Peacemaking in Medieval León and Castile, c. 1100-1230

Submitted by Charles Thomas Tindal-Robertson, to the University of Exeter as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Hispanic Studies in July 2014.

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Abstract

In early mediaeval Christian Iberia, domestic peace was necessary in order to provide a concerted military effort against Islamic al-Andalus during the Reconquest. This was the case both before and after the partition of the Empire in 1157, and especially during the era of the ‘cinco reinos’. Peacemaking was required to counteract the tendency of the Christian kingdoms to rivalry, particularly over territorial disputes. It was largely achieved through diplomacy, both by successive royal peace treaties, and through dynastic marriage alliances.
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**Peacemaking in the High Middle Ages:**

Peace in any era equates with an absence of violence. This applies both to politically motivated hostilities or private feuding, both of which were rife in the early Middle Ages. To this extent it is the corollary of security in any given territory at any specific time. Peace implied freedom from external attack by a potential aggressor. Often, it also entailed an absence of baronial rebellion, which uncontrolled, might lead to internal conflict and civil war. Peace was often associated with Christianity and the Church, which attempted to restrain the martial energies of medieval society and introduce peaceful harmony. Indeed, peace was regarded as a religious duty, whereas breach of the peace was a sin. Moreover, peace was regarded as the supreme good – the visible manifestation of the divine law on Earth.

Nevertheless, long-term peace also became the standard policy justification for war, to the extent that peace was equated with security.\(^1\) The strategic goal of peace could be used to justify hostilities. In practice, war was necessary to ensure the broader peace – for example, this was broadly Anglo-Saxon strategy with the Vikings.\(^2\) Isidore of Seville describes peace as one of the four stages of war.\(^3\) Fasoli argues that peace could only be achieved through victory over one’s enemies, and hence conflict is sometimes necessary. Hence, the medieval term ‘peace’ (\textit{pax}) had multiple

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\(^1\) J. Benham, \textit{Peacemaking in the Middle Ages – Principles and Practice} (Manchester and New York, 2011), 2, n. 16.
\(^3\) Isidore of Seville, \textit{Etymologiae sive originum}, ed. W.M. Lindsay, 2 vols (Oxford, 1911), Bk. XVIII, x.
connotations, and was employed in a variety of contexts by contemporaries, in narrative sources and treaties alike.\(^4\)

Whilst scholarship on medieval warfare has been prolific in the past half century, including much work on knighthood, the Crusades, castles and chivalry, peacemaking in Western Europe in the High Middle Ages is a much neglected topic.\(^5\) Nevertheless, there has been a shift in recent years, with the publication of works by Benham, Holdsworth, Althoff, and regarding Spain, Pascua.\(^6\) The exception to this dearth of scholarship is the subject of the Peace of God movement of the eleventh century.\(^7\) This is surprising since contemporaries regarded war and peace as two sides of the same coin.\(^8\) War and peacemaking were two alternate but complementary political means of achieving the same ‘foreign policy’ objective, especially the division of territory.

It is a truism to say that peace was often achieved through conflict, especially if the king in question was victorious in battle, thereby defeating his enemy and preventing a foreign invasion. Nevertheless, it was also the duty of the monarch to ensure the internal peace of his kingdom. Naturally, in a martial society domestic peace was easier to achieve when there was military success abroad. Footloose younger sons required land and booty to satisfy their career ambitions. The classic example of this phenomenon was the Normans, who had settled in Normandy after the Treaty of St.

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Norman society was pre-eminently a military one, both in terms of ethos and behaviour. At this time in the eleventh century, Francia was characterised by weak central government, in the wake of the demise of the Carolingian Empire and the rise of the successor Capetian monarchy after 987. Francia was divided into a plethora of feudal principalities, of which Normandy fast became the most powerful; the others included Anjou, Blois, Champagne, Flanders, Brittany, Burgundy and Toulouse. Ancient administrative divisions still commanded loyalty, however the new feudal bonds (liens) were a competing source of authority amongst the military aristocracy.

Hence, it became necessary for the Church to moderate the levels of violence in the interests of wider peace. By the mid-eleventh century, the Church had instituted the ‘Peace of God’ and the ‘Truce of God’ movements. These phenomena involved the public abjuration of violence on the part of local knights, in the interests of maintaining the peace. The Peace of God was instituted by local church councils, which were summoned by the bishop, abbots and lay nobility of the surrounding region. Whereas the Peace of God sought to protect certain classes of people at all times, especially the clergy, religious and the poor, the Truce of God sought to prevent all violence at certain times of the year. This peace movement acquired an ideological spirit, inspired by the ideals of order, unity and justice. At the Peace councils, local milites (knights) would be forced to swear oaths to keep the peace on relics in front of the clergy and local populace. These oaths would be enforced by the threat of excommunication and social penalties, such as ostracism from the local community. Such peacemaking councils became common in eleventh-century Francia, and extended as far south as Catalonia.

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and Galicia.\textsuperscript{13} Cowdrey argues that drawing on the power of the saints and their relics, the Church aimed to restore peace to a disordered society.\textsuperscript{14}

The Truce of God movement was rather a disciplinary measure than an ideological movement. The term \textit{treuga} (truce) lacked the Biblical, theological and liturgical overtones of the religious word \textit{pax} (peace). Its main purpose was to restrain the knightly classes from the use of arms at proscribed times, for example, during Lent. It reached its apex at the Council of Narbonne (1054), where by written agreement, inter-Christian violence was forbidden at all times.\textsuperscript{15} The significance of the Truce of God movement was that it prohibited all violence, not only against unarmed peasants and clergy, but also between armed knights. As such, it was an effective counterweight to the feud, which was endemic in eleventh-century Francia.\textsuperscript{16}

The tendency towards Christian domestic peace left the European aristocracy with a need to find an appropriate outlet for their martial energies. Erdmann observes that the Peace movement was significant on two levels: firstly, it was the first mediaeval religious movement in which the mass of the populace was involved, and as such demonstrated the influence of the Church on contemporary society; and secondly, it represented the principal means by which the Church attempted to Christianize the knightly profession. As such, it offered knights the opportunity to fight for the Church as part of a Holy War.\textsuperscript{17} Duby takes the debate one step further, arguing that the Peace movement acquired a moral force, in the sense that the shedding of Christian blood became outlawed.\textsuperscript{18} However, Bull rejects the argument that the Peace movement

\textsuperscript{14} Cowdrey, \textit{Peace and Truce}, 51.
\textsuperscript{15} J.S. Mansi, \textit{Sacrorum conciliorum nova et amplissima collectio [Mansi]}, XVII, Chap. 827.
\textsuperscript{17} Erdmann, \textit{Origin}, 57-58, 62-64, 75-76, 92.
inexorably led to the Crusades, observing that papal encouragement for the Crusades only really materialised when local prelates held Church councils and granted indulgences.\textsuperscript{19}

Kingship and the Royal Prerogative to Wage War and Conclude Peace:

Theoretically, only the king had the right to wage war and conclude peace with his enemies. The monarch, \textit{qua} sovereign, had the power to agree peace with his opponent above the level of the lord-vassal relationship. The emergence of independent kingdoms led to political discourse. The aim of such diplomacy might be to establish a truce in order to gain tactical advantage; or it might signal an outright end to hostilities – an armistice agreement. In León-Castile, successive monarchs followed these policies: Fernando I, Sancho II, Alfonso VI and Queen Urraca all did so, using the grant of forfeiture of castles to reward or punish their noble followers in the process. More broadly, the arms-bearing population was obliged to engage in hostilities by virtue of their duty to the king as subjects.\textsuperscript{20} In contrast to his magnates, whose primary concern was to defend their castles and their surrounding territory (\textit{alfoz}), the king was responsible for the security of his entire kingdom and its populace. Nevertheless, the defence of a castle assumed greater importance if it was located in a frontier region that was of great strategic significance to a ruler.

As Grassotti argues, the prerogative to wage war and make peace rested with the king, mediated by the clergy and accepted by all the subjects of his kingdom.\textsuperscript{21} Thus, it was the duty of monarchs to defend the realm, by virtue of the royal power conferred on him at his coronation. Indeed, Kershaw asserts that insofar as kingship was about peace

\textsuperscript{20} H. Grassotti, \textit{Instituciones feudo-vassallaticas}, II, 984, n. 129.
\textsuperscript{21} Idem, ‘El deber y el derecho de hacer guerra y paz en León y Castilla’, \textit{Cuadernos de la Historia de España [CHE]}, 59-60 (1976), 221-96 at 223.
and peacemaking, so in turn, peacemaking was about kingship. Le Goff emphasises that the ideals of the medieval king were to obey God and serve the Church; to ensure justice and the peace of his subjects; and to provide for their prosperity. In particular, the king was to be expected to be a leader in war. Nevertheless, sometimes this duty was circumscribed, for example in 1188 at Carrión, King Alfonso IX of León promised not to ‘make war and peace’ without the consent of his curia (court).

However, in return for loyal military service, nobles could expect to receive tenancies (tenencias), and these took the form of the grant of castles. Hence, there was a feudal element to royal peacemaking strategies. Increasingly, this practice was formalised by the redaction of written agreements, in which the formula ‘de hacer guerra y paz’ was made explicit. Grassotti further argues that the distinction between the royal power to levy an army for war, and the duty of feudal lords to raise contingents, is academic. Kings consulted with their magnates, prelates, and more occasionally, civic representatives (concejos) before commencing or ceasing hostilities, whether temporarily or more permanently. Nobles were also obliged to ‘make peace’ by ceasing hostilities when the king demanded it, either for reasons of policy – when a peace treaty had been signed – or else for more practical reasons, such as the tactics of war. In this respect, diplomacy was the continuation of warfare by other means, to quote the famous nineteenth-century German military theorist, Clausewitz’s famous dictum.

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24 J. González, Alfonso IX, 2 vols (Madrid, 1944), II, no. 11, 24 and 257.
26 Grassotti, Estudios Medievales, 87.
Peace in the Middle Ages has traditionally been defined in ‘negative’ terms, as an absence of hostilities, for example, this is Wallace-Hadrill’s view.²⁸ More recently, there has been a shift in the definition of ‘peace’ to one of an undertaking between certain groups of people with chronological and spatial specificity. Neils Lund, for example, argues for an empathic interpretation of peace, which was viewed by contemporaries as a positive concept implying a set of agreed terms.²⁹ Lavelle posits that in a period when strong leadership in battle was seen as a royal virtue, peacemaking would seem to represent a compromise. He poses the question of how can there be universal, Christian peace in an era of endemic warfare.³⁰ Nevertheless, he accepts later that there could be a universal peace in certain circumstances, namely following a major battle when one side was clearly the victor, thus eradicating the threat from his opponent and ensuring a lasting peace. Such was the case when King Alfred the Great defeated the Danish leader, Guthrum, at the battle of Edington (878) and agreed the Treaty of Wedmore with the Dane.³¹ In this situation, we see the king as Christian ruler and royal legislator.³²

Peace agreements could also be used strategically, to form political alliances.³³ Paying tribute, such as the Muslim *taifa* (party) kingdoms of al-Andalus had done to León-Castile under the paria arrangement of the eleventh century was one means of ‘buying’ short-term peace.³⁴ Tribute usually consisted of payment in coinage. Such

³³ Lavelle, *Contextualisation*, 46.
peacemaking had military and humanitarian consequences, to the extent that needless bloodshed was spared.

Althoff argues that friendship was the principal motivation for the contraction of mutual relations between medieval monarchs, out of a desire for a personal bond between the parties concerned. This was especially so in the early twelfth century, before feudal ties (liens) became widespread, which entailed legally-binding relationships between lord and vassal. This scenario applied to peace initiatives and conflict resolution as much as to other aspects of medieval diplomacy. Monarchs bound themselves to each other out of a desire for mutual recognition and support. For example, this was the case in the first Iberian peace treaty, the Treaty of Túy (1137), concluded between Emperor Alfonso VII of Castile-León and the Portuguese Infante, Afonso Henriques. The aim of the treaty was to establish the Portuguese Infante as a ‘good and faithful friend of the Emperor.’

Althoff observes that whilst there has been a lot of scholarship on preventative peacemaking, for example, the Peace and Truce of God movements, relatively little work has been done on amicable dispute resolution, such as arbitration and mediation. He notes that these mechanisms were operative before and after such conflicts erupted. Often, such litigation was resolved by mediators – who were often multilingual – to effect an amicable resolution to the dispute. Such personnel were usually persons of high rank, for example, bishops, nobles and persons connected to the parties in the dispute. Crucially, however, they were also friends with the parties to the case. For example, when Henry II of England adjudicated in the Castilian-Navarrese suit, he set

37 Pascua, Guerra y Pacto, 61.
forth his judgement in two letters to the respective parties, calling them his ‘dearest friends’ (‘carissimis amicis suis’).  

International meetings between monarchs (known as ‘vistas reales’) were usually prepared by envoys, who represented the parties to the negotiations, and this is the first issue that I will be examining in my research. Burns (1978) and Burns and Chevedden (1999) draw attention to the role of embassies in concluding peace after a prolonged military campaign, such as existed during the Spanish Reconquista. This was especially necessary when cross-cultural missions were undertaken, for example with the rulers of al-Andalus.

Emissaries would also be present as delegates if the vista real matured into a full-bodied peace conference. In this instance, the representatives would liaise with the monarchs participating in the vista real. For example, this occurred at Paradinas during the preparations for the Treaty of Fresno-Lavandera in 1183. Embassies could be both clerics and laymen, although Ganshof emphasises that such personnel were usually persons of high-standing at court, who were attached to the central administration, army or the Church.

When long-distance diplomacy was involved, diplomats were often granted full powers to conclude an agreement with a foreign power, as Queller describes. For instance this was the case with the Castilian nuncios despatched to arrange the marriage of the Infanta Berenguela to King Conrad III of Germany, which was ratified by the

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38 J. Gonzalez, El reino de Castilla en la epoca de Alfonso VIII, 3 vols (Madrid, 1960), I, 256.
40 ibid., 130.
Treaty of Seligenstadt (1188). About this time, in the late twelfth century, it became common practice to issue diplomats with written instructions as well a letter of credence, rather than merely oral commands. For instance, this was the case with the Castilian-Navarrese lawsuit referred to arbitration at the English Court in London (1177).

Nevertheless, the relationship between the parties themselves to an agreement was crucial in diplomatic activity, as Althoff argues in his work on friendship, and this is the second issue that I will be examining in my approach to the treaties. To this extent, ceremonies such as vassalage came to be imbued with added significance, as Le Goff asserts in his 1977 *opus*. Other aspects of the royal relationship include the exchange of gifts - as Mauss elaborates in his 1997 study, originally published in French in 1924 under the title ‘Essai sur le Don’, the English translation first being published in 1954 - although these are never mentioned in the treaties themselves, which represent the outcome of such diplomatic intercourse. Such ceremonial would be conducted at royal assemblies, held at special times of the year, and would involve the whole court comprised of the leading ecclesiastical and secular lords of the kingdom, as Reuter (2001) argues.

We also need to address the need for peacemaking at all, hence I will be examining the formal nature of the peace treaties in my research. In concrete terms, this implied the duty to wage war and make peace at the sovereign’s command. However, sometimes war was necessary to vanquish an aggressor – it was necessary ‘to win the peace’. In this scenario, peace and security might be attained by means of a decisive victory – for example, the battle of Las Navas de Tolosa (1212) - removing the threat of an invasion. In this sense, ‘peace’ really did mean an absence of hostilities.

42 Gonzalez, Alfonso VIII, II, Doc. 499.
This is a point which Jenny Benham makes clear\textsuperscript{46}, and in an age of endemic warfare, this consideration will form the thrust of my analysis of the Iberian peace treaties. Hence, in my thesis, I will examine the formal nature of the treaties in question.

Once diplomacy was embarked upon, peacemaking could take different forms. Jenny Benham\textsuperscript{47} is the only English scholar to attempt such a categorisation, and her work will influence my methodology considerably. Firstly, a truce might be agreed. In this case, a ceasefire would take effect during which peace negotiations would occur, leading to a lasting settlement. Secondly, an armistice agreement might be concluded. This was a comprehensive peace agreement, concluded in order to halt hostilities, usually on the victor’s terms. Thirdly, treaties of alliance might be agreed. These were concords of friendship and assistance, directed towards deterring hostilities from reoccurring. Consequently, they were of vital strategic value in geopolitical terms.

Once peace treaties were agreed, they needed to be implemented. This was largely achieved through castle exchange, as castles controlled the security of their surrounding territory (\textit{alfoz}). Glick (1995) is the foremost authority on Spanish castles, and the social consequences of the assignment of castles to the nobility.\textsuperscript{48} Although the transfer of castles occurs in almost every treaty, their true significance is most potently emphasised in the Treaty of Palencia (1199), when King Alfonso IX settled thirty castles on his bride, Queen Berenguela of Castile as a means of stabilising the frontier between the two kingdoms – a wedding gift with huge diplomatic repurcussions, as Bianchini (2012)\textsuperscript{49} and Rodríguez López (1995) argue.\textsuperscript{50} Bianchini emphasises the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{46} Benham, \textit{Peacemaking}, 4.
  \item \textsuperscript{47} Benham, \textit{Peacemaking}, 23.
  \item \textsuperscript{48} T.F. Glick, \textit{From Muslim Fortress to Christian Castle – Social and Cultural Change in Medieval Spain} (Manchester and New York, 1995), 57.
  \item \textsuperscript{49} J. Bianchini, \textit{The Queen’s Hand – Power and Authority in the Reign of Berenguela of Castile} (Penn., 2012).
  \item \textsuperscript{50} A. Rodríguez López, ‘Dotas y arras en la politica territorial de la monarquia feudal castellana: siglos XII-XIII’, \textit{Arenal}, 2:2 (1995), 271-93 at 291.
\end{itemize}
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significance of Queen Berenguela’s lordship in the Tierra de Campos by virtue of her control of her *arras* (prenuptial agreement) castles. More generally, Martin elaborates on the theme of Queen Berenguela’ political influence as a powerful women in both the Leonese and Castilian courts.\(^{51}\)

The exchange of castles is a subject which was has been addressed by the Spanish scholar, Pérez Alfaro (1991),\(^ {52}\) although she concentrates on the period of the ‘cinco reinos’ only (i.e. from 1157 until 1230). In this way, noble tenants of castles held the peace of the kingdom in their hands, effectively guaranteeing the substance of the peace agreement. The role of secular lords as guarantors of royal peace treaties is a topic which Calderón Medina (2001) alludes, too.\(^ {53}\)

In an age of endemic warfare, it was necessary to have some means of enforcing peace treaties. This was especially so when a treaty was agreed between two foreign powers, or at an international level. For example, the Emperor Alfonso VII concluded a treaty of *auxilium* (military support) with the Commune of Genoa, in Italy. This was agreed in the presence of more than forty witnesses to ensure that it was upheld, as Hall and Phillips observe.\(^ {54}\) Often, parties or their representatives were obliged to swear to maintain the peace on the Gospels or on the relic of a saint.

In case of derogation from the duties specified in the treaty, the parties implicated could expect to face severe sanctions. These could be ecclesiastical punishments, such as excommunicaton or interdict, as referred to by Vodola (1986)\(^ {55}\)

and Clarke (2007), respectively. However, they could also be secular in nature, principally the confiscation of castles, as Grassotti (1981) and Perez Alfaro make clear. This would constitute a drastic punishment for nobles responsible for breaching the peace, in violation of the peace agreement reached by their monarchical overlords.

Holdsworth observes that Anglo-French peace was achieved in Normandy through four treaties between Henry I and Louis VI of France. These were the treaties of 1101, 1109, 1113, and 1120. However, none of these treaties are extant, and he opines that diplomatic agreements of this era were not written down. The first treaty, the Treaty of Alton (1101), was between Henry I and his brother, Robert Curthose. Negotiations ended in stalemate, and according to the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, ‘the chief men’ intervened and reconciled the two brothers. The treaty was then guaranteed by the oaths of twelve worthy men on either side. A number of elements in diplomatic procedure can be elucidated from this agreement: first, the role of intermediaries or negotiators; second, the actual terms of the agreement; and third, measures to ensure compliance with the treaty.

The second agreement, that of 1109, was heralded by negotiations at Neaufles in the disputed Vexin region. The only coherent source for Louis is Suger’s Vie de Louis le Gros, and is heavily biased in Louis’s favour. The negotiations led to a truce. The agreement was guaranteed by the exchange of hostages.

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58 Pérez Alfaro, Alfoz y tierra, 36.
59 Holdsworth, Peacemaking in the Twelfth Century, 2.
63 Holdsworth, ‘Peacemaking in the Twelfth Century’, 5, n. 32: M. Chibnall has noted that hostages are only noted in the narrative sources when something untoward happened to them.
The third treaty, the Treaty of Gisors (1113), was preceded by preliminary negotiations between Henry and Count Fulk of Anjou near Alencon at the end of February 1113. The two monarchs met at Gisors at the end of March 1113,\textsuperscript{64} and swore to keep the peace.

The Treaty of 1120 was the last treaty between Henry and Louis.\textsuperscript{65} This treaty was mediated by Pope Calixtus II, to whom Louis had complained about Henry’s behaviour at the Council of Rheims. The pope visited Henry to hear his side of the dispute. The two met at a church halfway between the castles in which they were staying. The choice of a church as a venue, and one between castles on opposite sides of a strategic river, indicate that as neutral a location as possible was chosen.

Both the pope and the king were accompanied by intermediaries. Much of the diplomatic intercourse was effected by clergy present at the conference.

The outcome of these negotiations in the summer of 1120, was that William Adelin performed homage to the French king, and received Normandy as a fief in return. Both parties could claim tangible results: first, Henry did not have to perform homage himself; and second, Louis’s suzerainty was recognised.\textsuperscript{66}

The salient feature of Henry II’s reign (1154-89) is the sheer weight of evidence that remains, in contrast to the dearth of material from Henry I’s rule. This is so despite the fact that both reigns are of similar length, i.e. thirty-five years. Firstly, the chronicles are much richer from c. 1170 onwards. Some of them actually incorporate the complete texts of peace agreements from this epoch. For example, the *Gesta Henrici*, which Stubbs wrongly attributed to Benedict of Peterborough, and which is now thought to have been authored by Roger of Hoveden, tells us more about

\textsuperscript{64} OV, XI. 45 (vi, 180-1); Cf. Hollister, ‘Normandy, France’, *Monarchy, Magnates*, 39, 53-4.

\textsuperscript{65} OV, XII. 24 (vi. 290-1).

peacemaking in Angevin England than any other source. Other narrative sources, such as Roger of Hoveden, Ralph of Diceto and Gerald of Wales are all significant sources because all three chroniclers were court historians, and consequently their accounts are reliable.

Holdsworth now elaborates on the role of intermediaries in the reign of Henry I. He remarks on the involvement in peace negotiations of the Cistercian Order, who were attractive as mediators because of their strong organisational networks. The most famous Cistercian, St. Bernard of Clairvaux, had preached the Second Crusade, and lauded the ‘new knighthood’ (de laude novae militiae). The Papacy found the Cistercians useful in the Anglo-French negotiations, and employed them as papal legates.

The Papacy was heavily involved in late-twelfth century peacemaking, as it saw the peace of Christendom as the essential prerequisite to ensure the success of the Crusades to the Holy Land. To this end, Papal legates were despatched all over Europe to reconcile bellicose kings. These monarchs also welcomed the mediation of such third parties in their own partisan interests. Most legates were of the rank of cardinal.

Occasionally, legates lost patience with monarchs who placed the interest of the crown above the interests of the wider Church. When this occurred – and it was a regular feature of Western European politics at this time – legates had the power to excommunicate kings. For instance, Cardinal John Anagni threatened King Philip II Augustus of France with excommunication. Such a case demonstrates that ecclesiastical sanctions such as excommunication or interdict were not necessarily effective against a determined monarch, if the ruler concerned believed he was fighting in a just cause.

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Furthermore, internal and external peace often complemented each other; conversely, a deterioration in domestic harmony often presaged a decline in foreign relations. Contemporaries viewed these two spheres as one and the same duty of a Christian prince. For example, the chronicler Gerald of Wales described King Henry II of England thus:

‘[he] dreaded…war, and with supreme wisdom…he essayed every method before resorting to arms.’\(^\text{68}\)

Furthermore, medieval peacemaking was international in character. Peace was made between kings or rulers of independent polities, rather than between local magnates or royal subjects. However, although the latter were not interlocutors or parties to the agreement in question, they were often implicated in royal treaties, as the documents bear out. This scenario of inter-monarchical peacemaking presupposes that diplomacy was often bilateral or multilateral in the early Middle Ages. Reuter argues, correctly in my view, that a clear distinction must be made between international peace conferences (colloquia) and domestic assemblies (curia).\(^\text{69}\) However, the terminology was subject to great regional and stylistic variations.

Finally, peacemaking was often just one aspect of broader diplomatic initiatives, for example, commercial transactions or marriage alliances. Significantly, peacemaking was often required following noble rebellion. At times such as these, rebellious magnates would frequently align themselves with enemy rulers. Hence, domestic politics could assume an international character. In Spain, the classic example of this phenomenon of disaffected nobles defecting to a foreign court was the departure of the Castro dynasty to the court of Fernando II of León during the Castilian civil war (1162).

\(^{68}\) *Giraldi Cambrensis Opera*, V, 303.
Historiography:

There are several recent English works on mediaeval peacemaking, notably those by Holdsworth and Benham. Holdsworth begins by observing that Ganshof’s seminal work, *The Middle Ages – A History of International Relations*, published in 1953, has not been surpassed despite being somewhat dated. Ganshof asserts that in the Middle Ages there were a variety of conflict resolution methods, and diplomacy was often as important a means as war for attaining a state’s political objectives.

In his own paper delivered as the R. Allen Brown Memorial Lecture (1997), Holdsworth concentrates on the reigns of Henry I and Henry II of England. Using Orderic Vitalis as his principal source, he notes that Henry I (1100-35), was deeply committed to peace, and fostered peace in the international arena, namely with Capetian France. This is significant because Holdsworth is emphasising Anglo-French ‘long-distance’ diplomacy, as opposed to Henry’s domestic peace efforts in Normandy.

Benham adopts a comparative approach to peacemaking, contrasting the principles of diplomacy with contemporary reality, using twelfth-century England and Denmark as her case studies. She categorises five main aspects of peacemaking: first, the importance of the location of peace conferences; second, the role of ritual, such as banquets and diplomatic gifts; third, the role of envoys; fourth, the means of enforcing peace agreements, such as oaths and hostages; and lastly, the redaction of written

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agreements themselves. However, she emphasises the practice of diplomacy, rather than the subject of diplomatic agreements themselves. This is an aspect of diplomacy that I hope to remedy in this thesis.

Benham’s first chapter is devoted to the location of peace conferences. She argues that as meeting-places fluctuated with shifting patterns of territorial dominance, so too did frontiers.

In Chapter 3, devoted to the diplomatic envoys, Benham challenges Queller’s assertion that medieval envoys can be divided between *nuncii* and *procuratores* outside of Italy before 1200.\textsuperscript{75} Benham proceeds to argue that specific gestures of submission performed by lords to suzerains were of less significance than the circumstances in which they were undertaken. Even acts of fealty and homage ‘encompass a number of different scenarios and relationships.’\textsuperscript{76} In such a situation, Benham argues, peacemaking involved a set of standard procedures which added symbolism to the occasion. However, the real significance of these practices is open to interpretation, and contingent upon the specific political-military context in which the two parties met. Indeed, Benham admits that an examination of ritual, location and the parties provides only a superficial understanding of peacemaking, and could be misleading without a deeper knowledge of the political circumstances.

In his review of Benham, Cox alerts the reader to the fact that Benham’s work rests on the premise that in order to understand medieval warfare, we also need to comprehend medieval war and peace equally. Consequently, the medieval historian needs to grasp the mechanics of peacemaking.\textsuperscript{77} Benham chooses as her case study the

\textsuperscript{76} Benham, *Peacemaking*, 99.
\textsuperscript{77} R. Cox, review of Benham, in *English Historical Review [EHR]* (June, 2013), citing Benham, *Peacemaking*, 1.
relations between England and Denmark between the mid-twelfth to the mid-thirteenth centuries. She also examines the Angevin Empire, which is far better documented than Denmark, and more germane to my study.

Cox argues that Benham’s methodological approach is not particularly convincing. Benham adopts a comparison of extremes, contrasting the worst-documented kingdom (Denmark) with the best-documented kingdom (Angevin England) in Western Europe at this epoch. However, as Cox asserts, this approach does not materially advance our understanding of the principles of medieval peacemaking, which is the subject of her book. She also has a significant bias towards the Angevin Empire. Moreover, she does not confine herself to Angevin or Danish examples, and cites examples from both before 1154 and after 1241. This is to her credit, as it demonstrates both breadth and depth of research.

Cox observes that the argument that peacemaking was highly circumstantial undermines Benham’s central thesis that there were certain principles of peacemaking, and that analysis of these norms is essential to understanding war and peace. Indeed, the end of this argument is that it is impossible to discern general ‘principles’ of peacemaking. It would seem that the answer lies somewhere in between Benham’s and Cox’s views: there were principles of peacemaking, but these were confined to the practice of diplomacy, rather than the subject of diplomatic business.

Iberian Historiography:

The principal history of Iberian diplomacy in the Early Middle Ages is by Miguel Ochoa Brun in three volumes, however his account is rather a manual of the practice of diplomacy in the Middle Ages, rather than an academic historical study. In Volume III he discusses the principal themes of Castilian-Leonese diplomacy, both

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during the reigns of Emperor Alfonso VII, and after the partition in 1157. Much of his discussion concentrates on the late Middle Ages, namely, post-1250. However, his is a rather cursory account, and he does not subject the written treaties to close analysis. Ochoa Brun concentrates on diplomatic procedure, rather than the substance of the diplomatic agreements themselves. In so doing, he outlines diplomatic practice, but he does not elaborate on the changes in the methodology of diplomacy. Consequently, his analysis lacks depth.

In Chapter 10 he focuses on the morphology of ‘direct diplomacy’, the role of the king as protagonist in diplomacy, royal vistas reales (peace conferences) and the Spanish chanceries. However, his analysis is rather abstract, with no political context or specific examples. His discussion is confined to the theoretical and actual role of the monarch as a ruler, observing that in an autocratic age, foreign policy was embodied in the person of the ruler. However this analysis is very cursory, being confined to a few pages. However, he does emphasise the importance of the location of vistas reales. In particular, his discussion of the royal chancery is of a general nature, without close reference to documentary evidence, as for example, is to be found in Lucas Álvarez’s study. Nevertheless, he observes that chancery staff were scribes who could be entrusted with government business, namely redacting documents that resulted from royal peace conferences.

In his section on ‘Diplomacy by Procuration’, he notes that diplomacy became itinerant because the royal court was constantly on the move. He examines itinerant diplomacy in general, and the role of diplomatic personnel, focusing on the duties of the ambassador. This again is discussed in very abstract terms. Moreover, as Queller has

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observed, these emissaries only appear post-1200. Like Queller, he distinguishes between different classes of diplomat, however he does not elaborate on this distinction, although he states correctly that until c. 1200 diplomatic personnel only consisted of nuncios (messengers) and papal legates; ambassadors appeared later, constituting resident diplomats as opposed to earlier representatives who were merely entrusted with a specific mission. However, he does observe that different terminology was used to differentiate various categories of diplomatic personnel, such as messengers, procurators and heralds (p. 311). He also describes a diplomat’s duties, and relates the qualities required of a diplomat in the Middle Ages. He observes that a diplomat was required to be an orator, charged with the task of articulating the foreign policy of his principal.

His section on documentation is his most substantial. He observes that with the emergence of Feudal kingdoms and their bureaucracies in the twelfth century, there is a wealth of documentation for perusal by the scholar. Nevertheless, as for surviving documentation, he observes that only a tiny proportion of extant medieval Spanish documents concern foreign policy; instead, there is a mass of documentation relating to political affairs in general. He relates how diplomats required letters of credence to function effectively in their host court, and that a diplomat’s ‘armoury’ consisted of his diplomatic credentials, his brief, and his safe conduct. In an era of political uncertainty, when the iter (mission) itself was an ordeal, these issues were far from routine. However, his discussion of these matters is hindered by the fact that he selects examples exclusively from the Late Middle Ages. Moreover, his discussion of how diplomatic business was conducted is conflated with his section on Documentation, which is confusing for the reader.

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Regarding documentation, Ochoa Brun offers a short discussion of the form of diplomatic documents, beginning with the title of the king and ending with seals. This discussion is cursory in the extreme. However, he does have an interesting discussion of the conservation of diplomatic documents. In brief, he notes that copies of texts were preserved in chanceries (in the case of the Papacy called the Registry), and he illustrates this point by citing the example of the Corona de Aragón, which is known to be a very rich archive.

Ochoa Brun then examines the ‘Nature of Diplomacy’, focusing on the role of diplomats in the Middle Ages. Rightly, he analyses their immunity, and the privileged nature of their mission, based on Roman law. He then launches into a litany of exceptions to this rule. He proceeds to allude to the issue of diplomatic precedence, which in an age of hierarchies was of prime importance. He describes how the procedure of diplomatic business would unfold, and he relates how the actions of the ambassador would be shaped by the customs of the host court. He proceeds to outline how the host monarch’s response would be delivered. However, this is a very schematized analysis and takes no account of political reality in the Middle Ages.

