Strange Devices on the Jacobean Stage: Image, Spectacle, and the Materialisation of Morality

Submitted by Callan John Davies, to the University of Exeter as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, September 2015.

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I certify that all material in this thesis which is not my own work has been identified and that no material has previously been submitted and approved for the award of a degree by this or any other University.
Abstract.

Concentrating on six plays in the 1610s, this thesis explores the ways theatrical visual effects described as “strange” channel the period’s moral anxieties about rhetoric, technology, and scepticism. It contributes to debates in repertory studies, textual and material culture, intellectual history, theatre history, and to recent revisionist considerations of spectacle.

I argue that “strange” spectacle has its roots in the materialisation of morality: the presentation of moral ideas not as abstract concepts but in physical things. The first part of my PhD is a detailed study of early modern moral philosophy, scepticism, and material and textual culture. The second part of my thesis concentrates on Shakespeare’s Cymbeline (1609-10) and The Tempest (1611), John Webster’s The White Devil (1612), and Thomas Heywood’s first three Age plays (1611-13). These spectacular plays are all written and performed within the years 1610-13, a period in which the changes, challenges, and developments in both stage technology and moral philosophy are at their peak. I set these plays in the context of the wider historical moment, showing that the idiosyncrasy of their “strange” stagecraft reflects the period’s interest in materialisation and its attendant moral anxieties.

This thesis implicitly challenges some of the conclusions of repertory studies, which sometimes threatens to hierarchise early modern theatre companies by seeing repertories as indications of audience taste and making too strong a divide between, say, “elite” indoor and “citizen” outdoor playhouses. It is also aligned with recent revisionist considerations of spectacle, and I elide divisions in criticism between interest in original performance conditions, close textual analysis, or historical-contextual readings. I present “strangeness” as a model for appreciating the distinct aesthetic of these plays, by reading them as part of their cultural milieu and the material conditions of their original performance.
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**A Note On Citations.**

Throughout, I use original Quarto and Folio spellings and editions of early modern texts, except where I also wish to address editorial issues resulting from those texts. In terms of theatre history, alongside archaeological evidence, visual sources, reconstruction, and so forth, the original playtexts themselves are crucial in providing evidence for original meaning and staging; this matter is discussed in the Introduction, but it explains my preference for the early printed editions of the plays. Furthermore, being mindful of the quirks of language, spelling, and punctuation that attend these early printed texts avoids losing any ambiguity or added meaning; it also helps to “perform the vital work of ‘estranging the Renaissance’” (Hackel, “Practicing” 6)—a necessary task if one is to recapture the unique historical moment that gives rise to Jacobean “strangeness.”
Introduction.

Jacobean drama’s complex moral spectacles offer an array of tableaux, engines, and devices that run the gamut from violent to bizarre. A concentration of “strange” stage directions and descriptions—i.e. “Enter seuerall strange shapes,” “they vanish’d strangely,” “in the strange habite” (Shakespeare, The Tempest B1r; Heywood, The Brazen Age G2v)—and references to “strangeness” in the late 1600s and early 1610s prompts a reconsideration of theatrical spectacle in those years. The first decades of the seventeenth century mark a move away from tragedy as the modish genre. Shakespearean romance, Fletcherian tragicomedy, and genre-defying plays like Thomas Heywood’s Age plays introduce a popular drama that is characterised by self-awareness and spectacle. This drama is also infused with “strangeness.” The term appears with astonishing frequency in William Shakespeare’s “late plays” (a description discussed below) and more often in The Tempest (1610-11) than in any other play in his corpus (26 times). It also appears frequently at the Red Bull in these years. The word is often linked to scenes that showcase sensational stagecraft. In 1600, for example, Thomas Dekker’s Fortunatus describes his ability to teleport across the globe as a device with a specific desired effect: “I would have it seeme straunge to you” (E1r). In the following decade, Heywood’s Age plays (1611-13), John Webster’s The White Devil (1612), and Shakespeare’s Cymbeline (1609-10) and Tempest (1611) adopt Fortunatus’s soundbite as a governing conceit. In these plays, “strangeness” features in stage directions and in characters’ attempts to process on-stage action, suggesting that the word is of crucial importance to the description of and response to visual spectacle.

“Strangeness” in these plays prompts a reconsideration of theatrical spectacle in the early 1610s. What exactly does the concept mean for visual display? Why does it become a popular term for the description of and reaction to early modern “special effects”? What challenges does it present to the rational and verbal comprehension of visual phenomena? This thesis argues that strange spectacle has its roots in a materialisation of morality: the presentation of moral ideas not as abstract concepts but in physical things.

The materialisation of morality occurs from the mid-sixteenth century, when “popular” print incarnations of moral philosophy are increasingly buffeted
by philosophical scepticism, protoscientific thought, technological developments, and global exploration. Material objects offer a tangible means of assuaging the growing moral and visual aporia that attend the late Elizabethan and early Jacobean eras. In practice, however—especially literary practice—the investment of morality in “things” reveals its essential uncertainties and ultimately amplifies doubt: physical matter is ephemeral, subject to mutability, and eventually melts into air. Webster expresses the temporality of all that is solid at the end of *The Duchess of Malfi* (1614): “But all things haue their end: / Churches, and Citties (which haue diseases like to men) / Must haue like death that we haue” (M3v). Precisely such a concern with disease and death plagues moral-philosophical concepts as they are materialised into “things.”

The Jacobean stage represents these moral anxieties through spectacle. Technological terms associated with the stage offer an etymological conjunction of moral, visual, and physical domains: the words “device” and “engine” hold both abstract and material meanings in late sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century England. “Device” refers to moral symbols, emblems, and images, to rhetorical figures, and also to physical constructions like Barabas’s pulleys-and-cauldron trap at the end of *The Jew of Malta* (1589-90); “engine” is similarly used to describe mental, intellectual, or ingenious plans and designs as well as being a term for “engineered” objects from weapons to masque-scenery.

Having established and explained the materialisation of morality in Part One, the second part of this thesis examines the ways in which “strange plays” reflect upon these ideas and presents “strangeness” as a critical lens for understanding the period’s drama. “Strange” becomes something of a zeitgeist word in early modern drama of the late 1600s and early 1610s, featuring in a host of plays in connection with elaborate visual display and aligning theatrical spectacle with philosophical and cultural developments. This thesis explores recurrent explicit invocations of strangeness in these plays (far more frequent and concentrated than in previous or subsequent dramatic texts) to argue for a wider moral, visual, and rhetorical “strangeness” that governs these texts’ worlds and their playhouses.

Shakespeare’s *Cymbeline* and *The Tempest*, John Webster’s *The White Devil*, and Thomas Heywood’s first three *Age* plays are all written and performed within the years 1610-13, a period in which the changes, challenges,
and developments in both stage technology and moral philosophy are at their peak. Helen Wilcox’s recent monograph on 1611 reveals the “verbal energies” (3) released in a year that sees a startling concentration of significant moments in geographic discovery, travel, linguistic experiments, social and political troubles, and religious uncertainty. This thesis positions these plays in the context of the wider historical moment, exploring both cultural and material context and texts in depth to show that the idiosyncrasy of their “strange” stagecraft reflects the period’s interest in materialisation and its attendant anxieties. Dramatic spectacle in these years is associated with philosophical scepticism, technology, and wider elements of visual and material culture. I reinterpret the writing of Shakespeare, Webster, and Heywood to show that the epistemological uncertainty characteristic of their playworlds has a material basis in the theatres themselves—in the physical spaces, resources, and technologies of their early performances. These plays are radical experiments in representation: they challenge the boundaries between verbal and visual description by imbuing stage technology with “strange” moral and philosophical significance and by employing stage devices to dissolve the line between illusion and reality and between certainty and uncertainty. Channelling scepticism through stagecraft, Shakespeare’s late plays, Webster’s tragedy, and Heywood’s dramas explore our contingent experience of the material world in which we encounter their performance, just as much as the fictional worlds in which they are set.

This thesis is consequently separated from past approaches to “morality.” While I adopt the term “moral” as opposed to “ethical,” I do not use it in line with earlier twentieth-century approaches to morality by critics including Robert Ornstein, Rees Ennis, or Alfred Harbage. While the term has fallen out of preference in the later twentieth and the twenty-first century in favour of more complex, nuanced, and what might be perceived as less “loaded” descriptions of ethical conduct, I seek to reinstate its early modern significance. I therefore use “morality” in an historicist sense; for sixteenth- and seventeenth-century England, “moral” has a range of meanings but it importantly has a significant practical bent, encouraging both absorption of moral values and, crucially, their active application to matters of the everyday—and beyond.

The period’s probing and presentation of ethical issues is termed, in Thomas Elyot’s description, “the most noble studie of morall philosophy, whiche
teacheth both vertues maners, & ciuile policye” (The boke named the Gouernour G2r). Helena Grehan adopts a useful distinction between “ethics” and “morality” by adapting Zygmunt Bauman’s definitions: “the moral is the overarching code by which one is judged. Moral systems include the justice system, the legal system (etc.). Ethics, on the other hand, is the process by which individual subjects make sense of these systems and how they apply them to their own lives” (Grehan, 176 n.2). Writing about performance in the twenty-first century, it seems apt for Grehan to follow the “process” involved in ethical thought; in contrast, early modern men and women would have understood images, treatises, and plays such as those discussed below as doing moral work, and it is exactly with the way such forms work, are used, and have practical application that I am concerned. Indeed, this thesis relies on the activity and “practicality” at the heart of early modern England’s understanding of morality: it governs my treatment of contextual information, primary sources, and playtexts. While there has been recognition of this practicality in recent studies in intellectual history, there has been little incorporation of such scholarship into readings of early modern drama and its theatres.

Furthermore, earlier treatments of “morality” in early modern drama sought to explore the moments in the text at which a given action or statement can be deemed “moral,” and Ornstein sets out his discussion by noting that a reader may not always “approve” of a text (3). I am not interested, here, in such explicit questions of “right” behaviour or in applying personal moral standards to the play. Rather, I avoid a “moral” reading of early modern drama per se and channel instead the contextual significance of the term to open up drama of the early 1610s. Writing about morality, as this thesis demonstrates, does not solely address questions of right and wrong but takes in crucial contextual facets of philosophy and drama—notably print culture, visual culture, scepticism, and technological development. Refocusing discussion on “morality” therefore means taking heed of a whole raft of practical questions that provide a new and timely means of advancing readings of plays and playhouses.

My research is also separated from previous treatments of “strange” material, especially new historicist discussions of wonder, newness, and “otherness.” Critics, notably Stephen Greenblatt, Stephen Mullaney, and Emily C. Bartels, have treated “strangeness” as an example of “othering”—an
approach I discuss in Chapter Three. Channelling Foucault, their studies have touched—very lightly—on the ways in which “strangeness” marks the newness or difference of alien cultures, and in their brief consideration of the term deem it a marker of marginalisation, exclusion, or separation. While there is no doubt validity in these interpretations, I eschew “discursive” readings that rely on a theoretical framework or background in order to incorporate a much broader range of signification. As with “morality,” I seek to employ a deeper, more historicist, source-focussed appreciation of the term “strange.” I consequently maintain the historical term itself rather than absorp it within a critical or theoretical framework. Staying true to the “strangeness” of early Jacobean England helps to recover its contemporary connotations and present a framework for understanding Jacobean spectacle rooted in early seventeenth-century developments.

This thesis therefore moves beyond the surface—and still current—meanings of “strange” as “other,” something at work, for instance, in the description of Othello as “an extravagant and wheeling stranger / Of here and everywhere” (Ff4r). The term rather has an array of meanings in early modern English that have not yet been adequately explored; Theseus’ remark about the action in A Midsummer Night’s Dream, “more strange then true” (O2r), indicates the complexity of “strangeness.” I therefore move on from ideologically-driven readings of early modern drama to suggest that any treatment of the term “strange” must gesture to developments in a broad range of fields and across a variety of encounters (human and human, human and animal, human and technology, amongst others). Indeed, a “strange device,” in this understanding, would not merely describe an unusual, new, or alien device but one that has varying religious, philosophical, technological, and moral connotations. The concentration of the term in relation to theatrical spectacle between 1609 and 1613 also suggests its close connection with wider philosophical, geographical, and technological developments in those years.

Similarly, there has in recent years been welcome treatment of “wonder” in early modern literature. Critics including James Biester, T. G. Bishop, and Peter Platt have suggested the way in which wonder pervades engagement with the visual world and finds its way into a variety of literature and literary descriptions. Whereas as wonder, in these approaches, is something that escapes rational comprehension and articulation, borders on shock or awe, and
is often seen as pre-evaluative, I suggest “strangeness” is something related but distinct: a post-evaluative engagement with visual stimuli; an attempt at describing the ineffable. By gesturing towards the closer relationship between strangeness and visual description, I suggest that, unlike wonder, strangeness sits at the intersection between the ineffable and the verbal, between abstract/moral and material description. This thesis therefore seeks, in part, to recover strangeness from its relegation as a synonym of wonder, and to show the ways in which it is signally and significantly different from such related words.

Linking these plays through proximity in time and their shared interest in strange spectacle offers a gloss on repertory studies. That field, through the work of Roslyn Knutson, Lucy Munro, Marta Straznicky, Eva Griffith, Scott McMillin and Sally-Beth MacLean, and others, has sought in part to demonstrate that playing companies are distinct units of organisation for plays, styles, and interests. That recognition sometimes threatens to create an artificial distance between different companies and different theatres; Mark Bayer has argued, for instance, that the Queen’s Servants, who performed at the North London theatre, were distinctly removed in repertory and acting style from the more “cerebral” aspects of performance with which the King’s Men were experimenting (230). This thesis argues that “strangeness” serves to link repertories, companies, and playhouses during the late 1600s and early 1610s. Much like the way in which companies exploited offerings not only in their own repertory but also in the repertories of their competitors” (Knutson, Playing 74, 61), “strangeness” reveals echoes across different repertories.

I consider in comparative terms the Queen’s Servants at the Red Bull and the King’s Men at the Globe and Blackfriars. Webster, Heywood, and Shakespeare are often popularly seen as three remarkably different playwrights—one a “jobbing” writer, who sells self-consciously “literary” or poetic drama to whoever is buying; the second a company man who wrote “low” status drama for the Queen’s Servants at the Red Bull; the latter a genius whose plays represent the intellectual and poetic supremacy of the King’s Men and their repertory in Jacobean England. All three playwrights, though, generate worlds of visual and moral doubt through complex uses of stage technology rooted in “strange” devices. I show that Webster, although scathing of the Red Bull in The White Devil’s “To the Reader,” wrote a play whose
performance aspects are perfectly suited to the Clerkenwell milieu and audience. Shakespeare’s *Cymbeline* also famously mirrors a moment in Heywood’s *The Golden Age*, of Jupiter flying on an eagle. The way I read “strangeness” in Heywood’s and Shakespeare’s plays suggests that the moment is not merely a singular shared special effect—an appropriation of sensation—but, in this moment of the early modern theatre, a joint interest in the way visual display elicits and responds to moral uncertainty. In 1611, the court welcomed a double bill of *Cymbeline* (Globe/Blackfriars) and *The Silver Age* (Red Bull); I suggest that, returning the plays to their respective theatres, scholars ought to match the court’s implicit recognition that Shakespeare’s and Heywood’s companies share an approach to “special effects.”

Finally, this thesis elides divisions in criticism between interest in original performance conditions, close textual analysis, or historical-contextual readings. Richard Meek recognises that a cultural-historical approach to Shakespeare in the past few decades has marginalised interest in the rhetorical and narrative aspects of early modern literature but that critical trends in recent years may indicate “the emergence of a new formalism” (7). This thesis does not attempt a formalist reading, but it does renew attention to aesthetic and formal factors by reading them in the light of early modern cultural history. I read the distinct strange aesthetic of these plays from the 1600s and 1610s as part of their milieu and material conditions, in order to offer a more detailed cultural understanding of early modern drama—one that conjoins attention to literary and rhetorical style with appreciation of historical context and the materialities of Jacobean performance. I historicise and contextualise aesthetic factors but believe that such work neither precludes the appreciation of form and style nor hampers close reading of plays (something I discuss at length in the final chapter and the conclusion).

My research is therefore also aligned with recent considerations of spectacle. Special effects have long been maligned by critics of early modern drama, to the point where plays that rely heavily on spectacle have been regarded as early modern B-movies or exploitation dramas that incite moral outrage and employ sensational violence in lieu of poetic talent. In what remains the only book-length study of the period’s dumb shows, Dieter Mehl claims that the fascinating murder scenes in *The White Devil* are no more than “cynical demonstrations of two particularly interesting and ingenious methods of
getting unwanted people out of the way” (141). However, visual and spectacular elements of the stage are more elaborate and intricate by the Jacobean period, with popular venues like the Red Bull making full use of flashes and bangs and Shakespeare—probably the playwright most associated with “poetic” and therefore non-spectacular drama—depending on highly visual effects in his “late plays” at the Globe and Blackfriars.

Accordingly, critics have recently asserted the importance of spectacle throughout the period. Jenny Sager’s *The Aesthetics of Spectacle* (2013)—which makes direct parallels with contemporary films and applies the methodology of film criticism to early modern drama (and Robert Greene in particular)—has challenged the dismissal of visual effects to claim that spectacle, “rather than being devoid of meaning, simultaneously provokes both aesthetic delight and intellectual contemplation” (2). Recent studies build on earlier scholarship, including *Staged Properties in Early Modern English Drama* (2002) by Jonathan Gil Harris and Natasha Korda and Andrew Sofer’s *The Stage Life of Props* (1994), amongst others, which bring welcome attention to important visual and material aspects of theatrical culture. These studies position objects in a network of “material relations that are the stuff of drama and society alike” (Harris and Korda, “Introduction” 1); they go some way to reinstating the physical and material significance of stage properties often lost in textual analyses that reduce them to abstract symbols. Indeed, this thesis builds on twenty-first century approaches that respond to new historicism’s interest in fashioning a human subject by looking at the inanimate: “a pronounced tendency in the new millennium, evidenced in the turn to so-called material culture, is to engage with objects” (Harris *Untimely* 1). Yet I do not employ the deliberate interest in anachronism in Gil Harris’s approach and do not attempt here a “polychronic and multitemporal account” (24; see also Lucy Munro, “Shakespeare and the uses of the past” 111-12). Rather, I address a brief period in the late 1600s and early 1610s and its underpinnings in a wider background of intersections between material culture and morality.

In distinction from Harris’s new materialist approach, this thesis is not occupied with the journeys of things, but with the way in which early moderns used and encountered them: practically and actively, in both moral and material terms. I hope to avoid freezing the matter discussed within this thesis in time (and time in the matter—see Harris, *Untimely* 7), however, by suggesting that
these moral-material intersections are part of a much larger philosophical evolution. Going beyond immediate material engagements, I therefore connect objects like texts, broadsides, props, and technological inventions to philosophical thought, exploration, and prosody, to suggest that the historical moment itself can offer past objects exciting, fluid, and important fields of meaning. Furthermore, “strange” devices are particularly concentrated in this early Jacobean moment, but their energies are felt before and beyond that small window. As such, I share Harris’s wariness of reducing objects to the simply “physical,” by showing how the materials discussed in this thesis have a rich range of signification and significance beyond their physical facts.

More recently, the field of early modern drama studies has engaged with theatrical material and its relationship to the verbal energies of playtexts. *Shakespeare’s Theatres and the Effects of Performance* (2013), edited by Farah Karim-Cooper and Tiffany Stern, presents the work of theatre historians who view “theatrical effects as an extension of textuality” (3). Recent work on indoor theatres is also accompanied by interest in their visual significance, something evident from the varied consideration of spectacle and effect in the essay collection *Moving Shakespeare Indoors* (2014). The research in this thesis forms part of this revisionist approach to spectacle and supports recent claims that there is “no binary between the materiality of theatre and the emotional, metaphorical and poetic registers of the plays themselves” (Karim-Cooper and Stern 3). Combining such an approach with wider materialist attention to objects, this thesis connects the cultural and philosophical resonances of *things* to their dramatic effects. “Strangeness” itself is a concept in which the material and moral—and description and ineffability—are continually in tension. The term offers a useful way to link stagecraft with the thematic, poetic, and narrative facets of early modern drama and to appreciate the resulting richness.

Indeed, a model of “strange spectacle” combines recent materialist enquiries into spectacle with the rewards of intellectual, cultural, and philosophical history. Theatre history continues to make advances, not least in studies that open up lesser-studied venues like the Red Bull, as with Eva Griffith’s *A Jacobean Company and its Playhouse* (2013). Expanding the resonances of materiality beyond both playhouse and text and into the abstract questions and crises prominent in early Jacobean England affords a more
textured understanding of theatrical representation. I consequently combine approaches that are too often separated: the material thrust and physical facts of theatre history—which feature so prominently in recent studies of early modern performance—and, specifically, philosophical scepticism and its related fields of study. This thesis therefore builds on Douglas Bruster’s reading of *The Tempest* and Henry S. Turner’s multifaceted study of the period’s drama. There have been studies of early modern drama’s philosophical underpinnings and experiments, and William H. Hamlin has provided an informed reading of early modern English scepticism in dramatic writing. His study, however, does not situate scepticism in physical performance contexts or the space of the playhouse. On the other hand, while Sager asks that critics acknowledge the “wondering” provoked by spectacle, her study does little to advance theatrical display’s philosophical and moral significance in early modern England. This thesis offers a fresh contribution by matching recent studies in early modern spectacle and theatre history with more conceptual questions of moral meanings and contexts. Viewing spectacle through a “strange” lens reveals its historical, intellectual, and cultural underpinnings by exploring both its physical and philosophical presence in early Jacobean England.

The methodology underpinning this thesis is therefore necessarily wide and eclectic. Addressing the material and the moral aspects of the drama together requires an enormous amount of context, but it is only by drawing together theatre history, moral philosophy, visual and material culture (including history of technology), studies of rhetoric, and close textual analysis that I can fully address the ways in which stage devices and spectacle put the period’s anxieties and developments on show. Indeed, a close reading of Jacobean spectacle cannot be separate from a close reading of the texts themselves. Ultimately, a rich and diverse array of contexts are drawn together, in order to make sense of the original performance conditions of these plays and consequently to understand more fully their philosophical, intellectual, and moral power.

This thesis also, through “strangeness” and its focus on the 1610s, inevitably engages with the means of reading and understanding Shakespeare’s “late-career” plays. I am fully in mind of Gordon McMullan’s critique of the “discourse of lateness” and “the inadequacy of the idea of late style as a means of understanding a group of plays created in the conditions of
early modern English professional theatre” (Shakespeare and the Idea of Late Writing 5). This thesis duly situates Cymbeline and The Tempest within those theatrical conditions, while also appreciating the qualities that distinguish Shakespeare’s “late style” as a recognisable form of poetic expression—something I explore in detail in Chapter Five. Where a “discourse of lateness” can associate the plays “with the aesthetic at the expense of the historical” (McMullan, Shakespeare 7), I show that these areas are inextricable, that the historical generates an aesthetic of “strangeness” in Cymbeline and The Tempest rooted in contextual developments—theatrical, material, verbal, and philosophical. When I therefore refer to the “late plays," I use inverted commas. This is not to categorise simply Shakespeare’s late-career plays as a “clear, separate, unifiable group” (McMullan, Shakespeare 256-57), though I am interested in the “strange” echoes across the plays (see the conclusion). The label rather allows me to use a convenient chronological marker and to engage with wider criticism that insists on grouping them together, while acknowledging the phrase’s ideological and methodological baggage. By considering them as works of art in dialogue with the contemporaneous repertory at the Red Bull, in fact, this thesis heeds McMullan’s call to consider the “commercial structures of the theatre” and “the interactions of repertories” (‘What is a ‘late play’?” 21) as a means of understanding Shakespeare’s “late” or “last” plays, their contexts, and contemporaries.

The thesis is split into two parts—Part 1: Contexts and Part 2: Texts. Part 1: Contexts concentrates on the intersections between material culture and morality and their representation on the stage to introduce my concept of the materialisation of morality. The section includes a comprehensive survey of research and scholarship on moral philosophy, the moral role of images, and theatre’s relationship with the two.

Chapter One explores the relationship of visual culture to moral philosophy and then to the theatre, with print images proving an important underlying source for the reading and understanding of stage spectacle. It sets out a model of early modern morality’s practicality, stressing the various ways in which moral teaching is put to active use. I begin by surveying secondary criticism and historical scholarship on the subject, to set out the different approaches, schools, and interconnections at work in both older and current scholarship. I then assess primary sources from the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries—conduct manuals, education treatises, essays, moral-philosophical texts—to illustrate their practical emphases and their interest in usefulness. The middle part of the chapter explores the ways in which images burgeoned in the period, being used to convey important moral messages and teachings; it covers, likewise, scholarship regarding visual culture as well as reading texts like emblem books and broadsides to suggest the imbrication of the humanist cultures of education and moral advice. The chapter closes by relating this model of practical morality to the theatre; I explain approaches to morality by critics in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries and their difference from later criticism also interesting in mores, as well as setting out how this thesis differs from either. Thomas Heywood’s *Apology for Actors* (1612) ties the chapter together by suggesting that the theatre, uniquely placed between abstract and physical representation, is a space for practical moral action. The sense of practicality and usefulness laid out as a model for early modern morality in this chapter underpins the interest in material culture in subsequent chapters.

Indeed, the second chapter sets out the “materialisation of morality” and focusses on the period’s moral anxieties as they are expressed through visual, print, material, and theatrical culture. I start out by outlining the “crisis” of confidence in traditional moral values, concentrating on scepticism and science. I then outline the roles played by objects in countering such a lack of faith, arguing that metaphorically material objects in print provide a tangible means of assuaging moral doubts. The argument marshalls a large body of broadside and pamphlet images to argue for the role that materiality plays in texts’ moral functions: a double usefulness. I read, for instance, the multiple meanings of “spectacles” in admonitory texts and their images. The chapter continues to argue for the household as a space in which texts’ material functions are explicitly aligned with their didactic intentions. The final sections of the chapter attend to the ways the theatre fits into the model of materialised morality, connecting medieval performance to the developments of masque and pageant in the early Jacobean period. Pointing to the importance of technological objects on the early modern stage, I show the influence of scepticism and of scientific developments in presenting stage action and their integration within the wider, abstract messages of a text—a conjunction that is particularly forceful in Thomas Dekker’s account of King James’s *Magnificent Entertainment* (1604). The materialisation of morality explores the connections between the abstract
and the material realms that is the background for a discussion of Jacobean “strangeness.”

Part 2: Texts reads the plays themselves against a rich contextual backdrop to explore how “strangeness” reflects and engages with the materialisation of morality and is rooted in the moral philosophical and theatrical developments explored in the first part. Chapter Three addresses the broad early modern contexts of “strangeness,” its meanings and its manifestations, by reading its role in spectacle in Heywood’s Age plays and in The Tempest. It sets out the uniqueness of The Tempest and The Brazen Age as the only plays of the period to use the term “strange” in a stage direction, and explores what such a term might mean for theatrical display. I introduce a range of contemporary materials, chiefly sermons, popular prints, and pamphlets of prodigies and “strange” occurrences, to suggest the term’s full range of signification and its distinction from “wonder” while reading it against the Age plays: “strangeness” indicates truthfulness at the same time as it suggests a spurious, popish, or suspicious quality. Likewise, the chapter concentrates on the way the term is used in place of physical description. I argue for its role as a liminal concept between the material and the abstract realms—one that combines moral quality with appearance. The second part of the chapter applies these contexts to The Tempest, showing its centrality in a play that moves between visibility and invisibility, moral and physical action. I introduce some further important aspects of “strangeness”—new world discovery and scepticism—to suggest that a “shock of the new” and concurrent suspicion of the old is expressed through “strange” descriptions.

The fourth chapter builds on the material aspects of “strangeness” at the root of The Tempest by showing how stage technology forms the crux of the play’s moral and sceptical interrogations. Moving away from explicit attention to the term “strange,” it argues for a pervasive aesthetic of strangeness that can be found in the play’s theatrical materials: pulleys, ropes, sounds, and appearances. I set out the close relationship between technology and moral thought (exploring technology’s place in early modern Europe as a branch of philosophy), before exploring the ways in which Jacobean playhouses themselves are closely connected to technological developments. The chapter presents a reading of The Tempest that argues its practical stagecraft is part of (rather than distinct from—in any “naturalistic” or “fictional” way) the playworld
itself. I therefore move beyond recent approaches that view technology as a “contribution” to the “textual” aspects of theatre (Karim-Cooper and Stern 1, emphasis added) by suggesting that the two are inextricably connected in early modern performance. As such, I explore the relationship between ships and navigation, and the theatre—commonplace metaphors for the stage. That relationship is read in the way Prospero uses his powers throughout the play and in Ariel’s association with numerous strange technological devices and allusions. Ultimately, the chapter argues that Prospero be freshly conceived as a strange engineer—one who unites the playhouse’s mechanics with its fictional and moral labour.

Chapter Five brings the different strands of the thesis together by considering the way “strangeness” acts as a rhetorical device. Examining contemporary rhetorical theory and the moral anxieties provoked by verbal ornamentation, I explore the ways that “strange” speech has material dimensions in *The White Devil* and in *Cymbeline*, where rhetorical devices are transformed into stage devices. Setting out rhetoric as a major touchstone of early modern England in terms of morality and education, I also discuss in depth contemporaries’ concerns about its power and the truth-twisting possibilities it engendered. I introduce a notion of “rhetorical strangeness”: a means of contorting the syntax and other formal features of speech that achieves a stunning mixture of paradox and juxtaposition, conveyance and confusion, delay and gratification. The rhetorical style of *The White Devil* and of *Cymbeline* therefore matches their playworlds’ visual, aural, and narrative “strangeness.” As part of this reading, I use rhetorical manuals to show that the term “strange” was used as a desired effect in rhetorical elocution and composition. The chapter then moves on to read the plays themselves in light of such “strangeness,” showing that in speech, as in action, there is a relationship between abstract and material realms. Both playwrights generate “matter” that is both part of a rhetorical category and part of stage materials, especially in dumb shows and dumb-show-like scenes. I go further than recent treatments of verse, noted above, to introduce a range of contemporary materials from geometrical manuals to emblem books, in arguing for the “strange” role of rhetoric these plays’ material worlds. “Strange matter,” here, produces a sceptical uncertainty, but it also demands that rhetoric be read as part of the visual and material world of the playhouse.
Ultimately, this thesis argues that moral concepts, admonition, and instruction undergo a "material turn" in the early modern period. Exploring stage directions, visual display, description, and rhetorical effect, I show that the growing material interests of moral philosophy are reflected and interrogated in the playhouse. The attendant moral anxieties of materialisation are expressed through "strange" spectacle—most visibly in the six plays of the early 1610s I analyse.
1. Practical Morality: Philosophy, Visual Culture, and Theatre

... they do all best agree when they say, that virtue consisteth in action, and that the meditation thereof without practise, is as an unstringed instrument, whereon no man plaieth.

---William Martyn, *Youths Instruction* (1612), D1v.

This chapter presents a model of early modern morality drawn from primary sources and secondary readings, introducing its various facets and concentrating on its visual and dramatic strands. It also gives a detailed overview of research in the areas that underpin this thesis. I argue for a practical, active approach to morality in the period—one that pervades explicit moral philosophical writing (as detailed in surveys of primary sources and current scholarship) as well as in important visual presentations of moral admonition and teaching: moral images and the theatre. By suggesting that practicality underlines a raft of morally-involved genres and forms, I show that use and usefulness is central to early modern conceptions of the moral life—a maxim that becomes important when reading print culture and the stage business of playhouses. Previous studies of plays and playhouses have often neglected to connect the emphases of early modern moral philosophy—often consigned to intellectual history—to early modern England’s wider visual and material culture, so this chapter offers renewed and sustained attention to their interrelationship.

I concentrate here and in the following chapter on the contexts necessary for appreciating the wider resonance of “strangeness” in the period: moral philosophy, visual culture, and theatre. These three areas are crucial to understanding Jacobean “strangeness,” because the concept, especially in the early 1610s, is routinely ascribed to visual dramatic spectacle and represents both moral and visual description. Moral philosophy, visual culture, and theatre form the basis of the period’s “materialisation of morality,” explored in the second chapter, which governs my reading of dramatic “strangeness.”

My main interest is in how moral advice is to be “used” in a practical manner. Emphases on usefulness and practicality lend early modern ethics to metaphorically material applications. I begin this chapter by outlining the main areas of moral advice, admonition, and instruction in early modern England
through a survey of pertinent secondary criticism and an engagement with important primary works. While attitudes to moral philosophy, moral teaching, and abstract thought were subject to intense scrutiny in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, here I set out discernible “models” of early modern morality, specifically with regards to moral philosophy and concepts of “virtue”—concepts in some sense distinct from, though still interrelated with, Christianity. This survey takes in the major critical stances and research on that subject, before moving onto the primary texts—moral treatises and advice manuals—to give a sense of the way practical “moral” teaching worked in print in the early modern period. I go on to address the importance of visual culture in disseminating and representing moral philosophy and advice before exploring the ways in which the early modern theatre functioned as a practical moral tool. As part of my discussion of visual culture, I consider, therefore, the moral importance of the sense of sight in the period, exploring how the eye is particularly sensitive to printed images and visual action. In discussing drama, I am concerned with medieval and early modern ideas about its explicit didactic function. The moralistic roots of the period’s theatre are often framed in explicitly physical terms, in early drama as well as by later Jacobean writers. Thomas Heywood, in his Apology for Actors (1612), presents theatrical representation as a unique medium, between the spoken word and the painted picture, able to bring to life and “embody” noble ideals, a notion that forms the basis of the materialisation of morality. These ideas underpin “strange” spectacle’s moral resonances and serve as an important backdrop for the remainder of this thesis.

“Morality” in early modern England

As noted in the introduction, this thesis uses the word “moral” rather than “ethical”—hence “moral images” and “materialisation of morality”—because it offers the most historically accurate description of what these early modern texts and images are doing. Randall Cotgrave’s translation of the equivalent (almost exactly so) French terms in 1611 offers a useful means of understanding the word’s early modern currency in English. Moralité is described as “Moralitie; a morall sence, or subiect; also, a Morall, an Enterlude or Play of manners”; Moraliser is “To moralize, to expound morally, to give a morall sence vnto; also, to act a Morall, or Enterlude of manners”; and Moral is
“Morall, belonging unto ciuilitie, or maners” (Hhh3v). As a word that indicates either a double sense that requires unpicking or, in the latter definition, concerning “ciuilitie, or maners,” the term “moral” is to be associated with the question of “how to live” and, of course, how not to live. Moreover, its close association with theatrical modes of display (and, by extension, visual presentation) appears in two of Cotgrave’s definitions. The French words can be associated with the English “moral,” which can be used to describe a play or an element of a play. Alan Dessen highlights the historical specificity of the term with relation to Nashe’s threat to Gabriel Harvey that “Comedy upon Comedy he shall have, a Morall, a History, a Tragedy, or what he will,” while also noting that it is often used to refer to characters within such plays, including the Vice (Dessen, *Shakespeare and the Late Moral Plays* 12). The conflation of character with moral (“the old vice”; “the old morall”) endows the term with something more than what we consider its metaphysical meanings, meanings largely removed, as I suggest below, from early modern understandings. As “moralli” is almost always related to practical matters, its association with a stock figure or generic advice play ties the nature of its practicality into the theatrical, the visual, and the tangible. It is this tangibility that I return to in the second chapter, but first I discuss the period’s understanding of “morals” and “morality.”

To talk of “morality” in early modern England is to compass a number of interrelated elements. Some of its components can be identified as distinct genres or concepts—the virtues, for example—whereas other forms of moral advice and moral philosophical writing creep into a surprisingly large range of literary and visual thought. The early modern period sees a growing affinity between natural and moral philosophy, but generally the former is more concerned with aspects of the physical world, whereas the latter attends to human habits and behaviour. Francis Bacon explains that “morall vertue are in the Minde of man by habite & not by nature” (*Aduancement 2: Ss3v*), and so moral philosophy deals with the human cultivation of moral good.1 Indeed, the

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1 Although this overview concentrates on moral philosophy, maintaining the distinction that early moderns upheld, it is impossible entirely to avoid some association between the two. Galenic medicine and early modern conceptions of the body stress the power of affections, emotions, and passions over behaviour. If moral philosophy, stemming back to Plato and Aristotle, concerns the rule of reason, then impingements upon that rule can also be seen as the territory of natural philosophy. By the time one reaches Francis Bacon’s reform of natural philosophy, Stephen Gaukroger has demonstrated, it is possible to consider “the diseases and cure” of the
etymological root of the term “moral” links it to “manners” (from the Latin *mores*); though this sets the scope wider, it indicates how early moderns understand the term to connote, very broadly, ethical ways of living.

New historicism has touched on these broad “ways of living”—and touched on them very broadly. Literary critics in particular have seen ethical construction as part of “self-fashioning” and the development of an autonomous inward “self.” For example, Stephen Greenblatt’s seminal *Renaissance Self-Fashioning* (1980) and Katherine Eisaman Maus’s *Inwardness and Theater* (1995) both deal obliquely with moral issues by translating them into forms of power, display, and concealment. They allude to notions of virtue, but are invested in the way such notions are interrogated and ultimately revealed as absent in the period’s culture, leaving in their wake “competing, incommensurable perspectives” (Maus 66). Michael Schoenfeldt’s *Bodies and Selves* (1999) is perhaps more concerned with humanist and classical virtue, identifying the early modern body as a site of personal conflict in which issues of virtue and moderation are played out. Similarly, Deborah Shuger’s *Habits of Thought* (1990) aims to modify earlier new historicist or cultural materialist approaches by rejecting the oppositions of “subversive” and “orthodox” and rather considering the conflicted and contradictory nature of society and selfhood. Her study of George Herbert, Lancelot Andrewes, and Richard Hooker paints a fractured sense of morality and moral philosophy. Yet Shuger’s description of Herbert’s “failure to demarcate ethical from pragmatic evaluation, moral from social precepts” (96), for example, suggests in a typical new historicist fashion that early modern ethics has a distinctly “separate” remit from “pragmatic” or social issues, thereby separating moral philosophy from what is often perceived as the more ideologically charged aspects of social and cultural production.

Recently, such new historicist approaches to the moral construction of the “self” have come under fire by intellectual historians who, in Conal Condren’s words, see the “need for an inner psychological and moral agent” as an irksome, and by now a much echoed, anachronism. Condren does not wish to deny that these studies have identified something important at work in the

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mind to be “important far beyond the moral realm”; “Bacon’s detailed account of the diseases and the regiment required for their cure is developed not in the context of moral philosophy, but in that of natural philosophy” (114).
period, but he claims that they use “historically inappropriate terms” (*Argument* 139). His quarrel with these scholars represents a turn (or perhaps a re-turn) in both literary and historical scholarship of early modern “morality” that seeks to resituate discussion of the subject in contemporary philosophical and historical terms. Like new historicism, recent studies use both literary and non-literary texts as a means of exploring early modern thought, but ground their approach in specific branches of early modern moral theory. Rather than prioritise “self-hood” and interiority, they are more sensitive to the historical contingencies of early modern personhood and to the necessity of external, social factors when it comes to ethics. Such methodologies therefore look to the specific elements that comprise moral thought in the period and their context, returning to the approaches and studies of twentieth-century intellectual historians.

In this light, both literary and historical scholarship has begun to devote considerable attention to the virtues, the passions, and educational treatises. What is relevant to this thesis is the centrality of practicality and usefulness to these forms of thought. Such scholarship has largely focussed on the importance of humanism in the early modern period, exploring its negotiations with medieval scholasticism, its tensions with Christianity, and the character of its engagement with Greek and Roman writers, especially Aristotle and Cicero.

Classical thought informs much of the period’s understanding of morality. Any study of early modern ethics must consider, primarily, the virtues. Stemming from Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics* (and, to a lesser extent, his other works), Aristotelian virtues are usually described as “dispositions not only to act in particular ways, but also to feel in particular ways” (MacIntyre, *After Virtue* 147). There is also sometimes a distinction between intellectual virtues and moral virtues—the former, following Aquinas, associated with sound reason and the latter associated with the desire or appetite that lies behind an action—though often they are conflated in moral philosophy, as shall be discussed. Avoiding the complex specifics of classical approaches to the virtues (ranging from concepts of the ultimate good to the purpose of philosophy), it will suffice to state, here, that in Aristotle’s conception of virtue ethics, the end “is not knowledge but action” (*NE* 1.3.6-7). He even compares the function of man’s ethical life to the function of a craftsman (*NE* 1.10.13). It is this practical approach that is so visible in early modern moral philosophy, ultimately
lending itself to more flexible and metaphorical modes of expression than the written word.

Joshua Scodel has addressed Aristotle’s role in early modern England, noting the importance of humanism. Because Aristotle is associated with the scholastic curriculum of the Middle Ages, much of humanist thinking seeks to distance itself from explicitly Aristotelian frameworks. However, Horton notes that “his moral-philosophical writings retained much of their former importance” (57-58). Certainly, Scodel has sought to emphasise how an Aristotelian conception of “mediocrity” or the mean was the preferred way of regulating one’s behaviour in early modern England. Scodel’s wide-ranging study explores the moral philosophy that underpins notions of excess and mediocrity for English writers, addressing their negotiations between other classical models and conflicting religious demands.

Historians and critics from Quentin Skinner to Condren have generally been more interested in the influence of Cicero on early modern ethics and its practical bent. Skinner identifies the roots of humanist moral philosophy in Petrarch’s revival of Cicero. In his Tusculan Disputations, Cicero presents the notion of virtus, the single virtue above all others. It is this concept of virtus that underpins the notion of what it is to be a man (deriving from the Latin for “man,” vir) but also to the practical importance of moral thinking to late medieval and early modern writers. Skinner explains that “Cicero makes the study of moral philosophy central to the training of his character. But he must also be capable of putting his wisdom to use, relating his philosophy to his life and fulfilling himself as a citizen rather than merely as a sage” (Foundations 87). Cicero’s form of virtue is related to a man’s role in the commonwealth. It is the importance of public office that underpins the notion that all moral teaching is to be used—something particularly important with regard to materialised and “strange” advice that is conceived to be physically, as well as philosophically, useful.

More recently, Markku Peltonen has further interrogated the presence of Cicero in discussions of practical ways of living. Peltonen demonstrates the popularity of this practical approach in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. He claims that it is the vita activa, or active life, and virtue that permeate educational and moral treatises. The vita activa is associated with negotium, or work, and is traditionally the opposite of otium, or leisure and reflection. By the
Jacobean period, the method of learning virtue for practice is entrenched, and Peltonen articulates its association with educational models:

If the arguments presented in Jacobean England about the importance and desirability of the virtuous public life were essentially classical humanist in character, this was equally true when we turn to analyse the ways in which they thought this mode of life could be acquired in practice. It was widely agreed that this could only happen through an extensive education in the *studia humanitatis*. (*Classical* 168)

Moving away from the scholastic curriculum of the medieval period, the “stress on the utility of learning” (169) presented the humanities and the humanist curriculum as more morally efficacious. Humanist textbooks by scholars, philosophers, and schoolteachers in the sixteenth century, as well as the widespread translation of courtier manuals, mean that this approach to learning is commonplace by the Jacobean period, as is discussed below. In the first half of the seventeenth century, the notion of “practice” holds enough moral significance to warrant its own page-long category in Joseph Ayres’s moral and religious commonplace, comparing morality to a musical instrument (f.238). Practicality underpins materialisation and strangeness, both of which negotiate the various possible uses of moral advice and its non-abstract ends.

Alongside Aristotelian and Ciceronian strands of moral philosophy, historians and critics have looked to Stoicism. It is a philosophy characterised by a far greater “interiorisation of the moral life” (*MacIntyre, After Virtue* 157). Where Cicero “writes from the premise that humans are social animals before they are individuals” (David Wiles 53), much of Stoicism emphasises the negativity of social activity and displaces it from the moral arena. Stoic writers place the burden on the individual’s “will” and endurance. Michael Moriarty’s study on theories of virtue in French thought, for example, eloquently explains how Seneca, popular in early modern Europe, is far more pessimistic about society than Cicero or Aristotle: Seneca “insists that society’s values are corrupt, because social behaviour is corrupt, and the wise (or would-be wise) person seeking to establish a reliable basis for authentic moral values is thinking against the pressure of other people’s behaviour” (53). The impetus to
withdraw from the active life, so antithetical to Ciceronian moral philosophy, also manifests itself across early modern England; it is an important undercurrent in scepticism—an integral aspect of strangeness, especially in the work of Michel de Montaigne.

Peltonen has most fruitfully considered the resurgence of Tacitus in the 1590s as part of this move towards Stoical moral attitudes. He argues that the association of Tacitean and Senecan thought results in “an ethic of fortitude and endurance” in the period (124). Peltonen associates the rise of non-Ciceronian approaches with political preoccupations, however, and questions whether such a resurgence marks a “decisive point in humanist political discourse.” Although there are certainly marks of a “new moral outlook,” namely “ethical scepticism, the stoic attempt to enter into a state of apathy, as well as the principles of self-interest and self-preservation,” Peltonen considers the rise of such hallmarks of the late Elizabethan and Jacobean periods as a modification rather than a replacement of Ciceronian practicality:

. . . neither the growth of royal absolutism, nor the legal accounts of the freedoms of the Englishman, invoked to meet the challenge of absolutists, nor even the Tacitean pessimism and its related insistence on the merits of the contemplative and private life, could completely outweigh traditional Ciceronian humanism and its urging of the merits of the active life. (Classical 134)

Peltonen concludes, then, that “rather than seeing these new emphases, somewhat misleadingly, as the antithesis of classical Ciceronian humanism, such emphases should be interpreted as a part of the humanist political vocabulary” (134). In this light, the 1590s and the early Jacobean period can be considered to usher in a combination of explicit utility in moral thought with Stoical and sceptical introspection.

Indeed, J. B. Schneewind stresses the “practical approach” of writers in the vein of Michel de Montaigne, whose philosophy is distanced from the active life but nevertheless engaged with the “advice that European thought has so far offered” (47). Francis Bacon, similarly, is deeply pragmatic in both his natural and moral philosophy, displaying a Stoic move towards interior considerations of will (perhaps an essential aspect of the essay form) while emphasising the
usefulness of that contemplation. Rather than seeing negotium and otium as opposites, then, recent scholarship has begun to demand that they be seen as interrelated elements, the latter feeding into the former. Stephen Gaukroger even suggests that Francis Bacon’s approach during the late Elizabethan and Jacobean period is “effectively . . . to transform philosophy into something that comes within the realm of negotium” (55). Philosophy itself—traditionally the realm of otium—becomes a form of active work in the Ciceronian sense.

The passions also have an important relationship with classically-inspired virtue ethics. The passions are termed “perturbations of the mind” (B4r) by Thomas Wright in his Jacobean treatise on the subject. They are physical and mental aspects that affect one’s temperaments, and the Edmund Spenser who features in Lodowick Bryskett’s A Discourse on Civill Life (1606) ponders the “lethargies, Phenzies, Melancholie, drunkennesse, and such other passions” that might afflict the soul (Mm4v). These were seen to be governed, by reference back to Platonic and Aristotelian thought, by the rule of reason.

Critics who have renewed interest in the moral role of the passions have identified the importance of Stoicism in early modern concepts of the rule of reason. Unhae Park Langis’s recent study on the association of the virtues and passions in Shakespearean drama puts stress on the “reason-dominant ethics” that comes “through the writings of Cicero, Seneca, and others” and that characterised early moderns as “engrossed in the rational pursuit of human good and the guidance of passions towards this end” (2-3). Langis also identifies the connection of the passions to early modern physiology, claiming that “the salient feature about Renaissance ethics is indeed the interactivity between body and soul” (4). The early modern understanding that the passions were natural aspects of one’s constitution posits them as unavoidable objects in moral life. For this reason, Wright claims that passions “inhabite the confines both of sense and reason” (B4v). Although they are closer to the natural, physical realm of the senses, they can also influence man’s rule of reason and will, “inducing . . . to vice, and commonly withdrawing from vertue” as well as “prosecuting some good thing, or flying some ill thing” (B4v). Bryskett too sees virtue “busied about these two passions of pleasure and displeasure” (Ee1r). Because they are generally seen as inevitable intrusions upon behaviour and thought, early modern thinkers often, in distinction from Stoic belief, encourage the harnessing of passions for the best possible ends. Amy M. Schmitter
therefore notes “the practical approach most authors adopt to the topic” in the period (443). This aspect of moral philosophy, it seems, conforms to the broader expectations of the genre.

I must briefly outline here historians’ exploration of moral theology and its impact on the arguably more secular realm of early modern practical moral philosophy, because the interaction underpins the providential writing marked as “strange” and considered in Part Two. Alasdair MacIntyre connects Christian morality with both New Testament texts and Stoicism, in its “interiorisation of the moral life with its stress on will and law” (*After Virtue* 157). Medieval Christianity also introduces the concept of time to the virtues. In Aristotelian thought, *telos* refers to the way life is *lived* and construed, a process in which “a variety of human excellences have to be achieved at the various relevant stages.” The lack of an end-point in the moral life means that the “notion of final redemption” is completely absent from Aristotle’s thought (*After Virtue* 163). For medieval Christians, however,

the narrative in which human life is embodied has a form in which the subject—which may be one or more individual persons, or, for example, the people of Israel, or the citizens of Rome—is set a task in the contemplation of which lies their peculiar appropriation of the human good; the way towards the completion of that task is barred by a variety of inward and outward evils. The virtues are those qualities which enable the evils to be overcome, the task to be accomplished, the journey to be completed. (*After Virtue* 164)

Consequently, “the virtues are . . . those qualities which enable men to survive evils on their historical journey” (*After Virtue* 164). Medieval thinkers, most notably and influentially Aquinas, therefore update Aristotelian moral philosophy to fit a Christian framework.

Michael Moriarty and Jennifer Herdt have focussed most specifically on those aspects of Augustinian and Thomist thought that remain pertinent to the early modern period’s understanding of classical virtue. Both show that, while Augustine seeks to downplay the moral agency of humankind and is concerned with final salvation, Aquinas can still be considered broadly Aristotelian because he believes in the possibility of an autonomous moral realm for human beings.
Both writers, however, stress the essential role of God’s grace in the moral life. Ultimately, for both Moriarty and Herdt, tensions with classical concepts of virtue result in forms of secular moral thought in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Europe that are nonetheless constrained by the need for divine grace and by medieval criticism of classical pride.

The Reformation brings its own issues with classical virtue, on top of those addressed by medieval theologians. P. J. E. Kail’s explanation gives an indication of the tensions with Lutheran and especially Calvinist theology: “Virtue ethics opposes consequentialist and deontological approaches by putting at its centre, not consequences or dutiful action, but human flourishing and excellence” (363). In contrast to a theology that insists on man’s ultimate lack of all true knowledge and his inability to attain the truth without God’s gift of grace, humanism and its interest in classical philosophy valued the possibility that man could become morally perfect, the essential aim of the *vir virtutis*. MacIntyre neatly summarises the moral philosophy of Martin Luther:

The only true moral rules are the divine commandments and the divine commandments . . . have no further rationale or justification than that they are the injunctions of God. To obey such moral rules cannot be to satisfy our desires; for our desires are part of the total corruption of our nature, and thus there is a natural antagonism between what we want and what God commands us to perform. Human reason and will cannot do what God commands because they are enslaved by sin; we therefore have to act against reason and against our natural will. But this we can do only by grace. We are saved not by works, for none of our works are in any way good. They are all the product of sinful desire. (A Short History 121-22)

As with his theology, therefore, it is faith that inspires moral action and faith that matters—not the action performed. Luther’s deeply pessimistic view about man’s autonomy and ability to act virtuously aligns him with Augustinian thought and distances him from the optimism of Aquinas. Calvin, likewise, echoes the importance of faith and treats virtue as an instrument of God in the secular world. Moriarty offers an eloquent description of Calvin’s Augustinianism: “In
order to preserve human society, God restrains the perversity of human nature, not by grace but by the workings of natural passions. Shame, fear of the law, the belief that honesty is the best policy keep many people from abandoning themselves to evil. In other cases, the display of virtue is, so to speak, charismatic, as if designed to overawe the common herd into obedience” (96). Although they have differences, it is sufficient to note that both Luther’s and Calvin’s moral theology concerns the maintenance of human order.

Paul Cefalu has therefore explored the conflict that results from such an anti-Aristotelian approach and examined “why Reformed theology exclaimed so loudly against classical virtue theory” (4) in relation to English Protestant writers. He identifies a spiritual realm and an earthly realm with moral forms in both: “social or civic ethics in the secular kingdom, and an ethics of neighbour-regard and forbearance in the Christian kingdom” (6). Put simply, what Cefalu and studies by Shuger and C. F. Allison ultimately indicate is that English divines, most notably Richard Hooker, Lancelot Andrewes, Joseph Hall, and John Donne, possess complex and contradictory attitudes but share a Protestant scepticism about human moral perfection, a tension captured in “strange” expressions of morality that occupy a ground between the secular and the sacred.

Arguably the most significant exposition of Anglican moral theology in the period is Richard Hooker’s *The Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity* (1593, reprinted 1604), which is greatly preoccupied with issues of natural and moral law. Hooker displays a complex engagement with virtue theory. On the one hand, Shuger has noted, his “spiritual psychology consistently makes desire rather than reason the epistemic ground” (44). It is desire for God that gives us true insight. Yet desire itself offers no security, because “one can feel very strongly and still be wrong” (44). The *Laws* echo the Augustinian suspicion of both human emotion and knowledge, while also suggesting that “natural understanding” can show man how “to be beseeming or unbeseeming, vertuous or vitious, good or euill” (Hooker G1r). Anglican moral theology therefore moves frequently into the territory of natural law, a subject debated fiercely in the early modern period (as in the medieval). Considerations of natural law (and Hooker in particular) by R.S. White and Cefalu show that writers often
mediate and adapt classical virtue and medieval syncretism, borrowing and amending older understandings to fit post-Reformation purposes.²

Overall, then, it is clear that early modern English writers use virtue theory in various ways. The virtues and the concept of “virtue” are prominent parts of moral philosophy and other forms of moral thought in early modern England, but they are fraught with complex and contradictory meanings. While there are elements of traditional classical use, treating the virtues as habits that need to be acquired, they are also Christianised. Kail notes that “the presence or absence of dispositions of character” in virtue theory “play[s] an important role in what are explicitly Christian ethics” (364). There are therefore slippages between the practice of earthly conduct and the way the received grace of God displays itself in behaviour.

In this light, Blair Worden’s study of the impact of virtue on literary figures in late sixteenth-century England provides a concise and helpful conception of the period’s understanding of the term—particularly with reference to that famous defender of literature’s moral force, Sir Philip Sidney. Worden explains that

Virtue had a larger meaning for the Elizabethans than it has for us. It meant not only conformity to moral principles but the possession of divinely endowed gifts and powers. Those properties, if cultivated by education, would carry the authority of example and could change the world. (23)

His explanation brings to the fore the synthesis of classical and religious moralities as it appears in Elizabethan (and into Jacobean) England. Indeed, Worden notes that Sidney’s conception is largely classical more than it is Christian, but God nevertheless plays a role in the “giving” of virtue, even if it is a God who “differs from his medieval predecessor in the demands he makes on individual action and decision-making and on something we can loosely call citizenship” and also “differs from his Puritan successor in the scope he gives to, and the demands he makes of, freedom of will” (23). Worden neatly

² See Cefalu’s suggestion that Hooker integrates “not a system of character-based virtue theory” but “simply the language and rhetoric of virtue theory within his rule-centred system of positive law” (89).
summarises the strands of moral thought that have preoccupied historians and critics of the period, particularly with the difficulties of Christianising virtue.

With reference to English writers, critics have also begun to look at the process of writing moral treatises and the desired end of advice literature. Greg Walker’s *Writing Under Tyranny* (2005) identifies, in particular, Thomas Elyot’s *The boke called the governour* (1531), one of the period’s earliest, most famous, and most influential works of moral philosophy in English. Walker identifies it as a response to “the political situation of the moment,” claiming that moral treatises and manuals for princes “sought to do vicariously” what the writer “could not do in person and *ex officio*: counsel the King on his personal conduct and the public policy of the realm” (128). Alongside the political and moral efficacy of advice manuals, Robert Matz has also addressed the delight that literacy can provide and its importance in instilling moral precepts. Looking at Elyot and his successors in moral philosophy as well as the popular courtier manual tradition, Matz claims these writers stress “that humanist literacy will provide more enjoyment than the traditional pleasure of the elite, as well as more profit” (21). The genre of moral advice itself, therefore, becomes something both enjoyable and important. Matz also echoes Walker in suggesting that Elyot (and his ilk) can rewrite “his exclusion from counsel and his office as assistant clerk by imagining a kingdom in which eloquence reigns” (38). Studies including Matz’s *Defending Literature* (2000), Walker’s *Writing under Tyranny*, and Richard Halpern’s *The Poetics of Primitive Accumulation* (1991) have argued that the bureaucratic middle class, excluded from the truly power-wielding elite, sought to make humanist learning into its own form of power. They thereby transform moral philosophy into a form of moral agency. Writing advice itself, then, is an *office*, a Ciceronian moral duty that contributes to the active life of the commonwealth.

The notion of office is connected to the wider political and vocational importance of virtue ethics and of morality in general, which further emphasises the practical focus of the moral life. Condren, as part of his critique of new historicist “self-hood,” has sought to establish a more accurate understanding of the period’s morality. His study accommodates what might now be considered the “moral schizophrenia” of early modern conceptions of moral duty (*Argument and Authority* 139-40). Indeed, in *Argument and Authority* (2006), Condren argues that an “ethics of office” is at work in the period; morality is not to be
understood as the actions of self-governing individuals, but rather as the requirements necessitated by different offices and the *persona*\textsubscript{e}s they generate. His focus on Shakespeare’s plays in “Understanding Shakespeare’s Perfect Prince” (2009) links this focus to literary concerns, arguing that “public” and “private” in the period concern actions and responsibilities rather than the more modern idea of separate spheres. Condren’s important work insists that in the early modern period, spiritual, political, military, family, and all other elements can be understood as inhabiting “offices” with their own appropriate actions and moral responsibilities—responsibilities that are consequently both practical and pragmatic.

Steve Hindle’s *The State and Social Change* (2000) and Michael Braddick’s *State Formation in Early Modern England* (2000) have also touched on the state’s role in the moral life, suggesting the explicitly practical sides of moral thought. Both focus chiefly on the reformation of manners in the Jacobean period and the influence of court and local forms of justice and regulation. Hindle explores the effect of state policing of morality, noting that “the late Elizabethan and early Stuart period was characterised by the widespread promotion of ideals of moral reformation, with attacks on drunkenness, fornication, swearing, blasphemy, gaming, dancing, revelling and profaning the Sabbath.” The influence of the state resulted, Hindle explains, in “practical consequences” that include “the whipping of pregnant brides, the shaming of common drunkards, the fining of swearers and the sawing down of maypoles” (176). Such an approach associates the late Elizabethan and particularly the Jacobean literary interest in moral codes and advice with national government. It also allows us to associate the increase of images, tables, pamphlets, and treatises from the printing presses—a subject introduced below and explored in depth in Chapter Two—with political interference in ethics and crucially with the pragmatic and practical possibilities of moral philosophy.

