



**Why and How Authoritarian Regimes  
Produce Narratives of Governance:  
Discourse and Policy Narratives in Libya  
(2003-2010)**

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Anas Buera.....



## **Abstract**

This thesis starts from a basic intellectual curiosity: why would an authoritarian regime care about the ‘governance change’? What would governance possibly mean for a regime heavily sanctioned by the United Nations? And assuming that an authoritarian leader is forced to accept some notions of ‘improving on governance’; what specific dimensions of governance would be targeted for reform? How would they be ‘narrated’ to the domestic and international audience?

The main purpose of this thesis is to explore the communication of policy change in authoritarian regimes through a new lens on the policy process. This original lens is based on the combination of discursive institutionalism and the narrative policy framework. At the outset, we argue that authoritarian regimes are interested in ‘good governance’ as defined by international organizations, but very selectively and with strategic intentions connected to the different internal audiences and international audience costs. We also argue that these regimes use narratives to support their strategic intentions and that their discourse is contingent on the institutional context – which shapes coordinative and communicative elements of policy discourse.

Theoretically, our aim is to integrate Discursive Institutionalism and the Narrative Policy Framework, and apply them to authoritarian regimes. To do this, we use an exploratory case study (Libya, 2003-2010) and formulate explicit expectations about discourse, narratives and institutions. We test the expectations by coding a coherent corpus of documents with appropriate software, N-VIVO. Essentially, we draw on discursive institutionalism as macro template to explain the two functions of discourse (coordinative and communicative) in its institutional context, and the narrative policy framework to explain the specific forms in which discourse is cast.

Empirically, the thesis provides an analysis of coordinative and communicative discourse based on systematic coding of policy stories, causal plots, identities of the narrators, and the discursive construction of economic policy reforms in the domains of privatization, regulatory reform, and economic liberalization.

There are two elements of originality in the thesis. First, the thesis contributes to the integration of two approaches to empirical discourse analysis that have not communicated between them. Second, this is the first study to push discursive institutionalism outside the territory of advanced democracies-as such, it re-defines some arguments in light of the specific features of authoritarian regimes and developing countries by using Libya as exploratory case study.

The findings have their own empirical value for the period considered and for the narrative policy framework, but they also shed light on some elements of the current transition in Libya, at a time when Libya is under pressure to deliver on economic reform in the context of fragile democratic institutions and a complex, uncertain regime transition. The dissertation contributes to the literature as the discursive institutionalism and the narrative policy frameworks travel well to authoritarian regimes. Also our frameworks provide insights on how authoritarian regimes are different from traditional democracies. Finally, the thesis points to certain limitations and caveats, it suggests the need for further research agenda of the integrated DI and NPF frameworks in MENA region, Arab states and the third world, moving from explorative findings to building cumulative evidence in the field.

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## Dedication

*This work is dedicated to my father, mother, my wife and my children: Yumna, Sireen and Abubakr*

ALSO

*My brothers, sisters and relatives in Libya, the United States and the UAE*

## Table of Contents

Abstract.....	3
Acknowledgements.....	5
List of Tables.....	11
List of Boxes.....	12
List of Figures .....	12
List of Abbreviations .....	13
CHAPTER ONE- INTRODUCTION.....	17
CHAPTER TWO-AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES AND GOVERNANCE CHANGE .....	26
1. What is governance change? .....	27
1.1 The search for definitions.....	27
1.2 Good governance approaches.....	30
1.3 Measuring governance change.....	32
2. The need for new institutional analysis for policy change.....	41
3. Authoritarian regimes and governance change.....	43
3.1 The adoption of governance change in authoritarian regimes.....	45
3.2 Why would an authoritarian regime produce (what kind of) good governance? .....	48
3.3 Establishing causality: key arguments.....	48
3.4 Types of authoritarian regimes and governance change.....	53
3.5 Adopting selected dimensions of governance change.....	55
4. Governance change in Libya.....	56
4.1 The selected features of governance reform in Libya .....	59
4.2 Expectations of empirical investigation for the Libyan regime .....	59
CHAPTER THREE-ENTERING DISCOURSE AND NARRATIVE FRAMEWORKS IN THE ANALYSIS OF POLICY CHANGE IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES .....	61
1. Discourse: Concept formation .....	64
2. Entering discourse and narrative frameworks .....	66

2.1 Discursive Institutionalism (DI).....	66
2.2 The Narrative Policy Framework (NPF).....	69
2.3 Elements of the narrative policy framework.....	72
3. Implications for authoritarian regimes and Libya.....	79
4. Research questions .....	87
<b>CHAPTER FOUR-RESEARCH DESIGN.....</b>	<b>89</b>
1. Objectives and aims.....	90
2. Research Methodology .....	91
2.1 Single case study.....	91
2.2 Periodization .....	93
2.3 Unit of analysis .....	95
2.4 Triangulation of research data .....	95
3. Data-analysis and gathering techniques .....	97
3.1 Data collection techniques.....	97
3.2 Building our empirical evidence (Corpus).....	97
3.4 Archival documentation.....	99
3.5 Literature review and secondary data.....	100
3.6. Piloting interviews .....	100
3.7 Data analysis techniques.....	101
3.8 Establishing validity.....	104
4. Coding framework, levels of analysis and expectations.....	105
4.1 Adopting DI and NPF frameworks.....	106
4.2 Levels of empirical analysis.....	106
4.3 Templates for N-VIVO coding .....	111
4.4 Piloting nodes and text codes .....	112
<b>CHAPTER FIVE– COORDINATIVE NARRATIVES OF ECONOMIC</b>	
<b>GOVERNANCE IN LIBYA 2003-2010 .....</b>	<b>120</b>
1. The Libyan context of reform: emerging themes and narrators.....	122
1. The emergence of economic reform issues .....	123
1.1 Narrators and institutional venues.....	124
1.2 Economic regulatory reform .....	131



1.3 The emergence of trade partners .....	135
The Treaty with Italy: a new 'friend' and the implications for coordination .....	135
2. Corpus.....	137
3. Findings .....	140
3.1 The discursive definition of the policy problems.....	140
3.2 Dressing the argument for an audience .....	142
3.3 The narrative structure .....	144
3.4 Causal plot .....	150
4. Appraising our research expectations.....	162
<b>CHAPTER SIX- COMMUNICATIVE NARRATIVES OF ECONOMIC</b>	
<b>GOVERNANCE IN LIBYA 2003-2010 .....</b>	<b>169</b>
1. Libya's international context: major episodes and audience costs.....	171
1.1 Major episodes and events.....	171
1.2 Types of Audiences .....	173
1.3 Audience costs 2003-2010 .....	176
2. Corpus.....	178
3. Findings .....	182
3.1 The discursive definition of policy problems .....	182
3.2 Arguments supporting policy change.....	188
3.3 Narrative structure.....	191
3.4 The presentation of self.....	193
3.5 Causal plot .....	196
4. Appraising our research expectations.....	211
<b>CHAPTER SEVEN –COMPARING COORDINATIVE AND COMMUNICATIVE</b>	
<b>NARRATIVES.....</b>	<b>218</b>
1. Comparing coordinative and communicative narratives .....	219
1.1 Institutional settings .....	219
1.2 Problem definition .....	221
1.3 Plots .....	222
1.4 Narrative goals.....	225
1.5 Types of actors /audience in the plot .....	226

1.6 Tactics and strategies.....	226
1.7 Relationship between coordinative and communicative discourses.....	228
2. Narratives features and characteristics .....	230
3. Critical observations on the causal plots .....	231
3.1 Inconsistencies .....	231
3.2 Communication out of character.....	232
3.3 Role of the EU: sometimes it is a hero, often a villain.....	233
3.4 Lack of realism: how can we dismantle the public sector in one day? .....	234
3.5 The role of people, their skills, their lack of ownership of the reform.....	235
4. Answering our research questions .....	236
<b>CHAPTER EIGHT- CONCLUSIONS .....</b>	<b>241</b>
1. Back to our expectations.....	241
2. Contribution to the literature .....	247
3. What do the narratives of the past regime tell us about the current transition? .....	250
4. Limitations, caveats and suggestions for the future research .....	252
<b>Bibliography.....</b>	<b>256</b>

## List of Tables

Table No.	Title	Page
Table 2.1	Expected Adoption of Good Governance in Dictatorships	47
Table 4.1	DI and NPF in Libya: Coding Framework	117
Table 5.1	Corpus of Coordinative Narratives Texts	138
Table 6.1	Corpus of Communicative Narratives Texts	179
Table 8.1	Expectations about Coordinative narratives	244
Table 8.2	Expectations about Communicative Narratives	245
Table 8.3	Expectation about the differences between coordination and communication	246

## List of Boxes

Box No.	Title	Page
Box.1	Chronology of Coordinative Narratives in Libya 2003-2010	136
Box.2	Chronology of Communicative Narratives in Libya 2003-2010	178

## List of Figures

Figure No.	Title	Page
Figure 2.1	Variation in Economic Regulatory Quality in Libya 1996-2012	58
Figure 4.1	Coding the intergrated DI and NPF Frameworks ( main Nodes)	115
Figure 4.2	Coding the Node of Causal Plot in Libya	116
Figure 5.1	Causal Plot of Coordinative Narratives	168
Figure 6.1	Causal Plot of Communicative Narratives	217

## List of Abbreviations

**ADB:** African Development Bank CPIA (governance indicator)

**ADB-Business Regulations in the Economy:** An indicator on regulatory quality

**ADB-Property Rights:** An indicator on the rule of Law

**ADB-Trade policy:** An indicator on regulatory quality

**ADB-Transparency, Accountability and Corruption in Public Sector:** An indicator on the control of corruption

**AV:** Absence of Violence (governance indicator)

**BERI:** Business Environment Risk Intelligence Perceptions

**BPS- Regulations problems and growth:** An indicator on regulatory quality

**BTA-The Separation of Powers:** An indicator on the rule of law

**BTI-Anti-Corruption Policy:** An indicator on the control of corruption

**BTI:** Bertelsmann Transformation Index

**CC:** Control of Corruption and Transparency (governance indicator)

**CEER:** An indicator of political (in) stability by the Wall Street Journal

**CRD:** Coordinative discourse and narratives

**CMD:** Communicative discourse and narratives

**DG:** Democratic Governance initiative of the United Nations' Development Program

**DI:** Discursive Institutionalism

**EIU- Corruption among Public Officials:** An indicator on the control of corruption

**EIU:** Economist Intelligence Unit

**EIU- International Tension:** An indicator on the absence of violence

**EIU- Irregular Payment:** An indicator on the control of corruption

**EIU- Private Property Rights:** An indicator on the rule of law

**EIU-Social Unrest:** An indicator on the absence of violence

**EU:** The European Union

**FH:** Freedom House

**FRH-FNT:** Freedom of elections at national level

**FRH-FRW-Civil Society:** An indicator on voice and accountability in civil society

**GE:** Government Effectiveness (governance indicator)

**GCP:** The General People's Congress (The Libyan parliament)

**GCS-Burden of Government Regulations- Stringency of Regulatory Environment:** An indicator on regulatory quality

**GCS-Cost of Terrorism:** An indicator on the absence of violence

**GCS:** Global Competitiveness Survey by World Economic Forum

**GCS-Judicial Independence:** An indicator on the rule of law

**GPC:** The General People's Committee (The Libyan government)

**GWP- Widespread Corruption:** An indicator on the control of corruption

**HER:** Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom

**HER- Investment Freedom:** An indicator on regulatory quality

**HER- Property Rights:** An indicator on the rule of law

**HFSWJ:** The Heritage Foundation/Wall Street

**HWR:** Human Development Report

**IDV:** 'Italia dei Valori' (English: 'Italy of Values'): An Italian political party

**IMF:** International Monetary Fund

**IPD:** Institutional Profiles Database

**IPD-Levels of corruption between Policy Officials and Foreign Companies:**

An indicator on the control of corruption

**NEB:** The National Economic Board-Libya

**NES:** National Economic Strategy

**NPC:** The National Planning Council of Libya

**NPF:** Narrative Policy Framework

**PRS-Investment Profile:** An indicator on regulatory quality

**PRS-External Conflicts:** An indicator on the absence of violence

**PRS:** Political Risk Services International Country Risk Guide

**QoG:** The Quality of Governance

**RL:** Rule of Law (governance indicator)

**RQ:** Regulatory Quality (governance indicator)

**UfM:** Union for the Mediterranean

**UN:** United Nations

**UNDP:** United Nations Development Program

**UNDP-POGAR:** The United Nations' Development Programme on Governance in the Arab Region

**USA:** The United States of America

**VA:** Voice and Accountability (governance indicator)

**WB:** The World Bank

**WCY-Banking Regulations:** An indicator on regulatory quality

**WCY:** IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook

**WCY-Foreign Investment:** An indicator on regulatory quality

**WCY-Order and Security:** An indicator on the absence of violence

**WCY-Risk for Stability:** An indicator on the absence of violence

**WDR:** World Development Report

**WJP-Economic Regulatory Enforcements:** An indicator on regulatory quality

**WJP-Regulatory Policy:** An indicator on regulatory quality

**WMO-Contestation between Policy Officials:** An indicator on the control of corruption

**WSSD:** The 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development

**WTO:** The World Trade Organization



## CHAPTER ONE- INTRODUCTION

This thesis starts from a basic intellectual curiosity: why would an authoritarian regime care about ‘quality of governance’? What would governance possibly mean for a regime heavily sanctioned by the United Nations? And, assuming that an authoritarian leader is forced to accept some notions of ‘improving on governance’; what specific dimensions of governance would be targeted for reform? Most importantly, authoritarian regimes use reforms to send signals to their international trade partners and foreign investors, and to build a climate of confidence in the domestic public opinion. This raises a set of questions about how the reforms are narrated, by whom, and to what audiences.

To answer these questions, we take the case of Libya in a period (2003-2010) when the country was governed by one of the most authoritarian regimes. In a sense this is an extreme case: with power concentrated in very few hands, why would an authoritarian leader engage with governance reforms? What is the role of discourse, narration and, ultimately, persuasion in a regime dominated by total, cruel power? At a more subtle level, how did the few actors that called the shots in authoritarian Libya compete for power, trying to expand their narrative roles, and constrain the role of other narrators? By laying out these questions, we make the claim that an analysis of discourse and narratives is not an alternative to an analysis of power. For us, narratives instantiate power, and discourse generates power. This is in line with the literature on discourse analysis, no matter if ‘critical’, ‘interpretive’ or ‘epistemologically objective’ (Jones and Radaelli, 2015), and it is in this literature that we find the motivation behind our thesis.

Thus, this is the motivation that generated the research project. At the outset, however, we have to clarify why dictators have an interest in governance and its reform. To understand this, we need first to examine the literature on ‘quality of

governance’ – a literature that does not say much about the specific mechanisms leading authoritarian regimes to engage with the theme of governance reform. The fact is that this literature is more interested in measuring governance change and in benchmarking reforms, not in explaining processes of change, and even less in the details of the discursive construction of these reforms. But there are a few insights on types of authoritarian regimes and some discussion of the role of institutions like ‘parties’ and ‘parliaments’ in different forms of authoritarian regimes. For an authoritarian leader, the motivation to invest in governance reforms is limited to domains where there are low internal costs and high external benefits, aiming to provide continuity to the regime. Given the status of pariah state that Libya had reached, the engagement with the quality of governance agenda was a way to re-launch a discursive agenda based on at least some degrees of credibility in the international community and to raise the interest of foreign firms willing to invest in an acceptable regulatory system, given the oil resources of Libya.

In the end, it is useful to frame the cautious and selective approach of authoritarian regimes to ‘governance’ and ‘reforms’ in terms of audience costs—separating international and domestic costs and benefits. Obviously one does not expect authoritarian regimes to invest in the rule of law, freedom of the press, or other domains where the domestic costs for the regime are high. Some features of economic governance, such as privatization and regulatory reform, are much more attractive: they do not challenge the distribution of core governmental power— hence they have limited internal costs. But even there the authoritarian regime will be selective. It will choose domains of regulatory governance, privatization and economic reform that have low internal costs and high international benefits.

And yet, although we know quite a bit about economic reforms in non-democratic regimes, we still know very little about how they are narrated to the internal and external publics. Do authoritarian regimes draw on policy narratives to coordinate in their national planning councils? How does the elite shape policy and motivate

the bureaucracy with discourse? How are reforms justified to the international community? What do authoritarian regimes say to the international business community? How is legitimacy sought at home - after all, economic policy change is yet another way to strengthen the legitimacy basis of the regime?

Here is where a body of literature concerned with policy discourse assists us. Among the studies and approaches on policy discourse, we select discursive institutionalism and the narrative policy framework to examine the case of a failed authoritarian regime. Libya promoted limited economic/regulatory policy change to mitigate the effects of UN sanctions, to open up to trade, and to attract some support from trading partners involved in bilateral treaty negotiations - a new Treaty was signed with Italy in August 2008. Finally, the reforms were meant to send signals to the domestic audience. These kinds of internal and external legitimacy concerns explain the importance of discourse in authoritarian regimes.

Discursive Institutionalism (DI) is a political economy approach developed chiefly by Vivien Schmidt to explain change in economic policy. The DI framework connects institutions, actors, and ideas as dimensions of the process of policy change through discourse. DI draws attention to two types of discourse: the 'coordinative discourse' for policy preparation by the regimes elites and the 'communicative discourse' through which elites try to secure legitimacy for their governance reforms. So far DI has been used to examine discourse in developed economies, especially European economies and the European Union.

The Narrative Policy Framework (NPF) is associated with the work of policy analysts such as McBeth, Jones, Shanahan in the USA (2007, 2010), and, in Europe, Radaelli (Radaelli, 1999, Radaelli et al. 2013). Up until now, the NPF has been deployed in policy studies concerning the US, Europe and emerging economies like India. Both DI and NPF have not been tested on authoritarian regimes. The main advantage of the NPF is that it allows us to employ systematic, transparent, verifiable research protocols to generate research questions and to test them objectively. It revolves around the following key elements of empirical analysis that investigate the national institutional context of

governance including: 1).The institutional settings of a policy.2). A causal plot that introduces a temporal element and sequences of policy events. 3). Characters who are narrators, fixers of the problem (heroes), causers of the problem (villains), or victims harmed by the wicked problem. 4) Moral implications of the story (R. N. Jacobs and Sobieraj 2007; Jones and McBeth 2010; McBeth et al. 2005; Ney 2006; Verweij et al. 2006). Each component can be studied as a set of ideas and as an interactive dimension concerning the actors involved– a feature where the NPF can go along with the DI propositions.

Drawing on DI and the NPF, the thesis examines a corpus of documents to address some classic research questions in discourse analysis:

- (a) What is the role of discourse in the formal and informal institutions of an authoritarian regime like Libya in the period considered for this dissertation?
- (b) In the period considered, what was the relationship between coordinative and communicative discourse: was the former thin and the latter thick?
- (c) How did coordinative discourse deploy narratives of economic policy reform? Who was the narrator of this discourse and in what institutional venues did the narrator speak?
- (d) What are the narratives of communicative discourse? What types of audience do they address? For what purposes? With what narrative features?
- (e) How do coordinative and communicative narratives vary in a sample of texts? Why do they vary?
- (f) What do the narratives of the past Libyan regime tell us about the nature of discourse in authoritarian regimes?
- (g) Is there any lesson arising from our narrative-discursive analysis that can inform our understanding of the current transition to democracy in Libya?

The literature review and our analysis of DI and NPF will lead us to formulate eight theory-driven expectations that will be probed in the core empirical chapters of the thesis.

Empirically, our evidence includes sources that relate to both discourse functions (coordinative and communicative), such as written speeches and interviews of the Libyan former authoritarian leader Muammar Gaddafi, his son, Saif, and key policy actors and institutions such as the General People's Congress, GCP, (the Libyan parliament) and the National Planning Council, and the General Peoples' Committee, GPC, (The Libyan government) in order to trace the coordinative and communicative policy narratives, tactics and strategies aimed at preparing, justifying and legitimating new economic governance reforms in Libya.

The sources of coordinative discourse will address the stage of deliberation within the restricted key policy actors of the Libyan regime, whether between the authoritarian leader (son) and his institutions, or between key policy actors in formal and informal authorities who were acting with the dictator's permission.

The project has two major elements of originality. First, it provides an integration of two complementary approaches to discourse analysis; DI and the NPF. We pilot the integration between DI and the NPF because we believe that they have unnecessarily proceeded on separate tracks. Perhaps this parallel and independent life of DI and the NPF is a consequence of particular choices made by individual researchers. With one exception, (Radaelli, Dunlop, Fritsch, 2013), we did not find examples of this integration. We argue that the two approaches operate at different levels. DI is more macro and assigns different functions to discourse, depending on whether discourse is used to coordinate policy choice or to communicate the choices made. Policy narratives tell us about the various specific forms in which discourse is cast, and are empirically richer than discourse. Once this is understood, it is not difficult to integrate DI and NPF, and gain theoretical and empirical leverage from their simultaneous usage in a dissertation project like ours. We demonstrate this by testing a set of expectations that contribute to theory building in this field.

Second, the thesis is the first attempt to use DI and the NPF with empirical reference to an authoritarian regime. To make the transition from democracies to

authoritarian regimes, we build on the concept of audience costs, adapting it to narrative policy analysis. Our findings point to audiences, plots and narrative constructions that are not common in the literature on policy narratives in advanced democracies. Thus we argue that the DI + NPF approach travels well across democracies and authoritarian political systems, but the empirical variability of findings point to novel narrative constructions and political usages of narratives. These novel features are described at length in the thesis, and provide our contribution to theory-building in the field. To generate theoretical leverage, we draw on evidence for an exploratory case study. We do not know whether we can extend our findings to other authoritarian regimes of the past, and whether our findings are common to countries that have experienced the so-called Arab Spring. Given this exploratory nature of the project, we prefer to use the language of 'expectations' and 'empirical probes' rather than 'hypotheses' and 'tests'.

## **The structure of the thesis**

**Chapter two** introduces the literature of governance change and authoritarian regimes. This literature is particularly interesting because it provides both contributions from international organizations like the World Bank, and classic academic studies. Our approach to this literature is critical. In short, we find more measurement than genuine explanation in this field. The whole notion of causality between 'governance' and 'economic growth' is up for grabs in this field, and not clarified – although the proposition that governance is a fundamental level of growth is not contested within the different strands of institutionalism.

Our critical approach brings us to consider questions other than the relationship between governance and change, such as: Why would an authoritarian regime care about governance change? What are the publics or audience an authoritarian leader is trying to address by improving on governance indicators?

We conclude that authoritarian regimes have a selective approach to good governance and we reflect on how a leader in a non-democratic regime may reason about specific components of 'economic governance', such as regulatory quality, privatization, investment, competition and trade.

Reforms have to be discursively coordinated and explained to produce effects. Here is where another body of literature can assist us in **chapter three**, broadly speaking a literature concerned with discourse. Since the pioneering work of Peter Hall (1989) on the political economy of change, political economists have distinguished between the contents of reforms and how they are communicated. Economic policy change is a process of both 'doing things' and getting legitimacy for the reforms. Even authoritarian regimes, which have formidable levers of power for producing or stopping change, have to talk about change and seek legitimacy for this. Thus, we discuss DI and the NPF, and make the case for integrating them. Further, we reason on their possible extension to authoritarian regimes, and we find the extension plausible, provided that sufficient attention is given to the particular features of non-democratic political systems. This chapter sets the scene for our theoretical claims about how exactly we expect discourse to play a role in authoritarian reforms concerned with governance.

**The fourth chapter** is entirely dedicated to laying out our research design. This includes the methodological and theoretical considerations and the methodology plan adopted to explore this single case-study through a corpus of documents, a proper NPF protocol, and a clear operationalization of the main concepts. We also explain how we relate DI to the NPF empirically, by distinguishing between coordinative narratives and communicative narratives. Chapter four is particularly important because we detail the theoretical claims made in chapter three, in terms of a set of eight expectations that we want to probe with empirical analysis. Some of these expectations concern the relationship between coordination and communication, others the specific functions and forms of one type of narrative or another.

In **chapter five** we investigate the coordinative narratives and probe the expectations concerned with coordinative discourse. We detail the emergence of economic reform, followed by the identification of narrators and institutional venues of coordination. To gain a better understanding of the economic policy change context in Libya in the research period, we explain briefly in the chapter the economic changes and the role of the international community. One prominent theme in this chapter is the presence of the international partners and foreign investors as ‘readers over the shoulders’ of the narrators. Even at the stage of coordination we find the influence of the external audiences on the policy narratives and narrative roles within the regime. Our analysis of problem definition, characters, heroes and villains and other narrative elements culminates with the presentation of the causal plot implied by coordinate narratives. We reflect on the strength and many clear limitations of the plot, and go back to our research expectations on coordination to provide an answer.

**The sixth chapter** is devoted to the second stage of the thesis’ empirical analysis to investigate the communicative narratives. We enter the international context and political events that have discursively influenced the Libyan regime to show commitment to governance change. We discuss the policy narratives in their communicative function, pointing to elements such as problem definition, the discursive construction of policy rationales and arguments, the narrative structure of communication and other features, presenting data and memorable quotes. As in chapter five, we conclude with a representation of the causal plot implied by communicative narratives and probe our expectations on them.

**The seventh chapter** of this thesis is about the comparison between coordinative and communicative narratives. The chapter draws on the main elements extracted from the basic research questions to compare both narratives. Our findings are empirical and critical, because we discuss inconsistencies (such as the vagaries in the portrayal of the EU) and gaps in the narratives, and why in the end they failed the test of social legitimacy. We also



talk of lack of realism in the narratives, especially in relation to the timing of public sector reforms and the lack of ownership by the people of Libya.

Finally, the **eighth chapter** is devoted to our conclusions. We first recap on our assessment of research expectations, as they generated the main results of our empirical work. Among other things, we discuss the competition for narrative roles – which is striking, given that the political system did not have any form of pluralism. But within the very restricted elite of the time, competition for narrative roles (who narrates what, to whom) was a way to delineate, and (seek to) reshuffle power relations. This is powerful evidence that narratives instantiate power relations, as noted firstly by Emery Roe (1994). Other projects informed by the NPF have taken the content of narratives as much more important than narrative roles, and we re-establish balance between the two elements. Second, we go back to the over-arching research questions that motivate our project, and answer them. Third, we situate our findings in the context of the contribution to the literature, especially in relation to the NPF. In the final section, we acknowledge the limitations of our study and draw suggestions for further research.

## CHAPTER TWO-AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES AND GOVERNANCE CHANGE

### Introduction

The striking difference between authoritarian regimes that achieve results in terms of growth and those who spectacularly fail to do so has triggered interests on the institutional effects on policy change, and more precisely on the relationships between governance and economic growth. In turn, this neo-institutional literature on the causes of economic growth has encountered the activity of international organizations like the World Bank, which have provided international standards and benchmarks of 'good governance' with projects like the world-wide indicators on governance and the 'doing business' indicators. This activity goes under the label 'quality of governance' (QoG) – a term that is somewhat elusive even if, and possibly because of, its popularity both in the social science and in the discourse of policy makers and international organizations. Be that as it may, QoG is an emergent concept -linked mainly to governments' capacity for growth and reforms inspired by notions of 'good governance' and its benchmarks like privatization, access to regulation, rule of law, control of corruption (Holmberg and Rothstein 2012:13). A common theme in this literature is does good governance matter? (Holmberg et al. 2008:1). The answer provided by the literature is yes, but we are not clear about what dimensions of governance matter exactly for what types of reform. And we do not know much about the degrees of freedom left to authoritarian governments to choose from the vast menu of QoG certain reforms but not others. Even less do we know on how authoritarian leaders, once they have chosen reforms from the menu, seek to obtain legitimacy for their selective choices among international business leaders, the governments of trade partners, and, internally, their citizens. The discourse-legitimacy nexus is a major topic in our dissertation. Before we get there, however, we need to explore the QoG and demonstrate that

it has little to say about this topic. And, partly because of its statistical world-view, QoG has not contributed that much to the understandings of the choices linking reform and discursive usage (of the reforms) in individual countries. This will later on provide a justification for our emphasis on a single case study, Libya. In the meantime, the chapter will proceed with the following sections:

1. What is governance change? Exploring the notion
2. The need for a new institutional analysis of policy change
3. Authoritarian regimes and governance change
4. Governance change in Libya.

## **1. What is governance change?**

The great changes which swept across the world led to a growing awareness of the need to change government performance. These changes were the incentives that urged scholars to provide scientific concepts to tackle the question of the role of the institutional quality in policy change, through comparisons established among different regimes (Dellepiane-Avellaneda 2009:195). The massive neo-institutional interest in exploring the notion of governance related mainly to the awareness of governments' responsibilities to their citizens, accompanied by an increase in citizens' demands in matters of public affairs. These demands sent a clear message which stressed the decisive role of governance in improving the quality of life.

### **1.1 The search for definitions**

At the outset, we need to address the following two key questions: firstly, how confident can we be of measures of good governance? And, secondly, how solid are these measures to provide an empirical basis for economic growth? (Kurtz

and Schrank 2007:538). The search for empirical measures was mainly preceded by further attempts to provide key definitions. The actual use of the term 'governance change' as manifested in the notion of good governance started in 1989 when the World Bank report on Africa presented the argument entitled, 'Underlying the litany of Africa's development problems is a crisis of governance'(Leftwich 1993: 610; Mkandawire 2007: 679).

By the early 1990's, both the World Bank, and the United Nations development program (UNDP), and other international organizations, started to employ this term in light of their objectives. Hence, good governance was used to refer to the process of making decisions and involving all the mechanisms used towards implementing public policies (Cheema 1997:4). By the mid-nineties, the UNDP initiative for change stated that *"the goal of governance initiatives should be to develop capacities that are needed to realize development programs which give priority to the poor, advance women, sustain the environment and create the needed opportunities for employment in the economy"* (1997:4).

The World Bank defined the term firstly with regard to aspects of 'stewardship'. Basically, governance (for the international organizations) is the manner in which power is exercised in the public arena of a country's economic and social resources. Accordingly, the Bank identified three major aspects: (i) the form of political regime; (ii) the process by which authority and power are exercised in the management of a country's economic and social resources for development; (iii) the capacity of governments to formulate, and implement policies and discharge functions (WB 1994; Weiss 2000). In addition to the terms derived from the international financial institutions<sup>1</sup>, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD, defined the term as :*" The use of political authority and exercise of control in a society, in relation to the management of resources for social and economic development"*(Weiss 2000).

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<sup>1</sup>Both the World Bank and the IMF

This broad definition encompassed the role of public authorities in establishing the environment in which economic operators function and in determining the distribution of benefits, as well as the nature of the relationship between the ruler and the ruled (2000:796). Following these attempts, other organizations aimed to approach governance following the definition provided by Ottawa's institute of governance, defining the notion as important decisions to change the society and to achieve consensus between interests. Also, the Tokyo institute of technology presented governance as referring to the complex set of values, norms, processes and institutions by which society manages policies (WB 1994; Weiss 2000: 797).

The 2002 world summit on sustainable development (WSSD) reflects one of the more recent developments of the notion in practice through international organizations. Hence good governance was directly linked to issues of sustainability (UN 2002 ). This raised the question of how governance is considered as a crucial factor in achieving sustainability beside the goal of economic growth, widening the scope of this neo-institutional claim made by international organizations.

New questions were raised including: What are the mechanisms through which the causal effect of governance on policy can be measured and defined? How were the causal effects of governance debated? How can the causal effect of governance on public policy in an authoritarian regime be measured? Which dimensions are likely to be adopted by an authoritarian regime? The latter two questions lead in turn to the formulation of our arguments about the governance change in Libya, while the first two questions are aimed at appraising the traditional trends in measuring governance and how these measures can be adopted in an authoritarian regime.

## 1.2 Good governance approaches

'Good governance' is a field where international organizations and social scientists have exchanged many ideas and concepts over the years: sometimes we find a meeting of minds, but in the social-scientific debate has proceeded on autonomous tracks. For social scientists, the good governance approach is the result of the neo-institutional revolution both in economics and in sociology-political science. For the international organizations, QoG was a response to the limitations of reforms limited to sectors of the economy, without an overall effort to change the ways in which institutions 'think' and operate in developing countries and different types of regimes.

For social scientists, the focus was mainly on governance's causal effects on economic growth through the 'reversed outcomes' on the both sides of the causality between governance and economic policy (Gupta et al. 2002; Lopez 2004)<sup>2</sup>. In other words, the major attempt was to establish causality and its mechanisms.

In discussing how scholars addressed governance and policy change, the first feature of the study stream is that it was marked by different perspectives (Rothstein and Teorell 2005). The 'democratic approach' is the first perspective-presenting issues such as: civil liberty, effects on incomes, lack of repression in enhancing equality, as well as the linkage between established democracies and their effect on governance outcomes of patronage, corruption, distributive injustice (Carothers et al. 2007; Halperin et al. 2005). Scholars also addressed changes that affected the (then) communist and authoritarian regimes in both Latin America and Europe, as well as in some countries of the Third World (Leftwich 1993; Najem 2003; Teorell 2010). Although these studies revealed rich comparative data, there were disagreements between scholars as a result of the absence of one model that could provide unified stable and straightforward

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<sup>2</sup>According to Lopez 2004, the mixture of findings in both sides in results was clear when scholars used ICRG index to test QoG of richer countries, finding a negative relationship between institutional quality and political stability.

analysis that could interpret causality between governance and public policy change in developing countries (Holmberg et al. 2008: 8).

The second approach reflecting the evolution of the notion of governance change was the 'corruption approach' which presented arguments that found a positive effect of controlling corruption on enhancing income (Levi 2006; Mauro 1995). However, the same problem of the absence of a unified operational definition and its causal implications remained present in this approach (Holmberg et al. 2008: 15). 'Rule of law' – a concept with broader extension – then uncovers another gap in governance analysis, although many studies supported this approach based on providing empirical evidence in testing the relationship between law and economic growth. In this regard, scholars raised the need for 'qualitative interpretation' to present the actual effects of governance settings at the national level that could better interpret the dynamics of policy change (Rothstein and Teorell 2008).

The most influential approach to good governance was the 'economic and market approach', which was one of the main catalysts that unleashed the governance causality analysis. The ideas of 'market' and 'economic reform' presented degrees of success and failure in 'privatization' and 'regulatory governance' as well other measures of governance reforms (Rothstein et al. 2004). In fact, this approach provided the impetus to inspire new studies in the field of political economy that tackled the role of institutions in economic growth as well as issues of policy outcomes (Rodrik 2008). This naturally raised the question of how economic growth related to the governance standards of 'efficiency' and 'effectiveness' as basic requirements of policy change quality. According to Fukuyama (2004), an inefficient and ineffective government apparatus is likely to fail to produce satisfactory levels of governance. In fact, the debate over causality widened discussions about the deeper analysis of governance and the interpretation of problems such as : measurement, causality, levels of economic growth in different countries, as well as linking the institutional quality to given country context (Helliwell 2006; Pacek and Radcliff

2008). The variation in economic policy has raised further questions of the existence of a 'one-best-way-model' of all governance to provide interpretations of causality for different regimes with different contexts and settings, and how politics shapes governance (Andrews 2010; Kaufmann 2003). The rise of neo-liberal autocracies has further complicated the understanding of causality and mechanisms, breaking down the conventional notion that growth derive from free markets in liberal-democratic economies.

### **1.3 Measuring governance change**

Developments in defining good governance urged scholars to seek 'operational definitions' as an important issue in searching for measures to understand the institutional effect on policy change. These efforts were based on establishing a clear systematic approach for the measurement to provide determinants gained from the empirical analysis (Kaufmann et al. 2000: 10). These attempts coincided temporally with efforts of the international monetary fund (IMF), which in 1996 declared that the main key pillars needed for governance include: rule of law, transparency, efficiency, accountability of the public sector, combating corruption, and regulatory reform. The IMF asserted the fact that any measure of policy change should be defined by donors and the IMF. Also, domestic specificity should be considered in any case investigation and this should run alongside coordination with the World Bank (IMF 1997: 3-6).

In 1997, the UNDP issued its well-known report entitled 'the Shrinking State,' addressing the main goals of governance change through tackling the state's shrinking role in the public sector. This report stressed the necessity of achieving harmony between state actors and social justice and stated that this could be achieved by determining the citizens' minimum standard of living. The report also paid attention to the goal of achieving levels of efficiency in economic policies. Therefore, the governance change process refers mainly to the network of



government institutions which uses regulations that aim to achieve a sustainable economy that would lead to prosperity and well-being (UNDP 1997).

The UNDP view of governance change resembled the World Bank's definition in terms of focusing on good policy practice, but its perspective lacked consideration of the necessity of providing operational dimensions based on genuine empirical work.

This could be seen through the UNDP initiative of democratic governance (DG) which defined good governance from the 'democracy angle,' focusing on accountability, inclusiveness, and also the pillars of : rule of law; transparency; responsiveness; consensus; justice; efficiency and effectiveness (UNDP 2010:5). As a matter of fact, these components are just a long list of desirable features. It is not an operational measurement. Instead of measuring governance, the UNDP established interactive comparisons based on collecting other organizations' work, mainly the measurements provided by the World Bank. The Regional Arab governance initiative of good governance (UNDP-POGAR) presented a clear manifestation of this measurement failure, so to speak, as it was fully withdrawn in 2012 due to insufficient data that could interpret governance and policy change in the Arab Region<sup>3</sup>. As a response to the lack of measurement, calls arose to provide new systematic analysis to understand the countries' institutional reforms on the basis of rigorous data and deep interpretation.

The World Bank launched its well-known 'Aggregating Methodology'(Kaufmann et al. 2000: 10 ) and started to define good governance based on measurable dimensions that form the component of its methodology. According to Kaufmann and others, good governance is defined as: "the traditions and institutions that determine how authority is exercised in a particular country. This includes: (1) the process by which governments are selected, held accountable, monitored, and replaced; (2) the capacity of governments to manage resources efficiently and formulate, implement, and enforce sound policies and regulations; (3) the

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<sup>3</sup>The United Nations Development Programme on Governance in the Arab Region (UNDP-POGAR)

respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them”(2000: 11).

To further translate this broad definition, the aggregating methodology was established and organized into the well-known ‘World Wide Governance Matters(WGI)’ based on constructing six aggregate indicators that tackle matters of good governance, starting from an analytical comparison of 150 countries to provide empirical evidence of governance causal effect on policy change (Kaufmann et al. 1999a:1). The six governance dimensions included: ‘voice and accountability’; the ‘political instability and violence’; ‘government effectiveness’; ‘rule of law’; ‘control of corruption’; and finally ‘regulatory quality’ as fundamental concepts of governance change (1999a: 2).

In fact, Kaufmann and others’ investigation of causality was based on the argument raised by Hall and Jones (1999: 109) through raising the key question “why do some countries produce more outputs per worker than others?”. In this argument, they concluded that there is a notable governance variation between countries and that is mainly linked to the influence of each country context, irrespective of the cross-country comparisons (1999: 38 & 39). These results led the scholars associated with or engaged with the good governance matters project to employ the aforementioned six aggregate denominators of good governance to further test causality. They compiled a large amount of data emanating from several sources such as business environment risk intelligence perceptions BERI, the Wall street journal (CEER) survey covering 27 economies, the Economist intelligence unit (EIU) poll including 114 development and developing countries, a Freedom House (FH) poll covering 172 developing and developed countries, the World Economic Forum (GCS) competitiveness survey of 54 developed and developing countries, the Heritage Foundation/Wall Street Journal (HFSWJ) economic freedom poll, covering 154 developed and developing countries, a World Bank (WDR) survey including 74 developed and

developing countries, to mention only a few (Kaufmann et al. 1999b: 21)<sup>4</sup>. This work opened the way for the emergence of some operational indicators of the governance change. This data was based on the work of World Bank experts', and of several civil society organizations, collecting data from: respondents, entrepreneurs, policy makers, academics, civil servants and experts concerning governance perceptions (1999b:6).

Aiming to better work with data collected, scholars started to classify countries of the world according to categories such as: development level, income, regions, as well as categories established based on the 1998/99 World Development Report (WDR) classification by region and income (World Bank 1999). They also used scales to classify the performance of governance ranging from 0 to 1 and using statistical methods. This classification worked in parallel with the establishment of the aggregating methodology and database clusters to organize the gathered data (Kaufmann et al. 1999b).

Arguably, the most significant step in the process of governance data collection was based on gaining perceptions from surveys and polls in different sources(1999b: 7). The main justification for the six matters analysis was: firstly, they were regarded as operational concepts of good governance covering the largest country case sample and collecting data provided by the most significant sources such as the aforementioned indicators of EIU, FH, HFWSJ, and WDR. Secondly, these dimensions of governance measurement reflect the nature of data obtained from country field surveys (1999b: 7).

### *1.3.1 Aggregating methodology*

This methodology was established in 1999 to define and measure governance matters and comprised three main steps. First comes the classification of data

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<sup>4</sup>BERI, CEER, FH-EIU, HSWJ, WDR respectively represent : Business environment risk intelligence (Poll) ; Wall street journal (Survey); economist intelligence unit (Poll); economic freedom index( Poll); World development report (Survey) , as some examples of sources of quantitative measures of good governance and covering economies and countries that range from 27 to 154 case study. See (Kaufmann et al. 1999: 21-61).

gained from surveys and polls data from individual sources into six aggregate dimensions. The second step focuses on determining the value-range of responses, and then classifying regimes from the range -2.5 to 2.5 points on the statistical scale. The third step relates mainly to the application of quantitative methods to manage data in providing results of policy change<sup>5</sup>. In the period between 2000 and 2014, scholars associated with the World Bank project extended their study range to 215 countries, using aggregated data sources provided by 25 well known organizations in the world, compiled along the six dimensions we mentioned above (Kaufmann et al. 2004; World Bank 2013). Aggregating data was used to classify policy performance in each governance component, with scores ranging between -2.5 to 2.5 or 0-100 percentile<sup>6</sup>. The main reason for conducting this work was to understand similarities and differences that could justify policy change in various aspects (Kaufmann et al. 1999b: 18).

### *1.3.2 Operational dimensions*

In the growing attempts to measure the governance change, the empirical work was based on studying the cases of 215 regimes (World Bank 2013). In this respect, the first operational concept developed to define and measure governance was the voice and accountability (VA) index, as it mainly concerns the measuring of the institutional quality through capturing the perceptions of how a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their governments, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and also free media (Kaufmann et al. 2010:4). The analysis revealed notable variations in governance indicators between countries with democratic institutional settings rather than authoritarian regimes. This could be clearly seen through both representative and

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<sup>5</sup> - For further details of governance components see :WB, World Bank, 'Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) Country Data Reports, 1996-2012 : <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home>, (Washington: The World Bank Institute 2013).

<sup>6</sup> - Each component of this indicator rescaled from 0-1, Total score ranges from -2.5 to +2.5 or as a percentile rank from 0 to 100.

non-representative sources of data<sup>7</sup>. The most key representative sources of data were 'democracy indicators' comprised of : EIU-political rights, FRH-FRW-civil society, FRH-FNT-freedom of elections at national level-IPD<sup>8</sup>, whilst non-representative sources were linked to questions asked to respondents with regards to democratic accountability such as : trust, participation, political liberty and so on (World Bank 2013).

The second governance indicator of rule of law (RL) captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, particularly in dimensions such as: the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence (Kaufmann et al. 2010: 4).The representative sources measured included: EIU – private property rights, GCS-judicial independence, and HER –property rights. The non- representative sources can be gained through measures such as: ADB–property rights in governance, BTA-the separation of powers, and so on (World Bank 2013)<sup>9</sup>. Democratic countries show higher levels than authoritarian states. However, there was a clear lack of interpreting why some non-democratic countries perform well on the scale rather than others. Obviously we do not expect neo-liberal autocracies and authoritarian regimes in general to adopt RL because of the many challenges to their power that this dimension carries out.

The third governance indicator provides perceptions of government political stability and absence of violence (AV). Kaufmann et al. (2010:4) defined it as *“capturing perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically motivated violence and terrorism”*. The representative sources include data on state stability such as EIU-social unrest, EIU-international tension, GCS-cost of terrorism,

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<sup>7</sup> According to Kaufmann et al. (2010: 257), representative source of indicators gained from organizations and think-tanks referring to 'How representative are the sources of the world as a whole is also important'. A number of sources cover a large sample of developed and developing economies. While non-representative sources represent less coverage in the sampling of comparisons.

<sup>8</sup> Respectively are examples of indicators of governance perceptions gained from organizations & think tanks. See (Kaufmann et al. 2009: 21-61).

<sup>9</sup> Respectively these are examples of indicators of good governance perceptions gained from organizations & think tanks. See (Kaufmann et al. 2009: 21-61).

PRS-external conflicts, while non-representative sources included indicators such as WJP-order and security, WCY-risk for stability.

According to cross-country comparisons, some authoritarian regimes present high scores in favor of other governance indicators while others vary in score. This raises the question of how aggregating data can genuinely interpret why some autocracies have high performance rather than others, and why they keep high levels of security without abiding by the aforementioned means of assessment.

The fourth component of governance dimensions concentrates on the control of corruption (CC) and transparency, defined as *“perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as capturing the state capacity by elites and private interests”* (2010: 4). In terms of data, the representative sources include: EIU-corruption, among public officials- EIU irregular payment, GWP-widespread corruption, IPD-levels of corruption between policy officials and foreign companies, WMO-contestation between officials (World Bank 2013).

The non-representative sources of this indicator contain: ADB-transparency, accountability and corruption in public sector, (BTI-anti corruption policy, and so on. The comparative perspective also provides clear variation between states on the scale as democracies were better than the developed countries. However, the dynamic of each country performance remained unclear as there were cases on the scale showing a reversed causality and high degrees of transparency in some developing and authoritarian regimes (World Bank 2013).

Both the fifth and sixth indicators of good governance are the components most linked to causality as they deal with economic policy change. Consequently, governance effectiveness (GE) refers mainly to *“capturing perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and*

*implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment*"(Kaufmann et al. 2004: 4; WB 2013b)<sup>10</sup>.

What was also notable in the cross-country comparison is that some autocracies present high levels of GE and this raises further questions concerned with how sufficient these data are in the interpretation of policy change.

The last indicator of good governance is the regulatory quality (RQ). According to Kaufmann et al. (2010:4), RQ is defined as the indicator that captures "*perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies to promote economic sector development*" (2010:4). The representative sources provide perceptions that help to understand economic policy change such as:

EIU-unfair competitive practices-discriminatory taxes, GCS-burden of government regulations- stringency of regulatory environment, HER-investment freedom, PRS-investment profile and other regulations that link to privatization and reforming the public sector. On the other side, the non-representative sources provide data regarding perceptions such as (ADB-trade policy, ADB-business regulations in the economy, BPS- regulations problems and growth, WCY-foreign investment, WCY-banking regulations, WJP-regulatory policy, and WJP economic regulatory enforcements as well as other regulatory governance perceptions (World Bank 2013).

