The catholic and conservative ideals contrary to the policies carried out by the republican parties and the progressive Constitution of 1931 were the ideological baseline of its political goals. It is highly important to note that these elections were the first in which women were allowed to vote and, as it has been discussed in the historical review, it was a controversial point because of the potential influence of Church in female voters.

According to data of Carreras (2005: 1099), the PSOE was the political party with the largest vote share. 19.4% of the votes were for the PSOE. In second place was the PRR with 14.3% of the votes and the last large political force was the CEDA, with 13.9% of the vote share. Generally, the conservative and right-wing forces obtained a slightly higher number of votes in these elections. The Agrarians obtained 6.9% of the votes compared to a vote share of 3% in the previous elections. The Carlists got 4.3% in these elections and only 1% in 1931. The independent candidacies of right-wing ideals doubled their vote share from 1.4% to 2.8%. The *Lliga* recovered lost ground in Catalonia and obtained 3.8% of the votes, surpassing the 3.7% of the ERC. Likewise, the PNV increased their number of votes and reached 2.2% of the vote share. As it has been already said, the PRR and the CEDA formed coalition governments with support of the Agrarians in parliament; these governments were characterized by the political unrest and the Revolution of 1934.

Furthermore, as the data of the general elections indicate, the vote patterns by region also changed. The following table shows the vote distribution in the first round of the general elections of 1933:

	Andalusia	Madrid	Basque Country	Navarre	Castile ^a	Catalonia	Extremadura	National Total
PRR	20	7.6	-	3.6	8.2	5.9	30.8	14.3
PRRS	-	-	0.2	-	1.5	-	0.4	1.4
PRCon	-	-	-	-	-	-	5.5	3.9
CEDA	12.9	9.1	-	10.2	26	-	18.8	13.9
RE	-	5.4	7.4	-	-	-	-	2.8
PSOE	31.2	37	13.4	13.8	15.7	1.3	42.7	19.4
PCE	5.1	3.2	3.1	0.9	0.8	-	0.7	1.9
Right ^b	-	-	-	28.6	-	-	-	2.8
Agrarians	7.3	5.2	-	-	22.8	-	-	6.9
PNV	-	-	44.6	9.4	-	-	-	2.2
Tradition. ^c	1.8	3.5	17.2	42.9	3.4	4.8	-	4.3
ERC	-	-	-	-	-	31	-	3.7
Lliga	-	-	-	-	-	32.9	-	3.8

Table 3. Vote share (%) by region and total nationally in the general elections of 1933 (first round). ^a Castile corresponds to the current Castile and León. ^b Right indep. are independent right-wing candidacies. ^c Traditionalists represent Catholics and supporters of *fueros* under Carlism. Prepared by author based on available data from Carreras & Tafunell (2005: 1105).

In the general elections of 1933, the PSOE lost votes in almost all the regions displayed, except in Navarre and Castile, where their votes increased considerably. By contrast, the CEDA obtained a remarkable amount of votes in all regions. Without doubt, at this time, the beginning of the ideological polarization can be observed. The republican parties which had obtained a large number of seats in the elections of 1931, such as the PRRS and the DLR, disappeared or lost an important number of votes in these elections. The PRR was the only Republican Party with political power in parliament.

Nonetheless, the differences from region to region were still important in these elections. The number of votes for the PRR in Andalusia, for example, increased compared to the elections of 1931 and the party also obtained a remarkable vote share in Extremadura. By contrast, the PRR lost large amounts of votes in the remaining regions. On the other hand, the CEDA erupted in almost all regions and became the third political force in Andalusia and Extremadura, as happened nationally. In Castile, the CEDA was the main political force with 26% of the vote share, rivalling the agrarians, with 22.8% of votes, and the PSOE, with 15.7%. Similarly, in Navarre the party obtained 10.2% of the votes.

As can be seen in southern regions, in interior regions such as Castile, and in Navarre, the republican parties that obtained an important number of votes before, lost them in these elections. The other noticeable event was the rise of the CEDA in the aforementioned regions, which rapidly became the third political force or, in places such as Castile, first political force.

As national results indicate, the votes for the PNV increased in the Basque Country but decreased in Navarre. The failure of the conjoint autonomy process of the Basque Country and Navarre and, furthermore, the political discrepancies between the PNV and the parties in Navarre, could be key reasons. Likewise, it can be seen that the amount of votes for the traditionalists increased as the votes for PNV decreased from 12.7% to 9.4%, while traditionalists obtained 42.9% in 1933 and 39.5% in 1931. Moreover, in Navarre, the rest of the votes were mainly distributed among conservative forces, such as right-wing candidacies, and the CEDA. The number of votes of the PSOE, by contrast, increased in Navarre, although it cannot be compared to the number of votes of right-wing parties altogether.

In the Basque Country, the PNV was the major party with 44.6% of the vote share. Contrary to the case in Navarre, the increase in the votes for the PNV amounted to more than the votes lost by traditionalists. While the PNV got 44.6% in these elections and 29.8% in 1931, the traditionalists in the Basque Country obtained 17.2%, 2.1% less than in 1931.

In Catalonia, the political arena was divided between the ERC and the *Lliga* with a 31% and 32.9% of the vote share respectively. As occurred in previous elections, the support of the PSOE, with a 1.3% of votes, was irrelevant compared to other regions. In Madrid, the political landscape remained quite similar as well. The PSOE was the main political force. The CEDA obtained 9.1% of the vote share, significantly less than in close regions such as Castile or Extremadura. Besides the CEDA, other political parties also appeared. The emergence of the royalist *Renovación Española* (RE; Spanish Renovation), that obtained some support in the Basque Country or Madrid and got 2.8% of the votes nationally, is remarkable. The PCE improved its results by getting 1.9% of the votes nationally and obtained better results in Andalusia, the Basque Country and Madrid than in Castile and Navarre.

As can be seen in Table 3, voter tendencies also varied by region as occurred in 1931. Even so, despite the differences among regions, the voter tendencies within regions also changed, something that was reflected in the national results. The two main forces that would play an important role in the future, the CEDA and the PSOE, were tied in number of votes. Moreover, the republican parties, that obtained an important number of votes in the general elections of 1931, had been weakened, thus benefiting the CEDA and the PSOE. After the beginning the Second Republic, the ideological polarization began to be reflected in the party system. Even in nationalist regions such as Catalonia, this ideological polarization in nationalist and regionalist parties can be observed.

2.4 Party System and Vote by Region in 1936

In 1936, the increasing political tension eventually resulted in the formation of two electoral coalitions: the *Frente Popular* and a fragmented right-wing coalition called *Frente Nacional Contra Revolucionario*, led by the CEDA. Next, there is a description of the components of both coalitions in order to bring light to the ideological composition of each electoral block.

The *Frente Popular* was composed by the PSOE, the PCE and the IR (formed in 1934 by some republican parties such as the AR), among others, at national level. In some regions, nationalist and regionalist parties supported this electoral coalition. In Catalonia, the ERC supported the

coalition and, in Galicia, the *Organización Republicana Galega Autónoma* (ORGA; Autonomous Galician Republican Organization) integrated into the IR.

The *Frente Nacional ContraRevolucionario* was formed by the CEDA, the traditionalists, the RE and the agrarians, amongst other regional right-wing parties. In Catalonia, the Lliga supported this electoral coalition together with some of the aforementioned political parties. The PRR joined the coalition's electoral list occasionally. By contrast, the FE run for these elections alone. However, as it has been indicated, this coalition was highly fragmented and the joint candidacies were unsuccessful in several constituencies. The following figure displays the vote share for each party:




Figure 5. Vote share (%) in the general elections of 1936 (first round). Prepared by author based on data from Carreras & Tafunell (2005: 1099-1108).

Starting with the main parties of the *Frente Popular*, the PSOE obtained 16.4% of the vote share. The new IR got 13.7% of the votes and the PCE 2.5%. The ERC can be considered a formal component of the electoral coalition with 4.1% of the votes. Putting together all votes obtained by the aforementioned parties, the *Frente Popular* obtained approximately 36.7% of the votes.

On the other hand, the results for each formal member of the failed *Frente Nacional Contrarevolucionario* were a little worse. The CEDA got 23.2% of the votes, the Carlists (traditionalist) 3.4%, the RE obtained 3.8% of the votes and the agrarians 2.6% of the vote share. Altogether, they obtained 33% of the votes. However, the remaining political forces with relative strength (such as the Lliga with 2.7% of the votes, the right-wing candidacies with 3.1% of the

vote share too, or some conservative republican parties) were closer, in certain cases, to the counter-revolutionary coalition than to the *Frente Popular*.

Moreover, there were political parties which did not join any electoral coalition formally, but they supported to a greater or lesser extent both electoral coalitions. The PNV competed electorally with both national coalitions in the Basque Country and resulted winner. Nonetheless, despite its conservative ideals, it decided to support the *Frente Popular* after the elections and during the Civil War, aiming to maintain the autonomy achieved thanks to the support of the republican forces. There also existed a centrist party established to control the polarization between both ideological blocs. It obtained only 5.1% of the votes in the first round of the general elections. The FE did not form any electoral coalition with the right-wing forces; consequently, it did not obtain any seats in parliament, getting only 0.1% of the vote nationwide. Similarly to national results, the vote by region was also ideologically polarized.

	Andalusia	Madrid	Basque Country	Navarre	Castile ^a	Catalonia	Extremadura	National Total
PRR	2.5	4.9	-	-	4.2	4.1	7.9	3.6
IR	11.9	17.5	13.4	-	12.8	4.3	15.2	13.7
PRCon	0.7	-	-	-	3	-	3.1	0.8
UR	11.3	5.8	-	-	6.5	-	8.8	5.9
CEDA	21.4	22.9	7	22	33.3	9.1	21.6	23.2
RE	1.8	9.7	5.7	-	0.7	-	-	3.8
PSOE	24.7	29.1	12.8	4.6	14.3	1.6	27.3	16.4
PCE	5.4	2.9	7	4.4	-	1.4	-	2.5
Right ^b	3.3	4.9	-	10.3	1.3	-	-	3.1
Agrarians	3	1.1	-	-	10.9	-	2.7	2.6
PNV	-	-	32.9	2	-	-	-	1.4
Tradition. ^c	3.2	2.5	14.9	42.9	2.8	4.1	-	3.4
ERC	-	-	-	-	-	33.2	-	4.1
Lliga	-	-	-	-	-	21.6	-	2.7

Table 4. Vote share (%) by region and total nationally in the general elections of 1936 (first round). ^a Castile corresponds to the current Castile and León. ^b Right indep. are independent right-wing candidacies. ^c Traditionalists represent Catholics and supporters of *fueros* under Carlism. Prepared by author based on available data from Carreras & Tafunell (2005: 1108).

In Table 4, it can be seen how in Andalusia, Madrid and Extremadura the vote share between the CEDA and the PSOE was almost the same, both between 20 and 30 percent. The IR achieved the third position in the aforementioned regions. As has already occurred, Navarre, the Basque Country, Catalonia and Castile had different vote patterns compared to the rest of the regions analysed.

In Navarre, the traditionalists, the CEDA and the right-wing candidacies obtained the majority of the votes, circa 75.2% of the total votes. By contrast, the PSOE obtained just 4.6% of the votes, considerably less than in 1933 (see Table 3). The CEDA grew significantly until reaching 22% of

the votes. In the Basque Country, the PNV and the traditionalists also obtained a worse result than in previous elections. Likewise, the PSOE also obtained slightly fewer votes than in 1933. On the other hand, the IR obtained 13.4% of the votes. In Catalonia, the two main political rivals were still the ERC and the *Lliga*. The ERC got 33.2% of the votes, while the *Lliga* obtained 21.6%.

Finally, in Castile, the CEDA and the agrarians got 33.3% and 10.9% of the votes respectively. The remaining ballots went to the PSOE, with 14.3% of the votes, and to the IR, with 12.8% of the vote share. The CEDA, together with the agrarians, got 44.2% of the votes in Castile, while the PSOE and the IR obtained 25.2%. Moreover, conservative agrarianism was dominant in Castile compared to the rest of the regions. The low number of votes obtained by the PSOE is explained, to a great extent, by the lack of an ideologically close peasantry base, as the party had in Andalusia or Extremadura.

2.5 Discussion

In point 2 of the present work the development of vote patterns during the course of the Second Republic of Spain has been discussed, highlighting, among others, the regional differences regarding economic structure, trade unions and other social features.

As can be seen, the regional differences regarding economic, cultural and social issues are quite remarkable. The first difference is found in the economic structure of the country. Even though the agricultural and rural activities were dominant until the 1970s, the gap between industrialised and purely rural regions was large. Catalonia and the Basque Country were largely more industrialized than Andalusia, Extremadura or Castile (see GVA index by area from Carreras & Tafunell, 2005: 405).

Likewise, the political currents which found support both in agrarian and industrial areas were also diverse. The Spanish trade unions originated in industrialised areas but they also grew rapidly in rural areas, such as Andalusia and Extremadura. Both anarcho-syndicalism and socialism had a significant worker base in Spain, regardless of the economic sector they belonged to. However, the growing trade unionism had to cope with opposite political forces in the aforementioned economic fields, particularly, as it has been mentioned in the historical overview, in the rural world and agrarianism that was influenced by conservatism contrary to socialism and anarcho-syndicalism.