Recent scholarly interest in early modern “moralities” indicates, then, the chief characteristics of the period’s moral philosophical thought, which point towards a practical interest in duty, activity, and expression, alongside tension with Stoical introspection and Christian doctrine. Work since the 1970s has been concerned with identifying the tensions between Christian and pagan ideas—pioneered by Isabel Rivers’s seminal study *Classical and Christian*
Ideas—but in recent years a more explicit focus on the reception of the virtues and its impact on human agency with regard to early modern Europe has taken the subject further. Likewise, post-Reformation English approaches have also received discussions that note their complex and contradictory nature and emphasise the impact of Protestant moral theology on practical action and the secular world. That secular world, too, has in the last ten to fifteen years been subject to a number of studies of its own, identifying the importance of offices, political intervention, and state policing in the moral life.

Such a variation in approaches to the state of “early modern morality” indicate the breadth of its scope and the absence of a coherent “world picture.” Yet these studies also share a concern for the specifics of moral thought, reviving interest in texts of moral instruction and addressing particular aspects with full appreciation for their individual, political, and religious context. Building on this rich critical background, this thesis treats the specific manifestations of “practicality” stemming from the period’s moral thought—chiefly, its coordination with ideas of “materialisation” that result from the crise pyrhonnienne (or more broadly the “crisis” of doubt stemming from Pyrrhonian scepticism), Elizabethan rhetorical style, New World exploration, and science and technology. The next section of this chapter, accordingly, outlines the moral treatises of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. How do they interpret and convey the classical emphasis on practical use?

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While studies have shown that moral philosophical and advice treatises in early modern England are engaged with practicality, they also hinge, in Aristotelian fashion, on practice. Robert Johnson explains in 1601 how nobility often confers virtue upon successive generations, but only because “some families retaine proper customs naturalized in them” (B8v). His sentiments echo Elyot’s Governor (1531), The Institucion of a Gentleman (1555), Baldassare Castiglione’s Courtier (translated by Thomas Hoby in 1561), and Roger Ascham’s Scholemaстер (1570), to list only the most prominent. These forms of manuals and essays, which have their successors in texts in the vein of Bryskett’s Discourse (1606) and The office of Christian parents (1616), are invested in emphasising the moral duties of stately or noble offices—
Castiglione, for example, describes high birth as a lamp that shines upon good works and “enflameth and prouoketh vnto vertue” (C2v)—while insisting that virtue cannot be found in the blood. In speaking directly to a reader’s monetary means and distancing it from that reader’s moral means, these writers instil their texts with non-commercial value.\(^3\) The *Institucion* most forcefully captures the distance of economic and social status from the power of virtue:

> He which bequetheth to his son his maner place, cannot therwith bequeth vertue unto him, for lands com to men by gifte, purches, inheritaunce, or such lyke meane, but vertue cannot so do: for nether may it with mony be bought, geuen to others nor claymed by succession. (C7v)

Matz and Walker have explored the status of writers, notably Elyot, who are excluded from direct counsel to the Crown, and identify his moral writings as a vicarious form of influence. Other texts in the tradition, too, follow suit. Gesturing to a burgeoning class of non-elites with high ambitions, the cultivation of humanist virtue is posited in these manuals as a democratic and ultimately more important form of honour than formal office or nobility.

If virtue cannot be bought, given, or claimed, it can only be practised and perfected by habituation. Advice books and moral treatises offer ways to that practice in their very form. Indeed, authors are keen to dispel the idea that they as writers possess all or any of these virtues, yet the texts themselves are effectively forms of moral perfection: they contain multitudinous histories and examples of virtues, metaphysical and practical explanations, and prompts to action; they inhabit the culture of letters, noble society, and exhibit pleasant conversation (especially the dialogue form of books in the style of *The Courtier* and Bryskett’s *Discourse*); they merge Christian and classical virtue; they contain the best advice. Thomas Hoby’s preface to his translation of *The Courtier* explains the function of these texts; they should offer

> To yonge Gentlemen, an encouraging to garnishe their minde with morall vertues, and their bodye with comely exercises, and both

\(^3\) I return to this subject in the following chapter, addressing the materialising of humanist learning.
the one and the other with honest qualities to attaine unto their noble ende: To Ladyes and Gentlewomen, a mirrour to decke and trimme themselues with virtuous condicions, comely behauiours and honest entertainment toward al men: And to them all in general, a storehouse of most necessary implements for the conversacion, use, and training up of mans life with Courtly demeaners. (A3v)

In this sense, these authors have produced books that are separate from the writer’s hand but nonetheless greater than a “maner place”—and although Bryskett can modestly claim to have read “so little . . . in Morall Philosophy” (D3v), the text of the Discourse, as with other advice manuals, quietly establishes itself as greater and of more active importance than any inherited land. The texts themselves are the perfect courtier and the perfect counsellor.

Moral writing on these subjects contains a variation of forms. Yet whereas essays and discourses allow a degree of idiosyncrasy in their arrangement, moral treatises and courtier manuals share a similar structure. (Proto-)essay collections—Leonard Wright’s A Display of Duty (1592), Bacon’s Essaies (1597-98), and Robert Johnson’s Essaies, or rather imperfect offers (1601)—take a scattergun approach to considerations of the moral life and practical advice related to it, an approach most likely rooted in the explorative nature of the essay form. Both William Perkins and Joseph Hall, too, address notions of conscience and duty, yet their approach is closer to a sermon than a treatise or manual, with Perkins’s Discourse of Conscience (1596) nearing an almost scientific, anatomical investigation of the moral life and of mankind’s related physical and spiritual attributes. On the other hand, moral treatises, educational manuals, and courtier handbooks tend to start off by introducing their subject—usually with withering remarks about the contemporary state of morality and nobility in England (or Europe)—before moving onto an outline of the issues at stake.

William Baldwin’s much-reprinted A Treatise of Morall Philosophie (1547; expanded in 1610 by Thomas Palfreyman) is a popular and archetypal example. It begins with an outline of the Greek and Roman history of the subject, and describes the three parts of philosophy: “Phisick, Ethnicke, and Dialecticke,” claiming ethical, which is moral philosophy, to be concerned with
“life and manners” (B2r). Baldwin then goes on to discuss soul and body, governance and policy, virtues and vices in detail; he dedicates one chapter to “women” and offers a collection of “precepts & Proverbs of moral philosophy” (Y4r). The whole treatise is essentially a patchwork of quotation from classical (and occasionally contemporary) thinkers. Elyot’s *Governour* has a similar structure, aided by the presence of a contents page, from the first edition onwards, which separates each element into clear, definable topics. Elyot also puts greater emphasis on examples, drafting historical figures and noble men to flesh out each philosophical consideration. His important work provides a model for much that comes after, and *The Institucion of a gentleman* follows *Governour* very closely in its debate over pastimes, as well as in its overall structure.

Educational manuals, which likewise deal in moral philosophy, also use that structure. Elyot (whose *Governour* spans these similar genres more comprehensively than most), Ascham in *Scholemaster* (1570), and Richard Mulcaster in his *Positions* (1581) all treat the state of education before addressing the practicalities of teaching: when to teach certain subjects, how to teach them, how parents should bring up a child. An explanation of the forms of rhetoric and grammar is followed by praise of physical exercise, “the soule and bodie being coparteners in good and ill, in sweete and sowre, in mirth and mourning, & hauing generally a common sympathie, & a mutuall feeling in all passions” (Mulcaster D4v), going on to discuss more generally the place of education and its role. These texts also talk to each other; both Elyot and Ascham, for example, address the importance of Castiglione’s *Courtier*, which amongst other things “doth trimlie teache” how best to “ioyne learning with cumlie exercises” (Ascham G4v). *The Courtier* provides a slightly different format to Elyot and Baldwin, being framed as a discussion. Such intertextual conversations form a network or canon of moral philosophical advice for sixteenth- and seventeenth-century English humanists, at once participating in a culture of letters and establishing itself as an important self-defined genre: after all, Annibal explains to Guazzo in Stephano Guazzo’s *The ciuile*

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4 Elyot’s and Baldwin’s treatment of the virtues is sprawling, gesturing towards cardinal virtues but actually encompassing a large range. There is little distinction between Christian and classical virtues and the structure shows that one virtue begets another, one vice another, and so on, suggesting the vast interrelatedness of “virtue” and all forms of “virtues” for moral writers.
conversation of M Steeuen Guazzo, “conuersation is the beginning and end of knowledge” (trans. George Pettie 1581, D6r).

All these forms owe an important debt to Desiderius Erasmus’s The Education of a Christian Prince (1516), as well as to Machiavelli’s Prince (1513). Both are early mirror-for-magistrates texts that deal, in different ways, with the most expedient and (importantly and) virtuous methods of ruling. The structure of Erasmus’s Education in particular—moving through upbringing and onto the practical aspects of governance through marriages, treaties, and wars—and his explicit Aristotelian references and aphoristic style undoubtedly influence later works. Alongside his treatise on moral philosophy, for example, Baldwin also wrote part of the thrice-reprinted Myrrour for Magistrates (1559). The connection between these genres further associates moral philosophy with humanist exemplars, applicable advice, and practical action.

Education forms the basis of the early modern moral impetus. The new humanist curriculum, on its journey to replacing the medieval scholastic curriculum, is inextricably associated with moral philosophy. Most moral treatises are forms of as well as marketing tools for humanist education; in Elyot’s words, “We instructe our children in liberal sciences, not because those sciences maie geue any vertue, because they prepare the mind, and make it apt to receiue vertue” (Cc2r-v). Mulcaster, Ascham, and Elyot therefore promote the study of the liberal sciences as an important aspect of the new humanist curriculum—one that comprises grammar, logic, and dialectic (the trivium) and geometry, astronomy, music, and mathematics (the quadrivium). These educators seek to map out a course of learning from infancy to University studies into early adulthood, encouraging hard study, curtailed liberty, and a course of languages and texts. In the sixteenth century, Roger Ascham proudly states, “the scholemaster is uesed, both for Praeceptor in learning, and paedagogus in maners” (E4v); alongside the teaching of practical skills and capacities that are required for offices of work and service, education taught mores: manners, or morality.

An important element of this humanist education is also an important element of moral treatises: histories. All of these works draw on exemplars from the past as a means of ethical illumination. In his Defence of Poesie (c.1580, printed 1595), Sidney sees the historian as a rival to the moralist, claiming that
Sidney contrasts and separates the historian from the moralist, and indeed the opening clause of his portrait appears as the first example in the OED for “moralist,” where it is defined as “a teacher or student of morals; a writer on morals; a moral philosopher” (1.a.). The dependence of moral philosophy on history, however, suggests that such a nice distinction is artificial. Sidney is strictly referring to Platonic metaphysics, and he points out that such a philosopher “teacheth vertue by certainen abstract considerations,” unlike the historian, who can claim, “I onely bid you follow the footing of them that haue gone before you” (C4v). Yet it is precisely the anti-abstract, practical application of virtue that moral treatises employ by way of historical examples and figures.

Almost every virtue commended or vice condemned in Elyot’s Governour is supported by an historical anecdote. Baldwin’s Treatise is more sparing, but nonetheless its reworking of sayings and statements from both philosophers and statesmen of the classical world proves a kind of history. The Institucion most eloquently describes the function of histories, a description that gestures to the reason for their practical employment in moral treatises:

. . . in histories are to be learned manye morall lessons to the understanding of thinges paste, the ordre of thinges to come, and profite of thinges presente. By them we learn to know how princes and rulers of this worlde haue passed their liues, as sum geuen to knowledge of sciences, sum to see iustice truelye executed, other geuen to pitie, others to peace, quyetnes, and care of the commune wealthe. (K5r)

Such learning affords the reader “a delicious taste of good thinges belonging to the knowledge of noble men, through pleasure wherof by readyng of histories they may increase there wisdomes” (K5v). It is for this reason, then, that Elyot employs historical parallels and anecdotes to back up his assertions; not only,
he claims, are they more “plesant to the reader” (U5v), but they are associated with “experience” itself. For Elyot, history is part of the very essence of moral learning. It is

wonderfull profitable, whiche leaueth nothing hyd from mannes knowlage, that vnto hym maie be eyther pleasaunt or necessary. For it not only reporteth the gestes or actes of princes or captaines, theyr counsayles and attemptates, enterprises, affayres, maners in liuing good and bad, descripcions of regions and citees with theyr inhabitants: but also it bryngeth to our knowlage, the forms of sundry publyke weales, with theyr augmentacions and decaies, and occasion therof. (Cc4r-v)

The use of histories brings the “abstraction” of moral philosophy into the vita activa, mapping out precepts onto real life—evidenced by the Institucion’s reference to the “commune wealth” and Elyot’s to “sundry publyke weales.” It is exactly this use of history that appears in Myrrour for Magistrates, which lists the lives and actions of kings and prominent persons throughout history to provide pithy, sententious moral messages, delivered through poetry. History, therefore, is not only an essential part of education that instils virtue; it also forms part of moral philosophy—not just in treatises’ urgent gestures towards histories but, so often, in its inclusion of them in their teaching. The genre of moral-philosophy-cum-history proves interesting with regard to drama and especially to generically-confused (or confusing) historical- and mythological-minded plays along the lines of Heywood’s Ages.

The growing emphasis on the quadrivium⁵ meant a growth in the emphasis on other aspects of learning that might have a role in moral education. Music, therefore, is given considerable treatment in all of these treatises, and so follows painting and dancing. Educationalists treat them as part of exercise and pastimes. Both dancing and music get due treatment in Castiglione’s Courtier because of their importance to court life. They are praised as part of good grace, along with other forms of art, but later in the Courtier music is said to “make swete the minds of men, but also many times

⁵ See Benjamin Woolley (12).
wilde beastes tame . . .” (I2v), associating it with virtuous dispositions and granting it some spiritual power.⁶

In covering a range of aspects but characterising early modern humanist thought, moral treatises and advice manuals therefore exemplify the practical emphasis of the period’s ethics. They present themselves as copious windows onto history and ancient thought, while being themselves the perfected counsellor, the perfected courtier, the perfected teacher—Elyot’s work is therefore duly titled *The boke named the governour*. Not only do these forms of writing all reject inherited virtue and encourage the learning and practice of good manners—exercises in action—they also claim activity itself to be of moral significance. Pastimes are accorded philosophical power, but only insofar as they can be found useful. The emphasis on practicality and its relationship with the physical world is considered in depth in the following chapter.

First, however, it is necessary to outline another aspect of early modern moral teaching. Images are an essential aspect of the wider consumption of moral thought. They convert the more verbal and philosophical (even as they are practical) treatises into a wide array of visual forms, presenting advice and admonition directly to the period’s most “moral” sense.

**The “moral image”**

“Reading good Bookes of *Morality*, is a little Flat, and Dead,” claims Francis Bacon in “Of Friendship” (1625) (*The essayes or counsels* X4r). There is much that is surprising and entertaining in those moral treatises just discussed, but if one considers the formulaic nature of the bulk of their advice, then it is difficult to quarrel with Bacon. He is making an argument about the counsel and admonition of a friend, but there are other forms of “morality” that might be considered more lively. This section concentrates on the “moral image”—the visualisation of moral precepts and advice in a wide variety of images. By converting advice and teaching into visual form, moral images bring those aspects of early modern “morality” that might seem “flat and dead” to life.

“As the sight among the rest of the senses is most sharpe, and pierceth furthest, so is it proued most sure, and least deceiued,” declares Henry

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⁶ In the hybrid moralities of the Elizabethan period, therefore, a character “daunceth as evil favoured as may be devised” (Fulwell, 1568 [C1v]) in order to indicate his association with vice.
Peacham in the 1593 revision to his rhetorical “style-guide,” *The Garden of Eloquence*. It “therefore is very nigh to the mind in the affinitie of nature, so farre foorth as an externall sense of the bodie may be compared to an internall vertue of the mind” (C2v). Sight was considered the most spiritual of senses and, as Peacham’s sub-description of “metaphor” indicates, it was therefore the closest, too, to “vertue” and its conceptions.

Sight in fact becomes so confident and self-assured in its place as the primary sense that in 1607 it exerts an audacious self-confidence, provoking a contest amongst its jealous rivals; it appears as a character in the play *Lingua, or the combat of the tongue and the five senses* (1607), where it declares its noble stature: “I haue always beene accounted best” (C3r). If *Lingua*’s Visus provides a popular conception of early modern sight, he also intimates its noble and enriching function:

I hourely . . . conuay
Matters of wisdome by experience bred:
. . . Deepe contemplation, that attires the soule,
In gorgeous roabes of flowering literature:

(G3r)

Sight argues that both things “corporeall” (G2v) and the attire of the “soule” are under the eye’s remit. Vision is the early modern gateway to the physical world, yet the eyes are also esteemed as the organs of spirituality, connecting the earthly realm with higher truths, “that they may further of discerne” (Helkeiah Crooke Zz4r).

Such confidence comes from almost a century of moral information and advice proceeding from the printing presses. Printers were busy throughout the early modern period producing didactic woodcuts. The abstract incarnation of didactic teaching is also seen in the illustration of religious texts, such as John Foxe’s *Acts and Monuments*, or “Book of Martyrs” (1563; 1570; 1576; 1583), or in the imposing pictorial paratexts of Richard Day’s *Book of Christian Prayer* (1578).

Among the most well-covered literary-visual aspects of early modern culture is the emblem, proliferating in England from the 1580s. Emblems are visual and verbal allegories of moral truths (initially the Italian and continental
editions did not include pictures, but in all the later English editions they did). They are a fruitful source of metaphorical imagery and moral representation, as well as of violent and sometimes dissonant composition. Following Rosemary Freeman’s seminal work on *English Emblem Books* (1948), there have been a number of studies on the English and the European craze for the emblem; Michael Bath offers a more up-to-date overview of the English emblem in *Speaking Pictures* (1994), touching on its salient features and acknowledging its influences and its impact. Peter M. Daly’s work covers the literary emblem and the theory of the emblem in the period. John Manning, likewise, links emblems to other visual traditions and his co-edited collection with Daly, *Aspects of Renaissance and Baroque Symbol Theory 1500-1700* (1999), contains a number of interesting readings of the foreign and complex world of early modern pictorial symbols and puzzles.

Recent history and criticism has started to focus on medical and moral concepts of vision. Stuart Clark’s *Vanities of the Eye* (2007) addresses the complexities and uncertainties that surround sight in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Europe. Clark’s study uses George Hakewill’s “demolition of Renaissance optimism about vision” (25), *The vanitie of the eie* (1608), as a lens, for want of a better word, through which to view developments in European thought. Clark’s broad and ambitious study accordingly covers witchcraft, the Reformation approach to images and iconoclasm, theories of imagination, optical illusions, scepticism, and dreams. He is concerned with the notion that “eyes were evidently the most spiritual and least material of the senses” (10). Such a focus on the spiritual aspects of vision naturally leads to a sort of myopia, and, despite the vast reach of Clark’s study, it does not give full appreciation to the more physical aspects of sight. In discussing scepticism, for example, there is an acknowledgement that “‘Ethical’ instability had spawned perceptual instability, and vice versa” (285), but, other than a discussion of fideism, little is noted about a more positive relation between the two phenomena. Similarly, Clark sensitively discusses sceptical philosophy, contemporary tracts, and religious texts, but neglects the practical aspects of early modern moral advice discussed above, and so *Vanities of the Eye* is primarily concerned with abstract developments, losing sight, perhaps, of how humanist moral philosophy might relate in practice to changing concepts of vision.
Clark’s *Vanities* includes a chapter on *Macbeth*, but the last ten years have also seen critics focus more specifically on literary explorations of vision and early modern understandings of the roles and functions of sight. The interest is part of a broader concentration on the senses. Although vision has traditionally been prioritised by historians, critics have begun to think about sight as part of early modern medical thought more broadly, and Sergei Lobanov-Rostovsky’s “Taming the Basilisk” in David Hillman and Carla Mazzio’s collection *The Body in Parts: Fantasies of Corporeality in Early Modern Europe* (1997) charts the development of medical theories of sight. Lobanov-Rostovsky posits a fascinating tension, emerging from the sixteenth century, whereby “the practice of ocular anatomy made the eye visible to itself, intensifying the traditional conflict between the eye’s material nature and its status as metaphor” (197). Ultimately, though, he concludes that “the eye vanishes beneath the knife, rendering up its physiology only as evidence of its essential non-materiality. It remains an image of the soul, ruling over the visible world by the power of its gaze” (198). Enforcing a hierarchy of spiritual over physical maintains an anachronistic opposition between material and moral sight, and again results in a concentration on abstract considerations over practical ethical action.

*Knowing Shakespeare: Senses, Embodiment and Cognition* (2010), edited by Lowell Gallagher and Shankar Raman, goes some way towards remedying the division between material and spiritual notions of vision, with a number of provocative essays that consider their interrelation in Shakespeare’s plays. Essays in the collection—particularly Sean H. McDowell’s on *Macbeth* and Bruce R. Smith’s on *Cymbeline*—begin to address particular aspects of both natural and moral philosophy and draw them into early modern psychology and physiology. McDowell explores how “strong passions functioned both as transformers of reality, inflecting the sense of events, and as essential tools for personal agency” (38). He notes that medical theories were not deterministic, gesturing to the importance of conduct literature in mediating between senses and action. Smith’s essay examines the tensions between active and passive sight, and he claims that sight can be considered a form of haptic physicality, touching both viewer and viewed. This notion opens up the possibilities for further readings of early modern drama, in which vision is seen as closely related to tangible bodies and objects—something this thesis builds upon.
There have also been a number of studies on the symbolic and functional properties of printed pictures from scholars including John N. King and Margaret Aston. Further, a revival of interest in paratexts has led to conferences and a publication on the topic—Renaissance Paratexts (edited by Helen Smith and Louise Wilson, 2011)—inviting readings of non-textual and non-discursive aspects of printed books, and Thomas L. Berger and Sonia Massai have edited a collection on Paratexts in English Printed Drama to 1642 (2014). Juliet Fleming, who also has an essay in that collection, has explored a similar aspect of early modern print culture in Graffiti and the Writing Arts of Early Modern England (2001). Granting significance to pictorial aspects of a text encourages attention to be paid to the wider influence of images and visual features on a text’s or object’s meaning. Further approaches to the early modern image are treated in detail in the following chapter, but it is worth noting that an increase in attention to the early modern images has emphasised their diverse functions.

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Both religious and emblematic texts encouraged the reading of visual messages as “general conceiptes . . . of moral matters” (N.W.’s Preface to Daniel’s The worthy tract of Paulus Iovius *7 recto). Emblems address themselves to both the “inner” and outer eye, and the “mind’s eye” is therefore a familiar trope in the genre; George Wither defines it as a figure “by some . . . us’d, / When in an Emblem, they would signifie / A Minde, which on Celestiall Matters mus’d” (G2r). The trope appears in many forms in emblem books: as a floating hieroglyph in Henry Peacham’s Minerva Britanna (1612) and embedded in the hand in Andrea Alciato’s much reprinted and translated Emblemata (1531). In Alciato’s “sobriè viuendum,” the eye represents the inner mind that “credens id quod uidet” or ‘believes all it sees.’ Educating the organ, however, the emblem warns us against credulity and insobriety, stating that “Hi nerui, humanae membraque mentis erunt,” ‘these will be the nerves and limbs of the human mind’:
Fig. 1. *Sobriè viuendum:* & *non temerè credendum* from Andrea Alciato’s *Emblemata* (Lyons, 1550; B3v).

The image turns the physical organ of the eye into its moral incarnation in the mind. Such emblems therefore speak directly to the moral importance of sight. N.W.’s preface to *The Worthy Tract of Paulus Iovius*, a tract on emblems and impressas translated by Samuel Daniel in 1585, suggests that “we loue the sense of seeing, for that by it we are taught and made to learne more then by any other of our senses” (A1v); the ultimate aim of moral iconography was to teach and by teaching to place moral messages in the memory. Indeed, iconographical depictions are loosely connected with the period’s interest in memory arts—which Frances Yates has explored at length (*The Art of Memory* 1966)—and so “there is often a relationship between emblem books and the *ars memorativa*,” as Michael Bath reminds us (34). These *picturae* are designed to turn the mind inward in order to encourage interpretation and reflection alongside the internalisation of moral messages.

Emblems often use a combination of classical and Christian ethics similar to the conjunctions employed by moral philosophers and conduct writers. The humanist bent of the genre leans towards a classicisation of virtue, exercised throughout Peacham’s *Minerva Britannia*, which places classical figures and virtues opposite religious images that depict Lucifer and discuss
obedience to God. Moral images therefore unsurprisingly parallel the broad treatment of the virtues and vices by, for instance, Baldwin and Elyot, who similarly conflate Christian teaching with classical ethics and blur a distinction between cardinal and mental/intellectual virtues. Day’s *A booke of Christian prayers* surrounds its text with both illustrations from the Bible, *memento mori* images that include a coffin serving as a printer’s block at the top of the page, and classically inspired devices running the inside margins of the page: pilasters, vases, and vines propped up by figures in the unmistakable appearance of pagan Goddesses. Stephen Batman’s *A christall glasse of christian reformation* (1569) likewise offers classically-inspired figures alongside floating, flaming devils. Batman presents emblems of virtue and vice elaborated in terms of both the classical virtues and of Christianity in the accompanying “significations”—a visual and symbolic hodgepodge typical of printed moral images.

Indeed, what is an apparent mixture of visual symbolism matches the moral image’s philosophical underpinnings in the Christianising of neo-Stoic philosophy. Skinner notes how the “neo-stoic political philosophy” popular in sixteenth-century Europe had a common “point of departure” that was “supplied by the concept of Fortune, which they personify in typically humanist style as an inscrutable goddess, capricious and potentially overwhelming in power” (*Foundations* 278). Images of emblems were able to “personify” abstractions visually, offering to fulfil in image what Peacham had described in *The Garden of Eloquence* as metaphor’s most morally efficacious form: presenting to the sight. Emblems were therefore useful and very popular tools in synthesising Christian and classical moral philosophy. The English scholar Gabriel Harvey wrote approvingly at the end of the 1570s that, all across Cambridge, students were neglecting Aristotle for Alciato, Aquinas for Jovius (78-79, c.1578-80).

Emblems appealed to young University students who seem, according to Harvey, to enjoy the new humanist writings more than classical authors. The fact that Wither’s collection contains a “playing-page” split up into books and sections and to be played like a board game or “Lotterie” suggests that, like literature in the early modern conception (see Matz), emblems served to teach and to delight. It also underscores the practical aspect of these moral images: they are to be used in both metaphorical and literal ways.
Judging by Harvey’s letter, emblems were already very popular in England by the end of the 1570s. Part of Harvey’s praise is for the new fashion of humanist learning, and he even lists Guazzo and Castiglione in his list of the “owtlandishe braveries” (79) that have mercifully displaced the big names of scholastic learning. Harvey sees both emblems and courtier manuals as part of students’ desire to be “more then schollers” and be “rather active then contemplative philosophers” (78). In Harvey’s conception, emblems represent particularly well early modern moral philosophy’s chief aim of practical action.

Emblems also include a particularly calculated iconography, meaning that engaging and understanding their meanings is inevitably active. Manning has eloquently said of the emblem and its hieroglyph forebears that since the image does not make sense in naturalistic, mimetic terms, if it is not nonsense, it must make sense in some other way. The image becomes a puzzle, which teases its putative observer into speculation as to its metaphysical meaning. It would seem that such iconographic encoding was deliberately antimimetic, or, to put it another way, poetic, moralistic, or doctrinal motives radically moderated *mimesis*. (xv)

When an emblem, as always in England, is combined with an image, it is often done so in a calculated way in the sense of a puzzle. It is a conception, critics have noted, that can be associated with collections’ frequent reversion to analogies of cracking—what Daly phrases as “the topos of the kernel and shell” (“George Wither’s” 27). The emblem is a calculated visual-verbal statement, and in this light “the primacy of the bookish and the verbal in the formulation of allegorical images was pervasive. An implied or cited text will frequently form the key to unlock the mystery of some strange, unnatural visual construct” (Manning xv-xvi). In this sense, Wither’s “playing-page” simply makes the active and game-like aspect of the emblem explicit.

Broadside ballads, often comprised of a woodcut and a song-text, are another and altogether different example of this visual moral tradition, an example that was even more widespread throughout the sixteenth and

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7 This is what Bath, in a similar discussion of the need for wide reading in order to decode an emblem’s meaning, terms “subreading” (31).
seventeenth centuries. Broadside is a term for a one-sided single-sheet print, much like a poster, and the form was the cheapest and most widely available printed material of the early modern period. Many of them were ballads, though they also came as “tables”—that is, single-sheet diagrams or instructions (see Chapter Two for further discussion). They are often considered to be crucial in the development and spreading of new ideas. Tessa Watt explains that “these ballads, woodcuts and chapbooks . . . blended the new ideas with older attitudes to religion and morality, just as they embraced existing oral and visual traditions” (8). Being the most popular, simple, and cheap product of the printing presses, they were at the forefront of shifting moral issues and responses, from topical events to changing models of and approaches to moral advice.

Broadsides and ballads were popular in terms of their sheer number as well as their audience: Patricia Fumerton and Anita Guerrini explain that “one could not travel anywhere in the city of London without hearing ballads sung on street corners or seeing broadsides pasted up on posts and walls. Ballads and their broadside brethren thus touched all levels of society . . .” (2). Perhaps more than humanist learning, then, it is the cruder and more accessible woodcuts of ballad sheets and broadsides that spread moral messages through a visual medium. This “democratising” of humanist learning links the ballad woodcut with early modern drama, which, as I discuss below, also seeks to bring moral philosophical teaching to a wide audience through a popular and delightful medium.

In contrast to emblems, ballads and broadside tables offer a much more incidental—even accidental—relationship between image and intent. A number of the larger and more prescriptive tables have custom-built designs and some, perhaps, even custom-built images (like displaying the Ten Commandments in the form of gloves—an example discussed in the following chapter). Others, however, are no less involved in the acts of moral approbation and disapprobation, admonition and instruction, but are both visually and textually different in their approach. Ballads, for example, frequently recycle woodcuts, and consequently the relationship between image and text is often tangential or

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8 Tassie Gniady’s exciting reading of the “hog-faced woman” illustrates ballads’ complex engagements with discourses of acceptance and condemnation, and of moral and spiritual fascination as well as punishment.
simply baffling. Even so, there is normally a correspondence of sorts, as the “excellent song wherein you shall finde / Great consolation for a troubled minde” indicates:

Fig. 2. Detail from An excellent song wherein you shall finde great consolation for a troubled minde (London, 1628). STC 22918.7.

The ultimate effect of the image, however, is to add to early modern England’s moral-visual culture. Many Londoners would only be able to hear the textual content of the ballad when it was sung aloud, yet they could see its visual content pasted up in their own houses, in taverns, or elsewhere in public areas. Such visual importance makes a broadside’s image an important synecdoche of its moral message. Even if the image is not necessarily conveying a text's meaning in itself, its very presence serves as a reminder of the content, a
prompt to the memory, in a similar way to the more strictly mnemonic devices sometimes used in tables (see Fig. 4 in Chapter Two) or the emblem’s prompt to virtuous action. The image above (Fig. 2), too, serves a religious aim of coupling the ballad’s Christian advice with a prompt to prayer. The simplicity of the woodcuts, their ability to stand in and for themselves, as well as ballads’ affordability, meant that broadsides could offer “moral vision” to educated humanists and illiterate labourers alike.

The moral image therefore has a wide range of uses, but they are often directed towards practical ends. Increased critical attention to the role of vision in understanding medical theories and playtexts has opened up the diverse roles played by sight. Emblems and broadsides show that the printing press could capitalise on the most morally-sensitive sense by presenting pictorial puzzles that spark viewers into action. Broadsides offer a more popular space for the moral image, one not always bespoke or directly relevant but nonetheless not merely decorative. These images combine delight with contemplation, something that aligns them with the work of drama—a medium that, according to Thomas Heywood, is uniquely able to combine different sensory experiences in the service of moral representation and illumination.

Morality and the early modern stage

“Morality” is in effect commonplace in critical discussions of early modern dramatic texts—especially in readings that seek to know more about the manners and mores of the culture, the historical period that produces a given literary text, and the power of words on the page to affect readers in a whole host of ways. Indeed, “moral” in literature can consequently risk becoming an imprecise term that can indicate empathy for characters or situations, sensitivity to the broad issues at stake in the drama, or appreciation for an ethical “position,” outlook, or argument. As noted in the introduction, “morality” is sometimes used in early to mid-twentieth-century criticism to indicate a personal position of approval or disapproval from the critic themselves (see Ornstein and Harbage below). However, I am specifically concerned with early modern notions of moral teaching and admonition—something that features in part in some early mid-twentieth-century criticism but is largely lost amid the ideological concerns of new historicism and the material focus of some later
criticism. I seek here to rediscover early modern attitudes in a more thoroughly historicist sense in order to enliven and inform my readings of materiality and machinery below. I therefore explain how the stage itself can be and was considered a form of instruction akin to moral images and conduct manuals.

Mid-twentieth century critics have, in a somewhat conservative fashion, fastened their eyes on “moral” readings of the period’s drama. Robert Ornstein’s *The Moral Vision of Jacobean Tragedy* (1960) interrogates the way dramatists shore up a sense of moral value in the face of a changing world. Dramatists are not, he claims, “torn between humanistic and antihumanistic views of man. They are caught between old and new ways of determining the realities upon which moral values rest” (6). His concern is to dispel humanism as a (or at least as the sole) lens through which to view all of the period’s art, thereby separating the great artists from the merely conventional. His approach is sensitive to poetic quality as superior to the mere “ideas” expressed within, but *Moral Vision* nonetheless attends to the philosophical and religious complexities that such poetry addresses.

Ornstein characterises, for instance, the Jacobean age as an era in which “the tragedian confronts the anxiety which the popular moralist would exorcise: the cynicism of Italianate tragedies and the pious faith of the *Theatre of Gods Judgements* are, as [*The Revenger’s Tragedy*] indicates, opposite sides of a single coin” (18). Yet plenty of these Jacobean plays encompass both sides, and it is that tension and its outcomes that Ornstein is concerned with exploring. Practical ethics also features in *Moral Vision*, though its direct influence on the plays is not explicitly discussed; Ornstein claims that the Church-centric conscience of the medieval period changes in Protestant England: “The Reformation shifted the burden of moral discipline to the individual conscience” (33), hence

The Protestant spirit is manifest in the extraordinary Elizabethan taste for sermons and hortatory literature, for books of devotion and guides to moral conduct and godliness. The desire for practical ethical disciplines was satisfied more intellectually in treatises of ethical psychology and moral philosophy . . . . (33)
Despite an unquestioned association of natural law with moral philosophy,\(^9\) Ornstein sees the moral philosopher’s systematisation of codes of conduct into a “body of absolute imperatives” (36) as a key background to the stage’s exploration of moral conduct. It is in contrast, too, to the influence of the passions, as we have seen above. Consequently, the remainder of the study is concerned with assessing playwrights’ conformity to “traditional values” of the period and to the combat of reason with unreason.

*Moral Vision* is somewhat sweeping in its historical claims and uncritical of the differences and specificities of different traditions of conduct literature. Scepticism, similarly, is only thinly dealt with, despite its important influence on the writing and reception of moral theories. Yet Ornstein’s is a rare statement of how practical moral philosophy is a direct part of Jacobean drama (and early modern drama more generally).

Other mid-twentieth studies take a similarly “moral” approach but with perhaps fewer historicist sympathies. Alfred Harbage’s *As They Liked It* (1947) considers Shakespeare not an artistic moralist but a moral artist. Harbage argues that Shakespeare’s work was deeply conservative, in the sense that it followed contemporary ideas without challenge and rather made its commercial success out of the existing beliefs of its Elizabethan and Jacobean audiences: “The play is as moral as the person who traverses its course, and exercises the good in that person to the limit of his capacities, but it intensifies his moral convictions rather than alters or extends them” (54). Rees Ennis looks specifically at George Chapman in *The Tragedies of George Chapman: Renaissance Ethics in Action* (1954). Ennis argues that Chapman’s heroes are evidence both of the force of poetry itself as a form of learning—thereby making drama an educative force—while also claiming that “Chapman’s justice, like Aristotle’s, is virtue in action” (27). While likewise neglecting historical specificities, Ennis nonetheless gestures to the importance of practical morality in Jacobean tragedy. Critics including Ornstein, Harbage, and Ennis, however, make broad claims about early modern drama and its moral aims, suggesting a “world view” or coherent response to ethical issues that often tends to fit with the critics’ own broadly conservative moral outlook.

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Such studies stand for everything that later new historicist and cultural materialist scholars seek to undress. Jonathan Dollimore’s *Radical Tragedy* (1984), for instance, is concerned with demolishing any idea of a moral centre in these plays in an almost nihilistic, relativist fashion. I have already considered the impulse towards individuality in works by Greenblatt, Maus, and Schoenfeldt, whose research concentrates on the construction of selves against and through society’s shaping forces. If drawn upon by critics in these studies, moral treatises are most often considered for the way in which they are resisted by authors and are not frequently associated with the stage’s potential for moral education.

Richard A. McCabe, in his study of *Incest, Drama, and Nature’s Law* (1993), does suggest, though, that playwrights challenged both moral and natural law through certain tropes—namely, incest. With due treatment of reformed theology and sceptical thought, McCabe argues that “the incest theme may be employed as a focus for a wide variety of anxieties stemming from the paradoxical perception of ‘nature’ as both social ideal and moral enemy” (21). William M. Hamlin’s *Tragedy and Scepticism in Shakespeare’s England* (2005), too, treats the questioning aspects of the period’s drama. He considers the “essence of scepticism” to be “an irrepressible spirit of questioning: an abidingly critical attitude towards all dogmatic or doctrinaire positions conjoined with an implicit and unceasing defence of open-minded enquiry” (5). His argument therefore opposes Ornstein’s claim, for instance, that Webster’s drama upholds traditional values and is transparently moral. Hamlin rather claims that Webster exhibits consistent engagement with doubt, showing interest in the tropes of epistemological scepticism, casting a wary eye on metaphysical suppositions, and demonstrating a distinct lack of confidence in any human ability to find moral coherence on earth through the exercise of reason or the testimony of experience. (212)

The opposition between certain moral teaching and uncertain moral scepticism displayed by two critical readings is a fascinating one, and perhaps Webster’s plays occupy both territories—a subject I return to in the fifth chapter.
The focus on Jacobean scepticism as an anti-moralistic force in late-twentieth-century and twenty-first century criticism indicates, perhaps, the concerns of both the postmodern Western world and early modern England. The Jacobean perspective is often compared to that of postmodernity, or the late twentieth century. The filmmaker Alex Cox, for example, compares Middleton’s *The Revenger’s Tragedy* to the punk spirit of the 1970s: “1607 or 1976, there is no difference.” Yet while necessarily reflecting the spirit of their own age, critics Hamlin and McCabe acknowledge that Jacobeans write in a world very different to ours—one still dominated by religion and considerations of monarchical authority.

Further recent criticism has begun to suggest the civic, educational role of theatre. David Wiles’s *Theatre and Citizenship* (2011) reaches back into the classical world, touching on a number of figures whose influence extends to the early modern era, including Cicero and Machiavelli and moving through the medieval mysteries. His chapter on Heywood and Shakespeare acknowledges that self-fashioning might be less relevant to theatre audiences who are rather involved in a process of “collective fashioning” (93). His sensitive treatment of the contexts of both playwrights paints the picture of a world where theatre was political, commercial, and deeply moral—and ultimately he claims Heywood to be involved in a process of citizen-building, shaping and responding to an audience’s collective moral and social identity.

David Bevington and Alan Dessen have also examined traditions of theatre, seeing the presence of earlier morality plays within the drama of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. They both see early modern drama emerging from developments from the moralities and into the hybrid moralities, which “set abstractions and concrete figures side by side in the same play” (Bevington 10). Both Dessen and Bevington read these hybrid plays—discussed below—to recover a sense of the evolution of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century drama from its roots in moral allegory.

Helen Cooper and Beatrice Groves have more recently identified the influence of the medieval mysteries as well as moralities on later incarnations of drama. Groves links the spectacle of later Elizabethan and Jacobean plays to the visual emphasis inherent in Catholic mass (often surrounding the Eucharist)—a visual emphasis that translated into the mysteries. Cooper is similarly concerned with dissolving divisions between the “medieval” and the
“early modern,” and in *Shakespeare and the Medieval World* (2010) she revisits the “history of moral allegory as inherited by the early modern world” (115) as well as paying welcome attention to the dumb shows of drama. Unlike Mehl, who sees the transition into Jacobean drama as a decline of allegory in the dumb show, Cooper links dumb shows to the visual moral tradition. She claims, for example, that emblem books gave visual substance to abstract concepts that were at once generalizing, ethical and allegorical . . . street pageants and tableaux had long drawn on an established set of such images, such as the well-governed state as a well-ordered garden; and the dumbshows of early-modern drama were likewise used as emblematic mirrors of meaning. (126)

Acknowledging that “dumbshows themselves started as fully allegorical, but they rapidly came to occupy a position somewhere between emblematic pageant and literal action” (127), Cooper is more sensitive than Mehl to the moral resonances of early modern dramatic tropes. Her analysis shows that the more complex dramaturgy of the Elizabethan and Jacobean period nevertheless has its history in moral didacticism. I return to this discussion of dumb shows in the fifth chapter, which considers the way in which Shakespeare and Webster employ the device to raise a number of moral questions in material form.

The moral role of the stage in the early modern period is therefore a rich seam, and criticism has broached its scope and its roots, opening up room for consideration of the stage’s material and moral interaction. Thematically and in terms of content, of course, the list could be endless—Alexander Legatt’s *Jacobean Public Theatre* (1992) argues for the generalising tendencies of the majority of Jacobean theatre: “what matters is that a moral is drawn” (35). Its direct or explicit moralising agenda, legal connotations and structures, dumb shows, and medieval inheritance have all been subject to critical appraisal. Recently, as Wiles and Langis have shown, there is a growing interest in the civic and moral philosophical role of drama in the period. Building on this important work in early modern studies, I expand upon the moral potential of Jacobean drama to connect practical stagecraft with practical philosophy. What
follows, then, to conclude this overview of the major themes underlying this thesis, is a discussion of the Jacobean stage’s role in moral education, charting its development through the Elizabethan hybrids and commercial stage.

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Hearken unto a Verser, who may chance
Ryme thee to good, and make a bait of pleasure.
A verse may finde him, who a sermon flies,
And turn delight into a sacrifice.
George Herbert, “The Church-Porch” (A1r)

Morality in the theatre has a long history,\(^{10}\) and the most immediate point of reference for the early modern theatre is its predecessors on the medieval scaffolds, the moralities or moral plays. The moral plays are an early example of allegorical drama involved in moral fashioning. E.K. Chambers describes them as plays “in which the characters are no longer scriptural or legendary persons, but wholly, or almost wholly, abstractions, and which, although still religious in intention, aim rather at ethical cultivation than the establishing of faith” (151). Examples of these plays survive in manuscript—most notably *The Castle of Perseverance, Everyman, and Mankind*—and were likely played by touring groups across the country. Davidson speculates that royally-sponsored troupes, formed for festivities at court, would perform these plays. Those troupes were free to tour when not required at the Court and so the morality plays reached a wide audience. The aim at a wide appeal perhaps explains the mix of Latin sententiae and religious messages with abundant toilet humour (in *Mankind* this is especially prominent), as well as jokes about Latinate words: “Ey, ey! yowr body is full of Englysch Laten. / I am aferde yt wyll brest” (l.124-25). As popular plays that mix moralising with delight, then, these prove precursors to the quasi-allegorical moral impetus of later theatre.

Dessen rightly displays an anxiety over appealing to the favoured texts of medieval mysteries, however, noting that “some of the moral plays most often cited by modern scholars never found their way into print in the period (e.g.,

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\(^{10}\) See Wiles on classical and Renaissance ideas about the moral force of drama in *Theatre and Citizenship.*
The Castle of Perseverance, Mankind)" (4). He is therefore reluctant to ascribe to these plays a direct influence over later Elizabethan developments. Dessen’s interest in the later incarnations of morality plays in moral interludes, in Shakespeare and the Late Moral Plays (1986), is important in reviving interest in less-discussed drama. Yet the hybrid interludes of the Elizabethan period develop from a native tradition of theatre (one that is later blended with the “tone, form, and achievement found in the widely read Roman playwrights,” Dessen 4), and plays in the vein of The Castle of Perseverance and Mankind are some of the best examples of that earlier tradition. Indeed, the impulse to perform a moral message seems to have deep roots in English cultural history (perhaps in humankind itself) and Helen Cooper notes that “writers for the public theatres wrote out of the same assumptions about the stage” as medieval dramatists: “They all shared the belief that anything was stageable, and that the function of a play was to act its action” (72). Cooper claims that these early plays are not simply inferior prototypes for the later commercial theatre, but prove themselves “capable of surprisingly subtle analysis, not only of psychology, but of the interplay of psychology with theology, politics, and even economics” (106). In their explicit allegorising function and complex psychology, the medieval “moral plays” (the most accurate term, for Dessen) form an important backdrop to the early modern commercial stage, its intentions, functions, and defence.

They also survived long into the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Cooper states that “the genre enjoyed its heyday in the decades immediately preceding the rise of the public theatres” (106). Neither did they simply disappear once the more recognisable forms of Elizabethan theatre had developed. Contemporaneous with commercial theatre were what Dessen and Davidson call “hybrid moralities” or “hybrid moral plays,” which use both abstract and literal figures (Bevington 10). Such a development was part of a long period of change in which, Cooper explains, “morality plays increasingly turned away from personifying abstractions to representing exemplary figures: an ambitious man, rather than Ambition in itself; a chaste woman, rather than Chastity” (107). In the Elizabethan and Jacobean hybrids, then, the moral impetus remains but characters are often half-way between allegorical figures and actual human beings.
For instance, in these hybrids, something like a vice is fractured into recurring figures named Ralph Roister or Tom Tospot, who inhabit different aspects of immorality. In *Like Will to Like* (Fulwel, 1568), it is the chief vice-like-character of Nichol Newfangle who is at the root of the play’s viciousness, an apprentice figure who has trained under the Devil in hell. These moral interludes remain patently allegorical texts, but they play up to contemporary tastes for “mirth,” as their prologues state. An archetypal example is the prologue for *Like Will*, which acknowledges that the play is there not to bore in its didacticism but to entertain, while baldly setting out its allegorical objectives: “Heer in as it were in a glasse se you may: / The advancement of vertue and of vice the decay.” The combination of these two aims is largely achieved through the alignment of moral message with dramatic spectacle, with plays including *Enough is as Good as a Feast* (Wager, 1560), *Welth and Health* (c.1554-55), and *Vertuous and godlye Susanna* (Garter, 1563-69) all displaying an investment in visual representation. *Susanna*, especially, emphasises the importance of visual drama, with characters stating variously “we say but what we see,” “how plainly thy fault is seen,” and “your filthy lust is spyde” (C1r, E2r, E3v). These remarks draw attention to the visible aspects of the dramaturgy and point towards the staging, with the trial scene—including the presence of divine figures—proving a visual allusion to the last judgement. Such dramatic intent, though, also states the educative aims and wide accessibility of the theatre, with the prologue declaring that the play is performed “desiring that none heer at our matter wilbe perplexed” (A2r). Like the medieval moralities, commercial hybrid moral plays should appeal to a wide audience.

The educative impetus that moral interludes bring to the stage is also associated with the moral philosophical treatises discussed above, allying itself with the new curriculum. After coming to their sticky ends, characters duped into vicious lifestyles exhort the audience to bring up their children correctly and to follow the right sort of education:

If my parents had brought me up in vertue and learning,
I should not have had this shameful end. (*Like Will to Like* E2r)

They also dissuade parents from liberality and other perceived vices, thereby associating the interludes with education and advice manuals.
By the late Elizabethan period, the moral power of the stage is widely debated. Early Reformists harness drama for propagandist ends, with John Bale producing plays that use the spectacle of medieval ceremony to denounce Catholic practices and advance Protestantism.\textsuperscript{11} Yet by the later Elizabethan period, more radical Protestants denounce the theatre—especially the newly established commercial theatre scene in London—as a place of sin and depravity. These antitheatricalists claim that the sensuality of the theatre made it spiritually dangerous. Stephen Gosson’s comparison of the poet and the cook in \textit{Schoole of Abuses} (1579), a prominent and much-cited example, argues that theatre allures the affection and entices the appetite: “the pleasures of the one winnes the body from labor, & conquereth the sense; the allurement of the other drawes the mind from vertue, and confoundeth wit” (A8v). These pious figures see theatre as a direct threat to virtue and feel that it promotes the body over the soul. Antitheatricalists were making similar arguments from Gosson through to William Prynne—whose \textit{Histrio-mastix} (1633) is conceived as a “plaister” for the sins and ulcers of the stage and its printed output, and beyond.

Pro-theatricalists, though, were also vocal. Most famously, Sidney’s \textit{Defense} insists that poetry offers

\begin{quote}
Delight to moue men to take that godnes in hande, which without delight they would flye as from a stranger. And teach, to make them know that goodness whereunto they are mooued . . . . (11)
\end{quote}

Poetry, for Sidney, is more powerful than either moral philosophy or history, because the latter attempt to instil virtue in too limited a manner: “the Philosopher . . . and the Historian are they which would win the gole: the one by precept, the other by example. But both not hauing both, doe both halt” (D2v). Although he is critical of the English stage’s disregard for the unity of time and place, he nonetheless emphasises that they are “as full of notable moralitie,” making comment of \textit{Gorboduc} (1561) in particular (I4v). Indeed, despite his quibbles about the English stage’s lack of classical sophistication, plays “are

\textsuperscript{11} See Cathy Shrank for Bale’s use and repurposing of his pre-Reformation or “medieval inheritance” (192).
excelling parts of Poesie” (K3v)—an important facet of poetry, which naturally combines precept and example.

In 1603, literate English audiences were offered another counterpoint to antitheatricalist arguments—one made on the same terms and perhaps more applicable than Sidney’s to the commercial theatres—thanks to John Florio’s translation of Montaigne’s essays. In “Of the institution and education of children,” Montaigne defends public theatres. He accuses those “of impertinencie, that condemne and disalowe such kindes of recreations” and he blames “those of injustice, that refuse good and honest Comedians, (or as we call them) Players, to enter our good townes, and grudge the common people such publike sportes” (I2r). Indeed, the closing of the essay proceeds to argue that affection and appetite are the best forms of moral learning, alluding to the unavoidable passions that early moderns saw at the heart of human behaviour, but which, as explained above, may be harnessed to a virtuous end. Consequently, he claims “there should be Theatres and places appointed for such spectacles,” because there is

no better way then to allure the affection, and to entice the appetite: otherwise a man shall breede but asses laden with books. With jerkes of roddes they have their satchels full of learning given them to keepe. Which to doe well, one most not onely harbour in him-selfe, but wed and marry the same with his minde. (I2r)

This fascinating defence of the pastime makes theatre into a practical moral tool, and Montaigne’s arguments recall Bacon’s complaints about the “flat and dead” books of moral philosophy. Moral precepts are nothing unless they are witnessed in action—and so theatre, Montaigne suggests, is like a history: it provides examples that show how moral advice may be applied practically to life. Montaigne’s approach appears to be more accepting than Sidney’s of the varying forms of theatrical entertainment, the performances of mere “Comedians” or “Players,” and suggests that all these “publike sportes” have the power to deliver goodness. If the knowledge offered by the most valuable books is to be “Chewed and Digested,” in Francis Bacon’s memorable formulation (“Of Studies,” 1625, Pp3r), then plays are the perfect sweetener.
In the early 1610s—at precisely the period in time at which “strangeness” becomes a feature of moral-visual action on the stage—the prolific playwright Heywood attempts to situate the moral correctness of theatre within antiquity and to establish the profession of acting as something morally efficacious. His much-cited Apologie for Actors (1612) makes a comparison with both rhetoric—an important source of moral formation and debate, as I explore in Chapter Five—and with painting, arguing that neither is as morally affective or effective as theatre:

A Description is only a shadow receiued by the eare but not perceiued by the eye: so liuely portraiture is merely a forme seene by the eye, but can neither shew action, passion, motion, or any other gesture, to mooue the spirits of the beholder to admiration: but to see a souldier shap’d like a souldier, walke, speake, act like a souldier: to see a Hector all besmeared in blood, trampling upon the bulkes of Kinges. A Troylus returning from the field in the sight of his father Priam . . . Oh these were sights to make an Alexander.” (B3v-B4r)

Heywood also makes a direct link with histories on the stage, echoing the praise of written histories by moral philosophers. The practical element of the theatre—seeing things performed in “action, passion, motion—is linked with the performance of virtuous actions. Such an association foregrounds the importance of spectacle in bringing matters to life, something in which Heywood, as a particularly spectacular dramatist, was certainly invested.

He also uses the classical world to give esteem to the profession, linking moral philosophers (however tenuously) with theatrical instruction. The Apologie claims that wise men in ancient Greece used “moralized mysteries” that had such an effect on the population that they soon “excelled in civility and government” (C3r). His language makes theatre into a courtier’s or magistrate’s manual as well as a means of moral philosophical instruction. Frequent references to Aristotle and Cicero—those giants of early modern moral thought—serve to give authority to Heywood’s arguments, insisting that through the combination of performance and rhetoric, theatre is a powerful educative tool. Ultimately, he is concerned with establishing the “true use” of theatre—just
as moral philosophers are with the “use” of their philosophy. Although he deals directly with “Morals,” which are “to perswade men to humanity and good life, to instruct them in ciuility and good,” he also claims all other genres to have a hand in vice and virtue, from histories to comedies. Generally, for Heywood,

Playes are writ with this ayme, and carried with this method, to teach the subiects obedience to their King, to shew the people the untimely ends of such as haue moued tumults, and insurrections, to present them with the flourishing estate of such as liue in obedience, exhorting them to allegiance, dehorting them from all trayterous and felonious stratagems.” (F3v)

These arguments sit in opposition to antitheatricalist claims about sensual and sensory corruption, arguing for the senses’ role in moral learning and associating theatre with important historical figures. Echoing the language of advice treatises and claims about the moral importance of vision, Heywood, like Sidney and Montaigne before him, turns theatre into a form of moral philosophy that is already half put into practice.

By the Jacobean period, then, theatre is established as a form with a long inheritance of moral admonition, exhortation, and learning. Early modern England has a concern with practical morality that is rooted in its approach to moral philosophy; the revival of interest in Aristotelian and especially Ciceronian thinking emphasises the use of all learning and precepts and encourages participation in the vita activa. By alluding to this moral tradition, protheatricalists and dramatists make a case for the theatre as a place where morality is shown in action. Likewise, they build on the notion of vision as a spiritual sense, incorporating aspects of “moral images” into the heavily spectacular nature of English theatre, as it develops out of the medieval moralities and into the commercial stage.

Yet this notion of the moral image, and its connection with the stage, is also under threat from a number of contentious issues in the Elizabethan and Jacobean periods. The following chapter addresses these concerns and considers the role of images in reacting to the increasing moral anxieties of the 1590s and early seventeenth century. “Wee must to vertue for her guide
resort,” George Chapman’s Bussy D’Ambois tells the Jacobean era, “Or we shall shipwracke in our safest Port” (A2v). The period’s drama is concerned with navigating this uncertainty. One of ways the stage responds to the Jacobean moral situation is to exploit the practical nature of moral philosophy and the growth of moral images, and move towards materialising their wide array of conceits and teachings.
2. Materialising Morality from Image to Stage

The introduction has set out the broad background to “morality” in the early modern period, its practical aspects, and its visual and dramatic incarnations. This chapter plots the factors that challenge the certainty of practical morality—the “moral crisis” of the early modern period—and suggests that materialisation is a response to this crisis. Here I am concerned with the material representation of abstract ideas. I begin by outlining the precariousness of moral issues in the period before introducing the “materialisation of morality,” my description of the incarnation of moral ideas in practically usable material things. This concept underlies my reading of early Jacobean “strangeness,” which, I argue in Part Two, is a term that mediates between physical display and moral description. “Strangeness” offers a fittingly ambivalent moral frame for perceiving spectacle in a period of acute sceptical uncertainty.

From later sixteenth-century England, the physical and visual elements of an image hold moral force. In contrast to the now outdated idea that England was an iconophobic culture, I fall into line with studies since Margaret Aston and more recently with the work of Tara Hamling and Catherine Richardson, who have paid serious attention the presence, function, and significance of visual culture in creating everyday meaning. I argue, however, that beyond mere visuality, images are important because of their physicality and tangibility, rather than in spite of it. Whereas Huston Diehl claims that “the emblem reader . . . deconstructs images so that he can recollect moral and spiritual truths,” moving “from the image to a recollection of its significance” (58), I suggest that moral and spiritual truths are, alternatively, often embedded in the metaphorical and physical materials of the image itself.

The transference of knowledge from abstract to material expression parallels Henry S. Turner’s notion of a “geometric turn” and of “topographesis” (12). Turner’s model of changing early modern knowledge posits “a shift from dialogue to icon, or from a verbal and discursive method of analysis to a visual and diagrammatic one” (35) by examining geometrical studies, groundplots, spatial arts, and versification. In this chapter, I explore cheap print images, broadsides, pamphlets, and stage devices to argue that visual representation is more pervasively present and more physical throughout the period than hitherto.
considered. Verbal and discursive methods move beyond even the
diagrammatic in early modern England’s “material morality.” I concentrate on
“materialisation” broadly but focus specifically on the incarnation of moral
philosophy, precepts, and admonition.

By representing moral advice through usable objects, cheap print images
metaphorically visualise the “practical” mantra of humanist moral philosophy. I
consider this combination in relation, more deeply, to late sixteenth- and early
seventeenth-century England’s reception of scepticism. Critics including
Stanley Cavell, William H. Hamlin, David Hillman, and Ellen Spolsky have
considered scepticism and its material impulses, but I seek to link it more
explicitly to the surrounding print and material culture that has received such an
increase in attention in recent years (see above and in detail below). As such,
this chapter sees sceptical interests as a more central influence on the objects
and images of the popular moral tradition than has been considered to date,
and consequently combines materialist enquiries with both print and intellectual
history.

I then address the importance of material morality in the household
through images that figure themselves as part of domestic clutter. The final
section of the chapter examines material morality in relation to theatrical
practices, addressing the artificiality of stage devices and the materiality of
spectacle. While images in cheap print offer the possibility of physical use, they
remain metaphorical. On the stage, special effects make metaphorical
possibilities into material realities and as such can combine the moral potency
of visual devices with actual physical use and display.

Moral uncertainty: why materialise?