We see that RQ provides insight into the effect of the institutional architecture that may not challenge political powers. This concept's data sources include the aspects of economic change policy features such as: privatization, investment environment, banking regulatory reform, business reform, and regulatory environment and so on. Therefore, regulatory governance is one of the most favorable features of the institutional quality that is likely to be adopted by an authoritarian rule to show enhancement and change in governance as it does not challenge power relations and the essence of authoritarian control on the country.

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<sup>10</sup> Respectively are examples of indicators of good governance perceptions gained from organizations & think tanks. See (Kaufmann et al. 2009: 21-61).

### *1.3.3 Problems of measurements and criticisms*

The assessment of the World Bank and its linked scholars' data carries both advantages and disadvantage for the analysis of causality. In terms of the main advantage provided, cross-country work provided a large amount of rich data and rich results (Kaufmann et al. 1999a: 5). In contrast, the following criticisms were directed to this work pointing to the main gaps in this traditional analysis of governance and policy change:

1. The work was clearly marked by limitations due to the negligence about explaining 'the national institutional context, 'particularly for each case of non-democratic regimes (Kaufmann et al. 1999a; Kaufmann et al. 1999b). Moreover, comparisons based on perceptions gained through polls and surveys (experts, entrepreneurs) were fundamentally based on the 'availability of data' and hence raised serious concerns of both data quality and coverage (Kaufmann et al.1999a:4). Furthermore, another gap was related to the absence of a sound interpretation regarding policy change dynamics in a given national context.

2. Gaps emerged from surveys, polls and questions regarding the nature of the work. In this place, the answers provided by perceptions gained were influenced by local specificity and this weakens the grounds of 'perception analysis' - so to speak. A clear example lies in responses relating to the negative practice of governance in authoritarian regimes as they were affected by 'country-specific perceptions', and hence hindered creating sound comparisons (Kaufmann et al. 1999a: 4).

3. Problems of research design and implementation of methodology. Some of the above-mentioned surveys and polls cover a large sample (e.g. EIU, WDR, HFWSJ), whilst others provide a very limited range of coverage such as CEER in cases with economies that adopt transformation policies.

4. Variation of negative and positive results. This uncovers differences between regimes as in income levels showing a reversed causality between governance



on policy change. This has made the analysis difficult to present compatible, comparative results ( Kaufmann et al. 1999a; Kaufmann et al.1999b; La Porta et al. 1999).

5. The gap in causality interpretation was reflected in a clear absence of a 'qualitative analytical mechanism' that can interpret the effects of the institutional context on policy change.

## **2. The need for new institutional analysis for policy change**

Linking institutions to governance has been crucial to gaining better identification of the influence of the institutional context on the capacity of a system to govern in an effective manner (Peters 2010). The new institutionalism in political science called for the analysis of institutional complementarities (Hall and Soskice, 2001) and 'culture' in shaping policy and final economic outcomes. North (1997: 4) emphasized the critical role culture and history play in creating productive economic growth as it shapes the national institutional context.

This has also paved the way for studies of 'new institutionalism', questioning the validity of instruments, and also to deepen the approaches to causality. Moreover, the debate opened further paths for new issues of causality that relate to a country context such as : the structure of political powers, the nature of political institutions, society-rooted politics, all coupled with calling for the development of new mechanisms based on examining the conditions behind the shape of institutions and the interactive policy process (Sangmpam 2007).

However, questions of conceptualization and measurement remained unanswered, making governance effects on economic policy a contested notion (Landman and Häusermann 2003). This situation urged scholars to a further search for alternative ways to establish valid measures and a unified definition based on empirical work. In this respect, Kurtz and Schrank (2007:538) argued that the dominant measures of good governance suffered from further

'perceptual bias' due to the effect of country context on collected responses from polls and surveys. Another problem was the 'conceptual conflation' with policy choice, meaning that there is qualitative distinction between institutions, and policies should be one of the basic tenets in understanding governance causality based on the new institutionalism (Dellepiane-Avellaneda 2009: 203).

In fact, these initial criticisms show that the definition of good governance lacked precision. Dellepiane-Avellaneda (2009) supported this trend when he explicitly referred to the World Bank aggregating methodology as marked by 'analytical deficit' according to the neglect of conditions that shape the institutional context and help us to understand causality. This led to discussion about how to specify these gaps in the international comparative literature.

Defining these gaps and applying them to the context of authoritarian regimes requires close attention to the core issue of the 'national institutional context effect' on policy change. The issue has not been adequately covered to interpret the causality puzzle. What further raises such concern is the strong empirical evidence showing that some authoritarian regimes produce a more sustained economic growth than others.

This new orientation called on scholars to discriminate between the 'rules of the game', and the strategies and beliefs of 'players of the game'. Moreover, it called on them to distinguish between the 'structure of institution' and 'equilibrium' from causality. This shift in the literature of governance causality was not separate from the domestic context. Therefore, lessons which emanated from the experiences of Latin America and Asia provided a great deal of insight into a new, emerging literature which was mainly concerned with producing an analysis of governance in authoritarian regimes.

In economics this debate was based on the theme of 'institutions versus policy change'(Alesina 1997: 216-221). According to the impressive policy performance of a number of Asian regimes (mainly authoritarian governments including China), scholars formulated claims about the real dynamics behind 'policy

choices' and how they were affected by the national institutional context (Glaeser et al. 2004). Among the examples presented in this issue were the features of political instability and political contestation between the policy elites of such kinds of regimes (Mantzavinos 2004) – this intra-elite conflict will be later visible in our case study of Libya, although refracted in conflicts about narrative roles.

Other studies distinguished between 'formal' and 'informal' authorities (Dellepiane-Avellaneda 2009: 222). These points to the search for qualitative approaches to analytical mechanisms to interpret the effect of governance on policy change. The next section will further shed light on problems of the classic governance change analysis in authoritarian regimes.

### **3. Authoritarian regimes and governance change**

Based on Huntington's notion of the 'democracy waves' which swept over Eastern Europe and other parts of the world, eighty-five of the world's authoritarian regimes reached their end as genuine changes started to take place (Geddes 1999). These changes in autocracies started to receive attention from scholars and key issues were raised to gain interpretations such as: which dictatorship produces governance change? What are the mechanisms through which a dictator produces governance changes? (Charron and Lapuente 2011). These questions were also considered main catalysts for the exploration of the relationship between a regime type and issues of economic reforms.

In opening up the box of governance change in autocracies, this study will benefit from the modern comparative literature on good governance, using it to provide insights on factors influencing economic growth. In fact, what was interesting in studying some new good governance arrangements in autocracies were the results that came from numerous cases addressing types of regimes in order to compare the institutional performance based on two issues: firstly, policy outcomes of democratic countries vis-à-vis authoritarian regimes and, secondly,

differences within democratic systems which, for example, provide different characteristics of governance changes in Presidentialist versus Parliamentary regimes, with substantial variations that were notably overlooked by the traditional cross-country comparisons (Bäck and Hadenius 2008; Bohara et al. 2004; Persson and Tabellini 2003). Following this trend, further studies focused on tackling the relationship between authoritarian types and institutions relevant to economic reform. This has its roots back in the early nineties, when scholars presented an argument of how the political context affects economic growth, based on the regime's type (Przeworski and Limongi 1993). Moreover, the modern literature started to explore the relations between the regime type and reform aspects. In this place, Teorell and Hadenius (2006:2) argued that analyzing the type of regime is a key factor ingraining insight into democratic features in their studies of military regimes. This signaled the importance of tracing regime types to identify more governance change features.

Understanding regime type, beside narrowing down good governance aspects had also led to an understanding of the channels through which institutions affect growth and of how various institutions interact on the political, social and economic levels within a specific setting (Dellepiane-Avellaneda 2009). Moreover, limiting the scope of the case can facilitate raising questions about the relative significance of institutional reforms vis-à-vis policy choices in crafting new reforms (2009:224). We will employ aspects of economic governance including: regulatory quality, privatization, sustainability elements, and investment as they were the key declared features of some governance reforms in Libya 2003-2010.

### **3.1 The adoption of governance change in authoritarian regimes**

Based on the review of the operational dimensions of governance and the empirical findings available in the literature, we make the following conjectures about the governance dimensions that are expected in authoritarian regimes:

1. Policy variations of 'the voice and accountability' dimension revealed differences between democracies and autocracies. Autocracies are not likely to adopt these components due to measures such as: public accountability, democratic institutions, and political rights. They do not exist in autocracies as they are genuine governance components that may restrict the control of power of the ruling actors.

2. 'Rule of Law' is not a preferred measure by dictators willing to engage with governance change. Democracies show higher levels than authoritarian countries that are less likely to adopt this dimension due to measures such as the separation of powers which may restrict the concentration of power in the hands of the main policy actors.

3. The dimension of 'political stability and non-violence' provides insight into how the high scores of authoritarian regimes run in parallel with the high levels of democracies. This entails that dictators need some features from other dimensions to show some aspects of reform beside their control over powers. However, we see this dimension as not likely to present policy change or the adoption of any international norms, as authoritarian leaders often tend to maintain the status quo of the regime's stability.

4. 'Government effectiveness' is based mainly on an efficient bureaucratic apparatus as well as the participation of policy stakeholders. Thus, low levels in authoritarian regimes reveal the existence of an effective government, although some cases show reversed results, as some dictators demand government effectiveness in the economic sector based on their strategic intentions.

5. Although the aggregating-data results show that dictatorships resist the 'control of corruption and transparency' dimension, as there are low scores for autocracies on the scale, they do potentially adopt some measures in some arrangements of openness and economic reform in order to serve their intentions of selling the new policy change strategy. A more deep qualitative empirical investigation is needed in this respect.

6. 'Regulatory quality' is expected to be potentially the preferred governance change dimension to be adopted by dictators. It can be only be manipulated by the leading policy actors, due to components that do not directly cause concession of power and just support some governance reform features.

The failure in interpreting the country context of how governance affects policy change remained the major analytical deficit for studies of governance change in authoritarian regimes. Understanding the dynamics of reform needs further in-depth empirical investigations to interpret why dictators adopt specific features of good governance change. Table.2.1 below provides a comparison of the aforementioned remarks.

**Table.2.1 Expected adoption of good governance in dictatorships**

Dimensions of good governance	How it is measured?	Data gathering	Dictators likely to make efforts to improve on the indicator/ Reason
<b>VOICE &amp; ACCOUNTABILITY</b>	Each component rescaled from 0-1. Total score ranges from -2.5 to +2.5 or as a percentile rank from 0 to 100	Surveys and polls including issues of political rights, civil society, freedom of election, democratic trust, and political liberty.	<b><u>No</u></b>
<b>RULE OF LAW</b>	Each component rescaled from 0-1. Total score ranges from -2.5 to +2.5 or as a percentile rank from 0 to 100	Surveys and polls including issues of: confidence, the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, police, the likelihood of crime and, separation of powers.	<b><u>No</u></b>
<b>POLITICAL STABILITY AND ABSENCE OF VIOLENCE</b>	Each component rescaled from 0-1. Total score ranges from -2.5 to +2.5 or as a percentile rank from 0 to 100	Surveys of : social unrest, Country security, violence.	<b><u>Partially YES</u></b> expected but without abiding by its measures of perceptions
<b>CONTROL OF CORRUPTION</b>	Each component rescaled from 0-1. Total score ranges from -2.5 to +2.5 or as a percentile rank from 0 to 100	Surveys of: Corruption among public officials-irregular payment, widespread corruption. Levels of corruption between policy officials and foreign companies, contestation between officials, transparency.	<b><u>No</u></b> Allowed in some authoritarian rules coupled with limited economic reform
<b>GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESS</b>	Each component rescaled from 0-1. Total score ranges from -2.5 to +2.5 or as a percentile rank from 0 to 100	Polls and surveys of institutional quality, bureaucratic quality, government handling of policies in sectors, and quality of administration.	<b><u>Partially No</u></b> Some cases show demand based on the dictator's intentions
<b>REGULATORY QUALITY</b>	Each component rescaled from 0-1. Total score ranges from -2.5 to +2.5 or as a percentile rank from 0 to 100	Burden of government regulations-stringency of regulation, investment, regulations of privatization & reforming public sector. Trade policy- business regulation, regulations problems and growth, banking regulations, perceptions related to economic reform.	<b><u>YES</u></b> Key component of economic governance reform

### **3.2 Why would an authoritarian regime produce (what kind of) good governance?**

The modern literature on authoritarian regimes has its roots back in the mid-seventies of the last century when Dick (1974:819&823) presented his argument on 'authoritarian versus non-authoritarian approaches to economic development', covering 58 regimes of both types and aiming mainly to observe the economic growth rates along with the related form of government, whether authoritarian or democratic, and how they both perform in stages of growth. Through comparisons, Dick found that authoritarian governments may perform well in economic growth in later stages and can have the same rates of growth in real GDP per capita as the opposite type of regime. Dick concluded that the analysis of economic performance along with form of government should be cautiously studied. The evidence suggested that policy choice in autocracies should be qualitatively investigated depending on the national institutional context of each case.

### **3.3 Establishing causality: key arguments**

The basis of the shift in addressing the causal effects of governance on policy change in autocracies dates back to the argument entitled 'stationary bandit' presented by Olson (1993: 567) to address the case of the long-time stable dictator and linked policy actors who monopolize power and wealth, rationalizing theft of resources. This dominance is followed by an investment in some governance change arrangements as a direct response to the regime's security challenges, and also to seek the goal of extending the ruling time. To address the relationship between dictatorship and governance, Olson concluded that there are variations in economic growth even in both short and long term dictatorships. Thus, the following arguments are the three main forms of interpretation of causality between governance and policy reforms:



1. Causality observed when an authoritarian regime creates growth and low levels of governance. In an argument entitled 'Accepting Authoritarianism : State Society in China's Reform Era', T. Wright (2010: 133 ) referred to the Chinese case, focusing on economic advancement reached through enhancing private workers' conditions, irrespective of providing genuine governance change features. This type indicates that there is no significant relationship between the governance change and economic growth in such experiences.

2. An authoritarian regime produces governance changes that lead to economic growth based on the uncertainty of the length of the rule and of the succession. Therefore, the aforementioned 'stationary bandit' argument refers to a secure persona-list autocrat who seeks a short term economic reform due to the uncertainty of succession, or for more than one generation of rule, reflecting the main goal of survival and continuity (Olson 1993: 567).

3. When authoritarian regimes reform governance, there is economic growth. Therefore, citizens demand more governance reforms. This form of causality links to the argument of 'supply and demand' and is based on the notion of 'ordinary people' presented by Welzel and Inglehart (2008), when people demand more good governance as a consequence of economic growth that increases citizen's resources. This entails their engagement in policy decision and choice.

Dictators who follow the second causality do not need such a compromise of supply and demand; they tend to follow the 'stationary bandit' argument to serve their interest of continuity. Also, the second and third approaches of causality are based on 'public choice' theory, as rulers tend to adopt the governance change in terms of how it could fit with their interests and the institutions under their rule. In this context, Reid Jr and Kurth (1988) mentioned an example of the leaders 'tendency to gain the support of the poorer classes according to 'the political game' of: *"heat when they are cold, food when they are hungry, and medical care when they are sick"*. In terms of the demand side, citizens always expect benefits and high income, as they

also demand different policies from the government to respond to inputs. The political cost of demanding governance is also considered by dictators.

In understanding why autocracies produce policy change, Egorov et al. (2009) raise the question: Why do resource-poor dictators allow freer media?, providing empirical evidence of the degree of wealth of resources and aspects of good governance such as 'the freedom of press', which in several cases allows the dictator to enhance the economic reform.

Based on the above -listed causality forms, the following four arguments could be raised concerning the reason an authoritarian regime would produce some features of better governance:

1. The first argument is concerned with the 'stationary bandit', 'referring to the secure autocrat who seeks a short-term economic reform, due to the uncertainty of the succession. Economic reform serves the dictator's interests for a short time (Olson 1993:567). This includes measures imposed by dictators including 'limited regulatory reform' of the economy that is required for some growth. In short, although there are aspects of rationalizing and monopolizing the country's resources and economy, the dictator seeks to present some sort of economic development to ensure the continuity of rule. Therefore, the regime's behavior is expected to reveal a manifestation of policy change, such as a clear discursive declaration of economic reforms based on the key attractive element, for example oil or other resources, in order to convince audiences in both the local and international arena.

2. The second argument focuses on 'legitimizing policy change' intended by authoritarian regimes. In an argument entitled 'authoritarianism resilience' as a part of the theory of authoritarianism, dictatorships may seek to overcome the fragile nature of governance and weak legitimacy (Nathan 2003: 6). In fact, this issue was discussed early on between scholars of International Relations (IR), considering where various bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes seek the creation of legitimacy based on providing justification of the appropriateness of new policy reforms and new aspects of some institutional change (Epstein 1984:37). According to Gasiorowski (1995), dictators seek to invest in good governance to legitimize new policy actions to 'rehabilitate' the

government as a reaction to challenges that face the regime, such as the dissatisfaction of the public with the internal economic policy (Nathan 2003: 13).

Moreover, Gasiorowski provided empirical evidence regarding the linkage between economic crises and observed regime change, while others moved further by considering that dictators legitimize new governance based on the notion of 'investment without democracy' where some dictators tend to provide some aspects of governance reforms such as privatization and investment, without genuine democratic change (Gehlbach and Keefer 2011). This entails the fact that legitimizing policy change in autocracies can be analyzed in light of this trend. In parallel with legitimacy, early calls also raised the need to analyze the institutional settings of formal and informal rules as presented by Epstein (1984:38). In sum, the second rationale assumes that dictators (particularly persona-list ones) seek to rehabilitate the government to legitimize their continuity in rule.

3. The third argument is concerned with the 'international society and trade partners' audience' where autocracies live. Their potential partners are interested in governance changes in their bargaining with the dictator. In fact, this is mainly based on the notion of the 'bargaining game' which emanates from historical events such as 'economic sanctions' in the IR literature (Dorussen and Mo 2001). In this respect, the 'audience cost argument' linked to empirical 'policy discourse' analysis can better provide insights into the dictatorship's interest in the investment in some governance changes. According to this argument, dictators choose their attitude towards the audience; whether to attack, back down, or escalate (Fearon 1994: 577 ).

In terms of the international audience, Schultz (2001:33) argued that they also force dictators to choose between alternative domestic and foreign costs under political pressure and to show effort in the direction of reform. We will further discuss this issue when addressing entering the frameworks of 'discursive institutionalism' and the 'narrative policy analysis' in our investigation of the adopting of governance narratives in Libya in the next chapter.

4. The last argument of the thesis is concerned with the goals of an authoritarian regime to ensure continuity. As 'survival' is paramount for dictators, scholars stressed the need for studies that answer how policy actors under dictatorship behave in light of their interaction with the international community (Wright and Escriba-Folch 2010). In sum, a narrow and focused new empirical orientation to probe this rationale is needed to explore the dynamics of change. Besides the analytical deficit of cross-country data presented by the international institutions, the aforementioned arguments of causality confirm that economic governance is not just what the WB, UNDP, etc. tell us, but rather is what they do not measure what they are supposed to measure particularly in the country context of authoritarian regimes.

One important digression and clarification is in order at this point. So far we have reviewed studies that postulate and empirically examine causal relationships between governance and the economy. This is important for us because this causal logic of 'economic reforms have an effect on the overall quality of governance and governance is important for foreign direct investment' was refracted in the official discourse of the authoritarian regime. However, in our empirical analysis we will examine discourse, not economic variables and their effect on governance. This means that we will study the discursive representation of the causal relations between the economy and governance, and how 'good governance' appeared in policy narratives. But this is very different from the kind of empirical studies we have looked at in this chapter.

Back to these studies, empirical evidence today is conclusive: authoritarian regimes produce economic growth (Charron and Lapuente 2011). This new empirical work raised questions such as: how and why do the results of the aggregate data invalidate the good governance approach of the international organizations, particularly the World Bank, that are based on the template of liberal-market democracies? Can we achieve growth by following an authoritarian regime path as well as a democratic path? If both paths are possible, shouldn't we conclude that growth is not dependent on the presence of good governance, no matter how we measure it? These concerns raise the need to provide new focused orientation of analysis that can better interpret

the actual dynamics behind the governance change planned by authoritarian regimes.

### **3.4 Types of authoritarian regimes and governance change**

Charron and Lapuente (2011) presented their basic key question: which type of non-democracy is most likely to respond to demands for change? This consequently led to a focus on the nature of 'ruling organization in autocracies' (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007) as central in determining governance change features. In single-party regimes, the ruling party forms the leading organization, while individuals are dominant in the personalities and hereditary succession regimes (Charron and Lapuente 2011: 404 ; Geddes 1999:130). It is also important to note that comparing the organization of these types of regime would provide insight into the determinants of good governance causality. Hence, monarchies and military regimes provide what can be termed 'ready-made-institutions' of governance such as courts, and armed forces, where the aim is to gain huge loyalty and support (Hirschman 1970). Contrary to this perspective, single-party regimes tend to be persuasive to citizens through presenting a well-defined policy to gain voice and support.

By study development, scholars found that each type has its own institutional context (Charron and Lapuente 2011) and this requires more empirical investigation aiming to answer the question: Why do authoritarian regimes care about some governance aspects? This issue of defining types of autocracies was important to realize the variation in causality. Thus, single-party regimes are the most prominent ones to produce governance due to their flexibility in providing programs to tackle economic crises. They are also characterized by seeking to build a strong 'Weberian government' to tackle economic growth (Charron and Lapuente 2011; Haggard 1995).

In the argument of authoritarian regimes' time and investment resources, J. Wright (2008) found that single party regimes are the closest type for a higher degrees of economic growth, based on building an acceptable quality

of institutions. In fact, Wright built his investigations on findings reached by Mauro's work on the relationship between corruption and growth, finding a strong empirical linkage between the governance change and economic growth in single party regimes (Mauro 1995:695 ). Moreover, Wright moves further with his investigations of single party regimes 'investment in good governance to reach the conclusion that there is a positive effect of monarchy regime on economic growth (1995:695). Furthermore, the military regimes type represents the reversed causality gap, as two-sided causality was found by scholars in the effect of this type on governance, pointing out that they are less likely to present economic reform and are directly dominated by the military leader, presenting a case of a single-individual rule (Geddes 1999; Ulfelder 2005).

The literature has also presented the 'new hereditary-succession regimes' which emerged in modern republic-style autocracies. The basis of this type can be traced back to the argument of Burling (1974), presenting the idea that 'heredity has come to an end' to refer to the notion of 'regime survival' in the new era of the democracy wave in autocracies. This notion was followed by further modern academic work shedding light on the modern autocracies as they seek solutions for transition to features of good governance while practicing hereditary succession as featured in Azerbaijan (2003), Singapore (2004), and Togo in (2005), as little analysis is presented to clarify the mechanisms linking policy change and the leaders' behavior.

The key question was concerned with the emergence of the 'the new generation of autocracies', and how dictators tend to maintain their influence on any leadership change, as 'uncertainty' surrounds dictatorships' stability (Brownlee 2007). Such persona-list types of rule often seek some features of economic reform to prove the governance change. We will further re-visit these types when we reach the final stage of investigating our case of the Libyan regime to draw our final insights.

The literature on authoritarianism also identifies the fact that economic governance was mainly used by dictators to send signals. Brautigam et al. (2008) explain that in autocracies with limited resources resemble their

counterparts in democracies in their efforts to produce economic governance based on strengthening bureaucracy, taxation, and impartial laws to convince citizens and outsiders about state capacity. When the regime enjoys considerable amounts of resources and fewer incentives, the ruler finds it acceptable to invest in governance aspects.

### **3.5 Adopting selected dimensions of governance change**

The absence of an agreed unified definition of good governance is still the main criticism due to problems of reversed causality in governance analysis (Charron and Lapuente 2011; Holmberg and Rothstein 2012). Agnafors (2013:442) argued that the search for a clear definition of the quality of governance-QoG requires the narrowing of its components to an operational concept that could have an empirical weight in the analysis of policy change.

Authoritarian regimes focus on governance components that are manageable for their goals in light of the arguments presented above. For the purpose of this dissertation, we will focus on regulatory quality and its linked economic reform aspects, given the emphasis that the Libyan government had declared economic reform as the lever of broader changes in managing the economy. Regulatory reform was also discursively constructed to project a new identity of the country in the international system, e.g. a trusted partner with an open economy attractive to international business, as well as leader-country across the African continent.

Economic regulatory reform is preferred by the authoritarian leaders; we expect an authoritarian regime to present features that serve its intentions and goals and in light of the national context. Moreover, the requirements of better regulations present some insights into the potential features by an authoritarian rule. We expect that several regulatory principles that are central in the literature would not be chosen by dictators such as : 'necessity', 'consistency', 'accessibility', 'accountability' and open, 'pluralistic consultation' (Argy and Johnson 2003 : 5 & 6; Radaelli and De Francesco 2007: 31), all of which are not priorities for an authoritarian leader to embrace. Also, 'the

respect for the constitution'; 'protecting regulations'; 'openness'; 'participation of shareholders'; 'continuously updated and improved regulations' (Government of Canada 1994; Radaelli and De Francesco 2007: 32 & 33), are not expected to be found in the context of persona-list dictatorships.

On the other side, authoritarian rules in developing countries seem to adopt a kind of regulatory quality that links mainly to economic reforms presented by the World Bank. In this regard, WB scholarly studies found notable variation among autocracies when conducting their analysis of the regulatory quality (RQ), focusing on causality between institutions of governance and their causal effect on economic change (Kaufmann et al. 2010:4). What was notably missing in this trend was the presentation of a sound qualitative interpretation to answer the questions of why and how there are variations between authoritarian regimes in adopting change in their economic regulatory governance. Also, there was a silence over the interpretation of the role of the national institutional context in adopting such reforms and why some regimes ignore genuine principles of regulatory quality in favor of some limited and selected other measures. Finally, we need to explore the presentation of reforms and their discursive usage – this will be key to our project but does not feature prominently in the literature.

#### **4. Governance change in Libya**

At this point in the chapter we provide some background information on Libya. We will justify fully case selection in the research design chapter. Libya represents an authoritarian regime that faced several changes in governance since the military coup that toppled the monarchy regime in 1969<sup>11</sup>. Although the nature of power practice remained authoritarian, there was a change in the regime's ruling organization which witnessed subsequent transformations during the Gaddafi epoch. This change started from the military rule 1969-1973 to the features of a persona-list regime between 1977 and 2002.

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
<sup>11</sup>Libya was a Monarchy type under the rule of King Idris Senussi from its independence in December 1951 until the military coup of Muammar Gaddafi in September 1969.



In the period from 2003 to 2010, the Libyan regime started to move to an unclear mixture of a family, persona-list regime and a new-‘neo-patrimonial autocracy’ (Van de Walle 1994), seeking to show signals in a hereditary succession pattern during the period from 2003 to 2010. In addition, the regime sought to legitimate the new change based on strategies of transformation towards economic reform, searching for ‘external legitimacy’ and as a response to exogenous pressures (Al-Sawani 2013: 67-75). Accordingly, our thesis is based on the national context of governance in Libya when the regime initiated some structural changes after the end of the UN sanctions imposed on Libya in 1999 (Mateos 2005: 441; Pargeter 2006: 223).

As Libya presents the case of a family persona-list regime, we note that the World Bank cross-country studies failed to interpret any dynamic of change in this regime. The World Bank was silent when it came to providing illustrations of policy change powers and society-rooted dynamics. The studies are concerned with large n comparisons, then they do not interpret the notable variation in the regulatory governance change and the fluctuations witnessed during the period from 1996 to 2012 generally and in the period from 2003 to 2010 in particular (figure.2.1).

**Figure.2.1 Variation in economic regulatory quality governance in Libya 1996-2012**



**Source:** World Bank, Cross-Country World-Wide Governance indicators, regulatory quality-Libya, 1996-2012

The Libyan regime has its own unique authorities emanating from its national context. The political philosophy launched by Gaddafi in 1977 to reflect his views on governance conceptions (Davis 1982)<sup>12</sup>. In fact, there was a controversy surrounding the absence of analytical mechanisms to interpret the interactive process between institutions and policy change in the epoch of the Libyan regime.

We expect the Libyan regime's search for means of new adaptation in the international community to be expressed through presenting some governance reforms. In this regard, 'economic realism' presents one of the options for the Libyan regime, especially when Libya had faced serious challenges with the UN sanctions, EU, USA (Hurd 2005; Zoubir 2009). However, our questions remained: Why and how did the Libyan regime aim to produce some governance with which tactics, strategies, goals, and institutions?

<sup>12</sup>We will further address these arrangements in chapter 3.

#### **4.1 The selected features of governance reform in Libya**

Regulatory economic governance reforms were the main measures presented to prove some features of policy change in Libya between 2003 and 2010. According to figure.2.1, aggregating data provided by the World Bank show that Libya represents one of the most low and changing indicators of regulatory quality, as the country is ranked between 0 % and 10 % (1996-2005), then steadily improved to the range between 10 % to 25 % in the period from 2003 to 2010. We see that the start and the end of the period were marked by a notable decline in this indicator (World Bank 2013). There is a clear need to interpret this puzzle: Why and how were these measures chosen to produce new attitudes of some governance change?

#### **4.2 Expectations of empirical investigation for the Libyan regime**

There is a clear need for a new theoretical and analytical policy framework that can provide better interpretation of the relationships and strategies of the governance reform. There were several manifestations of policy change in aspects such as: privatization, investment, and breaking the monopoly of the public sector as the main features of reform in Libya. We expect that the governance change investigation in Libya should consider dimensions such as: 1.the actionable attitudes of political actors. 2. A declared will for change by main policy actors. 3. The regulatory and legal requirements of reform and economic policy change 4. Identifying the role of formal, informal and quasi-formal (if any) institutions in the actionable attitudes towards achieving the new intended reform. 5. Understanding the attitudes and main ideas affecting the governance reform. 6. Identifying patterns of interaction between the regime and all parts engaged in the reform process, including the international actors. Ultimately, we expect that adopting policy-oriented discourse as an analytical mechanism, based on building empirical evidence of policy change discourse can better provide genuine understanding for the aforementioned components of the policy story, and hence fill the gaps of the traditional literature analysis.

## Conclusions

This chapter tackled the literature review of governance and policy change in authoritarian regimes. We also sketched some background information on Libya to formulate our research expectations.

This stage of the literature review presents the following key messages: There is a vibrant debate on the governance causal effects on policy change by scholars and international organizations to provide measurement of governance and different interpretations of causality. The main contribution of these efforts was the presentation of the governance matters causal claim. The second is that the analysis of how exactly 'governance matters' in authoritarian regimes is not conclusive, although we can formulate some expectations. We know that authoritarian regimes produce sustained economic growth in some cases. Is this because of governance reforms? Which ones? We presented some conjectures: authoritarian regimes are expected to engage with regulatory quality. Not all aspects of regulatory quality and not all principles of regulatory governance will be accepted by authoritarian leaders. We also argue that these selective acquisitions of regulatory quality will be causally effective for authoritarian leaders if they manage to persuade the international community and the citizens. Hence discourse is fundamental because it projects reform onto its audiences. But this is where the literature has less to say. And this is where our project finds its strongest motivation. We need to explore the discursive mechanisms that distinguish between the 'rules of the game', and 'the players of the game'. The qualitative and discursive analysis we propose will provide insights regarding the structure of policy powers in the Libyan regime, the nature of political institutions, their formal and informal narrative roles, and society-rooted politics. We will examine these issues in the next chapter.

## **CHAPTER THREE-ENTERING DISCOURSE AND NARRATIVE FRAMEWORKS IN THE ANALYSIS OF POLICY CHANGE IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES**

### **Introduction**

The previous chapter has introduced the notion of good governance and how this concept is measured using different indicators and approaches. We have also discussed the preferences of authoritarian regimes for quality of governance. We argued that authoritarian regimes have an interest in promoting governance reforms because of internal legitimacy (even the most repressive regime needs a minimum of social legitimacy) and because of their external audience made up of international institutions, trade partners and the international business community. However, their interest in governance and reforms is limited to domains where there are low internal costs and high external benefits.

We do not expect authoritarian regimes to invest in the rule of law, freedom of the press, and other domains where the domestic political costs for the regime are high. However, domains such as privatization and regulatory reform are much more attractive: they do not challenge the distribution of core governmental power –hence they have limited internal costs. At the same time, these reforms have potentially high external benefits, in that they are positively perceived by the international business community and international institutions involved in trade, such as the European Commission, IMF, World Trade Organization, and by close economic partners such as Italy for Libya. Indeed these reforms are also important for individual trade partners (thinking of Libya, Italy is an important trading partner) that, like Italy at the time of the Italian-Libyan friendship treaty of 2008, do not have the political power or the interest to press for human rights and other governance reforms that would lessen the grip of authoritarian regimes on society and on political life. Few Italian MPs raised the issue of human rights and basic liberties in the parliamentary discussion of the friendship treaty.

Recall that the studies covered in the previous chapter are based on large-scale statistical analysis covering governance reforms, economic growth and political regimes. Such studies provide the greater comparative picture, but they say little on how governance reforms come about in individual cases. This is where another body of literature can assist us, broadly speaking a literature concerned with discourse.

Since the pioneering work of Peter Hall on the political economy of change (Hall, 1989), political economists have distinguished between the content of reforms and how they are communicated. After all, economic policy change is both a process of 'doing things' and of obtaining legitimacy for the reforms. Even authoritarian regimes, who have formidable levers of power for producing change, have to talk about change and seek legitimacy for this. In political life, policy change is both a set of reforms and a set of discursive representations of the reforms.

In centrally controlled economies like those of authoritarian regimes, the government has plenty of power to privatize and to produce regulatory reforms. This aspect of economic policy change is less problematic than in democratic systems with multiple veto powers, free unions, and pluralistic pressure group politics. We will cover the main national plans and governance reforms in the domain of the economy and regulations. And yet, whatever change is planned or carried out, authoritarian regimes have to sell it. They have to gain support from the international business community as they want the reforms to attract foreign firms and investments. Countries such as Libya also promoted economic policy change for another reason that is to attract support from trading partners involved in bilateral treaty negotiations. Finally, they wanted to give signals to their domestic audience that the government was positively engaged with growth and delivering on economic policy goals. This kind of internal and external legitimacy issues explains the importance of discourse in authoritarian regimes.

The literature on this topic is not narrow in scope. Political science and comparative political economy have developed many of insights into and methods of analysis of discourse in democratic political systems. In this

chapter, we will introduce and discuss these approaches. We will not review the entire body of literature on discourse analysis. This is because we are interested in political economy and governance reforms rather than broader issues of government ability - the latter would lead us to consider approaches such as critical discourse analysis and 'Foucauldian approaches' to government ability in general. Instead, we need approaches that are well-suited for the empirical analysis of economic governance such as privatization and regulatory changes concerned with easing business and the operation of firms.

For this reason, we will limit our research attention to discursive institutionalism (DI) (part.2) and narrative policy framework (NPF, hereafter). In part.3, we will discuss how these two approaches, combined in a syncretic research design, support our research and the adaptations, caveats and special points to bear in mind when examining authoritarian regimes. We stress this because as mentioned, these approaches have been tested mainly on advanced democracies such as Britain, France, Germany and the USA, hence they cannot be imported wholesale into the analysis of authoritarian regimes.

Based on the previous review, this chapter will be divided into four main sections:

1. Discourse: Concept formation
2. Entering discourse and narrative frameworks
3. Implications for authoritarian regimes and Libya
4. Research questions

We will then relate these concepts and framework to the case of Libya and introduce our research questions. We believe it is important to introduce the research questions here, since they originate directly from the literature. The next chapter will expand on the other elements of research design and handling empirical evidence.

## 1. Discourse: Concept formation

At least since the work of Peter Hall (1986;1989), comparative political economists have drawn attention to ideational variables in the study of economic governance. Political scientists have addressed the role of 'ideas' in policy reform, raising questions of how ideas represent the new policy program, and how ideas are associated with several policy decision making venues and institutions (Schmidt, 2002) and also (Baumgartner 2012). It was Peter Hall who distinguished between levels of policy change and suggested that major policy changes have an important ideational component: he called these paradigmatic changes, to point to the key values and norms that underpin change, and to suggest affinities with the change of paradigms in the history of science, following Kuhn. In comparative political economy, the proposition that policy change is ideational was initially seen as contrary to the conventional notion that economic and social policies are pushed by interests alone.

Yet, discourse-oriented scholars do not dispute the importance of interests. However they argue that actors need ideas, beliefs, symbols, and frames of reference to understand what their interests are in a given situation and to be able to take action and make decisions (Hay 2002, 2006). Interests are not even 'actionable' without ideas. In turn, 'ideas' is a broad category, which, depending on the authors we are considering, includes values, core policy beliefs, and norms. The work on discourse, therefore, is intimately associated with the grand debate in contemporary political economy about the three 'I's': ideas, interests, and institutions (Schmidt, 2002).

But what is discourse, then? To answer this, (Fairclough1992) distinguishes between discourse referring to language and meaning of the discourse, and 'discursive practice', that refers to the production of the text and how to analyze it based on putting meaning into a given context (1992). Another attempt to approach the definition has been presented by Hajer (1995:44), defining discourse as drawing the guide-line for both



subjects and objects to set the knowledge about reality and its main actors.

Therefore discourse is defined as the 'specific ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categories that are (re) produced, and transformed to give meaning to physical and social relations'(Hajer 1995:44). Discourse was also defined as linked to policy change by several scholarly attempts such as the definition of Jacobs and Manzi (1996 : 544 & 545), presenting the understanding of language carried in discourse, opening the debate for further discussions of communication and the deliberation part of policy change (1996: 547). In other attempts, several studies have set the scene for the modern mainstream of discourse addressing the notion of quality of governance and economic change.

Schmidt (1997: 170) links discourse with the process of national economies' adjustments through the early examination of discursive rationales for policy change, and recently she has made the case for discourse or the lack thereof as an element in the (dis) integration in Europe (1997:170). Essentially, she argues that elected leaders in Germany, France and the UK no longer explain why their country is in Europe. They shift blame to Europe instead of seeking domestic legitimacy for Europe when they communicate to their citizens. In short, leaders have lost the narrative.

This is perhaps an extreme proposition (that is, that discourse causes European disintegration) but it shows how discourse can be used to explain profound policy-level changes. Schmidt also argued that ideas of discourse refer to 'governance commitment' and social representations of changes (by the elites, towards other elites or towards the citizens) of each country towards policy adjustments (1997: 195 & 196). In this regard, scholars also presented the definition of discourse as "representing both the policy ideas that speak to the soundness and appropriateness of policy programmes and the interactive processes of policy formulation and communication that serve to generate and disseminate new ideas"(Schmidt 2000a,2000b; Schmidt and Radaelli 2004:184). This definition also refers to the claim that analysis should not be of the nature of discourse itself but should

rather focus on social interaction and deliberation in a specific institutional context to produce the new policy (Schmidt 2008: 309).

Consequently, the discussion on concept formation has also urged scholars to debate the new trend presenting discursive approaches as not just 'ideational' or grounded exclusively on ideas, but as also, and perhaps primarily, actors-centered because they consider how actors interact on the basis of shared meanings and language. Hence, these approaches are ideational and interactive at the same time. This is what Vivien Schmidt has argued throughout her career. This ideational dimension refers mainly to the content of discourse and seeks to legitimize decisions of policy makers (Hay and Rosamond 2002; Radaelli 2004: 195), while the interactive part of discourse is linked mainly to the collective actions of and connection among policy actors. Both dimensions clearly reveal that discourse can serve as an approach to analyze causality between institutions and new policy. According to Schmidt (2002a), discourse as a set of ideas, can serve as policy process in terms of demonstrating the policy change, whether through presenting good reasons for change or based on defending the existing values (2002a: 170 & 171).

To recap, discourse is both ideational and interactive. Further, discourse comes in different forms: policy paradigms, narratives, causal stories, and frames of references. Later in the chapter we shall examine a specific form of discourse, that is, narratives of public policy.

## **2. Entering discourse and narrative frameworks**

### **2.1 Discursive Institutionalism (DI)**

Discursive institutionalism is a political economy approach developed chiefly by Vivien Schmidt to explain policy change in economy policy. Later in her work she widened the approach to take in explanations of public policy and governance in general, claiming this to be a new theory alongside the existing rational choice, historical, and sociological institutionalisms. According to

Schmidt, in recent years DI has become one of the leading institutionalist approaches. This proposition is far from being universally accepted. But we do not need to adjudicate the case in this thesis; we do not need to say whether DI contributes to institutionalist theory. In fact, we are interested in policy change and for us the main point is that DI is particularly useful in the analysis of discursive patterns (ideational and interactive) at work in processes of policy change in a given institutional settings.

The most notable contribution of the DI framework is that it connects institutions, actors and ideas through discourse. Firstly, DI allows policy researchers to better identify ideas in general terms as regimes present policy plans, programs, development policies (Schmidt 2008: 305) in a given institutional context. This also entails providing types of content carried in policy including both 'cognitive' and 'normative' elements (2008: 305).

The second level is concerned mainly with the two types of discourse: the 'coordinative discourse' of elites and the 'communicative discourse' through which elites try to secure legitimacy for their policy reforms. To identify coordinative discourse, Schmidt refers to "individuals and groups at the centre of policy construction who are involved in the creation, elaboration, and justification of new policy and programmatic ideas" (2008: 310).

Schmidt also explained the contribution of this type of discourse in terms of providing information interpreting interaction between main actors, civil servants, elected policy legislatures, policy experts, and activists.

Governments deploy coordinative discourse when they are building consensus for a new policy at the level of elites, and communicative discourse when they seek legitimacy across citizens (Schmidt 2002a). Recall that discourse is both ideational and interactive. It follows that coordinative discourse is not just about the ideas used by elites, but also about the institutions and fora where elites interact and discuss emerging reforms and policy change in general. This concept requires adaptation when we move from liberal democracies to authoritarian regimes, since institutions and planning fora are bound to be different in content and function.

Moreover, coordination ideas reflect arrangements among actors in a certain institutional setting such as a council of economic policy advisers or a corporatist venue in countries with this style of policy-making. Hence, coordinative discourse may go so far as to cover the 'domain of individuals' connection in 'epistemic communities', also in transnational settings on the basis of shared cognitive and normative ideas about a common policy enterprise "(Haas 1992; Jobert 2001; Schmidt 2008). In many cases of policy change, scholars have argued that coordinative discourse can be captured in the relationship between regimes, policy actors and business leaders in the global diffusion of competition policy for example, but one can also (encounter norms entrepreneurs in an international setting (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Fligstein and Mara-Drita 1996) and mediating factors like veto players and coalition that constrain or expand the reach of discursive strategies (Jobert 1989; Schmidt 2008: 310 ).

In sum, coordinative discourse serves as a facilitator for governments to adjust policy based on the agreement of key actors and is how they reach consensus about the change, in addition to identifying both the logic and the goal of a new policy. In order to justify new policy, DI provides the communicative function of policy discourse to legitimate the policy direction among elites as well as to persuade the audience of the merits of the new ideas (Schmidt 2002b: 235).

With regard to communicative discourse, this type concerns actions taken to legitimate policy ideas, the deliberation of ideas, and the social representations of reform (Schmidt 2008: 310). In this regard, communicative discourse aims for persuasion and legitimacy, focusing on convincing internal and external audiences of the change proposed or under way (Mutz et al. 1996; Schmidt 2008).

Communicative discourse actors are not only represented by the policy decision makers, but also by other parties that are (in) directly engaged in policy persuasions. In this respect, Schmidt (2008: 310 ), mentioned several types of communicative actors engaged in the process, such as "members of opposition parties, the media, pundits, community leaders, social activists

,public intellectuals, experts, think-tanks, interests groups, and social movements.”These and other actors are often organized in the ‘policy forums’ of informed publics as classified by Schön and Rein (1995). Through the communicative function of discourse, governments seek to convince their audience about a change through establishing a frame that illustrates future events and policy changes (Schmidt 2002b:235). Yet again, we stress the difference between this ideal-type elaborated by Vivien Schmidt with advanced democracies in mind, and authoritarian regimes, where, for example, media are rigidly controlled by the authoritarian leader and his party. In terms of communicative content, the clarity of discourse by political leaders, in parallel with coherent ideas of policy, plays a crucial role in convincing the internal and external audience of the validity of their opinions (Zaller 1992:9). Along with coordinative discourse, communicative discourse serves as facilitator of policy change, particularly in relation to the external audience(s), as it concerns mainly the justification of new reform.

Finally, the DI framework presents a notable analytical contribution when compared to critical discourse analysis and other discursive approaches. The literature has shown that DI is particularly effective for comparative and empirical analysis at the policy level whilst other approaches to discourse prefer to focus either on episode like the assassination of a leader or on the wider discursive structure of governance and government ability. If DI works well for policy analysis, what are the specific forms in which discourse is elaborated within elites and communicated to citizens?

This question brings the NPF framework into the discussion of policy change.

## **2.2 The Narrative Policy Framework (NPF)**

In policy analysis, discourse has been examined in terms of its different, specific features and of the functions in which it is created and communicated. The concept of discourse – as we said earlier - is broad. It is difficult to pin down exactly what discourse is. For this reason some policy scholars working within discourse analysis have gone down the ladder of the abstract: simply

put, they have turned their attention to the 'forms' in which policy discourse is often cast, that is, policy narratives. In this section we move from DI to the narrative policy framework or NPF. We consider the NPF a specification of DI at a lower level on the ladder of abstraction, not a critique or an alternative. Indeed, there is nothing in the work of Vivien Schmidt and others that points to a rejection of the NPF. Equally, although the NPF is perhaps less concerned with institutions than DI, this approach is eminently compatible with the analytical core of DI, such as coordinative and communicative discourse, and the notion of the ideational and interactive dimensions of discourse analysis.

The NPF, in short, when compared to DI, simply operates at a lower level of abstraction. Empirically, it will enable us to code elements of policy narratives of privatization and regulatory governance. This is its major advantage within the context of this thesis.

The NPF framework is associated with the work of policy analysts such as McBeth, Jones, Shanahan in the USA (2007, 2010), and, in Europe, Radaelli (Radaelli, 1989, Radaelli et al. 2013). At the outset, we observe that the majority of studies in the field of narratives in international relations and comparative public policy are NOT inspired by the NPF. Consequently, we have to explain what is different and new in this approach and why we think it is suitable for our type of research questions concerning discourse and policy change.

The foundational proposition of the NPF is that public policy has a narrative dimension that can be studied with the same tools of rigorous, empirical policy analysis that we use for other dimensions of public policy. Put differently, the NPF rejects the post-modern and anti-foundational ontology of critical discourse analysis. It is much more at ease with empirical analysis than critical discourse analysis.

More specifically, the NPF acknowledges that public policy is socially constructed: policy problems, opportunities for change, even the notion of 'good governance QoG' and 'regulation' exist only in terms of shared or contested meanings within a given set of actors or a society. Public policy is socially constructed. This means that for the NPF, the ontology is social. The

'reality' that the NPF scholars study is a social web of meanings and interpretations.