Castile and Navarre are the best examples of regions where new trade unionism lacked a relevant support compared to other regions, likely due to the presence of conservative forces such as Carlism or conservative agrarianism. In Navarre, Carlist and traditionalist forces got approximately half of the votes during all the elections of the Second Republic. In Castile, conservative agrarianism also obtained a relevant amount of votes in the general elections of 1933 and 1936 compared to other regions. By contrast, the PSOE did not obtain similar results in such regions compared to the nationwide average.

Likewise, Catalonia and the Basque Country were regions where there existed a strong influence of peripheral nationalism. Over the course of the Republic, in Catalonia the majority of the votes were distributed between the ERC and the *Lliga*. Among all analysed regions, Catalonia was where the PSOE obtained the worst results. The popularity of the CNT among workers and the existence of the ERC, a nationalist left-wing force, may have negatively affected the PSOE. In the Basque Country, the PNV together with traditionalism obtained most of the votes and the PSOE remained below national average during all this period. The influence of the Basque trade union, the ELA-STV, can be pointed out as the main cause.

Madrid, Andalusia and Extremadura are the regions closest to the vote distribution nationally. Starting in 1931, the Spanish party system was dominated by republican parties of several ideologies and the PSOE. In 1933, the republican parties and the PSOE began to lose votes. By contrast, the CEDA erupted strongly in the party system and in such regions, although it did not obtain as many votes as the PSOE or the PRR. At this stage, the main forces nationally were the CEDA, the PSOE and the PRR. In 1936, the political situation was even more polarized. The CEDA and the PSOE obtained a similar number of votes in the abovementioned regions and the IR emerged as third force. Nonetheless, national results were more favourable to the CEDA than to the PSOE, likely because of the conservative vote from Castile and Navarre, where the PSOE had minor support.

From a general point of view, class cleavage intertwined largely with regional and social cleavages, specifically with peripheral nationalism and conservatism on religious issues. In spite of the class salience and the trade unionism during the Republic (see figure 3), the vote distribution by region shows that several ideological forces worker-oriented and peasantry-oriented obtained different results depending on the region. Agrarianism in Castile, traditionalism in Navarre, anarcho-syndicalism in Catalonia or socialism in Andalusia and Extremadura are the best examples of the heterogeneity of class ideologies.

CHAPTER 3. Spanish Party System and Voting Patterns after the Dictatorship (1978-1994)

The aim of this chapter is to analyse a possible change in vote patterns after the ending of the dictatorship in relation to previously observed indicators. As can be seen during the development of the previous chapters, some cleavages stand out among others.

Especially, it is remarkable how some issues, such as religion, territory (on the centralism-peripheral axis), class and monarchy-republic, have marked the development of the party system throughout the entire examined period. In the following chapter, the analysis focuses on the aforementioned issues for the purpose of drafting conclusions about whether these social cleavages still influence vote patterns and to what extent. The religious issue has been pointed out by several authors as a determining factor in voting patterns, whilst the old class cleavage has lost relevance to initiate a post-materialist process (Torcal & Montero, 1997; Linz & Montero, 1999).

For this part of the dissertation, some statistical analysis has been conducted using data from several studies of the *Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas* (CIS; Sociological Research Centre) between 1978 and 1994. The studies vary depending on the issues analysed, the territorial scope and the year.

Firstly, it has been considered appropriate to study the ideological positions of individuals on most important issues, such as religion or income, in 1978 in order to outline the configuration of the party system nationally according to the ideological positions after the ending of the dictatorship. Likewise, the same methodology has been used to examine possible variations by region in Andalusia, Madrid and Castile.

Secondly, a study of voting patterns in Catalonia and the Basque Country in 1983 and 1981 respectively has been conducted. The religious issues have been included in the study of Catalonia. In the Basque Country this study of the religious issues could not be conducted. Income has been replaced by the occupation variable in both studies. The purpose is to determine the influence of the occupation and birthplace on voting patterns, as has been described in previous chapters, before the dictatorship.

Finally, voting patterns are studied nationally in two models according to social issues that have been considered relevant in this period.

The monarchy issue is included in the two models carried out for 1985 and 1994. In the first model the monarchy variable is related to the value of the monarchy to provide political stability. In the second model the variable is a rating scale of the role of the monarchy. In addition, the survey of 1985 allows us to include the territorial issue as a preference scale of territorial models. The support for democratic or dictatorial systems is included in this model as well.

The final models contain variables which measure the level of satisfaction with Francoism and the democratic transition in a rating scale. Both variables are examined as dependent on religion, monarchy and income. Likewise, voting patterns are analysed according to the aforementioned variables regarding the two main parties in 1994.

3.1 Ideological Positions of Spaniards in 1978

In 1977, the first general elections since 1936 took place. In these elections some parties that existed previously, such as the PSOE, the PCE and the PNV, emerged once again after having been acting illegally during the last years of the dictatorship. Likewise, several new parties appeared in the Spanish party system. Examples of these are the *Alianza Popular* (AP; People's Alliance), which later would form the base of the *Partido Popular* (PP; People's Party), and the *Unión Democrática de Centro* (UCD; Union of the Democratic Centre), which would split into the *Centro Democrático y Social* (CDS; Democratic and Social Centre) by 1982.

In the first elections the UCD, led by Adolfo Suarez, won by absolute majority. The PSOE obtained the second largest amount of seats, followed by the PCE and the AP. Likewise, nationalist parties, such as the PNV and a coalition of Catalan parties called *Pacte Democràtic per Catalunya* (PDCP; Democratic Alliance for Catalonia), got a remarkable amount of votes.

The first aim of this chapter is to define the citizens' ideological positions according to the most relevant social issues previously studied. This model will help us to understand how the typical left-right scale was ideologically distributed in Spain at the beginning of the new party system.

Firstly, it has been chosen a multinomial regression model which measures the increase of right-left ideological positions from 1 to 7 in relation to a dummy variable for religion, where 0 is non-practicing Catholic and 1 is practicing Catholic, an income discrete scale from 1 to 7, and a continuous variable for age and another dummy variable which measures the willingness to join a strike (1) or not (0).

This model is an initial approach to illustrate the possible influence of the religious issue on Spanish politics, as well as age differences and the class cleavage in two dimensions; income disparity and strikes or riots. Table 5 shows the results obtained:

Ideological self-placement in 1978 (1 Left-wing, 7 Right-wing)

Variable	Estimate (Std. Error)	Significance (Code)
Intercept	2.36 (0.25)	0.000 ***
Religion	0.62 (0.08)	0.000 ***
Income	0.03 (0.02)	0.226
Age	0.01 (0.00)	0.000 ***
Strike	-0.25 (0.09)	0.005 **

Table 5. Prepared by the author based on CIS 1157 (N= 5350). R squared = 0.11. Adjusted R squared = 0.10. N= 5350. Confidence level 0.95. Significance codes *** for 0,000 – 0.001, ** for 0.001 – 0.01, * for 0.01 – 0.05.

In Table 5 it can be observed that the level of religiosity in the Catholic creed, the age and the willingness to join a strike were significant factors regarding the ideological positions of the citizens. Nonetheless, the goodness of fit is not especially high in this model. Even so, this model will serve to target the influence of the variables in the following models of vote patterns and to avoid possible problems of collinearity among explanatory variables in this kind of political research (see Kellstedt & Whitten, 2013: 244), concretely between ideology and other variables.

In the previous model, the estimation of ideological positions is 0.62 for practicing Catholics. The age increases 0.01 as the ideological position tends to right-wing, and the estimation according to the willingness to join a strike is apparently negative (-0.25). By contrast, the income level seems to not be significant enough to acquire a specific ideological position.

Among the significant variables of this model, religiosity, willingness to join a strike and income are particularly interesting. As can be observed, religion was an important issue that affected ideological placements to a great extent. Moreover, income and willingness to join a strike have been considered explanatory variables within a hypothetical class cleavage. In 1978, income level does not appear to largely affect Spaniards' ideology or to be a relevant component of class divisions.

However, by considering the strike variable as an indicator of class mobilization, seemingly, there existed differences in the ideological scale. Likely, this result is strongly related to the change of values in class cleavages described by Torcal and Montero (1993). Their findings point

out that class identification still continues to be relevant in Spanish society despite generational differences due to, partially, the change from materialism to post-materialism (Torcal & Montero, 1993: 3). Therefore, it is understandable, according to the findings of Torcal and Montero, that the model estimation for age regarding ideological positions turns out not to be remarkably large.

3.2 Ideological Positions of Parties and Voting Patterns in 1978

Once the first approach to the ideological scale after the dictatorship is known, it is possible to define party positions. Although in the newly established Spanish party system several political parties erupted in the first democratic elections of 1977, it is key for the research to focus on stronger political parties and their persistence over time.

Nationally, as it has been mentioned, the PSOE and the PCE reappeared in the party system. The UCD and the AP also reappeared in the Spanish party system but, unlike the PSOE and PCE, they were not formal political parties before the dictatorship. Nonetheless, both the UCD and the AP came from different currents of the old Francoist system (see Gunther et al., 1988: 37-58).

Table 6 shows the percentage of respondents' answers regarding the classification of the main parties in an ideological scale from left-wing to right-wing:

	Far-Left	Left	Centre	Right	Far-Right	Response rate
AP	0.17	0.80	3.89	56.49	38.62	62.42
UCD	0.10	2.57	72.84	23.48	0.97	68.84
PSOE	3.39	80.80	12.86	2.66	0.25	62.78
PCE	36.85	59.14	3.03	0.71	0.24	67.66

Table 6. Ideological Placement of Political Parties (%) in 1978. Prepared by the author based on CIS 1157 (N= 5350).

As can be observed, the ideological positions of the political parties are quite defined in the ideological scale. The AP classification ranges between right (59.59%) and far-right (38.62%). The UCD is defined by respondents as a centrist (72.84%) or right-wing party (23.83%). By contrast, the PSOE is located mainly in a leftist position with 80.8% of response, and just with 12.86% of response for the central position. According to the respondents, the PCE, similarly to the AP, ranges between the left (59.14%) and the far-left (36.85%).

According to the results shown in Table 5, the AP and the UCD slightly shared the right position, even though the UCD is placed primarily in the centre. The most remarkable case is that of the PSOE and the PCE, which largely share the left position. The central classification for the PSOE is minimal and the PCE is not classified by respondents as a purely far-left political party.

It is important to emphasise that, during the first years of the democratic transition, the PSOE kept its Marxist ideology but then it slowly moved towards the social democrat ideologies of the rest of the socialist parties of the time (Aguiar, 2006: 15). This is a good explanation as to why the PSOE and the PCE were ideologically close for Spanish society. In order to complete the ideological classification of the political parties, a multinomial logit analysis of voting patterns regarding the aforementioned political parties has been conducted, using the survey of 1978. The multinomial logit analyses conducted are based on the paper of Croissant (2011) for multinomial logit models.

As explanatory variables the ideological scale from 0 to 7 studied in Table 5 has been included, as well as the income variable, which did not provide relevant results in the multinomial model conducted in Table 5. All explanatory variables in the following model are individual. Other variables, such as religiosity, willingness to join a strike and age, have been removed from the model in order to avoid possible problems of collinearity with the main explanatory variable: ideology.

The dependent variable of alternatives is based on the question “which party would you vote for if general elections were held today?”. In Table 7 the results obtained for two reference alternatives are shown. In this model, it has been deemed convenient to choose the PSOE and the UCD, as they are the two parties with the highest frequency, with 43% and 26% respectively.

Reference level: PSOE

Party: (Variable)	Estimate (Std. Error)	Significance (Code)
AP:(Intercept)	-9.92 (0.88)	0.000 ***
PCE:(Intercept)	1.04 (0.53)	0.004 *
UCD:(Intercept)	-4.88 (0.56)	0.000 ***
AP: (Ideology)	1.84 (0.15)	0.000 ***
PCE: (Ideology)	-0.75 (0.13)	0.000 ***
UCD: (Ideology)	1.14 (0.11)	0.000 ***
AP: (Income)	0.20 (0.08)	0.014 *
PCE: (Income)	0.01 (0.07)	0.814
UCD: (Income)	0.02 (0.06)	0.659

Reference level: UCD

AP:(Intercept)	-5.03 (0.78)	0.000 ***
PCE:(Intercept)	5.93 (0.72)	0.000 ***
PSOE:(Intercept)	4.88 (0.56)	0.000 ***
AP:(Ideology)	0.70 (0.12)	0.000 ***
PCE: (Ideology)	-1.90 (0.16)	0.000 ***
PSOE:(Ideology)	-1.14 (0.11)	0.000 ***
AP:(Income)	0.17 (0.07)	0.016 *
PCE: (Income)	-0.01 (0.08)	0.905
PSOE: (Income)	-0.02 (0.06)	0.659

Table 7. Voting patterns in 1978. Prepared by the author based on CIS 1157 (N= 5350). McFadden R squared = 0.23. Log-Likelihood = -643.63. Frequency of parties PSOE 0.43 AP 0.13 PCE 0.16 UCD 0.26. Confidence level 0.95. Significance codes *** for 0,000 – 0.001, ** for 0.001 – 0.01, * for 0.01 – 0.05.