There are a number of issues that trouble early modern understandings
of morality. These lead to the impulse to turn to material representation in order
metaphorically (in print) or literally (on stage) to make moral concepts tangible
or solid, and ultimately echo the moral and material anxieties that underpin
stage spectacle in the 1600s and 1610s. Here, I concentrate on doubts about
time and custom, the emergence of “science” and changes in natural
philosophy, and scepticism—all of which have an interest in materiality.¹²

Virtue, considered in the period to be taught and practised rather than inherited,

¹² Rhetoric also significantly affects the understanding and certainty of moral philosophy. This
subject is discussed at length in Chapter Five of this thesis.
is exposed to the whims of custom and to devouring time. Roger Ascham explains that “to loue or to hate, to like or contemne, to plie this waie or that waie to good or to bad, ye shall haue as ye use a child in his youth” (E3v). The pliability of one’s character in youth and the consequent importance of the educator in shaping it the correct way bolsters the perceived importance of Ascham’s office as a “scholemaster.” Yet that pliability inevitably breeds doubts about the veracity of moral philosophy. Almost all education treatises begin with a lamentation about the fallen state of early modern England—a harking back to a mythologised past. While advice manuals and moral treatises necessarily posit their philosophy and advice as the “true” guide, they nevertheless express uncertainties about time—its decaying force—that inevitably result in doubts about truth.

By the end of the sixteenth century, Montaigne phrases the chiding voices of advice manuals in an even more sceptical fashion. Rather than time temporarily distorting the truth, something that much English moral philosophy claims to reassert, he questions whether any form of knowledge escapes the ravages of time: “What goodnesse is that, which but yesterday I saw in credite and esteeeme, and tomorrow, to have lost all reputation . . .” (“Apology” Gg1r).13 It is this more sceptical approach that I explore here. While the aspects of doubt in advice manuals could be pursued in depth, I concentrate on the physical interests of sceptical thought and protoscientific writing, positing them as important underlying factors in the materialisation of morality and in the exchange between description and ineffability central to understanding Jacobean “strangeness.”

Scepticism can be defined broadly, for the purposes of this thesis, as a searching for truth that forever suspends absolute judgement, a search that often seeks empirical proof and inevitably falls short, remaining suspicious of any claims to certainty. It is a perpetual questioning of the material and intellectual world. This broad definition is a useful starting point from which to evaluate the wide-ranging moral, intellectual, and artistic engagements with doubt and anti-dogmatism. It is an engagement that pervades the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, generating what might be termed an

13 I maintain Florio’s translations throughout except where explicitly stated or compared to the French itself, chiefly because that is the copy early modern English readers would have read. Peter Mack has criticised Florio’s mistranslation of this passage in “Florio and Montaigne” (84) but the section here quoted seems to be near enough to the French.
“atmosphere” of scepticism that affects secular morality and sensory perception (chief concerns of this thesis), while not always necessarily being grounded in an explicit philosophical scheme or adopting a decisive philosophical stance. William H. Hamlin has offered the only book-length study of scepticism’s reception and appropriation in literary-intellectual circles in early modern England; he identifies “the last decade of the sixteenth century and the opening years of the seventeenth” as the period when “with ever-increasing frequency . . . scepticism enters the lexicon of English poets and intellectuals” (56). It is during this period that the public (and private) theatres flourish and that printed materials begin to display a convergence of material and moral instruction, suggesting that scepticism in the 1590s and the 1600s deeply influences forms of moral and artistic thought in the country.

Two types of classical scepticism come to prominence in the sixteenth century. The first is academic scepticism, stemming from Plato’s Academy, and the second is Pyrrhonism, laid out by Sextus Empiricus. Academic scepticism was, perhaps paradoxically, certain of the impossibility of certainty. It therefore sought to develop, in Hamlin’s words, “forms of probable knowledge based on the scrupulous study of appearances” (3). Pyrrhonists do not go so far as to declare all knowledge uncertain, but rather remain in a state of questioning. Benson Mates explains that

the characteristic attitude of the Pyrrhonist is one of aporia, of being at a loss, puzzled, stumped, stymied. This state of mind is said to arise from the apparent equipollence of the considerations that can be brought for and against any assertion purporting to describe how things are in an external, mind-independent world.

(5)

It is a way of life rather than a set of beliefs. By being permanently puzzled, one can achieve epochē (suspension of judgement) and eventually reach

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14 Hamlin sees 1603 as a “watershed year” for scepticism, during which “common sense scepticism” fuses with its “philosophically-grounded counterpart” (70). Florio’s Montaigne translation is also published that year. In this light, I consider the beginnings of Jacobean England to be characterised by a sceptical spirit—one readily detectable in the drama of the 1600s, which combines epistemic curiosity with cynical doubt and moral complexity.
ataraxia (tranquility of the soul). Pyrrhonism covers questions of values as well as questions of sensory experience, and demands an ongoing suspension of judgement. In the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, Hamlin explains, Pyrrhonists acquired “a reputation as more thoroughgoing sceptics” due to their rejection of all forms of certainty—even the Academics’ certainty of uncertainty—but ultimately “the two traditions of scepticism were seen as fundamentally akin to one another” (3).

Texts that date back to the early fifteenth century like Raymond Sebond’s *Natural Theology* (1430s) impact upon early modern conceptions of scepticism—and Montaigne’s celebrated essay “An Apology for Raymond Sebond” treats a number of sceptical claims in response to (and in response to responses to) this work. Figures including Thomas More, Erasmus, and Agrippa demonstrate, as Hamlin has proved, familiarity with the scepticism of writers including Plato, Cicero in his *Academica*, and Lucian. Importantly, Cicero himself plays a major role in the period’s scepticism—something particularly noteworthy considering his influence on Renaissance humanism; the sceptical aspects of his writing are closely associated with his role as a rhetorician, linking, as I explore later in the thesis, the “probability” of philosophical thought with the presentation of likely facts in rhetorical declamation as well as in attacking others’ arguments. By the 1560s there is also demonstrable evidence of English interest in Sextus Empiricus’s work (John Wolley translated Sextus’s *Against the Mathematicians*, for example, that decade) before the later craze of the 1590s, which saw a now lost English translation of his theories, *The Skeptic*.

Ultimately, England was a hotchpotch of sceptical influences. Perhaps Hamlin’s broader definition of the term is most accurate: he posits scepticism as “an irrepressible spirit of questioning: an abidingly critical attitude towards all dogmatic or doctrinaire positions conjoined with an implicit and unceasing defence of open-minded enquiry” (5). This spirit was certainly marked in England by at least the 1590s, and it already had a long history behind it. The 1590s and the 1600s were deeply engaged with sceptical thought, as indicated

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15 The original Greek terms are used because of the difficulties and complexities of translation. Mates, for instance, calls ataraxia “a state of inner tranquillity or peace of mind” (5) whereas Hamlin terms it “cerebral tranquillity, freedom from anxiety” (6). Although not hugely dissimilar in meaning, most scholars tend to maintain the original terms, avoiding the nice distinctions of translation.
by works as diverse as Donne’s satires; a lost translation of *The Sceptick*; the
text attributed to Sir Walter Raleigh (which copies wholesale passages of
Sextus); and Marston’s characteristic quarrying of Michel de Montaigne’s
essays.

The period’s interest in scepticism synthesises concerns over education,
rhetorical redescription, and scientific advances and adds a level of
philosophical and epistemic doubt to considerations of conduct. It emphasises
both the necessity and the futility of sensory experience, puts the material world
and visual perception under extraordinary scrutiny, and consequently draws into
question notions of moral certainty.

**Science and Scepticism**

Scientific enquiry contributes and responds to the period’s reception of
sceptical thought. It is also an important technical and philosophical facet of
stage spectacle: theatrical technology falls under the broad and embryonic
rubric of early modern “science.” Ostensibly an optimistic development—Irving
Ribner calls it the “new scientific optimism of Bacon” (3)—changes in natural
philosophy nevertheless affect the way early moderns see the world and
encourage a prioritisation of external, physical fact. The Elizabethan
schoolmaster Richard Mulcaster notes that natural philosophy is characterised
by “necesitie of a demonstrable subiect” and so “regardeth the matter only”
(B1v). Although he is talking of deductive reasoning, his remarks also indicate
that “matter,” in the sense of *material*, is of primary importance to the new
scientific mind.

Indeed, Reformist thinking questions previous conjunctions of intellectual
and moral virtues while also ushering in a distinction between *faith*-based
knowledge and rational knowledge. The questioning is especially acute with
regard to Thomist thought. Aquinas linked the traditional cardinal virtues
(prudence, justice, temperance, fortitude) with the theological (faith, hope, and
love). He also, Peter Harrison notes, added “intellectual virtues” to the mix:
wisdom, science, and understanding. Because Lutheran and Calvinist

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16 Deborah Shuger explores this distinction in *Habits of Thought in the English Renaissance* (1990), in which she distinguishes between “rational consciousness” and “participatory consciousness” (the former privileging reason and the external world and the latter privileging the *desire* to believe).
theologies did not permit the sort of moral perfection implicitly accommodated by classical virtue and necessary in the “intellectual virtues,” which require a “contentious mechanism of habit,” a transformation begins to take place. Harrison identifies a move in the understanding of scientia (knowledge) away from “a mental habit” to become “something like the more familiar modern notion: a body of knowledge or set of practices aimed at bringing about a particular outcome” (216). In separating “knowledge” from traditional moral philosophy in this way, the practical scientific method—empirical and ultimately external—can be seen to emerge over an extended period of time.

In the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, though, the gradual separation of science from “morality” proper is countered by the scepticism that attends (and in part motivates) scientific knowledge. Intellectual historians mirror Harrison in identifying a major philosophical shift: a gradual move towards an empirical and proto-scientific approach to the physical world. That approach has its visual and moral complement: that we might know what we see—the ultimate aim of scientific practices like anatomy. Conversely, contemporary sceptics argue that one can never know with certainty what one sees. The materialisation of morality (and the “strange” special effects discussed in Part Two) points to the unique historical moment that captures the gap between those conflicting attitudes.

Indeed, while outside of theology Baconian developments in natural philosophy seek in part to isolate it from religious and moral considerations, making it a more “objective” discipline, it remains dogged by moral considerations. Ornstein has eloquently explained how Bacon “assumed quite correctly that his contemporaries were prepared to accept the philosophical authority of a completely unmoral, unreligious concept of physical nature, which testifies only indirectly to the existence of a providential order.” Although such a “separation of science and religion seemed to guarantee the sanctity of religious belief by eliminating possible conflicts between empirical reason and faith” (5), it also shook some of the foundations of moral thought. Early modern men and women were left “caught between old and new ways of determining the realities upon which moral values rest” (Ornstein 6). If the natural world is

17 Particularly the 1590s through to the 1610s—something evidenced by the “strangeness” of visual spectacle on the stage in this period and on which the second part of this thesis elaborates.
held up as the source of knowledge, can ethical knowledge not be found there too?

Such a turn to the physical, external world for both scientific and moral edification is represented by the growth of anatomy in early modern England. It is characterised by what Ruth Gilbert terms “the impulse ‘to see and know.’” Although Gilbert sees the scientific, anatomic thrust of early modern England “symbolised and actualised by Robert Hooke’s development of the microscope, a device which visually probed and penetrated previously uninvestigated worlds” (151), such an impulse occurs earlier, in 1615, with Helkiah Crooke’s Mikrokosmographia. Crooke’s text can be connected to a growth in visual enquiry in the period. The historian of early modern vision Stuart Clark points to the ‘optical naturalism’ at work in much of Renaissance aesthetic theory and criticism (and genres like portraiture and landscape), in the emergence of new models of naturalistic, and supposedly veridical, representation in sciences like astronomy, anatomy, mechanics, botany, physiognomy, topography, and natural history, in the faith placed, in all these and many other sciences, in direct observation, and the practice of certain kinds of narrative realism in early modern literature. (19-20)

Such a faith in “direct observation” is evident in Crooke’s text, which dissects the eye itself. Indeed, the penetrative ends of anatomical science have been linked with the growth of scepticism. David Hillman defines scepticism as “an attempt to deny the susceptibility of one’s interior to external influence; faith, as an attempt to deny one’s exteriority or separateness.” Scepticism “derives from a refusal to accept the inherence of inner in outer (and vice versa); it relies upon an idea of a gap between causes or inner truth and that which is represented externally. The sceptic rejects dogmatism, unquestioning acceptance of appearances, blind faith,” and in his pursuit of “empirical—and specifically visual—knowledge about the insides of the human frame” the anatomist proves himself “the sceptic par excellence” (28, 33). Both anatomy and scepticism are predicated on sensory enquiry, and so developments in natural philosophy complement contemplations of epistemic and moral doubt already spreading in England by the mid-sixteenth century.
Crooke’s *Mikrokosmographia* is more complicated than a simple anatomy, however, and the book’s focus on both scientific and spiritual vision neatly illustrates how visual scepticism, anatomy, and moral uncertainty are closely tied together. He deems eyesight a “spirituall Sense” (Nnn3r), given to us “that wee might pursue profitable things and auoyde whatsouer is hurtfull. . . .” (Sss2r). Although there is a delay between seeing and perceiving, relaying images to the “iudging Faculty” (Kkk6r) of “common” sense, vision is described throughout *Mikrokosmographia* as the way “unto that which is profitable” (ZZ4r). Eyesight is inherently and anatomically moral, not least because the reception of immaterial *species* place it amongst those senses that “doe Perceiue their obiects not Materially but Spiritually” (Lll2v). Indeed, Crooke notes that the eye “may very well bee compared to a looking glasse,” reflecting what is placed in front of it, but notes that it contains a crucial difference:

. . . there is no virtue of the Soule in a glasse which can referre and transmit the image receiued unto any other thing as it were unto a ludge. (Ll5r)

Visual images may be *like* reflections in a mirror, but distinct in that they are transmitted to the mind to be reflected *upon*. This decidedly non-anatomical definition of vision admits spirituality into science, but it is combined with detailed illustrations of the musculature of the eye and dissected eyeballs. The combination of spiritual and scientific language—what Bruce R. Smith calls the “psychophysics” of Crooke’s optics (56)—both undermines the objectivity of natural philosophy and the spiritual certainty of moral judgement. If the eye is a judge, in Crooke’s words, *Mikrokosmographia* seeks to know its reasoning in the muscles and materials of the human body even as it acknowledges that perception is immaterial.

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18 Drawn from Aristotelian theories in *De Anima*, and medieval theological commentaries upon it, vision was thought to be received by *species* (“images” in the form of rays or beams) emitted from “corporeall” objects, leaving a reflection, or more accurately a reliable representation, of that object in the eye. Aristotelian theories of receptive sight stood in direct opposition to the Galenic or Platonic gaze, which contended that beams were emitted *from* the eyes towards the “things corporeall.” Most of the period’s anatomy textbooks dismiss this latter theory. Addressing what Sergei Lobanov-Rostevsky has recently termed “the basilisk” (“Taming the Basilisk” 196), anatomists find alternative explanations for the “infecting” look and argue that vision could only be accurate and universal if objects themselves transmit their likeness. Almost all English discussions of optics in the seventeenth-century, by Hooke and by Crooke, prefer Aristotle’s receptive organ.
Crooke’s anatomical search for “immaterial” truths—an apparent contradiction that borders on paradox—resists a separation of practical and spiritual knowledge. William E. Slights argues, for instance, that a conjunction of scientific and spiritual meanings can be detected in the image and organ of the heart (The Heart in the Age of Shakespeare, 2008). Similarly, Jonathan Sawday’s seminal work, The Body Emblazoned (1995), insists on the complexities involved in dissection: “anatomies were performed in public, then, as ritualistic expressions of often contradictory layers of meaning, rather than as scientific investigations in any modern sense” (Body 63). Even anatomy, as demonstrated by Crooke’s work, can offer itself as a form of moral philosophical enquiry. This exchange between the “scientific” and the moral or spiritual is central to my reading of the aesthetic of “strangeness,” which, as explored below, negotiates between mechanical and moral construction, abstract and physical representation, illusion and ostensibly “empirical” reality.

Science and scepticism, then, have a powerful and often troubling relationship with early modern notions of morality, a relationship that very often finds its expression in issues of vision. Ruth Lunney has identified in the period an “increasing emphasis on the visual as the key to making sense of reality” (43)—the resurgence and advance of classical images, cartography, perspective, and printed type ornament and illustration—but there were also suggestions that such documents were not reliable forms of knowledge. Scepticism puts physical and moral knowledge in parallel and challenges both; it questions the material and immaterial roles of the eye—an organ about which it is keenly concerned. The reemergent scepticism of the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries used the material aspects of sight to challenge its spiritual power. Montaigne, for instance, contradicts sensory empiricism by arguing that “things lodge not in us in their proper forme & essence” but “yeelde unto our mercie, and lodge with us according to our pleasure” (“Apology” Ff1v): visual experience is relative. Indeed, the familiar relationship between “corporeal vision and spiritual enlightenment” (Clark 11) was complicated by numerous philosophical debates that parallel the period’s proliferating visual culture. Clark explains that early modern Pyrrhonists opposed dogmatic models of cognition (the idea that species received through the eye guaranteed visual certainty) and “Scepticism therefore underlined the de-rationalization of sight” (266). Many sceptical writers consequently explored notions of visual
*aporia* and the relativity of perception in the period. The process and the reliability of sight are steadily contested, almost to the point of collapse.

**Materialisation of Morality**

The sceptical moment throws both optics and ethics into doubt in early modern England. That doubt is complemented by a scientific interest in acquiring “material” knowledge and a sceptical interest in physical experience. The materialisation of morality is a response to these phenomena (and to the relativist possibilities of rhetoric—see chapter five). Faced with uncertainty over how to represent both moral and physical “knowledge,” England’s cheap print in the period often conflates the two. Metaphorical comparisons of moral advice with objects of practical use appear in moral philosophy generally, as with William Martyn’s observation that “vertue consisteth in action, and that the meditation thereof without practise, is as an unstrunged instrument, whereon no man plaieth” (D1v). Pamphlets and broadsides emphasise the moral efficacy of such metaphors by visually representing advice and admonition as objects. Cheap print images transform moral ideas into functional, everyday materials, turning the early modern insistence on practical use into a physical possibility. As discussed later in this chapter, such a transformation is realised, as well as contested, in stage spectacles that interrogate their own modes of representation.

Material morality in printed images owes much to the tensions between cheap print’s physical fragility and its content’s abstract aims. In *The English Gentleman* (1630), Richard Brathwaite quarrels with the public availability of text represented by the early modern broadside, drawing into question its authorial reliability. The book itself is surrounded by a considerable amount of prefaces and epistles, including an address “To the Reader” that outlines both the status of the physical book and its intentions, introducing “a Gentleman, *who professeth the true and new Art of Gentilizing*” (¶2r). Brathwaite emphasises that his work is a *book* rather than a less solid form of print; the physical security of that format situates the author himself as instructive and ethically sound, in contrast with the
begging pedanticall Artist, who by a mercenary Bill pasted on some frequented gate, gives notice to the itching Passenger, that if any one be minded to learne the rare and mysterious Art of Brachygraphie, Stenographie, Logarisme, or any Art (indeed) whatsoever, (though he be a mere stranger to any) upon resort to such a Sign in such a Lane, he shall find a most illiterate Anacharsis, ready to bray his brains in a Morter to give him content. (The English Gentleman ¶2r-v).

Exactly such a Bill survives in the Lemon collection at the Society of Antiquaries’ Library, London, where it advertises “the professors of . . . Artes &c. Readie to do their diligent endeouurs for a reasonable consideration” (Humfrey Baker; Lemon 102; STC 1209.3):
Fig. 3. Humfrey Baker’s bill poster. *Such as are desirous . . .* (N.p., 1590).
STC 1209.3.

As the extant example of Fig. 3 reveals, the cheap advertisement contains no borders, elaborate printer’s devices, or signatures; the text is metaphorically
“open.” Brathwaite’s “Gentleman” and his authorial voice assume greater credibility by questioning this “openness” and undermining its legitimacy. Brathwaite distances his text from street-corners and posts, much as Ben Jonson does when he implores his bookseller not to place his “title-leafe on posts, or walls, / Or in cleft-sticks, advanced to make calls / For termers, or some clarke-like seruing-man, / Who scarce can spell th’hard names…” (Workes Ttt1v). The wealth of prefatory material in The English Gentleman grants the text moral and literary authority by surrounding with epistles, recommendations, dedications, and flattering prefaces. Heidi Brayman Hackel recognises that the early modern preface establishes the idea that access to the words “was granted and could somehow be controlled” (Reading 86). For Brathwaite, the words are not only homeless in their printed context—lacking what Brian W. Schneider calls the “framing texts” of a preface or epilogue and so without the metaphorical “walls” these devices represent—but they are rendered vagrant in their content: the pasted bill carries the text of a “begging pedantical Artist,” not a scholar or a gentleman.

Patricia Fumerton’s work on broadside ballads and the travelling poor has extended understanding of the broadside market and its relationship to vagrancy. Ballads are of course distinct from the bill poster or advertisement of Fig. 3, marked by their “pleasing visual appearance” (498) and held as “cherished aesthetic artifacts.” Even so, their public availability aligns them with the “open” texts that Brathwaite quarrels with in The English Gentleman. Fumerton has drawn parallels between the ephemerality of the broadside and the ephemeral spaces of early modern London, such as the tenement or the alehouse (496). The composition of these ballads also associates them with poverty, with “itinerant woodcuts” and hotchpotch texts being “passed from usually anonymous author, to printer, to ballad-monger, to audience . . . and then often back again . . . to be reissued in a different key” (501). Fumerton argues that the recycling, re-appearance, and migration of woodcut images grant the broadside ballad an “aesthetic of displacement” that is inherently “vagrant” (504).

As fundamentally homeless texts and without the paratextual walls of prefatory material, the broadside ballad and the bill poster are associated with both material and intellectual poverty. Brathwaite’s undermining of the intellectual credentials behind the poster parallels the reduction of the poster
itself to material terms; the quip about “the begging pedanticall Artist” aligns the material wants of the beggar with the form of the public broadside. Fumerton suggests that broadsides are inextricably associated with their physical form, and her study emphasises their composition, circulation, and the very “fabric of broadside ballads” (502). Although other authors in the period, from Ben Jonson to Thomas Coryat, scorn the perishable paper of print, the broadside (and perhaps the pamphlet) has a more palpable fragility. Indeed, the tendency of many broadside ballads to advertise their prices and their status as objects-for-sale associates them with the processes of material exchange inherent in any market economy. The Cloak’s Knavery (c.1660) opens, “Come buy my New Ballad, / I have’t in my Wallet” (Wing C4721), at once alerting us to the ephemerality of the genre by emphasising its “newness” before referring us to the object of exchange, inside the seller’s wallet. The ballad-seller’s “begging” in these opening lines echoes the way Brathwaite assigns vagrant status to the “open” broadside. Similarly, Nicholas Bourne entered into the Stationers’ Register on the 9th March 1613 Good counsell for a little money or the blindmans Guid to heauen (Arber 3: 543). Though it has not survived, the title already ties the ballad’s advice up with the pricing of its physical form. It is an object of material and market production.

While the ephemerality gestured to by these ballads certainly undermines textual status, many broadside woodcuts use this more palpable materiality associated with their bibliographic form in order to strengthen their ethical credibility. Woodcut images and broadside titles identify themselves as “objects,” raising their physical status from what Tessa Watt would term “cheap print” to the more solid material “clutter” of the early modern world.

In The Winter’s Tale (1609-11), Autolycus appears as a pedlar who is associated with such “clutter” even as he attempts to sell love songs to the gathered revellers. Autolycus inhabits a similar role to the speaker of The Cloak’s Knavery, comically playing on the “newness” of his ballads and their “certain” truthfulness. The song of the usurer’s wife who gave birth to twenty money-bags is, he assures us, “Very true, and but a moneth old” (Bb3r), but Shakespeare also conflates Autolycus’s ballad-selling with his status as a “pedlar,” hawking his wares. Like The Cloak’s Knavery, Autolycus’s ballads are conceived as material things, indeed as bespoke items. We hear that “He hath songs for man, or woman, of all sizes: No Milliner can so fit his customers with
Gloues” (Bb3r). Such accessories, though, were actually aligned with the advice of some broadside tables (see the section on household decoration, below, for the distinction between “tables” and ballads):

Fig. 4. [Some fyne gloues devised for Newyeres gyftes to teche yonge peop[le] to] knowe good from euyll (London, 1560). STC 23628.5.
The gloves in the broadside of Fig. 4 are figured as New Year’s gifts, much like a milliner’s tailored objects, but they are designed to teach how to distinguish good from evil and to function as a mnemonic device for learning the ten commandments. While the poetry ostensibly aims “to encourage the viewer to look beyond the image and toward its higher, more sacred, meanings. . . .” (Engel 39), the broadside’s form nonetheless depends upon material metaphors for its success—not only as a memory image, but as a *useful* and *useable* broadside. If one considers that the hand often appeared in “sixteenth-century emblem books, heraldry, genealogical charts, and ritual gestures” as a “preeminent sign for political and personal agency” (Rowe 280), then the “fyne gloues” offer *fitting* ethical protection from the cold winds of conscience and moral uncertainty. At the same time, they offer to align the notoriously ephemeral broadside with a more tangible and durable item.

Autolycus’s reference to the milliner and the “fitting” of an appropriate broadside implicitly draws out a pun on wares and wears, but the conflation of ballads with those other wares similarly conflates the possible “higher” meanings of a broadside with its status as a physical object, a tension that is visually present in the example of *[Some fyne gloues]*. . . . Although Fig. 4 is the only extant example of a broadside figuring gloves, the joke in *The Winter’s Tale* seems a fine comparison, and it is of course quite possible that Shakespeare might have seen such a ballad in circulation.¹⁹

The use of an object in a broadside in this way signifies abstractly while also readying advice for practical *use*. Materialising the moral image moves it earthward away from the more symbolic representations that characterise the period’s emblems. A more prominent example of the figuring of cheap print in this way, as both a practical and ethical object, is the use of “spectacles” as a visual trope that combines abstract, medical, and material interpretations of both word and image. The “spectacles” title is popular throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries for advice literature and is often used in polemic writing, as when John Floyd employs the term in his response to Sir Humphrey Linde, *A paire of spectacles for Sir Humfrey Linde to see his way withall*. During the Civil War in the mid-seventeenth century, the association of “spectacles” with the moral judgement of the eyesight is made clear through

¹⁹ Perhaps the reference has the author’s personal touch, as Shakespeare’s father, John, was a glove-maker.
woodcut titlepages to cheap political pamphlets. Three 1644 pamphlets illustrate their titlepages with objects related to vision, emphasising the importance of clear eyesight:

Fig. 5. *A new invention; or, A paire of cristall spectacles* . . . (London, 1644; titlepage). Wing N650.
Fig. 6. *The Second Part of the Spectacles* . . . (London, 1644; titlepage). Wing S2316.
Fig. 7. *The Eye Clear’d; or A preservative for the sight* (London, 1644; titlepage). Wing E3935.

The twofold visual emphasis—both as images and as images associated with vision—suggests that these objects of the eye have a privileged access to truth, drawing on the ethical superiority of the sense of sight. Like the gloves of Fig. 4, they use physical objects for their abstract intentions. *The Second part of the*
Spectacles reveals a disembodied eye in the looking-glass, an appropriation of the familiar emblem trope from Alciato to George Wither that sees the eye symbolically placed in an image:

Fig. 8. Emblem 43 in George Wither’s *Emblemes* (London, 1635; G2r). STC 25900a.

When read alongside this tradition, the eye in The Second Part of the Spectacles enhances the moral aspects of the pamphlet, which can also be associated with the familiar “looking-glasse” that is deemed to serve as an admonition in moralised stories from William Painter’s *Palace of Pleasure* to “monstrosity” ballads and pamphlets: “You see the miserable discourse . . . which ought to serue for a looking Glasse” (Painter U5r). Indeed, the symbolic image combines with the material culture in *A Nevv Invention* to offer the user-reader “speciall vertue” (A1r).
Spectacles and glasses have both literal and allegorical meanings, indicating that the texts are there for moral instruction—like the admonitory “spectacles” and “mirror” literature of the period—as well as offering practical uses. This form of material morality can be traced back before Civil War writing through to Elizabeth’s reign, and the “spectacles” can be identified at least as early as 1589. The Lemon collection contains the earliest extant example of these printed “spectacles” in a proof-sheet for a broadside. Signed “Fulwood,” presumably the William Fulwood who wrote other legal and “monstrosity” ballads during the seventeenth century, the broadside is titled *A Spectacle fo[] Pe[]iu[]e[]s*:
Fig. 9. William Fulwood’s *A Spectacle for Peiues* (London, 1589). Reproduced with permission from the Library of the Society of Antiquaries, London. Lemon 90, STC 11485.5.

Fulwood’s image inhabits a similar conceptual space as the later Civil War pamphlets, solidifying the text and suggesting the Marvel-like power of God-
vision. By advertising John Jones as a “spectacle” of and therefore a deterrent from perjury, the divine spectacles are momentarily offered to the user-reader to see clearly through to the true moral order of this example. Yet at the same time as they lend God-vision to the viewer, they also represent God’s vision by containing a religious sententia that reminds the reader that Deus Videt, God sees. The broadside combines a number of aspects of “spectacle” literature, exploiting the word’s meaning as something-to-be-looked-at, its charged moral meaning, as well as referring to the physical objects designed for medical use.

The figuring of the texts as physical objects through these images heightens their textual status, making them doubly useful. While images can serve metaphorically to solidify flimsy texts, they can also solidify the use and aims of printed material. The moral tradition frequently encourages its readers to internalise its messages, applying them to their own lives: Estienne sees moral figures as designed “to instruct us” (B4v) and Wither’s emblems “may be made use of” (A1r). If emblems can be made use of psychologically, the spectacles also have a physical use. In the pamphlets, the reader is told that “right use of them . . . will recover his sight very perfectly” (A New Invention) or the vial will act as a “preservative for the sight” (The Eye Cleard). Where Henry Peacham insists in his emblem book Minerva Britannia (1612) on a hierarchy that privileges the “inward ei’ne” over the “outward ei’ne” (B3v), the spectacles of the pamphlets and the broadside deny this division. These objects’ practical capacity to assist the physical organs of sight—the “outward ei’ne”—is the figurative source of their advice, admonition, and instruction: there, like Wither’s emblems, to be “made use of.” Precisely such an exchange between physical and moral use attends the “strange spectacles” of plays in the early 1610s, whose special effects advertise their materiality while insisting on their moral efficacy.

Material Morality and English Scepticism

The spectacles of the broadsides and pamphlets are visual metaphors that incarnate ethical thought in physical objects, making that thought “practical.” They therefore bridge the gap between sceptical thought and the inculcation of humanist virtue. Clark claims that the “eyes were evidently the most spiritual and least material of the senses” (10), but it is the material function of eyesight that is at the heart of sceptical enquiry, the basis of moral,
religious, and earthly knowledge. In one of the staple arguments of early modern scepticism, the senses are said to be at the centre of knowledge, but that sensory knowledge is itself questionable. Montaigne deems the senses our “maistres” (masters), claiming that our science and knowledge is dependent upon them, and, in Florio’s translation, “in them is resolved” (“Apology for Raymond Sebond” Ff4r). Florio’s Elizabethan translation, however, signals an interesting shift in meaning from Montaigne’s original passage. Francis Yates has claimed Florio’s work as a whole is “such a bad translation that it is nearly an original work, not Montaigne but Florio’s Montaigne” (228). The uniqueness of Florio’s approach and his rhetorical preoccupations and euphuistic indulgence (see Yates 232-34), combined with Montaigne’s scepticism, emphasise England’s trend towards material understandings of morality. This change in representation is important to my argument about stage spectacle and strangeness, because visual display is increasingly subject to sceptical description and deconstruction.

In Montaigne’s 1595 edition, the pursuit of verité (truth) and its “essence” is dependent upon empirical sensory experience:

Qu’un homme endtendud, imagine l’humaine nature produicte originellement sans la veue, et discourse combien d’ignorance et de trouble luy apporteroit un tel defaut, combien de tenebres et d’aveuglemente en nostre ame: on verra par la, combien nous importe, a la cognoissance de la verité, la privation d’un autre tel sens, ou de deux, ou de trois, si elle est en nous. Nous avons formé une verité par la consultation et concurrence de nos cinq sens: mais: a l’adventure falloit-il l’accord de huict, ou de dix sens, et leur contribution, pour l’appercevoir certainement et en son essence (Balsamo et al., 627)

In this passage, Montaigne builds upon an almost identical argument in one of the central classical texts of early modern scepticism, Sextus Empiricus’s Outlines of Pyrrhonism, which has already been discussed above. Pyrrhus’s argument, which surrounds the perception of an apple (102), is repeated

\[20\] Mack has noted that scholars tend to agree that it “nevertheless retains ‘the essential spirit’ of Montaigne’s book (“Montaigne and Florio” 81).
wholesale in *The Skeptick* (C3r-v), but Montaigne concentrates more abstractly and generally on “truth” itself, rather than using the example of an apple as a sense object. Montaigne asks us to imagine a man created without sight, or hearing, and to imagine how much darkness and blindness that state would entail, both literally and figuratively. By this, we can see that what little truth we can currently comprehend is produced by our five senses, but, for all we know, we may require the use of eight or ten senses, “pour l’appercevoir certainement et en son essence,” if we are with certainty to perceive it (truth) in its essence. Even our five senses are not enough to understand the ethical and religious complexity of the world; they have “formé une verité” ‘formed a truth,’ but the “essence” of “Truth” is still in question.

Florio’s Elizabethan translation frames the passage slightly differently, personifying verité not as the abstract concept “truth” but in visual terms, figured as “Verity”:

> We have by the consultation & concurrence of our five senses formed one Verity, whereas peradventure there was required the accord & consent of eight or ten senses, and their contribution, to attain a perspicuous insight of hir, and see her in her true essence. (Gg4r)

Florio’s rendering of the passage reduces all the senses to sight, and builds the whole argument in terms of vision. Contemporary dictionaries allowed for the multiplicity of meaning in “appercevoir,” described in Jean Nicot’s 1606 French dictionary as “adviser, choisir . . . il est usité aussi pour se prendre garde de quelque chose, la descouvrir . . .”, “to choose” or “to discover” (Dictionnaires d’autrefois, “Appercevoir”), and, more idiomatically, in Claudius Hollyband’s 1593 English-French dictionary as to “haue an inkeling” (C6v). Rather, Florio emphasises its visual meaning as “voir” ‘to see’ (Dictionnaires d’autrefois), or “to perceiue, to spie out” (Hollyband C6v). He demands to “see” Verity as one might certainly have done, wielding an open book above the earth, in an early modern emblem book:

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21 Sometimes attributed to Sir Walter Raleigh, the important thing to note about the text is that Hamlin identifies it as a translation of Sextus Empiricus’s *Outlines* and provides a compelling argument for it being a very similar text to the now-lost translation circulating in England in the 1590s (Hamlin 52-54).
Ironically, by reducing the argument to visual knowledge, Florio’s translation illustrates Montaigne’s claim that knowledge is always a material process, inextricably related to the senses. Florio not only reverses Montaigne’s move away from the visual example of an apple used in *Outlines* and Raleigh’s *Sceptick*, but translates *verité* itself into the realm of vision, as an emblem figure, offering the argument to the reader through the visual trope of the moral tradition. He elides the syntactic ambiguity of “son essence” by translating the passage as a form of personification: it is not “its essence,” the root of truth, but “her true essence,” full sight of the visual figure, that familiar image, Veritas.

Florio’s pairing of “insight” and “sight” produces a similar effect to Brathwaite’s “illiterate” bill poster, inextricably connecting intellectual and material knowledge. Rather than attempting to comprehend “truth,” he presents the more palpable image of Verity. The relationship between abstract thought and material embodiment recalls the philosopher-critic Ellen Spolsky’s
insistence that “there is just not any such thing as an entirely intellectual assessment” (Satisfying 1). Spolsky’s search for a form of Satisfying Scepticism (2001) in the early modern period reminds us that our brains are not only the abstract Western locus of “intellect” but are bodily matter, too. They therefore require constant interaction with the physical and visual world in order to remain stimulated and satisfied: “knowledge is not only abstract, and is not always best expressed and communicated in words” (5). Forms of nonintellectual scepticism can therefore be a positive and generative means of enquiry.

The metaphorical “objectification” of images in broadsides offers a symbiosis between advice/admonition and, for example, spectacles—an empirical scientific object. It satisfies the physical and bodily thrust that so characterises the period’s sceptical enquiry while providing spiritual sustenance. By investing knowledge in material forms, images like the spectacles discussed above offer both physical and intellectual satisfaction, at once directing moral advice to the external eye and internal eye, to the brain and the mind.

Spolsky’s introduction to her later edited collection Iconotropism (2004) takes this point further, stressing the importance of images to our daily navigation of the world:

. . . human beings feed on pictures, metabolize them—turn them into nourishment—because we need the knowledge they provide. We turn to pictures when they are available, we imagine them if they’re not, and we produce them if we can. (16)

Providing nourishment for both body and mind, pictures are integral to abstract thought; they provide both the intellectual and physical “knowledge” essential to human thinking. Even in that generically symbolic George Wither emblem—a part of that genre so often said to take the mind away from material form—there is a contradiction. Although “the Minde should have a fixed eye / On Objects, that are plac’d on High,” the emblem is of course unable to present purely abstract ethical thought. Despite its attempt to belittle the “outward eye” of physical sight, it is “On Objects” that early modern popular print concentrated in the hope of offering some nourishment—intellectual, physical, and ethical.
Sпольский’s emphasis on “nourishment” is telling. Хилман has explored
cynicism’s obsession with bodily functions in *Shakespeare’s Entrails* (2007)
and acknowledges its material impulses: “the sceptic . . . experiences the world
as if it were made up of insides and outsides radically opaque to each other, as
if each object in it is split into a surface” (29). Unable to look past the
“knowledge” of the external body, the argument is again predicated on the
sense of sight. This chapter has so far shown that such philosophical
observations as those noted by Sпольский and Хилман can be supported by
concrete evidence from the printing press, and that such literary-philosophical
criticism can be brought down to earth, literally and metaphorically, through
interest in the material aspects of popular print culture. Further, unlike existing
scholarship on emblems (see Chapter One), a concentration on their material
aspects affords a greater and more nuanced appreciation of their moral
functions. Where the “spectacles” of the early modern broadside use material
images to satisfy ethical knowledge, ballads and tables also engage with the
bodily thrust of sceptical enquiry.

An entry in the Stationers’ Register on the 8th December 1610 attributes
“A booke called, *Thanotamy of a Christian man*” to bishop William Cowper, of
which a 1613 text is extant. In the same entry, the stationer John Budge also
registered “a table of the same matter, beinge 2 diuerse copyes” (Arber 3: 450).
Although no broadside of this title appears to survive, the Quarto text does
include a two-page diagram that strikingly presents the “Image of Christ”:
It seems likely, on the limited information in the *Register*, that the insert would at least resemble the broadside, which was to be sold separately. The *Anatomie* broadside emphasises its visual status. The very form of the text is predicated upon the body of Christ, as an *anatomy*.

Like the “satisfying” materiality of object-images in the manner of the *Spectacles*, Cowper’s anatomy engages with physical forms of sceptical
enquiry. Hillman’s description of “the anatomist” as “the sceptic par excellence” is useful when thinking of these images; Cowper’s “Image of Christ” synthesises empirical “bodily” knowledge with the ethical and religious, much in the way of Crooke in the ethical-anatomical enquiries of *Mikrokosmographia*. Images of Christ remained contentious in this period (Aston, “Symbols” 23), and considering *The Anatomie of a Christian* advertises its ethical and religious aims while so deeply involved with the “sceptical” act of anatomy, it is difficult to accept that this is a picture of man very literally in God’s image or that it is simply another portrait of “a famous name from antiquity” (Williams 78). Like the “iconotropic” emphasis in Spolsky’s work, the Christ-body situates the search for ethical truth within the search for physical knowledge. It exploits the unprecedented emphasis on “Christ’s penetrability and interiority,” channelling what Hillman sees in the period as the “obsessive topic” of Jesus’s “wounds, blood, heart and bowels” (Hillman 37). Cowper’s picture places ethical and religious truths at the centre of the “open body,” metabolising ethical thought through incarnation.

Early modern broadside images frequently materialise thought in this way, as objects or bodies. Although critics such as Williams and Diehl see the images of sixteenth and seventeenth-century England as part of the Protestant theological context, encouraging the viewer to “reject images which attract men to their physical and material qualities” (Diehl 55), it is those very qualities that ensure that the broadside image is fraught with moral power. Cowper’s Christ-like picture advertises its fleshliness and materiality in order to synthesise the period’s interest in physical knowledge with what would otherwise be a disembodied moral purpose. “Material morality” responds to the challenges facing early modern England’s moral certainties by going some way to translate moral advice into metaphorically tangible, rational, sensually verifiable, and essentially *useable* terms—though this response has its own anxieties, not least those captured in the moral ambiguity of “strange” spectacle.

*Not for decoration onely: materialisation of morality in the household*

*Each mans private Oeconomie ought to be a certaine Academie, wherein all sacred and morall knowledge is to be taught.*

--- Richard Brathwaite (¶2r).
The presence of the broadside in the early modern home demands that even closer attention be paid to its physical and material qualities. Indeed, while some broadsides—usually “ballads”—can be seen as “vagrant” texts, many—usually “tables”—also align themselves with the household, available for decoration and declaration, as household prop and household advice. Household images parallel physical labour with moral advice, and craft becomes a means for both material and abstract construction—a means of representation that is mirrored on an early modern stage whose “devices” encompass a range of conceptual meanings.

The reemergence of substantial criticism about and historical research on material culture has led to fresh understandings of early modern domestic life, and the printed picture is often physically a part of that life. The “third way” of the cheap moral image—reconciling material and abstract thought—places it within both print and material culture. In the early modern household, I argue, the broadside woodcut is as closely connected to the bed as it is to the book.

Broadside prints are often termed “tables” in the period, especially in the Stationers’ Register. Although some historians consider the terms synonymous, “ballad” invariably signifies the ballad format, with text and tune, whereas “table” generally refers to posters of advice and prints often associated with the household, as, for example, in Arthur Johnson’s entry for 7 December 1612:

Entred for his copie vnder thandes of master MASON and th wardens A table of Oeconomicall or household gouernment fit for euyere householder and his familie . . . . (Arber 3: 506)

These tables of advice support Richard Brathwaite’s contemporary definition of the household as a place “wherein all sacred and morall knowledge is to be taught.” They also fall under what Tara Hamling and Catherine Richardson would call “everyday objects” (Everyday Objects), even at the most basic semantic level, as “tables.” Malcolm Jones notes that while “table” “could mean ‘a broadside bearing printed text only,’ it could also certainly mean what we should now term a print, that is, an engraved single-sheet picture with or without text, by 1570 at the latest, and is commonly used in the Stationers’ Register in
this sense thereafter” (4). Such usage of the word does not therefore indicate textual predominance, though associations with writing-tables might suggest so. The term can be seen to signify the practical uses of both writing-tables and, in the household, quite possibly with the physical uses of furniture, the semantic possibilities expanding alongside their visual imagery.

William Cowper is clearly concerned with interior decoration. The broadside registered with his Anatomie book may well have found itself on the wall of a house. This household wall, then, was not merely a place for pretty pictures and decorative wallpaper. In the epistle to his 1619 commentary on Revelations, Cowper imagines the walls of heaven covered in jewels. He describes John of Patmos’s prophecy as a “precious stone,” given as a “great Present” to the Church (A3v). These visual metaphors are hardly unusual for one of the most frequently illustrated biblical passages of the period, notably in Miles Coverdale’s 1549 New Testament, but the close association of images with both decoration and instruction is telling. Although some have called the verses apocryphal, Cowper notes, “all the Lords Lapidaries, who haue seene the precious stones, wherewith the walls of Heauenly Jerusalem are garnished, haue easily perceiued this to be from heauen also.” Picturing God’s kingdom as a walled city, he figures biblical writings as fallen heavenly furnishings. Revelations, like decorations on the wall of God’s household, “partakes . . . both in color and vertue, and serueth Saints, not for decoration onely, but declaration also of many secrets, which greatly concerneth their state” (A3v). These speaking walls both beautify and edify, and indeed their colours represent different prophecies, “signification of things to fall out; eyther aduerse or prosperous” (A4r).

In using the metaphor of the household wall as the basis for biblical exegesis, Cowper understands that early modern surroundings are never “for decoration onely.” Colour and virtue are intimately connected, and the decoration of the home speaks morally and religiously to its everyday audiences. The recent collection of essays Art Re-formed (edited by Tara Hamling and Richard L. Williams) and Hamling’s Decorating the Godly Household (2010) offer a reappraisal of images in domestic interiors, arguing

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22 The Geneva Bible is, in relation to other illustrated Revelations passages (like Coverdale’s or the Matthew’s Bible of 1537), “comparatively unadorned,” but there are examples of “the insertion” of engravings (see Molekamp 135).
that paintings of the virtues and Biblical scenes on walls or tapestries contributed to a Reformist imagination and aesthetic. To prescribe religious limits to these decorative images, however, neglects their particular and unorthodox possibilities. As Cowper recognizes, the precious stones have special significance for the saintly residents of Heavenly Jerusalem, as they betray “many secrets, which greatly concerneth their state” while offering to impart generally “the truth of things . . .” (A4r). Similarly, interior decoration that was not overtly religious in subject-matter was nevertheless not merely decorative. The early modern domestic environment is inextricably connected to ethical vision, further blurring the boundaries between the material and the moral.

While Cowper’s images are chiefly religious, a number of household tables figure themselves as practical objects within the domestic environment. Broadsides frequently demand to be placed in houses, suggesting that their physical presence is of equal efficacy to their verbal content. A broadside, because it is relatively inexpensive, is able to substitute the richer “arras” paintings of wealthy households for the middling and aspiring classes and can also appear in taverns and poorer households (as their “vagrancy” may suggest); it therefore fulfills humanist advice on moral decoration without expensive and elaborate paintings.

Notions of construction, artifice, and materialisation of virtue can be associated further with humanists’ social aspirations and with their democratising of virtue, discussed in the first chapter. The preface to the advice manual Institucion compares the act of giving moral advice with the building of a house:

And because in buildynge vp agayne thys house of worthy fame, manye men must beare office beside the maister Masons and chiefe Carpenters, I haue therefore on my parte (in wrytyng thys booke) most wyllyngly begunne to dygge, to beare morter, to cary tyle, and doo such other small offices as belonge to the repayring therof, referring the greater perfection of building to workemen of more might and better skyll. (*4r-v)
Moral instruction is explicitly framed as an act of artifice or of workmanship. Although later the *Institucion* opposes “vertue” and the inheritable manor place, the author here builds both simultaneously. While the house metaphor is common for moral instruction, appearing as the House of Alma in Spenser’s *Faerie Queene*, for instance, the extended imagery of practical craftsmanship is telling. If the House of Alma has an anatomical floor map that indicates “an aggressively materialist notion of a self” (Schoenfeldt 60), the *Institucion* presents a similar model for moral philosophy, creating a materialist advice manual that describes its work as physical labour. Elyot’s *Governour* and the *Institucion* represent a union of moral philosophical instruction and physical construction.

These material metaphors are made visually manifest in household images. *The clearing of Master Cranfords Text*, for example, notes that it is “good to drive away evill spirits, being hung over the thresholds of houses, and pasted or hung up on the walls of Halls and Parlors, and all haunted places.” Despite its densely textual appearance, it is the physical act of “being hung over the thresholds” that provides protection for the house.

Closely aligned with the practical running of a household, for instance, is the neatly illustrated 1635 ballad *Come ye blessed, &c. Goe ye cursed, &c: *
Visually striking in its decoration anyway, the ballad conceives of itself in practical, objective terms. It claims to be a “Diall of Destruction to Doomes-day: denoting the Seauen deadly Sins, seauen dangerous steps descendant to destruction; and by their contrary opposite vertues, the Seauenfold ladder ascending to euerlasting Feliciteit.” The dial can be read through the pictorial emblems associated with each sin and virtue:
Fig. 13. Detail of Fig. 12; “Chastitie.”

Fig. 14. Detail of Fig. 12; “Lechery.”
These persuasive and dissuasive moral images are familiar emblem compositions, leading to the hell mouth or the angels of heaven, offering the standard *sententiae*: “Why so? t’is better to goe to Heauen single / Then with the hellish multitude to mingle.” Yet the pictures invite themselves to be *used* as well as read. Like the printed “spectacles,” the images suggest that they might be of physical use. As a “dial,” the broadside is an “instrument serving to tell the hour of the day” or indeed as a “timepiece or chronometer of any kind” (OED “Dial, n.¹,” 1 and 3).

Where other tables draw attention to their status as objects by declaring their physical benefits—cleansing the house of evil by sitting in a chamber—the “Seauenfold ladder” of *Come ye blessed, &c.* also figures the broadside as a moral household prop, one that is physically and psychologically available for use. Metaphorically positing itself as a household stepladder, it is not only available in its practical sense and its decorative function—possibly pasted on the wall, as a furnishing—but in its moral intention of directing the mind towards “Felicity.” Like the spectacles, the stepladder and the dial reconceptualise moral messages in physical forms, offering the metaphorical possibility of use. The ballad conceives of itself as part of Orlin’s “level of clutter,” part of the “fairly hidden history” of the early modern household’s fittings (112), while associating its symbolic meanings with emblem and advice literature.

**The Materialisation of Morality and Stage Spectacles**

The notion of material morality is present on the stage just as it is in print—acutely in the “strange” plays of the 1610s. Unlike in print, the stage’s actual, physical props have the power to literalise the metaphorical possibilities of practical moral use. Sceptical thinking in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries combines with anti-Catholic propaganda to decry illusion and spectacle, revealing them to be merely mechanical artifice. Reginald Scot and William Lambarde consequently reduce all forms of legerdemain, contraption, and theatrical device to engines of practical use. The stress on craftsmanship rather than spiritual significance accords with notions about the English stage, those *playwrights* whose profession is similarly occupied with artifice, craft, and construction. Yet the stage also draws in a number of moral overtones to these devices, even as the mechanics of stage effects are made obvious. In the
words of Farah Karim-Cooper and Tiffany Stern, “... there was no binary between the materiality of theatre and the emotional, metaphorical and poetic registers of the plays themselves” (3). This section builds upon the work of Karim-Cooper, Stern, and of recent materialist criticism by expanding material enquiry to the moral-philosophical contexts surrounding early modern theatrical display. It argues that the jointure of material and moral use in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century broadsides is visible in playhouse performance, where the practical Ciceronian strain of early modern morality is combined with the stage’s practical craft. As part of this discussion, I also acknowledge the affinities between medieval theatre’s explicit bodily interests and the spectacular displays of Jacobean performance; Scot and Lambarde both draw parallels and distinctions between mysterious pre-Reformation “display” and defiantly mechanical contraptions—between attempted illusion and acknowledged artifice. Similarly, new and developing genres including the masque combine classical ideals with practical issues, and I build on the work of Stephen Orgel and Roy Strong to explore how masques rely both on abstract and material representation. Both scepticism and the humanist ideals underpinning such genres as the masque add a renewed but critically enquiring interest in the materiality of performance in the late Elizabeth and early Jacobean period.

There is a long history of mechanical artifice in English theatre. On the medieval stage, the role of the guilds in the mystery cycles closely ties craft and theatre, associating stage props and their symbolic effects with practical occupation. Helen Cooper has remarked of the mystery cycles that “it is no coincidence ... that ‘incarnation,’ literally ‘enfleshment,’ the embodiment of God as Man, is inseparable from the plays that take their name from the feast of Corpus Christi, of the body of Christ” (“Mystery Plays” 30). It is the central symbol of the cross—integral to late medieval Christianity—that dominates the closing plays of these mystery cycles. V. A. Kolve notes how

The cross functioned as a kind of earthly throne, rather than as the instrument of His dying. In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries ... this image changed greatly, in response to new meditational modes, new theological ideas, new fashions in sensibility: Christ is depicted suffering on the cross, His body
broken and bleeding. This transformation of Christianity’s central image affected all art forms, the drama not least among them: the Corpus Christi cycles show Christ ‘don on the rood’ in greater circumstantial detail, and with greater force and artistic complexity, than any other art form of the Middle Ages. (175)

The enduring symbolic force of the cross is matched in the mystery plays by the curious practical details of crucifixion. Christ’s passion is drawn out to such intimate and excruciating detail that the religious power of the symbol is inextricable from its material presence in the performance and all the grotesque physical details that accompany it.

All Crucifixion scenes in surviving cycles merge symbolic imagery with physical action and most play on the role of the guilds in performance. It is important to remember with regard to these scenes that the guilds can be tied to most mystery cycles and were closely bound up with the performance and organisation of Corpus Christi day processions. The Early Banns of Chester state, in 1539-40, that “these be the craftys of the Citie the whiche craftys bere the charge of the pagyns in pley of corpus Christi” (REED Chester 31). Similarly, the Leet Book at Coventry records in 1494 how “dyuers charges haue beene continued tyme oute of mynde for the worship of the same as pagantes & such other which haue beene dyuers Craftes” (REED Coventry 79).

Richard Beadle and Pamela M. King point out that “the craft-guilds were occasionally referred to as ‘mysteries’, and from the association of the crafts with the pageants of the Corpus Christi play arose the modern expression ‘mystery plays’” (xv-xvi).

The Crucifixion scenes, whether played or sponsored by the Ironmongers (Chester), Pynners and Paynters (York), or an unidentified guild, combine the practicalities of professional trade with the pageants’ symbolic intentions. The pynners—nail makers—of the particularly violent York pageant complain about the mistakes of workmanship, driving a nail through Christ’s “bones and senous” that “failis a foote and more.” The third soldier claims that it was wrongly marked, noting, “in faith, it was ouere skantely scored; / that makis it fouly for to faile” (352 ll.103-112). After nailing Christ to the cross, the soldiers offer a familiar tradesman’s guarantee that “this werke will holde” (353 l.121). The ironmongers in the Chester crucifixion also provide “nayles good wonne / to
nayle him upon” (310 l.159) and the torturers make similar guarantees: “I dryve yn / this ilke iron pynne / that I dare laye will last” (312 ll.194-6).

The realistic qualities of these props are confirmed by the Smiths Accounts at Coventry, closely relating the dramatic action to everyday trade. In 1462, they record “a peyre of new whelys, the pryce viij s; item, for nayls and ij hokys for the sayd pagiente, iiiij d; item for a cord. . .” (REED Coventry 41), connecting the play of pageantry to the business of bookkeeping and material production. In the Townley cycle, the visual cues for these props are present in the text, where commands to lift up the cross, hold Christ, and drive the nails in are clearly signalled. According to Peter Happé, “we should bear in mind . . . that although much of the effect here depends on realistic detail painfully enacted, the iconic figure of Christ on the cross is also being brought about. This mixture of practical stagecraft and the evolution of iconic material is particularly effective as theatre” (98). In fact, the striking combination of realism and religiosity is central to the materially-orientated drama that, as V.A. Kolve, Rosemary Woolf, and Clifford Davidson have separately acknowledged, owes much to the visual and physical importance of the host in late medieval liturgy. Davidson’s study of the guilds in York acknowledges that the plays are “specifically designed to emphasize sympathy for the object of torture and against the distortion of the legal system that brought Jesus to his sacrificial death—a death believed to be a benefit for all who are willing to take advantage of the system of salvation offered by the church” (17), but Davidson’s study also testifies to the symbolic purposes of the guild’s participation. Each guild achieved a collective identity and place within the parade . . . from the Barkers, associated with the odorous process of tanning, with their Creation of Heaven and Earth, to the affluent Mercers. In so doing, each guild maintained its role of presenting an essential fragment of sacred story, often a fragment also pointing to its social and economic role in the city as in the case of the Bakers’ pageant of the Lord’s Supper . . . . (20)

Clearly, the presence of an “iron pynne” or “nayles good wonne” represents both contemporary trade practice and important components of the Biblical story, reinforcing “the collective memory of times past” and making them
“relevant to contemporaries” (Davidson 25). Yet the fashioning of iconic symbols and Biblical history is rooted in the material basis of its construction, both physically and metaphorically constructing religious images.

While the Reformation in England sought to distance itself, eventually, from religious celebrations like the Corpus Christi plays, the material morality displayed in popular print proves that images did not entirely abdicate their visual, material form and eventually came to harness it as a source of moral power. The English stage can be seen to move along a similar trajectory. Where deeply allegorical plays and dumb shows characterise the early and mid-sixteenth century, a subject explored in the first chapter of this thesis, Elizabethan theatre can also be closely associated with the medieval mystery cycles.

Critics including Cooper and Beatrice Groves have suggested that English theatre is closely aligned with pre-Reformation “embodied” drama. Groves explains that “the mystery plays, like the mass, had been a powerful spectacle, and the memory of both remained in many early-modern minds” (39). Consequently, spectacle is important for the commercial stage. Notions of “classical decorum” are, Groves notes, “violated” in both medieval and early modern drama through “the presentation of violence on stage,” and in Shakespeare, for instance, it is possible to see “the violent power of the medieval theatre” (49). “Hybrid” moral plays (see Chapter One) borrow visual, physical imagery from the dagger of lath to the hell’s mouth, while instances like Bajazeth’s beating of his brains on a cage in Tamburlaine (1587) and Gloucester’s blinding in King Lear (1606) echo the literal violence of medieval spectacle. Philip Butterworth has shown, too, that many of the stage’s special effects have roots in medieval performance, both English and continental.

The Jacobean period sees a further advance in stage effects, including, arguably, more subtlety and greater mechanical artifice. Jenny Sager notes that by the end of the 1590s, the limited special effects of the 1580s and early 1590s—the ‘creaking throne[s]’ descending from the heavens, the overtly fake ‘giants, monsters, furies, beats and bugbears’ and the ‘pasteboard march panes and our wooden
pies’—were beginning to be regarded as a ready source of comedy rather than of wonder. (39)

These effects did not disappear; John Melton’s comments about Dr Faustus, discussed below, suggest that commercial theatres maintained the tried-and-trusted effects that drew in crowds. Marion Lomax has characterised the seventeenth century as a period that places growing emphasis on visual-dramatic effects. She notes that “the roots of the development of spectacle in the public theatres have been traced to a strange mixture of soils—the medieval mysteries, civic pageantry, aristocratic tournaments, the masque, and the results of private theatre rivalry with eventual partial amalgamation” and argues that these influences “indicate a combination of old and new traditions and effects which can be traced in the drama” (19). Nonetheless, Shakespeare and Thomas Heywood exhibit a particularly “Jacobean” approach to stage spectacle from the late 1600s. Descending eagles, fireworks, tempests, and living statues dominate Heywood’s Age plays and Shakespeare’s “late plays.” These are exactly the displays described as “strange,” making the word a possible description for their shared stagecraft and its effects.