He concludes by examining the final audience of a diplomatic mission with the king and his councillors. These were of an occasional nature in the Middle Ages, as there were no resident embassies. However, the ambassador could hope to depart with a signed copy of the treaty which was outcome of his negotiations, concluded on the basis of his mandate from his principal. With the exception of a very few cases, these negotiations would be a bilateral intercourse between himself and the opposing monarch. Rarely, a third party, such as the Papacy or Holy Roman Empire would intervene to achieve a solution to a dispute that had wider regional consequences.
The main Spanish scholar to write on war and peace is Esther Pascua. This is the subject of her 1996 work, *Guerra y Pacto en el Siglo XII – La Consolidación de una sistema de reinos en Europa Occidental*.\(^{81}\) As the title implies, her range embraces the whole of Western Europe in the twelfth century, not just Spain, although Iberia features prominently. Her main objective is to relate the nature of peace agreements in twelfth-century Western Europe, their alternation with periods of bellicosity, and the role of both warfare and diplomacy in consolidating the emergent feudal kingdoms of the West.

Pascua’s work adopts an anthropological approach, concentrating on the procedures of diplomatic activity rather than the substance of the treaties themselves. She adopts a very broad approach, outlining the trends of twelfth-century Western diplomacy. There is scant reference to the political history which forms the context for these developments, and no analysis of specific political developments. Instead, the reader is offered a morass of generalisations, for example her assertion at the beginning of Chapter 1 that peace was the norm of inter-monarchical relations in the twelfth century.\(^{82}\) This is a very abstract hypothesis with little substantiation. Indeed, it is a very idealistic notion of peace as a political goal. However, she discusses the motivation for peacemaking, namely, friendship, fraternity or alliance. Later, she discusses dispute resolution and breach of the peace in sociological terms, with no historical context; this is typical of her work as a whole.

In Chapter II, she analyses the institutional nature of diplomacy, for example, the role of arbitration, excommunication and hostage-taking, without studying the political nature of these events. Once again, she adopts a sociological method, simply describing the principal vehicles for medieval diplomacy, rather than placing diplomatic

\(^{81}\) Pascua Echegaray, *Guerra y Pacto*.  
\(^{82}\) Ibid., 36.
activity within the context of political history. Nevertheless, in this chapter, she correctly focuses on the replacement of oral tradition with written forms of diplomacy.

As regards the documentation, she surveys the nature of diplomatic treaties, identifying the sequence of clauses common to all medieval treaties and classifying them in order of appearance in the agreements themselves. She also notes their significance as symbols of royal prestige: the outcome of *vistas reales* (royal summits), and the product of royal relationships, that *ipso facto* were superior to patterns of noble allegiance. She correctly observes regional variations in terminology, even within the Iberian Peninsula itself. She discusses *amicitia* (friendship) as the fundamental prerequisite for diplomatic business at a monarchical level. Later, she discusses hostages, although these do not appear in twelfth-century Iberian treaties at all, albeit other kingdoms of Western Europe employed this tactic. In discussing *vistas reales*, she rightly alludes to the landmark Treaty of Fresno-Lavandera (1183), which was a paradigm of royal peacemaking in Iberia, based on elaborate diplomatic practice.

She then analyses the practice of arbitration. She correctly defines the legal nature of arbitration – namely as a contractual process of conflict resolution, whereby the two parties to the dispute delegate a limited power of referee to an agreed third party. Furthermore, she correctly stresses the role of the king as judge, a phenomenon that becomes obvious in the litigation that I examine in my thesis, when King Henry II of England arbitrated in the dispute between Castile and Navarre. However, she devotes much space to disputes resolved by the Papacy or the Holy Roman Emperor, which are marginal to the concerns of my study.

She then discusses excommunication as a spiritual sanction. She correctly identifies the Papacy as the main enforcer of sanctions. She proceeds to discuss their likely success against monarchs who were adamant that their policies were justified, and
who were not to be deflected from their course of action. There is extensive discussion of excommunication as a foreign policy weapon of the Papacy, although she does not enter into the wider question of Papal intervention in the domestic politics of rulers who incurred the wrath of the reigning pope.

She also devotes a section to ‘Hostages and Conduct’, as does Kosto in his recent book.\(^{83}\) This phenomenon is outside the ambit of my thesis, as Iberian monarchs appear not to have employed hostage-taking as a diplomatic tool. Hostage-taking does not appear in any of the treaties that I examine in this thesis, although it is worthy of note, by being ‘conspicuous by its absence’, especially as it was common practice elsewhere in Western Europe, for example, in Anglo-Scottish relations. Consequently, I will not discuss it here.

In her 2002 article, ‘De Reyes, Senores y Tratados en la Peninsula Iberica del Siglo XII’, Pascua explores at length the relationship between the feudal monarchs of the Iberian Peninsula and the nobility of the twelfth century.\(^{84}\) This study analyses the effect of royal treaty-making on the monarchical-noble relationship. However, her argument is a rather polarized debate between kings and nobles, and war and pacts. She begins by considering the historiography of this topic however this receives very cursory treatment. She then analyses the consolidation of the Feudal monarchies of the period, and sets Iberia within the context of Western Europe at that time. However her sketch of twelfth century political history is very broad, with little elaboration or detail. Next, she focuses on the Iberian Peninsula in the twelfth century, considering the issue of feudalism in Spain. She notes that the vistas reales were one of the principal developments in Spanish history of the time. She also usefully examines the difference between monarchical policy and noble ambitions in terms of the establishment of royal


\(^{84}\) ‘Pascua, ’De Reyes, Señores’. 
power and the creation of political hierarchies. This leads into a discussion of the nobility and noble rebellions in this study. On the positive side, she confronts the issue of noble rebellions, which other scholars of peacemaking ignore. Her principal argument is that kings collaborated in order to constrain noble rebellion, which unhindered, might infringe the peace.

Royal supremacy was achieved through an alternating process of war and royal peace treaties, which effectively produced alliances of kingdoms aligned in royal blocs. She devotes a whole section to royal treaty-making in the context of vistas reales and ‘direct diplomacy’ between monarchs. This is positive to the extent that she cites specific treaties as examples. She examines the motivation for diplomacy, personnel, terminology, and the nature of liens between parties and non-parties, for example, magnates. In particular, she identifies the partition treaties as a special class of peace agreement, in the sense that they constituted an alliance between Castile and Aragon.

She also examines the role of the Church in peacemaking. She emphasises the role of senior clergy in the business of treaty-making, acting as mediators, scribes and witnesses. In her conclusion, she merely reiterates the monarch-noble dichotomy, its manifestations and consequences. She concludes by arguing that royal peace treaties constrained noble unilateral action through the formation of alliances of kingdoms that effectively constituted a political ‘bloc’. Like her 1996 work, Pascua’s article suffers from a lack of detailed political analysis which forms the background to her argument; she merely cites random examples to bolster her case, rather than offering an informed and extensive study of the period. On the positive side, she does examine some of the Iberian treaties in detail, analysing the terms of agreements in question.

Pascua’s last work, ‘Peace among Equals: war and treaties in twelfth-century Europe’ (2008), takes as its theme the equality of kingship in twelfth-century Western
Europe, and the role of royal peace treaties in subjugating the nobility, who were lower down the political hierarchy. Once again, she emphasises the nature of regal power at *colloquia pacis* (peace conferences), and the distinction between monarchs and their aristocratic retinues. She also emphasises that kings mutually recognised their authority, and that partition treaties, such as that of Cazola (1179), had the effect of denying magnates new land, as kings carved up territory and expanded their kingdoms. The net effect of this consolidation process was the formation of centralised feudal kingdoms at the expense of fragmented noble principalities.

However, she does not attempt to place treaties within their historical context. For example, she discusses gift exchange, citing Mauss, but in fact there are very few examples of gift exchange from twelfth-century Iberia. She correctly states that written diplomacy was the principal innovation in political discourse in twelfth-century Western Europe. Next, she provides a useful summary of the standard form of a medieval peace treaty. She also relates the whole gamut of terminology used to define the treaty in question, noting regional variations. For example, she has a useful section on *amicitia*, which was the basis for most early medieval treaties, although she does not cite Althoff, the principal authority on the subject. In discussing *convenientiae* (covenants), she omits to refer to Kosto.

Then she analyses the nature of *colloquia pacis*, distinguishing between monarchs and their noble lineages; this is the main thrust of the work. She briefly refers to the nature of treaty provisions and their likelihood of success, given the possibility of noble transgression. Then she states her argument: that monarchs collaborated to outmanoeuvre footloose magnates through a combination of treaties and wars, creating alliances that were too powerful for nobles to overcome. She has a brief section on chronicles, which is inconclusive. In discussing homage, she correctly differentiates
between the personal bonds of early medieval treaties which bound monarchs as common leaders in war, and the strictly legal ties (liens) that obliged parties and non-parties, such as nobles, to levy an army in return for a fief, which was the very essence of feudalism. In so doing, she correctly alludes to the specific, feudal duties that defined twelfth-century pacts.

She also refers to the definition of territory and problems of royal legitimacy, correctly observing that these problems often led to political submission, such as at the Curia of Carrión (1188). Pascua correctly observes that military auxilium (mutual assistance) was linked to the defence of kingdoms with established borders, although it was also employed in an aggressive capacity. Significantly, although this diplomatic nicety is elaborately articulated in numerous treaties in the twelfth century, it is difficult to cite a single example of defensive co-operation in practice. Moreover, the prosaic reality of political and military affairs also embraces the king-noble relationship: often magnates were dependent on their monarchs, rather than the converse. Finally, her case for the equality of rulers is not proven. Indeed, all the evidence points to a clear hierarchy of rulers, as I hope to illustrate in this thesis.

Pascua compares the Iberian treaties with those between the Anglo-Norman realm and Capetian France. However, she does not offer a comprehensive analysis of inter-monarchical treaty-making in any one kingdom, merely selecting random examples to support her argument. On a positive note, she elucidates the significance of royal treaty-making, emphasising the importance of solemnity, reputation, prestige and legitimacy between the parties to the agreement. She also examines legal terminology, the role of the Church, the need for enforcement of treaties with regard to conflicting noble ambitions, the importance of alliances between kingdoms, castle exchange, and fidelity between lords and vassals.
Research Aims and Methodology:

In this thesis I will first examine the motivation for peacemaking between the kingdoms of Christian Iberia in the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries. This will involve a consideration of the political context in which peace treaties arose. Hence, I will examine the political history of twelfth- and thirteenth-century Christian Iberia, especially León and Castile that forms the background to the diplomacy between these powers. In so doing I will survey the chronicles, which provide valuable historical context to diplomatic activity at this time. Peacemaking constitutes an arm of diplomacy, and this consideration of the foreign policy of the Christian Iberian kingdoms is the contribution of my thesis. Peacemaking was also a distinct political strategy, in opposition to waging war. Moreover, it was the prerogative of kingship; only the king, as leader of his subjects, was able to negotiate with foreign rulers. Iberian foreign policy was divided between broad, idealistic accords of friendship prior to c. 1150; and more pragmatic agreements of alliance that characterised the later period (c. 1150-1230). Thus, I will analyse the circumstances that led to the peace conferences (vistas reales), looking at the motivation for royal peacemaking.

As regards chronology, I have divided my first two chapters sequentially, the first examining the period c. 1100-1157; and the second the period 1157-1230. The first period was the age of the Castilian-Leonese Empire.

The second period was the era of the ‘cinco reinos’, and lasted from the division of the Empire at the death of Emperor Alfonso VII in 1157 until the reunification of the crowns of Castile and León in 1230. At this point Castilian-Leonese treaties terminate because there were no longer two rival kingdoms confronting one another. There was
now no need to conclude peace agreements because central Iberia was now controlled by one unified polity.

Nevertheless, treaty-making in Christian Iberia did not begin until 1137, when the first peace treaty between Castile-León and Portugal was agreed. Moreover, there is an uneven pattern of peacemaking as evidenced by the survival of treaties. Quite simply, there are more peace treaties for some reigns than others. This is partly because some monarchs lived longer than others, and longer reigns gave rise to greater opportunities to pursue an ambitious foreign policy.

Some monarchs also pursued more aggressive foreign policies than others. For example, King Alfonso VIII of Castile embarked upon an energetic diplomatic engagement with Aragón, Navarre and León. In contrast, King Enrique I of Castile, who was still a minor when he occupied the Castilian throne, was mainly concerned with ensuring his own survival. The multiplicity of treaties thus generally reflects the seniority of the ruler who propagated them.

In this thesis, I will examine the role of diplomatic personnel in negotiating treaties, such as nuncii (messengers) and papal legates. Subsequently, I will analyse the importance of preliminary negotiations, in which emissaries played a vital role, such as at Paradinas in 1183. I will also evaluate the significance of truces, which were broadly designed to hold the peace for a transition period whilst more permanent arrangements were made for a durable peace.

Thirdly, I will assess the importance of location regarding vistas reales. This was of vital significance in the Middle Ages, when the prestige of the monarchs who were the respective parties to the treaty in question was at stake. As Benham observes, it could be a humiliation for a lesser potentate to travel deep inside his enemy’s territory
to attend a peace summit.\textsuperscript{85} Hence, both sides often met at agreed frontiers, at place delineating their respective kingdoms. This ‘frontier’ was often a geographical feature, such as a river. More importantly, it constituted neutral territory.

Fourthly, I will examine the texts of the treaties themselves. Adopting a forensic approach, I will analyse the formal, technical language of the large cache of peace agreements which survive from medieval Castile and León. This will involve an appraisal of the parties to the treaty; the nature of the agreement – for example, concord and alliance – and the relationship of the parties in political and legal terms.

Finally, I will examine the measures incorporated in the treaty to ensure its implementation and compliance, such as guarantors and oaths, castles, hostages, and ecclesiastical sanctions, such as excommunication and interdict. Particularly important in this section will be an appreciation of the value of castles, both as assets in implementing agreements, and as liabilities in the case of derogation from the treaty in question.

In Chapter 1 I will look at Leonese-Castilian Diplomacy in the Imperial Age, prior to 1157. Firstly, I will examine Kingship, and the royal prerogative to wage war and conclude peace agreements. I will analyse friendship and fidelity between monarchs as the basis for foreign relations in the early twelfth century. On the negative side, territorial disputes led to political discourse, as the principalities of Iberia coalesced into feudal kingdoms.

Then I will examine frontier diplomacy, analysing long-term structural issues, such as the hegemony of León-Castile, and the rivalry with Aragón during the reign of Alfonso I \textit{el Batallador}. In this section I will focus on the partition treaties, and the partition of Navarre between Castile and Aragón.

\textsuperscript{85} Benham, \textit{Peacemaking}, 15.
Thirdly, I will appraise the subject of inter-Christian diplomacy and the crusades in Iberia. The context for this development was the internal peace of the Christian powers themselves. I will consider both long-distance diplomacy with states outside the Iberian Peninsula, such as the Italian Commune of Genoa, as well as diplomatic relations proper to Iberia itself, such as the Castilian-Aragonese alliance.

In Chapter 2 I will examine Leonese-Castilian Diplomacy in the era of the ‘Cinco Reinos’. In this chapter I will first continue my examination of frontier diplomacy. In particular, I will analyse the effects of Emperor Alfonso VII’s *divisio imperii* in the Tierra de Campos on sovereignty in León and Castile, and posing the question of whether fragmentation inevitably follows succession. I will also examine in depth the ongoing Castilian-Navarrese territorial dispute, and the various partition treaties between Castile and Navarre that affected Navarre.

Secondly, I will address the issue of the monarchical-noble relationship in Leon and Castile. Nobles were regarded as potential violators of the peace, and were often co-opted into peace treaties as non-parties. Pascua argues that alliances between monarchs alienated the nobility by forming royal ‘blocs’ that magnates were powerless to overcome. By contrast, Doubleday argues that ‘monarchs were the fount of noble power’, that it was only through royal favour that noble ambition could be rewarded. Pascua also asserts that monarchs were equals, whilst nobles were inferior in the political hierarchy – this is a hypothesis which I will confront.

Thirdly, I will look at marriage alliances and succession. For most of the latter half of the twelfth century, there existed a Leonese-Portuguese axis in the west of the Iberian Peninsula. This consisted of repeated dynastic marriages between the kings of

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86 This phrase was coined by R. Menéndez Pidal.
87 Pascua, Peace among Equals, 195.
Leon and Portuguese Infantas. Both Fernando II and Alfonso IX married Portuguese brides. These alliances were mediated by the Church, and dowries of castles were given. They were particularly successful in maintaining a durable peace because both sides had a stake in ensuring the success of the union.

My work will concentrate on the treaties themselves, which are the primary source for medieval Iberian peacemaking. There is a large cache of peace agreements from Iberia in the period c. 1100-1230, and this is fertile territory. These documents constitute the evidence for peacemaking activity during my period. I will first analyse the legal framework of the treaties themselves. Hence, I will examine the parties (and non-parties, such as nobles), their successors, and the role of third parties, such as arbitrators and papal legates. The main thrust of my argument will be to attempt to understand contemporary efforts to achieve peace, in an era of endemic warfare. In so doing, I will appraise the language of peacemaking, friendship, concord, alliance, and so forth. In analysing the treaties, I will consider whether they can be categorised as truces (treuga) designed to ensure peace for a limited period during which negotiations for a durable peace would occur; armistice agreements following a period of bellicosity; and treaties of friendship (amicitia) and alliance, including marriage alliances, designed to forge political unions and deter future hostilities.

I will then examine how peace was to be held once it had been agreed, focusing in particular on castle exchange. I will also survey sanctions to be implemented in case of derogation. Such sanctions could be either temporal – notably forfeiture of castles – or ecclesiastical, such as excommunication and interdict. However, the emphasis in medieval peace treaties was to ensure that peace would endure, hence there were elaborate compliance measures to prevent contravention of treaties, such as guarantees and oaths. Finally, I will attempt to gauge treaties’ success by their duration; a
proliferation of peace treaties will indicate that previous treaties have foundered, occasioning the need for a new agreement.

I will also discuss the role of papal influence in such diplomacy. The supreme court in the Middle Ages was the Papal curia. Ullmann argues that the Papal Curia had compulsory jurisdiction, and could enforce its judgements through the ecclesiastical sanctions of excommunication and interdict.\(^89\) By virtue of the universality of Church law, rulings of the Papal Court applied to all Christians. Nevertheless, Papal diplomacy could be protracted because of the distance of Rome from northern Europe. Death or defeat of one of the parties could halt papal intervention. Also, the pope himself, like other medieval rulers, could be a party to international diplomacy – this could hinder, delay or bias any final judgement.\(^90\) Furthermore, it is clear that formal papal judgements did not always take precedence over other political considerations in guiding a ruler’s decisions. For example, King Alfonso IX and Queen Berenguela proceeded to conclude an illegal marriage, despite Pope Innocent III’s pronouncements.

However, the Papacy was not the only forum for independent arbitration. There are also a number of cases of monarchical arbitration, of which the most celebrated was the case of the Castilian-Navarrese dispute. The arbiter, King Henry II of England, asked for the claims to be presented in writing. Among these were the Truce of Fitero (1167), which the Navarrese plaintiff, King Sancho VI, asserted had been breached by the Castilian monarch, Alfonso VIII.

The remarkable aspect of Henry’s arbitration in this case was that both the oral testimony of the Spanish envoys and the written petitions of both sides played a significant role in proceedings. Henry was not content with hearing the claims and


\(^{90}\) Benham, *Peacemaking*, 186.
allegations of the Spanish emissaries; he also wanted them committed to writing, ostensibly because he could not understand the spoken Latin of the diplomats. Furthermore, both sides were furnished with documentary proof of their claims, in the form of written petitions, which have survived.

In order to be able to submit their disputes to arbitration or to make an appeal, parties needed to have near exact copies of the terms of any agreement, redacted, exchanged and proclaimed. According to Chaplais, all surviving treaties from Henry II’s reign are in the form of a final agreement, drawn up in duplicate, in the joint names of the two sides. Both copies were then sealed interchangeably, and delivered to the opposite party, and vice versa. However, from the reign of Richard I onwards (c. 1190), Anglo-French treaties were no longer issued in the joint names of rulers, but were redacted in the form of individual letters patent and exchanged. Pascua notes that the stronger ruler often precedes the other party in peace agreements of the twelfth century. This was certainly the case in Christian Iberia from this period. However, in Anglo-French treaties of this era, it is more probable that each king disseminated a text in which he named himself first.

Sources - The Iberian Peace Treaties:

Despite the dearth of extra-Peninsula sources, there is a remarkable cache of documents from Christian Spain. This documentation amounts to thirty-five peace treaties between the five Christian Iberian kingdoms during the period c. 1100-1230. This proliferation of diplomatic activity is particularly significant when one considers that other comparable kingdoms in early mediaeval Europe, such as Plantagenet

92 Ibid., 25.
93 Pascua, Peace among Equals, 194.
England or Capetian France, have preserved very few such documents. Consequently, the Iberian cache constitutes a ‘forensic laboratory’ for the scholar of diplomacy.

Most of the treaties concerning Aragon are preserved in the cartulary known as the Liber Feudorum Maior, housed in the Archivo de la Corona de Aragon, in Barcelona. This has now been edited and published by F. Miquel Rosell. The Genoese treaties have been edited and published by C. Imperiale di Sant’ Angelo as part of the Fonti per la Storia d’ Italia series. Some Castilian and Leonese treaties are preserved in the Archivo Historico Nacional, and the Biblioteca Nacional, in Madrid, although sometimes there are copies in provincial cathedral and diocesan archives, as well as monastic archives. In the case of the Castilian-Leonese peace treaties of the 1180s, they are preserved in the archive of the Cathedral of Santiago de Compostela, the Metropolitan see of the Kingdom of Leon. The treaties relating to the Castilian-Navarrese dispute are preserved in the British Library in London, and were published as part of the Rolls Series. Thomas Rymer also published these documents in the eighteenth century as part of his ‘Foedera et conventiones’ series. The majority of the thirteenth-century treaties are preserved in the Cathedral archive of Leon. Two of the thirteenth-century treaties, the Treaty of Toro I (1216) and the Treaty of Benavente (1230), are preserved in the Archivio Segreto Vaticano, in the Registers of Popes Honorius III and Gregory IX, respectively. All the treaties from the post-Imperial epoch, i.e. dating from after the divisio imperii in 1157 until reunification in 1230, have been published in modern editions by Julio Gonzalez.

Most of these treaties are preserved in ecclesiastical archives, either monastic houses or cathedral archives. Often these monasteries were in remote locations, close to the frontier with neighbouring kingdoms. Three monastic houses have preserved documents that contain peace treaties during this period. They are: Sahagún on the
Castilian-Leonese frontier; Las Huelgas, near Burgos; and Silos, near the Castilian border with Navarre. The first treaty that concerns us, the Treaty of Túy (1137), was preserved in the archive of Sahagún, and is now published in the Colección Diplomática del Monasterio de Sahagún, edited by J.A Fernández Flórez. In addition, some treaties that are now preserved elsewhere originated in monastic scriptoria, for example, the Treaty of Sahagún (1158), whose provenance was the monastery of Sahagún, but which is now in the Archivo Histórico Nacional [AHN], Madrid.

Some treaties were deposited in monastic archives because the monastery was close to the frontier between the two kingdoms which were party to the treaty in question. For example, this was the case with the Treaty of Sahagún (1158), which addressed the apportionment of territory following the divisio imperii that attempted to divide the Castilian–Leonese Empire between the descendants of Emperor Alfonso VII. This was done so that future litigants could avail themselves of documentary proof of the terms of earlier treaties that they alleged had been breached by the other side. For example, the Treaty of Nájera–Logroño II (15 April 1179) was stored in the archives of the monastery of Silos in the vicinity of the Castilian–Navarrese border, so that both Castilian and Navarrese parties could have access to it.

Sometimes monasteries were also chosen to house royal treaties because the monastery was close to the political interests of the parties concerned. This was the case with Las Huelgas, which was a royal foundation. Several treaties were stored here, including the Treaty of Tordehumos (1194) and the Treaty of Palencia (1194), both of which concerned the dynastic interests of the royal houses of Castile and León.

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95 Treaty of Sahagún (23 May 1158), (1) Archivo Histórico Nacional, Madrid, [AHN], Sahagún.
97 Treaty of Tordehumos (20 April 1194). Archivo del monasterio de Las Huelgas, Burgos, leg. 1, no. 1.
namely the question of the Leonese succession and the settlement of strategic castles on the brides of the Leonese monarchs as dowries. Later, King Alfonso VIII of Castile and his queen, Leonor, were buried at Las Huelgas.

Cathedral and diocesan archives also preserved peace treaties in medieval Iberia. Sometimes, these archives belonged to metropolitan sees; at other times, they were suffragan dioceses. Several diocesan archives hold treaties, among them the Archivo de la Catedral de Palencia, which holds a twelfth-century copy of the partition Treaty of Sahagún (1158). The archive of the Archdiocese of Santiago de Compostela contains the important treaties of Medina de Ríoseco (1181) and Fresno-Lavandera (1183). These treaties regulated the peacemaking efforts of the kings of Castile and León in the 1180s. These peacemaking initiatives were focused on the dispute over the contested territory of the Tierra de Campos, which lay in the border area between the two kingdoms. These treaties were germane to the notion of territorial sovereignty of both kingdoms as they attempted to halt the seizure of land by the other party. Consequently, they were of immense political significance. Moreover, they needed to be preserved in case of future derogation. This was especially so with the Treaty of Fresno-Lavandera, which actually specified that the parties should reconvene at a later time and date to deal with issues arising from foreseen breaches of the original agreement.

Several treaties were preserved in the archives of the Metropolitan See of Toledo. Toledo had been the capital of Visigothic Spain, and several Councils of the Church had been held there during that period. For example, a contemporary copy of the Treaty of Sahagún (1158), formerly preserved in the Archives of Toledo Cathedral (Archivo de la Catedral de Toledo) is now preserved in the Archivo Histórico Nacional (AHN) in

100 Treaty of Sahagún (23 May 1158). Archivo de la Catedral [AC] de Palencia.
Several copies of treaties are also preserved in the cartulary known as the *Liber Privilegiorum Toletanae Ecclesiae* (Book of Privileges of the Church of Toledo).  

Most of the thirteenth-century peace treaties survive in the archive of the Cathedral of León (AC León), reflecting the ascendancy of the Kingdom of León at this time. These include the vernacular Treaty of Cabreros (1206); the Treaty of Valladolid (1209); the Truce of Coimbra (1212); the unnamed truce between Alfonso IX of León, and Fernando III and Queen Berenguela of Castile (1217); the Treaty of Toro II (1218); and the Treaty of Boronal (1219).

The Archivo Histórico Nacional in Madrid holds copies of several treaties whose provenance lie in the provincial cathedral archives of Spain. This is the case for the Treaty of Sahagún (1158). The Treaty of Cazola (1179), which also originates in Toledo; the Treaty of Fresno-Lavandera (1183), which originates in Ávila; the Treaty of Calatayud (1198), which also originates in Toledo.

The Biblioteca Nacional [BN] in Madrid also houses several copies of mediaeval peace treaties. One, the Treaty of Sahagún (1158) is a seventeenth-century

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105 Treaty of Cabreros (26 March 1206). AC León, no. 27.
107 Truce of Coimbra (11 November 1212). AC León, no. 597.
108 No topical date is given for this treaty. AC León, no. 627, treaty divided by ABC chirograph.
109 Treaty of Toro II (26 August 1218). AC León, no. 469.
110 Treaty of Boronal (13 June 1219). AC León, no. 25.
112 Treaty of Fresno-Lavandera (1 June 1183). AHN, Catedral de Ávila.
copy of the Palencia codex of this treaty. Significantly, a copy of the Cuenca manuscript of the Treaty of Seligenstadt (1188) is also preserved in the capital.

The Papal Curia was the supreme court of jurisdiction in Western Europe at this time, and it is natural to expect the papacy to take an interest in the affairs of Western rulers. This tendency increased after the election of Pope Innocent III in 1198, but earlier popes had despatched legates to ensure the Church’s interest was represented. Two thirteenth-century treaties are preserved in the Vatican Archives in Rome, known as the Archivio Segreto Vaticano (ASV): those of the Treaty of Toro I (1216), preserved in the Register of Honorius III; and the Treaty of Benavente (1230), contained in the Register of Gregory IX. Both of these reflect the Papacy’s continued interest in Iberian affairs at this time, as the bulwark of Christendom against Islamic al-Andalus.

The treaties in the post-Imperial period, i.e. after 1157, have all been transcribed and edited by Julio González. They appear in his four works, Regesta de Fernando II (Madrid, 1943); Alfonso IX, 2 vols (Madrid, 1944); El Reino de Castilla en la época de Alfonso VIII, 3 vols (Madrid, 1960); and Reinado y diplomas de Fernando III, 3 vols (Córdoba, 1980-86). Taken together they represent a far larger archive of diplomatic than exists in any other kingdom of Western Europe during the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries. This fact testifies to the flourishing diplomatic activity in León and Castile at this period in the early Middle Ages. Indeed, it is highly significant when

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118 J. González, Regesta de Fernando II (Madrid, 1943); Idem, Alfonso IX, 2 vols (Madrid, 1944); Idem, El Reino de Castilla en la época de Alfonso VIII, 3 vols (Madrid, 1960); Idem, Reinado y diplomas de Fernando III, 3 vols (Córdoba, 1980-86).
one considers that comparable kingdoms such as Angevin England had an efficient government bureaucracy.

The Treaty of Seligenstadt which determined the proposed marriage of Castilian Infanta, Berenguela, to the son of the Holy Roman Emperor, Conrad, survives in the original, in two copies. Both are preserved in Castilian cathedral archives, one in Cuenca and the other in Burgos. Indeed, the Cuenca version is authenticated by a lead seal of King Alfonso VIII of Castile, although the Burgos version has lost its seals. A later marriage alliance between doña Berenguela and King Alfonso IX of León is preserved in the Treaty of Palencia; this survives in the archive of the monastery of Las Huelgas, near Burgos, where her father was buried.

Most thirteenth-century Castilian-Leonese peace treaties, starting with the landmark Treaty of Valladolid (1209) survive in the Archivo de la Catedral (AC) de León. The Treaty of Valladolid is extant in the original. Two Leonese treaties were concluded with Portugal, León being the nearest Spanish kingdom to Portugal and sharing a long border with it: these were the Truce of Coimbra (1212) and the Treaty of Boronal (1219). Finally, two Castilian-Leonese treaties are preserved in the Vatican Archives, in the Registers for the pontificates of popes Honorius III and Gregory IX. This reflects the Papacy’s ongoing interest in the maintenance of peaceful Castilian-Leonese relations.

Most Aragonese treaties, where the Crown of Aragón was a party to the agreement, are preserved in the royal archives known as the Archivo de la Corona de Aragón (ACA) in Barcelona. Aragón-Catalonia was a major force in twelfth-century Iberian politics, second only to Castile-León, its principal rival and later partner in the Reconquest. Consequently there exists a proliferation of diplomatic agreements contained in the Aragonese archives. These contain the cartulary known as the ‘Liber
Feudorum Maior’ (LFM) (Book of Major Fiefs), edited by F. Miquel Rosell and published under this title. Often the LFM contains copies of treaties originating elsewhere, such as the Treaty of Carrión (1140/1), which is to be found in the cathedral archives of Jaca.\textsuperscript{120} For example, the treaty formalising the Castilian – Aragonese alliance, the Treaty of Zaragoza (1170), is preserved in the LFM cartulary in the ACA archive.\textsuperscript{121} Likewise, the Treaty of Cuenca (1177), agreed during the siege of the city by joint Castilian – Aragonese forces, is also preserved in the LFM cartulary. Some Castilian treaties concerning Navarre have also been preserved in ACA, reflecting Castile’s oriental policy throughout the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, both unilaterally and in conjunction with Aragón, such as the Treaty of Guadalajara (1207).

The treaties relating to Genoese intervention in the Second Crusade in Iberia (1147) are preserved in a modern edition known as the Codice Diplomatico della Repubblica di Genova (CDG), edited by C. Imperiale di Sant’ Angelo. This collection has been published as part of the Fonti per la Storia d’ Italia (FSI) series. These contain the treaties of 1146 between the Commune of Genoa and Emperor Alfonso VII of León-Castile relating to the forthcoming siege of Almería.\textsuperscript{122} The Genoese also concluded treaties with Count Ramon Berenguer IV of Barcelona regarding the siege of Tortosa (1148) and Lérida (1149) respectively, as part of their involvement in the Second Crusade.\textsuperscript{123} In each case, the treaties are significant for the division of captured territory, which represented the commercial reward for their participation in a ‘foreign war’.


\textsuperscript{121} Treaty of Zaragoza (July 1170). Archivo de la Corona de Aragón (ACA) - LFM, fols. 19a – 20a.


\textsuperscript{123} Hall and Phillips, Caffaro, 135.
The treaties relating to the Castilian-Navarrese dispute which was adjudicated by King Henry II of England at the Council of Westminster (Easter 1177), are all preserved in English archives preserved in the British Library in London. They were later published in Rymer’s *Foedera*. These documents were also incorporated into the English chronicles of the day, such as the anonymous *Gesta Regis Henrici* and Gerald of Wales’s chronicle. These include the Truce of Fitero (1167), which preceded the legal proceedings, and which was integrated into the *Gesta Regis Henrici*, translated by Stubbs and now part of the Rolls Series. Also included are the Treaty of Nájera-Logroño I (1176), which officially referred the issue to arbitration, and the Petitions of both monarchs, King Alfonso VIII of Castile and King Sancho VI of Navarre, stating their claims to the contested region of La Rioja. Only the Treaty of Nájera-Logroño II (1179), which finally settled the matter, is preserved in the archives of the monastery of Silos, on the Castilian-Navarrese frontier, where it could avail the parties to the controversy. This arbitration procedure was recorded for the purpose of providing a permanent record of the lawsuit.