As one might expect, the variable of ideology has a high level of significance for all alternatives. Likewise, the variable of income is significant just for the political party AP. Taking the PSOE as reference, the estimation of ideology increases from left-wing to right-wing 1.84 for the AP and 1.14 for the UCD. However, the estimation of ideology decreases 0.75 for the PCE. These results are similar to the data shown in Table 6, where the ideological distance between the PSOE and the PCE was smaller than between the UCD and the AP because they largely shared the left position.

In addition, the income variable is significant for the AP compared to the PSOE. The estimation shows that the income increases 0.20 for the AP voters if we compare it to the PSOE. Nevertheless, income is not as significant for the rest of the parties as for PSOE.

By using the UCD as reference level, it can be observed that the ideological distance of the voters of the AP increases 0.70 towards the right-wing position. This case is in line with the data in Table 5 and is similar to the results obtained for the PSOE and PCE. Compared to the UCD, the ideology decreases 1.14 for the PSOE voters and 1.90 for the PCE supporters.

Similarly to the PSOE case, income is significant and increases 0.17 for the AP voters compared to the UCD. For the rest of the parties it is still irrelevant. It seems that income does not largely influence ideological positions but it influences the voting patterns regarding the AP.

The reason why the voters of the AP were characterised by a slight higher income compared to the voters of the rest of the parties can be found in the structure and the history of the party. According to Gunther et al. (1988: 78-92), the AP structure was formed by the old elites of Francoism and society which, despite its reformist and democratic character, defended several conservative positions. Although the UCD was also formed by a sector of Francoism, according to Gunther, the UCD leaders were mostly progressive and they were not a *clientelist* organization as the AP was. Therefore, the closeness of the AP to the old elites, whether political or economic, can be a good explanation for the higher income of AP voters.

The leverage of each political party with different social groups is illustrated in the following table:

	PCE	PSOE	UCD	AP	NA and others
Executives	7.22	18.07	15.66	19.27	39.88
Upper-level employees	3.00	22.00	20.00	15.00	40.00
Middle-level employees	6.27	20.92	17.99	2.92	51.90
Skilled workers	8.52	28.58	14.34	2.61	45.95
Unskilled workers	6.51	23.48	15.34	3.25	51.42
Farmworkers	8.18	19.88	20.46	4.38	47.10

Table 8. Distribution of Vote (%) by occupational group in 1978. Prepared by the author based on CIS 1157 (N= 5350).

Firstly, it is noticeable that the AP is the political party with the highest estimation of vote among the executive group. In addition, in the group of the upper-level employees, the AP still has a relevant percentage. Nonetheless, its estimation of vote decreases abruptly in the lower occupational categories.

The voting patterns clearly show a large support for the AP by high-level occupational groups and very little support by middle-level employees, workers and farmworkers. Moreover, the PSOE and the UCD had similar support from all occupational categories. The PSOE is ahead of the UCD in all categories, except in the category of farmworkers, where the share of the UCD is slightly higher than that of the PSOE. These results point out that the countryside was mostly

conservative, unlike other lower professional categories as skilled and unskilled workers, where the PSOE apparently took advantage.

Finally, the support to the PCE was approximately evenly distributed over all occupational categories. However, the PCE voters were limited compared to the PSOE or the UCD and to the AP in higher categories.

In Table 8 it can be seen that the PSOE and the UCD attracted most voters in all categories, except in higher categories, where the AP was predominant. Middle classes represented by middle-level employees were divided between the PSOE and the UCD. Typical working class groups, like the skilled and unskilled workers, also supported the PSOE and the UCD. Likewise, the farmworkers had a similar voting pattern. As happened before the dictatorship, the PCE lacked major support from the working classes. By contrast, the PSOE appeared to have the mastery of the left-wing workers.

Summarizing the results, it can be stated that all the political parties of the new party system, except the AP, were equally distributed across the main occupational categories. As shown in Table 7, there existed a significant difference of income for AP voters compared to the rest of the political parties and this result can be verified by looking at the data of Table 8.

3.3 Voting patterns in Madrid, Andalusia and Castile 1978

Another point of interest for this research are the territorial differences of voting. As has been seen in chapter 2, before 1936 the voting patterns varied by region. Thanks to the large sample and the structure of the survey of 1978, different regions of Spain can be analysed with a proper level of confidence according to the population by region at that time.

In the first instance, the study focuses on the voting patterns of Andalusia, Madrid and Castile in 1978 and, separately, on those of Catalonia and the Basque Country in later years. It has been deemed crucial to examine deeply the case of Catalonia and the Basque Country due to the presence of nationalism and parties that do not exist nationally. The survey of 1978 does not provide data for previous purposes, consequently, concrete surveys have been used for the aforementioned regions in different years.

The multinomial logit model shown in Table 7 has been put together by using stratified sampling of Andalusia, Madrid and Castile, taking as reference level the PSOE as main party. Table 9 shows the results obtained:

Voting patterns in Andalusia, Madrid and Castile. Year 1978. Reference level PSOE.

ANDALUSIA

Party: (Variable)	Estimate (Std. Error)	Significance (Code)
AP:(Intercept)	-12.76 (1.64)	0.000 ***
PCE:(Intercept)	0.50 (0.74)	0.499
UCD:(Intercept)	-5.15 (0.87)	0.000 ***
AP: (Ideology)	2.66 (0.32)	0.000 ***
PCE: (Ideology)	-0.70 (0.20)	0.000 ***
UCD: (Ideology)	1.35 (0.20)	0.000 ***
AP: (Income)	1.35 (0.20)	0.775
PCE: (Income)	0.10 (0.10)	0.350
UCD: (Income)	-0.04 (0.09)	0.612

N= 884. McFadden R squared 0.26. Log Likelihood -278.54. Frequency PSOE 0.45 AP 0.11 PCE 0.17 UCD 0.26.

MADRID

AP:(Intercept)	-12.19 (2.20)	0.000 ***
PCE:(Intercept)	1.68 (0.99)	0.090
UCD:(Intercept)	-6.14 (1.31)	0.000 ***
AP: (Ideology)	1.98 (0.36)	0.000 ***
PCE: (Ideology)	-0.59 (0.20)	0.004 **
UCD: (Ideology)	1.20 (0.24)	0.000 ***
AP: (Income)	0.45 (0.18)	0.016 *
PCE: (Income)	-0.14 (0.13)	0.284
UCD: (Income)	0.16 (0.13)	0.209

N= 456. McFadden R squared 0.22. Log Likelihood -173.53. Frequency PSOE 0.46 AP 0.10 PCE 0.22 UCD 0.20.

CASTILE

AP:(Intercept)	-7.44 (1.34)	0.000 ***
PCE:(Intercept)	2.78 (1.46)	0.057
UCD:(Intercept)	-4.80 (1.06)	0.000 ***
AP: (Ideology)	1.27 (0.21)	0.000 ***
PCE: (Ideology)	-1.37 (0.40)	0.000 ***
UCD: (Ideology)	0.97 (0.18)	0.000 ***
AP: (Income)	0.25 (0.14)	0.083
PCE: (Income)	-0.08 (0.17)	0.651
UCD: (Income)	0.13 (0.13)	0.301

N= 459. McFadden R squared 0.23. Log Likelihood -175.89. Frequency PSOE 0.37 AP 0.19 PCE 0.10 UCD 0.32.

Table 9. Voting patterns by region in 1978. Prepared by the author based on CIS 1157(N= 5350). Reference level PSOE. Confidence level 0.95. Significance codes *** for 0,000 – 0.001, ** for 0.001 – 0.01, * for 0.01 – 0.05.

In all religions examined in Table 9, the ideological variables of the respondents are highly significant. Nonetheless, regional variations exist in the grade of ideological change of individuals regarding the political parties studied.

For example, in Andalusia the voters of AP, compared to the PSOE, are located more towards the right-wing positions (2.66) than in Madrid (1.98) and Castile (1.27). This regional variation also exists in the UCD voters compared to the PSOE. The estimation for UCD voters compared to the PSOE in Andalusia is 1.35, whilst it is 1.20 in Madrid and 0.97 in Castile. By contrast, the estimation for PCE voters compared to the PSOE is -0.70 in Andalusia and -0.59 in Madrid; however, it is -1.37 in Castile.

The income variable is not significant in Andalusia and Castile but it is significant for AP voters compared to the PSOE in Madrid, with an estimation of 0.45. Conversely to national results shown in Table 7, by conducting the same model by regions, significant differences can be seen in the level of estimates, and even in the significance of variables.

By looking at the distribution of the variables examined in Table 9, it is possible to indicate where the differences lie:




Figure 6. Distribution of Ideology and Income by Region in 1978. Prepared by the author based on CIS 1157 (N=5350). Ideological scale (1) Far-left (7) Far-right. Income scale 1-9 (see appendix 1 for income intervals).

In Figure 6, the ideological distribution of Andalusia and Madrid tends towards the left-wing whilst, in Castile, it seems to be normally distributed. Likewise, the presence of outliers in right and left positions in Andalusia and Madrid can be observed. This helps to explain the greater ideological distance from left-wing to right-wing positions between AP and UCD voters compared to PSOE voters in Madrid and Andalusia.

Regarding the income distribution, Andalusia and Castile tend towards low income levels whereas Madrid has more high income levels compared to the lowest. Levels of income lower than average, apparently, did not affect the influence of the income variable in Castile and Andalusia between the AP and the PSOE regarding the voting patterns. Nonetheless, as happened in Madrid, a greater income level seems to increase the influence of the income on the voting patterns between the AP and the PSOE. Likewise, it is interesting to note that, according to the frequency of the alternatives displayed in Table 9, Madrid was the region with the lowest support for the AP (10%), whilst in Andalusia it was 11% and in Castile 19%.

This shows that, presumably, the voting patterns varied regionally in the case of the AP, since the income variable is significant in Madrid but does not explain the AP vote in Andalusia and Castile, therefore, the AP vote in Castile and Andalusia was based on other causes.

Previous results are strongly linked to historical facts described in previous chapters. Voting patterns in predominant agrarian regions of mainly low income might still be based on conservative issues rather than on income differences. By contrast, in industrialised regions such as Madrid, income and class differences could have defined voting patterns in 1978.

3.4 Voting Patterns in the Basque Country 1981

The Basque Country is an interesting case since, together with Catalonia, it had a strong nationalist movement before the dictatorship. As it has been already seen, the PNV was the biggest nationalist party and, at the beginning of the democracy, it remained the strongest nationalist party in the Basque Country.

Likewise, left-wing nationalist political parties emerged again. The ANV formed a coalition with other leftist forces in 1978, called *Herri Batasuna* (HB; Popular Unity). Furthermore, the *Euskadiko Ezkerra* (EE; Basque Left) was also born into the nationalist left of the Basque Country vying with the HB.

The rest of the national parties were also present in the Basque Country. The PSOE and the PCE continued to attract large amounts of votes in the Basque Country, as had occurred before the dictatorship. Similarly, the UCD and the AP were also represented in Basque politics.

For the purpose of confirming if the voting patterns are based on the ones before the dictatorship, in the model the birthplace has been chosen because it is a key point described in chapter 1. As has been pointed out, the origin of the population, mainly due to the emigration of non-Basque workers to the Basque Country in order to work in the industry, provided a large support towards non-purely nationalist parties, such as the PSOE and the PCE (see Heiberg, 1989; Kasmir, 1996).

A multinomial logit model has been put together using the survey of 1981 (CIS 1276) regarding the main national parties (AP, UCD, PSOE and PCE) and the nationalist parties (PNV, HB and EE). As explanatory variables, we have chosen to base the model on a dummy variable of birthplace, in which 0 is born in the Basque Country and 1 is in the rest of Spain, and a scalar discrete variable for occupational categories, in which 4 is the highest (executives) and 1 is the lowest (unskilled workers) (see appendix 2 for full categories caption). The dependent variable of alternatives is based on the question “which party would you vote for if general elections were held today?”.

Individual variables about conservative issues, such as religion, have not been included in the model because the survey does not provide data. Likewise, it has been avoided to include the respondents' ideology as explanatory variable because of potential inferences with the occupational categories. Therefore, the model setting has been carried out looking for a deep explanatory power on origin and professional category of the voting patterns in the Basque Country.

The PSOE, the PNV and the HB have been selected as reference levels of the model when displaying the results. The reason lies in the PSOE being the most frequent alternative and the PNV and the HB being, respectively, the main right-wing and left-wing nationalist parties. The AP alternative has been excluded from the model in order to avoid fitting errors, since it only represents 1% of the votes in the Basque Country.

Table 10 shows the results obtained by the PSOE, the PNV and the HB as reference levels and the previous explanatory variables:

Voting patterns in the Basque Country. Year 1981.