At the same time, for the NPF scholars, it is possible to test whether a proposition is true or false by using the classic methodological canons of empirical social sciences. In this sense, scholars such as Radaelli have argued that the NPF has a social ontology and an objective epistemology (Radaelli et al. 2013). This dual proposition (that is, social ontology and objective epistemology) is unanimously shared within the NPF and distinguishes this approach from critical discourse analysis and post-modern policy analysis. This is an important point because there are several authors who study 'narratives', but outside the NPF the approach to narratives is often based on post-modern critiques of causality, empirical analysis, and classic social scientific research methods (Maggetti, Gilardi, Radaelli, 2012). The NPF takes exactly the opposite view. Causality exists, empirical analysis of narratives can be carried out via robust coding and other techniques, and the results can be validated and replicated within a community of social scientists. For us, the main advantage of the NPF is that it allows us to employ systematic empirically verifiable methods to generate conjectures and research questions and to test them objectively.

The literature addressing policy narratives can be broadly divided into two main categories: the first, post-structural approaches, with post-positivist epistemology and the rejection of the language of 'variables', and 'hypothesis testing causality and objectivity' (Fischer 2003). The methods used are interpretive, such as ethnography. This has led to post-positivist approaches to policy narratives<sup>13</sup>. Researchers do not 'test' anything; they generate meaning when using interpretive methods of narrative policy analysis (Fischer 2003; Hajer 1995; Roe 1994; Stone 2002; Yanow 1995; Zittoun 2014).

By contrast, the NPF (Jones and McBeth 2010: 333) operationalizes concepts such as narrative structure, tests hypotheses, and embraces both quantitative and qualitative methods (2010: 333). It prefers to derive hypotheses from theories and use both quantitative and qualitative methods of empirical

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<sup>13</sup> Exemplified by the recent volume by Philippe Zittoun (2014).

research to generalize results (2010:338). Promising NPF studies in media, communication, and the environment have shown that this approach can provide rigorous analysis, particularly in testing claims and hypotheses such as the case study presented by McComas and Shanahan (1999), providing empirical evidence from media news in environmental issues. Jones and Song (2013) have integrated the NPF with elements from cognitive and behavioral sciences, showing how the power of narratives depends on how the human mind works and responds to the manipulation of narrative structures. Radaelli et al (2013) have used the NPF to shed light on discursive processes of identity definition that operate during the preparation of benefit-cost analyses of policy proposals. Dunlop, O'Bryan and Radaelli (2014) have coded parliamentary hearings on the Arab Spring and concluded that experts' testimonies do not rectify the heuristics used by elected policy-makers in Congress and Westminster. Moreover, competing interest groups and advocacy coalitions contribute to the maturation of narratives across the years: the NPF has been instrumental in explaining the effects of the professionalization of pressure groups on narratives, and how narratives vary in 'conventional' and 'unconventional' campaign years. In this type of analysis, narratives are used as dependent and independent variables, although there is more emphasis on the effects of narratives, hence on narratives as independent variables generating change via different mechanisms (McBeth et al 2010). Finally, the NPF draws on and contributes to the analysis of advocacy coalitions over time (McBeth et al. 2005; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993).

### **2.3 Elements of the narrative policy framework**

The NPF considers causal stories as the main discursive element of public policy. Stories are characterized by a causal plot, the dominant metaphors being the distinction between 'heroes' and 'villains' (the good and bad characters in the story), the meanings associated with policy conflict, the doomsday scenario, or what happens if we do not act now. Essentially, for the



NPF scholars, a policy story transforms problems into situations that can be handled by public policy (Roe 1994). A typical NPF study revolves around the following key elements: 1). Institutional settings of a policy- in this the NPF is not different from DI. 2). A plot that introduces the temporal element and a sequence of policy events as represented in discourse. 3). Characters who are narrators, fixers of the problem (heroes), causes of the problem (villains), or victims harmed by the wicked problem. 4). Policy solution (often supported by a doomsday scenario), and 5). Moral implications of the story (Jacobs and Sobieraj 2007; Jones and McBeth 2010; McBeth et al. 2005; Ney 2006; Verweij et al. 2006). Each component can be studied as a set of ideas and as an interactive dimension concerning the actors involved- yet another element where the NPF can go along with the DI propositions. In this regard, it is important to mention that a structural narrative must have 'minimal qualities' (Jones and McBeth 2010: 339) manifested in the following features:

### *Causal Plots*

Basic components of narrative strategy require clear relationships between components and themes (e.g. characters& institutional settings ), as this is considered crucial in structuring causal expectations of the empirical work as well to determine the plausibility of the narrative policy (Abell 2004; Somers 1992; Stone 2002). In this context, plots move from stories of decline to stymied progress or consider the change as merely illusion (Stone 2002: 191 ). Additionally, narrative literature provides causal stories of policy change as plots such as: intentionality, inadvertence, accidental, and mechanical. In this regard, Jones and McBeth (2010: 340), presented plots and narrative components as having the potential to be operationalized based on new facilitating tools of qualitative research such as N-VIVO software using 'nodes' and 'codification' techniques.

### *Characters, narrators and identity*

One of the main components of the narrative policy structure is the role of characters and their causal relationships (such as 'who did what to whom') contained in the policy plot (Jones and McBeth 2010; Ney 2006; Stone 2002). Policy core beliefs in the policy dispute define heroes and villains. Drawing on intuitive notions of 'victimhood' and 'social construction of target populations', we have three basic categories: heroes and allies, villains and enemies, and victims of the conflict (McBeth et al. 2005; Ney 2006; Verweij et al. 2006).

The most important character, however, is the narrator. Who tells the story? Those who tell the story control the stage. The narrator can be the head of the authoritarian regime, the National Planning Council. Rhetorically, we can even envisage cases where 'we' is the nation of Libya, thus connecting the narrator to dynamics of identity politics and identification between the narrator and the reader.

The figure of the narrator is often linked to reasons why the reader should have trust in the narrator. All narratives have a reader over the shoulders of the narrator. It follows that the narrator has to balance the resources of trust and how the audience costs can deplete these resources (McBeth et al. 2005) (McBeth et al. 2010).

### *Policy Beliefs*

Policy beliefs are main components of narrative policy analysis. They generate the arguments on which the claims of the story are based. Thus, claim A about privatization is true because of the argument B about the advantages of an open economy anchored in a set of policy beliefs about the international position of Libya in world trade today. Beliefs can be secondary or core policy beliefs, as explained by Paul Sabatier in his 'advocacy coalitions' framework. Core economic policy beliefs refer to the position of state and market, the understanding of the role of economic planning in an authoritarian regime. Secondary beliefs are ideas susceptible to change.

Policy beliefs are relatively stable over time and policy disputes emerge when there is contention between advocacy coalitions over core beliefs (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999: 122). Additionally, McBeth et al. (2010: 393) argue that core beliefs can be identified when asking questions such as: “ (1). Who should have the power to make policy decisions? (2). Who (or what) is harmed by the policy status quo? And (3). On what basis should policy be decided (science, majority rule, etc.)?”

### *Moral implications and urgent actions*

Narratives present the moral part of the story, as this side represents the ‘urgent’ and ‘prompt’ policy action to face the potential consequences and effects (Jones and McBeth 2010: 341; Stone 2002). We have two issues here: one is the role of moral implications. They often come at the end of the story. To illustrate: claim A is true because of argument B supported by evidence C and leading to conclusion D. But D is also morally good and desirable, it is not just an effect of the economy or trade, but has intrinsic moral properties that make it attractive. The second is the role of time as discursively represented in the story. Notions of acceleration of events, urgency, and necessity boost the persuasive features of the narratives and are deployed strategically by the narrator.

### *Institutional settings (context)*

The institutional setting of a regime surrounding policy groups refers mainly to the policy context and the roots of policy, as narrative policy should not be disconnected from this institutional context, irrespective of geography or institutional venue (McBeth et al. 2005,2007). Further, the institutional settings of policy provides insight into the ‘policy arena’ and how it can be characterized by intense and emotional conflict (Jones and McBeth 2010: 340). In their causal relationships with other components in the plot, institutional settings should consider policy controversy (Ney 2006: 152), as

this provides suitable real settings to explain the change (Jones and McBeth 2010: 340; Verweij et al. 2006).

### *Narrative tactics & strategies*

NPF analysis has both tactics and strategies. Tactics refer mainly to the methods of manipulation of governance change strategies used by policy actors. NPF tactics differ from core policy beliefs in terms of the strategic employment of discourse to exert influence on both public opinion and policy process, as these tactics are used to mobilize members of policy interest groups (Levin 2005; McBeth et al. 2007; McBeth et al. 2010:394). In fact, tactics and strategies of policy change within the NPF reflect the dynamic of policy change, as the choice of narrative strategy depends on whether the coalition group is presented as losing or winning in the policy stage (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999). However, McBeth et al. (2007) raises the unexplored tactics when policy groups use both winning and losing tactics to strengthen the attitudes of a policy group. Such tactics have also been raised when addressing the policy strategies of winners and losers as “winning strategy uses diffused benefits and concentrated costs for their preferred policy, whereby many benefit and few suffer” (McBeth et al. 2007). Additionally, Stone (2002) argued that in this strategy the goal in policy is to portray your side in the broad public interest and the other side as narrow special interests. The loser’s appeal is more common in wicked problems (McBeth et al. 2010).

### *Strategies*

Narrative strategies are different from tactics in terms of the setting of plans and goals and employing resources to achieve them via discursive manipulation. Extant NPF literature has defined five key narrative strategies. Some are more relevant to issues concerning science and public policy; others apply to pretty much every possible policy domain.

**1) Identifying winners and losers.** Winners and losers are socially constructed in the NPF. A narrative can argue that winners are diffuse; another can state that winners are concentrated. The current controversy on shale gas (also called 'fracking techniques') in the UK portrays a stark contrast of narratives of winners and losers. According to McBeth et al. (2007: 90), "Interest groups that perceive themselves as winning on a policy issue are more likely to identify specific winners in their policy narratives, whereas interest groups that perceive that they are losing on a policy issue are more likely to identify specific losers. Winning strategies attempt to contain the issue by illustrating that the status quo is positive and no change is necessary". Additionally, this policy narrative strategy raises the issue of compromising policy beliefs.

**2) Benefits and Costs.** Groups expand policy problems to raise attention. Costs are represented differently by those who want to narrow down the scope of conflict, for example these actors will not represent long-term environmental and health costs in their narratives (McBeth et al. 2007: 91). Authoritarian regimes are not different from other actors, so we can expect them to manipulate costs and benefits in their narratives.

**3) Policy Symbols.** This strategy is based on 'symbolic terms' aiming mainly to simplify complex policy issues to define the problem (Baumgartner and Jones 1993:26; Stone 2002:137). Accordingly, coalitions tend to use 'condensation symbols' to reduce the complexity of the policy issue into a manageable pattern (Achter 2004:315). Furthermore, policy actors use symbols to characterize their opponents to sketch out their attitudes. According to McBeth et al. (2007: 91), "winning groups have fewer incentives to use condensation symbols because doing so might invoke unintended consequences such as riling the opposition. Losing groups, however, have tremendous incentives to negatively portray both the issue and their opponents through the use of condensation symbols".

**4) Scientific certainty and disagreement.** This pattern is mainly linked to how scientific disagreement leads to 'intractable natural resource-based

political conflict' (Nie 2003: 323). Such strategies are often employed when facing hard decisions based on science and concerning wicked policy problems. Accordingly, policy groups for the winning side are likely to define the issue in light of scientific certainty and to ignore normative and cultural considerations. In contrast, the losing side attaches scientific results and presents scientific disagreement to gain further deliberation (McBeth et al. 2007: 91 & 92).

**5) The policy surrogate.** A policy surrogate may be deployed to resolve the conflictual situations at hand. According to Nie (2003: 314), "policy problems can be turned wicked when they are used by political actors as a surrogate to debate larger and more controversial problems". Policy surrogates are linked to the narrative strategies. According to McBeth et al.(2007: 91) ,"losing groups strategically entangle policy issues in larger, emotionally charged debates in an effort to gain a competitive advantage by expanding the scope of the policy issue". In short, these policy surrogates are used to ignite the larger controversies already simmering in the political culture and to mobilize opposition. The clear example of this is the policy conflict raised in authoritarian rules when declaring some aspects of governance reform.

Alongside these tactics and strategies, we will also dedicate empirical analysis to the relationship between narrative and power relations. We will empirically determine that the key issue within the authoritarian regime was 'who is narrating what, and in what role?' The fact that the regime was authoritarian did not prevent key narrators from trying to expand their power and reduce the power of the others by modifying roles. Actually we will find that what Vivien Schmidt calls coordinative discourse was carried out in a fighting mode rather than a negotiating mode, with covert in-fighting within the upper layer of the regime. In a sense, this link between narratives and power demonstrates what Emery Roe (1994) once said: that, narratives of public policy do not merely portray power, they instantiate power. For Roe, in some circumstances "asymmetrical narratives do not reflect or mediate power relations; rather, they instantiate them" (Roe, 1994:73).

### 3. Implications for authoritarian regimes and Libya

Although ideas, discourses and narratives exist in both authoritarian and democratic regimes, we have to consider how DI and NPF may travel from their current usage (that is, to explain policy and policy change in democracies) to the case chosen for this dissertation. To begin with, institutions are not the same in democracies and authoritarian regimes. The party system is rigidly controlled. The elite is extremely narrow, in some cases not extending beyond the family of dictators and their advisors. According to Gandhi (2008: 8), “*Some dictators are crowned; others wear a uniform. Some organize a ruling party and stage single-party elections; others maintain a ‘façade’ of controlled multiparty competition*”.<sup>14</sup> And yet, non-democratic leaders may use democratic institutions, or their simulacra.

Gandhi also raised the key question: Why do authoritarian rulers govern with seemingly democratic institutions, such as (rigidly constrained) legislatures and (controlled) political parties? Dictators face two main problems of governance in their authoritarian rule. Firstly, the problem of ‘governance legitimacy’ as they have not been chosen by their people and they seek to face challenges that undermines their rule. Whilst the second problem facing dictators relates to how a dictator can maintain ‘compliance’ in society and reduce any potential dissatisfaction that may arise from the opposition side (2008: xvii & xviii). However, if a dictator has a clear and direct access to a country's resources, this would lead to the alleviation of such challenges in favor of exogenous pressure (Charron and Lapuente 2011; Gandhi 2008).

The shape of institutions resembles the ones in democratic regimes, taking different forms such as parliaments, assemblies, parties. The degree of regime concessions depends on the degree of pressure and opposition the dictator face (2008: xviii). According to Gandhi:

*“If authoritarian leaders face a weak opposition and need little cooperation, they will not need to make concessions and, therefore, will not*

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<sup>14</sup>The clear example of this notion is reflected in the assessment of Teorell (2007) based on findings revealed by Geddes (1999,2003) as military and persona-list regimes are more prone to institutional change.

*need institutions. But if they must impede opposition mobilization and solicit outside cooperation, rulers may need to make policy concessions, in which case they need institutions to organize these compromises”.*

Referring to the aforementioned change of autocracies in response to foreign pressures, particularly in Latin America, the literature revealed the third problem facing dictators which links directly to ‘managing the survival of leaders’ faced by outside threats. In their argument entitled ‘authoritarian institutions and regime survival’, Wright and Escriba-Folch (2010) provided empirical evidence of how institutional change matters for the survival of authoritarian leaders through internal institutions such as parties and legislators, as dictators create and/or amend institutions or even establish new policy ideas that help to maintain subsequent governance to insure the interests of policy elites and dominant parties in autocracies (Acemoglu 2006; Cox 2009; Dahl 1971; Wright and Escriba-Folch 2010).

As DI is linked directly with the role of institutions through the interactive process of communicative and coordinative narratives, we need to understand how dictators shape institutions in autocracies. Gandhi (2008:34) mentions that dictators tends to establish nominal governance institutions as they do not rule alone, and need such institutions to craft new policies. Irrespective of variations among autocracies, the most common institutions under dictatorships include, as mentioned, legislatures and political parties. Policy elites represent actors who support the leader to stay in power through a narrow elite group coalition. Planning councils exist to execute the policies of the elites; they are not a forum for open deliberation and contestation of the choices made by the elite. They may still deliberate about how a given choice can be implemented in practice and with what type of policy instruments. Gandhi further explains the given institutional settings in survival strategy by noting:

*“Dictators establish institutions such as consultative councils, Juntas, and political bureaus, as a first institutional trench against threat from the ruling elite, but when dictators need to neutralize threats from larger groups within society and solicit the cooperation of outsiders, they rely on normally*



*democratic institutions, such as legislators and political parties. Dictators who are more dependent on outsiders and face stronger opposition must institutionalize significantly, whereas those rulers have little need for cooperation and face weak opposition institutionalize little or not at all”*

DI analysis in authoritarian regimes will focus mainly on the discursive interactions in the elites and planning council(s) for the coordinative dimension. The communicative dimension refers to citizens, the international business community, international organization and individual treaty partners.

In the case of the national institutional settings in Libya as an authoritarian regime, Gaddafi created both formal and informal governance institutions that lacked the actual power to access the central policy decision which were mainly controlled by him, his son and close policy figures. In fact, this control is based on the governance arrangements he created in the early stages of his authoritarian rule. In his study of formal and informal authority in Libya, Mattes (2011: 57)<sup>15</sup> presented three key institutional transformations that have drawn the shape of the national institutional settings in Libya including: 1. the revolutionary legitimacy of leadership 2. The rejection of pluralism and political parties and their role in the formation of governance policies 3. the rejection of policy institutions elections in the classical sense in favor of a local unique style called ‘election by the mass (Jamahir)’ as Gaddafi considered it the only way of direct democracy and solutions of governance according to his views (2011:57).

In understanding the notion of DI in the Libyan persona-list regime, we build on what scholars have presented referring to the basic idea of ‘contextualizing discourse’ presented by Vivien Schmidt and Claudio Radaelli, stating that discursive institutionalism must be understood in light of the national institutional settings (Schmidt and Radaelli 2004:197). Persona-list regimes like Libya present the features of family-oriented governance; some of them restrict or ban pluralism and political parties. We have to situate discourse in this peculiar set of institutional features. Coordinative discourse

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<sup>15</sup>Mattes, Hanspeter (2011), ‘Formal and informal authority in Libya since 1969’, in Dirk Vandewalle (ed.), *Libya since 1969*, 55-81.

can vary between 'thick' or 'thin', depending on how internally conflictual the elite is. But it will never be as thick as it can be in open pluralistic societies. When power is concentrated in the hands of the leader, and policy making is the purview of a very restricted government elite, such types of dictatorships are most likely to have thick and elaborate communicative discourse which mainly focuses on persuading the general public of the necessity and justifications of new policy with little outside input (2004:198).

The control of discourse and language is expected to be one of the most important policies for the Libyan regime. We expect the DI proposition to be different in Libya. Overall, we expect thin coordinative discourse in authoritarian regimes as policy formulation and building consensus on reform issues are very restricted to the ruling dictator, ruling family members and actors linked to them.

In order to illustrate the thick communicative discourse expected to be found as the most prevalent type of policy discourse in the case of the Libyan regime, we need to explain what audience matters to them. In this regard, Wolf (2011:1), mentioned that 'audience costs' to reflect the threats and promises that leaders suffer from and face politically. Therefore, audience costs are part of the communicative strategy to mitigate concerns about potential conflicts, as they present solutions such as economic reform to resolve the new situation (Schultz 2001:52). For Baum (2004:628) the external audience is of paramount importance for political leaders in international affairs. However, the domestic audience also matters when there is a need to rationalize the leader's decisions, raising the issue of the leader's behavior and how to communicate new policy ideas effectively (Slantchev 2006: 470). This depends on communicative narrative strategies and tactics that the authoritarian regime uses for its aims.

Externally, the international society, the business community and international organizations represent the main external audience for an authoritarian regime. For a country sanctioned by the United Nations like Libya, compliance with the norms of international society is key to legitimation. Having failed to comply with these norms, the regimes tried to get the United Nations into a rhetorical trap (Hurd 2005).

At the same time, the use of economic reforms has been instrumental in gaining at least some leverage in relation to treaty partners, the European Union and the international business community. We can expect that business firms are more sensitive to regulatory quality, privatization plans and compliance with the norms of the World Trade Organization than with compliance with the human rights notions supported by the United Nations. Libya represents the institutional settings of a persona-list regime type with a declared orientation towards reform after 10 years of international isolation caused by the Lockerbie political crisis and decades of socialist economic orientation of governance.

In terms of landmark discourses defining institutions, the master references for Libya are the 'Declaration on the Authority of the People' in 1977, and the 'Declaration on the Separation of Rule and Revolution' in 1979 which influenced the national institutional settings of the Libyan authoritarian regime (Mattes 2011: 58). While the former was issued to regulate elections, the latter declaration was prepared to confer special status on any political or governing actions by Gaddafi as a personal revolutionary leader. According to the first declaration (1977), Gaddafi created 'formal non-binding legislative and executive institutions'. The main national legislative body of public policies was the General People's Congress (GCP), while the national executive branch was the General People's Committee (GPC) representing the Libyan government, or the 'the council of ministries'(2011:59).

The second declaration of separating rule from revolution (1979) enabled Gaddafi to build the 'informal power' to safeguard the revolutionary system and maintain influence on the formal internal governance policies (2011: 72 &73). Thus, the regime built its institutions based on the 'revolutionary ideology' of Gaddafi. According to Joffé (2011)<sup>16</sup>, there were formal legislative and executive structures for policy formulations, implementation and consultation, providing government officers and rule.

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<sup>16</sup>Joffé, George (2011), 'Prodigal or pariah: foreign policy in Libya', in Dirk Vandewalle (ed.), *Libya since 1969*, 191-214.

However, Gaddafi sought to control the policy decision through intervening via the informal authorities such as the 'revolutionary committees' founded in 1977 to maintain the revolutionary traditions of the regime and control the policy process (2011:200). Beside formal policy actors, these informal bodies have been also identified by Mattes (2011:62-77) as authorities providing key policy characters for the dictator to rely on in many aspects of internal and external policy deliberation.

As the formal bodies contained the legislative and executives branches, the informal structures relied on 'protagonists' who had a political influence derived from informal institutions and authorities. In Libya, protagonists included : Gaddafi's sons, blood relatives of Gaddafi, 'Gadadfa' tribe figures, 'the free unionist movement', 'the revolutionary committees', 'the forum of companions of Gaddafi', 'the people's social leadership committees', and other blocks (2011: 62-77).

Formal and informal institutions are also expected to represent the conflictual and consensual patterns of interaction emanating from the national settings under the dictator's control of rule. Hence, it is important to look at the types of 'quasi-formal policy institution' created by Gaddafi to govern the policy reform episodes after the international isolation. These institutions included types such as: the National Planning Council (NPC) which was formed in 2000 as an un-elected policy body providing policy reform and economic governance proposals based on the ideas of academics and experts. The 'Gaddafi International Foundation of Development' headed by Saif Gaddafi presents another type of these institutions, established in 1999 as an umbrella of non-government charity, human rights, and development organizations (2011:61). We expect that coordinative narratives in the period under examination involved formal and informal authorities representing restricted policy elites.

In contrast to thin coordinative discourse, the Libyan regime relied for years on 'the presentation of self' on the front stage to the external audience through rich communicative narratives with plenty of 'villains' acting against Gaddafi's survival, and on the attempt to craft a new imagine for the regime in

international politics and political economy, using economic reforms, regulatory quality and privatization as discursive lynchpins.

The aforementioned literature of discourse and narratives suggests our research main questions that we will answer following our empirical investigation. As we presented the implications of our adopted frameworks on authoritarian regimes and Libya, this invites our first question (a) to explore the role of formal and informal institutions, as this can better interpret the dynamics behind policy change in light of the national institutional context of Libya.

In (b) the basis of choosing this question is that authoritarian regimes use discourse in many ways (fighting, conflict, identity... and so on). However, the literature we explored suggests that we focus on coordinative and communicative discourse and link them with policy change narratives. These are the two important functions of policy change discourse in democratic countries. It makes sense to work with the expectation that we will find themes of these two discourses in the Libyan case. We acknowledge here that adopting these two dimensions of discourse means that we are choosing a focus that may hinder a fuller analysis of any other type of discourse. This is a trade-off between choosing a model and testing it and purely inductive research. We accept the cost of the trade-off but in the conclusions we will critically reflect on the limitations of our DI lenses, especially in relation to coordinative discourse. We will in fact observe that coordination in our case was not about negotiation and bargaining – there was a lot of in-fighting and cover conflict rather than ‘coordination.’

We will investigate the relationship with the narrative policy analysis which can empirically provide themes of policy change dynamics in the period considered. Moreover, the literature suggests that the ‘thinness’ and ‘thickness’ of discourse are to some extent in an inverse relationship and we raise this question to identify the nature of both discourses and how they differed in deployment and functions. Hence this question is mainly concerned with variation across texts and also considers the time element in narratives.

We have developed question (c) based on our review of the Libyan national formal and informal settings created by Gaddafi to control the power of policy decision making. The aforementioned governance arrangements created at early stages (Mattes 2011) shaped the roles of narrators, institutions and the role of formal and informal authorities in policy preparation and coordination. Hence question (c) aims mainly to identify this function of discourse.

The basis of choosing question (d) about communicative discourse is directly linked to our understanding of the notion of DI in the Libyan family-oriented regime's settings and to contextualizing discourse in this national context. Drawing on the conceptual analysis of authoritarianism presented by Gandhi (2008), the Libyan regime is expected to have thick and elaborate communicative discourse directed to external audiences and to solicit cooperation with little internal discourse on the institutional change, as it faced weak opposition and high external threats.

Our literature also invites question (e) about variation between narratives. Its aim is to identify the nature of DI in Libya as an authoritarian regime. This nature can be investigated through elements suggested by the NPF framework (problem, argument, settings, and characters and so on) and also via tactics and strategies provided by the literature on the narrative policy analysis (policy symbols, costs and benefits, surrogates and so on). This question will tackle this comparison between both coordinative and communicative narratives in order to set our final critical observations. It assumes that narratives are not static across texts and that there is a time element to be considered (before/after). Hence, this question addresses variation across texts.

Our research question (f) is devoted to present our findings' contribution to the body of theories and literature, while the last question (g) will tackle lessons gained from the past regime's narratives and draw out our suggestions relating to the current transition and future research agenda. We do not expect the Libyan narratives of reform to be similar to the narratives of democracy. We use the Libyan case as a pilot study in order to understand more about policy-oriented discourse in authoritarian regimes and to draw

lessons about the transition by considering critically the inconsistencies and weaknesses of the authoritarian narratives.

#### **4. Research questions**

The literature review suggests the following research questions:

- (a) What is the role of discourse in the formal and informal institutions of an authoritarian regime like Libya in the period considered for this dissertation?
- (b) In the period considered, what was the relationship between coordinative and communicative discourse: was the former thin and the latter thick?
- (c) How did coordinative discourse deploy narratives of economic policy reform? Who was the narrator of this discourse and in what institutional venues did the narrator speak?
- (d) What are the narratives of communicative discourse? What types of audience do they address? For what purposes? With what narrative features?
- (e) How do coordinative and communicative narratives vary in a sample of texts? Why do they vary?
- (f) What do the narratives of the past Libyan regime tell us about the nature of discourse in authoritarian regimes?
- (g) Is there any lesson arising from our narrative-discursive analysis that can inform our understanding of the current transition to democracy in Libya?

## **Conclusion**

This chapter has discussed the concepts and framework we need for the empirical analysis. We identified DI and the NPF in the context of an authoritarian regime. Although DI has been used to explain policy change in advanced democracies, we have made the case for also using this approach in the context of authoritarian regimes. Although the NPF is mostly used for the analysis of environmental policies and science-based policy problems, we have argued that it can be a good springboard for the analysis of economic policy reforms. We have consequently adapted DI and NPF to the special nature of our inquiry.

In the rest of the chapter we have put some flesh on the bones of terms like 'institutions' and explained the institutional setting of authoritarian regimes, and illustrated the audience that an authoritarian leader has, considering both informal and formal venues of policy change in Libya. Finally, we have derived our research questions from extant literature. The research questions pave the way for the next chapter, entirely dedicated to issues of research design, including our expectations and methods.



# CHAPTER FOUR-RESEARCH DESIGN

## Introduction

Given our epistemological choices, research design provides systematic and orderly steps towards the collection and empirical analysis of the evidence gathered by researchers (Remenyi 1998). This definition is appropriate for an analysis informed by Discursive Institutionalism (DI) and the Narrative Policy Framework (NPF) because they imply an objective epistemology, i.e., they assume that empirical analysis can show whether a social science conjecture is true or false and that causality can be examined empirically. Needless to say, in an interpretive epistemology research design involves other standards such as sense-making in data-generation and data-analysis (see Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2012).

Essentially, DI and the NPF frameworks inform our research design, especially with reference to our expectations, the research questions and the empirical activities carried out to answer them. Another important goal of our project is to fill the analytical gaps revealed from the 'good governance & policy change' quantitative work discussed in chapter two. This justifies us pioneering new frameworks of discourse and narrative in public policy analysis, and focus on the single case study method to explore and probe expectations.

Research design addresses the appropriate instruments to examine the research hypothesis and questions in a systematic manner (Flick 2006: 14 ). In short, research design reflects the correct strategy to address the empirical expectations of a project (2006:106 ). Moreover, each research phenomenon requires its own suitable method to tackle questions and hypotheses developed from the literature. Research design also identifies the techniques for data collection to establish the quality of analysis (i.e., triangulation, reliability, validity and so on). This applies to both qualitative and quantitative analysis (Howe 1992: 236).

Based on the previous review, this chapter will be divided into four main parts:

1. Objectives and aims
2. Research methodology
3. Data analysis and gathering techniques
4. Expectations, levels of analysis and coding framework

## **1. Objectives and aims**

The purpose of our qualitative empirical research is to explore the research expectations arising out of our understanding of the literature reviewed in previous chapters. We could use the terms hypotheses instead of expectations.

However, as we are dealing with a single exploratory case study and we are adopting qualitative research instruments, we cannot properly test a hypothesis and say whether it is true or false. Our aim is not to test hypotheses in this sense. Instead, the plan is to explore approaches like DI and NPF and apply them to authoritarian regimes – something that has not been done up until now. In exploring the approaches, we introduce our expectations. We then provide evidence from a single case study to appraise the expectations derived from theory. However, we will not be able to conclude whether a ‘hypothesis’ is definitively rejected. It may not be true for Libya but true in the case of other authoritarian regimes. Yet again we stress the exploratory nature of our project. And for this reason we conclude that it is better to use the term ‘expectation’ rather than ‘hypothesis’ and ‘empirical appraisal of the expectation’ rather than ‘test of the hypothesis’.

Drawing on what we said in previous chapters, the main purpose is to explore the role of discursive mechanisms (communicative and coordinative discourse, in turn de-composed into specific narrative strategies) in the ‘economic governance reforms’ in Libya. Hence our research aims include:

1. developing a conceptual and analytical framework to integrate NPF in the

main functions of DI. 2. Investigating the dynamics of policy change in Libya as an authoritarian regime. 3. Inserting our empirical findings, largely derived from coding a corpus of documents, into the historical context of reforms and reflecting on the implications of our 'appraisal of expectations' for the current transition to democracy in Libya.

Pragmatically, this requires major steps to organize the core process of investigation (see Maggetti, Gilardi, Radaelli 2012) including: (a) data collection, identification of the sample and choice of the instrument techniques, addressing issues of validity and reliability; (b) selecting the main components of communicative and coordinative discourse, then examining them minutely in policy narratives emerging from systematic coding of text sources; (c) presenting the analysis that connects good governance causality with two functions of discourse in the process within clear components of narrative; (d) discussing the evidence and (e) the discussion of these findings in the last stage.

## **2. Research Methodology**

### **2.1 Single case study**

This thesis is based mainly on 'one-single-case study' to empirically appraise the expectations. The single case study method is justified given the exploratory nature of our project. It is also suitable when issues of context play a large role in the exploration of social mechanisms (Falletti and Lynch 2009); in our case mechanisms of persuasion and legitimation via narrative tactics. We understand narratives as made up of beliefs/norms/values and political tactics (McBeth et al., 2010). The latter dimension (i.e., narrative tactics) implies mechanisms of manipulation. To understand this, we prefer a single case study because it allows us to look at a wide range of documents in a single context, thus (for example) we will be able to compare narrative tactics across a large set of speeches and documents coming from the same

source (such as the National Planning Council). Our findings will provide the basis for more systematic tests across countries and regimes. But before we move to large-n it is useful to develop robust foundations with a single case study. Finally, to compensate for the limitations of large-n studies of good governance, we need to zoom in on a specific segment of governance reforms in the context of authoritarian regimes, mainly dealing with economic policies. Yet again, the single case study is feasible for the understanding of how individual reforms are narrated by authoritarian leaders to their public opinion and to the international audience.

As far as case study approaches go (Kaarbo and Beasley 2002: 372), there are several types of case study. According to Remenyi (1998) and Yin (2009), the following types serve different purposes: 'exploratory' which aims to identify variables and hypotheses for further research; explanatory when there is a clear empirical link between independent and dependent variables; 'revolutionary', when a phenomenon is previously 'inaccessible' and can present a useful insight and contribution (Yin 2009); 'typical' (when a case study provides a representation of the most frequent type in a population); 'deviant', when a case is off the regression line in a large-n model.

The expected contribution of this case is exploratory and, with the limits discussed above, 'explanatory'. This will become clear when we enter our expectations below. Thus, both aspects, exploratory and explanatory, of the types of case study are suitable to be applied for in-depth investigation of this case. In terms of the exploratory approach, Yin (2009) argued that the great advantage of these two types is the focus on 'single case study', which can be intensively examined. The single-case provides explanatory insights by shedding light on 'embedded components' as this can better strengthen the case and its internal validity. The exploratory part reveals the relationships between the narrative components adopted.

## 2.2 Periodization

Choosing the period in this single case-study is a fundamental first step. We start from 2003, based on the former Libyan regime leader Muammar Gaddafi's speech of the 14 June 2003 to both the Libyan parliament and to the public audience in which he declared the dismantling of the public sector dominance of economic governance and the adoption of a new orientation of reform (The Libyan broadcasting service 2003). This announcement went in parallel with the emergence of his eldest son's (Saif) initiative of reform entitled 'Libya and the 21<sup>st</sup> Century', to justify the appropriateness of the intended 'economic governance' change in light of the failure of past policies. Following these developments, there were key amendments to economic governance measures based on ideas of privatization, and opening foreign investments, breaking public sector monopoly, and plans for future sustainability. These changes were launched through some regulatory and structural adjustments manifested in regulations affecting economic activities, banking, foreign investment and the stock market, or through the re-adjustment of and amendments to past regulations from the epoch of socialism, from 2003 to 2010, as the last year witnessed further regulatory change before the fall of the regime in 2011. Furthermore, the thesis aims to illustrate how communicative and coordinative narrative strategies interpret economic governance in terms of the real political dynamics behind the change, as narrative strategies and tactics provide relationships between the components of the narrative story and differ based on types of discursive functions. In this regard, policies as reflected in major landmark documents are an obvious element of our corpus. We also considered laws and decisions as regulations, but coding was limited to documents with a narrative structure. Laws and regulations are in the background of the communicative and coordinative discourses that 'sell' reforms to a domestic and an international audience.

We also carried out a set of semi-structured interviews (see below for details) to obtain more background and contextual information, prior to selecting documents and coding. The interviews were instrumental in pointing to some

policy changes and changes in the style of communication of the regime, as well as giving some initial insights on narrative strategies and how policy-makers involved in the changes felt about the strategies.

As described by Yin (2009:2), the single case study is a good tool in certain circumstances; firstly, when researchers formulate claims based on questions of 'how' or the 'why', and 'what' to investigate a situation and secondly, when researchers have to control for the context surrounding the phenomenon that research aims to explore (2009:2). Additionally, single case studies could be used to examine the relationship between variables of the research hypotheses to reach results which may prove factors which are contrary to what was contained in the research hypothesis, within a limited period of time and place (Gerring 2007:19; Stake 1978:7).

As far as the analysis is concerned with the importance of the country context, Ragin (1989: ix) presented his argument for single-case study, claiming that case-oriented research is 'sensitive' to complexity as referring mainly to the analysis of the historical-social context behind the shaping of politics. This makes such studies suitable for conducting qualitative empirical research concerning this local specificity (1989:ix). Additionally, this tackles the analytical deficit of quantitative methodology which neglects the context of individual cases. As such, the thesis attempts to appraise economic governance reform in Libya from 2003 to 2010, seeking to provide deep investigation regarding policy change based on the discursive mechanisms hypothesized by the theory of DI narratives adapted to this authoritarian regime.

In terms of the main empirical references of the research, we shall consider economic governance reform adjustments through aspects of: privatization, foreign investment, regulations and elements of sustainability. These will be empirically examined discursively via NPF coding of documents. Communicative and coordinative discourses represent the main over-arching dimension that provides the 'policy stories' of reform episode-manifested discursive narratives.

### **2.3 Unit of analysis**

The research 'unit of analysis'; represents the focal point that refers to the research problem, variables, phenomena, as well as the centre of data collection (Collis et al. 2003). In this regard, Remenyi (1998) sees that the unit is linked with the determinations of the research strategy of analysis, as it needs to be related mainly to the initial expectations of analysis. Accordingly, scholars have considered the unit of analysis as representing an individual, group of people, text, organization, situation, or a policy, as the case needs to be selective, and focused on a specific issue that is fundamental to understanding the system being examined (Sjoberg et al. 1991; Tellis 1997; Yin 2009).

In terms of the boundaries of this thesis, it is important to mention that it is restricted to policy oriented-discourse under DI and NPF frameworks without other 'policy process' considerations. Hence, the thesis focuses on the discourse 'text' as the unit of analysis through actors and activities involved in the discursive narrative components. In this regard, main themes and sub-themes that appear in the narrative components are linked to 'discourse- text'. Narrative policy components' texts are gathered from various sources of discourse which make the study a single-embedded case design.

### **2.4 Triangulation of research data**

Despite the exploratory nature of this research, single case study is known as a 'triangulated strategy', where triangulation is an important consideration for the 'internal validity' of the thesis findings (Stake 1995). As far as triangulation is important, this thesis is linked directly with three key types of triangulations: firstly, triangulation of data sources, which focuses mainly on collecting data based on several sources such as speeches, news items, interviews, official documents etc. This thesis relies mainly on sources of 'discourse text' which are mainly the 'corpus' documents and materials.

The second type of triangulation relates to triangulating conceptual and analytical frameworks in the analysis based on the literature review. In this regard, the integrated frameworks of DI and NPF have chosen to explain the situations of policy change in the light of both the narrative components and the communicative and coordinative functions of discourse.

The third triangulation relates to how qualitative findings 'speak to' large-n findings. Here we shall triangulate our findings with what we know about different types of regimes and their preferences for governance reforms, as shown by the good governance literature. Our qualitative analysis has something to offer to quantitative scholars, such as understanding local context, capturing policy actors' perceptions, understanding key relationship of the situations, providing flexibility to the research to overcome unanticipated changes in policy research (Huberman and Miles 2002; Miller 1999; Robson 2011).

One final word on triangulation: in interview techniques, triangulation has a special meaning. It refers to checks on the validity of interview findings by reading the findings across other sources, such as published documents and legislation. Hence a researcher would triangulate an interview finding on 'attribution of threat' for example, by looking at whether the media have also attributed threat to the same actor or phenomenon, and whether official government documents have referred to 'threat' in the same way. In our project, however, the use of interviews is limited. We used interviews as a preliminary, to gather some basic and rudimentary information on context, mechanisms and narratives. This certainly informed our choice of the corpus and how we coded it. But interviews are not a main empirical source and we do not attribute 'findings' to interview material. For this reason, the issue of triangulation of interview material does not apply to this thesis.



### **3. Data-analysis and gathering techniques**

Techniques, in our context, refer mainly to research tools used in collecting data, managing and working with data in light of a single –case study strategy and frameworks adopted from the literature. Therefore, research techniques of this thesis could be described based on two components: 1. Data collection techniques (corpus). 2. Data analysis techniques.

#### **3.1 Data collection techniques**

Collection techniques refer mainly to sources of discourse ‘written texts’, as they are conducted during the time under the study experience, offering insight into particular events in the policy reform episode. These original resources are collected) alongside other types of sources that provide ‘desk analysis’ and interpretation for policy change. Accordingly, the thesis data collection techniques include:

#### **3.2 Building our empirical evidence (Corpus)**

This thesis will rely on building a corpus that is based on a collection of written text' derived from primary material such as speeches of policy actors, providing a great deal of communicative and coordinative actions needed for discursive narrative analysis. Based on this, the qualitative analysis is mainly based on the integration of clear conceptual and analytical frameworks (DI and NPF), whereby the researcher is able to analyze words, expressions, indicators, documents, and other objects through coding of the text (Neill 2009). Thus, primary sources data for analysis will be concerned mainly with communicative and coordinative narrative shifts in light of expectations drawn and research questions derived from the literature. Hence, the following sources are used for the purpose of this thesis:

### *Corpus of text*

The empirical analysis of text includes sources relating to both discourse functions (coordinative and communicative) such as written speeches and interviews of the Libyan former authoritarian leader Muammar Gaddafi, his son Saif and key policy actors in institutions such as the General People's Congress GCP (the Libyan parliament), the National Planning Council NPC, and also the General Peoples' Committee GPC (The Libyan government) in order to trace the communicative policy narrative tactics and strategies aimed at justifying and legitimating economic governance reform in Libya. The sources of coordinative discourse, however, tackle the deliberation of policy change between the restricted key policy actors of the Libyan regime, whether between the authoritarian leader (son) and his institutions, or between key policy actors in formal and informal authority who were acting with the dictator's permission. In this regard, official written documents of NPC reports from 2003 to 2010, besides documents and sources recording meetings between policy actors, will provide data for the coordinative function, besides other data sources gathered. An important type of documents are those addressed to international investors and international organizations like the International Monetary Fund-the 'external' audience, so to speak, which is rarely considered in the existing studies of DI on OECD economies.

In terms of justifying the selection of our material of discursive narratives, we have collected the documents of both coordinative and communicative narratives (tables 5.1 and 6.1 in both the fifth and sixth chapters).

We wish to highlight the difficulty of establishing a proper universe for the discourses we consider in this project. During the transition to democracy whole areas of documentation were lost or destroyed. Some of the speeches were gathered by us during the first period of the transition, when some archives were still working – these documents are no longer in the public domain. Given the impossibility to establish the universe, our sampling was based on the key concepts and research questions we wanted to answer, and on the criterion of selecting the corpus from different stages of the period we

examine. We did not use probabilistic sampling because of the impossibility to establish the universe.

Our selection of the corpus documents was based on the following criteria:

- Sampling by period as the collection process have considered the years from 2003 to 2010 tracing the discursive actions of the Libyan policy actors and institutions in each month of the time-span.
- Our material included sources of: news items covering all discursive actions in all months of the research period.
- We have focused on collecting the coordinative discourse of the policy actors based on the institutional venues and main narrators and policy characters listed in chapter five of the thesis. Whilst the criteria of selecting entries for the corpus of communicative narratives were based on the events, western states, international community listed in the sixth chapter.
- The discourse material of coordinative discourse was mainly based on translation from Arabic to English (mainly the NPC reports and Saif Gaddafi initiative).
- The material of communicative narratives was often available in English (mainly from news items and media transcripts).

### **3.4 Archival documentation**

Another set of official and grey literature documents are mainly linked to the economic governance reform episodes. They were not coded since they do not belong to discourse. Yet they provide the background of policy change. In a sense, they are the episodes that the regime actors 'narrated' in the period under investigation. We coded the narration, not the laws and regulations, also for obvious reasons. Laws and regulations do not have a narrative structure but clauses and articles— although sometimes the preparatory documents and explanatory memoranda have a narrative dimension, as

shown by Radaelli, Dunlop and Fritsch (2012). These primary documents were collected systematically. They include: laws, regulations, formal decisions and explanatory memoranda or policy formulation documents.

### **3.5 Literature review and secondary data**

Due to the nature of the study, a number of secondary data were gathered during library research activities, besides those gathered from the government sources in Libya. Data from library research included print and online materials: news reports, research articles in academic journals, statistical data, official publications, and research publications by relevant national and international policy and research institutions. Institutions, which were major sources of data, included, but were not limited to, the commission of information in Libya, the ministry of control assessment reports, official economic institutions, and so on. All of data has been organized through the modern software of endnote library.

### **3.6. Piloting interviews**

As mentioned, in order to inform the design of this thesis, 'pilot interviews' were carried out at the preliminary stage in order to inform our design and coding.

We conducted experimental semi-structured interviews between September 2012 and August 2013 to gain insight regarding the Libyan elite's views of policy change as 20 of the interviewees were linked directly to the National Planning Council NPC, and 10 interviews outside the NPC. The information gathered from these initial interviews presented views outside of the corpus in order to provide basic information that would inform the thesis and provide understanding of the main policy domain of governance reform in Libya which was mainly the economic governance.

These initial interviews also helped in identifying the main 'themes' and 'nodes' of DI and NPF analysis such as: privatization, investment, elements of sustainability, corruption and transparency, and regulatory reform).

### **3.7 Data analysis techniques**

This issue relates mainly to the empirical analysis that aims to test expectations in the next section. In identifying data analysis techniques, Yin (2009: 129) refers to "examining, categorizing, tabulating, testing or otherwise recombining the evidence to draw empirically based conclusions". In choosing the appropriate technique of analysis, it is important to assure compatibility with the conceptual and analytical frameworks justified and provided by the literature. In this respect, Easterby-Smith et al. (2012), identifies six methods for analyzing data gathered with regards to this type of cases including: content analysis, grounded analysis, discourse analysis, narrative analysis, conversation analysis and argument analysis. In content analysis, the researcher identifies constructs and ideas that have been decided earlier by examining data, whereas in grounded analysis, ideas are determined from the empirical data itself, as pre-determined 'codes' play a role in establishing the analysis. This fits in with the DI and NPF frameworks adopted from the literature, as they provide basic themes that facilitate building communicative and coordinative narrative analysis through components of NPF and their role in connection with the content of discourse. The 'grounded theory' method is based on the notion of 'piloting codes' based on main 'nodes' derived from the NPF framework. Such a strategy facilitates building and developing codes based on well-defined and agreed components of discursive narrative policy analysis.

What facilitates and organizes this process is the use of the N-VIVO technique of working with data through connecting ideas based on nodes, codes, analyzing and visualizing data of discursive text.

### 3.7.1 Using N-VIVO.10

This qualitative tool aims mainly to facilitate managing, sorting, connecting, and visualizing discourse data gathered (Richards 1999). In this regard, N-VIVO.10 is considered as an appropriate tool for NPF analysis according to policy narrative findings reached by policy scholars such as Jones and McBeth (2010), who raised the importance of using this tool when presenting the NPF framework and its main components (nodes) of analysis levels. In this regard, N-VIVO has many advantages for managing data from several sources and shapes beside the ability to edit the text without affecting the coding of data (Denardo 2002). Additionally, N-VIVO provides the advantages of searching for words in the text beside the establishment of the relationships between nodes that represent the main components of policy narrative themes of NPF framework, beside sorting codes and relationships that could be ultimately visualized based on modeling (Di Gregorio 2000). Additionally, Bazeley (2008) defines the ways N-VIVO supports qualitative analysis as a technique of analysis including :

- Manage data – to organize and keep track of the many messy records that go into making a qualitative project.