The move towards indoor theatre amongst adult companies arguably contributes to a growing visual emphasis in Jacobean theatre as a whole. From the revival of the boy companies at the start of the century, there begins to develop an indoor-theatre aesthetic that is reflected in the content of their plays. Mary Bly explains that “boys’ plays persistently challenge the audience by referencing the artificiality of stage practice . . .” (147). Drawing attention to the practices of theatrical effect, the boy companies emphasise the materiality of spectacle. The attention to artificiality partly results, according to Bly, from the frequent gestures to the boy actors’ male body beneath his female garb, but the buildings themselves also draw out the material aspects of stage practice. Keith Sturgess describes the private theatres’ “end-stage,” which “favours tableau-like effect, such as the last two scenes of The Broken Heart, the Loretto scene of The Duchess of Malfi and the chess-game at the end of The Tempest: a succession of eloquent stage pictures best seen from the front” (54). Indeed, engagement with the physical occurrences of the theatre is partly a result of the intimate, candlelit spaces that characterise smaller indoor theatres. Matching candlelight to action and with the light of day streaming through the stone-
framed windows, a theatre like the Blackfriars arguably demands concentration on smaller visual matters.\textsuperscript{23} Ralph Alan Cohen adds that “the visual impact” of theatrical moments involving lighting

\begin{quote}
owes much to the largely fixed nature of the stage and the \textit{frons scenae}. Against that background even small changes can significantly influence the appearance of the room, and this kind of change applies as well to the use of such signifiers as torches, candles, and lanterns. (217)
\end{quote}

An early modern audience’s sensitivity to lighting, then, feeds into other visual aspects of the plays, as well as the lavishly decorated theatre itself. Outdoor theatres have their own tradition of special effects, however, and the Red Bull’s continued success with visually impressive drama suggests that visible effects are equally essential to the development of outdoor public theatre tastes. Philip Henslowe’s diary details a rich array of devices, props, and material improvements to the Rose that reveal the theatre to be equally interested in display from its outset. More pertinent to this thesis, the Red Bull theatre itself, host to the Queen’s Servants, acquired a reputation for being a particularly spectacular playhouse. Indeed, there is clearly a growing interest in the nature of elaborate visual display in the 1600s and 1610s in both indoor and outdoor theatres. The Queen’s Servants can be found playing alongside the King’s Men in 1611 for a performance of the \textit{Silver Age} (Chambers 212). Such collaboration draws Heywood’s public theatre spectacle and the King’s Men’s visually emphatic style close together, as subsequent chapters of this thesis explore.

Marion Lomax debates whether effects like Jupiter descending in \textit{Cymbeline} would have resembled the ridiculed devices of the 1580s-90s or have been impressive advances in stage technology. Given that it costs seven times more to attend an indoor theatre; that engineering in masques had developed rapidly (discussed below); and that visual aspects come to dominate so many plays of the period, it seems likely to me that effects by the Jacobean period must be somewhat advanced. Yet it remains safest to agree with Lomax

\textsuperscript{23} See, for instance, Paul Menzer’s argument about filmic acting and the Blackfriars in \textit{Moving Shakespeare Indoors} (2014).
“that the reality may have been a mixture of the two—both self-conscious artifice and awe-inspiring spectacle” (121). That mixture would serve doubly to expose the material reality of spectacle and at the same time to enhance its effect—a strengthening of moral and visceral experience by pointing to the materiality of the moment.

**Material-moral stagecraft: Devices and Engines**

The stage, by exposing its material underpinnings, shows physical construction to be an important aspect of ethical enquiry. This chapter has shown that early modern theatre was practical in its aims, objectives, and outcomes. Like the moral advice of popular print, the “craft” of theatre was and is both verbal and material. This final section examines how spectacle unites moral and practical force, concentrating on Jacobean spectacle in particular but taking context from the late Elizabethan period. Investigating the practical stagecraft of the period provides necessary context for understanding “strange” occurrences in the plays at their most spectacular moments—moments that necessarily combine the practical and the moral, emotional, and poetic.

The significance of material spectacle is teased out in the period by uses of the polyvalent terms “device” and “engine.” The rich, messy orthography and the flexible semantics of pre-stabilised English are particularly instructive. “Deuise” is a remarkably polysemous word in early modern England. The *Oxford English Dictionary* attests to the contradictory definitions current in the period: among its many meanings, it is both “something devised or framed by art or inventive power; an invention, contrivance; esp. a mechanical contrivance (usually of a simple character for some particular purpose)” and, simultaneously, “used of things non-material” (OED “device, n.,” 7a. and b.). If it is at once a mechanically material and a “non-material” invention, the device—whatever its form—seems to be peculiarly able to unite the abstract and the physical world. Henri Estienne’s emblem theory, translated into English in 1646 by Thomas Blount, indicates the “true Etimologie of the word” device: it is “by it . . . that we represent and discover humane passions, hopes, feares, doubts, disdaine, anger, pleasure . . . and all other motions of the soule” (C1v). In the context of emblems, *impresa, exempla* and *sententiae*, the moral connotations of “deuise” are drawn to the fore. Such a definition also links the material, mechanical “device” with printed moral images. Yet William Bourne’s *Inventions or Devises* (1590) uses the term to refer to matters of engineering,
and his list of various devices includes winches and cranes and stretches from martial affairs at sea to the construction of in-land fortifications. Indeed, for Turner, “Evidence from the Revels Office indicates that within a practical milieu the term ‘device’ could designate simultaneously an idea, invention or conceit; the actual show or entertainment itself; and finally the sketch, ‘outline’, or plat that was used in the process of realizing the conceit in its material, mechanical form” (129). As such, the term connotes a number of (potentially conflicting) states or concepts, including the idea of a thing and the thing itself.

The term “engine” contains parallel material-moral meanings, often used to describe tools or weapons but also associated with mental, intellectual, or ingenious plans and designs. Both “device” and “engine,” therefore, have close connections with the “material morality” of the broadsides: they merge moral significance and material object, visual image and practically usable constructions. They are part of the society’s technology as well as its culture, providing support to Kenneth J. Knoespel’s claim that “technology is not a spectacle that momentarily diverts our attention but a medium through which a culture defines itself” (120).

The practical and material nature of stage devices leads English authors Reginald Scot and William Lambarde to seek to know the machinations behind visual illusions—as anatomists scrutinising the human body. A sceptical impulse motivates their approach and puts the focus on material mechanics. Knowledge of illusion’s physical constructions offers some hope of moral edification. Lambarde tackles the famous Boxley rood in his Perambulation of Kent (1576)—in which an image of Christ is said to smile or frown on its worshippers (once they have devoutly paid their dues). Lambarde deconstructs these “pictures” by explaining the material workings behind them: the pictures were fixed “by means of a pyn of wood, stricken through it into a poste (whiche a false knaue standing behind, could put in, and pull out, at his pleasure)”: these (literally) crafty monks loosened the pin when they thought “folkes purses” were deep enough (Aa2r).

Reginald Scot goes further in providing a visual and verbal deconstruction of public spectacle. Where Thomas Beard’s Theatre of God’s Judgements (1597) collapses any distinction between elaborate visual punishment and divine providence, Scot’s Discoverie of Witchcraft (1584) is intent on exposing “the endeuor and drift of iugglers” that lie behind physically
realised images. Illusions are there, he insists, “onelie to abuse mens eies and iudgements” (Cc1r). His discussion of “iugglers” gleefully exposes the mechanical arts behind “supernatural” phenomena, including the means “to cut off ones head, and to laie it in a platter” (Dd8r):

Fig. 15. Image of artificial decapitation from Scot’s *The discouerie of witchcraft*. . . *Discourse concerning the nature and substance of devils and spirits* (London, 1584; Dd8r). STC 21864.
The diagram and text become a form of anatomy theatre that slices through illusion: it offers “the order of the action, as it is to be shewed,” and Scot uses emphatically ocular terms, concentrating on “shew” and “sight” and providing “necessarie obseruations to astonish the beholders.” That visual emphasis turns the original spectacle on its head: the theatrical moment is not in the suspension of belief but in the assurance of materiality. In using these sceptical impulses to attack visual display, Scot assures the reader that such spectacles are purely mechanical; he writes that they “are no supernaturall actions, but deuises of men” (Dd8r). It is clear that material knowledge is both morally and theatrically valuable.

Spectacle proves to be commercially useful in the theatres, but it is not without its dismissive critics, who gesture towards its illusory powers. Marlowe’s works remained perennial favourites at the Theatre, the Rose, and then the Fortune. John Melton’s well-known remarks in his Astrologaster (1620) about Doctor Faustus show that some thirty years or so after its first performances, audiences were clearly still more than happy to behold shagge-hayr’d Deuills runne roaring over the Stage with Squibs in their mouthes, while Drummers make thunder in the Tying-house, and the twelue-penny Hirelings make artificial Lightning in their Heauens. (E4r)

These remarks refer dismissively to the material realities of Jacobean spectacle, revealing effects to be little more than sulphurous fireworks, drummers, and stage-hands. Indeed, they are part of Melton’s attack on astrology. He denies that astrologers can “fore-tell of Lightning and Thunder that shall happen such a day” when the only “Inflamations” to be seen are those at “the Fortune in Golding-lane” (E4r). His witty comparison opposes theatrical effect to nature. The immediate conclusion, “Who then will beleueve these Fortune-sellers?” (E4v) echoes the theatre’s name and further aligns the falsity of astrological prediction with theatrical effect; Melton implicitly parallels the false prognostications of the astrologer with the artifice of dramatic devices, treating both as forms of deceit. His words echo Brathwaite’s complaints about
the “begging pedanticall Artist” (¶2r-v), whose flimsy and conspicuously “material” broadsheet deceives the passing passenger.

Anti-theatricalists in early modern England denigrate the stage by calling its actors and writers craftsmen; Stephen Gosson describes plays being “erected” (C1v) like the scaffolds they adorn. “As well as being called ‘play-makers’ and ‘poets’, playwrights of the early modern period were frequently known as ‘play-patchers,’” Tiffany Stern observes, and “the term was unflattering and designed to wound, as was ‘playwright,’ with its implication that constructing plays was a craft—equivalent to being a cartwright or a wheelwright—rather than an art” (Documents 1). This practical approach to playwrighting/writing suggests, in Bernard Beckerman’s words, “an active interchange between player and playwright” (122-23). Indeed, theatre historians and critics including Stern, Roslyn Knutson, and Douglas Bruster have shown that plays were deeply embedded in social and commercial contexts. Playwrights disseminated plays in parts, wrote for specific actors or companies, responded to shifts in genre and repertory, and took theatre spaces themselves into consideration. An important amount of a printed play, then, is a result of this broad, collaborative, and fluid interchange between playwright(s) and the theatrical world.

Ben Jonson seeks to deny this interchange in his prologue written for the 1616 Folio edition of Every Man In His Humour, where spectacular devices and engines are considered sensational and superfluous. Echoing Sidney’s distaste for the mongrel plays of the English stage, careless of unity of time and place, Jonson notes “th’ill customes of the age” in making a child “shoote up” from swaddling cloth to a threescore bearded man in the same clothes. More notably, he hopes for a stage where no

. . . creaking throne comes downe, the boyes to please;
Nor nimble squibbe is seene, to make afear’d
The gentlewomen; nor roul’d bullet heard
To say, it thunders; nor tempestuous drumme
Rumbles, to tell you when the storme doth come . . . . (A3r)

The prologue belittles the visceral effects of theatre, making fireworks a comic fright for ladies and descending chairs merely childish toys. Jonson prefers
“deedes, and language, such as men doe use,” and his voicing of effects suggests that he even wishes to transform theatricality into a realist form of literary representation—the bullets “say” and the drums “tell you.” The prologue transforms visual spectacle into descriptive and defiantly verbal narrative.

Further, in *The Devil is an Ass* (c.1616), the name of Jonson’s character “Mere-craft” represents not only his gulling and scheming, but his familiarity with theatrical artifice. He even echoes Hill’s pamphlet on the creation of artificial fire. Hill explains that it requires “the poudere of the Willowe sticke,” a ball of silk filled with powder, and a quick coal inside, and that, “holding the same softly with thy teethe” and breathing out, one might exhale fire (D1r). Mere-craft similarly notes, “A little castle-soape / Will do’t, to rub your lips: and then a nutshell, / With toe, and touch-wood in it to spit fire” (I1r). The association of Jonson’s comedy-vice with dramatic special effect suggests further contempt for illusion, associating it with both moral and visual deceit—if simultaneously acknowledging its entertainment value.

Yet “deedes and language” also suggest that performance is indeed necessary to theatre. “Deedes” implies here the actions of great men, in an Aristotelian sense, but it must also be understood as the actions played by an actor. As much as Jonson sometimes wishes to deny theatre its very theatricality, “language” alone cannot stage a play. The inventories of Henslowe’s diary suggest that physical properties and devices were an important part of the economic life of a playing company. Numerous scholars, from Beckerman to Andrew Gurr in his study of the Admiral’s Men, have shown the costs and benefits involved in procuring both playbooks and playing properties; items like a hell’s mouth, a cauldron, or a bed would be both economically and dramatically important.

“Divers thinges” bought for the stage included a number of costly items—especially in regards to popular Marlovian-style plays. Many productions demand a number of expensive props in order to construct the necessary “devices” in the play (see the entries for the *Jew of Malta*, Henslowe 170, 320). Henslowe’s inventory suggests that material goods, from tailoring to “thinges”—whatever that term might indicate—are essential investments. Towards the end of 1598, the diary records a bustle of activity around the commissioning, purchasing, and furnishing of the now-lost *Civil Wars of France* tetralogy, by Michael Drayton and Thomas Dekker. Roslyn Knutson sees these plays as part
of London’s pan-theatre cashing-in on Marlowe’s popularity, in which numerous theatres “duplicated, exploited, or in some sense answered” Marlowe’s Massacre at Paris (Marlowe’s Empery 32). The Admiral’s Men were seeking to replicate the success of Massacre, and so the Civil Wars plays, Knutson believes, mirror Marlowe’s characters; in this sense, they prove to be, like other theatres’ equivalents, what we might now term “mockbusters” in relation to Massacre at Paris. Importantly, the twenty pounds given to Robert Shaw and Edward Jewby on the 19 and the 24 November 1598 is a remarkably high total to “bye divers thinges for the playe” (101-02). Three years earlier, for instance, it cost seven pounds and two shillings for “mackinge the throne In the heuenes” (7)—a particularly spectacular property that evidences the ability of outdoor theatres to stage flying descents. Furnishing the Marlowe mockbuster at this expense, then, allows one to speculate that physical props and the creation of forms of “special effects” were essential to these plays’ appeal, and that Drayton and Dekker might well have made visual dramatic display central to the writing and staging of these Marlovian-style crowd-pleasers.

By the late 1600s, this form of visual “deceit” is not solely visible in stage effects. Ann Barton has noted that, in Shakespeare’s late plays, “not only Old Gower [from Pericles], but the statue scene in The Winter’s Tale, the bear, the wet mariners and deceptive spectacles of The Tempest, the unexpected appearances of gods, all seem designed to perplex a theatre audience, at least momentarily, as to the existential status of what it sees” (“‘Enter . . .’” 202). Spectacle begins to be infused within the fabric of the plays themselves, governing their moral and epistemic force. Shakespeare’s late plays and other Jacobean public drama, as Part Two of this thesis explores, react to the period’s optical and ethical uncertainty with overawing visual effects, both questioning and asserting the power of spectacle.

Indeed, by the Jacobean period, mechanical spectacle begins to be accorded significant moral force, becoming an essential but debated part of theatrical presentation. Civic pageantry played an important role in urban life as well as in the careers of dramatists; Heywood, for instance, wrote a number of civic pageants. Much of the pageant and its expenses surrounded not the

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24 The vague generality of the term suggests something other than clothes purchases, which are normally detailed explicitly. For instance, in the 1601 Jew of Malta entry, “divers thinges” appears to be distinct from the payment that same day to the tailor, suggesting that the five pounds lent to Shaw and Jewby is for some other matter or materials.
textual composition but the sourcing of props, materials, and costumes for
display (see the second chapter of Tracey Hill's *Pageantry and Power* [2010]).
Heywood confirms the visual emphasis of these pageants, when he
acknowledges that many who attend “are better delighted with that which
pleaseth the eye, than contenteth the eare” (*Londini Speculum* C2r).

Much of the growth of interest in spectacle, though, can be associated
with the rise of the masque, which David Lindley suggests only reaches its full
form in 1604 (383). In the Jacobean masque form, born from the collaboration
between the poet Jonson and the designer and engineer Inigo Jones, spectacle
and text combine to form a type of theatre with clear symbolic and moral ends.
It has long been noted that Jonson’s aim in the masque is a moral one, and he
summarises his approach in *Love’s Triumph Through Callipolis* (1631), where
he claims that “all Repraesentations, especially those of this nature in court,
publique Spectacles, eyther haue bene, or ought to be the mirror of mans life”
(A2r). Such a definition of masque and spectacle suggests their moral
importance and associates “spectacles” with deeper meanings than mere show.
His words echo the broadside *A Spectacle fo[] Pe[]iu[]e[]s*
by associating “public spectacles” with the mirror that is so often used as a symbol of moral advice.

The materials of the masque, though, are equally important in advice,
instruction, and betterment. “Jones’s aesthetics,” Stephen Orgel notes, “derive
from good Platonic doctrine and have clear moral ends” (“Poetics” 50). Rather
than viewing poetry and spectacle as opposites, Orgel’s work has shown that
there is an important philosophy behind the visual and material displays of the
masque. He links Jones’s work to Italian theories of visual theatre, from
Francesco Robortello to Sebastiano Serlio. These Italian writers, Orgel
explains, took inspiration from Aristotle’s claim that theatre should evoke
“wonder” or “marvelousness,” and that such effects can be found in spectacle.
Similarly, “on the practical side, Vitruvius provided the necessary assurances
that classical drama had employed scenic machinery. . .” (54). That practical
side is also complemented by the rise in machine technology and its
representation in the sixteenth century and onwards. In the new genre of
machine-books, the artifice of the machines combines visual and moral enquiry
in a similar manner to an emblem book. Like the images explored above,
though, it is in the *material form* of the display that the power is found.
Knoespel has explored the rise of this phenomenon in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries, associating it with a move towards visual expression. He notes that the many “books that advertise themselves as theaters for machines and instrumentation—the theatrum mechanorum—and the others that represent machines are part of this cultural fascination with the visual staging of knowledge” (100). Texts that share a model with Agostino Ramelli’s Le diverse et artificiose machine (1588) and Jacques Besson’s Théâtre des instruments mathematiques et mechaniques (1569), amongst numerous others, have been shown by critics including Orgel, Knoespel, and Jonathan Sawday to influence early modern English theatre-craftsmen, from Shakespeare to Jones (these texts are discussed in depth in relation to The Tempest in Chapter Four).

Although “the actual engineering” of Jones’s own masques “must remain highly conjectural” (Orgel and Strong 20), these machine-books were popular in Europe and it is likely that Jones at least encountered them. Possibly they contributed to his own theatre of instruments, which is characterised by spectacular stage effects and a practical approach to painted scenery; it is clear that he used machina versatilis, a two-sided scene that sits on a pivot, and scena ductilis, a series of grooves allowing backdrops to be drawn aside and so altered. Jones’s masque designs feed the idea that illusionistic scenery could “make virtue’s triumphs more immediately vivid than could words alone—a positive potential for bringing ideals alive in the minds of spectators” (Strout 235). Although Strout and Orgel seem to disagree about the specific results of realism (as manifested in perspective settings), the imitation of nature nonetheless represented a form of moral artistry:

It depended . . . on certain assumptions about the nature of the artist: that his power was the power to project illusions, but that these had meaning and moral force; that seeing was believing, and that art could give us a vision of the good and the true; that the illusion represented, in short, a Platonic reality. (Orgel, “Poetics” 66)

Jones’s approach to engineering has, therefore, philosophical and conceptual weight, and is designed with educative and abstract aims. It is closely related to book-of-nature and emblem theory, discussed in the introduction, and to notions about ut pictura poesis explored by, for instance, Jean H. Hagstrum in
The Sister Arts (1958)—a link with rhetoric explored in Chapter Five of this thesis. Cooper has also shown that masquing involves an “interplay between actors and spectators” that goes beyond “theatrical device” and unites the playworld and the real world. The effect is to heighten the allegorical experience and serve, in the same manner as morality plays, as “a reminder of the real existence of the abstract qualities concerned” (“Location and Meaning” 137-38). In this sense, the material experience of the masque—the visual power and tangibility of its spectacle—serves to sharpen its moral instructions.

Jonson, as he does with the prologue to Every Man In, questions the role of materiality in the masque. It took until 1631 for him to express fully his contempt for (or resentment of) the mechanical side of masquing, when he takes the competition between visual and verbal to an extreme. In “An Expostulation with Inigo Jones,” he describes the material role of his partner as “the maker of properties; in sum, / The scene, the engine.” Jonson rancorously observes, though, that “he now is come / To be the music-master; tabler too; / He is, or would be, the main Dominus Do- / All of the work . . . ” leading to his ironic denunciation of spectacle’s (and Jones’s) popularity: “O! to make boards to speak! there is a task! / Painting and carpentry are the soul of masque” (118).

This opposition between “the engine” and what Jonson sees as the “moral” poetic side of the masque is much more confused, however, in the early years of the genre, and often indistinguishable. In the preface to Hymenaei (1606), Jonson does indeed contrast the “body”—what is “obiected to sense”—with the “soul”—that “subiected to understanding”—already equating the material “object” with passive visual experience and opposing it to the actions of the “subjective” mind. He stresses that the body is frail and sensual, that it is temporary and decaying matter soon to be forgotten. Souls, though, are not so short-lived, and it is this remembrance that

. . . hath made the most royall Princes, and greatest persons (who are commonly the personaters of these actions) not onely studious of riches, and magnificence in the outward celebration, or shew; (which rightly becomes them) but curious after the most high, and heartie inuentions, to furnish the inward parts: and those grounded vpon antiquitie, and solide learnings) which, though their voyce be taught to sound to present occasions, their sense,
or doth, or should always lay hold on more remou’d mysteries.

(Gggg6r)

Unlike his later carping at carpentry, though, the passage does not present such a clear-cut division between poetry and engineering. Jonson’s use of “inventions” undermines the separation of the material from the moral: he uses the term here both metaphorically and physically, suggesting that performers should desire “high, and heartie” spectacles, in both the body of the entertainment and in the mind. Indeed, the preface expands the notion of “invention” in a similar way to the flexible term “device,” coming to mean both intellectual creativity and physical construction. In the Masque of Queens just three years later, for instance, Jonson credits Jones with “the deuice of their attyre . . . with the inuention, and architecture of the whole scene, and machine” (Kkkk5v). This description associates both device and invention with machinery, and a similar double meaning can be gleaned from Hymenaei, where the “more remou’d mysteries” lie in both meanings of the term “invention.” The importance of spectacle in the masque’s moral work—and this is a masque typically full of engineered devices, including a scene of Clouds “made artificially to swell, and ride like the Racke” (Hhhh2v)—is compounded by the material metaphor in “furnish,” which suggests that the soul of masque is, really, a marriage of mechanics and metre.

Jones’s engines, then, play an important moral role. Samuel Daniel, in complete contrast to Jonson, goes so far as to suggest, in Tethys Festival (1610), that Jones’s visual materials are the essence of the genre: “. . . the onely life consists in shew: the arte and inuention of the Architect giues the greatest grace, and is of most importance” (E2r). In one instance, he even appears to use the materiality of Jones’s invention as a means of praise. Daniel writes that “Mercury most artificially, and in an exquisite posture descends” (F4r), suggesting that the level of artifice is a point of particular delight.

25 It is clear, too, from his posthumously published commonplace book that Jonson appreciated—even celebrated—the moral power of pictures: “Whosoever loves not Picture, is injurious to Truth: and al the wisdom of Poetry. Picture is the invention of Heaven: the most ancient, and most a kinne to Nature . . . it doth so enter, and penetrate the inmost affection (being done by an excellent Artificer) as sometimes it orcomes the power of speech, and oratory” (Timber P2v).
The moral importance of materials in display is also shared by the city pageant. Thomas Dekker, the writer of a number of civic pageants, offers a more explicit celebration of engineering-as-moral-artistry in his 1604 entry pageant for King James.\textsuperscript{26} The description offers an explanation of each “Deuice” that explains their narrative significance as well as their physical construction—again illustrating that the word attends both to moral symbolism and to physical construction. Dekker offers an implicit hierarchy between poet and painter, claiming that “[t]he Soule that should giue life, & a tongue to this Entertainment, being to breathe out of Writers Pens. The Limmes of it to lye at the hard-handed mercy of Mychanitiens” (B2v). Yet his entertainment echoes the mystery plays, with their emphasis on everyday commerce and craft, by stressing the importance of practical engineering in poetic meaning—what Turner calls Dekker’s “geometric code” that has been “borrowed from the very communities who made up London’s political, economic, and social tissue” (151). Dekker paints a picture of “Carpenters, loyners, Caruers, and other Artificers sweating at their Chizzells” in order to construct the set and claims that even “children (might they haue bin suffred) would gladly haue spent their little strength about the Engines, that mounted vp the Frames: Such a fire of loue and ioy, was kindled in euery brest” (B3r). For Dekker, the chief part of the pageant’s moral force is the community spirit it generates, and here, with the various measures of heights, breadths, and distances, it is the mechanical aspect of the staging that brings London together both geographically and socially. If it is the engines and artifice that generate love and joy, then the mechanics begin to appear essential to the “soul” of the entertainment.

Indeed, referring to the dreadful plague year of 1603, Dekker exclaims,

Hee that should haue compared the emptie and vntroden walkes of London, which were to be seen in that late mortally destroying Deluge, with the thronged streets now, might haue beliued, that vpon this day, began a new Creation, & that the Citie was the onely Workhouse wherein sundry Nations were made. (B3v)

\textsuperscript{26} Jonson and Thomas Middleton also had a hand in the pageant (and Jonson printed a separate account, as did the architect Stephen Harrison). The pageant was delayed for a year after James’s arrival due to plague. It contained elaborate special effects and combined physical props with symbolic meaning and classical allusion.
Although ostensibly celebrating James’s arrival as a silver bullet, it is the Workhouse\textsuperscript{27} that dominates the rejuvenated London. Dekker suggests that the ingenious mechanics of the pageant—which have erected “wonders of Wood”—and the practical crafts of the city hold biblical power. He presents the adorned cityscape as an early modern ark, and posits practical craft as the moral and physical regenerator of plague-ravaged London as well as the world at large. Dekker’s description therefore echoes the materialisation of morality found in the popular print of the period: some broadsides, as seen above, make use of their material potential to enhance their moral force; the spectacles of \textit{A Spectacle fo\[] Pe\[i\[]j\[u\]e\[s]} gesture towards their (metaphorical) practical, physical use to substantiate ethical claims. Dekker’s pageant effects the same move, turning to the materials and the mass-assembly of spectacle to make the products of community-engineering into “wonders of Wood”: a phrase that, in its context, suggests materials and their construction are socially, morally, and physically forceful.

Early modern England sees a gradual materialisation of moral admonition and advice. The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries underwent gradual and uneven philosophical changes, with interest in empiricism and scientific discovery increasing alongside a rediscovery of scepticism. These factors encourage enquiry into the material facts of (both physical and mental) experience. Consequently, the practical emphasis in much of the period’s moral philosophy—captured in Elyot’s insistence that “all that euer was spoken or written, was to be executed” (K5r)—can be harnessed by objects and images that metaphorically present themselves as \textit{usable} advice. Materialised morality in popular print images therefore provides a means of fulfilling philosophical cravings for tangibility and visual evidence, while conveying (and strengthening) admonitory or didactic messages.

Material morality can have a wide application in the late Elizabethan and early Jacobean period, and its practicality translates onto the stage. Broadsides and ballads frequently align themselves with the “clutter” of early modern England, substantiating their moral claims by strengthening their

\textsuperscript{27} I follow the OED and numerous examples of the word in early modern England, pre-1650s, that suggest the word means “factory” or, as the OED puts it, “A house, shop, or room in which work is regularly performed” (“Workhouse” 1.a).
figurative physical forms. Images like the spectacles, which offer multiple types of “vision,” and the humanist household advice discussed in this chapter show that moral teaching is often inextricable from objects of print and material culture. Ultimately, “material morality” offers to strengthen moral instruction and respond to sceptical enquiry with the promise of sensory satisfaction.

In theatrical terms, scepticism challenges the spiritual significance of devices, but suggests that material construction can be morally illuminating. The range of evidence presented in this chapter suggests that the work of stage spectacle is embedded in wider philosophical developments, particularly those presented in popular print images. As such, the stage can be read in the same terms as household bills, public broadsides, and amid the shared spirit of sceptical and scientific enquiry. The result reveals sixteenth- and seventeenth-century England’s complex presentation of and reaction to stage mechanics. Karim-Cooper and Stern state that “it was feared that plays could touch spectators both in reality and metaphorically—emotionally or morally—perhaps changing them forever” (7). Antitheatricalists touch on this fear, but dramatists themselves likewise draw on the material-moral power of theatre. Like the metaphorical materiality of broadside images, the stage can make palpably material spectacle a source of moral power, linking the physical and abstract meanings of “device.” This chapter has shown the ways in which devices were employed on the early modern stage—and their development through late Elizabethan in to elaborate Jacobean engines. Exploring the influence of the masque and the city pageant on visual display shows the moral underpinnings of material spectacle. An interest in the mechanics, construction, and materials of theatrical display—as with the materials of printed moral images—fulfills anatomical sceptical curiosity but also charges those materials with moral significance.

Often, though, Jacobean drama is ambivalent about the merits of material morality. Part Two of this thesis demonstrates how plays in the Jacobean period negotiate between the materiality and morality of their “strange” spectacles, using that term to interrogate and reflect on spectacle’s moral efficacy.
3. Spectacular “Strangeness” in Heywood’s Age Plays and Shakespeare’s 
*The Tempest*

Shakespeare’s *The Tempest* (c.1610-11) brilliantly interrogates the materialisation of morality described in Chapter Two by exploring stage devices’ potential for moral edification. The stage directions in the play cannot be traced to a certain origin, but they nonetheless reveal the period’s (and *The Tempest’s*) keen interest in the description of spectacle and its moral effects. One such direction in the First Folio reads:

*Thunder and Lightning. Enter Ariell (like a Harpey) claps his wings upon the Table, and with a quient device the Banquet vanishes.* (B1r)

John Jowett has surmised that the phrase “quaint device” is distinctly un-Shakespearean, and W W. Greg claims that “it is descriptive of a thing seen, a compliment to the machinist” (qtd. in Jowett 108). Regardless of whether Shakespeare, Nicholas Crane, or an unidentified hand is behind the stage direction, the identification of a “thing seen” in terms appreciative of engineering acknowledges both the visual brilliance and the artificiality of the effect. The staging of “miraculous” or “providential” signs clearly requires a suspension of disbelief—a suspension attacked by writers William Lambarde and Reginald Scot, discussed in the previous chapter—and an element of visual deception that complicates their moral function. Shakespeare addresses the scepticism that often attends such spectacles, while also insisting on their moral possibilities. Ariel’s “quient deuice” is glossed in the Norton Shakespeare as “an ingenious mechanism” for clearing the banquet (3098). Yet as Henri Estienne proves, “device” can also refer to moral emblems, making the stage picture a form of instruction. That dual meaning is brought to the fore when Shakespeare’s Ariel weds the “quient deuice” with a pronouncement of “lingring perdition” that prompts Alonso to admit, “it did base my Trespasse.” The

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28 The earliest printing of *The Tempest* is that in the Folio, and a number of questions attend its stage directions. Even if those directions are not reliable sources of original staging, they share a significant interest in “strangeness” with the play’s dialogue that makes them visual clues to the action; as attempts to describe spectacle, they provide curious and important theatrical evidence about the term “strange.” See below for a discussion of stage directions and their reliability as performed cues.
mechanical stage effect and the moral combine in The Tempest to make redemption possible, making Alonso recognise his sins and creating the possibility of “hearts-sorrow, / And a cleere life ensuing” (B1r). The stage “deuice” reveals itself to be there for both practical and abstract use—just like the “materialised” images of popular print.

The exchange between materiality and moral efficacy is at the heart of the play, and it sits, tellingly, alongside “strangeness,” which dominates the language and aesthetic of The Tempest. This chapter examines the role “strangeness” plays in the Jacobean period, in the light of Part One of this thesis, by reading Shakespeare’s island play and Heywood’s Age plays. I concentrate on the way the term mediates between physical and abstract (or moral/qualitative) description, setting out its difference from “wonder” as something that is post-evaluative and that, unlike wonder, attempts description and explication. Exploring popular print, I go on to suggest that strangeness has a taut relationship with moral “truth” and with providential signs. I link the contexts of the term “strange”—rooted in popular print, religious writing, technology, and geographical exploration—to the notions of sceptical uncertainty introduced in Chapter One, suggesting that the stage directions of Heywood’s The Brazen Age, specifically the strange-heavy direction involving Medea, reveal an ambivalence about the moral power of spectacle. Such ambivalence is especially keen in the early 1610s, under the heat of global exploration, discovery, scepticism, and Protestant popular print. The chapter then closes by returning to The Tempest in the light of Heywood’s plays, to suggest that its “strangeness” marks an uncertainty about visual display—a manifesto for its power and a mark of man’s incomprehension of the visual world.

In these plays, “strangeness” shows spectacle to be sophisticated and challenging. It indicates the moral power of material or visual displays while complicating the connection between sensory experience and moral knowledge. By positing strange spectacle as a “puzzle,” Heywood and Shakespeare emphasise its moral significance, but they also eschew didacticism by refusing to describe, explain, or gloss the plays’ visual and material spectacles in precise terms. These “strange” plays are therefore testament to the moral ambiguities of Jacobean spectacle.
Ariel’s harpy scene in *The Tempest* is amongst the most “strange” in early modern drama, and the term in itself charges spectacle with a variety of meanings, from the sceptical to the technological. At *The Tempest*’s close, Prospero tells Alonso,

Sir, my Liege,

Do not infest your minde, with beating on

The strangenesse of this businesse . . . . (B4r)

The remark suggests that Prospero has an even greater understanding of the island and the past few hours’ events than merely his knowledge of the plots and positions of the shipwreck’s survivors. It implies, to a close reader of the play, that he recognises their responses to the visual displays, spells, deceptions, and murmurings—the “sounds and sweet airs” (A5v) and the quaint devices—that are repeatedly deemed “strange” by all the new island-guests. They have been “beating on / The strangenesse” of the business since the beginning of the play.

What does it mean, therefore, to call something one sees strange? The term abounds in that moment that opens this chapter—Ariel’s harpy performance, the final scene of act three. The edifying possibilities of visual display and its uncertainties—the force of spectacle and ambivalence towards it—are captured in characters’ reactions to the stagecraft and in the First Folio’s stage directions.

In act three, scene three, spirits enter to a “Solemn and strange Musicke,” and the stage directions describe them as “seuerall strange shapes” (B1r). Jowett notes that this description “suggests the spectacle as seen through the eyes of the audience” (112), and so “strange” refers less to practical staging requirements than to a reaction to the performance or staged effects that indicates perceptual uncertainty. Prospero hovers above, presumably on the balcony, “inuisible”—again, presumably to those on-stage characters beneath him.29 To enter invisible is, as has long been recognised, a bizarre contradiction in terms, but the puzzlement that attends that stage direction is perhaps part of the “strange” work of the scene: indeed, the shapes prompt a

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29 The paradox echoes one of John Donne’s songs: “If thou beest borne to strange sights, / Things invisible to see . . .” (Cc1v).
response from Sebastian, who claims that he will now instantly believe in unicorns and in the mythical phoenix. Having delivered the banquet, the shapes disappear, and Francisco tells us that they “vanish’d strangely” (B1r).

The whole scene plays with perception. The stage directions, with their teasing suggestion of visible invisibility and odd descriptions of spirits, suggest that the action in some way escapes the tongue. So too does Francisco’s commentary on their disappearance, which serves as a curious supplementary stage direction—an important aspect of stage-craft and directions that fits neatly into the category Mariko Ichikawa describes as “a verbal reference to a particular structure or thing” that can help to ascertain whether “the structure or the thing is actually there, being visible to the audience,” or, alternatively, whether “the structure or the thing referred to is not physically present and has to be imagined” (Shakespearean 22). Here, strangeness seems to refer to both—covering the visual facts of the dramaturgy while gesturing towards something that is not and cannot be physically present: the intellectual or emotional quality of “strangeness.”

Indeed, the stage directions already note of the spirits, “they depart,” and as such Francisco’s remark seems to gloss the manner of their departure at the same time as it comments upon the bizarre fact of the situation: being stranded on an island after a shipwreck, the royal party have just witnessed spirits in uncertain shapes (at least for a reader who cannot visualise them in any certain form from the description “strange”), deliver a banquet and then dissolve into thin air. His words offer two simultaneous meanings: it is strange that they have vanished, but the manner of their vanishing is also strange. The affair can tell us little of the scene’s “original” staging, but it does suggest that the spirits’ visual performance—what a strange manner of vanishing!—is of significant meaning to the scene and, I would suggest, to the overarching concerns of The Tempest, because that visual strangeness reflects a deep, questioning curiosity—how strange it is that they have vanished!

The scene reflects the play’s concerns with epistemological uncertainty, with visual knowledge and its precarious relationship with moral knowledge. It represents as “A liuing Drolerie,” in Sebastian’s words, the revelation of the characters’ moral selves, but they struggle to interpret the signs of the revelation. They misread the display as a trivial matter of materiality, seeing the spectacle as the promise of food without connecting its materiality to morality:
Alonso recognises that “such shapes”—those described as “strange”—“such gesture, and such sound”—also described as “strange” in the stage directions—are “a kinde / Of excellent dumbe discourse.” He acknowledges that they mean something deeper, but he “cannot too much muse” (B1r). The strangeness puzzles the will.

This chapter seeks to unpick some of the pieces of that puzzle. There has been to date some small critical engagement with “strangeness” as an idea, though it remains largely limited to new historicist readings that reduce the term to subversive “otherness.” Stephen Mullaney discusses “strange things” in wonder cabinets and their exchanges with the new world and defines the term only insofar as it is “a category that in fact withholds categorization, that neither specifies nor defines but rather sets the objects to which it refers aside, grants them the freedom to remain as they are” (62)—something I consider an unhelpful, untextured, and anachronistic definition of “strangeness.” For Mullaney, the term signifies “tokens of alien cultures,” but there remains no significant interrogation of the word’s historical, cultural, and social meanings in the early modern period. Emily C. Bartels follows Mullaney, borrowing his term (in turn borrowed from Jonson and discussed below) of the “spectacles of strangeness” displayed in Marlowe’s drama to discuss “a landscape filled with strangers and strange lands” (3). Like Mullaney, Bartels offers no sustained engagement with the term’s early modern meanings, taking it as a byword for the alien or other.

I move beyond these “Other”-orientated readings of strangeness and attempt to recover some of the wider late Elizabethan and, chiefly, early Jacobean significance of the term. Such new historicist considerations have treated strangeness not as a coherent concept but rather as one facet of developing colonialist, “othering” discourses. This chapter centres discussion on the term “strange” itself, arguing that it offers an alternative critical framework to such theoretical approaches, one rooted in documentary evidence, cultural context, and early modern moral philosophy. This broader historicist treatment of the term “strange” presents a concept that has a wider cultural purview and acknowledges its forceful moral aspects—something overlooked in criticism that

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30 Sebastian responds by dismissing the spirits’ departure as inconsequential: “No matter, since / They haue left their Viands behind . . .” (B1r). By misreading the significance of the material display, which Alonso has noticed is both physical and moral, Sebastian proves his statement to be true, and the food dissolves to “no matter” with Ariel’s quaint device.
moves away from moral interests and towards more narrowly politicised and perceived subversive ideological approaches (see the introduction and Chapter One). This chapter therefore offers the first dedicated discussion of “strangeness” and its cultural connotations, offering broad, thorough contexts for the term and setting out its distinction from “wonder.” The concurrent renewed attention to moral significance, as with Part One, is not a reversion to the conservative tendencies of twentieth-century criticism but gestures instead to the complexity, excitement, and energy surrounding ethical debate in early modern England—one brought to light here by a reexamination of the relationship between “strangeness” and scepticism.

“Strange” connotes improper religious doctrine as well as moments of divine providence, descriptions tinged with sceptical doubt alongside the rhetorical power of verbal artifice. The early 1610s are a period deeply concerned with the meanings of “strange,” as the Introduction has explained. Alan Dessen and Leslie Thomson’s dictionary of early modern stage directions draws specific attention to the term in only two plays: *The Tempest*—where it occurs as a direction three times—and Thomas Heywood’s *The Brazen Age* (1613). Other uses are listed, but they are few in number and limited in description (often concerned with music or dancing). I have already gestured to the interesting range of “strange” directions in *The Tempest*, as well as verbal stage directions that supplement the italicised descriptions, and this chapter accordingly examines the term’s relationship with visual and moral knowledge. Heywood’s *The Brazen Age* and the previous two parts of the *Age* plays are also steeped in strangeness—it is present not only in packed stage directions but also in the fabric of the plays themselves. In both Heywood’s and Shakespeare’s plays, “strangeness” is connected, with an unusual force and frequency, to visual display and stage devices. Why, in these works, is spectacle deemed to be “strange”?

An examination of “strangeness” must take into account new world spectacles such as those Mullaney and Bartels discuss: there existed “an intensified desire for knowledge of unknown or partially known domains, a desire answered and evidenced by the energetic contemporary production of cross-cultural descriptions” (Bartels 4). I consider the influence of “strangers” and strange animals, but I also show that “strangeness” is a keenly moral concept in early modern England, and that it should therefore be seen more
fully within the context of the philosophical, visual, scientific, and technological developments of the period—those factors that contribute to the materialisation of morality. As a term that negotiates between the material and the moral world, “strange” shows how spectacle in the Jacobean period reflects upon the changing moral-philosophical world of early modern England by indicating the difficulties of fully representing moral ideas in material form. “Strangeness” represents theatrical spectacle’s ambivalent relationship with material morality.

“Strangeness” indicates, through popular performance, a philosophical moment: the crossroads between empirical, proto-scientific understandings of the world; faith in providence; and sceptical doubt about truth. It points spectacularly and excitingly to the unique historical moment that captures the gaps between those conflicting attitudes. This chapter accordingly outlines the moral resonances of strangeness and its relationship with visual and material representation by focussing on Thomas Heywood’s first three Age plays (1611-13) and The Tempest.

Heywood’s sensational trilogy is quite different in style and tone from Shakespeare’s island play: episodic, archaic, temporally and geographically vast. Yet it nonetheless contains some telling similarities. All four plays share an aesthetic of strangeness that associates them with moral display and representation in contemporary texts, while also sharing practical matters of stagecraft and visual display. If The Tempest “bears the imaginative mark of a work written under the impact of Whitehall stage effects and theatrical conventions” (Demaray 93), so too do Heywood’s dramas (and The Silver Age, like Cymbeline and The Tempest, was also featured at court). They also bear the mark of their own distinctive theatres—practical aspects of which are discussed in the last two chapters of this thesis. The Age plays contain a number of provocative uses of the term “strange” with regard to surprising spectacles that offer some insight into its connotations. In this chapter, I therefore use the sensational visual effects in Heywood’s plays as a frame through which to explore the contextual associations of “strangeness” with machinery, popery, witchery, and monstrosity, connotations that abound in the popular print of the period.
Stage devices and Strangeness

Jason and the Argonauts have been popular with audiences and readers since their mythical exploits were recounted by classical writers, most notably Euripides, Apollonius, and Ovid. In early modern England, the story of the Golden Fleece was also popular and also spectacular. Classical translations of the story were widely available in Latin, Greek, and, by 1608, Italian. Thomas Heywood, the prolific dramatist writing from the late 1590s until 1641, treated the subject as part of his Age plays. The Age plays, beginning with The Golden Age (1611) and moving through the Silver (1612) and Bronze (1613), followed some time later by the two-part Iron Age (dates), dramatise periods of classical history in an episodic manner, beginning with Saturn’s rule and moving through the major characters of the period, no doubt largely well known to early modern audiences.

The Age plays are known for their sensational special effects, leading critics to be particularly dismissive of these “pot-boilers” (Holaday 16). Although occasional articles have appeared on these texts, even Richard Rowland’s monograph on Heywood neglects to mention them but as a passing reference. Among the most sustained treatments is found in Marion Lomax’s Stage Images and Traditions (1987), where she notes that the play’s narrator “Homer constantly stresses his blindness—which not only excuses him, as narrator, from any responsibility for the visual elements of the plays, but also enhances the audiences’ appreciation of the spectacles by emphasising their privileged position” (21). Lomax also notes that “no single source can be declared for the spectacular elements in the Ages: Heywood deliberately juxtaposes a variety of ideas” (28). Stage directions like “fire-workes all ouer the house” (Silver K3r) show that Heywood’s drama relies heavily on visual effect—something that accords with his role, in the 1600s and 1610s, as the resident playwright for and sharer in the Queen’s Servants at the Red Bull—a playhouse, as chapter two acknowledges, closely associated with spectacle.

In the Golden Fleece episode in The Brazen Age, then, it is no surprise that we find the curious stage direction

Two fiery Buls are discouered, the Fleece hanging ouer them, and the Dragon sleeping beneath them: Medea with strange fiery-
How do we interpret a stage direction that describes visual events as “strange” and what does this actually tell us about the staging of *The Brazen Age*? What does Medea look like and why do the pyrotechnics require particular remark in this instance?

*The Tempest* and the *Age* plays throw a light upon stage directions, proving them interesting documents of both performance and perception. Work on stage directions by critics including Alan Dessen has encouraged us to view play-documents as theatrical scripts and not purely literary texts, while also being alert to questions over their authorial authenticity. Shakespeare’s *The Tempest* has been the centre of a debate about the curiously detailed stage directions. Jowett’s thorough treatment of the debate offers a number of (tentative) possibilities about the “literary” nature of the descriptions. He proffers that Nicholas Crane was working from foul papers and hence had to elaborate on the directions in the play, that Crane may have seen performances of *The Tempest* at the Blackfriars and was building upon those witnessed performances (leading, perhaps, to the “perceptive” nature of the directions), and, telling, that some of the directions are borrowed from words in the playtext itself (like “strange”) (113). Jowett also suggests other possibilities, including a third hand. Either way, the interaction between the “literary” directions and the play’s performance remains intact—even if those directions are not theatrically sufficient, they are derived from the play’s original construction (likely for the Blackfriars—see chapter four) and bear the mark of past performances. Furthermore, John Demaray notes, echoing Jowett, “Even if it is assumed that the stage directions were in part written by Crane or someone else, the directions may well have mirrored the second writer’s memory of early productions” (160).

In the case of the *Age* plays, Heywood takes ownership of his work in the prefaces to each of the first three titles. He also suggests that the printed plays are close to the plays as they were performed, having “already past the approbation of Auditors” (*Golden A2r*)—though his preparation for the press perhaps suggests why the stage directions in the *Age* plays appear equally as “literary” and “perceptive” as *The Tempest’s*. As with *The Tempest’s*, however,
those directions maintain a close connection to their original performances, however much they were elaborated and beautified for literary consumption. Heywood was deeply involved with staging: he was an actor and a sharer in his company, and would, like Shakespeare, have had intimate knowledge of playhouse and players; his plays are, again like Shakespeare’s, inseparable from the practicalities of the early modern theatre.

The Medea stage direction is certainly teasingly literary—it is possible that a stage hand might understand what a “strange” firework would look like, or that a tailor could fashion a “strange habite,” but the direction seems unhelpful at best, if not downright impractical—exactly what Jowett thinks about the questionable “dramatic intelligibility” of some of The Tempest’s directions (120). The term “strange,” though, sheds some light on the possibilities of staging and on the wonder of stage devices.

There have been attempts, at least since George Reynolds’s Staging of Elizabethan Plays at the Red Bull Theatre (1940), to understand something of the original staging of these plays. Recently, David Mann has suggested that the Age plays were cobbled together out of older scripts, linking them back to plays performed at Henslowe’s Rose, where there was installed a “throne In the heuenes” in 1595 (7). The Diary also suggests the expense spent on costumes, and the Bulls, Fleece, and Dragon are likely to have been, both at the Rose, and at the later Red Bull, physical props—Henslowe’s 1598 inventory includes “j gowlden flece” (319). In spite of this connection and the numerous flights required in the Age plays, though, Mann has called into question the use of flying equipment in early modern theatres—suggesting even if it were installed, as at the Rose, it was rarely used. He wonders “why, if as so many scholars insist every amphitheatre was fitted with flying gear, are there so few records of its actual use in performance?” (184). While evidence is frustratingly elusive across the stages of early modern England, Eva Griffith’s recent study of the Red Bull Theatre in Clerkenwell, where the Age plays are known to have been particularly successful, nevertheless argues for “a good, strong tiring house, with ambitious ‘heavens,’ braced with winching machinery” (103) (for a

Ichikawa’s reference to the verbal stage direction, a cue from on-stage characters, also expands the literary possibilities of stage directions (Shakespearean). See Dessen (Elizabethan Stage Conventions 22-25) on earlier critical considerations of authorial directions. Lomax notes the parallels with civic pageantry and medieval mystery plays in these props (27).
more detailed discussion of winching machinery and descents at the Red Bull and at the Globe, see chapters four and five of this thesis). How does the Medea stage direction help us judge what devices, winches, and attire featured in the play’s first performances?

It cannot offer certainties to theatre history, but the stage direction and its “strangeness” suggests some of the effect desired and achieved by the Red Bull’s (and possibly Rose’s) stage devices. Ben Jonson talks of the entire effect of the antimasque in the Masque of Queenes by deeming it “not . . . a Masque, but a Spectacle of strangenesse, producing multiplicite of gesture, and not vnaptly sorting with the current, and whole fall of the deuice” (Kkkk5r). Though referring to the intellectual invention of the masque, a distinction made in the first chapter, Jonson nevertheless associates the visual effect of the scene with the wider spectacle of the show—including the music and the scenery: the whole fall of the device. The full effect of the impressive show is, for Jonson, a spectacle of strangeness.

Indeed, William Bourne’s invention book, Inventions or Devises (1589), refers specifically to material creation, illusion, and mechanical construction as a form of strangeness. Talking of the construction of engines and devices, the table of contents explains that the final “devise” in the collection is

as touching the making of strange workes, as the brasen head that did seeme to speake, or birdes of woode or mettall made by Arte to flie, and birdes made of woode or mettal to sing sweetely, as certaine hours appointed, &c., which the common people dooth maruell at. (A4r)

In the list of automata and devices, Bourne notes that the strangeness that attends them is largely down to their mysterious and illusionary qualities. If flying birds and doves seem relevant for the Age plays or for a performance of Shakespeare’s Cymbeline, then brazen heads are also features of the early modern theatre, featuring prominently in Robert Greene’s Friar Bacon and Friar Bungay (c.1590s), a play roughly contemporaneous with Bourne’s invention book. Friar Bacon echoes Bourne’s interest in strangeness, exclaiming that his “head of brasse” will “yield forth strange and uncoth Aphorismes” (B4r). Like the polyvalence of “device,” “strangeness” here seems to indicate a crossover between the moral and the material world—linking the brass head with abstract
aphorisms. It fulfils a similar role, then, to the terms that materialise morality on the stage. Yet while it is the mechanical head’s strangeness that associates it with the possibility of truths—the aphorisms that are a hallmark of early modern moral philosophy—it also obscures the full understanding of those truths, just as the “strange shapes” of *The Tempest* signal a “dumb discourse” that is unfathomable to Alonso and his company.

For Bourne, a lack of understanding is integral to the “strange workes that the world hath maruayled at” (O1v). Marvel and enchantment feature prominently, even in this mechanically-minded text. The “strange” effect drawn from devices and inventions is because the “common people would maruell at” the effect, “thinking that it is done by Inchantment, and yet is done by no other meanes, but by good Artes and lawfull” (O2r). Bourne approaches a form of mechanical deconstruction similar to Scot’s *Discouerie of Witchcraft*, discussed in chapter one, yet he argues for a reverse effect. Like the confusing spirits in *The Tempest* and the obscure aphorisms of Friar Bacon, visual display, however materially focussed, has the force of marvel and enchantment. “Strange” suggests that there is a power in spectacle and in mechanical devices that can both obscure the arts behind their workings and also gesture to those workings’ presence, a recognition of their potency with only half-comprehension of their meaning—something common to machine books, as the following chapter shows, which fail to offer fully practical instructions for assembly. “Strange” in Bourne and *Bacon* is provocative, rather than passive, teasing at material and immaterial truths but threatening to dissolve into marvel.

Its persistent presence in the *Age* plays, particularly with regard to what Jonson would call, were he feeling uncharacteristically generous, the “*Spectacle of strangenesse*” in the Medea scene, suggests that the plays contain significant “strange workes.” Their theatrical stage devices enchant the audience—an enchantment particularly pertinent to the conjuress, Medea. If it is not possible to ascertain precisely what stagecraft was employed in the original performances of these plays, either at the Rose or at the Red Bull (see Chapter Five for further discussion of Red Bull stagecraft), it is clear that it was noisy, loud, blazing, and amazing. The fireworks, costumes, and the possibilities of flight and suspension suggest that Medea’s prominent role in *The Brazen Age* connects the special effects of the stage with a deep form of marvel and enchantment.
Strange divinity

Heywood draws on the notions of marvel and enchantment, and on the effect’s purpose of signifying Medea’s otherworldly powers, to suggest that her conjuration is not “done . . . by good Artes and lawfull.” “Strange spectacle” is connected to religious and moral imagery that moves between abstract and visual or material description. Sermon writer Thomas Adams shares Heywood’s ambiguity about visual display and express that ambiguity through the term “strange.” Invoking “the hidden power of Earth, Aire, Water, Fire” and “strong spels,” Heywood’s Medea exhibits a form of strange divinity—something that may be said to attend the fusion of classical gods and figures with Christian ideas in wider humanist writing.

Indeed, strangeness is prominently associated with foreignness and heresy in the period, while inhabiting a borderland between moral and visual description. The primary definition given by the Oxford English Dictionary for that period is of “persons, language, customs, etc.: Of or belonging to another country; foreign, alien” (1.a). Hence, John Baret’s Alvearie, a protodictionary considered by T.W. Baldwin to be influential in “shaping the English definitions of Shakespeare’s generation” (qtd. Koppelman and Wechsler), gives numerous definitions for strange around the idea of alien customs, in a negative manner; one entry expands on strange through the terms and phrases “diuers, vnlike, not agreeable, another mans, none of ours” (Fff1r). This definition can be taken further by the association of the term with ungodly, heretical, or Catholic practices. “O strange diuinity!” William Crashaw cries in a 1607 sermon that attacks the “strange impiety” of papists—especially when it comes to their uses of images, for which casuistical Catholics offer “many . . . strange doctrines” (K1v, O1v, M1v).

The Church of England preacher Thomas Adams is exceptionally fond of the term, and it appears with frequency throughout his tracts and sermons. As in the Age plays, the term teases at visual appearance and moral judgements associated with display while avoiding any explicit visual or material description. Perhaps because of his “lively style” (McGee—ODNB “Adams, Thomas”), the flexibility of “strange” appeals to Adams. He uses it to describe apostate, sinner, and devil, as well as to mark his own works: in the sermon, The white deuil, he apologises for “so strange a title” and uses patronage to claim his work is no “strange child” (the sermon is delivered, interestingly, the same year as
Webster’s “strange” play of the same title and published a year later). In his moral and religious writings, Adams is happy to use the term to unmask moral (and specifically Catholic) sin, as in *Englands sicknes* (1615):

First, the Deuill, who comes like an old dotart, neatly tricked and licked up: his wrinckled hide smoothed and sleeked with tentations; he comes euer masqu’d, and dares not shew his face. Take away his vizour, and the soule is worse then a witch that can affect him. And as when hee temptes wretched Sorceresses to some reall covenant with him, hee assumes the forme of familiar and unfeared creatures; left in a horrid and strange shape they should not endure him. So in his spiritual circumuentions, the more facile, slie and suspectlesse insnuation into mortall hearts; Hee *transformes himselfe into an Angell of light*. (C4r)

His sermons delight in the play of colour and appearance, of the connection between vision and virtue. The devil in *Englands sicknes* comes in disguise, and his “horrid and strange shape” suggests an uncertain but unsavoury true appearance. His description is teasingly dramatic, performative, and even theatrical: he is “tricked and licked up” like a play-going gallant, “masqu’d” like a dancer, and adept at transformation. Yet the reader is never offered any concrete image of his true, sinful shape. Adams offers a half-way house in the materialisation of morality: it goes some way to describing sin in material terms, but avoids the clear, practical descriptions that would allow a reader to visualise it fully—quite unlike Florio’s visualising translation of Montaigne, discussed in chapter one.

Such tension over appearances is matched in his sermon titles, from *The white deuil* and *The blacke devil* (1615) to *The deuills Banket* (1614) and it can be associated with “strangeness.” The sermons themselves are presented as a form of dramatic presentation—something that Adams apologises for even as he insists upon its effectiveness in revealing and combatting sin. He insists in *The blacke devil* that the colourful title is neither for “imitation” nor for “affectation” but rather to “shew thy selfe, and all other perusers, the *blacknesse* of Sinne; and among the rest, of *Apostacie*. Would you not behold Impiety in the true colours: you may for beare” (A4r). Here, Adams promises to reveal the sins beneath the surface through unveiling its “blacknesse,” but the “true
colours” that come shining through are in morally rather than literally descriptive terms. In a period that asks questions of both ethics and optics, Adams’s idiosyncratic style suggests that uncertain visual forms can still signify certain truths.

Throughout The blacke deuill (as in numerous of the period’s religious tracts), strangeness is linked with Catholic impropriety: “O strange inversion” (C1v); “How strange, and unproper a speech is this; a contentious lambe, a troublesome Minister!” (C4v). Such uses exemplify a wider employment of the term in the Elizabethan and early Jacobean periods, where it represents a “foreign” religion, the heresy of apostasy.

Yet Adams’s repetitions of “strange” go further in linking uncertain appearance and sin, and the term becomes a visual-moral epithet. He caricatures the devil as a “strange pilgrim”—a means of indicating appearance without explicitly presenting the reader with colourful display or with words that might conjure up a definite image: “strange” seems to substitute a moral for a visual description, just as in the description in Englands sicknes of the devil’s “horrid and strange shape.” Writing in a period where “‘Ethical’ instability had spawned perceptual instability, and vice versa” (Clark 285), Adams avoids the precarious and misleading certainties of visual description in order to shore up certainty in moral and religious instruction; he uses “strangeness” to signify a mixture of the perceptual and the ethical, and the term assumes visual and material terms within moral description.

Medea’s “strange habite” and the “strange fiery-workes” assume some form of Adams’s moral-visual, description; after all, she is called in Ovid’s Metamorphoses, a major source for Heywood’s Age plays, “wicked Medea” (7.396). Like Ovid’s soubriquet, Heywood’s directions indicate a judgement on her actions in the play, while also suggesting that “strange” in this context might be shorthand for a theatrical appearance of devilishness, deceit, treachery, with overtones of “strange divinity.” Although the term does not appear in stage directions as a “theatrical point of view” (Ichikwa 18), their “fictional point of view” as a literary description nonetheless suggests a specific desired aesthetic effect in performance: the generation of “strange” spectacle. The fact that such spectacle is not described in Heywood’s published playtext in precise, practical, theatrical terms ironically enhances its power: by combining visual description
with moral description, the *Age* plays ascribe moral and religious significance to their most spectacular moments.