Party: Variable	Reference level PSOE		Reference level PNV		Reference level HB	
	Estimate (Std. Error)	Significance (code)	Estimate (Std. Error)	Significance (code)	Estimate (Std. Error)	Significance (code)
EE: (Intercept)	0.54 (1.48)	0.711	-1.90 (1.51)	0.210	-1.97 (1.94)	0.309
HB: (Intercept)	2.52 (1.44)	0.080	-0.06 (1.48)	0.962	-	-
PCE: (Intercept)	-1.02 (1.15)	0.375	-3.47 (1.21)	0.004 **	-3.54 (1.70)	0.037 *
PSOE: (Intercept)	-	-	-2.45 (0.79)	0.001 **	-2.52 (1.44)	0.080
PNV: (Intercept)	2.45 (0.79)	0.001 **	-	-	-0.06 (1.48)	0.962
UCD: (Intercept)	-2.74 (0.93)	0.003 **	-5.19 (1.02)	0.000 ***	-5.26 (1.60)	0.001 **
EE: (Birthplace)	-2.90 (1.07)	0.006 **	0.11 (1.14)	0.919	0.01 (1.48)	0.992
HB: (Birthplace)	-2.92 (1.07)	0.006 **	0.09 (1.14)	0.930	-	-
PCE: (Birthplace)	0.08 (0.56)	0.884	3.10 (0.69)	0.000 ***	3.00 (1.16)	0.009 **
PSOE: (Birthplace)	-	-	3.02 (0.52)	0.000 ***	2.92 (1.07)	0.006 **
PNV: (Birthplace)	-3.02 (0.52)	0.000 ***	-	-	-0.09 (1.14)	0.930
UCD: (Birthplace)	0.45 (0.42)	0.287	3.47 (0.57)	0.000 ***	3.37 (1.10)	0.002 **
EE: (Occupation)	0.65 (0.33)	0.050 *	0.02 (0.31)	0.929	0.96 (0.46)	0.039 *
HB: (Occupation)	-0.30 (0.39)	0.441	-0.93 (0.38)	0.016 *	-	-
PCE: (Occupation)	-0.34 (0.35)	0.331	-0.96 (0.36)	0.008 **	-0.03 (0.49)	0.941
PSOE: (Occupation)	-	-	-0.62 (0.21)	0.003 **	0.30 (0.39)	0.441
PNV: (Occupation)	0.62 (0.21)	0.003 **	-	-	0.93 (0.39)	0.016 *
UCD: (Occupation)	0.62 (0.22)	0.004 **	0.00 (0.23)	0.997	0.93 (0.41)	0.025 *

Table 10. Prepared by the author based on CIS 1276 (N= 964). Mc Fadden r squared 0.15. Log Likelihood -301.22. Frequency of parties HB 0.05 EE 0.05 PCE 0.07 PNV 0.31 PSOE 0.33 UCD 0.17. Confidence level 0.95. Significance codes *** for 0,000 – 0.001, ** for 0.001 – 0.01, * for 0.01 – 0.05.

Taking the PSOE as reference level and the birthplace as explanatory variable, it can be observed that the birthplace has only significance compared to the aforementioned nationalist parties: the PNV, the HB and the EE. By contrast, the vote related to the birthplace for national parties (the UCD and the PCE) lacks significance.

As might be expected, the estimation for the significant alternatives is negative, meaning that the vote for nationalist parties compared to the PSOE is more likely for respondents born in the Basque Country. It should be noted that the value of the estimates is almost equal for the HB (-2.92), the EE (-2.90) and the PNV (-3.02). Then, concerning the PSOE, there were no great differences in the vote related to the birthplace among the three main nationalist parties.

Regarding the professional occupation variable, only the UCD, the EE and the PNV hold significance compared to the PSOE. All of them have positive estimates; consequently, the expected estimation of vote for the UCD, the EE and the PNV compared to the PSOE increases in higher professional categories. Like in the previous variable, the estimates are almost equal among political parties. The UCD, just as the PNV, has 0.62 and the EE 0.65.

If the PNV is taken as reference level, the voting patterns are conceptually similar to the previous reference level. The likelihood of voting for national parties compared to the PNV increases equally for respondents born outside the Basque Country. The estimation for the UCD is slightly greater (3.47) than for the PSOE (3.02) and the PCE (3.10). The EE and the HB vote related to birthplace is not significant setting the PNV as reference level.

However, regarding the occupational variable, only the HB, the PSOE and the PCE have enough statistical significance. The expected value of vote for the HB compared to the PNV is -0.93, -0.96 for the PCE and -0.62 for the PSOE. These results illustrate that the likelihood of voting for the PSOE, the PCE and the HB is reduced in higher occupational categories.

Finally, if the HB is taken as reference level, the birthplace variable has explanatory power for the PSOE, the PCE and the UCD. Like in the case of the PNV, the estimates are positive and similar, which means more likelihood of voting for the referred political parties in respondents born outside the Basque Country.

The occupational variable is only significant for the EE, the PNV and the UCD. The estimates are 0.96 for the EE, 0.93 for the PNV and 0.93 for the UCD. Therefore, the expected values are positive, meaning that the likelihood of voting for the EE, the PNV and the UCD increases in higher professional categories compared to the HB.

Regarding the model adjustment, the McFadden R squared is 0.15, what represents an adequate fit for our purposes taking into account that it has not been possible to include other variables such as religion that, presumably, could have improved the adjustment and displayed new divisions among vote alternatives.

In general, the voting patterns of the Basque Country in 1981 were clearly divided by origin and professional categories.

Firstly, there is a division between nationalist parties, formed by the PNV, the HB and the EE, and non-nationalist parties, such as the UCD, the PSOE and the PCE, regarding the birthplace variable. Although the birthplace variable does not explicitly mean support for Basque nationalism, the respondents born in the Basque Country tend to support to a great extent the nationalist parties.

Secondly, another division arises from the professional categories and overlaps the voting patterns related to origin. In higher occupational categories is more likely to vote for the UCD, the PNV and the EE than for the PSOE, the PCE and the HB.

Table 10 confirms that, as happened before the dictatorship, in 1981 voters of lower professional categories and non-Basque origin were mainly distributed among the PSOE and the PCE. On the other hand, the HB attracted the lower-level professionals of Basque origin. In higher professional categories, the UCD was supported by non-Basque employees. Furthermore, the PNV and the EE shared the vote of Basque upper-level professionals. Consequently, the political division of voters of the PNV and the EE could lie in the socialist and Marxist features of the EE and the conservatism of the PNV.

3.5 Voting Patterns in Catalonia 1983

Catalonia has been analysed from the same perspective as the Basque Country. The aim of the analysis is to highlight the influence of origin and occupation on the voting patterns. As in the Basque Country, the main reason behind this kind of modelling is to verify if voting patterns are influenced by the occupational categories and the birthplace of voters.

However, unlike the case of the Basque Country, in chapter 2 it was shown that the vote in Catalonia was mainly distributed between the two main nationalist parties: the *Lliga* and the ERC. Likewise, the PSOE, which during the democratic transition obtained a great amount of votes from Catalonia, was a minor political party before the dictatorship. According to some authors (see Linz, 1967: 258; Anguera, 2001), the conclusive reasons stated in chapters 1 and 2 were that the power of anarcho-syndicalism in Catalonia and the birth of modern nationalism did not leave political bases for non-nationalist workers' parties, such as the PSOE or the PCE.

It is important to note that during the dictatorship and at the beginning of the democratic transition there existed internal migratory flows, mainly from southern regions of Spain to Catalonia, as well as to the Basque Country (see Capel, 1967: 81-83; Acosta, 2001: 43-48). The migration to the Catalan industrial areas was especially relevant in Catalonia during the 60s and 70s.

The CIS 1527 survey carried out in Catalonia in 1983 (N= 2399) has been used. The survey provides data regarding birthplace, occupational categories and, also, religiosity levels. Previous issues, such as the individual explanatory variables of voting patterns in Catalonia, have been taken into account. As an independent variable the following question has been used: "which party would you vote for if general elections were held tomorrow?" As has been done previously, the variable of individual ideology has not been included with the purpose of avoiding errors of collinearity with other explanatory variables.

The birthplace variable is dummy, where 1 is born in Catalonia and 2 is born outside Catalonia. In this case, the occupational variable is divided in five professional categories, where 1 is unskilled workers and 5 businesspeople. The religiosity variable is a discrete scale from 1 to 3, in which 1 is non-believer, 2 is practising Catholic and 3 is non-practising Catholic.

The PSOE has been selected as the first reference alternative because it was the most frequent alternative. Moreover, the two main political parties have also been chosen as reference levels. Firstly, the CIU, that might be considered to be the heir of the *Lliga Catalana* after the dictatorship, and secondly, the ERC, that emerged again during the democratic transition.

The following table shows the results obtained from the aforementioned model:

Voting patterns in Catalonia. Year 1983.

Party: Variable	Reference level PSC/PSOE		Reference level CIU		Reference level ERC	
	Estimate (Std. Error)	Significance (code)	Estimate (Std. Error)	Significance (code)	Estimate (Std. Error)	Significance (code)
AP: (Intercept)	-5.04 (1.23)	0.000 ***	-5.18 (1.30)	0.000 ***	-7.48 (1.76)	0.000 ***
PSC/PSOE: (Intercept)	-	-	-0.14 (0.72)	0.841	-2.44 (1.36)	0.073
CDS/UCD: (Intercept)	-4.20 (1.21)	0.000 ***	-4.34 (1.29)	0.000 ***	-6.64 (1.75)	0.000 ***
CIU: (Intercept)	0.14 (0.72)	0.841	-	-	-2.30 (1.42)	0.105
ERC: (Intercept)	2.44 (1.36)	0.073	2.30 (1.42)	0.105	-	-
PSUC/PCE: (Intercept)	0.56 (1.36)	0.551	0.42 (1.05)	0.684	-1.87 (1.55)	0.226
AP: (Religion)	1.11 (0.35)	0.001 **	0.53 (0.37)	0.156	1.33 (0.45)	0.003 **
PSC/PSOE: (Religion)	-	-	-0.58 (0.22)	0.009 **	0.22 (0.33)	0.507
CDS/UCD: (Religion)	0.24 (0.35)	0.484	-0.33 (0.37)	0.379	0.46 (0.45)	0.304
CIU: (Religion)	0.58 (0.22)	0.009 **	-	-	0.80 (0.34)	0.018 *
ERC: (Religion)	-0.22 (0.33)	0.507	-0.80 (0.34)	0.018 *	-	-
PSUC/PCE: (Religion)	-1.49 (0.34)	0.000 ***	-2.07 (0.37)	0.000 ***	-1.27 (0.43)	0.003 **
AP: (Birthplace)	-0.17 (0.41)	0.665	2.07 (0.49)	0.000 ***	3.32 (1.08)	0.002 **
PSC/PSOE: (Birthplace)	-	-	2.25 (0.35)	0.009 ***	3.50 (1.02)	0.000 ***
CDS/UCD: (Birthplace)	0.40 (0.43)	0.361	2.65 (0.51)	0.379	3.90 (1.09)	0.000 ***
CIU: (Birthplace)	-2.25 (0.35)	0.000 ***	-	-	1.24 (1.06)	0.242
ERC: (Birthplace)	-3.50 (1.02)	0.000 ***	-1.24 (1.06)	0.242	-	-
PSUC/PCE: (Birthplace)	-0.22 (0.40)	0.581	2.02 (0.50)	0.000 ***	3.27 (1.08)	0.002 **
AP: (Occupation)	0.33 (0.13)	0.012 *	-0.00 (0.13)	0.971	0.16 (0.17)	0.343
PSC/PSOE: (Occupation)	-	-	-0.33 (0.09)	0.000 ***	-0.16 (0.14)	0.251
CDS/UCD: (Occupation)	0.39 (0.14)	0.005 **	0.06 (0.14)	0.686	0.23 (0.18)	0.211
CIU: (Occupation)	0.33 (0.09)	0.000 ***	-	-	0.17 (0.14)	0.221
ERC: (Occupation)	0.16 (0.14)	0.251	-0.17 (0.14)	0.221	-	-
PSUC/PCE: (Occupation)	0.31 (0.14)	0.033 *	-0.02 (0.15)	0.862	0.14 (0.18)	0.431

Table 11. Prepared by the author based on CIS 1527 (N= 2399). Mc Fadden r squared 0.13. Log-likelihood -520.88. Frequencies of parties CIU 0.26 AP 0.07 ERC 0.07 CDS/UCD 0.06 PSC/PSOE 0.45 PSUC/PCE 0.07. Confidence level 0.95. Significance codes *** for 0,000 – 0.001, ** for 0.001 – 0.01, * for 0.01 – 0.05.

Noting the results displayed, it can be seen that all explanatory variables had some grade of significance in several alternatives and reference levels.

Beginning with the PSOE reference level and the religiosity variable, there exists statistical significance in the AP, the CIU and the PCE compared to the PSOE. As might be expected, in conservative parties such as the AP and the CIU, the estimation for religiosity increases 1.11 for the AP and 0.58 for the CIU compared to the PSOE. Moreover, the estimation for the PCE is -1.59 compared to the PSOE. It is important to note that for the CDS/UCD, compared to the PSOE alternative, there are not significant differences regarding the religious issue. Previous results illustrate the position held by the PSOE voters on the religious issue concerning the rest of the parties. The PSOE vote related to religion was located in a middle position between the conservative parties (the AP and the CIU) and the PCE. Furthermore, the differences in the religiosity level between the ERC and the CDS/UCD voters compared to the PSOE voters are irrelevant.