Most of the treaties examined in my thesis are copies, either contemporary or later ones. Six of the thirty five peace treaties are original documents. For example, the Treaty of Seligenstadt (1188) between Alfonso VIII of Castile and the Emperor Frederick Barbarossa contracted the marriage between Alfonso’s daughter, Berenguela, and the Emperor’s son, Conrad III. This dynastic marriage – which was never concluded – was significant because it represented the integration of the Kingdom of Castile, the most powerful of the Spanish kingdoms, into European politics in the

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twelfth century. Two originals of the treaty have survived, one in the Archivo de la Catedral de Cuenca\(^{126}\), and the other in the Archivo de la Catedral de Burgos\(^{127}\).

Several other late-twelfth century and early thirteenth century treaties have also survived in the original. They include the Treaty of Tordehumos (1194), the parties to which included the Papal Legate, Cardinal Gregory de Sant’ Angelo\(^{128}\), the Treaty of Cabreros (1206)\(^{129}\), which was the first treaty to be written in Castilian Romance, rather than Latin; and the Treaty of Valladolid (1209), which was the first treaty to successfully achieve a durable peace between the erstwhile enemies of Castile and León\(^{130}\).

In an increasingly litigious age, treaties were committed to writing primarily to anticipate future litigation. In the event of the dispute being referred to arbitration, written documents served as proof of claim, for example written submissions were required by King Henry II in his arbitration of the Castilian-Navarrese dispute. However, it seems likely that many treaties were incorporated into the accounts of chroniclers, simply for the purpose of providing a permanent record of the agreement being reached.

As regards patterns of preservation, many of the treaties have survived in the Archivo de la Corona de Aragón. This is largely because the rulers of the Crown of Aragón were a party to numerous peace treaties with their opposite numbers in Castile, both as Counts of Barcelona and later, as kings of Aragón. As regards the Navarrese

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\(^{126}\) Treaty of Seligenstadt (23 April 1188). AC Cuenca, caj. 1, leg. 2, doc. 17. Lead seal of Alfonso VIII.

\(^{127}\) Ibid. AC Burgos, Vol. 17, no. 434. Seal lost.

\(^{128}\) Treaty of Tordehumos (20 April 1194). Archivo del monasterio de Las Huelgas, Burgos, leg. 1, no. 1.

\(^{129}\) Treaty of Cabreros (26 March 1206). AC León, no. 27.

\(^{130}\) Treaty of Valladolid (27 June 1209). AC León, no. 30.
territorial dispute with Castile, the records of this litigation are preserved in the British Library, in London.

However, treaties of national importance are preserved in the Biblioteca Nacional, in Madrid. For example, the Treaty of Seligenstadt (1188) is preserved there. However, copies of this treaty are also housed in the Archivo Catedral de Toledo, the Metropolitan See of Castile, and other significant locations. Furthermore, treaties of geopolitical significance, like partition treaties, are to be found in the Archivo Histórico Nacional, in Madrid, for example, this is the case with the treaties of Sahagún (1158) and Calatayud (1198). Moreover, copies of partition treaties are usually to be found in situ, close to the frontier delineated in the treaty concerned.

Several treaties are preserved in locations connected with parties involved in their genesis. For example, this is the case with the Treaty of Palencia (1199), which was agreed at the initiative of Queen Leonor of Castile – this treaty is preserved in the archives of the monastery of Las Huelgas, Burgos, which had once been a palace of the Castilian monarchy.

As regards the proliferation or absence of treaties in any given reign, prior to the divisio imperii in 1157, the Castilian-Leonese emperor was the protagonist with respect to the agreement of peace treaties with neighbouring kingdoms, of which six remain. Three of these were concluded with the Crown of Aragón, Castile’s long-term ally in the Reconquest, most importantly the partition Treaty of Tudején (1151). This alliance was renewed under successive Aragonese rulers, namely Count Ramon Berenguer IV of Barcelona, Alfonso II and Pedro II. On the Castilian side, King Alfonso VIII was assiduous in cementing this alliance, and consequently there are a plethora of Castilian-Aragonese treaties from the later twelfth century.
The reign of Alfonso VIII of Castile was characterized by an aggressive foreign policy, achieved both by diplomacy and war. Hence, there was a cycle of agreements between the rulers of Castile and León, especially in the 1180s - notably the Treaties of Medina de Ríoseco and Fresno-Lavandera – and 1190s, aimed at attempting to achieve peace after the failure of the previous agreement and concomitant descent into conflict. This tendency began in the 1180s, with the reign of Fernando II of León (d. 1188), and continued under his son, Alfonso IX.

King Alfonso IX of León entered into various marriage alliances in order to safeguard the Leonese succession. This was necessary so as to achieve the domestic stability required for peace with León’s neighbours, Castile and Portugal. After King Alfonso VIII’s death in 1214, King Alfonso IX of León, who was now the senior ruler in Christian Iberia, followed a policy of détente with successive Castilian rulers, namely Enrique I and Fernando III, and this policy is evidenced by successive peace treaties between Castile and León from this period. Under Leonese hegemony, he was also able to assume a position of dominance in relation to his neighbour, Portugal.

King Alfonso VIII of Castile was also the protagonist in the dispute over La Rioja with Navarre. Including the Truce of Fitero (1167), this litigation involved no less than five separate documents, and even after the adjudication the issue was left unresolved. Indeed, the Castilian monarch pursued his oriental diplomacy until the end of the first decade of the thirteenth century, both in conjunction with Aragón (the Treaty of Calatayud, 1198), and unilaterally (the Treaty of Guadalajara, 1208).

Peace was a highly desirable foreign policy objective in an era when violence was rife. Indeed, from both the political and military perspectives, peace was ideal. This was true because quarrels over territory were frequent, and political rivalry could lead to conflict.
Chapter 1 – The Political Geography of León-Castile, c. 1100-1157

Introduction:

The first half of the twelfth century in Spain was dominated by Castilian-Leonese imperial pretensions, and, after the Imperial coronation of Alfonso VII in 1135, the formal realisation of the Castilian-Leonese Empire. ‘Imperator’ (Emperor) signified a supreme military leader who had won a decisive victory in battle. More often, it connoted a potentate who wielded suzerainty (overlordship) over a plurality of dominions. This predominance distinguished the Castilian-Leonese Empire from lesser powers of the era, such as the County of Barcelona. In the case of León, its dominions embraced Galicia and Extremadura (territory south of the River Duero); with Castile, there was the ongoing dispute with Navarre and Aragón over La Rioja region. Moreover, the Leonese monarchy considered that they were the legitimate personification of the ancient Visigothic kings of Spain, who had been usurped by the Arab invasion of the Iberian Peninsula in 711 AD.

The chapter will pose the question why diplomatic peace treaties appear to be recorded for the first time, when previously issues of war and peace had been the subject of oral agreements. In so doing, I will assess the long-term structural problems associated with the Castilian-Leonese Empire, such as the secession of Portugal, the desire for independence on the part of ascendant Aragon-Catalonia, and the perennial issue of Navarre.

Historiography:
The short-lived ‘Empire’ of Castile-León has been regarded as the exemplar for all later Spanish empires by Castilian historians, such as Ramon Menéndez Pidal and Recuero Astray. They view the Alfonsine era as the forerunner of the later Castilian and Aragonese empires that succeeded the Almohad Caliphate after c. 1250, when the Reconquista was almost complete. This phenomenon was achieved by the suzerainty exercised by successive Castilian-Leonese kings from Alfonso VI onwards.

By contrast, Aragonese and Navarrese historians, such as Ubieto Arteta view the Castilian-Leonese Empire as a historical construct. Such a paradigm manifests itself as a pretension to power that the kings of Castile wielded over Aragón and Navarre in a blatant desire to subjugate the lesser powers of Christian Iberia. This relationship was expressed in the feudal homage performed by the king of Aragón to the Castilian-Leonese emperor. As Estepa Díez argues, it is significant that King Sancho Ramírez of Aragón should acknowledge Castilian-Leonese hegemony, even if this does not fully equate with the notion of a formal Hispanic Empire.

Precedents for Imperial claims:

Precedents for claims of imperium refer back to the early eighth century, when Spain was ruled by the Visigothic dynasties, hence the scholar needs to bear imperial antecedents in mind when considering any claims to overlordship in the High Middle Ages. In the mid-twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the concept of sovereignty implied overlordship of an emperor over lesser kings and princes. Such was the status of the

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132 C. Estepa Díez, El Reinado de Alfonso VI (Madrid, 1985).
133 A. Ubieto Arteta, ‘Navarra-Aragón y la Idea Imperial de Alfonso VII de Castilla’, Estudios de la Edad Media de la Corona de Aragón [EEMCA], 6 (1956), 42-82.
134 Idem, ‘Homenaje de Aragón a Castilla por el condado de Navarra’, EEMCA, 3 (1947-48), 7-78.
135 Estepa Díez, Alfonso VI, 45; Cf. C. Sanchez Álbornoz, ‘La postestad real y los señoríos en Asturias, León y Castilla’, in Estudios sobre las instituciones medievales españoas (Mexico, 1965), 791-822.
Holy Roman Emperor. So too, was the aspiration of Emperor Alfonso VII of León-Castile.\textsuperscript{137} This struggle reflects the conflicting ideological currents in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. At the basis of the concept of imperial sovereignty lay the political theory that the Emperor was the legitimate suzerain over subject territories. This authority was both indivisible and inalienable.\textsuperscript{138}

However, French autonomy from the Empire was based on the justification that the Capetian monarch enjoyed his extensive territorial possessions (known as the royal domaine). This theory was elaborated from the thirteenth century onwards. This territorial concept was the basis for the division of the Empire and the Frankish kingdom (987), although formal division had occurred much earlier, during the Carolingian Empire, at the Treaty of Verdun (843).

The Imperial concept which animated the Asturian and Leonese kingdoms derived from the Visigothic kings of Spain, who had ruled the greater part of the Iberian Peninsula. It was this idea of an Iberian empire that inspired the Leonese monarchs in their ideal of a united Spain. The title ‘imperator’ signified the Leonese aspiration to hegemony over the other Christian Iberian states already in existence in the tenth century.

The Imperial ideal was personified in the supremacy of the Leonese monarchs. For Menéndez Pidal, this ideal manifested itself as an institutional reality in the early Middle Ages, from the tenth to the mid-twelfth century. This title of ‘Emperor’ declaimed the superior political and military power of the Leonese ruler over other monarchs of Iberia. The ideal of unity was aptly expressed by the title ‘Emperor’: a substitute title, for example, ‘rex Hispaniae’, could not suffice, as it merely connated a regional ruler, with no claims to overlordship.

\textsuperscript{137} Recuero Astray, Alfonso VII, 38.
King Alfonso VI (1072-1109) had begun to style himself ‘Emperor’ as early as 1077. He did this to signify Castilian-Leonese hegemony over all of Christian Spain, as well as to denoted papal and Islamic claims to overlordship. He employed the titles: ‘Imperator totius Hispanie’ (Emperor of all Spain), and ‘Imperator super omnes Hispaniae nationes constitutus’ (Emperor of all the peoples of Spain). This was to indicate his wider suzerainty over all of Spain, Christian as well as Muslim – for example, on the credentials of the Castilian envoy, Alvar Hanez to al-Mu’tamid, taifa king of Seville, Alfonso VI describes himself as:

    Emperador de los dos religiones’.

King Alfonso VI won an outstanding victory at Toledo in 1085, when he recaptured the former Visigothic capital from the Muslims. However, with the conquest of Toledo, the Christian frontier moved south from the River Duero to the River Tagus, in the centre of the Meseta. Following the capture of the ‘royal city’ (urbs regia), Alfonso assumed the mantle of a triumphant emperor, and his seat of power was the former Visigothic capital:

    ‘Adephonsus Imperator Toletanus Magnificus Triumphator’.

However, Alfonso’s imperial pretensions faced the reality of a plurality of nascent Christian kingdoms emerging in the late eleventh century. Ubieto Arteta argues that Alfonso’s suzerainty over the other Christian kingdoms of Iberia was merely notional, and that in fact relations of parity existed between the Peninsula rulers – that at this time there was not a hierarchy of monarchs. This argument rests on the premise that the kings of Iberia were equals, who merely performed homage out of a sense of

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140 Estepa Díez, Alfonso VI, 36.
friendship. For example, he cites the occasion when King Sancho Ramírez of Aragón swore fealty to Alfonso VI in 1087.\footnote{Ubieto Arteta, ‘Navarra-Aragón’, 41.}

Castilian-Leonese imperial pretensions were given actuality by Alfonso’s annexation of Navarre in 1077, following the assassination of the Navarrese monarch, Sancho García IV (1054-76) the year before, on 4 June 1076.\footnote{B.F. Reilly, The Medieval Spains (Cambridge, 1993), 104.} Navarre had already been a tributary of Castile prior to Sancho’s death, and Castile exercised suzerainty over the Pyrenean kingdom. Alfonso VI appropriated all of Sancho’s former possessions.

At this time, neighbouring Aragon also seized a portion of Navarre, which now devolved on King Sancho Ramírez I of Aragón (1063-94). Sancho Ramírez captured Pamplona and its surrounding territory. The two monarchs, or their agents, met to agree a partition treaty, which has not survived. Under the terms of the treaty, Aragon was to receive the core territory of Navarre around Pamplona, extending as far south west as Estella. However, he was to perform homage for it to the Castilian king, Alfonso VI. Castile was to receive the entire middle Ebro Valley, as far south as Calahorra, namely La Rioja region. Castile was also to receive the old Basque provinces of Alava, Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa.\footnote{Cf. Reilly, Alfonso VI, 87-92; A. Ubieto Arteta, ‘Homenaje de Aragón a Castilla por el condado de Navarra’, EEMCA, 3 (1947-48), 1-22.}

Consequently, Navarre was partitioned between Castile and Aragón, and ceased to be an independent kingdom for the next half-century, until 1134. La Rioja had become Castilian territory, and lordship over the Basque territories was now assumed by Castile, which exercised hegemony over them.

However, in 1081 Alfonso VI altered his oriental policy to the detriment of Aragon. The Basque territories of Alava, Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa were consolidated
under the lordship of the magnate, Lop Jiménez. He had co-operated with the Castilian monarch in the partition of Navarre in 1076. The fact that these three counties were now under Castilian control constituted a threat to Aragón. Alfonso VI also created a county of La Rioja under the powerful Castilian noble, Garcia Ordoñez, who had been a royal alférez (standard bearer). Garcia now appears in documents not only as comes (count), but also as husband of Urraca, sister of the former king of Navarre. This new county was designed to contain the Navarrese, and strengthen the frontier with the taifa of Zaragoza. The region also constituted a buffer zone between Castile and Aragón in the Upper Ebro Valley.

On Alfonso VI’s death, his daughter, Queen Urraca (1109-26), styled herself ‘Empress of all Spain’ (totius Ispanie Imperatorix).144 Meanwhile, her husband, who was King of Aragón, Alfonso I el Batallador, claimed the Leonese title for himself, adopting the style, ‘imperator de Leone et rex totius Hispaniae.’ However, at the Peace of Tamara (1127) he was sufficiently astute to acknowledge, that on Urraca’s death in 1126, the imperial title had passed to her son, Alfonso VII of León-Castile (1126-57).

During Alfonso VII’s reign, the Leonese imperial concept reached its zenith in political terms. This was particularly so after the Imperial Coronation of Alfonso in León in 1135. He was now ‘Imperator Hispaniae’ (Emperor of Spain). At this ceremony, the King of Navarre, García Ramírez (1134-50) and Count Ramon Berenguer IV of Barcelona, Prince of Aragón (1131-62), swore vassalage to the Leonese-Castilian emperor for their territories.

In the second half of the twelfth century, political circumstances did not facilitate the endurance of the Castilian-Leonese Empire. Since 1085, and the recapture of Toledo, Alfonso VI had styled himself ‘Imperator Toletanus’, after the ancient royal

144 Valdeavellano, Curso, 231.
city of Visigothic Spain. However, he had not been able to revivify Spain in its entirety. Moreover, according to Valdeavellano, the traditional ‘prestige of Empire’ had been linked to León in terms of political dominance, although Toledo was now ascribed to the emergent kingdom of Castile.\textsuperscript{145}

Moreover, territorial expansion and political consolidation by other Christian Iberian states, especially Aragón, did not permit Castile and León to exercise hegemony over other Iberian powers. For these reasons, the Imperial project was abandoned. Neither Fernando II of León (1157-88) or Alfonso VIII of Castile (1158-1214) adopted the title ‘Emperor’, which fell into disuse. Nevertheless, Fernando III of Castile (1217-52) vainly attempted to revive it on occasions.

Instead, the Christian Iberian states found expression in the thirteenth century as differentiated polities.\textsuperscript{146} The ‘five kingdoms’ were Castile, León, Portugal, Navarre and Aragón-Barcelona. However, this disintegration never implied the transcendant unity of the Hispanic nation or dynastic solidarity between its royal houses, who were still styled by chroniclers in diplomas as the ‘Reges Hispaniae’ (Kings of Spain).

**The Secession of Portugal:**

Alongside the existence of the Castilian-Leonese Empire, which occupied the core of Christian Iberia in the Middle Ages, the other, peripheral kingdoms exhibited varying degrees of drives towards independence, and these need to be considered on an individual basis. Portuguese secession tendencies dated back to the beginning of the twelfth century, when Count Henry of Burgundy had married Alfonso VI’s natural daughter, Teresa. Just before the former’s death in 1109, the couple had refused to accept his plans for a marriage alliance between their step-sister, Urraca, to Alfonso I of

\textsuperscript{145} Ibid, 231.
\textsuperscript{146} Ibid., 232.
Aragón. Consequently, they withdrew from the Castilian court to Coimbra, in Portugal. Reilly argues that ‘effectively they never returned, and that Portuguese independence dated from this time.' Under Afonso Henriquez (1128-85), an independent kingdom of Portugal emerged. From 1128 – 35 he merely styled himself ‘Infans’, emphasising his relationship to his grandfather, Alfonso VI of León-Castile. However, after the Imperial Coronation in 1135, Alfonso VII began to employ the title ‘Imperator’.

Following his Imperial Coronation, Emperor Alfonso VII sought to impose Castilian-Leonese hegemony over the other realms of Christian Iberia. His first objective was the subjugation of Portugal. Portugal was fighting the Almoravids on its own account, and was increasingly exhibiting secessionist tendencies – independence was achieved in 1140. Diplomacy was necessary to subordinate dominions such as Portugal, which might otherwise pose a threat if left to their own devices.

Shortly after the Imperial Coronation in 1135, the Portuguese ruler invaded Galicia – part of the Leonese Empire - and captured the city of Túy. This occurrence constituted a threat to León on its western flank. The Leonese nobles, Count Gómez Núñez and Count Rodrigo Pérez the Hairy rebelled against the Leonese emperor, and sided with the Portuguese leader. The Leonese emperor was obliged to march west to Túy, where he recaptured the city and forced the Portuguese leader to submit.

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147 Reilly, Medieval Spains, 112.
149 B. Reilly, The Kingdom of Leon-Castilla under King Alfonso VII, 1126-57 (Philadelphia, 1978), 70, n. 58 observes that Portuguese royal charters vary according to the rigour with which they are read.
151 CAI, 195, n. 177.
152 Ibid., 195.
153 Ibid., 197, n. 186, citing the Historia Compostellana [HC], 520: E. Falque Rey, HC, Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Medievalis [CCCM], 70 (Turnhout, 1988), 520.
Hence, Alfonso VII agreed the Treaty of Túy (4 July 1137) with the Portuguese Infante, Afonso Henriquez. This was the first Castilian-Leonese agreement to be committed to writing, and it set the precedent for royal peacemaking efforts in the kingdom.\textsuperscript{154} The treaty was described as a ‘pledge and a covenant’ (\textit{placitum et convenientia}), and it was intended to last in perpetuity. The aim of the Túy treaty was to establish the Portuguese Infante as a ‘good and faithful friend of the Emperor’:

\begin{quote}
‘bonus amicus eius et fidelis.’\textsuperscript{155}
\end{quote}

The border was to remain peaceful for the next three years. However, in 1140/1, Afonso launched another invasion of the Galician borderlands, in the River Mino Valley, achieving victories over the Leonese. Following the defeat of León, a truce for an indefinite period was agreed. Sometime during this period, and certainly by July 1140, Afonso Henriquez began styling himself ‘\textit{Portugalensium Rex}’ in Portuguese charters: the first original charter in which he styles himself by this title is dated 7 July 1140.\textsuperscript{156}

Friendship was one of the key motivations for kings to form diplomatic relationships with ‘opposing’ monarchs in the early Middle Ages, a phenomenon that has been much discussed by Althoff.\textsuperscript{157} He refers to the role of friendship in the exercise of political power, citing the role of \textit{consilium} (counsel) and decision-making. During the twelfth century, treaties agreed in friendship between the Iberian kings evolved into more formal political and military alliances. This was crucial to establish Christian unity in the face of the Islamic threat from al-Andalus. Allies in peace became partners in war. Alliances implied the provision of mutual \textit{auxilium}, and were


\textsuperscript{155} \textit{Ibid.}, 161.

\textsuperscript{156} \textit{Documentos Medievais Portugueses [DMP]}, ed. R. Pinto de Azevedo (Lisbon, 1958), 1-1, 222-23.

sealed by the swearing of oaths. However, an alliance might also act as a deterrent against attack from another Christian power.

In such treaties, the parties described themselves as friends, who were willing to fight to secure each other’s personal liberty and territorial security:

‘facit ei securitatem de suo corpore.’

The aim of such early pacts was to safeguard the peace. This was achieved through the lesser party swearing to be faithful to the senior party (fidelis). Hence, the role of goodwill, loyalty and trust was vital to the spirit of the agreement.

Personal loyalty was only part of the equation: parties also swore to uphold the other party’s territorial sovereignty. In the Tuy treaty we find that Afonso pledges the security of the territory belonging to Alfonso VII:

‘Faciat, etiam, illi securitatem de sua terra, quod non perdat.’

**Castilian-Aragonese Rivalry:**

All the principal Christian Iberian powers were pursuing the Reconquest on their own frontiers, and expanding their kingdoms in the process. Castile and Aragón were no exception. Until 1134, the year of the death of Alfonso I el Batallador (‘the Battler’) (1104-34), Castile-León and Aragón had been fierce rivals. The Aragonese monarch’s first opportunity for expansion came with the death of King Alfonso VI of Castile-León in 1109. The latter had died without male issue. Consequently, he directed that his daughter, Urraca, who had been proclaimed his heir, should marry Alfonso I, thereby safeguarding the realm of Castile and its newly-acquired gains. Such a union would

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158 Treaty of Túy, Colección Sahagún, 161.
159 Benham, Peacemaking, 47.
also create an alliance between the two major powers of Christian Iberia, Castile and Aragón. The wedding took place at Monzon, near Palencia, in October 1109.\textsuperscript{161}

The \textit{carta de arras} (marriage contract) was broadly favourable to the Castilian-Leonese side.\textsuperscript{162} Under its terms, if either party deserted the other, then the offender would forfeit the loyalty of its supporters; secondly, Alfonso I agreed that neither blood relations or excommunication would deter him from proceeding with the match; thirdly, they agreed that if they had a son, then Urraca and him would jointly inherit Alfonso’s territories after his death; fourthly, that if there was no progeny, then Alfonso would jointly inherit with the child; fifthly, if Urraca died first, Alfonso would jointly inherit with the child; and sixthly, in the absence of issue, he would only have use of her lands during her lifetime.

However, the Castilian-Aragonese marriage alliance failed. Both parties shared a common ancestor in Sancho el Mayor of Navarre (1000-35), and consequently they were related within the prohibited degrees of consanguinity. On these grounds, Archbishop Bernard of Toledo opposed the marriage, and Pope Paschal I condemned it in 1110.

Moreover, Alfonso I and Urraca failed to produce an heir. This was the undoing of the union: if the match had produced a successor, then both parties could have ruled their realms in his name until his majority.\textsuperscript{163} Even if the couple were forced to separate, the child would still have had a claim on the crowns of the two kingdoms. Under the circumstances, the lack of offspring meant that the marriage was doomed, as it was beset by enemies in the Church and the secular nobility.

\textsuperscript{161} B.F. Reilly, \textit{The Kingdom of León-Castilla under Queen Urraca (1109-1126)} (Princeton, NJ, and Guildford, 1982), 59.
\textsuperscript{162} J.M. Lacarra, \textit{Vida de Alfonso el Batallador} (Zaragoza, 1971), 37.
\textsuperscript{163} Reilly, \textit{Contest}, 131.
Alfonso I was clearly the most senior military leader in Christian Iberia, having scored a major triumph by his defeat of the *taifa* of Zaragoza in 1118, and subsequently having raided deep into Andalusian territory in a successful expedition in 1125. However, after March 1126, when Alfonso VII inherited the throne of León-Castile, Alfonso I faced an ambitious stepson, in the form of Queen Urraca’s heir. The former immediately attempted to recover Castilian-Leonese territory seized by Alfonso *el Batallador* since 1113. By 1127, the young Leonese monarch had recaptured Burgos and Carrion de los Condes. Moreover, Alfonso VII secured a marriage alliance with *doña* Berengaria, daughter of Count Ramon Berenguer III of Barcelona. Whilst Aragón was preoccupied with its struggle against Barcelona and the latter’s French allies (the counts of Aquitaine, Toulouse, Bearn and Bigorre), Alfonso VII captured Castrojeriz and Aragonese positions west of the Sierra de la Demanda.

However, Alfonso VII’s interests were harmed by the fact that several prominent Castilian nobles sided with the Aragonese monarch, no doubt attracted by his military prowess. These conflicting noble loyalties manifested themselves in the allegiances of the magnates concerned, who only made peace with Alfonso VII under duress. The *Chronica Adefonsi Imperatoris [CAI]* comments:

‘…they made peace with him, although they did so deceitfully on account of the king of Aragón, whom they esteemed above all others.’

However, the Battler died without heirs on 8 September 1134, shortly after the battle of Fraga (1134). As he was without male issue, he bequeathed the Kingdom of Aragón to the international military orders. Subsequently, Alfonso’s younger brother, Ramiro II (1134-37), who was a monk, assumed the throne. In September 1134, in the

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165 *Chronica Adefonsi Imperatoris [CAI]*, in ‘Chronica Hispana saeculi XII, pars’, ed. A. Maya, *Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Medievalis [CCCM]*, 71 (Turnhout), 109-248, Chap. 6, 166.
old royal city of Jaca, the majority of the Aragonese aristocracy recognised King Sancho II as the new monarch of Aragón. He was the brother of Alfonso I el Batallador, a monk, former abbot and bishop-elect. Papal dispensation was needed for his return to lay life, subsequent marriage and the transfer of Alfonso’s inheritance to him.

The kingdom of Aragón was arguably Alfonso I’s creation, and whether it would endure without him was a moot point. Meanwhile, León-Castile was in the ascendant under King Alfonso VII. On hearing of the death of his rival, Alfonso VII marched for La Rioja. At this time, Alfonso VII was able to recover the entire west bank of the River Ebro, which constituted the core of Castilian dominions in the east since the annexation of Navarre in 1077.166 The border city of Nájera had already declared for Garcia Ramirez of Pamplona, however at Alfonso’s appearance, the majority of the nobility transferred their allegiance to the Castilian monarch.167

Lourie argues that the consequence of Alfonso I’s Will was a significant reconfiguration of Christian Iberian politics in the early twelfth century168: firstly, and most significantly, León-Castile assumed hegemony over Christian Iberia, replacing Aragón. This development has been much discussed by Castilian historians, such as Menéndez Pidal, and many others since169; secondly, Aragón and Navarre sundered their alliance; and thirdly, a new union between Aragón and Catalonia was inaugurated by the marriage of Count Ramon Berenguer IV of Barcelona and Petronilla of Aragón.

Alfonso VII had a clear political advantage in exploiting the temporary Aragonese vacuum of power caused by the interregnum. He was a third claimant to the Aragonese throne, as he was a great-grandson of Sancho III *el Mayor* (‘the Great’) of Navarre, through his mother, Queen Urraca, wife of Alfonso *el Batallador*. Moreover, the Castilian monarchy had formed an interest on the frontier Rioja region dating back to 1076, during the reign of Alfonso VI.\(^{170}\) He also had a strategic political interest in acquiring the city of Zaragoza, as had his predecessors.\(^{171}\)

Castilian imperial hegemony consisted of the suzerainty (overlordship) of the Empire over a proliferation of Iberian dominions. Suzerainty was given legal actuality by the vassalage of Count Ramon Berenguer IV of Barcelona, ruler of Aragón and Catalonia and King García Ramírez of Navarre to King Alfonso VII.\(^{172}\) This feudal relationship was the basis for the most enduring alliance of the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries: that between Castile and Aragón. In that same year, 1134, Count Ramon and Count Alfonse Jourdain of Toulouse presented themselves before the Leonese king, promised to obey him in everything, and became vassals of the Leonese monarch.\(^{173}\) At this time Alfonso VII gave the lordship of Zaragoza to Count Ramon as a fief.

The lord-vassal relationship between the Emperor and the king of Aragón is demonstrated by the ceremony with which King Ramiro greeted Alfonso VII: the latter advanced down the River Ebro to Zaragoza, and Ramiro came out of the city to welcome him, with all his nobles, bishops and abbots.\(^{174}\) Alfonso entered the city in

\(^{171}\) Ibid., 80.
\(^{173}\) *Chronica Adefonsi Imperatoris* [CAI] in: M. Pérez González, *Crónica del Emperador Alfonso VII* (León, 1997), Bk. 1, c. 70 at 84.
December 1134. According to the terms of his agreement with Ramiro II, he acquired the city itself, as well as its surrounding territory, and Almazan and Soria. Alfonso was received by the nobles and citizens of the city, who welcomed him. He stayed several days in the royal palace, and left a garrison of soldiers to guard the city. Ramiro gladly accepted Alfonso’s promise of *auxilium* (military assistance) against the Muslims. Thus, the Castilian-Leonese monarch gained the capital of the kingdom of Aragón. Ramiro ceded the ‘*regnum Caesaraugustanum*’ (i.e. Zaragoza) in perpetuity. Indeed, according to the *CAI*, the city would:

‘always remain under his dominion and that of his sons.’

This reference to Alfonso’s sons, Sancho and Fernando, heralds the beginning of later Castilian-Leonese hegemony over the other Christian kingdoms of northern Iberia, namely Aragón-Catalonia and Navarre, although Aragón was formally released from its vassalage in 1170.

King Ramiro II of Aragón married Agnes, daughter of Duke William IX of Aquitaine in 1135, and the couple produced an heiress, Petronilla the following year (1136). However, the fact that she was a girl precluded her from ruling Aragón in an age when military prowess was essential in a leader. In 1137 she was married to Count Ramon Berenguer IV of Barcelona (1131-62), although the union was only consummated in 1150. The latter was initially made Protector of the Kingdom of Aragón, and later its sovereign, when he assumed the title, ‘Prince of Aragón’. Ramiro now abdicated in favour of Count Ramon, who ruled until his death in 1162.