**Strangeness and wonder**

*Strange days have found us*

*Strange days have tracked us down*

*They're going to destroy us*

--- *The Doors*

Jenny Sager argues, with reference to early modern theatrical display, “that sensory delight and intellectual contemplation are not mutually exclusive, they are inextricably linked: spectacle provokes ‘wonder’, which in turn induces ‘wondering’” (29). Heywood’s “strange” spectacle and its literary descriptions in the stage directions suggest something of that wonder, but the use of the word “strange” in the *Age* plays moves response to spectacle beyond “wondering” and into (dubious or failed) attempts at describing, categorising, or explaining visual events.

Criticism has recently paid significant attention to the meanings of “wonder” in the early modern period and in Shakespeare’s romance plays. While closely related to “wonder,” strangeness elicits a peculiar form of moral and visual uncertainty; it is not a-logical or pre-evaluative, but is visually, intellectually, and philosophically provocative. James Biester links the term “strange” with “wonder” in his exploration of lyrical, compositional, and rhetorical forms of admiration and literary ways of making wonder. He notes the close connection between a number of English meanings that are derived from Classical equivalents:

33 See James Biester, *Lyric Wonder, Rhetoric and Wit in Renaissance English Poetry* (1997), Peter Platt, *Reason Diminished, Shakespeare and the Marvelous* (1997), and T.G. Bishop, *Shakespeare and the Theatre of Wonder* (1996). Stephen Greenblatt's *Marvelous Possessions: The Wonder of the New World* also deals with the term and its contextual associations. Helen Wilcox, in her recent study, is the exception; she notes the frequency of the term “strange” in *The Tempest* and devotes several paragraphs towards the recognition that “the play’s moral world turns on the meanings and consequences of these ‘strange’ and ‘stranger’ impressions” (202)—a notion this chapter expands upon with deeper context and textual analysis.
The Latin adjective *admirabilis* and the Greek *deinos* register especially strongly the sense of a response to something that is powerfully affective either positively or negatively, something that so repulses or attracts, or repulses and attracts, that it renders the soul incapable of normal operation. *Deions* has an enormous and fascinating range of meanings, including fearful, terrible, terrifying, terrific, mighty, powerful, wonderful, marvellous, strange, able, and, notably, clever. (6)

Whilst Biester’s study suggests that there is a “verbal parallel” between strangeness, wonder, and admiration, his focus is on the meaning of the latter two and he neglects to interrogate meanings of strangeness.

Wonder, morality, and strangeness, though, are prominently combined in the popular print of the period. Indeed, the association between “strangeness” and the wrong religion underlines an equally (if not more) common relationship in the period between the “strange” and the “true.” It is a relationship that is fraught, however, as indicated by Theseus’s lines in *A Midsummer Night’s Dream*: “More strange then true” (O2r). The term’s rich polysemy means it always filters and reflects upon the meaning of “truth.” It is therefore difficult not to detect a spurious note, if not also an acknowledged anxiety, in many of the contemporary pamphlets that purport to present “strange” and “true” reports (see the list below).

The concept is often used in reference to providential signs and images—especially in “monstrous birth” pamphlets and broadsides, where it signals the “strange news” and “strange births” that should serve as warnings for a town or nation. While strange *practices* might be considered foreign, foolish, and, dangerous, strange *signs* offer a crucial link between visual, physical anomalies and moral and religious truths—and the one might indicate, precipitate, or warn about the other.34

One of the chief attractions for “strange” pamphlets is their supposed newness; claims of novelty, as suggested in Chapter 1, helped to sell ephemeral popular print. Baret’s *Alverarie* links “Seldome and Strange,” giving the example “I am moued also with the newenes or strangesesse of the place,”

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34 For an outline of popular print and providential signs, images, and news, and its popularity and scholarly consideration, see Walsham, 32-51 and 167-224.
listing the synonyms “Not woont, new” (Fff1r). Biester remarks that wonder signifies an “unstable mixture of repulsion and attraction,” and strangeness can be seen to have similar connotations—explored beneath in discussion of geographical and cultural discovery and *The Tempest*.

Montaigne, in Florio’s translation, recognises the curious power of the term, noting that “strangenes it selfe doth first give credite unto matters” (K6r), and indeed popular print adopts the term in many of the titles of broadsides and pamphlets to link, like Autolycus in *The Winter’s Tale*, the strange and the true. They frequently offer “strange news,” and pamphlets like Thomas Day’s *Wonderfull straunge sightes seen in the Element, ouer the Citie of London* (1583) represent the term’s importance to flashy titles that associate newness with both wonder and truth.

Suspending a conjuress in the air and putting on eye-catching pyrotechnic wizardry (apparently more elaborate even than other Red Bull plays) certainly seem like novel experiences—and possibly Heywood’s stage directions attempt themselves to conjure in the reader a sense of the rarity and sensation of the performed play. Yet the term also refers to visual, material, and bodily images of truth—notably portents and prodigies in popular print. Like dramatic spectacles, “strange” pamphlets and broadsides offer not merely the possibility of titillating novelty, but also, through visual wonder, the promise of moral illumination. Moral associations with the term are to be found in the works of moralists, moral philosophers, and historians of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, where it suggests links between truth, strangeness, and curiosity. Indeed, the wonder that accompanies strange historical tales or strangely presented displays is considered to be ethically illuminating; Thomas Elyot, in *The boke named the Governour*, deems histories to be “more strange” to readers than other forms of moral instruction, “and therfore I suppose more pleasant to the reder” (U5v). Elyot’s understanding of the term seems to be linked, like Philip Sidney’s “delight,” to the pleasures of moral instruction.\(^{36}\)

In one large swathe of popular print, it is not history but the relation of prodigious monstrosities and occurrences that are thought to be “pleasant” to the reader. In a period where portents can be linked to millenarian prophecies, through various forms of biblical exegesis, and also to warnings of sin and

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35 M. A. Screech also translates the term as “strangeness” (242).
36 See James A. Devereux’s discussion of “delight” in Sidney’s *Defence*. 
damnation, “strangeness” is both a worrying and a powerful term. Walsham notes that “visual experiences seem to have been interpreted as forerunners of Armageddon” (184), but they are also there as moral symbols, images that serve to edify and improve one’s ways. *Strange newes out of Kent* in 1609 describes a “Monstrous and misshapen Childe,” linking the idea of strange occurrences with visual experience: “the abortiue and prodigious byrths from time to time, which many of us have bene eye witnesses of, may sufficiently summon vs from sinne . . .” (A3r). Indeed, the strange birth here offers a hope of redemption, providing a curious visual experience that awakes the mind from sinful sleep. Day’s pamphlet also stresses the visual power of strangeness, exclaiming of man that “nothing can draw him, more forcibly vnto repentance, then the sencible sight and feeling, of fearefull and mighty plagues, heauenly threatninges, and strange and prodigious wonders . . .” (A2r). The linking of the “strange” and the “wonderful” in the titles of popular print, and its attendant association with visual experiences in the works themselves, suggests that in popular print, as in Adams’s sermons, strangeness is a particularly spectacular term. Indeed, Sager’s acknowledgement that “spectacle incites a continual cycle of wonder and wondering” (34) applies equally to monstrosity literature as it does to the film and theatre effects she discusses in her study.

While inciting continual wondering, these strange images also demand to be read, in part, as prodigies. Walsham notes that the “assumption that such aberrations of nature were metaphysical signs was common to both blackletter ballads and pamphlets and the erudite teratological writings of physicians, cosmographers, and divines” (194), though precise interpretations varied. Day’s Call of England in *Wonderful Straunge Sights* describes the various subjects of bizarre bodies and meteorological miracles, the basis for this large sector of popular print, as God’s fourth “forwarning” to man:

> The Lorde hath forwarned vs a great while, & yet doth not cease, so to doe stil, first by his Law, then by his gospel, thirdly by the benefites, that we haue continually receiued of him, fourthly by his creatures, and miraculouse tokens, strange monsters, blazing commets, vnwonted enumerations of waters, straunge fishes, perrillous warres, earthquakings, and last of all, firy constellations . . . . (A3v)
Such a conception of prodigies and portents illustrates Walsham’s claims that this thinking “sprang from a theocentric view of the universe, an intensely moralistic cosmology” (169). The “strange monsters” are therefore not merely spurious claims to “newness” (especially considering their long pedigree in oral and print tradition), nor simply foreign; instead the term holds a divine and symbolic charge—that of moral and religious forewarning—which is bolstered by its companionship, in *The Call of England*, with “miraculous.”

While noting that they are, in some way, a warning sign from on high, strange wonders in monster pamphlets also acknowledge, like Adams’s sermons, the ineffability of translating visual experience into verbal explanation, and vice versa:

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37 Although Walsham’s work draws a distinction between different forms of providential symbolism—noting that “prodigies and prophecies occupied something of a grey area in Protestant doctrine of providence” (176)—she also notes the “tension and interplay between Protestant theology and the pre-existing cultures of divination it sought to uproot and replace” (180).

38 Miraculous is also a term, according to Biester, associated with wonder.
Fig. 16. *Strange Newes out of Kent* (London, 1609; titlepage). STC 14934.

Despite the fact that the prodigy is presented in a large image on the front of *Strange Newes out of Kent*, the title insists twice on its unique “strangeness”—suggesting, as in emblem books, that the image is unable to speak sufficiently
for itself. Unlike emblem books, though, the pamphlet offers no precise framework or moral through which to understand or interpret the image or the occurrence. In contrast to the materialised moral images of popular print, it is unclear even how to process the image that appears in a pamphlet like *Strange Newes*, let alone how explicitly to use it. Instead, explication descends into a panic of strangeness and wonder:

God . . . is highly offended with vs, in that hee thus changeth the secret workings of nature, as he lately shewed, in the strange birth of a monstrous childe brought into the World, at Sandwitch in Kent, the strange shape and vnnatural proportion thereof . . . caused much feare, fright, and wonder . . . . (A3v)

The title and description suggest that visual signs and portents should be translated into a clearer description, both moral and material; as with Adams’s sermons, “strange” is flexible and imprecise enough to cover both. Yet its imprecision belies an uncertainty about both translating the material world into moral terms, and vice versa, and about the veracity of moral and religious interpretation itself. Such uncertainty is perhaps exacerbated, too, by the ambivalence of Elizabethan and Jacobean ministers and their anxiety “to restrain the popular impulse to derive specific, deterministic predictions from such occurrences” (Walsham 178-79). Whereas emblem books promise some insight into the Book of Nature, monster pamphlets like *Strange Newes out of Kent* admit uncertainty about visual and natural occurrences—“the secret workings of nature.”

Indeed, the relation of the events in *Strange Newes* uses the term so frequently—“strange & dreadful to behold,” “a most strange deformitie,” “a thing of strangenesse,” “this strange byrth,” “an accident most strange,” “this most strange birth,” “divers straunge birds, and foules,” amongst others—in a pamphlet only eight and a half pages long, that it cannot simply be put down to lazy writing. The same can be seen in other “strange news” pamphlets, including *Strange signes seen in the aire* (1594), translated out of Dutch, which includes a similar story about a headless child to the 1609 Kent incident. It, too, litters the page with “strange” and “strangeness.” Unlike the associations of “wonder” explored by Biester and Bishop, “strange” signifies an attempt at
qualitative and analytical explanation. The adjective fills a visual and moral gap, attempting description in the face of ineffability (and on top of what is supposedly, in *Strange Newes from Kent*, an accurate woodcut). Similar uses can be found across numerous pamphlets in the period.  

For Heywood’s Medea, then, it is not surprising that her appearance is aligned with the uncertain visual experiences of popular print. Witchery is treated with the same “strange reports” as prodigious births, with titles like *A Strange Report of Sixe most notorious Witches, who by their diuelish practises murdred above the number of four hundred small Children . . .* (1601) and *The most strange and admirable discoverie of the three Witches of Warboys* (1593). Fittingly Medea offers “strong spells” to tame the savage monster—a dragon—who is guarding the golden fleece, overcoming the “Vipers teeth” that will turn into ready-armed soldiers: Heywood calls them “strange seed” (G2v). Popular print and practices associated with the “wrong religion” or irreligion attend Medea at the height of her supernatural powers.

T.G. Bishop’s articulation of theatrical wonder is a useful way of thinking about “strangeness” here. He notes that during the “labile moment” of wonder the intimate interrelations of emotion and reason are explored, and wonder becomes a kind of high-level ‘switchpoint’ for transactions between emotional and rational responses. It is not the purging or conversion of wonder into something else that

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39 The term appears frequently across pamphlet literature: *Strange and Wonderfull news of a woman which lived neer unto the famous city of London* (c.1630, STC 20322.3) associates the term with a spectacular death by a devil; *A strange and wonderfull prognostication* (1624, STC 17183) links the term with fore-sight and with a visual sign that “betokens some strange thing” (B2r), similarly *The man in the moone, telling strange fortunes* (1609, STC 17155), *More strange newes of wonderfull accident hapning by the late ouerflowings of waters* (1607, STC 22916), and *A wonderful and straunge newes* (1583 STC 982.5) charge natural meteorological signs with moral significance, and the latter suggests that raining wheat is a providential punishment “sent to moue us to speedy repentance”; *Strange and wonderfull things* outlines the experiences of Richard Hasleton on his travels, suggesting, in line with Baret, that the term can indicate foreignness and novelty (1595, STC 12925); *Strange signes seene in the aire, strange monsters beheld on the land, and wonderfull prodigies both by land and sea* (1594, STC 21321), *A right strange and wonderful example of the handie worke of a mightie God* (1585, STC 20127), and *Strange newes of a prodigious monster* (1613, STC 15428) all associate “strangeness” with monstrous births and their signs: what the latter describes as “Nature . . . violated through the Corruption” (B1v); *A most certaine report . . . of a most strange and huge fish* (1595, STC 18895.5), *A most strange and true report of a monstrous fish, who appeared in the forme of a woman, from her waste upwards* (1604, STC 11501.5), and *A most strange and wonderfull herring* (1598, STC 13239) all deal with the maritime manifestations of strangeness—a phenomenon discussed below in relation to discovery and the shock of the new in *The Tempest*.  

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theatre seeks, but the placement of that emotion in relation to an audience’s understanding of the action. In particular, wonder registers not the audience’s analysis of the action, but something more like their sense of its significance. Wonder, that is, is less directed to the acquisition of knowledge than to the perception of meaning. (4)

Drawing on early modern approaches to Aristotelian theory—particularly of the importance of admiratio or wonder to tragedy (which, both Biester and Bishop note, is expanded in the period to all forms of literary and theatrical expression, including stagecraft itself)—Bishop suggests that wonder can effect a realisation of meaning but without the rational grasp of what that meaning is. The connotations of strangeness explored above suggest a more intellectual, and therefore more reasoning, engagement with spectacle than even this complex definition of wonder permits. Yet that sense of ineffability remains, challenging both perceptions of meaning and perceptions of the visual world—and all forms of knowledge that attend it.

Almost exactly like “strange” popular print, the term fills the entirety of the Age plays, again often in response to spectacle, visual display, or eye-opening material. In The Golden Age, Pluto builds a “strange city” (further linking the term to Hell and sinfulness), Calisto is described as a “strange dejected beauty” (D2r), Saturn suffers “strange perplexions” after an oracle, and at one instance it has the power to move a King to battle:

Saturne makes suite for aide, shewes the King his models, his inuentions, his seuerall metals, at the strangenesse of which King Troos is moued, cals for drum, and collors, and marches with Saturne. (I4v)

Heywood’s dumb show suggests that it is right to identify the power of strangeness to “move” men to credit and belief and it also echoes the power of strange devices or inventions, which enchant, seeming new and amazing. In a dumb show description—even a literary or fictional rather than a practical, theatrical one—it might even suggest some form of actorly expression that
attends moments of strangeness on the stage: to be “moued” by “strangenesse.”

The accumulation of “strangeness” in the plays compounds the term’s connection with wonder and marvel while also echoing the monster pamphlets’ loss of articulation. *The Silver and Brazen Ages* follow this lead by filling dialogue and description with “strange” adventures, doubts, confusions, and visions, including Pluto’s “strange wagon” (H1r). In *The Brazen Age*, another stage direction calls for a “strange confused fray” (D4v). In the same way that popular print adopts the term to avoid literal terms and instead posit moral description, the *Age* plays’ strange frenzies alert us to the difficulty and limitations of verbal expression. They also suggest a specific effect or aesthetic generated by spectacle: a “strangeness” that sits in between moral and visual description and that points to the ambiguous “moral” power of theatrical display.

**Strange scepticism**

The difficulty of verbal expression and questions over visual experience and visual description in monster pamphlets and the *Age* plays intimate a form of epistemological uncertainty and sceptical questioning, with its attendant distrust of sensory experience. Indeed, “strangeness” prompts a sceptical interest in physical form that underlies the materialisation of morality. Sager has recently explained how, in early modern plays as well as Hollywood films, “spectacle incites a continual cycle of wonder and wondering” (34). Indeed, her definition of spectacle is “the sight of a strange or unfamiliar thing or person, which incites speculation” (30). While Bishop suggests (using Descartes as a framework) that wonder is a transaction between the emotional and the rational, a “pre-evaluative contact with phenomena” (6), “strangeness” indicates a thwarted reflection on those phenomena, a failure of or substitute for analysis. It is not, as both Descartes and Stephen Greenblatt say of wonder, an “absolutely exigent, a primary or radical passion” (Greenblatt, *Marvelous* 17), but a response to, an attempt at processing, a coming-to-terms-with spectacle and spectacles. It is post-evaluative.

In the *Age* plays, certainty remains, like Medea, suspended. “Strange or unfamiliar” things on the stage provoke wonder and judgement, without the promise of any certain conclusion. They therefore inculcate, in characters and in the fabric of the plays themselves, a visual confusion and aporetic
questioning that is characteristic of scepticism—a philosophy that can be considered a perpetual process of “making strange.”

Samuel Daniel associates “strange” directly with “manifold incertaintie” in his commendatory verse prefacing Florio’s Montaigne translation. He worries about the “ouercharge” of words and the boundlessness of conceits or metaphors, an “Ocean without shore”:

As if man labor’d with himselfe to be
As infinite in words, as in intents,
And drawe his manifold incertaintie
In eu’ry figure, passion represents;
That these innumerable visages,
And strange shapes of opinions and discourse
Shadowed in leaues, may be the witnesses
Rather of our defects, then of our force. (¶1r)

Again, knowledge—and the “opinions” associated with moral knowledge—is translated into visual terms, but those “strange shapes” are deceptive, “innumerable visages” that have no concrete number and whose appearance, “visage” suggests, is hallucinatory or illusory. The passage is steeped in ocular imagery—with intents “drawn” and figures “represented” like emblematic images, with “witnesses” gesturing towards the ocular (and questionable) evidence of a law-court—evidence easily manipulated through “legal and literary feats of analysis and rhetorical power” (Schramm, Testimony 21). Daniel’s “drawing” of our own “incertaintie” in visual terms questions, like a true Pyrrhonic sceptic, even the knowledge of our own ignorance.

Daniel’s poem perfectly encapsulates the philosophical scepticism contained within many of Montaigne’s essays—especially the discussion of perceptual uncertainty in the “Apology,” discussed in the first chapter. He notes that Montaigne “Yeeldes most rich pieces and extracts of man; / Though in a troubled frame confus’dly set” (¶1v). Indeed, for Montaigne, like Pyrrhus, sight guarantees no knowledge of an object’s “forme & essence” but yields “unto our mercie” (“Apology” Ff1v)—the opinion of the viewer, itself dependent on circumstance. The consequent “uncertainty and feebleness of our sences” means that all knowledge deriving from their “meane and intermission” is
subject to the possibility that the senses may “corrupt or alter” what they bring to
us, obscuring the soul’s knowledge—and yet we have no other forms of
experience against which to judge their veracity: “From this extream difficultie
are sprung all these fantazies, which everie Subject containeth . . .” (“Apology”
Gg4r). Throughout Florio’s Montaigne, then, “strangeness” is associated with
visual fantasies, apparitions, and uncertain shapes; the term is therefore closely
linked to those shapes’ equally uncertain moral import—it represents, as Daniel
perceived, the “shapes of opinions and discourse.” In the opening of “Of
Feare,” for instance, the term is scattered with almost equal frequency to a
monster pamphlet, and it links the passions—those complex influences on
one’s moral balance, as outlined in Chapter One—with the corruption of
perception. Not only does fear work a “strange passion,” it “begetteth many
strange dazelings” and sometimes “representeth strange apparitions,” from
ghosts to goblins and “good-fellowes” (D2r). Again, the term represents a semi-
materialisation of morality; it stands poised between abstract and material
description.

Strange apparitions are part of Protestant popular print, especially the
monsters of pamphlets and broadsides—and in part they are designed to instil
fear of divine retribution and punishment. Yet their uses of “strangeness” seem
to be aligned with Montaigne’s own approach to strange descriptions, part of a
wider sceptical project described by Clark as the construction of “a non-
dogmatic theory of vision” that is part of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century
sceptics’ “ethical and political campaigns” (281). While Montaigne’s “strange
dazelings” of fear defy proper description and suggest a moral censure of
superstitious beliefs in fairies and hobgoblins, they also have parallels with the
ambivalent Protestant treatment of prodigies. By using “Pyrrhonist arguments
to strengthen the ‘fideistic’ argument that religious belief was beyond
demonstration either by the senses or by reason” (Clark 282), Montaigne
eschews literal description, just like Adams’s “strange” devils and England’s
monster texts. Clark sees Montaigne using the tropes of scepticism “to make a
fundamental distinction between the religion of faith and the religion of rational
belief—the one, divine, absolutely certain, universal, and unchanging, the other,
merely human, relative, and in a state of permanent flux” (285). “Strange”
descriptions serve to replace the latter—the sensory basis of human
experience—with a sufficiently mystical, imprecise, but morally charged
association with the former. While the “strange apparitions” of fear do not serve as providential warnings, they nevertheless share a concern about visual illusion and moral delusion; a wariness of the sort of precise, picture-making prose that Daniel describes; and a sign or symbol that demands to be heeded—for, after all, Montaigne admits “It is feare I stand most in feare of” (D2v). The affections it works in the mind are “strange”: on an earthly level they defy certain perception, but they also signal moral importance.

Certainly, throughout the Age plays, strangeness baffles and amazes and provokes doubt. The uncertainty of descriptions like “strange confused fray” and characters’ constant repetition of “strangeness” and “strange” generate the combination of wonder—seen in the monster pamphlets—and questioning gestured at by Sager. In both Heywood’s The Silver Age and for prominent sceptical thinkers like Montaigne, “strangeness” is puzzling.

In The Silver Age, the First Captain expresses his confusion at Jupiter’s impersonation of his Lord, Amphitrio. He claims

My Lord, ther’s much amazement in the opening of these strange doubts, the more you seek to unfold them, the more they pusle us.

(E1v)

His remark suggests something of the importance of “strangeness” to the plays, directly reflecting the “incertaintie” that characterises sceptical thought. Yet as with mechanical inventions and with wondrous prodigies, it is amazing, firmly linking doubt to visual experience. Heywood’s stage directions and the plays’ repetition of the term serve as anti-emploms; like the monster pamphlets, they suggest that there is something important to “open” or “unfold” in the “strange” events, but they continually elude elucidation. By contrast to emblems, which are puzzles that offer the reward of moral illumination, efforts to explain the “strange” events of the Age plays deny satisfaction and insistently remain puzzling. Just as in Montaigne’s “Apologie,” the more one “unfolds” the inconsistencies of the human experience, the more uncertain one must be about human claims to knowledge. In this sense, strangeness is opposed to the edifying effects of wonder as seen in Aristotelian thinking, which considers it the beginning of human knowledge: “for Aristotle, philosophy begins in wonder” (Biester 129).
The realisation that strange doubts are puzzling does not suggest, however, a form of relativism or an absence of moral significance. Alongside the term’s charged meanings in pamphlets and print, Heywood places great value on the visual, theatrical experience. The presence of “strangeness” in a sensational stage direction like Medea’s serves, therefore, as shorthand for a shortcoming of description but also, crucially, as a gloss on spectacle itself.

In his *Apology for Actors* (1612), roughly contemporaneous with the publication of the *Age* plays, Heywood argues that

> A Description is only a shadow receiued by the eare but not perceiued by the eye: so liuely portraiture is merely a forme seene by the eye, but can neither shew action, passion, motion, or any other gesture, to moue the spirits of the beholder to admiration: but to see a soouldier shap’d like a soouldier, walke, speake, act like a soouldier: to see a Hector all besmeareied in blood, trampling vpon the bulkes of Kinges. A Troylus returning from the field in the sight of his father Priam . . . Oh these were sights to make an Alexander. (B3v-B4r)

Heywood believes that sights have the power to make a man great. Unlike portraiture and, significantly, unlike description, the combination of seeing, speaking, walking, and acting can prove morally improving. Perhaps the disjunction between description and perception explains Heywood’s fondness for “strange” as a stand-in descriptive term, filling the gap between performance and print. It acknowledges the ineffability of visual perception while attempting to capture something of the material experience of performance—the uniqueness of theatrical display, especially as a moral mode.

However, the term also intimates that while displays on the stage can be instructive, they are rarely straightforwardly so. Heywood’s strangeness is a puzzle that asks a reader interested in spectacle to see the bigger picture, visually and morally, while never laying out all of the pieces. Associations of “strange” with witchery and popery and connotations of frustratingly uncertain providential signs in popular print indicate that, while clearly of moral import, Heywood’s spectacles “puzzle us.” “Strange” sights—like those that dominate the *Age* plays—are less convincingly edifying than Heywood’s *Apologie* would
like to suggest. They attest to an ambivalence about spectacle, acknowledging its association with fears, superstitions, and passions, as Montaigne suggests, and also its proximity to illusion. While moral force inheres in visual and material display, the earthliness of physical spectacle nonetheless remains unsettling. As such, characters and stage directions in the plays channel visual scepticism, while attempting, much as the Apologie itself does, to prove spectacle to be efficacious. The Tempest shares this approach to visual display, transforming stage devices into something rich and strange, insisting upon their power whilst recoiling from them as “insubstantial pageants.”

**Beating on strangeness in The Tempest**

The Tempest is more explicit than the Age plays in its acknowledgement of the contemporary resonances of “strange,” but it is also, at times, more abstract, more lyrical, and for it more poignant. Most notable is the play’s entire feeling of strangeness—something that encompasses the novelty of the island and the extraordinary oddity of the events that take place over the few hours of fictional time, already suggested above, but also the language itself. “Strange” syntax and rhetorical devices are discussed with respect to Cymbeline in Chapter Five, but the contorted verse and the fashioning of a “strange” style applies equally to The Tempest.

Yet the language and style of wonder and strangeness is part of a wider cultural experience in early modern England. Robert C. Fulton III has noticed the important influence of New World literature, specifically the Bermuda pamphlets, on the play—now a critical commonplace. He states that “a complementary theme in Bermuda pamphlets” to the manner of the characters’ arrival “is the strangeness of the islands where the shipwrecked expedition finds itself” (4). Yet while repeating the word himself, Fulton III does little to scrutinise its meanings or determine how it relates, directly, to the Bermuda pamphlets.

One parallel is in the shipwreck and the arrival of the stranded on the island. Prospero initially notes that it is “by accident most strange” that “bountiful Fortune / . . . hath mine enemies / Brought to this shore” (A2v). His comment initially confuses providential fortune with Prospero’s own devices, which have engineered the storm itself. His words echo A discovery of the Barmudas, otherwise called the Ile of Divels (Thomas Gates, George Summers, et al, 1610). The pamphlet states that their “deliuerie was not more strange in falings so opportunely, and happily upon the land, as our feeding preseruation,
was beyond our hopes, and all mens expectations most admirable . . .” (B2v). 
Admiration and strangeness also combine in *The Tempest* when Gonzalo
realises the “rarity” of the island, the dryness of their garments, and the lush
vegetation and sweet air (A3v-A4r). The prospect of “feeding preservation” is
toyed with later in the play, when Ariel tempts them with a vanishing banquet
that proves even more admirable and more strange.

Indeed, a more prominent parallel of strangeness is to be seen in the
play’s “strange shapes” and creatures. The pamphlets are keen to express the
strangeness of the natural world in the Bermudas. *A true declaration of the
estate of the Colonie in Virginia* (1609) describes the animals of the island in
parallel with the ravens of the Bible:

> . . . as in the great famine of *Israell*, God commanded *Elias* to fly
> the brooke *Cedron*, and there fed him by Rauens; so God
> provided for our disconsolate people in the midst of the Sea by
> foules: but with an admirable difference: unto *Elias* the Rauens
> brought meat, unto our men the foules brought (themselues) for
> meate: for when they whisteled, or made any strange noyse, the
> foules would come and sit on their shoulders . . . (D2v)

The description is made more interesting in light of Stephen Orgel’s
suggestions about the name Sycorax: both Orgel and Leah Marcus relate the
name of Caliban’s mother to *corax*, the Greek for “raven,” and so to Medea, the
classical witch who features prominently in Heywood’s *The Brazen Age*. Orgel
notes that Sycorax could perhaps be explained as Scythian Raven: Medea
(Orgel 19 n.1). Further, Demaray summarises how “the name Syorax has been
etymologized from the Greek korax (raven), an apparent epithet in the
Metamorphosis for Medea, the Scythian raven” (32). While the passage in *A
true declaration* suggests no witchery, it nonetheless places ravens as part of
the “wonder” in the “inchaunted pile of rocks” (D2r).

The presence of strange fowl thereby produces a link between the two
plays that associates the “magical” effects with new world creatures. Such
creatures also extend strangeness to wider descriptions of the new world, and
specifically points to various creatures and happenings in *The Tempest*. While
engagement with the peoples of the new world has understandably taken
— and Mullaney has engaged with “strange things” from other cultures—Miguel de Asúa and Roger French’s recent exploration of European encounters with new world animals suggests a further source of newness. They note that

the European powers set out to complete the settlement and exploitation of the recently discovered lands, and in the wake of this race for new sources of wealth and markets they had to cope with an alien and disturbing reality. . . A New World meant an exotic nature, new landscapes, new minerals, new plants and new animals. (xiii)

Asúa and French’s study shows how responses moved from a linguistically- and culturally-formed imposition of expectations on the new world's zoology to a more “scientific” response that describes in detail the animals encountered. This thesis, and this chapter with regard to strangeness, is particularly interested in advancing such a critical move that builds upon discursive and linguistic processes of “othering” by acknowledging concurrent technological, material, and scientific processes at work in estranging objects, individuals, and ideas.

One of the most popular sixteenth-century accounts of new world animals is Peter Martyr’s collection of letters, published as Decades of the New World. Asúa and French note that “The passages in which Martyr talks about the new animals were eagerly quoted, plagiarized and held as truth for two centuries, no matter how fantastic some of them were, judged by contemporary standards . . .” (53). Notably, Richard Hakluyt, who had earlier published a Latin version of Martyr’s Decades, encouraged the final parts of the book to be

40 Numerous critics, from Peter Hulme to Barbara Fuchs to Ania Loomba have made significant claims about the play's engagement with new world colonialism—see Virginia Mason Vaughan’s and especially Brinda Charry’s chapters in The Tempest: A Critical Reader (2014) for a recent overview of such criticism. For a critical overview and critique of “colonialist” studies of The Tempest, see G. A. Wilkes, “The Tempest and the Discourse of Colonialism.” Bartels discusses “strangeness” in this context as alien or “Other” characters, but with regard to Christopher Marlowe. Her study examines how “strange” characters, which are formed from a variety of geographic locales, are made spectacular in Marlowe’s drama: “For Marlowe, the choice of settings from Africa to the Mediterranean to the East turns our attention to the key sites of England’s imperialist exploits and so to the issue of imperialism. On a more symbolic level, however, his representation of those settings breaks down the barriers of difference, showing that the worlds out there are not so different from Europe” (15).
translated into English by Michael Lok and published in 1612 (Quinn 327),
around the time of the composition and performance of *The Tempest* and of the
other “strange” plays discussed in this thesis.

A striking moment echoes *The Tempest* in the close of the seventh
decade, which is described in a marginal gloss as “A strange tale of a
prodigious monster,” revealing the proximity of new world animals to monstrous
pamphlet literature. In this strange tale, there is a “violent tempest of blustering
whirlwinds” in the country of *Camara*:

> Through that violent tempest, they say two foules were brought
> into the country, almost like the Harpiae of the Ilands *Strophades*
> so much spoken of, for that they had the countenance of a virgin,
> with a chinne, mouth, nose, teeth, smooth brow, and venerable
> eyes and faire. (Oo2v)

The *Decades* combines classical mythology with half-hearted taxonomy.
Though this harpy violently attacks adventurers and is eventually killed by the
Spanish, it echoes Ariel's descent “like a Harpey” in *The Tempest*. The wonder
of the happy-to-be-eaten fowls in the Bermuda pamphlets is extended in
Martyr's book, still popular, it seems, among the publication of more reliable (or
at least more verifiable) travel texts. As with Adams's devil-portraits and the
attempt at visual-moral description in prodigy pamphlets, Martyr's strange tale is
inextricably associated with strange visual description, which notes the facial
features and the “exceeding waight” that left “the verie print of her talons
remained in the stones of the rockes where she went to perch all night” (Oo2v).

> “Brauely the figure of this Harpie” does Ariel perform (B1r) in
> Shakespeare's *The Tempest*, and he and his “ministers” form part of the
> “obseruation strange” performed in the display. In light of the creatures that link
> the new world setting of Prospero’s island with the bird-like Medea, Ariel's
descent in *The Tempest* appears to be a similar moment to Medea’s
suspension in *The Brazen Age*, a strange dramaturgical echo.41 Lomax notes
that the *Age* plays combine “familiar old effects of thunder and lightning with

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41 Both Prospero and Medea are conjurors or magicians, and this link suggests further the
technological aspects of “strangeness” that govern their spectacular performances in the two
plays. The “aesthetic of strangeness” generated by stage technology—at the root of their
“magic”—is discussed in the following chapter.
timing and newly acquired technical expertise,” thereby suggesting that “an awareness and a delight in artifice indicate links with private theatre practice and also show that Heywood has successfully modified a pageant device for the stage” (28). The learned allusions shared with The Tempest as well as the performance of The Silver Age in court alongside Cymbeline compounds the connections between Heywood’s supposedly sensational outdoor theatre and Shakespeare’s sensory and sensitive Blackfriars plays. The strange ornithological occurrences in both plays channel both the visually perplexing and the ostensibly exotic aspects of new world creatures, using spectacle to unite and represent a variety of cultural interests—from the flight of masque devices (see the following chapter) to proto-taxonomy.

Indeed, like Martyr’s marginal gloss, the spectators’ observation in The Tempest is made strange by Ariel’s performance, prompting Gonzalo to ask Alonso “. . . why stand you / In this strange stare?”: a literal form of “observation strange” on the behalf of Alonso. Like the sceptical uncertainty that attends vision in Heywood’s stage directions and his characters’ “strange doubts,” Alonso’s response to Gonzalo and his observation of the Harpy-Ariel is hesitant and fearful:

O, it is monstrous: monstrous:
Me thought the billowes spoke, and told me of it,
The windes did sing it to me: and the Thunder
(That deepe and dreadfull Organ-Pipe) pronounc’d
The name of Prosper: it did base my Trespasse . . . B1r

Mary B. Moore acknowledges that the “play’s characters insistently wonder: they question whether they have imagined or seen what appears before them” (498), and certainly Alonso’s interpretation here appears dreamlike. One might go so far as to term it, repeating Sebastian, “a sleepy Language,” echoing the “strange drowsines” and “strange repose” that overcome Alonso through Ariel’s art in the second act (A4v). The effect is that the stage directions that explain Ariel’s actions and the “strange shapes” that bring in the banquet are thrown into confusion. The dream-like reflection (Me thought) and the subjective interpretation of the spectacle causes retrospective doubt in the audience or the reader: how can one know what one has just seen?—Alonso
certainly does not. They resemble, in this sense, Heywood’s own impractical stage directions—directions that offer no visual certainty.

That uncertainty is something that Greenblatt explores in Marvelous Possessions (1994). He notes that European processing of the new world depended on the recognition of readable signs, on the detailing of salient features that can be processed in Western terms.

But if the English infuse into their strange encounter their powerful confidence in the system of symbolic representation that they carried with them, their dream of the executive power of signs, their fantasy of plenitude and control, they continue to be haunted by the sense of emptiness that is paradoxically bound up with the imagined potency of their art. (116)

Alonso’s and Gonzalo’s bafflement at the “monstrous” but acknowledgement of its “strangeness” captures this paradox—of legibility and illegibility. Ariel’s verse, in its strangeness, also intimates the possibility of understanding coming into collision with confusion—the difficulty of its syntax and the overwhelming visual power of the scene, in accordance with the sceptical resonances of the term “strange,” challenge the onlooker’s knowledge (just as Heywood’s descriptive power is challenged in the Age plays): the whole scene culminates in “observation strange.”

Shakespeare transforms the zoological curiosity of Martyr’s Decades (if not a direct influence on the play, then part of a cultural matrix of texts that reflect interest in “strange creatures”) into a moral spectacle of strangeness. The spectacle confirms, in theatrical terms, Mullaney’s suspicions about the wonder cabinet: “to speak of Renaissance curiosity or fascination with other cultures hardly begins to address what is odd in such anthropology, geared not toward the interpretation of strange cultures but toward their consummate performance” (69). Yet incorporating the wider connotations of the “strange” in early modern culture, Shakespeare encourages a form of uncertain interpretation and interrogation of what exactly such a “strange” performance

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42 Martyr explains that the harpies appeared “through that foule tempest,” and Alonso too merges meteorological, material, and moral. This conjunction is considered in the next chapter.
might mean. The play draws on the admonitory overtones of prodigy print and combines them with the curious shapes of the new world—a new world that is difficult to process, confusing, and uncertain.

Caliban is also drafted into the world of strange monsters and prodigies. Like the appearance of Ariel's harpy, he is part of old world wonders and new world marvels. If “strange” serves elsewhere as a substitute for visual description—a means of describing in moral terms without giving precise, literal, visual details—then references to Caliban throughout the play contain something of the strange. Virginia Mason Vaughan notes that terms like “ridiculous,” “scurvy,” and all derivations and modifications of the term “monster”—his “most frequent sobriquet”—“do nothing . . . to clarify our picture of him”: “From this confusion of epithets no clear image emerges. Shakespeare seems to have invited his actors and directors to see Caliban however they wished” (391). Trinculo in the play calls him a “strange fish”:

Were I in England now (as once I was) and had but this fish painted; not a holiday-foole there but would giue a peece of siluer: there, would this Monster, make a man: any strange beast there, makes a man: when they will not giue a doit to reliue a lame Begger, they will lay out ten to see a dead Indian . . . . Misery aquaints a man with strange bedfellows. (A5r)

Trinculo explicitly associates Caliban with new world prints in and the popularity of monsters in England. Malcolm Jones notes that fish were particularly popular in early modern print images (259), and as outlined above, there are plenty of extant examples. A most strange and true report of a monsterous fish, who appeared in the forme of a woman, from her waste upwards (1604) contains a large woodcut of a mermaid, described as a “monstrous Fish”:
Shakespeare thereby draws Caliban and his apparent formlessness into the same discourse as the monster pamphlets discussed above, combining the attempt at moralising with the failure of expression that attends new world discovery.

Ironically, though, Caliban himself also takes Stefano and Trinculo for wonders. He marvels, “these be fine things, and if they be not sprights.” Trinculo regards him as “a most ridiculous Monster, to make a wonder of a poore drunkard” (A5v)—though they, in calling the inebriated Caliban “monster,” do exactly that themselves. Caliban’s role as a “strange beast” associates him, therefore, with Ariel—and certainly he has proven throughout the play and in its criticism to be, like Ariel’s strange spectacle, a moral puzzle. Yet at the same time, Shakespeare’s Caliban encourages us to think of Stefano and Trinculo as “wonders”—they too are transformed into something rich and strange.

It has long been recognised that Montaigne’s essays are a deep influence on The Tempest, and Arthur Kirsch notes that

In the absence of a narrative source, Shakespeare’s organization of the action, as well as Prospero’s, seems unusually informed by
the kind of working out of ideas that suggests the tenor of Montaigne’s thinking: inclusive; interrogative rather than programmatic; anti-sentimental but humane; tragicomic rather than only tragic or comic, incorporating adversities rather than italicizing them as subversive ironies. The particular constellation of ideas in the play, moreover—the mutual dependence of virtue and vie, forgiveness, compassion, imagination—is habitual in Montaigne. (338)

The doubling of Caliban with Trinculo and Stefano (something that happens both in the plot—with their plotting together—and in the language, here, of wonders) channels this thinking. It reflects Montaigne’s own culturally-reflective essay “Of Cannibals”—long noted as a character source for the play (Gurr, “New Directions” 96). Montaigne ponders a tribe of supposed cannibals in the new world, while noting that censure of their practices often obscures our own barbarity. He writes that “there is nothing in that nation, that is either barbarous or savage, vnlesse men call that barbarisme, which is not common to them. As indeede, we have no other ayme of truth and reason, then the example and Idea of the opinions and customes of the countrie we live-in” (K3r). Montaigne’s cultural scepticism, here, suggests that conceptions of truth and reason are dependent upon experiences, rather than on a central, metaphysical truth, and the comedy of Trinculo and Stefano expresses a similar realisation: as Caliban is “strange” to them, so they are “strange” to him. Indeed, Montaigne makes similar claims for some “cannibal” visitors to the court of King Charles XI; while he describes them frequently as “woondrous strange and remarkable,” they too remark that European practices, like answering to a beardless king, are “very strange.” The patient tolerance of poverty is also thought to be “strange” (K5v). In “Of Cannibals,” the term is turned back against Western practices to make readers aware of their own barbarity. The Tempest likewise casts strangeness upon the real strangers to the island, drawing not only the “marvels” of the new world into “strange” description but the fragile certainties of our own selves.

In the same way that Heywood’s Age plays interrogate and defend theatrical display, The Tempest acknowledges the uncertainties of visual and moral experience while revealing their power. The new world connects the “strange” aesthetic of The Tempest with the difficulty of processing the “new”—
itself a synonym for “strange.” Yet that sceptical impulse—the difficulty of explaining visual phenomena and the reluctance to claim knowledge—is also turned inwards, in the manner of Montaigne. Shakespeare focusses “strangeness” on the shipwrecked survivors, in their responses and in their paths towards redemption. Like Montaigne’s barbarism, moral knowledge is made to seem precarious and contingent, yet images and spectacles remain powerful means for self-realisation—they become, therefore, the play’s tools of repentance and redemption—just as Ariel’s “quient deuice”—the play’s most acute moment of “strangeness”—bases Alonso’s “Trespasse” (B1r).

Visual strangeness makes audiences and characters alike aware of their own perceptual and conceptual shortcomings—escaping both description and comprehension—but it also proves a form of admonition. It directly reflects Montaigne’s approach to cannibalism: “I am not sory we note the barbarous horror of such an action, but grieved, that pryning so narrowly into their faults, we are so blinded to ours” (K4v). Duly, Shakespeare turns the “strangeness” of the new to the old.

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“Strangeness” is a concept associated with both optical and ethical perception. While it resists clear definition, it might broadly be described as the quality of a morally and visually ambiguous moment, feeling, perception, or aesthetic (sometimes simultaneously). The term reflects the novelty of the new world of animals and people as well as the material world of devices and inventions. The word is particularly prominent in the early 1610s, where it responds to the shock of the unknown, amidst the publication of new world pamphlets, ethical and optical scepticism, and prodigy pamphlets. Helen Wilcox identifies 1611 in particular as a year characterised by the “the enormous verbal energies of Jacobean England, a period when the English language was rapidly expanding, and its expressive potential was confirmed both in new works and in translations of existing ones” (3). Indeed, Wilcox recognises The Tempest as a play of its time:

This tragicomedy of ‘strangeness’ and ‘wonder’—two recurrent concepts featuring prominently in the textual culture of the year in
which it was first performed—deploys magical visual effects and witty language, as well as the rhetoric of theme and variation on the adjectives ‘strange’ and ‘wondrous’ themselves, to bring these unusual elements to the fore in the play. . . (206)

Her study recognises the rich cultures of translation, rhetoric, music, song, masquing, and wonder that dominate the printing presses in the year of Shakespeare’s late tragicomedy. Wilcox’s short acknowledgement of The Tempest’s strangeness in particular recognises that “the play’s moral world turns on the meanings and consequences of these ‘strange’ and ‘stranger’ impressions” (202). This chapter has expanded upon the moral importance of that term, exploring the deeper contextual associations and topical charges it represents and setting out its relationship to the spectacular.

The crucible of literary activity described by Wilcox also includes Heywood’s theatrical alchemy, too often left out of the discussion. Heywood’s interest in “strangeness” provides a template for what spectacle can achieve in the period: despite the habit of contemporaries and of critics to reduce the Red Bull theatre repertoire to simple sensationalism, Heywood’s Age plays actually insist upon the ethical and optical complexity of “strange” spectacles: “the more you seek to unfold them, the more they pusle us” (Silver E1v). Not only can material spectacle be sensational, but it offers to “pusle” an audience; alert it to Jacobean culture’s web of “strange” sights; and contemplate the way such “impressions,” to use Wilcox’s term, affect the theatre’s moral and visual world.

The Age plays and The Tempest echo each other through the verbal mention of the term but also through parallel moments of “strange” stage display, like Medea’s suspension and Ariel’s descent as a harpy. Dramaturgical echoes as well as staging practices actually link the outdoor Red Bull theatre with the King’s Men’s Blackfriars. Both theatres, at this moment, borrow from court display and masquing, but both reflect upon the purpose and efficacy of spectacle and draw on philosophical concerns about moral and sensory knowledge.

As a term concerned with negotiating between the material and the moral world, “strangeness” demands an interrogation of spectacle. Where the materialisation of morality enshrines abstract concepts in physical things, strange spectacle opens up doubts about such a presentation by showing the
fragilities as well as the force of theatrical effects. The second chapter has shown how material and abstract use was united through popular print, and “strangeness” follows a similar model—serving as a term that stands for both physical and moral description, from Adams’s devils to Medea’s performance to Caliban’s appearance. Yet where uniting material and abstract use shores up the certainties of household prints, “strange” spectacle hides the true “uses” of its devices in a puzzle that resists both moral and physical clarity. Prominent in these plays of the early 1610s, it reflects the moment at which materialisation is becoming increasingly central to moral representation, while also critiquing such representation and reflecting upon the theatrical mode.

_The Tempest_ and the _Age_ plays present spectacular display as a curious puzzle, a challenge to description and a marker of confusion, yet the plays’ “strange doubts” also offer moral significance and sometimes, on Prospero’s Island especially, moral illumination. Alonso calls the events in _The Tempest_ at the close, “as strange a Maze, as ere men trod,” a description that aptly describes both plays themselves. Both _The Tempest_ and the _Age_ plays tease audiences and readers towards conclusions and then frustrate them, unfold doubts through displays and then transform them back into puzzles, and Shakespeare and Heywood leave everybody, against Prospero’s instructions, “beating on / The strangenesse of this business” (B3v).
4. Strange Engineering: Stagecraft and Prospero’s Moral Technology

“It doesn’t take away from believing. I think you believe more. You go with it. ‘The Lion King’ proves completely that seeing the mechanics is the magic.”
---Julie Taymor

The previous chapter has shown that strangeness is intimately connected with exploration and discovery. One of the earliest occurrences of the concept in *The Tempest* is in Prospero’s description of the storm itself, which he calls an “accident most strange” (A2r). Yet the accident is not entirely providential; Prospero himself has a hand in conjuring the storm, with Ariel performing it “to point.” What can we make of this man-made, spirit-made strangeness?

In this chapter, I take the “aesthetic of strangeness” described in the last chapter as a point of departure, but rather than concentrating on the term itself, I look at the scenes in which “strangeness” is prominent and examine the way such an effect is created through material-moral exchange. I therefore examine the play’s stagecraft as a conceptual form of “strangeness.” A further link between Heywood’s and Shakespeare’s “strangeness” can be seen in the fact that both Medea and Prospero are “conjurors” or magicians, yet their power lies in “strange” special effects rooted in theatrical display. This chapter concentrates on Prospero, because theatrical engineering is arguably more prominent in *The Tempest*, but “moral technology” can implicitly be read into the Age plays, and the final section of this chapter looks at Saturn’s inventions in *The Golden Age*. I argue that engineering is the root of Prospero’s magic and the generator of the “strange” stagecraft that characterises *The Tempest*. If “strangeness” precariously links the moral and material realms, then “strange engineering” charges technological devices, performances, and effects with significant admonitory force.

Recent treatments of spectacle (notably *Moving Shakespeare Indoors* and *Shakespeare and the Effects of Performance*, discussed in the introduction) have pointed to the technology underlying display in early modern playhouses. There remains limited discussion, however, of the way wider cultural functions of technological inventions—notably their moral and visual
power—are also present on stage. The cultural and moral role of technology is especially prominent in plays where such technology is itself part of the playworld. As such, this chapter builds on past engagements with the materials of the theatre, a critical move since before the turn of the millennium and new materialism, and of particular interest in the last five years, where the material thrust of theatre history has been closely allied with dramatic criticism in the work of Farah Karim-Cooper, Gwylim Jones, Tiffany Stern, and others. As in previous chapters, I expand my range of evidence to combine theatre-historical interest in props and stage spaces (here, Blackfriars and the Globe) with cultural and intellectual history of early seventeenth-century inventions, their theories, and their representation as moral devices in images and pamphlets. Aligning stage spaces with contemporary philosophical contemplations of inventions and devices—particularly sceptical reflection upon material objects—helps to open up a new and enabling reading of Jacobean stage spectacle and specifically *The Tempest*, one that demonstrates how the stage interrogates its own means of representation.

Prospero’s role in conjuring the storm at the outset is described as a force of magic. We learn of his tampering with the weather, both actively and by proxy, in his conversation with Miranda and his interrogation of Ariel, but he also gives credit to otherworldly beings in act five. When renouncing his powers in his famous monologue, Prospero thanks the elves and demi-puppets of the island,

by whose ayde

(Weake Masters though ye be) I haue bedymn’d
the Noone-tide Sun, call’d forth the mutinous windes,
And twixt the greene Sea, and the azur’d vault
Set roaring warre: To the dread ratling Thunder
Haue I giuen fire . . . . (B2v)

The monologue frames the action as Prospero’s; the active verbs are all his. In this forceful manifesto of, and farewell to, his abilities, Prospero terms this transformation of nature “rough Magicke.”

Such “rough Magicke” is the cause, then, of the spectacular meteorological events—and other moments of visual wonder—in the play. This
chapter argues that such magic is tangibly, visibly, audibly, and olfactorily material. As such, the moral power of Prospero’s spectacles—addressed in the previous two chapters—is rooted in technology. Stephen Orgel notes that “many critics talk about Prospero as a Renaissance scientist, and see alchemical metaphors in the grand design of the play” (9); while Prospero is often considered a form of alchemist, he is rarely conceived of as an engineer. Shakespeare’s The Tempest shows in enchanting fashion that the early modern fascination with human engineering has a deeply important moral element. Edmund Spenser uses a technological metaphor to describe The Faerie Queene’s aim to “fashion a gentleman or noble person in vertuous and gentle discipline” (Pp1r); at moments of strange spectacle, The Tempest literally crafts moral admonition, advice, revelation, and instruction, combining Prospero’s science with the engines of theatre to produce powerful moral-material displays. This goes further than the materialisation of morality discussed in the previous chapters and suggests that moral messages can be not only transformed into material forms but can be born from them.

The Tempest displays scepticism’s interest in material proof; it embarrasses the idea of theatrical illusion by alluding to and then making manifest the technologies that lie behind its freak weather and frightening spirits. Yet those technologies are never fully deconstructed; as such, the play’s engineering channels the ambivalent descriptive power of “strange” spectacle, which sits between material and abstract explanation. Further, the power of technological moral spectacles to counter sceptical doubt is also undermined by the ephemerality of these displays. If moral admonition comes not from transcendent powers but from earthly engines, they are subject to the fact that all material and especially theatrical creations “dissolve”: “the gorgeous Pallaces, / The solemne Temples, the great Globe it selfe” (B2r). Prospero’s moral technology is subject to the mutability of all material things.

This chapter explores the association of magic with technology in the medieval and early modern periods, before suggesting the extent of technological display and invention in Jacobean England. It then addresses the conjunction of the playworld and the theatre in The Tempest, examining Prospero’s use of stage technology in “strange” moments of spectacle. I explain the moral significance of storms on the early modern and specifically Jacobean stage, before demonstrating how the technologies of The Tempest
are crucial moral tools. The chapter ends by considering the implications of Prospero’s moral mechanics.

**Magic, Machinery, and *The Tempest***

There is a burgeoning scholarly interest in early modern technological advance, with important studies from Jonathan Sawday (2007) and Jessica Wolfe (2004) outlining the intellectual significance of the period’s developing machine culture. Literary studies have also sought to map out the significance of these developments, with provocative edited collections including Wendy Beth Hyman’s *The Automaton in English Renaissance Literature* (2011) and more focused studies from Stephen Orgel’s “Prospero’s Wife” (1984) to Kevin LaGrandeur’s *Androids and Intelligent Networks in Early Modern Literature and Culture* (2013) suggesting that artificial craft on the page or the stage interrogates “ambivalence” about humanity’s “innate technological abilities,” from “the danger of our intellectual products” to “the power and potential of *techne* and human artefact” (LaGrandeur 1-2). Little consideration has been given, though, to the more precise moral functions of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century technology, which this chapter addresses with regard to *The Tempest*.

Critics, most notably Frances Yates (see *The Last Plays* and *The Occult Philosophy in the Elizabethan Age*), have noted that the arcane, the occult, the mysterious, and the magical are traits closely associated with Prospero. Machinery and technology must also be a part of this association; they are often considered throughout medieval and early modern Europe as branches of magic, conjuration, or alchemy. It is important to note at the outset that, in Wolfe’s words,

> While there are many texts depicting mechanical devices, there is little if any categorical distinction between mechanics and other intellectual disciplines. In an era preoccupied with the classification and arrangement of knowledge, objects which from our contemporary standpoint appear to belong to a discrete category cannot predictably be located in any particular place. (6-7)
Though this is the case, machines and mechanics nevertheless become a significant part of discussion from practical matters to more experimental, mysterious, occult, or natural-philosophical preoccupations; indeed, the polyvalence of technological creations in the period draws engineering into line with forms of magic. “In the Renaissance,” Sawday states, “magic had become linked to mechanics through the supposed ‘discovery’ of the works of Hermes Trismegistus, the ‘author’ (so it was believed) of 30,000 volumes of esoteric law. For the occult writer Henry Cornelius Agrippa, drawing on this well of mystical lore, mechanism and magic were inseparable from one another” (Engines 186). These associations can be linked, too, through Hero of Alexandria, whose automata were known in the medieval and early modern periods. William Eamon has explored the wider explanations for these associations and the peculiar historical situation:

Technological progress, both in terms of greater sophistication of techniques and wider application of them, was exceedingly rapid between the fourteenth and the seventeenth centuries. Nor did this surge of technological innovation go unnoticed by contemporaries: the output of writings on technology was larger than at any time previously, and by the beginning of the seventeenth century European intellectuals praised the new inventions that they believed had made Europe vastly superior to antiquity and to other cultures of the world. Yet despite these dramatic changes, belief in magic did not correspondingly wane . . . magic underwent an unprecedented revival in the Renaissance. (172)

Eamon suggests that magic lent a theoretical context to technological development, as well as providing a backdrop for the aims of engineers who wished to use human art to dominate, manipulate, and control the natural world: “the ‘technological dream’ of the late-Middle Ages and the Renaissance was largely a product of the magical world view” (172).

Hermes Trimegistus and the association of magical lore with engineering (explored, for instance, in Frances Yates’s Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition, 1964) can be combined with the rise of “mysteries,” which sought to
protect craft secrets, lending these forms of physical, manual, and technological craft an aura of actual mystery. Eamon notes, for instance, that the presence of engineered objects in medieval literature as “enchanted” devices are often “unmistakably references to mechanical devices” (174). As such, commonplace references to technologies become suffused with notions of magic and occult power.

The medieval and early modern technological progress is compounded in the advance of mechanical engineering, specifically in forms of automata. Clocks, for instance, burgeoned from the fourteenth century—especially “clock-jacks” or “Jacquemarts,” which included moving figurines. LaGrandeur places these clocks among “the chief technological wonders of their day,” claiming that “those who worked with them were the equivalent of our nuclear scientists” (35). Indeed, there are a number of surviving automata (what LaGrandeur calls “clockwork androids,” and he lists eight extant examples, 37) from the period that were arguably inspired by these early clock automata, from master engineers Hans Bullmann of Nuremberg and Gianello Torriano de Cremona, both of the early to mid-sixteenth century. Importantly, for this discussion, Torriano was suspected of witchery by monks and others who objected to the construction of these “self-moving” toys (LaGrandeur 37).

Further forms of technological construction—especially of humanoid creatures—are also associated with witchery. Humanoids, golems, and mechanical automata receive great interest in the medieval and early modern periods. The alchemical roots of golems and homunculi and the “technological” developments involved in mechanical automata are regarded as a form of magic. From the discoveries of Hero of Alexandria through the scientific experiments of Roger Bacon to sixteenth- and seventeenth-century developments in machine technology, any form of humanoid or lifelike machine “has its roots,” LaGrandeur explains, “and its clearest early expression in actual scientific theory of the Renaissance, called natural philosophy—a philosophical system in which magic and the beginnings of modern empirical science were bound together” (48-49). Indeed, there is little distinction in these writings between a philosophy interested in scientific progress and alchemical magic: both were seen as forms of technological creation, in the ability to fashion gold from baser materials and in the possibility of creating through this “magical-scientific” art a humanoid creature, miniature man, homunculus, or golem.
Practitioners of science and technology did not all encourage this occult reading of their works. One of the enduring names of occult practices, Roger Bacon, eloquently distanced his interest in scientific development from wizardry, yet he remained famous into the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries chiefly as a conjuror or juggler. He offers Eamon’s “‘technological dream’ of the Middle Ages” in a famous list of potential inventions, *De nullitate magiae* (1260-80). The list appears in the prose history *The Famous Historie of Fryer Bacon* (which, though it first appeared in the sixteenth century, exists in extant form only as early as a 1627 edition). That edition, which evidences an enduring interest in earlier technological fantasies into the seventeenth century, includes a series of crafted marvels, which the supposed writer Bacon emphatically says are “performed by Art and Nature, wherein shall be nothing Magickal”:

. . . by the figuration of Art, there may be made Instruments of Navigation without men to rowe in them, as great Ships to brooke the Sea, onely with one man to steere them, and they shall sayle farre more swiftly then if they were full of men. . . . an Instrument may be made to flye withal, if one sit in the midst of the Instrument, & doe turne an Engine, by which the wings being Artifically composed, may beat ayre after the manner of a flying Bird. (C4r)

These dreams of unmanned boats and aeroplanes (or ornithopters) (and an interest in flight characterises Jacobean inventions, which is discussed below) are firmly considered “Art” and distanced from magic. Yet as the complicated meanings of “natural philosophy” suggests, exactly what “Art” encompasses remains open to interpretation.