Turning now to the birthplace variable, predictably, both nationalist parties have differences of significance with the PSOE alternative. Estimates for the ERC and the CIU are -3.50 and -2.25 respectively, meaning that the probability to vote for the ERC and the CIU compared to the PSOE increases for individuals born in Catalonia. Likewise, there is no statistical relevance regarding birthplace linked to the PSOE alternative for the rest of the national parties.

Finally, the occupational category variable generates conclusive results. The AP, the CDS/UCD, the CIU and, remarkably, the PCE had positive and significant estimates. The estimates are approximately equal among them, compared to the PSOE alternative. The conclusion derived from those results is that the likelihood of voting for the AP, the CDS/UCD, the CIU and the PCE increased in higher occupational categories compared to the PSOE.

The results obtained about the PSOE and the PCE are particularly interesting. If we take a close look at the three explanatory variables, the differences between the PSOE and the PCE lie in the religiosity level and in the occupational category of voters. Whilst it is more likely to find PSOE voters in lower occupational categories with a greater religiosity level and not born in Catalonia, the PCE voters are upper-level employees with a lower religiosity level than the rest of the parties analysed and they are not born in Catalonia. Contrary to the intuitive relationships between the PSOE and the PCE, in Catalonia, the PSOE seemed to attract more voters among

lower-level employees than the PCE which, presumably, attracted more voters based on lowest level of religiosity than on professional category.

Establishing the CIU as reference level, all variables have some explanatory power. Religion is significant for the PSOE, the ERC and the PCE compared to the CIU. The biggest religious distance lies between the PCE and the CIU. The expected value of choosing the PCE compared to the CIU decreases -2.07 as the religiosity increases. Moreover, the estimates for the PSOE are -0.59 and -0.80 for the ERC regarding the religious issue.

Regarding the birthplace variable, the origin affects the voting patterns for the AP, the PCE and the PSOE compared to the CIU. The likelihood to vote for the AP, the PCE and the PSOE increases in voters born outside Catalonia compared to the CIU voters.

Furthermore, it is important to notice that the CDS/UCD lacks statistical significance regarding the birthplace variable compared to the CIU. This is particularly striking since the CDS/UCD was a non-nationalist national party. Likewise, voting patterns in the Basque Country (see Table 10) clearly displayed a division regarding the birthplace variable among the main nationalist parties (the PNV and the HB) and the UCD.

Turning now to the occupational variable, the PSOE is the only party which has a statistical significance of -0.33 compared to the CIU. The rest of the alternatives, including the ERC, have no significant choosing patterns related to the occupational category.

Overall, the three dependent variables included in the model explain the division of voting compared to the CIU concerning the PSOE (religion, birthplace and occupational category), the PCE (birthplace and religion), the ERC (religion) and the AP (birthplace). However, the model is unable to explain the choice patterns of the CDS/UCD compared to the CIU that, apparently, are based on other explanatory variables.

Finally, taking the ERC as reference level, the religion variable shows significance for the AP and the CIU alternatives. The estimates are positive for the AP (1.33) and the CIU (0.80). Consequently, the likelihood of voting for the AP compared to the ERC is greater than to the CIU compared to the ERC and increases in higher religiosity levels. On the other hand, the PCE estimate on the religiosity scale is negative compared to the ERC (-1.27). Once the analysis of

the three reference levels is finished, it can be stated that the PCE was the party with the least religious supporters of the three alternatives examined.

The birthplace variable is significant, positive and approximately similar for all national political parties compared to the ERC. It is interesting to note that, unlike the CIU alternative, the estimate compared to the ERC for the CDS/UCD is significant and the highest (3.90) of the rest of the national political parties. This result shows that the vote for the two main nationalist parties (the CIU and the ERC) compared to the CDS/UCD was much more polarized regarding the birthplace variable for the ERC than for the CIU.

Regarding the occupational variable, this variable is not significant for any political alternative compared to the ERC, meaning that the vote for the ERC compared to the rest of the political parties was not influenced by the occupational group of voters.

Once the results have been evaluated, it can be stated that the vote for the ERC compared to the rest of the parties examined was influenced in two dimensions (religion and birthplace), whilst the occupational category does not appear to be significant. The religiosity level influenced the vote for the AP and the CIU compared to the ERC. Moreover, the birthplace variable divided the vote between all national parties and the ERC.

By comparing the results obtained in 1983 with the voting patterns before the dictatorship, it can be observed that the PSOE attracted the majority of votes from lower occupational categories and people born outside Catalonia, something that was caused, presumably, by the immigration from other Spanish regions to Catalonia during the dictatorship. The PCE did not attract voters from lower occupational categories; by contrast, the PCE voters were upper-level professionals, born outside Catalonia and non-religious. Consequently, unlike before the dictatorship, the PSOE monopolised to a large extent the support of unskilled and skilled workers.

The rest of the parties were divided regarding other issues such as religion and birthplace. As happened with the *Lliga* during 1930s, the CIU attracted the vote from Catalan voters, religious people and, mainly, upper-level professionals compared to the PSOE. The ERC attracted votes from lower professional and Catalan voters, less religious people and from several economic groups. At this point, it can be stated that the differences between the two nationalist parties lie in social and conservative cleavages more than in a class cleavage.

The vote for national parties and nationalist parties was clearly divided by birthplace, except for the CDS/UCD and the CIU. The reasons why voters chose the CDS/UCD or the CIU could not be explained by our explanatory variables. Religiosity, birthplace and occupational categories seem to be similar for the CIU and the CDS/UCD voters. Perhaps the levels of agreement with nationalism or regarding territorial issues rather than the birthplace are a good explanatory variable for this case.

In conclusion, voting patterns in Catalonia varied after the dictatorship but social cleavages appear to be similar. Religion continues to play an important role in voting and affects voting among main nationalist and national political parties. The birthplace shows the cleavage between two groups of nationalist and non-nationalist parties in most cases. The class cleavage has weakened since it does not affect most parties except the PSOE, which occupied the place of the anarcho-syndicalists and attracted supporters from lower occupational categories, probably due to the immigration from other regions

3.4 Voting Patterns regarding Monarchy, Territory and Sociological Francoism

In previous chapters, the voting patterns concerning several variables have been studied. The results obtained from the models show that religion or income influenced, to a greater or lesser extent, the vote during the first years of the democratic transition. Other variables taken into account, such as the willingness to join a strike, illustrate possible divisions related to the rupture of the old political regime in 1978. Likewise, voting differences continued to be salient, both in inner regions and in Catalonia and the Basque Country. Income, occupational category and birthplace continued to affect the vote variations by region.

The purpose of this chapter is to clarify voting patterns related to previous concepts by using more suitable and accurate variables. To this end, religiosity and income have been kept as explanatory variables of vote alternatives because of their statistical significance. Moreover, besides religiosity and income, new variables from data of survey CIS 1441 of 1985 and CIS 2084 of 1994 have been introduced.

New variables of survey CIS 1441 of 1985 are a scale of preference among various forms of territorial organisations, democracy support and a dummy variable regarding the role of monarchy to ensure order and security. Such variables have been chosen with the aim to provide a better and extensive insight with regard to territorial cleavage, democracy and monarchy.

Likewise, a key point of this research lies in the influence of the previous regime on Spanish democracy. This issue has been addressed by using the new variables of the surveys of 1985 and 1994.

Firstly, the variables of 1985 about preferences regarding political regime and the monarchy as guarantor of social stability might be useful to identify potential divisions of vote on such issues. The preference of political regime might point out a vote related to specific political parties with *continuist* character, whilst the monarchy as guarantor of social stability might provide insights about the role of monarchy after the dictatorship in the new democratic context.

Secondly, by using data of 1994 two variables related to the confidence in the monarchy and the level of satisfaction during Francoism have been used. These two variables are conceptually different to previous ones. The monarchy variable measures the general level of confidence, which can be interpreted as social support for the monarchy. Moreover, the level of satisfaction during Francoism is strongly related to the idea of sociological Francoism. Several authors (Pintor, 1982; Montero & Torcal, 1990) explain sociological Francoism as the persistent social acceptance and the absence of political culture of the majority of Spaniards during the authoritarian regime and the democratic era due to the influence of the years of the dictatorship. From another point of view (see Recio, 2004), sociological Francoism persists even now as a network of interests and political support around the Francoist ideology and it owns a large part of the economic and political power. The variable about the level of satisfaction during Francoism can be used as rough index of the concept of sociological Francoism concerning the ideas of acceptance of an authoritarian regime and absence of opposition to it.

Regarding the territorial analysis, it has been seen that voting patterns varied regionally according to variables such as income. Nonetheless, despite the regional variations of voting patterns on variables related to the typical class cleavage or to conservative issues, the territorial cleavage in Spain is based on the territorial organization of the State.

Through the evolution of the Spanish party system by the 1980s, the PSOE and the AP/PP became the main parties, transforming the party system into a two-party system. However, the party system was imperfect due to the presence of peripheral nationalisms. In regions with nationalist movements, variables such as birthplace largely influenced voting patterns.

However, even though the vote in Catalonia or the Basque Country was influenced by the underlying nationalism, the problem of the territorial organization could have influenced the vote nationally by defining the vote between the two main national parties. For this reason, a scaling variable of agreement with different forms of territorial organization in Spain has been selected and it has been included in a multinomial logit model of voting alternatives between the PSOE and the AP/PP using data from the survey of 1985.

Furthermore, data of the survey of 1985 enable us to make a first approximation to the monarchy issue. In this case, the selected variable is a dummy variable related to the capacity of the monarchy to ensure order and stability, where 1 is agree and 0 is disagree. Although this variable does not conceptually reflect the level of support for the monarchy, it provides an approach about the role of the monarchy after the dictatorship. These results are particularly useful because Franco conferred the role of political continuity to the King Juan Carlos I and, as Powell stated (1997: 84), he served as institutional link between the authoritarian past and the democratic future. The question chosen can illustrate the level of acceptance of the monarchy as an institution that guarantees social stability concerning voting patterns. However, the interpretation about this variable is quite wide; therefore, the most feasible interpretations will be debated later according to the results obtained.

Finally, in the model of 1985, a variable related to preferences of political regime has been included. This variable is formed by 1 (democracy not preferable), 2 (in certain cases dictatorship) and 3 (democracy preferable). The selected variable will help us to reveal if a significant association exists between the grade of support for democracy or dictatorship and voting patterns. As before, this variable is related to the idea of continuity of the old regime and support for democracy.

The data of CIS 2084 of 1994 provides another two variables related to previous concepts. Firstly, the monarchy but, this time, in a scale from 0 to 10 regarding the level of confidence in relation with the monarchy. Secondly, a scale level of satisfaction with Francoism from 1 to 5. In this case, the variable about monarchy might be read as social support for the monarchy in an overall context and it can reveal the persistence of the monarchy-republic cleavage on voting patterns. As has been discussed previously, the variable of satisfaction during Francoism is related to the idea of sociological Francoism, that is, the acceptance of the authoritarian regime.

3.4.1 Voting Patterns in 1985

Before analysing voting patterns in 1985, the new variables provided by the data of 1985 have been included in a multiple linear regression where the dependent variable is the ideological range of respondents from 1 to 10. Monarchy, territorial organization and democracy support have been modelled together with the most relevant explanatory variables in previous models: religion and income.

Ideological self-placement in 1985 (1 Left-wing, 10 Right-wing)

Variable	Estimate (Std. Error)	Significance (Code)
Intercept	1.86 (0.42)	0.000 ***
Religion	1.00 (0.09)	0.000 ***
Territory	0.29 (0.06)	0.000 ***
Democracy	-0.18 (0.10)	0.071
Monarchy	0.04 (0.13)	0.753
Income	0.10 (0.04)	0.015 *

Table 12. Prepared by the author based on CIS 1441 (N= 1199). R squared 0.20. Adjusted R squared 0.20. Confidence level 0.95. Significance codes *** for 0,000 – 0.001, ** for 0.001 – 0.01, * for 0.01 – 0.05.

The significant variables of the model are the religiosity level and income, as well as the new variable about the territorial organization. Both the support of democracy and the monarchy variable seem not to be significant for explaining individuals' ideological positions. The goodness of fit of the model is 0.20 according to the adjusted squared index.

The religiosity level continues to be the explanatory variable with higher estimation (1.00), meaning that, at greater levels of religiosity, the individuals' ideology moves towards right-wing positions. The variable about territorial organization is below religiosity and its estimate is 0.29. This result shows that right-wing positions are related to the preference for a more centralised state. Likewise, income level continued to define the ideological positions in 1985. The estimation of the model for the income variable is 0.10. The income estimate in this model is slightly greater than in the model of 1978. This result shows that income, typically related to the class cleavage, might have persisted and strengthened during the 1980s. The negotiations between trade unions and the government for the former to become institutionalised resulted in a period with general strikes and in the rupture between trade unions and political parties (see Hamann & Martínez, 2003; Luque, 2012). This factors could have been influenced by the salience of the income, typically associated to the class cleavage, on ideological positions.