- Manage ideas—to organize and provide rapid access to conceptual and theoretical knowledge.

- Query data – to ask simple or complex questions of the data, and N-VIVO retrieves the answers from its relevant database.

- Graphically model – to show cases, ideas or concepts being built from the data, and the relationships between them to present those ideas and conclusions in visual displays through models and matrices.

- N-VIVO facilitates the establishment of the relationships between the NPF themes within the empirical analysis based on data which emanated from the coded sources of text. The analysis of NPF themes relationships could be conducted through the following steps: Firstly, we focus on the language carried in the discourse as it is important to track the discursive actions of

public policy actors. The second step of our empirical analysis will be based on establishing the narrative features of coded texts of coordinative and communicative narratives including nodes for: 'transitions in discourse', 'turning points', 'denotation in time', 'repetitions', 'silence' 'omissions', 'endings', and 'inconsistencies' (Bazeley 2008:80), beside other features which we explored through capturing specific NPF nodes like 'heroes' and 'villains'. Thus we drew on classic NPF themes of causal plots, doomsday scenarios, heroes and villains and other nodes. N-VIVO also helps in the identification of relationships between NPF themes based on the software tools including: 'associated', 'influence/ affects', 'leads to', 'prepares', 'symmetrical influence' (Bazeley 2008). The plot was not established through the procedure of 'coding text at a given node' or 'set of nodes' (Bazeley 2008). Instead, it emerged out of our interpretation of the whole corpus. We identified a plot for coordination and another plot for communication.

### *3.7.2 Grounded technique of analysis*

In developing the discursive text codes, the thesis employs N-VIVO.10 relying mainly on coding structures specified ex ante by the researcher on the basis of the NPF main dimensions such as plots, devil shifts, heroes and villains, moral implications, doomsday scenarios, and so on. But during our research process we also relied on grounded coding, albeit sparingly. In N-VIVO, grounded theory methods concern the idea of extracting and developing codes from the discourse text. These codes are not specified ex ante but they occur in the corpus and are significant. There is tension between ex ante coding and grounded theory, but since we used the latter sparingly the tension has been kept at a minimum.

### **3.8 Establishing validity**

Yin presented four basic measures for research quality including: validity, internal validity, external validity, and reliability to ensure the quality of research analysis and findings.

#### *3.8.1 Construct validity*

This measure refers mainly to the correct operational measures and steps for concept formation (Riege 2003; Yin 2009). Our concepts are derived from solid research protocols established in the integrated DI and NPF frameworks.

#### *3.8.2 Reliability*

This means that measurement by A can be repeated by B and C with the same results (Yin 2009). To avoid weak reliability, scholars have suggested that the work should consider tackling ‘threats to reliability’ such as bias in working with multiple sources and correcting for subject error (Robson 2011). This single case study follows a clear protocol. In terms of inter-coder reliability, there is no inter-coder reliability in that there was only one coder. However, reliability will be measured across time, since measures arising out of coding can be replicated two-three months later by the researchers with appropriate indicators such as Krippendorff’s alpha. In the case of this thesis, we can talk of inter-temporal reliability instead of inter-coder reliability.

#### *3.8.3 Internal validity*

This measurer refers mainly to the analytical strategy adopted by the thesis. According to Yin (2009: 40), internal validity is engaged in the process of “establishing a causal relationship, whereby certain conditions are believed to lead to other conditions, as distinct from a spurious relationship”. In this



respect, the researcher should demonstrate a satisfactory analytical strategy that is based on clear literature review as well as well-defined and suitable conceptual and analytical frameworks. This thesis is inspired by dimensions and causal understandings that are foundational for the NPF, such as the notion that narratives influence policy and those policies are represented via narrative structures.

The thesis is aware of the limitations of these understandings but because we do not test causality directly we have fewer problems than researchers arguing that 'narrative A' had 'this causal influence on public Z'. Recall that our work is exploratory rather than being a test of hypotheses such as 'A causes B'.

#### *3.8.4 External validity*

Yin (2009) presented the view that external validity could be achieved based on generalized findings; this would make it difficult to attain in a single-case study. In fact, generalization requires a specific protocol and the need to feel confident about the sampling, such as in the statistical procedures. In this regard, external validity is not a direct concern in our study. It will be up to future comparative research to demonstrate if our findings have or do not have external validity.

## **4. Coding framework, levels of analysis and expectations**

This section provides the major components of the analytical framework and introduces our expectations.

## **4.1 Adopting DI and NPF frameworks**

Our thesis is based mainly on the adoption of the discursive institutionalism and the narrative policy frameworks in the analysis of governance in Libya as an authoritarian regime. The Libyan regime's new policies to enter the international society date back to 2003, and arose directly in response to UN sanctions. This was also followed by the regime's attempts to normalize its behavior and discourse towards the outsiders, in some cases with a clever calibration of discourse and audience costs (Hurd 2005). As described in both chapters two and three, the most preferred approach for the Libyan dictatorship to show some aspects of governance reform was the vision of 'economic governance' reform presented mainly by Gaddafi and his son to reflect some change in the regime's political behavior. This focus on the economy was considered as one of the most prominent of Gaddafi's changing strategies for survival and continuity.

In tackling our expectation of discursive narratives based on DI and NPF, the institutional settings determine the shape of both coordinative and communicative discourse. Additionally; narrative strategies and tactics reflect the nature of DI in authoritarian regimes as explained in chapter 3. The adoption of DI types of discourse is connected to the identification of the NPF; essentially we use DI as macro template to explain the two functions of discourse, and narratives as specific forms in which discourse is cast. In this we follow the recent hybridization of DI and NPF suggested by some European scholars (Radaelli et al. 2013).

## **4.2 Levels of empirical analysis**

Our NPF analysis ranges from the macro-level– when the documents present the regime's perspective on regulation and the economy – and the meso level when the documents refer to a specific policy like liberalization. We will explore the narrative structure of these levels by looking at classic features of narratives, such as canonicity and breach, narrative transportation,

congruence and incongruence, and trust in the narrator (Jones and McBeth 2010).

Each type of DI narratives is linked with the NPF components defined by the literature reviewed in chapter 3. In this respect, strategies and tactics of winners and losers, conventional and unconventional lobbying narratives (Best et al. 2006; Dalton et al. 2003; Munro 2005) may be different in communicative and coordinative. This is an empirical question. Instead of fluid advocacy coalitions typical of democratic regimes (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999), we expect discourse to be crafted within a very limited and restricted set of actors in the Libyan regime. Another tactic that should be empirically examined in the Libyan economic governance is the social construction of benefits and costs strategy (Jones and McBeth 2010) which we expect to be coordinated yet again by a narrow number of core regime actors, whilst in democracies there is a thicker social construction.

As mentioned, we expect 'political narratives' in the sense of McBeth and others (2010), meaning that narratives provide beliefs, identities and norms together with tactics, manipulation, and presentations of self (the regime) to increase support from the international and domestic audience. We have no reason to expect higher or lower levels of manipulation of narrative elements in an authoritarian regime (as opposed to a democracy) but clearly there is no opposition that can openly and freely challenge the presentation of self provided by the actors in an authoritarian regime. A kind of surrogate of this challenging function comes from the international audience, which however can itself be discursively manipulated, as shown by Professor Hurd's study of the Libyan reaction to the UN sanctions.

We build a set of expectations taking into account different dimensions. Firstly, DI suggests that we should cast our empirical net in the direction of two broad forms of discourses; the coordinative and the communicative discourse. Second, the NPF stimulates us to look at the precise form in which discourse is cast, looking at narrators, characters, and audiences. This makes our expectations more specific. Third, our literature review of governance and 'good governance' points us towards economic reform, regulation and some

dimensions of liberalisation that we expect to find in the narrative. Our empirical research on economic policy change assists us in giving empirical depth to the expectations. Finally, we took into account the theme of 'good governance' and economic reforms as refracted in the piloting interviews. These interviews were not used to produce evidence, as we encountered several limitations in this direction. Rather, they suggested elements of the context that informed our choice of expectations – in a sense the interviews provided another clue as to where to look and for what type of evidence.

This leads us to the following set of expectations. For each expectation, we first present its formulation and then the motivation for it.

***E.1*** *Coordinative discourse on economic governance (regulatory reform, privatisation, elements of sustainable development) is thin rather than thick. It revolves around the vision of the leader and his family, especially the son who was effectively in charge of economic policy.*

We have developed this expectation based on our argument of 'stationary bandit' we addressed in chapter 2 proposing that persona-list authoritarian leaders who have uncertainty of rule time and succession often seek a short-term economic reform based on their family and linked policy circles.

***E.2*** *The main forum of coordinative discourse is not an elected assembly. It is instead the National Planning Council (NPC).*

This expectation is theoretically supported by the argument reviewed in the literature review on authoritarianism (chapter 3). We have addressed how an authoritarian leader tend to establish institutions such as consultative councils, Juntas, and political bureaus, as an 'institutional trench' against threat from the ruling elite, and to solicit the cooperation of outsiders (Gandhi 2008).

Elected assemblies and other classic forms of democratic representation – we reason – certainly existed in the period we examine, but they are simulacra of democracy: their functions are atrophic; they do not produce any form of real democratic representation.

**E.3** *The communicative discourse is thick especially the discourse targeting external audiences such as the international organizations, the international business community, and important trading partners.*

*The internal communicative discourse on economic governance exists, but its role is to support the legitimacy of the ruling regime together with other, broader themes of political discourse like patriotism and identity.*

We have this expectation according to the theoretical argument we explored in the second chapter. It is based on the notion of 'bargaining game' between the Libyan regime and the external audiences and their costs (audience cost argument) where authoritarian leaders choose their attitude towards audiences whether to attack, back down, or escalate within their interactive arguments with the externals (Fearon 1994). The 'bargaining game' between the Libyan regime and the outsiders emanates from historical events such as the UN sanctions. This argument supports an expectation about the regime's narratives being somewhat 'in conversation with' external audiences, at least implicitly.

**E.4** *We expect narratives to differ depending on whether they are included in the coordinative discourse or in the communicative discourse. For this purpose we will examine two different bodies of documents and test whether their narratives differ. The regime may find it useful to manipulate narratives for internal and external consumption; using different rationales for economic reform at the stage of coordination and the stage of communicating plans and visions to international audiences (See tables 5.1 & 6.1 in the fifth and sixth chapters).*

We develop this expectation because it is central to Vivien Schmidt's discursive institutionalism. The very essence of DI is to work with the assumption that discourse has two main functions: one is to coordinate between elites, the other is to communicate. The important difference with what Vivien Schmidt has argued in the past is that we place more emphasis on external audiences, which we will often describe as the reader over the shoulders of the regimes' narrators. All plans, tactics, strategies, goals are

expected to be manipulated in light of the differences and nuances between communication and coordination.

**E.5** *Narratives of economic governance do not include elements such as individual economic freedom, liberties, the human rights of workers and the economic benefits of a free press. Instead, the causal plot, metaphors, and other core narrative features revolve around ease of business, the process of the opening up of the economy, and the key economic position of Libya in international trade. The causal plot will not stress the endowment of the country in terms of raw materials, oil, etc., since this was already experienced prior to 2003 with limited success, but rather the skills of the people and the good regulatory framework that supports business. (See N-VIVO nodes - figure.4.2)*

This expectation is also linked with the 'stationary bandit' argument referring to the secure autocrat who seeks a short term economic reform according to uncertainty of succession, as economic reforms serve the dictator interests for a short time (Olson 1993). This includes measures imposed by dictators including 'limited regulatory reform', some other features of reform that serve their goals and avoid any components that may challenge their control on the decision- making power.

**E.6** *The role of time is to project economic success and a modern economy into the near future, showing that the regime is moving towards modern values of economic governance such as sustainability, privatization, investment and regulatory reform.*

In this expectation, we draw on our knowledge of the historical facts. The regime was objectively in a difficult position in relation to political actors like the US and the European Union, and had low attractiveness for firms. The regulatory environment was bad and not interesting for the international business community. We therefore expect the regime's narrators to use time to build a discursive bridge between present and future and mobilize internal actors towards policy change.

***E.7*** *The characterisation of heroes and villain is blunt, with the heroes working for the future economic progress of the country and the villains being either aggressive foreign regimes or those internal actors who resist modernisation of the economy to protect their privileges.*

Strategies and tactics of winners and losers, conventional and unconventional lobbying narratives (Best et al. 2006; Dalton et al. 2003; Munro 2005) may be different in communicative and coordinative narratives. Our knowledge of the historical facts suggests a drastic, blunt characterization of heroes and villains, suitable for an authoritarian regime desperate to buy time and the support of important allies like Italy and the foreign business community.

***E.8*** *The narratives of economic governance have a strong appeal to the domestic audience in terms of strengthening the identity and values of the regime.*

The theoretical basis of this expectation is mainly linked with the argument presented by Schultz (2001) when he argued that costs may also force dictators to choose between alternative domestic and foreign costs under political pressure and to show effort in this direction of reform in both international and local levels . We aim to empirically investigate the existence of the Libyan people as main agents in the narratives deployed for the new economic governance change. Anger is always a kind of Damocles' sword hanging upon even the most authoritarian dictator. Change cannot be brought about unless people believe in it. We will find later that this expectation is not supported by empirical evidence, and we will explain why.

### **4.3 Templates for N-VIVO coding**

Based on the literature review of NPF presented in chapter three, Jones and McBeth (2010), mentioned that N-VIVO is considered as a useful qualitative tool for conducting empirical analysis of policy narrative. In integrating NPF with DI framework, N-VIVO provides connection between ideas of discourse types through integrating communicative and coordinative discourse with NPF

components. Therefore, N-VIVO facilitates the connection of key components and relationships between them to understand the interactive process of discursive institutionalism with regards to economic governance narratives during the period 2003-2010.

Before addressing these components and working with discourse text data, it is important to shed light on the method of 'piloting' the major themes of communicative and coordinative narrative policies derived from the integration of DI and NPF frameworks.

#### **4.4 Piloting nodes and text codes**

Following the NPF framework components of empirical analysis, we used the 'initial coding' of NPF structure adopted by the discursive institutionalism and the narrative policy analysis literature, and then we plan to code as the analysis goes with the communicative and coordinative documents of the corpus, opening up our research to elements of grounded theory (See tables 5.1 & 6.1 in the fifth and sixth chapters). Our initial nodes are suggested by the NPF framework.

In this regard, narratives of economic governance in Libya 2003-2010 are divided into two types of body of evidence (corpus): 1. List of coordinative discourse of narrative deliberating policies of economic governance. 2. List of communicative discourse narratives had revolves around justification and legitimating the appropriateness of economic reform (See tables 5.1 & 6.1 in the fifth and sixth chapters).

Pragmatically, we developed our nodes around the following:

**Identity:** This component tends to project certain discursive definitions of the Libyan economic governance as arising out of a specific identity. The empirical analysis strategy tackles questions such as: What are the moral and normative assumptions behind economic reform choice that define the core identity of the regime and its people? Who are we Libyans in the world and how does this generate economic values? Where our economy in the world is



and what do we expect from our economy in terms of supporting core identity values? How does our identity project onto external actors?

**Metaphor:** A component that tends to tackle codes extracted from the text that contains: figures of speech, descriptions using analogy, and references to 'climbing' towards economic success and prosperity. In turn, metaphors are manipulated to provide persuasion, justifications, and appropriateness of economic reform. Some metaphors will be about distance – from Europe, or from trade partners. For example, a recurring theme in Libya is the distance from the European Union, and whether the reforms can make it closer to this area of regional integration. In turn, metaphors often support doomsday scenarios, to be introduced in a moment.

**Policy characters/ heroes and villains:** Who are the actors in the narratives of economic reform? We will code for informal and formal actors who gain from the policy status-quo (winners) and concessions by the dictatorship and others who will not (losers)? Who will incur the cost? Who are the good people, the characters who deserve? Who is 'guilty' of what and who influences the change? The causal plot provides features of proper 'heroes' and 'villains' of the policy narrative structure, as shown by the next item below.

**Causal plot:** This component identifies actors in relation to economic policy change. But the plot is also used to portray the reasons for reform, in 'if A then B' types of narrative structures. Causality may be anchored in the history of Libya and the foundations of the regime. Or it may refer to more recent events in international trade, and how these create impetus for privatization and economic reforms that can no longer be delayed. The plot can terminate in the present or in the future, showing how certain reforms will lead to economic prosperity in the near future (see figure 4.2).

**Norms/Values:** Provides core questions for the analysis such as: What are the norms that motivate economic policy change in Libya? Also, what are the international values of economic governance reform that Libya is inspired by? Does Libya follow the same norms of international organizations like the UN,

at least in the discursive manipulation of the UN language as shown by Hurd?  
How do these values support the case for reform?

**Doomsday Scenarios:** This component creates momentum for action by showing the very negative consequences of not reforming the economy. Empirically, we can envisage the existence of different scenarios concerning economic backwardness, the risk of becoming more isolated, the future of relations with countries like Italy (with which Libya signed a landmark treaty during the period considered in the thesis), and the prospects for distance-proximity with the European Union.

**Time Pathos drama:** This component looks at urgent and prompt policy action, and the role of time in projecting successful economic governance in terms of necessary actions reflecting the Libyan government's attitudes towards critical situation in light of the international norms.

**Blame/Devil Shift:** A component that refers to narrative tactics based on underplaying the regime's power in favour of overstating opponents' capabilities in order to shift the blame away in the narrative strategy. Based on these components, we developed our coding framework (see table 4.1 below).

Figure.4.1 Coding the intergrated DI and NPF frameworks

( Nodes established for empirical analysis)

Nodes							
Look for:		Search In	Nodes	Find Now	Clear	Advanced Find	
Nodes							
Name	Sources	References	Created On	Created By	Modified On	Modified By	
ARGUMENT	12	53	07/12/2013 09:30	AMB	24/05/2015 12:38	AAB	
CAUSAL PLOTS	67	162	04/12/2013 15:54	AMB	24/05/2015 12:38	AAB	
CHARACTERS	10	21	05/02/2014 16:58	AMB	24/05/2015 12:38	AAB	
CONFLICT	9	27	28/01/2014 13:46	AMB	24/05/2015 12:38	AAB	
DEVIL-SHIFT	5	13	28/01/2014 13:43	AMB	12/04/2015 18:55	AAB	
DOOMS-DAY SCENARIO	10	23	04/12/2013 15:55	AMB	12/04/2015 18:44	AAB	
HEROES & VILLAINS	36	68	04/12/2013 15:54	AMB	12/04/2015 20:13	AAB	
IDENTITY	31	77	04/12/2013 15:54	AMB	08/04/2015 03:52	AMB	
INSTITUTIONAL SETTINGS	10	14	15/01/2014 18:02	AMB	24/05/2015 12:38	AAB	
METAPHORS	8	8	07/12/2013 08:52	AMB	12/04/2015 18:54	AAB	
MORAL IMPLICATIONS	2	4	28/01/2014 13:46	AMB	12/04/2015 17:12	AAB	
NARRATIVE STRUCTURE	9	42	28/01/2014 13:49	AMB	24/05/2015 14:43	AAB	
NORMS, VALUES and BELIEFS	9	21	04/12/2013 15:54	AMB	24/05/2015 12:38	AAB	
POLICY PROBLEM	14	40	28/01/2014 13:49	AMB	24/05/2015 12:38	AAB	
TERMS OF REFERENCE	6	8	28/01/2014 13:56	AMB	12/04/2015 18:54	AAB	
THE PRESENTATION OF SELF	21	27	19/10/2014 07:25	AMB	12/04/2015 18:49	AAB	
TIME- PATHOS- DRAMA	8	26	04/12/2013 15:56	AMB	12/04/2015 18:46	AAB	
TYPES OF SUPPORT FOR CHOICE	7	15	28/01/2014 13:45	AMB	24/05/2015 12:38	AAB	

Figure. 4.2 NPF Coding the causal plot node (Coding CMD.11)

Look for: 
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Find Now
Clear
Advanced Find

### Nodes

- Nodes
- Relationships
- Node Matrices

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- Sources
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- Classifications
- Collections
- Queries
- Reports
- Models
- Folders

### Nodes

Name	Sources	References	Created On	Cr
CAUSAL PLOTS	67	162	04/12/2013 15:54	Al
Modern and Liberal Economy 2003-006	31	47	23/10/2014 14:28	Al
Oil Attractivness 2006-10	36	54	23/10/2014 14:27	Al
Sustainable development & Stability 2006-10	25	38	06/04/2015 08:59	Al
CHARACTERS	10	21	05/02/2014 16:58	Al

CAUSAL PLOTS

Reference 1 - 1.53% Coverage

**► Friday, 28 January, 2005:** Libya on Friday will unveil its most sweeping proposals for economic reform in 35 years as part of a new national strategy aimed at ushering the country into the modern economic era. The multi-pronged initiative would streamline government, speed up privatization and liberalize the media sector in a bid to begin a transition from what remains essentially an authoritarian regime to a more liberal economy, Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi (photo), son of Libya's ruler Colonel Qadhafi, and Abdulhafidh al-Zlitni, the chairman of Libya's National Planning Council, said Thursday on the sidelines of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. **"The old times are finished and Libya is ready to move onto the new stage of modernization," Saif al-Islam said in an interview. "... But of course success can only be measured by the implementation," Saif al-Islam added. [IHT]**

**Table.4.1 DI and NPF in Libya: Coding Framework**

NPF element	In the text we are coding....
<b>Identity</b>	How does the text define the Libyan identity in texts about economic governance? Does the text define the identity of the regime, the Libyan people, and the army? Who is 'us' in the text – for example, 'us' can be public managers involved in economic reforms, with their own identity as builders of a future.
<b>The structure of the narrative: Narrator, Main issues and Lead discourse genre</b>	<p>1 Who is the narrator? Who tells the story in this text?</p> <p>2 What issue/themes does the regime seek to address via the reform?</p> <p>3 Is there a predominant genre in talking about the issue, e.g. 'exhortation', 'evidence-based', the 'homework'? (see Radaelli, Dunlop, Fritsch 2013 for 'genres' in the narrative policy framework)</p>
<b>Institutional settings as discursive representations in the narrative</b>	How does the text describe the institutional venues and settings for economic reform? How are institutions evoked and represented discursively?
<b>Heroes and villains</b>	Who are heroes working for the future of economic progress? Who are the aggressive/negative actors, externally and internally?
<b>Initiator of change</b>	Which specific actors are described as those who have provided momentum for the reform?
<b>Policy problem</b>	What is the policy problem that the regime actors seek to tackle and remedy
<b>Terms of reference</b>	Which terms are used to describe the referent object or subject matter of narratives of economic reform policies in Libya?
<b>Argument</b>	What is the argument that supports the claim about change?
<b>Types of evidence</b>	What is the form, nature and basis of evidence supporting the claim made in the text?
<b>Characters</b>	Who are the primary actors? Who does what in the narrative?
<b>Causal plot</b>	What are cause and effect relations? How does time play into causal relations?
<b>Metaphors</b>	How are metaphors deployed to frame the policy problem or solutions for the Libyan economy such as the issue of 'climbing' towards success?
<b>Conflict</b>	How are patterns of consensus and conflict represented discursively? How are they described? How do they involve institutions?

<b>Types of support for choice</b>	How are proposed solutions to the economic reform justified or explained? Example – evidence or values
<b>Norms/Values</b>	What are norms and values that motivate economic policy reform in the narrative?
<b>Moral implications</b>	What are the moral implications of the narrative (if any)?
<b>Doomsday scenario</b>	To what extent are 'doomsday' scenarios deployed to justify economic governance? To what degree is it stated that there will be negative consequences if 'we do not reform now'?
<b>Blame shift</b>	How does the Libyan regime underplay the country's economic and political power in favour of overstating the position of opponents to shift the blame away
<b>The role of time in the drama</b>	What the role of time in projecting successful economic governance in terms of necessary actions in the plot?
<b>Conclusion</b>	What is the conclusion of the narrative? Does it contain a plan of 'things to do'?

## **Conclusion**

This chapter tackled the justifications of research design and handling empirical evidence in order to justify the research operations undertaken at the empirical level. It was divided into four sections to tackle the research design and the foundations of conducting our empirical analysis of discursive narratives of the economic governance change in Libya during the research period. We have presented objectives and aims followed by a clear justification of our choice of research design, introduced our approach to data gathering, and motivated choices for techniques. An important part of this chapter was to derive expectations for empirical analysis from discursive institutionalism and the narrative policy framework, and to give a flavor of the empirical analysis we will carry out in the next fifth and sixth chapters. Our empirical analysis will provide findings that will then feed back into the contribution of this thesis to discourse analysis and narrative policy analysis.

# CHAPTER FIVE– COORDINATIVE NARRATIVES OF ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE IN LIBYA 2003-2010

## Introduction

The primary purpose of this chapter and the next is to understand how narratives of economic governance were deployed in the period considered in our dissertation, and to what effect on the regime's strategic intentions to signal to different types of audiences the adoption of some aspects of 'good governance'. This chapter deals with coordinative discourse, the next with communicative discourse. In both chapters, our empirical focus will be on narratives, drawing on the narrative policy framework (NPF).

The authoritarian regime used the discourse on 'good governance' strategically, in two ways: first, by adopting only certain components of this discourse, mainly the language of modernization of the economy, openness to the market, and regulatory reform. Second, by drawing on these components to seek legitimacy both for the policy changes under way and for the regime. In other words, the strategic usages refer to the dimensions of specific support (that is, support for this or that reform) and diffuse support (that is, using the language of governance to create legitimacy for an authoritarian system). Not surprisingly then, in the narratives under consideration in this chapter we shall find a combination of discursive references to economic policies and to the regime, the key characters in the Libyan political system, and the evocation of identities and 'nation'. We also have to add what we mean by 'adoption'. On the one hand, adoption was more than cheap talk, because the regimes took economic and regulatory decisions that went beyond symbolic signals to the international audience. On the other, the implementation of these decisions varied markedly, with a minimum of implementation in the domain of sustainability - which was by contrast quite prominent discursively.



As mentioned, our plan is to empirically investigate the coordinative narratives of economic governance in Libya. We use NPF in light of the expectations we have introduced earlier on – expectations that will be probed in this and the next chapter. Following discursive institutionalism, we also have to situate discourse in its institutional context – as we said in previous chapters, this requires that we bring formal and informal institutions into the context of our project.

Empirically, we use our original coding of the official coordinative discourse documents – our corpus for this chapter. In the remainder, we discuss the narrative strategies with their relationships to the NPF's key themes. We will answer our full set of research questions at the end of our analysis of both coordinative and communicative discourse – hence this chapter is limited to the expectations about coordinative discourse but it also provides some initial conclusions for the expectations on discourse and narratives in general – this step will come to completion after we see the findings of the next chapter.

We use NPF framework of analysis in light of the following expectations we have introduced in chapter four:

***E.1*** *Coordinative discourse on economic governance (regulatory reform, privatization, elements of sustainable development) is thin rather than thick. It revolves around the vision of the leader and his family, especially the son who was effectively in charge of economic policy.*

***E.2*** *The main forum of coordinative discourse is not an elected assembly. It is instead the National Planning Council (NPC).*

***E.5*** *Narratives of economic governance do not include elements such as individual economic freedom, liberties, the human rights of workers and the economic benefits of a free press. Instead, the causal plot, metaphors, and other core narrative features revolve around ease of business, the process of the opening up of the economy, and the key economic position of Libya in international trade. The causal plot will not stress the endowment of the*

*country in terms of raw materials, oil, etc., since this was already experienced prior to 2003 with limited success, but rather the skills of the people and the good regulatory framework that supports business.*

**E.6** *The role of time is to project economic success and a modern economy into the near future, showing that the regime is moving towards modern values of economic governance such as sustainability, privatization, investment, and regulatory reform.*

**E.7** *The characterisation of heroes and villains is blunt, with the heroes working for the future economic progress of the country and the villains being either aggressive foreign regimes or those internal actors who resist modernization of the economy to protect their privileges.*

Before we enter discourse, however, we need to provide information on the context of economic and governance reforms during our period and provide information on the narrators and the actors engaged. For this reason the chapter is structured as follows:

1. The Libyan context of economic reforms
2. Corpus
3. Research findings
4. Appraising our research expectations

## **1. The Libyan context of reform: emerging themes and narrators**

This section tackles the main features and milestones of economic reform in Libya and presents the parties engaged in the interactive process, as well as

providing information on key policy measures, mainly in regulatory reform. This section is divided into the following parts:

- The emergence of economic reform issues
- Narrators and institutional venues
- Economic regulatory reform
- The emergence of trade partners

### **1. The emergence of economic reform issues**

As briefly outlined in chapter 4, the period of this single-case study was chosen to start from 2003. This was the year of Muammar Gaddafi's speech, on 14-6-2003 to both the Libyan parliament (GCP) and the Libyan policy makers. The speech signaled the discursive change from public sector dominance of economic governance to the adoption of a more liberal governance for the economy (The Libyan broadcasting service 2003). This announcement was in parallel with his son's informal initiative of 'Libya and the 21<sup>st</sup> Century', to justify the appropriateness of new reform in light of the failure of socialism.

Discursively, there was major emphasis on regulatory change as 'the' change, covering new 'modern' ideas of privatization, investment, and breaking the public sector monopoly. In line with the governance vocabulary of international organizations like the World Bank, this change also featured the totemic presence of sustainable development. The 'regulatory adjustments' manifested in past and new regulations of governance concerned economic activities, banking, limiting money laundering regulations, foreign investment and new stock-market arrangements, and the re-adjustment of past regulations derived from the socialism epoch.

## 1.1 Narrators and institutional venues

Libya presents a clear case of a persona-list-family oriented regime under which policies of development are decided by a narrow range of actors. Hence, governance reforms were produced top-down by a narrow set of actors – in line with what we said about authoritarianism and governance (chapter 2).

### 1.1.1 Primary characters

#### *Muammar Gaddafi: Initiator of the new governance discourse*

The leader of the former Libyan regime had called for economic change in the third meeting of the parliament on 14 June 2003, urging the dismantling of the public sector and the adoption of new governance that would improve the economy. In the same speech, Gaddafi called for the appointment of Shokri Ghanem who was the minister of the economy, and former deputy secretary of OPEC (National Oil Corporation 2011). In fact Ghanem was one of Gaddafi's son's trusted mentors in the new economic initiative and new thoughts. He was also praised by Gaddafi in 2003 as the 'man of reform' who had a 'golden weight' in the global economic institutions (The Libyan broadcasting service 2003) and then was discharged from the position in 2006<sup>17</sup>.

It is also important to point out that Gaddafi's discourse was directly followed by Libyan acceptance of 'IMF Article VIII' obligations to enter the international financial procedures, presenting a key turning point in the adoption of new governance. This formal letter was sent by the minister of finance two weeks after Gaddafi's speech (IMF 2003, doc no.03/122).

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<sup>17</sup> The Libyan parliament (GCP) had formally discharged Ghanem following a recommendation by Muammar Gaddafi in 2006. This change had directly followed his demands to combat corruption and more governance jurisdiction for the executive branch (GPC) to implement the new reforms. Ghanem then was appointed as the head of the National Oil Corporation (NOC) to set the scene for the new role of oil in attracting new potential partners and economic friends.

## *Saif Gaddafi: The informal narrator of 'Libya and the 21<sup>st</sup> Century' Initiative*

One of the seven sons and one daughter of Gaddafi, Saif is the second eldest son by Gaddafi's second wife, who came from Eastern Libya<sup>18</sup>. While other sons were prominent in other policy and military issues<sup>19</sup>, Saif was the son who had acquired a profile mainly in economic policy through his initiative of Libya and the 21<sup>st</sup> Century which he presented in 2003. This initiative was formally distributed to the public audience in 2003 in a book containing extensive economic steps for good governance (Gaddafi 2002). It also presented an appraisal of the past economic governance problems in Libya for the past epoch of a socialist economy, criticizing public sector dominance of economic activities (2002:19-64).

Additionally, this initiative included five main aspects of Libya's movements in economic governance according to the international standards: 1. lessons from the dominance of the public sector over economic activities in the past 2. Breaking the monopoly by privatization through new regulations 3. Introducing a new monetary policy 4. Prospects of a new trade policy 5. Prospects of Libya and EU/Italy cooperation (Gaddafi 2002; Pargeter 2006).

The son's initiative was the basis for setting the reform, presenting him as an 'informal narrator' of the new change. His informal role also witnessed several 'turning points' in the governance discourse in later stages, ranging from direct

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<sup>18</sup> Gaddafi had one (and the first) son- Muhammad Gaddafi (b. 1970) from his first wife, Fathia Nuri, in 1969- the daughter of General Khalid, a senior figure in King Idris' Monarchy. Gaddafi and his first wife divorced in 1970. He married his second wife- Safia Farkash El-Barasi, a former nurse from Bayda-Cyrenaica and remained married until his death. They had seven biological children: Saif al-Islam Gaddafi (b. 1972), Al-Saadi Gaddafi (b. 1973), Mutassim Gaddafi (1974–2011), Hannibal Gaddafi (b. 1975), Ayesha Gaddafi (b. 1976), Saif al-Arab Gaddafi (1982–2011), and Khamis Gaddafi (1983–).

<sup>19</sup> The most notable among Gaddafi's children who had roles in policy and public life were the following: Muhammad Gaddafi was formally in charge of reforming the Telecommunications and IT sector. Ayesha Gaddafi (daughter) held some charity and humanitarian informal roles. Al-Saadi Gaddafi was the Libyan former association football player, and then acquired some unclear informal roles such as: Head of an incomplete business project for a semi-autonomous city similar to Hong Kong in Libya (Zwara-Abu-Kammash Free Trade Zone (ZFTZ)), stretching 40 km between Tripoli and the Tunisian border. He also held a military role as the commander of Libya's Special Forces between 2009 and 2011; Khamis Gaddafi was the military commander in charge of the 'Khamis Brigade' of the Libyan Army. He was distanced from policy and reform issues. The fourth son -Mutassim Gaddafi was a Libyan Army officer and the National Security Advisor of Libya from 2008 until 2011. Mutassim presented some challenges to the economic reform episode presented by his brother Saif. His protagonists had formally opposed the national reform project of sustainable development ( Libya 2025 ) presented by Mahmoud Jibril, who was acting as the head of the National Planning Council (2007-2010) and one of the quasi-formal actors linked to Saif. Our empirical analysis will show how discursive roles of protagonists from both sides were manipulated.

and indirect engagement in the plot via informal discourse, starting from distributing the new ideas of governance in 2003 to declaring a radical political and economic change in 2005 via 'new discourse', carried through the extensive political initiative entitled 'Libya Al-Ghad 'in 2005 to focus on a further economic openness<sup>20</sup>(Al-Sawani 2013). This discourse of change was linked to the informal 'National Economic Strategy NES' initiative which followed this discourse in 2005 to concentrate on modern regulations based on standards of privatization, competitiveness, energy investment, and internal and external investment (Porter and Yergin 2006). The informal attempts were ended in 2007 when another quasi-formal actor linked to Saif Gaddafi presented the initiative of 'Libya 2025:Sustainable Development' in 2007 focusing on entering sustainability elements (NPC &Center for research and consultation 2008). Our analysis of NPF themes will determine the role of these informal and formal actors in the plotting of the new governance.

Saif completed his Ph.D. at the London School of Economics (2008) on the role of civil society in the democratization of global governance institutions, showing another discursive shift in parallel with the broad discourse of sustainable development in order to present himself as an informal international actor rather than continuing the economic reforms in Libya which he trumpeted in his first narratives<sup>21</sup>. In this thesis he spent time on the notion of the civil society – yet our empirical analysis will reveal that the citizens were never primary actors in the narratives.

*Prime Minister Shokri Ghanem: initiator of reform episodes  
in 2003-2006*

As a former mentor of Saif Gaddafi for the study of 'Libya and the 21<sup>st</sup> Century', and also a key policy actor appointed by Gaddafi, Ghanem presented his

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<sup>20</sup>An Arabic expression refers to 'the future of Libya'.

<sup>21</sup> The thesis title was: The Role of Civil Society in the Democratization of Global Governance Institutions: From 'Soft Power' to Collective Decision-Making.

economic program mainly based on privatization that aimed at dismantling the state monopoly, resolving labor market issues, and elements of investment through new regulatory measures (Pargeter 2006 :223). He also called for ending corruption in the public sector, preventing the misuse of resources and for enhancing transparency in government <sup>22</sup>.

*Head of the NPC Council<sup>23</sup>, Mahmoud Jibril 2007-2009*

Mahmoud Jibril was one of the key policy actors backed by Saif Gaddafi and was the first head of the National Economic Board (NEB)<sup>24</sup> which took over the National Economic Strategy (NES) as an informal economic project directly linked to Saif and supported intellectually by Porter and Yargin (2005/2006) from Monitor Group/Harvard University and some notable think tanks, to implement Saif Gaddafi's reform vision (2003)<sup>25</sup>.

In parallel with this informal position with Saif, the Libyan parliament (GCP) appointed Jibril as the minister of the NPC Council NPC (GCP legislations 2007) to be responsible for economic governance coordination. In 2008, Jibril presented his initiative: 'Libya 2025, sustainable development culture', declaring new economic governance based on sustainability elements and not only on narrow governance reform limited to the economic domain. This initiative was based on the deliberation between Jibril and a number of experts, key ministers and parliament officers during the first national conference of public policy held at the Garyounis University <sup>26</sup> on June 2007 and published in a book (El-Mogherbi et al. 2009). This conference resulted in the formation of the NPC team that was

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<sup>22</sup> For further details see: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/9237196/Shukri-Ghanem.html>

<sup>23</sup> The National Planning Council.

<sup>24</sup> Established in 2007 by the Libyan government and initiated by Saif Gaddafi in the Libyan media.

<sup>25</sup> For further details see: Institute for strategy and Global Competitiveness, Harvard University National Economic Strategy: An assessment of the competitiveness of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 2006: <https://opecconomica.files.wordpress.com/2012/04/harvard-business-school-institute-for-strategy-and-competitiveness.pdf>, accessed on 28-3.2014.

<sup>26</sup> The past official name of the University of Benghazi.

selected to present a written document on this project to the NPC council (NPC & Center for Research and Consultation 2008).

### *Former Prime Minister, El Baghdadi El-Mahmoudi 2006-2010*

El Baghdadi El-Mahmoudi was appointed as the prime Minister for Libya in March 2006, succeeding Shokri Ghanem. He was one of Muammar Gaddafi's protagonists of technocrats. His main task was to stabilize the new economic governance beliefs based on selective regulatory reforms and also on the stabilization of the financial and banking sectors during the period (2006-2010). El-Mahmoudi presented the 'Government Development Program 2008-2012' which was formally adopted by the legislative branch and the NPC council alongside the neglect of the quasi-formal project of Libya 2025, presented by Jibril in the same year.

#### *1.1.2 Institutional venues*

##### *The National Planning Council-NPC*

This institution had emerged in 1999 after the UN decision to lift the sanctions imposed on Libya after the Lockerbie political crisis. According to the literature on authoritarianism, the NPC is considered as one of the 'quasi-formal bodies of consultancy' often created by dictators to provide direct plans for policy reform (Mattes 2011). Our investigation reveals that policy actors who headed this institution were mainly protagonists and actors from different backgrounds linked to the Gaddafi family to secure policy change deliberation<sup>27</sup>. Additionally, there

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<sup>27</sup> Since the establishment of the NPC the following have been leaders of this institution ( along with their political backgrounds) :  
-A .M. El-Baghdadi (1999-2000), Former head of the Revolutionary Committees ( Gaddafi's Revolutionary and Security protagonists) .  
- J. Al. Talhi (2000-2001)- Former Prime-Minister of Libya (Gaddafi's Technocrats).  
-T.H. Al-Juhaymi (2001-2002) - Former Governor of the Libyan Central Bank (Gaddafi's Technocrats)  
- M. Al.Shamikh (2003-2005) – Former Libyan Prime Minister (Gaddafi's Technocrats) .  
-A. M .Al-Zlitni ( 2005-2007)- Former Minister of Economy (Gaddafi's Technocrats)



was a clear 'unstable' and 'inconsistent' pattern of appointing leaders of this institution<sup>28</sup>. The most notable initiative to challenge the regime core beliefs on reform was 'quasi-formal' and only linked to Jibril (Libya 2025). This initiative was disputed by the aforementioned development project (2008-2012) presented by El-Mahmoudi.

The NPC started its actual work in economic governance in 2001 to present solutions for the economic problems which had accumulated through the socialism epoch. Its notable policy and economic governance included initial proposals, such as: economic policies (2000), policy alternatives to oil revenues (2001), and the policy of 'one billion' Libyan dinars for housing projects between 2000-2002 (NPC 2003). The analysis of the text carried within its reports reveals the significance of the coordinative narratives strategies of new governance.

### *Legislative and executive branches*

The legislative body (GCP) and the government (GPC) form the branches of the formal governance. They both represent the formal, 'non-binding' institutions of governance under dictatorship. These bodies also served under Gaddafi's declaration on the authority of the people' in 1977, and 'The declaration on the separation of rule and revolution' in 1979 to present his political part of the Green Book (Mattes 2011 : 57-59). What was important in presenting these formal bodies is how they both coordinated with the NPC council.

Additionally, their role served mainly in presenting the formal turning points of economic regulatory reform beside the determination of which 'initiative' of economic development was to be adopted, such as the aforementioned development program 2008-2012 which was formally presented by the last Libyan prime minister-El Baghdadi El-Mahmoudi, in 2008 and which was notably

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-M. Jibril (2007-2009) –Former head of the National Economic Board ( Informal position linked to Saif Gaddafi)

-B. Zenbeil (2009-2010) –A former public service official.

-I. A. Gaddafi ( 2010-2011)- Former Minister of Control ( Gaddafi relatives and protagonists )

<sup>28</sup> No actor has remained more than two years in this quasi-formal position.

given the priority of implementation rather than the informal initiatives of Saif's reformers.

Bureaucracy was mainly dominated by Muammar Gaddafi in order to secure loyalty in the decision-making process with seemingly democratic elections<sup>29</sup>. According to Gaddafi's 'Declaration on the authority of the people' in 1977, the Libyan parliament (GCP) was headed by 9 secretaries including Muammar Gaddafi himself (1977-2010)<sup>30</sup>. One of his main closest relatives,<sup>31</sup> A. Al-Zenati Gaddafi, headed this institution for over 14 years (1992-2006)<sup>32</sup>. The Libyan government (GPC) was not far from this pattern of decision-making control. Ten prime ministers were appointed during the period from 1977 to 2010. No prime minister governed for more than 3 years, except for El Baghdadadi El –Mahmoudi, who ran the task of stabilizing the Libyan economy and setting up a suitable environment for new trading partners from 2006 until the regime change in 2011<sup>33</sup>. In terms of bureaucratic links to Gaddafi, indicators of 'governance recruitment 1977-2006' reveal the domination of Gaddafi over the composition of the Libyan legislative elite. 5 out of 54 positions were filled by the military, representing 9% of GCP leading actors. The revolutionary committees, Gaddafi's ruling party, controlled 37 positions (69%) leaving 22 % for the technocrats with 12 legislative leading positions. In this place, it is worth mentioning that the GCP dominated the appointment of the GPC prime ministers and other policy actors following Gaddafi's orders.

Alongside the control of bureaucratic recruitment, the regulatory architecture of government in Libya was marked by inconsistent and unstable features. The 'over-regulation' phenomenon had dominated the regulatory governance scene

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<sup>29</sup> Names of its members were only announced in media with the claim that these were the final results of the GCP election.

<sup>30</sup> Muammar Gaddafi (1977-1979) ,A.Al-Obeidi (1979-1980), M.Z. Rajab (1980-1984) , M.Al-Usta Omar (1984-1990) ,A.Al-Sawsa'a (1990-1992), A. Al-Zenati Gaddafi ( 1992-2006) , M.Kaeeba (2006-2008), Mubarak Al-Shamikh (2008-2009) , M.A. Alzwee (2009-2010)

<sup>31</sup> He is also a prominent member of Gaddafi's Tribe (Gaddadfa).

<sup>32</sup> For further details on these indicators, see: Amal S. Obeidi, Political Elites in Libya since 1969, in Dirk Vandewalle (ed.), Libya since 1969, 105-126

<sup>33</sup> A.Al.Obeidi (1977-1979), J. Al. Talhi (1979-1982 and 1986-1987), M.Z.Rajab (1984-1985),O.Al-Muntasir (1987-1989) , A. Dawrda (1990-1992), A.Al-Q'wad (1994-1997), Al-Mangoush (1997-2000), M.Al.Shamikh (2002-2002),Shokri Ghanem (2003-2006), El-Baghdadi A. El-Mahmoudi (2006-2010).

in Libya over four decades. Additionally, instability of policy sectors was also marking the policy performance of the executive branch. During the period from 1977 to 2010, the Libyan government witnessed successive changes in the size of the policy sectorial ministries. The government size (1977-2010) ranged between: 26 sectorial policy ministries in 1977, 21 in 1980, 19 in 1983, 20 in 1985, 11 in 1987, 14 in 1989, 22 in 1991, 13 in 1993, 14 in 1995, 20 in 1997, 21 in 1998, 7 in 2000, 9 in (2002), 10 in (2003), 19 in 2006, 19 in 2007, and 12 between 2009 and 2011 (El-Mogherbi 2003). This demonstrates clear features of instability and inconsistency dominating the structure of bureaucracy before and after declaring the governance change.

Our analysis of discourse also considers the key transitions in policy measures of economic governance. Hence, it was important to present the key regulatory reform transitions as the main domain to show the change.

## **1.2 Economic regulatory reform**

Although we are not concerned with the details of the implementation of different reforms, our analysis of discourse has to be cast in the context of decisions that were taken in the period. One aspect is which decisions were taken, another how they were narrated to coordinate action (or coordinative discourse). The two elements go together, but in this section we are concerned with the former. Regulatory change was the main domain strategically selected by the Libyan regime to coordinate the discourse on governance. In terms of decisions, the main references are to the regulations concerning the stock (or past regulations) and the regulations concerning the flow, or new regulation.

### *1.2.1 Past regulations (before 2003)*

This group represents the regulations that aimed to set the scene for the economic change between 1997-2002 including Laws that show new, significant

changes for past activities such as: Law No. 9/2000 regarding organizing the trade of transit and free zones. Additionally, Law No.13/2000 on planning, and the Law No.21/2001 were issued regarding the practice of new economic activities in Libya, and its bylaws. To encourage investment, Law No.5/1997 concerning encouragement of foreign capital investment was also issued, coupled with some controlling measures in the economy, such as the administrative contract regulations/2000. Finally, decision No.21/2002 regarding encouragement of foreign capital investment was launched as a preliminary reflection of the new discourse.