Despite Bacon in *The Famous Historie* arguing for the purely scientific invention of these wonders, Robert Greene’s popular stage play represents Bacon’s “Art” as a form of conjuring. The titlepage on the 1594 printing calls the play *The Honourable Historie of Frier Bacon*, at once suggesting that it is less of a fantastical imaginative fiction than a form of drama akin to the prose history on which it was based; as such, it gives credence to the magical interpretations of Bacon’s “Art” by drawing its spectacular occurrences into line with the mysterious, magical wizardry that haunts other history plays in the period, not
least Shakespeare’s Henriad. It is a play that shows Bacon defending the claim that he is

read in Magicks mysterie,
In Piromancie to diuine by flames,
To tell by Hadromaticke, ebbes and tides,
By Aeromancie, to discouer doubts,
To plaine out questions, as Apollo did. (B1v)

Indeed, he practises a vanishing act on a rival “magician” and manages to craft a brazen head that speaks (though he is too busy sleeping to notice it) and then shatters. Greene’s transformation of “instruments devised” (as associated with Bacon in the prose history) into “spells conjured” could not be clearer, and the popularity of the magical rather than the “Art-ful” is demonstrated by a riotous crowd, sometime between 1611 and 1615, calling for “‘Friars, Friars’” at the end of a play at the Curtain (Sager 141).

Eamon notes that “By the fifteenth century, many of the ‘miraculous’ inventions in Bacon’s famous letter were commonplace items in technological treatises. Whether they were actually built or not, medieval engineers were clearly speculating on designs for submarines, flying machines, automobiles and ‘unheard-of engines’” (185), yet the authors of those machine treatises “were often the ones for whom the idea of technology as magic held the greatest appeal” (186). While this is not always the case with engineers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the second chapter of this thesis has shown that William Bourne’s Inventions or Devises (1589) encourages the idea of “strange” inventions as something to prompt marvel; similarly, William Blagrave’s The Mathematical Jewell (1585), a treatise on an astrolabe, obscures the more sober scientific rigour of its contents through its bold title-page, which argues for its “wonderfull dexteritie . . . The use of which jewell, is so aboundant and ample, that it leadeth any man practising thereon, the direct pathway (from the first steppe to the last) through the whole Artes of Astronomy, Cosmography, Geography, Topography . . .” and so forth. By making such large claims, the “Arte” itself is, like Bacon’s own, drawn into question: the robustness of the jewel’s mathematics becomes conflated with larger claims.
about mastery over terrestrial and extra-terrestrial matter. It almost appears to be magical.

**Prospero as Engineer**

Precisely such a tension between the mysterious and the mechanical exists in *The Tempest*. It cannot be argued that Prospero is transparently an engineer, not least in light of the alarming magical practices he claims in his monologue, discussed above. Yet those ostensibly magical developments are partially undressed in the play by the repeated references to technology and by the inevitable visibility of that technology on the Blackfriars or the Globe (or the Whitehall) stages. Moreover, the King’s Men’s repertory opens up Prospero, played by Richard Burbage, to interrogation; “*The Alchemist*, remaining in the repertory,” Keith Sturgess observes, “would inevitably colour not only Burbage’s playing but also an audience’s reception of Shakespeare’s play about a conjuror. Subtle is the other side of the coin—magician as charlatan” (75). Prospero’s “magic” is less charlatanism than acknowledged use of theatrical technologies to achieve his “magic.” Like the Janus-figure of Friar Bacon, Prospero is a “techno-mage.” He may claim the capacity for wizardry, but he is practically an engineer and technologist.

Prospero’s engineering begins with the world of technological objects—like those listed above—that surrounds his abilities. Though not all of these objects are explicitly present in the play, they nevertheless saturate its “magical” moments. Indeed, while the “elves” and “spirits” of the island provide some form of mystery to Prospero’s control of the weather—the play’s “accident most strange”—contemporaries would be well aware of the claims of engineers and scientists to begin to master nature. Blagrave’s *Iewel*, as above, makes a number of large claims for its device. More spectacularly, though, the years immediately surrounding *The Tempest*—the 1600s and the 1610s—also saw a fascination with the notion, or myth, of “perpetual motion.” Wolfe has suggested that such an obsession with perpetual motion and like devices, which served as both exemplars and as amusing or titillating spectacles, springs from a moral philosophical interest in court behaviour and manners drawing on models set out in texts along the lines of Castiglione’s *The Courtier* (trans. Hoby 1561):
These oxymoronic demands for a constancy-in-change and a versatile steadfastness are fulfilled by the machinery of Renaissance court spectacle—the stage machines, clocks, and perpetual motion machines that are both steady and responsive to change. (Wolfe 25)

The moral framework of mechanics accords with Prospero’s own use of technomagic in *The Tempest*; as discussed below and in previous chapters, he seeks to reform the wayward courtiers stranded on the island by his mechanical displays.

In 1607, Cornelius Drebbel presented at King James’s court a perpetual motion machine; he returned to London in 1612, promising to show how the machine worked. In the same year, a witness of the demonstration, Thomas Tymme, published a tract entitled *A dialogue philosophical: Wherein natures secret closet is opened, and the cause of all motion in nature shewed*. . . . Yet the text quite contrastingly “enshrouds the device in both hermetic and political secrecy” (Wolfe 66). The account does not, despite its titular promise, explain the workings of the machine, though it does associate Drebbel’s creation with “*Naturall Philosophie,*” suggesting that it links both divine and earthly manufacture—a connection compounded by the explanation of God’s own works as a form of “wonderfull workmanship” (Tymme A3r). His tract explains that Drebbel has constructed an “instrument” that is “perpetually in motion, without the meanes of Steele, Springs, & waights” (I2v); an annotated diagram is included, where the speaker explains the ability of the machine to tell the proportion and act “like a perpetuall Almanacke,” as well as setting forth the particulars of Celestiall motion” (I2v). Despite Tymme’s “coniecture” in explaining how a fiery element was extracted from mineral and placed within the device as an “imprisoned spirit” to make its “continuall rotation or reuolution,” the precise engineering remains a “misterie” known only to Drebbel (and disclosed by him to King James) (I3v).

Tellingly, though, its applications in natural philosophy are also considerably practical; it acts as a shipping forecast, with a “Cristall Glasse” within “representing the Sea, which water riseth and falleth, as doth the floud, and ebbe, twice in 24 houres” (I2v). A mastery over the elements can, it is claimed by Drebbel and Tymme, be achieved through engineering (albeit, to
readers, mysterious engineering). It is not necessarily through magical means, then, that Prospero is able to have such intimate knowledge of and control over the elements. Like Drebbel’s machine, Blagrave’s *lewel*, or Bacon’s technological dreams, the mixture of “misterie” and machinery suggests that technology is itself a form of “rough Magicke.” Indeed, Tymme’s conjectural explanation of the perpetual motion machine uses the language of Elements, “fierie spirits,” and of “imprisoned spirit” (I3v). The double meaning of spirit is especially acute when considering *The Tempest* as a play that concerns the technological as much as the supernatural; although Ariel is more closely associated with water than fire, he is nevertheless able “to diue into the fire,” to have “flam’d amazement” and to “burne” (A2r); he was also, as a delicate spirit, “imprisoned” by Sycorax. Ariel’s ability to work as one of Prospero’s “demi-puppets,” then, brings him close to an alchemical property allegedly used by the likes of Cornelius Drebble the engineer.

Ariel’s alchemical qualities suggest an important intermixture of science and magic. More crucially for Prospero’s role as “engineer,” though, Ariel’s puppet-likeness lends him a mechanical aspect. Not only are he and the other spirits termed “demi-puppets” by Prospero (B2v), but throughout the play they are characterised by being controlled like puppets. These properties associate Ariel with mechanical automata and, more specifically, mechanised puppets.

Tiffany Stern has pointed out the range of puppetry in early modern England, specifically with regard to the theatre. She explains that there is a long tradition of “making puppet versions of major theatrical characters” (“If I could see” 343) and, importantly, “Fundamental to the entertainment aspect of puppet-shows were squibs and firecrackers” (348), drawing the spectacular roles performed for Prospero by Ariel into a deeper dramatic parallel with puppetry. Indeed, while there may be no squibs in the opening storm of *The Tempest*, the language—as with other effects in the scene—serves to supplement visual and material stagecraft, something that Gwilym Jones has explored (“Storm Effects”). The notion of spectacular puppetry therefore complements Ariel’s verbal recreation of his performance and associates his presence with the flashes and bangs of other modes of theatre. Furthermore, puppets are closely associated with mechanical automata and mechanised theatres. Hero of Alexandria (10-70 C.E.) designs and describes a number of miniature theatres in his *Pneumatics*; these theatres run through pulleys and
ropes (much like effects at the real theatre, discussed below). Hero’s designs contain spontaneous combustion and figures that move backwards and forwards, dance, and complete other motions like puppets. They had great influence upon the inventors of the early modern period, who were interested in recreating such artificial movement and who had access to texts like Hero’s discussion of automata-construction.

Indeed, Ariel’s casting of the storm in The Tempest mirrors puppet performances and automatic theatres, drawing him into line with the demi-puppets thanked by Prospero towards the close of the play. Prospero ensures that the spirit has “Performed to point” the storm and Ariel assures him:

I flam’d amazement, sometime I’d diuide
And burne in many places; on the Top-mast,
The Yards and Bore-spritt, would I flame distinctly,
Then meete, and ioyne . . . (A2r)

While Prospero’s thanks to the elves and demi-puppets is, as noted above, in defiantly first-person form, making all the active verbs his own, Ariel’s “performance” is described as though he himself were the very special effects of the theatre. The craft-like construction of both ship and theatrics are gestured to in the pun on “ioyne,” which combines with the sensational description of combustion—the “fire, and cracks / Of sulphurous roaring” that strongly suggest the fireworks of both the London theatres and of puppetry. Richard Flecknoe, in a mid-seventeenth-century character description, describes the “Ring-leaders of the Iansenists blown up like crackers in a Puppet play” (H6r), and the effect of squibs—firing and flaming—is how Ariel describes his own “performance.” He seems to embody the acts of mechanised puppets, controlled by Prospero, and duly plays his largely material/visual part by flaming and burning. The spectacular nature of puppetry connects Ariel’s performance to the visually arresting mechanics of automata “performances” so intriguing for early modern engineers.

The allusions to and echoes of puppetry in The Tempest suggest that Prospero is both a puppet-master and a proto-engineer, two roles that overlap. “The inanimate figure as represented by the puppet or mechanical image,” Philip Butterworth explains, “is linked to the substitution, or partial substitution,
of bodies and/or their limbs” (Magic 5). As such, Ariel and his spirits become the partially-mechanised, partially-flammable “limbs” of Prospero himself. The Tempest’s interplay of human body with mechanical objects can be described in light of a French medieval and early modern theatre tradition that used inanimate figures. Laura Weigert explains that

human, sculpted, woven, or painted figures were all seen within a similar set of circumstances. The same types of temporary structures . . . were erected to contain them. . . . [I]n addition to these practical and linguistic overlaps, a conceptual parallel between static and living materials also emerges in the descriptions. Animate and inanimate figures were considered to create the same constellations of meaning or to prompt homologous experiences on the part of their audiences. Bodies of human beings and those fabricated from other materials could potentially create the same scenario. (39)

Ariel and Prospero also offer a conceptual parallel between static and living materials. The bodies of both actors merge with technological, theatrical, and scientific devices in both the language and implied stagecraft of The Tempest—acutely, here, with the exchange between puppets, mechanics, and players, but also with regard to the stage machinery discussed below.43

The convergence of Prospero’s humanity with technology, beings, and technological-beings is rooted in the theatre(s) and can be associated with the moral potential of dramatic performance. While LaGrandeur has explored how the uses of the “servant network” in The Tempest are related to Aristotelian

43 Jennifer Parker-Starbuck’s conception of “cyborg theatre”—a form of performance that integrates bodies and technologies—provides a parallel twenty-first-century framework to this early modern exchange of player, puppet, and technology. She defines the cyborg as “a cybernetic organism” comprised of part organic/living organism and part synthetic/technological material” (1). Prospero’s relationship with the island’s supernatural figures begins to look, in part, like such a synthesis; LaGrandeur argues that Prospero’s use of his servants in The Tempest is more like a “network” that bears “closer resemblance to the modern idea of a vast, networked computer system or supraorganism than they do to robots” (105); yet LaGrandeur also states that Prospero’s use of “servants” represents a form of “prosthetic apparatus that symbolizes the dangers of new thinking and scientific innovation” (105). By drawing on contemporary moral and technological anxieties, The Tempest provides “strange engineering” that approaches an early modern form of “cyborg theatre,” one “created through an intertwinements and negotiation between organic and non-organic materials, the body and technology” (Parker-Starbuck xiv).
notions of servitude and employs scare quotes around the notion of “machines” and “engines” in the play—“arguing that the island becomes a “sort of ‘engine’” (116)—there are also literal aspects to Prospero’s use of technology and literal forms of “engine” on stage. Ariel’s and Prospero’s language concerning puppetry and performance places them, perhaps obliquely, within the discursive realm of mechanics, and that realm is physically and metaphorically present within the theatre itself.

The technologies of the early modern theatre are often on display, as the second chapter of this thesis demonstrates. Such technologies play an important role in confirming the moral power of theatrical display and are tied in with metaphors and allegories of theatre and performance. It is common in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries to regard the theatre as a microcosm of the world, most famously evident in the name of the Chamberlain’s Men’s theatre, The Globe. What is also increasingly common in the period is the conception of the theatre as a ship. It is a conception that draws mechanical and practical technologies into line with the work of the theatre while offering a moral framework for performances.

“By 1611,” Douglas Bruster notes, “the trope of theatre as ship had become commonplace” (37). Bruster argues that The Tempest concerns most immediately the theatre of the Blackfriars (and its relationship with the Globe) itself:

Because The Tempest relies on elements of and working histories associated with each theater, it is important to keep both in mind. To begin with the beginning: the opening scene of The Tempest incorporates Shakespeare’s experiences of the Blackfriars playhouse, a private theater known for its elite, sometimes pretentious clientele. The confusion of authority and division of labor on the deck of the ship respond to what it must have been like to work as an actor on the Blackfriars’ stage. (37)

Further, there are numerous references, Bruster points out, to the theatre-as-ship in plays and prologues of the period, from Jonson’s Every Man in His Humour to the conflation of clapping and rope-pulling in the Prologue of Robert Daborne’s A Christian Turned Turk (1610): “Our Ship’s aflote, we feare nor
rockes nor sands, / Knowing we are inviron’d with your helping hands” (A4r).
“The metaphor,” for Bruster, “is in every way a natural one” (37), because

Playhouses are like ships in many ways. Both are wooden structures packed with people. Both are sites of labor where work is usually concentrated and frantic. Both rely on intensive cooperation: ships and their sailors’ hands; actors and their audiences’ hand-clapping—and, in a common trope, windy shouts of acclaim. . . . In early modern London, people took boats to playhouses—the Blackfriars as well as the Globe. (37)

These similarities, I argue, are compounded by the demands of place and imagination required by the more extravagant plays put on at the theatres—those vast travels in time and space scorned by the likes of Philip Sidney and Ben Jonson:

Now you shall have three Ladies walke to gather flowers, and then we must believe the stage to be a garden. By and by we heare newes of shipwrack in the same place, then we are too blame if we accept it not for a Rock. (Sidney H4r-v)

While Sidney considers unconvincing effects to belittle the force of storms, those storms nevertheless hold important narrative and symbolic power. Thomas Heywood laments in 1 The Fair Maid of the West that “Our stage so lamely can expresse a Sea, / That we are forst by Chorus to discourse / What should have beene in action” (H3r), and precisely that discoursing occurs in his earlier play, The Four Prentises: “Imagine now yee see the aire made thicke / With stormy tempests . . .” (C1r). Such feats of the imagination demand that the audience draw parallels between the practical work of the theatre and the fictional playworld—those associations between clapping and sailors’ hands, wind and shouts identified by Bruster. By combining the material realities of the playhouse with the imagination, the technological basis of spectacle is proven to be “strange” in the early modern sense mapped out in the previous chapter: it blurs the boundaries between abstract and physical representation.
Stage tempests—in their conceptual and their technological respects—also encourage metaphorical associations with the imagery of moral philosophy, because stage storms are both visceral and allegorical. While the “global” model of theatre has its own moral connotations—with the “heavens” providing a framework, literal and metaphorical, for ethical appeal and deus ex machina intervention—imagery of ships, shipwreck, and navigation are also crucial aspects of early modern moral philosophy. Their moral symbolism maps onto the work of dramatic display, making the theatre a symbol of admonition and exploration from the didactic to the provocative.

Theatrical experience is often conceived of in moral-tempestuous terms, by comparing the narrative structure of the play with perilous navigation. Roger Ascham’s influential *Scholemaster* describes the achievement of nobility in exactly these terms:

> But Nobilitie, gouerned by learning and wisedome, is in deede, most like a faire shippe, hauyng tide and winde at will, under the reule of a skilfull master: whan contrarie wise, a shippe, carried, yea with the heist tide & greatest winde, lacking a skilfull master, most commonlie, doth either, sinck it selfe upon sandes, or breake it selfe upon rockes. And euen so, how manie haue bene, either, drowned in vaine pleasure, or ouerwhelmed by stout wilfulnesse, the histories of England be able to affourde ouer many examples unto us.” (G1r)

Ascham characterises the common use of this metaphor in moral philosophy, most notably its resonances of stoical steadfastness in the face of violent storms, keeping one’s passions under rule much like the captain of a ship keeps the tide and wind under control. On the other hand, those unable to govern themselves through learning and wisdom are metaphorically overrun by the force of the tempest, sunk, beached, or broken.

This allegorical model is common throughout the period and appears in a variety of different texts. John Aubrey describes Francis Bacon’s garden as having “curious pictures,” including an emblematic image of a ship and a representation of Tiphys, the helmsman of the Argo in Virgil’s *Aeneid* (82); indeed, something approaching that emblem is to be found on the frontispiece
to Bacon’s *Advancement of Learning* in the first English translation of 1640. More traditional metaphors for the moral life of man also use this imagery, with William Perkins likening the world to an ocean: “Now, we all are as passengers, the worlde is an huge sea through which we must passe: our shippe is the conscience of euery man” (*A discourse of conscience* L7r). Naturally, emblem books adopt the image, too; Peacham’s collection, *Minerva Britanna* (1612), roughly contemporaneous to *The Tempest*, uses the image of a tempest to liken man’s constancy to a rock and mutable opinion to a ship in peril, “Whose Pilot’s Pride, & Steeresman Vaine Desire, / Those flames Hot Passions, & the World the sea” (Z1r):

> Fig. 18. “Nec igne” from Peacham’s *Minerva Britanna* (London, 1612; Z1r). STC 19511.

These commonplace metaphors suggest that audiences literate in either moral philosophy or basic moral iconography might read the opening of *The Tempest* both literally and metaphorically; even before the backstories of the shipwrecked passengers are told, it can be gleaned that they are in some
considerable moral as well as physical distress. The opening scene of The Tempest ties together the conception of a storm as a moral metaphor with the theatrical space itself—a space often likened to ship and that shares some nautical practical details. Playgoing is imagined as a material and a metaphorical experience—a “strange” event—in which a play’s metaphorical moral framework joins with the ship-like technologies of the playhouse. Those technologies are an essential part of The Tempest’s “strange spectacle.”

Playworld, theatre, and ship in The Tempest

Unlike, for instance, Shakespeare’s earlier storm in Pericles, the “accident most strange” or the meteorological events of The Tempest are presented less as divine creations than as the effect of human craft and technological ingenuity—both fictionally, through Prospero, and literally, in the effects of the theatre.  The opening storm brings, remarkably, the ladder tackles and canvas climbers that feature verbally in Pericles onto the playhouse stage. Andrew Gurr notes that “there are no real precedents anywhere in earlier plays for mounting a storm complete with shipwreck on stage” (“The Tempest’s Tempest” 95). The audacity of representing shipwreck is bold and innovative: “Mercy on us. / We split, we split, Farewell my wife, and children, / Farewell brother: we split, we split, we split” (A1r). Both Gurr and Raphael Lyne argue that the intentional literal-mindedness of this scene makes more powerful the revelation that it is all dramatic illusion, provided when Prospero owns up to conjuring the storm and when the shipwrecked arrive on land dry (in marked contrast to their entrance “wet” in the first scene). Yet that “illusion” is essentially a very real form of engineering brilliance—a theatricality constructed within the playing venue. The construction of the tempest brings theatrical illusion and reality closer together, because the “unreal” tempest is in fact the demonstration of real playhouse technologies.

The opening scene of The Tempest blurs the lines between the playworld and the theatre by mirroring the technologies used in both—

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44 The cumulative feel of the weather in Pericles is one of heavenly design, from the thunderbolt that strikes down the incestuous king Antiochus (“a fire from heauen”) to the play’s summation in Gower’s epilogue: “Vertue preser[v]ed from fell destructions blast, / Lead on by heauen, and crown’d at last” (I4r). Choric interventions implore audiences to “imagine” a ship, but, unlike The Tempest, there is little explicit technological representation.
especially ropes. Eva Griffith notes, when considering the technologies of the
Red Bull playhouse, that “land-bound sailors found employment at theatres
because of their expertise in pulling ropes” (105). The pulleys and
requirements of the early modern theatre liken it further, and more literally, to a
ship to the degree that familiarity with one meant a certain familiarity with the
other. Not only is there a “structural analogy between stage and deck, balcony
and mast, tiring house and cabin” (McInnis 118), but ropes were also seen, on
occasion, on stage, especially in fights at sea. “It appears to have been
normal,” Stern observes, “to bring a rope or, more usually, a rope-ladder on
stage” (“This Wide and Universal Theatre” 27). Gurr ponders this question
with regard to The Tempest and concludes that, due to the multiple exits and
entrances, the size of the Blackfriars stage, the difficulty of removing ropes after
the scene, and the limits of cast numbers, it is unlikely that the rope
pulling would have been visible in the play’s opening scene: “All the hauling, therefore,
must have happened offshore” (“The Tempest’s Tempest” 97). Yet it is also
quite possible that some form of descent machinery is present throughout the
performance. It makes at least one, possibly two, appearances—certainly
when “Iuno descends” during the marriage masque (B1v) and arguably, if
following Clifford Davidson’s claim, “the aid of a flying machine” is “elsewhere
used in the play by Ariel” when he enters “like a Harpey” (B1v) (13). This would
answer Gurr’s unease about where the ropes would go if they were present on
stage (without visibly ridiculous removal for the scene immediately following),
because they would already be part of the stage machinery and could
presumably be hoisted up to wherever they were fixed. Gurr suggests that “The
ropes could not be hauled up silently into the music room without someone first
releasing them and making such a public and all-too-visible readjustment look
silly” (97), but presumably the machinations of stage effects in these later
scenes would in that case be visible too, making it a moot point. One might
also ask why ropes should be hauled “silently” at all.

Winching machinery could be both practical and aesthetic technology for
The Tempest. The presence of flying machinery in the theatres and in which
particular theatres remains a debated subject; David Mann argues that Juno’s
entrance suggests a walk-on from the stairs and claims that there is no proof of
flying in theatres in Shakespeare plays (or more generally in any outdoor
theatres at all up to 1613), including Cymbeline, whose descending entrances
could derive from court performances. The Blackfriars requires such technology, not only for *The Tempest*, arguably designed for that particular theatre, but also to transfer the other spectacular descents in plays like *Cymbeline*. Given the range of mechanical demands, there seems no reason why even a small theatre might not be equipped with flying machinery.  

A parallel moment of staging to *The Tempest* suggests that ropes in moments of spectacle were both visible and audible. In 1613, two years after *The Tempest* was first performed, Thomas Campion’s *Masque of Squires* was presented at Somerset House. The agent of Savoy, who attended the masque, wrote back to Spain unimpressed at the visible and audible mechanics of the stage effects:

> In the cloud there were twelve niches all in a group, where the twelve masquers sat, and when it came down one could see the ropes that supported it and hear the pulleys or rather wheels, making the same noise as when they raise or lower the mast of a ship. (trans. Orrell 304)

*The Tempest* requires similar machinery and other forms of spectacular rope- and-pulleys constructions. While Campion’s masque was constructed by a Florentine engineer in Inigo Jones’s absence, whatever his failings he had considerable money and materials at his disposal with which to furnish the masque. A theatre operated on a much tighter budget than a lavish private masque—especially in a space that had to accommodate numerous other plays. Although different levitation machinery is employed in court and masquing spectacles (i.e. post-and-beam levitation devices, as opposed to the “dangling” descents of the former—see Demaray 90), *Squires* demonstrates that even in this ostensibly more sophisticated effect the construction of the display shows through. It is possible, perhaps likely, that the sounds and sights of the theatre’s arguably more rudimentary machinery would likewise have been advertised to an audience.

Even if no ropes were visible, the sounds of ropes “making the same noise as when they raise or lower the mast of a ship” could accompany the

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45 See Stern (“This wide . . .” 19); Davidson (“Masque” 13); McMullan (Shakespeare 98), and Ichikawa (“Continuities” 80) for support, and Chapter Five of this thesis for outdoor descents.
opening scene in *The Tempest*—part of the “confused noyse within,” perhaps, or the taking in of the topsail. Gurr and Gwilym Jones argue that storm scenes are largely dependent upon sound rather than sight on the early modern stage: “The technical aids available for creating a storm amounted to little more than the offstage noises . . . . Fireworks or rosin for lightning flashes were available at the amphitheatres but unpopular at the halls because of the stink” (Gurr, “The *Tempest’s* Tempest” 95). Jones concurs that *The Tempest* displays a more subtle use of effects than in grander outdoor plays like *Julius Caesar*. He argues that “A tempestuous noise of thunder and lightning heard” at the opening of the play refers only to sound, and that lightning here, as it sometimes does in the period, signifies an aural rather than a visual effect. 46 He concludes that the opening scene “depicts a ship in a storm by using

46 I am not entirely convinced that fireworks were wholly absent from the indoor theatres, though in the opening scene of *The Tempest* the stage directions imply noise only. There are instances of indoor plays prior to the King’s Men occupation of the Blackfriars using squibs and fireworks. Ben Jonson’s *Cynthia’s Revels*, a play from 1600, refers metatheatrically at several points to the effect of fireworks on its indoor audience, gesturing to the stench it might create inside the Blackfriars:

MER. S’lid, what rare fireworks be here? flash, flash. (V1r)
MER. Peace, good squib, goe out.
CRI. And stinke, he bids you. (X1v)

Middleton’s *The Ladies’ Tragedy*, written for the Blackfriars, also contains the stage direction “On a sudden in a kind of noise like a wind, the doors clattering, the tombstone flies open, and a great light appears in the midst of the tomb” (4.4.43-45). The “great light” could, as with a recent Sam Wanamaker Playhouse production of *The Duchess of Malfi*, be candlelight, but would be considerably more impressive if it were a form of firework. Philip Butterworth’s *Theatre of Fire* (1998) also suggests a range of ways in which fireworks could be used—while not necessarily as loud and large as outdoor effects, indoor fireworks could be constructed in a number of ways (being handheld or fixed in tapers to create a variety of visual effects). The King’s College *Mundum Book* of 1552-53, for instance, shows a list of payments for gunpowder to achieve a thunder and lighting effect (to present *Hippolytus*, presumably in the hall), and money paid to a certain Thorpe “pro factura Fulminis tempore Ludorum”—“for the making of lightning at the time of the plays” (REED Cambridge 1.179-80, trans. 2.1126).

Further, it is clear that a number of plays with spectacular effects—including *The Devil’s Charter*, *Macbeth*, and the Age plays, to list only a few—were performed not only in outside theatres but at court. Masques, also performed indoors at court, also required flames, bangs, flashes, and squibs. If the court can stomach noisome sulphur in the name of spectacular entertainment, why would theatre audiences be so averse to it—especially in light of Stern’s remarks about the “smoky Blackfriars atmosphere” (“Taking Part” 45)? In this light, while indoor audiences might find the “stinke” unsavoury, it is nevertheless possible that such effects were present on the indoor stage. What would happen, otherwise, to Jove’s lightning strike in *Cymbeline* when it moves inside to the Blackfriars? As a crucial narrative and symbolic moment in the play, and combined with allusions to firework use of various kinds in indoor atmospheres, it seems highly unlikely that the lightning bolt would have been only “noise.”

In *The Tempest*, therefore, it is possible to accept Jones’s argument that the opening scene might only contain the “noise” of thunder and lightning, but there seems to be no reason why Ariel’s banquet could not have the full visual effect of thunder and lightning—something that Sturgess entertains, describing it as a moment of “Jovian judgment” (93).
nautical terminology, rather than relying on conventions of stage practice” (“Storm Effects” 41, 43). Yet Campion’s masque and the use of ropes show that nautical terminology can be complemented by the “stage practice” of the playhouse.

The work of the fictional sailors is combined with that of the stagehands, themselves possibly former sailors, and the technical nautical terms resonate within the theatre as part of its own labour.47 There is therefore no reason to see why the opening scene should necessarily be “dependent upon the language of the scene more than upon the stage effects of thunder and lightning” (Jones 45, emphasis added) in a play where artificial technologies and effects are central. The sound and exposure of ropes or any form of technical effect in the opening scene would not shatter a “realistic” illusion because the technological materials of the theatre are akin to those required by the Boatswain, the Master, and his crew. If the language of the Boatswain depends on the “absence of metaphor,” as Jones characterises it (44), then there is no reason why stage technology should interfere because it too is literal. The gap between the theatre and the fictional “ship” vanishes.

The revelation that Prospero has “engineered” this storm therefore paints him as a technologist as much as a mage, something furthered by the common critical association of Prospero with a playwright figure. Without encouraging a reading of Prospero as a form of William Shakespeare himself—a mythologising tendency critiqued by Gordon McMullan in his study of “late writing”—Prospero’s connection with the work of a playwright can certainly be extended to more practical aspects of play construction. In his character, the playworld and the theatre-world converge. Creating the storm at the opening, after all, involves not magical incantation but practical and noticeable use of technology; he is the arch-stagehand, the playwright.48 My reading of The Tempest, here, therefore goes beyond current approaches to spectacle that treat technology as a tool merged with language—what has been conceived as a “contribution” of the physical aspects of theatre to “textual” theatre (Karim-Cooper and Stern 1).

47 “Striking the topmast in heavy weather was fairly new technology in Shakespeare’s day” (Gurr, “The Tempest’s Tempest” 97), suggesting both that the play is closely aligned with the practicalities of sailing and that theatre effects might mirror the development of naval technologies as both develop throughout the Jacobean period.
48 This parallel is brought to the fore by a production like the American Shakespeare Center’s 2011 performance of The Tempest: “In a particularly effective bit of stage business, the American Shakespeare Center’s 2011 production had Prospero (James Keegan) clearing the stage of the properties associated with the ship and storm of the first scene” (Farabee 133-34).
Rather than the hierarchy implied by the term “contribution,” reading Prospero as an engineer suggests that *The Tempest* is a play in part about and of Jacobean technology.

Bruster reads the relations between characters in *The Tempest* as metaphorical representations of theatre business; “Miranda’s relation to Prospero is in part that of an idealized spectatorship to what is perhaps an equally idealized playwright” and “Ariel relates to Prospero as boy actor to adult dramatist or stage director” (44). Further, Patricia Parker’s work on the tropes of joining and joinery in *A Midsummer Night’s Dream* connects symbolic theatrical work to artisanal craft.

More literal connections with the theatre can also be established if we consider Prospero as both playwright and engineer. Playwrights use forms of technology in the construction of plays; Gurr and Keith Sturgess both believe *The Tempest* to have been purpose-written for the Blackfriars, with several scenes including the shipwreck and the harpy moment, for Sturgess, showing “Shakespeare’s confidence in the staging ability of the Blackfriars company” (80). Others, more recently, also entertain the likelihood—including Stern and Evelyn Tribble. Demaray argues, in contrast, that the play should be considered in light of Whitehall staging conventions, rather than the private theatre, because the only two known performances of the play are documented at the Masquing House. Regardless, the play was almost certainly played at the Blackfriars and was part of the King’s Men’s repertory—though the crossover between court and commercial theatrical devices are essential aspects of its stagecraft. *The Tempest*, as Demaray’s study shows, uses a number of elaborate masque-like effects that shows the influence of court spectacle technology on the construction of the play—

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49 While indoor venues similar to the Blackfriars might remain a little more “fixed,” Griffith’s study of the Red Bull does show that replacing, for instance, trapdoors on the floor or rearranging the stage bespoke for different plays could be done “at not that much extra cost” (106). Craftspeople, carpenters, or workmen were therefore integral to stage business.

50 Demaray’s argument rests on the notion that Whitehall “stage effects were far more subtle than those in the public and private theatres” (82), but this has no bearing on the more or less certain production of *The Tempest* in the Blackfriars and the Globe. While quarreling with Jowett’s and Orgel’s views on the play’s staging in a theatrical setting (as opposed to a court one), the production of the play in the court’s Masquing House does not preclude the likelihood of similar (if less sophisticated) effects in the King’s Men’s commercial settings; Demaray therefore provides little evidence to challenge the critical commonplace from Kermode to Bruster to Gurr that the Blackfriars was the venue around which *The Tempest* was designed and where its special effects could happily be realised. Although court spectacles were more lavish and possibly more visually impressive, Demaray himself concedes that a Blackfriars production could make good use of “‘dangling’ descents” at “the end of a wire or more likely a rope from a fly gallery in a roof representing the heavens” (82).
technology that the Blackfriars certainly had the capacity to exploit (see, separately, Sturgess, Davidson, and Orgel, “Introduction”).

Those capacities are part of The Tempest in numerous ways. Miranda’s recognition that the tempest was created by Prospero’s “art” is, like Ariel’s description of his flaming, saturated with theatrical terminology:

If by your Art (my deerest father) you haue
Put the wild waters in this Rote; alay them:
The skye it seems would powre down stinking pitch,
But that the Sea, mounting to th’ welkins cheeke,
Dashes the fire out . . . (A1v)

Like Ariel’s references to fireworks and puppetry, Miranda notes the stinking pitch associated with squibs and so with spectacular displays and storms on outdoor stages. Her reference to the “welkins cheeke” also gestures towards the heavens—perhaps more specifically to the ceiling of Blackfriars. While Jon Greenfield believes that, despite examples of coved ceilings, “complex ceiling shapes in surviving Jacobean examples . . generally have flat, coveless ceilings” (55), the Blackfriars building and its plays nevertheless gesture towards the theatre’s heritage as a monastery (Stern, “A Ruinous Monastery” 104); crucially, it contains a covered ceiling. Consequently, the “welkin,” “The apparent arch or vault of heaven overhead; the sky, the firmament” (Oxford English Dictionary, “Welkin” 2.a), suggests the indoor theatre’s “heavens.” The past contexts of the overhead ceiling in the Blackfriars recall the vaulted ceilings of gothic monasteries, friaries, and cathedrals still part of the English landscape—ceilings that architecturally gestured towards “heaven” by directing the gaze upwards. Such a metatheatrical reference in Miranda’s speech thereby accords with the references to the Globe and the Blackfriars later in the play (in Prospero’s renunciation speech) and closer aligns theatre technology with The Tempest’s tempest.

References to books in the play also connect Prospero to theatrical technology: “Burne but his Bookes, / He ha’s braue Vtensils (for so he calles them) / Which when he ha’s a house, hee’l decke withal” (A6v). The “braue Vtensils” could refer to magical paraphernalia, as the editors of the Norton edition suggest (3095 n.9), but they could also (and simultaneously) be a term
for the books themselves. By drawing books, either directly or indirectly, into the world of domestic or household objects, they become a part both of mathematical technology and of the theatre itself. Bruster sees the play’s interest in books as part of the “local relations of actors at the playhouses” with which Shakespeare was associated: “It is as though Caliban . . . is thinking of a cache of playbooks—a collection of oppressive works owned by an acting company and stored in their ‘house.’” Similarly, Prospero’s singular “book” is the promptbook for the particular play itself (49). These references to books being part of the playworld and the theatre at the same time also link to technological developments. The metaphorical transformation of the book into a tool, utensil, or invented object complements notions about texts prevalent in the early modern era. Neil Rhodes and Jonathan Sawday’s edited collection *The Renaissance Computer* (2000) encourages critics to think of books as though they were a technological network or system akin to modern digital systems. The means for Prospero’s knowledge—his books—are essentially technological tools themselves. Prospero’s conjuration of the storm and its descriptions, then, relate directly to theatrical practice and the technology that enables it.

“*Accident most strange*”: Moral mechanics and meteorology

Prospero’s “art” is in part, then, the creation of stage effects. Connecting with his “network” of servants-cum-puppets and “commanding” the theatre’s technologies to move, Prospero acts as a Blackfriars engineer. His technological control over the theatre/playworld subverts the traditional moral symbolism of the stage storm and places admonition and ethical confusion in the hands of his technologies. The opening storm of *The Tempest*—the play’s foremost “strange accident,” reveals that both shipwreck and safety lie in Prospero’s machines.

Indeed, if magic and technology are closely associated and confused in the early modern period, then critics who have sought to find traces of the great Elizabethan mage John Dee in Prospero should also detect a significant degree of skill in nautical engineering. William Sherman’s study of Dee seeks to re-position him, in contrast to Yates’s “magical” figure, as a complicated but important figure for a variety of “disciplines”:
By equipping himself with a humanistic education in the recovery and analysis of textual information, by pursuing all practical (and most speculative) knowledge, by assembling his country’s largest and most valuable library and museum, and by developing a wide range of courtly and commercial contacts, Dee fulfilled a powerful and challenging role. Setting himself up in what was perhaps the first English think tank, he acted as a retailer of special (often secret) knowledge, an ‘intelligencer’ in the broadest sense. (xiii)

If “the European courts of the late Renaissance fostered hybrid roles, which drew on skills from the arts and the sciences, and favoured at once the polymath and the pragmatist” (25), Dee’s role in engineering and nautical technology must be rescued from, or married to, his (critical and early modern) reputation as a conjuror.

Dee’s “Mathematicall Preface” extols the virtue of mechanics, in all its forms practical and theoretical. He particularly singles out a number of “necessary Mechanicall Artes”: “Namely, Howsing, Fortification, and Naupegie. . . .” The latter, the building of ships, shows how issues of practical craft are related to things of wider importance. It is linked, in the following paragraph, with “The Arte of Nauigation,” which

demonstrateth how, by the shortest good way, by the aptest Direction, & in the shortest time, a sufficient Ship, between any two places . . . assigned: may be conducted: and in all stormes, & natural disturbances chauncying, how, to use the best possible meanes, whereby to recouer the place first assigned. (D4v)

Prospero’s abilities are thereby associated with magicians like Dee, who have a practical, mechanical interest in nautical matters. Like Drebbel’s perpetual motion device, contemporaneous with the play, which contains a glass “representing the Sea, which water riseth and falleth, as doth the floud, and ebbe, twice in 24 houres” (I2v), any associations with Dee also link Prospero’s magic with the practical knowledge to master the sea and sky.

Dee himself displayed a convergence of mathematical precision with theatrical display when he staged Pax at Trinity College in 1546,
with the performance of the Scarabeus his flying up to Jupiter’s palace, with a man and his basket of victuals on her back: whereat was great wondering, and many vaine reports spread abroad of the meanes how that was effected. (“The compendious rehearsal” 5-6)

In a text designed to dispel vicious rumours of his necromancy, Dee’s autobiography connects such a theatrical performance with his pursuits in other areas, mathematical and mechanical. While flying deities might be less wondered at in the Jacobean theatres than in 1546 Cambridge, Dee’s insistence throughout all of his works that such displays and performances are rooted in practical areas of engineering and mathematics supports the notion that his aims were practical and pragmatic rather than spiritual—or “magical” in the twenty-first-century sense. It also connects the earlier type of “techno-mage” represented by Dee with Prospero through their interest in performance and effects, even if Prospero’s storm wears its “meanes” on its sleeve in the opening scene.

Such technological and technical ingenuity by both figures brings mechanics onto the stage and so suggests its power both within and without the playworld. A few pages earlier than his discussion of navigation in the “Mathematicall Preface,” Dee uses the term “Menadrie” to explain

how, aboue Nature’s vertue and power simple: Vertue and force may be multiplied: and so, to direct, to lift, to pull to, and to put or cast from, any multiplied or simple, determined Vertue, Waight or Force: naturally, not, so, directible or moueable. (D1r)

For Wolfe, the concept “characterizes mechanical power as auxiliary and compensatory in that it enables the triumph of the weak over the strong” (9). Mechanics provides opportunities to govern nature. That is precisely what Prospero’s stage mechanics achieve in The Tempest; the convergence of the playworld with the theatre allows audiences to see precisely—and threateningly literally—how practical craft might control natural forces. Prospero’s is a tour de force of mechanics before it is illusion or magic.
If the opening of the play shows how mechanics can control nature, the symbolism of stage storms links it to the manipulation of human nature, too. Dee’s multiplication and manipulation of “Vertue and force” relates to mathematical qualities, but “vertue’s” dual meaning in relation to mechanics is explored in *The Tempest*, where Prospero’s engineering controls the sea storm but also brings moral fear and the promise of redemption to those whose ship he has both wrecked and, in Dee’s terms, “recovered.” His technology combines “Vertue and force” in mathematical and moral senses.

The storm is unique chiefly in the sense that it is an engineered storm and not a providential, external, natural, or divine creation. In *The Tempest*, traditionally providential events are placed in human hands. Lyne acknowledges that “the goddesses in *The Tempest* are, extraordinarily, there to fill up time—taking the sense of slight extraneousness found around the classical gods in the other romances a stage further” (48). Elsewhere in the play, the force of human virtue and technology over ostensibly natural or divine events compounds that “extraneousness.” The storm, chiefly, calls into question traditional interpretations of meteorological events by suggesting that, in the same way as Dee or Drebbel, human beings might be able to manipulate weather and perform extraordinary feats of navigation, without divine assistance.

Such manipulation of meteorology has symbolic importance, too, connecting the “force” of mechanics with the “virtue” of morality. If storms are a moral trope in both the moral philosophy and the drama of the period, they are also signs of divine warning in popular print. In 1615, John Taylor, the water poet, describes a tempest much like the one that opens Shakespeare’s play, with the Boatswain calling to “lower, the top-saile” (B2r) and the sea instantly reverting to calm, but the poem is suffused with the imagery of classical gods and the escape from danger is put down to “Heaun’s fauour” (B3r). Likewise, pamphlet writers see storms as legible warnings from God—building on the moral associations with the storm discussed above to suggest a divine source for freak weather.

Prospero’s “strange accident” draws on these providential storms. A 1607 pamphlet, *More strange newes*, addresses the unusual amount of flooding across England that year, as well as considering tempests at sea and the
fortunes and miseries they bring. The author explains the dual nature of meteorological occurrences:

Albeit that these swellings up, and ouerflowings of waters proceede from naturall causes, yet are they the very diseases and monstrous byrths of nature, sent into the world to terrifie it, and to put it in mind, that the great God (who holdeth storms in the prison of the Clouds at his pleasure, and can enlarge them to breede disorder on the Earth, when hee growes angry) can aswell now drowne all mankind as hee did at the first. (B2v)

The revelation that Prospero engineered the storm in *The Tempest*, then, charges man with divine capabilities and theatrical engineering takes on the moral charge associated with providential storms. The rest of this chapter concentrates on the “Vertue and force” of mechanics, which become a capacity for “moral engineering” in the play’s “strangest” moments. If the storm represents a tendency in the “late plays” to displace divine power and promote human action (Lyne 47), Prospero is the supreme example of this demythologising. More acute than the storm—and more explicit in its moral functions—is Ariel’s harpy scene, which transfers supernatural power to a form of “strange” pseudo-technology.

**Mechanising moral admonition in Ariel’s harpy**

The harpy scene has been examined in previous chapters as a form of moral reformation and an example of moral strangeness. Here, those aspects are associated with the technologies surrounding *The Tempest* and used within its performance, which like “strangeness” associate the spectacles of theatre with both moral power and with scepticism.

The second chapter introduced the “machine books” popular in the early modern period and influential in stagecraft and in masque design. Not only do machine books express an interest in the visual staging of knowledge that associates them with anatomical textbooks, they are also linked to the

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51 Strachey’s account, *A True Reportory*, and other new world expeditions also look to God as the cause of meteorological affliction. More broadly, other pamphlets also espouse a similarly providential explanation—see the list given in the previous chapter.
materialisation of morality. They link the mechanics of technological production with abstract ideas through their symbolic imagery and both tease at and then withhold full comprehension of their workings—characteristics, following the previous chapter, that mark such mechanics as conceptually “strange.”

Jacques Besson’s *Théâtre des instruments mathematiques et mechaniques* (1569), for instance, presents a series of mechanical devices that are explained to be useful for labour, and in the 1578 edition (it first appeared in 1569) the items are lengthily glossed at the beginning with a description of their mathematical design and physical construction by François Béroalde de Verville. The figures of illustration, however, contain a degree of visual symbolism that complicates, or enriches, the sober mechanical explanations of the introduction. Importantly, Knoespel explains that “[w]hile Beroald’s description provides remarkably detailed measurements for thinking about the engine, it does not supply knowledge sufficient for its construction” (107). The descriptions and the illustrations, therefore, are not instructive diagrams—and any similarities they share with Reginald Scot’s deconstruction of beheading, discussed in the second chapter, seem to dissolve here, as the machines in Besson’s theatre teasingly suggest ways towards their mechanical assembly while never being helpfully explicit. Rather, they are closer to emblematic drawings, and Knoespel notes that the illustrations “invite us to view these machines as visual puzzles” (105).

Sawday’s comparison of machine-illustrations with anatomy textbooks is a helpful parallel. One can go further than Sawday, who claims that they copied anatomical texts’ keying systems and “opened up a world of *interior* mechanical invention which was analogous to the interior world which the magnificent Vesalian and post-Vesalian books of anatomy laid before their wealthy readers” (“*Forms . . .*” 178). Crucially, Besson’s images also contain visual echoes that charge the illustrations with moral and spiritual concerns. In Vesalius’s *De Humani Corporis Fabrica* (1543), sketches of the human body appear in Christ-like suffering, as grotesques of earlier religious suffering paintings.
Fig. 19. Plate 7 of Book 7 in *De Humani corporis fabrica* . . . (Basle, 1543; Q5v [190]).

The form and parts of man are often stretched out across a backdrop of nature to monstrous sizes, associating the images with hieroglyphical (and hence emblematic) representation. Like hieroglyphs—and like their counterparts in
emblem books—Vesalius’s oversized organs and inflated corpses appear as signs that might reveal the hidden truths of the natural and spiritual worlds. William W.E. Slights remarks that in these anatomical drawings, “moral and aesthetic concerns intersect with technical matters such as perspective, proportion, and surface textures” (40). Besson’s machines approach a similar intersection of moral and aesthetic with mechanical and mathematical representation:

Fig. 20. Wheelbarrow from *Theatre des Instrumens Mathematiques & Mechaniques* . . . (Lyon, 1579; plate 15).
Like Vesalius’s anatomies, the new wheelbarrow—with which one man can carry a burden that otherwise requires two to three men—is presented whole and in proportion in the foreground, but its skeletal figure is also stretched over the horizon like the hand of god.

Fig. 21. “Hic . . .” from Peacham’s *Minerva Britanna* (London 1612; C4r). STC 19511.

Fig. 22. “Quae plantui irrigabo” from Peacham’s *Minerva Britanna* (London, 1612; D2r). STC 19511.
In echoing emblem images that distort the relation of symbolic figures to nature, in refusing to reveal the precise method of mechanical construction, and in linking back to the morally-charged images of anatomy textbooks, machine images suggest that their technologies are symbolically a part of the natural world. They are therefore connected with the moral truths that lie behind nature and that can be read through it—in much the same way as emblems interpret that natural world as a book of signs. These machines offer to reveal something about the world, and as such beg both physical and moral deconstruction.

Machine images inhabit equally the two meanings of “device” laid out in the second chapter: they are technological engines and symbolic representations. It is telling that Guillaume La Perrière’s emblem book *Le Théâtre des bons engins* is translated into English in the 1590s as *The Theater of Fine Devices* (and again in 1614—for the existence of a 1590s translation, see Daly, “Case”). The original French title seems to imitate machine-books like Besson’s (crucially titled *Théâtre des instruments*) and indeed Hollyband’s 1593 French-English dictionary gives only the meanings “an engine or instrument” for the entry “engin.” The translation “device,” though, also maintains both the mechanical-material and the moral meanings for the term. It is clear that technology and moral images are closely connected, and again these texts reveal that any distinction between materials and morality seems to collapse with the terms “engine” and “device.”

These machines are important in the harpy scene in *The Tempest* and draw the illusion of the playworld and the material realities of spectacle close together. The descent machinery likely used in Blackfriars (or court) performance contributes to the presence of mechanics on the stage—especially if, following the account of Campion’s masque, such mechanics audibly and visibly place pulleys and ropes before the audience and mimic the sound of seafaring technology. Furthermore, the harpy, and the stage spectacle with which it is associated, is connected to the Jacobean interest in mechanised birds and artificial flight. Roger Bacon’s technological dream considers flying birds as part of its world of futuristic, practical inventions. More detailed is Agostino Ramelli’s popular machine book, *Diverse e Artificiose Machine* (1588), which presents mechanical birds sat atop a statue.
Ramelli explains that the water moving through the pipes pushes air to the birds’ mouths, causing them to “sing” with different sounds; he also states that “les oyseaux se meuuent quand ils seignent leurs chants” “the birds move when they start bleeding their songs” (Cc1v). The beak is made in such a way that it moves when the birds sing, and they appear as though alive (Cc2r).

Most significant, perhaps, is a manuscript plan of proposed inventions by Henry Reginald, held in the British Library. The early seventeenth-century
manuscript (c.1603) sets out a number of inventions (though without specific details of their construction and closer to Bacon’s technological fantasy than Ramelli’s half-plans) for the distribution of information; they are mechanical, as the reference to mathematics on the title makes clear, terming it a “mathematicall invention for briefe speedie and secrete Intelligence, without messenger or Letters sent” (f.154). Reginald describes in Latin that “Nuncius Volucris, quae, novae facultatis novitatem sapere videatur” ‘A flying messenger will be seen, with a taste of its new powers’ (MS 4403 f.154). In a separate manuscript dedicated to King James, in presentation copy and dated 1603, Reginald lists six inventions, one of which will be useful “In matters of great mome[nt] and Causes of expedit[i]on” to return “secure and most swift answer”—and “in ten times more speedie ma[n]ner, then by the flying of any Feathered fowle” (MS 4384 f.72a). Read together, the two “inventions” attest to the late-Elizabethan and Jacobean interest in mechanising avian abilities through technology. Both prototypes are “messengers” that are able to transmit important and secret messages with a built-in security system. Although Reginald’s plans are unlikely to have been realised, they do show that technology is closely connected with politics and court communication and display a belief that the “powers” of mechanical flight can supersede those of nature.

This form of mechanical flight interrupts The Tempest at one of its most critical moments. Ariel, a spirit who is closely associated with images of flight throughout the play, enters the stage “like a Harpey” and “claps his wings upon the Table, and with a quient deuice the Banquet vanishes” (B1r). In a recent essay, Peter Holland contrasts this moment with the “realism” of the opening scene, claiming that it is “undeniably seen as a moment of the supernatural” (186-87). Rather, this spectacular event continues the merging of playworld and stage technology introduced at the play’s outset. Rather than appearing as an illusionistic mythological monster, Ariel is part of a world of mechanical technology.

He acts in the scene as one of Prospero’s messengers, approaching precisely the kind of “Nuncius Volucris” “invented” by Reginald; “a grace it had deouering / Of my Instruction,” Prospero praises Ariel, “hast thou nothing bated / In what thou had’st to say” (B1r). Performing his role as a flying messenger, albeit a particularly spectacular and fearful one, Ariel is again associated with
mechanical imagery. Just as elsewhere in the play his “performances” come close to both stage technologies (flaming amazement) and automata or puppets, the “figure of this Harpie” that he has “perform’d,” as Prospero puts it, is also described in terms of engineering:

Me thought the billowes spoke, and told me of it,
The windes did sing it to me: and the Thunder
(That deepe and dreadfull Organ-Pipe) pronounc’d
The name of Prosper . . . .

In his response to Ariel’s moral admonition and call to reformation, Alonso conflates the spirit’s voice with the elements. Crucially, the “Organ-Pipe” also associates Ariel’s speech with mechanised song—perhaps indicating the tone of the play’s “strange music.” “[O]rgans and sufflators,” Wolfe explains, create “an uncannily anthropomorphic effect” and serve to “blur the precarious distinction between human and mechanical instrumentality”:

‘Organ’ can denote the instrument of the human voice, as in the ‘shrill pipes’ of Shakespeare’s Viola, but it can also denote the mechanical imitation of natural human speech. As Raymond Williams has illustrated, the terms ‘organic’ and ‘organicall’ carry a spectrum of meanings during the Renaissance which includes their own opposites: ‘organicall’ can signify a natural sound or physical structure, but it can alternatively signify the reproduction of that sound or structure by means of mechanical artifice. (114)

The dual meaning is clearly intended in The Tempest. Its use, though, in a scene that relies heavily on stagecraft—from the banquet’s quaint device to Ariel’s entrance to the imitation of thunder—puts the whole of Ariel’s performance within the world of engineered mechanisms. As in the opening of the play, which channels the auditory effects of theatre technology (like the

52 See Gurr (Shakespearean Stage 176) and Dessen (Recovering 261 n.1) for the staging possibilities of the table; Gurr suggests “a kind of reversible table-top with dishes fastened to one surface and the other bare” and Dessen links the scene to the manuscript play of the 1630s, The Wasp, in which appears the stage direction “The table turns and such things appear” (176; 261 n.1). Sturgess argues for a more rudimentary sleight-of-hand, in which Ariel’s harpy wings cover the actors while they turn the table (92).
ropes and pulleys of descent machines to echo mast-raising), Ariel’s “deepe and dreadfull Organ-Pipe” does not distinguish the playworld from the theatre or create the illusion of otherworldly sound. Instead, technology is at the root of the “strange” effect of the scene, from music to mechanised tables to vanishing acts.

The previous chapter connected Ariel’s harpy scene with the moral significance of “strange” events, suggesting its material importance but linking it with moments of providential and moral import. Ariel’s mechanical performance emphasises the materiality of the scene’s moral advice; “my meaner ministers / Their seuerall kindes haue done,” Prospero declares, and states triumphantly, “my high charmes work” (B1r). Those charms are exactly the form of technological instrumentality associated with his role in the play as engineer. His ministers certainly take on the aspect of a “network,” as LaGrandeur identifies, but they also take on more literal, material forms of technology. By figuring Ariel’s “performances” and his own “natural magic” as a form of technological ingenuity, Prospero utilises “stage” mechanics to induce guilt and moral censure and extends his power beyond the human body and into his automata/puppets/harpies/flying messengers/machines. The engineer’s “high charmes” reveal, spectacularly, the ability to mechanise moral advice, admonition, and spectacle.

**Scepticism and moral mechanics**

The technological underbelly of *The Tempest*’s strange spectacles forms another facet of the play’s scepticism. While the materialisation of morality displayed in the play helps to temper scepticism, providing ready material answers for the strange occurrences on the island, it also destabilises traditional ideas about “moral signs.” In the world of *The Tempest*, technology is not merely an expression of morality; it is its arbiter. Shakespeare—through Prospero and his network of stage-hands dressed up as elves, shadows, nymphs, and spirits—presents technology, not providence, as the root of moral revelation. The play toys with the illusionary power of spectacle and suggests that what lies behind its forms of visual-moral power is material craft. In the midst of a period of social and industrial advance in and fascination with machinery, *The Tempest* shows that human engineering has the power not only to cut the messenger from messaging, to ease agricultural labour, to prompt
marvel at hydraulic decorations, and to strengthen an army through tricks of warfare, but can begin to engineer the soul, too.

“Machines are means, not ends,” Wolfe writes, and “The most inefectual or impractical machines are often more compelling to Renaissance culture than machines that ‘work’ in the modern sense of the term” (237). The technologies in *The Tempest* and Prospero’s engines are also means and their effect would largely be derived from the visibility of their mechanics. While the Agent of Savoy is not amused by the visible pulleys and ropes in Campion’s masque, he nevertheless, quite literally, considers it something to write home about—even making a forceful comparison with the masts of ships. The stage technologies of *The Tempest*, which become part of the playworld itself, likewise prompt spectators to consider the means of power and persuasion in the play. Far from being aloof, mysterious, magical forces, Prospero’s “charmes” are present, material, mechanical. Their moral efficacy is therefore placed before an audience who can ponder both the means and the ends of technological devices.

Yet the materiality of strange moral “devices” in *The Tempest* opens up philosophical questions about the roots of moral judgement and its origins and authority. After all, what the play suggests is that Prospero can manufacture miracles and mechanise his ideas of moral censure. Such issues suggest that technology is at the heart of a debate about morality, its materialisation, and sceptical concerns about worldly and spiritual knowledge.

Scepticism and science, the first chapter of this thesis shows, are concerned with physical proof, wary of metaphysical truths that have no material basis, but are equally uncertain about sensory evidence when it is available. Technology contributes to such an empirical but anxious mindset. Sawday notes that “the scientific devices that were gaining currency in the period also announced the inherent fallibility of the undisciplined or untutored senses,” with technological precision underlining the sceptical distrust of organic sensory experience. By the time Robert Hooke’s microscopes are able to focus on the minute composition of nature in the mid-seventeenth century, the material basis of the world is crucial:

For Hooke . . . the deployment of instruments, machines, and gadgets that rendered nature measurable, had become a part of
his intellectual being. His ‘refined’ speculations were to become the very essence of the mechanical philosophy. For if a phenomenon could be observed, then it could be measured, and only when it had been measured was it truly comprehensible. (Engines 221-22)

Mechanical movement—from its medieval origins onwards—brings a form of motion, construction, and action before the eyes of observers. In the Jacobean period, such forms are not wholly obscured by notions of magic or illusion; after at least half a century of printed machine books, technological displays at court, and stage machinery, the “Vertue and force” of mechanics is visible.

The visibility, audibility, and tangibility of technological displays offer a more concrete alternative to abstract or metaphysical motion. Jacobean engines, as suggested in chapter two, parallel sceptical interests in anatomy. If the anatomist is “the sceptic par excellence” because of his pursuit of “empirical—and specifically visual—knowledge about the insides of the human frame” (Hillman 33), then the frames of machines also offer the promise of knowledge. The rejection of “blind faith” that is a hallmark of scepticism (Hillman 28) is displayed in The Tempest, where the source of freak weather or flying monsters can be visibly recognised as an adept engineer.