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175 *CAI*, Chap. 64, 191, n. 155.
The county of Barcelona, which came to form the nucleus of Catalonia, was now united to the Kingdom of Aragón. This joint polity, Aragón-Barcelona, was to become the principal rival to Castile-León in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, second only in power to Castile itself. Reilly concludes that this new power disputed the leadership of the Iberian Peninsula with Castile-León until the fifteenth century.\textsuperscript{178}

After 1134 and the death of the ‘Battler’, the king of León-Castile allied himself to the Count of Barcelona, Ramon Berenguer IV, who by virtue of his marriage to Petronilla, daughter of Ramiro II, became Prince of Aragón. This alliance was remarkable because it replaced the earlier rivalry that had existed between Castile and Aragón during ‘the Battler’s’ reign. Aragón was now united with Catalonia. This alliance between Castile-León and Aragón-Catalonia took the form of the feudal submission of Aragón to León-Castile by Count Ramon swearing homage to Emperor Alfonso VII (1136). In this manner, the lesser rulers of Christian Iberia were bound to the Castilian monarch through a network of feudal liens (bonds). Indeed, Le Goff remarks on the typically feudal nature of the gesture of homage to the Castilian ruler.\textsuperscript{179}

The CAI describes the ceremony:

‘In the same year…the king’s brother-in-law, Count Ramon of Barcelona, and his relative, Count Alfonse of Toulouse, came before the king of León and promised to obey him in all matters. They were made his knights, after they had touched he king’s right hand to confirm their loyalty.\textsuperscript{180}

As Count Ramon Berenguer IV was a vassal of Emperor Alfonso VII, he was the junior partner in the Castilian-Aragonese alliance. In the early twelfth century, the main purpose of this alliance was to subjugate and partition the kingdom of Navarre, in

\textsuperscript{178} Reilly, \textit{Medieval Spains}, 113.
\textsuperscript{179} Le Goff, \textit{ritual symbolique}, 367.
\textsuperscript{180} CAI, Chap. 67, 192.
which both powers had long-standing territorial claims dating to 1077. This was achieved through three successive treaties of concord, those of Carrión (1140/1), Tudejen (1151) and Lérida (1156). In each case, although Emperor Alfonso VII received the lesser share of the territory in Navarre, he ensured his hegemony over Christian Iberia by insisting that Count Ramon Berenguer IV perform homage to him for the Aragonese share of Navarre. Thus, Castilian suzerainty was preserved. For example, in the Treaty of Carrión we find:

‘et pro illis duabus partibus quas habebit, faciat imperatori Adefonsi tale hominium, quale rex Sanctius et rex Petrus Adefonsi regi, avuo imperatoris Adefonsi fecerunt.’\footnote{Treaty of Carrión (22 February 1140/1), \textit{LFM}, ed. Miquel Rosell, I, 37-8.}

By this feudal device, Emperor Alfonso VII succeeded in preserving Castilian suzerainty over Navarre, despite only being in possession of one-third of the kingdom. Prior to partition however, Castilian-Aragonese forces had to capture Navarre. The Navarrese had defeated the Aragonese at the battle of Ejea (1140). The Castilians came to the aid of the Aragonese army, whereupon the Navarrese fled the field at the sight of the Castilian standard. The following year (1141), Alfonso VII moved to Nájera on the Castilian-Navarrese frontier to renew his attack on King García of Navarre. However, García had no appetite for war, having been defeated several times by Castilian forces.\footnote{\textit{CAI}, Pérez González trans. (1997), Bk. 1, c. 89 at 90.} Hence, he sued for peace. The \textit{CAI} reports that this move on García’s part was inspired by the Treaty of Túy, between Alfonso VII and Afonso Henríquez of Portugal:
Peace with Navarre was agreed at the end of October 1140. It was achieved through the mediation of Count Alfonse Jourdain of Toulouse, who was embarked on a pilgrimage to Santiago de Compostela. Count Alfonse and the Navarrese nobles, having arrived at a decision, went out to meet the Emperor – we are not told where - and peace was agreed between the latter and the Navarrese king. At this meeting, King García agreed to serve the emperor all the days of his life. The outcome was a marriage alliance between King García of Navarre and the Castilian Infanta, Urraca, daughter of Emperor Alfonso VII. The wedding took place on 24 June 1144.

This union achieved peace between Castile-León and the Kingdom of Navarre. It constituted a vivid illustration of the benefits of marital alliances as a form of diplomacy. The wedding was also a magnificent example of twelfth-century pageantry. The CAI describes the festivities in great detail:

‘Venit autem imperator et cum eo uxor suæ imperatorix domna Berengaria et maxima turba potestatem, comitum et militum Castelle. Venit autem et rex Garsia cum turba militum non paucâ ita paraus et ornatus, sicut regem sponsatum ad proprias decet venire nuptias. Intravit autem serenissima infans domna Sanctia in Legionem per portam Caüriensem et cum ea sobrina suæ infans domna Urraca, sponsa regis Garsie, cum maxima turba nobelium militum et clericorum et mulierum et puellarum…’

The Issue of Navarre:

183 CAI, Pérez González trans. (1997), Bk I, Chap. 90; in Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Mediaevalis [CCCM], Vol. 71 (Turnhout, 1990), 191
185 CAI, CCCM edn., Vol. 71, Bk. 1, Chap. 92, 192.
Both Aragón and Castile claimed parts of the Kingdom of Navarre for themselves, on the basis of ancestral claims dating back to the late eleventh century. Both refused to countenance an independent Navarre existing in its own right, so in any study of Navarre we also have to consider Castilian and Aragonese foreign policy, sometimes in isolation, but more usually in conjunction with each other. Although this choice of successor was acceptable to Sancho’s Aragonese subjects, Navarre – part of which was claimed by Aragón at this time – refused to acknowledge the new incumbent. Instead, they turned to García Ramírez, a Navarrese noble, of royal but illegitimate descent. García was duly acclaimed King of Navarre (1134-50).\textsuperscript{186} He was known as ‘el Restaurador’ (‘the Restorer’), as he championed the restoration of Navarrese independence for another seven years, until 1144, when he settled for a restored Kingdom of Navarre, albeit one limited to Pamplona and the Rioja as far south as Tudela.

King García of Navarre also performed homage to the Leonese king at this time, when he received gifts and a lordship. This meeting probably occurred at Nájera, on the Castilian-Navarrese border, in November 1134.\textsuperscript{187} During the vista real (royal meeting), the Leonese king recognised King García as the legitimate Navarrese sovereign. In return, García surrendered the Rioja and all the other territories west of the River Ebro that his mother, Urraca, had lost to King Alfonso I of Aragón. This augmented Castilian territory formerly held by Aragón in Navarre, cementing Castilian dominance.

\textsuperscript{186} Ubieto Arteta, ‘Navarra-Aragón’, 57.
\textsuperscript{187} The vista real probably occurred at Nájera, because this settlement was located on the Castilian-Navarrese frontier, although it was situated on the Castilian side of the border; no treaty was drawn up on this occasion – only homage was performed by King Garcia IV of Navarre to Alfonso VII: CAI, Pérez González trans. (1997), Bk. 1, c. 63 at 83. However, cf. Reilly, Alfonso VII, 46, n. 94 citing: F. Soldevila, ed., Historia des Catalans, 2\textsuperscript{nd} edn., 3 vols (Barcelona, 1964), I, 150: according to Soldevila, Alfonso entered Aragón by way of Agreda and Tarazona, although he does not provide any evidence for this assertion. Cf. also H. Grassotti, ‘Homenaje de García Ramírez a Alfonso VII,’ Cuadernos de Historia de España [CHE], 37-38 (1963), 318-29.
The following May (1135), the Navarrese ruler renewed his oath of homage to Alfonso VII.\textsuperscript{188}

Territorial disputes, such as that of Castile versus Navarre led to political discourse and diplomatic exchanges in the twelfth century. In the process, kingdoms such as Navarre emerged. Following the collapse of Aragón at the time of the death of the Battler, Navarre once more became a separate polity, autonomous from Aragón. This circumstance was largely due to the widespread feeling in Navarre that the union of the two kingdoms could not continue under such a weak ruler as King Ramiro II of Aragón.\textsuperscript{189} Alfonso VII exploited this division to subordinate Navarre (and Aragón). The new kingdom of Navarre centred around Pamplona and stretched as far south as Tudela on the River Ebro. The Leonese monarch recognised García Ramírez as the legitimate\textit{ dux} (duke) of Pamplona, the Basque provinces and other territory of Ramiro beyond the River Ebro that he could capture. In return, Alfonso required Navarrese military\textit{ auxilium} in Zaragoza against Ramiro II\textsuperscript{190}

The two principal Christian powers of Iberia, Castile and Aragón, both attempted to divide Navarre and al-Andalus on repeated occasions in the mid-twelfth century. These attempts manifested themselves in the partition treaties. Such partition treaties also implicitly recognised the rights of monarchs to expand their kingdoms at the expense of al-Andalus. It was not merely enough to defeat the Muslims in battle; their territory had to be annexed and resettled with a Christian population. This implied the partition of al-Andalus between the respective Christian powers, namely Castile-León and Aragón. Hence, the diplomatic treaties of the first half of the twelfth century regarded it as perfectly legitimate to partition territory which had yet to be recaptured.

\textsuperscript{189} Lacarra,\textit{ Vida}, 99.
\textsuperscript{190} Reilly,\textit{ Alfonso VII}, 51.
The purpose of the Treaty of Carrión (1140/1) was to partition the Kingdom of Navarre between Castile-León and Aragón, both of which wanted to reclaim the parts of Navarre which they asserted belonged to them:

‘Concordati sunt…super illam terram quam tenet Garsias, rex Pampilonensium.’\(^{191}\)

The parties to the treaty were Emperor Alfonso VII, ‘Emperor of Spain’, and Ramon Berenguer IV of Barcelona, who was by now ‘Prince of Aragón’. King García IV must be considered a non-party to the treaty. The terms of the treaty were that Aragon would receive the larger, two-thirds share of Navarre. Ubieto Arteta argues that on this basis the import of the treaty ran contrary to the ambitions of Emperor Alfonso VII, as its effect was to promote the interests of Count Ramon, who was now Prince of Aragón.\(^{192}\) Thus, the count of Barcelona would hold the same territory which former Aragonese monarchs, Sancho Ramírez and Pedro I had done. This division of territory was made on the grounds that part of the kingdom of Navarre legally belonged to the Aragonese kingdom:

‘…totam illam terram que regno Aragonensi pertinet’\(^{193}\)

The Aragonese claim derived from the land beyond the River Ebro held by King Alfonso I el Batallador at his death, ex parte King García of Navarre:

‘…totam aliam terram quam Adefonsus rex, avus illius illo die quo mortuus est, ultra Iberum ex parte Pampilonie tenebat.’\(^{194}\)

Castile-León was granted the remaining share, around the city of Pamplona and Estella. However, Count Ramon was obliged to perform homage to Emperor Alfonso

\(^{191}\) Treaty of Carrión (22 February 1140/1), LFM, ed. Miquel Rosell, I, 37-38.
\(^{192}\) Ubieto Arteta, Navarra-Aragón, 58.
\(^{193}\) Ibid., 37.
\(^{194}\) Ibid., 38.
VII for his share of Navarrese territory, as King Sancho Ramírez had earlier done to King Alfonso VI of León-Castile. In this manner, Emperor Alfonso VII managed to preserve his suzerainty over Christian Iberia, whilst only receiving the minority share of partitioned Navarre.

As regards al-Andalus, only a joint Christian effort could succeed in defeating the Muslims. The preliminary objective was to end internecine warfare between the Christian kingdoms as a prerequisite to engaging the Muslims in combat. Hence, the Christian powers of Castile-León and Aragón agreed to partition al-Andalus into respective spheres of influence, in return for mutual auxilium.

The first such partition treaty, the Treaty of Tudejen (1151), effectively partitioned the whole of the Levante (the Eastern seaboard of al-Andalus) between Emperor Alfonso VII and Count Ramon Berenguer IV of Barcelona. The Treaty of Tudejen was the first of several partition treaties to apportion as yet unconquered territory in al-Andalus. However, although on the face of the document it claimed to divide the whole of al-Andalus, only the Levantine coast is mentioned specifically. It was intended to be enforced after those lands had been seized in battle, at a yet unspecified date.

The Count of Barcelona was promised the Eastern seaboard of al-Andalus in return for his assistance. Specifically, this territory included the strategic cities of Valencia, Denia and Murcia, and all their hinterlands:

‘Preterea, predictus imperator et prenominatus comes se invicem convenieunt et faciunt placitum et concordia de terra Ispanie, quam modo sarraceni tenant, ut comes habeat civitatem Valenciam cum omni terra...ad terminam regni Tortose; et habeat

195 Treaty of Tudején (27 January 1151), LFM, ed. Miquel Rosell, vol. 1, fols. 16b-17d (MS); P. de Bofarull, Colección de documentos inéditos del Archivo de la Corona de Aragón (Barcelona, 1849), vol. 4, 64-65 (Ptd.).
similiter civitatem Deniam cum omnibus suis pertinentiis et cum omni illo domino quod tempore sarracenorum ipsi sarraciensi habeant.”¹⁹⁶

In each case, the Count of Barcelona was granted the city mentioned as well as its appurtenances and surrounding territory (alfoz). Moreover, the treaty was careful to delineate the borders of such allocated territory. Hence, Ramon Berenguer was to receive:

‘the city of Valencia with all its territory…as far as the Kingdom of Denia.’

In return, the count of Barcelona was obliged to perform homage to the Emperor Alfonso VII in return for the possession of Valencia and Murcia:

‘tali pacto, ut habeat predictas ciuitates prelibatus comes per iam dictum imperatorem per tale hominium…’¹⁹⁷

The third partition treaty was the Treaty of Lérida (May 1156).¹⁹⁸ This pact, too, aimed to partition Navarre between León-Castile and Aragón. Both León-Castile and Aragón-Catalonia wanted to divide Navarre again. Hence, they both signed a partition treaty, in which the respective shares of territory would be allocated according to the earlier Treaty of Tudején (1151). Under Tudején, Aragón had received the majority two-thirds share, and León-Castile had retained a one-thirds share. However, the Emperor Alfonso VII had reserved the right of feudal suzerainty over the Aragonese share as the senior Iberian ruler at the time.

The parties to the new treaty were Emperor Alfonso VII, his two sons, Sancho and Fernando, and Count Ramon Berenguer IV of Barcelona. In the accord, Ramon

¹⁹⁶ Treaty of Tudején (1151), _LFM_, I, fols. 16b-17d, .
¹⁹⁷ _Ibid._, vol. 1, fols. 16b-17d, .
confirmed the terms of the earlier Treaty of Tudején (1151), which had partitioned Navarre between these two powers:

‘Ego…Raimundus…concede et laudo et recognosco illam divisionem et convenienciam per medium factam inter me et illustriissimus imperatorem Adefonsum et filios eius regem Sancio atque Ferrandum de regno Navarre eiusdemque terris, sicut olim statutum est inter nos…que facta fuit in loco qui dicitur Tudilen…’

Lérida was a mutual alliance pact between León-Castile and Aragón, and consequently, both sides agreed to undertake reciprocal measures in common cause against the Kingdom of Navarre. Consequently, Count Ramon promised the Emperor and his sons that he would not receive at his court, maintain or defend King García Ramírez of Navarre in word or deed, or provide him with auxilium, against the will of the Emperor. The Emperor agreed similar terms in the treaty:

‘Ita, quidem, quod imperator et filii eius non manuteneant nec defendant iam dictam regem Sancium Navarre, nec auxilium ei prebeant aliquo modo dictis nec factis contra voluntatem meam.’

Execution of the treaty was provided for by Count Ramon confirming that he would abide by its terms:

‘…conveniencias ego iam dictus comes laudo, et per fidem meam sine dolo et fraude confirm perficiendas atque compleendas.’

Thus, it is possible to discern that these treaties reflected the current of political relationships in twelfth-century Christian Iberia: the Crown of Aragón and the King of Navarre were both now vassals of the Castilian-Leonese emperor, and both had received

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199 Ibid., 43.
200 Ibid., 43.
201 Ibid., 43.
their own territories as fiefs from him. Moreover, even the Portuguese monarch, King Afonso I Henriquez, remained a vassal of the Leonese emperor, as he had been since the Treaty of Túy (1137). Nevertheless, Afonso Henriquez did not perform homage for the kingdom of Portugal itself, as García Ramírez had done for Navarre – Portugal was independent.202 Thus, by the end of 1140, Alfonso VII had consolidated his control over the Christian kingdoms of Iberia – the princes of Navarre and Aragón-Barcelona had performed homage to him, and the ruler of Portugal had sworn allegiance. However, the attempt to absorb Navarre had proved beyond the resources of either Castile-León or Aragón.

The Imperial Coronation of Emperor Alfonso VII:

Although Emperor Alfonso VII was the most powerful military ruler in Christian Iberia after the death of ‘the Battler’, this was unsufficient for him: he wanted political recognition of his imperial power. This could only be achieved by having himself crowned Emperor. The consequence of his imperial coronation was that he could style himself ‘Emperor’ in legal documents – they would refer to the fact of his coronation, which was now incontestable. The plenitude of his dominions enabled Alfonso VII to style himself ‘Emperor’. The title ‘Totius Hispanie Imperator’ implied Castilian-Leonese hegemony over the lesser kingdoms of the Iberian Peninsula. He used the imperial title from the beginning of his reign in 1126, although he was only crowned Emperor in 1135.203 However, although Alfonso asserted his imperial title, he was confronted by the Almoravid threat and the rivalry with Aragón early in his reign, and it was not until the Battler’s death in 1134 that he began to realise his status as the Peninsular’s senior military leader.

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202 For example, Recuero Astray cites a document dated 1143 which states: ‘ad colloquium Portugaliae Regis cum imperatore venit’: Recuero Astray, Alfonso VII, 89.
203 M. Lucas Álvarez, El Reino de León en la Alta Edad Media – Vol. 5: Las Cancillerías Reales (1109-1230) (León, 1993), 118.
The Imperial Coronation took place on Whitsunday 1135 in the cathedral of León. Our principal source is the chronicle, CAI. The ceremony was attended by King García Ramírez IV of Pamplona, Count Ramon Berenguer IV of Barcelona, Count Alfonse Jordan of Toulouse and by a plethora of nobility from France and Gascony. All the ecclesiastical and lay nobility were present to celebrate the festivities. On the Feast of Whitsunday all the assembled magnates and people of the realm witnessed Alfonso being crowned Emperor of León-Castile:

‘ut vocarent regem imperatorem.’

He was attired in a cape and crowned with a golden crown. Then he was acclaimed Emperor by the assembled congregation. This lavish ceremonial was intended to impress his new status and prestige on the assembled rulers. Reilly emphasises that it reaffirmed Alfonso’s political authority and the military strength of the kingdom of Castile-León in the Peninsula. On the third day of the Royal Council, the Emperor sanctioned new customs and laws to be enacted throughout his dominions:

‘Deditque imperator mores et leges in universe regno suo.’

He also ordered the settlement of towns and villages that had been ravaged by war, and ordered the planting of trees and vineyards. After the Coronation, Alfonso embarked on a royal progress from Toro to Burgos.

Diplomacy and the Second Crusade:

War and peace had always been the prerogative of medieval kings throughout Western Europe, and this was nowhere more certain than in the Iberian crusades,

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205 CAI, CCCM, Vol. 71, Bk. I, Chap. 70, 182.
206 Reilly, Alfonso VII, 49.
207 CAI, Bk. I, Chap. 71.
208 CAI, CCCM, Vol. 71, Bk. 1, c. 70, 183.
collectively known as the ‘Reconquest’. Usually, diplomacy preceded warfare, establishing the parameters of the campaign in hand. This was especially necessary when long-distance diplomacy was required, as was the case in the second crusade, when the Commune of Genoa, in Italy, combined forces with the Castilian-Leonese Empire, and Aragonese-Catalan polity to launch a siege of the port city of Almeria, in al-Andalus.

Peace between the Christian Iberian kingdoms was the essential prerequisite for the prosecution of the crusade against the Muslim Almoravid regime. However, whereas in the Holy Land war and diplomacy were complementary tactics to be employed alternately against the infidel, in Spain peacemaking was necessary for Christian unity. Political unity was the vital precondition for victory on the battlefield. It was also necessary to nullify domestic distractions whilst the Reconquista was ongoing. Christian leaders tended to be rivals, and they competed for the same territory. However, in time of need they could forge alliances against a common foe. In Christian Iberia, this unity was largely achieved by c. 1140, when Emperor Alfonso VII had received the feudal submission of all the lesser rulers in the Peninsula.

The crusades were essentially military expeditions against the Muslims that were licensed by the Papacy. It was the Papacy that was responsible for coordinating Christian intervention against the Muslims. Pope Urban II had preached the First Crusade as a war of liberation. This implied both the liberation of the Orthodox Church in the East – which had seceded from Rome in 1054 – and the liberation of the Holy Land and the city of Jerusalem from its servitude. Riley-Smith argues that this ‘war of liberation’ must be viewed in the context of the prevailing spirit of the age,

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namely the liberation of the Church as a whole, and cites eleventh-century sources which are replete with the terms ‘libertas’ and ‘liberatio’. ²¹²

However, at the same time the Papacy was keen to ensure the prosecution of the war against the Muslims in Christian Europe, most notably in Spain. This required internal peace between the kingdoms of Western Europe. Hence, the Papacy encouraged the knighthood of Europe to redirect their martial energies towards fighting the Holy War. ²¹³ In the process, a measure of peace and unity was achieved in Christendom. Alphendery advances the argument one stage further: he asserts that the crusades were manifestations of the Christian unity that they helped to create. ²¹⁴ Mastnak elaborates that Pope Urban II’s crusade propaganda was based on ‘the community of the whole of Christendom’… launching a ‘massive assault, a common front’ against the infidel. ²¹⁵

From the very beginning of the crusading movement the Papacy equated the Reconquista in Spain with the crusades to the Holy Land: Urban II urged Spanish knights to restore the frontier city of Tarragona, which had been an ancient Roman provincial capital, and was the eastern metropolitan diocese of Spain. ²¹⁶ Consequently, Spain became an equally valid theatre of war for crusaders in the twelfth century.

²¹² Riley-Smith, First Crusade, 17-18; H. Hagenmeyer, Die Kreuzzugsbriefe aus den Jahren 1088-1100 (1901); G. Vizmara, Impium Foedus: Le origine della “repubblica Christiana” (Milan, 1974), 64, n. 186.
²¹³ T. Mastnak, Crusading Peace – Christendom, the Muslim World and Western Political Order (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London, 2002), 95.
Indeed, the Papacy endeavoured to dissuade Spanish knights from venturing to Outremer because of the need to combat Islam in the Iberian Peninsula.217

The Papacy made explicit the link between the Reconquista and the Crusades to the Holy Land under Pope Calixtus II in 1123.218 This was a vital step in the history of the Iberian crusades. Calixtus had been Papal Legate to Spain, and he was well aware of the need to achieve parity between the two theatres of war from the perspective of Christian Iberia and the whole of Western Christendom. Hence, the role of the crusade came to have a pivotal role in the Reconquest. The First Lateran Council (March 1123) formally equated warfare in Iberia and the Holy Land, and granted to the former the crusading elements of vow, cross and indulgence. Within a month Calixtus had issued a bull for Catalan crusaders in which he explicitly promised remission of sins, like that granted to participants in the Crusades to the East:

‘With Apostolic authority and power divinely bestowed on us we graciously grant to all those fighting firmly on this expedition the same remission of sins that we conceded to the defenders of the Eastern Church.’219

The Papacy consistently supported the Reconquest from the origins of the Crusading movement onwards. This support is most visible in Pope Eugenius III’s bull, Quantum Praedecessores, in which he explicitly promoted the crusade in Spain. On 27 May 1145 he granted the Archbishop of Tarragona the pallium and reissued an earlier Bull for a campaign to Tarragona:

‘…for the Reconquest of which our predecessors are known to have laboured greatly.’220

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219 Ibid., 266-67.
This Bull had already been promulgated by earlier popes, including Urban II (1089), Gelasius II (1118) and Lucius II (1144).

The chief protagonist in the Iberian second crusade was Emperor Alfonso VII. From 1133 onwards he had engaged with the enemy on a sporadic basis, however from c. 1140, he began to campaign regularly in al-Andalus. Contemporaneously, the Almoravid caliphate was experiencing a rebellion in its heartland of Morocco. This provided the perfect opportunity for a Christian offensive. The Almoravids were confronted by a radical new sect, the Almohads, who represented a puritanical version of Islam.

By the 1140s, they had grown sufficiently strong to descend from their base in the Atlas Mountains and threaten the Almoravid capital of Marrakesh. Ibn Khaldun argues that the ancien régime had grown weak on the sophisticated Andalusi lifestyle, although no convincing evidence of this theory exists. The Almoravid emir, Yusuf b. Tashufin, was recalled to North Africa in 1138, and by the early 1140s their power in the Maghreb (North Africa) had started to wane. Christian rulers exploited this weakness, and they mounted raids into al-Andalus in 1143 and 1144.

The crusades in the Iberian Peninsula in the late 1140s and the Second Crusade to the Holy Land (1147-49) were contemporaneous. Concomitantly, knights were fighting the pagan Wends in Pomerania. Contemporaries regarded these diverse campaigns as part of a common enterprise. However, whilst the Iberian crusades were largely successful, the Second Crusade to the Holy Land was not. It was the Geneose who proposed the launch of a new campaign in the Iberian Peninsula to Emperor

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224 Lomax, The Reconquista, 83.
225 G. Constable, 'The Second Crusade as seen by Contemporaries', Traditio, 9 (1953), 213-79.
Alfonso VII. Their participation, and the support of the Papacy, transformed a series of raids (razzias) into a full-blooded campaign.

Alfonso VII sent Bishop Arnaldo of Astorga (1144-52) on an embassy to the Count of Barcelona and William, Lord of Montpellier. He was charged with recruiting their assistance for the forthcoming Almería campaign, so that:

‘…for the redemption of their souls, they could participate in the expedition.’

This phrase is indicative of crusading ideology involved in the Almería war, and Barton and Fletcher argue that it is suggestive of a strong spiritual motivation for the crusade. Phillips observes that Papal involvement would also explain the grant of the spiritual rewards promised by Bishop Arnoldo, as described in the CAI:

‘…so that for the redemption of their souls, they would all be present…to destroy the aforementioned nest of pirates. Receiving these words with great joy, they promised they would be present with the Genoese.’

Although no Papal bull survives for the Almería campaign, there is a strong presumption that one was issued, because the Genoese annalist, Caffaro, reports that the Genoese:

‘…prompted and called by God, through the Apostolic See, swore to lead an army against the Saracens of Almería.’

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227 CAI, 247.
229 No Papal Bull survives for the Almería campaign however there is a strong presumption that one was issued because Caffaro refers to Apostolic support: J. Phillips, The Second Crusade – Extending the Frontiers of Christendom (New York and London, 2007), 253, citing Caffaro, Annali Genovesi di Caffaro e di suoi’ continuatori, Fonti per la Storia d’ Italia [FSI], ed. L.T. Belgrano (1890-1929), Vol. 1, 21.
230 CAI, English trans. in S. Barton and R. Fletcher, The World of El Cid – Chronicles of the Spanish Reconquest (Manchester and New York), 249.
However, in October 1146 Pope Eugenius III issued the crusading letter, *Divina Dispensatione I* to the clergy of Italy, who were participating in the crusade, in which he alluded to the Spanish Reconquest in general terms. Papal encouragement for the Almería campaign was expressed in the issue of the bull, *Divina Dispensatione II*. Although this Bull was addressed to participants in the Wendish Crusades in the Baltic, Pope Eugenius placed that campaign in the context of the wider Christian struggle in Iberia and the Levant:

‘…the king of Spain is strongly armed against the Saracens of those regions, over whom he had already frequently triumphed…so great a multitude of faithful from diverse regions is preparing to fight the infidel and that almost the whole of Christendom is being summoned for so great a task.’

Both Ramon Berenguer IV and Lord William of Montpellier agreed to participate in the Almería campaign. The motivation for their involvement was probably a combination of commercial strategy and religious inducements. For both leaders, Almería represented a commercial rival and a military threat – it was a ‘nest of pirates’, having once been the naval base of the Umayyad Caliphate of Córdoba. The assembly of such a plethora of Christian forces and the prospect of spiritual rewards meant that it made military logic to capture Almería (1147), Lisbon (1147), Tortosa (1148) and Lérida (1149) all at once. The outcome of Bishop Arnoldo’s negotiations was that by the end of 1146, Emperor Alfonso VII, the Commune of Genoa, Count Ramon Berenguer IV of Barcelona, and Lord William of Montpellier were all committed to a two-year campaign across the Peninsula.

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However, Pope Eugenius III encouraged the Genoese to participate in the Second Crusade in Spain; indeed, he specifically enjoined them to do so.\(^{235}\) A precedent for Italian involvement in Iberian political affairs may have been the Pisan attack on the Balearic Islands in 1114-15.\(^{236}\) Constable concludes that this evidence leaves no doubt of Pope Eugenius’s interest in the Spanish Reconquista. Further, it proves that the Papacy under Eugenius’s pontificate was active in co-ordinating the geographically diverse crusading movements of the day, from the Baltic to the Mediterranean, and from Portugal to the Holy Land.\(^{237}\) To a far greater degree than the First Crusade, the Second Crusade was achieved through the joint efforts of ecclesiastical and secular leaders, witnessed by the oratory of St. Bernard and Bishop Arnaldo, and the military leadership of Emperor Alfonso VII and the Commune of Genoa.

The Genoese treaties with León-Castile were almost entirely motivated by commercial interests on the part of the Commune. From c. 1100 onwards, the great maritime republics of Italy – Genoa, Pisa, Venice and Amalfi – had emerged to rival the Islamic naval powers of the Mediterranean, like Almería.\(^{238}\) By participating in the Spanish Reconquest, the Commune of Genoa could expect to receive a commercial quarter in each of the cities that it captured in alliance with Spanish troops. These developments were accompanied by a revolution in nautical technology, making navigation easier than it had been hitherto.\(^{239}\) The result was the emergence of trade arteries transversing the Mediterranean, manifesting the competition between Christian

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\(^{235}\) ‘Regesti delle lettere pontifice riguardanti la Liguria’, *Atti della Societa Ligure de Storia Patria*, 19 (1887), no. 117, 59.


\(^{237}\) Constable, *Contemporaries*, 276.


and Muslim powers, and later, between Christian powers themselves, such as the rivalry between Genoa and Pisa.

Genoa’s participation in the Almería campaign was recorded by the annalist, Caffaro.\textsuperscript{240} Caffaro was also a consul of the Commune, so he is an authoritative source for Genoese history. Consuls were elected officials, although their method of selection is unclear. In the twelfth century, these urban communes were proliferating in northern and central Italy: they existed in Venice, Florence, Pisa, Milan and Genoa.\textsuperscript{241} The main purpose of the commune was to defend its people, and to find the financial means to pay for such defence.\textsuperscript{242} The consuls were responsible for proclaiming and enforcing trade sanctions (i.e. embargos) against all enemies of the republic. Defence of the commune was entrusted to the consuls after they had sworn an oath (\textit{compagna}). The oath represented an attempt to create an urban government with moral and legal authority, whose power was binding on its citizens. Caffaro states that the Genoese established a \textit{compagna} early in 1099.

In this period, c. 1100-1150, treaties and other written documents, such as \textit{acta}, charters and legal documents, all attest to Genoa’s growing importance in Mediterranean affairs. It was the consul’s duty to manage relations with other Mediterranean powers. According to Epstein, the consuls would have relied upon a political consensus amongst the civic population to formulate foreign policy.\textsuperscript{243} Expansion often meant military conflict with competing powers, such as the Islamic port of Almería, although consuls also took measures to ensure that peaceful rivals, such as Pisa, could not undermine the commercial base of the city’s wealth.

\textsuperscript{240} Caffaro, \textit{Annali Genovesi di Caffaro e de suoi’ continuatori}, FSI, ed. L.T. Belgrano (1890-1929), I, 5.
\textsuperscript{243} Epstein, \textit{Genoa}, 34.
The Almería campaign of 1147 was particularly significant in the history of the Commune because it was an enemy naval base. As such, it was not only a military threat, but also the entrepot for Andalusian commercial shipping.

The treaties between the Commune and Emperor Alfonso VII were probably agreed between 24-30 September 1146, the year before the invasion of Almería. No topical date is given, so we are ignorant of the location of the *vista real* that preceded the redaction of these treaties. Both treaties were mutual assistance agreements that specified the promise of *auxilium* by the respective parties. After redaction, presumably by notaries, they were duplicated and exchanged.

The object of this Leonese-Castilian – Genoese alliance was Almería (1147). The treaties agreed between these two powers specified the division of captured territory that was the hallmark of Italian trading agreements at this time. Typically, the commercial quarter granted to the Genoese comprised a third of the captured territory of Almería. This territory was held with absolute title, freely, and with all appurtenances and property rights. Moreover, the Genoese were allowed full possession of the land, although in practice such possession was granted to a Genoese noble or group of nobles. Hence, the treaties describe how two thirds of captured territory was to be held by Emperor Alfonso VII and the remaining third by the Genoese, for example:

‘…tali convencione habiter inter nos et imperatorem quod civitatum et locorum cum eorum pertinentiis quas vel que cum imperartore ceperimus vel ipsi vel nobis se se

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reddiderunt, duas partes imperator habeat, tercia nobis retenta, quam libere, sine omni gravamina habere possidere ius debemus."\textsuperscript{246}

These land rights were subject to elaborate provisions in the treaties. They included chattels (moveable goods) and appurtenances (rights and privileges associated with the land). Terms included the free enjoyment of property (\textit{habeatis libere}), and exemption from land taxes (\textit{sine omni gravimine}).

Nevertheless, the Genoese held such territory from the Emperor, Alfonso VII. Under the treaties, the Genoese were obliged to recognise the lordship (\textit{dominium}) of the Emperor, as the senior political ruler in the Iberian Peninsula. They were also forced to acknowledge that they held their quarter from him. Furthermore, they had to accept that this lord-vassal relationship would continue under the Emperor’s heirs and successors, Sancho and Fernando. The object of such stringent terms was to force foreign powers to recognise the precedence of Imperial claims to captured cities or territory in Spain. This was vital at a time of growing international participation in the Iberian crusades, and the concomitant proliferation of long-distance diplomatic links which heralded this intervention:

Preterea Ianuenses illi qui tenebunt partem illam, recognoscent dominium imperatoris et suorum heredum, sic tamen ut partem illam libere…possideant, ita ut Ianuenses illi iurent meis heredibus duas partes et mei heredes comuni Ianue terciam partem salvare et fideliter defendere bona fide.\textsuperscript{247}

The Emperor was privileged over other, lesser, Hispanic rulers, such as the Count of Barcelona, who had also entered into agreements with the Genoese on his own initiative. Given this precedence, it is natural that the Genoese treaties were also

\textsuperscript{246} \textit{Ibid.}, Doc. 166.
\textsuperscript{247} \textit{Ibid.}, Doc. 167.
characterized by their exclusivity. Consequently, the Commune promised not to conclude treaties with other Hispanic powers, who might be rivals or enemies of the Emperor. The exception was the Count of Barcelona, himself an important actor in the *Reconquista*.