The monarchy variable is irrelevant in this model. Therefore, the role of the monarchy as guarantor of order and social stability does not divide the ideological positions of society along left-wing and right-wing. Likewise, the preference between democracy or an authoritarian

regime does not influence the ideological self-placement. Consequently, the type of political system and the institutional role of the monarchy do not seem to be significant in the Spanish ideological positions of 1985. Nonetheless, the typical social and class-cleavage issues such as religion, territory and income continue to define the ideological self-placement.

The same explanatory variables have been included in a multinomial logit model of voting patterns. The AP, the CDS, the PSOE and the PCE have been selected as alternatives and the results of the AP and the PSOE are displayed as reference. As it has been done previously, the aim is to reveal the variations of vote related to the aforementioned variables since they could differ from the ideological self-placement. Table 13 shows the results obtained:

Party: Variable	Reference level PSOE		Reference level AP	
	Estimate (Std. Error)	Significance (code)	Estimate (Std. Error)	Significance (code)
AP: (intercept)	-7.62 (1.20)	0.000 ***	-	-
CDS: (intercept)	-5.28 (1.34)	0.000 ***	2.33 (1.60)	0.145
PCE: (intercept)	2.11 (1.44)	0.143	9.72 (1.83)	0.000 ***
PSOE: (intercept)	-	-	7.62 (1.20)	0.000 ***
AP: (Religion)	1.63 (0.26)	0.000 ***	-	-
CDS: (Religion)	0.89 (0.28)	0.001 **	-0.73 (0.34)	0.034
PCE: (Religion)	-0.86 (0.33)	0.010 *	-2.50 (0.41)	0.000 ***
PSOE: (Religion)	-	-	-1.63 (0.26)	0.000 ***
AP: (Territory)	0.68 (0.16)	0.000 ***	-	-
CDS: (Territory)	0.33 (0.19)	0.090	-0.35 (0.22)	0.119
PCE: (Territory)	-0.70 (0.25)	0.006 **	-1.38 (0.29)	0.000 ***
PSOE: (Territory)	-	-	-0.68 (0.16)	0.000 ***
AP: (Democracy)	-0.09 (0.21)	0.660	-	-
CDS: (Democracy)	-0.18 (0.26)	0.485	-0.09 (0.28)	0.749
PCE: (Democracy)	-0.30 (0.36)	0.392	-0.21 (0.40)	0.595
PSOE: (Democracy)	-	-	0.09 (0.21)	0.660
AP: (Income)	0.28 (0.09)	0.001 **	-	-
CDS: (Income)	0.24 (0.10)	0.023 *	-0.03 (0.12)	0.747
PCE: (Income)	0.08 (0.14)	0.557	-0.19 (0.16)	0.235
PSOE: (Income)	-	-	-0.28 (0.09)	0.001 ***
AP: (Monarchy role)	-0.75 (0.28)	0.008 **	-	-
CDS: (Monarchy role)	-0.06 (0.36)	0.868	-0.69 (0.40)	0.082
PCE: (Monarchy role)	-1.00 (0.45)	0.026 *	-0.24 (0.51)	0.633
PSOE: (Monarchy role)	-	-	0.75 (0.28)	0.008 **

Table 13. Voting patterns in 1985. Prepared by the author based on CIS 1441(N= 1199). McFadden R squared 0.15. Frequency of Parties: AP 0.21 CDS 0.10 PCE 0.05 PSOE 0.62. Log-Likelihood: -391.16. Confidence level 0.95. Significance codes *** for 0,000 – 0.001, ** for 0.001 – 0.01, * for 0.01 – 0.05. Explanation about variables and methodology in appendix 3.

All explanatory variables, except the democracy or dictatorship support, have significance with some alternative for both the PSOE and the AP. The goodness of fit of the model is 0.15 for such variables.

Taking the PSOE as reference level, the religiosity level influences the vote division among all other alternatives. The greatest religious distance with the PSOE voters lies with the AP voters. The estimate is 1.63 for AP voters compared to PSOE voters. Likewise, the CDS voters are more

religious than PSOE voters. Nonetheless, the religiosity level decreases in PCE voters compared to the PSOE voters.

On the other hand, taking the AP as reference level, the influence of religion still remains, compared to PSOE and PCE voters. However, the religiosity level does not produce differences between AP and CDS voters. As would be expected, the PCE voters have the largest negative estimate (-2.50), whilst the PSOE has -1.63. It can be seen that both the AP and the PCE were the most polarized alternatives regarding the religious issue.

It is the first time in this research that religion is introduced as a distinctive explanatory variable of voting patterns nationally. Previously, it has been used to analyse the ideological self-placement in 1978 and the voting patterns in Catalonia, showing strong significance as well. The results illustrate the remarkable significance of religion in Spanish voting patterns, since it divides vote preferences among the major political parties.

Furthermore, these results are in accord with previous research (Torcal & Montero, 1997; Calvo, Martínez & Montero, 2006) that state the persistence of religion as an influencing factor on the Spanish party system during the 1980s and onwards. Concretely, the study of Calvo, Martínez and Montero (2006) points out that religion in Spain, unlike in Portugal, also affected the ideological self-placement. Portugal is used as comparative case because of its similarities. Table 12 shows the same insights about the ideological identities of Spaniards in 1985.

The new variable about preferences of territorial organization shows compelling results. If the PSOE is taken as reference, the preferences about the territorial organization affected the voter alignments for the AP and the PCE voters. The likelihood of voting for the AP compared to the PSOE rises as the preferences for a more centralised State increase. On the other hand, the likelihood of voting for the PCE compared to the PSOE rises as the preferences for lower levels of centralisation increase. The territorial variable does not seem to influence the CDS compared to the PSOE.

If the AP is used as reference level, territorial preferences affected the vote for the PSOE and the PCE compared to the AP. The likelihood of voting for the PSOE and the PCE compared to the AP increases in preferences of a less centralised State. Moreover, the likelihood is higher for PCE voters than for PSOE voters. As in the case of the PSOE, the territorial preferences, apparently, do not influence the choice of voting for the CDS or the AP.

The new variable about preferences of territorial organization represents another conceptual approach about the territorial issue in Spain. As has been seen previously, the vote was fragmented by peripheral nationalisms in regions such as Catalonia and the Basque Country, where variables as birthplace played an important role in the voting patterns. Nonetheless, as has been discussed in the historical review, the presence of peripheral nationalisms has also encouraged an ongoing debate about which territorial organization is more suitable for Spain.

The results displayed in Table 13 show that this debate influenced voting patterns in 1985 at a national level. Likewise, some other reasons have been given for explaining such debate. According to Stapell (2007), Spain developed several regional, national or mixed identities after Francoism, not only within or caused by nationalist regions, such as Catalonia and the Basque Country, but in all regions of Spain. From Stapell's point of view, this might be caused by a response to the Francoist legacy, the formation of the autonomic State and the modern supranationalism as a result of the accession to the European Union (Stapell, 2007: 181-182). A previous research conducted by Bollen and Medrano (1998) highlights some of such insights by showing several levels of national identity regionally.

As seen in Table 12, the variable of preferences towards democracy or dictatorship does not affect the voting patterns of any party in the model of 1985. Consequently, neither the ideological self-placement in 1985 along right-wing and left-wing identities nor the voting patterns were divided by an eventual democracy-dictatorship cleavage after Francoism. This result contrasts with previous research related to a similar study case. According to conclusions of Katz and Alvarez (2009) about Chilean voting patterns in the 2005 election, preferences of democracy influenced the choice between the Chilean political alternatives. However, preferences about form of government in our model are not directly linked to the support or not for Francoism, understood as a social and value system. This approach to Francoism will be studied in the following chapter.

Concerning the income variable, if the PSOE is taken as reference, it has significance for alternatives of the CDS and the AP. The income appears not to affect the choice between the PSOE and the PCE in the model. The estimates related to income of the CDS and the AP compared to the PSOE are almost equal, 0.24 and 0.28 respectively. The likelihood of voting for the AP or the CDS compared to the PSOE increases in higher income ranges. If the AP is selected as reference, the results only show significance for the PSOE choice. Remarkably, the PCE alternative concerning the income is not significant compared to the AP.

At this point, it can be observed that income continued to influence voting patterns by 1985. In this case, there is an obvious division between the PSOE, on the one hand, and the CDS and the AP. This result differs partially from data of the model of 1978, where income only influenced the AP alternative.

Moreover, income is not significant for choosing the PCE compared to the PSOE and the AP. This result matches the conclusions of the model for Catalonia in 1983. Likewise, the vote for the PCE is also marginal (0.05) compared to the PSOE (0.62). The PSOE alternative attracted the largest part of the population with lower income levels, whilst the CDS and the AP attracted higher income ranges. The vote for the PCE concerning income was not mainly distributed neither in low nor high income levels; by contrast, the vote for the PCE seems to be mainly based on social issues, as the religiosity variable shows.

Finally, the dummy variable concerning the role of the monarchy as guarantor of order and stability displays interesting results. Taking the PSOE as reference level, this variable is significant for the AP and the PCE. Both estimates are negative and have a value of -0.75 for the AP and -1.00 for the PCE. If the AP is taken as reference, the monarchy variable is only significant for the PSOE alternative. In this case, the monarchy variable does not reach the minimum significance for influencing the vote between the CDS and the AP.

Looking closer at the meaning of this variable and the results obtained, it can be observed that neither the AP nor the PCE supporters agreed with the role of the monarchy as guarantor of order and stability. This idea could have influenced their voting choice compared to the PSOE, according to the alternatives set as references. By taking into account their ideologies, this might be explained by the polarisation of both of them at opposite ends on the ideological spectrum. The AP has been pointed out by some authors (see Gunther, 1988) as a party which attracted

votes from Francoist sectors of the population. Therefore, some voters of the AP might have lacked confidence in the ability of the monarchy to ensure social stability.

On the other hand, the results related to the PCE are more understandable because of its republican and Marxist character. It is interesting to note that the vote was not significantly opposed to the role of the monarchy as guarantor of social stability; by contrast, of all the alternatives analysed, it is the alternative with the largest support in such a role. This result contrasts with the performance of the PSOE concerning the monarchy before the dictatorship.

As it has been seen, according to Andrade (1979) the PSOE changed its ideology from pure Marxist ideals to more moderate positions during the first years of the 21st century. According to some historians (Lamelas, 2003; Blanco & Andrade, 2010), over the democratic transition, the PSOE changed again its ideological position by accepting the new government model, including the monarchy, and approaching European social-democracy. The acceptance of the monarchy by the PSOE could have been reflected in the moderation of their voters regarding the monarchy.

3.4.2 Sociological Francoism, monarchy endorsement and voting patterns in 1994

In this chapter, two new variables related to monarchy and Francoism have been included by using data of 1994. As has been stated in the introduction, the variable about monarchy is, in this case, a confidence scale from 0 to 10. This variable is conceptually different to the previous one and it intends to be a rough index of the endorsement of the monarchy.

Additionally, the concept of sociological Francoism defined previously has been approached using a variable about the satisfaction with the Francoist era from 1 to 5. Likewise, the satisfaction with the democratic transition has been analysed using the same scale.

Satisfaction with Francoism and with the democratic transition have been modelled in a multiple linear regression taking into account religiosity, endorsement of the monarchy and income. The purpose is to reveal causal relationships between the new variables and the rest of the explanatory variables before setting up the final model of voting patterns, as well as to illustrate new insights.

Before explaining the results derived from the aforementioned models, it is appropriate to discuss briefly the distribution of satisfaction with Francoism and the democratic transition, which will help to draw a first point of view about the issue:

Francoism	Democratic Transition					Total
	Very satisfied	Satisfied	Neutral	Unsatisfied	Very unsatisfied	
Very satisfied	1.04	1.41	0.56	0.84	0.32	4.17
Satisfied	2.45	12.25	2.25	1.69	0.08	18.72
Neutral	1.57	9.79	4.67	0.92	0.16	17.11
Unsatisfied	4.11	20.24	1.93	1.33	0.08	27.69
Very unsatisfied	5.76	8.91	1.89	0.92	0.48	17.96
Total	14.93	52.96	11.3	5.7	1.12	86.01/85.65 ^a

Table 14. Frequencies (%) of satisfaction with Francoism and the democratic transition in 1994. ^a Francoism has an error rate of 13.99% that includes not available data, not response and approximation errors. The Democratic Transition has an error rate of 14.35% that includes not available data, not response and approximation errors. CIS 2084. N= 2485.

Francoism is almost equally distributed from *very unsatisfied* to *satisfied*, but only 4.17% of the respondents were very satisfied with the Francoist era. By contrast, the great majority of responses about the democratic transition (79.19%) are gathered in categories from *neutral* towards *very satisfied*. On a subjective basis, respondents were mainly more satisfied with the democratic transition than with Francoism but, neutrality or satisfaction with Francoism was not marginal since 40% of the respondents were neutral, satisfied or very satisfied with the Francoist era.

A closer look at the main response rates reveals that 20.24% of the respondents were dissatisfied with Francoism but satisfied with the democratic transition. Nonetheless, the second largest rate (12.5%) is for those satisfied with both Francoism and the democratic transition. The third largest rate was 9.79% for those neutral with Francoism and satisfied with the democratic transition. Overall, Table 14 shows that, generally, the population was satisfied with the democratic transition and was divided about the satisfaction with Francoism.