### *1.2.2 Economic regulations 2003-2010*

This includes the new regulatory architecture of the Libyan economy. These are regulations issued for the purpose of diversifying the closed Libyan economy and opening new economic sectors other than oil production, particularly those regulations that originated from the leader's guidance. The GCP and the GPC were active in the period to issue new rules to specify key measures to support new activities, particularly the specification of civil sectors for foreign companies and investors (Libyan Official Gazette 2003-2010). Additionally, other regulations aimed to send signals to the external audience on the process of expanding the liberalizing reach of existing laws, such as in the case of the amendment of Law No.21 of 2001 regarding the practice of economic activities in Libya.

Another set of regulations concerned the transformation towards privatization and opening the economy included Law No.1 of 2005 for banking, representing aspects of new policy measures for both privatization and investment (Libyan Official Gazette 2005). Another type of regulations suggested by Ghanem's government included Law No.2 of 2005, on combating 'money laundering' to provide new elements of 'transparency' and the 'control of corruption' as Libya started to show a very low ranking on both the World Bank and Transparency International measures of governance assessment (Libyan Official Gazette

2005). In fact, limited aspects of transparency element were also found coupled with Law No.3 of 2005 on the public sector firms to regulate and specify the activities of public sector firms in terms of the regime goals (Libyan Official Gazette 2005). This law aimed mainly at emphasizing the presence of these bodies in the economy under the regime's control and direction (Libyan Official Gazette 2006), and also the General People's Committee (GPC) decision No.118 of 2007 issuing on the ownership of public firms (Libyan Official Gazette 2007), which also presents the regime 'selectivity' in classifying economic activities that are controlled by the government.

We noticed that the regime had not settled a clear position towards elements directed to foreign investors and potential trade partners such as: the primary Law No.7 of 2003 to encourage foreign capital investments<sup>34</sup>. Additionally, the element of economic transparency, as the GPC resolution No.20 of 2007 on Transparency had come very late and through inconsistent manner. In addition, the government decision No.3 of 2007 on establishing the National Economic Board was only devoted for implementing Saif's informal strategy of new governance (Libyan Official Gazette 2007). We did not witness adopting genuine, radical, and stable reform regarding elements of economic policy change such as regulations of: the individual economic freedom, and economic liberties. Another regulations required for an open and dynamic economic reform have been issued in a later time of the governance reform declaration such as Law No.23 of 2010 on commercial activities. In terms of rights of workers, Law No.12 of 2010 on Labor Relations in Libya has introduced new details regarding organizing labor relations in both public and private sectors. We noticed that the language of 'socialist economy' was presented in this Law even it was issued at the stage of partnership with Italy (Libyan Official Gazette 2010)<sup>35</sup>.

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<sup>34</sup> Amending Law No.5/1997 concerning encouragement of foreign capitals investment.

<sup>35</sup> Article.2 stated that "Labor relations must be liberated from the bondage of fare", as a signal to maintain the regimes core beliefs against capitalism and market economy.

Additionally, the GPC decision No.134 of 2006 on establishing the Libyan stock market and its statute was another step toward organizing the new modern economy and prepare it for potential trade partners (Libyan Official Gazette 2006). However, the regime was very selective following a 'slow pace' in establishing this body. This was clearly seen through the late issuance of Law No.11 of 2010 regarding the Libyan Stock Market (Libyan Official Gazette 2010). Furthermore, the continuous presence of economic regulatory reform was very strong in the coordinative action during the end stage of our research period. It was manifested in Law No. 23 of 2010 concerning commercial activities in Libya (which also included the re-adjustment of past regulations), Law No.10 for 2010 regarding customs (Libyan Official Gazette 2010), and the above-mentioned Law No.12 of 2010 on Labor Relations in Libya.

The investment-drive in the regulatory framework put forward by Gaddafi, Ghanem, and Saif was also featured via what the regime called 'continuous regulatory preparation'. Such manifestations included: the decision of the secretariat of the GPC No.443 of 2006 specifying certain provisions for the performance of foreign companies and their activities in Libya. Moreover, some 'innovative regulatory attempts' were noted in later stages through the declaration of Law No.9 of 2010 on investment promotion in Libya (Libyan Official Gazette 2010), issued by the Libyan parliament (GCP) to set a new economic change in the later stage of the regime's time. Some executive decisions also aimed to present further aspects of economic governance via signals of transparency and improving the public sector efficiency. These regulations included: decision No.108 of 2006 for property rights, and decision No.563 of 2007 for administrative contracts issued by the (GPC), to reflect the nature of administrative control on the new economic governance (Libyan Official Gazette 2006 & 2007).

Finally, the economic regulatory reform trend was clearly marked by several transitions, turning points, and a continuous pattern of inconsistent amendments. All this will inevitably feature when we analyze the NPF narratives. The previous review clearly shows the ‘selective’ regulatory measures for economic change.

### **1.3 The emergence of trade partners**

#### **The Treaty with Italy: a new ‘friend’ and the implications for coordination**

Although this part is mainly linked to communicative discourse, we recall now (as an important element of the context) that Italy represented and still represents the main international partner in the audience. Strategically, it was important to sell the Italians the notion of a turn towards ‘good governance’. Yet again, we see that coordinate discourse took place in the shadow of major international steps. The Treaty with Italy was used for communicative purposes, but internally the notion of Libya as friend of a member state of the European Union like Italy was used to cement support among elites. The coordinative discourse was that the regime was making new friends abroad: consequently, for the internal elites, the imperative was to be ready to make the Libyan economic and regulatory framework suitable for the new friend. This was no ordinary international treaty, it was a *friendship* treaty, and the ‘narrators’ made the most of it both in terms of coordination and communication. The new treaty on friendship and cooperation between Italy and Libya was signed on 30<sup>th</sup> August 2008 (see Kashiem 2010,2012). Saif’s initiative also presented key guidelines for the elites about how to approach this important step.

To conclude, our review of the Libyan context presented the main turning points of the Libyan attempts to adopt a new discursive turn towards governance within specific institutional fora and with some clear choices about the audience ‘out there’, notably the IMF and Italy. We will find narratives references to these episodes in our NPF analysis. To conclude, we portray the timeline of events below.

### **Box. 1 Chronology**

- **January 2003**-Saif presents his initiative of 'Libya and the 21<sup>st</sup> Century'.
- **June 2003**-Muammar Gaddafi's speech calling for economic reform.
- **June 2003**- Appointment of Shokri Ghanem as the new reformer of the Libyan Economy
- **May 2004** – Ghanem opens the dialogue of the economic reform (privatization)
- **January 2005**-Statement by Ghanem-presenting the new economic program for reform.
- **August 2005**- Statement by Saif-'The economic reform should start from tomorrow'.
- **January 2006**- NPC council presents the NES initiative as an informal proposal of economic reform.
- **March 2006**- The Libyan parliament, GCP, discharges Ghanem.
- **January 2007**- Appointment of new head of NPC council- Mahmud Jibril.
- **June 2007**- Jibril presents his project of new governance: Libya2025.
- **November 2007**-The Libyan government (GPC) presents its development program 2008-2012
- **August 2008**-Saif: 'I have no further political role in Libya and I announce my withdrawal from the political life'.
- **August 2008**- Treaty of partnership and friendship with Italy.
- **November 2008**- Adopting the government program of development (2008-2012), and to leave the project of Libya 2025 for further discussions.
- **May 2009**- The Libyan Parliament GCP discharges Jibril.
- **2010** – Further economic regulatory changes linked mainly to stabilizing the Libyan economy followed by the Libyan revolution in February 2011



## 2. Corpus

This section reports on the empirical investigation carried out using the NPF. Among other things, we will use the quotations and the graphical display of NPF themes-using diagnostic tools provided by N-VIVO. The discourse-text was transcribed, translated, classified, summarized, and analyzed into the NPF categories.

The main justification for using the DI framework is to understand the interactive dimension of discourse. As explained in previous chapters, discourse can be empirically traced in narratives-coordinative and discursive. We have transferred the NPF coding suggestions to the Libyan context. It was also important to look at the Libyan regime's early attempts to present narratives of new governance features in the aftermath of the lifting of sanctions on Libya after the Lockerbie crisis, as the regime aimed to show patterns of engagement with the international society and show some changes in its behavior (Hurd 2005: 522).

In sorting and coding the data gathered, we have transcribed and coded the evidence about coordinative discourse at the appropriate nodes. We transcribed text segments of coordinative text and it was translated from Arabic to English. Each coordinative item within the corpus was given a specific number (CRD.1.2.3.....27). The coded documents of the corpus comprised the following documents presented in Table.5.1 below.

**Table 5.1-Corpus of Coordinative narratives texts**

Coordinative Narratives Document No	Title	Type of Institution-Actor(s)	File format	No. of words	Language	Source and date
<b>CRD.1,4,26,27</b>	Call to find alternatives to Oil revenues-April2003 Dismantling public sector-June2003 Speech to the Libyan parliament GCP-January2006 Speech to the Libyan parliamentGCP-January2008	Muammar Gaddafi Speeches	Word	7078	Arabic (Translated)	Recorded video-VLC
<b>CRD.2</b>	Economic Reform Program presented to the GCP 2003-2006 (Hearing Session/January2005)	Former Prime- Minister Shokri Ghanem 2003-2006	Word	1107	Arabic (Translated)	Recorded video-VLC
<b>CRD.3</b>	Dialogue of New Economic Governance in Libya	Policy Ministers (Forum )	Word	1000	Arabic (Translated)	Libya, Ministry of Economy, Economic bulletin,2004
<b>CRD.5</b>	Saif Gaddafi speech to the Libyan Youth Organization	Informal Forum	Word	4001	Arabic (Translated)	August 2005 The Libyan T.V Recoded in 20.8.2005
<b>CRD.6</b>	Libya and the 21 <sup>st</sup> Century'	Informal Initiative	Word	4000	Arabic (Translated)	2003

Coordinative Narratives Document No (page.2)	Title	Type of Institution-Actor(s)	File format	No. of words	Language	Source and date
CRD.7-14	News Items2003-2010	Actors, institutions and ideas	Word	2547	English	Extracting Communicative discourse segments in Libya News Items: <a href="http://www.libya-watanona.com/libya1/oldnews.htm">http://www.libya-watanona.com/libya1/oldnews.htm</a>
CRD.15-22	Reports of the National Planning Council	NPC	PDFs	11196	Arabic (Translated)	NPC, the Libyan National Planning Council, Annual Reports 2003-2010-PDFs
CRD.23	Memoranda of Libyan economic Reform Regulations	Formal	Word	1000	Arabic (Translated)	Memoranda of Regulations reviewed in Chapter.5
CRD.24	The National Economic Strategy in Libya NES	NPC	Word	1000	English	The National Planning Council
CRD.25	Libya 2025 : Sustainable Development Culture	NPC	Word	850	Arabic (Translated)	Centre for Research and Consultations-University of Benghazi

We have then established the relationships between the NPF themes based on data which emanated from the sources. Firstly, we focused on the language carried in the discourse.

According to Drew (2003:141), “language is employed in the service of doing things in social world”. We then established our empirical analysis of the following features of narrative (Bazeley 2008:80): ‘transitions in discourse’, ‘turning points’, ‘denotation in time’, ‘repetitions’, ‘silence’ ‘omissions’, ‘endings’, and ‘inconsistencies,’ beside other features which we explored through capturing series of discourse segments during the research period. This significantly expands on the classic NPF themes of the plot, doomsday scenarios, heroes and villains and so on. Coding also helped in identifying relationships between NPF themes based on the software tools including: ‘associated’, ‘influence/ affects’, ‘leads to’, ‘prepares’, ‘symmetrical influence’ (Bazeley 2008).

We have then followed the same orderly steps of research design and sorted our coding of the data gathered using the symbol of (CRD) to refer to the collected primary sources of coordinative discourse.

### **3. Findings**

#### **3.1 The discursive definition of the policy problems**

We have developed our coding based on our key questions: “What was the key problem that the regime sought to tackle and remedy”? We found that the problem domain chosen was ‘the economic governance’ to describe the reasons for reform by the key actors. As we shall see in a moment, these coordinative discourses had very visible implications in terms of how the elites were addressed, in one case the text goes as far as to call all this ‘patriotism’. This chimes with what Schmidt argues about discourse: it is language, but in

the coordinative form it is also a structure for the interaction among elites. In our case this interaction is hierarchical.

Among (59) references of coordinative narratives, we found (20) forming a percentage of (30 %) devoted to discursively define policy change problems from main actors to their elites.

Saif introduced policy problems in Libya through his rhetorical question: *“How did the regime control economic activities in Libya?”* (CRD.6). He also aimed to deploy the problem by stating: *“Any comprehensive strategy must provide a clear dimension for the new economic governance features of reform based on the international standards”* (CRD.6). In addition, the public sector is presented by his father as the problem in the following quotation:

*“I think that the public sector dominance of the economy must be ended now. The public sector needs idealist officials and people with a high level of patriotism to help it to succeed. We do not have people at this level”* (CRD.4).

In terms of goals, we found a dominant pattern of ‘inconsistency’ which refers mainly to the changeableness of attitudes in the narrative (Bazeley 2008). According to Saif, the new reform should abide by the international standards, while his father wanted the reform to be established on a *“Specific national vision of dismantling the public sector and in light of our philosophy of “popular capitalism”* (CRD.1). We have also noticed a detailed perspective in presenting a ‘type of solution’ suggested by Saif when he included the ‘regulatory reforms’ combined with cooperation with Italy and the European Union. Whilst his father was not clear, there is still an evocation of a future scenario in terms of vision: *“I urge the Libyan parliament, GCP, to call for the preparation of a new vision of the Economy”* (CRD.4).

In exploring further components, we found a contradiction between the ‘terms of reference’ and the ‘structure of beliefs’. Saif’s discourse was more linked to new modern thoughts marking more details of reform rather than the ‘silence’ of ‘norms and values’ in his father’s language. The NPC council engaged in ‘repetition’ in adopting Gaddafi’s definition of policy problem. Its reports mentioned the expression *“guidance of the brother leader”* twenty-second

times in its reports. Additionally, these reports were clearly 'silent' in mentioning the role of Saif Gaddafi in the coordination between NPC and the GCP.

To sum up then, policy problems is represented as follows:

- Our coding has identified the presence of problems as forming 30 % of the discourses. They have mainly come from the discourse of the Gaddafi family (75% father, 70 % son) then Shokri Ghanem, 48%, and the NPC council, 10 %<sup>36</sup>.
- The terms used to present the problem were deployed significantly by the family with notable discursive differences. Gaddafi used the term *"Failure of public sector-popular capitalism"* (CRD.4), while Saif used *"Failure of socialism"*(CRD.6). We found the NPC council using 'economic problem', abiding by the guidance of Gaddafi (CRD.15).
- A pattern of association in coding was found in our corpus, meaning that "the economic problem prepares the causal plot".

### **3.2 Dressing the argument for an audience**

Why would the Libyan personalist regime care about some dimensions of good governance rather than others? What is the argument that supports the claim about policy change in Libya? To answer these two questions, we need both elements of coordinative and communicative discourse, broken down into narratives. However, even in the context of coordination, that is the topic of this chapter, the corpus we coded speaks volumes about the need to dress the argument about a governance turn in relation to a given audience. The discussions within the elite ruling the country- coordinative discourse - did

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<sup>36</sup> This means that: Gaddafi's discourse was present in 75% of the coordinative sources. Saif was present in 70 %, Ghanem in 48 %, NPC in 10 %.

take place with an external audience that was ever present in the discursive references made by Gaddafi, the other leaders and the NPC. In a sense, even at the stage of coordinative discourse, much of what was said ‘internally’ was said with a very visible (in the corpus, of course) reader over the shoulders of regime's narrators.

At the outset, some features of new governance are signals of an approach geared to entering the international society – mostly defined in terms of trade, not values and liberties. The implications for coordination within the regime were very clear: we want Coca-Cola, NOT the American constitution. This can be seen in the statements we coded. According to Saif Gaddafi:

*“I would like to send this message to the American people and government that we, the Libyan people, want to have a more constructive and fruitful relationship with the Americans and the international society. We want to invest in the New York Stock Exchange. We want economic cooperation. To have Pepsi Cola, Coca-Cola. We don't want confrontation and aggression”*

(CRD.7).

Shokri Ghanem, as a former minister of economy, in 2003 confirmed the adopted domain of economy as the best way to connect with the Western powers: *“Libya seeks to improve ties with the United States based on improving links of business and economic policies”* (CRD.7). These signals of discourse were underpinned by further coding of the governance speeches.

Our coding also noticed ‘the reactive side’<sup>37</sup> of the international audience in both the stage of coordination and communication based on a statement by the U.S. Congressman, Chris Chocola, when heading to Libya: *“I have the opportunity to meet with Gaddafi, which is an extraordinary opportunity given the fact that he's decided to get out of the terrorist business, we should cooperate and we should try to make sure that we have more stability”* (CRD.8).

The ‘ending signal’ to entrench this argument in discourse was defined by the main ‘initiator,’ Muammar Gaddafi. Gaddafi appointed the minister of the

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<sup>37</sup> Discourse and counter discourse between the Libyan regime and its external audiences.

economy, Shokri Ghanem, as a new prime minister to present another initiator of the change and a new face of economic reform: *“From tomorrow, Shokri will start the process of reforming the Economy, this man has a golden weight in the international community and will initiate our new economic reform to tackle all the past failure”* (CRD.4).

### **3.3 The narrative structure**

The structure of narrative represents the narrators and initiators of change in light of a given institutional setting to identify the venues of preparing the plot.

#### *Narrators and initiators*

Who is the narrator? Who tells the story in the text? Saif Gaddafi was the first main ‘narrator’ of economic reform (2003), presenting a detailed vision through the response to his basic question: *“How did the Libyan regime control the economic activities?”*(CRD.6). There was a turning point of discourse (2005) when Saif presented himself as a ‘key initiator’, albeit no formal position was appointed for him – hence he was a self-appointed initiator:

*“There will be no delay in our economic governance reform as it will start with a new vision from tomorrow. The leader has given me the permission to lead the reform”* (CRD.5). In NPC reports, a notable silence was witnessed in presenting Saif's role in economic governance, as the reports continued to discuss the visions of economic development linked to him in the years 2006-2007-2008 without officially adopting them. In CRD.4, we see the emergence of orders for the Congress - discourse here goes further than ‘structuring the interaction among the elites’ and approaches the discursive format of a military order: *“I call on the Libyan congress immediately to dismantle the public sector”* (CRD.4).



Although Gaddafi asserted the need for new governance, coding consequent speeches of Gaddafi (CRD.26 & CRD.27) shows a clear language of 'avoidance' which refers mainly to the aversion and the omission (Bazeley 2008) of the international norms contained in the initiative presented by his son. We found one signal from Gaddafi pointing to the informal role of Saif:

*"GCP, NPC and social leaders in Libya should find a clear role for Saif"* (2008-CRD.27). In addition, the text also found former prime-minister, Ghanem, to be one of the main formal initiators supported by Gaddafi's family to present another level of reform. According to a statement by Ghanem:

*"The mission was clear, as I have been commissioned by our leader with a task of a clear and specific goal aiming to end the domination of the public sector of economic activity and to open the Libyan economy to new economic elements"* (CRD.2).

As noted in the literature review, coordinative discourse must be defined and situated within its institutional settings that affect the narratives deployed. According to our expectations, we have to examine the NPC body as the main institutional venue of coordination although this does not mean that the NPC was a creative, original narrator. The coding presents NPC as a forum, in the sense that coordinative discourse was produced elsewhere and formally legitimised within the NPC. We found that the NPC's role was to give resonance and formal endorsement to plans devised by the self-appointed narrator, Saif, and Gaddafi himself. The role of NPC was a central forum which provides stability and legitimacy to narratives created elsewhere. This is shown by the almost obsessive use of the 'repetition' discursive technique within its reports.

The NPC adopted Gaddafi's guidance to consider *"regulations that extend development spending in housing projects, and lending to ease business"* as the main official domain rather than engaging in the projects for other international standards that do not fit with the nature of the regime (CRD.18-20). The evidence clearly shows a limited and restricted 'official specification' for the concept of good governance. The analysis of NPF components within the communicative discourse will further extend the analysis.

To further identify the narrative structure, the 'institutional settings' is one of the NPF framework themes investigating the representation of coordinative discourse in both formal and informal venues. We start by Gaddafi's preparatory discourse (April 2003) for the plot referring mainly to the economic change in parallel with the son's initiatives presented earlier. However, we noticed that his father's discourse was devoid of the ideological concessions in the detailed vision of his son. But rather the plot, in coordinative terms, has the objective of disorienting the elites in order to then group them under the call of the new vision put forward by the leader.

This appears in the speech by Gaddafi at a forum concerned with finding alternatives to oil revenues in April 2003 - note the link between the plot and who should work out the detail, the narrator has the vision, the audience has the task of working out what that implies for the 'new economy':

*"55% of the economic activities in Libya are not useful. I call you now to discuss the new visions to reconsider the situation of economy. I warn the Libyans against dependence on oil. Therefore, I call on those who are responsible for the economy to find economic alternatives for oil revenues through measures that follow a specific vision of a productive economy"* (CRD.1). In the later formal declaration of economic change (June 2003) Gaddafi adds:

*"I urge the General People's Congress to put emphasis on the establishment of new trends of economic governance based on the 'Socialist People's capitalism' or even 'popular capitalism' so to speak"* (CRD.4).

In further exploring the institutional settings, we noticed that the family's formal visions were used as the main guidelines of the NPC reports. In this venue of coordination, Gaddafi was considered as the 'formal initiator' who orders the change:

*"The NPC Board devoted its closing session of the second regular meeting entirely to reviewing the guidance of the leader"* (CRD.15). Even the last informal initiative of sustainable development required the leader's approval:

*“The vision must be submitted to the historic Libyan leadership to gain the final approval” (CRD.20).*

We have also found ‘repetition’ in the NPC discourse using *“Gaddafi’s formal guidance”* to stress his orders as an initiator. We found the frequency of this expression by its use eighteen times (CRD.15-22). We also noticed that the NPC reports show little institutional links with the informal structure of narrative (Saif). In fact, the NPC discourse was ‘silent’ regarding any formal role of Saif in preparing the change. Its language witnessed several ‘turning points’ are concerning the role of expertise, academics and international norms in presenting the reform. The text search found that the word ‘preparation’, as linked to the new development vision, was repeated ‘eight times’ in the final recommendations of the NPC reports. We found this language of ‘denotation in time’<sup>38</sup> often used by the NPC reports in dealing with the preparation of change. We see that the ruling family had manipulated narratives limiting the policy preparation to a small number of people (e.g. Ghanem, Jibril, and other formal and informal actors). The coded corpus views the NPC as the central forum of coordination that shares ideas of governance and creates momentum among the elites. The NPC, discursively at least, sees itself as the engine or the hub that transforms the new vision into concrete steps, although in reality, it was responding to the leader’s narratives as if they were military orders. According to the official NPC report (2003):

*“1. All ministries, departments and government agencies in Libya were commissioned by the National Planning Council to provide information on economic policies, 2. The General People’s Committee-GPC (government) is charged to provide a clear policy program to reflect the government’s new economic vision on managing economic policies and planning” (CRD.15).*

In addition, the text defines the nature of coordinative discourse as ‘thin’ and restricted, as the NPC report (2003) stated that it *“devoted its closing session of the second regular meeting solely to a review of the guidance of the brother leader Gaddafi, where it was agreed to take the following actions: 1) All*

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<sup>38</sup> According to Lieblich et al., (1998) and Bazeley (2007), denotation in time refers mainly to indicating identification of events described or/and attempts to bring an event closer in narratives.

*council basics, which consist of all sectorial ministries and state bodies that discuss the implementation of economic governance are assigned to follow leader Gaddafi's guidance, and 2) translate the points agreed into actions, programs and policies. 3) This should be also communicated to the Secretariat of the Council” (CRD.15).*

The corpus we examined shows that coordinative discourse was ‘thin’ and a narrow range of actors were responsible for economic policy in formal, quasi-formal, and informal institutions. Essentially, the leader of the regime ordered the parliament to establish the NPC to manage coordination among policy elite groups within the parliament (GCP) and government (GPC). There was a limited number of venues to coordinate discourse and all were hierarchically ordered. Our coding of the NPF themes shows that the attempts to reform the economy started among the Gaddafi family members when the son presented his initiative (2003) to pave the way for the new governance. Saif was an ‘informal actor’ -a kind of self-appointed narrator - in the Libyan narratives. In his speech (2005) to the Libyan Youth two years after launching the previous initiatives, Saif designated his role by stating:

*“Many people are wondering about my role? Is he the crown prince and an heir of his father? Is he the uncrowned king? I would like to clarify that I do not have any formal position, I just give advice from my position as close to the leader and as a Libyan citizen who have the basic right to do this”*

(CRD.5).

Although the discourse of Saif included a plan of action containing elements of: *“Breaking monopoly, privatization, tourist, trade partners particularly Europe and Italy”* (CRD.6), it did not result in adopting this policy proposal wholesale at the NPC. However, the Council adopted the technical part of regulatory reforms as a compromise between core beliefs and new thoughts.

Although Gaddafi supported his son as informal narrator, and Ghanem as another formal initiator of the change, the coordination of reform - as reflected in our discourses - was selective, and limited to some aspects of good regulations that did not seem to challenge the control of power - and was dressed up for the ‘reader over their shoulders’(the international audience). As

soon as some regulatory reforms challenged control, there was a swift response as Ghanem was replaced by the new Prime Minister, El Baghdadi El-Mahmoudi, in March 2006. Gaddafi then stated that governance should concentrate on enhancing spending and lending rather than adopting foreign norms that do not fit with his philosophy:

*“We must strengthen the role of development expenditure, particularly in housing, expansion of granting of loans for youth, foreign investment for reforming the Libyan banks rather than simulating the standards of the west, and if Shokri demands resignation, the Libyan General Congress should discuss this and give him this permission” (CRD.10).*

According to the aforementioned review, the narrative structure presents the following main features:

- Coordinative narratives were restricted by Gaddafi's guidance as the main initiator of reform. The coding shows that the NPC council formally followed his orders without any formal links with the son (CRD.15-22)
- The texts define the formal and informal narrators and initiators of policy change. Saif as the informal narrator- then a self-appointed initiator(2005), Muammar Gaddafi-‘formal initiator’, Shokri Ghanem-‘formal initiator’, the NPC council as ‘quasi-formal narrator’ with features of a ‘non-binding institution’ (CRD 15-22)
- Governance coordinative discourse revealed the ‘thin’ nature of deliberating economic governance through limited actors.
- The structure of coordinative narratives is a ‘lead to’ pattern which means that the new good governance features are defined in light of the ruling family’s intentions. Exploring the plot will further determine the links between narrative structure and other NPF themes.

### 3.4 Causal plot<sup>39</sup>

What are cause and effect relations? How does time play a role in the causal relations? What are the relationships between the NPF themes? In order to understand the plot, texts in our corpus were coded further to identify 'patterns of relationship' between the nodes of the NPF framework. Hence, the coding revealed policy problems as defined by the informal and formal narrators and initiators and how they 'prepare' the new governance.

The plots start with the reader over the narrator's shoulder: the international investors, important trade partners and the new 'friends'. They need a suitable environment. To achieve this, the elites have to work hard together to change regulations. This is a colossal task. It will not be achieved - the plot carries on - if the elites do not change their core beliefs about how they govern the economy. Gaddafi's discourse in 2003 was already eloquent on these steps in the plot: *"We need to review all laws and regulations that organize the Libyan economy to create a new effective environment for investment and achieve the new goals"* (CRD.1). In another segment he added:

*"We must change our pattern of governance. We need people to invest in all economic sectors including oil. However, this does not mean Western capitalism; instead, we urge the Libyan parliament to call for a new idea of 'collective ownership' for the public economic sector, even the oil sector, so we can prevent any exploitation by capitalism. I suggest opening the trade, investment, lending to the youth and the re-distribution of wealth. You should also consider changing the regulations to transfer the public ownership from this sector to a new pattern of collective ownership based on our pioneering idea of pluralistic capitalism"* (CRD.4).

We see the language of coordinating economic governance in the father's discourse as 'selective' to regulatory reform as a domain linked to the regime's 'beliefs' rather than calling for a radical change in the economic values and standards as presented by his son. According to Saif:

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<sup>39</sup>The cause –effect relations of the discursive manipulation of new economic governance.

*“The economic governance should be established based on the following emergent pillars: 1.Easing international isolation 2. Reforming the legacy of economic regulations.3. Past economic failure 4.Providing international standards of privatization, modernizing trade policy, and monetary policy”*  
(CRD.6).

Our total investigation of the plots reveals two types of narrative deployed within a restricted elite, the first was narrative of urgent shift to the new economy that is based on regulatory reform of privatization, investments, transfer of public ownership (2003-2006). Whilst the second type is devoted to a broad discourse of economic development based on the increase of development spending in parallel with the call for a new vision(s) of sustainable development and pluralistic capitalism in the Libyan economy (2006-2010).

Both new types of cause-effect narrative have led to the ‘selectivity’ of governance, which has been clearly followed by the discourse of the NPC council. In examining its reports, we noticed a clear variation in the language employed to address the domain of regulatory reform. In the first instance, it seems that NPC reports offered support for Saif in presenting details of regulatory reform as an approach for the new governance: *“New economic regulatory governance based on modern privatization, investment, a new regulatory system. Any new arrangement for the economy must re-construct the economy based on the international norms”* (CRD.15). However, there was no mention of a clear formal role for Saif even when he discursively declared himself as the initiator of reform in 2005. The NPC report (2005) just signalled initiatives provided by his sources: *“The NPC considers studying the economic project that aims mainly at the preparation of the long-term strategy of economic reform and social development in Libya under the title: “The National Economic Strategy NES”*<sup>40</sup>(CRD.17).

Crucial in the plot is the thinking about good governance. This is yet again ‘new thinking’ geared to please the reader over the shoulders of the regime,

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<sup>40</sup> As we will further present in the next chapter, this initiative was also employed at the communicative level to convince the external audience of the regime’s new embracement of international good economic governance norms and values.

that is, the external audiences and to motivate the internal audience. The elites ought to embrace new thinking to produce change, but this thinking is the 'modern' thinking of international organizations. Indeed, we find that according to the NES report: *"In conducting this assessment, the project team adapted the latest thinking on competitiveness and the global economy"*(CRD.24) Also, the same report stated, the NES suggested arrangements containing: *"The steps of perfect democracy, enhancing the quality of life through public policies, reforming workforce policy, creating the economic diversification, clear governance structure, competitiveness, and improving the Libyan institutional and regulatory capacity"*. This discourse also stressed *"enhancing the energy and oil sector in national and foreign investment"* (Porter and Yargin 2006). The pattern of 'incongruence' in the NPC reports between informal initiatives and formal speech is evidenced by the neglect of immediate implementation of the NES strategy. According to NPC report (2007), the Council demanded further visions for economic governance through: *"emphasizing the importance of further comprehensive strategy for development"* (CRD.19).

Another 'turning point' in discourse was also witnessed during the presentation of the vision of 'Libya 2025: sustainable development' (2007) by Mahmoud Jibril. Although this vision also contained modern norms of governance in a comprehensive manner of development, it was officially neglected in the NPC's last formal reports in 2008 in favor of presenting the development program 2008-2012, which was identical to the regulatory solutions linked to Gaddafi's 'terms of references' and core ideology.

We see that plot that prepares the governance is directly built on the 'structure of beliefs'. In light of the views of both narrators and initiators, Saif presented the need for a radical change that abides by the international norms. He stated: *"I refer to a set of questions that can help in the discussion of the dimensions of the economic problem in Libya, and how to overcome them and apply open and modern international economic standards. How and why was the economy governed by the public sector? How did this happen? What were the problems that accompanied this control?"*(CRD.6). In another speech addressing the Libyan National Youth (2005), Saif said:



*“We should re-construct the past legacy of economic affairs which failed to meet the people's needs. The country has no constitutional arrangements, no free press. I think the best program to reform the country is the project of ‘Libya Al-Ghad’ which will develop the economy besides opening the political freedom” (CRD.5).*

Although such discourse challenged the dictatorship's core structure of beliefs, the new trend witnessed support from the father for the new ideas such as dismantling the public sector and openness to privatization and investment. These new ideas of the plot were coupled with using the ‘blame-shifting’ technique described in previous chapters, to entrench the new orientation without genuine concessions from the leader. According to Muammar Gaddafi:

*“It is the time now to try a new trend for governing our country. We have experienced all powers and our loyal actors’ roles in the past: My comrades in the revolutionary command council, the revolutionary committees, and the technocrats, they all had let me down. They all failed, as it did in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe” (CRD.4).*

Gaddafi had also tried to use the ‘revolutionary arrangements’ he created to show no political responsibility for the change<sup>41</sup>: *“As the leader of the revolution, I formally relinquished power in 1977. You, the Libyan people and the GCP are responsible for this change. From tomorrow we will start a new trend of governance” (CRD.4).*

Despite the explicit declaration of the radical ideas of change, the structure of ‘core beliefs’ signaled the regime's tendency to avoid any concession of ideology in practice. The use of the new term ‘shift to new popular capitalism’ was a reflection of this intention. However, we found that the NPC council discourse of coordination did not challenge the position of Gaddafi in guiding the change. The council's reports presented less challenge to his beliefs through calling on all entities to abide by the ‘leader’s order’ (CRD.14-22).

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<sup>41</sup>These arrangements include : Declaration on the Authority of the People’ in 1977, and the ‘ Declaration on the Separation of Rule and Revolution’ in 1979. Mentioned in further detail in chapter 3.

Our original coding also identified 'the role of time<sup>42</sup>/ doomsday scenarios' through specific coding framework questions: To what extent are 'doomsday-scenarios' deployed to justify economic governance? To what degree is it stated that there will be negative consequences if 'we do not reform now'?

We see that this theme was linked to the plot. The 'thin' coordination at the early formal discourse shows that this theme has some significance. According to Gaddafi:

*"If the public sector does not change, it would damage the economy of Libya and lead to the waste of public money and the country's oil resources and Corruption hence will be further produced"*(CRD.4). Shokri Ghanem also mentioned the *"International legal consequences' affecting Libya's economy to refer to the delay in adopting genuine governance"* (CRD.2).

When comparing this language of the early coordinative discourse in the plot with the later sources, we noticed that Gaddafi signaled 'the importance of time' in projecting the reform to present some changes in the regime governance style in the period of 2003-2006. The discourse of Saif (2003) presented the 'urgency' of adopting the international norms and the failure of past governance. Further, he declared the urgency with an increased momentum during his presentation of the new strategy (2005) tackling the new role of the youth movement in Libya<sup>43</sup> : *"If we do not change drastically, there will be real problems in our economy, we will live in isolation, will not cooperate with the world. We must be realistic and must begin immediately in the public administration reform, economic regulations, and property rights. The shape of our economy must be clear in a stable constitution"* (CRD.5).

It is worth mentioning that the communicative discourse analysis of these two turning points is needed to determine the dynamics behind the presentation of reform urgency in both 2003 and 2006. However, the son's informal orientation started to witness 'silent' language during the period from 2006-

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<sup>42</sup>Also referred to as: 'Time Pathos Drama'.

<sup>43</sup> This discourse was mainly linked to the National Economic Strategy (NES) linked to Saif.

2010 as Saif finally declared no further public engagement in the plot<sup>44</sup>. We have also explored NPC council data to gain further insight regarding the role of time. Thus, the texts show that the plot was linked to Gaddafi's guidance rather than the informal sources that urged for detailed economic change.

In 2003, the NPC recommendations stressed the call for “*further preparation of another holistic development plan in Libya*” (CRD.15). Another report pointed that: “*There is a need for a long, medium -term plan, built on a holistic development plan rather than a narrow economic policy reform. This plan must be clear, straightforward, and with accurate data*” (CRD.16). This report also stressed: “*The continuing need for coordination between sectorial policies in order to create a unified perspective of governance*” (CRD.16).

The previous review shows that time has been mainly linked to the early strategies of presenting changes in the governance style (2003-2006), rather than presenting substantive elements of reform. However, we found that the two types of both liberal economy, and holistic development framework for the economy were equal in the discursive reference coding. Among (59) discourse references of the coordinative plot, we found that (30) reference were devoted to the modern economy and most of them were located in the period from 2003-2006. Whilst (29) narratives were directed to establish holistic development policy program during the period from 2006 to 2010. The ‘thin’ nature of coordination was also found in both types through the extensive repetition of ‘regulatory reform’ <sup>45</sup>(20) times between 2003 and 2006<sup>46</sup>. We found the same technique in the second type referring mainly to ‘holistic development policy plan’-within (18) references from 2006 to 2010. This tactic of two distinct narratives was used by the regime aiming mainly at grouping them behind its main strategy of change.

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<sup>44</sup>The discourse evidence addressing this attitude will be addressed later when tackling tactics and strategies of narratives with regards to the role of time in the plot.

<sup>45</sup>Discursive signals of regulatory reform included: privatization, public ownership of firms, investment, labour regulation and so on.

<sup>46</sup>20 times out of 30 between 2003 and 2010.

We found that the delay in adopting consistent strategy was noted through different attitudes ranged from 'alteration' in highlighting the importance of time to minimize its importance (Saif as informal actor) or the languages of 'omission' and 'silence' by his father at later stages of the plot (2006-2010). Thus, we found that the relationship between the plot and the role of time is 'symmetrical' as the initiator, informal narrator, and the quasi-formal forum of coordination- all deployed narratives that employed time role.

We have also found 'identity and metaphors' themes within the plot. The text defines the form of new governance identity. According to the leader's vision, new governance is required but should not be separate from the past ideas and philosophy of socialism. Therefore, the text presents his new idea of 'popular capitalism' which aimed to provide specificity to the Libyan governance. According to Muammar Gaddafi:

*"We will provide added value to the economic thought in this world through our intellectual idea of 'Popular Capitalism'. It is possible that we will also call it the 'New People's Socialist Economy', we will jump towards a system of success based on collective ownership so that we can merge our new philosophy with our past legacy" (CRD.4).*

Identity also implied the refusal of any imposed ready-made arrangements of liberal democracy that carry radical economic adjustments to the grounds of the Libyan regime. However, this presentation of identity took a different method in narratives deployed by the son, which seem to hint at slightly closer links with international norms:

*"Based on the past dominance by the public sector, our economic openness is relatively unstructured as there were monopolies supported by the past economic regulations which extended their leverage on many economic decisions affecting the basis of economic governance. This has caused many adverse results. Understanding the problem will lead to the adoption of new measures that are compatible with international standards" (CRD.6).*

These two different types of narratives affected both 'terms of reference' as well as effects on the orientation of governance coordination. Both perspectives of father and son differed in the deployment. We witnessed the informal sources of discourse (i.e., the son) presenting 'terms of references' of new 'modern norms and values' such as: elements of 'opening and regulating an unstructured economy', presented by Saif to reflect the new informal plan (CRD.6), 'future vision of economy' (CRD.4), 'Libya and the 21<sup>st</sup> century' (CRD.6), 'The Vision for Libya 2019: enhancing competitiveness' (CRD.24), and also 'The vision of Libya 2025: sustainable development' (CRD.20).

On the other side (i.e., the father), there were clear language of 'reservation' towards any radical change in the formal sources, such as: 'change to popular capitalism', used by Gaddafi to reflect the entrenched ideology of socialism even there is an urgent need for change (CRD.4). He also used 'economic collapse' to refer to both the 'doomsday-scenarios' and the 'moral implications' of urgent action to be taken (CRD1&4). The most dominant markers of identity are: we/our as new open and productive economy with suitable environment (9 references). (6) References clearly refer to the Libyan economy as social and welfare.

Additionally, we see policy metaphor used in the major turning points of narrative. They were mainly linked to the manipulation of the role of time in projecting some aspects of good governance. In fact metaphors were limited to some turning points in time to create enthusiasm among the regime elite for the reform plan as well as new faces of reform (8 references). Gaddafi had mainly used this feature at early stage to be linked to the role of time in presenting some change: "*New People's Socialist Economy*", and also "*jump towards a system of success based on collective ownership*" (CRD.4). Additionally, he employed the use of policy metaphor for settling some new arrangements of governance and actors who steer them. This was clear in the discourse of Gaddafi when he described the qualifications of reformers: "*Shokri is the man of reform who has a golden weight*" (CRD.4).

The plot also defined 'policy characters' who were responsible for the new change to explore both the narrative structure and the NPF theme of 'heroes

and villains' to further understand the dynamics of change. As characters of the reform episode were presented in reviewing the Libyan context, our investigation of this theme is mainly concerned with the 'conflictual and consensus pattern' between actors of the plot. Ghanem as a formal initiator was the first to explicitly raise the 'internal conflict' in governance change:

*“Our government power must include the selection of members of my cabinet to work as one team executing the general plans and economic policies. We also demand the selection of senior staff in public positions. Without having these real powers, government will remain just a small administration controlled by key members of the Libyan parliament who confront our efforts to establish a plan of reform” (CRD.2).*

The coding of this session also revealed a confronting discourse from the highest officials in the Libyan parliament (GCP). According to Ahmad Ibrahim, the vice-chairman of the Libyan parliament GCP in 2005 and one of top figures of the revolutionary committees:

*“Our basic reference in any reform is the leader Gaddafi; the reform must reflect the privacy of our philosophy. We reject any standards that are not agreed under the commander of the brother leader” (CRD.2).*

This internal conflict was coupled with the vision of reform as selective and limited to some extent of the regime interest in showing some regulatory changes and benefiting from increased legitimacy in the international system - and new treaties with partners like Italy. We have also found that the regime used the conflictual pattern between 'winners and losers' to manipulate the conflict between the two wings of reform. The vision of 'Libya 2025: sustainable development' was also instrumental in bringing about a certain degree of discursive coordination within the NPC council. This strategy was clearly supported in the discourse of the NPC council. According to the NPC reports 2007-2008:

*“The NPC emphasizes the importance of extending discussion of the comprehensive strategy for economic development for several times” (CRD.19 & 20).*

In conclusion, a family-oriented set of narrators manipulated the narratives of governance to make claims about the behavior of the regime and reach coherence within the formal, quasi formal and informal institutions.

In addition, this theme was apparently seen at the stage of coordination when an informal initiative of development also challenged the 'core beliefs' of the Libyan regime. As such, a clear 'variation' between the parliament and governments on the content of the vision of Sustainable development (Libya 2025) was mentioned in the NPC coordinative report (2007),(CRD.19).The regime protagonists had explicitly declared their refusal of this new initiative in a formal NPC coordinative meeting in 2007.

This was asserted by Yousef Al-Sawani, the head of Saif Gaddafi foundation of development, stating:

*“Saif was supposed to be the patron of economic reform. He did not care about it at last. The project has faced very sharp attacks in the NPC forum last meeting of 2007”* (Al-Sawani 2013). This discourse also shows how the actors manipulated the plot, based on time – we will get back in a moment to the manipulation of time.

Time and reforms are obviously connected – reform is indeed a process that unfolds through time. But the regime used regulatory reform very selectively and with a strong political intent. In fact, the narrators pushed the discursive button that Libya was moving away from state socialism after 2003.The evidence shows no signs of individual liberties having a role in this change. Thus, we see here a language of modernization, but it does not extend to the standards of human rights, rule of law and rights in the markets like equal pay, democratic governance of corporations, and so on. The major effort is to sell the new regulatory framework instead, with new approaches to the registration of companies for example. According to the NPC (2005) report:

*“Based on the leader’s guidance, the NPC council discussed this new regulatory framework in a paper prepared by the general authority for ownership of companies and economic units of the public to suggest the new legislative framework as well as operational procedures for the program to*

*broaden the base of ownership, describing the overall concept of the program.*

*This is based mainly on transferring ownership” (CRD.17).*

In this context, ‘sustainable development’ becomes a very tall order indeed. The informal initiative, ‘Libya 2025: sustainable development,’ points to contradictions and frustration, conceding that: “*Libya has limited its efforts to improve the innovation, although the trend for development witnessed some regulatory changes particularly in transferring the public ownership, the pattern has been ineffective as there was not a good enough regulatory and legislative environment to encourage the change*” (CRD.25). We noticed the language of ‘silence’ and the ‘omission’ of this project of sustainable development in the last NPC official report in 2008. The last word is always to seek refuge in the leader's words, but without addressing any concrete challenge:

*“We emphasize the importance of the development project 2008-2012 as presented by the government and in light of the brother leader's guidance.*

*We need further discussions to determine the venues of development expenditure that mobilize the economy” (CRD.20).*

The manipulation of time is essential, although in different texts the notion of moving towards the modern economy is linked to the past in different ways - depending on whether the narrator was stressing continuity and evolution or radical change. The former minister of public service, Ammar Eltyiaf, stated:

*“We have clear reasons to change our economic regulations as the private sector is not productive. We need to amend our regulations to improve our position in the Arab region and the world” (CRD.3).* Additionally, Ghanem stated the necessity to move forward without delay: “*There will be costs if we delay the new regulatory reform...unemployment will increase. We will have great benefits if we open the economy and operate a labor market based on privatization and investment*” (CRD.3).

As mentioned, the language of time started to be more ‘silent’ from 2006. This was clear in a statement by Saif in 2008, expressing the stability of the economy with no mention of adopting new standards: “*I think we have put the*



*train on the tracks now. We benefit from our economic situation and specificity. Therefore, I announce my withdrawal from the political life now”* (CRD.12).

Our investigation of the plot ends with examining strategies and tactics used to manage ‘conflict/consensus’ pattern between the two wings within the elites and mutating types of ‘Winners and Losers’ within those who coordinated the stage of reform. According to Ghanem’s statement in a hearing session of his government:

*“I would like to point out those obstacles, both formal and informal, and of many characters are confronting our government policies. We were surrounded by both "visible" and "invisible" forms of them. Also, some of them are tying the hands of our government, and do not abide by our decisions”* (CRD.2). In another segment he adds:

*“I demand more governance powers to be given to the prime minister of the GPC, in light of the absence of constitutional rules. Governance power must include the selection of members of my cabinet to work as one team to execute the general plans and policies of the economy”* (CRD.2).

We now recap the findings of the coordinative plot:

- The formal and quasi-formal narratives to determine the new governance were ‘selective’ to the domain of economic regulatory reform that does not challenge the regime powers, while the informal language shows more presentation of the international norms and values. The selectivity of reform was adopted in the discourse of the NPC council as the main forum of coordination.
- The regime had deployed two types of narratives based on the time in the plot, the first was narratives of urgent new economy that is based on regulatory reform of privatization, investments, transfer of public ownership (2003-2006). Whilst the second type directed its coordinative narratives to a broad discourse of development based on the increase of economic development in parallel with the call for a new vision of sustainable development (2006-2010).