In terms of compliance, the Genoese respected the divisions of spoils that they had agreed with the Emperor. Both sides swore to allocate their respective shares of territory to their vassals, according to the terms of the treaty. However, these treaties go further than the division of spoils. As Pascua argues, they also relate the mutual recognition of the parties to the relevant agreement. For example, in Doc. 167 (the treaty does not have a title because the place of redaction is unknown), the Genoese holding the third part of the city of Almeria pledge to recognise the lordship of the Emperor and his sons.

Various measures were taken to enforce the treaties. These included clauses stipulating the overriding force of the relevant treaty: agreement of mutual *auxilium* against transgressors of the accords; and provisions for the restitution of land captured by a tortfeasor. Hence, in Doc. 167, Alfonso VII promised to safeguard the Genoese and their possessions from attack from any quarter if the attacker should desire to kill them. This is the first time that the term ‘security’ is employed in a twelfth-century treaty, and it demonstrates the extent to which the Christian powers were determined to hold on to their newly-acquired dominions.248

Crucial to the success of such bilateral diplomacy was the guarantee that the relevant treaty would be honoured. This commitment was a two-way process: the Genoese ‘safeguarding’ the two–thirds share of the Emperor, and the latter respecting

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the Genoese quarter. In case of a change in foreign policy by a new or existing consul, the treaty was to prevail despite pronouncements to the contrary by serving Genoese consuls. On the Spanish side, if the Emperor was prevented from fulfilling the terms of the relevant treaty in person, then his son and his nobles would honour the agreement. The Genoese participated in the Iberian crusades when it suited their interests. These were largely dictated by commercial considerations, as opposed to the territorial and religious concerns of the Iberian powers.

Conclusion:

The legal realisation of the Castilian-Leonese Empire in 1135 allowed Emperor Alfonso VII to dominate the peripheral Christian Iberian kingdoms, in order to prosecute the Reconquest against Islam undhindered by domestic distractions. Political and military hegemony was also necessary to form a united front against the Islamic Almoravid and Almohad caliphates of al-Andalus. By c. 1140, all of the lesser kingdoms of Christian Iberia had acknowledged the suzerainty of the Emperor. This took the form of peace treaties with Portugal and the Crown of Aragón, agreed to stabilise the disputed frontier regions of Galicia and La Rioja. Navarre was partitioned between the Empire and Aragón, despite the efforts of the Navarrese king, García IV, to restore his kingdom to its former glory. Imperial hegemony entailed recognition of the Emperor’s political seniority, his military supremacy and the plenitude of his dominions. The resultant treaties ensured the security of the Empire, and led to the enduring alliance between Castile and Aragón, which was such a political hallmark of the twelfth century.
Chapter 2 – The Political Geography of León-Castile, c. 1157-1230

After the demise of the Castilian-Leonese Empire with the death of Emperor Alfonso VII in 1157, Christian Iberia fragmented into a plethora of lesser kingdoms, collectively known to historians as the ‘cinco reinos’ (‘five kingdoms’). At the centre of this fragmentation was the core of the former Empire itself: the kingdoms of León and Castile. The fault line ran through the heart of the twin kingdoms, separating them on a north-south axis. The other kingdoms of Christian Iberia coalesced around them.
Castile engaged with Aragon and Navarre in the east, forming an alliance with Aragon, whilst attempting to subjugate Navarre. Meanwhile, León contracted successive marriage alliances with the Portuguese kingdom in the west.

In this chapter, I will attempt to answer the question of why there are so many peace treaties extant between the cinco reinos, and in particular, between Castile and León. In so doing I will examine the political context of the agreements, analysing the issue of fragmentation that occurred in the wake of the partition of Empire. In particular, I will attempt to gauge whether fragmentation inevitably followed succession, and consequently, whether it led to such a proliferation of treaties between the divided powers. I will begin by appraising the divisio imperii itself, as this was the root cause of all the disputes that lay ahead in the second half of the twelfth century, especially between Castile and León, until a final resolution of the conflict was found in reunification of the crowns in 1230.

The Divisio Imperii:

Partition was intended to prevent the Emperor’s heirs, kings Sancho III and Fernando II, from quarrelling over their inheritance. In this sense, it was meant to anticipate any unilateral action which might threaten the Empire after the Emperor’s death. In Spain, the second half of the twelfth century is marked by the divisio imperii (division of the Empire). In 1157, Emperor Alfonso VII, divided the core of his realm, León-Castile, into separate kingdoms. León was allocated to his son, Fernando II (1157-88), whilst Sancho III (1157-8) inherited Castile. Partition commenced on Alfonso’ death in 1157. The Crónica Latina comments on the partition:
‘divisit siquidem regnum suum permittente de propter pessata hominium duobus filiis suis.’

However, partition led to the fragmentation of the Leonese-Castilian Empire, occasioning internecine conflicts. This in turn led to a succession of peace treaties, which were largely unsuccessful, and consequently necessitated new peace accords. However, the Castilian-Leonese dispute of the later twelfth century was confined to a limited geographical area known as the ‘Tierra de Campos’. This was the frontier area between the two kingdoms, located on the Meseta to the north of Valladolid. The frontier established by the divisio imperii ran north-south from the Asturias Mountains to the River Tagus in central Spain. This border zone was fiercely contested in the twelfth century, and was the cause of endemic warfare between Castile and León. The dispute was only definitively resolved by the reunification of the two crowns of Castile and León under the rule of King Fernando III in 1230.

With the demise of the Castilian-Leonese Empire, the other kingdoms of twelfth-century Iberia pursued a path of independence, with varying degrees of success. Portugal had seceded in 1140. Aragón was released from its bond of vassalage after providing auxilium at the siege of Cuenca (1177). Only Navarre persisted in remaining a target of Castilian foreign policy objectives. This was to lead to a lengthy arbitration dispute, and further partition treaties between Castile and Aragón. Maravall observes that these fledgling states would later form the nuclei of the kingdoms of Spain. However, in the process, this fragmentation led to the growing consciousness of the concept of ‘Hispania’ (Spain) and the ‘reges Hispaniae’ (kings of Spain).

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249 Anon. (attrib. Juan of Osma), Crónica Latina de los Reyes de Castilla [CL], ed. L. Charlo Brea, Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Medievalis [CCCM], 73 (1997), 7-118.

250 J.A. Maravall, El Concepto de España en la Edad Media (Madrid, 1954), 376.
This acquisition of territory formed the power bases of the respective Christian Iberian kingdoms. They were delineated by geographical boundaries, albeit ones that shifted with the political circumstances. As the treaties show, these ‘frontiers’ acted as a restraint on a monarch’s authority more than would a borderline in the modern sense.\textsuperscript{251}

Specifically, the \textit{divisio imperii} was significant because the frontier zone contained castles situated in strategic locations, which held the key to the security of their surrounding territories (\textit{alfozes}). As Ladero Quesada argues, the formation of territorial boundaries under royal administration from the late twelfth to the thirteenth centuries has to be taken account of in any study of border relations between the Christian Iberian kingdoms during this period.\textsuperscript{252} The demarcation of the border area provoked numerous disputes, settlements and pacts in the post-Imperial period. Although, in a sense border relations were an internal issue, they dominated Castilian-Leonese diplomatic efforts from the \textit{divisio imperii} in 1157 to reunification in 1230.\textsuperscript{253}

The division of the respective realms of Alfonso VII’s empire was the issue affecting King Sancho III of Castile and King Fernando II of León when they met at Sahagún on 23 May 1158. Sahagún was essentially a partition treaty. Firstly, they confirmed the Treaty of Tudején (1151), which had previously established the partition of Navarre and al-Andalus. Secondly, they acknowledged the status of the Count of Barcelona, Ramon Berenguer IV. However, he was the only Iberian ruler deemed worthy of Castilian-Leonese recognition.\textsuperscript{254}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{251} \textit{Ibid.}, 381.
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The partition agreement reached at Sahagún extended to embrace all of Portugal. However, King Afonso Henriquez had established the independent kingdom of Portugal in 1140, and later conquered Santarem and Lisbon, where he established his capital.\textsuperscript{255} Al-Andalus, ‘the territory of the Saracens’, was to be partitioned as follows: Fernando II was to acquire all the lands as far south west as Lisbon, including Extremadura, with the \textit{taifa} (party) kingdoms of Mérida and Badajoz:

‘De terro vero Sarracenorum hanc facimus divisionem, scilicet, quod vos, frater meus Fernandus, habeatis…ad Lixbonam…Emiratem cum toto regno suo, Badailoz cum toto regno suo…cum mari, cum insulis, cum montibus, terries et aguis.’\textsuperscript{256}

King Sancho III of Castile was to be allocated ‘all the territory’ of Spain, namely the remainder of Almohad al-Andalus:

‘et ego rex Sancius ab hinc superius habeam totam aliam terram.’\textsuperscript{257}

The treaty also fixed borders with al-Andalus, and granted territory to Castilian and Leonese nobles, namely, Ponce de Cabrera, Ponce de Minerva and Osorio Martínez.

This partition represented the east-west division of territory in Spain following Alfonso VII’s death. Indeed, Linehan argues that the Treaty of Sahagún represented the formalization of the Emperor’s partition of Spain in the Treaty of Tudején (1151).\textsuperscript{258} Then, Alfonso VII and Count Ramon Berenguer IV had agreed to divide the Kingdom of Navarre. They had also agreed to occupy respective spheres of influence in the south and south-east of the Iberian Peninsula.

\textsuperscript{257} \textit{Ibid.}, 81.
\textsuperscript{258} P. Linehan, \textit{Spain, 1157-1300: A Partible Inheritance} (Oxford, 2008), 8.
At Sahagún, the two monarchs, Sancho and Fernando, agreed the partition of the ‘land of the Saracens’ in the south and south-west of the Peninsula, namely Andalucia and Extremadura. Portugal was to be eradicated despite the fact that it was now independent, and Seville, the provincial capital of the Almohad Caliphate, was to be shared between the two Christian powers. Essentially, León was to occupy all the territory towards the Atlantic Ocean, whilst Sancho was to acquire all of al-Andalus as far as Granada and the Mediterranean.

Castile v. León:

Castile and León were constantly at loggerheads after the divisio imperii, instead of enjoying the stability hoped for by the late emperor. Following the premature death of Sancho III (d. 1158), Castile was ruled by a regent, Count Manrique de Lara, which made for weak government. Castilian nobles defected to the neighbouring kingdom of León, and King Fernando II of León invaded Castile, seizing the capital, Toledo, and the young king, Alfonso VIII. Castile itself was riven by civil war. Royal peacemaking in Spain was best exemplified by the Castilian – Leonese peace treaties agreed to restore order to the troubled Tierra de Campos region between the two kingdoms. Disputes in this area had occurred since 1034, but since the divisio imperii in 1157 they persisted in a more pronounced way. Warfare was endemic between the two kingdoms, and both sides engaged in razzias (raids) in the border region. Fernando II of León invaded Castile during the civil war in the 1160s, capturing the former royal capital of Toledo in 1162, and after attaining his majority (1169), King Alfonso VIII of Castile was eager to recover lost territory. Both sides wanted to preserve the territorial integrity of their kingdoms, and this could only be ensured through the maintenance of law and order.

The first such Castilian-Leonese peace treaty to attempt to restore peace in the Tierra de Campos was that of Medina de Ríoseco (1181). Prior to the Treaty of Medina de Ríoseco, the two parties agreed a Peace at Castronuño (27 February 1181). Ambassadors from both kingdoms met at Castronuño, where they issued a document affirming their mutual intent to make peace. This appears to have been a goodwill gesture preliminary to the main treaty, signed by the monarchs who were party to the agreement at Medina de Ríoseco.  

The aim of the Treaty of Medina de Ríoseco (21 March 1181) was to ‘make peace, agreement and friendship between the two parties’ (‘facimus pacem et concordiam et amiciciam firmam’). The duration of the treaty was indefinite (‘in perpetuum’). This was to be achieved through binding the heirs of the parties in the same manner as the parties themselves: ‘tam inter nos quam inter filios nostros et filias.’

Several means were employed to maintain the peace. Firstly, the parties agreed to hold to the partition line between the two kingdoms made by the Emperor Alfonso VII in the *divisio imperii*, as far south as the River Tagus frontier:

‘…teneamus divisionem et stemus per illam quam fecit Adefonsus imperator inter me, regem Fernandum, et patrem vestrum, regem Sancium, fratrem meum; et inde usque ad flumen Tagum, quod teneamus et stemus per eandem divisionem quam fecit Adefonsus, idem imperator, inter ambo regna quando ea divisit.’

Secondly, the nobility were prevented under the treaty from invading the other party’s kingdom, and they were obliged to respect the frontiers of the respective parties:

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‘et uterque nostrum sit dominus et rex omnium qui continetur infra limites regni sui iuxta predictum divisionem’\textsuperscript{264}

Moreover, the nobility from both sides were to be restrained from intervening in the affairs of the neighbouring kingdom, as defined by its recognised borders.

‘…nulla impediente requisitione nulloque interveniente impedimento alterius nostrum ad alterum super his que infra terminos alterutrius regni continentur, salvis in utroque regno directuris nobelium quos appellant filios de algo.’\textsuperscript{265}

Thirdly, peace was to be achieved through the exchange of castles as a means of security. As castle tenure was granted to tenants over a term of years, this was an effective means of guaranteeing long-term peace between the parties and their heirs. For example, King Fernando II of León placed five castles in the political arena: Melgar; Castrotierra; Peñafiel; Siero; and Portella.

Various guarantees were also included in the treaty in order to maintain peaceful relations. Firstly, no magnates were allowed to cross the frontier established by Emperor Alfonso VII between Castile and León; secondly, no-one was permitted to attack the other party to the treaty; thirdly, no-one was allowed to lead an army across the borders of the other kingdom; fourthly, no-one was to construct a castle in the other party’s kingdom or settle people there; and fifthly, no-one was to capture a castle in the other party’s territory.

The sanctions for derogation from the treaty were draconian. They can be divided into temporal and ecclesiastical measures. Chief of the temporal sanctions was the forfeiture of castles by a violator of the peace:

\textsuperscript{264} \textit{Ibid.}, 615.
\textsuperscript{265} \textit{Ibid.}, 615.
‘Similiter, si in propria persona mea infra terminos regni vestri aliquam rapinam fecero…tradantur vobis aliquod de castellis meis fidelitate.’

This measure applied particularly to vassals of both the monarchical parties to the treaty, Fernando II and Alfonso VIII.

As regards ecclesiastical sanctions, if a suspect should raid the other party’s kingdom, and failed to make amends within forty days, then the bishop of the diocese in which the raid occurred was to impose an interdict on the part of the diocese that lay in the other kingdom. Moreover, if the crime still had not been remedied forty days after the imposition of the interdict, then the sentence of excommunication was to be applied to the criminal:

‘…et si usque ad alios XL dies postquam fuerit positum interdictum predicta rapine duplum non emendavero, fuerat sententiam excommunicationis.’

The Treaty of Medina de Ríoseco was unsuccessful in maintaining peace between Castile and León, despite the fact that both sides ratified it, and duly executed it by exchanging castles. The treaty failed to achieve peace because it did not satisfactorily resolve the border dispute between the two kingdoms, which was the root cause of military hostilities. Rather, Alfonso VIII recovered Castilian territory in the Tierra de Campos that Fernando II of León had captured during his minority. The Castilian royal notary records that by November 1181, Alfonso VIII had recovered ‘all of the Tierra de Campos’. Hence, there was a flagrant violation of the Treaty of Medina de Ríoseco within months of its agreement.

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266 Ibid., 615.
267 Ibid., 616.
268 González, Regesta de Fernando II, (Madrid, 1943), 135.
269 González, Alfonso VIII, 1, 696.
The resumption of hostilities led both sides to consider that peace was desirable. Both parties recognised that it was necessary to find a just solution to the border conflict which underlay the pattern of belligerence that characterised Castilian-Leonese relations in the late twelfth century. Hence, a new peace initiative was required. This led to the Treaty of Fresno-Lavandera (1 June 1183).  

Fresno-Lavandera is significant for the role of diplomatic agents in the preliminary negotiations to the treaty. As such it constitutes an exceptional example of Castilian-Leonese diplomacy in the later twelfth century. Its relevance lies in the insight that it affords historians about contemporary diplomatic procedure leading to the conclusion of a peace between the parties to the treaty. Both kings decided to re-embrace peace, and to this end they held a colloquium at Paradinas. This symposium summoned nobles from both sides to represent their respective parties. The Castilians were represented by Rodrigo Gutiérrez and Tello Pérez de Meneses. For their part, the Leonese delegation consisted of Fernando Rodríguez ‘el Castellano’ and Pelayo Tabladelo. After their discussion, they reached a written agreement, which was to form the basis of the future peace treaty. The Treaty of Fresno-Lavandera is a clear example of monarchs delegating political duties to lay and ecclesiastical magnates. In this case, both the Leonese representatives had been witnesses to the preceding Treaty of Medina de Río Seco (1181). Consequently, they were the ideal choice to represent the Leonese monarch at Paradinas; they were familiar with antecedent Leonese-Castilian peacemaking activity. Moreover, as landowners themselves, they were cognisant of the wider territorial dispute that characterised Leonese-Castilian relations at this time, namely the division of the Castilian-Leonese Empire into two adjacent kingdoms.

270 Treaty of Fresno-Lavandera (1 June 1183), González, Regesta, Doc. 46, 315.
271 Calderón Medina, Magnatibus Regni Mei, 408.
A short time later, both monarchs met in a *vista real* (royal summit) at a neutral location between the towns of Fresno and Lavandera, the respective bases of Fernando and Alfonso VIII. Both sides attempted to reach a definitive peace agreement on this occasion, mindful of past failures, such as the Treaty of Medina de Río Seco (1181). At Paradinas it had been accepted that Alfonso VIII had breached the peace, and a new effort was made to resolve the underlying issues at dispute.

The core of the Castilian-Leonese dispute was a quarrel over territory, and specifically the border area of the Tierra de Campos between the two neighbours. Under Fresno-Lavandera, peace was to be created by establishing a definitive frontier line, which would eliminate frontier disputes by delineating future zones of influence. The scope of the treaty was wide. It was intended to bind the secular nobility and clergy by common consent. In particular, the treaty was intended to transform relations between the two powers by investing power in the nobility, who swore allegiance to the two monarchs:

‘Et ibi, per potesta tem quam vobis in nos concessarum prius et vos invicem vobis in vos, et nos ac regna nostra fecistis, reformastis pacem…’\(^{273}\)

Tenants were obliged to respect the *divisio imperii* that was germane to all peacemaking activity at this time, in an attempt to stabilise the frontier:

‘…et tunc per eandem districtionem per quam tenemur ad servandam pacem compellamur ad regnorum divisionem.’\(^{274}\)

The apportionment of respective castles on either side of the border was to be observed faithfully, on pain of excommunication and interdict:


‘Et hoc totum observare per distinctionem castellorum fidelitatis et per sententiam excommunicationis et interdicti…’

These concords demonstrate that the overriding imperative of Castilian and Leonese diplomacy in the 1180s was to achieve a durable peace. It is arguable that in real terms this could only be achieved by both sides agreeing to cease hostilities in the frontier zone. In order to guarantee compliance with the treaty, draconian sanctions were imposed. Furthermore, if a monarch adopted bellicose policies, then an appeal could be made to the pope, who had the power to authorise the local prelate to impose a sentence of excommunication on the culprit.

To ensure the durability of the treaty, which had been the shortcoming of the Treaty of Medina de Ríoseco, the term of the peace was enshrined in the treaty:

‘…debo ego tenere usque ad decem annos sine aliquot querela.’

Indeed, to ensure that peace was upheld in the future, a time and place was specified in the treaty in order to examine whether it had been implemented. Nevertheless, a mere five years later, after Fernando II’s death (d. 1188), King Alfonso VIII resumed his aggressive policies and seized Leonese castles in the Tierra de Campos.

In short, the peacemaking attempts of the 1180s proved unsuccessful due to the continued border dispute between Castile and León. In this frontier region, both kingdoms sought short-term political gain through military advantage. Such rivalry was to endure until the definitive resolution of the Castilian-Leonese dispute through the marriage of King Alfonso IX of León and Queen Berenguela of Castile, and later, the

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275 Ibid., 319.
276 C. Morris, Papal Monarchy, 213.
278 Martínez Díez describes the military situation between Castile and León as ‘very tense’ at this time, after Fernando II’s death in 1188, although he does not mention Castile seizing Leonese castles specifically. He does not allude to Alfonso’s justification for such seizures: G. Martínez Díez, Alfonso VIII, rey de Castilla y Toledo (Burgos, 1995), 71.
reunification of the two crowns in 1230 under the rule of their son, King Fernando III (1217-52).

**The Castilian – Aragonese Alliance:**

A consistent theme of the twelfth century is the long-standing alliance between Castile and Aragón. Broadly speaking, during the second half of the twelfth century, Castile faced east towards Aragon and Navarre, whilst León gravitated towards Portugal in the west. After the death of Emperor Alfonso VII and the *divisio imperii* in 1157, there was a new configuration in Iberian politics. Most importantly, the Kingdom of Aragón united with the County of Catalonia under the rule of a single prince. Initially, this prince was the Count of Barcelona, Ramon Berenguer IV (d. 1166). He was betrothed to Petronilla of Aragón, and on his death, the Crown of Aragón passed to their son, King Alfonso II.

The most powerful Christian Iberian ruler in the 1160s was King Fernando II of León (1157-88). He held sway largely because his fellow rulers, King Alfonso VIII of Castile and King Alfonso II of Aragón were still minors, and had yet to exercise personal rule. Civil war erupted in Castile in March 1160 between the rival Castro and Lara families. The Castros sought the assistance of the Leonese, conducting negotiations with King Fernando II of León. By 1162, the Leonese had captured the city of Toledo, where Fernando Rodríguez de Castro was installed as governor. Moreover, the Leonese king exercised tutelage over the young Castilian monarch; likewise he acted similarly with respect to the Aragonese monarch. Lucas of Túy describes Alfonso VIII as being in the care of Fernando II (‘nutrierat’).²⁷⁹ However, Fernando was unable to control the whole of the Castilian kingdom. Neither did he personally take custodianship of the young Alfonso VIII. Instead, he entrusted the child

to the Castilian regent, Manrique Pérez de Lara. Finally, King Sancho VI of Navarre allied himself to Fernando II in order to make a common anti-Castilian front in La Rioja region. Linehan argues that this development amounted to Leonese colonization of the entire region. Hence, it is possible to discern the Leonese and Navarrese appropriation of Castilian territory which was to form the *casus belli* for later Castilian incursions into these two kingdoms.

Once King Alfonso VIII had attained his majority (1169), he forged an alliance with his neighbour, the king of Aragón, Alfonso II. The rationale for this alliance was to form a concerted anti-Navarrese coalition. Initially, the aim was to recover Castilian territory recently seized by King Sancho VI of Navarre in Alava and Guipuzcoa during Alfonso VIII’s minority. This land had been in Castilian possession since the late eleventh century. It was intended that the treaty of Zaragoza (July 1170) would provide the basis for a joint campaign by Castile and Aragón against Navarre. However, no military action actually took place.

The nature of the Treaty of Zaragoza was that of ‘friendship, perpetual accord and peace’:

‘…facimus et firmamus veram amicitiam et perpetuam concordiam et pacem inter nos…’

It was to last in perpetuity (‘…omnibus diebus vite nostre…’). In case of derogation from the treaty by either party, that side would forfeit their castles, which would accrue to the other side:

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‘…quod si ego rex Adefonsus Castelle…ex tunc sim periurus, fide mentitus, proditor et alevosus, et amittam predicta castella, ita quod veniant in potestate regis Ildefonsus Aragonensium…’

Moreover, the nobility of the aggressor would be obliged to perform homage to the aggrieved party:

‘…et illi mei vassalli qui tenant predicta castella per me faciant hominium Ildefonso, regi Aragonensium…’

Crucially, the treaty contains a pledge by Alfonso VIII of Castile to secure Aragonese territory should the king of Aragón become involved in a foreign war. In this respect it was a veritable treaty of alliance, and similar to the Treaty of Túy (1137) in this respect:

‘…et, si forte contingerit propter guerram vel aliquam occasionem, regem Ildefonsum Aragonensem ire in Provincia vel alias extra terram suam, ego defendam et manuteneam terram suam per bonam fidem…’

Instead of fighting Navarre, Alfonso VIII of Castile concentrated his forces against the Almohads of al-Andalus. For this venture, he sought the military assistance of the King of Aragon, Alfonso II. The two kingdoms jointly besieged the frontier city of Cuenca. This city was of strategic importance because it straddled the frontier of both kingdoms with al-Andalus. During the siege, the two monarchs agreed a new treaty, the Treaty of Cuenca (1177), under which the Castilian monarch released the Aragonese leader from his duty of vassalage for the Kingdom of Zaragoza. This concession was in reward for Aragonese military assistance during the siege of Cuenca. The Treaty of Cuenca also stipulated what territory both kingdoms could hold freely.

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282 Ibid., 251.
283 Ibid., 251.
284 Ibid., 251.
which had been agreed by their predecessors. Specifically, Alfonso VIII of Castile released the Aragonese king from the homage owed by the latter since 1136.

The nature of the treaty was peace between Castile and Aragon:

‘…ego Aldefonsus, rex Castelle, et ego Ildefonsus, rex Aragonis…pacem firmam.’\(^{285}\)

It was to last in perpetuity (‘in perpetuum habere’). The terms of the treaty were an alliance against all-comers, both Christian and Muslim:

‘…ut iuvenmus nos ad invicem contra omnes christianos et sarracenos, excepto rege Ferrando…’\(^{286}\)

In practice, this meant an agreement to form a joint effort to make peace or war against all other parties:

‘…et habeamus comuniter pacem vel guerram cum aliis omnibus, sicut in convenienciis nostris scriptum est.’\(^{287}\)

Later, in 1179, the two monarchs met at Cátula, near Jaén, where they agreed a partition treaty. It was also a friendship and and alliance treaty against all other rulers, both Christian and Muslim, but especially against the king of Navarre. This treaty, the Treaty of Cátula (20 March 1179) was of vital strategic importance for the future development of the two kingdoms, as it determined the future spheres of influence of both kingdoms in al-Andalus (‘terram Hyspanic’). However, Cátula was different from the earlier partition treaty of Tudején (1151) because that pact had obliged Aragón to perform homage to Castile for territory that it captured. Valdeavellano argues, that on this basis, the imperial idea had been abandoned; no longer were other peninsular

\(^{286}\) Ibid., 473.
\(^{287}\) Ibid., 473.
monarchs obliged to perform homage in recognition of Castilian-Leonese hegemony.\textsuperscript{288} Whereas Fernando I, Alfonso VI and Alfonso VII had assumed the integration of conquered territory into the Castilian-Leonese Empire, post the \textit{divisio imperii} the partition treaties between the various Peninsula kingdoms divided the respective zones of influence of captured Islamic territory.

The Treaty of Cázola granted freely and in perpetuity to the king of Aragon all of the Levante, including the city and territory of Valencia, Játiva and Denia as far south as the port of Alicante:

‘…concedit atque in perpetuum diffinit per se suos successores predictus Aldefonsus rex Castelle iam dicto Ildefonso regi Aragonum et successoribus suis, ut adquirant sibi, habeant…Valentiam.’\textsuperscript{289}

The king of Aragón was to possess this territory freely, with absolute title, in perpetuity, and without interference from any other party:

‘…et im perpetuum possideant libere, solide et absolute, non interveniente aliqua contraria ab uno ad alterum…’\textsuperscript{290}

This territory was to be accompanied by all its appurtenances and subject population:

‘…cum omnibus suis pertinenciis heremis et populates que sibi pertinent et pertinere debent.’\textsuperscript{291}

Likewise, the treaty granted to the king of Castile all the territory south of Alicante, namely the Kingdom of Murcia, with all its castles, towns and population:

\textsuperscript{288} L.G. de Valdeavellano, \textit{Historia de Espana}, 2 vols, 4\textsuperscript{th} edn. (Madrid, 1968), II, 567.
\textsuperscript{289} Treaty of Cázola, González, \textit{Alfonso VIII}, II, Doc. 319 at 528.
\textsuperscript{290} \textit{Ibid.}, 529.
\textsuperscript{291} \textit{Ibid.}, 529.
‘Similiter predictus Ildefonsus, rex Aragonum...concedit atque in perpetuum diffinit per se iam dicto Aldefonso regi Castelle...totam terram Hyspanie heremam et populatam que est ultra predictum qui est ultra Biar...cum omnibus castellis...et villis...et populates.’

This concession by the king of Aragón effectively granted King Alfonso VIII of Castile carte blanche to capture all of al-Andalus south of Alicante. Hence, the treaty concludes by restating its purpose as a pact of ‘division, concession and partition’ (‘...divisionem, concessionem atque diffinitionem’).

The outcome of these two treaties, Cuenca and Cázola, was independence for the other Peninsula kingdoms, which were no longer obliged to recognise Castilian-Leonese suzerainty. During the siege of Cuenca, both powers dealt with each other on equal terms. Similarly, at Cázola, when both parties divided al-Andalus, they dealt with each other on a basis of parity.

The Castilian-Navarrese Territorial Dispute:

Both Castile and Aragón had enduring claims to Navarre, dating back to the late eleventh century. In both cases, the issue was the same: the partition of territory. During the 1170s, Castile was preoccupied with the Kingdom of Navarre, whether in alliance with its old rival Aragón or unilaterally. Essentially, both Castile and Aragón competed for their share of the Kingdom of Navarre based on their inheritance. Both kingdoms regarded an independent Navarre as the enemy, and they could not countenance an autonomous Navarrese kingdom existing on terms of parity with their own realms.

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292 Ibid., 529.
293 R. Menéndez Pidal, Imperio Hispánico, 193.
Specifically, the cause of the dispute between Castile and Navarre in the mid-1170s was the issue of the frontier region of La Rioja seized by the King of Navarre, Sancho VI, during the minority of King Alfonso VIII of Castile. On the Navarrese side, Sancho VI claimed that Alfonso VI had infringed a truce agreed in 1167 between the two monarchs. This was the Truce of Fitero. In this accord, King Alfonso VIII and King Sancho VI had made a temporary peace between their two warring kingdoms.

The duration of the truce was ten years, the usual term for truces in the twelfth century. As regards the scope of the accord, both monarchs and their magnates were bound by the treaty, on oath, sworn on the Gospels. In case of derogation, if either monarch or his nobles should breach the peace, and failed to make amends within forty days, then he was to be declared a perjuror (periurus).

However, both Castile and Navarre were reluctant to resort to force of arms to resolve their dispute. Rather, both parties were keen to employ diplomatic means to achieve peace. Contemporaneously, Castile was engaged in fighting the Almohads, and was reluctant to fight on two fronts at once. It was for this reason that Alfonso VIII of Castile opted to seek for a diplomatic solution to the crisis.

Hence, on 25 August 1176 King Alfonso VIII of Castile and King Sancho VI of Navarre agreed to seek an arbitration of their case by the English monarch, Henry II Plantagenet (1154-89). Calderón Medina observes that arbitration was one of the principal means of conflict resolution in the Middle Ages. Pascua defines arbitration as a contractual arrangement, whereby both parties delegated the power to adjudicate defined issues to a third party during a limited period of time.

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294 Cf. G. Martínez Díez, Alfonso VIII, rey de Castilla y Toledo (Burgos, 1995), 82-84.
295 Truce of Fitero (October 1167), González, Alfonso VIII, II, Doc. 99.
296 I. Calderón Medina, Cum Magnatibus Regni Mei – La Nobleza y la Monarquía Leonesas Durante los Reinados de Fernando II y Alfonso IX (1157-1230) (Madrid, 2001), 413.
297 Pascua, Guerra y Pactos, 52.
Henry II was chosen as an arbiter because the Castilian monarch, Alfonso VIII, was married to his daughter, Eleanor. Family and kinship ties were the most important means of guaranteeing peace in the Middle Ages. Eleanor had received Aquitaine as a dowry, although it was her brother, Richard – later Richard I of England – who exercised lordship over it. Moreover, English kings would have sought the support of Castilian rulers to control Gascony in the twelfth century. However, Navarre was also close to Gascony, and the Basque kingdom would have been a valuable ally in English attempts to control the region. For example, Richard I of England married the daughter of Sancho VI of Navarre, doña Berenguela.

Both parties agreed a preliminary treaty, prior to the arbitration process itself. This was the Treaty of Nájera-Logroño (1176). The purpose of this treaty was to regulate the subsequent arbitration proceedings, in short to establish the parameters of the forthcoming litigation. In this treaty, both parties exchanged castles, in order to show goodwill, and to provide sureties for any settlement agreed in London.

This exchange guaranteed the parties’ mutual acceptance of Henry’s sentence, and compliance with the settlement pronounced in London. For Castile, Alfonso gave the castles of Nájera, Arnedo and Celerigo; for Navarre, Sancho granted Estella, Funes and Maranon. The term of the agreement was a seven-year truce.

Nuncii (envoys) from both parties were to present themselves before the court of the English king. Under the Treaty of Nájera-Logroño, both monarchs were to elect four nuncii to represent them at the proceedings. These diplomats were charged with presenting their party’s case before the English monarch, who would then proceed to

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298 R. Barber, Henry Plantagenet (Woodbridge, 2001), 194.
299 Pascua, Guerra y Pactos, 43.
give his judgment. Both sides would make an oral submission, before presenting their written petitions to the English court.