The following table displays the results of the model carried out on both scales of satisfaction concerning religiosity level, endorsement of the monarchy and income:

Level of satisfaction with the Francoist era (1 Very unsatisfied, 5 Very satisfied)

Variable	Estimate (Std. Error)	Significance (Code)
Intercept	1.26 (0.15)	0.000 ***
Religion	0.53 (0.05)	0.000 ***
Monarchy	0.02 (0.01)	0.001 **
Income	0.00 (0.02)	0.672

R squared 0.10. Adjusted R squared 0.10.

Level of satisfaction with the democratic transition (1 Very unsatisfied, 5 Very satisfied)

Variable	Estimate (Std. Error)	Significance (Code)
Intercept	3.16 (0.10)	0.000 ***
Religion	0.01 (0.03)	0.617
Monarchy	0.07 (0.01)	0.000 ***
Income	0.06 (0.02)	0.000 ***

R squared 0.05. Adjusted R squared 0.05.

Table 15. Prepared by the author based on CIS 2084 (N= 2485).

In the first model, it can be observed that the religiosity level and the endorsement of the monarchy affect the levels of satisfaction with the Francoist era positively. Satisfaction increase with Francoism is remarkably large in the religiosity variable (0.53). The monarchy variable, although significant, is quite small (0.02) compared to the religiosity level. Income seems not to be an explanatory variable of satisfaction with Francoism.

On the other hand, the satisfaction with the democratic transition seems to be just positively affected by the endorsement of the monarchy and income. The religiosity level does not influence neither negatively nor positively the satisfaction with the democratic transition. As in the previous model, the increase of satisfaction with the democratic transition is fairly small in regard to monarchy (0.07) and income (0.06).

It should be emphasised that the results in Table 15 do not compare both cases, only the level of satisfaction in both cases concerning the explanatory variables is analysed. As a general point, even though a logistic model comparing Francoism and the democratic transition as alternatives has not been carried out, religion seems to be a key explanatory variable of the differences between satisfaction with Francoism and the democratic transition. Satisfaction with both government forms rises as the endorsement of the monarchy increases, whilst the income level seems to increase slightly as satisfaction with the democratic transition grows.

Finally, voting patterns have been modelled taking the PSOE and the *Partido Popular* (PP; People's Party) (refounding of the AP in 1989) as reference levels. A new party called *Izquierda Unida* (IU; United Left), constituted in 1986 as a federation of the PCE, the PSUC and the IR,

among others, has also been included. Vote alternatives have been linked with religion, income, endorsement of the monarchy and satisfaction with Francoism. Due to the possible inference between satisfaction with Francoism and the religiosity level, two models are displayed: one with the religion variable and one without it. Table 16 shows the results obtained:

Voting patterns in 1994

Party: Variable	With religion				Without religion			
	Reference level PSOE		Reference level PP		Reference level PSOE		Reference level PP	
	Estimate (Std. Error)	Significance (code)						
IU: (Intercept)	1.04 (0.69)	0.137	1.69 (0.79)	0.000 ***	-0.77 (0.54)	0.153	-1.83 (0.58)	0.001 **
PP: (Intercept)	-0.65 (0.59)	0.266	-	-	1.05 (0.42)	0.013 *	-	-
PSOE: (Intercept)	-	-	0.65 (0.59)	0.000 ***	-	-	-1.05 (0.42)	0.013 *
IU: (Religion)	-0.74 (0.19)	0.000 ***	-1.46 (0.23)	0.000 ***	-	-	-	-
PP: (Religion)	0.71 (0.16)	0.000 ***	-	-	-	-	-	-
PSOE: (Religion)	-	-	-0.71 (0.16)	0.000 ***	-	-	-	-
IU: (Income)	0.07 (0.08)	0.361	-0.31 (0.09)	0.000 ***	0.11 (0.07)	0.154	-0.23 (0.08)	0.008 **
PP: (Income)	0.39 (0.06)	0.000 ***	-	-	0.34 (0.06)	0.000 ***	-	-
PSOE: (Income)	-	-	-0.39 (0.06)	0.000 ***	-	-	-0.34 (0.06)	0.000 ***
IU: (Monarchy)	-0.26 (0.04)	0.000 ***	-0.20 (0.04)	0.000 ***	-0.28 (0.03)	0.000 ***	-0.27 (0.04)	0.000 ***
PP: (Monarchy)	-0.05 (0.03)	0.185	-	-	-0.00 (0.03)	0.817	-	-
PSOE: (Monarchy)	-	-	-0.05 (0.03)	0.185	-	-	0.00 (0.37)	0.817
IU: (Francoism)	-0.20 (0.10)	0.060	-0.98 (0.12)	0.000 ***	-0.29 (0.10)	0.005 **	-1.13 (0.11)	0.000 ***
PP: (Francoism)	0.77 (0.07)	0.000 ***	-	-	0.84 (0.07)	0.000 ***	-	-
PSOE: (Francoism)	-	-	-0.77 (0.07)	0.000 ***	-	-	-0.84 (0.07)	0.000 ***

Mc Fadden R squared 0.20. Log-Likelihood -640.28. Mc Fadden R squared 0.16. Log-Likelihood -690.7.

Table 16. Voting Patterns in 1994. Prepared by the author based on CIS 2084 (N= 2485). Frequency of parties PSOE 0.50 PP 0.21 IU 0.13

In the first model, all variables have some level of significance with some alternative for the two reference levels. If the PSOE is taken as reference level, religion affects the vote for the PP (0.71) and the IU (-0.74). The likelihood of voting for the IU decreases in higher religiosity levels, whilst it increases for the PP compared to the PSOE. This concurs with previous findings: the PSOE occupies an intermediate position between the right-wing (PP/AP) and the far-left (IU/PCE) regarding the religious issue. Income is statistically significant for the PP alternative compared to the PSOE. The value of the estimate (0.39) is similar to those seen in the model of 1985. Like the results displayed in Table 13, the IU vote is not significant compared to the PSOE. Endorsement of the monarchy affects the vote for the IU compared to the PSOE. The likelihood of voting for the IU decreases as the support of the monarchy increases. Satisfaction with Francoism generates interesting results: the probability of voting for the PP compared to the PSOE increases as the satisfaction with the Francoist era grows.

Regarding the second model, the religion variable has not been included and the results showed a goodness of fit of 0.16, 0.04 less than in the previous model. Moreover, the estimates have not changed significantly with respect to the previous model. The major variance lies in the fact that, by removing the religion variable, the estimation of satisfaction with Francoism results significant for the IU alternative compared to the PSOE.

Broadly, the religiosity level still played a remarkable role in 1994 by dividing the vote of all main parties. However, according to McDonough, Barnes and Pina (1998), the influence of religion on ideological identities and satisfaction with Francoism was decreasing over the democratic transition. As has been analysed in Table 13 and Table 15, and consistent with the conclusions of McDonough, Barnes and Pina (1998: 28-30), the attitudes towards democracy appear not to be significantly affected by religion or the satisfaction with Francoism. Consequently, the influence of a democracy-dictatorship cleavage on voting patterns and ideological identities is barely feasible. By contrast, the influence of Francoism, understood as a cultural and social system strongly related to religion and other issues (see Pintor, 1982; Montero & Torcal, 1990; McDonough, Barnes & Pina, 1998; Recio, 2004), seems to have influenced Spanish politics during the democratic transition and onwards.

Furthermore, endorsement of the monarchy does not affect the voting choice of the two main parties, the PSOE and the PP. By contrast, it is significant when voting for the IU compared to the PSOE and the PP. It can be observed that the royalism ceased to affect, negatively or

positively, the voting choice between the main parties. Only the vote for the main far-left party (IU) was negatively affected. This result contrasts with the voting patterns before and during the Second Republic, but it could be related to the two-party system in the 19th century. Therefore, the republic-monarchy cleavage could be eventually considered a salient cleavage and not a lifelong cleavage, as are religion or territory.

3.5 Discussion

Throughout the analysis of the ideological identities and the voting patterns after the dictatorship, several findings and insights have been obtained regarding the significance of the factors stated by several authors in chapter 1 and the data in chapter 2.

By studying the data of 1978, we can observe the strong importance of religion and the willingness to join a strike for defining ideological self-placement to the detriment of income. This underlines the salience of social issues rather than a pure class division related to income level on the ideological axis shortly after the dictatorship (see post-materialist process in Torcal & Montero, 1997; Linz & Montero, 1999). As Table 7 and 8 show, the income level and the occupational category are only relevant for defining the vote for the AP, whilst the occupational category is equally distributed among the remaining political parties. Likewise, the voting patterns in 1978 were divided on this ideological axis among four political parties ideologically well-differentiated: the PCE (far-left), the PSOE (left), the UCD (centre-right) and the AP (far-right).

Unlike variables such as religion, that remain significant in all the analysis, income and other indexes related to class varied according to year and region. For example, income influenced the vote for the AP in Madrid in 1978, but was irrelevant in Andalusia and Castile, where ideology defined the voting patterns. By contrasting the distributions in figure 6 and the results in Table 13, it can be observed that lower income rates did not affect the right-wing self-placement and the vote for the AP in Castile and Andalusia compared to Madrid. Similarly, the vote influenced by occupational categories varied in the Basque Country and Catalonia. In the Basque Country, the PCE and the PSOE voters were lower-level professionals, whilst in Catalonia the PCE voters were upper-level employees compared to the PSOE. Consequently, the vote for right-wing or left-wing parties could have been influenced by income rates in those richer regions (Madrid, Basque Country or Catalonia) and by ideological issues in those poorer regions (Castile or Andalusia).

The vote for the PCE was marginal and not strongly linked to the income level. For instance, in 1985 the PCE vote was not influenced by income compared to the AP, whilst the vote for the PSOE was. It can be observed that the PSOE was the party with the largest support among the lower-level occupational categories and low income levels.

Although income as voting explanation was significant only in certain cases, it seems to gain importance over the years, leading to a greater disparity between left-wing and right-wing parties. In 1985, income influenced the vote for the AP and the CDS compared to the PSOE (see Table 13). In 1994, income influenced the vote for the IU and the PSOE compared to the PP (see Table 16), but also the vote for the IU compared to the PSOE in the second model. It is important to note that the increasing significance of the income level coincided concurrently with the merging of political parties and the development of an imperfect two-party system.

Concerning the centre-periphery cleavage, it has been studied in two conceptual dimensions. Firstly, the divisions of vote regarding birthplace in Catalonia and the Basque Country are highly significant. A clear division of vote between nationalist and national parties existed, which largely intersects with religion or class as explanatory variables of vote. Secondly, as previous works have stated (see Bollen & Medrano, 1998; Stapell, 2007), the preferences regarding territorial organization are also highly remarkable for explaining the social context and the vote choice nationally after the dictatorship. As Table 13 shows, the PCE voter tended towards decentralisation, whilst the AP voter tended towards centralisation. The PSOE and the CDS voters occupied central positions regarding this issue, but the PSOE voters were more in favour of the decentralisation than the CDS voters.

The monarchy-republic cleavage has been studied under two ideas highlighted over the research: the role of the monarchy after the dictatorship and the endorsement of it. The role of the monarchy as guarantor of order and social stability was not significant for defining ideological self-placement, but it affected the voting patterns in 1985. The AP and the PCE voters mostly disagreed about the role of the monarchy, whilst voters of the major parties (the PSOE and the CDS) agreed on it. Moreover, the endorsement of the monarchy seemed to encourage the satisfaction with both Francoism and the democratic transition, but the endorsement of the monarchy was negatively linked to the vote for the IU in 1994 compared the PSOE and the PP.

In general, the monarchy was inconsequential in moderate positions of the ideological axis for defining ideology or vote. This is confirmed by observing that the monarchy affected the vote negatively only in far-left parties, such as the PCE or the IU, and in far-right parties such as the AP. Consequently, the influence of the monarchy as explanatory variable was confined to small and ideologically polarized alternatives.

Finally, the influence of Francoism on ideology and vote has been studied from two approaches. Firstly, by assuming that Francoism encouraged a dictatorship-democracy cleavage, understood as a form of government, and which affected vote and ideological identities. Secondly, by taking into account the effect of the dictatorship on society as a social and value system, what has been named sociological Francoism (see Pintor, 1982; Montero & Torcal, 1990; Recio, 2004).

The results reveal that preferences about form of government did not have any effect on ideological identities or voting patterns in 1985. By contrast, the concept of sociological Francoism was strongly influenced primarily by religion and, in turn, sociological Francoism mainly encouraged the vote for the PP compared to left-wing parties in 1994. Consequently, the Francoist era affected post-dictatorship voting patterns and ideological identities by involving specific positions on life-long cleavages, as high religiosity levels, rather than the endorsement of an authoritarian regime.

Overall Conclusions

Throughout the study of the pre-dictatorship era and the years after its end, it can be observed how several determinant factors of Spanish politics have remained unchanged. Nonetheless, those specific factors have varied in their importance and have taken various forms by region and over the years.