Any reassurance about the constructed nature of Shakespeare’s island, though, is shaken by the realisation that, thanks to technology, external or eternal influences are largely redundant. Prospero’s art reveals that strange signs traditionally taken as moral warnings or providential punishments can actually derive from the human hand, and so their messages become crafted, potentially arbitrary, forms of morality.

Sawday identifies early modern tensions between “progress” and “negativity” that accompany industrial development. The images of mechanical culture in the period are underpinned by

that great reservoir of classical myth and narrative to be found in Ovid’s Metamorphoses, in which human inventiveness is imagined as part of a history of decline. In the distant Golden Age, Ovid writes, there was no need for the arts of civilization, the skills of the miner, the blacksmith, or the ploughman . . . . But with
the coming of the ‘age of hard iron’, and with it the technological arts of mining and husbandry, the innocent pastoral world was shattered for ever. (Engines 9)

If, for some, “the presence of the machine would come to symbolize all that humanity had lost in losing Eden” (295), for others it represented an opportunity to recraft such a paradise. Dekker’s image of creating a new Eden and an ark from the craftwork of a pageant, discussed in Chapter Two, suggests that mechanics might be married to Edenic ideals. Further, in direct contrast to Ovid’s images of a nonmechanical utopia, Thomas Heywood makes Saturn’s Golden Age the dawn of technology:

Let his vertues speake for himself: he hath taught his people to sow, to plow, to reape corne, and to skorne Ake-horns with their heeles, to bake and to brue: we that were wont to drinke nothing but water, haue the brauste liquor at Court as passeth. Besides, he hath deuised a strange engine, called a Bow and Arrow, that a man may hold in hand, and kill a wilde beast a great way off, and neuer come in danger of his clutches. (The Golden Age B4r)

It is not merely “Time” that Saturn invents; in Heywood’s The Golden Age he is the source of engines and devices. In marked contrast to a history of decline, Heywood’s plays paint technology as a “vertue,” and Saturn duly enters after this panegyric, “with wedges of gold and siluer, models of ships, and buildings, bow and arrows, &c.” (B4r). Heywood is clearly very familiar with Ovid and traditional accounts of the Golden Age, yet he represents Saturn as a master engineer, capable of refining gold from “Grosser metals” and making brooks and rivers “by practise Nauigable” (B4r-v). The term “virtue,” here, also links technology with practice, drawing on moral philosophical notions about activity and practical use crucial to the early modern moral life.

The Golden Age and its sister plays are of course deeply interested in technologies of the stage, rooted in their thirst for “strange” spectacle. Yet Heywood’s Saturn also offers a contemporaneous comparison with Prospero, as a Kingly presence whose “vertues” not only speak for themselves, but act for themselves. The contemporary importance of technology is represented by
Saturn’s interest in “models of ships” and Prospero’s own control over weather and sea, and both connect to the pressing issues of navigation in the early 1610s (with new world ventures and reports being published and circulated). Yet they also demonstrate an interest in the source of power and “vertue.” Prospero appears God-like, just as Saturn is proclaimed to contain “A God-like spirit” and, as one Lord proclaims, he “is a God” (B4v). The chief reason for such deification is because “Saturnes inuentions are diuine, not humane” (B4r).

While Prospero is not deified and rather renounces his powers and returns to Milan at the close of *The Tempest*, his charms suggest to an audience that craft is indeed the source of “vertue.” Its products strike fear and repentance into the heart of Alonso, through wings, descent machines, thunder and lightning, and organ pipes. Prospero’s engineering extends Dee’s notion of “Vertue and force” and combines it with the “vertues” of Heywood’s Saturn. Such a glorification of technology celebrates the contemporary world of machinery, to be seen in the crafts of London and in the very theatres themselves. It also suggests that engineering has the “force” to destabilise traditional moral categories and craft its own “vertues.” Prospero and Saturn are both “engineers” of the early modern theatre, and their craft advertises theatre’s moral force as well as the material basis of its spectacles—both of which are prominent in the plays’ “strangest” moments.

Prospero’s strange engineering, however, opens up an extreme sceptical anxiety at the same time as it satisfies a form of scepticism. *The Tempest’s* moral messages and tropes—from the ship to the harpy—are born from material construction and so are ultimately subject to the decay and mutability that writers of the period so fear. Spenser’s Mutabilitie shows concerns about decay:

What man that sees the euer-whirling wheele
Of Change, the which all mortall things doth sway,
But that therby doth find, and plainly feele,
How MVTABILITY in them doth play
Her cruell sports . . . (Hh4r)

Likewise, Montaigne’s images of custom affect conscience and soul:
Montaigne's view of custom shows a number of signs of cultural relativity, and the creation, development, and change of “all mortall things” suggests that even aspects of the moral life are merely customary. In light of such concerns about the “soule,” Prospero’s inventions show custom-as-craft to be the governor of guilt, admonition and warning—central aspects of moral popular print; his devices are the most visibly mortal of all moral customs, because they have frame and body.

_The Tempest's_ concerns with illusion and its ephemerality are equally pertinent with regard to the moral powers of technology, especially in light of the conjunction of playworld and theatre set forth in this chapter. Prospero’s lament about the spirits melting “into Ayre, into thin Ayre” confirms the mortality of material construction:

> And like the baseless fabricke of this vision  
> The Clowd-capt Towres, the gorgeous Pallaces,  
> The solemne Temples, the great Globe it selfe,  
> Yea, all which it inherit, shall dissolue,  
> And like this insubstantiall Pageant faded  
> Leaue not a racke behinde . . . . (B2r)

Stern has pointed out that, like the widely recognised metatheatrical reference to _The Globe_, “Temples” might also refer to the Blackfriars (“A ruinous . . .” 104). Here, after the final spectacular display of the masque scene, Prospero makes a last gesture towards the material realities and technologies that underpin the play. Traditionally read as a wisp of cloud, “racke” also has connotations and echoes of “rock” and “wreck” (the latter often spelled “wrack” as in “shipwrack”); the verbal echoes alone pull the ship-theatre metaphor into a powerful statement of mutability. Whatever engineering might achieve in the realm of “Vertue” or “force,” it is a troubling indication that the “engineer’s” moral
authority is a temporary, fleeting, ephemeral thing. Like the ship at the beginning, everybody is metaphorically at sea.

The epilogue finally overthrows Prospero’s “Charmes,” but Prospero’s craft carries over into the audience. The technological realities of theatre and playworld are reduced to the custom of applause, Prospero begging the “helpe of your good hands” to set him free: playhouse and fiction combine at the very end in the audience’s manual labour. As part of the theatre’s work, the audience are consequently part of its ephemerality. They will, like the whole vision itself, dissolve and “Leaue not a racke behinde.”
5. Making Rhetoric Matter: Rhetorical Strangeness in *Cymbeline* and *The White Devil*

How strange these words sound?
--- *The White Devil* (F4r)

Strangeness is at the heart of the crossover between the theatre’s material and poetic registers. This chapter explores the term’s relevance to rhetoric while focussing on two “strange” plays that exemplify the early Jacobean interest in merging verbal and material construction: Shakespeare’s *Cymbeline* and John Webster’s *The White Devil*. Both of these plays evoke the term “strange” repeatedly, *Cymbeline* second only in occurrences in Shakespeare’s corpus to *The Tempest*. They share, likewise, an interest in rhetorical construction that, I argue, is at the root of their mentions of “strangeness”—both plays also demonstrate repeated interest in the term “matter,” which is at the root both of technological display and rhetorical construction. As such, these two plays (both current in 1611-12), while different in plot and ostensibly different in tone (though see below for their shared generic features), both cultivate a rhetorical strangeness. That verbal style is, for both Shakespeare and Webster, integral to the plays’ visual representation: in moments like dumb shows or tableau-like stage-effects, strange rhetorical invention plays a reciprocal role in cultivating visual, moral, and narrative uncertainty.

Webster’s play is marked by outbursts of “strangeness”—from the “strange tongue” (E2v) of the law court to the simple outburst by Francisco, “strange!” (F1r)—as if the term itself were enough to mark Vittoria’s testimony as morally dubious. Flamineo’s distracted ramblings are “strange,” his intrusion on the court a “strange encounter,” and he a “strange creature” (F4r). The term features in the rest of the play to mark morally questionable action. Francisco describes the “strange doctrine”\(^\text{53}\) of Monticelso’s “Black Book” of murderers (G1v), moments before a visitation of Isabella’s ghost—a moment that essentially manifests “strange doctrine” on stage. Shakespeare’s play shares Webster’s strangeness, and at three key moments characters remark of the

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\(^{53}\) See the discussion of “strange divinity” in Chapter Three for the religious connotations of this description.
action, “It’s strange” (Cloten’s death, aaa6v) and “‘Tis strange” (Posthumus’s absence and Pisanio’s being “perplexed,” bbb2r, and Posthumus’s remarks about death following his capture by the Britons, bbb3r). The term is also invoked to describe the play’s “strange chance” and the “strangely” turning vicissitudes of fortune (bbb3r, bbb2v).

In these strange plays of the late 1600s and early 1610s, rhetorical devices are transformed into stage devices. This chapter brings together the different aspects of this thesis by addressing the moral effects that attend a conjunction of verbal, visual, and material media in theatrical spectacle. I employ a critical approach that combines historically-minded close reading with recent critical attitudes towards spectacle, by reading rhetorical style as part of the visual and material world of the playhouse. As noted above, recent work in early modern theatre studies has made some broad gestures to the way in which poetic and verbal effects are linked with the practical theatrical work of the playhouse (Bruster; Jones; Stern; Karim-Cooper). Rhetoric and rhetorical style have also been subject to renewed scholarly interest, with increasing attention to the formal features of verse, style, and expression (Richard Meek; Russ McDonald; Christopher Pye; Mark Robson). Little has been done to date, however, to explore the direct connection between staged spectacle and the features and effects of early modern rhetoric. This chapter seeks to remedy that critical division by showing the explicit relationship between formal rhetorical devices and material stage devices, as well as exploring the broader cultural relationship between rhetoric and material display, and the moral significance of that relationship in early modern England. These issues are at the fore in Cymbeline and The White Devil—two plays where tricks and tics of rhetoric are at the heart of the playworlds’ crises of moral judgement and visual certainty.

By giving verbal models a physical form—through the staging of a thunderbolt or the incorporation of chiaroscuro into both language and dramaturgy—“strange” drama underlines recent claims that there is “no binary between the materiality of theatre and the emotional, metaphorical and poetic registers of the plays themselves” (Karim-Cooper and Stern 3). The previous chapter noted that such recent treatments of spectacle describe a “contribution” made by “physical theatre” to “textual theatre” (1), but I argue in this chapter that it is in fact a reciprocal exchange, where rhetoric is integral to stage display
and where visual occurrences and spectacle also infuse verbal style. That exchange is rooted in questions of morality, and as such this chapter continues above chapters’ merging of materially-orientated theatre history with cultural and intellectual history and contemporary philosophical questions. The materialisation of verbal effects in the theatre reflects and comments upon contemporary moral anxieties surrounding rhetoric and indicates a broader evolution of the concept in the early seventeenth century. This chapter thereby explores further the materialisation of morality introduced in Chapter Two, but it examines the way the stage materialises moral anxieties rather than moral axioms.

Through what I term “rhetorical strangeness”—a deliberate contortion, confusion, and suspension of certainty that mirrors the “strange” material effects of stage devices—Shakespeare and Webster push the traditional, Elizabethan model of rhetoric to its limits. Francisco remarks in Webster’s play, “How strange these words sound” (F4r), and the comment can be taken to refer to the style of the play’s prose and verse as well as its narrative arc. Rhetorical strangeness pervades Shakespeare’s late style and Webster’s drama and is in line with contemporary conceptions of rhetorical construction that desire “strange” effects. Shakespeare’s late style is, as is widely noted, “audacious, irregular, ostentatious, playful, and difficult” (McDonald 1). Webster is likewise interested in working uncertainty into the verbal texture of his plays. Critics have noted the “sharp modulations of language” that characterise his writing, in which “The frontier between prose and verse is rapidly crossed and recrossed” (Berry 27). Shakespeare’s late style and Webster’s famously contorted verse offer a useful comparison through which to approach the connected rhetorical and moral uncertainties of the period.

The 1600s and the 1610s are marked by a move away from “tragedy” as the fashionable genre and into a variety of forms, not least the popular tragicomedy. It is perhaps in the light of the experimental dramatic forms developing in the period that “strangeness” becomes an important factor in the theatre’s visual and verbal construction. Indeed, the intertextual references, linguistic self-awareness, and dramatic structure in an ostensible tragedy like The White Devil have led critics to note its parallels with the more popular tragicomic form of its day:
The White Devil expands and tests a tragic structure by adding elements we might associate with tragicomedy: clashing tones, ironic repetition, ambiguity of characterization, theatrical self-consciousness, and a critical treatment of the rhetoric it uses. (Pearson 71)

It is the latter that forms the basis of this chapter and that provides clear similarities to Cymbeline. Critics have long recognised the “likeness . . . to Shakespeare’s romances” in Webster’s style, with E. E. Stoll noting the “tendencies lyrical, spectacular, and symbolical” that resonate with Shakespeare’s “late style” (105-06). Both visually and tonally, I suggest, The White Devil offers parallels with Cymbeline.

The verbal-visual character of both plays is reflected in their interest in formal oratory and in the way in which truth is derived from rhetorical construction. Webster’s concern with legal rhetoric stems from his residence at the Inns of Court and is reflected in the elaborate court scene in The White Devil and in the play’s wider probing of appearance, truth, and the troublingly transformative power of language. Shakespeare’s Cymbeline is also concerned with matters of evidence, persuasion, and proof, from the second-hand information that underpins most of the play’s action to the explicitly “legal” language of the wager scenes. Their forensic nature prompts Subha Mukherji to address both plays’ image-making language and relationship with “things.”

Explicit interest in the narrative and persuasive power of rhetoric is complemented by Cymbeline’s and The White Devil’s self-awareness and artificiality, which encourage audiences and readers to reflect on the language of playworld and theatre. Shakespeare and Webster repeatedly refer to “matter”—a charged term that itself holds both physical and abstract meanings simultaneously. The word’s force throughout the plays draws attention to the nature of formal oratory, where “matter” is an important term, and also to the material spectacles that characterise both plays: as with The Tempest, dramatic “constructedness” brings to the fore the theatre’s technological as well as its verbal contrivances.

This chapter concentrates on the spectacular murder scenes and the appearance of Isabella’s ghost in The White Devil and on Giacamo’s evidence and Jupiter’s entrance in Cymbeline. These scenes all advertise their own constructedness through elaborate stage technology, archaic conventions, and
formal rhetorical speech. They also demonstrate how speech can be given material form, through the crossover between verbal and visual “invention,” through dramatising emblems, and through literalising the metaphors used to describe rhetorical tropes. The “strange” manner of that materialisation adds to the plays’ senses of moral uncertainty, doubt, and confusion.

*Cymbeline* is variously dated from between 1609-10, though it is clear that the play was performed at the Globe in 1611, when Simon Forman records the plot in his diary. *The White Devil* was first performed the following year at the Red Bull. Reading *Cymbeline’s* and *The White Devil’s* rhetorical interests alongside the implied stagecraft of their early performances reveals the intimate relationship between the language and technologies of theatre (as well as the affinities between different playhouses and companies) and suggests how that relationship is rooted in contemporary developments regarding morality and materialisation.

**Amazed with matter**

Both plays alert readers and audiences to their self-conscious concern with verbal construction by the repetition of the term “matter.” This section explores the material and verbal significance of “matter” in early modern England and in the two plays specifically. The following section then moves onto the wider moral status of rhetorical ornamentation and its role in early modern England, in order to provide the contextual backdrop for my discussion of rhetorical strangeness.

Stylised or ornamental language is a hallmark of early modern rhetoric, which depends upon “matter” for the subject of discourse. Matter features in both *Cymbeline* and *The White Devil*—and it features both explicitly, by verbal reference, as well as implicitly, by allusion, echo, and association. The term draws in both rhetoric and early modern “science” from technology to anatomy. Chiefly, it signifies “an event, circumstance, fact, question, state or course of things” (OED, 1.a)—something that can broadly be extended to remarks, current throughout all early modern English discourses, along the lines of “what’s the matter?” (*The White Devil* B2v). The term is a major demonstration of the plays’ acknowledged artifice, which places explicit emphasis on the rhetorical construction of the playworlds and their narrative fragilities.

Critics often observe that both *Cymbeline* and *The White Devil* are theatrically self-conscious. The conventions of repetition and saturation of
contrived symbolism in Shakespeare’s romance has been noted by critics as diverse as Leah S. Marcus, Raphael Lyne, and Anne Barton. Jacqueline Pearson makes similar observations of Webster’s play:

An important part of the play’s undermining of tragedy lies in its deliberate theatrical consciousness. It is very rich in play-quotations, theatrical allusions, and images of stage and performance. ‘Plot’, ‘act’ and ‘auditory’, ‘part’, ‘revels’, ‘tragedy’ and ‘tragic’, are used repeatedly to remind us of the fictional nature of what we are watching. (Pearson 71)

What has been less discussed, however, is the way in which rhetorical terms function as a form of theatrical consciousness in both Cymbeline and The White Devil, and the way in which rhetorical self-awareness feeds into the plays’ concerns about veracity, visual representation, and language.

Five times in Cymbeline, a character asks, “what’s the matter?” In one instance, the wording is simply, “The matter?” (bbb1r). Indeed, the question appears in the fifth line of the play (in the Folio), part of the exposition in which two gentlemen discuss Imogen’s engagement. Here and throughout, “matter” indicates the play’s narrative and rhetorical substance. From the very opening, rhetorical construction underpins the structure of the play, because “matter” signifies an important stage in classical oratory. Loosely, it is synonymous with the “subject” about which one speaks, as when George Puttenham talks of the “matter or subiect of Poesie” (E1v). For Thomas Wilson, the author of the most popular English manual of rhetoric in the early modern period, matter is any form of subject that enters into the discourse at hand; more precisely, the most useful matter is what should be sourced. This sourcing of relevant material is the first stage of classical rhetoric—and here Wilson borrows from his ancient forbears Quintilian, Cicero, and the anonymous and influential author of the ad Herennium. His list of the five key stages of oratory is as follows:

i. Inuencion of matter.
ii. Dispocisicion of the same.
iii. Elocucion.
iv. Memorie.
As such, the diagrammatic structure presented here and elsewhere in rhetorical manuals places “matter” at the heart of all rhetorical construction. Wilson states that the “finding out of apte matter” is also called “Invention,” which is a “searchyng out of thynges true, or thynges likely, the whiche maie reasonably sette furth a matter, and make it appere probable” (A3v). Gathering pertinent “material” on a subject forms the building blocks—the invention—of rhetorical construction.

Wilson’s definition of “invention” as the “finding out of apte matter” hovers over the first scene’s use of the word, making the term of crucial importance to the playworld’s action—both the audience and characters await the “matter” of the play. It is therefore also of crucial importance to the nature and status of the fiction itself, where probability and improbability, likeliness and uncertainty are paramount, and in this light Shakespeare’s constant reference to the building blocks of rhetoric indicates a self-conscious recognition of Cymbeline’s artifice, engaging with the essence of “truth” and moral certainty that arise from early modern Europe’s fascination with rhetorical ornament. Just as The Tempest refers audiences and readers to the world of the theatre itself, through its combination of the terms of theatre practice with the language of the fictional world, so the repetitions of “matter” advertise the rhetorical “constructedness” of Cymbeline and alert audiences to its various elaborate “inventions”—mechanical, rhetorical, theatrical.

The conjunction of theatre and playworld is evident in King Cymbeline’s own interest in the term. When he declares himself to be “amazed with matter” (bbb2r), Cymbeline refers both to the updates about the war just delivered to him but he also speaks for the audience, which has seen material horrors in the preceding scenes—not least with a the decapitation of the semi-royal Cloten, the Queen’s son. Cymbeline is an oddly quiet character in his eponymous play, featuring most significantly as an auditor and “audience” (as well, like the audience, as judge or jury) in the extended recognition scene at the close, and as such his alienation from the action and his alarmed attempts to make sense of the “matter” present him as a spectator in his own play. In the final scene, Cymbeline’s urgency to “Come to the matter” and his surprise, “New matter still” (bbb4v, bbb5r), emphasise the court(room) overtones of the play’s anagnorisis;
the drama’s “evidence” and “proof”—as well as its plot—is re-presented to a stage that is a King’s court but is also, momentarily, a courtroom. Cymbeline’s references to the term transform the “matter” of the play’s preceding action into the “matter” of legal rhetoric and blur the distinctions between the verbal and the material world.

Matter’s capacity to signify both verbal and material significance is suggested by the wider connotations of the term. The rhetorical conception of “matter” draws on Aristotelian definitions, which are widely understood throughout the medieval and early modern periods. For Aristotle and his numerous followers, syncretisers, and borrowers, “matter” forms the building blocks of physical objects in the world, just as it forms the building blocks of an oration in rhetoric. “Substance”—the primary, most basic state of physical existence—is the jointure of “matter” with “form.” An analogy: matter is the Plasticene; the “form” is the mould (i.e., of a house): when combined, they generate the substance of a house.54

Aristotelian “matter,” then, is physical—by its very etymological association, it is “material.” The verbal or mental meanings of the term to the rhetorician Wilson are effectively “material” metaphors; although more hidden, they bear the traces of the early modern and medieval predilection for conceptualising the abstract in terms of the physical world, seen in the practical visualisation of memory as a house or a theatre.

The combination of matter with physical craft is also seen in feats of technology in the Jacobean period. Cornelius Drebbel’s perpetual motion machine, discussed in the previous chapter of this thesis, is described in Thomas Tymme’s pamphlet, *A Dialogue Philosophicall* (1612). The dialogue concerns how motion is derived from matter and form, and Drebbel’s creation of his machine is described in terms of the manipulation of matter:

> *Cornelius*, by his practise in the vntwining of the Elements . . . extracted a fierie spirit, out of the mineral matter, ioyning the same with his proper Aire, which excluded in the Axeltree, being hollow, carrieth the wheeles, making a continual rotation or reuolution . . . . (I3v)

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54 Like Plasticene, Aristotelian matter is endlessly recycled into various different substances by combining with different forms.
In Tymme’s dialogue, matter combines the metaphor of the “workman”—a God-like creature who can mould essentials and elements—with its literal, mundane, workaday meaning: one who creates and crafts objects. Mineral matter is linked with wheels and axles, and the notion of “matter” as a building block is literalised.

In creating his perpetual motion machine, Drebbel brings an alternative meaning to the “invention of matter.” Wilson’s rhetorical notion of true or likely “thinges” is, in Tymme’s pamphlet, composed of physical, external “things.” Even the term “invention” has its associations with mechanical technology, with titles along the lines of William Bourne’s *Inuentions or deuises* (1590) and, later in the century, John Evelyn’s library collection devoting a category to “inventions Mechanic, Trades, Work, Vasal &c.” (Evelyn Papers).

Francisco draws on these double physical and rhetorical meanings of “matter” in *The White Devil*:

> One summer she will beare unsauory fruite.  
> And ere next spring wither both branch and roote.  
> The act of bloud let passe, onely descend,  
> To matter of incontinence. (F1r)

He means that the court should address Vittoria’s sexual “incontinence,” but the disjunction between his sententious message, emblematic in its imagery and rhyming couplet, and the formal presentation of new legal “matter” suggests a more literal meaning, too—“matter” as physical flesh. Vittoria’s response, “I decerne poison, / Under your guilded pills,” only underlines the wordplay over the term “matter”—it alludes to medical or physical issues as well as preoccupations of the courtroom.

The physical associations of “matter” are extended in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries when it begins to find currency not only in terms of scholastic philosophy but also as part of anatomical discourse. Crooke describes the body as being “made of sublunary and elementary matter”—a condition that he claims enables sensory knowledge (B3v). Indeed, corporeality itself is described throughout his anatomical work as a condition of “matter”:
> “For the matter of mans body, it is soft, pliable and temperate, readie to follow the Workeman in euery thing, and to euery purpose . . .” (B3r). While matter
clearly retains its Aristotelian connotations, it begins to signify by itself an “object” or corporeal “thing” in the physical world. The familiar metaphor of the workman suggests God’s own moulding of matter and his creation of substances, but it also associates the term with craft and with flesh and physicality.

Indeed, Francisco’s lines, “The act of bloud let passe,” contain the echo of bloodletting, a common medical practice, but they also foreshadow the following line’s jibe about “passing” and sexual promiscuity. “Incontinence” means, in this context, the inability to control bodily appetite. When he urges the courtroom to “descend, / To matter of incontinence,” then, Francisco infers that Vittoria herself is that matter. His oration effectively “invents” her as “incontinence” incarnate, echoing anatomical and moral as well as legal discourse. It is a rhetorical practice of “invention” that abounds throughout the play, repeated with the image of devil, sin, and whore. Francisco’s conflation of the legal subject (of incontinence) with human subject (Vittoria) suggests that abstract rhetorical language can also have material significance.

In the early 1610s, then, “matter” (and, indeed, “invention”) has both rhetorical and physical associations. Cymbeline and The White Devil exploit the concept of matter by inventing, transforming, and literalising it. Both plays depend on and experiment with rhetoric, using “matter” as a means of demonstrating their artifice. Matter is at the root of early modern culture’s discussions about rhetoric in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, particularly concerning the worrying power of extreme rhetorical artifice and its moral effects.

Morality and rhetoric

The rhetorical self-consciousness that characterises Cymbeline and The White Devil reflects a wider acknowledgement of the artifice of rhetorical construction and its power. One can detect in Shakespeare’s and Webster’s continual references to the polysemous term “matter” a reflection of contemporaneous writing on verbal construction.

Rhetoric is of supreme importance to literate sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Englishmen and Englishwomen; it is taught early in school and underpins almost all forms of verbal construction, from debates in the law courts
to dramatic dialogue and structure. The development of ornamental rhetoric from the sixteenth century begins to suggest that both language and man are pliable. Rhetorical instruction is embedded in secondary and university curricula. Quentin Skinner has explored the impact of rhetoric on education and its ongoing presence in early modern culture in Reason and Rhetoric (1996), which provides a comprehensive introduction to its place and problems in early modern England, as does Peter Mack’s thorough Elizabethan Rhetoric (2002).

From a young age, when beginning to learn more advanced Latin texts, students are invited to engage with rhetorical forms of influence. They learn to speak in utramque partem—that is, arguing on both sides of a controversial argument. Such practices open up the possibility early on in education that a subject has two sides, which can both be convincingly put forward. Students also learn moral philosophy after acquiring skills of rhetoric, and the two were closely connected. The association of moral precepts and sentences (Sententiae pueriles) is especially important in rhetorical instruction and in the ultimate end of practical rhetorical use (in statecraft, reading, writing, and so forth), where they can be advantageously deployed and manipulated (see Mack, Elizabethan 11-12). “They were told that virtues were important values of morality,” Markku Peltonen explains, but “at the same time . . . schoolmasters inculcated virtues as a significant part of rhetoric and rhetorical persuasion.” The result is that moral virtues become an exercise in expression, and are seen as “not so much intrinsic values of morality as instrumental values of rhetoric” (“Virtues” 159). In this light, moral concepts early on in education become subject to a form of possible relativism, in which successful rhetorical persuasion begins to be closely tied to the ideas of virtue.

Cicero’s Topica, for instance, was a particularly popular textbook throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in England. Cicero claims elsewhere, in the de Oratoria, that “orators are bound to possess the intelligence, capacity and skill to speak both pro and contra on topics of virtue, duty, equity and good, moral worth and utility, honour and disgrace, reward and punishment, and like matters” (qtd. Reinhardt 11). Consequently, the Topica itself, which teaches the rhetorical practice of argumentation, presents a “grid of

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55 Lorna Hutson, Subha Mukherji, and Quentin Skinner, amongst others, have all shown the importance of legal and formal rhetoric to early modern playwrights. This is discussed beneath in relation to The White Devil.

56 On the text’s role in teaching dialectic at Oxford and Cambridge, see Mack (55).
conceptual ‘viewpoints,’ as it were, each offering a different perspective upon the matter at hand” (Altman 50). Indeed, the basis of classical rhetorical oratory, Cicero explains, is to move away from particular persons and instances to “a discussion of a general issue” termed “thesis,” which requires an argument that attends to both sides of “the question ‘What was the nature of the act?’ by the principles of right and wrong” (qtd. Reinhard 4). Rhetorical argumentation therefore involves itself with at the very least debating, and so potentially opening up disagreements over, questions of right and wrong.

Such a method of rhetorical invention and argumentation is designed not only to help improve rhetorical skill but to find out the truth of the matter at hand. The approach is exemplified in the early seventeenth century by Bacon’s “new learning” in *The Advancement of Learning* (1605), where he encourages the use of “Antitheta,” that is “Theses argued, pro & contra, wherein men may be more large & laborious” (Rr4v). In the extended Latin version of the text, *De Augmentis Scientiarum*, he also encourages the topics to be “exaggerated both ways with the utmost force of the wit, and urged unfairly, as it were, and quite beyond the truth” (qtd. in Altman 41). The list that follows, an “Antitheses of Things,” is a series of “fors” and “againsts” for major themes including “fortune,” “nobility,” “beauty,” and so forth. Altman has noted that “[many] of these appear in identical form in the *Essays*,” which suggests that those essays are themselves “active, ongoing ponderings, rather than digested presentations” (41). By extending Ciceronian pro and contra into matters “civill and morall,” Bacon’s *Advancement* and his essays attempt to balance opposites in order better to determine a truth, and indeed the essays demand perpetual questioning rather than any certain judgement. In this sense, they represent a practical application of Cicero’s rhetorical technique, but they also leave moral topics at the “general” level firmly in doubt and up for debate.

In remaining partial rather than whole, Bacon’s antitheta also threaten to be partial in another sense; on the preceding page in the 1605 *Advancement*, he claims that persuasive rhetoric should “differ according to the Auditors,” going so far as to suggest that the same topic should be spoken of in different

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57 Cicero, Quintilian, and other classical rhetorical instructors all stress that an orator should be a good man, with his character providing virtue to his oratory. Bacon too echoes this sentiment (see below). There is regardless, though, the implication that matters of virtue can be disagreed upon, and that the way of truth and justice is unclear and must be mediated by contrived forms of language.
ways depending on the listener; he therefore questions whether such a practice should come under the heading of “Policie” rather than rhetoric (Rr4r). The term “policy” is morally complex, and Bacon uses it in many complex ways in his writing (as he does with Machiavelli, too), but it is nevertheless often associated from the 1580s with perceived Machiavellian behaviour, “cunning, and altogether amoral conduct based on expediency, deceitfulness—especially after the massacre of St Bartholomew” (Rubinstein 54). Although Bacon is writing in the 1600s, the term retains its currency (as Ennis Rees shows with regard to Chapman’s Jacobean plays). For and against argumentation therefore lends rhetorical practices not only to the possibility of opening up debates over moral issues, but, for Bacon, it also makes possible the manipulation of those issues depending on one’s audience—something that approaches, even if in practice it never quite attained it, a form of “politic” relativism.

Wilson’s *The Arte of Rhetorique* (1553), true to its sources in Quintilian, Cicero, and the unattributed *Rhetorica Ad Herennium*, also encourages making speeches “appere probable” (A2v). Barbara Shapiro explains that “probability in the rhetorical context did not refer to particular pieces of evidence in the modern sense but rather to the likelihood, verisimilitude, and persuasiveness of the general account of the case presented to the decision-maker” (55). As such, it is necessarily removed from external and physical fact. Cicero’s *De inventione* suggests that an orator should, in deliberative rhetoric, “ground his case on either honesty or utility, or on both” (Peltonen, “Virtues”164). The option to link rhetorical expression to moral virtues therefore arises. Yet one could equally choose *utilitas* as a motivation, making rhetoric a tool rather than a means of expressing moral truth. This concern over rhetoric as a useful craft rather than a noble art is something that begins to be more explicitly discussed in rhetoricians’ approach to truth-twisting figures. The idea of rhetoric as a “tool” is also linked to the notions of “artificial” or “inartificial” proofs. The former are the persuasiveness, probability, and circumstantial factors related to the matter at hand (arguments and strategies of rhetoric). The latter are the more concrete aspects of proof (testimony,

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58 Machiavelli does not warrant full exploration in the context of this chapter, but it is worth noting that his “politics” are also closely associated with forms of rhetorical presentation and argumentation (see Skinner, *Reason* 170-72).
documents, etc.) (see Eden 13). Aristotle and classical rhetoricians privilege artificial proofs over inartificial proofs. In purely oratorical terms, it is consequently rhetorical style and effectiveness that become of primary importance. It is the skill of rhetorical *elocutio*—the “appliyng of apte words and sentences to the matter, founde out to confirme the cause” (Wilson A3r)—that is also essential in influencing the judgement of truth or falsehood, virtue or vice.

Although Wilson stresses that all five elements of rhetoric are necessary and none is to be considered more important, Gérard Genette observes that the concentration of such rhetorical texts upon “figures” rather than on a more “general” application develops from the early medieval period, “because the rhetoric of the *trivium*, crushed between grammar and dialectic, soon came to be confined to the study of *elocution*, the ornaments of discourse, *colores rhetorici*” (“Rhetoric Restrained” 104). These two aspects—the privileging of artificial proof and the emphasis on ornamental rhetoric—inevitably create a divide between truth and oration. The purpose of rhetoric is not to convey moral truth but rather, in Wilson’s words, to “make our sayinges appere lykely, and probable . . . & frame our inuencion accordyng as we shal thynke them most willyng to allowe it, that haue the hearyng of it” (P3r). Indeed, the suggestion that matter need not be “true” but simply “likely,” repeated throughout *The Arte of Rhetorique*, problematises the meaning of “knowledge,” which need not be objectively “known” but rather rhetorically convincing.

That confusion over “knowledge” is compounded when Wilson admits that “the knowlege of a Metaphore, shall bryng men to muche knowledge” (S2v). His verbal obfuscation suggests that rhetorical elocution is associated in some way with moral truth; “knowledge” itself is inextricable from rhetorical ornament. Webster expresses precisely such a concern through Flamineo’s final speech and the figure or trope of “mist”:

> I doe not looke
> Who went before, nor who shall follow mee;
> Noe, at my selfe I will begin and end.
> "While we looked vp to heauen wee confound
> "Knowledge with knowledge. ô I am in a mist. (M2r)
Mist represents both a psychological and a physical struggle with death, but the punning in the speech adds to the confusion over moral and visual knowledge, not least in the various meanings of “look.” In the final throes of life, Flamineo visualises the purgatorial “mist” of near-death—a literal image—but that vision is also what Milton would later call “the common gloss / Of theologians” (5.435-36)—the “mist” that surrounds “spiritual or physical matters” (OED “Mist” n.2). The duality is continued in the two uses of “knowledge,” which are visually and aurally identical while intimating a difference between material and abstract understanding. Webster’s verse and its characteristic incorporation of quotations precisely parallels Wilson’s use of “knowledge” in his rhetorical treatise, where he associates material “truth” with rhetorical ornament. Considering that the period held conversation to be “the beginning and end of all knowledge” (Guazzo, D6r), ornaments of expression come to be substituted for facts. If legal and moral proof rests on rhetorical exercise, avenues of subjective dissent and disagreement open up. Those possibilities generate concerns that rhetoric could make wrong of right and right of wrong. While it is linked to negotium and the similar drive in educational treatises towards the vita activa, rhetoric is also at risk of relativising concepts of duty (see chapter one). Rhetorical speech begins to take on an almost supernatural power, with indications that words themselves can be forces of creation. Henry Peacham, in his exploration of rhetoric, The Garden of Eloquence (1577), claims that an orator with amplified rhetoric has the power to “draw the minds of his hearers whether he will, and wynde them into what affection he list . . . . The Oratoure . . eyther breaketh all in peeces, like a thunderbolt, or else by little and little, like the flowing water, creepeth into the minds of his hearers . . . .” (N2v). Peacham’s God-like imagery indicates the potency with which rhetorical persuasion and eloquence are regarded. Skinner identifies the association of this powerful persuasion with concerns about a Machiavellian approach to truth and virtue: “the good orator is . . . seen as someone who seeks so far as possible to teach the truth, but who seeks at the same time by every possible means to impel or persuade us to accept it . . . . The art of rhetoric stands in an equivocal

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59 Amplification is defined as “a certain affirmation very great & weighty, which by large & plentifull speech, moueth the minds of the hearers, & maketh them to beleuee that which is said” (Peacham, Garden N2r). Skinner identifies a wider trend in the use of the term by early modern rhetoricians, noting that it can be used “to cover the whole process of arousing the emotions by way of stretching the truth . . . .” (Reason 136).
relationship with the truth” (Reason 102-03). Despite claims that echo Bacon’s optimism—that ornamentation is more apt to furnish truth than falsehood—concerns about the potential deceptiveness of ornamental or amplified rhetorical speech abound in early modern England.

Peacham, despite his praise for amplification, argues that some figures are able to reclothe virtues as vices and vice versa. At the root of this concern was the figure of *paradiastole*, or rhetorical redescription:

> . . . it is when by a mannerly interpretation, we doe excuse our own vices, or other mens whom we doe defend, by calling them vertues . . . This figure is used, when vices are excused. (Garden, N4v)

Although Peacham’s definition presupposes the existence of vices and virtues, merely renamed by rhetoric, rhetoric opens the possibility of making vice acceptable. George Puttenham offers a more favourable definition in *The Arte of English Poesie* (1589), in which he describes *paradiastole* as the “moderation of words” that “tend to flattery, or soothing, or excusing.” He colloquially names it the *Curry-fauell*, “as when we make the best of a bad thing, or turne a signification to the more plausible sense: as to call an vnthrift, a liberall Gentleman.” Nevertheless, the figure retains the possibility of “moderating and abating the force of matter by craft” (X3v). The perversion of “matter” by artifice indicates the power of rhetorical redescription to bend “truth.” It also conflates physical and verbal terms, inferring that “matters” occurring or that have occurred in the physical world might be manipulated by language.

Writers and dramatists lament the link between ornamental language and moral obscurity in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. Montaigne, for instance, reels against the vanity of words and their ability to assault “our judgement; and to bastardize and corrupt the essence of things” (“Of the vanitie of Wordes” P5r). In the play *Lingua*, Lingua himself claims that “delightful speeches” and “sweet perswasions” (A4v) earn him the right to be accounted a sense, and he explains how he deceives the senses with “sugred words, to delude Gustus taste”:

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60 See Skinner (Reason 165) for the meanings and origins of this phrase.
And oft embellisht my entreatiue phrase
With smelling flowres of vernant Rhetorique
Limming and flashing it with various dyes
To draw proud Visus to me by the eyes. (A4v)

By attacking each sense and its weakness for linguistic embellishment, Lingua exploits concerns about the association of rhetoric with imagination and impression. Attacking the senses’ weaknesses in those areas, the play exposes how easy it is for language to exploit affection and passion through rhetorical amplification, or “sugaring” and rephrasing. If redescription has the ability to make us see facts in “a different moral light” (Skinner 145) then the possibility of endless contradictions, disagreements, and paradoxes (beloved in the period) arises.61

**Rhetorical Strangeness**

Strangeness serves as a talisman for the contemporary concerns about rhetorical power discussed above. It also materialises abstract moral concerns about rhetoric by combining the various meanings of “matter” and drawing on the connotations of the concept “strange” already explored in previous chapters of this thesis.

The “matter” that is at the root of contemporary concerns about rhetoric combines with ornamentation in *Cymbeline* and *The White Devil*, where Shakespeare and Webster push the notion of Elizabethan rhetoric to its limits through “rhetorical strangeness.” By extending and exaggerating the elements that form the Elizabethan concept of “rhetorical” composition and exploiting the room for redescription, amplification, and ornamentation, both playwrights infuse the very style of the plays with some of the anxieties over truth and certainty that plague early modern rhetoric.

Employing recognisable legal rhetoric, *Cymbeline*’s Giacamo attempts to convince Posthumus that his wife has been unfaithful by providing a legal-oratorical list of artificial “proofs.” That rhetorical delivery is later in the play

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61 Casuistry is sometimes associated with this trend, although its significance is chiefly religious; for a discussion of its relationship to scepticism and to Machiavelli, see Condren (*Argument* 174-225). Rosemary Colie and Peter G. Platt have written on “paradox” and its mark on Renaissance rhetoric and culture.
criticised by Pisanio, who exclaims of Posthumus, “O Master, what a strange infection / Is falne into thy eare!” (Aaa2v-Aaa3r). The exclamation could equally well characterise the whole play’s versification, style, and syntax—a marker of Shakespeare’s “late style.” The late plays generate worlds of epistemic anxiety, balanced between certainty and uncertainty, understanding and confusion; as such, the drama presents a number of moral complexities that are rooted in Shakespeare’s language.

Numerous critics have identified what Frank Kermode calls “a new rhetoric” (16), which challenges detailed comprehension but retains a haunting, lyrical power to convey meaning and music in even the most opaque and oblique manner. Indeed, as Kermode notes, “Sometimes it takes the poet beyond the limits of reason and intelligibility” (16). While “late style” ultimately fails to unite these plays as a group, as Gordon McMullan has shown (Shakespeare and the Idea of Late Writing, see esp. 104-26), “strange style” provides a framework that foregrounds wider theatrical and cultural contexts than, say, genre, author, or “lateness” and accommodates the multiplicities and difficulties of the language. Certainly, “late Shakespeare” contains various rich challenges, largely due to its key features, which are detailed by Russ McDonald and are worth quoting in full:

Ellipsis exerts a constant pressure on the sound and sense as the poet concentrates expression, omitting phonemic and verbal units that in an earlier phase of composition he would have retained. Connectives between clauses are sometimes removed, creating the effect of asyndeton: the words and phrases that remain make the verse sound unusually ‘distilled.’ Syntax becomes convoluted, often confusingly so, and even though word order in early modern English is much less standardized than it has since become, the number of deformed phrases, directional shifts, and intricately constructed sentences is exceptional for the period and exceptional for Shakespeare. Related to this grammatical complexity is the dependence on parenthesis, what one critic refers to as ‘parenthomania, the alarming outbreak of brackets.’ Repetition of various units—letters, words, phrases, rhythms—becomes more prominent and sometimes almost
obsessive, patterning heard clearly in the incantatory doublings in *Macbeth* and resounding most audibly in the extraordinary echoing effects of *The Tempest*. Blank verse, usually a guarantor of order and regularity, is now aggressively irregular, encompassing enjambments, light or weak endings, frequent stops or shifts of direction, and other threats to the integrity of the line. Metaphors tend to be introduced and often succeeded rapidly by others, not articulated at length. Finally governing all these technical features is a pervasive self-consciousness, an artist’s playful delight in calling attention to his own virtuosity. (33)

Critics and editors have long realised these challenges, with Kermode and Anne Barton, in their respective editions of *The Tempest*, acknowledging the play’s “remarkably intense” language: “Over and over again, the verse achieves an uncanny eloquence by way of what it omits or pares away” and through “the brusque juxtaposition of two words neither of which appears to modify or to be syntactically dependent upon the other in any normal sense” (Barton, “Introduction” 13, 14). Despite the numerous critical considerations of Shakespeare’s *Tempest*-uous verse, Kiernan Ryan—though not writing from an historicising or contextualising angle—insists that a neglect of the peculiar rhetorical style of late Shakespeare still bars a full understanding of its working and effects, something of consequence to all critical approaches to the plays:

it is to the deliberate detail of the language and form that we must look, if the late plays are to be released from both the retrospection of old and new historicism and the abstractions of the allegorists. For it is by dislocating the dramatic narrative and contorting conventional poetic discourse that Shakespearean romance articulates its alienation from its own age and its commerce with futurity. What makes these plays still strike us as enigmatic and elusive is neither their engrossment in recondite topical allusions nor their veiled subscription to the perennial mysteries of myth and religion. It is the fact that we have not yet mastered their formal grammar and poetic idiom, and so have not yet learned how to read them. (18)
I make no claims in this chapter to mastering that formal grammar, but I suggest that the contortion of “poetic discourse” is part of a contrived effort to effect and enhance the aural, visual, and moral “strangeness” associated with the world of the romances. Shakespeare’s verse is an extraordinary achievement of paradox and juxtaposition, in form and effect—it is both sceptical and magical, it both conveys and confuses.\(^62\)

McDonald’s analysis of the “patterns and fractals” in these plays convincingly demonstrates that “they signify or function as carriers of meaning” (29). He notes that Shakespearean rhetoric in the romances often follows the pattern of the romance mode itself, with its “managed complexity” generating “a feeling of pleasurable uncertainty,” eliciting anxiety and then security through the sentence structures as well as the plot structures. The effect is to make one aware of the contrived language, and to appreciate that the “matter” of rhetoric is not hidden or elided but is conspicuously present. Indeed, one can turn to the closing of Cymbeline to support this notion of strange syntax validating and mirroring the strange occurrences in the fiction, with its disjunctive happy-ever-after ending. Jupiter tells Posthumus,

> Whom best I loue, I crosse; to make my guift
> 
> The more delay’d, delighted. (bbb3v)

Serving as an exquisite definition of Jacobean tragicomedy itself, Jupiter’s lines omit connectives, muddy the syntax, and repeatedly delay meaning itself until the second half of each phrase, after the caesura (I crosse, delighted). The association of poetic devices or deliberate verbal artifice with wider thematic or narrative purpose can be taken further by the association of “delight” with early modern literary theory—not least in Philip Sidney’s Defense of Poesie (1595),

\(^62\) The features of paradox are deemed “strange” by early modern theorists of rhetoric; Henry Peacham describes paradox as “a forme of speech” used when something is “so strange, so great, or so wonderful, that it may appeare to be incredible . . . . This figure is then to be used, when the thing which is to be taught is new, straunge, incredible, and repugnant to the opinion of the hearer” (Q4v). John Florio’s A Worlde of Wordes (1598) echoes Peacham’s definition, as Peter G. Platt recognises (Shakespeare and the Culture of Paradox 19), when he describes the Italian paradosso as “a marvellous, wonderfull and strange thinge to heare” (Y3r). Indeed, Platt’s survey of early modern English definitions of “paradoxy” frequently turns up “strangenesse” as a description, cause, and effect of the trope. The trope itself, like an extreme form of strangeness, can cause a reader to “become ineffectually—perilously—lost in doubt” (Platt, Shakespeare 12).
where it is used to marry pleasure to practical instruction. Jupiter’s words serve in miniature as an emblem of the play’s own delaying of meaning, clarity, and delight and reflect contemporary considerations of rhetoric and its effects on or obfuscation of moral “truth.”

McDonald argues that a recognition of such correspondences “between minute grammatical particulars and broad organizational principles helps to show how style makes meaning” (40). Accordingly, such “strangeness” in the verse of Cymbeline connects with strangeness elsewhere in the play; Cymbeline contains numerous references to the term, second only in Shakespeare’s corpus to The Tempest. The “more delay’d, delighted” remark is preceded and foreshadowed by the Lord’s comment earlier in the scene about the “rediscovery” of the King’s sons: “This was strange chance” (bbb3r). Both the “chances” of the play’s action and the sound of its speech are marked by a “strangeness” that complicates straightforward providential, moral, or generic interpretations. The idiosyncratic style also prompts a reflection on and studied consideration of language in the play, adding to the self-consciousness that underlines the playworld’s “matter.”

Webster’s writing shares similarities with Shakespeare’s in wearing its rhetorical techniques on its sleeve. Ralph Berry remarks on the way in which “the movement of Webster’s language . . . constantly forces the listener to readjust, to experience more intensely, in a word to involve himself in it.” The “frequency, variety, and abruptness” of his “transitions” from one mode to another, from verse to prose, and from full line lengths to stunted expression contribute to a particularly idiosyncratic style (29). Leah S. Marcus observes that, “if Webster’s verse often sounds like prose, his prose is often almost indistinguishable from verse” (“Introduction” 83). Even the “literary” effect of the Quarto does not prevent Webster’s “strangeness” from entering the page. Marta Straznicky notes the “literary” qualities of “every” Red-Bull-performed play that is printed in quarto: “In addition to continuous printing, features that signal an awareness of drama as a literary genre include author attribution, Latin on the titlepage, a dedicatory or other prefatory epistle, a list of speakers or dramatis personae, and regular division into acts” (148-49). The White Devil Quarto accordingly seeks to make lines fully “poetic” through continuous printing: ensuring that the full ten syllables, on average, fit into a single line (and
therefore lines are arranged so that different characters’ speeches run into each other).

Yet there remain moments in which such “tidying” of Webster’s verse does not stick:

LOD. In taffeta lininges; that’s gentile melancholie,
Sleepe all day.  FLA. Yes: and like your melancholike hare
Feed after midnight.
Wee are obserued: see how yon couple greue.
LOD. What a strange creature is a laughing foole,
As if man were created to no vse
But onely to shew his teeth. . . . ( F4r)

Flamineo speaks often in prose, aside from occasional poetic meditations and
sententious couplets, yet here, in the middle of his own speech, a line of five
syllables is given preference and a new line begun. This choice is not a space-
saving measure, as the page contains stage directions that are placed on the
same line as verse, where they are elsewhere given a line to themselves.63
The strange flow of the metre in Flamineo’s exchange with Lodowick, where
one line reaches eleven syllables (in confused metrical arrangement) and the
following is stunted at five, therefore strikes in print as well as in performance,
where what Berry terms the “modulations” of Webster’s language are of course
audible.

Puttenham actually argues that strangeness can infuse the “sound” of
speech, as it would do in the theatre. He links the term to metre and sound
(both in feet and in line length), remarking that

by diuersitie of placing and situation of your measures and
concerds, a short with a long, and by narrow or wide distances, or
thicker or thinner bestowing of them your proportions differ, and

63 Marcus, in a recent edition of The Duchess of Malfi, detects authorial intervention in the
printing of Webster’s Quartos (where a ditty in a revised issue of Malfi is explicitly said not to be
by “the Author”) (73-78). Although this does not conclusively prove any involvement in the
printing process, it does show that Webster was in dialogue with the printers of his work. The
Quarto of The White Devil is printed over ten years earlier than Malfi, but the impulse to ensure
poetic “quality” is present in the paratextual material, suggesting that Webster may have had an
enduring interest in the presentation of his work in print.
breedeth a variable and strange harmonie not onely in the eare, 
but also in the conceit of them that heare it. (M1v)

The sound or “harmonie” of language is, according to Puttenham’s influential, foundational text of English prosody (see Hardison Jr.) made “strange” through the variation of line length or metre. The sound of verse is enough to suggest a meaning, separate to its content. Further, appreciation of measure and concord shows that “strangeness” can suffuse a play like The White Devil even aside from direct visual or verbal references to the concept. It is, effectively, a verbal “style.”

Most crucial for the performance of Cymbeline and The White Devil, however, is the way in which rhetorical “performance” infuses not only the audible parts of a play but its material aspects. Keir Elam detects an “epistemological shift” within rhetoric in the early seventeenth century (70-71) in which language and physical action are drawn together (77). It is perhaps not surprising, then, that drama in these years of rhetorical revolution displays a close connection between rhetorical and physical construction. Elam argues that Thomas Wright’s treatise Passions of the Mind (the expanded edition of 1604) situates the verbal demonstration of passion “on the borderline between elocutio in its schematic guise and actio, performance” (72). As such, language and action are closely linked, and Elam proceeds to argue that Shakespeare develops, from Macbeth, a “syntactic inelocutio”: utterances or passionate exclamations that explore “the relationship between the private expression and public simulation of passion, and which experiments an extraordinary and in many ways revolutionary rhetorical expressionism” (77). Shakespeare’s “strange style” connects with a wider development of rhetoric that puts the emphasis on both the physical and rhetorical aspects of “matter.”

What is interesting about Wright’s treatment of rhetoric is the level of emphasis on embodied speech. While gesture has always been a part of oration, Wright makes it central to his discussion, displacing even elocutio—the figures and tropes that dominate early modern interests in rhetoric. He “dedicates his whole discussion to syntactic devices and their phonetic, intonational and gestural orchestration in rhetorical performance” (Elam 72). This emphasis, building on classical advice to orators to frame their physical action to fit the words, is for Elam essential to acting on the early modern stage:
It is the playhouse that makes an art of the interaction between the rhetorical figure and the acting and moving figure of the speaker, literally giving body to discourse through the corporeal orchestration of speech, with the institutional purpose of creating effects or affects in an audience. The stage player acts out, kinesically, but above all phonetically, syntactically, and even punctuationally the movement of the passions. (75)

As such, the precise elements of style have material equivalents; one is logically led to assume, for instance, that the rhetorical uniqueness, metrical ruggedness, and syntactic circuitousness of Shakespeare’s romances have their duplicate in body.

Wright’s emphatically material conception of verbal expression echoes earlier conceptions of rhetorical strangeness by stating that an orator “questionlesse may effectuate strange matters in the mindes of his Auditors” (B2r).64 Rhetoric has the ability to inculcate a form of “strangeness” in a listener, suggesting the force of verbal power by drawing on the moral implications of the term. The association with “matter” also implies a physical aspect to early modern oratory. Wright stresses that with the rules of action allied to pronunciation, “how much more liuely it representeth the conceits and affections of the mind, because that thorow both the eares and the eyes of their auditors, they intend to imprint them in their soules the deeper” (I6v). His new conception of expression frames the moral force of rhetoric in explicitly physical terms and adds a visual aspect to oratory. The language of “imprinting” is common in both antitheatrical and protheatrical treatises of the period, and Peter G. Platt has noted that moral transformation is associated with verbal display in oratory and taken further in anxieties about the public stage: “able to imprint on souls, ‘words and actions’ were even more potent when placed on the stage” (Shakespeare 190). If rhetoric itself is explained in explicitly physical

64 George Puttenham notes that one should fashion “language and stile, to such purpose as it may delight and allure as well the mynde as the eare of the hearers with a certain noueltie and strange maner of conueyance, disguising it no little from the ordinary and accustomed” (Q3r). More precisely, Thomas Wilson puts the emphasis on strangeness when discussing the figure of amplification (see above). For Wilson, “In praisyng, or dispraisyng, wee muste exaggerate those places towards the ende, whiche make menne wonder at the straungenesse of any thyng” (N3v). The “truth-twisting” figure of amplificatio had long before Wright been associated with enhancing the “strangeness” of matter.
metaphors, from “imprinting” to effectuating matter, it is unsurprising that
stylised or deliberately ornamental language on the stage should be coupled
with spectacular “strangeness.”

**Rhetorical and Material Construction in The White Devil**

There is a concentration of “strangeness” around the dumb show murders and their discussion in the arraignment scene, but this section
cconsiders the implicit conceptual strangeness of *The White Devil*. Rhetorical
strangeness represents a particular style, medium, and moment in Jacobean
drama that merges verbal effects and stage effects. Webster’s use of
chiaroscuro as both a dramaturgical and a verbal trope shows on a primary
level how verbal and visual elements combine in a theatre. *The White Devil*
also dramatises “absent” figures and events in the dumb show murders and the
ghost scene, where verbal “conjuring” materialises the immaterial or the
invisible. *The White Devil’s* stagecraft, like *Cymbeline’s*, mirrors developments
in rhetoric in the late 1600s and early 1610s, while self-consciously showcasing
its own rhetorical strangeness. This chapter’s rooting of stage effects in their
immediate philosophical and intellectual context provides an important
extension to the physical facts of theatre history and to current understandings
of the relationship between spectacle and verbal effect. The following sections
therefore set out the pertinent physical theatrical evidence for these plays’ early
stagings and read them against contemporary approaches and attitudes
towards verbal construction. Exchanges between verbal and physical “matter”
in *Cymbeline* and *The White Devil* underline the period’s anxieties about
rhetorical construction, adding to the moral uncertainty that characterises the
precariously artificial worlds of both plays.

The dumb shows in *The White Devil* have long been recognised as a
“strange technique,” in the phrase of Dieter Mehl, whose study of dumb shows
marks Webster as one of the first to combine two traditional facets of the
device: a staged murder and a performance for on-stage characters (139-40).
More recently, Katherine M. Carey sees these scenes as a marker of
“hypermediation”—“multiplicity which makes multiple acts of representation
visible” (73)—something that connects it with the rhetorical technique of
*ekphrasis*, discussed below. More widely, Marion Lomax has observed the way
in which “Webster juxtaposes previously established, and sometimes old-
fashioned stage techniques with experimental contemporary effects,” though her study barely touches on *The White Devil* (127). Subha Mukherji has shown how the play’s “coloured” language connects it with rhetorical, legal, and moral description (see especially 139-46) and Martin Wiggins’s attention to the many “ghost” characters—those figures who are frequently on-stage but not an active or speaking part of the action—raises questions over “what could be effectively communicated in performance” (458) in its original staging (drawing parallels with Ben Jonson’s *Sejanus*). Wiggins points out that “there are six leading roles” (457). The saturated stagecraft is at its pinnacle in the court scene, where the stage directions note the most actors onstage, but is perhaps most complex during the dumb shows, where Bracciano and the Conjuror form a third layer between the ephemeral image of the murders and the murderers watching Isabella—the “hypermediacy” detected by Carey. Faced with a mass of distractions that compete for the foreground, audiences are forced to make visual priorities. George F. Reynolds long ago noticed the possibility that the two dumb shows each took place on different sides of the Red Bull stage (139), making visual “decentring” a forceful aspect of performance and contributing to the visual and moral doubt that characterise the play.

Some understanding of the early staging of the play must be established, as far as possible, in order to explore how strange rhetorical devices are merged with stage devices. Critics generally agree that *The White Devil* was staged in the Red Bull theatre in Clerkenwell, 1612. Contextual knowledge about the Red Bull theatre, its repertory, and its surroundings reinforce the appropriateness of the play to its venue. Although Webster expresses disdain for the audience and the playhouse in his address “To the Reader,” *The White Devil* suits the Clerkenwell milieu well. Although he brought *Malfi* inside to the Blackfriars, there is no reason to suggest that Webster was unaware of the staging capacities and the audience tastes of the Red Bull, having already been an apprentice on and co-author of several plays. I see no reason to disbelieve that *The White Devil* was written for the Red Bull and that the Quarto reflects in

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65 Griffith’s recent study of the playhouse and the Queen’s Servants, who performed the play, acknowledges possible doubts. The Queen’s Servants, although based at the Red Bull, also made use of the Curtain, and because Webster’s play has no playhouse affiliation on the Quarto—only a company affiliation—Griffith warns that “we are left with the possibility that what Webster describes [in his ‘To the Reader’] is not the Red Bull at all but the Curtain in Shoreditch.” Nevertheless, continuing critical convention, Griffith concludes that “it is more likely it was performed in Clerkenwell” (208).
some ways its performance at that theatre. The area around the theatre is “a focal point for legal activity against crime” (Griffith 23)—acting as a “Sessions House for the hearing of criminal cases for the entire Middlesex area”—and it is an ironic echo of Webster’s play that in 1615, a short distance from the playhouse, a house of correction called the “Clerkenwell Bridewell” was erected. In 1612, the year of the play’s original performance, a “whole building was erected for the purpose of hearing cases” (Griffith 21). The White Devil’s concerns with legal matters and trials make the immediate surroundings of the Red Bull theatre an apt real-world setting.