The Castilian and Navarrese petitions illuminate twelfth-century diplomatic practice, because we know more about them than any other contemporary treaty. They have survived and have been transcribed by González. Lomax illustrates the financial arrangements for the London conference: the English Treasury was to finance the travel expenses of the Spanish envoys. A significant feature of this litigation procedure was that Henry required the pleas of the respective embassies to take written form, because he could not understand the spoken Latin of the diplomats. Moreover, both sides had furnished themselves with documentary proof of their respective claims and allegations. In order to facilitate their dispute to arbitration, and to make good their claims to breach of the peace and restitution of territory, rulers needed to have access to exact copies of the terms of any previous treaty that had been agreed, exchanged and proclaimed. In this case, this was the Treaty of Nájera-Logroño (1176).

The protracted dispute was also alluded to in the English chronicles of the period. These were the Gesta Regis Henrici – wrongly attributed by Stubbs to Benedict of Peterborough, but now thought to have been authored by Roger of Hoveden – and the Chronicle of Roger of Hoveden. Another contemporary witness to events at Henry’s court at Westminster was that of the chronicler, Gerald of Wales.

The basis of the Castilian monarch’s claim to Navarre was that he had inherited the kingdom from his ancestors. In the Castilian petition, Alfonso VIII clearly states his claim to Navarre, based on his legitimate inheritance from earlier Castilian monarchs,

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who had also ruled this territory during their reigns. In his petition, King Alfonso VIII alleges that his grandfather, Alfonso VII, had conquered the Kingdom of Navarre at the battle of Ejéa (1140). As a benign ruler, he had then granted Navarre to its own monarch, García IV Ramírez as a fief. The latter had paid homage to the Emperor for his kingdom, which he, García, ruled as dux (duke) of Pamplona.

Subsequently, the Emperor had granted it to his son, Sancho III, who ruled it peacefully during his lifetime. In the post-Imperial age, the descendant of Emperor Alfonso VII, Sancho III, had nevertheless preserved his claim to Navarre:

‘et post mortem imperatoris rex Sanctus filius eius sine querela et sine placito iure hereditario possedit.’\textsuperscript{305}

It is noteworthy that the petition unequivocally states that Sancho III ‘possessed’ Navarre. Against this background, the present Castilian grievance was that the Navarrese monarch, Sancho VI, had violently withheld this land:

‘…Rex Navarre abstulit et violenter detinet.’\textsuperscript{306}

After Sancho’s death (d. 1158), the incumbent Castilian monarch, Alfonso VIII, legitimately inherited and peacefully ruled this territory:

‘Quo mortuo dominus Rex noster Aldefonsus, filius eius, iure hereditario in pace posedit…’\textsuperscript{307}

For the opposition, Sancho VI of Navarre asserted that all his territory was possessed by the Kingdom of Navarre since the death of Sancho IV el de Peñalen in 1076:

\textsuperscript{305} Petitions presented by the King of Castile against Navarre at the English Court (1177), González, Alfonso VIII, II, Doc. 277, 457.
\textsuperscript{306} Ibid., 457.
\textsuperscript{307} Ibid., 457.
Sancho’s claim was a mixture of *de jure* and *de facto* causes. On the one hand, he claimed to have inherited his kingdom from his ancestor, King Sancho García, who had expelled King Alfonso VI of Castile from Navarre in the late eleventh century. On the other hand, he maintained that he possessed and held in peace all this land:

‘Hec omnia ad regnum suum spectantia possedit et habuit in pace, et quieta abavus huius regis Sancii, Garsias, scilicet, rex Navarre et Nagere…’

In 1134, King García IV Ramírez, Sancho’s father, had recovered his kingdom from its union with Aragón, thus preserving its integrity. Subsequently, he bequeathed Navarre to his son, the present incumbent, Sancho VI.

Sancho’s complaint was that King Alfonso VIII of Castile had sequestered King García’s kingdom. He alluded to the fact that during his lifetime, the Emperor had restored Navarre to his father, King García IV. He petitioned that on this basis he should be allowed to enjoy his inheritance in peace, especially now that the Emperor was dead:

‘Conqueritur etiam…quod imperator reddiderat regi Garsie patri suo; et eo mortuo, idem imperator abstulit illud Sanctio nunc regi Navarre, tunc habenti et in pace possidenti tanquam suam propriam hereditatem.’

According to Gerald of Wales, King Henry II of England chose a *via media* in his Sentence: he adjudicated that both sides were to have restored to them the territory that the other party had seized from them, which they had rightly petitioned and which

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308 Petition of the King of Navarre against Castile at the English Court (1177), González, *Alfonso VIII*, II, Doc. 278, 458.
the other party had not contradicted. However, restitution was to be circumscribed by the border demarcations established at the death of Emperor Alfonso VII in 1157, regardless of preceding claims on either side.

In short, both parties were to be granted restitution of the settlements that had been violently and unjustly seized by the opposing party:

‘Super querelis vero pretaxatis de castellis et terries cum omnibus terminis et pertinentiis hinc inde violenter et inuste abbatis…pleniaram utrique parti supradictorum que in iure petita erant fieri restitutionem adiudicavimus.’

For Castile, these were Logroño; Navarrete; Entrena; Autol; and Ausejo. For Navarre, they were Leguin; Portilla; and the castle of Godin. In addition, Alfonso VIII was obliged to pay three thousand maravedis to King Sancho VI annually for ten years, making payment every four months in Burgos.

The Gesta Henrici records how the English monarch made the Spanish ambassadors sign the peace agreement, and take oaths on the Gospels that they would observe, and make their principals comply with, his decision, in order that it may be ‘faithfully and indefinitely observed’:

‘…ut pacem inter vos firmetis et in perpetuum fideliter observetis.’

He also forced the embassies to swear that if one of their principals derogated from his judgement, then they would be forced to surrender one of the castles that they had conceded as a guarantee. However, the chronicle relates how only the most recent

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311 Gerald mentions the ‘Great Council’ of Henry II in March 1177, although he does not specifically refer to Henry’s arbitration of the Castilian-Navarrese dispute at the venue, neither does he allude to the presence of Spanish envoys representing the respective kingdoms at the Council: Giraldi Cambrensis, De Rebus a Se Gestis, Bk. 2, Chap. 8, 57, in Idem, Opera, ed. J.S. Brewer, Vol. 1, Rolls Series, 21 (London, 1861).
312 González, Alfonso VIII, II, Doc. 279.
313 Ibid., II, Doc. 279, at 460-61.
314 Gesta Regis Henrici, 154.
conquests were subject to Henry’s judgement; previous, outstanding claims were disregarded.\textsuperscript{315} Henry also despatched letters to the two monarchs, setting out his judgement.

This procedure gives the impression that arbitration was the standard legal remedy in the twelfth century. However, the territorial dispute between Castile and Navarre was not resolved by Henry’s arbitration, and it remained pending. Firstly, the decision only referred to places which had been contested by the two monarchs during their respective reigns. Luis Corral questions whether both sides desired a valid arbitration.\textsuperscript{316} He cites Pascua, who remarks that often pacts were means of gaining intelligence regarding the political intentions of the enemy, without the slightest intention to abide by the judgement given. Luis Corral concludes, that on the basis of the evidence, that this was the case here.\textsuperscript{317}

Neither Alfonso VIII of Castile or Sancho VI of Navarre showed any inclination to abide by the judgement proclaimed by Henry II in London. Alfonso VIII was currently occupied with the siege of Cuenca (1177), in which enterprise he counted on the \textit{auxilium} of the Aragonese. Castile and Aragón were now firm allies, having sworn ‘friendship, concord and peace’ at the Treaty of Zaragoza (1170):

‘Facimus et firmamus veram amicitiam et perpetuam concordiam et pacem inter nos omnibus diebus vite…’\textsuperscript{318}

This alliance demonstrated two things: first, the endurance of the Castilian-Aragonese partnership against the Almohads; and secondly, as the London conference had proved ineffectual, the resumption of the Castilian-Aragonese pact against Navarre. This

\textsuperscript{315} \textit{Ibid.}, 154-5.  
\textsuperscript{317} \textit{Ibid.}, 35.  
\textsuperscript{318} Treaty of Zaragoza (1170), González, \textit{Alfonso VIII}, II, Doc. 147.
alliance was cemented at the Treaty of Cázola (1179), when the two monarchs agreed a ‘confederation pact’. Under this agreement, they swore mutual assistance that the Castilian monarch could recover the lands the Navarrese had seized during his minority. On the other hand, the Navarrese failed to return the Castilian territory that was the subject of the London arbitration. The renewed Castilian-Aragonese bloc as manifested by the Treaty of Cázola prompted an immediate diplomatic response from Navarre. A new peace treaty was hastily agreed between Castile and Navarre, of which little is known. Sancho VI’s aim in these negotiations was to avoid an imminent attack by Castile.

In this context, Luis Corral argues that Alfonso VIII was the principal beneficiary of the London arbitration. The proceedings had coincided with Alfonso’s campaign against Almohads at Cuenca. Rather, it was more expedient to launch a diplomatic mission, which could prolong matters. In short, Luis Corral argues that the arbitration procedure was an astute political manoeuvre on Alfonso’s part. The real problem arising from the litigation was that there was no means of enforcing it. In the absence of strong royal power, it was impossible to ensure adherence to the judgement, or to specify the consequences in the event of derogation. However, after his victory at the siege of Cuenca, and buoyed by his alliance with Aragon, which culminated in the Treaty of Cázola, Alfonso VIII possessed the political and military prestige to reclaim Castilian territory which had been captured by Navarre. As the senior military ruler in Iberia, he was able to use to the diplomatic tactic of the London arbitration to facilitate a fragile truce with Navarre, and to assert his agenda, which was the reclamation of territory which he considered legitimately belonged to the Kingdom of Castile.

320 Luis Corral, Territorial Litigation, 38.
This newly assertive Castile was able to demand peace from Navarre in the disputed border territory between the two kingdoms, which Navarre had seized during Alfonso’s minority. This peace took the form of a new treaty, the Treaty of Nájera-Logroño II (15 April 1179). The treaty was significantly agreed at the same location that the pre-arbitration pact had been signed. This pact was one of ‘friendship and concord’. Sancho VI gave Alfonso VIII the frontier castles of Logroño, Antelenam and Navarret, Auguseio, Abtol and Resam. In turn, Alfonso would grant the same castles to his vassals, who were named in the treaty: Petri Roderici de Acafra; Martín Roderici de Acafra and Martín Guillermi. These vassals would each hold these castles and serve Alfonso VIII for a term of ten years. The aim of this measure was to stabilise the Castilian-Navarrese frontier for the foreseeable future. In an attempt to engender cross-border security, these three vassals were elected by the King of Navarre, granting him a direct stake in the peace process:

‘…et Lucronium et iam dicta castella teneat per Aldefonsum regem Castellae primitus quislibet dictorum trium militum, quam rex Navarre elegerit.’

These vassals were to render homage to the king of Navarre, as Navarrese tenants holding these castles had done before them.

Marriage Alliances and Succession:

In Castile-León, a marriage alliance succeeded where years of diplomacy had failed: through the union of the royal houses of both kingdoms, the offspring came to reunite the thrones of the divided Empire into one kingdom. One of the principal means of forging diplomatic alliances in the Middle Ages was the dynastic union

322 Ibid., 533.
between the ruling houses of rival kingdoms. In this respect, León and Portugal exceeded all expectations, both Leonese monarchs marrying Portuguese brides in the second half of the twelfth century: Fernando II married Urraca Alfonsez, daughter of the first king of Portugal, Afonso Henriquez, as his first wife; and his son, Alfonso IX married Teresa of Portugal also as his first spouse. Thus, we can speak of a Leonese-Portuguese axis in the later twelfth century. However, in addition to this axis, the monarchs of León and Castile attempted to mend their fractured relationship by arranging a marriage between doña Berenguela, daughter of King Alfonso VIII of Castile and Alfonso IX of León.

Bianchini argues that a woman’s primary role in the Middle Ages was to marry. In this sense, Queen Berenguela fulfilled her destiny. Such a union would secure an alliance between Castile and León, as desired by her father, King Alfonso VIII of Castile. It would also allow her husband to beget heirs to the throne of León. The hope of most contemporaries was that such an heir would reunite the crowns of León and Castile, and so end the internecine warfare that was crippling political relations between the two kingdoms.

After marriage, a woman’s interest was expected to align with that of her husband and his family, and with their offspring. Modern scholarship has enlightened this role. Marriage alliances gave the bride’s father an ally in the opposing court. Indeed, monarchs used their married daughters as mediators between their natal and marital families. This role could flourish long after the wedding ceremony was over. Such relationships attest to the growing agency and authority wielded by royal wives and daughters.

Queen Berenguela only ruled as Queen of León for seven years. However, during this period she wielded broad powers, both independently and in conjunction with her husband, King Alfonso IX of León. Earenfight argues that to some extent this was just her natural due: Iberian queens enjoyed greater prestige and authority than their northern European counterparts. However, the terms of Berenguela’s marriage contract, and a comparison of her rule in León with other contemporary queens, demonstrate that her reign was unusual even by the standards of her age. Firstly, she benefitted from the strength of the Kingdom of Castile in which she had been born. Secondly, the terms of her marriage contract made her the “agent and symbol” of peace between Castile and León; she actively mediated between her husband and her father both during and after her marriage to Alfonso IX. In particular, she was the designated mediatrix of the troubled Tierra de Campos region that straddled the Castilian-Leonese frontier.

She was also a significant force within Castilian-Leonese politics in her own right. She was a partner to her husband, the king of León. She was a mother to the couple’s children. However, most importantly she was an intermediary between her natal and marital families. As regards the proposed marriage alliance in 1197, the Leonese could not hope to recover their lost castles by military force. However, the King of Castile, Alfonso VIII, might be persuaded to settle the disputed territory on his daughter, as her dowry. According to Archbishop Rodrigo’s De Rebus Hispaniae, Alfonso VIII was understandably reluctant to return castles he had just won in battle. However, Queen Leonor, his wife, intervened to arrange their daughter’s marriage, in the interests of peace between Castile and León.

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327 Archbishop Rodrigo Ximénez de Rada, De Rebus Hispaniae [DRH], CCCM, 72 (Turnholt, 1987), Bk. VII. Chap. 31, 253; Spanish trans., J. Fernández Valverde, Historia de los Hechos de España (Madrid, 1989).
Leonor’s active participation in the arrangement of her daughter’s marriage demonstrate the significant influence of medieval queens in the sphere of dynastic alliances. Marriage alliances were generally regarded as the remit of queens in the Middle Ages. For example, such powerful queens as Eleanor of Aquitaine and Adela of Blois, negotiated marriage alliances on behalf of their sons and daughters.

Peace efforts between Castile and León largely failed in the late twelfth century because both sides had territorial interests in the frontier region, known as the Tierra de Campos. These interests justified conflict, and consequently undermined the peace. This explains why the repeated diplomatic initiatives aimed at peacemaking between Castile and León all achieved nothing in the long term. However, diplomacy finally succeeded at the end of the twelfth century, when a marriage alliance was proposed between King Alfonso IX of León and the Castilian Infanta, doña Berenguela, daughter of King Alfonso VIII of Castile.

However, whilst she was still only a child, doña Berenguela had been betrothed to an arguably more powerful suitor, namely Conrad III, son of the Emperor, Frederick Barbarossa. The fact that she was heir to the Kingdom of Castile dramatically increased her marriage prospects. Conrad was an attractive suitor from the Castilian standpoint because, as he had three elder brothers, he would probably not inherit the Imperial throne, merely a duchy or two. Nevertheless, there was a broader political purpose to this proposed alliance, namely to integrate the kingdom of Castile more fully into European affairs beyond the Pyrenees. Since the late eleventh century, Castilian rulers

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328 Parsons, ‘Mother, Daughter’, 63-65.
330 Bianchini, Queen’s Hand, 24.
had desired to participate in political developments beyond the Iberian Peninsula, and had arranged dynastic marriages to achieve this objective.

This arranged marriage was contracted by way of the Treaty of Seligenstadt, the seat of Frederick’s court, near Frankfurt, (23 April 1188).\(^{331}\) The parties to the agreement were the Emperor, Frederick I, and Alfonso VIII of Castile, grandson of Emperor Alfonso VII of Castile-León. The purpose of the treaty was to contract a marriage alliance between the Emperor’s son, Conrad and Berenguela of Castile. At issue was the Castilian inheritance.

The kings of Castile were the senior political and military rulers in the Iberian Peninsula in the late twelfth century. Hence, it was vital to ensure their succession. However, the treaty’s provisions reveal profound anxieties in the Castilian camp about the prospect of a female heir.

The solution, according to Bianchini, was to create a ‘plural monarchy’.\(^{332}\) Berenguela’s position as heir to the Castilian throne made her the sole source of legitimate royal authority. Moreover, it could not be transmitted to Conrad without her formal, public agreement. Even after this occurred, she would retain royal authority for herself, too. The treaty does not specify the circumstances of Castilian royal government if Berenguela and her children were the only successors to the throne. Nevertheless, it implies that royal legitimacy could be transmitted to her offspring (‘eis’).\(^{333}\)

The treaty provided that if Alfonso VIII should die without leaving issue, then Berenguela was to succeed him, reigning with her husband, Conrad:

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\(^{331}\) Treaty of Seligenstadt (23 April 1188), González, *Alfonso VIII*, II, Doc. 499, 858.

\(^{332}\) Bianchini, *Queen’s Hand*, 25.

‘Si rex Aldefonsus sine filio masculo superstite obierit, succedat illi in regno filia sua Berengaria et vir eius Conradus, salvo et reservato illeso iure suo domine regine Alienor, uxori dicti regis Castelle, in omnibus et per omnia in arris suis.’

However, Queen Leonor of Castile, Alfonso’s wife, was to retain her property in these circumstances. In this scenario, Conrad would act as Berenguela’s consort. However, if Conrad should die without leaving male issue by Berenguela, then she would inherit the Kingdom of Castile in her own right, and the Castilian throne would pass through the female line. If Conrad and Berengaria had progeny, then the Kingdom of Castile was to devolve on them.

Castilian-Leonese relations had been fraught since the Leonese humiliation at the Curia of Carrión in 1188, when King Alfonso IX had sworn homage to King Alfonso VIII of Castile. In front of the assembled Curia, Alfonso IX submitted to the Castilian ruler, kissing his hand. In return, he was knighted by Alfonso VIII. This was a brilliant example of statecraft on the part of the Castilian monarch, who was now the senior political and military leader in Christian Iberia. In reality, León resented its humiliation at Carrión, and this resentment perpetuated in Castilian-Leonese relations throughout the whole of Alfonso IX’s reign, until reunification in 1230.

King Alfonso IX’s first marriage was to Teresa, daughter of Sancho I of Portugal. This Leonese-Portuguese alliance was contracted in February 1191. The aim of this axis on the Leonese side was to contain Castile. This was to be achieved through enlisting Portuguese assistance against Castile. A measure of the success of this partnership was that Leonese-Portuguese amity was now so profound that they felt

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337 Lucas of Túy, Chronicon Mundi, Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Medievalis [CCCM], 74 (Turnhout, 2003), Bk. IV, chap. 107, 158.
able to despatch a joint delegation to the King of Aragón to seek his assistance, too. Thus, the two blocs, León-Portugal and Aragón-Navarre formed an anti-Castilian league at Huesca (12 May 1191).

However, the Papacy was alarmed by the polarization of relations between the Christian kingdoms of the Iberian Peninsula, especially given the Almohad menace. Hence, Pope Celestine III made a concerted attempt to establish a lasting peace between Castile and León. The aim of this diplomatic activity was to engender peace and unity between the Christian powers. This was needed to effectively combat Muslim al-Andalus.

In this undertaking, Pope Celestine III and his legate, Cardinal Gregory de Sant’Angelo, were the principal actors. The Church had always played an important role in mediating dynastic alliances between belligerent neighbours. However, this occasion was different because it marked the first time that the Papacy had directly intervened in Castilian-Leonese foreign policy. Unlike earlier treaties, which had been mutual agreements, Cardinal Gregory imposed a solution on the two monarchs.

The motivation for the Treaty of Tordehumos was to restore peace between Castile and León, as well as between Castile and Aragón. Aragón had betrayed its long-standing alliance with Castile by joining the League of Huesca. The parties to the treaty were Cardinal Gregory de Sant’Angelo, King Alfonso VIII of Castile and King Alfonso IX of León. The treaty aimed to redress the climate of hostility and distrust between Castile and León that was symptomatic of their relations in the early 1190s.

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Peace would achieved by returning Leonese castles captured by Alfonso VIII since the
death of Fernando II of León in 1188. These were principally the castles of Alba, Luna
and Portella. All other castles that Alfonso VIII had captured during the internecine
conflicts of the early 1190s were to revert to the king of León on Alfonso VIII’s death.
This was a mutually beneficial arrangement: Alfonso VIII held them during his lifetime
(i.e. he was tenant for life), whilst ultimately they would devolve on the Leonese
monarch, Alfonso IX. Castilian tenants who still held these castles on the death of
Alfonso VIII were to perform homage to the Leonese monarch for them:

‘…et illi qui tenant ea faciant regi Legionis hominium quod post mortem regis
Castelle et ea regi Legionis vel eius heredi restituant.’

The Treaty of Tordehumos (1194) also dealt with the question of the Leonese
succession. King Alfonso IX of León had married Teresa of Portugal illegally: the
union breached the ecclesiastical laws of consanguinity. Consequently, the marriage
was annulled by Cardinal Gregory de Sant’ Angelo. However, in the Treaty, the Papal
legate overlooked the rights of Alfonso’s offspring by his marriage to Teresa. The
treaty merely stipulated that if King Alfonso IX died without leaving an heir, then his
kingdom would revert to the Castilian monarch, Alfonso VIII:

‘Mandamus etiam quod si regem Legionis contingerit sine herede decedere,
regnum eius ad regum Castelle devolvatur…’

King Alfonso IX was also beset by internal feuding from the ‘Castilian party’ at
the Leonese court. Alfonso’s stepmother, Queen Urraca López, was a powerful figure
domestically, and her son, Sancho ‘el Castellano’, weakened Alfonso’s position by
providing a rival focus of attention. All the parties to the treaty recognised that Urraca

342 ibid., 105.
343 Treaty of Tordehumos (20 April 1194), González, Alfonso VIII, III, Doc. 622.
344 ibid., 107.
and Sancho needed to be contained in order to prevent them becoming alternate claimant to the Leonese throne. Hence, the treaty provided that their castles should be held trust for a term of ten years.

However, the Treaty of Tordehumos failed to deliver the sought after peace. Once again it was the disputed ownership of the frontier zone that caused hostilities to erupt. King Alfonso IX aligned León with the Almohad Caliphate against Castile in the wake of the Castilian defeat at Alarcos (1195). Together with the Navarrese they invaded Castile. In return, the Aragonese monarch, Pedro II (1196-1213), resumed the traditional Aragonese alliance with Castile. To counter the Almohad invasion, Alfonso VIII and Pedro II entered the Kingdom of León, occupying Ardon, Castro Gonzalo and Castrotierra. León was clearly the aggressor in this case. However, neither side was inclined to make peace, although it was obvious that military action had ended in a stalemate.345

A marriage alliance between Castile and León was seen by contemporaries as the only hope of achieving peace between the two quarrelling kingdoms.346 Queen Leonor of Castile perceived that a marriage alliance could resolve the border conflict with León. Although Castile was victorious in the war with León that resulted from the League of Huesca (1191), the conflict had drained Castile of its resources. Consequently, it was in a weaker position to counter the Almohad threat from the south. Thus, she convinced her husband to come to terms with the Leonese. This démarche represents the influence of medieval queens in the sphere of marital diplomacy.347 Bianchini argues that marriage alliances were generally the remit of queens in the Middle Ages, citing such powerful cases as Eleanor of Aquitaine and Adela of Blois, who negotiated marriage alliances on behalf of their offspring.

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345 Gonzalez, Alfonso VIII, I, 976.
346 González, Alfonso VIII, I, 724.
347 Parsons, Mothers, Daughters, 63-78.
Hence, Berenguela of Castile was wedded to King Alfonso IX of León. She only ruled León for seven years, however during this time, she exercised broad powers over the kingdom, both independently and in conjunction with her husband. Both parties hoped that the union would heal the rift between Castile and León that had existed since the *divisio imperii*. The *Crónica Latina* reports that:

‘…reformata est pax inter regem Legionis et regem Castelle que non potuit aliter reformari nisi rex Castelle filiam suam dominam Berengariam regi Legionis copularet, in matrimonio...’

Significantly, the majority of the Spanish clergy were favourably disposed to the union, despite the fact that it lay within the prohibited degrees of consanguinity. This was because they were aware of the pressing need for peace between the two neighbours: it was vital to expedite the union as soon as possible, because the peace was very fragile at this stage. Nevertheless, as the match was uncanonical, Pope Innocent III excommunicated both parties on 6 June 1198. Later, the new pope despatched his legate, Cardinal Rainerio, to formally separate the couple, according to the terms of a papal bull of 25 May 1199. Later still, the Kingdom of León was placed under interdict as a punishment.

Queen Berenguela’s marriage to King Alfonso IX of León was politically significant because she held a large number of castles in her pre-nuptial settlement (*arras*). Castles had geopolitical significance in the Middle Ages because they controlled their surrounding territory. In this case, they held the key to peace in the

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349 *Crónica Latina*, Chap. 15, at 50.
351 *PL*, CCXI V, col. 214.
frontier zone of the Tierra de Campos. To contemporaries, the union was the ideal solution to the frontier dispute between Castile and León: it was felicitous because it represented a peaceful solution to the ongoing quarrel.\textsuperscript{353} The Leonese could not hope to recover their castles by force; however King Alfonso VIII of Castile might be persuaded to settle them on his daughter as her dowry. These would then revert to the Leonese Crown on Queen Berenguela’s death.

The union took place in 1197, in the context of a peace between Castile and León. Peace would be secured by providing that castles in the Tierra de Campos should be held by the new Queen of León. Berenguela was to hold the disputed territory in her dowry, which was advantageous to the Leonese king. However, it also preserved Castilian influence in the border region. The transfer of castles would lead to peace because both sides would have a stake in the governance of them and their surrounding territory. The Leonese chronicler, Lucas of Túy states:

‘Pacificatum est inter reges predictos post multas strages et dampna, sed iterum inter eos mota Discordia cum venirent ad pacem, dedit rex Adefonsus Legionensis uxori sue regine domine Berengarie, que tunc degebat cum patre suo in Castelle, Villarpando, Ardon, Roda, Arbolium, Gordonem et Lunam.’\textsuperscript{354}

In the Treaty of Palencia (8 December 1199), Alfonso IX granted thirty castles to his wife, Berenguela of Castile as her \textit{arras} (dowry).\textsuperscript{355} Twelve of these castles were in the disputed Tierra de Campos region. They were to be held with their surrounding territory (\textit{alfozes}) and appurtenances. Consequently, she was a major presence in the frontier region:

\textsuperscript{353} González, \textit{Alfonso IX}, I, 91.
\textsuperscript{354} Lucas of Tuy, \textit{Chronicon Mundi}, Bk. IV, Chap. 84 at 324.
\textsuperscript{355} Cf. Bianchini, \textit{Queen’s Hand}, 44 for a map of Queen Berenguela’s \textit{arras} possessions in 1199.
‘…ego Adefonsus, Dei gratia Rex Legionis, do in dotem uxori mee, regina domne Berengarie, filie domni, regis Castelle, ista triginta castella cum alfozis et directuris suis.’

The tenants of these castles, who were her vassals, were to perform homage to her in a measure designed to engender peace and security.

The principal objective of including frontier castles in Queen Berenguela’s dowry was to resolve the frontier dispute. According to Bianchini, this was a common function for arras property in medieval Iberia. Queen Berenguela’s agency regarding these vital strategic fortresses was shared by her husband and father, but not circumscribed by them. This implied that she was lord in her own right, subordinate to the kings of Castile and León, but able to exercise authority over the noble tenants of her castles so long as these demands did not conflict with the latters’s duties to their and her overlords.

The Treaty of Palencia established stringent measures for its implementation. These were designed to halt a return to warfare by Castile and León. Nearly half of the castles in Berenguela’s arras lay within the contested Tierra de Campos region, and had been the subject of internecine warfare in the previous decade. Consequently, the stakes in the negotiations that preceded the treaty were high. The castles risked attack from either her father or husband at any change in the political circumstances. For example, Alfonso IX would lose the arras castles if he dismissed his wife, held her captive, killed her, or had her killed. Forfeiture of castles was the sanction for any king who seized

358 Treaty of Palencia (1199), González, Alfonso VIII, III, Doc. 681 at 206, ll. 8-18.
her arras by force.\textsuperscript{359} However, in the absence of hostilities during her lifetime, she would retain her arras castles until her death, although they were likely to be contested after her or her husband’s death.\textsuperscript{360} Moreover, the treaty specified the line of succession to the Leonese throne in order to anticipate potential hostilities after her death.\textsuperscript{361}

Several contingencies were provided for by guarantees in the Treaty of Palencia, including the politically-sensitive status of Berenguela’s castles in the event of separation of the spouses. If the marriage was dissolved, she would retain the castles in her arras agreement. Moreover, they would be subject to vassalage to both the Castilian and Leonese crowns – this guarantee was designed to prevent the reoccurrence of hostilities. Nevertheless, after the couple separated in 1204, Alfonso IX insisted that some of his wife’s castles be retained by the Leonese Crown. This demand on the part of the Leonese was to remain an obstacle to Castilian-Leonese peace until reunification in 1230.

However, if the Leonese monarch divorced his wife, then he was to lose those afore-mentioned castles. In this case, the knights who held them were to transfer the potestas (right of entry) to her father, Alfonso VIII of Castile, or her brother, or whoever was reigning Castile at that time. To ensure compliance from these vassals – who essentially held the fragile peace between Castile and León in their hands – they swore to faithfully abide by the terms of the treaty. If they failed to honour it, then they were branded ‘traitors’ and unworthy of salvation:

‘Et nos predicti fideles qui has arras tenemus facimus itaque istorum regum et regine domne Berengarie…quod fideliter compleamus et compleri faciamus hec omnia

\textsuperscript{359} Ibid., 206, ll. 28-30.
\textsuperscript{360} Ibid., 206, ll. 36-38.
\textsuperscript{361} Ibid., 206, ll. 23-27.
que in presenti continetur carta. Quod si non fecerimus, simus inde traditores et alevosi et non possimus nos de proditione salvare.\textsuperscript{362}

In theory, this marriage alliance should have constituted the ideal diplomatic solution to the long-running frontier dispute. In reality, Queen Berenguela and Alfonso IX were cousins, and their marriage was uncanonical. In January 1198 Pope Celestine III died, and his successor, Pope Innocent III (1198-1216) was elected. Innocent’s predecessor, Pope Celestine, had taken a lenient view of this incestuous union in the interests of peace between the two kingdoms. However, Pope Innocent III, who was young and energetic, was much more assiduous in applying canon law. He was not prepared to tolerate such a state of affairs, on the basis that the illicit marriage might destabilise the two central kingdoms of Christian Spain.

The Spanish clergy sent a delegation to Rome to plead for the union of Alfonso IX and Queen Berenguela to be upheld.\textsuperscript{363} This commission consisted of the bishops of Toledo, Palencia, Leon and Zamora. They urged the pope to ignore the question of consanguinity in the interests of peace between Castile and León. In their petitions, they advocated the issue of the queen’s *arras*, which largely consisted of castles in the Tierra de Campos, and which held the key to peace in the disputed frontier zone. The pope merely ordered that the castles be returned to the Kingdom of León.\textsuperscript{364} He also insisted on the separation of the spouses.

The desire of the Spanish clergy was that the couple would have an heir, who would reunite the thrones of Castile and León, and so restore peace to the two warring kingdoms. During the delay created by the papal judgement, the couple had a son, the future Fernando III. He ascended to the Castilian throne in 1217, and on his father’s

\textsuperscript{362} Ibid., 206-7.
\textsuperscript{363} Bianchini, *Queen’s Hand*, 72.
\textsuperscript{364} *PL*, CCXIV, col. 610.
death, to the Leonese Crown, in 1230. The hope of all parties that a united monarchy would restore peace to the two warring kingdoms was fulfilled. However, it was Queen Berenguela who played a determining role in managing tension on the Castilian – Leonese frontier in the years between her marriage to King Alfonso IX of León and the reunification of the two crowns under Fernando III in 1230. This was achieved through her lordship over strategic castles in the frontier region to engender political stability.

Monarchs versus Nobles:

In medieval society, peacemaking occurred primarily at a monarchical level, between rival kings. However, nobles, who formed the retinue of these monarchs, were also affected by royal peace treaties. Usually, they were instrumental in implementing the peace, despite the fact that they were almost always non-parties to the agreements themselves. Hence, it is to them that we now turn. From the point of view of monarchs, nobles were potential violators of the peace, and therefore needed to be constrained. Baronial rebellions could breach a hard-won peace, and therefore hinder royal peacemaking activity. Consequently, as Pascua argues, monarchs undertook to circumvent noble ambitions. This was achieved through a combination of war and diplomatic pacts. These peace agreements co-opted the nobility as non-parties, who were nevertheless obliged to obey their monarchical superiors, as expressed in the peace treaties themselves. Hence, most peace treaties from the twelfth century contain extensive provisions for implementation and derogation by nobles.