Concurring with previous research (see Torcal & Montero, 1997; McDonough, Barnes & Pina, 1998; Coller, 2004) and this study, one of the most salient cleavages is the religion and every respect related to it. Over the analysis, we have seen the high influence of it on defining ideological identities, vote and the development of the party system, before and after the dictatorship.

The centre-periphery cleavage has also been highly relevant for the definition of Spanish politics during centuries. This cleavage affected both the vote and the ideological identities within nationalist regions and in the whole country, by encouraging people to vote for nationalist

parties and by opening an ongoing debate about territorial organization, likely caused by the reshaping of post-dictatorship territorial identities (see Bollen & Medrano, 1998).

The class cleavage was and remains determinant when voting in some cases. From the history of the pre-dictatorship era (see Linz, 1967: 263) and the vote distributions of the Second Republic, the class issues largely intersected with more salient cleavages, such as religion or territory. The ambiguous positions of the PSOE (the main class-oriented party) about nationalism or the presence of the traditionalism and the CEDA in certain poor regions and social sectors in contrast to anarcho-syndicalism or socialism, confirm such conclusions. Likewise, the analysis conducted after the dictatorship seems to reveal that income significance was a weak explanatory variable in certain cases. For example, it differed depending on region in 1978, and voting for the PCE was not affected by income level but it was strongly influenced by religion.

Monarchy was, likely, the less salient long-term explanatory variable of vote and ideology among those aforementioned. The monarchy-republic cleavage played an important role before and after the constitution of the Second Republic, but the new party system focused rapidly on issues related to religion, territory or class. The voting patterns for the main parties after the dictatorship were clearly not influenced by issues related to the monarchy. Neither the role of the monarchy, nor its endorsement, affected the vote for the PSOE, the CDS and, later, the PP. After the dictatorship, rejection of the monarchy arose from far-left and far-right parties partially close to Francoism.

Concerning the role of Francoism for defining the post-dictatorship party system, the analysis has revealed that no division of attitudes towards democracy or dictatorship (understood as a form of government) existed regarding voting patterns and ideological identities in 1985. By contrast, Francoism, understood as a social and value system (Pintor, 1982; Montero & Torcal, 1990; Recio, 2004), affected both voting patterns and ideological identities. Religion was pointed out as strongly correlated to sociological Francoism and voting patterns, in turn, were also divided by sociological Francoism in 1994.

These final insights show that Francoism erupted by holding specific ideological positions on the aforementioned social cleavages and that such specific positions remained together as a set of ideals that influenced Spanish voting patterns during the democracy.

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Appendix 1. CIS 1157

Data treatment of CIS Number 1157 July 1978

Stratified sampling N = 5350 nationally

Variables

P.14. *What party would you vote in next general elections?* (Nominal)

AP (1) PSOE (2) PCE (3) UCD (4) Other Parties (5, 6, 7, 8) NA (9).

AP (1), PSOE (2), PCE (3), UCD (4) set as alternatives in multinomial model. Other Parties (5, 6, 7, 8) set as NA.

P.16. *We would like to know if you would be willing to carry on some of following actions to defend and make known your point of view about some issue of greatest importance for the future of the country.* (Dummy)

Participate in a strike. I will (1) I will not (2) Not response (3) Do not know (4).

I will not (2) sets as 0, Not response (3) and Do not know (4) set as NA.

P.53. *Please, place yourself on following scale according your political belief.* (Ordinal)

Far-left (1) Left (2) Centre-left (3) Centre (4) Centre-right (5) Right (6) Far-Right (7) Not response (8) Do not know (9).

Not response (8) and Do not know (9) set as NA.

P.57. *How old are you?* (Discrete)

Unaltered.

P.59. *How do you consider yourself on religious issues?* (Nominal)

Practicing Catholic (1), non-practicing Catholic (2), other religions (3), non-believer (4), indifferent (5), not response (6).

Processed as dummy. Non-practicing Catholic (2), non-believer (4) and indifferent (5) set as 0. Not response (6) and other religions (3) set as NA.

P.61. *How much is the income of your household monthly?* (Ordinal)

Over 85000 pta. per month (1) 66000-85000 (2) 46000-65000 (3) 36000-45000 (4) 26000-35000 (5) 19000-25000 (6) 12000-18000 (7) 6000-11000 (8) up to 6000 pta. Per month (9) NA (0).

Processed as inverse ordinal variable. Up to 6000 pta. per month (1) - ... - Over 85000 pta. per month (9).

Appendix 2. CIS 1276

Data Treatment of CIS Number 1276 April 1981

Stratified sampling N = 964 Basque Country and Navarre

Variables

P.11. *Socio-economic background.* (Nominal)

Industry and services entrepreneurs (1), owners and trades (2), senior executives of government and private enterprise (3), new professionals of computing and marketing (4), middle management (5), office clerks and assistants (6), skilled workers (7), unskilled workers (8), agricultural businessmen (9), farmworkers (10), unemployed (11), housework (12), student (13), military service (14), retired (15), other (16).

Processed as Categorical Ordinal. Industry and services entrepreneurs (1), owners and trades (2), senior executives of government and private enterprise (3) and agricultural businessmen (9) set as 4. New professionals of computing and marketing (4), middle management (5) and office clerks and assistants (6) set as 3. Skilled workers (7) sets as 2. Unskilled workers (8) and farmworkers (10) set as 1. Unemployed (11), housework (12), student (13), military service (14), retired (15) and other (16) set as NA.

P.12. *In which region were you born?* (Nominal)

Basque Country (1), Navarre (2), other region of Spain (3), Abroad (4)

Basque Country (1) set as 0. Navarre (2) and other region of Spain (3) set as 1. Abroad (4) sets as NA.

P.28 *Might you tell us which party would you vote in new general elections?* (Nominal)

UCD (01) PSOE (02) PCE (03) AP (04) PNV (05) HB (06) EE (07) Other Parties (08, 09, 10, 11) blank vote (12) no vote (13) Not response (14).

UCD (01) PSOE (02) PCE (03) AP (04) PNV (05) HB (06) EE (07) set as alternatives in multinomial model. Other Parties (08, 09, 10, 11) blank vote (12) no vote (13) Not response (14) set as NA.

Appendix 3. CIS 1527

Data Treatment of CIS Number 1527 April 1986

N = 2399 Catalonia

Variables

P.30A. *What party would you vote if general elections would take place tomorrow?* (Nominal)

AP (1) CDS (2) CIU (3) ERC (4) PRD (5) PSC/PSOE (6) PSUC/PCE (7)

AP (1) CDS (2) CIU (3) ERC (4) PSC/PSOE (6) PSUC/PCE (7) set as alternatives in multinomial model. PRD (5) sets as NA because it was marginal.

ORIGEN. *Birthplace.* (Dummy)

Born in Catalonia (1), not born in Catalonia (2)

Unaltered.

SITUACIÓN LABORAL Y OCUPACIÓN. *Socio-economic background*. (Nominal)

Industry and services entrepreneurs \geq 6 employees (1), Industry and services entrepreneurs \leq 6 employees (2), agricultural self-employed (3), industry and services self-employed (4), freelance (5), senior executives of government and private enterprise (6), middle management (7), office clerks and assistants (8), dealers (9), junior employees (10), skilled officials (11) skilled workers (12), unskilled workers (13), farmworkers (14), not response (99).

Processed as Categorical Ordinal. Industry and services entrepreneurs \geq 6 employees (1), Industry and services entrepreneurs \leq 6 employees (2), agricultural self-employed (3), industry and services self-employed (4) and freelance (5) set as 5. Senior executives of government and private enterprise (6) and middle management (7) set as 4. Office clerks and assistants (8), dealers (9) and junior employees (10) set as 3. Skilled officials (11) and skilled workers (12) set as 2. Unskilled workers (13) and farmworkers (14) set as 1. Nor response (99) sets as NA.

SITUACIÓN Y PRÁCTICA RELIGIOSA. *How do you consider yourself on religious issues?* (Nominal)

Practicing Catholic (1), non-practicing Catholic (2), other religions (3), non-believer (4), indifferent (5), not response (6).

Processed as Categorical Ordinal. Practicing Catholic (1) sets as 3. Non-believer (4) and indifferent (5) set as 1. Other religions (3) and not response (6) set as NA.

Appendix 4. CIS 1441

Data Treatment of CIS Number 1441 November 1984

Stratified sampling N= 1199 nationally

Variables

P.13. *What the following statements is more right?*

Statement 1. Democracy is preferable to any form of government. Agree (1), Disagree (2), Do not know (9), Not response (9).

Statement 2. In some cases the dictatorship can be preferable. Agree (1), Disagree (2), Do not know (9), Not response (9).

Statement 3. Any form government is preferable to democracy. Agree (1), Disagree (2), Do not know (9), Not response (9).

Processed as Ordinal from 3 to 1 where:

- 3 is democracy is always preferable.
- 2 is in some cases democracy or dictatorship.
- 1 democracy is always not preferable.

In 3 option all respondents chose Agree in Statement 1 and Disagree in Statement 2 and 3.

In 2 option all respondents chose Not Know in Statement 1 and 3, and Agree in Statement 2.

In 1 option all respondents chose Agree in 3, Disagree in Statement 1, and Agree or Not Know in Statement 2.

Remaining options set as NA.

Overall Not available data 23.26% of N=1199.

P.24. *Which of the following state organizations agree more for Spain?* (Categorical)

A central government state without autonomies (1), a state with regions and autonomies like currently (2), a state with autonomies and nationalities with greater autonomy (3), a state with nationalities and the ability to create independent states (4).

Processed as inverse ordinal. A central government state without autonomies (4) ... A state with nationalities and the ability to create independent states (1).

P.28. *Is following statement right?*

The King is a guarantee of order and stability for the Spanish. Strongly agree (1), Agree (2), Disagree (3), Strongly disagree (4), Not Know (8), Not response (9).

Processed as Dummy. Strongly agree (1) and Agree (2) set as 1. Disagree (3) and Strongly disagree (4) set as 0. Not Know (8) and Not response (9) set as NA.

P.41. *What party would you vote if general elections would take place tomorrow?* (Nominal)

AP (01), CDS (02), PSOE (03), PCE (04), Other parties (05, 06, 07, 08, 09, 10, 11), No vote (77), Not Know (88), Not response (99).

AP (01), CDS (02), PSOE (03) and PCE (04) set as alternatives in multinomial model. Other parties (05, 06, 07, 08, 09, 10, 11), No vote (77), Not Know (88) and Not response (99) set as NA.

D.7. *How much is the income of your household monthly?* (Ordinal)

Under 15000 pta. per month (1) 15001-30000 (2) 30001-50000 (3) 50001-75000 (4) 75001-100000 (5) 100001-150000 (6) 150001-200000 (7) Over 200000 pta. per month (8) Not response (9).

Unaltered. Not response (9) sets as NA.

D.9. *How do you consider yourself on religious issues?* (Nominal)

Practicing Catholic (1), non-practicing Catholic (2), other religions (3), non-believer (4), indifferent (5), not response (9).

Processed as Categorical Ordinal. Practicing Catholic (1) sets as 3. Non-believer (4) and indifferent (5) set as 1. Other religions (3) and not response (9) set as NA.

Appendix 5. CIS 2084

Data Treatment of CIS Number 2084 March 1994

Stratified sampling N= 2485 Nationally.

Variables

P.33. P.33A. *When you think about the Francoist era or the democratic transition; how do you feel?*

Very satisfied (1), satisfied (2), neutral (3), unsatisfied (4), very unsatisfied (5), not know (6), not response (7).

Processed as inverse ordinal. Very satisfied (5) ... Very unsatisfied (6). Not know (6) and not response (7) set as NA.

P.29. *To what extent from 0 to 10 do you trust the following institutions: the monarchy.* (Discrete)

Unaltered.

P.49. *How do you consider yourself on religious issues?* (Nominal)

Practicing Catholic (1), non-practicing Catholic (2), practicing of other religions (3), non-practicing of other religions (4), indifferent (5), non-believer (6), not response (9).

Processed as ordinal. Practicing Catholic (1) sets as 3. Indifferent (5) and non-believer (6) set as 1. Practicing of other religions (3) and non-practicing of other religions (4) set as NA because of they were marginal. Not response (9) set as NA.

P.51. *How much is the income of your household monthly?* (Ordinal)

Under 50000 pta. per month (1) 50001-100000 (2) 100001-150000 (3) 150001-200000 (4) 200001-300000 (5) 300001-400000 (6) 400001-500000 (7) 500001-750000 (8) 750001- 1 million pta. (9) Over 1 million pta. per month (10) Not response (99).

Unaltered. Not response (99) sets as NA.

P.53. *What party did you vote in the 1993 elections?* (Nominal)

IU (02), PP (03), PSOE (04), Other parties (01, 05, 06, 07, 08, 09, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14), blank vote (95), Not legal age (96), No vote (97), Do not remember (98), Not response (99).

IU (02), PP (03) and PSOE (04) set as alternatives in multinomial model. Other parties (01, 05, 06, 07, 08, 09, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14), blank vote (95), Not legal age (96), No vote (97), Do not remember (98) and Not response (99) set as NA.

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