- The role of time was mainly linked to the early strategies of presenting some changes in governance style rather than presenting substantive elements of reform. The ‘silent’ language of time at the later stage supports this finding.
- Narratives were used to group the policy elites and create enthusiasm behind the new strategy.
- The NPC coordinative discourse neglected norms provided by the informal sources that may contain challenges to the regime powers.
- We found a clear distinction between formal and informal sources of discourse in presenting both ‘identity’ and ‘terms of references’ to the internal coordination as the regime used both sources to manipulate the new governance.
- ‘Metaphors’ were deployed to serve the regime's intention of presenting some features of good governance at the early stage of coordination.
- The characterization of ‘heroes and villains’ is internally sharp in the plot. It leads us to consider the regime strategy of ‘winners vs. losers’ and based on both internal conflict between new thoughts and core ideology.

#### **4. Appraising our research expectations**

We can now go back to our expectations and see what the evidence says. We will consider the expectations relevant for this chapter in order, one by one.

**E.1** is made up of two propositions: the first is concerned with the nature of coordinative narratives. Narratives reveal a ‘thin’ nature of deliberating governance within a very limited range of actors. According to the evidence, policy coordination was restricted by Gaddafi's guidance as the initiator. The coding shows that the NPC council was formally following his orders without any formal links with the son<sup>47</sup>. The new governance was defined in light of the

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<sup>47</sup>CRD.15-22.

family views<sup>48</sup>. We found that this proposition is supported by empirical evidence.

The second proposition is that discourse moved towards the vision of the leader, especially the son-for economic policy matters. We reject the part of the proposition stating that the son was effectively in charge of the change. In fact, the father led the reform through the coordination of roles and this will be further clarified when tackling the role of actors in communicative narratives.

Therefore, **E.1** is partially corroborated with evidence and its first proposition is accepted, while the second is rejected. To be true, Saif made consolidate efforts to impose his role of 'informal narrator' and his narratives show elements of originality when compared of those of his father. However, his discourse did not become dominant in the NPC, which preferred to follow the father's narratives as if they were military orders.

**E.2** contains the proposition of the NPC role in the plots. The NPC was effectively a non-binding body of policy planning controlled by main actors. This nature was supported by the analysis of its reports<sup>49</sup> as well as the narrative structure<sup>50</sup>. The coding shows that this body was dominated by the father's guidance. Additionally, the manipulation of the plot also shows that the NPC discourses have reflected both 'urgent' discourse of modern economy, and broad holistic development policy plan as both narratives were design to serve the ruling family intentions. The evidence shows that **E.2** is corroborated with empirical evidence.

**E.5** contains propositions of core elements of the plots of the governance adopted by the regime. Hence, we present the following answers:

- Narratives do not address the individual economic freedom, liberties, the human rights of workers and the economic benefits of a free press. The coding does not identify a special node(s) devoted to these issues. Thus, this expectation is fully corroborated by empirical evidence.

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<sup>48</sup>CRD.1.4.15.16.17.18.19.20.

<sup>49</sup>CRD.15-22.

<sup>50</sup>CRD.18-20.

- We found coordinative narratives stressing the regulatory reform of business, investment, public ownership of firms particularly in the first stage of reform (2003-2006) and partially within the period (2006-2010). However, the oil element was not prominent in narratives between actors and the national planning council. Gaddafi and his son called for opening this sector at the beginnings of their narratives<sup>51</sup>, then followed by excluding oil revenues from the plot<sup>52</sup>. But anyhow, the reference is on regulating reform and a new type of collective and pluralistic capitalism not wider economic freedoms. The bottom line remains: “*We want Coca-Cola, not the American constitution*”.
- Proposition stressing skills of people as not genuinely present in the narrative content. But several discourse elements were manipulated to raise enthusiasm and commitment of people. The regime knew it was embarking on ambitious project, a kind of holistic transformation, and consequently the attitudes of people had to change, including attitudes towards consumption. Further, regulatory reform was also employed in light of the discursive ‘turning points’ as we presented in the plot. As a result, **E.5** is corroborated with empirical evidence, with the exception of the role of oil. The regime manipulated policy change in its discourse. There were some non-trivial changes in economic policy components and these changes were clearly in line with the preferences of the regime<sup>53</sup>. In this limited sense they were real, so to speak. But when these changes were portrayed in the narratives they were magnified and manipulated. The implications that the narrators drew from these changes were part of the attempt to create legitimacy, but manipulation was evident to the point of gross, almost ridicule distortions of what was really happening in Libya.

In answering **E.6** our investigation shows that the strategic goals of the coordinative cause-affect plot were built on manipulating two types of narratives based on the role of time. The first was urgent governance abided

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<sup>51</sup>CRD.1.2.6.

<sup>52</sup>CRD.15-22.

<sup>53</sup> See economic regulatory changes in pp.130-134

by the international norms to create enthusiasm among the regime's elite that the reform is under way<sup>54</sup>. Whilst the second stage was devoted to stabilize the economy with selective reforms to establish a new discourse that calls for holistic sustainable development policy. We found less evocation (Silence) on urgency, open and liberalized economy in favor of selective regulatory reform stressing issues of development and spending<sup>55</sup>. According to the two distinct stages, this expectation is corroborated with empirical evidence as the plot was based on both 'urgency' to the 'decline of time importance' discursive tactics.

We also corroborated **E.7**. Indeed, we found blunt characterization of 'heroes and villains'. The discursive manipulation of the 'winners and losers' was instrumental in managing the internal conflict between policy elites in order to create balance between roles and finally group them behind the regime's plot as in ( CRD.4.5.6.19.24) for international norms, (CRD. 14.15.17.18.19.20.21) for the core ideology, and (CRD.1 & 27) for balancing the policy beliefs. Thus, this expectation is corroborated with enough empirical evidence and accepted in our results.

## Conclusions

In this chapter we have carried out our empirical analysis of coordinative discourse, looking at the policy narratives of change, their narrators and their effects on the stabilization of beliefs within the regime. We have appraised our expectations on the basis of empirical evidence (section 4). In this section we briefly conclude going back to the essence of coordinative discourse, that is, the causal relations within the narrative plot and what it means for our understanding of coordinative discourse.

The coordinative narrative themes come together in a plot (see figure 5.1) but not without contradictions and inconsistencies, as mentioned on several

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<sup>54</sup>CRD.1.2.5.6.10.11.14.27.

<sup>55</sup>CRD.15.16.17.18.19.20.21.27.

occasions in the previous sections of this chapter – hence the dashed lines around ‘stabilization of beliefs’ in our figure. Both at the level of beliefs and in terms of substantial conflict within the elite, the position of Saif as informal narrator was not stable. The narratives proposed by Saif were not exactly complementary to the narratives of his father, and when push came to shove the NPC had no doubt on which ‘instructions’ to follow. Over time, we found some discrepancies in narrative themes, even a sense of frustration. Overall, the coordinative narratives failed on a crucial dimension, that is, the stabilization of beliefs within the ruling elites of the time.

As shown in figure 5.1, the plot was developed with a very important reader over the shoulders of the elite. All the discursive interactions within the NPC and the formal and informal narrators were carried out in light of their possible effects on international audiences: the stage of economic reform was prepared for them (see the left part of figure 5.1). The regime felt that Libya was at a turning point in the economy, a sort of ‘now or never moment’. But coordinative discourse was also deployed to maintain legitimacy at home. Actually the narrative of change required a complete change of attitudes from the people, commitment if not enthusiasm for the new economic perspectives. It is difficult however to imagine any ownership of the citizens in this plan, since they were not given individual liberties or human rights (see the central part of figure 5.1). Like the NPC, people were there to receive and implement instructions and orders.


Time was used to represent the necessity of change – recall that in the discourse of the period (2003-2006), we found that the public sector had to be dismantled “immediately” - something that taken logically is nonsense, given that dismantling the whole public sector takes years. And, later on in the period we observed, time reverts to a sense of frustration because some of the most ambitious rhetorical and practical claims about reform, like sustainable development, were slipping away. Time as ‘necessity’ and ‘urgency’ becomes silent over time, it fades out.

The urgency and necessity of change was amplified by the doomsday scenario, which contains references to the time-pathos-drama elements. Our

nodes show different variations within the theme of the doomsday scenario, such as the possible colossal waste of resources (if change does not materialize), the re-production of corruption large-scale and missing the favorable, unique moment for change (see the box on the doomsday scenario in figure 5.1). At the end of this transformation – the narrative plot argues – the country should have come out with prosperity, new attitudes, and something like a new type of capitalism – ‘collective’ or ‘pluralistic’.

In conclusion, this chapter has evidenced a causal plot with some inconsistencies and rather poor substance. The gap between the changes envisaged by the regimes (such as ‘dismantling the public sector immediately’ or creating a new form of capitalism in a few years) and the substance of policy making is very large indeed. Equally large is the gap between what was asked people to do and what was given them in terms of real ownership of the reforms under way. All these inconsistencies were made more acute by the fact that the narratives failed to stabilize roles and beliefs within the ruling elite of the time.

Figure.5.1-Causal Plot of Coordinative Narratives





## CHAPTER SIX- COMMUNICATIVE NARRATIVES OF ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE IN LIBYA 2003-2010

### Introduction

In this chapter we explore how communicative narratives of economic governance were deployed in the period considered in our dissertation. We investigate the Libyan regime's strategic intentions to signal the adoption of some new 'economic governance' features to different types of audiences to show that it was moving towards modernization and good governance. The regime used policy discourse strategically, in two ways: firstly, by adopting only certain components of communicative discourse, mainly the language of modernization, the economic liberalization, cooperation and trade and secondly, by drawing on these components to seek external legitimacy for policy change and to 'sell' it to the external audiences and to seek to build legitimacy internally.

As in the coordinative stage, we use the NPF framework in light of the following expectations introduced earlier on in chapter four:

**E.3** *The communicative discourse is thick especially the discourse targeting external audiences such as the international organizations, the international business community, and important trading partners.*

*The internal communicative discourse on economic governance exists, but its role is to support the legitimacy of the ruling regime together with other, broader themes of political discourse like patriotism and identity.*

**E.5** *Narratives of economic governance do not include elements such as individual economic freedom, liberties, the human rights of workers and the economic benefits of a free press. Instead, the causal plot, metaphors, and other core narrative features revolve around ease of business, the process of the opening up of the economy, and the key economic position of Libya in international trade. The causal plot will not stress the endowment of the*

*country in terms of raw materials such as oil, etc, since this was already experienced prior to 2003 with limited success, but rather the skills of the people and the good regulatory framework that supports business.*

**E.6** *The role of time to project economic success and a modern economy into the near future, showing that the regime is moving towards modern values of economic governance such as sustainability, privatization, investment, and regulatory reform.*

**E.7** *The characterisation of heroes and villains is blunt, with the heroes working for the future economic progress of the country and the villains being either aggressive foreign regimes or those internal actors who resist modernisation of the economy in order to protect their privileges.*

**E.8** *The narratives of economic governance have a strong appeal to the domestic audience in terms of strengthening the identity and values of the regime.*

We also have to situate discourse in its institutional context – as we said in previous chapters, this requires that we bring formal and informal actors' discourses into the context of our investigation.

For this reason the chapter is structured as follows:

1. Libya's international context : major episodes and audience costs
2. Corpus
3. Research findings
4. Appraising our research expectations

## **1. Libya's international context: major episodes and audience costs**

This section introduces key events and milestones of economic reform, and also the main audiences engaged in the process. To understand narratives and the discursive interactive process, we need to situate actions historically looking at key events in the period. By considering these milestones, we will investigate the 'policy problems' the regime faced on its way to break the international isolation, as the leader and his son manipulated these policy issues to present the new arrangements.

### **1.1 Major episodes and events**

#### *1.1.1 Involvement in terrorism*

Libya's association with terrorism revolved around supporting terrorist groups and parties around the world (St. John 2013). St. John also mentions that the milestone marking Gaddafi's tendency to terrorism could be traced back to his rhetoric addressing the legislative branch of his regime in 1985, stating "*Libya has the right to liquidate any opponent of the revolution*" (2013:126). Gaddafi moved further by naming groups involved in violence, such as the Red Brigades in Italy, the Irish Republican Army and supporting Black and Native American movements in the United States (2013:126). The climax was reached with the US assault on Libya in 1986 which was considered by Gaddafi as a personal attack on him and on the philosophy he carried for the Third World (Ronen 2008 : 32-33).

This involvement in terrorism was also followed further when Gaddafi decided to attack French and American interests as a reaction to the American attack on Libya in 15April1986. This action reached its peak in the case of UTA flight 772 which was bombed over southern Niger, resulting in the killing of 156 passengers and 14 crew members. The Libyan regime was further involved in the Lockerbie case; an American transatlantic flight which was

attacked by terrorists in 21 December 1988, resulting in the death of 243 passengers and 16 crew on board and 11 people in the town of Lockerbie in Scotland<sup>56</sup>. According to Simons (1993:3), Lockerbie was considered as a 'noose' that began to tighten around Gaddafi's regime over almost two decades. These problems were fluctuating between the 'whims' of the United States and the 'vagaries' of the Libyan regime policies (1993:3).

### *1.1.2 The war in Iraq/on terror*

The initiation of the 'War on Terror' following the September 11<sup>th</sup> terrorist attacks on the United States was recognized as being an influence towards forcing the Libyan regime to change its policies by attempts to employ norms of good governance. This transformation was clear in some Middle East dictatorships such as Libya, which started to emphatically deny links with terrorism. Hence, Western powers and international organizations sought to take advantage of this turn of events. They increased their focus from merely urging economic structural adjustments towards stressing the importance of governance reforms alongside the growth of economy (Najem 2003).

### *1.1.3 The turn to Africa*

In 1999, Muammar Gaddafi declared his own USA, or the United States of Africa. It was a bid to present him as a respected leader in the continent. Gaddafi also found it a good change to promote himself as the 'wise man of Africa' and an elder statesman, in order to satisfy his desire for world influence (ABC2004). In fact, the turn to Africa reflects a new pattern of discourse and a step towards improving the image of the Libyan regime through extending the economic reform to a broader notion of continental cooperation with Europe. According to Ronen (2008:181), the new trend

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<sup>56</sup> For further details of Pan Am victims and case See the following links:  
Pan Am Victims : <https://www.victimsofpanamflight103.org/>

Gaddafi and Lockerbie Bombing :  
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-south-scotland-12552587>

towards Africa aimed at creating new vehicles for Gaddafi as a revolutionary leader.

## 1.2 Types of Audiences

This section presents types of audiences that the regime faced at the international stage in order to present and sell itself and its new governance.

### *The United States of America*

The U.S. represents the biggest reader over the Libyan narrator's shoulder as the relationships between both states have been crucial, politically as well as economically. The reason behind choosing economic reform as a 'selective approach' to good governance was to prove the change in behavior in the domain where the regime could concede a lot to its audiences or gain mutual benefits. In this regard, Chorin (2011:154)<sup>57</sup>, argued that despite the 'conflictual pattern' marking the Libyan-American relations in the past, there is a common notion that the two societies enjoy a special history of commercial relationships that transcends oil trade arrangements. Ronen (2008:35) mentions: "*Having scored successive achievements in its war against the Gaddafi regime, the United States closed in on Libya with fresh impetus*" (2008:35), and that this was a good opportunity for Libya to move towards normalizing its relationships with the West through economic and trade channels.

### *Sanctions by the international community*

In this category we find the UN, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and also economic organizations such as the World Bank and the IMF.

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<sup>57</sup> Chorin, Ethan (2011), 'The future of the U.S.-Libyan Commercial Relationship', in Dirk Vandewalle (ed.), *Libya since 1969*, 153-171.

The power of the international community is manifested through measures to press Libya into respecting international norms, especially the dismissal of plans to support terrorism and to develop weapons of mass-destruction. Hurd mentions that the Libyan regime made efforts to present commitments to the international community via discourse in order to avoid sanctions, with Gaddafi performing 'out of character' as an unlikely defender of the UN policy on human rights (Hurd 2005:511&512). Indeed in 1999, Gaddafi manipulated discourse to show respect for international norms and values such as sympathy for victims of terrorism and also urged the UN assembly to fight terrorism (2005:512&513). Turning to the economic players in the international community, we have demonstrated how the regime responded to international economic obligations by accepting article VIII of IMF obligations-July 23, 2003 (Press release No. 03/122 July 23, 2003. This acceptance enabled Libya to participate in policies that required the approval of the IMF standards of economic governance.

### *Italy and the European Union*

Italy and the European Union were the main target audiences to create support for the policy change. This was clear through the presentation of policy problems by the key informal narrator, Saif, in his initiative, 'Libya and the 21<sup>st</sup> Century', when he devoted a full chapter to Libya's potential relationship with Europe alongside the future prospects of the Mediterranean partnership and the cooperation with Italy<sup>58</sup>. These audiences were also crucial in resolving the problems that hindered the change such as: the flood of African immigration to Europe (2003-2010), the Bulgarian medics' issue (1998-2007)<sup>59</sup> in parallel with the Lockerbie crisis (1988-2008) and the UTA bombing (1988-2007). The Libyan engagement with the EU started when Gaddafi visited the European Union in Brussels in April 2004, calling for

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<sup>58</sup> See: Gaddafi, Saifallah M. (2002), *Libya and the 21<sup>st</sup> century* (Dar Almaha Publications ), pp: 257-311

<sup>59</sup> In 1999, there was a court case in Libya with five Bulgarian nurses and one Israeli-Palestinian doctor accused of deliberately trying to kill 426 Libyan children by injecting them with HIV contaminated blood. An appeal of the case ended with the re-instatement of the death penalty verdict on December 18, 2006. In July 2007- The Libyan regime freed HIV Bulgarian Medics after pressures came from the European Union and the international community.

economic cooperation between Libya and Europe. Gaddafi had also signaled his initial refusal to support the 'Barcelona process'<sup>60</sup> and its framework that would lead to joining the Union of Mediterranean-UfM<sup>61</sup>. We would expect a 'thick' deployment of discursive narratives to target these issues. Additionally, the giant Italian oil & gas company (Eni) and its contract with Libya (June 2008) in the exploitation of oil<sup>62</sup>, the treaty of friendship and cooperation with Italy in August 2008, coupled with symbolic compensation for colonialism, the creation of a framework of cooperation between Italy and Libya (Ronzitti 2009: 126)<sup>63</sup>, along with the declaration of the EU that it would work with Libya in September 2008 and 2010, were all clearly reflective of a 'selective plot' that the regime planned to present.

### *The domestic public opinion*

As mentioned in chapter 2, studies addressing policy change and audience costs have considered the domestic public opinion as one of the key venues of communicative discourse. One of the research expectations in this chapter is linked to how the regime manipulated 'identity' to strengthen its position. This is why we go back again to public opinion as a domestic audience in this chapter.

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<sup>60</sup>According to the EU website: The Barcelona Process was launched in November 1995 by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the 15 EU members and 12 Mediterranean partners, as the framework to manage both bilateral and regional relations. See :[http://www.eeas.europa.eu/euromed/barcelona\\_en.htm](http://www.eeas.europa.eu/euromed/barcelona_en.htm). The Libyan regime refused to join the initiative due to economic governance arrangements contained.

<sup>61</sup>The Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) is a multilateral partnership of 43 countries from Europe and the Mediterranean Basin comprised of 28 states of the European Union and 15 Mediterranean partner countries from Middle East and North Africa region and Southeast Europe .The Union has the aim of promoting good stable economic governance, and prosperity throughout the Mediterranean region. The Libyan regime's gas industry repeatedly declared its refusal to participate in its arrangements. The Union for the Mediterranean introduced new institutions into the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership such as the Secretariat of the Union for the Mediterranean, established in Barcelona in 2010, with the aim to identify and promote regional cooperation projects that would contribute to achieving its goals and objectives as indicated in its mandate.

<sup>62</sup>Eni S.p.A., is an Italian multinational oil and gas company head quartered in Rome. Eni is an industrial company with a market capitalization of 68 billion Euros (US\$ 90 billion). Eni signed a new agreement with Libya for the exploitation of 'Bouïri' - the biggest oilfield in the centre of the Mediterranean (Libya's first Sub-see Project).

<sup>63</sup> The Framework of cooperation in this treaty included: The normalization of Italian-Libyan relations, emphasizing the "special and privileged" relationship that the two countries intend to develop, without forgetting the roles that they pursue, respectively, in the European Union and the African Union. The economic partnership part contained mainly a programmatic nature; it did not allocate any funds, except for the fight against illegal immigration. Cooperation is envisaged in many sectors: culture, science, economy, industry, energy, defence, non-proliferation and disarmament, the fight against terrorism and illegal immigration (Ronzitti 2009).

### 1.3 Audience costs 2003-2010

The notion of 'audience costs' refers mainly to the penalties a leader incurs from his or her constituency if they escalate a foreign policy crisis and are then seen as backing down (Fearon 2013). In our thesis we will apply the notion to the context of an authoritarian regime which incurs costs from outsiders, unlike the advanced democracies who selected officials expect costs from their people. According to ACT theory<sup>64</sup>, the dictator faces political consequences if he is seen as backing down in a crisis (Slantchev 2012:377). To tackle these costs, the regime seeks to manipulate a discursive plot of the new governance change by using strategies to reduce any potential threats (2012:377).

#### *International isolation*

This type of audience cost is directly linked to the international community as an audience for the Libyan regime policies that started particularly since 1991, when the regime was implicated in both the Pan-Am and UTA airline bombings. France, the United Nations and the United States demanded that Libya submit the two Libyan suspects to Justice. The Libyan regime's refusal of the UN requests resulted in the UN security council measures which placed trade and air embargoes on Libya from 1991 to 1999 (El-Kikhia 1997: 123) and resulted in a broad political and economic isolation in both the Arab region and the international society. The isolation was one of the main problems the regime aimed to remedy through its new discursive strategies and tactics.

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<sup>64</sup>Audience Cost Theory.



### *Internal anger*

Public outrage is also considered as an important factor as it links to the domestic opinion in Libya. In this regard, (Slantchev 2012:377) claims that there is evidence of leaders who manipulated strategies to manage the public outrage, e.g. the discourse of the former German Deputy Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Kiderlen, who mobilized the German internal anger to force the government to end the German –French conflict in the Moroccan Crisis of 1911 and avoid a ‘national defeat’. In a different direction, internal anger also forced the Russian government to refuse any concession in the Russian-Turkish conflict during the Eastern Crisis of 1878 and this isolated the Russian diplomats as a consequence (2012). Absent democratic elections, internal anger can manifest its influence in various forms and force leaders to adopt strategies of either discourse or policy change-or both.

### *Regime change threats*

This type represents the major threat that the dictator might face from the international parties. According to the notion of Audience Cost Capacity (ACC), the international powers shape a dictatorships audience costs (Uzonyi et al. 2012).

Unlike democratic institutions’ capability of mitigating audience cost through democratic means, international conflict between the dictator and the outsiders could make the regime's audience cost capacity internally weak and externally strong. This could lead to the regime collapse. Economic reforms can therefore be a way to limit these threats.

Below, Box2 presents the timeline of events affecting narratives of economic governance which emanated from the aforementioned audience costs and events. Our aim is to identify how the regime selected the discursive causal plot of new good governance in the economic domain.

### Box.2 Chronology

- **August 2003**-The UN Security Council lifted the UN sanctions imposed on Libya for the 1988 Lockerbie bombing
- **December 2003**-Libya announces the abandonment of program to develop weapons of mass destruction.
- **March 2004** –The United States keeps Libya on its list of state sponsors of terrorism and then removes it in May 2004
- **April 2004**-Gaddafi visits the European Union in Brussels and calls for Economic cooperation between Libya and the EU.
- **April 2004**-Gaddafi declares Libya's refusal of the Barcelona process.
- **May 2004**- EU and Italy to Libya: normalizing economic and political relationships is linked to resolving the case of the HIV Bulgarian Medics.
- **October 2004**- EU ends 12 years of economic sanctions against Libya.
- **July 2007**- The Libyan regime frees HIV Bulgarian Medics.
- **October 2007**-Eni, the Italian oil group, secures a 25-year extension to its oil and gas contracts in Libya.
- **December 2007**-The European Union decides to open negotiations with Libya in order to conclude a "framework of economic cooperation agreement"
- **July 2008** – Gaddafi refuses to attend and participate in The Union for the Mediterranean (UfM).
- **August 2008**-Libya and Italy sign the Treaty on Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation in Benghazi.
- **August 2008**- Comprehensive claims settlement agreement between the United States of America and Libya
- **February 2009**- Election of Gaddafi to take over the chairmanship of the African Union in Ethiopia
- **March 2009** – The treaty on Friendship between Libya and Italy comes into force on March 2, 2009. Ratifications, protocol and document exchanged during Prime Minister Berlusconi's visit to Libya

## 2. Corpus

We will use the same diagnostic tools provided by N-VIVO in chapter.5.The discourse-text data was transcribed, translated, classified, summarized, and analyzed into NPF categories. We have then followed the same orderly steps of research design and sorted our coding of the data gathered using the symbol of (CMD) to refer to the collected primary sources of communicative discourse.

**Table 6.1-Corpus of Communicative narratives texts**

Communicative Narratives Document No	Title	Type of audience	File format	No. of words	Language	Source and date
<b>CMD.1</b>	The New Libya-2003	International audiences	Word Transcribed from video file	3339	English	SBS News and Politics videos - series of policy change discourse- News item-October2003: <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H3yARINeA-0">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H3yARINeA-0</a>
<b>CMD.2</b>	Libya-Gaddafi's Gamble	International audiences	Word Transcript	4669	English	ABC videos of Foreign corresponds 22-6-3004 : <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/foreign/content/2004/s1137968.htm">http://www.abc.net.au/foreign/content/2004/s1137968.htm</a>
<b>CMD.3</b>	Interview with Muammar Gaddafi	International society	Word Transcript	1400	English	Newsweek2003 <a href="http://www.libya-watanona.com/news/n2003/n12jan3a.htm">http://www.libya-watanona.com/news/n2003/n12jan3a.htm</a>
<b>CMD.4</b>	Talking To Muammar Gaddafi's Son-National Review Online-2003	U.S/International society	Word Transcript	4089	English	Interviews with Saif Gaddafi 2003: <a href="http://www.libya-watanona.com/news/n2003/n04jan3a.htm">http://www.libya-watanona.com/news/n2003/n04jan3a.htm</a>
<b>CMD.5</b>	'Libya and the 21 <sup>st</sup> century'	International and domestic audience	Word Transcript	4000	Arabic (Translated)	An Initiative launched by Saif Gaddafi in a book'2003
<b>CMD.6</b>	Interview with Shokri Ghanem	International and domestic audience	Word Transcription	1000	Arabic (Translated)	June 2003-Aljazeera: <a href="http://www.aljazeera.net/programs/today-interview">http://www.aljazeera.net/programs/today-interview</a>

Communicative Narratives						
Document No. (page.2)	Title	Type of audience	File format	No. of words	Language	Source and date
CMD.7	Libya, Past Present And Future. LSE Lecture	External & internal	Word Transcript	1500	English	Lecture presented by Saif Gaddafi Source 2010 : <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CkYeKYtzZhA">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CkYeKYtzZhA</a>
CMD.8	Saif Gaddafi lecture on the Libyan reform issues at AUC speech	International and domestic audience	Word Transcript	1059	English	Transcribed Video, May 2003. See also: <a href="http://www.masress.com/en/dailynews/65591">http://www.masress.com/en/dailynews/65591</a>
CMD.9-16	Libya :News & Views	International society/domestic Audiences	Word Transcript	7000	English	Extracting Communicative discourse segments in Libya News Items: <a href="http://www.libya-watanona.com/libya1/oldnews.htm">http://www.libya-watanona.com/libya1/oldnews.htm</a>
CMD.17	Prime Minister El Baghdadi El-Mahmoudi Statement to Pana-press regarding the Libyan Economy (2006)	International society	Word Transcript	500	Arabic (Translated)	Pana-press Archives: <a href="http://www.panapress.com/pana-10-lang3-index.html">http://www.panapress.com/pana-10-lang3-index.html</a>
CMD.18,19,20, 21,22,23	<u>Speeches/Statements of M.Gaddafi:</u> -Gathering of U.S and Libyan Academics, 2006 -Statement on the Union for the Mediterranean-July2008 -Speech to the UN General Assembly -September2009 -Press conference with the Italian president Giorgio Napolitano2009 - Gaddafi's statement in the African-European Summit-2010 -Statement to the Summit of the community of Sahelo-Saharan States-June20	International and domestic audience	Word Transcript	5000	Arabic (Translated)	Muammar Gaddafi speeches Recorded and transcribed

Communicative Narratives						
Document No. (page.3)	Title	Type of audience	File format	No. of words	language	Source and date
CMD.24	Libya and IAEA agreement opening up Libya's nuclear activities to full inspection by the IAEA	International and domestic audience	Word Transcript	1200	English	Regime's policy actors-Matouq Mohamed-Libyan Minister of Science Recorded and transcribed
CMD.25 & 26	Aljazeera TV-Interview with Saif Gaddafi-2007 CNN -Interview with Saif Gaddafi-2009	International and domestic audience	Word Transcript	3000	Arabic (Translated) English	Sources: for CMD.25 : <a href="http://www.aljazeera.net/home/print/0353e88a-286d-4266-82c6-6094179ea26d/a38a5f02-e7a3-448e-98e2-1082b3648275">http://www.aljazeera.net/home/print/0353e88a-286d-4266-82c6-6094179ea26d/a38a5f02-e7a3-448e-98e2-1082b3648275</a> (translated)  for CMD.26 : <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1005/26/ctw.01.html">http://edition.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1005/26/ctw.01.html</a> (CNN transcripts)
CMD.27	Shokri Ghanem First interview to communicate with media via the Libyan Trade bulletin-July 2003	International and domestic audience	Word Transcribed from video +written material	1000	Arabic (Translated)	Trade bulletin of the Libyan Ministry of Economy-Segments of key policy actors discourse 2003-2010+Video file

### **3. Findings**

NPF empirical analysis ranges from the macro-level– when the corpus presents the regime’s perspective on the economic regulatory change as a response to the outsiders– to the meso-level when the documents refer to a specific policy like liberalization. Communicative narratives analysis will further provide insight of into both levels as we will explore the narrative structure of both by looking at the characteristics of narratives, such as canonicity and breach, narrative transportation, congruence and incongruence, and trust in the narrator (Jones and McBeth 2010). This will be discussed when tackling the findings.

Additionally, strategies and tactics of winners and losers (Best et al. 2006; Dalton et al. 2003; Munro 2005), symbolic narrative and policy surrogates are explored incommunicative discourse to discuss their differences with the coordinative narratives later in chapter 7. As we noted in the implications of audience costs, we have no reason to expect higher or lower levels of manipulation of narrative elements in an authoritarian regime (as opposed to modern democracy) but clearly there is no opposition that can openly and freely challenge the ‘presentation of self’ provided by the actors in the Libyan regime in national domestic elections.

#### **3.1 The discursive definition of policy problems**

At the stage of communication, coding of the corpus provides evidence about how the regime defined economic governance as a solution suggested by the regime's formal and informal authorities. The discussions of these problems and the types of solution suggested did take place with an external audience that was ever present in the communicative references made by Gaddafi and other actors. Economic reforms in response to policy problems were first and foremost a way to reduce audience costs arising from the IMF and the economic players in the international community. But, second, the determination to address economic problems was discursively deployed to

mitigate audience costs at the political level with the UN, the US and trade partners. Third, economic problems were constructed in a way to allow the regime to shape identity and reassure the internal audience.

(40) discourse segments<sup>65</sup> came from (14) communicative narratives sources coded at the node 'policy problems'. We noticed that these references were discursively distributed through the interaction between the Libyan regime and international audiences in a symmetrical pattern including: 60% of references came mainly from the international audiences, while the US presented 40%, the international community organizations presented 20%. Discursive references which came from the Libyan regime's actors also made up 40% of policy problem references, those deployed mainly by Gaddafi (25 %), while his son and linked elite provided 15% of the policy problems definition in light of the external political pressures<sup>66</sup>.

Some features of new economic governance were signals of an approach geared to let Libya enter the international society– mostly defined in terms of trade partners, and economic cooperation in communicative narratives rather than in the substance of genuine governance changes which took place at the time (2003-2006) with 38 narrative references. In fact, they were basically directed to outsiders' particularly in the time between 2006 and 2010 with 65 out of 103<sup>67</sup> coded narrative references found in the corpus regarding economic governance. The definition of policy problem was actually started with discourse directed to the outsiders. According to Saif Gaddafi: *"No more foreign battles. No more confrontation with the west. No more confrontation with the United States"* (CMD.2). At the same time, Saif was more explicit in evoking important trade partners of the regime as they mitigate economic isolation and upgrade the institutional capacity of the regime:

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<sup>65</sup>Discourse segments are the coded text that defines policy problems through the discursive interaction between international audiences and the Libyan regime.

<sup>66</sup> The percentages refer to the amount of discourse in these (40) coded discourse segments.

<sup>67</sup> The coding found 103 discourse references to communicative narratives of economic governance: 38 references for themes of economic openness and (65 for trade partners, investors and related actors.

*“The European union is the most important partner to improve the Libyan Economy even for Arab economies. It has the biggest exports and imports with Libya”* (CMD.5). This claim has been discursively supported by figures of exports between Libya and partners such as the European Union, which provided half of this trade with Libya<sup>68</sup>.

In parallel with the classification of outsiders, the former-prime minister (2003-2006), Shokri Ghanem, started to formally deploy the solution to economic problems as the best way to attract investors and partners, stating: *“The Libyan economy will not improve until we enter the foreign banks. The main obstacle that we face in opening our economy is the obvious weak presence of Libyan commercial banks and their inability to keep up with the movement of economic development”*(CMD.2). Hence the problem is classified as a problem of economic ‘closure’ to the positive forces of free, open international markets.

Beside this initial classification, the definition of the policy change problem was associated with the regime’s intention to remedy its conflict with outsider ‘villains’-particularly threats coming from the US. According to a Bush administration official in 2003: *“Libya had not proved that it no longer supported terrorism. As a result, the State Department is not ready to cancel Libya's designation as a terror sponsor. Some economic sanctions will remain in place”* (CMD.10).<sup>69</sup> Former US president George Bush (2003) also mentioned :*“Leaders who abandon the pursuit of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons will find an open path to better relations with the US,”*(CMD.10).

The attempt to discursively tackle the economic roots of the problems is accompanied by a rhetorical re-construction of Libya in the international political community. In fact, these statements spawned Libyan narratives to prove the existence of the new economic governance, and as a solution for the political problems and in response to US allegations.

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<sup>68</sup> Europe provides imports to Libya with 1,12,739, 695 dollars While exports are : 2,500,362794. See- Libyan Foreign Trade statistics, 1997.

<sup>69</sup> CMD.10 is one of the coded policy change discourses series in news item narratives CMD.9-16 .



The discursive definition of the policy problem was lined by the regime's discourse to resolve threats and to reflect the 'dooms-day scenario' fears. When signing an agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (April 2003) to open up Libya's nuclear activities to full inspection by the IAEA, Matouq Mohamed, the Libyan science minister, (2004) said:

*"We wanted to show Libya's absolute and unlimited determination to implement the declaration of 19 December 2003 to abandon weapons of mass destruction. We affirm our commitment to development, economic growth and friendship rather than the race to the weapons of mass destruction"* (CMD.24).

Indeed the definition of problem is linked with the regime's evocation of a 'doom's-day scenario' in the first stage of reforms. Our coding shows that the policy problem node is connected to nodes about fears of isolation and potential collapse of the Libyan economy. We found that 11 references at the node were representing 'dooms-day scenario' evocation and signals in relation to negative consequences.

We have also found the presentation of the problem linked to norms of 'openness' and 'cooperation' directed towards selective partners. From the aforementioned 40 coded references to policy problem, we found 17 references also coded at the node 'transportations' in Gaddafi's narratives. 6 references (35%) reflect Gaddafi's criticism of the outsiders, whilst 11 statements reflected the need for openness and cooperation. According to Gaddafi's response to the Newsweek's (2003) question asking if America had plans to change his regime and to colonize the world, he responded:

*"America, this superpower, is it not ashamed to mobilize all these forces against a poor and drained country, as if it is aiming to confront China or the (former) USSR under Nikita Khrushchev? This is madness! America wants to colonize the world and the world and we will resist"* (CMD.3). This shows a problem of narrative 'inconsistency' in addressing the external audiences. Communicative discourse fluctuates between signaling openness and calling the US administration "mad".

The nodes covering Gaddafi and his international audience point to the 'selectivity' of the future international partners who would be involved in any arrangements of change. Saif presented the European Union and the Mediterranean states as potential partners when he urged the adoption of partnership with the European states as one of the main pillars of new Libyan economy. The node 'dooms-day scenarios' also signals selectivity. According to Richard Perl, a U.S. official: *"The U.S will not be satisfied with only toppling Saddam Hussein, but also seeks to change other regimes throughout the Arab world. The regimes include those in Iran, Libya and Syria"*(CMD.9). Such narrative has a 'symmetric relationship' with what Gaddafi says about peace and cooperation. According to Libya's foreign ministry statement: *"Libya has decided of its free will to completely eliminate the internationally banned weapons of mass destruction. We have reached agreement to establish a future cooperation."*(CMD.9). This change in discourse was followed by noticeably changeable attitudes of the US discourse. According to U.S Rep. Curt Weldon:

*"If Libya continues to cooperate, diplomatic and economic normalization may be just ahead."* (CMD.9).

The coding also identified the presence of the variable 'narrator trust'. Gaddafi shifted the issue of trust away from his regime, arguing that trust was first and foremost a problem affecting the US and the Europeans. In an interview with Time magazine (2003), Gaddafi said: *"They promised, but we haven't seen anything yet. Libya and the whole world expected a positive response, not just words, although they were nice words, from America and Europe."*(CMD.11).

The aforementioned Lockerbie crisis was the major problem that the regime aimed to address in its narrative transportation in order to gain its new 'ticket of admission' to the world. Gaddafi stated: *"We'll pay so much, to hell with \$2 billion or more. It's not compensation.<sup>70</sup> It's a price! The Americans said it was*

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<sup>70</sup> On 29 May 2002, Libya offered up to US\$2.7 billion to settle claims by the families of the 270 killed in the Lockerbie bombing, representing US\$10 million per family. The Libyan offer was that: 40% of the money would be released when United Nations sanctions, suspended in 1999, were cancelled; Another 40% when US trade sanctions were lifted; and the final 20% when the US State Department removed Libya from its list of states sponsoring terrorism.

*Libya who did it.*”(CMD.1). Gaddafi used the blame-shift to show that there was no concession even with this high price:

*“We did not concede our principles of the revolution; we just pay for our return to the international society. I agree... \$2 billion are a large amount but this is the price of our victory”* (CMD.12).

Instead of engaging with principled arguments, Gaddafi limits this to modernization: We pay a price, but we won't change our principles. We stick to beliefs in which the modernization was grounded; we do not embrace the principles of democracy.

Saif Gaddafi provided support to this rhetoric through the language of economic cooperation, balancing the boundary between trade and security policies: *“Libya was one of the most attractive places for U.S. investments, especially in the energy sector. Today there is no justification for keeping Libya's name on the list of sponsors of terrorism.”*(CMD.4).

Formal and informal sources of narratives have engaged in a 'repetition' of the change necessity for Libya to satisfy the international community and that these were distributed between the Gaddafis and their close actors. To sum up then, the policy problem is represented as follows:

- Economic cooperation and reform were discursively constructed as selective items to normalize the relationships with audiences.
- The political problem for the Libyan regime was discursively presented to reflect the Libyan regime plan to tackle the threats of outsiders.
- The evidence suggests, although it does not prove, that the policy problem was built around intensive discourse signals from the outsiders and the responses of the Libyan regime, as we noted in our remarks on symmetrical relationships between the US arguments and the responses of the Libyan regime, pointing to supposed weaknesses in the credibility of the US officers (as we said above regarding trust in the narrator).

- The nodes show that the discourse deployed by the Libyan regime has a 'symmetrical (effect)' with narratives deployed by audiences. This suggests that the discursive interaction between the regime and audiences led to the adopting of a new plot of open economy.

### 3.2 Arguments supporting policy change

The communicative corpus contains evidence about how the regime sought to justify the initiatives of new governance and sell it to outsiders. In his general meeting with the Libyan congress (GCP), Muammar Gaddafi addressed the Libyan legislators, the general public and the outsiders presenting the regime's argument:

*“Libya has no serious foreign challenges. Libya is not in blockade and it's not persona non grata! I made it clear that all world countries, their presidents and companies are racing for Libya to invest and make friendly relations with it”*  
(CMD.12).

However, Saif was more clear in addressing the argument, stating:

*“At the beginning of course it wasn't easy but my father realized that it is in our favor and for Libyan society, the Libyan people, the Libyan state, for the future of the next generation and I think all of us agreed that Libya should adopt the reform.”* (CMD.4).

This discourse was the first step in a narrative series that aimed to justify the necessity of change to gain the international 'license'. According to Youssef Al-Sawani, one of the actors linked to Saif<sup>71</sup>: *“Even though we paid money for something that we did not commit, we are paying this to buy a license. Libya needs to be admitted onto the world stage, to be looked into as a serious partner that people can do business with.”*(CMD.2).

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<sup>71</sup> - The former chairman of Saif Gaddafi foundation for charity and development.

This led to a further formulation of the new argument about economic and governance change. Beside norms of economic governance presented by Saif Gaddafi in his initiative, he aimed to set the scene for new governance arrangements to bring important trade partners in the plot. In this regard, Saif borrowed the famous saying of Romano Prodi- the former president of the European Commission:

*“Mediterranean civilization reflects the crossroads of trade, which is not subject to dispute or division. The time has come for the establishment of an economic partnership between Europe and the Mediterranean countries and the opening to the Middle East.”(CMD.5).*

In the formal sources of discourse, oil was used in dressing the argument to attract investors. According to Shokri Ghanem:

*“Libya expects to increase its oil production capacity to two million barrels a day in four or five years, after the United States removes the ban on U.S. investment. Attracting foreign and domestic private investment is a priority as the country emerges from international isolation and decades of economic ‘mis-governance’.”(CMD.10).*

However, the son clarified the regime’s attitude to core beliefs at the political level. In the 2005 World Economic Forum in Davos, Saif said: *“I bring a message of radical economic reform that aims to attract foreign investment. At the same time, we must be clear that we reject the notion of multi-party democracy as it was ill suited to Libya's tribal desert society.”(CMD.11).* Saif also stressed limited important economic change elements: *“I think that the shape of the economic governance system must be observed through laws and regulatory measures related to economic activities such as the law and its implementing regulations.”(CMD.5).*

This call was backed by main actors linked to the father in his role as the hero in the initiation of change. The second prime–minister in the plot (2006-2010), El Baghdadi El-Mahmoudi expressed the need to maintain the regime beliefs

through using Gaddafi's terms of reference to merge the new liberal economic trend with his long-held view of popular capitalism:

*"Libya is pursuing an economic policy that is open to outsiders. We give priority to domestic investments and also encourage our friends and foreign investors to enter the country. We'll continue our current economic policy organized by regulations which give a clear picture of 'economic liberalization' in order to create jobs and raise the standard of living. This policy is consistent with our principle of popular capitalism" (CMD.17).*

This statement shows a manipulation of selective governance arguments that do not challenge the core powers of those who control the economy. We have coded 53 discourse references from 18 corpus sources related to the regime's policy change arguments, finding the following remarks:

- The narratives did take place between the regime's formal and informal actors, as well as the outsiders. The coding identifies 43 discourse references to policy argument. We have noticed that 80% of narratives references came from the Libyan regime actors, and 20% from the outsiders. This 'thick' justification of the argument shows the amount of the need to communicate the appropriateness of change. We found the discourse of Saif as the dominant speaker among other sources with a percentage of 44 % of coded sources in the corpus.
- We found a repetition of the word 'economic cooperation' within the argument theme as the most used one to refer to the economic governance with audiences. It was repeated 8-times within sources coded for the new argument. In addition, other terms were used to refer to the new change such as: economic development-7times, regulatory change and amending policy laws and decisions, 6-times, investment and privatization- 4 times, competition-2 times.
- We conclude that the communicative narratives of economic governance made up a specific strategic plan to select a new

economy that would be mainly linked to creating new partners with an extended economic action to satisfy some outsiders and avoid potential threats.

### 3.3 Narrative structure

To better identify the narrative structure of communicative narratives, statements of key actors were examined together also to identify the connections between actors. In this regard, Shokri Ghanem affirmed the formal role of the father as the leader of the discourse genre. In an international media interview, Ghanem stated:

*“Well, he supports it and he of course agrees to it. He is of course behind it. You see our economic reforms are aimed at, as I said, improving the standard of living of the people, improving the rate of growth of the economy and everyone would like it of course, Gaddafi would like it.”(CMD.2).*

Saif aimed to tackle criticisms directed to his father's radical change from the economic socialist style. When he was dispatched by his father on a tour to Western capitals (2003) to soften the image of the regime, he said: *“My principal aim is to clear the air and offer a more realistic picture of my country to the Western public. Libya has been demonized for years.”(CMD.4).*

His first initiative of economic reform was a step towards presenting himself as a narrator: *“The Libyan economy suffers from major problems generating real challenges. We need to reform the policies, regulations, and public sector. Trade is the oldest profession in Libya and the major Libyan activity as the country was a transit region”. In another segment he adds: “We should reform our economy although we have a conflict between building a modern state and the evolutionary thoughts.”(CMD.5).*

The coding also shows that the father's discourse was reluctant to present any ideological concessions, although he insisted on the 'urgency' of a new modern economy. Furthermore, Gaddafi employed the informal role of his son to present the 'norms and values' of the change. In this context, we found

Muammar Gaddafi's discourse targeting the international audience with messages to search for an option of change. When Gaddafi was asked by Newsweek: Will there be another attack on the U.S? Gaddafi used the 'type of support for choice' to prepare the argument for economic cooperation with the US as in: *"In our conflict with America we are not terrorists who call for attacking America like Bin-Laden. I am optimistic. There are so many American companies eager to come here—whether in oil or economic sectors. Now it is time for peace, and I want to be part of world peace,"* (CMD.3).

Once again, we see that Gaddafi draws on the unique attractiveness of the oil revenues, links this to the priority to invest of US companies, and instead of necessitating the US in terms of political reforms and democracy, he makes the claim: we are not terrorists, we will not attack you.-This should be enough for you to feel assured.

In Saif's nodes, economic governance is portrayed with details that mirror international norms. In his initiative's conclusion he stated<sup>72</sup>:

*"I present these points as a proposed solution for our economy: reorganizing trade policies based on a new modern role for the central bank, enhancing competitiveness, a new policy of capitalism momentum to create an innovative workforce, the importance of a new regulatory system, privatization as a new tool for a good redistribution of wealth, and creating new trade partners in Africa and Europe."*(CMD.5).

To sum up, the narrative structure presents the following features:

- Communicative narratives were subject to the interaction between the father and son and also their linked actors, with outsiders. The coded corpus documents (CMD.2-8) present Saif as the narrator of the change who performs under his father-the initiator of the governance change. According to Saif:

*"Nobody can replace the leader, nobody can say now I'm the leader - neither me nor anyone in the society."* (CMD.2).