Webster’s tragedy also chimes with plays at the Red Bull in the Queen’s Servant’s repertory. There is a wide interest in legal matters, with a number of trial scenes, noted by Reynolds and reinforced by Griffith. Two plays performed either side of The White Devil, Greene’s Tu Quoque (Cook, 1611) and Swetnam the Woman-Hater, Arraigned by Women (1618-19), both contain a possibility for “slots in the stage into which a post might be placed along with, perhaps, further slots for a wooden stall area standing for a court” (Griffith 106, 140); as such, the oratorical performances of legal rhetoric in the Red Bull may well have been accompanied by physical stage props that signalled the place of a law court, establishing dramaturgical echoes of rhetoric as a feature of the stage.66 The White Devil, however, as Reynolds recognises, remains more akin to a “council scene,” as there is no explicit stage direction requiring the presence of a “bar” (82-83).67

The prologue to a 1619 play, The Two Merry Milkmaids (published 1620), also seems to suggest that features of The White Devil are part of the Red Bull’s “characteristic” repertory, and intimates its own connection between rhetorical and physical performance. The prologue warns Red Bull audiences that Milkmaids contains no squibs or battles, as the stage usually represents:

This Day we entreat All that are hither come,

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66 Swetnam features a title-page woodcut that Griffith considers “the closest representation we have of the actual staging of a Red Bull play during the Queen’s Servants’ time there” (145); it therefore suggests possible echoes of The White Devil’s own arraignment scene, and shows the brick tiring house wall and paved floor of the theatre. If considered an accurate representation of the stage, it prompts consideration that there may not be any permanent recess space at the centre rear of the stage—see below for further discussion.

67 This does not preclude the possibility that a more formal “legal” staging was initially favoured, a feature that did not translate onto the page—see below for a discussion of the Quarto’s “literarification” of the play.
To expect no noyse of Guns Trumpets, nor Drum,
Nor Sword and Taruet; but to heare Sence and Words,
Fitting the Matter that the Scene affords. (A4v)

The sense of “matter” as material stagecraft is punned upon, suggesting that the “scene” (both a literary marker and a term used for the rear of the *frons scenae*) is rather more interested in “Sence and Words”—its rhetorical incarnation. Nonetheless, the play does “haue in’t a Coniurer, a Devil, / And a Clowne too . . .” (A4v). Listing stock figures of the Red Bull stage, a conjuror draws to mind Webster’s earlier play, despite its lack of success at the venue, and at the very least the prologue is evidence that Webster’s mixed-mode drama was in fact not unusual fare for the audience of so-called “ignorant asses” (Webster A2r).

Aspects of its early performance can be detected in the Quarto itself, despite Webster’s “literarification.” Recent work on the playhouse and its published plays shows that, “With their detailed stage directions, theatrically oriented prefatory material, and carefully arranged songs, Red Bull quartos serve as encapsulations of performance, rather than displacements of it” (Munro 105). Such “encapsulations” are simultaneously and self-consciously transformed into literary products, as Marta Straznicky has established. Red Bull Quartos can therefore be said to combine performance and print, reflecting the one while fitting themselves for another. Straznicky also suggests that the two markets—performance and print—are not necessarily opposed, and “that a seemingly ‘low’ or popular theatrical repertory is not sufficient evidence of the social or educational make-up of its audience” (144). Popular and critical conceptions about a “lower-class” audience at the Red Bull cannot therefore be assumed—especially in a period when the playhouse was only in the process of receiving its “citizen”-orientated reputation (Griffith 107, 110). Further, Webster’s interest in literary presentation is not unusual and does not distinguish the play from its fellow Red Bull productions: “every . . . play with a Red Bull attribution has some combination of elements that imply literary distinction” (Straznicky 149). The fact that *The White Devil* conspicuously lacks a Red Bull attribution on the titlepage and contains a scathing critique of the theatre in its “To the Reader,” however, suggests that the Quarto represents a mixture of enshrined performance and an attempt to distance itself from its
Clerkenwell origins. Its detailed stage directions nonetheless offer considerable evidence for original staging, a fact recognised by Reynolds, who marks the play as an “A” in his grade scale for the likeliness of a printed play reflecting performance at the Red Bull.

The features that define *The White Devil’s* performance show an exchange between rhetorical and stage devices. Subha Mukherji explores the play’s interest in seeing, and in “‘colour’ in its legal, rhetorical, theatrical, theological and physiognomical senses” (135), making reference to its “persuasive force in a particular circumstance” (142). Chiaroscuro is one aspect of the play’s chromatic scale that reflects both lyrical and dramaturgical techniques, foreshadowing the uses of light that characterise *Malfi* and that mark the repertories of candlelit indoor theatres.

Chiaroscuro is already, though, a significant feature of the outdoor-performed *The White Devil*. The play repeatedly riffs on the binary opposition of black and white, just as it does with other “painted” images—from “whore” to cosmetics:

> I shall bee playner with you, and paint out
> Your folies in more natural red and white.
> Then that upon your cheeke. (E3r)

The colour imagery is a sign of rhetorical ornamentation, because, by the late Elizabethan period, “by extension, the figures or tropes of rhetoric . . . themselves came to be known as the ‘colours of rhetoric’” (Mukherji 140). Indeed, “ornamental” styles of rhetoric might be said to “over-flower” as much as overflow with verbal inventiveness; the verbal-visual power of speech is often characterised as “flowers,” from Cicero’s *flosculi* in the classics, and in rhetorical texts framed as “gardens” as in Henry Peacham’s *Garden of Eloquence* (1577).

The black-and-white images of the play are mirrored in its stagecraft. The moral language, so steeped in colour, is accompanied by staged darkness, signified by the presence of torches on stage and by the explicit references to dimness: “Come sister, darknesse hides your blush” (B4v). Marion Lomax notes how
actual or implied darkness is an important feature of both *The White Devil* and *The Duchess of Malfi*. [R. B.] Graves draws attention to the fact that Webster was the only dramatist of the period to stage the removal of lights for scenes involving illicit love. As a rhetorical figure, the idea was well-known, but as a dramatic action, it was previously untried. (147)

The play’s chiaroscuro doubles visual and verbal figures, making rhetorical devices into stage effects. Later, in the murder scene, a similar doubling of darkness occurs, with Bracciano entering “at midnight” and watching his wife “feed her eyes and lips / On the dead shadow.” The stage directions imply that hand-held “lights” illuminate the scene. Indeed, one of the most spectacular elements of the murders is the perfume-fire that burns before the picture and is put out by the Doctor and Christophero before Isabella enters:

\[
\text{. . . and then burne perfumes afore the picture, and wash the lips of the picture, that done, quenching the fire, and putting off their spectacles they depart laughing. (D4v)}
\]

At the outdoor Red Bull, burning perfumes signal a contrast between lightness and darkness and work as a stage effect that doubles the language’s preoccupations with light and dark. R.B. Graves explains that “the most typical light source for an afternoon performance at the amphitheatres was an overcast sky producing an evenly distributed illumination from above” (532). He suggests, because both amphitheatres and hall theatres had a “steady, overall illumination” that enabled audiences to “see and respond to the visual media of the actors’ craft,” that “the staging at the indoor and outdoor playhouses may not have been so different in regard to the particular aspect of stage production that one might have thought would define the principal difference between them” (542). Plays began at about two in the afternoon, according to Thomas Platter’s account of London theatregoing, and at the end of the second act, the murder dumb shows would fall at three quarters of an hour to an hour in, at around three o’clock (with plays generally said to be around two to two and a half hours long). Webster notes himself that the play was “acted, in so dull a time of Winter, presented in so open and blacke a Theater” (A2r), suggesting,
as all British residents know, that afternoon gloom can easily encompass and
darken an outside venue, not least one surrounded by tall brick buildings as
was the Red Bull and shrouded in tallow smoke. Despite Webster’s complaint
about the conditions, the theatre’s “blackness” shows that even on the outdoor
stage, light sources like the burning perfumes are visible and therefore perfectly
effective dramaturgy.  

The murder of Isabella is also, it is implied by the stage directions,
featured in a discovery space or recess, adding to the scene’s darkness. It is
very difficult to be certain of exactly how and when a discovery space at the
Red Bull would be used: “All tests of the use of a discoverable space are . . .
open to more or less question” (Reynolds 158). Such a view has been
reinforced more recently by Tim Fitzpatrick, whose study of space and
dramaturgy proposes that “discoveries” need not always indicate a central
discovery space, that doors at the side of the stage could be used with
hangings for moments of discovery or action, and that the “place in the middle”
need not necessarily have access to the tiring house and so could act solely as
a “concealment” space (and one of his studies in the appendix is Webster’s
Duchess at the Globe and Blackfriars) (29, 264-66). Griffith actually questions
the desire to find a “constant discovery space involving a curtain” (104)—
something that would be reinforced if the title-page woodcut for Swetnam
(1620) shows the centre-rear of the stage, containing two windows set into a
brick wall—although Reynolds does entertain the possibility that there “may
have been removable structures” (155); his recognition that the stage direction
“sounds like a special curtain hiding only the picture” makes it possible that
neither of the dumb shows occur in a recess/discovery space. The “vaulting
horse” murder of Camillo seems likely to have been on the front stage, as the
“horse” is at least two yards high (described during the following trial scene) and
there are rushes on the floor, requiring a certain amount of space (Reynolds
139; Webster E3v). Nevertheless, Griffith entertains the possibility that a
“tower” tiring house, visible in a sketch of the playhouse from the 1660s, was in
use earlier; it would be particularly useful to the “tower” stagecraft in Heywood’s
roughly contemporaneous Age plays (97, 104-05), and perhaps offers dramatic
possibilities for The White Devil.

68 Griffith offers three possible orientations for the stage, depending on which building is
believed to be the tiring house: north-east, south-west, or south-east (99).
Reynolds also makes a series of informed assumptions about what might have occurred in such a recess space, should it exist, which include the picture-murder of the dumb show: “four or five scenes in a curtained space: ? a picture with a curtain, a trial; two scenes before, then in, a bedchamber; five persons discovered behind a traverse” (159). The list of possible recess moments in *The White Devil* alone—without listing the considerable wider dramatic connotations of a discovery space(s), from *The Spanish Tragedy* to *Othello*—shows the liminality of that part (or parts) of a playhouse. It introduces a “moral chiaroscuro” to the action, which complements both the language of darkness and the physical darkness of the scene. Sex and death are intertwined in the space(s), which often represents a bedchamber but is also used to discover or to act as backdrop to scenes of murder and death. Richard Madeleine explains that action may not always occur in a recess, but that the space of darkness has symbolic significance. Further, he notes, such stage locations “emblematize as well as . . . sensationalize passion and violence and their psychological and moral connections” (160). The two are conjoined in *The White Devil* (as they also are, for instance, in *Othello*) when Bracciano enters, dying, “presented in a bed” (K1v), shortly before his murder. It is a piece of stagecraft that echoes his illicit encounters with Vittoria and his murderous action earlier in the play—what Madeleine identifies as a “Renaissance poetics of punishment” that “recognized the value of executing malefactors near the site of their crimes” (160)—and so the blocking suggests a moral arc that results in a retributive poetic justice.

When Bracciano is first shown to be intimate with Vittoria, the Quarto has him “Enter” (B4v); however, there is no direction for him to exit earlier in the scene. Christina Luckyj, in a recent edition of the play, takes this to mean that Bracciano “withdraws,” presumably to a stage recess, rather than exits the stage, and then subsequently “comes forward” (1.2.44.1; 1.2.179.1). In such an interpretation, Flamineo’s line “Come sister, darkness hides your blush” (B4v; 1.2.180) draws together the moral connotations of adultery that characterise the play’s language of “darkness” by exploiting the meanings of a recess. It becomes a space where the play’s black-and-white rhetoric physically shadows—shrouding Vittoria’s “blush,” Bracciano—and also foreshadows: Bracciano’s move forward from the “discovery space” charges the shadowed recess with sexual hunger (which he makes explicit by making jokes about his
“jewel”) and associates it with nefarious activity, including the coming murders of their partners and their own demise.

Sowing the seeds for those murders, Vittoria’s “foolish idle dreame” (C1r) at this moment links the light/darkness of the evening chamber scene with the liminality of a dream world that makes interpretation, meaning, and vision uncertain. 69 That liminality is drawn to the fore with the visions of the murders in the dumb shows, which occur in a similar “dream world” and are witnessed only thanks to the “charmed” nightcap worn by Bracciano. The “dreamlike” aspects of the dumb shows are especially significant, because they channel concerns about interpretation and proof associated with rhetorical invention and also make use of “blackness.”

Bracciano’s response to the murders conflates the physical staging of the scene with rhetorical and legal language:

'Twas quaintly done, but yet each circumstance
I taste not fully. (E1r)

“Circumstance” inflects the scene and becomes important in “colouring” the murders; it is a legal-rhetorical term concerned chiefly with persuasion and not necessarily with proving “truth.” Wilson’s Arte impresses the importance of “circumstance” in setting out “any matter, and to amplify it in the uttermost” (C2r), as strong supplementary evidence; he also indicates that it testifies to “profe of his purpose” (C2v). The following scene immediately makes the legal connotations of the term clear:

. . . we have nought but circumstances
To charge her with, about her husband’s death;
Their approbation therefore to the proofs
Of her black lust. (E1r)

The “black lust” draws attention back to the intimate bedchamber scene and the dumb show murders, both of which represent “black lust” by drawing on the

69 Mukherji notes Bracciano’s recognition that the dream is a “rhetorical artefact,” signalled by the use of the word “invention” (139).
sex-and-death connotations of the recess through a combination of black-and-white language and stagecraft.

Activity in and around the recess, however, is tellingly inflected with the rhetorical devices and terminology of the law court. The word “circumstance” links the dramatic activity witnessed in the dumb shows with rhetorical presentation. Mukherji explains that the dumb shows probably “prospectively show Bracciano, and us, what is to happen” while simultaneously “presenting in formulaic form what is actually happening at that moment” (144). They radicalise the dumb show formula by making the scene self-consciously artificial and constructed. What is ostensibly a window onto the murders is coloured by the indirectness of the scene: the audience (and Bracciano) do not witness the murders, because they are presented as “dream concepts.” They are an attempt to construct an event and not unmediated access to it.

By terming the dumb shows “each circumstance,” then, Bracciano marks the attempted construction as rhetorical as well as material. “Circumstance” does not represent “truth” but rather the quality of persuasion; Jan-Melissa Schramm notes its judicial function as “evidence of a subsidiary fact from which the existence of the primary fact may be inferred” and explains that “if testimony as to the main fact can be criticised as incomplete or misleading, then so can the testimonial presentation of circumstantial evidence” (Testimony 19, 20). Wilson aligns the word with ornamental styles of rhetoric—not least the figure of amplificatio (which makes “men wonder at the straungeness of any thing”) (N3v). The charmed nightcap acts as its own form of “amplification,” translating the “circumstances” of a law court into a material performance on the stage.

Webster effectively exploits the conventions of the early modern English dumb show to destabilise the order and status of evidence, proof, demonstration, and circumstance. Jeremy Lopez characterises the effect of dumb shows on a viewer:

Watching a dumb show, you must not only work vigorously to interpret gestures that are almost necessarily of a different size and style from gestures elsewhere in the play; you must also put the act of interpretation into a kind of suspense, waiting for later action, accompanied by words, to help you sort out meanings: does this dumb show represent something that has happened, is
happening, or is going to happen? Is its action expository, imaginary, or allegorical?” (294)

The later court scene therefore reflects on scenes that may or may not have happened, that may be imaginary or allegorical, or that may simply be entirely illusory. As such, the representation of the murders in a dumb show questions their truth-status and the theatrical device inextricably links the rhetorical oration of the law court with the material performance of the murders. In this sense, the dumb shows do not serve as the cause for the arraignment scene that follows; they represent, in material rather than verbal from, the same attempted construction of proof. Legal rhetoric and theatrical dumb show are two sides of the same coin. Both are marked by levels of obfuscation: through a mediated “dream” effect in the dumb shows and in court through the speaking of Latin and the comically verbose Lawyer (“this debausht and diversivolent woman”—what Vittoria terms the “strange tongue” of the court (E2v).

Webster’s introduction of a “dream concept, a reality beyond the characters’ living reality,” Carey notes, “enables layers of media—a perspective of ‘seeing through’” (77). The interpretation offers parallels with circumstantial rhetoric—which offers a second-hand testimony of “seeing through” rather than primary access—and it also links to wider aspects of rhetorical construction, especially the verbal device of ekphrasis. The device contributes to the power of verbal construction in the early modern period and forms part of what Jean Hagstrum calls “pictorial imagery” (xx). _Ekphrasis_ is a poetic description of a work of art, important in establishing relationships between words, images, and imitation: prior to the invention and spread of engraving techniques capable of the kind of detail appropriate to the reproduction of fine art, it was the principal means by which copies of works of art were made, and the only means by which lost, often ancient, works of art were reconstructed. (Acheson 91)

It can be strictly defined, in late-twentieth-century terms as “the verbal representation of graphic representation” (Heffernan 299), though Joel Altman has noted its “wider purview” in early modern England, where it encompassed
and was sometimes confused with an array of rhetorical categories (274). I discuss two of those important categories (enargeia and energeia) in relation with this more recent, narrow critical conception of ekphrasis. As a part of the paragone tradition that often sees visual and verbal modes in competition, ekphrasis closely connects and even threatens to unite picture and poetry. While the word only appears in English as a critical term in the eighteenth century, critics including Hagstrum, James A. W. Heffernan, and Katherine Acheson have acknowledged its continuing presence throughout verbal and visual exchanges in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Heffernan acknowledges its potential to offer “a radical critique of representation,” not least in its use of “one medium of representation to represent another” (304, 300). The device therefore mirrors the dumb shows in Webster’s The White Devil, which themselves collapse distinctions between visual and rhetorical representation by referring to the performances as “circumstances.” They represent rhetorical persuasion as a material performance—a reverse ekphrasis—thereby radicalising the dumb show as a representative technique and not only enabling “layers of media” (Carey 77) but troubling the distinction between verbal and visual representation.

More significant and appropriate to this conjunction of rhetorical and material performance in The White Devil is enargeia (also known in the Latin as evidentia). Enargeia signifies a powerful visual, pictorial quality in verbal or poetic description—one that is “highly natural” (Hagstrum 12). Hagstrum explains that the term “originated in rhetoric, where it was used to describe the power that verbal visual imagery possessed in setting before the hearer the very object or scene being described” but that it came to be part of later antiquity’s and succeeding centuries’ tendency “to blur the distinction between poetry and rhetoric” (11). In the early modern period, the term retains significance. Puttenham describes it in conjunction with its homonymous sister term, energeia. The latter describes full potency, “the achievement in art and rhetoric of the dynamic and purposive life of nature” (Hagstrum 12), making comparisons with painting unnecessary. Puttenham describes all “ornament poetical” as falling into these two categories:

one to satisfy and delight the ear only, by a goodly outward show set upon the matter with words and speeches smoothly and
tuneably running; another by certain intendements or sense of such words and speeches inwardly working a stir to the mind. That first quality the Greeks called *enargeia*, of this word, *argos*, because it giveth a glorious lustre and light; this latter they called *energeia*, of *ergon*, because it wrought with a strong and virtuous operation. And figure breedeth them both: some serving to give gloss only to language, some to give it efficacy by sense, and so, by that means, some of them to serve the ear only, some the conceit only and not the ear. (135)

Gavin Alexander explains that Puttenham is the first to give these terms the centrality they receive here but that he somewhat misrepresents *enargeia*, which generally relates to “compelling description” that appeals to the eye of the mind (381 n.3). Nonetheless, the ear is delighted in Puttenham’s description by an “outward show,” likening listening to looking. *Enargeia* provides the delightful visual aspects and *energeia*, it is suggested, provides the strength and force of the “matter”; yet both are so closely connected that they threaten to be indistinguishable—a result, perhaps, of Puttenham’s less than accurate rendering of these classical terms. Indeed, *energeia* uses the “*sense* of such words” (emphasis added) and so exploits the double meaning of “sense”—at once signifying “meaning” and so appealing to “conceit” but also meaning “sensory” and so, like *enargeia*, delighting the ear and the eye. Both the pictorial quality (*enargeia*) and what Hagstrum calls the “effectual working power” (12) of poetry (*energeia*) are joined in sensory terms in Puttenham’s descriptions.

*The White Devil’s* dumb shows exploit the sensory aspects of these rhetorical ornaments. Mukherji argues that the play offers “a radical hierarchy of proofs that defies institutional morality” (Mukherji 135), but Webster arguably uses rhetoric to de-hierarchise the distinction between artificial and inartificial proofs. Certain physical or visual proof is often unavailable in law courts, and Mukherji explains that *The White Devil* showcases Vittoria’s own image-making “artificial” proofs during the trial scene, as opposed to the “documentary evidence, objective facts, testimonies, oaths, depositions, confessions under torture or rumour” that constitute Aristotelian inartificial, or *atechnic*, proofs (162-63). The staged murder scenes contain both circumstantial rhetoric (artificial)
and physical, visual “evidence” (inartificial). The doubleness of the dumb shows is reinforced by the manner in which the Conjuror redescribes the action, upon Bracciano’s request. He is told, “O ’twas most apparent,” but the events of the dumb show are then relayed in verbal terms, offering an enargeia-ic and almost ekphrastic description of the material performance. Even the visual experience of the event itself is described in rhetorical terms. The Conjuror stops his description to state, “your eye saw the rest, and can informe you / The engine of it all” (E1r). The words detach Bracciano’s eye from his understanding, and his vision “informs” in a verbal manner.

Aligning material and rhetorical performance in this way adds a level of moral complexity to the dumb shows, which are marked as subjective, persuasive, and constructed performances. Such lack of objectivity connects with contemporary ideas about the “physical” aspects of rhetoric. Wright’s influential treatise on the passions considers actions—and dumb shows in particular—to be closely related to rhetorical matters. He links oratory and action by way of comparison with the theatrical device:

> The internall conceits and affections of our minds, are not only expressed with words, but also declared with actions: as it appeareth in Comedies, where dumbe shewes often expresse the whole matter . . . . (I6v)

The dual meaning of “matter” is telling, making dumb show performances both rhetorical and physical. As such, internal “conceit” and “affection” are projected outward, just as rhetorical expression is used to externalise inward thoughts. When dumb shows are linked to rhetoric in this manner, they further complicate the veracity and impartiality of the display, because like “words” they express not external, empirical reality but necessarily internal “conceits.”

The play repeats the materialisation of “internal conceits” later, by coupling the language of verbal construction with dramatic effect. When Francisco muses on revenge for his sister and contemplates the uses of Monticelso’s “black book” of villains, Isabella’s ghost appears:

> Call for her picture: no; I’le close mine eyes, And in a melancholie thought I’le frame
Enter Isabela’s Ghost.

Her figure ‘fore me. Now I --- ha’te how strong
Imagination workes! how she can frame
Things which are not! me thinks she stands afore me;

Were my skill pregnant, I could draw her picture. (G2r-v)

Mukherji suggests that “we are left in little doubt as to the reality-status of the apparition,” placing it firmly as an image. Yet Francisco’s terminology suggests that imagination becomes so strong that it borders on material creation—for the ghost can only be embodied in theatrical terms by the actual, bodily presence of the actor representing Isabella’s ghost. The language of framing and “making” that governs the soliloquy is powerful enough to suggest that words themselves create a material “image.” That Francisco may “draw her picture” links the projection to rhetorical acts of description and echoes Puttenham’s definitions of *enargeia* and *energeia*—the ghost is vivid (being visible) and the language proves so potent that the image of Isabella actually appears on stage. Francisco’s “imagination” performs a rhetorical act and the ghost materialises from it. The stage direction in the original Quarto intrudes mid-line after “frame,” meaning that, textually and in performance, the ghost is born in between the spoken lines as if produced by the words.

Despite the presence of Isabella on stage, Francisco wonders how imagination “can frame / Things which are not!” The projection of the ghost from his “imagination” is called into question, and there remains a disjunction between what Francisco “thinks” and what he (and the audience) sees. With his eyes shut, the figure of the ghost symbolises his subconscious, but it parallels the murder scene—where Bracciano must wear a “charmed” cap in order to witness the spatially removed murders of Isabella and Camillo. Both Bracciano and Francisco are and are not seeing the figures they witness. Such sensory uncertainty underlines the ambivalent attitude towards moral, mental, and material knowledge in a play where rhetoric shapes meaning.

The slippages of meaning attendant on the term “circumstance” reveal an anxiety that persuasive rhetoric is more powerful than “truth,” and the murder scenes and the appearance of Isabella’s ghost show that rhetorical “framing,” “making,” and “engineering” have a reciprocal relationship with the material
Rhetorical and Material Construction in *Cymbeline*

*Cymbeline* also shares an interest in legal, rhetorical, and material invention—especially in the reciprocal relationship between linguistic and physical construction. Earlier, when attempting to “prove” to Posthumus his wife’s infidelity, Giacamo relies on the sort of verbal descriptions associated with the law courts:

Sir, my Circumstances
Being so nere the Truth, as I will make them,
Must first induce you to beleue . . . . (aaa1v)

Like the rhetorical-material constructions in *The White Devil*, Giacamo explains that he is “making” the circumstances and attempting to fashion a belief in his auditor, Posthumus. The language of construction in his “proof” captures Shakespeare’s preoccupation with the boundaries of material and verbal images in *Cymbeline*.

Critics acknowledge these boundaries. Mukherji stresses the “voyeurism” essential to *Cymbeline*’s “exploration of tokens” (51). They are corporal signs of proof, and “what makes these objects convincing to Posthumus is their visual vividness” (Mukherji 52). However, Maurice Hunt sees those objects not in the play’s *enargeia*, the vivid speech of description, but in the *things* themselves. For Hunt, the play’s objects take on the status of an “Idea,” because “once a material object expresses values, those values are subsequently known chiefly in terms of the object” (329). It is this argument that
Jason Scott-Warren has recently extended to “people,” contending that the play merges subject and object:

People invest their emotions in things, most notably love-tokens, and in so doing they render those emotions hostages to fortune, since love-tokens can be exchanged, stolen or lost. People repeatedly materialize the immaterial, as when Imogen ‘pawn[s her] honour’. (233)

Perhaps Shakespeare’s material impulse in Cymbeline explains why Giacamo’s oration is so successful. He describes the tapestry to Posthumus in terms that intimate the rhetorical force of descriptive energeia:

So bravely done, so rich, that it did strive
In workmanship and value; which I wondered
Could be so rarely and exactly wrought,
Such the true life on’t was. (aaa3r)

The “workmanship” that is “rarely and exactly wrought” reflects back on Giacamo’s own oration, deeming his rhetoric a form of “making,” as he claims ten lines earlier (“as I will make them”—see above); the doubling of this language of construction suggests that his ekphrastic description of the artwork in the chamber has a material force of its own. Although Posthumus refuses to accept these descriptions as proof, the language of “things” invades his own speech. He tells Giacamo that his descriptive speech “is a thing” he might have heard elsewhere, but that “thing” then turns into the very moral virtue at stake. His outburst, “This is her honour!” (aaa3r), takes “this” to refer both to the abstract, rhetorical “matter” at hand as well as the physical matter with which Giacamo’s speech is crammed. Accordingly, such “making” rhetoric paves the way for Posthumus’s too ready acceptance of the ring as a token of “proof.”

Rhetoric’s ability to influence and modify one’s mental, moral, and sensory perception of the world is the cause of great anxiety in and beyond the early modern period, and it marks concerns about “certainty” in legal proceedings and presentation, as critics Terence Cave and Schramm recognise. Cave notes (talking of the infamous sixteenth-century French legal
case of Martin Guerre) that “protracted legal proceedings” inevitably “demonstrated . . . [a] failure of legal authority to establish a certain basis for judgement” (13). Schramm relates fictional forms of recognition to such uncertainty, acknowledging that while “the emotional veracity of imaginative literature . . . suggests the power of poesy to generate the most effective and ‘truthful’ anagnorisis . . . it also betrays anxiety that such an imposture, so evidently parodic and weakly imitative, nevertheless almost succeeded” (Atonement 201). The closing of Cymbeline, with its concentration on the play’s “matter,” delivers precisely such anxieties about the constructed rhetoric performed and “invented” by Giacamo. Not only do the physical language and material metaphors surrounding rhetorical “proof” in the play challenge certainty of judgement, they open up wider epistemological questions about sense experience, representation, and moral knowledge.

In Cymbeline, as in The White Devil, rhetoric moves between verbal and material manifestations. The conspicuous stagecraft of Jupiter’s entrance on an eagle actually offers parallels with stagecraft at the Red Bull theatre in its use of self-conscious devices. Shakespeare’s Jupiter

\[ \textit{descends in Thunder and Lightning, sitting uppon an Eagle . . .} \]

(Bbb3v)

Its dramaturgical affinities with Heywood’s The Golden Age (1611) are clear:

\[ \text{Jupiter drawes heauen: at which Iris descends and presents him with his Eagle, Crowne and Scepter, and his thunder-bolt. Jupiter first ascends upon the Eagle . . .} \]

(K2v)

Roger Warren suggests Heywood’s stagecraft is borrowed from Cymbeline by offering a number of verbal echoes in Heywood’s play (66-67), but both plays were current by 1611 and offer a possible shared sensational special effect across theatres. The King’s Men were playing at both the indoor Blackfriars and the outdoor Globe, meaning that such an effect may have been possible in both theatres—though this remains the subject of debate (the previous chapter discussed the flight capabilities of the indoor Blackfriars).
With regard to the Globe, John Astington argues that descent machinery would be inexpensive and available in any purpose-built Elizabethan theatre (whether a heavens were present or not), but Gabriel Egan argues against such “scholarly wish fulfilment,” by pointing out that “no Globe play uses flying” (“Reconstructions of the Globe: A Retrospective,” Shakespeare Survey 52 (1999): 1-16: 7) (something not necessarily true of Cymbeline, which is considered by many scholars and by Warren’s dating as a Globe play).

Alexander Leggatt points out that

It may be that neither the Boar’s Head nor the first Globe was so equipped, but the evidence for this is negative—a lack of stage directions in extant plays—and if the vision of Jupiter was part of the original text of Cymbeline as acted at the Globe, and not a later addition, then the first Globe had such machinery. (Jacobean Public Theatre 24)

Considering the obvious ability of the Red Bull to install and exploit such technology, and considering the similarities with the contemporaneous Heywood play that suggest the Cymbeline stage direction dates from the period 1610-11, rather than being a later addition, it remains possible that the Globe was indeed able to present Jupiter’s descent. Both Heywood’s The Silver Age and Cymbeline were performed at court in 1611, before returning to their respective public/private theatres; even if the precise stage directions do not reflect their respective theatre practice exactly, their billing and the wider similarities between the Age plays and Shakespeare’s Blackfriars drama implies some dramaturgical affinity. Indeed, some manner of flying in Cymbeline (performed, Roger Warren suspects, at both the Blackfriars as well as the Globe, 2-3) and the Age plays and their wider sharing of “strange spectacle” aligns the stagecraft of Queen’s Servants at the Red Bull and the King’s Men’s theatres. Their visual strangeness offers to lessen the sharp distinctions sometimes made between “outdoor” and “indoor” stagecraft. It also adds credence to the likelihood that The White Devil belonged in the outdoor Red Bull. Ultimately, like the dumb shows in Webster’s play, the spectacular stagecraft in Jupiter’s descent draws attention to the self-consciousness of both language and visual effect while manifesting the strangeness of both.
Jupiter’s bizarre deus ex machina entry in Cymbeline and his spoken judgement on the action illustrate a particularly acute moment of rhetorical and visual strangeness:

No more you petty Spirits of Region low
Offend our hearing: hush. How dare you Ghostes
Accuse the Thunderer, whose Bolt (you know)
Sky-planted, batters all rebelling Coasts.
Poore shadowes of Elizium, hence, and rest
Vpon your neuer-withering bankes of Flowres.
Be not with mortal accidents opprest.
No care of yours it is, you know ’tis ours. (bbb3v)

While these lines are mostly in perfect iambic pentameter, ruggedness certainly breaks through at moments, to ripple the smooth flow of the line: the first (“No more”) and the sixth line (“Vpon”) of Jupiter’s speech overrun ten syllables. One must bear in mind the observation made about the essential variation of iambic pentameter by George T. Wright, for whom the “varied rhythmic interplay” between metre and phrase “constitutes the great beauty of the form” (10-12, 54-56, 149-84). Yet the lines fit with the speech, and the tongue can run over the extra syllables with only a heightened sense of Puttenham’s “variable and strange harmony.” Wright’s observation of this facet of Shakespearean language captures the effect exactly:

Like Wyatt, he [Shakespeare] may have realized that a line could gain in richness of sound and sense if its meter trips hurriedly over some syllables as if the thought or feeling of the speaking character were fuller than its words could quite articulate. To write ten-syllable lines that have, in a sense, eleven or twelve syllables (or eleven and a half) is to crowd the air with meanings only half-spoken, partly concealed. The hypermetrical half-syllables imply that, just as the line contains more in the way of syllables than the meter promises, so too in the meanings conveyed by the words there is more than meets the ear. (158)
Jupiter’s “strange” presence requires such a sense of “partly concealed” meanings, linking his descent and his speech with the allegorical text he deposits in the jail cell. The moment’s “strangeness” provides a link between the dramaturgy and the speech in the same way that Webster’s dumb shows link “circumstance” with performance.  

Shakespeare signals the importance of spoken riddles with the delivery of a book. Leah Marcus notes the significance of this moment, recognising that the cryptic text “is read twice during the action—the only text so privileged in all of Shakespeare’s plays—and in the Folio it is printed exactly the same way both times like a properly ‘authored’ document” (Puzzling 120). Marcus associates it with “emblematic ‘texts’” (120). The effect is to centre not just interpretation but also action on the written (and spoken) word:

Let thy effects  
So follow, to be most unlike our Courtiers,  
As good, as promise. (Bbb3v)

Shakespeare makes rhetorical “effects” synonymous with the consequences in the “real” world. The “strange style” of the play in this scene particularly, and of Jupiter’s speech, only heightens the importance of rhetorical “effect”; the riddle itself fits into the play’s strange rhetorical mode:

When as a Lyons whelpe, shall to himself vnknown without seeking finde, and bee embrac’d by a piece of tender Ayre: And when from a stately Cedars hall be loppt branches, which being dead many yeares, shall after reuiue, bee ioynted to the old Stock,

70 Puttenham also gestures to “meanings only half-spoken” when he suggests that “strange harmony” breeds not only in the ear but also in the “conceit of them that hear it.” Conceit can signal both imagination and mind—as Alexander glosses it (126)—but it also has literal rhetorical associations of pretty “devises” or manners of expression (OED 8.a). It is occasionally used in titles of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries as a byword for verse, poem, or “riff,” as in Thomas Churchyard’s A pleasant conceite penned in verse (1593) or the ballad Collins conceite (1625, STC 5559). Puttenham’s suggestion that verse might impress both ear and “conceit” with strangeness implies that rhetoric—and more specifically the sound and rhythm of poetry—has conceptual power.

71 There is no stage direction for placing the book in the Folio, so most editors insert it somewhere towards the end of Jupiter’s speech, but Posthumus recognises its appearance with the words, “A book?” (Bbb3v).
and freshly grow, then shall Posthumus end his miseries, Britaine
be fortunate, and flourish in Peace and Plentie.

Indeed, the style of the riddle itself is hardly differentiated from the ellipses and
omissions that characterise Posthumus’s own response:

'Tis still a Dreame: or else such stuffe as Madmen
Tongue, and braine not: either both, or nothing,
Or senseless speaking, or a speaking such
As sense cannot vntye. Be what it is,
The Action of my life is like it, which Ile keepe
If but for simpathy. (Bbb3v)

His language foreshadows Prospero’s “dream” speech in *The Tempest*, which
shares concerns about the relationship between material and immaterial “stuff.”

The riddle proves quite the opposite of “senseless speaking,” and
Posthumus’s recognition that the “Action” of his life is like it recalls Thomas
Wright’s interest in embodying rhetoric, marrying “words” with “actions” through
a comparison to a dumb show. Lomax recognises the parallels between the
deliberately archaic form of a dumb show and the descent in *Cymbeline*, noting
that Shakespeare’s scene resembles a dumb show: “a silent, dream-like
sequence, befitting the spirit of the play as a whole. This old-fashioned service
also conveys a sense of reliving history and of looking back to another
dimension in time” (31). The parallels with *The White Devil* are striking, and
Webster’s dumb shows likewise feel like they are in another (at least spatial)
dimension and also have the feel of a dream or a projection of the imagination,
reinforced by Brachiano’s rhetorically-conscious language. In this moment in
*Cymbeline*, words and actions are linked through implicit rather than explicit
attention to rhetorical construction. While Wright’s embodied rhetoric refers to
the display of internal “passions,” he associates oration with gesture and,
similarly, Jupiter’s book in *Cymbeline* channels the conceit of the whole play by
linking verbal “effects” with “Action.”

Jupiter’s riddle falls under what Tiffany Stern has labelled “scrolls”—
“papers that are to be delivered onstage” (*Documents* 174). The stagecraft
therefore naturally associates rhetorical delivery with the visual and physical
presence of a prop. Stern suggests that the preserved feature of the scroll in a printed text reflects the way the stage prop itself would look, its appearance in print making it a “would-be stage property and sometimes a preserved one (Documents 179). As a focal point for the spectacular entrance and oration of Jupiter, a physical version of the scroll is a central part of the scene’s stagecraft, already drawing verbal modes into “Action.”

The nature of the printed or scribed scroll connects not only to Wright’s embodied rhetoric, but to an earlier “epistemological shift” that transforms rhetorical models into physical and spatial illustration. Walter Ong’s seminal work on Ramism and the birth of print culture shows how spatial logic attends the development of movable type. The emergence of printed books corresponds with a rise in thinking “of knowledge and of expression, in terms more committed to space” (308). Puttenham’s Arte, for instance, certainly has elements of Ramist methodology in its presentation of metrical style. When describing how to breed the “variable and strange harmonie” in both the ear and the mind, he accompanies the description with an illustration:

Fig. 24. Diagram from Puttenham’s Arte (London, 1589; M1v). STC 20519.5.

This illustration of poetic metre can be considered a form of instruction, and as such falls, in part, under Acheson’s category of “diagrams and illustrations of a technical nature,” which “insinuated ways of thinking in their audiences” (2). While it is not strictly a dichotomous table, it is set out in such a way as to echo such diagrams, family trees, or biblical tables, with the separate measurements (in concord—feet—or in measure—line length) split between the left and the right. The “strange harmonie” and its impact on one’s imagination are translated into explicitly visual terms—Puttenham calls it an “ocular example”—and as such the illustration can be categorised as an “epistemological form” (Acheson 6). At the same time as it follows a tradition of print logic and Ramist
instruction, Puttenham’s illustration challenges modes of representation in the same way as ekphrasis: it turns a vocal representation into a visual one. Though such a conception is familiar to twenty-first-century readers, the illustration in Fig. 24 and the versions that feature throughout the subsequent pages of Puttenham’s Arte all appear at a time when diagrams and illustrations in printing are developing and newly expanding.

The diagrams of Puttenham’s rhetorical treatise also align with scientific modes of representation, as Henry S. Turner realises. They are abstract conceptions of line length and of rhyme and metre. They equally mirror other developing diagrams of the period’s print culture, especially military tactics, garden design, and technical works. Turner notes that transformations of verbal units into pictorial lines are “gestures that reproduce exactly the expository and practical techniques of geometrical manuals” (123). His work on English prosody and rhetoric shows parallels in the way that poetic construction and instruction are heavily influenced by contemporary thinking in trade, technology, and mathematics: “Puttenham positions the reader as a kind of poetic artisan who is taught not a series of rules or precepts—not a theory of poetry—but is guided through a set of practical techniques according to the methods of the workshop” (125). All such genres of diagrams “are schematic and abstract” and are based on practical mathematics:

They use devices of abstraction that encode elements of the physical world in disproportionate and non-realistic figures. They imagine the physical world as it is measured, traversed, and used, not as it is conceived of mythologically, metaphorically, or ontologically. (Acheson 5)

While sound is inevitably somewhat abstract, the hallmarks of these diagrams are shared by Puttenham’s verse illustrations; Ong’s claim that “the visual is the area most proper to science” (in its broad sense) seems pertinent to a rhetorical treatise in which “Reduction to spatial form fixes everything, even sound” (109). Rhetoric—and specifically, here, poetry—is aligned with other design works that have such an impact on the stage, not least Bourne’s Inventions or devises, discussed in previous chapters, which includes technical illustrations and tables. Emphases in Puttenham’s and Wright’s works on physical and spatial
manifestations of rhetoric show that verse and style participate in the material world. Jupiter’s performance in *Cymbeline* achieves precisely such a combination, linking rhetorical delivery with his elaborate entrance and delivery of a scroll, a physical prop that unites the visual and verbal aspects of the scene’s strange spectacle.

**Embodied Emblems in *Cymbeline* and *The White Devil***

Emblems provide an important parallel to the conjunction of material and verbal construction discussed above. While they have often been used to read plays symbolically (see Daly, *Literature*) or presentationally (Lomax; Lunney; Michael Neill “What strange . . .”), little work has been done to unpick the way in which their rhetorical-visual construction and connected moral message is echoed in early modern theatrical display. Rhetorical strangeness mirrors the early modern emblem’s combination of abstract and physical description, puzzle and explication, and matter and meaning.

If Shakespeare’s rhetorical strangeness manifests itself through a combination of spectacle and physicalised speech, Webster infuses the meaning of words with strangeness. Francisco reacts to Bracciano’s comments to the court by remarking, “How strange these words sound? what’s the interpretation?” (F2v). The questions capture the concerns about speech in a playworld where the interpretation of words borders on the manifestation of words. Indeed, “strange” words are the occasion for the murder and the play’s emblematic riddles prove to have material consequences. The emblem thrown in at Camillo’s window contains “a stag . . . hath shed his horns / And for the losse of them the poor beast weepes” (D3r). His query, “What should this meane,” is answered in the following murder scene, which alludes to the cuckoldry of the “emblem”: mounting the “vaulting-horse” and falling beneath it suggests that the emblem’s interpretation has become manifest. Shedding horns implies a lack of sexual virility on top of the initial cuckoldry (perhaps compounded by Francisco’s question, “Haue you any children”). The sexual connotations of “vaulting” and his apparent failure, placed “as ‘twere under the horse” (D4v), implies that the murder is an embodied and enacted version of the emblem—a correlation between words and action that perverts Wright’s “strange” effectuating.
Emblems themselves are widely regarded as rhetorical exercises in early modern Europe. The tradition’s rhetorical roots are captured in Claude Mignault’s celebrated preface to the 1616 Lyons edition of Alciato’s Emblemata, which associates the genre with *ekphrasis*:

Itaque metaphorica[..] hic Emblemata vocantur carmina, quibus imaginibus, agalmatis, pegmatis, & id genus alia scite adinuenta, varie & erudite explicantur

[And so verses in which pictures, sculptures, tapestries, and other things knowledgeably devised of like kind are variously and learnedly explained, are here metaphorically termed Emblems] (A8r).

As verse, emblems are able to unfold knowledge and learning (“scite”; “erudite”), and Mignault thereby pins the didactic benefits of emblem writing on its rhetorical qualities. He emphasises that, just as emblems can be set for ornaments on floors, walls, vases, bowls, and clothes, they are also a part of the rhetorical arts:

Sed & oratio variis verborum rerumque pigmentis & lenociniis Rhetoricae artis elaborata Emblematis refera dicat figurative potest.

[But also, discourse that is elaborated with various colourings of words and matter, and with the allurements of the Art of Rhetoric, can figuratively be said to be crammed with Emblems] (A8r).

Mignault’s “oratio . . . refera,” discourse “crammed” with emblems, neatly associates rhetorical play with the emblem genre, and vice versa. It explicitly gestures to the importance of “colouring” in discourse, drawing ornamental rhetoric and emblems together. Camillo’s verbal emblem represents another instance of rhetorical play turned into material fact; it projects the “colourings of words and matter” implicit in its wordplay into the physical colours and matter of the dumb show. The play’s materialised rhetoric proves both dangerous and dangerously deceptive, resisting interpretation and making “strange” words into the murderous spectacle of the dumb show.
Cymbeline’s conjunction of “Action” and speech is also troubling and provocative. The book or scroll delivered makes claims to be of great weight and importance, including the revelation of Posthumus’s “full fortune.” The rhetorical device in the scroll-riddle essentially promises access to the book of nature and comprehension of providence, just as Webster’s dumb shows (spuriously) offer the “full circumstance” of the crimes. As such, the rhetorical qualities of Jupiter’s descent become even more apparent. Michael Bath explains the connection between rhetoric, nature, and meaning in the emblem tradition:

the emblem was conceived both as an art of rhetorical invention in which novel or witty connections were suggested between signifier and signified, and at the same time as an art which used inherent meanings already inscribed in the Book of Nature by the finger of God. (3)

Henry Peacham’s Minerua Britanna (1612) includes an emblem that makes precisely those associations explicit. Though possibly a coincidence, the collection is printed a few years after Cymbeline was first performed and its symbolism fits the scene of Jupiter’s descent perfectly:
Fig. 25. “Poulatim” from Peacham’s *Minerva Britanna* (London, 1612; N4r). STC 19511.

The emblem warns reader-viewers not to resist fate:

> By violence who tries to turne away,
> Strong natures current, from the proper course,
> To mooue the Earth, he better were assay,
> Or wrest from loue, his thunderbolts perforce . . . . (N4r)

Shakespeare’s Jupiter’s delivery of a rhetorical riddle, or emblem, suggests that divine rhetoric allies with matter to construct the “proper course” of the play. Indeed, the figure of the lion in Peacham’s image conveniently links Jove with Shakespeare’s Posthumus Leonatus. Peacham was a known playgoer who drew a sketch of a performance of Shakespeare’s *Titus Andronicus*, making it perfectly possible that Peacham drew the inspiration for this emblem from a performance of *Cymbeline*. Yet even ignoring such conjecture, the
extraordinary similarity in structure and composition show Shakespeare’s
dramaturgical appropriation of visual, rhetorical, and emblematic traditions.

The delivery of the book itself marries the expressive “dumb show”
quality of Jupiter’s descent with his “strange” stylised speech through what is
presumably a form of firework described as thunder and lightning—indeed the
combination of thunder and lightning links verbal and visual effect:

\[\textit{Jupiter descends in Thunder and Lightning, sitting vpon an Eagle:}
\]
\[\textit{hee throwes a Thunder-bolt. The Ghostes fall on their knees.}\]
\[(bbl3v)\]

The visual symbolism detailed in this stage direction aligns the figure of a God
with the figures of rhetoric, especially \textit{amplificatio}, in which orators “breaketh all
in peeces, like a thunderbolt” (Peacham N2v)—a device at the centre of the
period’s moral anxieties over rhetoric. Certainly, amplification is employed at
this moment in \textit{Cymbeline} in order to heighten the power of the spectacle: “a
certain affirmation very great & weighty, which by large & plentifull speech,
moueth the minds of the hearers, & maketh them to beleewe that which is said”
(Peacham N2r). Wilson also views amplification in visual-aural terms, noting
that “Uehemencie of words full often helpe the matter forwarde, when more is
gathered by cogitacion, than if the thing had been spoken in plaine words.
When wee heare one say . . . The Preacher thundered in the Pulpite . . .” (S2v).
“Vehemencie” and use of non-plain words begins to echo the “strange” effects
that Wilson and Puttenham desire in a good oration. As a metaphor for
vehement (or “strange”) speech, thundering is made quite literal in \textit{Cymbeline}
through its use as a visual-aural prop: Jupiter’s rhetorical style becomes a
special effect. Certainly, the language—Jupiter’s, the tablet’s, Posthumus’s—is
decidedly removed from “plaine words,” effectively making the deity’s descent a
piece of “strange” rhetorical stagecraft.

When the text is read again shortly afterwards, Posthumus encourages
the Soothsayer to interpret it: “Let him shew / His skill in the construction”
(Bbb6r). The final instance of interpretation is framed as an act of “making,”
following the play’s preoccupations with creating material things from language.
“Construction” refers, as it is usually glossed, to the Soothsayer’s interpretation,
but it draws on geometric uses of the term to describe a figure drawn to solve a
problem. It therefore calls to mind the manufacture of the riddle itself: its rhetorical “matter.” Being read out for a second time, the prop/riddle takes an audience back to the text’s delivery, a moment of defiantly constructed stagecraft that draws attention to the invention of its verbal as well as its visual devices. It is a creation that mirrors the playwright’s own craft, whose profession is described by the very word playwright as a craft, one that insists on the wider technological, practical, and hence material aspects of theatrical production (see Stern, Documents 1). Even in the play’s final moments of deconstruction—when all should be interpreted—Cymbeline reminds us of the nature of its visually and verbally spectacular matters: they are constructions. The words serve as a gloss on the playwright and stagehands themselves and emphatically prove Lomax’s description of Cymbeline as “a fluid play” in which “boundaries dissolve between the metaphorical and the literal” (126). Its “matter” is derived from the jointure of rhetorical and material construction.

* * *

Anne Barton recognises that “in the romances, characters continue to misconstrue or be baffled by the evidence presented to their eyes,” although she claims that “it is rare, now, for such uncertainties to result in moral confusion” (“Enter . . .” 189). Nevertheless, with specific reference to Jupiter in Cymbeline, “in a theatre with technical resources comparatively recently developed, the plot material to which Shakespeare now seems to have been drawn encouraged him to re-think the function of the eye in determining ‘belief’” (196-97). The close connection with rhetoric in the stage business of the romances, and Cymbeline in particular, suggests that the technical resources do in fact combine with “moral confusion”—something that is anyway, as the opening chapters of this thesis demonstrate, inextricable from visual confusion. Dena Goldberg notes a similar critical interest in the The White Devil’s scepticism—of vision and of moral philosophy: “Modern criticism has been especially sensitive to the poignancy of Webster’s dramatic recreation of a dying culture, a society without workable values” (1), something evident from Robert Ornstein’s conservative consideration to recent editions and

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72 See Henry Billingsley’s translation of Euclid’s The elements of geometrie (1570) (C4r-v).
introductions that touch on the play’s “cynical” Jacobean hallmarks. In their shared tonal dissonance, verbal construction, and visual confusion, *Cymbeline* and *The White Devil* generate playworlds of sceptical uncertainty, only exaggerated by their self-referentiality and acknowledgement of theatrical (and narrative) artifice. Rhetorical strangeness and its presence in stage “matter” are at the root of such moral and epistemological confusion.

Chloe Porter has recently examined “dramatists’ engagements with processes of visual construction as metatheatrical moments of reflection on the significance of representational activity” (1). Both *Cymbeline*’s rhetorical texts and *The White Devil*’s visions offer such a reflection, and they also interrogate the veracity of visual and rhetorical representation. The conjunction of rhetoric and material stagecraft explains in part the plays’ interest in “strangeness.” In questioning understanding, troubling notions of “truth,” and threatening to “construct” matter from imagination and proof from “invention,” Shakespeare and Webster present a forceful “strange” aesthetic. As chapters Three and Four examined, the term can link the material and the moral realms of early modern England and is particularly charged in the late 1600s and the early 1610s, when scientific and technological developments, geographical exploration, and advances in stagecraft present new means and materials for understanding the world. These elements of “strangeness” are reflected through the term’s rhetorical connotations: *The White Devil*’s concerns with legal rhetoric prompt characters to question their surroundings and give them the scope to translate moral images from emblems to the material world. The sceptical uncertainty associated with “strangeness” is also poetically reflected in *Cymbeline*, where the difficult rhetorical style matches a “revolution” in rhetoric in the early years of Jacobean England, which sees the development of more “embodied” orations.

Exchanges between rhetorical construction and the material world therefore “materialise” the moral anxieties associated with rhetoric, especially its relativising and truth-twisting capacities. Framed as stagecraft, these capacities simultaneously convince and confuse, revealing the persuasive power of rhetorical ornament while also acknowledging its ability to “effectuate strange matters in the mindes of . . . Auditors” (Thomas Wright B2r). The “strange

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See, for instance, David Coleman’s conception of Webster as an “aesthetic relativist” (2), in a study that draws on a wide range of criticism on the playwright.
matter” of these plays produces a profound moral and material uncertainty, but it also represents the moment at which the verbal and the material combine. Strangeness offers a model in which rhetorical style can be read as part of the visual and material world of the playhouse.
Conclusion.

In recent years, scholars including Richard Meek and Christopher Pye have argued for a move away from materialist concerns and towards an appreciation of aesthetic values. A seminar on “Early Modern Aesthetics” at the 43rd annual meeting of the Shakespeare Association of America in Vancouver in 2015 began with the hosts Katherine Attie and Joel Slotkin pushing for an “aesthetic turn” in literary criticism, one that incorporated formal ideas of beauty and style. This thesis implicitly engages with that notion by suggesting that aesthetic ideals demand consideration but are necessarily affected and influenced by their cultural and material surroundings. Yet there also remains room to explore more explicitly the complex aesthetic qualities of strange Jacobean drama. “Strangeness” represents an interest in the aesthetic, and it sometimes comes close in the plays to describing a specific aesthetic effect, but it remains united with material and cultural concerns. In a sense, “strangeness” offers to combine burgeoning academic interest in the “aesthetic” with the now-established “material turn”—a body of scholarship with which this thesis has been continually in dialogue.

Building on the research in this thesis will advance the debate about aesthetics in Jacobean drama. This thesis has chiefly sought to explore a prominent use of spectacle in early Jacobean England and a series of “strange” reactions to and descriptions of such spectacle. What emerges is a model for understanding visual display’s inextricable intellectual, moral, and aesthetic elements.

I have argued for a shift in moral-philosophical thought and presentation, one that converts abstract thought into material terms. The first Part of this thesis explored the contexts of early modern England’s ideas about morality, and the way in which visual and dramatic forms played an important role in disseminating and presenting moral ideas. England underwent a “moral-material” turn in the late Elizabethan and early Jacobean period, exploiting the tangibility of “things” in order to shore up moral axioms, and the materialisation effected by popular print is in turn interrogated on the stage.

Part Two established the stage’s complex interaction with the materialisation of morality. In the theatre, spectacle is treated with ambivalence and anxiety, but it is also shown to be powerful, provocative, and morally
efficacious. In a period in which spectacle is under discussion, the “strange” plays of the 1610s explored in this thesis present powerful interrogations of visual display on the stage. Heywood’s Age plays, far from being sensational but shallow, interrogate the complex puzzles that attend visual representation in the same ways as Shakespeare’s more discussed island play. Similarly, Webster’s The White Devil and Shakespeare’s Cymbeline have long been recognised as plays concerned with visual and material symbols, but they also share a self-conscious materialising of verbal style. The rhetorical and cultural contexts of Heywood’s, Shakespeare’s, and Webster’s plays all combine with “strange” stagecraft, in which practical matters of staging are imbued with philosophical doubt. The six plays discussed in this thesis present powerful examinations of sensory experience and scrutiny of their own mode of representation, but they are also of their age, reflecting a moment early in the seventeenth century in which faith and scientific reason, superstition and scepticism, are held in tension.

“Strangeness” sits at the intersection between the material and the abstract—chiefly by offering both moral and visual description. As such, it constitutes an important extension of Lisa Hopkins’s “drama on the edge,” forming part of the “cross-border traffic” between physical and non-physical realms (2). Spectacle becomes a locus for a host of anxieties in a period in which modern science and technology emerge and evolve and in which scepticism offers a popular philosophical platform for undermining epistemological certainty. The strange 1610s merge scepticism and stagecraft, puzzling audiences with displays and opening up questions about visual experience. Consequently, “strangeness” itself imbues spectacle with a range of intellectual, moral, and aesthetic qualities that push stage display beyond mere sensationalism.

Both building on and challenging some of the conclusions of repertory studies, I have shown in Part Two that different theatres share commercial and aesthetic and intellectual interests. I have read Heywood’s and Webster’s Queen’s Servants’ plays at the Red Bull alongside Shakespeare’s King’s Men at the Globe and Blackfriars theatres. While there are important differences in form, style, and tone, the two companies nonetheless display aesthetic interests in visual display as well as a concern for putting spectacle under the
microscope, holding it up to the light (sometimes literally), and asking its spectators to puzzle out meanings.

In critical terms, “strangeness” thereby offers an alternative to “lateness” in reading Shakespeare’s Jacobean plays—a concept Gordon McMullan has shown to be anachronistic and ideologically inflected by notions of “late writing” in general (Shakespeare and the Idea of Late Writing): “a construct, ideological, rhetorical and heuristic, a function not of life or of art but of the practice of reading and appreciating certain texts within a set of predetermined parameters” (5). A model of “strange Shakespeare” helps to counter ideas of Shakespeare as an exceptional, isolated genius. The term shows that his later drama is enmeshed with the concerns of his contemporaries. “Strange Shakespeare” is equivalent and related to “strange Heywood” and “strange Webster,” all of whom share an approach to spectacle, rhetoric, technology, and an interest in the moral force of visual display.

Shakespeare’s “late style” has been the subject of sustained literary critical interest, but I suggest that it can be read as a “strange style” partly in tune with other, non-Shakespearean drama. While idiosyncratic, Shakespeare’s style is therefore also a product of his historical moment. Further, I have shown that “strange” verbal style significantly participates in Jacobean theatre’s visual effects. The final chapter of this thesis combines rhetorical studies and theatre studies with intellectual and cultural history, and “rhetorical strangeness” presents a new critical model for understanding the connection between speech and stagecraft.

Indeed, reading these plays with strangeness in mind provides a means of appreciating drama’s and the theatre’s aesthetic qualities while ensuring they remain rooted in contemporary cultural considerations. “Strange Shakespeare” thereby offers an alternative to new historicist readings that are sometimes blinkered by the ideological aspects of a play like The Tempest while also avoiding a Romantic reading of Shakespeare rooted in ideas of “late writing.” Because the concept of strangeness mapped out in this thesis combines rhetorical and visual effects, it is able to unite formal aesthetic concerns with the practical aspects of performance.

“Strangeness” therefore offers an important contextual, conceptual, and critical lens through which to analyse drama of the period. This thesis has concentrated on plays that frequently and explicitly invoke and reference
“strangeness” and the “strange.” Yet the lens may be expanded to read other drama in these years, from *The Winter’s Tale* (Globe/Blackfriars, 1611) to Dekker’s *If This Be Not a Good Play, the Devil Is In It* (Red Bull, 1611)—plays also deeply concerned with spectacular display. “Strangeness” affords a way of reading Jacobean stage spectacle that places it in its intellectual, aesthetic, and material contexts. It therefore provides a platform from which to interrogate the intellectual as well as commercial concerns of London’s repertories, ambivalent attitudes towards spectacle, and engagement with changes in technology and travel in a variety of contemporary plays.

The concept connects the stage to the moral, intellectual, and aesthetic contexts of the early seventeenth century—a period fraught with various forms of uncertainty—while offering audiences a glance at the ineffable and the incredible. The “strangeness” of these plays offers a fascinating example of one way in which a culture processes major change in a period of newness, doubt, and aesthetic and linguistic development.
Bibliography.


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