The nobility were a significant political force in the Middle Ages. The terms ‘noble’ refers to magnates, with or without a comital title, as well as local lords, infanzones (lesser magnates), and knights (caballeros). Nobles, in contrast to the rest of

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366 Pascua Echegeray, *De Reyes, Señores*, 15.
the populace, were part of a privileged class: they were born into noble families, often they were knights, and they constituted a social elite. However, there is a great distinction between the upper nobility, who had access to the king and the royal family, and local lords, who merely had a range of rights and goods conferred on them.

In the late eleventh and twelfth centuries, the Iberian nobility were ambitious to increase their wealth and influence. To this end, many nobles migrated to neighbouring kingdoms, where the opportunities for royal patronage were greater than in their own kingdom. In the twelfth century, to a large degree, the king was the fount of royal power, and the source of social advancement. The monarchical-noble relationship was a mutual one: magnates provided political counsel and military assistance; whilst the king distributed land, money, offices – including revenue and jurisdictional offices - and lordship. Frequent presence at court was therefore essential for nobles aspiring to power and wealth. Consequently, they were obliged to live a peripatetic existence. This is testified by the subscription lists attached to royal documents.

Nevertheless, noble fortunes could ameliorate or decline, depending on the political circumstances of the epoch. Against this background, wealthy magnates took action to ensure the perpetration of their dynastic lines, and the insurance of their patrimonies. Meanwhile, royal politics could disrupt the fortunes of the nobility. Most graphically, the divisio imperii of 1157 sundered many Castilian-Leonese nobles from their landed estates, especially those who held tenencias (tenancies) in the Tierra de Campos region. Noble lordship became more dispersed. This tendency was

370 Doubleday, Lara Family, 35 and n. 40 alludes to this process of disenfranchisement; E. Pascua Echegaray, Guerra y Pacto en el Siglo XII – La consolidación de una Sistema de reinos en Europa Occidental (Madrid, 1996), 179.
exacerbated by the lack of military advancement with respect to the Almohad caliphate, as the lack of territorial advancement became more acute. Consequently, successive Castilian and Leonese monarchs were unable to reward the service of their vassals with newly-reconquered land.

At the same period, in the twelfth century, royal domains were governed by dynastic monarchies. This process was no different in Christian Iberia. In this process, noble families played a key role. For example, Count Ramon Berenguer IV of Barcelona became Prince of Aragón by virtue of his marriage to Petronilla, daughter of King Ramiro II of Aragón. He was a leading player in the Aragonese Reconquest, and negotiated many peace treaties with his Castilian-Leonese counterparts.

Pascua identifies four principal trends in the monarchical – noble dynamic. Firstly, there was endemic warfare between the Christian kingdoms of the north of Iberia. Secondly, the emergence of noble dynasties via political marriages occurred, involving families from distant regions. Thirdly, there appeared a change of service of members of the noble class between different royal courts. Fourthly, the practice of vistas reales and truces between peninsular kings began to become established.\textsuperscript{371}

The twelfth century was an era of civil war, urban uprisings, running contrary to the prevailing development of the consolidation of Feudal kingdoms. During these hostilities, the nobility seized castles, land and men, in order to expand their power base. Nowhere was this more true than in the Castile of Alfonso VIII’s minority, in the 1160s, when the Lara and Castro dynasties competed for control of the young king.

Meanwhile, kings were establishing themselves at the pinnacle of the political hierarchy in the twelfth century. They did this in the face of competition from rival monarchs. They did so by forging political and military alliances with their

\textsuperscript{371} Pascua, \textit{De Reyes, Señores}, 10.
contemporaries, such as the long-standing alliance between Castile and Aragón that endured through the reigns of successive monarchs from these kingdoms.

These alliances were both political, designed to create a bloc larger than the sum of the two constituents, which would deter future attack against one of its members, and thus lead to peace. This was the case with successive Castilian-Aragonese treaties regarding Navarre, such as the Treaty of Cazola. On the offensive side of the equation, they were also military alliances, reliant on the mutual auxilium of the parties to the agreement, to effectively combat the enemy.

However, these alliances had the effect of alienating the nobility of the kingdoms who were the parties to such agreements. Pascua argues that royal power, as expressed in this ‘network of alliances and armies’ was very distinct from the familial organisation and kinship ties which characterised the feudal nobility at this time. This was despite the political marriages that great magnates engaged in, and the trans-regional nature of these marital relationships. Over time, monarchs managed to curtail noble ambition, and confine them to defined territorial units. Nobles were obliged to align themselves with the emerging royal blocs that were contending for power at this time in Christian Iberia.

Nobles were alienated because they were excluded from the partition of territory that accompanied military activity. In effect, kings divided captured territory, and then allotted it to their vassals, who had served them in battle. However, this was often at the expense of nobles, who held patrimonial estates that they had inherited, as opposed to tenencias (tenancies) granted by the king. Against this background it is easy to see how nobles could become disaffected.

Nobles possessed similar strategies in the twelfth century. They proferred multiple service to different kings; they changed their fidelity according to fluctuating political circumstances; and they acquired castles in volatile frontier regions. Indeed, Pascua concludes that the phenomenon of migrating nobles is the most characteristic feature of twelfth-century Iberian politics. In particular, nobles changed their allegiances between rival kings, as it suited their own ambitions. Accompanying them went knights, vassals, families and the dependants of their households.

When a new incumbent ascended the throne, there was always a concomitant realignment of the kingdom’s nobility. This is reflected in the pattern of peace treaties, which were regularly renewed on the ascendancy of a new monarch or ruler. Those nobles who had been demoted might seek new arenas for their talents at rival courts. Similarly, established nobles could expect to face competition from *arriviste* magnates, who had migrated from foreign courts. For example, during the Castilian civil war of the early 1160s, the Castro dynasty, who had been entrusted with the custody of the heir to the throne, Alfonso VIII, migrated to the court of King Fernando II of León. They held extensive properties in Extremadura, which was largely under the Leonese sphere of influence, hence it is unsurprising that they took refuge at the Leonese Court. The arrival of new families at court affected the position of established magnates in terms of proximity to the king. This factor probably explains the appearance and disappearance of certain noble names in the witness lists of royal *acta* from this period.

At this time, royal diplomacy had a direct impact on the nobility of the Christian kingdoms of Iberia. Kings imposed their authority on the rest of the population, especially the nobility, who were prone to rebel if by doing so they could improve their position. One way that this was achieved was through diplomatic treaties,

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which bound nobles as ‘vassals’ of the monarchical parties. At the same time, monarchs depended on their magnates to provide feudal levies in time of war. This was especially true in reference to treaties of mutual alliance, which provided for military assistance against common enemies, such as the king of Navarre.

Competing monarchs attempted to define their territories and government hierarchies. The treaties of medieval Spain employ terms such as ‘confederatione et amicicia’\textsuperscript{374}, ‘pacem et concordiam et amiciciam’\textsuperscript{375}, ‘veram amicitiam et perpetuam concordiam et pacem’\textsuperscript{376}, ‘pacis et concordie’\textsuperscript{377}. The partition treaties between Castile and Aragón, in particular, explicitly divide up al-Andalus, and in doing so, delineate spheres of influence during the Reconquista.\textsuperscript{378}

However, for their part, kings recognised that their noble followers might act autonomously, following their own ambitions. Nobles tended to shift allegiances, and this might hinder royal foreign policy, which depended for its implementation on noble participation. Hence, monarchs took action to constrain noble activity. This took the form of ensuring that nobles were coerced into accepting monarchical foreign policy, by the insertion of binding clauses in peace treaties. Thus, we see the appearance of clauses prohibiting the support, protection or employment of renegade nobles from enemy kingdoms. For example, the Treaty of Nájera-Logroño II (1179) specified that:

‘Item, si quis nobilium Regis Navarre per sel vel cum alio intraverit cum exercitu in terram regis Aldefonsi Castelle, perdat hereditates et honores quos a rege

\textsuperscript{374} For example: Treaty of Sahagún (1158), González, Alfonso VIII, II, 80.
\textsuperscript{375} For example: Treaty of Medina de Ríoseco (1181), Ibid., II, 615.
\textsuperscript{376} For example: Treaty of Zaragoza (1170), Ibid., II, 251.
\textsuperscript{377} For example: Truce of Fitero (1167), Ibid., II, 170.
\textsuperscript{378} The Treaty of Tudején (1151); the Treaty of Sahagún (1158); and the Treaty of Cázola (1179).
Navarre teneas erit et amorem eiusdem, et non recuperate hec nec amorem regis Navarre nisi cum voluntate regis Castelle.\footnote{379}{Treaty of Nájera-Logroño II (1179), González, Alfonso VIII, II, Doc. 321, 534.}

The *divisio imperii* of Castile-León in particular was a constant source of conflict between the two kingdoms, as the nobility of either side saw their estates divided between the opposing powers. Consequently, the peace treaties of León-Castile of the early 1180s sought to regulate the activities of the nobility of the respective kingdoms in the interests of the wider peace. This was achieved through explicit anti-compliance measures in the treaties themselves. For example, the Treaty of Fresno-Lavandera (1183), specified a reconvention of the parties, where the treaty could be reviewed in order to ensure that peace was achieved:

‘…ita quod singulis annis uno certo loco et die pro conservation pacis huius conveniamus.’\footnote{380}{Treaty of Fresno-Lavandera (1183), González, Regesta, Doc. 46}

The nobility formed political alliances which transcended frontiers. Meanwhile, monarchs gradually came to oppose the nobility. Constant border warfare led to treaties between neighbouring royal kingdoms. This led to the necessity for the nobility to assign themselves to political and geographical entities under the authority of the king. Secondly, monarchs developed legal mechanisms to render noble rebellion more difficult. Finally, nobles could no longer hope to compete against alliances of several monarchs.

**The Leonese Succession:**

Before, Castile and León could establish peace between themselves, there was the outstanding domestic issue of the Leonese succession to resolve. This was necessary in order to restore political stability to the Kingdom of León. This had been
harmed by the Treaty of Tordehumos (1194), which had stipulated that if King Alfonso IX died without leaving heirs, then the Kingdom of León would revert to King Alfonso VIII of Castile.\textsuperscript{381} Hence, there was a pressing need to restore the Leonese royal line. Stability in León was essential if there was to be a lasting peace between the two kingdoms.

Pope Innocent III denounced the marriage of Alfonso IX and Queen Berenguela on 16 April 1198 in a letter to his legate in Iberia, Cardinal Rainerius.\textsuperscript{382} This was on the grounds of in consanguinity. It is no exaggeration to say that this circumstance led to a diplomatic ‘war of attrition’ between the Iberian kingdoms and the Papacy. Under the energetic Pope Innocent, the marriage could not survive.

The main issue, however, was not the union itself, but the matter of Queen Berenguela’s castles.\textsuperscript{383} Negotiations regarding these castles, which were crucial to the marriage, proceeded continuously between 1198 and 1204.\textsuperscript{384} However, once the couple had separated (1204), all hope of a peaceful settlement evaporated.

The restoration of the Leonese royal line was the motivation for the Treaty of Cabreros (26 March 1206).\textsuperscript{385} The treaty was a peace agreement between Alfonso VIII of Castile and Alfonso IX of León, and their respective heirs, Berenguela of Castile and the Leonese Infante, Fernando. The end of the last frontier war in 1197 with the marriage of Berenguela to Alfonso IX had created a more favourable climate for peace initiatives between the two erstwhile enemies.

The treaty aimed to restore the Leonese succession by donating castles to the Leonese Infante, Fernando. In this way, he would have a strong power base, consisting

\textsuperscript{381} Treaty of Tordehumos (1194), González, Alfonso VIII, III, Doc. 622 at 105, ll. 19-23.
\textsuperscript{382} Bianchini, Queen’s Hand, 69.
\textsuperscript{383} Bianchini, Queen’s Hand, 69.
\textsuperscript{384} Ibid., 70.
\textsuperscript{385} Treaty of Cabreros (26 March 1206), González, Alfonso VIII, III, Doc. 782 at 365.
of castles from both Castile and León. All of the disputed frontier castles were devolved onto Fernando under the terms of the pact. However, the treaty was also favourable to Castile. By restoring the Leonese succession, it eliminated the main source of instability in León, which in turn created the necessary conditions for peace with Castile.

The two monarchs met at Cabreros, between Valderaduez and Señillo on 26 March 1206, where they signed a peace:

‘Esta es la forma de la paz que es firmada entrel rei don Alfonso de Castella et el rei don Alfonso de Leon, et entre el rei de Leon et el filio daques rei de Castella que en pos el regnara.’

The treaty was unique amongst Iberian diplomatic treaties in that it was composed in the vernacular, Castilian Romance, rather than in Latin.

To engender peace and stability between Castile and León, King Alfonso VIII gave to Fernando several castles: Monreal; Carpio; Almanza Castrotierra Valderas; Bolanos Villafrechos; and Siero. To reinforce Castilian peace efforts towards León, Berenguela gave Cabreros to her son:

‘…et la reina de Leon doña Berenguela, filia del rei de Castella da a su filio, Cabreros.’

On the Leonese side, Alfonso IX acted to bolster the Leonese succession by giving five castles to his son. In all cases these castles were accompanied by pledges of security (arras), as well as surrounding territory and appurtenances (alfozes y

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386 Cf. Fig. 4.
387 Treaty of Cabreros (1206), González, Alfonso VIII, III, Doc. 782 at 365, ll. 21-24
388 Cf. R. Wright, El tratado de Cabreros (1206), estudio sociofilológico de una reforma ortográfica (London, 2000).
Nevertheless, Bianchini argues that both monarchs retained considerable power over the donated castles, even though they were nominally under Fernando’s lordship. 390

One of the principal objectives of the Leonese party was to ensure the loyalty of the ‘Castilian faction’, namely Queen Berenguela and her retinue, to the Leonese Crown. This was essential to ensure a smooth succession. To this end, King Alfonso IX placed eight castles in the hands of the Infante’s vassals:

‘Et, porque la reina dona Berenguela segura en aver estos ocho mil maravedis, mete el rei de Leon estos ochos castellos en seguranza en manos de vassallos ne nieto del Rei de Castella, filio del rei de Leon.’ 391

In order to ensure fidelity to the Leonese Infante, tenants holding these castles had to perform homage to him, and thus become his vassals. The rationale for these measures was the maintenance of peace between the two kingdoms, a situation that had been conspicuously absent for the majority of the second half of the twelfth century. As Bianchini argues, Fernando was now the chosen peacemaker by virtue of his royal lineage and his lordship over the frontier fortresses. Thus, the treaty boldly stated that the performance of homage to both parties was designed to uphold the peace between the two kingdoms:

‘…et deven fer omenage al rei de Castella de al rei de Leon que lealmientre fagan tener los pazes entre ellos.’ 392

To successfully uphold the treaty, nobles who held these castles were to hold them from the King of León and the Leonese Infante, Fernando. In so doing, they were

390 Bianchini, Queen’s Hand, 85.
391 Ibid., 367.
392 Ibid., 368.
obliged to comply with all the pledges agreed by their liege lords, the monarchs of Castile and León, who were the signatories to the treaty:

‘…et los cavalleros que los deveren tenio recibanlos per portero del sombrenombrado filio del rei de Leon, et sean vassallos del dellos, et retenganlos por complir todos los pleitos que por ellos deven seer complidos.’

To further enhance peacemaking initiatives in the treaty, knights who held these castles were obliged to give homage to the king of León himself, and were regarded as vassals of him. As such, they were obliged to perform military service for the land that they held, as specified in the treaty:

‘…et aquellos que tovieren los castellos que dichos son de suo, quando los recibiren, fagan omenage al rei de Leon et sean vassallos del por complirle el servicio de terras et de terminos et de pertinenzas daquelos castellos…’

However, castle tenure was explicitly linked to the performance of homage and the provision of military assistance on the part of these vassals. In this way, peace was maintained between Castile and León as part of the ‘Feudal contract’. This was a novel departure as no twelfth-century treaty had contained such a clause:

‘…et antes que reciban elo castell ho los castellos devengen vassallos del rei de Leon por el servicio cumplir assi quomodo dicho es de suso, et faganle end omenage et ante fagan omenage ed ambos los rees et a la reina dona Berenguela por fazer tener las pazes et convenenzas de los rees et de la reina anci quomodo es escripto.’

Castile’s Oriental Diplomacy:

393 Ibid., 365.
394 Ibid., 366.
395 Ibid., 370.
Since the era of the Empire, Castile had engaged with Aragón, as its principal partner in peace and ally in war. As it had done in the twelfth century, Castile faced east towards Aragón and Navarre in the thirteenth century. Once again, it renewed its longstanding alliance with Aragón. This alliance was oriented towards attacking Navarre. Meanwhile, León was isolated in the west.

In the last decade of the twelfth century, Castile attempted to redefine its borders from those existing at the death of King Sancho III (d. 1158). It also attempted to recapture territory lost during the minority of King Alfonso VIII. This implied imposing its authority on Navarre, with the assistance of neighbouring Aragón.396

Navarre, for its part, distanced itself from peninsula affairs, fearful of Castilian-Aragonese intentions. Castile had already begun recapturing disputed territory. In so doing, it contravened previous truces – such as Fitero (1167) – and had occupied castles faithfully held in guarantee of antecedent peace treaties.397 The conduct of the Navarrese king and the reaction of the papal legate, Cardinal Rainerio, provided the pretext for the monarchs of Castile and Aragón to ‘close in’ on Navarre, and definitively resolve their quarrel regarding the weaker neighbour.

Both parties, Castile and Aragón, despatched envoys, probably lay persons, and to the exclusion of clerics, with the aim of concluding a military alliance between Alfonso VIII and Pedro II of Aragón. This oriental policy was manifested in the Treaty of Calatayud (20 May 1198).398 In this treaty both powers agreed a pact of mutual assistance and the partition of Navarre. The western part of Navarre would accrue to Castile; whilst Aragon would receive the eastern part, the partition line passing through Pamplona. To this end, the two monarchs, Alfonso VIII of Castile and Pedro II of

396 J. González, ‘Reclamaciones de Alfonso VIII a Sancho el Fuerte y Tratado del Reparto de Navarra en 1198’, Hispania: revista española de historia, 13 (1943), 545-68 at 545.
397 Ibid., 552.
Aragón agreed to sign a ‘Peace, concord and friendship covenant’ between the two kingdoms. The Castilian offensive began in January 1199, contrary to the London settlement of 1177.

The Castilian-Aragonese alliance was strengthened by the explicit reference to ‘friendship’ between the two parties. Alfonso VIII of Castile promised to King Pedro II of Aragón to:

‘…devenio bonus et fidelis amicus.’

However, the treaty extended beyond mere friendship. It also committed the Castilian monarch to providing military assistance to the King of Aragón should the latter become engaged in a war.

In the Treaty of Calatayud, Alfonso VIII placed five castles in the possession of an Aragonese noble, a certain Guillermo González, namely: Agreda; Aprol; Arneto; Aguilar; and Cervera. The latter was to hold them as fief of the King of Aragón and become his vassal. In reciprocal gesture, the King of Aragón placed five castles into the hands of a Castilian vassal, in order to stabilise the territory that they controlled. This was a measure designed to ensure cross-border security.

The evidence for the significance of castle exchange is patent. If a noble vassal failed to observe the treaty under which he had received his castle, then he would forfeit it, and it would accrue to the party in whose kingdom it lay. On the other hand, faithful vassals were to perform homage to their natural lord, as well. Moreover, they were obliged to perform homage for castles held from the opposing party. This is the first example of cross-border collaboration between monarchs to engender peace along the frontier:

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‘Fideles autem qui tenuerit castra fidelitatis Regis Aragonis sint de regno regis Castelle et faciant hominium regi Castelle de castris fidelitatem.’

The sanctions for derogation from the treaty were severe. The treaty explicitly states that vassals were to abide by all the treaties that had been agreed between Castile and Aragón, on pain of forfeiture of their castles. Thus, the Treaty of Calatayud can be said to have retrospective effect. Moreover, the treaty was pervasive in the sense that it applied to both monarchs and their vassals, although this was standard practice in medieval diplomacy. Thus, if a monarch should enter the other party’s kingdom with hostile intent, then he was to be punished by losing his castles, and the vassals who held them were to surrender them to the aggrieved party:

‘Preterea, si ego Adefonsus, rex Castelle, intravero hostiliter terram Regis Aragonis cum exercitu meus, vel exercitus meus sine me, contra fidelitatis amittam, et fidelis qui ea tenuerit tradat ei regi Aragonis…’

Anticipating complete circumvention of the treaty, it further specified that if anyone should attempt to breach it, or to attack a castle mentioned in it, then he was to be branded a ‘traitor and a perjuror’ (*proditor et perjurus*). Such a condemnation implied a spiritual as well as a temporal punishment as perjury involved lying on oath.

The significance of this treaty was that, in conjunction with other powers, Castile had partitioned the whole Peninsula in less than half a century: in the West, with León, under the Treaty of Sahagún (1158); in the *Levante*, with Aragon, under the Treaty of Cázola (1179); and in Navarre, again with Aragón, under the Treaty of Calatayud (1198). In military terms, Alfonso VIII renewed the war with Navarre in the

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following year, 1199, besieging Vitoria, and capturing San Sebastián and Guipúzcoa. Sancho VI fled his kingdom, leaving it to its fate. Meanwhile, Alfonso VIII successfully recovered the territory that the Navarrese had seized during his minority between Alava and Guipúzcoa. Consequently, he took no further interest in securing the provisions of the Treaty of Calatayud, or the outcome of Navarrese politics.

Later, in the first decade of the thirteenth century, Castile unilaterally made peace with Navarre. Castile had a long-standing claim to parts of Navarre, but it needed peace more urgently than mere piecemeal territorial gains. Peace with its eastern neighbour was desirable mainly because a unified Christian Iberia could more effectively combat the Almohad Caliphate of al-Andalus: erstwhile Christian rivals would fight under the same banner against the Muslims. Peace was also necessary to avoid domestic distractions that might hinder the war effort.

To this end, Castile agreed a peace treaty with Navarre, the Treaty of Guadalajara (29 October 1207). The term of the peace was fifteen years. Each party was obliged to swear to uphold the treaty in the presence of six magnates (ricos homines). In this relationship, Castile clearly held the superior position. If the Navarrese king failed to uphold the treaty, then the King of Castile was licensed under the terms of the treaty to request the auxilium of the six ‘ricos homines’ of Navarre to make war on Navarre as a means of punishment:

‘…et quod adiuent illum ad guerreare contra regem Navarre et contra suam terram…donec iste treuge compleanture, et sint in adiutorio regis Castelle et in toto deservitio regis Navarre.’

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402 G. Martínez Díez, Alfonso VIII: Rey de Castilla y Toledo (Burgos, 1995), 95.
403 Treaty of Guadalajara (29 October 1207), González, Alfonso VIII, III, Doc. 813 at 425.
404 Treaty of Guadalajara (29 October 1207), González, Alfonso VIII, III, Doc. 813, at 425.
However, Castile did not have carte blanche to attack Navarre. Indeed, it was prevented under the treaty from launching an unprovoked attack on Navarre in alliance with Aragón. This clause effectively reversed Castilian-Aragonese foreign policy towards Navarre in the twelfth century, when the latter kingdom had effectively been partitioned by the two powers.

In a measure designed to ensure adherence to the treaty, both parties exchanged castles in a spirit of fidelity. Both sides elected four nobles from the opposite kingdom to hold the aforesaid castles. The *ricos homines* who held these castles, were to become vassals of the king in whose territory the castles lay. They were also obliged to perform homage to him.

The sanctions of the treaty were severe. If the King of Navarre infringed the treaty, then the six *ricos homines* of Navarre, who had performed homage to the Castilian monarch, were to transfer their allegiance to the latter with all their retinue. Compliance with the treaty also extended to the nobility of both kingdoms. ‘Faithful’ vassals who had previously sworn homage to either of the parties were obliged to comply with the treaty. If they failed to do so, they were to be branded ‘perjurors and traitors’.

Both parties promised to observe the treaty, and swore oaths and bound their vassals to unequivocally uphold the treaty. These vassals were the *ricos homines* who had been elected to hold the castles exchanged in the treaty. They also promised to protect faithful vassals who held their castles faithfully, with their persons, and with the persons of their vassals, and with their descendants. Thus, the Treaty of Guadalajara represented an initiative towards a durable peace with firm commitments to uphold it on both sides.

*Christian Peace and a United Front against Islam:*
Christian peace was the essential prerequisite for war against Muslim Spain. Internal peace between the Christian kingdoms of Iberia was necessary to effectively combat the Muslim Almohads of al-Andalus. This was because domestic peace was necessary in order to avoid distractions during the forthcoming campaign. González argues that although there was not outright war between Castile and León at this time, nevertheless the Treaty of Cabreros (1206) had been insufficient to prevent continuing friction between the two kingdoms.\(^405\) Hence, the Papacy intervened to encourage peace between the Christian kingdoms of Spain as a diplomatic prerequisite for the ongoing prosecution of the *Reconquista*.\(^406\)

Peace between Castile and León was achieved by the Treaty of Valladolid (27 June 1209).\(^407\) The treaty contained several explicit peacemaking initiatives. Firstly, both parties stated that they would put aside all animosity that had previously existed between the two kingdoms, and they agreed to abide by the pact made at Cabreros:

‘Et ego et vos, Aldefonsus, rex Legionis, sumus pacati de totis rancuris quas de novis ad invicem habebamus, salvis pactis et convenienciis que scripte sunt in cartis illis que facte fuerunt inter nos apud Cabreros.’\(^408\)

To further engender amicable relations, both sides agreed in the treaty that they were friends, and that they would strive for peace, both between themselves and their successors

Nunc igitur promittimus nobis ad invicem et iuramus sacrosancti evangalia quod, dum vixerimus, amici fideles simus et veri per bonam fidem et sine malo ingenio et

\(^{408}\) *Ibid.*, 480.
hanc amicitiam et pacem firmamus tam inter nos quam inter filios nostros qui post nos regnaverint.’

On the negative side, peacemaking measures included a prohibition on waging war, or otherwise infringing the treaty by breaching the peace:

‘Nec liceat nobis guerram invicem facere vel damnun nobis inferred vel aliquid contra pacem vel treugas facere…’

To pre-empt any disputes that might arise in the future, King Alfonso IX gave Queen Berenguela three towns, namely, Villapando; Ardon; and Rueda. This concession was accompanied by all their respective territories. They were to be held for the duration of her lifetime. Upon her death, Queen Berenguela was obliged to relinquish these towns to her son, the Infante, Fernando. Those knights who held castles on the frontier were obliged to perform homage to the ruler of the kingdom in which their castle lay, and to refrain from engaging in hostilities. These measures were designed to stabilise the frontier and forestall any invasion of the other party’s territory, such as had been common in the 1190s.

Temporal sanctions for infringement of the treaty were stringent. If anyone should contravene the treaty, then he was to be regarded as a ‘perjuror and a traitor’, an apparently new brand of transgression that only seems to appear from the early thirteenth century in the treaties. If the felon was a monarch who was party to the treaty, then all his nobles were permitted to transfer their allegiance to the opposing monarch, ‘…who was upholding the treaty and serving the peace.’

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409 Ibid., 480.
410 Ibid., 482.
411 Suárez Fernández, Historia de España, 266.
The ecclesiastical penalties for derogation were also stringent. Anyone who breached the peace or engaged in hostility was to be anathematized or excommunicated, and their kingdom placed under interdict.

However, unlike the twelfth-century treaties between Castile and León, thirteenth-century peace treaties envisaged a solution to potential derogations from agreements. In the Treaty of Valladolid, both sides agreed to perform mutual homage, to comply with the terms of the treaty, and to make amends for any possible breaches of the treaty, on the face of the agreement:

‘…et nos per supra dictum hominium et iuramentum tenemur emendare et compere sicut illi mandaverit vel plures ex eis.’

This commitment to peace marked an unprecedented departure in relations between the Christian kingdoms of Spain: both parties agreed to serve the treaty, according to its letter.

The success of the Treaty of Valladolid (1209) in maintaining the peace can be gauged from the decisive victory won by King Alfonso VIII at the battle of Las Navas de Tolosa in 1212, when all the Christian kingdoms of Spain, including León, were represented on the battlefield. Moreover, there are no reported incidents of inter-Christian violence during this pivotal epoch. However, prior to the Las Navas campaign, King Alfonso VIII of Castile had requested the presence of the Leonese ruler himself amongst the assembled Christian forces, but Alfonso IX had replied that he would only do so if the former returned the Leonese castles that he had captured. Hence, both sides failed to honour the outcome of the Curia of Carrion, when Alfonso VIII had

412 Ibid., 482.
413 Cf. Lomax, The Reconquest, 28; O’Callaghan, Reconquest and Crusade, 49.
demanded Leonese *auxilium*; on the other hand, Castile failed to oblige León, by withholding Leonese castles that rightfully belonged to the Leonese monarch.

**The Post-Las Navas Reconfiguration of Iberian Politics:**

The battle of Las Navas de Tolosa was the turning-point in the Reconquest. However, it not only paved the way for eventual victory against the Muslims of al-Andalus, it also altered the manner in which the Christian powers engaged with each other. Due to his decisive victory at the battle of Las Navas de Tolosa (1212), King Alfonso VIII had great political strength and military prestige. Castile was triumphant at Las Navas, although all the Christian Iberian kingdoms had been represented on the battlefield in a demonstrable show of unity, even if King Alfonso IX of Leon was absent.\(^{414}\) Nevertheless, King Alfonso VIII of Castile chose to negotiate with his Christian neighbours rather than indulge in military campaigns against them.

The three monarchs, Alfonso VIII of Castile, Alfonso IX of León and Afonso II of Portugal convened for a summit, held at Coimbra on the Feast of St. Martin de Tours (11 November 1212). The preliminary formula of the agreement consisted of a promise to agree a truce between the hostile neighbours, Castile and León. Portugal was invited to join the agreement, perhaps attracted by its alliance with León:

‘Hec est forma treuga quam fecit Rex Legionis cum rege Castelle…in qua debet intrare Rex Portugalie…’\(^{415}\)

The truce effectively ended armed incursions into their respective kingdoms, thus ensuring peace. It was intended to endure until 1 May 1213. To resolve the latent conflict between León and Portugal, the treaty provided for conflict resolution: if Leonese men committed a crime in Portugal, or vice versa, they were obliged to make

\(^{414}\) Linehan, *Partible Inheritance*, 54-5.
amends within twenty days, according to the terms of the truce. All three monarchs swore to abide by the terms of the truce in good faith and with resolve, thus acting as guarantors of the agreement:

‘Et ego rex Portugalie cum vassallis et hominibus meis has treugas iuravi quod eos teneam et teneri faciam bona fide et sine malo ingenio sicut dictum est in ista carta, et sicut reges Castelle et Legionis et vassali illorum eas iuraverunt.’

Moreover, the three parties agreed to make war on al-Andalus. Each party would engage in their own theatre of war, which would be delineated by their border with al-Andalus. Each would provide mutual auxilium. To this extent, the Truce of Coimbra was fundamental in that it provided an equitable partition of the western part of the Iberian Peninsula (al-Gharb), just as the Treaty of Tudején (1151) had done in the Levante.

A Second Castilian Regency:

Following the death of King Alfonso VIII, King Alfonso IX of León became the senior political and military leader in Christian Iberia. He bequeathed the Kingdom of Castile to his surviving male heir, Enrique I (1214-17), who was still a minor. Consequently, there was a regency for the second time in Castilian history in a century; Alfonso VIII himself had been a minor when he inherited the throne of Castile in 1158. In these circumstances, Queen Leonor, who died shortly after King Alfonso VIII, invested all regalian rights in her daughter, Enrique’s sister, doña Berenguela.

Bianchini argues that most regencies were turbulent, as the issue of the custody of the monarch while still a minor led to conflicts between the various factions at

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416 Ibid., 576.
court. Enrique’s minority was characterised by feuding amongst the nobility. Once again the principal cause of the dispute was the custodianship of the young king. Berenguela chose two prelates to be the tutors of Enrique: Archbishop Rodrigo Ximénez de Rada of Toledo, and Bishop Tello of Palencia. This choice of tutors led to a rapprochement between the monarchy and the Church. However, it opened the monarchy to charges of ecclesiastical preferment. Conversely, the secular nobility felt alienated and marginalised by this monopoly of power by the Church.

Moreover, the fact of Queen Berenguela’s gender and the corresponding assumption that she could not rule like a king made it tempting for powerful men at court to attempt to seize power from her. The nobles of Castile observed that Queen Berenguela had not been chosen as Regent by the late King Alfonso VIII, only by his wife, Queen Leonor. According to the Crónica Latina, the majority of magnates agreed that Álvaro Núñez de Lara should be the Regent, in place of Berenguela. Within four months, Álvaro Núñez, head of the powerful Lara family and royal alférez (standard bearer) had reclaimed Enrique’s tutelage and the regency of Castile. The majority of the Castilian nobles revolted and accepted Álvaro’s position as regent.