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<sup>72</sup>See: Gaddafi, Saif, Islam M. (2002), *Libya and the 21<sup>st</sup> Century* (Dar Almaha Publications ), p.311



- Communicative discourse signals a ‘thick’ nature to clarify the necessity of economic reform. A large amount of discourse is directed to the regime audiences.
- Unlike coordination, communicative narratives have an ‘associated’ relationship between the institutional settings and the plot, meaning that the intended reform plan is defined in light of the ruling family’s intentions through interaction with outsiders. The formal and informal settings of the Libyan regime as a family oriented persona-list regime were prepared by the leader to control all initiatives for change in policy and governance. In the case of economic change, narratives were defined by the regime's settings in light of the interaction with audiences where the presence of an ‘associative pattern’ of coding the discourse evidence was dominant.
- The labour division of both father and son requires shedding further light on the ‘Presentation of self’ strategy the regime used to manipulate the new governance.

### **3.4 The presentation of self**

The idea of the presentation of self was introduced by Goffman (1956,1959) to refer to the manipulation of how others perceive us in order to convince our audiences. The discursive manipulation in this case comes from the interactions and pressures of discursive responses in a given situation (Goffman 1959: 1&2). The presentation of self is strongly coupled with the discursive feature of ‘dramatic realization,’ referring to actions by a dictator using mystification with contradictive narratives to mobilize situations and convey what he/she needs from the outsiders. He discursively constitutes a problem within an ‘idealized view’ to create an ‘impression of legitimacy’ for the new actions.

We found this strategy based on three notable tactics: firstly, playing ‘the discrepant roles’ by formal and informal actors to manipulate the

communication of information and facts through over/under communicating facts by key policy actors (1956:87). This tactic is present in our case, providing three 'discrepant roles' of interaction in the plot: those who perform (formal and informal actors), those who are performed to, and the outsiders (external audiences). We have also found the 'go-between mediator audience' who suppresses the conflict (as we will see in the discursive portray of Italy and its role) in the plot (CMD.12).

Further, we have the tactic of the 'communication out of character' which relies on presenting a 'different character of self' in different stages. Hurd (2005) already reports on the communication of the leader at the UN, an episode totally 'out of character'. In our corpus we find the Gaddafi family's management of their discursive roles (father and son) in both coordinative and communicative stages – to be out of character in the same sense outlined by Hurd. Saif's role in stabilizing the policy beliefs was notable in the plot. He presented his call to adopt international norms and values of governance as an informal narrator in the coordinative stage (CRD.6), while this role was different in the communicative stage, through calling to respect the Libyan unique system of governance and own style of democracy (CMD.7).

In the third tactic, we found 'the art of impression management' also used in the coded discourse to manage the roles of actors who perform in an expressive responsibility to create impressions of policy change, as in Muammar Gaddafi's call for economic cooperation (CMD.12), Saif Gaddafi in Davos (CMD.11), and Shokri Ghanem in presenting the new open economy (CMD.2.10.27).

In communicative narratives, the presentation of self-started when the regime needed to normalize its relations with the outsiders. Our 'node' of self-strategy <sup>73</sup>shows 24 references out of 103 coded sources using this element. To justify past political mistakes, the regime employed the 'devil-shift' and 'moral implications' to show some limited concessions in its core beliefs through recognizing these mistakes. According to Saif: *"Sometimes, in order to pursue*

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<sup>73</sup> As shown in research design (chapter.4), 'Node' is a qualitative tool provided by N-VIVO to present the discursive evidence collected, transcribed, and saved. Nodes established within the software present the coding element of narrative policy framework (NPF).

*that moral principle, sometimes you adopt the wrong way, the wrong tool. We're not perfect. We are human beings we do make mistakes"* (CMD.2). Furthermore, the devil-shift (that is, to exaggerate the motives, influence and power of the opponents) was discursively deployed to show the regime's intentions to obtain admission to the international society based on compliance to the international standards in the face of the US power and the American's denial of this Libyan goodwill.

The regime narrators displayed the pattern of discursive 'incongruence,' as both father and son used this tactic to attract potential partners who may resolve problems and bring Libya back to the international society. The EU was the object of this incongruence. According to Gaddafi: *"We should benefit from the European and foreign experience in regulating investment and privatization of the Banking sector"* (CMD.12). In a later contradictory segment Gaddafi says:

*"I express astonishment concerning the economic arrangements of the project of the Union for the Mediterranean in Paris in July 2008. I am astonished at those who joined this initiative without thinking carefully of future consequences"* (CMD.19).

In 2007, Saif also used the 'blame-shift' to overstate the need for economic openness based on the European economic power: *"We want to resolve the problem of the Bulgarian medics. We do not want to lose a golden opportunity to attract the European and Italian investments in Libya along with reforming our economy. We do not want to lose this opportunity to invest hundreds of millions and, as a result, resolving our problems."*(CMD.25).

In the last year of the regime's rule (2010) Saif explicitly presented such incongruent rhetoric. After his support for the 'norms' of the new economy in coordination, he defended the regime specificity of governance by stating: *"One major problem in Libya is the legacy of colonialism. Most Arab states have no traditional, established communities or identity. We have a clear problem of economic structure as result."*(CMD.7). We will look further into the presentation of self-strategy when we reach the causal plot.

### 3.5 Causal plot<sup>74</sup>

We aim to identify the cause-effect relationships in our analysis of the modern economy plot. Our coding found the plot to be classifiable into two major stages related to the 'time element' leading to the regime's strategic goals: firstly: narratives of liberalizing and opening the Libyan economy were found in 38 segments, mostly in the period from 2003-2006, and secondly, narratives that employed oil as the country's source of economic power in order to attract trade partners and investors with limited economic reforms. In fact, the second stage carried the dominant narratives in the causal plot presenting 65 references. The period from 2003 to 2006 had witnessed a dominant 'cause-effect urgency' meaning that the role of time was important to open and modernize the economy in the near future. Whilst cause-effect in the second period, 2006 to 2010, reduced the role of time in favor of narratives of attracting important partners via the oil and gas element, along with stabilizing the Libyan economy.

The discourse of the first stage was directed towards the open and modern economy. Although segments of them were found in the second stage, 17 of 38, they were reflecting an extended discourse to show the commitment to modernization to trade partners and the international community. Narratives were concerned mainly with presenting the 'good regulatory framework' of the new economy in both time periods<sup>75</sup>. They were firstly deployed by the informal settings of the regime (Saif) to sell it to the outsiders: *"Reorganizing trade policies, a modern role for the central bank, enhancing competitiveness, momentum towards capitalism, a new regulatory system, privatization, creating new partners in Africa and Europe."*(CMD.5). We found 9 references by Saif Gaddafi and his linked prime-minister, Shokri Ghanem, who initiated the momentum of this reform following the support provided by the leader and his son: *"We aim to improve the standard of living of the people, improving the rate of growth of the economy. The leader had ordered us to amend the regulations that reform these issues."* (CMD.2).

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<sup>74</sup>The cause –effect relations of the discursive manipulation of new economic governance.

<sup>75</sup> Regulations reviewed in chapter.5

Ghanem also pointed to a delay in the new governance before he was discharged in 2006, particularly when he demanded transparency and obtaining more governance powers: *“Libya is moving slowly into an open-market economy after decades of socialist-style policies.”*(CMD.11). Furthermore, he stressed a radical policy change by stating:

*“We have urgently to enter the WTO and be a member to participate in the establishment of its basis instead of responding to its imposed measures in the future.”* (CMD.27).

During the whole period (2003-2010), we have found 38 references coded at the node of open and liberalized economy where the first stage witnessed 21 references to open and urgent modern elements, while 17 were found in the next stage based on the lesser importance of radical economic change in favor of limited and selective financial and regulatory openness<sup>76</sup>.

The formal references, meaning references in speeches by actors with formal position of authority, were the most dominant narratives between 2003-2006. They began to deploy liberal economy ideas following the son's initiative. Formal sources-mainly Ghanem- presented around 50% (10 of 21) of the coded references to narratives of modern economy to show the regime's commitment to the new economic trend. In fact, Ghanem was playing the role of presenting the official reformer team in the presentation of self-strategy. Speaking to British and US economic experts (July2004), Ghanem declared that around half of 360 state firms founded by the government for reform had already been privatized: *“Libya has begun the process of developing the private sector. One hundred and sixty public companies have been transferred to the private sector and major international firms have been invited to take part in this privatization.”*(CMD.10). In another segment he adds: *“Libya will spend \$50 billion over the next 20 years on investments in oil, industry, tourism and services. We encourage foreign and local investments in the private sector to catch up with development and*

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<sup>76</sup> They represent the type of narrative in the first stage but extended to the second stage, showing more selectivity in openness and a modern liberalized economy.

*modernization it missed during more than a decade of international sanctions over its part in terror bombing attacks”(CMD.9)<sup>77</sup>.*

We noticed that adopting a modern economy reached its peak when the regime unveiled its economic proposal for governance reform in 35 years –the National Economic Strategy (NES) aimed at ushering the country into the modern economic era. According to a statement by Saif in the World Economic Forum in Davos (2005):*“The old times are finished and Libya is ready to move onto the new stage of modernization”<sup>78</sup>*(CMD.11).

In addition, the deployment of these narratives aimed to gain the narrative trust as they brought satisfactory signs from audiences. According to the WTO secretary: *“The World Trade Organization (WTO) looks certain to agree Tuesday to open accession talks with Libya.”* (CMD.10). This marked a further step in Tripoli's drive to normalize its relations with the international community.

The signs of trust directed to the regime were also witnessed even after the replacement of Ghanem from his position as a radical reformer<sup>79</sup>. According to an IMF statement: *“We welcome the important progress in implementing structural reforms, particularly in the financial sector. However, there is a need to advance structural reforms that would support the authorities’ aim of diversifying the economy away from oil and promoting the role of the private sector. We also welcome the authorities’ decision to postpone the implementation of the declared Wealth Distribution Program.”*(CMD.14) as the regime was later silent to implement any genuine policy program in this regard after some formal and symbolic manifestations.

However, the years between 2006 and 2010 witnessed more specific reform steps that aimed to stabilize the financial system and prepare the environment for partners. The regulatory changes of genuine reform such as privatization

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<sup>77</sup>This discourse reflects the issuance of consequent regulations of investment ranging from the issuance of the first investment law in 1997, amended in 2003, and finally Law No.9/2010 on investment promotion in Libya which came at a very late stage of reform. See the policy measures of the coordinative stage section in chapter five.

<sup>78</sup>Chapter five has introduced the elements NES presented to reform the Libyan economy (CRD.24).

<sup>79</sup> Replaced by El Baghdadi El-Mahmoudi in the GCP session, March2006.

and foreign investments were slowed. Although the IMF appraised the steps to modernize the financial system and banking infrastructure, it clearly pointed to the initial failure of governance in Libya, (2006) particularly in labor policies in the Economy:

*“Libya is facing the problems of unemployment which, according to some formal estimates is exceeding 15%<sup>80</sup>, at a time that the state's administrative department is not able to hire more employees, as the number of workers in it has reached one fifth of the population. This pushed the authorities to tighten measures concerning the foreign labor force in Libya. The IMF recommended Libya to use oil to make structural reforms including the rehabilitating of the public sector.” (CMD.11)<sup>81</sup>.*

Additionally, the cause-effect in narratives from 2006-2010 were manipulated towards a new ‘selective’ modern economy rather than achieving further genuine openness. Communicative discourse was planned for limited reform and to slow any genuine open economy that might challenge the regime control of economic policy change decisions. However, we found that oil and gas were employed as the second type of narrative devoted to attracting important partners and entrepreneurs.

As mentioned in chapter5, the reason behind the replacement of Shokri Ghanem was his demands for more reform of the jurisdictions of governance and for combating corruption that comes from un-hidden and hidden entities. He revealed a lack of clarity in the reform discourse. When Ghanem was asked about a clear timetable for the privatization policy, he pointed to the unclear reform plan by stating:

*“In fact, nobody can determine any time table for transformation into privatization and modern economy in Libya. We need further steps to have a gradual transition from public sector dominance to the new genuine market economy.”(CMD.27).*

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<sup>80</sup> The World Bank and the World Economic Forum, raised a higher number of unemployment ranges between 30 %-40 %.

<sup>81</sup>Law No.12/2010 of labour relations in Libya came very late as response to this criticism by the IMF.

Furthermore, the period from 2006-2010 witnessed a different economic narrative. Out of 65 discursive references, we found 17 pointing to modern economy. However, 10 of these references were devoted to stabilizing the banking and financial system to increase both development and current expenditures. The minister of the economy linked to Gaddafi senior- Tayeb al-Saffi- was appointed to signal these new narratives to audiences, showing that the economy was modern, stable and ambitious. Speaking to the IMF delegation in Tripoli (2006) he stated:

*“Libya is capable of playing a major role in international trade in view of its strategic geographical location, which presents it as the northern gate to the African continent. The government has adopted a law to establish a stock market in order to prepare the ground for investments, and to encourage Libyans to direct their efforts towards economic projects serving the objectives of social and economic development.”(CMD.12).*

(7) Statements signaled the need for moving with foreign banks’ investment to organize and monitor the activities of these Banks and investors. We found also discourse about establishing a stock market and free-zone<sup>82</sup> area at this period, which were both established at a very late stage of reform. According to the new Prime Minister, El Baghdadi El-Mahmoudi, who was also linked to Muammar Gaddafi:

*“The government was discussing the possibility of giving a bigger role to foreign banks to help expand the provision of credit to businesses. Foreign banks have been slow to enter Libya, despite a 2005 law permitting them to open branches, largely because of what bankers call bureaucratic regulation and administrative procedures.”(CMD.12)<sup>83</sup>.*

In initiating the regime’s attempts to stabilize the economy, Gaddafi affirmed the importance of funds saved from oil revenues, noting that his government in 2006 had some 13bn dinar (\$10.4bn), and pushing the total consolidated funds to 65bn dinar. In a statement on Libyan TV, he said: *“Before the*

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<sup>82</sup> Law No.9 of Free-Zone Area was issued in 2000; the policy measures of an effective implementation were delayed for almost a decade according to events and episodes we mentioned in section.1.

<sup>83</sup> Law No.1 of the year 2005 on Banking in Libya.



*creation of the public fund saving mechanism, annual oil revenue ended up being all spent, and Libya's central bank reserves were meager. The oil wealth will be allocated to each poor Libyan family, and the balance would be put in Economic and Social Development Fund, to be used to purchase shares in banks and companies in Libya on behalf of the families.”(CMD.13).*

The causal plot in this part also moved further in tackling the stabilization of the economy. In 2007, prime minister-El Baghdadi El-Mahmoudi stated:“40 % of all public sector employees in Libya are to lose their jobs under a \$24 billion (18.5 billion euro) draft budget for 2007 presented to parliament. I see the necessity to lay off some 400,000 civil servants out of a total state payroll of one million.”(CMD.13). In August2008, Saif had also changed the discourse from a modern economy to the measurements that stabilize it, stating: “Our government must improve the living conditions of the population and spread oil revenues more fairly, the minimum monthly wage for civil servants would rise 110 percent from next month. The minimum stands at 200 Libyan dinars (\$155). Salaries of Libyans working in state-owned oil companies will jump 275 per cent.”(CMD.14).

Beside these discursive signals of internal spending and prosperity, a new direction of preparing a suitable environment for the outsiders started to become prominent between 2006 and 2010. According to Ali Chnebech, an official Libyan Banker:

*“The Central Bank would have a new tool to manage in an indirect way the liquidity of the banking system. We will replace the old system of papers and allow rapid access to the market by foreign and local banks and permit the central bank to mop up liquidity when the need arises”*(CMD.14).

The second stage of narratives was linked to those deployed to employ oil as the country's source of wealth in order to present a cooperative open economy set for selective partners and potential foreign investors. Accordingly, we found links to narratives deployed in relation to important partners-mainly Europe and Italy. By using policy 'Metaphor', Saif discursively initiated early signals of this part of the plot: “*The EU is the biggest partner to Libya. We have a future cooperation with them like the movement of a warm*

*wind from South to West. We export oil, gas, and raw materials to them.”(CMD.5).*

The oil sector has a special consideration in the plot. Its node presents 53 references out of 103 references, presenting half of the references that concern economic policy change and more than 80% of the sources of the second stage of causal plot narratives.<sup>84</sup>

The narratives of the EU were seen as a reward for the concessions made. According to the EU foreign office (October2004):*“The EU ended 12 years of economic sanctions against Libya yesterday and effectively lifted an arms embargo, in response to Tripoli abandoning plans to develop WMDs.”<sup>85</sup> The ministers implemented a 2003 UN decision to drop a trade embargo against Libya.”(CMD.10).* In order to gain external legitimacy, both Libya and Italy have used ‘symbolic signals of legitimacy’, building their new identity on partnership with a friend.

According to an Italian official statement: *“Italy wants to help its former colony to curb the influx of illegal immigrants landing on the tiny island of Lampedusa after transiting through Libya. And despite the bitter colonial legacy, Libya is Italy's main supplier of oil, accounting for about 25% of Italy's oil needs, while Italy is Libya's main trading partner.”* (CMD.10). The friendship treaty was ratified by a large majority of Italian MPs, with strong, articulated opposition coming only from the Radical Party (the group ‘Italia dei Valori’). The IDV also voted against the ratification. The main MP group of the left (PD) endorsed the treaty. Interestingly, the declaration of the radical party in the parliament, at the moment of the ratification, pointed to the symbols of legitimacy bestowed upon Gaddafi and a regime which had not really done anything about human rights and democracy, and to the aggravation of the situation of human rights of migrants.

In dealing with Europe, Gaddafi also declared the need for a new cooperation to improve the Libyan economy. After arriving in Brussels for a landmark visit:

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<sup>84</sup>The node of Oil narratives has (53) of (65) economic narrative coded references of the second type of the plot. The total coded reference is 103 of 27 communicative documents presented in Table.7.

<sup>85</sup> Weapons of Mass-Destruction.

*“We need European companies; we need American companies to upgrade and modernize the economy and the gas and oil wells and to upgrade them,”* Yet again, the plot ‘monetizes’ all problems, making them all a question of economic resources and nothing more. According to the Italian MEP-Rocco Buttiglione: *“Libya should be readmitted as a full partner in a Mediterranean system.”*(CMD.10).

When Gaddafi declared his aforementioned refusal of the UfM Agenda which emanated from the Barcelona process, the EU re-declared allowing Libya’s entry through a conditional admission (November2004):*“The efforts to build closer relations between the European Union and Libya depend on the fate of the five Bulgarian nurses under sentence of death.”*(CMD.10).

As a ‘go-between mediator’ in the plot, Italy helped Libya in gaining its new identity based on some ‘symbolic legitimacy’ to move forward as a trade partner. According to a statement by Italian Interior Minister, Giuliano Amato:

*“We have to accept that we were the imperial country that invaded Libya at the beginning of the 20th century. We have to be aware that there is a legitimate demand for restitution by a country that was occupied by another for no other reason than imperialistic aspirations, which is something that has no sense at all.”*(CMD.11).

In fact, Italy lobbied for Libya even within the EU. After signing an agreement to control African immigration with Libya in 2006, Italy moved further with Libya when the Foreign Minister, Massimo D’Alema, said:

*“Italy and Libya are poised to sign a treaty designed to settle the question of compensation for Italy’s colonization of the country; we can announce an important accord between Libya and Italy.”*(CMD.12).

This symbolic policy was rewarded by Eni, the Italian oil group, which won a 25-year extension to its oil and gas contracts in Libya but would face tighter commercial terms under the new deal. According to Paolo Scaroni, chief executive of Eni:

*“The increased competition for Libyan oil and gas reserves following the end of international sanctions had forced oil companies to accept tighter terms for oil and gas acreage. Under the new agreement, the expiry dates for concessions are set for 2042 for oil and 2047 for gas.”(CMD.12).*

This further signals the Libyan regime's caution in securing the economic powers even with a close partner based on oil deals, rather than opening a genuine and liberalized economy. This has later manifested through the regime's extension of economic engagement with Italy. Speaking to the Libyan officials, national and international media, Muammar Gaddafi said: *“Italy is a friend and welcomes Libyans and I encourage you to go to Europe and above all to Italy, which is a friend, to invest their..., you should gather courage and go to Italy, where we have decided to integrate with each other. They need us and we need them.”(CMD.14).*

Italy's engagement urged the EU once again to launch its first agreement with Libya to establish closer ties. According to the EU: *“Talks would take place between external and high-level Libyan officials to engage Libya with the UfM system.”(CMD.12).* However, these signals for UfM partnership were not welcomed by Muammar Gaddafi who expressed refusal of any arrangements imposed under this union<sup>86</sup> : according to his statement at the 10th summit of the Community of Sahelo-Saharan States-June 2008:

*“If the aim is to put Europe in league with six African countries against the rest of Africa, then it's no! Initially the project was a union of six countries bordering on the Mediterranean and six European countries on the Mediterranean. We were in agreement with that. We are going to fight that project.”(CMD.23).*

This attitude had increased the presence of firms in the narratives. According to a statement by Eni (June2008):

*“We plan to expand its activities in the Libyan gas sector, including the supply of the local market and upgrading gas export capacity. In the oil sector, the*

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<sup>86</sup>One of its major goals is Sustainable Economic Development and Reform based on the international standards.

*two companies will focus on exploiting existing oil fields with advanced technology as well as new drilling.”(CMD.12).*

Gaddafi moved in his intention to deal with Italy, which lobbied for Libya's return to the world. In June 2009, he addressed members of Italy's industrialists association stating: *“Italian companies will be given priority in Libya; any need of Italy will have priority in Libya. We will not favour other countries at Italy's expense and, since Italy really needs Libya. My country will not provide gas and petrol to other countries.”(CMD.15).*

Back to February 2009, the EU external relations continued to send signals to urge Libya to further engagement: *“Libya has the potential to become a key partner for the EU”* (CMD.12). Along with these narratives, we noticed that the regime deployed three types of narratives to them: the first are narratives aimed to secure the business of oil and gas with US and biggest Italian investors with 19 references to Italy and 14 to the US investors and 4 to the French, while 14 references were to the narratives between Libyan and the EU.

In another element of the plot, the investigation of 'heroes and villains' provides some further insights. Gaddafi deployed selectivity towards the classification of new important partners; mainly Italy and the European Union. This selectivity aimed mainly at attracting partners who may not threaten the regime's powers. By using the presentation of self, the regime manipulated 'discrepant roles' and narrative labour when dealing with the potential threats of measures imposed by the UfM partnership with Europe. In the early period (2003), the Gaddafi senior left the discursive role to his son as a narrator to welcome any cooperation with neighbors:

*“We see the necessity of the Mediterranean partnership between Europe and North Africa. However, we all have to take the specificity of governing societies in the Middle East and their own civilization values into consideration.”(CMD.5).*

We can see that Saif aimed at presenting potential partners who can serve the regime's strategic goals,<sup>87</sup> besides signaling that the regime maintained its 'beliefs'. The 'Europe of colonialism' is no longer the 'villain'. By contrast, the integration with the UfM was considered as a villains' threat. Hence, the Gaddafi declared his complete refusal of this project. Gaddafi used a new identity based on the 'symbolic strategy' of Arab unity to point to this partnership as 'villain': "*We reject the European label for this project as Union for the Mediterranean. How can Arabs form any unity with Europe? Arabs didn't even form a unity with each other!*"(CMD.19). Hence, Europeans moved closer to the role of villains, contradicting what we have just seen.

After securing the partnership of Italy, Gaddafi moved further with the refusal of the international 'norms and values' of economic governance, showing a narrative feature of 'incongruence' in the summit of African and European unions, stating: "*I call for the cancellation of the WTO, I advise all not to join and that the countries that joined them exit this nightmare that kills national industries.*"(CMD.22).

Additionally, our investigations of 'time pathos drama' also revealed the language of 'urgency' within 21 references out of 38 that concerned the modern economy, then time started to be more 'silent,' in only 17 during the second period (2006-2010). The overall theme of an open economy formed 37% of the plot between 2003 and 2010. The sharp decline in the importance of time was manifested in Saif's rhetoric (2008), expressing the stability of the economy, with no mention of adopting further standards: "*I think we have put the train on the tracks now. We benefit from our economic situation and specificity. Therefore, I announce my withdrawal from the political life now.*"(CMD.14)<sup>88</sup>. This discourse was coupled with economic measures to

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<sup>87</sup> As mentioned earlier, one of the main goals listed in the framework of cooperation in this treaty with Italy in 2008 was the normalization of Italian-Libyan relations, emphasizing the "special and privileged" relationship that the two countries intend to develop, without forgetting the roles that they pursue, respectively, in the European Union and the African Union.

<sup>88</sup> This segment was coded as: CRD.12 carrying key policy change metaphor deployment coordinative and communicative stages.

stabilize the economy and prepare the regulation of investment, the banking system, stock for trade partners, and investors of foreign oil companies.<sup>89</sup>

We have witnessed 'changeable attitudes' in the leader's narrative, showing contradictory roles and a type of 'cynical rhetoric' that served his interests. In March 2006, Gaddafi called for the opening of the Libyan economy to foreign banks for the first time in years in the first session of GCP (2006):

*"The Libyans should benefit from the foreign banks and the local banks must compete if they can withstand it. It is not the Europe of colonialism as in the past. The foreign capital will not deceive us as in Malaysia, which opened its doors to foreign investment and became a leading national entity and one of the greatest voices that blocked the colonization."*(CMD.12).

In another narrative change, the plot has identified the employment of 'metaphor'-especially by the ruling family (father and son) to explicitly point to their selective and limited governance aspects to avoid any genuine change. This would secure the stability of the regime based on presenting Gaddafi as the future wise leader of Africa who can speak to Western powers within an equivalent position. In the European-African summit entitled 'Investment and economic growth' (2009), Gaddafi referred to a series of agreements between Europe and Africa as: *"just ink on paper", If you want to deal with Africa, it should be handled as a single bloc and not according to the regions.*"(CMD.22).

Metaphors were also employed at a later stage to replace the rhetoric that had been deployed by reformers in the early phase. Unlike the early demand for urgent reform by Ghanem: *"We urgently have to enter the WTO."*(CMD.27), Gaddafi employed policy metaphor to show opposite claims against the international community, when Libya's accession to the WTO was delayed, as he mentioned in CMD.22: *"I advise all not to join this nightmare that kills national industries!"*

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<sup>89</sup> Both Law No.11/2010 regarding the Libyan stock market, and Law No.9/2010 on investment promotion in Libya.

The evidence shows that the Libyan regime used the role of time to manipulate the discursive causal plot in limited reforms. As a result of the aforementioned negative signals of the economic reform received from the WTO and IMF<sup>90</sup>, a discursive contradiction was noted in Muammar Gaddafi's narratives, calling to 'fight' the international economic community, reflecting both discouragement of economic reform as well as insisting on his beliefs against any imposed measures of governance. He presented himself as the leader of Africa by stating:

*"I would like to introduce key issues for the African- European cooperation. The corruption of the United Nations and the call to fix it, the dictates of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organization. I hope we will not face the failure of all these challenges. The WTO is a tool of neo-colonialism because it destroys the economies of weak states and eliminates their industries."*(CMD.22).

In building the 'new identity' for the governance adopted by the regime, we found a clear manipulation of this element: through presenting Italy as 'go-between mediator' and friend, the regime sought to gain 'symbolic legitimacy' and identity to strengthen patriotism through the partnership. Hence, Libya and Italy can morally and economically engage in a partnership to upgrade the Libyan economy and show that reform is on track.

Beside symbolism, the regime had discursively presented the tactic of 'policy surrogates' to create a large scope of economic cooperation through Gaddafi's leadership with Africa, not Libya, as a part of the Mediterranean partnership. In fact, the strategy was set when Gaddafi declared his refusal of the UfM arrangements, stating on behalf of the African Union: *"We have good relations with European states, with the EU, but I do not accept integration into the Union for the Mediterranean."*(CMD.12). The evidence shows that Gaddafi had broadened the discourse to avoid any arrangements that threatened his selective economic policy with Europe and other outsiders, while he specified in discourse directed to Italy: *"Italian companies will be*

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<sup>90</sup> The delay of Libya's accession to the WTO, IMF criticism of the unemployment rate in Libya and the delay in restructuring the Libyan economy.



*given priority in Libya.*”(CMD.15). Hence, symbolic and surrogate strategies were aimed basically at gaining new legitimacy for the regime.

Our coding of the ‘identity’ node shows that the plot was prepared for important partners as 59 coded references of identity used the presentations of ‘we’ and ‘our’. The most dominant types were: we/our as a stabilized economy with a suitable environment (18 references), a modern and open economy which abided by norms 10, a cooperative Libya 15 and this was mostly coupled with discursive interaction with Italy. Also, 7 references were found for Libya as a supporter of development between Europe and Africa.

We found a ‘thick’ communicative discourse in the emphasis on the new economy. It was directed as a response to resolve outside problems and to manipulate the presentation of a modern economy, attractive and rich in resources, but not liberal and democratic. The thickness of narratives is proved through the number of communicative narrative references; 103 more than in the coordinative stage (59 discourse references). However, the coding also found that narratives were manipulated for selective goals. As we mentioned earlier, 80% of coded references in the second stage of reform were devoted to: a stabilized economy, attracting trade partners using oil and gas means,<sup>91</sup> as well as narratives to settle relationships with the EU as a partner and also Italy as a friend.

Based on our nodes of NPF elements, we present the following findings of the plot:

- The Libyan regime had discursively declared the opening and liberalizing of the economy with a formal and informal evocation of adopting international norms and values of ‘good economic governance’. However, the discursive evidence shows that the main goal of the regime was to gain ‘external legitimacy’ to be adopted into the international community with less tension with the Western powers, presenting Libya as no longer a state friend of terrorism, alleviating

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<sup>91</sup> (53) of ( 65) coded references presented the economic plot of stabilized economy, oil and new trade partners arrangements.

international isolation, obtaining new friends (Italy), and finally gaining a leading role in Africa.

- The coding shows that the plots were built on manipulating two stages of cause–effect reform based on the role of time. The first was urgent reform which abided by the international norms and values to gain some acceptable levels of audience’s trust. While the second stage was devoted to stabilizing the economy with limited and selective governance reforms towards partners and new friends, using the oil element as a source of economic power. Also, the regime had discursively used the tactics of the presentation of self to manage the role of time in favour of its plans to stress the new plot of the economy that is based on new friends who invest in oil and do not threaten the regime’s economic powers by demanding genuine reforms. The Europeans are either heroes or villains, their characterization is contingent on the objectives and the specific episodes mentioned.
- Policy Metaphors were employed in the plot to serve the regime intentions of stabilizing the economy. At the communicative level, metaphors were basically used by both informal and formal actors to maintain the regime’s core beliefs even with incongruent narratives. Identity characterization was deployed to serve the core strategy of ‘raising the external legitimacy’ through achieving the regime's strategic goals.
- The causal plot shows the Libyan regime’s strategic goals of new governance during the period 2003 to 2010 including: the normalization of relationships with the Western powers and gaining a leading role in Africa, presenting a modern Libya that has better trade with partners, and finally gaining Italy as a friend to Libya.

The discursive causal plot of communicative narratives of economic governance, containing its main stages, components, and strategic goals plan is visualized and summarized in figure 6.1.

## 4. Appraising our research expectations

In this section we go back to our expectations about communicative narratives and appraise them.

**E.3** is about the relationship between different audiences of communicative discourse. We have argued that the regime faced two types of audience costs, referring to international actors (political and economic) and to internal anger, but we expected the former to be much more important than the latter. We found on almost obsessive repetition of simple but crucial themes across the corpus<sup>92</sup>. Most of these themes have a causal structure involving external audiences. Whether we look at the role of oil as ‘attractor’, the discursive presentation of regulatory reforms, the position of Libya in Africa and beyond, or the arguments about ‘the price to pay’ to be an acceptable tradable partner, the main objective of the regime, at least in the corpus we examined, is to reduce external audience costs. There are references to internal audience costs, but they seem limited in comparison to those addressing the US, the UN, Europe, Italy and the other African countries. There are few concessions in terms of revisiting critically the founding beliefs of the revolution and changing the core foundations of Libyan ‘patriotism’ – indeed the changes in this direction are explicitly framed in economic terms (‘the price to pay’), not in terms of altering political beliefs and admitting political mistakes on terrorism and foreign policy. To conclude on this expectation, our empirical evidence corroborates E3.

**E.5** contains propositions about the content of narratives. We reasoned that the content should contain references to economic themes concerning governance, sectioning off all governance elements concerning classic liberal-democratic values and human rights. This claim is corroborated by empirical evidence throughout the corpus. Even if we look only at the economic sphere, there are no real concessions to individual economic freedoms. There is nothing on the rights of workers or the economic benefits of a free press. By contrast, the economy triumphs in all other dimensions of the narrative. The

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<sup>92</sup> CMD from 1-27.

whole causality in the narrative revolves around the economy, with a causal prominence of gas and oil. This is seen as latent attractor of international investment. To make this latent attractor real and effective – the narrative argues – regulatory reforms and economic governance changes are in order. The regime manipulated the role of time in the economic plot to present limited and selective features of business, privatization, and investment in favour of preparing the economy for partners, investors and friends. This proposition is corroborated with empirical evidence<sup>93</sup>. For the regime, the goal was to stabilize the Libyan economy in parallel with securing the oil sector between the regime and foreign entrepreneurs rather than internally privatizing the sector to enhance its potential of raising the standard of living for the Libyan people, although such a goal was symbolically mentioned in the deployment of oil narratives.

The second proposition in E5 was: *The causal plot will not stress the endowment of the country in terms of raw materials, oil, etc, since this was already experienced prior to 2003, with limited success, but rather the skills of the people and the good regulatory framework that supports business.* This proposition is rejected. Propositions of stressing the skills of people and good regulatory reform were only employed in the plot to serve the regime goals of stabilizing the economic reform in favour of attracting trade partners in the second stage.<sup>94</sup>As a result, E5 is partially corroborated with empirical evidence and partly rejected. Contrary to our expectations, oil and raw materials trump the skills of people.

In appraising **E.6** our investigation shows that the strategic intentions of the communicative cause-effect plot were built on manipulating two stages of reform by using time discursively. The first was the theme of urgent reform which abided by the international norms and values to gain some acceptable levels of audience's trust, while the second stage was devoted to stabilizing the economy with selective governance reforms towards trade partners and new friends using the oil element. We found less evocation of sustainability,

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<sup>93</sup>CMD.1.2.5.10.11.14.27 in the causal plot.

<sup>94</sup>CMD.5.9.10.11.12.14.15.19.

open and liberalized economy in communicative discourse in favor of selective regulatory reform and investment with partners and foreign investors. Therefore, this expectation is corroborated with empirical evidence and the plot was based on ‘urgency’ and almost obsessive repetitions. Time plays an important role in the corpus we examined in this chapter.

We have also found **E.7** (about heroes and villains) corroborated with empirical evidence.<sup>95</sup>

The findings show a ‘selective’ and blunt characterization of ‘heroes and villains’ although we also found inconsistencies. The incongruence in the characterization of heroes and villains seems to track pretty closely the vagaries of the contingent foreign policy goals of the regime – especially in relation to the USA and the international political community. The EU is also portrayed as the villain in some cases and almost a hero in others, depending on the policy episode we look at, such as the Union for the Mediterranean. In these narrative vagaries, one point stands still: the position of Italy as ‘friend’ of the regime. This – the narrative argues – is because Italy has historical duties towards the Libyan people arising out of the colonial past. The presence of a foreign policy stance in the Italian parliament and government favorable to Libya led to the friendship treaty – opposed in parliament by a minority of MPs. This treaty was ideal for the Libyan regime’s communicative discourse. The fact that the treaty had a high cost in terms of the human rights of migrants and lack of pressure on the regime to improve at least marginally on rights and liberties for the Libyan people was not a problem for the dictator, given what we said above about the relationship between external and internal audience costs. Different characters performed different parts of the communicative discourse (father, son, and connected narrators), with Gaddafi establishing a sinister empathy with the Italian Prime Minister of the time, Silvio Berlusconi, also shown in the choreography that led to the signature of the friendship treaty when Gaddafi visited Rome.

At last, we reject **E.8** because the internal ‘added value’ (for the people of Libya) of economic narratives existed but it was never prominent in the

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<sup>95</sup> As in CMD.5.19.22

material we coded. True, some formal actors (Gaddafi and Ghanem and other linked actors) as well as informal yet pivotal narrators (Saif), pointed to the standards of living to enhance the life of Libyans<sup>96</sup>, this segment of the discourse was symbolic (as opposed to being based on evidence of real benefits) and restricted to the ruling elite. We struggled to find discursive connections and genuine narrative interaction between the domestic audience and the regime, between the people and the dictator. The presentation of self and other elements of identity were part of a strategy to gain the international acceptance rather than serving internal goals. In the first part of this chapter we identified anger as the most important potential internal audience cost. This was totally under-valued and neglected by the communicative discourse. Not surprisingly, anger was a major element in the destabilization of the regime in the Libyan revolution that followed the period we study in this dissertation. There are only references to the construction of identity of the 'modern Libyan Economy'.<sup>97</sup> For sure, the regime made an effort in this direction, but the narrative content is poor.<sup>98</sup> The Libyan people are in the plot. But they are not agents of change. Instead, they ought to change to accommodate economic and regulatory openness, the international community and the vision of the leader. People are means to an end in the plot but they are not active in the plot. They are not agents of change; they are instrumental to the change and have to follow the instructions from the elite.

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<sup>96</sup> CMD.2.5.14.17

<sup>97</sup> CMD.1.2.5 and also CMD from 9-12.

<sup>98</sup> As in Saif's informal discourse in CMD.14 : "*Salaries of Libyans working in state-owned oil companies will jump 275 per cent*"

## Conclusions

This chapter tackled the analysis of communicative narratives. We have introduced the Libyan context of reform and the international events that have politically affected the choice of economic governance as a domain to normalize the relations with international powers. We then provided our justification for building the evidence. This step was followed by in-depth investigation of our framework of analysis (NPF) integrated. We found that most of our expectations are corroborated by empirical evidence. However, we expected people and domestic identity to feature in a more important role in discourse and narratives. These expectations are not supported by evidence, and were duly rejected. Importantly, by rejecting these expectations (the second proposition of E5 and E8), we point to the neglect of internal audience cost (e.g., anger) the serious problem of legitimacy, that ushered in the Libyan revolution later on. We also found that there were inconsistencies in the narrative construction of heroes and villains and that the presentation of self did not reach to any profound transformation that could really speak to the Libyan people, often seen as mere cogs in the machinery of change. Granted that there were serious limitations and inconsistencies, it is still useful to portray graphically the causal plot in the narratives – we dedicated our conclusions to this dimension, illustrated by figure 6.1.


One effective way to identify the causal plot is to start from the problem of internal and international audience costs we introduced at the beginning of our chapter. This is portrayed on the left of the figure where we also see the latent factors (such as gas and oil) that can reduce the costs. As mentioned in the previous section, the regime's narratives were more efficient in targeting international audience costs, whilst its narratives were silent on internal audience costs, actually they aggravated anger. Moving towards the right in the figure, we noted that the regime monetized important foreign policy issues – reducing key controversies to a problem of 'paying the price' for becoming an international economic partner. This is represented by the box on openness of the Libyan economy – which was seen by the regime as the necessary and sufficient conditions for many other causal effects on Libya.

This was also the main limitation of communicative discourse, that is, to monetize and ‘treat as economic issues’ fundamental questions of foreign policy, human rights, and ultimately governance. For this reason, the boxes on the international foreign audience and the redefinition of identity have a different color and shape in our figure – to signal that they were much more incomplete and inefficient in the plot than the openness of the economy. Time is important in this plot; hence the causality can only work if Libya opens ‘at a rapid pace’.

Indeed, in our figure most of the expected effects (in the causal plot of the regime) come from the box on openness, whilst the other two boxes on the dialogue with the international audience and the domestic audience do not produce causal effects – hence the dashed lines. The regime’s narrative as identified in our coding goes from ‘opening the economy’ to attractiveness: the latent potential of gas and oil becomes real. This becomes the new base for the trade relationships with partners and the overall trust of Libya as narrators (see the three boxes to the right of the box on ‘Libya opens the economy’). In the plot this change leads to a major result: the new international posture and assertiveness of Libya in the international political economy and the international political economy of the time. The friendship treaty with Italy is not a consequence of this, but in a sense it was supposed to be the proof, the manifestation, the exemplification of the results achieved by the regime, as well as an efficient springboard for further action and future benefits for the regime, encapsulated in our formula of substantive reduction of audience costs. The final column to the right is about the final expectations of the regime concerning the plot: obviously this is a rosy scenario that did not take place in the real world.



Figure.6.1-Causal Plot of Communicative Narratives



# CHAPTER SEVEN –COMPARING COORDINATIVE AND COMMUNICATIVE NARRATIVES

## Introduction

In this chapter we discuss and compare the empirical evidence provided in both the fifth and sixth chapters in light of our research design and expectations. We will synthesize the findings and use the different plots outlined in the two previous chapters to compare coordinative and communicative discourse. More broadly, we will draw on the comparison between coordinative and communicative discourses to answer higher-level research questions that we introduced in previous chapters.

Finally, our comparison of communicative and coordinative discourse will inspire a set of critical observations on inconsistencies, communication out of character and, causal relationships that were incomplete or simply wrong in the narratives. This critical analysis will also suggest reasons for the limited reach of the narratives. We will leave the general contribution of our project to the field of NPF and discourse and the suggestions for further research to the final chapter.

The chapter is structured as follows:

1. Comparing coordinative and communicative narratives of economic governance in Libya 2003-2010
2. Narratives' main features and characteristics
3. Critical observations on the causal plots
4. Answering our research questions

## 1. Comparing coordinative and communicative narratives

At the outset, let us go back to our expectation no.4:

**E.4** *We expect narratives to differ depending on whether they are included in the coordinative discourse or in the communicative discourse. For this purpose we will examine two different bodies of documents and test whether their narratives differ. The regime may find it useful to manipulate narratives for internal and external consumption, using different rationales for economic reform at the stage of coordination and the stage of communicating plans and visions to international audiences.*

To answer the questions implied by E4, we consider the following elements of comparison: institutional settings, problem definition, plots, and narrative goals, types of audience/actors in the narrative interaction, tactics and strategies, the relationship between coordinative and communicative discourses. This analysis will allow us to answer expectation 4 of our research project.

### 1.1 Institutional settings

The institutional context refers mainly to the settings of public policy and leading actors (McBeth et al. 2005,2007,2010). It also provides the pattern of consensus/conflict in a given context beside explaining the real settings of change (Ney 2006; Verweij et al. 2006). These settings also shape the structure of narrative and the distribution of discursive roles between policy actors.

In terms of empirical analysis, both discourses were affected by the national institutional settings. In coordination, the narrative structure revealed that the definition of new good governance was provided strictly in light of the ruling family's intentions. Unlike coordination, communicative narratives have an

interactive process between the national institutional settings and the external pressures.

In the coordinative stage, narratives of governance change preparation were restricted by the guidance of Muammar Gaddafi as the main initiator of reform. The coding shows that the NPC council, as a quasi-formal institution of coordination, and formal actors had all formally followed his orders without any formal links with his son<sup>99</sup>. Reformers continued to present informal perspectives for an open and liberal governance in line with the international norms but without any genuine role in policy change. By contrast, communicative narratives were subject to the interaction between the family and their linked actors with external audiences. The coordinative and communicative corpus presents Saif as the narrator of the change who performs under his father<sup>100</sup>. Hence, the settings of coordinative and communicative roles show complementary roles between both discourses, although they differed in the manipulation of tactics and discursive roles.

Coordination was 'thin' in nature as there were few deliberations among limited actors. Saif acted as the informal narrator (2003), then a self-appointed initiator (2005). Muammar Gaddafi was the 'formal initiator'; Shokri Ghanem too was a 'formal initiator' On the other side, communicative discourse has a 'thick(er)' nature to clarify the necessity of a pre-planned economic reform - limited in scope but wide-reaching in the plot. A large amount of communicative discourse was directed to the regime's external audiences instead of to the internal Libyan public opinion. The division of labour in institutional settings between the father and the son's narratives was discursively manipulated in light of the 'presentation of self' strategy directed to the outsiders, in the hope of stabilizing the policy actors' beliefs in synch with the arrangements prepared by the father.

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<sup>99</sup> CRD.15-22

<sup>100</sup> CMD 2-8

Coordinative narratives were basically arranged to set the front-stage, then to communicate to the outsider audiences, and to present the necessity and the appropriateness of new governance for special close trade partners targeted by the regime as new friends.

Together, formal and informal settings were mixed in a family-oriented vision to control and tighten any intended future change in governance and to limit the scope of policy change in critical areas. Crucially, narratives of economic policy change were deployed in ways that were intended to avoid any real change in power relations. On the one hand, we have policy stories about the economy. On the other, we have a colossal attempt to freeze power relations around the pivotal position of the family: the power story, so to speak, was meant to remain stable, without any empowerment of the people or other actors. In the coordinative and communicative discourse, the settings play complementary functions although they differed in the deployment by the Gaddafi family.

## **1.2 Problem definition**

For the regime, the problem to resolve was its isolation and other audience costs, in order to gain admission to the international society. Both the internal (coordination) and the external (communicative) stages carried features of problem definition.

A pattern of association was found in our corpus, meaning that the node 'economic problem' triggered the causal plot. This node was defined in light of the Gaddafi' family arrangements<sup>101</sup>. As shown by the content of the nodes 'problems' and specifically 'economic problems', the central preoccupation for the Libyan regime was to tackle the threats of outsiders. Hence 'problems' were mainly built around intensive discourse signals from the outsiders and the

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<sup>101</sup> According to Gaddafi : *"Reform must be established on a specific national vision of dismantling the public sector and in light of our philosophy of "popular capitalism" (CRD.4)*

responses of the Libyan regime, as we noted in our remarks on symmetry in the nodes, showing relationships between the US arguments and the responses of the Libyan regime. The communicative discourse deployed by the Libyan regime had a 'symmetrical (effect)' with narratives deployed by audiences. By contrast, there is no symmetry of this type in the coordinative narratives.

### 1.3 Plots

The coordinative plot draws attention to urgent new economic goals- including regulatory reforms of privatization, investments, and the transfer of public ownership (2003-2006). The economic policy change was trumpeted by the regime; however, it was not described in much detail<sup>102</sup>. The plot changed in 2006-2010 to show a broadening discourse of economic development, based on the increase of development in parallel with the call for a new vision of sustainable development in the Libyan economy. The communicative plot draws attention to oil as the country's source of economic power, in order to attract trade partners and investors with limited reform components. The essence of this plot is to transform the latent attractiveness of oil into real, concrete attractiveness for foreign investors.