However, this scenario is complicated by the Laras’s gradual ascendancy in Castilian politics. They had been gradually increasing in power during the reign of Alfonso VIII. Now, they used their position as Enrique’s tutor to dominate Castilian affairs. For example, as early as April 1215, Álvaro began styling himself ‘comes’ (count). Álvaro commanded the support of the majority of the aristocracy, episcopate and municipalities – the ‘three estates’ – for the duration of his regency. However, there was growing opposition to him among sectors of the nobility, caused by noble

417 Bianchini, Queen's Hand, 104.
418 CL, chap. 64.
419 Doubleday, Lara Family, 130.
420 Ibid., 53.
421 González, Alfonso VIII, I, 693-95.
exclusion from court. For example, Gonzalo Rodríguez Girón, who had been Castilian maiordomo (head of the royal household) for eighteen years, was promptly dismissed.422 Later, this trend towards noble exclusion intensified: the king ceased inviting to the Cortes either Queen Berenguela or her noble retinue, for example, Lope Díaz de Haro, Álvaro Díaz de Cameros, Alfonso Tellez de Meneses, as well as the Metropolitan of Castile, Archbishop Rodrigo Ximénez de Rada.423

Despite the undercurrent of tension between Castile and León, principally caused by Álvaro’s bellicose policies, relations between the two kingdoms were sufficiently harmonious for the two rulers, Alfonso IX of León and Enrique I of Castile to conclude an agreement, the Treaty of Toro I (12 August 1216). The pope urged peace, and the Spanish clergy returning from the Fourth Lateran Council (1215) bore the same message.

The two monarchs held a vista real at Toro. The treaty aimed to establish a lasting peace between the two kingdoms. This was to be achieved by securing the Castilian-Leonese frontier:

‘Hec est forma pacis inter regem Legionensem domnus Alfonsum et regem Castelle domnum Henricum, facta secundum mandatum domini pape, que debet in perpetuum inter eos bona fide et sine malo ingenio observari.’424

In the interests of achieving a lasting peace, the peacemaking initiatives contained in the treaty were stringent. Thus, if anyone from Castile committed a crime in the Kingdom of León, then he was to make amends within nine days, witnessed by ten magistrates, who were elected on an ad hoc basis from the town where the felony was perpetrated:

422 Doubleday, Lara Family, 54.
423 Ibid., 54.
424 Treaty of Toro I (12 August 1216), González, Alfonso VIII, III, Doc. 1005, at 730.
“Si quis igitur de regno Castelle dampnum aliquod aut malum fecerit in regno Legionensi…omnia emendentur per decem iurators ad hoc electos in singulis civitatis et villis, sic, scilicet, ut statim emendetur quicquid poterit emendari. Et omnis emendatio plene fiat usque ad novem dies.”^425

Further peacemaking measures were designed to maintain the peace already achieved. Hence, the parties were not permitted to make treaties or wage war on other kingdoms not party to the treaty. Rather, they were obliged to implement policies that served the peace:

“Et non fiat alia pugnaratio nec alia guerra sed pax semper firma inter reges et regna servetur.”^426

The nobility of both realms, who were the potential transgressors of the treaty, were bound to uphold the agreement and to perform homage on an *ex parte* basis:

“Pro pace autem istas et aliis que superdicta sunt observandis ex parte regni Legionensis iurantet hominium faciunt…”^427

In short, during Enrique’s brief reign, there was an underlying current of dissidence at the Castilian court, where the ‘Church party’, represented by the Regent Berenguela, confronted the nobility, led by the ambitious Count Álvaro Núñez de Lara. However, this did not prevent both monarchs from seeking a durable peace.

**Reunification:**

Queen Berenguela was the direct heir of King Alfonso VIII of Castile, and the right of succession vested in her. In default of a male heir, then the eldest daughter would inherit the throne. Indeed, there had been a precedent for female succession in

the twelfth century, when Queen Urraca (1109-26) had inherited the Castilian throne from Alfonso VI. Hence, on 2 July 1217, at Valladolid, the burgesses, aristocracy and her knights acclaimed Berenguela as Queen of Castile.

However, the primary requirement of a monarch in the thirteenth century was to be a strong warleader, so it was impossible for a woman to rule in her own right. Hence, the people of Castile petitioned Berenguela to cede the Crown to her son, the Leonese Infante, Fernando, who was the sole male heir to the Crown of Castile. The Crónica Latina relates:

‘Audita morte fratris…Regina domina Berengaria misit nuncios suos, viros nobiles et potentes…ad regem Legionis…dare ipsi filio maiori regnum patris sui…’

Berenguela freely conceded the crown to her son, Fernando, as he was next in line to the Castilian throne. As Fernando was the Leonese Infante, as well as being heir to the throne of Castile, this démarche represented the best hope for peace between the two kingdoms. In 1197, King Alfonso IX of León and Queen Berenguela of Castile had married in the desire to produce heirs who could reunite the quarrelling kingdoms of León and Castile. The intention on both sides was that eventually, the offspring of this relationship would reign the two kingdoms under one throne, and that peace would ensue as a result.

However, Berenguela retained a political role once she had ceded the Castilian throne to her son, Fernando. Martin observes that Berenguela played a decisive role in her son’s accession to the Castilian throne in 1217. She preserved her status as Queen of Castile, assuring her an ongoing role in Castilian government. Indeed, from the date of his accession until the death of his mother, King Fernando III executed the

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428 CL, chap. 33 at 76.
429 Martin, Berenguère, 10.
majority of his policy decisions with her consent and acquiescence. Hence, Martin argues, that far from being a retreat for Berenguela, the accession negotiations in 1217, assured: firstly, the permanence of the Castilian royal line; secondly, the necessary preliminaries for the reunification of Castile and León under one Crown; and finally, it allowed Queen Berenguela to reign in a consultative capacity – to ‘regner sans regner’, to use Martin’s phrase.430

Against this context of gradual rapprochement between Castile and León, Alfonso IX of León, and King Fernando III and Queen Berenguela for Castile, agreed a truce. This was to last for one year, and it was signed on 26 November 1217.431 The Leonese monarch, as the senior ruler in Christian Iberia in the early thirteenth century, held superior power in the Peninsula; Fernando III had only recently acceded to the throne of Castile. At this time, Alfonso IX of León pursued a policy of détente with Castile, being unwilling to attack his own son.

Under this truce, King Fernando III of Castile and Queen Berenguela were to secure the castles of the Leonese king, with all their surrounding territory, and they promised not to capture them openly or by stealth. In a reciprocal measure, the King of León promised the Castilian monarch that he would not attack Castilian castles, either overtly or covertly. Hence, if a vassal of one of the parties should seize a castle in the frontier region, or otherwise commit a crime, and failed to make amends, then the felon was to relinquish the castle to the Leonese monarch.

Stringent measures were included to prevent noble interference. In particular, the magnate Don Álvaro de Lara was prevented from becoming a vassal of the Castilian monarch or his mother, Berenguela, should he continue his policy of allying himself to the Leonese monarch. This was necessary because Don Álvaro had appealed to King

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430 Ibid., 10.
Alfonso IX for *auxilium* following King Fernando’s accession to the Castilian throne.\(^{432}\) Hence, this clause effectively curtailed noble ambition that might threaten the fragile Castilian monarchy.

In the same vein, the treaty also went further than its twelfth-century forebears in providing for conflict resolution. As there are no recorded incidents of disputes after its implementation, it can be said to be more successful than its prototypes of the previous century. Hence, the treaty stipulates:

‘Si vero aliquis de regno Legionis vel de regno Castelle aliquam rapinam vel pignoram fecerit homini de altero regno, et emmendare noluerit usque ad triginta dies…sin autem eiciatur de regno pro inimico de ambobus regnis et integrant querelosum de suo avere.’\(^{433}\)

At this time, just after the accession of King Fernando III of Castile (1217), the Lara clan was still engaging in rebellions against the crown. Moreover, they were still seeking *auxilium* from the Leonese monarch, King Alfonso IX.\(^{434}\) However, as the chronicles demonstrate, Alfonso was reluctant to attack his son, even though he was intent on disinheriting him from the throne of Leon. The truce of 1217 had expired at Easter, so warfare was theoretically once again legitimate.

The Treaty of Toro II (26 August 1218) was an attempt to further bolster cross-border security.\(^{435}\) This Peace was preceded by a preliminary agreement in which Alfonso IX promised mutual *auxilium* to Castile against all enemies (*contra omnes*), except against the Almohads, with whom the Castilians already had truces.


\(^{433}\) Ibid., 459.


The parties to the treaty were King Alfonso IX of León and his son, Fernando III of Castile, as well as his mother, Queen Berenguela. For the first time in a generation, the Leonese held the superior position in negotiations between Castile and León. To ensure that peace was actually maintained, as agreed in the treaty, both sides refused to shelter or grant military assistance to nobles who sought refuge in the other party’s kingdom, or to take counsel from them. This measure was primarily aimed at Gonzalo and Fernando Núñez de Lara, who were exiled from the Kingdom of León until Christmas 1218, with the threat of forcible expulsion if they attempted to enter the realm.436 This clause effectively curtailed the dissenting noble faction in Castile that remained from Enrique’s reign, namely the belligerent Lara family, who had so plagued Berenguela’s regency.

At this time in the early thirteenth century, León was in the ascendant, following the death of King Alfonso VIII of Castile, in 1214. Fernando III of Castile had only recently acceded to the Castilian throne. Against a background of peaceful relations with Castile, Alfonso IX concentrated his forces in the west of the Peninsula, against Portugal.

However, both monarchs came to terms. Alfonso IX agreed a peace and friendship treaty with King Afonso II of Portugal, the Treaty of Boronal (13 June 1219).437 Both parties swore mutual assistance against all comers, except the Almohads, with whom the Portuguese already had truces. This effectively prevented the Leonese from concluding their own truces with the Almohads without Portuguese consent.

In order to provide for Leonese security, the men of Portugal were obliged to swear allegiance to the King of León. To ensure mutual security, once the Portuguese

436 González, Alfonso IX, I, 186.
437 Treaty of Boronal (13 June 1219), González, Alfonso IX, II, Doc. 374 (González does not give a precise date for the Treaty of Boronal, and neither does the Treaty itself in its dating clause).
truce with the Muslims had expired, neither party could make a new truce without the agreement of the other. Thirdly, if the Leonese king wanted to forge a truce with the Muslims whilst his treaty with the Portuguese king was still valid, then the new treaty would not supersede the treaty that he already had with the Portuguese monarch.

Compliance with the Treaty of Boronal was rigorous, and this may be why it can be judged to be successful in maintaining peaceful Leonese – Portuguese relations. Both parties were obliged to swear in good faith and without malicious intent to faithfully uphold the truces. In this way, peace was created, and the treaty was upheld, creating a mutual alliance between León and Portugal.

In the person of King Fernando III, the Castilian and Leonese crowns were reunited for the first time since the division of the Empire in 1157. The Leonese succession was threatened because the Infante’s father, Alfonso IX, was opposed to his inheriting the crown. Alfonso IX had been attempting to disinherit him since 1217, when Fernando inherited the Castilian crown. Alfonso’s aim was to maintain the separation of the kingdoms. This was at odds with Castilian foreign policy, which aimed to reunite the two kingdoms. The only means of doing this was to establish heirs in opposition to Fernando. Thus, Alfonso turned to the children of his first marriage, by Teresa of Portugal. Teresa’s offspring were older than Fernando, and therefore they had a prior claim by virtue of seniority, although Fernando was Alfonso’s only male heir.

King Alfonso IX of León (d. 24 September 1230) intended that his kingdom should devolve onto his two daughters, the Infantas, Sancha and Dulce, rather than on his son, who had become Fernando III of Castile in 1217. Once again, it was Queen Berenguela, Fernando’s mother, who apprised him of his legitimate inheritance. Lucas of Tuy relates how the bishop and citizens of the city of León sent messengers to King
Fernando requesting that he take possession of the city.\textsuperscript{438} González observes that the prelates of the realm of León, the Leonese magnates, and the concejos (municipalities), all declared in favour of King Fernando.\textsuperscript{439}

Queen Berenguela acted to reach an initial agreement with doña Teresa of Portugal, King Alfonso’s first wife, who was the mother of the two Infantas.\textsuperscript{440} This was a significant diplomatic coup, considering that both Infantas had a substantial following and possessed many castles in the Kingdom of León. According to the terms of Alfonso’s Will, they were the legitimate heirs to the Kingdom of León.\textsuperscript{441}

The Treaty of Benavente (11 December 1230) was a peace agreed between King Fernando III and his sisters, Sancha and Dulce.\textsuperscript{442} Fernando retained the political advantage by reserving the regalian rights of justice, coinage and military service. However the aim of the treaty was to provide for the maintenance of Fernando’s sisters, by allocating them an annual income of thirty thousand morabetinos each, to be raised from specified towns and rents. If either sister died or married, her share would revert to the Leonese Crown. In return, the princesses renounced all claims to the Leonese throne that had been ‘promised’ to them by their late father, Alfonso IX:

‘…et resignant iuri regni Legionensis, si quod habebant vel habere se contendebant, et abrenuntiant omnibus privilegiis sue cartis ab illustri Aldefonsi rege patre suo bone memorie sibi factis super donation seu concessione regni.’\textsuperscript{443}

As usual, the security of the kingdom largely depended on the possession of castles, which controlled their surrounding territory. Therefore, under the treaty, both Infantas agreed to concede to Fernando all their castles, except those guaranteeing the

\textsuperscript{438} Lucas, Chronicon Mundi, Bk. IV, Chap. 115.
\textsuperscript{439} González, Fernando III, Vol. 1, Estudios, citing Rodrigo Ximénez de Rada, DRH, Bk. VII, Chap. 25.
\textsuperscript{440} Suárez Fernández, Edad Media, 283.
\textsuperscript{441} Treaty of Benavente (11 December 1230), J. González, Reinado y diplomas de Fernando III, 3 vols (Córdoba, 1980-86), II, Doc. 270 at 314, ll. 1-4.
\textsuperscript{442} Treaty of Benavente (11 December 1230), González, Fernando III, II, Doc. 270 at 311.
\textsuperscript{443} Ibid., 314.
present treaty. The tenants holding these castles were to swear homage to Fernando and the Infantas, and become their vassals, as guarantees that both sides would adhere to the agreement. The sanctions incurred for transgressing the treaty included being branded ‘perjurors and traitors’:

‘Et fideles debent castra recipere per portarium infantum et facere eis homagium…Similiter, fideles debent esse vassalli domini regis et infantum, et facere ipsi et eis homagium…sin autem sint alevosi et traditores.’

Also, Fernando promised to protect his sisters and their property. According to Bianchini, the Treaty of Benavente achieved more than merely dissolving Sancha’s and Dulce’s claim to the Leonese Crown. Several of the castles that formed part of the treaty’s guarantee had been granted to the Infantas by Alfonso IX. The treaty effectively appropriated these fortresses from the Infantas’s direct control. This was achieved by transferring them to tenants who were vassals of both the Crown and the Infantas. Hence, this legal manoeuvre effectively brought the castles back under direct royal authority. More significantly, it consolidated Leonese-Castilian control in Galicia and along the Leonese-Portuguese frontier. In return, Fernando III and Queen Berenguela granted the Infantas properties and rents in Asturias, more distant from their supporters in Portugal. These were crucial steps in widening King Fernando’s power base in the west of the Kingdom of Leon.

The knights whose castles were the subject of the Treaty of Benavente were to be regarded as ‘natural lords’ of the King of Leon, and were obliged to serve his Kingdom. This reference to ‘natural lords’ is significant because it is the first time that nobles are identified as belonging to a specific territory. Moreover, it represents the alignment of the Leonese nobility with their new monarch, Fernando III, who had

444 Ibid., 312.
445 Bianchini, Queen’s Hand, 204-5.
already been crowned king of Castile some twelve years earlier. The reunification of the crowns of Castile and León, which had been separated at the *divisio imperii* of 1157, was complete.

**Conclusion:**

During the reign of Emperor Alfonso VII, Castilian-Leonese diplomacy was principally aimed at achieving hegemony over rival Christian Iberian powers, namely, Aragón, Portugal and Navarre. This was necessary to accomplish internal peace and stability. However, it was also essential to achieve domestic peace in order to be able to successfully prosecute the Reconquista against the Almoravid and Almohad regimes of al-Andalus.

Castile dominated Christian Iberia in the later twelfth century, although there was a temporary lapse during the minority of Alfonso VIII, when León invaded Castile. Castilian supremacy was evident both politically and militarily during the era of the ‘cinco reinos’, and was demonstrated in such episodes as the siege of Cuenca and the Curia of Carrión. In diplomatic terms, the greatest achievement of this epoch was the enduring alliance between Castile and Aragón, manifested in repeated partition treaties. These two kingdoms consistently subjugated Navarre on the basis of ancestral claims dating back to the eleventh century.

León, the other central kingdom in Christian Iberia, was weak both internally and externally during this period. This was due to the frontier dispute with Castile in the Tierra de Campos, where there were repeated conflagrations, focused on the disputed border established by Alfonso VII. This problem could only be resolved by a mutually acceptable diplomatic solution, where both sides had a stake in the outcome. This was achieved by the marriage between King Alfonso IX of León and the daughter of King Alfonso VIII of Castile, *doña* Berenguela.
Peace between Castile and León was finally achieved in the thirteenth century by successive treaties between the two powers. Whereas in the 1100s a temporary cessation of hostilities had been agreed by halting raiding into enemy territory, in the 1200s both kingdoms agreed reciprocal, cross-border initiatives to counter noble ambitions. These included the performance of homage by nobles to the ruler of the opposite kingdom for castles that they held in the latter’s territory. Such radical proposals appear to have been largely successful, as there are no recorded incidents of violence in Castile and León in the thirteenth century. In this sense, the year 1200 was a watershed in peacemaking attempts between Castile and León, and in wider political relations between the two kingdoms.

**Conclusion**

This thesis is the first work to systematically analyse the Iberian peace treaties in English. Moreover, it is pioneering to the extent that it places them in the context of Spanish history of the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries. It is novel insofar as it
assesses their geopolitical significance, i.e. the degree to which they altered the ensuing course of events in Christian Iberia.

Christian rivalry during the Imperial era led to competing territorial claims, especially in the frontier regions of La Rioja, Galicia and Extremadura. Peacemaking was necessary to counteract the secessionist tendencies of an increasingly autonomous Portugal. This led to the landmark Treaty of Túy (1137), which came to serve as a prototype for later peace treaties elsewhere in the Peninsula. Subsequently, the Empire was obliged to contain events on its eastern frontier, where the newly-constituted Crown of Aragón – consisting of a union of Aragón with Catalonia under the rule of Count Ramon Berenguer IV of Barcelona – was contesting ancient claims to its former ally, namely Navarre. Three successive peace treaties, Carrión (1140/1), Tudején (1151) and Lerida (1156), partitioned Navarre between the two powers, but on each occasion, the Empire retained overlordship, guaranteed by its military superiority. Menéndez Pidal and Ubieto Arteta both examine this state-of-affairs from opposite perspectives, but my study is the first to analyse the role of peace treaties in subduing a resergent Navarre.

This tendency towards fragmentation was exacerbated by the partition of the core Iberian kingdoms, Castile and León, which before the diviso imperii had constituted the Empire. After the Emperor’s death in 1157, these twin kingdoms contested the border zone of the Tierra de Campos. Moreover, as Menéndez Pidal argues, the partition led to the fragmentation of the peripheral kingdoms, known as the ‘cinco reinos’. Now, it was a question of survival, as Aragón, Portugal and Navarre pursued their own foreign policy agendas, as I make clear in Chapter 2.

The numerous Castilian-Aragonese alliance treaties examined in my thesis attest to the enduring partnership between the two former rivals. Together they partitioned Navarre and the Levante on several occasions. Initially, the Empire, and later a
separate Castile under the rule of King Alfonso VIII was the superior party in the relationship, but after the joint siege of Cuenca in 1177, Aragón was released from its bond of vassalage, and was free to capture Islamic territory without acknowledging Castilian suzerainty. No other historian deals with this alliance.

In Navarre, too, both allies attempted to partition a kingdom in which they had long-standing territorial interests. However, c. 1200, it was Castile, and not Aragón, which held dominance over the Pyrenean kingdom of Navarre. This analysis runs contrary to Linehan’s view that Aragón dominated the thirteenth century. Indeed, it is evident from the treaties of Cázola (1179), Calatayud (1198) and Guadalajara (1208) that King Alfonso VIII of Castile exploited his diplomatic manoeuvres vis-à-vis Aragón and Navarre to aggrandize his own kingdom of Castile, which then enjoyed hegemony over Christian Iberia. This was largely achieved by forming a Castilian-Aragonese coalition, which could be used to intimidate Navarre. No other historian has argued this case, and consequently this is a novel contribution to the current scholarship.

The Castilian-Leonese tension in the Tierra de Campos was the subject of several peace treaties in the 1180s, notably those of Medina de Ríoseco (1181) and Fresno-Lavandera (1183). The root cause of the dispute was the failure of both sides to respect the border demarcation of the divisio imperii, as established in the will of Emperor Alfonso VII. Both sides raided each other’s territory, thus endangering a fragile peace. Castile, in particular, instigated repeated conflagrations on the basis that it was recovering lost territory, allegedly seized by León during the civil war of Alfonso VIII’s minority. This analysis is novel to the extent that it supercedes González’s argument by examining the role of the peace treaties in attempting to halt the violence and create a durable peace.

Where traditional diplomacy failed, marriage alliances could prove very effective. This was because both sides had a stake in the outcome. León, in particular, was very adept at utilising this form of diplomacy, outside official channels of communication. Both kings Fernando II and Alfonso IX had wed Portuguese brides as their first wives. However, it was the celebrated union of King Alfonso IX and Queen Berenguela which eventually overcame the Castilian-Leonese impasse, despite the opposition of the Papacy. The Leonese monarch assigned thirty castles to his wife in a grant of *arras*. As many of these castles were in the frontier zone of the Tierra de Campos, they held the key to the surrounding territory. This was achieved through the Treaty of Palencia (1199). Bianchini alludes to the issue of lordship under Queen Berenguela, but she does not explicitly confront the political and military consequences of this *démarche*.

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**Appendix - Catalogue of Treaties**

1. Treaty of Túy. 4 July 1137.

   M.S.: No surviving manuscript.


Pledge and covenant of friendship and fidelity between Emperor Alfonso VII and the Portuguese *Infante* Afonso Henríquez, whereby the *Infante* assured the Emperor of the latter’s personal liberty and territorial security.

2. Treaty of Carrión. 22 February 1140/1.

**M.S.:** (1) Archivo de la Catedral de [A.C.] Jaca, 4, 5, 34. Presumed copy.


(2) P. de Bofarull, *Colección de documentos inéditos del archivo de la Corona de Aragón (col. doc. ined. ACA)* (Barcelona, 1849), vol. 4, 64-5.

(3) Zurita, *Anales de la Corona de Aragón* (1660), vol. 1, fol. 59v.

Covenant and concord between Alfonso VII and Ramon Berenguer IV, Count of Barcelona, partitioning Navarre, and under which the Aragonese ruler pledged to perform homage to the Emperor, thus acknowledging the latter’s suzerainty.

3. Treaty of Tudején. 27 January 1151.

**M.S.:** Miquel Rosell, *LFM*, vol. 1, fols. 16b-17d. Copy.

Peace, covenant and perpetual concord between Emperor Alfonso VII and his son, Sancho, and Count Ramon Berenguer IV of Barcelona, partitioning the whole of the Levante between the two powers.


Covenant and concord between Emperor Alfonso VII and his sons, Sancho and Fernando, and Count Ramon Berenguer IV of Barcelona partitioning Navarre and reserving Castilian-Leonese suzerainty over their one-thirds share.


M.S.: No surviving manuscript.


Treaty of alliance between the Emperor and Genoa guaranteeing the Commune a commercial quarter in return for military assistance.


M.S.: No surviving manuscript.
Treaty of alliance between the Commune and the Emperor specifying Genoese obligations: to besiege Almería by sea, to protect the city from Muslim attack, and to respect the lordship of Emperor Alfonso VII.


Ptd.: (1) España Sagrada [E.S.], ed. H. Flórez (Madrid, 1765), vol. 42, 375.

(2) LFM, ed. Miquel, vol. 1, no. 31, 43-45.

(3) Bofarull, col. doc. ined. ACA, vol. 4, 245-47.

Treaty of concord between King Sancho III of Castile and Count Ramon Berenguer IV of Barcelona.

8. Treaty of Sahagún. 23 May 1158.


(5) Madrid, Biblioteca Nacional [BN], MS. 705, fol. 21v – 23r. 17th Century copy of Palencia manuscript.

Peace and friendship treaty between King Sancho III of Castile and King Fernando II of León partitioning Portugal, Extremadura and the remainder of al-Andalus.


Truce between King Alfonso VIII of Castile and King Sancho VI of Navarre to last for a term of ten years in their dispute over La Rioja region.


Ptd.: Miquel, ed., *LFM*, vol.1, no. 32, 45-47.

Friendship, concord and peace treaty between King Alfonso VIII of Castile and King Alfonso II of Aragón, who agreed to forge an alliance with the aim of providing mutual military assistance in the event of one of the allies becoming involved in a war.


M.S.: BL, Cotton MS. Julius A. XI, fol. 89.


(2) T. Rymer, *Foedera et Conventiones*, vol. 1, 43-44.
Pact and covenant between King Alfonso VIII of Castile and King Sancho VI of Navarre with aim of referring their territorial dispute to arbitration by Henry II of England, and to establish the parameters of the forthcoming litigation.


Ptd.: (1) Rymer, Foedera, vol. 1, 46.

(2) Stubbs, Gesta Regis Henrici, 138-54.

Petition to request restitution of Castilian territory in La Rioja which Alfonso VIII claimed he had legitimately inherited from his ancestors, and which had allegedly been seized by the Navarrese monarch during Alfonso’s minority,


Ptd.: (1) Rymer, Foedera, vol.1, 47.

(2) Stubbs, Gesta Regis Henrici.

Petition to restore Navarrese territory inherited from Sancho IV el de Peñalen, which belonged to the kingdom of Navarre and which had been unjustly seized by the Castilian monarch.

Peace treaty between King Alfonso VIII of Castile and King Alfonso II of Aragón, agreed during joint siege of Cuenca by both parties, in which Castilian monarch released the Aragonese leader of his bond of vassalage in return for providing military assistance.


M.S.: (1) Barcelona, ACA, doc. 268. Copy.

(2) Barcelona, LFM, fol. 22. Copy.


Partition treaty agreed between King Alfonso VIII of Castile and King Alfonso II of Aragón, by which the Aragonese ruler was to capture all the territory of the Levante as far south as Alicante, and the remainder of al-Andalus was reserved for the Castilian leader.


(2) Archivo Monasterio de Silos, MS. 13, fols. 201-7. 18th Century Copy.

Ptd.: Moret, Anales, Bk. 19, chap. 7, trans.

Friendship and concord pact between Alfonso VIII of Castile and Sancho VI of Navarre agreed with the aim of stabilising the frontier between the two kingdoms.

17. Treaty of Medina de Ríoseco. 21 March 1181.


Peace, concord and friendship treaty between King Fernando II of León and King Alfonso VIII of Castile in which both sides agreed to recognise the divisio imperii.


(2) AC Santiago Tumbo B, fol. 208v. Copy.

Ptd.: J. González, Regesta de Fernando II (Madrid, 1943).

Peace treaty aimed at halting violence between Castile and León, in which both sides contested the border Tierra de Campos zone.


Pact between King Alfonso VIII of Castile and King Alfonso II of Aragón, renewing peace between the two allies.

20. Treaty of Berdejo. 5 October 1186.


**Ptd.**: Cirot, ‘Appendices’, *B. Hispan.*., vol. 20, 150-54.

Contract of peace, concord and friendship between King Alfonso VIII of Castile and King Alfonso II of Aragón and their successors.


**Ptd.**: Cirot, ‘Appendices’, *B. Hispan.*., 20 (1918), 155-56.

Treaty of friendship between Alfonso VIII of Castile and Alfonso II of Aragón.

22. Treaty of Seligenstadt. 23 April 1188.

**M.S.**: (1) AC Cuenca, caj. 1, leg. 2, doc. 17. Lead seal of Alfonso VIII. Original.


(3) Madrid, Biblioteca de la Academia de Historia, *Colección Conde de Mora*, vol. 3. Copy of Cuenca original.

(4) Biblioteca Colombina, MS. 82-4-23, fol. 76. 17th Century copy of Burgos original.

(6) Bib. Colombina, MS. 83-3-29. 18th Century of Cuenca original.

(7) Madrid, AHN. Estado, leg. 3190, no. 3, fol. 52r-56r. Copy of Morales of Cuenca original.


(11) Bib. Colombina, MS. 85-5-11, s.f. 17th Century copy of Burgos original.


Ptd.: (1) Pertz, Monumenta Germaniae Historia [MGH], Leges, vol. 2 (1837).


(3) P. Rassow, De Prinzgemahl (1950).

Contract of dynastic marriage alliance between Conrad III of Germany and the Castilian Infanta, doña Berenguela, specifying the arrangements for the Castilian inheritance.


M.S.: Barcelona, ACA. Copy.

Covenant between King Alfonso II of Aragón, King Sancho of Portugal and King Alfonso IX of León to ally together in the form of a league, to provide mutual military assistance against their common enemy, King Alfonso VIII of Castile.

24. Treaty of Tordehumos. 20 April 1194.

M.S.: Monastery of Las Huelgas, Burgos, leg. 1, no. 1. Original.

Peace treaty between King Alfonso VIII of Castile and King Alfonso IX of León, dictated by Cardinal Gregory de Sant’Angelo, with the intention of restoring peace to the two kingdoms, and to eliminate the climate of distrust and hostility between them, so as to more effectively combat al-Andalus.


Peace, concord and friendship convention between King Alfonso VIII of Castile and King Pedro II of Aragón specifying the partition of Navarre and the provision of mutual assistance to achieve this aim.
26. Treaty of Palencia. 8 December 1199.

**M.S.:** (1) Archivo del monasterio de Las Huelgas, Burgos, leg. 1, no. 2. Original.


**Ptd.:** Amancio Rodríguez, *Las Huelgas*, vol. 2, 327.

Prenuptial agreement between King Alfonso IX of León and his wife, Queen Berenguela, granting her thirty castles as a gift of *arras*, many of which, being in the Tierra de Campos, held the key to the security of the frontier zone.

27. Treaty of Cabreros. 26 March 1206.

**M.S.:** (1) AC León, no. 27. Original, although much deteriorated in last part.

(2) Barcelona, ACA. Copy.

**Ptd.:** (1) Risco, *E.S.* vol. 36, app. 62.


Peace treaty between King Alfonso VIII of Castile and King Alfonso IX of León, and their respective heirs, Berenguela and the *Infante*, Fernando, agreed with the intention of re-establishing the Leonese royal succession through the settlement of castles on Fernando.


**M.S.:** Barcelona, ACA, *armorio 20 de negocios entre Reyes*, no. 269, of Pedro II. Copy.

**Ptd.:** Cirot, ‘Appendices’, *B. Hispan.*., vol. 20 (1918), 180-84.
Peace treaty between King Alfonso VIII of Castile and Sancho VI of Navarre agreed to finally settle the territorial dispute between the two neighbours.

29. Treaty of Valladolid. 27 June 1209.

M.S.: AC León, no. 30. Original. Chirographed ABC, superior part; lost its 3 seals.

Ptd.: Risco, E.S., vol. 37, app. 65.

Peace between King Alfonso VIII of Castile and King Alfonso IX of León agreed at the instigation of the Papacy in order to achieve the unity necessary to combat Islamic al-Andalus.

30. Truce of Coimbra. 11 November 1212.

M.S.: AC León, no. 597. Copy.

Ptd.: L.G. Azevedo, R. H. Lisboa (1921), 137.

Truce agreed between King Alfonso VIII of Castile and King Alfonso IX of León, and King Afonso II of Portugal, following the battle of Las Navas de Tolosa, and Castile’s consequent military dominance over the Iberian Peninsula.


Ptd.: (1) Serrano, Don Mauricio, app. 3.
Peace treaty between King Alfonso IX of León and King Enrique I of Castile, who as a minor, was the junior partner in the Castilian-Leonese relationship.

32. Truce between Alfonso IX of León, and King Fernando III of Castile and Queen Berenguela. 26 November 1217. No location given. Copy.

_M.S._: AC León, no. 627, treaty divided by ABC chirograph.

_Ptd._: González, _Alfonso IX_, 2 vols (Madrid, 1944), vol. 2.

Truce between the Kingdoms of León and Castile to last for a term of one year, during which King Alfonso IX pursued a policy of _détente_ with Fernando III.

33. Treaty of Toro II. 26 August 1218.

_M.S._: AC León, no. 469. Copy.

_Ptd._: González, _Alfonso IX_, vol. 2,

Pact between King Alfonso IX of León and his son, King Fernando III of Castile, designed to ensure cross-border security and mutual assistance against all enemies.

34. Treaty of Boronal. 13 June 1219.

_M.S._: AC León, no. 25. Original.

_Ptd._: Azevedo, _Rev. H. Lisboa_ (1921), 139.

Peace treaty between King Alfonso IX of León and King Afonso II of Portugal in which both parties swore mutual assistance against all enemies, except the Almohad Caliphate, with whom the Portuguese already had truces.
35. Treaty of Benavente. 11 December 1230.


Provision of maintenance for the two Leonese *Infantas*, Sancha and Dulce, by allocating them a fixed annual income, in return for them relinquishing their claims to the Leonese throne that had been promised to them by their father, King Alfonso IX in his will.
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