After securing some signals of satisfaction and a reduction of audience costs from the international community and Western powers, the regime's narratives use stability and broad economic narratives to prepare the Libyan economy for engagement in new economic partnerships, oil and gas agreements, and to upgrade the Libyan economy, especially with the help of selective friends like Italy<sup>103</sup>. In the communicative plot, the friendship treaty with Italy enforces and completes the transformation under way. In a sense, the treaty was intended to

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<sup>102</sup>The discursive evidence shows that the main goal of the regime was to gain 'external legitimacy' to be adopted into the international community with less tension with the Western powers, presenting Libya as no longer a state friend of terrorism, alleviating international isolation, obtaining new friends (Italy), and finally gaining a leading role in Africa. As in CMDs.9.10.11.12.15

<sup>103</sup> As in narratives coded in CMDs.5.12.13.14.15.19.27

lock-in beliefs about the new economy. Looking at the content of our nodes, we found that the treaty was used discursively to provide evidence that Libya was assertive and attractive.

In the coordinative narratives, regulatory reforms were presented to create enthusiasm among the domestic elites and to generate momentum for urgent reform<sup>104</sup>. The same regulatory changes were directed to communicate the necessity of change to the outsiders and to stress that the Libyan regime was practically engaged in the international economic norms manifested in the regulatory reform.

We also found a difference about beliefs between both discourses. Coordinative narratives aimed as a priority task to stabilize the new economic governance through balancing the supporters of new norms with the beliefs of the regime's protagonists. In contrast, the communicative narratives directly benefited from this stabilization of policy beliefs, presenting thicker and more intense narrative claims directed towards the strategic goal of securing the regime's leverage on economic governance. The communicative plot revolves around four major outcomes: prosperity for the country; the achievement of a separate position in international political economy; the avoidance of the negative scenarios; and identity.

In terms of new 'identity' presentation in the plot, we found a relatively different deployment of this element in both discursive narratives, although they share the main goal of gaining external legitimacy. In coordinative narratives, identity definition was limited in the discursive deployment. In the first stage of managing the coordinating of the reform (2003-2006), the employment of this discourse

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<sup>104</sup>-According to Gaddafi: *"I think that the public sector dominance of the economy must be ended now. The public sector needs idealist officials and people with a high level of patriotism to help it to succeed. We do not have people at this level"* (CRD.4)

-According to Saif : *"Any comprehensive strategy must provide a clear dimension for the new economic governance features of reform based on the international standards"* (CRD.6)

was directed mainly to strengthening the identity of vaguely defined 'popular capitalism' and the new people's 'socialist economy'.

In the second stage of coordination (2006-2010), narratives referred to the Libyan economic policy as representing social and welfare goals. The communicative identity element shows that the plot was prepared for important partners and to gain closer friends even at an early coordination stage. It is revealing to see how the narrators evoke identity notions encapsulated in words like 'we' and 'our'. The analysis shows that the most frequent types were: *we/our* as 'stabilized economy' with suitable environment. We see that identity, in both coordinative and communicative discourses, was deployed to serve the core strategy of 'gaining some external legitimacy' for the new economy, rather than a good economic governance. The people are not dominant in 'we' and 'our' – they have no ownership of the vision for the country proposed by the narrators.

The discursive element of 'doomsday-scenarios' was also deployed to justify the policy choices in specific narrative milestones (see the graphic representation of the plots, especially the communicative plot graph in the sixth chapter). The doomsday scenario is basically an extension of the current problem of isolation, but significantly augmented by the fear of aggravation of marginalization and the loss of any role in trade, in the international economy and in Africa.

In the coordinative stage, this element was coupled with the regime's time- role strategy to rally the selective policy elite behind the new economic choices. Unlike what we expected, the communicative use of 'doomsday-scenarios' was not thick – possibly this is evidence of the fact that narratives were not coherent. They were somewhat incomplete (see the section with our critiques of the narratives below in this chapter). In fact, this element was only used to support the justification of problem definition to the regime elites, to avoid any potential internal anger, and to play the 'devil-shift' role by overstating the Western powers in front of the Libyan regime as a state seeking entry into international society.



Another component to compare both narratives is the element of 'heroes and villains' in the plots. At the stage of coordination, this theme was mainly concerned with the 'conflictual and consensus pattern' between actors. The internal conflict was sharp and coupled with the vision of reform as limited to some extent to the regime's interest in showing some regulatory changes and benefiting from increased legitimacy in the international system and new treaties with partners like Italy. In communicative narratives, 'heroes and villains' was contingent on the objectives and the reform episodes.

The selectivity towards the classification of new partners was clear in the plot, especially the references to Italy and the European union. This selectivity aimed basically at attracting partners who may not threaten the regime's powers and at building on the role of the Italians as friends. Italy has a long-standing position in foreign policy which is much closer to the Arab world than any other NATO country. We also noted that the node referring to the EU was not stable in content. In fact, the EU's role was changing all the time in the narratives, from hero to villain, depending on the political contingencies of the regime.

#### **1.4 Narrative goals**

The main coordinative narratives' goal was to create enthusiasm among the elites and show that the economic reforms were under way. Communicative narratives were mainly directed to external audiences, to the normalization of relationships with the Western powers and to gain a leading role in Africa, presenting a modern Libya with a new identity as a cooperative and peaceful regime. An important part of the narratives was to reduce the audience costs.

The main purpose for using narrative tactics and strategies was to manipulate the plots and to manage the role of time. Both narratives shared this discursive plan. Also, they did not target a genuine economic reform in the plot but rather aimed to select limited economic change that would help the regime to buy a

'ticket of admission' to the international community. The use of metaphors also reflected this selectivity in the turning points we observed in our findings.

### **1.5 Types of actors /audience in the plot**

In managing the plot, coordinative discourse was mainly directed to manage the conflict/consensus interaction between policy change actors linked to the ruling family and to determine the roles of both formal and informal sources. In communicative narratives, the interaction was mainly towards external audiences. We already noted that some actors like the EU, were not 'stable' in the discursive representations.

### **1.6 Tactics and strategies**

In coordinative narratives, the regime relied mainly on the 'managing time' strategy to control the pace and tempo of (discursively represented) change. The regime narratives also presented the moral part of the story, as this side represented 'urgent' and 'prompt' policy action to face the potential consequences and effects (Jones and McBeth 2010: 341; Stone 2002).

The discourse emerged in a 'thin' environment— as we said earlier - restricted to the family and their linked formal and informal roles. Therefore, Gaddafi and Saif were the main policy leaders responsible for injecting urgency in the various actions. They demanded urgent responses and essentially obedience from the policy actors to the NPC and the people of Libya, in some cases with exhilarating 'orders' to dismantle the public sector immediately.

Time features in two ways. While, between 2003 to 2006, time was used to present prompt actions and to group the elite behind the new governance, in the second period (2006-2010), time focused mainly on coordinating an extended,

broad discourse of sustainable development plans presetting an extensive reform vision without any genuine power concessions. The time strategy was also employed in communicative narratives to present the same two stages.

In fact, the strategy of time was strategically employed in both narratives to manage the goal of gaining 'external legitimacy'. Additionally, time was deployed with different techniques to stabilize the policy beliefs, and to present a new economy that had a suitable environment for important-selective trade partners and friends who may not threaten the regime's control over political and economic powers. At the coordinative stage, villains and heroes feature prominently in narratives. Villains and heroes are instrumental in manipulating the internal conflict among the policy elite in order to mitigate the threats from the international 'villains' side, with the new norms and values provided by Saif and his associated fixers<sup>105</sup>.

In another tactic, the regime used the 'symbols' of policy change to simplify a complex policy issue and suggest potential solutions through the symbol of 'friendship'. This was employed mainly between Libya and Italy (as ago-between mediator) in the communicative narrative. Policy-symbolism does not feature in coordinative discourse.

In addition, the strategy of 'benefits and costs' showed notable variation in our research findings. This strategy is based on how groups expand policy problems to raise attention, based on benefits and costs manipulation (McBeth et al. 2007: 91). We noticed this tactic in our finding when the regime sought to narrow down the scope of conflict with outsiders and potential trade partners. The regime sought to employ the 'oil attractiveness' element in the plot to attract new investors and potential partners in the oil sectors (such as US companies), while Italy and the European Union were discursively present in the narrative content

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<sup>105</sup> Our coding of the economic reform program discussion presented by Ghanem to the GCP (2003-2006), had clearly pointed to this conflict (CRD.2). See the causal plot of coordinative narratives, chapter 5 for further details.

as partners and a friend-but the EU-related benefits and costs are not stable in the narratives.

There was a thick communicative narrative to alleviate the external pressures. The regime used the oil element as a latent, then a real, source of economic power. Also, the tactics of the presentation of self were discursively manipulated. However, the narratives were thin in discursive coordination where the Gaddafi family manipulated benefits and cost among limited actors to stabilize the two wings of reformers and the regime's traditional protagonists<sup>106</sup>.

Our empirical investigation of narrative content did not find any discursive references to 'scientific certainty and disagreement' as one of the strategies often used by policy elites in advanced democratic governments.

### **1.7 Relationship between coordinative and communicative discourses**

We can now tackle the relationship between coordinative and communicative narratives in order to answer expectation 4, which stated that, "*The Libyan regime may find it useful to manipulate narratives for internal and external consumption, using different rationales for economic reform at the stage of coordination and the stage of communicating plans and visions to international audiences*". Our results show that rationales for economic reform varied in coordinative and communicative narratives to serve the discursive plans.

The rationales are clearly different, as shown by the graphic representations of the plots, where oil dominates in one case but not in the other. Identity elements are also deployed differently. The doomsday rationale for change has a limited role but it features especially in communicative narratives. The rationale based on the leading role of Africa appears in one case but not in the other.

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<sup>106</sup> According to the fifth and sixth chapters, the coding shows (103) communicative discourse references and (59) references for coordinative discursive narratives.

#### *Appraising expectation.4*

This central expectation in the thesis is made up of two main propositions:

- The first looks at differences and similarities between both coordinative and communicative findings. In this regard, our evidence shows that both have been deployed with the aim of gaining external legitimacy in order to save the regime from any potential collapse, as a consequence of international isolation. This is an original finding: even the coordinative narrative was with the non-domestic reader over the shoulders of the various narrators. Typically, coordinative narratives are about coordinating policy among domestic elites: but in our case the external reader is of paramount importance. Although narratives were targeting the same goals, they differed in their tactics and narrative purposes and complementary discursive roles. Coordinative narratives (CRD.1-27) assisted the deployment of communicative narratives (CMD.1-27). There are also important differences in the plot, which mean that, although they were complementary, the narratives differed in their causal structure.
- The second proposition is about different rationales for economic reform. The Libyan regime manipulated both the coordinative and communicative discourse of economic reform, but here there is a division of labor among narrators for internal preparation and external consumption using different rationales for economic reform at the stage of coordination and at the stage of communicating visions to international audiences. An interesting finding is that narrators pushed the boundaries of their narratives roles all the time. In some cases narrators started with a role of economic reform communication and, a few years later, ended up with a much-reduced role (e.g. Shokri Ghanem). This means that the key issue within the authoritarian regime was 'who is narrating what, and in what role?'. The fact that the regime was authoritarian did not prevent key narrators from trying to expand their power and reduce the power of the others by

modifying roles. In a sense, this demonstrates what Emery Roe (1994) once said: that narratives of public policy do not merely portray power, they instantiate power. For Roe, in some circumstances “asymmetrical narratives do not reflect or mediate power relations; rather, they instantiate them” (Roe, 1994:73).

## **2. Narratives features and characteristics**

Based on the aforementioned comparison, the main features and characteristics of policy narratives in Libya are the following:

- Both coordinative and communicative narratives were restricted by the Gaddafi family’s guidance through the formal and informal venues. However communicative narratives were thicker as they required more interaction with external audiences.
- The management of policy problems was characterized by economic themes to coordinate the policy elite’s efforts (internally), and to mobilize the external actors’ attitudes and beliefs towards the country.
- Narrative roles and their change expose patterns of internal conflict within the three main personalities of the Libyan regime. The narratives’ roles were manipulated in an effort to manipulate and alter power relations. By contrast, institutions like the NPC and the simulacra of democratic representation did not have any active role in building the policy stories. They existed only to tackle orders and to implement them. In a sense, this can be said also of the people of Libya: they were there as instruments of change, not as ‘principals’ in the chain of representation – and for this reason we refer to elements of representation as ‘simulacra’.

- The narratives were concerned with identity. This process of identity re-definition was mainly based on seeking external legitimacy. Central in this process was the attempt to re-define the identity of the leader on both the Pan-African and the international stages. The very identity of the country was re-defined as a system in motion with committed, ultimately obedient, people and citizens. The regime identity was assertive, open to trade and prosperity-seeking.
- Narratives of economic governance (mainly-communicative discourse) in Libya were marked by clear features of: 'inconsistencies', 'incongruence', and the 'narrative breach'. We will further address these features below.

### **3. Critical observations on the causal plots**

In this section, we will present some critical observations on the two plots in both coordinative and communicative narratives. The following points present our main critical observations:

#### **3.1 Inconsistencies**

We have found this feature in the narrative plots in both coordinative and communicative discourses. Coordinative narrative themes come together in a plot, (see figure 5.1 in chapter 5) but not without contradictions and inconsistencies, – hence we see the dashed lines in the coordinative plot revolve around the 'stabilization of beliefs'. Both at the level of beliefs and in terms of substantial conflict within the elite, the position of Saif as informal narrator was clearly not stable. The narratives proposed by Saif were not exactly complementary to the narratives of his father (inconsistent and incongruent discourse). When the regime approached the real moment for reform, the NPC had no doubt to follow the instructions of the regime through military guidance.

Discrepancies in narrative themes were clearly observed, with a sense of frustration on the part of the narrators. Internal anger was aroused as a result of these discrepant-inconsistent narratives. Inconsistencies also affected the communicative narratives; we have pointed to the neglect of the domestic audience cost (internal anger) as epitomized by the serious problem of legitimacy that unleashed the Libyan uprising in February 2011. We found inconsistencies in the narrative construction of heroes and villains and revealed that the presentation of self did not achieve any profound transformation that could really speak to the Libyan people (see figure 6.1 in chapter 6). Inconsistent discourse was also found in Gaddafi's breach of narrative when he criticized the international economic community, as his fears of doomsday scenarios were dissipated in parallel with silent language any genuine internal liberal reform.

### **3.2 Communication out of character**

The second main observation of our findings is regarding the tactic of 'communication out of character' which relies on presenting a 'different character of self' in different stages as in Hurd (2005), who reported on the communication of Gaddafi at the UN, presenting an episode that was totally 'out of real character'. In our corpus, we found that the Gaddafi family's management of their discursive roles (father and son) in both coordinative and communicative plots was some times out of character in the same sense outlined by Hurd. We observed this tactic when Saif called for the adoption of modern and international norms and conventional values of good governance as an informal narrator in the coordinative stage, whereas this role was different in the communicative stage, when he clearly defended the core ideology of the Libyan regime through respecting its own style and specificity of governance<sup>107</sup>.

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<sup>107</sup> In defending the regime's core beliefs, Saif stated: "*One major problem in Libya is the legacy of colonialism. Most Arab states have no traditional, established communities or identity. We have a clear problem of economic structure as a result.*" (CMD.7)



### 3.3 Role of the EU: sometimes it is a hero, often a villain

This observation tackles the changeable attitudes of the Libyan regime towards the outsiders without clear justifiable foundations for this change. It is well-known that no policy actor can change the image of an institution (like the EU) according to the problem of the day. Yet the narrators behaved as if this was possible.

As we noted in chapter 6, the investigation of 'heroes and villains' provided insights into the regime's selective intentions. Gaddafi deployed this selectivity towards classifying new important partners; mainly Italy and the European Union. The selectivity of classifying trade partners was aimed mainly at attracting partners who may not threaten the regime's powers. For this narrative goal, Gaddafi employed the 'discrepant roles' to alleviate any potential threats of measures that might come from the UfM partnership with Europe. Gaddafi senior left the discursive role to his son as a narrator to welcome any cooperation with neighbors<sup>108</sup>. Saif aimed at presenting potential partners who could serve the regime's strategic goals,<sup>109</sup> besides signaling that the regime maintained its 'beliefs'. The 'Europe of colonialism' (CMD.16) was no longer the 'villain'. But it became the villain again when the episodes became critical for the dictator.

In fact Gaddafi used a new identity based on the 'symbolic tactic' of Arab unity to point to Europe as the 'villain', declaring his refusal for the UfM as it had negative consequences on the Arab region. Such lack of 'realism' points to the features of 'incongruence', 'inconsistency', and 'breach' of governance change narratives<sup>110</sup>.

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<sup>108</sup> According to Saif: "We see the necessity of the Mediterranean partnership between Europe and North Africa. However, we all have to take the specificity of governing societies in the Middle East and their own civilization values into consideration."(CMD.5)

<sup>109</sup> As mentioned earlier, one of the main goals listed in the Framework of cooperation in this treaty with Italy in 2008 was the normalization of Italian-Libyan relations, emphasizing the "special and privileged" relationship that the two countries intended to develop, without forgetting the roles that they pursued, respectively, in the European Union and the African Union.

<sup>110</sup> "I have expressed astonishment concerning the project of the UfM in Paris (2008). I am astonished at those who joined this initiative without thinking carefully of future consequences. We refuse this initiative... We reject the European label for this project as Union for the Mediterranean. How can Arabs form any unity with Europe? Arabs didn't even form a unity with each other!"(CMD.19)

### 3.4 Lack of realism: how can we dismantle the public sector in one day?

This observation is mainly captured at the coordinative stage and the preparation of economic policy reforms. Time was used to represent the necessity of change - recall that shown in CRD.4<sup>111</sup>. We found that the public sector had to be dismantled “immediately” - something that taken logically is nonsense, given that dismantling the whole public sector takes years of time. But, in the later part of the period we observed, time reverts to a sense of frustration because some of the most ambitious rhetorical and practical claims about reform, like sustainable development, were slipping away. Time as ‘necessity’ and ‘urgency’ becomes silent and fades out of the narratives. The reform as an issue of policy change was very deficient in terms of moral and functional content, particularly toward the Libyan people.

The coordinative plot also evidenced some features of ‘inconsistencies’ besides its poor substance. As we mentioned in chapter 6, the gap between the changes envisaged by the regimes (such as ‘dismantling the public sector immediately’ or creating a new form of capitalism in a few years) and the substance of policy making was very large. Equally large is the gap between what people were asked to do and what was given to them in terms of real ownership of the economic reform. All these inconsistencies were made more acute by the fact that the narratives failed to stabilize roles and beliefs within the ruling elite of the time, and more importantly the people. It is to citizens that we now turn.

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<sup>111</sup> According to Muammar Gaddafi: “*I call on the Libyan congress immediately to dismantle the public sector*” (CRD.4)

### **3.5 The role of people, their skills, their lack of ownership of the reform**

The last observation is the most important one. Narratives of governance change were silent on why the people should bestow legitimacy on the reform plan and contribute enthusiastically. Citizens were obedient agents; they were never the principals or had any ownership of narratives and the process of change.

In the communicative plot (chapter 6), the internal 'added value' (Libyan people) in the narratives was not totally absent, but it was never prominent in our corpus findings. Although Gaddafi, Saif, Ghanem and other linked actors pointed to the standards of living to enhance the life of Libyans, this segment of the discourse was merely symbolic (as opposed to being based on evidence of real benefits) and restricted to the ruling elite .

There was no genuine narrative interaction between the domestic audience and the regime, between the Libyan people and Gaddafi and his son and linked reformers. The whole discursive strategy was based on the presentation of self and identity. The major goal was 'to obtain a ticket' to enter the international community rather than serving the Libyan people's living. The internal anger cost was the major element in the destabilization of the regime in the Libyan revolution that followed the period we study in this dissertation. The revolution started when the regime was still searching to stabilize its friendship with Italy in further practical manifestations.

#### 4. Answering our research questions

After we have appraised E4 in the second section, we go back to our general questions and answer them. The literature review we included in chapter three suggested the following research questions<sup>112</sup>:

*(a) What is the role of discourse in formal and informal institutions of an authoritarian regime like Libya in the period considered for this dissertation?*

According to the comparison of the institutional settings in both coordinative and communicative narratives, both formal and informal discourses were affected by the national institutional settings in Libya. The formal and informal discursive roles were strictly guided in a military order in the case of the NPC. By contrast, these key narrators had some latitude to push, expand and constrain their formal and informal narrative roles and the domestic power relations. The informal narrator seems to present the international values of governance reforms to stabilize the beliefs among the policy elites and create an enthusiastic atmosphere for some change. In the communicative narratives, the discursive roles were designed mainly by Gaddafi seeking the goal of external legitimacy and gaining friends. In both discourses, the settings play similar functions although they differed in the method of manipulation by the Gaddafi family. Together, formal and informal settings were mixed in a family-oriented vision to control and tighten any intended governance and to limit the scope of policy change.

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<sup>112</sup> We will leave the following two questions to the last chapter of conclusions: (f) What do the narratives of the past Libyan regime tell us about the nature of discourse in authoritarian regimes? (g) Is there any lesson arising from our narrative-discursive analysis that can inform our understanding of the current transition to democracy in Libya?

*(b) In the period considered, what was the relationship between coordinative and communicative discourse: was the former thin and the latter thick?*

Coordinative and communicative narratives present 'symmetrical' and complementary relationships. The coordinative plot was defined to group the policy elite behind the new vision. It was a 'thin' coordinative deployment.

The communicative plot revealed a 'thick' nature to clarify the necessity of economic reform. A large amount of discourse, including coordinative discourse, was directed to external audiences. It was designed by the Gaddafi family (mainly the father), to manage their conflict with the Western powers, and alleviate audience costs and negative consequences, including doomsday scenarios of marginalization and isolation. Both narratives were different in internal and external deployment although the coding was similar in the pattern of symmetrical relationship.

*(c) How did coordinative discourse deploy narratives of economic policy reform? Who was the narrator of this discourse and in what institutional venues did the narrator speak?*

Coordinative narratives were mainly restricted by Gaddafi's guidance as the main initiator of reform. The analysis and comparison of both narratives shows that the NPC council formally followed his orders without any formal links with the son. Saif acted as the informal narrator (2003-2008) -then a self-appointed initiator (2005), Muammar Gaddafi-'formal initiator' (2003-2010), Shokri Ghanem-'formal initiator' (2003-2006). We have found that narrative roles shifted and that these shifts were a way to re-define power relationships within an authoritarian regime. Another original finding is that on the coordinative stage there was always a reader over the shoulders of the narrators and institutional venues. This reader was the international political and economic community.

*(d) What are the narratives of communicative discourse? What types of audience do they address? For what purpose? With what narrative features?*

The communicative narratives were mainly subject to the interaction between the father and son and also their linked actors, with outsiders. The corpus presents Saif as the narrator of the change who performs under his father-the initiator of the governance change. External audiences from the Western powers, the international community, the US and Italy, and Libya's international context and political events, all have determined the main goals of the communicative narratives. In terms of the communicative narratives' goals, our answer to this question is that the causal plot shows that the Libyan regime's strategic goals of new governance during the period 2003 to 2010 included: the normalization of relationships with the Western powers; gaining a leading role in Africa; presenting a modern Libya that has better trade with partners; gaining Italy as a friend to Libya; and finally avoiding a doomsday scenario of isolation and marginalization.

We found the key features of communicative narratives to be: 'symbolic' in identity definition; 'selective' in managing time and the external conflict with the outsiders; 'inconsistent' and 'incongruent' between the father and son and their linked actors.

*(E) How do coordinative and communicative narratives vary in a sample of texts? Why do they vary?*

Comparing both coordinative and communicative narratives shows that there were notable differences but also complementarities and similarities (for example: in the use of time and beliefs about identity). Our evidence shows that both were generated to gain external legitimacy and avoid any collapse as a consequence of international isolation. Although narratives were unified in goals, they differed in their tactics; the two plots differ markedly, showing a variation in their causal structure.

This leaves us with the big question: why did they vary? How do we explain the variation? The stage of coordination was the stage where the key narrators competed for power. This is where the ‘who narrates, what, and in what role?’ issue was settled. Apart from the three main protagonists pushing the boundaries of narrative roles, the institutions, public administration and citizens were passive recipients of rules. They had to listen and obey. By contrast, the communicative stage was about re-defining the position of the country and its dictator in Europe and within the political and economic relations of the international community. All this, however, without conceding anything substantial concerning human rights, democracy, and rule of law. The only domain where change was deemed possible was the economic domain –and even here in a very selective range of economic and regulatory reforms.

This variation shows however an interesting, deep link between coordination and communication. Coordinative narratives were created with the external reader over the shoulders of the domestic actors. Thus, coordination was connected with the international audience, which is the main, obvious target of communication. At the same time, communicative narratives looked back at internal/domestic issues: in fact, by communicating the ‘grand vision’ to foreign audiences, the regime was also seeking to stabilize beliefs at home to generate enthusiasm and domestic modernization for persuasion, de-regulation, and open trade.

## **Conclusions**

We started this chapter by addressing the comparison between coordinative and communicative narratives in light of our research questions considering the following elements of comparison: institutional settings, problem definition, plots, narrative goals, types of audience/actors in the narrative interaction, tactics and strategies, and the relationship between coordinative and communicative discourses.

We have found that coordinative discourse was thin, but not without its own internal competition for power via the shifts in the narratives' roles. By contrast, communication was thick, but inconsistent. Actually inconsistencies affected coordination too. We therefore examined the following major inconsistencies: communication out of character; the unstable narratives' projection of heroes and villains; the neglect of real world constraints in the modernization process; and the lack of people's ownership of change. Finally, we answered the research questions pointing to original findings, and explained the variation between narratives.



## CHAPTER EIGHT- CONCLUSIONS

In this final chapter we first recap our assessment of the expectations because this is the main empirical result of our work. Next we deal with the over-arching research questions that motivated our project, and answer them. We then situate our project in the context of the contribution to the literature, especially in relation to the narrative policy framework. Finally, we acknowledge the limitations of our study and make suggestions for further research.

### 1. Back to our expectations

We have already addressed our expectations and commented on each of them in the previous chapters. Tables 8.1, 8.2 and 8.3 present our assessment of the expectations graphically, with 8.1 dedicated to coordination, 8.2 to communication and 8.3 to the central expectation about variation in the narratives that affects both coordination and communication. We have provided extensive comments on variation between the two stages and offered an interpretation about why they vary. But now we have to look at our expectations together.

Recall that the expectations were based on theories of authoritarian regimes, discursive institutionalism and the narrative policy framework. They did not come from nowhere. Instead, they were observable implications of theoretical constructs. Looking at the tables together, we see that they are, broadly speaking, corroborated by empirical evidence, with some surprising elements. This means that our empirical analysis is supportive of the theoretical approach followed in this dissertation.

In chapter seven we have probed our theoretical approach in more depth, answering questions about the role of discourse within institutional settings, the relationship between thin coordinative discourse and thick communicative

discourse, the types of audiences addressed, and the reasons behind the variability between coordinative and communicative modes of narration. One element of surprise was that the coordinative element was even more thin than we expected, with the dictator alone in charge of all the most important discursive moves. Another was the neglect of people – instruments of change, but never agents of change (see E8 and why it was rejected, table 8.2). A third surprise arises from the different plots in the coordinative and communicative modes – a proof that one can really say two different things on two different stages to different audiences. Both coordinative and communicative narratives are deployed with the intention of seeking legitimacy. Although coordination and communication address different audiences, we found that external actors and audiences appear in coordinative discourse, as well as in the communicative plot. In Vivien Schmidt's model coordinative narratives are about coordinating policy among domestic elites: but in the regime the external reader was of paramount importance. And actually there was little to coordinate internally, certainly much less than in a democratic regime.

A fourth interesting element we drew attention to is the large number of inconsistencies, communications out of character, and claims that were clearly impossible to support. All this suggests reasons for the limited reach and ultimately the failure of the narrative project launched by the regime: Libya did not evolve under authoritarian rule to become a beacon for African countries. It does attract international business. It did not become friend of the Italians and a solid partner of the European Union. Quite the contrary, the regime was toppled and the dictator fell in the most tragic way one could possibly think of. This is a good point to pause on the link between discourse and legitimacy. Our main point is about how reality was grossly manipulated in discourse in order to achieve legitimacy. We are not making causal claims between discourse and legitimacy. Actually we have shown the contrary, that a discourse fraught with inconsistencies was not expected to generate enthusiasm, commitment and legitimacy – at home or abroad. Yet there is no doubt that the dictator was trying to use discourse to achieve legitimacy, even with cumbersome and sometimes totally unrealistic distortions of reality.

We can even raise the question of whether this was discourse or propaganda. We do not think that what we have analyzed is exactly propaganda and in any case we did not design our empirical investigation around the apparatus for propaganda, although this depends on our definition of propaganda. For us, propaganda requires a certain level of coherence (something we definitively have not found in relation to the characterization of the EU and the USA) and a supportive machine of public communications. We have not examined items other than texts. We did not look at how the dictator used the press, who helped him with the diffusion of the message, at home and in international contexts.

**Table.8.1 Expectations about Coordinative narratives**

Expectations	Propositions and Empirical Evidence		Corroboration
	Proposition	Evidence	
E1	Coordinative discourse is thin rather than thick. It revolves around the vision of the leader and his family.	Coordinative discourse was very thin. Saif made efforts to impose his role of 'informal narrator' and his narratives show elements of originality when compared of those of his father. However, his discourse did not become dominant in the NPC (see E2), which followed the father's narratives as if they were military orders.	<b>Yes, but coordinative discourse revolved around the leader, not leader and son</b>
E2	The main forum is not a directly elected assembly. It is the National Planning Council.	Elected assemblies and democratic institutions were not fora for coordination of the elites. Our findings show that these institutions are simulacra, not active bodies. By contrast, the NPC played a role, but as recipient of messages and narrations. It cannot be considered a body where actual coordination took place. The NPC was an institution dedicated to the reception and amplification of messages of the father.	<b>Yes, NPC role was even more limited than we thought</b>
E5	Coordinative narratives do not include rights and liberties; the 'economy' trumps all other values. Causal plot stresses the skills of the people, not resources like oil.	The economy trumps human rights and liberties. "We want Coca Cola, not the American constitution". However causal plot did not pay attention to the skills of the people, and yet again was anchored to the economy, especially the attractiveness of oil. This second part of E5 is therefore rejected.	<b>Yes, the economy trumps everything. Skills of people less important than oil (this part of E5 is rejected)</b>
E6	The role of time is to project the economy into the future showing that the regime is moving towards economic values of modernity	Times provided rhythm and tempo to the discursive presentation of the path to reforms.	<b>Yes</b>
E7	The characterization of heroes and villains is blunt	The discursive manipulation of the 'winners and losers' was instrumental in managing the internal conflict between policy elites and creating a bloc of consensus behind the plot.	<b>Yes</b>

**Table.8.2 Expectations about Communicative narratives**

Expectations	Propositions and Empirical Evidence		Corroboration
	Proposition	Evidence	
E3	The communicative discourse is thick, especially the discourse targeting external audience, e.g. international organizations, the international business community, and important trading partners. The internal communicative discourse on economic governance exists, but its role is to support the legitimacy of the ruling regime.	Thick narratives. The major audience cost was in relation to external institutions and organizations. There was also an internal audience cost concerning anger, but the external audience costs were of paramount importance. Although external audience costs were the most pressing concern, there were no concessions in terms of changing the core ideology and beliefs, it all seems 'a price to pay' to get into the international club, not a change of preferences or beliefs. The plot contained goals such as the normalization of relationships with the Western powers, gaining a leading role in Africa, and presenting a modern Libya that has better trade with partners, and finally gaining Italy as a friend to Libya.	Yes
E5	Communicative narratives of economic governance do not include rights and liberties; the 'economy' trumps all other values. Causal plot stresses the skills of the people, not resources like oil.	The whole causality in the narratives and the plot revolves around the economy. Contrary to our expectations, however, the people of Libya are not agents of change; they do not play any important discursive role. They are only instruments in the hands of the regime. The economy is more important than the skills, motivation and beliefs of the people.	<b>Yes, the economy trumps everything. Skills of people less important than oil (this part of E5 is rejected)</b>
E6	The role of time is to project economic success and a modern economy into the near future, showing that the regime is moving towards modern values of economic governance such as sustainability, privatization, investment, and regulatory reform.	Time is very important: the plot was based on 'urgency' especially in the first stage of the reform. Time leads (discursively) to the path to modern economic governance, but this notion of economic governance is very selective, for example it does not include sustainability and access to regulation.	Yes
E7	The characterisation of heroes and villain is blunt.	Our findings show a 'selective' characterization of 'heroes and villains'. We found 'inconsistencies', and contradictive narratives. The incongruent characterization of heroes and villains tracked closely the vagaries of the contingent foreign policy goals of the regime.	Yes
E8	The narratives of economic governance have a strong appeal to the domestic audience in terms of strengthening the identity and values of the regime.	The values and skills of the people were never prominent in the material we coded. The Libyan people are in the plot. But they were not agents of change, they were instruments. There were narrative efforts to re-define identity and limit anger – hence in a way the domestic audience was addressed, but the new 'modern' goals were inculcated and pushed top-down, with no effort to explain, justify and convince the citizens.	No

**Table.8.3 Expectation about the differences between coordination and communication**

<p><b>E4 (Central)</b></p>	<p>We expect narratives to differ depending on whether they are included in the coordinative discourse or in the communicative discourse. For this purpose we will examine two different bodies of documents and test whether their narratives differ. The regime may find it useful to manipulate narratives for internal and external consumption, using different rationales for economic reform at the stage of coordination and the stage of communicating plans and visions to international audiences</p>	<p>P.2 <b>-corroborated</b> with evidence-using different rationales</p>	<p>Both have deployed for unified goals to gain an external legitimacy to survive the regime from any potential collapse as a consequence of international isolation. Although narratives were unified in goals, they differed in their tactics and narrative purpose and complementary discursive roles</p>	<p><b>Accepted</b></p>
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## 2. Contribution to the literature

Our observations on the expectations lead us to the key question of what do narratives of the past Libyan regime tell us about the nature of discourse in authoritarian regimes? The best way to answer this question is to situate our project in the context of the literature, especially the Narrative Policy Framework (NPF) but also Discursive Institutionalism (DI). In fact, the narrative 'can tell us' something 'about the nature of discourse' only if the project makes an original contribution to NPF and DI.

At the outset, we observe that at the beginning of this project we were not sure whether DI and NPF could be used to examine authoritarian regimes. We were not aware of any study informed by these approaches before ours, so we were about to uncover new territory. One big concern we had in mind was whether the conceptual framework of DI and NPF, designed for advanced economies, could really travel to authoritarian regimes. We were wondering whether the concepts of heroes and villains, devil-shift, and so on had been designed with the classic features of policy controversies in modern democracies in mind. What is the point of 'talking' about heroes and villains if there is no majority and opposition, if there is no debate on policy choice, if there is no pluralism in the media and the political system? What is the 'reader over the shoulders' of the narrator in a non –democratic regime?

Notwithstanding our doubts, the framework seemed to work relatively well. We did not find any problem in finding the key concepts of the NPF in the text. There was no ambiguity in coding devil-shifts, heroes, problem definitions, doomsday scenarios in the texts we examined. This means that the first contribution of the dissertation is to demonstrate that the concepts of DI and NPF are eminently comparative. They are not bound and restricted to democratic cultures. They travel well; at least they travel to the authoritarian regime we examined.

But here comes the second important contribution. These concepts and the apparatus of DI and NPF travel well but need adaptations informed by our knowledge of authoritarian regimes. We have to substitute internal anger for

domestic public opinion. Our framework provided insights on how authoritarian regimes are different from traditional democracies. We did not find the fluid 'advocacy coalitions' such as the typical one in democratic regimes (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999). We found that coordinative and communicative narratives were crafted within a very limited and restricted set of actors in the Libyan regime, although they differed in the amount of deployment (thin and thick).

The plot is governed by a dictator, not by a constellation of elites. Most pertinently still, the external audience is composite and immensely influential. It is composite because it includes the international business community, individual firms, international organizations like the UN and the EU, individual countries like the US and Italy. And it is so influential that even the coordinative narratives contain elements that clearly re-direct us towards the external-international reader over the shoulders of the narrator. The whole plot was designed with the goal of limiting audience costs – not with the goal of settling a policy controversy within a democracy, using consensus and other resources.

This set of considerations makes our authoritarian narratives empirically different from the ones observed in advanced democracies. And yet, conceptually, the apparatus is the same, and therefore this solidity makes it highly informative of the nature of discourse in authoritarian regimes.

Our results also allow us to reflect critically on the DI model. The model performs relatively well in relation to communicative discourse. But we found that coordinative discourse is a tight jacket to accommodate our evidence. When Vivien Schmidt talks about coordination, she thinks of bargaining in democratic political systems. In our context, there was fierce competition for the role of narrators between certain actors operating right below the dictator. There was a lot of fighting that does not fit in nicely with the notion of coordination. We have to acknowledge this. Arguably we were limited in our project by the very adoption of the two-dimensional model of Vivien Schmidt. We adopted the two dimensions of discourse and by doing this we have not controlled for other types of discourses. This is a consequence of our



methodological choice. Future research on authoritarian regimes should be more critical of the adoption of the category of 'coordinative discourse' and in any case it should qualify that 'coordination' may go beyond bargaining – simply because within an authoritarian regime there is little to bargain about in terms of policy concessions. It's the very role of narrator that is the object of bargaining, as well as the object of subterfuge, threat, and more or less covert fighting.

A third contribution of our work is about blending NPF and DI. More often than not, the NPF authors consider policy narratives without distinguishing between stages of discourse. But we know from DI that there is a moment of coordination and a moment of communication, with different institutional fora and different opportunities for the narrators, as well as different tactics and strategies. Our empirical analysis shows how useful it is to distinguish the two elements of coordination and communication. The theoretical leverage of this distinction is evidenced by the important differences between the narratives used in the two modes. Even the plots differ between coordination and communication. Future research on the NPF should take this twofold nature of narratives into consideration, and pay more attention to whether a narrative is coordinative or communicative.

A fourth contribution to the literature is that, even if there is no pluralism, narrators still compete for power. Actually this is no surprise to those who have observed conflict within authoritarian regimes. But for NPF scholars the lesson is much more general. It is a lesson about how actors negotiate, compete for, and struggle over the definition of their narrative roles. Who narrates what is a manifestation of the conflict for power. This is a dynamic element, a contested dimension of the policy process. It can be easily overlooked if we start coding text thinking that 'this is what actor A says' without thinking deeply about whether A is saying something to push a narrative role forward or backward, to get a bit higher on the stage of discursive representation or not. Thus this contribution to the NPF is about examining power in action by exploring the contestation of narrative roles. This is an important interactive dimension of discourse. In turn, this feeds into the larger picture of interactive discursive interactions: within the restricted

number of narrators, between the narrators and the institutions, between narratives and external audiences, between meanings, interpretations and reforms.

So, does discourse matter? The traditional literature on governance change notion (good governance) in authoritarian regimes signaled a clear deficit marking the 'large-n data quantitative analyses' in the global studies conducted by the World Bank and other linked scholars. Our take on discourse provides a different interpretive mechanism based on the integration of both discursive institutionalism and the narrative policy frameworks. The regime's search for external legitimacy comes out prominently from our analysis, as well as the inadequacy of the plots and narratives – thus enabling us to evaluate the discourse of the regime critically. By reviewing in our coding the arguments of 'stationary bandit' presented by (Olson 1993) and 'political institutions under dictatorship' by Gandhi (2008), we have gained insights into the regime and its desperate search for time (to change), and, through time, for reform and legitimacy. This legitimacy could not be provided by democratic institutions, which indeed appear as simulacra in our thesis, but by external audiences. To conclude on this point, our dissertation shows a dimension of authoritarian regimes that the large-n studies on 'quality of governance' reviewed in the first part of the thesis cannot capture. As such, the thesis contributes to the discursive turn in the analysis of authoritarian political systems.

### **3. What do the narratives of the past regime tell us about the current transition?**

To use our findings to shed light on the current transition is certainly challenging. We can learn from the failure of the authoritarian narratives, especially considering the neglect of people, reduced to instruments of change – as opposed to agents of change.

Coordinative narratives in Libya reflected an authoritarian, family-oriented pattern of governance. Therefore, policy change was promoted by a thin and

restricted policy preparation where narrators competed for the key roles. All this led to a controlled monopoly of new governance arrangements by the family and the vision of change revolved mainly around their policy preferences and interests, rather than going through wider legitimate and democratic circles to engage the Libyan people. There was no ownership for the Libyan people in the governance change narratives we explored. Neither was the structure of public management seriously involved: from the NPC down to the individual managers, the mission impossible, so to speak, was to reinvent the state and public administration in days. More generally, the findings show that the narrative structure presented a clear, non-democratic distribution of powers. Democratic institutions were reduced to atrophic symbols of representation; hence we used the word simulacra.

There was no real sustained engagement with the content of reform. The message was to change everything, but no attention was paid to resources, implications for implementation, preparation for change and other pretty obvious dimensions. On this, the narratives of change were not only limited to the economic dimension (excluding citizenship), they were also absolutely NOT realistic. Simply, they were a bad plan for change: not inclusive and not pragmatic. Of course, we can explain why this happened. It happened because the main goal behind the narratives was to concede as little as possible to the international audience and to keep the domestic status quo protected from any possible change. When the situation got tough within the three main narrators, power issues were resolved in favor of the status quo, with the dictator re-gaining the sole discursive authority to call the shots for economic policy change. Although the communicative narratives presented thicker narrative content for economic change, they were also controlled by limited actors – and ultimately by the dictator.

Thinking of the current, difficult and often tragic transition to democracy, we provide the following lessons. Coordinative discourse benefits from a clear vision that is more than the enunciation of major goals. Coordination is the stage where elites can look at the detail and think about the content of reforms. To illustrate, until courts start to work properly, there is no point in planning for 'better regulation', a sustainable economy and major privatization

initiatives. In particular, coordination should be sensitive to the politics-administration nexus. Politicians have to work with plans that are shared by public administration. Public managers have to discuss implementation with politicians. The separation of politics from administration we found in the authoritarian narratives led to un-realistic plans. Discourse is after all both 'words' and 'interaction': the nascent institutions of democratic Libya are the place where these discursive interactions should be nurtured.

Reforms have to be designed and then communicated. Here is the place for communicative discourse. The future coordination of policy reforms should be mainly based on coherent and consistent policy-discourse that reflects a clear and credible political commitment to governance. Domestically, discourse should leverage consensus. Pluralistic rules of engagement of stakeholders are indispensable, possibly within a clear and stable constitutional settlement. Externally, Libya faces the challenge of offering to the international partners the presence of a 'state' – something it has failed to achieve so far. This is the minimal pre-requisite to build communicative narratives. Moreover, communication should be engaging, in the sense of engaging actors other than the domestic elites. Successful communication is a two-way process. This is however not just a challenge for Libya. It is a challenge for countries like Italy and organizations like the European Union: they have to change policy and engage in communicative discourse with Libya, becoming stakeholders in the transformation and transition to democracy. They have to see themselves as engaged with legitimate Libyan authorities in problem solving, rather than pointing to the failures of the Libyan state as 'the problem'. The range of issues where this dual engagement is necessary is vast, from migration to justice, human rights and economic policy.

#### **4. Limitations, caveats and suggestions for the future research**

Our thesis findings and observations are limited in different perspectives: Firstly, the focus of the thesis theory is between the discursive institutionalism

and the narrative policy framework, without the employment of other frameworks (such as Advocacy coalition).

As such, it is limited to the hybridization of these two frameworks. We have not explored the vast territory of critical discourse analysis (Fairclough, 2010) and new interpretivist approaches to discourse and public policy (Zittoun, 2014). These are certainly avenues for further exploration of discourse and narratives in authoritarian regimes.

The second limitation facing this thesis is that it does not juxtapose policy-oriented discourse to other policy change variables. However, the findings of the thesis clearly highlight the role of policy ideas, institutions, audience costs and actors in the reform process in the Libyan regime, reflecting the dynamics of policy attitudes in an authoritarian regime. A third limitation of the thesis relates mainly to the corpus as the body of evidence we built. It is objectively impossible to establish what the universe is and draw an appropriate sample. We have no idea of whether the corpus is 10 per cent or 70 per cent of the speeches by the narrators. Most of the original documentation is hard to find; some important blocks of material were destroyed during the collapse of the authoritarian regimes and the transition.

In terms of field work and empirical investigation, the limitation affects the fieldwork challenges at the coordination stage. The NPC reports were destroyed after the Libyan revolution in 2011 and we have relied mainly on the personal archives built when the regime established e-government by former Prime Minister Shokri Ghanem in 2004, alongside some personal collections from academics and policy researchers who were engaged in work with the NPC council and were contacted by us. We recommend that other researchers in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region should be aware of such limitation when conducting other similar research projects, for example in former authoritarian regimes in Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen and so on.

The fourth limitation of this thesis looks at a single individual case of Libya as an authoritarian regime during the period from 2003 to 2010. We defended and justified our choice of the single case studies. And yet, obviously we considered only one case – we cannot use cross-country variation to increase

the theoretical leverage of our findings. Other authoritarian regimes may be different in this respect. This should encourage researchers to carry on with the NPF-DI agenda in further studies of the region, and move from explorative findings to building cumulative evidence in the field, for example with paired comparison or medium-n comparisons assisted by qualitative comparative analysis.

In terms of time span, we examined only one period, but the regime was ruling the country for a much longer period and this raises another limitation to be considered in future research.

Finally, we did not prove that narratives have this or that effect on policy and politics. This study of narrative as independent variables affecting other variables should be carried out by other researchers. However, we pointed to some obvious implications of narrative inconsistencies, and reasoned about the implications of our findings for the current political transition. Yet, a critique could observe that the authoritarian regime was swept away by the Arab Spring, not by the narratives! In this dissertation we were the first to explore the relationship between narrative and (coordinative and communicative) discourses in authoritarian regimes. This was a big effort, but we did not consider whether narratives were the very key to the collapse of the regime, although we described them, analyzed them, and dissected them.

Another caveat of the thesis is linked to research methods we adopted. In our research design, we aimed to provide evidence from a single case study to appraise the expectations derived from theory. However, our aim was not to conclude whether a 'hypothesis' is definitively rejected. A conjecture may not be true for Libya but true in the case of other authoritarian regimes. Thus the exploratory nature of our project presents another limitation and this is the reason for using the term 'expectation' rather than 'hypothesis' and 'qualitative empirical appraisal of the expectation' rather than a statistical 'test of the hypothesis' that is based on a true or false basis. In this thesis, we carried out qualitative analysis and did not engage with the quantitative analysis of the corpus, which is of course always a possibility. This is the reason why in the

tables above we used the term ‘corroboration’ when we appraised our expectations.

To conclude, this project explored the role of narratives and discourse in an authoritarian regime, bringing new contributions to the field, as well as a full range of empirical findings that qualify and add to our knowledge of policy narratives. It complements and enriches the current scholarship on narratives in democratic systems, showing that there is room for the NPF and DI in authoritarian regimes.

The agenda for future research is vast, and it should attract both scholars working with the NPF-DI as well as interpretivists and critical discourse theorists – see Jones and Radaelli (2015) on the possible conversation between NPF and interpretivism. Empirically, there is a fantastic opportunity to extend our approach to other countries and time periods. We hope that the next generation of students and scholars will find this research enterprise as exciting and fascinating as it was for us.

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